Federal Building and Fire Safety Inves

of the World Trade Center Disast

Project #8,

Emergency Response

October 19, 2004

J. R. Lawson, Project Leader

Building and Fire Research Labo

National Institute of Standards and Tec

U.S. Department of Commerce

james.lawson@nist.gov
Contributing Personnel Contributing Personnel

• J. Randall Lawson• Robert L. Vettori• Schuyler Ruitberg• Lisa Petersen• Steve Cauffman

NIST Experts:

• Vincent Dunn, FDNY (retired) • John J. Hodgens, FDNY (reti• Kevin S. Malley, FDNY (retire• Nustats, Inc.
Purpose of Project #8 Purpose of Project #8 

1. Fully documenting what happened during 

the fire services to the attacks on the Worup to the time of collapse of WTC 7; 

2. Identify issues that need to be addressed 

practices, standards and codes;

3. Identify alternative practices and/or techno

address these issues; and

4. Identify R&D needs that advance the safe

service in responding to massive fires in t
Emergency 

Services 

Response

Stru

Col

(WT

Codes and 

Standards

Active Fire 

Protection

Evacuation

Interactions With Other WTC P

Interactions With Other WTC P
Changes After the 1993 Bom

Changes After the 1993 Bom

• Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was est

with inter-agency operations

• FDNY Incident Command System was upgraded:

• Addressed the delegation of functions;

Command, Planning, Operations, Logistic

• Added Command Staff: Safety, Informatio• Interagency representation at command p• Established a Communications Coordinat• Expanded Field Communications Unit ope• Added an officer to Field Comm operation

• 800 MHz radios were purchased for FDNY manag
Changes After the 1993 Bom

Changes After the 1993 Bom

• PANYNJ adopted a policy for implementation of fi

recommendations made by local government fire after a fire safety inspection of PANYNJ facilities

• PANYNJ adopted a policy for prior review by loca

agencies of fire safety systems to be introduced tfacility.

• PANYNJ entered into an agreement with FDNY w

the above policies and recognized the right of FDfire safety inspections of PANYNJ properties in Nguidelines for FDNY to communicate needed cor

the PANYNJ, assured that new or modified fire s

were in compliance with local codes and regulatithird-party review of such systems by a NY State architect or engineer.
Changes After the 1993 Bom

Changes After the 1993 Bom

• FDNY worked with the PA to upgrade WT

protection

• FDNY high-rise radio repeater was • Fire Command Desks installed in W• Elevator intercom system was upg• New Operations Control Center wa

the complex on the B1 level of WT

• Multiple power sources installed fo

lighting

• New decentralized fire alarm syste

installed at the WTC

• Various fire drills were conducted a

and some included FDNY particip
First Person [face First Person [face-to-face] Interviews Con

face] Interviews Con

• New York City

FDNY Interviews - 68Command Officers, Company Officers, Fir

Squads, EMS, Communications, Fire Mars

NYPD Interviews - 25Command Officers, Special Operations Di

Communications Personnel, and Aviation 

• Port Authority of New York and New Jer

PANYNJ Interviews - 15PAPD Command Officers, Police Officers, Staff, Communications & Vertical Transpo

• Other

Security, Fire Safety, and Commun
Role of Each Responding Depa

Role of Each Responding Depa

September 11, 2001 September 11, 2001

FDNY - Established operational control and the Inc

Post for the WTC operations, conducted evacuatoperations, and fought fires at the disaster.

PAPD - Established security at the WTC and cond

and rescue operations.

NYPD - Established traffic control, perimeter secur

security for command posts, and conducted evacrescue operations inside the WTC. The aviation observation capabilities and assessed the potentrescue.

OEM - Functioned as a multi-agency command res

provided support for all agencies and departmendisaster.
FDNY’s Initial Size-up of WTC Conditions:

• A large aircraft had hit the WTC 1 building. • Large fires were burning on multiple floors at and abo

impact zone.

• The elevators were not working and people were trap

many of the elevators.

• The sprinkler system and standpipe systems were lik

compromised. 

• It was likely that no water supply was available to figh

at and above the impact zone.

• It was likely that many of the occupants trapped at an

the impact zone were already dead or would die befocould get to them.

Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper
FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W

No one interviewed by NIST thought th

WTC towers would totally collapse

Three operational strategies:Outside Command Posts & Inside Command Comthe Outside Command Post - Fires in the buildings were located too high in the buildings to accomplish fthat could save the lives of occupants above the firesto evacuate and rescue all below the fires.Command Officers for Inside Operations - The firextinguish. The objective was to get enough personnupstairs to cut a path through the fire to rescue occupand also evacuate and rescue all below the fires.Company Level Command - Saw this as a convenrise fire. The objective was to get up to the fire floors fires. In some cases firefighters were persuaded by 

officers to switch from the idea of fire fighting to evacuoperations. 
FDNY Units Dispatch to the 

FDNY Units Dispatch to the 

3

26 35

66

121

0 0

6

23 30

0

50

100150200250

8:46 8:48 8:50 9:00 9:15 

time (h:m)

Number of Units 

Dispatched Signal Arriva

Dispatch and Arrival of FDNY Units 
Emergency Responder Comma

Emergency Responder Comma

FDNY established one Incident Command PosOperations Command Posts at the scene.

• Incident Command Post at West and Ves• Lobby Command Post inside of WTC 1• Lobby Command Post inside of WTC 2• Lobby Command Post inside the Marriott • Command Post at West and Liberty Stree

NYPD established two Mobilizations Points and ground level landing zone at one location.

• Mobilization point at Church and Vesey S• Mobilization point at West and Vesey Stre• Landing zone at the ball field on West Str

PAPD had a Command Post located inside WT
Staging, Assignments, & Per

Staging, Assignments, & Per

Accountability Accountability

• Emergency responders generally followed their de

protocol related to staging, assignment, and acco

• Some freelancing (not officially assigned or directe

experienced during the emergency response at t

• An Operations Post and staging area was ordered 

inside of WTC 1. It was to be established by the 

FDNY units on the 70th floor of the building.

• FDNY established off site staging areas at differen

city for assembling personnel and equipment and units and assignments at the WTC site.

• Many FDNY units assigned to the WTC site did no

building was WTC 1 and which was WTC 2. The not well marked.

• FDNY personnel had great difficulty trying to safe

WTC towers as a result of falling debris and hum
Staging, Assignments, & Per

Staging, Assignments, & Per

Accountability Accountability

• FDNY maintained personnel accountability on Comman

the lobbies of WTC 1 and 2 and at the Incident CommVesey Streets in front of WFC 2.

• EMS maintained personnel accountability and patient tr

on paper tablets.

• NYPD maintained a personnel accountability list at each 

This list was typically kept on a clipboard.

• PAPD maintained personnel accountability from the PA

located inside of WTC 5.

• With the collapse of WTC 2, all accountability lists for ea

were lost, and no records were maintained beyond the 

• 91 FDNY fire apparatus and vehicles parked at the WTC 

destroyed when the WTC towers collapsed. Unit assiglists) for many of these units were lost.
Access to the buildings:

1. After aircraft impact only two elevators out of 1operating inside the two WTC towers. WTC 1, frthe 16th floor. WTC 2, from the lobby to the 40th f

2. The stairways were filled with occupants evacbuildings. FDNY personnel and other emergencreported difficulty attempting to climb the stairs in environment.3. Counter flow in the staircases made it difficult responders to carry equipment up the stairways.4. Counter flow in the staircases caused teams oresponders to become separated, causing delays team operations. 

FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W
Human Physiological Challenge:

1. Firefighters’ personal protective equipment weighs 

23 kg (50 lb).

2. Firefighters carry an additional 23 kg (50 lb) of gearise fire fighting, i.e., hose packs, tools, and extra air-ta3. Many of the firefighters were only able climb the firson the stairways before they had to rest. Subsequent often require additional rest periods and hydration afteadditional 3 to 5 floors. Some firefighters and other emresponders with light loads were able to climb a seconbefore resting.4. Climbing many floors of stairs and carrying heavy loseriously degrades the physical capabilities of firefightrescue and fire fighting operations. 

FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W
Emergency Responders & High Emergency Responders & High

-Rise 

Ris

• First responding FDNY units took from 4 to 1

to the WTC complex. They then got their eqreceived assignments, another 3 to 5 minuteoperations 7 to 15 minutes.

• Of the 27 emergency responders interviewed 

WTC 1, maximum floor height achieved befocollapsed, a time period of 1 hour 13 minute

1 – A police officer carrying no extra equipment a

uniform climbed to the 44th floor.

8 – Emergency responders (FDNY, PAPD, NYP

30’s. Two FDNY took an elevator to the 16th 

16 – Emergency responders (mostly FDNY) climb

2 – Emergency responders (NYPD) climbed to th

• Estimated climbing rate based on a 60 min

period to their maximum height: 1.4 to 2 
Situational Awareness:

Definition: The degree of accuracy by which operception of the current environment mirrors Perception vs. Reality

• View of the situation• Incoming information• Expectations & biases• Incoming information vs. expectations

Factors that Reduce Situational Awareness

• Insufficient communications• Fatigue / stress• Task overload & Task underload• Group mindset• “Press on regardless” philosophy• Degraded operating conditions

Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper
Situational Awareness:

• Emergency responders working outside of the WTC view building conditions and communicate over radios situational awareness.

• Situational awareness for personnel that observed thand fires from outside the buildings before entering exp

maintaining their awareness after entering the buildings• Emergency responders working inside of the WTC bunot see what was happening outside and had poor radhad poor situational awareness. 

• Emergency responders working inside of the WTC busee what was happening outside and had good radio cbetter situational awareness over those with poor radio 

Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper
Three cases were identified where fire fighting 

WTC 2 collapsed.1. Fireball victims were extinguished with the use oextinguishers at the lobby of WTC 1 upon FDNY a2. A Port Authority employee was reported as usinextinguish flames entering a staircase in one of the occupants to evacuate down the staircase.3. At 9:55 a.m. firefighters on the 78th floor inside W

that they were going to extinguish two fires in the B they could get to the A staircase. 

Fire Fighting Operations at th

Fire Fighting Operations at th
Evacuation and Rescue Oper

Evacuation and Rescue Ope

• PAPD began assisting with the evacuation of WTC 1 immediat

was hit by the aircraft.

• FDNY & EMS began assisting injured building occupants upon 

complex.

• NYPD personnel climbed the stairs in WTC 1 and provided oxy

personnel exhibiting heart or respiratory difficulties.

• FDNY & EMS personnel assisted the evacuation of occupa

each of the two towers and other areas around the comp

• FDNY personnel chopped a hole through the wall of a shop in 

provide an evacuation route out of the complex.

• PAPD and FDNY personnel assisted with the rescue of occ

elevators in the WTC complex. 

• FDNY, PAPD, & NYPD personnel assisted the evacuation o

challenged building occupants from the WTC complex.

• FDNY, PAPD, & NYPD personnel using their flashlights assiste

building occupants after the collapse of WTC 2.
Roof Evacuation Roof Evacuation 

• Standard evacuation protocol for the WTC to

recommended by The Port Authority of NY & building occupants only evacuated down the 

• The Port Authority had no procedures for roo• NYPD had a roof rescue protocol that had be

with the cooperation of FDNY. NYPD helicoa number of people from the WTC roof durinbombing.

• FDNY had the same basic roof rescue protoc

only planned to use it as a last resort to save building occupants that may have gotten on 
Roof Evacuation Roof Evacuation 

Air Support Plan, High-Rise Fires Objectives:• Provide FDNY with the capability to place fire pers

of high-rise buildings, otherwise inaccessible due for the purpose of ventilating and search.

• Control, comfort and direct people who view them

and remote from help.

• Provide the lobby command post with intelligence 

conditions.

• Evacuate persons in need of immediate medical a• Provide a capability to evacuate the roof as a last 
NYPD Aviation Units Roof Op

NYPD Aviation Units Roof Op

• NYPD aviation units arrived at the WTC by 8:52 a.m

see if roof rescue was possible and reported back th

to land as a result of heavy smoke conditions.

First person interviews with aviation unit perso

that heat from the building’s fires was causing 

engine temperature to increase. 

An aviation unit called again at 9:38 a.m. for p

the roof of WTC 1. First person interviews ind

aviation units were desperate to assist the pejumping from the upper floors. There was no landing conditions had improved.

Five minutes after the request to land, a senio

ordered that no one was to rappel onto the bu

Definition: rappel – to descend by means of a rope
• Before the attack at the World Trade Center both l

cellular telephone systems were working.

• Moments after the first aircraft impacted WTC 1 the 

systems were stressed by increased caller volume

• Although there was impact damage and fires were 

World Trade Center towers, some landline telepho

the buildings.

• After the collapse of WTC 2, a number of cellular p

were not functioning in lower Manhattan.

• After the collapse of WTC 2, there were still some 

telephones working within the city block areas adja

World Trade Center.

First Person Accounts of Tele

First Person Accounts of Tele

Communications Communications 
Emergency Responder Radio S

Emergency Responder Radio S

Simplex Communications - direct point-to-point, 

HT-to-Base Station 

Duplex Communications - transmissions are cha

through a radio rep

PAPD Operations - Duplex through their dedicated 

police department repeater

FDNY Operations - Simplex for command channel 

tactical operations

- Duplex through their dedicate

FDNY high-rise repeater.

- Cross-band through the Batta

repeater.

NYPD Operations - Simplex between ESU teams m

ESU Mobilization Point.

- Duplex through the NYPD SO

repeaters.
Radio systems available to FDNY during operati

• Firefighter Handie-talkie (HT) radios - 154 MHz, VH

Seven Channels:

1 - Universal HT frequency (tactical channel on 9/11)2 - City Wide base (command channel on 9/11)3 - Queens mobile4 - Manhattan mobile5 - Brooklyn mobile6 - Staten Island Mobile7 - High-rise repeater: RX, 154 MHz / TX, 153 MHz

• Command & Management HT radios - 800 MHz, U• Battalion Car Cross-band repeater, - 154 / 460 MH

[RX, 154 MHz & TX, 460 MHz][RX, 460 MHz & TX, 154 MHz]

• WTC FDNY high-rise building repeater, 50 W - 153 

[RX, 153 MHz & TX, 154 MHz]

FDNY Radio Communications 

FDNY Radio Communications 

Cross-band d
Example: Radio Repeater Sy

Example: Radio Repeater Sy

Building

Radio

Repeater

HT 

TX 153 MHz

RX 154 MHz

TX 

RX 153 MHz TX 154 M

Duplex

Operation

Only one radio transmission at a t

HT

RX 154 MHz

TX 153 MHz
Example: Battalion Car Cross Example: Battalion Car Cross

-ban

ba

Signal attenuation,

multiple floors of

steel and concrete

Rx

Tx

460 MHz, UHF 

460 MHz HT

154 MHz HT’s

Clear line-of-sigh

L-CP

Only one transmis

154 MHz HT’sDrawing by NIST base on document by Battalion Chief Orio J. Palmer and or

FF Bill Kristoff, FDNY, WNYF, Repeater Systems, 3rd 1998. 
FDNY Radio Communications 

FDNY Radio Communications 

Incident Command Post

WTC 1 WTC 2 Marriott Hote

Senior Staff

Battalions

Companies

Battalions

Companies

Battalions

Companies

800 MHz

154 MHz Command Channel

154 MHz Tactical Channel
Example: Handie Example: Handie-Talkie Radio System 

Talkie Radio System 

FDNY Command Post

Bat. Chief Bat. Chief 

3 to 5 Engine

Companies

3 Ladder

Companies

3 Radios/

Company 4 Radios/ Company

3 to 

C

3 R

Com

3 to 5 Engine

Companies

3 Ladder

Companies

3 Radios/

Company 4 Radios/ Company

Potentially 90 radios on

one frequency at one time 

HT freque

Point-to-Po

Only one radio transmission at a t
• FDNY HT radios used until March 14, 2001 - Motorola S

analog, 150 MHz VHF, output power 1 Watt, with 6 simpduplex repeater channel

• FDNY deployed new radios - Motorola XTS 3500 R, dig

output power 2 Watts and 5 Watts, 16 channels plus adBattalion Chiefs and higher ranks.

Why were they deployed?• provide error correction• reduce interference• provide interoperability with other city agencies• increase the number of frequencies• provide higher output power levels

• Motorola XTS 3500 R radios were recalled by FDNY on M

Why were they recalled?• On March 19th a firefighter in trouble calling Mayday a

• NYC document states the Mayday was not heard beca

radio transmissions.

• The Saber HT’s were placed back into service as a result 

used them at the WTC complex on September 11, 2001

FDNY Handie FDNY Handie

-Talkie (HT) Ra

Talkie (HT) R
• All three of the responding departments, F

PAPD experienced difficulties with radio com• Each of the departments was aware of the associated with their radio communications related to operations in high-rise buildings.• Two basic issues with radio communicatio1. Normal function of the radio equipment in environments. (Radio signal attenuation in 

concrete buildings)2. The volume of radio traffic.

Radio Communications Radio Communications
1. After the first aircraft struck WTC 1, there was an 

of 5 peak increase in traffic level over the norma

responder radio communications, followed by an of 3 steady increase in level of subsequent traffic

2. A surge in communications traffic volume made i

handle the flow of communications and delivery o

3. Analysis of radio communications records indicat

to 1/2 of the radio messages during surge conditcomplete nor understandable.

Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con
NYPD SOD Channel

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 20 30 40

Time (Minutes)

Percent Transmission (%) First Aircraft Impact Second Aircraft Impact

NYPD 

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 

Percent Transmission (%) 

PAPD Channel 26/W

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 20 30 40

Time (Minutes)

Percent Transmission (%) First Aircraft Impact Second Aircraft Impact

FDNY C

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 

Percent Transmission (%) First Aircraft Impa

Radio Traffic Volume – T% = 100(Transmissio
Readability of Radio Communi

Readability of Radio Communi

Factors affecting communications:• background noise either at the transmissi

receiving point or both;

• operating health of transmitting and recei

and antenna systems;

• doubling or crossing of radio signals caus

multiple transmissions at the same time oradio frequency; and

• radio transmissions may be affected by a

materials or electromagnetic interference signals.
• Both PAPD and NYPD had handie-talkies 

stuck microphones that produced radio inteaddition, reports came in from the field indradios were not working well.

• There were many cases where FDNY, PA

personnel made radio calls, and they neveanswer. This may be attributed to the failsystem or the inability of the person called 

There were cases where the person called 

and would not be heard by the party that ocall.

Radio Communications, cont

Radio Communications, cont
The following examples of radio communications re

1) the surge in radio traffic2) the inability of the radio systems to handl

message at a time, and 

3) undesirable radio operations practices

Between when the first aircraft hit and approximately emergency responder communications included the of messages:

• asking officers to stay off the air• comments that messages were being cut-off, t

crossing or doubling, and messages were unre

• comments that multiple units were talking at th

time and requests that units talk one-by-one

Radio Communications, cont

Radio Communications, cont
Radio Communications Readabilit

Radio Communications Readabilit

Readability, is a communications term uthe ability of a person to hear and undertransmission.Readability Scale:1 – Unreadable2 – Barely readable, occasional words d3 – Readable with considerable difficulty4 – Readable with practically no difficult5 – Perfectly readableNote: This is a subjective scale related to a trainability to hear and understand communications Ref: The ARRL Handbook for Radio Communica
Analysis Method for Reada

Analysis Method for Reada

• Most readability analysis work was condupersonnel with extensive radio communicat• Experienced personnel trained less experpersonnel on readability analysis technique• To reduce the subjective nature of the ratwhere radio communications analysis was dthan one experienced person would listen to communications and provide an analysis. 
Readability Summary Befor

Readability Summary Befor

Readability 

Dept. 1 2 3 PAPD Ch 26/WPolice Desk 8% 17% 19% FDNY H-R Ch 7(PAPD Ch 30) n/a - - RepeaterNYPD Div. 1 2% 9% 8% NYPD SOD 0% 0% 14
Readability Summary During O

Readability Summary During O

Readability 

Dept. 1 2 3 PAPD Ch 26/WPolice Desk 9% 24% 43% FDNY H-R Ch 7(PAPD Ch 30) 10% 26% 42% RepeaterNYPD Div. 1 11% 26% 32% NYPD SOD 10% 35% 32% 
• NYPD had relatively good radio communication

to-point communications in the WTC towers becaonly six ESU teams working on the frequency, an

• NYPD’s mobilization point that was communicapersonnel inside the towers was set up more thaaway from the towers allowing for more direct or 

communications with the towers. 

• FDNY was attempting to operate communicatioinside the WTC towers where building componen

radio communications signals. 

Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con
• Even though the Battalion Car Cross-band Repeate

approximately 9:07 a.m. and was to be delivered tcommand post, there is no record that FDNY used repeater at the WTC site. All known personnel thathe repeater died with the collapse of WTC 2.

• FDNY radio protocol specified that only one Battalio

repeater was to be used at any incident. This was 

repeaters at one site from interfering with each oth

• There is no evidence that the WTC 1 lobby Comma

the FDNY/ WTC high-rise channel 7 repeater or th

repeater to communicate with other personnel up 

Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con
• Analysis of the FDNY City-wide, high-rise, channel 7 

30) repeater recording indicates that the World Trade repeater was operating.• At approximately 9:05 a.m. the repeater’s recording the WTC 1 Lobby Command Post attempts to check reHandset and handie-talkie radio communications were • It is possible that one or both of the following conditiradio check that took place at the WTC 1 Lobby Comm

1. The radio repeater handset earpiece was bro2. The radio repeater handset volume was not t

• It is unlikely that the repeater’s antenna was broken debris since radio signals were received during the radinside WTC 1 and the communications that followed fr• The repeater system recorded radio communicationbetween several different firefighters and several diffeas they worked inside of WTC 2. 

Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con
Equipment that influenced emergency respo

• Handie-talkie radios, for transmitting and 

evacuation and rescue information (for sresponders).

• Flashlights, for providing needed light wh

from the WTC complex after WTC buildi

• Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SC

providing safe air to breathe after WTC 2 collapsed.

Equipment Contributing to Op

Equipment Contributing to Op
• A significant amount of evidence (first person intervi

photographic data) shows that the different agencies wtogether during the WTC disaster.• Data also indicates that inter-agency operations werloss of the OEM command center that was located ins

• OEM functions became dispersed• The OEM communications center was lost• The computer systems and other equipment u

support for emergency response operations w

• Unified operations structure for the emergency 

diminished

• First person interview data and photographic data shpersonnel working with different emergency respondelocated at the various department command posts.• First responder interviews suggest that inter-departmhad minimal affect on operations at the WTC complex September 11th. First person interview data also sugg

the problems experienced were due to personnel not uoperating practices of the other agencies. 

Inter

-Agency Cooperatio

Agency Cooperatio
• Difficulties with command and control bega

dispatch of large numbers of fire fighters to tadequate command posts and staff could be manage them.• Self-dispatch further complicated commanthe incident.• FDNY & EMS command and control was amany private and volunteer ambulance units dispatching that contributed to clogging the sother responders assigned to the WTC had through.

Command and Contro

Command and Contro
• FDNY apparatus had to be moved to a

ambulances to get through and exit the svictims.• FDNY command and control was serioby the lack of good communications.• FDNY’s system for maintaining records assignments at each command post was of managing the numbers of units and peassigned to the incident. • FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD: there was nback-up the unit assignment records gencommand posts.

Command and Control, cont

Command and Control, cont
National Practices, Standards, and 

National Practices, Standards, an

Occupant and Emergency Responder Safety

• NFPA 101, Life Safety Code

Emergency Responder Operations and Safety

• Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Mana

Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan

• NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Sa• NFPA 1521, Standard for Fire Department Safety Officers• NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Ma• NFPA 1620, Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Plan• NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and DeploymenOperations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Opby Career Fire Departments

Emergency Responder Equipment

• NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, anServices Communications Systems• NFPA Technical Committee Standard on Electronic Safety • NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and MaintenancFighting Protective Ensembles• NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble for Structu• NFPA, 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Brethe Fire Service• NFPA 1982, Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) for Fire • NFPA 1999, Standard on Protective Clothing for Emergenc
Mobility Impaired Occupa

Mobility Impaired Occupa

• As the emergency responders started evacuating 

collapse of WTC 2, they found mobility impaired 

the staircases going down.

• Several ambulatory mobility impaired occupants w

be walking down the stairs with one hand on eacthey took one step at a time going down. In addioften accompanied by one person, another occuemergency responder. This blocked others behimoving more rapidly down the stairs.

• FDNY and PAPD personnel found 40 to 60 mobili

occupants on the 12th floor of WTC 1 as they wen

attempted to clear each floor on their way out. Tindividuals had been placed on this floor in an attstairways.

• Emergency responders were assisting approxima

mobility impaired people down the staircase just collapse of WTC 1. It is unknown how many fatawith this group. 
High-Rise Buildings & Emergency 

Rise Buildings & Emergency 

Example: Fire department response to a 60 story high-ris

trapped above fires on the 58th floor and no opera

Lo

Firefighters begin to climb 10 minutes

Fire department arrival 4 minutes 

Firefighters carrying equipment and

wearing PPE ~ 70 minutes

Firefighters carrying no equipment and not

wearing PPE ~ 50 minutes

Fi

Firefighters carrying equipment and wearing PPE ~ 125 minutes

Firefighters carrying no equipment and not

wearing PPE ~ 90 minutes
Issues

Evacuation - Comments

• Missed opportunities to better communinformation among the occupants, 911 odispatch, fire department dispatch, police dispatch, emergency management servicand site security.

- Inadequate situational awareness- Convergence confusion among firs
Issues

Emergency Response - Access and Firefig• Physiological impact on firefighters with equipment clim

to 12 floors during an emergency.

• Adequacy of capacity for egress and firefighter access d

evacuation of fully occupied tall buildings.

- Access to high-rise buildings by first respondehindered by counter flow, egress capacity, and laavailable elevators.

• Distance between stairwells where standpipes are locat

(Standpipes supply water for fire suppression.)

Emergency Response - Communications• Lack of rigorous pre-emergency inspection and testing o

communications systems within high-rise buildings to performance gaps and inadequacies.
Issues

Emergency Response - Communication• Performance requirements for emergency commu

in buildings.

• Design, testing, certification standards• Maintenance and inspection requirements

• Lack of communications network architecture (inte

operational protocols for intra- and inter-agency call levels of organizational hierarchy. This includ

• Overall network architecture that covers local n

incident sites, dispatching, and wide-area urbanetworks

• Scalability in terms of the number of first respo

system and in providing radio coverage in largchallenging radio frequency propagation envir

• Interoperability with existing legacy emergency 

communications systems

• Localization techniques to identify first respond

building environments

• Conventional two-way systems versus wireless 
Issues

Emergency Response - Command and Control• Availability of detailed procedures and methods for gath

and delivering situational information to all first responoperators, wardens, incident commanders, etc.; this coand data integration.

• Availability of effective codes and protocols for establish

uninterrupted operation of the incident command and for preservation and dissemination of information manposts.

• Command posts establishment within the collapse zobuildings that received serious impact damage and conlarge multi-floor fires.• Establishing the command post prior to dispatch of n• Impact of self-dispatch and free-lancing on commanresponders and ambulances• Assignment and tracking (accountability) system for emergencies• EMS and private ambulance personnel did not have 

• Secure location of state and local emergency operation
Issues

Emergency Response - Command and • Rapid adoption and execution of a unified 

response mission by all first responder ra

• The dispatch of large numbers of personn

apparatus and the ability of managemenaccountability in a timely manner associaarrival and deployment of personnel and the incident site to effectively accommodnumbers of personnel and apparatus.
Questions? Questions?