* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAR 19 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TERRY BAKER, P.E., L.S.; UTAH

SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL

ENGINEERS; AMERICAN SOCIETY

OF CIVIL ENGINEERS; UTAH

COUNCIL OF LAND SURVEYORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CONSTANCE WHITE; DAVE

ROBINSON; DAVID FAIRHURST;

KEITH VAN ORDEN; UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-4039

(D.C. No. 95-CV-242)

(D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their civil rights action

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because plaintiffs have not shown a

property interest in their professional license numbers or the procedures used to

obtain a license, we affirm.

In 1993, defendant Utah Department of Commerce Division of Professional

Licensing renumbered the licenses of, inter alia, professional engineers and land

surveyors. Defendant also changed certain licensing procedures, including

eliminating the land surveyor-in-training certification, changing the time at which

experience is determined, changing the examination to a proctored exam, and

discontinuing the issuance of frameable license certificates. Plaintiffs brought

this action, alleging that the changes deprived them of property without due

process of law and violated certain state statutes. The district court dismissed

plaintiffs’ action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,

and this appeal followed.

We begin by examining whether we have jurisdiction over the claims of all

plaintiffs, or only those of Terry Baker. The notice of appeal in this case did not
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specify which particular plaintiffs sought review, merely identifying as plaintiffs

“Terry Baker et al,” and stating in the body of the notice that “plaintiffs appeal”

the order of dismissal. On March 7, 1996, we ordered the parties to brief this

jurisdictional issue. 

In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988), the

Supreme Court held that naming only one party and adding “et al.” was

insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the version of Fed. R.

App. P. 3(c) then in effect, which required that a notice of appeal “specify the

party or parties taking the appeal.” Thereafter, Rule 3(c) was amended to permit

an attorney representing more than one party to describe the parties with such

terms as “all plaintiffs,” and to clarify that “[a]n appeal will not be dismissed for

informality of form or title of the notice of appeal, or from failure to name a party

whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). 

In Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1994),

we held a notice of appeal containing “et al.” in the caption and describing the

appealing parties as “defendants” in the body of the notice satisfied the new

requirements of Rule 3(c). Based on Cole, we conclude that we have jurisdiction

over the claims of all plaintiffs.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding they

did not have a protectable property interest in their license numbers or the
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licensing procedures. To establish entitlement to procedural due process, a

plaintiff must demonstrate a property interest in the benefit for which protection

is sought. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). “To have a

property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract

need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He

must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. at 577. To

determine plaintiffs’ property interest in their license numbers or the licensing

procedures, we look to Utah law. See id. (holding “[p]roperty interests . . . are

not created by the Constitution. . . . they are created and their dimensions are

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law”); Watson v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 577

(10th Cir. 1996) (“The question whether a plaintiff had a protected property

interest is determined by state law.”).

Here, plaintiffs have pointed to no state law upon which a property interest

in their license numbers or the licensing procedures might be grounded. Although

the licenses themselves may be property, plaintiffs have made no showing that

their professional status or existing legal rights have been significantly altered. 

See Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989)

(holding a claim for deprivation of liberty or property interest does not arise

absent significant alteration in professional’s status and existing legal rights). 
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Because plaintiffs have not shown the existence of a property right, the district

court properly dismissed their due process claims. Plaintiffs have raised no

argument on appeal regarding the dismissal of their state law claims.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge