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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1425 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1425

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 17, 2024

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To require any convention, agreement, or other international instrument 
on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by the World 
         Health Assembly to be subject to Senate ratification.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No WHO Pandemic Preparedness Treaty 
Without Senate Approval Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump sent a letter 
        to World Health Organization (referred to in this Act as 
        ``WHO'') Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (referred 
        to in this Act as the ``Director-General''), announcing that--
                    (A) United States contributions to WHO would be 
                halted due its mismanagement of the COVID-19 outbreak 
                and its lack of independence from the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (B) the United States would withdraw from WHO if it 
                did not commit to substantive improvements within 30 
                days.
            (2) President Trump's May 18 letter cited numerous 
        instances of WHO mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
        including--
                    (A) unjustified delays informing member states 
                about a potentially serious disease outbreak in Wuhan, 
                China; and
                    (B) repeated grossly inaccurate or misleading 
                claims about the transmissibility of the virus and 
                about the Government of China's handling of the 
                outbreak.
            (3) On June 30, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
        formally notified the United Nations of the United States 
        decision to withdraw from WHO, which would have taken effect on 
        July 6, 2021, under the terms of a joint resolution adopted by 
        Congress on June 14, 1948 (Public Law 80-643; 62 Stat. 441).
            (4) A Pew Research Center survey conducted in April and May 
        2020 indicated that 51 percent of Americans felt that WHO had 
        done a poor or fair job in managing the COVID-19 pandemic.
            (5) On January 20, 2021, President Joseph Biden sent United 
        Nations Director-General Antonio Guterres a letter retracting 
        the United States notice of withdrawal from WHO.
            (6) On December 1, 2021, at the second special session of 
        the World Health Assembly (referred to in this Act as the 
        ``WHA'') decided--
                    (A) to establish an intergovernmental negotiating 
                body (referred to in this section as the ``INB'') to 
                draft and negotiate a WHO convention (referred to in 
                this section as the ``Convention''), agreement, or 
                other international instrument on pandemic prevention, 
                preparedness, and response, with a view to adoption 
                under Article 19 or any other provision of the WHO 
                Constitution; and
                    (B) that the INB shall submit a progress report to 
                the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working draft of the 
                convention for consideration by the Seventy-seventh 
                WHA, which is scheduled to take place beginning on 
                March 18, 2024.
            (7) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and June 6 through 8 
        and 15 through 17, 2022, the INB held its inaugural meeting at 
        which the Director-General proposed the following 5 themes to 
        guide the INB's work in drafting the Convention:
                    (A) Building national, regional, and global 
                capacities based on a whole-of-government and whole-of-
                society approach.
                    (B) Establishing global access and benefit sharing 
                for all pathogens, and determining a global policy for 
                the equitable production and distribution of 
                countermeasures.
                    (C) Establishing robust systems and tools for 
                pandemic preparedness and response.
                    (D) Establishing a long-term plan for sustainable 
                financing to ensure support for global health threat 
                management and response systems.
                    (E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its mandate as the 
                directing and coordinating authority on international 
                health work, including for pandemic preparedness and 
                response.
            (8) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held its second 
        meeting at which it agreed that the Convention would be adopted 
        under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution and legally binding on 
        the parties.
            (9) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB held its third 
        meeting at which it accepted a conceptual zero draft of the 
        Convention and agreed to prepare a zero draft for consideration 
        at the INB's next meeting.
            (10) In early January 2023, an initial draft of the 
        Convention was sent to WHO member states in advance of its 
        formal introduction at the fourth meeting of the INB, which is 
        scheduled for February 27 through March 3, 2023. The draft 
        includes broad and binding provisions, including rules 
        governing parties' access to pathogen genomic sequences and how 
        the products or benefits of such access are to be distributed.
            (11) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Department of State's 
        Foreign Affairs Manual states that when ``determining whether 
        any international agreement should be brought into force as a 
        treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty, 
        the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or 
        compromise of the constitutional powers of the President, the 
        Senate, and the Congress as a whole'' and includes the 
        following criteria to be considered when determining whether an 
        international agreement should take the form of a treaty or an 
        executive agreement:
                    (A) ``The extent to which the agreement involves 
                commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole''.
                    (B) ``Whether the agreement is intended to affect 
                state laws''.
                    (C) ``Whether the agreement can be given effect 
                without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the 
                Congress''.
                    (D) ``Past U.S. practice as to similar 
                agreements''.
                    (E) ``The preference of the Congress as to a 
                particular type of agreement''.
                    (F) ``The degree of formality desired for an 
                agreement''.
                    (G) ``The proposed duration of the agreement, the 
                need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the 
                desirability of concluding a routine or short-term 
                agreement''.
                    (H) ``The general international practice as to 
                similar agreements''.
            (12) Article II, Section 2 of the United States 
        Constitution provides that the President ``shall have Power, by 
        and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
        Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur''.
            (13) Alexander Hamilton writes in Federalist Paper #75 
        regarding the Treaty Making Powers of the Executive that ``Its 
        objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the 
        force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. 
        They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, 
        but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in 
        question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to 
        belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the 
        Executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in 
        the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive 
        as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast 
        importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, 
        plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion 
        of the legislative body in the office of making them''.
            (14) If any provisions of a treaty are to have legal 
        bearing on United States citizens those provisions must pass 
        both the United States House of Representatives and the Senate 
        and be presented to the President, as all Federal laws must.
            (15) The United States Constitution establishes a clear 
        framework for making treaties by the Executive and with the 
        advice and consent of the Senate. This process is indispensable 
        for the Founders' vision of constitutional government.
            (16) The United States House of Representatives does not 
        vote for, ratify, affirm, or consent to treaties.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to unequivocally support 
Taiwan's full participation in the World Health Organization.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) a significant segment of the American public is deeply 
        skeptical of the World Health Organization, its leadership, and 
        its independence from the pernicious political influence of 
        certain member states, including the People's Republic of 
        China;
            (2) Congress strongly prefers that any agreement related to 
        pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response adopted by the 
        World Health Assembly pursuant to the work of the INB be 
        considered a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the 
        Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;
            (3) the scope of the agreement which the INB has been 
        tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Director-General, is 
        so broad that any application of the factors referred to in 
        section 2(11) will weigh strongly in favor of it being 
        considered a treaty; and
            (4) given the level of public distrust, any relevant new 
        agreement by the World Health Assembly which cannot garner the 
        two-thirds vote needed for Senate ratification should not be 
        agreed to or implemented by the United States.

SEC. 5. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR AGREEMENT OR OTHER 
              INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
              NEGOTIATING BODY'S FINAL REPORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY 
              SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any convention, 
agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, 
preparedness, and response reached by the World Health Assembly 
pursuant to the recommendations, report, or work of the International 
Negotiating Body established by the second special session of the World 
Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that is subject to the 
requirements of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of 
the United States, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, 
with two-thirds of Senators concurring.

SEC. 6. NO FORCE OR EFFECT TO TREATY PRIOR TO RATIFICATION.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any convention, 
agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, 
preparedness, and response deemed to be a treaty by section 5--
            (1) shall have no force or effect under the laws of the 
        United States before the date on which such treaty is ratified 
        with the advice and consent of the Senate; and
            (2) may not be used, prior to such date, to establish or 
        demonstrate the existence of a violation of United States law 
        or an offense against the law of nations in United States 
        courts, including--
                    (A) to establish standing, a cause of action, or 
                damages as a matter of law; or
                    (B) to demonstrate whether an action by a Federal 
                agency is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of 
                discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 2024.

            Attest:

                                             KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

                                                                 Clerk.
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