alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



Certification Furnished Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Southern Investors Service Company, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December
31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Eric Schumann, Senior Vice President  Finance and Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Eric SchumannName:

Eric SchumannTitle:

Senior Vice President  FinancePrincipal Financial and Accounting OfficerDate:

March 25, 2004




A signed original of this
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Southern Investors Service Company, Inc. and will be retained by Southern Investors Service Company, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
APHTON CORPORATION

    Reconciliation of shares outstanding for earnings per share calculations


                                                    Three Months Ended
                                                         July 31,

  Primary Earnings Per Share                      1997             1996    Note

Balance at the beginning of the period         12,913,149      12,911,149

Weighted average of shares issued or shares
 reacquired during the period                     480,170           1,333

Weighted average - primary earnings per share  13,393,319      12,912,482

Net loss for the period                       $(2,265,640)    $(1,380,917)

Net loss per share for the period 
   ($0.05 per share for amortized 
   (non-cash) interest expense of 
   convertible securities in 1997
   and $0.00 in 1996)                             $(0.17)          $(0.11)
                                                  =======          =======

  Fully Diluted Earnings Per Share                 1997             1996
Balance at the beginning of the period         12,913,149       12,911,149

Weighted average of shares issued or 
shares reacquired during the period               480,170            1,333

Incremental common stock equivalents
from the treasury stock method                   (187,857)        (412,365) 1

Weighted average-fully diluted shares          13,205,462       12,500,117

Net loss for the period                       $(2,265,640)     $(1,380,917)

Net loss per share for the period 
    ($0.05 per share for amortized
    (non-cash) interest expense of
    convertible securities in 1997
    and $0.00 in 1996)                            $(0.17)          $(0.11)
                                                  =======          =======
Note:
Fully diluted earnings per share includes certain common stock  equivalents
that are  anti-dilutive  and are therefore not reflected in primary earnings per
share. This calculation is provided as required by SEC regulations,  even though
the fully diluted earnings per share amounts are not required to be disclosed in
the financial statements.

                                  Exhibit 11.1
#### UNITED STATE of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge PRIETO-MOLINAR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-50546.

D.C. No. CR-99-00851-GHK.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 29, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and WARD LAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jorge Prieto-Molinar appeals his guilty-plea conviction and 46-month sentence for being an alien found in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1826. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

Prieto-Molinar contends that because *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), effectively overruled *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), his sentence is illegal because it exceeds the two-year statutory maximum authorized under section 1326(a). Prieto-Molinar further contends that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his previous deportation was subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction as required by section 1326(b)(2). Prieto-Molinar’s contentions are rejected in light of *United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda,*234 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir.2000), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 1503, 149 L.Ed.2d 388 (2001), and *Almendarez-Torres,*523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 234, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350.1

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. We also reject the government's contention that Prieto-Molinar lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1326(b). *See United States v. Bozarov,*974 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.1992) (constitutional challenge requires demonstration of injury in fact and substantial likelihood that judicial relief will redress injury).
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

KERRI S. KUHLMANN,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

, Intervenor

______________________

2024

- 1527

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC

- 1221

- 17

- 0437

- W

- 1.

______________________

ON PETITION AND MOTION

______________________

Before S TOLL

, C UNNINGHAM

, and S TARK

, Circuit Judges

.

P ER C URIAM

.
O R D E R

Before the court are Kerri S. Kuhlmann ’s petition for panel rehearing of the aspect of the court’s June 25, 2024
remand order that denied her motion to vacate the initial Case: 24-1527 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 08/12/2024KUHLMANN v. LABOR 2

decision in this matter, ECF No. 28, and Ms. Kuhlmann’s

mo tions to (1) take judicial notice of a June 20, 202 4 decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board and modify the court’s June 25, 2024 remand order , ECF No. 22, and (2)

vacate th e Board’s June 20th d ecision a nd initial decision

, ECF No s . 23

, 27

. The Board responds to the motions.

Ms. Kuhlmann sought this court’s review after the
Board informed her that , due to a recusal, it lacked a

quorum , making the initial decision the final decision of the

Board. On June 25, 2024, we remanded to the Board for further proceedings in light of the Boa rd’s statement that

there was now a quorum

. Unbeknownst to the court (and prior to the issuance of our mandate)

, the Board purported

to issue a new final decision on June 20, 2024.

“Normally a petition for judicial review, like an appeal from a judgment of a district court, transfers authority over

the case

, ” Gao v. Gonzales , 464 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc

. Co. , 459 U.S. 56 (1982) ), and “ [u] ntil the mandate issues [,]

. . . any action by the [originating tribunal] is a nullity.” Kusay v.
United States , 62 F.3d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1995). The Board offers no authority for issuing a “new” final decision while the matter was still pending before this court and does not seriously defend it here . We therefore vacate that decision.

W e deny Ms. Kuhlmann ’s request to vacate the initial decision, which she can challenge before the Board and then before this court if necessary. Finally, Ms. Kuhlmann
asks the court to correct the June 25, 2024 order to indicate the Board purported to reopen her appeal before Chairman Harris revised her recusal position. That request, which the Board does not oppose, will be granted to the extent

that the court will issue a corrected modified order

. Accordingly, Case: 24-1527 Document: 31 Page: 2 Filed: 08/12/2024KUHLMANN v. LABOR 3

I T I S O RDERED T HAT :

(1) ECF No. 2 3 is granted to the extent that the Board’s June 20, 2024 decision is vacated

. (2) ECF No. 2 2 is granted to the extent that the court will issue a corrected June 25, 2024 order.

(3) The petition for panel rehearing is denied.

A ugust 12 , 2024
Date F OR THE C OURT Case: 24-1527 Document: 31 Page: 3 Filed: 08/12/2024
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                       123,036,627
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                       71,156,765
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                         72,004,919
<EQUITIES>                                           0
<MORTGAGE>                                           0
<REAL-ESTATE>                                        0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                             213,477,744
<CASH>                                         859,920
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                           1,314,836
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                      10,384,752
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             320,653,382
<POLICY-LOSSES>                            140,341,343
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                         60,728,798
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,174,066
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               320,653,382
<PREMIUMS>                                  46,774,152
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                          4,969,123
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                             313,867
<OTHER-INCOME>                               1,217,220
<BENEFITS>                                  53,696,490
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                  1,233,384
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                         8,537,285
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (21,857,198)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (8,728,160)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (13,129,038)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.63)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Etheridge *v.*Bird Brothers.

Opinion delivered March 12, 1928.

Landlord and tenant — lien for advances. — Under Crawford & Moses’ Dig., § 6890, a landlord is not entitled to a lien on his tenant’s crop for money advanced to make a pleasure trip.

Appeal from Conway Circuit Court; *J. T. Bulloch,*Judge;

affirmed.

*J. A. Eades,*for appellant.

*Strait & Strait,*for appellee.

McHaney, J.

Appellees, plaintiffs below, brought this suit in the justice court against appellant and one Melvin Mitchell, tenant of appellant, to recover $45.63 alleged to be due on an account for merchandise furnished by appellees to Mitchell., An order of general attachment was issued out of the justice court, and three *650bales of cotton seized. Appellant gave a forthcoming bond for the attached cotton. It was agreed that Mitchell had turned over to appellant, his landlord, his crop,including the attached cotton, in settlement of his indebtedness to appellant, and that this crop was in possession of appellant at the time of .filing the suit. A writ of garnishment was also issued and served upon appellant upon the usual allegations and interrogatories. On the day of trial Mitchell made default, but appellant appeared and defended his right to the property. Judgment was rendered in the justice court against both defendants, and the attachment and garnishment sustained. An appeal was prosecuted by appellant only, to the circuit court, and, at the conclusion of the testimony, a verdict was instructed against appellant, Etheridge, and he has appealed.

It is first contended for a reversal of the case that, since Mitchell was the tenant of appellant during the year 1925, and was indebted to him in excess of the value of the crop produced, lacking $23.30 of paying appellant’s account, he had a prior lien for the amounts furnished by him to Mitchell. It is shown that appellant had an account against Mitchell amounting to $331.83, which began January 1, 1925, and terminated October 10, 1925. In the account filed by appellant there is one item of $60 cash advanced, and it is agreed that this $60 was furnished Mitchell by appellant to make a pleasure trip to visit his kinsfolk in Oklahoma. This being the fact, appellant had no lien on the crop for this item The advances covered by the statute, § 6890, C. & M. Digest, for which the landlord has a lien, must be made to enable his tenant to make and gather the crop, therefore the lien given by the statute did not attach to the crop in favor of appellant as to this item, and, although the crop had been turned over to appellant at the time the suit was brought, the lien of the attachment was ahead of appellant’s claim for this item. Since, as we have already seen, the attachment lien was superior to appellant’s claim with reference to this $60 item, and since this *651amount is more than sufficient to cover appellee’s debt, we do not decide the other questions raised in the brief, including the question of usury, in appellant’s account with Mitchell.

The judgment of the circuit court directing a verdict against appellant was therefore correct, and it is accordingly affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

HAROLD FRANKLIN WALTERS, ) 

Petitioner, ) 

CIVIL ACTION 10-0131-CG-M 

v. ) 

CRIMINAL ACTION 05-0145-CG-M 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

Respondent. ) 

 ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all pleadings in this file, and a de novo

determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made1, the 

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B) is adopted as the 

opinion of this Court. 

It is ORDERED that Respondent=s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46) be GRANTED, that 

Petitioner=s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 44) be DENIED, and that this action be DISMISSED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of June, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

1 Petitioner was given the opportunity by the magistrate judge to show why his petition should 

not be dismissed as time barred. The only reason he proffered was that he is serving a sentence 

for a “something [he] did not do. (Doc. 48). After the Report and Recommendation was 

issued, petitioner now claims the time for filing should be equitably tolled because his failure to 

timely file the 2255 petition was due to the fact that his appellate counsel was preoccupied with 

his own legal troubles during the time of petitioner’s appeal and did not inform petitioner of the 

outcome of his appeal. This still does not show that petitioner exercised any diligence. The 

petition was filed almost two and a half years after the time for filing had expired. 

Case 1:05-cr-00145-CG-M Document 51 Filed 06/11/10 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1

                         THE MONARCH CEMENT COMPANY
                         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                                SECTION 906
                                  OF THE
                         SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of The Monarch Cement Company (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, in the capacity and on the date indicated
below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
          Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
          Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly
          presents, in all material respects, the financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to The Monarch Cement Company and will be retained by The
Monarch Cement Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


Dated:  March 15, 2004

                                         /S/ Walter H. Wulf, Jr.
                                        Walter H. Wulf, Jr.
                                        President and
                                        Chairman of the Board
National Institute of

Report of the 94th
National Conference on
Weights and Measures

0 adopted by the 94th
National Conjerence on Weights and Measures
1009

rian (O99

bin
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 6, 2017

No. 04-16-00778-CR

Carlos DE LA O,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2001CR3651

Honorable Steve Hilbig, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice 

Karen Angelini, Justice 

Marialyn Barnard, Justice 

Rebeca C. Martinez, 

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 

Irene Rios, Justice

The en banc court has considered Appellant’s motion for en banc reconsideration; the 

motion is DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.7.

It is so ORDERED on February 6, 2017.

PER CURIAM 

ATTESTED TO: ___________________________________

 Keith E. Hottle

 Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boundless Corporation, a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30,
2004, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned officers of the Company does
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350 (section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), that:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

The foregoing certification (i) is given to such officers' knowledge, based upon
such officers' investigation as such officers reasonably deem appropriate; and
(ii) is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350 (section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and is not being filed as part of the Report or
as a separate disclosure document.


Dated: March 3, 2006                 /s/ John D. Ryan
                                     ------------------------------------------
                                     John D. Ryan
                                     Acting Chief Executive Officer


Dated: March 3, 2006                 /s/ Joseph Gardner
                                     ------------------------------------------
                                     Joseph Gardner
                                     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures
that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Boundless Corporation
and will be retained by Boundless Corporation and furnished to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                    23 of 23
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6845

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus NELSON EDDY WALKER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CR-97-91, CA-03-63) Submitted: August 14, 2003 Decided: August 22, 2003 Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Nelson Eddy Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Nelson Eddy Walker seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of a magistrate judge to construe his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) and denying it. The order is appealable only if a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, , 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Walker has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED