alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                           5                    
<MULTIPLIER>                        1 
<CURRENCY>                       U.S. Dollars
       
<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     3-MOS  
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 SEP-30-1996  
<PERIOD-START>                    OCT-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                         1
<CASH>                                550
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     855,096  
<ALLOWANCES>                       74,848
<INVENTORY>                       901,972
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                1,748,956
<PP&E>                          5,855,952
<DEPRECIATION>                  1,840,052
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  7,566,089
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           3,409,079
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             0
<COMMON>                           40,627
<OTHER-SE>                      1,631,790 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    7,566,089
<SALES>                         2,920,625
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        0
<CGS>                           2,154,317
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     701,314
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   (4,112)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                141,501
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (72,395)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     0
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                      (72,395)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           0
        


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6790

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MIRACLE SMITH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:08-cr-00283-REP-RCY-2; 3:17-

cv-00403-REP)

Submitted: August 24, 2017 Decided: August 29, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Miracle Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Miracle Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s order recharacterizing her 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012) motion as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and denying relief 

on her § 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Smith has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Hunter Ryan Hamilton Woods v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-16-00651-CR

Trial court case number: 1442018

Trial court: 232nd District Court of Harris County

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel, filed a brief on February 13, 2017, 

concluding that the above-referenced appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Although counsel attaches a copy of a letter, 

dated February 13, 2017, to her Anders brief that appears to comply with Kelly v. State, 

436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and refers to an enclosed motion to withdraw, 

counsel has not, however, filed a motion to withdraw from representation with the Clerk 

of this Court.

If appointed counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous, counsel must request 

permission to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An Anders brief must accompany 

a motion to withdraw, neither the brief nor the motion may be filed on its own. See id.; 

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Accordingly, we order appellant’s appointed counsel, Patti Sedita, to file with the 

Clerk of this Court within 10 days of the date of this Order a motion to withdraw that 

complies with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.5 and 9. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5, 9; 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 410, 412.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura Carter Higley

  

Date: February 16, 2017
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Aphton Corporation
(the Company) for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Frederick W. Jacobs, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Chief
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: August 14, 2003



By:

/s/    FREDERICK W.
JACOBSFrederick W. JacobsVice President, Chief Financial Officer,Treasurer and Chief Accounting Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
Position Statement on the 

Role of AFIS Ranks and Scores and the ACE-V Process

SWGFAST Position Statement 

Approved 9/16/11 

Posted: 10/23/11 

Page 1 of 1 

POSITION STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF AFIS RANKS 

AND SCORES AND THE ACE-V PROCESS 

Standard AFIS ranks and scores cannot currently be considered a mathematical model for 

assessing the likelihood or probability that a subject deposited a particular friction ridge 

impression. The purpose of this document is to clarify that AFIS ranks and scores have no role in 

formulating and stating conclusions based on ACE-V.

Ranks and scores are mechanisms of an AFIS system that provide information about a particular 

search relative to prospective candidates whose impressions are contained in the AFIS database. 

They provide possible matching candidates as determined by automated search mechanisms to 

an examiner. 

AFIS does not replace the human expert role in Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, or Verification 

(ACE-V). It is inappropriate to use AFIS scores in lieu of Evaluation or Verification decisions. If 

testifying in court to having followed the ACE-V methodology in response to a “lights-out” AFIS 

identification, the examiner must have performed a traditional ACE examination separate from the 

system determination. Additionally a second examiner must have conducted a Verification. This 

would also apply to searching latent prints in an AFIS database. A latent print examiner cannot 

use an AFIS system result as the verification step of ACE-V.
Exhibit 32.2
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. §1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
     In connection with the Quarterly Report of AMDL, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Arthur S. Rosten,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.     /s/ ARTHUR S. ROSTEN Arthur S. Rosten Chief Financial Officer August 11, 2004
11831.

#### Early *v.*The State.

Decided November 9, 1920.

Accusation of violation of liquor law; from city court of Macom—Judge G-uerry. August 13, 1920.

*Olin J. Wimberly, Grady Gillon,*for plaintiff in error.

*Roy W. Moore, solicitor, H. S. Strozier,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

There is evidence to authorize the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge; no error of law appears, and this court will not interfere.

*Judgment affkmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
### NUMBER 13

- 1 4

- 00 4 32

- CV


## COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF Y . C., A CHILD

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 398 th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam
Appellant, Arabella Tijerina , filed an appeal from a judgment entered by the 398 th
District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, in cause number F

- 1074

- 10

- I . Appellant ha s filed an unopposed motion to dismiss or withdraw the appeal and request s that this Court
dismiss and/or withdraw the appeal. The Court, having considered the documents on file and appellant ’ s u nopposed

motion to dismiss or withdraw the appeal , is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(a). Appellant ’ s motion to dismiss is granted, and the2

appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Costs will be taxed against appellant. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(d) ("Absent agreement of the parties, t he court will tax costs against the appellant."). Having dismissed the appeal at appellant ’ s request, no motion for rehearing
will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

PER CURIAM

De livered and filed the 1 2 th day of February , 20 1 5

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          55,335
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,520,971
<ALLOWANCES>                                   239,774
<INVENTORY>                                  1,366,133
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,824,775
<PP&E>                                       2,211,567
<DEPRECIATION>                                  92,472
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,235,812
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,909,361
<BONDS>                                      4,131,759
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,577
<OTHER-SE>                                     193,115
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,235,812
<SALES>                                     10,454,582
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,454,582
<CGS>                                        8,569,254
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                8,569,254
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,637,778
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                12,202
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             227,986
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (924,981)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (924,981)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (924,981)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 155 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 155

To prohibit a single bill or joint resolution presented by Congress to 
  the President from containing multiple subjects and to require the 
           equal application of laws to Members of Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 9, 2023

    Mr. Fitzpatrick (for himself and Mr. Gallagher) introduced the 
  following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit a single bill or joint resolution presented by Congress to 
  the President from containing multiple subjects and to require the 
           equal application of laws to Members of Congress.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Citizen Legislature Anti-Corruption 
Reform of Congress Act'' or the ``CLEAN Congress Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITING MULTIPLE SUBJECTS IN SINGLE BILL.

    (a) In General.--Each bill, order, resolution, or vote submitted by 
Congress to the President under section 7 of article I of the 
Constitution of the United States shall embrace no more than one 
subject, and that subject shall be clearly and descriptively expressed 
in the title of the bill, order, resolution or vote.
    (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the 
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress and each succeeding Congress.

SEC. 3. REQUIRING EQUAL APPLICATION OF LAWS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
provision of law that provides an exception in its application to a 
Member of Congress or an employee of the office of a Member of Congress 
shall have no effect.
    (b) Clarification Relating to Exercise of Official or 
Representational Duties.--Subsection (a) shall not be construed to 
apply to provisions of law or rules which permit Members of Congress or 
employees of offices of Members of Congress to carry out official 
duties that are tied directly to lawmaking, including provisions or 
rules permitting Members and employees to enter and use the United 
States Capitol, the United States Capitol grounds, and other buildings 
and facilities.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Member of Congress'' 
means a Senator or a Representative in, or Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner to, the Congress.
                                 <all>
```
11297.

#### Newkirk *v.*Burts & Goodman.

Decided October 13, 1920.

Jenkins, P. J.

1. “ The right to rescind a horse-swap exists only by virtue of such special terms of the contract of sale as may so authorize, • or, in the absence of any such agreement, by reason of knowingly false and fraudulent misrepresentations of existing facts, made to the complaining party, whereby he was induced to act to his injury. A mere breach of an express warranty which was the controlling inducement to trade, unaccompanied by any such fraudulent misrepresentation of fact, will not afford ground for the avoidance of such a eontra'ct.” *Battle*v. *Livingston,*21 *Ga. App.*809 (95 S. E. 316); *Dunn*v. *Beasley,*143 *Ga.*376 (85 S. E. 100). The charge of the court was not inadequate, nor was it prejudicial to the defendant as being in conflict with the foregoing rule. The jury was instructed as follows: “If you believe, from the evidence submitted to your consideration, that the defendant made this trade with the plaintiff, and that, in doing "so, a fraud has been perpetrated as alleged in this case, an actual fraud by the defendant upon the plaintiff, and that the same was knowingly perpetrated by the defendant, I charge you that it would be your duty to find for the plaintiff. On the other hand, if you should believe, and should so find by a preponderance of the testimony, that a fraud was perpetrated, but not knowingly by the defendant, you should find in favor of the defendant and against the rescission of the contract.” The jury were authorized, but not compelled, to find that the alleged warranty made by the defendant in this case was accompanied by knowingly false representations as to an existing and material fact, to wit, that the defendant had kept and successfully used the mule to make a crop, whereas he had in fact owned the mule for a period of only three weeks prior to the swap. The jury were thus authorized by the evidence to find that the plaintiff was defrauded in having relied upon this alleged statement of the defendant, both as tending to show the condition of the mule and the opportunity of the defendant to know the facts represented by him to be true.

2. Exception is taken to this portion of the charge: “Look to the evidence and find in favor of that party with whom you believe the preponderance of the testimony lies,” the contention being that the defendant was thus compelled to bring forth preponderating evidence, whereas the rule of law places this burden upon the plaintiff only. This portion of the charge has no reference to where the burden of proof lay, but relates to another subject; and besides, in another portion of the charge, the judge instructed the jury as follows: “I charge you that the burden is upon the plaintiff in this case to prove the allegations as contained in the petition, by a preponderance of the testimony.”

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*

*690January Trover; from city court of Sylvester — Judge Monk. 20, 1920.

*Passmore & Forehand,*for plaintiff in error.

*Perry & Williamson,*contra.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss.1350



In connection with the filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission of BBJ Environmental Technologies,
Inc.s (the Company) Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2004 (the Report), I, Jean Caillet, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify in my capacity as an officer of the Company,
that:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of
ss.13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



The above certification is given as of the date of the Report and is limited to the periods covered by the Report.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this
Certificate on May 20, 2004.



By:

/s/ Jean CailletJean Caillet  Chief Executive Officer




A signed original or this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission of its staff upon request.
# • ORIGINAL (
IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RETHE PETITION OF CHLOE RODDY PR23-0004 

# FILED JUN 13 2023 Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER

Chloe Roddy has petitioned this Court for admission to active status in the State Bar ofMontana after havingbeen on inactive status sinceApril 2022. IT IS ORDERED that upon payment of the appropriate fees to the State Bar of Montana, Petitioner shall be admitted to the active practice of law in the state of Montana. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within six months of the date of this Order, Petitioner shall submit to the Board of Continuing Legal Education, P.O. Box 577, Helena, MT 59624, proof of attendance at fifteen hours of approved Continuing Legal Educationto be creditedtothetime Petitioner was on inactive status. The Clerk is directed to provide copies ofthis Order to Petitioner and to the State Bar ofMontana. DATED this 13th day ofJune, 2023. Forthe Court, By 06/13/2023

Case Number: PR 23-0004