In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379

MARCUS HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DEREK DUSZAK, Chicago Police

Officer, Star #10658, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 08277 — John Z. Lee, Judge.

SUBMITTED APRIL 9, 2020* — DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2020

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

*

   We have elected to decide this appeal without oral argument as the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments. See Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379

BAUER,CircuitJudge.   Marcus Harrington brings this appeal

requesting us to reverse the district court’s admitting evidence

of his firearm, prohibiting him from arguing racial animus in

closing arguments, failing to sanction the Appellees, and

denyinghismotionforpost‐trialdiscovery.Because thedistrict

court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error, we

affirm.

On November 18, 2011, at approximately 8:30p.m.,Officers

Derek Duszak and Jaime Weberinitiated a traffic stop because

the light over Harrington’s license plate was out. Dispatch

notified the officers that there was no record of Harrington’s

license plate. The officers attempted to identify the vehicle

through the VIN number and asked Harrington to exit the

vehicle. Harrington fled and the officers chased him down.

Officer Weber tased him and Officer Duszak hit him with a

baton. During the encounter, Harrington’s gun fell to the

ground. Officers handcuffed Harrington, retrieved his gun,

and took him to the hospital for his injuries.

Harrington sued the officers for excessive force and failure

to intervene. The jury ruled in favor of the officers. Harrington

moved for post‐trial discovery and a new trial, which were

denied by the district court. Harrington appeals, seeking

reversal for admitting the gun that fell into evidence and being

unable touse racial animus in closing arguments. He also seeks

post‐trialdiscovery andsanctions againstthe officers, basedon

unverified third‐party information obtained after trial outside

ofthe five‐year period requested during discovery. He claimed

that the officers failed to produce nine additional complaints

of misconduct by Officer Duszak. After the district court

denied the motion, Harrington filed a records request with the
Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379 3

City of Chicago and received this additional documentation.

The district court found that these documents exist outside of

the five‐years sought and Harrington was not prejudiced by

this nondisclosure.

We first consider issues during trial: admittance of the gun

and Harrington being unable to argue racial animus during

closing arguments. We review the district court’s admission or

exclusion of evidence under Rule 26 for an abuse of discretion.

Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 728 (7th Cir. 1999). If

the admission was erroneous, we consider whether it is clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that no rational jury could have

rendered the verdict. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 580, 586

(7th Cir. 2001). “The operative question in excessive force

cases is ‘whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a

particular sort of search or seizure.’” County of Los Angeles v.

Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546–47 (2017) (citing Tennessee v.

Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700 (1985)). Excessive force claims

“are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the

information the officers had when the conduct occurred.”

Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2001). “The district court

has considerable discretion in supervising” arguments by

counsel. Jones, 188 F.3d at 730.  Furthermore, the district court

is afforded a “special degree of deference” when balancing

relevant factors, such as prejudice under Rule 403. Lewis v. City

of Chi. Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 441 (7th Cir. 2009). We grant

new trials only if there is a significant chance that improperly

admitted evidence influenced the outcome of the trial. Shick v.

Ill. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 307 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 2002).

With regards to admitting the gun into evidence, the

district court properly considered the totality of the circum‐
4 Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379

stances, including the officers’ testimony, and followed the

relevant Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that

the evidence was admissible, not unduly prejudicial, and left

a question of fact best determined by the jury.

Concerning the racial animus argument, Harrington failed

to present any evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury

could infer that the officers’ actions were racially motivated.

Undeveloped arguments are waived without proper support.

United States v. Cisneros, 846 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2017).

Without support for race‐based allegations during the case or

presented at trial, introducing this argument at closing

arguments wouldhave been highly inflammatory andprejudi‐

cial. Harrington did not offer any support for this argument

and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

prohibited Harrington from using racial animusduring closing

arguments.

Next, we consider post‐trial issues of discovery regarding

the additional documentation Harrington believes the officers

were required to produce. We review the denial of sanctions

under an abuse of discretion standard. Cooney v. Casady, 735

F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2013); Ins. Ben. Adm’rs v. Martin, 871 F.2d

1354, 1361 (7th Cir. 1989). “An abuse of discretion may be

established if the district court based its decision on an

erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous evaluation of

evidence.ʺ N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880,

883 (7th Cir. 2017).

The dispute centers on information reports and additional

complaints filed against Officer Duszak. Harrington sought
Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379 5

sanctions post‐trial based on an unverified third‐party website

detailing nine additional complaints. After his motion was

denied, Harrington filed a records request with the City of

Chicago and was provided with nine “complaints.” One

complaint listed was included in discovery and Harrington

produces no evidence that this record was incomplete. Four

complaints not included in discovery were filed after the

discovery request. Harrington’s discovery request sought “all

complaints ... lodged against any of the individual defend‐

ant[s] in the past five years.” The district court found the

common meaning of “past five years” to include the date the

request was served to five years prior and any complaints filed

after would be outside the scope of the request. Harrington

had opportunity to seek these additional documents during

discovery. The final four “complaints” requested were not

complaints, but information reports.  

Harrington fails to show how the absence of these records

prejudiced him and provides no newly discovered evidence to

support his position that these documents would have led to

a different outcome. Even if we assume that the officers

possessed these documents during litigation, Harrington fails

to provide evidence that the officers withheld these records in

bad faith, intentionally misrepresented their position, orfailed

to perform a reasonable inquiry. Without such evidence, the

denial of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion. Bracey v.

Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013).
6 Nos. 16‐4120 & 19‐2379

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of sanctions and

post‐trial discovery.