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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ORLANDO BETHEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-009-CG-N

)

CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Orlando Bethel brought this lawsuit against the defendants, City of Mobile,

Alabama, Mayor Sam Jones in his official capacity, Police Officer Michael P. Ellzey, Police

Officer Jonathan David Lee, and three unnamed police officers in their individual and official

capacities, for injuries he alleges he suffered when he was arrested and charged with disorderly

conduct during a 2009 Mardi Gras parade in Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 1). On February 8, 2010,

the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 14). As part of his complaint, the plaintiff asks

“[t]hat this Court issue a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Defendants’ (sic) from enforcing City

Ordinance Number/ Section 39-1, which embraces Section 13A-11-7 (Disorderly Conduct),

Code of Alabama 1975...” (Id., p.20). Specifically, the plaintiff asks this court to preliminarily

enjoin the defendants from acting in such a manner against the plaintiff so that:

(1) Defendants shall permit Plaintiff Orlando to continue to exercise his right to free

speech, assembly and religion on public sidewalks and right-of-ways in the City of

Mobile during Mardi Gras parades and at other reasonable times, places and manners;

(2) Defendants are prohibited from harassing or threatening to arrest Plaintiff Orlando

while Plaintiff engages in preaching and witnessing on public sidewalks and right-ofways in the City of Mobile during Mardi Gras parades and at other reasonable times,

places and manners;

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(3) Defendants must provide equal treatment to Plaintiff Orlando in all respects to the

treatment Defendants provide to those engaging in other activities in the City of Mobile

on public sidewalks and right of ways during Mardi Gras parades and at other reasonable

times, places and manners;

(4) Defendants will not act in any manner whatsoever to infringe on Plaintiff’s

Constitutional rights. 

(Id. at p. 20-21). 

Also on February 8, 2010, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunction.

(Doc. 13). In said motion, the plaintiff argues the following:

1.) Plaintiff Orlando is most likely to succeed on the merits of his Amended Complaint; 

2.) An injunction is necessary to provide Plaintiff an unabridged opportunity to engage in

protected First Amendment activity and not have his speech further chilled;

3.) Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued because the

Defendants have demonstrated flagrant disregard for protected First Amendment

liberties; and

4.) Granting Plaintiff’s Injunctive relief is the appropriate way to best serve the public

interest in this case. 

(Doc. 13, pp. 6-7).

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of

the district court...” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). This court may

grant a preliminary injunction only if the plaintiff demonstrates each of the following

prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat

irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury

outweighs the potential damage the required injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and

(4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id., 287 F.3d at 1329; see also

McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d. 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). “In this Circuit, ‘[a]

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the

movant clearly established the “burden of persuasion” ‘ as to the four requisites.” McDonald’s

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 Additionally, this court questions whether the plaintiff has the standing to bring a

motion for preliminary injunction in this situation. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95, 101-110, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). 

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Corp., 147 F.3d at 1306; All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc.,

887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)(a preliminary injunction is issued only when “drastic

relief” is necessary). 

The plaintiff asserts that there is a substantial threat of irreparable injury if this court

were to not grant this preliminary injunction in that his “right to freedom of expression, freedom

of association, freedom of speech and religious exercise has been chilled and continues to be

chilled” because of the defendants’ actions. (Doc. 13, p. 5). This court disagrees.1

 First, “[t]he

speculative nature of [the plaintiff’s] claim of future injury requires a finding that [the second]

prerequisite of equitable relief has not been fulfilled.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). As stated by the Supreme Court in Lyons, 

it is no more than conjecture to suggest that in every instance of a traffic stop, arrest, or

other encounter between police and a citizen, the police will act unconstitutionally and

inflict injury without provocation of legal excuse. And it is surely no more than

speculation to assert either that [the plaintiff] himself will again be involved in one of

those unfortunate instances, or that he will be arrested in the future and provoke [the

police’s alleged improper acts] by resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or threatening

deadly force or serious bodily injury. 

Id. at 108. 

Second, the injury the plaintiff allegedly suffered during the 2009 Mardi Gras parade will not go

unrecompensed. He has an adequate remedy at law for that alleged injury, since the legality of

the police conduct during the 2009 Mardi Gras parade is at issue in his suit for damages and can

be determined there. Since the plaintiff has not and can not show a substantial threat that

irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction, the plaintiff’s motion for a

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preliminary injunction is due to be denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for

preliminary injunction is DENIED. 

Dated this the 8th day of February, 2010.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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