1 Petitioner’s health problems are documented in the Presentence Investigation

Report (doc. 18), which reflects that he has an enlarged heart, high blood pressure, high

cholesterol, and arthritis in his right hip, and that he was being considered for a heart transplant. 

(PSI, at ¶ 78.) Thus, this information was available to the undersigned at sentencing.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 05-0137-WS

 )

MORRIS LABARRIN DENT, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Amend Judgment Nunc Pro

Tunc (doc. 22).

On July 29, 2005, defendant Morris Labarrin Dent pleaded guilty to one count of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January

5, 2006, the undersigned sentenced Dent to a term of imprisonment of 40 months in the custody

of the United States Bureau of Prisons, to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. 

Dent now files a pro se Motion to Amend Judgment, requesting that his 40-month sentence be

amended to time served or that it otherwise be reduced to a shorter period of incarceration. As

grounds for this request, Dent asserts that he suffers from an enlarged heart, that he requires a

heart transplant, and that during his imprisonment his health has deteriorated because he has

been “unable to continue his medical treatment”.1

This Court is not empowered to modify Dent’s sentence under the circumstances

presented here. District courts do not possess “some sort of inherent authority to modify a

sentence.” United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2002). To the

contrary, it is exceedingly well established that a sentencing court generally “may not modify a

term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also United States v.

Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, a district court may not modify a

term of imprisonment once imposed”); United States v. Bowens, 2005 WL 3311989, *1 (11th Cir.

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2 Petitioner’s stated concerns that he “has been unable to continue his medical

treatment” during his incarceration are troubling; however, they do not confer upon this Court

the authority to modify, adjust or reduce his sentence. Any issues petitioner may have with the

adequacy of medical care that he is receiving in prison must be directed to the facility at which

he is incarcerated or to the Bureau of Prisons, at least in the first instance.

-2-

Nov. 8, 2005) (similar); Quesada Mosquera v. United States, 243 F.3d 685, 686 (2nd Cir. 2001)

(similar); United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A district court does not

have inherent authority to modify a previously imposed sentence; it may do so only pursuant to

statutory authorization.”); United States v. Lenderman, 2004 WL 335024, *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23,

2004) (“the court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except in

very narrow circumstances”).

By statute, a sentencing court may modify a term of imprisonment only (1) upon motion

by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, (2) “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by

statute or by Rule 35,” or (3) in certain limited circumstances where a sentencing guidelines

range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see

also United States v. McGranahan, 2006 WL 460929, *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006) (explaining

that district court may correct sentence under Rules 35 or 36, or may modify a sentence under §

3582(c)); United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear in this

Circuit that Rule 36 may not be used to make a substantive alteration to a criminal sentence.”)

(citation omitted). Here, there is no motion from the Bureau of Prisons, no jurisdiction under

Rule 35 or any statute other than § 3582(c), and no subsequent lowering of the applicable

guidelines range. Therefore, regardless of any “nunc pro tunc” designations in Dent’s Motion,

this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.2

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s Motion to Amend Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc

(doc. 22) is denied for lack of jurisdiction.

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cr-00137-WS-C Document 23 Filed 08/29/06 Page 2 of 2