alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**
 **OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Trintiy3 Corporation (the “Company”) on
Form 10-KSB for the quarter ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”),
I, Steven D. Hargreaves, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)  Information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Dated:
      April 21, 2005
    /s/
      Steven D. HargreavesBy:
      Steven D. HargreavesIts:
      Chief Financial Officer
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Trinity3 Corporation and will be retained by Trinity3 Corporation and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 26, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 70555]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27988]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--PXI Systems Alliance, Inc.

    Notice is hereby given that, on October 28, 2014, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), PXI Systems Alliance, Inc. 
has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney 
General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its 
membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending 
the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to 
actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Alazar 
Technologies, Inc., Pointe-Claire, Quebec City, CANADA, has been added 
as a party to this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and PXI Systems Alliance, Inc. intends 
to file additional written notifications disclosing all changes in 
membership.
    On November 22, 2000, PXI Systems Alliance, Inc. filed its original 
notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of 
Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 
6(b) of the Act on March 8, 2001 (66 FR 13971).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on August 8, 
2014. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54745).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2014-27988 Filed 11-25-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P
* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-10131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DENNIS EARL McMAHAN Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

(3:98-CR-341-ALL-R)

March 4, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

We have benefited from able argument and briefs of counsel. We

are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in

detaining McMahan pending trial.

AFFIRMED.
#### Louis R. HIXSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; Charles C. Plummer, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-16144.

D.C. No. CV-97-00589-SI.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 16, 2000.

Decided May 11, 2001.

*490Before WALLACE, FISHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Appellant Luis Hixson appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants on his discrimination, retaliation and due process claims.

Appellant failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding disparate treatment. *See Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225*F.3d 1115, 1122-23 (9th Cir.2000). Specifically, there was no evidence presented that similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated better than he. Appellant similarly failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding hostile work environment. *See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.,*934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir.1991). He failed to present evidence of severe or pervasive verbal or physical harassment because of his race or other protected status. Since Appellant never complained of discrimination based on his race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, there is no evidence that he engaged in an activity protected under Title VII. Consequently, his retaliation claim also fails. *See Payne v. Norwest Corp.,*113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.1997).

The district court’s grant of summary judgment on Appellant’s substantive due process claim was based upon qualified immunity. We review de novo the district court’s ruling on qualified immunity. *See Moran v. Washington,*147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.1998). Because the law in this Circuit has not clearly established a substantive due process claim for arbitrary discharge from public employment, we agree with the district court that Sheriff Plummer is entitled to qualified immunity. *See Lum v. Jensen,*876 F.2d 1385, 1387-89 (9th Cir.1989); *see also Portman v. County of Santa Clara,*995 F.2d 898, 908 (9th Cir.1993).

Finally, Appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his procedural due process claim. The record reflects that Appellant’s complaints were sufficiently investigated.

Because Appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his discrimination, retaliation and due process claims, we AFFIRM the decision below.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1512

In re: RAMESE AUGUSTUS MCKOY,

 Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(1:15-cr-00411-TDS-1; 1:17-cv-00514-TDS-JLW)

Submitted: August 20, 2019 Decided: September 3, 2019

Before FLOYD, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ramese Augustus McKoy, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ramese Augustus McKoy petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district 

court has unduly delayed in ruling on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. He seeks an 

order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not 

reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-92,046-03

EX PARTE DERIC EUGENE MADISON, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W14-76000-U(C) IN THE 291 DISTRICT COURT ST

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam. YEARY, J. filed a concurring opinion.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Fifth Court of

Appeals affirmed his conviction. Madison v. State, No. 05-15-00859-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov.

8, 2016)(not designated for publication) Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus

in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective by requesting a

felonymurder charge which contradicted the defense at trial, by abandoning and failing to argue the

viable defense, and by failing to move for a directed verdict. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true,

might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, the record
2

should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. TEX.CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim. 

In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the

trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is

indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him

at the hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial

court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel’s name.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whethertrial counsel’s

performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court may make any other

findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant’s claims.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from

the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s

findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things,

affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from

hearings and depositions. See TEX.R.APP.P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested

by the trial court and obtained from this Court.

Filed: January 25, 2023

Do not publish
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Scott L. Vining, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Paragon Financial Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a.) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b.) [intentionally omitted] 

 

c.) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

d.) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a.) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b.) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting. 

 

Dated: April 14, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM EMPIRE GOLD
INC.'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AT DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND DEFICIT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           2,457
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   85,029
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                87,486
<PP&E>                                         489,536
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 577,022
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          253,462
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    48,405,267
<OTHER-SE>                                (48,081,707)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   577,022
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   413
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (77,970)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 78,383
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             78,383
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    78,383
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

November 20, 2012

p1113

Order 

November 20, 2012

145863

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145863

COA: 305475

Oakland CC: 2011-235533-FC

JONATHAN VINCENT HUNTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 24, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the 

cases of People v Hardy (Docket No. 144327) and People v Glenn (Docket No. 144979) 

are pending on appeal before this Court and that the decisions in those cases may resolve 

an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the 

application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1995.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                         204,056
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,726
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 211,782
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     (145,724)
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   211,782
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                58,990
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                35,039
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 23,951
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             23,951
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,951
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .02
<FN>
<F1>REGISTRANT HAS AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
             PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Telecom, Inc. ("the Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Alexander
Vinogradov, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; as amended; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
28th day of March 2003.



/s/ ALEXANDER VINOGRADOV
--------------------------------------

Alexander Vinogradov
President, Chief Executive Officer and
Director



<PAGE>
                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Telecom, Inc. ("the Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, David Stewart,
Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Director of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; as amended; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
28th day of March 2003.



/s/ DAVID STEWART
-------------------------------

David Stewart
Senior Vice President, Chief
Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### Martin McFall *v.*Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Criminal Law — Insanity—Instruction.

Insanity of a defendant at the time of the commission of a crime is a complete defense.

Where there is evidence produced in a criminal cause that the defendant was at the time of the offense on the verge of delirium tremens, and where instructions are asked, the court should instruct the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime, was not sane, and could not, because of mental incapacity, know right from wrong, whether that incapacity was caused by drink or not, they should acquit.

APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT.

December 8, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

McFall was indicted for a breach of the peace. The proof disclosed an aggravated assault upon the person of his wife.

It was proved by a practicing physician that a day or two after the assault, McFall was apparently on the verge of *delirium tremens,*and that he was very much frightened. In the opinion of the witness he was not then responsible for his acts. Another witness proves that he saw him the morning after the assault, and that he seemed to be dodging, and frightened. It is further proved that on the same morning, McFall was found in a dark room, and that he “looked cowed and frightened, and was dodging.”

Upon this proof, the defendant asked that the jury be instructed that if they should believe that “the defendant, at the time that it is alleged he assaulted his wife, was not sane, and could not, because of mental incapacity, know right from wrong, whether that incapacity was caused by drink or not, they ought to acquit.” The *237court refused so to instruct. In so refusing it erred. We know of no instance in which it has been held that a person, who is so far insane as not to know right from wrong, is criminally responsible for his acts. The cause of the want of mental capacity is- immaterial. The temporary aberration of the intellect, caused by drunkenness, does not excuse; but when from excessive indulgence, the drunkard becomes a lunatic, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, he must be treated as other insane persons.

*Edward Wallace, for appellant.*

*John Rodman, for appellee.*

It is not for this court to determine as to the sufficiency of the proof to sustain the plea of insanity. There was some evidence tending to sustain it, and therefore the defendant should have had the benefit of the instruction asked.

For the error indicated the judgment is *reversed*and the cause remanded for a new trial, upon principles consistent with this opinion.