i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 02 2- CV Adam E. SALAZAR , Appellant
v . Pauline Gar cia DI CK

EY , Fr ank Eug ene D ickey , Eliz abeth Rodrig uez Coronado, Roberto D. Ross, M.D., and SCI Texas Funer al Service s, I nc., Appellee s Fr om the 225th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI -02712 Honora ble Peter Saka i, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 27, 2010 AF F I RME D I

N PA RT, REV ERS ED AN D R EM AN DE D I N PA RT Adam E. Salazar a

ppeals fr om the trial court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt. We affirm in par t
and re ve rs e a nd

re ma nd in p art
. B ACKG ROUND S a l a z ar , r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f , s u e d h i s s t e p s i s t e r , P a

u l i n e D i c k e y, h e r

s p o u s e , F r an k

D i c k e y, her da ug hter, Elizabeth Rodrig uez Coronado, and her employ er, SC I Texas Fune ral Servic es, I nc.04

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- 2- (“SCI ”), a lleg ing that the y failed to inf orm him of the death of his f ather , J uan Salazar, in a

n eff ort to hide assets, destroy documents, and avoid an autopsy
. Salazar also sued Dr. Roberto D. Ross, the phy sician who sig ned Juan Salazar’s death cer tificate, alleg ing that Dr. Ros s had a duty to order a n autopsy
. Sala zar ’ s f

a th e r , Ju an , s u f

f e r e d f r o m d ia b e te s , h y p e r te n s io n , Pa

r k in s o n ’ s d is e a s e , and demen ti a. J uan Sa la zar

die d o n Jan

ua ry 17 , 2 00 5. Th a t da

y , A dam Sa la zar

wa s in fo rm e d b y

his stepsister, Pa

u li n e D ic k e y , th a t h is f

a th e r h a d d ie d
. O n Ja n u ar y 1 8 , 2 0 0 5 , Sa la za

r c o n ta c te d

the funer al hom e an d al l eges that he was told his fathe r’s body had alr eady

been e mbalmed. Salazar claims that he was not timely informed of his f ather ’s death due to an ef fort on the f

unera l home’s p artt o p r e v e n tana

u t o p s y an d

h i d e h i s f

a t h e r ’ s p r o p e rt y. Four months after Sala zar filed his lawsuit, Dr. Ros s moved for summary judgme nt, arg uing that Salazar’s c laims ag ainst him were ba rre d by the two-y ear statute of limitations for health ca re liability claims as provided in se ction 74.251 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code, and by Salazar’s fa ilure to provide notice of his claims as re quired by section 7 4
. 0 5 1 . Salazar filed a written re sponse, ar g uing that his claims wer e not hea lth care liability claims g overne d by

chapte r 74. The trial c ourt disag ree d with Salazar and g rante d Dr. Ross’s motion for summary judgme nt. Six months a fter Salazar filed his la wsuit, SCI filed a tra ditional and no-evide nce motion for
su m m ar y j u d g m e n t
. T h e r e m a i n i n g d e f e n d an t s , P a

u l i n e D i c k e y , F r an k

D i c k e y , an d

El iza be th Rodrigue z C oronado joined SCI ’s motion for su mma ry judgme nt. The trial cour

t gr anted the motion. Sa la zar no w a pp e a ls.04

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1 ... T h is m o tio n w a s b ro u g h t a fter S C I h a d filed s p e c ia l ex c e p tio n s a n d the trial c o u rt h a d o rd e re d S a la z a r to re p le a d
. 2 ... At t he end of hi s r es po ns e, Sal aza r at t ach es an “ af f i davi t ” i n whi ch he af

f i r ms t hat “ [ a] l l t he mat t er s r ef er r ed t o and co nt ai ned wi t hi n t hi s A f f i d avi t are wi t hi n m y p ers o nal know l ed ge and are t rue and co rr ect
. ” H o wever, t here are no f urt her s t at em ent s co nt ai ned i n t hi s af f i d avi t
. It a p p ears as t ho ugh S al azar m ay have b een at t em p t i ng t o m ake hi s ent i re re sp o n se into a n a ff

id a v it.

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SCI ’ S M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT SCI moved for a

traditional and no-e vidence summary judgme nt with respec t to five ca uses of a c tio n a rgua bly ra ise d b y

Sa la zar ’s thi rt

y -e ig ht p a g e pe tit ion : br e ach of fi du c iary du ty , c ivi l
c on sp ir a c y , n e g lig e nc e pe r s e , u n s p e c if ie d c la ims un de r t

he Con sti tut ion , a

nd a se c ur iti e s- ba se d c la ss
a c tio n. I n it s mo tio n, SCI

a rgue d th a t ( 1) Sa la zar , a ft e r be ing or de re d to re ple a d, fa ile d to state c la ims fo r br e a c h of fi du c iary du ty , civ il co ns pir a c y , ne g lig e nc e pe r s e , a nd any c on sti tut ion a l c la ims ; 1 ( 2 ) the re spective statutes of

limit ations barr ed his claims for c onspiracy and neg lige nce per se; (3) no evidenc e supported his c laims for bre ach of fi d u ci ar y duty , civil conspirac y , neg lige nce pe r se, or
a s ec u rities-base d class ac tion. SC I ’s motion was joined by Pauline Dickey , Fr ank Dicke y , and Eliz abeth Rodrig uez Coronado. S a l a z a rf i l e d a wr i t t en re s p o n s e to t h e mo t i o n , s t at i n g t h at al t h o u gh h e wa s n o t p u rs u i n g a class ac tion or a neg lige nce pe r se c laim, SC I had proper ly char acte rized his c laims. Salazar did not attach a ny supporting e vidence ; nor did his response a ddress SC I ’s ar guments in any meaning ful
w ay. 2 Salazar did not seek a continuance . On appe al, he a ppear s to co m p l ai n t h at (1) SCI ’s noevidenc e motion for summary judgme n t s h o uld not have bee n g rante d beca use discover

y had not been c ompleted; (2) t h e t ri al court should have spec ified the g rounds on which it was g ranting summary judgm en t ; (3) the tr ial court’s summar y judgme nt is a void judgment; and ( 4) “it is not enoug h to move for summary judgme nt without supporting the motion in any way .”04

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- 4- Firs t, w it h r e s p e c t t o h is ar g u me n t t h a t S CI ’ s n o - e v id e n c e mo ti o nf o r s u mm ar y ju d g me nt should not hav e bee n g rante d beca use discover

y had not y et bee n completed, Salazar did not preser

ve this complaint by

reque sting a

continuance in his res p onse to the summary judgme nt motion. See B la k e v . I n tc o I n v s . o f Te x . , Inc. , 1 2 3 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (e xpla ini ngthat to pr e se rv e c omp la int that a no -e vid e nc e su mma

ry jud g me nt w a s pre ma tur e , a p a rt y must file an aff

idavit e x plaining the need for further discovery or a ver ified motion for continuanc e). Se c on d, Sa la zar

argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld have sp e c if ie d the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it was g ranting summary

judgme nt. Howeve r, when g ranting summary judgme nt, a trial cour

t need not specify g rounds. See State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. S.S. , 858 S.W .2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) (explaining that when the trial court does not state the specific g rounds on which it g rante d summary judgme nt, we must aff

irm if any of the theor ies adva

nced a re me ritorious). Th ir d, Sa la zar c omp la ins of dif fe re nt jud g e s p re sid ingov e r t he same c a se , a

rguin g that th e ir actions were void. Be x ar County uses a centr al docket, rotating , presiding court sy stem. See L OC AL R U LES F O R C I V I L D I S TR I C T C O U RT S O F B EX A R C OU NT Y . Thus, while Salazar’s orig inal petition was
a ssi g ne d to the 40 8th

Judic ia l D istri c t Co ur

t w he n it wa s f ile d, ru lin g s w e re ma de by the 13 1s t J udicial District Court. L ater , the case wa s desig nated a s complex and assigne d to the 225th J udicial Di str ic t Co ur

t, w hic h s ig ne d th e su mma ry jud g me nts . T hat di ff

e re nt c ourt s r

ule d o n d if

fe re nt p a rt s of the case does not ma

ke their actions void. T he Texas Constitution allows a centr al docket sy stem like the o n e in Be x ar County . T EX . C O N ST . ar tV, § 1 1 (a u t h o ri z i n g d i s t ri ct j u d ges t o “e x ch an ge distr ic ts, or

ho ld c ourt

fo r e a c h o the r” ); se e In re Sc hm itz , 2 8 5 S. W. 3 d 4 5 1 , 4 5 4 ( T e x . 2009) (e xpla ini ngthat “ Te xas l aw a llo ws judges to sit f or on e ano the r w he ne ve r t

he y c ho os e ” ); T EX . R. C IV . P. 330( e) (“Where in suc h county there are two or more district c ourts having civil jurisdiction,04

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- 5- the judg es of suc h courts may , in their discre tion, ex chang e benc hes or districts fr om time to ti me, and . . . any

of them may

in his own courtroom try and dete rmine any

case or proc ee ding pe nding in another c ourt without having the ca se transfe rre d, or may sit in any other of sa id courts and ther e hear and dete rmine any

case there pending . . . .”). Thus, the trial court’ s judgme nt is not voi d. Four th, Salazar argues that “i t is not enough to move f or summary

judgme nt without
su pp or tin g the mot ion in a

ny wa y .” Te xas R

ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 16 6a (i ), ho we ve r, a llo ws a pa rt y to move f o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t o nth e g r o u n d

th a t t h e r e is n o e v id e n c e o f

o n e o r mo r e e s sential elements of a

claim or defe nse on which the responde nt would have the burden of proof at trial. See T EX . R. C IV . P
. 1 6 6 a( i ). T h e b u rd en t h en s h i ft s t o t h e r es p o n d en tt o p ro d u ce ev i d en ce ra i s i n g a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. See id. He re , SCI fi le d a no -e vid e nc e mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt, which was t hen joined by the re maining de fenda

nts, challeng ing e ach e lement of c onspiracy and brea ch of f

iduciary duty . Salazar did not produce evidenc e raising a g enuine issue of material f act on the eleme nts of the claims and de fense s attacke d. After the motion was g rante d, in his mot ion for new tria l, Salazar attac hed fune ral re cords a nd other discove ry

responses. Howeve r, summary judgme nt evidence may

be filed late only with leave of court, whic h Salazar did not seek or rec eive. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 66 a (c ); Benc hmark Bank v. Crowder , 919 S.W .2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996). Salazar also argues that the evidenc e that SCI , itself, attache d to its m otion constitut es more tha n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g his c la ims . Spe c if

ic a lly , Sala zar c la ims Juan Sa la zar ’s de a th
c e rt i f i c a t e c o n t a i n s f

a l s e an d m i s l e a d i n g i n f

o r m a t i o n , w h i c h i s e v i d e n c e o f t h e a l l e g e d

c o n s p i r a c y. Ho we ve r, the re is n o e vid e nce th a t th e de a th c e rt if ic a te c on ta ins fa lse inf

or ma tio n. Sa la zar

a lso argues that statements of SCI ’s employ ees “clea rly indicate a nd show that the conspira cy to conce al and mislead are evident in this cause .” Salazar does not, how ever , point to which statements of SCI ’s04

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- 6- employ ees a

re e vidence o f a c onspiracy . Salazar also empha siz es that althoug h SCI stated that no fi du c iary du ty wa s ow e d to him be c a us e the re wa s “ no c on ta c t, l e t a lon e a re la tio ns hip , b e tw e e n SCI
and Sa la zar ,” Ros ie Pe re z’s a ff ida vit and Pa uli ne Di ckey ’s disc ov e ry re sp on se s c on tr a dic t th is statement. Howeve r, neither Perez’s aff idavit nor Dickey ’s discovery response s s h o w a fi duciar y relationship between SCIand Salazar. Salazar also argues that whe n he told the fune ral home that he and his sis te r E va

we re Juan

Sa la z ar’s on ly

natur a lly bo rn c hil dr e n, SCI

ha d “ an im me diate
re sp on sib ili ty ” “ to i nv e sti g a te the sit uatio n a nd a lle g a tio ns .” S ala z ar c ite s n o s up po rt fo r t his argument that SCI had a f iduciary duty to investigate once told that Salazar was Juan Salazar’s son. W e a f f i r m t h e s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n tg r a n t e d i nf

a v o r o f S C I, P a u l i n e D i c k e y, F r an k

D i c k e y, and Elizabeth Rodrig uez Coronado.

D R . R O SS ’ S M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT Sa la zar argue s t hat su mma

ry jud g me nt s ho uld

no t ha ve be e n g ra

nte d in fa vo r o f D r. Ros s be c a us e his c la ims we re no t he a lthc are lia bil ity c la ims g ov e rn e d b y

the re qu iremen ts set f

or th i n chapte r 74 of the T exas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code. We ag ree . I n d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r a c la im is a h e a lt h c ar e li a b il it y c la im g o v e r

n e d b y c h a

p te r 74, we focus on the e ssence of t he plainti ff’ s claim and consider the a lleg ed wr ong ful conduc t and the duties alleg edly brea ched. Di v e rsi c ar e Ge n. Pa rtn e r, In c . v . R ub io , 1 8 5 S
. W
. 3 d 8 4 2 , 8 5 1 ( T e x . 2 0 0 5 )
. “ It is we ll se ttl e d that a he a lth c are lia bil ity c la im c ann ot b e re c a st a s a no the r c a us e of a c tio n to a vo id the re quirements” of

the Medica l L iability

I n s u ra n ce I mprovement Ac t, as codified in c hapter 74. Id. I n h i s p et ition, S alazar a lleg es that (1) Dr. Ross should have orde red a n autopsy to be perf ormed be fore s i gn i n g h is father ’s death cer tificate; a nd (2) be cause Dr. Ross was not pre sent04

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- 7- wh e n h is f

a the r d ie d a

nd did no t pe rf or m an a uto ps y , D r. Ros s f

ra ud ule ntl y sig ne d a de a th c e rt if

ic a te indicating that Salazar’s fathe r had died of natura l c auses. Thus, Salazar alleg es that Dr. Ross enter ed into a conspirac y

with his stepsist er, Pauline D ickey , to expedite the embalming of his father

and preve nt an autopsy

from beingperf

ormed. Chapter 74 de fines a he alth car e liability claim as
a ca use of a ction ag ainst a hea lth car e p ro v i d er or phy sician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other c laimed depa rture f rom ac cepte d standards o f m ed i cal c are , or he alt h c ar e , o r s a fe ty

or pr of e ss io nal or a dmi nis tr a tiv e se rv ic e s dir e c tly re lat e d to he alt h c ar e , which proximately results in injury to or death of a c laimant, whether the c la ima nt’ s c la im o r c a

us e of a c tio n s ound s in

tor t or c on tr a c t. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74 .0 01 (a )( 13 ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . “ He a lth
car e” me ans “a

ny act or treatment perfor

med or fur

nished, or that shoul d h av e b een perfor med or furnished, by

any health ca re pr ovider for

, to , o r o n b e ha lf o

f a pat ie nt during the patient’s medical

c ar e , trea t m ent, or c onfinement.” Id. § 74.001(a) (10) ( emphasis adde d). “Me dical ca re” means “any act de fined a s prac ticing me dicine under Section 151.002, Oc cu p at ions Code, perfor med
or fu rn ish e d, or

wh ic h s ho uld

have be e n p e rf

or me d, by on e lic e nsed to pr a c tic e me dic ine in t his state for, to, or on behalf of a pat ient during the patient’s car e, treatment, or confineme nt .” Id. § 74.001(a) (19) ( emphasis adde d). I n Hare v

. Graham , N o. 02 -0 7- 00 11 8- CV , 2 00 7 WL 30 37 70 8, a t *3 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2007, pet. denied) , t h e Fo rt Worth Court of Appeals addr essed the similar issue of whether the alleg ed failure to obta in c onsent for an autopsy constituted a health car e liabilit y cl ai m . Af

ter
c on sid e ri ngthe a

bo ve de fi nit ion s, the c ourt no te d tha t the de fi nit ion of “ he a lthc are lia

bil ity c la im” is depende nt on the definition of “heal t h ca re,” which is in turn depe ndent on the def inition of “medica l car e.” Id. The court of appea ls e x plained that the “hea lth c are ” def inition “ends with the04

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- 8- phrase ‘the patient’s medical c are , treatment, or confine ment,’” a nd the “medic al ca

re” d efinition also “e nds with the phrase ‘the patient’s medical c are , treatment, or confine ment.’” Id. The c ourt then noted that “patient” is defined in Chapter 313 of the Te x as He alth and Safe ty Code as a pe rson who is admitted to a hospital or residing in a nursing home. Id. ; se e als o T EX . H EA L TH & S AF E TY C ODE ANN . § 31 3. 00 2( 8) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 09 ) ( de fi nin g “ patie nt” a s a pe rs on wh o “ is a dmi tte d to
a ho sp ita l” ; “ is re sid ing in a nurs ingho me ” ; or “ is r e c e ivi ngse rv ic e s f

ro m a ho me and

c omm un ity support service s ag ency”). A ccor ding to the c ourt, “[t] his clear ly implies that a per son must be alive in order to be a ‘patient.’” Ha re , 2007 WL 3037708, at *3. Noting that “the idea that a c adave r ca n be a ‘ patient’ is, on i ts fac e, il logic al,” the court held that “ a dea d body is not a patient” a

nd cannot “re ceive ‘medica l car e, tre atment, or c onfinement’ a fter de ath.” Id. (q u o t i n g T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 7 4. 00 1( a )( 19 )) ; see also Putthoff v. Ancrum , 934 S.W .2d 164, 171 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1996, writ denied) (stating that a doctor conducting an autopsy is “not perf

orming the servic es of a he alth car e provide r,” the deceased is not a patient, and the a utopsy is not a form of medic al tr e a tme nt) . T hu s, the c ourt c on c lud e d tha t the pla int if f’ s cla im re la tin g to an a lle g e d fa ilure to o bta in consent for

an autopsy

was not a he alth car e liability claim and not subj ec t t o chapte r 74’s require ments. Ha re , 2007 WL 3037708, at *3. He re , Sala zar c omp la ins of Dr . Ross ’s fa ilure to or de r an a uto ps y be fo re sig nin g the de a th
c e rt if ic a te and Dr
. Ros s’ s ind ic a tio n of c a us e of de a th by natur a l c a us e s on the death certif

ic a te without c onducting an autopsy or being prese nt f or the de ath. As in Ha re , these a lleg ations are not he a lthc are lia

bil ity c la ims . B e c a

us e Sa la zar ’s fa

the r wa s a lr e a dy de a d a t the tim e Dr
. Ros s a lle g e dly de pa rt e d fr om a c c e pta

ble sta nd ard s and

pr a c tic e s, his fathe r c ou ld n ot b e a “ patie nt. ” No r c ou ld h is04

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3 ... W e e m p ha si ze t ha t we are no t co m m en t i ng o n the v ali d i t y of Sa l az ar’s clai m s aga i nst D r. R o ss.
4 ... W e no te tha t D r. R o ss m o v e d fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t o n ly o n the b a sis o f S a la z a r’s n o n c o m p lian c e w ith ch apt er 74.

5 ... W e no t e t hat t hese j ud g e s a b o u t whi ch Sa l azar co m p l ai ns o n ap p eal did no t hear or s i gn t he summ ary ju d g m e n ts a t i ssu e . In ste a d , t h e H o n o ra b le P e te r S a k a i gr a n te d b o th su m m a ry j u d g m e n ts.

- 9- fathe r have rec eived medic al ca re, tre atment, or c onfinement a fter his de ath. 3 Thus, Salazar’s alleg ations ag ainst Dr. Ross do not f it within chapte r 74’s definition of “hea lth care liability claims.” And, beca

use they are not he alth car e liability claims, the trial court err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of

Dr. Ross on g rounds that Salazar ha d not complied with chapter 74’s
re qu ir e me nts
. 4 O T HE R I SS U ES On Fe bruar

y 10, 2009, we struck the first brief Salazar filed, ordered him t o file an a mended br ie f, and wa

rn e d him that he c ou ld no t c ir c umv e nt the fi ft y -p a g e lim it by arguin g the me ri ts o f h is issues within the “I ssues Presente d” section of his brief. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(f) (r equiring brief to state “c oncisely

all issues or p o i n t s prese nted for r eview” ). On Mar ch 6, 2009, we struck the second brief filed by Salazar, and once ag ain warned him that his statement of the issues pr esente d should be conc ise statements and should not ar g ue the merits of the issues. Salazar’ s third brief now lists t en pag es of “ I ssues and/or Poi nts.” To the extent that any issue is arg ued in the “I ssues and/or Points ” sec tion of his brief and not in the “Arg ument” section of his brief, he has wa ived the issue throug h improper br iefing
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1. Salazar also complains that his motions to r ecuse sever al judge s who ruled on matters below should not h av e b ee n d enied. 5 We reviewthe denial of a motion to recuse under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd on appe al. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 18a(f ). Afte r re viewing the re cord, w e find no04

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- 10- abuse of discretion in the denia l of the motions to recuse. Se e Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 240-41 (Te x . 2001). I n his brief, Salazar also complains of orders t his court issued in this appea l befor e the a

ppeal wa s set for submission. W e find a ll his arg uments to be without merit. Fin a ll y , Sa la zar c o mp la in s th a t SC I is n o t th e c o r r e c t p arty an d th a t h e s u e d Ro y Aker s Fune ral Chape ls and Sunset Northwest F unera l Home. Thus, he a rg ues t h at his moti on to show authority should have be en g rante d by the trial cour

t. SCIresponds that a lthough Salazar ’s orig inal petition mis identified SCI ’s assumed names, it voluntarily enter ed an appea ranc e, and the assumed name statute d o es n o t cre ate a reme dy for Salazar ’s private enfor ceme nt. We ag ree . The a ssumed
name statut e re qu ir e s e ve ry c or po ratio n op e ra

tin g un de r an a ssume d n a me to f ile an a ssume d n a me
c e rt if ic a te wi th the Se c re tary of State and wi th the c ounty c le rk wh e re the e nti ty is d oin g bu sin e ss. T EX . B US . & C OM . C ODE ANN . § 71 .1 03 (Vern on Sup p. 20 09 ). F a ilure to f ile an a ssume d n a me
cer tificate aff

ects a plaintiff’ s capa city

to bring suit. See id. § 71.201(a) (Ve rnon 2009) ( explaining that “the pe rson may

not maintain in a co u rt o f t his state an ac tion or proce eding arising out of a contra ct or act in which an assumed name was used until an or igina l, new, or r enew ed ce rtificate has be e n f ile d a s r e qu ir e d b y

thi s c ha pte r” ); see also § 71.002(9) (def ining “ person” as including “an ind ivi du a l, p art

ne rs hip , li mit e d p art

ne rs hip , li mit ed li a

bil ity c omp any , r e g ist e re d li mit e d li a bil ity pa rt ne rs hip , c omp any , or co rp or a tio n” ). An d, fa ilure to fi le an ass ume d na me c e rt if ic a te may re su lt in a plaintif

f r e c e iving“expenses incur red, inc luding attorney ’s fe es, in locating and ef fec ting se rvice of proce s s o n t h e d ef

en dant.” Id. § 7 1. 20 1( b) . I t do e s n ot, ho we ve r, a ff e c t a de fe nd ant’ s a

bil ity to defe nd itself in civil lit igation. Id. § 71.201(a) (“Aperson’ s failure to comply with this chapter doe s not impair the validity

of any contra ct or act by the person or pre vent the per son from def ending any action or pr ocee ding in a

ny court of this state . . . .” ).04

- 08

- 00 02 2- CV

- 11- C ONCL US I ON Wit h respe ct to SCI , Pauline Dickey , Fr ank Dickey , and Eliz abeth Rodrig uez Coronado, we
a ff ir m th e su mma

ry jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt . H ow e ve r, wi th r e sp e c t to Sa la zar ’s c la ims a g a ins t Dr. Ross, we reve rse the judgme nt of the trial cour

t and re mand the ca

use to the trial cour

t for fur ther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice