alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11109.

#### Long *v.*Hartford Fire Insurance Company.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Broyles, C. J.

1. There is no substantial merit in any of the special grounds of the motion for a new trial.

2. Under the rulings in *Athens Mutual Insurance Co.*v. *Evans,*132 *Ga.*703 (64 S. E. 993), the evidence in the instant case demanded a verdict in favor of the insurance company, and the court did not err in so directing. See also, in this connection, *Lippman*v. *Ætna Insurance Co.,*108 *Ga.*391 (33 S. E. 897, 75 Am. St. R. 62) ; *McAfee*v. *Dixie Fire Insurance Co.,*18 *Ga. App.*192 (89 S. E. 181).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*

*25Action on fire-insurance policy; from Liberty superior court — Judge Sheppard. October 25, 1919.

After the issuance of the fire-insurance policy sued on, the insured executed a deed by which title to the insured house was conveyed as security for a debt. Subsequently the house was burned. The policy contained provisions identical with those set out in the decision in the case of *Athens Mutual Insurance Co.*v. *Evans,*supra. No written consent to the conveyance was given on the part of the insurance company, and the company contended that for this reason the policy was void. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to prove that after the conveyance was made he went to the agent who had issued the policy, and who was authorized to endorse thereon the defendant’s consent to the conveyance, and informed him orally of the making of the conveyance, and the agent said to him, “All right, go on home, I will take care of that; that is my part of the job;” and that to the best of his recollection the agent said that some time when he was passing through there he “would stop and take the policy and make the necessary endorsement on it.” This ruling was complained of in the motion for a new trial.

*Oliver & Oliver,*for plaintiff.

*King & Spalding, Seabrook & Kennedy,*for defendant.
10672, 10673.

#### Hodges *v.*Montezuma Fertilizer Company; and *vice versa.*

Decided July 19, 1920.

Complaint; from city court of'Amerieus—Judge Harper.. May 9, 1919.

*Hixon & Pace,*for Hodges.

*John B. Guerry,*contra.

Jenkins, P. J.

The Supreme Court, in response to certain questions certified to' it in this case, held that “ Where a contract for the purchase of fertilizers specifically provides from what source the phosphoric acid, the nitrogen, or the potash is to be derived, and where the fertilizer is furnished in accordance with such special order, such contract of sale would be void unless the fertilizers so furnished had been registered as provided by Civil Code (1910), § 1771. The fact that such fertilizers were furnished as ordered under a name or brand properly-registered with the commissioner of agriculture, but which registration gives a source other than the actual one from which the phosphoric acid, nitrogen, or potash is derived, would not operate to change the rule above stated.” 150 *Ga:*248 (103 S. B. 231). The ruling made by the Supreme Court, in response to the questions certified in said case, is also to the effect that where a brand is registered and states that the nitrogen is derived from “blood, tankage, cyanimid, and sulphate of ammonia,” and the proof shows that in accordance with the contract of purchase, the nitrogen is derived from “ equal parts of fish-scrap, blood, and tankage,” there is such variance between the registered sources and the actual sources as would invalidate the contract of' purchase under the provisions of § 1771, supra, covering registration of fertilizer brands.

In accordance with the foregoing rulings by the Supreme Court, the contract of purchase and sale as to the guano sued for in this case being invalid, the judgment of the court below 'will be affirmed only in the amount of the principal sum of $430, besides interest at seven per cent, from October 1, 1917, representing the purchase-price of ten tons of acid phosphate and four tons of nitrate of soda, about which there is no dispute under the-pleadings and the evidence. Such judgment of affirmance by this court is entered with direction that the excess amount of principal and interest included in the judgment of the court below, and representing the guano sued for, be written therefrom. The answers of the Supreme Court in response to the questions made by the main bill of exceptions being controlling, the cross-bill is dismissed.

*Judgment on main bill of exceptions affirmed, with direction; cross-bill dismissed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*
**EXHIBIT 23****Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**We consent to the incorporation by referencein the Registration Statements (File Nos. 333-14177, 333-38259, 333-68481, 333-44652, 333-55700,333-111014, 333-129559, 333-129560, 333-129561, 333-129562 and 333-138901) of Molex Incorporated onForm S-8 of our reports dated July 30, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financialstatements and schedule of Molex Incorporated, Molex Incorporated management’s assessmentof the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectivenessof internal control over financial reporting of Molex Incorporated, included in the AnnualReport (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2007./s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consentto the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-158668, 333-151382, and 333-147202 on Form S-8 of our reports dated February 19, 2010, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of NeutralTandem, Inc. and subsidiaries, and the effectiveness of Neutral Tandem, Inc. and subsidiaries’ internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Neutral Tandem, Inc. for the year ended December 31,2009. 

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

Chicago, Illinois 

February 19, 2010
10499.

#### SMITH *v.*SPENCER-DOWLER COMPANY.

Sale of a stolen vehicle under condemnation proceedings based on its use in carrying intoxicating liquors, of which the owner was ignorant, did not divest his title to it.

Decided October 9, 1919.

Trover; from Newton superior court—Judge Smith. March 28, 1919.

*Rogers & Knox,*for plaintiff in error,

cited: Act of March 28, 1917 (Pamph. p. 16); 5 Parle’s Code, § 5967; *Stroupper*v. *McCauley,*45 *Ga.*77; 23 Cyc. 1406; *Silvey*v. *Tift,*123 *Ga.*808; Freeman, Judgments (3d ed.) § 611; 12 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 147; United States *v.*One Buick Automobile, 244 Fed. 963; United States *v.*Mincey, 254 Fed. 287 (C. C. A., 5th Circuit); United States *v.*Blackhorse, 147 Fed. 770; Kriess *v.*Faron, 50 Pac. 388-9; *2364 Park’s Code, § 5554; *Smith*v. *Downing Co.,*21 *Ga. App.*741

*King & Johnson,*contra,

cited: Act of 1917, supra; United States *v.*Cargo of Ship Favorite, 4 Cranch (U. S.), 347; *Shrouder*v. *Sweat,*148 *Ga.*378; *Whites*v. *State,*23 *Ga. App.*174; *Campbell*v. *Hutcheson,*23 *Ga. App.*111; *Mack*v. *Westbrook,*148 *Ga.*690; Boyd *v.*United States, 116 U. S. 116; Skinner *v.*Thomas, 171 N. C. 98 (87 S. E.976), and note to same case in L. R. A. (N. S.) 1916 E, p. 343; United States *v.*Two Barrels of Whisky, 96 Fed. 479 (37 C. C. A. 518).

Luke, J.

The facts of this case show that an automobile was stolen in the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and was subsequently seized in the County of Cobb, in this State, and that intoxicating liquors were contained in it and being transferred by it. Condemnation proceedings under the act of March 28, 1917 (pamph. p. 16), were had against the car, and under such proceedings it was duly sold. The true owner of the car subsequently located it and instituted trover proceedings for its recovery. The evidence in the case established the ownership of the ear, and it was conclusive that the true owner had lost it by theft and had no knowledge that anyone was illegally transporting liquor in it. A verdict was returned in his favor; the defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled, and the movant excepted.

It was admitted on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff was entitled to recover unless the condemnation proceedings and the sale thereunder divested the title of the plaintiff, but the defendant contended that notwithstanding the fact that the car was stolen and the owner had no knowledge of the illegal use to which the thief put it, the fact that the car was condemned and sold under the condemnation proceeding forever barred the owner from claiming the car. We do not agree with this contention. The thief obtained no title to the ear and the purchaser at the sale got no better title than the possessor had at the time of its seizure. *Lawless*v. *Orr,*122 *Ga.*276 (50 S. E. 85); *Campbell*v. *Hutcheson,*23 *Ga. App.*111 (97 S. E. 555). The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
10637.

#### Waters *v.*The State.

Decided July 29, 1920.

Conviction of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act; from Clarke superior court'—1 Judge -Cobb. May 22, 1919.

*Thomas & Thomas, H. S. West, T. J. Shackelford, Shackelford & Meador,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. O. Dean, solicitor-general, S. C. Upson, T. W. Rucker,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

1. A motion in arrest of judgment is a separate cause from the main case and must be predicated upon a defect not amendable which appears on the face of the record or pleadings. Where one has been convicted and sentenced in a criminal case he can maintain a bill of exceptions to the judgment of the court overruling a motion to arrest the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that there is still pending and undisposed of in the lower court a motion for a new trial. *Hay*v. *Collins,*118 *Ga.*243 (44 S. E. 1002) ; *Earnest*v. *State,*148 *Ga.*632 (97 S. E. 672). Under this ruling the motion to dismiss the writ of error is denied.

2. The question as to whether the judge erred in overruling the defendant’s motion to arrest the judgment is controlled by the decision this day rendered in *Summerlin*v. *State,*post, 565.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
NO. 07-02-0154-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

JULY 2, 2002

______________________________

In re J.A.G, a CHILD

______________________________

FROM THE 320th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 62386-D; HON. DON EMERSON, PRESIDING

_____________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., QUINN and REAVIS, J.J.

Pending before the court is the motion by the Texas Department of Protective and

Regulatory Services (TDP) to dismiss the appeal of Leigh Goldsmith for want of

jurisdiction. The latter had attempted to appeal from an order signed on January 4, 2002,

terminating her parental relationship with J.A.G, a child. The notice of appeal was filed on

April 2, 2002.

Since September 1, 2001, statute mandates that appeals from decisions terminating

the parent / child relationship be treated as accelerated. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. §263.405(a)

(Vernon Supp. 2002). Applicable rule of procedure, therefore, requires an appellant to file

the notice of appeal within 20 days after the judgment or order is signed. TEX. R. APP.

PROC. 26.1(b). More importantly, this time period is not extended by timely filed motions
2

for new trial or other post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions

of law. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §263.405(c). 

Here, the final order terminating the parental rights of Goldsmith was signed on

January 4, 2002. Thus, her notice of appeal was due on or before January 25, 2002.

However, it was not filed until April of 2002. Since a timely motion to extend this time

period was not filed and because we lack the authority to modify the deadlines applicable

to perfecting an appeal, TEX. R. APP. PROC. 2, we cannot entertain the cause.

Accordingly, the motion of the TDP is granted and the cause is dismissed for want

of jurisdiction.

Per Curiam 

Do not publish.
IoT Advisory Board Meeting # 7 – Agenda

Day 1: Sept 26, 2023 Tuesday

11:00 AM Open/Action Item Review (Benson Chan / Dan Caprio) 

11:20 AM Report Feedback and Comments (Greg Witte) 

12:00 PM Report Themes and Recommendations 

• Mapping Recommendations to Themes

• Possible Recommendation Consolidation 

• Identifying Gaps

2:00 PM Break

2:30 PM Discussion of Needed Additional Text 

• Commentary

• Opportunities 

• Barriers 

• Identifying volunteers to write 

5:00 PM Close 

Day 2: Sept 27, 2023 Wednesday

11:00 AM Open

11:05 AM Outside Speaker: Jayne Morrow, NIST 

11:45 AM Recommendations for Report 

• Identify gaps in existing strategy documents for IoT relevance – e.g., cyber workforce strategy, 

standards strategy, privacy strategy

• Review and discuss recommendations flagged in previous meetings 

• Discuss new recommendations 

4:00 PM Wrap Up

• Identify agenda items for October meeting (Meeting #8) 

• Set dates for meetings after October

5:00 PM Adjourn
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-26-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-26-2000
<CASH>                                         103,393
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,454,061
<ALLOWANCES>                                   182,991
<INVENTORY>                                  5,497,536
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,664,598
<PP&E>                                       2,031,105
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,023,850
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,868,955
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       12,621,767
<BONDS>                                              0
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,868,955
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             167,563
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```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4551 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4551

To establish 4 memorials to the Space Shuttle Columbia in the State of 
                                 Texas.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 14, 2004

 Mr. Turner of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                     to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To establish 4 memorials to the Space Shuttle Columbia in the State of 
                                 Texas.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Columbia Space Shuttle Memorials Act 
of 2004''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Memorial.--The term ``memorial'' means each of the 
        memorials to the Space Shuttle Columbia established by section 
        3(a).
            (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of the Interior, acting through the Director of the National 
        Park Service.

SEC. 3. MEMORIALS TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA.

    (a) Establishment.--There are established as units of the National 
Park System 4 memorials to the Space Shuttle Columbia to be located on 
the 4 parcels of land in the State described in subsection (b) on which 
large debris from the Space Shuttle Columbia was recovered.
    (b) Description of Land.--The parcels of land referred to in 
subsection (a) are--
            (1) the parcel of land owned by the Fredonia Corporation, 
        located at the southeast corner of the intersection of E. 
        Hospital Street and N. Fredonia Street, Nacogdoches, Texas;
            (2) the parcel of land owned by Temple Inland Inc., 10 
        acres of a 61-acre tract bounded by State Highway 83 and Bayou 
        Bend Road, Hemphill, Texas;
            (3) the parcel of land owned by the city of Lufkin, Texas, 
        located at City Hall Park, 301 Charlton Street, Lufkin, Texas; 
        and
            (4) the parcel of land owned by San Augustine County, 
        Texas, located at 1109 Oaklawn Street, San Augustine, Texas.
    (c) Administration.--The memorials shall be administered by the 
Secretary.
    (d) Additional Sites.--The Secretary may recommend to Congress 
additional sites in the State of Texas related to the Space Shuttle 
Columbia for establishment as memorials to the Space Shuttle Columbia.

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act 
$5,000,000, to remain available until expended.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in 1994 Employee Stock Purchase
Plan Registration Statement No. 33-79014 as amended by Post-Effective Amendment
No.3, 1997 Special Stock Option Plan Registration Statement No. 333-33439 as
amended by Post-Effective Amendment No.1, 1997 Incentive Stock Option Plan
Registration Statement No. 333-32455 as amended by Post-Effective Amendment
No.1, 1987 Special Stock Option Plan Registration Statement No. 333-29111, and
1987 Incentive Stock Option Plan Registration Statement No. 33-15017 as amended
by Post-Effective Amendment No.1, each on Form S-8, of our report dated May 30,
2000 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Fresh Foods, Inc. for the
fiscal year ended March 4, 2000.

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Hickory, North Carolina
May 30, 2000
AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

 

This Amendment No. 3 to Employment Agreement (“Amendment”) is made as of the 29th day of July, 2008, by and between RUBY TUESDAY, INC., a Georgia corporation (the “Company”) and SAMUEL E. BEALL, III, a resident of the State of Tennessee (“Executive”).

 

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive are parties to that certain Employment Agreement dated as of June 19, 1999, as amended by Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement dated January 9, 2003 and Amendment No. 2 to Employment Agreement dated July 9, 2008 (collectively, the “Agreement”); and

 

WHEREAS, Executive and Company desire to amend the Agreement as hereinafter set forth; and

 

WHEREAS, capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning attributed to such terms in the Agreement.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree that the Agreement shall be amended, effective as of July 30, 2008, as follows:

 

| 1. | By deleting Section 2 in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 “2.       Term.  Except as otherwise provided in Section 4 of the Agreement, the Term of the Agreement is extended and shall continue until July 18, 2010.  The Agreement may continue for any subsequent renewal periods agreed to by the Executive and the Company.  The period described herein, as the same may be renewed as provided for herein, shall be referred to as the ‘Term’.”

 

| 2. | By deleting Appendix 3.7 in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

**“Appendix 3.7**

 

In accordance with Section 3.7 of this Agreement, if the Executive timely elects a lump sum form of payment under the Ruby Tuesday, Inc. Executive Supplemental Pension Plan, the lump sum amount shall be the amount as determined in accordance with this Appendix 3.7, as follows:

 

|   | Effective Date of Retirement | Lump Sum Amount |
|--------|------------------------------|-----------------|

 

| Prior to June 3, 2008 | $7,565,106 |
|-----------------------|------------|

| On or after June 3, 2008, but prior to June 2, 2009 | $7,584,587 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------|

| On or after June 2, 2009, but prior to June 1, 2010 | $7,740,709 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------|

| On or after June 1, 2010, but prior to or on July 18, 2010 | $8,068,250 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------|

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4677 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4677

  To name the lake known as Falls Lake in North Carolina after United 
                      States Senator Jesse Helms.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 2004

 Mr. Jones of North Carolina introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To name the lake known as Falls Lake in North Carolina after United 
                      States Senator Jesse Helms.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. JESSE HELMS LAKE.

    (a) In General.--The lake described in subsection (b) and known as 
Falls Lake shall be known and designated as ``Jesse Helms Lake''.
    (b) Lake Described.--The lake referred to in subsection (a) is--
            (1) north of the northern boundary of Raleigh, North 
        Carolina;
            (2) located along a 21 mile stretch of the Neuse River, 
        which runs in a northwest to southeast direction;
            (3) approximately 11 miles wide at its widest point; and
            (4) centered at 36 degrees 1.75 minutes North, 78 degrees 
        43.25 minutes West.
    (c) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, document, 
record, map, or other paper of the United States to the lake referred 
to in subsection (a) is deemed to be a reference to Jesse Helms Lake.
                                 <all>
```