research, how else was the government scientist to serve

society? For Astin, the answer was clear.
"Usually the science administrator in Government
must deal with the nonscientist in Government. In
this sense he is a link between research and public
policy. In this respect his public responsibility is
equally significant. He has the opportunities to
educate and to bring his special knowledge to bear
on those carrying out the people's mandate."

This last imperative was actually a corollary of
Astin's advice to all scientists, whether administrators or
not, that in their contacts with the public "their primary
responsibility is to interpret as clearly, accurately, and
simply as possible the nature of their work and its
technical implications and limitations."(90) Every
scientists, in his own sphere, was to be a benevolent agent
for educating and improving society.

When the Senate Select Committee on Small Business
reconvened on June 22, 1953, after nearly 3 months' recess
they heard their first testimony from Jess M. Ritchie. (The

first session, on March 31, heard only from Secretaries

90. "Scientists and Public Responsibility," an address
by Allen V.Astin to the American Physical Society given
September 6, 1957. Reprint in Physics Today, vol.10, Nov.,
1957, pp.23-27.

-70-


wien Astin's influence on the events of 1953 was more
subtle than Jess Ritchie's, but no less powerful. He
epitomized the career government scientist, and it was the
Character of that group which the scientific community and
the wider public saw impugned in this controversy. The
maltreatment of scientists-in-the-public-interest was being
played out through Dr.Astin.

Astin was neither the aberrant scientific genius nor
the political opportunist.(86) He had a solid educational
background, and a long association with the Bureau. After
receiving his Ph.D. from New York University in 1928, he
served as a National Research Council Fellow at Johns
Hopkins University (1928-1930), and then a Research
Associate for both the NRC and the Utilities Research
Commission, Inc., in a program carried out at the Bureau of
Standards. He became a member of the Bureau staff in 1932.
Over the next 15 years he published a modest but respectable
number of articles in technical journals on
radiometeorology, air capacitors, cosmic ray measurement and

proximity fuse technology, and earned several patents.

86. -Daniel Kevles makes a most interesting study of
public mistrust of science and scientists in the early Cold
War years. (The Physicists, op.cit.,ch.23) The following
excerpt is a gem in the history of that culture:

"In the mid-1950s a Monsanto Chemical Company
recruitment film displayed a group of scientists in white
coats and assured the audience: 'No geniuses here; just a
bunch of average Americans working together.'" (p.383)

6A


any scientific information because it might have
some effect on curtailing the marketing of some

products that it is related to."(94)

In their handling of the AD-X2 case, the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business showed nothing more clearly than
that they were incapable of establishing an agenda or
rendering judgement. The participants had little awareness
of even the fundamentals (Senator Hunt thought Edward Condon
was still the Director of the Bureau when the hearings
began), and their list of witnesses appears to have been
determined by Ritchie and Weeks. They never solicited
testimony from the Post Office, the FTC, the National Better
Business Bureau, or even from Condon or Vinal. They made
only furtive attempts to consider the role of regulatory
agencies and even had difficulty establishing just what the
National Better Business Bureau was. As a result, they
constantly redirected their enquiry to the Bureau itself,
for here they had a stationary target. And they constantly
found themselves trying to evaluate the technical aspects of
the additive testing, a task for which they were singularly
incompetent. More than anything else, the Senate Committee
hearings were an exercise in political posturing.

The legacy of even the narrow issue of battery
additives is anomalous at best. As already mentioned, the
Post Office dropped its then suspended fraud order against

Ritchie in August, 1953. The charge of fraud requires an

94. Hearings, p.315.

745


meme se

possible. "Broadly, it is to assist the people at the Bureau
to make it a still better place to work."(73)

SRI conducted the survey in the spring of 1954, and the
summary results were actually more favorable than might be
expected. Much of this can be attributed to the strong
identification the staff had with the Bureau rather than
Commerce.

"In the interviewing, we have gradually come to the
conclusion that identification with the Bureau

(even as a symbol) has probably increasedin the past
15 months, due to the conflicts involving the
Bureau, and that before that time there was probably
still less awareness of and interest in the Bureau
as a totality. Historically, we are informed, this

was not always the case; before the wartime

expansion there was a much stronger sense of
community within the Bureau."(74)
In this connection, only 20 percent of the NBS professionals
thought of the Bureau as part of the Department of Commerce,
and yet far more than half felt that federal laws and the
operation of Commerce needed to be addressed to effect

improvement at the Bureau.(75)

73. NBS Administrative Bulletin no. 53-66, NBS
Archives, Administrative History Files, box l.

74. "The Professional Employe at National Bureau of
Standards Looks at the Bureau and his Work," Social
Research, Inc., report, July 1954, p.10. NBS Archives,
Administrative History File, box 2.

75. ibid, pp.16,17.

-55-


Weeks and Sheaffer.) Ritchie knew how to stir men's blood,
and this he did for a day and a half. When Allen Astin came
to the stand on the afternoon of the twenty third he faced

an uphill battle.

As soon as Astin finished his prepared statement,
Senator Edward Thye, chairman of the committee, began his
attack. Despite his frequent insistence that he wanted "to
believe in the Bureau of Standards." he bluntly questioned
how a test lasting only a couple of weeks could ascertain
anything about the life of a battery, and told Astin that
the purchasing orders of the American businessman (who "is
not fooled very often") mean more to him than "a technical
test of a group of chemists standing over a bench in the
laboratory. .."(91)

The attack even grew vicious at one point. Senator
Homer Ferguson questioned Astin about the Bureau's
correspondence with the National Better Business Bureau.
Astin said he felt what was done was simple dissemination of
technical information. Ferguson countered by saying, "Do you
believe then that the Bureau of Standards has authority to
participate in an aggressive campaign to discredit any
proprietary product?" This drew some protest froma

committee member as to the propriety of the question.

91. Hearings, p.228.

Tia


Epilogue

certainly a controversy which caused so much
embarrassment and hand-wringing must have resulted in some
fundamental changes in science policy. For the Bureau of
Standards, the outcome seems strangely unrelated to the
original issue: excising the largest and most prominent
research and development divisions followed by a period of
meager support for the remaining programs. There was also a
commitment to a joint decision-making policy for the
Director of the Bureau and the Secretary of Commerce in
future product-testing activities, and an enhancement of the
Associate Director level of Bureau administration, both of
which appeared more proximate to the AD-X2 controversy.

But a uniform, simple, and disinterested method of
dealing with testing and regulation of new technology (be it
useful, useless, or harmful) may never arrive. Even in the
seemingly benign case of the publishing of technical
information by a non-regulatory body, such as the Bureau,
the issue is fraught with complexity. Allen Astin saw one
side of the question quite clearly, though he still had an
abiding faith that there was a right way for rational people
to resolve such problems.

"<..({A]11 progress in science and technology is
regulatory. The invention of the incandescent lamp
bulb made obsolete gas lights and so on, so that if

you carry this too far, then you never disseminate

<=


Of course, one interpretation of Astin's extreme
accommodation is simply that he was trying to salvage his
job, which was still very much in jeopardy in May, 1953.
There were reports that Astin was offered other (and much
higher-paying) positions during this time, and he certainly
would not have remained on the unemployment rolls for long.
But it is equally obvious that he had a deep loyalty and
affection for the Bureau, and leaving that association would
have been traumatic.

However, if one is looking for indications that Astin
changed his tune, or gave way to bitterness later in his
career, the evidence just isn't there. Dr.Astin's position
was confirmed by the fall of 1953, and he remained Director
until 1969. He worked assiduously during his tenure for
improved salary schedules and a broader and deeper research
agenda for the Bureau. He presided over NBS during some of
its greatest changes, such as the construction of the
expansive facilities at the Bureau's present site in
Gaithersburg, Maryland. Yet all the while he was very much
the team player. Enhancing the Bureau was never to come at

the cost of reduced favor with government.

A less hagiographic reading of Astin might be that the
government scientist should make a concerted effort to fit
in to society, and not allow the layman his natural tendency
to isolate, and either elevate or denigrate, the scientists.

But even this apparently pragmatic dictum was part of a

-68-


told him not to get into "those technical terms." Ritchie
returned, "I am not too good with them, either...", and
began a much more visual description of the action of his
additive. (81)

His skill in repartee was also quite remarkable.
Senator Hubert Humphrey tried to deflate the scientific
credibility of Ritchie's presentation by referring to the
primary ingredients of AD-X2 by their household names, while
quoting from a letter written by Merle Randall to the Bureau
of Standards. Ritchie recognized that the language was not
Randall's and called Senator Humphrey on it.

Mr.Ritchie: Senator, Dr.Randall never wrote "epsom
salt" and "glauber salt" in any letter to anyone, I
am sure.

Senator Humphrey: He [Merle Randall] wrote
"anhydrous sodium sulfate" and "anhydrous magnesium
sulfate." Anyone who has had the first year of
college chemistry knows that one of those is glauber
salt and one is epsom salt. One of them you give to
horses and one to people; that is right, is it not?
Mr.Ritchie: I am not a veterinarian.

Senator Humphrey: I have taken chemistry. I am a

pharmacist. Now, I happen to know that you give

81. Hearings, pp.16,17.

-60-


affadavits, tests, technical documents, and witnesses (both
expert and nonscientific user). Ritchie did not cease
petitioning the government until 1961, when his suit for
damages ($2.4 million) was dropped "with prejudice," meaning
the case could not be reopened. (77)

Another unmistakable quality Ritchie possessed was a
courage which bordered on vigilantism. He was not content to
simply work through channels and remain backstage. He
insisted on personally carrying his cry of foul play to any
forum he could, including the nation's Capitol. He cannot
accurately be accused of arrogance; he vehemently believed
in his cause.(78)

Perhaps the best evidence of his abiding faith that ‘he
was right and they were wrong' was his willingness - his
determination - to confront the scientific establishment
face to face. At the center of Ritchie's defense was his
contention that the conclusions of the Bureau concerning his
additive were wrong, and he undertook to refute their

experimental methods on a point to point basis.

77. Science,vol.134 , December 29, 1961, p.

78. -Of course, it is possible that Ritchie wasn't
telling all he knew. There was some discussion that an
attorney from the Justice Department was putting together a
case inl959 to show that Ritchie really was a fraud, and
even that some battery tests may have been doctored. (Astin
interview, op.cit., comments of C.Eisenhart pp.16,17,
comments of W.Weinstein p.17). Nothing substantial has ever
come to light in this connection, however.

-57


Dr.Astin and Mr.Ritchie

the context in which the events of 1953 were played out
goes a long way toward explaining their resolution. While
the removal of ordnance work from the Bureau can be seen,
with hindsight, as healthy for basic research in the long
run, this was not the case for the remainder of the decade.
The very act of convoking the (Kelly) evaluation committee
finds explanation only in a potent mixture of long-standing
prejudices, business interests, and strenuous political
conflicts. And yet we must also consider the presence of two
particular personalities. To a considerable extent, the
actions and pronouncements of those who wielded power were
shaped by these personalities.

It is tempting and facile to dismiss Jess Ritchie as an
unschooled , small businessan whose fortune it was to arrive
at a critical place and time. But he was possessed of
qualities which reveal it as unlikely that "“anyman" would
have caused the same stir in similar circumstances.

The most notable attribute was his unusual energy.
Although Ritchie obviously relished telling of the work that
went into developing his additive, where he "often worked
all night," and "ran through more than 1600 different
chemical blends,"(76) it could not have compared with his
ardor in defending his product. By the time Ritchie came to
Washington he had enlisted the aid of 24 senators and a

congressman. He assembled a seemingly endless procession of

76. Heeetngs, p.484
-56-


higher spiritual calling. His philosophy was clearly stated

in another talk before the American Physical Society in

1957.%

"Although the Government scientist has sometimes
been maligned, it is my opinion that nowhere is
there greater opportunity for service to society by
scientists than in Government. ...It is not my
belief that the Government trades on its purchase of
scientific consciences. Those who emphasize the case
where scientists have suffered on the Government
payroll are doing the Government and
Government-science a disservice. I say this knowing
full well the implications of this statement in
relation to my own personal history. I wish to
emphasize that during my own 25-year-long Government
career there has been considerable opportunity to
work on things which interested me principally, and
I have felt, throughout that career, that the work I
was doing had more general social value and somewhat
more scientific value than that I might have
undertaken under other conditions. This sort of

satisfaction I believe is repayment for much of the

so-called disadvantages of Government employment you

hear so much about."

Apart from finding satisfaction in conscientious

269%


because the White House refused to restore General MacArthur
to command in the Far East. (80)

Finally, Jess Ritchie showed a certain genius during
the hearings. Ritchie's persistent focus on the Bureau of
Standards, first on technical issues and then building up a
case of complicity with certain "interests," was masterful.
His testimony shows him to be an extremely deft and
articulate man. He knew just when to assert and when to
retreat, when to play the expert and when to assume the
humble inventor/entrepreneur.

At one juncture during questioning, he spontaneously
weaves an argument for the possibility and precedent of
scientific discoveries occurring accidentally. (Ritchie

maintained that despite all their preparation and

experimentation, he and Randall discovered AD-X2 by
accident, which gave the whole thing considerable charm. See
note 18.) This was true in battery science, he pointed out.
Galvanic action itself was discovered accidentally. He then
began elaborating on the concept of electrochemical cell

potential, at which point the senators got lost. One of them

80. The Evening Star, May 1, 1953. Ritchie's presence
and participation were also reported in The Washington Post,
May 1. Bethe is reported as responding to Ritchie's
argument by saying, "I must take exception. Gen.MacArthur
overstepped from the military field into politics. Secretary
Weeks overstepped from politics to science." The reply was
applauded vigorously.

<5:


intent to deceive, and the Post Office found insufficient

proof of EnEsiy This seems responsible, given what had come
—

to light .(95))

The case of false advertising pursued by the FTC is not
as simple, and it took much longer for them to pass
judgement. An initial decision was reached on November 18,
1955, where the Commission's examiner ruled that in
consideration of contradictory scientific evidence and
strong user testimony (as Ritchie had pointed out in the
Senate hearings, he had sold nearly half a million dollars
worth of the additive, and there was not a single known
user complaint), the Commission's counsel had "failed to
prove false advertising charges..." In the "scientific
testimony," the MIT test was now credited with concluding
that AD-X2 "was capable of a significant and beneficial
effect on batteries."(96)

This announcement prompted Senator Sparkman of the
Senate Small Business Committee to proclaim: "This action is
a spectacular triumph for all small businessmen in their
fight to achieve equal treatment with big business at the
hands of Government agencies." The Senator added, "This
vindication of AD-X2 by the Federal Trade Commission,

coupled with its earlier clearance on fraud charges by the

95. The New York Times, Aug.21, 1953.
96. Federal Trade Commission press release, Nov.18,
1955. NBS Archives, box 202.

-75-


before being cleared by the Defense Secretary.(68) There was
no such requirement (the review of individual contracts by
the Secretary of Defense) for orders placed with private
contractors.

Timing was everything to an organization so dependent
upon transferred funds. Robert Huntoon, then chief of the
Bureau's Missle Development Lab at Corona, California,
remembers telephoning Washington every morning during this
period, to find out if funds were available for that day's
operations.(69) The Kelly Committee requested the Kyes Order
be suspended at least until they had finished their

investigation.

The true motives of Weeks and Wilson were even more
suspect when columnist Drew Pearson reported that on March
2, little more than a month after Weeks was sworn in,
Moorehead Patterson, president of American Machine and
Foundry Co., visited NBS. Patterson, allegedly a close
friend of Weeks, told scientists at the Bureau that it was
his understanding that the whole proximity fuse R&D program
would soon be taken from NBS, and that his company was ready
to move the whole operation to his Boston plant. He also
made offers to several key scientists. Pearson pointed out,

control of this sensitive and costly effort would have a

68. The Washington Post, May 1, 1953.
69. Personal interview, op.cit.

Sis


Senator Ferguson: Have any of them complained?
Mr.Ritchie: Yes,sir; that they couldn't get any more

of it.(83)

A most telling appraisal of Ritchie's interpersonal
skills came from Allen Astin thirty years later.
"The best story I can give on the persuasiveness of
Jess Ritchie involves my secretary in the Director's
office at that time, Dorothy Kingsbury. This is
important because Ritchie's persuasiveness was, I
would say, a major factor in this thing becoming the
controversy that it was...[W]e designed and ran a
special test, to an appreciable extent designed by
Ritchie, to try and settle the matter. Ritchie was
in my office all the time the tests were being run
and the results were being evaluated. He would sit
with Miss Kingsbury in the outer office and chat
with her. And when we finally got the results and
Ritchie called me and I had to tell him that the
results were not favorable to him, Miss Kingsbury
said to me, 'I am sorry you had to tell him that. He
is the nicest man.' He had her completely sold. He

was a great guy."(84)

83. Hearings, p.47.
84. Astin interview, 1983, op.cit., pp.12,13. NBS

Archives.

=62=


glauber salt to animals and epsom salt to people.

One is magnesium sulfate and one is sodium sulfate.

Everybody knows that.

Mr.Ritchie: I don't give them to people or horses,

either one. The salts in this material do not appear

as epsom salt or glauber salt.(82)

Late

r, during questioning about commercial and military concerns
who had used AD-X2, the following exchange took place

Senator Ferguson: The [Post Office] did issue a

fraud order against you?

Mr.Ritchie: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Without a complaint being made?

Mr.Ritchie: Yes, sir; except from the Bureau of

Standards.

Senator Ferguson: Except from the Bureau of
Standards.

Mr.Ritchie: There is no complaint in the docket any

place, except from the Bureau of Standards and the

Post Office.

Senator Ferguson: You say that the military

authorities have used 1t?

Mr.Ritchie: Yes, sir.

82. Hearings, p.21l.

xiii


It was at Ritchie's instigation that the Bureau of
Standards ran its final and most comprehensive series of
tests on AD-X2, and Ritchie conferred personally with Allen
Astin to establish what the testing procedure would be.(79)
When the Bureau concluded that even these tests showed no
operational merit for the additive, Ritchie insisted that
NBS had deviated from agreed-upon procedure. While Ritchie

was quite possibly assisted in preparing his technical

refutations (by Laidler of Catholic University and Weber of
MIT), he showed little hesitation in bringing up technical
objections when on his own.

Mr.Ritchie's style is well demonstrated by an encounter
in the spring of '53. On April 30, the Washington chapter of
the Federation of American Scientists held a symposium where
Hans Bethe, the celebrated theoretical physicist, was the
principal speaker. After Bethe finished his address, in
which he denounced Secretary Weeks, Ritchie addressed the
assembled scientists from the floor. He insisted that his
product had been wrongly judged by NBS, and that allowing
mass resignations from the Bureau is Astin were dismissed

would be tantamount to allowing all Army generals to quit

79. The most complete NBS report on AD-X2 was
submitted on April 16, 1953. It was a 100 plus page report
with a 617 page appendix of data. NBS Report #2447, NBS
Archives, Box 208.

-58-


Ferguson turned back on Astin, asking him to identify what
was wrong with the question. Astin replied, "Well, it is
somewhat difficult to answer", to which Ferguson snapped "I
thought it would be by the conduct that had taken place in
this case; I thought it would be hard."(92)

But Astin kept his composure. He answered directly to
all questions, not responding in kind when his inquisitors

turned combative. Neither was he timid. He vigorously

defended the actions of the Bureau, and in particular Condon
and Vinal, whose actions were at the center of the presumed

wrongdoings. It is not certain that any of the committee had

changed his opinion by the end of the arduous cross
examination. Senator Thye was still concerned that a small
businessman had been dealt with unfairly. But he was
prompted to offer a sentiment that might well serve as a
statement of character for Allen Astin.

"As man to man, the last thing in the world that I
would want to do would be to embarrass you, because
personally I could accept you as one whom I would

like to have as a friend, and that is my sincere

feeling at this time."(93)

92. Hearings, p.316.
93. Hearings, p.335.

uf


There is no_doubt that Kelly and his investigators were in
contact with Weeks as they conducted their evaluation, but
it is not surprising, or even especially noteworthy, that
divestiture was one of the specific recommendations in the
final report. By the fall of 1953 all groups involved
desperately sought a clean slate, and a reconciliation
between the scientific community, and the departments of
commerce and defense.

In light of the Bureau's treatment at the hands of a

mercurial Commerce administration and an unpredictable

Congress, there is another cogent interpretation of the loss
of these four divisions. The research programs were right at
the core of sensitive post-war defense technology. The
Pentagon would certainly not want to rely on a volatile and
vulnerable agency for such work.(72)

* * *

Government scientists, and particularly Bureau
scientists, felt very abused by the events of 1953. In
November of that year, Allen Astin contracted Social
Research, Inc. to survey the Bureau staff about morale and
management. Astin outlined the purpose of the study to his

division and section chiefs in the most sanguine terms

72. This was expressed by Robert Huntoon in personal
interview (op.cit.). The same view appears in an editorial,
"NBS and Defense," The Washington Post, July 25, 1953.

-54-


Dr.Astim began work on ordnance technology in 1940,
becoming Chief of the Ordnance Development Division in 1948.
He received awards for exceptional service from the Navy and

Army in 1945 and 46 respectively. His work on proximity

fuses even earned him the Presidential Certificate of Merit
in 1948. It seems a bitter irony that in 1952 the Department
of Commerce awarded him the Gold Medal for Exceptional
Service. (87)

By the time he was appointed Director of NBS in June,
1952, Allen Astin had established himself as a competent
scientist and administrator, who had conscientiously worked
his way up to a position well-deserved. He was also
something of a scientific war hero, with none of the
questionable associations or personal ambitions which
attended some of the country's scientific elite. He was no
loose cannon, as Congress was apt to feel about Astin's
predecessor, Edward Condon. An assault on Dr.Astin was an
assault on the most conservative of public servants. Indeed,
it constituted an attack on the ideal of responsible federal

science.

87. From a "Justification for Nomination for the
President's Award for Distinguished Civilian Service: Allen
Varley Astin," January, 1962. NBS Archives, Astin Files, box
2. Astin was also awarded "His Majesty's Medal for Service
in the Cause of Freedom, 1947" for proximity fuse work.

-65-


of NBS in a technological economy. His final article of

faith was the following:
"We believe also that for federal employees loyalty
to our country includes, in addition to the more
commonly accepted values, loyalty to the institution
for which we work and for its traditions, and
loyalty to the administration which shapes its
policy."(88)

During the same meeting, the Council of the American
Physical Society unanimously approved their own strong
statement on the harm which the Secretary of Commerce had
perpetrated, and called for a 'hands-off' policy (that is,

for scientific research to be free from "political or other

pressures") to be clearly set forth by the Government. The
same journal issue which carried Astin's talk also carried

an editorial by G.P.Harnwell ( Editorial Director, Physics

Today) which was even more confrontational to
Weeks, saying "...the Secretary of Commerce appears to

believe that science and politics are miscible in the

cauldron of the marketplace."(89)

88. "The National Bureau of Standards," Physics Today,
vol.6, June, 1953, pp.12-13.

89. G.P.Harnwell, "Integrity of Science in
Government," Physics Today, vol. , June 1953, p.4. APS
Council statement, ibid, p.20. Harnwell also suggested it
might be appropriate to enact the Hyde bill (see note 48)
and make the Bureau an independent agency.

=672


Weeks said that no more than $25 worth of his business

interests were associated with the Department of Commerce,

while allowing that some business was done with the
Department of Defense. About a third of his business was in
the electronics field. But with the fuse program in friendly
hands, orders for components to Weeks' companies could
amount to "many millions," this writer felt.(70a)

One cannot say, then,that the decision to divest the
National Bureau of Standards of its ordnance divisions was
born simply of a rational and dispassionate effort to
improve basic research at the Bureau, even if American
Machine and Foundry never took possession of the fuse
program. In light of the adverse publicity, such a move
would have been essentially unthinkable by the summer of
"53 «

Weeks and Wilson jointly announced the removal of the
ordnance divisions on July 24, months before the Kelly
Committee presented its proposals to Weeks, though it was

justified as a recommendation of the evaluation group..(71)

70a. New Republic, May 25, 1953, pp.11-12. This
periodical ran a series of articles on the controversy in
1953 by a contributor known only as "Scientist Q," probably
a Bureau staffer.

71. The New York Times, July 24, 1953.
The actual transfer of the four divisions from Commerce to
Defense was ordered to take place on Sept.27, 1953, “or as
soon thereafter as possible." Federal Register, Sept. 25,
1953, pp.5713-4.

-53-


profound pay-off in defense contracts. According to
Pearson's account, the week following Patterson's visit to
the Bureau saw Fred Powell, vice-president of American
Machine and Foundry, in Washington visiting Defense and
Commerce officials. He informed these officials that his
company was positioned to absorb the entire fuse project "on
a moment's notice." Shortly thereafter, on March 25, Weeks
sent his infamous letter to Wilson.(70)

One commentator observed that Weeks himself was a
potential benficiary if the fuse program were given to
A.M.&F. Two Boston-area companies in which Weeks had a
substantial business interest were United Carr Fastener and
Reed & Barton Corporation. In his pre-confirmation testimony

to the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,

70. “Politics Wins Feud with Science," by Drew Pearson
in The Washington Post, May 1, 1953. Jacob Rabinow also
mentions American Machine and Foundry in connection with the
divestiture of the ordnance divisions, and recalls the
following: "We heard before the [1952] election that if the
Republicans won, the Bureau would be split and the three
ordnance divisions would be given to private industry,
specifically to American Machine and Foundry...We weren't
happy about this. We liked the Bureau of Standards...We
thought the story was probably true. It came to us from many
sources." ("Jacob Rabinow recollections," op.cit. p. 14)

In a later column, Pearson also put the spotlight on
Defense Secretary Charles Wilson. In a series of defense
contract cutbacks affecting Ford, Chrysler, Studebaker and
American Locomotive, Wilson's former company, General
Motors, was left unscathed. The curious manipulation of
bidding policy was all the more indicting in light of an
earlier refusal by Wilson to sell off his General Motors
stock, since he saw no conflict between the public interest

and General Motors' interest. "GM Escapes Defense Cutbacks,"
(The Washington Post, Aug.17, 1953)

-52-


In 1954 Ritchie ran for Congress on the Republican
ticket versus the incumbent Democrat George Miller. His
campaign literature described him as "strenuously opposed to

threats to the small businessman."(85) He lost.

* * *

85. The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1953.

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It was not just his reputation which Astin carried with
him to the Senate hearings. His depertment was so modest and
gracious it must have been maddening to his foes. While the
scientific professional groups, the press and members of
Congress railed against Weeks, Sheaffer and the
Administration in general, Astin refused to take part. All
his public pronouncements were conservative, with words of
conciliation and understanding. He never questioned the
actions of the Secretary of Commerce, and always committed
himself to following whatever course were for the good of

the nation and the Bureau.

For example, on May 1, 1953, at the apex of the
controversy, Astin addressed the American Physical Society
on the role of the National Bureau of Standards. Astin
opened his talk to the overflow audience acknowledging the
present turmoil, but insisting that "[t]hese events have
been sufficiently well publicized that there is no need for
me to specify them." He then turned his attention to the
beliefs of the Bureau of Standards concerning its importance
to national welfare and security

Astin began each item with "we believe," speaking for
the Bureau staff. His talk covered the extension of
knowledge through experimental investigation and the place
of precise standards in such a program, as well as the

scrutiny of the scientific peer review process and the place

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