IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH R. WRIGHT, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : CA 13-00511-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), 

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying her claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties have 

consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 22 (“In accordance with the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United 

States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . . order the entry 

of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”).) Upon consideration 

of the administrative record (“R.”) (doc. 13), the Plaintiff’s brief (doc. 14), the 

Commissioner’s brief (doc. 19), and the arguments presented at the October 9, 2014 

hearing, it is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits should be

affirmed.1 

 1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall 

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See doc. 22 (“An appeal from a judgment 

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for 

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district 

court.”).)

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I. Procedural Background

On or around July 23, 2010, the Plaintiff filed an application for DIB (R. 131; see R. 

23), alleging disability relating to the following ailments: “acute pancrea[titis],” “colon 

duct problem,” “gall bladder problem,” “diabetes,” “cholest[e]rol,” and “arthritis in 

[the] left knee.” (R. 135.) He stated that he became disabled on August 2, 2008, (R. 

131), and his date last insured was December 31, 2008, (id.). His application was 

initially denied on September 23, 2010, (R. 56-59). A hearing was then conducted before 

an Administrative Law Judge on December 15, 2011. (R. 35-53). On January 20, 2012,

the ALJ issued a decision finding that the claimant was not disabled at any time from 

the date of alleged onset to the date he was last insured, (R. 23-30), and, on January 28, 

2012, the Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council, (R. 19). On October 10, 

2013, the Appeals Council issued a decision declining to review the ALJ’s decision. (R. 

1-3.) Therefore, the ALJ’s determination was the Commissioner’s final decision for 

purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint in 

this Court on October 23, 2013. (Doc. 1.) 

II. Standard of Review and Claims on Appeal

In all Social Security cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he or

she is unable to perform his or her previous work.2 Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

 2 Additionally, in a case such as this where the Plaintiff seeks DIB,

[the P]laintiff must prove he has a medically determinable impairment or 

impairments of sufficient severity to constitute a disability as contemplated by 

the Act and that the impairment or impairments became disabling while he was 

insured for disability purposes. The Act places the burden of establishing 

disability on the [P]laintiff. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir.

1983); see also 42 U.S.C. § [] 423(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). In order to receive 

disability insurance benefits or a period of disability, [the Plaintiff] must establish 

that h[is] condition became disabling before the expiration of h[is] insured status 

on [December 31, 2008]. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. 

denied, 455 U.S. 912, 102 S. Ct. 1263, 71 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1982) (Claimant “must show 

that she was disabled on or before the last day of her insured status.”). If [the 

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(11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the examiner 

must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical facts and clinical 

findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

plaintiff’s age, education, and work history. Id. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, it 

becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove that the plaintiff is capable—given his or 

her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial 

gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 

836 (11th Cir. 1985). Although at the fourth step “the [plaintiff] bears the burden of 

demonstrating an inability to return to his [or her] past relevant work, the 

[Commissioner of Social Security] has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” 

Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

The task for this Court is to determine whether the ALJ’s decision to deny 

Plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined 

as more than a scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 

(1971). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must view the 

record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts 

are precluded, however, from “deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the evidence.” 

 P]laintiff bec[ame] disabled after [his] insured status . . . expired, the claim must 

be denied despite disability. See[] Kirkland v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.

1973); Chance v. Califano, 574 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1978); Morgan v. Astrue, [No. 07-

60726-CIV,] 2008 WL 4613060, [at] *13 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2008) (“If a claimant 

becomes disabled after she has lost insured status, her claim for disability 

benefits must be denied, despite her disability.”); Benjamin v. Apfel, [No. CIV. A. 

99-0738-P-L,] 2000 WL 1375287, [at] *3 (S.D. Ala. August 02, 2000) (“If a claimant 

becomes disabled after her insured status has expired, her claim must be denied 

despite her disability.”)[.]

Dumas v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 12-00518-N, 2013 WL 4523584, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 27, 2013) 

(emphasis added).

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Davison v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 995, 996 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (citing Dyer 

v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). And, “[e]ven if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a court] must affirm if the decision 

reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004)).

On appeal to this Court, the Plaintiff asserts one claim: that “[t]he ALJ reversibly 

erred in failing to obtain the opinion of a medical expert to determine whether the 

Plaintiff’s progressi[ve] chronic pancreatitis was disabling prior to his date last 

insured.” (Doc. 14 at 1.) For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision 

denying the Plaintiff benefits should be affirmed.

III. Relevant Medical Evidence

In July and August 2008, the Plaintiff was hospitalized and treated for 

pancreatitis. (R. 171-80.) On July 20, 2008, he presented to Springhill Medical Center 

with complaints of severe abdominal pain, which apparently resulted from a three-day 

drinking binge. (R. 172.) Dr. Raymond Bell3 examined the Plaintiff and diagnosed him 

with acute pancreatitis, history of alcoholism, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 

and hypertension. (Id.) A CT scan was performed, which revealed both acute 

pancreatitis and chronic pancreatitis. (R. 176.) After receiving treatment for eleven 

days, his condition improved, and on July 31, 2008, he was discharged. (R. 171.) On 

August 4, 2008, the Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital after presenting to the 

emergency room with epigastric and left upper quadrant pain. (R. 178-79.) He was 

 3 Dr. Bell’s office notes indicate that, for several years prior to 2008, Dr. Bell treated 

the Plaintiff for various medical issues including hypertension, high cholesterol, low potassium, 

and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). (R. 186-98.)

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diagnosed with acute pancreatitis, pneumonia,4 hypokalemia, and hypertension. (Id.) 

He was treated and discharged on August 6, 2008, after his pancreatitis began resolving. 

(R. 177.) 

On August 26, 2008, the Plaintiff saw Dr. Bell for a follow up visit following his 

hospitalization. (R. 199.) Dr. Bell noted the Plaintiff’s pancreatitis, but did not indicate 

that the Plaintiff was in significant pain or otherwise having acute problems related to 

his pancreatitis at that time. (Id.) Dr. Bell continued the Plaintiff’s medications for his 

hypertension, high cholesterol, low potassium, and GERD. (Id.) Dr. Bell did not 

prescribe any treatment for Plaintiff’s pancreatitis. (Id.) Dr. Bell advised the Plaintiff to 

return for a follow up visit in three months. (Id.) On November 25, 2008, the Plaintiff 

returned for his next visit with Dr. Bell. (R. 200.) The Plaintiff complained of having 

pain in his left shoulder following his lung surgery. (Id.) Dr. Bell continued Plaintiff’s 

previous medications and did not prescribe any treatment for Plaintiff’s pancreatitis. 

(Id.) However, Dr. Bell did order a CT scan of the Plaintiff’s abdomen, which was 

performed on December 4, 2008. (R. 204.) The report from the CT scan indicates that, 

as compared to a previous CT scan on August 8, 2008, the “pseudocyst formation near 

the tail of the pancreas and adjacent inferior spleen decreased in size significantly . . . 

[and] [t]he other areas of pseudocyst formation ha[d] resolved radiographically.” (Id.) 

The report also indicated that calcifications were still present in the head of the pancreas 

and that the pancreatic duct was still dilated, though slightly less than in August 2008. 

(Id.) The Plaintiff next visited Dr. Bell on June 16, 2009, when he had pain and swelling 

 4 Additionally, in August 2008, the Plaintiff underwent lung surgery to treat his 

pneumonia. (See R. 182-85.) On August 29, 2008, the Plaintiff visited his pulmonologist for a 

post-operative visit. (R. 182.) By that time, the Plaintiff had fully recovered from surgery and 

was no longer having any pulmonary problems. (Id.; see R. 182-83.)

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in his left knee. (R. 201.) Dr. Bell diagnosed the Plaintiff with arthritis and continued 

prescribing medications for the Plaintiff’s hypertension, high cholesterol, low 

potassium, and GERD. (Id.) Dr. Bell also indicated that an examination of the Plaintiff’s 

abdomen was normal. (Id.) 

On November 30, 2009, a CT scan of the Plaintiff’s abdomen was performed and 

the findings were consistent with chronic pancreatitis. (R. 246.) The CT report also 

included findings of wall thickening and luminal narrowing in the distal stomach. (Id.) 

The radiologist who authored the report suggested that a follow up endoscopy should 

be considered. (Id.) On December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff had an initial visit with Dr. F. 

Steven Orleans, the gastroenterologist who would perform his endoscopic procedure. 

(R. 242.) The Plaintiff reported that he was having “occasional abdominal pain.” (Id.) 

He was not having any nausea or vomiting. (Id.) Dr. Orleans noted that it had been 

sixteen months since “his last episode of severe pancreatitis in which he was 

hospitalized,” developed pneumonia and underwent lung surgery. (Id.) Dr. Orleans 

performed a physical examination and determined that the Plaintiff was “[w]elldeveloped, well-nourished . . . [and] in no apparent acute distress.” (Id.) Nevertheless, 

Dr. Orleans found that the Plaintiff had chronic pancreatitis, questionable narrowing 

and wall thickening in the distal stomach, and gallbladder polyps. (R. 243.) Dr. Orleans 

prescribed viokase, a medication to treat the Plaintiff’s pancreatitis, and scheduled an 

esophagogastroduodenoscopy (EGD) and colonoscopy. (Id.) On December 21, 2009, 

Dr. Orleans performed the EGD and colonoscopy on the Plaintiff. (R. 240-41.) The EGD 

revealed no areas of inflammation or ulceration, (R. 240), and the colonoscopy revealed 

mild diverticulitis, (R. 241). Dr. Orleans referred the Plaintiff to Dr. Matthew Eves for 

an endoscopic ultrasound (EUS), which was performed on February 3, 2010. (R. 249-

50.) The EUS revealed “chronic pancreatitis secondary to stones within the pancreatic 

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duct.” (R. 250.) Dr. Eves recommended that the Plaintiff undergo “[e]ndoscopic 

retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) with dilation and stenting of the 

pancreatic duct.” (Id.) Dr. Eves performed the ERCP on April 2, 2010, but it was 

unsuccessful because Dr. Eves was unable to cannulate the pancreatic duct. (R. 219-30.) 

Following the ERCP, the Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for monitoring and postprocedural treatment. (Id.) He was discharged on April 6, 2010, after his condition 

improved. (R. 219.) He had no complaints of abdominal pain at that time. (Id.) On 

June 30, 2010, the Plaintiff underwent a second ERCP, in which Dr. Eves was able to 

successfully cannulate the Plaintiff’s pancreatic duct, dilate the duct and place a stent. 

(R. 257-60.) Dr. Eves noted that the pancreatic duct was markedly strictured and that it 

will probably take multiple procedures over the course of a year to fully dilate the 

pancreatic duct. (Id.) The Plaintiff was prescribed Creon to treat his pancreatitis. (R. 

258.) 

From June 2010 to August 2011, the Plaintiff underwent serial ERCP procedures 

to progressively dilate and stent the Plaintiff’s pancreatic duct to allow for proper 

drainage. (R. 257-356.) During this period, the Plaintiff had some complications when 

one of the stents became embedded, (R. 271-76); however, that stent was removed and 

the Plaintiff improved, (R. 275-76, 316). On August 19, 2011, Dr. Eves removed the final 

stent without complication and the pancreatic stent treatment was completed. (R. 320-

21.) On October 11, 2011, the Plaintiff had a follow up visit with Dr. William Gewin. 

(R. 375-78.) Dr. Gewin noted that the Plaintiff continues to suffer from chronic 

pancreatitis and that he had been treated with pancreatic stents. (Id.) Dr. Gewin also 

noted that the Plaintiff continued to have abdominal pain, but did not have nausea, 

vomiting, diarrhea, constipation or blood in his stool. (Id.) Dr. Gewin continued the 

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Plaintiff’s Creon medication to treat his pancreatitis and advised the Plaintiff to return 

to see Dr. Eves in December 2011. (Id.)

On October 13, 2011, the Plaintiff presented to Dr. Keith Varden for a disability 

examination. (R. 365-74.) During that examination the Plaintiff reported “generalized 

weakness and fatigue”; “chronic recurring abdominal pain”; “poorly controlled 

diabetes”; “occasional nausea[,] mostly without vomiting”; and “some occasional 

shortness of breath.” (R. 365.) The Plaintiff denied having chest pain, rashes, 

“significant weight changes or other pertinent positives upon constitutional review [of] 

systems.” (Id.) The Plaintiff also stated that one of his physicians had advised him “not 

to do any vigorous work or work outside in the yard because of [the] possibility of him 

passing out.” (Id.) After examining the Plaintiff, Dr. Varden concluded that

[t]he patient appears to have significant debility related to his pancreatitis 

and difficulties to control diabetes. This also seems to be affected by 

activity level as instructed by his current physician regarding overexertion 

and strenuous activity leading to fluctuations in blood sugars and history 

of a near syncopal type activity. . . . [T]herefore[, Dr. Varden] consider[ed] 

him disabled for most types [of] work-related activities[,] especially those 

involving heavy lifting[,] walking[,] increased exertion[,] exposure to heat 

and other job expected duties.

(R. 367.) Dr. Varden also completed a medical source statement regarding the Plaintiff’s 

ability to perform work-related activities, (R. 369-74), which the ALJ found to be 

consistent with light work, (R. 27).

IV. ALJ’s Decision

On January 20, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff “was not 

disabled . . . through December 31, 2008, the last date insured. (R. 23-30.) In reaching 

his decision, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity during the period between his alleged onset date, August 2, 2008, and the date 

he was last insured. (R. 25.) The ALJ found that, “[t]hrough the date last insured, the 

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[Plaintiff] had the following severe impairments: chronic pancreatitis and 

hypertension.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) The ALJ concluded that, through the date last 

insured, the Plaintiff did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 27.) The ALJ made the following findings 

with respect to the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds 

that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual 

functional capacity to perform medium word as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(c) except he should not be exposed to dangerous machinery or 

work at heights. This limitation is to account for his allegation that he has 

fainting spells and that a physician had advised him he might pass out. 

To account for his abdominal tenderness from pancreatitis, the claimant is 

limited to occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling and to 

frequently, as opposed to continuously, reaching, handling, fingering and 

feeling.

(R. 27-28 (emphasis omitted).) Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ 

concluded that the Plaintiff “was capable of performing past relevant work as a mental 

health specialist” through the date last insured, and, thus, he was not disabled. (R. 29.)

V. Analysis

As mentioned above, the sole argument asserted by the Plaintiff is that the ALJ 

erred by failing to obtain a medical expert to opine as to whether the Plaintiff’s chronic 

pancreatitis, a slowly progressive condition, was disabling before December 31, 2008, 

the date he was last insured. The Plaintiff relies on Social Security Ruling 83-20 and 

McManus v. Barnhart, an opinion from the Middle District of Florida interpreting SSR 

83-20. (Doc. 14 at 2 (quoting SSR 83-20; McManus v. Barnhart, No. 5:04-CV-67-OC-GRJ, 

2004 WL 3316303, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2004)).) SSR 83-20 provides in relevant part 

as follows:

In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical evidence to 

reasonably infer that the onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some 

time prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g., the 

date the claimant stopped working. How long the disease may be 

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determined to have existed at a disabling level of severity depends on an 

informed judgment of the facts in the particular case. This judgment, 

however, must have a legitimate medical basis. At the hearing, the [ALJ] 

should call on the services of a medical advisor when onset must be 

inferred. If there is information in the file indicating that additional 

medical evidence concerning onset is available, such evidence should be 

secured before inferences are made.

SSR 83-20. In McManus, the Middle District of Florida concluded that, based on its 

interpretation of SSR 83-20, the ALJ erred by failing to obtain the advice of a medical 

expert as to whether the onset of the plaintiff’s disability occurred prior to the date of 

last insured. McManus, 2004 WL 3316303, at *6-9. The court explained the applicability 

of SSR 83-20 as follows:

Because the issue of onset is inextricably tied to the determination 

of disability in cases where the impairment is a slowly progressive 

condition that is not traumatic in origin, the Court concludes that the most 

logical interpretation of SSR 83-20 is to apply it to situations where the 

ALJ is called upon to make a retroactive inference regarding disability 

involving a slowly progressive impairment, and the medical evidence 

during the insured period is inadequate or ambiguous. Accordingly, in 

those situations the ALJ should be required to obtain the advice of a 

medical advisor to assist the ALJ in making the determination from the 

available medical evidence of whether the slowly progressive impairment 

constituted a disability prior to the date last insured.

Id. at *6.

The Plaintiff’s reliance on SSR 83-20 and McManus is misplaced because the ALJ 

never found the Plaintiff disabled in this case, (R. 23-30).

5

 The Eleventh Circuit has 

twice held in unpublished opinions that an ALJ is only required to obtain the opinion of 

a medical expert to determine the date of disability onset if the ALJ first concludes that 

the plaintiff is disabled. See Caces v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 560 F. App’x 936, 939 

(11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (“The plain language of SSR 83-20 indicates that it is applicable 

 5 As discussed above, the ALJ specifically found that the Plaintiff was not disabled 

prior to his date last insured. (R. 30.) The ALJ also granted weight to the opinion of Dr. Varden 

that the Plaintiff was able to perform light work in October 2011. (R. 29.)

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only after there has been a finding of disability and it is then necessary to determine 

when the disability began.” (citation omitted)); Klawinski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. 

App’x 772, 776 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2010) (“We conclude that the ALJ did not contravene 

SSR 83-20 because the ALJ ultimately found that [the plaintiff] was not disabled, and 

SSR 83-20 only required the ALJ to obtain a medical expert in certain instances to 

determine a disability onset date after a finding of disability.”). This Court has followed 

that determination by the Eleventh Circuit previously, Odom v. Astrue, No. CA 11-0492-

C, 2012 WL 2568222, at *7 (S.D. Ala. July 3, 2012) (“[T]his Court agrees with the 

defendant that since the ALJ did not determine that [the plaintiff] was disabled, there 

was no need to establish an onset date pursuant to SSR 83-20 (or otherwise). In other 

words, SSR 83-20 has no application to this case.”), and it does so here as well. Thus, 

the undersigned concludes that SSR 83-20 does not apply to this case, and the ALJ did 

not err by failing to obtain the opinion of a medical expert to determine whether the 

Plaintiff was disabled as a result of his chronic pancreatitis prior to his date last insured.

Furthermore, SSR 83-20 also is inapplicable to this case because the Plaintiff’s 

medical records are not inadequate or ambiguous. See Caces, 560 F. App’x at 939

(“There was no need for assistance from a medical advisor to determine the date of 

onset because the unambiguous medical evidence shows [the plaintiff] was not disabled 

before the date of last insured.”); Gregory v. Astrue, No. 5:09-cv-517-Oc-TEM, 2011 WL

1100292, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011) (“Here, the medical evidence during the insured 

period was neither inadequate nor ambiguous. While Plaintiff's condition may have 

become progressively worse over time, the ALJ had sufficient medical evidence upon 

which to base her determination that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to June 30, 2001. 

That Plaintiff received limited treatment during the insured period does not render the 

evidence inadequate or ambiguous; rather, it further supports the ALJ's finding that 

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Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ had no obligation to obtain a medical 

expert.”); McManus, 2004 WL 3316303, at *7 (“[T]he ALJ is only required to secure the 

assistance of a medical advisor where the medical evidence of record is ambiguous or 

inadequate.”). 

The Plaintiff’s medical records clearly support the ALJ’s determination that the 

Plaintiff’s chronic pancreatitis was not disabling prior to the date of last insured. The 

medical records show that, prior to the Plaintiff’s date last insured, the Plaintiff only 

required treatment for his pancreatitis for a period of a few weeks in late July and early 

August of 2008 when he was hospitalized due to an episode of pancreatitis that 

apparently resulted from a three-day drinking binge. (R. 171-80.) During the course of 

the sixteen months following that episode, the Plaintiff saw Dr. Bell for follow-up visits 

on three occasions and did not report any serious complaints related to his pancreatitis. 

(R. 199-201.) While the Plaintiff was prescribed medications for his hypertension, 

GERD and other conditions during that period, his pancreatitis did not require any 

treatment. (Id.) In December 2009, nearly one year after the Plaintiff’s date last insured,

the Plaintiff reported occasional abdominal pain during a visit with Dr. Orleans. (R. 

242.) Dr. Orleans examined the Plaintiff and determined that he was “well-nourished” 

and “in no acute distress.” (Id.) Dr. Orleans noted that the Plaintiff had not had an 

episode of pancreatitis for sixteen months; however, Dr. Orleans decided to perform an 

EGD in light of the Plaintiff’s chronic pancreatitis and questions regarding possible 

narrowing and wall thickening in the Plaintiff’s distal stomach. (R. 240, 242.) 

Additionally, Dr. Orleans prescribed the Plaintiff medication to treat his pancreatitis, (R. 

243), and referred the Plaintiff to Dr. Eves who began treating the Plaintiff’s pancreatitis 

in 2010 by dilating and stenting the pancreatic duct, (R. 219-60).

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The Plaintiff’s testimony is consistent with this general course of treatment. The 

Plaintiff testified that the symptoms related to his pancreatitis were much worse in 2011 

than they were in 2008, (R. 45), that he was not receiving medication for his pancreatitis 

prior to 2010, (R. 44), and that he did not begin undergoing stenting procedures until 

the end of 2009 or the beginning of 2010, (R. 40).

Because the medical evidence of record adequately and unambiguously shows 

that the Plaintiff’s pancreatitis was not disabling prior to his date last insured,6 the ALJ 

was not required to procure the opinion of a medical expert to assist in that 

determination. Therefore, for this additional reason, the ALJ’s failure to obtain such an

expert was not error. 

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying the Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED.

DONE and ORDERED this the 23rd day of March 2014.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 6 The undersigned notes that the ALJ discussed the Plaintiff’s testimony and 

medical records in detail, (R. 25-30), and reasonably concluded based on that evidence that the 

Plaintiff was not disabled prior to his date last insured, (id.). Given the evidence of record, 

including Dr. Varden’s findings regarding the Plaintiff’s work restrictions, which the ALJ found 

to be consistent with the Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work in 2011, (R. 27, 29), and given 

the Plaintiff’s testimony that his condition was much worse in 2011 than it was in 2008, (R. 45), 

the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

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