alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**Pursuant      to**

**18      U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**As      Adopted pursuant to**

**Section      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| Date:                June 28, 2006 | By:    | /s/                Craig E. Peeples                                                                                                |
|------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                               |   | Craig                E. Peeples                                                                                                    |
|                               |   | Interim                Chief Financial Officer and Corporate Controller(Principal                Financial and Accounting Officer) |

**A      signed original of the written statement above required by Section 906 of the      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to ClearOne Communications, Inc.      and will be retained by ClearOne Communications, Inc. and furnished to the      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon      request.**
Judgment 1

AO 245D (Rev. 12/03) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations (452090)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

V. (For Revocation of Supervised Release)

NECESTER DOUGLAS WARMACK

CASE NUMBER: 1:14-CR-00150-001

USM NUMBER: 13981-003

THE DEFENDANT: Fred Tiemann, Esquire

Defendant's Attorney

admitted guilt to violation of supervision conditions 1,3,6,11, two special conditions & 7 as set forth in 

the Petition dated 1/19/2016.

was found in violation of supervision condition: ___

Violation Number Nature of Violation

Date violation

Occurred

1

3

6

11

Special Condition

7

Special Condition

Technical

Technical

Technical

Technical

Technical

Technical

Technical

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 2 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed 

pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has not violated condition(s) and is discharged as to such violation(s) 

condition.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this 

district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, 

and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

April 11, 2016

Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

April 14, 2016

Date

X

Case 1:14-cr-00150-CG-B Document 70 Filed 04/14/16 Page 1 of 2
Judgment 2

AO 245D (Rev. 12/03) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations: Sheet 2 - Imprisonment

Defendant: NECESTER DOUGLAS WARMACK

Case Number: 1:14-CR-00150-001

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be 

imprisoned for a total term of TWELVE (12) MONTHS.

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: 

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at .m. on .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of 

Prisons:

before 2 p.m. on .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

Defendant delivered on to at __________________

with a certified copy of this judgment.

 UNITED STATES MARSHAL 

By _________________________________

 Deputy U.S. Marshal

X

Case 1:14-cr-00150-CG-B Document 70 Filed 04/14/16 Page 2 of 2
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1664 

To require the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 

the Federal Open Market Committee to consider inflation, employment, 

and financial stability when setting interest rates. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2023 

Mr. TORRES of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To require the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System and the Federal Open Market Committee to consider inflation, employment, and financial stability when 

setting interest rates. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Financial Stability 

5 Mandate Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. INTEREST RATE CONSIDERATIONS. 

7 Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act is amended— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1664 IH

1 (1) by striking ‘‘The Board of Governors of the 

2 Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Mar3 ket Committee shall’’ and inserting the following: 

4 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Board of Governors of the 

5 Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 

6 Committee shall’’; and 

7 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

8 ‘‘(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—The Board of Governors of 

9 the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 

10 Committee shall, when setting interest rates, consider in11 flation, employment, and financial stability.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### John Flynn *v.*Patrick Carroll, et al.

Real Estate — Adverse Possession — Husband and Wife.

A person having entered into possession of real estate by virtue of bis wife’s title cannot assert adverse possession as against bis wife or ber beirs.

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.

March 29, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The mere assertion of claim by the party in possession that he *657is the owner of the property does not constitute an adverse holding. It is evident from Horan’s own showing that he entered upon the property by reason of his marital relation, and held under the wife’s title. What the character of proof was in the original action by the appellees against Horan does not appear, but the latter’s answer indicates that he was without right or title, and might as well have alleged in order to create an adverse holding that the property descended to him and not to the children. Having entered by virtue of his wife’s title and the property descending to the children, he must be considered as their tenant, and the appellant (his tenant) is liable for the rent, and particularly as the action to recover the property was pending when he entered, actual notice having been given him of appellees’ claim. If the husband had leased this property in his own name, during the life of the wife, the tenant, if the husband had died and not the wife, could not have defeated the wife’s claim for rent, in the event he held over, by reason of the alleged parol agreement relied on by the husband in his answer. If alleged in the answer that the husband, by a parol gift from the wife, had acquired the title, it could not be regarded as an adverse holding; nor are we inclined to the opinion that the answer filed constituted anything more than this character of defense. The original case, no doubt, was disposed of on the idea that the husband entered under the deed to the wife and claimed only by reason of his marital rights, and that at her death no such claim as that asserted in the answer could be regarded as vesting him with title or as an adverse holding. The husband alleges that he bought the lot, and the wife agreed to have it conveyed to him. The proof, no doubt, showed that he held under the wife. His holding was not adverse to the appellees, and the instructions given were proper. As the law of the case is with the appellees on the merits, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the bill of evidence shows that all the instructions are contained in it.

*R. A. Thornton, for appellant. Morton & Parker, for appellees.*

Judgment *affirmed.*
SUBROUTINE UNICDF(X,CDF)
C
C     PURPOSE--THIS SUBROUTINE COMPUTES THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
C              FUNCTION VALUE FOR THE UNIFORM (RECTANGULAR) 
C              DISTRIBUTION ON THE UNIT INTERVAL (0,1).
C              THIS DISTRIBUTION HAS MEAN = 0.5
C              AND STANDARD DEVIATION = SQRT(1/12) = 0.28867513.
C              THIS DISTRIBUTION HAS THE PROBABILITY
C              DENSITY FUNCTION F(X) = 1.
C     INPUT  ARGUMENTS--X      = THE SINGLE PRECISION VALUE AT
C                                WHICH THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
C                                FUNCTION IS TO BE EVALUATED.
C     OUTPUT ARGUMENTS--CDF    = THE SINGLE PRECISION CUMULATIVE
C                                DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION VALUE.
C     OUTPUT--THE SINGLE PRECISION CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
C             FUNCTION VALUE CDF.
C     PRINTING--NONE UNLESS AN INPUT ARGUMENT ERROR CONDITION EXISTS. 
C     RESTRICTIONS--X SHOULD BE BETWEEN 0 AND 1, INCLUSIVELY.
C     OTHER DATAPAC   SUBROUTINES NEEDED--NONE.
C     FORTRAN LIBRARY SUBROUTINES NEEDED--NONE.
C     MODE OF INTERNAL OPERATIONS--SINGLE PRECISION.
C     LANGUAGE--ANSI FORTRAN. 
C     REFERENCES--JOHNSON AND KOTZ, CONTINUOUS UNIVARIATE
C                 DISTRIBUTIONS--2, 1970, PAGES 57-74.
C     WRITTEN BY--JAMES J. FILLIBEN
C                 STATISTICAL ENGINEERING LABORATORY (205.03)
C                 NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
C                 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20234
C                 PHONE:  301-921-2315
C     ORIGINAL VERSION--JUNE      1972. 
C     UPDATED         --SEPTEMBER 1975. 
C     UPDATED         --NOVEMBER  1975. 
C
C---------------------------------------------------------------------
C
      IPR=6
C
C     CHECK THE INPUT ARGUMENTS FOR ERRORS
C
      IF(X.LT.0.0.OR.X.GT.1.0)GOTO50
      GOTO90
   50 WRITE(IPR,2)
      WRITE(IPR,46)X
      IF(X.LT.0.0)CDF=0.0
      IF(X.GT.1.0)CDF=1.0
      RETURN
   90 CONTINUE
    2 FORMAT(1H ,120H***** NON-FATAL DIAGNOSTIC--THE FIRST  INPUT ARGUME
     1NT TO THE UNICDF SUBROUTINE IS OUTSIDE THE USUAL (0,1) INTERVAL **
     1***)
   46 FORMAT(1H , 35H***** THE VALUE OF THE ARGUMENT IS ,E15.8,6H *****)
C
C-----START POINT-----------------------------------------------------
C
      CDF=X
C
      RETURN
      END
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHRISTOPHER CHARLES ROGERS, : 

 Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 10-00011-CG-B 

CITY OF GULF SHORES POLICE : 

DEPARTMENT, et al., 

 : 

 Defendants. 

 : 

JUDGMENT 

 It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action be dismissed without 

prejudice. 

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:10-cv-00011-CG-B Document 9 Filed 07/09/10 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 99.2

(b)  Schedules

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS  ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT SCHEDULE

To
the Board of Directors and Stockholders of NetZero, Inc.

Our
audits of the consolidated financial statements referred to in our report dated August 14, 2001 appearing in this Registration Statement on Form S-4 also included an
audit of the financial statement schedule included on page II-4 of this Registration Statement on Form S-4. In our opinion, this financial statement schedule presents fairly,
in all material respects, the information set forth therein when read in conjunction with the related consolidated financial statements.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Century
City, California
August 14, 2001

II3

---

NETZERO, INC.    Schedule IIValuation and Qualifying Accounts

|                                            |  | Additions
|------------------------------------------- |  | ---------
|
|Year ended June 30, 2001                    |  | $        
|Year ended June 30, 2000                    |  | $        
|Year ended June 30, 1999                    |  | $        
|Valuation allowance for deferred tax assets |  |          
|Year ended June 30, 2001                    |  | $        
|Year ended June 30, 2000                    |  | $        
|Year ended June 30, 1999                    |  | $        

---

II4

---

QuickLinks
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                             336
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   336
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     336
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          194,377
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   (196,041)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       336
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,620
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              11,289
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (36,909)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                        (887)
<NET-INCOME>                                  (37,796)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

HORBERG ENTERPRISES LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, AND HOWARD TODD 

HORBERG

v.

USA RECYCLING INDUSTRIES, INC., 

F/K/A VOYAGER PETROLEUM, INC., 

AND VINCENT SMITH

PETITION OF: VINCENT SMITH

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 198 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              APR-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                         25,498
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   6,211
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,592)
<INVENTORY>                                         0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               31,983
<PP&E>                                          5,633
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,020)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 49,213
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           3,477
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          133
<OTHER-SE>                                     44,667
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   49,213
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                5,553
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   7,816
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (114)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (467)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (293)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (293)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    ($293)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  ($0.36)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($0.36)
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

     EXHIBIT 32.1 -- SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

I, Richard L. Wambold, certify that:

     (1) the Form 10-K/A(2) of Pactiv Corporation for the year ended December
         31, 2003, (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
         sec.13(a) or sec.15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
         amended, and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
         Pactiv Corporation for the period then ended.

/s/ RICHARD L. WAMBOLD
------------------------------------------------------
Richard L. Wambold
Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer

January 31, 2005
------------------------------------------------------
Date
10179.

#### WHEELER *v.*ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY *et al.*

Decided May 11, 1920.

Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in the ease of *Robinson*v. *Central of Georgia Railway Co.,*150 *Ga.*41 (102 S. E. 532), the court in this ease erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the suit as to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. See 150 *Ga.*109 (102 S. E. 823).

Action for damages; from city court of Thomasville — Judge W. H. Hammond. September 19, 1918.

*Titus & Dekle,*for plaintiff.

*Bennet & Branch, Merrill & Grantham,*for defendant.

Bloodworth, J.

This was a suit for damages for the homicide of the plaintiff’s husband and was brought against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and three of its employees. .Upon the call of the case the defendant company made a motion in writing to dismiss the action, so far as it was concerned, upon the following grounds: “ (1) The petition of the plaintiff shows that the cause of action for which she sues to recover damages arose out of the homicide of the plaintiff’s husband, Ransom C. Wheeler, it being alleged in said petition that the said Ransom C. Wheeler was run over and killed by certain box-cars attached to an engine being operated by Charlie Griffin as engineer, Link Wright as fireman, and Simon Cook as flagman, and that said engine being operated by said engineer, fireman, and flagman was owned and operated by the defendant Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, by and through its agents and employees aforesaid. (3) The defendant is not liable to the plaintiff in damages as alleged in the petition, because the petition alleges that said Ransom C. Wheeler was run over and killed on the 3d day of January, 1918, and on December 38, 1917, at 13 o’clock noon, the President of the United States, through Newton D. Baker, secretary of war, took possession of and assumed control of each and every railroad system in the United States, including the line of railroad of the defendant, and that since said date the line of railroad of the defendant has been operated by the government of the United States, through the director-general of railways and his subordinate officers and agents; and this defendant was not operating said railroad, or in the possession or control of same, or any of its railroad properties, and had no *282agents or employees in charge oí its railroad properties, but that the agents who are alleged to have been operating said engine were the agents and employees of the United States railroad administration, W. G. McAdoo, director-general of railroads, working for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad under Lyman Delane, federal manager for said Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, and were not the agents or employees of the defendant.” Upon consideration of the motion the court sustained it and dismissed the suit as to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.

Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in *Robinson*v. *Central of Georgia Ry. Co.,*150 *Ga.*41 (102 S. E. 532), there was no merit in the motion to dismiss, and the court erred in sustaining it.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DIANE G. MELECH, ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 10-00573-KD-M 

 ) 

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 

NORTH AMERICA, et al., ) 

 Defendants. ) 

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Rule 72 “Statement of Appeal of Magistrate 

Judge’s Order [D.E. 129]” (Docs. 130, 131) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 132). 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. 129) is clearly 

erroneous and contrary to law because the ruling “interprets” a prior order (April 27, 2012 Order 

mandating conflict-of-interest discovery) as providing that the Defendant “is not required to 

produce documents [highly relevant to the conflict-of-interest issue] evidencing the actual 

evaluations performed for each of its employees involved in closing Melech’s claim[.]” Plaintiff 

contends that such information is critical to her ability to show whether the Defendant’s decision 

was actually motivated by improper reasons such as company profitability. 

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 72(a), in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s order on a 

nondispositive matter, the court will set aside or modify an order only when it is found to be clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law.1

 The undersigned has reviewed the Order and Plaintiff’s Appeal. The 

 

1 A Magistrate Judge’s discovery rulings are final decisions not subject to a de novo determination. See, e.g., Merritt v. 

International Broth. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1981); Featherston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 

223 F.R.D. 647, 650-651 (N.D. Fla. 2004). Such final decisions are subject to a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” 

standard which is “extremely deferential.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Rule 72(a); S.D.Ala. LR 72.3(c); Pigott v. 

Sanibel Dev., LLC, 2008 WL 2937804, *5 (S.D. Ala. July 23, 2008). “Relief is appropriate under the ‘clearly 

erroneous’ prong...if the district court ‘finds that the Magistrate Judge abused his discretion or, if after viewing the 

record as a whole, the Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Pigott, 2008 WL 

2937804, *5. A ruling is “contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statues, case law or rules of 

Case 1:10-cv-00573-KD-M Document 133 Filed 07/18/12 Page 1 of 2
2 

Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. 129) is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, 

it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Appeal (Docs. 130, 131) is DENIED and the Magistrate Judge’s 

Order (Doc. 129) is AFFIRMED such that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 132) is also DENIED. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 18th day of July 2012. 

 /s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DUBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 procedure.” Id. 

Case 1:10-cv-00573-KD-M Document 133 Filed 07/18/12 Page 2 of 2