Present: All the Justices 

ROBERT L. SANSOM 

v. Record No. 981492 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 16, 1999 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 

MADISON COUNTY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 Robert L. Sansom (Sansom) owns a 191-acre tract of 

real estate located in Madison County (the County). In 

order to effect a subdivision of this tract of land, Sansom 

had a plat prepared depicting a division of the 191 acres 

into parcel C, containing 48.788 acres, and parcel D, 

containing 70.385 acres, leaving a residual parcel (the 

residue) of 71.886 acres.1 A 9.29-acre, closed landfill 

that the County formerly operated is located wholly within 

the residue. The area previously used as a landfill is the 

focus of the controversy in this appeal. 

 Pursuant to Article 4-3-1, Madison County, Virginia, 

Subdivision Ordinance (Mar. 29, 1974, as amended) (the 

Ordinance),2 the circuit court determined that a 

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 The subdivision plat did not include the boundaries 

of the residue. 

2

 Article 4-3-1 of the Ordinance provides as follows: 

Flood Plains and Drainage Courses. When any stream or 

substantial surface drainage course is located in the 
“substantial surface drainage course” is located on the 

landfill area and, consequently, upheld the County’s denial 

of Sansom’s application to approve his subdivision plat. 

According a presumption of correctness to the court’s 

factual findings, we conclude that the court properly held 

that the County based its denial on the applicable 

ordinance and that its decision was neither arbitrary nor 

capricious. Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court. 

I. 

On March 7, 1997, Sansom submitted to the County an 

application for approval of his subdivision plat. During a 

joint meeting of the Madison County Board of Supervisors 

(the Board) and the Madison County Planning Commission (the 

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area being subdivided, no land disturbing activity 

except to build approved bridges shall be permitted 

within fifty (50) feet of the stream or drainage 

course, and provisions may be required for an adequate 

easement along the stream or drainage course for the 

purpose of widening, deepening, relocating, improving, 

or protecting the streams or drainage course for 

drainage purposes. Such easements shall not be 

considered part of the required road width. Flood 

plain limits shall be established with reference to 

current flood plain maps or by current soil survey and 

engineering methods, and shall be furnished to the 

Board of Supervisors or its agent by the subdivider. 

To insure development of lots containing sufficient 

land upon which to place structures without impeding 

natural drainage, the subdivider may be required to 

provide elevation and flood profiles. 

2
Commission) on April 2, 1997, the Commission members 

expressed concern about Sansom’s plan to construct a road 

over the landfill in order to provide access to the residue 

from Route 652. The Commission considered a letter dated 

January 9, 1997, from Robert M. Roberts, P.E. (Roberts), to 

the County Administrator, in which Roberts suggested that, 

if Sansom followed certain recommendations for building the 

access road, it would not create any adverse effects with 

regard to the closed landfill. Sansom’s attorney advised 

the Commission that his client was willing to construct the 

road in accordance with the standards outlined in Roberts’ 

letter but that Sansom would not accept a drainage easement 

prohibiting any land disturbing activity in the landfill 

area that would alter the existing drainage course. 

The Commission recommended to the Board that Sansom’s 

application be denied based on the following articles of 

the Ordinance: “Article 1, second paragraph, Article 4-1-

4, Article 4-3-1, Article 4-4-6 and Article 5-3.” The 

Board then convened its meeting and subsequently denied 

Sansom’s application “because of concern about the risk 

3
that might be created by a new access road across the 

closed landfill.”3

On May 29, 1997, Sansom filed an “Appeal and Motion to 

Approve Subdivision Plat” in the circuit court pursuant to 

Code § 15.1-475(B)(3) (now § 15.2-2259(C)). Sansom alleged 

that the Board’s decision was not “properly based upon the 

Madison County Subdivision Ordinance under the articles 

specified in writing on the plat, and that the provisions 

of the local ordinance, as construed by the [Board], are 

beyond the authority granted by the enabling statutes.” 

Sansom further asserted that the Board’s disapproval of his 

application was arbitrary and capricious because the 

decision was based on reasons other than those provided by 

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 Pursuant to Code § 15.1-475(B)(1) (now § 15.2-

2259(A)), the County Administrator wrote the following 

reasons for denial on Sansom’s subdivision plat: 

 Denied by Madison County Board of Supervisors on 

April 2, 1997, under Article 1, Article 4-1-4, Article 

4-3-1, Article 4-4-6 and Article 5-3 due to concern 

about risk of proposed access road to residue over the 

closed landfill. Relocation of proposed access road 

to residue so that it does not cross closed landfill 

required. 

The General Assembly repealed Title 15.1 effective 

December 1, 1997, in Acts of Assembly 1997, c. 587. Since 

Title 15.1 was in effect during all times relevant to this 

appeal, we will cite Title 15.1 with references to the 

corresponding sections in Title 15.2. 

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the Board. Finally, Sansom alleged that the request by the 

Board for a drainage easement over the entire area of the 

old landfill, which would in effect prohibit any land 

disturbing activity in that area, was an unconstitutional 

taking of land without compensation. 

 After the court denied Sansom’s motion for summary 

judgment and the Board’s motion for partial summary 

judgment in a decree dated March 4, 1998, this matter 

proceeded to a bench trial on March 16, 1998. During that 

trial, testimony from several witnesses established the 

following facts relevant to this appeal. 

The residue fronts on Route 652 for 1,851.8 feet. The 

former landfill area runs parallel with all but 50 feet of 

that road frontage. The state highway department would not 

authorize a road entrance from Route 652 into the residue 

within the 50-foot frontage outside the former landfill 

area because of inadequate sight distance along the 

highway. The department did, however, approve access from 

Route 652 into the residue at a point along the road 

frontage where the closed landfill is situated. A road 

going from that point to the remaining section of the 

residue would traverse the landfill. 

The licensed land surveyor who prepared the 

subdivision plat described the landfill area as a pasture 

5
that slopes generally downward from west to east, with some 

depressions typical of those in any field, and that 

contains an area on the southern edge where surface 

drainage flow concentrates. He noticed the presence of 

some check dams that had been constructed to help control 

erosion. Although the surveyor acknowledged that he saw 

evidence of surface water drainage on the landfill area, he 

denied seeing a “substantial surface drainage course” 

across the landfill. 

Roberts testified that the drop in elevation of the 

landfill area from west to east is approximately 70 feet. 

His physical examination of the landfill revealed the 

presence of three drainage swales that run from west to 

east. Two of the swales eventually run out, and surface 

drainage from them becomes sheet flow that continues to 

travel in a southeasterly direction until it reaches the 

remaining swale near the perimeter of the landfill. The 

residue also contains six check dams, five of which are 

located within the area of the landfill cover. These check 

dams are used for erosion and sedimentation control and to 

lessen the velocity of the surface drainage. Finally, 

three earthen berms are located on the landfill that also 

aid in the prevention of erosion. 

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Based on his calculations of the amount of runoff for 

a 2, 10, 25, and a 100-year storm event, Roberts opined 

that there is substantial runoff from properties adjacent 

to the landfill and from the landfill itself and that the 

runoff could create erosion problems and infiltrate the 

landfill. He also stated that, if the flow of the surface 

water is impeded and allowed to collect, it could cause 

generation of leachate from the landfill. Finally, based 

on his examination of the site and its physical features, 

Roberts responded affirmatively to a question regarding 

whether the drainage flow across the landfill is a 

substantial surface drainage force. Nevertheless, Roberts 

maintained his position that a road could be constructed 

across the landfill without adverse consequences if it were 

built in accordance with the recommendations that he had 

made in his letter to the County Administrator. 

Upon considering the evidence presented during the 

trial, the circuit court determined that the Board properly 

applied Article 4-3-1 of the Ordinance. The court reasoned 

that 

evidence of a combination of drainage structures . . . 

over the closed landfill constitute a substantial 

surface drainage course located on the residue within 

the area being subdivided and the board was justified 

in requiring an easement prohibiting land-disturbing 

activity including the roadway within this area. 

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The court further stated, “Since the law permits the board 

to protect drainage in a subdivision, that the primary 

concern is the closed landfill, does not make the 

requirement that the road be located other than across the 

landfill arbitrary or capricious.”4

On April 22, 1998, the circuit court entered a final 

decree dismissing with prejudice Sansom’s appeal and motion 

for the reasons stated in the record. Sansom appeals. 

II. 

 Code § 15.1-466(A)(3) (now Code § 15.2-2241(3)) 

provides that “[a] subdivision ordinance shall include 

reasonable regulations and provisions that apply to or 

provide . . . [f]or adequate provisions for drainage and 

flood control . . . .” Pursuant to the directive contained 

in this section, the County enacted Articles 4-3-1, 4-3-2, 

and 4-3-3 to deal with flood plains and drainage courses, 

flood control and drainage structures, and erosion control, 

respectively. 

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 The Court also concluded that it was unnecessary to 

determine whether Article 4-4-6 of the Ordinance, 

concerning drainage easements, is applicable and that 

Article 5-3, concerning road access, does not pertain to 

this case. 

In its previous decision denying summary judgment, the 

court had determined that references to Article 1 and 

Article 4-1-4 on the subdivision plat were not relevant to 

any alleged deficiencies in the plat. 

8
 Article 4-3-1, the provision at issue in this appeal, 

does not define the term “substantial surface drainage 

course,” nor is it defined elsewhere in the County’s 

Ordinance. “When . . . a statute contains no express 

definition of a term, the general rule of statutory 

construction is to infer the legislature’s intent from the 

plain meaning of the language used.” Hubbard v. Henrico 

Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 

(1998) (citing City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 

358, 362, 467 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1996); Marsh v. City of 

Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987)). An 

undefined term must be “given its ordinary meaning, given 

the context in which it is used.” Dep’t of Taxation v. 

Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 

S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980). “The context may be examined by 

considering the other language used in the statute.” City 

of Virginia Beach v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mecklenburg 

County, 246 Va. 233, 236-37, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993). 

On brief, Sansom argues that the term “substantial 

surface drainage course” must be construed as a “prominent, 

well-defined topographical feature such as a creek bed, 

ravine or gully in which surface water concentrates and 

through which it is channeled . . . away.” He asserts that 

it cannot encompass a nine-acre, gently-sloping, grass9
covered, “cow” pasture. However, the County used the 

disjunctive “or” in the opening phrase of Article 4-3-1: 

“When any stream or substantial surface drainage course is 

located in the area being subdivided.” (Emphasis added.) 

Thus, we conclude that the County did not intend for the 

terms “substantial surface drainage course” and “stream” to 

denote the same kind of topographical features. Sansom’s 

interpretation of the phrase “substantial surface drainage 

course” would “violate the settled principle of statutory 

construction that every part of a statute is presumed to 

have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless 

unless absolutely necessary.” Hubbard, 255 Va. at 340-41, 

497 S.E.2d at 338 (citing Sims Wholesale Co. v. BrownForman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405, 468 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1996); 

Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 

S.E. 541, 542 (1929)). 

 Sansom also assigns error to the circuit court’s 

conclusion that a “substantial surface drainage course” is 

located on the closed landfill. He asks this Court to 

reverse the judgment of the circuit court and to order that 

his subdivision plat be approved for recordation as 

submitted to the County. 

In reviewing the circuit court’s judgment, we accord a 

presumption of correctness to the factual findings in favor 

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of each party. West v. Mills, 238 Va. 162, 168, 380 S.E.2d 

917, 920-21 (1989). In addition, Code § 15.1-475(B)(3) 

(now Code § 15.2-2259(C)) limits the circuit court’s review 

to a determination of whether the County’s disapproval of 

Sansom’s subdivision plat was “‘not properly based on the 

ordinance applicable thereto, or was arbitrary or 

capricious.’” 238 Va. at 168, 380 S.E.2d at 920 (quoting 

Code § 15.1-475); accord Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 256 

Va. 350, 355, 504 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1998). 

Using these principles, we find that the circuit court 

properly determined that a “substantial surface drainage 

course” is situated on the landfill area of the residue. 

As the County noted, Roberts testified that significant 

surface drainage flows across the landfill area from 

adjacent properties and from the former landfill itself. 

When specifically asked if the drainage flow across the 

landfill is a substantial surface drainage force, he 

responded affirmatively. The presence of drainage swales, 

earthen berms, and check dams in the landfill area confirms 

the volume of surface drainage and the need to control the 

flow of water and to prevent erosion. Even the land 

surveyor testifying as a witness for Sansom acknowledged 

the presence of check dams and an area on the southern edge 

of the landfill where surface drainage flow concentrates. 

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Thus, we conclude that the County’s denial of Sansom’s 

application to approve his subdivision plat was properly 

based on the applicable ordinance and was not arbitrary or 

capricious. Under the terms of Article 4-3-1, the County 

was justified in permitting no land disturbing activity, 

including the construction of the access road, in the area 

where the closed landfill is situated. The fact that the 

County’s decision also alleviates its concerns with regard 

to the risks that might be created by constructing an 

access road across the former landfill does not change our 

conclusion. 

 Finally, Sansom summarily argues that a predicate for 

the application of Article 4-3-1 is that a “substantial 

surface drainage course” actually be “located in the area 

being subdivided.” He contends that the area being 

subdivided is parcel C and parcel D, not the residue where 

the landfill is located, and that, therefore, Article 4-3-1 

is not applicable. We find no merit in this argument 

because it ignores the definition of the term “subdivision” 

in Article 2-38 of the Ordinance: “The divisions of a lot, 

tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, tracts or 

parcels . . . .” The parcel of land being subdivided is 

Sansom’s 191-acre tract, which includes the residue and 

thus the closed landfill. 

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 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 

the circuit court.5

Affirmed. 

______________________ 5

 We do not need to address Samson’s remaining 

assignment of error regarding whether the residue 

constitutes a “lot” under Article 4-4-6 of the Ordinance. 

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