alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Henry Lieber, et al., *v.*Henry Cooper.

Sale of Real Estate — Lien for Purchase Money — Notice.

A lien for purchase money of real estate may be provided for in the deed and when such a deed is recorded a purchaser is bound to take notice of the lien.

APPEAL PROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT.

October 25, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer :

A lien is expressly retained in the deed from Jenkins to Mrs. Wright to secure the payment of the purchase money, and unless the notes held by the appellee as assignee of Jenkins have been paid, of which there is now no evidence in the record, he has a lien on the land enforceable against Brandenburg, even though he be a purchaser for value without actual notice. He was bound to take notice of the lien reserved in the deed.

*783*Lewis & Fairleigh, Edwards & Seyman, for appellants.*

*A. T. Rankin, for appellee.*

But we are of the opinion that the appellee has no lien on the land to secure the notes on King assigned to him by Wright. Mrs. Wright and her husband had conveyed the land to Brandenburg & Lieber, and of course she could not assert a lien against her vendees, and the appellee can be in no better attitude in this respect than she would be in were she suing on the notes. Whatever claim the appellee has as to those notes he derived from her and her'husband, and any defense against her is good against him. Having sold and conveyed the land to Brandenburg & Lieber, she could not have a claim against King for the purchase money he agreed to pay her, and could not reach the land through him.

The appellee has a judgment in personami against King, but that judgment does not bind Brandenburg & Lieber, nor their vendee, Brandenburg, nor give a lien on the land. Nor can the appellee reach the land as the property of King under his proceeding on the return of no property. Kiñg had no property in the land at the institution of this suit. The sale to him was void, and the subsequent sale and conveyance to Brandenburg & Lieber divested Mrs. Wright of title and left her assignee without any claim whatever upon the land, even though Brandenburg & Lieber may have had notice of the sale to King, for, that sale being void, Mrs. Wright’s assignee would not have a lien enforcible even against her. She could not incumber her land in that way.

Judgment *reversed,*and cause remanded with directions to render judgment for the appellee to sell so much of the land as will pay the balance due on the notes held by him as assignee of Jenkins, and to dismiss the residue of the petition.
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<PAGE>
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP., WHICH WERE FILED
WITH SEC FORM 10-K, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<NAME> NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP.
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#### V. D. McManama *v.*Isabella Campbell, et al.

Redemption from Sale of Real Estate — Agreement to Extend Time for Redemption.'

The owner of land sold on decree may redeem it from sale within a year, but where the purchaser at such a sale for a consideration agrees to give the owner a longer time and breaks the agreement and procures a deed from the sheriff, the owner may set such deed aside and be allowed to redeem within the time agreed upon between the parties.

APPEAL PROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT.

January 26, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

It is alleged in substance in the amended answer that before the expiration of the year in which the appellant had the right to redeem, it was agreed between himself (the defendant) and the plain-' *587tiffs that the time for redemption should be extended until the first of March, 1873, in consideration that the defendant would at that time pay to the plaintiffs the sum of one hundred dollars in addition to the amount that would be due on the execution; that the plaintiffs, prior to that time, and in violation of .the agreement, obtained from the sheriff a deed to the land, and are now asserting their right to recover the possession by reason of said deed, etc. He asks that he be allowed to redeem and the deed be cancelled.

/. *J. Laudmm, for appellant.*

*I. M. Collins, E. H. Smith, for appellees.*

If such was the agreement between the parties the appellees were not entitled to a deed until the expiration of the time at which the appellant was allowed to redeem, and having violated their agreement by accepting the deed, or having it executed to them by the sheriff before they were entitled to it, cannot defeat appellant’s equitable right because of his failure to tender the money. This agreement, if made, was binding on the parties and the appellees having procured the deed prior to the 1st of March violated the contract and released the appellant from the necessity of making a tender. It was, in effect, saying to appellant, “You shall not have the land although you may be willing to pay the money,” and besides, the deed, having been made before the time for redemption expired, passed no title to appellees. That it was so made is admitted by the demurrer, and all the allegations of the answer and amended answer must be taken as confessed. The appellant is now asking to enforce the agreement, and he should be permitted to redeem if the statements of his answer are sustained by the proof. The court erred in refusing to permit appellant to file his amended answer offered at the May term, 1875. It is too late to object to the manner in which the last pleading was supplied after the answer was filed, even if it be regarded as error.

The judgment is *reversed*and cause remanded with directions to award appellant a new trial, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. *Stapp v. Phelps,*7 Dana 296.
EXHIBIT 32.02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection
with the Annual Report of Kana Software, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Michael J. Shannahan, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, in accordance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.02, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                      |  |  |  |                                             
|--------------------- |  |  |  | --------------------------------------------
|                      |  | 
|Dated: March 17, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ MICHAEL J. SHANNAHAN                    
|                      |  |  |  | Michael J. Shannahan Chief Financial
Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### William Hicks v. Daniel C. Lyle.

*Trover lies for conversion of chattel notes.*

In Michigan a chattel note is transferable and the assignee can sue upon it (Comp. L. § 5775) and trover lies for its conversion.

A bailee of a note who gives it up, without authority, to be destroyed is liable for its conversion.

The Supreme Court does not weigh testimony in law cases, or judge of its truth.

Error to Kent.

Submitted June 29.

Decided July 1.

Trover. Plaintiff brings error.

Peversed.

*C. G. & W. W. Hyde*for plaintiff in error.

A promissory note can be converted: *Burrows v. Keays 37*Mich. 433; where one is only authorized to deliver a note to another, any other disposition of.it is conversion: *Fisher v. Kyle*27 Mich. 454; *Stewart v. Martin*49 Vt. 266 ; *Kingman v.*Pierce 17 Mass. 247.

*D. E. Corbitt*for defendant in error.

Cooley, J.

This case originated in justice’s court, and was removed to the circuit court by *certiorari.*Hicks was plaintiff in the justice’s court, and counted upon the conversion of a chattel note which was payable in cedar posts. In justice’s court he recovered judgment which was reversed in the circuit court.

*489The sole questions which we find to be open to us on this record *are*— First, whether such a note is the subject of conversion; and *second,*if so, whether there was in the case any evidence tending to show a conversion. On both these questions the case is with the plaintiff.

A chattel note in this State is the subject of transfer, and suit may be brought upon it in the name of the assignee. Oomp. L. § 5778. As respects this action, therefore, it does not differ from a promissory note; and the right to bring trover for a promissory note, is unquestionable. *Bose v. Lewis*10 Mich. 483. The evidence of conversion in this case was that the note was left with Lyle, together with other papers belonging to different persons, to be delivered to the several persons owning them, and that the maker of this note, by means of the false statement that he had paid it up with the exception of two dollars, induced Lyle to give it up for that sum, and immediately destroyed it. The maker of the note admitted that his statement was false, but he added that Lyle knew it at the time. It is probable • this was false, but we do not weigh testimony or judge of its truth. There was certainly evidence tending to show that Lyle delivered the note to the maker for destruction without any authority therefor; and this was evidence of a conversion.

The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed with costs of both courts and that of the justice affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.
[Exhibit 32.2]

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Annual Report of BF Acquisition Group
V,  Inc.  (the "Company") on  Form 10-KSB for  the period  ending
April  30,  2001  as  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William Colucci,
Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of
2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements  of
Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act  of  1934;
and
          (2)  The  information contained in  the  Report  fairly
presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition  and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: June 16, 2004

                                 /s/ William Colucci
                                 -------------------------------
                                 William Colucci, Treasurer
                                 BF Acquisition Group II, Inc.
**EXHIBIT 21.1**

**LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY **

| ** ** | **COMPANY NAME**                        | **STATE OF  INCORPORATION/ORGANIZATION**    |
|------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1.         | Eddy Potash, Inc.                       | Mississippi                                 |
| 2.         | Melamine Chemicals, Inc.                | Delaware                                    |
| 3.         | MissChem (Barbados) SRL                 | Barbados Society With  Restricted Liability |
| 4.         | MissChem Nitrogen, L.L.C.               | Delaware                                    |
| 5.         | MissChem Trinidad Limited               | The Republic of  Trinidad and Tobago        |
| 6.         | Mississippi Chemical Company, L.P.      | Delaware                                    |
| 7.         | Mississippi Chemical Holdings, Inc.     | British Virgin Islands                      |
| 8.         | Mississippi Chemical Management Company | Delaware                                    |
| 9.         | Mississippi Nitrogen, Inc.              | Delaware                                    |
| 10.        | Mississippi Phosphates Corporation      | Delaware                                    |
| 11.        | Mississippi Potash, Inc.                | Mississippi                                 |
| 12.        | Triad Nitrogen, L.L.C.                  | Delaware                                    |

** **
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### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

RONALD SMITH

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 2672

[ May 6, 2021 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Ernest A. Kollra

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 07

- 23026CF10A

.

Ronald Smith, Okeechobee, pro se.

No brief filed for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

M AY

, G ERBER

, and A RTAU

, JJ., conc ur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### W. J. Walker *v.*G. W. Craddock.

Suit on Judgment — Pleading.

A petition on a judgment, to be sufficient, must aver that tbe judgment sued on was unpaid at tbe time tbe suit was brought.

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 6, 1875.

*John L. Scott, for appellant.*

*G. W. Craddock, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

It is not alleged that the judgment, satisfaction of which is sought in this suit, was unpaid at the time the suit was brought; and the petition is, therefore, insufficient, and the judgment in this case must consequently be reversed.

As any inaccuracy of the judgment may be corrected upon a return of the cause, it is not necessary to decide whether such inaccuracy is error to be corrected here, or misprision to be corrected in the court below.

The judgment is *reversed*and the cause is remanded with directions to allow the appellee to amend his petition and for further proceedings.