United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 21, 2018*

Decided February 21, 2018

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐1269

EARNEST D. BEAMON, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM POLLARD, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 15‐CV‐560

William E. Duffin,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Earnest Beamon, an inmate at Waupun Correctional Institution, was disciplined

for possessing illicit materials. He sued various Waupun officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

asserting that he was disciplined without due process and in retaliation for submitting a

grievance about the search of his prison cell. The district court entered summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment.   

 * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17‐1269    Page 2

Beamon’s discipline stems from his possession of materials connected with the

“Nation of Gods and Earths,” sometimes referred to as the “Five Percent Nation,” a

movement that began in New York City in the 1960s after breaking away from the

Nation of Islam. It teaches that white people are inherently evil and that black men are

godly. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections considers it a “security threat group”

and prohibits inmates from possessing materials related to its teachings. See WIS.

ADMIN. CODE DOC § 303.20 (2006). In mid‐2014 Beamon’s mail and phone calls were

monitored and his cell searched after the Waupun Gang Task Force received

anonymous information that he possessed, and was disseminating, literature from the

Nation of Gods and Earths. During the cell search, one prison officer found handwritten

pages and letters that contained writings relating to the movement. Beamon tried to

discuss this incident with the prison’s security director, who told Beamon he could not

comment on the issue. Beamon then submitted an inmate grievance, complaining that

the search constituted harassment. Two days later Beamon was written up in a conduct

report for possessing illicit materials. A disciplinary hearing was held, after which a

hearing officer found Beamon guilty of group resistance and petitions, disrespect,

possession of contraband, and violations of institution policies and procedures. Beamon

was sanctioned with 270 days in disciplinary segregation, of which he served half.   

Beamon then filed this lawsuit. He asserted that the defendants (the warden, the

security director, the officer who issued the conduct report, and the hearing officer)

violated the First Amendment by confiscating his religious materials and by retaliating

against him for filing an inmate grievance. He also argued that defendants deprived

him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by disciplining him without first

providing adequate notice that his materials were prohibited.   

The magistrate judge, presiding by consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), entered summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. With regard to Beamon’s First Amendment claims,

the judge found that the Department of Corrections’s ban on these materials was

rationally related to a penological interest. Beamon’s retaliation claim failed, the judge

added, because he could not demonstrate that the defendants had a retaliatory motive

for disciplining him. As for the due‐process claim, the judge pointed out that an officer

had previously warned Beamon that he could be punished for possessing literature

related to the Nation of Gods and Earths.   

On appeal Beamon broadly challenges the magistrate judge’s handling of his

retaliation claim. But Beamon has not pointed to any evidence to suggest that his filing

of a grievance motivated his being punished. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964
No. 17‐1269    Page 3

(7th Cir. 2012). As the magistrate judge found, only the hearing officer was aware of

Beamon’s grievance, and Beamon has not proffered any theory why his grievance

would have motivated this defendant to discipline him. As for the remaining three

defendants, no evidence hints that any of them even knew about Beamon’s grievance,

and we cannot infer retaliatory motive merely by the fact he was written up in a

conduct report two days after filing a grievance. Andonissamy v. Hewlett‐Packard Co.,

547 F.3d 841, 851 (7th Cir. 2008).   

Beamon also challenges the rejection of his due‐process claim and maintains that

he did not receive adequate notice that his materials were prohibited. He says that the

confiscated materials had been inspected and returned to him, so he assumed he was

permitted to possess them. But Beamon’s time in segregation was insufficient to deprive

him of a protected liberty interest. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).

Whether a liberty interest is implicated by disciplinary segregation depends on both the

time and conditions of confinement, see Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697

(7th Cir. 2009), and 135 days in segregation—absent any atypical conditions related to

confinement—does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff,

734 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2013) (no liberty interest in avoiding 182 days’ segregation);

Lekas, 405 F.3d at 612 (noting that 90 days’ segregation was “still not so long as to work

an atypical and significant hardship”).   

AFFIRMED