alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

LARRY D. BUTLER
, Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA PENINSULA INSURANCE COMPANY
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 678

[ February 17, 2021 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Glenn D. Kelley , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2019

- CA

- 001896

- XXXX

- MB

.

Christopher A. Haddad of The Law Office of Christopher A. Haddad, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Lara J . Edelstein of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Appellant, Larry D. Butler, appeals the trial court’s final summary judgment entered in favor of appellee, Florida Peninsula Insurance Company (“ the Insurance Company ”). Appellant filed suit against the Insurance Company after the insured entered into a Coblentz 1 settlement

with Appellant

, stipulating to a consent judgment and assigning Appellant the right to collect a judgment of $100,000 against the Insurance Company. 2 In the operative complaint, Appellant alleged one count of bad faith against the Insurance Company for denying coverage and its failure

1 Coblentz v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. , 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969). “A ‘ Coblentz agreement’ refers to a negotiated consent judgment ‘entered into between an

insured and a claimant in order to resolve a lawsuit in which the insurer has denied coverage and declined to defend.’” Mid

- Continent Cas. Co. v. Royal Crane,

LLC , 169 So. 3d 174 , 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Bradfield v. Mid

– Continent Cas. Co., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1257 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 2014) )

.

2 The insured is not a party to this appeal or the suit below.2 to defend the i nsured under the i nsured’s personal injury insurance policy in a separate suit filed by Appellant against the i n sured. The Insurance Company moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant’s action was barred by the statute of limitations because the i nsured, whose claim Appellant had asserted, was required to file an action against the Insurance Company within five years of its denial of coverage and request to defend in the underlying suit. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurance Company.

Appellant raises the same argument on appeal it raised in opposition to summary judgm ent below: T he statute of limitations began to run, not

at the time of the Insurance Company refused to cover and to defend , but at the time Appellant’s bad faith claim (as the assignee of the insured) became cognizable, which is when damages were fixed b y the entry of the agreed judgment based on the Coblentz settlement

. The Insurance Company concedes the trial court err ed as to the statute of limitations

issue in granting summary judgment.

After reviewing the record, we agree that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded

.

G ROSS
, C IKLIN and C ONNER
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Anderson *v.*The State.

APPEAL from, the Parke Circuit Court.

Pettit, J.

This case is the same, in all legal aspects, as *555the case of *Anderson*v. *The State, ante,*p. 553; and on the authority of that, and for the reasons therein given, the judgment in this is reversed, and'cause remanded for further proceedings.

S'. *F Maxwell, S. D. Puett, J.'E. McDonald, J. M.. Butler,*and *E. M. McDonald,*for. appellant.

*B. W. Hanna,*Attorney General, for the State.
EXHIBIT 99.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with the Quarterly Report of
Wells Real Estate Fund III, L.P. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Leo F.
Wells, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that:





(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.





/s/ LEO F. WELLS, IIILeo F. Wells, III Chief Executive Officer August 12, 2002
ex-10.2

 EXHIBIT 10.2
 ALLONGE
 

 This Allonge to Promissory Note (the “Allonge”), dated as of May 13, 2015, is attached to and forms a part of the 12% Senior Secured Convertible Note issued by Blue Earth, Inc. (the “Borrower”) dated March 10, 2015 to Jackson Investment Group, LLC (the “Lender”) in the principal amount of $10,000,0000  (the “Note”)  
 

 1.
 Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Allonge shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Note.
 2.
 The Original Conversion Price as set forth in the Note is hereby deleted and replaced by “$1.02”.
 3.
 Section 2(a) is hereby amended to delete the reference to “$1.00” and replace it with $1.02 as the Interest Conversion Rate.
 4.
 Section 4(b) is hereby amended to delete “$1.00” as the Conversion Price and replace it  with “$1.02”.  
 5.
 Except as expressly amended hereby, the terms and provisions of the Note shall remain in full force and effect.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 
 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrower has caused this Allonge to be signed and delivered by its duly authorized officer this 13th day of May 2015.
 

 BORROWER:
 

 Blue Earth, Inc.
 

 

 

 By:      /s/  Johnny R. Thomas
 Name:  Johnny R. Thomas
 Title:    Chief Executive Officer
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30381 Summary Calendar

OKECHUKWU MUMMEE AMADI Plaintiff-Appellant

v. CRAIG ROBINSON; WES WILLIAMSON; JAMES HAY ES; DEAN HOTH; MARK JOHNS, Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:06-CV-1833
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Okechukwu Mummee Amadi, an immigration detainee, requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The district court dismissed Amadi’s civil rights action, filed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for failure to state a claim, and it also denied Amadi’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal. In order to obtain leave to United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D January 17, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-30381

2 proceed IFP, Amadi must show that he is a pauper, and he must raise a nonfrivolous issue. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986). A madi argues in conclusory fashion that his complaint states a constitutional claim. Amadi’s second amended complaint, however, contains no allegations of personal involvement on the part of the only named defendant,
nor does the second amended complaint contain allegati ons of a causal connection between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the claimed violation ofAmadi’s constitutional rights. Amadi fails to raise a nonfrivolous issue in his appeal ofthe district court’s dismissal ofhis complaint for failure tostate a claim
on which reliefcould be granted. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Amadi’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Howard
v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, his request for leave to proceed IFP is denied, and the appeal is dismissed. See 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2. The district court’s dismissal of Amadi’s complaint and the dismissal of this appeal as frivolous count as two strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). Amadi is cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes under § 1915(g), he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g). IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
|   | 1. | The                Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                15(d)                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));                and |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                April                27, 2007 | /s/                Lee W. Hendrickson                   Lee                W. HendricksonChief                Financial Officer |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHANTELL WILLIAMS, )

Petitioner, )

v. ) :CIVIL ACTION 09-440-KD-M 

CYNTHIA WHEELER-WHITE, )

Respondent. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all pleadings in this file, and no objection having

been made, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and dated February 2, 2010, is adopted as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED as time-barred. 

The undersigned also finds that there are no grounds to appeal this determination. 

DONE this 23rd day of February, 2010.

s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00440-KD-M Document 16 Filed 02/23/10 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATIONS
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Morgans Foods, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this annual report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results
of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
annual report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and
Rule 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and we have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function):
   Date: June 1, 2009
    /s/ Kenneth L. HignettKenneth L. HignettSenior Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer 49
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: APPOINTMENT TO THE 

APPELLATE COURT PROCEDURAL 

RULES COMMITTEE

:

:

:

:

:

No 264

APPELLATE COURT RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11

th day of August, 2016, James L. McMonagle, Jr., Esquire, 

Luzerne County, is hereby appointed as a member of the Appellate Court Procedural 

Rules Committee for a term of three years.
|   | 1. | The                Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                15(d)                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));                and |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                October                31, 2006 | /s/                Lee W. Hendrickson                Lee                W. HendricksonChief                Financial Officer |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FREDERICK CARTER, et al., ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) CIVIL ACTION NO 08-0155-KD-N 

vs. ) 

 ) 

AUSTAL, USA, L.LC., ) 

Defendant. ) 

 ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Frederick Carter’s Renewed Motion for Judgment 

as a Matter of Law or Motion for New Trial (Doc. 540) pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

1 The Court has previously (and extensively) addressed, on the record, 

each of the grounds which are re-asserted by Plaintiff Carter in his motion. Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’ Frederick Carter’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or 

Motion for New Trial (Doc. 540) is DENIED for reasons previously stated on the record. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 18th day of November 2011.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

1 Rule 50 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New 

Trial...No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment--or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, 

no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged--the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 

law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the 

court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of

judgment as a matter of law....(e) Denying the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; Reversal on Appeal. If the 

court denies the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the prevailing party may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling it 

to a new trial should the appellate court conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion. If the appellate court 

reverses the judgment, it may order a new trial, direct the trial court to determine whether a new trial should be granted, 

or direct the entry of judgment. 

Case 1:08-cv-00155-KD-N Document 554 Filed 11/18/11 Page 1 of 1
United States Department of Com

National Institute of Standards and Technolo

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For: 

Utah 

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international system of units (SI), maintains a documented calibration program, documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented measurement procedures, successfully completed training and proficiency tests, submitted a quality management system, and has demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate. The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. 

Scope 

Mass Echelon III Volume Transfer, II 30 kg to 1 mg 100 gal 50 lb to 0.001 lb 5 gal 4 oz to 0.03125 oz 

NIST Office Effective Date___________Katrice Lipp

(Rev.: September 2021)
#### Willie E. YOUNG, Appellant, v. Dr. J. B. KENLEY, Individually and as Commissioner of Health, Virginia State Department of Health; Sarah E. Sayers, Individually and as Director of Public Health Nursing, Virginia State Department of Health; Wayne Hardin, Individually and as Director of Personnel, Virginia State Department of Health; H. H. Hedley, Individually and as Retired and Former Director of Personnel, Virginia State Department of Health, jointly and severally, Appellees.

No. 79-1234.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 8, 1979.

Decided Dec. 11, 1979.

Brent E. Simmons, New York City (Elaine R. Jones, New York City, Charles M. L. Mangum, Leonard L. Brown, Jr., Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for appellant.

John R. Butcher, Richmond, Va. (R. Leonard Vance, Robert T. Adams, Asst. Attys. Gen., Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellees.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, *et seq.*The action was settled during trial. Plaintiff moved for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k), contending that she was the “prevailing party.” The district court denied such relief, *Young v. Kenley,*465 F.Supp. 1260 (E.D.Va.1979), and plaintiff appeals. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for consideration of plaintiff’s application in light of this court’s recent opinion in *Bonnes v. Long,*599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).

The district court properly noted that a plaintiff whose case ends in settlement may be considered a “prevailing party” under the civil rights attorney’s fees provisions. In making its determination whether the plaintiff was in fact the “prevailing party,” the court applied the test set forth in *Nadeau v. Helgemoe,*581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). After the district court rendered its opinion, this court issued its decision in *Bonnes. Bonnes*establishes the test to be applied in this circuit for the *374consideration whether a party to a case which ends in settlement is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k).

Accordingly, the order of the district court is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*VACATED AND REMANDED.*
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 13

- 00339

- CV

ACADIA HEALTHCARE CO MPANY, INC.; PSYCHIATRIC RE SOURCE PARTNERS, INC.; MICH AEL A. SAUL; TIMOTHY J. PAL US; PETER D. ULASEWICZ; BARBAR A H. BAYMA; AND JOHN M. P IECHOCKI APPELLANTS
AND APPELLEES

V.

HORIZON HEALTH
CORPORATION APPELLEE

AND APPELLANT

------ ------

FROM THE 16TH DISTRI CT COURT OF DENTON C OUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2011

- 10846

- 16

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

------------

We have considered the parties’ “Agreed, Joint Motion for Disposition

Pursuant to Settlement.” We grant the mot ion. In accordance with the

agreement signed by the parties’ attorneys, we dismiss this case in its entirety

and order that the mandate be issued this same day. See Tex. R. App. P.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

18.1(c), 42.1(a)(2) (A) , 43.2(f). And as provided in the parties’ signed agreement,

all costs of the trial and appeal shall be paid by the party incurring the same, for

which let execution issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1 (a)(2)(A), (d).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GABRIEL, J.; SUDDERTH, C.J.; and WALKER, J.

DELIVERED: February 1, 2018
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0644

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

KAITLYN DAWN POLICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including September 21, 2022, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 15 2022

08/15/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0644
<page>					EXHIBIT 32.02


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dean Witter Diversified
Futures Fund II L.P. (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-Q for the
period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Jeffrey
D. Hahn, Chief Financial Officer, Demeter Management Corporation,
general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:	  /s/	Jeffrey D. Hahn

Name:		Jeffrey D. Hahn
Title:	Chief Financial Officer

Date:		August 14, 2003