Filed 6/10/16 In re Hallie R. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re HALLIE R. et al, Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

COREY M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F072976

(Super. Ct. Nos. JD134256-00, 

JD134257-00, JD134258-00)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. William D. 

Palmer, Judge.

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Theresa A. Goldner, County Counsel, and Kelley D. Scott, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

* Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Detjen, J.
2

Corey M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and 

dispositional orders as to her three daughters, now seven-year-old Hallie, five-year-old 

Mia and two-year-old Jasmine. She contends there was insufficient evidence to adjudge 

the children dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision 

(b)1 and to order them removed from her custody. (§ 361, subd. (c).) We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

In March 2015, mother contacted the Kern County Department of Human Services 

(department) and, sounding very distraught and tearful, stated that she could no longer 

handle her children and wanted someone from the department to pick them up. She said 

she was afraid of what she might do, but also immediately added that she would “never 

hurt [her] children.” The police were contacted and an officer responded to the home. 

Mother told the officer she was under extreme stress because of ongoing personal and 

family issues. She said she had no family in the area and did not know where Joseph,2

her husband and the children’s father, was. While mother was speaking to the officer, 

Joseph returned home. He was shocked that mother had contacted the department. The 

officer explained to Joseph that he did not have to relinquish the children. Joseph said he 

did not want to oppose mother and believed it would be in the children’s best interest 

since he and mother had some issues they needed to work out. 

Social worker Shelley Nisperos met with mother at the family home. Mother told 

Nisperos that things were hard and she could not handle taking care of the children 

anymore. She said she had been working with a social worker and that she had 

previously had children adopted. She would not provide any further detail but said she 

just wanted her children to be safe. She had prepared two plastic bins with the children’s 

 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Joseph is not a party to this appeal.
3

belongings along with their birth certificates and social security cards. Nisperos took 

the children into protective custody and placed them in foster care. 

Social worker Jason Montez was assigned to investigate the referral. Mother told 

Montez she was just “stressed out” and that she and father were having marital problems. 

She did not know what to do under the circumstances other than give the children up. 

She said Joseph had an appointment for mental health treatment and she wanted to join 

him in counseling. She was unsure if she had bipolar disorder and was not taking 

medication. She told Montez she and Joseph only had one incident of domestic violence 

and it occurred in February 2015. She denied ever using drugs but refused to drug test 

unless the court ordered it. When Montez asked her if Joseph was still living in the home 

she would not directly answer him. After Montez explained the danger of having him 

there given their domestic violence and possible mental health issues, she denied that 

domestic violence was a problem. She also told Montez she wanted the children’s 

godmother, Megan, to take custody of them. 

Megan told Montez she thought mother may be suffering from post-partum 

depression. She had never witnessed mother and Joseph engage in domestic violence, 

but thought Joseph may be using drugs and referred to him as a “tweeker” because he 

was constantly moving. She added that mother had lost custody of three other children. 

Montez researched the family’s child welfare history and found a report of 

domestic violence in August 2009, during which Joseph shoved mother, causing her to 

stumble backward and hit her back on the television. Mother grabbed Hallie and fled. 

Mother and Joseph denied substance abuse but stated they were diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder for which neither of them were being treated. Mother said that Joseph verbally 

abused her but had never been physical with her before. Both parents agreed to get help 

for domestic violence, and Joseph agreed to pursue mental health treatment. The agency 

lost contact with the family but considered them high risk. 
4

Montez also found a report received in April 2013 in San Bernardino County that 

a family was living in a van parked outside a store. A woman was seen hitting a child 

multiple times, and a male was heard yelling at the child, “Fuck you.” The male and 

female were Joseph and mother who were living with then four-year-old Hallie and 

two-year-old Mia in a van. Mother and Joseph denied any drug abuse, mental health 

issues or criminal history. However, Joseph had a warrant for his arrest for drug 

possession and mother admitted she would test positive for marijuana. Joseph was 

arrested and the children were taken into protective custody. A petition was filed on 

behalf of Hallie and Mia alleging mother and Joseph’s substance abuse, unresolved 

mental health issues, domestic violence, and failure to provide a safe and appropriate 

home placed the children at a substantial risk of harm. At the jurisdictional hearing on 

the petition, evidence was presented that mother tested positive for methamphetamine in 

April 2013, and that she and Joseph told a social worker conducting a child welfare 

investigation in 2009 that they both had untreated bipolar disorder. The juvenile court 

exercised its dependency jurisdiction, removed the children from parental custody and 

ordered mother to participate in domestic violence counseling, parenting instruction and 

to submit to random drug testing. The court did not order reunification services for 

Joseph. In December 2013, the juvenile court returned the children to mother’s custody 

at the six-month review hearing and dismissed the petitions. 

Montez also discovered the February 2015 domestic violence to which mother 

referred. She and Joseph were arguing in their living room when Joseph shoved her in 

the chest with both hands, causing her to fall backward onto the couch. When she got up, 

he pushed her again. Jasmine was in the room during the physical altercation. Mother 

grabbed Mia and Jasmine, left the residence and called the police. Joseph was arrested at 

the residence. The next day, someone reported that mother and Joseph regularly argued 

and appeared to be using drugs. They were up a lot at night and people could be heard 

entering and leaving their residence all night long. A known drug dealer had been seen 
5

leaving their residence the day before. In addition, mother and Joseph could be heard 

calling the baby “M’fer” when the baby cried, and Mia appeared to be pale and lethargic 

and had what appeared to be a bruise under her left eye. The reporter was concerned that 

mother and Joseph gave the children medication to keep them quiet or asleep because 

there were times when the children could not be heard for a couple of days at a time,

which was unusual. In addition, the family had no furniture and ran out of food by the 

19th of the month. The house was so infested with roaches that the roaches were coming 

out of the electrical sockets. 

Montez filed a dependency petition on behalf of Hallie, Mia and Jasmine, alleging 

they came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) 

(failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition alleged three counts 

under subdivision (b) (hereafter “count b-1, b-2 and b-3”). Count b-1 pertained to mother 

and Joseph and alleged that the children were at substantial risk of suffering physical 

harm or injury because of the domestic violence between the parents. As supporting 

evidence, count b-1 cited the details of the domestic violence incidents that occurred in 

August 2009 and February 2015. Count b-2 concerned mother only and alleged that she 

placed the children at risk of physical harm or injury because of her undiagnosed mental 

health issues. As supporting evidence, the petition cited the fact that mother asked that 

the children be removed from the home in March 2015 because she was stressed and 

could not appropriately care for the children. Count b-3 pertained to father only and 

alleged that his mental health issues, particularly his bipolar disorder, placed the children 

at risk of harm or injury. The subdivision (g) allegation consisted of one count pertaining 

to both parents, stating they were unwilling or unable to care for the children. 

The juvenile court conducted a contested detention hearing. Mother testified that 

she wanted the children returned to her custody. She said her purpose in calling the 

department was to obtain counseling services, not to have her children taken from her. 

She said she had been working with a social worker prior to that call. She denied ever 
6

having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder or any other mental illness. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court was prepared to release the children to 

mother’s custody under the condition father only have contact with them under the 

department’s supervision. However, the court ordered the children detained after mother 

questioned whether she could decide when father had contact with the children. 

The juvenile court convened a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing and continued it 

to May 2015. Meanwhile, the department received information that father was arrested 

in February 2015 for indecent exposure. He was found standing on the sidewalk outside 

a school fence with his pants down to his knees, exposing his genitals. He was 

masturbating with his right hand and holding his testicles with his left hand. He was also 

in possession of suspected methamphetamine and a glass smoking pipe. Joseph denied 

exposing himself to children, and angrily stated that he was at the school to pick up a 

friend’s child. He also denied recent drug use and said he was holding the glass pipe for 

a friend. 

A week after Joseph’s arrest, one of the students who observed Joseph gave a 

statement to a detective. He said he saw a young male with several tattoos on his body 

standing by the fence. The man pulled off his shirt and put it over his head, covering his 

face except his eyes. He pulled his pants down to his thighs and was getting ready to pull 

his underwear down when the student ran to tell someone. He said the man told him, “I 

know what you look like,” which the student interpreted to mean that the man was going 

to murder him. 

The department filed a first amended petition to include the details of Joseph’s 

arrest. It resulted in the addition of count b-4 concerning Joseph’s arrest for drug 

possession, and one count under section 300, subdivision (d) (sexual abuse) concerning 

his arrest for indecent exposure. 

In May 2015, the juvenile court conducted an initial hearing on the first amended 

petition and mother and Joseph denied the allegations. The court deemed Joseph the 
7

presumed father of all three children and set a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the 

amended petition. Prior to the hearing, the department filed a supplemental report 

advising the juvenile court in part that the foster father believed mother was still in 

contact with Joseph. He recounted an instance in early May 2015 when mother showed 

him some pictures of the children that she had on her cell phone. She said she had to be 

careful because Joseph had put pictures of his genitalia on her cell phone. The foster 

father was concerned because mother allowed the children to play games on her phone. 

In October 2015, after multiple continuances, the juvenile court conducted a 

contested jurisdictional hearing. Mother testified she was no longer in a relationship with 

Joseph and had not been since a little before she called the department in March. She 

said he left the home at the end of February but may still have some articles of clothing

there. She was asked whether Joseph’s arrest for masturbating in front of school children 

and possession methamphetamine concerned her for her children. She said she did not 

believe Joseph was the man identified at the school because he was not a young man and 

did not have tattoos. However, it would concern her that he was in possession of 

methamphetamine. 

Jason Montez testified that mother completed a mental health evaluation for the 

department and did not meet the criteria for specialty mental health services. He also 

testified that mother denied any mental health issues and he did not discover that she had 

any mental health diagnoses in his investigation of the case. He testified that he believed 

mother and Joseph were still together because she had recent photos of Joseph on her cell 

phone and because she said she would have to consult him when one of the girls wanted 

her ears pierced. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court sustained counts b-1 through b-

-4 but dismissed the subdivision (d) and (g) counts. The court set the matter for 

disposition. 
8

In its report for the dispositional hearing, the department informed the juvenile 

court that in May 2002 mother, then a 13-year-old juvenile dependent, was diagnosed 

with major depressive disorder, severe post-traumatic stress disorder and oppositional 

defiant disorder. In February 2003, mother ran away from a children’s shelter. By 

March 2004, she had a warrant for her arrest and, according to her mother, planned on 

going to Las Vegas with then 26-year-old Joseph. She subsequently had three children 

that she gave up for adoption. The department also reported that mother had been semicooperative and regularly visited the children. In addition, she was participating in the 

Learning to Protect/Failure to Protect from Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse 

Program (hereafter “Learning to Protect”) and making good progress. She completed a 

mental health screening and did not qualify for specialized mental health services. The 

department still believed she had some mental health issues that needed to be addressed 

and referred her for a mental health assessment twice. However, mother refused to attend 

the appointments and refused to drug test. The department recommended the juvenile 

court order the children removed from mother and Joseph’s custody and order them to 

participate in reunification services. 

On October 27, 2015, the juvenile court convened the dispositional hearing. 

County counsel advised the court that someone from the department went to mother’s 

home the day before and found articles of father’s clothing there. However, other than 

the presence of Joseph’s clothes, the department did not find anything in the home that 

would pose a danger to the children. Mother’s attorney advised the court that mother had 

completed 21 of the 25 Learning to Protect group sessions, and was willing to participate 

in any mental health counseling that was ordered. He asked the court to return the 

children to mother under family maintenance. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered the children removed 

from parental custody, ordered mother and Joseph to participate in reunification services,

and set a six-month review hearing for April 2016. 
9

This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the jurisdictional findings as to her should be reversed because 

there was insufficient evidence at the time of the jurisdictional hearing that she suffered a 

mental illness or that the children were at a substantial risk of harm because of domestic 

violence between her and Joseph.3 We disagree. 

When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on 

appeal, we review the record to determine if substantial evidence supports the conclusion 

of the trier of fact. In doing so, we review the record in the light most favorable to the 

court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s 

findings and orders. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

Section 300, subdivision (b) applies when “the child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of 

the failure or inability of the parent ... to adequately supervise or protect the child, or ... 

by the inability of the parent ... to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s ... 

mental illness ....” A finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires three elements: 

“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and 

(3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or 

illness.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 (Rocco M.).) 

The “ ‘basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the 

hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (In re J.N. (2010) 181 

Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) Evidence of past events may be probative in assessing the 

 

3 Mother persuades us that her challenge to the juvenile court’s findings as to her 

under section 300, subdivision (b) are justiciable even though any decision we might 

render on the allegations involving her would not affect the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

over the children since the jurisdictional findings as to Joseph are unchallenged. (In re 

I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App. 4th 1484, 1490-1495.)
10

current conditions “if circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the 

children will suffer the same type of ‘serious physical harm or illness’ in the future.” (In 

re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388.)

The defined risk in this case as to mother is the possibility that she might harm the 

children. It was her fear of what she might do and her frantic call to the department that 

necessitated their initial removal. Mother was adamant that the department remove the 

children immediately for their safety and she apparently intended more than a temporary 

separation because she wanted to send many of their belongings with them, including 

their important documents. Though mother never specified what she feared doing, her 

history of child abuse lends itself as a possibility. Further, though mother denied 

suffering a mental illness, there is ample evidence from which to infer that she does or 

may. She reported in 2009 that she suffered from bipolar disorder, and it was her 

untreated bipolar disorder that caused the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over 

Hallie and Mia in 2013. In addition, mother questioned whether she had bipolar disorder 

when she contacted the department to remove the children in this case. 

Mother, however, argues other evidence proves that she does not have a mental 

illness, pointing to Montez’s inability to discover a mental health diagnosis for her and 

the mental health screener’s conclusion she did not qualify for specialty mental health 

services. According to the record, however, mother did not seek mental health treatment. 

Therefore, it stands to reason that Montez would not be able to find a diagnosis for her. 

Further, Montez testified that the screener determined mother did not qualify for mental 

health services based strictly on the information mother provided. If mother was not 

forthcoming about her mental health history, then the results of her screening would not 

be valid.

Based on the foregoing, we can infer that mother’s yet undefined mental health 

problem, in combination with her own fear for her children’s safety, placed the children 

at a substantial risk of harm.
11

We can also infer from this record that domestic violence between mother and 

Joseph placed the children at a substantial risk of harm. They had multiple incidents of 

domestic violence, the most recent occurring a month before mother made her frantic 

call. In addition, Jasmine was present during the dispute and, despite mother’s assertions 

that she and Joseph were no longer in contact, there was evidence from which to infer 

that they were.

We thus conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings as to mother under section 300, subdivision (b). For the same reasons, we 

conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal order as we now 

explain.

Section 361, subdivision (c), the governing statute, provides in relevant part:

“A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents ... 

with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile 

court finds clear and convincing evidence ...: [¶] (1) [t]here is or would be a substantial 

danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which 

the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the 

minor’s parent’s ... physical custody.”

In determining whether to order a child removed from parental custody, the 

juvenile court is not required to find the child was harmed. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 

Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) The juvenile court only has to have some reason to 

believe that circumstances which place the child at a substantial risk of harm would

continue in the future. (Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) The parent’s level of 

denial is an appropriate factor to consider when determining the risk to the child if placed 
12

with the parent. Ultimately, the purpose of the removal statute is to avert harm to the 

child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.)

We review the juvenile court’s removal order for substantial evidence, bearing in 

mind the heightened burden of proof. (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529.) 

We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order.

The children were taken into protective custody because mother could no longer 

take care of them and was afraid of what she might do. She explained that she and 

Joseph were having marital problems and that she was stressed. She denied, however 

that domestic violence, mental illness or drug abuse were problems for them despite 

evidence to the contrary, and she maintained contact with Joseph though she knew the 

risks to herself and the children. Given the volatility of the family situation and mother’s 

refusal or inability to protect the children from it, there was no reason for the court to 

return the children to mother’s custody. There were no assurances that the next time 

mother was stressed out she would have the wherewithal to contact the department before 

she actually harmed the children.

 Mother nevertheless argues that a formal removal order was not necessary 

because she was cooperative, and a voluntary service plan would have been more 

appropriate in her case.4 We disagree. Mother was cooperative to the extent that she 

visited the children and participated in the Learning to Protect Program. However, she 

refused to drug test and complete a mental health assessment. In addition, there was no 

guarantee that mother would not leave with the children as she had done in the past. The 

 

4 Appellate counsel also argues that respite services under section 16500.5, 

subdivision (c)(1) (which counsel mistakenly denotes as § 16500, subd. (c)(1)) were an 

alternative to removal, and that mother’s trial counsel presented this argument to the 

juvenile court. Trial counsel in fact raised the issue of respite services at the 

jurisdictional hearing and, after a brief discussion, the juvenile court determined that such 

a program was not available. At the dispositional hearing, mother’s trial counsel argued 

for family maintenance services in lieu of removal. 
13

risk to the children in mother’s custody was simply too high and a voluntary services plan 

would not have reduced that risk in her case. 

Mother also attempts to support her position by citing and briefly discussing 

several cases5in which the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s removal order. 

She fails, however, to show that any of the cases are factually on point or legally 

instructive. Thus, we decline to discuss them.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders entered on October 30, 2015 

are affirmed.

 

5 Mother cites In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, In re Steve W. (1990) 217 

Cal.App.3d 10, and In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996.