alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2



                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                        AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of The InterGroup Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, David T. Nguyen, Treasurer and Controller of the Company,
serving as Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.


Date: October 8, 2004                           /s/ David T. Nguyen
                                                ----------------------------
                                                David T. Nguyen, Treasurer
                                                and Controller (serving as
                                                Chief Financial Officer)




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to The InterGroup Corporation, Inc. and will be retained by The
InterGroup Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
#### E. J. Green *v.*William Cates.

Sale of Real Estate — Title Bond — Warranty—Purchaser.

Where a title hond is assigned the implied warranty is, not that the land is free of incumbrance, hut that the assignor has title to the hond.

The purchaser of a title hond is hound to take notice of its contents, and where reference is made therein to notes that constitute a lien on the land described in the hond, he is held to take such bond subject to such notes.

APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT.

October 16, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The evidence conduces to show that Cates understood the agreement of the 20th of August, 1865. If he did, his written acknowledgment that Green had complied with his undertaking ought to conclude him, there being neither averment nor proof that, said acknowledgment was procured by fraud or executed by mistake.

But if it be true that Green agreed to transfer to Cates thp bond *160for title, still it by no means follows that he is bound to remove the incumbrance created by the note executed to Plunkett and assigned by him to Hudson. Upon this assignment of a title bond, the law does not imply a warranty of title to the land described. The implied warranty is that the assignor has title to the bond.

*Lindseys, for appellant.*

*J. M. Collins, for appellee.*

It seems from Cates’ answer to the action of Hudson’s administrator, that it appeared upon the face of the bond that a note for two hundred dollars was executed by Fenwickes to Plunkett, and he seeks to avoid the lien because said note does not bear even date with the bond. The bond was enough of itself to' put Cates upon inquiry. But further than this Fenwickes swears that he informed Cates of the existence of the note, and that it had not been paid before the purchase of the bond from Green.

Under the circumstances of this case, to authorize a judgment for Cates against Green, it is necessary to show that pending the negotiations betwen them, Green expressly represented to Cates that the purchase price due1 from Fenwickes to Plunkett had been fully paid, or made such other representation as in' law amounts to a warranty of title, not to the bond but to the land itself, and this is what this court meant when it said in its former opinion, that Green might, in view of his representations, be liable for the costs of the suit, or possibly for indemnity against the incumbrance.

The evidence fails to show representations by Green amounting to either a fraud or warranty of title. It was therefore error to render judgment against him.

The judgment appealed from is *reversed*and the cause remanded with instructions' to dismiss Cates’ cross-petition so far as he seeks relief, against Green.
#### John Gorman *v.*Sarah L. Gorman.

Dower — Fixing Value of Dower.

Where the widow has a dower interest in a house and lot which not being susceptible of being partitioned has to be sold, her interest shifts to the proceeds of sale and it is error for the court to fix the value of her interest before sale.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

October 10, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

The appellee has asked the chancellor to sell the house and lot, for the reason that to allot her dower by a division of the property would impair its value. The chancellor granted the prayer of the petition, but undertook to fix the value of the dower before the property was sold. This was error. She was entitled to her dower out of the proceeds of sale, and the amount the house and lot sold for must be regarded as its value for the purposes of the action.

• The judgment is *reversed*with directions to the court below to give the widow the value of her dower in money, estimating the value of the property at the price for which it was sold. In rendering the *768former opinion affirming the case, the attention of the court was not called to this question.

*Russell & Helm, for Appellant.*

*J. C. Walker, M. Mundy, for appellee.*
Opinion filed January 3, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-13-00231-CV

___________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.M. AND J.J.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 161st District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. B-3219-PC

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the mother 

and the fathers of A.L.M. and J.J.A. The mother filed a notice of appeal. We 

dismiss the appeal.

The mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a 

supporting brief in which she professionally and conscientiously examines the 

record and applicable law and states that she has concluded that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel has provided the mother with a copy of the motion to withdraw 

and brief and advised the mother of her right to review the record and file a 
2

response to counsel’s brief. The mother has not filed a response.1 Court-appointed 

counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In this 

regard, the practice recognized in Anders for court-appointed counsel to seek a 

withdrawal from a frivolous appeal applies to parental termination proceedings 

involving appointed counsel. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have 

independently reviewed the record, and we agree that the appeal is without merit 

and should be dismissed. Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. Court-appointed 

counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. Additionally, we order counsel to notify 

the mother of the disposition of this appeal and the availability of discretionary 

review in the Texas Supreme Court. Counsel is directed to send the mother a copy 

of the opinion and judgment within five days after the opinion is handed down, 

along with notification of her right to file a pro se petition for review under TEX. R.

APP. P. 53. Likewise, this court advises the mother that she may file a petition for 

review pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 53. 

The motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed. 

PER CURIAM

January 3, 2014

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.

 1

By letter, this court granted the mother more than thirty days in which to exercise her right to file 

a response to counsel’s motion to withdraw and brief.
10731.

#### Savannah Electric Company *v.*Johnson.

Decided July 19, 1920.

Action, for damages; from Chatham superior court—Judge Meld-rim. June 20, 1919.

The following extract from the charge of the court contains the language complained of: “Her contention is, that the car came to a full stop at the place where it usually stopped; that there was a number of people on the car, and that, without warning to her and while in the act of stepping off the car at that place, it was moved suddenly forward and she was thrown to the ground and hurt. If you should find that to be the truth of the case, you would be authorized to find a verdict in behalf of the plaintiff. Unless there is negligence on the part of the defendant, there cannot be any recovery on the part of the plaintiff,'—that is, the negligence as averred in this petition; and by the negligence as averred in this petition the plaintiff must stand or fall. . . . But this defendant is not liable for injury to the plaintiff if'it appears that the defendant used such diligence, or if it appears that the accident occurred by reason of the negligence on the part of the plaintiff herself. According to the contentions made by the respective parties, the issue is narrowed down to one question: Did that woman, at the time and place where the car usually stopped, get up after it had stopped, go upon the platform, and while there, in the act of getting off, the car was suddenly moved forward and she was thrown? Is that the truth ? Or is the truth of it this,—that before the car stopped *518she jumped from a moving ear and was thereby hurt? If you find that the contention of the plaintiff is true, you would be authorized to find a verdict for her.”

*517Stephens, J.

l..In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, where a certain state of facts proved by the evidence did not demand the inference that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence, it was error to instruct the jury that, should they believe such facts to be true, they would be authoried to find for the plaintiff. Such error is not cured by an instruction, elsewhere in the charge, that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover unless the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence. Such instruction was not calcu- • lated to disabuse the minds of the jury of the erroneous instruction that a certain state of facts constituted negligence and entitled the plaintiff to recover.

2. Allegations in a petition for damages for personal injuries, that petitioner “brings her suit for the services of her physician,” naming him, “in the sum of $25.00,” and that petitioner was treated by said physician “for a broken arm,” are sufficiently specific to withstand a special demurrer.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.*

*518*Osborne, Lawrence & Abrahams,*for plaintiff in error.

*Oliver & Oliver,*contra.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 10
----------

                             AMENDMENT NO. ONE TO

                         BAY VIEW CAPITAL CORPORATION

           Amended and Restated 1986 Stock Option and Incentive Plan


     Effective July 22, 1999, Section 2 of the Bay View Capital Corporation
Amended and Restated 1986 Stock Option and Incentive Plan is amended by revising
the definition of "Normal Retirement" to read in its entirety as follows:

          "Normal Retirement" -- means retirement from employment with the
     Corporation after the Participant has: (i) reached the age of 55 and
     maintained Continuous Service for at least three years; or (ii) reached the
     age of 50 and maintained Continuous Service for at least five years.
FILED

December 21, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JUNE SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00406

)

Appellee, )

)

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY

ANTONIO L. SAULSBERRY ) JUDGE

& FRANKLIN C. HOWARD, )

)

Appellants. ) (First Degree Murder; Aggravated 

) Robbery)

OPINION DISSENTING IN PART

The evidence in this case would unquestionably be sufficient to support a

conviction of Defendant Howard for felony murder in the first degree. His guilt of

felony murder would obviously be predicated on his participation in the

aggravated robbery.

As I understand our law, to convict Howard of premeditated first degree

murder would require proof that he acted with the intent to assist the shooter in

the commission of the premeditated and intentional first degree murder of the

victim. I agree with the majority that Howard cannot escape criminal

responsibility for premeditated murder by “claiming he did not share the criminal

intent or premeditation with the actual triggerman.” Our law mandates, however,

that Howard escape criminal responsibility for premeditated murder unless the

State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Howard did share the shooter’s
-2-

criminal intent for premeditated and intentional murder. I do not find this proof in

the record. I also cannot agree that a premeditated murder is a natural and

probable consequence of an especially aggravated robbery.

I must therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the

evidence is sufficient to support Defendant Howard’s conviction of premeditated

first degree murder. In all other respects, I concur.

____________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Nashua Corporation
(the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Andrew B. Albert, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

      (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  March 19, 2003                          /s/Andrew B. Albert
                                                ---------------------------
                                                Andrew B. Albert
                                                Chairman, President and
                                                Chief Executive Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on October 31, 2014, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), High Density Packaging User Group International, Inc. (“HDPUG”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Compeq Manufacturing, Taoyuan, TAIWAN; Introbotix, Albuquerque, NM; Freescale, Austin, TX; and Ventec International Group, Ward Hill, MA, have been added as parties to this venture.                

Also, Enthone, West Haven, CT; IST, Hsinchu, Taiwan; and Park and Electrochemical, Melville, NY, have withdrawn as parties to this venture.

No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned activity of the group research project. Membership in this group research project remains open, and HDPUG intends to file additional written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.

                    On September 14, 1994, HDPUG filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on March 23, 1995 (60 FR 15306).                

                    The last notification was filed with the Department on July 11, 2014. A notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on August 8, 2014 (79 FR 46451).                

Patricia A. Brink,

Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 2014-29392 Filed 12-15-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE GREKA
ENERGY CORPORATION FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM YEAR TO DATE PERIOD
ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,015,325
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,850,478
<ALLOWANCES>                                   158,535
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,260,452
<PP&E>                                      79,136,303
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,280,631
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              84,724,537
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       46,237,343
<BONDS>                                      2,536,178
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    36,055,019
<OTHER-SE>                                 (8,372,007)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                84,724,537
<SALES>                                        282,888
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               353,102
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  856,096
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (527,166)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             103,420
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,132,542)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,132,542)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,132,542)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.38)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1996
<CASH>                                          15,140
<SECURITIES>                                       000
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,665
<ALLOWANCES>                                       000
<INVENTORY>                                        000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 9,645
<PP&E>                                         356,024
<DEPRECIATION>                                  44,810
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 339,664
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,682
<BONDS>                                        138,547
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              000
<PREFERRED>                                        000
<COMMON>                                        11,563
<OTHER-SE>                                     167,185
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   339,664
<SALES>                                            000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                54,928
<CGS>                                              000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,925
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,198
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 12,805
<INCOME-TAX>                                       000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             12,805
<DISCONTINUED>                                  11,500
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    000
<CHANGES>                                          000
<NET-INCOME>                                    24,305
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.11
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOHN ELVIN TURNER, Petitioner, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, Respondent. No. 67942 

# FILED JUL 1 2 2016

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION This pro se petition was docketed in this court on January 22, 2015, without payment of the requisite filing fee. On February 17, 2015, petitioner submitted a motion for an order to waive Supreme Court filing fee. On February 3, 2016, this court issued an order directing petitioner to submit an affidavit in support of his motion within 30 days or the petition would be dismissed.' To date, petitioner has not paid the filing fee. Accordingly, cause appearing, the motion is denied and this petition is dismissed. It is so ORDERED. CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT TRACE K. LINDEMAN BY: 

# aa 'The order entered on February 3, 2016, was returned as undeliverable by the United States Postal Service.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA CLERK'S ORDER (01-1947 

# lo-LO3jcc: John Elvin Turner Attorney General/Carson City Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA CLERK'S ORDER
( 0 )- 1 947 

### e t

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