UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-5132

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES HAMPTON WILLIAMS, II, 

 Defendant – Appellant, 

 

DONNA C. ADKINS; ALISIA H. AKBAR; CHERYL L. AMAKER; LACARIA 

BROWN; LUTHER BRYAN; CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 

LAVACA COUNTY TEXAS; RANDY MARTIN; GEORGEAN MCCONNELL; 

JOSEPH E. MCCONNELL; CHRISTOPHER M. MORRIS; FLORENCE 

NOLLKAMPER; GUSSIE D. NOLLKAMPER; JOHN M. WARTHER; WELLS 

FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INCORPORATED, 

 Parties-in-Interest. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:02-cr-00548-CMC-3) 

Submitted: March 23, 2009 Decided: April 24, 2009 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit 

Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
Leland B. Greeley, LELAND B. GREELEY, P.A., Rock Hill, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States 

Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Jane B. Taylor, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

 James Hampton Williams, II, was convicted by a jury on 

several counts related to his participation in a large-scale, 

ten-year long conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, 

and was sentenced to life in prison. Specifically, Williams was 

convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006); one 

count of conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956 (2006); one count of cocaine distribution, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); and one count of possession 

with intent to distribute 500 grams of more of cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

 Williams appealed, challenging his conviction and 

sentence. We affirmed Williams’ conviction but because he was 

sentenced under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, 

vacated and remanded for resentencing consistent with United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. 

Williams, 227 F. App’x 307 (4th Cir. May 16, 2007) (No. 04-4654) 

(unpublished). 

 On remand, the district court imposed a 360-month 

variance sentence and Williams timely appealed. Williams claims 

that the district court erred when it calculated his Guidelines 

range without a jury finding the facts supporting the Guidelines 

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range beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams also asserts that the 

district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it 

must find that the drug quantities contained in the conspiracy 

were reasonably foreseeable to Williams, as required by United 

States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311-15 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding 

that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three 

graduated penalty subsections of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) applies to 

defendants convicted of a § 846 drug conspiracy, the jury must 

be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs 

attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial). Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

 We conclude that Williams’ Sixth Amendment rights were 

not violated because the district court enhanced Williams’ 

Guidelines range based on facts found by it under a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. Because the district 

court appropriately treated the resultant Guidelines range as 

merely advisory, and since Williams’ sentences on each count 

were within the statutory maximums authorized by the jury’s 

verdict, we find that the district court fully complied with the 

Sixth Amendment. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44 (holding that 

judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the 

Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that 

authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the 

defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right 

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to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 

2456, 2465-66 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment 

cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take 

account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to 

increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. 

Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing only 

that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find 

no facts”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 

 It is undisputed that Williams did not raise a 

Collins-type objection (i.e., challenge the conspiracy’s drug 

weights attributed to him) at trial or on his first appeal. 

Because such an objection could have been raised but was not, 

the Government asserts that Williams’ Collins objection is 

precluded by the mandate rule. See Volvo Trademark Holding 

Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 

2007) (“[A] remand proceeding is not the occasion for raising 

new arguments or legal theories.”); United States v. Bell, 

5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the mandate rule 

“forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly 

decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by 

the district court but foregone on appeal.”). 

 We need not decide whether the Government is correct 

that Williams’ Collins argument is foreclosed by the mandate 

rule. It is abundantly clear that even if Williams’ Collins

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argument is entertained, his failure to object to the drug 

weights for which he was held responsible renders any Collins

error harmless. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 

700-01 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the element was uncontested and 

supported by overwhelming evidence, the harmless error inquiry 

ends, and we must find the error harmless.”). 

 Moreover, we find that even if we were to vacate 

Williams’ sentence on his conspiracy charge, Williams would 

still be subject to a 360-month sentence for his cocaine 

distribution conviction. Thus, even if the Collins claim was 

properly before this court and found to be meritorious, it would 

still afford Williams no relief as the district court’s sentence 

on remand would have been the same. See United States v. Abu 

Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that an 

error “will be deemed harmless if a reviewing court is able to 

say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 

without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error”) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED