### FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUNE 10, 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

* Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 02-14991

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 00-00942 CV-CG-L CHARLES DESMOND TUC KER, Plaintiff-Appel lant,

versus FRANK EDWARD FEARN, JUDY FEARN, Defendants-Appe llees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for th e Sout hern D istri ct of A labama

_________________________ (June 10, 2003) Before BIRCH and HULL, Circuit Jud ges, and EDENFIELD * , District Judge. HULL, Circuit Judge: In this admiralty case, plaintiff Charles Desm ond Tucker seeks to recover1 Specifically, Tucker sought nonpecuniary damages for the loss of love, affection, and companionship of his deceased minor son and for his grief and anguish over his son’s death. 2 for the death of his m

inor son, Charles Ju

stin Tucker, who was killed in a boati ng collision. Plaintif

f Tucker appeals

from the distr

ict court’s order

precluding him from recovering loss of society damages in his wrongful death action under general maritime law. After review and ora l argument, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Charles Justin Tucker was traveling on a 19-foot Wellcraft power boat when his boat collided with

a 36-foot Pearson s ailboat operated by defendants Frank a

nd Judy Fearn (the “Fearns”) in Alabam a’s territorial waters. Charles Justin Tucker died as a result of injuries received in thi s boating collis ion. Because the collision occurred in territorial waters, plaintiff Charles Desmond Tucke

r (“Tucker

”) brought this wrongf

ul death action again

st the Fearns under general maritime law. Tucker sought to recover nonpecuniary dam ages, in the form of loss of societ y damages, under general maritime law. 1 Tucker also brought state law cl

aims under Ala

bama’s wr

ongful death statute,

Ala. Code § 6- 5-410. The Fearns m

oved to strike Tucke

r’s general m

aritime clai

m for nonpecuniary damages because he was not financially dependent on his deceased2 Whether Tucker may recover loss of society damages in a wrongful death action under general maritime law is a question of law that we review de novo

. See King v. Moore , 312 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002). 3 minor son. The

district court ente

red an order grant

ing the Fearns’ m

otion to strike Tuc ker’s claim for nonpecun iary damages an d thereby limit ing Tucker ’s potential recovery

under general m

aritime law

to pecuniary da

mages for the l

oss of his minor son. S

ubsequently, the

district court cer

tified that “this order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” On Sep

tember 13, 2002 , this Court grante d Tucker’s petit

ion for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In this interlocutory

appeal, the only

issue is whether T

ucker, as a nondependent parent,

may reco ver loss of society

damages for th

e wrongful death of his minor child und er general maritime law. 2 For the reasons outl ined below, we conclude that the

district court corr

ectly determ

ined that loss of socie

ty damages are not recoverable by Tucker in a wrongful death action under general maritime law. II. DISCUSSION To guide our analysis of this issue, we first consider the fundamental principles of adm

iralty law se

t forth by the Sup

reme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. , 398 U.S. 375 (19 70), and then in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham , 436 U.S. 618 (19 78), and Miles v. Apex Mar ine Corp. , 498 U.S.3 119 U.S. 199 (1886). In The Harrisburg , the Supreme Court “held that the general

maritime law (a species of judge-made federal common law) did not afford a c ause of action for wrongful death. The Harrisburg Court said that wrongful-death actions are statutory and may not be created by judicial decree.” Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun , 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (discussi ng The Harrisburg ).

4 See In re Amtrack “Sunset Limited” Train Crash in Bay ou Canot, Alabama, on September 22, 1993 , 121 F.3d 1421, 142 8 (11th Cir. 1997) ( noting that “

Moragne . . . for the first time gave an ad

miralty comm

on law right of a

ction for wrong

ful death of non-s

eamen in state territorial waters”). The deceased in Moragne was a longshoreman. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 376.

5 DOHSA provides a cause of action “whenever the death of a person shall be cause d by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high se as beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. App. § 761(a). 4 19 (1990). A. Moragne : Wrong ful De ath un der General M aritim e Law In Moragne , the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision i n The Harrisburg 3 and created a wr ongful death action und

er general ma

ritime law f

or deaths occurring in s

tate territorial

waters. 4 In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that C ongr ess ha d enac ted le gisl ation to cov er some but n ot all types of mari time wrongful deaths. Id. at 397-98. Specifically, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) had c

reated a wrongful

death action but only

for all persons kille

d on the high seas. 5 46 U.S.C. Ap p. § 761 et seq. Similarly, the Jones Act provided only seamen

a right of recover

y against their e

mployers f

or negligence resul

ting in injury or death. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 394 ; 46 U.S.C. § 688. The Supreme Court observed, however

, that Congress had n

ot yet provided a statutory right of action6 DOHSA does not cover deaths resulting from incidents occurring within state territorial

waters—that is, deaths resulting from incidents occurring within three-miles of the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States. See Moragne , 398 U.S. at 395. He re, the parties d

o not dispute that the

incident resulting

in the death of Tucker’s son occurred in Alabama’s territorial waters. The boats were be ing operated in the Inter-Coastal Waterway near Or ange Beach, Baldwin County, Alabama.

5 for wrongful death

s occurring in state territorial wat ers. 6 Moragne , 398 U.S. at 397-98. The Supreme Court reasoned that this was because Congress saw no need for such a federa

l statute because the

States historicall

y provided rem

edies for deaths occurring in their territorial waters

. Id. at 398. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Congre ss’s “failur e to extend [DOH SA] to cover suc h deaths primarily reflected the lack of necessity for covera ge by a federal statute.” Id. at 397; see also Miles , 498 U.S. at 24-25. The Supreme

Court in Moragnethen discussed at length how a “transform

ation” in marit

ime law had be

gun in 1944 and that the em ergence of the strict liability claim of “unseaworthiness” in federal m aritime law had created inconsistencies in re

covery for dea

ths on the high seas ver

sus recovery f

or deaths on territorial waters u nder state statutes

. See Moragne , 398 U.S. at 399-400. Thus, the Suprem

e Court in Moragnesought to eliminat e these inconsistenc

ies and rende r marit ime wro ngfu l deat h law u nifor m by crea ting a gene ral mar itime wrongful death actio n applicable in all waters, including st ate territorial waters. See id. at 401-02. In doing so in Moragne , the Supreme Court relied to a la

rge extent on its7 For instance, the Supreme Court stated that “the Jones Act was intended to achieve

‘uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction’ by giving seamen a federal right to recover from their employers for negligence r egardless of the location of the injury or death.” Moragne , 398 U.S. at 401.

8 In Norfolk Shipbuildin

g & Drydo

ck Corp. v. Garri

s , 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001), the Supreme Court held

that “[t]he maritime c

ause of action tha

t Moragne established for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligenc e.” In this case,

plaintiff Tucker

based his maritime claim on negligence rather than unseaworthiness. 6 determination t

hat Congress enacte

d the Jones Act and DOHSA to further “the constitutionally b ased principle that f ederal admir

alty law should be

‘a system

of law coexten sive with, and operat ing unifo rmly in, the whol e country.’” 7 Id. at 402 (citation omitt

ed). The Suprem

e Court further re

asoned that “[o]ur recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication o f federal policies.” 8 Id. at 401. The Supreme

Court’s conclusion

in Moragnealso was motiva ted, in part, by the maritim

e principle that “special solicitude [ be given] for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.” Id. at 387. The Supre

me Court obser

ved that federal m

aritime law

, as it thenexisted, actually disad vantaged Jones Act s eamen. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 395-96. Because the Jones Act preempts state law remedies for the death or injury of a

seaman , the S upreme Court remark ed tha t the “‘ stran gest’ anomal y” in mar itime law was that a Jone s Act seamen “ is provided no rem

edy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters , while a [nonseaman] . . . does have such9 The current version of 46 U.S.C. App. § 762(a) is identical to § 762 as it existed at the

time Higginbotham

was decided. Since Higginbotham , Congress has added subsection (b) to § 762, which provides: “If the death resulted from a commercial aviation accident occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of any State . . . additional compensation for nonpecuniary damages for wrongf ul death of a decedent is recoverable.” 46 U.S.C. App. § 762(b)(1). 7 a remedy when allowed by a state statute.” Id. at 395-96 (empha sis added). Thus, the Supreme Court’s recognition of a wrongful death action under general maritime law served to rem

edy a disparity

for seaman tha

t had existed prior to Moragne

. See Miles , 498 U.S. at 30.In Moragne , the Supreme Court did not set forth the scope of the remedies available in a wrongful death action under general maritime law but left such devel opment for future litiga tion. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 408. B. Higginbotham : No Loss of Society Damages under DOHSA Since Moragne , the Supreme Court has held that loss of society damages are not recoverable und er DOHSA. See Higginbotham , 436 U.S. 618. When the Suprem

e Court decided Higginbotham , D OHSA provided that “recovery . . . shall be a fair and j ust compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for

whose benefit the s

uit is brought . . . . ” 46 U.S.C. A pp. § 762 (1975) (emphasis added). 9 The issue in Higginbotham was whether the e

xplicit use of the term

“pecuniary

loss” implied tha

t nonpecuniary da

mages were n

ot available under DOHSA. Higginbotham , 436 U.S. at 619 -20. Although the Supreme Court

recognized that DO

HSA “does not

address every

issue of8

wrongful-death law . . .[,] when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to ‘supplement’ Congress’ answer so thoroughly that [DOH SA] becomes meaningless.” Id. at 625. The Supreme Court thus concluded that Congress had “limited survivors to recovery of their pecuniary losses.” Id. at 623. C. Miles : No Loss of Societ y Damages for Seamen Under J ones Act or General Maritim

e Law In Miles , a unanimous Su preme Court a

lso addressed whethe

r recovery f

or loss of society da

mages was ava

ilable for seam

en under the Jones Ac

t (based on negligence) and in a

general mari

time action (ba

sed on unseaworthine ss). To aid its analysis of th

ese issues, the Supr

eme Court “

described Moragne

at length because it exem

plifies the fundam

ental principles tha

t guide[d] [the Co

urt’s] decision.” Miles , 498 U .S. at 2 7. Draw ing fr om Moragne , the Supreme Court in Miles emphasized the need to look to “legislative enactments for policy guidance” and “achieve t

he uniform vindication of such policies [,]” stating as follows: We no longer live in an area w hen seam en and their loved one s must look primarily to the courts as a sour

ce of sub stantive legal protection from injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively

in these areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance

. We may supplement

these statutory rem

edies where doing so

would achieve

the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep st rictly within t

he limits im

posed by Congress. Miles , 498 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added ). In Miles , the Supreme

Court first conside

red whether loss of

society9

damages wer

e recoverable unde

r the Jones Act. A

fter analyzin

g the legislative history of the Jone s Act, the Suprem e Court determ

ined that “Congr

ess must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages.” Id. at 32. Thus, the Supreme Court held that “[t]here is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action.” Id. The Miles plaintiff also presented a general m aritime clai

m alleging that t

he decedent-seam

an “had been kill

ed as a result of the

unseaworthiness of

the vessel.” Id. Because this claim was brought under ge

neral maritim

e law, the Supreme Court’s first determination that loss of society dam ages were precluded under the Jones Act d id not decide the se cond issue directl y. See id. Nevertheless, t

he Supreme Co

urt looked to the Jones A ct for policy gui

dance and concluded that “[i]t would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were

we to sanction m

ore expansive rem

edies in a judicial

ly created ca

use of action in which li

ability is withou

t fault than Congress

has allowed in case s of death resulting from negligence.” Id. at 32-33. The Supr eme Court ther

efore held that “there is no recovery for loss of society in

a general mar

itime action fo

r the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.” Id. at 33. In reaching this outcome in Miles , the Supreme Court noted that its decision “restore[d] a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritim e law.” Id. (emphasis added).10

D. No Loss of Society Damages for Nonseamen Applying Moragne , Higginbotham , and Miles , we determine that nondependent survivors,

such as Tucker, o f nonseamen, s uch as Tucker’s

son, equally cannot recover loss of society damages in a wrongful death action under gener al mari time la w. We st art ou r anal ysis wi th DOH SA, whi ch the Supre me Court has recognize

d as being “the c

ourts’ prima

ry guide as they

refine the nonstatutory deat

h remedy, both because of the in

terest in uniform

ity and because Congress’ considered judgment has great force in its own right.” Higginbotham , 436 U.S. at 624. In looking to DOHSA , we are partic

ularly mind

ful of the Supreme Court ’s recent state ment in Norfolk Shipbuilding D rydock Corp. v. Garris , 532 U.S. 811 (2001), that “[w ]hile there is an

established and contin

uing tradition of feder

al common l

awmaking in adm

iralty, that l

aw is to be developed

, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field.” Id. at 820 ( internal quotation m arks omitted) (

“Because of Congress’s extensiv e involvement in le

gislating causes of a

ction for mari

time personal i

njuries, it will be the better course , in many cases that assert ne w claims bey

ond what those statutes have seen f

it to allow, to leave fu rther development to Con gress.”). Further, DOHSA provides a wrongful death action in favor of anyone killed on the high seas, but li

mits recovera

ble damages in w

rongful death suits to “pecuniary

loss sustained by th

e persons for whose

benefit the suit is br

ought.” 4611

U.S.C. App.§§ 761(a), 762(a).In light of this lim itation, it would be inconsistent with Congress’s “considered judgment” for this Court to permit the rec overy that plaintiff Tucker seek s in this case under general maritime law. Denying recove

ry to Tucker f

or loss of society

damages is also

consonant with t he pri ncip le tha t cour ts see k a uni form vi ndic ation of fed eral ma ritime policies. It would

be discordant for this Court to sanction add itional remedi

es for deaths of nonseamen occurring in a state’s territorial waters than (1) Congress has permitted under

DOHSA for deaths of nonseame n occurring on the high seas, Higginbotham , 436 U.S. at 623 , (2) Congress has permitted for seamen under t

he Jones Act, Miles , 498 U.S. at 32, and (3) the Suprem

e Court has allowe

d for seamen under general maritime law, Miles , 498 U.S. at 32-33. We are also mindful that our decision comports with the “special solicitude” that admiralty law displays for sea men. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 398 . A strange anomaly w

ould result if we w

ere to permit the survivors of nonsea men the right to recover loss of society damages while the survivors of seamen—the traditional wards of admi

ralty law—ar

e barred from

such recovery under the Jones Act a nd general maritime law . Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have ever indicated that adm

iralty law ev

inces any parti

cular consideratio

n for nonseamen

, we decline to fashion a rule that would permit their survivors a more liberal recovery under general maritime law.12

E. Tucker’s Gaudetarguments Plaintiff Tucker

primarily relies on the Supre

me Court’s d

ecision in SeaLand Services, Inc. v. Gaudet , 414 U.S. 573 (19 74). In Gaudet , the dependent widow of a longshoreman sought to recover loss

of society dam

ages in a wrongful death action under general maritime law. Id. at 585-86. The Supreme Court permitted the r

ecovery of loss of society dam ages, stating that “

our decision is compelled if we are to shape the remedy to com port with the humanitarian policy of the maritim

e law to show ‘sp ecial solicitude’ for those who are i njured within its jurisdiction.” Id. at 588. Tucker ar gues that Gaudet

is broadly writ

ten and supports the proposition t hat loss of society

damages are r

ecoverable by

nonseamen. One problem for Tucker, however, is that the Supreme Court since has limited the applicability of Gaudet to its facts. In Miles , the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he holding of Gaudet applies only in te

rritorial water

s, and it applies only to longshoremen .” Miles , 498 U .S. at 3 1 (emph asis a dded ). In f act, t he Sup reme Court in Miles indicated that Gaudet was no longer even a

pplicable on its fact

s, in view of amend

ments made

to the Longshore and H

arbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1972. Miles , 498 U.S. at 30 n.1. Consequently, as the Sixth Circuit stated in Miller v. Am

erican President

Lines, Ltd. , 989 F.2d 1450, 1459 (6th Cir. 1993), “[ Gaudet ] has therefore

been condemned to a kind of legal lim bo: limited to its10 On appeal, the parties focus on whether nondependents of nonseamen kille

d in territorial waters may recover loss of society damages. There is a strong argument, however, that the pertinent threshold question is whether any survivors of nonseamen are entitled to recover loss of society

damages and not

whether nondepe

ndent survivors of

nonseamen may

recover loss of society damages. This is because (1) it would still y ield an anomalous result for dependent survivors of nonseamen to have greater recovery than dependent survivors of seamen and (2) allowing dependent survivors of nonseamen to recover loss of society da mages would defeat the principle of achieving uniformity in admiralty law since loss of society damages are not recoverable under DOHSA and the Jones Act. Additionally, the argume nt is made that an essentially

pecuniary

standard such as

dependency

should not provide th

e dividing line on t

his issue, given the nature of loss of society damages. See Gaudet , 414 U.S. at 585 (“The term ‘society’ embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others’ continue

d existence, includ

ing love, affe

ction, care, att

ention, companion

ship, comfort, and protection.”). Nonetheless, given that Tucker is a nondependent survivor, we decide today only that nondependent survivors of nonseamen cannot recover loss of society damages under general maritime law. 13 facts, inapplicable on its facts, yet not overr uled.” The second hurdle f

or Tucker is that th

e plaintiff is Gaudet

was a dependent widow, whereas Tucker is a nondependent survivor. A number of other federal circuit courts have held explicitly that nondependent survivors may not recover loss of society da

mages in wrongf

ul death actions for a nonseaman’ s death in territorial waters. See, e.g. , Wahlstrom v.Kawasaki Heav y Indus. , 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1993); Anderson v. Whit taker Corp. , 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); Miles v. Melrose , 882 F.2d 976 (5th Ci r. 1989), aff’d sub nom on other grounds , Miles v. Apex Mar

ine Corp. , 498 U.S. 19. But see Sutton v. Earles , 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994). 10 F. Tucker’s Yamaha Motor Arguments Plaintiff Tucker

also asserts that Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun

, 516 U.S.14

199 (1996), allows fo r the recovery of loss of so ciety damages in this case. However, Yamaha Motor has no application to th

e issue here because it concerns the remedies available under a state ’s wrongful deat h statute and not the sha

pe of the wrongful death action under federal general maritime law. In Yamaha Motor

, a twelve-y

ear old girl was kil

led in a recreati

onal jet ski accident in the terri torial waters of Puerto Rico. Id. at 201-02. Her pa rents brought suit under Penn

sylvania’s w

rongful death statute

and sought recovery

of loss of society damages. Id. at 202. The Supre me Court concl

uded that “the damages availa

ble for the jet ski

death of [the girl]are properly g overned by state law.” Id. at 216. Tucker’s reli

ance on Yamaha Motor

is misguided beca

use that decision does not support the asse rtion that federal maritime law provides for lo ss of society recovery in this case

. Rather, the significance of Yamaha Motor is how the Supreme Court concluded that DOHSA did not displa ce the application of state law in terr

itorial waters a

nd “preserve[d] the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters.” Id. at 216, 215 n.13 (“Federal maritime law has long accomm

odated the States’ interest in regulat ing maritim

e affairs within their territorial wat

ers.”). As thi s Court stated in In re Amtra ck “Sunset Lim

ited” Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Alabam a, on Septemb er 22, 1993 , 121 F.3d 1421, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997), “[i]t goes w ithout saying that t

he State of Alaba

ma has a11 The only restriction on the States’ regulation of maritime affairs within their territorial

waters is that “[p]e

rmissible state re

gulation . . . must be

consistent with fe

deral maritime principles and policies.” Yamaha Motor , 516 U.S. at 215 n.13 ; see In re Amtrack , 121 F.3d at 1427 (concluding that although plaintiff had wrongful death action under Alabama’s statute, “the federal maritime

interests presen

t in this action outwe

igh Alabama’s in

terests in having

its wro ngfu l de ath sta tut e app ly in its entirety ” and concluding that “applying the Alabama wrong ful death act in this case so as to allow recovery for wrong ful death based upon simple negligence only would deprive the litigants of substantive admiralty rig hts that must be applied given the exceedingly commercial nature of this incident”) (emphasis added) . It is noteworthy that Yamaha Motor

involved a recre

ational jet ski acc

ident, whereas In re Amtrack involved a traditionally commercial maritime incident. Yamaha Motor , 516 U.S. 201; In re Amtrack , 121 F.3d at 1422-23.

12 Tucker’s reliance on American Dredging Co. v. Lambert , 81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996), also is misplaced. American Dredging involved the deaths of nonseamen in Florida’s territorial waters; the collision was between a floating dredge pipeline and a motorboat with four passengers, three of whom died. Id. at 128. Although the personal representatives of the deceased nonsemen in American Dredging did file claims under general maritime law, the issue on app eal fo cused on whe ther n onpec uniar y damage s were recov erabl e unde r Flor ida la w. In American Dredging , this Court permitte d recovery

of nonpecuniary

damages under Florida’s 15 sovereign interest i

n activities that occ

ur within its terri

torial waters.”

In light of the State’s inte

rest, a State m

ight offer a rem

edial scheme i

ndependent of, and more generous t

han, what feder

al law provides, so long as it is not in conf lict with federal policies. 11 Yamaha Motor , 516 U.S. at 215(citing Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 724 (1980 )). Thus, Yamaha Motor concerns the applicability of state wrong ful de ath st atute s and d oes no t cont radic t the S upreme Court’s concern

s in Miles and Moragnethat courts achieve a uniform vindic

ation of federal maritime policies. Consequently, Yamaha Motor does n ot sp eak to Tucke r’s ge neral mariti me claims but would assist Tucker’s separate state law claims onl y if Alabama’s wrongful death stat

ute permitted t

he recovery of

loss of society da

mages. 12wrongful death statutes because “federal maritime law does not displace statewrongful death and

survival statutes permitting non-pecuniary damages in wrong ful death actions arising out of accidents in territorial waters” and “no federal statute or common law precedent pre cludes the personal representatives from recovering non-pecuniary damages under Florida law.” Id. at 130- 31. The decision did not outline what nonpecuniary damages were soug ht. American Dredging also did not appear to involve punitive damages, which were at issue in In re Amtrack

.

13 Tucker’s complaint did seek recovery of punitive damag es under Alabama’s wrongful death statute. However, subsequent to the order at issue in this interlocutory appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant Fe arns on plaintiff Tucker’s punitive damages claims under state law. The district court determined that punitive damages under Alabama’s wrongful death statute were not recoverable in light of this Court’s decision in In re Amtrack , 121 F.3d 1421. The district court’s determination is not before this Court on interlocutory appeal, and we express no opinion on that issue. 16 However, such recovery is not provided for by that statute either. 13 See Ala. Code. § 6-5-410. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons sta

ted above, we af

firm the distr

ict court’s order

precluding plaintiff Tucker

, a nondependent surv

ivor, from re

covering loss of socie

ty damages in his w

rongful death action under general m aritime law

for the death of his nonseaman son. AFFIRMED.