IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT	FOR	THE

SOUTHERN	DISTRICT	OF	ALABAMA

SOUTHERN	DIVISION

DONNIE	SHROPSHIRE,

Plaintiff

v.

CHANDRA	JOHNSON,

Defendants,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL	ACTION	NO.

10-00470-CB-N

ORDER

On	January	12,	2015,	this	matter	came	before	the	Court	for	a	bench	trial	on	

the	Plaintiff’s	claim	that	Defendant	used	excessive	force	in	violation	of	the	Eighth	

Amendment	and	42	U.S.C.	§	1983.		After	due	consideration	of	the	witnesses	and	

evidence	presented	the	Court	enters	the	following	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of	

law.

Findings	of	Fact

On	July	4,	2010,	Plaintiff	Donnie	Shropshire,	an	Alabama	prison	inmate,	was	

incarcerated	at	the	Atmore	Work	Release	Center,	a	correctional	facility	operated	by	

the	Alabama	Department	of	Corrections (ADOC).		Shropshire	was	working	as	a	

runner	for	the	defendant,	Sgt.	Chandra	Johnson,	an	ADOC	correctional	officer.		Early	

that	morning	Shropshire	carried a	computer	to	the	dining	hall	to	be	used	for	

visitation.		As	Shropshire	approached	the	entrance,	another	inmate	opened	the	door	

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and	squeezed	liquid	from	a	squeegee	outside the	door,	soaking	Shropshire’s	right	

foot.		Immediately,	his	foot	began	to	burn	and	itch.		Shropshire	went	to	Johnson	and	

told	her	that	his	foot	was	burning	and	itching.		Johnson	replied,	“Bull	[Shropshire’s	

nickname],	I	need	you.”		Shropshire	took	off	his	sock	but	put	his	wet	shoe	back	on	

and	continued	with	his	duties.		When	his	duties	ended	around	2:00	p.m.,	Shropshire	

took	a	shower.		At	that	point	the	top	of	his	right	foot	was	very	red	and	continued	to	

itch	and	burn.

The	following	morning,	Monday,	July	5th,		Shropshire’s	foot	was	in	pain	and	a	

large	blister “bigger	than	a	50-cent	piece”	had	developed	on	the	top	of	his	foot.		At	

this	point,	Shropshire	categorized	his	pain	as	an	“8	or	9 out	of	10.”		The	foot	was	so	

swollen	that	Shropshire	could	not	get	his	shoes	on.		Shropshire	described	his	big	toe	

as	being	the	“size	of	two	thumbs.”		Two	blisters	had	developed	on	the	top	of	his	foot,	

each	the	size	of	a	50-cent piece,	about	half	an	inch	high,	and	filled	with	fluid.		

Shropshire	could	not	work	that	day	because	of	the	pain,	which	he	described as	

“pulsating”	and	as	an	“8	or	9”	out	of	10.		He	put	in	a	“sick	call	slip”	requesting	

medical	treatment	for	his	foot.		

The	primary	factual	dispute	in this	case	centers	on	the	events	of	July	6th.		

That	morning	 Shropshire	was	called	to	the	kitchen.		At	this	point,	his	foot	was	even	

more	swollen	than	the	day	before.		He	had	to	drag	his	foot	when	he	walked	because	

could	not	bend	it.		He	was	wearing	shower slides,	and	had	cut	the	top	so	that	he	

could	get	it	on	his	swollen	foot.		Shropshire	went	to	the	kitchen	and	reported	to	

Steward	Stonewall,	who	was	in	charge. He	told	her	he	could	not	work	and	showed	

her	his	foot.		Stonewall	asked,	“What’s	wrong	with	your	foot?		You	got	gout?”		Also	

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present	in	the	kitchen,	according	to	Shropshire,	were	Steward	English,	Inmate	

Jerome	Fletcher,	and	Sgt.	Johnson.		Shropshire	was	standing	just	a	few	feet	from	

Stonewall	as	he	was	talking	with	her	and	showing	her	his	foot.		Stonewall	told	

Johnson	to	go	back	to	his	bunk.

According	to	Shropshire’s	testimony,	when he	started	to	leave,	Sgt. Johnson,

who	had	been standing	a	couple	of	feet	behind	Stonewall,	took	a	squeegee	from	

Inmate	Fletcher,	who	was	mopping	the	floor.		Johnson	took	the	squeegee in	both	

hands	and	intentionally	“bammed”	it	down	on	Shropshire’s	injured	foot.		The	impact	

caused	the	blisters	to	burst,	oozing	blood	and	fluid.		Shropshire	described	the	pain	

he	felt	at	that	time	as	“excruciating.”		The	pain	was	so	bad	that	it	made	him	cry,	and	

he	hurried	out	the	door	so	that	he	would	not	react	in	front	of	Johnson.		After	the	

blow,	Shropshire’s	foot	hurt	worse	than	before.		According	to	Shropshire	his	pain	

level	was	“at	least”	10	out	of	10.		Shropshire	further	testified	that	when	Johnson	

struck	his	foot,	she	had	a	look	on	her	fact	that	said	“Obey.”		

Johnson	testified	that	that	she	did	not	remember	how	Shropshire’s	foot	was	

injured,	that	she	never	had	a	conversation	with	Shropshire	on	July	4th about	his	

burning	foot	and	his	wet	shoe,	and	denied	ever	striking Shropshire	with	a	squeegee.	

She	did	admit	to	being	in	the	kitchen	in	the	course	of	her	duties	on	July	6th.

According	to	Johnson,	the	first	time	Shropshire’s	injury	came	to	her	attention	was	

on	the	morning	of	July	7th when	Shropshire	was	brought to	the	duty	office	in	a	

wheelchair by	Inmate	McGaster.		 Johnson	called	the	medical	office	at	nearby	

Fountain	Correctional	and	spoke	with	a	nurse	about	Shropshire,	then	had	another	

officer	take	Shropshire	to	the	infirmary	at	Fountain.		

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Shropshire’s	injury	was	a	serious	one.		He	was	admitted	to	the	infirmary	

ward	at	Fountain,	where	he	stayed	for	approximately	two	to	three	weeks.		He	was	

diagnosed	with	a chemical	burn	and	a	penicillin-resistant	strain	of	staph	infection	

known	as	MRSA.		After	a	month	of	treatment	consisting	of	intravenous	and/or	

intramuscular	antibiotics,	pain	medication,	and	wound	care,	Shropshire’s	foot	was	

healed,	according	to	his	medical	records	and	the	testimony	of	his	health	care	

providers.1		There	is	no	medical	evidence	that	the	single	blow	to	Shropshire’s	foot	

caused	either	the	staph	infection	or	any	other	injury	that	necessitated	the	treatment	

Shropshire	received	or	his	stay	in	the	infirmary.		

Ultimately,	the	Court	finds	Shropshire’s	testimony	regarding	the	incident	to	

be	more	credible.		First,	Johnson’s	memory	was	very	selective.		She	clearly	

remembered	events	that	showed	her	in	a	favorable	light,	such	as	helping	Shropshire	

earn	him	extra	benefits	because	he	had	no	family	support	and	moving	him	to	a	

bottom	bunk	when	one	became	available.2		Yet,	she	did	not	recall	anything	about	

Shropshire’s	injury,	even	though	she	admitted	(and	others	similarly	testified)	that	

Shropshire	was	not	one	to	remain	quiet	when	he	had	a	problem.		In	addition,	

Johnson	was	less	than	forthcoming	when	her	attitude	about Shropshire’s

homosexuality	was	questioned.		From	Shropshire’s	testimony,	it	appeared	that	

Johnson	was	morally	opposed	to	homosexuality	and	that	her	opposition	affected	her	

																																																							 1 Dr.	Oscar	Lopez	and	Nurse	Practitioner	Barry	Gaston	testified	by	

deposition.

2 Johnson	also	insisted	that	she	called	a	nurse	“every	time”	a	prisoner	

complained	to	her	about	a	medical	problem.		Yet	when	questioned	further	by	the	

Court,	Johnson	admitted	that	she	called	a	nurse	“every	time	“	if	something	serious	is	

involved,	like	shortness	of	breath	or	bleeding.

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attitude	toward	Shropshire.3		Johnson,	who	is	a	lay	minister,	insisted	that	she	had	no	

religious	problem	with	homosexuality,	but	when	questioned	further	she	admitted	

that	her	church	“believe[s]	that	sin	is	morally	wrong”	and	that	“homosexuality	is	a	

sin.”		Finally,	Johnson	was	unduly	evasive	when	it	came	to	admitting	knowledge	of	

Shropshire’s	injury.		First,	she	said	that when	he	was	brought	to	the	duty	office	of	

July	7th he	was	wearing	a	sock,	that	she	did	not	see	his	foot,	and	that	she	was told	

that	there	was	“blood	and	stuff.”		On	cross	examination,	Johnson	admitted	that	

Shropshire’s	foot	was	not	in	a	sock	but	was	wrapped	(which	was	consistent	with	the	

makeshift	bandage	Shropshire	described).

The	Court	also	finds	Shropshire’s	version	more credible	for	other	reasons.		

Shropshire,	who	is	a	57-year-old	inmate	serving	life,	testified	that	he	had	never	

before	filed	a	lawsuit	and	thus	has	no	history	of	frivolous	actions.		Furthermore,

there	is little	motivation	to	lie	about	the	incident,	which	was	never	the	primary	

focus	of	this	lawsuit.4		Moreover,	defense	counsel’s	attempts	to	discredit	Shropshire	

were	not	successful.		Shropshire	was	disciplined	once	by	Johnson,	but	he	admitted	

to	the	infraction,	which	was	minor,	and	the	discipline	imposed	had	little	effect	on	

Shropshire.		Shropshire	may	not	have	told	medical	staff	that	Johnson	hit	him	

(although	he	claimed	to	have	secretly	told	Dr.	Lopez).		However,	as	he	explained,	

																																																							 3 Shropshire	testified	Johnson	did	not	like	other	inmates	calling	him	“Mama	

Bull”	in	reference	to	his	homosexuality,	that	she	once	put	holy	oil	on	his	head	and	

said	“The	devil	is	alive,”	that	she	“got	on	him”	about	his	voice	(because	it	was	not	

manly	enough),	and	told	him	to	be	a	man	because	God	did	not	put	him	on	the	earth	

to	be	like	he	was.		Furthermore,	both	Johnson	and	J.	C.	McGaster	testified	that

Johnson	put	the	homosexual	prisoners	in	a	separate	dormitory	during	the	time	they	

were	at	Atmore	Work	Release	Center.			

4 Shropshire’s	predominant	complaint	was	the	delay	in	medical	care.		

Summary	judgment	was	granted	in	favor	of	the	defendants	on	that	claim.

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there	are	guards	in	the	infirmary.		Therefore, is	understandable	that	Shropshire

would	not	have	publicly	accused	a	guard	of	misconduct.		Finally,	why	would	

Shropshire	fabricate	an	incident	with	two	prison	employees	(Steward	Stonewall	and	

Steward	English)	as	witnesses?

Conclusions	of	Law

Based	on	the	foregoing	facts,	the	Court	finds	by	a	preponderance	of	evidence	

that	Johnson	has	violated	Shropshire’s	constitutional	right,	guaranteed	by	the	Eighth	

Amendment,	to	be	free	from	cruel	and	unusual	punishment	and	is	liable	for	

damages	under	42	U.S.C.	§	1983.		

To	establish	an	Eighth	Amendment violation	a	prisoner	must	prove	

that	his	injury	was	caused	by	an	“unnecessary	and	wanton	infliction	of	

pain.”	The	Supreme	Court	has	admonished	that	in	such	cases	“the	core	

judicial	inquiry	is	...	whether	force	was	applied	in	a	good-faith	effort	to	

maintain	or	restore	discipline,	or	maliciously	and	sadistically	to	cause	

harm.”		The	absence	of	“serious	injury”	alone	is	insufficient	to	dismiss	

a	prisoner's	Eight	Amendment	claim.	Id. Instead,	analysis	of	an	Eighth	

Amendment	excessive	force	claim	is	contextual	and	requires	that	

many	factors	be	considered:	“the	need	for	the	application	of	force,	the	

relationship	between	that	need	and	the	amount	of	force	used,	the	

threat	reasonably	perceived	by	the	responsible	officials,	and	any	

efforts	made	to	temper	the	severity	of	a	forceful	response.”

Harris	v.	Chapman,	97	F.3d	499,	505	(11th	Cir.	1996)	(quoting	Hudson	v.	McMillian,

503	U.S.	1,	5, 7	(1992)).		However,	“[not]	every	malevolent	touch	by	a	prison	guard	

gives	rise	to	a	federal	cause	of	action.”		Hudson,	503	U.S.	at	9.				Thus,	“de	minimis	

uses	of	physical	force”	are	not	prohibited	“’provided	that	the	use	of	force	is	not	of	a	

sort	repugnant	to	the	conscience	of	mankind.’”		Id. at	10	(quoting	Whitley	v.	Albers,	

475	U.S.	312,	327	(1986)).

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Viewed	in	context,	Johnson’s	use	of	force	was excessive	because	striking	

Shropshire’s	obviously	injured	and	painful	foot	was	malicious,	gratuitous,	and	

without	justification	or	provocation.		As	the	Supreme	Court	stated	in	Hudson	v.	

McMillian,	503	U.S.	at	9,	“[w]hen	prison	official	maliciously	and	sadistically	use	force	

to	cause	harm,	contemporary	standards	of	decency always	are	violated.		This	is	true	

whether	or	not	significant	injury	is	evident.”		Even	if	the	force	used	to	strike	

Shropshire	might	be	considered	minor	in	other	circumstances,	the	act	of	

deliberately	striking	a	prisoner’s	injury	solely	for	the	purpose	of	inflicting	pain	is	

nothing	short	of	malicious.		The	Court	has	no	doubt	Johnson	was	aware	of	the	injury	

to	Shropshire’s	foot	when	she	hit	him.		Shropshire	complained	to	her	when	his	foot	

was	first	injured,	and	she	overheard	the	conversation	between	Shropshire	and	

Steward	Stonewall	immediately	before	she	struck	Shropshire.		Furthermore,	

Johnson’s	blow caused	significant	pain	and	contributed to	the	severity	of	the	injury.	

Shropshire	testified	that	the	pain	was	a	10	out	of	10	and	that	he	had	to	leave	the	

area	so	that	he	would	not	react	against	Johnson.	The	blow	caused	an	open	wound,	

and,	according	to	medical	testimony,	open	wounds	increase	the	risk	of	infection.	In	

sum,	Johnson’s	wanton	and	unnecessary	infliction	of	pain	amounts	to	cruel	and	

unusual	punishment.		

Having	decided	the	issue	of	liability,	the	Court	must	determine	damages.		In	a	

§	1983	lawsuit,	a	plaintiff	may	be	entitled	to	recover	both	compensatory	and	

punitive	damages.		Compensatory	damages	include	“damages	based	on	monetary	

loss,	physical	pain	and	suffering	or	demonstrable	mental	and	emotional	distress.”		

Slicker	v.	Jackson,	215	F.3d	1225,	1233	(11th Cir.	2000).			Shropshire	undoubtedly	

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suffered	mental	and	emotional	distress	due	to	the	chemical	burn,	MRSA	infection,	

and	subsequent	treatment.		But	these	are	not	attributable	to	the	squeegee	incident	

and,	therefore, are	not	compensable.		Damages	will,	however,	be	awarded	for	the	

increase in	pain	and	suffering	and	emotional	distress	resulting	from	the	incident.

Shropshire	testified	that	the	pain	was worse	after	the	blow,	was “excruciating,”	and	

was “at	least”	a	10	out of	10.		In	addition,	Shropshire	testified	that	blow	caused	an	

emotional	reaction	strong	enough	to	make	him	cry.		Altogether,	the	Court	finds	that	

$1,000	is	an	adequate	and	appropriate	award	for	physical	pain	and	suffering	and	

mental	and	emotional	distress.

Next,	the	Court	turns	to	punitive	damages.		In	general,	punitive	damages	may	

be	awarded	for	a	violation	of	§	1983	”when	when	the	defendant's	conduct	is	shown	

to	be	motivated	by	evil	motive	or	intent,”	i.e., is malicious,	or	“when	it	involves	

reckless	or callous	indifference	to	the	federally	protected	rights	of	others.”		Smith	v.	

Wade,	461	U.S.	30,	56	(1983).	 Having	determined	that	Johnson’s	conduct	was	

malicious,	the	Court	has	no	difficulty	concluding	that	Shropshire	has	met	the	

threshold	necessary	for	an	award	of	punitive	damages.		However,	the	inquiry	is	

more	complicated	here.	

In	an	Eighth	Amendment	excessive	force	case,	an	award	of	punitive	damages	

is	governed	by	the	Prison	Litigation	Reform	Act	(PLRA),	18	U.S.C.	§	3626(a)(1)(A).		

Johnson	v.	Breeden,	280	F.3d	1308,	1323-24.		The	PLRA	strictly	limits	the	availability	

of	“prospective	relief”	which	it	defines	as	“’all	relief	other	than compensatory	money	

damages.’”		Id. at	1324	(quoting	18	U.S.C.	§	3626(g)(7)).		Thus,	for	PLRA	purposes,	

punitive	damages	are	considered	prospective	relief	and	must	be	“narrowly	drawn,	

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extend[	]	no	further	than	necessary	to	correct	the	violation	of	the	Federal	right,	and	

must	be	the	“least	intrusive	means	necessary	to	correct	the	violation.”		Id.		18	U.S.C.	§	

3626(a)(1)(A).		Furthermore,	“[t]he	court	shall	give	substantial	weight	to	any	

adverse	impact	on	public	safety	or	the	operation	of	a	criminal	justice	system	caused	

by	the	relief.”		Id.		The	district	court is	required	to	discuss	and	enter	findings	with	

respect	to	these	factors,	even	though	“there	may	not	be	much	to	say	about	the[m].”		

Johnson,	280	F.3d	at	1326.		

The	Court	finds	that	a	punitive	damages	award	in	the	amount	of	$1,000	is	

appropriate	and	satisfies	the	foregoing	criteria.		Punitive	damages	serve	the	dual	

aims	of	punishment	and	deterrence.		State	Farm	Mut.	Auto	Ins.	Co.	v.	Campbell,	538	

U.S.	408	(2003).		This	modest	award	goes	no	further	than	is	necessary	to	serve	those	

goals	and	could	not	be	more	narrowly	drawn	or	less	intrusive.		Moreover	requiring	

an	officer	who	intentionally	violated	a	prisoner’s	constitutional	rights	to	pay	a	small	

punitive	damages	award	should	not	have	a	significant	adverse	impact	on	public	

safety	or	the	operation	of	a	criminal	justice	system.		

Conclusion

For	the	foregoing	reasons,	the	Court	finds	in	favor	of	the	Plaintiff	and	awards	

compensatory	damages	in	the	amount	of	$1,000	plus	punitive	damages	in	the	

amount	of	$1,000.		Judgment	will	be	entered	by	separate	order.	

As	the	prevailing	party,	the	Plaintiff	 may	be	entitled	to	“a	reasonable	

attorney’s	fees	as	part	of	the	costs.”		42	U.S.C.	§	1988(b).		Plaintiff	shall	file	a	

properly	supported	motion	for	attorney’s	fee	and	costs	on	or	before	February	13,	

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2015.		Defendant	must	file	its	opposition	to	the	motion	on	or	before	February	27,	

2015.

DONE and	ORDERED this	the	21st day	of	January,	2015.

s/Charles	R.	Butler,	Jr.

Senior	United	States	District	Judge

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