alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-02-1999
<CASH>                                             848
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  194,759
<ALLOWANCES>                                    25,011
<INVENTORY>                                    267,040
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               467,108
<PP&E>                                         555,792
<DEPRECIATION>                                 333,414
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 833,095
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          331,473
<BONDS>                                        293,280
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        19,292
<OTHER-SE>                                     139,016
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   833,095
<SALES>                                      4,115,589
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,160,011
<CGS>                                        3,783,661
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  395,097
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                10,637
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,034
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (58,418)<F1>
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (18,837)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (39,581)
<DISCONTINUED>                                (16,487)<F2>
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (5,569)<F3>
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (61,637)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (5.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (5.45)
<FN>
<F1>INCLUDES FOURTH QUARTER PROVISION FOR SPECIAL CHARGES TOTALING $69.7 MILLION.
<F2>IN OCTOBER 1998 THE COMPANY ADOPTED A PLAN TO SELL NASH DECAMP, ITS PRODUCE
GROWING AND MARKETING SUBSIDIARY.
<F3>LOSS ON EXTINGUISHMENT OF DEBT NET OF TAX BENEFIT OF $3,951.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
11457.

#### Carter *v.*Booth.

Jenkins, P. J.

A general custom governing a trade or business, although it might be otherwise admissible to aid in expressing the true meaning and intent of a contract, cannot be proved for the purpose of depriving one of the contracting parties of an absolute right explicitly secured to him by the law of the State. *Fleming*v. *King,*100 *Ga.*449 (2) (28 S. E. 239). If, therefore, the provisions of § 3G88 of the Civil Code (1910) have reference to landlords and tenants -where the term of the tenancy extends for less than five years and the estate is created, then, under the rule just stated, no proof of mere custom would operate to give to the tenant the right to emblements thus specifically-denied; but since the statute referred to relates only to “estates” for" years, and since a tenant who holds for a term of less than five years is not positively' denied by any law of this State the right to gather matured crops from the rented premises after the term of his tenancy has expired, and since the evidence was uncontradicted that such right existed under a general and universal local custom, it became a question of fact for the jury to decide whether or not, under the circumstances *797of the ease, the tenant liad by his acts and conduct tacitly abandoned such right, or had forfeited it on account of having' failed to exercise it within a reasonable time.

Decided November 10, 1920.

Trover; from city court of Athens — Judge Greene. March 20, 1920.

By suit in trover Carter sought to recover certain cotton from Booth. According to the evidence the plaintiff rented certain land from Booth under a written instrument, dated March 10, 1917, reciting that it was “for this year.” Owing to bad weather and illness in his family he was unable to gather all his cotton crop before the expiration of the rental term. He moved from the land on Februarjr 4th or 5th, 1918, and a few days thereafter he told Booth that he desired to return and finish gathering the cotton, and Booth told him that as he had left the cotton on the place, it belonged to him (Booth); and Booth proceeded within a day or two to gather the cotton. A receipt was introduced, dated February 19, 1918, signed by Carter and reading as follows: “Beccived of G. M. Booth settlement in full for 1917 to date.” Carter testified that-this receipt did not include the cotton in controversy, and Booth testified that he did not know whether he had the cotton in mind at the time or not. It was testified that there was a general and universal custom in that locality to allow a tenant, after the expiration of his term of tenancy, to go back and finish gathering 1ns crop on the rented land where he had failed to do so during the tenancy. On motion of the defendant’s counsel the judge directed a verdict for the defendant; the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was overruled, and he excepted.

*Wolver M. Smith, Thomas J. Shackelford,*for plaintiff.

*H. C. Tuck,*for defendant.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                      15,121,329
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,346,496
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    776,117
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,545,410
<PP&E>                                     123,952,774
<DEPRECIATION>                              21,945,978
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             127,296,998
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,949,965
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      3,060
<COMMON>                                       151,997
<OTHER-SE>                                  48,693,926
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               127,296,998
<SALES>                                     19,487,246
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,487,246
<CGS>                                       14,513,111
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               14,513,111
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               309,470
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,515,386
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,768,219
<INCOME-TAX>                                   349,400
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,418,819
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,302,387
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .10


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-2548

L. A. GRIER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

FIRST MARINER BANK,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-00-3135-JFM)

Submitted: June 21, 2001 Decided: June 27, 2001

Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lorenzo Grier, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Omar Lawson, LAWSON & KIPP,

Fairfax, Virginia; John Sears Simcox, Karen Montgomery Crabtree,

SIMCOX & BARCLAY, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Lorenzo Grier seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his discrimination suit. We dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, because Grier’s notice of appeal was not timely

filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after entry of the district

court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and

jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.

257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,

229 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on November 2, 2000. Grier’s notice of appeal was filed on December 7,

2000. Because Grier failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to

obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### John Martin *v.*J. H. Reed, Thompson et al.

Limitation of Actions — Recovery of Usurious Interest.

Wliere a note was satisfied and cancelled by acceptance of other notes payable by different parties, the right of action to recover usurious interest on the first note accrued, and limitation began to run from the date of satisfaction of the first note.

APPEAL FROM 'CLARK CIRCUIT COURT.

December 17, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The usurious interest, sought to be .set off against this note, had been paid prior to its execution, and whilst the original contract of loaning was in full force and effect.

The acceptance of the four notes for five hundred dollars each, in lieu of the original note for two thousand dollars, was, in law, a satisfaction and extinguishment of the original contract of loaning. It was not merely a renewal of the promise to pay. A new surety was required and accepted, and additional time given within which to pay the money. If an action had been instituted on the old promise, the acceptance of the four notes given April 20, 1872, might have been pleaded in bar of its prosecution. The new notes were accepted in payment of the old. The transaction was equivalent to paying off the old debt, and again borrowing the money. No usury was paid on the note sued on. The payments were all made under the old contract, and upon the two thousand dollar note that was cancelled. If these payments of usurious interest can be relied on as a defense to this action, it is upon the ground that Reed, the principal, has the right, under the statute, to sue for and recover back- the amounts so paid on the old note.

The moment the first note was satisfied and cancelled, or the accord and satisfaction arising out of this cancelment, and the acceptance of notes payable by persons different from those who were payers' of the first, became complete, Reed’s right of action to recover back the usurious interest paid on the first note accrued, and limitation commenced to run. *Hays v. Goodwin,*4 Met. 80. More than twelve months elapsed after such payments, before Thompson, by his answer, set up this claim for the recovery of usury.

*371
      *Huston & Mulligan, Beckner, for appellamt.*

*Simpson, appellees.*

But if the institution, by Martin, of his action, stopped the running of the statute, still, before this: was done, the bar was complete. In this view of the case it is unnecessary to express an opinion as to Thompson’s right to avail himself of the set-off relied on.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the plea of limitation set up in the reply, and for further proper proceedings.
10970.

#### McElveen *v.*Handshaw.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Trover; from Bulloch superior court — Judge Hardeman. August 28, 1919.

*Fred T. Lanier,*for plaintiff in error.

*T. B. Hunter,*contra.

Luke, J.

The evidence in this ease — a trover suit — demanded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff as to title, and it was not error for the court so to instruct the jury. The only remaining issue was as to the proved value of the property sued for. The charge of the court upon this question was appropriate and full. The evidence authorized the verdict for the plaintiff, and, the judge of the superior court having approved that finding, it was proper to overrule the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1563 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1563

 To prohibit contributions to the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 10, 2023

 Mr. Roy (for himself, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mrs. 
Boebert, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Self, Mr. McClintock, Ms. Greene of Georgia, 
 Mr. Biggs, Mr. Miller of Ohio, Mr. Loudermilk, Mr. Jackson of Texas, 
 Mr. Hudson, and Mr. Steube) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit contributions to the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No taxpayer funding for United 
Nations Human Rights Council Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Secretary of State--
            (1) shall withhold from a United States contribution each 
        fiscal year to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount 
        that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the 
        Secretary determines would be allocated by the United Nations 
        to support the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
            (2) may not make any voluntary contributions to the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council.
    (b) Rescission.--On the date the Secretary of State withholds funds 
pursuant to this section, such funds are rescinded and shall not be 
considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bay View Capital Corporation
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 (the
Report), I, Charles G. Cooper, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
my knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company for the periods presented therein. Date: May 10, 2004 /s/ Charles G. CooperCharles G. CooperPresident and ChiefExecutive Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Bay View Capital Corporation and will be retained by Bay View
Capital Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 23.1


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
MOCON, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
33-42255, 33-49752, and 33-58789) on Form S-8 of MOCON, Inc. of our reports
dated February 23, 2001, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of MOCON,
Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the related
consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and comprehensive
income, and cash flows and related financial statement schedule for each of the
years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2000, which reports appear in
or are incorporated by reference in the December 31, 2000 annual report on Form
10-K of MOCON, Inc.


                                               /s/ KPMG LLP


Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 30, 2001
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERNEST BRAGGS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0756-KD-M

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, :

Defendant. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this

file deemed relevant to the issue raised, and there having been

no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) is ADOPTED

as the opinion of this Court. 

It is ORDERED that this action be and is hereby DISMISSED

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

DONE this 10th day of February, 2010.

s/ Kristi K. DuBose

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00756-KD-M Document 7 Filed 02/10/10 Page 1 of 1
11390.

#### Pitts, administrator, *v.*Rape.

Decided November 2, 1920.

Complaint; from, city court of Houston county — *Judge*Riley. February 9, 1920.

*Marlin & Marlin,*for plaintiff in error.

*M. Kunz,*contra.

Jenkins, P. J.

1. “ A charge stating substantially the law that admissions should be scanned with care, and cautioning the jury not to give them more meaning than they are justly entitled to, was not erroneous.” *Stewart*v. *DeLoach,*86 *Ga.*729 (2) (12 S. E. 1067); *Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray,*113 *Ga.*424, 430 (38 S. E. 992).

2. While a court of record lias plenary control of its judgments during the term at which they are rendered *(Jones*v. *Garage Equipment Co.*16 *Ga. App.*596, 85 S. E. 940), still it is mandatory that they shall in all cases conform to the true meaning and intent of the verdict. *Southern Ry. Co.*v. *Oliver,*1 *Ga. App.*734 (5) (58 S. E. 244) ; *Mangel*v. *White Crown Fruit Jar Co.,*20 *Ga. App.*339 (93 S. E. 307). Thus, in a suit on a note, where the plea filed is that of complete payment, and where a verdict is rendered in favor of tlio defendant, *it is*beyond tlie power of the judge, either in term time or thereafter, to enter up a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a named amount, although the evidence! of the defendant himself in support of his plea of payment might have demanded such a verdict. It was the duty of the judge on motion to set the verdict aside, as being contrary to evidence.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*
Back to Contents

|   | **Exhibit 32.1** |
|--------|------------------|

**CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO SECTION 1350****(furnished, not filed)**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Black Warrior Wireline Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, William L. Jenkins, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ William L. Jenkins

William L. JenkinsPresident and Chief Executive OfficerDecember 8, 2004

 

----
J

- S 47006

- 18

* Retired Senior Judge app ointed to the Superior Court. NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

v.

ZACHARY ZANE MOORE
,

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1278 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 25, 2017 I n the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County C riminal Division at No(s): CP

- 07

- CR

- 0000807

- 2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J. MCLAUGHLIN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J. *

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

FILED : October 19 , 2018

I join the Majority’s holding that Appellant’s discretionary aspects of

sentencing claims are waived , and that the third claim , if not waived, fails to

raise a substantial question. I write separately to express my disquiet about

the nearly unfettered discretion given to trial courts in imposing consecutive

or concurrent sentences.

“The imposition of consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences is

solely within the discretion of the trial court , and does not in and of itself

even r ise to the level of a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.

Johnson , 873 A.2d 704, 709 at n.2 (Pa. Super. 2005).

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is “i n the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of theJ

- S 47006

- 18

- 2

-

individual circumstances before it.” Commonwealth v. Ward
, [] 568 A.2d 1242, 1243 ( [Pa.] 1990); see also Commonwealth v. Jones
, [] 613 A.2d 587, 59 1 ( [Pa. Super.] 1992) ( en banc ) (offering that the sentencing court is in a superior position to “view the defendant’ s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference and the overall effect and nature of the crime.”). Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh

- and

- blood defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing t o its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Walls
, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007).

“ [T] he imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences

may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances,

such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the

nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v.

Lamonda , 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012) ( en banc ) (emphasis

added).

I am mindful of these principles; however, as is so often the case,

inconsistent application of the sentencing factors and limited appellate

review results in similarly situated defendants being treated disparately with

no recourse. I believe this is a situat ion our jurisprudence cannot

countenance. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JOE HENRY SCOTT, III, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0709-WS-C 

CENTRAL RECORDS AND REVIEW : 

BOARD, 

Defendant. : 

 ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to 

the issues raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Report and 

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B) is 

ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court. It is ORDERED that this action be and is 

hereby dismissed without prejudice. 

DONE this 3rd day of June, 2010. 

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:09-cv-00709-WS-C Document 4 Filed 06/03/10 Page 1 of 1