LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS®

OF THE UNITE D STATES 

President 

Kay J. Maxwell 

Greenwich, Connecticut

Vice-Presidents 

Linda Claire McDaniel 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Marlys Robertson 

Boulder, Colorado

Secretary-Treasurer 

Shirley Eberly

Rochester, New York

Directors 

Sarah Diefendorf

San Francisco, California 

Jan Flapan 

Chicago, Illinois 

Jane Gross 

Plantation, Florida 

Xandra Kayden

Los Angeles, California 

Odetta MacLeish-White 

Gainesville, Florida 

Carolie Mullan 

Lubbock, Texas 

Carol Reimers 

Hingham, Massachusetts 

Olivia Thorne 

Wallingford, Pennsylvania 

Mary Wilson 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Executive Director 

Nancy E. Tate

January 18, 2005 

Allan Eustis

Technical Guidelines Development Committee 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

100 Bureau Drive 

Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899-8900 

By Electronic Transmission 

Dear Mr. Eustis: 

The League of Women Voters Education Fund has developed a whitepaper entitled 

Helping America Vote: Safeguarding the Vote that touches on several issues that

will be considered by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. I am

attaching a copy of that document for consideration by the committee. 

In addition, the League of Women Voters of the United States (LWVUS) at its 

convention last June adopted the following statement: “In order to ensure integrity 

and voter confidence in elections, the LWVUS supports the implementation of 

voting systems and procedures that are secure, accurate, recountable, and

accessible.” The term “recountable” is not a code word for paper trail, indeed, the 

League’s stand is based on the understanding that voting technology is rapidly 

developing. We believe that standards must allow for technological innovation. 

We also believe that any analysis of voting systems must be balanced, and apply the 

same criteria equally and appropriately to all systems, including any attached devices 

for recording, printing, or other function. Thus, each element of the voting system

that produces a ballot to be counted must assure that the ballot is secure, accurate, 

recountable, and accessible. 

We ask that the Technical Guidelines Development Committee consider the 

League’s views as it does its work. 

Sincerely, 

Kay J. Maxwell 

President 

cc: The Election Assistance Commission

 

1730 M STREET, NW, SUITE 1000 , WASHI NGTO N, DC 20036 - 4508

202-429 -1965 Fax 202-429 -0854 

Internet http://ww w.lwv .or g . E-mail: lwv@lwv.or g
Safeguarding the Vote

I

n 2002 Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) authorizing $3.9 billion to modernize

and improve federal elections.Debate over how to fulfill the requirements of the new law has focused

on new technology, both new voting machines and computerized statewide registration systems.Yet,

as election officials well understand, new, sophisticated technology alone will not solve the ills that surfaced

in the 2000 presidential election. Sound administrative practices are equally necessary to ensure that elections are run both fairly and accurately.And much less has been said on this subject.

July 2004

Education Fund

HELPING

AMERICA VOTE

continued on page two

According to the law’s congressional authors, HAVA is

intended to ensure that eligible voters are able to cast a

vote and have that vote counted accurately. The law established minimum federal requirements to protect both

eligible voters and valid votes, thus providing stronger

security for the election process. 

In this report, the League of Women Voters focuses not

on the technology, about which much has already been

said and written, but on the administrative framework that

will deploy new technologies and management systems to

meet the goals of greater accuracy and security. The

report sets forth a set of recommended operational and

management practices for election officials that protect

eligible voters, ensure valid votes will be counted and

bolster voters’ confidence.

In “Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems

(DREs): Analysis of Security Issues,” (2003) a report

issued by the Congressional Research Service, three widely

accepted elements of defense against security risks are

cited: technology, personnel and operations. This League

report adopts that framework, but focuses primarily on the

latter two elements, personnel and operations.

Technological security defenses will be addressed by

guidelines developed by the federal Election Assistance

Commission (EAC) in cooperation with the National

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 

In 2002, elections officials in Florida discovered the

cost of focusing on technology without equal emphasis on

personnel and operations. One county purchased all new

electronic voting systems only to discover in the 2002

gubernatorial primary that its process for administering the

new machines was flawed — ballots were incorrectly

loaded — and its poll workers had not been adequately

trained on how to operate the new machines. As a consequence, many polls opened late and some never opened

at all. 
2

continued from page one

SECTION ONE: VOTING SYSTEMS SECURITY

ACCOUNTABILITY, OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY

• Require bipartisan or third-party monitoring of sensitive

election procedures.

• Require tracking and documentation of all procedures

from the testing of machines to the handling of ballots. 

• Require transparency in the operation and management

of voting systems.

UNIFORMITY 

• Establish statewide practices for the management and

operation of voting systems.

• Require that all systems, at a minimum, have been 

state certified and meet all federal voluntary voting

system standards. 

TESTING 

• Test every voting machine to ensure it is operating 

properly.

• Perform uniform, public testing of voting systems.

• Verify that the electronic and optical scan machines

used are the same as the systems that were certified.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF VOTING SYSTEMS

• Restrict physical access to all components of 

voting systems. 

• Maintain and operate voting systems in isolation 

from networks and the Internet.

PREPARATION PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY

• Educate voters on the use of all voting equipment both 

in advance of the election and in the polling place on

Election Day. 

• Provide adequate training for all Election Day workers. 

ON ELECTION DAY

• Ensure adequate technical support to poll workers on 

Election Day. 

• Provide a back-up plan in the event of machine failure.

AFTER ELECTION DAY

• Design a routine process that checks for problems that

may have occurred but not been visible on Election Day.

SECTION TWO: VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEMS

• Establish electronic transmission of voter information to

the election authority from motor vehicle and other agencies offering voter registration. 

• Ensure the registration process enfranchises all eligible 

citizens.

• Protect voter privacy and database security. 

• Require transparency in the administration as well as in

the creation of statewide voter registration systems.

• Require tracking and documentation of all changes to

the database. 

• Conduct accurate voter registration list maintenance. 

• Give voters access to review and check their voter

record. 

RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS

The same principle holds true with regard to voter registration. Example: In 2000, Florida paid a firm to conduct

a computerized match of the voter rolls against felon lists.

The resulting list of felons that the state then transmitted

to counties for purging had an accuracy rate of only 80

percent. Counties that purged the voters without verifying

the information found that they had erroneously removed

eligible voters from the rolls. In both cases, technological

solutions provided voters no protection against flawed

management of that technology. 

As states purchase new voting machines and create

statewide registration systems, they will need to pay equal

attention to administrative and management practices. 

This report culls from interviews with election officials

and other experts a set of practices that can provide a more

secure foundation for two key components of election

administration: voting systems and voter registration

systems. The recommendations offered below are based on

practices already in use. In other words, they are not theoretical but practical. n
ACCOUNTABILITY, OPENNESS 

AND TRANSPARENCY

RECOMMENDATION #1: Require bipartisan 

or third-party monitoring of sensitive election

procedures.

A time-honored and effective method to guard against

fraud is to open the election process up to bipartisan or

nonpartisan scrutiny.Procedures that may be vulnerable or

perceived as vulnerable to tampering and manipulation

should be conducted under the watchful gaze of partisan

and nonpartisan observers. Sensitive election procedures

— that is, procedures where cheating might occur —

include, but are not limited to, distribution of ballots and

deployment of voting systems to polling places; programming and testing of voting machines, including optical

scanners; opening and closing the polls; maintenance and

trouble-shooting; and the process of counting ballots,

including provisional ballots.

The use of increasingly sophisticated voting equipment

raises concerns that sensitive election functions will be

administered by technology experts, including outside

consultants, with little or no oversight precisely because

the work is so technical.In the absence of bipartisan technical oversight, election officials may choose to conduct a

third-party review of technical processes.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Puerto Rico, representatives from the

major political parties play a strong role in almost every

aspect of election administration. On Election Day votes are

tallied both at the polling place and at the state election

headquarters. Both counts are conducted jointly by a team

of officials from each of the three major parties. 

MODEL PRACTICE: In New Mexico, the state contracts with

an independent certified public accounting firm to conduct

a thorough audit of the vote counting process. This independent audit follows the state’s own audit of all vote totals.

RECOMMENDATION #2: Require tracking and

documentation of all procedures, from the testing of

machines to the handling of ballots.

Documentation, that is, a thorough and precise record

of all relevant operations and procedures, provides the

foundation for security in elections. The benefits of

sound documentation are two-fold: First, requiring staff

and poll workers to record their activities, particularly

activities to protect security, helps ensure those tasks get

done. Documentation also allows election officials to

retrace what happened in the event of a machine or

administrative failure. Requiring staff and poll workers to

document their actions will allow for an audit to determine whether security measures were bypassed.

Tasks that should be documented include, but are not

limited to, the following: receiving and verifying that the

correct number of each ballot style has been received from

the company printing the ballot;conducting tests to ensure

voting machines are running properly;performing scheduled maintenance of all types of voting systems;transfer of

ballots or memory cartridges from the polling place to the

central office; and any trouble-shooting or repairs on

Election Day.

Documentation may not necessarily be paper documentation.For example,a protocol of electronic signatures

can track who did what to the machines and when they

did it.Some software now allows officials to monitor who

gains access to the computer system.

MODEL PRACTICE: In New Mexico, after polls close, the

presiding election judge mails to the Secretary of State documentation of the number of voters and the vote totals. The

Secretary of State’s office reviews the documents, comparing

the total voters with the votes cast according to the tapes. 

Poll workers are required to explain any anomalies. When the

county sends the Secretary of State the canvass sheet, 

the state office compares the machine tapes to the totals on

the canvass sheet and investigates any discrepancies.

3

SECTION ONE: VOTING SYSTEMS SECURITY

The voting machines on which Americans cast their votes have been called into question. From the now-infamous punch

card systems to brand-new electronic voting equipment, voting machines no longer have the automatic confidence of

America’s voters. While much of the controversy has focused on the voting machines alone, the voting equipment does

not constitute the entire voting process. Voting machines function within a larger legal and administrative structure;

they are a single component in a larger system. Operational and management issues are very important in the functioning of any system. Many of the risks inherent in the use of particular voting systems — optical scanners, punch

card systems, lever machines, and electronic systems — can be substantially reduced by improving such management

practices as personnel training and by instituting rigorous administrative procedures. With the November 2004 general

elections close at hand and public scrutiny of elections growing more intense, election officials will want to demonstrate their commitment to security. By following relevant best practices that can be implemented in time for the 2004

general election, such as many of those described below, election officials can better protect their voting systems and

shore up public confidence in the voting process. 
MODEL PRACTICE: The computer system that administers

Georgia’s election system incorporates information used to

produce a comprehensive set of audit data. For transactions

occurring on the system, the system records the nature of the

transaction, the time of the transaction and the person that

conducted the transaction in an audit log. The audit log

allows an investigator to reconstruct the sequence of events

surrounding any incident or system failure.

RECOMMENDATION #3: Require transparency in

the operation and management of voting systems.

In order to ensure public confidence,the administration

of a voting system in its entirety — from purchase to postelection maintenance — should be open and transparent.

Election officials must take extra steps to assure voters that

not just the systems themselves but the procedures

involved in readying systems for Election Day are fully

open and accountable.

Certain tests, such as those that verify that machines are

running properly — logic and accuracy tests — should be

conducted in public.Counting operations such as running

punch cards through counting decks and the counting of

absentee ballots should be open to public scrutiny as well.

All procurement should be conducted through a bid

process that is open to public scrutiny. Reviews and evaluations of various options should be made available to the

public. Several jurisdictions formed committees that

included technology experts, as well as public interest

organizations and stakeholders to evaluate and select new

voting systems.

MODEL PRACTICE: Georgia formed a partnership with

Kennesaw State University (KSU) to provide in-house

expertise in the administration of the state’s new statewide

uniform voting system including purchase, testing, maintenance, and Election Day trouble-shooting. KSU also helped

train the poll workers and educate voters on the new system.

The voting systems are tested and approved for use in elections at KSU’s Center for Election Systems. The Center

ensures the systems meet state requirements and conducts

a mock election.

MODEL PRACTICE: Ohio developed a statewide procurement

process for the purchase of voting systems using HAVA funds

that included a four-phase evaluation of all voting systems.

In addition, the Secretary of State kept the public informed

at each step of the process, and evaluation reports were

posted on the state’s Web site. As part of the evaluation, the

state hired two independent firms to review the security risks

of each voting system. The reports are posted in their entirety

on the state’s Web site as well. 

UNIFORMITY 

RECOMMENDATION #4: Establish statewide

practices for the management and operation of

voting systems.

The scrutiny that occurred during the 2000 presidential election demonstrated the lack of uniformity

throughout the nation’s election systems. Some jurisdictions experienced voting error rates as high as 30 percent

while in other jurisdictions only one or two percent of the

votes were not counted.The minimum “uniform and nondiscriminatory” requirements established in HAVA were

intended to introduce greater uniformity among all election jurisdictions.

Traditionally, while most states have statewide standards

for voting systems, the purchase and administration of

such systems have been left to local jurisdictions. Local

management practices vary widely,leading to disparities in

the functioning of voting machines. In the wake of the

U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, however,

states have a responsibility to ensure the equal treatment

of all votes statewide.

States such as Maryland and Georgia elected to establish a statewide uniform voting system. In Georgia, the

state purchased the voting system that would be used in

every precinct in federal elections. Every voter casts his

or her vote on the same type of touchscreen voting

machine. Ohio issued a request for proposals for voting

systems and negotiated contracts with four vendors;

localities using HAVA funds to replace equipment may

purchase equipment only from these vendors. Both

approaches recognize that the state now has a responsibility to ensure greater uniformity.

As recent elections have made clear,the management and

administration of voting systems can dramatically affect the

performance of those systems. Jurisdictions using punch

card systems that neglected to keep the vote recorders free

of chads experienced problems with votes not registering.

Some jurisdictions using electronic systems failed to

recharge the voting machine batteries. Other jurisdictions

using optical scan systems have run into problems with the

scanners’displays when they stored the machines in a room

without climate control.These examples demonstrate that

all voting systems require diligent maintenance.

States should address this challenge by developing

statewide practices for maintaining and administering

voting systems and, in addition, providing for uniform

testing of all voting systems. Such procedures might

include, for example, a schedule for recharging voting

machine batteries, physical storage requirements for

certain voting systems or required maintenance for 

4
punch card counting decks and other voting systems. In

addition, states should develop mechanisms to monitor

local compliance.

Procedures associated with poll closing are a critical

point in the election process. States are well-advised to

have in writing statewide poll-closing procedures that

guarantee the process is observable,secure and well-documented.

MODEL PRACTICE: Maryland is developing and implementing

a statewide security plan based on a framework recommended by the National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST) in the publication, “Guide for Developing

Security Plans for Information Technology Systems.” The

state is involving local election officials in the development

of the plan. 

MODEL PRACTICE: California directs poll workers to post the

results for each precinct on the door of the polling place at

the close of the polls. These tallies serve as an audit of election night tallies conducted at the central office. 

RECOMMENDATION #5: Require that all

systems, at a minimum, have been state certified and

meet all federal voluntary voting system standards.

Prior to the enactment of HAVA, 38 states required that

voting systems meet federal voting system standards. All

major U.S.voting systems manufacturers participate in the

independent testing process, which qualifies systems

according to the federal standards. Once systems have

been qualified, the states certify them for purchase or use

by localities. Several states impose additional requirements. California, Georgia and Florida, for example,

conduct their own certification programs to ensure

systems meet state-specific requirements. State certification programs should supplement but not supplant federal

testing, standards and guidelines.

If a state requires that voting systems meet federal standards, then the state — as well as the local jurisdiction —

has an obligation to prevent bypassing the testing and

qualification process. In the 2004 presidential primaries

multiple counties used new voting systems with software

that had not been federally qualified,a process that includes

testing for reliability.According to news reports,a lab hired

by the vendor performed only cursory testing prior to the

election.The real test came on Election Day when there

were not only significant problems with the mechanism

for encoding ballots, but the vote tabulating software also

attributed thousands of votes erroneously.

While the EAC is developing guidelines for protecting

voting systems,states may consider requiring voting system

manufacturers to abide by information technology standards already developed by NIST. NIST develops these

standards,called Federal Information Processing Standards

(FIPS), to fill the vacuum when there are no accepted

industry standards. There are FIPS, for example, that

address encryption, the security of computer applications

and data authentication. Recommendations in the FIPS

guidelines for physical security of automatic data

processing systems address such issues as preventing access

by unauthorized individuals and appropriate climate

controls.These recommendations could easily be adapted

to voting systems.

MODEL PRACTICE: Ohio issued a statewide Request for

Proposals (RFP) from voting system manufacturers and

required localities wishing to use HAVA money to purchase

new voting systems to purchase only voting systems that

have been approved by the state. Ohio required that all voting

systems be state certified to meet the federal standards. In

addition, the state rigorously tested all potential voting

systems, hiring two outside firms to conduct a thorough security review of each system. 

TESTING 

RECOMMENDATION #6:Test every voting

machine to ensure it is operating properly.

Performing tests on every voting machine provides

assurances that the system will operate properly on

Election Day. This task is time-consuming so election

officials will have to plan ahead to allow sufficient time

to test every machine.Time spent testing machines prior

to Election Day can save time in the end. For example,

in a recent primary, a manufacturer technician in one

jurisdiction failed to calibrate the optical scan machines

to accept ballots marked with a certain type of ink; all

ballots marked with that ink had to be recounted.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Georgia, voting machines are arranged

by precinct and the memory cards inserted. Each machine is

tested to ensure that it is running properly and that the

proper ballot information is stored on the machine.

5
6

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), authorized federal

funds to replace poorly-functioning voting equipment. Some

have raised concerns about the security of new Direct

Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems — also known as

“touchscreen” voting machines and have proposed a particular solution — the voter-verifiable paper trail (VVPT). 

Most VVPTs are add-on systems that print out voters’ individual ballot choices after they have been cast on the DRE.

Proponents of the VVPT argue that this allows the voter to

confirm his or her vote and that it provides an opportunity for

recounts since the paper record of each individual ballot is

retained by election officials. 

Because VVPTs are relatively new, federal voting system

standards for security, accuracy, accessibility, reliability,

availability and maintainability have yet to be developed.

Therefore, VVPT systems have yet to be qualified to meet

these currently unknown federal standards. VVPT systems

also have yet to be widely tested under the rigorous conditions of major elections.

As a potential solution to election problems, VVPT systems

deserve and require a close and critical examination. 

A number of questions have been raised: 

• Does the VVPT add security, and if so, how? 

• What does it mean to be voter-verified? Does every voter

have to verify his or her ballot? What is the value of unverified paper records?

• How will the process of voter verification, whether it is

required or optional, be carried out at the polling place?

• What happens if a voter says the paper record is incorrect?

What is the process if the voter affirmatively does NOT

verify? In this case, how is the electronic record or the paper

record, or both, corrected and the ballots accurately

counted? 

• How will the paper records be counted or recounted? What

are the standards of accuracy that must apply to the

counting of the paper records? What mechanisms for

protecting the paper records will be put in place to guard

against manipulation or loss?

• What is the official record of the vote? When will the electronic tally count under the VVPT system, and when will the

paper records be relied on? What are the effects of an

ambiguous outcome? 

• How will the system work mechanically? What certification

and other standards will apply to the printers, the paper

records, the counting devices and the security systems for

the paper records?

• What is the effect of the VVPT system on voting access for

persons with visual and physical disabilities, persons of

limited English proficiency and persons of limited literacy? 

The answers to these questions should reflect practical

changes to election procedures. 

Often the debate over DRE voting systems has been limited

to the proposal to require a VVPT. However, a paper trail is

not the only means available for auditing the voting process.

The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project stated that, “an

auditable voting system need not be based on paper. Other

technologies might emerge in the coming years that would

guarantee confidence in election results and would improve

on paper ballots in other ways.” Caltech/MIT has proposed

an alternative solution: separate the vote-recording and the

vote-counting processes. This and other approaches, such as

instituting a third-party audit, should be explored. Many of

the security measures outlined in this report, primarily

preventing physical and electronic access to the voting

system, would reduce the risk from hacking and manipulation of voting systems. n

VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER TRAIL: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

RECOMMENDATION #7: Perform uniform, public

testing of voting systems.

This testing should include, at a minimum, (1) logic and

accuracy testing for electronic and optical scan systems,

(2) testing to ensure the proper ballot has been loaded in

the systems, and (3) checking to ensure that paper and

optical scan ballots have been properly distributed to the

polling places.

Election Day testing and monitoring may also include:

• Verification that the number of voters entering the

polling place is equal to the number of votes cast in that

polling place.There may be a small discrepancy in these

two numbers since sometimes voters will leave the

polling place without casting a vote. Nevertheless, this

test effectively verifies that ballots have not been fraudulently added.
• Parallel monitoring.This test requires randomly pulling

voting machines that have been readied for voting —

“live”machines — from the polling place on Election

Day and testing them to verify that they are accurately recording and tallying votes.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Marshall County, Iowa, election officials

perform logic and accuracy testing on each optical scanning

device, and perform a hand tally of the test deck. In addition,

Marshall County officials employ a written chain-of-custody

documentation for all paper optical scan ballots, both to

track ballots before Election Day and after they have been

scanned and counted.

RECOMMENDATION #8: Verify that the electronic and optical scan machines used are the same

as the systems that were certified.

To ensure meaningful compliance with federal and state

standards, jurisdictions must develop procedures to

confirm that the software being used in an election is the

same software that was qualified by an Independent Testing

Authority and certified by the state.

MODEL PRACTICE: Georgia tests its voting equipment to

ensure that only the certified software has been installed. To

conduct this test, the Kennesaw State University Election

Center creates and administers a “validation program” that

tests whether the software installed on systems at the county

level is the same as the certified software. Election officials

run this validation program both before and after the election.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

VOTING SYSTEMS

RECOMMENDATION #9: Restrict physical access

to all components of voting systems.

Election authorities should have systems and procedures in place to guarantee that at no time are ballots,

optical scanners, voting machines or records physically

vulnerable.Providing such protection may be as simple as

storing the computer server in a locked cabinet or it may

involve working with the police to provide security for

the transportation of ballots. In this context, the voting

system encompasses not only voting machines, but also

servers and other computer equipment involved in the

process of administering the election.Indeed,Section 301

of HAVA defines a voting system broadly as “the total

combination of mechanical, electromechanical or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware and

documentation required to program,control and support

the equipment) that is used to — (A) define ballots; (B)

cast and count votes;(C) report or display election results;

and (D) maintain and produce any audit trail information.” A voting system also includes the “practices and

documentation” used to identify the components, test

the systems,maintain records of defects and errors, determine any system changes to be made after the system has

been certified, and provide materials to the voter.

Providing physical security means restricting access to

offices and warehouses storing voting systems.Access to all

election facilities should be carefully monitored and

controlled.

Providing physical security also means protecting ballots.

Election officials should have a plan for managing and

documenting the trail of optical scan,punch card or paper

ballots, as well as electronic records and paper back-up

systems.The plan should aim to allow officials to maintain

strict control over the ballots at all times. If feasible, election officials, not poll workers, should take responsibility

for transporting ballots from the polling place to election

headquarters.Stories abound of poll workers losing ballots

or leaving ballots unprotected.

Physical security also encompasses the voting process on

Election Day. Neither ballot boxes nor voting machines

should ever be left unattended. Even lever machines have

physical vulnerabilities: Standing at the back of the

machine, it is possible to jam the vote tally mechanism

using a device as simple as a paper clip.The mechanism for

overriding the error notification feature of optical scanners

needs to be protected to ensure that this significant voter

protection is not intentionally or inadvertently turned off.

Finally, the mechanisms used to end voting are very

important and should be protected. Polling place operations should be set up to ensure that poll workers can

monitor the voting process.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Georgia, the servers are kept in locked

offices within the county election office. No person is allowed

access to the computer until his or her identity has been

established by the county Election Superintendent. In addition, the PC memory cards in the touchscreen voting equipment are in locked compartments. Only the Precinct Manager

has keys. 

MODEL PRACTICE: In Virginia and Maryland, the poll workers

insert the smart card for the voter to prevent the possibility

that a voter might use a “home-brew” generic smart card that

could add fraudulent votes to the machine’s tally. Smart

cards initiate the voting process.

7
8

CHECKLIST FOR VOTING SYSTEMS

Punch Card = 14%

Lever = 14%

Optical Scan = 33% Paper Ballot = 1%

Electronic = 31% Mixed = 7%

ALL VOTING SYSTEMS

• Work with design or usability professionals to ensure the readability of the ballots. In particular, the ballot design and

instructions should aim to prevent overvoting and undervoting.

• Use only systems that meet federal qualifications and state certification guidelines and standards.

• Educate voters on how to cast a vote properly on their election system, including how to review their ballots, and how to

check for overvotes and undervotes. Instructions should be written clearly and simply and provide illustrations. 

• Test voting machines and counting machines, including their hardware and software, prior to Election Day. Carry out

testing in a public process. 

• Educate media, campaigns and elected officials on security measures to protect the voting system and encourage them

to disseminate this information to their constituents. 

• Ballots, voting machines, memory cartridges and counting machines should never be left unattended. 

• Preferably two election officials will oversee all processes, including the transfer of ballots and other election materials to

the central office.

• Educate poll workers on how to provide assistance to voters without compromising the secrecy of the ballot. 

• Educate poll workers on use of the voting system, including troubleshooting common problems. Poll workers should have

a checklist for starting and ending voting on their voting system.

• Do not remove machines from the polls for repairs or for any other reason until voting has ended. 

EXPECTED VOTING EQUIPMENT USAGE IN 2004 (PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS)

(SOURCE: Election Data Services, Inc., May 2004.)
9

CHECKLIST FOR VOTING SYSTEMS

PUNCH CARD SYSTEMS

• Instructions should include directions to check for

hanging chads and to review the ballot. 

• Provide voters with information regarding what constitutes a spoiled ballot and a clear and no-fault system for

replacing a spoiled ballot so the voter can vote on a new

ballot. 

• Ensure that routine maintenance has been completed

before Election Day, including making sure the voting

machines are free of chads. 

LEVER MACHINES

• Instructions should include illustrations of proper positioning of levers for voting, as well as clear directions on

how to write in a candidate and how to cast the vote. 

• Ensure that routine maintenance has been completed

before Election Day. 

• Perform a hundred-vote test count on each machine prior

to Election Day. 

• Test to make sure mechanism for preventing overvotes is

functioning properly. 

OPTICAL SCAN: PRECINCT-COUNT SYSTEMS

• If the scanner requires the use of a particular marking

device or color, this information should be prominently

displayed.

• Provide clear instructions that explain the ballot review

process so that voters will feel comfortable correcting a

ballot with an overvote or other problem revealed by the

scanning process. 

• Provide voters with information regarding what constitutes a spoiled ballot and a clear and no-fault system for

replacing spoiled ballots so the voter can vote on a new

ballot. 

• Ensure that scanners are properly calibrated before

Election Day.

OPTICAL SCAN: CENTRAL-COUNT SYSTEMS

(also applies to absentee optical scan ballots)

• Voters should receive clear instructions, particularly with

absentee ballots. Instructions should be written simply

and should include illustrations of properly filled out

ballots. 

• Both in-person and absentee voters should receive

instructions on what constitutes a spoiled ballot and

what to do if they spoil their ballot.

• If the scanner requires the use of a particular marking

device or color, this information should be prominently

displayed.

• Ensure that scanners are properly calibrated before

Election Day.

• After 2000, many voters believe that absentee ballots

will not be counted unless the election is close. Election

officials may want to clarify this process by including a

description of the absentee ballot vote counting process

and timeframe with the instructions. 

• Establish procedures for determining voter intent using

uniform vote counting standards and for counting ballots

that cannot be scanned. The process for counting ballots

should be open and conducted under bipartisan scrutiny.

TOUCHSCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS

• Many of the newer electronic voting systems allow the

voter to check if the ballot was actually cast; if so, this

process should be included in the instructions. 

• Test audio and magnification systems for each machine.

• On Election Day, periodically check to make sure

machines are properly calibrated and that cords remain

plugged into the socket. 

• Double-check to ensure that the device used to encode

ballots — the encoder or card activator — has been sent

to the proper polling place. 

• Configure the polling place to allow full view by poll

workers of voting and voter activity to guard against

unauthorized access while protecting voter privacy.
RECOMMENDATION #10: Maintain and operate

voting systems in isolation from networks and 

the Internet.

In the debate over the vulnerability of electronic systems

to hacking and software tampering, critics have cited the

danger of viruses and hacking.Election officials can reduce

this risk by maintaining the system in isolation. In other

words, no component of the system should ever be

connected to the Internet.

Many jurisdictions require unofficial results for optical

scan systems and DREs to be sent by modem from the

polling place to the central office. According to security

experts, the results should be encrypted during the transmission. Even though these election night results are not

the official results, discrepancies that show up between

election night results and certified results will diminish

public confidence in those results.

MODEL PRACTICE: Maryland has implemented cryptographic

protocols for all data transmitted via modem. These protocols

apply to all systems statewide. 

PREPARATION PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY

RECOMMENDATION #11: Educate voters on the

use of all voting equipment both in advance of the

election and in the polling place on Election Day.

The Caltech/MIT report,“Voting:What Is,What Could

Be,” found that nationwide 2.5 percent of votes cast were

not counted.The number was much higher in some jurisdictions: In some Georgia precincts that used punch card

or optical scan systems in 2000, upwards of 12 percent of

the votes were lost because of problems with the voting

equipment — a percentage that exceeded the margin of

victory. Georgia subsequently adopted a statewide system

that solved this problem. Their new electronic voting

system fully eliminated the possibility of an overvote —

the largest source of voting errors on punch card or optical

scan voting systems — and reduced the undervote in the

top ticket races from 4.8 percent in 1998 to less than 0.9

percent in 2002. Of significant interest were the considerable reductions in overvoting and undervoting in

minority precincts.Without replacing voting systems, the

number of lost votes can be reduced with thorough,

aggressive voter education.

Voters need clear instructions on the voting process.

Many jurisdictions conduct extensive pre-Election Day

outreach,taking voting systems to malls,grocery stores and

community centers to familiarize voters with the process.

Hands-on demonstrations are more effective than written

instructions.Written instructions are necessary, however,

and should include illustrations.

Voters using punch card ballots need to understand that

unless the stylus fully punches through the card their vote

may not be counted.Voters using precinct-count optical

scan ballots need to understand that if the scanner rejects

their ballot it may not be counted, and that they should

have the opportunity to correct the problem.Voters using

electronic voting systems need to understand the process

for changing their vote, and that once they have hit “cast

ballot,” their ballot is irretrievable.And all voters need to

understand the ballot, whether it be the layout of a paper

ballot or a touchscreen.

Jurisdictions that have replaced their voting systems will

find that voter education is key to promoting a successful

transition.

MODEL PRACTICE: When Detroit, Michigan, replaced its

punch card voting system with a precinct-count optical scan

system, election officials undertook a city-wide voter education campaign. The percentage of uncounted votes for president decreased by almost two-thirds, from 3.1 percent in

1996 to 1.1 percent in 2000. Precincts that had over 7

percent uncounted votes in 1996 had less than 1 percent

uncounted votes in 2000. Detroit spent approximately

$100,000 on voter education, taking systems out into the

community, conducting daily demonstrations at community

centers, churches, festivals and government buildings. The

city also produced public service advertisements for television, radio and billboards, and blanketed the city with flyers

and pamphlets.

MODEL PRACTICE: Montgomery County, Maryland, and Los

Angeles County, California, both provide live-streaming video

instructions on the voting process on their Web sites.

RECOMMENDATION #12: Provide adequate

training for all Election Day workers.

On Election Day, the voting system lies in the hands of

poll workers. The importance of adequate poll worker

training,therefore,cannot be overemphasized.Poll workers

must be trained to ensure the physical security of the voting

system,to start and end the voting process correctly,to assist

voters who may have difficulty voting, and to protect the

voter’s privacy.

Poll workers need to understand the security vulnerabilities in order to effectively guard against security

breaches. They need to understand the purpose of the

10
11

optical scanner’s error notification features so they can

explain it to the voters.Poll workers need to be trained on

how to close down the poll properly and document the

vote tallies accurately.

After the 2000 presidential election,Florida overhauled

its election system, replacing voting systems in 2002. As

most election officials remember, two counties experienced serious problems when new systems made their

debut in the 2002 primary.

On September 20, 2002, the Miami-Dade Inspector

General (IG) issued a report following an inquiry into

circumstances surrounding the primary election. While

the IG’s report faults problems with the voting systems and

with administrative planning, the report also focused on

the inadequacy of poll worker training.

Beyond the problems poll workers experienced with

equipment, two reports, including the IG’s report, noted

that poll workers did not have a clear understanding of

basic procedures.The problem did not lie with the poll

workers themselves, “... the matter does not lie in the

caliber or technological experience of the poll worker,but

is grounded in the absence of quality training sessions and

written training materials,” the IG concluded.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Los Angeles County, California, election

officials are preparing for an eventual transition to electronic

voting systems by actively diversifying the poll worker 

workforce, and by recruiting tech-savvy municipal employees,

students and private-sector volunteers.

MODEL PRACTICE: Maryland’s statewide security plan

requires training Election Day workers, “election judges,” on

the security procedures outlined in the plan. In addition, the

state will also train other key Election Day officials, including

local election officials and staff on the new plan.

ON ELECTION DAY 

RECOMMENDATION #13: Ensure adequate technical support to poll workers on Election Day.

While many election officials rely on the voting system

manufacturer to provide technical support on Election

Day — provided they included such service in the

contract with the vendor — they also need a plan in place

to supplement the manufacturer’s support with independent technical support. Such a plan would likely

provide tiers of technical expertise ranging from a troubleshooting checklist at each polling place to manufacturer

technical support.The aim is to reduce the burden on the

response system by giving poll workers the tools to fix

routine problems themselves.

To reduce the reliance on voting system vendor support

over time, election officials should plan on developing

their own in-house expertise.Election administrators may

consider developing a cadre of trained professionals to

handle the demand for technical support on Election Day.

This cadre of technicians would be available either to

resolve problems over the phone or to go to the polling

place. Knowing how to operate a computer does not

qualify as adequate technical expertise. The technical

support personnel must understand the larger administrative process as well.

The support plan must not only cover ensuring the

availability of technical support,but also a communications

strategy to guarantee that poll workers can access that

support.A common sense solution is to provide a hotline

for poll workers on Election Day — and to make sure the

hotline is adequately staffed!

Jurisdictions may wish to consider conducting an assessment of poll workers’ comprehension and comfort level

with basic operations and troubleshooting to ensure they

have adequate knowledge to carry out their duties.

MODEL PRACTICES: The District of Columbia Board of

Elections recruited, trained and deployed “precinct technicians” to help poll workers and voters operate new electronic

voting equipment. Following a trouble-filled primary in 2002,

Miami-Dade County, Florida, brought in computer specialists

from other county agencies to provide Election Day support

to poll workers. Likewise Montgomery County, Maryland,

called on county information technology workers to assist at

the polls on Election Day. 

RECOMMENDATION #14: Provide a back-up

plan in the event of machine failure.

The reality of technology is that individual machines —

individual touchscreen units, ballot encoders, scanners —

will fail.And when that happens on Election Day,whether

the result of human error or machine error, voters can be

disenfranchised. Accordingly, there must be a back-up

option.In jurisdictions that use DREs,additional machines

should be available in the event of machine failure. In

other jurisdictions, additional ballots should be available

in case sufficient ballots did not arrive at the polling place.
RECOMMENDATION #16: Establish electronic

transmission of voter information to the election

authority from motor vehicle and other agencies

offering voter registration.

A well-run registration system will provide an electronic link between the election agency and the agencies

specified in NVRA as registration agencies, including

agencies serving persons with disabilities and public assistance agencies.

Electronic transmission is timelier and more accurate

than physical transmission. In Michigan, the information

is transmitted instantaneously since the motor vehicle and

the election authority share the same database. Electronic

transmission also eliminates the need to enter the data a

second time, thus reducing costs and minimizing the

opportunity for clerical error.

Jurisdictions that transmit voter information from one

agency to another electronically are much less likely to

experience registrations falling through the cracks.

Conversely, voters in jurisdictions that still transfer paper 

applications are far more likely to show up at the polls

believing they have registered,only to find their names are

not on the list. States that fail to provide for electronic

transmission will likely have far more provisional ballots,

increasing their post-election administrative burden. A

majority of Los Angeles County’s provisional ballots are

cast by voters who registered at the motor vehicle agency

but whose registrations either got lost in the system or

were not processed in time.

MODEL PRACTICE: Michigan’s Qualified Voter File is a unified

database shared by the state election agency and the motor

vehicle agency. Changes and updates made to the voter

registration record are automatically made to the driver’s

license record, and vice versa (in Michigan the address for

voter registration and motor vehicle registration must be the

same). Electronic transmission allows new registrations and

updates to be processed in real-time and significantly

reduces the likelihood of losing applications in transmission.

12

SECTION TWO: VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEMS

When Congress first began looking into the election system following the 2000 presidential election, it soon became clear

that poorly administered registration systems posed a bigger problem affecting more voters than antiquated voting machines.

Eligible voters were disenfranchised because their registration applications were not being processed and because of other

systemic problems. Ten years after passage of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), some states and localities had not

yet found an efficient, reliable means to transmit voter registration applications from motor vehicle and other agencies, which

are required to provide such applications to citizens, to the proper election authority. 

In Section 303 of HAVA, Congress mandated that states establish a statewide computerized voter registration list in order to

address these types of problems. Forty-four states requested waivers from this new requirement and are therefore not required

to implement this provision until 2006. The design of these statewide computerized registration systems is key to establishing

a well-administered election process. 

AFTER ELECTION DAY 

RECOMMENDATION #15: Design a routine

process that checks for problems that may have

occurred but not been visible on Election Day.

States may conduct an audit of the election after

Election Day to provide the public with additional assurance that all votes were counted properly and accurately.

This practice may also alert election officials to problems

that occurred that may not have surfaced on Election Day.

MODEL PRACTICE: In New Mexico, poll workers keep duplicate copies of all documents, such as machine tapes, poll

books and hand tally sheets. These documents are mailed

separately to the state election office. After the state’s

canvass, an independent certified public accounting firm

conducts an audit of the entire election, checking the

documents received from the poll workers against those

received from the local election officials. Any discrepancies are investigated. 
RECOMMENDATION #17: Ensure the registration

process enfranchises all eligible citizens.

The voter registration process can assure good administration of the election process,or it can serve as a barrier

to voter participation.The design and implementation of

a statewide computerized voter registration system holds

great promise if it is properly designed to ensure enfranchisement of all eligible citizens.

In creating a statewide database, states must establish

where responsibility lies for adding,deleting and updating

voter records and specify,in law or regulation,the rules for

determining both eligibility and ineligibility.

States must assign each voter a unique identifier, a

change that will significantly reduce the deadwood on

voter lists over time by allowing states to track voters as

they move within the state. State election officials can

either create their own system by assigning randomly

generated numbers to each new voter or piggy-back on

another system such as the motor vehicle agency

numbering system.

In establishing rules for the voter registration process,the

state should ensure that information is used to complete

accurate registrations,rather that setting up obstacles to the

voter registration process. For example, if a voter registration applicant fails to provide a driver’s license number or

inadvertently transposes numbers, the database system

should help correct that application so it can be processed

and accepted.The state should have a transparent administrative process that includes information on the acceptance or rejection of applications.

HAVA requires that a voter registration application

include the driver’s license number, or the last four digits

of the SSN if the applicant has not been issued a current

and valid driver’s license.The appropriate number can be

provided by the applicant or by the state’s databases.The

chief state election official and the official responsible for

the state motor vehicle authority are required to enter an

agreement to match data, and the motor vehicle official

must enter a similar agreement with the commissioner of

Social Security.

As HAVA is silent on how states should treat the results

of this database matching, states must determine how to

conduct these matches as well as what to do with the

results.According to the Social Security Administration

(SSA), at least ten percent of the information obtained

as a result of matching the name and last four digits of

the SSN will likely be inaccurate. Two types of errors

may result: First, matching the last name and the last

four digits can produce multiple apparent matches,called

“false positives.” In addition, errors such as inaccurate

13

PURGING OF VOTER LISTS

In 1993, Congress passed the National Voter Registration

Act (NVRA) to expand the opportunities for eligible citizens

to register to vote. In addition, the NVRA encouraged states

to coordinate voter records with other databases in order

to keep lists accurate and up-to-date. At the same time,

however, the law also established safeguards to prevent

eligible voters from being erroneously purged. 

HAVA adopts the NVRA list maintenance standards.

Nothing in HAVA alters the requirements under NVRA to

protect voters from erroneous purges.

The consequences of flawed list-cleaning procedures

were clearly evident in November of 2000 when thousands of Florida voters found themselves unable to vote

after they had been purged from the rolls based on erroneous information sent to county election officials by the

Secretary of State. 

In 2000, the Florida Secretary of State’s office

contracted with an outside firm to match voter registration

records against felony records. Not only was the underlying

data from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement

unreliable, but the matching criteria were so broad that

thousands of eligible voters were erroneously tagged as

felons. The resulting match had an error rate of approximately 20 percent. Despite the inaccuracy of the information, the state made the data available to the counties

and encouraged them to use the information to purge the

voting rolls. 

Several counties then purged voters from the registration

records without bothering to verify the accuracy of the

information. 

The lesson from Florida is simple: database matching to

remove felons, deceased voters and duplicates, cannot, in

itself, substitute for an accurate verification process.

Accordingly, states and local election officials must build

sufficient time into the list-cleaning process to conduct

proper verification. And the reliability of the underlying

data should always be checked before it is used. (See

page 16 for details of the settlement agreement between

the state of Florida and the NAACP.)

Still, even using stricter standards, database matching

is not foolproof; further verification is advisable.

Providing notice to the voter before any purge is carried

out allows that voter to correct an error before it results

in erroneous purging. n
name spellings and transposed numbers can result in the

appearance of no match.

Given this high rate of inaccuracy,it would be a mistake

to reject voter applications when there is no identical

match; doing so would almost certainly result in disenfranchising eligible voters. In the event the attempt to

match produces no match, states have the option of

assigning a randomly-generated unique identifier. In the

event that a database match produces information

suggesting ineligibility, such as when the voter’s last four

SSN digits and name correspond to someone who is

deceased, states should develop procedures for following

up with the applicant to verify the information. (See

“Purging of Voters Lists” for a more detailed discussion

of the challenges involved in database matching.)

Matching with motor vehicle records poses other difficulties: addresses are likely to be different; driver’s license

numbers may be accidentally transposed by the applicant; and the types of data may be different.All of these

indicate the need for officials to use DMV data to supplement the registration process rather than use it as a reason

to reject an applicant.To resolve inconsistencies, election

officials will need to follow up with the voter by mail or

other means.

Election officials would be well-advised to study the

matching process, particularly at the beginning, to determine the reliability of the information received from either

the motor vehicle agency or the SSA.

While HAVA gives the state responsibility for defining,

maintaining, and administering the official voter registration list, local registrars will likely retain responsibility for

important steps in the process. A well-run registration

system will necessarily involve close cooperation between

state and local offices. States must spell out the details of

processing voters and take steps to ensure the procedures

are followed uniformly throughout the state.

MODEL PRACTICE: In California, the state searches the motor

vehicle database to pull the driver’s license number, which

then is added to the voter record. The state also compares

voter records to health records. The practice not only helps

the voter, it also ensures more accurate records.

RECOMMENDATION #18: Protect voter privacy

and database security.

HAVA requires that the appropriate “State or local official shall provide adequate technological security measures

to prevent unauthorized access to the computerized

list...” States therefore must establish strict rules for

administering the database and ensure each locality adheres

to those rules.

Creating a protocol for access to voter records should be

part of establishing a regulatory framework for administering the database. This protocol would create hierarchical levels of access to the database, giving certain users

discrete authority to perform certain tasks. Not all election staff have authority to perform the same functions.

Very few staff, for example, would have authority to

remove names from the list.

On the one hand, of course, the registration list will be

a very public document:Almost every state allows political organizations and parties to purchase the list, which

contains voters addresses, party affiliation and voting

participation history.On the other hand,information such

as the voter’s driver’s license number or SSN requires

strong protection.The database must be structured in such

a way as to accomplish both goals.

As with the administration of voting machines, thorough and rigorous documentation of all operations is

necessary to ensure public confidence in the security as

well as the accuracy of the list.List administrators must be

able to track who has accessed the list as well as what

transactions, such as updates and additions, have been

performed, and when.

Protecting database security includes providing physical

protection as well. Moreover, the server should be in a

protected location that does not offer public access.

MODEL PRACTICE: In Michigan, local election officials have

authority to add, delete and update voter records; however,

any change must ultimately be approved by the state in order

to be made official. Michigan also has in place rules

governing which employees can perform which tasks. 

MODEL PRACTICE: In the District of Columbia, the chief

technology officer can monitor both successful and unsuccessful attempts to enter the voter registration database. In

addition, all users are now required to change passwords on

a monthly basis in order to prevent former employees from

gaining access or allowing others to gain access to the

database.

14
RECOMMENDATION #19: Require transparency

in the administration as well as in the creation of

statewide voter registration systems.

A computerized voter registration system is more than

just a database — the details of its creation and administration will determine if and how well the rights of eligible

citizens are protected. Many states are seeking consultants

to help them write the “request for proposal”for technical

assistance in constructing the registration system; some

states are developing the database themselves. In either

case,the process for designing the system should be public

and transparent. It should involve stakeholders, including

the local election officials, parties, voter advocates and the

public.These stakeholders should have a voice in defining

the system — particularly the procedures for adding,

deleting and modifying records.

In many states, involving local election officials at the

beginning of the process will reduce the likelihood of

problems when it comes time to implement the system.

Such officials bring a practical understanding of the registration process and will have insight on the details of the

system’s construction.

States may divide up the administrative work between

state and local officials differently. For example, in

Michigan the localities submit voter information to the

state that has ultimate authority for adding and deleting

voters to the database.In Kentucky,the state has authority

to remove registrations while localities have authority to

add and update registrations.In the end,however,the state

has sole responsibility for the system and for ensuring its

accuracy.

MODEL PRACTICE: Pennsylvania made both the initial study

of what would be required to create a statewide list as well

as the RFP publicly available. Soon after Pennsylvania began

implementing its statewide system, the state contracted with

a private firm to review and evaluate the implementation

process. The firm conducted a thorough review of the system

and made dozens of recommendations for improvements.

The state posted the report on its Web site.

RECOMMENDATION #20: Require tracking and

documentation of all changes to the database.

States should have a method for monitoring all changes

— additions, deletions and updates — made to the list.

This monitoring might include electronic signatures

within the database or it might include a requirement for

thorough documentation.

MODEL PRACTICE: In the District of Columbia, the voter registration database tracks who made changes — additions,

updates, deletions — to the voter registration records.

RECOMMENDATION #21: Conduct accurate

voter registration list maintenance.

Elections are a unique governmental function; the use

of database technology in election administration will

require different procedures and more stringent safeguards

than in other areas of government.

Nothing in HAVA allows election officials at the state

or local level to bypass protections intended to prevent

voters from being disenfranchised for administrative errors,

specifically, the protections for voters established in the

NVRA. Under NVRA, election officials are prohibited

from removing a voter who they believe has moved unless

the voter confirms the information in writing.Nothing in

HAVA alters this safeguard.

Even if it appears that several records belong to a single

voter — who has moved from one jurisdiction to another

and registered after each move — the election official

cannot remove any of the apparent duplicates without

written confirmation by the voter.

NVRA requires states to perform list-cleaning procedures to keep voter registration lists current and accurate,

including obtaining data from other sources such as the

National Change of Address program, death records and

felony records.While this data can provide useful information, it must always be verified. Stories abound of

people who have died continuing to receive Social

Security checks posthumously and,conversely,people still

very much alive erroneously being included among the

dead. One jurisdiction in 2000 matched the voter list

against a tax assessor’s list and required voters whose

addresses did not match the assessor’s list to vote by provisional ballot at the central election office. However, the

assessor’s list was ten years old, and some of the addresses

identified by the assessor as invalid or “vacant lot” had

since been developed into residences.Voters should not be

penalized for inaccurate or out-of-date record keeping.

15
16

WRITTEN BY TRACY WARREN 

IN COLLABORATION WITH LLOYD LEONARD, JEANETTE SENECAL

AND KELLY CEBALLOS

PUB#2065

1730 M STREET NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20036

TELEPHONE 202.429.1965

www.lwv.org

The polling place on Election Day can be a key point

in the list-cleaning process if voters are allowed to update

their registration information when they come in to vote.

Poll worker training should, therefore, include easy-tofollow guidelines on how to note change of address,

spelling corrections and other changes. Election officials

must be vigilant in following up on this information.

MODEL PRACTICE: The following rules for determining

multiple registrations, sometimes known as “duplicates,”

were taken from the settlement agreement between the state

of Florida and the NAACP. Following this model will guard

against faulty matches.

To determine multiple registrations, the state may match:

• the last name, first name, least common denominator of

the middle name, and the date of birth (DOB);

• full nine digits of the SSN, last name, and either first

name or DOB;

• driver’s license or state ID number, and last name;

• SSN and last name, or DOB; or

• Florida ID and last name, or DOB.

In applying these matching criteria, the following conditions

apply:

• the last name in both records must be exact;

• the DOB in both records must be exact;

• there can be no conflict in race data or gender data; and

• there can be no conflict in SSN — transpositions will not

be accepted.

Of course, the data that is matched against the voter registration list must be accurate.

RECOMMENDATION #22: Give voters access to

review and check their voter record.

Voters can and should be a part of the process to ensure

the accuracy of their voter record.Voters should be able

to view their registration information in order to check

the accuracy of the address, party affiliation, voting jurisdiction, polling place and age.

In smaller jurisdictions, voters can call the registration

office to obtain their voter information. In larger jurisdictions, the administrative burden can be reduced by

making a copy of this information available on a Web site.

Encouraging voters to check their registration information for accuracy prior to the deadline should allow for

a reduction in the number of provisional ballots cast

during an election.The more voters who can straighten

out registration problems prior to the election, the fewer

voters whose eligibility will be in doubt on Election Day.

MODEL PRACTICE: Virginia’s elections Web site allows citizens using a personal identification number to view their

voter registration information, including their proper polling

place, online. Voters do not view this information directly in

the database, but review a public copy of this information.