Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2324 | June 12, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stephen Gerald Gray

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William C. Kinslow,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 12, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2324

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable

Shatrese M. Flowers, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G20-1703-F2-9698

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] William C. Kinslow (“Kinslow”) brings this interlocutory appeal, challenging 

the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress illegal drugs and weapons 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2324 | June 12, 2019 Page 2 of 11

found in his vehicle. He raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as 

whether police violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when they 

placed electronic tracking devices in a package containing drugs that Kinslow 

later retrieved.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Detective Steven Brinker (“Detective Brinker”) worked for the Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Department’s Criminal Interdiction Unit. Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. 

On March 9, 2017, he was at a FedEx facility in Marion County when he 

identified a suspicious package. State’s Ex. 1. This package was addressed to 

Charlie Sims at 3222 North Bancroft Street in Indianapolis. Tr. Vol. 2 at 10. 

Because Detective Brinker believed the package was suspicious, he had a police 

dog perform a free-air sniff of the package, and the dog alerted to the presence 

of drugs. State’s Ex. 1. Detective Brinker applied for a search warrant to open 

the package, which was granted. State’s Ex. 2. Inside of the package, Detective 

Brinker found methamphetamine and marijuana. State’s Ex. 1. He and other 

officers removed most of drugs from the package but left some inside. Tr. Vol. 2

at 10. Officers also placed a GPS tracking device and a “light sensor device” 

(collectively, “the electronic devices”) inside of the package. Id. The purpose 

of the light sensor device was to detect when the package was opened. Id. 
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[4] At 12:39 p.m. on the same date, an undercover officer delivered the package to 

3222 North Bancroft Street. Id. at 11. At 1:35 p.m., Kinslow arrived at 3222 

North Bancroft and entered the house. Id. He emerged ten minutes later, 

picked up the package, and took it with him as he entered his large SUV. Id.

While Detective Brinker briefly observed Kinslow, he had several other officers 

track Kinslow. Id. at 12-13. Some officers relayed information to Detective 

Brinker over a covert radio channel, including one officer who was monitoring 

the electronic devices. Id. 

[5] Kinslow drove around Indianapolis, stopping at several locations, until 

approximately 8:00 p.m. State’s Ex. 1; Tr. Vol. 2 at 11-12. The police never lost 

visual contact of Kinslow’s vehicle. Tr. Vol. 2 at 13-14. At approximately 8:00 

p.m., the electronic devices indicated that Kinslow’s vehicle had stopped and 

that the package had been opened. Id. at 14, 22; State’s Ex. 1. Officers saw 

Kinslow step out of his vehicle, walk to a dumpster, and place an item in the 

dumpster, which they later discovered was the GPS device. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14, 22. 

At 8:13 p.m., officers stopped Kinslow and recovered the package. State’s Ex. 1. 

The police also found methamphetamine, marijuana, and a handgun in 

Kinslow’s vehicle. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 16-18.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2324 | June 12, 2019 Page 4 of 11

[6] On March 14, 2017, the State charged Kinslow with dealing in 

methamphetamine1 as a Level 2 felony, possession of methamphetamine2 as a 

Level 3 felony, dealing in marijuana3 as a Level 6 felony, possession of 

marijuana4 as a Level 6 felony, and carrying a handgun without a license5 as a 

Class A misdemeanor. Id. Kinslow filed a motion to suppress evidence, and at 

the hearing on the motion to suppress, Kinslow acknowledged that he was not 

disputing the validity of the warrant that allowed police to originally open the 

package, but he argued that the warrant did not allow the police to search 

anything else. Tr. Vol. 2 at 39-40. The trial court denied the motion to 

suppress. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 13-15. On August 31, 2018, the trial court 

certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 50. On September 26, 2018, 

Kinslow filed a petition for this court to accept jurisdiction, and on November 

2, 2018, we granted that petition. Kinslow now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Federal Constitution 

[7] Kinslow argues that placing the electronic devices inside the package and 

monitoring his activities through those electronic devices violated his rights 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d).

3

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(a)(2), (c)(2)(A).

4

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1), (c).

5

See Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(e).
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under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We review 

the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). We 

consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling, along with 

uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to decide if the evidence is sufficient to 

support the denial of the motion to suppress. Id. The trial court has broad 

discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse such a 

ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Glasgow v. State, 99

N.E.3d 251, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We defer to the trial court’s factual 

determinations unless they are clearly erroneous. Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 

849 (Ind. 2017). A trial court’s legal conclusions about the constitutionality of a 

search and seizure are reviewed de novo. Id.

[8] In arguing that placing the electronic devices in the package violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights, Kinslow relies on United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 

(2012), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government’s 

installation of a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle constituted a “search” under 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 949. Jones did not hold that installation of the 

GPS device violated Jones’s expectation of privacy but instead held that it 

constituted an impermissible trespass. Id. at 950-54. 

[9] Here, Kinslow argues that by placing the electronic devices in the package, the 

police trespassed on his property. Kinslow argues that the officers’ actions also 

constituted a trespass on his vehicle, even though he, not the police, placed the 

package within his vehicle. Finally, even though Jones did not rely on an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2324 | June 12, 2019 Page 6 of 11

expectation-of-privacy analysis, Kinslow cites that as one more ground to 

suppress the contraband found in his vehicle. 

[10] Jones does not apply here because its facts are significantly different from the 

facts in the present case. In Jones, the GPS device was attached to a vehicle 

after the vehicle was already in Jones’s possession, and police tracked Jones’s

movements for twenty-eight days. Here, however, police placed the electronic 

devices in a package that did not bear Kinslow’s name and tracked his 

movements for only a little over six hours, maintaining continuous visual 

contact with Kinslow’s vehicle. They also placed the electronic devices inside

the package well before the package came into Kinslow’s possession. 

Therefore, Kinslow’s trespass argument under the Fourth Amendment fails. 

[11] As to Kinslow’s argument that the conduct of the police violated his 

expectation of privacy, we look to Lagrone v. State, 985 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), which found no expectation of privacy under facts almost identical to the 

facts here. In Lagrone, personnel from UPS alerted police that they found 

marijuana in a package that they were repackaging because the package was 

damaged. Id. at 69. Police retrieved the package, which was addressed to 

someone other than Lagrone. Id. As they repackaged the marijuana, they 

placed a GPS device and parcel wire inside the package. Id. They took the 

package to the address on the shipping tag, a Wingate Hotel located on the 

northwest side of Indianapolis. Id. at 70. Lagrone picked up the package and 

drove away; police followed him because at the time they did not know 
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Lagrone’s identity or destination. Id. They tracked Lagrone through both 

visual observation and GPS tracking information. Id. 

[12] A panel of this court ruled that Lagrone had no expectation of privacy in the 

package, and, therefore, the police did not violate Lagrone’s Fourth 

Amendment rights by placing the GPS device and parcel wire into the package. 

Id. at 72-74. We relied on several decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court, including Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983). In that case, the Court 

held that “[n]o privacy interest remains in contraband in a container once 

government officers lawfully have opened that container and identified its 

contents as illegal.” Id. at 771. “The simple act of resealing the container to 

enable the police to make a controlled delivery does not operate to revive or 

restore the lawfully invaded privacy rights.” Id. We also cited United States v. 

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), where a shipper opened a package, found 

contraband, and then notified law enforcement. The Supreme Court held that, 

“[o]nce the frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth 

Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate 

information.” Id. at 117. Applying that precedent, we held that because UPS 

had opened the package before turning it over to police, any privacy interest in 

the package was lost when it was opened while in the shipper’s possession. See

Lagrone, 985 N.E.2d at 73. We also concluded that the officers’ subsequent 

repackaging of the package did not revive any privacy interest. See id. (citing

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 and Andreas, 463 U.S. at 771). 
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[13] In Lagrone, we also determined that transmission of information from the GPS 

device and parcel wire did not violate Lagrone’s expectation of privacy, relying 

on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). In Knotts, law enforcement 

officers installed a beeper inside a container before delivery was made to the 

addressee. Id. at 277. The beeper signal was tracked on the public roads to the 

location where defendants deposited it outside a building. Id. at 285. Knotts 

held that the warrantless monitoring of the beeper signal by law enforcement 

agents on the public road and outside the building where defendants left it did 

not violate legitimate expectations of privacy. Id.; see also United States v. Karo, 

468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (where law enforcement officers installed a beeper 

inside a container and tracked the container via the beeper as defendants drove 

on public roads, monitoring the beeper while the vehicle was on public roads 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment).

[14] The factual similarities between Lagrone and this case are striking. As in 

Lagrone, police found drugs in the package well before Kinslow possessed the 

package. At that point, any expectation of privacy Kinslow may have had in 

the package evaporated and resealing the package after placing the electronic 

devices in the package did not restore an expectation of privacy. See Andreas, 

463 U.S. at 771. In addition, the use of the electronic devices to monitor the 

movements of Kinslow and the package on public roads did not constitute a 

search. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285; Karo, 468 U.S. at 721. Therefore, the police 

did not violate any purported expectation of privacy in the package and in the 
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data from the electronic devices that the police used to track Kinslow and the 

package. Thus, Kinslow’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.6 

II. Indiana Constitution

[15] Kinslow argues that the warrantless installation of the electronic devices into 

the package and the monitoring of Kinslow’s movements and the status of the 

package was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is interpreted 

and applied independently of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Washington, 898 

N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind. 2008) (citing Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 

(Ind. 2001)). The focus of the state constitutional analysis is not on reasonable 

expectations of privacy but on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police 

conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 

356, 359-60 (Ind. 1995). To determine the reasonableness of police conduct, 

reviewing courts look at three factors: the degree of suspicion that a crime has 

 

6 Kinslow also argues that Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) mandates suppression of the 

evidence. In Carpenter, the FBI obtained location-tracking data about Carpenter, a robbery suspect, for 

12,898 location points, cataloging Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average of 101 data points per 

day. Id. at 2212, 2217-18. While the United States Supreme Court found that tracking such information 

violated Carpenter’s expectation of privacy, we read the Court’s holding to apply to records, such as cellphone tracking data, that “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’” Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 

573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)). Cell phone location data “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, 

revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his professional, political, religious, and 

sexual associations. Id. at 2217. Because the tracking of Kinslow lasted only approximately six hours and 

because the electronic devices used here do not provide an intimate window into a person’s life, we find that 

Carpenter has no bearing on this case.
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occurred; the degree of intrusion on the citizen’s ordinary activities; and the 

extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 359-61.

[16] Kinslow admits that the degree of concern that a crime was committed was 

high. He argues, however, that the needs of law enforcement were minimal 

because the officers had ample time to seek and obtain a search warrant to put

the electronic devices into the package. He also contends that the degree of 

intrusion was severe, but he does not explain why. 

[17] We reject Kinslow’s claim that placing the electronic devices inside the package 

and monitoring his activities partly through those devices was unreasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances. See Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359. First, 

we need not address the degree of concern that a crime has been committed 

because Kinslow concedes that the degree of concern was high. Second, we 

reject that the degree of intrusion was high. Kinslow was not obstructed in his 

“ordinary activities” until he was arrested. Id. at 360-61. While being 

monitored, he travelled freely to wherever he wanted to travel. Third, the needs 

of law enforcement to place the electronic devices was high. If the officers had 

lost sight of Kinslow, the electronic devices would have prevented the 

methamphetamine and marijuana from being sold, lost, or discarded before the 

police could seize the drugs. As to Kinslow’s argument that the police should 

have obtained a warrant before putting the electronic devices in the package, 

Kinslow fails to acknowledge that the potential delay caused by seeking a 

warrant could have tipped off Kinslow that police had discovered that the 

package contained illegal drugs and would have thus compromised their 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2324 | June 12, 2019 Page 11 of 11

important task of enforcing laws regarding the possession and sale of illegal 

drugs. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, the conduct of the 

police was not unreasonable, so the placement of the electronic devices in the 

package and using those devices to track Kinslow and the package did not 

violate Kinslow’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.