NO. 92-617 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1993 

STATE OF MONTANA, "* " g 

Plaintiff and Respondent, &ma $, .: 

ii; 8. 

JOSEPH RAY RENTMEISTER, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Joseph Ray Rentmeister, Pro Se, 

Black Eagle, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, 

Micheal S. Wellenstein, Asst. Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana; Patrick L. Paul, Cascade 

County Attorney, Gene Allison, Deputy County 

Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: June 17, 1993 

Decided: September 16, 1993 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant Joseph Ray Rentmeister appeals an order of the 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, finding him guilty 

of attempting to transport his oversized house trailer on a public 

highway. 

We affirm. 

Appellant raises two issues. 

1. Did the District Court err in finding that 5 61-10-102, 

MCA, was the controlling statute, as opposed to g 61-4-310, MCA, in 

regard to the transporting of appelianc's house rrailer? 

2. Did the District Court err in finding that the officer 

issuing the citation had the authority to enforce the width 

requirement of g 61-10-102, MCA? 

On November 26, 1991, Appellant was charged by complaint in 

Justice Court under § 61-10-102, MCA, with exceeding vehicle width 

requirements when attempting to transport his house trailer on a 

Great Falls city street. On May 1, 1992, the Justice Court found 

appellant guilty, fined him $50, and ordered that he pay $15 in 

costs. Appellant appealed the conviction to the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, which conducted a bench trial. On October 15, 

1992, the District Court found appellant guilty and imposed the 

same penalties as did the Justice Court. On November 24, 1992, 

appellant filed notice of appeal to this Court. 

1. 

Did the District Court err in finding that g 61-10-102, MCA, 

was the controlling statute, as opposed to 5 61-4-310, MCA, in 

regard to the transporting of appellant's house trailer? 

2 
Appellant does not deny that his vehicle exceeded the 102-inch 

maximum width mandated by 5 61-10-102, MCA. Rather, he argues that 

the transportation of his house trailer is controlled by 

§ 61-4-310, MCA. As required by § 61-4-310, MCA, appellant 

acquired a permit to make a single movement of his house trailer 

and paid a $5 movement fee. He argues that after purchasing the 

moving permit, he was authorized to transport the house trailer, 

regardless of the maximum width mandated in 61-10-102, MCA. 

Appellant is mistaken. Section 61-4-310(1), MCA, provides: 

A vehicle, subject to license under this title, may be 

moved unladen upon the highways of this state from a 

point within the state to a point of destination. The 

county treasurer at the point of the origin of the 

movement shall issue a special permit therefor in lieu of 

fees required under 61-3-321 and part 2 of chapter 10 of 

this title, upon application presented to him in such 

form as shall be provided by the department and upon 

exhibiting to said county treasurer proof of ownership 

and evidence that the personal property taxes on such 

vehicle, if any are due thereon, have been paid and upon 

payment therefor of a fee of $5. Such permit shall not be 

in lieu of fees and permits required under 61-4-301 and 

61-4-302. 

Clearly, this section does not govern the width requirement for 

transportation of vehicles, such as house trailers. Instead, this 

section pertains to whether property taxes have been paid on a 

vehicle that will undergo a single movement. 

The State is correct to assert that 8 61-10-102, MCA, controls 

this case. Chapter 10, Title 61, governs the maximum dimensions, 

weights, and other characteristics of motor vehicles operating over 

Montana highways. Section 61-10-101, MCA. In particular, 

§ 61-10-102 (1) , MCA, provides that "no vehicle, including a bus, 
unloaded or with load, may have a total outside width in excess of 

102 inches." According to the evidence, which appellant did not 

dispute, his house trailer measured 168 inches; clearly exceeding 

the 102-inch maximum. Appellant's solution to the problem would 

have been to apply for and receive a special permit pursuant to 

g 61-10-121, MCA, authorizing him to operate and move his house 

trailer which exceeded the maximum width allowable. 

We hold that the District Court did not err when it found that 

g 61-10-102, MCA, was the controlling statute, as opposed to 

5 61-4-310, MCA, in regard to transportation of appeliantis house 

trailer. 

11. 

Did the District Court err in finding that the officer issuing 

the citation had the authority to enforce the width requirement of 

9 61-10-102, MCA? 

Appellant argues that the citing officer did not have the 

authority to enforce the width requirement of g 61-10-102, MCA, by 

writing him a ticket. Again, appellant is mistaken. Section 

61-12-206, MCA, authorizes the Department of Transportation to 

enforce the width requirements of 5 61-10-102, MCA, the controlling 

statute in this case. Section 61-12-206(1), MCA, provides in part 

that "[e]mployees appointed under 61-12-201 may make arrests for 

violations of the following statutory provisions only: (a) part 1, 

chapter 10, of this title . . . . " Section 61-10-102, MCA, is 

specifically included in this cross-reference. Thus, as occurred, 

the citing officer had the authority to arrest and deliver to 
appellant a notice to appear before the nearest justice of the 

peace, and which described the nature of the offense. See 

§ 61-12-208, MCA. 

We hold that the District Court correctly found that the 

citing officer had the authority to enforce the width requirement 

of 5 61-10-102, MCA. 

We affirm. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a pubiic document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

We concur: 
September 16, 1993 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following 

named: 

Joseph Ray Rentmcistcr 

P.O. Box 46 

Black Eagle, MT 59414 

Hon. Joseph Mazurek, Attorney General 

Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant 

215 N. Sanders, Justice Bldg. 

Helena, MT 59620 

Patrick L. Paul, County Attorney 

M. Gene Allison, Deputy 

Cascade County Courthouse 

Great Falls, MT 59401 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

Deputy