UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SOUMAINE MAHAMAT DJORKODE, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 13-9549 (Petition for Review)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , Chief Judge, PORFILIO and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

Soumaine Mahamat Djor kode, a native and citizen of Chad, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration App eals’ (BIA) decision, which dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, restriction on removal, and relief under th e Convention Against Torture (CAT). His

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - single issue is easily resolved. He quarrels about ex ceptionally cogent and complete credibility determinati ons. We deny review. 1 Djorkode was admitted to the Un ited States on nonimmigrant visa but overstayed. At a preliminar y hearing before an IJ, he admitted the charges against him, conceded removability, and renewed his timely-filed applications for asylum, restriction on removal, and CA T protection. Djorkode assert ed he had been detained and tortured in Chad on account of his memb ership in the Gorane clan and because he is related to Mahamat Nouri, a leader of an organization engaged in subversive activities against Chad’s government. Following a merits hearing, at which onl y Djorkode testified, the IJ issued an extremely thorough decision fi nding Djorkode not credible. Admin. R. at 155-202. 2 It cited numerous, specific in consistencies within Djorko de’s testimony and between his testimony and his prior wr itten statement. It also noted several implausible explanations offered by Djorkod e. Ultimately, the IJ deni ed all relief because of Djorkode’s lack of credibility. The BIA, in a brief, single-member d ecision, discussed certain inconsistencies the IJ had identified, held that the IJ’s credibility finding was not clearly erroneous, and dismissed Djorkode’s appe al. The BIA explained:

1 Our jurisdiction derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)

. 2 The IJ’s 48-page oral decision incor porates a separate 14- page order outlining the applicable law. Admin. R. at 156; id. at 141-54.- 3 - We find, given the totality of the circumstances, that the [credibility] concerns noted by the Immigrati on Judge are substantial and seriously call into question the ve racity of [Djorkode’s] story, and we rely on the Immigration Judge’s re citation of these problems. Given [Djorkode’s] lack of cr edibility, we find no error in the Immigration Judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum and [restriction on] removal. . . . [Further, Djorkode] has provided insufficient supporting evidence—give n that the Immigration Judge properly found [him] not credible—to suggest that [he is entitled to CAT relief]. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). On appeal, Djorkode challenges the BIA’ s adverse credibility determination. We review the BIA’s factual findings, in cluding credibility de terminations, for substantial evidence. Uanreroro v. Gonzales , 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)

. “Where the BIA’s decision relies upon an IJ’s initial findings, we must ensure that such determinations are s ubstantially reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “And [b]ecause an alien’s testimony alone may support an application for [restriction on] removal or asyl um . . . the IJ must give specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In conducting our review, we do not reweigh the evidence, see Sarr v. Gonzales , 474 F.3d 783, 789 (10th Cir. 2007), and “the admi nistrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonabl e adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 125 2(b)(4)(B). “In form ulating those reasons, the trier of fact must look to the ‘totality of the circum stances’ and ‘all relevant- 4 - factors.’” Sarr , 474 F.3d at 789 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Under the asylum statute, the trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the . . . candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the inherent plau sibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consiste ncy between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal c onsistency of each such statement, [and] the cons istency of such statemen ts with other evidence of record . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (same language in removal-proceedings statute); see also Elzour v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2004) (explain ing that an “adverse cred ibility determination may appropriately be based upon . . . inconsistencies . . . , lack of sufficient detail, or implausibility”). Here, the IJ gave specific, cogent reasons for finding Djorkode’s testimony incredible. The BIA highlighted several inconsistencies the IJ had identified and expressly relied on the IJ’s credibility finding. Having carefully reviewed the record in accordance with the prescribed deferentia l standard of review, we see no basis to conclude that the BIA’s decision was s ubstantially unreasonable or that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. Djorkode would have us to reweigh the evidence. That is not our place. The petition for review is denied. Entered for the Court Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge