UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

SOUMAINE MAHAMAT DJORKODE, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., 

United States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 13-9549 

(Petition for Review)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Soumaine Mahamat Djorkode, a native and citizen of Chad, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision, which dismissed his 

appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, 

restriction on removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 11, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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single issue is easily resolved. He quarrels about exceptionally cogent and complete 

credibility determinations. We deny review.1

 Djorkode was admitted to the United States on nonimmigrant visa but 

overstayed. At a preliminary hearing before an IJ, he admitted the charges against 

him, conceded removability, and renewed his timely-filed applications for asylum, 

restriction on removal, and CAT protection. Djorkode asserted he had been detained 

and tortured in Chad on account of his membership in the Gorane clan and because 

he is related to Mahamat Nouri, a leader of an organization engaged in subversive 

activities against Chad’s government. 

 Following a merits hearing, at which only Djorkode testified, the IJ issued an 

extremely thorough decision finding Djorkode not credible. Admin. R. at 155-202.2

 

It cited numerous, specific inconsistencies within Djorkode’s testimony and between 

his testimony and his prior written statement. It also noted several implausible 

explanations offered by Djorkode. Ultimately, the IJ denied all relief because of 

Djorkode’s lack of credibility. 

 The BIA, in a brief, single-member decision, discussed certain inconsistencies 

the IJ had identified, held that the IJ’s credibility finding was not clearly erroneous, 

and dismissed Djorkode’s appeal. The BIA explained: 

 

1

 Our jurisdiction derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

2

 The IJ’s 48-page oral decision incorporates a separate 14-page order outlining 

the applicable law. Admin. R. at 156; id. at 141-54. 
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 We find, given the totality of the circumstances, that the 

[credibility] concerns noted by the Immigration Judge are substantial 

and seriously call into question the veracity of [Djorkode’s] story, and 

we rely on the Immigration Judge’s recitation of these problems. 

 Given [Djorkode’s] lack of credibility, we find no error in the 

Immigration Judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum and 

[restriction on] removal. . . . [Further, Djorkode] has provided 

insufficient supporting evidence—given that the Immigration Judge 

properly found [him] not credible—to suggest that [he is entitled to 

CAT relief]. 

Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 

 On appeal, Djorkode challenges the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. 

We review the BIA’s factual findings, including credibility determinations, for 

substantial evidence. Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). 

“Where the BIA’s decision relies upon an IJ’s initial findings, we must ensure that 

such determinations are substantially reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “And [b]ecause an alien’s testimony alone may support an application for 

[restriction on] removal or asylum . . . the IJ must give specific, cogent reasons for 

disbelieving it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 In conducting our review, we do not reweigh the evidence, see Sarr v. 

Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 789 (10th Cir. 2007), and “the administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 

conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “In formulating those reasons, 

the trier of fact must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and ‘all relevant 
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factors.’” Sarr, 474 F.3d at 789 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Under the 

asylum statute, the 

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the . . . candor, or 

responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the inherent plausibility of the 

applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between the applicant’s . . . 

written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such 

statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence 

of record . . . . 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (same language in 

removal-proceedings statute); see also Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1152 

(10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that an “adverse credibility determination may 

appropriately be based upon . . . inconsistencies . . . , lack of sufficient detail, or 

implausibility”). 

 Here, the IJ gave specific, cogent reasons for finding Djorkode’s testimony 

incredible. The BIA highlighted several inconsistencies the IJ had identified and 

expressly relied on the IJ’s credibility finding. Having carefully reviewed the record 

in accordance with the prescribed deferential standard of review, we see no basis to 

conclude that the BIA’s decision was substantially unreasonable or that any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. Djorkode would 

have us to reweigh the evidence. That is not our place. 

 The petition for review is denied. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Terrence L. O’Brien 

 Circuit Judge