12



### Presidential Authority t o Direct Departments and Agencies to Withhold Expenditures F rom

Appropriations Made

Neither t he Economy Act of 1933 nor any other statute authorize s the President to direct department s and agencies, either on a percentum basis or with reference to specific items, to withhold expend itures from appropriations made

.

In the absence of legislative sanction

, an executive order withhold ing expenditures from appropriations

made w ould not be binding on the disbursing officers in the event that a department head or other

authorized official should desire funds from the amount ordered to be withheld

. The President may request or direct the heads of the department s and agencies to attempt to effect such savings as may be possible without violation of a duty prescribed by law

.

May 27, 1937

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

My Dear Mr. President: I have the honor of referring to your memorandum of May 17, 1937, in which you inquire as to the scope of your authority to direct departments and a gencies, either on a percentum basis or with reference to specific items, “ to withhold expenditures from appropriations made. ” The statute to which you particularly refer is the Econo my Act of March 3, 1933 (47 S tat. 1513). I do not find in that Act

, or in any other

, authorization for the

President to direct the withholding of such expenditures. To answer your inquiry, it is, therefore, necessary to consider the extent, under

the Constitution, of the President ’ s powers over the various departments and agencies of government and the officers thereof. The scope of such powers, while long the subject of discussion, has not yet been absolutely defined, and perhaps is susceptible of del imitation only as particular powers are drawn into question. However, it seems quite clear that the Constitution conf ers on the Congress the

power to establish d epartments and agencies in the E xecutive B ranch of the

g overnment and to define the duties and functions of the officers who are to administer them; and that

, when the Congress has so done, the President, in the absence of legislative authority, has no legal power to interfere with the admi nistration of such departments or agencies

, further than to “ take C are that the Laws be faithfully executed. ” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Several opinions of the Attorneys General have pointed out that

, when a stat utory duty devolves primarily upon an officer other than the President, the latter ’ s sole obligation is to see that the officer performs such duty or to replace him.

Thus

, in The President and Accounting Officers , 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625

– 26 (18 23 ), Attorney General Wirt said:Presidential Authority to Direct Departments to Withhold Expenditures

13 The c onstitution of the United States requires the President, in general terms, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that is, it places the officers engaged in the execution of the laws under his general superintendence: he is to see that they do their duty fait hfully; and on their failure, to cause them to be displaced, prosecuted, or impeached, according to the nature of the case.

. . . But it could

never have been the intention of the constitution, in assigning this general power to the President to take care that the laws be executed, that he should in person execute the laws himself. For example: if a

marshal should either refuse to serve process altogether, or serve it irregularly, that the President should correct the irregularity, or supply the omission, by executing the process in person. To interpret

this clause of the constitution so as to throw upon the President the duty of a personal interference in every specific case of an alleged or defective execution of the laws, and to call upon him to perform such duties himself, would be not only to require him to perf orm an i mpossibility himself, but to take upon himself the responsibility of all

the subordinate executive officers of the government

— a construction too absurd to be seriously contended for. But the requisition of the constitution is, that he shall take ca re that the laws be executed. If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it without a violation of the law; and were the President to perform it, he would not only be not taking care that the laws were

faithful ly executed, but he would be vio lating them himself. The constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of particular officers: the President is only required to take ca re tha t they execute them faithfully.

. . . He is not to perform the duty, but to

see that the officer assign ed by law performs his duty fai thfully

— that is, honestly : not with perfect correctness of judgment, but honestly

.

In Power of the President Respecting Pension Cases

, 4 Op. A tt’y G en . 515,

516 (18 46 ) , Attorney General Mason, referring with approval to the opinion from which the above quotation is taken, said:

It is the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws

be faithfull y executed. But the constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of particular subordinate officers; and the President is to take care that they execute their duties fait hfully and honestly. He has the power of removal, but not the power of correcting, by his own official act, the errors of judgment of i ncompe tent or unfaithful subordinates.Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

14 The same conclusion is found in the words of Attorney General Miller, Eight

Hour Law

, 19 Op. A tt’y G en . 685, 686

– 87 (18 90 ) :

The President has, under the Constitution and laws, certain duties to perform, among these being to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that is, that the other executive and administrative officers of the Government faithfully perform their duties; but the statutes regulate and prescribe these duties, and he has no more power to add

to, or sub tract from, the duties imposed upon subordinate executive

and administrative officers by the law, than those officers have to

add or sub tract from his duties.

These vie ws ar e confirmed by the opinion of the Circuit Court in United States

v. Kendall

, 26 F. Cas. 702, 752, 754 (C.C. D.C. 1837 ) (No. 15,517)

, wherein the

court said:

In the United States, by the c onstitution, all offices are to “ be e stablished by law. ” The p res ident cannot appoint an officer to any o ffice not established by law. The legislature may prescribe the duties of the office, at the time of its creation, or from time to time, as ci rcumstances may require. If those duties are absolute and specific,

and no t, by law, made subject to the control or discretion of any s uperior officer, they must be performed, whether forbidden or no t, by any other officer. If there be no other officer who is, by law, specifically authorized to direct how the duties are to be pe rformed, the o fficer, whose duties are thus prescribed by law, is bound to execute them according to his own judgment. That judgment cannot lawfully be controlled by any other person. He is the officer, not of the p res ident who appoints him, but the office r of the sovereign power of the

nation. He is the officer of the United S tates, and so called in the

c onstitution, and in all the acts of c ongress which relate to such o fficers. He is responsible to the United States, and not to the p res ident, further than for his fidelity in the discharge of the duties of his office, unless the p resident is, by express law, authorized to assign him duties over and above those specially prescribed by the legisl ature . S uch an officer is the postmaster

- g eneral. As the head of an e xecutive department, he is bound, when required by the p resident, to give his opinion, in writing, upon any subject relating to the duties of

his office. The p resident, in the execution of his duty, to see that the

laws be faithfully exec uted, is boun d to see that the p ostmas ter

g eneral discharges, “ faithfully, ” the duties assigned to him by law;

but this does not authorize the p resident to direct him how he shall discharge them. In that respect, the p ostmaster

- g eneral must judgePresidential Authority to Direct Departments to Withhold Expenditures

15 for himself, and upon his own responsibility, not to the p resident, but to the United States, whose officer he is.

. . .

. . . .

The court, therefore, is confirmed in its opinion

, . . . that the

p ostmaster

- g enera l , in the faithful discharge of those duties which are prescribed by law, is not lawfully subject to the control of the

p res ident. The p resident ’ s power of controlling an officer in the e xercise of his official functions, is limited, we think, to those fun ctions which are by law to be exercised according to the will of the

p resident

. . . .

In affirming the decision of the lower court, the S upreme Court said:

The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of

an y other department

, except in the mode prescribed by the constit ution through the impeaching power. But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under the excl usive direction of the President. Such a principle, we apprehend, is

not, a nd certainly cannot be claimed by the President.

There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the dire ction of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that c o ngress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and pr otected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and respons ibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, a nd not to

the direction of the President.

Kendall v. United States , 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (18 38 ). As the Supreme Court said in United S tates v. Midwest Oil Co. , 236 U.S. 459,

505 (1 915 ) :

The Constit

ution does not confer upon him [ the President ] any po wer to enact laws or to suspend or repeal such as the Congress enacts.

Kendall v. United States , 12 Pet. 524, 613. The President ’ s powers are defined by the Constitution of the United States, and the Go vernment

. . . freely concedes the general proposition as to the lack of authority in the President to deal with the laws otherwise than to see that they are faithfully executed.Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

16 It appears to follow from these authorities that in the absence of legislative sanction an order by you withholding expenditures fr om appropriations made would not be binding on the disbursing officers in the event that a department head

or other authorized official should desire funds from the amount ordered to be withheld. Further doubt regarding the existence of the power to make s uch an

order arises from the fact that the power would in effect enable the President to

overcome the well

- settled rule that he may not veto items in appropriation bills. Opinions of the Attorney General indicate that p residential power over appr opriations must find its source in legislation. While there has apparently been no ruling on the particular point here presented, various Attorneys General in a long line of opinions have uniformly decided questions of p residential power over appropriations by refer ence to legislation to ascertain whether the power sought has been conferred upon the President by Congress. Authority of President to Reallot Unexpended Balances of Appropriations

, 32 Op. A tt’y G en . 359 ( 1920 ) ; Samoan Islands

—

Appropriation

, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 484 ( 1892 ) ; Transfers of Surplus of Appropriations , 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 273 (1850); Transfers of Surplus of Appropriations

, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 90 ( 1849 ) ; Transfers o f Appropriations for the

Naval Service , 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 310 (1844); Transfers of Appropri ations for the Navy Department

, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 266 ( 1843 ) ; T ransfers of Specific Appropri ations of House of Representatives to Contingent Fund

, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 442 ( 1839 )

. The opinions just cited clearly indicate, however, and there would appear to be

n o doubt, that Congress can validly authorize you to direct withholding of expenditures. Even in the absence of legislative authority, it is, of course, entirely legal for you in an endeavor to accomplish the desired ends to request or direct the

heads of t he departments and agencies to attempt to effect such savings as may be possible without violation of or interference with the proper performance of any duty prescribed by law.

HOMER S. CUMMINGS Attorney Genera l