United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4193

Non-Argument Calendar.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Raymond COE, a/k/a Raymond Robertson, Defendant-Appellant.

March 29, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida. (No. 94-92-CR-DTKH), Daniel T.K. Hurley,

Judge.

Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

 Raymond Coe appeals his sentence of 267 months for possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon. Coe argues that the trial court

erred in refusing to grant a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1 (1994). In reviewing a trial

court's refusal to grant an adjustment, this court reviews

interpretations of the sentencing guidelines de novo, United States

v. Pedersen, 3 F.3d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir.1993), and factual

determinations for clear error, United States v. Kendrick, 22 F.3d

1066, 1068 (11th Cir.1994).

Section 3E1.1 requires a downward adjustment "[i]f the

defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his

offense." USSG § 3E1.1(a). To determine whether a defendant

qualifies, a sentencing court should consider whether he

"truthfully admitt[ed] or [did] not falsely deny[ ] any additional

relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §
1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)." USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 1).

Relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 includes

all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the

defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the

offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in

the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility

for that offense.

USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1). The commentary to § 1B1.3 further explains:

The principles and limits of sentencing accountability under

this guideline are not always the same as the principles and

limits of criminal liability. Under subsection[ ] (a)(1) ...

the focus is on the specific acts and omissions for which the

defendant is to be held accountable in determining the

applicable guideline range, rather than on whether the

defendant is criminally liable for an offense as a principal,

accomplice, or conspirator.

USSG § 1B1.3, comment. (n. 1).

Coe admitted that he used a firearm to commit a robbery,

although he claimed he could not remember whether he had pulled the

weapon's trigger. The government points out that Coe initially

denied that he had held the gun to the victim's head and pulled the

trigger and had brandished the gun at other civilians. The

district court found that Coe did not accept responsibility because

he was not forthright about brandishing the gun and pulling its

trigger.

On appeal, Coe argues that whether he accepted responsibility

for pulling the trigger and brandishing the gun is irrelevant to

the acceptance of responsibility analysis because those actions do

not constitute "relevant conduct" within the meaning of § 1B1.3.

He argues that according to § 1B1.3's heading—"Relevant Conduct

(Factors That Determine the Guideline Range)"—and note 1 of §

1B1.3's commentary, relevant conduct includes only those acts and
omissions that are used to calculate the applicable guideline range

prior to adjustment. However, the broad language of § 1B1.3(a) is

clear: relevant conduct includes all acts that occurred during the

commission of the offense. Moreover, note 1 must be read in its

entirety and in light of the breadth of § 1B1.3(a). In context it

becomes apparent that note 1 is not limiting, but merely explains

that relevant conduct encompasses more than those acts directly

relevant to criminal liability.

 In this case, Coe brandished a gun and pulled its trigger

during the offense for which he was convicted. Those acts are

relevant conduct for which Coe is accountable, and therefore, a

court may consider them in assessing whether Coe accepted

responsibility for his offense. Because the court correctly

interpreted the sentencing guidelines, and its factual

determination that Coe had not been forthright about pulling the

trigger and brandishing the gun is not clearly erroneous, we affirm

Coe's sentence.

AFFIRMED.