NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

9540, LLC, Complainant/Appellee, 

v.

CAROL JEAN EDMONDS, trustee of the 

CJE Living Trust Dated October 1, 2007, Defendant/Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0157 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015CV201607192 

The Honorable Charles W. Gurtler Jr., Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Musgrove Drutz Kack & Flack PC, Prescott

By Mark W. Drutz, Jeffrey Gautreaux

Counsel for Complainant/Appellee

Jaburg & Wilk PC, Phoenix

By David L. Allen, Kathi M. Sandweiss

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

FILED 12-30-2021
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Carol Jean Edmonds appeals the superior court’s grant of 

summary judgment regarding her quiet title action against 9540, LLC. 

(“9540”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Nace Land & Cattle Company, Inc. (“Nace”) owned multiple 

parcels of land in Mohave County subject to a deed of trust in favor of ALC 

Financial Corporation, a Minnesota Corporation (“ALC”). In 2008, 

Edmonds purchased one of Nace’s parcels (the “Property”) for $435,000

and received title by warranty deed. During escrow, Chicago Title 

Insurance Company forwarded Edmonds’ payoff funds to ALC, but ALC 

did not release the lien attached to the Property.

¶3 The deed of trust was ultimately assigned to LSREF2 Cobalt 

(AZ) (“Cobalt AZ”), and a notice of trustee’s sale was recorded in 

September 2014. The trustee’s sale was conducted in December 2014, and 

Cobalt AZ appeared at this sale to make a credit bid. Accepting the credit 

bid, the trustee shortly thereafter issued a trustee’s deed conveying title to 

the Property to Cobalt AZ. After discovering she no longer owned the 

Property, Edmonds filed a lawsuit in 2016. Edmonds did not record a notice 

of lis pendens regarding the Property, and in January 2018, Cobalt AZ sold 

the Property to 9540. In March 2018, Edmonds was granted leave to amend 

her complaint. The amended complaint alleged claims against Cobalt AZ

and LSREF2 Cobalt (IL) (“Cobalt IL”) for failure to release a lien, negligence, 

wrongful foreclosure, declaratory judgment, quiet title, and filing a false 

lien. This amended complaint did not initially name 9540 as a defendant.

¶4 The superior court dismissed each of the claims except for the 

quiet title claim. The court gave Edmonds the opportunity to amend the 

complaint to include an allegation that she did not receive notice of the 

trustee’s sale. When Edmonds did not amend, the court dismissed her quiet 

title claim.
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

3 

¶5 Edmonds appealed the court’s dismissal of her claims for 

declaratory judgment and quiet title. She argued that at the time of sale, 

Cobalt IL was the named beneficiary of the deed of trust and that Cobalt 

AZ submitted an invalid credit bid. Edmonds v. LSREF2 Cobalt (IL), LLC, 1 

CA-CV 18-0772, 2019 WL 5701802, at *2, ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Nov. 5, 2019) (mem. 

decision).

¶6 In that first appeal, we held Edmonds’ claim for declaratory 

judgment to find the sale void was simply an alternative method of 

pursuing a wrongful foreclosure claim, which the superior court properly 

recognized is not a cognizable claim under Arizona law. Id. at ¶ 9 (citing 

Zubia v. Shapiro, 243 Ariz. 412, 417, ¶ 29 (2018)). 

¶7 We also upheld dismissal of Edmonds’ claim for quiet title 

because Cobalt AZ no longer claimed “any right or interest in the 

Property,” having already sold the Property to 9540, and therefore, 

Edmonds could not prevail on a quiet title claim “by asserting that a 

trustee’s sale error occurred without naming the party who currently owns 

the Property.” Id. at ¶¶ 10–12. However, we did not address “whether the 

trustee’s sale could be deemed invalid based on the credit bid discrepancy.” 

Id. at ¶ 12. 

¶8 Meanwhile, 9540 intervened in the action before the superior 

court, filing a third-party complaint against Edmonds, who filed an answer 

and counterclaim against 9540 in turn, with both parties seeking to quiet 

title as to the Property. Following our decision in the first appeal, the 

superior court granted summary judgment in favor of 9540. The court 

found Edmonds’ claims for wrongful foreclosure and declaratory judgment 

based on the credit bid discrepancy had been litigated and Edmonds had 

no interest in the Property. Although we had not addressed the quiet title 

count directly, the superior court found that the “very same factual and 

legal argument” of the credit bit discrepancy “was litigated at both the trial 

court level and on appeal” and was therefore precluded. Following 

resolution of a dispute concerning attorneys’ fees, the court entered final

judgment in 9540’s favor. Edmonds timely appealed, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lee v. M & H Enters., Inc., 237 Ariz. 172, 175, ¶ 10 (App. 2015). 
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

4 

“We will affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason supported 

by the record, even if not explicitly considered by the superior court.” KB 

Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 236 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 14 (App. 

2014). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo with the goal to 

effectuate legislative intent. Ariz. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Am. v. City of Phx., 247 Ariz. 45, 47, ¶ 7 (2019) (citations omitted). 

¶10 In the instant matter—her second appeal concerning the 

Property—Edmonds again argues that, because it occurred at the time of 

sale, the credit bid discrepancy is not subject to the pre-sale injunction

requirement of A.R.S. § 33-811(C). In support of this argument, Edmonds 

relies on BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz., 229 Ariz. 299, 301, ¶ 11 

(2012). She notes that “a person subject to § 33-811(C) cannot later challenge 

the sale based on pre-sale defenses or objections.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Seizing upon the BT Capital Court’s use of this descriptor, Edmonds argues

that even if a person who has not complied with the requirements of A.R.S. 

§ 33-811(C) is deemed to have waived any defenses or objections to pre-sale

matters, such a person would not be barred from asserting defenses or 

objections to post-sale defects. However, this argument is unavailing. 

¶11 Edmonds’ case did not involve post-sale conduct, nor did it 

interpret or apply the wavier provisions of A.R.S. § 33-811(C) to deficient 

post-sale conduct. Id. at 299–300, ¶¶ 1–8. Thus, BT Capital does not stand for 

the proposition for which Edmonds employs it. To the contrary, a fair 

reading of the case clarifies that “a person who has defenses or objections 

to a properly noticed trustee’s sale has one avenue for challenging the sale: 

filing for injunctive relief.” Id. at 301, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). Therefore, all

defenses and objections to properly noticed trustee’s sales must be 

challenged pursuant to § 33-811(C). See id. Taken in context, the BT Capital

Court’s reference to “pre-sale” matters is merely descriptive of the facts 

under review in that case and not intended to be exclusive or otherwise 

limiting to the application of § 33-811(C). Id. at ¶ 11. This interpretation is 

consistent with the wording of A.R.S. § 33-811(C) itself, which contains no 

restrictive language that limits its provisions concerning waiver by a 

covered party to only pre-sale defenses or objections. 

¶12 This reading of BT Capital also aligns with the Zubia decision. 

In that case, our supreme court reasoned the language of A.R.S. § 33-811(C) 

“requires enjoining the sale as a prerequisite to any claim arising out of the 

sale.” Zubia, 243 Ariz. at 415, 418, ¶¶ 16, 31 (observing, further, that to 

survive preclusion due to waiver pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-811(C), a claim 

must “not depend on whether a trustee’s sale occurred”) (citation omitted) 

(emphasis added). 
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

5 

¶13 Edmonds argues that because the facts supporting her 

objections—allegedly arising the day of the sale and thereafter—could not 

be known in time for her to file for an injunction, the waiver provisions of 

A.R.S. § 33-811(C) must not apply to post-sale defects. This argument is 

likewise unavailing.

¶14 “The deed of trust scheme is a creature of statutes.” BT 

Capital, 229 Ariz. at 300, ¶ 9 (citing In re Vasquez, 228 Ariz. 357, 359, ¶ 4 

(2011)). “Although . . . statutes pertaining to deeds of trust must be strictly 

construed in favor of the borrower, we must give effect to § 33-811(C)’s 

express language, which requires enjoining the sale as a prerequisite to any

claim arising out of the sale.” Zubia, 243 Ariz. at 415, ¶ 16 (internal citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). Further, “[w]hen a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply its plain language and need not engage in any 

other means of statutory interpretation.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

283, ¶ 14 (2005) (citation omitted). 

¶15 It is true that Edmonds could not have known about any 

objection or defense arising from alleged discrepancies occurring on the 

day of the sale itself or after its completion, therefore making it impossible

to timely comply with the prerequisites to avoid waiver under A.R.S. § 33-

811(C). However, as already noted above, the express language of. § 33-

811(C) makes no exceptions to the requirements for its waiver provision 

regarding post-sale objections or defenses to the conduct of the trustee’s 

sales. The language of A.R.S. § 33-811(C) is not ambiguous in this regard. 

Thus, we interpret the statute as the legislature’s intent to disallow technical 

or procedural post-sale objections or defenses related to trustee’s sales, such 

as those presented by Edmonds in this case, where proper notice was given, 

and which do not implicate fraud or similar equitable claims. Such an 

interpretation furthers the goals of finality and certainty of title following 

transfers from completion of trustee’s sales. Though Edmonds argues for a 

different construction—one that preserves a path to reclaim title to the 

Property at this late date—it is not our place, or within our power, to inject 

a provision, exemption, or right into a statute that is not provided for by its 

language. Cf. In re Martin M., 223 Ariz. 244, 247, ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (“[I]t is not

within either the trial court’s or this court’s authority to amend a statute to

correct what appears to have been legislative oversight.”). 

¶16 By not timely seeking injunctive relief as required by A.R.S. 

§ 33-811(C), Edmonds waived all objections and defenses to the validity of 

the sale itself. See Zubia, 243 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 14. As such, any claims that 

depend upon the conduct of the sale are barred, including her quiet title
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

6 

claim arising from objections to alleged post-sale defects with the credit bid 

for the Property. See id. at 418, ¶ 31. 

¶17 The absence of any proper claim to title to the Property 

further raises concerns about Edmonds’ standing here. Arizona courts 

impose a rigorous standing requirement. Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 

210 Ariz. 138, 140, ¶ 6 (2005). “In general, a party establishes standing by 

showing a personal, palpable injury.” Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. 

Kard, 219 Ariz. 374, 377, ¶ 10 (App. 2008) (citing Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 

Ariz. 520, 524, ¶ 16 (2003)). Where one cannot point to an injury personal to

oneself caused by conduct of another, one generally lacks standing to insert 

themselves in a claim that cannot provide them redress, and is therefore not 

their own.

¶18 Finally, Edmonds argues that a trustee’s sale may be void “if 

there are grounds for equitable relief based on serious sale defects, 

including deliberate notice failure, fraud, misrepresentation, or 

concealment.” In re Hills, 299 B.R. 581, 586 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002). This may 

be true in a general sense, in that the court’s equitable powers may form a 

proper basis for challenging a trustee’s sale as void in the face of an 

applicable equitable claim. Indeed, our supreme court has recognized 

limited equitable oversight in deed of trust sales. See In re Krohn, 203 Ariz. 

205, 210, 212–14, ¶¶ 18, 29–32, 38 (2002) (setting aside a deed of trust sale 

on the basis that the bid price was grossly inadequate). Be that as it may, 

the validity of such claims is not properly before us in this case because 

Edmonds did not advance any such equitable claims in this case. Nor did 

she present any evidence on this record that would sustain them. And, we

cannot say that voiding the trustee’s sale would serve public policy, a 

component of qualifying for equitable relief. See id. at 214, ¶ 36. 

¶19 Further, the record in this case does not establish that 

Edmonds suffered any inequity as a result of technical errors as to the party 

making the credit bid or as to any other alleged defects with the procedures 

of the trustee’s sale, regardless of the timing of their occurrence. Rather, any 

unfairness concerning Edmonds’ situation resulted from the failure to 

release the lien on the Property after her purchase in 2008. Thus, permitting

Edmonds to proceed in litigating the credit bid issue does not serve the 

interests of equity, but would instead only create “an end-run around the

§ 33-811(C) waiver provision.” See Zubia, 243 Ariz. at 415, ¶ 18. 

¶20 Just as Edmonds could not bring a claim for declaratory 

judgment as an alternative method to pursue wrongful foreclosure, see 

Edmonds, 1 CA-CV 18-0772, at *2, ¶ 9, Edmonds likewise may not litigate 
EDMONDS v. 9540 

Decision of the Court

7 

the credit bid discrepancy to restore defenses and objections that have been 

waived by failure to comply with the limitations imposed by A.R.S. § 33-

811(C). The opportunity to raise those objections and defenses is long past. 

Thus, the superior court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.