alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1558 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1558

 To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to provide that nonnative 
species in the United States shall not be treated as endangered species 
            or threatened species for purposes of that Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 10, 2023

  Mr. Moran introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to provide that nonnative 
species in the United States shall not be treated as endangered species 
            or threatened species for purposes of that Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Saving America's Vulnerable 
Endangered Species Act'' or the ``SAVES Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON TREATMENT OF NONNATIVE SPECIES IN THE UNITED 
              STATES AS ENDANGERED SPECIES OR THREATENED SPECIES.

    (a) Limitation.--Section 13 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(relating to amendments to other laws, which have executed) is amended 
to read as follows:

 ``limitation on treatment of certain species as endangered species or 
                           threatened species

    ``Sec. 13. 
    ``(a) Limitation.--The species described in subsection (b) shall 
not be treated as endangered species or threatened species for purposes 
of this Act.
    ``(b) Covered Species.--The species referred to in subsection (a) 
are species in the United States that are not native to the United 
States.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
section of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 
13 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 13. Limitation on treatment of certain species as endangered 
                            species or threatened species.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### H. J. Poor *v.*Thomas Stevenson, et al.

Practice and Pleading — Bad Petition May Be Cured by Answer — Demurrer.

Where a petition is defective, but is answered on the merits, such defect may in some cases be cured.

Demurrer.

Where a defective petition is made good by an answer, and the petitioner demurs to the answer, it will reach back *to*the petition.

APPEAL *FROM*PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 13, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

We do not understand the position assumed by counsel to be a correct rule of pleading, but, on the contrary, directly in conflict with the practice, as well as all the rules of pleading. Where a cause of action is defectively stated, as in the failure to allege that a party of unsound mind was in that condition on the day the writing sought to be cancelled was executed, and the defendant by answer denies that he was of unsound mind on the day and at the time he signed the writing, this last pleading has made an issue for the plaintiff that he himself should have made, and cures the defect. The pleader, when his petition is defective, should never demur to the answer for the reason that the demurrer goes back to the petition unless the answer has made the petition good.

In this case, if the answer had been defective, the plaintiff should have demurred because, although the answer is bad, the petition is cured by it. Where the petition is bad, and the defense is desirous to experiment with the case in order to see what the court or judge will do with his client, it is best not to demur, but to traverse the petition with an answer that is no better than the petition; and if the case is lost a motion to arrest the judgment must prevail. It is *433true, the good pleader dislikes to file a badi plea, but if he prefers pleading over, the result is that the petition is made good. If the petition is defective the defendant must stand by his demurrer to avail himself of the defect in the declaration, or file a plea that is no better than the declaration, or be careful not to aid the original pleading. If he cures the defect by pleading over, his demurrer amounts to nothing. It is true there are some petitions in which matters of substance are failed to be alleged that cannot be cured by plea or answer; but such is not the case in the pleading before us. The demnurrer was before us when the case was considered. The petition is *overruled.*

*A. R. Clark, for appellant.*

*C. H. Lee, for appellees.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *

 * CRIMINAL NO. 08-00042-CG 

v. *

 * 

OSHEA MONTRELL ODOM *

AMENDED PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to

Title 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule G(4)(a)(iv)(C) in

lieu of newspaper publication, the government may publish notice “by posting notice on

an official internet government forfeiture site for at least 30 consecutive days.” 

All other provisions of the previously entered Preliminary Order of Forfeiture

(Doc.45) shall remain in effect.

DATED this 11th day of March, 2009.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:08-cr-00042-CG-M Document 50 Filed 03/11/09 Page 1 of 1
#### Farman *v.*Ratcliff et al.

*Practice.—Appeal.—Superior Court.—Assignment of*Error.—On appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court, the error should be assigned upon the action of the court in general term.

APPEAL from the Marion Superior Court.

Downey, J.

This was an action by the appellant against *538the appellees. After issues formed there was a trial by the court, finding for the defendants, motion for a new trial overruled, and judgment for the defendants. An appeal was taken from the special to the general term, where it was assigned that certain errors had been committed by the court in special term. The court in general term affirmed the judgment of the special term. From this judgment of affirmance the present appeal is taken, and it is now assigned as error, that “the court erred in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.” According to the opinion of this court, in *Wesley*v. *Milford,*41 Ind. 413, this assignment presents no question for the decision of this court. The trial took place in special term, and the motion for a new trial was then made and overruled. Appeals from the superior court to this court can only be taken from the judgment of that court in general term, and the errors must be assigned upon the action of the general term. See, also, *Carney*v. *Street,*41 Ind. 396.

*J, S. Harvey,*for appellant.

*A. T. Beck*and *B. H Cale,*for appellees.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
**EXHIBIT 23** **CONSENT    OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration    Statement Nos.    333-35887,333-42182,333-43081,333-65327,333-65329,333-98811,333-111076    and    333-111077    on    Form S-8    and Registration Statement No. 333-140778 on Form S-3    of our reports dated May 29, 2007 (which report on the    consolidated financial statements and financial statement    schedule expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an    explanatory paragraph relating to the Company’s adoption of    FASB Statement No. 123R, *Share-Based Payment)*,    relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial    statement schedule of Mylan Laboratories Inc. and    management’s report on the effectiveness of internal    control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual    Report on    Form 10-K    of Mylan Laboratories Inc. for the year ended March 31,    2007. /s/  Deloitte &    Touche LLP    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania    May 29, 2007
|   | (1) | the      Quarterly Report of Willamette Valley Vineyards, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the      quarterly period ended March 31, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act      of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | information      contained in the Report fairly presents in all material respects the      financial condition and results of operations of Willamette Valley      Vineyards, Inc. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    |  /s/ James W.Bernau     |
|--------|------------------------------|
| Name:  | James W. Bernau              |
| Title: | Chief      Executive Officer |

----
<page>			EXHIBIT 32.02


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dean Witter Diversified
Futures Fund II L.P. (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-Q for the
period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Kevin
Perry, Chief Financial Officer, Demeter Management Corporation, the
general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Partnership.









By:	  /s/	Kevin Perry

Name:		Kevin Perry
Title:	Chief Financial Officer

Date:		May 15, 2006
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

***URANIUM RESOURCES, INC.***

405 State Highway 121 Bypass, Building A, Suite 110, Lewisville, TX 75067

972.219.3330 Phone 972.219.3311 Fax

 

May 13, 2011

 

Securities and Exchange Commission

450 5th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20549

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Thomas H. Ehrlich, Vice President - Finance and Chief Financial Officer of Uranium Resources, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(1)  The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2011, which this certification accompanies fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| */s/* Thomas H. Ehrlich                      |   |
|----------------------------------------------|--------|
| Thomas   H. Ehrlich                          |   |
| Vice   President and Chief Financial Officer |   |
| May 13,   2011                          |   |

 

----
#### Kemp *et al. v.*Rossignol.

Atkinson, J.

Two members of a firm composed of three persons instituted an equitable action for an accounting against their copartner. It was charged that the defendant, contrary to the copartnership agreement and without the knowledge or consent of the petitioners, withdrew certain funds on deposit in the bank to the partnership account and converted them to his own use. The defendant denied such charge, and alleged that the partnership was indebted to him upon certain accounts. He set up also a discharge in bankruptcy, of which it was alleged that *821the plaintiffs had notice. They denied that they had notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, and alleged that the act of the defendant in withdrawing the partnership funds was fraudulent, and that their demand for an accounting of-such money was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. *Held,*that the evidence was not of such character as authorized the direction of a verdict for the defendant, under the provision of the Civil Code (1910), § 5926, that “Where there is no conflict in the evidence,- and that introduced with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom demands a particular verdict, the court may direct the jury to find for the party entitled thereto.” It was error to overrule the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.

No. 6480.

February 12, 1929.

*R. B. Feagin*and *J. F. Urquhart,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Martin, Martin & Snow,*contra.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

NEAL MCCOLLUM,

Petitioner

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

OF DAUPHIN COUNTY,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 147 MM 2020

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 19th day of October , 2020, the “King’s Bench Matter

- Application

for Extraordinary Relief” is DENIED.
#### R. J. Daniels, et al., *v.*G. B. Dockery.

Sheriff May Maintain Trover for Conversion of Personal Property.

A sheriff who levies an execution upon personal property may maintain trover for its conversion.

APPEAL PROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT.

April 6, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer :

A sheriff who levies an execution upon personal property may maintain trover for its conversion while in his possession, or in the possession of his bailee. Williams, *et al., v.*Herndon, 12 B. Mon. 484. In this respect the rights of the sheriff are at least equal to the rights of any other bailee; and as an ordinary bailee may maintain trover in his own name and recover the value of the property converted, a sheriff may do so.

It is not in terms alleged that the execution was in force when the levy was made, but it is alleged that it was levied, and the date of the execution is given and copies of the execution and levies are filed and made part of the petition, from which it appears that the levy was made on the same day on which the execution issued.

It is not distinctly alleged that the logs levied on were the property of Romans, but it is alleged that they were levied on as his property. And besides this, the defendants denied that the logs were the property of Romans and thereby cured any defect that may have existed in the petition on this point. And although the petition may not have been sufficient on demurrer, we think that it is so after verdict.

The logs were cut and delivered in the creek by Romans, and were prima facie his property; and it devolved on the appellants to show that they belonged to Daniels; whether the evidence was sufficient *669for that purpose was a question for the jury, and we cannot say that their finding was palpable against the evidence.

*McHenry & Hill, B. L. D. Guffy, A. Duvall, for appellants.*

*Thomas G. & William Ward, for appellee.*

The appellee was, as already decided, entitled to maintain the action, and it follows that he had the same right of recovery which he would have had if he had been the absolute owner of the logs; and consequently he had a right to recover damages for the unlawful conversion as well as for the value of the property converted.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### Samuel May, et al., *v.*A. P. Lacy.

Attorney and Client — Appeals.

An attorney at law does not, by virtue of his employment to conduct the prosecution or defense of an action in the circuit court, have the right to prosecute an appeal to' the Court of Appeals.

*541APPEAL, FROM WOLFE CIRCUIT COURT.

November 24, 1875.

*William L. Hurst, for appellants. Rodman, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

An attorney at law does not, in virtue of his mere employment to conduct, or to assist in conducting the prosecution or defense of an action in the circuit or other inferior court, have the right to prosecute an appeal from the judgment therein to this court.

The appellants here swear that they did not authorize either of their attorneys to procure a copy of the record, in the cases of *Samuel May, et al., v. James Eaton, et al.,*for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to this court. In this regard they are not contradicted by any one. Hazelrigg swears that he did not order the transcript. In this he is contradicted by Lacy and other witnesses. But there is no proof whatever tending to show that he had any authority in the premises. The payment of the $5 to Hensley is explained by May, and both May and Hazelrigg show that they then denied his liability to pay the fee bill herein sought to be enjoined.

As Hazelrigg had no right or power, express or implied, to bind appellants by his supposed order to the clerk, and as appellee’s right to collect the fee bill rests solely upon the alleged action of Hazelrigg, it seems to us clear that the temporary injunction should have been made perpetual.

Judgment *reversed*and cause remanded for a judgment conformable to this opinion.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 23.1b


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
No. 333-94213 dated January 7, 2000 pertaining to the National Bancshares
Corporation of Texas 1994 Nonqualified Stock Option Plan and the National
Bancshares Corporation of Texas 1995 Stock Plan of our report dated March 18,
1999 with respect to the 1998 and 1997 consolidated financial statements of
National Bancshares Corporation of Texas included in its Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 1999, file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.



/s/ Padgett, Stratemann & Co., L.L.P.



San Antonio, Texas
March 27, 2000


                                      57
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM  
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10K.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000065666
<NAME> MICHIGAN RIVET CORP.
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1994
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1995
<CASH>                                         110,682
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,418,533
<ALLOWANCES>                                    50,000
<INVENTORY>                                  4,968,944
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,328,388
<PP&E>                                      22,999,298
<DEPRECIATION>                              14,178,218
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,654,792
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,114,518
<BONDS>                                      4,436,829
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       638,525
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,707,836
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,654,792
<SALES>                                     39,210,844
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            39,210,844
<CGS>                                       34,487,789
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               34,487,789
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,412,508
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             646,227
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                664,320
<INCOME-TAX>                                   175,793
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            488,527
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              1,141,394
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,629,921
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.55
        

</TABLE>
#### S. Haskead *v. A.*W. Mallory.

Real Estate — Adverse Possession — Grantee’s Knowledge of Claim.

A possession is not adverse where the person holding it looks for title to another under whom he holds.

Grantee’s Knowledge of Claim.

Where the real holder of title conveys it to another who knows -that one in possession is asserting a claim, he takes the title subject to any defense such claimant may have.

APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT

September 16, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

We do not think the circuit court abused a sound discretion in allowing appellee’s amended petition to be filed, especially in view of the fact alleged therein, and not denied, that appellant’s deed, to attack which, as champertous, seems to have been the principal inducement to the filing of the amendment, had only been filed a few days before.

*54
      *Terry & Perkins, for appellant.*

That both Martin and appellee knew and recognized the fact that Cidcock held the legal title, and that Martin looked to him for title up to the time of his alleged sale to appellee, is clearly established by the evidence. That such a possession is not adverse is well settled. *Gossom v. Donaldson,*18 B. Mon. 185. The agreement by which Martin sold his interest in the land to appellee, expressly recognized Cidcock as holding the title; he took possession to hold until the title could be procured from Cidcock; and there is nothing to indicate a change in the character of appellee’s holding prior to the date of the deed from Martin in 1869.

The conveyance from Cidcock to appellant was made in 1867, while appellee held under the arrangement with Martin, and was looking to Cidcock for title, and were not champertous, but appellant had notice of the character of appellee’s claim, and took the legal title subject to any equity in Martin, or in his vendee; so that appellant stands in precisely the same position that Cidcock would have stood if he, instead of appellant, had been sued.

It is alleged in the amended petition that at or about the date of the sale of the land to Martin, Cidcock gave him a title bond, agreeing therein to convey the land to said Martin. This allegation is not denied, and as appellant knew Martin was in possession, and that appellee had entered under him, he holds the legal title subject to the superior equity of appellee. But as he holds subject to the equities of appellee, because he stands' in the position of Cidcock, he, for the same reason, has the same rights that Cidcock would have had; and as Cidcock could not have been compelled to convey until he was paid for the land, it was error to bar appellant’s right without payment to him of the unpaid purchase money, which the evidence shows was agreed, in 1861, to be twenty-five dollars. But when that sum, with interest from January 1, 1862, is paid, appellant ought to be adjudged to convey the land to appellee.

For the error indicated, the judgment is *reversed,*and the cause is remanded for further procedings as herein directed.