alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                              5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED  STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOUND IN
THE  COMPANY'S  FORM 10K FOR THE YEAR 1997 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE  TO SUCH  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  AND IS  QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                                  <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                       JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                         SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                                    46,727
<SECURITIES>                                              71,148
<RECEIVABLES>                                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                               8,221
<INVENTORY>                                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         307,101
<PP&E>                                                     4,218
<DEPRECIATION>                                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           420,973
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    371,225
<BONDS>                                                   12,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                    0
<COMMON>                                                  26,085
<OTHER-SE>                                                11,663 <F1>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             420,973
<SALES>                                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                          36,451
<CGS>                                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          18,290
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           1,530
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        10,869
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            5,762
<INCOME-TAX>                                               2,109
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        3,653
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                               3,653
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                               1.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                               1.05
<FN>
<F1>INCLUDES UNREALIZED GAIN ON SECURITIES AFS OF 368
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Thomas D. Knapp v. Van Rensselaer W. Woolverton.

*Exceptions from, warranty*— Trespass *against grantee for destruction of wheat.*

Where the covenants of warranty in a deed of land are followed by the-clause “except all the wheat on the ground or land as above described ” the deed is not to be construed as reserving the wheat to the grantor, but as excepting it from the warranty.

A grantor cannot maintain trespass against his grantee for destroying the-wheat on the land, when the strict construction of the deed is merely to except the wheat from the covenants of warranty, but not to-reserve it.

Error to Ionia.

Submitted Oct. 25.

Decided Jan. 5.

Trespass. Defendant brings error.

Reversed.

*A. A. ElTAs*for plaintiff in error.

*A. B. Morse*for defendant in error.

Marston, J. -

This was an action of trespass *qu. cl. fr.y*commenced in justice’s court, notice being given that the title-to lands would arise and the cause certified to the circuit,. *293where trial was had and judgment rendered in favor of the jdaintiff.

The plaintiff in his declaration alleged that on the 1st day ■of June, 1880, and on divers other days, the defendant with force and arms the close of the plaintiff, describing the same, which premises the plaintiff claimed in fee, broke and ■entered, and with his feet and'with cattle, etc., trampled upon and destroyed the grass, wheat, etc., growing thereon.

It appeared on the trial that April 8th, 1880, the plaintiff by warranty deed conveyed a portion of the premises described in the declaration to defendant ICnapp. The deed was in the usual form with full covenants of warranty, followed by the clause, “ except all the wheat on the ground or land as above described.” In June, 18S0, Knapp’s cattle injured the wheat growing upon the premises so conveyed, •and the plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of the wheat under the exception referred to, brought the present action.

"We are of opinion that the present controversy may be ■disposed of in a very few words.

At the time of the alleged trespass the defendant was the ■owner of the lands upon which the wheat was growing, having obtained title thereto under a conveyance from the plaintiff after the wheat was sown. The clause referred to in the deed did not- amount to a reservation of the wheat. Looking at the instrument alone, the fair legal construction •of the clause quoted would indicate an exception of the wheat from the operation of the covenants, and we cannot .give it a construction more favorable than this in behalf of the grantor. The plaintiff therefore having parted with his right, title and interest in the land and crops growing thereon, •could not maintain the action, especially against the party who apparently was the rightful owner thereof.

The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.
Exhibit 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Real Estate  Fund
XVIII Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form 10-QSB  for
the  period ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on  the  date hereof  (the  "Report"),  the
undersigned, Robert P. Johnson, President of AEI Fund  Management
XVIII, Inc., the Managing General Partner of the Partnership, and
Patrick  W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer of AEI Fund Management
XVIII, Inc., each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Partnership.



			      /s/ Robert P. Johnson
                              Robert P. Johnson, President
                              AEI Fund Management XVIII, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              August 8, 2003




			      /s/ Patrick W. Keene
                              Patrick W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer
                              AEI Fund Management XVIII, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              August 8, 2003
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1573 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1573

 To require the Secretary of Education to accept certain documentation 
 from the Department of Defense as proof of employment for purposes of 
              the public service loan forgiveness program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 14, 2023

 Mr. Connolly introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require the Secretary of Education to accept certain documentation 
 from the Department of Defense as proof of employment for purposes of 
              the public service loan forgiveness program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPAYMENT PLAN FOR PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES.

    Section 455(m) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1087e) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(5) Treatment of certain documentation from the 
        department of defense.--In determining the eligibility of a 
        borrower for loan forgiveness under this subsection, the 
        Secretary of Education--
                    ``(A) shall accept a DD Form 214 submitted by the 
                borrower as proof of the borrower's employment in the 
                position indicated on such form during the time period 
                indicated on such form; and
                    ``(B) shall not require a borrower who submits a DD 
                Form 214 to submit a separate employment certification 
                form as proof of the borrower's employment in such 
                position during such time period.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30381

Summary Calendar

OKECHUKWU MUMMEE AMADI

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CRAIG ROBINSON; WES WILLIAMSON; JAMES HAYES; DEAN HOTH;

MARK JOHNS, 

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CV-1833

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Okechukwu Mummee Amadi, an immigration detainee, requests leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The district court dismissed Amadi’s

civil rights action, filed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for failure to state a claim, and it also

denied Amadi’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal. In order to obtain leave to

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 17, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-30381

2

proceed IFP, Amadi must show that he is a pauper, and he must raise a

nonfrivolous issue. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th

Cir. 1986).

Amadi argues in conclusory fashion that his complaint states a

constitutional claim. Amadi’s second amended complaint, however, contains no

allegations of personal involvement on the part of the only named defendant,

nor does the second amended complaint contain allegations of a causal

connection between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the claimed violation

of Amadi’s constitutional rights. Amadi fails to raise a nonfrivolous issue in his

appeal ofthe district court’s dismissal of his complaintfor failure to state a claim

on which relief could be granted. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007); Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Amadi’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Howard

v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, his request for leave

to proceed IFP is denied, and the appeal is dismissed. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

The district court’s dismissal of Amadi’s complaint and the dismissal of

this appeal as frivolous count as two strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). Amadi is

cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes under § 1915(g), he will not be

able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or

detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury. See § 1915(g).

IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          22,185
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             615
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                37,100
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    113,784
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         665,829
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           643,908
<LOANS>                                      2,571,582
<ALLOWANCE>                                     38,925
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,428,175
<DEPOSITS>                                   2,094,454
<SHORT-TERM>                                   830,813
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             61,078
<LONG-TERM>                                    248,135
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            66
<OTHER-SE>                                     193,629
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               3,428,175
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                139,167
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               37,365
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               176,532
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              74,712
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             118,602
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           57,930
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,851
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               (262)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 52,576
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,736
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       6,101
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,101
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.86
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.86
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    2.48
<LOANS-NON>                                     13,895
<LOANS-PAST>                                     1,152
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   647
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                43,014
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    6,204
<RECOVERIES>                                     1,015
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               38,925
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            38,925
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
Order entered October (8, 2012 

-. ~-·--- -·- -- -·- --

In The 

QCourt of appea~ 

--.~-----~--

jfiftb 11Bi~trirt of ~exa~ at 1JBalla~ 

No. 05-12-00234-CR 

No. 05-12-00235-CR 

No. 05-12-00236-CR 

No. 05-12-00237-CR 

No. 05-12-00238-CR 

No. 05-12-00239-CR 

ROBERT DOUGLAS GINTER, Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 199th District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 199-81522-10, 199-81898-10, 199-81899-10, 

199-81900-10, 199-81901-10, 199-8102-10 

ORDER 

The Court ORDERS court reporter Niki Garcia to file, within FWI'EEN DAYS of the 

date of this order, a supplemental record containing Defendant's Exhibit no. 1, CD of jail calls. 

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Niki 

Garcia, 207 Royal Oaks Place, Denton, Texas 76210, and to counsel for all parties. 

C)_JL~ DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE
#### J. V. Conn *v.*William Anderson, et al.

Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction—Parties—Pleading.

A creditor has the right to sue a debtor in the circuit court notwithstanding the pendency in bankruptcy against him, but it is the duty of the court to refuse to proceed to judgment until such proceeding shall terminate.

Parties — Pleading.

If the bankrupt court refuses the debtor a discharge, or if after’his discharge he fails to plead it, the plaintiff in the circuit court may take personal judgment against such bankrupt.

Jurisdiction.

The circuit court has no jurisdiction over the trustee in bankruptcy; where the trustee does not choose to assert his right in the state court he may have the action dismissed as to him.

APPEAL PROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT.

November 13, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Conn had the right to sue Anderson notwithstanding the pendency of the proceeding in bankruptcy. But as the petition suggests the existence of such proceedings, it is the duty of the court to refuse to proceed to judgment until they shall terminate. If the bankrupt court refused Anderson a discharge, or if, after obtaining a discharge, he shall fail to plead it, then the circuit court has the power to render a personal judgment against him. The circuit court also has the power to foreclose the mortgage. It is true, Conn may be enjoined from proceeding with his suit, by the bankrupt court, but even after that is done the jurisdiction of the state court remains. The bankrupt court may operate upon Conn, and compel him to suspend proceedings or to dismiss his suit, but it can not take away from the circuit court its jurisdiction in the premises.

*224
      *Craddock, Trabue, W. B. Winslow, for appellant.*

The only party over whom the circuit court has no jurisdiction is Harrison, the assignee. If he does not choose to assert his rights in the state tribunal, he may have the action dismissed as to him. It was proper to malee him a party, and thus give him an opportunity either to avail himself of the jurisdiction of the circuit court to obtain relief, or to apply to the bankrupt court, and compel Conn to come into that court and establish his debt, and enforce his mortgage.

The joint special demurrer as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court should have been overruled. The judgment dismissing appellant’s petition is *reversed*and the cause remanded with instruction to overrule the said demurrer. If Harrison so desires, the court should dismiss the action as to him.

Further proceedings will be had conformable to this opinion.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10322 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE CABALLERO, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas (3:94-CR-163-R) August 9, 1996 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * 

### Jose Caballero, a Texas state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence as violative of
the double jeopardy clause. Caballero maintains that he was twice punished in that1 _____ U.S. _____ (June 24, 1996), 1996 WL 340815, *14--*16.

2 Id. at *13.
2 

### a civil forfeiture of his automobile occurred prior to his sentencing.
Caballero’s c omplaint is foreclosed by the holding in the very recent decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Ursery , 1 

### reaffirming “our traditi onal understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” 2 

### The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, successor by merger to 

WACHOVIA BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE MYERS GROUP, INC., HARRY E. 

MYERS, III, and DAENA R. MYERS, 

 Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-567-CG-B 

CONSENT JUDGMENT

 This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint filed by plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, 

National Association, successor by merger to Wachovia Bank, National Association (“Plaintiff”) 

against the defendants The Myers Group, Inc., Harry E. Myers, III, and Daena R. Myers 

(collectively “Defendants”) on or about August 31, 2009, and the Joint Motion For Entry of 

Consent Judgment (the “Joint Motion”) filed by the parties. (Doc. 31) 

 Based upon the request of the parties, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby 

ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES that: 

 Judgment is hereby GRANTED in favor of Wells Fargo Bank National Association, 

successor by merger to Wachovia Bank, National Association, and against The Myers Group, 

Inc., Harry E. Myers, III, and Daena R. Myers, jointly and severally, in the amount of 

$1,962,279.83, plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $1,091.40, representing accrued 

interest from June 7, 2010 to the date hereof at the per diem rate of $218.28; and post-judgment 

interest at the rate of 0.36% pursuant to Title 28 § 1961. The parties are to bear their own costs. 

Case 1:09-cv-00567-CG-B Document 32 Filed 06/11/10 Page 1 of 2
2 

 Plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in 

executing and collecting on Consent Judgment. 

 This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purposes of handling any motions 

or other matters relating to the enforcement and collection of the Consent Judgment, and making 

an award of attorneys’ fees to the Plaintiff for its future collection costs, if any. 

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of June, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:09-cv-00567-CG-B Document 32 Filed 06/11/10 Page 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-10131

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DENNIS EARL McMAHAN

Defendant-Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas 

(3:98-CR-341-ALL-R)

 

March 4, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

We have benefited from able argument and briefs of counsel. We

are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in

detaining McMahan pending trial. 

AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARNOLD KNIGHT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0528-CG-M

) CRIMINAL NO. 07-00242-CG-M

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issue 

raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this 

Court. It is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 62) be DENIED and that this 

action be DISMISSED. It is further ORDERED that any certificate of appealability filed by 

Petitioner be DENIED as he is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of March, 2016.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cr-00242-CG-M Document 69 Filed 03/21/16 Page 1 of 1