NO. 07-01-0315 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L D APRIL 8, 2002

______________________________ BOB Y ARI, IND IVIDUA LLY, AND D/B/A PERS ICO, INC., PERS ICO, INC., A TEXA S CORP ORATION, A ND YAR ICO, INC., A TEX

AS C ORPO RATIO N, AP PELL ANTS V. LIGIA REVUELT A GILES AND LRG ENT ERPRISES, INC., APPELLEES

_________________________________ FROM THE 127 TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY; NO. 199422727; HON ORABLE SHARO LYN WOOD, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.
Thisapp eal a r ises from a com merc ial landl ord-tenant dispute concerning the tenant’s right to ma intain a particular sign over the leased premises. Af ter a bench trial and judgm ent in favor of the tenant, a nd reversal on appeal, the case was retried be fore
a jury. In conform ity with the j ury’s verdict, the trial court rendered j udgme nt for the tenant2

for $11 8,6 13. 27, tog eth er w ith a tto rne ys fee s in excess of $100,000. The landlord, Bob Yari (Yari) and Persico, Inc., (Pers ico) now present ten issues in challenge of the trial court’s judgm ent concerning the sufficiency of the e vidence, proper construction of the lease, evidentiary rulings, attorneys fees, and discovery sanc tions. W e affirm. Proper consideration of

the issues raised in this appeal requires a somew hat detailed recitati on of the facts gi vi ng rise to the dispu te. A bout 198 9, appellant Yari undertook

to build a comm ercial buil ding to hou se r eta il st ore s on Westhe im er S tre et in Houston. Ya ri solicited appell ee Ligia Revuelta Giles as a tenant in that building. On August 25, 1989, Yari and Giles signed a lease coveri ng 1,000 square feet of the proper ty. The leas e re cite d th at it was bet

wee n Persico, Inc., as l andlord and Gil es and LRG Ent erp ris es, Inc . (L RG) , asten ant . H oweve r, P ers ico w as n ot in cor por

ate d un til Novem ber

3, 1989. The lease required the landlord’s approval of any sign placed on the building. An am endme nt to the lease executed Novem b er 26, 1989, provided for rent increases based on a consum er price index. The building was com pleted and the threeyear lease term began in June 1990.
The shopping center is designed in an “L” shape w ith the storefronts facing the interior of the “L.” Eac h wing of the s tructure has a covered walkwayextending several feetout from the front of the building and signs for tenants in those w ings are located on the fascia of this wa lkway. The w alkway covers

do notextend tothe interior corner of the building. A second fascia, fl ush w ith t he m ain structure, rises above the interior corner and3

the adjacent

storefronts on each side. Videoland, whic h Pers ico desc ribes as a n “ancho r” tenant, occupies the space at this intersec tion . G il es’s restaurant occu pied the spa ce adjoining Videoland on the left. The si gn for Videoland is at the top of the fa scia at the intersection of the twowings and faces directly toward the cen ter of the parking lot, at a 45- degree angle from each wing. I f a line were draw n exten ding the com m on w all be tween the spaces leased by Giles and Videoland, the V ideoland sign would extend beyond that line. This sign also extended above t he building fascia. Giles’s request in Septem ber 1990 for a sign was not approved. Another request
wasapproved by Persico on Octob er 12, 1990. This sign was to be 18 feet long and w as to run “ exactly along edge of w all - none above.” W hen the sign was fabricated and delivered, it was initial ly installed with the top even w ith the fascia. Because the sign was larg ely obstructed by the covered walkway, Giles requested that it be mov ed up one foot. The sign was placed partially above the fasc ia, to the left, but slight ly lower th an the Videoland sign.
On Novem ber 5, 1990, Persico, acting through its property managem ent company, deman ded rem oval of the sign, stating it violated the lease. On January 24, 1991, Giles deman ded removal of the Videol and sign beca use it “is encroaching on [her leasehold] by app rox im ate lysix feet.” In a March 1991 letter, an attorney for Gi les wrote to Yarico, Inc. (Yarico) and BMSManagem ent requesting that the covered walkway be extended in front of her restaurant so that a sign could be placed on the front of that wa lkway. A ppellants4

declined this request. On April 5, 1991, appellant dem anded the rem oval of Giles’s sign and, when it w

as n ot rem oved, had it rem oved and dem anded paym ent of $200. Giles abandoned the property in April 1991.
After both parti es file d suit in county co urt, the actions were consolidated in the 127 th District Court. In that ac tion, Giles and LRG were the plaintiffs and Yari, Persico, and Yarico were defenda nts. Giles’s petition alleged appellants breached the lease “by failing and refusing to consider or approve any sign plans presented by [her]” and by failing to
remove unauthorized signs which encroac hed on her leasehold. Yari answered a sserting he wasnot liable in the capacity in which he was sued because his participation wasonly
as president of Persico. Ya rico made a similar assertion, claiming it was not a party to the lease ag re eme nt . A l l th re e d ef en da nt s a l so as se rt ed se ve ra l fa ct s a nd cl ai ms label ed affirmative defens es.
Af tera benc h tr ial, t he cour t re nde red j udg m ent

for app ellee s fo r ap pro xi m ate ly $56,000 in actual damagesand $22,000 in attorne ys fee s. The j udgm ent w as agains t Yari indiv idua llyand d/b/a Persico and Y arico. Ya ri ap pea led a nd, in an opin ion is sue d A pril 1, 1999, t he First C ourt

of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgm ent on the basis that the discove ry s anc

tion s were im pro per ly im pos ed. It rem and ed t he casefor a new tria l.
The second trial was to a jury in M arch 2000. The j ury found the landlord failed to allowGiles a business sign and tha t $5 9,4 28. 75 w ould fair lyand reasonably com pensate her. It denied any recovery for lost profits from 1990 through 1993. The issue of attorneys1 Giles does not chall enge Persico’s standing to prosecute this appeal because the

judgm entdoes not ex pressly dispose of th e cl ai ms ag ai ns t Pe rs ic o. Fo r s imp li ci ty we refer to a ppe llants as

Ya ri. 5 fees was s eparately tried to the court. The court r endered judgm ent for Giles for $59,184.52 in ac

tua l dam age s an d $1 08, 000 in attorn eysfee s th rou gh t rial, and additional
amoun ts of $30,000 on appeal to th is court , $5,000 if a petition for review is filed in the
su pr eme court, $15,000 if a petition is granted and $50,000 on w rit of certiorari to the United States S upreme Court. The j udgme nt wassigned M arch 27, 2001, a nd afte r a m otio n fo r ne w

tria l, Y ari a nd P ers ico t im ely f iled anot ice of ap pea l.
We recognize that the tria l court’s judg ment ma kes no ex press disposition of the cl ai ms against Persico and Yarico. It did, h owever, contain a “Mothe r Hubbard” cl ause stating that all reli ef not expressly gran ted was d enie d. Because t he judgm ent was rendered after a conventional tria l on t he m erits, w e pr esu m e th at it

disp ose d of

all parties and cl ai ms and is appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Co rp. , 39 S.W .3 d 1 91 , 1 98 -9 9 ( Te x. 2001); North East Independe nt School Dist. v. Aldri dge , 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex . 1966). 1 Appella nts’ first issue contends there is no evidence tha t they breached the lease. Giles ’s bre ach of cont rac t cl aim was bas ed on Yari’s failure and refusal to consider and approve of the sign plans and the failure to rem ove signs which sh e claimed encroached
on her leased sp a ce. Yari argues there is no evidence th at the lease required them to consider and approve the sign plans. In review ing a no-evidence point, we mu st exam ine the record i n the li ght most favorable to the fi nding to de termine if there i s any probati ve6

evidence, or reasonable infe renc es therefrom, which supports the fi nding, and we m ust disregard all evidence orreasonable inferences therefrom to the contrary. Ra w Hid e O il &Gas, Inc. v. Maxus E

xplorati on Co. , 766 S.W.2d 264 , 27 6 (T ex .A pp. --A m arillo198 8, w rit denied). Giles’s breach claim w as based on section 14.3 of the lease, which provides that the “lan dlor

d sh all not be in default unless landlord fail s to perform obligations required of landlord within a reasonable tim e, butin no eventlater than thirty days afte r written noti ce bytenant.” Yari contends “the lease imposed n o obligations whatsoever on thelandlord.” If theland lord tru ly ha d noobli gations un der the lease, section 14.3 w ould be unnecessary. Moreover, a total absen ce of obligations on the landlord would make the contract unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Section 7.5 of the lease go verne d tenant signs and provided, “[t]enant shall not place or affix any s igns or other object s upon or to the roof or

exterior walls of the prem ises

. . . w ithout the prior written consent of landl ord.” The l ease also provided that the property
wasto be used for a retail store. The re was t estimony that a sign is necessary to t he success of a b usiness of this type. Taken as a w hole, the contract clearly contem plated thattenants were to have signs, otherw ise the phrase “without th e prior written consent of the landlord” would serve no pu rpose. T he effect of sec tion 7.5 was to reserve to appellants the right to approve those signs. W here a lease requires a tenan t to seek a landl ord’s approval, the landlord’s duty to con sid er that request is necessarily im plied. Section 14.3 affirm atively required the determination to be m ade in a reasonable time.7

Although itis undisputed that appellants gave w ritten approval for a sign, i t is also undisp u ted that they rem oved the sign that w as constructed pursu ant to those plans because it was not instal led in the positi on specifi ed in the pl ans. Beca use th ere was evidence that the sign would be wholly ine ffec tive if installed where demand ed by the landlord, a rational trier of fact could find this to be som e evidence that appellants breached their obligations und er t he le aseby eff ect ively denying appellees the ability to have a sign over the leased space.
In their second issue, appellants contend the trial court erred in instructing the jur y thatGiles “was al lowed a business sign that complied w ith the Landlords’ approval of October 12, 199 0,” becaus e th at s tat em ent doe s no t ap pea r an yw her e in th e lease. Appellants arg ue t her

e were no p lead ingsor e vide nceto s upp ort this instruction and the court improperly im plied an additional provision into the una mbiguous agree ment. As noted above, section 7.5 sim ply reserved to appellants the right to approve any sign to be erected by a tenant. It did not bar the use of signs by tenants but, rather supports th e conclusion thattenants would have some type of sign. Th e evidence is undisputed that appellants approved a plan for a sign on October 12, 1990. The appl icati on of the lease te rms to the undisputed sign plan approval made the statem ent in the disputed instruction true as a mat te r o f l aw. Because the undisputed evidence supports such a determ ination, the trial court’s instruction that Giles was allowed a business sign in com pliance with the approval was proper.8

Appellants also contend the instruction was not raised by the pleadings as required byRule 278. The question subm itted to the jury waswhether “the landlord fail ed to allow the ten ant

a bu sine ss sign .” T his i ssu e was t he core com plain t of app elle es’ petition. They alleged that appellants breached the lease by failing to approve a business sign. A petition need not all ege each supporting fact, only give fair notice of the claims as serted. Te x. R. Civ. P. 45 . Th e evidence of the term s of the contract and October 12 w ritten approval meet the requirementsof Rule 278. We overrule appell ants’ second issue. Appellants ’ third iss ue contends th ere is no e vidence to suppo rtthe jury ’s answer thattheydid not allow Giles a business sign that com plied with the approval. In support, itcites the testi mony of Rob ert Tanner that the sign fit w here it was intended on the approved plan. Appellants characteri ze Tanner as “a n unbiased witness with no interest in th is la wsu it .” Howe ve r, th e r ec or d cl ea rl y sh ows thatat the time of the events givi ng rise to this litigati on, Tanner wasthe property m anager hired by Yari orPersico, and the conduct of the m anagem ent com pany during the origin of this dispute formed part of the bas is of Giles’s theory of liability. Cons equently, Tanner, although not a party to the liti gation, was defendi ng his own conduct at tri al and was not an unbi ased witness. Appellants also ass erttha t “t he s ign s tay ed o n th e ro of u ntil Giles abandoned the premises.” The record ref ere ncegive n do es n ot s upp ort this st at eme nt. Indeed, the statem ent is directly controverted by Giles’s testim ony: Q: Ap pro xi m ate lyhow long after the rem oval of the sign did you m ove out?9

A: How ma ny days? I don’ t recall but it was very – im mediately alm ost. Q: What was the reason that you moved out? A: Becaus e they didn’t – I didn’t hav e a sign . . . .
There w as a lso e vide ncetha t ha d th e sig n be en p lace d be low thetopof t he f

asc ia, it
w ould have been largely obstructed. A rational factfinder could find that by only allowing app ellee s toplace a s ign in that position, appellants effectively denied appellees a sign. W e overrule appellants’ third issue.
In the ir fourth issue, appellants assign error to the rendition of jud gm ent agains t Yari indiv idua llyand d/b/a Persico, Inc ., rather than the corporate entity Persico, Inc., w ho they claim wasthe true landlord. Their claim is primarily based on the fact that Persico was the partynamed on the face of the written lea se and clai m there was no evidence of a contract between Giles and Yari. W e disagree. Appellants do not dispute that Giles was a party to the lease or thatYari signed as or for the landlord. Nor do they dispute the f act that Persico w

as not incorporated w hen the lease was ex

ecuted. The evidence also showed thatYari was t he owner of the real propertywhich w

as the subj ect of the lease. The rule is well-established in Texas that a contract m ade by the prom oter of a corporation before the corporate ex istence does not be co me a contract of the corporation w hen form ed. Aloe Ltd., Inc. v. Koch , 733 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.A pp.--Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Gutheri e v. Country

Club Est ates, Co. ,2 Thisrule exists inde pen den t of Tex . R ev. Civ . S tat . A nn. art . 13 02- 2.0 2, w hich is the primary foc us of appellants’ argum ent. It is likewise independent of article 2.21 of the Business Corporation Act (Vernon Supp. 20 02), whi ch concerns the liability of sharehol ders, not promoters. 10 26 S. W.2d 40 3, 4 04 ( Tex .Ci v .App.–Aust in 1930, nowrit). 2 The pro m ote r is n ot lia ble whe re the other party know s the corporation does not yet exist. Aloe , 733 S.W.2d at 366. Appellants presented no evidence that appe llees knew Persico w as not a corporation at the tim e the leas e wa s executed . Therefo re , th e rule stated in Aloe , m aking prom oters such as Yari personally liable i s applicable. Alt hou gh a ppe lleesdid not specifically allege promoter liabil ity in its

pet ition , th e iss ue w

as f ully litigated without obj ection to the lack of supporting pleadings, making the rule of trial by consent applicable. Tex. R. Civ. P. 67. Ap pella ntsalsoarg ue t hat Ya ri is not

liableon the lease because Giles executed
an am ended lease on Novem ber 28, 1989, after P ersico was form ed. Howev er, at tha t time, Yari still owned the property and did not con vey it to Persico until the fo llowing January. Because P ersico did not own the real property, it could not grant a leasehold to Giles. Appellants next argue t he judgm ent was improper because section 16.2 of the lease prevente d G iles from looking to any property be yond the real property, w hich was the subject of the lease to execute on any j ud gment . A ssu m ing, w itho ut d ecid ing, tha t th is clause is effec tive , an y li mitations on Giles’s ability to exec ute on a j udgme nt does not make rendition of that judgm ent error. Appellants cite Oxford Mall Co. v. K & B Mi

ssissippi Corp. , 737 F.Supp. 962 (S.D. Miss. 1990), which considere d a similar cl ause. That case11

is distinguishable because it was governed by and decided on t he F ede ral R ule o f C ivil Proce dure permitting m otions to dismiss f or failure to state a claim. B ecause those rules are inapplicable i n this proceeding, we ov errule appellants’ fourth point. Appella nts’ fifth point i s based on the tri al court’s decision to allow Giles to present evidence of her attorneys fees when sh e had not proper ly supplem ented dis covery responses. Giles re sponds that the di scovery request at issue was filed in the prior county
c ourt proceeding on April 14, 1994. Becaus e the two county court proceed ings were dismissed to allow the action to be refil ed in di strict court on May 13, 1994, Giles contends the prior discovery re quest did not survive the dism issal. W ithout citation to the record, appellants assert they served a second request for disclosure, including identifi cation of experts, on March 14, 2000. When the issue of attorneys fees wastried separately to the court on March 8, 2 001, appellants objected to anytestimon y of attorneys fees above the app rox im ate ly$2,200 provided in the response to discovery in the co unty court. The court decli ned to exclude the testi mony of additional fees.
In a May 1, 2 000 m otion to exclude Gil es’s experts, appell ants cited the trial court’s Febr uary 22, 2000 docket control order setting April 1, 2000, as the deadline for designation of ex pert w itnessesin confor m ity w ith Rule of Civil Proce dure 194.2(f). The only designation which appears in the record is dated February 9, 1994, w hile the dispute
wasbefore the county court, and lists Giles’s attorney as an ex pert on attorneys fees . The trial co urt decline d to rule on this m otion. W e need not further address this motion12

because it was filed after the bench trial on attorneys fees and concerned the designation of expertson econom ic losses. Likew ise, any failure to re spond to the M arch 14 discover y cannotshow reversible error be cause tha t dis cov ery req ues t do es n ot a ppe ar in this record and it was also made a fter the issue of attorneys fees w

as tried. The absence of a tim ely obj ection or request waiv es any error. Te x. R . App. P. 33 .1(a)(1).
W ith regard to Giles’s

failure to s upplem ent the1994 discovery a nswer, Yari does notcite any authority supporting his contention that dism issal of the county court act ions terminated any duty to supplem ent. The argum ent does find som e suppo rtby ana logy in Aetna Casu alty v. Spe cia , 849 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1993), w here the court held that a discover ysanction for failure to supplement answers did not survive a nonsuit. Id. at 807. Under the record before us, w e cannot say the t rial court abu sed its dis cretion by overruling appellants’ objection to th e testimo ny of Giles’s attorney on attorneys fees. We overrule their fifth issue. Appella nts’ sixth point alleges Giles failed to establi sh entitlement to at torneys fees bystatute or contract

. Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice & Rem edies Code provides for the recovery of attorneys fees on succes s ful prosecu tion of sever al types of cl aims, inc luding contract claims . Section 38.001 (Vernon 1997). Section 38.002 es tab lishe s thr ee prerequisites to recover attorneys fees : 1) that the party b e represented by a n attorn ey; 2) t hat

the y pr ese nt t he c laimto the opposing party; and 3) t hat paym entof the claim was not tendered before the 30 th day after presentation of the claim. Ap pella nts’13

argue that Giles failed to e stablish s he presented the claim to them as required, and therefo re is not entitled to attorneys fees underChapter 38. In respo nse, Giles cites t estimony

and letter s introduce d in which she assert ed that appel lants’ conduct was i n violation of t he le aseagr eem ent . I t is w ell es tab lis h ed that no particular form of presentm entis required to meet the requirementsof section 38

. 02. Whitehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins . Co. , 952 S.W.2d 79, 89 (Tex.App.--Tex arkana 1997), rev’d on other grounds , 988 S.W.2d 744 (Tex . 1999). The record supports a finding that Giles presented her claim under the contract. The only provision in the lease agreement for recove ryof attorneys fees ap pears in section 16.15 . It allows for the re covery of attorne ys fees if either party “brings an action to enforce the term s hereof or declare rights hereunder.” Arguing that G iles’s claim s were for recover

y of da m ages rat her than specific p erform ance or declarato ry j udgm ent, Yari cl ai ms t his pro vision is inapplicab le. We disagree. The a ction w as broug ht to de clare rights under the agreem ent. The fact that Giles also sought dam ages does not alter that. W e overrule appellants’ sixth issue.
In their sev enth issu e, appellants assign erro r t o the trial court’s impos ition of a discover ysanction for abuses alleged to have occ urred in 1994, prior to the first trial of the
case. Before the first trial, Giles sought the exclusion of Yari’s testim ony as a sanction for discover yabu se. The tria l court did n ot r ule o n th e re que st u ntil t he t rial w as w ell underway. Giles did not object to the c ourt’s failure to rule before trial. On appeal, the14

First Cou rt o f A ppe als found Giles waived therigh t toreq ues t sa nct ionsby failin g toobtain
a rulin g, or obj ect to the failure to rule, before trial. Yari v . Gil es , No. 01-95-057 0-CV (Tex.App.--H ouston [1 stDist.] October 29, 1995, no writ).
Ata hearing b efore th e secon d trial, Ya ri’s cou nsel ra ised the issue of discove ry sanctions. The court recounted its reco llection of the events leading to the original discover ysanctions, i ncludi ng Yari’s fai lure to appear at several scheduled depositions and the court’s post ponem ent of san ctio ns to giv e him an o ppo rtu nity

to g ive h is deposition. At Yari’s reques t, the court also limited the de po sition t o two hours . After reading the transcript of the deposition, the court described it as “a rem arkable piece of abuse o f the j udicial proces s” beca use of the “obs tructionism that w as eviden t in [it].”
The trial court found the opinion reversing its original judgment was bas ed on the failure to give Yari adequate tim e t o secure anot her witness, not that the sanction w

as impr oper. The court also opined the appe llate ju dgm ent did no t revers e her discovery sanction order and that order w as still in effect, stating that the five years from the original trial gave Yari adequ ate time to secure another witness and “if the defendant here today was thinking that perhaps that prior ruling had been set aside by the appellate court, let
me know.” She also expressly author ized Yari to substitute an other witness on the m atters thatwould have been a ddressed by his testimony . Yari m ade no objec tion to the court’s assertion that the j udgme nt on original appeal did not vacate her ruling or declare it invalid. The trial court then ov erruled Y ari’s objection that Giles had waived the right to seek15

sanctions by failing to seek sanctions after the original judgm ent was reversed. Ya ri did not seek a continuance to secure another w itness.
We need not

determ ine wh ether th e trial court correct ly interpreted the Firs t Court of Appeals’ j udgme ntbecause Yari’s failure to object to that interpretation in response to the trial court’s express invitation waived anyerror that m ight have existed on tha t issue. W e overrule appellants’ seventh issue.
A ppell ants’ eigh th is sueque stio ns t he s uff icien cy of t he e vide ncesup por tin g th e jury’s answer of $59,428.78 i n actual damages. They also ar gue there was no eviden ce thatany dam ages were t he r esult of th eir breach of the lease. Giles presented the testimony

of her accountant

Patrick Levantino. He te stified that Giles had spent$41,186 in improvem ents to the property, $7, 263 on e quip m ent , $7 ,61 4 in f urn itur e an d $3 ,08 5 in lost sec urit

y depo sits . Th eseex pen sestotaled $59 ,15 8. H e als o te stif ied t hat , in his opinion, a sign was im perative for success of a restaurant and the absence of a sign w as dire ctly related to the failure of Em panada House. This uncontroverted evidence supports the jury finding of actual damages. W e overrule appellants’ eighth issue.
In their ninth issue , appellants challenge the admission of evidence w hich, they contend, was adm itted in violat ion of the rule against hearsay. The evidence at issue includes Giles’s testimony that num erous custom ers told her they had difficulty finding the restaurant. W hen she related these com ments to the landlord’s representative, she w as told to s ubm itthe com ment s in writing. Giles placed a writing tablet in the restaurant and16

obtained several written com ment s from custo m ers concerning their difficulty in findi ng the business. Giles submitted these to the management com pany, and al so introduced them into evidence over appellants’ object ion.
The written com m ents w ere adm itted for the lim ited purpo se of s how ing that Y ari had no ti ce of

cu st ome r complaints r ather than for the truth of thei r contents. W e must pr es ume the jury followed the court’s instructions. Moore v. Si ms , 882 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex.Crim .App. 1994). Moreover, Giles presented the testimony of one of the custo m ers who subm itted a written com ment . C o nsequently, any error in adm itting the written
com ments washarmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. We overrule appellants’ ninth issue. Appella nts’ tenth issue assigns error to the t rial court’s failure to award dam ages to them for unpaid rent on the ground that Giles abandoned the property in violation of the lease “be cau se t her

e is no e vide ncetha t ap pella ntsbre ach ed t he le ase .” T his i s m ere ly
a restatem ent of appellants’ first issue. Having f ound the re was legall y sufficie nt evidence to support the jury’s findi ng that appel lants brea ched the lea se, we ove r ruled the first issue. W e likewise overrule this issue. Finding no m erit

in appellants’ issues we m ust, and hereby do, affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.
John T. Boyd Chief Justi ce17

Do not publish.