COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and Agee 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

WILLIAM GARRISON, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1620-00-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 JULY 31, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

Thomas D. Horne, Judge 

 Joseph R. Winston, Special Appellate Counsel 

(Public Defender Commission, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 William Garrison, Jr. (Garrison) was convicted in the 

Loudoun County Circuit Court, pursuant to a conditional guilty 

plea, of stealing a credit card on or about June 28, 1999, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-192, credit card forgery, in violation 

of Code § 18.2-193 and credit card fraud, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-195. The trial court sentenced Garrison to serve a term 

of one year and six months incarceration. 

 Pursuant to the conditional plea, Garrison now appeals 

averring the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

statements he made to Leesburg police officers. Garrison 

complains the motion should have been granted because the police 

officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain 
him. In addition, Garrison avers the trial court erred, at the 

hearing on the motion to suppress, by (1) excluding from 

evidence Garrison's subjective belief that he was in police 

custody and (2) admitting certain hearsay evidence. For the 

following reasons, we disagree and affirm the decisions of the 

trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On July 8, 1999, Officers Daly and Pebler of the Leesburg 

Police Department were called to Dulles Motorcars, a car 

dealership. The proprietor of the dealership, Jeffrey Collins, 

complained that a customer's wallet and credit card were stolen 

from a car left for service on June 28, 1999. Collins suspected 

Garrison, an employee, to be the thief because he had access to 

the car when it first came in and left "unexpectedly within a 

few minutes." Collins also informed the police officers that a 

worker from K-Mart had "heard about a transaction where 

(Garrison) went and bought a battery charger and some jumper 

cables with a credit card and that those items were at this 

person's girlfriend's house or apartment." Collins showed the 

officer a carbon of the credit card receipt from K-Mart, 

explaining it was not the victim's handwriting. 

 As a result, the police officers resolved to "follow up on 

this and see if there was anything to this." They interviewed 

some dealership employees and thought it "would be a good 

opportunity" to interview Garrison. However, when they 

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approached Garrison's department, he had "for whatever reason, 

left the business again on foot and started walking from Dulles 

Motorcars toward the Douglas Community Center," which was 

nearby. A co-worker had informed Garrison that "the police are 

coming back here for you right now." By police radio, Officers 

Daly and Pebler issued a lookout for Garrison and "completed 

[their] interview very quickly and started moving in the 

direction we thought [Garrison] had gone." 

 As the officers were leaving Dulles Motorcars, they 

received a communication from Officers Amato and Rourke that 

they "had seen [Garrison] and that they were detaining him for 

us to talk to him." Approximately one minute passed between the 

time the lookout was issued and Garrison was spotted. Officers 

Amato and Rourke, who were in plain clothes, saw Garrison in the 

Douglas Community Center, so they pulled into the parking lot, 

stopping about ten feet from him. Garrison "continued to walk 

toward the officers." 

 Officer Rourke never exited the car, but he opened his door 

and informed Garrison other officers were on their way and 

wanted to talk to him. Rourke did not order Garrison to stop, 

point a weapon or put hands on him. 

 Officer Amato knew Garrison from past "dealings" with him. 

As Officer Amato stepped out of the car, Garrison greeted him. 

The officer "greeted him back and said something like 'hey man, 

what's going on?' [Officer Amato then said] 'I think these guys 

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want to talk to you' and that's when [Pebler and Daly] pulled 

up." Officer Amato did not put his hands on Garrison or draw 

his weapon. He remained away from Garrison next to his vehicle 

while they spoke. 

 Officers Daly and Pebler arrived in the parking lot 

approximately thirty seconds later. Officers Amato and Rourke 

left as soon as the others began speaking with Garrison. 

 Officer Pebler spoke to Garrison in the parking lot. He 

told Garrison that he had evidence Garrison might have been 

involved in a theft at the car dealership and that the officers 

would like him to talk with them at the police station. 

Garrison asked what the officers wanted to speak to him about. 

Officer Pebler told Garrison that they would discuss everything 

with him at the police station, but that Garrison was "free to 

go and would be free to go when [they] concluded [their] 

conversation." He further stated that Garrison could refuse to 

go. Garrison agreed to go with the officers. 

 Garrison "got into the [police] car" but was not "put into 

the car." The car doors were not locked. The ride to the 

police station took approximately one minute. The officers and 

Garrison walked into the station and went into an interview room 

off the lobby. While entry to the interview room required a 

passkey, a person could exit at any time without a key. 

Garrison was seated by the door with the police officers across 

a table facing him and the door. Garrison had unimpeded access 

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to the door. Officer Pebler again advised Garrison that he was 

free to leave at any time. Garrison did not ask to leave and 

did not ask for a lawyer. 

 Officer Pebler reviewed with Garrison the evidence that he 

had at that point. Garrison "admitted that he had taken the 

credit card, but not the wallet . . . and [had] left work and 

went to the K-Mart store on his break and purchased a battery 

charger and jumper cables." Garrison voluntarily wrote these 

"very same facts" down on paper at the police officer's request. 

Garrison was "very cooperative and it was a cordial 

conversation." Garrison was never read the Miranda rights. 

 Officer Pebler and Garrison were in the interview room for 

approximately thirty minutes. Office Pebler left the room once. 

Officer Daly was in and out and never spoke to Garrison. When 

Garrison completed his written statement, Officer Pebler asked 

him if he wanted a ride home. Garrison declined the offer and 

left the station. 

 At the suppression hearing, Garrison gave a slightly 

different version of his encounter with the four police 

officers. Garrison claimed Officer Amato had informed him in 

the parking lot that "he needed me to stay here." Further, he 

claimed Officer Amato did not know why Garrison needed to stay. 

Garrison testified that he did not feel free to leave because he 

had witnessed Officer Amato chasing people in the past and that 

walking off would "create a problem that wasn't necessary at the 

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time." Garrison admitted that no officer raised his voice, 

pulled a weapon or put hands on him. 

 Garrison testified that Officer Pebler directed him to the 

police car and that, when he tried to get out, the door was 

locked. Also, according to Garrison, he was never informed that 

he could leave after his arrival at the police station and he 

did not know the interview room door was unlocked. He testified 

that once, when he was left by himself, he "touched the knob, 

but the door wouldn't open." 

 As to his statements regarding the stolen credit card, 

Garrison, on cross-examination, explained that he "told the 

police officer what he, what he asked me." 

 At the end of the presentation of evidence on the motion to 

suppress, the trial court found Garrison voluntarily went with 

the officers to the police station. The trial court further 

found that Garrison knew he was in an unlocked room from which 

he was free to leave, but chose not to do so. Finally, the 

court found Garrison spoke to the officers of his own free will 

and accord and that a reasonable person under the circumstances 

would have felt free to leave and under no compulsion to 

participate in the police interview. 

I think Mr. Garrison made a conscious 

decision on his own that he was going to 

stop and that he was going to see what these 

officers wanted. . . . Mr. Garrison made a 

voluntary decision on his own to stay there. 

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[Mr. Garrison] wasn't under arrest, he was 

free to leave. [The officers] wanted to 

talk to him and they wanted to do it down at 

the police station. I don't think that a 

reasonable person of Mr. Garrison's 

circumstances there would have thought that 

he was under any compulsion by those police 

officers to have to do that. 

* * * * * * * 

I think he voluntarily went to the station 

with the police officers. I think that Mr. 

Garrison was led into a room that was right 

off the lobby, that was unlocked and Mr. 

Garrison was aware of that. 

* * * * * * * 

He was told . . . that he was free to leave. 

I think being told that he also would have 

reason to believe that he didn't have to 

continue with this, he could leave at 

anytime. He didn't want to. 

* * * * * * * 

[I]n this case I don't think he was 

compelled in any way by the officers to 

agree to talk. 

II. THE ALLEGED SEIZURE 

In his first contention on appeal, Garrison argues that he 

was seized by Leesburg Police Officers Amato and Rourke in the 

community center's parking lot and this seizure continued until 

his release at the police station. He avers that the police 

lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause to 

detain him and all evidence garnered as a result of the 

detention should have been suppressed by the trial court. 

"At a hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress, the 

Commonwealth has the burden of proving that a warrantless search 

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or seizure did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment 

rights." Reel v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 262, 265, 522 S.E.2d 

881, 882 (2000). "It[, however,] is well established that, on 

appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that 

the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible 

error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41, 437 

S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). "Ultimate questions of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause . . . involve questions of both law 

and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. This Court is 

bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support them and we give 

due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers." Neal v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237, 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998) 

(citations omitted). 

A. The Encounter with Officers Amato and Rourke 

 The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection does not 

prohibit encounters between the police and citizens, but, 

rather, proscribes limitations on them. Case law regarding the 

Fourth Amendment "has placed police-citizen confrontations into 

three categories." Iglesias v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 99, 

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372 S.E.2d 170, 173 (1988). "First, there are communications 

between police officers and citizens that are consensual and, 

therefore, do not implicate the fourth amendment." Id. Second, 

"are brief investigatory stops" based upon an officer's 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot, and third, are "highly intrusive, full-scale arrests" 

based on probable cause. Id. 

 We find Garrison's initial encounter with Officers Amato 

and Rourke to be a consensual exchange that was not prohibited 

by the Fourth Amendment. A consensual encounter exists when "a 

reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and 

go about his business.'" Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 

232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000) (citation omitted). "Such 

encounters 'need not be predicated on any suspicion of the 

person's involvement in wrongdoing,' and remain consensual 'as 

long as the citizen voluntarily cooperates with the police.'" 

Payne v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 86, 88, 414 S.E.2d 869, 870 

(1992) (citations omitted). 

 Garrison, who knew Leesburg police officers were interested 

in talking to him, walked toward the officers in the car, 

recognizing Officer Amato. The officers did not approach him. 

In fact, Officer Rourke did not exit the car. Upon his 

approach, Garrison was informed other officers wanted to speak 

with him. Garrison was not told he had to remain in the parking 

lot and wait for the other officers. The evidence supports the 

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trial court's finding that Garrison acted voluntarily and that 

the brief encounter with Officers Amato and Rourke was 

consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. "Law 

enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment merely 

by approaching an individual on the street, identifying 

themselves and asking the individual questions." Buck v. 

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 301-02, 456 S.E.2d 534, 535-36 

(1995). 

B. The Encounter with Officers Daly and Pebler 

 We also hold that Garrison's encounter with Officers Daly 

and Pebler was consensual. "A consensual encounter occurs when 

police officers approach persons in public places 'to ask them 

questions,' provided 'a reasonable person would understand that 

he or she could refuse to cooperate.'" Payne, 14 Va. App. at 

88, 414 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 

116, 121 (4th Cir. 1991)). The trial court determined that a 

reasonable person in Garrison's situation would have felt free 

to refuse to cooperate and leave. Garrison was told that he 

could leave at any time and that he could refuse to talk with 

the officers. He voluntarily chose not to continue on his way, 

but to get into the police car for the one-minute trip to the 

police station, and to answer questions once there. Garrison 

could have walked away or required the questions be asked in the 

parking lot, but he elected not to do so. Garrison was not 

coerced into these actions, and he was not treated in a 

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confrontational manner. He was not subject to a pat-down nor 

was he restrained or locked in. Garrison was asked, not told, 

to participate in the interview. The officers even offered to 

give Garrison a ride home when he was ready. 

 This case is distinguishable from McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 

Va. App. 193, 487 S.E.2d 259 (1997), where we held the defendant 

had been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when three 

uniformed police officers, who received an anonymous tip of drug 

sales at a particular site, approached the defendant near the 

given site and informed him that he matched the given 

description of the drug dealer. The defendant was never 

informed he could leave the officers' presence and he was 

subjected to a frisk upon their arrival. 

 We held: 

[W]hen a police officer confronts a person 

and informs the individual that he or she 

has been specifically identified as a 

suspect in a particular crime which the 

officer is investigating, that fact is 

significant among the "totality of 

circumstances to determine whether a 

reasonable person would feel free to leave." 

When confronted with an accusation from 

police, such as, "we know you are selling 

drugs from this location, let us search 

you," no reasonable person would feel free 

to leave. 

Id. at 200, 487 S.E.2d at 262. 

 However, we also noted "[w]hether a seizure occurs must be 

determined by evaluating the facts of each case to determine 

whether the manner in which the police identified the individual 

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as a suspect conveys to the person that he or she . . . is not 

free to leave." Id. at 200-01, 487 S.E.2d at 262-63. 

McGee's holding that a seizure occurred was not solely 

based on the statement to the defendant that he was suspected of 

presently dealing drugs, but on the totality of the 

circumstances which included the fact that the three uniformed 

police officers, who suddenly approached the defendant, 

did not by their words or actions suggest 

that the defendant was free to leave. The 

unmistakable message conveyed to the 

defendant was that the officers had reason 

to suspect that he was [presently] selling 

drugs and that they were detaining him to 

investigate his [current] activity. A 

reasonable person would have believed . . . 

that he or she was being detained and was 

required to [submit to the officers]. 

Id. at 201, 487 S.E.2d at 263. 

 Circumstances of a similar nature are not present in the 

case at bar. The police officers asked Garrison if he would 

stop and talk about an investigation of his possible involvement 

and if he would talk with them at the police station instead of 

in the parking lot. The police officers made no demand. They 

specifically informed Garrison that he did not have to speak 

with them at that time and could leave. Further, if he did 

choose to speak with them, he was free to leave at any time 

during the discussion. Under the totality of the circumstances 

in this case, the encounter between the police officers and 

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Garrison was consensual and, thereby, did not implicate the 

Fourth Amendment. 

C. The Police Station Interview 

 The fact that the interview took place in a police station 

does not mandate a finding that the encounter was 

non-consensual. "Custody does not result merely because an 

individual is questioned in a 'coercive environment,' or is the 

'focus' of a criminal investigation." Davis v. Allsbrook, 778 

F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). "A person's 

voluntary appearance at a police station, where he is 

immediately advised that he is not under arrest and from which 

he leaves 'without hindrance' [sic] at the end of an interview, 

indicates that he is not in custody 'or otherwise deprived of 

his freedom of action in any significant way.'" Hughes v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 576, 592, 431 S.E.2d 906, 916 (1993) 

(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977)), aff'd

en banc, 18 Va. App. 510, 446 S.E.2d 451 (1994). 

 We find no credible evidence to support Garrison's 

contention that the consensual interview changed to a custodial 

interrogation. He was free to leave at any time and voluntarily 

chose not to do so. Because Garrison was not subject to a 

coercive, custodial interrogation, he was not entitled to 

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Miranda warnings,1 and the trial court properly admitted his 

statements. 

III. ALLEGED ERROR IN CONDUCTING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING 

 Garrison alleges the trial court erred by excluding any 

testimony from him as to whether he felt free to leave during 

the parking lot encounter with the police officers. He also 

avers that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony 

regarding his whereabouts on July 8, 1999. Upon our review of 

the record, we find no error. 

A. The Exclusion of Garrison's Subjective Belief 

 Garrison states his "subjective belief" is relevant, 

relying on Hughes, 16 Va. App. 576, 431 S.E.2d 906. Reliance on 

Hughes, however, is misplaced. 

 Garrison relies on Hughes for the proposition that "[a] 

'defendant's subjective belief regarding his freedom to leave' 

is relevant to determining whether a custodial interrogation had 

occurred." 16 Va. App. at 592, 431 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting 

United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 693 n.7 (5th Cir. 

1984)). However, following the Charles decision, the Supreme 

Court of the United States stated that "the only relevant 

inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would 

have understood his situation" and the "objective, reasonable 

 1 Miranda warnings are required only when an individual is 

in custody and subjected to interrogation. See Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 13, 371 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988). 

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man test is appropriate because, unlike a subjective test, it 

'is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations 

of the police officers or the defendant.'" Berkemer v. McCarty, 

468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (footnote omitted). "[T]he initial 

determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances 

of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by 

either the interrogating officers or the person being 

questioned." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 

 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its decision in Charles 

was abrogated by the United States Supreme Court's subsequent 

adoption of the objective, reasonable man standard. See United 

States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (1988). We also believe that 

the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the objective, 

reasonable man standard prohibits us from considering the 

suspect's subjective belief or state of mind in determining 

whether a custodial interrogation occurred. Thus, the trial 

court did not err in refusing to allow Garrison to testify as to 

his subjective belief that he was in custody. 

B. The Inclusion of a Statement on 

Garrison's Whereabouts 

 Finally, Garrison challenges the admission of certain 

testimony by the police officer regarding a statement from 

Garrison's co-worker as to Garrison's whereabouts on July 8, 

1999, when the officers wished to question him. Garrison argues 

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the statement should have been excluded as hearsay. We 

disagree. 

 The statement was admitted by the trial court, not as proof 

of the truth of the matter asserted, but, rather, as an 

explanation as to what caused the officers to issue a lookout 

for Garrison. In Upchurch v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 408, 256 

S.E.2d 506 (1979), the Virginia Supreme Court held that a 

detective's testimony that he responded to a radio report of a 

"burglary in progress" was not hearsay because the "hearsay rule 

does not operate to exclude evidence of a statement . . . 

offered for the mere purpose of explaining or throwing light on 

the conduct of the person to whom it was made." Id. at 410, 258 

S.E.2d at 508. The trial court did not err in allowing the 

officers to describe the statement. 

 The rulings of the trial court were proper and supported by 

the evidence. Garrison's convictions are hereby affirmed. 

Affirmed.

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