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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED October 23, 2018

v No. 334510 Chippewa Circuit Court

JEFFREY HAROLD STEFANSKI, LC No. 15

- 001741

- FC

Defendant

- Appell ant

.

Before: B ECKERING

, P .J., and R IORDAN and C AMERON , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

D efendant , Jeffrey Stefanski, was convicted by jury of two counts of first

- degr ee criminal sexual conduct (CSC

- I), MCL 750.520b, and one count of second

- degr ee criminal sexual conduct (CSC

- II), MCL 750.520c. The trial court sentenced Stefanski to concurrent prison term s of 11 to 40 years for the CSC

- I convictions , and 2 to 15 years for the CSC

- II conviction. On appeal, Stefanski claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court

erred when it allowed the admission of other acts evidence. W e affirm.

Stefanski , who was 46 years old at the time of trial, owned a house and cabin in northern Michigan. According to the victim

, Stefanski allowed him and other teenage boys to use his

house and cabin to drink alcohol and party. T h e victim testified at trial that on two occasions

Stefanski inserted his penis into the victim ’s mouth while the victim was so intoxicated that he

claimed “there wasn’t really anything I could do. I tried pushing him off but I literally had no strength in me

. ” The victim testified that on a different occasion, Stefanski put his penis against

the victim ’s anus while the victim was intoxicated and nearly unconscious

. The victim rolled away before penetration occurred. Based on this and other testimony, the jury found Stefanski guilty of two counts of CSC

- I and one count of CSC

- II.

On appeal, Stefanski argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to confront a

witness ’ s false statement with available documents, for failing to object to an incomplete limiting instruction, for failing to properly object to hearsay evidence, and for fail ing to file a timely

motion to exclude evidence of other acts . He further argues that the trial court erred in denying- 2

- hi s motion to exclude the admission of other acts evidence. We conclude that the trial court, after conducting a Ginther 1 hearing, did not err when it denied Stefanski ’s claims.

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSIS TANCE

“Whether a defendant has been denied the eff ective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Solloway , 316 Mich App 174, 187; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). “ Generally, a trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. ” Id . at 188. “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is

left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Armstrong

, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011).

A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963 art 1, § 20. This right to counsel encompasses the righ t to the effective assistance of counsel. People v Cline , 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient

, and (2) that counsel’s de ficient performance prejudiced the defense. People v Taylor , 275 Mich App 177, 186; 737 NW2d 790 (2007)

. The performance will be deemed to have prejudiced the defense if it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Jordan , 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007)

. The d efendant must also show that the resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Odom , 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). The effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears the heavy burden of proving otherw ise. People v Rodgers , 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001)

.

A. THE VICTIM ’S MOTIVATION

Stefanski first argu es that his trial counsel was ineffective for not using court records during trial to impeach a witness, which would have support ed Stefans ki’s theory that the victim falsely accused him of sexual assault to obtain leniency in an unrelated probation violation case

. We disagree.

Stefanski insist s that the timing of the victim’s disclosure of sexual assault is important.

The victim’s first disclosure was to Jennifer France, the defense attorney appointed to represent
the victim on his pending probation violation case. The victim readily admitted at trial that his

sexual assault disclosure s were made to his attorney, and later to the p olice, after he had been charged with violating his probation

, but before he was sentenced

. However, the victim denied that he was trying to use the sexual assault claims for leniency in his probation violation case or that he expe c ted to “get anything out of it.”

Although France’s testimony at trial was generally consistent with the victim’s testimony of the disclosure, France provided slightly different testimony regarding the circumstances of the

1 People v Ginther , 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973)

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- disclosure. Unlike the victim, France denied that the victim had a “pending” criminal matter

when she was told about the sexual assault . On cross examination, France claimed the victim “was on probation but he wasn’t charged with any new crimes” when the sexual assault was disclosed to the police.

Stefans ki argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for fail ing to impeach France ’s testimony with court records that clearly showed the disclosure to France occurred after the probatio n violation warrant was filed. This failure to impeach France

, Stefanski argues, undermined Stefanski ’s “motive

- to

- falsify theory” and enabl ed the prosecution to inaccurately

state during rebuttal closing argument : “W e all heard what Ms. France said. She said ‘He w as not in trouble when he told.’ He came in, talked to Ms. Fr ance, talked to Detective Postma and left. He wasn’t locked up. He wasn’t in jail.” On appeal, Stefanski uses the victim’s probation

records admitted at the Ginther hearing showing that the victim was indeed facing charges of violating his probation whe n he reported the sexual assault on August 5, 2014. 2

Defense counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient for failing to impeach

France with court records from the victim’s probation file

. Although defense counsel could have impeached France with these records, the fact remains that the victim himself readily admitted

that he was facing a probation violation when he disclosed the sexual assault

. Therefore

, the probation documents would have demonstrated that the victim testified truthfully , b olstering his credibility

. Further

, the significance of impeach ing France on this issue was diminished by France’s acknowledgement that she asked the trial court handling the probation violation sentencing to impose a lenient sentence because of the victi m’s cooperation in the sexual assault

case. Thus

, Stefanski ’s trial counsel elicited ample evidence to support the defense’s “motive

- to

falsify theory

, ” and a failure to impeach France on this issue was not deficient performance

. 3

Even if trial counsel was deficient in this regard, Stefanski cannot demonstrate prejudice

. Counsel’s performance will be deemed to have prejudiced the defense if it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jordan , 275 Mich App at 667

. Stefanski argues that this case was strictly a credibility contest between him

and the victim , and the failure to present information that would impact the credibility

assessment was fatal to his defense. However, apart from information about the victim ’s possible motive, there were other witnesses who corroborated the victim ’s testimony regarding

the sexual assault . Specifically, t hree other young men testified that they had visited Stefanski ’s

house an d cabin , had access to alcohol and pornography in a sexually charged environment in

2 The probation file record establishes that on June 30, 2014, a bench warrant was signed and defendant was arrested. He was then arraigned on July 8, 2014. Another record shows that on July 16, 2014

, the victim was notified that a probation violation hearing would be held on August 5, 2014. Thus, the victim had a probation violation pending at the time he spoke to France and the police.

3 We note that the trial court at the Ginther hearing acknowledged that France may have been “speaking about two different things because [the victim] testified openly that he was on probation.”- 4

- which Stefanski made sexual remarks, encouraged them to wear only board shorts, and had them

watch or participate in a game where Stefanski and others would masturbate and “race” to see who could ejaculate fir st. Defendant would also jo kingly grab at their crotches. One of the witnesses testified to having seen defendant grasp the victim’s penis, and one night he walked downstairs to observe the victim lying on a bench an d defendant in the corner masturbating. The witness recalled that the victim looked sweaty and ravaged

, with a blanket on his lower half and no shirt, and defendant was nude. Thus, the ju ry considered other evidence that corroborat ed the

victim’s testimo ny , and t he contradiction about the timing of the victim’s probation violation proceedings was not outcome determinative.

B. LIMITING INSTRUC TION

Stefanski next argues that his t rial attorneys were deficient for failing to object when the trial court gav e an incomplete instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of other acts evidence. We disagree.

Where evidence of a defendant’s other acts is admitted under MRE 404(b), the

“ defendant is entitled to a carefully crafted limiting instruction advising the jurors that they are to consider the other acts evidence only as indicative of the reasons for which the evidence i s proffered to cushion any prejudicial effect flowing from the evidence. ” People v Martzke , 251 Mich App 282, 295; 651 NW2d 490 (2002).

Here, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to introduce evidence of Stefanski ’s other acts, explaining that it was not character evidence but properly admitted evidenc e show ing

“ desensitization

. ” At trial, there was evidence admitted that Stefanski created an atmosphere at his home and cabin meant to desensitize teenage boys to sexual contact by provid ing alcohol and pornography to them

, and that Stefanski encouraged t he young men to engage in acts of mutual masturbation. Also, although not part of the other act s evidence, the victim testified twice during

trial that Stefanski had been arrested for child pornography on his computer. After denying

Stefanski ’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court agreed to provide a limiting instruction at the end of trial to “disregard [the victim ’s statements about defendant’s arrest for child pornography] and any prior commentary about that from [the victim ] and I’ll be specific in the instruction.”

D efen se counsel had requested the model jury limiting instruction

. 4 T here was no discussion at

the end of trial about a “ special instruction ” addressing testimony about Stefanski ’s arrest for child pornography , however

. Ins tead, the trial court instructed the jury as follows :

You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant committed improper acts for [which] he is not on trial. You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For example, y ou must not decide that it shows that the defendant is a bad person or that he is likely to commit crimes.

You must not convict the defendant here because you think he’s guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable

4 See M C rim JI 4.11

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- d oubt that the defendant committed the alleged crime or you must find him not guilty.

Stefanski ’s trial counsel did not object to the instruction

.

Stefanski claims that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object when the trial

court gave an incomplete jury instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of other acts evidence.

Stefanski first points out that the trial court fail ed to give the specific instruction that “it had promised” in order to lessen the prejudicial effect of Stefanski ’s arrest for child pornography

. Instead, the trial court gave a less specific standard jury instruction for limiting evidence under

M Crim JI 4.11 that would cover all of the “other acts evidence,” but in doing so omitted the second paragraph from the in struction . That paragraph of M Crim JI 4.11 states : “If you believe this evidence, you must be very careful only to consider it for certain purposes

. You may only

think about whether this evidence tends to show:

. . . [State other proper purpose for whic h evidence is offered.] ” Defense counsel never objected to the jury instruction, and o n appeal,

Stefanski provides no authority supporting the assertion that the trial court was obligated to provide the model instruction exactly as written or how defense counsel’s fa ilure to ensure this paragraph was included prejudiced him. “ A n appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly , 231 Mich App 627, 640

- 641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Stefanski ’s entire analysis of this issue is

limited to a single sentence in his brief on appeal: “[d]efendant maintains that in both these regards, his trial counsel’s failure to act constituted deficient performance, which denied him a fair trial before a properly instructed jury. ” Accordingly, defendant has abandoned this issue.

Regardless , the trial court’s instruction directed the jury to not consider the evidence for

the purpose of showing Stefanski is a bad person or is more likely to commit crimes. The trial court’s instruction was sufficient to instruct the jur ors that they could consider the other acts

evidence only with regard to the fact that Stefanski may have engaged in other acts, and that the jury could not convict Stefanski in this case based on uncharged mis conduct. 5 Stefanski ’s trial

counsel did not ask for an instruction to address the victim’s statement that Stefanski had been

arrested for having child pornography on his computer. However , the jury was instructed to not
consider the evidence of Stefanski ’s arrest on unrelated charges to establish guilt in this case.

B ecause the jury is presumed to follow these instructions, People v Torres , 222 Mich App 411, 423; 564 NW2d 149 (1997)

, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that the incompl ete instruction was prejudicial. T herefore

, Stefanski was not denied the effective assistance of

counsel

.

C. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT

Next

, Stefanski argues that his trial counsel was inef fective for failing to properly object

to hearsay testimony from the victim’s mother. We disagree.

5 A t the Ginther hearing, defense counsel testified that the jury received the written instruction to

consider.- 6

- The victim ’s mother testified about a conversation she had with her son during a phone

call while he was in jail . During the call, the victim was crying a nd told her that Stefanski had

done “ something to him

, ” impl ying that Stefanski sexually assaulted him

. The challenged brief exchange elicited during direct examination provided :

[ Prosecutor ]: What did he tell you?

[ Victim’s Mother ] : He told me that what um,

-- he showed me

-- he called from the jail

-- and he was crying. He said you know I told what happened. He explained a bit about

-- because I didn’t know all the details because of where he was calling me from about what had

-- s omething had happened between him and Mr. Stefanski

.

Prosecutor : To the extent that he shared the details; what did he say?

Victim’s Mother : I’m sorry?

Prosecutor : To the extent that he shared details with you; what did he say?

Victim’s Mother : Just th at he kind of

-- he didn’t come right out and say it but um, he said something similar to it was

-- gosh it was a while ago, that had did something to him

. Mr. Stefanski had did something to [ the victim ] and then I was crying. I was really upset. I don’t remember much of the conversation because it was hard to hear that from your kid

-- you can’t even hold him.

Prosecutor : Did he imply it was sexual?

Victim’s Mother : Yes. It’s not something I connect ed the dots on with my son. [Emphasis added.]

T he trial court initially sustained defen se counsel ’s timely object ion to the mother’s testimony as hearsay. However, the trial court reversed its decision following th e prosecutor ’s argument that

the stateme nt was not hearsay because it was a prior consistent statement under MRE 801(d)

. B ecause defense counsel claimed in his opening statement that the victim ’s testimony was a lie

, t he trial court agreed and allowed the testimony.

Stefanski argues that his t rial counsel failed to make the proper objection to the mother’s testimony. H owever, even assuming the mother ’s vague summary of her conversation with her son constitutes a statement, 6 hearsay was the proper objection. See MRE 801(c). A prior consistent statement is not hearsay if it is “consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or

6 “ A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an ass ertion. ” MRE 801(a).- 7

- improper influence or motive .” MRE 801(d)(1)(B). Stefanski suggests that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to inform the trial court that the statement could not be a prior consist e nt

statement because under MRE 801(d)(1)(B )

, the declarant had a motive to fa bricate when he

made the statement

. According to People v Jones , 240 Mich App 704, 707 ; 613 NW 2d 411 (2000)

, “the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.”

We agree that , assuming the mother’s su mmary constitutes a statement un der MRE 801(a), the testimony was inadmissible hearsay because MRE 801(d)(1)(B) was not applicable

. Here , the motive to fabricate arose when the victim was charged with violating his probation.

The victim’s mother stated that the victim told her about the sexual assault after he was jail ed on the probation violation

. Thus, defense counsel could have properly argued that the statements from jail were in admissible under MRE 801(d)(1) because the consistent statement was made after there was a motive to make false allegations

. Although d efense counsel objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds, he failed to raise this more specific hearsay objection

.

However, Stefanski cannot show that the testimony from the victim ’s mother prejudiced

him. As already described, the mother’s recollection of the victim’s disclosure was extremely

vague and it is doubtful that the jury gave it much weight , particularly in light of more definitive testimony from other witnesses like Fra nce and the investigating detective . Further, given that her testimony was that the victim disclosed the sexual assault after he was jailed for violating his probation, her testimony actually bolstered Stefanski ’s motive

- to

- falsify theory

. T herefore

, Ste fanski was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

D. UNTIMELY MOTION IN LIMINE

Stefanski argues that h is trial counsel failed to timely file a motion to exclude evidence of

hi s other acts under MRE 404(b). We disagree.

On May 6, 2016, Stefanski filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of other sexual

acts, including masturbation, indecent exposure, pornography, and that he maintained a sexualized atmo sphere in his home and cabin . The trial court denied the motion be cause it was

unt imely filed and it lacked merit. The trial court explained that the challenged evidence was admissible because it was not character evidence and was offered for a proper purpose. As discussed below, t he trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion

. A ny deficient performance in fil ing an untimely motion to exclude evidence was inconsequential because the

motion was also denied on substantive grounds

. Therefore, Stefanski has not proven he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel.

II. OTHER A CTS EVIDENCE

Finally, Stefanski argues on appeal that t he trial court erred in overruling his objection to

the admission of other acts evidence. We disagree.

Whether other acts evidence was properly admitted is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. People v McGhee , 268 Mich App 600, 6 10 ; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The trial court- 8

- does not abuse its discretion when it chooses an outcome within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock , 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

E xcep t as allowed by MRE 404(b), e vidence of other acts or crimes by a defendant is

excluded so as to avoid the danger of a conviction based on a defendant’s history of misconduct. People v Starr , 457 Mich 490, 495; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). MRE 404(b)(1) provides :

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparatio n, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the

conduct at issue in the case.

T his list is not exhaustive

, People v Sabin (After Remand) , 463 Mich 43, 56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000)

. E vidence is not subject to MRE 404(b) analysis solely because it discloses a bad act; bad acts can be independently relevant as substantive evidence. People v Houston , 261 Mich App 463, 468

- 469; 683 NW2d 192 (2004). Also, even if evidence refl ects on a defendant’s character

, it may be admissible under MRE 404(b) if it is relevant to a noncharacter purpose. People v

Mardlin , 487 Mich 609, 615

- 616; 790 NW2d 60 7 (2010).

As noted above, Stefanski sought to exclude evidence of his “sexually

- themed conduct” with several witnesses, including “encouraging (or requiring) his young male visitors to wear ‘board shorts,’ and nothing else, touching them inappropriately, providing them with pornography, engaging with them in masturbation, all of which was accompanied by free

flowing alcohol

. ” The trial court found that such evid ence was not character evidence and was properly offered for the purpose of demonstrating Stefa nski ’s efforts to sexual ly desensitiz e

young men , including the victim

.

Generally, to be admissible under MRE 404(b), other acts evidence (1) must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) must be relevant, and (3) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v Knox , 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004) , citing People v VanderVliet , 444 Mich 52, 74

- 75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993) . A proper purpose is one other than the establish ment of the defen dant’s character and his propensity to

commit the crime

. People v Johnigan

, 265 Mich App 463 , 465; 696 NW2d 725 (2005).

Stefanski argued below that the evidence show ed hi s bad character and was not offered for a proper purpose

. However, the evidence d emonstrated Stefanski ’s lack of sexual boundaries

and his sexualized manner of relating to the victim

. Thus, this evidence was properly admitted

because it was offered to show the context of Stefanski ’s relationship with the victim and his friends, not to demonstrate Stefanski ’s bad character.

Stefanski , however, argues that this evidence was not relevant to the charges against him

. Evidence is relevant if it has “ any tendency to make the existence of a ny fact that is of consequence to the determinatio n of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence. ” MRE 401; Wayne Co v Mich State Tax Comm , 261 Mich App 174, 196;- 9

- 682 NW2d 100 (2004). “ Under this broad definition, ” evidence that is useful in shedding light

on any ma terial point is admissible. People v Aldrich , 246 Mich App 101, 11 4 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001)

. Stefanski argues that

, besides the evidence of alcohol use, these acts had no relationship to the allegations of nonconsensual sexual behavior. Stefanski claims tha t the grooming

behavior alleged to have desensitized the victim is not relevant to the sexual assault. Specifically, these acts had no part in Stefanski ’s alleged sexual assault of the victim while he

was intoxi cated. However, t he prosecution notes that this Court has found such evidence

relevant in the following circumstance:

[W] hen a defendant is charged with unlawful sexual acts, it is proper to admit evidence of uncharged activities between the defendant and the victim when that

evidence e nhances credibility, shows familiarity, explains and gives context to the relationship, forms a link in the chain of events, allows the jury to appreciate the full range and nature of the interactions between the defendant and the victim, and otherwise pro vides the jurors with the full or entire story, instead of leaving the jurors to view events in a vacuum. [ People v Sardy , 313 Mich App 679, 729 ; 884 NW2d 808 (2015) , citing People v DerMartzex , 390 Mich 410, 415 ; 213 NW2d 97 (1973) .]

In this case , the b ehavior was relevant to demonstrate Stefanski ’s sexually charged relationship with the victim and the sexualized environment in which they related. The evidence

of Stefanski ’s encouragement of visitors to wear only boa r d shorts, the availability of pornography, the intrusive touching of genitals, and the simultaneous acts of mutual

masturbation was relevant to the charged crimes because t h at sexually charged environment

, coupled with excessive alcohol consumption

, ma de i t more likely that sexual contact would occur, including nonconsensual acts. Evidence that Stefanski ’s interactions with the victim were often sexually charged increased the likelihood that Stefanski would sexually assault the victim

wh ile he was intoxica ted

.

Stefanski argues that the evidence was highly prejudicial because of its inflammatory

nature and lack of relevance. Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded under MRE 403 if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfai r prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” People v Watkins , 491 Mich 450, 481 ; 818 NW2d 296 (2012) . Unfair prejudice occurs when the re is a tendency for the evidence to be “ given undue or preemptive weight” by the jury, or when it “would be inequitable to allow the use of such

evidence. Taylor v Mobley , 279 Mich App 309, 315; 760 NW2d 234 (2008). “ ‘ Unfair prejudice ’ does not mean ‘ damaging. ’ ” Lewis v Legrow , 258 Mich App 175, 199; 670 NW2d 675 (2003) (citation omitted)

. Evidence that is unfairly prejudicial goes beyond the merits of the case to inject issues broader than the defendant’s guilt or innocence , such as “bias, sympathy

, anger, or shock

. ” McGhee , 268 Mich App at 614 (citation omitted)

.

In Watkins, 491 Mich at 487

- 488, the Court enumerated several examples of factors that may lead a trial court to exclude evidence as unfairly prejudicial under MRE 403:

(1) the dissimi larity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of- 10

- the other acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony.

In this case, rather than support the exclusion of the challenged evidence , these factors weigh in

favor of its admission as proba tive of grooming behavior leading to a sexual assault

. Additionally, there was an element of reliability to the evidence since the testimony of four witnesses generally supported each other’s similar statements regarding the evidence. T he probative value of the evidence, which provided the jury with the context of the relationship

between Stefanski and the victim , outweighs any prejudicial effect

. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stefanski ’s motion to exclude other acts evidence.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron