If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ALEXANDER KATHAWA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 24, 2022

v No. 355907

Tax Tribunal

TOWNSHIP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD, LC No. 20-002685-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner appeals as of right the December 9, 2020 Final Opinion and Judgment of Tax 

Tribunal (tribunal) ruling in favor of respondent and concluding that the true cash value, state 

equalized value, and taxable value of the subject property were $1,749,160; $874,580; and 

$866,490, respectively. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner purchased the residential property located at 6300 North Shore Drive, West 

Bloomfield Township, Michigan, on September 14, 2018, for $1,150,000. On October 9, 2018, 

Armstrong Appraisal & Consulting, LLC assessed the property at $1,300,000. Respondent 

assessed the true cash value, state equalized value, and taxable value of the property for the 2020 

tax year as $1,866,620; $943,310; and $866,490, respectively. Petitioner appealed respondent’s 

assessment by filing a petition in the small claims division of the tribunal on July 15, 2020. Both 

parties submitted valuation disclosures. 

A hearing was conducted by telephone on November 2, 2020. On December 9, 2020, the 

tribunal issued a final opinion and judgment in favor of respondent, adopting respondent’s 

evidence and concluding that the true cash value, state equalized value, and taxable value of the 

subject property was $1,749,160; $874,580; and $866,490, respectively. This appeal followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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“Absent fraud, our review of [tribunal] decisions is limited to determining whether the 

[tribunal] erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong legal principle.” VanderWerp v Plainfield 

Charter Twp, 278 Mich App 624, 627; 752 NW2d 479 (2008). Questions of statutory 

interpretation are reviewed de novo. Mich Props, LLC v Meridian Twp, 491 Mich 518, 528; 817 

NW2d 548 (2012).

In addition, the tribunal’s factual findings must be supported by competent, material, and 

substantial evidence. Dow Chemical Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 185 Mich App 458, 462-463; 462 

NW2d 765 (1990). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla of evidence, although it 

may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence required in most civil cases.” Id. 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that the tribunal’s final opinion and judgment was not supported by 

competent, substantial, and material evidence. We disagree. 

The Michigan Constitution “provides for the uniform taxation of property assessed at not 

in excess of 50 percent of its true cash value.” President Inn Props LLC v Grand Rapids, 291 

Mich App 625, 636; 806 NW2d 342 (2011), citing Const 1963, art 9, § 3. True cash value is “the 

usual selling price” or “fair market value.” MCL 211.27(1); Detroit Lions, Inc v City of Dearborn, 

302 Mich App 676, 696; 840 NW2d 168 (2013). We have stated that fair market value “is the 

standard and not merely a guideline” for determining the value of a property. Safran Printing Co 

v Detroit, 88 Mich App 376, 381; 276 NW2d 602 (1979). In a valuation dispute, the task of the 

tribunal is to find the true cash value by making an independent determination of the value of the 

property. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v City of Warren, 193 Mich App 348, 354; 483 NW2d 416 

(1992). “The petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing the true cash value of the property.” 

MCL 205.737(3). 

There are different approaches used for determining the value of a property. See Great 

Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 390; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). 

One approach is the cost-less-depreciation approach (i.e., the cost approach). Id. Under this 

approach, “true cash value is derived by adding the estimated land value to an estimate of the 

current cost of reproducing or replacing improvements and then deducting the loss in value from 

depreciation in structures, i.e., physical deterioration and functional or economic obsolescence.” 

Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v Holland, 437 Mich 473, 484 n 18; 473 NW2d 636 

(1991). A second approach is the sales-comparison approach. Great Lakes, 227 Mich App at 390. 

Under this approach, “true cash value is derived by analyzing recent sales of similar properties, 

comparing those properties with the subject property, and adjusting the sales price of the 

comparable properties to reflect differences.” Meadowlanes, 437 Mich at 492.

The tribunal is required to select a valuation methodology that is recognized as accurate 

and that bears a reasonable relationship to the property’s true cash value. Safran, 88 Mich App at 

380. “[T]he tribunal is not bound to accept either of the parties’ theories of valuation. It may 

accept one theory and reject the other, it may reject both theories, or it may utilize a combination 

of both in arriving at its determination.” Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 356. “The [tribunal] 

may correlate, reconcile, and weigh valuations derived under various approaches with the ultimate 
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goal of considering all factors under the circumstances in determining the fair market value of the 

subject property.” President Inn, 291 Mich App at 640. 

A. PERCENTAGE-BASED ADJUSTMENT METHOD

While respondent utilized both the cost approach and the sales-comparison approach, 

petitioner’s sales grid—prepared by petitioner’s counsel, who is not a valuation expert—used only 

the sales-comparison approach and chose to use the percentage-based adjustment method in doing 

so.

1

 The tribunal gave no weight to petitioner’s adjustments because petitioner used the 

percentage-based adjustment method. Petitioner challenges this conclusion, arguing that the 

percentage-based adjustment method is a valid and commonly-used adjustment method, and the 

tribunal failed to support its rejection of petitioner’s adjustments. We disagree. 

Again, “the tribunal is not bound to accept either of the parties’ theories of valuation. It 

may accept one theory and reject the other, it may reject both theories, or it may utilize a 

combination of both in arriving at its determination.” Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 356. 

Therefore, the tribunal was not required to utilize petitioner’s percentage-based adjustment 

method. 

The tribunal noted that percentage-based adjustments are normally used for commercial 

properties, not residential properties. Applying percentage-based adjustments to a residential 

property such as the subject property, noted the tribunal, “does not illustrate those features that are 

truly similar between comparable and subject properties” and is therefore “not meaningful in a 

residential context.” This was particularly the case for the subject property, which was simply a 

single-family residential property. As the tribunal stated: “Single family residential properties are 

more typically analyzed and adjusted on the basis of sale price and dollar amounts . . . . Said 

differently, the subject property is not so complex . . . that may warrant adjustments on a percentage 

basis.”

Petitioner argues that the tribunal failed to provide support for its conclusion, but he 

appears to have overlooked the clearly delineated reasons provided by the tribunal in its final 

opinion and judgment. Petitioner also argues that the percentage-based adjustment method has 

been approved by the Appraisal Institute for all sales comparison analyses. However, the fact that 

it may have been approved does not necessarily mean that it is the better approach or that the 

tribunal’s conclusion is incorrect. Petitioner further argues that adjustments are commonly made 

using the percentage-based adjustment method and cites The Appraisal of Real Estate, 15th Edition 

(2020). However, petitioner provides, in a footnote, language from the 15th edition of The 

Appraisal of Real Estate that actually supports the tribunal’s decision. Petitioner writes:

During 2020, the Appraisal Institute released the 15th Edition of the Appraisal of 

Real Estate. This volume takes a slightly different approach to the question. 

 

1 As explained by the tribunal, there are multiple methods of adjustment for the sales-comparison 

approach, and “[w]hile percentage adjustments are acknowledged in valuation practice and theory, 

this form of application is relevant to commercial properties. Single family residential properties 

are more typically analyzed and adjusted on the basis of sale price and dollar amounts.” 
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“While it is possible to calculate a price per square foot of gross living area for a 

house, most residential appraisers do not focus on that unit of comparison but 

instead base the analysis on the total price.”

In other words, most residential valuations focus on the actual sale price rather than an 

adjusted sale price arrived at through percentage-based adjustments. The tribunal recognized this 

in its final opinion and judgment: “[E]quating a price per square foot ($/SF) as opposed to an 

adjusted sale price is not meaningful in a residential context.” Therefore, the tribunal did not err 

by rejecting petitioner’s percentage-based adjustment method. 

For these reasons, petitioner’s argument falls short. 

B. COMPARABLE SALES

Petitioner next takes issue with the tribunal’s decision to choose the 6530 Commerce Road, 

West Bloomfield, Michigan property as a common comparable sale and not consider the other 

comparable sales provided by him. We disagree. 

We first note that petitioner himself did not consistently rely on all of the comparable sales 

listed in his valuation disclosure. More importantly, there is nothing to suggest that the tribunal’s 

decision was not one the parties could have expected. The 6530 Commerce Road property was 

the only sale included in all of the documents submitted by the parties. Respondent’s valuation 

disclosure, petitioner’s valuation disclosure, and the Armstrong appraisal report all list 6530 

Commerce Road as a comparable sale. This was true for none of the other sales. The tribunal is 

not required to utilize all of the comparable sales provided by a given party. Rather, the tribunal 

is required to make its own independent determination regarding true cash value. MCL 211.27(1). 

The tribunal’s conclusion to rely upon the 6530 Commerce Road sale is further supported 

by the fact that there are a number of similarities between 6530 Commerce Road and the subject 

property that make it a relevant comparable sale for purposes of determining value under the salescomparison approach. For instance, 6530 Commerce Road is the property that is closest in size to 

the subject property.

Petitioner responds that 6530 Commerce Road is a poor comparable sale because it sold 

19 months before December 31, 2019, the relevant assessment date; is built in a different style; is 

situated on the opposite side of the lake; and is 35 years newer than the subject property. Petitioner 

argues the other comparable sales presented in petitioner’s valuation disclosure are at least as 

relevant as the 6530 Commerce Road sale. Again, however, no Michigan caselaw suggests that 

the tribunal was required to use all of petitioner’s comparable sales, particularly where petitioner 

framed those sales in the context of the percentage-based adjustment method. Merely because, in 

petitioner’s view, the additional comparable sales might be as relevant as 6530 Commerce Road 

does not mean that (1) they actually are as relevant, (2) their relevance is helpful in determining 

value for the subject property, or (3) that 6530 Commerce Road is therefore not a good comparable 

sale. 

For these reasons, petitioner’s argument falls short. 

C. SALE PRICE
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Petitioner next argues that the tribunal erred by essentially ignoring the recent sale of the 

subject property to him at $1,200,000. We disagree. 

The tribunal did not err in not giving significant weight to the recent sale of the subject 

property for two reasons. First, Michigan precedent establishes that sale price is not determinative 

of a property’s value:

[T]he selling of a particular piece of property is not conclusive as evidence of the 

value of that piece of property. . . . The most obvious deficiency in using the sales 

price of a piece of property as conclusive evidence of its value is that the ultimate 

sale price of the property, as a result of many factors, personal to the parties or 

otherwise, might not be its “usual” price. [Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 

265, 278; 362 NW2d 632 (1984).] 

Likewise, we have stated that “the sale price of a particular piece of property does not 

control [the] determination of the value of that property . . . .” Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App 

at 354. Therefore, because the sale price of the subject property is not ultimately conclusive for 

purposes of determining value, the tribunal did not err in failing to give significant weight to the 

recent sale of the subject property. Second, the sale of the subject property occurred on September 

14, 2018, more than a year before the relevant assessment date of December 31, 2019. Presumably, 

the subject property appreciated in value after it was sold to petitioner. Indeed, the Armstrong 

appraisal report, which was issued less than a month after the subject property was sold to 

petitioner, valued the subject property at $1,300,000. This was $100,000 more than the sale price. 

In other words, the evidence showed that the subject property was appreciating in value, which 

minimized the anchoring relevance of the sale price.

For these reasons, petitioner’s argument is falls short. 

D. RULES OF EVIDENCE

Petitioner argues that the tribunal violated MCL 205.746(1),

2 which states that “[t]he 

tribunal may give probative effect to evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably 

prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.” He argues that by applying an unduly exacting 

standard, the tribunal incorrectly rejected “evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably 

prudent persons,” specifically his comparable sales and the Armstrong appraisal report. We 

disagree. 

Initially, petitioner’s argument misses the mark because he apparently interprets the statute 

to mean that the tribunal must admit “evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably 

prudent persons.” However, the statute states instead that the tribunal may admit “evidence of a 

type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons.” “The word ‘shall’ is generally used 

to designate a mandatory provision, while ‘may’ designates discretion.” Mollett v City of Taylor, 

 

2 Petitioner cites Mich Admin Code, R 792.10287(3), but we interpret his argument as 

contemplating MCL 205.746(1). 
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197 Mich App 328, 339, 494 NW2d 832 (1992). Petitioner mistakes a permissive statute for a 

mandatory one.

In any event, as previously explained, the tribunal did not err by failing to consider his 

comparable sales because he invoked the percentage-based adjustment method. And, with regard 

to the Armstrong appraisal report, the tribunal explained its decision to reject it: 

Petitioner’s bank appraisal report . . . is insufficient in the determination of market 

value for the subject property. First, the effective date of this report is October 9, 

2018, and not the effective tax day of December 31, 2019, for this appeal. All of 

the comparable sales are analyzed to a different point in time. Second, site 

adjustments are adjusted for acreage as well as site square feet. This lack of

consistency is confusing and infers that site size alone is the only factor for a site 

adjustment. The comparable sites were not described in lake front feet, topography, 

site view, street frontage, site depth, etc. Given the subject’s larger lake frontage 

of 200 feet, greater analysis would be expected. Third, this appraisal report was 

exclusively for banking/lending/underwriting purposes. Acronyms and cryptic 

notes in the adjustment grid are not meaningful to an average reader of this report. 

We conclude the tribunal did not err by failing to consider the Armstrong appraisal report 

because, as the tribunal explained, it (1) is not applicable to the effective assessment date of 

December 31, 2019; and (2) was prepared for banking purposes, not valuation purposes. 

Specifically, the Armstrong appraisal report was prepared fourteen months before December 31, 

2019, for a refinancing, and contained no adjustments for the time that elapsed between the sale of 

the subject property and the assessment date.

Petitioner maintains that his argument is supported by Kozma v Twp of Independence, 

unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 8, 1996 (Docket No. 

183405),3in which we determined that refinancing appraisals are the type of evidence relied upon 

by prudent persons. Kozma, unpub at 2. However, Kozma does not stand for the proposition that 

the tribunal was required to give weight to the Armstrong appraisal report, which was prepared 

for refinancing. Rather, it stands for the proposition that the tribunal may give weight to 

refinancing appraisals. In other words, the fact that such appraisals fall within the definition of 

MCL 205.746(1) does not mean they must be considered; it only means they are the kind of 

evidence that tribunals may consider if warranted by the case at hand. 

For these reasons, petitioner’s argument falls short. 

E. 2943 WARNER SALE

Petitioner’s final argument is that the tribunal erroneously relied on the sale of 2943 Warner 

Road, West Bloomfield, Michigan, in reaching its final valuation decision. Specifically, petitioner 

argues that the tribunal did not realize that its final valuation number was on the basis of

 

3

In Michigan, unpublished cases are not legally binding, but can be considered for their persuasive 

value. MCR 7.215(C)(1).
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respondent’s adjustments to 2943 Warner Road. Petitioner further argues that the sale of 2943 

Warner Road is not relevant because it occurred five months after the relevant assessment date,

December 31, 2019, so for this additional reason, the tribunal should not have relied on it. We 

disagree. 

Petitioner misapprehends the tribunal’s final opinion and judgment. Petitioner claims that 

the final valuation reached by the tribunal was intended to be based only on the 6530 Commerce 

Road comparable sale. This is incorrect. The tribunal stated: 

[T]he parties’ utilization of a common comparable sale provides the most reliable 

and credible valuation evidence for the determination of market value . . . . 

Therefore, a reasoned and reconciled determination of market value for the subject 

places weight on the parties’ common comparable sale located at 6530 Commerce 

Road which supports Respondent’s revised [true cash value] contention. 

In other words, the existence of a common comparable sale, 6530 Commerce Road, was 

the most reliable evidence for determining the value of the subject property, and because that 

common comparable sale supported respondent’s valuation, the tribunal sided with respondent. 

The tribunal did not claim to base its final valuation on 6530 Commerce Road alone; it stated that

the use of 6530 Commerce Road as a common comparable sale generally supported an adoption 

of respondent’s valuation.

Further, while 2943 Warner was sold about five months after the assessment date of 

December 31, 2019, that fact does not render the sale irrelevant. It still was a comparable sale of 

a nearby property that could be considered in determining the value of the subject property in the 

tribunal. Indeed, we specifically have held that the tribunal may consider a sale that occurs after 

the assessment date when valuing a property. See Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the tribunal’s conclusion was supported by substantial, competent, and material 

evidence. The tribunal did not err in rejecting petitioner’s percentage-based adjustments, nor did 

it err by choosing 6530 Commerce as a common comparable sale, or choosing not to give 

determinative weight to the Armstrong appraisal report. The tribunal also did not err by choosing 

not to give determinative weight to the sale price of the subject property to petitioner, and it did 

not apply an unduly exacting standard to the evidence. Finally, petitioner’s argument that the 

tribunal unwittingly based its final determination on 2943 Warner Road, despite choosing 6530 

Commerce Road as the common comparable sale and exclusive basis for the valuation of the 

subject property, is not reflective of the tribunal’s decision. We affirm.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan