alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11183.

#### Anderson *et al. v.*First National Bank of Millen.

Decided August 13, 1920.

Affidavit of illegality; from city court of Millen — Judge Dekle. October *22, 1919.*

Jenkins, P. J.

Exception is taken to the overruling and dismissal of an affidavit of illegality in which it was alleged that the fi. fa. was proceeding illegally for the reason that, although it was issued after the filing in the court below of the remittitur from this court, it was issued before the remittitur was made the judgment of that court. *Held:*The affidavit of illegality presented no valid reason why the proceeding under the fi. fa. should be suspended. Civil Code (1910), § 6217; *Knox*v. *State,*113 *Ga.*929 (1) (39 S. E. 330).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*

*611
      *A. S. Anderson,*for plaintiffs in error.

*W. Woodrum,*contra.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1
<CURRENCY>                                  US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         725,344
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,296,694
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (136,959)
<INVENTORY>                                    218,887
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,306,717
<PP&E>                                       6,444,291
<DEPRECIATION>                              (3,855,110)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,523,379
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,877,676
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,093
<OTHER-SE>                                    (583,393)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,523,379
<SALES>                                      2,165,018
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,165,018
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,216,479
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,928,943
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              39,759
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 33,941
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             33,941
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    33,941
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01
                                               




</TABLE>
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                   EXHIBIT 11
                               ALLTEL CORPORATION
                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
           (Dollars and Shares in Thousands, except per share amounts)


For the Years Ended December 31,                       1995             1994              1993              1992            1991
 
<S>                                                  <C>              <C>               <C>              <C>              <C>      
Net income applicable to
      common shares                                  $353,458         $270,521          $260,439         $226,894         $196,883
Adjustments for convertible securities:
   preferred stocks                                       236              258               293              355              566

Net income applicable to common
    shares, assuming conversion
    of above securities                              $353,694         $270,779          $260,732         $227,249         $197,449


Average common shares outstanding
    for the year including equivalents                190,072          189,454           187,665          185,672          180,007
Increase in shares which would
    result from conversion of
    convertible preferred stocks                          603              670               755              905           2,921
Average common shares, assuming
    conversion of the above securities                190,675          190,124           188,420          186,577          182,928


Earnings per share of
    common stock:

    Primary                                             $1.86            $1.43             $1.39            $1.22            $1.09

    Fully-diluted                                       $1.85            $1.42             $1.38            $1.22            $1.08


<FN>
Note:  Amounts have been restated for mergers accounted for as a pooling-of-interests.
</FN>

</TABLE>
                                       27
No. 15,397.

#### The Lake Erie and Western Railway Company *v.*Kennedy.

*License.*— Power *of Revocation*— Estoppel.—A mere permission to occupy land is a license, which may be revoked by the licensor or his grantee,, unless some act is done which operates by way of estoppel to make the-license irrevocable.

From the Howard Circuit Court.

*J. O’Brien*and *W. E. Hackedorn,*for appellant.

Elliott, J.

— The parties by agreement made the evidence taken in the case of *Lake Erie, etc., R*. *W. Co.*v. *Michener,*117 Ind. 465, part of the evidence in this case, and, as to other matters, dispensed with evidence by an agreement as to the facts. We are unable to perceive any substantial difference between the case we have referred to and the one now before us, and we think the former rules this case. It is contended by counsel that there is an essential difference between the two cases, inasmuch as in the present case the structures placed on the land were standing when Kennedy purchased the land from Macy, through whom both parties claim, while in the other case they were removed before the purchase by Michener. If it were granted that this difference exists between the two cases, the result would not be affected, for the evidence justified the conclusion that the occupancy of the lands was by virtue of a mere permissive license from Macy, and not by virtue of any right or claim of ownership. Macy never intended to grant an interest or estate in the land, so that the appellant did not acquire the rights of an owner. Nor was there an irrevocable license. There was a permission which gáve a right of occupancy and nothing more. There is no element of fraud, and no consideration was paid for the right to use the-land. A mere permission to occupy land is a license which *275may be revoked by the licensor or his grantee unless some act is done which operates by way of estoppel to make the license irrevocable. There is here no element of estoppel that transforms the permission to occupy into an irrevocable license.

Filed October 5, 1892.

Judgment affirmed.
11447.

#### Harris *v.*The State.

Decided June 15, 1920.

Indictment for intoxication in public place; from Murray superior court-—-Judge Tarver. February 28, 1920.

The court charged the jury that if they should find that the defendant appeared in an intoxicated condition at the place named in the indictment, and that the intoxication was caused in the manner prescribed by the statute (that is, by the use of intoxicating wines, beers, liquors, or opiates), and was made manifest in any manner provided by statute (that is, by boisterousness, by indecent condition or acting, or by vulgar, profane, or unbecoming language, or by loud and violent discourse), they should find the defendant guilty. This instruction is complained of in the first special ground of the motion for a new trial, for the reason that '' it is not the law of the case,” and “ it tells the jury, in defining the statute, that 'the use of intoxicating wines/ etc., is sufficient when the law is, the 'excessive use of intoxicating wines/ etc.”

In the other special ground of the motion for a new trial it is alleged that the province of the jury was invaded and an opinion intimated that the defendant was drunk and intoxicating, by the following instruction of the court: ''It is not necessary that the *399drunkenness or intoxication should be made manifest in all of the ways which the statute provided, but, if it was made manifest in one of the ways, that would be sufficient.”

*398Bloodwortii, J.

The excerpts from the charge of the court complained of in the special grounds of the motion for new trial contain .no reversible error; there is ample evidence to support the verdict, and the judgment is

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*

*399
      *H. H. Anderson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Joseph M. Lang, solicitor-general,*contra.
11111.

#### Henderson *v.*Leviton.

Decided April 14, 1920.

Trover; from Echols superior court — Judge Thomas. October 4 1919.

*J. B. Sicks, W. T. Dickerson, S. Burkhalter,*for plaintiff in error.

*Franklin & Langdale, E. K. Wilcox,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

There is no merit in any of the special grounds of the motion for new trial; the verdict was based on conflicting evidence, was satisfactory to the trial judge, and must be to this court.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                              32
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        139
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     178
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                         145
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              2
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     2
<CGS>                                                2
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        2
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (1)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (3)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (3)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       8
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         5
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .44
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SEDRICK JAMES RUFFIN, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0533-CG-C

WALTER MYERS, et al., :

Defendants. :

JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action be and is hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice. 

DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 2010.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00533-CG-C Document 6 Filed 05/26/10 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LESLIE FRANCE, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIVIL ACTON 16-0301-CG-M

vs. ) CRIMINAL NO. 09-00077-CG-M

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, and there having 

been no objections filed, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 102) be DENIED

and that this action be DISMISSED. It is further ORDERED that any certificate 

of appealability filed by Petitioner be DENIED as he is not entitled to appeal in 

forma pauperis.

DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of September, 2016.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cr-00077-CG-B Document 109 Filed 09/26/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:

<pageID>
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4729 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4729

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to rename the earned income 
           credit as the Ronald Reagan earned income credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 25, 2004

 Mr. Emanuel introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to rename the earned income 
           credit as the Ronald Reagan earned income credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RONALD REAGAN EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended in the heading by striking ``earned income'' and inserting 
``ronald reagan earned income credit''.
    (b) Conforming Changes.--
            (1) The following provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
        of 1986 are each amended by inserting ``Ronald Reagan'' before 
        ``earned income credit'':
                    (A) Paragraphs (7) and (10) of section 6051(a).
                    (B) Section 6012(a)(8).
                    (C) Subparagraphs (F) and (K) of section 
                6213(g)(2).
            (2) Section 32(g) of such Code is amended in the heading by 
        inserting ``Ronald Reagan'' before ``Earned Income Credit''.
            (3) Section 3507 of such Code is amended in the heading by 
        inserting ``ronald reagan'' before ``earned income credit''.
            (4) Section 6695(g) of such Code is amended in the heading 
        by inserting ``Ronald Reagan'' before ``Earned Income Credit''.
            (5) The table of sections for subpart C of part IV of 
        subchapter A of chapter 1 of such Code is amended by striking 
        the item relating to section 32 and inserting the following new 
        item:

``Sec. 32. Ronald Reagan earned income credit.''.
            (6) The table of sections for chapter 25 of such Code is 
        amended by striking the item relating to section 3507 and 
        inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 3507. Advance payment of Ronald Reagan earned income credit.''.
                                 <all>
```
NUMBER 13-13-00020-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

ALONZO GONZALEZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 275th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Alonzo Gonzalez, filed a notice of appeal challenging his conviction for 

aggravated sexual assault. Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily 

dismiss the appeal because the trial court granted appellant’s motion for new trial. 

When the trial court grants a motion for new trial, it restores the case to its position 

before the former trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.9(b). Because there is no conviction to 
2

be appealed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Waller v. State, 931 

S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. App.BDallas 1996, no pet.).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and the 

appellant’s unopposed motion to dismiss, is of the opinion that the appeal should be 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See id. The appellant’s motion is GRANTED and the 

appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

31st day of January, 2013.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00503- CV

John Rad y, Appellan t

v. F ederal Nat ional Mortgage A ssociation, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 1 O F O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CV- 12- 0046 33, H ONO RAB LE J. DAVID P HI LLIP S, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
On May 22, 2013, the Clerk of this Court sent notice to appellant J ohn Rady that his brief was due on May 13, 2013, and was overdue , and that if he failed to file a brief, t his Court would dismiss his appea l for wa n t o f prosec ution. The Clerk also notified Rady that his appea l would be dismiss ed for want of prosec ution if he did not respond to this Court by J une 3, 2013. To date, Rady has not responded t o this Court’s notice and has not filed a brief. Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appe al for w ant of prose cution. SeeTex. R. App. P . 42.3(b), ( c).

__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice Be fore Chief Justice Jones, J ustices Goodwin and F ield Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: June 26, 2013
BOSTON FINANCIAL QUALIFIED HOUSING TAX CREDITS L.P. III
                             (A Limited Partnership)

                                 EXHIBIT [32.1]

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boston Financial Qualified Housing
Tax Credits L.P. III (the "Partnership") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended
September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the Executive Vice President,
hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Partnership.


                                                    /s/Jenny Netzer
                                                    Jenny Netzer
                                                    Executive Vice President
                                                    MMA Financial, LLC

                                                    Date:  November 12, 2004










A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been
provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the Partnership and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.2

 

**                                                THE MONARCH CEMENT COMPANY                                                   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                                                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                                                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                                                                      SECTION 906                                                                           OF THE                                                    SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of The Monarch Cement Company (the"Company") on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2005, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the "Report"), theundersigned, in the capacity and on the date indicated below, hereby certifiespursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects,the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to The MonarchCement Company and will be retained by The MonarchCement Company and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

Dated:  March 13, 2006

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Debra P. Roe, CPA                                                                                            Chief Financial Officer and                                                                                            Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Order filed, April 01, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-01045-CR

____________

EDWARD MONTEMAYER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1351306

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case was due January 17, 2014. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 35.1. On January 29, 2014, this court ordered the court reporter to file the 

record within 30 days. Also, on January 29, 2014, Arlene Webb attempted to file 

her portion of the record which was rejected because it was not signed and the 

cover was not numbered properly. The corrected record has not been filed with the 
court. Because the reporter’s record has not been filed timely, we issue the 

following order.

We order Arlene Webb, the official court reporter, to file the record in this 

appeal within 30 days of the date of this order. No further extension will be 

entertained absent exceptional circumstances. The trial and appellate courts are 

jointly responsible for ensuring that the appellate record is timely filed. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 35.3(c). If Arlene Webb does not timely file the record as ordered, we 

will issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the 

reason for the failure to file the record.

PER CURIAM