VISION FOR SUCCESS:

Facilities for 

Semiconductor Materials 

and Manufacturing 

Equipment

CHIPS Incentives Program

June 23, 2023
for AMERICA

CHIPS.gov

CHIPS for America includes the CHIPS Program Office, responsible for 

semiconductor incentives, and the CHIPS Research and Development Office, 

responsible for R&D programs. Both sit within the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) at the Department of Commerce. 

NIST promotes U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing 

measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance 

economic security and improve our quality of life. NIST is uniquely positioned 

to successfully administer the CHIPS for America program because of the 

bureau’s strong relationships with U.S. industries, its deep understanding of the 

semiconductor ecosystem, and its reputation as fair and trusted. 

 Visit https://www.chips.gov to learn more.
CHIPSfor AMERICA

CHIPS.gov

Vision for Success:

Facilities for 

Semiconductor 

Materials and 

Manufacturing 

Equipment

CHIPS Incentives Program

June 23, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................. 4

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................5

STRENGTHENING SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE......................................................... 6

ADVANCING U.S. TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP ..........................................................7

SUPPORTING VIBRANT FAB CLUSTERS......................................................................8

CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................8

ENDNOTES ...................................................................................................................... 9
4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The semiconductor supply chain is global, specialized, and 

interconnected. Chipmakers do business with thousands 

of individual suppliers that provide the highly complex 

materials and tools used to produce semiconductors. 

Often, even the biggest chipmakers lack full visibility into 

their entire supply chain.

The United States and its allies and partners produce 

nearly all of the world’s most advanced semiconductor 

materials and manufacturing equipment. But as suppliers 

have expanded overseas, the United States has also 

grown vulnerable to risks stemming from the geographic 

concentration of critical suppliers, as well as from threats 

to supply chain security and integrity. At the same 

time, the CHIPS Incentives Program presents a unique 

opportunity to strengthen the U.S. supplier ecosystem as 

a historic expansion of U.S. chipmaking capacity boosts 

domestic demand for semiconductor materials and tools.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. Department of 

Commerce’s CHIPS Program Office is releasing two 

funding opportunities for the semiconductor supply 

chain. The first, released in June 2023, expands the 

funding opportunity released in February 2023 to 

accept applications for the construction, expansion, 

or modernization of semiconductor materials and 

manufacturing equipment facilities for which the total 

capital investment equals or exceeds $300 million. The 

second, to be released in the fall of 2023, will cover 

semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment 

facilities with total capital investments under $300 million. 

This document lays out the CHIPS Program Office’s 

“Vision for Success” for both funding opportunities across 

three categories: strengthening supply chain resilience, 

advancing U.S. technology leadership, and supporting 

vibrant U.S. fab clusters.

The CHIPS Program Office aims to work with industry, 

U.S. partners and allies, U.S. government agencies, state 

and local entities, labor unions, workforce development 

organizations, career and technical education providers, 

economic development organizations, and institutions of 

higher education to achieve the following goals by the 

end of this decade:

Strengthening supply chain resilience. The CHIPS 

Program Office will invest, in coordination with other 

U.S. government agencies, to reduce chokepoint risks 

flowing from geographic concentration. Meanwhile, U.S. 

semiconductor supply chain participants will improve the 

transparency of demand and supply to reduce the risks of 

production disruptions due to chronic shortages of critical 

supply chain inputs.

Advancing U.S. technology leadership. Major U.S. 

semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials 

suppliers will increase their footprints in the United 

States, reinforcing American technology leadership in 

the supply chain. In addition, non-U.S. suppliers of the 

world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing 

equipment, materials, and subsystems will establish 

large-scale footprints in the United States for the first 

time, contributing to and benefiting from the domestic 

innovation ecosystem and bringing new strategic 

capabilities and know-how to the United States.

Supporting vibrant U.S. fab clusters. Each CHIPS-funded 

fab cluster in the United States will be supported by 

dozens of suppliers, including many that will be investing 

in the United States for the first time to close critical 

gaps in the U.S. supplier ecosystem. The CHIPS Program 

Office will encourage state and local entities to facilitate 

the expansion of these ecosystems and to support both 

domestic suppliers growing their U.S. presence and

non-U.S. suppliers expanding in the United States for

the first time.

In pursuit of these objectives, the CHIPS Program Office 

will be guided by the nine cross-cutting themes detailed 

in the “Vision for Success: Commercial Fabrication 

Facilities” released on February 28, 2023. These include 

catalyzing private investment, encouraging customer 

demand, engaging with U.S. partners and allies, building 

a skilled and diverse workforce, reducing time-to-build, 

reducing costs through innovation, promoting operational 

security, supply chain security, and cybersecurity; spurring 

regional economic development and inclusive economic 

growth; and enforcing guardrails. These themes apply 

across the CHIPS Program Office’s varied investments. 

Continued U.S. leadership in semiconductor materials 

and manufacturing equipment supply chains is critical to 

establishing a vibrant U.S. manufacturing sector, which is 

in turn core to America’s economic and national security. 

The CHIPS Program Office will reserve a significant 

majority of its investments for the commercial fabrication 

facilities that will bring semiconductor manufacturing 

back to the United States. But targeted investments in 

semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment 

will help address important vulnerabilities and capitalize 

on existing U.S. strengths in one of the world’s most 

important supply chains. 
5

INTRODUCTION

In February 2023, the CHIPS Program Office within 

the Department of Commerce released its first funding 

opportunity pursuant to Section 9902 of Title XCIX—

Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors 

for America of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (CHIPS 

Act).1 Alongside the funding opportunity, the CHIPS 

Program Office released a “Vision for Success,” outlining 

how investments in commercial fabrication facilities can 

revitalize the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem and advance 

U.S. economic and national security.2 

Building on that report, this document outlines the CHIPS 

Program Office’s “Vision for Success” for a second set of 

investments, this time in the semiconductor supply chain. 

This vision will guide implementation of two funding 

opportunities. The first, released June 2023, expands the 

funding opportunity from February to accept applications 

for the construction, expansion, or modernization of 

semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment 

facilities for which the total capital investment equals 

or exceeds $300 million. The second, to be released in 

the fall of 2023, will cover semiconductor materials and 

manufacturing equipment facilities with total capital 

investments under $300 million.

The CHIPS Program Office will subsequently release 

a separate funding opportunity for research and 

development facilities, which will seek to complement 

investments by the CHIPS Research and Development 

Office in the National Semiconductor Technology 

Center, the National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing 

Program, one or more Manufacturing USA institutes, and 

the NIST metrology program under Section 9906 of

the CHIPS Act.3 

***

Transforming raw silicon into a finished chip involves 

one of the world’s largest and most complex supply 

chains. Chip manufacturers do business with thousands of 

individual suppliers that provide the often highly complex 

materials and tools needed throughout the production 

process.4 Adding to the complexity: suppliers have their 

own supply chains to manage, and even the biggest 

chipmakers and their suppliers often lack full visibility into 

their entire supply chain.5 

In the early days of semiconductor manufacturing, 

the American chipmakers who founded the industry 

developed and manufactured many of their manufacturing 

tools and materials in-house. Over time, companies 

were spun out to service the growing diversity of mostly 

U.S.-based chipmakers, spawning many increasingly 

specialized suppliers largely based in the United States.6 

In the last forty years, however, as semiconductor 

manufacturing has shifted abroad, the supply chain 

has expanded overseas as well.7 The United States 

continues to produce many of the world’s most advanced 

semiconductor manufacturing tools, subsystems, and 

materials, and its allies and partners have produced 

remarkable technological advances that have benefited 

the United States and the entire global ecosystem.8 But 

the transformation of the supply chain has also come 

with risks. U.S.-based chipmakers have been buffeted 

by disruptions and shortages in recent years—partly 

because of vulnerabilities associated with the geographic 

concentration of highly specialized suppliers; the lack

of visibility into demand, supply, and security risks in

the supply chain; and the months- or even years-long

lead times required to qualify new suppliers in the

event of disruptions.9 

At the same time, the CHIPS Incentives Program presents 

a unique opportunity to build on U.S. strengths in the 

supply chain, as a historic expansion of U.S. chipmaking 

capacity boosts domestic demand for semiconductor 

manufacturing inputs. If successful, the CHIPS Incentives 

Program will not only address supply chain vulnerabilities 

but also accelerate U.S. innovation in manufacturing 

equipment and materials and grow the supplier 

ecosystems supporting new clusters of U.S. fabs. 

To guide its supply chain investments, the CHIPS Program 

Office has developed a “Vision for Success” focused 

on strengthening supply chain resilience, advancing 

U.S. technology leadership, and supporting vibrant fab 

clusters.10 In pursuit of these objectives, the CHIPS 

Program Office will be guided by the nine cross-cutting 

themes detailed in the “Vision for Success: Commercial 

Fabrication Facilities” released on February 28, 2023.11 

These include catalyzing private investment, encouraging 

customer demand, engaging with U.S. partners and 

allies, building a skilled and diverse workforce, reducing 

time-to-build, reducing costs through innovation, 

promoting operational security, supply chain security, and 

cybersecurity; spurring regional economic development 

and inclusive economic growth; and enforcing guardrails. 

These themes apply across the CHIPS Program Office’s 

varied investments. 

One such theme—engaging with U.S. partners and allies—

will be especially critical to strengthening supply chain 

resilience. The United States does not seek to create a 

self-sufficient semiconductor supply chain. The United 

States will continue to depend on advanced materials 

and tools produced overseas, and through bilateral and 
6

multilateral dialogues and business-to-business and 

government-to-business forums, the CHIPS Program 

Office and other government departments and agencies 

will work with like-minded partners to diversify the global 

semiconductor supply chain. 

This Vision for Success will guide the CHIPS Program 

Office as it assesses the trade offs between worthy supply 

chain projects and other types of projects across the 

CHIPS Incentives Program. The CHIPS Program Office 

will reserve a significant majority of its investments 

for the commercial fabrication facilities that will bring 

semiconductor manufacturing back to the United States. 

But targeted investments in semiconductor materials 

and manufacturing equipment—investments focused 

on projects that would not happen without CHIPS 

Incentives Program funding—will help address important 

vulnerabilities and capitalize on existing U.S. strengths in 

one of the world’s most important supply chains. 

STRENGTHENING SUPPLY CHAIN 

RESILIENCE

Without access to the wide array of materials and tools 

needed for semiconductor manufacturing, chipmakers 

would struggle to produce the devices that are critical to 

U.S. economic and national security. Even isolated supply 

chain disruptions can be damaging. In 1993, for example, 

the explosion of a Sumitomo Chemical factory in Japan 

caused spot prices for dynamic random-access memory 

chips in the United States to more than double.12 

Unfortunately, many supply chain inputs are 

geographically concentrated. Ukraine produced roughly 

half of the global supply of neon in 2022, for example, and 

the United States depends on the People’s Republic of 

China for a variety of upstream inputs such as rare earths 

and gallium.13 Meanwhile, certain inputs face chronic 

shortages simply because U.S. production is limited 

in quality and quantity. For example, ultra-high purity 

chemicals such as hydrofluoric acid and isopropyl alcohol 

are required for wafer manufacturing and are often in 

short supply.14 Promoting supply chain traceability, 

recovering chemicals and metals, identifying alternative 

raw materials sources in low-risk geographies, and 

increasing the domestic production of shortage-prone 

materials will all help prevent supply disruptions such as 

those the United States experienced during the

COVID-19 pandemic. 

Frame Thermal management 

system

Wafer stage Pre-alignment,

focus and overlay

Light source Illumination &

imaging optics Wafer handler Reticle stage

Subsystems of a photolithography machine. A single photolithography machine incorporates many subsystems that are often sourced 

from highly specialized suppliers who have many suppliers of their own. The proliferation of suppliers at tier 2 and above—subsystems 

and materials suppliers that chipmakers often have no direct relationship with—makes it difficult for any one company to have full 

supply-chain visibility.
7

The CHIPS Program Office has set the following objectives 

to strengthen supply chain resilience:

The CHIPS Program Office will invest, in coordination 

with other U.S. government agencies, to reduce 

chokepoint risks flowing from geographic concentration.

The CHIPS Program Office will focus especially on 

inputs that are highly specialized for semiconductor 

production and that are not being addressed by other U.S. 

government agencies. Pressure from chipmakers, their 

investors, and U.S. allies and partners will also help to 

diversify supplier procurement. These efforts will ensure 

that the world continues to benefit from innovations 

across a globalized supply chain, while also mitigating the 

risks that flow from geographic concentration. The

United States does not seek a self-sufficient 

semiconductor supply chain and will continue to 

collaborate with allies and partners to fill critical gaps in 

advanced materials and manufacturing equipment. 

U.S. semiconductor supply chain participants will 

improve transparency of demand and supply to reduce 

the risks of production disruptions due to chronic 

shortages of critical supply chain inputs. Applicants 

to the CHIPS Program Office’s funding opportunity 

for commercial fabrication facilities and large-scale 

semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment 

facilities must list and map all key suppliers and address 

techniques used to manage supply chain risk, such as 

conducting supply chain stress test analyses and regular 

supply chain mapping into second-tier and further 

suppliers.15 In most cases, the CHIPS Program Office 

expects chipmakers as well as their suppliers and end 

customers to manage shortage risks without CHIPS 

incentives. Industry stakeholders should also work to 

establish secure venues and best practices for crossindustry supply chain information sharing. In rare cases 

where industry is unable to address a given supply-chain 

risk, targeted CHIPS Incentives Program funding may be 

necessary to ensure the supply keeps pace with rising U.S. 

and global demand. 

ADVANCING U.S. TECHNOLOGY 

LEADERSHIP

American companies produce many of the world’s 

most technologically sophisticated semiconductor 

manufacturing tools and materials. The United States 

is home to three of the top five semiconductor 

manufacturing equipment companies by revenue, and 

U.S. equipment manufacturers are the leading suppliers 

of many tools needed to make the most advanced 

chips.16 The United States is also a major supplier of 

semiconductor materials, from electronic gases and 

wet chemicals to deposition and chemical mechanical 

planarization materials.17 

Sustaining and building upon these pre-existing strengths 

will be critical to the overall success of the CHIPS 

program and will help the American innovation ecosystem 

attract continued investment from both chipmakers and 

their suppliers. Innovations in semiconductor process 

technology benefit from close collaboration between 

chipmakers and suppliers.18 Developing extreme 

ultraviolet (EUV) photolithography tools, for example, 

required co-optimization of reticles, photoresists, and 

electronic design automation software, as well as years 

of testing and feedback from leading-edge chipmakers.19 

U.S. leadership in one part of the supply chain can thus 

reinforce and accelerate leadership in other parts, further 

advancing U.S. strategic capabilities. 

Recognizing the symbiotic relationship between 

chipmakers and suppliers, the CHIPS Program Office aims 

to incentivize U.S. manufacturing equipment and materials 

firms to build capacity in the United States. At the same 

time, the CHIPS Program Office also welcomes and 

encourages investment from leading non-U.S. suppliers, 

especially since non-U.S. firms produce many critical 

manufacturing inputs. 

The CHIPS Program Office has set the following objectives 

for sustaining and growing U.S. technology leadership:

Major U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment 

and materials suppliers will increase their footprints 

in the United States, reinforcing American technology 

leadership in the supply chain. The United States must 

remain a world leader in technologies like deposition, 

etch, inspection, metrology, process control, and other 

critical equipment inputs. In addition, to ensure the longterm sustainability of manufacturing in the United States, 

equipment firms will improve the productivity of their 

manufacturing processes.

Non-U.S. suppliers of the world’s most advanced 

semiconductor manufacturing equipment, materials, and 

subsystems will establish large-scale footprints in the 

United States for the first time. Such suppliers will benefit 

from and contribute to the U.S. innovation ecosystem 

and bring new strategic capabilities and know-how to the 

United States. At the same time, the contributions of U.S.-

based engineers will drive faster progress in advanced 

equipment and materials, benefiting the many industries 

that rely on continued progress in semiconductor 

technology.
8

SUPPORTING VIBRANT FAB CLUSTERS

Chipmakers prefer to—and in some cases must—

domestically source many materials and manufacturing 

equipment, as illustrated by the rise in semiconductor 

supply chain investments around recently-announced 

fab locations.20 Recent supply chain shortages have 

also highlighted the need for establishing local materials 

production facilities.21 Sourcing these materials 

domestically and taking steps to recover chemicals and 

metals for further use can help lower shipping costs and 

reduce the risk of shipping delays, allowing clusters to 

become more efficient and productive. 

Investments to support vibrant fab clusters will overlap 

with, but are distinct from, investments to strengthen 

supply chain resilience. The CHIPS Program Office expects 

the latter investments to focus on inputs that face acute 

chokepoint or shortage risks. By contrast, supporting 

vibrant fab clusters involves making the United States as 

attractive as possible to chipmakers to ensure continued 

investment in the United States. 

State and local entities will be critical partners for CHIPS 

Program Office investments through the provision of 

both public investments and non-financial services 

and resources to support suppliers. Especially valuable 

are efforts that benefit a wide set of firms, such as 

streamlining permitting, investing in a strong and diverse 

workforce, and building critical infrastructure like electric 

or water utilities. 

Of course, as fabs are established in the United States 

thanks to the CHIPS Act, many suppliers will move here 

organically to secure business from the new facilities. The 

CHIPS Program Office aims to reserve its investments 

for the rare cases where suppliers would be unwilling or 

unable to move to the United States in the absence of 

CHIPS Incentives Program funding.

The CHIPS Program Office has set the following objectives 

for supporting vibrant fab clusters:

Each CHIPS-funded fab cluster in the United States will 

be supported by dozens of suppliers, including many 

that will be investing in the United States for the first 

time to close critical gaps in the U.S. supplier ecosystem.

Initial investments in each cluster will create a flywheel 

effect that helps the cluster expand over many years, 

attracting new investments and driving continuous 

improvements in cluster productivity. While the CHIPS 

Program Office will fund projects to strengthen these 

supplier ecosystems, it expects that many suppliers will 

not require CHIPS Incentives Program funding because 

they will expand here naturally in response to the demand 

signal from new U.S. fabs.

The CHIPS Program Office will encourage state and local 

entities to facilitate the expansion of these ecosystems 

and support both domestic suppliers growing their 

U.S. presence and non-U.S. suppliers expanding in the 

United States for the first time. In particular, state and 

local entities should consider establishing science parks 

or regional one-stop shops to facilitate investments in 

infrastructure, land, and workforce development as well 

as to guide critical suppliers through the complexities 

of permitting and identifying additional U.S. customers. 

The Department is also dedicating staff to support the 

formation of clusters, including by helping communities 

and businesses access resources critical to cluster growth, 

such as those related to permitting, infrastructure, 

workforce development, and others. 

CONCLUSION

The CHIPS Incentives Program is an unprecedented 

effort to reestablish U.S. leadership in manufacturing 

the semiconductors that power the global economy and 

undergird U.S. economic and national security. Building 

off the vision for success for investments in the front- and 

back-end fabrication of leading-edge, current-generation, 

and mature-node semiconductors, this document presents 

a complementary vision for success for investments in 

semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment. 

Investments to strengthen supply chain resilience, 

advance U.S. technology leadership, and support vibrant 

U.S. fab clusters are essential to the broader success 

of the CHIPS Incentives Program and ultimately to U.S. 

economic and national security.
9

ENDNOTES

1 The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 appropriates $52.7 billion in funding 

to the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of State, and the National Science Foundation to advance 

U.S. leadership in the semiconductor industry. The CHIPS Program Office 

within the Department of Commerce is responsible for administering $39 

billion to support semiconductor production in the United States pursuant 

to Section 9902 of the CHIPS Act. Of that $39 billion, the Department can 

allocate up to $6 billion to support loans and loan guarantees to covered 

entities, which could be leveraged to support a $75 billion credit program. 

See CHIPS Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-167, Div. A, § 102, 136 Stat. 1372 

(2022) (“CHIPS Act of 2022”).

2 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Vision for Success: Commercial 

Fabrication Facilities,” February 2023.

3 In addition to the $39 billion being administered by the CHIPS Program 

Office, the Department of Commerce is also responsible for administering 

$11 billion for research and development pursuant to Section 9906 of 

the CHIPS Act. Section 9906 funding will be administered by the CHIPS 

Research and Development Office.

4 To take just two examples, both Intel and Taiwan Semiconductor 

Manufacturing Company (TSMC) do business with more than 1,000 

suppliers. Intel, “2020-21 Corporate Responsibility Report,” June 2021, 

3, https://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/pdfbuilder/pdfs/CSR-2020-21-FullReport.pdf; TSMC, “Supplier Sustainability Management,” 2021, 1, https://

esg.tsmc.com/download/file/2019-csr-report/english/pdf/e-5-issue-1.pdf.

5 Vishal Gaur, Nicolay Osadchiy, Maximiliano Udenio, “Research: 

Why It’s So Hard to Map Global Supply Chains,” Harvard 

Business Review, October 31, 2022, https://hbr.org/2022/10/

research-why-its-so-hard-to-map-global-supply-chains.

6 Unni Pillai, “The Emergence of Tools Suppliers in the Semiconductor 

Industry,” SUNY Polytechnic Institute, January 2017, 2-3.

7 Akhil Thadani and Gregory C. Allen, “Mapping the Semiconductor Supply 

Chain: The Critical Role of the Indo-Pacific Region,” Center for Strategic 

International Studies, May 2023, 11, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mappingsemiconductor-supply-chain-critical-role-indo-pacific-region; Henry WaiChung Yeung, “Explaining Geographic Shifts of Chip Making Towards East 

Asia and Market Dynamics in Semiconductor Global Production Networks,” 

Economic Geography, Vol. 98, No. 3, 2022, 273.

8 Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)/Boston Consulting Group 

(BCG), “Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an 

Uncertain Era,” April 2021, 31, https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/

strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain.

9 Wall Street Journal, “Biden Orders Broad Supply-Chain Review Amid Chip 

Shortages,” February 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-to-addresschip-shortages-supply-chain-problems-with-executive-action-11614160803; 

SIA/BCG, “Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain”; David 

Simchi-Levi, Feng Zhu, and Matthew Loy, “Fixing the U.S. Semiconductor 

Supply Chain,” Harvard Business Review, October 2022, https://hbr.

org/2022/10/fixing-the-u-s-semiconductor-supply-chain. 

10 The CHIPS Program Office defines clusters as geographically compact 

areas with multiple commercial-scale fabs owned and operated by one or 

more companies; a large, diverse and skilled workforce; nearby suppliers; 

R&D facilities; utilities; and specialized infrastructure. See Department of 

Commerce, “Vision for Success: Commercial Fabrication Facilities,” at 1, 5. 

As outlined in this first “Vision for Success,” the CHIPS Program Office aims 

by the end of the decade for each CHIPS-funded fab to be supported by 

an ecosystem of reliable suppliers committed to operating and innovating 

in the United States. See id. at 6.

11 See Department of Commerce, “Vision for Success: Commercial 

Fabrication Facilities,” at 7-8.

12 David Thurber, “Semiconductor Industry Faces Problems After 

Resin Plant Explosion,” AP News, August 4, 1993, https://apnews.com/

article/8fe2925b68d34d33f19a53e4892c74a2.

13 Alexandra Alper, “Exclusive: Russia’s Attack on Ukraine Halts Half of 

World’s Neon Output for Chips,” Reuters, March 2022, https://www.reuters.

com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-halts-half-worlds-neon-output-chipsclouding-outlook-2022-03-11/; White House, “Building Resilient Supply 

Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based 

Growth: 100- Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017,” June 2021, 7, 45, 

156. The examples in this sentence are for illustrative purposes only. The 

Department will evaluate the merits of each proposal on a case-by-case 

basis.

14 Shannon Davis, “Shortage Threat to Semiconductor Materials from US 

Chip Expansion Plans,” Semiconductor Digest, July 8, 2021. The examples 

in this sentence are for illustrative purposes only. The Department will 

evaluate the merits of each proposal on a case-by-case basis.

15 See Department of Commerce, “Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO): 

CHIPS Incentives Program – Commercial Fabrication Facilities,” February 

28, 2023, at 42.

16 Congressional Research Service, “Semiconductors: U.S. Industry, Global 

Competition, and Federal Policy,” 15-16, https://crsreports.congress.gov/

product/pdf/R/R46581.

17 Saif M. Khan, Alexander Mann, and Dahlia Peterson, “The Semiconductor 

Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness,” Center for Security 

and Emerging Technology, June 6, 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/

publication/the-semiconductor-supply-chain/. 

18 Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Tom Howell, “Can Semiconductor 

Reshoring Prime a U.S. Manufacturing Renaissance?” Center for Strategic 

& International Studies, September 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/

can-semiconductor-reshoring-prime-us-manufacturing-renaissance.

19 Sander Hofman, “Making EUV: From Lab to Fab,” ASML, March 2022, 

https://www.asml.com/en/news/stories/2022/making-euv-lab-to-fab.

20 Shivakumar, Wessner, and Howell, “Can Semiconductor Reshoring Prime 

a U.S. Manufacturing Renaissance?”

21 Shannon Davis, “U.S. Chip Expansions Squeezed by Shortages of 

Specialty Materials,” Semiconductor Digest, August 2022, https://www.

semiconductor-digest.com/u-s-chip-expansions-squeezed-byshortages-of-specialty-materials/. 
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