Affirmed and Opinion filed March 16 , 2023
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14
- 21
- 00274
- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.M. , A CHILD

On Appeal from the 300th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 4337 0

OPINION
T he Office of the A ttorn ey General (OAG) appe als the denial of its plea to the jurisdic tion. In two issues it contends that (1) sovereign immunity bars the trial court from i mposing sanctions under it s inher ent authority; and (2) th e trial court violate s t he separation of p owers doctrine wh en i t sanctions the OAG when the OAG is acting solely in its administrative autho rity. We affirm the order of the trial court denying the OAG ’ s plea to the juris diction

.2 B ACKGROUND In 2018, the trial court ordered Moth er to pay $534.0 0 per month in child support. In February 2020, Mother filed a Petition to m odify the p arent c hild

r elationship

. Father filed an answer, and t h e OAG filed a n otice of n on
a ppearance. Soon thereafter, the t rial court enter ed temp orary or ders tha t termina ted Mother ’ s child support obligation as o f February 19, 2020 . The temporary orders also established a child support obligation for Father.
After th e trial court terminated M other ’ s child support obligation , Mother allege s that the OAG continue d to subm it writs of with holding to he r employer. Mother alleges that the OAG “ continued to withhold $5,597. 74 from [Mother ’ s] paychecks and deni ed her child support from [Father]

. ” Mother file d a “ Motion to C o mpel Termination of Wa ge Withholding O r der an d Motion for S a nctions ” (Motion) a s serting that the trial court should compel the OA G to withdraw the wage withholding orde r as to Mother and a ssess sanctions against the OAG for its failure s to withdra w the wage withholding order in violation to the trial court ’ s temporary orders

. In response to Mother ’ s M otion , the OAG filed an answer

. The OAG asserted a plea to the jurisdict ion alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order or award sanctions against the OAG base d on s overeign immunity and th e separation of powers do ctrine

. 1 After conducting a hearin g , the trial court denied the OA G ’ s plea to the jurisdiction but d id not award sanctions. Instead , the trial court reserved the question of whether it would award san ctions for a later hear in g. T he OAG filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.

1 The OAG asserted o ther immunity defense s, but those are not raised on appeal.3 P LEA TO THE J U RISDICTION
The OAG argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to impose any sanctions under its inherent autho rit y because of the doctri ne of s ove reign immunity. T he O AG next contends that if the trial court were to impose sanctions that such an order would violate the sepa ration of powers doctrine.
A. General Legal Pr inciples
I n reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction , a court does not weig h the me rits of the claims but only consider s the pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. C nty

. of Cameron v. Brown , 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Te x. 2002). We constr ue the ple adings in favor of the plain tiff and loo k to the intent of the pleader

. Id

. If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, then the case should b e dismissed. Id

. Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent. City of Houston v. Will iams , 353 S.W.3d 128, 1 34 (Tex. 2011). Sovereign immunity refers to the state’s immunity from both suit and liability and protects the state and its divisions

. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). “ An action to det ermine or protect a pri vate par ty ’ s rights a gainst a state o fficial who has acted without l egal or statutory authority is n ot a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars. ” Fed. Sign v. T

ex. S. Un iv. , 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997). “ [W]e disti nguish suits to determi ne a par ty ’ s rights against the State from s ui ts seeking damages. ” Id

. ; see also In re A.C.B. , 103 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ( concluding trial court had jurisdiction over dispute regarding writ of withhol ding because “ [ Father ] filed hi s motion for declaratory judgment within thirty da y s after mee ting with the [OAG]. Accordingly, we hold the [ father ] substantially com plied with section 158.506 ” ).4

B. Analysis
The substance of the Motion is a request that the trial court determine the righ ts and obliga tions of the parties

— specifically , of Mother ’ s child support ob ligation and arrearages, a n order from the trial court that Mother be reimbursed, an accounting of the child support paid to the OA G, a nd for the OAG to cease all
wag e withholding from M o ther

. This is akin to a suit against the government for a determination of rights and is not barred by sovereign immunity

. See Fed. Sign , 951 S.W.2d at 404 ; In re A. C.B. , 103 S.W.3d at 574 ; see also Tex . Fam. Code § 158.506(c ).
Included in the Mot ion is a req uest for sanctions b ased on the OAG ’ s conduct pursuant to the trial court ’ s inherent power

. Mother asserts that the OAG should be sanction ed for its alleged failure to comply with the trial court ’ s order termina ting Mothe r ’ s child support obli gation despite her multiple requests and the

“ improper garnishment of child support despite receipt of p roper notice

. ” Mother alleges that the OAG “ ignored ” all requests and con tinued to unlawfully garnish Moth er ’ s wages. Mother all eges this is an “ abuse of process and demonstrates bad faith

. ”
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the OAG argu es that the trial court has inherent authority to sanction ba d faith conduct resulting from the impeding of the ju di cial
pr ocess itself. See Brew er v. Lennox Hearth Pr ods. , LLC , 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020). The OAG argues that its actions in the administrative writ of withholding process are not part of the judicial process c iting to In re B.N.A. , 278 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Te x. App.

— Dallas 2009, no pet.)

. However, the In re B.N.A

. court concluded that an errant administrative writ of withholding was not asserting a cause of action or counterclaim under section 105. 002 of the Civil Pr ac tice and Remedi es Code. Id

. “ The only i tems complained of in F ather ’ s motion (issuan ce5

of the administrative writ and violation of the inju nction) d o not constitute the assertion of a cause o f action by an agency. ” I d

. Therefore, the trial court concluded that an award under section 105.002 w as improper because the OAG had not assert ed a cause of action. Id

. The opinion did not address sovereign immunity or whether it would have been appropriate to otherwise sanction the conduct at issue

. It i s further clea r that “ a n award of attorney ’ s fee s under [ se ction 105.00 2] requires more than a finding that particular in cidents of an agency ’ s conduct are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ” Black v. Dallas Cnty

. Child Welfare Unit , 835 S.W.2d 626, 629

– 30 (Tex. 1992).
Here , appellee d id n ot seek or request sanc tions under section 105.00 2 and instead requested sanctions under the tri al court ’ s inherent authority. “ I t is well established that when the State enters the courts as a litigant, it m ust observe and will be bound by the same evide n tiary and procedural r ules that apply to a ll litigants. ” Att ’

y Ge n
. of Tex. ex rel

. State v. Cartwright , 874 S. W.2d 210 , 219 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, wr it denied) ; see also Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ. , 540 S.W.2d 297 , 301 (Tex. 1976) ( “ [T]he State is not ex empt from these rules of proced ure but is subject to them as any othe r litigant. ” ) ; In re A.C.B. , 103 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (request for declaratory judgment against the O AG for alleged wrongful issuan ce of writ of withholdi ng and sanctions did not implic ate sovereign immunity ) ; Office of Att ’ y Gen. v. Phillips , No. 14

- 03

- 01040

- CV, 2004 WL 2559934, * 1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem . op.) ( “ We are unpersuaded . . . and decline to hold in this case t hat sovereign i mmunity applie s to dep rive the trial court of jurisdiction to assess attorney ’ s fees against it. ” ).
We are unpersuaded by the OAG ’ s general arguments that the trial court ’ s inherent authority is “ limite d ” and theref ore the trial court lac k s jurisdiction. See6

In re T ex. Dep ’ t . of Fam. & Pro te cti ve Servs. , 415 S.W.3d 522, 529

– 30 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (concluding inherent auth ority limited by plenary power do c trine but not discussing court ’ s in herent authority to sanction under principles of sove reign immunity )

. The OAG does not dispute that it may be sanctioned under Rule 13 of the R u les of Civil Pro cedu re but a rgues that an

“ e xpres s rule of civil proced ure ” should be trea ted differently

. However, the OAG has gi ven no argument as to why such a dis tinction should be made between an

“ express rule ” and the trial court ’ s inherent authority

. Instead, the OAG asserts that a n award of attorney ’ s fees i n this case could not be rendered under secti on 105.002 of the Civil P r actice and Remedies Code, nor under Rule 215.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

. However, t h e OAG acknowledges the trial court ’ s author ity and jurisdiction to render such an award in those cases

. The OAG does not indicate why or how the trial court ’ s i nherent authority should be affor ded different treatment and w e decline to apply such different treatment und er the facts as presented herein. See Lowe , 540 S.W.2d at 301 Cartwright , 874 S. W.2d at 219

.

“ Courts possess inherent powe rs that aid the exercis e of their jurisdiction, facilita te the administration of jus tice, and preserve the independence and integrity of the judicial system. ” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC , 60 1 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020). Thus , we disagree with the OAG that the trial court la cks jurisdiction to ren der sanctions under its inherent authority or that sove r ei gn immunity is implicated herein

. See Lowe , 540 S.W.2d at 301 ; In re A.C.B. , 103 S.W.3d at 574

. We do not comment on whether such sanctions , would be appropriate in this case . The trial court has not rendered any opinion on whether it will or will not award sanctions and the record has not been developed with the presentation of evidence

. We merely conclude that in this case, the trial court ’ s jurisdiction is not implicated by a request for sancti ons under its inherent authority

.7

We ov errule the OAG ’ s first issue.

S EPARATION OF P OWERS D OCTRINE
The OAG next contends that any award of sanctions i n this case would

ne cessarily conflict with the separat ion of power s doctrine beca use it “ seeks to
manage th e solely administrative actions of the OAG, an execut ive branch
agency. ” See Tex. Dep ’ t of Transp. v
. T. Brown Constructors, Inc. , 947 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1997, pet. denied). T he OAG concludes that “ the trial court violated the separate [ si c ] of powers doctrine when i t held tha t it could sanction the OAG under these facts. ” 2

“ In the context of judi cial review of administrative decisions, the separation

of

- powers doctrine ensures that discretionar y f unctions deleg ated t o administrative
age ncies by the le gislature are not usurped by the judicial bran ch. ” Id

. “ Although courts have the authority to hold t hat an agency erred and must correct its error,
courts cann ot dictate how to correct the error if, by doing so, t he court effectively

us urp s the authority and discretion delegated to the agency b y the legislature. ” Id

. H o wever, “ [i]t is well settled that trial courts may review an a dministra tive action only if a statute provides a right to judicial review or the ac tion advers ely affects a

v ested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional ri ght. ” In re Of fice of Att ’ y Gen. , 456 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. 2015) ; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 158. 506(c) ( “ [T] he obligor may file a motion with the court to withdraw the administrative writ of wi thholding and request a hearing

. . . . ” ). The OAG argues that through sanctions the trial court “ seeks to manage the solely administrative actions of the OAG. ” However, the OAG admits that the trial

2 The order denying the Plea to the Jurisdiction states that “ the Court has juris diction to consider imposing sanctions against the OAG for alleged acts of bad faith in only its conduct of t he litigation. Therefo re , the p lea to the j urisdiction is denied.

. . . This find ing is not a comment on the merits of the request for sanctions. ”8

court ha s not yet ordered sa nctions. The question pr esented by the OAG is , there for e, whether if the trial court rendered sanctions under th ose facts p leaded, it would violate the separation of powers doctrine. However, since no such sanctions have been awarded and the record has n ot been fully developed , the mere consideration of the evidence and facts does not implicate a separation of powers

concern
. Any award of sanctions is still contingent and uncertain. As a res ult, this question is not ripe for our review

. See Perry v. De l Rio , 66 S.W.3d 239, 2 49

– 50 (Tex. 2001) ( “ Ripeness is one of several categories of ju s ticiability

. . . . ‘ Ripeness doctrine is invo ked to determine whether a dispute has yet matured to a point that warrants de cision. The central concern is whether the c ase involve s un certain or

con tingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or inde ed may not occur at all. ’ ” (quoting 13 Charles Al an Wright , Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal P r

actice and Procedure § 3529, at 278

– 79 (2d ed . 1984))).
We ov errule the OAG ’ s s econd issue

. C ONCLUSION Concluding that a request for sanctions under the facts herein does not implicate sovereign immunity and the s eparation of powers issue is not ripe for our review because the trial court has not awarded any sanctions , we affirm t he trial
court ’ s order denying the OAG ’ s plea to the jurisdiction.

/s/ Ken Wise Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell

.