United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-1421

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Arthur Tyrone Lee, Jr.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

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 Submitted: March 20, 2020

Filed: July 24, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Arthur Lee appeals after a jury convicted him of possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession of

a firearm by a person previously convicted of an offense punishable by more than one
year in prison, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 sentenced him to 360

months in prison. The evidence at trial showed that investigators seized a .45 caliber

pistol, ammunition, and methamphetamine during a search of a house leased by Lee. 

The parties stipulated at trial that before the date of the search, Lee had been

convicted of a crime that was punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one

year. At sentencing, the record showed that Lee had sustained three prior felony

convictions in Iowa and served more than a year in prison on two of them after

revocations of probation. R. Doc. 104, ¶¶ 51, 56, 57.

Lee’s counsel originally moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel argued that the prosecutor appealed to

racial bias when he used the term “slave” during opening statement and closing

argument. In an opening statement, the prosecutor said that “[a]ccording to an

ancient proverb, a secret can be your slave if it’s kept; but once it’s disclosed, it can

quickly become your master.” The prosecutor continued that Lee “possessed such a

secret, a secret that when he quietly kept it was an incredibly profitable one; but when

he lost it, it threatened to become his master.” In closing argument, the prosecutor

sounded a similar theme, referring to Lee’s stash house as his “secret” that he could

make a “slave” until the secret was exposed. Lee did not object to these statements

during the trial. Counsel also maintained in the Anders brief that there was

insufficient evidence to support the verdicts. Lee filed a pro se brief raising a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

We denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and ordered supplemental briefing

to address whether, in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), there

was a plain error warranting relief on the sufficiency of evidence. Rehaif held that

in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm under § 922(g), the government

1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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must prove that the defendant knew he belonged to category of persons barred from

possessing a firearm. Id. at 2200. 

In his supplemental brief, Lee argues that the stipulation at trial that he had

been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison was insufficient

to satisfy the knowledge element under § 922(g)(1). Lee also argues that if the

§ 922(g) conviction is reversed, then he is entitled to a new trial on Counts 1 and 2,

because the evidence of his prior conviction was irrelevant to those counts and

prejudicial.

After considering the supplemental briefs and relevant authorities, we conclude

that the evidence was sufficient to support Lee’s conviction for unlawful possession

of a firearm. Lee made a general motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

government’s case, so we assume for the sake of analysis that he preserved a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the knowledge element under

§ 922(g). See United States v. Owens, No. 19-1516, 2020 WL 3980243, at *5 (8th

Cir. July 15, 2020); United States v. May, 476 F.3d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 2007). During

trial, Lee stipulated that he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than

a year in prison. A rational jury could have inferred from the stipulation that Lee

knew about his status as a person convicted of such an offense. It is reasonable to

infer that “a felony conviction would be a significant life event that a person would

know about when it happened and remember at a later date.” Owens, 2020 WL

3980243, at *5. And “it is highly improbable that a person could be convicted of a

felony without being aware that his possible sentence would exceed one year’s

imprisonment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 954 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir.

2020)). We therefore uphold the conviction under § 922(g)(1). Accord United States

v. Staggers, 961 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2020).

As to the arguments raised in the Anders brief, we conclude that the district

court did not plainly err in allowing the prosecutor’s comments during opening

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statement and closing argument. The remarks, when viewed in context, did not

invoke racial biases and did not deprive Lee of a fair trial. We also conclude there

was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Lee’s convictions on Counts 1

and 2. Witness testimony, Lee’s rental of the house, and indicia of residency found

in the locked north bedroom reasonably supported a finding that Lee possessed the

methamphetamine and firearm found in the house, that he intended to distribute the

drugs, and that he possessed the firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.

Insofar as Lee asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we

decline to address the claim in this direct appeal. Any such claim may be raised in

a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Hernandez, 281

F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 2002). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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