NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALBERT W. UPSHUR, YOLANDA D. THOMPSON, 

BENNIE SHEPPARD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-2274

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:16-cv-01451-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen 

Coster Williams.

______________________ 

Decided: November 13, 2017

______________________ 

 ALBERT W. UPSHUR, YOLANDA D. THOMPSON, BENNIE 

SHEPPARD, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

 ERIN MURDOCK-PARK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BRIAN A. MIZOGUCHI. 

______________________ 
2 UPSHUR v. UNITED STATES

Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellants Albert Upshur, Yolanda Thompson, and 

Bennie Sheppard brought this action in the United States 

Court of Federal Claims. The court dismissed the action. 

We affirm.

I 

In November 2016, appellants filed a complaint in the 

Court of Federal Claims challenging the authority of the 

United States, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and 

various third parties to “make legal decisions and judgments” and to “interpret and apply the law.” J.A. 5–8. 

They claimed violations of their “Constitutional rights, 

Federal law, and a treaty,” J.A. 8; and the Court of Federal Claims eventually treated the complaint as involving, 

in particular, certain claims under the First, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments, Upshur v. United States, No. 

16-1451C, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 2017) (Decision). 

As bases for the court’s jurisdiction, appellants invoked 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1337, 2461, and 2463. They sought damages totaling nearly $4.6 trillion.

The United States moved to dismiss the complaint 

under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims. On June 21, 

2017, the court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint after determining that appellants had not established subject-matter jurisdiction. Decision at 2–3. The 

court explained that, for it to have jurisdiction here, the 

complaint would have to come within the Tucker Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1491, not 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 & 1337, which are 

conferrals of jurisdiction only on district courts, not the 

Court of Federal Claims. As to the Tucker Act, one problem with the complaint, the court ruled, is that the United 

States was the only “proper defendant,” and the court 
UPSHUR v. UNITED STATES 3

therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear claims against any of

the other named defendants. Id. at 2. And even as to the 

United States, the court further determined, appellants 

have simply not stated a claim that comes within the 

Tucker Act’s reach, which requires a source of law outside 

the Act that mandates monetary relief against the United 

States for identified wrongs. Id. Neither 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2461 and 2463 nor any discernible claim under the 

First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments in this case is 

such a money-mandating source of law. Id.

Appellants timely appealed from the dismissal. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) to review 

the dismissal of the complaint. We review dismissals by 

the Court of Federal Claims for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction de novo. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 

1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

II

Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims 

has “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim 

against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied 

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right 

enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). In 

order for the Court of Federal Claims to have subjectmatter jurisdiction over appellants’ claims, the claims 

must be for money damages against the United States, 

and appellants “must demonstrate that the source of 

substantive law [they] rel[y] upon ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.’” United States v. 
4 UPSHUR v. UNITED STATES

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216–17 (1983) (quoting Testan, 

424 U.S. at 400). 

The Court of Federal Claims followed that wellestablished framework. Appellants nevertheless seek 

reversal, asserting that the court did not adequately 

consider (a) certain Title Deeds and (b) certain alleged 

sources of money-mandating law, namely, the “Laws of 

Universal Life” or “Heavenly Laws,” and the Ninth 

Amendment. Appellants have not shown error.

Although appellants point to various Title Deeds, they 

have not taken the next crucial step for stating a claim 

within the Tucker Act. They have presented no comprehensible argument about the identified Title Deeds that 

would even plausibly state a claim under a source of law 

that is money-mandating for Tucker Act purposes. Appellants have not identified any relevant source of law that is 

money-mandating against the United States. We note 

that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is money-mandating. See Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. 

United States, 569 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 

Hernandez v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 193, 197 (2010). 

But appellants have neither invoked that clause nor 

provided any understandable basis for making a takings 

claim in this case, as to the Title Deeds or otherwise. 

Appellants suggest that the Court of Federal Claims 

overlooked two sources of law relevant to the Tucker Act. 

One they characterize as the “Laws of Universal Life” or 

“Heavenly Laws” (or “the Biblical Scriptures”). Appellants failed to make this contention in the Court of Federal Claims, thus waiving the contention, but in any event 

we see no basis for finding a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States under the Tucker Act for such 

claims. Appellants likewise failed to invoke the Ninth 

Amendment in the Court of Federal Claims, but in any 

event we see no basis for newly deeming the Ninth 

Amendment to be money-mandating, an innovation we 
UPSHUR v. UNITED STATES 5

have rejected before. See, e.g., Conner v. United States, 

641 F. App’x 972, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Barksdale v. 

United States, 582 F. App’x 890, 891–92 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

III

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of 

Federal Claims is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.