J-A26019-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WARREN MCGRATH, NANCY ZIHALAMCGRATH, MARTIN BURRIDGE D/B/A 

BURRIDGE TENT RENTALS AND MARTIN 

BURRIDGE, INDIVIDUALLY,

Appellants No. 355 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered January 27, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Civil Division at No.: 2013-CV-8099

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2015

Appellants, Warren McGrath and his wife, Nancy Zihala-McGrath, 

appeal from the order denying their motion for summary judgment against 

Appellee, Maryland Casualty Company, and, in a related case, from the order 

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee. We affirm on the basis of 

the trial court opinion. 

This is the second of two companion cases, which were listed 

consecutively. The same parties are involved and the issues are similar. To 

the extent possible, both of our decisions are identical.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26019-15

- 2 -

The trial court filed one opinion which applies to both cases. (See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/15, at 1-10). In its opinion, the trial court fully 

and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here. 

For context and the convenience of the reader we note briefly that the 

over-arching issue in both cases is the McGraths’ claim for coverage by 

Maryland Casualty for their injuries from a motor vehicle accident involving 

Martin Burridge, doing business as Burridge Tent Rental[s] (Burridge). As 

the name suggests, Burridge operated a seasonal rental business which 

provided tents, tables and chairs for outdoor activities, which he transported 

in his pick-up truck. Burridge’s business was insured under a commercial 

general liability policy (CGL) issued by Appellee Maryland Casualty.1 

On the day of the accident, Burridge’s load of tables and chairs 

became unfastened from the tie-down straps and fell onto the roadway. 

Warren McGrath was operating his motorcycle in the opposite direction when 

he collided with a chair which had fallen off Burridge’s truck. His motorcycle 

flipped, he was thrown, and he alleges he suffered multiple serious injuries. 

The McGraths filed a complaint against Burridge. They argued inter 

alia, that Burridge improperly secured the load, and transported it in a 

____________________________________________

1 The actual policy was apparently underwritten by Zurich North America 

Small Business, an affiliate of Zurich Insurance Group Ltd., commonly known 

as Zurich. Zurich is not a party to these appeals. 
J-A26019-15

- 3 -

negligent manner, failing to warn, and failing to remove the obstructions 

from the roadway. 

Appellee Maryland Casualty maintained that it had no duty to defend 

or indemnify Burridge against a claim for damages arising out of a motor 

vehicle accident because all claims fell within the auto exclusion of Burridge’s 

CGL policy. The auto exclusion is defined to include loading and unloading of 

a vehicle. 

Maryland Casualty Company filed an amended complaint against the 

McGraths and Burridge, seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have 

a duty to defend or indemnify Burridge for the liability alleged in the 

McGraths’ complaint against Burridge. Eventually, the parties cross-filed 

motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered declaratory 

judgment in favor of Maryland Casualty. This appeal followed.

The four overlapping questions raised in both of Appellants’ briefs are 

identical:

1. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist such that 

a grant of [s]ummary [j]udgment in favor of [Appellee] Maryland 

Casualty is inappropriate?

2. Whether the allegations set forth in the underlying 

[a]mended [c]omplaint fell within the [a]uto [e]xclusion of the 

[Appellee] Maryland Casualty [p]olicy?

3. Whether [Appellee] Maryland Casualty does not have a 

duty to defend or indemnify their insured Martin Burridge d/b/a 

Burridge Tent Rentals or [Appellee] Martin Burridge, individually?

4. Whether the record supported the [trial c]ourt’s 

conclusions that [the a]uto [e]xclusion of the Maryland Casualty 
J-A26019-15

- 4 -

[p]olicy is applicable based upon the facts of record and the 

reasonable expectations of the insured?

(Appellants’ Brief, at 5).2 

The McGraths argue from Burridge’s deposition that Burridge had a 

reasonable expectation of coverage. On appeal they now maintain that the 

representations of Maryland Casualty, Burridge’s expectation of coverage, 

and the reasonableness of his expectation are issues of fact precluding 

summary judgment (their own cross-motion for summary judgment 

notwithstanding). (See Appellants’ Brief, at 41). We disagree.

Initially, we note our standard of review of a trial court’s 

decision in a declaratory judgment action is narrow. Because 

declaratory judgment actions arise in equity, we will set aside 

the judgment of the trial court only where it is not supported by 

adequate evidence. The test is not whether we would have 

reached the same result on the evidence presented, but whether 

the trial court’s conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the 

evidence. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 652 A.2d 1338, 1340-41 (Pa. 

Super. 1994), appeal denied, 659 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1995) (citations omitted). 

Summary judgment may be granted only where there is no 

genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1)[.] In 

making this assessment, we view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party. The scope of review of an order 

granting summary judgment is plenary. The standard of review 

____________________________________________

2 Burridge filed a joinder, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 2137, joining in all briefs filed by or on behalf of the McGraths. 
J-A26019-15

- 5 -

provides we reverse the trial court’s order only where the court 

committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. To 

the extent the issues before us are questions of law, our 

standard of review is de novo; thus, we need not defer to the 

lower court’s determinations. 

Belden & Blake Corp. v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 528, 531 (Pa. 2009) 

(case citations and quotation marks omitted). 

[T]he interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law 

for the Court. Having so stated, we note that “where . . . the 

language of [a] . . . contract [of insurance] is clear and 

unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 

language.” Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American 

Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983).

Duffy v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 542 A.2d 144, 145 (Pa. Super. 1988) (one 

citation omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude 

that there is no merit to the issues Appellants have raised on appeal. The 

trial court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. (See Trial 

Court Order and Opinion, 1/27/15, at 6-10) (concluding: (1) no genuine 

issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment; (2) the 

allegations of the underlying complaint fell within the auto exclusion of the 

policy; (3) Appellee Maryland Casualty does not have a duty to defend or 

indemnify their insured Martin Burridge d/b/a Burridge Tent Rentals or 

Martin Burridge, individually based on the plain meaning of the policy’s auto 

exclusion; (4) the auto exclusion of the CGL policy also applies to Appellants’ 

allegations of failure to warn and failure to remove obstacles from the 
J-A26019-15

- 6 -

roadway; and (5) the reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply to 

protect a commercial insured from the plain meaning of the exclusion in a 

commercial general liability policy). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of 

the trial court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2015
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, :7 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Plaintiff : vs. 

WARREN MCGRATH, NANCY ZIHALAMCGRATH, MARTIN BURRIDGE D /B /A 

BURRIDGE TENT RENTALS AND 

MARTIN BURRIDGE, INDIVIDUALLY, 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

CIVIL ACTION - G , v O 

-o cv 

~c 

c3 

.. - 

w 

Defendants , No. 2013 -CV -8099 

OPINION 

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment, filed by Defendants Warren McGrath and Nancy Zihala- McGrath to 

the Amended Complaint on March 21, 2014 and the Cross -Motion for Summary 

Judgment, filed by Plaintiff Maryland Casualty Company on April 21, 2014. 

Supporting briefs, responses /opposing briefs have been filed by the parties to the 

aforesaid motions. Oral argument on the aforesaid motions having been 

conducted on August 20, 2014, this opinion follows. 

Procedural History 

Nlaintiff commenced the above- refetented action on or about July 8, 2013 

by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons against Defendants. A Complaint was 

filed on August 20, 2013 and an Amended Complaint was filed on February 24, 

2014. On March 3, 2014 and March 17, 2014, respectively, Defendants filed 

Answers with New Matter to aforesaid Amended Complaint. The above -recited 

procedural history demonstrates that the relevant pleadings are closed and /or 

that the time for filing a response to the last filed pleading has expired, and 

wain! m1ÌÌ iiii7 iii k LEN- iiiim iiii i ¡ i I -wi ìi- 7-i i ü is üßí ü i railii 

Filing ID: 2006846 

2013- 08099 -0059 Opinion 

Luzerne County Civil Records 

1/27/2015 11:45:13 AM 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

therefore that the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are timely filed and 

pursued under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. 

Procedures Governing Motions for Summary Judgment 

Under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2: 

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time 

as not to unreasonably delay trial, a party may move for summary 

judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law 

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact 

as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which 

could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or 

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the 

motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party 

who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce 

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which 

in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. 

Hence, a motion for summary judgment is based upon an evidentiary 

record which entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law, and which 

is one of two types: (1) the record shows the material facts are undisputed, and 

hence no issue exists to be submitted to a jury, or (2) the record contains 

insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or 

defense, and hence there is no issue to submit to a jury. In the latter instance, 

the motion for summary judgment is made by a party whn rine_c not have the 

burden of proof at trial and who does not have access to the evidence to make a 

record, which affirmatively supports the motion. 

The burden of responding to a motion for summary judgment is set forth in 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3: 

(a) The adverse party may riot rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of the pleadings but must file a response 

within thirty days after service of the motion identifying 

2 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

(1) one or more issues of fact arising from the evidence in 

the record controverting the evidence cited in support of the motion 

or from a challenge to the credibility of one or more witnesses 

testifying in support of the motion, or 

(2) evidence in the record establishing the facts essential to 

the cause of action or defense, which the motion cites as not 

having been produced. 

In responding to a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party under 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(b) "may supplement the record or set forth the reasons why 

the party cannot present evidence essential to justify opposition to the motion 

and any action proposed to be taken by the party to present such evidence." In 

resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(c) 

"may rule upon the motion for judgment or permit affidavits to be obtained, 

depositions to be taken or other discovery to be had or make such order as is 

just." 

Finally, under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(d), the court is permitted to enter 

summary judgment against a party who does not: respond. 

Resolution of Motion for Summary Judgment 

The issue in the instant matter is whether under the relevant Maryland 

Casualty Company commercial general liability insurance policy, wl wa5 

issued to Martin Burridge DBA Burridge Tent Rentals ( "Insured "), Maryland 

Casualty has a duty to defend or indemnify the Insured in the underlying action 

filed against the Insured by Warrant McGrath and Nancy Zihala McGrath 

( "McGrath ") to Luzerne County Docket Number 10269 of 2012. Specifically, the 

question before this Court is whether the underlying action only alleges bodily 

injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance and /or use of a motor vehicle. 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

From a review of the policy at issue and the relevant precedent, the Court finds 

the underlying action so alleges and as a result, Maryland Casualty does not 

have a duty to defend or indemnify in this case for the reasons discussed herein. 

Although the factual and procedural history is well known to the parties, a 

brief summary of the facts remains necessary. C)n August 17, 2011, Defendant 

Warren McGrath was riding his motorcycle on Hillside Road in Jackson 

Township, Pennsylvania. At the same time and place, Defendant Martin 

Burridge, in the course and scope of his agency and /or employment with 

Defendant Burridge Tent Rentals, in the opposite lane of travel of Defendant 

Warren McGrath, was transporting at least 70 folding chairs and 10 folding tables 

in the back of his pickup truck as part of the business of Defendant Burridge Tent 

Rentals. The folding tables were set upright on the left side of the truck bed. 

Defendant Martin Burridge had stacked the chairs in two horizontal piles of 35 

chairs each on the right side of the truck bed, positioning one stack in front of the 

other. 

Defendant Burridge secured this load of chairs and tables by using 2 nylon 

ratchet -type tie -Uuwi r straps 1 rooked tu tl i p truci. 

process of transporting the load of chairs and tables to a customer, the road 

curved to the right and the load of chairs and tables became loose, shifted to the 

left, and fell from the bed of the pickup truck into the roadway directly into the 

path of Defendant Warren McGrath, who was traveling in the opposite direction. 

Defendant Warren McGrath attempted to swerve to avoid the chairs, but the rear 

4 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

tire of his motorcycle hit a chair in the roadway and his motorcycle flipped. He 

was thrown from the motorcycle and suffered injuries. 

At the time Defendant Warren McGrath was injured, Martin Burridge DBA 

Burridge Tent Rentals ( "Insured ") was insured by a Maryland Casualty 

commercial general liability insurance policy ( "Policy ").1 In relevant part, the 

Policy provided: 

SECTION I - COVERAGES 

COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE 

LIABILITY 

1. Insuring Agreement 

a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 

obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 

'property damage' to which this insurance applies. We will 

have the right and duty to defend insured against any 'suit' 

seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to 

defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking damages for 

'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which insurance does 

not apply. . . See, CGLCF at 1 of 17. 

2. Exclusions 

g. Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft 

'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the 

ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any 

aircraft, 'auto' or watercraft owned or operated by or rented 

or loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and 

'loading or unloading'... . There are several different types of coverages provided under the Policy. Although the Policy in 

its entirety is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Warren 

McGrath and Nancy Zihala- McGrath to Amended Complaint, the Commercial General Liability 

Coverage Form ( "CGLCF "), which consists of 17 numbered pages, contain the provisions of the 

Policy applicable to the resolution of the instant matter. Citations to this document will be CGLCF 

at p. of 17. 

5 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

See, Id. at 2 of 17. 

SECTION V - DEFINITIONS. 

2. 'Auto' means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for 

travel on public roads, including any attached machinery or 

equipment. But 'auto' does not include 'mobile equipment'. 

11. 'Loading or unloading' means the handling of property: 

a. After it is moved from the place where it is accepted for 

movement into or onto an aiircraft, watercraft or 'auto'; 

b. While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or 'auto'; 

c. While it is being moved from an aircraft, watercraft or 'auto' 

to the place where it is finally delivered; 

but 'loading or unloading' does not include the movement of 

property by means of a mechanical device, other than a hand truck 

that is not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or 'auto'. 

Id. at 14 -15 of 17. 

As noted above, the issue in the instant matter is whether the August 17, 

2011 accident falls within the aforesaid "Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft" Exclusions 

and correspondingly whether there is any duty to defend or indemnify by 

Maryland Casualty under the Policy. The interpretation of an insurance contract 

regarding the existence or non -existence of coverage is "generally performed by 

the Court." General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 

1093 (Pa. 1997). "Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy 

provision is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.... 

Where, however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

is required to give effect to that language." Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company, 512 Pa. 420, 517 

A.2d 910, 913 (1986). 

The underlying complaint fixes the parameters of an insurer's obligation 

to defend its insured." Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen's Club, 618 A.2d 945 

( Pa.Super. 1992) quoting Hartford Mutual Insurance Company v. Moorhead, 578 

A.2d 492, 494 -495 (Pa. 1990). The obligation of an insurer to defend an action 

against the insured is fixed by two considerations: (1) the language of the policy 

itself and (2) the allegations in the underlying complaint. See, Gene's Restaurant, 

Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1988); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Fidler, 808 A.2d 587 (Pa.Super. 2002); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 1208 (Pa.Super. 1994). Therefore, in order to determine 

whether a claim may potentially come within the coverage of a policy, as required 

for the insurer to be obligated to defend, a court must first ascertain the scope of 

insurance coverage and then analyze the allegations in the complaint. See, 

Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 1208 (Pa.Super. 1994). 

The duties to defend and indemnify are deemed as separate and distinct: 

While the duty to defend can "be determined merely on the basis of whether the 

factual allegations in a complaint potentially state a claim against the insured" 

such that duty to defend thereby "arises whenever the claims asserted by the 

injured party potentially come within the coverage of the policy, ... the duty to 

indemnify arises only when the insured is determined to be liable for damages 

within the coverage of the policy." See, Regis Ins. Co. v. All American 

7 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.Super. 2009) (internal citations 

omitted). See also, General Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 

1095 (Pa. 1997). Although an insurer's duty to defend is separate from and 

broader than the insurer's duty to indemnify, both duties flow from a 

determination that the underlying complaint triggers coverage. See, General 

Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 706, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 

(1997). 

The above -cited language from the Policy clearly provides that Maryland 

Casualty does not have a duty to defend or indemnify for bodily injuries that arise 

out of "use" of an "auto ". See, CGLFC at 4 of 17. "Use" includes "loading and 

unloading ", which is defined by the Policy to include, but is not limited to, "the 

handling of property ... while it is in or on an ... 'auto". See, CGLFC at 14 -15 

of 17. As a result, the question before the Court: is whether the allegations in the 

Amended Complaint in the underlying action fall within this definition. 

The Amended Complaint in the underlying action alleges that the Insured 

failed to secure the chairs and tables properly when the same were loaded onto 

the pickup truck. This alleged fariuru cau,ed tl le cl ratrs and tables to tali from the 

pickup truck, onto the road directly into the path of Defendant Warren McGrath, 

who was traveling in the opposite direction. Defendant Warren McGrath 

attempted to swerve to avoid the chairs, but the rear tire of his motorcycle hit a 

chair in the roadway and his motorcycle flipped. He was thrown from the 

motorcycle and suffered injuries. This alleged failure to secure the chairs and 

tables clearly falls within the definition of "loading and unloading ", as defined at 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

Section V, Paragraph 11 of the CGLCF, i.e., the alleged negligence involves the 

handling of property (chairs and tables) while the property is in or on the auto 

(Insured's pickup truck). 

The Amended Complaint in the underlying action also alleges that the 

Insured is liable for failing to remove an obstruction (i.e., the tables and chairs, 

which fell from the Insured's pickup truck) on the roadway and /or for failing to 

warn operators of vehicles on the roadway of the dangerous condition (i.e., the 

fallen tables and chairs) that the Insured created. The Court must also consider 

whether these allegations arise out of the "loading or unloading" of the "auto" so 

as to fall within the Exclusion at issue. 

When the words "arising out of" the use of an automobile in an insurance 

exclusion clause, as is found in the Policy, "it must be concluded that this clause 

acts to exclude only those injuries which are proximately caused by the 

automobile" (or, with respect to the specific provision of the Policy, the handling 

of property while it is in or on the automobile.) See, Eichelberger v. Warner, 434 

A.2d 747, 752 (Pa.Super. 1981). "Proximate causation is defined as a wrongful 

Gerald E. Ort Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

The record is clear that the substantial factor in bringing about the harm to 

Defendant Warren McGrath was the Insured's allleged failure to secure the chairs 

and tables properly when the same were loaded onto the pickup truck. This 

alleged failure clearly was the substantial factor that caused the obstruction 

which the Insured failed to remove and the dangerous condition of which the 

9 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

Insured failed to warn. As a result, these allegations likewise fall within the 

exclusion provision at issue in the policy as the bodily injury is alleged to have 

arisen out of the handling of property while said property is in or on the 

automobile.2 

Accordingly, the allegations set for in the underlying Amended Complaint 

fall entirely with the Auto Exclusion in the Maryland Casually Policy, and we enter 

the following 

End of Decision 

Order on Separate Page 

2 In addition, Defendants argue that the reasonable expectation of the Insured is that the Policy 

would provide coverage of the bodily injury. However, the reasonable expectations doctrine is 

applied in very limited circumstances. Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 

735 A.2d 100, 109 n.8 (Pa.1999). It has only been applied to protect non -commercial insureds 

from policy terms not readily apparent and /or to protect non- commercial insureds from deception. 

See, Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978) (applying doctrine to protect 

non -commercial insured from policy terms not readily apparent); Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987) (applying doctrine to protect non -commercial insured 

from deception). Since the Court has not found any ambiguity in the terms of the Policy and there 

is no evidence of record to support any allegation of deception or even a representation by 

Plaintiff or its agents, the reasonable expectation doctrine does not apply in this case. 

10 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Plaintiff 

vs. 

WARREN MCGRATH, NANCY ZIHALAMCGRATH, MARTIN BURRIDGE D /B /A 

BURRIDGE TENT RENTALS AND 

MARTIN BURRIDGE, INDIVIDUALLY, 

Now, this a` day of 

Defendants : ORDER 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

CIVIL ACTION - LAW 

ó r- -0 c.s., c ó ,,,,_--.,T, d23-1--. ' ----L) _t_ `1 c3Q.Cî 

No. 2013-CV-8099 -o r 

, 

, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 

(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Warren 

McGrath and Nancy Zihala- McGrath to Amended Complaint, on March 21, 2014, 

is hereby DENIED for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion. 

(2) The Cross -Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Maryland Casualty 

Company, on April 21, 2014, is hereby GRANTED for the reasons set forth in the 

attached opinion. 

(3) Declaratory Judgment is hereby enterod in favor of Plaintiff Maryland 

Casualty Company declaring that the allegations set forth in the underlying 

Amended Complaint fall entirely with the Auto Exclusion in the Maryland 

Casualty Policy, and that the applicability of this exclusion is sufficient to bar 

coverage for the claim arising out of the underlying action. Plaintiff Maryland 

Casualty Company, therefore, has no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants 

Martin Burridge d /b /a Burridge Tent Rentals or Defendant Martin Burridge 

11 

7iiN 

¡SW E WON_ s339 

MICH Urin IITE.' L°; WYi rm! if 

-. r L < Z-- (3 

Filing ID: 2006845 

2013 -08099 -0058 Order with Rule 236 

Luzerne County Civil Records 

1/27/201 5 1 1:44:56 AM 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM
Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM 

individually, for or against the allegations and damages set forth in the Luzerne 

County action, docketed at Luzerne County Docket No, 10269 -2012. 

(4) The Prothonotary is directed to enter this Order of record, and to mail a 

copy of this Order to all counsel of record pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236. 

By the Court: 

Counsel: 

Brigid Q. Alford, Esquire 

100 Corporate Center Drive, Suite 201 

Camp Hill, Pa 17011 

Julia Munley, Esquire 

227 Penn Avenue 

Scranton, PA 18503 

Daniel E. Cummings, Esquire 

700 Electric Building 

507 Linden Street 

Scranton, PA 18503 

12 

Circulated 11/24/2015 06:04 PM