IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-20314

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

BDO USA, L.L.P., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:

IT IS ORDERED that our prior panel opinion, EEOC v. BDO USA, 

L.L.P., 856 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2017), is WITHDRAWN, and the following 

opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor. 

During the course of an employment discrimination investigation, the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought a subpoena 

enforcement action against BDO USA, L.L.P. (“BDO”) in federal district court.

The EEOC sought production of information relating to the investigation and 

asserted that BDO’s privilege log failed to establish that the attorney-client 

privilege protected the company’s withheld documents. The district court held 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 16, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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that the log was sufficient and also granted BDO’s request for a protective 

order. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE and REMAND.

I. BACKGROUND

BDO, a financial and consulting services firm, hired Hang Bower as a 

Human Resources (“HR”) Manager in 2007. Bower, an Asian-American 

female, was eventually promoted to Chief Human Resources Officer, the 

company’s highest-ranking HR position. While at BDO, Bower was responsible 

for investigating discrimination complaints and communicated with both inhouse and outside counsel. Bower resigned from her employment with BDO 

on January 15, 2014. 

On July 9, 2014, Bower filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that BDO 

violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act by subjecting her and other female 

employees to gender discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work 

environment. Bower claimed, inter alia, that: (1) as a result of her efforts to 

assure compliance with company policies, BDO removed her from leadership 

meetings, decreased her job responsibilities, reprimanded her, and ordered her 

to stop investigating certain employees; (2) in retaliation for her “expressed 

determination” to investigate male managers and a male partner, she was 

stripped of her investigatory authority and removed from the Chief 

Compliance Officer position; (3) top corporate management shielded a male

manager accused of discrimination and blocked an appropriate investigation; 

(4) BDO fired or constructively discharged female employees who complained 

about mistreatment; and (5) BDO discriminated against non-white employees.

On August 18, 2014, BDO filed a position statement in response to Bower’s 

charge, providing additional information, denying the allegations, and arguing 

that the charge should be dismissed for lack of probable cause. 

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Between October 2014 and June 2015, the EEOC issued three Requests

for Information (“RFIs”) to BDO, seeking details related to the individual and 

class-wide claims in Bower’s charge. In December 2014, BDO filed another 

position statement that outlined BDO’s investigation policy and rejected 

Bower’s allegations that the company blocked her attempts to investigate 

discrimination claims. BDO, however, objected to providing other information 

it believed was “far beyond the scope of Bower’s individual charge.” BDO also 

alleged that the EEOC was eliciting—and Bower was revealing—attorneyclient privileged communications between Bower and BDO’s in-house and 

outside counsel. In June 2015, BDO stated that it could not provide any 

additional information until the matter was “transferred to a new investigator 

who ha[d] not been tainted by reviewing, or eliciting, privileged information.” 

On July 14, 2015, the EEOC issued a subpoena to BDO, seeking 

documents and information relating to the investigation. In response, BDO 

provided some, but not all, of the requested information and created a privilege 

log cataloging withheld documents as to which it asserted attorney-client 

privilege. The 278 entries in the log’s final version referenced “confidential” 

emails, memoranda, and other documents, and included communications

between (1) Bower and in-house and outside counsel, (2) other BDO employees 

and in-house and outside counsel, (3) non-attorney employees with counsel

courtesy copied, and (4) non-attorney employees regarding legal advice (but not 

involving any attorneys). 

On December 10, 2015, the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action 

in federal district court. According to the EEOC, BDO’s refusal to comply with 

the subpoena had “delayed and hampered the investigation,” and the privilege 

log BDO submitted contained various deficiencies: certain entries “lack[ed]

sufficient detail and specificity,” were “simply incomplete,” and/or appeared to 

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reference communications that were not exchanged with or copied to an 

attorney, or that appeared only to courtesy copy counsel. On February 4, 2016, 

BDO filed its response, which included a request for a protective order 

enjoining the EEOC from questioning Bower and BDO employees regarding 

their conversations with BDO’s counsel, and requiring the EEOC to return or 

destroy evidence of witness interviews and other documents that memorialized 

the privileged conversations. 

On February 9, 2016, the magistrate judge presided over the show cause 

hearing. She rejected the EEOC’s contention that communications BDO 

claimed were privileged were not protected and stated that the EEOC had not 

“made a sufficient showing” that the privilege log reflected “an improperly 

claimed privilege.” Ultimately, the magistrate judge denied the EEOC’s 

request to enforce the subpoena and for an in camera review of the documents, 

explaining: “I am not going to look through 278 documents. I decline to do that. 

The privilege log seems adequate.” The magistrate judge also granted BDO 

the protective relief it requested, stating that it was “not Ms. Bower’s job to 

decide what’s attorney-client [privilege]” and that “anything that comes out of 

[BDO’s] lawyer’s mouth is legal advice.” 

The EEOC filed objections to the magistrate judge’s order in the district 

court, arguing that the decision was based “on incorrect interpretations of the 

facts and the applicable law.” The EEOC appended to its objections Bower’s 

declaration, which stated, inter alia, that many of the communications she 

exchanged with BDO’s counsel were for the purpose of seeking or imparting 

business, not legal, advice regarding officer investigations and how to carry out 

her HR duties. Similarly, Bower maintained that emails exchanged between her 

and other non-attorneys pertaining to these investigations were made for the 

primary purpose of conveying business directives or factual information. Bower

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further claimed that, in order to protect communications from disclosure in future 

legal proceedings, BDO required her to forward to or courtesy copy in-house 

counsel on virtually all communications pertaining to employee investigations

and to include in HR-related emails a false designation that the communication 

was prepared “at the request of legal counsel.”1

BDO filed an opposition to the EEOC’s objections, arguing that they 

should be overruled and that the district court did not have discretion to 

consider Bower’s declaration. On March 21, 2016, the district court summarily 

affirmed the magistrate judge’s order. The EEOC timely appealed, seeking

that (1) the question of whether the attorney-client privilege is available to the 

withheld documents on BDO’s privilege log be remanded to the district court

and (2) the protective order be reversed and remanded. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Privilege Log

We begin with the question of whether the district court erred when it 

accepted BDO’s claim of attorney-client privilege based on the privilege log.

1. Legal Standards

“The application of the attorney-client privilege is a ‘question of fact, to 

be determined in the light of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial 

precedents.’” In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hodges, 

Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985)); see 

also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). “The clearly 

 

1 BDO argues that the district court did not have discretion to consider Bower’s declaration 

because the EEOC did not submit the declaration to the magistrate judge. However, the subpoena

was a dispositive matter triggering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and the district court’s right 

to receive further evidence. See EEOC v. Schwan’s Home Serv., 707 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Minn. 

2010) (holding that “an application to enforce an administrative subpoena . . . where there is no 

pending underlying action before the [c]ourt, is generally a dispositive matter”); see also NLRB v. 

Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 817–18 (3d Cir. 1992).

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erroneous standard of review applies to the district court’s factual findings.” 

King v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., 645 F.3d 713, 721 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994)). We review de novo 

the district court’s application of the controlling legal standards. See id.; In re 

Avental, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2003). 

“The attorney-client privilege limits the normally broad disclosure 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 . . . .” SmithKline Beecham 

Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2005). For a 

communication to be protected under the privilege, the proponent “must prove: 

(1) that he made a confidential communication; (2) to a lawyer or his 

subordinate; (3) for the primary purpose of securing either a legal opinion or 

legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding.” United States v. 

Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1997). Determining the applicability of 

the privilege is a “highly fact-specific” inquiry, and the party asserting the 

privilege bears the burden of proof. Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 

406, 411 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (citing United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th 

Cir. 1978)); see also Hodges, 768 F.2d at 721. “Once the privilege has been 

established, the burden shifts to the other party to prove any applicable 

exceptions.” Perkins v. Gregg Cty., 891 F. Supp. 361, 363 (E.D. Tex. 1995) 

(citation omitted). Ambiguities as to whether the elements of a privilege claim 

have been met are construed against the proponent. See Scholtisek v. Eldre 

Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462–63 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (listing cases).

Because the attorney-client privilege “has the effect of withholding relevant 

information from the fact-finder,” it is interpreted narrowly so as to “appl[y]

only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” Robinson, 121 F.3d at 974 

(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). In keeping with 

this well-settled principle and the broad investigatory and subpoena authority

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given to agencies, courts have indicated that the privilege should be granted 

cautiously where administrative investigations are involved. See F.T.C. v. 

TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Okla. Press Publ. Co. v. 

Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946)); see also Cavallaro v. United States, 284 

F.3d 236, 245–46 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We note, but do not rely on, the doctrine of 

construing the privilege narrowly, which has particular force in the context of 

IRS investigations given the ‘congressional policy choice in favor of disclosure

of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry.’”) (quoting United States 

v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984)) (emphasis in original).2

2. Analysis

The EEOC argues that the district court erred when it concluded that all 

communications between a corporation’s employees and its counsel are per se 

privileged and inverted the burden of proof, requiring that the EEOC prove 

that BDO improperly asserted the attorney-client privilege as to its withheld 

documents. See Hodges, 768 F.2d at 721. Although the magistrate judge did 

not explicitly address the burden of proof issue, she did, for example, state to 

the EEOC: “You haven’t made a sufficient showing that that’s an improperly 

claimed privilege when Counsel is . . . copied on a lot of these—on all these 

documents.” 

These pronouncements plainly run afoul of well-settled attorney-client 

privilege principles. There is no presumption that a company’s communications 

with counsel are privileged. See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 214 

F.R.D. 143, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 

492, 502 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is true...that the attorney-client privilege does not 

 

2 We are aware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in McLane Corp. v. EEOC, No. 15-

1248, 2017 WL 1199454 (S. Ct. Apr. 3, 2017). That case, while informative, has no bearing on the 

ultimate disposition of this case. 

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apply simply because documents were sent to an attorney”). Indeed, more is 

required. To begin, “[i]t is vital to a claim of [attorney-client] privilege that the 

communication have been made and maintained in confidence.” Robinson, 121 

F.3d at 976 (quoting United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976)). 

“[A] confidential communication between client and counsel is privileged only 

if it is generated for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance . . . 

.” In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007). Additionally, 

“communications by a corporation with its attorney, who at the time is acting 

solely in his capacity as a business advisor, [are not] privileged,” Great Plains 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mut. Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1993), 

nor are documents sent from one corporate officer to another merely because a 

copy is also sent to counsel, Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, LLC v. Mike Mullen 

Energy Equip. Res., Inc., No. 03-1496, 2004 WL 1299042, at *25 (E.D. La. June 

4, 2004). 

For these reasons, courts have stated that simply describing a lawyer’s 

advice as “legal,” without more, is conclusory and insufficient to carry out the 

proponent’s burden of establishing attorney-client privilege. See United States v. 

Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Calling the lawyer’s advice ‘legal’ or 

‘business’ advice does not help in reaching a conclusion; it is the conclusion.”). In

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Hill, this circuit explained that where there is a mixed 

discussion of business and legal advice, courts should consider the “context...key,” 

ultimately seeking to glean the “manifest purpose” of the communication. 751 

F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2014).

Given the “broad” and “considerable discretion” district courts have in 

discovery matters, we will not analyze the privilege logs in the first instance. 

See Winfun v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 255 F. App’x 772, 774 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 

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546, 569 (5th Cir. 1996)). Nevertheless, the error below counsels us to reiterate

that although Rule 26 “does not attempt to define for each case what 

information must be provided,”3 1993 Advisory Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26 ¶ 33, a privilege log’s description of each document and its contents must 

provide sufficient information to permit courts and other parties to “test[] the 

merits of” the privilege claim. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541

(5th Cir. 1982); Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d at 502 (“When a party relies 

on a privilege log to assert these privileges, the log must ‘as to each document 

... set[ ] forth specific facts that, if credited, would suffice to establish each 

element of the privilege or immunity that is claimed.’”) (quoting Bowne, Inc. v. 

AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). Continual failure to 

adhere to Rule 26’s prescription may result in waiver of the privilege where a 

court finds that the failure results from unjustified delay, inexcusable conduct, 

or bad faith. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 347 F.3d 951, 954 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003).

3. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, by adopting the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation, the district court erred when inverting the burden of proof, 

requiring that the EEOC prove that BDO improperly asserted the attorneyclient privilege as to its withheld documents, and concluding that all 

communications between a corporation’s employees and its counsel are per se

privileged. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for 

 

3 Rule 26 provides that a party claiming the privilege shall describe the nature of withheld 

documents and communications “in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or 

protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(5)(A)(ii). 

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a determination applying the correct attorney-client privilege principles and 

legal standards.4

B. Protective Order

We turn next to the question of whether the district court applied the 

correct legal standard when it granted BDO’s request for a protective order. 

1. Legal Standard

“[T]his court reviews discovery orders for abuse of discretion . . . .” 

Crosswhite v. Lexington Ins. Co., 321 F. App’x 365, 367 (5th Cir. 2009); see also 

Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1982) (reviewing protective 

order under abuse of discretion standard); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, 

P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the district 

court’s adoption of the magistrate’s judge’s denial of a protective order for

abuse of discretion). However, whether the district court used the correct legal 

standard in determining whether to issue a protective order is reviewed de 

novo. See In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2003) (a court 

“review[s] the application of the controlling law de novo” in an attorney-client 

privilege case). 

A “court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person 

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The movant bears the burden of showing that a 

 

4 Given the serious nature of Bower’s allegations through her affidavit and the lack of a 

countering affidavit from the party claiming privilege, we note that in camera review will likely be 

necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569 (1989) (“[T]his Court has approved the 

practice of requiring parties who seek to avoid disclosure of documents to make the documents 

available for in camera inspection ... and the practice is well established in the federal courts.”) 

(citations omitted); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 5507 p. 573 (1986) (stating that courts widely use in camera inspections of privileged 

information to “determin[e] the preliminary facts of the privilege and its exceptions”). We acknowledge 

that the amount of documents in this case—278—does not present an unduly burdensome task for 

review. 

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protective order is necessary, “which contemplates a particular and specific 

demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory 

statements.” In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 

States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). “A trial court enjoys 

wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery,” and it is 

therefore “unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters.” 

Sanders, 678 F.2d at 618. 

2. Analysis

After considering the parties’ arguments, the magistrate judge concluded 

that the EEOC had communicated with witnesses and obtained information 

about their discussions with BDO attorneys. Based on these findings, she

ordered the EEOC to: (1) refrain from communicating with Bower or other 

BDO employees about conversations with BDO’s counsel; (2) disclose 

employees’ names, dates of disclosure, and the substance of their conversations 

with BDO’s counsel; (3) produce notes of each of these conversations, redacting 

the EEOC’s work product; (4) return to BDO any documents containing 

privileged communications; and (5) destroy any notes or documents that were 

created as a result of reviewing the documents. The EEOC argues that the 

magistrate judge’s decision to grant the protective order was grounded in the 

same legal error as the order denying the EEOC’s application for subpoena 

enforcement—an “overly broad” legal standard that “wrongly swe[pt] under 

the umbrella of non-disclosure all communications involving an attorney.”

We agree that the trial court appears to have applied an incorrect legal 

standard. During the show cause hearing, the magistrate judge on several 

occasions articulated an overly broad definition of attorney-client privilege.

For example, during a colloquy with the EEOC regarding the protective order,

the magistrate judge stated, “Frankly, anything that comes out of that lawyer’s 

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mouth is legal advice,” explained that her position was that “anything that’s 

communicated from or to [c]ounsel is privileged and [Bower] cannot discuss 

that in any manner,” and said to counsel, “I’m telling you that if it’s 

communications from or to an attorney, it’s privileged.” The magistrate judge 

also approved BDO’s contention that “the default position should be that if the 

conversation is with an attorney, a lawyer who has an ethical responsibility, 

should not invade that privilege” and rejected the EEOC’s assertion that “it’s 

not legal advice when [Bower is] being told to do things that are not ethical, 

that are not within the bounds of her position.” These statements support the

EEOC’s claim that the magistrate judge granted and determined the scope of

the protective order based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. 

We do not, however, hold that a protective order is unwarranted, and we 

leave the decision whether to grant such an order to the trial court. 

3. Conclusion

Because the magistrate judge’s incorrect application of the legal 

standard may have affected both her analysis of the allegedly disclosed 

communications and the breadth of the protections she imposed in her order,

we remand so that BDO’s request for protection may be considered under the 

proper legal standard for determining privilege.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and

REMAND for a determination consistent with this opinion.

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