IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

AUGUST 5, 2004 Session

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

 LIZZIE TOMLIN DAUGHRITY, DECEASED 

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Marshall County

No. 12506 J. B. Cox, Chancellor

No. M2003-02244-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 16, 2004

This case involves a claim filed by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare against the estate of an elderly

decedent to recover certain benefits paid to the decedent to cover nursing home expenses during her

lifetime. The executor filed an exception to the claim arguing that it was filed outside the four (4)

month limitations period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code. The

chancery court issued an order barring the bureau’s claim on the grounds that is was untimely filed.

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and

Remanded

ALAN E.HIGHERS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W.FRANK CRAWFORD,P.J.,W.S.,

and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter, Sue A. Sheldon, Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN,

for Appellant, Bureau of TennCare

Cecilia West Spivy, Lewisburg, TN, for Appellee, The Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity

OPINION

Factual Background and Procedural History 

On December 30, 1998, Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity (“Decedent”) enrolled in the Tennessee

TennCare program administered by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare (“Bureau”). Beginning

January 1, 1999, the Bureau began making payments on behalf of Decedent to NHC HealthcareLewisburg, a nursing home facility. Decedent died on July 30, 2002, at the age of 89 with

accumulated benefits paid on her behalf to the nursing facility up to that point in the amount of

$97,870.91. 
 Section 30-2-306(d) of the Tennessee Code provides:

1

An affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper, in case of such publication, showing

the dates on which the notice was published, or of the personal representative, in

case of posted notices, showing the date on which the notice was first posted, shall

be prima facie evidence of the publication required by this section. The affidavit

shall be filed with the clerk and be noted by the clerk on the docket of the cause. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306(d) (2003). 

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On September 10, 2002, Decedent’s son, Charles Richard Daughrity (“Executor”), filed a

Petition to Probate Will in the Chancery Court of Marshall County, Tennessee. On September 11,

2002, the chancellor entered an order admitting Decedent’s will to probate and appointing Executor

to oversee the administration of the estate. On March 25, 2003, the Bureau filed a claim against

Decedent’s estate, pursuant to section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee Code and applicable federal

Medicaid statutes, seeking reimbursement of the benefits correctly paid to the nursing facility on

Decedent’s behalf. On April 25, 2003, Executor filed an exception to the Bureau’s claim alleging

that the claim was not filed within the four (4) month period allowed for the filing of claims under

section 30-2-306(c) of the Tennessee Code. Executor also asserted that the Bureau received actual

notice to file a claim on September 16, 2002. 

The chancellor conducted a hearing on July 2, 2003, to address the Bureau’s claim. On the

day of the hearing, the Executor filed a copy of the Actual Notice to Creditors along with an attached

certificate of service, as well as a copy of the published Notice to Creditors. The Actual Notice to

Creditors indicated that it had been mailed to the Bureau on September 14, 2002, and the certificate

of service showed that it was accepted by an employee of the Bureau on September 16, 2002. The

published Notice to Creditors indicated that it was issued on September 17, 2002. The bookkeeper

for The Lewisburg Tribune Marshall Gazette provided a Publisher’s Affidavit which showed that 1

the Notice to Creditors was published in their newspaper on September 17 and 24, 2002. 

The chancellor issued an order on August 13, 2003, which contained the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law:

This matter came to be heard on the 2nd day of July, 2003

before the Honorable J.B. Cox upon the Exception to Claim filed by

the Executor of the Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, statements of

counsel and the record as a whole. From which the Court finds that

Actual Notice to the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare was

received by the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare on the 16th

day of September, 2002 and the State of Tennessee, Bureau of

TennCare filed it’s [sic] Claim on March 27th, 2003. The State’s

assertion of sovereignty is limited by its own action. The State’s

action to be bound by the one (1) year barr [sic] to claims should by

the same choice impose the conditions of T.C.A. § 30-2-310 upon the

State. For these reasons the Court finds that the claim of the State of

Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare is barred by T.C.A. § 30-2-310. 
 Section 30-2-315(b), governing the appeal of a probate court’s ruling on a disputed claim, provides:

2

(b) A judgment upon the findings of the court shall be entered in the court and from

the same an appeal may be perfected within thirty (30) days from the date of entry

of the judgment, to the court of appeals or the supreme court, as the case may be.

The procedure on appeal shall be governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-315(b) (2003). 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare is

enjoined from denying a release as required by law and shall issue a

release to this Estate. 

The Bureau filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to section 30-2-315(b) of the

Tennessee Code, presenting the following issues for our review: 2

I. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the statutory four (4) month limitations period

found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code upon the Bureau’s

claim; and 

II. Alternatively, if the four (4) month limitations period does apply to the Bureau’s claim,

whether this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to clarify whether

the Bureau received actual notice according to the governing law given the facial irregularity

of the notices supplied to creditors. 

For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Standard of Review 

In reviewing the judgment of the chancery court, we are bound by the following standard 

of review:

This case was tried in the probate court without a jury. Accordingly,

the standard of review is de novo upon the record with a presumption

of correctness as to the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of

the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Cross v. City of

Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642, 644–45 (Tenn. 2000). To the extent that

the determination of the issues rests on statutory construction, they

present questions of law. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920,

924 (Tenn.1998). Questions of law are reviewed de novo with no

presumption of correctness. Id. 

Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). 
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Bureau’s Ability to File a Claim Against Decedent’s Estate

In order to properly analyze the applicability of the four (4) month limitations period found

in Title 30 of the Tennessee Code, it is necessary to discuss the process by which the Bureau is

seeking recovery of benefits paid to Decedent. The Bureau is required by both state and federal law

to seek recovery of benefits paid to Decedent under the facts presented in this case. 

The Medicaid program was created in 1965, when Congress

added Title XIX to the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), for the purpose of

providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to

reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.

Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional,

once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the

requirements of Title XIX. 

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). A state wishing to participate in the federal Medicaid

program must establish a state plan for medical assistance which “provide[s] for the establishment

or designation of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan.”

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2003). 

Tennessee chose to participate in the federal Medicaid program when the legislature

promulgated the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act of 1968. Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-101 (2003).

Accordingly, Tennessee is required to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a which mandates that

participating states must “comply with the provisions of section 1917 [42 USCS § 1396p] with

respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets,

and treatment of certain trusts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2003). Section 1396p provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfer of assets.

. . . .

(b) Adjustment or recoveryof medical assistance correctly paid under

a State plan.

(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly

paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made,

except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical

assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State

plan in the case of the following individuals:

. . . . 
 Recovery of “incorrectly-paid” benefits is governed by a separate statute which is not at issue in this case.

3

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117 (2003). 

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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older

when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall

seek adjustment or recovery from the individual’s estate, but only for

medical assistance consisting of — 

(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and

related hospital and prescription drug services, or

(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State

plan.

. . . . 

(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made

only after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and

only at a time — 

(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with

respect to States eligible to participate in the State program

established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or

permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are

not eligible to participate in such program) is blind or disabled as

defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c]; and 

. . . .

(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with

standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall

waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph (1)(C))

if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on

the basis of criteria established by the Secretary. 

42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2003). Congress amended the Medicaid Act in 1993 to require, not just permit,

states to seek recovery of medical costs from the estates of certain deceased beneficiaries to combat

rising costs and perceived abuses. State v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 284

(4th Cir. 2002). 

Section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act governs the recovery of

“correctly-paid” TennCare benefits from the estates of deceased TennCare recipients. The Bureau

3

files claims for recovery of these benefits against estates pursuant to section 71-5-116(c), which

provides:
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(c) There shall be no adjustment or recovery of any payment for

medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of any individual under

this part, except in the case of an individual who was fifty-five (55)

years of age or older when such individual received such medical

assistance or services, from such individual’s estate, and then only

after the death ofsuch individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only

at a time when such individual has no surviving child who is under

eighteen (18) years of age or who is blind or permanently and totally

disabled.

(1) To facilitate and enhance compliance with this subsection (c), the

department of health shall promptly notify the bureau of TennCare,

in a format to be specified by the bureau, of the death of any

individual fifty-five (55) years of age or older. Such notification shall

include the decedent’s name, date of birth, and social security

number. It is the legislative intent of this subsection (c) that the

bureau of TennCare strive vigorously to recoup any TennCare funds

expended for a decedent after the date of death.

(2) Before any probate estate may be closed pursuant to title 30, with

respect to a decedent who, at the time of death, was enrolled in the

TennCare program, the personal representative of the estate shall file

with the clerk of the court exercising probate jurisdiction a release

from the bureau of TennCare evidencing payment of all medical

assistance benefits, premiums, or other such costs due from the estate

under law, unless waived by the bureau. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116 (2003). 

Statute of Limitations Applicable to Bureau’s Claim

The Bureau correctly points out that there are two limitations periods which apply to

creditor’s claims under Tennessee’s probate law. See In re Estate of Jenkins v. Guyton, 912 S.W.2d

134, 135 (Tenn. 1995). First, section 30-2-210(b) provides as follows: 

Limitations on time of filing claims.

. . . .

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), all claims and

demands not filed by the State of Tennessee with the probate court

clerk, as required by the provisions of §§ 30-2-306 – 30-2-309, or, if

later, in which suit shall not have been brought or revived before the

end of twelve (12) months from the date of death of the decedent,

shall be forever barred. This statute of limitations shall not apply to
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claims for state taxes. Such claims shall continue to be governed by

Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 67-1-1501.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) (2003) (emphasis added). Decedent died on July 30, 2002, and the

Bureau filed its claim with the probate court on March 27, 2003. The Bureau’s claim, therefore, was

filed well within the twelve (12) month limitations period. 

Second,sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307, which are at issue in this case, combine to establish

a four (4) month limitations period applicable to creditor’s claims. See In re Estate of Jenkins, 912

S.W.2d at 135–36. Section 30-2-306 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Notice to creditors of qualification of personal representative.

. . . . 

(c) The notice shall be substantially in the following form:

NOTICE TO CREDITORS

Estate of ____________________________(name of deceased)

Notice is hereby given that on the _____ day of

____________, 20____ letters testamentary (or of administration as

the case may be) in respect of the estate of

________________________ (name of deceased) were issued to the

undersigned by the _________________ Court of ______________

County, Tennessee. All persons, resident and nonresident, having

claims, matured and unmatured, against the estate are required to

file the same with the clerk of the above named court within four (4)

months from the date of the first publication (or of the posting, as the

case may be) of this notice, otherwise their claims will be forever

barred.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306 (2003) (emphasis added). Section 30-2-307 provides, in relevant

part, as follows:

Claims against estate — filing.

(a)(1) All claims against the estate arising from a debt of the decedent

shall be barred unless filed within the period prescribed in the notice

published or posted in accordance with § 30-2-306(c).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307(a)(1) (2003). The Bureau concedes that it did not file its claim within

four months of September 17, 2002, the date of the first publication of the Notice to Creditors in the

local newspaper. 
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The Bureau argues, however, that the statutes establishing a four (4) month limitations period

for filing claims against the estate do not apply to a state agency acting in a sovereign governmental

capacity. The Bureau asserts that recovery of TennCare benefits in this instance is a governmental

function, and when the state is acting in such a capacity it is not barred by any statutes of limitations

unless the legislature expressly provides that a particular limitations period applies to actions brought

by the state. We agree.

The courts of this state have consistently held that, when the State of Tennessee, acting

through its various departments, files a claim in a governmental capacity, statutes of limitations do

not bar the state’s claim absent an express legislative directive to the contrary. 

The common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi,

which is literally translated as “time does not run against the king,”

prevents an action brought by the State from being dismissed due to

the expiration of the statutory period of limitations normally

applicable to the specific type of action. This doctrine has been

justified on the ground “that the public should not suffer because of

the negligence of its officers and agents . . .” State ex rel. Board of

University & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir.

1982). . . . This doctrine is not to be lightly regarded, as we have

repeatedly stated that statutes of limitations are looked upon with

disfavor in actions brought by the State, and will not be enforced in

the absence of clear and explicit statutory authority to do so. Dunn

v. W.F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn. 1978);

Anderson v. Security Mills, 175 Tenn. 197, 133 S.W.2d 478 (1939).

Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. v. Asbestospray Corp., 909 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tenn. 1995); see also

In re Estate of Darwin, 503 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1973); Jennings v. Davidson County, 344

S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tenn. 1961); Dossett v. Obion County, 221 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tenn. 1949);

Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, 156 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1940); Nelson v. Loudon County,

144 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn. 1940); In re Estate of Lacey, No. W2002-01230-COA-R3-CV, 2003

Tenn. App. LEXIS 505, at *17–19 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2003); Milhous v. Metro. Gov’t of

Nashville, No. M1997-00226-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589, at *6 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Aug. 31, 2000); Knox County v. Perceptics Corp., No. 03A01-9803-CH-00089, 1998 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 656, at *9–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1998); Wood v. Cannon County, 166 S.W.2d 399,

401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942).

Executor asserts that, in seeking a recovery of benefits from Decedent’s estate, the Bureau

is acting in a proprietary, not a governmental, function. Accordingly, Executor argues that the

Bureau is required to file a claim for correctly paid benefits within the four (4) month period set forth

in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a). 
-9-

The statute of limitations does not run against the sovereign

or the state, or against a county, when seeking to enforce a demand

arising out of, or dependent upon, the exercise of its governmental

functions as an arm of the state. But the statute does run against a

county or municipality in respect of its claims or rights which are of

a private or corporate nature and in which only its local citizens are

interested, as distinguished from a public or governmental matter in

which all the people of the state are interested. 

Wood, 166 S.W.2d at 401 (citations omitted). Executor contends that the Bureau is operating the

TennCare program as a state run insurance company accepting premiums and providing coverage

to not only those in financial need, but also to those who cannot obtain private insurance coverage

for whatever reasons. 

The legislature set forth the purpose behind the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act, in

relevant part, as follows:

(a) The purpose of this part is to make possible medical assistance to

those recipients determined to be eligible under this chapter to receive

medical assistance that conforms to requirements of Title XIX of the

Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title

XIX. 

(b) (1) Except as may be required by federal law or regulation, it is

hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Tennessee that

participation in the TennCare program, or its successor programs, is

not an entitlement and is conditional upon, among other things,

specific appropriations for the program. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-102 (2003). As an extension of the Medicaid program, TennCare is

designed to meet the policy goal of Medicaid; providing medical treatment to those in need. See

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). “The authorities over the country generally, however,

are practically unanimous in holding that in providing for the poor the state is exercising a

governmental function. . . .” Jennings v. Davidson County, 344 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1961).

Therefore, we find that the Bureau was carrying out a governmental function when it filed a claim

against Decedent’s estate seeking to recover benefits paid on Decedent’s behalf. 

Having determined that the filing of a claim for the recovery of benefits pursuant to section

71-5-116(c) of the Tennessee Code constitutes a governmental function, we now examine whether

the four (4) month limitation period set forth in sections 30-2-306(c) and 32-3-307(a) of the

Tennessee Code applies to that claim. Upon carefully reading these statutes, it is clear that the

legislature did not expressly mention their applicability to claims filed by the State of Tennessee. 
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The supreme court addressed a similar issue as the one before this Court in State Department

of Public Welfare v. O’Brien, 292 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1956). In O’Brien, the department filed a

claim against the estate of a deceased elderly female seeking to recover benefits paid under the Old

Age Assistance Law, the precursor to the Medical Assistance Act. Id. at 733. The department filed

its claim more than nine months after the notice to creditor’s was given, well beyond the limitation

period in the statute existing at the time. Id. at 733–34. Finding that the statute of limitations for

filing claims did not apply to the state in that instance, the court stated:

Commerce UnionBank v. Gillespie, supra, held that the claim

of the sovereign state for taxes and assessments was exempt from that

provision of the statute barring claims against the estate of decedent

which are not filed within the time limited by that statute, (nine

months now) Section 30-513, T.C.A. One of the reasons given by the

Court was that this exemption of the sovereign existed because of

“the general rule that the sovereign is not within the limitation [of a

statute of limitation], unless expressly so provided.” This is the

common law rule. 

State v. Smith, 194 Tenn. 582, 585–587, 253 S.W. 2d 758,

760, held that the claim of the State for moneys paid under the Old

Age Assistance Law, as it then existed, was a claim owed to the State

in its sovereign capacity, and that there was nothing in the Old Age

Assistance Law “which evinces any intention of the Legislature to

divest the State of any of its prerogatives, rights or remedies.” 

One of such rights is to have its claims exempt from statutes

of limitations, except when it is expressly embraced within the

limitations provided by the statute. Hence, under the aforestated

ruling in State v. Smith, the claim of the sovereign against the

decedent’s estate for moneys furnished such decedent under the Old

Age Assistance Law is not barred by that provision of the

administration of estates statute barring claims which were not filed

within the time therein specified. Section 30-513, T.C.A. 

Further, this Court is unable to find any distinction in quality

between the claim owed the State for payments in its sovereign

capacity from its taxes to aid indigent persons, and the claim of the

State for taxes and assessments owed it. If, therefore, the provision

in the administration of estate statute barring claims which have not

been filed within the time provided by the statute does not apply to

the claim of the sovereign for taxes owed it because of the rule stated

in Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, surpa, then for the same

reason, that statute does not bar the claim of the sovereign against the

estate of the decedent for payments made such decedent under and by

virtue of the Old Age Assistance Law.
 The chancellor’s order relied on section 30-2-310 to find that the Bureau’s claim was time barred. The 4

chancellor was apparently relying on the language in subsection (b), where the legislature expressly made the twelve (12)

month limitations period applicable to the state, to justify finding that the four month limitations period found in sections

30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) applied to the state as well. See 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 970, §1. We find the chancellor’s

reasoning in this regard to be misguided. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislative

intent, with all the rules of construction being aides to that end.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998)

(citing Locust v. State, 912 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). When examining a statute to glean legislative

intent, we “are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature in the statute.” Id.

(citing Austin v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983)). We also presume that the Tennessee General

Assembly was aware of the existing state of the law when it promulgated the 2000 Amendment. See Winter v. Smith,

914 S.W.2d 527, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1994)).

Our reading of Tennessee Code section 30-2-310, in conjunction with sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307, reveals that the

legislature chose to make only the twelve (12) month limitations period applicable to claims filed by the state while

withholding application of the four (4) month limitations period to such claims. 

-11-

Id. at 734; see also In re Estate of Darwin, 503 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1973). 

Executor directs our attention to the language in section 71-5-117 of the Tennessee Code,

governing recovery of incorrectly paid benefits, which provides that “[a]ny benefits incorrectly paid

shall be recoverable from the recipient, while living, as a debt due to the state and, upon the

recipient’s death, as a claim classified with taxes having preference under the laws of this state.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117(a) (2003). Executor notes that section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee

Code, governing recovery of correctly paid benefits, does not classify these benefits in the same

manner. Executor, however, has overlooked the fact that section 71-5-116, the statute both parties

agree is at issue in this case, provides as follows:

Before any probate estate may be closed pursuant to title 30, with

respect to a decedent who, at the time of death, was enrolled in the

TennCare program, the personal representative of the estate shall file

with the clerk of the court exercising probate jurisdiction a release

from the bureau of TennCare evidencing payment of all medical

assistance benefits, premiums, or other such costs due from the estate

under law, unless waived by the bureau. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). In addition, the legislative amendment

to section 30-2-310 expressly provides that “[t]his statute of limitations shall not apply to claims for

state taxes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) (2003). Similar language is conspicuously absent

from sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307 of the Tennessee Code. Therefore, we find Executor’s

argument in this regard to be without merit. 

After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that the four (4) month limitations

period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code is inapplicable to the

claim filed by the Bureau against Decedent’s estate. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s

ruling in this regard and remand with the instruction that the chancellor accept the Bureau’s claim 4
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as timely filed. Since we have determined that the Bureau’s claim is not subject to the four month

limitations period, it is unnecessary for us to address the Bureau’s alternative issue. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the chancery court’s ruling and remand this case to the

chancery court with the instruction to admit the Appellant’s claim as timely filed. Costs of this

appeal are taxed against the Appellee, the estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, for which execution

may issue if necessary. 

___________________________________ 

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE