alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



Certification of Principal Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



I, Lorie M. Guerrera, Chief Accounting Officer of Cordia Corporation (the "Registrant") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period March 31, 2005 of the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



By: /s/ Lorie M. Guerrera

_________________________

Lorie M. Guerrera

Chief Accounting Officer



May 10, 2005



* A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Cordia Corporation and will be retained by Cordia Corporation and furnished to the Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection
with the Annual Report of Kana Software, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-K/A for the annual period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
John M. Thompson, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, in accordance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.02, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                      |  |                                         
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Dated: April 30, 2007 |  | /s/ JOHN M. THOMPSON                    
|                      |  | John M. Thompson Chief Financial
Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 235 (Monday, December 8, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 72708]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28707]



[[Page 72708]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-275-LR and 50-323-LR; ASLBP No. 10-900-01-LR-BD01]


Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 
Plant, Units 1 and 2); Notice of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Reconstitution

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.313(c) and 2.321(b), the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board in the above-captioned Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 
Plant, Units 1and 2 license renewal proceeding is hereby reconstituted 
by appointing Administrative Judge Paul S. Ryerson to serve as Chairman 
in place of Administrative Judge Alex S. Karlin.
    All correspondence, documents, and other materials shall continue 
to be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule. See 10 CFR 2.302 
et seq.

     Issued at Rockville, Maryland this 1st day of December 2014.
E. Roy Hawkens,
Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.
[FR Doc. 2014-28707 Filed 12-5-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
#### Louisville & Nashville R. Co. *v.*Luther G. Hall.

Judgment — Collection of Judgment Against Corporation.

The holder of a judgment against a railroad corporation may compel the company or its officers and agents to disclose and surrender its property, choses in action or equitable or legal interests which it may own or which are held by or for it by strangers.

Attachment.

In the collection of a judgment against a railroad corporation it is error for the court to award an order of .attachment against the president and directors of the company, -without first bringing them into court as garnishees and ascertaining whether they had money or property of the defendant in their possession, or under their control.

APPEAL PROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT.

April 27, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

This is a suit in equity to enforce the judgment rendered in the ordinary action of *Luther G. Hall v. Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad Co.,*which judgment we have this day affirmed. The defendant is styled “The Louisville & Nashville & Great Southern Railroad Company, alias The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company.” As it declined in the ordinary action to disclose its true name, it cannot complain that the appellee has not yet learned what it is. The question of names, however, can cut no figure in this proceeding. That question is concluded by the course pursued by the appellant in the ordinary action.

The appellee has the right to enforce the collection of its judgment at law, by compelling the company or officers or agents to disclose and surrender any property, choses in action, or equitable or legal interest in any property, which it may own, or they may hold for it, and to disclose the existence of any such property, held by or for it, by strangers or persons now in his employ.

But it was error in this action to render a second judgment against the appellant. The judgment at law may be enforced, but a judgment in equity founded on that judgment is neither necessary nor proper. It was also error to award an order of attachment against the president and directors of the company, without first bringing them into court as garnishees, and ascertaining whether or not they had money or property of the defendant in their possession or under their control.

*691*William Johnson, for appellant.*

*Muir & Wickliffe, for appellee.*

Judgment *reversed*and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4783

To adjust the boundaries of the Ouachita National Forest in the States 

of Oklahoma and Arkansas. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 8, 2004

Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Resources 

A BILL

To adjust the boundaries of the Ouachita National Forest 

in the States of Oklahoma and Arkansas.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ouachita National 

5 Forest Boundary Adjustment Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT, OUACHITA NATIONAL 

7 FOREST, OKLAHOMA AND ARKANSAS. 

8 (a) BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT.—The boundaries of 

9 the Ouachita National Forest in the States of Oklahoma 
2

•HR 4783 IH 

1 and Arkansas are hereby modified as depicted on the fol2 lowing maps, dated May 15, 2001: 

3 (1) Ouachita National Forest Boundary Exten4 sion for the Broken Bow Area. 

5 (2) Ouachita National Forest Boundary Exten6 sion for the Southern Tiak Area. 

7 (3) Ouachita National Forest Boundary Exten8 sion for the Northern Ouachita Area. 

9 (4) Ouachita National Forest Boundary Exten10 sion for the Southern Ouachita Area. 

11 (5) Ouachita National Forest Boundary Exten12 sion for the Eastern Ouachita Area. 

13 (b) TREATMENT OF MAPS.—The maps referred to in 

14 subsection (a) shall be on file and available for public in15 spection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service 

16 in the District of Columbia. The Secretary of Agriculture 

17 may make minor corrections to the maps. 

18 (c) MANAGEMENT OF ACQUIRED LAND.—Any feder19 ally-owned lands that, before the date of the enactment 

20 of this Act, have been acquired for National Forest Sys21 tem purposes within the boundaries of the Ouachita Na22 tional Forest, as modified by subsection (a), and any lands 

23 that are acquired on or after that date for National Forest 

24 System purposes within such boundaries, shall be man25 aged as lands acquired under the Act of March 1, 1911 
3

•HR 4783 IH 

1 (commonly known as the Weeks Act), and in accordance 

2 with the other laws and regulations pertaining to the Na3 tional Forest System. Nothing in this subsection shall 

4 limit the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to ad5 just the boundaries of the Ouachita National Forest pur6 suant to section 11 of such Act (16 U.S.C. 521). 

7 (d) RELATION TO LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION

8 FUND ACT.—For purposes of section 7 of the Land and 

9 Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l–

10 9), the boundaries of the Ouachita National Forest, as 

11 modified by subsection (a), shall be considered to be 

12 boundaries of the Ouachita National Forest as of January 

13 1, 1965.

Æ
10938.

#### Drury *v.*Cameron & Barclay Company.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Petition for certiorari; from Camden superior court — Judge Highsmith. September 13, 1919.

*Cowart & Vocelle,*for plaintiff in error.

*S. C. Townsend,*contra.

Luke, J.

It appearing from the motion and the affidavit of counsel for the defendant in error that the judgment excepted to by the plaintiff in error has been paid by him, the' questions raised by the bill of exceptions have become moot, and the writ of error must be

*Dismissed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40948

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NELSON VALLE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:18-CR-59-1

Before KING, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Nelson Valle has 

moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Valle has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief 

and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 16, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-40948 Document: 00514960642 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/16/2019
No. 18-40948

2

appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the 

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 18-40948 Document: 00514960642 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/16/2019
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SCALES EXPRESS, INC. and LINCOLN )

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.: 05-719-BH-B

)

ELBERT R. SMITH, JR., et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant H&W Holdings, LLC’s (hereinafter, “H&W”)

Motion to Dismiss which has been plead as part of their Answer (Doc. 67). Defendant H&W seeks

the Court to dismiss the claim for interpleader filed against them by both Scales Express, Inc.

(hereinafter, “Scales”) and Lincoln General Insurance Company (hereinafter, “Lincoln General”).

Pursuant to the Court’s Order (Doc. 55), Scales has been terminated as a plaintiff in the instant

action and no longer has a claim of interpleader against any of the named defendants. As to

Plaintiff Lincoln General, however, the Court has found that an interpleader action is appropriate

in these circumstances and has been properly brought before this Court. Therefore, Defendant

H&W’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.

So ORDERED, this 1st day of March, 2006.

s/ W. B. Hand

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00719-BH-B Document 73 Filed 03/01/06 Page 1 of 1
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-14-00667-CV

In the Estate of Mildred Ozella Favor Pursley a.k.a. Mildred F. Pursley, deceased

On appeal from the

Probate Court of Hidalgo County, Texas

Trial Cause No. P-34,801-A

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 24, 2015.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4787

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale to, and possession 

by, unauthorized users of traffic signal preemption transmitters, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 8, 2004

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale 

to, and possession by, unauthorized users of traffic signal 

preemption transmitters, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That (a) Chapter 2 of title 18, United States Code, is 

4 amended by adding at the end the following: 

5 ‘‘§ 39. Traffic signal preemption transmitters 

6 ‘‘(a) OFFENSES.—

7 ‘‘(1) SALE.—Whoever, in or affecting interstate 

8 or foreign commerce, knowingly sells a traffic signal 

9 preemption transmitter to a person who is not a gov-
2

•HR 4787 IH 

1 ernment approved user of such a transmitter shall 

2 be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 

3 than 1 year, or both. 

4 ‘‘(2) POSSESSION.—Whoever, not being a gov5 ernment approved user of a traffic signal preemption 

6 transmitter, knowingly possesses a traffic signal pre7 emption transmitter in or affecting interstate or for8 eign commerce shall be fined under this title or im9 prisoned not more than 6 months, or both. 

10 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the term ‘traffic 

11 signal preemption transmitter’ means any device or mech12 anism that can change a traffic signal’s phase.’’. 

13 (b) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 

14 2 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 

15 at the end the following:

‘‘39. Traffic signal preemption transmitters.’’.

Æ
PRECEDENTIAL

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 08-3877 

_____________ 

EMMANUEL NOEL, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

THE BOEING COMPANY 

 

___________ 

On Appeal from the District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(No. 06-cv-2673) 

District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 

___________ 

Submitted January 26, 2010 

Before: FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges, and KANE, 

District Judge*

 

 

*

 Honorable Yvette Kane, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting 

by designation.
(Opinion Filed: October 1, 2010) 

Albert J. Michell, Esq. 

Albert J. Michell, PC 

510 Bainbridge Street 

First Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19147 

Attorney for Appellant

Thomas K. Johnson II, Esq. 

Leora F. Eisenstadt, Esq. 

Dechert LLP 

Cira Centre 

2929 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

Attorneys for Appellees 

___________ 

 

ORDER AMENDING OPINION 

___________ 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge

 IT IS NOW ORDERED THAT the first paragraph of 

the opinion shall be amended to state as follows: 

 “Defendant, the Boeing Company, filed a 

 pretrial motion for summary judgment with 

 the District Court, which was granted in part 
 and denied in part. The District Court then 

 conducted a four-day bench trial. During the 

 trial, Boeing presented a motion for judgment 

 on partial findings of fact, which was also 

 granted in part and denied in part. After the 

 trial, the District Court entered judgment in 

 favor of Boeing on all counts. Plaintiff, 

 Emmanuel Noel appeals these rulings, arguing 

 that the recently enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair 

 Pay Act of 2009 renders his otherwise out-of- 

 time administrative filing timely, preserving 

 his failure to promote claim. For the following 

 reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 

 rulings. 

 The first three sentences of the first paragraph of 

Section B of the opinion shall be deleted and replaced with 

the following: 

 Before trial, Boeing filed a motion for summary 

 judgment. The District Court granted that motion 

 as it related to Noel’s claim that Boeing violated 

 Title VII when it failed to send him offsite to 

 Amarillo in May 2002 and when he was not 

 promoted to offsite mechanic Labor Grade 11 in 

 2003, holding that this claim was time-barred 

 since Noel did not file a charge of discrimination 

 with the EEOC until March 2005, well outside 

 the 300-day statutory time period. At the 

 subsequent bench trial, the District Court also 

 granted Defendant’s motion for Judgment on 

 Partial Findings on Noel’s claim that he should 

 have been promoted to lead mechanic upon his 
 return to Ridley Park. 

 The word “reaches” in the first full paragraph on page 

twelve of the opinion shall be replaced with the word 

“reached.” 

 There is only one defendant in this case. Therefore, 

the word “Defendants” as used on pages 6, 7, 8, and 19 shall 

be replaced with the word “Defendant.” Also, the word 

“Defendants'” on the same pages shall be replaced with 

“Defendant’s”. 

 BY THE COURT, 

 /s/ Julio M. Fuentes

 Circuit Judge 

DATED: 18 October 2010
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ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

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IT IS SO ORDERED



1

Judge’s signature

-


1

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

 Southern District of Alabama

MARTIN DOMINGUEZ-LEDESMA 11-00102-001

12025-003

09-27-2011

✔

✔

97 78 months

09-27-2011

April 14, 2015

11-01-2015 United States District Judge

Callie V.S. Granade 

U.S. District Judge

Digitally signed by Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge 

DN: cn=Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge, o=U.S. 

Government, ou=Federal Judiciary, 

email=efile_granade@alsd.uscourts.gov, c=US 

Date: 2015.04.14 17:12:45 -06'00'

Case 1:11-cr-00102-CG-M Document 138 Filed 04/15/15 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5                        
                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         149,231
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  552,375
<ALLOWANCES>                                   2,000
<INVENTORY>                                    1,260,738
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               2,059,019
<PP&E>                                         523,752
<DEPRECIATION>                                 195,101
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,929,380
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,469,033
<BONDS>                                        0
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<COMMON>                                       31,776
<OTHER-SE>                                     2,303,538
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,929,380
<SALES>                                        2,299,507
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2,299,507
<CGS>                                          1,840,495
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  501,815
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               10,763
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             38,790
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (92,356)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (25,299)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (75,895)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (75,895)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.00
        


</TABLE>
#### Stevenson *v.*Ennis.

*Costs.—Court of Common Pleas.—Recovery of Less than Fifty*Dollars.—In an action on an implied assumpsit, commenced in the common pleas, the plaintiff recovered forty-two dollars, the amount claimed *by*him not having been reduced by counter claim or set-off.

*Held,*that the plaintiff was liable for costs.

APPEAL from the Wayne Common Pleas.

Worden, J.

Action by the appellant against the appellee, on an implied assumpsit for the pasturage of certain cattle. Answer of general denial, and two special paragraphs, neither of which was a counter claim or set-off. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for forty-two dollars. Judgment was rendered against the plaintiff for costs, the action having been commenced in the common pleas, and from that judgment he appeals and seeks a reversal in respect to the costs.

On the trial, the plaintiff’s testimony made out a case apparently entitling him to a little over fifty-one dollars, but the defendant’s evidence had a tendency to show that the fences around the land, on which the cattle were pastured, were bad, and that the cattle at times escaped therefrom, and hence, that the cattle were not really pastured by the plain*217tiff as long as his evidence tended to establish. This evidence was competent under the general denial, as it tended to reduce the time of the claimed pasturage of the cattle.

*Y. Railsback*and *A. B. Young,*for appellant.

*W. A. Peette*and *H. C. Fox,*for appellee.

The jury found there was due to the plaintiff for the pasturage forty-two dollars. The amount claimed by the plaintiff was not reduced by counter claim or set-off. Under these circumstances, we think it quite clear that the plaintiff was liable for costs, and that the judgment below should be affirmed. 2 G. & H. 227, sec. 397.

The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.