### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 7, 200 5
THO MAS ALBERT DOLAN v. B RUCE POSTO N, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 98C-3000 M ariet ta Ship ley, Judge

No. M2003- 02573-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Septem ber 29, 2005

Th e plaint if

f i s a fo rmer Uni vers ity

of Te nn e sse e fa c ulty

me mbe r. He wa s d ism iss e d f ro m hi s po sit ion a ft e r the de fe nd a nt co rp or a te of fi c e r c ir c ulate d a

le tte r t o g ov e rn me nt o ff

ic ia ls a c c us ing him of using numerous dec eptions in the procur ement of a grant from the United States De partment of En e rg y . T he plaint if

f’ s pro s e defamation lawsuit named the defe ndant in both his indi vidual and his corporate ca

pacities. The trial court dismissed the cla im ag ainst the defe ndant in his indivi dual c apa c ity un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 12 .0 2( 6) a ndc e rt if ie d the dis mis sa l a s f

ina l un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 54 .0 2 s o it

c ou ld b e app e a le d. We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt

.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.
Travis Ha wkins, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Thomas A. Dola n. Thomas Anthony

Swaffor d, David L . J ohnson, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, B ruce E. Poston, and East Tennesse e B anking Corp. and Environmenta l I nk, I nc. OP IN ION
I. B ACKG ROUND
This case arose from a dispute over a fede ral g rant for

ink rec y cling technolog y . Be cause the case is s t i l l at t h e pleading sta g e, the f ollowing brief a ccount is totally derive d from the va

rious ve rs ion s of the plaint if

f’ s Complaint a nd the a lle g e dly de fama tory le tte r dr a ft e d by the def e nd a nt.-2-

The plaintiff, Thoma s A. Dolan, is an e ng ineer who h el d a fa culty

position wit h the University

of Tenne ssee Cente r for

I ndustrial Service s (UT-CI S) for over se ven y ear s. Acc ording to his complaint, he had built a g ood reputation a s a proce ss e ng ineer at Dupont over

a twenty -y ear perio d b e f

o r e g o in g to U T

- CI S, w h e r e h e d ido u ts tan d in g w o rk inth e f ie ldo f w a s te r eduction c ou ns e lin g a nde arn e d a

so lidre pu ta tio n a mon g his pe e rs a ndsu pe rv iso rs
. At some poi n t , M r. Dolan be g an wor king w ith an inventor name d Fr ank Prasil, who had develope d an ink re cy cling proce ss called L ithogr aphic I nk Reformulation Tec hnology (LI RT). Mr. Do l an gav e M r. P ra s i l s o m e m o n eyt o at t en d a gr an tm ee t i n g att h e U

. S

. De p ar t m en to f E n er gy (D OE ) i n Wa sh ing ton , D .C. With e xten siv e a ssi stanc e fr om Mr. Dolan , M r. Pr a sil su bs e qu e ntl y app lie d f or a ndre c e ive d a

$3 90 ,0 00 DO E g rant f

or his L I RT t e c hn olo g y . M r. Do la n appar entl y advised him on his gr ant application and certified the cor rec tness of the data in his presentation.
One of the t hreshold requirements for obtaining the type of g rant that Mr. Pra sil rece ived was proof that the a

pplicant had a n industrial pa rtner and matching equity funds in pla ce. Mr . Prasil had approa ched de fendant East Tenne ssee B anking Corp. (ETB ) for f unding in Oc tober of 1995. H e and Mr. Dolan be lieved that they had ETB ’s commitment f or the matching funds, and they repr esente d thi s c omm itm e nt a s a

fa c t to the Te nn e sse e De pa rt me nt of En vir on me nt an d Co ns e rv a tio n ( TD EC) wh ic h w a s D OE ’s pa

rt ne r i n th e g rant p ro g ram.
Howeve r, on November 30, 1995, ETB ’s president sent Mr. Dolan a certified letter stating that it was withdrawing financ ial support. Mr. Prasil a lleg edly subsequently obtained the a g ree ment of a n o rg a nizatio n c a lle d Ve ntu re Al lia nc e to c omm it p ri vate c apit a l to his pr oje c t. M r. Do la n c la ims that s o m e t i m e l at er , “u p o n i n fo rm at i o n an d b el i ef , ” E T B i n co rp o ra t ed d ef en d an tE n v i ro n m ental I

nk, I nc ., wh ic h “ se t a

bo ut p ur su ing ma nu fa c turing pr oc e sse s tha t we re sim ila r, if no t id e nti c a l, t o th os e invented by

Mr. Prasil.” Mr. Dola n and Mr. Pra sil objected and took st ep s t o t ry to ge t En vir on me nta l I nk

to c e a se a ndde sis t.
Sub se qu e nt e ve nts fo rm

the ba sis of

Mr

. Do la n’ s la ws uit

. B ru c e Pos ton , p re sid e nt o f b oth ET B a ndEn vir on me nta l I nk , w ro te a tw e nty -f ou r pa g e le tte r to DO E w itha c c omp a nying e xhibi ts, asking for a

formal investig ation into the gr ant to Mr. Prasil. Copies of the letter w ere sent to TDEC and to UT-CI S. The letter c laimed that Mr. Dolan and Mr. P ra s i l h ad i ntentionally defr auded the fede ral g overnme nt and desc ribed in spec ific deta il numerous alleg ed irre g ularit i es i n t he g rant application submitted by

Mr. Prasil, in the supporting doc umentation for that application, and in the su bs e qu e nt u se of

g rant f un ds

. The alleg ed irreg ularities included misrepr esentations as to Mr. Prasil’s business ex perie nce, fa lsi fi e d te st d a ta , r e pr e se ntatio ns of fi na nc ia l su pp ort w hic h d id n ot e xist, a ndg ro ssl y dis torte d c os t and bene fits inform at i o n
. Mr. Poston alleg ed that Mr. Dola n was the author of most of the mis le a din g inf

orma tio n a ndthat th e g rant a pp lic a tio n w a s su c c e ssf

ul be c aus e the inf

orma tio n o n it was furnished by

UT-CI S, an “indepe ndent source ” that ca rried the imprimatur of the Unive rsity of Tenne ssee.-3-

Th e le tte r f

urthe r s ta te d th a t Mr . Po sto n be lie ve d, on the ba sis of inf orma tio n f

ro m “ re lia

ble source s,” that Mr. Dola n had ac ted out of self- interest and that he had a private f inancial a rra ng ement w i t h M r
. P r a s i l f

o r h i s o w n f i n a n c i a l b e n e f

i t

. T h e l e t t e r w a s p r i n t e d o n E n v i r o n m e n t a l In k s t a t i o n e r y, was signe d “B ruce E. Poston, in his c orporate capa city on behalf of ETB Corp. and Environmenta l I nk, I nc.,” and was dated Dec ember 15, 1997.
Ac c or din g to M r. Do la n, Mr . Po sto n g a ve a dd iti on a l f a lse info rm ati on abo ut h im t o University

of Tenne ssee of

ficial s d uring a formal investigatory revie w on J anuary

30, 1998, and possiblyon other oc casions as w ell. Mr. Dolan was dism issed from his position at UT-CI S on J une 15, 1998. Mr. Prasil’s g rant wa s withdrawn a s well.
II. P R O C EE D ING S I N T R I A L C OURT
On Novembe r 3, 1998, Mr. Dolan filed a pro s e Complaint for libel, slander, a nd fraud in the Circuit Court of Davidson County

. He named as def endants B ruce E. Poston, both i n his indivi dual capa cit y and in his capa city

as an of fice r of ETB and Environmenta l I nk, I nc., and the two c or po ratio ns the mse lve s. Th e Complaint fo c us e d o n d a ma g e s, bu t di d n ot i nc lud e a ny sp e c if ic information about the substanc e of the alleg edly defamatory

publication.
The de fendants filed a Motion to Dismis s the Complaint for failure t o s t at e a claim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because it did not alleg e any specific statements, writt en or oral made by t h e d ef en d an ts. The Motion also asserte d that the Complaint failed to alleg e fr aud with the particula rity require d by

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02, and that it “fails to alleg e any actionable conduct by Br uce Poston in his capac ity as an individual.”
Mr . D olan f

ile d a re sp on se wh ic h s ta te d inpa rt : Additionally

the Def endant se eks to dismiss claims against Mr. Bruc e Poston as an individual based on the fa ct that the information he supplied leading to damag es wa s done so only

in the course o f h i s ac t ing in his cor porate capa city

for the E TB Cor po ratio n a nd En vir on me nta l I nk I nc
. I t is true that he a c te d s o inthe c ou rs e of his corpor ate c apac ities. Howeve r, Mr. Poston a lso pr ovided like and similar damag ing inf orma tio n in pe rs on to the Pla int if f’ s e mpl oy e r a s an in div idu a l du ri ng the fi rs t ha lf of 19 98 , ju st s ho rt ly

be fo re the Pla int if

f’ s e mpl oy e r ma de the de c isi on to t e rm inate the Plaintiff. Ag ain, particulars of such information will be aired in the he aring , and there fore , the Plaintiff opposes the De fendan t s p l ea to dismiss Mr. Poston as an ind ivi du a l. Thus, Mr. Dolan disting uished betwe en Mr. Dolan’s authoring and distributing the le tter, on the one hand, and his appea ranc e and statements bef

ore U niversity

officia ls investigating the cha rg es made in that letter, on the othe r. He acknow ledg ed the f irst were done in Mr. Poston’s capa city as a c or po rate of fi c e r. Ho we ve r, he a lle g e d the se c on d we re do ne “ a s an i nd ivi du a l.” I n late r f ili ng s, Mr. Dolan c ontinued to make this distinction.U nder pr i or l a w , a pl a i n t i f f f i l i n g s u i t for de f a ma t i on w a s r e qu i r e d t o s e t for t h i n h i s Com pl a i n t t h e ex act 1 la n g u a g e c la im e d to b e d e fam a to ry. St r ee t v. Nat i onal Br oadcas t i ng Co. , 512 F. Supp 3 98 ( E

. D

. T enn
. 197 7). T he l aw has s i nce b een rel axed t o a l l o w t he p l ai nt i f f to m erel y al l ege t he gi st of t he d ef am at o ry co m m uni cat i o n. T enn. R

. C i v. P . R u le 8 .0 1 ; H andl ey v . M ay , 58 8 S.W

. 2 d 77 2 , 77 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 7 9 ).

T he mo t i on was b as ed on t he pas s i ng of t he s i x mont hs s t at ut e of l i mi t at i ons , an d we pr es ume t he di s mi s s al 2

wa s a l s o. -4- Following an initial hearing, the trial court or dere d the plaintiff to file a n amende d complaint stating a cause of action ag ainst the defendants by Marc h 19, 1999, the date of the next scheduled hearing. The court a lso stated it would rule at that hea ring , if nec essary , on the def endants’ motions to dismi ss Mr. Poston i n his indivi dual ca pacity “base d on Plaintiff’s alleg ation s in his original c omp la int a lle g ing that Mr . Po sto n a c te d o n be ha lf of ET B Cor p. a ndEn vir on me nta l I nk , Inc . inhis corpor ate c apac ity .”
Mr. Dolan’ s amende d complaint briefly stated the substanc e of the statements he be lieved to be ac tionab l e. I n this amended c omplaint, Mr. Dolan continued to distinguish betwe en 1 publication of the letter and Mr. Poston’s pa rticipation in the University ’s investigation, where in he is a lle g e d to ha ve ma de fa lse a nd de fama tory state me nts le a din g to Mr . Dol a n’ s loss of e mpl oyme nt. “The statements were delivered as persona l statements to University of Tenne ssee Of

ficials, and a

re so do c ume nte d a s su c h. ” On Ap ri l 12 , 19 99 , the c ou rt dis mis se d wi th pr e jud ic e a ll c la ims a g a ins t Br uce Poston in his indivi dual ca pacity and all cla ims of fraud. A period of status confe renc es, ca se mana g ement conf eren ce s , and re fer

ral to mediation ensued. A fter the fi n al co n fe re n ce, a sche duling or der w as ente red on May 16, 2001, allowing amendment of

pleading s, and Mr. Dolan filed two Amendments t o Complaint and a new c omplaint on the same day . I n essenc e, in these doc uments Mr. Dolan ex presse d his opposition to dismi ssal of Mr. Poston in his i ndividual capa city , althoug h that dismiss al had oc curr ed two y ear s earlier, and asked that Mr. Poston be reinstated a s an indi vidual defe ndant. He a g ain re fer red to Mr. Poston’s s t a t e m e n t s t o U n i v e r s i t y o f f i c i a l s a s t h e b a s i s o f h i s c l a i mt h a tM r
. P o s t o n w a s l i ab l e i n d i v i d u a l l y. He a lso stated that University officia ls had “re viewed” Mr. Poston as an i ndividual and not repr esenting any

org anization.
After motions t o dism i s s we re fi led by the re maining de fendants, the court dismissed the slander c laims. I n response to the defe ndants’ re peate d reque st for a more definite stateme nt, the 2 court g ave Mr . Dolan additional time to once a g ain amend his c omplaint. I n the same or der, dated Se pte mbe r 7 , 2 00 1, the tr ia l c ou rt no te d th a t a ll c la ims a g a ins t Mr . Po sto n inhis ind ivi du a l c apa c ity had pre viouslybeen dismissed with prejudice

. On November 13, 2001, the remaining defendants moved t he court to dismiss the surviving claims or to stay

further proce eding s in the case pending resolution of a criminal case that had bee n filed in the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of Te nnessee , sty led United States of America v . Frank J. P rasil & Thomas J. Dolan. The pa rties ultimately

ag ree d to the stay

.-5-

Mr. Dolan f

inally reta ined an attorney

in this case. The attorney filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have Mr. Poston reinstate d as an individual def endant, tog eth er with a proposed Ame nded C o m p l a i n ta n d m o t i o n t o a m e n d

. T h i s d o c u m e n t f o r t h e f i r s tt i m e q u o t e d d i r e c t l y f

r o mt h e t w e n t yfour pa g e letter

from which this dispute ar ose. The trial court de nied the plaint i ff ’s R ule 60.02 motion.
On Au g us t 6, 20 03 , the de fe nd a nts fi le d a mot iona sking the tr ia l c ou rt to d e sig nate its Ap ri l 12 , 1 99 9, or de r a

fi na l ju dg me nt a s to Mr . Posto n, “ the re be ing no jus t r e a so n f or de la y .” Te nn . R. Civ. P . 54.02. Mr. Dolan f iled a re sponse in opposition t o the motion, to which w as attache d a copy of th e ac t u al l et t er from which this ca se ar ose. The trial court g rante d the motion. This appeal f o l l o w e d

. T h e o n l y i s s u e i n t h i s ap p e a l i s t h e d i s m i s s a l o f M r
. P o s t o n i n h i s i n d i v i d u a l c ap a c i t y.
III

. T HE S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW A Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion only tests the leg al sufficie ncy of the complaint, not the str e ng th o f the plaint if

f' s p ro of . F or the pu rp os e s of the motion , the de fe nd a nt a dmi ts the truthof a ll rele vant and materia l a verme nts c ontained in the complaint, but a sserts that such fa ct s d o n ot constitute a cause of action. Stein v. Dav idson Hotel Co. , 9 45 S.W. 2d71 4, 71 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Da v is v. The Tennesse an, 83 S.W. 3d12 5, 12 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; King v. Danek Med., I nc. , 37 S.W .3d 429, 453-54 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000).
I n c on sid e ri ng a

mot ion to dis mis s, the tr ia l cou rt sh ou ld c on str

ue the c omp la int

lib e ra lly in favor of the plaintiff, taking a ll alleg ations of fa ct as true , and deny the motion unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no se t of fac ts in support of his c laim that would entitle him to relief . Cook v. Spinnake r's of

Rivergate, I

nc. , 87 8 S .W .2 d 9 34 , 9 38 (T e nn .1 99 4) . O n a pp e a l, w e take a ll alleg ations of fac t in the plaintiff' s complaint as true, and revie w the lower c ourt’s leg al conc lusions de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Da v is , 83 S.W .3d at 128. The only issue befor e us is whether Mr. Poston can be he ld pers o n al l y l i able if Mr. Dolan proves he has been defamed. For the purposes of this a ppeal, we are obligated to cre dit Mr. Dolan’s assertion that he lost his job and suffere d other da mag es as a result of Mr. Poston’s ac tions, which are alleg ed to be the authoring and sending of the l etter and participation in the University ’s re sulting investigation.
IV. D E F AM AT I ON
To establish a prima fac ie case of defamation, the pl aintiff must prove that ( 1) the de fenda nt published a statement; (2) with knowledg e that the statement wa s false and defaming to the other ; or (3 ) w ithre c kle ss d isr e g ardfo r the truthof the state me nt o r w ithne g lig e nc e in f a ili ng to a sc e rt a inO nl y s t at em ent s t hat are fal se ar e act i o nab l e as def am at i o n. T he t rut h of t he st at em ent s m ad e i s t hus a near- 3

a b so lute d e fen se to a d e fam a tio n c h a rg e
. W e st v . M e d ia G e n e ra l C o n v e rg e n c e , In c ., 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 5 (T enn. 20 0 1 ); A l i v. M o o re , 9 8 4 S .W .2 d 2 2 4 , 2 3 0 (T e n n
. C t. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ); St ones Ri ve r M ot or s , Inc. v . M i d- Sout h Publ i s hi ng Co. , 651 S.W

. 2 d 71 3 , 71 9 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 8 3 ). U nd er defama tio n la w ,“p u b l i cat i o n” i s a t erm of art t hat s i m p l y m eans co m m uni cat i o n of d ef am at o ry m at t er t o a t hi rd p ers o n. -6- the truthof

the state me nt. Sullivan v

. Baptist Memorial Hosp. , 995 S.W .2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999) ;

3 Da v is , 83 S.W .3d at 128. “[T] he basis for

an ac tion for def

amation, whethe r it be slander or libel, is that the defamation has resulted in an injury

to the person' s char acte r and r eputation.” Da v is , 83 S.W .3d at 128, quoting Quality Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Bluff City Buick Co., Inc. , 876 S.W .2d 818, 820 (Tenn. 1994). To be ac tionable, the alleg edly defamatory statement must “ constitute a serious threat to the pla intiff’s reputation.” Sto ne s Ri v e r M oto rs, In c . v . Mid- So uth Pu bl’ g Co ., 65 1 S. W.2 d 7 13 , 7 19 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 83 ). Dama g e s fr om fa lse or ina c c ur a te state me nts c a nn ot b e pr e su me d; a c tua l dama g e mus t be sustained and proved. Me mp his Pu bl’ g Co . v . Ni c ho ls , 569 S.W .2d 412, 416, 419 (Tenn. 1978)

. W h i l e t h e law of de famation applies g ener ally to protect a

person’ s reputation within the community , the law is espe cially conce rne d ab o u t defamatory statements that tend to pre judice a party in his business, trade, off ice or profe ssion. See, e .g. , Smith v. Fielde n , 326 S.W .2d 476, 479 (T e nn . 1 95 9) ; Mc W

ho rte r v . B ar re , 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 5 4 , 3 6 4 -3 6 5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 3 ); W

. P age Kee ton, et al., Pr

os se r a nd Ke e ton on the Law o

f To rts § 112 at 790 (5th Ed. 1984) (“ The law has alway s been ve ry

tender of the reputation of trade smen, and there fore words spoken of them in the way of their tra de will bear

an ac tion that will not be ac tionable in the ca se of a nother pe rson.”)
L ia bil ity fo r d e fama tio n n orma lly e xten ds to e ve ry ind ivi du a l wh o ha s ta ke n a re sp on sib le part in publishing the de famatory materia l. I n t h e ca se of a libel printed in a new spaper , even the printer a nd the car

rier of the paper can be held liable, if it can be pr oven that they wer e aw are of the libel. See W. P ag e Ke eton et al., Pr os se r a nd Ke e ton on the Law o

f To rts § 113 at 7 9 9 (5th Ed. 19 84 ). As a pr a c tic a l ma tte r, of c ou rs e , the re qu ir e me nt that th e de fe nd a nt b e a wa re of the lib e l a lso protec ts innocent individuals from such liability

. Knoxville Publishing Co. v. Taylor , 215 S.W .2d 27, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).
Mr . D olan’ s pro se Complaint , as am e nd e d, wh ile ina rt fu lly dr a ft e d, a lle g e d f

a c ts w hic h if proven w ould be suffic ient to establish the elements of de famation. He identified Mr. Poston as the author a nd source , alleg ed the state ments were false, and alleg ed he suf fer ed loss of employ ment beca use of the statements in the letter a nd made to his employ er.

V. I M M U N ITY O F C OR PORA TE O F F I CE RS Mr. Poston arg ues that he c annot be he ld personally liable for the statements he made in the letter he composed a nd distributed or t he oral statements he made to University officia ls because of the per sonal immunit y

g rante d to corporate offic ers in the discha rg e of the ir duties by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18-403(d). That statute provides that an of fice r of a corpor ation “is not liable for a ny-7-

action take n as an of

fice r, or a ny

failure to take any

action, if the of

fice r per for m ed the duties of of fi c e in c omp lia nc e wi th this se c tio n. ” As thi s lang ua g e ind ic a te s, the re ma ind e r o f the statut e e sta bli sh e s st a nd ard s o f c on du c t ne c e ssa ry to t ri g g e r the imm un ity . T he re ma ind e r o f the statut e re a ds : Discharge of duties. -- (a ) An of fi c e r wi th dis c re tio na

ry auth ority

sh a ll d isc ha

rg e a ll d u t i e s u n d e r

t h a tau t h o r i t y: (1) In g ood faith; (2 ) Wi th the c are a n o rd ina ri ly pr ud e nt p e rs on in a

lik e po sit io n wou ld exercise unde r similar circ umstances; and (3) In a manne r the off

icer rea sonably

believes to be in the best interest of the corpor ation: (b) I n discharg ing such duties, an office r is e ntitled to rely on i nformation, opinions, reports, or stateme nts, including fina ncial stateme nts and other f inancial d a t a , i f p r e p ar e d o r

p r e s e n t e d b y: (1) One (1) or more office rs or employ ees of the cor poration (or

a subsidiary of the c orporation) whom the offic er r easona bly believes to be reliable and comp e tent in the matters pre sented; or (2) L eg al counse l, public acc ountants, or o t h er persons a s to matters the officerre as o n ab l y

b el i ev es ar e w i t h i n t h e p er s o n 's p ro fe s s i o n al o r e x p er tcompetenc e. (c ) A n o ff

i ce r i s n o tac t i n g i n go o d fa i t h i f t h e o ff i ce r h as k n o wl ed ge conce rning the matter in que stion tha t m ak es re liance othe rwise pe rmitted by subsection (b) unw arr anted.
Prior to enac tment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18-403 in 1986, in Tenne ssee c orporate offic ers e njo y e d n o p ro te c tio n fr om tort li abil ity e ve n if a c tin g wi thi n th e sc op e of the ir e mpl oyme nt w hil e comm i t t i n g t h e t ort. I n 1971, the Tenne ssee Court of A ppeals in Cooper v. Cordova Sand and Grave l Company , 485 S.W .2d 261, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971), he ld that the following quotation from 19 Am.J r.2d 778 cor

rec tly stated the law :
I f, ho we ve r, a

dir e c tor or of fi c e r c omm its or pa

rt ic ipate s in the c omm iss ionof a tort, whether or not it is also byor for the corporation, he is l iable to third persons injure d the re by , a ndit d oe s n ot m a tte r wh a t liab ili ty a tta c he s to the c or po ratio n f or the tort.T he l et t er co nt ai ni ng t he al l eged l y d ef am at o ry st at em ent s was f i nal l y s ub m i t t ed by M r. D o l an as an at t achm ent 4
t o hi s opp osi t i on t o M r
. P ost on’ s mo t i on f or t he cour t t o cer t i f y as f i nal i t s o r der di s mi s s i ng M r
. P ost on. T he l et t er wa s si gn ed “B ruc e E

. P o st o n, In his co rp o rate c ap ac i t y on b eh alf o f E T B C o rp an d E nv i ro nm en t al Ink, Inc .” R eg ard l ess o f what t he si gnat ure may or m ay no t pro ve, fo r our purp o ses , i t i s suf f i ci ent t hat M r. D o l an had earl i er al l eged t hat t he l ett er w as signe d b y M r. P o st o n a nd t ha t M r. P o st o n w as a n o f f i ce r o f t he co rp o rate d efen d an t s. -8- 485 S.W .2d at 271-72. See also Brungard v. Caprice Rec ords, Inc. , 608 S.W .2d 585, 590-91 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1980) (“of

fice r or dire ctor of a

corpor ation who commits or participates in the commission of a tort is likewise liable to third pa rties re g ardle ss of the liabilityof a c orporation”).
Howeve r, af

ter enactment of T enn. Code Ann. § 48- 18-403, a c orporate offic er may raise a s a de fe ns e imm un ity

fr om tortio us a c ts i f the c on dit ion s se t ou t in the statut e are me t. In o the r w or ds , the immunityg rante d by the statute is c onditional, not absolute. When a c orporate offic er r elies on Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18-403 for immunityin his or her individual ca pacity , the question bec omes whether that office r wa s perf

orming duties of a c orporate offic er in g ood faith and in furthera nce of the perceive d best interest of the corpor ation. Ne lso n v . M ar tin , 958 S.W .2d 643, 650 (Tenn. 1997) (over ruled on other

g rounds, Trau-Med of Ame rica, Inc. v . Allstate Ins. Co. , 71 S.W .3d 691 (Tenn. 2002)). The critica l fac tors in considering this question are “intent, m otive or purpose , and mea ns.” Id. , q u o t i n g Fo rre ste r v . S toc k sti ll, 869 S.W .2d 328, 333 (Tenn. 1994). These are , o f c o u rs e, questions of fac t.
On c e it i s e sta

bli sh e d th a t th e a c tio n at is su e wa s ta ke n b y a c or po rate of fi c e r a c tin g a s a c or po rate of fi c e r, the bu rd e n is on the plaint if f t o p ro ve that th e of

fi c e r w a s n ot a c tin g in g oo d f a ith in fu rt h erance of the be st interest of the c orporation or, in other words, that the c ircumstance s trig g ering the protection of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18-403 (d) are not prese nt. Nelson , 958 S.W .2d at 650.
I n th e c a se be fo re us , M r. Pos ton was di smi sse d o n a mot ionto d ism iss ; he didno t f ile aff idavits or other e vidence which would have been a ppropriate in support of a motion for summary judgme nt. There fore , there is no evidence reg arding his compliance w ith Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18- 40 3 ( d) . In h is s e ve ra l pro se c omp la int s, Mr

. Do la n did no t a lle g e that Mr

. Pos ton ha d n ot a c te d in g ood faith as a

corpor ate of

fice r or in furthera nce of the corporations’ best intere sts. He alleg ed that Mr. Poston wa s the president of both de fendant c orporations, that Mr. Poston had signed the alleg edly defamatory

letter, and consistently alleg ed that all the def endants c ommitt ed the tortious 4 acts c omplained of. Importantly , Mr. Dolan a lso essentially withdrew any claim that the dra fting and distribution of the letter was not done by Mr. Poston in hi s capa city as a c orporate offic er.
I t was only

afte r Mr. Dola n obtained counse l and four y ear s after the trial court’s orig inal ruling dismiss ing all claims ag ainst Mr. Poston individually that any pleading or attempted ple ading a dd re sse d M r. Pos ton ’s c on du c t r e g ard ing the le tte r s e pa rate ly fr om that of

the c or po ratio n. I n h isT hi s p rop o sed am end ed co m p l ai nt was f i l ed wi t h a m o t i o n t o am end

. A l t ho ugh we f i nd no o rder d enyi ng t he 5

m o t i o n to am en d t he co m p l aint, t he t rial co urt’ s o t he r a c tio ns ren d er a n a t t em p t t o am en d t o i nc l ud e M r. P o st o n a s a defendan t i n h i s i ndi vi dual ca paci t y m o o t

. T he t r i al cour t deni ed M r
. D ol an’ s mo t i on t o s et as i de i t s ea r l i er order d ism issin g M r. P o sto n in h is ind ivid u a l ca p a c ity a n d c e rtifi e d tha t o rd e r a s fina l f o r p u rp o se s o f ap p e a l.

T h e ame n ded pl ea di n g a l s o a l l eg ed t h at bot h c or por at e def en dan t s h ad bee n a dmi n i s t r at i v el y di s s ol v ed. 6
-9- pr op os e d Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int , Mr . D olan a lle g e d th a t Mr. Pos ton ’s a lle g e dly tortio us a c ts 5
wer e committed outside the course and scope of his authority

. This alleg ation, howeve r, wa s used 6 to su pp ort a n a lle g a tio n that the c or po rate ve il sh ou ld be pie rc e d a ndMr . Po sto n h e ld i nd ivi du a lly liable. It did not address the fa ctors in Tenn. Code A nn. § 48-18-403.
Mr . D olan w a s g ive n th e op po rtun ity to ame nd his c omp la int , a ft e r n oti c e of the de fe nd a nts ’ objections to it reg arding Mr. Poston’s indivi dual liability , to make suff icient alle gat ions that Mr. Poston could be held liable individually

. W i t h re gar d to the acts of dr afting and distributing the le tte r, Mr . D olan d id n ot m ake a ny su c h a lle g a tio ns a ndin es se nc e a g re e d w iththe mot ionto d ism iss

. Howeve r, Mr. Dola n asserted then, and c ontinued to assert, alleg ations that Mr. Poston acted ind ivi du a lly

in m akin g state me nts to U niv e rs ity of fi c ia ls. Al tho ug h n ot s pe c if ic , th os e state me nts are enoug h to alleg e that Mr. P oston was not entit led to corpor ate of fice r immunity . We are require d to rea d Mr. Dolan’ s Complaint l ibera lly and to af ford it the benefi t o f al l i n fer ence s that can be rea sonably

draw n from the f

acts plea d. Leach v. Taylor , 124 S.W .3d 87, 92 (Tenn. 2004)

. Conse q u en t l y , we must reve rse the dismissal and re mand so that evidenc e could be had, throug h summary

judgme nt proce dure or otherwise, on the eleme nts require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 48 -1 8- 40 3, inc lud ing the e xer c ise of re a so na ble c are , the pr e se nc e of g oo d f a ith , a ndthe le g iti ma te interest of the corpor ations Mr. Poston represe nted in the ac tion taken.
VI . We reve rse the or der of

the trial court and remand the case t o the C ircuit Court of Davidson County . The c osts on appeal a re ta x ed equa lly

betwee n the app el l an t , Thomas A. Dolan, and the appellee s, Br

uce E . Poston, East Tennessee Banking Corp., and Environmental Ink, I nc.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE