PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 95-5088

KENNETH EDWARD BULLOCK, a/k/a

K.B., a/k/a Pete,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CR-94-160)

Argued: July 10, 1996

Decided: August 30, 1996

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Michael and Judge Motz joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Anthony George Spencer, MORCHOWER, LUXTON &

WHALEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Laura Marie Everhart,

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Michael Morchower, Christopher C. Booberg, MORCHOWER, LUXTON & WHALEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellee.
OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After Kenneth E. Bullock was indicted for various federal narcotics

offenses, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress, inter alia, more than

nine kilograms of cocaine discovered during a search on July 13,

1994, of the automobile he had been driving. When the district court

refused to suppress the cocaine, Bullock pled guilty to conspiring to

distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court sentenced him to 324 months imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Bullock reserved for appeal his right to challenge the search and

evidentiary rulings made at the suppression hearing.

On appeal, Bullock contends that the automobile search violated

his Fourth Amendment rights because (1) his traffic stop was pretextual; (2) his consent was produced by "pressure and coercion"; (3) his

consent did not permit police to cut open the automobile's concealed

compartment; (4) his arrest was not supported by probable cause; and

(5) his arrest, even if valid, did not justify a warrantless search of the

car. Bullock also contends that the district court violated his constitutional right to confront the officer who had stopped him by refusing,

during the suppression hearing, to allow him to present evidence and

to cross-examine the officer about his practice of escalating traffic

stops of young black males into drug interdiction searches. Because

we find Bullock's contentions without merit, we affirm.

I

Late in the morning of July 13, 1994, Maryland State Police Officers M.A. Lewis and R.A. Gunter stopped a brown Nissan Maxima

which had a cracked windshield and was proceeding on Route 13 in

Salisbury, Maryland, at 61 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.

The driver, Kenneth E. Bullock, was unable to produce a driver's

license or any other identification, but he did hand Officer Lewis the

car's registration, which was in the name of "Quincy Jones." In

retrieving the registration from the center console, Bullock quickly

opened and closed the lid and attempted to block Officer Lewis' view

of the console's contents with his shoulder. Officer Lewis neverthe-

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less was able to observe a large bundle of cash in the console, secured

with a rubber band. Lewis also observed two cellular telephones and

a beeper elsewhere in the car. At the time of the stop, Raheema Watson was reclining in the passenger seat.

After receiving the car registration, Lewis asked Bullock to step

out to the rear of the car to answer some questions. Bullock falsely

identified himself as his brother, Keith J. Bullock, and stated that he

was returning to Norfolk, Virginia, after having picked up his girlfriend from "the college" in Dover, Delaware. Bullock also claimed

that Quincy Jones was a friend who had lent him the car.

Officer Lewis then questioned Raheema Watson separately. She

too said that Bullock's name was Keith and that he had just picked

her up from college in Delaware. But Watson could not tell Officer

Lewis the name of the college. And, while talking to Lewis, Watson

frequently looked over her shoulder in Bullock's direction.

Officer Lewis returned to Bullock and asked him about the money.

Bullock represented that the roll contained $600 or $700. Lewis then

asked Bullock if the car contained any drugs or weapons. Bullock

responded negatively and said that Officer Lewis could check the car

if he wished.

At that point, Officer Lewis removed the cash from the center console and approached Bullock. As Lewis began counting the money,

Bullock admitted that the bundle contained over $2,000. He stated

that he had planned to use the money on a shopping trip in Norfolk

and again told Officer Lewis that he could search the car.

Officer Lewis then presented Bullock with a standard Maryland

State Police consent-to-search form, which advised Bullock of his

right to refuse consent to search the car, informed Bullock that signing the form acknowledged that he had given his knowing and voluntary consent "without fear, threat, or promise either express or

implied," and stated that consent to search the car included "any suitcases, boxes or other containers within" the car. After Officer Lewis

read and explained the form, Bullock indicated that he understood it

and signed the form "Keith Bullock."

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During his search of the car, Officer Lewis first found a fully

loaded 15-round, 9 millimeter clip containing "Black Talon" ammunition. Searching for a weapon, Officers Lewis and Gunter pulled the

back seat down to discover a door and false compartment that

appeared to have been professionally installed. As he attempted to

open the compartment, Officer Lewis observed Bullock acting nervously. Lewis then instructed Officer K.J. Plunkert, who had been

called for backup, to arrest Bullock and Watson.

After attempting unsuccessfully to open the secret compartment,

Officers Lewis and Gunter drove the cars to a nearby state police barracks where Lewis cut the compartment open and discovered 9.7 kilograms of cocaine.

On December 1, 1994, Bullock was charged in a 20-count indictment with various federal drug offenses. He filed a pretrial motion to

suppress, inter alia, the cocaine that had been discovered during the

July 13, 1994, search of the car he had been driving.

At the suppression hearing, Bullock sought to introduce for

impeachment purposes a series of incident reports involving stops that

Officer Lewis had made from February 1993 through August 1994.

Bullock argued that the reports revealed Lewis' modus operandi of

using routine traffic stops to obtain drivers' consent to search. The

district court refused to permit the evidence and any crossexamination about Lewis' prior stops, explaining that while the legality of a search must be based on the totality of circumstances, evidence concerning past stops would enmesh the court in collateral

issues. The court further noted that there was sufficient evidence to

allow it "to make th[e] determination [as to whether Officer Lewis

had sufficient justification] without going back and trying to examine

his motives or his MO in other kinds of cases."

After the hearing, the district court denied Bullock's motion to suppress the cocaine, and Bullock entered into a plea agreement with the

United States. Pursuant to the agreement, Bullock conditionally pled

guilty to Count I of his indictment, which charged him with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine

and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the government

dismissed the remaining counts.

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This appeal followed.

II

Bullock first contends that the district court erred in refusing to

permit him to introduce evidence concerning Officer Lewis' prior

traffic stops and to cross-examine Lewis about them. We disagree.

The district court astutely recognized the danger of enmeshing the

court in mini-trials about each of Officer Lewis' past stops. Focusing

on such collateral matters would unduly encumber the court's proceedings. Moreover, Officer Lewis' subjective motives are irrelevant

to a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v. United States,

116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). Finally, Bullock failed to lay any foundation for an equal protection challenge based on racially selective

enforcement procedures. Id. (selective enforcement based on race

implicates equal protection, not Fourth Amendment); see also

Armstrong v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (standard

for establishing Fifth Amendment selective-prosecution claim is "a

demanding one").*

III

Turning to the automobile search, Bullock does not deny that after

Officer Lewis stopped him, he gave Lewis consent to search the automobile. He argues, rather, that the stop was motivated by a race-based

drug courier profile and that his consent was produced by pressure

and coercion. These contentions are without merit. Officer Lewis'

motives for stopping an automobile that was violating traffic laws is

irrelevant to the legitimacy of the stop under a Fourth Amendment

analysis. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. And while racially motivated

law enforcement can violate the equal protection component of the

Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see id., Bullock has failed

to meet the rigorous standard for proving such a violation, see

Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486. Also, we find no evidence that the

officers placed undue pressure on Bullock to sign the consent form.

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*Because of our rulings here, we deny Bullock's motion to supplement

the record or to take judicial notice of these earlier, unrelated incidents.

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On the contrary, before signing the form, Bullock had eagerly offered

his consent to Officer Lewis two times.

Bullock argues further that the scope of his consent did not include

breaking open secret compartments and that the police did not have

probable cause for such a search. Even though Bullock's written consent encompassed "suitcases, boxes or other containers" within the

car, we need not decide whether a consent to search authorizes breaking into a secret compartment. The officers in this case had probable

cause to believe that the car Bullock had been driving contained contraband and, therefore, were justified in searching it without a warrant

under the well-established "automobile exception." See United States

v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.

102 (1994).

After the police officers legally stopped Bullock for traffic violations, he was unable to produce a driver's license or other identification. Although Bullock attempted to conceal Officer Lewis' view of

the center console, Lewis observed a large roll of cash, and, elsewhere

in the car, two cellular telephones and a beeper. After Bullock consented to a search of the vehicle, moreover, Lewis discovered ammunition and a secret compartment, often used, in Lewis' experience, by

drug traffickers to conceal contraband. And as the officers tried to

open the concealed compartment, Bullock acted nervously. Finally,

Bullock and his passenger gave incredible explanations for their trip,

claiming that Bullock was transporting his girlfriend home from a college that neither of them could name. We believe that these circumstances, taken in their totality, provided the officers with probable

cause to conduct the automobile search.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

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