IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JEFFERY WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0433-KD-C

MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF :

EDUCATION, 

:

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is before the undersigned on the Motion for Summary

Judgment of Defendant, Monroe County Board of Education (Docs. 6, 7, 17, 18, 23, 24),

and Plaintiff’s opposition thereto. (Docs. 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 22). For the reasons stated

below, it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted

and that Plaintiff’s action against Defendant be dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the parties’ allegations

material to the issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation as follows. 

1. According to Plaintiff, on or before October 11, 2006, Lana Wilson, the former

principal at Monroeville Junior High School, subjected him to “racial slurs,” using the

word “nigger” twice during a meeting with Plaintiff in Wilson’s office at the school. 

(Doc. 1 at 2, Complaint; Doc. 11 at 1, Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss; Doc. 11

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at 4, Plaintiff’s letter to Dennis Mixon, Superintendent of the Monroe County Board of

Education). 

2. On October 11, 2006, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Dennis Mixon, Superintendent

of the Monroe County Board of Education (“the Board”), requesting the opportunity to

speak about this incident at a school board meeting scheduled for November 9, 2006;

however, the Board denied him the opportunity to do so. (Doc. 11 at 4; Doc. 13 at 2,

Letter to Plaintiff from Dennis Mixon; Doc. 16 at 1, Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for

Summary Judgment). 

3. Defendant responds that, on or before October 11, 2006, Lana Wilson met with

Plaintiff, as well as with parents of other children at the school, to discuss her concerns

about possible gang activity at the school. (Doc. 23 at 2, Affidavit of Lana Wilson). 

4. According to Wilson, she discovered a note that had been exchanged by

Plaintiff’s grandson and other students at the school discussing possible gang activity, and

the note referred to a group called “TYN.” (Id. at 2; id. at 5, student note).

5. Wilson asked the students what “TYN” stood for, and they told her “The Young

[N-word]s.” (Id. at 2) (brackets in original). 

6. After speaking with the students, Wilson called a meeting with the students’

parents and other family members in an effort to work with them to try to combat what

she suspected was gang activity. (Id.). 

7. When Wilson met with the parents and Plaintiff, Wilson was asked what “TYN”

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1

 Plaintiff’s Complaint is extremely brief, consisting of only four sentences. (Doc. 1). 

For purposes of determining the timeliness of this action, the Court has considered the

allegations contained in all of Plaintiff’s filings and has liberally construed those allegations to

ascertain Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant.

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stood for, and, in responding to the question, Wilson “used the N-word, just as the

students had used it when telling [her] what ‘TYN’ stood for.” (Id. at 2-3). 

8. According to Wilson, Plaintiff became very upset and accused her of using a

racial slur toward him. (Id.).

9. Defendant further maintains that Plaintiff was allowed to address the Board at

the November 9, 2006, meeting; however, when Plaintiff began talking about his

grandson, he was told that, because of privacy concerns, he would have to wait and

discuss the issue in executive session because his comments concerned a particular

student. (Id. at 3; Doc. 18, att. 1 at 3, Minutes of November 9, 2006, school board

meeting). Plaintiff refused to wait and left the meeting. (Doc. 23 at 3). 

10. On July 16, 2009, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the Monroe County Board of Education, alleging violations of his rights

under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arising out of Lana Wilson’s use of racial slurs against

him and Defendant’s refusal to allow him to speak at the November 9, 2006, school board

meeting.1

 (Docs. 1, 11, 16, 20). 

11. On August 24, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court

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converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 5, 2009. (Docs. 6, 7, 15, 17,

18). 

12. Plaintiff filed multiple responses in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 11, 12, 13, 16, 20). 

13. On March 29, 2010, the Court raised the issue of the timeliness of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, sua sponte, and ordered Plaintiff to file a response addressing that issue (Doc.

21), which Plaintiff filed on April 14, 2010. (Doc. 22). 

14. Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff’s response on April 30, 2010. (Doc. 24).

15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

untimely, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted on that

basis.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

1. In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, the Court begins

with these basic principles. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for

summary judgment. 

2. “[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

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3. All of the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d

1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). 

4. However, Rule 56(e) states that:

When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on

allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response

must--by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule--set

out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the

opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment

should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

5. “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations

omitted). 6. “Summary judgment is mandated where a party ‘fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v.

Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

1. As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks redress against Defendant, Monroe County

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2 Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. . . . 

3 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §

2000d, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are likewise measured by the personal

injury limitations period of the forum state. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir.

1996). 

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Board of Education, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for alleged violations of his rights

under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, arising out of racial slurs made by Lana Wilson, the former principal of

Monroeville Junior High School, on or about October 11, 2006, and arising out of

Defendant’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to speak at a school board meeting held on

November 9, 2006. (Docs. 1, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20). 

2. It is well settled that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action brought in

Alabama is two years. Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing

Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l)). 

3. In a § 1983 action,3

 “the federal courts are to borrow the ‘general’ or ‘residual’ statute

of limitations for personal injuries provided under the law of the state where the court hearing

the case sits.” Lufkin, 956 F.2d at 1106 (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989)).

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 The same accrual rule applies to Plaintiff’s Title VI claim. See Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561-

62, 563 n.9; Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390, 1413 (M.D. Ala.

1998).

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4. While the length of the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is borrowed from

state law, the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law. Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 

5. Under federal law, accrual occurs “when the plaintiff has a complete and present

cause of action . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

6. The Eleventh Circuit has further described the accrual rule as follows:

It has long been the law of this Circuit that in § 1983 actions

“the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts

which would support a cause of action are apparent or should

be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for

his rights.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716

(11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008).4

7. In the instant action, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s altercation with Lana

Wilson, in which Wilson allegedly used racial slurs against Plaintiff, occurred on or

before October 11, 2006. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 11 at 1, 4). 

8. It is also undisputed that Defendant’s alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to speak

at the school board meeting occurred on November 9, 2006. (Doc. 13 at 2; Doc. 16 at 1).

9. Since the facts which would support a cause of action against Defendant were,

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5 Court records show that Plaintiff was, at one time, a party to an action filed on

August 8, 2007, styled Nicky Williams, et al. v. Monroe County Board of Education, et

al., 07-0561-CG-B (S.D. Ala.), in which the plaintiffs alleged discriminatory conduct by

various defendants associated with Monroeville Junior High School against black

students at the school. (See 07-0561-CG-B, Doc. 1). After the defendants moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that he was not the legal guardian of his

grandson, Plaintiff’s daughter, Nicky Williams, was substituted for her father as plaintiff

individually and on behalf of her son. (07-0561-CG-B, Docs. 10, 44). The Court

dismissed the action with prejudice on July 27, 2009. (07-0561-CG-B, Docs. 121, 126). 

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or should have been, apparent to Plaintiff on the dates that the allegedly injurious acts

occurred – October 11, 2006 (the date of Lana Wilson’s racial remarks), and November 9,

2006 (the date of Defendant’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to speak at the board meeting), the

statute of limitations commenced to run on Plaintiff’s action at that time.

10. The record shows that Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 16, 2009, more

than two years after the incidents forming the basis of his Complaint. (Doc. 1). 

11. In his response to the Court’s Order of March 29, 2010, requiring Plaintiff to

address the issue of the timeliness of his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he filed a

previous lawsuit in 2006 against Lana Wilson; Dennis Mixon, the Superintendent of the

Monroe County Board of Education; and the Monroe County Board of Education; that the

previous action was filed on behalf of himself and his grandson, but he “could not add

[his grandson] in the lawsuit;” that his daughter joined the lawsuit on behalf of her son;

that the action was dismissed without prejudice; “so [he] filed again in 2009 on behalf of

[him]self.”5

 (Doc. 22). 

12. Plaintiff’s response misses the point. The fact that Plaintiff may have been a

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 While a federal limitations period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff untimely

files because of “extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable

with diligence,” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999), Plaintiff in this

action has not alleged any circumstances that might warrant equitable tolling of the limitations

period. See also Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (Plaintiff bears the

burden of showing extraordinary circumstances); Talley v. Housing Auth. of Columbus, Ga.,

2009 WL 4755379, *5 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (Plaintiff’s claims should have been apparent to him on

the dates the acts giving rise to the cause of action occurred. “Pro se status [and] ignorance of

the law . . . do not warrant equitable tolling. . . . [L]iberal construction given to pro se pleadings

does not mean liberal deadlines.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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party to the previous action, 07-0561-CG-B (S.D. Ala.), has no bearing on this case.6

13. Because the two-year statutory period had expired at the time Plaintiff filed the

instant Complaint on July 16, 2009, this action is time-barred.

CONCLUSION

14. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

untimely, and, thus, Defendant, Monroe County Board of Education, is entitled to

summary judgment in its favor on all claims asserted against it by Plaintiff. 

15. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be granted, that this action be dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be

entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on all claims.

16. In addition, Plaintiff’s pending motion (Doc. 20), which seeks to have the

Court unseal document number 17 containing the names of minor students at Monroeville 

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Junior High School, is DENIED. 

17. The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain important

information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge.

DONE this the 3rd day of May, 2010. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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 Effective December 1, 2009, the time for filing written objections was extended to “14

days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

11

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of

anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the

Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The procedure for

challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a

dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by

filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’ within

ten days7 after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different

time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those

portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the magistrate

judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the

magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or

referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to

submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the

district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915 and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost

of the transcript.

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