NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 18a0631n.06

Case No. 17-6295

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALBERT FRANKLIN, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE 

BEFORE: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Albert Franklin, Jr. received a sentence enhancement 

because the district court determined that he had three prior convictions serving as predicate 

offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Franklin challenges the use of a 2008 

Tennessee conviction as an ACCA predicate, arguing that he was only subject to a six-year 

maximum sentence for that conviction, less than the ten years ACCA requires. For the reasons set 

forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

Albert Franklin, Jr. has had several encounters with the criminal justice system throughout

his life. Most recently, in 2013, he was tried and found guilty in federal court of (I) conspiring to 

possess with intent to distribute oxycodone; (II) being a felon in possession of a firearm; and 
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

2

(III) carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. 

At Franklin’s initial sentencing, the district judge found that Franklin qualified as an armed career 

criminal under ACCA because he had three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug 

offenses. Consequently, Franklin’s sentence was automatically increased. Franklin appealed his 

conviction and sentence. This Court affirmed Franklin’s conviction, but sent the case back for 

resentencing because two of the prior convictions that the district court used as ACCA predicates 

only qualified under ACCA’s residual clause, which had subsequently been made defunct by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). See United States 

v. Franklin, 622 F. App’x 501, 514 (6th Cir. 2015). On remand, Franklin’s presentence report 

included two new predicate offenses to replace the ones that no longer qualified. The district court 

again sentenced Franklin as an armed career criminal, accepting the two new predicates listed in 

Franklin’s presentence report. Franklin objected to the use of one of those predicate offenses—a 

2008 Tennessee conviction.

Franklin’s 2008 conviction was the result of a plea agreement. He was charged with one 

count of tampering with evidence and one count of possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams 

of cocaine. As a result of Franklin’s plea, the evidence-tampering charge was dismissed and he 

was convicted of the lesser offense of possession with intent to deliver under .5 grams of cocaine. 

The plea agreement also stipulated that he would serve a suspended five-year, six-month sentence 

during which time he would be on probation. Although Franklin would serve his sentence on 

probation, the plea agreement also included a thirty-five percent release eligibility—i.e., the 

percentage of time he would have to serve his sentence incarcerated before he would be paroleeligible. 
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

3

II.

The sole question on appeal is whether Franklin’s 2008 drug trafficking conviction 

qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. ACCA mandates a minimum fifteen-year 

sentence for any person who has three previous convictions for violent felonies, serious drug 

offenses, or a combination of the two. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). A serious drug offense, as relevant here, 

is a state law offense involving possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance “for 

which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Id. § 

924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense under ACCA is a 

question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Davis, 406 F. App’x 37, 38 (6th Cir. 

2010) (citing United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2008)).

Tennessee law establishes a two-part scheme for determining an offender’s sentencing 

range. Part one delineates the “authorized terms of imprisonment” according to the class of crime

(from A to E), establishing minimum and maximum sentences for each class. See Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-35-111. Part two applies the individual’s “offender classification”

1—determined by prior 

convictions—to the class of crime, resulting in a sentencing range within the authorized terms of 

imprisonment for that class of crime. See id. §§ 40-35-106, 40-35-112. As relevant here, a Class 

C felony carries a three- to fifteen-year authorized term of imprisonment, but a Range I offender 

only faces a three- to six-year sentencing range and a Range II offender a six- to ten-year 

sentencing range. Id. §§ 40-35-111(b)(3), 40-35-112. 

Offender classification also establishes when an individual will be parole-eligible. Id. § 40-

35-501. This is termed “release eligibility.” Id. § 40-35-501(a)(1). Each offender must serve a 

 

1

“Offender classification” is sometimes referred to as the offender’s “Range” (from I to III), 

“range classification,” and “range designation.” A Range I offender is also known as a “standard 

offender.” And a Range II offender is also known as a “multiple offender.”
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

4

certain percentage of his sentence—determined by offender classification—before becoming 

parole eligible. For example, a multiple offender—i.e., a Range II offender—must serve thirtyfive percent of his sentence before he will be release eligible. Id. § 40-35-501(d).

Although offender classification is set according to statutory criteria, a plea agreement can

ignore these criteria and stipulate, not only to offender classification, but also to “term of years, 

and release eligibility without regard to what [the] sentencing scheme might call for absent a plea 

bargain so long as (1) the term of years is within the overall range of years specified for the offense, 

and (2) the [release eligibility date] is not less than the minimum allowable for the offense.” Davis 

v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). This means that an individual could 

be classified, for example, as a standard offender (Range I) for sentencing range purposes and as 

a multiple offender (Range II) for release eligibility. This results in a “hybrid” offender 

classification. Id. at 757. Flexibility in plea agreements is permissible because offender 

classification and release eligibility (which is determined by reference to offender classification) 

have long been used as plea bargaining tools. The Tennessee Supreme Court has reasoned that the 

Tennessee legislature did not intend to restrict that use in the 1989 Sentencing Act from which the 

current sentencing scheme derives. Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn. 2007).

Additionally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that “a knowing and voluntary guilty 

plea waives any irregularity as to offender classification or release eligibility.” Id.

Franklin argues that he was considered a Range I offender for sentencing range purposes

and thus that the maximum term of imprisonment for which he was eligible was the six-year 

maximum for a Class C–Range I offender. We find Franklin’s argument unavailing.

Franklin’s 2008 sentencing documents show that he was sentenced as a Range II offender

for sentencing range purposes. Neither Franklin’s plea petition nor the sentencing transcript 
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

5

mentions Range I or indicates that his plea agreement contemplated a hybrid offender 

classification. In his plea petition, Franklin wrote that he was pleading to possession of under .5 

grams of cocaine, and a five-year, six-month suspended sentence “Range II 35% Release.” In the 

plea colloquy, the Tennessee judge told Franklin that he would be sentenced “as a range two 

multiple offender at 35 percent.” Furthermore, Franklin’s judgment form affirmatively states that 

he received a Range II sentencing range. Tennessee law prescribes a “Uniform Judgment 

Document”—the official name for Franklin’s judgment form—that includes, among other things, 

offender classification. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(e). Franklin’s judgment form contains 

two columns indicating his offender classification, one titled “Offender Status,” meaning 

sentencing range,2and the other “Release Eligibility.” Both have the “Multiple” box checked off.

The term “multiple offender” is synonymous with the term “Range II offender.” See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-106(c).

Franklin argues that his actual sentence, rather than what appears in his sentencing 

documents, tells us his sentencing range. He contends that because his five-and-a-half-year 

sentence was within Range I (which provides for a three- to six-year sentence) and not within 

Range II (which provides for a six- to ten-year sentence), Tennessee law would direct the 

sentencing judge to consider him a Range I offender. Franklin attempts to rely on the presumption 

 

2

In his reply brief, Franklin states that the offender status box might not indicate sentencing range 

and could instead “serv[e] some other purpose, such as supporting the court’s determination 

regarding the Range for the percentage of service.” Tennessee caselaw, however, equates the 

offender status box with sentencing range. See McChristian v. State, 159 S.W.3d 608, 614 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 2004) (explaining that issues with previous judgment forms not accounting for hybrid 

offender classifications were solved with the new form because it provided separate boxes for 

sentencing range and release eligibility); cf. United States v. Brown, 516 F. App’x 461, 466 (6th 

Cir. 2013); State v. Turner, No. E2016-00790-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1379999, at *9 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017) overruled on other grounds by State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59 (Tenn. 

2018). Accordingly, Franklin’s argument is meritless. 
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

6

of regularity—i.e., that judicial action is “presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary 

appears[.]” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992) (quoting Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 

449, 472 (1836)). He argues that the presumption of regularity should lead us to conclude that 

Franklin actually received a Range I sentencing range, even if the sentencing documents suggest 

otherwise.

Even assuming that the presumption of regularity would apply despite the record evidence,

Franklin’s argument still fails. Although a plea agreement might result in a sentence or offender 

classification that is erroneous or irregular as to what the sentencing statute would call for without 

a plea agreement, it is “rightly done” for a court to accept a plea agreement with those otherwise 

improper terms. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that a plea-bargained sentence may 

mix and match both offender classification and term of years. Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 760. The 

Tennessee Supreme Court sometimes describes this mixing and matching as erroneous or irregular. 

See id. (“Examples of sentences which might contain ‘errors’ . . . include . . . a plea-bargained 

sentence including a term of years that was incompatible with the range designation . . . .”). 

Franklin points to these descriptions to support his argument; however, he misconstrues what the 

Tennessee Supreme Court means. “Error” and “irregularity” describe sentences and offender 

classifications that do not conform with what the sentencing scheme would permit absent a plea 

agreement. Tennessee cases do not use those terms to denote something improper for a court to 

do. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has only spoken in the habeas context, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals of Tennessee has applied the same reasoning in direct review, observing that “as

long as [a] sentencing agreement was entered into voluntarily and knowingly, it will be valid, even 

if the sentence was outside the applicable offender range.” State v. Waters, No. M2002-01297-
Case No. 17-6295, United States v. Franklin

7

CCA-RM-CD, 2003 WL 141087, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2003), perm. app. denied, May 

12, 2003.3

Even Franklin implicitly recognizes this distinction between what is irregular or erroneous

as to the statute and what is improper for a court to do. Franklin states that the correct thing for the 

sentencing judge to have done would be to have treated Franklin as Range II for release eligibility, 

and Range I for sentencing range; in other words, to have sentenced Franklin with a hybrid 

offender classification. As with a sentence that includes a term of years incompatible with the 

offender classification, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that a hybrid offender 

classification is “irregular” but permissible. See Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 760. Franklin does not 

explain why that result is correct while the result the Tennessee court reached in his case is

incorrect. Nor can we find any meaningful difference between the two. They are both equally 

permissible when done as part of a plea agreement.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 

3 Franklin’s passing nod to the rule of lenity does not require a different outcome. ACCA is clear 

that a prior drug conviction must carry a maximum sentence of ten years or more to qualify as a 

predicate offense, and Tennessee law, while complicated, is not “grievously ambiguous.” See 

United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 172–73 (2014) (quoting Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 

474, 488 (2010)).