[Cite as State v. Rupert, 2020-Ohio-6893.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

VAN WERT COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 15-20-03 

 v. 

THOMAS D. RUPERT, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR-19-01-005 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 28, 2020 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Marley C. Nelson for Appellant 

Eva J. Yarger for Appellee 

 
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WILLIAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Thomas D. Rupert (“Rupert”) brings this appeal 

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert County accepting 

the verdicts of guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and sentencing him 

to an aggregate prison term of 60 months. Rupert claims on appeal that the verdicts 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct which prejudiced him. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is 

affirmed. 

{¶2} On January 3, 2019, the grand jury of Van Wert County indicted Rupert 

on five counts: 1) rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 2907.02(B), a felony 

of the first degree; 2) gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), 

2907.05(C)(2), a felony of the third degree; 3) gross sexual imposition in violation 

of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), 2907.05(C)(1), a felony of the fourth degree; 4) sexual 

battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), 2907.03(B), a felony of the third degree; 

and 5) sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), 2907.03(B), a felony of 

the second degree as the victim was less than thirteen years of age. Doc. 2. Rupert 

entered pleas of not guilty to the charges. Doc. 11. A jury trial was held from 

October 28 through October 30, 2019. Doc. 66. The jury returned verdicts of not 

guilty on the rape, as charged in count 1, but found Rupert guilty of the lesser 

included offense of gross sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree. Doc. 64. 

The jury also found Rupert guilty of gross sexual imposition as set forth in count 2. 
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Id. The jury found Rupert not guilty of counts 3, 4, and 5. Id. The trial court 

accepted the jury verdicts on October 31, 2019. Doc. 66. A sentencing hearing was 

held on January 10, 2020. Doc. 71. The trial court ordered that Rupert serve a 

prison term of 30 months on each count and that the sentences be served consecutive 

to each other. Id. Rupert appeals from this judgment and raises the following 

assignments of error on appeal. 

First Assignment of Error 

[Rupert’s] convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence in violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial. 

Second Assignment of Error 

Prosecutorial misconduct denied [Rupert] a fair trial and due 

process of law. 

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶3} In the first assignment of error, Rupert claims that his conviction was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. When reviewing a judgment to 

determine if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court 

“review[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Mendoza, 137 Ohio App.3d 336, 738 N.E.2d 822 (3d Dist. 2000). See, also, State 

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A new trial should 
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be granted only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against 

conviction. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. Although the appellate court acts 

as a “thirteenth juror,” due deference to the findings made by the fact-finder must 

still be given. State v. Moorer, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13–12–22, 2013-Ohio-650, ¶ 

29. 

{¶4} Here, Rupert claims that the testimony of the victims was inconsistent 

and unreliable. The jury convicted Rupert of two counts of gross sexual imposition 

in violation of R.C. 2907.05, which provides in pertinent part as follows. 

(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the 

spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the 

offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two 

or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the 

following applies: 

* * * 

(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than

thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age 

of that person. 

There is no dispute in this case that the two victims were under the age of 13 at the 

time of the offenses. Thus, the only question is whether there was credible evidence 

that Rupert had sexual contact with the victims. Sexual contact is defined as “any 

touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, 

genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose 

of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). 
Case No. 15-20-03 

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{¶5} T.R., the victim of the actions making up Count 2, testified that on 

multiple occasions, Rupert would grab her hand and force her to touch her breasts, 

her vaginal area, or his “private area.” Tr. 121. She also testified that Rupert would 

touch her vaginal area, breasts, and butt. Tr. 121. She indicated that most of the 

touching occurred over her clothing, but that there were two instances where he 

touched her vaginal area under her clothing. Tr. 128, 146-47. Rupert argues that 

this testimony is not credible because there were discrepancies in her testimony. 

The jury is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the 

credibility of witnesses. It may believe or disbelieve any witness 

or accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest. In 

reaching its verdict, the jury should consider the demeanor of the 

witness and the manner in which he testifies, his connection or

relationship with the prosecution or the defendant, and his 

interest, if any, in the outcome. 

State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). “The choice between 

credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact 

and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of 

fact.” State v. Kruse, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-16-15, 2017-Ohio-5667, ¶ 66 quoting 

State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). Here, the alleged 

inconsistencies were before the jury and it had the opportunity to weigh the evidence 

presented. The jury clearly took its task seriously as it found Rupert not guilty of 

Counts 3 and 4 which were also based upon T.R.’s testimony. 

{¶6} E.B., who was the victim of the actions in Count 1, testified that she 

was lying on the bed in Rupert’s bedroom watching tv when he came in and laid on 
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the bed behind her. Tr. 168-69. E.B. then testified that Rupert reached his arm over 

her and started touching her vagina inside her pants, but on the outside of her 

underwear. Tr. 169-70. According to E.B., Rupert was rubbing the outside of her 

vaginal area, but did not go inside of her. Tr. 171. Rupert argues this testimony 

lacks credibility because on redirect, she indicated that his finger went in. However, 

as discussed above, the jury was given the opportunity to hear all of the evidence, 

including the inconsistencies and determine what was credible. The jury was not 

required to believe all of the testimony. The jury evidently chose to believe the 

testimony given on direct because it found Rupert not guilty of rape, but guilty of 

the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition. The jury also found him not 

guilty of sexual battery as it related to E.B. Viewing all the evidence as a whole, we 

cannot say that the evidence weighs heavily against conviction or that the jury 

clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. The first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

Prosecutorial Misconduct 

{¶7} Rupert argues in the second assignment of error that he was denied a 

fair trial when the prosecutor accused him of committing perjury. We note initially 

that Barnes failed to object to the statement during the trial, so our review is limited 

to one of plain error. State v. Dixon, 152 Ohio App.3d 760, 2003-Ohio-2250, ¶ 26, 

790 N.E.2d 349 (3d Dist.). “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the 

remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the accused's 
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substantial rights.” State v. Liles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1–14–61, 2015-Ohio-3093, ¶ 

31, citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). Prejudice is 

shown when there is a reasonable probability that but for the improper remark by 

the prosecutor, the result of the trial would have been different. State v. Stevens, 3d 

Dist. Allen No. 1-14-58, 2016-Ohio-446, ¶ 53, 58 N.E.3d 584. “Not every 

intemperate remark by counsel can be a basis for reversal.” State v. Landrum, 53 

Ohio St.3d 107, 112, 559 N.E.2d 710 (1990). 

The touchstone of analysis “ * * * is the fairness of the trial, not 

the culpability of the prosecutor. * * * ” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 

209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, (1982). The 

Constitution does not guarantee an “error free, perfect trial * * 

*.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 

1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, (1983). 

Id. 

{¶8} Barnes’ argument is based upon one comment made by the prosecutor 

during closing arguments. Specifically, after discussing the testimony of the victims 

and their relationship with Barnes, the prosecutor inferred that Barnes had lied 

during his testimony. The prosecutor’s statement was “if a person will abuse a child, 

what’s a little perjury.” Tr. 498. This Court does not find accusations that a witness, 

including the defendant, has committed perjury in a case to be proper. “Such 

statements function as backhanded impeachment as well as attempted witness 

intimidation and express the prosecutor’s personal belief or opinion as to the 

credibility of the witness, which is improper.” State v. Halley, 93 Ohio App.3d 71, 
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79, 637 N.E.2d 937 (10th Dist. 1994). However, the fact that the prosecutor made 

one isolated remark during closing argument does not automatically make the trial 

unfair. A review of the closing argument as a whole does not show that the error 

was prevalent throughout the closing argument. Throughout the closing argument, 

the prosecutor repeatedly stated “if” you believe or “if” you find, inferring properly 

that it was up to the jury to determine the facts. See e.g. Tr. 484, 485, 488, and 489. 

The jury was properly instructed that statements made by counsel during closing 

argument were not evidence. Tr. 516. The trial court also told the jurors that they 

were the “sole judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 

the evidence.” Tr. 516. Given all of this along with the evidence presented at the 

trial, this Court does not find that the single inappropriate statement by the 

prosecutor in this case was prejudicial. Thus, the second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶9} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert 

County is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed 

PRESTON and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.