alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George Greenaway and Edward Greenaway v. Edgar C. Fuller.

*Chattel mortgage on after-acquwed merchandise.*

Where the purchaser of merchandise mortgages it in order to pay the vendor, and the mortgage is given, payment made and goods delivered on the same day, the mortgage will not be regarded as given on after-acquired property; and if duly filed the mortgagee can bringtrover against a purchaser.

Error to Livingston.

Submitted Jan. 12.

Decided Jan. 25.

Trover. Plaintiffs bring error.

Reversed.

*RoTlin H. Person*for plaintiffs in error.

A mortgage on property to be hereafter acquired is good, and a filing or registration of it gives notice to purchasers: *Gregg v. Sanford*24 Ill. 17; *Scharfenburg v. Bishop*35 Ia. 60; *Morrill v. Noyes*56 Me. 458; *Everman v. Robb*52 Miss. 658; *Duke v. Strickland*43 Ind. 494; one in possession under an executory agreement may mortgage: *Chase v. Ingalls*122 Mass. 381; *Harrington v. King*121 Mass. 269; *Crompton v. Pratt*105 Mass. 255.

*L. 8. Montague*for defendant in error.

Property acquired after the execution of a mortgage-is not included as against subsequent purchasers in good faith or without notice: *Leland v. Collver*34 Mich. 423; *Farrington v. Bristol*35 Mich. 33; *Amer. Cigar Co. v. Foster*36 Mich. 368; *Robson v. Mich. Cent. R. R.*37 Mich. 70; *Beall v. White*94 U. S. 396; *Thorpe v. Cowles*(Iowa) 7 N. *W.*Rep. 677; *Pennington v. Jones*10 N. *W.*Rep. 274.

Campbell, J.

Plaintiffs sued in trover for the conversion of an organ mortgaged to them by one Norton. Defendant claimed by a subsequent right acquired from Norton. The ■ court below instructed the jury that plaintiff’s mortgage was. void as against Fuller, because given on property not then owned by Norton.

*558The facte were in brief that on the 16th of April, 1879, in the morning, there were four organs, including the one in question, at the express office in Brighton consigned to Norton by the vendors, to be paid for on delivery to him. Norton borrowed the mortgage money from plaintiffs to pay for the organs and their freight, and on such payment the organs were received by him from the express agent that same day.

We do not think this can be regarded as in any sense a mortgage on after-acquired property. The mortgage described the organs, and they were subject to Norton’s order whenever he chose to pay for them. The mortgage at once attached to his interest, which became released from conditions as soon as paid for. Nothing further remained to bring the instruments within the express terms of the mortgage. It was a present mortgage in terms and in effect, and the payment merely completed the operation of its language, and removed what was really no more as to the rights of plaintiffs than an encumbrance.

Treating it as a present mortgage, it was properly filed and became notice, so that the other defences do not seem to have any importance. The charge was wrong, and the plaintiffs should have been allowed to go to the jury with their case.

Judgment must he reversed with costs and a new trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>   5
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   JUN-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                        JUN-29-1996
<CASH>                                                    464
<SECURITIES>                                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                                             365
<ALLOWANCES>                                              132
<INVENTORY>                                               902
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                        1,681
<PP&E>                                                 12,129
<DEPRECIATION>                                          8,993
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                          4,817
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  12,750
<BONDS>                                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                       0
<PREFERRED>                                                 0
<COMMON>                                                2,231
<OTHER-SE>                                            (10,164)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                            4,817
<SALES>                                                 4,151
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        4,151
<CGS>                                                   3,605
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           4,685
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          (63)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          135
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        865
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                        (1,336)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    (1,336)
<DISCONTINUED>                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                             0
<CHANGES>                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                           (1,336)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                           (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           (0.06)
        

</TABLE>
1

For instance, the Commissioner argues that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of

proof with respect to the Listing and that the plaintiff’s IQ score was not conclusive. Before

those arguments can be addressed, however, the resolution of those issues by the ALJ must be

clear since it is his decision that is under review.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA L. SHAW, )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-0365-CB-B

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security,

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this matter be remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the

objection is overruled and the Magistrate Judge’s opinion is adopted. 

The Magistrate Judge recommended that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) be overturned because it failed to address whether plaintiff met the criteria of Listing

12.05C. As noted in the R&R, “it is not clear from the decision that [the ALJ] considered

Plaintiff’s impairments in light of this Listing.” (Doc. 16 at 10.) The Commissioner presents

various arguments that do not address the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ failed to

articulate the basis for his decision.1

 The Commissioner then argues that the ALJ’s discussion of

certain facts in his opinion means that he considered the appropriate listing. However, as the

Case 1:05-cv-00365-CB-B Document 18 Filed 11/07/06 Page 1 of 2
2

The Commissioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that upon remand

the ALJ should clarify the plaintiff’s residual function limitations. The Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation on this issue is also affirmed. 

2

Magistrate Judge stated, the discussion is very generalized and does not address why the ALJ

rejected plaintiff’s test scores which met the first criteria for presumptive disability under

12.05C. The Magistrate Judge correctly decided that the ALJ’s findings were insufficient.2

Therefore, after due and proper consideration of those portions of the file deemed proper

to the issues raised and a de novo review of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to

which objection is made, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and dated September 13, 2006 is hereby ADOPTED as the opinion of

this Court.

DONE and ORDERED this the 7th day of November, 2006.

s/ Charles R. Butler, Jr. 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00365-CB-B Document 18 Filed 11/07/06 Page 2 of 2
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-12-00691-CR

OSMIN PERAZA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 184th District Court of Harris County. 

(Tr. Ct. No. 1305439).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on July 16, 2012. After 

submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly raised by the parties, the Court 

holds there is error in that portion of the trial court’s judgment which assesses as court costs a $50.00 

charge for “serving capias” and a $250.00 “DNA Record Fee.” Accordingly, the Court modifies the 

referenced portion of the trial court’s judgment to reduce the total amount of court costs for which 

appellant is financially responsible to $334.00.

The Court further holds that there was no reversible error in the remaining portions of the trial 

court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment as herein modified.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered December 30, 2014.

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown. Opinion delivered by Justice Jennings. 

Justice Brown, concurring and dissenting.
11141.

#### Thompson *v.*The State.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Indictment for burglary; from Franklin superior court •— Judge W. L. Hodges. November 29, 1919.

*W. B. Sloan,*for plaintiff in error.

*A. S. Skelton, solicitor-general,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

1. Under the ruling made in *Childers*v. *State,*52 *Ga.*106, and repeatedly approved and followed by the Supreme Court and this court, a defendant in a felony ease can not be lawfully convicted on the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence which in itself,. and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connects the defendant with the crime, or leads to the inference that he is guilty. *Stokes*v. *State,*19 *Ga. App.*235 (91 S. E. 271), and cit.

2. Slight evidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to authorize the jury to find the accused guilty, and the sufficiency or weight of the corroborating evidence is a question solely for them; and where there is *any*evidence which in itself and independently of the accomplice’s testimony directly connects the defendant with the crime or raises an inference of his guilt, the finding of the jury (if approved by the judge), that the testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated, will not be set aside by this court. *Brown*v. *State,*18 *Ga. App.*288 (89 S. E. 342), and cit. However, in a case where the record discloses *no evidence lohalever*that in itself and independently of the testimony of the accomplice directly connects the defendant with the crime or raises an inference of his guilt, the finding of the jury that the testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated is, as a matter of law, unauthorized, and the judgment refusing a new trial will be reversed.

3. Under the above rulings and the facts of the instant case, the court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
11511.

#### Phillips *v.*Jacobs.

Decided July 14, 1920.

Complaint; from city court of Carrollton — Judge Beall. April 1, 1930.

*Emmett Smith,*for plaintiff in error.

*I. N. Cheney,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

There being some conflict in the evidence as to material issues, the court .erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, a verdict in his favor not being demanded.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
11107.

#### Hill *v.*West, administratix, for use, etc.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Complaint; from Gilmer superior court — Judge Morris. October 14,1919.

*Thomas A. Brown, A. N. Edwards,*for plaintiff in error.

*Clark Ray, William Butt,*contra.

Luke, J.

1. An assignment of error in the following words: “Because the court erred in failing to charge the jury on the subject of admission, and especially in failing to charge the jury that admissions when proven should be scanned with care,” without more, cannot be considered by this court, no reason being assigned why this charge should have been given. The attention of the court was not called to any part of the record which would require this charge, and no reason is assigned why a charge on the question of admission should have been given.

2. The newly discovered evidence was not sufficient to have authorized the granting- of a new trial. The evidence, though conflicting, authorized the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge. Eor no reason assigned was it error to overrule the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
Version 1 / Date of Issue: 10.29.15 / Issuing Authority: Forensic Science Standards Board (FSSB)

OSAC Research Needs Assessment Form

Title of research need:

Keywords:

Submitting subcommittee(s): Date Approved:

(If SAC review identifies additional subcommittees, add them to the box above.)

Background information:

1. Description of research need:

2. Key bibliographic references relating to this research need:

3a. In what ways would the research results improve current laboratory capabilities?

Best practices and scientifically validated techniques to improve facial image quality for biometrics 

and forensics.

1. Forensic Photoshop a comprehensive imaging workflow for forensic professionals by Jim 

Hoerricks.

Facial analysis efficiencies, accuracy and consistencies will be improved by knowing what types of 

tools and techniques available yields better results.

Scientifically validated techniques to improve image quality for biometrics and forensics would 

improve laboratory capabilities because of the potential to provide examiners with materials that 

would enable them to strengthen their analysis, comparisons, and conclusions.

Post Capture Imaging Processing

Processing, enhance, photo, facial, image, 

Facial Identification 1/29/16
Version 1 / Date of Issue: 10.29.15 / Issuing Authority: Forensic Science Standards Board (FSSB)

3b. In what ways would the research results improve understanding of the scientific basis for the 

subcommittee(s)?

3c. In what ways would the research results improve services to the criminal justice system?

4. Status assessment (I, II, III, or IV): 

This research need has been identified by one or more subcommittees of OSAC and is being provided as an 

informational resource to the community.

Major gap 

in current 

knowledge

Minor gap 

in current 

knowledge

No or limited

current research 

is being 

conducted

I III

Existing current 

research is being 

conducted

II IV

At present there is not specific facial examination scientific validation of the techniques currently 

used. 

Will provide scientifically validated methods which are expected to improve the accuracy of results 

supporting forensic evidence to the legal justice system.

I
Version 1 / Date of Issue: 10.29.15 / Issuing Authority: Forensic Science Standards Board (FSSB)

// Approval date:

(Approval is by majority vote of subcommittee. Once approved, forward to SAC.)

1. Does the SAC agree with the research need? Yes ⃝ No ⃝ 

2. Does the SAC agree with the status assessment? Yes ⃝ No ⃝

If no, what is the status assessment of the SAC:

Approval date:

(Approval is by majority vote of SAC. Once approved, forward to NIST for posting.)

1/29/16 Subcommittee

SAC

6/15/16
Exhibit 10.1







Susquehanna Bank


Robert P. Whelen, Jr., Senior Vice President


307 International Circle, 6th floor


Hunt Valley, MD 21030-1376


Tel (410) 316-0214


Fax (410) 316-0016







May 12, 2015







Mr. Jeffery G. Hough


SVP, Chief Financial Officer


GSE Systems


1332 Londontown Blvd.


Sykesville, MD 21784







Dear Jeff:







The purpose of this letter is to confirm that the Bank has agreed to the following:







	
·

	
The Bank has agreed to extend the Revolving Credit Expiration Date until June 30, 2015, as defined in the Master Loan and Security Agreement dated November 22, 2011 in Section 1.1 (a), by and among GSE Systems, Inc., GSE Power Systems, Inc., GSE EnVision, Inc. (collectively, the Borrowers) and Susquehanna Bank. The Bank has also agreed to waive compliance by the of the financial covenants set forth in Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 of the Loan Agreement for the testing measurement date of March 31, 2015 (the "Waiver").  Each of these financial covenants remain in full force and effect for the quarter ending June 30, 2015 and for each quarter thereafter.  The Bank's agreement to waive the said financial covenants in Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 of the Loan Agreement for the testing date of March 31, 2015, and no other consent or waiver is hereby granted, nor should any other consent or waiver be implied.


 


The Waiver described herein is limited precisely as written and shall not be deemed to (i) be a consent to or waiver of any other term or condition of the Loan Agreement or any of the other Financing Documents, or (ii) prejudice any right or rights which the Bank may now have or may have in the future under or in connection with the Loan Agreement or any of the other Financing Documents.















Respectfully,







/s/ Robert P Whelen, Jr.


Robert P Whelen, Jr.


Senior Vice President
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 11
STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                      1996                        1995                       1994
                                             --------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------
                                               SHARES        AMOUNT        SHARES       AMOUNT        SHARES        AMOUNT
                                             ------------  ------------  ------------ ------------  ------------  ------------
<S>                                            <C>         <C>             <C>        <C>             <C>         <C>

Weighted average number of
      shares and net income (loss)
      applicable to common stock               3,744,967   $    (5,498)    3,744,967  $       786     3,744,967   $    (1,463)

Stock options granted, assumed
      issued since date of grant                  43,300                      43,800                     40,900

Less shares assumed to have been
      purchased under the treasury
      stock method                               (43,300)                    (43,800)                   (40,900)
                                             ------------  ------------  ------------ ------------  ------------  ------------

                                               3,744,967       (5,498)     3,744,967          786     3,744,967        (1,463)

Per share, primary                                         $    (1.47)                $       .21                 $      (.39)
                                                           ============               ============                ============

Conversion of $1.80 convertible
      preferred shares                            59,028            27        59,028           27        59,028            27
                                             ------------  ------------  ------------ ------------  ------------  ------------

                                               3,803,995   $    (5,471)    3,803,995  $       813     3,803,995   $   (1,436)
                                             ============  ============  ============ ============  ============  ============

Per share, fully diluted                                   $     (1.44)(1)            $       .21                 $     (.38)(1)
                                                           ============               ============                ============

</TABLE>

(1)   For 1996 and 1994, loss per share, fully diluted is reported as $1.47 and
      $.39, respectively, in the consolidated financial statements because the
      effect of converting preferred shares is antidilutive.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 238 (Thursday, December 11, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 73582]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29150]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Notice; Cancellation of Meeting Notice

December 9, 2014.
    The following Commission meeting has been cancelled. No earlier 
announcement of the cancellation was possible.

TIME AND DATE:  10:00 a.m., Thursday, December 11, 2014

PLACE:  The Richard V. Backley Hearing Room, Room 511N, 1331 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004 (enter from F Street 
entrance)

STATUS:  Open

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:  The Commission will consider and act upon 
the following in open session: Secretary of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 
Docket No. KENT 2009-1368. (Issues include whether the Administrative 
Law Judge erred by affirming a ``significant and substantial'' 
designation and an ``unwarrantable failure to comply'' designation.)
    Any person attending this meeting who requires special 
accessibility features and/or auxiliary aids, such as sign language 
interpreters, must inform the Commission in advance of those needs. 
Subject to 29 CFR 2706.150(a)(3) and Sec.  2706.160(d).

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFO:  Emogene Johnson (202) 434-9935/(202) 
708-9300 for TDD Relay/1-800-877-8339 for toll-free.

Sarah L. Stewart,
Deputy General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2014-29150 Filed 12-9-14; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6735-01-P
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,443

EX PARTE RANDALL LOUIS MCCOY, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. B-16,777A IN THE 173 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT RD

FROM HENDERSON COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant pleaded guilty to escape and was

sentenced, pursuant to a plea agreement, to five years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his

conviction. 

Applicant contends that his plea agreement was breached because he is not receiving all the

pre-sentencing jail time credit he was awarded on the judgment. The specific amount of presentencing jail time credit was an affirmative element of the plea agreement in this case. The amount
of time with which Applicant was to be credited was more than the time he spent in jail on this

particular charge, although Applicant mayhave been in jail pursuant to another charge that was taken

into consideration in sentencing for this case. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice cannot give

Applicant credit for jail time served prior to the commission of the offense for which he is presently

incarcerated. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03 §2(a). Applicant’s plea bargain is

unenforceable, and the State agrees that he is entitled to relief.

Relief is granted. The judgment in Cause No. B-16,777 in the 173rd Judicial District Court

of Henderson County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of

Henderson County to answer the charge against him.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: November 3, 2010

Do Not Publish