In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2576

HEATHER GILLESPIE and ANGELA CINSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TRANS UNION CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 8299—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2006—DECIDED MARCH 16, 2007

____________

Before POSNER, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

EVANS, Circuit Judge. Heather Gillespie and Angela

Cinson (who hoped to represent a class) appeal Judge

Matthew F. Kennelly’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the Trans Union Corporation on their claims

alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(FCRA). Today we resolve their appeal, which requires

a short journey through an array of statutes (all from

Title 15 of the code) with a numbering system (1681c,

1681c(c)(1), 1681g(a)(1), 1681a(g), and 1681i) that only

a lawyer could love.
2 No. 06-2576

1 Although Trans Union asserts it does not retain the date of

delinquency, we assume, drawing all reasonable inferences in

favor of Gillespie and Cinson, that it keeps the date in its file.

Trans Union, a consumer reporting agency (CRA),

collects credit information and provides it to businesses

in connection with credit transactions. In particular,

Trans Union (like other CRAs) gathers and reports data

it receives about delinquent accounts. And the reports it

provides, if sprinkled with enough (or in some cases, any)

negative information, guarantee that a person seeking

credit will be turned away. Because this sort of situation

could haunt a credit seeker forever, the FCRA sets a limit

on how long CRAs can disclose negative information in

a consumer report (generally, no longer than 7 years). 15

U.S.C. § 1681c. As a result, when Trans Union receives

data about a delinquent account, that information must

include a “date of delinquency,” which is a date 180 days

after any collection activity, charge to profit and loss, or

similar action has occurred. § 1681c(c)(1). Trans Union

uses the date to generate, for its internal purposes, what

it calls a “purge date,” that is a date when the information will be removed from the reports that it issues. Trans

Union does not include the date of delinquency or the

purge date in consumer reports that it sends to third

parties. For our purposes, we will refer to the two dates

collectively as the purge date.1

In 2004, Cinson and Gillespie asked Trans Union for

their credit histories under § 1681g(a)(1), which states

that “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon

request, . . . clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer: (1) All information in the consumer’s file at the

time of the request . . . .” In response to the requests,

Trans Union gave them consumer reports that revealed

delinquent account information but omitted any mention
No. 06-2576 3

of the purge date. Cinson and Gillespie argue that this

omission violates the FCRA. The question on appeal is

whether the term “file” in § 1681g(a)(1) encompasses

everything in Trans Union’s consumer file, or just material included in a consumer report issued to third parties.

We review a district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is proper if no genuine

issue of material fact exists and the nonmovant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. We draw all factual

inferences in favor of Cinson and Gillespie. Hrobowski v.

Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 2004);

Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir.

2003).

Cinson and Gillespie claim the word “file” in

§ 1681g(a)(1) includes the purge date because the broader

definition of “file” from § 1681a(g) applies: “The term

‘file’ . . . means all of the information on that consumer

recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency

regardless of how the information is stored.” Not so, says

Trans Union—the clear wording plus the legislative

history of § 1681g(a)(1) and the commentary adopted by

the Federal Trade Commission, confirm that only the

information included in a consumer’s credit report must

be disclosed. We recognize that these provisions are

somewhat at odds. However, we think that Trans Union’s

argument must carry the day.

Section 1681g(a)’s paragraph 1, as we just noted, requires CRAs to disclose all information in the consumer’s “file” at the time of the request. Subsequent

paragraphs, however, list other types of information that

must be revealed as well, including: the name of each

person that received a consumer report; the date, original

payees, and amounts of any checks that form the basis

of an adverse credit entry; and a record of all credit

inquiries during the one-year period before the consumer’s
4 No. 06-2576

request. If, as Cinson and Gillespie argue, the word “file”

in paragraph 1 means “all information on the consumer

recorded and retained” by a CRA, then these additional

paragraphs are unnecessary. On the other hand, if the

word “file” in paragraph 1 has a narrower meaning, as

urged by Trans Union, then these other subsections

retain some semblance of relevancy. Because we try to

avoid interpretations of statutes that render words, or

other sections, superfluous, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 174 (2001); United States v. Chemetco, Inc., 274

F.3d 1154, 1160 (7th Cir. 2001), the plain language of

§ 1681g(a)(1) favors Trans Union.

For what it’s worth, the FTC’s commentary on

§ 1681g(a)(1) also limits the scope of the term “file” to

material included in a consumer report: “The term ‘file’

denotes all information on the consumer that is recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency that

might be furnished, or has been furnished, in a consumer

report on that consumer.” 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, app. § 603

(emphasis added). This agency interpretation, while not

binding, supports Trans Union’s argument. Cinson and

Gillespie counter that the purge date is a proper part of

a consumer report because the phrase “information . . .

that might be furnished, or has been furnished” allows

for the possibility that Trans Union could supply the date

in the future.

This argument is not persuasive. A more reasonable

view, as Judge Kennelly observed, would require some

showing—aside from the existence of the purge date in

its file—that Trans Union included similar information

in a consumer report in the past or that it plans to do so

in the future. No such showing has been made.

Language in the Senate Committee Report discussing

the 1996 amendments to the FCRA also favors Trans

Union. Before 1996, § 1681g(a)(1) required CRAs to provide
No. 06-2576 5

consumers, upon request, with the “nature and substance”

of the information in their files. Congress amended the

“nature and substance” language of § 1681g(a)(1) to make

CRAs disclose “all of the information” in a consumer’s file.

However, the Committee Report indicates that the

amendment aimed to give consumers better access to

complete copies of their consumer reports: “Section 408

explicitly requires consumer reporting agencies to provide,

upon request, all information in the consumer’s file. The

Committee intends this language to ensure that a consumer will receive a copy of that consumer’s report,

rather than a summary of the information contained

therein.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 41 (1995) (emphasis

added). While this legislative history is not dispositive,

it suggests Congress wanted consumers to receive exactly

what Cinson and Gillespie got from Trans Union—complete copies of their consumer reports, not their entire

files in whatever form maintained by the CRA.

Finally, Cinson and Gillespie argue other parts of the

FCRA show Congress meant to require CRAs to disclose

more than the information in their consumer reports. They

point, for example, to § 1681c, which (as we have discussed) requires creditors to provide the date of delinquency to CRAs along with delinquent account information; and to § 1681i, which allows consumers to request

reinvestigation of certain information CRAs get from

their customers. However, the fact that Congress requires creditors to give CRAs dates of delinquency but

does not require that those dates be disclosed (or included

in a consumer credit report) is of no great moment.

Congress, it seems, chose to limit the right to contest

information to material actually contained in consumer

reports. And of course it was free to draw the line as it did.

The language of § 1681g(a)(1), the FTC’s interpretive

guideline, and the Senate Committee Report all support
6 No. 06-2576

Trans Union’s argument that “file” means information

included in a consumer report. We affirm the judgment

of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-16-07