alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements onForm S-8 (No. 333-141458, No. 333-19011, No. 333-71373, No. 333-42276, No.333-45534, No. 333-73652, and No. 333-89176) and on Form S-3 (No.333-141454,No. 333-141455, No. 333-138023, No. 333-134666, No. 333-130977,No. 333-130423, No. 333-129141, No. 333-128020, No. 333-128019, No. 333-123902, No.333-119645, No. 333-102244, No. 333-76432, No. 333-69652, No. 333-33612, No.333-89257, No. 333-84587, No. 333-81311, No. 333-79753, and No. 333-76395) ofMicrovision, Inc of our report dated March 28, 2007 relating to the financialstatements and financial statement schedule of Lumera Corporation, which appears inthis Form 10-K/A.
/s/  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Seattle, Washington
#### Josh Iogues *v.*A. Levi.

Sales — False Representations by Purchaser.

Where one purchased goods, upon the false representation that he was a member of a certain firm, and the goods were sold to the firm upon such representation, the purchaser can not escape personal liability by showing that his representations were false.

Sales — Pleading—False Representations.

Where one purchased goods and obtained credit on false- representation that he was a member of a certain firm, it is not necessary in a suit against him on the debt to rely in the petition on such false representation, but it is sufficient to show that he obtained the credit and that he was a party to the transaction when the goods were sold,- and claimed to be a member of the firm.

*653*Pirtle & McP hear son, for appellant.*

*J. H. Wilkinson, for appellee.*

OPINION by

Judge Lindsay:

There was evidence before the jury conducing to prove that logues represented himself to Levi to be a member of the firm of Flecher & Co., and that these representations were made at the time the account sued on was created. It was, therefore, proper to instruct that if the jury believed he so represented himself, and that the goods were sold to the firm upon the faith of his representations, they should find for the plaintiff. In this view of the case, he was a purchaser of the goods, a party to the contract, and the party to whom the credit was extended. To allow him to escape responsibility, by showing that his representations' were false, would be to permit him to stultify himself, in order to escape the payment of a debt he had voluntarily contracted. It was not necessary to set up and rely on these representations in the petition. It was enough to show that he obtained the credit, and that he was a party to the transaction at the time the goods were sold, and claimed to be a member of the firm.

The bill of exceptions does not show that the affidavits on file were read on the motion for a new trial; but if it did we would not feel authorized to reverse on this account. The verdict is sustained by the evidence, and we cannot condemn the fact that the circuit judge permitted appellee’s counsel to so far abuse his privilege as an attorney, as to authorize the interference of this court.

Judgment affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JAMES REVELES, §

No. 08

- 16

- 00073

- CV

Appellant, §

Appeal from the

v. §

County Court at Law No. 6

OEP HOLDINGS, LLC and MVT

SERVICES, LLC,

Appellees. §

§ of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2014DCV3664)

O R D E R

On February 6, 2019, the Court issued an order for mediation referral and suspended the

appellate timetable for forty

- five days. The order required the parties and the mediator to take

certain steps, including filing a mediation report and a dispositive m otion if mediation was

successful, or a motion to reinstate the appellate timetable if it was not. The mediator filed a report

stating that mediation was unsuccessful. The parties have not filed a motion to reinstate the

appellate timetable, but Appellee s filed a motion requesting a third extension of time to file motion

for rehearing. On our own motion, we order that the appeal continue and that the suspension of

the appellate timetable is lifted. Further, the motion requesting a third extension of tim e to file

motion for rehearing is GRANTED. The motion for rehearing is due to be filed on or before April

28, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 14 TH DAY OF MARCH , 2019.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Palafox, J., and Chew, C.J. (Senior Judge)

Chew, C.J. (Senior Judge), sitting by assignment
EXHIBIT 13


Report of Independent Auditors


We have  audited  the  accompanying  consolidated  balance  sheets  of  National
Computer Systems, Inc. and subsidiaries as of January 31, 1999 and 1998, and the
related consolidated  statements of income,  changes in stockholders' equity and
cash flows for each of the three years in the period  ended  January  31,  1999.
These financial  statements are the responsibility of the Company's  management.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial  statements based
on our audits.

We  conducted  our  audits  in  accordance  with  generally   accepted  auditing
standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement.  An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.  An audit also includes
assessing the  accounting  principles  used and  significant  estimates  made by
management,  as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion,  the financial  statements  referred to above present fairly, in
all material respects,  the consolidated financial position of National Computer
Systems,   Inc.  and  subsidiaries  at  January  31,  1999  and  1998,  and  the
consolidated  results of their  operations  and their cash flows for each of the
three years in the period ended January 31, 1999, in conformity  with  generally
accepted accounting principles.


/s/Ernst & Young LLP


Minneapolis, Minnesota

March 1, 1999
-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 27, 2016 

v No. 324460 

Wayne Circuit Court 

THYRONE DESHAWN EVANS, LC No. 13-009779-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

SHAPIRO, J. (dissenting). 

 After briefs were filed in this case, our Court issued its decision in People v Agar, ___ 

Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016) (Docket No. 321243). In Agar, the defendant was 

convicted of distributing child sexually abuse material and possessing child sexually abusive 

material. Before trial, he moved for public funds so that he could retain his own computer 

forensics expert, but he was unable to articulate what he expected the expert to say. Id. at ___; 

slip op 2-3. This Court nevertheless concluded that the defendant had met his burden of 

establishing a nexus between the facts of the case and the need for an expert, in part because of 

defense counsel’s “admission that he needed help in understanding the technical issues at 

play[.]” Id. at ___; slip op 2-3. This Court noted that “the defense would have benefited from 

adequately educated counsel, even in the examination of the people’s expert.” Id. at ___; slip op 

3. Similarly, in this case defense counsel was unable to articulate what he expected a ballistics 

expert to say and he expressed a need to consult an expert in order to understand the science. I 

would conclude that, under the circumstances, defense counsel established a sufficient nexus 

between the facts and the need for the appointment of an expert. This case involves two people 

firing guns, defendant from inside a car and an unknown third party from outside and behind the 

car. The police located two different caliber bullets but could not determine which bullet struck 

the victim. At minimum, consultation with an independent ballistics expert could have better 

prepared defense counsel for cross examination of the prosecution’s witness, and it may have 

provided exculpatory evidence. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the trial court to allow 

defendant to obtain funds for retaining such an expert and, if he chooses, to move for a new trial 

based upon the testimony or affidavit from such an expert. 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
10837.

#### Bennett *v.*Hendricks.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Complaint; from city court of Nashville — Judge Lovett. August 2, 1919.

*Ira S. Clary,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. G. Harrison,*contra.

Luke, J.

It appearing, from the uncontradieted certificate of tlie clerk of the city court, in the record, that this ease has been settled between the parties, the questions raised in the bill of exceptions are moot, and the writ of error must be

*Dismissed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 6117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DAVON PERRY , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Stephanie A. Gallagher, District Judge. ( 1:08

- cr - 00165

- SAG

- 1 )

Submitted : July 20, 2021 Decided: July 23, 2021

Before WILKINSON , AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Davon Perry , Appellant Pro Se. Annie Meredith McGuire , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding prec edent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Davon Perry appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115

- 391, 132 Stat. 5194. We revie w the district court’s order for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kibble , 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constr aining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard , 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record confirms that the dist rict court properly considered the circumstances presented by the pandemic, Perry’s health conditions, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, before denying Perry’s motion. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order. We deny Perry’s motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. AFFIRMED
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-1862

LT Case No. 2000-CF-000803-A

_____________________________

ANTHONY J. AKINS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

A Case of Original Jurisdiction. 

Anthony J. Akins, Graceville, pro se. 

No Appearance for Respondent. 

September 13, 2024

PER CURIAM.

This Court previously affirmed Petitioner’s direct appeal and 

thereafter, affirmed several postconviction appeals filed in this 

Court stemming from Putnam County Circuit Court Case No. 

2000-CF-000803-A. Because it appears that Petitioner’s filings are 

abusive, repetitive, malicious, or frivolous, Petitioner is cautioned 

that any further pro se filings in this Court asserting claims 

stemming from the identified case number may result in sanctions 

such as a bar on pro se filings in this Court and referral to prison 
2

officials for disciplinary proceedings, which may include forfeiture 

of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2024); State v. Spencer, 

751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999). Moreover, the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed July 8, 2024, is dismissed with prejudice. See 

Richardson v. State, 918 So. 2d 999, 1002–03 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). 

PETITIONER WARNED; PETITION DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. 

JAY, SOUD, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
11717.

#### Melton *v.*The State.

Decided November 9, 1920.

Conviction of larceny of automobile; from Randolph superior court — Judge Worrill. May 29, 1920.

Failure to charge on circumstantial evidence, and the charge given as to admissions and confessions (in the language of the Penal Code, § 1031), were complained of in the motion for a new trial.. It was contended that no confession was proved, though statements in the nature of admissions were shown, and that this charge tended to impress on the jury that the defendant had confessed guilt. There was no request to charge on circumstantial evidence.

*Charles W. Worrill,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. T. Castellow, solicitor-general, R. R. Arnold,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

The conviction of the defendant did not depend entirely upon circumstantial evidence; the evidence, circumstantial and direct, amply authorized the verdict, and none of the special grounds of the motion for a new trial is meritorious.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         283,924
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  110,768
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (13,393)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      11,865,490
<DEPRECIATION>                             (5,822,348)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,234,935
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          368,980
<BONDS>                                      7,825,793
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,040,162
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,234,935
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,118,279
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,832,136
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,836
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             498,120
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (226,813)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (226,813)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (226,813)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (4.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (4.38)
        

</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 27, 2020 a0520

Order 

Clerk

May 27, 2020

160864

DWANITA McDADE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 160864

COA: 345179

Wayne CC: 18-004003-NF

PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY and

PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendants,

and

PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 26, 2019 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
ex10-1.htm


 

Exhibit 10.1

 

SECOND AMENDMENT

TO

EXAMWORKS GROUP, INC.

AMENDED AND RESTATED 2008 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN, AS AMENDED

 

THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO EXAMWORKS GROUP, INC. AMENDED AND RESTATED 2008 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN, AS AMENDED is effective as of May 12, 2015 (this “Amendment”).

 

WHEREAS, ExamWorks Group, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the ExamWorks Group, Inc. Amended and Restated 2008 Stock Incentive Plan, as Amended (the “Plan”), and Section 19 of the Plan permits the board of directors of the Company (the “Board”) to amend the Plan;

 

WHEREAS, the number of shares of common stock of the Company (“Shares”) available for issuance under the Plan was previously increased by the Board on July 12, 2010 and approved by the written consent of a majority of the stockholders of the Company (the “Stockholders”) on September 15, 2010;

 

WHEREAS, as a result of the stock split effective as of October 12, 2010, the number of Shares available for issuance under the Plan was increased to 10,282,200; 

 

WHEREAS, the number of Shares available for issuance under the Plan was again increased by the Board on June 9, 2011 and approved by the Stockholders at the 2011 Annual Meeting on August 3, 2011, resulting in 15,282,000 Shares available for issuance under the Plan; 

 

WHEREAS, the Board desires to amend Section 3(a) of the Plan to (1) increase the number of Shares available for issuance under the Plan to 17,982,200 (2) change the termination date of the Plan from July 14, 2018 to May 11, 2025 (the date that is ten years after May 12, 2015), and approved this Amendment on March 20, 2015; and

 

WHEREAS, this Amendment was submitted to the Stockholders for approval and approved at the 2015 Annual Meeting.

 

NOW THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

 

	 	
1.
	
Section 3(a) is hereby amended and restated as follows:

	 	 	


	 	 	
Subject to Section 13 below, a total of 17,982,200 Shares shall be available for issuance under the Plan. The Shares deliverable pursuant to Awards shall be authorized but unissued Shares, or Shares that the Company otherwise holds in treasury or in trust.



  

	 	
2.
	
Section 20 is hereby amended and restated as follows:

	 	 	


	 	 	
If not sooner terminated by the Board, this Plan shall terminate at the close of business on May 11, 2025, the date that is ten years after May 12, 2015. No Awards shall be made under the Plan after its termination.



 

	 	
3.
	
The modifications set forth above shall not affect any other provisions of the Plan.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No.
333-86252, 333-10630, 333-6366) on Form S-8 and the Registration Statement (No.
333-82728) on Form S-3 of our reports dated February 12, 2003, (which audit
report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an additional paragraph
regarding the audit procedures we applied to certain adjustments made to Moore
Corporation Limited's 2000 financial statements for the change in accounting
policy related to earnings per share, restatement of the segmented information,
and the reclassifications to conform to the current year's presentation but does
not express an opinion or any form of assurance on the 2000 financial statements
taken as a whole) appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Moore
Corporation Limited for the year ended December 31, 2002.


DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
Toronto, Canada
February 12, 2003


                                                                              74
#### Robert J. NORBECK, Appellee, v. BASIN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, Appellant.

No. 00-3482.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 16, 2001.

Decided May 21, 2001.

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, FAGG and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Basin Electric Power Cooperative (Basin) appeals from the district court’s order and judgment entered following our remand in this retaliatory discharge case. *See Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.,*215 F.3d 848 (8th Cir.2000). Basin argues that the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of both plaintiff Robert J. Norbeck and Basin when this court in its mandate instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of Basin. We agree with Basin that the district court’s judgment on remand is inconsistent with the law which exonerates an employer who succeeds—as did Basin—on a dual-motive defense, and that the judgment also is inconsistent with our mandate.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to modify the judgment to read as follows:

> IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered nunc pro tunc to April 6, 1999, document no. 60. That judgment is against Plaintiff Robert J. Norbeck and in favor of Defendant Basin Electric Power Cooperative. Parties to bear their own trial costs. Defendant to have its appellate costs in the amount of $779.30.
##### 



Exhibit 10.62
 AMENDMENT NO. 6
TO THE NATIONAL CITY
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN
 
     Employee ,




---



##### 



Employment Year
  Payment of Small Benefits
  Appendix AS  Relating to the acquisition of Charter One Vendor Finance,
LLC by National City Bank
 2




---



##### 



Appendix AT  Provident Financial Group, Inc. Retirement Plan  Merger into
this Plan
 Appendix AU  National City Savings and Investment Plan No. 2  Merger into
this Plan
 Appendix AV  Allegiant Bancorp, Inc. 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan and Trust 
Merger into this Plan
 Appendix AW  Wayne Bancorp, Inc. and Affiliates Employee Stock Ownership
Plan   Transfer of Assets
  NATIONAL CITY BANK, TRUSTEE
    
    NATIONAL CITY CORPORATIONBy:
    
    
    
    By:Title:
    
    Title:By:Title:
 3