## RAL PH SC HOENMAN ,

Plaintiff,

v. FED ERAL BU REAU OF I NVESTI GATI ON, et al. , Def endants. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 04-02202 ( CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (January 23, 2012) Over seven y ear s ag o, Plaintiff Ralph Schoenman (“ Schoenman” ), a se lf-desc ribed political activist and author, c ommenced this ac tion ag ainst the Central I ntellige nce A g ency

(the “CI A”) and a ha

ndful of other

fede ral a g encie s, citing the Fr eedom of I nformation Ac t (“F OI A”) and the Privac y

Act of 1974 ( “PA”) as a ba sis for the disclosure of a br oad ar ray of re cords rela ting to him, L ord B ertra nd Russell, and sever al org anizations. Over the y ear s, Schoenman’s claims for disclosure have be en succ essively winnowed down by

the dec isions of this C ourt such that, today , there is only

one “live” substantive issue rema ining—namely , the disposition of 120

rec ords that wer e re fer

red to the CI A by

the Fe dera l Bure au of I

nvestig ation (the “ FB I ”) f or proce ssing a

nd a dire ct re sponse to Schoenman. The re a re nowtwo motions before the Court that speak to this issue: the CI A’s [164] Motion for Summary J udg ment and Schoenma n’s [166] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment as to the F BI

Records Ref

err ed to the CI A (“ Cross-Motion for Summary

J udg ment”). U

pon car eful c onsideration of the parties’ submissi ons, the rele vant authorities, and the r ecor d as a w hole, the Court shall GRANT the CI A’s [164] Motion for Summary J udg ment and DEN Y Schoenman’ s [166] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment. I n

## addition, beca use no other via

ble claims for

disclosure re main extant in t his case, the Court shall
enter a fina l judgment, mar

king the final cha

pter in this protrac ted litigation. I. P RELIMINARY M ATTERS Preliminarily , the Court must address two matter s that, once r esolved, will define the scope of the re cord f

or the pe nding c ross-motions for summary judgme nt. A. Schoenm an’s First Motion to L ate File The fir st preliminary

matter to be a ddresse d is Schoenman’s self -sty led [171] Unopposed Motion for L eave to File Reply to Defe ndants’ Opposition to Pl aintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udmgme nt [ sic] W ith Respect to CI A Refe rra ls Out-of-Time ( “F irst Motion t o L ate File” ). Throug h this mot ion, Schoenman see ks the Court’s leave to late file two doc uments in support of his Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment—specific ally , a re ply memorandum of points and authorities and a decla ration pre pare d by

his wife. Althoug h the motion is unopposed, the Court declines to e x erc ise its discretion to allow Schoenman to late f ile.
I n this case, Schoe nman did not file his First Motion to L ate F ile until August 8, 2011, four da y s after his deadline to ac t had alre ady expired. See Scheduling & Proc edure s Order (“Sche duling Or der” ), ECF N o. [162] , at 4; Min. Order (June 20, 2011). As a re sult, he must do more than e stablish that there is “g ood cause ” for the re quested e x tension; he must also show that his failure to a ct within the time specified w as the produc t of “e x cusable neg lect.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1); see also F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 16(b)(4) ( “A sc hedule may be modified only

for g ood cause and with the judg e’s c onsent.”). Schoe nman has satisfied ne ither standar d. See ge nerally
Y esudian ex

rel. U.S. v. H

oward Univ. , 270 F.3d 969, 971 ( D.C. Cir. 2001) (identify ing the fac tors that should ge nera lly be conside red unde r the “ excusable neg lect” inquiry ).

2

## Honoring the par ties’ joint request, this Court origina lly set an e x cee dingly

g ener ous schedule for the br iefing of the pe nding c ross-motions for summary judgme nt. Under the defa ult framework supplied by

the L ocal Rules, any

motion shoul d be fully

briefe d somewher e betwe en twenty -one a

nd twenty -seve n day s, depending on the method(s) of service employ ed. See L C V 

## R 7(b), ( d); F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(d). I n this case, the Court a ffor ded the pa rties, who we re a lrea dy intimately

familiar with the c ontours of this case , a total of fif ty -six day s to brief their c rossmotions for summary

judgme nt. See Scheduling Orde r at 4. Ac cording to the schedule set by the Court, Schoenman’s r eply would be the last filing in the series a nd was due to be filed no late r than J uly 21, 2011. See id. Despite the g ener osity

of the sche dule, Schoenman, c iting “de velopments in other ca ses handled by

[hi s] counsel,” previously moved this Court for a fur ther two-w eek e nlarg ement. Pl.’s Unopposed Mot. to Revise Brie fing Schedule, ECF No. [165] , at 1. “Ve ry reluc tantly ,” the Court exercised its discretion to g rant Schoe nman’s motion, ext ending the brief ing sc hedule a

n additional two wee ks and g iving him until and including A ug ust 4, 2011, at close-of -business, to file his reply

paper s with the Court. See Min. Order (June 20, 2011). But in so doing , the Court “under score [d] that [i t was] an extension of an alre ady exceeding ly

g ener ous briefing schedule ” and wa rned Schoe nman, in no uncer tain terms, that “NO FURTHE R EXTENSI ONS [would] be
g rante d to either pa

rty absent e x traordina

ry circ umstances.” Id. (ca

pitaliz ation in orig inal). 1 

## The Court’s g ener osity

proved to be misplaced. Schoe nman did not file his reply paper s,

T h e C o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e C I A w a s s u b j e c t t o t h e s a m e w a r n i n g b u t n o n e t h e l e s s r e c e i v e d a f o u r 1 h o u r e x t e n s i o n o f o n e o f i t s f i l i n g d e a d l i n e s . S e e M i n . O r d e r ( J u l y 2 2 , 2 0 1 1 )

. H o w e v e r , u n l i k e h e r e , t h e l e n g t h o f t h e C I A ’ s d e l a y w a s m o d e s t a n d i t s f u l l d u r a t i o n w a s j u s t i f

i e d b y u n f

o r e s e e n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n c o m p a r e d t o S c h o e n m a n , t h e C I A h a s n o t e x h i b i t e d t h e s a m e i n a b i l i t y t o m e e t t h e d e a d l i n e s s e t b y t h e C o u r t n o r d e m o n s t r a t e d a d i s r e g a r d o f C o u r t

- o r d e r e d d e a d l i n e s . 

## 3

## seek a

n extension of tim e, or ta ke any other proa ctive steps bef ore the Aug ust 4, 2011 deadline expired. I nstead, he elec ted to allow the Court-orde red de adline to come a nd g o without so much
as a pe ep. I ndeed, it wa s not until four da y s later, on Aug ust 8, 2011, that Schoenman filed his First Motion to L ate F ile. Plainly , Schoenman did not hee d this Court’s prior warning s. I n his First Motion to L ate F ile, Schoenman tende rs a litany of excuses for

his failure to abide by the sche dule orde red by

the Court. Whil e some of those excuses might provide a leg itimate expl anation why Schoenman’ s counsel wa s unable to work on this matter f or a f ew day s, or per

haps eve n a we ek, they

do not satisfy

the Court that a re asonably diligent a ttorney would be unable to prepa re a nd file the re quisite submis sions in a timely manner . Under

the specifie d schedule , Schoenman ha d twenty -one da y s after being serve d with the CI A’s pape rs to
prepa re a nd file his response —multipl es more tha n the norm. See L C V 

## R 7(d). Even a cce pting that Schoenman’ s counsel enc ountere d the cited diff iculties during this ex tended pe riod, there was still more than ample time for a re asonably

diligent a ttorney

to prepa re a nd file a c og ent, thoughtf ul, and well-r esea

rche d reply . Yet the r ecor d is barre n of any indication that Schoenman’ s counsel soug ht to do so. I ndeed, Schoe nman’s “a ctions in this case do not bespea k diligenc e or a

ny sense of urg ency at all.” Capitol

Sprinkler Inspec tion, Inc. v. G uest Servs., I nc. , 630 F.3d 217, 226 ( D.C. Cir. 2011). Upon consider ation of the totality of the c ircumstance s, the Court finds that Schoenman has f ailed to dischar g e his burden of showing that there is “g ood

cause ” for

a fur ther e x tension of his deadline. F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1)(A) ; F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 16(b)( 4). Moreove r, in his First Motion to L ate F ile, Schoenman a lleg es that he “ continued to believe tha t he could met [sic] the August 4 deadline until late on Aug ust 3rd,” at whic h point it

4

## “bec ame c lear that there was still much work to do.” F irst Mot. to L ate F ile at 3. I n other wor ds, by his own acc ount, Schoenman subjec tively believed a s ear ly

as the da y befor e the e x piration of the Court-orde red de adline that he w ould be unable to mee t that deadline. De spite this admission, Schoenman offe rs no satisfac tory explanation as to why

he still waited another

five day s, until hi s time to act had a lrea dy expired, to petition t he Court for a further extension. Fa

r 2 

## from “e x cusable neg lect,” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)(1)( B) , these c ircumstance s evince something closer to “ willful disreg ard” of the Court’s proc ess, B L A C K 

## ’ S 

## L A W 

## D I C T I O N A R Y 

## 1133 (9th ed. 2009), a c onclusion that is only bolstered by

the fa ct that Schoenman ha d long sinc e bee n on
actua l notice that the Court expected him to adher e to the spec ified sche dule and wa s strong ly disinclined to gr ant furthe r extensions absent extraordinary circ umstances, see Tibbetts v. Sweetland , No. 02-7151, 2004 WL 287123, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Fe b. 3, 2004) ( per curiam ) (de ny ing leave to file out of time wher e par ty was g iven a “ final wa

rning ” that “[n]o further e x tensions” would be allowe d); Rones v. Nat’l Ass’n for the Adv ancem ent of Colored People , 170 F.R.D. 80, 81-82 (D.D .C. 1997) (same) . Under these unique c ircumstance s, the Court finds that Schoenman has fa iled to establish “excusable ne g lect” f or his failure to act within the time specifie d. F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)(1)( B)

.

S c h o e n m a n ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t h i s c o u n s e l h a d a p r i o r c o m m i t m e n t t o m e e t w i t h a b o a r d m e m b e r o f a 2
n o n - p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n . F i r s t , S c h o e n m a n a d m i t s t h a t t h e m u l t i

- d a y m e e t i n g b e g a n n o e a r l i e r t h a n t h e a f t e r n o o n o f A u g u s t 4 , 2 0 1 1 , m e a n i n g t h a t t h e r e i s n o r e a s o n w h y h e c o u l d n o t h a v e a c t e d i n t h i s m a t t e r o n t h e e v e n i n g o f A u g u s t 3 , 2 0 1 1 o r t h e m o r n i n g o f A u g u s t 4 , 2 0 1 1

. S e c o n d , S c h o e n m a n s t a t e s o n l y t h a t h i s c o u n s e l h a d t o s p e n d “ m u c h o f t h e n e x t t h r e e d a y s ” m e e t i n g w i t h t h e b o a r d m e m b e r , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t h i s c o u n s e l h a d w i n d o w s o f o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c t d u r i n g t h e m e e t i n g . T h i r d , S c h o e n m a n c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e m e e t i n g w a s s c h e d u l e d “ w e e k s ” e a r l i e r , m e a n i n g t h a t h i s c o u n s e l ’ s p u r p o r t e d u n a v a i l a b i l i t y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d w a s r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e a n d s h o u l d h a v e b e e n t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t w h e n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w t o g o a b o u t m e e t i n g t h e C o u r t

- o r d e r e d d e a d l i n e . F o u r t h , a n d p e r h a p s m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , S c h o e n m a n s e e m s t o b e l a b o r i n g u n d e r t h e m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t h i s c o u n s e l ’ s o t h e r c o m m i t m e n t s o v e r r i d e h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n a n d a s a n o f f i c e r o f t h i s C o u r t

. T h e m e r e e x i s t e n c e o f a p r i o r c o m m i t m e n t d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a l e g i t i m a t e e x c u s e f o r n o n - c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e d i r e c t i v e s o f t h i s C o u r t

. 

## 5

## I n short, Schoenman ha s failed to esta blish to t his Court’s satisfaction that there is “g ood

cause ” for

the re quested e x tension and that his failure to act within the time specifie d was the product of “ excusable neg lect.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1). Ac cording ly , in an exercise of its discretion, the Court shall DENY Schoenman’ s [171] First Motion to L ate F ile. 3


## B. Schoenm an’s Sec ond Motion to Lat e File The sec ond preliminary

matter to be a ddresse d is Schoenman’s [172] Motion for L eave to File L ocal Rule 7(h) Statement Out-of- Time (“Sec ond Motion to L ate F ile”), w hich the CI A has opposed. F iled on Aug ust 10, 2011, Schoenman’s motion asks the Court’s blessing to late file a statement of undisputed mate rial fa cts, as re quired by L ocal Civil Rule 7(h). As Schoenma n

conce des, his statement wa s due by no later tha

n J une 30, 2011, mea

ning tha t he is asking this Court permission to file one month and eleve n day s late. B ut beca use Schoenma

n has fa iled to establish that there is “g ood cause ” for the extension and that his failure to ac t within the tim e specifie d was the pr oduct of “ excusable neg lect,” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1), the Court shall exercise its discretion to DENY Schoenma n’s [172] Second Motion to L ate F ile. 4

I n a n y e v e n t , t h e C o u r t h a s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d S c h o e n m a n ’ s p r o p o s e d s u b m i s s i o n s a n d f i n d s t h a t , e v e n 3 i f t h e y w e r e t i m e l y f

i l e d , t h e y w o u l d n o t w a r r a n t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t o n t h e p e n d i n g c r o s s - m o t i o n s f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t

. A s a t h r e s h o l d m a t t e r , m a n y o f t h e a r g u m e n t s i n S c h o e n m a n ’ s p r o p o s e d m e m o r a n d u m w o u l d b e r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n r e p l y a n d w o u l d b e d i s r e g a r d e d o n t h a t b a s i s . S e e B a l o c h v
. N o r t o n , 5 1 7 F

. S u p p . 2 d 3 4 5 , 3 4 8 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ I f t h e m o v a n t r a i s e s a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n h i s r e p l y t o t h e n o n - m o v a n t ’ s o p p o s i t i o n , t h e c o u r t [ m a y ] e i t h e r i g n o r e t h o s e a r g u m e n t s . . . o r p r o v i d e t h e n o n - m o v a n t a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e s p o n d

. ” ) , a f f ’ d , 5 5 0 F

. 3 d 1 1 9 1 ( D

. C

. C i r . 2 0 0 8 )

. R e g a r d l e s s , S c h o e n m a n ’ s a r g u m e n t s w o u l d f a i l o n t h e m e r i t s : t h e y a r e s p e c u l a t i v e , u n s u p p o r t e d , a n d c o n t r a d i c t e d b y a l l t h e c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d

.

T h e r e a r e t w o a d d i t i o n a l , i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s f o r d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n . F i r s t , a l t h o u g h S c h o e n m a n 4
s u g g e s t s i n h i s S e c o n d M o t i o n t o L a t e F i l e t h a t a c o p y o f h i s p r o p o s e d s t a t e m e n t i s a t t a c h e d , n o s u c h d o c u m e n t a p p e a r s o n t h e p u b l i c d o c k e t , r e n d e r i n g i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h i s C o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r i t i s e v e n w o r t h w h i l e t o p e r m i t l e a v e t o l a t e f

i l e . S e e L C V R 5

. 4 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( “ A p e r s o n f i l i n g a d o c u m e n t b y e l e c t r o n i c m e a n s i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n s u r i n g t h e a c c u r a c y o f t h e o f f i c i a l d o c k e t e n t r y g e n e r a t e d b y t h e C M

- E C F s o f t w a r e . ” )

. S e c o n d , t h e C I A c o n t e n d s , w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , t h a t S c h o e n m a n f a i l e d t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e m e e t

- a n d

- c o n f e r r e q u i r e m e n t s o f L o c a l C i v i l R u l e 7 ( m ) b e f o r e f i l i n g h i s m o t i o n . S e e E l l i p s o , I n c
. v
. M a n n , 4 6 0 F

. S u p p . 2 d 9 9 , 1 2 0 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( “ [ W h e r e ] a p a r t y f i l e s a n o n d i s p o s i t i v e m o t i o n w i t h o u t c e r t i f y i n g i t s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h R u l e 7 ( m ) , t h e m o t i o n w i l l b e d e n i e d

. ” )

.



## 6

## As an initial matter, Schoenma n had an e x cee dingly

g ener ous one month and four day s to
prepa re a nd file his Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, including his stateme nt of undisputed materia l fac ts. See Scheduling Orde r at 4; Min. Orde r (June 20, 2011). Fur ther, he was on notice that this Court “strictly

adher es” to the dic tates of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h) and that he was e x pecte d to submit a stateme nt of undisputed materia l fac ts. Scheduling O rder at 2-3. None theless, Schoenman of

fer s a sing le re ason for

his failure to file a

timely statement—name ly , that he purportedly

encounte red “ multipl e [technica l] problems, primarily with a malfunc tioning

scanne r” w hen attempting to file on the eve of the e x piration of the de adline. Second Mot. to
L ate F ile at 1. On its fac e, the e x cuse is pate ntly insufficient. When a pa

rty is affor ded a
g ener ous briefing schedule of this kind, he waits until the cusp of the de adline to beg in filing a t his peril. Schoenman ha d more than a month to prepare and submit a timely filing in c onnection with a re latively

straig htforwa

rd motion. His cursory

explanation for his inability to timely file, viewed w ithin the context of the sche dule as a whole, fa ils to satis fy

this Court t hat there is “g ood cause ” for

the re quested e x tension. F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1)(A) . Ag ain, this conclusion is bolstered by

the fa ct that Schoenman w as on notice tha t the Court expected him to adhere to the specifie d schedule , which had a lrea dy been “ very

reluc tantly ” extended once , and that the Court was disinclined to g rant fur ther e x tensions “abse nt ext raor dinary circ umstances.” Min. Order (June 20, 2011). Fa

r fr om “extraordinar

y ,” the c ircumstance s cited by Schoenman we re e ntirely fore seea ble. Fur thermore , Schoenman ha s failed to esta blish “excusable neg lect.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1)(B ). Afte r his deadline to f ile a stateme nt of undisputed materia l fac ts elapsed, he waited another one month and ele ven day s befor e taking any steps to remedy

his non-compliance

.

7

## Schoenman doe s not offer a satisfa ctory

explanation for this ex traordina ry and unac cepta

ble delay . I ndeed, he conce des that the CI A ef fec tively put him on noti ce of

his non-compliance when it filed its opposition papers on Jul y 21, 2011, three wee ks befor e he f iled his Second Motion to L ate F ile. Reg ardle ss, Schoenman’s a bility to file a timely

statement wa s a matter entirely within his control; he simpl y failed to a ct with rea sonable dilig ence . And to allow Schoenman lea

ve to late f

ile at this advanc ed date would unduly prejudice the CI A. Due e ntirely to Schoenman’s f

ailings, the CI A cr afte d its opposit ion to Schoenman’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment without prepar ing a responsive state ment of mater ial fac ts, for the simple

rea son that Schoenman ha d not submit ted a timely statement re quiring a re sponse. As a r esult,
g ranting Schoenman the r equeste d leave would unfairly require the CI A to draf

t its opposi tion

anew and would dela

y the re solution of this action fur ther. See Pl.’s Resp. to C I A’s Opp’ n to Pl.’s Mot. for L eave to File L ocal Rule 7(h0 [sic] S tmt. Out-of-Time, ECF N o. [174] , at 2 (conc eding that “[o] bviously there is some disadvantag e to def endant’ s counsel in having to . . . revisit the issues raise d by ear lier plea dings.” ). On this rec ord, viewing the totality of the circ umstances, the Court f inds that Schoenman has f ailed to establish “e x cusable neg lect.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1)(B ).
I n sum, Schoenman has f ailed to establish to this Court’s satisfaction that there is “g ood

cause ” for

the re quested e x tension and that his failure to act within the time specifie d was the product of “ excusable neg lect.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 6(b)( 1). Ac cording ly , in an exercise of its discretion, the Court shall DENY Schoenman’ s [172] Second Motion to L ate F ile.

8

## II. BACKG ROUND

This action is no spring chicke n; it has been pe nding f or over seven y ear s and has se en more than its fa ir share of motion practice in that time. Setti ng forth the f ull breadth of the fac tual and proc edura l backg round of the c ase is neither nece ssary

nor desira

ble her e. I nstead, the Court assumes familiarity with, and incorpor ates he rein, its many prior opinions in this
matter. I n this section, the Court shall briefly outline the backg round that is most ge rmane to the 5 

## pending motions.
I n J uly 2001, Schoenman, a cting throug h counsel, submitted various F OI A/PA reque sts to

sever al fe dera l ag encie s, including the CI A and the F BI , seeking the disclosure of an ar ray of

rec ords re lating to him, L ord B ertra nd Russell, and six named or g anizations. Subsequently , the 6 

## CI A and F BI

acknow ledg ed re ceipt of the reque sts and conducte d sear ches of their re cords, ultimately

producing some rec ords and withholding others in full or in par t. Unsatisfied with the
ag encie s’ re sponse, Schoenman c ommenced this ac tion in Decembe r 2004, naming the CI A, the
FB I , and seve ral other

identified and unide ntified fede ral a g encie s as def endants.
I n the y ear s that have f

ollowed, the issues in this action have be en succ essively winnowed down or re fined by

the dec isions of this C ourt. Most notably for pr esent purpose s, in an opinion

2/9/11 S e e S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n ( “ S c h o e n m a n ” ) , 7 6 3 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 7 3 ( D

. D

. C

. F e b

. 9 , 5 2 0 1 1 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 7 6 4 F

. S u p p . 2 d 4 0 ( D

. D

. C

. J a n . 2 1 , 2 0 1 1 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 2 6 3 F

. R

. D

. 2 3 ( D

. D

. C

. N o v . 9 , 2 0 0 9 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n 3/31/09 ( “ S c h o e n m a n ” ) , 6 0 4 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 7 4 ( D

. D

. C

. M a r . 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n 3/19/09 ( “ S c h o e n m a n ” ) , C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 0 4

- 2 2 0 2 , 2 0 0 9 W L 7 6 3 0 6 5 ( D

. D

. C

. M a r . 1 9 , 2 0 0 9 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 5 7 5 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 6 6 ( D

. D

. C

. S e p t

. 2 2 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 5 7 6 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 6 6 ( D

. D

. C

. S e p t

. 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 5 7 3 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 1 9 ( D

. D

. C

. S e p t

. 1 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 5 7 5 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 3 6 ( D

. D

. C

. A u g . 2 5 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 0 4

- 2 2 0 2 , 2 0 0 6 W L 1 5 8 2 2 5 3 ( D

. D

. C

. J u n e 5 , 2 0 0 6 ) ; S c h o e n m a n v
. F e d

. B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n , C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 0 4

- 2 2 0 2 , 2 0 0 6 W L 1 1 2 6 8 1 3 ( D

. D

. C

. M a r . 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 )

. T h e s i x o r g a n i z a t i o n s w e r e t h e B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l P e a c e F o u n d a t i o n ; t h e B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l P e a c e 6 F o u n d a t i o n , N e w Y o r k ; t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l W a r C r i m e s T r i b u n a l ; t h e W h o K i l l e d K e n n e d y C o m m i t t e e ; t h e B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l R e s e a r c h C e n t e r ; a n d t h e C i t i z e n s C o m m i t t e e o f I n q u i r y . 

## 9

## dated Ma

rch 31, 2009, the Court concluded tha t the FB I had fa iled to justi fy

some of the withholding dec isions it made whe n responding to Schoenman’s r equests bec ause the Vaughn

3 / 3 1 / 0 9 

## index that it proffe red in this litigation was ina dequate

. Schoenm an , 604 F. Supp. 2d at 7 

## 194-204. F inding that the inf irmities in the index wer e suff iciently pronounce d so as to preve nt the Court from testing the proprie ty of the F BI ’s withholding de cisions, the Court directe d the
FB I to prepa

re a nd submit a revised Vaughn index. Id. at 204. Ther eaf ter, the pa rties ag ree d that the best cour se of a ction was for the FB I to reproc ess the full universe of re sponsive documents in its poss ession, re- rele ase the disclosable portions to Schoenman, a nd then pre pare a fina l Vaughn index. See J oint St atus Report & Proposed B riefing Schedule, ECF No. [113]

. I n the cour se of r eproc essing the 3,987 pag es of r esponsive re cords in its possession, the
FB I encounte red a

number of CI A-orig inating doc uments. Def.’ s Stm t. of Mater ial Fa cts as to Which There I s No Genuine Dispute, ECF No. [164], ¶ 3. Rather than ha ndling the r ecor ds 8 

## itself, the FB I elec ted to ref er a total of 120 documents to the CI A for pr ocessing and a dir ect
response to Schoenman. Id. The CI A subsequently revie wed those doc uments and, on January 21, 2010, provided Schoe nman the disclosable por tions thereof, ultimately

rele asing 101 documents in part ( a total of 288 pa g es) a nd withholding 19 docume nts in full (a total of 52
pag es). Id. ¶ 4. As g rounds for its dec ision to wit hhold cer tain information, the CI A re lied upon FOI A Exempti ons 1, 3, and 6, and PA Exemptions (j)(1) and ( k)(1)

. Id. ¶ 5.

T h e r e f e r e n c e i s t o V

a u g h n v
. R o s e n , 4 8 4 F

. 2 d 8 2 0 ( D

. C

. C i r . 1 9 7 3 ) , c e r t

. d e n i e d , 4 1 5 U

. S

. 9 7 7 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 7 i n w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t h e l d t h a t a g e n c i e s s h o u l d g e n e r a l l y p r e p a r e a n i t e m i z e d i n d e x c o r r e l a t i n g w i t h h e l d i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h a s p e c i f

i c e x e m p t i o n a n d t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r n o n d i s c l o s u r e . E v e n t h o u g h h e w a s w a r n e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t “ s t r i c t l y a d h e r e s ” t o L o c a l C i v i l R u l e 7 ( h ) , S c h e d u l i n g O r d e r

8
a t 2 , S c h o e n m a n n o n e t h e l e s s f a i l e d t o f i l e a t i m e l y c o u n t e r - s t a t e m e n t o f m a t e r i a l f a c t s r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e C I A ’ s s t a t e m e n t

. T h e C o u r t e x e r c i s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n t o t r e a t t h e u n c o n t r o v e r t e d f a c t s i d e n t i f

i e d b y t h e C I A i n i t s s t a t e m e n t a s a d m i t t e d

. S e e L C V R 7 ( h ) ( 1 ) ; S c h e d u l i n g O r d e r a t 2

- 3

. 

## 10

## Whil e this action wa s focuse d on reque sts directed to a g encie s other than the CI A, Schoenman’ s counsel lost track of the re cords pr oduced by

the CI A. See J oint St atus Report, ECF No. [157], at 2 n.1. According ly , on Fe bruar y 25, 2011, the CI A re -re lease d the disclosable portions of the re cords to Schoenma n. Dec l. of Elizabeth Anne Culver, I nformation Review Offic er, N ational Clandestine Servic e, Centra l I ntellige nce A g ency (“Culver Dec l.”), ECF No. [164-1] , ¶ 5. Ther eaf

ter, Schoe nman selec ted a sa mple of 31 docume nts (a total of 86 pa g es) that, by mutual ag ree ment, would be the subjec t of the CI A’s Vaughn index and the parties’ anticipated br iefing

. See J oint St atus Report, ECF N o. [163] , at 1. The pa rties then proc eede d to brief the pending cross-motions for summar y judgme nt. See Def

.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def .’s Mot. for Summ. J . (“D ef.’ s [164] Mem.”), E CF No. [164] ; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J . Wit h Respect to F BI Docs. Ref

err ed to the CI A and in Opp’ n to Def .’s Mot. for Summ. J ., ECF No. [166]; Def .’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J . and Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’ s Mot. for Summ. J ., ECF No. [169]. As set forth above, Schoenman f

ailed to file a

timely reply in support of his Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment. The pe nding motions are now fully briefe d and ripe for a

decision. I n an exerc ise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral a rg ument on the motions would not assist the Court in rende ring its decision. See L C V 

## R 7(f). III. LE GA L ST ANDAR D Congr ess ena cted F OI A to “pier ce the veil of administrative sec rec y and to open a g ency action to the lig ht of public scrutiny .” Dep’ t of the Air Force v. R ose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quotation marks a

nd citation omitted). Howeve r, Cong ress re mained sensitive to the nee d to achie ve bala

nce be tween the se objec tives and the potential that “ leg itimate gove rnmental a nd

11

## private inter ests could be ha rmed by rele ase of

cer tain ty pes of infor

mation.” Criti cal Mass Energy P roject v. Nucle ar Regulatory Comm’n , 975 F.2d 871, 872 ( D.C. Cir. 1992) ( en banc ) (quotation marks a

nd citation omitted), cert. de nied , 507 U.S. 984 (1993). To this end, F OI A “re quires fe dera l ag encie s to make Gove rnment re cords a vailable to the public, subjec t to nine exemptions for c ateg ories of ma terial.” Milner v. De p’t of Navy , __ U.S. __, 131 S. C t. 1259, 1261-62 (2011) . Despite such e x emptions, “disclosure, not sec rec y , is the dominant objective of the ac t.” Rose , 425 U.S. at 361. For this reason, the “ exemptions are expli citly made e x clusive, and must be nar

rowly construed.” Milner , 131 S. Ct . at 1262 (quotation marks a nd citations omitted). When presente d with a motion for summary judgme nt in this context, the dist rict cour t must conduct a “ de novo” r eview of the re cord, 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ), which “ require s the
court to asc erta in whether the ag ency

has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the documents re quested . . . a re e x empt from disclosure ,” Assassinati on Archive s & Researc h Ctr. v. Cent. Intelligence Agenc

y , 334 F.3d 55, 57 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks a nd citation omitted). “Consistent with the purpose of the A ct, the burde n is on the ag ency to justi fy withholding re quested doc uments,” Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 ( D.C. Cir. 1993), and only

afte r an a g ency

has prove n that “it has fully discharg ed its disclosure obliga tions” is summ ary

judgme nt appropria te, W eisberg v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1983). I n asce rtaining whether the ag ency

has met its burden, the district c ourt
may rely upon ag ency

aff idavits or decla

rations. Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “I f an a g ency ’s af fidavit descr ibes the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrate s that the information withheld log ically falls within

12

## the claimed e x emption, and is not contradicte d by contra ry evidenc e in the re cord or by evidenc e of the a g ency ’s bad f

aith, then summary

judgme nt is warra

nted on the basis of the aff idavit alone.” Am. Civil Liberti es Union v. U .S. Dep’ t of Defense , 628 F.3d 612, 619 ( D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). I n other wor ds, “[u] ncontra dicted, plausible a ffidavits showing rea sonable specific ity

and a log ical re lation to the exempti on are likely to preva il.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. De

p’t of State , 641 F.3d 504, 509 ( D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Summary judgme nt is proper whe n the pleading s, the discover y materia ls on file, and any aff idavits or decla rations “show[] t hat there is no ge nuine dispute as to any materia l fac t and the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” F E D


## . R. C I V


## . P. 56(a) . Wit h these princ iples in mind, the Court turns to the merits of the pa rties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt. IV. DISCUSSIO N The CI A’s [164] Motion for Summary J udg ment and Schoenma n’s [166] Cross-Motion for Summary

J udg ment both speak to the same issue—namely , the proprie ty of the CI A’s withholding dec isions with respect to the 120 docume nts that were ref err ed to the CI A by

the FB I for pr ocessing and a dir ect r esponse to Schoenma n. Of these 120 documents, the CI A ultimately rele ased 101 doc uments to Schoenman in part ( a total of 288 pa g es) a nd withheld 19 documents in full (a total of 52 pa g es). To justify its withhol ding de cisions under F OI A, the CI A now re lies 9

3/19/09 C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e a p p r o a c h h e h a s t a k e n t h r o u g h o u t t h i s c a s e , s e e , e
. g
. , S c h o e n m a n , 2 0 0 9 W L 9 7 6 3 0 6 5 , a t * 1 9 , S c h o e n m a n d o e s n o t d i s p u t e t h e C I A ’ s r e l i a n c e o n P A E x e m p t i o n s ( j ) ( 1 ) a n d ( k ) ( 1 ) a s a b a s i s f o r n o n - d i s c l o s u r e u n d e r t h a t s t a t u t e , s e e D e f

. ’ s [ 1 6 4 ] M e m . a t 7

. I n t h i s C i r c u i t , “ i t i s w e l l u n d e r s t o o d

. . . t h a t w h e n a p l a i n t i f f f i l e s a n o p p o s i t i o n t o a d i s p o s i t i v e m o t i o n a n d a d d r e s s e s o n l y c e r t a i n a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t , a c o u r t m a y t r e a t t h o s e a r g u m e n t s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o a d d r e s s a s c o n c e d e d

. ” H o p k i n s v
. W

o m e n ’ s D i v
. , G e n
. B d

. o f G l o b a l M i n i s t r i e s , 2 8 4 F

. S u p p . 2 d 1 5 , 2 5 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) , a f f ’ d , 9 8 F

. A p p ’ x 8 ( D

. C

. C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) ; a c c o r d L e w i s v
. D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a , N o . 1 0

- 5 2 7 5 , 2 0 1 1 W L 3 2 1 7 1 1 , a t * 1 ( D

. C

. C i r . F e b

. 2 , 2 0 1 1 )

. S c h o e n m a n w a s a l e r t e d t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e l o n g b e f o r e h e f i l e d h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e C I A ’ s M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t

. S e e S c h e d u l i n g O r d e r ¶ 3 ( c )

. B a s e d o n S c h o e n m a n ’ s f a i l u r e t o r e s p o n d , t h e C o u r t e x e r c i s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n t o t r e a t t h e C I A ’ s a r g u m e n t a s c o n c e d e d

. 

## 13

## upon FOI A Exempti ons 1 and 3 —two of the tools that the United States Supreme Court ha s 1 0



## rec og nized are a

vailable to ag encie s to “shield national sec urity information and other

sensitive materia ls” from public disclosure

. Milner , 131 S. Ct . at 1271. The Court finds the CI A has met its burden of de monstrating to the Court’ s satisfaction that the c laimed exemptions apply to the information withheld. A. The CIA Has Properly I nvoke d Exe mption 1 Ex emption 1 applies to materials that a re “ specific ally

authorized under c riteria established by

an Executive orde r to be ke pt secre t in the interest of na tional defe nse or f

oreig n policy and . . . ar e in fa ct prope rly classified pur suant to such Executive order .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 1). I n this case, the CI A re lies upon Ex ecutive O rder 13,526, 75 Fe d. Reg . 707 (De c. 29, 2009), which pr escr ibes a unifor m sy stem for c lassify ing a nd safe g uarding national sec urity information. To show that it has prope rly withheld information on this basis, the CI A must show both that the information was c lassified pursua nt to the proper pr ocedur es and tha t the withheld information substantively falls within the scope of

Ex ecutive O rder

13,526. See Salisbury v. United States , 690 F.2d 966, 971- 72 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (a naly zing a pr edec essor to Executive Orde r 13,526). Stated somew hat diffe rently :

I nformation can be proper ly classified under Ex ecutive Orde r 13526 if four requ i re ments are met: (1) an orig inal classifica tion authority classifies the information; (2) the United States Gover nment o wn s, produce s, or controls the information; (3) the information falls within one or more of eig ht protecte d cate g ories listed in section 1.4 of t he Ex ecutive Orde r; and (4) the orig inal classifica tion authority deter mines that t he unauthorized disclosure of the information rea sonably could be expected to result in a specifie d level of damag e

O r i g i n a l l y , t h e C I A a l s o r e l i e d u p o n F O I A E x e m p t i o n 6 a s a b a s i s f o r n o n - d i s c l o s u r e , b u t “ [ t ] h e C I A i s 1 0
n o l o n g e r a s s e r t i n g E x e m p t i o n 6 t o p r o t e c t a n y w i t h h e l d i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e E x e m p t i o n s 1 a n d / o r 3 a l s o [ p u r p o r t e d l y ] f

u l l y p r o t e c t a l l s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n . ” D e f

. ’ s [ 1 6 4 ] M e m . a t 6 n . 4

. 

## 14

## to the national secur ity , and the orig inal classifica tion a u thor ity is able to identify

or desc ribe the da

mag e. Am. Civil Liberti es Union v. D ep’t of Justice , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 4005324, at *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011) (c iting Executive Orde r 13,526 § 1.1(a )). Eliz abeth Anne Culver (“ Culver”) , the I nformation ReviewOffic er f or the CI A’s National Clandestine Ser vice, holds orig inal classifica tion and decla ssification authority . Culver Dec l. ¶¶ 12-13. She r eviewe d the documents a t issue with respec t to the pending cross-motions for summary

judgme nt and deter

mined that they

are owned, pr oduced by , and under the control of the United States Gove rnment. Id. ¶ 14. She explains in considerable de tail that the information withheld by

the CI A includes, a mong othe r thing s, (a) information that would re veal the identities of human and f oreig n intelligenc e ser

vice sourc es; (b) infor

mation pertaining to

source rela tionships t hat the CI A has for g ed with fore ign intellig ence service s and liaisons; and (c) information per

taining to the CI A’s for eig n intelligenc e ac tiviti es and me thods. See id. ¶¶ 24- 51; Second Dec l. of Elizabeth Anne Culver, I nformation ReviewOffic er, N ational Clandestine Service , Central I ntellige nce A g ency (“Suppl. Culver De cl.”) , ECF No. [169-1], ¶¶ 2-5. F urther, she explains, ag ain in considera ble detail, that the disclosure of such infor mation would cause damag e or se rious damag e to national sec urity beca use, among

other thing s, (a) fore ign intelligenc e ser

vices a nd others who have intere sts at odds with the United States could use the information to thwart na tional policies and prog rams and to de tect, pene trate, c ounter, a nd evalua te the CI A’s ac tiviti es; (b) the reve lation of the CI A’s intellige nce a ctivities in a particular country or with a for eig n liaison service could, eve n afte r the pa ssag e of time, ha rm the United States’ re lationship with t hat country or re sult in countermeasur es; and (c ) the disclosure of the identities of intelligenc e sourc es could ha mper the CIA’s ability to maintain curre nt intelligenc e
15

## source s and deve lop other intellige nce sour ces in the f uture. See Culver Dec l. ¶¶ 24-51; Suppl. Culver Dec l. ¶ 4. I n short, Culver explains why the information withheld in this case is prope rly classified a s “conf

idential” or “ secr et” unde r Executive Orde r 13,526, which pr otects, among other thing s, “for eig n g overnme nt information,” “intellig ence activities (including cover t action), intelligenc e sourc es or methods, or c ry ptology ,” and “ fore ign r elations or for eig n activities of the United States, including confide ntial sources.” Ex ecutive O rder 13,526 § 1.4(b)- (d). The Court is mindful of its responsibilit y to conduct a “ de novo” r eview of the re cord. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ). None theless, in rec og nition that courts are g ener ally ill-equipped to second- g uess an a g ency ’s opinion in the national secur ity context, “the g overnme nt’s burden is a light one.” Am. Civil Liberti es Union , 628 F.3d a t 624. I n this contex t, the district court “must

acc ord substantial weig ht to an ag ency ’s af fidavit conc erning the details of the c lassified status of the disputed rec ord,” ke eping in mind “that any aff idavit or ag ency

statement will alway s be specula tive to some ext ent, in the sense tha t it describes potential futur e har m.” Id. at 619 (quotation marks, notations, and c itations omi tted). I n the end, “ an ag ency ’s justification for invoking a

FOI A exemption is sufficie nt if it appear s ‘log ical’ or ‘plausible.’” Larson v. Dep’t of State , 565 F.3d 857, 862 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting W olf v. Cent. Intelligence Agenc y , 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) . I n this case, a ccor ding substantial we ight a nd defe renc e to Culver’s dec lara tions, the Court finds that it is both plausible and logic al that the disclosure of the information withheld by the CI A “r easona

bly could be e x pecte d to result in damag e to the national sec urity .” Executive Orde r 13,526 § 1.1(a )(4)

. “[F]inding no evidenc e in the re cord to 1 1

C o u r t s i n t h i s C i r c u i t h a v e r o u t i n e l y f o u n d s i m i l a r i n f

o r m a t i o n t o b e p r o t e c t e d f r o m d i s c l o s u r e u n d e r 1 1 E x e m p t i o n 1

. S e e , e
. g
. , L a r s o n , 5 6 5 F

. 3 d a t 8 6 3

- 6 4 ; K r i k o r i a n v
. D e p ’ t o f S t a t e , 9 8 4 F

. 2 d 4 6 1 , 4 6 4

- 6 5 ( D

. C

. C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ; A m
. C i v i l L i b e r t i e s U n i o n , 2 0 1 1 W L 4 0 0 5 3 2 4 , a t * 1 4

- 1 7 ; I n t ’ l C o u n s e l B u r e a u v
. U

. S

. C e n t

. I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , 7 7 4 F

. S u p p . 2 d 2 6 2 , 2 6 7

- 7 3 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 1 1 ) ; M o r l e y v
. U

. S

. C e n t

. I

n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c

y , 6 9 9 F

. S u p p . 2 d 

## 16

## support the opposition conclusion, no further investiga tion is required,” Am. Civil Liberti es Union , 628 F.3d a t 625, and the Court’s inquiry is at an end. Schoenman’ s arg uments to the contrar y are disjoint ed and of

ten difficult to follow. More importantly , they

are wholly

unpersua sive. Many

of them ar e mer e re statements of a rg uments alre ady raised a nd reje cted a

t ear lier points in this litigation. Reg ardle ss, the arg uments are so lacking in merit that they

command little or no extended attention here . Five e x amples will illust rate the point. First, Schoenma

n raises a series of complaints with the CI A’s prof fer ed Vaughn index, but despite the numerosity of his complaints, they

are unavailing . Considering the CI A’s submissi ons collectively , including Culver ’s dec lara tions, the Vaughn index, and the partial production to Schoenman, the CI A has prof fer ed more than enoug h information to “identify the

rec ords re fer ence d and under stand the basic r easoning behind the cla imed exemptions .” Morley v. Cent. Intelligenc e Age ncy , 508 F.3d 1108, 1123 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). I n this case, the CI A’s submissi ons provide suff

icient information to test the applica bility of the e x emptions relied upon without going so far

as disclosing protec ted information. F or this rea son, the Court declines Schoenman’ s invitation t o revie w the re cords a t issue in camera

. Second, Schoenma

n launche s a broa dside attac k on Culver’s desc ription of the har m that could be e x pecte d to flow from the disclosure of the infor mation withheld, but in so doi ng he fails to g ive suffic ient cre dence to the axiom that, in this particular c ontext , “any aff idavit or
ag ency statement will alway s be spec ulative to some extent, in t he sense that it describes

2 4 4 , 2 5 2

- 5 3 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 1 0 ) ; A m
. C i v i l L i b e r t i e s U n i o n v
. D e

p ’ t o f D e f

. , 6 6 4 F

. S u p p . 2 d 7 2 , 7 6

- 7 8 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 0 9 ) , 3/19/09 a f f ’ d , 6 2 8 F

. 3 d 6 1 2 ( D

. C

. C i r . 2 0 1 1 ) ; s e e a l s o S c h o e n m a n , 2 0 0 9 W L 7 6 3 0 6 5 , a t * 2 0

- 2 3 ( f i n d i n g , e a r l i e r i n t h i s a c t i o n , t h a t t h e C I A e s t a b l i s h e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f E x e m p t i o n 1 t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n f o r m a t i o n )

. 

## 17

## potential future ha rm.” Am. Civil Liberti es Union , 628 F.3d a t 619 (quotation marks and citations omitt ed). Suff

ice it to say

that the Court has conduc ted a se arc hing r eview of Culver’s decla rations, the CI A’s Vaughn index, and the partial produc tion to S choenma n, and is satisfied that it is bot h plausible and log ical that the disclosure of the infor mation withheld “re asonably could be e x pecte d to result in damag e to the national se curity .” Executive Orde r 13,526 § 1.1(a) (4). Third, the Court appr ecia tes that Schoenman ha s his own opinion as to the mag nitude of the national sec urity

interests implicated by

the information ca

ptured by his FOI A re quests, but he once ag ain fa ils to recog nize that “[t ]he applicable le g al standar d . . . is clear and ‘a llocates to the [g]overnment the r esponsibility for e valuating the har

ms associated w ith public disclosure, and neither

the propone nt of disclosure nor the district court is fre e to substitute its own policy

2 / 9 / 1 1 

## judgme nts for those of the Ex ecutive.’ ” Schoenm an , 763 F. Supp. 2d at 195 (quoting Alsawam v. Obama , 764 F. Supp. 2d 11, 19 (D.D .C. 2011)). I n this contex t, “little proof or explanation is required be y ond a plausible a ssertion that information is proper ly classified,” Morley , 508 F.3d a t 1126, and the CI A has discha rg ed that burde n, even w hen one a ccounts for the passag e of time a

nd political chang es interve ning sinc e the unde rly ing ma terials first c ame into ex istence. Four th, Schoenman conte nds that continued non-disclosure of the infor mation withheld by the CI A is inappropria

te bec ause a

n unspecifie d universe of information re lating in some w ay to his FOI A re quests has purpor tedly made its way

into the public domain. Howeve r, to preva il on this prior disclosure theor y , Schoenman be ars the bur den of e stablishing that “the specific information soug ht . . . [ enter ed] in the public domain by officia l disclosure,” Am. Civil Liberti es

18

## Union , 628 F.3d a t 21 (citation and e mphasis omitt ed), a nd his ge nera liz ed ar g ument falls considera bly short of mee ting that bur den. Fifth, Schoe nman intimates that the CI A’s insistence upon ma intaining the c lassification of the infor

mation at issue is calcula ted to hide past or pr esent g overnme nt improprieties. Thoug h his submis sions “rec ount[ ] a lit any of alleg edly

suspicious circumstanc es,” the y “lac k[]
any substantiation.” Blackwell v. F ed. Bureau of I

nvestigation , 646 F.3d 37, 41 ( D.C. Cir. 2011).
L ike similar alleg ations that he has tende red in this litigation, Schoenman’ s sugg estion that the CI A’s “de terminations . . . are desig ned to conc eal illicit conduct ar e spec ulative, unsupported,

2 / 9 / 1 1 

## and contr adicted by

all the evidenc e in the re cord.” Schoenm an , 763 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96. The Court has c are fully

considere d Schoenman’ s remaining arg uments and finds them to be without merit. The Court conc ludes that the CI A has discha rg ed its burden of

establishing that it has proper ly

invoked Exempti on 1 in this case. B. The CIA Has Properly I nvoke d Exe mption 3 Ex emption 3 applies to materials that a re “ specific ally

exempted from disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 3). I n other wor ds, Ex emption 3 incorpora tes the protec tions aff orded by other statutes shielding rec ords from public disclosure . I n this case, the CI A invokes two statutes: (1) a pr ovision of the National Secur ity Act of 1947 r equiringthe Dire ctor of National I ntellige nce to “ protec t intelligenc e sourc es and me thods from unauthorized disclosure,” 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1); a nd (2) a provision of the Centra l I ntellige nce A g ency Act of 1949 requiring the protec tion of “intellige nce sour ces a nd methods from unauthorized disclosure ” and exempting the CI A from a ny law that re quires “the publication or disclosure of the org anization, functions, names, of

ficial titles, salarie s, or numbers of personne l employ ed by

the [CI A],” id. §

19

## 403g . Pursuant to the National Secur ity Act, the CI A withheld information about c lassified intelligenc e sourc es and me thods, including infor mation pertaining to human and for eig n intelligenc e ser

vice sourc es, cove rt installations, diss emination-control mar kings, a nd technica l intelligenc e collec tion. Cul ver D ecl. ¶ ¶ 55-56. Pursuant to the Centra l I ntellige nce A g ency Act, the CI A withheld information about its fore ign intellig ence collection ac tiviti es, the na mes of its employ ees, pe rsonal identifier s, officia l titl es, file number s, and interna l org anizational data. Id. ¶¶ 57- 58. When it comes to Ex emption 3, “the sole issue for decision is the exist ence of a r eleva nt statute and the inc lusion of withheld material within the statute’s c overa g e.” Morley , 508 F.3d a t 1126 (quotation marks a

nd citation omitted). I t is well-established that both of the pr ovisions relied upon by

the CI A in this case f

all within the ambit of Ex emption 3. See, e .g. , Goland v. Cent. Intelligence Agenc

y , 607 F.2d 339, 349 ( D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. de nied , 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Subh v. Cent. Intelligenc e Age ncy , 760 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D .C. 2011);

3 / 1 9 / 0 9 

## Schoenm an , 2009 WL 763065, at *24. Upon a se arc hing r eview, the Court finds that Culver’s dec lara tions, the CI A’s Vaughn index, and the CI A’s par tial production provide a sufficie ntly

detailed e x planation as to why the information withheld fr om Schoenman fa lls withi n the universe of informa tion protected f rom public disclosure by

the National Sec urity

Act and the Central I ntellige nce A g ency Act. Ta king into ac count the “spe cial def ere nce ow ed to ag ency aff idavits on national secur ity matters,” the Court is satisfied that the CI A has met its burden of establishing the applicability of Exemption 3 t o the withheld information. Schoenma n’s
arg uments to the contrar

y , which ar e either

discussed above or ar e other wise devoid of me rit, simply do not counsel in favor

of a diff ere nt result.

20

## C. The CIA Has Discharged its Burden of Establishing that It Has Disclosed All Reasonably Se

gregable Portions of the Responsive Rec ords Even whe n an ag ency

may proper ly withhold a responsive r ecor d under one of F OI A’s

enumer ated e x emptions, it nevertheless must disclose any non-exempt information that is “re asonably

seg reg able.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The que stion of seg reg ability is by nece ssity subjective a

nd context-specific, turning upon the nature of the doc ument in question and the information containe d there in. Mead D ata Cent., Inc. v. U .S. Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977). An a g ency need not, f

or instance , “commit signific ant time and re source s to the separ ation of disjointed words, phra ses, or e ven sente nces w hich taken se para tely or toge ther ha ve minimal or no information conte nt.” Id. at 269 n.54. Ultimately , to discharg e its burden be fore the district court, the a g ency “must provide a r easona

bly detailed justification rathe r than c onclusory

statements to support its claim that the non-exempt material in a doc ument is not reasona

bly seg reg able.” Id.
I n this case, Culver’ s decla rations desc ribe how the CI A ca ref ully revie wed a

nd rele ased all rea sonably

seg reg able infor

mation, which included c onducting a line-by -line re view of e ach document in an a ttempt to identify and re lease non-exempt portions of eac h document. Culver Dec l. ¶¶ 59-60; Suppl. Culver Dec l. ¶¶ 2-5. B ased upon this desc ription and a sea rching revie w of the doc uments that the CI A has withheld only in part, the Court finds that the CI A has adequately

demonstrated, in r easona ble and non- conclusory

terms, that all non-e x empt materia l has either been disc losed to Schoenman or is not re asonably seg reg able.

V. CONCLUSION The Court has c onsidered the rema ining a rg uments tendere d by

Schoenman a

nd
21

## conclude s that they are without merit. There fore , and for the re asons set for

th above, the Court shall DENY Schoe nman’s [171] First Motion to L ate F ile, DENY Schoe nman’s [172] Second Motion to L ate F ile, GRANT the CI A’s [164] Motion for Summary J udg ment, and DEN Y Schoenman’ s [166] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment. I n addition, beca use no other c laims for disclosure rema in ext ant, the Court shall enter a fina l judgment mar

king the end of this ca se. An appr opriate O rder

acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: J anuar

y 23, 2012 /s/ COLLE EN KOLLAR-K OTEL LY United States District J udg e

22