UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4878

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMAL HICKS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. Glen M. Williams, 

Senior District Judge. (2:03-cr-10088-GMW) 

Submitted: January 28, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Louis Dene, DENE & DENE, P.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, Acting United States Attorney, 

Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Jamal Hicks appeals his sentence on remand from his 

conviction for assaulting a federal correctional officer, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), 111(b) (2006).1 Following 

consideration of the presentence investigation report (“PSR”),2

the arguments and objections of counsel, the statements made by 

Hicks, and the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the district court sentenced Hicks 

below the guideline range recommended in the PSR to forty 

months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and 

ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $1,167.52. 

 Hicks noted a timely appeal, and the sole error he 

raises on appeal is that the district court erred in 

resentencing him pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 2A2.2 (2003). Specifically, he asserts error in the 

district court’s application of the aggravated assault 

 1

 On November 15, 2005, we affirmed his conviction, but 

remanded the case for resentencing in light of United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

2

 The probation officer who prepared the PSR on resentencing 

concluded that Hicks should be sentenced at a total offense 

level of twenty, and a criminal history category of IV, with an 

attendant sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three months’ 

imprisonment. 

2 
guideline, claiming the officer did not sustain serious bodily 

injury.3 

 The charge arose on August 31, 2003, when Hicks 

punched Corrections Officer Brian Doyle in his left eye while 

passing through the metal detector at the United States 

Correctional Facility-US-Lee, in Lee County Virginia. The 

assault was captured on video and viewed by the judge, as 

factfinder, at trial. Outside the view of the surveillance 

camera, Hicks hit Officer Doyle a second time on his left cheek. 

 As a result of the assault, Officer Doyle’s left eye 

was swollen shut, and he received medical treatment at the 

institution as well as x-rays and treatment at a local hospital 

emergency room. Officer Doyle attested that he thereafter had 

to return to the facility to prepare a report, after which he 

was relieved of his duty and sent home, as he was unable to 

perform his job because of the swelling and impaired vision of 

his left eye. He further attested that the vision in his left 

eye was “very, very blurred” and that the bruising was “very 

 3

 We find Hicks’ alternative argument, that USSG § 2A2.3 may 

be applicable, to be without merit. Under the guidelines, for 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 111, Hicks’ offense of conviction, 

Appendix A directs the court to utilize either USSG § 2A2.2 

(Aggravated Assault) or § 2A2.4 (Obstructing or Impeding 

Officers). USSG, App. A (2003). Hence, application of USSG 

§ 2A2.3, as Hicks argues, would have been inappropriate, as that 

section relates to assault statutes not at issue here. 

3 
substantial.” He applied ice for three days to reduce the 

swelling. While he already was scheduled for the two days 

following the assault off from work, when he returned to work 

thereafter, he was given office work to do, as he was unable to 

perform his regular duties because of his impaired vision. 

Officer Doyle testified that he suffered from blurred vision, a 

splitting headache for a week, and that he had to take off three 

days of sick leave as a result of his injuries. Approximately 

four months after the assault, Officer Doyle sought further 

medical treatment for blurred vision, residual bruising, and 

headaches. The bruising from the assault was so significant as 

to still be evident at the time of trial, almost six months 

later. 

 We review a sentence imposed by the district court 

“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United 

States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall 

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007)). In reviewing 

guideline determinations, we review questions of law de novo, 

and questions of fact for clear error. United States v. Green, 

436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 “Aggravated assault” is defined under the guidelines 

as “a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon 

with intent to cause bodily injury . . . with that weapon; (B) 

serious bodily injury; or (C) an intent to commit another 

4 
5 

felony.” USSG § 2A2.2, App. Note 1 (2003). “Serious bodily 

injury,” is defined, in pertinent part, as “injury involving 

extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function 

of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” Id. USSG 

§ 1B1.1, App. Note 1(L)(2003). 

 Given the nature and duration of Officer Doyle’s 

injuries, we find no clear error in the district court’s 

determination that these injuries were sufficiently serious so 

as to constitute “serious bodily injury” under the definition 

provided for in the guidelines. Accordingly, the district 

court’s application of § 2A2.2 was not erroneous. 

 We therefore affirm Hicks’ sentence. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED