Filed 5/23/24 Dilonell v. Chandler CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

FRIDA DILONELL,

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

SUZANNE CHANDLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

B329945

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC677717)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.

Plotkin, Marutani & Kaufman and Jay J. Plotkin for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Peter D. Gordon & Associates and Andrew T. Schoettle for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

This is the second appeal from an action originally begun in 

2017 by plaintiff Alice Jackson, who sought partition by sale of a 

five-unit residential rental property in Inglewood in which she 

owned a 50 percent interest.1 Defendant Suzanne Chandler 

owned the other 50 percent interest. In 2018, Jackson 

transferred her interest in the property to Frida Dilonell, who 

continued to pursue the partition action.

In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s ruling that 

the highest valid offer at the end of the court-ordered listing 

period was from a third party, not Dilonell. (Dilonell v. Chandler

(Mar. 23, 2022, B310695) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the third 

party cancelled escrow. Following a new listing period, the trial 

court found Dilonell made the highest valid offer and ordered 

Chandler to sign Dilonell’s purchase agreement and complete the 

sale.

Chandler appeals from that order, contending the trial 

court abused its discretion in ordering her to sell her interest in 

the property to Dilonell, because Dilonell’s purchase offer was not 

in compliance with the trial court’s October 2, 2019, order and the 

trial court lacked authority to modify that order. We affirm the 

trial court’s order.

1 The appeals in this matter were preceded by a contract 

dispute between the parties, affirmed by our colleagues in 

Division Two (Dilonell v. Chandler (Oct. 24, 2018, B282634) 

[nonpub. opn.]), and paralleled by a probate action now itself on 

appeal in case No. B330813. Both cases involve disputes about 

the ownership of the property.
3

BACKGROUND

In June 2018, after Dilonell substituted in as plaintiff, she 

obtained an appraisal of the property at $960,000 and sought to 

buy Chandler’s interest at the appraised value. Chandler 

brought two motions to have a partition referee appointed to list 

and sell the property. Chandler was concerned that a sale price 

based on an appraisal alone would not reflect the property’s true 

value, which she believed to be about $1.5 million.

As relevant to this appeal, Judge Richard Burdge, Jr., 

sitting in Department 37, denied the motion for a partition 

referee and on October 2, 2019, issued the first order directing 

the sale of the property and specifying procedures for the sale. 

The order directed the parties to select a neutral third party 

broker and provided that the listing price would be determined 

by that broker. The order specified that “[a]ny written offer for 

less than the listing price shall require the written acceptance of 

both parties.” The listing period was 90 days, but paragraph 9 of 

the order provided that if no offer at the listing price was received 

in the first two weeks of the listing, “either party can purchase 

the property at the listing price without any right of first offer or 

right of first refusal. If one of the parties is the successful 

purchaser, then that person need only close the escrow with one 

half of the agreed to sales price but all other expenses of the sale 

shall be paid equally by the parties.” The trial court directed the 

parties to return to court if escrow had not closed in 90 days, for 

“purposes of the Court considering and making further orders in 

respect to the sale of the Property.”

The broker listed the property for $1.5 million. After an 

extended six-month listing period, the highest third party offer 

was $1 million. On August 6, 2020, the court ordered the listing 
4

period extended again, until January 1, 2021, at the lower price 

of $1.295 million. The court’s order also provided: “After January 

1, 2021, the highest outstanding valid offer shall be accepted.”

As set forth in more detail in our prior opinion, in January 

2021, the trial court determined that the highest valid offer was a 

third party offer from Abdul Sherriff (the Sherriff offer) for 

$1.050 million. The trial court found Dilonell’s offer to be lower 

due to the form of her offer.2 The court ordered the parties to 

accept the Sherriff offer. Dilonell appealed. We affirmed the 

trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

When the case was returned to the trial court, Judge 

Burdge had moved to another courtroom and Judge Killefer had 

been assigned to Department 37.

The parties signed the purchase agreement and opened 

escrow with Sherriff, but he cancelled the escrow apparently due 

to a then-pending probate action which challenged Dilonell’s 

interest in the property. Dilonell represented to the trial court 

that she offered to buy the property for the same amount as 

Sherriff, but Chandler rejected this offer.

At a September 13, 2022, hearing, Judge Killefer directed 

the parties to follow the October 2, 2019, order, but added the 

condition that the parties could not select the same broker as 

before. The parties agreed to a neutral listing broker, who 

ultimately agreed that the listing price would be $1.125 million. 

The parties subsequently stipulated that the listing broker would

2 Briefly, the offer was from “Frida Dilonell on behalf of The 

Wood Property LLC” in the amount of $527,500 and read, 

intentionally or not, as an offer for the whole property.
5

have 60 days to market the property before either party could 

purchase the property by making a full price offer.

The highest offer received during the initial 60-day

marketing period was $1,102,500. Although the listing broker 

repeatedly urged Chandler to accept the offer, she refused. The 

offer was withdrawn.

After the 60-day marketing period expired but before the 

90-day listing period ended, Dilonell offered to buy Chandler’s 

interest in the property for a price of $1.005 million for the whole 

property. (Chandler would receive half that amount for her 50

percent share.) The offer stated that escrow would close upon 

deposit of half the purchase price ($502,500) plus $16,000 due 

under a separate settlement agreement, for a total deposit of 

$518,500. 

By the end of the listing period, there was only one third

party offer, for a firm $1 million. The listing broker suggested 

that the price be reduced to $1.1 million and the property 

continue to be marketed. Chandler stated she did not want to 

reduce the listing price.

In her statement for the February 16, 2023, status 

conference, Chandler asked the trial court to continue the matter 

to allow the probate trial to conclude. In her statement, Dilonell 

asked the trial court to deem her offer of $1.005 million the 

highest offer and to order Chandler to sign Dilonell’s purchase 

agreement and complete the sale.

The court continued the status conference to April 5, 2023, 

to allow the probate trial to conclude. At the same time, the court 

issued a tentative ruling granting Dilonell’s request that 

Chandler be ordered to execute Dilonell’s purchase agreement 

and complete the sale to Dilonell. Before that hearing could take 
6

place, Chandler filed a brief to which she attached a new third

party offer for $1.049 million which she herself had obtained. 

Chandler asked the court to reconsider its tentative ruling and 

either order Dilonell to pay $1.049 million for the property or 

order the property be sold to the third party.

The probate action concluded on April 11, 2023, in favor of 

Dilonell. At the hearing on April 20, 2023, the trial court adopted 

its previously announced tentative decision and ordered Chandler 

to execute Dilonell’s purchase agreement and complete the sale to 

Dilonell. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Chandler contends that Judge Killefer could not change 

Judge Burdge’s October 2, 2019, order permitting Dilonell to 

close escrow with a deposit of 50 percent of the purchase price 

because, in the absence of a full price offer, “one trial court judge 

may not reconsider and overrule a ruling of another judge.”3 This 

is contrary to Chandler’s position in the trial court, where she 

3 To the extent Chandler contends in her reply brief that the 

order permitted the parties to purchase the property only for the 

full list price, we disagree. We do not consider claims made for 

the first time in a reply brief. Further, Chandler has not cited 

any language from the order imposing such a restriction. The 

order in essence gives a party the right to purchase the property 

at full price if no full price offers are made in the marketing 

period, but the order in no way requires such an offer.
7

argued that Judge Killefer did have authority to change the 

order.4

We agree that, as a general rule, “the power of one judge to 

vacate an order made by another judge is limited.” (In re Alberto

(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427.) We review a trial court’s order 

to reconsider and vacate the ruling of another judge for an abuse 

of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Oliverez (2015) 238 

Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247.) We see no abuse of discretion because 

we understand an exception to that rule, identified by Chandler 

in the trial court, to be applicable here: “[W]here the trial court’s 

Order governs future events and circumstances render 

modification of the Order necessary or appropriate, the Court has 

the power to modify its Order. Specifically in a circumstance in 

which the trial court issues a judgment or order governing future 

actions and there exists a possibility of an unfor[e]seen change in 

circumstances over which the Court has no control, the Court 

retains the inherent authority to modify the judgment or Order 

(Restat.2d Judgments, section 73, com.b.).” We also agree with 

Chandler that “[b]ecause of the change of circumstances in this 

case by Mr. Sher[r]iff’s cancellation of the escrow, and the 

passage of time since January[] 2021, and changes in market 

conditions, this is an appropriate case for the trial court to 

exercise its authority to modify its previous orders concerning the 

sale of the Property.”

4 We recognize Chandler does not agree with the specific 

“modifications” made by Judge Killefer, but that has no bearing 

on whether the trial court had the authority to modify the order.
8

Even if the exception were inapplicable, we would find that 

permitting Dilonell to close escrow with a 50 percent deposit did

not amount to reconsidering, overruling, or vacating the October 

2, 2019, order. The interpretation of a court order is a question of 

law which we review de novo. (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co.

(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326.) As we noted in our opinion in 

the first appeal, the 50 percent escrow deposit provision expressly 

applies to a full listing price offer by a party. The order is silent 

on escrow requirements when a party has made the highest offer 

for the property, but the offer is for less than the full listing price. 

As we explained: “If we were to extrapolate from the court’s order 

to other offers, we would find the most reasonable understanding 

would be that a party who makes an offer for the property need 

only deposit half the purchase price to close escrow.” (Dilonell v. 

Chandler, supra, B310695.) Thus, such a provision would be 

consistent with the October 2, 2019, order. We previously noted 

that the trial court could make an order permitting a party to 

close escrow by depositing 50 percent of the purchase price, when 

the purchase price was less than the full listing price. That, in 

effect, is what happened here. The trial court ordered Chandler 

to accept Dilonell’s offer, which included a provision allowing an 

escrow deposit of 50 percent of the purchase price.

Further, and perhaps more importantly, the October 2, 

2019, order expressly contemplated that further orders would be 

necessary if escrow did not close within the specified 90-day 

listing period. The October 2, 2019, order did not limit what 

additional orders might be needed. Such a provision was just 

common sense in this case: if the property did not sell when 

marketed using the timeline and procedures in the order, an 

entirely different approach to the sale might well be necessary. 
9

As Chandler acknowledged in the trial court, an order may 

properly contain such an express provision for future 

modifications.

When Judge Killefer took active control of the case on 

remand after Sherriff cancelled escrow, she had authority to 

devise a new approach to the sale under the further orders 

provision of the October 2, 2019, order. The fact that she initially 

directed the parties to follow the October 2, 2019, order did not 

negate that provision. Thus, her order permitting a 50 percent

escrow deposit by Dilonell was actually authorized by the October 

2, 2019, order, not contrary to it.

To the extent Chandler argues Judge Killefer abused her 

discretion in permitting a 50 percent deposit of the purchase 

price, we disagree. (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 

589, 597 [standard of review for interlocutory partition order is 

abuse of discretion].)

The goal of a partition sale is to actually sell the property 

for a fair price in a limited period of time. In this case, the trial

court’s order that the parties use a neutral broker and list the 

property for sale was designed to ensure that the property was 

sold at a price determined by the market (and not an appraiser); 

this was done largely done in response to Chandler’s concerns. 

There have now been two extended and impartial listing periods, 

and Dilonell was ultimately the high bidder for the property in 

both periods. She offered to match the Sherriff offer from the 

first listing period after Sherriff cancelled escrow. Chandler 

refused. Dilonell again emerged as the high bidder at the end of 

the second listing period, after Chandler refused a higher third 

party offer. At this point, the market has spoken. Facilitating 

the completion of the sale at this fair market price by requiring a 
10

deposit of only 50 percent of the purchase price (the amount due 

to Chandler) is consistent with the goals of a partition action and 

the trial court’s October 2, 2019, order, and is in both parties’ best 

interests at this point.

Placing obstacles in the way of Dilonell’s purchase is not in 

either party’s best interest. Chandler expressly claims on appeal 

that requiring a deposit of the full purchase price would prevent 

Dilonell from purchasing the property, and that the late third 

party offer she somehow found would then become the high offer. 

She contends that the third party offer represents the true 

market value and it is only fair that the property be sold for this 

price. This is wishful thinking. The trial court rejected this late

third party offer when it ordered Chandler to sign the purchase 

agreement for the Dilonell offer. We see no abuse of discretion in 

this decision, as the late third party offer clearly did not comply 

with the trial court’s orders. Thus, if the Dilonell offer is 

withdrawn due to a pointless requirement that she deposit money 

owed to herself in escrow, the listing process will start all over 

again. There is absolutely no guarantee that a third listing 

period will result in a higher final offer than the current Dilonell 

offer as borne out by the fact that, so far, successive listings have 

resulted in lower final offers.
11

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Appellant Chandler to 

bear costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.