### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 22, 200 8 S es sio n TRACY LYNN AUTRY, BY AND THROUGH HER 

### N EXT 

### F RIEND AND 

### M OTHER 

### , CAROL HOO D, AND 

### CA ROL HOO D, I N HER INDI VIDUA L CAP ACITY



### v. PHI L HO OKE R, T EACHER A T 

### M ILAN 

### H IGH 

### S CHOOL 

### ; JAM ES TOW ATER, IN HIS OFF ICIAL CAPAC ITY A S 

### D IREC TOR OF 

### S CHOOLS OF THE 

### M ILAN 

### S P ECIAL 

### S CHOOL 

### D IS TRICT 

### ; TI M WARREN, AS 

### P RINC IPAL OF 

### M ILAN 

### H IGH 

### S CHOOL 

### ; JE RRY JO HNSO N, F EDERAL 

### R IGHT S 

### C OORDI NATOR O F THE 

### M ILAN 

### S P ECIAL 

### S CHOOL 

### D IS TRICT 

### ; AND 

### BOARD OF DIRECT ORS

OF THE 

### MIL AN SPECIAL S CHOO L DIS TRI CT An Appeal from the C ircuit Court f or Gibson County No. 8103 Clayburn L . Pee ples, Jud ge

No. W2008-01027-C OA-R3-C V - Filed May 15, 2009

This appea l involves a sexual ha rassment c laim by a student aga inst a school district. The plaintiff
was a student at a high school located in the def endant sc hool district. In h er s enior ye ar, the plaintiff enr olled in a class taught by the def endant tea cher . Severa l times during class, the teac her made inappr opriate c omments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff re p o rted the te ache r’s be havior, a n investigation was conduc ted, and ultimately the tea cher rec eived a letter of r eprimand. Theplaintiff the n f ile d th is l a ws uit

a ga ins t th e te a c he r, thesc ho ol d ist ri c t, andoth e r s c ho ol d ist

ri c t e mpl oy e e s in their off icial ca pacities. The trial court grante d summary judgment in f avor of the school district and its e mpl oy e e s, a ndit de nie d su mma ry jud gme nt t o th e te a c he r. Th e plaint if f s tud e nt n ow app e a ls the gr a n to f

s u m m ar y j u d g m e n ti n f a v o r o f t h e s c h o o l d i s tr i c ta n d i t s e m p l o y e e s
. W e a ff ir m, c on c lud ing that th e stu de nt’ s c la ims e sse nti a lly a lle ge d c ivi l ri gh ts vio latio ns a nd , the re fo re , th e se defe ndants areimmune from suit under the GT LA. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court is Aff irme d

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.T h e se fa c ts a re n o t d isp u te d fo r p u rp o se s o f th is a p p e a l. 1

A u try ’s d a te o f b irth is Ju ly 1 6 , 1 9 8 7 . B y th e ti m e o f th e fin a l h e a rin g in th is c a se , A u try h a d re a c h e d m a jo rity 2 and w as m ar r i ed.
-2- Sam J. Watridge, H umboldt, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Tra cy Lynn Autry.
Je nn if e r K . Cr a ig andJay G . Bu sh , J a c ks on , T e nn e ssee, for th e app e lle e s, Ja me s T ow a te r, Ti m War ren, Je rry Johnson, and the Board of D irec tors of the Milan Specia l School District.
OP IN ION
F ACT S AND P R O C EE D ING S B E L OW Plaintiff/Appellant Trac y Lynn Autry (“A utry”) was a student at Milan High School in the Milan Special School District in Milan, Tennesse e. During the 2003-2004 school year , when Autry was a junior, she took two vocational classes from Def endant teac her Phil Hook er (“Hooker” ). Du ri ng thec ou rs e of

thec la sse s, Au tr y heard H oo ke r m ake se ve ral bo orisha ndina pp ro priate rema rks to stude nts. Hooker

ref err ed to another

fema le student as “T opsy,” alluding to her buxom 1 figure, and ref

err ed to a f

emale te ache r as “ a whole lot of w oman.” He also told students, “if you want it done right, don’t let the girls do it.” Hooker maintained a scra pboo kt h at i n cluded inappropriate photographs of students, suc h as a photograph of two stude nts “mooning” ea ch other on a student t rip. On another occa sion, during class, Hooker dre w what looked to be a lightbulb on the class boa

rd. After asking the students to identify what the draw ing w as, he told them that it was “a f at woman trying to pull her unde rwe ar up.”
The next school year , when Autry was a senior, she e nrolled in a gre enhouse ma nageme nt class taught b y Ho o k er. Not surprisingly, Hooker continued his ha bit of making crude , vulgar comments, this tim e aimed at Autry. On one occa sion, he remarke d that he believed t hat Autry wa s wea ring “butt floss.” In another instance , when Hooke r’s c lass was pollinating tomatoes, he told the students that pollinating tomatoes by hand was like “giving the pl ants a handjob” and commente d that A utry w a s “ pr ob ably go oda t gi vin g h a nd job s. ” Ona no the r oc c a sio n, wh e n H oo ke r w a nte d to sit in t he chair in which Autry wa s sitti ng, he told he r to “ get her f at ass up” out of

the chair. At the time these comments we re ma de, Autry w as seve nteen ye ars old. 2

Af te r the la st i nc ide nt, Au try w e nt t o h e r n e xt c la ss, taug ht b y a n urs in g inst ru c tor , M s. Tucke r (“ Tucke r”) . Autry told Tucker about Hooker’s offensive comments. Tucke r advised A utry to tell one of the school p ri n ci p al s ab out the incident. Autry a lso occa sionally confided in Joann Canada (“Cana da”) , a bookkee per w ith whom Autry worked in the school office

. Canada advised Au try to te ll A ssi stant P ri nc ipa l Kri s T od d ( “ To dd ” ) a bo ut H oo ke r’ s c on du c t. Autry dec ided to take this advice . The da y af t er Hooker

made the third c omment, on approximate ly Dece mber 10, 2004, Au t ry we n t to Hooker’ s class, but told him t hat she wa s not fee ling well. Hooker asked if Autry had her assignment, but she di d not. Autry left the c lassroomC an ad a later said t h at T o d d t o l d A u t ry t o g o b ac k t o class an d ap o l o g i ze t o H o o k er fo r l ea v i n g class. 3

H o o k e r h a s sin c e re sig n e d fro m h is p o sitio n w ith th e M ilan S p e c ia l S c h o o l D istric t. 4
-3- a ndwe nt t o A ssi stant P ri nc ipa l T od d’ s o ff ic e
. Th ere sh e re po rt e d a ll o f H oo ke r’ s in app ro priate behavior

. Because only one wee k rema ined in the semester , Todd suggested that Autry go ba ck and finish the class, but Autry declined, and Todd did not require her to do so. Todd asked for a written 3
acc ount of Autry’s a llegations against Hoo k er , wh i ch she pr ovided. Autry’s mother , Carol Hood (“H ood”), a lso met with Todd, and h e referr ed her to Defe ndant/Appellant Jer ry Johnson (“Johnson” ), the Fede ral Rights Coordinator of the Milan Specia l School District.
OnDe c e mbe r 1 4, 20 04 , H oo d a nd Au try me t wi th Jo hn so n to dis c us s Ho ok e r’ s mi sc on du c t. They c ompleted and filed a Milan Special School District Discrimination Grie vanceForm. The next day, Johnson began investigating Autry’s complaint. He interviewed H ooker, se vera l students, and others as w ell. Ultimately, Johnson issued Hooker a written reprimand, w arning him that continued ina pp ro priate c on du c t w ou ld j e op ard iz e his job . O n J a nu ary 21 , 2 00 5, Jo hn so n w ro te a le tt er t o Ho od , A utry’ s mo the r, re ga rd ing theinv e sti gatio n a ndthedis c ipl ina ry a c tio n th a t w a s ta

ke n a ga ins t Hooker

. 4 Autry had no morecontac t with Hooker. How ever , in appar ent r ep risal for he r re port of Hooker ’s misdeeds, Autry was verba lly harasse d, threatened, and humiliated by some students at the high school. For ex am p l e, som e students ca lled out “Hooker ” to Autry a s she passed the m in the ha llw a y. Ho ok e r l a te r a dmi tte d that he ha d tol d se ve ra l stud e nts a bo ut A utry’ s c omp la int s a ga ins t him, that he was a war e that the students w ere hara ssing Autry for this re ason, and that he did nothing to stop the harassment. Ne ither Autry nor Hood re ported the student hara ssment to any school of fi c ia l.
There afte r, Autry wa s diagnosed with a djustment disorde r with anxiety and depre ssion. He r gr a de s f e ll d uring he r s e nio r y e ar, a lle ge dly a s a re su lt o f the ha

ra ssm e nt she e nd ur e d f

ro m bo th Hooker and the students.
On Ju ly 5, 2 0 0 5 , A u tr y , b y a n d t h r o u g h H o o d , a n d H o o d i n h e r i n d i v i d u a l c ap a c i ty (collec tively, “Plaintiffs”), filed this lawsuit against Hooker, Johnson, Tim Wa rre n (“W arr en”) , the Principal of Mi lan High School, James Towater (“Towater” ), t he Dire ctor of Schools of the Milan School District, and against the Board of Dire ctors of the Milan Special School District(“School District”). Thecomplaint was ba sed on Hooke r’s misconduct and t h e d efe ndants’ re sponse. The Plaintiffs alleged that the de fendants were liable for int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n of emo tiona l di str e ss, reta liation, breac h of contra ct, hazing, teac her malprac tice, loss of consortium, and g ross neg lige nce. As to the defe ndants other than Hooker , the P laintiffs asserted t hat they did not take a ppropriate steps to s to p th e h ar a s s me n t a g a in s t A u try , a n d th a t th e y w e r e g r o s s ly n e g li g e n t in n o t h a v in g a system in p la c e to r e c e ive , in ve sti gate , a ndre so lvesu c h r e po rt s o r c omp la int s o f m isc on du c t.
The de fendants filed a notice to remove the la wsuit to feder al court, claiming that Autry’s complaint stated civil right s cl ai m s p ursuant to fe dera l law, spec ifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. OnO n A ug ust 17, 200 7, H oo ker al s o fi l ed a m ot i on f or s um m ar y j ud gm ent , w hi ch i s not at i s s ue here

. 5

-4- Au gu st 1 , 2 00 5, Au try f

ile d a n o bje c tio n to re mov a l, andthec a se wa s r ema nd ed to state c ou rt

. Extensive discove ry ensue d.
On Au g u s t 3 , 2 0 0 7 , d e f

e n d a n ts T o w a te r , W arr e n , J o h n s o n , a n d th e Bo ar d o f D ir e c to rs (collec tively, “Def

endants” ) filed a

motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, the Def endants submitted, among other things, the depositions of Autry, Ho o d, Canada , Towate r, War ren, Johnson, Hooke r, and Todd. The Defendants argue d that the Plaintiffs’ claims we re ba sed on legal theories of re covery that have ne ver be en re co g n i ze d in Tennesse e, and f or which governme ntal immunit y has not bee n remove d. Def endants Towate r, War

ren, and Johnson asserted that claims against them in their offic ial capa cities wer e in essenc e claims against their employer, the School District, under the Governmental Tort Liabili ty Act (“ GTLA” ). Beca use the School District was a

named de fendant, they contended, t he claims against t he individuals wereduplicative and s h o u l d b e dismissed. They maintained that they wer e immune from suit under the GTLA, beca use the Plain tiffs did not allege that the a cts committed werewillful, malicious, criminal, or pe rf orme d f or pe rs on a l f

inanc ia l gain, no r w a s a ny e vid e nc e su bmi tte d to su pp ort su c h a lle gatio ns
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-310(c ) (Supp. 2008). In a ddition, the Defe ndant s noted that the complaint was ba sed on Hoo k er ’s i n t en t i o n al m i s co n d u ct , an d t h ey ar g u ed t h atg o v er n m en t al en t i t ies
are immun e fr om a c tio ns ba se d on c e rt a in i nte nti on a l c on du c t of its e mpl oy e e s, inc lud ing c ivi l righ ts violations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205(2) (2000 ). R eg ar ding the Plaintiffs’ claims of reta liation or hazing, the D efe ndants pointed out that immuni ty under the G TLA is not removed f or such suits. They ar gued that the Plaintiffs’ br eac h of contra ct claim must be dismiss ed bec ause the Plaintiffs wer e not third-party benef iciarie s of Hooker ’s contra ct with the School District. Finally, the Def endants maintained that the Plaintiffs’ claim of teac her malprac tice had no basis in Tennesse e law. Bec ause the Def

end an t s we re entitled to summ ary judgment on the primary cla ims, the Def endants a rgued, H ood’s derivative claim of loss of c onsortium mustalso be dismissed. 5

On Se pte mbe r 5, 20 07 , the Pla int if fs fi le d a re sp on se to the su mma ry ju dg men t m otion s, claiming that

t h e D ef en d an t s ’ a ct i o n s am o u n t ed t o wi l l fu l , wa n t o n , o r g ro s s n eg l i g en ce
. T h ey ar g u ed that so me of

the ir c la ims fo r re lie f, su c h as the c la ims fo r br e a c h of c on tr a c t a ndlos s o f c on so rt ium , wer e not af

fec ted by t he GTLA . They c ontended that the individual def endants sued in their

officia l capa cities wer e grossly negligent in their investigation of Hooke r, and that they violated their ow n policies in con d u ct i ng the investigation. In support of their r esponse to the summary judgment motion , t h e Plaintiffs relied on the de position t estimony submit ted by the De fendants. They submitt ed no additional docume ntation to their response. On September 1 2 , 2007, the trial court hear d argume nts on the parties’ motions. At the conclusion of the he aring, the tria l court granted summary judgment in fa vor of a ll of the Def endants, e xcept Hooke r, base d on immunit y under the GTLA. On April 15, 2008, the trial court enter ed an or der c onsistent with it s oral ruling. The trial court he ld: 1. Th a t Mr . Tow a te r, Mr . Wa rr e n, a nd Mr . Joh ns on , in th e ir of fi c ia l c apa c iti e s, did not engage in willful, malicious or c riminal acts with intent to harm the Plaintiff andH o o d is n o t l isted a s a n a p p e llan t i n h e r in d iv id u a l ca p a c ity in th e n o tice o f a p p e a l. 6
-5- the re fo re , e a c h is immun e fr om su it u nd e r T e nn e sse e ’s Go ve rn me nta l T ort L ia bil ity Act (he reina fter “ GTLA” ). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310 ( 2007).
2. That under

the GTLA , g o v ernme ntal entities are immune from suits alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205 (2007)

. 3. Th a t th e GT LApr ov ide s th a t go ve rn me ntal e nti tie s areimmun e fr om s uit un le ss the immunity i s removed by the State Legislature . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-201(a ) (2005). 4. Pursuant to the GTLA, immunity from suit has not been re moved for a llegations involving civil right s. Tenn. Code Ann. §20- 205(2) [ sic]
5. Pla int if

f f a ile d to make a

c la im f or re ta liatio n o r h a z ing a ga ins t th e De fe nd a nts

. 6. Th a t th e pa

rt ie s to a c on tr a c t must int e ndtheob je c t or pu rp os e of

thec on tr a c t to be fo r the dir e c t ben e fi t of a thi rd -p arty f

or a ny thi rd -p arty b e ne fi c iary re latio ns hip to be cr eate d. Coburn v. Dyer sburg, 774 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1989).
7. That the Plaintiff i s not intended third party be nefic iaries [ sic] of the employment
c o n tr a c t b e tw e e n th e Sc h o o l D is tric t a n d D e f e n d a n t Ph il H o o k e r , a te a c h er, a nd there fore arenot entitled to damag es because of Def endant Hooke r’s a lleged violation of the School District’s policy.
8. That a c laim for tea cher malprac tice is not rec ognized unde r Tenne ssee law

. 9. That the a lleged intentional ac ts of Def endant Hooke r we re not for esee able to Mr. Towate r, Mr. W arr en, and Mr . Johnson in their officia l capaci t i es and the School Di stric t, the re fo reno lia bil ity fo r n e gl ig ence exi sts a s to the se De fe nd a nts respe ctively. See Limbaugh v. Coff ee Me d. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001)

. 10 . T hat Plaintif

f C aro l H oo d’ s lo ss of c on so rt ium c la im i s d e ri vativ e ; th e re fo re , [ it] should be dismissed.
Because the order did not adjudicate all the claims of all the parties befor e the c ourt, the trial court ma de the or de r f

ina l a ndapp e a la

blepu rs ua nt t o Ru le 54 .0 2 o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re . Fr om this or de r, Au try n ow app e a ls. 6A sc h o o l d istric t i s a “ g o v e rn m e n ta l en tit y ” u n d e r th e G T L A

. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 29- 20- 102( 3) ( A ) ( Supp. 7 2 0 0 8 ). -6-

I S S UE S ON A PP E AL AND S TANDA RD OF R EVIEW On appe al, Autry argue s that the trial court erre d in determining that Def endants Towater, Johnson, War

ren, and t h e S p ec ial School District are immune from liability under the GTLA , beca use their c onduct amounted to will ful, wanton, or gr oss negligence . In addition, Autry ar gues that a governmental entity may be held l iable for the i ntentional misconduct of an employee if the intentional m i s conduct could rea sonably have been f orese en by the e ntity, and the governme ntal entity fails to protect the plaintiff from that fore seea ble risk. In response , the Def endants a rgue that theSc ho ol D ist

ri c t is immun e fr om s uit , b e c aus e Au try’ s c la ims fo r r e lie f a ree sse nti a lly c ivi l righ ts claims. Pursuant to the GTLA, immunity is not removed from a governme ntal enti ty for injuries
cause d by an employee ’s civil rights violation or infliction of emoti o nal distress. The individual Def endants a re immune, they contend, because the governmental entity is immune, and the c onduct of the individual Def

endants wa s not “willful, malicious, criminal, or performed f or per sonal financ ial gain.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-310(c ). Ther efor e, the De fendants argue, the trial court’s gr ant summary judgment was a ppropriate

. W e re vie w the tria l c ou rt ’s g rant of summa ry jud gme nt de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Wa rre n v . Es tate of Kir k , 9 54 S.W .2 d 7 22 , 7 23 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . Su mma ry jud gme nt i s appropriate whe re “ the pleadings, d ep o s i t ions, answer s to interrogatorie s, and admissions on file, together w ith the affida vits, if any, show that t h ere is no genuine issue as to any material fa ct and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law

. ” T enn. R . Civ. P . 56.04. The iss ue s th a t lie a t th e he art

of a mot ionfo r s umm ary jud gme nt a re(1 ) w he the r a

fa c tua l di sp utee xis ts; (2) whe ther the disputed f act is material to the outcome of the case ; and (3) w hether the disputed fac t cre ates a genuine issue f

or trial. By rd

v . Ha ll , 84 7 S.W .2 d 2 08 , 2 11 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . I n d e c idi ng the se issues, we must view the e vidence in the l ight most favor able to the nonm oving party, giving that party the be nefit of a ll reasona ble infer ence s. Warren , 954 S.W.2d at 723 (quoting Bain v . W e lls , 936 S.W

. 2 d 6 18, 622 (Tenn. 1997) ). Onc e the moving party demonstrates that no ge nuine issues of mate ri a l f

a c t e xis t, the no n- mov ing pa rty mu st d e mon str a te , b y a ff ida vit or ot herw is e, th a t a disputed issue of materia l fac t exists for trial. By rd , 847 S.W.2d at 211. If the fac ts, when viewe d in the light mos t f

avora ble to the non-moving party, permit a rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conclusion, summary judgment should be grante d. McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995).
A N A L Y SIS The issues in this appea l are governe d by the GTLA. In general, the GTLA provide s that 7 governme ntal entities, such as the School District in this ca s e, ar e i m mune from suit unless the immun ity is r e mov e d b y th e Te nn e sse e Le gis latur e . I t st a te s: (a) Exce pt as may be othe rwise pr ovided i n t h i s chapte r, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may re sult from the ac tiviti es of suc h-7-

go vern ment al e nt it ies whe rei n s uch go vern men tal ent it ies are en gag ed i n t he ex ercise and discha

rge of any of the ir functions, governmental or proprietary.

... [(b) ](2) All members of b o ar d s, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other go ve rn ing bo die s o f any govern me nta l e nti ty, c re a te d b y p ub lic or private a c t, whether compensated or not, shall be immune fr om suit arising from the conduc t of the af fairs of such boar d, commission, agency, authority, or other gove rning body. Suc h im mun ity fr om s uit sh a ll b e re mov e d w he n s uc h c on du c t am ou nts to w ill fu l, wanton, or gr oss negligence

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-201 (Supp. 2008). Governmental entities are not immune, however , from la ws uit s b a se d o n in

jurie s c aus e d b y th e ne gli ge nt a c t or omi ssi on of

a n e mpl oy e e , e xc e pt i n c e rt a in situations enumerate d by statute:

Im mun ity fr om su it of a ll go ve rn me nta l e nti tie s is re mov e d fo r inj ury p roximate ly
c aus e d b y a

ne gli ge nt a c t or

omi ssi on of

a ny e mpl oy e e wi thi n th e sc op e of his employment exce pt if the injury arises out of:

... (2) f alse imprisonment pursuant to a mittimu s from a c ourt, false arr est, malicious prosec ution, intentional trespass, abuse of proce ss, libel, slander, dece it, interfer ence with contrac t rights, inf

lic tio n of me nta l an

gui sh , invasion of right of priva cy, or c iv il r igh ts

. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205 (2) ( emphasis adde d). Subsection 2 of this statute is sometimes ref err ed to as the “intentional tort exce ption” to the gener al re moval of immunity for an employee ’s negligence

. See Limbaugh , 59 S.W.3d at 79. Thus, when the injury cause d by the governmental employee a

rises out of one of

the listed intentional torts, the governmenta l entity is i mmune from
su it.
Anind ivi du a l e mpl oy e e of a go ve rn me nta l ent ity is immu ne wh e n th e go ve rn me nta l e nti ty fo r w hic h h e wo rk s is immun e fr om s uit , u nle ss the e mpl oy e e ’s a ct or omi ssi on wa s w ill fu l, malicious, criminal, or pe rformed for pe rsonal fina ncial gain: (c) No claim may be b ro u g h t against an e mployee or judgment e ntere d against an
e mpl oy e e fo r inj ury pro xim a te ly caus e d b y a n a c t or omi ssi on of

thee mpl oy e e wi thi n the s c o p e o f t h e e m p l o y e e ’ s e m p l o y m e n t f o r w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n tit y is immune in any amount in exce ss of th e am o u n ts established for gove rnmental entities in § 29-20-403, un le ss the ac t or om iss ion was will

ful, m ali c iou s, c rim ina l,
or pe rfo rm e d fo r p e rso na l fi na nc ialga in , or unless the a ct o r o m i ssion was one of medical malpr acticecommitted by a hea lth care prac titioner . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-310(c ) (e mphasis added)

. Against t h i s b ackdr op, we c onsider Autry’ s arguments on a ppeal. Autry disputes the trial court’s r elianceon Li

mba ugh v . Co

ff e e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001). She argue s that theThe Li m baugh Cour t ove r r ul ed Pot t er v . Ci t y of Chat t anooga , 556 S. W

. 2d 543 ( Tenn. 1977) , “ t o t he ext ent 8
t h at i t retain s i m m u n i t y fro m l i ab i l i t y fo r t h o se to rts not s pec i f i ca l l y en u m erat ed i n t he i nt ent i onal t or t e xc ept i on .” Li m baugh , 59 S. W

. 3d a t 81.
-8- holding in Limbaugh supports her po sition t hat the School District is not imm une under the in te n ti o n a l to rt e x c e p ti o n o f the GTL A. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205(2) . In Limbaugh , a nursing assistant employed by a state nursing home physically assaulted a ninety-year- old resident of the nursing home. Theresident, through he r conse rvator, sue d both the nursing assistant and the
nu rs ing ho me fo r h e r i nju ri e s. Af te r a be nc h tria l, thetria l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e nu rs ing ho me was ne gligent, because the nursing a ssistant wa s k n o wn t o be combative, and that the risk of the ha rm inf lic te d o n th e plaint if

f w a s f or e se e abl e. The re fo re , b e c aus e thenu rs ing ho me ne gli ge ntl y failed to take prec autionary a ction to pr ev en t the incident, the tria l court held both the nursing assistant and the nursing home liable for the r esident’s injuries. Limbaugh , 59 S.W.3d at 77.
The interme diate appe llate court affirmed the dec ision as against t he nursing assist ant, but it rever sed the de cision against the nursing home , fi n d i n g that governme ntal immunit y was not remove d based on the i ntentional tort exce ption set out in Section 29-20-205(2)

. Id. at 78. Upon further appea l, the Supreme Court re verse d the intermediate appe l l at e co urt’s holding that the nursing home was immune f ro m s u i t

. The Supreme Court noted that the nursing home had be en found negligent, a nd that the risk of ha rm t o t h e re s i dent had be en found to be fore seea ble. It determined that immunit y had bee n remove d for the nur sing home’s negligenc e under Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 29-20-205, and that the intentional tort e xception contained in subse ction (2) of that statute did not apply. The Limbaugh Court held that the exc eption in subsection (2) a pplied only to the intentional torts enumerate d in the statute. See id. at 81. Because “a ssault and battery” 8 was not one of

the intentional torts enumer at ed , t he Court held, the e xception to the re moval of immunit y for suc h actions did not apply:
Ba se d o n th e pl a in l a ng ua ge of se c tio n 2 9- 20 -2 05 , th e inj ury in fl ic te d o n M s. Limbaugh was “ proximately caused by a ne gligent act or omission” of this nursing home’s supervisory personne l. A lthough it is that negligence of which the plaintiff
c omp la ins , it

is c le ar that Ms. Limb aug h’ s inju ri e s “ aro se ou t of ” theint e nti on a l to rt s of a ssa ult a ndbatte ry c omm itt e d b y M s. Ra y. Be c aus e the se torts a rec on sp ic uo us ly absent fr om the intentional tort exce ption rendering governmenta l entities immune from liability f

or injuries, we hold that the clea rly negligent def

endant is not immune under this exc eption.
Id. at 84. Thus, immunit y for the nursing home was not r emoved, it wa s subject t o s u i t , an d t he Court upheld the trial court’s judgment as to the nursing home.

In theins ta nt c a se , A utry a rg ue s th a t Li

mba ugh su pp orts he r po sit ion that the se De fe nd a nts are not immune from suit. She claims that, beca use the De fendants could rea sonably have fore seen the damagecause d by Hooker ’s intentional c onduct, and they nevertheless failed to protect he r fr om harm, im munity is not remove d under the “intentional t ort” e xception. Autry e mphasizes Hooke r’s long history of inappropriate behavior , as well as evidenc e that the school sys t em d i d n o t haveThe i ndi vi dual de f enda nt s s ued i n t hei r of fi ci al ca pac i t i es ar gue t hat t hey s houl d be di s m i s s ed, be ca us e t he 9

s ui t a gai ns t t hem i n t hei r offi ci al c apa ci t y i s dupl i ca t i ve of t he s ui t a gai ns t t he ent i t y t hat t hey r epr es ent

. I n l i ght of our c o n c lu sio n th a t t h e y sh a re th e im m u n ity o f th e so v e re ig n , w e n e e d n o t ad d re ss th is issu e
. -9- sufficie nt complaint manager s to investigate such cla ims. She a rgues that these circ umstances show that H oo ke r’ s c on du c t w a s f or e se e ableby theDe fe nd a nts

. The ho l d i ng in Limbaugh , h ow e ve r, wa s b a se d o n th e fa c t th a t L imb aug h’ s in jurie s a ro se out of intentional torts not enumerate d in subsection (2) of Section 29-20-205. I f the injury allege d arises out of a tort that is listed, the issue of fore seea bility nee d not be rea ched. In the case at bar , Autry’s injuries a

rise fr om he r claims of intentional inf licting of emotional distress or her claims of sexual ha rassment, i.e. , a

vio latio n o f Autr y’s civil righ ts. Both a resp e c if ic a lly e nu me rate d in subsect i o n 2 of Section 29-20- 205. There fore , even if it were established that Hooke r’s a ctions against Autry wer e fore seea ble, immunit y against these Def endants is not remove d under the statute. Autry next a

rgues that summary judgment in fa vor of the D efe ndants was not appr opriate, be c aus e thee vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t th e De fe nda nts ’ c on du c t a mou nte d to wi llf ul, wanto n, or

gr os s ne gli ge nc e . “ Gr os s n e gli ge nce” i s a “ c on sc iou s n e gle c t of

du ty o r a

c a llo us ind if

fe re nc e to conseque nces.” Conroy v. City of Dickson , 49 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
W e mus t r e sp e c tf

ull y d isa gr e e . Fi rs t, the ind ivi du a l D efen da nts we resu e d o nly in the ir of fi c ia l c apa c iti e s. “ Of

fi c ia l- c apa c ity ” su its are in e sse nc e a no the r w a y o f p le a din g a n a c tio n a ga ins t the entit y repr esente d by the individual defe ndant. See Leac h v . Shelby Cou nty Sh eriff , 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6 Cir. 1989) (citing Kentu cky v . Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Ther efor e,

th insofar a s the School District is imm une fr om suit, t he individual Def endants in t heir off

icial capa cities share that immunit y. 9 In addition, the undisputed evidenc e does not support a n allegation of wi l l fu l, wanton, or gross negligenc e. The evidence showed that Autry and H ood reported Hooker ’s conduc t to Johnson on approximate ly Dece mber 14, 2004. Johnson began his investigation into the m atter the very ne xt day, and the evidenc e indi cate s clea rly that he conducted the investigation in a reasonable manner
. The de position t estimony submit ted by the De fendants showed that Johnson interviewe d Hooker , stu de nts, andoth e r t e a c he rs in an e xp e die nt m a nn e r. He pe rf orme d f oll ow -u p in te rv ie ws wi th students whose name s werementioned in the pre vious interviews. In he r deposition, Hood admitted that Johnson’s investigation was not a sham, and that Johnson did not purposefully conduct a poor investigation. Autry alleged that she was damaged by the har as s m en t o f t he students at the high school afte r she reported Hooker ’s conduc t; neverthe less, neither she , nor Hood, nor anyone else put the School Di s t ri ct o n n otice of the students’ hara ssment. Under the se circ umstances, Autry’s
a lle gatio n th a t th e De fe nd a nts area t f ault fo r f a ili ng to i nv e sti gate the s tu den ts’ c on du c t is unsupported. The crux of Autry’s a rgument is that, despite the School Dist rict’s investigation, the punishment ulti mately meted out to H ooker was not sufficiently seve re. Eve n if the punishment was insufficient, howe ver, this does not support the Plaintiffs’ a llegation that the Def endants a cted in a willful, wanton, or grossly negligent manne r.-10-

Autry conte nds that her a llegation of gross negligence is supported by Towater’s a dmission that th e Sc ho ol D ist

ri c t do e s n ot h a ve tw o c omp la int ma na ge rs fo r e a c h sch oo l, in a c c or da nc e wi th its ow n p oli c y. Ra the r, the rearetw o c omp la int ma na gers for thee nti reSc ho ol D ist ri c t. T his is simply i rre levant in this case. A utry had no problem acc essing a complaint manage r to pr ocess he r claim. The grieva nce system was in place , it was utilized, a nd Autry’s c omplaint was revie wed by the re levant per sonnel. In sum, the evide nce in the r ecor d does not support a c laim that Johnson, Towate r, or W arr en committed any willful or wanton acts or any acts of gr oss negligence

. Finally, Autry maintains that she stated viable claims for r elief ba sed on haz ing, retaliation, br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, andte a c he r m a lpr a c tic e . W e ha ve re vie we d th e tria l c ou rt ’s ru lin g a ndits
rea soning, the rec ord, and the evidenc e submitted, and Autry’ s legal ar guments on these claims. We must conclu d e t h at t h e t ri al court did not err in gra nting summ ary judgment in fa vor of the Def endants on Autry’ s claims based on ha zing, re taliation, brea ch o f contract, and tea cher
ma lpr a c tic e . O ur

de c isi on pr e te rm its a ll o the r i ssu e s r a ise d inthi s a pp e a l.
The de cision of the trial c ourt is affirmed. C osts on appea l are to be taxed to Appe llant Trac y Lynn Autry and he r sure ty, for which e xecution may issue, if ne cessa ry.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE