alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-20249 Summary Calendar

WILLIAM SOLOMON LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant

v. BRAZORIA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHE R IFF CHARLES WAGNER; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH, Defendants-Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:10-CV-5014
Before DAVIS, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * William Solomon Lewis, Texas prisoner # 7 3 9 9 8 2 7 9, appeals from the dismissal of his civil ri gh t s a c tion, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own motion, i f necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). A t i m e l y “notice of appeal in a civil case i s a j u ri sdictional requirement.” Bowles v. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 3, 2 011 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-20249 Document: 00511653963 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/03/2011No. 11-20249

Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). A document may be construed as a notice of appeal only if it “clearly evinces the party’s intent to appeal.” Mosley , 813 F.2d at 660 (int e r n al quotation marks and citation omitted). A pleading that both seeks to appeal and to obtain relief from the district court does not clearly evince an intent to appeal. See id. B oth of the pleadings Lewis evidently intended to serve as noti c e s o f appeal also sought postjudgment relief from the district court. See Rosenzweig

v. Azurix Corp. , 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003). Those pleadings therefore did not clearly evince an intent to appeal, and were ineffective to serve as notices of appeal. See Mosley , 813 F.2d at 660. Because there is not effectiv e notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction over Lewis’s appeal. See Bowles , 551 U.S. at 214. Lewis moves for leave to supplement his brief and to have his case placed under seal. Because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, Le w i s ’ s motions are denied. APPEAL DISMISSED. MOTIONS DENIED.

2 Case: 11-20249 Document: 00511653963 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/03/2011
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge CARRILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-50475.

D.C. No. CR-96-00095-DT-02.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 25, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ and WARD LAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jorge Carrillo appeals his guilty plea conviction and ten-year sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of, methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.1

Relying on *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Carrillo contends that (1) he did not knowingly waive his right to have a jury determine the quantity of methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the statutory minimum sentence should not have been imposed, because it was based on the amount of methamphetamine. We review for plain error, *United States v. Nordby,*225 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir.2000), and find none.

Because Carrillo’s ten-year sentence for the methamphetamine conspiracy is below the twenty-year statutory maximum applicable to the smallest amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), *Apprendi*does not affect this case. *United States v. Garcia-Sanchez,*238 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.2001) (limiting *Apprendi*to sentence enhancements above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. A panel of this court previously granted Carrillo’s counsel leave to withdraw, struck his brief filed pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), appointed new counsel, and directed counsel to brief whether *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) invalidated Carrillo’s sentence.
<PAGE>   1



                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.3



                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

 As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference in this registration statement on Form S-8, to be filed on or around
August 28, 1998, of our reports dated February 20, 1997, on the Consolidated
Financial Statements of MFS Communications Company, Inc. included in WorldCom,
Inc.'s Current Report on Form 8-K dated August 25, 1996, as amended by Form
8-K/A filed on December 19, 1997, and to all references to our Firm included in
this registration statement.



                                                   ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP


Omaha, Nebraska,
August 27, 1998
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE MONARCH
CEMENT COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<PP&E>                                        90575103
<DEPRECIATION>                                68057293
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<CGS>                                         62159712
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 62159712
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               12073450
<INCOME-TAX>                                   4400000
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</TABLE>
11035.

#### National Surety Co. *v.*Walker County, for use, etc.

Decided September 17, 1920.

Complaint; from Walker superior court — Judge Wrigbt. September 3, 1919.

*Shattuck & Shattuck,*for plaintiff in error.

*Rosser & Shaw,*contra.

Stephens, J.

1. The motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions upon failure to make proper parties is met by the voluntary appearance of the Little-Cleckler Construction Company and its consent- to be made a party plaintiff to the bill of exceptions. It is therefore ordered that the Little-Cleckler Construction Company be made a party plaintiff to the bill of exceptions.

2. A bond executed by a building contractor, conditioned for the prompt payment by him of all indebtedness to persons supplying labor or material in the execution of certain work, is an obligation to pay any indebtedness of the contractor so arising, and an extension by the contractor of the time of payment of any such indebtedness will not necessarily operate to discharge the surety upon the bond.

3. In a suit against the contractor and the surety on the bond by a plaintiff supplying material used for the construction of the work referred to in the bond, where the defendant surety set up as a defense an extension by the contractor of the time of payment of the indebtedness sued on, evidenced by the execution of a promissory note by the contractor, accepted by the plaintiff as payee, covering such indebtedness, the note falling due within the period provided by the statute within which suit on the original indebtedness may be brought, and within the period within which laborers’ and materialmen’s liens may be asserted, such defense was properly stricken on demurrer.

4. The demurrer to the plea was properly sustained upon all tlie grounds.

5. The evidence demanded the verdict for the plaintiff, and the court did not err in so directing.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.*
H. R. 480

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the twentieth day of January, two thousand and four

An Act

To redesignate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 747

Broadway in Albany, New York, as the ‘‘United States Postal Service Henry

Johnson Annex’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION.

The facility of the United States Postal Service located at

747 Broadway in Albany, New York, and known as the United

States Postal Service Carrier Annex, shall be known and designated

as the ‘‘United States Postal Service Henry Johnson Annex’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,

or other record of the United States to the facility referred to

in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘United

States Postal Service Henry Johnson Annex’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Gyu-tae Park tae Park

(gyutae.park@samsung.c

(gyutae.park@samsung.c

Computing Lab. Computing Lab.

2006. 03. 22 2006. 03. 22

Samsung Advanced Institute of 

Samsung Advanced Institute of 

2D Still Face Recog

2D Still Face Recog

Performance (SA

Performance (SA

- FRGC v.2.0 FRGC v.2.0 -
Contents Contents

II Introduction Introduction

IIII

IIIIII

FRGC v.2.0 Result FRGC v.2.0 Result

IVIV

FERET Result FERET ResultConcluding Remarks Concluding Remarks
FRGC 2D Face Recognition Exp. FRGC 2D Face Recognition Exp. 

FRGC v.2.0 2D Experiments

– 2D Frontal Face Recognition : Exp. 1(1:1), Exp. 2(4:4), 

– Data Set: 4M pixels, ~ 36,000 images

Exp. 1 (1:1) Exp. 1 (1:1)

 Target: 1 Controlled Still 2D Image Query: 1 Controlled Still 2D Image High Security (e.g. Biometrics)

- Controlled Environment

 Target: 1  Query: 1  Real App

Access Co

... ... ... 

Controlled (Expression, Hair, Closed Eye, Highlight, P

Uncontrolled (Illumination, Highlight, Blur, Backlight, Sha
FRGC Result FRGC Result

FRGC v.1.0(2004.Oct) FRGC v.1.0(2004.Oct) FRGC v.2.0(2005.Feb) FRGC v.2.0(2005.Feb)

FRGC Exp. 4 : Most Challenging Problem 

– Exp4: 76%(Feb. 2005), less than 85 %(Oct. 2005, BC20
FRGC v.2.0(SAIT) FRGC v.2.0(SAIT)

Exp. 4 (Uncontrolled, 1:1) : VR (at FAR=0.1%) = 94 ~ 95 %*Exp. 1 (Controlled, 1:1) : VR (at FAR=0.1%) = ~99 %*Exp. 2 (Controlled, 4:4) : VR (at FAR=0.1%) = ~100 %*

All the three experiments were performed using a single algorithmthe FRGC training set only.

* The mask matrices in the original bee v.2.0 distribution, which include minor mistakes, are used for 

there may be slight change of verification rates depending on the upcoming correction of mask matric
Partial vs. Full Matching (FRGC 

Partial vs. Full Matching (FRGC 

Exp. 1 (Controlled) : 1~2 % decrease (99% 

 97 ~ 98 %)

Exp. 4 (Uncontrolled) : ~3% decrease (94~95 % 

 91 ~ 

Exp. 2 (Controlled) : little decrease

•Partial Matching : Grou•Full Matching : Full A

Face and Eye Localization Rate 

– 99.1 % (Controlled)– 97.9 % (Uncontrolled)
FERET Result FERET Result

VR (at FAR=1%) = 99~100 %VR (at FAR=0.1%) = 93 ~ 100 % : decrease in aging scenaRobust to Illumination and aging change
Conclusions Conclusions

SAIT 2D Face Recognition Performance 

– Robust to illumination change– Little decrease in Full Automatic Face Detection : 

We appreciate the FRGC Team for theand contributions for promoting develRecognition Technology.Thank you for attention.
Exhibit 10.4


 





AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


THIS AMENDMENT (the “Amendment”)
is entered into as of the date set forth below, effective as of March 1st, 2015 (the “Effective
Date”), by and between Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the State of Israel,
with offices at 12 Bazel street Petah-Tikvah, Israel, registered # 513601021, (the "Company") and Alla
Patlis of Salant 57 str.,Petah Tikwa (the "Employee").


 


WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee
entered into an Employment Agreement, dated December 23rd, 2012 (together with any amendments, exhibits and schedules
thereto, the “Employment Agreement”); and


 


WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee
desire to amend the Employment Agreement on the terms and conditions more fully set forth herein;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed
as follows:


 


		1.	Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms in this Amendment shall have the meanings
ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement.



 


		2.	As of the Effective Date, Employee will be entitled to a monthly gross Salary of 20,000
NIS (in words: twenty thousand NIS).



 


		3.	Except as set forth herein, the provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged and
in full force and effect.



 


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,


 


	
        Company:

         

        Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Ltd.

         

        By: Uri Yablonka

        Title: COO

        Signature: /s/ Uri Yablonka

         

        Date: May 13, 2015
	
        Employee:

         

        Alla Patlis

         

        Signature: /s/ Alla Patlis

         

        Date: May 13, 2015
EXHIBIT 32.2

                               TELVUE CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 U.S.C. sec. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of TelVue Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John Fell,
Controller of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date:    11/14/2008                    /s/ John Fell
                                       -------------
                                       John Fell
                                       Treasurer (Controller)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,550,658
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             147,403
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                162,334
<INCOME-TAX>                                   134,622
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   134,622
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04
        

</TABLE>
#### Lynch Gray *v.*N. E. Cromwell.

Judicial Sales — Insolvent Bidder.

Where a purchaser of land at Judicial sale is-, insolvent, it is the duty of the Judgment plaintiff to have the sale set aside, or take such steps as would secure him the purchase-money,

*152APPEAL PROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

October 7, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

Cromwell, McGee and Hobbs were all parties to the action by the appellant, Gray, to enforce his lien on the lot sold by Griffin to Cromwell.

Cromwell 'bought two feet of the lot on the south side, extending the whole length of the same for the debt, interest and costs, and gave his bond with security for the purchase money in compliance with the judgment. This sale extinguished the lien and was a satisfaction of the original debt as against those at least who were the purchasers from Cromwell of the remaining ground'. The only lien that Gray has was on that portion of the lot sold under the judgment. It is true that the deed from Cromwell to McGee directed, or rather contained the consent of Cromwell that the twelve hundred dollar note might be applied to the payment of the appellants’ lien, but all these parties were before the court and admitted in the original action of Gray that the whole of the property embraced in Griffin’s deed to Cromwell was liable for Gray’s debt, and Gray took a judgment subjecting the whole of it to the satisfaction of the lien, and under this judgment of sale Cromwell and his surety agreed to discharge the lien for a small strip of the lot. When this was done and the report of sale confirmed, it left Cromwell to dispose of the notes of his vendees as-he saw proper. Weir was no party to the proceeding and if he had been his rights could not have been affected by it. When the sale by the commissioner to Cromwell was confirmed, the latter had the right, if he had not previously sold, to sell the balance of the ground and make to the purchaser a title free from any lien that Gray had by reason of his note. The latter had asked the chancellor to sell the land, and it was his duty, if the purchasers were insolvent, to have had the sale set aside, or to take such steps as would have secured him in his money. The authorities referred to- by counsel for appellant are not analogous to this case, and if they were the Code of Practice in this state gives a lien only on the land sold under the judgment. Besides, there is no reason assigned in the record for the failure on the part of the sheriff to sell the land that was surrendered by Cosby and wife to pay this debt. They both in writing waived their right to the bene*153fit of the homestead act and agreed that the real estate surrendered should be sold. It was the duty of the appellant to have sold this property, and so far as the record shows, he is without excuse in not doing so. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. *Etlinger v. Tansey, 17*B. Monroe 366.

*Sweeney &*Stuart, *for appellant.*

*Weir &*Son, *for appellee..*
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. §1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of AMDL, Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Gary L. Dreher, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |                                                                                                                                                              
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                    
|
| | (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
     operations of the Company.

| |                                                             
| | ------------------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ Gary L. Dreher
Chief Executive Officer
November 12, 2002

14
HMM Reference NIST Technical Note 2205: Item 28.2 Deck Attached to Residence

Item 28.2 Deck Attached to Residence – Replace combustible deck material with noncombustible material to reduce risk of ignition. 

Damaged combustible deck

Noncombustible deck with concrete steps and metal rail

Noncombustible

landing and steps

Source: ADAI, Univ of Coimbra

Damaged combustible deck

Note: Selected photographs are included to illustrate each HMM hardening item. Additional vulnerabilities or hardening items may be seen in the photographs, but those are highlighted within their specific HMM item.
, 

e: A 

1/1 

Color Key: Fire Hazards · Hardening Action: Replace entire deck with ignition Installation Cautions resistant option (metal or other material) · Applicable Conditions: Combustible deck, stairs and landings attached to residence · Performance Goals: Prevent ignition of deck and limit flame spread to exterior walls

ICC

· Light Gray: Metal flashing on exterior of residence· Dark Gray: Metal deck framing· Black: Ignition resistant decking material