### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 4, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. VIV IAN BR AX TON

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-05618 John P. C olton, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-02506-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 10, 2005

The De fenda nt, Vivi an Braxton, pled guilty to one count of the ft betwe en ten a nd six ty thousand do lla rs , a Cla ss C fe lon y . A ft e r a

se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt se ntenced th e De fe nd a nt a s a Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r, to thr e e y e ars to be serve d a s f oll ow s: s ix mon ths in the Cou nty Wor kh ou se wi th the re ma ind e r s us pe nd e d, a ndthr e e y e ars of pr ob a tio n to fo llo w the c on fi ne me nt. The De fenda nt now appea ls, contending that the trial court erre d in declining her r equest for judicial diversion; deny ing he r re quest for full probation; and in ordering her to serve six months day -for -day in c onfinement. We modify the Def endant’ s sentenc e insofar

as re moving a ny

require ment that she

serve her pe riod of conf

inement day -for -day

. I n all other re spects, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed as Modif ied

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

L eslie B allin, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Vivian B raxton.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di stric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; L ind a Ki rkle n, As sis ta nt Dis tr ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Mike Mey ers, Ass istant Attorney Gene ral Spec ial Prosecutor, f or the a ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS Rob e rt Dinke lsp ie l te sti fi e d th a t he is the app oin te d r e c e ive r f or Pe e Wee Wisd om C hil d Deve lopment Center in Memphis, a nonprof it corporation (“the Center ”). H e further testified tha t the day -to-day operations of the Center w ere handled by the Def endant’ s sister, J ean Johnson. The Def endant wa s a salaried employ ee of the Center and acte d as an oversee r. Mr. Dinke lspiel statedT he defens e s t i pul at ed at t he D e f e n da n t ’ s g ui l t y pl ea hea r i ng t hat t he D ef endan t “ r ece i ved a pp r oxi mat el y t hr ee1

p o int-fi v e m ill io n d o llar s fro m the S ta te o f T e n n e sse e to c a re fo r c h ild re n tha t ca m e to he r d a y c a re .”

Appar en t l y , t h e Cen t er a l s o c ol l ec t ed fee s f r om “ pr i v at e pa y ” pa r en t s , w h os e ch i l dr en w er e n ot s u bs i di ze d by 2

t he St at e.

-2- that, as re ceive r, he is responsible for ha ndling the f inancial a ffa irs of the Center and investig ating whether there had bee n “any financ ial impropriety with r eg ard to the operation of that cente r.” H e explained that his investigation had not y et bee n completed, but that he ha d co n d u ct ed an inquiry into the pay ment of re nt by the Center.

Mr. Dinkelspiel explained that the De fenda nt and her husband o wned the land and the building in which the Ce nter wa s located a nd operated. Acc ording ly , the Center ha d paid re nt to the Def endant a nd her husband since it s opening in 1994. As part of his inqui ry , Mr. Dinkelspiel hired tw o e xpe rt s to det e rm ine the fair re nta l va lue of the pr op e rt y

fr om 1 99 4 f

or wa rd . O ne of

the e xpe rt s determined that the re asonable annual renta l va lue for the property in 1994 was $29,172. The other expert determined that the rea sonable a nnual rental value for t he property in 1994 was $48,856.60. I n conducting his investigation, Mr. Dinke lspiel avera g ed these two fig ures, a rriving at the sum of $39,014.30. Mr. Dinkelspi el compil ed these fig ures f or y ear s 1994 throug h 2003. By doing so, he

arrived at a total a vera g e re asonable renta l value for that entire pe riod of time of $446,684.30.

Mr. Dinkelspiel then c alculate d the re nt pay ments that the Def endant wa s paid during that tim e pe ri od , u sin g the fi g ur e s r epo rt e d o n th e Ce nte r’ s F orm 99 0: a re po rt that no np ro fi t corpor ations are require d to file with the I nterna l Revenue Ser vice (“ t h e I R S”). The total dollar amount reported t o t h e I RS as paid in rent payments by the Center f

rom 1994 throug h 2003 was $7 7 7
, 2 0 0

. Su b tr acting the cumulative r easona ble re ntal value f

rom the cumulative a ctual re ntal paid, Mr. Dinkelspiel dete rmined that the Center had overpa id rental to the De fenda nt and her husband in the amount of $330,515.70 for the y ear s 1994 throug h 2003.

Mr. Di n k els piel also testified that, in J anuary 1994, the Def

endant ha d an appr aisal of the pr op e rt y pe rf orme d. Ac c or din g to that app raisa l, the re a so na ble a nn ua l re nta l va lue of

the pr op e rt y in 1994 was $27,500. Mr. Dinke lspiel then applied a three perc ent ra te of inflation over the ensuing y ear s and ar

rived at a total rea sonable rental value for the period 1994 throug h 2003 of $315,256.68. Using the Def

endant’ s own 1994 appra isal, Mr. Dinkelspiel determined that the Def endant ha d been overpa id over $400,000.

Mr. Dinkelspiel explained that the Center was “very , very heavily subsidiz ed by

the State of Tenne ssee with re g ard to pa y ment of tuition, that is chil d ca re e x pense a nd food by the State of T e n n e s s e e

. ” In c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e s e s u b s i d i e s , t h e S t a t e r e q u i r e d t h e C e n t e r t o c o l l e c ta

“ c o

- p a y” 1 from the pa

rents of the children e nrolled at the c enter . Mr. Dinkelspiel stated that his investig ation

re ve a le d th a t the Ce nte r s ho uldha ve be e n c oll e c tin g app ro xima te ly $2 ,0 00 pe r m on th f

ro m pa re nts in co-pa y m en t s

. T h e Form 990 filed with the I RS i ndicated that, in 1994, the Center collec ted 2 $71,259 in pa

renta l f ees. The Form 990 filed with the I RS for 1995 indicated r ece ipts from pare ntal fee s of $63,643; 1996 fees wer e $56,863; 1997 fe es we re $3,886. The Forms 990 filed for y ear s-3-

1998 throug h 2002 indicated that the Center c ollected no pa renta l fee s for those pe riods. As to the fe e s th a t w e re c oll e c te d, Mr . Din ke lsp ie l tes tif ie d, “ [w]e ’r e no t com fo rt able wi th wh e re a ll tha t c a sh went.”

Mr. Dinkelspiel also testified that the D efe ndant had r epa i d $65,877.49 to him as rece iver for the Ce nter pursua nt to a promissory note held by

the Center on w hich she wa s liable. A bala nce of $15,097.72 re mained due unde r the note. The note was not re lated to the amounts he de emed the Ce nte r t o h a ve ov e rp a id i n r e nt.

When asked a

bout his dealing s with the Defe ndant, Mr. Dinkelsp i el d escribed her as “hostile.” He continued: “i t ’s been unpleasa nt wheneve r I have to de al with her,” and “[she] has abused me and my

staff on nume rous occ asions.” Mr. Dinkelspiel added that, as of April 2004, there continued outs tanding a set of i nterrog atories that he had submitt ed to t he def ense in Oc tober 2003.

Ang ela Gr aves testified that she i s an attorne y and ce rtified public ac countant. She re viewed the C enter ’s financial data in conjunction wit h Mr. Dinkelspi el’s rece ivership. She determined that in 200 3, the y e ar i n w hic h M r. Di nk e lsp ie l w a s a pp oin te d r e c e ive r, the Ce nte r c oll e c te d $ 64 ,6 00 in pare ntal fee s. This money had not bee n turned ove r to the re ceive r, howe ver.

Ms. Graves also examined the Def endant’ s I RS Forms 1040 for y ear s 1994 throug h 1999. For y ear 1996, the De fenda nt reporte d rec eiving $60,000 in rental income from the Cente r. Howeve r, the F orm 990 for that y ear indicates that the Cente r re ported pay ing the Def endant a nd her husband a total of $150,000 in r ental pay ments. The total diffe renc e betwe en the r ental re ported a s paid by the Center, and the re ntal reported as rec eived from the C enter , was $111,000 for y ear s 1994 throug h 1 9 9 9 ; th a t is
, th e D e f e n d a n t u n d e r

- r e p o r te d h e r in c o me b y a to ta l o f $ 1 1 1
, 0 0 0 over the

course of those six y ear s.

Mr. Van Dra y ton te stified that he wor ks for a private pr obation company and had r eviewe d the Def endant’ s prese ntence report. He t es t i fi ed t h at his company would be able to supervise the Def endant in either

a primar y or sec ondary

capa city should she be re lease d on probation. The Def endant would be ar the expense of his company ’s participation.

Jame s Wr ig ht, c e rt if

ie d p ub lic a c c ou ntant, te sti fi e d th a t th e Ce nte r h a d b e e n a c lie nt o f h is since 1993, ha ving been hired at that time by the Def endant. Hehas pre pare d the g ener al ledg er a nd the financ ial statements for the Center since 1994.

Mr. Wright e x plained that, initially
, he rec eived separ ate c hecks f or re ntal pay ments from the Ce nte r: on e fo r the re nta l of va ns a nd on e fo r the re nta l of the re a l pr op e rt y . L a te r, the se pa y me nts

we re c on so lid a te d int o a sin g le c he c k a nd he re po rt e d bo th fo rm s of re nt a s “ re nt. ” He te sti fi e d, “ it was still understood that it was for both the va n renta l and for the rent.”

Mr . Wr ig ht e xpla ine d th a t th e Ce nte r p art ic ipate d in a fo odpr og ram on a

“ c os t reimburse ment” basis. That is, the Center would purc hase f ood for the enr olled children a nd then-4-

submit a document to the State for reimburse ment of the cost. Mr. Wright stated that he per formed audits of the food pr og ram at the Center a nd never found any

discrepancies.

Mr. Wright wa s familiar with a 1999 pay ment in the sum of approximately $90,000 that the C e n t e r m a d e t o t h e D e f e n d a n t a s “ b a c k r e n t

. ” H e e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s s u m w a s “ b a s i c a l l y a reimburse ment for f

unds that, well, s he had spent to g et t hat corporation up and going .” He testified that, when he initiallyviewed the Center prior to its opening , “it was just a shell.” The Def endant pr ov ide d th e mon e y

to c on ve rt

the pr op e rt y

int o a n op e ratio na l da y c are c e nte r. Th e De fe nd a nt a lso provided the mone y

neede d to buy

initial equipment and supplies.

Mr. Wright wa s also familiar with a tr ansac tion where by the Def endant use d funds from the Ce nte r t o p e rf

orm r e no vatio ns a t on e of he r f or -p ro fi t day

c are c e nte rs. Wh e n h e dis c ov e re d th is transac tion, he called the Def endant a nd informed he r that the tra nsaction wa s improper a nd the money would have to be repa id. He prepar ed the nece ssary documents t o ref lect the r epayment and to l d h er that the re habilitative transac tion would have to be a pproved by

the Center’ s board of dir e c tor s. Mr . Wr ig ht s ta te d th a t he pr e pa re d a n in te re st- be ari ng pr omi sso ry no te fo r the re pa y me nt. He e x plained that, in or der to set the interest ra te, he would “ usually

try to see what prime is and I think I knocked it up a c ouple of pe rce ntag es.” The note re q u i re d m o nthly pay ments by

the Def endant, whic h she made

.

Mr

. W ri g ht t e sti fi e d th a t th e a mou nt o f m on e y the De fe nd a nt t oo k f

ro m th e Ce nte r t o
renovate her

for- profit ce nter wa s approximately $108 ,000. The a mortiz ation schedule for he r repay ment of t his sum was ten y ear s. The De fenda nt provided him with a document re flec ting boa rd autho r iz a ti o n o f th e r e p a y me n t tr a n s a c ti o n

. M r

. Wr ig h t te s ti f ie d th a t th e p r o mi s s o r y n o te for the

re pa y me nt o f the mon e y

div e rt e d f

ro m th e Ce nte r b or e the sig natur e s of al l of the bo ardme mbe rs

. Mr. Wright testified that, due to his oversig ht, he fa i l ed to prepa re F orms 1099 for the Def endant r efle cting rents that the Cente r paid to her . These f o rm s would have be en sent to the Def endant f or her use i n calc ulating and reporting the renta l income she re ceive d from the Cente r. Mr. Wright testified tha t he did not prepa re the Def

endant’ s ind i v i d u al t ax returns until afte r the investigation beg an.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Mr . Wr ig ht a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e “ ba c k re nt” pa y me nt m a y a c tua lly ha ve be e n ma de in 1 99 6. He state d th a t he wa s g ive n “ [n]o b oa rd min ute s, no do c ume ntatio n” in support of that payment. He f urther e x plained that his documents reflec ted that the De fenda nt had spent $15,797 in start-up costs for equipment, including play g round equipment. He stated that he had neve r see n a contr act between the Def endant and the S tate for the provisi on by the S tate of f unds for start-up costs.

On redirect, Mr. Wrig ht testified that, in addition to the $15,000 in st art-up c osts for eq u i p m en t , another $259,000 was spent in start-up c osts. Mr. Wright testified that, as f ar a s he knew, that money

came from the De fenda nt’s persona l funds. He did not know if the Center e ver
re c e ive d a

g rant f or sta rt -u p c os ts.-5-

Mr . Wr ig ht a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e imp ro ve me nts ma de to the re a l e state that e ve ntu a lly ho us e d th e Ce nte r w ou ld b e lon g to the De fe nd a nt o nc e the Ce nte r v a c a te d th e pr e mis e s.

An tho ny Cart e r t e sti fi e d th a t he is a se rg e a nt w ith the City of Me mph is Pol ic e De pa rt me nt. He state d that, with the assis tance of the De fenda nt and Flor ence Mason, he ha d enrolled his thre e daug hters with one of

the Def endant’ s for-pr ofit Pee Wee Center s. He stated that the Def endant “alway s appea

red to be [a] caring pe rson, warm and alwa y s willing to do whate ver she could to try to help any

body .” He testified that he ha s known the De fenda nt since 1991 and has se en her three d a y c ar e c e n t e r s g r o w i n t h a tt i m e

. H e r t o p p r i o r i t y ap p e ar e d t o b e “ p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e c h i l d r e n

. ” In his opinion, t he De fenda nt’s forg ing sig nature s and providing false doc uments wo u ld b ein consistent with her c hara cter . Sgt. C ar t er s tated that he supported the De fenda nt’s reque st for diversion or probation. He testified: “The re’ s been some misfortunes t hat have occur red, but ove rall I

look at [the De fe nd a nt] a s be ing so me on e wh o is ve ry c on sc ie nti ou s abo ut wh a t sh e do e s, ta kes pri de in try ing to do the ve ry

best and provide the best ser vice that she can.”

Danny Fay testified that he is a Special Ag ent with the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation. I n that capa city , he investig ated a lleg ations aga i n s t t h e Defenda nt at the re quest of the District Attorney Gene ral’s office

. I n conjunction with his investigation, he took a sworn statement from the Def endant, in the pr esenc e of he r attorne y , in which “she confe ssed to the alleg ations.”

Ag e nt F a y e xpla ine d tha t, during his inv e sti g a tio n, “ it w a s d e te rm ine d th a t [th e De fe nd a nt]

m a d e a b o u t a t h i r t y

- f

i v e h u n d r e d s q u ar e f

o o t a d d i t i o n t o t h e f

o r

- p r o f i t c e n t e r u s i n g S t a t e m o n e y, which is a crime.” The Def endant told him that she took the money from the Cente r bec ause “ she had no conve ntional way

of g etting that money .”

Ag ent Fay ag ree d that this case ha d been “ highly publicized.” He a lso ag ree d that the theft of public funds wa s a “pr oblem” in Shelby County

. He added: “ unfortunate ly this is a problem that we’ re ha ving and I ’m seeing more a nd more of it.” H e also stated, howeve r, t hat he was “stunned” when he learned that the De fenda nt was re pay ing the money that she had misappr opriated f rom the Center.

The De fenda nt testified that she is fifty -six y ear s old, has been marrie d thirty -three y ear s and h a s o n e g r o w n d au g h te r

. Sh e h a s a ma s te r ’ s d e g r e e in g u id a n c e a n d c o u n s e li n g

. Sh e h a s worke d as a te ache r. She has no prior criminal re cord. T h e De fe n d an t testified that she doe s not drink alcohol or use illega l drug s. She attends chur ch. She has hy perte nsion and has take n presc ription medication for

depre ssion.

The De fenda nt admitted to having f org ed the sig natur es of board member s to a document draw n up by Mr. Wright and she admitted to ha ving falsified minutes. She knew at the time that her actions we re w rong but stated that, “at the t ime that I was doing it, I

didn’t g ive too much thoug ht to it. I t was just, y ou know, it was conve nient and I did it o u t o f co n venienc e, I g uess.” The Def endant state d that she wa s “immensely , . . . terribly sorry ” for her c riminal actions and that she-6-

acc epted re s p onsibili ty

for them. She testified that she was “ truly remorse ful” a nd explained that her a ctions were “totally

out of cha

rac ter.”

As to the rea son for he r misappropriation of Center funds, she testified:

I had the opportunityto buy a prope rty

next door to my for- profit cente r. And at that t i m e I t ri ed to get fina ncing from the ba nk and wa s basically turned down. The prope rty

was purc hased w ith the intent of providing some kind of cove r for the school ag ed childre n, who at the time was occupy ing a s pace within the center , the main cente r. And the summers had just g otten so hot, I decide d it would be nice, y ou kn ow , if I c ou ld a c tua lly

ha ve the pla c e re no vate d, y ou kn ow , s o th e c hil dr e n c ou ld

a c tua lly be ou t of the su n fo r a po rt ion of tim e a nd , y ou kn ow , w e c ou ld s wi tc h th e ir

a c tiv iti e s, so me a c tiv iti e s in a ndso me ou t.

She d i d n o t realiz e that using the Center’ s fund for this purpose was wr ong until Mr. W rig ht informed he r that she “ couldn’t do t hat.” There afte r, she sig ned the pr omissory note that Mr. Wrig ht prepa red, w hich bore an intere st rate of “seve n o r s even and a half ” per cent. F ollowing that, she made pay ments on the note on a monthly basis.

As to the payment of $90,000 in “ba ck re nt,” the De fenda nt expl ained:

I at s ome po in t, I

d o n ’ t kn o w , I

d is c o v e r e d th a t I

w a s o n ly r e c e iv in g r e al estate r ent, and that wa s rent for the rea l pr operty , which wa s the building, the squa re fo ota g e a ndthe lik e

. I wa s no t re c e ivi ng re nt fo r the c on te nts . I ha d a pp ro xima te ly $60,000.00 worth of contents and I had not be en pay ing my self rent for the pe rsonal property . So I

approa ched Mr . Wright about the pe rsonal prope rty as well as the sta rt -u p mo ne y . A ndhe tol d me to g ive him the re c e ipt s, a nd I did , th e sa me re c e ipt s that I have sinc e g iven to the rec eiver . And he did a c alculation, came up with that

sc he du le a ndtol d me that I wa s e nti tle d to abo ut $ 90 ,0 00 ba se d o n h is c a lc ulatio ns

.
As to the discrepancies betwee n the amount of re nt the Def endant wa s paid by

the Center a nd the amount of re ntal income that she reported to the I RS, t he De fenda nt testified that her sy stem for keeping up with rec eipts was “fla wed.” She stated, “I wasn’t try ing to g et awa y with not reporting that.” Ra the r, sh e didno t ke e p s uf fi c ie ntl y a c c ur a te re c or ds

.
The De fe n d a n t te s ti f

ie d th a t, o v e r th e y e ar s , th e n u mb e r o f “ p r iv a te p a y ” c h il d r e n in the Center de cre ased until, eve ntually , the Center’ s children we re a ll subsidi zed. As to collecting the co-pay s due on these c hildren, the De fenda nt stated, “we collecte d what the parents paid. You know
, we didn’t ha

rass them for

pay ment.”

The De fenda nt stated that it was Mr. Dinkelspiel who ha d spoken “ve ry harshly ” to her

when she ca lled to inquire about one of her se rvice men being paid.-7-

Wit h reg ard to her punishment, the Def endant state d that she did not want to g o to jail, but

wa nte d to c on tin ue he r w or k in c hil d c are . Sh e c on tin ue d:

Child care ha s been my

life an d I know that, y ou know, the pape r transa ctions was wrong . I know I did wrong there

. But as far as caring for f olk’s children, I

do have a g enuine pa ssion for what I do. I have a g enuine pa ssion for what I do. And I

have invested all of my

life and, y ou know, these c hildren depe nd on me.

Th e De fe nd a nt expl a ine d tha t she a lso did no t wa nt to be c on fi ne d to he r h ome be c a us e sh e wo uld not be able to inter act with the c hildren fr om there. She state d:

I get m ore e njoy ment out of just walking a round [the day

car e ce nter] and holding hands and sing ing song s and cla pping and that sort of thing

.
She c on tin ue d: if the jud g e a llo ws me to stay ou t of ja il, I ’l l do e ve rythi ng in my po we r, I g ue ss, to try to rede em my self beca

use I am a g ood person reg ardle ss of what the f

igur es point out, I am a g ood person. And I spend the majority of my time and a g reat deal of the money that I take in for

the day car e childre n.

The De fenda nt stated emphatica lly that the Center ne ver r ece ived any g rant money

from the State for start-up money

. She testified t hat t he money neede d to g et t he C enter operational was her “per sonal money .”

On cr oss-examination the Defe ndant admitted that she had fabricated the minutes of a boar d meeting with reg ard to a

pproving the $90,000 payment of back rent to her. She explained that the $90,000 actua lly

repr esente d both back r ent for the use of the persona l pr operty with which she ha d equipped the Center, and reimburse ment for some start-up costs. She also explained that, during the y e ars that sh e wa s c ha

rg ing the Ce nte r $10 ,0 00 a mon th f or re nt, that su m in c lud e d b othre a l pr op e rt y rent a nd persona l property rent. F or the re al prope rty rent, she used $1.50 per

square foot as her calc ulation.

The De fenda nt acknowle dg ed that, bef ore she appropr

iated the $108,000 f

rom the Center

for improvements t o one of he r for -prof it center s, she did not apply for a bank loan. She state d that, a sh ort ti me prior

to that, s he “ ha d met wi th a g re a t dea l of re sis ta nc e wh e n [sh e ] tr ie d to g e t a loan to purcha se the prope rty

next t o [her].”

After the s entenc ing hearing, the trial court e ntere d a written sentencing order . The trial c ourt revie wed the testimonyand found that “[i] t appea rs from the r ecor d that almost half a million dollars

wer e re ceive d by

Def endant illeg ally .” The court c ontinued:

Con sid e ri ng div e rs ion the c ou rt re vie we d f

a c tor s in g ranting or den y ing it. Th e c ou rt fi nd s th a t th e c ir c ums ta nc e s o f thi s off e ns e are tot a lly re pu g na nt t o s oc ie tyW e n ot e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e has r ece nt l y amended s eve r al provi s i ons of t he C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng Ref orm Act 3

of 198 9, s ai d cha ng es becomi ng ef fect i ve Jun e 7, 200 5. H o w ev er, the D ef endan t ’ s cr i me i n t hi s ca s e, as wel l as he r (c o n tinu e d ...)

-8- and to this ge og raphic are a. Public funds provided by statute to help poor childre n
a nd po or pa

re nts to be tte r the mse lve s a nd pr ov ide c are fo r ind ig e nt c hil dren while po or pare nt s a tte mpt

to w or k w e re lit e ra lly

sto le n f ro m th e se le ss f

ortun a te pe op le and the public coffe rs. Diversion from this rec ord would not serve the publ ic. The deter renc e value to the convicted D efe ndant and other s not convicted must be

co nsidered. T his court finds from the r ecor d that J udicial Diver sion will not serve the int e re sts of

the pu bli c or

the De fe nd a nt. The c ircumstance s of the off ense a re of such a nature a s to outweig h all other fac tors favoring pr obation. The best interests of the public must ag ain be looked at

as we ll as that o f t h e Def endant. The court notes a certain lack of

candor from Defendant. The proof shows a n educated per son who has deg ree s. The re cord

re fl e c ts c a lc ulate d ta

kin g of pu bli c mon e y , whi c h c ou ld b e us e d to he lp l e ss f ortun a te folks and a scheme that seemed to start when De fenda nt served on theboard of another car e take r Mrs. Madison. This court further finds o t h er incidents in this communit y have be en incre asing ly

prese nt reg arding matters of this [kind] . The De fenda nt[ ’]s c rime wa s the re su lt o f i nte nti on a l, kno wi ng a ndre c kle ss c on du c t a nd mot ivate d by a de sir e to profit or g ain from the c riminal behavior. Th e De fe nd a nt kne w f

ro m pr e vio us wo rk

wi th M s. Ma dis on that sh e c ou ld use the same type of c riminal conduct or sc heme. This court finds for all of the stated r easons it ca nnot gr ant total probation. Def endant would be elig ible for pa role unde r our law in approxim ately one y ear without diversion or probation. Sin ce Defe nd ant is tak in g medi cat io n fo r em ot io nal pro bl ems and made s ome restitution the Court finds Def endant must serve six months day per day , be put on thr e e y e ars of pr ob a tio n af te r that, an d mak e re sti tut ion to the Sta te of Te nn e sse e in an amount to be de termined by the local Chanc ery

Court . . . .

The De fenda nt now challeng es the trial c ourt’s sentenc ing de cision, c la iming that the trial court erre d in not gr anting her e ither judicial diversion or full probation, and also that the trial court’s order of six months of confineme nt “day per day ” is excessive and de nies her “ g ood conduct c redits.”

STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentenc e upon a convicted criminal defe ndant, it must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; (b) t he presentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) e vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and m itigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f ) any statement th e d ef

en d an t wi shes to make in the de fenda nt’s own 3(

. . . con t i n u ed) 3

sen t en cing
, p red ate t he eff ec t i ve d ate of t he se a m en d m en t s. T he refo re, t his case i s no t aff ec t ed b y t he 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t s,

an d t h e s t at u t es c i t ed i n t h i s opi n i on a r e t h os e t h at w er e i n e f fec t a t t h e t i me t h e i n s t an t c r i me wa s c ommi t t ed.

-9- behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 0 0 2 )

. T o f

a c i l i t a t e ap p e l l a t e r e v i e w , t h e tr i a l c o u r ti s r e q u i r e d t o p l a c e o n t h e r e c o r d i ts

rea sons for imposing the sp ec i fi c sente nce, inc luding the ide ntification of the mitigating a nd enhanc ement fa ctors found, the spec i fi c fa cts supporting e ach e nhance ment fac tor found, and the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h ave been eva luate d a ndba la nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).

Upon a c halleng e to the sente nce imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sente nce w ith a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). Howe ver, this pre sumption “is conditioned upon the affirmative sh ow ing in the re c or d tha t the tr ia l cou rt c on sid e re d the se nte nc ing princ ipl e s and a ll re le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the court imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g iven due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ iples s et out under the sentenc ing la w, and that the trial court’s finding s of fac t are adequately supported by

the re cord, then the pre sumption i s appli ca b l e, an d we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. See State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W. 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We will uphold the sentenc e imposed by the trial court if (1) the se ntence complies with the purposes and princ iples of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, and ( 2) the trial c ourt’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . The burde n of showing that a sente nce is improper

is upon the appe aling party . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401 Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

I. Denial of

Judi cial Diversion The Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989 provides that, a fter acc epting a g uiltyplea, a tr ia l c ou rt

may defe r further proc eeding s ag ainst a qualified defe ndant and plac e such de fenda nt

o n p ro b at i o n u p o n s u ch re as o n ab l e c o n d i t i o n s as i tm ayre q u i re wi t h o u ten t er i n g a judgme nt of g ui l t y an d wi th the consent of the qualified de fenda nt. Such defe rra l shall be for a

period of time not less than the pe riod of the maximum s entenc e for the misdemeanor w ith which the per son is charg ed, or not m o re t h an t he period of the maxi mum sentence of the fe lony with which the per son is charg ed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-313(a )(1) (A). T his form of probation is known as “ judicial diversion” a nd has been described by our supreme court as “leg islative larg ess.” State v. Schindler, 986 S .W.2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1999) . The De fenda nt in this case is a “qua lified defe ndant” be cause she has pled g uil ty to an e lig ibl e of

fe ns e a ndha s n ot p re vio us ly been con vict e d o f a fe lon y or a Cla ss A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-313(a )(1) (B )(i).T h e D e fen d a n t as se rts in h e r a p p e llate b rie f th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt d e v o te d “ a m e re p a ra g ra p h ” to se tti n g fo rth it s 4

a n a lysis o n the D e fen d a n t’s re q u e st fo r j u d ic ia l d ive rs io n . W e re a d the trial c o u rt’s se n te n c ing o rd e r m o re b ro a d ly. W h ile th e trial c o u rt re fer re d to “p ro b a tio n ” in th e r e m a inin g p a ra g ra p h s o f i ts o rd e r, w e no te tha t ju d ic ia l d ive rs io n is

a f o rm of

pr obat i on

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35- 313( a) ( 1) ( A)

. Ac cor di n g l y , w e r ea d t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s fi nd i ngs regardi ng t he D efend ant ’ s sui t ab i l i t y fo r f ul l pro b at i o n as ap p l i cab l e eq ual l y t o her s ui t ab i l i t y fo r j ud i ci al diver si o n.

-10- Be fore determining whether to g rant or deny judicial diversion, a tria l court must consider the following fac tors: “(a ) the a ccuse d’s am en ab i lityto corre ction, (b) the c ircumstance s of the offe nse, (c ) the a ccuse d’s criminal recor d, (d) the ac cused’ s social history , (e) the status of the

acc used’s phy sical and mental health, and (f) the deter renc e value to the acc used as well as others.” State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) , overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000) . Additionally
, t h e t ri al co u rt should consider the

a c c us e d’ s a tti tud e , b e ha vio r s inc e arr e st, emo ti on a l st abil ity , c ur re nt dru g us e , p a st e mpl oy me nt, home environme nt, marital stability , family responsibility , g e n e r a l re p u ta tion, a nd the likelihood that judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice and best interests of both the public and the a ccuse d. See State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 343-44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Mo re ov e r, the re c or d mu st r e fl e c t th a t th e c ou rt has wei ghe d a ll o f the fa c tor s in

rea ching its determination. The c ourt must ex plain on the re cord w hy the def endant does not qualify

under i t s an aly sis, and if the court has based its dete rmination on

on ly so me of the fa c tor s, it m us t e xpla in w hy the se fa c tor s o utw e ig h th e oth e rs

. State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (c itation omit ted).

We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on wh e the r or no t to g rant j ud ic ia l r e vie w u nd e r an a bu se of discretion standard. See Cutshaw, 967 S.W .2d at 344. Where the trial court f ollows the require d proce dure f

or dete rmining w hether

or not to g rant judi cial diversion, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling if any

substantial evidence exis ts to support it . See id.

I n this case, the trial court de termined to deny diver sion on the bases of the circ umstances of the off ense; de terre nce c onsiderations; the De fenda nt’s “lac k of candor”; and beca use diversion would not serve the interests of the public or the Def endant. The re is substantial evidenc e in the

re c or d to su pp ort th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on

. Mo re ov e r, the se fa c tor s tog e the r pr ov ide a pr op e r b a sis upon which to deny

diversion. 4

As n o ted by

the trial court, the Def

endant is an e ducate d woman. She has be en in the day

car e b u s in e s s f

o r man y y e ar s

. Sh e s a t o n th e b o ar d o f Ch e r o k e e Ch il d r e n a n d F a mi ly Service s, a child car e broke r, fr om 1992 to 1999. W hen she c reated the nonprof it Center i n 1 9 9 3-94, Mr. Wright made her f

ully awa re “ about t h e importance of making sure that it wasn’ t treate d as an owned e ntity . That i t was a c ommunityentity and that it belong ed to the people and the individual

was no more than just an empl o y ee

. An d an y t h ing that was done tha t was out of the or dinary

o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e c o rp o r a t i o n h a d t o h a v e b o ar d ap p r o v a l

. ” H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t“ i tw a s a l w a ys understood that . . . [the Center] was . . . an e ntitythat belong ed to the people .” I ndeed, the De fe nd a nt a dmi tte d th at, a t th e tim e sh e c re a te d th e Ce nte r, sh e un de rs too d th e sig nif ic a nc e of itsT h e D e fen d a n t ap p ro v e d a s im il a r t r a n sa c tio n w h ile sitting o n the b o a rd o f C h e ro k e e C h ild re n a n d F a m ily 5

Se rvi ces t o t he b enef

i t of M s. W i l l i e A nn M ad i son, t he o rgani zat i o n’ s executi ve d i rect o r.

-11- no np ro fi t status a nd that the Ce nte r’ s a sse ts we re to be us e d to pr ov ide qu a lit y da y c are se rv ic e s to the working poor.

Ne ve r t h e l e s s , b e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 9 6
, t h e C e n t e r b e g a n p a y i n g r e n t a l t o t h e D e f e n d a n t f a r i n excess of what her own appra iser tol d her it was worth. I n addition to this inflated mont hly rent, the Def endant a rra ng ed for

a $90,000 pay ment of “back rent.” Subsequently
, the Defenda nt withdrew 5 $108,000 from the Cente r to u s e fo r i m p roveme nts to one of her for- profit fa cilities. W hen he learned of this withdraw al, Mr. Wrig ht a dvised her that the transac tion wa s improper and the money would have to be repa id. Although she was informed that the Center’ s board of direc tors would have to approve the transa ction, the Def endant f alsified minutes and sig nature s to m ak e i t ap p ear as though B oard a

pproval ha d been obta ined.

This evidence points to t he conc lusion that the Defe ndant knowingly and intentionally bilked the Center out of subs tantial funds. Her partial repayment of t he funds she “borr owed” to improve another of her fac iliti es does not over come the eg reg iousness of the Def endant’ s conduct. Nor doe s the use to which she put the money excuse the De fenda nt’s behavior . The De fenda nt makes much of the fa ct that the “bor

rowe d” money

was used to be tter anothe r child ca re f aci l i t y

. W e are not persua ded. The improvements still acc rued to the Def endant’ s benef

it, a s she owne d t h e r eal property that was be ing improve d. She also operated it as a for-prof it facility . Moreove r, the improvements do not acc ount for the e x orbitant rent monies she c harg ed the Cente r.

The De fenda nt repe atedly misused taxpay er mone y , over a n extended period of time. The tr ia l c ou rt fo un d n ot c re dib le the De fe nd a nt’ s p ro te statio ns that he r a c tio ns we re me re ly the re su lts of mis take s a ndc on ve nie nc e a ndpo or re c or d k e e pin g . We wi ll n ot s e c on d- g ue ss the tr ia l c ou rt in thi s r e g ard

. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s la c k o f c a nd or su g g e sts a

re du c e d c apa c ity

fo r r e ha bil itatio n. Th e se fac tors are sufficie nt to support the trial court’s de nial of judicial diversion.

Mor e o v e r , c o n s id e r a ti o n s o f d e te rr e n c e a ls o s u p p o r t th e tria l c o u r t’ s d e n ia l o f judicial div e rs ion . O ur

su pr e me c ou rt

ha s in str uc te d u s to pr e su me that

a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to i nc arc e rate a de fe nd a nt b a se d o n a

ne e d f or de te rr e nc e is

corr ect so long as any rea sonable person looking at the entire rec ord could c onclude t h a t ( 1 ) a

n e e d t o d e t e r

s i m i l ar c r i m e s i s p r e s e n ti n t h e p ar t i c u l ar c o m m u n i t y, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole, and (2) inca rce ration of the de fenda nt may rationally serve as a deter

rent to othe rs simil arly situated and likely to c ommit s imilar

c ri me s.

State v. H o o p e r , 2 9 S. W. 3 d 1
, 1 0 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( f o o tn o te o mi tt e d )

. F a c to r s in d ic a ti n g a n e e d for deterren c e in c lu d e p r o o f th a t ( 1 ) in c id e n ts o f th e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e ar e in c r e a s in g ly p r e s e n t in the community ; (2) the defe ndant’s crime was the r esult of intentional, knowing , or re ckless conduc t or-12-

wa s o the rw ise mot ivate d b y a de sir e to p ro fi t or

g a in f ro m th e cri me; (3 ) the de fe nd a nt’ s c ri me
rec eived substantial publicity exceeding that of the ty

pical ca se; (4) the defe ndant was a member of

a c ri min a l e nte rp ri se ; a nd

/or (5 ) the de fe nd a nt pr e vio us ly e ng a g e d in c ri min a l c on du c t of the sa me type as the instant offense . See id. at 10-12. “The se fa ctors ar e mea nt to serve only as a g uide, and

a court need not find that a ll of these fa ctors ar e pre sent befor e o rd er i n g i n ca rceration base d on a need to de ter similar crimes.” I d. at 12.

Her e, Ag ent Fa

y testified that the thef

t of public funds in Shelby County was a problem, and that he wa s se e ing “ mor e a ndmor e of it. ” Ag e nt F a y

a lso te sti fi e d th a t th is case wa s “ hig hly publicized.” He r efe rre d to n ew s p ap er a rticles, articles on the interne t, and a pr ess conf ere nce including se vera l television and radio stations on t h e d ay t h e Def endant wa s indicted. Copies of newspa per a rticles we re a dmitted into evidence. Repr esenta tives of the p re s s we re prese nt at the

se nte nc i n g h e ar i n g

. T h e s e f a c t o r s , t o g e t h e r

w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f

t h e D e f e n d a n t ’ s c r i m i n a l c o nd uc t, support the trial co u rt ’s determination that diversion should be denied in orde r to deter further

c ri min a l a c tiv ity

. Al l of the se fa c tor s a lso su pp ort the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion that di ve rs ion in this

c a se wo uldno t se rv e the pu bli c ’s int e re st.

I n s um, we se e no abu se of dis c re tio n b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

in d e nying the De fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st for judicial diver sion. This iss ue is without merit.

II. Denial of

fu ll probation We turn now to the Def

endant’ s contention that the trial court erre d by not fully probating her se ntence

. A def

endant is elig ible for pr obation if the ac tual sentenc e imposed upon the de fenda nt is eig ht y ear s or less and the of fense for whic h the def

endant is sentenc ed is not spec ifically excluded by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( a). The trial court shall automaticallyco n sider probation as a

sentenc ing a lternative f

or elig ible defe ndants; h o w e v e r , th ed e f e n d an t bear s the burden of pr ovin g h is or her

su ita bil ity fo r p ro batio n. Se e id. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ). No c ri min a l de fe nd a nt i s automatically

entitled t o p ro b ation as a ma tter of law . See id. § 40-35-303( b), Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; St ate v. Da vis, 940 S.W .2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997) . Rather, the de fenda nt must demonstrate that probation would serve the e nds of justice and the best interests of both the public and the de fenda nt. See State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

I n determining whe ther to g rant probation, the cou rt must consider the na ture a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse; the def

endant’ s criminal re cor d ; his or her ba ckg round and soc ial his tory ; hi s o r h e r p re se nt c on dit ion , b othph y sic a l a ndme nta l; the de te rr e nt e ff e c t on the de fe nd a nt;

a ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s po te nti a l fo r re ha bil itatio n or tr e a tme nt. Se e id. I f the c ou rt de te rm ine s th a t a perio d o f p r o b a ti o n is ap p r o p r iate , it s h a ll s e n te n c e th e d e f

e n d a n t t o a

s p e c if ic s e n te n c e b u t th en suspend that sentenc e and pla ce the defe ndant on s upervised or unsupervised pr obation either immediately

or af ter the service of a period of confine ment. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 303(c)
, -306(a ).In fac t, the te c h n ic a l re c o rd b e fo re this C o u rt c o n ta ins two ju d g m e n ts m e m o ria lizin g the D e fen d a n t’s 6

convi ct i on. T he f

i r s t was en t er ed on Ap r i l 23, 200 4, t he s ame dat e as t he D ef endan t ’ s s ent enc i ng he ar i ng

. T hi s i ni t i al j udgment i ndi cat es t hat t he D ef endan t i s s ent enc ed t o t hr ee y ear s i n t he W ork house

. T he s econd j udgment
, en t er ed O c to b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 4 , d iff

e rs o n ly i n so far a s it ind ic a te s tha t th e D e fen d a n t is to s e rv e six m o n ths in c o n fine m e n t p rio r to bei n g r el ea s ed on pr obat i on

. N ei t h er j u dg men t doc u men t ma k es a r ef er en ce t o “ day for da y ” s er v i ce of t h e per i od of

c o n fine m e n t.

-13- For the same r easons that the rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s denia l of judicial diversion, we conclude that t h e re co rd supports the trial c ourt’s denia l of full probation. This issue is without

me ri t.

III . Le ngt h of c onfine m e nt Th e De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e six mo nthpe ri od of c on fi ne me nt o rd e re d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

is excessive. The Defe ndant’s ar g ument on this iss ue in her appellate brief is limited to the following statement: “I f a brief period of confine ment is deemed to be nece ssary , [t he De fenda nt] urg es the

c ou rt to co ns ide r the princ ipl e s o f s e nte nc ing un de r the Cr imi na l Se nte nc ing Re fo rm Ac t a ndto u se its discretion in ordering an appr opriate te rm of inca rc eration.” We are not persuade d that the Def endant’ s six month term of conf inement is excessive or is in any way contra ry to the principles of sentenc ing. T h e trial court c onducted a n extensive sentencing hearing and issued a

c omp re he ns ive or de r a dd re ssi ng a ll o f the iss ue s r a ise d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt , a ndno t th is C ou rt , w a s in

a p o s it io n to o b s e r v e th e D e f e n d a n t an d a s s e s s h e r c r e d ib il it y a n d p o te n ti a l f o r r e h ab il it a ti o n

. We

see no err or by the trial court in or dering the Def endant to se rve six months in confine ment. No er ror ha vin g be e n d e mon str a te d, we ho ld this iss ue to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

IV. Order t hat period of confi nem ent be ser ved “day per day” Th e tr ia l c ou rt or de re d the De fe nd a nt to se rv e six mo nth s o f c on fi ne me nt i n th e wo rk ho us e “day per day .” I n this, the trial court er red.

Whe re a pe ri odof

c on fi ne me nt i s impo se d, a n o rd er of da y -f or -d a y se rv ic e is impermissible because a tria l court ca nnot deny a def endant the sta tutory

rig ht to earn g oo d c on du c t c re dits or authorize d w or k c re dit s w he re the de fe nd a nt r e c e ive s a sentenc e of split confine ment and bec omes a c ounty jail inmate.

Sta te v. Chris E. Hi xson , No

. M2 00 2- 03 14 1- CCA -R 3- CD
, 20 04 WL 74 16 70 , at *2 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , N a sh vil le , A pril 7 , 2 00 4) . G oo d c on du c t cr e dit s app ly to f e lon s se rv ing le ss tha n o ne y e ar i n the county

workhouse. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41- 2-111(b) ; St at e v

. M i ch ae l E. Owenby , No. E2001-02012-CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 0 2 W L 2 0 1 2 6 5 3
, at * 3 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , Kn o x v i l l e, Aug . 28, 2002).

We note, howeve r, that the a ctual judg ment enter ed ag ainst the Def endant on Oc tober 11, 20 04
, make s n o r e fe re nc e to the De fe nd a nt s e rv ing he r c on fi ne me nt “day fo r d a y .” Th e on ly 6 docume n t in w h ic h w e h a v e f o u n d th is lan g u a g e is th e tria l c o u r t’ s w r it te n o r d e r s e tt in g f o r th the judge ’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law reg arding the Def endant’ s sentenc e, which order was enter ed on Oc tober 7, 2004. Out of an abundanc e of c aution, we he re b y m o dify the orde r to the extent of deleting the “day per day ” lang uag e. The Def endant will thus be entitled to any g ood-14-

c o n d u c tc r e d i t s s h e e ar n s , w h i c h w i l l ap p l y t o w ar d h e r s i x m o n t h s o f

c o n f i n e m e n t

. S e e O w e n b y, 2002 WL 2012653, at *3.

CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE