IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

O.G., a Minor, etc.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

S259011

Second Appellate District, Division Six

B295555

Ventura County Superior Court

2018017144

February 25, 2021

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 

Cuéllar, Kruger and Kline* concurred.

________________________

* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

S259011

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Proposition 57, passed in the November 2016 general 

election (Proposition 57), requires prosecutors to commence all 

cases involving a minor in juvenile court. “Proposition 57 is an 

‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law’ ” that “the legislative 

body intended ‘to extend as broadly as possible.’ ” (People v. 

Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal. 5th 299, 309 (Lara).)

Proposition 57 expressly allowed for amendments that “are 

consistent with and further the intent of this act . . . .” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 

5, p. 145 (2016 Voter Guide).) As originally enacted, Proposition 

57 allowed prosecutors to move to transfer some minors as 

young as 14 from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Senate 

Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391), enacted 

in 2018, amended Proposition 57 to prohibit minors under the 

age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court. (See 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 

2018, ch. 1012, § 1.)

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill 1391

is inconsistent with Proposition 57 and thus invalid (O.G. v. 

Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626, 629), a holding at 

odds with every other Court of Appeal opinion to have addressed 

the issue. We agree with the majority view that Senate Bill 1391 

was a permissible amendment to Proposition 57 and we reverse 

the judgment in this case. Because Proposition 57 expressly 

permits legislative amendments, we must presume the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

2

Legislature acted within its authority and uphold Senate Bill

1391 “if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said that the 

statute” is consistent with and furthers the intent of 

Proposition 57. (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 

Cal.4th 1243, 1256 (Amwest).) While barring the transfer of 14 

and 15 year olds to adult court is a change from Proposition 57’s 

statutory provisions, that change is what makes Senate Bill

1391 an amendment to Proposition 57. The amendment is fully 

consistent with and furthers Proposition 57’s fundamental

purposes of promoting rehabilitation of youthful offenders and 

reducing the prison population. We therefore uphold Senate Bill

1391 as a permissible amendment to Proposition 57.

I. BACKGROUND

“ ‘Historically, a child could be tried in criminal court only 

after a judicial determination, before jeopardy attached, that he 

or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’ ” 

(Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.) In 1961, the Legislature set 

16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be 

transferred to criminal court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former 

§§ 510, 603, 707, as amended by Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, pp. 3462, 

3472, 3485.) The age limit preventing prosecution of those 

younger than 16 in criminal court remained in place for close to 

34 years. 

In 1995, California began to move away from the historical 

rule when the Legislature permitted some 14 and 15 year olds 

to be transferred to criminal court. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 707, former subds. (d), (e), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 453, 

§ 9.5.) This trend continued over the next five years and 

culminated with Proposition 21 in 2000. For specified murders 

and sex crimes, Proposition 21 required prosecutors to charge 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

3

minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 602, former subd. (b), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.1.) 

For other specified serious offenses, Proposition 21 provided 

prosecutors with discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly 

in criminal court instead of juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 707, former subd. (d), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.2.)

In the years after the passage of Proposition 21, there was 

“a sea change in penology regarding the relative culpability and 

rehabilitation possibilities for juvenile offenders, as reflected in 

several judicial opinions.” (People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 

1099, 1106.) These changes were based upon developments in 

scientific research on adolescent brain development confirming 

that children are different from adults in ways that are critical 

to identifying age-appropriate sentences. (See, e.g., Roper v. 

Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571; Graham v. Florida

(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 (Graham); Miller v. Alabama (2012) 

567 U.S. 460, 469–470; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 

1353, 1375–1376; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 

267.) In the same period, the California Legislature enacted

numerous reforms reflecting a rethinking of punishment for 

minors. (See, e.g., Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1; Stats. 2013, ch. 312, 

§ 4; Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats. 2015, ch. 234, § 1.)

Consistent with these changes, in November 2016, the 

public implemented a series of criminal justice reforms through

the passage of Proposition 57. For juvenile defendants, 

Proposition 57 “largely returned California to the historical 

rule.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.) “ ‘Among other 

provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and 

Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors. 

Certain categories of minors . . . can still be tried in criminal 

court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

4

hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, 

degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and 

whether the minor can be rehabilitated.’ ” (Ibid.) For minors 16

or older, prosecutors can seek transfer to criminal court for any 

felony offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).) For 14

and 15 year olds, prosecutors could seek transfer to criminal 

court only for specified serious or violent offenses. (Id., § 707, 

former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Prop. 57, § 4.2.) “All 

remnants of Proposition 21 were deleted by passage of 

Proposition 57.” (People v. Superior Court (K.L.) (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 529, 534, fn. 3 (K.L.).) 

Senate Bill 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) continued 

California’s return to the historical rule. Effective January 1, 

2019, Senate Bill 1391 amended Proposition 57 by eliminating

the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when 

they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended 

after the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (See Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 

1012, § 1.) In this way, Senate Bill 1391 marked a return to the 

rule in place beginning in 1961 and for close to 34 years 

thereafter — 16 again became the minimum age for transferring 

a minor to criminal court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former 

§§ 510, 603, 707, as amended by Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, pp. 3462, 

3472, 3485.) 

Two days after the passage of Senate Bill 1391, the

Ventura County District Attorney’s Office (the District 

Attorney’s Office) filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that 

when minor O.G. was 15 years old, he committed two counts of 

murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of second

degree robbery (id., § 211), with gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) 

and firearm (id., § 12022.53, subds. (b), (d), & (e)(1)) 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

5

enhancements. The District Attorney’s Office 

contemporaneously filed a motion to transfer O.G. to criminal 

court. The District Attorney’s Office argued that Senate Bill

1391 is an unconstitutional amendment to Proposition 57 and 

the juvenile court therefore retained its authority to conduct a 

hearing to determine O.G.’s suitability for transfer to criminal 

court.

The juvenile court found that Senate Bill 1391 is 

unconstitutional because it prohibits what Proposition 57 

“expressly permit[s]: adult court handling of 14 and 15 year old 

minors accused of murder.” O.G. filed a petition for writ of 

mandate challenging the juvenile court’s ruling. The Court of 

Appeal denied writ relief and held that Senate Bill 1391 is 

unconstitutional because the language of Proposition 57 permits 

adult prosecution for 14 and 15 year olds, but Senate Bill 1391 

precludes such prosecution. (O.G. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 

Cal.App.5th 626, 628–629.) The Court of Appeal disagreed with 

what was at the time five and is now seven other Court of Appeal

panels to have addressed the issue. (See People v. Superior 

Court (Alexander C.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 994 (Alexander C.); 

K.L., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 529; People v. Superior Court 

(T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, 

S257980 (T.D.); People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 

Cal.App.5th 383, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773; People 

v. Superior Court (S.L.) (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 114, review 

granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258432; B.M. v. Superior Court (2019) 

40 Cal.App.5th 742, review granted Jan. 2, 2020, S259030

(B.M.); Narith S. v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1131, 

review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S260090.) We granted review.
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

6

II. DISCUSSION

The parties disagree over whether Senate Bill 1391 is a 

constitutional amendment to Proposition 57. The District 

Attorney’s Office, which is the real party in interest, argues that 

Senate Bill 1391 is an invalid amendment. O.G.’s position, with 

which the Attorney General agrees, is that Senate Bill 1391 is a 

valid amendment. We agree with O.G. and the Attorney 

General.

A. Legal Standard

“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative 

statute by another statute that becomes effective only when 

approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits 

amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” (Cal. 

Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) In this case, in an uncodified 

amendment clause, Proposition 57 provides that its provisions 

concerning the treatment of juveniles “may be amended so long 

as such amendments are consistent with and further the intent

of this act by a statute that is passed by a majority vote of the 

members of each house of the Legislature and signed by the 

Governor.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 

145.) The parties agree that Senate Bill 1391 amended

Proposition 57 by, in almost all circumstances, eliminating a 

juvenile court’s power to transfer cases to criminal court for 

more serious crimes committed by 14 and 15 year olds. (See 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 

2018, ch. 1012, § 1.) The question in this case is whether the 

amendments in Senate Bill 1391 are “consistent with and 

further the intent” of Proposition 57. (2016 Voter Guide, supra,

§ 5, at p. 145.)
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

7

In making this determination, we “apply the general rule 

that ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality supports the 

Legislature’s acts.’ ” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1253.) 

However, an initiative “must be given the effect the voters 

intended it to have.” (Id. at pp. 1255–1256.) “[S]tarting with 

the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority, 

we shall uphold the validity of [a legislative amendment] if, by 

any reasonable construction [of the initiative], it can be said that 

the statute” complies with the initiative’s conditions for enacting

legislative amendments. (Id. at p. 1256.) Often, as is the case 

here and in Amwest, the initiative’s conditions for making 

amendments involve the requirement that any amendment

“furthers the purposes of [the] Proposition . . . .” or words of 

similar effect. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 1251.) In discerning the 

purposes of a proposition, “we are guided by, but are not limited 

to, the general statement of purpose found in the initiative.” (Id. 

at p. 1257.) “ ‘[E]vidence of its purpose may be drawn from many 

sources, including the historical context of the amendment, and 

the ballot arguments favoring the measure.’ ” (Id. at p. 1256.) 

“ ‘[L]egislative findings, while not binding on the courts, are 

given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to 

be unreasonable and arbitrary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1252.) “ ‘ “[W]here 

limitations upon [legislative power] are imposed they are to be 

strictly construed, and are not to be given effect as against the 

general power of the legislature, unless such limitations clearly 

inhibit the act in question.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1255, quoting Martin v. 

Riley (1942) 20 Cal.2d 28, 40.)

Guided by, but not limited to, the initiative’s statement of 

purpose, we therefore are bound to afford a highly deferential 

standard: We must presume the Legislature acted within its 

authority if by “any reasonable construction” (Amwest, supra, 11 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

8

Cal.4th at p. 1256) of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391’s 

amendments are “consistent with and further the intent” of the 

proposition. (Prop. 57, § 5.) This means that we must uphold 

the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391 even if the District

Attorney’s Office is able to proffer other, plausible 

interpretations of the purpose and intent of Proposition 57. As 

long as there is “any reasonable construction” of Proposition 57

such that Senate Bill 1391’s amendments are “consistent with 

and further the intent” of Proposition 57, we must uphold 

Senate Bill 1391. In this case, Senate Bill 1391 is fully

consistent with and furthers Proposition 57’s purposes.

B. Express Purpose and Intent of Proposition 57

Proposition 57’s statement of “Purpose and Intent” 

provides that: “[i]n enacting this act, it is the purpose and intent 

of the people of the State of California to: [¶] 1. Protect and 

enhance public safety. [¶] 2. Save money by reducing wasteful 

spending on prisons. [¶] 3. Prevent federal courts from 

indiscriminately releasing prisoners. [¶] 4. Stop the revolving 

door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for 

juveniles. [¶] 5. Require a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide 

whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.” (2016 Voter 

Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) The proposition 

further provides that “[t]his act shall be broadly construed to 

accomplish its purposes” (id., § 5, p. 145) and that “[t]his act 

shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes” (id., § 9, 

p. 146). We examine each of these enumerated purposes in turn.

First, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 

proposition’s public safety purpose. (See 2016 Voter Guide, 

supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Adjudicating juveniles in 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

9

juvenile court where the focus is on rehabilitation, rather than 

in criminal court, may reasonably be considered as furthering 

public safety by discouraging recidivism. The voters who 

enacted Proposition 57 considered that “evidence shows that 

minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are less 

likely to commit new crimes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 

argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) In passing Senate Bill

1391, the Legislature also considered that “[e]xtensive research 

has established that youth tried as adults are more likely to 

commit new crimes in the future than their peers treated in the 

juvenile system . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of 

Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 

2018, p. 4 (hereafter Senate Committee Analysis).) The 

Assembly Committee on Public Safety reiterated that “[y]outh

who commit crimes fare much better in the juvenile system than 

in the adult system because they benefit from the rehabilitative 

services, and are also less likely to commit crimes in the future 

than youth in the adult system.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 

Analysis. of Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

May 25, 2018, p. 4 (hereafter Assembly Committee Analysis).) 

The practice of trying 14 and 15 year olds as adults “was started 

in the 90’s, a time in California history where the state was 

getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not smart on crime. Back then, 

society believed that young people were fully developed at 

around age 14. Now, research has debunked that myth and 

cognitive science has proven that children and youth who 

commit crimes are very capable of change.” (Id. at p. 3.) 

Furthermore, as “stated by the Supreme Court, ‘it does not 

follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality 

approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few 

incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

10

capacity for change.’ ” (Id. at p. 5, quoting Graham, supra, 560 

U.S. at p. 77.) The Senate Committee on Public Safety noted 

that “[m]ost youth will eventually be released from prison and 

in the interest of protecting public safety, we need to ensure they 

get the treatment and tools they need to succeed when they 

return to society.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, p. 4.) 

The District Attorney’s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 

does not protect public safety because Proposition 57 adopted a 

flexible approach that permits 14 and 15 year olds to be tried as 

adults when public safety warrants, but Senate Bill 1391 

ordinarily requires juvenile treatment for 14 and 15 year olds 

even if they have committed very serious crimes and pose a 

danger. The District Attorney’s Office argues that it believes 

that Proposition 57’s “evidence-based approach” is more 

protective of public safety than Senate Bill 1391’s approach that 

places even greater emphasis on rehabilitation. But that is not 

how our deferential standard works. (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 

at p. 1256.) Both Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 sought to 

protect public safety by reducing juvenile recidivism and 

therefore, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57,

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 

proposition’s public safety purpose. As the Court of Appeal 

explained in B.M., “Senate Bill 1391 can easily be construed to 

promote public safety and reduce crime, since it increases the 

number of youth offenders who will remain in the juvenile 

justice system and avoid prison where the chance of recidivism 

is higher.” (B.M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.)

It is also worth emphasizing that Senate Bill 1391 focused 

only on 14 and 15 year olds, leaving Proposition 57’s procedures 

for handling 16 and 17 year olds completely intact. Nothing in 

Proposition 57 appears to forbid the Legislature from making a 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

11

judgment that public safety can be better protected by keeping 

the subset of particularly young, 14- and 15-year-old offenders 

in the juvenile system where they are more likely to receive 

appropriate education and emotional and psychological 

treatment, and less likely to reoffend after their release. 

The District Attorney’s Office cites cases where 14 and 15

year olds committed particularly serious crimes and argues 

these individuals pose such a danger to the public that releasing 

them at age 25 under the juvenile system would not protect the 

public. Again, the fact the District Attorney’s Office does not 

agree with Senate Bill 1391’s approach to public safety does not 

mean that there is no reasonable interpretation that, like 

Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 

protecting public safety. Moreover, in the case of the 

particularly heinous crimes cited by the District Attorney’s 

Office, other avenues are available to retaining jurisdiction over 

juvenile offenders that pose a danger to the public. In signing 

the law the Governor “considered the fact that young people 

adjudicated in juvenile court can be held beyond their original 

sentence” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800. 

(Governor’s message to Sen. on Senate Bill 1391 (Sept. 30, 2018) 

Sen. J. (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) p. 6230.) That section permits 

the prosecutor to petition for an extension of juvenile court 

jurisdiction, even past the age of 25, if discharging a juvenile 

offender “would be physically dangerous to the public because of 

the person’s mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or 

abnormality that causes the person to have serious difficulty 

controlling his or her dangerous behavior . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 1800, subd. (a).)

Second, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57,

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

12

proposition’s aim to save “money by reducing wasteful spending 

on prisons.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 

141.) Senate Bill 1391 sought to save money by ensuring that, 

under the bill, fewer minors will be transferred to adult criminal 

court where they could be incarcerated for a longer period in

adult prison and be more likely to recidivate. (See Sen. Rules 

Com., Unfinished Business Analysis of Senate Bill 1391 (2017–

2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2018, p. 6 [“Potential longterm savings of an unknown amount by preventing youths from 

receiving extremely long sentences if adjudicated as an adult. 

[¶] 3) Potential savings of an unknown amount to the extent 

that keeping youth in juvenile court and facilities designed to 

rehabilitate juveniles reduces recidivism”].) Proposition 57 

ballot materials expressed the same goal, informing voters that 

trying fewer minors as adults “would reduce state prison and 

parole costs as those youths would no longer spend any time in 

prison or be supervised by state parole agents following their 

release.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 

Legis. Analyst, p. 57.) The District Attorney’s Office does not 

dispute that Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 

this cost-saving purpose.

Third, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the goal of 

preventing “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing 

prisoners.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 

141.) Proposition 57’s ballot materials explained that 

“[o]vercrowded and unconstitutional conditions led the U.S. 

Supreme Court to order the state to reduce its prison population. 

Now, without a common sense, long-term solution, we will 

continue to waste billions and risk a court-ordered release of 

dangerous prisoners. This is an unacceptable outcome that puts 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

13

Californians in danger — and this is why we need Prop. 57.” 

(2016 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) 

The federal court order required California to “reduce the prison 

population to 137.5% of the adult institutions’ total design 

capacity.” (Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 922 

F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see also Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 

501–503.) The federal court later refused to vacate its order 

because, inter alia, the state failed to produce a “ ‘durable 

remedy’ ” to the problem of prison overcrowding. (Coleman v. 

Brown (E.D.Cal.2013) 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1043 (Coleman II).) 

The federal court warned that the state had “thus far engaged 

in openly contumacious conduct by repeatedly ignoring both this 

Court’s Order and at least three explicit admonitions to take all 

steps necessary to comply with that Order.” (Id. at p. 1049.) The 

federal court further advised “Governor Brown has a duty to 

exercise in good faith his full authority, including seeking any 

changes to or waivers of state law that may be necessary to 

ensure compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment.” (Id. at 

p. 1054.) Proposition 57 therefore facilitated California’s 

compliance with this federal court order by ensuring that fewer 

juveniles would be incarcerated in state prison. These changes

to juvenile transfer proceedings were part of the proposition’s 

broader strategy to reduce the prison population. In addition to 

these changes, Proposition 57 also enabled inmates to be 

released earlier on parole by: (a) making any person convicted 

of a nonviolent felony offense eligible for parole consideration 

after completing the full term for his or her primary offense and 

(b) giving the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

authority to award credits to inmates for good behavior. (2016 

Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, §§ 3–4, p. 141.) Each of 

these changes provided a “ ‘durable remedy’ ” that would
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

14

decrease the prison population (Coleman II, at p. 1043) and

thereby diminish the likelihood that federal courts would 

“indiscriminately release[e] prisoners” (2016 Voter Guide, 

supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141). Senate Bill 1391 similarly 

mitigates against federal courts “indiscriminately releasing

prisoners” in order to reduce prison population because the bill 

ensures that now and in the future fewer minors are ultimately 

sent to adult prison. The District Attorney’s Office does not 

dispute that Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 

this purpose.

Fourth, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of 

stopping “the revolving door of crime by emphasizing 

rehabilitation, especially for juveniles.” (2016 Voter Guide, 

supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) The District Attorney’s 

Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is inconsistent with this 

purpose because Proposition 57 already stopped “the revolving 

door” by implementing “a more balanced approach, which 

specifically includes the transfer of certain 14-or 15-year-olds to 

adult court.” However, by its terms, Proposition 57 sought to 

broadly emphasize rehabilitation for all juveniles, including 14 

and 15 year olds. In approving Proposition 57, voters considered 

“[e]vidence show[ing] that the more inmates are rehabilitated, 

the less likely they are to re-offend. Further evidence shows 

that minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are 

less likely to commit new crimes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 

argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) Proposition 57 “focuses 

our system on evidence-based rehabilitation for juveniles and 

adults because it is better for public safety than our current 

system.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in enacting Senate Bill 1391, the 

Legislature considered that “[t]he juvenile system is very 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

15

different from the adult system. The juvenile system provides 

age-appropriate treatment, services, counseling, and education, 

and a youth’s participation in these programs is mandatory. 

The adult system has no age-appropriate services, participation 

in rehabilitation programs is voluntary, and in many prisons, 

programs are oversubscribed with long waiting lists.” (Sen. 

Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.) “When youth are given ageappropriate services and education that are available in the 

juvenile justice system, they are less likely to recidivate.” 

(Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.) “Keeping 14 and 15 year 

olds in the juvenile justice system will help to ensure that youth 

receive treatment, counseling, and education they need to 

develop into healthy, law abiding adults.” (Ibid.) Senate Bill

1391, like Proposition 57, seeks to prevent recidivism by 

emphasizing juvenile rehabilitation in lieu of state prison. 

Under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill

1391 is consistent with and furthers this fourth purpose.

Finally, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57,

Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of 

requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles 

should be tried in adult court.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text 

of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Proposition 57 accomplished this 

purpose by repealing a prosecutor’s power to directly file charges 

against juveniles in criminal court. Senate Bill 1391 does not 

attempt to reinstate direct filing. Rather, Senate Bill 1391 

“repeal[ed] the power of the prosecutor to make a motion to 

transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court if 

the minor was alleged to have committed certain serious 

offenses when he or she was 14 or 15 years old.” (Sen. Com. on 

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1391, supra, as introduced 

Feb. 16, 2018, p. 2, boldface and italics omitted.) Proposition 57 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

16

took away prosecutorial power to bypass juvenile court 

jurisdiction by eliminating the direct filing authority. Senate 

Bill 1391 then narrowed that power further. In this way, both 

Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 had the same goal: to limit 

prosecutorial authority to prosecute juveniles as adults.

Moreover, both before and after Senate Bill 1391, a judge, 

and not the prosecutor, still decides whether to transfer 

juveniles to criminal court, whenever the prosecutor has the 

authority to initiate the transfer process. After Senate Bill

1391, the prosecutor continues to make a motion to transfer 

charged minors age 16 and over and the juvenile court continues 

to determine whether the minor should be transferred. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1) [in certain cases involving minors 

“16 years of age or older . . . the district attorney . . . may make 

a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of 

criminal jurisdiction”].) Thus, when there is a transfer decision 

to be made, a judge, and not a prosecutor, still makes that 

decision. Senate Bill 1391 has not eliminated that procedural 

scheme. 

The District Attorney’s Office argues the Senate Bill 1391 

is inconsistent with requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to 

decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court” (2016 

Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141) because under 

Senate Bill 1391 a judge can no longer decide whether 14 and 15

year olds can be transferred to criminal court. The District 

Attorney’s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is therefore at 

odds with the specific statutory provisions of Proposition 57 that 

allow a prosecutor to make a motion to transfer 14 or 15 year 

olds to criminal court in specified cases. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 707, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Prop. 57, § 4.2 [stating 

that a prosecutor may make a motion in any case where a 14 or 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

17

15 year old was alleged to have committed a qualifying offense].) 

The District Attorney’s Office also emphasizes language in 

Proposition 57’s ballot materials that states that juvenile court 

judges will decide whether minors should be prosecuted and 

sentenced as adults and that permit the transfer of juveniles age 

14 and older.

1

 However, the focus of requiring “a judge, not a 

prosecutor” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p.

141) to make transfer decisions was neither to confer new 

powers on judges nor to ensure that 14 and 15 year olds would 

continue to be subject to adult criminal prosecution. Instead, 

the focus of the provision was on restraining prosecutorial 

discretion and upon ensuring that fewer youths would be tried 

in adult court. Indeed, immediately after referencing the 

requirement that judges will make the juvenile transfer 

decision, the Legislative Analyst focused on the new protections 

for minors and not on the authority granted to juvenile court 

judges. (See 2016 Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 

Legis. Analyst, p. 56 [“As a result, the only way a youth could be 

tried in adult court is if the juvenile court judge in the hearing 

decides to transfer the youth to adult court. Youths accused of 

committing certain severe crimes would no longer automatically 

be tried in adult court and no youth could be tried in adult court 

based only on the decision of a prosecutor. . . . [T]here would be 

fewer youths tried in adult court”].) Senate Bill 1391 “certainly 

narrows the class of minors who are subject to review by a 

juvenile court for potential transfer to criminal court . . . but it 

1 For instance, the “Official Title and Summary” included: 

“Provides juvenile court judges shall make determination, upon 

prosecutor motion, whether juveniles age 14 and older should be 

prosecuted and sentenced as adults for specified offenses.” 

(2016 Voter Guide, supra, Official Title and Summary, p. 54.)
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

18

in no way detracts from Proposition 57’s stated intent that, 

where a transfer decision must be made, a judge rather than a 

prosecutor makes the decision.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) Under a reasonable construction of 

Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers

this purpose because, like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 

further narrowed prosecutorial power to try 14 and 15 year olds 

in criminal court and, when there is a transfer decision to be 

made, a judge, and not the prosecutor, still makes that decision

under Senate Bill 1391.

Of course, eliminating the ability to transfer 14 and 15

year olds to adult court is a change from Proposition 57’s 

statutory provisions and the prior practice, but that change is 

what makes Senate Bill 1391 an amendment to Proposition 57. 

Proposition 57 provides that its provisions concerning the 

treatment of juveniles “may be amended so long as such 

amendments are consistent with and further the intent of this 

act by a statute that is passed by a majority vote of the members 

of each house of the Legislature and signed by the Governor.” 

(2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145.)

The District Attorney’s Office argues that Proposition 57’s 

amendment clause is a two-part test requiring that any 

amendment be both “consistent with [this act]” and “further[] 

the intent of this act.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 

57, § 5, p. 145.) The District Attorney’s Office argues that 

because Senate Bill 1391 is not expressly consistent with 

Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is invalid. However, O.G. 

argues that we should interpret Proposition 57’s amendment 

clause as authorizing amendments that are “consistent with 

[the intent of the act] and [that] further the intent of this act.” 

In other words, O.G. argues that the amendment must be 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

19

consistent with and further the intent of the act, but does not 

need to be consistent with the express language of the act. O.G. 

has the better argument. Limiting authorized amendments to 

those consistent with the express language of the act, “would 

appear to preclude any amendment that deletes or repeals any 

portion of the Act, no matter how consistent such action might 

be with the purpose of the Act itself.” (T.D., supra, 38 

Cal.App.5th at p. 372.) “[I]f any amendment to the provisions of 

an initiative is considered inconsistent with an initiative’s 

intent or purpose, then an initiative such as Proposition 57 could 

never be amended.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 

1003.) The District Attorney’s Office’s interpretation here would 

render the amendment clause a nullity. (See Williams v. 

Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 357 [“An interpretation 

that renders statutory language a nullity is obviously to be 

avoided”].) 

The District Attorney’s Office nonetheless suggests this 

would not make the amendment clause a nullity because 

amendments “consistent with” Proposition 57 could still include 

“minor” amendments to “clarify ambiguous terms, to correct 

drafting errors in the original language” or adjust procedures. 

There is no reason to believe that Proposition 57’s amendment 

clause contemplated only the correction of typographical and 

drafting errors. To the contrary, in enacting an initiative, voters 

are presumed to be aware of existing laws. (Professional 

Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 1016, 1048.) Because existing case law had interpreted 

similar amendment clauses by the time of the passage of 

Proposition 57, we presume that in authorizing “amendments” 

that “are consistent with and further the intent of this act” (2016 

Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145), the voters 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

20

intended that authorization to carry the broad meaning defined 

by case law. (See In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1483, 

1482 [even though one “plausible reading” of an initiative was 

inconsistent with subsequent legislation, “an alternat[e] and 

equally plausible reading” of the initiative “would satisfy the 

proposition’s requirement that any amendment be consistent 

with and further its intent”]; Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 426, 441 [“[I]f the mental health services 

funding requirements [of Proposition 63] prove too onerous, the 

electorate or the Legislature may vote to diminish them in the 

future” without exceeding legislative authority to amend the 

initiative consistent with and in furtherance of its intent].) In 

this specific context, it is at least a “reasonable construction” of 

Proposition 57 (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256) to 

conclude that “consistent with and further” (2016 Voter Guide, 

supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145) is simply a means of 

conveying emphasis — even though this involves surplusage.

Finally, the District Attorney’s Office’s interpretation —

which seeks to read the amendment clause in exceedingly 

narrow terms — also runs counter to the express language of 

Proposition 57, which provides that it “shall be broadly 

construed to accomplish its purposes” (2016 Voter Guide, supra,

text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145) and that it “shall be liberally 

construed to effectuate its purposes” (id., § 9, p. 146). Both 

provisions call for broadly or liberally construing Proposition 

57’s provisions to serve its “purposes.” If voters want to 

specifically limit amendments to clarify terms or change 

procedures, there are amendment clauses that do that. (See, 

e.g., Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) text of 

Prop. 63, § 18, p. 108 [“The Legislature may by majority vote add 

provisions to clarify procedures and terms including the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

21

procedures for the collection of the tax surcharge imposed by 

Section 12 of this act”].) The drafters of Proposition 57 could 

have explicitly limited amendments to minor clarifications or to 

procedural changes not affecting transfer eligibility. The 

drafters could have also stated more overtly a purpose to ensure 

that judges retain the discretion to transfer some 14 and 15 year 

olds to criminal court. Noticeably, they did neither.

Arguing that any doubts should be resolved in favor of 

precluding changes to the initiative, the District Attorney’s 

Office relies upon People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008 and 

Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 

Cal.App.4th 1473. Kelly, however, involved legislative 

amendments to Proposition 215 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)). As 

stated earlier, the “Legislature may amend or repeal an 

initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only 

when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute 

permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” 

(Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) Unlike Proposition 57, 

Proposition 215 did not contain a provision allowing for 

legislative amendment of the initiative. (See Kelly, at p. 1013, 

fn. 2.) The issue in Kelly was therefore whether the subsequent 

legislation amended Proposition 215 because, if so, the 

legislation would necessarily be impermissible under California 

Constitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c). (Kelly, at p. 

1024.) The initiative at issue in Quackenbush did have an 

amendment clause, but the court separately analyzed two 

different issues: (1) whether legislative changes to the Insurance 

Code actually amended the provisions of Proposition 103 (Gen. 

Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988)) and, if so, (2) whether these amendments 

furthered the purposes of Proposition 103 as its amendment 

clause required. (Quackenbush, at pp. 1483–1494.) Although 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

22

the District Attorney’s Office cites Quackenbush for a standard 

that would resolve any doubt against validity of the amendment, 

the cited passage (id. at pp. 1485–1486) concerns the same

question at issue in Kelly, i.e., whether subsequent legislation 

constitutes an amendment to the initiative. When the 

Quackenbush court addresses the separate question of 

furtherance of the initiative’s purposes (Quackenbush, at pp. 

1490–1494), it cites Amwest’s statement of the standard 

(Quackenbush, at p. 1490) and does not purport to resolve 

doubts against the amendment. (See Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 

at p. 1256 [“[S]tarting with the presumption that the 

Legislature acted within its authority, we shall uphold the 

validity of [a legislative amendment] if, by any reasonable 

construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the 

purposes of [the] Proposition . . . . ”].)

C. The Fundamental Purpose and Intent of 

Proposition 57

In considering a challenge to a legislative statute that 

amends an initiative, we consider not only the initiative’s 

statements of purpose or intent, but also the initiative “ ‘as a 

whole. ’ ” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1257 [“we are guided 

by, but are not limited to, the general statement of purpose 

found in the initiative”]; see id. at p. 1259 [construing the “major 

purposes” of Prop. 103].) In this case, just as the District 

Attorney’s Office’s argument fails when reviewing each of 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

23

Proposition 57’s enumerated purposes, their argument also fails 

when reviewing the initiative’s purpose as a whole.2

The major and fundamental purpose of Proposition 57’s 

juvenile justice provisions — as evidenced by its express 

language and enumerated purposes, the ballot materials, and 

its historical backdrop and the changes it made to existing law 

— was an ameliorative change to the criminal law that 

emphasized rehabilitation over punishment. The impact of this 

ameliorative change was decarceration that, in turn, would 

prevent “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing 

prisoners.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 

141.) Our court has already stated that “Proposition 57 is an 

‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law’ that we infer the 

legislative body intended ‘to extend as broadly as possible’ ” and 

that “ ‘we find an “inevitable inference” that the electorate “must 

have intended” that the potential “ameliorating benefits” of 

rehabilitation (rather than punishment) . . . .’ ” (Lara, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at p. 309.) “The [a]ct’s overriding purpose was to 

2 The District Attorney’s Office argues that we may not 

ignore any of Proposition 57’s enumerated purposes by 

designating one or more of them as “primary” or “fundamental.” 

Designating a major purpose, however, is consistent with our 

own statements about Proposition 57 in Lara. (See Lara, supra, 

4 Cal.5th at p. 309; see also Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 

1257, 1259 [reviewing the available information about Prop. 103 

“ ‘as a whole’ ” and its historical backdrop before construing its 

“two major purposes”].) We can properly assess the major 

purpose or purposes of an initiative. In any event, under a

reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is 

consistent with and furthers each of Proposition 57’s 

enumerated purposes. Thus, whether we look to the statute’s 

“major” purpose or instead analyze each of its enumerated 

purposes, O.G. still prevails.
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

24

channel more juvenile offenders into the juvenile justice system 

and to have a juvenile court judge make the transfer decision if 

one was to be made, not to set in stone the age parameters for 

such a determination.” (T.D., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) 

Proposition 57’s changes to juvenile filing were also consistent 

with its other provisions that advanced the time at which adult 

prisoners become eligible for parole and allowed prisoners to be 

released earlier on parole by earning credits for good behavior. 

(2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 3, p. 141.) All of 

these measures serve the broader purpose of decarceration.

Senate Bill 1391 is likewise an ameliorative change to the 

criminal justice system that emphasizes rehabilitation over 

punishment and serves the broader purpose of decarceration. 

Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 focuses on rehabilitation 

by increasing the number of juveniles adjudicated in juvenile 

court and decreasing the number of juveniles tried in criminal 

court. Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 continued 

California’s return to the state’s historical rule on juvenile 

justice and undid a policy enacted at “a time in California 

history where the state was getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not 

smart on crime.” (Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 3.) Senate 

Bill 1391, accordingly, moves the law in the same direction as 

Proposition 57 — toward the historical rule placing minors 

under 16 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. 

(Cf. Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256 [striking down an

amendment when the Legislature attempted to exempt surety 

companies from an initiative that had imposed rate rollback and 

rate approval provisions on them along with other types of 

insurance].) 

The District Attorney’s Office argues that Proposition 57 

was intended to be ameliorative, but only to a point. The District 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

25

Attorney’s Office contends that the aim of Proposition 57 was 

also somewhat punitive in nature to ensure that certain 14 and 

15 year olds could be tried as adults, and therefore Senate Bill

1391, which is even more ameliorative, is at odds with 

Proposition 57. But Proposition 57 did not seek to punish 

juveniles. Instead, Proposition 57 was clearly aimed at 

providing the “ ‘ “ameliorating benefits” of rehabilitation (rather 

than punishment) . . . .’ ” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309.) 

Viewed in its historical context, the juvenile transfer 

provisions of Proposition 57 functioned as a repeal of Proposition 

21, the 2000 initiative that had required prosecutors to charge 

eligible juveniles directly in criminal court if they were accused 

of specified murders and sex crimes.

3

(See K.L., supra, 36 

Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 3 [“All remnants of Proposition 21 

were deleted by passage of Proposition 57”]; J.N. v. Superior 

Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 710 [“The voters apparently 

rethought their votes on Proposition 21 and passed Proposition 

57 at the November 8, 2016, General Election”].) The purpose 

of Proposition 57 was to have the electors undo what different 

electors had done sixteen years prior, not to insulate earlier 

legislation from future legislative change.

Nothing in the text or history of Proposition 57 suggests 

that by changing the relevant procedural mechanism from 

direct filing to transfer hearings, voters intended to ratify the 

Legislature’s decision from over 20 years before to lower the 

minimum transfer age from 16 to 14, or to preclude the 

3 Proposition 57 also effectively repealed a 1999 legislative 

act that required direct filing of criminal charges against 

juveniles 16 and older in adult court for select offenses. (Stats. 

1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, p. 7560.)
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

26

Legislature from revisiting that choice. Similarly, there is 

nothing to suggest that Proposition 57 sought to endorse the 

punitive goals of the 1994 decision to expand eligibility criteria 

to include certain 14 and 15 year olds. (See Assem. 3d reading

analysis of Assem. Bill No. 560 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Jan 27, 1994, p. 2 [the intended purpose of the 1994 

amendment was “to deal with juveniles committing serious 

violent crimes who currently hide behind the protections of 

Juvenile Court law”].) Indeed, the passage of Proposition 57 was

a repudiation of the punitive goals behind the 1994 amendment 

and Proposition 21 — not an endorsement of them. The 

Legislature’s decision in Senate Bill 1391 to further the 

ameliorative purpose of Proposition 57 by repealing the 

Legislature’s punitive 1994 statutory framework is fully 

consistent with Proposition 57 itself.

D. Conclusion

In sum, O.G. merely needs to show that by some

“reasonable construction” of Proposition 57 (Amwest, supra, 11 

Cal.4th at p. 1256), Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and 

furthers the purposes of the proposition. It does not matter if 

the District Attorney’s Office has a different view as to whether 

Senate Bill 1391 advances public safety or Proposition 57’s 

procedural scheme. The District Attorney’s Office seeks to turn 

the applicable standard on its head and argues that any doubts 

whether such a reasonable construction exists should be 

resolved in favor of precluding changes to the initiative. That is 

not the standard. We start with the presumption that the 

Legislature acted within its authority. (See Amwest, at p. 1256

[“[S]tarting with the presumption that the Legislature acted 

within its authority, we shall uphold the validity of [a legislative 

amendment] if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

27

that the statute furthers the purposes of [the] 

Proposition . . . ”].) In this case, under a reasonable construction 

of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and 

furthers each of the proposition’s enumerated purposes. That is 

all that is necessary in order for us to hold that Senate Bill 1391 

was lawfully enacted. We therefore hold that Senate Bill 1391 

is a constitutional amendment to Proposition 57.

III. DISPOSITION

We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

KLINE, J.*

________________________

* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion O.G. v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal 

Original Proceeding 

Review Granted XXX 40 Cal.App.5th 626

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S259011

Date Filed: February 25, 2021

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior 

County: Ventura 

Judge: Kevin J. McGee 

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Jennifer Hansen and Willard P. Wiksell, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.

Susan L. Burrell, L. Richard Braucher, Cyn Yamashiro and Marketa Sims for Pacific Juvenile Defender 

Center and Independent Juvenile Defender Program Los Angeles County Bar as Amici Curiae on behalf of 

Petitioner.

Michael C. McMahon for California Public Defenders Association and Todd W. Howeth, Public Defender 

(Ventura), as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, William D. Temko and Sara A. McDermott for Human Rights Watch, AntiRecidivism Coalition and W. Haywood Burns Institute as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. 

Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitor General, Anthony R. Hakl, 

Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Petitioner.

Rebecca P. Jones; Bryan A. Stevenson and Alicia A. D’Addario for The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus 

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Jeff Rubin, District Attorney (Santa Clara), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Respondent and Real Party in Interest.

Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney, Michael D. Schwartz, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Tate 

McCallister and Michelle Contois, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Amicus Populi as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 

Interest.
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Jennifer Hansen

California Appellate Project

520 S. Grand Ave., 4th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 243-0300

Nelson R. Richards

Deputy Attorney General

1300 I Street, Suite 125

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

(916) 210-7867

Michelle J. Contois

Deputy District Attorney

800 South Victoria Ave.

Ventura, CA 93009

(805) 654-3078