2010, Hicks filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the 

district court denied as untimely, because it was filed more than a year 

after the judgment of conviction was filed, and successive. This court 

reversed, concluding that because Hicks' Lozada petition was his appeal 

deprivation remedy, his second petition was timely and not successive. 

Hicks v. State, Docket No. 56486 (Order of Reversal and Remand, April 6, 

2011). After remand, the district court denied Hicks' petition on the 

merits,' and this appeal followed. 2 

Hicks argues that the district court erred by denying his 

claims that trial counsel was ineffective. To prove ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance 

was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

and resulting prejudice in that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

'While the district court's order states that Hicks' claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel are time-barred, it also addresses the 

merits of Hicks' claims. Hicks' claims were not time-barred, see id., and 

the district court appropriately reached the merits of his claims. 

2The State contends that Hicks' claims are successive because his 

first petition raised some claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which 

were addressed by the district court. However, this did not preclude Hicks 

from raising additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial and Lozada 

counsel in the instant petition. See generally NRAP 4(c)(4) (providing that 

"[a] habeas corpus petition filed after a direct appeal conducted under [the 

rule that replaced the Lozada remedy] shall not be deemed a 'second or 

successive petition' under NRS 34.810(2)"); In re Olabode, 325 F.3d 166, 

171 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the majority approach that a post-conviction 

petition is not successive when it follows a petition which raised a valid 

appeal deprivation claim). 

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different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden 

v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test 

in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. We give deference to the district court's 

factual findings but review the court's application of the law to those facts 

de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). 

Hicks argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to witness 

bolstering, object to the prosecutor's use of a "golden rule" argument and 

injection of personal opinion during closing argument, seek the recusal of 

the trial judge, and move for a mistrial. The district court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing and denied these claims because it concluded that 

they were strategic decisions of counsel and Hicks failed to demonstrate 

that the verdict would have otherwise been different. We conclude that 

the district court did not err by denying these claims. 

Hicks also argues that the district court erred by denying his 

claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of 

appeal and that the Lozada remedy is not adequate to cure the deprivation 

of a direct appeal. Because Hicks was provided an adequate appeal 

deprivation remedy pursuant to Lozada, we conclude that the district 

court did not err by denying these claims. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 

387, 399 (1985) (expressing approval of a state court's use of a 

"postconviction attack of the trial judgment as the appropriate remedy for 

frustrated right of appeal" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Finally, Hicks argues that the district court erred by denying 

his claim that counsel's errors, considered cumulatively, warrant relief. 

Because we agree with the district court that counsel was not ineffective, 

there are no errors to cumulate. 

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Parraguirre '"" Cherry 

- ewe3 

Having concluded that Hicks' contentions are without merit, 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

fACtt 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Matthew D. Carling 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3Hicks also argues that the district court erred by denying his claims 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict 

on the conspiracy charge or object to the conspiracy instruction, and that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to raise "meritorious issues on 

appeal." Hicks fails to support these claims with any cogent argument or 

relevant authority and therefore we decline to consider them. Maresca v. 

State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

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