Elevators and Fire

Journal, in it’s Letters Column, contained a letter
from Ed Donoghue. He said: "Since 1984,
ASME/ANSI A17.1 has required that automatic
elevators on independent service automatically
respond to Phase I recall after a period of 15 to 60
seconds. Since 1985, the same code has aiso
required that all elevators with firefighters service
be subject to monthly Phase I and II operation,
with a record of this operation maintained at the
building”. This is of sufficient importance that
such requirements should be in the building code
or fire code or both since it was obviously
overlooked in Los Angeles.

While mentioning the elevator lobby
separation requirement, why aren’t we installing a
standpipe outlet in the elevator lobby? It seems to
me that would be a "natural" addition at very little
cost. It has been opposed by the fire service when
it has been proposed as a code chance.

For some reason or another, advancements
made by the industry are not being made known
adequately to the enforcement official. Possibly,
when a fire safety measure is developed, it should
be proposed for introduction into the building or
fire code. I recognize that there is a sort of
agreement that the requirements of building codes
will not be written into the elevator code and vice
versa. But there must be some cross over. For
example, in one Colorado area, a single person is
the elevator inspector for a number of
jurisdictions. Everything pertaining to elevators is
his responsibility. The building official himself
doesn’t become involved. It is a "hands off
situation for anyone except the one person
assigned. In some states all elevator inspections
are the responsibility of a state inspector. The
local man has next to nothing to do with elevators
nor does the fire inspector. That one inspector
may not be sufficiently knowledgeable in other
areas of the building and fire code which have to
do with fire safety and so certain things may be
overlooked. When fire departments are developing
fire fighting strategies for specific buildings, they
are apparently not aware of new requirements of
A17.1 and it certainly isn’t a particularly available
document nor one which is easily read and
understood.

Years of effort have been expended to inform
the public that they are not to use elevators at the
time of fire. Now there is major activity, new
Federal Legislation — the Americans with
Disabilities Act — to require access to buildings for
the mobility impaired. In a multi-story building
that means, most frequently, access by elevators.
So now we have made the upper stories accessible.
But how do we get those people out in a fire

79

emergency once they are inside? By elevator,
naturally. But that is somewhat contrary to what
we have been preaching all these years. How are
we going to reverse this position? The Life Safety
Code and the Board for the Coordination of
Model Codes have proposed making elevators
accessible for egress for the mobility impaired.
Various fire marshals have called questioning the
wisdom of this approach. How is the possible
opposition from the fire service going to be
resolved? Frankly, it is my opinion, that with the
new requirements for accessibility for the mobility
impaired, the fire service has no choice. There is
No other realistic solution for evacuation without
help from others. Stair landings can be made
larger to accommodate a couple of wheelchairs but
the occupants of those chairs will eventually have
to be carried down physically. Buildings can be
divided into two or more compartments or fire
areas with elevator facilities in each area but
horizontal exist are not always practical nor the
best solution. Based again on personal experience,
1 am not willing to accept the premise that just
because a building is protected by an automatic
sprinkler system, there is no problem. Sprinkler
systems have been known to fail. The 1983 San
Francisco fire tests, in an actual building, made it
abundantly clear that unacceptable levels of smoke
can be developed before the sprinklers operate —
and they may not operate at all. So, while the
NFPA and BCMC and the Federal government,
the latter apparently concerned only with access
and no concern for evacuation, may introduce new
code provisions. There is certainly work to be
done by the elevator industry to see that the new
requirements will function properly and safely.

John G. Degenkolb is a registered fire protection
engineer and a 1938 graduate of the University of
California. He is a retired battalion chief of the
Los Angeles Fire Department where his primary
duty was in the Fire Prevention Bureau in charge
of public safety. He represented the Fire
Department to the Building Code Committee and
represented the California Fire Chiefs Association
to ICBO. Mr Degenkolb is chairman of the
NFPA 80, NFPA 102, and NFPA 105
Committees. He is also a member of NFPA 101,
ICBO, BOCA, and SBCC. He is the originator
of the fire test program conducted by the Los
Angeles Fire Department know as Operation
School Burning and School Burning #2, and has
done extensive full scale fire testing resulting in
the adoption of mechanically operated smoke-
proof enclosures.



7 6

Elevators and Fire

ELEVATOR USAGE DURING A BUILDING FIRE

by John "Gus" Degenkolb

As indicated in the announcement for the
iymposium on Elevators and Fire, there are three
nodel building codes used in the United States as
vell as certain requirements pertaining to elevators
n the National Fire Protection Association’s Life
iafety Code. With a few exceptions, one or
nother of the editions of the three model building
‘odes are the basis for building construction
hroughout the United States. Broadly speaking,
sven those jurisdictions which do not use a model
vuilding code, have quite similar requirements.
Where elevators are concerned, some edition or
snother of A17.1 is the foundation for their
‘levator requirements. In this area, A17.1 is
omewhat similar to the National Electrical Code.
Che principle difference, as I see it, is that the «
National Electrical Code accepts and really
onsiders input from a wide spectrum of interests
vhile the A17.1 code is much more in-bred
considering input almost exclusively from those
ntimately involved with elevators.

As an example, the elevator industry has been
epresented on the NFPA 80 Committee
concerning Fire Doors and Windows for many,
nany years — well before 1955 to my knowledge.
Nevertheless, there were no tested and labeled fire
loors for use with passenger elevators until
‘ometime around 1970. There were such doors for
eight elevators, but not for passenger cars.

About that time, a building official, architect and
in owner came to agreement that a new high rise
yuilding would have to have labeled fire doors for
apenings in the hoistway to the elevator cars. One
sompany had to test and label, and soon the rest of
he industry followed.

Another example has been the elevator
ndustry resistance, with a few exceptions, to the
yasketing or otherwise modifying elevator doors to
nake them resistive to the passage of smoke.

Each of these items came from outside the industry
and were resisted. It has only been in recent years,
with the active participation of Ed Donoghue and
Elmer Sumka that there has been real cooperation
from the elevator industry.

So, how do the three model building codes
deal with elevators? Two of the three building
codes make specific reference to A17.1 at the very
start of the Chapter concerning elevators. The
third only references A17.1 in the Appendix
Chapter. An Appendix Chapter is generally
understood to be that part of a code which must be
specifically adopted. It is not part of the adoption
process of the main body of the code.

All three limit the number of cars permitted
within a hoistway to four, and when four or more
serve the same portion of a building and there are
no others, two hoistways must be provided.

The elevator car must be 68 inches in one
code, 51 x 80 in another, and the third is silent.
The clear opening to the car is required to be 42-
inches in one code and 36-inches in another.
Where the code is silent, it is assumed that A17.1
prevails.

Two codes require an enclosed elevator lobby
separating that lobby from the remainder of the
building. While the third code has no specific
requirement, there is a provision that smoke is to
be so controlled that it will not enter the hoistway.
With the advent of requirements for mobility
impaired persons becoming mandatory, the
elevator lobby separation requirement may be
universal and not just for high rise buildings as is
now the case.

The three codes are consistent in specifying the
area of the hoistway vent. The vent shall be not
less than 344% of the area of the hoistway provided
a minimum of 3 square feet is provided for each
car. But here the similarity stops. Two specifically
require that the vent be in the side of the hoistway
enclosure with one of them also saying that it must
be directly below the floor at the top of the
hoistway.

Two permit mechanical ventilation if it
provides equivalent venting. This is not acceptable
in a residential occupancy. The third permits
hoistway pressurization. There is a considerable
difference as to the degree to which the vent is to
be open. Automatic venting by actuation of the


Elevators and Fire

elevator lobby smoke detector, with a manual
override, is a requirement of one of the codes. A
second requires that not less than 1/3 of the
required vent area be permanently open unless all
vents activate upon detection of smoke by a lobby
smoke detector. The closed portion of the
Tequired vent area may be of 1/8 inch thick plain
glass. Nothing is said as to how that glass is to be
broken out to provide the required vent area. The
third code also permits the closed portion of the
required vent area to consist of windows, skylights
or duct openings glazed with plain glass not more
than 1/8 inch thick but there are no provisions for
breaking it out or opening it up.

Only one of the codes prohibits the
interconnection of hoistway vents, that is,
combining two hoistways into one vent as was the
situation found in the Las Vegas MGM hotel fire.

Then, two of the codes will permit the
complete elimination of vents in a building
equipped throughout with an approved sprinkler
system if the building is not one having overnight
sleeping facilities such as a hotel, apartment house,
or hospital. This is particularly hard for me to
understand after having seen smoke development
in great quantities in sprinklered buildings such as
occurred in Operation School Burning, the San
Francisco fire tests of 1983.

A couple of years ago the elevator industry
Proposed limiting the size of the opening in the
floor of the elevator machine room into the
hoistway. One of the codes bought this proposal.
With that exception, it is true that the codes do
not limit the size of the floor opening and require
sleeves which are to extend 12 inches beneath the
machine room floor in an effort to limit the
amount of smoke which may enter the elevator
machine room. But the measurements proposed
by the elevator industry would permit great
amounts of smoke into the machine room. But
more about that later.

The code differences given are not all of those
to be found but are more or less typical. Several
years ago, it was my understanding that the
building codes would only cover specifies involving
information or requirements which are not
provided in A17.1. At the same time, A17.1 would
delete requirements which are found in the
building codes. For example, earlier editions of
A17.1 specified the type of construction and its
level of fire-resistance. After all, all building codes
are not identical in that regard. For example, two
will permit 1 hour shaft walls in buildings of Type
I construction four or less stories in height. One
Tequires that the shaft be of 2 hour construction.
Each of the codes has different designations for the

77

type of construction, one having 4 classes, one has
5 and the other has 6. So, rather than have A17.1
make requirements which may conflict with the
local code, it was decided to leave it up to the
locally used building code.

In my opinion there is a solution to this mess,
the Council of American Building Officials is one
of the sponsors of this symposium. It has its "code
arm", the Board for the Coordination of Model
Codes (BCMC). With the active participation of
the elevator industry, it is my opinion that the
BCMC could develop a single position. That does
not mean that it will fly with all three model
building codes but it could much closer than what
we have now.

Before discussing specific problems concerning
the use of elevators under fire conditions, I wouldd
like to mention one somewhat aggravating
condition which comes up sporadically. It concerns
elevator lobbies with locked doors so that there is
No escape from the lobby except by elevator. It the
elevator cars have been recalled and no longer
Tespond to floor calls, anyone in the lobby is
trapped. That should not be and is an absolute
violation of the codes whether called an exit access
or exit. Means of egress doors shall be readily
openable from the side from which egress is to be
made without the use of a key or special
knowledge or effort. Terminology may vary with
the different codes but the intent is clear — you
shall not lock anyone within an elevator lobby.
Now to specific problems concerning the use of
elevators under fire conditions.

In May 1988 there was a fire in the First
Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles. It was a
62 story building. The fire originated on the 12th
floor at about 10:30 p.m. It took a total of 64 fire
companies and 383 fire fighters more than 34
hours to control the fire according to the NFPA
Fire Investigation Report by Thomas J. Klem.
There were, in my opinion, significant elevator
problems.

The Los Angeles Fire Department did not use
elevators to carry equipment up to the 10th floor
with the fire on the 12th. It required
approximately 100 men to carry equipment to that
level. Suppose the fire had been on the SOth floor
of that 62 story building. I have no information on
the fire in the New York Empire State Building in
July 1990. It was reported to have been on the
51st floor. It is most likely that elevators were
used to carry equipment at least the major part of
the height to the fire. Doesn’t the use of elevators
become almost mandatory to carry equipment at
least part of the way up? So, because of the
nature of the elevator operation, it is exceedingly



8

mportant that the elevator machine room be kept
‘lear of smoke, heat and humidity.

With the sensitive electronic equipment used
© operate the cars, with light emitting diodes used
n the controls, etc., smoke in the machine room
‘ould knock out any use of elevators completely.
30, pressurization of the machine room or
:nclosure of the cables and hoisting mechanism at
he point of entry into the machine room becomes
‘ssential. I amm informed by the elevator industry
hat the sleeves protecting the floor openings
igainst the passage of smoke are not being
nstalled even though they are a requirement of the
nodel codes. The industry contends that they will
1ot work anyway. So something needs to be done.
N response to some of my comments some time
igo, Ed Donoghue wrote to me saying: "Your
concern regarding smoke in the machine room is
vell founded. That concern should also include
controlling the heat and humidity in the machine
‘oom. Excessive temperature and humidity will be
ust as deadly in knocking out elevator service".

In the September/October 1990 Fire Journal is
in article by Elliot Gittleman. He discussed the
subject of elevators and sprinklers. He said that
he "A17.1 Committee was concerned about the
offect of water on the elevator controllers." Mr.
Sittleman proposed that such a possible danger
sould be corrected if you placed the elevator
control equipment in raintight enclosures even
hough the A17.1 Committee felt it was
mpractical. I think it is a sound solution. This
night be an alternate or adjunct to pressurization
of the machine room. An insulated enclosure
vould be capable of maintaining low temperature;
>rotect against smoke particles interfering with the
dperations; and could probably protect against
anacceptable levels of humidity. Based on
dersonal observations, elevator machine rooms are
10t maintained free of combustibles. Sprinkler
orotection in the room is justified.

Back in 1988 a question was raised by the fire
services in Oregon concerning automatic sprinkler
reads in elevator shafts. It was stated that the
Uniformed Building Code requires a sprinkler head
‘0 be installed at the bottom of the shaft and at
2very Other floor within the shaft. It was stated
that the state elevator code conflicted with that
suggesting that one head be located at the bottom
of the shaft and in the equipment room and “if
heads are located above that, at every other floor,
that they be open heads activated by a smoke
detector in the elevator shaft or equipment room".
The representative of the Oregon Fire Services
thought "it would be inappropriate to activate
automatic sprinkler heads in an elevator shaft

Elevators and Fire

strictly by smoke and would question the benefit of
that type of installation". I agree and so would, I
think, Mr. Gittleman based on what he wrote in
his article. He said: "The real problem is whether
sprinkler protection is needed in the elevator
shaft". After some discussion pro and con in his
article, he concluded that "The solution to the
problem is to remove the requirement for a
sprinkler at the top of a noncombustible elevator
shaft. Protection of the shaft pit by sprinklers
would still be required and would be effective
against a fire in the pit area.”

In my opinion, the elevator machine room
should be sprinklered; the elevator control
mechanisms should be protected against water
damage; the elevator pits should be sprinkler
protected; and hoistway pressurization should be
required so that relatively smoke free elevator
lobbies will be provided as areas of refuge for the
mobility impaired. That also means that elevator
lobbies are to be separated from the remainder of
the building.

The First Interstate Bank fire disclosed
another problem involving the elevators.
According to the NFPA report, the building
contained 31 passenger elevators in 4 banks, 2 for
sublevels, and 2 service elevators which served all
levels and with a lobby at each floor. According to
the report, all of the elevators were designed to be
recalled to the ground floor lobby on smoke
detector activation. But those used by cleaning
and maintenance crews were on “independent
service" and could not be recalled. Other cars were
not accounted for because their doors did not open
when they returned to the ground floor. One
elevator stopped on the 22nd floor and one on the
33rd. This was, should be, cause for concern.
Something needs to be corrected. When a smoke
detector is actuated in an elevator lobby, all
elevator cars in that bank are to return to the
ground floor or other designated floor. Because
the hoistway openings to the cars are fire doors,
they must go to the closed position if smoke is
detected in that lobby, all elevator cars in that
bank are to return to the ground floor or other
designated floor. Because the hoistway openings to
the cars are fire doors, they must go to the closed
position if smoke is detected in that lobby.
Otherwise they are to stand with open doors so
that they can be checked to see if anyone is inside.
Insofar as I am concerned, the failure to have cars
returned to the basic floor is improper and
unacceptable. The Fire Department has enough to
do without having to try to locate “lost” cars.

In my opinion, the building codes are not clear
on this point. The November/December 1989 Fire