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*********************************************** 
IN RE ELAINE M. COLE

(SC 20746)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 55-3), ‘‘[n]o provision of the general statutes, not

previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any

new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have

a retrospective effect.’’

In November, 2021, the debtor, C, filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter

7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the District of Connecticut, claiming, inter alia, a statutory

(§ 52-352b (21)) homestead exemption in the amount of $250,000. The

public act (P.A. 93-301) that created the homestead exemption allowed

a debtor to protect up to $75,000 of the value of his or her primary

residence from attachment in postjudgment or bankruptcy proceedings.

Public Act 93-301, however, included a carve-out whereby the homestead

exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the act’s

effective date of October 1, 1993. The legislature subsequently passed

an amendment (P.A. 21-161), effective October 1, 2021, that repealed

the previous version of § 52-352b and replaced it with a new version,

which increased the homestead exemption from $75,000 to $250,000 but

did not include any carve-out for preexisting debts. The trustee of the

bankruptcy estate objected to C’s claimed homestead exemption of

$250,000, arguing that, although her bankruptcy proceeding was commenced after October 1, 2021, all of her debts were incurred prior to

that date. Relying on the principle embodied in § 55-3, the parties focused

their arguments before the Bankruptcy Court on the issue of whether

P.A. 21-161 enacted a procedural amendment, which presumptively

applies retroactively, or a substantive amendment, which presumptively

applies only prospectively. The Bankruptcy Court overruled the trustee’s

objection, concluding that the amendment was intended to apply retroactively to preexisting debts and, accordingly, that C was entitled to the

$250,000 homestead exemption. The trustee appealed from the decision

of the Bankruptcy Court to the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut, which certified to this court a question concerning whether P.A. 21-161 applied retroactively or only prospectively to

debts incurred by a debtor before that act took effect. Held:

1. This court concluded, as a threshold matter, that the answer to the certified

question was a matter of state, rather than federal, law for choice of

law purposes:

Under the federal statute (11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3) (A)) specifying what

property can be exempted from a debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy estate,

a debtor may protect ‘‘any property that is exempt under . . . State or

local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition,’’ and,

accordingly, this court clarified that the question presented by this appeal

was whether the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-

161 was applicable to C’s case, given that the expanded exemption

was in effect when her bankruptcy petition was filed but not when her

underlying debts were incurred.

Moreover, in determining whether the applicability of a state exemption

statute, as recognized under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3) (A), is a matter of

federal bankruptcy law or state law, this court recognized that there is

a split of federal authority on this choice of law question but assumed

that the Bankruptcy Court would adhere to the rule adopted by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to which

state law governs.

2. The expanded, $250,000 homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161

applies in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after October 1, 2021, the

effective date of the act, regardless of when the underlying debts
accrued:

a. The trustee could not prevail on his claim that the expanded homestead

exemption does not apply to debts incurred prior to the effective date

of P.A. 21-161:

P.A. 21-161 was silent as to the accrual date of the debts that are the

subject of the postjudgment or bankruptcy proceeding governed by the

amended homestead exemption, nothing in the language of the act indicated that the legislature had intended to carve out preexisting debts

from the reach of that exemption, and § 52-352b, as part of the statutory

scheme that regulates postjudgment procedures, simply defines what

property is exempt, that is, what property is not subject to any court

order for purposes of debt collection.

b. This court rejected the trustee’s claim that it should find in P.A. 21-

161 an implicit carve-out for debts accrued prior to the act’s October 1,

2021 effective date insofar as the legislature had included such a carveout in P.A. 93-301:

The trustee’s argument that the legislature, having been aware of the

carve-out language in P.A. 93-301, would have clearly indicated if it had

intended not to include a similar carve-out for preexisting debts in P.A.

21-161 was unavailing because it was inconsistent with basic rules of

statutory interpretation, pursuant to which the fact that the legislature

included a special carve-out for preexisting debts in the original homestead exemption but did not include one in P.A. 21-161 indicated an

intent not to exclude preexisting debts from the scope of the expanded

homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161.

c. There was no merit to the trustee’s claim that this court should find

in P.A. 21-161 an implicit carve-out for debts accrued prior to the act’s

October 1, 2021 effective date because a failure to do so would improperly

give the act retroactive effect without the express authorization of the

legislature:

Although the parties’ arguments centered primarily around the issue of

whether P.A. 21-161 was a procedural or substantive amendment for

purposes of § 55-3, which applies only if the amendment has a ‘‘retrospective effect,’’ this court concluded that § 55-3 did not apply to the present

case because the increased homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161

did not constitute retroactive legislation when C’s bankruptcy proceeding

was initiated after the effective date of the act.

Moreover, because it is not always apparent whether a new law has a

‘‘retrospective effect,’’ especially when the statutory changes solely alter

the future, rather than the past, legal consequences of previous transactions or occurrences, this court looked to the approaches taken by the

United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (511

U.S. 244), in which the majority concluded that a new statute has a

retroactive effect if it impairs established rights of the parties, imposes

new duties or obligations that they could not reasonably have anticipated,

or disturbs other reasonable, settled expectations, and in which the

concurrence concluded that the focus of the retroactivity inquiry should

not be on whether the amendment affects vested rights but, rather, on

the relevant activity that the amendment regulates, and clarified that

both approaches were part of a proper retroactivity analysis under Connecticut law.

The application of P.A. 21-161 to preexisting debts would not constitute

a retroactive application under either of the Landgraf approaches.

Specifically, under the majority’s approach in Landgraf, there was no

claim that P.A. 21-161 imposed any new duties or obligations on the

parties, and applying the increased homestead exemption to preexisting

debts would not be fundamentally unfair, insofar as it allegedly would

frustrate the settled expectations of unsecured lenders who extended

credit to C while the lower, $75,000 exemption was in place, because

there was no evidence in the record that C’s unsecured creditors ever

considered the equity in C’s home or relied on the size of the homestead

exemption when they decided to extend C credit, and the creditors were

presumed to have been aware that the legislature could increase the

size of the homestead exemption at any time and that their rights might

otherwise be adversely impacted by changes in federal or state law.
Furthermore, under the concurrence’s approach in Landgraf, applying

P.A. 21-161 to preexisting debts would not qualify as a retroactive application of the law because the accrual of those debts was not the primary

or principal activity that the act sought to regulate, insofar as § 52-352b

is part of a chapter of the General Statutes that deals with postjudgment

procedures, neither the original 1993 homestead exemption nor the 2021

amendment made any reference to the source or nature of the underlying

debts involved, instead focusing entirely on the enforcement process,

and, accordingly, it was clear that the purpose of the 2021 amendment

was to specify the exemptions that were presently available to the debtor.

Argued December 12, 2022—officially released July 18, 2023

Procedural History

Petition for bankruptcy relief, brought to the United

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut,

where the court, Tancredi, J., overruled the trustee’s

objection to the debtor’s claim for a homestead exemption, and the trustee appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, where the

court, Bolden, J., certified a question of law to this

court concerning whether No. 21-161, § 1, of the 2021

Public Acts applied retroactively to debts incurred by

the debtor before the act took effect.

Jeffrey Hellman, for the appellant (trustee).

Jenna N. Sternberg, for the appellee (debtor).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. In 1993, the legislature, for the first

time, enacted a so-called ‘‘homestead act,’’ whereby a

debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a

primary residence from attachment in postjudgment

proceedings or bankruptcy. See Public Acts 1993, No.

93-301, § 2 (P.A. 93-301). Although P.A. 93-301 had an

effective date of October 1, 1993, and thus applied to

any proceedings initiated on or after that date, the act

included a special carve-out: the homestead exemption

could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the

effective date.1 See P.A. 93-301, § 3. In 2021, the legislature amended the homestead act and replaced it with

a new version that included several changes from the

prior version of the act. For purposes of this appeal,

the relevant change made by the legislature was to

increase the exemption from $75,000 to $250,000,2 but

this time the legislature did not include any carve-out

for preexisting debts. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161,

§ 1 (P.A. 21-161). The primary question presented by

this appeal, which reaches us in the form of a certified

question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether

we should nevertheless read a carve-out into the 2021

public act. We decline to do so.

I

On November 22, 2021, the debtor, Elaine M. Cole,

filed a petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 7

of the United States Bankruptcy Code; 11 U.S.C. § 701

et seq. (2018); in the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Connecticut. In re Cole, 642 B.R. 208,

211 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). At that time, the debtor

owned a home in Mystic that she valued at $589,000,

with equity of more than $350,000, and that was under

contract for sale. See id., 211, 213. Pursuant to General

Statutes § 52-352b (21), she claimed a homestead exemption in her home in the amount of $250,000. See id., 211,

214.

The trustee of the bankruptcy estate, Anthony S.

Novak, objected to the claimed homestead exemption.

Id., 211. The trustee argued, among other things, that the

debtor could not use the increased homestead amount

because, although the bankruptcy proceeding was commenced after the October 1, 2021 effective date of P.A.

21-161, § 1, all of the debtor’s debts were incurred prior

to that date. See id., 211–12.

Relying on the principle, embodied in General Statutes § 55-3,3

that procedural amendments to a statute

presumptively apply retroactively, whereas substantive

amendments presumptively apply only prospectively;

see, e.g., State v. Nathaniel S., 323 Conn. 290, 295, 146

A.3d 988 (2016); the arguments of the parties before

the Bankruptcy Court centered around the question

of whether P.A. 21-161, § 1, enacted a procedural or
substantive amendment to the homestead act. See In

re Cole, supra, 642 B.R. 212, 218. The Bankruptcy Court,

focusing less on the procedural/substantive distinction

and more on various canons of statutory construction,

concluded that the amendment was intended to apply

‘‘retroactively’’ to preexisting debts. Id., 220–24. Accordingly, the court overruled the trustee’s objection and

concluded that the debtor was entitled to the $250,000

homestead exemption. Id., 224.

The trustee appealed from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut. The District Court indicated

that it was inclined to agree with the conclusion of

the Bankruptcy Court that P.A. 21-161, § 1, applies to

preexisting debts in any bankruptcy proceeding brought

on or after the effective date. Nevertheless, the District

Court determined that the absence of an authoritative

state court decision, the importance of the issue, and

the capacity of certification to resolve the litigation all

counseled for certification of the question to this court.

The District Court therefore certified to this court the

question of ‘‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161 applies retroactively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21-

161 took effect or prospectively.’’ We accepted certification but, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (k),

and for the reasons discussed in part II B 3 of this

opinion, we will answer a slightly modified version of

the certified question: does the expanded homestead

exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date

of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date? We

answer that question in the affirmative.

II

A

Because the certified question involves the intersection of federal bankruptcy law and Connecticut law

governing postjudgment proceedings, we first must

determine, as a threshold matter, whether the answer

is dictated by federal or state law. As we explain more

fully hereinafter, although there is a split of federal

authority on this question, we assume that the Bankruptcy Court will adhere to the choice of law rule that

has been adopted by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, pursuant to which state substantive law governs. See, e.g., CFCU Community Credit

Union v. Hayward, 552 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).

The federal statute at issue is 11 U.S.C. § 522, which

specifies what property can be exempted from a debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.4 The statute provides

that, by default, debtors can choose to avail themselves

of either the limited exemptions that are afforded under

federal bankruptcy law or, if more generous, the exemptions afforded under state, local, or other federal law.5

That provision, now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b),
was enacted in 1978, prior to the original Connecticut

homestead act.

Section 522 provides in relevant part that a debtor

who opts for the alternative exemption can protect ‘‘any

property that is exempt under Federal [nonbankruptcy]

law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the

date of the filing of the petition to the place in which

the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days

immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3)

(A) (2018). So, the question presented by this appeal

is whether Connecticut’s homestead exemption, as

increased under P.A. 21-161, § 1, is applicable to the

debtor’s case, given that the amended, $250,000 homestead exemption was in effect when her bankruptcy

petition was filed on November 22, 2021, but not when

the underlying debts accrued.

The threshold question is whether the applicability

of a state exemption statute, as recognized under 11

U.S.C. § 522, is determined by federal bankruptcy law,

which would preempt any contrary state law under the

supremacy clause of the United States constitution; see

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; or is a matter of state law

because the intent of Congress was to incorporate state

exemption law fully into the Bankruptcy Code. The

federal courts of appeals and other federal courts are

divided on this question. See, e.g., J. Lockhart, Annot.,

‘‘What Constitutes State or Local Law That Is Applicable

on Date of Filing of Bankruptcy Petition for Purposes

of Applying 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (b) (3) (A) or Its Predecessor in Opt-Out States,’’ 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 333, 405–12,

§§ 27–28 (2013).

Some courts have held that, under 11 U.S.C. § 522,

the Bankruptcy Code preempts any contrary state law,

and, therefore, any state exemption statutes in effect

at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed apply, regardless of whether the state legislature intended a particular exemption statute to apply only prospectively, retroactively, or only under certain circumstances. See, e.g.,

In re Morinia, Docket No. 11-07-12803 SA, 2008 WL

5157501, *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. August 13, 2008); In re

Skjetne, 213 B.R. 274, 275, 278 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1997). As

the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the

First Circuit explained, ‘‘we must discern the outer limits of a state law’s ability to control an exemption’s

operative characteristics in the bankruptcy universe.’’

In re Leicht, 222 B.R. 670, 677 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998).

‘‘[A]lthough through § 522 (b) Congress provided states

with the opportunity to define the category and content

of exemptions resident debtors may invoke in bankruptcy (going so far as to authorize states to opt out of

the federal exemption scheme), it defined the operative

effect of exemptions in bankruptcy through [§] 522 (c)

and (f). . . . As a consequence, those provisions of the

[state] homestead statute that limit the exemption’s
vitality against certain categories of claims cannot hold

sway against conflicting [Bankruptcy] Code provisions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. On this

view, the answer to the certified question would be

easy: because P.A. 21-161, § 1, took effect prior to the

date the debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed, the new,

higher exemption would apply as a matter of federal

law.

The Second Circuit, however, has reached a different

conclusion with respect to the choice of law question,

holding that whether and to what extent an exemption

is applicable on the date a petition is filed is a matter

solely of state law. SeeCFCU Community Credit Union

v. Hayward, supra, 552 F.3d 259 (‘‘[although] federal

law governs the date on which the exemption comes

into play, [state] law governs the nature and scope of

the exemption’’); see also First National Bank of Mobile

v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting

argument that 11 U.S.C. § 522 preempts state law regarding retroactive application of homestead amendments).

We assume that the Bankruptcy Court will adhere to

Second Circuit law on this point. See, e.g., In re Pratt &

Whitney Co., 140 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992);

see also, e.g., In re Duda, 182 B.R. 662, 667 (Bankr. D.

Conn. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R.

601 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98

F.3d 729 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we must proceed

on the assumption that Hayward controls and that it

falls to this court to determine, as a matter of Connecticut law, whether the new exemption amount contained

in P.A. 21-161, § 1, applied to the debtor’s bankruptcy

petition filed after the effective date of that statute,

regardless of when the underlying debts accrued.

B

We turn our attention, therefore, to the trustee’s argument that the legislature intended the amended homestead exemption to apply to bankruptcy petitions6

filed

on or after October 1, 2021, but did not intend debts

accrued prior to that date to be subject to the higher

exemption amount. We are not persuaded.

1

Because the applicability of the expanded homestead

exemption presents a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text of the act. See General

Statutes § 1-2z; see also Maghfour v. Waterbury, 340

Conn. 41, 46–47, 262 A.3d 692 (2021) (when addressing

issue of retroactivity, we begin by asking whether legislature has expressly prescribed statute’s proper reach).

Public Act 21-161, § 1, begins by repealing General

Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 52-352b in its entirety. It then

provides, with respect to the homestead exemption:

‘‘The following property of any natural person shall be

exempt . . . (21) The homestead of the exemptioner

to the value of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, pro-
vided value shall be determined as the fair market value

of the real property less the amount of any statutory

or consensual lien which encumbers it, except that, in

the case of a money judgment arising out of a claim of

sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, sexual assault

or other wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct committed by a natural person, to the value of seventy-five

thousand dollars . . . .’’ P.A. 21-161, § 1. Finally, the

act provides that it is ‘‘[e]ffective October 1, 2021

. . . .’’ P.A. 21-161, § 1.

On its face, P.A. 21-161, § 1, is silent as to the accrual

date of the debts that are the subject of the postjudgment

proceeding or bankruptcy governed by the amended

homestead exemption. Nothing in the language of the

act indicates that the legislature intended to carve out

preexisting (or any other) debts from the reach of the

exemption. Section 52-352b is part of chapter 906 of

the General Statutes, which regulates postjudgment

procedures, and the statute simply defines what property is exempt, that is, ‘‘not subject to any form of

process or court order for the purpose of debt collection

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-352a (3). Accordingly, on

the face of the statute, there is no reason to think that

the expanded homestead exemption, which undisputedly applies in all bankruptcy proceedings brought on

or after the effective date, does not apply to preexisting

debts. See, e.g., Southwick at Milford Condominium

Assn., Inc. v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road, Milford, LLC,

294 Conn. 311, 320, 984 A.2d 676 (2009) (‘‘if the legislature had intended to create any exception to this rule

. . . we must assume that it would have said so

expressly’’); Earl B. v. Commissioner of Children &

Families, 288 Conn. 163, 175–76, 952 A.2d 32 (2008)

(similar); Board of Education v. Booth, 232 Conn. 216,

221, 654 A.2d 717 (1995) (‘‘there is nothing in the definition of ‘earnings’ under [General Statutes] § 52-350a

(5) to suggest that the legislature intended to limit the

exemption from prejudgment garnishment only to those

debts payable prior to the termination of the employment relationship’’).

We do not understand the trustee to contest that this

is the plain meaning of the statutory text. Rather, he

contends that we should nevertheless find an implicit

carve-out for preexisting debts for two reasons. First,

the public act that created the prior version of the

statute contained such a carve-out. See P.A. 93-301,

§§ 2 and 3. Second, interpreting P.A. 21-161, § 1, not to

include a similar carve-out would be to give the act

retroactive effect without the express authorization of

the legislature. We consider each argument in turn.

2

The trustee first contends that we should read a

carve-out for preexisting debts into P.A. 21-161, § 1,

because the legislature included such a carve-out in

P.A. 93-301, the act that created the initial homestead
exemption. Public Act 93-301, § 3, provides: ‘‘This act

shall take effect October 1, 1993, and shall be applicable

to any lien for any obligation or claim arising on or

after said date.’’ (Emphasis added.) The federal courts

have read the highlighted language to create a carveout for preexisting debts in bankruptcy proceedings.

See, e.g., Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R. 601, 604–605 (D.

Conn.), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98 F.3d 729 (2d

Cir. 1996). The trustee’s argument appears to be that

the legislature, having been aware of the language and

judicial interpretations of the prior act, would have

clearly indicated had it intended not to include a similar

carve-out in P.A. 21-161, § 1.

Even if we were to agree with the trustee that it is

appropriate to look to the legislative history of the act,

however; see Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642, 665–66,

A.3d (2023) (plurality opinion); see also id., 705

n.10 (Ecker, J., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment); we are not persuaded that the trustee’s

interpretation is correct.7

Indeed, the trustee’s argument

runs headlong into a basic rule of statutory interpretation. ‘‘As we have stated many times, [when] a statute,

with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar

statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant

to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Assn. v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 256,

890 A.2d 522 (2006). This principle applies with equal

force to reenactments of previous statutes. See, e.g.,

Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 313 Conn. 535, 543–48, 98

A.3d 808 (2014).

The fact that the legislature included a special carveout for preexisting debts in the original homestead act

but did not include one in the 2021 act indicates an

intent not to exclude preexisting debts from the scope

of the expanded homestead exemption. Indeed, it makes

perfect sense that, when the legislature increased the

homestead exemption in 2021 to keep pace with inflation, it would have opted to avoid the practical problems

that could have arisen from carving out preexisting

debts at that time.8

3

Finally, we turn our attention to the issue at the core

of the certified question, as originally framed by the

District Court. The trustee’s primary argument is that

interpreting P.A. 21-161, § 1, not to include a carve-out

for preexisting debts would give the act retroactive

effect without the express authorization of the legislature. Specifically, the trustee contends that P.A. 21-161,

§ 1, effected a substantive change in the law and that,

under § 55-3, substantive amendments presumptively

apply on a solely prospective basis. The debtor counters

that the amendment was procedural rather than substantive in nature and, therefore, can be applied retroac-
tively. In the alternative, the debtor argues that, regardless of whether we characterize the amendment as

substantive or procedural, in the present case, it is

being applied on a solely prospective basis, insofar as

it applies to a bankruptcy proceeding that was initiated

after the effective date of the act. Because we agree with

the debtor that the enactment of the higher homestead

exemption does not constitute retroactive legislation

when applied to postenactment petitions, we need not

resolve the question of whether the amendment was

procedural or substantive in nature. In short, there is

no retroactivity problem here.

‘‘It is well established that § 55-3 is a rule of presumed

legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive

rights shall apply prospectively only. . . . The rule is

rooted in the notion that it would be unfair to impose

a substantive amendment that changes the grounds [on]

which an action may be maintained on parties who

have already transacted or who are already committed

to litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shannon v. Commissioner of Housing, 322 Conn. 191, 202,

140 A.3d 903 (2016). This rule is easier stated than

applied. See, e.g., id., 204. It is not always clear, for

example, whether a particular change in the General

Statutes qualifies as substantive or procedural. See, e.g.,

Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 243 Conn. 311, 317–

18, 702 A.2d 1180 (1997); see also, e.g., Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 80, 110, 115 A.3d

1031 (2015) (majority and dissenting justices disagreed

over whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.

Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), announced watershed

rule of criminal procedure for purposes of retroactivity), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 577 U.S.

1202, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). Most of the

briefing in the present case is addressed to that issue.

But dispositive considerations can arise well before

we reach the substantive/procedural junction. Section

55-3 comes into play—that is, we only need to determine

if a new provision of the General Statutes is substantive

or procedural—only if the amendment would have a

‘‘retrospective effect.’’ Section 55-3 does not define the

term ‘‘retrospective effect,’’ however, and whether a

new law would have such an effect in a given case is

not always apparent. See, e.g., Shannon v. Commissioner of Housing, supra, 322 Conn. 204 (‘‘deciding

when a statute operates retroactively is not always a

simple or mechanical task’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). As United States Supreme Court Justice

Antonin Scalia explained in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S.

343, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1999), asking

whether a change in the law is intended to operate

retroactively ‘‘leaves open the key question: retroactive

in reference to what?’’ Id., 362 (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment).

Many retroactivity cases, and most of the easy ones,
involve ‘‘what modern scholarship calls primary retroactivity—altering the past legal consequences of past

actions. [This includes] legislative creation of criminal

or civil liability for completed acts, significantly lessening or adding onto the burdens of past contracts

(particularly debt contracts), legislative termination of

accrued claims for relief [regardless of whether they

are] the subject of a pending action, and legislative

undoing of final judgments no longer subject to appeal.’’

(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) A. Woolhandler, ‘‘Public Rights, Private

Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,’’ 94 Geo. L.J. 1015,

1022–23 (2006). These situations tend to be governed

by well established rules, such as that ‘‘[a] criminal

statute is said to have [primary] retroactive application

if it applies to crimes allegedly committed prior to its

date of enactment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739, 746, 258 A.3d 14 (2021);

see also General Statutes § 1-1 (u) (passage or repeal

of act presumptively does not affect pending actions).

More troublesome is so-called secondary retroactivity, which refers to statutory changes that solely alter

the future legal consequences of past transactions or

occurrences. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 219, 109 S. Ct. 468, 102 L.

Ed. 2d 493 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing

distinction between primary and secondary retroactivity); J. Laitos, ‘‘Legislative Retroactivity,’’ 52 Wash. U.

J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 81, 84–85 (1997) (same). Many

changes in the law could be characterized as retroactive

in some respect. That is to say, they attach some new,

future legal consequences to actions that were taken

or decisions that were made prior to their enactment.

See, e.g., A. Woolhandler, supra, 94 Geo. L.J. 1022 (‘‘[s]ome

modern judges and even more modern scholars see the

retroactivity-prospectivity line in the civil context as

logically illusory, because all legal change may defeat

expectations, creating winners and losers’’). That alone

is not enough to render a statute retroactive. See, e.g.,

D. Bassett, ‘‘In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity Analysis,’’ 69 U. Cin.

L. Rev. 453, 467 (2001) (‘‘[e]ven when laws expressly

state that they are to be applied prospectively, it is

virtually certain that they will affect expectations and

prior transactions’’). Indeed, we frequently have recognized that ‘‘a statute does not operate [retroactively]

merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment . . . or upsets

expectations based in prior law.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Maghfour v. Waterbury, supra, 340

Conn. 49–50.

Take alimony, for example. The legislature might

amend the alimony laws to make them less favorable

to either the payer or the payee. Such a law would

almost certainly qualify as retroactive if applied to

divorces and alimony awards that were finalized prior
to its passage, and we would require a clear statement

of legislative intent before applying it to them.9 But,

surely, applying the new law in a future divorce action

to a couple who married in 1990 would not be characterized as a retroactive application, even though the substantive legal rules and duties that govern the couple

will now differ from those that were in place when they

made the choice to marry. In that case, the opposite

presumption applies; we would assume that the new

rules do apply to existing marriages, unless the legislature provides otherwise. The fact that the change in

the law is substantive is of little moment. The reason

for the different outcome is that the relevant reference

point for purposes of retroactivity is the divorce, which

happens after the change in the law, and not the marriage, which happened before.

The relevant reference point is not always so intuitively clear. Hadix was a particularly thorny case. The

attorney’s fee statute at issue in that case arguably could

have been retroactively applicable to five different categories of events.10 Before the United States Supreme

Court could assess whether the ordinary presumption

against retroactivity applied, the court first had to identify the relevant reference point or points. See Martin

v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 357–58.

In the present case, as in the alimony hypothetical,

there really are just two possibilities. The trustee contends that the accrual of the debts qualifies as one

relevant reference point. If we permit the debtor to

claim the expanded homestead exemption with respect

to debts that accrued prior to the passage of P.A. 21-

161, § 1, then its application will be retroactive as to

those debts and should be permitted only if the legislature demonstrated an intent for the amendment to apply

retroactively.

The debtor disagrees. She contends that the only

relevant consideration is when her bankruptcy proceeding was commenced, as the relevant reference point is

the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding, not the

debts to which the homestead exemption would apply.

If the expanded homestead exemption were applied to

a previously commenced bankruptcy proceeding, then

a retroactivity issue would arise. But, she contends,

merely to apply the expanded exemption in a bankruptcy proceeding that was commenced after the effective date of P.A. 21-161, § 1, does not raise any retroactivity concerns, regardless of when the debts accrued,

and, so, § 55-3 simply does not apply here.

For secondary retroactivity claims of this sort, courts,

including this court, have struggled to identify the

proper reference point or points and to define exactly

when a new law so alters the future legal consequences

of prior conduct that it can be said to operate retroactively with respect to that conduct. The seminal case

in which the United States Supreme Court attempted
to resolve these issues was Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229

(1994). In Landgraf, a five justice majority recognized

that the high court had used various formulations to

articulate when a substantive change in the law is being

applied retroactively, including that a statute or law is

retroactive if it ‘‘changes the legal consequences of acts

completed before its effective date’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) id., 269 n.23; ‘‘gives a quality or effect

to acts or conduct [that] they did not have or did not

contemplate when they were performed’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.; or ‘‘takes away or impairs

vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates

a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new

disability, in respect to transactions or considerations

already past . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 269. Ultimately, the Landgraf majority settled

on the following formulation: ‘‘[T]he court must ask

whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The

conclusion that a particular rule operates retroactively

comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning

the nature and extent of the change in the law and the

degree of connection between the operation of the new

rule and a relevant past event.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 269–70. Put differently, ‘‘[a] new

statute would have retroactive effect . . . [if] it would

impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase

a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties

with respect to transactions already completed.’’ Id.,

280; see also Martin v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 358 (retroactivity assessment ‘‘should be informed and guided

by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable

reliance, and settled expectations’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The Landgraf majority’s formulation certainly covers

the full ambit of primary retroactivity. With respect to

secondary retroactivity, however, the guidance is less

instructive. As we discussed, virtually every substantive

change in the law has the potential to upset someone’s

expectations or impose new consequences on some

prior actions and decisions. Under the majority

approach in Landgraf, the more settled and reasonable

those expectations, the more likely we are to deem the

change retroactive. But the majority readily admits that

this analysis is a subjective one, recognizing that its

formulation ‘‘will leave room for disagreement in hard

cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety

of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity.’’

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 270.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by two

other members of the court, proposed a different

approach to retroactivity questions. See Landgraf v.

USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 290, 114 S. Ct. 1522,

128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgments). The concurrence argued that ‘‘[t]he critical
issue . . . is not whether the rule affects vested rights

. . . but rather what is the relevant activity that the

rule regulates. [In the absence of a] clear statement

otherwise, only such relevant activity [that] occurs after

the effective date of the statute is covered. Most statutes

are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will

not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred

before their effective date. But other statutes have a

different purpose and therefore a different relevant retroactivity event.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 291 (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgments). By way of example, the concurrence

explained, ‘‘[a] new ban on gambling applies to existing

casinos and casinos under construction . . . even though

it attaches a new disability to those past investments.

The relevant retroactivity event is the primary activity

of gambling, not the primary activity of constructing

casinos.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 293–94 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgments).

Although the majority’s approach in Landgraf is, of

course, the law of the land, at least as far as federal

law is concerned, the United States Supreme Court has,

at times, also relied on the Landgraf concurrence. See,

e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.

Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 138 L. Ed.

2d 135 (1997) (majority approach in Landgraf is not

‘‘the exclusive definition of presumptively impermissible retroactive legislation’’); id., 951 (citing concurrence’s approach); see also, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 566

U.S. 257, 269–70, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 182 L. Ed. 2d 473

(2012) (part of what court considers in assessing

whether application of statute would be retroactive is

what primary activity Congress sought to regulate).

Accordingly, the lower federal courts have found both

approaches instructive when faced with thorny questions regarding secondary retroactivity. See, e.g., Covino v. Reopel, 89 F.3d 105, 106–108 (2d Cir. 1996). Insofar

as our prior retroactivity cases have not provided adequate guidance in this respect, we take this opportunity

to clarify that both approaches are part of a proper

retroactivity analysis under Connecticut law.

In this case, both the majority’s and the concurrence’s

approaches in Landgraf point to the same result: application of P.A. 21-161, § 1, to preexisting debts would not

constitute a retroactive application. Under the majority’s

approach, we look to factors such as whether allowing

the debtor to avail herself of the higher homestead

exemption would impair established rights of the creditors or the trustee, impose new duties or obligations

that they could not reasonably have anticipated, or disturb other reasonable, settled expectations. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 270, 280.

There is no claim here that P.A. 21-161, § 1, imposed

any new duties or obligations on the parties.
With respect to the rights and expectations of the

parties regarding the unsecured debts at issue in this

case, we are persuaded by the following analysis: ‘‘The

reality of modern commercial transactions is that a

lender who reasonably expects specific property to be

available to satisfy an obligation . . . takes a secured

position in the property. A lender’s expectation of later

realization of payment from unsecured property in existence at the time of contract is, [in the absence of]

unusual circumstances, an expectation founded on pure

speculation. Realization of payment from such property

is necessarily dependent [on] circumstances and rights

that do not exist at the time of [the] unsecured contract

and that are not created by it. It is dependent [on]

continued retention of ownership and equity in the

property by a debtor as well as the subsequent creation

of a lien by judgment and/or levy.

‘‘A creditor’s right to enforcement of the contract

through remedy of judgment and levy against specific

unsecured property of a debtor is an implied contract

right. But the contractual relationship of parties is not

substantially impaired by later legislation compromising or eliminating that right unless the right otherwise

has substantial value to the contractual relationship at

the time of the legislation complained of. [When] an

unsecured claim has not been reduced to judgment

prior to such legislation, the abstract right of potential

enforcement out of specific unsecured property, standing alone, ordinarily has no substantial value to the

contractual relationship in light of modern commercial

transactions. This is particularly so [when] the legislation compromising or eliminating the right is in an area

of established, long-standing legislative control and regulation, such as homestead exemption laws. The abstract

right is simply one without reasonable expectation of

fulfillment.’’ (Footnote omitted.) In re Johnson, 69 B.R.

988, 993 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); see also Central Bank

v. Hickey, 238 Conn. 778, 784, 680 A.2d 298 (1996) (‘‘the

very nature of an unsecured debt is that the creditor

has no current legal interest in the assets of its debtor’’);

Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147, 3 A.2d 839 (1939)

(established rights that are presumptively secure from

retroactive civil legislation ‘‘must be something more

than such a mere expectation as may be based [on] an

anticipated continuance of the present general laws’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

For this reason, we reject the trustee’s argument that

applying the increased homestead exemption to preexisting debts would be fundamentally unfair because it

would frustrate the settled expectations of unsecured

lenders who extended credit while the lower, $75,000

exemption was in place. There is no evidence in the

record that the debtor’s creditors ever considered the

equity in her house, much less that they relied to their

detriment on the size of the Connecticut homestead
exemption when they decided to extend her credit.

Rather, the unsecured creditors are presumed to have

been aware that the legislature could increase the size

of the homestead exemption at any time and that their

rights might otherwise be adversely impacted by

changes in federal or state law. See, e.g., CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward, supra, 552 F.3d 268;

see also, e.g., In re Van Hove, 78 B.R. 917, 920 (N.D.

Iowa 1987) (lenders’ reasonable contract expectations

were not impaired by application of increased exemption, in light of state’s ‘‘clearly established . . . rule

that the extent of the debtor’s exemption rights [is]

determined by reference to the exemption statutes in

effect on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed,

regardless of when the debts arose’’ (emphasis in original)). Indeed, the debtor could have simply shielded

additional assets by selling her Connecticut home and

relocating to one of the many states with larger (in some

cases, unlimited) homestead exemptions. See, e.g., T.

Tarvin, ‘‘Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus

Accepting the New Job Out of State,’’ 43 Loy. U. Chi.

L.J. 141, 145 (2011). Any expectation that the debtor

would be perpetually limited to a $75,000 exemption

was, in short, unreasonable.

The result is the same under the concurrence’s

approach in Landgraf. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 291 (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgments). Applying P.A. 21-161, § 1, to preexisting

debts would not qualify as a retroactive application of

the law because the accrual of those debts is not the

principal activity that the law seeks to regulate. See id.

As we discussed; see footnote 6 of this opinion; § 52-

352b is part of chapter 906, which deals with postjudgment procedures, and the title of P.A. 21-161 is ‘‘An Act

Concerning Property That Is Exempt from a Judgment

Creditor.’’ Neither the original homestead act nor the

2021 amendment makes any reference whatsoever to

the source or nature of the underlying debts involved.

The focus, rather, is entirely on the enforcement process—what exemptions are available to the debtor during the bankruptcy or postjudgment proceeding.

11 Public

Act 21-161, § 1, provides that the homestead exemption

‘‘shall be determined as the fair market value of the real

property less the amount of any statutory or consensual

lien which encumbers it’’ at the time of the proceeding,

not when the debt or debts accrued. It is clear that the

purpose of the act is to specify the exemptions that are

presently available to a debtor. Indeed, counsel for the

trustee conceded at oral argument before this court that

the primary purpose of the statute is to allow debtors

to shield from creditors a portion of the equity in their

home. For this reason, applying the expanded homestead exemption to a bankruptcy proceeding that was

initiated on or after the effective date of the act does

not constitute a retroactive application, any more than
a new law governing divorces would be retroactive

with respect to already married couples. That result is

consistent with this court’s prior secondary retroactivity cases.12

We thus conclude that P.A. 21-161, § 1, is not retroactive as applied to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

Accordingly, § 55-3 is not applicable, and we need not

resolve the dispute between the parties as to whether

the 2021 amendment effected a substantive or procedural change in the law. See State v. Faraday, 268 Conn.

174, 197 and n.11, 842 A.2d 567 (2004). Because the

legislature did not direct otherwise, the expanded

homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1,

applies in all bankruptcy and postjudgment proceedings

initiated on or after the effective date of the act, regardless of when the underlying debts accrued.

The answer to the certified question, as reformulated,

that is, does the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to

debts that accrued prior to that date, is ‘‘yes.’’

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The relevant statutory language is set forth in part II B 2 of this opinion.

2 The act maintained the $75,000 exemption for money judgments arising

out of certain tort claims that are not relevant to the present case. Public

Acts 2021, No. 21-161, § 1; see also part II B 1 of this opinion.

3 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes,

not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any

new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a

retrospective effect.’’

We will use the terms ‘‘retrospective’’ and ‘‘retroactive’’ interchangeably.

4

‘‘Under the [federal Bankruptcy] Code, all property of the debtor, including exempt property, initially becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. The

debtor is thereafter permitted to assert exemptions by filing a list of property

that he or she claims as exempt. . . . [T]he exemptions augment the debtor’s ‘fresh start’ by allowing the debtor to take back certain assets from the

bankruptcy estate.’’ (Citations omitted.) Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R. 601, 603

(D. Conn.), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98 F.3d 729 (2d Cir. 1996).

5 Under the Bankruptcy Code, states can choose to opt out of the federal

bankruptcy exemptions, so that only those afforded by state law are available

in a federal bankruptcy proceeding conducted in that state. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 522 (b) (2) (2018). Approximately one third of the states, including Connecticut, have not opted out. See, e.g., G. Sullivan, ‘‘A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy

Exemptions,’’ 2018 BYU L. Rev. 335, 339 (2018); J. Salisbury, Note, ‘‘Are

They or Aren’t They ‘Retirement Funds’? The Case for Including Funds from

an Inherited IRA in a Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate,’’ 80 Mo. L. Rev. 871, 884

n.142 (2015).

6 The amended homestead exemption is codified at § 52-352b (21). By its

terms, § 52-352b makes no mention of bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, on

its face, all of chapter 906 of the General Statutes is dedicated only to

postjudgment proceedings. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the legislature intended the homestead exemption, like all of the exemptions contained

in § 52-352b, to be available in federal bankruptcy proceedings under 11

U.S.C. § 522 (b), as well.

Section 52-352b begins with the statement that ‘‘[t]he following property

of any natural person shall be exempt . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-352a

(3), in turn, defines ‘‘exempt’’ expansively as ‘‘not subject to any form of

process or court order for the purpose of debt collection . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) To the extent that the statutory language is ambiguous in this

respect, the legislative history confirms that the homestead exemption was

intended to be used primarily in federal bankruptcy proceedings. This point

is made repeatedly in the legislative histories of both the original version

of the homestead act and the 2021 amendment. See, e.g., 36 H.R. Proc., Pt.
30, 1993 Sess., p. 10,828, remarks of Representative Dale W. Radcliffe (‘‘[t]he

amendment merely adds to several of those exemptions in the event of

bankruptcy’’); id., pp. 10,849–50, remarks of Representative Lee A. Samowitz

(discussing application of homestead exemption in foreclosure and bankruptcy); id., p. 10,857, remarks of Representative Radcliffe (‘‘[o]nly two

states . . . provide no protection [whatsoever] for a . . . resident in the

event of bankruptcy and that is really what this does’’); see also, e.g., 64 H.R.

Proc., Pt. 6, 2021 Sess., p. 4170, remarks of Representative Craig Fishbein

(discussing exemptions in bankruptcy context); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 2021 Sess., pp. 1454–58, remarks of Attorney

Susan M. Williams (discussing exemption in bankruptcy context); id., p.

1456, remarks of Attorney Williams (‘‘three decades is much too long to

wait to amend the home bankruptcy exemptions’’).

7 Likewise, we have reviewed the legislative history of P.A. 21-161, § 1,

and, to the extent that it is relevant, we find therein no support for the

trustee’s contention that the legislature intended to create a new carve-out

for preexisting debts.

8 As the Bankruptcy Court observed, if P.A. 21-161, § 1, repealed the prior

homestead exemption, but the expanded one was applicable only to those

debts accrued on or after October 1, 2021, then the practical effect could

have been to create a ‘‘donut hole’’ in which the exemption was temporarily

abolished in its entirety. See In re Cole, supra, 642 B.R. 221. That was

certainly not the intent of the legislature. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy

Court explained, even if the original homestead exemption did continue to

follow debts accrued while it was in effect, the trustee’s interpretation would

significantly and unnecessarily complicate bankruptcy proceedings, as different exemption amounts could apply to portions of different debts that

were accrued before and after the effective date. See id. (‘‘asserting two

applicable state homestead exemptions would be incongruous and would

irreconcilably complicate the administration of a bankruptcy estate’’); see

also In re Skjetne, supra, 213 B.R. 278 (with respect to revolving credit

accounts, cautioning about ‘‘the tremendous cost . . . and the impossible

task of knowing what debt is incurred prior to . . . and what debt is incurred

after the effective date of the homestead amendment’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

9 This assumes that such application satisfied all relevant constitutional

restraints. The question of whether application of a new or amended statute

qualifies as retroactive—a matter largely of statutory interpretation—is distinct from the question of whether it violates the contract clause of the

federal constitution or the ex post facto, takings, or due process provisions

of the federal or state constitutions.

10 Hadix addressed a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-72 (codified

as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (d) (3)), that placed new limits ‘‘on the

fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits.’’

Martin v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 347. In that case, the limits arguably could

have applied ‘‘retroactively’’ with respect to five different points in time or

categories of events: ‘‘(1) the alleged violation [on] which the fee-imposing

suit is based (applying the new fee rule to any case involving an alleged

violation that occurred before the PLRA became effective would be giving

it retroactive application); (2) the lawyer’s undertaking to prosecute the

suit for which attorney’s fees were provided (applying the new fee rule to

any case in which the lawyer was retained before the PLRA became effective

would be giving it retroactive application); (3) the filing of the suit in which

the fees are imposed (applying the new fee rule to any suit brought before

the PLRA became effective would be giving it retroactive application); (4)

the doing of the legal work for which the fees are payable (applying the

new fee rule to any work done before the PLRA became effective would

be giving it retroactive application); and (5) the actual award of fees in a

prisoner case (applying the new fee rule to an award rendered before the

PLRA became effective would be giving it retroactive application).’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 362–63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).

11 Although the 2021 amendment maintained the $75,000 cap on the homestead exemption for debts arising from certain categories of legal claims,

it did so only with respect to money judgments arising out of those claims.

See General Statutes § 52-352b (21) (maintaining prior homestead exemption

‘‘in the case of a money judgment arising out of a claim of sexual abuse

or exploitation of a minor, sexual assault or other wilful, wanton, or reckless

misconduct committed by a natural person’’ (emphasis added)).
12 See, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, 307 Conn. 53, 69–70, 52 A.3d 636 (2012) (application of nondisclosure rule to previously detained individuals would not be retroactive); Contractor’s Supply of Waterbury, LLC v. Commissioner of Environmental

Protection, 283 Conn. 86, 88–89, 109–10, 925 A.2d 1071 (2007) (law barring

location of asphalt plants in proximity to watercourses was not retroactive

as applied to prior permit application); Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor

Control, 194 Conn. 165, 172–76, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984) (statute that prohibited

termination of wholesale liquor distributorships except for cause applied

prospectively to all terminations regardless of whether distributorships predated or postdated statute); Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180, 187, 423 A.2d

875 (1979) (statute expanding inheritance rights of ‘‘illegitimate children’’

operated prospectively as to future deaths but, apparently, encompassed

children born before enactment); Hartford v. Suffield, 137 Conn. 341, 343–45,

77 A.2d 760 (1950) (in action to recover cost of supporting ‘‘paupers,’’ statute

providing that ‘‘ ‘[a]ny person, having a settlement in any town in this state,

who shall have resided outside of said town for a period of four consecutive

years, shall be deemed to have lost his settlement therein’ ’’ was prospective

in effect because it governed actions brought after its operative date, even

though it altered legal status of persons who relocated prior to that date).