### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 52 -C R

______________________________ THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V. Z ACHARY J AMES HOL L AND, Appe llee

On Appea l from the County Court Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 43511

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Me mor and

um O pin ion

by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr issBa rker , who had be en commissioned as a state trooper

approximately

a month befor e, wa s 1 a passe ng er in the patrol car ; L ander os, Trooper Ba rker ' s field training office r, wa s driving the patrol car . L an deros testified he had ac tivated his rada r as Holland a

pproac hed, esta

blishing that 2 Holland was not spee ding. H olland was not we aving in his lane and did not cross the c enter lane or cros s o ver i nt o "t he ri ght- han d-s id e la ne. " Ba rker testified she e stimated three to f our ca r leng ths to be fiftee n to twenty y ards. 3 Holland admitted to drinking ear lier in the eve ning, ha d slurred spe ech, ha d g lassy ey es, and 4 had a strongodor of al co h o l

. Ba sed on Holland' s perf ormanc e of se vera l field-sobriety tests, the Trooper s conclude d that Holland was intoxi cate d. The State intende d to use this evidence obtained during the traf

fic stop to prosec ute Holland for misdemeanor dr iving while intoxicated. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON As Texas Depa

rtment of Pu b l i c S af

ety Trooper s Ricardo L ander os and Carme n Ba rker 1 trave led south on Hig hway 273 in Fannin County

toward a n establishment known as " J .C. W hiskey Riv e r, " the y

no tic e d a ve hic le dr ive n b y

Z a c ha ry Jame s H oll and e me rg e fr om that e sta bli sh me nt o nto Hig hway 273 and turn n orth toward the m. From L ander os' and B arke r' s testimony at the pre trial sup p re s sion hearing , befor e stopping Holland' s vehicle, the troopers pe rce ived no evidenc e that 2 Holland was intox icated; and the only rea son they g ave for the stop w as that, when h e w as ab out t h re e t o fo u r c ar

l e n gt h s aw ay

fr o m t h e t ro o p er s ' v eh i cl e, Ho l l an d b ri ef l y s wi t ch edh i s v eh i cl e's 3 headlig hts to high beams befor e returning them to low beams. After stopping Holland, how ever , the troopers discove red nume rous indicators that Holland w as intox icated. 43

Holland succ essfully

challeng ed the s to p w it

h a p r e tria l m o tion to suppre ss evidence obtained

as a r esult of t he st op. The State a ppeals the suppr ession of that evide nce, c laiming that the tr oopers ha d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

fo r t he sto p. We a ff

ir m. At the suppression heari ng , Holland ar g ued the hig h-bea m light did not interfer e with the troopers' vision. The State responde d that, no matter how trivial his ac tions, Holland violated the law by turning on his high beams wit hin 500 fee t of t he troopers. The trial court stated, " Ba sed on

. . . T ro op e r L and e ro s' s te sti mony , it we nt f ro m lo w t o h ig h a

nd ri g ht b a c k to low . I t sh ow s, to t his Court's satisfaction, that the oper ator wa s trying to f ollow the law. And I understand what y ou' re - - bu t t hat 's goin g to b e th e ord er of th e cou rt ." W e r ev i ew t h e t ri al co u rt 's d ec i s i o n o n a m o t i o nt o s u p p re s s ev i d en ce b y

ap p l y i n g a b if u r c a te d s ta n d ar d o f r e v ie w d e f

e r r in g to th e tr ia l c o u rt' s d e te r mi n a ti o no f

h is to r ic a l f

a c ts tha t depend on c redibility , but review ing de novo the trial cour t's a pplication of the law

. W

ie dev . S tate , 21 4 S.W. 3d 17 , 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07); se e Gu zm an v . S tate , 9 55 S.W. 2d

85 , 8 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1997). T h e trial c ourt' s evidentiary ruling "w ill be upheld on appea l if it is correc t on any th eory of l aw t hat fi nd s s up po rtin th e reco rd. " Go nz ale z v . S tate , 195 S.W. 3d

11 4, 12 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); se e Ro me ro v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Gene rally , afte r g ranting defe renc e to the trial c ourt' s determination of his t o ri cal facts, we revie w de novo deter minations of rea sonable suspicion and pr obable c ause. Guzman , 955 S.W .2d at 87.4

I ndividuals have the rig ht to be secur e ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s. U. S. C O N ST . a me nd . I V; T EX . C O N ST . art

. I , § 9. A criminal defe ndant alleg ing a Four th Amendment violation be ars the burd e n of pr od

uc ing so me e vid e nc e that re bu ts the pr e sumpt ion of pr op e r po lic e c on du c t. Am ad or v . S tate , 221 S.W .3d 6 6 6 , 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "Adefe ndant meets his initial bu rden of p roo f by

est abl is hi ng th at a sear ch or sei z ure occu rred wi th ou t a warr ant ." Id. The burde n then shifts to the State to prove that the se arc h or seizure wa s non et h el ess re asonable under the totality of the c ircumstance s. Id. a t 67 2– 73 . E vid e nc e mus t be e xclu de d if a c a us a l c onne c tio n is established betwe en illeg al ac tions by law enforce ment and the evidence

. Ro qu e mo re v . S tate , 60 S.W. 3d 86 2, 87 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.23 (V ernon 2005). Under Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U. S. 1 (1 96 8) , a nd its pr og e ny , th e po lic e mus t be a ble to a rt ic ulate

s p ec i fi c f ac t s t h at s u

p p o rt a re as o n ab l e su s p i ci o n t h at t h e su s p ec t i s en gagi n g i n , o r i s ab o u t t o en gage in, c ri min a l a c tiv ity . " [T]he po lic e of fi c e r m us t be a ble to p oin t to sp e c if

ic and art icu la

ble fa c ts which, take n toge ther with rational infere nces f rom those fac ts, reasona

bly war rant that intrusion." Da v is v . S

tate , 947 S.W .2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "A routine traf fic stop re sembles an in ves ti gati ve d ete nt io n. " State v. Cardenas , 36 S.W .3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 20 01 , p e t. r e f' d) . Alaw e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r may lawf ull y sto p a nd de ta in a pe rs on fo r a tr a ff ic violation committ ed in the pre sence of t he officer

. Ga rc ia v . S tate , 8 27 S.W. 2d

93 7, 94 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Ze rv os v . S

tate , 15 S.W .3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. re f' d).The State a rg ues the trial c ourt err ed i n gra n t i n g the motion to suppress beca use Holland 5
" wa s tr yingto f oll owthe law. " We a g re e wi th t he State tha

t pr oo f t hat a de fe nd ant u

ns uc c e ssf ull y tr ie d to fo llo w t he la

w i s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a mot ion to s up pr e ss. I f a

de fe nd ant c omm its a traff ic offe nse, eve n unintentionally , a police of fice r may conduct a

traff ic stop. 5 The State' s sole argument, both at the suppression hea ring and on appe al, is that the offic ers had re asonable suspicion that Holland violated Secti o n 5 4 7

. 3 3 3 ( c ) o f

th e T e xa s T r ansportation Code. Se c tio n 5 47 .3 33 (c ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: (c ) Ape rs on

wh o o pe rate s a

ve hic le on

a ro a dw ay or sh ou lde r s ha ll s e le c t a dis tr ibutio n o f l ig ht o r c omp os ite beam th at is ai me d a nd e mit s li g ht s uf

fi c ie nt t o re ve a l a pe rs on or ve hic le a t a

sa fe dis tanc e ahe a d o f t

he ve hic le , e xce pt t

hat: (1 ) an op e rator a

pp ro a c hin g an o nc omi ngve hic le wi thi n 5 00 fe e t sh a ll s e le c t: (A) the lowermost distribution of light or composite be am, re g ardle ss of road contour or c ondition of loading; or (B ) a distribution aimed so that no p ar t o f the hig h-intensity portion of the lamp projec ts into t he ey es of a n approa ching vehicle ope rator; a nd (2) a

n operator approa ching a vehic le from the r ear wi t hin 300 fee t may

not selec t the uppermost distribution of light. T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 547.333(c) (Ve rnon 1999). A lt h o u g h th e r e a s o nf

o r s u p p r e s s io ne nu n c iate d

b y th e tr ia l c o u rt ( th a t H o ll an d w a s tr y ing to comply with the law) is not a v al i d l egal ba sis for g rantinga motion to suppress, the trial cour t also found that the exception in subsection (c) (1)( B) of the above section applied to this case. The 5 tr ia l c ourt ma de a fi nd ing of fa c t tha t "the De fe nd ant did no t op e rate any

pa rt of the hig h in te ns ity p o rt i o no f t h e l am p o f t h e m o t o r v eh i cl e s o t h at i tp ro j ec t edi n t o t h e e y es o f a nap p ro ac h i n g v eh i cl e's operator." We are obligated to uphold the trial court' s ruling on the motion to s uppress if that r uling was supporte d by

the re cord a

nd was c orre ct under

any theory of law a pplicable to the c ase. Sta teL ander os opined that, bec ause H olland was drivinga 1957 Chevrole t, th e vehicle' s headlig ht 6 int e ns ity wa s le ss t

ha n mo re mod e rn

c ars . T he tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld hav e reas on a

bly dis re g ard e d th is e xplanatio n in

pa rt or wh ole . " Th e tr ia l ju dg e is the so le f act fi nd er a t a

he ari ngon

a mot ion to suppress evide nce obta ined in a sea rch, and may

choose to be lieve or disbelieve any or all of a wi tn ess ' tes ti mo ny ." Al lri dge v . S tate , 850 S.W .2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

6 v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tex. C ri m . Ap p. 2000). " That rule holds true even if the trial cour

t gave th e wro ng reas on for it s ru li ng." Ar me nd ar iz v . S tate , 123 S.W .3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The State a

rg ues the fa ct that the hig h-bea m lights wer e ac tivated appr ox imately three to four

c ar l e ng ths in f

ro nt of the po lic e re qu ir e s a fi nd ing that the lig ht d id p ro je c t in to t he of fi c e rs ' e y e s. But ther e is some evidenc e in the re cord that the high- beam lig hts were aimed so that no part of the high- intensity

portio n o f t h e lamp projec ted into the ey es of a n approa ching vehicle ope rator. L and e ro s te sti fi e d he wa s no t " bli nd e d" by the hig h b e a ms. Whe n a sk e d " [a]n d at no tim e , d id t he se 6 h i gh b ea m s , i n any

way , interfe re w ith y our vision, y our oper ation of y our vehic le, or in any way i n t er fe re wi t h an y

t h i n g ab o u ty o u r o p er at i n g y o u r v eh i cl e, ri gh t , " L an d e r o s re s p o n d ed , "T h at 's

corr ect." Ba

rker testified she wa s not "blinded by the light" and could not re member whether she ha d to a ve rt he r e y e s. Whil e the of fi c e rs te sti fi e d the y ob se rv e d Ho lla nd a c tiv ate th e hi gh be a ms within 500 feet of the ir patrol ca r, the e vent could have been obse rved f rom any ang le. Th e tr ia l c ourt ' s fin din g wa s ent ir e ly fa c tua l and ha s so me su pp or t in the re c or d. We m

us t aff ord " almost total defer ence to the trial court 's d eter mination of historical fac ts that the rec ord

su pp or ts, e sp e c ia lly wh e n the fa c t- fi nd ing s a re ba se d o n a

n e va luatio n o f t

he wi tne sse s' c re dib ili tyThe State a lso argues the trial c ourt applied the w rongstandard f o r rea sonable suspicion. 7 The State c ites a number of case s in support of i ts argument "the issue is not whether an off ense w as a c tua lly c omm itt e d b ut, ins te a d, wh e the r the of fi c e r ha d ' re a so na

ble su sp ic ion ' to b e lie ve an o ff e ns e was bei ng com mi tt ed. " Se e Ga rc ia v . S tate , 4 3 S. W.3 d 5 27 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Drago v . S tate , 55 3 S.W. 2d

37 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 77 ); Hi c k s v . S tate , 255 S.W .3d 351 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 08 , n o p e t.) ; Mc Qu ar te rs v. Sta te , 58 S.W .3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2001, pet. ref' d). As this Court has st ated, "proof that an offense was actually committed is not nece ssary to justify the inv e sti g a tiv e de te nti on

a s lo nga s [th e po lic e of fi c e r] r e a so na

bly be lie ve d th a t a v io latio n w a s in pro gress ." Hicks , 255 S.W .3d at 354–55. An incor rec t understandingof the law , howeve r, does not g ive rise to a reasonable belief. An officer' s incorre ct understanding of the l aw will not "satisfy the Fou rt h Am end men t an d ri se t o t he l evel of reas on abl e su sp ici on ." Fo wle r v . S tate , No . 0 2- 06 -0 01 83 -C R, 2 00 8 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 62 53 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th Aug . 1 4, 20 08 , p e t. filed).

7 anddem eano r." Se e Ro ss , 32 S.W .3d at 856. While we may not have r eac hed the same conc lusion,

we are prohibited from substitut ing our opinion for the trial c ourt' s. Be cause the alleg ed violation of Section 547.333(c) of the Tex as Transportation Code was the sole justification for the tra ffic stop, the tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de te rm ini ng the of fi c e rs la c ke d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to justify stopping Holland. 7 We a ff ir m th e or de r o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

g ra nti ngHo lla

nd ' s mo tio n to su

pp re ss.

J o s h R

. M o r

r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: November 17, 2008 Date D ecide d: Dec ember 12, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh