alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### S. B. Heaberland *v.*Nancy Griffee et al.

Improvements — Liability for.

One person -cannot hold another responsible for improvements made on the land in question where there is no privity shown.

APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT.

February 12, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

We are unable to perceive any ground upon which relief could have been afforded appellant against either of the appellees. He could not have pay for his improvements at the expense of G. W. and W. L. Sturgill. He was not an occupying claimant, having reason to- believe himself the owner of the land. He regarded the . patent to John A'. Justice as insufficient to secure the title. The doubt on that question was settled, if at all, by an examination of McDaniel’s warranty. This paper amounted *in*law *to*notice of the claim of the Sturgill children. If appellant did not examine as to their claim it was his own fault.

He was not entitled *to*judgment against M’cDaniel. His warranty, if it be a warranty, was- to Henry I. Justice. So far as the record evidence before us shows, appellant has not succeeded to the benefit-of this warranty. He bought from John A. Justice, and he does not show that there was ever any such contract of sale from *497Henry I. Justice to John A., as would authorize the latter to look to McDaniel in case he should lose the land for which he took out the patent.

*E. B. Wilhoit, for appellant.*

*R. D. Davis, Botts, for appellee.*

Privity' between McDaniel and'appellant is not shown to exist. For the same reason he cannot hold Henry I. Justice responsible. He never had any contract with him, and never had the right to demand that he should be allowed the benefit of McDaniel’s warranty.

The agreement of the latter, after the institution of the suit by the Sturgills, that he should, was without consideration, and Henry I. had the right to refuse to carry it out if he chose to do so. Appellant must look for relief to John A. Justice, from' whom he purchased.

Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit 10.20(b)
 Highly Confidential
 AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO
EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
     1.
    
    The following sentence is hereby added to the end of Section 3(b) of the Agreement:
 th
 2.
    
    The following sentences are hereby added to the end of the section of the Agreement entitled
General Release as Condition for Post-Employment Payments:
 th th provided however
 3.
    
    The following shall be added as the last section of the Agreement:
 Conditions to Payment and Acceleration; Section 409A of the Code




---



##### 



provided however
 4.
    
    This Amendment shall be governed by, interpreted under and construed in accordance with the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.5.
    
    Except as modified by this Amendment, the Agreement is hereby confirmed in all respects.
  MYLAN INC./s/ Heather BreschBy:  Heather BreschTitle:
    Chief Operating Officer/s/ Daniel C. Rizzo, Jr.Daniel C. Rizzo, Jr. 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANDRE M. CARSTARPHEN, SR., : 

on behalf of 

ANDRE M. CARSTARPHEN, JR., : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-0359-WS-M

 

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, : 

Commissioner of

Social Security, : 

Defendant. : 

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all pleadings in this file, and a de novo determination of

those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made, the Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED and that this action

be DISMISSED.

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2006.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00359-WS-M Document 17 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         344,808
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  133,990
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,871)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      11,468,665
<DEPRECIATION>                             (5,379,781)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,640,511
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          379,135
<BONDS>                                      8,059,644
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,201,732
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,640,511
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,344,655
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,243,675
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,492
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             160,731
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (65,243)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (65,243)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.26)
        

</TABLE>
#### E. C. Curd *v.*Commonwealth Mutual Life Ins. Co.

Insurance Policy — Time of Payment of Premium — Construction.

The terms of a contract of insurance are to he determined by an examination of the application and the policy and the receipt delivered by the company to the assured.

Waiver by Company.

The insurance company may waive the ■ payment of a premium when due or it may insist that the contract of insurance had terminated by the failure to pay premium when due. The company could not compel the insured to keep the policy alive by the payment of the premium and the insured could not compel the company to accept payments after the time it became due.

APPEAL PROM JEFFERSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

December 2, 1876.

OpiNion by

Judge Lindsay :

In order to ascertain the exact terms of the contract of insurance, the application signed by the insured, the policy, and the receipt delivered by the company to him, must all be considered together. It is clearly , and conclusively proved that a receipt for this first annual premium, was delivered to the insured at the same time with the policy. .Appellee was not precluded from proving that both the receipt and policy were delivered on a day different from that averred in the petition. The averment of the particular day of the delivery was immaterial as to the substantial issues of the case, and the appellee was not bound to deny it. When these three papers are considered together, it is clear that the annual premium of $172.50 was to be paid in two semi-annual installments and that the increase of the premium for the beginning of the year was intended to compensate the company for allowing the insured six months time within which to pay the second semi-annual installment.

*816
      *W. R. Abbott, for appellant. Bullock & Anderson, for appellee.*

It was expressly agreed in the face of the policy that if any premium or installment of premium should not be paid when due, then the policy should cease and determine. The stipulation with regard to the payment of premiums during the lifetime of the insured applied only to the first premium, if to be paid in full, or to the first installment thereof, if to be paid in installments.

It is not pretended that the second installment of the first yearly premium was paid or tendered until long after it was due. The fact that the general agent of the company was willing to receive payment and insisted upon the insured paying said installment after it was part due, did *not make it*obligatory upon the insurance company to waive its right to insist that the contract had ceased and determined after the insured become fatally sick.

The company could not compel the appellant or her agent to keep the policy alive by the payment of the installment in question, and neither could they compel it to accept payments after the time at which it fell due. From that time forward it was a matter of election with the insurer, as well as with the insured. The instruction of the court below.accords with this view of the law of the case, and those asked by appellant conflict with it.

The judgment appealed from is *affirmed.*
#### Andrew Kinser, et al. *v. A.*J. Robertson, et al.

Mortgage — Husband and Wife.

A voluntary conveyance to the wife will not defeat a creditor who took a mortgage from the husband after such conveyance, to secure a debt created before the conveyance was made.

*627APPEAL FROM METCALFE CIRCUIT COURT.

March 3, 1876.

*Garnett & Dehoney, for appellants.*

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

The mortgage to the appellant is valid as> to A. J. Robertson, and the conveyance to his wife being voluntary and subsequent in date to the creation of the indebtedness to Mrs. Kinser, is void as to her, and the debt having been created before the passage of the homestead law we perceive no valid reason why the mortgage may not be enforced.

The liability was created in 1863 or 1864. The execution of the note and mortgage did not extinguish the old liability, but merely furnish evidence in a different form of the existence of the debt. *Lowry v. Fisher, et al.,*2 Bush 70; Kibbey v. Jones, 7 Bush 243.

The court, therefore, erred in dismissing the petition as to Mrs. Robertson, and the judgment is *reversed*and the cause is remanded with directions to render judgment directing a sale of so much of the land embraced in the deed from W. W. Robertson to Mrs. M. F. Robertson as will satisfy the debt sued for and the interest thereon and the cost of the suit.
## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 76, 443

EX PA R TE R A N D A LL LO U I S M C C O Y , A ppl i c ant
ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. B- 1 6 , 7 7 7 A I N T HE 1 7 3 J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT RD FROM HEND ERS ON CO UNTY

P er cur i am . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Crimi n al P ro ce dure, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habea s corpus. Ex pa rte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant plea ded guilty to esca pe and wa s
se nte nc e d, purs ua

nt t o a ple a a g re e me nt, to fi ve ye ars ’ i mpriso nme nt. He did no t a pp e a l his conviction. Applicant conte nds that his plea a g ree ment was bre ache d beca use he is not re ceivingall the pre- sentenc ing ja il tim e cr edit he wa s awa rded on the judgme nt. The spec i fi c am o unt of presentenc ing ja il tim e cr edit was a n aff irmative ele ment of the plea agree ment in this case. The amountof

tim e wi th whic h App lic ant w a s to be c re dit e d w a s mo re than t he ti me he sp e nt i n ja il o n th is particula r charg e, althoug h Applicant may have been in ja il pur suant to a nother c harg e that wa s taken into consideration in sentenc ing f or this case . The Tex as Department of Crimi nal J ustice ca nnot give Ap pli c ant c re dit

fo r j a il t ime se rv e d p ri or

to t he c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e fo r wh ic h he is p re se ntl y incar cer ated. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 4 2. 03 §2 (a). Ap pli c ant’ s p le a ba rg a in i s unenfor cea

ble, and the State a g ree s that he is entitled to relief. Relief is grante d. The judgment in Cause No. B- 16,777 in the 173rd J udicial District Court of Hende rsonCounty

is set asid e, an d Applicant is rema nded to the custody

of the Sherif

f of He nd e rs on

County to a ns we r t he c ha rg e a g a ins t him
. Co p i es o f t h i s o p i n i o ns h al l b e s en tt o th e T ex as De p artm en to f C ri m i n al Justice–Corre ctional Institut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Deliver ed: Novembe r 3, 2010 Do No t Pu

bli sh
USGv6 Test Selection Tables* 

DHCP Server 

I13-Interoperability: DHCP-Server-v1.1

Applicable Profile: NIST SP 500-267 A profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government - Version 1.0, 

July 2008.

Configuration Option: DHCP-Server 

Test Specification Id: 

• [DHCPv6-Interoperability] IPv6 READY DHCPv6 Interoperability Test Suite, Revision 

1.1.1 , [editor: IPv6 Ready Logo ]. 

Reference: 

• [RFC 3315]Droms, R. J. Bound, B. Volz, T. Lemon, C. Perkins, M. Carney, Dynamic 

Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), July, 2003 

Device Type Definitions:

• ROUTER: A device capable of forwarding packets.

• HOST: A device which is not a ROUTER.

• Server: Both HOSTs and ROUTERs can be Servers.

Interoperability Partner Requirements: 

• Any host or router claiming compliance with the USGv6 profile MUST demonstrate 

evidence of interoperability with three or more independent implementations of IPv6. 

The three implementations must include at least one Host and at least one Router.

• Can not change Target nodes once testing has begun. 

DHCPv6-Interoperability 

If your Device Under Test (DUT) Type is Server: 
• DUT = TAR-Server1 for all tests. 

• TAR-Client1 = Independent Implementation Device B 

• TAR-Relay-Agent1 = Independent Implementation Device C 

• Third Interoperability Partner is satisfied by executing the test specification again using 

the following:

o TAR-Client1 = Independent Implemenation Device D 

DHCP Server Test Check List

Reference Test Specification 

Id Test Number Device Type

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability DHCPInterop.1.1: DHCPv6 Initialization Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.2: Client Initiated: Transmission of Confirm 

messages 

Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop1.3: Client Initiated: Transmission of Renew 

messages 

Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.4: Client Initiated: Transmission of Rebind 

messages 

Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.5: Client Initiated: Transmission of Release 

messages 

Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.6: Client Initiated: Transmission of Decline 

messages 

Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.7: Server Initiated: Transmission of Advertise 

messages with NoAddrsAvail Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.8: Server Initiated: Transmission of Reply 

messages with NotOnLink Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.9: Relay-Agent Basic Message Exchanges (A) 

(B) (C) (D) (E) (F) Server 

RFC 3315 DHCPv6-

Interoperability 

DHCPInterop.1.10: Layered Relay-Agent Basic Message 

Exchange (A) (B) Server 

* The objective of this test selection sheet is to provide a reference for available test 

specifications that identifies tests applicable to the USGv6 Profile.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ROBERT WORTHY, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-00664-WS-N 

 ) 

ACCUMARINE TRANSPORTATION, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

 ORDER 

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed 

relevant to the issues raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Report and 

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B) and dated 

May 11, 2010, is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court. It is ORDERED that this 

action be and is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to prosecute and to 

comply with the Court's Order. 

DONE this 29th day of July, 2010. 

 s/WILLIAM H. STEELE 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:09-cv-00664-WS-N Document 23 Filed 07/29/10 Page 1 of 1
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 236 (Tuesday, December 9, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 73104]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28794]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Notice of Permits Issued Under the Antartic Conservation Act of 
1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation of 
1978, Public Law 95-541.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Li Ling Hamady, ACA Permit Officer, 
Division of Polar Programs, Rm. 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230. Or by email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#55141614253027383c2126153b26337b323a23"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="dc9d9f9dacb9aeb1b5a8af9cb2afbaf2bbb3aa">[email protected]</span></a>

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 23, 2014 the National Science 
Foundation published a notice in the Federal Register of a permit 
application received. The permit was issued on December 3, 2014 to:

Dr. Ari Friedlaender Permit No. 2015-011

Nadene G. Kennedy,
Polar Coordination Specialist, Division of Polar Programs.
[FR Doc. 2014-28794 Filed 12-8-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Exhibit 32.1
**Written Statement of thePresident and Chief Executive Officer****Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350**
     Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, I, theundersigned President and Chief Executive Officer of Whitehall Limited, Inc.(the “Company”), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the QuarterlyReport on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter endedSeptember 30, 2004(the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.
*/s/ Ronald Mustari*Ronald Mustari
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1505 

To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain 

rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2023 

Mr. ISSA (for himself and Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States 

courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade 

names, or commercial names. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Stolen Trademarks 

5 Honored in America Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION. 

7 Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Re8 lated Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in 

9 section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105–277; 112 

10 Stat. 2681–88) is amended— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1505 IH

1 (1) in subsection (a)(2)— 

2 (A) by inserting ‘‘or entity of the executive 

3 branch’’ after ‘‘U.S. court’’; 

4 (B) by striking ‘‘by a designated national’’; 

5 and 

6 (C) by inserting before the period ‘‘that 

7 was used in connection with a business or as8 sets that were confiscated unless the original 

9 owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial 

10 name, or the bonafide successor-in-interest has 

11 expressly consented’’; 

12 (2) in subsection (b)— 

13 (A) by inserting ‘‘or entity of the executive 

14 branch’’ after ‘‘U.S. court’’; and 

15 (B) by striking ‘‘by a designated national 

16 or its successor-in-interest’’; 

17 (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub18 section (e); 

19 (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol20 lowing: 

21 ‘‘(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall 

22 apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew 

23 or had reason to know at the time when the person or 

24 entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade 

25 name, or commercial name was the same as or substanVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:46 Mar 22, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1505.IH H1505

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1505 IH

1 tially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name 

2 that was used in connection with a business or assets that 

3 were confiscated.’’; and 

4 (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by 

5 striking ‘‘In this section:’’ and all that follows 

6 through ‘‘(2) The term’’ and inserting ‘‘In this sec7 tion, the term’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### James Cockrell *v. A.*B. Hainline’s Adm’x.

Evidence — Res Gestae.

A statement of a party as to why lie is borrowing money from a witness to the effect that he desires it to pay a note is not admissible in a suit on such note when made in the absence of the plaintiff. Such a statement is not a part of the res gesta for it was not made at the time the money was claimed to have been paid and the payment was the transaction.

*226APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT.

November 15, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

On the trial of this cause in the .court below, the appellee introduced W. A. Thomas as a witness, who proved that before the death of' Hainline, the witness was ini Mt. Sterling with him, and he came to witness with, a $5 bill in his hand, and witness loaned him $70, Plainline then telling him he wanted to pay Cockrell $75. It was proved that Cockrell was not present when the money was loaned; appellant objected to the statements made by Hainline to the witness in his absence; but the court below overruled his objection, admitted the evidence, and he excepted.

It is insisted on the part of appellee that these declarations of Hainline are admissible as forming a part of the *res gestee.*To make them such they must have been contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and so connected with it as to illustrate its character. The declarations must have been made at the time of the act done, and so harmonize with it as to constitute but one transaction. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 108. The declarations, as proved by Thomas, were not made at the time the money was paid; the payment was the transaction. After the declaration Hainline and the ivitness separated; they went into different houses. The declarations or announcement to the witness of the purpose for which he wanted the money was a mere abstract statement, disconnected with the main transaction, which may or may not have transpired at all, and unless the act is done there can be no res *gestee.*The court below therefore erred in admitting the evidence.

Mrs. Plainline, the widow of the obligor in the note, was examined as a witness for appellee, and appellant objected to her as being incompetent. Sec. 24, Chap. 37, General Statutes, does not disqualify her from testifying in this case. We think she and the son of decedent are both competent witnesses. As to her statement about the open letter received from appellant, she said it was a note or a verbal message, and did not say which; but the evidence was not objected to, and the question of its competency is not before us.

No objections are perceived to the instructions. But for the error pointed out, we feel constrained to *reverse*the judgment and re*227mand the cause for a new trial, and for further proceedings consistent herewith.

*W. H. Holt, for appellant.*

*Apperson & Reid, for appellee.*