UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRET DAVID LANDRITH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; CATHERINE A. REIN; BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION; COUNTRYWIDE HOMELOAN, INC.; CWALT, INC.; ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2007-OA7; BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP; COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL; COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS; KPMG LLP; STEPHEN E. SUMMERS;REALTY EXECUTIVES OF KANSAS CITY; SOUTH & ASSOCIATES, PC; BRYAN CAVE, LLP, Defendants-Appellees No. 13-3080 (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-02352-EFM-DJW) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 10, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Before MATHESON , Circuit Judge, PORFILIO , Senior Circuit Judge, and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judge.

Bret Landrith appeals the district cour t’s dismissal of hi s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi zations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) & (d), 1964(c), and its impositio n of filing restrictions. Th e parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not recite them here. The district court applied collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), but we affirm

for another reason that defendants raised be low. Landrith has no standing to bring this suit because he has no ownership intere st in the real prope rty that underlies his RICO claims (the Property). See Tal v. Hogan , 453 F.3d 1244, 125 4 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[S]tanding for private individuals under RI CO requires a plain tiff to have been injured in his business or property by th e conduct constituting the violation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Landrith’s purported interest in the Property arises from a quitclaim deed that the former owner execute d after a sheri ff’s sale and the expiration of the statutory redemption pe riod. By that point, the former owner had no interest in the Prope rty to convey to Landrith, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2414, and the quitclaim deed did not transfer to Landrith any cause of ac tion that the former owner might have had regarding the foreclosure on the Property, see Colver v. McInturff , 212 P. 88, 88-89 (Kan. 1923). Accordi ngly, we affirm th e district court’s

dismissal of the lawsuit.- 3 - As for the filing restricti ons, Landrith failed to file any response or objections to the district court court’s order notifyi ng him of the proposed injunction. “We do not review claims on appeal that were not presented below.” Pignanelli v. Pueblo

Sch. Dist. No. 60 , 540 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008). Landrith’s motion to proceed without prep ayment of fees and costs is denied. The district court’s judgment and injunction are affirmed.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge