The Need for Management Control. Bazjanac
compared results of an actual complete evacuation
of a 22-story office building in San Francisco with
Tesults of a computer simulation. In the actual
evacuation, which occurred because of smoke
Spread from a fire, "using both elevators and
stairwells it took over half an hour to evacuate the
building. The evacuation caused a lot of confusion
and was far from efficient." The evacuation was
simulated with the elevators in normal "down-peak"
mode. "The simulated evacuation of the entire
building (with no use of stairwells) was
accomplished in 8 minutes and 20 seconds." The
difference was attributed to "the extent of control
exercised in the evacuation exercise." Bazjanac
noted that "all experimental results are based on
the assumptions of a steady flow of people to be
evacuated to the elevators and the smooth loading
of elevators without any delay. . . . In fact, the
ability to provide such controlled loading of
elevators is by far the most critical factor for
accomplishment of fast evacuation."

By way of conclusion, Bazjanac contended that
“the decision to pull elevators out of service should
be made according to the spread of danger in each
individual case by an authorized person on
location—not a priori through legislation."

Simulations by Pauls

While Pauls’ simulation efforts were
contemporary with those by Bazjanac, they (and
their funding) were far less extensive than
Bazjanac’s. Pauls presented a graphical simulation
of a few procedures in which elevators were used —
in non-automatic mode and with fire service
supervision — in conjunction with stairs to
evacuate tall office buildings (Pauls, 1977). Like
Bazjanac, Pauls considered treating sky lobbies (the
floors where elevator zones overlap) as "refuge
areas” but the usage was quite different; Bazjanac
treated these floors as ones to which the elevators
would take people; Pauls used these floors as
points of departure for the majority of people who
would first utilize exit stairs to move downward to
the closest sky lobby. From this level the building
occupants could then utilize elevators serving a
zone other than one in which a fire was occurring.
This should be safer and would also leave the fire-
zone elevators — if safe — free for possible use by
firefighters.

Graphical Simulation. First published by
Pauls (1977), Figure 1 is a graphical simulation
showing the complete evacuation of 4500 persons,
in 35 minutes, from a 41-story office building. Of

Elevators and Fire

the total time, fully 15 minutes are assumed to be
needed for fire department response, elevator
capture (Phase I in ASME/ANSI A17.1), elevator
system checking, and dedicated (Phase II) use to
remove people, unable to walk down stairs, from
all of the 40 above-grade, office floors. The other
20 minutes are used for express trips from three
refuge floors or sky lobbies to which ambulatory,
stair-capable persons descend by means of the exit
stairs before boarding elevators in an organized
fashion. The simulation assumes that there are
four 3500-pound (1600 kg), 19-passenger elevator
cars per elevator zone with vertical speeds in the
range of 800 to 1200 feet per minute (4.1 to 6.1
m/s). Due to fire conditions and fire fighting, one
zone of elevators is assumed to be unusable for the
egress from these transfer floors. If stair use were
increased — with one-third of those above the 12th
floor using stairs for their entire egress, the
evacuation time could be reduced to under 30
minutes. A superimposed simulation of 4500
persons able to use stairs, utilizing only the exit
Stairs, predicts a total evacuation time of nearly 40
minutes, including 27 minutes of queuing by the
uppermost occupants before they can descend. For
this simulation, each of the two exit stairs is
assumed to be 44 inches (1120 mm) in nominal
width and each is assumed to be optimally used.

General Prediction. Figure 2, also from Pauls
(1977), can be used to predict evacuation times for
various building heights, evacuation procedures,
and populations utilizing stairs alone or elevators
with stairs. As with Figure 1, it is assumed that
there are four 3500 pound, 19 passenger elevator
cars per elevator zone with vertical speeds in the
range of 800 to 1200 feet per minute (4.1 to 6.1
m/s). Although evacuation time increases linearly
with total building population when only stairs are
used, the combined use of elevators and stairs —
with a conservative 15 minute period allowed
before mass use of elevators begins — is shown as
requiring approximately 30 to 35 minutes, starting
from the first alarm. A less conservative 5 minute
delay in beginning elevator egress is also shown.
However, it is felt that such a short delay does not
permit sufficient time for the supervisory personnel
(firefighters or specially trained building staff) to
assess the situation and decide on the best course
of action for the particular situation encountered.

Finally, as discussed more completely
elsewhere (Pauls 1980, 1988f), the population
figures assumed in Pauls’ simulations are actual
occupants, not building-code occupant loads based
on one occupant per 100 square feet (9.3 sq. m) of
gross floor area. The latter are generally too high
by a factor of two or more for office buildings.


Elevators and Fire

(2) Therefore it follows that people waiting for
the car must be able to indicate their whereabouts
to the person controlling the evacuation.

(3) The persons controlling the evacuation
must be able to give directions to the elevator
operator and building occupants.

(4) The elevator operator must be able to
communicate with the controller.

Choice of Elevators. Whenever possible, an
elevator with firefighter service would be used for
the evacuation. There has been some concern that
use of the firefighting elevator for evacuation will
delay fire service operations but with the British
specification, which uses a simple rocker switch for
the recall, this need not be so. They are able to
recapture the elevator without delay by operating
the recall switch, first restoring "NORMAL
SERVICE’ and then the RECALL’. The
communication system will enable firefighters to
seek information from the elevator operator so
that they can decide on their priorities for further
action. This will inevitably include taking
responsibility for the continuing evacuation.
Where an elevator without firefighter service is
used for evacuation, operation on ’car preference’
(key) control will afford the means to avoid
unwanted stops and the crowding and delay caused
by unauthorized passengers.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It should be clear that, to some extent (and
perhaps especially in North America), an
attitudinal turn of 180 degrees is required to
implement the recently proposed or adopted
measures formalizing use of elevators for egress by
persons unable to use stairs. Long-held attitudes
might well turn out to be a bigger impediment
than the technology needed (and largely available)
to make elevators relatively safe in many fire
conditions and to make the options known to
building occupants plus the fire services before and
during a fire emergency. A case in point was the
opening (in September 1990) of a new, 200 foot
(61 m) deep station (Forest Glen) in the
Washington Metro subway system. The station
utilizes elevators for access and egress. Originally,
elevator lobbies were provided with signs stating,
"Use These Elevators in Case of Fire or
Emergency." Adverse reactions (including some
from fire safety personnel) were dramatically
reported by news media. This was followed by the
posting of new signs: “These Elevators for both

73

Normal and Emergency Use.”

Of course some of the reticence about elevator
use in emergencies is warranted. Other than in
Britain, little has been done to even outline, let
alone detail, the operational aspects of refuge and
the combinations of stair and elevator egress.
Generally the British work (Gatfield, 1989a, 1989b)
demonstrates how elevator use can be a reasonably
safe option provided that perceived risks are
properly analyzed and addressed in design codes,
and that there are competent personnel available
to manage such use. Although the traditions of
building design and use, plus fire protection
strategies, differ between North America and
Britain, there is much benefit in greater North
American awareness of the detailed attention given
to operational or management procedures in the
British literature on the topic of elevator use for
emergency egress for people with disabilities. The
British standard, BS 5588:Part 8, for example has
four and a half pages devoted to Appendix A:
Advice to management. Included are:

Al Procedures in case of fire

A2 Techniques for the evacuation of
disabled people down (or up)
Stairways

A3 Management of evacuation lifts

A4 Examples of fire plan strategies in
buildings provided with evacuation lifts

AS Fire alarm systems.

Within the U.S. fire protection, elevator
systems, and building safety communities there
should be greater recognition of the need for this
kind of detail in readily available documents. If
this paper spurs the effort to develop, and make
widely available, such information it will have
accomplished an important objective.

REFERENCES

ANSI, 1986, "American National Standard for
Buildings and Facilities - Providing Accessibility
and Usability for Physically Handicapped People,
ANSI A117.1," American National Standards
Institute, Inc., New York.

ASME, 1987, "Safety Code for Elevators and
Escalators, ASME/ANSI A17.1-1987," American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York.



TIME FROM START OF ALARM, minutes

Elevators and Fire

so T T T T
A, EVACUATION TO GROUND LEVEL BY WAY OF TWO
44-in. WIDE EXIT STAIRS
8). EVACUATION OF LOWEST 10 FLOORS TO GROUND LEVEL
BY WAY OF TWO 44-in. WIDE EXIT STAIRS
50K By REFUGE EVERY 10 FLOORS, REACHED BY WAY OF |
TWO 44-in. WIDE EXIT STAIRS
c, EVACUATION TO GROUND LEVEL BY EXPRESS
ELEVATORS ( )® FROM REFUGE FLOORS:
1, BEGINNING AT 15 minutes
2, BEGINNING AT 5 minutes
( *% 3500 POUND ELEVATORS WITH SPEEDS
rT) 800 TO 1200 fpm, INCREASING WITH a
HEIGHT [19 PERSONS / CAR) A
30
20
10
FLOORS ‘
0 FLOORS 20 FL 30 FLOORS 40 FLOORS FLOORS
A OF OFFICES OF OFFICES OF OFFICES OF OFFICES OF
. OFFICES
0 1 ! i !

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

ACTUAL TOTAL POPULATION

FIG. 2
TIMES NEEDED FOR VAIOUS REFUGE AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES USING
AND ELEVATORS IN TALL OFFICE BUILDINGS

(From: Pauls, 1977)



69°

a LEAR ne enn Benne bl
—
= Fa wor ny z
aPr— —— — ee — am
>~o S| — ——
oo (=) SS SS SC ee i)
sé se — SS  - - ee — = ° R
- =e es Se o” °
Sx 7° f= I B
GB le z
Seo" na iad
art gg wn &
- ot = ——4~ a
5! Le TS CCS 3 £
eI en ETS
wt ge £ che
i SS ae angen Ss € =|
5
gt : SSS ee:
2! > —S— eae cae ee ee ere err Or TS a w Eg
ay 2 = se
<! — - Be
= \ SS eee ees ge
| S24 t g
Sa 2e 8
1g & 5
- {bese ® ° E
— <
1 oar
=
P
B
= mn
2 g
7 Yds é
; Pi o
o
§ zs
id

GRD

AWd01S



72

telephone/intercom only if there is a delay
of more than several minutes before the
emergency personnel arrive or if
conditions become life-threatening and you
are unable to leave to lobby and move to
one of the exit stairs.

Alternative refuge areas are provided
in the exit stairs located at each end of the
corridor. Use these alternative refuge
areas if you cannot safely stay in the
elevator lobby. Assistance will be provided
in the exit stairs and a telephone/intercom
is available also.

Availability of Options. In the view of some, it
is highly desirable to have both the elevator(s) and
one exit stair served directly by a common
protected lobby. Ironically, while this is the
preferred practice in Britain (under BS 5588:Part
8:1988), it is prohibited by one U.S. model building
code, specifically 506.6.2 of the 1988 edition of the
Standard Building Code in relation to special
provisions for high rise buildings. The pros and
cons of this arrangement — which appears to be
useful from normal stair use, evacuation logistics,
and smoke management perspectives — should be
examined further.

The British Situation

With its somewhat different traditions of fire
protection in buildings there is greater emphasis
on compartmentation generally and protected
lobby access specifically or, as it sometimes put,
“two-door protection to vertical escape routes.”
Having the protected lobby directly accessing the
elevator and an exit stair is also highly favored, the
situation referred to above as being prohibited by
one U.S. model building code. One British
reaction to this was, "I am at a loss to understand
why one building code prohibits a stairway opening
onto a lift landing/lobby" (Gatfield, 1989b). Ata
minimum, it is believed that the refuge should have
direct access to a stair. Here it is acknowledged
that contemplating the use of a stair contradicts
the whole rationale for using elevators but, as a
means of last resort, the inherent difficulties and
risks may be unavoidable and must be accepted. In
other words, a "belt and braces” approach is
warranted.

In Britain, the protection of the elevator —
counted on for egress use — is comparable to what
is called for with less detail in the U.S. For this
BS 5588:Part 5, "Code of practice for firefighting
stairways and lifts" (BSI, 1986) is utilized.

Elevators and Fire

Generally, the elevator should have the “firefighter
service" control system and be designed so that the
risks which can be eliminated are eliminated; and
for those which cannot, the means to mitigate
them must be provided.

Operations. The most important component
in the strategy for use of an elevator for egress is
people, or what could be called an assistance
system. This need not necessarily be a "buddy
system" where one person is assigned to a specific
"buddy," to help in case of emergency. There is
some concern that it might be unsafe to leave it to
people with disabilities to use an elevator on their
own initiative; they might be unable to deal with
crowding and excessive demand by others. This
might cause delays. (Here it is useful to recall the
remarks made previously on the welfare-approach
taken in Britain, versus the individual-oriented,
civil-rights approach which is more common in the
U.S. All candidates for assisted egress cannot be
identified in advance. Thus the system, and.the
emergency plan generally, must be flexible while
taking into account identifiable requirements of
those who pre-notify building management of their
needs.)

In the British scheme of things, it is
recommended that evacuation of people with
disabilities should begin at the first alert of a fire
and not wait until a hazardous situation has been
confirmed. (That is, others — not considered
disabled — might be permitted to remain at this
early stage.) Responsible people should be
detailed in advance by building management to
undertake specific responsibilities in the event of
fire. These should include, for example:

(1) One person should obtain control of the
elevator, (using the emergency recall switch) take
the car only to those floors where there are people
with disabilities waiting for assistance, starting with
those at most immediate risk, and taking them to
the evacuation level. No person other than those
necessary to assist with the evacuation should be
permitted in the car.

(2) Others should assist people with disabilities
to the elevator lobby, notify their presence and stay
with them for as long as necessary. If the elevator
is delayed they must be prepared to move their
charges into the stair or another place of refuge.

Information and Communication Systems.
For the evacuation strategy to work effectively
information is needed. The location of danger
influences the choice of egress routes; a fire alarm
and indicating (annunciation) system will provide
this information.

(1) The elevator operator will need to know on
which floors people are waiting for the car.



Elevators and Fire

59

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION POLICY
SPRINKLERS IN ELEVATOR HOISTWAYS
AND MACHINE ROOMS

by Stewart J. Levy

The General Services Administration (GSA) is
responsible for 230 million square feet of
Government-owned or leased office space. In
addition, it operates one of the largest design and
construction activities in the nation. As part of its
responsibility, the GSA must assure the fire and
life safety of it employees and visitors to the space
under its control. The Safety and Environmental
Management Division (S&EM) within the Public
Buildings Service of GSA is responsible for
developing the policies and procedures used for
evaluating the safety of government occupied
buildings and coordinating program
implementation by the GSA regional offices
throughout the nation.

GSA has established a policy of utilizing risk
assessment methodology to provide fiscally
responsible building safety. Simple adherence to
code compliance is not sufficient justification for
resource allocation. In many cases, codes can
conflict with each other, violate other laws (¢.g.,
historic preservation), or not provide the desired
level of protection. The relationship between
expenditures on fire safety and the actual impact of
these expenditures must be examined.

Continuing research into fire phenomena is
making it possible to perform an engineering
analysis of the fire safety performance of a building
and its systems. This building or its system(s)
could differ widely from current perceptions of
code conforming buildings or systems. Using
analytical engineering tools, the development and
impact of fire in a building and on its systems can
be assessed. The installation and operation of the
building systems can then be analyzed based upon
the risks associated with potential fire exposure.

There are several diverse thoughts concerning
the protection of elevator machine rooms. Codes
and standards concerning protection of elevator
hoistways and control rooms are primarily

developed through a consensus of its membership,
and often based upon some past event.
Membership generally consists of professionals in
the particular code related field and depending
upon the basic philosophy of the membership, may
have differing approaches in the resolution of a
particular area of concern. This is the case with
elevator control room protection.

GSA's primary concern during an elevator
control room fire is the safety of the elevator
Passengers. A secondary concern is the protection
of the elevator equipment and the building. Based
upon these concerns, GSA has analyzed the risks
associated with the conditions and the different
Tecommendations for protection and has
established a policy, for facilities under its control,
which provides an acceptable level of risk to the
elevator occupants that is also fiscally responsible.
The policy consists of the following elements:

+ Smoke detection recalls the elevator to the
primary floor,

+ Heat detection will shunt trip the power to the
elevator controls,

+ Sprinkler protection (set to activate at a higher
temperature rating than the heat detection)
will extinguish or control the fire.

This policy is based on the assumption that the
typical elevator control room fire will be a smoke
producing fire (most likely due to a transient fault)
which should initially activate the smoke detector,
recalling the elevator to the designated level. If
the fire in the machine room continues, the
temperature should increase, activating the heat
detector which in turn will disconnect the power
supplied to the elevator controller. By this time,
the elevator has recalled or at least has increased
the distance between the elevator cab and the fire.
Continued production of heat would then activate


Elevators and Fire

Works Canada, Architectural and Engineering
Services, Ottawa.

Pauls, J., 1988f, "Movement of people,”
DiNenno, P. (ed.), The SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering, National Fire

75

ProtectionAssociation, Batterymarch Park, Quincy,
MA, Section 1, Chapter 15, pp. 246-268.

Pauls, J. and Juillet, E., 1990, "Recent social
and technical developments influencing the life
safety of people with disabilities," Building
Standards, Vol. 59, No. 3, May-June, pp. 7-14.

Jake Pauls researched building use and safety with
the National Research Council of Canada from
1967 to 1987. Well known for his field studies in
Office buildings and large facilities used for public
assembly, his work focused on building evacuation,
movement of people generally, stair design, crowd
behavior, emergency behavior of people, safety
needs of people with disabilities, and the associated
Safety standards and codes. Moving to the U.S. in
June 1987, he became the Life Safety Specialist at
Hughes Associates, Inc. In addition to researching
life safety for people with disabilities and consulting
on life safety problems generally, he is active in
bridging between human factors and related
national standards and model codes. Together
with John J. Fruin, he is writing a book, People

Movement in Buildings and Public Places: Design,
Management, and Safety for Individuals and

Crowds, to be published by Butterworths.

Edwina Juillet is the founding Executive Director of
the National Task Force on Life Safety and the
Handicapped, Inc. and is active in NFPA standards
committees, including the Committee on Safety to
Life, the Standing Subcommittee on Means of
Egress, and the Standing Subcommittee on
Residential Board and Care Occupancies (which
she chairs). Other committee memberships include
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations Healthcare Safety
Committee and the NFPA Learn Not to Bun
Technical Advisory Committee. She is the Director
of Risk Management at Martha Jefferson Hospital
in Charlontesville, VA, President of the Woodrow
Wilson Rehabilitation Center Foundation, and a
Life Safety Associate with Hughes Associates, Inc.
in Wheaton, Maryland.



74

Bazjanac, V., 1977, "Simulation of elevator
performance in high-rise buildings under
conditions of emergency," Human Response to Tall
Buildings, Conway, D.J. (ed.), Dowden, Hutchinson
& Ross, Inc., Stroudsburg, PA., pp. 316-328.

BCMC, 1990, "Accessibility and egress for
people with disabilities,” Part I of public hearing
report for October, 1990, Board for the
Coordination of the Model Codes, Council of
American Building Officials, Falls Church, VA.

Bryan, J.L., 1988, "Behavioral response to fire
and smoke," DiNenno, P. (ed.), The SFPE
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, National
Fire Protection Association, Batterymarch Park,
Quincy, MA, Section 1, Chapter 16, pp. 269-285.

BSI, 1986, “British Standard for Fire
Precautions in the Design and Construction of
Buildings: Code of practice for firefighting
Stairways and lifts, BS 5588:Part 5," British
Standards Institution, London.

BSI, 1988, "British Standard for Fire
Precautions in the Design and Construction of
Buildings: Code of practice for means of escape for
disabled people, BS 5588:Part 8," British Standards
Institution, London.

Bryn, K., 1973, "Disaster brings out the best in
people," Science Digest, August 1973.

CSA, 1990, "Barrier-Free Design, CAN/CSA-
B651-M90," Canadian Standards Association,
Rexdale, Ontario.

Gatfield, A.J., 1989a, "Principles of fire safety
for disabled people in buildings," Paper presented
at the National Fire Protection Association Annual
Meeting, Washington, D.C.

Gatfield, A.J., 1989b, "The use of lifts in case
of fire: operational and design considerations,”
Paper presented at the Fifth International Fire
Protection Engineering Institute, IFPEI-V,
Ottawa.

Goldsmith, S., 1983, "The ideology of designing
for the disabled,” Design for Special Needs, No. 31,
pp. 10-16.

Home Office, 1984, "Principles of fire safety
for disabled people in buildings, Draft Code of
Practice," HM Fire Service Inspectorate, U.K.
Home Office, London.

Elevators and Fire

Johnson, B.M., 1983, "Evacuation techniques
for disabled persons: Research summary and
guidelines,” National Research Council of Canada,
Ottawa, NRCC 23932.

Klote, J.H. and Tamura, G.T., 1986, "Smoke
control and fire evacuation by elevators,” American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning
Engineers Transactions, Winter Meeting, Vol. 92,
No. 1A, pp. 231-245.

Levin, B.M. (ed.), 1980, "Fire and Life Safety
for the Handicapped," Center for Fire Research,
National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, MD,
NBS Special Publication 585. (This is distributed
by NTIS as NBSIR 80-1965)

Pauls, J.L., 1977, "Management and movement
of building occupants in emergencies,” Proceedings
of Second Conference on Designing to Survive Severe
Hazards, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, pp.
103-130.

Pauls, J.L., 1980, "Building evacuation:
research findings and recommendations,” Fires and
Human Behaviour, Canter, D. (ed.), John Wiley &
Sons, Chichester, pp. 251-275.

Pauls, J., 1988a "Egress procedures and
technologies for people with disabilities: final
report of a state-of-the-art review with

recommendations for action,” Prepared for the U.S.

Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board, Washington, DC.

Pauls, J., 1988b, "Egress procedures and
technologies for people with disabilities: literature
review,” Prepared for the U.S. Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board,
Washington, DC.

Pauls, J., 1988c, “Review of standards and
codes plus recommendations for accessible means
of egress," Prepared for the U.S. Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board,
Washington, DC.

Pauls, J., 1988d, "Life safety for people with
disabilities: a state-of-the-art summary with an
emphasis on codes and standards,” Prepared for
Public Works Canada, Architectural and
Engineering Services, Ottawa.

Pauls, J., 1988e, "Life safety for people with
disabilities: literature review," Prepared for Public



Elevators and Fire

CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR EGRESS
UTILIZING ELEVATORS

The U.S. Situation

The Elevator System. Following the lead of
other countries, in the U.S., proposals entailing
elevator use for egress by people with disabilities
have been discussed and voted upon during 1990
within BCMC, ICBO, and NFPA. Further
deliberations are likely during 1991 within BOCA
and SBCCI. The proposals assume limited egress
use of elevators, with supervised, ASME/ANSI
A17.1 (Rule 211.3) procedures, to evacuate people
who are unable to use stairs. Protected elevator
lobbies (for temporary refuge while awaiting the
elevator) and protected elevators are required
although the details — such as pressurization-based,
smoke management methods — are not spelled out
consistently. The BCMC report, completed in
October 1990, simply specifies that:

Elevators intended for use from areas of
refuge shall conform to the requirements
in Section 211 of A17.1. Standby power
shall be provided. Elevator shafts and
adjacent lobbies provided to comply with
8.2.2 (the section dealing with required
accessible means of egress) shall comply
with the requirements for smokeproof
towers (which are covered by a previously
issued BCMC report). An exception is
permitted for elevators in an area of refuge
formed by a horizontal exit or smoke
barrier.

Instructions for Use. Notably, unlike the
British Standard, BS 5588:Part 8: 1988, the U.S.
proposals provide little or no guidance on
operating procedures. For example, the BCMC
report, completed in October 1990, for areas of
refuge which could be an enlarged exit stair
landing or an elevator lobby, simply focuses on the
physical aspects of the facility.

Every area of refuge using an
emergency (fire fighter) service elevator or
stair enclosure complying with 8.2.1 (with
adequately sized landing area and width
between handrails) shall be provided with
a two-way communication system between
the area of refuge and a central control
point used for emergency management of
the elevator.

Each area of refuge shall be identified
by a sign stating AREA OF REFUGE and

7

the International Symbol of Accessibility.
The sign shall be illuminated as required
for exit signs where exit sign illumination
is required. Instructions shall be posted
on the use of these facilities under
emergency conditions. Tactile signage
complying with ANSI A117.1 (4.28) shall
be located at each door to an area of
Tefuge.

No guidance is provided here on the content
of posted instructions which should, almost
certainly, be markedly different from the
instructions on signs typically found today at
elevators. Under all the U.S. model building
codes, a sign is required indicating that, in case of
fire, the elevator will not operate or must not be
used and that exit stairways should be used. (This
ignores or evades the fact that, under ASME/ANSI
A17.1, only certain modes of detection or manual
recall will take the elevator out of automatic
service. That is, there could be a fire which
neither recalls the elevator nor is known to the
person desiring to use the elevator.) In those
buildings which will employ the elevator egress
option information should be provided such as in
the following draft. Note that this text is not all
intended for incorporation on a posted sign, but
rather should be tailored for an information
program, including signage.

Elevator use in fire emergencies

In this building, elevator use is an
evacuation option only for persons unable
to use the exit stairs. If possible, such
people should prearrange with building
management to have their special
evacuation assistance requirements
incorporated in the emergency plan for the
building. In an emergency, everyone who
can use the stairs should do so, otherwise
the evacuation of those needing to use the
elevator will be delayed.

Under emergency conditions the
elevator should be operated only by
trained emergency service personnel who
will first verify that elevator use is safe and
then will check each elevator lobby to take
waiting people to the ground floor lobby.

If there is a fire incident in the
building make sure that the doors are
closed between the elevator lobby and the
Test of the floor. If unable to use stairs,
stay in the lobby for instructions to be
given over the speakers/intercom. Use the


Elevators and Fire

egress. In November 1990, NFPA membership
approved a “menu item" for the 1991 edition of the
Life Safety Code covering areas of refuge and
elevator use for egress. During 1991, the
memberships of the two other BCMC
organizations, BOCA and SBCCI, are expected to
process the BCMC recommendations for areas of
refuge and elevator use for egress. This would
result in revisions to the BOCA National Building
Code and the Standard Building Code respectively.

As in Britain, the elevator egress requirements
evolving in the U.S. do not affect the required
capacity of conventional egress routes. Also
egress-related elevator use is expected to be
Testricted to those people who cannot safely use
the exit stairs.

Mobility Disability Demographics. It should
be recognized that most of the people, who are
sometimes included in the group improperly called
"the disabled" (reported as including 43 million
Americans to help justify passage of the ADA), are
quite capable of using stairs. According to U.S.
demographic data noted by Pauls and Juillet
(1990), only about 0.3 percent of the civilian
noninstitutionalized population use wheelchairs. A
similar percentage use walkers for getting around.
The percentages of noninstitutionalized civilians
65-74 years, using wheelchairs and walkers, are 1.1
and 1.2 respectively. The percentages of those 75
years and over using wheelchairs and walkers are
2.3 and 4.8 respectively. Generally, in the U.S.,
about 3 percent of noninstitutionalized civilians
use one or more mobility aids (i.e. wheelchairs,
walkers, crutches, canes, special shoes, braces,
artificial limbs). This rate is only 1.8 percent for
the 0-64 age group and rises to 8.3 percent for the
65-74 age group and to 22.4 percent for the 75-
and-over age group. In buildings used
predominantly by people under 65 years of age, we
can assume that about 3 percent of building oc-
cupants have mobility disabilities but can
independently use exit stairs if moving behind
others who are able to move faster. We'can con-
Servatively assume that 0.5 percent, in such
buildings, cannot use stairs without assistance.
This percentage includes users of wheelchairs,
walkers, or crutches. They might need elevators.

Summing up developments: generally the last
fourteen years have witnessed many developments
on this topic, including many publications on
research, standards, and recommended safety pro-
grams. Indeed it came as a surprise -- even to
researchers active in the area -- that a recent
published literature review of the area included
some 350 documents (Pauls, 1988e). A more
recent, unpublished review included 526 items

67

(Pauls, 1988b). Therefore, this brief paper can do
little more than merely introduce a small part of
the background to the matter of egress by elevators
for people unable to use exit stairs.

LOGISTICS OF EGRESS
VIA ELEVATORS

Bazjanac’s Simulations of Elevator Use for Egress

Bazjanac and colleagues at the University of
California, Berkeley, performed computer
simulations of elevator use for evacuating all or
portions of tall office buildings (Bazjanac, 1977).
Although funded for two years by the National
Science Foundation this work had little impact in
firesafety and standards organizations. An assumed
reliance on automatic operation of elevators, with
procedures calling for first response to the fire
floor, might have had something to do with the
work’s small impact. Indeed some attitudes against
such egress methods might have hardened because
of Bazjanac’s work.

Partial Evacuation. The simplest strategy
explored by Bazjanac and his team was to have
elevators operate in a “down-peak" mode and
respond only to three floors in an evacuation zone.
The computer simulation predicted that the last
person would be evacuated from any three-floor
zone in less than eight minutes. The simulation
also suggested that this time could be improved, to
less than five minutes, if people were unloaded at
an intermediate floor rather than going all the way
to the ground floor. Some uncertainty was noted
about how short the actual time might be because
"jt is impossible to predict what percentage of the
floor population might escape through means
other than elevators in an actual emergency in
which elevators are available" (Bazjanac, 1977). It
was concluded that the "fastest method of
evacuation of any individual floor is the
simultaneous dispatch of all available elevators to
that floor" and "the success of this strategy depends
entirely on the ability to get everybody on the floor
to the elevator lobby in the short time it takes the
elevators to reach the floor and load people.”

Complete Evacuation. Bazjanac’s simulation
suggested that all buildings could be completely
evacuated, using elevators, in less than 30 minutes.
It was noted that, because of their use of elevator
zones and high-speed elevators, some tall buildings
could be evacuated in less than half the time of
buildings with half as many floors.



Elevators and Fire

reasonably required in the circumstances of the
case."

While on the topic of public policy, it is also
important to describe a basic difference in
ideology, in Britain and in the U.S, regarding
accommodation of people with disabilities. In
Britain, concern for these people has been
generally viewed as a public welfare issue. In the
U.S., the concern has been seen more as a matter
of civil rights. This basic public policy difference
between the two countries has been described by
Goldsmith (1983) and is reflected in the recent
landmark civil rights legislation known as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990
(Public Law 101-336 signed in July 1990).

Human Behavior

Regarding the concern about inappropriate
human behavior in emergencies (stated as item 5
above) it seems clear, on the basis of evidence
from general behavior in fires and other life-
threatening events plus evidence on people’s
evacuation behavior with stairs, that the fears
about inappropriate behavior are largely
unwarranted. This is especially true if people are
provided — both before and during the emergency
— with realistic information about their options
and about the conditions related to those options.
Although disasters can be physically and
psychologically harmful to people, we can see some
truth in the opinion expressed by some
investigators of disaster behavior: "Disaster brings
out the best in people" (Bryn, 1973). The term
“best” refers, for example, to altruistic Tesponses
which often characterize coping behavior.
Furthermore, these experts often emphasize that
the greatest need, of people in emergencies, is for
useful information.

Nonetheless, despite findings from studies of
actual behavior in emergencies, it will be difficult
to change some long-held attitudes about behavior
of people in emergencies (item 5 above). One
reason is that there has been little if any research
in the last few years on the general matter of
behavior of people in fires (i.e., work subsequent
to that reviewed by Bryan, 1988). Neither has
there been work on the particular topic of
evacuation logistics plus behavior when elevator
use is an option. Apparently, not since 1977 has
the technical literature (in the U.S.) even
addressed simulation of egress by elevator from a
logistical perspective (Bazjanac, 1977; Pauls, 1977).
Even this literature is not well known in the
firesafety field.

65

It is especially important to hold realistic
attitudes about human behavior in emergencies
when we are dealing with emergency egress,
including that on stairs and in elevator systems.
Some problems, such as inappropriate
overcrowding behavior with elevators, are likely to
be more perceived than real. The reality has been,
and is expected to continue, that people tend to
take each other’s needs into account to at least the
same extent as is normally the case. Indeed,
altruism is even more marked in emergencies.
This characteristic complements that of
information-seeking behavior, a topic again
addressed later in this paper.

History of Concern about Life Safety for People
with Disabilities

The literature on human behavior and on
elevator-based evacuation logistics largely predated
the marked, recent growth of concern about egress,
Tefuge, and life safety generally for people with
disabilities. Even with the increased concern over
the last few years in the U.S. and Britain, about
emergency egress for people with disabilities,
nobody has picked up the incomplete work on
evacuation logistics. Moreover, for
noninstitutional buildings, little has been done to
spell out the details of operational aspects of
Tefuge concepts. A notable exception is the British
Standard, BS 5588:Part 8: 1988, in which details of
operational aspects are provided (BSI, 1988).

Much of the history of the concern, research,
and regulatory developments on life safety for
people with disabilities has been reviewed in
publications and presentations by Pauls and Juillet
(e.g., the article, "Recent social and technical
developments influencing the life safety of people
with disabilities," Pauls and Juillet, 1990). There
has been an international scope to the work of
these authors. However, with current
developments, their focus is on the U.S. scene,
especially with regard to proposals recently
processed through the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Life Safety Code (NFPA 101,
1991 edition), the International Conference of
Building Officials (ICBO) Uniform Building Code
(1991 edition), and the Council of American
Building Officials (CABO) Board for the
Coordination of the Model Codes (BCMC) report
on accessibility scoping, means of egress, and
mainstreaming.

National concern for life safety of people with
disabilities was first marked by a seminar, "Fire
Safety for the Handicapped,” held in Edinburgh,



60

the sprinkler head and allow for the application of
water to extinguish/control the fire.

Some rapid growth fires produce heat at a rate
that can cause the power to shut down prior to full
elevator recall. In this situation the elevator will
stop somewhere in the elevator hoistway prior to
reaching the designated floor, and could even stop
between floors. Since the distance between the fire
(in the elevator control room above the elevator
cab) and the elevator cab has been increased, this
condition should expose the elevator occupants to
minimal danger.

As illustrated in the following two worst case
scenarios, GSA policy addresses the risk associated
with providing sprinkler protection in elevator
machine rooms.

Worst Case Scenario Without Sprinklers

A fire occurs in the control room with an
occupied elevator cab located immediately below
the elevator machine room.

The elevator controls heat to a temperature
which exceeds their reliable operating temperature.
This results in complete failure of elevator controls
causing the elevator to stop and freeze in place. In
turn, this subjects the occupants to smoke and/or
heat which is being generated from the control
room fire.

Worst Case Scenario With Sprinklers

A fire occurs in the control room with an
occupied elevator cab located immediately below
the elevator machine room, and the power to the
elevator controls is disrupted prior to recall.

The fire is controlled and/or extinguished. The
occupants of the elevator could the wet from
sprinkler discharge and become trapped as in the

Elevators and Fire

scenario without sprinklers. However, since the
fire is controlled and/or extinguished, there is little
exposure to heat or smoke generated from the fire.

It is readily apparent that the risk to the
elevator occupants is greater in the case without
sprinklers.

GSA is using the growing body of fire science
knowledge to develop and implement scientific
methods of assessing the fire risk to occupants of
GSA controlled space. The allocation of resources
can no longer be justified solely on the basis of
code compliance. After evaluating the two
scenarios above, the sprinklered elevator control
room with defined actions prevailed and became, in
part, the basis for the current GSA policy. This
paper will expand on the philosophies used to
develop this policy. GSA welcomes comments
concerning its policies for providing safe and
healthful workplaces.

GSA is currently developing a policy for
elevator recall as it relates to a fire in the elevator
pit. The sequence of events for a control room fire
may have an adverse effect on elevator occupants if
the fire is below the elevator. This paper will
address concerns with the implementation of an
elevator control room protection system and its
potential impact on other elevator related fires.

Stewart J. Levy is a Fire Protection Engineer with
the US General Services Administration,
responsible for developing and revising fire
protection policy, including elevator policies,
relating to public buildings. He has a B.S. degree
in Fire Protection Engineering from the University
of Maryland. Mr Levy is a member of the
Chesapeake Chapter of the Society of Fire
Protection Engineers and is a member of the
NFPA Protected Premises Signaling Committee.