# U n ited S ta tes C o u rt o f A p p ea ls

FO R TH E D IST R IC T O F C O L U M B IA C IR C U IT

Argued De cembe r 13, 2005 Dec ided J une 16, 2006

No. 04-1411

F AS HI ON V AL L EY M A LL , L L C., P ETI TI ONER

v.

N A T I O N A L L A BOR R ELA T I O N S B O A RD ,

R ES PO NDE NT

Con so lid a te d w ith 05-1027 & 05-1039

On Petitions for Review of a n Orde r of the National L abor Relations Boar d

Wil liam M. L ines argued the cause for petitione r F ashi on Va lle y Ma ll, L L C. W ithhim

on the br ie fs wa s T he od or e R. Sc ott

.
Anne Ma rie L o fa s o, Attorney , National L abor Relations Boa rd, ar g ued the c ause for r espondent. With her on the brie f

wer e Arthur F . Rosenfeld, Ac ting Ge nera l Counsel, Marg ery E. L ieber , Acting Associate Gener al Counsel, Aileen A. Ar mstro ng , Depu ty

As so c iate Ge ne ra l Co un se l, a nd Da vid S. H a b e n s t r e i t , S u

p e r v i s o r y A t t o r n e y.2

B e fo re : G I N SBURG , Chief Judge, and S E N T ELLE , Cir c uit Judge, and W I L L I AMS , Senior Circuit Judge.

O p i n i o nf o r t h e C o u rtf

i l e d b y Chief Judge G I N SBURG

.
C o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o nb y Senior Circuit Judge W I L L I AMS

.
G I N SBURG , Chief Judge : Fashion Va lley Mall, L L C, which is o wn e d a

nd op e rate d by the Eq

uit a ble L if e As sura nc e Soc ie ty and I T C Fashion Va lley

Corporation, allows individuals and org anizations to eng ag e in expressive ac tiviti es on its premises if they first g et a pe rmit from the Ma l l

. I n o rd er to re ceive a permit, a pa

rty must ag ree to abi de by

Fa shion Valley ’s rules and re g ulations, which prohibit ur g ing consumers to boycott any of the Ma ll’ s te na

nts

. Th e Natio na l L a

bo r Re latio ns B oa

rd he ld Fa shion Valley

violated § 8(a )(1) of the National L abor Relations Act both b y m ai ntaining this re quirement a nd by excluding fr om its premises cer tain union handbillers.

We hold that whether F ashion Valley v i o l ated the Act de pe nd s u po n w he the r i t had the ri g ht, un de r Ca lif or nia law, to mai n t ain and enforc e its anti-boy cott rule. B eca use the

un de rl y ingqu e sti on is on e of state law a s to wh ic h w e c an o nly speculate, we c er t i fy

that question to the Supreme Court of California for

an author itative answe r.

I . Ba ckg round

Fa shion Valley

owns a l arg e shopping mall in San Dieg o, Ca lif or nia

. Th e Com

pa ny pe rm its e xpre ssi ve a c tiv iti e s b y tho se who apply for a permit and ag ree to a bide by its re g ulations. A n applicant f

or a pe rmit m u st state the purpose of the proposed expressive ac tivity ; submit a copy or a d es cr i p tion of any

mate ri a ls a

nd sig ns to b e us e d; l ist

the ind ivi du al(s) wh o w ill pa rt ic ipate ; pr ov ide a

$5 0. 00 re fu

nd a ble c le anin g de po sit ;3

purc ha se insuran c e a s n e c e ssa ry ; and , p e r R

ule 5. 6. 2, a g re e to

a bs ta in f ro m:

Ur g ing
, or enc oura g ingin a ny mann e r, c us tom e rs no t to purcha se the merchandise or services off ere d by any one or more of the stores or mer chants in the shopping cente r.

I n October

1998 approximately

30 “me m b ers and

s u p p o r te r s” of the G raphic Communi cations International Union g ather ed outside the Robinsons-May depar tment store at the Mall to protest ac tions taken by The San Die g o Union-Tribune newspa per. The Union decide d t o s t age the protest there beca use the store adver

t ises in the paper

and is locate d not far from the pa

per’ s premises.
The prote stor s distributed a handbill addre ssed “De ar cust omer of Robinsons-May” that outlined the Union’s g r ie v an c e s a g a in s t t

h e n e w s p a

p e r w h il e ma

k in g c le ar “ [t ]o the employ ees of

Robinsons-May

... [t he] dispute is wit h The San Dieg o Union-Tribune . We are not asking y ou to cea se working for y o u r employ er.” The Union e ncoura g ed patr ons and employ ees only t o “[ c] all Gene Be ll, CEO at the Union Tr ibu ne .” I n c los ing , th e ha

nd bil l me nti on e d th a t “ Rob ins on sM ay a dv e rti s e s w it

h th e U n io n

- T r ib u n e

. ” A f te r a b out 15 minutes a repr esentative of F ashion Valley approa ched the protestor s , explained that a per mit was require d for e x pressive activity , and told them to leave the premises, whic h they did.

There afte r, instead of applying for a per mit, the Union filed a cha rg e with the B oard a ll egi n g that Fa shion Valley had violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), whic h makes it an unfa ir labor pr actice t o “i n terfe re w ith, restrain, or

c oe rc e e mpl oy e e s in

the e xer c ise of

the ri g hts g ua

ra nte e d in section 7” of

the Act, to wit,4
... the rig ht to self-org anization, to form, join, or assist labor

o rga n i z at i o n s , t o b ar gai n co l l ec t i v ely through

re pr e se ntativ e s of th e ir

ow n c ho os ing , a

nd to e ng a g e in other c oncer

ted ac tiviti es for

the purpose of

collective barg aining or other mutual a id or protec tion.

29 U.S.C. § 157. An Adminstrative L aw J u d ge held the Com pa ny ha d v iol a te d § 8( a )( 1) , a

nd the B oa rd a ff ir me d, a lbe it on a diffe rent g round. The B oard r easone d:

[W e] look[ ] to State law to asce rtain whether an employ er ha s a pr op e rt y ri g ht su ff

ic ie nt t o d e ny

a c c e ss t o nonemploy ee union repr esentatives.... [A] n employ er cannot e x clude individuals exercising Section 7 rig hts if the State law would not al l o w t he employ er to e x clude the individuals.... California law permits the exercise of speec h

and pe tit ion ingin p ri vate sh op pi ng c e nte rs , s ub je c t to

rea sonable time, plac e, and ma nner ru l es adopte d by

the p r o p e rt y o w n e r

. . . . R

u l e 5

. 6

. 2
, h o w e v e r , i s e s s e n t i a l l y a content-ba sed restric tion a nd not a time, place, a

nd manner

re str ic tio n pe rm itt e d und e r Ca lif or nia law.

.. . [T]he purp os e
and e ff e c t of th is rule wa s to sh ie ld [F a sh ion Va lle y ’s ] tenants, such a s the Robinsons-May depar tment store, from

o t h er wi s e l aw fu l co n s u m er b o y cott handbilling. Acc ording l y , we f

ind [ Fa shion Valley ] vi olated Section 8(a) (1) by maintaining Rule 5.6.2.
Equitable Lif

e Assur. Soc’

y of the United States, e t al., 343 N.L .R.B. No. 57 ( Oct. 2 9, 2004) (inter nal citations and quotations omit ted). The Boa rd also held t he C ompany

violated § 8(a) (1) by

“re quir[ing] [ the Union’s] ad here nce to [the] unlawful rule ” in its permit application p ro cess. Id. Con se qu e ntl y , th e B oa

rd or de re d F a sh ion Va lle y to r e sc ind Rul e 5.6.2.5

I I . A na ly sis

F a sh ion Val ley

pe tit ion s f

or re vie w, and

the B oa rd c ro ssapplies for enfor ceme nt, of the orde r. We enfor ce a Boa rd orde r if the fa ct ual finding s upon which it rests ar e supported by “substantial evidenc e,” see U nited States Testing Co. v. NLRB , 160 F.3d 14, 19 ( D.C. Cir. 1998), and the Boar d’s interpre tation of the Ac t is re a so na

ble and c on sisten t wi th a

pp lic a ble prec edent, see Local 702, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. W orkers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB , 215 F.3d 11, 15 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). When the Boa rd has

oc c a sio n to int e rp re t st a te law, ho we ve r, our re vie w i s o rd ina ri ly deno v o. Se e Ce llwa v e Te l. Ser v s. L.P . v . FCC , 30 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (no de fer ence aff orded to a g ency inte r p r e tati o no f

s tate la w a b s e n t a g e n c y

e xp e rti s e o nthe subject).

As menti o n ed , the B oard de termined F ashion Valley vio late d § 8( a )( 1) in t

wo way s -- fir st, by

“ ma int a ini ng ” Rul e 5.6.2 and, sec ond, by “enf orcing ” Rule 5.6.2 ag ainst the Union. I n the latt er r eg ard, the Boa rd re asoned that “inasmuch a s the application proc ess re quires adhe renc e to an unlawfu l rule,” F a sh ion Va lle y “ vio late d Se c tio n 8 (a )( 1) by e nf orcin g Ru le 5.6.2, i.e., by

requiringthe instant application for a permit.” 343 N.L .R.B. No. 57.

I n Lechme re, Inc . v. NLRB , 502 U. S

. 527 (1992), the Supreme Court held it is not a violation of t h e Ac t for an

e mpl oy e r t o b ar no ne mpl oy e e un ion or g anize rs fr om i ts p ro pe rt y “except in the rar e case where the inacc essibility of employ ees
make s ine ff

e c tiv e the re a so na

ble a tte mpt s b y

no ne mpl oy e e s to communicate with them throug h the usual cha nnels.” Id. at 537- 38 (empha sis and internal quotations o mitted). Under the Boa rd’s re ading of Le c hm e re , which F ash i o n Valley does not6

* Fa s hi o n V a l l e y do e s no t c ha l l e ng e t he B o a r d’ s a s s um pt i o n t h at b ec au se it is an “ em p loyer” w it h in th e m ea n in g of § 2(2) of th e A c t, 29 U

. S. C

. § 1 5 2 ( 2 )
, i t may be he l d l i a bl e f o r i nt e r f e r i ng wi t h t he § 7

r i g ht s o f t he e m pl o y e e s o f

a not h er em p l o y e r wi t h whi c h i t ha s no ag en cy relati o n sh ip - - a m atter u p o n w h ich w e e x p ress n o op in ion

. dispute, an employ er ma

y , without violating § 8(a )(1) , exclude a nonemploy ee union r epresentative f rom its property

if and only if it has t hat right under state law. See W aremart Foods v. * NLRB , 354 F.3d 870, 872 ( D.C. Cir. 2004).

Our r e vie w o f t

he B oa rd ’s ho ld in g in t

he pr e se nt c a se require s us to resolve two further questions: (1) St ate law aside, did Fashion Valley ’s re quirement of a permit for e x pressive activity , conditioned as it was upon the U nion’s ag ree ment not to u r g e a b o y c o tt o f an y M a ll te n an t, v io late § 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) of the Act? (2) I f so, was Fa shion V alley acting within its rig hts under C a l i f o r n i a l aw ?

A. The N ational L abor Relations Act

Fa shion V alley does not c halleng e the B oard’ s position t hat

ma int e na nc e of the anti -b oyc ott ru le vio late d § 8( a )( 1) if the ru le also violated the law s of California ( of which more later)

. The Company do es , howeve r, conte st the Boa rd’s fur ther deter mination that Fashion Va l ley violated the Ac t a sec ond t i m e when it enforc ed Rule 5.6.2 by conditioning the U nion’s demonstration upon its ad h er ence to the Rule. I n Fa shion Valley ’s view, there is s imply not substantial evidence the Un ion int e nd e d to bo y c ott

Ro bi nson s- Ma

y or any oth e r M a ll te na nt; the re fo re the Un ion

wo uld have re c e ive d a per mit ha d it applied for

one. F urther to this point, F ashion Valley argues that beca use its permit application “doe s not highlig ht Rule 5.6.2, wh ic h o nly

c on sume s thre e of

the 71 lin e s in c lud e d in Ar tic le 5, ” the B oa

rd c ann ot r e a so na

bly inf e r t he Unio n “base d it s7

ref usal to apply

for a per mit on Rule 5.6.2” nor , hence , that the

ru le int e rf e re d w ith§ 7 ri g hts

.
The Boa rd argue s that Fa shion Valley interfe red w ith the employ ees’ § 7 rig hts when it sought to for ce the Union members to forg o a lawf ul method of protest. I f the B oard

corr ectly understands that under California law F ashion Valley did not hav e the rig ht to ex clude the de monstrators, then, the Boa rd maintains, the Mall violated § 8(a )(1)

.
We a g re e wi th t

he B oa rd . A lth ou g h F a sh ion V all e y is

corr ect that ther e is not substantial evidence the Union intended to b oyc ott any of the Ma ll’ s te na nts , n oth ingin t

he Ac t pr oh ibi ts the Union from c arr

ying out a

seconda ry boy cott b y m ea ns of p e a c e f u l h an d b il li ng

. Ed

war d J . D e Ba rto lo C

or p. v . F la. Gu lf C o ast Bldg. & Constr. T

rade s Cou nc il
, 4 8 5 U

. S. 5 6 8
, 5 8 3

- 87 (1988). I n subjecting the Union to a per mit process that re quired it to forswea

r use of this law ful tactic, there fore , Fa shion Valley interfe red w ith the employ ees’ rig hts under § 7 of the Act. That Rul e 5. 6. 2 co mpr ise d o nly thr e e lin e s o f t e xt is ir

re le va nt; it imp osed an unla

wf ul c on dit ion

fo r o bta ini nga

pe rm it. En fo rc e me nt o f R

ule 5. 6. 2 th e re fo re vio late d § 8( a )( 1) -- un le ss, that is , th e Com

pa ny ha d th e ri g ht u

nd e r C a lif

or nia constitutional law to ex clude the e mploy ees al t og ether

. See W ar e ma rt , 354 F.3d at 872.

B . T he Con sti tut ion

of Ca lif or nia
The Supreme Court of California h as rul ed that “the C al i fo rn i a C o n s t i tu t i o np ro t ec t [ s ] s p ee ch an d p et i t i o n i n g,
rea sonably

exercised, in shopping cente rs eve n when the c enter s
are p ri vately

owned.” Ro bin s v . Pru ne y ar d S ho pp ing Ctr

. , 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 86 0 (1 979)

. Fa shion Valley there fore seeks r efug e in the “r easonably exercised” lim itatio n u

po n p e tit ion ing , p oin tin g ou t t hat the Court in8

Pr un e y ar d a lso sa id a

pr ivate sh op pin g c e nte r is not re qu ir e d to ho st e xpre ssi ve a c tiv ities that “ int e rf e re wi th n or

ma l bu sin e ss op e ratio ns ,” 15 3 Ca l. Rpt r. a t 86 0- 61
, and re a so nin g that Rule 5.6.2 i s l aw fu l beca

use it merely

protec ts the Mall “from disruption of normal business operations and ... interfe renc e with cust o m er c onvenienc e.” H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Represe ntative Gov’ t , 1 93 Ca l. A pp . 3 d 1 19 3, 12 08 , 2 38 Ca l. Rptr. 8 41, 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1987); see also Diamond v

. Bland , 3 Cal. 3d 653, 666, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (1970) ( parties may restric t speec h in order

to preve nt “obstruction of or undue int e rf e re nc e wi th n or

ma l bu sin e ss o pe ratio ns ” ); In re Hoffman
, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 852, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1967) ( protestors not per m itted to “interfe re[] wit h the conduc t of the ra ilroad business”).

I nth e Co mp an y ’ s v ie w , th a t i s , th e U n io n ’ s c o n s ti tuti o n al rig ht to eng ag e in expressive ac tiviti es does n ot ext end to any

a c t i v i t y t h ati n t e r f

e r e s w i t h t h e M a l l ’ s p r i m ar y p u r p o s e , n a m e l y,

“ to f a c ili tate the e a se of

c omm e rc e and

to p ro mot e the bu sin e ss of its mercha

nt tenants.” H- CH

H A sso c s. , 238 Cal. Rptr. at 859. Acc o r d in g to F a s h io n V a ll e y , in u r g in g a b o y c o tt “ w hat the pr ot estor is a sk ingthe c us tom e r t o d o .

.. is i nh e re ntl y inconsistent with the dedicate d purpose of the shopping cente r -- the promotion of merc handis e an d service s in the shopping cente r.”

Alternatively , Fa shion Valley ar gu es, eve n if there is no “primar y purpose” doctrine in Pruneyard and H-CHH A s s o c ia tes , t he Mall is not a “public f orum” unde r the law s of Ca lif o r n i a an d t h e r e f o r e i t s r e g u l a t i o no f

e xp r e s s i v e a c t i v i ty “nee d only be rea sonable” ; yet the Boa rd failed to add re s s t he

“ fo rum ana ly sis ” un de rt a ke n by the Sup re me Cou rt of Ca lif or nia in Clark v. Burleigh , 4 Cal. 4th 474, 482-489, 14 Cal. Rp t r. 2d 455, 460-65 (1992) . Under Fa shion Valley ’s re ading of Cla rk
, a ll “ pr op e rt

y oth e r t ha n s tr e e ts a

nd pa rk s, ” and he nc e the Ma ll,9
is a non-public for

um.

F ina lly
, F a sh ion

Va lle y argue s th a t e ve n if

the Ma ll i s a public forum, Rule 5.6.2 is a per missibl e, conte nt-neutra l regulation of speec h. I n Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of L os Angeles , 22 Cal. 4th 352, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1992), the Sup re me Cour t of

Ca lif or nia , d e fi nin g a

“ c on te nt- ne utr a l” regulation as a res t ri ction “justified without refe renc e to the

c on te nt o f t

he re g ulate d s pe e c h, ” 93 Ca l. R ptr

. 2d a t 10 , u ph e ld

an ordinanc e that banned “all solicitation in cer tain d efine d pla c e s” and “ a g g re ssi ve ” so lic itatio n in any pu bli c pla c e , 9 3 Ca l. Rptr. 2d a t 7. F a sh ion Va lle y ma int a ins Rul e 5. 6. 2 is sim ila rl y content-ne utral bec ause it “pr ohibits all boy cott appea ls directed

a t th e Ma ll’ s st or e s o r a

ny of the g oo ds or se rv ic e s so ld by Ma ll

merc hants, reg ardle ss of the subject matter of t he protest or the protestor’s ... vie wpoint.”

Th e B o a r d d i s a g r e e s w i t h F a s h i o n V a l l e y o n a l l c o u nts

. F ir st, the B oa

rd argue s F a sh ion

Va lle y mis re a ds Pr un e

y ar d and H-C HH A sso c iates to me an“ Ca li f o r n ia h a s c r e a te d

a f orum op e n to a ll sp e e c h e xce pt fo r that c ri tic izin g the a c tio ns of ma ll tenants.” In the B oard’ s view, the re fer en ce in H-CHH As so c iates to “ fr e e do m f rom di sr up tio n o f n or

ma l bu sin e ss op e ratio ns ” me ans on ly

that a sh op pin g mal l may

imp os e appropr iate time, place , and manne r re strict i o n s on expressive

a c t i v i t y.

Se c on d, re lyingup on th e Ninth Cir c uit ’s de c isi on

in Glendale Assoc iates, Ltd. v. NL RB , 347 F.3d 1145 ( 2003), the Boa rd maintains the Mall is indeed a “ public forum” unde r the State Cons t i t ution. I n Gl e nd alethe cour

t rea d Pr un e

y ar d to mean “ privately -owne d shopping center s are require d to respec t individual free speec h rig hts on their premises to t he same ext ent that g overnme nt entities are bound to observe state and f eder al fre e spee ch rig hts.” Id. at 1154. The B oard a lso adverts to our1 0

decision in W

ar e ma rt , in

wh ic h w e he ld that un de r C a lif or nia law a g ro c e ry sto re c ou ld e xclu de un io n handb ill e rs fr om i ts parking lot, but in pa ssing noted that in Pr un e y ar d the Sup re me Court of Ca lif or nia “ re a so ne d th a t sh op pin g c e nte rs ha d b e c ome the fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nts of ‘m ini a tur e do wn towns ’ a nd sh ou ld be tr e a te d as p ub lic fo rums, fr om whic h e xpre ssi ve a c tiv ity cannot be entirely

excluded.” 354 F .3d at 872.

Fin all y , the B oard a

rg ues Rule 5.6.2 is not content-neutr al bu t rath er a

“ c on te nt- ba se d r e str a int on sp e e c h b e c a

us e it fac ially prohibits persons from urg ing or encour ag ing, in a

ny
manner , customers not to purcha se the merc handise or ser vices offe red by any Mall tenant.” In Gl e nd

ale , th e Ni nth

Cir c uit he ld a shopping mall regulation that prohibited the distribution of written mater ials mentioning by name a ny “tena nt, owner, or manag er” of the mall, 347 F .3d at 1147, was not c ontent-neutra l beca u se it was “ba sed on hostility ... towards the unde rlying messag e expressed.” Id. at 1157-58. So, too, say s the Boa rd of F a sh ion Valle y ’s ba

n o n b oyc ott s: “ I nd e e d th e Sho pp ingMa ll admits that it m aintains the rule be cause it disfavors spee ch that may adver sely

aff ect its business.”

Ne ith e r p art

y ’s argume nt i s f

ull y pe rs ua siv e

. Ea c h ma

rs ha ls the California c ase la

w to advanta g e, but the fac t remains that no California c ourt has squarely decide d whether

a shopping cente r
may la wf ull y ba n f ro m its pr e mis e s sp e e c h urg ing the pu bli c to bo y c ott a te na nt. Th e c a se c los e st i n p oin t is UNITE v. Superior Cou rt of L os An ge le

s Co un ty , 56 Cal. App. 4th 996, 1020, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 8 5 4 (C al . App. 2d Dist. 1997), which inv olv e d “ Pr oh ibi tio n[s] Agai ns t Inte rf e re nc e WithMa ll T en an t s ” v ery s i m i l ar t o Fa s h i o n Va l l ey ’s R u l e 5

. 6

. 2

. Al t h o u gh the c ourt sa id the anti -b oyc ott ru le s “ c ou ld l e a d to imp e rm iss ibl e content-ba sed regulation of expressive ac tiviti es” in violation of the State Constitut ion, i t did not determine whe ther the r ules

ac t u ally wer e unconstitutional beca use the issue ha d not been1 1

prese rved. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854-55. The Supreme Cou rt of California we think could rea sonably ag ree with either F ashion Valley or the B oard.

I I I . Conclusion

I n sum, whether F ashi o n Valley violated § 8(a )(1) of the Act depe nds upon whether i t co uld lawfully maintain and enfor ce an anti-boy cott rule -- a question no California court has resolved. B eca

use we owe no de fe rence to the B oard’ s int e rp re tatio n o f t

he Con sti tut ion

of Ca lif or nia and c an o nly g uess how the Supre me Court of California w ould resolve the iss ue , w e sh a ll c e rt if

y to t hat c ourt the fo llo wi ngqu e sti on :

Under California lawmay

Fa shion V alley

maintain and

e n f o r c e a g a i n s tt h e U n i o ni t s R u l e 5

. 6

. 2 ?

Pursuant to Rule 29.8 of the California Rules of Court, we may cer tify “a que stion of California law if: ( 1) the de cision could deter

mine the outcome o f a matter pending... and (2) there is no controlling pr ece dent.” Cal. R. Ct. 2 9.8(a) . Her e, bo th re qu ir e me nts are me t. Ac c or din g ly , w e sh a ll h old thi s c a se in a be y anc e pe nd inga

re sp on se fr om t

hat c ourt

.
So ordered

.W ILLIAMS , Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the certification to the Supreme Court of California : I write separately to underscore what the decision does not hold and to explain where I depart from the majority’s reasoning. First, as Maj. Op. at 6 n.* observes, we take no position on whether a firm connected to a labor di spute or relationship only by virtue of being the landlord of a firm (Robinsons-May) thatadvertises with the disputing employer (the San Diego UnionTribune) is subject to the dutie s (vis-à-vis a union seeking to handbill against the Union-Tri bune) that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) imposes on “employers” with respect to their own employ ees (and unions seeking to represent them). Fashion Valle y raised no such issue.
Second, the Board found that, assuming that Rule 5.6.2 violated California law, Fashi on Valley had violated § 8(a)(1) both “by maintaining” Rule 5.6.2, Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of the United States, et al. , 343 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at 2 (Oct. 29, 2004), and “by enforcing” the rule, id . Fashion Valley didn’t challenge the Board’s “mainten ance” finding; thus we reach no holding on that issue, a nd the question of California constitutional law is properly befo re us (and in turn certified).
But Fashion Valley did challe nge the Board’s conclusion that it (Fashion Valley) violated § 8(a)(1) “by enforcing Rule 5.6.2, i.e., by requiring the instant application for a permit,” id . (emphasis added), and I cannot agree with the court’s reliance on that finding—reliance that appears quite unnecessary in view of the Board’s unchallenged “maintenance” conclusion. I s ee three problems with the majority’s enforcement analysis. First, the union’s proposed leafleting didn’t run afoul of Rule 5.6.2. Although the Board incorporated the ALJ’s finding that “the Union’s October 4 leafleting had, as its primary object, a consumer boycott of the Mall’s Robinsons-May store,” id . at 1, 7, the majority correctly reverses th at finding. See Maj. Op. at 7 (agreeing2
with Fashion Valley’s contention “that there is not substantial evidence the Union intended to boycott any of the Mall’s tenants,” id . at 6). It is hard to see how a firm can “enforce” a rule in an episode to which the rule is irrelevant.
Having removed the factual support from the Board’s position, the court goes on to affirm on different grounds, disregarding the familiar principles of Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp. , 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943). The court says that “Fashion Valley interfered with the employees’ rights” by “subj ecting the Union to a permit process that required [the Union] to forswear use of a lawful tactic.” Maj. Op. at 7. This evidently rests on the Board’s conclusion that “inasmuch as th e application process requires adherence to an unlawful rule, [Fashion Valley] may not enforce it .” 343 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at 2 (emphasis added). The referent for the word “it” is unclear. The majority reads “it” as the application process. Thus, under the majority’s reading, a firm imposing an application requirement “enforces” all of its rules (at least ones that a successful applicant must pledge to obey) anytime that it insists on an application. The majority thus eviscerates much of the distinction between enforcement and maintenance. Fashion Valley maintained Rule 5.6.2, butin no way enforced it.
Alternatively, “it” may refer to Rule 5.6.2. This seems more likely, in view of the Board’s finding that the union intended a boycott (which we now reverse), and its later reference to Fashion Valley’s “enforcing Rule 5.6.2.” Id . On this reading, of course, the Bo ard’s analysis would founder for want of factual support.
Second, the majority’s enforcement theory is further marred by the union’s complete unawareness (on the date of3
the supposed “enforcement”) of the very existence of Rule 5.6.2 or its content. The evidence suggests that Fashion Valley excluded the union on October 4 simply because the union refused to apply for a permit, not because Fashion Valley “enforced” Rule 5.6.2 in any non-metaphysical way.
Lastly, the majority notes that under Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Cost Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council , 485 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1988), nothing in the NLRA barred the union from carrying out a secondary boycott by peaceful handbilling. Maj. Op. at 7. True. But of course that tells us little or nothing about the possible affirmative duties of parties subjected to secondary boycotts.
In sum, the majority stretc hes ordinary language (and the case law) too far—and substitu tes its own reasoning for the Board’s—in concluding that when a company conditions leafleting on submission of an application it automatically “enforces” any rule (that a su ccessful applicant would be required to obey) against persons who have neither contemplated conduct that might violate the rule nor learned of the rule’s existence.