NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0291n.06 F iled: April 20, 2009 No. 07-1811 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DE NN IS K

IN CA DE , P etitioner -Appellant,
v. HUGH WOLF ENBARGER, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appeal from the Un ited St at e s D is tr ic t C our t fo r th e Eastern Distr ict of Michigan

Be for e : BOG G S, C hie f Judg e ; a nd G ILM AN and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s.

BOGG S, Chief

Judge. Petitioner-Appellant De nnis Kincade , proce eding p ro se, appea ls a district court’s denial of his pe tition for a writ of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The pe tition challenges Ki ncade ’s state c onviction for first-de g ree murder a nd possession of a fi re arm duri ng the c omm iss ion of a fe lony on the ba sis of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l and a pp e llate counsel. Kinc ade claims that trial counsel was ineffe ctive beca use he failed to a

pprise Kincade of the state sente ncing g uidelin es ap p l i ca b le to the state’s ple a off er a nd failed to objec t to alleg ed prosec utorial misconduct. Kinca de alleg es that appe l l at e counsel was ineffe ctive bec ause he abandone d claims of inef

fec tive assistance of trial counsel and failed to ra ise meritorious claims on direc t appea l. We hold that the district c ourt corr ectly denied Kincade ’s petition and, there fore , we aff irm.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 2 - I A De nn is K inc a de wa s c ha

rg e d in Way

ne County , M ic hig an w ithfi rs t- de g re e mur de r, a ssa ult with intent to commit murder, a nd possession of a fir ear m during t h e commis sion of a fe lony (“f elony firea rm”). T he cha

rg es stemmed fr om a shooting in De tr o i t o n November 7, 1984. The testimony at trial est ab l i shed that Kinca de and G lenn Thomas appr oache d Kevin Ta ylor and Car l B ra nh a m, a nd Ki nc a de fi re d a

g un a t T aylor . Taylor

die d f ro m th e re su lti ngg un sh ot w ound s. Kincade fired add i tional gunshots at B ranha m, who nonetheless r an aw ay uninjured. The prosec utor’s theory

was that Kinc ade intende d to shoot and kill Branha m, either be cause he wa s hir e d to kil l B ra

nh am or be c a

us e B ra nh a m sa w him sh oo t Ta

ylor . T ho ma s w a s a lso c ha rg e d w ith
mur de r a nd a ssa ult , p le a de d guil ty to a less e r c ha rg e , a nd a g re e d to te sti fy

a g a ins t K inc a de . B oth Thomas an d

B r an h am t e s ti f

ie d th a t T aylo r

w a s n o t a

r me d an d d id n o t t h r e a te nK in c a d e . Thomas testified that he a

nd Kincade visited Fre deric k Blakely at the latter ’s home and B lakely g ave K incade

a g un . T he thr e e me n le ft

and e nc ounte re d T aylor

and B ra nh a m in an a lle y : T h o ma s c o n c lu d e d

th a t d e f e n d an t w a s g o in g to r o b th e m [i.e. Taylo r an d B r an h a m]
. Def endant c alled for

Taylor and B ranha

m t o “c o m e h ere ” and the n told Thomas to gr ab B ra nh am. D e fe nd ant p ull e d o ut t he g un and fi re d tw o s ho ts at T aylor and tw o o r t hr e e sh ots at B ranha m as he ra n awa y . . . . Thomas saw no w eapons on Ta ylor or B ranha

m at any time, no r d id t he y make any

thr e a te nin g g e sture s to wa rd s d e fe nd ant. Acco rdi ngto T ho ma s’ testimony , defe ndant later told Thomas that he shot the wr ong person a nd would not ge t paid. Br anham’ s descr iption of the shooting was similar to Thomas’, a nd Br anham indicated that h e a n d T ay l o r h adt al k edt o Bl ak el y ab o u ts el l i n g dru gs a s h o rt t i m e b ef o re t h e s h o o t i n g. People v . Kincade , 4 12 N. W.2 d 2 52 , 252 -5 3 (Mi c h. Ct. Ap p. 19 87 ). Ki nc a de wa s th e on ly wi tne ss in his own defense . He a dmitted shooti ng Taylor, but claimed that he did so in self-def ense:No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 3 - De fe nd ant t e sti fi e d, ho we ve r, that he re c e ive d a c a ll fr om s ome on e name d Ro y and we nt t o Blakely ’s house to pic k up money Taylor owed him fr om a drugdeal. B lakely told defenda

nt that Taylor had jus t left, and had money and a pistol. Def

endant bor

rowe d Blakely ’s g un and he ld i t vi sib le in h is h a

nd a s he wa lke d tow ard s Ta ylor , tho ug h de fe nd ant sa id it wa s at hi s sid e . T ay lor

wa lke d to wa

rd s d e fe nd ant a

nd tol d h im h e ha d n o mo ne y . D e fe nd ant t old T h omas to watch B ranha m and to hold him. As Taylor approa ched, de fenda nt thought he was re achingfor a

g un and wa s g oing to shoot def endant, so he fired two shots. Taylor’s gun fell to the g round. De fenda nt fired two more shots in the air. He the n picked up a nd kept Taylor’s gun. Id . at 253. On J uly 23, 1985, a ju ry

acquitted Kinc ade of

the cha rg e of a ssault with intent to m urder Br anham, but found him g uilty of first-de g ree murder and felony firea rm. The trial c ourt sentenc ed Kincade to two y ear s in prison for the felony firea rm conviction and to a consecutive statutory term of life imprisonment without the possibili ty of par ole for the murder. B This case has a le ng thy

proce dural history , which is succinc tly summarized by

the distr i ct
c ourt : Di r e c t- App e al P r oc e e ding s: Pe tit ion e r [i .e . K inc a de ] ap pe a le d h is c on vic tio ns and wa s g ra nte d a re mand

so that he c ou ld file a moti on for new t rial and seek an evidentiar y hear ing on a

claim of inef

fec tive assistance of tr ia l couns e l. He and his a tto rn e y su bs e qu e ntl y de c ide d not t o p ur su e the ine ff e c tiv e ne ss c la im. I ns te a d , t h e y

a l l e g e d t h a ti tw a s e r

r o r t o a dm i tG l e n nT h o m a s ’ s g u i l t y p l e a in evidenc e. On Au gu st 3, 1987, two judge s of a thre e-judg e pane l affir med Petitioner’s convictions in a publi shed opi nion. See P eople v . Kincade , 41 2 N. W.2 d 25 2. Th e ma jor ity held that, althoug h an ac complice’ s g uilty plea gen er al l y

may not be used a s substantive e vid e nc e at a de fe nd ant’ s tr ia l, t he pr os e c uto r u se d G le nn Th oma s’ s guil ty

ple a to r e fute Petitioner’s theory

of self de fense and not a s substantive evidenc e of Petitioner’ s g uilt. The dissenting judg e voted to reve rse Petitioner’s c onviction on the basis that self def ense g oes to t he he art of an a lle g e d c ri min a l a c t and , th e re fo re , any e vid e nc e wh ic h ne g a te s se lf de fe ns e is substantive.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

See P eople v . Ginther , 212 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1973). 1 Th e c ourt

did no t spe c if

y wh ic h g ro un ds fo r c la imi ngine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l it 2 c on sid e re d “ ne w” and

the re fo re pr e c lud e d fr om c on sid e ra tio n un de r Mic hig an Co ur t Ru le (M CR) 6.508(D)( 3)(a )(b)

. People v . Kincade , No. 85-002809-01 ( Mich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2002). - 4 - State P ost-Conviction P roce edings, 1987-1998: Petitioner did not appeal the court of appeals dec ision to t he Michig an Supreme Court. He did file two pro se motions for a new tria l [ the first filed in September 1987, the sec ond on September 23, 1989], which the trial court denied. On a ppellate r eview of

the trial cour

t’s de nia l of the se c on d mo tio n f

or ne w tri a l, t

he Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court

re mand e d th e c a se to the trial court f

or a hear ing on Petitioner’s claim that he was denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of counse l. See People v . Kincade , 461 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1990). The tr ial court a ppointed counsel for

Petitio ner a

nd held a he aring

on J anuar

y 23-24, 1991, and A

pril 26, 1991 [“ Gi nther h e ar in g ” ]. O n th e f in a l d ay o f th e h e ar in g , th e tr ia l c o u rt d e n ie d r elief a fter 1 c on c lud ingthat Pe tit ion e r r e c e ive d e ff e c tiv e re pr e se ntatio n. Th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls aff irmed the trial c ourt’s dec ision, see Pe ople v. Kincade , No. 190068, 1997 Mich. App. L EXI S 2219 (Mich. Ct. App. N ov. 21, 1997), and the Michig an Supreme Court denied leave to a ppeal on September 2 8 , 1 9 98, see Pe ople v. Kincade , 586 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. 1998) (table)

.
F irst Habeas Corpus P etition, 1999-2001: Nex t , P et i t i o n er fi l ed a fe d er al h abea s corpus pe tition, which alleg ed (1) ineffe ctive assistance of trial and appellate counsel, (2) prosec utorial misconduct durin g cl o s ing argument, and (3) denial of the rig ht to poll t he jurors f ollowing their

verdic t. This [ fede ral district] Court dismi ssed the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust st ate r emedies for the second a

nd third claims. Se e Kin c ad e v . S te ga ll , N o. 99 -C V- 76 35 0- DT , 2 00 1 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 3039 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2001).
State P ost-Conviction P roce edings, 2002-2004: Petitioner then fil ed a motion for relief from judgme nt alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of tria l and appe llate counse l, prosecutor ial misconduct duringclosing argument, and denia l of the rig ht to poll t he jurors. [On Octobe r 21, 2002] [t] he trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. I t f ound no me ri t in

Pe tit ion e r’ s i nef

fe c tiv e ne ss c la ims , a

nd it s tate d th a t Pe tit ion e r c ou ld have r aised his cl ai m about pol ling the jur y [and “new ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel iss ue s” ] on ap pe a l fr om his c on vic tio ns .[ ] Th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls d e nie d le a ve to 2No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 5 - appea l the trial court’ s decision for f ailure to e stablish e ntitlement to relief under Michig an Court Rule 6.508(D). See P eople v . Kincade , No. 248330 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2003). On April 30, 2004, t he Mi chig an S upreme Court denied leave to appe al for the same re ason. See P eople v . Kincade , 679 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. 2004) (table ). Second Hab eas Cor pus P etition, 2004: Petitioner initi ated this ac t i o n b y fi l i ng a habe as cor pus petition on J uly

19, 2004. The habea s petition raised four claim s : (1) inef

fec tive assistance of trial counse l, (2) prose cutorial mis c on du c t, ( 3) de nia l of

the ri g ht t o p oll the jur

y , and (4 ) ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate counsel. Responde nt moved for summary judgme nt on the g round that the ha beas pe tition was ba rre d by the one-y ear statute of limit ations. The Court denied the motion and re quested an answ er on the merits of Petitioner’s claims. I n the meantime, Petitioner filed an amended habea s petition, which does not include the cl ai m ab o u t being denied the r ight to poll the jury . The Court dee ms that claim abandone d.
Kincade v. W

olfenbarger , No. 04-CV-72599- DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 33944, at *5-6 (E .D. Mich. May 9, 2007) (bolded he ading s and alter ations added; pa rallel c itations omi tted). The fe dera l district court consider ed the pe tition on i ts m er i t s an d denied ha beas r elief. Ki n ca d e filed a motion for a c ertifica te of a ppeala bility and a notice of appe al. The district c ourt g rante d a ce rtificate of appe alability on Kincade ’s appellate -counse l c laim a nd the two re lated subclaims about t rial counsel: trial counsel’s failure to a dvise Kinca de that state se ntencingg uidelines would apply

wer e he t o p lead guilty , and counse l’s failure to object to the prosec utor’s use of Thomas’s g uilty

plea. Kincade , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 43812, at *4. We construed the notice of

a pp e a l a s an ap pli c a tio n for a c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity , w hic h w e de c lin e d to iss ue wi th r e g ard to Kincade ’s re maining c laims. IINo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

Whil e Wolfenbar g er does not c ross-appe al this issue, “matter s raised be low as alter native 3 g rounds in support of a judg ment are proper ly befor e this Court even in the a bsence of a cross-a ppeal.” United States v. True , 250 F.3d 410, 419 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Th is r ul e o f l aw h a s o c c a s i o n a l l y b e e n r e p h r a s e d i n a m an n e r t h a t a p p e ar s t o a l t e r

its 4 meaning : “[a]n abuse-of-disc retion standar d is applicable only when the unde rlying f

acts on whic h t o l l i n g i s b as ed ar e in d i s p u t e. W h en , as h er e, t h o s e fa ct s ar e un d i s p u t ed an d t h e d i s t r i c t co u rt 's decision to g rant or de ny

equitable tolling involves only a question of law, our revie w is de novo.” Bilbr ey v. Douglas , 124 F. App’ x 971, 973 (6th Cir. 2005) (c iting, inte r a lia , Dunlap v. United States , 250 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2001)). This ref ormulation sug g ests de novo review of a decision to apply equitable tolling in c ases suc h as the one at bar, be cause it was made on the basis of undisputed fac ts. W e do not think that this i s an appropriate interpretation of the applica ble standar d of re vie w. Al tho ug h th e fa c ts a re no t in dis pute in t

his c a se , it

c annot be sai d th at th e de c isi on to equitably toll the statute was “o n l y a question of law ” bec ause it wa s made in the e x erc ise of the court’s discr etion. As we e x plained in Gr iff in v. Roge rs , “[e]quit able tolling is a discretionar

y doctrine that does not lend itself to brig ht line rules.” 399 F .3d 626, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks and citation omit ted). We think it would be incong ruous to revie w de novo a - 6 - Respondent Wa

r d e n Hug h Wolfenbarg er a rgues that, while the district c ourt corr ectly denied habea s re l i ef, the petition should have bee n dismiss ed for non-complianc e with the statute of limit ations beca

use the district cour

t erre d in equitabl y

tolling the statute a

nd denying Wolfenbarg er’ s motion for summary judgme nt. We disag ree .

3 I n Dunlap v. United States , we he ld that the one-y ear limit ation period c ontained in § 2244 of the Antiterr orism and Eff ective D eath Penalty Act of 1996 (“A EDPA”) is a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. 250 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 34 U. S. 10 57 (2 00 1) . We f

urt her he ld t hat “ wh e re the fa c ts a

re un dis pute d o r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

ru le s a s a matter of la

w that equitable t o l l i n g i s unavailable , we a pply the de novo standa

rd of r eview to a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re fu sa l to a pp ly the do c tr ine of

e qu ita ble tol lin g ; in

a ll o the r c a se s, we a

pp ly the a bu se of di scre tion standard.” Id . at 1008. In this case, the district c ourt’s dec ision to equitably toll the statute was made in the exercise of the cour t’s discretion, which w e re view for abuse of discretion. 4No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

decision to apply

a discre tionary

reme dy when it entails no application of a cle ar r ule of law

. - 7 - “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [a petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has bee n pursuing his rights dilig ently , and (2) that some extraordinary circ umstance stood in his way ’ and pr evente d timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida , 1 2 7 S
. C t
. 1 0 7 9 , 1 0 8 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Pacev. DiGuglielmo , 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). We have identified f ive fa ctors that we f

elt wer e “pe rtinent” to an application o f eq u itable tolling: “( 1) lac k of ac tual notice of f iling re quirement; (2) lack of constructive know ledg e of f iling re quirement; (3) diligenc e in pursuingone’s r ights; (4) absenc e of prejudice to the defe ndant; and (5) a plaintiff’ s rea sonablene ss in r emainingignor ant of the notice require ment.” An dr e ws v . O rr , 851 F.2d 146, 151 ( 6th Cir. 1988). I n additi o n, we ha

ve esta blished a “ma

ndatory” for

m of equitable tolling in the context of post-AEDPA “mixed” petitions. Palmer v. Carlton , 276 F.3d 7 7 7 (6th Cir. 2002) (a dopting “mandatory

equitable tolling” for ha b ea s petitions containing both e x hausted a nd unexhausted claims, entitling pe titioners to such tolli ng if they file i n state cour t within 30 day s of the dismissal and ret urn to fe de ra l c ourt wi thi n 3 0 d ay s f

oll ow inge xha

us tio n o f s tate re me die s) . We have a lso
c la ri fi e d th a tt h i s “ m an d a t o r y ” t o l l i n g d o e s n o tf

o r e c l o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f a p p l yi n g “ t r a d i t i o n a l” equitable tolling a ddresse d in An dr e ws . Gr iff in v . R oge rs , 399 F.3d 626, 631 ( 6th Cir. 2005). At the tim e AE DPAwa s e na c te d on Ap ri l 24 , 19 96 , Ki nc a de wa s p ur su ingstate re me die s. State proce eding s came to a close on Septe mber 28, 1 9 9 8 . I n his Aug ust 15, 2005 order de nying Wolfenbarg er’ s motion for summary judgme nt, District J udg e Steeh tolled the limit ation period “anothe r ninety

day s” beyond the close of state pr ocee dings “ or until Dece mber 27, 1998, for the t i m e t h at P et i t i o n er co u l d h av e so u gh t re v i ew i n t h e S u p re m e C o u rt
. ” J
. A. 1 6 4 (c i t i n g Bronaugh v.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

The lawon the ef

fec t of Supreme Court review has been reve rsed a number of times. The 5 first time we confronted the question, we held that “§ 2244(d)(2) doe s not toll the limitations period to take into acc ount the t ime in which a defe ndant could have potentially filed a pe tition for cer tiorari with t h e United States Supreme Court, following a state cour

t’s denial of post-convic tion relief .” Is ha m v . R an dle , 226 F.3d 691, 694 ( 6th Cir. 2000 ) (e m p h asis added)

. Isham wa s su bs e qu e ntl y o v e r r u l e d b y Ab e la v . M

ar tin , 348 F.3d 164, 172 (6th Cir. 2003) , in which the en ba nc cour t held that the 90-da y period to file a petition for a writ of certiorar i to the United States Supreme Court af ter denial of r elief in a

state post-convic tion action would toll the l imitation period. The Supreme Court effec t i v el y

o v erruled

Ab e la in Lawrence v. F lorida , 549 U.S. 327 (2007), which he ld that “the AEDPA l imitations period would not be tol led duringthe 90 day s in which a prisone r ca n seek that Court’s re view of a

state cour

t’s denial of post-c onviction relief.” Hende rson v. Luoma , No. 05- 2 5 4 2 , 2 0 0 8 U. S
. Ap p . L E XIS 2 4 2 2 5 , at * 5 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Lawrence , 549 U.S. 327). At the time K incade filed his f

irst ha beas petition on September 13, 1999, Isham had not y et bee n decide d and the re wa s n o c le ar r

ule of law o n th is i ssu e . O n Augus t 15 , 2 00 5, wh e n Jud g e Ste e h is su e d h is order decliningto dismi ss Kincade ’s petition as untimely , Abela was still g ood law; there fore , tolling AE DP A’ s l i m i t at i o n s fo r 9 0 -d ay af t er s t at e p o s t -conviction procee dings en d ed , fo l l o wi n g Ab e la , was rea sonable. See H

enderson, 2008 U.S. App. L EXI S 24225, at *8-9. - 8 - Oh io , 2 35 F .3 d 2 80 , 2 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; Ab e la v . M ar tin , 348 F.3d 164, 172-73 (6th Cir. 2003), c e rt. de nie d s ub no m. Car us o v . A be la , 5 41 U. S. 1 07 0 ( 20 04 )) . T hu s, acc or din g to t he dis tr ic t c ourt , Kincade ’s first petition was ti mely filed on S eptember 13, 1999, with about three and a ha lf months
rema ining of

the one- y ear

limit ation period (a

bout 106 day s). 5 The fir st habea s petition was dism issed without prejudice on J anuar y 23, 2001, and Kinca de fi le d a po st- c on vic tio n mo tio n in state c ourt

on Marc h 4 , 2 00 2. Judg e Ste e h e qu ita bly tol le d th e tim e limit ation while Kinca de’s f irst petition was pending befor e the f eder al cour

t (September 13, 1990 – Jan ua ry 23 , 2 00 1) , n oti ngthat “ fe de ra l c ourt s ma y de e m th e lim itatio ns pe ri od tol le d f or a fi rs t fe d er al h ab ea s p et i t i o nas a m at t er o f eq u i t y . ” J
. A. 1 6 4 (c i t i n g Duncan v . W alker , 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2 00 1) (S te ve ns , J., c on c ur ri ng )) . O n th e date of

dis mis sa l of

his fi rs t ha

be a s p eti tio n, takin g int o
acc ount the periods tolled, Kinca de had a pp roxi mately

106 day s – or until approxi mately May 9,No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

See note 5, su

pra . 6 - 9 - 20 01 – to re -f

ile his ha be a s pe tit ion , or to fi le fo r po st- c on vic tio n state re lie f and to ll th e st atut e ag ain. Kinca de’s Ma

rch 2002 f

iling for post-conviction re lief ex cee ded that date by near ly ten months. Post-conviction relief w as denie d by the Michig an Supreme Court on April 30, 2004, and Ki n ca d e’ s s e c o n d

h ab ea s p et i t i o nwa s fi l eda l i t t l e o v er t wo m o n t h s l at er

o nJ u l y 8 , 2 0 0 4
. J u d ge Steeh consider ed that latter filing to be timely

b ec ause the limi tation period wa s statutorily tolled during the pende ncy

o f p ost-conviction state proc eeding s and Kinca de had nine ty day s from the April 30, 2004 Michig an Supreme Court decisi o n t o s ee kSupreme Court re view. Wolfenbarg er 6

argue s th a t th e statut e sh ou ld n ot h ave be e n tol le d by po st- c on vic tio n s tate pr oc e e din g s w he n th e se
wer e commenc ed af

ter the statute of

limit ations has alre ady run. Resp. Br . at 12. Howe ver, if the district court did not abuse its discretion in equitably tolling t he ten- month period pr ior to t he se state p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e r e i s n o r e a s o nw h y s t a tu t o r y t o l l i n g u n d e r

§ 2 2 4 4 ( d ) ( 2 ) w o u l d

n o ta p p l y. Thus, the delay

in filing the se cond petition that wa s argua bly attributable to Kinca de amounts to approxim ately ten months bey ond AEDPA’s ti m e l i m i t (the time period be tween the dismiss al of his first habe as petition and fili ng in state court for post-convic tion relief) . The district judge deter

mined that his “order

of dismissal c ould ha

ve led Petitioner to be lieve that ther e wa s no deadline f or filing a post-conviction motion in state court and that the statute of limitations was not a bar to filing another habeas petition i n fede ral c ourt.” J.A. 166. The district judge explained that fi rs t, K inc a de re lie d o n a

fo otn ote in the or de r dis mis sin g his fi rs t pe tit ion , s tatin g that “ the statut e of lim itatio ns c on ta ine d in 28 U.S. C. § 2244 (d )( 1) wo uld be tol le d pur su ant to § 22 44 (d )( 2) wh ile this sec ond motion for relief from judg ment was pe nding be fore the Michig an cour ts.” J .A. 114.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

Nor doe s Wol fenba

rg er c laim prejudice from the a pplication of equitable tolling. 7 - 10 - Se c o n d , th e c o u rt’ s d is mi s s a l o r d e r “ d id n o t e s ta b li s h an y ti me ta

b le o r c o n d it io n s for returning to state court.” Ib id

. Moreove r, at the t ime, this circ uit had not y et dec ided Palmer , which held that habea s petitioners must ordina rily return to state court within 30 da y s of a dismissal of a habea s petition for failure to exhaust st ate r emedies. F inall y , t h e d i strict court de termined that Wolfenbarg er w as not prejudice d by the delay

. Ba sed o n t h es e conside rations, the district cour t 7 deeme d it appropriate to apply equitable tolling. Whil e we have noted that “abse nce of prejudice ” is not an independe nt ba sis f or invoking equitable tolling, we have not re quired that a ny of the five An dr e ws fac tors must be prese nt to just ify equitable tolling. I

nstead, we stated that “the se fa ctors
are not nece ssarily

compre hensive a

nd they are not all releva

nt in all cases. Ultimately , the dec ision whether to equitably

toll a period of limit ations must be decide d on a ca se-by -ca se basis.” Souter v. Jone s , 3 9 5 F. 3 d 5 7 7 , 5 8 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Miller v. Collins , 305 F.3d 491, 495 ( 6th Cir. 2002)) ( internal quotation marks omitted). There fore , we hold that the district cour t did not commit reversible e rror in the exercise of its discretion, and proc eed to r eview the district court’s disposition of the substantive claims. III A AEDPA g overns this court’s revie w of Kincade ’s habe as petition. Under 28 U .S.C. § 2254,
a wr it of habea s corpus may be g rante d only

if the state c ourt’s adjudicati o n o f t h e cl ai ms “(1)
re su lte d in

a de c isi on that w a s c on tr ary to, or inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f, c le arl y estab l i s h ed F eder al law, a s determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) r esultedNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 11 - in a dec ision that was based on a n unrea sonable de termination of the f acts in lig ht of the evide nce prese nted at the State c ourt proce eding s.” § 2254(d) (1). AEDPA’s de fer ential s tandar d of review applies only to claims that wer e adjudicated on the
me ri ts i n s tate c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. I f t

he c la ims ra ise d in

the pe tit ion

are pr oc e dura lly

de fa ult e d in state c ourt , th e pe tit ion e r m us t e ith e r “ de mon str ate c a us e fo r t he de fa ult and actua l pr e

jud ic e a s a
re su lt o f t he a lle g e d v iol a tio n o f f

e de ra l la w, or de mon str a te that fa ilure to c on sid e r t he c la ims wi ll result i n a fundamental miscar riag e of justice.” Mu rp hy v . O hio , 551 F.3d 485, 502 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (q u o t i n g Coleman v. Thompson , 5 01 U. S. 722 , 7 32 (1 99 1) ). A p e tit ion e r p ro c e dura lly de fa ult s h is claims for ha

beas r elief if he did not prese nt those claims to the state cour ts in accor dance with the state’s proc edura l rules. See W ainwright v. Syk es , 433 U. S. 7 2, 87 (1 97 7) ; Murphy , 551 F.3d at 501- 502. Whether a state court foun d t h e petiti oner’ s claim to be proc edura lly defa ulted is a question of law that we re view de novo. Couch v. J abe , 9 51 F .2 d 9 4, 96 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) ; Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 922. We revie w t he dis trict court’s denial of habe as cor pus de novo; the district court’ s findings of fac t will be upheld unless they are clea rly err oneous. Simpson v. Jone s , 238 F.3d 399, 405 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (c itations omi tted). B Ki nc a de argue s th at his tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e in t wo re sp e c ts. F ir st, Ki nc a de c la ims that trial counsel’ s ignor ance and misrepr esentation of t h e s t ate’s sentencingg uidelines violated Kincade ’s Six th Amendment rig ht beca use he w as not able to make an informe d decision with reg ard to a possible g uilty

plea. Sec ond, Kincade claims that his counsel fa iled to object to the introductionNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

As we recen tly

ob se rv e d, thi s q

ue sti on ari se s f re qu e ntl y wi th r e sp e c t to Mic hig an s tate 8 p ro cee dings beca

use the state courts persist in using a standard, one-se ntence order , cit i n g a proce dural rule with no further explanation. Al e

x an de r v . S

mi th , No. 06-1569 (6 t h Cir. Feb. 20, 20 09 ) ( un pu bli sh e d) ; se e als o A be la , 3 80 F .3 d 9 15 ; Burroughs v. Mak owski , 28 2 F .3 d 41 0, 41 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 2) ; Simpson , 238 F.3d 399. - 12 - and use of T h o m as’s guilty plea, whic h Kincade alleg es wa s used as substantive e vidence of Kincade ’s g uilt by

association. Wolf e nb arg e r c on te nd s f

ir st that K inc a de ’s ine ff

e c tiv e -assi sta

nc e c la ims are pr oc e dura lly defa ulted. The district cour

t noted that it is “not required to a ddress a proce dural-de fault issue bef ore d ec i d i n g aga i n s tt h e p et i t i o n er o nt h e m er i t s , ” 2 0 0 7 U. S
. Di s t
. L E XIS 3 3 9 4 4 , at * 6 (q u o t i n g Hudson v. Jone s , 3 51 F .3 d 2 12 , 2 15 (6 th Cir

. 20 03 )) , a nd e le c te d to a dd

re ss t he me ri ts o f K inc a de ’s c la ims

. We now hold that Kincade ’s claims we re not pr o ce d u ra l l y defa ulted and proc eed to r eview the district court’s de cision on the merits. I n Ma up in v . S

mi th , this court adopted a

three -par t sta ndard to de termine whe ther a claim has been pr ocedur ally

defa ulted in state courts. 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). Fir st, there must be a state pr ocedur al rule in plac e that the pe titioner failed to follow. Ib id . Se c on d, the state c ourt mus t have a ctually d enied c onsideration of the petitioner’s c laim on the g round of the state proc edura l rule. Ibid. Th ir d, the state pr oc e dura l r ule mus t be an “ a de qu a te and ind e pe nd e nt” state g ro un d to 8 prec lude habe as re view. Ma up in , 78 5 F .2 d a t 13 8. To be “ a de qu a te ,” a state ru le mus t be “ fi rm ly established and r egularly

followed at the time it is applied.” Ab e la , 3 8 0 F
. 3 d a t92 1; W

illiams v. Coy le , 2 60 F .3 d 6 84 , 6 93 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . A nd to b e “ ind e pe nd e nt, ” the state c ourt mus t “ a c tua lly [have] relied on the rule to ba r the c laim at issue.” Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 921.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 13 - Wolfenbarg er

ar gu es t h at Ki n ca d e “ n ev er p ro p er l y ra i s ed ” t h e c l ai m s conce rning trial counsel “until he filed his motion for relief from judgme nt in Marc h 2002,” pursua nt to the fede ral district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his first habea s petition. Resp. Br. at 19. That motion was denied by the Michig an Circuit C ourt on the grounds that Kincade has not complied with Michig an Court Rule (MCR) 6.508(D)(3) (a) (b), whic h prec ludes courts fr om gr anting relief to the defe ndant when a motion “alleg es g rounds for r elief . . . which could have been r aised on a ppeal f rom the conviction and se ntence or in a prior motion under this s u b ch ap t er , unless the def endant demonstrates ( a) good cause for the failure to ra ise such g rounds on appe al or in the prior motion, and (b) actua l prejudice from the a lleg ed irre g ularity that support the claim for

relief .” The Michiga

n Court of Appea ls and then the Michig an Supreme Court, Ki n c ade, 6 79 N.W.2d 74, denied the

a pp lic a tio n f

or le ave to a

pp e a l, w iththe sta

nd ard on e -s e nte nc e or de r c iti ngfa ilure to e sta bli sh g rounds for r elief pur suant to MCR 6.508(D). Resp. Br . at 19. The Michig an Supreme Court de cision does comply with the first and sec ond parts of the Ma up in inquiry : MCR6.508(D) is a state proc edura l rule th at Ki n ca d e failed to follow, a nd, following Alexande r, No. 06-1569, a nd Simpson , 2 38 F.3d 399, the la st “explained” or “ rea soned op ini on ” of the state c ourt wa s b a se d o n a

vio la tio n o f t hat st a te pr oc e dura l r

ule . H ow e ve r, MCR 6.508(D) did not constitute an “ adequate and indepe ndent” g round for that decision. MCR 6.508(D) is not an adequate ground in this case beca use it was not a “ firmly

established and re g ularly

followed” rule at the time when Kinca de wo u l d have violate d it. MCR6.508(D) enter ed into eff

ect on Oc tober 1, 1989, signific antly alteringMichig an’s pr ocedur al ar chitectur e for
c ri min a l a pp e a ls a nd po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f. As the Mic hig an Su pr e me Court

e xpla ins :No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 14 - B e fo re O c t o b e r 1 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r c o l l at e r a l r e v i e w o f c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s in Michig an did not make a n y provision for fina lity

of judg ments. As a conse quence , defe ndants could, and did, re peate dly seek r elief w ithout li mitation. To create a unifor m sy stem of proc edure , Michig an Court Rules 6.501 et seq . w e r e e n a c te d

. T h e r u le s p r e sent a c are fu lly ba lanc e d s c he me that li be ra lly pe rm its the a sse rt ion

of c la ims on

dir e c t a pp e a l, wh et h er t i m el y

o r n o t , wh i l e a tt h e s am e t i m e i n t ro d u ci n g a c o n ce p to f f

i n al i t y t o d i s co u ra ge repe ated trips up and down the appe llate ladder

. People v . Ree d , 5 3 5 N
. W
. 2 d 4 9 6 , 5 0 3 ( M i c h

. 1 9 9 5 )

. W e h a v e d e c l i n e d “ t o a d o p tan y pe r se approa ch for

pinpoin ti n g wh e n MCR 6.508(D) bec ame ‘ firmly established’ w ith respec t to all habeas petitioners.” L u b e rd

a v . T r ipp e tt , 2 11 F.3d 1004, 1008 ( 6th Cir. 2000). I nstead, we “dec ide on a
c a se -b y -c a se ba sis wh e the r, duri ngthe pe ri od tha t a de fe nd ant m ay , if he wi sh e s, ta ilo r his [dir e c t] appea l to avoid the conseque nces of a state pr ocedur al rule, the defe ndant . . . could . . . be deemed to have be en appr ised of [the proce dural rule ’s] ex istence.” Ibid. (c i t i n g Fo rd v . G e or gia , 4 98 U. S. 411, 423 (1991)) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n that case , we found that althoug h Luberda ’s
c on vic tio n o c c ur

re d p ri or to the e na c tme nt of MCR 6.5 08 , “th e re wa s n o r e a so n w hy Lub e rd a c ou ld not have r equeste d permission to a dd the constitutional arg uments raised in the pr esent pe tition prior to the submissi on of his direc t appea l in November 1990. There was a period of 13 months in which he mig ht have done so.” Ib id . By contra st, in Go nz ale

s v. E lo , we he ld that MCR 6. 50 8 wa s n ot a firmly established rule in the case of a ha beas pe titioner whose co n v i ct i o n was a ffirme d by the Michig an Court of Appe als in J anuar y 1986, prior to the enactment of the rule. 233 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2000). I n th is c a se , th e Mic hig an Cir c uit Court state d that Ki nc a de “ ha d e ve ry op po rt un ity to r a ise any issue he had” reg ardingineffe ctive counse l either on direc t a ppeal or “to the Court of Appe als,”No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 15 - without specifying the particula r appe ara nce be fore the Court of Appe als at issue. People v

. Kincade , No. 85-002809-01 (Mich. C ir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2002). Howeve r, Kinca de’s c onviction, direct appea l and the fina l decision on his direct a ppeal ( Aug ust 3, 1987) all occur red prior to the eff

ective date of MCR 6.508. Moreove r, hi s second moti on for a new trial, which came before the Court of Appea ls a nd eventuated in a rema

nd by the Michig an Supreme Court for a Ginther hear ing, w as filed
on Se pte mbe r 23, 19 89 – a lso pr ior to t he e ff e c tiv e date of

MCR 6 .5 08 . Wh ile the Mic hig an c ourt s
are less than clea

r with r espec t to when Kincade could or should have r aised these claims, we think Ki nc a de c ou ld no t “ be de e me d to h ave be e n a pp ri se d o f” MCR 6 .5 08 a t th e re le va nt t ime s. Thus , his ineffe ctiveness- of-tria l-counsel c laims are not pr ocedur ally defa ulted. Be cause these c laims are not proce durally

defa ulted and Michig an courts have not considere d them on the merits, this court’s revie w is de novo. Murphy , 5 5 1 F. 3 d at 4 9 4 (c i t i n g Hartman v. Bagley , 492 F.3d 347, 356 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). C To establish that counsel ha s been ine ffe ctive, a de fenda nt must show t h at (1) “ counsel’s perf ormanc e was defic ient,” and ( 2) “the defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense .” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To e stablish constitut ionally defic ient p er fo rm ance , a defe ndant mus t demonstrate “ that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a n objective standa

rd of
rea sonablene ss.” Id

. at 68 8. To e sta bli shpr e jud ic e , a de fe nd ant m

us t de mon str a te “ a

re a so na ble probabil it y that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en differ ent.” Id . at 694.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 16 - We h ave he ld t

hat “ inc omp e te ntl y

a dv isi nga

de fe nd ant t o g o to tr ia l ra the r tha n p le a d guil ty may amount to the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.” Tyler v. United States , N o. 97 -1 61 6, 19 98 U. S. Ap p . L E XIS 2 7 0 8 5 , at * 6 -7 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Turner v. Tennessee , 8 58 F .2 d 1 20 1, 12 05 (6 th Cir. 1988)). To e stablish that advice with re g ard to a g uilty plea ha d a pre

judicial ef

fe ct under S t r i ck l a nd , a def

endant must establish “a

rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s err ors, he would . . . have ple aded guilty and woul d [not ] have insisted on goingto trial.” Turner , 858 F.2d at 1 2 0 6 (q u o t i n g Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985))

. Du ri n g p l ean ego t i at i o n s , t h e s t at e o ff er edt o d i s m i s s Ki n ca d e’ s fi rs t -d egr ee m u rd er ch ar ge if he pleaded guilty to second- deg ree murder, with no specific sentenc e re commendation. Kinca de claims that he wa s prejudice d by trial counsel’ s defici ent per formanc e bec ause c ounsel did not know, and there fore did not inform Kinca de, that the unde r state se ntencingg uidelines, a pleato seconddeg ree murder w ould have r esulted in a re commended se ntence of twelve y ear s to life wit h the possibili ty

of par ole. Appellant’ s Br . at 16. At the Ginther

hear ing, K incade ’s trial attorne y testified t h at he did not know whe ther the sentenc ing guidelines wer e applica b l e at t h e t ime, althoug h case law indicate s that the g uidelines
wer e in ef

fec t and that they

wer e advisory

. Kincade , 2007 U.S. Dist L EXI S 33944, at *11 (citing People v . Jame

s , 368 N.W.2d 892, 893 (1985)). Eve n if ig noranc e of the applicable sentenc ing g uidelines amounted to defic ient assistance of counse l, Kincade cannot e stablish that this defic iency pre ju d ic e d h is d e c is io nw it

h r e g ar d to th e p le a . H is tr ia l c o u n s e l t e s ti f ie d th a t K in c a d e w a s n ot interested in plea ding guilty , a propositi on that finds ample support in t he re cord. K incade indeed stated, at the 1991 Ginther hear ing and at some points prior to trial, that he wa s interested in plea dingNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 17 - g uil ty . H ow e ve r, he ult imate ly re je c te d, on the re c or d an d be fo re tr ia l, the state ’s ple a of fe r o n te rm s that he un de rs too d to be a t le a st a s attr a c tiv e a s th e on e s his c ouns e l w ou ld h a ve pr e se nte d to him had counse l been a

war e of the state guidelines. On the fir st day of trial, afte r Kincade indicated that he “mig ht not want to go a head w ith his t rial” a

nd take the ple a, the c ourt questioned t h e par ties about the plea

offe r: Mr. Slameka [counsel for Kincade ]: . . . Mr. Kinca de aske d me if I could g et him a plea. I tol d h im the on ly

ple a that ’s be ingof

fe re d is se c on d d e g re e mur de r. He a sk e d me a bo ut a sentenc e. I

said there ’s bee n no sentenc e off ere d whatsoeve r. The statute, as I rea d it after the Supreme Court de cision, indicates he g ets any wher e from one y ear

and a da y up to life. Mr. Rey nolds [ prosec ution] : Any

wher e fr om a microsec ond to life.

. . . Mr
. Slame ka : Ho we ve r, y ou did te ll me if he ha d s ome inf

or matio n th a t mi g ht b e he lpf ul t o the po lic e , th a t th a t mi g ht b e a c on sid e ra

tio n in his se nte nc e . A m I

no t c or re c t? Mr. R ey nolds: That cer

tainly stands to rea son. I t’s logic al. It’s not part of a ny plea ag ree ment . . .
Kincade initially

indicated that he wanted to take this plea, but when he was g iven the guilty -plea fo rm to s ig n, he de c lin e d, statin g tha t he “ c an’ t do thi s. ” He wa s off e re d – and re

je c te d – a ple a

wi th a sente nce that he understood to r ang e from “a microsec ond to life,” plus whate ver r eduction he ma y have be en g rante d for c ooperation with the police

. There is no reasona ble proba bility that Kincade
wo uld have a g re e d to a

ple a wi th the lik e ly

se nte nc e ra

ng ingfr om t

we lve y e ars to l if

e , w he n h e did not ag ree to a plea w ith a sentenc e ra ng ing f rom a “microse cond” to life

. Be cause Kincade does not establish that his trial counsel’s pe rfor mance prejudice d him with reg ard to the ple a off er, w e nee d not decide whether

counsel’s pe rfor

mance was in fa ct def

icient.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 18 - D Ki nc a de a lso c la ims that tr ia l c ouns e l w a s ine ff e c tiv e be c a

us e he fa ile d to ob

je c t to the us e of Thomas’s guilty

plea, whic h was improper ly employ ed by

the prosec utor as substantive evidenc e of Kinca de’s guilt. We ha ve held that “a failure to obje ct to pr osecutoria l misconduc t can amount to ineffe ctive assistanc e of co u n s el.” Hodge v . Hurley , 426 F.3d 368, 377 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citing Grav le yv . M ill s , 87 F .3 d 77 9, 78 5- 86 (6 th Cir

. 19 96 ))

. To su c c e e d on thi s c la im, Ki nc a de ne e ds to
e sta bli shtha t pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t ha s ta ke n p la c e , th a t hi s tr ia l c ouns e l’ s f a ilure t o ob

je c t to it was defic ient, and that this failure prejudice d the def ense. Duringopening statements, the prose cutor de scribed T homas’s plea barg ain, empha s izi ng that “ wh ile Th oma s w a s g e tti ng ‘s ome thi ng out of it [i.e

. te sti fy inga g a ins t K inc a de ],’ he wa s a lso a per son who ‘did something wrong ’ but was g oing ‘ to fac e up to it.’” Kincade , 412 N.W.2d at 253. The prose cutor questioned Thomas extensively about the plea

at the beg inning of

Thomas’s dire ct testim o n y , to w h ic h K in c a d e ’ s a tt o r n e y d id n o t o b je c t; in s te a d , th e a tt o r

n e y in qu ir e d a b o u t the reduc ed cha

rg e and “ sug g ested that Thomas’ guilty plea was ‘no big deal’ beca use he ha d violated his parole a

nd likely would have g one to prison any way .” Ib id

. Thomas’s plea ag ree ment was introduced a s an exhibit without objection from defense. Duringclosing arguments, the prosec utor soug ht to impress on the jury the import of Thomas’s plea . I f Kinca de act ed in self- defe nse, the prosec utor asked, T homas too would have a defe nse – he w as “he lping someone defe nd himself” – and would not “book[] t he next five y ear s in prison.” Id . at 84. We have e x plained that althoug h g uilty pleas of co-c onspirators or co-de fenda nts “are never admissible as substantive evidenc e of the defendant’s guilt,” they “may be introduce d into evidenceNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 19 - if the c o- c on sp ir a tor or c o- de fe nd ant te sti fi e s at tri a l, so that the fa c tf ind e r w ill have a

pp ro pr iate fa c ts on hand to assess the w itness’s cre dibilit y .” Un ite d S tates v . S an de rs , 95 F.3d 449, 4 5 4 (6 th Cir. 1996) (inter

nal citations omitted). Kincade maintains that the prosec ution went beyond mere dis c los ur e of th e ple a

ba rg a in f or the purp os e s o f e sta

bli sh ingTh oma s’ s c re dib ili ty and us e d h is g uilty plea as substantive evidenc e of Kincade ’s g uilt by association. This impropr iety prejudice d the outcome of

the trial, Kinca de ar g ues – all t he more so in view of the trial c ourt’s fa ilure to g ive “ca utionary instructions” as re quired by this circuit’s law. Sa nd

e rs , 9 5 F .3 d at 45 4 ( “ Whe n a g uil ty plea . . . is introduce d into e vidence , the

. . . court is r equire d to g ive a cautionar y instruction to the eff ect that the jur

y may use the c onviction or g uilty plea only to determine the testifying w itness’s
cre dibilit y .” ). We need not dec ide whethe r the prose cutor’s use of Thomas’s guilty plea c onstitut ed pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t or wh e the r K inc a de ’s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s d e fi c ie nt i n f a ili ngto o bje c t to i ts
use. See Strick

land , 466 U.S. at 694 (stating that co urts need not a ddress both compone nts of the inquiry “if the de fenda

nt makes an insuff

ici en t s h owingon one”) . Even if we assume that trial
counse l w a s d e f

ic ie n t i nn o t o b

je c ti n g to th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s ta c ti c s , K in c a d e h a s n o t e s ta b lished prejudice under Strickland

. Strickland ’s pre judice inqui ry require s the court to “consider the tot ali ty of the e vidence befor e the judg e or jury .” 466 U.S. at 695 (e mphasis added) . “[T] he prejudice deter mination,” as we clar ified, “is nece ssarily aff ecte d by the quantity

and quality

of other e vidence ag ainst the defe ndant.” Hodge , 426 F.3d at 376. I n this c as e, t h e q u an tity and quality

of other evidenc e ag ainst Kincade substantially and unambiguously

outweig hs any ev i dence for his selfdefe nse theory

.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 20 - Ki nc a de a dmi tte d s ho oti ngTa ylor . T he on ly

iss ue a t tria l wa s w he the r t he sh oo tin g wa s in self-de fense

. Kincade was the only one to testify in his own defense, claiming that he thought Ta y lor
rea ched f or his g un and that Kinca de picke d up and kept Taylor’s gun after the murder. The police could not find the g un and Kinca de could not produc e it. Nor could Kincade proff er a ny evidenc e,
a sid e fr om his ow n te sti mony , th a t T ay lor ma de any thr e a te nin g mov e me nts . K inc a de ’s se lf -d e fe ns e theory was c ontradicte d by

Thomas, who testified that Kincade said that he shot the wrongperson
and wo uld no t g e t pa id, and

B ra nh am, wh o state d that Ta

ylor wa s no t arm e d. I n v ie w o f t he tot a lity of the e vidence , Ki n ca d e cannot show that but for his attorney ’s fa ilure to object to the use of Thomas’s gu i l ty

plea, ther e wa s a re asonable probability that the jury

would have ha

rbore d
re a so na ble do ub t r e g ard ing his g uil t. Th e re fo re , we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th is claim does not wa

rra nt gr anting the writ of ha

beas c orpus. IV Ki nc a de ’s fi na l c la im a lle g e s in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate counse l. A n a

pp e llate attorney ’s perf

ormanc e is a lso e valuated in a ccor dance with the Strickland standard. Ma

pe s v . Ta te , 3 8 8 F.3d 187, 191 ( 6th Cir. 2004). To be constitutionally adequa te under Strickland , a

p p e lla te counsel is not require d to r aise ever y non-fr ivolous a

rgument on appea l. Caver v. Straub , 349 F.3d 3 4 0 , 3 4 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Jones v . Barnes , 463 U.S. 745, 751(1983))

. To demonstrate that an appellate attorney

has re ndere d d ef

i cient per formanc e under Strickland , “ the pe tit ion e r m us t demonstrate that the i ssue not prese nted ‘was clea rly strong er than issues that counsel did pre sent.’” Ibid. (q u o t i n g Smith v. Robbins , 5 2 8 U
. S. 2 5 9 , 2 8 9 ( 2 0 0 2 ) )

. T h e p r e ju d ic e s ta n d ar d in th e c o n te xt of an a lleg ed fa ilure to raise issues on appea l require s showing “ a re asonable pro b ab i lity thatNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 21 - inclusion of the issue would have c hang ed the r esult of the appe al.” Ho war d v . B ou c ha rd , 405 F.3d 4 5 9 , 4 8 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Gr e e r v . M itc he ll , 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001) , cert. de nied , 546 U.S. 1100 (2006)). The c ertifica

te of a ppeala bility g rante d by the district c ourt limit ed the scope of Kincade ’s claims about appe llate counse l to failure to ra ise “mer itorious claims” on appeal and abandoning
c la ims a bo ut t ri a l c ouns e l a ft e r b e ingg ra nte d a re mand . App e llate c ouns e l’ s f a ilure t o r a ise meritorious claims moreove r, i s limit ed to his failure to ra ise claims “ r elated to the c laim[ s] about trial counsel” – that is, the same alleg ations of ineff ective tr ial counsel c onsidered a bove. Kincade argues that the a bandonment of c laims on remand itself c onstitut ed ineffe ct i ve assistance b ec au s e “[ c]ounsel had an oblig ation to consult with petiti oner c oncer ning the rema

nd hear ing a nd by his own admis sion he failed to do so.” Appe llant’s Br . at 21. At the 1991 Ginther hear ing, a

ppellate c ounsel testified that he “ ad v i s ed [Kincade] that his lawy er ha s a ver y g ood reputation as a skilled a

nd excellent trial lawy er and that

. . . he could not have possibly done a be tter job.” Appellate counsel fur ther res p o n d ed in writing to Kincade ’s inquiry about ra ising ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la ims , e xplai ni ngthat he wo uld ra ise iss ue s h e tho ug ht w e re via ble in h is profe ssional judgment. Ib id . Thu s, to the e xten t Kinc a de a lle g e s a pp e llate c ouns e l di d n ot c on su lt with him, the recor d belies the all eg ation. Moreove r, as the district c ourt points out, “[ e]ven assuming that [ Kincade ] was unawar e of t he state a ppellate c ourt’s re mand,” a ppellate c ounsel’s abandonme nt of claims had no pre judicial eff

ect on Kinc ade’ s challeng e to his conviction: “[T] he trial court ulti mately

considere d Petitioner’s claims about trial c ounsel and a ffor ded Petitioner an evidentiar y hear ing on the claims. The trial c ourt deter mined that Petitioner’s trial attorne y was notNo. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 22 - ineffe ctive, and the Michig an Court of Appe als ag ree d.” 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 33944, at *34. Wit h reg ard to the failure to include meritorious claims on direc t appea l, Kincade does not establish that counsel’s perfor mance was deficient because he does not demonstrate that the omitted claims wer e “c lear ly

strong er” than the issue ac tually prese nted (the improper admission of Th oma s’ s guil ty

ple a ). No r c an K inc a de de mon str a te pr e jud ic e fr om the omi ssi on of the se c la ims
on dir e c t a pp e a l: ha d ap pe llate c ouns e l pu rs ue d th e same c la ims we no w f ind to l a c k me ri t, t

he re is
no re a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity that th e re su lt o f t

he a pp e a l w ou ld h a ve c ha

ng e d. Ki nc a de ’s str on g e st claim with reg ard to trial c ounsel was the latter’s fa ilure to object to the prosecu t i on’s use of Thomas’s guilty

plea. See Kincade , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 33944, at *34. A closely related issue, the a dmi ssi on

of Th oma s’ s guil ty

ple a , w a s c on sid e re d o n d ir e c t r e vie w; a tw o-j ud ge ma

jor ity deter mined on the merits that the plea was not admitted i mproperly

. At the same time, that one of three judge s dissented demonstrates the streng th of the issue appellate counsel chose to raise. As the district court points out: “The [same] judges in al l likelihood would have found no me rit in the
co n te n ti o nth a t d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l s h o u ld

h a v e o b je c te d to th e e v id e n c e ” if

th e a dmi s s io no f

th at evidenc e itself wa s not improper. Id . at *35. Ultimately , in view of our de termination that trial counse l’s perf ormanc e did not prejudice the de fe ns e , th e c on c lus ion that a pp e llate c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to r a ise cla im s abo ut thi s sa me perf ormanc e likewise ca

used no pre

judice is inevitable. Gree r , 264 F.3d at 676 (“[B]y definition,

a pp e llate c ouns e l c ann ot b e ine ff e c tiv e fo r a fa ilure to r a ise an is su e that la c ks me ri t.” ); Ho war d , 405 F.3d at 485.No. 07-1811

Kincade v. Wolfenbarg er

- 23 - V For the re asons set for

th above, we AFF I RM the district court’s deni al o f a writ of habea s corpus.