alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

GERALD C. MARSHALL, JR.
, Appellant,

v.

JACK ROBERT MARSHAL L
, individually and as Trustee of The Gerald C. Marshall Revocable Trust Agreement, as Restated, et al.,

Appellee s

.

No. 4D 21

- 2976

[ June 30, 2022 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Sarah Willis , Judge; L.T. Case No s

. 502019CP001432NB

and 502019CP001447NB

.

Brett M. Amron and Jamie B. Leggett of Bast Amron LLP, Miami (withdre w after filing initial brief), and Brandon J. Tittle of Tittle Law Group, PLLC, Plano, Texas (withdrew after filing initial brief) for appellant

.

Dariel Abrahamy and Mitchell D. Adler of Greenspoon Marder LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee Jack Robert Marshall , individually and as Trustee of the Gerald C. Marshall Revocable Trust Agreement, as

Restated.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

G ERBER
, L EVINE and A RTAU , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOE HENRY SCOTT, III, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-00762-CG-N

G.K. FOUNTAIN CORRECTIONAL

CENTER, et al, :

Defendants. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issue

raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this

court. It is ORDERED that this action be and is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice for

failure to prosecute and to obey the Court's order.

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 2010.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00762-CG-N Document 17 Filed 03/22/10 Page 1 of 1
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.12
 Molex Incorporated
2005 Molex Incentive Stock Option Plan  Stock Option Agreement
 «PARTICIPANT NAME» «GRANT DATE»
 Grant of Stock Option «NUMBER OF SHARES GRANTED» «GRANT PRICE»
 Vesting and Expiration «EXPIRATION DATE»
 Exercise of Stock Option
 Effect of Termination of Service, Death or Disability
 Registration of Stock
 Transferability




---



##### 



Rights as Stockholder
 Taxes
 Severability
 Governing Law
 Electronic Acceptance
 Acknowledgment
 Eligibility
 Limitation of Liability
 2




---



##### 



Molex Incorporated
    
    EmployeeMark K. Montague
    
    «PARTICIPANT NAME»Vice President, Human Resources
    
    (Signed electronically)
 3
JOHNNY L. BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA PAROLE 

COMMISSION,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D13-5426

Opinion filed July 2, 2014.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari -- Original Jurisdiction.

Johnny L. Brown, pro se, Petitioner.

Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for 

Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

PADOVANO, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS  SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE 10-QSB
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 FOR USA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL, INC. AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       2,829
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    0
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,829
<PP&E>                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,829
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            0
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                        13
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,829
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,829
<SALES>                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 0
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,685
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (7,685)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (8,485)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                (8,485)
<EPS-BASIC>                                 (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (.01)



</TABLE>
#### Benjamin Hatcher *v.*John F. Alford, et al.

Arbitration — Power of Arbitrators to Correct Mistake.

A board of arbitration after it bas made an award, but before it adjourns, bas tbe power to correct a mistake.

APPEAL PROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT.

May 20, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer :

The board of arbitration had not adjourned by any act of its own, nor had its members even separated after rendering and announcing their decision, before they discovered the mistake they had made, and they at once announced that they would correct the mistake, and proceeded to do so. The appellant had gone from the room where the board was sitting before the mistake was discovered, but *720his attorney came in and learned that a mistake had been made, and that it was proposed at once to correct it; and the appellant does not deny that he knew what was going on, and does not claim that he had not an opportunity to be present. Nor does he rest his case on the ground that he had no opportunity to be heard, or that any injustice was done him. If the board had legal authority, after announcing its decision and delivering to him a copy, to correct a mistake the existence of which is not disputed. The whole case is rested on the ground that when the decision was made out, s-igned in triplicate, and a copy delivered to the appellant, the board eo instanti lost all power over the case, and stood adjourned by operation of law, except for the purpose of giving a certificate of costs and the making of a bill of exceptions.

*P. T. Edwards, A. Duvall, for appellant.*

*J. W. Rodman, R. Rodes, Haselip & Botts, for appellees.*

It is not necessary, in this case, to decide how long the power of the board to correct a mistake continues after its decision is announced and a copy is delivered to the successful party. The only question to be decided is whether such correction can be made at all. We know of no tribunal, however great or small its jurisdiction and powers may be, or what its nature or character is, that is so restricted in its authority that, having once announced its decision, is in an instant powerless to recall that decision, however erroneous it may be.

We think that under the facts in this case the board has power to correct the mistake, and that having done so, the decision at first made was thereby revoked, and that the court properly refused to award a mandamus.

Judgment *affirmed.*
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 95-60578

Summary Calendar

 

GLYNN WALLACE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:97-CV-339

- - - - - - - - - -

July 7, 1999

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Glynn Wallace appeals from the dismissal of his complaint

seeking social security disability and supplemental security

income benefits. Wallace, who is represented by counsel,

contends that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by failing

to call a vocational expert to testify before finding that he was

able to perform sedentary work. Wallace asserts that a

vocational expert is a necessity once an ALJ finds that a

claimant may not return to his past relevant work. Wallace

contends that the ALJ erred by finding his testimony about pain

not credible. He alleges that he suffered from a combination of 
No. 98-60578

-2-

impairments that he does not specify. He argues that there was

no evidence of a lack of veracity on his part, as he believes is

required before an ALJ may reject a claimant’s credibility. He

argues, without elaboration, that the ALJ erred by making his

decision solely on the medical-vocational guidelines contained in

the social security regulations and he suggests that the ALJ

failed to carry his burden of showing that there was work

existing in Mississippi that Wallace could perform.

Wallace did not exhaust his administrative remedies

regarding whether the testimony of a vocational expert was

necessary and whether the ALJ’s credibility findings were

erroneous, as he did not raise those contentions before the

Appeals Council. Equitable concerns do not persuade us to

examine those issues. Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th

Cir. 1994). 

Wallace provides no legal arguments to support his

assertions that the ALJ erred by making his decision solely on

the medical-vocational guidelines contained in the social

security regulations and that the ALJ failed to carry his burden

of showing that there was work existing in Mississippi that

Wallace could perform. He has failed to brief those issues for

appeal. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813

F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Wallace’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. 

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because it

is frivolous, the appeal is dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Aaron LITTLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-6355.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 2001.

Decided May 29, 2001.

Michael Aaron Little, pro se. Jerry Wayne Miller, United States Attorney, Asheville, NC, for appellee.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Aaron Little seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *See United States v. Little,*Nos. CR-86-18-C; CA-01-26-V (W.D.N.C. Jan; 26, 2001). Little’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT LAWRENCE NOUWEN, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 12-0269-WS-C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0492-WS-C

Respondent.

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of the issues raised, and a de 

novo determination of those portions of the recommendation to which objection is 

made, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) 

and dated April 10, 2015, is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

DONE this 4th day of May, 2015.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:12-cr-00269-WS-C Document 44 Filed 05/04/15 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THE GRANITE BROADCASTING CORPORATION
2ND QUARTER 1997 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,922,913
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               33,291,455
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            46,357,537
<PP&E>                                      35,119,556
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             625,792,770
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       27,182,234
<BONDS>                                    382,757,005
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      197,775,235
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        87,665
<OTHER-SE>                                (16,024,156)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               625,792,770
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            73,629,941
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               53,983,630
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,125,642
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          19,904,487
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,383,818)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   377,400
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,761,218)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              (320,804)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,082,022)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.51)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.51)
        

</TABLE>
11652.

#### Ellis *v.*The State.

Decided July 28, 1920.

Luke, J.

The hill of exceptions, not having been tendered within twenty days of the judgment complained of, must be and is

*Dismissed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*

*558Indictment for sale of liquor; from Bulloch superior court — Judge Lovett. May 5, 1920.

*Anderson & Jones,*for plaintiff in error.

*Walter F. Grey, solicitor-general,*contra.
USGv6 Test Selection Tables 

Addressing Architecture Requirements 

F5-Conformance: Addr Arch Requirements R1v1.2

Applicable Profile: NIST SP 500-267B Revision 1 USGv6 Profile – November 2020.

Test Specification Id: 

• [Addr] Address Architecture Conformance Test Specification, [editor: UNH InterOperability Laboratory]. 

Addressing Architecture Test Check List

Reference Test 

Specification Id Test Number Device Type

RFC 4007, 

4291 Addr Addr.1.1: IPv6 Scoped Address (A)(B)(C)(D) Host/Router 

RFC 6724 Addr Addr.1.2: Default Source Address Selection (A)(C) Host/Router 

RFC 6724 Addr Addr.1.2: Default Source Address Selection (B)(D)(E) Host

RFC 6724 Addr Addr.1.3: Default Destination Address Selection (A) Host/Router 

RFC 6724 Addr Addr.1.3: Default Destination Address Selection (B) Host 

RFC 4193 Addr Addr.1.4: Unique Local IPv6 Address (A)(B) Host/Router

RFC 3879 Addr Addr.1.5: Deprecating Site Local Addresses (A)(B) Host/Router 

RFC 4193 Addr Addr.2.1: Routing Unique Local Addresses Router

RFC 3879 Addr Addr.2.2: Routing Deprecated Site Local Addresses Router 

RFC 3879, 

4291 Addr Addr.2.3: IP Forwarding – Source and Destination Address (A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(H)(I)(J) Router

RFC 6164, 

7608 Addr Addr.2.4: IPv6 Prefixes greater than 64 bits (A) Router

References: 

• [RFC 4193] R. Hinden, B. Haberman. "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses." RFC 4193, October 2005 

• [RFC 4291] R. Hinden, S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture," RFC 4291, February 2006 

• [RFC 4007] S. Deering, B. Haberman, T. Jinmei, E. Nordmark, B. Zill, "IPv6 Scoped Address 

Architecture," RFC 4007, March 2005 

• [RFC 3879] C. Huitema, B. Carpenter, "Deprecating Site Local Addresses." RFC 3879, September 2004 

• [RFC 6724] D. Thaler, R.Draves, A.Matsumoto, T.Chown, “Default Address Selection for Internet 

Protocol version 6 (IPv6)”, RFC 6724, September, 2012.

• [RFC 6164] M. Kohno, B.Nitzan, R.Bush, Y.Matsuzaki, L.Colitti, T.Narten. “Using 127-bit Ipv6 Prefixes 

on Inter-Router Links”, RFC 6164, April 2011.

• [RFC 7608] M. Boucadair, A. Petrescu, F. Baker, “IPv6 Prefix Length Recommendation for Forwarding”, 

RFC 7608, July 2015.

The objective of this test selection sheet is to provide a reference for available test specifications that identifies 

tests applicable to the USGv6 Profile.
Exhibit 99.2

              Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63
              of Title 18 of the United States Code as adopted
              Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

        I, Curtis W. Cariddi, the Chief Financial Officer of ML-Lee Acquisition
Fund II, L.P. (the "Registrant"), certify that (i) the Form 10-Q of the
Registrant for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2002, fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant for the periods presented.




By:
           /s/ Curtis W. Cariddi
           ----------------------------------------
               Curtis W. Cariddi
               Treasurer, ML Mezzanine II Inc.


Dated:     November 14, 2002
XRM-EX-101_2015Q1










Xerium Technologies, Inc.
Non-Management Director Compensation Policy




Non-management directors receive an annual retainer of $132,000, which will be paid pursuant
to the Xerium Technologies, Inc. Directors’ Deferred Stock Unit Plan. Under the plan, 54% of
the retainer will be paid in the form of a grant of deferred stock units. Non-management directors will be given the opportunity to elect to receive the remainder of such retainer in deferred stock units or in cash. Please see the Directors’ Deferred Stock Unit Plan for additional information.


Each of the chairs of the Audit Committee and Compensation Committee also receive additional cash compensation at an annual rate of $10,000 per year, and the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee, and the Lead Independent Director, if there is one, each receive additional cash compensation at an annual rate of $5,000 per year. If the Chairman of the Board is a non-management director then he or she will receive additional cash compensation at an annual rate of $55,000 per year. Directors are also reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses for attending board and committee meetings.
11225.

#### Williams v. The State.

Luke, J.

1. The court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the indictment.

2. Upon the hearing of the defendant’s motion for a continuance, based upon the absence of a material witness, the movant did not state that he expected to have the testimony of the witness at the next term of the court. It was therefore not error to overrule the motion.

*381Decided June 15, 1920.

Indictment lor larceny from house; from city court of Carroll-ton— Judge Beall. December 5, 1919.

Williams was convicted of simple larceny, under an indictment which charged larceny from the house. The indictment described the stolen property as “one leather collar of the value of $4.00, and one pair leather buggy lines of the value of $2.00, of the personal goods of” Emory Thomas in his buggy-house. In the demurrer it was contended that this description was not sufficiently specific.

As to possession of the articles alleged to have been stolen, the court charged the jury as follows: “Were they recently found in the possession of Will Williams, the defendant on trial? If you find that they were, has Will Williams made satisfactory explanation of his possession and shown to your satisfaction that he was not recently in possession of them? If he has, then you could not convict him. But if you should find that the goods were stolen, that they were recently found in the possession of Will Williams, the defendant, and he has not made satisfactory explanation, and explanation that satisfies you as jurors, then that would be a circumstance that would authorize you to convict the defendant.” In the motion for a new trial it is alleged that the court erred in charging, “If you find that they were [recently found in the possession of Will Williams], has Will Williams made satisfactory explanation of his possession and shown to your satisfaction that he was not recently in possession of them.” The exception to this part of the charge is that it “conveyed to the jury the idea that movant must show that he was not in recent possession of the goods, rather than that he must explain possession; and such language is so positive and so misleading that no subsequent language in an effort to modify the same could be sufficient to clear the minds of the jury of the impression.”

*R. W. Adamson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Willis Smith, solicitor,*contra.

3. The charge upon the subject of recent possession of stolen property was confusing to the jury, in that it tended to mislead them into thinking, that the defendant had the burden of showing that he had never been in the recent possession of the stolen property. As it was a very close case upon its facts, this error requires another trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*