alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 7554** 

JAMIE PAUL DESPER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.
SUPERINTENDENT JACK LEE; MAJOR LORI NICHOLSON; LT. FRED BYRD; MR. JOHN LILLY; MAJOR LARRY DULL , Defendants

- Appel lees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke

. Glen E. Conrad , Chief District Judge. ( 7:10

- cv - 00473

- GEC

- RSB )

Submitted : February 16, 2012 Decided: February 23, 2012

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, an d WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Jamie Paul Desper, Appellant Pro Se. Rosalie Fessier, TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, PC, Staunton, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in t his circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jamie Paul Desper appeals the district court ’s order entering summary judgment on several of the claims raised in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint and dismissing the remainder
of them under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (200 6 ). We h ave reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Desper v. Lee , No.
7:10

- cv - 00473

- GEC

- RSB (W.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal cont entions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
|   | 1. | The      Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));      and |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  July 31,      2009 | /s/ Lee W.      Hendrickson                                                                                                                  Lee      W. HendricksonChief      Financial Officer |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANAPR06-0422INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONOFKELLYJ.MOEJUL272"21BowenGra,anwcodORliPErRofSupra:crpT,CourtSta,-)1•Rro.KellyJ.MoehaspetitionedtheCourttowaivethethree-yeartestrequirernentfortheMultistateProfessionalResponsibilityExamination(MPRE)forpurposesofMoe'sapplicationforadmissionuponUBEscoretransfertotheStateBarofMontana.Byrule,applicantsforadmissionbyscoretransfermustprovideevidenceoftherequisitescoreonanMPREtaken"withinthreeyearsprecedingthedateoftheapplicationforadmission."RuleIV.A.3,RulesofAdmission.MoepassedtheMPREin2018whenseekingadmissiontothepracticeoflawinNorthDakota,whereMoewasadrnitted.ThepetitionstatesMoehaspracticedlawasafamilylawattorney"withoutanyethicalordisciplinaryaction."Goodcauseappearing,ITISHEREBYORDEREDthatthepetitionofKellyJ.Moetowaivethethree-yeartestrequirementfortheMPREforpurposesofMoe'scurrentapplicationforadmissionbyUBEscoretransfertotheStateBarofMontanaisGRANTED.TheClerkshallmailacopyofthisordertoPetitionerandtotheAdministratoroftheBoardofBarExaminersattheStateBarofMontana.DATEDthis-1--dayofJuly,2021.ChiefJustice07/27/2021Case Number: PR 06-042241-iin.44,Justices2
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ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

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IT IS SO ORDERED



1

Judge’s signature

-


1

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

 Southern District of Alabama

STACY ADAM WARD 09-00194-001

10823-003

4-22-2010

6-6-2012 Pro Se

✔

✔

100 79 months

4-22-2010

2-27-2015

11-1-2015 United States District Judge

Callie V.S. Granade 

U.S. District Judge

Digitally signed by Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge 

DN: cn=Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge, o=U.S. 

Government, ou=Federal Judiciary, 

email=efile_granade@alsd.uscourts.gov, c=US 

Date: 2015.02.27 09:20:08 -06'00'

Case 1:09-cr-00194-CG-B Document 70 Filed 02/27/15 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amendment No. 2 on Form 10-K/A of Huntsman Corporation and Huntsman International LLC (the "Companies")
for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J. Kimo Esplin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.

|/s/J. KIMO ESPLINJ. Kimo Esplin Chief Financial OfficerJune 30,
2008 |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 

---



QuickLinks
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-11541 Conference Calendar

MICHAEL D. RODGERS, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus STATE OF TEXAS; JOHN NELMS, Judge, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:01-CV-1934-M

-------------------- December 12, 2002 Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Michael D. Rodgers, Sr., appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Rodgers concedes that the district court’s reasons for dismissal were supported by citations to authority, but he contends that the dismissal was erroneous because the actions of the defendants were unfair.No. 01-11541 -2- Rodgers has failed to cite to any legal authority to support his contention. By failing to provide any legal analysis in support of his contention, he has waived the only issue on appeal. See Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 44 F.3d 256, 260 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995). This appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
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#### *C.*Voight *v.*F. Adams.

New Trial — Service of Summons by Copy — Inability to Read.

The fact that defendant on whom a summons was served did not read the copy of the summons served on him because of his ignorance of the English language, is not such an “unavoidable casualty or misfortune” as to prevent him from appearing and defending the action, and, therefore, a cause for a new trial.

Process — Service by Copy — Inability to Read.

Where a summons is served by a copy on one who can not read the English language, he should, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, have it interpreted to him.

APPEAL PROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT.

March 5, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

The jurisdiction of this court in an appeal in a case like this, was expressly recognized and affirmed in the case of McCall v. Hitchcock, 7 Bush 615.

*558
      *Webster, for appellant.*

*G. B. Hodge, W. W. Cleáry, for appellee.*

We cannot concur in the conclusion of the court below that the mere fact that the appellee was a foreigner, and in a great degree ignorant of the English language, and unable to read the copy of the summons served on him by the deputy sheriff, constituted, in the meaning of Sec. 579, Civil Code Practice, such “unavoidable casualty or misfortune” as to prevent him from appearing and defénding the action, and consequently a cause for adjudging him a new trial.

It seems to us that, having the summons delivered to him by the proper officer, ordinary prudence should have prompted him to have it interpreted and explained to him, and that it was amply sufficient to put him on the inquiry to ascertain its purpose, which he does not pretend to have made any effort to do.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CATHY ANN TAITE, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : 

 CIVIL ACTION 05-0320-BH-M

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, : 

Commissioner of

Social Security, : 

Defendant. : 

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all pleadings in

this file, and a de novo determination of those portions of

the Recommendation to which objection is made, the

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) is adopted as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be

AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED.

DONE this 20th day of March, 2006.

 s/ W. B. Hand 

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00320-BH-M Document 24 Filed 03/20/06 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alicia MAGALLON-GUERRERO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-50801.

D.C. No. CR-99-00755-RSWL.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 29, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alicia Magallon-Guerrero appeals the 77-month sentence imposed by the district *547court following her guilty plea to being an illegal alien found in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Magallon-Guerrero contends that the district court erred by enhancing her sentence above the applicable statutory maximum penalty, in violation of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), on the basis that her prior conviction of an aggravated felony was neither charged in the indictment nor admitted by her when she pled guilty.

Because Magallon-Guerrero’s contention is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda,*234 F.3d 411 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that *Apprendi*preserves the rule in *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), that all prior convictions, not just those admitted on the record, are sentencing factors and not elements of the offense), *amended*(Feb. 8, 2001), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 1503, 149 L.Ed.2d 388 (2001), the district court properly considered Magallon-Guerrero’s prior aggravated felony conviction in sentencing her. *Pacheco,*2000 WL 33156290, at *5.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the *547courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 31.2**CERTIFICATIONS**I, Akio Ariura, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of AMDL, Inc. for the period ended June30, 2007;2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this annual report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periodspresented in this quarterly report;4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) for the small business issuer and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly duringthe period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisquarterly report based on such evaluation; and  c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s first fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, thesmall business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.Date: August 20, 2007   /s/ Akio Ariura   Akio Ariura  Chief Financial Officer
#### Mounts, Appellant, *v.*Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc., et al., Appellees.

(No. 4273

Decided October 13, 1949.)

*Mr. John P. Moloney*.and *Mr. Russ Bothwell,*for appellant.

*Messrs. Hamilton & Kramer,*for appellees.

Wiseman, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, sustaining a motion to quash service of summons and dismissing the action against the Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc.

The exhibits in the form of affidavits presented to the trial court in support of the motion to quash cannot be considered by this court, as there is no bill of ex-*212coptions. The affidavits are attached to the transcript of the docket and journal entries and original papers. The affidavits being used in proof of an issue of fact are not a part of the record, even though filed with the clerk. Such affidavits should have been brought upon the record in the form of a bill of exceptions. *Langan v. Kessinger,*23 Ohio Law Abs., 392; *Simes*v. *Dayton-Xenia Ry. Co.,*24 Ohio Law Abs., 595, 36 N. E. (2d), 517; *Willett, Admr.,*v. *New York Central Rd. Co., 73*Ohio App., 59, 54 N. E. (2d), 317; 2 Ohio Jurisprudence, 593, 641, Sections 300, 344.

A factual issue being presented, in the absence of the bill of exceptions, the regularity and the validity of the judgment will be presumed. We regret that the record is not properly prepared to present the more important question raised in the briefs.

The judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Miller, P. J., and Hornbeck, J., concur.
11026.

#### Smith *v.*The State.

Broyles, C. J.

1. Conceding, but not deciding, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the testimony as complained of in the first special ground of the motion for a new trial, a reversal of the judgment below is not required, since other testimony to the same effect was introduced without objection. See *Matthews*v. *Richards,*19 *Ga. App.*489 (2) (91 S. E. 914), and citations.

2. The special grounds of the motion for a new trial which complain, in effect, that the judge in his charge failed to state fully and fairly the contentions of the defendant are without substantial merit.

(a) While the contentions of the State were given more at length than were the contentions of the defendant, the statement of the defendant’s contentions was apparently full and fair, and, in the absence of a timely and appropriate request for fuller instructions as to his contentions, no error appears in this respect. It is well settled that the mere fact that contentions of one side are stated more at length than those of the other does not show that undue stress was laid upon or *655undue prominence given to the contentions so stated. *Millen &c. Railroad Co.*v. *Allen,*130 *Ga.*656 (1) (61 S. E. 543), and. cit.

Decided January 6, 1920.

Conviction of assault and battery; from McDuffie superior court —Judge Henry C. Hammond. September *21,*1919.

Application for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.

*John T. West, J. B. Burnside,*for plaintiff in error.

*A. L. Franklin, solicitor-general, John M. Graham,*contra.

(6) The fact that the court, in charging that the State contended that the defendant was intoxicated, added, in immediate connection therewith, “I charge you, gentlemen, that intoxication is no excuse for crime,” affords no ground for complaint.

(c) The judge’s charge as to the contentions of the State and the defendant was not erroneous for any other reason assigned.

3. The alleged newly discovered evidence was largely cumulative and impeaching in its character, and it does not appear that the judge abused his discretion in overruling those grounds of the motion for a new trial which were based thereon.

4. The verdict was authorized by the evidence, and the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
#### W. H. Roberts *v.*D. F. Curle, et al.

Judgment by Default — Injunction.

Where one fails to defend when sued upon a note, he cannot enjoin the collection of the judgment for a defense that existed and of the existence of which he had knowledge before the judgment was rendered.

APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT.

October 5, 1874.

*W. H. Botts, for appellant.*

*Bohannon & Carter, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Appellant failed to defend when sued on the note. He seeks to enjoin the collection of the judgment for a defense that existed, and of the existence of which he had full knowledge, before the judgment was rendered. Sec. 14 of the Civil Code of Practice, forbids in express terms the interference of the chancellor in such a state of case. *Ross v. Ross,*3 Met. 274.

When the judgment at law shall have been satisfied, appellant may have a cause of action against either the payee in the note, or the owner of the judgment, under the provisions of Sec. 2, Chap. 42, R. S., or of Sec. 2, Chap. 47, Gen. Stat.

Which of these parties will then be liable to him is a matter that cannot properly be determined on this appeal.

Judgment *affirmed.*