alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                     5
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                      5,313,000
<SECURITIES>                               34,355,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                 367,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           52,559,000
<PP&E>                                     45,663,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             15,200,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             83,022,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      20,844,000
<BONDS>                                    39,044,000
<COMMON>                                       14,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                 12,605,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               83,022,000
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           15,312,000
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              11,006,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            2,341,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          3,000,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             1,869,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                  934,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           482,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               328,000
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                  154,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.11

</TABLE>
Exhibit 21


<Table>
                       SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


<Caption>
                                  State of            Names Under Which
    Names of Subsidiaries       Incorporation         They do Business
<S>                               <C>           <C>
Capitol Concrete Products         Kansas        Capitol Concrete Products
  Company, Inc.                                   Company, Inc.

City Wide Construction            Missouri      City Wide Construction
  Products Co.                                    Products Co.

Concrete Materials, Inc.          Kansas        Concrete Materials, Inc.

Kansas Sand and Concrete, Inc.    Kansas        Kansas Sand and Concrete, Inc.

Monarch Cement of Iowa, Inc.      Iowa          Monarch Cement of Iowa, Inc.

Salina Concrete Products, Inc.    Kansas        Kansas Building Products
                                                Salina Concrete Products, Inc.

Springfield Ready Mix Co.         Missouri      Springfield Ready Mix Co.

Tulsa Dynaspan, Inc.              Oklahoma      Arrow Concrete Company
                                                Tulsa Dynaspan, Inc.
</Table>


          All other subsidiaries considered in the aggregate as a single
subsidiary do not constitute a significant subsidiary.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6928

DERRYMORE CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RONALD J. ANGELONE; GENE JOHNSON; DUNCAN

MILLS; ARMSTRONG; JOHN DOE; RUFUS FLEMING; H.

R. POWELL; M. JORDAN; W. F. SEAL; R. A. YOUNG;

L. W. JARVIS; CLARENCE A. HOLLAR; NENA ADAMS;

K. A. POLINSKY; D. F. MILLER; PIRES; F. E.

LOCKHART; P. E. MADDEX; TED DURR; L. HUFFMAN;

G. K. WASHINGTON; L. T. EDMONDS; B. BOOKER; C.

S. WINGFIELD; KELLY HARRISON; JANE DOE;

LINAMEN; W. CLARK; HANKINS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (CA-01-1023-7)

Submitted: May 31, 2006 Decided: September 27, 2006

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derrymore Campbell, Appellant Pro Se. Dana L. Gay, Richard Carson

Vorhis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,

Virginia, for Appellees.
- 2 -

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

Derrymore Campbell appeals from the district court’s

order granting summary judgment to the defendant prison officials

in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action challenging, among other

things, the validity and enforcement of the prison’s grooming

policy. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the

district court. Campbell v. Angelone, No. CA-01-1023-7 (W.D. Va.

Apr. 19, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<RESTATED>
       
<S>                               <C>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          12-MOS            12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1996       DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1996       DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                              4,066,000         1,103,000
<SECURITIES>                                0                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                      31,371,000        30,906,000
<ALLOWANCES>                          830,000           205,000
<INVENTORY>                        21,479,000        20,423,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   59,694,000        55,344,000
<PP&E>                             58,183,000        55,513,000
<DEPRECIATION>                     41,639,000        38,627,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     86,047,000        78,193,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              24,367,000        20,210,000
<BONDS>                                     0                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0                 0
<PREFERRED>                           176,000           176,000
<COMMON>                            2,586,000         2,583,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  0                 0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       86,047,000        78,193,000
<SALES>                           142,892,000       121,037,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  142,892,000       121,037,000
<CGS>                              82,688,000        66,960,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      82,688,000        66,960,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            0                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    466,000           438,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     2,752,000           609,000
<INCOME-TAX>                        1,474,000           350,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 1,278,000           259,000
<DISCONTINUED>                              0                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0                 0
<CHANGES>                                   0                 0
<NET-INCOME>                        1,278,000           259,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             .49               .12
<EPS-DILUTED>                             .47               .12
        


</TABLE>
#### *A.*S. Gamble and Firth *v.*W. M. Dunnegan et al.

Husband and Wife — Removal of Disability.

The legislature has power to make provision for the relief of married women from the disability of coverture.

APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT.

April 18, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The evidence satisfactorily shows that Mrs. P. Waggoner accepted the benefits of the act of February 10, 1869, Sess. Acts 1869, Vol. 1, page 281, and that she was acting as a *feme sole*and a member of the firm of Wm. Dunnegan & Co. when the debt sued on was contracted. We see nothing in said act repugnant to the State Constitution ; we may doubt the policy of such acts but can not doubt the power of the Legislature to relieve a married woman from the disabilities attending coverture under the general laws.

There was no reason for transferring the cause to equity; and the court in this action need not, and ought not to determine whether lot No. 28 in the town of Morganfield' can be subjected to the payment of this debt.

The act of February 10, 1869, provides that Mrs. Waggoner may engage in trade and transact business in the same manner and to- the same extent as if she were an unmarried woman, and that she may sue and be sued in her own name. Such being the case, appellants had the right to sue her at law; and if they make out their right to relief, they may have a judgment *in personam*against her; and such a judgment, when obtained, may be enforced by execution.

The evidence conduces very strongly ü> show their right to have judgment. The judgment dismissing the petition as to Mrs. Wag-*699goner is reversed. Upon the return of the cause it should be transferred to the ordinary docket, and Mrs. Waggoner allowed to defend, just as other persons, not laboring under disabilities, may make defense to a suit at law. When appellant attempts to subject lot No. 28 to the payment of such debt as he may establish, the question of its liability can possibly be determined, but not until then.

*Bush, Spalding & Chápese, for appellants.*

*D. H. Hughes, for appellees.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                              5
<CIK>                                         0000840401
<NAME>                                  ACCUHEALTH, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                       1,000
<CURRENCY>                                           USD

<S>                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                               APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                 DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                        1
<CASH>                                                25
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     18,296
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (1,996)
<INVENTORY>                                        1,119
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  17,660
<PP&E>                                             7,426
<DEPRECIATION>                                    (4,102)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    21,173
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             20,926
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            1
<COMMON>                                              51
<OTHER-SE>                                        (6,960)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      21,173
<SALES>                                           27,029
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  27,029
<CGS>                                             18,535
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     18,535
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   9,981
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (1,487)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 1,613
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (3,100)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    0
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (3,100)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (.60)


</TABLE>
Report of the 96th
National Conference on
Weights and Measures

05 adopted by the 96th
National Conference on Weights and Measures
0

ria EDS
11738.

#### Kitchens *v.*The State.

Decided November 9, 1920.

Broyles, C. J.

It appearing that *the*bill of exceptions in this case was not tendered the judge within twenty days of the date of the judgment overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the writ of error must be *Dismissed.*

*Luke and*Bloodworth, *JJ., concur.*

*757Conviction of manslaughter; from Washington superior court — Judge Hardeman. June 8, 1920.

*Rawlings & Wood,*for plaintiff in error.

*Walter F. Grey, solicitor-general,*contra.
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .

                                                                      Exhibit 12

                CALCULATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                  (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS, EXCEPT FOR RATIOS)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         FISCAL YEARS ENDED
                                                   ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      2004         2003         2002         2001          2000
                                                   ----------   ----------   ----------   ----------    ----------
<S>                                                <C>          <C>          <C>          <C>           <C>
Income/(loss) from continuing operations before
  income tax provision (benefit) and acumulative
  effect of accounting change                      $    2,737   $    2,900   $      734   $   (4,979)   $  (19,060)

Add Fixed Charges:
    Interest expense                                   16,209       13,482       12,679       12,763        14,086
    Interest expense on operating leases                  485          391          450          394           353
    Amortization of financing costs                       770          746          528          571           900
                                                   ----------   ----------   ----------   ----------    ----------
        Total income (loss) as defined             $   20,201   $   17,519   $   14,391   $    8,749    $   (3,721)
                                                   ==========   ==========   ==========   ==========    ==========

Fixed Charges:
    Interest expense                               $   16,209   $   13,482   $   12,679   $   12,763    $   14,086
    Interest expense on operating leases           $      485   $      391   $      450   $      394    $      353
    Capitalized interest                                  230            -            -            -             -
    Amortization of financing costs                       770          746          528          571           900
                                                   ----------   ----------   ----------   ----------    ----------
        Total fixed charges                        $   17,694   $   14,619   $   13,657   $   13,728    $   15,339
                                                   ==========   ==========   ==========   ==========    ==========
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                       1.14         1.20         1.05

Additional income required to meet a 1.0 ratio:           n/a          n/a          n/a   $    4,979    $   19,060
</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.9


 


Loan and Investment Agreement dated March 15,
2015


 


By and between


 


Blue Sphere Corp.


 


and


 


Ori Ackerman


 


Set forth below are the terms and conditions of the loan and investment
agreement between the above-mentioned parties.


 


1. Ori Ackeman shall lend $220,000 (the “Loan”) to Blue
Sphere Corp (the “Company”) by transferring the NIS-equivalent of $200,000 to the order of the Company.


 


2. Reserved.


 


3. $20,000 shall be withheld and considered a payment of interest
in advance.


 


4. The Loan will not bear any additional interest.


 


5. The principal of the Loan shall be repaid within three business
days after the Company receives revenue from either its Rhode Island, Charlotte or Italian projects, but, in any event, not before
July 31, 2015.


 


6. Shlomi Palas, CEO of the Company, personally guarantees repayment
of the Loan.


 


7. Ori Ackerman hereby agrees to purchase $220,000 in outstanding
convertible notes of the Company provided that the Company (provided that the Company purchases 50% of any such notes for its own
account.


 


8. In the event that the Company’s Rhode Island projects closes,
the Company may purchase additional outstanding convertible notes and Ori Ackerman shall have an option to purchase up to an additional
$220,000 of such notes.


 


/s/ Shlomi Palas


 


/s/ Ori Ackerman
Cybersecurity Community,

Strengthening the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure is believed 

by most to be achievable through adequate societal, government, and industry interest 

and support afforded to educational institutions that are charged with educating the 

future cybersecurity workforce. Well-designed cybersecurity education programs are 

characterized by curricula that are balanced in breadth and depth, and optimally consist 

of an appropriate blend of didactic and applied experiences. Programs, such as the 

Maine Cybersecurity Cluster (MCSC) cybersecurity internship program and 

corresponding cybersecurity degree program, can serve as exemplars of

great instructional potential. The MCSC cybersecurity internship program avails 

cybersecurity program students’ practical, project-based, cybersecurity experiences that 

are refined by regional workforce needs, insight, and industry recommendations.

Increasing commitment and support from those organizations that employ cybersecurity 

program graduates, has yielded a significant “cybersecurity” return on investment. The 

educational institutions that produce such graduates can implement additional 

improvements to their respective cybersecurity curricula, raise the awareness and 

interest of primary and secondary education populations, form even deeper 

relationships with their regional partners in education, and achieve even higher 

production of highly qualified cybersecurity program graduates. Additional investment is 

needed however, to maintain their positive momentum.

Some argue the greatest challenge facing educational institutions focused on increasing 

the production of cybersecurity graduates, and in turn, the adequacy of the American 

cybersecurity workforce of the future, is a function of leadership conviction and ability to 

garner and spur needed investments in higher education. Conviction alone is 

insufficient. Much work remains to be done and it is critical that additional investments 

be made to achieve sufficient production of cybersecurity program graduates to ensure 

the cybersecurity of the Nation’s most critical asset, its citizens.

--

Raymond Albert, Ph.D.

Professor of Computer Science, UMFK

Director, Maine Cybersecurity Cluster (MCSC), USM
# United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 14-1058

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v. WILLIAM BERRÍOS-CRUZ, Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Lenore Glaser on brief for appellant. Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, on brief for appellee.

December 12, 2016- 2

- **PER CURIAM.** Defendant-Appellant William Berríos-Cruz appeals certain special conditions of supervised release imposed in connection with his guilty plea to production of child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Because Berríos's plea agreement contained a knowing and voluntary waiver of any right to appeal his sentence, we may reach the merits of his claims only toprevent a "miscarriage of justice." United States v. VélezLuciano, 814 F.3d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 2016). With respect to all but one of the challenged conditions, Berríos falls short of this bar and, accordingly, we must enforce his appellate waiver. Condition four's requirement that Berríos submit to penile plethysmograph ("PPG") testing, however, presents a different situation. Indeed, the government concedes that this requirement, imposed without any explanation by the district court, should be vacated. See United States v. Medina, 779 F.3d 55, 71 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court must "provide a substantial justification before making submission to PPG testing part of a condition of supervised release"). We agree that enforcement of Berríos's appellate waiver with respect to the PPG testing requirement would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Vélez-Luciano, 814 F.3d at 564-65 (holding that "potentially subjecting [the defendant] to PPG testing when the government expressly disavows the utility of this particular procedure about- 3

- which we have expressed reservations, especially when the record lacks any explanation of the applicability of PPG testing to this defendant, constitutes a miscarriage of justice," as well as plain error (citation omitted)). For the foregoing reasons, we **VACATE** the portion of condition four that authorizes PPG testing and remand for the district court to consider the parties' joint recommendation that the relevant part of the condition be stricken. We **AFFIRM** all other aspects of Berríos's sentence.
#### Golden, Appellant, *v.*The Dow Drug Co. et al., Appellees.

(No. 7233

Decided May 1, 1950.)

*Mr. Robert G. McIntosh,*for appellant.

*Messrs. Merland, O’Meara, Santen £ Willging*and *Messrs. Rendigs, Fry £ Kiely,*for appellee Dow Drug Company.

*Mr. Don Burkholder,*for appellee Charles G. Mul lane.

*Per Curiam.*

The appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to give a special charge defining the duty of an occupier of premises abutting on a public sidewalk and ending with the statement that ‘ *‘*if a potentially dangerous condition is created or negligently maintained, such occupier is liable in damages to a pedestrian. ’ ’

The court was justified in refusing to give this charge for the following reasons:

(1) It is an abstract statement which a court may always properly refuse to give.

(2) The mere creation or maintenance of a condition “potentially” dangerous without reference to any other consideration would not create a liability.

(3) The special charge entirely omits the requirement of proximate cause.

Appellant contends also that the court erred in refusing to give another special charge which was not subject to the objection of being abstract, but which *66contained the other objectionable features of the first charge.

Appellant contends also that the court should not have submitted the issue of contributory negligence. This incident took place in midday. The door adjoining the sidewalk was in full view. It was there to furnish ingress and egress to the room. Can it be said that a reasonably careful person would not have anticipated that it would be used and taken that into consideration in passing? ' We do not think so. Whether an ordinarily careful person would have anticipated the opening of the door or the exit of a person, and guarded against a collision, it seems to us was for the jury to determine.

We are of the opinion that the issues were fairly submitted to the jury and that no prejudicial error intervened.

For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Ross, P. J., Hildebrant and Matthews, JJ., concur.