The HONORABLE DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN, United S tates Circuit Judge for * the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. The HONORABLE E. RICHARD WEBBER, United States District Judge for 1 the Eastern District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-3712

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Darrell Regans, also known as * Eastern District of Missouri. Kevin Price, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: May 20, 1997 Filed: October 17, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, FRIEDMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. *

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. Darrell Regans appeals the 110-month s entence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a f irearm. Regans argues that the district court erred 1 in applying the four-level enhancement prescribed in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for-2-

possessing a firearm "in connection with another felony offense" sole ly because Regans was in possession of a small quantity of heroin at the time of his arrest. We affirm. The following facts are undisputed. Regans was a passenger in a c ar stopped for a traff ic violation. When Regans appeared to be concealing a weapon, the officer s conducte d a pat-down search and discovered a .22 caliber pistol in his waistband

. They ar rested Regans and brought him to the police station, where a further searc h uncovered .29 grams of heroin. Re gans said he possessed the heroin for personal use. Regans pleaded guilty in state court to possession of heroin, a felony charge, and was sentenced to two years probation. He th en pleaded guilty to this federal charge of being a felon in posse ssion of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His Presentence Investigation Report recommended a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5 ) because carrying the firearm along w ith the heroin warranted a finding that the firearm was poss essed "in connection with" the drug felony. Regans objected to tha t recommendation, arguing that he possessed only a small amount of heroin consistent with personal use, and there was no evidence "that the possession of the weapon and the poss ession of heroin are in connection with each other." The district cour t disagreed, finding that Regans "did possess a firearm in c onnection with another felony offense," and applied the four-level § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement. Reg ans's state court conviction was "another felony offense" for purposes o f § 2K2.1(b)(5). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.7). Thus, the only question i s whether he possessed the firear m "in connection with" that felony. The district court’s fi nding regarding Regans’s purpose in possessing the firearm is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Kissinger , 986 F.2d 1244, 1246 (8th Cir. 1993). The Guidelines do not attempt to define the term "i n connection with." Adopting an ordinary meaning approach, most circuits have concluded that the phrase "should be construed as equivalent to the 'in relation to' language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)."S mith also construed the term "use" in § 924(c)(1), and its construction wa s 2 overr uled in Bailey v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). The "use" issue decided in Bailey is not present here because U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), like § 2D1.1(b)(1) , applies if the we apon was possessed with the requisite connection to another offense, with out regard to use. See United States v. Imes , 80 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (9th Cir.) , vacated on other grounds , 91 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1996). -3- United States v. Spurgeon , 117 F.3d 641, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1997), and cases cited

. Equating the two is convenient because the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of "in relation to" in § 924(c)(1):
The phrase "in relation to" thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firear m must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug traffickin g crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident o r coincidence.

. . . Instead, the gun at least must "facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating," the drug trafficking offense.
Smith v. United States , 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993). 2 Regans argues the district court erred in finding t he requisite connection between the fir earm and his drug felony because the firearm was merely "coincidental" to hi s possession of heroin. We have frequently observed that a firearm is a "tool of the trade" for drug dealers; theref

ore, a factfinder may infer a connection when defendant carried a fire arm and a distribution quantity of illegal drugs. For example, in United States v. White , 81 F.3d 80, 82-83 (8th Cir. 1996), we affirmed an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction because de fendant carried a firearm while distributing crack cocaine. Similarly, w e affir med a § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement in United States v. Johnson , 60 F.3d 422 (8t h Cir. 1995), a case in which a drug dealer was arrested with a firearm, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in his home. We commented that a "weapon's physical proximit y to narcotics may be sufficient to provide the nexus required between the weapon and the drug charges." Id. at 423, quoting United States v. Gomez--4-

Arrellano , 5 F.3d 464, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1993). Accord United States v. Bur ke , 91 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 1996), applying U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Regans not es that the defendants in Johnson and these other cases were dru g dealers and argues it is wrong to infer a connection between the firearm and the drug felony whe n defendant carried a firearm along with only a small amount of drugs fo r personal use. We disagree. This enhancement a nd other Guidelines provisions such as § 2D1.1(b)(1) are b ased in part on the increased risk of violence whenever guns are in the possession of persons engaged in committing drug felonies. See United States v

. Condren , 18 F.3d 1190, 1195-98 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 856 (1994). When a firearm is carried during a drug offense, inc luding a possession-for-use offense, the drug felon has the ability to use the weapon in connection with his drug offense. Or, as the Fifth Circuit put it in explaining Condren , “Theft is a close and ever presen t pa rtner of illegal drugs.” United States v. Fadipe , 43 F.3d 993, 994 (5th Cir. 1995)

. The firearm may not be a "tool of the trade," because possession for use is not a "trade" like drug trafficking. But when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, th ere are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug of fense and dangerously embolden the offender. Thus, a finding of the requisit e connection in

this situation is consistent with the purpose of § 2K2.1(b)(5) and cannot be clearly erroneous except, perhaps, in the exceptional circumstance recognized i n Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1 -- if "it is clearly improbable that the weapon wa s con nected with the offense." No such improbability is apparent from this record

. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court must be affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.