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to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 21-CV-0275 & 21-CV-0276

MARY OATES WALKER, APPELLANT,

V.

D.C. OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS, et al., APPELLEES.

Appeals from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2019-CA-002406-P(MPA), 2019-CA-003093-P(MPA))

(Hon. Jose M. Lopez, Trial Judge)

(Argued October 19, 2022 Decided February 29, 2024)

Daniel J. McCartin, with whom Anthony M. Conti was on the brief, for 

appellant. 

Lasheka Brown filed a Statement in Lieu of Brief for the D.C. Office of 

Employee Appeals. 

Stacy L. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. 

Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile,

Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, 

for the Executive Office of the Mayor. 
2

Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN,

* Senior 

Judge.

EASTERLY, Associate Judge: Mary Oates Walker challenges the decision by 

the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”) upholding the Executive Office of the 

Mayor’s (“EOM”) decision to terminate her employment as Chief Administrative 

Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings. Specifically she asserts that 

OEA’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; OEA erred in rejecting 

her claims that she was terminated without due process and in violation of D.C. Code 

§ 2-1831.04(b)(7) and 6-B D.C.M.R. § 907.3; and OEA erred in rejecting her 

argument that the Mayor was obligated to consider the Douglas factors, see infra

note 7, in deciding whether termination of her employment was the appropriate 

response to her misconduct. 

The OEA’s decision was affirmed by the Superior Court, but we “review[]

agency decisions on appeal from the Superior Court the same way we review 

administrative appeals that come to us directly.” Sium v. Off. of State Superintendent 

of Educ., 218 A.3d 228, 232 (D.C. 2019). “Thus, . . . confining ourselves strictly to 

the administrative record, we review the OEA[’s] . . . decision, not the decision of 

 * Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge at the time of argument. His status 

changed to Senior Judge on December 21, 2022. 
3

the Superior Court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We will affirm the 

OEA’s decision as long as it is “supported by substantial evidence in the record and 

otherwise in accordance with law.” Love v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 90 A.3d 412, 

421 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards, we 

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Ms. Walker was appointed by Mayor Adrian Fenty in 2010 as Chief 

Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). In 

2012, OAH came under public scrutiny in the media. Concerns were raised about 

Ms. Walker’s leadership at OAH, as well as about the fact that she had hired her 

business partner and friend, Kiyo Oden,1 to serve as OAH’s general counsel in 2010,

and recommended the company TPM, owned by Lincoln Tyson, Ms. Oden’s 

then-fiancé, to assist the Department of General Services (“DGS”) with the 

relocation of OAH’s offices in 2011. The District’s Office of the Inspector General 

(“OIG”) and a private law firm retained by OAH launched investigations, as did the

 1 Ms. Oden married in 2011 and became Kiyo Tyson, but we use her maiden 

name in this memorandum opinion for consistency with the contemporaneous record 

materials. 
4

D.C. Board of Ethics and Government Accountability (“BEGA”). On Feb. 6, 2014, 

BEGA issued a Notice of Violation to Ms. Walker, charging her with nineteen 

violations of specific D.C. ethics statutes and regulations2 in relation to 

Ms. Walker’s co-ownership of a business licensed in D.C. and Maryland, MKM 

Ventures, LLC, with Ms. Oden; her preferential treatment of Mr. Tyson and failure 

to disclose his relationship to Ms. Oden; her related misrepresentations to BEGA 

investigators; and her leadership at OAH. 

The next day, Mayor Vincent Gray placed Ms. Walker on administrative leave 

with pay and issued an Advance Written Notice of Intent to Remove. The Advance 

Notice identified five “findings of good cause”: the first incorporated by reference 

the entirety of the BEGA Notice of Violation and the statutes and regulations BEGA 

 2 D.C. Code §§ 1-1162.23(a) (conflicts of interest), 22-722(a)(6) (prohibiting 

obstructing or impeding “the due administration of justice in any official 

proceeding”); District Personnel Manual (“DPM”) §§ 1800.3 (private business 

conflict), 1803.1(a)(1) (appearance of using public office for private gain); 

1803.1(a)(2) (giving preferential treatment to anyone), 1803.10 (interfering with or 

obstructing an investigation by a district agency), 1803.11 (harassment or retaliation 

against employees acting in good faith), and 1804.1(i) (engaging in other interest in 

violation of district law) (2006). (BEGA miscited this last DPM regulation as DPM 

§ 1803.1(i), but it was clear that BEGA meant to refer to § 1804.1(i), given that it 

reproduced the text of that regulation.)
5

cited; the second identified violations of Chapter V(D) & (P) 3 of the Code of Ethics 

for ALJs based on the same constellation of facts described in the BEGA Notice of 

Violation; and the last three identified grounds for removal notwithstanding the 

outcome of BEGA proceedings in relation to Ms. Walker’s failure to disclose her 

relationship with Ms. Oden to OIG investigators, her misrepresentation under oath

to BEGA that she had not suggested TPM be hired to assist with OAH’s move, and 

her inability to resolve conflict at OAH. Ms. Walker sent the Mayor a twenty-page 

letter in response on Feb. 20, 2014, responding to these findings and denying any 

wrongdoing. 

On May 19, 2014, while the BEGA investigation continued, Mayor Gray 

issued a Final Notice terminating Ms. Walker. At the outset of the letter, the Mayor 

stated that he had considered her response, but based on “the entire record available 

to me” had found against her on all five findings listed in the Advance Notice. The 

Mayor then made certain findings of fact and set forth his “Determination of Good 

Cause for Removal.” In the good cause discussion, the Mayor seemingly repackaged 

the five bases for termination for good cause as nine specific violations of ethics law, 

 3 The Mayor miscited the relevant code chapter as Chapter IV, but it was clear 

that the Mayor meant to refer to Chapter V(D) & (P) given that he reproduced the 

text of those two rules and given that Chapter IV(C) and Chapter IV(P) do not exist. 
6

regulations, or codes, almost all of which had been cited in the BEGA Notice of 

Violation and the Advance Written Notice,4 all relating to the same facts alleged in 

the BEGA Notice of Violation and the Advance Written Notice. 

Ms. Walker appealed her termination to the OEA. Meanwhile, in 2014 she

entered into a negotiated disposition with BEGA in which she admitted she had 

violated D.C. Code § 1-1162.23(a), and DPM §§ 1800.3, 1803.1(a)(2) by virtue of 

“maintaining a private business and financial relationship with [Ms. Oden],” and

failing to disclose Ms. Oden’s relationship with Mr. Tyson to DGS when it hired 

Mr. Tyson’s company to assist with OAH’s office move. Ms. Walker agreed to pay 

a fine of $20,000. 

In 2017, OEA held an evidentiary hearing at which more than twenty-five

 4 See supra note 2. The two additions were D.C. Code § 1-618.02 (conflict of 

interest) and DPM § 1803.1(f). Regarding the latter, we assume the EOM meant to 

cite to DPM § 1803.1(a)(6) (affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the 

integrity of the government), given that § 1803.1(f) does not exist.

In its Final Notice, the EOM also incorrectly cited DPM § 1803.1(a)(a) 

instead of DPM § 1803.1(a)(1) (using public office for private gain), which had been 

included both in the BEGA Notice and the Advance Written Notice, but it was clear 

that the Mayor meant to cite § 1803.1(a)(1) given that the Mayor reproduced its text

in his letter. 
7

witnesses, including Ms. Walker, Ms. Oden, Mayor Gray, and Mayor Gray’s 

General Counsel at the time of Ms. Walker’s termination, Brian Flowers, testified.5

 

On March 26, 2019, the OEA issued its decision upholding Ms. Walker’s 

termination, focusing on “Mayor Gray’s five charges.” Although the OEA 

concluded that good cause did not exist to terminate Ms. Walker based on her 

inability to resolve conflict within OAH, it ruled that she had (1) violated D.C. Code 

§ 1-1162.23 by failing to divest herself of her interest in MKM Ventures;

(2) violated Chapter V(D) and (P) of the OAH Code of Ethics for ALJs by 

maintaining her engagement in an outside business, MKM Ventures; (3) failed to 

disclose information to BEGA investigators regarding Ms. Oden’s involvement with 

MKM Ventures; and (4) made misrepresentations under oath to BEGA investigators

when she denied she recommended TPM to DGS officials. The OEA rejected 

Ms. Walker’s due process claims that she was entitled to a pre-termination hearing 

and that Mayor Gray had failed to personally consider her response to his Advance 

Notice of termination. The OEA also rejected Ms. Walker’s argument that the 

Mayor was required to justify her removal under a Douglas6 factor analysis. On 

 5 The OEA initially issued a decision without holding a hearing but the 

Superior Court reversed, ruling that Ms. Walker was due a post-termination hearing 

as a matter of due process, and remanded. 

6 Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981) (Merit System 

Review Board decision that it possesses authority to mitigate agency imposed 
8

consideration of Ms. Walker’s petition for review of the OEA’s decision, the 

Superior Court affirmed.

II. Substantial Evidence Claims

As noted above, we review the OEA’s factual findings only for “substantial 

evidence.” Brown v. Watts, 993 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C. 2010). “Substantial evidence 

is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion. If the administrative findings are supported by substantial 

evidence, we must accept them even if there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support contrary findings.” Hutchinson v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 710 A.2d 227, 

230-31 (D.C. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The OEA upheld four good cause findings from the EOM’s Final Notice for 

Ms. Walker’s removal from office. But because the Final Notice stated that each 

listed finding independently constituted good cause for Ms. Walker’s removal, and 

Ms. Walker has not challenged the validity of that statement, we see no need to 

 

penalties that are excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable and identifying twelve factors that are generally recognized as relevant 

to that analysis). 
9

address all four. Instead, in the interest of economy, we address only one: the finding 

that Ms. Walker violated the ALJ Code of Ethics. Cf. Jones v. D.C. Unemp. Comp.

Bd., 395 A.2d 392, 395-96 (D.C. 1978) (explaining that the agency could have 

upheld discharge on only one ground if it was clear the employer intended each 

ground to be an independent basis). 

The Code of Ethics for Administrative Law Judges states in pertinent part that 

“[a]n [ALJ] shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect 

adversely on impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, 

[or] exploit the [ALJ’s] official position” and “shall not serve as an officer, director, 

manager, general partner, advisor, independent contractor[,] or employee of any 

business entity.” D.C. Off. of Admin. Hearings, Code of Ethics for OAH 

Administrative Law Judges Chapter V(D) & (P) [hereinafter ALJ Code of Ethics] 

(adopted by the Chief ALJ pursuant to Section 8(a)(9) of the OAH Establishment 

Act of 2001, D.C. Law 14-76, codified at D.C. Official Code § 2-1831.05(a)(9)). 

The OEA, like the Mayor before it, found that Ms. Walker had violated this rule 

because it was undisputed that she had “held a one-third interest as a member of 

MKM Ventures MD and DC while employed as OAH’s [Chief] ALJ.” The OEA 

further found that Ms. Walker’s “involvement with the various MKM entities 

should . . . have required her to legally divest herself from the business entities upon 
10

her appointment to the position of [Chief] ALJ” and “should have precluded her 

from offering the OAH General Counsel position to [Ms.] Oden.” 

As the EOM highlights, Ms. Walker did not make any argument in her briefs

to this court (or in her filings in the Superior Court) that the OEA’s finding that she 

violated these Ethics Code provisions lacked a substantial evidence foundation.

7

 

Ms. Walker attempts to contest her forfeiture of this argument in her reply brief, 

asserting that she has “not conceded any good cause for her removal.” But she points 

only to her challenge to the good cause finding under D.C. Code § 1-1162.23, which 

does not preserve a challenge to the application of Chapter V(D) & (P) of the Code 

of Ethics for OAH Administrative Law Judges, and her discussion of her asserted 

disclosure of her involvement in MKM Ventures to various individuals and entities, 

which is unhelpful given that the Ethics Code provisions impose flat bans on certain 

conduct and do not recognize exceptions to those bans so long as the conduct is 

disclosed. See ALJ Code of Ethics, Chapter V(D) & (P). 

Regardless, the OEA’s findings here were supported by substantial evidence 

 7 Before the OEA Ms. Walker argued that she should not be found in violation 

of these Ethics Code provisions because the MKM “entities had been essentially 

abandoned and were losing money,” but the OEA rejected these arguments. 
11

in the record, including: (1) various organizational documents, bank statements, 

property conveyances, and emails entered into evidence during the OEA hearings, 

confirming that MKM Ventures was founded in 2006 and that Ms. Walker and 

Ms. Oden jointly participated in it through their time as government employees; 

(2) testimony from the OEA hearings in which Ms. Walker and Ms. Oden as well as 

the third MKM manager confirmed their participation in MKM Ventures during 

their government employment; and (3) findings of fact in the BEGA Negotiated 

Disposition8 to which Ms. Walker agreed, stating that Ms. Walker and Ms. Oden 

and a third-party started MKM Ventures in 2006 and “maintained a private business 

and financial relationship that continued during their employment” in D.C. 

government, including monetary contributions at least through 2012.

III. Procedural Claims

It is undisputed that Ms. Walker had a property interest in her employment as 

 8 Even though the Negotiated Disposition postdated both the EOM’s Advance 

Notice and its Final Notice of Removal, the OEA explained that the Negotiated 

Disposition was “nevertheless [] relevant and material in this matter as . . . clear 

proof of [Ms. Walker’s] unethical misbehavior, particularly because several of the 

reasons for termination set forth in the Final Notice were admitted to by 

[Ms. Walker] in the [negotiated disposition].” Ms. Walker did not object to the 

OEA’s consideration of the Negotiated Disposition although she now seeks to 

minimize its significance, see infra note 18.
12

Chief ALJ of OAH. See D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) (2014) (restricting 

termination before the end of the Chief ALJ’s term except for “good cause”). As a 

result, she was constitutionally entitled to “due process of law”—notice and the 

opportunity to be heard—before permanent deprivation of that interest. See U.S. 

Const. amend. V; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) 

(“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or 

property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature 

of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We review her constitutional 

claims de novo. See Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 238 A.3d 

222, 226 (D.C. 2020).

We do not understand Ms. Walker to make a due process-notice challenge to 

her removal.

9

 Rather, she asserts she should have been granted a full evidentiary 

 9 Ms. Walker does make a regulatory argument that she was “never provided 

a meaningful pre-termination opportunity to respond to the charges against her 

because the grounds for termination in the Mayor’s advance notice of intent to 

remove differed from the grounds for termination in the Mayor’s final termination 

letter,” as required by 6-B D.C.M.R. § 907.3, highlighting that only five findings of 

good cause were listed in the Advance Notice while nine were listed in the Final 

Notice. Ms. Walker did not make this argument before the OEA and as discussed 

above, we see no material variation between the two notices. In any event 

Ms. Walker has never argued that she did not have specific notice that the Mayor 

was considering her removal due to her violation of Chapter V(D) and (P) of the 

Ethics Code for OAH Administrative Law Judges. 
13

hearing pre-termination, and second, that the Mayor violated the maxim of “[t]he 

one who decides must hear,” Feldman v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 160 A.2d 100, 102 (D.C. 

1960) (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)), by not 

personally considering her written response. Like the OEA, we disagree.

As for Ms. Walker’s first argument, the OEA rightly concluded that 

Ms. Walker had “not present[ed] any credible binding case or statu[t]e that mandates 

that her [evidentiary] hearing occur before her removal was effectuated.” 

Ms. Walker’s reliance on Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 

(1985), is misplaced. Loudermill analyzed the process due to a public employee 

who, by statute, could only be terminated for cause and had a right to appeal his 

decision and receive a “full post-termination hearing.” 470 U.S. at 535, 546. After 

conducting the requisite “balancing of the competing interests at stake” under 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the court concluded that a full 

evidentiary hearing, pre-termination, was not needed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 

545 (holding that a “‘hearing,’ though necessary, need not be elaborate”). Instead, 

at that juncture, the employee need only be accorded “an opportunity to present 

[their] side of the story,” “either in person or in writing.” Id. at 546. 

Ms. Walker received an opportunity “to present [her] side of the story” before 
14

she was removed from office. Id. In his February 7, 2014, Advance Notice, the 

Mayor invited her to “respond in writing.” She did so, on February 20, 2014, 

submitting a twenty-page response with 186 pages of exhibits. (Although she asked

the Mayor to postpone his decision until BEGA and other proceedings had 

concluded, she did not request an evidentiary hearing at that time.

10) On such 

analogous facts to Loudermill, Ms. Walker received all the “process [she was] due.” 

Id. at 541. 

We are unpersuaded by Ms. Walker’s citation to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 

254 (1970), a case decided pre-Loudermill, entitling public assistance recipients to 

an evidentiary hearing before those benefits are terminated. Ms. Walker asserts 

Goldberg supports her claim that when “credibility and veracity are at 

issue . . . written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.” Id. at 

269. While termination of employment undeniably has a profound effect on 

someone’s life, the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg was focused on the 

distinct and dire situation that someone reliant on public benefits, by definition lowincome and often already without employment, would face if those benefits were 

 10 Ms. Walker made her request for an evidentiary hearing three months later, 

on May 12, 2014, after she learned that the Mayor had set a May 14, 2014, deadline 

to proceed with his removal decision. 
15

unjustly terminated, and the Court specifically distinguished this scenario from that 

of “the discharged government employee,” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, which it 

subsequently addressed in Loudermill. See 470 U.S. at 545 (noting that Goldberg

was the only case in which “the Court [had] required a full adversarial evidentiary 

hearing prior to adverse governmental action” and explaining that “that case 

presented significantly different considerations than are present in the context of 

public employment”).

We are likewise unpersuaded by Ms. Walker’s argument that her liberty 

interest in clearing her name gave her a due process right to a pre-termination 

evidentiary hearing under Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 

(1972). Ms. Walker fails to explain how Board of Regents, which held an untenured 

professor did not have a due process right to a pre-termination hearing, id. at 578, 

supports her argument. Nor does she reconcile her argument with the Supreme 

Court’s express consideration of this concern in Loudermill, when it analyzed the 

process due to a government employee in Ms. Walker’s circumstances. The Court 

acknowledged that a terminated employee seeking new employment “is likely to be 

burdened by the questionable circumstances under which [an employee] left [their] 

previous job,” 470 U.S. at 543; nonetheless the Court held in Loudermill that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was not required as a matter of due process. Id. at 
16

547-48.

Alternatively, Ms. Walker argues that she was deprived of a meaningful

opportunity to be heard prior to her removal because the Mayor testified that he did 

not personally review her written response to the Advance Notice, nor the evidence 

supporting it. Ms. Walker argues that the Mayor violated the principle that “[t]he 

one who decides must hear,” Feldman, 160 A.2d at 102 (quoting Morgan, 298 U.S. 

at 468). She further relies on D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) (2014), which specifies 

that the Chief ALJ of OAH can be terminated only upon a “written finding of the 

Mayor.” Id. (emphasis added). 

We affirm the OEA’s conclusion that the Mayor was empowered to reach 

decisions using his staff and without delving into the “minutiae of work necessary 

to effectively carry out every policy and procedure necessary for good 

governance.”11 Although the Mayor was statutorily obligated to make the final 

decision to remove Ms. Walker from office, see id., he was also statutorily 

authorized to make broad delegations of power in coming to that decision, see D.C. 

Code § 1-204.22(6) (2014). And it is wholly within the bounds of due process for a 

 11 The OEA came to this conclusion in assessing Ms. Walker’s due process 

arguments and did not explicitly reference D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) in this 

context. But we conclude the same rationale governs.
17

statutorily obligated decision maker to delegate the review and interpretation of 

evidence to staff and rely on those staff members to inform their final decision. See 

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1967)12

(“It is well settled that . . . an administrative officer may rely on subordinates to sift 

and analyze the record and prepare summaries and confidential recommendations, 

and the officer may base his decision on these reports without reading the full 

transcript.”); Feldman, 160 A.2d at 102 (noting that it does not violate due process 

for a “hearing officer . . . [to] submit[] a report to a superior board or agency for its 

decision”); see also Morgan, 298 U.S. at 481 (explaining that “[e]vidence may be 

taken . . . [and] sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates”); S. Garment Mfrs. 

Ass’n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (“Realism negatives the idea 

that a subordinate is to exercise no intelligence . . . .”). 

Thus it is immaterial that the Mayor did not personally review Ms. Walker’s 

written submission or her exhibits, as his role in “consider[ing] and apprais[ing]” the 

evidence, Feldman 160 A.2d at 102, did not require such a personal review. Instead

it was sufficient that (1) the Mayor’s general counsel and other staff reviewed these

 12 Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit prior to February

1, 1971, are binding on this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). 
18

materials, conducted additional investigation, and prepared for his review and 

approval of a Final Notice13 that referenced Ms. Walker’s response,

14 and that (2) the 

Mayor, contrary to the representations made by Ms. Walker’s counsel at oral 

argument, in fact approved and signed the letter.

15

IV. Consideration of the Douglas Factors in Determining Whether Removal 

of Ms. Walker from Office Was Justified

Lastly, Ms. Walker argues that the Mayor’s decision to remove her was 

arbitrary and capricious because he concededly did not consider the Douglas factors. 

 13 Ms. Walker highlights the fact that Mr. Flowers admitted that he did not 

draft good cause findings seven through nine in the Final Notice (when the Mayor 

repackaged the five bases for termination for good cause as nine specific violations 

of ethics law, regulations, or codes). But given that we have concluded that we only 

need to look to the Mayor’s determination that good cause existed to remove 

Ms. Walker based on her violation of the Code of Ethics for ALJs—number five in 

this list of nine—this admission cannot give rise to reversible error. 

14 Given our assessment that the Final Notice and the Advance Notice were 

not materially different in detailing the Mayor’s good cause findings, see supra note 

9, we agree with Ms. Walker that the OEA was wrong to conclude that Ms. Walker 

had actually persuaded the Mayor not to rely on certain findings listed in the 

Advance Notice. 

15 Hodges v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 M.S.P.R. 591 (M.S.P.B. 2012), which is 

not binding authority on this court, is not to the contrary, as Ms. Walker claims. See 

id. 593-94 (holding that due process was violated when the only official involved in 

the decision did not consider the employee’s response).
19

See supra note 6. The OEA concluded that these factors do not apply to Ms. Walker 

because her position as the Chief ALJ of OAH is designated “excepted service,” see

D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(9) (designating the Chief ALJ of OAH as excepted service), 

and under the D.C.M.R., the Douglas factors do not apply to individuals in excepted 

service positions, 6B D.C.M.R. § 1600.2(f) (excluding excepted service positions 

from the career and educational service regulations); id. § 1606.2 (requiring Douglas 

factor consideration only for the career and education service). We assume without 

deciding that the Douglas factors do apply to Ms. Walker and affirm the OEA’s 

ruling uphold the Mayor’s decision to remove Ms. Walker as the Chief ALJ of OAH.

 In Stokes v. District of Columbia, 502 A.2d 1006 (D.C. 1985), this court 

affirmed a Superior Court decision ruling that the OEA had overstepped its bounds 

in reinstating a career service employee to his job. 502 A.2d at 1007. Explaining 

that the OEA’s job was “like that of its federal counterpart, the Merit Systems 

Protection Board, . . . simply to ensure that managerial discretion has been 

legitimately invoked and properly exercised,” “not to substitute its judgment for that 

of the agency,” this court endorsed the OEA’s decision in an earlier case to be 

“guided” in its review of agency decision-making by the Douglas factors. Id. at 

1010-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the cases cited by Ms. Walker 

reflect, the Douglas factor analysis is a tool for the OEA and this court to ensure an 
20

agency’s decision to sanction or terminate an employee is well-grounded.16 See, 

e.g., Love, 90 A.3d at 417 n.10 (explaining that in Stokes, this court “essentially 

adopted Douglas to aid our review of employment terminations, reviewed by [the] 

OEA”); D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 88 A.3d 724, 730 

n.3 (D.C. 2014) (“There is no requirement that an agency articulate its Douglas

analysis before terminating an employee.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we 

reject Ms. Walker’s argument that the Mayor was required to engage in an analysis 

of the Douglas factors. At most, the Mayor was simply required to reach a decision 

that could survive a Douglas factor review by the OEA. 

Furthermore, although the OEA determined (correctly) that the Mayor “was 

not required to perform an explicit Douglas Factor analysis” it then determined that 

had a Douglas factor analysis been performed[,] it is likely 

that Douglas Factors 1 [the nature and seriousness of the 

offense and its relation to the employee’s duties, including 

whether the offense was intentional or technical or 

inadvertent, or was committed intentionally or maliciously 

for gain, or was frequently repeated], 2 [the employee’s 

job level and type of employment, including supervisory 

or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence 

of the position], 5 [the effect of the offense on the 

employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its 

effect on supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability 

 16 We have never held that Douglas applies to members of the excepted 

service, and all the cases Ms. Walker cites in her briefs to this court involve career 

service employees. 
21

to perform assigned duties], 8 [the notoriety of the offence 

or its impact on the reputation of the agency] and 9 [the 

clarify with which the employee was on notice of any rules 

that were violated in committing the offense, or had been 

warned about the conduct in question] would have been 

aggravating factors in her removal analysis.

Ms. Walker has not challenged the OEA’s assessment of these Douglas factors (or 

identified factors that the OEA should have but failed to consider).

17 Even if she 

had, we would see no basis to reverse on this record. 

As explained above, the Mayor determined there was good cause to remove

Ms. Walker from her office as the chief jurist for the Office of Administrative 

Hearings, because she had violated the Code of Ethics for the Administrative Law 

Judges. Subsequent to that determination Ms. Walker entered into a negotiated 

disposition with BEGA, in which she admitted to multiple charges of ethical 

wrongdoing. Specifically she admitted that she had violated the District Code of 

Conduct, D.C. Code § 1-1162.23(a), regarding conflicts of interest, and had violated 

provisions of the District Personnel Manual, DPM §§ 1800.3, 1803.1(a)(2), based 

on (1) her “private business and financial relationship” with Ms. Oden that existed 

at the time Ms. Walker hired Ms. Oden and continued thereafter while she 

 17 Even as to the Mayor, Ms. Walker has never explained how an analysis of 

the Douglas factors would have led to a different outcome; she only posits that his 

failure to consider them was in itself arbitrary and capricious.
22

“supervised and was a superior to” Ms. Oden, and (2) her failure to disclose to DGS 

her “social relationship” with Lincoln Tyson or her knowledge of his relationship 

with Ms. Oden. Ms. Walker agreed to a $20,000 fine in return for BEGA dismissing 

the remaining ethics charges against her, and expressly conceded that the Negotiated 

Discipline is “not just an admission but constitutes various factual admissions by 

her” that could be used in any future efforts to enforce the agreement.18 Based on 

these facts, we agree that the Douglas factors the OEA identified supported 

Ms. Walker’s removal. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

So ordered.

 18 Based on this language, we reject Ms. Walker’s argument that the 

Negotiated Disposition cannot be construed as an admission and was only a 

“settlement agreement that [she] entered into to resolve the baseless allegations 

levied against her by BEGA.”