COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLe e and Senior Judge Clements

CHYNA ROXANNE REED MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1514- 17-3 PER CURIAM APRIL 17, 2018 ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE William D. Broadhurst, Judge (Matthew Dunne, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitti ng on brief. (Daniel J. Callaghan, City Att orney; Heather P. Ferguson, Ass istant City Attorney; Valer ia L. Cook, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Chyna Roxanne Reed (mother) appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her two youngest children. Mother argues that the trial court erred by holding that (1) the evidence was sufficient “to sustain a finding that the parental rights of [m other] be terminated;” and (2) the termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interes ts of the children. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial co urt did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we view the evide nce and all reason able inference s in the light most favorable to the prevailing part y below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S. E.2d 16, 18 (1991)). The Roanoke City Department of S ocial Services ( the Department ) first became involved with mother and her family on Ja nuary 9, 2014. At the time, mo ther was pregnant and homeless. The Department assisted mother in obtaining housing, and it pro vided her with bus passes and food cards. 1 In May 2014, mother gave birt h to one of the children who is the subject of this appeal. The child was born substance exposed and failed a hearing test at b irth. The Departmen t assisted mother with scheduling appointments for the child. Mother missed seve ral appointments and did not reschedule them. On March 3, 2015, the Department received a report from the Ro anoke City Police Department. The police had foun d mother and the child outside of a Food Lion. Mother had left the child in the care of a stranger while she “went to the rest room for an extended period of time.” When the police arrived, mother was “semi-coherent” and told th e police that she had “mushed-up” Suboxone and injected it. The police found two syringes on her person. Mother was transported to a hospital, and the child was placed in the paternal grandmothe r’s care. Mother did not maintain contact with the Department. The Depa rtment received allegations of domestic violence between mother and the child’s biological father. The Department closed its prevention case on Jul y 20, 2015, since mo ther was no longer co mplying with services. On July 21, 2015, the Department received a complaint that mot her was cooking methamphetamine in her mother’s house and that drug paraphernal ia was within the child’s reach. On July 23, 2015, the Department visited mother. Mother denied cooking methamphetamine, but admitted that she had used heroin within t he previous three wee ks. She also told the Department

1 Mother’s two youngest children, w ho are the subject of this ap peal, were not born at the time of the Department’s firs t involvement with mother.- 3 - that she used Suboxone and Addera ll if she could not obtain her oin. The Department referred mother for substance abuse treatment. On August 4, 2015, mothe r tested positive for buprenorphine, opioids, and heroi n. On August 7, 2015, the Roa noke City Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) entered an emergency r emoval order, an d the Department placed the child in foster care. On September 14, 2015, the JD R court entered an order finding that the child was abused or neglected. In February 2016, mother gave birth to her youngest child, who also is the subject of this appeal. The child was born subst ance exposed. Due to the Depa rtment’s concerns about mother’s housing situation and substance abuse issues, th e child was rem oved from mother’s care and placed in foster care on February 5, 201 6. On March 10, 2016, the JDR court entered an order finding that mother’s youngest child was abused or neglected and at risk of being abused or neglected. The Department filed foster care plans with several requirements for mother. The Department required mother to obtain and maintain stable housin g and employment, complete a parenting class, and complete a domestic violence assessment an d class. The Department also required mother to remain substance free and participate in a s ubstance abuse treatment program. Furthermore, the Department planned to arrange visitation betwe en mother and the children and required her to participate in the visitations. Mother did not comply with most of the Dep artment’s requiremen ts, although she did complete the parenting class after her second attempt. She mis sed the first three domestic violence assessments. She appeared for t he fourth assessment and comple ted the class. Mother was unemployed for mo st of the time that the children were in foste r care. She also did not have stable housing and stayed with friends, her mother, or the father of h er oldest child. In order to address mother’s substance abuse issues, the Depar tment referred her to a program at the Blue Ridge Behavi oral Health Care. She was disc harged from the program three- 4 - times for excessive absences. O n June 27 and Jul y 18, 2016, th e Department asked mother to complete a drug screen. On both occasions, mother tested posit ive for Suboxone, for which she did not have a prescription. On Augus t 2, 2016, the Department ask ed mother to complete another drug screen, and mother tested nega tive for drugs on that date. Mother also failed to maintain contact with the Department and was inconsistent with visiting the children. Initially , the Department arranged for mother to visit with the children weekly for two hours. Mother frequentl y was late to the visits and mi ssed ten appointments prior to September 17, 2016. Between Sep tember 29 and October 24, 2016, mother was incarcerated for a larceny conviction. When she was released, the Department arra nged for a visitation on October 31, 2016, but mother did no t appear. The Depar tment subsequently l earned that mother was hospitalized for a heroin overdose. Mother later called the De partment to restart visitation. However, since she had missed thr ee visits in a row, the Depart ment suspended the visits and required her to come into the office to meet with a social work er. The Department scheduled a meeting for mother to meet with t he social worker on December 1 4, 2016, but mother did not appear. The Departm ent did not hear fro m mother un til March 23 , 2017, when the pa rties appeared before the JDR court for a hearin g on the terminat ion of mother ’s parental rights. On March 23, 2017, the JDR cour t terminated mother’s parental rights to her two youngest children. Mother appealed to the circuit court. The parties a ppeared before the circuit court on June 22, 2017. The De partment presented evidence that the children were doing well in foster care. They are placed together and very attached to the foster parent s. Mother testified about her current situation. She explained t hat since summer 2016, she has been living “on and off” with he r seven-year-old child and his father. Mother stated that she had been working for a temporary service for approximately a month and a half prior to the final hearing. She explained that she works the night shift, for fou r days a week, at the Volvo plant doing- 5 - cleaning work. Mother denied tha t she had not maintained conta ct with the Depar tment and said that she left messages for the so cial worker, who did not retur n her calls. 2 Mother also testified that she is no longer taking Suboxone and has been clean since her o verdose in October 2016. After hearing the parties’ evidence and argument, the trial co urt found that it was in the children’s best interests to term inate mother’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). The trial court also approved the foster care goals of adoption. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbe d on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. Ap p. 185, 190, 717 S.E.2d 811, 814 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). “When considering ter mination of parental righ ts, ‘the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). Mother argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights and asserts that termination is not in the best interests of the children. Moth er emphasizes that she completed the parenting class and dom estic violence class. She also notes th at she found employment with a temporary agency and was saving m oney for permanent housing. L astly, she states that she has been clean of illegal substances for approximately a year. The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights pursuant t o Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). A court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months

2 The social worker testified tha t after the March JDR court hea ring mother left a voicemail message with a number, b ut when the social worker cal led the number, she was unable to leave a message.- 6 - from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Since 2014, the Department provid ed numerous services to mothe r. Despite these services being offered to mother, the trial court found that mother had not complied with the Department’s “very reasonable requi rements.” The Depar tment referred mother to several substance abuse treatment programs, b ut she did not complet e any of them. Howe ver, the trial court accepted mother’s statement that she was clean and no longer using Subox one. The trial court also found that mother was unable to remedy th e conditions that led to the children being placed, and remai ning, in foster care. The tria l court noted that mother still did not have independent housing. Inade quate housing was one of the re asons that the Department first became involved with mother and her family in 2014. Furthermor e, although the Department arranged for weekly visitation between mother and the children, mother frequently was late to the visitations. The trial court explained that it was “detrimenta l” to the children to wait and see if mother was going to appear. The n, she missed several scheduled visitations, an d the Department was forced to suspend her visitations. The Department explaine d to mother that the visitations could restart, but that she had to come in and meet with the so cial worker first. Mother missed the appointment. Mother had not seen the children since September 2016. The trial court stressed that mother had not “tried to at lea st maintain contact with the chi ldren” since September 2016. At the time of the final hearing, one of the children had been in foster care for almost two years, and the other child had b een in foster care for approxim ately sixteen months. The children were doing well and th riving. At the conclu sion of the hearing , the trial court told mother that the children “need to be able to mov e on and so do you.” “It is cl early not in the best interests of a- 7 - child to spend a lengthy peri od of time waiting to find out whe n, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] r esponsibilities.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 322, 746 S.E.2d 509, 522 (2013) (quoti ng Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990)). Based on the totality of the re cord, the trial court did not e rr in finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to Co de § 16.1-283(C)(2) and that termination was in the ch ildren’s best interests. “When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternativ es is sufficient to sustain th e judgment of the t rial court, and if so, we need not address the ot her grounds.” Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1, 684 S.E.2d 219, 220 n.1 (2009); see also Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (t he Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subs ection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to a nother subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminati ng mother’s parental rights pursu ant to Code § 16.1-283(B).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is affirme d. Affirmed.