1

In the body of his Complaint, Plaintiff has listed as

parties, “Nancy Buckner”, “District Attorney for the Department

of Human Resources”, and “Jennifer M. Bush, Assistant Attorney

General for the Department of Human Resources”. There is no

indication that either Ms. Buckner or Ms. Bush was properly

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLIE C. DANZY, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION 09-00836-KD-B

 )

STATE OF ALABAMA, DEPARTMENT )

OF HUMAN RESOURCES, )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the Court on Defendants State of Alabama

and the Department of Human Resource’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6)

Defendants’ motion has been referred to the undersigned for a report

and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Based

upon a careful review of the Defendants’ motion and supporting

memorandum, and Plaintiff’s brief in opposition, the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion be granted.

Plaintiff Charlie C. Danzy, proceeding pro se, filed the

instant action on December 30, 2009. (Doc. 1). As a preliminary

matter, the undersigned observes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not

the model of clarity. In the caption of his Complaint, Plaintiff

lists as Defendants, the State of Alabama and the Alabama Department

of Human Resources (hereinafter “DHR”) (Doc. 1)1. As best the Court

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 1 of 11
served nor does the Complaint contain any allegations regarding

any action these individuals are alleged to have taken, or failed

to take; thus, they have not been properly added as defendants in

this action. In addition, the law is clear that a prosecutor is

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages in a §

1983 action for acts or omissions associated with the judicial

process, in particular, those taken in initiating a prosecution

and in presenting the government’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976);

Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985); Fullman

v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 558-59 (11th Cir. 1984). 

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can discern, Plaintiff essentially argues that the State of Alabama

and DHR have engaged in fraud in connection with their attempts to

force Plaintiff to make child support payments which Plaintiff

contends he is not obligated to make. Plaintiff alleges violations

of the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth amendments, and

violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961 and the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against a

state except where such immunity is waived by the state or is

abrogated by Congress. Manders v. Lee, 338 F. 3d 1304, 1308 (11th

Cir. 2003). A State may consent to federal jurisdiction, but this

waiver of sovereign immunity must be expressly done. Atascadero

State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-240, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87

L. Ed. 2d 171 (1985). Such immunity extends to agencies of the

State. "[A] suit in which the State or one of its agencies or

departments is named as defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh

Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); Kid's Care,

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 2 of 11
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Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Human Res., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26102 (M.D.

Ala. June 14, 2001) (holding that the Eleventh amendment bars claims

against DHR because DHR is a State agency). 

The State of Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity, nor has Congress abrogated that immunity in § 1983, §

1985, §1986, §1988 cases, or cases alleging violations of the First,

Fourth or Fourteenth amendments. Alyshah v. Georgia, 239 Fed. Appx.

473 (llth Cir. 2007) (plaintiff’s claims against the state which

alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1986, and 1988 and the

First, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments were barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity); Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502

(11th Cir. 1995); Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524

(11th Cir. 1990); Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.

1989); Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article 1, § 14 ("[T]he State

of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or

equity."); Fincher v. State of Florida Dept. of Labor and Employment

Security-Unemployment Appeals Commission, 798 F.2d 1371, 1372 (11th

Cir. 1986)("We find no express congressional abrogation of the

state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1985

actions.") In this case, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that

the State of Alabama has agreed to be sued under the circumstances

presented by this case, or that Congress had abrogated the State’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the issues raised in the

instant action. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 3 of 11
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claims against the State of Alabama and DHR are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks review of the child

support orders entered by the state courts, this court does not have

jurisdiction to review his claims. It is well established that

federal district courts exercise only original jurisdiction; they

lack appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions reached

in administrative and judicial proceedings. District of Columbia Ct.

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311-12,

75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923). Under the

“Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” federal courts lack subject-matter

jurisdiction over certain matters related to previous state court

litigation. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (llth Cir. 2001).

"The doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in the

state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state

court but are 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court's

judgment." Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466 (11th Cir. 1996).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal court

jurisdiction where four criteria are met: (1) the party in federal

court is the same as the party in state court; (2) the prior state

court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3)

the party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable

opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state court

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 4 of 11
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proceeding; and (4) the issue before the federal court was either

adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with

the state court's judgment. Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354

F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "A

federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court

judgment 'if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the

state court wrongly decided the issues before it.'" Siegel v.

LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation

omitted).

In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005), the Supreme

Court clarified that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is

confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its

name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.

In the instant case, Plaintiff was the state court "loser," and

he is complaining about state court child support orders which were

rendered against him years before the instant action was commenced.

Plaintiff does not allege any facts that suggest that he did not

have a reasonable opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in

state court. In this action, he is seeking to have this Court

review and reject the state courts’ child support decisions.

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 5 of 11
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Plaintiff’s instant action is inextricably intertwined with the

state court judgments, and must therefore be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Redford v.

Gwinnett County Judicial Circuit, 350 Fed. Appx. 341 (llth Cir.

2009)(plaintiff’s actions which sought to overturn state court child

support decisions was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.)

To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, his claim is

also subject to dismissal on Younger abstention grounds. In Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the

Supreme Court "reaffirmed the 'basic doctrine of equity

jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the

moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer

irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.'" O'Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499, 94 S. Ct. 669, 677-78, 38 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1974) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44). In determining

whether abstention under Younger is warranted, a court must

consider three factors: (1) whether there is an ongoing state

judicial proceeding, (2) whether the proceeding implicates important

state interests, and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity

to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. See

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.

423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982).

Plaintiff has not satisfied the Middlesex factors. First of

all, while the specific nature of Plaintiff’s request for injunctive

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 6 of 11
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relief is not clear, the undersigned finds that to the extent

Plaintiff is seeking to have his child support withholdings halted,

it is hard to imagine how such injunctive relief would not interfere

with the state proceedings; thus, the first Middlesex factor is

satisfied. Second, the State of Alabama clearly has an important

interest in child support proceedings. See Kulko v. Superior Court

of California in and for City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S.

84, 100, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978) (the State has

substantial interests in protecting resident children and

facilitating child support actions on behalf of those children); see

also Adams v. State of Fla., 185 Fed. Appx. 816, 817 (11th Cir.

2006) (unpublished) (ability to collect child support payments is

an important state interest). Thus, the second Middlesex factor is

satisfied. As for the third and final factor, whether Plaintiff

has an avenue to raise his constitutional claims in the state

proceeding, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the state

proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy for his constitutional

claims. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1279 (11th

Cir. 2003). "Minimal respect for the state processes, of course,

precludes any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard

federal constitutional rights." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431. A

federal court "should assume that state procedures will afford an

adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the

contrary." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S. Ct.

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 7 of 11
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1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987). Plaintiff must overcome this initial

presumption by demonstrating that the state remedies are inadequate.

31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. Plaintiff has not alleged,

let alone demonstrated, that the state court proceeding does not

provide him with an opportunity to raise his claims. Thus, the

final Middlesex factor is satisfied. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed under the Younger

doctrine. 

Before recommending dismissal however, the undersigned observes

that ordinarily a pro se plaintiff should be given at least one

opportunity to amend his deficient complaint before dismissal unless

any amendment would be futile. See Williams v. Quality Filters,

Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87411 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 27, 2007)(court

dismissed pro se action without prejudice rather than affording

plaintiff leave to amend after determining that “any attempt by

[plaintiff] to replead her Complaint would be futile because of the

glaring legal defects.”)(citing Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1073

(11th Cir. 2005); O'Halloran v. First Union Nat. Bank of Florida,

350 F.3d 1197, 1206 (11th Cir. 2003). As noted supra, Plaintiff’s

Complaint against the State of Alabama and DHR contains several

legal defects, and it is evident that any attempt by him to replead

his claims against these two entities would be futile. Accordingly,

the undersigned finds that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to

replead his claims against these two entities.

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 8 of 11
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For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ Motions to granted, and that Plaintiff’s Complaint

be dismissed without prejudice.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the Report and Recommendation. 

DONE this the 26th day of April, 2010. 

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 9 of 11
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The Court’s Local Rules are being amended to reflect the

new computations of time as set out in the amendments to the

Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective December 1,

2009.

10

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of

service of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination

by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar

an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©; Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736,

738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the findings

and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part,

that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days2

 after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 10 of 11
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2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within fourteen

(14) days of being served with a copy of the statement of

objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00836-KD-B Document 19 Filed 04/27/10 Page 11 of 11