[Cite as Feathers v. Ohio Dept. Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-8179.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

David Feathers, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 16AP-588 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2014-00783) 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 12, 2017 

 

On brief: Swope and Swope - Attorneys at Law, and 

Richard F. Swope, for appellant. Argued: Richard F. 

Swope. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Peter E. 

DeMarco, and Timothy M. Miller, for appellee. Argued: 

Timothy M. Miller. 

 

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, David Feathers, appeals a July 20, 2016 judgment of the 

Court of Claims of Ohio which overruled his objections to the March 16, 2016 magistrate 

decision in favor of defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On September 25, 2014, appellant filed a complaint against appellee. The 

complaint alleged that, in early April 2014, appellee negligently, and contrary to their 

policies and procedures, required appellant, while restrained, to ascend stairs without 
No. 16AP-588 2 

assistance, supervision, or escort, knowing that appellant was still suffering from injuries 

and also had no way to prevent a fall. Appellant alleged that such negligence caused him 

to trip and fall down the stairs, injuring his head, face, neck, eyes, right leg, and body, as 

well as causing constant pain, suffering, and emotional distress. 

{¶ 3} At trial before a magistrate, on the issue of liability, appellant testified that 

he was an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution in the segregation unit. 

According to appellant, he was ordered to ascend stairs from the first to the second floor 

while wearing handcuffs on the front of his body. The handcuffs were secured to a tightly 

secured belly band. Appellant was wearing shower shoes at the time. Appellant testified 

he believed he also was wearing leg irons, but was not positive. Appellant stated: 

Going - - I was ordered to come up the stairs from the 

bottom of the stairs. About three-quarters of the way up, the 

shower shoe caught the tread underneath the concrete stairs. 

I couldn't grab the rail with my other hand to break the fall. 

And I couldn't break the fall by letting my arms down, so my 

leg - - I went down a few treads. 

My left leg went through the riser of the concrete stairs. My 

left side of my face smashed on the upper riser of the 

concrete stairs, and basically my head is what broke the fall. I 

couldn't break it by hand touch. 

(Tr. at 16.) 

{¶ 4} Appellant presented documents related to the incident and subsequent 

investigation: the initial inmate accident report form containing appellant's description of 

the incident, an informal complaint resolution form containing another description of the 

incident from appellant and a response from a corrections officer, the notification of 

grievance form appellant filed following his informal complaint, and the disposition of 

grievance form and inspector's report that resulted from his grievance filing. Appellant 

also introduced a record of the entries made by corrections officers in an electronic log 

book for the segregation unit on April 7, 2014, and a copy of the post orders that applied 

to the segregation unit as of that date. Appellant's counsel argued the corrections officers 

violated section (J)(4) of the post orders for the segregation unit ("Post Order (J)(4)"), 

which provided as follows: 
No. 16AP-588 3 

J. Recreation 

* * * 

4. Upon completion of the recreation period, the inmate will 

be handcuffed and belly chained before the door is opened 

and will be escorted to his cell where restraints will be 

removed through the cuff port only after the door has been 

secured. 

(Plaintiff's Ex. 7 at 15.) Appellant asserted the corrections officers violated Post Order 

(J)(4) by failing to escort him up the stairs while returning him to his cell, and that this 

violation resulted in his injuries. Appellee presented testimony from Ronald J. Hoesel, 

who was working as a corrections officer on the day of the incident. Hoesel testified about 

the policies on the segregation unit, but admitted he had no specific recollection of the 

particular incident when appellant fell. 

{¶ 5} On March 16, 2016, the magistrate filed a decision which found that the 

totality of the evidence demonstrated that appellee did not breach its duty of care toward 

appellant because: (1) appellant had the ability to grip one of the handrails that ran the 

length of the stairs on both sides and failed to do so or only had a loose grip on the rail, 

(2) appellant did not ask for any assistance and it was not unreasonably dangerous for 

him to negotiate the stairs by himself while restrained, (3) appellee did not violate Post 

Order (J)(4) and that such post order was not designed to protect inmates but, rather, as a 

security measure. The magistrate further found the evidence also established that 

appellant's injuries proximately resulted from his own negligence as he did not exercise 

appropriate care for his own safety insofar as he did not pick up his feet enough to avoid 

them getting caught underneath a stair tread, and he did not utilize the handrail. The 

magistrate thus recommended judgment in favor of appellee. 

{¶ 6} Appellant filed the following objections to the magistrate's decision: 

[I.] The Magistrate erred in ruling violation of [appellee's] 

regulations, policies, or orders, is not evidence of lack of 

ordinary care; 

[II.] The Magistrate erred in ruling the block order requiring 

escort was not a safety provision and solely a security 

measure; 
No. 16AP-588 4 

[III.] The Magistrate erred in ruling plaintiff was guilty of 

contributory negligence because he was not able to firmly 

grip the handrail as he ascended the steps; 

[IV.] The Magistrate, without any testimony, erred in 

holding [appellant] had not been to recreation based solely 

on [appellant's] dim recollection as to the facts; 

[V.] The Magistrate erred in ruling failure to escort shackled 

inmates up and down stairs was not a violation of ordinary 

care; and 

[VI.] The Decision of the Magistrate is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and contrary to law. 

{¶ 7} On July 20, 2016, the Court of Claims overruled all six of appellant's 

objections to the magistrate's decision. The court considered objections one, two, five, 

and six and found no error with the magistrate's decision finding that appellant failed to 

establish appellee's alleged violation of its own post orders and that a failure to support 

appellant while restrained was not a breach of ordinary care. The court then considered 

objection three and found that appellee is not an insurer of inmate safety and appellant 

had a duty to ensure his own safety by wearing proper footwear and gripping the handrail. 

Next, the court considered objection four and found that appellant's testimony indicated 

he was not at recreation at the time of his fall and also that appellant had failed to 

introduce any evidence that appellee's regulations define "escort" as physically supporting 

an inmate anytime they are belly chained and handcuffed. 

{¶ 8} Appellant has timely appealed the decision of the Court of Claims. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 9} Appellant assigns the following six assignments of error for our review: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ERRED 

IN RULING VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S 

REGULATIONS, POLICIES, OR ORDERS, IS NOT 

EVIDENCE OF LACK OF ORDINARY CARE. 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ERRED 

IN RULING THE BLOCK ORDER REQUIRING AN ESCORT 

WAS NOT A SAFETY PROVISION AND SOLELY A 

SECURITY MEASURE. 
No. 16AP-588 5 

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT AND MAGISTRATE ERRED IN 

RULING PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY 

NEGLIGENCE BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ABLE TO FIRMLY 

GRIP THE HANDRAIL AS HE ASCENDED THE STEPS. 

[IV.] THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE, 

WITHOUT ANY TESTIMONY, ERRED IN HOLDING 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT BEEN TO 

RECREATION BASED SOLELY ON PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT'S DIM RECOLLECTION AS TO THE FACTS. 

[V.] THE TRIAL COURT AND MAGISTRATE ERRED IN 

RULING FAILURE TO ESCORT SHACKLED INMATES UP 

AND DOWN STAIRS WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF 

ORDINARY CARE. 

[VI.] THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE 

MAGISTRATE ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE. 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 10} When objections are filed to a magistrate's decision, the trial court must 

undertake an independent de novo review of the matters objected to in order "to ascertain 

[whether] the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately 

applied the law." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). See also James v. My Cute Car, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 

16AP-603, 2017-Ohio-1291, ¶ 13. "The standard of review on appeal from a trial court 

judgment that adopts a magistrate's decision varies with the nature of the issues that were 

(1) preserved for review through objections before the trial court and (2) raised on appeal 

by assignment of error." In re Guardianship of Schwarzbach, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-670, 

2017-Ohio-7299, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 11} We begin with appellant's fourth assignment of error, which asserts the 

magistrate erred by finding that appellant was not returning from recreation when he fell 

and that the Court of Claims erred by adopting that finding. The magistrate's decision 

noted that an entry in the electronic log book made on the day of the incident and a 

subsequent inspector's report indicated that appellant had been at recreation prior to the 

incident, but found that the evidence at trial failed to explain or support those statements. 

The magistrate concluded appellant had not been at recreation and was not returning 

from recreation when the incident occurred. Accordingly, the magistrate concluded that 

Post Order (J)(4) did not apply and that the corrections officers did not violate that order 
No. 16AP-588 6 

by failing to escort appellant up the stairs. In overruling appellant's objections and 

adopting this finding, the Court of Claims concluded that appellant's testimony 

established he was not returning from recreation when he fell, but, instead, that he had 

been removed from his cell and instructed to wait downstairs during a search. Appellant 

argues the magistrate and Court of Claims erred by relying on his limited recollection of 

the incident, rather than the notations included in the log book and inspector's report. 

{¶ 12} Appellant effectively argues the magistrate's conclusion that he was not 

returning from recreation when the incident occurred was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. An appellate court will not reverse a judgment as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence if some competent, credible evidence supports all the essential 

elements of the case. Coffman v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-447, 2009-

Ohio-5859, ¶ 10. In making this determination, we give deference to the trial court's 

findings of fact because it is best able to observe the witnesses and use its observations in 

weighing the credibility of the testimony. Id. "A reviewing court may reverse a judgment 

on the ground that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only ' "if 

* * * the verdict is so manifestly contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence as to produce a result in complete violation of substantial 

justice." ' " Cantwell Mach. Co. v. Chicago Mach. Co., 184 Ohio App.3d 287, 2009-Ohio4548, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), quoting Royer v. Bd. of Edn. of C.R. Coblentz Local School Dist., 

51 Ohio App.2d 17, 20 (12th Dist.1977), quoting Jacobs v. Benedict, 39 Ohio App.2d 141, 

144 (1st Dist.1973). 

{¶ 13} Appellant introduced at trial a copy of the electronic log book maintained by 

corrections officers in the segregation unit. Hoesel testified that every event that occurred 

on the segregation unit was entered in the log book. An entry in the electronic log book 

indicated appellant was returning from recreation when he fell on the stairs. Hoesel 

testified the log book entry was made by Corrections Officer Hogan and that he had no 

specific recollection of the incident. Appellant also introduced a report issued by the 

inspector of institutional services in response to appellant's grievance. The inspector's 

report referred to Post Order (J)(4), but did not contain an express finding that appellant 

was returning from recreation when he fell. In his testimony before the magistrate, 

appellant did not indicate that he was returning from recreation when the incident 
No. 16AP-588 7 

occurred. Instead, appellant simply testified that he was removed from his cell on the 

second tier of the unit and taken to the lower tier. He testified he had been on the lower 

tier approximately ten minutes before he was ordered to ascend the stairs. Moreover, 

neither appellant's initial description of the incident, contained in the inmate accident 

report he signed on the date of the incident, nor appellant's initial informal complaint, 

submitted four days after the incident, contain any mention of appellant returning from 

recreation when the incident occurred. Thus, there was some evidence suggesting 

appellant may have been returning from recreation when the incident occurred and other 

evidence suggesting he was not. Under these circumstances, based on the evidence 

presented to the magistrate, we cannot conclude that the magistrate's finding that 

appellant was not returning from recreation when the incident occurred was "so 

manifestly contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence as to produce a result in complete violation of substantial justice." (Quotations 

and citations omitted.) Cantwell Mach. at ¶ 14. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. 

& Corr., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-965, 2013-Ohio-5699, ¶ 14-16 (holding that trial court's 

finding that the appellant failed to prove future damages for loss of earning capacity was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellant failed to prove that his 

injury impacted his capacity to work in a particular industry). 

{¶ 14} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's fourth assignment of error. 

{¶ 15} Next, we turn to appellant's first and second assignments of error. 

Appellant addresses these assignments of error together, and we will do the same. In his 

first assignment of error, appellant argues the magistrate and the Court of Claims erred by 

ruling that a violation of Post Order (J)(4) was not evidence of a lack of ordinary care. In 

his second assignment of error, appellant argues the magistrate and the Court of Claims 

erred by ruling that Post Order (J)(4) was not a safety provision and was solely a security 

measure. As explained above, we find the magistrate's conclusion that appellant was not 

returning from recreation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Post Order 

(J)(4) sets forth conditions to be applied when an inmate is returning from recreation. By 

concluding that appellant was not returning from recreation at the time of the incident, 

the magistrate effectively found that Post Order (J)(4) did not apply. Accordingly, 

appellant's first and second assignments of error, which relate to the magistrate's 
No. 16AP-588 8 

conclusions regarding Post Order (J)(4), are rendered moot by our decision on appellant's 

fourth assignment of error. 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, we render moot appellant's first and second assignments of 

error. 

{¶ 17} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant asserts the magistrate erred by 

ruling that appellee did not breach its duty of care to him. This assignment of error 

effectively argues the magistrate's conclusion that there was no breach of the duty of care 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Similarly, in his sixth assignment of 

error, appellant argues the decisions of the magistrate and the Court of Claims were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because both these assignments of error 

challenge the decisions as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, we consider 

them together. 

{¶ 18} As explained above, we will not reverse a judgment as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence if some competent, credible evidence supports all the 

essential elements of the case. Coffman at ¶ 10. Appellant asserted a negligence claim; 

therefore, he was required to show: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, 

and (3) an injury proximately resulting from the breach. Price v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-11, 2014-Ohio-3522, ¶ 9. "While the state is not an insurer of 

the safety of inmates, the state generally owes a duty of reasonable care and protection 

from harm to inmates under its custody." Id. Appellant was also required to use 

reasonable care to ensure his own safety. Id. 

{¶ 19} This court has previously held that it was not a breach of the duty of 

reasonable care when an inmate wearing handcuffs and a belly band was required to exit a 

van using a small wooden step for support. Morgan v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th 

Dist. No. 90AP-35 (Sept. 25, 1990). The court noted that the inmate testified he had 

previously navigated the wooden step safely and did not ask for any help. Under those 

circumstances, the court concluded that it was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence to find that there was no breach of the duty of care. By contrast, in Woods v. 

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 130 Ohio App.3d 742 (10th Dist.1998), we held it was a 

breach of the duty of care to an inmate to fail to provide safety restrains for a prisoner 

riding in a van while restrained in handcuffs, a belly band, and leg irons, because it was 
No. 16AP-588 9 

reasonably foreseeable that the prisoner would encounter a dangerous situation while 

physically restrained in the back of a van lacking safety restraints. Id. at 745-46. 

{¶ 20} Appellant argues the decision in this case was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence because he was ordered to ascend the stairs without an escort while wearing 

handcuffs connected to a belly band that restricted his ability to grasp the handrail or 

prevent himself from falling. Appellant asserts the corrections officers placed the 

restraints on too tightly, limiting his mobility. He further argues the corrections officers 

should have noticed that he was wearing shower shoes, which made ascending the stairs 

more difficult and increased the risk of falling. Appellant claims the testimony and 

evidence presented to the magistrate established a lack of supervision, disregard of 

danger to appellant, and a failure to protect appellant from that danger. 

{¶ 21} The evidence demonstrated the stairs were constructed with open risers and 

a metal handrail on each side of the stairwell. There was no suggestion of any defect or 

flaw in the stairs. Appellant testified he had been removed from his cell and ordered to go 

downstairs on prior occasions, although he also testified that a corrections officer had 

always walked beside him when going down and up the stairs on those occasions. 

Appellant testified that the handcuffs and belly band were placed tightly, restricting his 

movement; however, he admitted that he climbed the stairs near the handrail and was 

holding the handrail with one hand while walking back up to the upper tier. Appellant 

further admitted it would have been possible, although difficult, for him to grasp the rail 

with two hands while climbing the stairs. Appellant testified he did not ask for assistance 

from the corrections officers, asserting he did not know that he was permitted to do so. 

Appellant stated he fell because his shower shoe hit the stair tread and asserted that he 

believed he should not have been permitted to leave his cell with shower shoes on. 

However, Hoesel testified that although inmates were required to wear some type of shoe, 

there was no policy restricting or prohibiting inmates from wearing shower shoes when 

leaving a cell. 

{¶ 22} Based on the evidence presented to the magistrate, we find this case to be 

more analogous to Morgan, where the inmate was moving out of the van under his own 

power and had done so without problems in the past, than to Woods, where the inmate 

was not secured and was unable to protect himself against sudden movements by the van 
No. 16AP-588 10 

driver. Appellant admitted he was able to hold the handrail while ascending the stairs. 

He also admitted he had previously gone up and down the stairs when removed from his 

cell. As noted, there was no evidence of any defect or dangerous condition on the stairs. 

Under these circumstances, on the facts of this case, the magistrate's conclusion that 

appellant failed to establish appellee breached its duty of care toward him was not so 

manifestly contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence as to produce a violation of substantial justice. Cantwell Mach. at ¶ 14. 

Therefore, the decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's fifth and sixth assignments of error. 

{¶ 24} Finally, we turn to appellant's third assignment of error, in which he asserts 

the magistrate and Court of Claims erred by concluding that his own negligence 

contributed to his injuries. "The contributory fault of a plaintiff bars him from recovery if 

it exceeds the negligence of all other persons involved." Lloyd v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-499, 2017-Ohio-2942, ¶ 17. See also Gumins v. Ohio Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-941, 2011-Ohio-3314, ¶ 23. However, having 

concluded that the magistrate and Court of Claims did not err by finding that appellee was 

not negligent, we need not reach the question of whether appellant's own negligence 

contributed to his injuries. See Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 

04AP-1193, 2005-Ohio-2669, ¶ 16; Genton v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 10th Dist. 

No. 01AP-705, 2002-Ohio-2392, ¶ 31. 

{¶ 25} Accordingly, we render moot appellant's third assignment of error. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's fourth, fifth, and sixth 

assignments of error, render moot his first, second, and third assignments of error, and 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK, P.J., and SADLER, J., concur.