NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LARRY NORRINGTON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0171 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-147514-001

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michelle L. Hogan

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Scott L. Boncoskey

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 3-24-2020
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Vice Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani

joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Larry Norrington appeals his convictions and sentences for 

one count of taking the identity of another, and one count of theft of a credit

card or obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 In the summer of 2017, Norrington worked for a private 

security company as a guard and was assigned to provide security-related

services to a residential community in Scottsdale. Norrington worked in a 

guardhouse located at the entrance to the community, and his primary job 

responsibilities included monitoring individuals entering and exiting the 

community and supervising the company’s other employees. Because 

Norrington worked the morning shift, he was also required to sort the 

residents’ mail, which his supervisor delivered every morning.

¶3 In August 2017, J.T., a resident in the community where 

Norrington worked, noticed charges on his bank account that he had not 

made and reported the activity to the Scottsdale Police Department. He told 

the police that he suspected Norrington of stealing his mail. The police 

department referred the complaint to the United States Postal Service, 

which had been receiving complaints of lost or stolen mail from the 

community for some time. Traci Long, a Postal Inspector with United States 

Post Office, was notified of J.T.’s report.

¶4 Long contacted Tracy Real, a fraud investigator working for 

J.T.’s bank. After reviewing the bank’s internal records, Real confirmed that 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State v. 

Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1 (App. 2019).
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

3

a replacement debit card sent by the bank had been successfully activated 

on July 17, 2017. The records also showed that two withdrawals using the 

card had been attempted, but denied, at a branch of a different bank located 

near the residential community on the evening of July 20, 2017. Real 

provided Long with the phone number used to activate the card and the 

location of the branch where the attempted transactions occurred.

¶5 As she continued to investigate the circumstances 

surrounding the theft and misuse of J.T.’s debit card, Long learned that the 

phone number used to activate the card was connected to the guardhouse 

where Norrington worked. Long also acquired images taken by a video 

surveillance system in place at the bank branch where the July 20 

transactions occurred. In the surveillance images, an individual wearing a 

mask over his face, earrings, and a necklace can be seen approaching and 

using the ATM. The man removed the mask while looking to the side and 

looking down, revealing some of his facial features in profile. When Long 

compared these images with Norrington’s driver’s license photograph, 

Long concluded Norrington was the individual in the surveillance images. 

She later reaffirmed this identification by observing Norrington while 

driving past the guardhouse.

¶6 In October 2017, Long and two other law enforcement officers

contacted, detained, and questioned Norrington. During the interview, 

Long showed Norrington the surveillance images. Norrington denied that 

he was the individual shown in the images but acknowledged that the 

individual looked like him. Norrington also confirmed that he was 

responsible for sorting the mail received at the guardhouse when the debit 

card was activated. At the end of the interview, Long arrested Norrington. 

As part of the booking process, Long removed Norrington’s jewelry—a pair 

of earrings and a necklace—and photographed him.

¶7 The State charged Norrington with three counts each of theft 

of a credit card or obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means, class 5 

felonies, and taking the identity of another, class 4 felonies, for the 

attempted withdrawals and other incidents involving the use of J.T.’s debit 

card. In July 2018, a four-day trial was held. After the State’s case, 

Norrington moved for a judgment of acquittal. After hearing argument 

from the parties, the court granted the motion on two of the counts. The 

jury deadlocked on the remaining counts, and the court declared a mistrial. 

The State elected to retry Norrington and dismissed the counts related to 

other incidents, leaving only one count for each offense related to the July 

20, 2017, attempted withdrawals.
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 In February 2019, the court conducted a retrial. During the 

retrial, the State admitted into evidence the surveillance images, 

Norrington’s driver’s license photograph, the jewelry removed from him 

during his arrest, and the photograph of Norrington taken after his arrest. 

The State also called Long to testify. After discussing her investigation into 

the theft and misuse of J.T.’s debit card, the State asked Long who she 

believed was the individual shown in the surveillance images. Long 

answered that she believed it was Norrington and explained how she 

arrived at that conclusion. The State then asked Long again whether she 

thought Norrington was the individual in the surveillance images. 

Norrington objected, citing a lack of foundation. The court overruled the 

objection and permitted Long to identify Norrington as the individual in

each of the surveillance images admitted into evidence by the State. During 

the defense’s case, Norrington elected to testify and denied that he was the 

individual in the surveillance images.

¶9 The jury found Norrington guilty as charged. At sentencing, 

the court suspended the imposition of the sentences and placed Norrington 

on concurrent probation terms totaling three years. Norrington appealed, 

and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes sections 

12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Norrington argues the superior court erred by permitting 

Long to offer her lay opinion identifying Norrington in the surveillance 

images under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 701, which governs the 

admissibility of opinion testimony by lay witnesses. Specifically, 

Norrington contends Long’s opinion did not meet the second requirement 

of the rule—that the opinion is “helpful to clearly understanding the 

witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue,” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

701(b). In his view, Long was in no better position than the jury to identify 

him in the images.

¶11 “The question of whether a lay witness is qualified to testify 

as to any matter of opinion is a preliminary determination within the sound 

discretion of the trial court whose decision must be upheld unless shown to 

be clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.” State v. Fuentes, 247 Ariz. 

516, 524, ¶ 28 (App. 2019) (quoting Groener v. Briehl, 135 Ariz. 395, 398 (App. 

1983)).

¶12 Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may testify in the form of 

an opinion if that opinion is:
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

5

(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony 

or to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

If the requirements of Rule 701 are met, a lay witness may offer an opinion 

concerning the identity of a person in an image or photograph. See State v. 

King, 180 Ariz. 268, 280 (1994).

¶13 Whether such lay witness identification testimony is 

“helpful” within the meaning of Rule 701 “depends on the totality of the 

circumstances,” including:

the witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance at 

the time the crime was committed, the witness’s familiarity 

with the defendant’s customary manner of dress, insofar as 

such information related to the clothing of the person 

depicted in the surveillance photograph, whether the 

defendant disguised his or her appearance during the offense 

or altered his or her appearance before trial, and whether the 

witness knew the defendant over time and in a variety of 

circumstances, such that the witness’s lay identification 

testimony offered to the jury a perspective it could not acquire 

in its limited exposure to the defendant.

United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)

(quotations omitted); accord United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 297 (3d Cir. 

2016); United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2008); see also

Fed. R. Evid. 701 (mirroring Arizona Rule of Evidence 701); State v. 

Winegardner, 243 Ariz. 482, 485, ¶ 8 (2018) (“When an Arizona evidentiary 

rule mirrors the corresponding federal rule, we look to federal law for 

guidance.”). However, “[t]he absence of any single factor will not render 

testimony inadmissible because cross-examination exists to highlight 

potential weaknesses in lay opinion testimony.” Beck, 413 F.3d at 1015. In 

other words, so long as “there is some basis for concluding that the witness 

is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than 

is the jury,” the testimony is admissible. Contreras, 536 F.3d at 1170 (quoting 

United States v. Allen, 787 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated on other 

grounds, 479 U.S. 1077 (1987)); see also United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4–5 

(1st Cir. 1995) (opinion testimony identifying defendant in photographs is 

admissible when “witness possesses sufficiently relevant familiarity with 
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

6

the defendant that the jury cannot also possess, and when the photographs 

are not either so unmistakably clear or so hopelessly obscure that the 

witness is no better-suited than the jury to make the identification”).

¶14 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Long’s encounters with 

Norrington provided a basis on which Long was more likely to identify 

Norrington in the surveillance images than the jury. Long personally 

encountered Norrington twice during her investigation, once while driving 

by the guardhouse of the residential community where Norrington worked 

and a second time while interviewing him just before his arrest. Although 

these interactions were post-offense and for an unknown duration, they 

were still much closer in time to the date of the crime than during trial when 

the jurors observed Norrington.

¶15 Given these facts, Long’s opinion helped determine a core fact 

at issue in this case—the identity of the individual in the surveillance 

images. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

Long’s identification testimony.

¶16 Even assuming arguendo that Long was in no better position 

to accurately identify Norrington than the jury and permitting the 

testimony under Rule 701 was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt in this case. Long’s identifications were cumulative of other evidence 

offered by the State. See State v. Murray, 247 Ariz. 447, 452–53, ¶ 12 (App. 

2019) (erroneous introduction of evidence harmless if cumulative of other 

evidence). Before her testimony, the State called Norrington’s former 

supervisor at the private security company, who testified that he interacted 

with Norrington almost every day for several years, including when the 

offenses occurred. The supervisor then also identified Norrington in some 

of the same surveillance images and explained why he believed the 

individual was Norrington. The State also introduced substantial 

circumstantial evidence to support the identification testimony, including 

evidence that the call activating J.T.’s debit card came from the guardhouse 

during Norrington’s shift and Norrington was responsible for handling the 

residents’ mail. Finally, Norrington himself even acknowledged that the 

person in the images looked like him.

¶17 The alleged error here was also harmless because the jury 

could compare the surveillance images with other photographs Long 

utilized in her investigation and with its observations of Norrington at trial. 

The jury was thus “permitted to reach its own conclusion as to the similarity 

or dissimilarity” between the individual shown in the surveillance images 
STATE v. NORRINGTON

Decision of the Court

7

and Norrington. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 168 (1990) (concluding 

witness’ opinions of similarity between footprint and defendant’s shoe 

were harmless because the jury could compare the print and shoe for 

themselves). And although Norrington contends Long’s testimony could 

have unduly influenced the jury because she was a law enforcement officer, 

the jury was explicitly instructed that they were “to consider the testimony 

of a police officer just as [they] would the testimony of any other witness,” 

and we presume jurors follow their instructions. State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 

175, 189, ¶ 58 (2017).

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm Norrington’s convictions and sentences.