UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4443

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN ROBERT MYERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:08-cr-01072-RBH-6)

Submitted: December 21, 2010 Decided: January 14, 2011

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Russell W. Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Rose Mary 

Sheppard Parham, Assistant United States Attorneys, Florence, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Appellant John Robert Myers pled guilty to one count 

of conspiracy to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base 

and five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced 

Myers to 120 months’ imprisonment. Myers timely appealed.

Myers’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the 

adequacy of Myers’ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 

hearing; whether Myers’ knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

appellate rights; and whether Amendment 706 to the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines applies to this case. Myers received 

notice of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but did 

not do so. Because we find no meritorious grounds for appeal, 

we affirm.

First, Myers questions whether the district court 

adequately advised him during his Rule 11 hearing, and, 

relatedly, whether his waiver of his appellate rights was 

knowing and voluntary. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a 

district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs 

the defendant of, and determines that the defendant comprehends, 

the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty, any 

mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he 

faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. 
3

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 

116 (4th Cir. 1991). “In reviewing the adequacy of compliance 

with Rule 11, this Court should accord deference to the trial 

court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy 

with the defendant.” DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, 

and conclude that the district court complied with the mandates 

of Rule 11 in accepting Myers’ guilty plea. Thus, we hold that 

the record affirmatively shows there was a factual basis for 

Myers’ plea, Myers understood the constitutional rights he 

waived in pleading guilty, and Myers’ guilty plea — including 

his appellate waiver — was knowing and voluntary. 

Next, Myers questions whether Amendment 706 to the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provided for a twolevel downward adjustment to “‘the base offense level assigned 

to each threshold quantity of crack listed in the Drug Quantity 

Table in section 2D1.1,’” should have resulted in a reduced base 

offense level in this case. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 

367, 373 (4th Cir. 2008). The record affirmatively shows Myers 

already received the benefit of Amendment 706, as his base 

offense level was calculated pursuant to the 2008 edition of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, and Amendment 706 became effective 

November 1, 2007. Brewer, 520 F.3d at 373 (citing United States 
4

Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal 

Sentencing Policy (May 2007)). 

Finally, we conclude Myers’ sentence was reasonable. 

This court reviews a district court’s sentence for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. 

Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007). When sentencing a 

defendant, a district court must: (1) properly calculate the 

Guidelines range; (2) determine whether a sentence within that 

range serves the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); 

(3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) explain 

its reasons for selecting a sentence. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473. 

In the Fourth Circuit, “[a] sentence within the proper 

Sentencing Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” 

United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see 

also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-56 (2007) 

(upholding presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines 

sentence). 

Here, the district court followed the necessary 

procedural steps in sentencing Myers, properly calculating the 

Guidelines sentence, considering the § 3553(a) factors, and 

sentencing Myers to the mandatory minimum sentence for his 

crime. Hence, we determine that the sentence imposed by the 

district court was reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Myers, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Myers requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Myers.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED