The Honor able Milton I . Shadur, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District * of I llinois , sitti ngby

desig nation. That sec tion has since bee n modified and is now found at 21 U.S.C. §841(c)(2) . 1 NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0453n.06 F iled: Jun e 27, 2007 No. 05-4279 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee , ) ) v. ) ON A PPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES ) D I STR I CT C OU RT F OR TH E N OR TH ERN R O N A LD M E R K O S K

Y , ) D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

) De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ____________________________________) Before: DA UG HTREY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; and S HADUR, Distr ict Judge. * Shad ur, District

Judge. R o n a l d

M e r k o s ky ( “ M e r

k o s ky” ) w a s o r i g i n a l l y c o n v i c t e d b y a jury and then se ntence d in November 2002, when the f

eder al SentencingGuidelines (“Guidelines”) w ere still thought to be ma ndatory , to concur

rent ter ms of imprisonment of 135 months on

a c ount o f p os se ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bute ps e ud oe ph e dr ine un de r 2 1 U .S. C. §841(d)( 2) (Count Two) and of 36 months on a count of fa iling to kee p a re cord or make a 1
re po rt un de r 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 3( a )( 4) (A )( Count T hr e e ). Me rk os ky a pp e a le d h is c onvic tio ns to t his Court, which af

firmed the c onvictions but rever sed and r emande d his case f or re sentenc ing a fter finding plain err or in the district court’ s decision bec ause of its understandable failure to haveU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

2 anticipated the reme dial holdings of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and of such po st-Booke r

c a se s a s United States v. Olive r , 397 F.3d 369 ( 6 Cir. 2005), all of which ha d since th h e l d th atth e G u i d e l i n e s w e r e m e r e l y a dv i s o r y. On re mand the district cour t resente nced Me rkosky

to a prison term of 130 months on eac h of the two c ounts, thus reducingthe sentenc e on Count Two by 5 months while increa sing the sentenc e on Count Three by 94 months. Merkosky

now appe als the district court’ s rese ntencingdecision, cha lleng ing the use of judicial f actf inding to ar

rive a t his sentence. Merkosky

also urg es that we find he wa s denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. For the re asons stated her eaf

ter, the district c ourt’s dec ision is affirmed a s to Count Two and reve rsed ( and the sentenc e is reduc ed) a s to Count Three, while we decline to e ntertain Mer kosky ’s ineff

ective a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l c la im. Standard of Review As we ha ve re cently

articulated in United States v. Kosinski , 480 F.3d 769, 774 ( 6 Cir. th 2007) (inter

nal citations omitted): This Court reviews a

sentenc e imposed by

a district cour

t for re asonable ness. The Court re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio ns of the se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s de novo and its fac tual finding s for c lear err or. We w ill e xami ne the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s po st- re mand de te rm inatio n in

tho se te rm s.U.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

3 Back ground An oth e r p ane l of

thi s Co ur t de ta ile d th e re le va

nt f a c ts o f t his c a se on

Me rk os ky ’s fi rs t a pp e a l ( United States v. Me rkosky , 1 35 F . App ’x 82 8, 83 0- 32 (6 Cir . 2 00 5) ). B e c a us e thi s th opinion is notbeingpublished in full tex t and bec ause w e ca n assume fa

miliarity with the ear lier opinion, we see no need to r ecount onc e ag ain the proof at trial or the initial sentenc ing pr oc e e din g s. I t su ff

ic e s f or purp os e s o f t

he pr e se nt a

pp e a l to no te that th e dis tr ic t c ourt or ig ina lly calc ulated Mer

kosky ’s base level off

ense at 30 “base d on fac ts that were neither pr oved to a jury beyond a re asonable doubt nor admitted by Merkosky

himself” (

Merk osky , 135 F. App’ x at 836), and that ca lculation was lef t unchang ed by

the district court followingthe re mand. Duringthe post-re mand re sentenc ing he aring , the district court e ng ag ed Mer kosky ’s counsel in numerous c ritical discussions about his strateg y . For example, at one point the district court c ommented: [JA 263] B ut t he be tte r c ours e Iwo uld

have tho ug ht f

or y ou wo uld no t ha ve be e n to c ome in and ar g ue [the merits of the convic tions] . Iwould have thought the better c ours e fo r you

wo uld have be e n to c ome in a

nd argue the fa c tor s und e r [1 8 U .S. C. §] 3553. But Ifind y ou do y our client a disservice and he doe s himself a dis se rv ic e by

c omi ngin h e re and

arguin gthe we ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e argume nt. Shortly afte r that, the district cour t simi larly

observe d to counsel that Mer kosky “could have made [a diffe rent ty

pe of] argument and per

haps g otten himself a lesser sentenc e, but instead, he , rea lly at your enc ourag ement, with your enc ourag ement, come s in and basica lly argues ag ain that he’s not re sponsible for any thing.” [JA 264] Those asse rted fa ilures form the ba sis ofU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

4 Me rk os ky ’s ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im. At the same time, a

nd despite those cr iticisms, t he district cour t itself review ed the statutory criter ia under

18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(“ Section 3553(a) ”) in a rrivingat the new

sentenc es imposed on Merkosky . I t is ag ainst that background that we proce ed with our pre sent revie w. Resente ncing Dec ision Booke r , 543 U.S. at 244 rea ffirme d the Supreme Court’s e arlier holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 (2 00 0) in t he se te rm s: Any fac t (other than a

prior convic tion) which is nece ssary to support a sentenc e exceedingthe maxim um authorized by the fa cts established by

a plea of guilty or a jury verdic t must be admitted by the def endant or proved to a

jury beyond a re a so na ble do ub t. Booke r , id. at 232 (interna l quotation marks omitted) had ea rlier r econf

irmed that a c riminal de fe nd ant h a s th e ri g ht t o h ave a jur y fi nd the e xiste nc e of

any fa c t e sse nti a l to his punis hme nt, and “ [t]hat r ig ht i s im

pli c ate d whe ne ve r a

jud g e se e ks to i mpo se a

se nte nc e tha

t is no t so le ly based on f

acts re flec ted in the jury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant.” We n e e d n ot, ho we ve r, loo k to tho se pr inc ipl e s to re je c t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ine xplic a ble upwar d ratc hetingof the sente nce on the false r ecor ds char g e beyond the statutory maxi mum of 48 months’ imprisonment, for of cour se no cour t can thus g o above the ceilingset by Congr ess. Be cause that sentenc e ca

nnot stand, and bec ause the sentenc es on the two c ounts runU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

Ba sed on the district cour t’s revie w and a

naly sis of the Section 3553(a) fac tors, we do 2 not consider its sentenc ing de cision as to Count Two to have bee n tainted by the ea rlier- identified err or as to Count Three . Indeed, a ll the district court said duringthe sentenc ing he aringwas that Merkosky

“be c ommitt ed to the custody of the B urea

u of Prisons for a te rm of 130 months,” [JA 267] without specifying the count or c ounts on which that sentenc e wa s imposed. I t was the late r ame nd e d ju dg me nt a

nd c omm itm e nt o rd e r t

hat e rr on e ou sly

a pp lie d th at te rm

to e a c h c ount. 5 concur rently , a re mand for r esente ncingon Count Three is unnec essar y . Instead we order

that Merkosky ’s conc urre nt sentence under 21 U .S.C. § 843(a)(4) (A) be reduc ed to the statutory maxi mum of 48 months’ imprisonm ent, ag ainst which of c ourse he is entitled to credit for a ny time alrea dy

serve d. 2 As fo r M e rk os ky ’s ult imate se nte nc e of 13 0 mo nth s o n th e po sse ssi on wi th t he int e nt t o distribute char g e under

what wa s then 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2), that level is well under the statutory maximumof

24 0 mo nth s. As su c h c a se s a s United States v. Flores , 477 F.3d 431, 438 ( 6 Cir. th 2007) have explained, “

Apprendiis not trigg ere d so long a s the judicial finding s of fa ct do not re su lt i n th e de fe nd ant r e c e ivi nga se nte nc e that e xce e ds the statut or y maximum ” (a

pr inc ipl e , it will be rec alled, that wa s rea ffirme d in Booke r). Inth i s i n s t an ce th e d i s tri ctco urtwe n tth ro u gh the fa ctors enume rate d in Section 3553(a) a nd “ar ticulate[d] its reasoningin decidingto impose a s e n t e n c e i no r d e r

t o a l l o wf

o r r e a s o n a b l e a p p e l l at e r e v i e w , ” a s d i c t at e d b y United States v. Kirby , 41 8 F .3 d 6 21 , 6 26 (6 Cir .2 00 5) . T hat pr oc e ss p ro du c e d a mod e st r e du c tio n f

ro m th e or ig ina lly th imposed 135-month sentence , and our r eview c onfirms that the ultimate sentenc e of 130 months is r e a so na ble , to say

no thi ngof

its no t be ing“ pla inl y

unre a so na

ble ” (a s to the pr e c ise a

pp e llate criter ion that we ar e oblig ated to apply , see the discussion in Kirby , id . at 62 5 n .3 ). Ac c or din g lyU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

6 that sentenc e is aff

irmed. In e

ffe c tiv e As sis tan c e of C

ou ns e l Cla im We “traditionally

addre ss ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laims on collatera l review ” unless ther e is a g ood rea son to depart f rom that prac tice ( United States v. Bradley , 400 F.3d 459, 460 ( 6 Cir. th 2005)). Bradley, id. at 461-62 (c itations and internal quotation marks omitted, bra ckets a nd e lli ps is i n o ri g ina l) , e xpla ins why a dir e c t a pp e a l do e s n ot o rd ina

ri ly pr ov ide the mos t a

pp ro pr iate fo rum f or a dju dic atin gan in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im: As in most direct appe als, howeve r, the re cord c ontains scant information re g ard ingthe pr e pa

ratio n o f B ra dle y ’s tr ia l c ouns e l or his c omm

un ic atio ns wi th Br adley about this or any

other issue. That is why

in most cases a motion broug ht under [28 U.S.C.] §2255 is prefe rable to direct a ppeal f or dec iding c laims of ineffe ctive assistanc e. B eca use [t] he evide nce introduc ed at tria l...will be devoted to issues of g uilt or innocence , the re sulting re cord [on direc t appea l] in many case s will not di sclose the f acts ne cessa

ry to decide whether

trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive. And [t] he appe llate cour t may have no w ay

of knowingwhether

a seeming ly

unusual or misg uided ac tion by counsel ha d a sound strate g ic motive or was take n beca

use the c ounsel’s alter

natives we re e ven wor se. A c c o r d i n g l y Bradley declined to he ar a n ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, quoting the teac hing in Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) that “[i]neffec tive assistance c la ims or din ari ly

wi ll b e lit ig ate d in

the fi rs t in sta

nc e in t he dis tr ic t c ourt , th e fo rum be st s uit e d to developingthe fa cts nec essar y to determiningthe ade quacy of re prese ntation during an entire trial.” Un ite d S

tates v . S an de rs , 404 F.3d 980, 986 ( 6 Cir. 2005) similarly declined to de part th from the g ener al rule be cause “the pr esent re cord c ontains no evidenc e whatsoever c oncer ningU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

7 S an d er s ’s tri al co un s el ’s re as o n s ” f o r t h e d ec i s i o n s h e m ad e, “n o r d o es i tp erm i ta t h o ro u gh evaluation of the prejudice , if any , resultingfrom this alleg ed shortcoming .” In this inst ance those consider ations operate in a somewhat differ ent but closely related way . On the pre sent appe al we ha ve only the transc ript from the re sentenc ing he aring , during which the district cour

t criticized counsel’s pe rfor mance , identifying what would have been the “better course ” for

counsel to have pursued dur ing the sentenc ing he aring . But we cannot tell-- as the district court sure ly

can- -whe ther “ there is a rea sonable proba bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en diffe rent” (the sec ond prong of the a naly sis taught by

the seminal opinion in this area of the law, Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In terms of the r emar ks made by

the district court duringthe rese ntencing , it would really call for speculation on our part if we soug ht to evaluate the deg ree (if any ) to which c ounsel’s ac tions may have r esulted in such pre judice to Merkosky . Plainly the far better ve hicle for

that purpose is a motion befor e the district cour t under 28 U.S.C. §2255. We t he re fo re de c lin e to e nte rt a in M e rk os ky ’s ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im. Conclusion We RE VE RSE the judg ment of the district cour t and re duce Me rkosky ’s sentenc e on the Count Three f

alse re cords c harg e to 48 months (for whic h purpose we REMAND the c a se so that the district court may enter an ame nded judg ment and commitment order). We AF F IRM Merkosky ’s sentenc e on the Count Two possession with intent to dist ribute cha rg e. F inally , weU.S. v. M

erkosk y 05-4279

8 de c lin e to e nte rt a in h is i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im.