FOURTH DIVISION

	December 13, 2001

Nos. 1-99-3522) (Consolidated)

	1-00-3217)

THE PEOPLE ex rel.JAMES E. RYAN, 		)        Appeal from

Attorney General of Illinois,          	)     the Circuit Court

            						)      of Cook County.

		Plaintiff-Appellant,		)

								)

	v.							)      No.  96-CH-5514

								)

RUDE WAY ENTERPRISES, INC., n/k/a Ricci	)

and Associates, Inc.; RANDAL RICCI; and	)

COMBINED COUNTIES POLICE ASSOCIATION,	)         Honorable

								)      Michael B.Getty,

		Defendants-Appellees.		)      Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

	The State of Illinois (State) appeals from an order of the

circuit court of Cook County dismissing several counts of its

complaint for failure to state a cause of action as a matter of law. 

At issue in this appeal is whether this court has jurisdiction to

address the matter and, if so, whether the allegations in the

complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief

could be granted.  For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

	The State filed an amended complaint against defendants, Rude Way

Enterprises, Inc., now known as Ricci & Associates, Inc., an Illinois

corporation,  Randal Ricci, and Combined Counties Police Association, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation (CCPA).  Therein it alleged a

violation of the Solicitation for Charity Act (225 ILCS 460/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)) (count I), common law misrepresentation and fraud (count II), sought an imposition of a constructive trust on funds

improperly solicited (count III), and further alleged a violation of

the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS

505/1 et seq.) (West 1996)) (count IV).  

	On November 26, 1998, the circuit court dismissed counts II, III,

and IV as failing to state a cause of action as a matter of law,

relying on the holding in People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 559, 729 N.E.2d 965 (2000), aff'd No. 89738 (Nov. 21, 2001).  The court's order did not include a

finding that the dismissal order was immediately appealable pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 304(a).  155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).  The record

reveals that, at that time, the State indicated its intent to

voluntarily dismiss count I and thereafter perfect an appeal from the

adverse ruling on the remaining counts.  

	However, on April 22, 1999, count I was dismissed for want of

prosecution (DWP).  On May 21, 1999, the State filed a motion to

reconsider and vacate the DWP.  That motion was denied on June 2,

1999.  On June 14, 1999, the State filed a second motion to

reconsider.  The circuit court provisionally granted the motion and

vacated the DWP, but thereafter on August 31, 1999, the court denied

the motion to reconsider and reinstated the DWP order.

	On September 30, 1999, the State filed its first notice of

appeal, seeking review of the orders of August 31, 1999, and November 26, 1998 (appeal No. 1-99-3522).  Thereafter, on September 12, 2000,

it filed a second notice of appeal, seeking review of the same orders

(appeal No. 1-00-3217).  However, we note that the State does not

raise any issue in its appeal concerning the order of August 31, 1999,

or the DWP.  Its sole contentions on appeal relate to the November 26,

1998, dismissal of counts II, III, and IV.

	We commence our analysis by addressing defendants' contention

that we lack jurisdiction to hear this matter.  Specifically,

defendants maintain that the entire matter was not final and

appealable until after the expiration of the statutory one-year

refiling period for actions subject to a DWP.  Furthermore, defendants

argue that the one-year refiling period began to run upon the denial

of the State's motion to vacate.  Therefore, the State was required to

file its notice of appeal within 30 days of June 2, 2000.  The State

contends that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 301.  155 Ill. 2d R. 301.   

	Rule 301 allows appeals from final judgments as a matter of

right.  155 Ill. 2d R. 301.  A judgment or order is "final" if it

disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire case or on

some definite and separate part of the controversy.  Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502, 687 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1997).	

	However, under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),

if a trial court's order disposes of fewer than all of the claims in

an action, the court must make an express written finding that there

is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of those claims.  Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465, 563 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1990).  Without the Rule 304(a) finding, a final order

disposing of fewer than all of the claims is not an appealable order

and does not become appealable until all of the claims have been

resolved.  Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 465, 563 N.E.2d at 463.  Thus, in the present case, the order dismissing with prejudice counts II, III, and

IV was a final order but, because there was no Rule 304(a) finding, it

was not immediately appealable until the remaining count I had been

resolved.

	The State initially argues that count I was resolved and the

matter became final and appealable when the DWP was entered, citing

Dubina in support.  There, a defendant sought to appeal certain final orders entered in a suit that was ultimately voluntarily dismissed. 

The court held that the voluntary dismissal terminated the action and

that all orders which were final in nature, but not previously

appealable, became immediately appealable.  Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 503, 687 N.E.2d at 874-75.  However, the Dubina case is distinguishable given the nature of a DWP order.  

	Our supreme court in Flores v. Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 435 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1982), explained that a DWP order does not operate as

a final order and does not terminate the litigation because the party

has an absolute right to refile its action within one year pursuant to

the savings statute set forth in the predecessor statute to section

13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994);

see also Wold v. Bull Valley Management Co., 96 Ill. 2d 110, 449 N.E.2d 112 (1983).  

	Thereafter, in S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 502, 693 N.E.2d 338, 344 (1998), the supreme court, relying on Flores, held that it is not until the expiration of the period for refiling under section 13-217 that a DWP

order becomes a final and appealable order.  Thus, unlike the

voluntary dismissal in Dubina, here the order dismissing count I for want of prosecution was not itself a final order and could not

terminate the litigation with respect to all counts until the period

for refiling under section 13-217 had expired.  S.C. Vaughan Oil Co., 181 Ill. 2d at 502, 693 N.E.2d at 344; 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994).  Consequently, the State's notice of appeal filed on September 30,

1999, prior to the expiration of the refiling period, was premature.

	To determine whether the second notice of appeal, filed on

September 12, 2000, was timely, we must consider whether the one-year

time period for refiling began to run on June 2, 1999, the date the

motion to vacate the DWP was denied, or on August 31, 1999, the date

the subsequent motion to reconsider was ultimately denied.  It has

been held previously held that, where a timely motion to vacate an order of

dismissal has been filed, the one-year refiling period does not begin

to run until the trial court has ruled on the motion to vacate the

DWP.  See Bowers v. Village of Palatine, 204 Ill. App. 3d 135, 138-39, 561 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1990).

	However, in Wilson v. Evanston Hospital, 276 Ill. App. 3d 885, 888, 659 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1995), this court rejected the argument that

a plaintiff be permitted to extend the refiling period beyond the

limitations period fixed by the statute by filing additional motions to reconsider after the motion to vacate had been denied.  Thus, the

court held that, "in order to promote certainty and finality of

judgments, the one-year refiling period of section 13-217 begins to

run when the motion to vacate the trial court's dismissal order is

denied, and not when the motion to reconsider is denied."  Wilson, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 659 N.E.2d at 102.  

	Applying these principles to the present case, the DWP was

entered on April 22, 1999.  The motion to vacate the DWP was denied on

June 2, 1999.  Thus, the matter became final and appealable on June 2,

2000.  The State's notice of appeal filed on September 12, 2000, was

therefore untimely. 

	While we make no judgment on the ability of a party to file

successive motions to reconsider a denial of a motion to vacate a DWP,

it is clear that the filing of the successive motion does not toll the one-year limitations period under section 13-217.  Otherwise, the

limitations period could be theoretically extended for an indefinite

period of time until the successive motions are heard and denied. 

Such an approach is inconsistent with the promotion of finality and

certainty of judgments and the purpose of section 13-217.  The

rationale behind section 13-217 is to provide a limited extension to

prevent injustice and not to provide a mechanism to prolong

litigation.  See Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343, 518 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (1988).  

	Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this matter.

	Dismissed.  

	hHofIOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.