### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A U G U ST 5, 200 4 S es sio n IN TH E MA TTEROF THE E STA TE OF LI Z Z IE TOML IN DAUGHRI TY, DECEASED
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Mar shall County

No. 12506 J. B. Cox, Chancellor

No. M2003- 02244-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Novem ber 16, 2004

Th is c a se inv olv e s a c la im fi le d b y theTe nn e sse e B ur e au o f T e nn Carea g a ins t th e e state of a n e lde rl y dece dent to rec over c erta in benef its paid to the dece dent to cover nursing home ex penses during he r lifetime. The e x ecutor

filed an e x ception to t he claim arg uing that it was filed outside the four (4) month lim itations period found in sections 30-2- 306(c) and 30-2- 307(a) of the Tenne ssee Code. The chanc ery court issued a n order barring the bureau’s claim on the g rounds that is was untimely filed. For the re asons stated he rein, we reve rse.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral & R eporte r, S ue A. Sheldon, Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN, for Appe llant, Bure au of Te nnCare
Ce c ili a Wes t Sp ivy , L e wi sb ur g , T N, fo r A pp e lle e , T he Es tate of Lizzie To mli n D aug hrity
OP IN ION
F actual Background and Proc edural History
On Dec ember

30, 1998, Lizz ie Tomlin Daug hrity (“D ece dent”) enrolled in the Te nnessee TennCar e prog ram a dminist ere d by the Tenne ssee B ureau of TennCa re ( “B u reau”). B eg inning J anuary 1, 1999, the B ureau beg an making payments on behalf of Dec edent to NHC He althcar eL e wi sb ur g , a

nu rs ing ho me fa c ili ty . D e c e de nt d ie d o n J ul y 30 , 20 02, at th e a g e of 89 wi th acc umulated bene fits paid on her be half to the nursing fac ilityup to that poi n t i n t h e amount of $97,870.91.S ec t i o n 3 0

- 2

- 3 0 6 (d ) o f t he T en ne ssee C o d e p ro vid es: 1 A n af

f i d avi t of t he p ub l i sher of t he newspa p er, i n case of such p ub l i cat i o n, s ho wi ng the d a te s o n w h ic h t h e no tice w a s p u b lishe d , o r o f t h e p e rs o n a l re p re se n ta tive , i n c a se o f p o ste d n o tice s, s h o w ing the d a te o n w h ic h the no tice w a s first p o ste d , sha ll b e p rim a fac ie e v id e n c e o f the p u b lica tio n re q u ire d b y this se c tio n . T h e a ff id a v it sh a ll b e fi le d w ith the c le rk a n d b e n o te d b y th e c le rk o n th e d o c k e t o f t h e c a u se
. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 0 -2 -3 0 6 (d ) (2 0 0 3 ). -2- On Sep t ember

10, 2002, Dec edent’ s son, Charles Richar d Daug hrity (“Executor” ), filed a Petition t o Probate Will i n the Chance ry Court of Marsha ll Count y , Tenne ssee. On Septe mber 11, 2002, the chancellor e ntere d an orde r admitting D ece dent’s will to pr obate and appointing Ex ecutor to ov ers ee the a dmi nis tr a tio n o f the e state . O n M arc h 2 5, 20 03 , th e B ur e au f ile d a c la im a g a ins t Dec edent’ s estate, pur suant to section 71-5-116 of the Tenne ssee Code and applicable fede ral Medica id statutes, seeki n g re i mbursement of the benef its corre ctly

paid to the nursing fac ilityon Dec edent’ s behalf

. On April 25, 2003, Ex ecutor filed an e x ception to the B ureau’s claim alleg ing that the claim was not filed wit hin the four (4) month period allowed for the filing of c laims under section 30-2- 306(c) of the Te nnessee Code. Executor also asserted that the B ureau rec eived a ctual notice to file a

claim on September

16, 2002.
The chanc ellor conducte d a hearing on July2, 2003, to addre ss the Bur eau’ s claim. On the day of the he aring , the Executor filed a copy of the Actual Notice to Cre ditors along with an attac hed c e rt if ic a te of se rv ic e , a s we ll a s a c op y of the pu bli sh e d No tic e to Cr e dit or s. Th e Ac tua l N oti c e to Cr e dit or s in dic a te d th a t it ha d be e n ma ile d to the B ur e au on Se pte mbe r 14 , 20 02 , a ndthec e rt if ic a te of service showe d that it wa s acc epted by an employ ee of the Bur eau on September 16, 2002. The published Notice to Creditors indicated that it wa s issued on September 17, 2002. The bookke eper for The Lewisburg T

ribune Marshall Gazette provided a Publis her’ s Affida vit which showe d that 1 the Notice to Cre ditors was published in their new spaper on September 17 and 24, 2002.
T h e c h an ce l l o r i s s u ed an o rd er o n Au gu s t1 3 , 2 0 0 3 , wh i ch co n t ai n ed t h e f o l l o wi n g fi n d i n gs of fa ct and c onclusions of law:

This matter came to be hear d on the 2nd day of J u l y , 2 003 befor e the Honorable J .B. Cox upon the Ex ception to Claim filed by the Executor of the Estate of Lizz ie Tomlin Daug hrity , statements of counsel a nd the record as a whole. Fr om which the Court finds that Actual Noticeto the State of Tenne ssee, Bu re au of TennCa re w as re c e ive d b y the State of Te nn e sse e , Bu re au o f T e nn Careon the16 th day of September , 2002 and the State o f T ennesse e, B ureau of TennCar e filed it’s [sic] C laim on March 2 7 t h, 2003. The State’s assertion of sovere ignty is limited by its own action. The S t ate’ s action to be bound by the one ( 1) y ear barr [si c] to claims should by the s ame choice impose the c onditions of T.C.A. § 30-2-310 upon the State. For

these re asons the C ourt finds that the claim of t he State of Tenne ssee, B ureau of TennCa re is bar red by T.C.A. § 30-2-310.S ec t i o n 3 0

- 2

- 3 1 5 (b ), go ve rning the a p p ea l o f a p ro b ate c o urt’ s ruli ng o n a d i sp uted claim , p ro vid es: 2 ( b) A j u dg men t u pon t h e f i n di n g s of

t h e c ou r t s h al l be e n t er ed i n t h e cou r t a n d f r om t he same an ap p eal m ay b e p erf ect ed wi t hi n t hi rt y (30 ) d ays f rom t he d at e o f

ent ry of t he j udgment , t o t he cour t of appeal s or t he s upr eme cour t , as t he cas e may be. T h e p ro c e d u re o n a p p e a l sh a ll b e g o v e rn e d b y the T e n n e sse e R u le s o f A p p e lla te P ro c e d u re
. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 0 -2 -3 1 5 (b ) (2 0 0 3 ). -3-

I T I S TH EREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DE CRE ED that th e State of Te nn e sse e , B ur e au o f T e nn Careis enjoined fr om deny ing a rele ase as require d by law and sha ll issue a rele ase to this Estate.
The B ureau filed a timely notice of a

ppeal to this Court pursuant to section 30-2 -3 15(b) of the Tenne ssee Code, prese nting the f ollowing issues for

our re view: 2

I

. Whether the tri al co urt err ed in imposing the statutory four ( 4) month limi tations period found in sections 30-2- 3 0 6 (c ) an d 30-2-307( a) of the Tenne ssee Code upon the Bur eau’ s claim; and I I

. Al te rn a tiv e ly , if th e fo ur (4 ) m on th l imi tatio ns pe ri oddo e s a pp ly to the B ur e au’ s c la im, whether this c ase should be rema nded to the trial court with instructions to clarif y whether theB ur e au r e c e ive d a c tua l no tic e a c c or din g to the g ov e rn ing la w g ive n th e fa c ia l ir re g ula ri ty of the notice s supplied to creditors.
For the re asons set forth here in, we re verse the ruling of the trial c ourt and r emand for furthe r proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w
I n revie wing the judg ment of the c hance ry court, we are bound by

the following standard of re view:
T h i s c a s e w a s tr i e d i n t h e p r o b a t e c o u rt w i t h o u ta j u r y. A c c o r d i n g l y, the stand ardof

re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of cor rec tness as t o the findi ng s of fact, unl ess t he pre ponderance of thee vid e nc e is o the rw ise . T e nn. R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Cross v. Cit y of Me mp his , 20 S.W .3d 642, 644–45 (Tenn. 2000) . To the extent that the determination of the issues rests on statutory construction, they prese nt que stions of la w. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 9 2 4 (T en n .1998). Que stions of law arerevie wed de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Id

. Bo wde n v . W

ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

.-4- Bureau’s Abili ty to F ile a ClaimAgainst Dece dent’s Estate
I n order to properly

analy ze the applicability of the four (4) month lim itations period found in T itl e 30 of

the Ten ness e e Cod e , it

is n e c e ssa

ry to d isc us s th e pr oc e ss b y wh ic h th e B ur e au is seeking rec overy of benefits paid t o Dec edent. The Bure au is require d by both state and feder al law to seek re covery

of bene fits paid to Dece dent under the fa cts prese nted in this case.
Th e Me dic a id p ro g ram w a s c re a te d in19 65 , w he n Co ng re ss added T itle XIX to the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amende d, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq . (1976 ed. and Supp. I I ), for the purpose of pr ov idi ng fe de ra l f

inanc ia l a ssi stanc e to S tate s that c ho os e to re imb ur se c e rt a in c os ts o f m e dic a l tr e a tme nt for ne e dy pe rs on s. Al tho ug h part ic ipatio n in the Me dic a id pr og ram is e nti re ly op tio na l, once a S t at e el ects to participate, it must complywith the require ments of Title XIX.
Harris v. McR ae , 4 48 U. S. 2 97 , 3 01 (1 98 0) . A state wi sh ing to p art ic ipate in the fe de ral Me dic a id prog ram must establish a state pla n for medic al assistance which “pr ovide[s] for the e stablishment or designation of a si ng le S tate age ncy to administer or to supervise the a dminist ration of the plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (5) ( 2003).
Tenne ssee c hose to participate in the f ed er al M edicaid prog ram whe n the leg islature promulg ated the T ennesse e Medic al Assistance Act of 1968. Te nn. Code Ann. § 71-5- 101 (2003). Acc ordi n gl y , Tenne ssee is re quired to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a which mandate s that pa rt ic ipatin g state s mus t “ c omp ly wi th the pr ov isi on s of se c tio n 19 17 [42 USC S § 1 39 6p ] wi th re sp e c t to lie ns , ad

jus tme nts , an d re c ov e ri e s of m e dic a l a ssi stanc e c or re c tly pa id, tr a ns fe rs of

a sse ts, a ndtr e a tme nt o f c e rt a in t ru sts .” 42 U. S.C. § 1 39 6a (a )( 18 ) ( 20 03 ). Se c tio n 1 39 6p pr ov ides , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: Liens, ad justm ents and recove ries, and transfer of ass ets

.

. . . . (b) Adjustment or r ecove ry of medical assistance corr ectly paid under a State plan. (1 ) N o a dju stm e nt o r r e c ov e ry of a ny me dic a l a ss is tan ce c or

re c tly paid on beha lf of an individual unde r t h e S t ate plan may be made , except that the State shall seek adjustment or re covery of any medical a ssi stanc e c or

re c tly pa id on be ha lf of a n ind ivi du a l un der th e State plan inthec a se of

thefo llo wi ng ind ivi du a ls:

. . . .Recover y of “ i ncor r ect l y
- pai d” benef i t s i s governe d b y a se para t e s t at ut e wh i ch i s not at i s s ue i n t hi s ca s e. 3 T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 7 1 -5 -1 1 7 (2 0 0 3 ). -5-

(B ) In the ca s e of an individual who wa s 55 y ear s of ag e or olde r wh e n the ind ivi du a l re c e ive d suc h med ic a l a ssi stanc e , th e State sh a ll seek adjustment or rec overy from the individual’s e state, but only for medical a ssistance c onsisting of — (i) nursing fac ilitys e rv ic e s , home and c ommunity -base d service s, and related hospital and pre scription drug service s, or (i i) a t th e op ti on of theState , a ny ite ms o r s e rv ic e s u nd e r the State plan.

. . . . (2) Any adjustment or re covery u n d er p arag raph ( 1) may be made only afte r the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any , and only at a time — (A ) w he n h e ha s n o s ur viv ing child w ho is u nd e r a g e 21 , o r ( wi th respe ct t o S t ates eligible to participate in the State prog ram established under

title XVI [42 US CS §§ 1381 et seq .]) is bl ind or perma nently and totally disabled, or (with respe ct to States which ar e not eli gi b l e t o participate in such prog ram) is blind or disabled a s define d in section 1614 [42 USC S § 1382c]; and

. . . . (3 ) T he State a g e nc y

sh a ll e sta bli sh pr oc e du re s ( in accorda nc e wi th stand ard s sp e c if

ie d b y theSe c re tary ) u nder whi ch th e a g e nc y sh a ll waive the application of this subsec tion ( other than par ag raph ( 1)(C)) if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of c riteria e stablished by the Secr etary
. 42 U. S.C. § 1 39 6p (2 00 3)

. Con g re ss am e nd e d th e Me dic a id A c t in 19 93 to r e qu ir e , n ot j us t pe rm it, states to seek recove ry of medica l costs from the estates of ce rtain dec ease d benef iciarie s to combat ri sin g c os ts an d p e rc e ive d a bu se s. Sta te v . U

.S . D e p’ t of He alt h & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 289 F.3d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 2002).
Section 71-5-116 of

the Tennessee Me dical Assistance Act g overns the r ecove ry of “cor rec tly -paid” TennCar e benef its fr om the estates of dece ased Te nnCare r ecipients. The B ureau 3 files claims for

rec overy of these be nefits ag ainst est ates pursuant to section 71-5-116(c ), which pr ov ide s:-6- (c) Thereshall be no adjustment or reco v er yof any payment for medi ca l assistance c orre ctly paid on beha lf of any

individual under this part, except in the case of an individual who wa s fifty -five ( 55) y ear s of a ge or older when suc h individual rece ived such medic al a ssi stanc e or

se rv ic e s, fr om s uc h in div idu a l’ s e state , an d the n o nly a ft e r the de a th of su c h indi vid ua l’ s sur viv ing sp ou se , if an y , andon ly at a time whe n such individua l has no surviving child who is under e ig hte e n ( 18 ) y e ars of

a g e or wh o is blindor

pe rm a ne ntl y

a ndtot a lly disabled. (1) To f acilitate and enhanc e compliance with t his subsection (c) , the department of hea lth shall promptlynot i fy t h e bure au of Te nnCare, in a format to be specifie d by t h e b u re au, of the death of any ind ivi du a l f

if ty -f ive(5 5) y e ars of

a g e or old e r. Suc h noti fi c a tio n s ha ll inc lud e thede c e de nt’ s n a me, date o f b irth, a ndso c ia l se c urity number. It is the leg islati v e i n t ent of thi s subsection (c) that the bureau of TennCar e strive vigor ously to r ecoup any TennCar e funds expended for a

dece dent af

ter the date of de ath. (2 ) B e fo re a ny pr ob a te e state ma y be c los e d p ur su a nt t o ti tle30 , w ith respe ct t o a dec edent who, at the time of death, was enr olled in the Te nn Carepr og ram, the pe rs on a l r e pr e se ntativ e of thee state sh a ll f

ile wi th the c le rk

of thec ou rt e xer c isi ng pr ob a te j uri sd ic tio n a re le a se from the bur eau of

TennCar e evide ncing payment of all medica l a ssi stanc e be ne fi ts, pr e miu ms, or oth e r s uc h c os ts d ue fr om the e state under la w, unless waive d by the bure au. Tenn. Code Ann. § 71- 5-116 (2003)

.

St at ut e of Lim it ation s A pplic abl e to Bur e au’ s C lai m
Th e B ur e au c or

re c tly po int s o ut that th e re are tw o li mit a tio ns pe ri od s w hic h a pp ly to cre ditor’s claims under Tennesse e’s pr obate law

. See I n re Estate of Je nkins v. Guy ton , 912 S.W .2d 13 4, 13 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) . F ir st, se c tio n 3 0- 2- 21 0( b) pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:
L i mi ta ti o n s o n ti me o f

f i l i n g cl a i ms
.

. . . . (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a ), all claims and demands not filed by the State of Tennesse e wi t h t h e probate court c le rk , a s r e qu ir e d b y

the pr ov isi on s of § § 3 0- 2- 30 6 – 30 -2 -3 09 , o r, if later, in which suit s hall not have been brought or rev ived be fore the
e nd of t we lv e ( 12 ) mo nth s fr

om the da te of d

e ath of t he de c e de nt, shall be forever barre d . T his statut e of lim itatio ns sh a ll n ot a

pp ly to-7- claims for state taxes. S uch claims shall continue to be g overne d by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated, Section 67-1- 1501.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310( b) (2003) (empha sis added). D ece dent died on Jul y 30, 2002, and the Bur eau f iled its claim with the probate court on Marc h 27, 2003. The Bure au’s claim, theref ore, w as filed we ll within t he twelve (12) month limitations period.
Se c on d, se c tio ns 30 -2 -3 06 a nd 30 -2 -3 07 , whi c h ar e a t is su e in this c a se , c omb ineto e sta bli sh a four (4) month limitations period a pplicable to cr editor’s c laims. See In re Estate of Je nkins , 912 S.W. 2da t 13 5– 36 . Se c tio n 3 0- 2- 30 6 p ro vid e s, in r e le vant p art , a s f oll ow s:
Noticeto cr editors of qu alif ication of p ersonal re presentative

.

. . . . (c ) T he no tic e sh a ll b e su bs ta nti a lly in the fo llo wi ng fo rm : NO TI CE T O C RED I TO RS Estate of ____________________________( name of dece ased) Notice is her eby

g iven that on the _____ day of ____________, 20____ letters testamentary (or of administration as the ca se may be) in re spe c t o f the estate of ________________________ (name of dec ease d) we re issued to the undersig ned by

the _________________ C ourt of ______________ County , Tenne ssee. All persons, resident and nonresident, having
c lai ms , m atu re d a nd

un ma ture d, ag ain st t

he e sta te a re requ ire d to file the same with the clerk of the above named court wit hin four (4) months from the dat e of the f irst publication ( or of the pos ting, as the
case may be) of this notice, otherwise their claims will b e f oreve r barred

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 30- 2-306 (2003) (empha sis added). Sec tion 30-2-307 provides, in re levant pa rt , a s f oll ow s:
Cl aim s a ga inst

e st at e — fil ing

. (a) (1) All claims ag ainst the estate arising from a de bt of the dec edent shall be barred unless filed wit hin the period presc ribed in the notice published or posted in ac cordance w ith § 30-2-306(c ).
Te nn . Co de An n. § 30 -2 -3 07 (a )( 1) (2 00 3) . T he B ur e au c on c e de s th a t it didno t f ile its c la im w ith in four months of September 17, 2002, the date of the first publication of the Notice to Creditors in the local new spaper
.-8-

The B ureau arg ues, howe ver, that the statutes establishing a four ( 4) mon th

limitations period for f iling claims ag ainst the estate do not a pply to a state ag ency

acting in a sovere ign g overnme ntal capa city

. The Bur eau a sserts that re covery of TennCa

re be nefits in this inst anceis a g overnme ntal function, and w hen the state is acting in such a c apac ity it is notbarr ed by any

statutes of limitations
u n l es s t h e l egi s l at u re ex p re s s l y p ro v i d es t h ata p ar t i cu l arl i m i t at i o n s p er i o d ap p l i es to actions broug ht by the state. We ag ree
. The c ourts of this state have consistently held that, when the State of Tenne ssee, a cting throug h its various departments, files a claim in a governmental capacity , statutes of limitations do not bar the state ’s claim abse nt an express leg islative directive to the c ontrary

.

The c om m o n l aw doctrine of nullum tempus occ urit regi , which is literally

tr an s l at ed as “time does not run ag ainst the king ,” pr e ve nts a n a c tio n b ro ug ht b y theState fr om be ing dis mis se d d ue to thee xpir a tion of the s tatut ory pe ri odof

lim itatio ns no rm a lly applicable to the specific type of a ct ion. This doctrine has be en justified on the g round “that the public should not suffe r bec ause of the neg lige nce o f i ts office rs and a g ents . . .” State ex re l. Board of University & School Lands v. Andrus , 671 F.2d 271, 274 ( 8th Cir. 1982). . . . This doctrine is not to be lig htly reg arde d, as we have re pe a te dly

state d th a t st a tut e s o f li mi tatio ns areloo ke d u po n w ith dis fa vo r i n a c tio ns br ou g ht by theState , andwi ll n ot b e e nf or c e d in the abs en ce o f clear and e x plicit statutory authority to do so. Dunn v. W .F. Jam es o n & Sons, Inc. , 569 S.W .2d 799, 802 (Tenn. 1978) ; An de rso n v . S e c ur ityMi lls , 175 Tenn. 197, 133 S .W.2d 478 (1939). Hamilton County Bd. of E duc. v. Asbestospray Corp. , 909 S.W. 2d 78 3, 78 5 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; se e als o In re Es tate of D ar

win , 5 03 S.W. 2d51 1, 51 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) ; J e nn ing s v
. Dav idso n Coun ty , 344 S

. W

. 2 d 3 5 9 , 3 6 1 ( T e n n
. 19 61 ); Dos sett v. Ob ion Cou nty , 221 S.W .2d 705, 709 (Tenn. 1949) ; Com me rc e Un ion Ba nk

v . G ill e sp ie , 156 S.W .2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1940) ; Ne lso n v. Lou do n Co un ty , 14 4 S. W.2 d 7 91 , 7 92 (T e nn . 1 94 0) ; In re Estate of Lacey , No. W2002-01230-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Te nn. A pp . L

EX I S 50 5, a t *1 7– 19 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . July 17 , 2 00 3) ; Milhous v. Me tro. Gov’t of Nas hv ill e , No. M1997-00226-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 589, at *6 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Au g . 3 1, 20 00 ); Knox County v. Pe rceptics Corp. , No. 03A01-9803- CH-00089, 1998 Tenn. A pp. LEX I S 65 6, a t *9 –1 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . Se pt. 30 , 1 99 8) ; W oo d v
. Can no n Co un ty , 166 S.W .2d 399, 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942).
Ex ecutor asserts that, in seeking a re covery of bene fits from Dec edent’ s estate, the B ureau is acting in a propr i et ar y , n o t a g overnme ntal, function. Ac cording ly , Ex ecutor arg ues that the B ur e au is re qu ir e d to fi le a c la im f or c or re c tly pa id b e ne fi ts w ith in the fo ur (4 ) m on th p e ri odse t f

orth in sections 30-2-306( c) and 30-2-307( a).-9- T h e s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s d o es n o tru n aga i n s tt h e s o v er ei gn or t h e st ate, or

ag ainst a county , when se eking to enforc e a de mand arising out of, or depe ndent upon, the exerc ise of its g overnme ntal fu nc tio ns a s a n a

rm of thestate . B ut the st atu te do e s run a g a ins t a county or municipality

in respec t of its claims or rig hts which areof a private or c orporate nature and in which only its local citiz ens ar e int e re ste d, a s dis tin g uis he d fr om a pu bli c or g ov e rn me nta l matte r i n which all the pe ople of the state are interested.
W ood , 166 S.W .2d at 401 (c itations omi tted). Executo r co ntends that the B ureau is operating the T en n C ar e p ro gra m as a s t at e r u n i n s u ra n ce co m p an y ac ce p t i n g p re m i u m s an d p ro v i d i n g co v er age t o n o t o n l y t h o s e in fi n an ci al n ee d , b u t al s o t o t h o s e wh o ca n n o t o b t ai n p ri v at e in s u ra n ce co v er age for whatever

rea sons.
Th e le g isl a tur e se t f

orth the pu rp os e be hin d th e Te nn e ssee M edi cal As sis ta nc e Ac t, i n re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: (a ) Th e pu rp os e of thi s pa rt is to make po ssi ble me dic a l a ssi stanc e to those rec ipients determined to be e ligible unde r this chapte r to rec eive medical a ssistance that c onforms to requir ements of Title XIX of the Soc ia l Se c urity

Ac t a ndthere g ulatio ns pr omu lg a te d pu rs uant t o T itl e XIX. (b ) ( 1) Ex cept a s may

be re qu ir e d b y

fe de ra l la w o r r e g ulatio n, it i s here by decla

red to be the public policy of the state of T ennesse e that pa rt ic ipatio n in the Te nn Care pr og ram, or its su c c e sso r p ro g rams, is no t a n e nti tle me nt andis c on dition a l up on , amon g oth e r thi ng s, specific appropriations for the prog ram.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 7 1- 5-102 (2003) . A s a n e xten sio n o f the Me dic a id p ro g ram, T e nn Careis desig ned to m ee t t h e p o l i cy g oal of Medic aid; providing medical tre atment to those in need. See Harris v. McR ae , 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). “T he authorities over the c ountry g ener ally , howeve r, ar e p ra ct i ca l l y

u n an i m o u s i n h o l d i n g t h ati n p ro v i d i n g fo r t h e p o o r t h e s t at e i s ex er ci s i n g a g overnme ntal function. . . .” J e nn ing s v
. Da v idson C ou nty , 344 S.W .2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1961)

. Th e re fo re , w e fi ndthat th e B ur e au wa s c arry ing ou t a g ov e rn me nta l fu nc tio n wh e n it fi le d a c la im ag ainst Dec edent’ s estate se eking to rec over be nefits paid on De cede nt’s behalf

. Having determined that the fil ing of a claim for the re covery of bene fits pursuant to section 71-5-116( c) of

the Tenne ssee Code c onstitut es a g overnme ntal function, we now examine whether the four ( 4) m onth limi tation period set forth in sections 30-2-306(c ) and 32- 3-307(a ) of the Tenne ssee Code a

p p l i es t o t h at claim. Upon ca ref ully rea ding the se statutes, it is clear that the leg islature did not expressly mention their applicabilityto claims filed by the State of Te nnessee
.-10-

The supre me court addre ssed a sim ilar issue as the onebefor e this Court in State Departme nt of P u b l i c W

elfare v. O ’Brien , 292 S.W .2d 733 (Tenn. 1956) . I n O’Brien , the depa rtment filed a c la im a g a ins t th e e state of a de c e a se d e lde rl y

fe ma le se e kin g to re c ov e r be ne fi ts paid u nd e r the Ol d Ag e Assistance L aw, the prec ursor to the Medica l Assistance Ac t. Id . at 733. The de partment filed its claim more than nine months afte r the notice to cre ditor’s was g iven, well bey ond the limitation period in the statute e x isting at the time. Id . at 733–34. Finding that the statute of limitations for filing c laims did not applyto the state in that instance, the court stated:

Com me rc e Un ion Ba nk v . G ill e sp ie , su pr a , he ld that thec la im of the sover eig n state for taxes and assessments was e x empt from that provision of the statute bar ring claims ag ainst the estate of dece dent which ar e not filed withi n t h e ti me limited by that statute, (nine months now) Section 30-513, T.C.A. One of t he reasons given by the Court was that this exempti on of the sover eig n ex i s t ed because of “the g ener al rule that the sovere ign is not within the l imitation [ of a statute of limitation] , unless expressly so prov ided.” This is the common law rule

. Sta te v . S mi th , 194 Tenn. 582, 585–587 , 253 S.W . 2d 758, 76 0, he l d t h a tt h e c l a i mo f t h e S t a t e f

o r m o n e y s p a i d u n d e r

t h e O ld Ag e As sis ta nc e L a w, a s it the n e xiste d, wa s a c la im ow e d to the State i n i t s s o v er ei gn cap ac i t y , an d t h att h e r e w a s n o t h i n g i n t h e O l d Age As sis ta nc e L a w “ which evin c e s a ny int e nti on of

theL e g isl a tur e to divest the State of any

of its prerog atives, rig hts or reme dies.” One of such rights is to have its claims exempt from statutes of limitations, ex cept whe n it is ex pressly embra ced w ithin the limit ations provided by

the s t atute. He nce, unde r the a fore stated ruling in Sta te v . S

mi th , the claim o f the sovere ign a g ainst the de c e de nt’ s e state fo r mon e y s furnis he d s uc h d e c e de nt u nd e r the Ol d Ag e Assistanc e L aw is not barr ed by that provision of the administration of estates statute ba rring claims which we re not filed within the time therein spec ified. Section 30-513, T.C.A. F urthe r, thi s Co urt is un ableto f inda ny dis tin c tio n inqu a lity b et we en t h e c l ai mo we d t h e S t at e f o r p ay m en t s i n i t s s o v er ei gn capa city from its tax es to aid indig ent per sons, and the claim of the State for taxes and a ssessments owed it. I f, there fore , the provision in the administration of estate statute barring c laims which have not be e n f ile d w ith in the ti me prov ide d b y thestatut e do e s n ot a

pp ly to the claim of the sovere ign f or t axes owed it bec ause of the rule state d in Com me rc e Un ion Ba nk v . G ill e sp ie , surpa , th e n f or thesa me rea son, that statute does not bar the claim of the sovere ign a g ainst the estate of the dec edent for pay ments made such de cede nt under a nd by virtue of the O ld Ag e Assistance L aw.T he chancell o r’ s o rder rel i ed on sect i o n 30

- 2

- 3 1 0 to fin d t hat t he B ureau’ s cl ai m was t i m e b arred. T he 4 ch an ce l l or w as appa r en t l y r el y i n g on t h e l an g u ag e i n s u bs ec t i on ( b) , w h er e t h e l eg i s l at u r e ex pr es s l y ma de t h e t we l v e ( 12)
m o nt h l i m i t at i o ns p eri o d ap p l i cab l e t o t he st at e, t o jus t i f y f i nd i ng t hat t he fo ur m o nt h l i m i t at i o ns p eri o d fo und i n s ect i o ns 3 0 -2 -3 0 6 (c ) a n d 3 0 -2 -3 0 7 (a ) a p p lied to th e s ta te a s w e ll. S e e 2 0 0 0 T e n n . P u b . A c ts c h . 9 7 0 , § 1 . W e fi n d the c h a n c e llo r’s reasoni ng i n t hi s regard t o be m i sgui d ed

. “ T he card i nal rul e o f s t at ut o ry co nst ru c tion i s t o ef fect uat e t he l egi sl at i ve i nt ent , wi t h a l l t he r ul es of cons t r uct i on bei ng ai des t o t hat en d. ” B ro w d e r v . M o rris , 975 S. W

. 2d 308, 311 ( T en n
. 1998) (ci t i ng L o c u st v . S ta te , 91 2 S.W

. 2 d 71 6 , 71 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 9 5 ))

. W hen exam i ni ng a s t at ut e t o gl ean l egi sl at i ve i nt ent , we “ ar e r es t r i ct ed t o t he nat ur al and ordi nar y meani ng of t he l ang uag e u s ed by t he l egi s l at ur e i n t he s t at ut e. ” Id

. (ci t i ng Aus t i n v
. M emphi s Publ ’ g Co. , 655 S. W

. 2d 146 , 148 ( T enn
. 198 3))

. W e a l s o pres ume t hat t he T enn es s ee G ene r al A sse m b ly w a s a w a re o f the e x isting sta te o f the la w w h e n it p ro m u lga te d the 2 0 0 0 A m e n d m e n t. S e e W in te r v . S m ith , 9 1 4 S.W

. 2 d 52 7 , 53 8 ( T e n n . C t. A p p
. 19 9 5 ) ( ci t i ng W ilso n v . Jo h n so n C o u n ty , 87 9 S.W

. 2 d 80 7 , 81 0 (T enn. 19 9 4 ))

. O ur r ead i ng of T enness ee C o d e sect i o n 30

- 2

- 3 1 0 , i n co njunct i o n wi t h s ect i o ns 3 0

- 2

- 3 0 6 and 30

- 2

- 3 0 7 , reveal s t hat t he le g islatu re c h o se to m a k e o n ly t h e twe lve (1 2 ) m o n th lim itatio n s p e r io d a p p li c a b le to c la im s fil e d b y the sta te w h ile
w ithh o ld ing a p p lica tio n o f t h e fo u r (4 ) m o n th lim itatio n s p e rio d to su c h c la im s. -11- Id . at 73 4; se e als o I

n re Es tate of D ar

win , 503 S.W .2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1973)

. Ex ecutor direc ts o u r at t en t i on to the lang uag e in sec tion 71-5-117 of the Te nnessee Code, g ov e rn ing re c ov e ry of inc or re c tly pa id b e ne fi ts, wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ [a]n y be ne fi ts i nc or

re c tly pa id shall be re cover able f

rom the re cipient, while living, a s a debt due to the state and, upon the rec ipient’s death, a s a cla im classified with taxes having pr efe renc e under the laws o f t h is state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 71- 5-117(a ) (2003) . Ex ecutor notes that section 71-5- 1 1 6 of the Te nnessee Cod e , g ov e rn ing re c ov e ry of c or re c tly paid be ne fi ts, do e s no t c la ssi fy the se be ne fi ts in th e sa me manner . Ex ecutor , howeve r, has overlooke d the fact that section 71-5-116, the s tatute both parties a g re e is at is su e in this c a se , p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: Before anyprobate estate ma y b e closed pursuant to t itle 30 , w ith respe ct to a dec edent who, at the time of death , was e nrolled in the Te nn Carepr og ram, the pe rs on a l r e pr e se ntativ e of thee state sh a ll f

ile wi th the c le rk

of thec ou rt ex ercisin g pr ob a te jurisd ic tio n a re le a se from the bur eau of

TennCar e evide ncing payment of all medica l a ssi stanc e be ne fi ts, pr e miu ms, or oth e r su c h c os ts d ue fr om the e state under la w, unless waive d by the bure au. Tenn. Code Ann. § 71- 5-116(c )(2) (2003) ( emphasis adde d). In addition, the leg islative amendment to section 30-2-310 e x pressly provides that “[t]hi s statute of limitations shall not apply to claims for state taxes.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 30-2-310( b) (2003) . Simi lar lang u age is c onspicuously absent from sec tions 30-2-306 and 30-2- 307 of the Te nnessee Code. Theref o re, we find Executor’s arg ument in this reg ard to be without merit.
After revie wing the re cord and the applica ble law, wefind that the four (4) month limitations period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tenne ssee Code is inapplica ble to the claim filed by the Bur eau ag ainst Dec edent’ s estate. A ccor dingly , we r ever se the c hance ry court’s ru lin g in this re g arda ndre ma ndwi th the ins truc tio n that the c hanc e llo r a c c e pt the B ur e au’ s c la im

4-12-

a s ti me ly fi le d. Sin c e we ha ve de te rm ine d that the B ur e au’ s claim is not sub je c t to thefo ur

mon th limit ations period, it is unnece ssary for us to addr ess the B ureau’s alternative issue.
Conclusion
For the fore g oing r easons, we reve rse the c hance ry court’s r uling and remand this case to the c ha nc e ry c ou rt wi th the ins truc tio n to a dmit the A pp e llant’ s c la im a s ti me ly fi le d. Cos ts o f this appeal are taxed ag ainst the Appellee , the estate of Lizz ie Tomlin Daug hrity , for whic h execution may issue if nec essary
.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE