alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11234.

#### Clover Leaf Casualty Co. *et al. v.*National Life Insurance Company.

Decided June 15, 1920.

Action for damages; from Fnlton superior court — Judge Bell. October 25, 1919.

The National Life Insurance Company of the United States of America sued the Clover Leaf Casualty Company, George W. Cooper, and J. E. Ashley for damages, alleging that the defendants conspired together to persuade and did persuade and cause certain agents of the plaintiff to break their contracts of employment with the plaintiff and leave its service for the service of the defendant company. Ashley died and was stricken as a party defendant. The trial of the case resulted in a verdict against the other defendants, their motion for a new trial was overruled, and they excepted.

Paragraph 3 of the foregoing decision relates to testimony of PI. C. Iietterer as to certain conversations and transactions witli Ashley, to which the defendants objected on the grounds that the conversations and transactions were solely between a deceased agent of the defendant company and an agent of the plaintiff, and that the statements made and advice given to Ashley by the witness, who was an agent of the plaintiff, could not bind the defendants, being made without their knowledge, and were prejudicial to the rights of the defendants and tended to mislead and confuse the jury. The witness stated that in these conversations Ashley exhibited his contract of employment with the Glover Leaf Casualty Company and told of his employing the agents and “working on the men,” and of the commissions to be paid, and discussed methods of getting men away from the National Life Insurance Company.

Bloodworth, J.

1. When the charge of the court as given is considered in its entirety and in connection with all the facts of the case, there is no reversible error in any of the excerpts therefrom of which complaint is made.

2. The requests to charge, so far as legal and pertinent, were covered by the charge given.

3. The court did not err in admitting the evidence of .which complaint is made in the 8th ground of the motion for new trial.

4. There was evidence to support the verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*

*383*Dorsey, Shelton & Dorsey, G. L. Bynum,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Moore & Pomeroy,*contra.
<PAGE>   1



                                                                     EXHIBIT 21


Brigham Holdings I, LLC
Brigham, Inc.
Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.
Brigham Holdings II, LLC
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3891

_____________________________

BARBARA JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

LEON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Charles W. Dodson, Judge.

June 12, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Marie A. Mattox of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for 

Appellant.

Deborah Stephens Minnis, Ruth E. Vafek, and Alexandra E. Akre 

of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ex10-1.htm


Exhibit 10.1

 

NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

 

 

Cash compensation for non-employee directors is as follows: 

	 	 	 	 
	
Position
	 	
Annual Retainer
	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	
All Members (Base)
	 	$	25,000	 
	
Additional Retainers
	 	 	 	 
	
Board Chairman
	 	$	20,000	 
	
Board Vice Chairman
	 	$	5,000	 
	
Audit Committee Chairman
	 	$	15,000	 
	
Compensation Committee Chairman
	 	$	10,000	 
	
Nominating Committee Chairman
	 	$	--	 
	
Audit Committee Member (other than Chairman)
	 	$	5,000	 
	
Compensation Committee Member (other than Chairman)
	 	$	5,000	 
	
Nominating Committee Member (other than Chairman)
	 	$	--	 


 

Equity compensation for non-employee directors is as follows:

 

Annual Grants. Each year, immediately following Cardica, Inc.’s Annual Meeting of Stockholders, each non-employee director will automatically be granted an option to purchase 50,000 shares of the Company’s common stock. Each such option will vest monthly over the ensuing year.

 

Initial Grants. Automatically upon becoming a director, any new non-employee director shall be granted an option to purchase 75,000 shares of Cardica, Inc.’s common stock, vesting monthly over three years.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARRYL RIGGINS, AIS # 184051, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 08-0651-CB-M

GRANTT CULLIVER, et al., :

Defendants. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this

file deemed relevant to the issue raised, and there having been

no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED

as the opinion of this Court. It is further ORDERED that this

action be and is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and that the Motion to Proceed Without

Prepayment of Fees be and is hereby DENIED.

DONE this 22nd day of February, 2010.

s/Charles R. Butler, Jr. 

Senior United States District Judge

Case 1:08-cv-00651-CB-M Document 24 Filed 02/23/10 Page 1 of 1
11264.

#### Adams *v.*The State.

Decided April 13, 1920.

Accusation of larceny; from city court of Brunswick — Judge Krauss. December 23, 1919.

Larceny of a handbag of 0. L. Wright was charged in the accusation. He testified that on September 18, 1919, at 5:30 o’clock in the morning, he left Ms suit-case in his room at the house in which he boarded, and that when he returned at noon it was gone, and he never saw it again; he saw Willie Adams, the defendant, who was one of the other' persons living in the house, and asked him about the suit-case, and Adams said he knew nothing about it, but believed ho knew somebody who did know. Mrs. Griffin testified that she “ran the house” in which Wright and Willie Adams roomed, and she remembered seeing the suitcase in Wright’s room when her daughter was cleaning up the room on the day on which the suit-case disappeared; that she left her daughter in the room and went down stairs, and Willie Adams was then up stairs in his room; she did not know when *191he left the house; he never came back after that day; when he was working he left the house early in the morning; she did not know whether he was working then or not; her house was a rooming house. ' A policeman testified, that he went to a certain house to arrest the defendant and found him asleep, and told him he was under arrest, and he said: “I know what you are after me about; it is about that suit-case; I did not take it, but I know who did;” that the defendant said no more, and was taken to jail; that the arrest was in the latter part of October, and the witness had then and for a considerable time before that time a warrant for his arrest; the defendant had run on seeing the witness before that time. No additional witness testified. The defendant, in his statement at the trial, said that he left Mrs. Griffin’s house early in the morning of the day on which they said the suit-case was stolen, and he carried Arthur Brown’s grip to a designated place and went to his work; he returned from his work about 6 o’clock, was asked about the suit-case by Mrs. Griffin, and told her that he knew nothing about it; when he went to his room that night he found that his bed had been taken down, and he left and did not return; from that time he stayed at his mother’s house, where he was found at the time of his arrest; he told the officer that he did not take the suit-case, but knew who did, and that when he got before the court and told what kind of house they were running they would know who got the suitcase; he did not know that this particular one got it, but believed that some one allowed in the house got it.

*190Broyles, C. J.

Under the undisputed facts of this case, the circumstantial evidence relied upon to convict the defendant failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt; and, therefore, his conviction was contrary to law and the evidence.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*

*191
      *Frank H. Harris,*for plaintiff in error.

*F. M, Scarlett Jr,, solicitor,*contra:
01

02

03

04
Exhibit 4.16

 



 

Stikeman Elliott LLP Barristers & Solicitors

 

4300 Bankers Hall West, 888-3rd Street S.W., Calgary, Canada T2P 5C5

Tel: (403) 266-9000 Fax: (403) 266-9034 www.stikeman.com

 

	
BY SEDAR
    	
May 12, 2015
    


 

Alberta Securities Commission, as principal regulator

Ontario Securities Commission

 

CONSENT

 

Dear Sirs/Mesdames:

 

RE:                          TransCanada PipeLines Limited and TransCanada Trust (the “Trust”)

Short Form Base PREP Prospectus dated May 12, 2015

 

We refer to the final short form base PREP prospectus dated May 12, 2015 (the “Prospectus”) of the Trust relating to the issuance and sale of Trust Notes - Series 2015-A due 2075.

 

We hereby consent to the references to this firm on the cover page of the Prospectus, under the captions, “Legal Matters”, “Interest of Experts” and “Documents Filed as Part of the Registration Statement” in the Prospectus and consent to being named and to the use of our opinion under the heading “Certain Canadian Federal Income Tax Considerations” in the Prospectus.

 

We confirm that we have read the Prospectus and have no reason to believe that there are any misrepresentations (as defined in the Canadian securities legislation) in the information contained in the Prospectus that are derived from our opinion referred to above or that are within our knowledge as a result of the services we provided in connection with such opinion.

 

 

	
 
    	
 
    	
CALGARY
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
VANCOUVER
    
	
 
    	
Yours truly,
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
TORONTO
    
	
 
    	
“Stikeman Elliott LLP”
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
MONTREAL
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
OTTAWA
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
NEW YORK
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
LONDON
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
SYDNEY
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES PATRICK PREYEAR, : 

 : 

Petitioner, : 

 : 

v. : Civil No.: 10-00280-KD 

 : Crim. No.: 05-00267-KD-N 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 

 : 

Respondent. : 

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all pleadings in this file, and a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, 

the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. ' 636 and dated 

September 22, 2010, is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court. 

It is ORDERED that the petitioner=s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence is 

DENIED, and that a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. The Court further finds that any 

appeal from the judgment of this court may not be taken in forma pauperis. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 13th day of October 2010. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DUBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:05-cr-00267-KD-B Document 590 Filed 10/13/10 Page 1 of 1
10985.

#### Mooty, administrator, *v.*Butler.

Jenkins, P. J.

'1. Under the provisions of the act approved August 21, 1911 (Park’s Code, § 6090 (a)), no question as to the filing of the brief of evidence can be entertained by the reviewing court, where the judge has finally passed on the merits of the motion for a new trial, unless the question was first raised and insisted on before the trial judge. *Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co.*v. *McElmurray,*12 *Ga. App.*441 (78 S. E. 258) ; *Collins*v. *State,*12 *Ga. App.*655 (77 S. E. 1079) ; *Chicago & Northwestern Railway*v. *Elliott,*16 *Ga. App.*388 (85 S. E. 615). A bona fide effort to brief the evidence being manifest in this case, this court will not hold that it so fails to comply with the requirements of law as to prevent its being treated as a brief of the evidence.

2. This was a suit for damages growing out of an alleged malicious prosecution. The verdict in the criminal case found the defendant (the plaintiff in this suit) not guilty, and also found that the prosecution was malicious. The judge trying the damage suit instructed the jury that “ as a matter of law that verdict is conclusive as to the question of malice, but is not conclusive as to the question of probable cause.” The jury found for the plaintiff damages in a named sum. The trial judge granted a new trial, and the plaintiff excepted. *Held:*

*(a)*This court declines to hold as a matter of law that the evidence de- . manded a finding that the criminal prosecution was without probable cause. Such would be the effect of holding that the grant of the new trial Was an abuse of discretion.

*122Decided April 8, 1920.

Action for malicious prosecution; from city court of LaGrange — *h.*L. Meadors, judge pro hac vice. September 24, 1919.

*M. U. Mooty,*for plaintiff.

*Duke*Davis, *E. T. Moon,*for defendant.

(6) The verdict was properly set aside for the reason that the excerpt quoted from the charge is deemed erroneous. Although the defendant in the damage suit was the prosecutor in the criminal proceeding, and while under the Penal Code the prosecutor can be compelled to pay the cost when a jury finds the prosecution to be malicious, still it cannot be said that the real parties in the criminal case and in the damage suit were identical, or that the issues were the same either in scope or as to attendant results. The defendant in the criminal case, not being sworn, was not subject to the penalties relating to witnesses, and was not subject to the right of cross-examination, nor was the conduct of the criminal case under the direction and control of the prosecutor. See *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.*v. *Hand, 25 Ga. App.*90 (102 S. E. 647), and cit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*
Exhibit 32.1

                              CNB BANCORP, INC.

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of CNB Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
William N. Smith, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of
          operations of the Company.


By  /s/ William N. Smith
    --------------------
    William N. Smith, Chief Executive Officer
    November 8, 2005
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. PRODUCTION PLATING COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 78-1041.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Feb. 19, 1980.

*1118Elliott Moore, William Wachter, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Jay Shanklin, Wyneva Johnson, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Emil Farkas, Director, Region 9, N. L. R. B., Cincinnati, Ohio, for petitioner.

Robert F. Houlihan, Lexington, Ky., Joseph A. Yocum, Evansville, Ind., for respondent.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and PECK, Senior Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of its order reported at 233 NLRB No. 25. The Board’s order was based upon findings that the company had violated the National Labor Relations Act by illegal surveillance and coercion designed to prevent free exercise of employee rights to engage in collective bargaining and by discharging three employees because of union activities.

After review of the briefs and record, this court concludes that the findings of the Board are based upon substantial evidence upon the whole record and that the bargaining order is appropriate under the principles enunciated in *NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,*395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). Wherefore the enforcement is granted as prayed for.
Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION
 
 I, Gordon Fong, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer), certify that:
 
 1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Vineyard National Bancorp;
 
 2.    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;
 
 3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
 
 4.    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 
 (a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
 
 (b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 (c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 
 5.     The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 
 (a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 
 (b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 
 Date: August 10, 2004
By:
/s/ *Gordon Fong*Gordon FongSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
No. 15,590.

#### Black *v.*Plunkett et al.

Filed June 15, 1892.

From the Montgomery Circuit Court.

*T. F. Davidson*and *J. West,*for appellant.

*B. Crane*and *A. B. Anderson,*for appellee.

Olds, J.

— This case is in this court for the second time. The former decision is *Plunkett*v. *Black,*117 Ind. 14. The judgment being reversed, it was certified back to the Montgomery Circuit Court, and the demurrer sustained to the complaint, and two amended paragraphs of complaint filed, to each of which a demurrer was filed and sustained, and exceptions reserved, and judgment on demurrer in favor of the defendant. After-wards the appellant filed his complaint to review the judgment, to which a demurrer was sustained and exceptions reserved, and this appeal prosecuted. The facts substantially appear in the former opinion of *Plunkett*v. *Black, supra,*the only difference being that appellant pleaded the facts a little more fully in relation to the contract. It appears that the judgment in the Parke Circuit Court is in full force, and that an executiou was issued thereon to the sheriff of Montgomery county. It appears from the averments of the complaint that there was an agreement entered into by which, the judgment plaintiff, for a consideration, was to allow the judgment to be set aside and permit a judgment to go in favor of the judgment defendant, the plaintiff herein, but the contract was never carried out and executed. Under the authority of the former decision, *Plunkett*v. *Black, supra,*the Montgomery Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is suggested that it is shown that the appellant owns land in Montgomery county, and the writ casts a cloud upon his title, and that such fact gives the Montgomery Circuit Court jurisdiction to remove the cloud and to quiet appellant’s title, but this is not a suit to quiet title.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
EXHIBIT 23.1



                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
MOCON, Inc.:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
33-42255, 33-49752 and 33-58789) on Form S-8 of MOCON, Inc. of our reports dated
February 18, 2000, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of MOCON, Inc.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1999 and 1998, and the related consolidated
statements of income, stockholders' equity and comprehensive income, and cash
flows and related financial statement schedule for each of the years in the
three-year period ended December 31, 1999, which reports appear in or are
incorporated by reference in the December 31, 1999 annual report on Form 10-K of
MOCON, Inc.


                                          /s/ KPMG LLP


Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 23, 2000
10471.

#### Harris *v.*Adams, executor.

Decided June 15, 1920.

Complaint; from Washington superior court — Judge Hardeman. March 14, 1919.

*Jordan & Harris,*for plaintiff.

*Evans & Evans,*for defendant.

Luke, J.

1. “ Where an instrument purporting to be a will is duly probated in common form in pursuance of the Civil Code, § 3855, and letters testamentary are duly issued to the executor nominated in the will, and recorded as provided by the statute, the executor may proceed with the regular administration of the estate. *Maund*v. *Maund,*94 *Ca.*479 (20 S. E. 360). Where an executor has qualified after the probate of the will in common form in the manner indicated above, and, after more than twelve months have expired since the qualification of the executor, a creditor of the estate institutes a suit against the executor to recover a debt created by the testator, the institution of the suit is not premature.

*“ (a)*The facts that before the probate of the will in common form an application had been presented to the court of ordinary to probate the paper in solemn form, and a caveat had been filed to such probate, and a judgment rendered by the court of ordinary setting up the will, and an appeal entered from the judgment of the court of ordinary to the superior court, and the suit by the creditor was instituted within less than twelve months after the judgment probating the will in solemn form, would not affect the case. If, pending the application to probate the will in solemn form, the ordinary had merely appointed as temporary administrator the person nominated in the will as executor, as provided in the Civil Code, § 3943, par. 10, a different question would arise.” 150 *Ga.*204 (103 S. E. 229).

2. The foregoing is the answer of the Supreme Court to a question certified by this court, and under the^ruling there made the trial court erred in sustaining the defendant’s plea in abatement, which set up that the suit was prematurely brought. •

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*