COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements 

TIMOTHY D. WILSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1514-01-2 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 8, 2002 

PETERSBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge 

 (William B. Bray; Perry & Bray, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 (Joan M. O'Donnell, on brief), for appellee. 

 Timothy D. Wilson (father) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court terminating his residual parental rights to his 

sons, Lord I. Jones and Chaz A. Jones. On appeal, father contends 

the trial court erred in finding (1) the permanency planning 

orders of May 21, 2001 were in the best interests of the children; 

(2) the evidence sufficient to support termination of his parental 

rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1); (3) the evidence sufficient to 

support termination of his parental rights under Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2); and (4) the termination of father's parental 

rights was in the best interests of the children. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision 

of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all the reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party 

prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 

391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). 

Background

 On October 15, 1998, the Petersburg Department of Social 

Services (the Department) filed petitions requesting emergency 

removal of Lord and Chaz from their parents' care, alleging the 

children had been abandoned and neglected. Trisha R. Jones 

(mother) left her home at approximately 11:00 p.m. on October 12, 

1998 without providing information on her whereabouts or when she 

would return. Father was incarcerated at the time. Father and 

mother are both infected with HIV, as is Chaz, their younger son. 

When mother left, she did not leave any instructions concerning 

Chaz's medical care. 

 In November 1998, the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court reviewed the initial foster care service plans for 

the children. The initial goal was to return the children home. 

The plans were reviewed regularly in accordance with Code 

§ 16.1-282, providing mother and father opportunity to present 

evidence of alternatives to foster care for their children. 

However, the children have remained in foster care since October 

1998, and the parents have failed to demonstrate they have made 

- 2 -
sufficient change in their lives to allow a safe return of the 

children to their care. 

 In February 2000, the Department sought approval of a new 

plan with a change in goal from returning the children home to 

adoption. The juvenile court continued the hearing from February 

22, 2000 until August 22, 2000, to allow father the opportunity to 

establish a safe environment for his children. After reviewing 

the evidence, the juvenile court approved the change in goal to 

adoption on August 22, 2000. In February 2001, the juvenile court 

granted the Department's separate petitions to terminate mother's 

and father's parental rights. 

 The circuit court heard the evidence ore tenus on April 12, 

2001. The court approved the permanency plan and terminated 

mother's and father's parental rights. 

Analysis

I. 

 On April 12, 2001, pursuant to Code § 16.1-282, the circuit 

court approved the Department's plan changing the foster care 

service plan goals for the children from "Return to Parent" to 

"Goal for Adoption." 

 Father argues the circuit court erred by failing to require 

proof that he abused or neglected his children. "[P]arental 

fitness [is] not an issue in" proceedings under Code § 16.1-282. 

Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs., 22 Va. App. 643, 645, 

472 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996). The evidence showed father had not 

- 3 -
maintained contact with the Department and had not provided 

information regarding his current financial, medical, housing or 

psychological situation. Father abruptly abandoned his 

visitation of the children after maintaining regular visitation 

for only several months. During the December 2000 extended 

visitation, father walked out on his family after only one 

night, leaving the children in mother's care despite orders not 

to leave them alone with her. The Department proved, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that changing the goal from 

"Return to Parent" to "Goal for Adoption" was in the best 

interests of the children. 

II. 

 Father argues the Department failed to produce clear and 

convincing evidence to support termination of his parental 

rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). 

 In pertinent part, that section provides: 

 The residual parental rights of a 

parent or parents of a child placed in 

foster care as a result of court commitment 

. . . may be terminated if the court finds, 

based upon clear and convincing evidence, 

that it is in the best interests of the 

child and that: 

 1. The parent or parents have, without 

good cause, failed to maintain continuing 

contact with and to provide or substantially 

plan for the future of the child for a 

period of six months after the child's 

placement in foster care notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of 

social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to communicate with 

- 4 -
the parent or parents and to strengthen the 

parent-child relationship. Proof that the 

parent or parents have failed without good 

cause to communicate on a continuing and 

planned basis with the child for a period of 

six months shall constitute prima facie 

evidence of this condition. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). During the time his children have 

been in foster care, father has been incarcerated several times 

and did not have contact with his children for significant 

periods of time. Furthermore, father failed to provide any plan 

for his sons' future. In the two years prior to the hearing 

that Lord and Chaz spent in foster care, father had continuing 

contact with them between August 2000 and December 2000 only. 

Father's continued failure to maintain contact with his children 

constituted prima facie evidence to terminate his parental 

rights. Father failed to rebut the presumption created by 

statute. We conclude that this record contains sufficient 

evidence that father's parental rights were properly terminated 

under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). 

III. 

 Under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), the court can terminate a 

party's parental rights if the parent has "been unwilling or 

unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve 

months from the date the child was placed in foster care to 

remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required 

continuation of the child's foster care placement." Father's 

- 5 -
children spent thirty months in foster care, and father was 

incarcerated several times during that period. 

[W]hile long-term incarceration does not, 

per se, authorize termination of parental 

rights or negate the Department's obligation 

to provide services, it is a valid and 

proper circumstance which, when combined 

with other evidence concerning the 

parent/child relationship, can support a 

court's finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the best interests of the 

child will be served by termination. 

Ferguson v. Stafford County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 

333, 340, 417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1992). In addition to his repeated 

incarceration, father failed to complete many required programs, 

including anger management classes, family counseling, and 

individual counseling. He also failed to undergo a required 

substance abuse evaluation. Father's inability to remedy 

substantially the conditions that led to his sons' placement in 

foster care was without "good cause." We conclude that this 

record contains sufficient evidence that father's parental 

rights were properly terminated under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 

IV. 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested 

with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard 

and to foster a child's best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 

Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we 

presume that the trial court "thoroughly weighed all the 

evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

- 6 -
determination based on the child's best interests." Id. at 329, 

387 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore, "[w]here, as here, the trial 

court heard the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to 

great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. 

Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 

348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986). The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by determining it was in the best interests of the 

children to terminate father's residual parental rights. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed. 

- 7 -