PUBLISH

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

IN RE EUROGAS, INC.,

 Debtor.

__________________________________

THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC,

 Appellant,

v.

ELIZABETH R. LOVERIDGE, Chapter 7 

Trustee, EUROGAS, INC., and TEXAS 

EURO GAS CORP.,

 Appellees.

BAP No. UT-16-033

Bankr. No. 04-28075

Chapter 7

OPINION

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Utah

_________________________________

Brent D. Wride (Michael R. Johnson with him on the brief) of Ray Quinney & Nebeker 

P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant. 

Reid W. Lambert of Woodbury & Kesler, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee 

Elizabeth R. Loveridge, Chapter 7 Trustee.

Doyle S. Byers (Mona L. Burton with him on the brief) of Holland & Hart LLP, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Appellee Eurogas, Inc.

_________________________________

Before MICHAEL, ROMERO, and HALL, Bankruptcy Judges.

_________________________________

ROMERO, Bankruptcy Judge.

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

November 21, 2017

Blaine F. Bates

Clerk
2

_________________________________

Appellant, the Slovak Republic, appeals the bankruptcy court’s order approving a 

settlement agreement proposed by the Chapter 7 trustee, which provides for the 

bankruptcy estate’s abandonment of litigation claims in exchange for consideration and 

waiver of claims. Because we find Appellant lacks standing, we dismiss this appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

a. The 2004 Bankruptcy

In June 2004, the Southern District of Texas bankruptcy court entered a judgment 

against Eurogas, Inc. (the “Debtor”), the Debtor’s principals, and five other corporate 

entities in the amount of $113,733,315 plus interest. The judgment creditors, consisting 

of several bankrupt entities and their principals, were represented by a Chapter 7 trustee

(the “Texas Trustee”). The Texas Trustee initiated the Debtor’s involuntary Chapter 7 

proceeding in the District of Utah bankruptcy court in May 2004. In November 2004, the 

Texas Trustee filed a proof of claim in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case in the amount of 

$113,371,837 (the “$113 Million Judgment”). Texas Euro Gas Corp. (“Texas Euro Gas”) 

purchased the $113 Million Judgment claim from the Texas Trustee in September 2007.1

Neither the Debtor nor its officers or representatives filed schedules or statements 

in the bankruptcy case, despite a court order to do so.2 The appointed Chapter 7 trustee in 

the Debtor’s case investigated assets, liquidated them, and distributed approximately 

 1 Despite the name, it does not appear that Texas Euro Gas is affiliated with the 

Debtor or EuroGas, Inc.

2 In re Eurogas, Inc., 560 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. D. Utah 2016). 
3

$700,000 to creditors, representing a .56 percent distribution on the claims in the case.3

Texas Euro Gas received the majority of that distribution on account of the $113 Million 

Judgment.4 The bankruptcy court closed the case in March 2007. During the Debtor’s 

bankruptcy case, the Debtor’s officers, directors, and shareholders formed a second entity 

also named EuroGas, Inc. (“EuroGas”). EuroGas incorporated in November 2005 and 

asserts that it merged with the Debtor in July 2008, assuming all of the Debtor’s assets 

and liabilities.5

b. The 2015 Reopening

In September 2015, Texas Euro Gas sent a letter to the United States Trustee for 

the District of Utah (the “U.S. Trustee”), urging the U.S. Trustee to reopen the 

bankruptcy case to investigate additional property of the estate, which Texas Euro Gas 

suggested had not been administered during the bankruptcy case. The assets related to the 

Debtor’s interest in a foreign entity. As of the date of the involuntary petition, the Debtor 

was the sole stockholder of an Austrian company. The Austrian company owned a thirtythree percent interest in a Slovakian corporation, Rozmin, s.r.o. (“Rozmin”).6 Rozmin 

owned a twenty-four percent interest in mining rights to talc deposits in the Slovak 

 3 Id. 

4 The remaining claims totaled approximately $1.3 million. Exhibit A to Motion to 

Approve Agreement at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 21. 

5 Id. at 3-4, in Appellant’s App. at 22-23.

6 Eurogas, 560 B.R. at 578.
4

Republic (the “Talc Mining Rights”).7 The Slovak Republic revoked the Talc Mining 

Rights in December 2004.8 This led to several lawsuits in the Slovak Republic over the 

Talc Mining Rights, which remain unresolved (the “Talc Mining Rights Claims”). Prior 

to Texas Euro Gas’ letter to the U.S. Trustee, EuroGas initiated an arbitration proceeding 

before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Paris, France, 

seeking resolution of the Talc Mining Rights Claims (the “Arbitration”). 

The U.S. Trustee filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case, explaining the 

Chapter 7 trustee may not have administered the Talc Mining Rights Claims. The U.S. 

Trustee requested the bankruptcy court reopen the case to allow a trustee to investigate 

and potentially administer the Talc Mining Rights Claims.

9 The bankruptcy court 

reopened the bankruptcy case over EuroGas’ objection. The U.S. Trustee selected

Elizabeth Loveridge for appointment as the Chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee Loveridge”) on 

December 21, 2015. 

c. Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement and Notice of Abandonment

 7 Objection to Motion to Reopen Under 11 U.S.C. §350, for an Order to Appoint 

Chapter 7 Trustee under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010 and Delay Payment of the Filing Fee 

Pursuant to L.B.R. 510(b) at 4, in Appellee’s App. at 4.

8 Memorandum Decision at 6, in Appellant’s App. at 75. Rozmin immediately 

contested the revocation of the Talc Mining Rights, which led to three Slovakian 

Supreme Court decisions confirming the revocation violated the Slovak Republic’s laws. 

Despite these rulings, the Slovak Republic refused to reinstate the Talc Mining Rights.

Exhibit A to Motion to Approve Agreement at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 22. 

9 Motion to Reopen Under 11 U.S.C. §350, for an Order to Appoint Chapter 7 

Trustee under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010 and Delay Payment of the Filing Fee Pursuant to 

L.B.R. 510(b). Bankr. ECF No. 148.
5

After her appointment, Trustee Loveridge investigated ownership of the Talc 

Mining Rights Claims. Trustee Loveridge determined she “would be required to bring an 

adversary proceeding against EuroGas,” to establish the estate’s interest in the Talc 

Mining Rights Claims, “which would require substantial time and resources.”10

Accordingly, Trustee Loveridge negotiated a settlement agreement with EuroGas that 

provided for Trustee Loveridge’s abandonment of the estate’s interest in the Talc Mining 

Rights Claims in exchange for consideration (the “Agreement”). The pertinent portions of 

the Agreement provide that in exchange for consideration of $150,000 from EuroGas to 

the bankruptcy estate, Trustee Loveridge would file a notice of abandonment of any 

remaining interest in the Talc Mining Rights Claims (the “Abandonment”). Upon 

bankruptcy court approval of the Abandonment, EuroGas would make an additional 

payment of the lesser of (a) $100,000; or (b) the amount needed to pay administrative 

claims in full plus an additional $175,000 distribution to creditors. This effectively 

capped EuroGas’ consideration at $250,000. As further incentive for the Abandonment, 

Texas Euro Gas agreed to withdraw its proof of claim for the $113 Million Judgment, 

eliminating the debt from the estate.

Trustee Loveridge filed the Motion to Approve Agreement and Notice of Intent to 

Abandon Property of the Estate (the “Settlement Pleadings”) in August 2016.11 The 

 10 Exhibit A to Motion to Approve Agreement at 4, in Appellant’s App. at 23. Trustee

Loveridge found the pervious Chapter 7 trustee “did not expressly abandon” the mining 

rights, “but may or may not have intended that the [mining rights] be abandoned upon 

closing of the Bankruptcy Case.” Id., in Appellant’s App. at 23.

11 Appellant’s App. at 8, 26.
6

Slovak Republic objected to the Settlement Pleadings, arguing the Agreement was 

effectively a sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363,12 instead of a settlement or compromise and the 

Agreement was not made in good faith because it relied on the withdrawal of Texas Euro 

Gas’ claim—among other arguments.13 After Trustee Loveridge and EuroGas entered the 

Agreement, the Slovak Republic offered $250,000 to purchase the estate’s interest in the 

Talc Mining Rights Claims by quitclaim deed.

14

After conducting a three-day hearing, the bankruptcy court approved the 

Agreement, finding its terms, including withdrawal of Texas Euro Gas’ claim, resulted in 

a fifteen to twenty percent distribution on the claims of unsecured creditors.15 The 

bankruptcy court noted whether the Talc Mining Rights Claims were property of the 

bankruptcy estate or were previously abandoned was “of great interest to both [EuroGas] 

and the Slovak Republic.”16 The bankruptcy court also noted the Slovak Republic 

objected “not because it believe[d] it [would] be paid more as a creditor if the Agreement 

[was] rejected, but because it [stood] to benefit in the [Arbitration]” if the bankruptcy 

 12 All future references to “Code,” “Section,” and “§” are to the Bankruptcy Code, 

Title 11 of the United States Code, unless otherwise indicated.

13 The Slovak Republic’s Combined Objection to the Chapter 7 Trustee’s (A) Motion 

to Approve Agreement, and (B) Notice of Intent to “Abandon” Property (the “Objection 

to Compromise”), in Appellant’s App. at 32. 

14 In re Eurogas, Inc., 560 B.R. 574, 581 (Bankr. D. Utah 2016).

15 Id. at 580.

16 Id. at 579.
7

court did not approve the Agreement and Abandonment.17 The bankruptcy court 

considered the Slovak Republic’s argument that the Agreement was effectively a § 363 

sale, but determined there was no advantage to creditors to applying a § 363 analysis. The 

bankruptcy court found Trustee Loveridge “compromised several issues that would 

require protracted litigation” and that “[a]voiding litigation may be the subject of a 

compromise or settlement.”18

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court reviewed the Agreement as a Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9019 settlement and applied the analysis set forth in 

Kopexa.

19 The bankruptcy court’s analysis under the Kopexa factors weighed in favor of 

approving the Agreement. The bankruptcy court also authorized Trustee Loveridge to 

abandon any claim to the Talc Mining Rights Claims pursuant to § 554(a) as being 

burdensome and of inconsequential value to the estate. Specifically, the bankruptcy court 

found litigation to determine the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the Talc Mining Rights 

Claims would be costly and the Talc Mining Rights Claims were of inconsequential value 

to any parties outside of the Arbitration.20 The bankruptcy court also relied on Trustee

 17 Id. at 581. The bankruptcy court was also “aware that the matters in [the] 

bankruptcy case [were] important to the Slovak Republic and [EuroGas] not on their own 

account, but because the parties hope[d] to gain an advantage in the [Arbitration].” Id. at 

579.

18 Id. at 582 (citing Rich Dad Operating Co., LLC v. Zubrod (In re Rich Glob., LLC), 

652 F. App’x 625, 630 (10th Cir. 2016)).

19 In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R 1020 (10th Cir. BAP 1997). All future 

references to “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

20 Eurogas, 560 B.R. at 586.
8

Loveridge’s business judgment for rejecting the Slovak Republic’s offer to purchase the 

Talc Mining Rights Claims for $250,000 by quitclaim transfer.

Trustee Loveridge requested the bankruptcy court approve the abandonment nunc 

pro tunc, but the bankruptcy court did not specifically order nunc pro tunc relief because 

“[w]hen property is abandoned, it ‘reverts to the debtor and stands as if no bankruptcy 

petition was filed.’”21 The bankruptcy court concluded that the Agreement and 

Abandonment removed the dispute over title of the Talc Mining Rights Claims from the 

context of the bankruptcy case. Any further disputes as to the Talc Mining Rights 

Claims’ title would be resolved in the Arbitration. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court 

entered the Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Approve Agreement and Memorandum 

Decision (collectively, the “Decision”), granting the Settlement Motion and approving 

the Abandonment. The Slovak Republic filed a timely notice of appeal of the Decision.

EuroGas filed the Motion to Dismiss Appeal (the “Motion to Dismiss”),22 alleging the 

Slovak Republic lacks standing to appeal, which we now consider.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to hear timely filed appeals from “final judgments, 

orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy courts within the Tenth Circuit, unless one of the 

parties elects to have the district court hear the appeal.23 The Slovak Republic appeals an 

 21 Id. (quoting In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom. 

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)).

22 BAP ECF No. 16.

23 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1), & (c)(1); Rule 8005; 10th Cir. BAP L.R. 8005-1.
9

order approving a settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 9019, which is a final order of 

the bankruptcy court.24 None of the parties elected to have this appeal heard by the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah. 

While a determination as to the legal standard applied to an issue is typically 

reviewed de novo,

25 the Tenth Circuit recognizes that a bankruptcy court’s decision 

“[w]hether to impose formal [§ 363] sale procedures is ultimately a matter of discretion 

that depends on the dynamics of the particular situation.”26 The bankruptcy court’s 

approval of a settlement agreement brought pursuant to Rule 9019 is also reviewed for 

abuse of discretion.27 A bankruptcy court’s decision to authorize or disallow 

abandonment is reviewed for abuse of discretion.28 Similarly, a bankruptcy court’s 

 24 Loyd v. Foxglove, Inc. (In re S. Med. Arts Cos.), 343 B.R. 250, 254 (10th Cir. BAP 

2006).

25 Hadden v Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The issue of whether the 

[trial] court relied on the correct legal standard . . . is a matter of law which we review de 

novo.”).

26 Rich Dad Operating Co., LLC v. Zubrod (In re Rich Glob., LLC), 652 F. App’x 

625, 630 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Goodwin v. Mickey Thompson Enter. Grp., Inc., 292 

B.R. 415, 422 (9th Cir. BAP 2003)).

27 S. Med. Arts Cos., 343 B.R. at 261 (“The approval of a compromise is within the 

sound discretion of the bankruptcy court and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 

(citing In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R. 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. BAP 1997))).

28 See In re Buerge, Nos. KS-12-074, KS-12-077, KS-12-078, KS-13-022, KS-13-

023, KS-13-024, KS-13-025, 2014 WL 1309694, at *19 (10th Cir. BAP Apr. 2, 2014) 

(finding bankruptcy court abused discretion in compelling abandonment under § 554(b)); 

see also In re Schwarz Publ’g, Inc., 398 F. App’x 321, 321-22 (9th Cir. 2010); In re 

Johnston, 49 F.3d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re K.C. Mach. & Tool, Co., 816 

F.2d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 1987)).
10

decision whether to enter an order nunc pro tunc will not be disturbed absent abuse of 

discretion.29

III. DISCUSSION

a. The Slovak Republic’s Standing to Appeal

In the Motion to Dismiss, EuroGas argues the Slovak Republic lacks standing to 

appeal the Decision. The Slovak Republic obtained standing as an unsecured creditor in 

the bankruptcy case by purchasing two unsecured claims.30 In the Motion to Dismiss, 

EuroGas argues the Slovak Republic is not an aggrieved party because, as an unsecured 

creditor, the Slovak Republic stands to receive a greater return on its claim under the 

Agreement than it otherwise would. The Slovak Republic responds, arguing: (1) EuroGas 

waived its right to contest the Slovak Republic’s standing by not objecting below; and (2) 

the Slovak Republic is an aggrieved party because the bankruptcy court’s orders 

foreclosed a § 363 sale, which may have generated a greater distribution to creditors.

We begin with a review of standing. Constitutional standing is a threshold issue 

that may be raised at any time.31 Constitutional standing requires an injury in fact; a 

 29 In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265, 1265 (10th Cir. 1991) (order denying nunc pro tunc 

relief reviewed for abuse of discretion); Malloy v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 298 B.R. 435, 

439 (10th Cir. BAP 2003) (order granting nunc pro tunc relief reviewed for abuse of 

discretion), aff’d 99 F. App’x 870 (10th Cir. 2004).

30 The Slovak Republic purchased claims three and four, each in the amount of 

$240,181 from the original claimant O & F Proinvest AG, a Swiss corporation, and filed 

a notice of transfer of claim for both on August 19, 2016. 

31 In re Blagg, No. NO-01-006, 2001 WL 725993, at *5 (10th Cir. BAP June 28, 

2001) (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1993)).
11

causal relationship between the injury in fact and the challenged conduct; and a 

likelihood that the injury will be redressed by the court’s review.32 Where existence of a 

case or controversy is not an issue, courts may impose “a judicially-created set of 

principles that, like constitutional standing, places ‘limits on the class of persons who 

may invoke the courts’ decisional and remedial powers,’” known as prudential 

standing.33 Generally, the “‘party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing’ standing.”34

“[A] party that has satisfied the requirements of constitutional standing may 

nonetheless be barred from invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction.”35 Prudential standing 

necessitates meeting three conditions a party must overcome before invoking federal 

jurisdiction: (1) “a plaintiff must assert his own rights, rather than those belonging to 

third parties;” (2) “the plaintiff’s claim must not be a generalized grievance shared in 

substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens;” and (3) “a plaintiff’s 

grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the 

statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.”36

 32 Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir. 1998).

33 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Sweetwater Cty. v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

34 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014) (quoting Clapper 

v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411-12 (2013)).

35 Geringer, 297 F.3d at 1112 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)).

36 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
12

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals places prudential standing limitations on 

bankruptcy appeals, recognizing that, “although the Bankruptcy Code ‘does not contain 

an explicit grant or limitation on appellate standing,’ only a ‘person aggrieved’ by a 

bankruptcy court’s order may appeal.”37 The “person aggrieved” standard “is more 

stringent . . . than the ‘case or controversy’ standing requirement . . . because it is 

designed to limit appellate standing ‘in order to avoid endless appeals brought by a 

myriad of parties who are indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.’”38 A 

“person aggrieved” is a person “whose rights or interests are directly and adversely 

affected pecuniarily by the decree or order of the bankruptcy court.”39 “Accordingly, to 

qualify as a person aggrieved, [a party] would have to show that the bankruptcy court 

order at issue ‘diminish[ed his] property, increase[ed his] burdens, or impair[ed his] 

rights.”40 “Appellants bear the burden to demonstrate standing.”41

 37 In re Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc., 282 B.R. 9, 13-14 (10th Cir. BAP 2002) 

(quoting In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1994)); Holmes v. 

Silver Wings Aviation, Inc., 881 F.2d 939, 940 (10th Cir. 1989) (adopting the “person 

aggrieved” standard).

38 In re Kreutzer, 249 F. App’x 727, 729 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Ready Mix. 

Inc., 14 F.3d at 1500) (internal citations omitted).

39 Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d at 1500 (quoting Holmes, 881 F.2d at 940.

40 Kreutzer, 249 F. App’x at 729 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 

F.3d at 1500); Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d at 1500 (“standard [ ] requires an appellant 

to show that he is a ‘person aggrieved’ by the challenged bankruptcy court order.”).

41 In re Miner, 229 B.R. 561, 565 (2d Cir. BAP 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. of Lancaster 

v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1330, 1332 (3d Cir. 1990)); Spenlinhauer v. 

O’Donnell, 261 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing numerous cases) (concluding the 

party asserting appellate jurisdiction bears the burden of proving standing).
13

The Slovak Republic correctly points out prudential standing differs from 

constitutional standing in that the former is not jurisdictional and may be waived.42

However, Tenth Circuit authority provides the “‘person aggrieved’ test is meant to be a 

limitation on appellate standing.”43 Furthermore, the Rules required Trustee Loveridge to 

provide all creditors with notice and opportunity to object to the Settlement Pleadings.

44

Accordingly, EuroGas had no basis to object to the Slovak Republic’s standing under the 

person aggrieved standard prior to the appeal. Therefore, EuroGas has not waived the 

standing issue.

The Slovak Republic contends it is a person aggrieved based on its status as an 

unsecured creditor of the bankruptcy estate. The Slovak Republic argues had the 

bankruptcy court required a § 363 sale of the Talc Mining Rights Claims, the estate 

would have realized more for distribution to unsecured creditors. The Slovak Republic 

also argues issues in the Arbitration diminish its property, increase its burdens, or

 42 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1154 (10th Cir. 2013)

(“Prudential standing doctrines are not jurisdictional: they may be forfeited or waived.”)

(citing Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007)); see also Niemi v. 

Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1345 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cty, 

632 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011)). 

43 In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.2d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).

44 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(3) requires all creditors receive twenty-one days notice 

of a hearing on approval of a compromise or settlement. Even if, as the Slovak Republic 

argues, the Agreement should have been reviewed as a sale under § 363, all creditors 

must receive twenty-one days notice. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(2).
14

otherwise impair its rights. However, the Slovak Republic abandoned this contention at 

oral argument.45

EuroGas counters, asserting while being an unsecured creditor gave the Slovak 

Republic standing to participate in the hearing on the Settlement Pleadings, it is not a 

person aggrieved for purposes of appellate standing because it benefited from the 

Decision. EuroGas argues but for the Agreement, there is virtually no payout on the

Slovak Republic’s unsecured claims because the $113 Million Judgment receives the 

majority of the distribution to the class. However, under the Agreement, the distribution 

to unsecured creditors significantly increases upon withdrawal of the $113 Million 

Judgment. Accordingly, the Slovak Republic is not harmed by the Agreement and has no 

standing as a person aggrieved. Even had the bankruptcy court required a sale of the Talc 

Mining Rights Claims, EuroGas urges, a sale to a third party would not have included the 

withdrawal of the $113 Million Judgment, leaving the Slovak Republic with virtually no 

recovery on its unsecured claims. 

Although the Slovak Republic argues its objection to the claim for the $113 

Million Judgment would result in the same increased distribution to unsecured creditors, 

this argument depends on a number of unknown outcomes. As this Court recognizes, 

where there are “multiple layers of intertwined contingencies that must occur in order for 

[an appellant] to arguably claim any pecuniary benefit from the appeal,” the party’s 

 45 When questioned by the panel at oral argument as to the basis for standing, the 

Slovak Republic relied solely on its status as an unsecured creditor.
15

“interest in the appeal [is] too remote and indirect to confer standing.”46 The Slovak 

Republic’s argument is contingent upon the bankruptcy court sustaining the objection to 

the $113 Million Judgment claim, which may or may not occur.

Accordingly, we agree the Slovak Republic lacks standing to appeal the Decision. 

As an unsecured creditor, the Slovak Republic offers no explanation to suggest how the 

Decision diminishes its property, increases its burdens, or impairs its rights. Because the 

Agreement results in a significant increase in the distribution to unsecured creditors, the 

only logical reason the Slovak Republic could have to appeal the Decision is to better its 

position in the Arbitration.

47 Such reasons are insufficient to confer standing to appeal the 

Decision and the Slovak Republic has not met its burden of establishing appellate 

jurisdiction.

48

b. The Merits of the Appeal

Even if this Court determined the Slovak Republic had standing and considered

the merits of the appeal, we cannot hold that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 

 46 In re Paige, No. UT-08-062, 2010 WL 3699747, at *11 (10th Cir. BAP Sept. 15, 

2010) (stating that financial stake would be had if party sought to overturn a judgment 

and confirm a more favorable plan of reorganization was too remote to support standing).

47 We note, on August 18, 2017, the Slovak Republic filed a copy of the Award, 

indicating the adjudicating body dismissed the Arbitration. BAP ECF No. 69. 

48 See In re Ernie Haire Ford, Inc., 764 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] 

party is not aggrieved, for the purposes of appealing from a bankruptcy court order, when 

the only interest allegedly harmed by that order is the interest in avoiding liability from 

an adversary proceeding.”); In re LTV Steel Co., 560 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 

numerous cases) (“we are aware of no court that has held that the burden of defending a 

lawsuit, however onerous or unpleasant, is the sort of direct and immediate harm that 

makes a party ‘aggrieved’ so as to confer standing in a bankruptcy appeal.”).
16

approving the Agreement and authorizing the Abandonment. First, the bankruptcy court 

considered whether the Agreement should be analyzed as a § 363 sale and determined, 

using its discretion, it would not benefit creditors to do so. Furthermore, the bankruptcy 

court stated, “[a] sale presupposes a property right that can be sold. If the Trustee were to 

undertake to sell the [Talc Mining Rights Claims], she would need to ascertain whether 

the bankruptcy estate owns” those claims.49 “As [Trustee Loveridge] stated . . . she was 

unable to determine whether or not the [Talc Mining Rights Claims] remained with the 

bankruptcy estate . . . .”50 As determining the ownership of the Talc Mining Rights 

Claims “indicate[d] that formal sale procedures under § 363 would be a lengthy and 

litigious process, . . . [i]t does not appear that there is any advantage to be gained for 

creditors by applying . . . § 363 in lieu of treating [the] transaction under Rule 9019.”51

Furthermore, the bankruptcy court properly applied the factors set forth in 

Kopexa,

52 in determining the Agreement was fair and reasonable. Kopexa requires “(1) 

the chance of success on the litigation on the merits; (2) possible problems in collecting 

 49 In re Eurogas, Inc., 560 B.R. 574, 582 (Bankr. D. Utah 2016).

50 Id.

51 Id. (“[T]o the extent the Agreement is not a classic settlement, it is still within the 

purview of Rule 9019 as a compromise. The Trustee has compromised several issues that 

would require protracted litigation. Avoiding litigation may be the subject of a 

compromise or settlement.”) (citing Rich Dad Operating Co., LLC v. Zubrod (In re Rich 

Glob., LLC), 652 F. App’x 625, 629-30 (10th Cir. 2016)).

52 In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R. 1020 (10th Cir. BAP 1997).
17

the judgment; (3) the expense and complexity of the litigation; and (4) the interest of the 

creditors.”53

The bankruptcy court found the probability of success of litigation, the complexity 

and expense of litigation, and the interest of creditors all weighed in favor of approving 

the Agreement. The bankruptcy court considered the difficulty of collection a negligible 

factor because should the bankruptcy estate be determined the owner of the Talc Mining 

Rights Claims, Trustee Loveridge would likely liquidate the claims instead of enforcing a 

judgment. However, because no factor weighed against approving the Agreement and 

Trustee Loveridge “adequately explained the business reasons for entering into [the]

Agreement,” the bankruptcy court approved the Agreement.54

Finally, in considering the Abandonment, the bankruptcy court correctly found 

pursuing litigation to determine ownership of the Talc Mining Claims would place a 

burden on an estate with no assets to fund such litigation. Additionally, the bankruptcy 

court did not err in finding the Talc Mining Rights Claims were 

very valuable to the parties in the Arbitration [], but because they are not 

liquid claims, or easily administered, the [Talc Mining Rights Claims] are 

of inconsequential value to the bankruptcy estate outside of an arrangement 

with one of those two parties. The Trustee is trying to maximize the value 

to the estate with the Agreement with [EuroGas].55

 53 Loyd v. Foxglove, Inc. (In re S. Med. Arts Cos.), 343 B.R. 250, 256 (10th Cir. BAP 

2006) (citing In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R. 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. BAP 

1997)).

54 In re Eurogas, 560 B.R. 574, 585 (Bankr. D. Utah 2016).

55 Id.
18

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court appropriately considered and relied on Trustee

Loveridge’s business judgment in authorizing the Abandonment. As such, the bankruptcy 

court did not abuse its discretion.56

IV. CONCLUSION

The Slovak Republic appeals an order that creates no demonstrable harm to its 

status, but only increases dividends paid to unsecured creditors. Because the Slovak 

Republic does not establish it is a “person aggrieved,” other than by implicating the 

Arbitration, we must dismiss this appeal for appellant’s lack of standing. Accordingly, it 

is hereby ordered that this appeal is DISMISSED.

 56 Finding no Tenth Circuit authority, the Court notes other circuits and bankruptcy 

courts recognize when determining whether an asset is burdensome or of inconsequential 

value, the bankruptcy court must “find the trustee made: 1) a business judgment; 2) in 

good faith; 3) upon some reasonable basis; and 4) within the trustee’s scope of authority.” 

In re Slack, 290 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003), aff’d, 112 F. App’x 868 (3d Cir. 

2004); Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th ed., rev. ¶ 554.02[4].