J-S68024-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DEANDRE PAYTON JONES, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 359 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-32-CR-0000621-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2019

Appellant Deandre Payton Jones, Jr., appeals from the Judgment of 

Sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of Second-Degree Murder, 

Robbery, and Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and asserts a Brady1 violation. We 

affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record, particularly from

the notes of testimony from Appellant’s trial. See N.T. Trial, 8/22-8/25/17. 

On September 29, 2014, Michael Eades, Jr., drove Appellant, Kevin King, and 

Stanley Boynton from Altoona to Tyron Howard’s apartment in Blairsville. 

Eades told the others that he was going to pick up some cash that Howard

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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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(”the Victim”) owed to him in connection with their work in the illicit drug 

trade.

2 While en route, Eades told them all to turn off their cell phones.

When they arrived at the Victim’s apartment, Eades told the Victim he 

was there for the money he owed him and proceeded to gather up money that 

was laying around the living room in banded bundles. An argument ensued 

between Eades and the Victim, and King pulled out a gun, pointing it at the 

Victim while demanding that he give Eades the money he owed him. The 

Victim gave Eades money that was under the cushion of a chair. King and 

Eades then directed Appellant and Boynton to get cash from the bedroom. 

Appellant found the money in the bedroom, put it in a bag, and handed the 

bag to Boynton. Boynton and Appellant then returned to the living room, and 

Eades directed Appellant to tie up the Victim with an extension cord while the 

men gathered more money from around the living room and put it into the 

bag. After Appellant tied the Victim’s ankles with an extension cord and his 

wrists with a black USB cable, as ordered by Eades, he tried to remove his

DNA from the cords with his saliva. 

Soon thereafter, King grabbed a sword from the Victim’s collection held 

in a bin in the living room and began stabbing the Victim. Boynton ran out of

the house with the bag of money and jumped into the back of the car. Eades 

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2 King and Eades are brothers; Appellant is King’s cousin and was visiting from 

Baltimore at the time. N.T. Trial, 8/22/17, at 36. Eades and the Victim were 

allegedly best friends. Id. at 301.
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directed Appellant to go find Boynton, and King and Eades continued stabbing 

the Victim.3

King and Eades shortly thereafter returned to Eades’s vehicle where 

Appellant and Boynton were waiting. They all drove back to Altoona, stopping 

at a Sheetz in Ebensburg along the way. When they got to King’s apartment, 

Eades and King split up the money, giving Appellant $10,000.

Police officers found the Victim’s body three days later lying on his living 

room floor. An electric cord bound the Victim’s feet, another cord bound his 

hands, and a sock was in his mouth. The body had nearly 40 stab wounds, 

and a sword impaled the Victim’s skull to the floor. 

After extensive investigation by the Pennsylvania State Police, the 

Commonwealth charged the four men with murder and other crimes. With 

respect to Appellant, the Commonwealth charged him with Second-Degree 

Murder, Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Homicide, Robbery, and Conspiracy 

to Commit Robbery. 

On August 21, 2017, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial,4 where the 

Commonwealth presented testimony from numerous police officers, 

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3 There were discrepancies in the testimony as to whether the Victim was tied 

up before or after Appellant went to the bedroom, and where Appellant was 

located when the stabbing began. It was within the province of the jury to 

reconcile those discrepancies in order to reach its verdict. Commonwealth 

v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003).

4 Eades had a separate trial in June 2017; King and Boynton pled guilty. King 

testified at Eades’ trial as a Commonwealth witness. 
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investigators, forensic experts, and Boynton. See N.T. Trial, 8/22/17-

8/23/17, at 34-240.5 The Commonwealth did not call King as a witness.

Appellant called King to testify on his behalf. See N.T. at 242-80. King

testified that Appellant was like a little brother to him. He stated that 

Appellant was not involved in the illicit drug trade and did not know that a 

robbery was going to happen that night. See id. at 245-47. King stated that 

once the trouble started, he knew Appellant “didn’t want to be there,” and 

that Appellant “was uncomfortable” when Eades directed him to tie up the 

Victim. Id. at 251. He also stated that Eades gave money to Appellant as 

“shut up, don’t say nothing money.” Id. at 256. King also testified that as 

part of his plea agreement, he agreed to testify for the Commonwealth against 

Eades, but not against Appellant. Id. at 259. Appellant’s counsel did not 

question King about any other aspect of his plea agreement.

Appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he has known 

Eades and King his entire life and that they could be violent men, so he was 

afraid of them when they got upset. He stated that he did not know during 

the drive to Blairsville that they were going to rob the Victim. He stated that 

because he was afraid of Eades, he turned off his cell phone, gathered money 

in the Victim’s apartment, and tied up the Victim when Eades told him to do 

so. He also said that, although he heard commotion in the living room while 

he was collecting money from the bedroom, he did not see the Victim getting 

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5 The notes of testimony from the multi-day trial are included in one volume.
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stabbed before Eades told him to leave the house to find Boynton. See N.T., 

8/23/17, at 289-303. He stated that he took the money from Eades after the 

Robbery because Eades and King gave it to him for making him be part of the 

Robbery. See id. at 306. Appellant also testified that he did not know about 

the Victim’s death until three days later when he ran into Eades’s mother in a 

mall in Baltimore. Id. at 308-09. 

The jury found Appellant guilty of Second-Degree Murder, Robbery, and 

Conspiracy to Commit Robbery,6 and not guilty of Conspiracy to Commit 

Murder. On September 8, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of 

incarceration of life without parole. 

Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion alleging, inter alia, a Brady

violation involving King’s plea bargain, and challenging the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence, and certain evidentiary rulings. On October 10, 

2017, the court held a hearing on Appellant’s Motion, at which Corp. Michael 

Zimmerman of the Pennsylvania State Police testified that he conducted 

interviews with all four men and that when King told him about what happened 

at the Victim’s apartment, “we basically came to the agreement that like a 

murder 2 or life would be off the table” for King. N.T. Post-Sentence Motion, 

10/10/17, at 8-9. Corp. Zimmerman further testified that on or about June 

6, 2017, he attended a meeting with King, the Indiana County District 

Attorney, and others, in which the Commonwealth offered King an open plea 

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6 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1), 903 and 3701(a)(1), respectively.
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of Third-Degree Murder in exchange for his testimony against the others. Id. 

at 13. Corp. Zimmerman testified that he informed King at that time that the 

standard range provided in the sentencing guidelines was “14 to something or 

17 to something” and that “17 is still better than life.” Id. at 12-13. He also 

indicated that at no time did the Commonwealth promise to make a sentencing 

recommendation to the court and that the Commonwealth informed King that 

there was no guarantee with respect to any sentence. Id. at 13-14.7 

The court admitted a portion of the notes of testimony from Eades’ trial 

in which King testified, as a Commonwealth witness, that neither the District 

Attorney’s office nor members of the State Police ever promised him any 

particular sentence for his Third-Degree Murder plea. Id. at 18. He stated 

that he discussed possible sentences with his attorney but he knew that the 

open plea meant that the sentencing was left up to the judge. Id. The court 

denied Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion.

Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.8

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

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7 After Appellant’s trial, King was sentenced to a term of 10-20 years’ 

incarceration based on a recommendation the Commonwealth made after 

Appellant’s trial. N.T. Post-Sentence at 33-34; Trial Ct. Op., dated 2/12/18, 

at 1-2.

8 The trial court submitted its Opinion denying Appellant’s Post-Sentence 

Motion as its Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
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1. Did the trial court err in concluding that there was no Brady

violation for failure of the Commonwealth to disclose terms of the 

plea agreement and/or other benefits to cooperating codefendant, Kevin King[?]9

2. Did the trial court err by not granting counsel’s motion for 

mistrial, after a Commonwealth witness commented about the 

Appellant being incarcerated in the Cambria County Jail[?]

3. Did the trial court err by overruling defense counsel’s objection 

and permitting the Commonwealth to show the murder weapon, 

still covered with the victim’s blood, to the jury[?]

4. Did the trial court err in finding that the evidence was sufficient 

to support convictions of Murder in the Second Degree, Robbery, 

and Conspiracy to Commit Robbery[?]

5. Did the trial court err in finding the verdict was not against the 

weight of the evidence, thus did the trial court err in denying 

defense counsel’s request for a new trial[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Issue 1

Appellant avers that he “was denied due process of law when the 

Prosecution withheld information about a favorable sentence being provided 

to cooperating co-defendant, Kevin King.” Id. at 14. After citing the 14th

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and quoting from Brady, supra,

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9 Following the filing of his Brief, Appellant filed a Motion for Remand Based 

Upon After-Discovered Evidence, with an averment signed by Kevin King 

stating that the Commonwealth offered him a “sentence of 10-20 years in 

exchange for my testimony in the Deandre Jones case.” See Motion for 

Remand, Exh. A. He also stated: “I knew that I would be getting a sentence 

of 10-20, as long as I said what they wanted me to say.” Id. For the reasons 

discussed infra, we deny Appellant’s Motion for Remand filed December 19, 

2018. 
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Appellant notes that, although he was aware before trial that King entered an 

open guilty plea to Third-Degree Murder in exchange for his testimony against 

his co-defendants, the Commonwealth did not tell him that it would 

recommend that King receive a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration. 

Appellant asserts that because “the Commonwealth has a duty to disclose any 

and all benefits and considerations given to a cooperating witness[,]” the 

Commonwealth’s failure to do so violated Appellant’s due process rights. Id. 

at 16. 

“[T]o establish a Brady violation, an appellant must prove three 

elements: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because 

it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed 

by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.” 

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

However, the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed 

information might have helped the defense, or might have 

affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in 

the constitutional sense. Rather, evidence is material only if there 

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. 

Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis in 

original; citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Appellant fails to provide any argument to support his averment that he 

was denied due process of law. He presents a selective and incomplete 
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recitation of the circumstances of King’s sentencing, but he does not attempt 

to review the Brady factors as applied to his case. 

“When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an 

appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our 

review.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citation omitted). “The brief must support the claims with pertinent 

discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal 

authorities.” Hardy, supra at 771 (citation omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), 

(c). “Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which they are 

cited.” Hardy, supra at 771 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)). “This Court will not

act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” 

Hardy, supra at 771 (citation omitted). “[W]hen defects in a brief impede 

our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal 

entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Here, Appellant does not attempt to analyze the Brady factors relative 

to his case. He does not explain how the alleged evidence would have been 

favorable to him, how he suffered prejudice because of the Commonwealth’s 

alleged omission, and how King’s sentence pertained to Appellant’s guilt or 

punishment so as to affect the outcome of his case. Significantly, Appellant

fails to acknowledge that King testified on behalf of Appellant at Appellant’s 
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trial.10 Appellant’s failure to develop and analyze his Brady claim impedes 

our ability to conduct meaningful review. Accordingly, this issue is waived.11

Issue 2

Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his 

motion for a mistrial because he suffered prejudice when Commonwealth 

witness Boynton testified at trial that he was in Cambria County Jail with 

Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 16.

Appellant fails to cite to the transcript of the notes of testimony from his 

trial. An appellant’s failure to cite to the record constitutes waiver. 

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10

 King testified for the defense that Appellant “lacked criminal sophistication 

and that his role in the case was minimal and Appellant had no intent to harm 

the Victim[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Appellant does not attempt to develop an 

argument that the allegedly withheld evidence would have been used to 

impeach King’s credibility.

11 Moreover, even if Appellant had not waived this claim, we would conclude 

it is without merit. Our review of the record supports the following analysis 

presented by the trial court:

[T]he [c]ourt finds that there was not an agreement but rather it 

was anticipated that a standard range sentence would place King 

in the 10[-] to 20-year range that he was requesting. It was only 

after counsel discovered their error as to King’s prior record score 

that the recommendation of a mitigated sentence was made. As 

a result, an agreement that a recommendation be made did not 

come into existence until after [Appellant’s] trial took place. 

Trial Ct. Op., dated 2/12/18, at 4. See also N.T. Post-Sentence Motion, 

10/10/17, at 72 (District Attorney Patrick Dougherty testifying regarding the 

first time the Commonwealth even considered making a sentencing 

recommendation for King was after Appellant’s trial).
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Failing to provide . . . citation to the record represents serious 

deviations from the briefing requirements of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Because such an omission impedes on our ability to 

address the issue on appeal, an issue that is not properly briefed 

in this manner is considered waived. 

Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006)(quotation 

marks and citation omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (providing: “If 

reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any 

other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in 

immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears[.]”).

Appellant’s failure to cite to the notes of testimony to direct our attention 

to where in the trial the challenged testimony occurred and when he requested 

a mistrial “impedes our ability to address the issue on appeal.” Gould, supra

at 873. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue is waived.

Issue 3

Appellant next asserts that the court erred in overruling his objection to 

the Commonwealth showing the murder weapon to the jury after the jury had 

just seen a photograph of the weapon. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Again, 

Appellant fails to cite to the Notes of Testimony from his trial. Accordingly, 

this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c), (d), (e); Gould, supra. 
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Issue 4

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, stating that 

the “Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element 

of each crime for which the Appellant was found guilty.” Appellant’s Brief at 

19. He states that the Commonwealth did not prove that he was a “partner[] 

in the commission of the crime of Robbery,” and “there was insufficient 

evidence that Appellant acted with malice.” Id. Accordingly, he avers, there 

was insufficient evidence “to prove accomplice liability,” and the malice 

needed to support the Second-Degree Murder conviction. Id. at 20, 23. 

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the 

following precepts:

Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 

question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. In assessing Appellant's sufficiency

challenge, we must determine whether viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact–finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented.

Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), appeal denied, 

176 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2017).

Second-Degree Murder, also known as Felony Murder, is defined as a 

criminal homicide “committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or 

an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b). For the 
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purposes of Second-Degree murder, a “felony” is defined as, inter alia,

Robbery. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). 

Our Crimes Code provides that a person is guilty of Robbery, a felony in 

the first degree, if in the course of committing a theft, he “threatens another 

with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). The evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant of 

Robbery under this section if the evidence demonstrates aggressive actions 

that threatened the victim's safety. Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 

801, 807 (Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Jannett, 58 A.3d 818, 821-

22 (Pa. Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. 

Super. 2011).

In a series of conclusory sentences, Appellant contends that the 

Commonwealth proved neither conspiracy nor accomplice liability with respect 

to Appellant’s participation in the crimes. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines conspiracy as follows:

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to 

commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or 

more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime 

or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or 

commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a).
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To prove conspiracy, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that: (1) 

the defendant entered into an agreement with another to commit or aid in the 

commission of a crime; (2) he shared the criminal intent with that other 

person; and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011). “This 

overt act need not be committed by the defendant; it need only be committed 

by a co-conspirator.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

An accomplice is also legally accountable for the conduct of the other 

person involved in committing the crimes. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3). The Crimes 

Code defines an accomplice as follows:

A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of 

an offense if:

(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of 

the offense, he:

 (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or

 

 (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in 

planning or committing it; or

(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his 

complicity.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c). 

“Both requirements may be established wholly by circumstantial 

evidence. Only the least degree of concert or collusion in the commission of 

the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice. 
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No agreement is required, only aid.” Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 

A.2d 1244, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). “[P]roof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from 

the circumstances that attend its activities.” Id. at 1253–54 (citation 

omitted).

With respect to the mens rea element which, Appellant contends, the 

Commonwealth failed to prove, our Supreme Court has observed the 

following:

. . . In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all 

times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing 

incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. This 

doctrine may be applicable whenever a death occurs during the 

perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate a felony, whether or 

not the accused actually inflicted the mortal wound. Restated, the 

felony-murder concept was a judgment by our courts at common 

law that the willingness to participate in conduct amounting to a 

felony exhibited the recklessness of consequences, the callous 

disregard and the hardness of heart which evidenced a malicious 

state of mind. This reasoning was applicable to the actual slayer 

as well as to those who participated in the felony with him.

Commonwealth v. Allen, 379 A.2d 1335, 1336–37 (Pa. 1977) (footnotes 

omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa. 

1958)).

Appellant argues that “there was insufficient evidence to prove an 

agreement to commit Robbery between Appellant and the Co-Defendants, 

which was necessary to prove accomplice liability.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

Appellant conflates the concepts of conspiracy and accomplice liability. As 
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noted above, “no agreement is required, only aid” in order to prove accomplice 

liability. Kimbrough, supra at 1251.

Moreover, Appellant’s argument is essentially that the jury should have 

believed him. See id. at 22 (where Appellant supports his argument by noting 

that he and Boynton testified at trial that they “had no idea the victim was 

going to be robbed,” that Appellant “did not have a weapon,” and that 

Appellant “participated only out of duress and fear.”).12 Such an argument 

asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and make our own credibility 

determinations. This we will not do. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 

A.2d 492, 501 (Pa. 1997) (the credibility of witnesses is “solely for the [fact 

finder] to determine”); see also Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 860 A.2d 

31, 36 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that 

of the [fact finder] on issues of credibility.” )(citations omitted).

Moreover, “[i]t is the function of the [fact finder] to evaluate evidence 

adduced at trial to reach a determination as to the facts, and where the verdict 

is based on substantial, if conflicting evidence, it is conclusive on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1165–66 (Pa. 

2012) (observing that “questions regarding the reliability of the evidence 

received at trial [are] within the province of the finder-of-fact to resolve, and 

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12 Again, Appellant fails to cite to the record when referencing this testimony. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring citation to the record).
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[appellate courts] will not, on sufficiency review, disturb the finder-of-fact's 

resolution except in those exceptional instances . . . where the evidence is so 

patently unreliable that the jury was forced to engage in surmise and 

conjecture in arriving at a verdict based upon that evidence.” ).

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to enable the 

jury to find every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant knew that Eades and King were involved in the drug trade, agreed 

to turn off his cell phone on the way to the crime scene, understood that they 

were going to Blairsville to collect drug money, and gathered up the money 

and bound the victim as directed by Eades and King. There was, thus, 

sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit 

Robbery convictions. Further, because of his involvement in the Robbery, 

Appellant was liable as an accomplice to the Victim’s murder. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions warrants no relief.

Issue 5

In this final issue, Appellant’s avers that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 25. He contends that because 

he did not know about the plan to commit the Robbery and participated only 

because he was under duress, “punishing Appellant for something he never 

intended, did not agree to do, and in fact did not even know about and could 
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not have foreseen is a shocking injustice and a new trial should be granted to 

avoid such manifest injustice.” Id. at 26.

When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply 

the following precepts. “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the 

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and 

to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 

129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are matters for 

the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. 

Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for 

that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra at 546.

Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial 

court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the 

post-sentence motion; this court does not review the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See id. at 545-46. 

“Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the 

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s 

determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the weight of the 

evidence.” Id. at 546. “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was 
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not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted 

in the interest of justice.” Id.

Furthermore, “in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain 

that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear, reversal 

is only appropriate “where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable abuse 

of discretion[.]” Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) 

(citations omitted; emphasis in original).

“[A] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient 

evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be 

believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 758 (Pa. Super. 

2014). For that reason, the trial court need not view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, and may instead use its discretion in 

concluding whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 and n.3 (Pa. 2000).

Appellant essentially asks us to reassess the credibility determination 

made by the jury and reweigh the testimony and evidence presented at trial. 

As noted above, we cannot and will not do so. After a thorough review of the 

certified record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the trial 

court’s Opinion, we conclude that there is no merit to Appellant’s challenge to 

the weight of the evidence. The trial court carefully evaluated the record and 
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the evidence in reviewing Appellant’s weight claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 

dated 2/12/18, at 10. Our review of the record indicates that the evidence is 

not tenuous, vague, or uncertain, and the verdict was not so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock the court’s conscience.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s 

weight claim. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his weight 

claim.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Appellant’s Motion for Remand and 

affirm the Judgment of Sentence. 

Motion for Remand denied. Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2019

 
J-S68024-18

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