alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.1



Certification
of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to

18
U.S.C. Section 1350,

As
Adopted Pursuant to

Section
906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report of The InterGroup Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2023, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John V. Winfield, President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | ● | The
    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                    
| | - | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |   |                                                                                                                                                             
| | ● | The
    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
    of the Company.



|/s/
                                            John V. Winfield | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|John
    V. Winfield                                             | 
|President
    and Chief Executive Officer                        | 
|(Principal
    Executive Officer)                                | 



Date:
October 13, 2023



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The InterGroup Corporation and will be retained
by The InterGroup Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
---



Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of First Cash Financial Services, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, R. Douglas Orr, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                   
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  November 4, 2009

/s/ R. Douglas OrrR. Douglas Orr
Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-1019
ROBERT L. DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ROBESON COUNTY; PURNELL SWETT, Superintendent, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Fayetteville. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-94-14-3-14-H1) Submitted: January 11, 1996 Decided: January 23, 1996 Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert L. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin Norman Thompson, THOMPSON & GODWIN, Dunn, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals from the district court's order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment in his civil action in which he alleged constitutional violations and employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asamended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1981 & Supp. 1994) and the district court's order denying Appellant's motion to vacate and fortemporary retention of the record. With respect to the order granting summary judgment, we have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Acc ordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Davis v. Public Schools of Robeson County , No. CA-94-13-3-14-H1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 1994). We do not consider the district court's order denying the motion to vacate and to retain the record because Appellant has failed to note a timely appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). We also deny Appellant's motion to strike and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
• Change Management

o What is a considered a change

o Defined Process specifically PHI applications

• End‐Point Security

o Encryption

o Data Loss Prevention

o Social Networking

• Identity Management & Remote Access

o Physicians

o Independent Contractors

o Vendor Support

Tomas Rivera

Director ITS - Security Administration 

St. Luke's Episcopal Health System 

Office: 832.355.7726
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLAR

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                    1.0
<CASH>                                          30,056
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,775
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,327)
<INVENTORY>                                     17,893
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                79,567
<PP&E>                                          76,596
<DEPRECIATION>                                (36,594)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 130,445
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           44,005
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,915
<OTHER-SE>                                      59,911
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   130,445
<SALES>                                        170,844
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               170,844
<CGS>                                          129,872
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  168,614
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,300)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   647
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (678)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,883
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,303
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (420)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (4,001)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,421)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.77)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.77)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of First Cash Financial Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, R. Douglas Orr, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date:  April 25, 2011  /s/ R. Douglas Orr R. Douglas Orr Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Company's
form 10-Q for the 9 months ended September 30, 1998 filed November 13, 1998 with
Securities and Exchange Commission and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such 10Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          29,785
<SECURITIES>                                    12,152
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,856
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (68)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                46,835
<PP&E>                                          17,663
<DEPRECIATION>                                (14,085)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  57,153
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,702
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           106
<OTHER-SE>                                      50,075
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    57,153
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,751
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,091
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,967
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 122
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,883
<INCOME-TAX>                                        58
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,825
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,825
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16
        

</TABLE>
[Exhibit 32.2]

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Annual Report of BF Acquisition Group
III,  Inc.  (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period  ending
April  30,  2004  as  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William Colucci,
Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of
2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements  of
Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act  of  1934;
and
          (2)  The  information contained in  the  Report  fairly
presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition  and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: June 16, 2004

                                /s/ William Colucci
                                ---------------------------------
                                William Colucci, Treasurer
                                BF Acquisition Group III, Inc.
#### METRIC CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-5055.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 20, 2001.

Before LOURIE and DYK, Circuit Judges, PLAGE R, Senior Circuit Judge.

DECISION

PER CURIAM.

Metric Constructors, Inc. appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims granting summary judgment in favor of the government on Metric’s claim to recover expenses it incurred while working on the plumbing and air ventilation systems of the Kennedy Space Center Space Station Processing Facility under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. *Metric Constructors, Inc. v. United States,*Nos. 96-72C, 96-73C (Fed.Cl. Jan. 20, 2000); 44 Fed. Cl. 513 (1999). Because the Court of Federal Claims did not err in granting summary judgment, we *affirm.*

DISCUSSION

In support of its contention that the Court of Federal Claims erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the government on its claim to recover expenses for having to insulate the heat pumps and install flexible connectors, Metric makes two primary arguments. First, Metric argues that it was not obligated to insulate the heat pumps in the plumbing system because, under a particular provision of *854the contract, insulation was required only for those “surfaces subject to condensation,” which excludes heat pumps. Second, Metric contends that the Court of Federal Claims misunderstood the technical nature of the flexible connectors when it required those connectors to possess a specific thermal conductivity.

The government responds that numerous provisions in the contract expressly require insulation of the heat pumps, and therefore that Metric’s reading of the “surfaces subject to condensation” language would render those provisions superfluous. The government also argues that Metric’s flexible connector argument should not be considered because Metric raised this argument for the first time in its request for rehearing at the Court of Federal Claims.

After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of the Court of Federal Claims, we affirm the decision of that court for the reasons stated in its opinion.
#### Cain BARAJAS-ARREDONDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 00-56125.

D.C. No. CV-00-04489-MLR.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 29, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Cain Barajas-Arredondo appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging his conviction for use of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (d). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Barajas-Arredondo contends that the district court erred by denying his § 2241 petition on the grounds that he previously filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion raising the same claim, because § 2255 is an inadequate or ineffective remedy to test the legality of his detention. We review the district court’s denial of a § 2241 petition de novo. *Bowen v. Hood,*202 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.2000).

Barajas-Arredondo’s contention that § 2255 is an inadequate remedy because it bars him from raising a successive motion fails. *See Lorentsen v. Hood,*223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that the ban on unauthorized second or successive motions does not per se make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective).

Because a habeas petitioner cannot circumvent the bar against successive § 2255 motions by bringing a § 2241 petition styled as a § 2255 motion attacking the legality of his firearm conviction, the district court properly denied Barajas-Arredondo’s § 2241 petition. *See Porter v. Adams,*244 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir.2001) (affirming the denial of a § 2241 petition *558raising the same claims attacking petitioner’s conviction that he unsuccessfully raised in a prior § 2255 motion); *Moore v. Reno,*185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (stating that § 2241 relief may not be sought unless § 2255 has been shown to be inadequate or ineffective), *cert. denied,*528 U.S. 1178, 120 S.Ct. 1214, 145 L.Ed.2d 1115 (2000).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT 10.8(b)AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT          THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) by and between MylanLaboratories Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation (the “Company”) and John P. O’Donnell (the“Executive”), is made as of April 3, 2006.          WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive are parties to that certain Executive EmploymentAgreement dated as of July 1, 2004 (the “Agreement”);          WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive wish to amend the Agreement, effective as of April 1,2006, as set forth below;          NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which arehereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. The following proviso is hereby added to the end of the second sentence of Section8(c) of the Agreement:“provided, that, such lump sum payment shall be reduced by any disability benefits that theExecutive is entitled to pursuant to plans or arrangements of the Company.” 2. The following proviso is hereby added to the end of the final sentence of Section8(g) of the Agreement:“provided, however, that such consideration, compensation, and benefits shall be reduced by anydeath benefits that the Executive’s estate or beneficiaries are entitled to pursuant to plansor arrangements of the Company.” 3. The following is hereby added as Section 8(h) of the Agreement:“Section 409A. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, the payment ofconsideration, compensation, and benefits pursuant to this Section 8 shall be interpreted andadministered in manner intended to avoid the imposition of additional taxes under Section 409Aof the Internal Revenue Code.” 4. This Amendment shall be governed by, interpreted under and construed in accordancewith the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  5. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be an originaland all of which shall constitute the same document.  6. Except as modified by this Amendment, the Agreement is hereby confirmed in allrespects.
 

 
          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been duly executed and delivered as of the date and theyear first written above.         MYLAN LABORATORIES INC.         By:  /s/ Robert J. Coury          Name: Robert J. Coury  Title: Vice Chairman and CEO         EXECUTIVE           /s/ John P. O’Donnell       John P. O’Donnell
2
#### FAUCHER v. ST. JOHNSBURY TRUCKING CO., Inc.

Civ. A. No. 916.

United States District Court D. New Hampshire.

May 4, 1951.

*153Hughes & Burns, Dover, N. H., for plaintiff.

Robert P. Booth, Manchester, N. H., for defendant.

CONNOR, District Judge.

The defendant on March 5, 1951, filed a verified petition for removal, setting forth that at the time of the commencement of this action it was and continues a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Vermont and having its principal place of business in St. Johns-bury, within said state. With all necessary jurisdictional facts stated therein and the requisite bond appearing to be in order, the petition was granted ex parte. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand, alleging that the pleadings in the state court did not disclose diversity of citizenship as prescribed by Sections 1332 and 1441, Title 28 U.S.C. In the copy of the state process accompanying the petition, the defendant is described as a corporation “duly organized by law and having a place of business at Albany Street, Portsmouth, County of Rockingham, State of New Hampshire.” Upon hearing, the defendant offered evidence, not contradicted, of its incorporation in 1945 under the laws of Vermont.

Failure to clearly and correctly describe the citizenship of the defendant in the state process is no bar to effect removal of an action to this court. Philipbar v. Derby, 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 27; City of Ysleta v. Canda, C.C., 67 F. 6, 8; Berry v. Mobile & O. R. Co., D.C., 228 F. 395, 397. The description of the defendant in the state process is inadequate rather than incorrect, but, with other jurisdictional requirements met, the defect presents no insurmountable barrier to the establishment of diversity in and under the petition for removal. To preclude the defendant from asserting the fact of diversity would in effect permit the plaintiff to dictate the forum of his choice in derogation of the statute. Jurisdiction of this court is grounded upon statutory enactment, and is not to be defeated by the whim or error of the plaintiff in drafting his state process.

The plaintiff urges that within the rationale of Cobleigh v. Epping Brick Co., D.C., 85 F.Supp. 862, 863, where, as in this action, the citizenship of the defendant was not clearly described, it was stated that the defendant was “neither required nor permitted to institute steps for removal.” Upon reconsideration of Section 1446 which defines the mode of removal, it is now my view that nothing therein, either expressly or inferentially, denies the defendant the privilege of initiating steps for removal in such circumstance, and in so far as the contrary may be deemed a holding of this court, it is overruled.

The plaintiff’s motion is denied, and the defendant will forthwith file appropriate pleadings to correct the defect of process as permitted by Section 1448, 28 U.S.C.