F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

E R R I S E D G E R

L Y , Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

C I T Y A N D C O U N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O ; D A

V I D G O F F ; J O H

N C O N E F R E Y , Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 11-15655

D.C. No. 3:03-cv-02169- CRB

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. B rey er, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted March 11, 2013—San F rancisco, California

F iled April 10, 2013

B efore: J ohn T. Noonan, J r., Ray mond C. F isher, and J acqueline H. Ng

uy en, Circuit J udg es.

O pinion by

J udg e F isherE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 2

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’ s j udg ment, entered following a jury trial, a nd

r emanded in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a ction alleg ing unlawfu l search and false arrest.

The panel held that Ca l i f ornia Penal Code § 853.5 provides the ex clusive g rounds for the custodial arrest of a person arres t e d f

or an infraction. The panel rejected defendants’ arg

ument that California Penal Code § 853.6(i), wh i c h p r ovides a dditional broader g rounds for the custodial
arrest of a person arrested for a misdemeanor, also applied to t h e nonrelease of a p erson arrested for an infraction. T h e panel t herefore vacated the judg ment in favor o f the defendants on plaintiff’s state law false arrest c laim a nd remanded for further proceeding s.

The panel affirmed the district court’s judg ment in favor of d efendants o n plaintiff’s unlawful search claim. The panel held that plaintiff had not shown that the district court’s error

on the false arrest claim tainted the jury ’s finding that h e was not subjected to a strip search.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 3

COUNSEL

Greg ory M. Hay

n es, San F rancisco, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Sean F

. Co n nolly

, Deputy City Attorney
, San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

F I SHER, Circuit J udg e :

This appeal requires us to decide when a person arrested for an infraction may

be taken into custody u nder California law. California Penal Code § 853.5 provid es t hree narrow g rounds for the nonrelease of a person a r rested for an infraction. California Penal Code § 853.6(i) provides 10 broader grounds for the nonrelease of a person arrested for a misdemeanor. The defendants arg ue – and the district court ruled

– that the g rounds for c ustodial arres t specified in § 853.6(i) apply not only to misdem eanors but also to infractions. W e disag ree. Consis t e n t with decisions of the California Court of Appeal an d t h e statute’s plain lang uag e , we hold that Penal Code § 853.5 provides t h e e x c l usive
g rounds f

or c u stodial arrest of a person arrested f or an infraction. W e therefore vacate the judg ment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s state law false arres t cl a i m a nd remand for further proceeding s.

B A C K G R O U N D

I n 2000, E r r is Edg e rly was standing by himself inside a play g round at the M artin L uther King /Marcus GarveyE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 4

Housing Cooperative in San F rancisco, where he w as not a resident. The p lay g round was surrounded by a fence and h ad “No T respassing ” sig ns posted at every entrance. Two San F rancisco Police Depar t m ent o f ficers, J ohn Conefrey a

nd David Goff, arrested Edg erly for trespassing

. The officers conducted a pat-down search, then transferred Edg erly to the Park Police Station, where they perfo rmed an additional search. T h e s e arch d id not reveal any contraband a nd Serg e ant F r ederick Schiff, the police supervisor o n duty at the time, authoriz e d the officers to issue Edg erly a citatio n for trespass and release him. Edg e rly was cited an d released. Edg erly was not prosecuted f or trespass o r any other offense.

Edg erly f iled this 42 U. S

. C

. § 1983 action ag ainst Goff, Conefrey

, Schiff and the City a n d County of S an F rancisco, alleg ing that Goff a

nd Cone f re y unlawfully arrested a nd searched him in violation of the F ourth Amendment, and that Schiff and the City w ere liable for t he officers’ unconstitutional actions. Edg erly also asserted various state
tort claims, including

, a s relevant here, c laims for false arrest and unlawful search.

The case went to trial and, at the close o f e v i d e n ce, the district court g ranted the d efendants’ motion for judg ment a s

a matter o f law on Edg erly ’s false arrest claim. The court ruled that, as a matter o f law, Goff and Conefrey h ad probable cause to arrest Edg erly under California Penal Code § 602( l ) (now § 602(m)) or § 602.8. Edg erly appealed. 1

1 F o r t h e p ro ced u ral h isto ry o n Ed g erly ’ s rem ain in g claim s, w h ich a r e

n o t relev an t t o th is ap p eal, see Ed g erly v. City & Co u n ty o

f S an Fra n cisco
, 5 9 9 F.3 d 9 4 6 , 9 51

– 5 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 0).E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 5

On appeal, we held that the o fficers lacked probable cause to arrest Edg erly under § 6 02( l ) but that probable cause for an arrest ex isted u nder § 602.8. See Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of S.F.
, 599 F .3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 2 W e held, however,

2 Sectio n 6 0 2 .8 p ro v id es in

relev an t p art:

(a) A n y p erso n w

h o w ith o u t th e w

ritten p erm issio n

o f t h e l an d o w

n er , th e o w

n er’ s ag en t, o r th e p erso n in law f u l p o ssessio n of th e lan d, w illf u lly en ters an y lan d s

u n d er cu ltiv atio n o r en clo sed b y f en ce, b elo n g in g to , or

o c c u p ied b y , an o t

h er, o r w h o w illf u lly en ters u

p o n

u n c ul tiv ated o r u n en clo sed lan ds w h ere sig n s f o rb id d in g t resp ass are d isp lay ed at in terv als n o t less th an th ree to th e m ile alo n g all ex terio r b o u n d aries an d
at all ro ad s an d t

rails en terin g t h e l a n ds, is g u ilty o f a p u b lic o f f en se.

(b ) A n y p erso n co n v icted o f a v io l a t i o n of

su bd iv isio n (a) sh all b e p u n ish ed as f o llo w s:

(1 ) A f i rst o f f en se is an in f

ractio n p u n ish ab le b y a f in e o f sev en ty

- f iv e d o llars ($ 7 5 ).

(2 ) A seco n d o f

f en se o n th e sam e lan d or an y

co n t ig u o u s lan d o f t h e sam e lan d o w n er, w ith o u t th e p erm issio n o f t h e l an do w n er, t h e lan do w

n er’ s ag en t, o r th e p ers o n in law f u l p o ssessio n o f th e lan d, is an in f

ractio n p u n i s h a b le b y a f in e o f tw o h u n d red f if ty d o llars ($ 2 50 ).

(3 ) A th ird or su

bseq u en t o f

f en se o n th e sam e lan d o r an y co n t ig u o u s l a n d o f th e sam e lan do w n er, w i th ou t th e perm issio n o f th e lan do w n er, th e lan d o w

n er’ s ag en t, o r th e p erso n in law f u l p o ssessio n

o f th e lan d , is a m isd em ean o r.

Cal. P en al Co d e § 6 0 2 .8 (a)– (b ).E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 6

that the officers lacked authority un d e r state law to place Edg erly into custody

. S

ee id. at 956. W e ex plained that

a first offense under section 602.8(a) is
p u nishable only as a

n infraction and, unde r California law, “[ i] n all c a s e s

. . . in which a person is arrested for an infraction,” custodial
arrest is authoriz ed “[ o] nly if th e a r r estee refuses to sig n a w ritten promise [ to appear]
, has no satisfactory identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or f ing erprint.” Cal. Penal Code § 853.5(a).

Here, because the Office r s did not testify that Edg erly met any of these three

re q u i rements, or that they h ad reason to bel i e v e that he previously violated section 602.8(a), the c u stodial arrest was not authoriz ed by state law

. . . . W e therefore

reverse and r emand for further proceeding s on this state law claim.

Id. at 959 (alterations in orig inal but last ellipsis added). 3

3 Sectio n 8 5 3 .5 (a) p ro v id es:

E x cep t as o th erw ise p ro v id ed b y law

, in an y cas e in w h i ch a p erso n i s arrested f o r an o f f en se d eclared to b e an in f ractio n , th e perso n m ay b e released acco rd in g to th e p r o ced u res s et f

o rth b y th is ch ap ter f

o r th e release o f p erso n s arrested f o r an o f f en s e d eclared to b e

a m isd em ean o r. In all cases, ex cep t as sp ecif ied in Sectio n s 4 0 3 0 2, 4 0 3 0 3, 4 0 3 0 5
, an d 40 3 0 5 .5 o f th e Veh icle Co d e, in w

h ich a p erso n i s ar r e sted f o r an in f ractio n , a p eace o f

f icer sh all o n ly req u ire th e arresteeE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 7

On remand, the defend a n t s r aised a new arg u ment that Edg erly ’s cu s t o d ial arrest w as authoriz ed by Penal Code § 8 53.6(i). 4 On its face, § 8 5 3.6(i), which specifies 10

to p resen t h is o r h e r d riv er’ s licen se o r o th er satisf acto ry ev i d en ce o f h is o r h er id en tity f or

ex am in atio n an d to s i g n a w r i t t en p ro m ise to ap pear

co n t ain ed i n a n o tice to ap p ear. If th e arrestee d o es n o t h av e a d riv er’ s licen se or oth er satisf acto ry ev id en ce of id en tity in h is o r h er po ssessio n , th e o f f i cer m ay req u ire
t h e a rrestee t o p lace a rig h t th u m b p rin t, o r a lef

t th u m b p rin t o r f

in g erp rin t if th e perso n h as a m issin g or d isf ig u red rig h t t h u m b

, o n th e n o tice to ap p ear. Ex cep t f o r l aw en f o rcem en t p u rp o ses relatin g to th e id en tity of th e arre s t ee, n o p erso n o r en tity m ay sell, g iv e aw ay , allo w th e d istrib u tio n o f

, in clu de in a d atab ase, o r create

a d atab ase w ith , th is p rin t . On ly if th e arrestee ref u ses to sig n a w

ritt e n p ro m i se, h as n o satisf acto ry id en tif i catio n , o r ref

u ses to pro v id e a th u

m b p rin t or f in g erp rin t m ay

th e arrestee b e tak en

in to cu sto d y

.

Cal. P en al Co d e § 8 5 3 .5 (a).

4 Sectio n 8 5 3 .6 (i) p ro v i d es:

W h en ev er an y p erso n is arrested b y a p eace o f f icer f o r a m isd em e a n o r, th at p erso n s h all b e released

acco rd i n g to t

h e pro ced u res set f

o rth b y th is ch ap ter

u n less o n e o f th e f

o llo w in g i s a reaso n f

o r n o n release, in w h ich case t

h e arrestin g o f

f icer m a y release th e p erso n , e x cep t as p ro v id ed in su b d iv i sio n (a), o r th e arrestin g o f

f icer sh all in d icate, o n a f o rm to b e estab lish ed b y h i s o r h er em p lo y in g law en f

o rcem en t ag en cy , w h i c h o f th e f

o llo w in g w as a reaso n f

o r th e

n o n release:

(1 ) T h e p erso n

arrested w as so in t o x icated th at h e

o r sh e co u l d h av e been a d an g er to h im self o r h erself or to o th ers.E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 8

(2 ) T h e p erso n arrested req u ired m ed i cal

ex am in atio n o r m ed ical care o r w as o th erw i se u n ab le to care f o r h is o r h er o w

n saf ety

. (3 ) T h e perso n w as arrested u n d er o n e o r m o re o f th e circu m s tan ces l isted in Se c t i o n s 4 0 3 0 2 an d 4 0 3 0 3

o f th e Veh icle Co d e.

(4 ) T h ere w ere o n e o r m ore o u tstan din g arrest

w arran t s f

o r th e p erso n

. (5 ) T h e p erso n co u ld n o t p ro v i d e satisf a c t o ry

ev id en ce o f

p erso n al id en tif

icatio n

. (6 ) T h e p ro secu tio n o f th e of f en s e o r o f

f en s es f or

w h i ch th e p erso n w as arrested

, o r th e p ro secu tio n o f

an y o th er o f

f en se o r o f f en ses, w ou ld b e j eo p ard ized b y im m ed iate release o f

th e p erso n

arrested

. (7 ) T h ere w as a reaso n ab le lik elih o o d th at th e

o f f en se o r o f

f en ses w o u ld co n tin

u e o r r e s um e , o r th at th e saf ety o f p erso n s o r p ro p erty w o u ld b e im m in en tly

en d an g ered b y

release o f

th e p erso n

arrested

. (8 ) T h e p erso n arrest e d d e m an d ed to b e tak en b ef o re a m ag istr a t e o r ref

u sed to s ig n th e n o t ice to ap pear.

(9 ) T h ere is reaso n to b eliev e th at th e p erso n w ou ld

n o t ap p ear at th e tim e an d p lace sp ecif ied in th e n o tice. T h e b asis f

o r th is d eterm in atio n sh all b e sp ecif ically stated

. (1 0 ) T h e p erso n

w as su b j ect to Sectio n

1 2 7 0.1

.

T h e f o rm sh all b e f

iled w ith th e arrestin g ag en cy as

so o n as practicab le an d sh all b e m ad e av ailab le to an yE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 9

gr ounds for nonrelease, a p p lies only to misdemeanors. Th e defendants arg ued, however, that § 8 5 3

. 6 (i) a pplies to infractions as well, rely ing o n the f irst sentence of § 853.5(a), which states: “[ e] x c ept as otherwise provided by law, in any

case in which a person is a rrested for an offense declared to be an infraction, the person may be released a ccording to the procedures set

forth by this chapter

for the release o

f persons arrested for a n offense declared to be a m isdemeanor .” Cal. Penal Code § 853.5(a) (emphasis added).

The d istrict court ag reed with the d efendants that “these
ten ex c e p tions from section 853.6 a r e incorporated into section 853.5.” I n s upport of this conclusion, the district
court cited People v

. Arnold

, 132 C al

. Rptr. 922, 925 n.2 (App. Dep’t Super. C t. 1976), and California Criminal Procedure § 3:58 (2010-11 ed.).

Having decided that § 853.6(i) applies to infractions, the district court permitted three of § 853

. 6 ( i ) ’s g r ounds for nonrelease to be submitted to the jury

. S e e Cal. Penal Code § 853.6(i)(4), (7). 5 The jury determined t h at these g rounds

p arty h av in g cu s to d y o f th e arrested p erso n , su bseq u en t to th e arrestin g o f

f icer, an d to an y p erso n au th orized b y law to release h im

o r h er f ro m cu s to d y b ef o re trial.

Cal. P en al Co d e § 8 5 3 .6 (i).

5 T h e v erd ict f

o rm ask ed :

1

. G iv en w

h at y o u f in d t h e o f f icers k n ew , d id th ey tran sf er Mr. E d g e r ly t o th e s tatio n to d eterm in e

w h eth er Mr. Ed g erl y h ad an y : (a) Ou tstan d in g

w arran ts; [o r] (b ) S t ay

- aw ay o rd ers, h o ld s, ad m o n ish m en ts, o r o th er restrictio n s?E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 10

for nonrelease applied to E d g erly ’ s arrest. As a result, t he district court entered judg ment in favor of the defendants on Edg erly ’s false arrest claim. Edg erly once ag ain appeals.

S T A N D A R

D O F R E V I E W

The district court’s interpretation of state law is reviewed de novo. See Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc.
, 636 F .3d 5 0 1
, 505 (9th Cir. 2011).

D I S C U S S I O N

I.

Edg erly was arrested for tr e s p a ss under Penal Code § 6 02.8. A first o r second o f f e n s e u nder § 602.8 is an infraction. See Cal. Penal Code § 602.8(b). Penal Code § 853.5(a) g overns when a person arrested for an infraction can be taken into custody . I t provides:

2

. Giv en w

h at y o u f in d th e o f

f i cers k n ew , d id th ey b eliev e th at th ere w as a reaso n ab le lik elih o o d th at Mr. Ed g erly ’ s t

res p ass o f

f en se w o u ld co n tin

u e or

resu m e if t

h e o f f icer s d id n o t t

ran sp o rt h im f

ro m th e scen e o f

th e arrest?

3

. Giv e n w h at y o u f

in d th e o f

f icers k n ew , w as i t

reaso n ab le fo r t h em to b eliev e th at th e saf ety of
p erso n s (in clu d in g Of

f icers Go f f an d Co n e f

rey , Mr. Ed g erly

, o r an y o n e else) w o u ld b e im m in en tly

en d an g ered b y th e release o f M r

. E d g erly at th e

scen e o f th e arrest?

T h e j u ry an sw ered each o f

th ese q u estio n s in

th e af f irm ativ e.E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 11

[ 1] Ex c ept as o therwise provided by law, in
any c ase in w h ich a p erson is arrested for an offense declared to be a n i nfraction, the
person may be released accord i n g to the
p r ocedures set forth by this chapter for t h e release of p ersons arrested for an offense declared to be a misdemeanor. [ 2] I n all
cases, e x cept as specified in Sections 40302, 40303, 40305, and 4 0305.5 of the Vehi c le Code, in which a person is arres t e d for an i nfraction, a p eace officer shall only r equir e the arrestee to present his or her driver’s license or other satisfactory e vidence of h is o r her identity for ex amination a n d t o sig n a written p romise to appear contained in a

n o tice to appear. [ 3] I f the a r restee does no t have a driver’s license or o ther satisfactory evidence of identity i n h i s or her possession, the officer may require the arrestee to place a rig ht thumbprint, or a left thumbprint o r fing erprint if the person has a missi n g o r disfig ured r i gh t thumb, on the notice to appear. [ 4] Ex cept for law en f orcement pu r poses r elating to the identity of the arrestee, no person or entity may sell, g ive
away , allow the d istribution of, include in a database, or create a database with, this print. [ 5] Only if the arrestee refuses to sig n a

w r i t t e n p r o m i s e , h a s n o s a t i s f a c t o r y identification, or r efuses to provide a thumbprint or fing erprint may the arrestee be taken into custody

. Cal. Penal Code § 853.5(a) (sentence numbering added).E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 12

By its ex press terms, § 8 53.5(a) specifies only thr e e situations in which custodial arrest is perm i t t ed for an infraction: (1) the a

r restee refuses to sig n a written promise to appear; ( 2 ) the arrestee is unable to produce satisfac t o ry i dentification; or (3) the arrestee refuses to provid e a thumbprint or fing erprint.

At the same time, however, § 853.5(a) also ex p r e ssly incorporates the procedures for release applicable to misdemeanor a

rrests. Section 85 3

. 5(a) thus incorporates, at least in part, § 853.6. The question presented here is whether § 853.5(a) incorporates all of § 853.6 – including its g rounds for nonrelease in § 8 5 3

. 6 (i)

– or only some o f § 853.6. The defendants arg ue that § 853. 5 ( a) incorporates all of § 853.6, including § 853.6(i), whereas Edg erly arg ues that § 853.5(a) incorporates only § 853.6’s re lease procedures, not its
g rounds for nonrelease. W e conclude that Edg erly is correct.

“I n a case requiring a federal court to a pply California law, the court must apply the law as it believes the California Supreme Court would apply it.” Kairy v. SuperShuttle Int’l

, 660 F .3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n the a

bsence of a controlling California Supreme Court d ecision, “we follow decisions o f the California Court of Appeal unless there is convincin g e vidence that the California Supreme Court w ould hold otherwise.” Carvalho

v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC
, 629 F .3d 876, 88 9 ( 9 th Cir. 2010).

Here, there are two California Court of Appeal decisions

on p oint, and each supports Edg erly ’s position. I n I n re Rottanak K. , 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeal stated:E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 13

F or adults accused of violating penal laws, several ty pes o f release are possible. W hen an adult is arrested for an infraction (with the

ex c eption o f a few specified Veh. Code violation s), the arresting officer requires that the person present a d r iver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of identification a nd sig n a promise to appear. O n l y if the person refuses to present identification or to sign the promise to appear can he or she be taken into custody . (Pen. Code, § 853.5 .) . . .

W h en an adult is arreste d fo r a misdemeanor and does not demand to be tak e n b e fore a mag istrate, he or she must be relea s e d once the arresting officer has prepared a wr i t ten notice to appear in court and the arrestee has g iven a written promise to appear as specified in the notic e , u n less the office r m a kes special findings

. (Pen. Code, § 853.6, subds. (a), (d), (

i)

. )

Id. at 552–53 (emphasis added). Similarly

, in Peop l e v

. W illiams

, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992), the court o f appeal stated:

W h en a p erson is a

rrested for an offense declared to b e an infraction

, the person is ordinarily released after the officer prepares a notice to appear and the person a rrested g ives his wr i t t e n p romise to appear in court a s specified in the notice. Only if the arrestee refuses to present written i d e ntification or to sign the written promise to appear may he beE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 14

taken i nto custody

. ( Pen. Code, §§ 853.5, 853.6, subd. (a).)

Id. at 61 n.1 (emphasis adde d )

. Notably

, althoug h W illiams cited § 853.5 and § 853.6(a), it did not cite § 853.6(i). Each

o f these decisions said that § 853.5(a), not § 8 5 3.6(i), provides the ex clusive g ro u n d s for nonrelease of a person arrested for an infraction. They make cle a r that § 853.6(i) does not apply

to infractions.

W e recog niz e that Rottanak K. and W illiams conflict with People v. Arnold

, 132 Cal. Rptr

. 9 2 2
, 925 n .2 (App. Dep’t S u p er. Ct. 1976), w hich stated that § 853.6(j) – n o w § 853.6(i)

– applies to infractions as well as misdemeanors. Arnold

, however, is a d e c ision of the appellate department o f the superior c ourt, which is inferior to the California Court o f Appeal and the California Suprem e Court. S ee Snukal v

. Flightways Mfg., Inc.
, 3 P.3d 2 86, 3 00 (Cal. 2000). The appellate d epartment’s decisions are not binding on the California Court of Appeal, see Carter v

. Cohen

, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 311–12 ( Ct. App. 2010); W o r t h i n g ton v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

, 134 Cal. Rptr. 507, 5 10 (Ct. App. 1 976), and we d o not follow decisions of the appellate department when, a s here, they conflict w ith decisions of the California Court of Appeal, cf. McSherry v. Block

, 880 F .2d 1049, 1053 n.2 ( 9th Cir. 1989). Arnold

, therefore, does not diminish the respect we owe to Rottanak K. and W illiams

.

As noted, “we f

ollow decisions of the California Court o f Appeal unless there is convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would hold otherwise.” Carvalho , 629 F .3d
at 889. Here, we find no evid e n c e t hat the California Supreme Court would depar t f r o m these decisions. On theE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 15

contrary , California’s rules of statutory construction strong ly support Rottanak K. a

nd W illiams ’ c o nstruction of § 853.5(a).

Under California law, “ o u r f u n d a m e n t a l task in c onstruing

a s t at u t e i s to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose o f the statute.” Martinez v. Combs

, 231 P.3d 259, 268 (Cal. 2010) (alteration omitted). “I n this search for w hat the L eg islature meant, the statutory lang uag e itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start w ith the statute’s wo r d s , assig ning them their usual and ordinary meanings

, and construing them in c ontex t.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks o mitted). “I f t h e words themselves are not am b i gu o u s, we presume the L e g islature
meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning g overns.” Id. “On the other hand, if the lang uag e allows more than o ne reasonable construction, we ma y l o ok to such aids as the leg islative history of the measure and ma x i m s of statutory construction. I n cases of uncertain m e a n i n g , we may also consider the consequences of a particu l ar interpretation, including its impact on public policy .” Id.

The defendants’ statutory construction arg ument r elies on the first sentence of § 853.5(a). This sentence say s:

Except as otherwise p r o vided by law

, in any

case i n which a person is arrested for an offense declared to be a n infraction, t h e person may be releas ed according to the procedures set forth by this c h a pter for the release of persons a rr e sted for an o ffense declared to be a misdemeanor

.

Cal. Pena l C o d e § 853.5(a) (emphasis added). As the defendants p oint out, this lang uag e incorporates “proceduresE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 16

. . . for

. . . release” g overning misdemeanors and makes them

a pplicable to infractions, e x cept a s otherwise provided b y law. The d e fendants a

rg ue that the g rounds for nonrele ase specified by § 853.6(i) are “procedur e s f o r release” and that
t h ey are therefore incorporated b y § 853.5(a). W e find t h i s arg ument unpersuasive.

F irst, g i ving the phrase “procedures for release” its natural a nd ordin a ry meaning

, o ne would not g enerally understand that term to ex ten d t o g rounds for nonrelease. Procedu r e s f

o r release and g rounds for nonrelease a ppear to constitute two different, albeit related, subjects. There is, therefore, n othin g in § 853.5(a)’s plain lang uag e to sug g e st that the leg islature intended to incorporate § 8 5 3

. 6 (i) in the first instance.

Second, e ven if § 853.6(i)’s g rounds for nonrelease could be considered release p r ocedures (and

, hence, potentially subject to incorporation), the first six words of § 853.5(a)

–

“ E x cept a s otherwise provided by law”

– would bar that result. I ncorporating § 8 53.6(i) into § 853.5(a) w ould conflict with § 853.5(a) itself, which specif i e s i n its fifth and final
sentenc e only three g r ounds for nonrelease for a person arrested for a n infraction. The g rounds for nonrelease specified in § 853.5(a) would therefore control.

Third, it is a g eneral rule of statutory interpretation that “a statutory provi s ion containing a specific enumeration shall take p recedence o v e r another couched in more g eneral lang uag e.” People v. Valentine

, 121 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1975); see also R o bertson v. W illis

, 143 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 ( Ct. App. 1978) (“W hen specific lang uag e conflicts with the g eneral, the specific provisions will p r evail.”). As a pplied here, § 8 53.5(a)’s specific enumeration of the g rounds forE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 17

nonrele a s e o f a person arrested f or an infraction takes precedence over its g e neral incorporation of misdemeanor “procedures . . . for . . . release.”

F ourth, “[ i ] t is a settled principle o f statutory construction, that c ourts should strive to g ive meaning to every word in a statute and to avoid c o n structions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.” In re C.H.
, 264 P.3d 357, 362 (Cal. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). I f,

as the defendants arg ue, § 853.6(i) determines when a person arrested for an infraction can be taken into custody

, then § 8 5 3

. 5(a)’s fifth sentence – “Only if the arrestee refuses to sig n a written promise, h as no satisfactory identificat i o n , o r refuses to p r o v i d e a thumbprint or fing erprint may the
arrestee be taken into custody ” – serves no purpose. U n d er Edg erly ’s reading

, by c ontrast, every word in § 853

. 5 ( a ) is
g iven meaning and no words are rendered superfluous. The first sentence incorporates § 853.6’s release procedures (but
not its g rounds for nonrelease) and the fifth sentence specifies
t he g rounds for nonrelease of a person arrested for an infraction.

F inally

, the defendants’ in t e r p r e t a t i on contradicts not only California case law and the statute’s plain lang uag e but also the leading t r e a t i s e on California law. W itkin ex plains that “[ a] person arrested for an infraction is subject to the release procedure specified in P.C. 853.6.” 4 B .E. W itkin, California Criminal Law § 57, at 299 (4th ed. 2012) (emphasis added). W h en it comes t o g rounds for nonrelease, however, W itkin
states that § 853.6(i) g over n s m i sdemeanors and § 853.5(a)
g overns infractions, as Edg erly a r g ues. See id. § 6 1
, at 301–03. A ccording to W itkin: “Ex c ept as specified in Veh. C. 40302, 40303, 40305, and 40305.5

. . . , a person arrested for a n inf r a c tion may be taken into c ustody only if he or sheE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 18

refuses to present satisfactory evidence of identity or refuses
to sig n the promise to appear. O therwise, the person must be

r e leased

. (P.C. 853.5.)” Id. at 302–03 (emphasis adde d ) ; accord L

. L e venson, California Criminal Procedure §§ 3:59, 3:64 (2012-2013 ed.) (same).

I n sum, we find n o convinci n g evidence that the California Supreme Court would not follow Rottanak K. a nd W illiams

. Consistent with those decisions, the statute’s plain lang uag e, t h e r ule ag ainst superfluity and other p ersuasive

au t h ority

, we hold that Penal Code § 853.5 provides the

ex c lusive g r ounds for custodial arrest of a person arrested for

an infraction. 6 W e therefore vacate the judg ment in favor o f the defendan t s o n E d g erly ’ s state law false arrest claim a nd remand f or further proceeding s. I f there are no further issues pertaining to liability on this claim, the district court shou l d
enter judg ment in favor of Edg erly a n d proceed to a trial on damag es.

6 T h e def en dan ts’ arg u m en ts to t

h e co n trary are w

h o lly w i th o u t m erit. T h eir arg u m en t th at th e seco n d

, t h ird an d f if th sen ten ces o f § 8 5 3 .5 (a)
ap p ly o n ly to Veh icle C o d e in f ractio n s is im

p o ssib le to reco n cile w ith th e p lain lan g u ag e of th e sta t u t e a n d co n trary to each o f th e au th o rities w e h av e cited

. T h e d ef

en dan ts’ arg u m en t th at t

h e o ffi c e r s w ere en t itled to tak e Ed g erly

in to cu sto d y

an d tran sp o rt h im

to th e statio n

h ou se in o rd er

“ t o research ” w

h eth er th i s m ig h t

b e h is th ird § 6 0 2 .8 o f

f en se at th e sam e lo catio n , a m i s d em ean o r, is h ig h ly u n p ersu asiv e. A s w e ex p l ain ed in Ed g erly

, b ecau s e th e o f

f icers h a d n o “reaso n to b eliev e th at h e h ad
p rev io u sly v io lated sectio n 6 02 .8 (a), th e cu sto d ial arrest w as n o t

au th orized b y state law .” 5 99 F.3 d at 9 5 9

. T h e d ef en d an ts h av e p o in ted
to n o th in g in § 8 5 3 .5 (a) – o r an y o th er p ro v isio n

o f Calif o rn ia law – th at

au th orize s p o l ice o f

f i cers t o tak e a d ef

en d an t in to cu sto d y b ased on

n o th in g m ore th an ran k s p ecu latio n th at th e d ef en d an t m ay h av e

co m m itted a m isd em ean o r. T h e d ef en d an ts’ relian ce o n 5 8 Cal. Op

. A t ty

. Gen

. 8 86 (1 9 75 ) is a lso m isp laced ; n o th in g i n § 6 0 2 .8 g ran ts au th o rities d iscretio n to treat a f

irst o f f en s e as a m isd em ean o r.E D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 19

II.

W e reject E dg erly ’s remaining contentions. F irst, althoug h his arg u ment to the contrary is understandable, we hold that the district court did not violate the law of the case doctrine or the rule of mandate by submitting Edg e rly ’s false
arrest claim to the jury

. S e e U nited States v. Thrasher

, 483 F .3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (“F or the [ law of the case] doctrine to apply

, the issue in question must have been decided ex plicitly or b y necessary implication in the previous disposition.”); Hall v. City of L.A.
, 697 F .3d 1 059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[ T] he rule o f mandate allows a lo w e r court to decide a ny thing not foreclosed by the mandate.”). Second, Edg erly has n o t shown that the district court’s error on the false arrest claim tainted the jury ’s finding that he was not subjected to a strip search. See G CB Commc’ns, Inc. v. U .S. S. Commc’ns, I

nc. , 6 50 F .3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2011) (“W e review evidentiary r

uling s for a

buse of discretion, but will not

reverse those unless it is more probable than not that an error, if any , tainted the outcome.”); Clem v. Lomeli

, 566 F .3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (“An error in in s tructing the jury in a civil case requires reversal unless the error is more probably than not harmless.”). The judg ment o n Edge r l y ’ s unlawful search claims therefore stands.

C O N C L U S I O N

W e a f firm judg ment in favor of the defendants on Edg erly ’s unl awful search claims. W e vacate judg ment inE D G E R L Y V

. C I T Y & C O U

N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O 20

favor of the defendants on Edg erly ’s state law false arrest

c l a i m and remand for further proceeding s. Costs of appe al are awarded to Edg erly

.

AF F IRMED IN PA R T , V ACATED IN P ART AND REMANDED.