1 In compli ance wit h Tenn. R. App. P. 30( b)(2) and (d) (2), the pa rti es have st yled t heir plea dings befo re this court “Sta te of

Tenness ee v. Keith Mayfiel d, J r.” and have s imply adde d the na me of the appell ant and its stat us before this court. Tenn. R. App. P. 30 provides that pa pers a ddr essed to this court shoul d conta in a c apti on set ti ng fort h the title of the case as it appeared in the trial court. I n this case, documents r elat ing t o the ba il bond forf eit ure proc eedings were styled in accordance with t he underl ying cr iminal case . Notwi thst anding t he st yle of

the c ase i n the t

ria l cour t and becau se Speed y Relea se Bail Bonds, rather t han Mr. May fiel d, is the appell ant in t hese proceedings, we have styled this opin ion “ In re: S pee dy R elease Bail B ond s.” 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON Assigned on

Briefs J une 13, 2001 IN RE: SPEEDY RELEASE BAIL BONDS 1 Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 99-472 Donald H. Allen, Judge

No. W2000-02260-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 23, 2002

The appellant, Speedy Release Bail Bonds, appeals the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying its motion for reimbursement of a forfeited bail bond. Following a review of the recor d and the parties’ briefs, we

reverse the judgment of

the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgment

of the Cir

cuit Cour

t Rever sed; Remanded
J OE G. R ILEY , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which C ORNELI A A. C LARK , S P
. J., joined

. N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., filed a separ ate opini on concu

rring in p art and d

issenting in part. Marcus M . Reaves , Jackson , Tennes see, for the appe llant, Spe edy Rele ase Bail Bo nds. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Generaland Repor ter; J. Ros s Dyer, A ssistant A ttorney G eneral ; James G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney General; and Shaun A . Brown , Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee.

OPINION The issues in

this case are as follows: when a bondsman pays into court the full amount of the bond forfeiture after entry of the condition al judgment, issuance of the scire facias , and expiration of the 180-day period, (1) c an th e bondsman later seek reimbursement; and, if so, (2)-2-

which statute governs the proceeding seeking reimbursement? W e answer the first query

i n the affirmative and, as to the second query, conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204( a) governs the proceeding. We remand to thetrial court for further proceedings pursuant to Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 11-204(a).

I. Factua l Background The instant case arose in 1999 from the criminal prosecution of Keith Mayfield, Jr. Bail was set in the amount of $10,000, and on March 29, 1999, the appellant, Speedy Release Bail Bond s , agreed to secure Mayfield’s appe arance. On July 6, 1999, a Madison County Grand Jury indicted Mayfield, and the trial court scheduled his arraignment for July 13, 1999. Mayfield, however, failed to appear for his arraignment, and on July 16, 1999, the trial court entered a

conditional judgment of forfeit ure aga inst both Ma

yfield a nd the app ellant, is suing a ca pias for Mayfield ’s arre st and a w

rit of scire facias for the appellant. The Madison Count y Sheriff ’s Department served the appellant withthe writ of scire facias on July 26, 1999, th ereby no tifyin g the appellant that the conditional judgmentwould be made final unless the appellant appeared be fore the cour

t wit hin 180 da

ys to show cause “to the contrary.” The appella nt failed to appea r or file anything with the court within 180 days. In r

esponse t o a letter from t he Circuit Cou rt Clerk dated January 25, 2000, advising appellant to pay the

bond within

ten days o

r its bond a

uthority w ould be re

voked, the appell ant paid the bail bond on F ebruary 3, 2000, which was after the 180-da y period. No final judgment was entered. The appellant

filed nothing until July 26, 2000, almost six months after paying the forfeiture, when it filed a motion in the Madison County Circuit Court requesting reimbursement of the forfeited bail bond. The appellant allegedit had disc overed t hat Mayf ield had b een inca

rcera ted in Wilmington, North

Carolina, between December 8, 1999, and June 1, 2000, a t which time he had been transferred to the custody of law enforc ement authorities in Madison County an d had pled guilty to the pending charges. There was no aff idavit or documentation attached to the motion which established Mayfield’s being in custody in North Carolina. The appe llant alle ged in

its motion that it had exe rcised d ue dilige nce in at tempting to

locate M ayfield

prior to its paymen

t of the ba il bond. In particular, the

appella nt allege d that it ha

d hired tw o bounty

hunters to locate Mayfield, and one of the bou nty hunters had located Mayfield in North Carolina prior to his incarcer ation i n Wilmington. Appellant alleged that because the outsta

nding cap ias in

Madison County had not yet been registered with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the bounty hunter was forced to release May field

in order to avoid prosecution for kidnapping. Thereafter , the appellant was unable to locate Mayfield and paid the bail bond forfeiture of $10,000.
The trial court conducted a h earing o n the appellant’s motion where Shawki Madyun, a representativeof the ap

pellant, testifie d conce

rning fa cts alleged in the motion. Again, no affid avit or documentation concerning Mayfield’s custodial status in North Carolina was introduced. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion, concluding that the appellant had “waited too late” to request reimbursement. The appe llant now appeals the trial court’s denial of relief.-3- II. Analysis
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201(a) (1997) au thorizes a trial court to enter a conditional judgmentof forf

eiture a gainst a defendant and h

is suretie s when a d

efenda nt fails to appear in court in accordance with a

bail bond agreement. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139(a) (1997). The trial court then issues a writ of scire facias or otherwise provides notice to the defendant and hi s sureties in conjunction wit h the cond itional jud

gment. Te

nn. Code A

nn. § 40-1 1-202 (19 97); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139(a). A surety has 180 days from the date it is served with the scire facias to produce the defendant; otherwise, “the court may enter [final] judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139(b).
Th e applicable statutes provide sureties with several avenue s of relief from the liability of forfeiture. First, Ten

n. Code An

n. § 40-11 -132 (199 7) provid es that, “[ a]t any time before the forfeiture of their und er taking, the bail bondsman or s urety ma y surrender the d

efenda nt in their exonera tio n, or th e defendant may personally surrender to the of ficer.” Moreover, “[a] fter the liability of the bail bondsman o r surety ha s become fixed by forfeiture, and befor e payment,” a surety may obtain relief under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-203(a) (1 997) by the surrender of the d efendant and the payment o f all cost s. Under the latte r statute , the degr

ee to whic

h the sure ty is released from liability is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id . at (b).
In addition to the above statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201 (b) pr ohibits the entry of a “forfeitureor conditional forfeiture” when a s urety is unable to surrender a defendant due to the defendant’s incarceration in a jail, workhouse, or penitentiary; provided, the surety furnishes the t

rial court “a sworn affidavit of the jailer, ward en, or other

responsible officer” verifying defenda nt’s incarceration. Finally, and importantly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a) (1997) provides in pertinent part that, regardless of whether “final judgment has bee n entered .

. . or the jud

gment hasbeen pa

id ,” (emphas is added) , the cour t
may receive, hear and de termine t he petition of any person who claims relief is merited on any recogni zancesforfeit ed, and s o lessen or absolutely remit the same, less a clerk’s commission . . . , and do all and everything ther ein a s they shall deem just and right, and consistent with the welfar

e of the s tate, as well as the person praying such relief. Prior to 1987, this statute did not contain the language “or the judgment has been pa id;” thus, it did not authorize relief after the judgment had been paid. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40-1304 (1982) (predecessor

statute to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-2 04); Wallac e v. State , 223 Tenn. 255, 443 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1969) (holding relief was unavailable under Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-1304 after final judgment, execution and collection of forfeiture). In 1987, the statute w as amend

ed to specifically authorize relief even after “ the judgment has been paid.” See 1987 Public Acts, Chapter 423.-4-

The discretion granted the trial court under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-2 04(a) is broad and co mp rehensive, empowering the trial court to make determinations based on justice and “r ight.” State v. Shredeh , 909 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Having reviewed the possible statutory bases for relief, we conclude that

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-20

4(a) ap plies onc e the for

feiture has been paid in full after expiration of the 180 days. Thi s statute is entitled “Relief on Forfeited Recognizances,” and is the only stat ute which ex

pressly authorizes relief after “the judgment has been paid.” The fact that the

forfeiture was paid before, or even without, th

e entry o f a “fin al judgme nt,” doesnot author

ize proc eedings, or the possibility of greater relief, under Tenn. Code A nn . § 40-11-201. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201, entitled “Conditional Judgment on Failure to Appear,” provides that “[n]o forfeiture or conditional forf eiture shallbe rendered ” when it is shown by affidavit that the defendant is prevented from being in court due to ment al or physical disability or incarceration elsewhere. (Empha sis added). It does not provide relief once the forfeiture has been paid . We further note that, even if Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201 did apply after payment of the forfeiture, theappella nt did not c omply with its provisio ns. An affidavit from a jailer, warden or other appropriate personnel showing defenda nt was in custody was never filed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201(b).

III. NECESSITY FOR REMAND In this ca se the tri al court ’s finding s indicate it did not bel

ieve relief waspossible

once the forfeiture was paid after

the 180 days had expired. The trial court did not consider whether any relief s hould be granted under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a) . As stated, the trial co urt has broa d discretion under this statute to determine whether any relief should be gr anted.
We rever se and remand for another hear ing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a). It is within the trial court’s discretion as to the relief, if any, that should be granted.

___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE