Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 1 of 27

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony J. Saunders

New Castle, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Joel E. Harvey

New Castle, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Virginia Madden,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Robert Phelps,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 23, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-2630

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1105-JP-16

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 2 of 27

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, Virginia Madden (Mother), appeals the trial court’s 

Order modifying custody of the parties’ minor child, B.P., in favor of AppelleePetitioner, Robert Phelps (Father), and ordering Mother to pay attorney’s fees 

and parenting coordinator fees. 

[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.

ISSUES

[3] Mother presents the court with four issues, which we restate as the following 

three:

(1) Whether the trial court’s award of sole legal custody and 

primary physical custody to Father was clearly erroneous;

(2) Whether the trial court’s contempt finding against Mother 

and award of $1000 in attorney’s fees to Father was clearly 

erroneous; and

(3) Whether the trial court’s order that Mother pay $3,645.50 in 

parenting coordinator fees was clearly erroneous. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On January 20, 2011, B.P. was born to Mother and Father (collectively, 

Parents). Parents, B.P., and Mother’s two children from a prior relationship 

resided at a home on Prairie Knoll Drive in New Castle, Indiana, which had 

been left in trust to Mother’s two older children by their deceased father. After 
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Parents terminated their relationship, Mother continued to reside at the Prairie 

Knoll home for a time, and Father resided in Bloomington, Indiana. On April 

9, 2012, Father’s paternity was established by entry of a judgment that provided 

that Parents would share joint legal custody but Mother would have primary 

physical custody of B.P. At the age of three, B.P. was diagnosed with a 

language disorder and developmental delay. When he was four years old, B.P. 

was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. It was recommended at that 

time that B.P. receive more intensive school services than he was currently 

receiving, that he continue with outpatient occupational and speech therapy, 

and that Parents receive education and support to assist with consistent 

parenting. B.P. has an individualized education plan at his public school. His 

therapists have recommended that he engage in group activities outside of 

school to assist in his social development. 

[5] Parents’ attempts to co-parent B.P. were not without conflict. Between April 

26, 2012, and January of 2018, Father filed three contempt motions and a rule 

to show cause motion against Mother. During the same period, Mother filed 

motions to modify child support and to mandate counseling for B.P. as well as

two motions seeking to have Father held in contempt and to have his parenting 

time modified. Parents agreed to the use of a parenting coordinator. One 

coordinator was engaged but withdrew when Mother did not pay her portion of 

the coordinator’s fees. 

[6] On February 5, 2018, after further litigation between Parents, the trial court 

entered an order appointing Dr. Erica Kane (Dr. Kane) as a parenting 
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coordinator whose mandate was to assist Parents to resolve their issues without 

court intervention. Dr. Kane was to make binding recommendations for the 

parties if they were unable to agree, but she was not to “serve as a custody 

evaluator in the case” or “offer a binding recommendation for a change in 

[B.P.’s] primary physical residence[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 47). 

Parents were to pay equal shares of Dr. Kane’s fees, but the trial court’s 

appointment order also provided that Dr. Kane had 

the discretion to report to the [c]ourt that [she] desires to charge 

either party separately for individual contacts with that party or 

joint contacts made necessary by that party’s behavior. The 

[c]ourt shall have the power to review, reallocate and enforce the 

payment of the fees of the [parenting coordinator]. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 43-44). 

[7] The current phase of litigation between Parents began on March 16, 2018, 

when Father filed a verified notice of intent to relocate to New Castle to take 

advantage of an employment opportunity and to be closer to B.P. Father’s 

notice also included a request to modify parenting time to two-week blocks 

spent at each parent’s home. Mother objected to Father’s proposed 

modification of parenting time. The trial court referred the matter to 

mediation, but mediation was never scheduled. 

[8] In the spring of 2018, Parents could not agree on whether B.P. should 

participate in baseball and soccer. As per the parenting coordinator order, Dr. 

Kane issued a binding recommendation that B.P. should participate because 
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those activities would assist in his socialization. B.P. attended all practices and

games when he was in Father’s care, but Mother did not take B.P. to sports 

when he was with her. 

[9] In May of 2018, Mother was notified by the trustees of the trust holding the 

Prairie Knoll home that she would be required to vacate within thirty days. 

Mother moved out of the Prairie Knoll home in June of 2018 but did not file a 

notice of intent to relocate with the trial court. In June of 2018, the Department 

of Child Services (DCS) substantiated a finding of neglect against Mother when 

B.P. sustained bruising on his neck after one of Mother’s other children shoved 

him while he was in Mother’s care. Parents participated in an informal 

adjustment which was extended until January of 2019 because Mother did not 

confirm her current address and had home inspections done at three different 

homes during the adjustment. The closeout report for the informal adjustment 

noted that Parents “will not agree on how to raise [B.P.] other than he does 

need services to help him thrive.” (Exh. Vol., p. 73). Mother and Father have 

reported each other to DCS on eleven occasions. 

[10] Parents disagreed about Father’s summer 2018 parenting time. Father had 

timely submitted his proposed dates, but Mother disagreed with his selected 

schedule. In July of 2018, Dr. Kane made a binding recommendation that 

Parents follow Father’s selected schedule for summer parenting time. On 

August 1, 2018, Father filed a contempt motion against Mother alleging that 

Mother had not followed Dr. Kane’s binding recommendations on summer 

parenting time, Mother had moved from the Prairie Knoll home without filing 
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the required notice of intent to relocate, and Mother failed to communicate 

with him. On August 28, 2018, the trial court found Mother in contempt for 

refusing Father summer parenting time and ordering her to serve thirty days in 

jail. The trial court allowed Mother to purge herself of her contempt by 

providing Father with thirty-four days of consecutive parenting time. The trial 

court also ordered Mother to pay $750 to Father’s attorney. 

[11] On January 22, 2019, Father filed a motion for contempt and mediation seeking 

payment of uninsured dental expenses Mother had been previously ordered to 

pay, mediation of his March 16, 2018, parenting-time modification motion, and 

payment of the $750 in attorney’s fees Mother had been ordered to pay after she 

had been found in contempt. The parties engaged in mediation. On March 18, 

2019, the mediator filed the Mediated Partial Agreement (MPA) with the trial 

court that provided, inter alia, that Parents would communicate with each other 

via email on decisions for B.P. regarding routine health care, education, 

religion, and extracurricular activities. If one parent failed to object to the 

other’s proposed decision on one of these issues within forty-eight hours, it was 

considered an agreement. If no agreement was reached on a healthcare or 

religious decision, either parent could petition the trial court for a hearing. Any 

unresolved disagreement regarding extracurricular activities was to be referred 

to the parenting coordinator for a binding recommendation. Mother was also 

to provide Father within ten days with a current utility bill held in her name for 

the Prairie Knoll home as well as proof of her payment of that utility bill. The 

MPA provided that “Mother states that she is residing full time at [the Prairie 
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Knoll home].” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 68). The MPA provided that 

“physical custody, parenting time, child support and 2018 uninsured health 

expenses” were the issues remaining to be resolved by the trial court. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 69). Mother signed the MPA, which was 

subsequently approved by the trial court. Mother did not provide Father with 

the utility bill and proof of payment required by the MPA. 

[12] In May of 2019, Father moved to a home in New Castle that was located 

approximately eight miles from his previous home. Father notified his attorney 

of his move in April of 2019, but his attorney did not file a notice of intent to 

relocate with the trial court. Father’s move did not result in any change in 

B.P.’s care. Father did not alert Mother to his change of address, which 

resulted in Mother calling law enforcement when she attempted to retrieve B.P. 

at Father’s old address and was informed that Father had moved. 

[13] Also in May of 2019, Father contacted Mother about B.P.’s participation in 

summer soccer and baseball. Mother responded via email that she would have 

to consult with her attorney about the matter. Mother never provided Father 

with further input on B.P.’s summer sports, so Father enrolled him and 

provided Mother with the schedule. Mother did not take B.P. to summer sports 

when he was in her care. On May 6, 2019, Father filed a verified motion “to 

address issues regarding custody and parenting time of [B.P.] and other issues 

described in this Petition.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 72).
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[14] Parents could not agree regarding Mother’s desire that B.P. participate in 

Conduct Curb, which is a school for children who have severe autism. B.P. 

was receiving psychotherapy. Neither B.P.’s therapist nor his social worker 

recommended that B.P. participate in the intensive treatment offered by 

Conduct Curb. 

[15] On June 25, 2019, Father filed a belated notice of intention to relocate with the 

trial court providing notice that he had moved to his new residence in New 

Castle. On June 26, 2019, Mother filed a contempt motion against Father 

alleging that he had not followed the required procedures for making medical 

and extracurricular activity decisions and had moved without filing a proper 

notice of intent to relocate. Mother also filed a motion seeking an order 

compelling B.P.’s attendance at Conduct Curb as well as a motion to have Dr. 

Kane removed as parenting coordinator. On June 27, 2019, Father filed a 

contempt motion against Mother for failing to provide him with the previouslyordered utility bill and proof of payment for the Prairie Knoll home. 

[16] On July 3, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s motion to have Dr. 

Kane removed as parenting coordinator. Dr. Kane testified that she had a 

personal bias against Mother as a result of the allegations made by Mother in 

her removal petition and that “I don’t think it’s my competence that’s in 

question, I think that it’s [Mother] who has created this.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 22). 

On July 9, 2019, the trial court entered an order allowing Dr. Kane to withdraw 

from the case and directing her to file her final report with the court. 
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[17] On August 5, 2019, Dr. Kane submitted her final report to the trial court. 

Mother had not been communicative with Dr. Kane regarding confirming her 

address, regarding her non-compliance with binding recommendations, 

inquiries about balances due, scheduling mediation, and her reasons for wishing 

to enroll B.P. in Conduct Curb. It was Dr. Kane’s opinion that B.P. did not 

meet the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder, that he was 

responding very well to outpatient treatment, and that he did not require the 

intensive level of intervention offered by Conduct Curb. Dr. Kane observed 

that Mother had not participated in B.P.’s therapy for over a year, despite being 

asked by his therapist several times. Dr. Kane had spoken with B.P.’s previous 

therapist who believed that B.P.’s symptoms were the result of “high levels of 

anxiety related to chronic parental conflict and Attention Deficit Disorder.” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 89). It was Dr. Kane’s opinion that B.P. was more 

than capable of learning in a general education classroom and that attending an 

intensive intervention school like Conduct Curb when it was not necessary 

could be demeaning for B.P. Dr. Kane observed that, given that Parents record 

of bypassing her and reporting issues directly to law enforcement, DCS, or 

filing motions with the court, it was unlikely that they would comply with 

parenting coordination in the future without imposition of consequences for 

non-compliance. Dr. Kane observed that Father had been arrested for domestic 

battery against his then-current partner in March of 2018, but that the charges 

were dismissed after Father participated in an intervention class and an online 

domestic violence course. Father was also receiving mental health services 

through the Veteran’s Administration. Dr. Kane opined that 
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[g]iven Mother’s history of contempt of court and refusal to

comply with recommendations, binding recommendations, 

orders from the court, as well as this [parenting coordinator’s], 

the former [parenting coordinator’s], DCS’S, and [Youth 

Services Bureau’s] instructions, [B.P.’s] needs may be best met 

with Father as the primary custodian.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 91). Dr. Kane recommended that Mother pay the 

full balance owed to her in the amount of $3,645.50 within thirty days of the 

filing of the report. 

[18] On August 14, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on all pending motions. 

Prior to beginning testimony, the trial court reviewed the issues to be addressed 

at the hearing. Joint legal custody was not mentioned as an issue. Father asked 

for primary custody of B.P. On cross-examination, Father confirmed that 

Parents had joint legal custody, that as primary physical custodian Mother 

made the majority of decisions about B.P., and that “[l]egally, I want to switch 

that, so I can make decisions based on . . . him.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 86). Father 

understood that, as joint custodians, he and Mother were supposed to work 

together on decisions about medical appointments and extracurricular activities, 

but that they only worked well together when Mother got what she wanted. 

When asked by Mother’s counsel, “but my client, even if you get what you 

want, would still have joint legal custody rights, correct?” Father responded, “I 

believe so, yes, . . . As I understand it.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 98). Father testified 

that Mother would frequently fail to respond to his emails or would respond 

with a blank email. Mother would not answer Father when he asked about 

exercising parenting time on Fridays when he was off work and she was 
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working, as provided for in the MPA. Father had contacted Conduct Curb and 

learned that they recommended thirty-five hours of therapy per week. Father 

renewed his request that Mother be held in contempt for not providing him 

with a utility bill in her name and proof of payment for the Prairie Knoll home 

as directed by the court-approved MPA. Father requested $1000 in attorney’s 

fees as a sanction. 

[19] Mother acknowledged in her testimony that she did not provide Father with the 

required Prairie Knoll utility bill and proof of payment. Mother agreed it is in 

B.P.’s best interests to participate in sports and confirmed that she lived close to 

the location of his soccer and baseball practices. Mother testified that she 

believed that Father had taken B.P. to have three cavities filled unnecessarily 

just so that he could incur dental bills she would be required to pay. Mother did 

not present any testimony regarding what she believed she owed Dr. Kane in 

fees. 

[20] On October 21, 2019, the trial court entered its Order on All Pending Matters in 

which it awarded primary physical and sole legal custody of B.P. to Father. 

The trial court found that a modification of physical custody to Father was 

merited because it was in B.P.’s best interests and because there had been a 

substantial and continuing change in several relevant factors, including Father’s 

desire to have custody, Mother’s ability to act in B.P.’s best interests, Mother’s 

ability to exercise good judgment, and Mother’s housing stability. The trial 

court noted Father’s arrests for domestic battery with concern but found that 

Father was participating in mental health counseling, appeared to be acting in 
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B.P.’s best interests, was consistently employed, and was capable of providing 

for B.P.’s care. The trial court also noted that “Dr. Kane’s report to the [c]ourt 

dated August 1, 2019, acknowledges that [B.P.’s] needs may be ‘best met’ with 

Father having primary physical custody.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 31). 

The trial court found that it was no longer in B.P.’s best interests that Parents 

share joint legal custody, observing that they were “unable to communicate and 

cooperate regarding [B.P.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 32). 

[21] The trial court further found that Father had moved from his last residence 

without filing the required notice of intent to relocate as alleged by Mother in 

her contempt motion. The trial court admonished Father to strictly comply 

with the notice requirement in the future but chose not to sanction Father 

because Father had alerted his attorney to the move and because Mother had 

also moved without filing the required notice. The trial court found Mother in 

contempt for failing to comply with the provision of the MPA requiring her to 

provide a current utility bill in her name for the Prairie Knoll home and proof of 

payment. The trial court further found that Mother knew at the time that she 

signed the MPA that she could not provide what was required and that her 

actions “in connection with this provision represent a bad faith effort to mislead 

Father and the [c]ourt.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35). As a sanction, the 

trial court ordered Mother to pay Father’s attorney $1000. The trial court also 

ordered Mother to pay the $3,645.50 that Dr. Kane indicated in her August 1,

2019, report was due to her. 

[22] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Custody

A. Standard of Review

[23] Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of legal and physical custody in 

favor of Father. This court recently stated our standard of review in custody 

matters as follows:

We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion with 

a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges 

in family law matters. This is because it is the trial court that 

observes the parties’ conduct and demeanor and hears their 

testimony firsthand. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge 

the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, we will reverse the trial 

court’s custody determination only if the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. [I]t is not enough that 

the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must 

positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant 

before there is a basis for reversal. It is not impossible to reverse

a trial court’s decision regarding child custody on appeal, but 

given our deferential standard of review, it is relatively rare. 

Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up). 

[24] Neither party requested that the trial court enter special findings pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). When a trial court enters findings of fact and 

conclusions of law sua sponte, those findings control only with respect to the 

issues they cover, and the general judgment standard applies to issues upon 

which no findings were entered. Ahls v. Ahls, 52 N.E.3d 797, 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016). Where the trial court entered findings, we consider whether the findings 
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are supported by the evidence and whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. We will only disregard a finding if it is clearly erroneous, meaning that there 

are no facts or inferences in the record to support it. Id. Matters falling under 

the general judgment standard are reviewed without reweighing evidence or 

considering witness credibility and may be affirmed upon any theory consistent 

with the evidence. Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind. 2008). 

B. Legal Custody

[25] Mother’s first challenge to the trial court’s award of sole legal custody to Father 

is that the issue was not properly before the trial court. Mother argues that

“[t]he parties had not agreed that the issue of joint legal custody would be 

contested and there was no written motion requesting a modification of legal 

custody.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Father responds that Parents put legal custody 

at issue by filing open-ended requests to modify custody. 

[26] In support of his argument, Father relies on Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 822 

N.E.2d 609, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), in which mother and father had joint 

legal custody of their child, with primary physical custody resting with mother. 

Id. Father subsequently filed a petition to modify custody, and the parties 

agreed to a custody evaluation. Id. The evaluator recommended that custody 

remain the same, with the addition of a parenting coordinator. Id. However, 

the evaluator further recommended that if the trial court decided to grant sole 

legal custody to one parent, it should be mother. Id. at 612. At the hearing on 

father’s motion, the parties stipulated to the admission of the custody 

evaluation and agreed with its recommendations. Id. After the trial court 
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awarded sole legal and physical custody to mother, father appealed, arguing 

that the trial court had erred in modifying legal custody because the parties had 

not placed legal custody at issue. Id. In affirming the trial court, we noted that 

father’s motion had requested an “open-ended” modification of custody after 

an evaluation and that the parties had agreed to the evaluator’s 

recommendations about legal custody. Id. As such, we found the issue to be 

“squarely before the trial court.” Id. 

[27] Here, an examination of the substance of the entirety of Parents’ motions 

reveals that their dispute pertained only to the physical custody of B.P. Legal 

custody was never mentioned by either party. Although Father is correct that, 

as in Higginbotham, he and Mother filed motions addressing “custody”,

Higginbotham is factually distinguishable because Father and Mother did not 

agree to abide by any third-party’s custody evaluation. (Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II, pp. 52, 54, 72). Other factors also lead us to conclude that the issue was not 

properly before the trial court. The MPA listed “physical custody, parenting 

time, child support and 2018 uninsured health expenses” as the only issues 

remaining to be addressed by the trial court. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 69). 

Notably, at the beginning of the August 15, 2019, hearing on all pending 

matters, the trial court and the parties did not identify legal custody as a matter 

to be addressed. 

[28] Neither do we find that Parents consented to try the issue of joint legal custody 

during the hearing. “[I]ssues raised by the pleadings can be altered by the 

evidence adduced at trial where the parties have impliedly or expressly 
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consented to new issues being tried.” Bailey v. Bailey, 7 N.E.3d 340, 344 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014). Although Father asserted during the hearing that he wanted to 

legally change who made most of the decisions about B.P., when Mother’s 

counsel observed that Mother would still have joint legal custody of B.P. even if 

Father received primary physical custody, Father affirmed that was his 

understanding. Thus, Mother did not believe that legal custody was in play, 

and Father did not indicate that he sought sole legal custody. Neither party 

submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions requesting sole legal 

custody. 

[29] It has been long-established that trial courts may not sua sponte order a change 

of custody. See, e.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Achor, 225 Ind. 319, 327, 75 N.E.2d 

154, 157 (1947)). On the facts and circumstances before us, we conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion when it modified legal custody without a 

request from either party. Given that we reverse the portion of the trial court’s 

Order granting sole legal custody to Father, we do not address Mother’s 

argument that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s modification of 

legal custody. 

C. Physical Custody

[30] Mother also contends that the trial court’s Order modifying primary physical 

custody of B.P. in favor of Father was clearly erroneous. Indiana Code section 

31-14-13-6 provides that, after a custody order has been issued in a paternity 

proceeding, a trial court may not modify custody unless modification is in the 

best interests of the child and there is a substantial change in one or more of the 
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factors that the trial court may consider under Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2

(Section 2), including:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parents;

(B) the child’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best 

interest.

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either 

parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.
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[31] Here, the trial court concluded that the grant of primary physical custody to 

Father was appropriate because it was in B.P.’s bests interests and there had 

been a substantial and continuing change “in multiple relevant factors,” 

including Father’s desire to have primary physical custody, Mother’s repeated 

and continuing refusal to act in B.P.’s best interests, and Mother’s unstable 

housing situation. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 31). The trial court also found 

that Mother’s evasiveness and dishonesty to the trial court about the fact that 

she was no longer living at the Prairie Knoll home raised serious concerns 

about her judgment. These conclusions were supported by the trial court’s 

findings and evidence in the record that Mother ignored Dr. Kane’s binding

recommendations about 2018 summer parenting time and B.P.’s participation

in summer sports, Mother desired to enroll B.P. in Conduct Curb despite the 

fact that B.P.’s therapist and social worker advised against it, Mother failed to 

pay two parenting coordinators, she failed to pay her share of B.P.’s medical 

expenses, she had home evaluations at three separate homes during the DCS 

informal adjustment, and she lied to the MPA mediator, Father, and the trial 

court about continuing to live at Prairie Knoll. The trial court’s best interests 

conclusion was further supported by its findings based on evidence in the record 

that Father had been consistently employed, was capable of providing for B.P., 

owned his own home, and had ensured that B.P. arrived at school on time. 

Because the trial court’s findings and conclusions were supported by evidence 

in the record, we cannot say that they were clearly erroneous. See Ahls, 52 

N.E.3d at 800. 
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[32] Mother argues otherwise because she contends that the trial court only found 

that one factor expressly listed in Section 2 had changed, namely, Father’s 

desire for custody, and that there was no substantial change in that factor 

because Father had always wanted custody. Section 2 provides that a trial 

court “shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the 

child” in light of “all relevant factors, including [the enumerated factors].” 

(Emphasis added). Thus, the trial court must consider what is in the best 

interests of the child, and the factors enumerated in the statute are not 

exclusive. Here, the trial court found a substantial and continuing change in 

one listed statutory factor, Father’s desire to have custody, as well as three nonenumerated factors, namely, Mother’s failure to act in B.P.’s best interests, her 

poor judgment, and her unstable housing situation. In addition, custody was 

established by a paternity order in 2012, and Father filed his first request to 

change custody on March 16, 2018, with his notice to relocate. Therefore, 

there was a substantial change in the one statutorily-enumerated factor found 

by the trial court. 

[33] Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding that Dr. Kane recommended 

primary physical custody rest with Father. Mother contends that the trial court 

should not have considered Dr. Kane’s recommendation because “[b]y offering 

a custody evaluation, she acted on her bias against . . . Mother and violated her 

own charge from the [c]ourt in making a custody evaluation.” (Appellant’s Br. 

pp. 12-13). We find this argument to be unpersuasive for at least two reasons. 

First, the trial court’s order appointing Dr. Kane merely provided that she was 
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not allowed to “serve as a custody evaluator in the case” or “offer a binding 

recommendation for change in [B.P.’s] primary physical residence,” not that 

she could offer no opinion on the subject at all. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 

47). There is no indication in the record that Dr. Kane acted as a formal 

custody evaluator in this matter or that the trial court considered the 

recommendation contained in Dr. Kane’s report to be binding on it or the 

parties. In addition, the same trial court judge presided over both the hearing 

on Mother’s petition to remove Dr. Kane and the final hearing in this matter. 

The trial court judge was, therefore, aware of the interaction of the parties with 

Dr. Kane and what Dr. Kane had said at the hearing about her personal bias 

against Mother. It was within the trial court’s discretion to credit or discredit 

Dr. Kane’s recommendation regarding physical custody in light of any potential 

bias on Dr. Kane’s part and, as we are not allowed to reweigh the evidence, 

Mother’s argument is contrary to our standard of review. See Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 

at 1029. 

[34] Mother also draws our attention to evidence in the record that Father had 

moved six times since paternity had been established, Father had a pattern of 

domestic violence that the trial court should have taken into account, and the 

trial court disregarded Father’s testimony “about his ongoing mental health 

treatments for anxiety and his belief that he has Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). These arguments are also contrary to our 

standard of review in that crediting them would entail consideration of evidence 

that does not support the trial court’s determination and/or a reweighing of the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 21 of 27

evidence. See Hecht, 142 N.E.3d at 1029. Mother’s argument regarding 

Father’s mental health also mischaracterizes the record, as Father did not testify 

at the August 15, 2019, hearing that he believed he had PTSD, and he 

specifically denied that he had been formally diagnosed with PTSD. Given the 

ample evidence supporting the trial court’s findings and conclusions, Mother 

has failed to meet her burden of persuasion on appeal to show that the evidence 

“positively require[d] the conclusion” that she have primary physical custody of 

B.P. See id. 

II. Contempt

[35] Mother next challenges the trial court’s grant of Father’s motion seeking to 

have her held in contempt for failing to produce a utility bill with proof of 

payment in her name for the Prairie Knoll home and the trial court’s award of 

$1000 in attorney fees. “Civil contempt is failing to do something that a court 

in a civil action has ordered to be done for the benefit of an opposing party.” 

P.S. v. T.W., 80 N.E.3d 253, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Trial courts have the 

inherent power to punish litigants in order to maintain the dignity of the court, 

secure obedience to process and rules, rebuke interference with the orderly 

conduct of business, and to punish unseemly behavior. City of Gary v. Major, 

822 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005). Whether a party is in contempt is a matter 

left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse a trial court’s 

finding of contempt only if no evidence or inferences exist in the record to 

support it. P.S., 80 N.E.3d at 256. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 22 of 27

[36] The gravamen of Mother’s argument regarding the trial court’s contempt 

finding is that it was unjust for her to be held in contempt for failing to file the 

required notice of relocation when Father did the same thing and was not held 

in contempt. However, Mother’s argument is based on a mischaracterization of 

the trial court’s ruling. The trial court did not find her in contempt for failing to 

file a notice to relocate; rather, it held her in contempt for failing to produce to 

Father the utility bill and proof of payment in her name for the Prairie Knoll 

home as she was required to do once the trial court approved the parties’ MPA

and for entering into the MPA knowing that she could not produce those 

things. The trial court found that “Mother’s actions in connection with this 

provision [of the MPA] represent a bad faith effort to mislead Father and the 

[c]ourt.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35). Mother does not address the 

evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s findings regarding her 

knowing violation of the MPA. As such, she has failed to persuade us that the 

trial court acted outside of its discretion by finding her in contempt. See P.S., 80 

N.E.3d at 256. 

[37] As to the trial court’s award of $1000 in attorney’s fees to Father, Mother

argues that this portion of the trial court’s Order was clearly erroneous because 

there was no evidence to support an award in that amount. Regardless of 

consideration of economic resources, once a party is found in contempt, the 

trial court has the inherent authority to compensate the aggrieved party for 

losses and damages resulting from another’s contemptuous actions, including 

an award of attorney’s fees. Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1222 (Ind. Ct.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 23 of 27

App. 2002). “The determination of damages in a contempt proceeding is 

within the trial court’s discretion, and we will reverse an award of damages 

only if there is no evidence to support the award.” City of Gary, 822 N.E.2d at 

172. 

[38] We agree with Mother that there was no evidence in the record to support the 

trial court’s award of $1000 in attorney’s fees to Father. Although Father 

testified that he sought an award of $1000 in fees for his contempt motion, he 

presented no evidence to support that request such as an attorney’s fee affidavit,

testimony establishing his attorney’s fee schedule and the time and expenses 

incurred on the contempt motion, or even testimony that he had been billed 

that amount for services rendered in connection with the contempt motion. 

Because no evidence supported the award, we find it to be an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion and clearly erroneous. See id.; see also Ahls, 52 N.E.3d at 800. 

Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s Order awarding Father

$1000 in attorney’s fees in relation to his contempt motion. 

III. Dr. Kane’s Fees

[39] Mother argues that the portion of the trial court’s Order directing her to pay 

$3,645.50 is clearly erroneous because “there is no evidence to support this 

disproportionate award of parenting coordinator fees[.]” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

14). However, Dr. Kane’s final report was filed with the trial court without 

objection by either party. In her report, Dr. Kane recommended to the trial 

court that Mother pay her the full balance owed for her services in the amount 
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of $3,645.50. Therefore, there was evidence in the record to support the trial 

court’s Order, and it is not clearly erroneous. See Ahls, 52 N.E.3d at 800.

[40] Mother also argues that the trial court’s Order that she pay $3,645.50 while 

ordering Father to pay only $593.75 in parenting coordinator fees was clearly 

erroneous because it contravened the parenting coordinator appointment order 

directing Parents to split those fees evenly. However, Mother’s argument 

overlooks the fact that the parenting coordinator appointment order also 

provided that Dr. Kane had the authority to “charge either party separately for 

individual contacts with that party or joint contacts made necessary by that 

party’s behavior.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 43). Therefore, Dr. Kane had 

the authority to charge Mother more than Father. Because the trial court’s 

Order was within the parameters of its previous order appointing Dr. Kane, its 

determination that Mother should pay $3,645.50 in fees was supported by the 

record and was, therefore, not clearly erroneous. See Ahls, 52 N.E.3d at 800.

CONCLUSION

[41] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the issue of legal custody was not 

properly before the trial court and that its award of $1000 in attorney’s fees to 

Father was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the trial 

court’s Order. We also conclude that the trial court’s grant of primary physical 

custody, its finding that Mother was in contempt, and its order that Mother pay 

$3,645.50 in parenting coordinator fees were not clearly erroneous. 

[42] Affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 25 of 27

[43] Mathias, J. concurs

[44] Tavitas, J. concurs in result with separate opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 26 of 27

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Virginia Madden,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Robert Phelps,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-2630

Tavitas, Judge, concurring in result

[1] I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, notwithstanding 

Mother’s failure to object below,[1] I write separately regarding Dr. Kane’s 

recommendation that “[the Child’s] needs may be best met with Father as the 

primary custodian[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 91.

[2] Not only did Dr. Kane exceed the scope of her duties, as outlined in the trial 

court’s order, but she also became an advocate. When parties work with a 

court-appointed parenting coordinator, they expect to be aided by a neutral 

official in resolving their disputes. The parties do not expect the parenting 

coordinator to simultaneously assess the parties for the court or to advocate 

[1] Mother did not object to Dr. Kane’s recommended change in custody by filing a petition for a hearing in 

the manner prescribed by the trial court’s order appointing Dr. Kane. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 44-45.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-2630 | July 23, 2020 Page 27 of 27

regarding such matters as custody. This is the first step down a slippery slope 

because such conflation of roles can sabotage the parent coordination process.