J-A20021-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

ESTATE OF OLYMPIA GEORGES, 

DECEASED 

APPEAL OF: GEORGE A. GEORGES 

AND JAMES A. GEORGES 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 3012 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 0681-2023-O 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J. 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2024 

Appellants, George Georges and James Georges, Esq., appeal from the 

Orphans’ Court’s Decree entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 

County, on November 15, 2023, which granted the Petition of the 

Administrator Pendente Lite, Michael Mattison, Esq., for sanctions in the 

amount of $3,160 against James Georges and George Georges pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2503.1 Section 2503 provides: 

Right of participants to receive counsel fees 

The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel 

fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter: 

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1

 The amount of $3,160 was awarded to the Administrator based on his 

hourly rate of $395 per hour and estimated 8 hours to review Appellants 

frivolous filings. The Orphans’ Court based the award on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2503(7). 
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(1) The holder of bonds of a private corporation who 

successfully recovers due and unpaid interest, the liability for the 

payment of which was denied by the corporation. 

(2) A garnishee who enters an appearance in a matter which 

is discontinued prior to answer filed. 

(3) A garnishee who is found to have in his possession or 

control no indebtedness due to or other property of the debtor 

except such, if any, as has been admitted by answer filed. 

(4) A possessor of property claimed by two or more other 

persons, if the possessor interpleads the rival claimants, disclaims 

all interest in the property and disposes of the property as the 

court may direct. 

(5) The prevailing party in an interpleader proceeding in 

connection with execution upon a judgment. 

(6) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a 

sanction against another participant for violation of any general 

rule which expressly prescribes the award of counsel fees as a 

sanction for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the 

pendency of any matter. 

(7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a 

sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or 

vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter. 

(8) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a 

fund within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to any general 

rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the 

jurisdiction of the court. 

(9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the 

conduct of another party in commencing the matter or otherwise 

was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith. 

(10) Any other participant in such circumstances as may be 

specified by statute heretofore or hereafter enacted. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503. The trial court accurately summarized the factual and 

procedural history of the case. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 1/31/24, at 
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1-5. Therefore, a detailed recitation of the factual and procedural history is 

unnecessary. 

The trial court considered Appellants’ opposition to the aforesaid 

Petition. In its January 31, 2024 opinion, the trial court has aptly reviewed 

Appellants’ arguments on the merits. However, we have reviewed the certified 

record and the briefs, and the relevant law, and conclude that this is an 

attempted appeal of an interlocutory order. 

An “appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by 

statute.” Funk v. Empfield, 281 A.3d 315, 318 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting 

Gasper v. Gasper, 432 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 1981)). “A final order 

disposes of all claims and of all parties ....” Pa.R.A.P. 341. 

It is well settled: 

Under Pennsylvania law, an appeal may only be taken from an 

interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311), from a final order 

(Pa.R.A.P. 341), from a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313), or from 

an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 313, 1311, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)). 

Smitley v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 707 A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. Super. 1998). 

Generally, an order imposing sanctions is interlocutory and not appealable. 

See, e.g., Brawley Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Heartland Props., 712 A.2d 331, 

331 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quashing appeal from an order granting fees based 

upon frivolous pre-trial filing). “An appeal from an order either awarding or 

denying attorney's fees is interlocutory.” Block v. Bilinski, 823 A.2d 970, 

973 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
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On August 13, 2024, Appellee, Mattson, filed an Application to Quash 

because, inter alia, the appeal is from an interlocutory order. Appellants filed 

a response to the application on August 19, 2024. We denied the application 

“without prejudice to the issue being raised at the time of oral argument.” 

Order, 8/19/24. For the reasons cited above, we find the order granting 

sanctions to be interlocutory and unappealable, and therefore grant the 

application to quash.2

Appeal quashed. 

Date: 9/19/2024 

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2

 In a decedent's estate, generally the confirmation of the final account of the 

personal representative constitutes the final order subjected to exceptions and 

appeal. In re Est. of Cherwinski, 856 A.2d 165, 166-57 (2004). A surcharge 

in an estate case is final between the estate and the respondent and is, 

therefore, subject to immediate appeal. The decree in this case is an order for 

sanctions and not an order for a surcharge.