COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

May 11, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP964 Cir. Ct. No. 1996CF576

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JONATHAN L. LIEBZEIT,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County: 

JOHN A. DES JARDINS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP964

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jonathan Liebzeit appeals an order denying his 

WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2019-20),1 motion for a new trial. Liebzeit argues that the 

circuit court erred by denying his motion without holding a previously scheduled 

evidentiary hearing or otherwise permitting Liebzeit to further amend his motion 

or reply to the State’s response. For the reasons discussed below, we reject 

Liebzeit’s arguments, and we affirm the order. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In October 1996, the State charged Liebzeit with first-degree 

intentional homicide and hiding a corpse, both counts as party to a crime. The 

State alleged that Liebzeit, Dan Mischler and James Thompson were responsible 

for beating Alex Schaefer with a bat, drowning him and hiding his body in a 

drainage tunnel. A jury found Liebzeit guilty of the crimes charged, and the 

circuit court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

¶3 Liebzeit, by appointed counsel, filed a WIS. STAT. RULE 809.30 

postconviction motion for a new trial, alleging that the circuit court erred when it 

deviated from a scripted jury instruction and when it responded to a jury question 

on unanimity. Liebzeit further claimed he was deprived of his due process right to 

be present when the court and counsel formulated an answer to the jury question. 

Additionally, Liebzeit asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing 

to: (1) object to the use of verdict forms that were purportedly inconsistent with 

the pattern jury instructions on transitioning from the greater-to lesser-included 

offense; (2) object when the court deviated from the agreed-upon instructions; and 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2018AP964

3

(3) object to the court’s answer to the jury’s question on unanimity. After a 

Machner2 hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. On direct appeal, we 

rejected Liebzeit’s arguments and affirmed the judgment and order. See State v. 

Liebzeit, No. 1998AP1057-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Sept. 28, 1999).

¶4 In February 2017, Liebzeit filed the underlying WIS. STAT. § 974.06 

postconviction motion for a new trial, challenging the effectiveness of his trial 

counsel with seven new claims. The twice-amended postconviction motion 

alleged that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to move for the jury to see 

the crime scene or to otherwise recreate the confines of the tunnel so as to show 

Liebzeit could not have hit Schaeffer in the head with a bat with the force

described by pathologists; (2) failing to object to medical examiner testimony on 

the “ultimate issue”—whether Schaeffer’s injuries were consistent with 

intentional, as opposed to accidental, injuries; (3) failing to pursue a jury 

instruction on the voluntary intoxication defense; (4) conceding Liebzeit’s guilt on 

elements of an offense; (5) failing to object or move for a mistrial based on alleged 

violations of Liebzeit’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination; 

(6) failing to present evidence of alleged incentives to a State’s witness; and 

(7) failing to present evidence that the same witness wanted the men to beat up 

Schaeffer and would not have been able to overhear conversations that witness 

testified about at trial. Liebzeit added that his postconviction counsel was 

ineffective by failing to raise the same issues or to otherwise assert that the 

combination of “failures” was grounds for a new trial. 

 

2

 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
No. 2018AP964

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¶5 Liebzeit further asserted that some of his ineffective assistance 

claims alternatively constituted newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial. 

He also sought resentencing on the basis of alleged new factors—specifically, that 

he could not have caused the injuries given the tight confines of the tunnel, and 

that he was “highly intoxicated” at the time of the incident. Liebzeit additionally 

sought a new trial in the interest of justice. 

¶6 After a two-day evidentiary hearing was scheduled, the State filed its 

response to the motion. The circuit court ultimately denied the postconviction 

motion without holding the scheduled hearing. Liebzeit moved for 

reconsideration, but he filed a notice of appeal before the court issued any decision 

on the reconsideration motion. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 When, as here, a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion follows a prior 

postconviction motion, a defendant must show a “sufficient reason” for failing to 

previously raise the issues in the current motion. State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 

Wis. 2d 168, 184-85, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). We determine the sufficiency of a 

defendant’s reason for failing to previously raise the issue by examining the “four 

corners” of the subject postconviction motion. See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 

¶27, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. 

¶8 As an initial matter, we note that Liebzeit’s initial brief challenges 

only the circuit court’s rulings on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

Because Liebzeit has effectively abandoned the other issues raised in his WIS.

STAT. § 974.06 motion, we need not address them. See State v. Flynn, 190 

Wis. 2d 31, 39 n.2, 527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994) (issues raised but not briefed 

or argued are deemed to be abandoned). 
No. 2018AP964

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¶9 Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may, in some 

circumstances, be a “sufficient reason” as to why an issue was not raised in an

earlier proceeding. State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 

681-82, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996). A claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

defendant was prejudiced by that deficient performance. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When the relief sought is a new trial 

based upon an allegation that postconviction counsel failed to raise material issues 

before the circuit court, a defendant must establish that the issues he or she 

believes counsel should have raised were clearly stronger than the claims counsel 

pursued on direct review. State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶¶45-46, 360 

Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.22d 668. In doing so, the defendant must allege “sufficient 

material facts—e.g., who, what, where, when, why, and how—that, if true, would 

entitle him to the relief he seeks.” Id., ¶58. 

¶10 As the Romero-Georgana court recognized, the “clearly stronger” 

pleading standard applies when evaluating the deficiency prong of the Strickland

test. Id., ¶45. In turn, the prejudice inquiry asks whether “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. However, 

“a defendant need not prove the outcome would ‘more likely than not’ be different 

in order to establish prejudice in ineffective assistance cases.” State v. Sholar, 

2018 WI 53, ¶44, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

693).
No. 2018AP964

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¶11 A defendant may not rely on conclusory allegations in his or her 

postconviction motion, hoping to supplement them at an evidentiary hearing. See

State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 313-18, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). Whether a 

WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion alleges a sufficient reason for failing to raise an issue 

earlier is a question of law that we review independently. State v. Kletzien, 2011 

WI App 22, ¶16, 331 Wis. 2d 640, 794 N.W.2d 920.

¶12 Here, the ineffective assistance of counsel issues raised in Liebzeit’s 

WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion could have been raised on direct review. Therefore, 

to circumvent Escalona-Naranjo’s procedural bar, Liebzeit was required to 

establish the ineffectiveness of his postconviction counsel in failing to raise the 

issues earlier. Liebzeit’s motion, however, failed to allege sufficient material facts 

regarding postconviction counsel’s performance. An evidentiary hearing is not a 

“fishing expedition,” and the circuit court and the State “are entitled to know what 

is expected to happen at the hearing, and what the defendant intends to prove.” 

State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶68, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. 

¶13 Liebzeit’s WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion made only conclusory 

allegations that his postconviction counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue his 

present challenges to the effectiveness of his trial counsel. In particular, his 

motion failed to allege the “who, what, where, when, why, and how” that, if true, 

would entitle him to the relief sought. See Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 

¶58. In fact, Liebzeit acknowledges on appeal that he failed to argue the “clearly 

stronger” standard, noting that his motions did not “explicitly compare[] the 

strength of the issues those motions raised to the strength of the issues raised on 

direct appeal.” 
No. 2018AP964

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¶14 Liebzeit nevertheless suggests that a “technical” application of the 

“clearly stronger” pleading standard would have been too onerous in this case, as 

it would have required eighteen different discussions, comparing each of the six 

WIS. STAT. § 974.06 issues to each of the three WIS. STAT. RULE 809.30 issues. 

Liebzeit, however, fails to provide any legal authority to support the proposition 

that it is somehow unfair to require him to fully address multiple issues in his 

postconviction motion, nor does he establish why any difficulty in doing so should 

make a difference in our analysis. We will not consider arguments unsupported by 

legal authority. State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis. 2d 531, 545-46, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 

1980). 

¶15 Liebzeit also emphasizes that the circuit court addressed the merits 

of his motions despite his failure to satisfy the “clearly stronger” pleading 

standard. Liebzeit, however, fails to explain how the court’s decision to address 

the merits exempts him from the pleading requirement. To the extent Liebzeit 

suggests the court could assume his current issues were clearly stronger given the 

brevity of this court’s decision on Liebzeit’s direct appeal, he again offers no legal 

support for this claim. 

¶16 Because Liebzeit failed to address whether the arguments raised in 

his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion were clearly stronger than the claims 

postconviction counsel raised on direct review, he has failed to show a sufficient 

reason to circumvent the procedural bar. Therefore, the circuit court properly 

denied the motion without a hearing. See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9 (a circuit 

court may deny a postconviction motion without a hearing if the motion presents 

only conclusory allegations or if the record otherwise conclusively demonstrates 

the defendant is not entitled to relief). 
No. 2018AP964

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¶17 Liebzeit nevertheless faults the circuit court for scheduling the

motion hearing and then “pulling the plug” after receiving only the State’s 

objections and no response from the defense. The burden, however, was on 

Liebzeit to adequately plead his motion. See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶65, 70. 

When he failed to do so, despite twice amending his motion, the court had 

discretion to deny it without a hearing. See Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 

¶30. To the extent Liebzeit attempts to use his reconsideration motion to attempt 

to fill in the gaps of his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motions, any arguments related to the 

reconsideration motion are not properly before us because the circuit court never 

ruled on the motion—because Liebzeit filed a notice of appeal in the interim. See

Ramsthal Advert. Agency v. Energy Miser, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 74, 75, 279 N.W.2d 

491 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a judgment or order must be reduced to writing 

and filed with the clerk of the circuit court before an appeal can be taken). 

¶18 In his reply brief, Liebzeit, by new counsel, withdraws three of the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursued in his initial brief and he renews 

arguments that were abandoned in the initial brief, including his claim that newly 

discovered evidence required an evidentiary hearing in the interest of justice. This 

court generally declines to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief, as “[i]t is inherently unfair for an appellant to withhold an argument from its 

main brief and argue it in its reply brief because such conduct would prevent any 

response from the opposing party.” A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 

Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998). We are not persuaded in this 

instance to depart from our general rule.
No. 2018AP964

9

By the Court.—Order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.