IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2018-CP-01660-COA
JUAREZ KEYES APPELLANT

v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/16/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF W EILL SR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JUAREZ KEYES (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MATTHEW

W YATT W ALTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/07/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ. C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The Hinds County Circuit C ourt, First J u dicial District, denied Juarez Key es’s m otion
f or post-conviction relief

(PCR). Key e s appeals. Finding no error, we af f irm

. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On Septem

ber 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , K e y e s p led guilty to a num ber o f crim es, including rape, robbery , burglary , aggravated assault, and breaking out of a c l o s u r e a f t er com m ission o f a
crim e. For all but one o f these crim es, the court sentenced Key es as a habitual of f enderunder Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Supp. 1 976). 1 Since h is sentencing,

Key es has f

iled m u l tiple PCR m otions, a ll of which were denied. See Keyes v. State , 549 So.
2d 949 ( Miss. 1989); Keyes v. State , 918 So. 2d 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Order, Keyes v.
State , No. 25CI1:13-cv-00796 ( Hinds County , Miss., Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2013); Keyes v. State , 281 So. 3d 40 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). ¶3. Nonethele s s , o n Novem ber 30, 2017, Key e s f

iled another PCR m otion, sty led as a
“Motion f or Post Conviction Collateral Relief to V acate Habitual Sentencing.” In this latest

m otion, Key es asserted that h is habitual-of f ender i ndictm ents were invalid b ecause they did

not i dentif

y the specif

ic Cook C ounty , Illinois judicial district in which his prior f elony
convictions occurred, as required by Rule 11.03 of the Unif orm Rules of Circuit and County
C o urt Practice. 2 K ey es a lso asserted inef f ective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’ s

1 T h e co u r

t sen ten ced K ey es to serv e as f o llo w s : (1 ) a term o f th irty -sev en y ears f o r rap e as an h a

b i tu al o f f en d er u n d e r S ectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 ; (2 ) f

if teen y ears f

o r ro b b ery as an h ab itu al o f f en d er u n d er S ectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 to ru n co n cu rren t to

. . . t h e p rio r sen ten ce; (3 ) ten co n c u rren t y ears f o r b u rg l a r y ; ( 4 ) ten co n cu rren t y ears f o r b u rg lary as an h ab itu a l o f f en d er u n d er S ectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 ; (5 ) tw en ty co n secu tiv e y e ars ag g rav a ted assau lt as an h ab itu al o f

f en d e r u n d er S ectio n 9 9 -1 9

- 8 1 ; an d (6 ) ten co n cu rren t y ears f o r b reak in g o u t o f a clo su r e af ter co m m issio n o f a crim e as a n h ab i tu al o f f en d e r, b u t co n secu tiv e to th e rap e , ro b b ery , an d tw o b u rg lary ch arg es.
K e yes , 9 1 8 S o . 2 d at 7 7 (¶2 ) (em p h asis o m itted )

.
2 R u le 1 1 .0 3 p ro v id ed in p art: “T h e in d ictm en t m u s t alleg e w i th p articu larity th e n atu r e o r d escrip tio n o f th e o f f en se co n stitu tin g th e p rev io u s co n v ictio n s, th e state o r f ed eral j u risd ictio n o f a n y p rev i o u s co n v ictio n , an d t h e d ate o f j u d g m en t.” R u le 1 1 .0 3 w as n o t ad o p ted u n til M ay 1 , 1 9 9 5 , an d K ey es w a s s e n t e n ced in 1 9 8 3

. A t th e tim e o f K ey es’s
sen ten cin g , U n if

o rm C rim in al R u le o f C ircu it C o u rt P ractice 6 .0 4 (1 ) p r o v i d ed th e sam e req u irem en t. B o th o f th ese ru les a re n o w su p ersed ed b y th e M ississip p i R u les o f C rim i n al P ro ced u re, w h ich b ecam e ef f e ctiv e Ju ly

1 , 2 0 1 7

. 2f

a i l u r e t o object to the alleged def ect in the indictm ents. The circuit court denied Key es’s
PCR m otion, and Key es now appeals.
DISCUSSION ¶4. “W hen reviewing a circuit court’s denial or d i s mi s s a l o f a P C R m otion, we will

re v e r s e the judgm ent of the circuit c ourt only if its f actual f indings are clearly erroneous; however, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a d e n o v o s tandard of
review.” Gunn v. State , 248 So. 3d 937, 941 (¶15) (Miss. C t. App. 2018) (quoting Berry v.
State , 230 So. 3d 360, 362 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). ¶5. On appeal, Key es again asserts (1) that his indictm ents were invalid because they did not specif y the Cook County , Illinois judicial district in which his prior f e lony convictions
occurred and ( 2) that his c ounsel’s assistance w as inef f ective. Because Key es pled guilty in
198 3 a n d because Key es has previously f iled m ultiple PCR m otions, each of which were denied, t hese claim s are barred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) (“A m otion
f or relief under this article shall be m a de . . . in case of a guilty plea, within three (3) y ears
af ter entry of the judgm ent of conviction.”); see a lso Evans v. State , 115 So. 3d 879, 880 (¶2) (Miss. C t. App. 2 013) (“Under Mississippi’s Unif o rm Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), any order d eny ing or dism issing a PCR m o tion is a bar to a s econd or successive
PCR m o tion.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). 3 Irrespective of these

3 E rro rs af

f ectin g certain f

u n d am en tal rig h ts, in clu d in g t h e rig h t to b e f r e e f ro m an illeg al s e n ten ce, are e x cep ted f r o m P C R p ro ced u ral b ars. C a rter v. S ta te , 2 0 3 S o . 3 d 7 3 0 , 7 3 1 ( ¶7 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 1 6 ). “ U n d er ‘ex trao rd in ary circu m stan ces,’ in ef f ectiv e assistan ce o f c o u n sel can [ also ] co n stitu t e an ex cep tio n to th e statu to ry tim e-b ar.” M o ra les
v. S ta te , N o
. 2 0 1 8 -C P -0 0 7 3 7 -C O A , 2 0 1 9 WL 3 5 6 2 0 3 1 , a t * 5 (¶2 4 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. A u g
. 6 , 2 0 1 9 ) (citatio n s o m itted ), cert. d en ied , O rd er, N o
. 2 0 1 8 -C T

- 0 0 7 3 7 -S C T (M iss. F eb

. 2 7 , 3procedural bars, Key es’s claim s also lack m erit.

¶6. In its order deny ing Key e s’s subject PCR m otion, the circuit court f ound that Key e s
“waived his r ight t o object to t h e e r r o r o n the indictm ent charging him as a habitual
of f ender.” The circuit court cited W ells v

. State , 160 So. 3d 1136 ( M i s s
. 2015), o verruled

on other grounds by Rowsey v. State , 188 So. 3 d 486, 494 (¶22) (Miss. 2015), and Vanwey

v. State , 149 So. 3d 1023, 1 0 24 (¶3) (Miss. 2014), in support of this f inding. In W

ells , the appellant contended tha t h i s habitual-of f ender indictm ent was invalid because it did not specif y whether h is prior conviction occurred in the First or Second J u d i c i a l D i strict in
Harrison County , Mississippi. W ells , 160 S o
. 3d at 1 144 ( ¶21). The suprem e c ourt held that
b e c a u s e t h e a ppellant f

a iled to object t o this error at trial, the issue was b arred f ro m
consideration on a

ppeal. Id

. Sim ilarly , in Vanwey , the appellant contended, i n h e r PCR

m ot ion, that o ne of her prior f elonies did not m eet the habitual-of f ender s e ntencing requirem ents of section 99-19-81. Vanwey , 149 So. 3 d a t 1024 (¶1). The suprem e court held
that t he appellant “waived whatever contention she m ight have had with her
habitual-of

f ender status when she f

ailed to challenge t he suf f iciency or validity

of her two

p r i o r f e lony convictions and sentences a t her plea h earing and then voluntarily a n d intelligently

entered her guilty

plea . . . as a habitual of

f ender.” Id

. at (¶3). ¶7. As noted in t he circuit c ourt’s order, t he sam e is true here. In S eptem ber 1983, Key es knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty p lea a s a habitual o f f ender. Keyes , 549 So. 2d at

2 0 2 0 ). H o w ev er, “the m o van t [ ] b e ars the b urden of proving an e xception applies to the UPCCRA’s procedural bars.” Gunn , 248 So. 3d at 942 (¶19). Key es has not shown that an exception applies to the procedural bars in this case.
4950. D uring his sentencing hearing, Key es did not challenge either o f his p rior Cook County ,

Illinois convictions but in f act conf irm ed them

bef ore the circuit court: Q. You a l s o u nderstand that on this charge, as w ell as the rest of the charges, t h a t y ou’re charged as a habitual and the indictm ent—the
rem aining indictm ents c harged that y ou’ve previously been c onvicted of robbery in the Circuit Court of Cook County , Illinois, on August the 29 t h , 1979, in Cause No. 79-1762—60—excuse m e, 6 02 a nd the charge of plain robbery in t h e Circuit Court of Cook C ounty , Illinois, on August the 5th, 1977, in Cause N o. 75-2590 and that on each o f those charg e s t h e y a rose o ut of separate incidents a nd they were separately —and that on e ach one of them y ou were sentenced to separate term s o f o ne y ear or m ore i n the penal institution. Do y ou understand that y ou’re being charged as a habitual on that one?
A. Yes. Q. Have y ou in f

a ct been convicted of

those two charges?
A. Yes. Q. In Illinois?
A. Yes, sir. Q. Again, have y o u g o n e over all of the f acts o f t his case of this charge with Mr. May ?
A. Yes.
Id . at 950-51. Accordingly , Key es waived his right to object to the lack of judicial-district specif icity in his habitual-of

f ender indictm ent. See Vanwey , 149 So. 3d at 1024 (¶3). ¶8. Key es also waived his inef f ective-assistance-of

-counsel claim

. A v oluntary guilty plea waives c l a i m s of inef f e c tive assistance of counsel, except i nsof

ar as the a lleged inef

f ectiveness relates to the voluntariness of the giving o f the guilty plea. Thus, to o b t a i n post-conviction r elief , a petitioner who pled guilty m

ust prove that his attorney ’ s inef f ective perf

orm ance proxim ately caused the plea—i.e., that but f o r counsel’s errors, t he petitioner

5would n o t h a v e entered t he plea. This r equires proof bey ond the petitioner’s

own conclusory

assertions.

W orth v

. State , 223 So. 3d 844, 849-50 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 017) (citations and quotation

m ark om i tted). K ey es h as f ailed to of f er any proof “ that but f

or c o unsel’s errors, [ he] would

not have entered the plea.” Id

. W e theref ore af f irm the circuit court’s denial of Key es’s PCR

m otion. ¶9. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR.

6