* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 5, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-20083

Summary Calendar

 

ROYCE EUGENE MITCHELL, JR.; DR. CLIFFORD F. WILLIAM, J.D.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

GWYN SHEA, Secretary of State for the State of Texas; THE STATE

BAR OF TEXAS; THOMAS R. PHILLIPS; NATHAN L. HECHT; CRAIG T.

ENOCH; PRISCILLA R. OWEN; JAMES A. BAKER; DEBORAH G. HANKINSON;

HARRIET O’NEILL; WALLACE JEFFERSON; XAVIER RODRIGUEZ; JEFFREY A.

LEHMANN; BROADUS A. SPIVEY; TIMOTHY J. CLYNE; WILLIAM T. HAGAN;

KATHY HOLDER; R. LANCE FLORES; BRENT GAMBLE; DON W. BROWN; JAN

GREENBERG; MARSHALL HILL; DAVID LINKLETTER,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CV-2167

--------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Royce Eugene Mitchell, Jr. and Dr. Clifford F. William, J.D.,

appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant

to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). They challenge the constitutionality
2

of candidacy requirements for election to the Texas Supreme Court

and the State Bar Act requiring attorneys to be licensed to

practice law in Texas. Because Mitchell and William are not

licensed to practice law in the State of Texas, they are not

eligible to be candidates for a position on the Texas Supreme

Court. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (West 1993). The plaintiffs

have not shown that either the Tex. Const. art. V, § 2 or the State

Bar Act is unconstitutional under the United States or Texas

Constitutions.

The plaintiffs argue that the Texas State Bar Association and

the other defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The plaintiffs

have not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that the

defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity connected

to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an

enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962; In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733,

741 (5th Cir. 1993).

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants interfered with the

freedom of elections and violated the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973. They have not alleged facts indicating that they were

removed from the ballot for a position on the Texas Supreme Court

due to their membership in a protected class in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1973. The record shows that they were removed from the

ballot because they were not licensed to practice law in the State

of Texas and, therefore, were not eligible to be candidates under
** Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

3

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2.

The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in

dismissing their complaint without conducting an evidentiary

hearing. Because the plaintiffs have not shown that they could

assert any viable claims if given an opportunity for additional

factual development, the district court did not err in dismissing

the complaint without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See,

e.g., Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1994).

The plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in

dismissing their complaint under the Rooker-Feldman** doctrine.

Because the issues raised in this case are inextricably intertwined

with these state court judgments concerning William, the district

court’s dismissal of William’s claims may be affirmed based on

applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davis v.

Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Sojourner T v.

Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants were not

entitled to immunity because they committed criminal actions.

Because the district court did not err in dismissing the

plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, the court need

not address this alleged error. See Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974

F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiffs’ appeal is without arguable merit and,
4

therefore, it is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707

F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.