alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.5


             Summary of Executive Officer Compensation


      The Company's Board of Directors meets periodically during the course of
the year to consider compensation programs for executive officers and senior
managers of the Company. The following are the base salaries for the Company's
Chief Executive Officer and its other five most highly compensated officers as
of December 1, 2005.

Executive Officer                Position              2005 Base Salary

Jerry D. Cash           Chief Executive Officer           $400,000
David E. Grose          Chief Financial Officer           $275,000
Bree M. Stewart         Executive VP Land                 $80,000
Richard A. Marlin       Chief Operating Officer           $132,000
Walter Yuras            Executive VP Geology              $159,600
F OR P UBLICATION



### JUDICIAL CO UNCIL O F T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

I N R E C O M P L

A I N T O F J U D I C I A L M I S C O N D U C T No. 13-90073

ORDER

F iled Aug ust 13, 2013

ORDER

KOZ I NSKI , Chief J udg e :

C o mplainant h a s f

iled an Emerg ency Motion to Sta y Proceeding s B elow captioned as a motion in this misconduct proceeding

. The misconduct complaint is pending before me in my administrative capacity as presiding officer o f t he J udicial Council of the Ninth Circuit. The J u d i c i a l Council is not a c ourt and has no authority to i n t e r f e r e with judicial
proce e ding s. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct

, 630 F .3d 1262 (9th Cir. J u d. Council 2 011). Complainant cites 28 U.S.C. § 2106 but that st a tute only applies to “court(s) o f appell at e jurisdiction,” w hich the J udicial Council is not.

The e m e r gency motion is denied. The misconduct
comp l a i n t is held in a

b ey ance pending resolution of the appellate proceeding s in the underly ing litig ation. See Commentary to J u d icial-Conduct Rule 3 (“[ C] o n sideration and disposition of a c o m plaint under these Rules may beI

N R E C O M P L

A I N T O F J U D I C I A L M I S C O N D U C T 2

properly deferred by a chief judg e until a ppellate proceeding s are concluded ... .”).

DENIED.
11189.

#### Mackle Construction Co. *v.*Hotel Equipment Co.

Smith, J.

1. “While agency may he proved by the testimony of the alleged agent as a witness, it cannot be proved by his more declarations, either spoken or written. Such declarations ought not in any event to be received in evidence, unless the party tendering the same offers in good faith to supplement them by other and independent evidence of agency; and if such offer' is not made good, the declarations ought to be excluded from consideration by the jury. The safer and better practice, in all cases, is to require proof of the agency before admitting such declarations at all.” *Abel*v. *Jarratt,*100 *Ga.*732 (2) (28 S. E. 453). Under this ruling it was not reversible error for the court to admit testimony of T. M. Turner to the effect that goods included in the account sued on were bought for the Mackle Construction Company, the defendant, by E. W. Roberts. Roberts was later introduced by the plaintiff and testified that he was the agent of the Mackle Construction Company and purchased the goods for that company.

2. The court erred in admitting evidence as to purchases of goods for the Mackle Construction Company made for the commissary at Camp Gordon at some time previous to the purchase of the goods included in the account sued on in this case, this being a suit on an account for goods alleged to have been sold to the defendant for a commissary at Camp Jesup, and that testimony being as to an entirely different transaction.

3. The evidence in the case being in strong conflict as to whether the goods included in the account sued on were bought by the Mackle Construction Company through E. W. Roberts, or whether he bought them on his own account and not as agent of that company, the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, as the question of agency and the question as to whom credit was given and who was the real purchaser were all questions of fact for the jury to determine.

4. Such of the assignments or error not dealt with above as are insisted upon in this court are without substantial merit; and under the above *138ruling tlie judge of the superior court erred in overruling the certiorari and entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Decided April 8, 1920.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court — Judge Humphries. October *27,*1919.

*Norman I. Miller,*for plaintiff in error.

*Burress & Dillard,*contra.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4491 

To amend part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal the 

reduction in Medicare payment for certain items of durable medical 

equipment. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 2, 2004 

Mr. HOBSON (for himself and Mr. FORD) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition 

to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently 

determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend part B of title XVIII of the Social Security 

Act to repeal the reduction in Medicare payment for 

certain items of durable medical equipment. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF REDUCTION IN MEDICARE PAY4 MENT FOR CERTAIN ITEMS OF DURABLE 

5 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. 

6 Paragraph (21) of section 1834(a) of the Social Secu7 rity Act (42 U.S.C. 1395m(a)), as added by section 

8 302(c)(2) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
2 

•HR 4491 IH 

1 ment, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108– 

2 173), is repealed. 

Æ
11556.

#### Arwood *v.*The State.

Decided July 14, 1920.

Indictment for vagrancy; from Whitfield superior court — Judge Tarver. April 30, 1920.

A witness testified: “I am chief of police of Dalton, in Whitfield county, Georgia. The defendant lives in Dalton and has lived here for several years. She is 25 years, or more, of age. She is a woman of lewd reputation. I have never known her to do any work. She is addicted to the use of morphine, and has been treated for the dope habit by the county physician since, she was placed in jail. I do not know how she lives. She has been staying with her mother, who is very poor and unable to support her. I arrested her upon the complaint of her mother. She is physically able to work. She has no property 'that I know about. ’’ The clerk of .the court testified: “ The defendant was in my office not long ago. . . While there she used a great deal of vulgar and profane language. Among other things she said she had been out ‘last night with a damned good man.’” It was also testified that she had been seen seated on church steps about 10 o’clock on a certain night, and that when the witness and another man offered to take her to her home she said that she did not need *483any assistance, that she had sat down merely to take off her shoes to rest her feet. The defendant’s statement at the trial was as follows: "My mother had my brother arrested for using morphine, and after he had been in jail for five days I came down and asked to be locked up to get off of the dope myself. I got off of the dope while I was in jail, 'and do not want any more.”

*482Broyles, C. J.

The evidence, while weak, authorized the defendant’s conviction of the offense of vagrancy, and, the finding of the jury having been approved by the trial judge, this court is without authority to interfere.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*

*483
      *William E.*Mann, *W. Gordon Mann,*for plaintiff in error,

cited: 17 *Ga. App.*742; 119 *Ga.*427, and cit.

*Joseph M. Lang, solicitor-general,*contra.
#### SMITH v. THE MORMACDALE.

No. 243.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

April 12, 1951.

William M. Alper, of Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Thomas E. Byrne, Jr., of Krusen, Evans & Shaw, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

WELSH, Judge.

The Libellant, a longshoreman, brought this suit in rem against the Steamship “Mormacdale”, a vessel owned by his employer, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.

In substance, the first defense pleaded by-Respondent in its answer, against which the Libellant has filed a motion to strike, is that as between the Libellant and the Steamship “Mormacdale” the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., are applicable and that under Section 5 of that Act the liability of the Claimant (the vessel’s owner and Libellant’s employer) for the payment of compensation pursuant to that Act constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy of the Libellant against the -Steamship “Mormacdale”. We think the pleaded defense is. a valid one and should be sustained.

The argument, of Libellant is that while a longshoreman’s rights against his employer are limited to those granted him by the Act the present suit is not against his employer but against a .third party, i. e., against the ship, and therefore maintainable since his rights against third parties were expressly reserved to him by the Act. The argument, we think, .is untenable, for the present suit, which is brought against the ship to recover damages allegedly caused by unseaworthiness and * negligence, is in fact a suit brought against the ship’s owner and Libellant’s employer and such suit is barred by the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

Libellant’s motion to strike first defense of Respondent’s answer is accordingly denied.

An order pursuant to the foregoing opinion will be prepared and submitted.
Exhibit 10(gg)

                        RENEWAL AND EXTENSION AGREEMENT

         This Renewal and Extension Agreement ("Agreement") is dated effective
as of January 2, 1998, by and between RadioSunGroup of Texas, Inc. ("Borrower")
and Kenneth R. Reynolds, ("Lender").

                               W I T NE S S E T H

         WHEREAS, the Borrower executed and delivered that certain Promissory
Note dated October 31, 1985 (the "Note") in the original principal amount of
$212,577.00 bearing interest at the rate stated therein: and

         WHEREAS, the Note is secured by various real and personal property; and

         WHEREAS, the Borrower and Lender have agreed to extend the final
maturity of the Note to March 31, 1998;

         NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are acknowledged, the Borrower and Lender hereby agree as
follows:

         1. The Note, including all principal then unpaid shall be due and
payable on June 30, 1998.

         2. The interest rate charged on the Note is hereby changed to equal the
fixed rate of interest of ten percent (10%) per annum. Accrued interest shall be
due and payable on January 31, 1998 and on the final day of each successive
calendar month thereafter. Provided, however, on June 30, 1998, all principal
and interest then unpaid shall be finally due and payable.

         3. Privilege is reserved to prepay this Note at any time. Provided,
however, if this Note is prepaid, regardless of the date of prepayment, such
prepayment shall be accompanied by such additional sums as may be required to
ensure that Holder receives a full six months interest on this Note. For
example, if this Note is prepaid on February 1, 1998 (and assuming the regular
interest payment was made as scheduled on January 31, 1998), the prepayment
shall be accompanied by an additional five months of interest as if the Note
were paid in full on its maturity date of June 30, 1998.

         4. All liens presently securing the Note are hereby ratified and
confirmed as continuing to secure the payment of the Note. Nothing herein shall
in any manner diminish, impair or extinguish the Note of the lien securing the
Note.

         5. Borrower and Lender hereby agree that the present unpaid balance
under the Note is $32,800.00 as of the date of this Agreement.

         6. The Lender represents and warrants to Borrower that he is the lawful
owner and holder of the Note and that Lender has full power and authority to
enter into this Agreement.

         EXECUTED, the date written above.

                                             RadioSunGroup of Texas, Inc.
                                             By: /s/ John W. Biddinger
                                                       President
                                             and
<PAGE>

                                             By: /s/ Kenneth R. Reynolds
11378.

#### Williams *v.*The State.

Decided May 11, 1920.

• Indictment for murder — conviction of manslaughter; from Pulaski superior court — Judge Graham. January 33, 1930.

*M. H. Boyer, H. E. Coates,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. A. Wooten, solicitor-general, H. F. Lawson,*contra.

Luke, J.

The evidence in this case was conflicting, and a verdict of either murder, voluntary manslaughter, or justifiable homicide, according as the jury gives credence to the evidence, would have been authorized. The charge of the court, when read in its entirety, submitted the issues fully and fairly to the jury. The verdict has the approval of the trial judge, and for no reason assigned do we find error requiring a new trial

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 6999

KEITH HAGER

,

Petitioner

- Appellant

,

v.

WARDEN

, Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke

. Glen E. Conrad , District Judge. ( 7:19

- cv

- 00226

- GEC

- PMS )

Submitted : March 10, 2020 Decided: March 12, 2020

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Keith Hager , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Keith Hager , a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on

his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (201 8 ) petition in which he sought to c hallenge his conviction and

sentence by way of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018)

. * We review de novo

the denial of § 2241 relief. Fontanez v. O’Brien , 807 F.3d 84, 86 (4th Cir. 2015). Pursuant

to § 2255(e), a prisoner may challenge his conviction and sentence in a traditional writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective to

test the legality of his detention.

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a convictio n when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

In re Jones , 226 F.3d 328, 333

- 34 (4th Cir. 2000).

[Section] 2 255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.

United States v. Wheeler , 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).

* As the district court noted, although Hager attempted to frame his § 2241 petition as contesting the execution of his sentence, his claims in fact challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence.3 We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. Hager v. Warden , No. 7:19

- cv

- 00226

- GEC

PMS (W.D. Va. June 21, 2019). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

lega l contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending
December 31, 2002, of ANR Pipeline Company (the "Company") as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John W.
Somerhalder II, Chairman of the Board (Principal Executive Officer), certify (i)
that the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (ii) that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                             /s/ John W. Somerhalder III
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             John W. Somerhalder II
                                             Chairman of the Board
                                             (Principal Executive Officer)

                                             March 27, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          BD
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
     <CIK>                                 0000065596
     <NAME>                    SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP.
<MULTIPLIER>                                        1
<CURRENCY>                                        USD

<S>                                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                      5,694,142
<RECEIVABLES>                               2,134,839
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                                 0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                               0
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                         8,564,668
<PP&E>                                        475,553
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             17,881,589
<SHORT-TERM>                                        0
<PAYABLES>                                  3,171,485
<REPOS-SOLD>                                        0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                                 0
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                          2,037,547
<LONG-TERM>                                 3,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                       52,376
<OTHER-SE>                                  9,620,181
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               17,881,589
<TRADING-REVENUE>                           1,795,104
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                          704,911
<COMMISSIONS>                              18,879,674
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>               4,487,594
<FEE-REVENUE>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            418,405
<COMPENSATION>                              8,208,006
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             4,675,101
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                  4,675,101
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                2,618,101
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .50
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .50


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         495,719
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  878,128
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,398,990
<PP&E>                                       5,078,168
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,515,983
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,969,975
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,255,009
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                       237,945
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<PREFERRED>                                  2,789,192
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,969,975
<SALES>                                      3,987,525
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,987,525
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,206,052
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,593,095
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 9,440
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             437,347
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (255,697)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (255,697)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (255,697)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.004)
        

</TABLE>