[Cite as In re Z.W., 2018-Ohio-896.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

IN RE: 

 CASE NO. 5-17-21 

 Z.W., 

ALLEGED JUVENILE TRAFFIC O P I N I O N 

OFFENDER. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court No. 20171069 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 12, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

F. Stephen Chamberlain for Appellant 

 Heather M. Pendleton for Appellee 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Z.W., a minor, appeals the Hancock County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, July 11, 2017 judgment entry of sentence. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} On March 8, 2017, Findlay Police Department Office Cory Glick 

(“Officer Glick”) initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle operated by Z.W. after Officer 

Glick observed that vehicle “slid[e] sideways for a few feet” before “straighten[ing] 

out and continu[ing] to travel * * * at a high rate of speed.” (Doc. No. 1). There 

were two juvenile passengers in the vehicle that Z.W. was operating. (Id.). Z.W. 

was cited for willful or wanton disregard of safety on highways in violation of R.C. 

4511.20, commonly known as reckless operation of a motor vehicle, a minor 

misdemeanor. (Id.). 

{¶3} On March 14, 2017, Z.W. entered a written not-guilty plea. (Doc. No. 

3). On June 26, 2017, a bench trial was held. (Doc. No. 15); (June 26, 2017 Tr. at 

1). On July 11, 2017, the trial court issued its entry finding Z.W. to be a juvenile 

traffic offender under R.C. 2152.02(N) by virtue of his reckless operation. (Doc. 

No. 15). The trial court ordered Z.W. to pay a fine of $50 and $120 in court costs, 

converted Z.W.’s operator’s license “back to temporary status until said child’s 

eighteenth birthday, September 18, 2017,” and suspended Z.W.’s license “for a 

period of six months, from September 18, 2017 until March 18, 2018.” (Id.). 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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{¶4} On July 21, 2017, Z.W. filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 16). He 

raises three assignments of error for our review, which we will address together. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The Conviction and finding that Wagner is a Juvenile Traffic 

Offender was against the Manifest Weight of the evidence 

presented at trial. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The Conviction and finding that Wagner is a Juvenile Traffic 

Offender was not based upon Sufficient Evidence to support the 

judgment of the Trial Court 

Assignment of Error No. III 

The State failed to establish that Wagner’s operation of a motor 

vehicle was with a willful or wanton disregard of the safety of 

persons or property 

{¶5} In his assignments of error, Z.W. argues that his reckless-operation 

conviction is based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶6} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are 

clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 

(1997). As such, we address each legal concept individually. 

{¶7} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional 

amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly, 

“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the 

evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the 

credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. 

Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, 

citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). 

See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 

(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight 

of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386. 

{¶8} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, 

“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of 

witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier 

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that 

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, 

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing 
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court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating 

to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 

10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, 

“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the 

conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. 

Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. 

Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. 

{¶9} As an initial matter, we must address Z.W.’s argument that his recklessoperation conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although Z.W. 

asserts that he is challenging the weight of the evidence supporting his conviction 

in the statement of his first assignment of error, he fails to make any argument in 

support of that contention. See State v. Yoder, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0017, 

2016-Ohio-7428, ¶ 22 (“[Mr. Yoder] fails to set forth ‘any argument concerning the 

credibility of the evidence presented or the weight of the credible evidence.’”), 

quoting State v. Schmitz, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 11CA010043 and 11CA010044, 

2012-Ohio-2979, ¶ 36, quoting State v. Wilson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25100, 2011-

Ohio-4072, ¶ 21. “[A] defendant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the 

error of the trial court on appeal.” State v. Stelzer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23174, 

2006-Ohio-6912, ¶ 7, citing State v. Cook, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20675, 2002-Ohio2646, ¶ 27. “Moreover, ‘[i]f an argument exists that can support this assignment of 
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error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Id., quoting Cook at ¶ 27. “App.R. 

12(A)(2) provides that an appellate court ‘may disregard an assignment of error 

presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on 

which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in 

the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).’” State v. Jackson, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 14AP-670, 2015-Ohio-3322, ¶ 11, quoting App.R. 12(A)(2). “Additionally, 

App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief include ‘[a]n argument containing 

the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented 

for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the 

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.’” Id., quoting 

App.R. 16(A)(7). Not only did Z.W. fail to include an argument regarding how his 

reckless-operation conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, but 

Z.W. failed to provide citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 

that support his argument. Accordingly, we decline to conduct a manifest-weight 

analysis on Z.W.’s behalf. See Yoder at ¶ 23, citing Schmitz at ¶ 36 and App.R. 

16(A)(7). Therefore, we will address only Z.W.’s sufficiency-of-the evidence 

argument. 

{¶10} R.C. 4511.20 sets forth the offense commonly known as reckless 

operation of a motor vehicle and provides, “No person shall operate a vehicle * * * 

on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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property.” R.C. 4511.20(A). Therefore, to establish that Z.W. operated his vehicle 

recklessly, the State had to show that Z.W.: (1) operated a vehicle on any street or 

highway and (2) in a willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property. 

See State v. Tanner, 9th Dist. Medina No. 3258-M, 2002-Ohio-2662, ¶ 23. Because 

Z.W. challenges only the willful-or-wanton element, we will address only whether 

the State presented sufficient evidence that Z.W. willfully or wantonly disregarded 

the safety of others or property. 

{¶11} “[W]illful conduct ‘implies an act done intentionally, designedly, 

knowingly, or purposely, without justifiable excuse.’” State v. Luikart, 3d Dist. 

Marion No. 9-06-35, 2007-Ohio-770, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Earlenbaugh, 18 Ohio 

St.3d 19, 21 (1985). “Wanton conduct, on the other hand, is defined as ‘an act done 

in reckless disregard of the rights of others which evinces a reckless indifference of 

the consequences to the life, limb, health, reputation, or property of others.’” Id., 

quoting Earlenbaugh at 21-22. 

{¶12} At trial, Officer Glick testified that he was observing traffic on 

Stadium Drive, a residential area in Findlay, Ohio on March 8, 2017. (June 26, 2017 

Tr. at 10). According to Officer Glick, the weather that day was “dry,” “[c]lear,” 

and with “[g]ood visibility.” (Id.). He testified that vehicles were parked on “the 

south side” of Stadium Drive. (Id. at 11). Regarding Z.W., he testified, 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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I was parked on the south side of Stadium Drive facing eastbound. I 

could hear a loud car behind my direction, which would have been to 

the west of me. Using my driver side view mirror, I was watching 

that direction when I observed a silver Lexus come off of Southwest 

Street on to Stadium Drive, sliding sideways. The vehicle then 

straightened out and continued at its high rate of speed past me. I do 

not know the speed of that vehicle and I did not have time to get that 

vehicle’s speed. 

(Id.). He testified that he could “see the side of the vehicle” that Z.W. was operating 

after it “turned the corner and accelerated.” (Id. at 33). According to Officer Glick, 

he would have seen only “the headlights” of a vehicle if it was “traveling in a straight 

pattern down the road.” (Id.). Officer Glick further testified that there were two 

passengers in the vehicle—both juveniles. (Id. at 13); (See also id. at 65, 81). 

{¶13} Based on that evidence, we conclude that the State presented sufficient 

evidence that Z.W. operated his vehicle with a willful and wanton disregard of the 

safety of persons and property. That is, the State presented sufficient evidence that 

Z.W. “demonstrated a ‘reckless disregard of the rights of others which evinces a 

reckless indifference of the consequences’ to the safety and property of other 

motorists * * *; the evidence was also sufficient to show that [Z.W.], ‘with full 

knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, recklessly and inexcusably disregards 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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the rights of other motorists.’” State v. Vanoss, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2009-T0047, 2010-Ohio-1453, ¶ 13, quoting Earlenbaugh at 21-22. That is, when Z.W. 

operated his vehicle in a manner which caused it to slide around a corner, he did so 

with juvenile passengers in the vehicle and while other vehicles were parked along 

the side of the road. Compare id. (concluding that “Vanoss acted ‘wantonly in 

disregard of the safety of others’” when he “passed several vehicles * * * causing 

one of the drivers to apply the brakes, a maneuver highly likely to cause the vehicle 

to spin out of control due to the precarious road conditions”). Furthermore, 

operating his vehicle in a manner that caused the vehicle to slide disregarded a 

known risk—the risk of losing control of the vehicle and wrecking. See State v. 

Monigold, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 03 CO 25, 2004-Ohio-1554, ¶ 17 (“At the point 

that the vehicle began fishtailing and sliding across the road, the risk of losing 

control of the vehicle and wrecking became known. Continuing to drive in a manner 

that allowed the vehicle to fishtail and slide was disregarding the known risk.”). 

{¶14} Accordingly, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Z.W. willfully or wantonly disregarded the safety of 

others or property. As such, Z.W.’s reckless-operation conviction is based on 

sufficient evidence. 

{¶15} Z.W.’s assignments of error are overruled. 
Case No. 5-17-21 

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{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr