is report offers an overview of the r ongoing efforts of the the elevator 

industry, the NFPA, the National Institute for Standards and Technology 

(NIST), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and other involved parties to develop solutions to the 

problems involved in enhancing the security of elevator systems against various 

aspects of the fire environment. Their 

goal is the continued use of elevators 

during fire emergencies. 

Tho Baltimore symposium 

In February 1991, the NFPA, the ASME, 

and the Council of American Building 

Officials (CABO) sponsored a symposium 

on elevators and fire in Baltimore, Maryland. It was organized in anticipation of 

the forthcoming Americans with Disabilities Act and its associated Accessibility 

Guidelines (ADAAG). 

The symposium emphasized a number 

of well-known questions regarding the 

need for elevator lobbies and their presNFPA Journal May/June 1993 

surization, as well as the appropriateness 

of sprinkler waterflow versus smoke detector initiation of elevator recall. It also 

provided an opportunity to publicize a 

number of elevator operation problems 

that were known only to the elevator 

industry, such as low heat tolerance of 

microprocessor controls and water sensitivity of door interlock and other elevator equipment in hoistways. 

The 200 attendees, who were elevator 

and building officials and fire professionals, left the meeting determined that 

some immediate code revisions and further study of local fire service experience 

were steps to be taken as soon as possible. A few of these actions are outlined 

below. 

NFPA panel session 

in New Orleans 

To broaden the fire community’s awareness of this major exit problem and to 

report on progress made since the Baltimore symposium, a special panel session 

titled “The Use of Elevators in High-Rise 

Buildings During Fire Emergencies” was 

held at the NFPA Annual Meeting in New 

Orleans in May 1992. 

Session panelists pointed out that the 

NFPA Life Safety Code Subcommittee on 

Means of Egress had recognized this basic problem nearly 15 years ago, culminating in the Section 5-12 proposal that 

was passed by the Safety to Life Committee, but was rejected on the floor at an 

annual meeting more than a decade ago. 

At the time, the prediction was made that 

if the NFPA membership failed to act 

favorably on the proposal, the federal 

government would force the issue. 

Some European and Asian nations also 

have recognized the problem, and several 

are ahead of the United States in the 

process of solving it. Currently, we are 

enmeshed in a lack of building code 

coordination and a federal law to be 

enforced by individuals who are long on 

legal training, but may be unfamiliar with 

building construction. The Board for the 

49 - 
Coordination of Model Codes and the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) are rushing 

to establish codes and regulations, but 

there is no one authority to establish a 

humanistic approach to implementing 

them. 

Technical problems 

There are still both technical and operational problems to overcome. The technical problems are heat, smoke, water, and 

electric power reliability, most of which 

were addressed at the NFPA meeting in 

New Orleans. 

Stairwell pressurization has been in 

use long enough to be a proven method 

of minimizing fire and smoke invasion of 

that component of means of egress. The 

same engineering principles apply to elevator hoistway pressurization, and similar success can be achieved if we recognize the differences in construction of 

stair and elevator shafts and their doors. 

Because most building codes still require venting of elevator hoistways, provision must be made to negotiate away 

that requirement with the authority having jurisdiction, or to supply additional 

pressurization air to compensate for that 

which is lost. The number of stair doors 

open during a fire emergency has been 

the subject of debate and the cause of 

design limitations. Fortunately, in the 

case of elevators, the maximum design 

condition is one open door (or more, if 

there is more than one elevator in a 

shaft). 

On the other hand, stairwells, unlike 

elevators, can be entered when you arrive at the door. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to provide lobby smoke 

doors at every floor level to create smoke 

zones separated from the remainder of 

the floor areas. Conventional, loose-fitting elevator doors generally permit 

enough air leakage into the lobbies so 

that a separate, ducted lobby pressurization system is unnecessary. 

Such a system effectively creates temporary areas of refuge and keeps fire, 

heat, and smoke at bay until and unless 

the entire floor area is overwhelmed by 

fwe. This is an infrequent occurence, particularly during the early stages of a fire 

when at least one elevator car could 

reach the fire floor to evacuate occupants 

waiting in the elevator lobby. In a building with a well-maintained sprinkler system, total floor involvement should never occur. However, until the time comes 

when all high-rise buildings are sprinklered and the sprinker systems are 

tested semiannually, smoke will continue 

to be a major problem when fire occurs. 

Water is a distinct problem requiring a 

separate solution. It was not discussed at 

the New Orleans session, but will be 

covered later in this report. 

Heat and electrical reliability are 

closely related. If a pressurization system 

can keep elevator hoistways substantially clear of heat and smoke, why not 

use hoistways as vertical risers to provide duplicate and remote electrical 

power supplies during emergencies? The 

failure of nonfire-resistive, single or clustered power supplies has resulted in catastrophic losses in several recent highrise building fires. Hoistways can be 

better constructed to protect both a 

building’s occupants and the electrical 

power that is needed to descend elevators for their safe egress. 

For electrical power reliability during a 

lire, expensive large-capacity, space-consuming emergency generators are not the 

answer. The proper solution is duplicate, 

remotely run, fire-resistive power lines 

fed from two separate substations where 

available, as in all large cities. 

However, emergency generators are 

still necessary in hospitals and critical 

service facilities and for utility outages. 

Smaller units capable of running one 

elevator car per elevator bank in addition 

to emergency lighting should be provided. 

Another heat problem can occur in the 

elevator machine room. Most high-speed 

elevators used in high-rise buildings have 

microprocessor controls that are temperature-sensitive at degrees varying from 

85°F to 104°F. ASME A17.1, the Elevator 

Code, does not mention air conditioning 

in elevator machine rooms because it is 

considered a building design function. 

Since no model code requires air conditioning in elevator machine rooms, the 

type and existance of air-conditioning 

equipment there is a local option. 

The problem may be compounded by 

the fact that some fire department officers habitually switch off electrical and 

air-handling equipment power when they 

enter a fire building. Without cooling, the 

microprocessor controls rapidly overheat due to normal ambient heat released 

from elevator motors, resistors, and 

transformers. Loss of cooling is a more 

frequent cause of elevator control failure 

than is the direct effect of fire. 

The elevator industry is aware of this 

control sensitivity. A common solution is 

to install internal thermostats to shut 

down the elevator car instantly when the 

critical temperature is approached; there 

is a separate control panel for each car. 

Stopping elevators is no help in evacuating people or in fire service operations, 

and it frequently adds the problem of 

elevators stalled between floors. 

A patent is pending for liquid cooling 

of microprocessor elevator-control cabinets, not only to provide more efficient 

cooling during normal operations, but 

also to provide a minimum of 1 hour of 

heat absorption capacity if a coolingpower failure occurs. This will provide 

control capability for the continued safe 

operation of elevators during a building 

fire for double the normal rush-hour 

evacuation time and loads carried. It also 

places the responsibility for cooling elevator controls with the most concerned 

parties-the elevator manufacturers or 

installers. 

Few people have had as much operational experience in high-rise building 

fires as Elmer Chapman, retired chief of 

the New York City Fire Department, who 

was one of the panelists at the New 

Orleans session. His extensive field experience led him to develop 13 criteria for 

safe elevator design (see sidebar). 

Members of the New Orleans panel 

discussed human factors involved in the 

problem, as well as the hardware requirements. In fire situations, mobility-impaired individuals have no choice but to 

use elevators or to wait in stairwell refuge areas either until the fire is controlled or until people can assist them 

down the stairsby using a wheelchair 

carry, for example. 

There has been a successful 20-year 

campaign to teach people not to use 

elevators in fires, but there is a downside 

to not using the elevators for those who 

have a choice of elevators or stairs. 

Longer evacuation time, physical effort 

required to descend stairs, the potential 

for long delays, and fear of stairway 

congestion all are important considerations. The need for phased evacuation 

of public buildings by floors in order to 

prevent congestion must be better publicized, especially to building occupants. 

Both occupant training and written emergency plans are vital to ensure safe evacuation. 

The chairman of the New Orleans session concluded that all the speakers, despite the differences in their backgrounds 

and experience, agreed that when the 

revisions needed to meet the full intent of 

the ADAAG are completed, not much 

more will be required to provide safe 

evacuation for all building occupants under fire conditions. 

ASME AW dortr 

The ASME A17 Elevator and Escalator 

Committee considered every suggestion 

made by the 16 speakers at the Baltimore 

symposium. Each suggestion was reviewed and assigned to one of 24 permanent A17 subcommittees or to several 

A17 ad hoc committees specifically created to review and analyze them. 

Some of the technical work has been 

completed, and a few proposed changes 

to the Elevator Code have been submitted to the main A17 committee to be 

considered for inclusion in the 1993 edition of the Code. 

After a careful review of fire and elevator industry experience, passage is 

May/June 1993 NFPA Journal 
likely for the following pending sprinkler 

recommendations that are of particular 

interest to the fire community: 0 Use sidewall sprinklers in the elevator 

hoistway pits. Nearly all hoistway fires 

result from trash accumulation in the 

pits. There will be installation stipulations to prevent water soaking of the 

elevator car and the lowest-level doorclosing mechanism and to assure pit 

drainage. 

0 Sprinklers are not required at the tops 

of noncombustible hoistways of passenger elevators with car enclosure materials that meet the requirements of ASME 

A17.1. Sprinklers would rarely operate 

from that location, and if they did, would 

be ineffective and would raise havoc with 

the elevator controls in the hoistway. 0 Sprinklers in elevator machine rooms 

are not considered detrimental to the 

safe operation of elevators. The underlying assumptions are that regular 212°F 

sprinkers-not quick response sprinklers-will be installed, and if the environment is hot enough to open such a 

sprinkler, the elevator machinery has exceeded its temperature limits and probably would be shut down before sprinkler 

activation occurred. Disconnecting the 

main power “upon or prior to” the application of water would then permit the 

use of a simple waterflow switch, in lieu 

of a preaction system. 

These proposals have been coordinated with the NFPA sprinkler committee so that the NFPA 13, Installation of 

Sprinkler Systems, and ASME A17.1 

standards will not conflict. 

A pending recommendation by another 

A17 ad hoc committee is the establishment of “impending over-temperature” 

(IOT) at 5°C below that of the critical 

temperature (CT) of the microprocessor 

controls. If this recommendation is 

adopted, each control cabinet will have 

two safety thermostats, one to return the 

car to the designated level (normal Phase 

I elevator recall) when the IOT is 

reached. If the temperature then drops, 

the elevator automatically will go back 

into service. If the temperature rises to 

the CT, power will be cut immediately 

and will require manual reset, as it is at 

present. When the controls are in the 

range between the two temperatures, the 

car holding in Phase I will be available 

for Phase 11 fire fighters’ service, but it 

will have a new signal light to warn of the 

possibility of immediate shutdown, a feature not now available. 

It has been accepted practice to connect smoke detectors required by A17.1 

for elevator recall to the building fire 

protective signaling system, where one is 

in place. There is currently no provision 

for an annunciation panel for elevatorrecall smoke detectors in buildings that 

lack fire signaling panels. Because the 

13 Criteria for Safe Elevator Design 

Elmer F. Chapman 

e following is a list of 13 proevator safety during fire emergencies. It is not all-inclusive or in any 

order of priority, nor is it a pick-andchoose list of options. 

Instead, it is intended as a compendium of safeguards that must be 

included in a total approach to the 

design of elevator systems that can 

be used safely for evacuation during 

fire emergencies, will enhance fire 

fighting operations, will reduce 

costly fire damage to elevators, and 

will diminish the time that businesses in the building must endure 

interruption to their normal routines. Additional studies are needed 

to ensure that all potential events 

have been considered. 

1. The building shall be fully protected by a sprinkler system. 

2. Elevator shafts should be pressurized. 

3. Elevator lobbies on all floors 

should be enclosed, 

4. Elevator lobbies should be pressurized. 

5. Air intakes for the elevator shaft 

and lobby pressurization systems 

should be made from a smokefree 

location. 

6. All elevator lobbies should be 

CI posed requirements to ensure elA17 Elevator and Escalator Committee 

did not want to expand into panel specifying, it persuaded the NFPA 72 Protected Premises Committee to do so. This 

has been proposed by the NFPA 72 Technical Committee and approved by the 

NFPA Signaling Systems Correlating 

Committee for final association action at 

the NFPA Annual Meeting in Orlando in 

May 1993. 

Local actions taken 

In September 1992, NIST held a workshop on elevator use during fires. Dr. 

Jack Snell, deputy director of NIST’s 

Building and Fire Research Laboratory, 

opened the workshop, which was conducted by Dr. John H. Klote, head of 

NIST’s building fire physics group. 

Klote’s summary of the meeting follows: 

0 The fire protection community should 

have the ability to use elevators for fire 

evacuation as one of many tools-such 

as sprinklers and compartmentation-to 

protect people in new and remodeled 

buildings. An elevator to be used for 

evacuation should be protected from 

heat, smoke, and water. Phase I1 operaprotected by smoke detectors. 

7. Elevator systems should be 

made water-resistive. 

8. When a power failure occurs, all 

elevators should return to their designated level. 

9. All elevators should be capable 

of being operated from a dedicated 

emergency power generator. 

10. All elevator lobbies should 

have access to a pressurized stairway without [the occupants] passing 

through another fire area. 

11. All elevator cars should have 

means for two-way voice communication between the elevator car and 

the fire command station. 

12. All elevator lobbies should 

have means for two-way voice communication between the elevator 

lobby and the fire command station. 

13. A program specifying the priority of elevator response during fire 

emergencies should be developed. 

Technical problems to be solved 

include heat, smoke, water, and electrical power reliability in elevators 

during a fire. 

Elmer F. Chapman is a retired chief 

of the New York City Fire Department. 

tion can be used for fire evacuation. 

0 Wher research concerning the extent of the water problem and development and evaluation of potential solutions are needed. 

0 While elevator evacuation technology 

may primarily be aimed at sprinklered 

buildings, information about elevator 

protection in unsprinklered buildings 

also is needed. 

0 The application of elevator evacuation 

for disabled people only is much simpler 

than for the general population and is the 

next logical step. Based on what is 

learned in this step, an application for the 

general population could follow. 

In November 1992, a meeting hosted by 

an engineering firm was held in New 

York City for the city’s building and fire 

officials and members of the A17 Emergency Operations Committee. The following subjects were among those discussed: 

0 In the past, New York City permitted 

sprinkler waterflow switch control of elevator recall in fully sprinklered buildings, rather than smoke detector control, 

basically because of past experience with 

many unwanted alarms from sensitive 

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52 

detectors. Members of the A17 Emergency Operations Committee stressed 

the great improvements that had been 

made in detector selective sensitivity, 

cross-zoning, and alarm verification, as 

well as the inherent delay in ordinary 

sprinkler operation. It was noted that 

New York City now requires two crosszoned detectors in each elevator lobby. 

Most important, according to most 

members of the committee, was the need 

for the recall signal to come from the 

elevator lobby, not from somewhere else 

on the floor. No one at the meeting could 

recall any building with a sprinkler system zone that was restricted to elevator 

lobbies. Such a system, with fast response sprinklers, might be ideal but not 

cost-effective, particularly in light of recent improvements in smoke detector 

systems. 

0 Water, either from sprinkler actuation 

or from hose streams, is a major concern 

in regard to operational reliability of elevators. A broad-based committee with 

members from the A17 Emergency Operations Committee and New York City fire 

and building departments has an ongoing 

program to locate and prepare a site in 

which to test the water sensitivity of 

elevator elements in hoistways under 

controlled test conditions. There is a vital 

need to know more about this situation, 

which may be the weakest link in safe 

elevator operation under fire conditions. 

Elevator-door designs are being reviewed 

to restrict the flow of water into the 

hoistway, in place of expensive, waterproof elevator equipment in the hoistway. 

0 Control cooling is a subject that is not 

widely understood. Fire department officials sometimes turn off building power 

when they arrive at the fire scene, perhaps unaware that this action reduces 

both the reliability of the elevators and 

the time available to use them under 

emergency power. The need for some 

method of control cooling that is independent of all building power during an 

emergency is apparent. 

0 Current practice in New York City 

encourages immediate elevator recall, regardless of the point of water flow. This 

reserves the elevators exclusively for fire 

department use, and all evacuation by 

elevators is supervised by fire department personnel. This early recall signal 

from areas that may be remote from the 

elevator lobbies appears to be in conflict 

with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 

ADAAG. 

0 It was pointed out that the elevator 

industry is promoting elevator accessibility, not “egressibility.” The industry prefers the status quo, rather than having the 

mobility-impaired wait in areas of rescue 

assistance on stair landings until fire de- partment personnel arrive. Why should 

they wait, if the automatic elevator system can be “fire-hardened” sufficiently to 

provide safe automatic service, at least 

until fire fighters arrive? What assurance 

is there that fire fighters know the location of people who need assistance? 

Current stdus of the situation 

and future expec)cltionr 

At the present time, the situation is in a 

state of flux. The problem will not go 

away. The question is: How long will 

solving it take? 

At the moment, we have a new, extremely broad federal law-the ADAwith enforcement power vested in DOJ 

attorneys whose knowledge of existing 

building codes-and more important, the 

reasons for them-may be limited. 

At the same time, there has been a lot 

of activity by the elevator industry, at 

least through the main committee and 

many subcommittees of A17. But elevator manufacturers are aware that the 

longer elevators are kept in service during building emergencies, the more likely 

is the possibility of real or perceived 

incidents involving equipment malfunction, which could lead to litigation. 

There is encouraging closer cooperation between the ASME A17 committee 

and the NFPA 13 and 72 committees, but 

there are also many local codes and 

practices that are slow to change and 

continue to conflict with well-developed 

consensus standards. 

Another advantage that has been attained is the generally nationwide requirement that all new high-rise buildings 

be sprinklered. But until a building, old or 

new, is fully sprinklered and its sprinkler 

equipment is frequently inspected and 

tested, there will continue to be a potential for substantial smoke emergencies. 

Because the elevator industry was a 

major contributor to and beneficiary of 

the development of skyscrapers, it is 

being looked to for leadership in substantial enhancement of elevator reliability 

during building emergencies. But the elevator industry cannot do the job alone. 

All those who are affected by and interested in the solutions will have to help in 

order to meet this goal. 

All in all, there is an interesting decade 

ahead of us. Is, 

J. Brooks Semple is president of Smoke/ 

Fire Rise Management, Inc. in Warrenton, Virginia. .He is a member of the 

NFPA Smoke Management Systems, Initiating Devices for Signaling Systems, 

and Fire Investigator Professional Qualifiations committees, and is an alternate on the Household Fire Warning 

Equipment Committee. He also is a 

member of the ASTM A17 Elevator 

Emergency Operations Committee. 

May/June 1993 NFPA Journal