IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

PETER J. BARBER, )

 )

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 10-0263-WS-B 

 ) 

BP, PLC, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. )

ORDER

 This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (doc. 

68), the Motion of Defendant Anadarko Petroleum Corporation to Stay Proceedings (doc. 74), 

and the Motion of Defendant Cameron International Corporation for Further Extension of Time 

(doc. 75). 

 Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal reflects his desire to dismiss, without prejudice, 

all claims asserted in this action against defendant Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. The Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, as a general proposition, “the plaintiff may dismiss an 

action without a court order by filing ... a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves 

either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).1

 The court file 

confirms that defendant Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. has not served an answer or motion for 

summary judgment in this action. Accordingly, Barber’s filing is sufficient to dismiss his claims 

against that defendant pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without court authorization or approval. 

See generally Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (“As the notice of 

dismissal was filed before the United States had served its answer or motion for summary 

 1

 To be sure, Rule 41(a) recites certain exceptions to that general rule; however, 

none of those exceptions apply here. For example, while the Rule 41(a) right to voluntary 

dismissal is subject to limitations in the class action context pursuant to Rule 23(e), and this 

action was nominally styled as a class action at its inception, no class has been certified in this 

action to date; therefore, Rule 23(e) is inapplicable on its face. 

Case 1:10-cv-00263-WS-B Document 76 Filed 08/16/10 Page 1 of 3
-2- 

judgment, Qureshi’s notice was ... immediately self-effectuating. ... [I]n the normal course, the 

district court is divested of jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the notice of dismissal 

itself.”). Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. are dismissed 

without prejudice, and the Clerk’s Office is directed to terminate Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., 

Ltd. as a party defendant on the docket sheet.2

 Next, the Court considers defendant Anadarko Petroleum Corporation’s Motion to Stay 

Proceedings. On August 10, 2010, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 

entered a Transfer Order in In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 

Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179. The effect of this Transfer Order is to transfer 77 

Deepwater Horizon-related actions to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. The Transfer Order does not expressly 

reach this case, much less effectuate its transfer to the Eastern District of Louisiana, inasmuch as 

this action postdates the original motions for transfer and consolidation filed in other Deepwater 

Horizon cases. Nonetheless, Anadarko requests a stay of this action based on the Transfer Order 

because (i) it is a tagalong action, (ii) the MDL Panel has been notified of its existence, (iii) it is 

nearly identical to the cases already transferred, and (iv) the transferee court has indicated in 

MDL No. 2179 that, as to that action, “[e]ach defendant is granted an extension of time for 

responding by motion or answer to the complaint(s) until a date to be set by this Court.” (Doc. 

74, Exh. B, ¶ 8.) 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Anadarko that transfer of this action to 

MDL No. 2179 in the near future appears highly likely. In light of that fact, and because the 

 2

 The application of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is proper here as to defendant Mitsui, 

irrespective of whether any other defendants have or have not filed answers or motions for 

summary judgment. See, e.g., Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining 

that “Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss without a court order any defendant who has yet 

to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment” even if other defendants have done so);

Madsen v. Park City, 6 F. Supp.2d 938, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“In a multiple defendant case, it is 

permissible to voluntarily dismiss just some of the defendants ... and the fact that some of the 

defendants have already answered does not preclude invoking this rule as to other defendants.”);

Cordis Corp. v. Siemens-Pacesetter, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1200 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (“Under the rules 

governing dismissal by notice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 ..., dismissal against such of defendants as 

have not served an answer or motion for summary judgment is permitted even though the case 

might remain pending against other defendants.”). 

Case 1:10-cv-00263-WS-B Document 76 Filed 08/16/10 Page 2 of 3
-3- 

transferee court has expressly stayed all deadlines for answers or Rule 12(b) motion practice in 

the consolidated proceedings, the Court finds that the interests of justice would be served by 

entry of a stay in this case until such time as the MDL Panel rules on the transfer issue. 

Accordingly, Anadarko’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (doc. 74) is granted, and this action is 

stayed pending a decision from the MDL Panel as to whether this case will be transferred to the 

Eastern District of Louisiana. 

 In light of the stay, defendant Cameron’s Motion for Further Extension of Time (doc. 75) 

is moot. 

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of August, 2010. 

 s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:10-cv-00263-WS-B Document 76 Filed 08/16/10 Page 3 of 3