alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Town of Bowling Green *v.*W. A. White.

Damages — Instruction—Compensatory Damages.

In. actions for personal injuries, the jury should have been instructed as to what elements or circumstances go to make up the compensation to be allowed the injured party.

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 17, 1874.

*Wright, Halsell, Mitchell, for appellant.*

-, *for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The instruction in this case authorized the jury to find for plaintiff the damages sustained, not exceeding $1,000. The objection to this mode of .instructing in actions for personal injury, is that, it furnishes the jury no standard or test by which to determine the amount proper to be given in the way of damages. It leaves that question to their uninstructed and fluctuating discretion. For injuries to property or for breaches of contract, this may be safely done, but not so in cases of injury to the person. The jury should, in this class of cases, be informed as to what elements or circumstances go to make up the compensation allowed by law, to the party injured. *Parker v. Jenkins,*3 Bush 587. It is clear that the verdict in this action was intended to cover more than the injury to appellee’s property, and that the personal injury entered into the consideration of the jury. . It is also clear that nothing more than compensatory damages could properly be given for this injury.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial, upon principles consistent with this opinion and with the law as defined in the case cited.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-1476
PETER JAMES ATHERTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ARLINGTON COUNTY, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at A lexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-81-1104-A) Submitted: April 28, 1998 Decided: June 2, 1998 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Peter James Atherton, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Peter James Atherton appeals the district court's order denying his motion to file an amended complaint without prejudice to his right to file a new complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. In an order dated January 26, 1982, the district court removed Atherton's case from the active docket, but retained jurisdiction to consider his claims once various state court proceedings had concluded. Although Atherton seeks to file an amended complaint on the basis that the state court proceedings have recently concluded, he provided noevidence to establish this fact. Further, the district court dismissed Atherton's motion without prejudice to his right to file a new complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. See Atherton v. Arlington County , No. CA-81-1104-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 10.10(b)**AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**     THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made as of this31st day of March, 2006, by and between Mylan Laboratories Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation (the“Company”), and                                          (“Executive”).     WHEREAS, the Company and Executive are party to that certain Executive Employment Agreementdated as of                      (the “Agreement”), pursuant to which the Company agrees to employExecutive, and Executive accepts such employment, as more particularly described in the Agreement;and     WHEREAS, as permitted by Section 15 of the Agreement, the Company and Executive desire toamend the Agreement, upon the terms and conditions set forth herein;     NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which arehereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:     1. The references to “March 31, 2006” in Section 2 (Effective Date; Term of Employment),Section 8(c) (Termination Without Cause) and Section 8(e) (Extension or Renewal) of the Agreementare hereby amended to read “March 31, 2008” in each instance.     2. (a) The parties acknowledge and agree that this Amendment is an integral part of theAgreement. Notwithstanding any provision of the Agreement to the contrary, in the event of anyconflict between this Amendment and the Agreement or any part of either of them, the terms of thisAmendment shall control.          (b) Except as expressly set forth herein, the terms and conditions of the Agreement are andshall remain in full force and effect.          (c) The Agreement, as amended by this Amendment, sets forth the entire understanding of theparties with respect to the subject matter thereof and hereof.          (d) This Amendment shall be governed by, interpreted under and construed in accordance withthe laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.          (e) This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be anoriginal and all of which shall constitute one and the same document.*[Signature page follows]*
 

 
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been duly executed and delivered as of the day and yearfirst above written.         MYLAN LABORATORIES INC.         By:            Name:     Title:            EXECUTIVE:            
2
11380.

#### Atlanta Milling Co. *v.*Acme Manufacturing Co.

Decided October 13, 1920.

Jenkins, P. J.

Where goods of a certain quality are ordered on contract for *future*delivery, and goods of an inferior quality are delivered, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the goods delivered, at the time and place of delivery, and the value of goods of the character ordered, at the time and place of delivery. *Seaboard Lumber Co.*v. *Cornelia Planing Mill Co.,*122 *Ca.*370 (50 S. E. 121).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*

*700Action on contract; from Fulton superior court — Judge Ellis. January 27, 1920.

The action was on a contract made in June, for the sale of cottonseed meal to the plaintiff, to be delivered in December. The plaintiff alleged that certain quantities of the cottonseed meal delivered contained less ammonia than the percentage of ammonia guaranteed in the contract. As to the measure of damages the trial judge charged the jury that the damages, if the plaintiff was entitled to recover, would be “the difference between the market value of the meal bargained for in June, 1916, to be delivered in December, 1916, at the time and place of delivery fixed by the contract, and the value of the meal actually delivered at the time and place named in the contract.” The verdict was for the plaintiff, and in the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the overruling of which was excepted to, it was alleged that the court erred in giving the instruction quoted above, because “the facts in this case showed that there was a delivery and acceptance of the meal by the buyer, and therefore the measure of damages would be the difference between the price paid and the value of the goods as they actually were at the time and place of delivery, and not the measure of damages as charged by the court.”' Refusal of a request to charge the jury in accordance with this contention was also complained of. These were the only grounds of the motion for a new trial other than the general grounds as to the verdict.

*J. W. Bachman, Evins & Moore,*for plaintiff in error.

*Bryan & Middlebrooks, Troutman & Freeman,*contra.
Did you also see the recent advances in acoustic listening devices to hear and 

evaluate sounds to identify lost people shouts, cries and banging through 

artificial intelligence?

The primary goal of the challenge 3.1 is to detect and communicate the location

of missing hikers. The lost hikers may be incapacitated and/or have degraded

ability to communicate, so any proposed sensor solution would need to be

capable of finding a stationary and relatively quiet person.

For FastFind challenge 3.1, do we get a dataset or a peek at the environment 

where UAS will be deployed to help find missing persons?

The total search area will not exceed 1200’ x 2400’. Maximum height of trees in

this forest is approximately 30’, and the composition of the forest is

predominately pine. Each contestant should design a solution that can deploy the

system, perform the search and return the UAS to the launch area within an hour

or less.

For 3.1 can we build a swarm of UAVs or only one UAV is allowed?

All operations at the MSU site must be conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part

107; 107.35 states : ”A person may not manipulate flight controls or act as a

remote pilot in command or visual observer in the operation of more than

one unmanned aircraft at the same time.” Therefore, a single operator controlling

more than one UAS is explicitly prohibited for this event. Given these FAA Part

107 parameters, the UAS solution can assess design trade-offs in accordance with

contest requirements, as outlined in the UAS Design Specification table beginning

on page 5 of the Official Challenge Rules. UAS requirements of particular note:

The Total System Weight must be under the 120 lbs. weight limit, the Maximum

Gross Takeoff Weight must be less than 55 lbs. per UAS in the system (FAA Part

107 compliance), and the total system cost must be under $20,000.
National Fire Protection Agency (1994). Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extingui.\·hingSystems, NFPA 200 I.

Papas, P., Fleming, J. W., and Sheinson, R. S. ([996). Extinction of non-premixed methane- and propane-air counterflow flames inhibited wjth CF4, CF3H and CF3Br. Proceedings of The Combustion Insrltute, 26, ]405-1411.

Pitts, W. M., and Blevins, L. G. (1999). An investigation of extinguishment by thennal agents using

detailed chemical modeling of oppo$Cd-flow diffusion flames. Proceedings of tl1« 9th Halon

Option;' Technical Working Conference (H01WC-99!, Albuquerql.le. NM, pp. 145-]56.

Raghunandan. B. N., and Yogesh. G. P. (1989). Recirculating flow over a burning surface-flame

structure and heat transfer augmentation. Proceedings afThe Combustion Institute, 22, 1501- 1507.

Rohmat, T. A., Katoh, Ii .• Obara, T., Yoshihashi. T., and Ohyagi. S. (J998). Diffusion !lame stabilized on a porous plate in a parallel airstream. AIAA J. 36, 1945-1952.

Saito, N., Ogawa. Y., Saso, Y., and Sakai, R. (1996). Improvement on Reproducibility of Flame

Extinguishing Concentration Measured by Cup Burner Method. Report of Fire Research Institute of Japan, No. 81, pp. 22-29.

Sakai, R., Saito, N., Saso. Y, Ogawa. Y., and Inoue, Y. (1995). Flame Extinguishing Concentrations

of Halon Replacements for Flammable Liquids. Report of Fire Research Institute of Japan, No. 80, pp. 36--42.

Saso, Y., Saito, N., Liao, c., and Ogawa, Y. (1996). Extinction of counterflow diffusion flames with

halon replacements. Fire Safety Journal, 26, 303-326.

Sheinson, R. S., Pener-}-jahn, J. E., and Indritz, D. (1989). The physical and chemical action of fire

suppre,sants. Fire SafetvJoumal, 15,437-450.

Simmons, R. E, and Wolfh~d. H. G. (1957). Some limiting oxygen concentrations for diffusion

flames in air diluted with nitrogen. Combustion and Flame. 1, 155--161.

Takahashi, F.. Schmoll, W. 1., Strader, E. A., and Belovich, V. M. (2000). Suppression of a nonpremixed flame sca.bilized by a backward-facing step. CombLL~lionand Flame. l22, ]05-116.

Tieszen, S. R., and Lopez, A. R. (1999). Issues in nl.lmericaI simulation of fire suppression. Proceedings of the 9th Halon Options Technical Working Conference (HOTWC-99), Albuquerque, NM, pp.178-190.

Tsuji, H. (1982). COUnter flow diffusion flames. Prog. EI1«rgyComhust. Sci., 8, 93-119.

United Nations Envirollment Programme (UNEP) (1994). Report of thi! Halon Fire Extinguishing

Agenls Tech'zical Oation.> Committee.

Williams, F. A. (1974). A unified view of fire suppression.Journal of Fire & Flammability, 5, 54-63.

Winterfeld, G. (1965). On processes of turbu!ent exchange behind flame hoMers. Proceedings of The

Combustion Instil'lL!e, 10, 1265-1275.

130 FUMIAKI TAKAHASHI et al. l

I
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1581 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to standardize work requirements for able-bodied adults enrolled in the supplemental nutrition assistance program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 14, 2023 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota (for himself, Mr. ELLZEY, Mr. EDWARDS, Mr. 

DAVIDSON, Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. PFLUGER, Mrs. 

CHAVEZ-DEREMER, Mr. BRECHEEN, Mrs. KIGGANS of Virginia, Mr. 

OGLES, Mr. FEENSTRA, Mr. NEHLS, Mr. ZINKE, Mr. ALFORD, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Mr. FALLON, Ms. FOXX, Mr. GROTHMAN, Mr. WALBERG, 

Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. CLOUD, Mr. HUDSON, Mr. C. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida, and Mr. ROSENDALE) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to standardize work requirements for able-bodied adults enrolled 

in the supplemental nutrition assistance program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘America Works Act 

5 of 2023’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1581 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDING WORK REQUIREMENTS FOR ABLE-BOD2 IED ADULTS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRI3 TION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 

4 Section 6(o)(3) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 

5 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(3)) is amended to read as follows: 

6 ‘‘(3) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (2) shall not 

7 apply to an individual if the individual is— 

8 ‘‘(A) under 18 or over 65 years of age; 

9 ‘‘(B) medically certified as physically or 

10 mentally unfit for employment; 

11 ‘‘(C) a parent or other member of a house12 hold with responsibility for a dependent child 

13 under 7 years of age; 

14 ‘‘(D) otherwise exempt under subsection 

15 (d)(2); or 

16 ‘‘(E) a pregnant woman.’’. 

17 SEC. 3. STANDARDIZING ENFORCEMENT OF WORK RE18 QUIREMENTS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRI19 TION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 

20 Section 6(o)(4)(A)(ii) of the Food and Nutrition Act 

21 of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(4)(A)(ii)) is repealed. 

22 SEC. 4. ADJUSTING WORK REQUIREMENT EXEMPTIONS IN 

23 THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSIST24 ANCE PROGRAM. 

25 Section 6(o)(6) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 

26 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(6)) is amended in subparagraph 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1581 IH

1 (G) by inserting ‘‘that begins before the date of the enact2 ment of the America Works Act of 2023’’ after ‘‘year’’ 

3 the second place it appears. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### Anton Pulte v. Wayne Circuit Judge.

[See ante, p. 560.]

Where an appeal bond is defective or insufficient, the remedy is by-motion in the Supreme Court for leave to amend or file a new bond, and not by mandamus against the judge who approved it.

Motion for order to show cause.

Submitted October 11, 1881.

Denied October 12.

*Ed. E. Kane*for the motion.
11211.

#### Payne *v.*Braswell.

Decided June 15, 1920.

Foreclosure of lien; from city court of Monroe — Judge Stone. November 17, 1919.

*Orrin Roberts,*for plaintiff in error.

*R. L. & H. C. Cox, E. W. Roberts,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

1. The special grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit, and the evidence warranted the verdict for plaintiff.

2. Not being fully convinced that this case was brought to this court for delay only, the request to award damages against the plaintiff as provided by section 6213 of the Civil Code of 1910 is denied.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
United States Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For:

USDA/AMS/FGIS

Agricultural Marketing Service

Federal Grain Inspection Service

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international system of units (SI), maintains a documented calibration program, documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented measurement procedures, successfully completed training and proficiency tests, submitted a quality management system, 

and has demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate.

The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State 

Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. 

Scope

(Rev.: September 2021)

Mass Echelon III 

(Limited Availability)

10 000 lb

1000 lb

50 lb

25 lb

Railroad Test Cars

110 000 lb to 80 000 lb

2023

____________________________________

Katrice Lippa, Chief

NIST Office of Weights and Measures

Effective Dates: 2023-02-01 to 2024-02-01
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11** 
**- 2286** 

UNDER SEAL ,
Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

UNDER SEAL; UNDER SEAL ,
Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News

. Arenda Wright Allen , District Judge. ( 4:09

- cv
- 00056

- AWA

- TEM )

Submitted : February 21, 2012 Decided: February 23, 2012

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Under Seal, Appellant Pro Se. Craig Wittman, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
The pro se plaintiff/relator in this qui tam suit
appeals the d istrict court ’ s order s dismissing his action and
denying his subsequent motions to reconsider its ruling. We

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, though we grant the P laintiff’s pending motion to

seal, we affirm the judgmen t of the district court. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRME D
Exhibit 32.2

                              CNB BANCORP, INC.

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of CNB Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, George A.
Morgan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



By /s/ George A. Morgan
-----------------------------------------
George A. Morgan, Chief Financial Officer
August 10, 2005
11628.

#### Wright *v.*Wright.

Decided October 19, 1920.

Trover; from city court of Greensboro — Judge Brown. May 3, 1920.

*M. C. Few,*for plaintiff in error.

*Miles W. Lewis,*contra.

Smith, J.

1. The only special ground of the motion for a new trial relates to alleged newly discovered evidence of a certain witness. “ If • the newly discovered evidence is that of witnesses, affidavits as to their residence, associates, means of knowledge, character, and credibility must be adduced.” Civil Code (1910), § 6086. No such affidavits were presented in this ease. Moreover, the alleged newly discovered evidence was merely impeaching in its character, and not such as probably would change the result on another trial.

2. There was ample evidence to support the verdict, and the court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

3. The writ of error in this case being manifestly without merit, and evidently sued out for delay only, the prayer of the defendant in error that ten per cent, damages be awarded against the plaintiff in error, ■ as provided in section 6213 of the Civil Code of 1910, is granted. ■

*Judgment affimned, with damages.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
#### Jacob Coon v. Loren Houghton.

*Liability for property of stranger talcen without lea/oe.*

0. hired a steam saw and agreed to furnish, fuel. H. had some wood on O.’s premises and part of it being taken for fuel, he sued 0. Held, proper to charge that 0. would be liable if he furnished it to the workmen, or if he made no objection when he saw it taken and used.

Error to Ionia.

Submitted Oct. 20.

Decided Oct. 27.

Trespass. Defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

*Vosper Brothers*for plaintiff in error.

*John S. Bennett*for defendant in error.

Marston, O. J.

An action of trespass was brought in justice’s court to recover damages for taking and burning a quantity of wood and fence-caps belonging to the plaintiff Houghton. It appears that the plaintiff had some wood and fence-caps upon the defendant’s land; that the latter employed 02ie Durkee who ow2ied a steam sawing machine, to saw a quantity of wood for him, he, Ooon, agreeing to furnish fuel and water for the boile2\

The evidence tended to show that Durkee’s son was fireman ; that the plaintiff’s wood and caps were taken by the fireman, assisted by Coon’s boys, and used in firing; that the defendant Coon was working at the time assisting in cutting the wood and had an opportunity to see Durkee’s boy take and use this wood, and there was proof of an admission made by the defendant afterwards that he knew they were burn*241ing the wood but not the caps. The court charged the jury that if Durkee set his machine and made use of this wood, burning it as alleged, and without any action being taken in regal’d to it upon the part of the defendant,—if it was simply an act upon the part of Durkee and his boy, the defendant would not be liable; but if defendant in fulfilling his part of the agreement furnished this wood or in any way allowed it to be used by Durkee, standing around and seeing the parties use it and not saying a word about it, such would be considered as a permission to use it and he would be liable.

This, it seems to us, was as favorable as the defendant could ask, and the judgment should be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.