Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 22-0620

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Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc.,

Petitioner,

v.

Travis Central Appraisal District, by and through Marya Crigler, 

acting in her official capacity as Chief Appraiser of Travis 

Central Appraisal District, 

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued February 22, 2024

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, 

Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined.

JUSTICE BOYD filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justice 

Devine joined.

In this tax appraisal dispute, we decide whether limits placed on 

a taxing authority’s claim in an appeal from an appraisal review board 

decision also confine the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We 

conclude that the limits the Tax Code imposes on bringing such an 
2

appeal are not jurisdictional. A trial court must nonetheless evaluate 

compliance with Tax Code mandates in deciding the subject property’s 

appraised value. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had 

jurisdiction over the taxing authority’s challenge, albeit for a different 

reason. We therefore affirm its judgment.

I

A

The Texas Constitution provides that “[a]ll real property and 

tangible personal property in this State . . . shall be taxed in proportion 

to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law.”1 Any 

calculation of property tax in Texas thus begins with an assessment of 

the property’s value. Under laws implementing this constitutional 

provision, a subject property is appraised at its “market value.”2

The Tax Code provides guidance for conducting this appraisal. 

Appraisers must use “generally accepted appraisal methods,” and the 

Code endorses specific kinds of appraisal methods for determining 

market value.3 Regardless of the method, the overarching goal is to fix 

1 Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1(b).

2 Tex. Tax Code § 23.01(a). The Legislature is free to adopt other modes 

of valuation, provided that those modes do not exceed market value. EXLP 

Leasing, LLC v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 554 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Tex. 

2018). 

3 Tex. Tax Code § 23.01(b). The Tax Code provides: 

The market value of property shall be determined by the 

application of generally accepted appraisal methods and 

techniques. If the appraisal district determines the appraised 

value of a property using mass appraisal standards, the mass 

appraisal standards must comply with the Uniform Standards 

of Professional Appraisal Practice. The same or similar 
3

a market value for the subject property. Market value is “the price at 

which a property would transfer for cash or its equivalent under 

prevailing market conditions” in an informed, arms-length transaction.4

From there, one calculates the property tax owed by applying 

exemptions and multiplying the appraised value by the applicable tax 

rate.

The Constitution enshrines two limits on property taxes. First, 

“Taxation shall be equal and uniform.”5 An appraiser must use similar 

appraisal methods and techniques for similar properties and must 

appraisal methods and techniques shall be used in appraising 

the same or similar kinds of property. However, each property 

shall be appraised based upon the individual characteristics that 

affect the property’s market value, and all available evidence 

that is specific to the value of the property shall be taken into 

account in determining the property’s market value.

Id.

4 Id. § 1.04(7). The Tax Code defines “market value” as:

[T]he price at which a property would transfer for cash or its 

equivalent under prevailing market conditions if:

(A) exposed for sale in the open market with a reasonable 

time for the seller to find a purchaser;

(B) both the seller and the purchaser know of all the uses 

and purposes to which the property is adapted and for which 

it is capable of being used and of the enforceable restrictions 

on its use; and

(C) both the seller and purchaser seek to maximize their 

gains and neither is in a position to take advantage of the 

exigencies of the other.

Id.

5 Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1(a). 
4

arrive at a value proportionate to the appraisals of similar properties.6

A taxpayer may challenge a taxing authority’s appraised value on the 

ground that the value is not equal and uniform when compared with 

similarly situated properties.7

Second, a property appraisal must not be set at “a greater value 

than [the property’s] fair cash market value.”8 A market value 

determination is a constitutional ceiling: under the Constitution, 

property is to be appraised in proportion to its value, but it must never 

be appraised at more than market value.

The Tax Code secures these constitutional rights to fair taxation 

through a robust protest procedure. A taxpayer may challenge a taxing 

district’s proposed appraised value on grounds that the appraised value 

is greater than the property’s market value. The taxpayer may also 

claim that the appraised value results in taxation that is not equal and 

uniform. Such challenges are first brought before a local appraisal 

review board.9 If a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the board’s 

determination, then the taxpayer may seek judicial review.10 Once in 

court, the parties start from scratch, without any deference to the 

board’s decision. The trial court conducts a trial de novo of the protest, 

6 Tex. Tax Code §§ 23.01(b), 41.43, 42.26. The requirement that taxation 

be equal and uniform applies within classes of property, not between classes of 

property. Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., 496 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2016). 

The Legislature has latitude to construct tax classifications. Id.

7 Tex. Tax Code §§ 41.41(a)(2), 41.43.

8 Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 20. 

9 Tex. Tax Code § 41.41(a). 

10 Id. § 42.01.
5

setting an appraised value for the subject property based on the evidence 

it hears.11

Rarely, the appraisal district is the party dissatisfied with the 

board’s decision. In such a case, the Tax Code gives appraisal districts 

the right to seek judicial review.12 But the Tax Code places different 

limits on the district’s claim for relief than it does the taxpayer’s. Before 

an appraisal district may appeal, the chief appraiser must obtain 

permission to appeal from the board of directors of the appraisal 

district.13 And a district cannot challenge an appraised value under 

$1 million unless the district first establishes fraud.14 Finally, pertinent 

here, a district’s appeal is confined to an appeal from “an order of the 

appraisal review board determining . . . a taxpayer protest.”15

11 Id. §§ 42.23, 42.24. The Tax Code grants the trial court determining

the appeal the authority to:

(1) fix the appraised value of property in accordance with the 

requirements of law if the appraised value is at issue;

(2) enter the orders necessary to ensure equal treatment under 

the law for the appealing property owner if inequality in the 

appraisal of his property is at issue; or

(3) enter other orders necessary to preserve rights protected by 

and impose duties required by the law.

Id. § 42.24.

12 Id. § 42.02. 

13 Id. § 42.02(a). 

14 Id. § 42.02(b), (c). 

15 Id. § 42.02(a). 
6

B

Petitioner Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. owns 344 acres 

of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, 

Respondent Travis County Central Appraisal District appraised the 

market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this 

amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform 

taxation.16 The Landfill did not, however, claim that the District’s 

appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. 

The Landfill won its challenge. The appraisal review board 

reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety 

percent. The board concluded: “The subject property was unequally 

appraised, and the appraisal records should be adjusted to reflect a 

value of $2,800,000.” 

The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board 

erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and 

uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District 

also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject 

property’s true market value:

The market value of [the landfill] is greater than the 

determination of the [Appraisal Review Board] and the 

value set by the ARB results in unequal appraisal of the 

subject property. The ARB’s value determination was 

arbitrary, erroneous, unjust, and unlawful and violated the 

requirements of Tex. Tax Code §§ 1.04(7) and 23.01. The 

result of the ARB’s determination is an appraisal of the 

subject property below market value and unequal 

appraised value.

16 See id. § 41.41(a)(2).
7

The Landfill answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. In its 

jurisdictional plea, the Landfill argued that the challenge it made before 

the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one 

based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider market value. The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea. 

The court of appeals reversed.17 The court held that a trial court’s

review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the 

grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board. 18 The court of appeals 

further concluded that an appraisal district has no obligation to raise 

reasons justifying its appraised value in response to a taxpayer protest; 

therefore, the statute permits appraisal districts to support their 

claimed appraised value for reasons the appraisal review board did not 

consider.19 We granted the Landfill’s petition for review. 

II

A

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 

law we review de novo.20 If the Legislature assigns exclusive or original 

jurisdiction to an administrative body, then no right to judicial review 

exists “unless a statute provides a right or unless the order adversely 

affects a vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional 

17 684 S.W.3d 470, 480 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022).

18 Id. at 477–78.

19 Id. 

20 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 

2004). “[W]e have an obligation to examine our jurisdiction any time it is in 

doubt . . . .” Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020). 
8

right.”21 Even when such a statute provides judicial review, ordinarily 

the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction until the party exhausts its 

administrative remedies.22

The Tax Code grants appraisal districts the right to judicial 

review of an appraisal review board’s orders. “On written approval of 

the board of directors of the appraisal district, the chief appraiser is 

entitled to appeal an order of the appraisal review board 

determining . . . a taxpayer protest as provided by” certain tax code 

provisions permitting a protest.23 The parties dispute whether the 

appeal, granted from “an order of the appraisal review board 

determining . . . a taxpayer protest,” restricts judicial review to the 

protest grounds the property owner presented before the appraisal 

review board. 

The Landfill argues that the trial court decides only the 

taxpayer’s protest. To open the door to matters the taxpayer did not 

raise in protest would thwart the Legislature’s goal of an expedient, 

taxpayer-driven protest system. The District responds that its appeal is 

from the board’s “order” and thus the statute does not confine the 

District’s appeal to the taxpayer’s protest. The District notes that the 

Tax Code requires a trial de novo, in which “a court may consider 

21 Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 

397 (Tex. 2000).

22 Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 

221 (Tex. 2002).

23 Tex. Tax Code § 42.02(a). 
9

arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh.”24 The District also 

notes that the statute vests the trial court with the authority to “fix the 

appraised value of property in accordance with the requirements of law 

if the appraised value is at issue.”25

B

Considering the context of the Tax Code and its provisions 

granting an appeal, the language authorizing the District to appeal from 

the order determining the taxpayer’s protest does not limit the trial 

court’s jurisdiction.26 By authorizing the chief appraiser to appeal “an 

order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a taxpayer protest,”

the Tax Code imposes limits on the District’s claim, but like many of the 

Code’s procedural limits, the one presented in this case does not carry 

jurisdictional implications. Rather, it governs proceedings before the 

trial court and the availability of relief to an appraisal district.27

We agree with the Landfill that the statutory language limiting 

an appeal to “an order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a 

24 Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 

S.W.3d 29, 50 (Tex. 2018).

25 Tex. Tax Code § 42.24(1); see also Cherokee Water Co. v. Gregg Cnty. 

Appraisal Dist., 801 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. 1990) (holding that a trial court has 

the authority to increase or decrease the appraised value). 

26 In this case, we examine the distinction between a market-value 

protest and an equal-and-uniform protest; we do not foreclose the possibility 

that an appeal of another type of determination may have a jurisdictional limit.

27 San Jacinto River Auth. v. City of Conroe, 688 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 

2024) (concluding that compliance with adjudication procedures is mandatory 

but not jurisdictional); Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 

S.W.3d 172, 183 (Tex. 2004) (construing an “unable to agree” requirement as 

mandatory but not jurisdictional). 
10

taxpayer protest” narrows the trial court’s de novo trial to the protest

the appraisal review board heard. This limitation, however, is not 

jurisdictional. The taxpayer fixes the grounds for protest. The statute 

authorizes the trial court to hear an appeal of the protest. Under the 

statute, however, the District cannot prevail in a new trial of that 

protest by importing claims the appraisal review board did not hear. 

Since Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, our Court has embraced the 

modern trend of declining to read statutory mandates to be 

jurisdictional prohibitions absent clear indication that failure to comply 

with the mandate also deprives a court of the power to decide the 

claim.28 Dubai Petroleum was a wrongful death suit in which the 

defendant disputed the trial court’s jurisdiction on the basis that a 

foreign country lacked “equal treaty rights” with the United States, a 

statutory requirement.29 We held that any failure to comply with the 

“equal treaty rights” statutory mandate did not deprive the trial court 

of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.30 The Court announced its 

movement away from the traditional rule that a claim must satisfy given 

statutory requisites to vest the trial court with jurisdiction to decide the 

claim’s merit.31

In doing so, we emphasized that “the modern direction of policy is 

to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground 

28 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000). 

29 Id. at 74.

30 Id. at 76–77.

31 Id.
11

that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”32 Denominating 

statutory requirements as “jurisdictional” has the unfortunate effect of 

casting doubt on otherwise final judgments. In general, whether a 

plaintiff has complied with statutory prerequisites implicates the right 

to relief, not the jurisdiction of the court.33

Following Dubai Petroleum, we later held that no jurisdictional 

bar stemmed from a failure to comply with a statute permitting a 

condemnation action when “the entity and the property owner are 

unable to agree on the damages.”34 Because a party opposing 

condemnation could waive the right to complain of the lack of effort to 

agree, the statutory context revealed that requirement was not a 

jurisdictional one.35 And in another condemnation case, we held that 

(1) the trial court’s statutory authority to try appeals “in the same 

manner as other civil causes”; (2) the lack of an option for the trial court 

to simply affirm the award; and (3) the fact that the commissioners’ 

award was not admissible, taken together, meant that the trial court 

32 Id. at 76 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 cmt. e 

(Am. L. Inst. 1982)). 

33 Id. at 76–77. In suits against the government, however, all statutory 

prerequisites to suit are jurisdictional requirements. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 

(abrogating Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 

351 (Tex. 2004)). 

34 Hubenak, 141 S.W.3d at 180–83 (quoting and analyzing Tex. Prop. 

Code § 21.012(b)). 

35 Id. at 181–82. 
12

was not jurisdictionally confined to evidence presented during the 

administrative phase.36

The statutory framework in this case similarly employs 

procedural limits on the trial de novo of a tax protest that are not 

jurisdictional. A taxpayer and the appraisal district each may appeal to 

the trial court an order determining a protest.37 When a taxpayer raises 

a new basis to protest for the first time in the trial court, the court may 

“remand the action to the appraisal review board with instructions to 

allow the property owner an opportunity to cure the property owner’s 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”38 While the statute 

contemplates jurisdictional challenges arising from the failure to 

exhaust, it eliminates mandatory dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The 

parties may forgo remand entirely and “elect that the court determine 

the appeal on the merits,” including the taxpayer’s newly presented 

protest.39 We have long held that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by 

agreement.40 The parties’ ability to proceed by agreement on a 

taxpayer’s newly identified ground for protest signals that the 

parameters of an appeal, though mandatory, are not jurisdictional. 

36 PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State, 251 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. 

2008) (quoting Tex. Prop. Code § 21.018(b)). 

37 Tex. Tax Code §§ 42.01, 42.02.

38 Id. § 42.231(b). Section 42.231 applies to all appeals filed on or after 

September 1, 2019. Act of May 9, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 157 §§ 3–4, 2019 

Tex. Gen. Laws 286, 287. 

39 Tex. Tax Code § 42.231(e).

40 PR Invs., 251 S.W.3d at 476–77 & n.17 (observing that jurisdiction 

cannot be manufactured by consent or waiver).
13

The statute provides no mirror-image avenue of review to 

appraisal districts because an appraisal district is in the position of 

defending its appraised value before the review board. But no matter 

which party appeals, the trial court hears the protest anew, including 

new evidence and argument. The trial court does not defer to the 

appraisal review board’s determination. This de novo review is further 

indication that the limit on the appraisal district’s claim is not 

tantamount to a jurisdictional prohibition.41

In this way, the Tax Code provision permitting the appraisal 

district’s appeal shares characteristics with provisions in the 

condemnation review statute our Court concluded are not 

jurisdictional.42 Like the condemnation statute, the Tax Code directs the 

trial court to conduct a trial de novo. The court may not simply affirm 

the appraisal review board’s order, and it “may not admit in evidence 

the fact of prior action by the appraisal review board . . . except to the 

extent necessary to establish its jurisdiction.”43 The Tax Code also 

provides that the trial court is not confined to the evidence presented to 

the appraisal review board, similar to condemnation procedures that we 

held lacked jurisdictional implications.44 The trial court “is ‘appellate’ 

41 The trial court’s de novo review does not, standing alone, confer 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Cont’l Cas., 19 S.W.3d at 398–99 (holding that 

statutory provisions that prescribe the manner of judicial review do not 

independently create jurisdiction). The Legislature’s grant of an appeal is the 

basis for the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

42 PR Invs., 251 S.W.3d at 475–79.

43 Tex. Tax Code § 42.23(b). 

44 Compare id. § 42.23(b), (h), with PR Invs., 251 S.W.3d at 475–79.
14

only as distinguished from ‘original’ or ‘concurrent,’ but not in the sense 

that the evidence is fixed or that court is confined to that paper record.”45

The Tax Code’s grant of trial de novo is unlike the statute 

authorizing permissive interlocutory appeals. The latter is a general 

statute permitting an appeal for “an order that is not otherwise 

appealable” if the order “involves a controlling question of law” and the 

appeal will materially advance the litigation toward resolution.46 As we 

said in Elephant Insurance Co. v. Kenyon, these two conditions are 

necessary for permission to appeal, but the court of appeals’ jurisdiction 

extends to the entire order, without a limit on any examination of 

subsidiary issues.47

Tax Code Section 42.02, in contrast, grants a right to appeal “an 

order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a taxpayer protest.” 

The condition is not merely requisite but exclusionary. 

This interpretation is consistent with our treatment of other 

provisions of the Tax Code in Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Wilbarger 

County Appraisal District.48 The taxpayer in that case brought appeals

after appraisal districts declined to correct alleged errors in the tax rolls 

45 Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 50 (holding that an 

appraisal district may raise a new argument during the taxpayer’s appeal to 

the trial court because review is de novo). The Court in Willacy additionally 

supported its holding by explaining that an affirmative defense cannot be 

waived by failing to raise it in the administrative phase, but the first reason—

that the trial is de novo—is sufficient on its own. Id. 

46 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d).

47 644 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2022). 

48 ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. June 21, 2024) (No. 23-0138). 
15

stemming from tax protest settlement agreements. The question in 

those cases was whether provisions barring appraisal review boards 

from rejecting settlement agreements jurisdictionally barred the trial 

court from hearing the taxpayer’s challenge that those agreements were 

void due to a mutual mistake. In that case, as in this one, we concluded

that a trial court has jurisdiction to consider the claim. 49

The Landfill argues that statutory limits must be jurisdictional 

to secure the goal of an expedient, affordable protest system. We agree 

that the purpose of administrative proceedings is to streamline dispute 

resolution. A statutory mandate, however, is no less a limit on the 

prosecution of a claim for relief in court than one that implicates the 

trial court’s power to decide that claim. A court cannot ignore a statutory 

mandate simply because the mandate lacks jurisdictional 

consequences.50 Under the statute in this case, the trial court’s 

consideration of the appraisal district’s claim is confined to a de novo 

determination of the taxpayer’s protest.51 The District has no mandate 

to expand trial court review of an appraisal beyond the taxpayer’s 

protest.

C

In this case, confining the claim before the trial court to the 

taxpayer’s protest is of limited consequence. 

49 Id., slip op. at 18.

50 Image API v. Young, ___ S.W.3d ___, slip op. at 16 (Tex. June 21, 2024)

(No. 22-0308). 

51 Tex. Tax Code §§ 42.02(a), 42.23(a).
16

First, to the extent that the fair market value of the subject 

property deviates from its equal and uniform appraised value, the 

Landfill is entitled to the lower of the two amounts for calculating the 

property tax it owes. In a perfect world, market value and uniform value 

are the same number, as all properties must be appraised based on 

market value, adjusted for each property’s unique characteristics. 

Giving the property owner the benefit of the lower of the two valuations 

harmonizes the cumulative constitutional mandates that property 

cannot be assessed “at a greater value than its fair cash market value” 

and that taxation must be “equal and uniform.”52 The Landfill’s vigorous 

rejection of judicial inquiry into fair market value might deprive the trial 

court of the ability to appraise the property at a value that is lower than 

the equal and uniform amount. But if the fair market value of the 

property is higher—as both parties seem to presume—that value must 

yield to the lower equal and uniform value as assessed on comparable 

properties. 

Second, even though the Tax Code limits the trial court’s 

determination in this case to an appraisal amount that is equal and 

uniform, evidence of a subject property’s fair market value is relevant to 

both the taxpayer’s challenge and the trial court’s duty to set the subject 

property’s appraised value at an equal and uniform amount, which as 

we have said, should approach the property’s market value.53 The Tax 

Code provides three formulas for use in determining whether an 

52 Tex. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1(a), 20.

53 See Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Hous. 8th Wonder Prop., L.P., 395 

S.W.3d 245, 251–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). 
17

appraisal is equal and uniform.54 Two compare the “appraisal ratio” of 

the subject property to comparable properties.55 The “appraisal ratio” is 

“the ratio of a property’s appraised value as determined by the appraisal 

office or appraisal review board, as applicable, to . . . the market value 

of the property.”56 The third formula compares “the appraised value of 

the property” and “the median appraised value of a reasonable number 

of comparable properties appropriately adjusted.”57 Implicit in this third 

formula are appropriate adjustments to the market value of comparable 

properties, in a manner similar to appropriate adjustments to the 

market value of the subject property, making their respective appraised 

values “comparable properties appropriately adjusted.” Thus, evidence 

of the subject property’s fair market value is admissible in either kind 

of taxpayer protest to support or challenge the appropriateness of 

comparable properties and the adjustments made in determining 

whether the appraised value is equal and uniform. Using evidence of 

appropriately adjusted fair market values, the District is free to counter 

the taxpayer’s suggested equal and uniform value of comparable 

properties—with the caveat that, under the statute, the Landfill gets 

the benefit of the calculation that results in the lowest appraisal value.58

54 Tex. Tax Code § 42.26.

55 Id. § 42.26(a)(1), (2). 

56 Id. § 1.12(b). 

57 Id. § 42.26(a)(3). 

58 Id. § 42.26(b) (“If a property owner is entitled to relief under more 

than one subdivision of Subsection (a), the court shall order the property’s 

appraised value changed to the value that results in the lowest appraised 
18

Finally, the potential relevance of a subject property’s fair market 

value does not permit sweeping discovery into every aspect of a property 

owner’s business. Discovery is limited to that information relevant to a 

de novo resolution of the taxpayer’s protest, and the burden of answering

such discovery must be proportionate to its importance in arriving at an 

equal and uniform appraised value.59 Trial courts must limit discovery 

and protect confidential information when taxing authorities fail to 

narrowly tailor their discovery requests in a taxpayer protest appeal.

* * *

value.”). We disapprove of courts of appeals cases to the extent they suggest 

that market value of the subject property is per se irrelevant in 

unequal-appraisal litigation. See In re Catherine Tower, 553 S.W.3d 679, 

685–87 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); In re 

APTWT, LLC, 612 S.W.3d 85, 90–93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, 

orig. proceeding). For this reason, the differences between the Court and the 

dissent on this point have little practical effect. Evidence of fair market value 

is admissible in determining both kinds of taxpayer protests. And we agree 

that the trial court must address all issues of fact and consider new arguments

and evidence in arriving at an appraised value without deference to the review 

board’s determination.

59 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(b).
19

The Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial 

of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, 

the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for 

the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not 

jurisdictional. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment for the reasons 

stated in this opinion. We remand the case to the trial court for further 

proceedings. 

Jane N. Bland

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 21, 2024