I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1425 

To require any convention, agreement, or other international instrument on 

pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by the World 

Health Assembly to be subject to Senate ratification. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 7, 2023 

Mr. TIFFANY (for himself, Mr. BIGGS, Mrs. BOEBERT, Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. 

GOODEN of Texas, Mr. GOSAR, Mrs. HARSHBARGER, Mrs. HOUCHIN, 

Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. NEHLS, Mr. ROY, Mr. SELF, Mr. SESSIONS, 

Mr. STEIL, and Ms. TENNEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To require any convention, agreement, or other international 

instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and 

response reached by the World Health Assembly to be 

subject to Senate ratification. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No WHO Pandemic 

5 Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump 

2 sent a letter to World Health Organization (referred 

3 to in this Act as ‘‘WHO’’) Director-General Tedros 

4 Adhanom Ghebreyesus (referred to in this Act as the 

5 ‘‘Director-General’’), announcing that— 

6 (A) United States contributions to WHO 

7 would be halted due its mismanagement of the 

8 COVID–19 outbreak and its lack of independ9 ence from the People’s Republic of China; and 

10 (B) the United States would withdraw 

11 from WHO if it did not commit to substantive 

12 improvements within 30 days. 

13 (2) President Trump’s May 18 letter cited nu14 merous instances of WHO mismanagement of the 

15 COVID–19 pandemic, including— 

16 (A) unjustified delays informing member 

17 states about a potentially serious disease out18 break in Wuhan, China; and 

19 (B) repeated grossly inaccurate or mis20 leading claims about the transmissibility of the 

21 virus and about the Government of China’s 

22 handling of the outbreak. 

23 (3) On June 30, 2020, Secretary of State Mike 

24 Pompeo formally notified the United Nations of the 

25 United States decision to withdraw from WHO, 


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1 which would have taken effect on July 6, 2021, 

2 under the terms of a joint resolution adopted by 

3 Congress on June 14, 1948 (Public Law 80–643; 62 

4 Stat. 441). 

5 (4) A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 

6 April and May 2020 indicated that 51 percent of 

7 Americans felt that WHO had done a poor or fair 

8 job in managing the COVID–19 pandemic. 

9 (5) On January 20, 2021, President Joseph 

10 Biden sent United Nations Director-General Anto ́nio 

11 Guterres a letter retracting the United States notice 

12 of withdrawal from WHO. 

13 (6) On December 1, 2021, at the second special 

14 session of the World Health Assembly (referred to in 

15 this Act as the ‘‘WHA’’) decided— 

16 (A) to establish an intergovernmental ne17 gotiating body (referred to in this section as the 

18 ‘‘INB’’) to draft and negotiate a WHO conven19 tion (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Conven20 tion’’), agreement, or other international instru21 ment on pandemic prevention, preparedness, 

22 and response, with a view to adoption under Ar23 ticle 19 or any other provision of the WHO 

24 Constitution; and 


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1 (B) that the INB shall submit a progress 

2 report to the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working 

3 draft of the convention for consideration by the 

4 Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled to 

5 take place beginning on March 18, 2024. 

6 (7) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and 

7 June 6 through 8 and 15 through 17, 2022, the 

8 INB held its inaugural meeting at which the Direc9 tor-General proposed the following 5 themes to guide 

10 the INB’s work in drafting the Convention: 

11 (A) Building national, regional, and global 

12 capacities based on a whole-of-government and 

13 whole-of-society approach. 

14 (B) Establishing global access and benefit 

15 sharing for all pathogens, and determining a 

16 global policy for the equitable production and 

17 distribution of countermeasures. 

18 (C) Establishing robust systems and tools 

19 for pandemic preparedness and response. 

20 (D) Establishing a long-term plan for sus21 tainable financing to ensure support for global 

22 health threat management and response sys23 tems. 

24 (E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its man25 date as the directing and coordinating authority 


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1 on international health work, including for pan2 demic preparedness and response. 

3 (8) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held 

4 its second meeting at which it agreed that the Con5 vention would be adopted under Article 19 of the 

6 WHO Constitution and legally binding on the par7 ties. 

8 (9) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB 

9 held its third meeting at which it accepted a concep10 tual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to pre11 pare a zero draft for consideration at the INB’s next 

12 meeting. 

13 (10) In early January 2023, an initial draft of 

14 the Convention was sent to WHO member states in 

15 advance of its formal introduction at the fourth 

16 meeting of the INB, which is scheduled for February 

17 27 through March 3, 2023. The draft includes broad 

18 and binding provisions, including rules governing 

19 parties’ access to pathogen genomic sequences and 

20 how the products or benefits of such access are to 

21 be distributed. 

22 (11) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Depart23 ment of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that 

24 when ‘‘determining whether any international agree25 ment should be brought into force as a treaty or as 


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1 an international agreement other than a treaty, the 

2 utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion 

3 or compromise of the constitutional powers of the 

4 President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole’’ 

5 and includes the following criteria to be considered 

6 when determining whether an international agree7 ment should take the form of a treaty or an execu8 tive agreement: 

9 (A) ‘‘The extent to which the agreement 

10 involves commitments or risks affecting the na11 tion as a whole’’. 

12 (B) ‘‘Whether the agreement is intended to 

13 affect state laws’’. 

14 (C) ‘‘Whether the agreement can be given 

15 effect without the enactment of subsequent leg16 islation by the Congress’’. 

17 (D) ‘‘Past U.S. practice as to similar 

18 agreements’’. 

19 (E) ‘‘The preference of the Congress as to 

20 a particular type of agreement’’. 

21 (F) ‘‘The degree of formality desired for 

22 an agreement’’. 

23 (G) ‘‘The proposed duration of the agree24 ment, the need for prompt conclusion of an 


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1 agreement, and the desirability of concluding a 

2 routine or short-term agreement’’. 

3 (H) ‘‘The general international practice as 

4 to similar agreements’’. 

5 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that— 

7 (1) a significant segment of the American pub8 lic is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organiza9 tion, its leadership, and its independence from the 

10 pernicious political influence of certain member 

11 states, including the People’s Republic of China; 

12 (2) Congress strongly prefers that any agree13 ment related to pandemic prevention, preparedness, 

14 and response adopted by the World Health Assembly 

15 pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a 

16 treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Sen17 ate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring; 

18 (3) the scope of the agreement which the INB 

19 has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Di20 rector-General, is so broad that any application of 

21 the factors referred to in section 2(11) will weigh 

22 strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and 

23 (4) given the level of public distrust, any rel24 evant new agreement by the World Health Assembly 

25 which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for 


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1 Senate ratification should not be agreed to or imple2 mented by the United States. 

3 SEC. 4. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR 

4 AGREEMENT OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL IN5 STRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTER6 NATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY’S FINAL RE7 PORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO 

8 ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE. 

9 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any con10 vention, agreement, or other international instrument on 

11 pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached 

12 by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the rec13 ommendations, report, or work of the International Nego14 tiating Body established by the second special session of 

15 the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that 

16 is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, 

17 clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which 

18 requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two19 thirds of Senators concurring. 

Æ 


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