[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

•Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 106269 

JOHN C. GUE

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

CHRISTINE M. GIRARDI 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. DR-13-346345 

BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, A.J., McCormack, J., and Boyle, J.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 20, 2018 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

APPELLANT

John C. Gue, pro se 

1380 112th Street, Apt. 204B 

Cleveland, Ohio 44102 

APPELLEE 

Christine M. Girardi, pro se 

25157 Carlton Park, #317 

North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant-father John Gue (“father”), pro se, appeals from the trial 

court’s order modifying the child support obligation of defendant-appellee-mother 

Christine Girardi (“mother”), pro se. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial 

court’s decision. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} Father and mother divorced in June 2014. At the time of their divorce, 

they had one adult child and three minor children — T.G. (age 17), N.G. (age 14) and 

H.G. (age 12). Under the shared parenting plan, which was adopted by the trial court, 

T.G. was to reside primarily with mother, N.G. was to reside primarily with father and 

H.G. was to reside with both parents, alternating weeks between their homes. The 

parties agreed that the parent not in possession of H.G. would pick her up at the end of 

the other parent’s parenting time unless otherwise agreed. 

{¶3} Pursuant to the agreed child support order incorporated in the divorce decree, 

mother was to provide health insurance for the children and was to pay $200.01 per 

month ($66.67 per month per child)1

 in child support for the three minor children. 

Mother’s child support obligation was deviated downward from the amount computed 

under the child support worksheet based on the amount of time each parent spent with the 

 1

 The child support figures referenced herein do not include the 2 percent processing fee. 

They also reflect the amounts to be paid when private health insurance is provided, since mother has 

provided private health insurance for the children through her employer at all times relevant to this 

appeal.
children and as “an offset on the house.”2

 The parties agreed that all school expenses 

and all noncovered medical expenses would be paid 60 percent by mother and 40 percent 

by father. 

{¶4} Effective May 31, 2015, T.G. became emancipated, and mother’s monthly 

child support obligation was reduced to $133.34 for the parties’ two remaining minor 

children. 

 2 Under the parties’ separation agreement, father agreed to quitclaim his interest in the 

marital residence to mother. Mother agreed to seek a modification of the mortgage, assumed 

responsibility for all of the utilities and maintenance expenses of the marital residence (which was 

then in foreclosure) and accepted responsibility for any profit or deficiency upon foreclosure or 

modification of the mortgage.

{¶5} On May 17, 2016, father filed a motion to modify child support, seeking an 

increase in mother’s child support obligation to $200 per month ($100 per month per 

child) over the standard child support obligation calculated under the child support 

guidelines. Father asserted that a change in circumstances had occurred and that an 

increase in mother’s child support obligation was warranted because (1) mother had 

stopped spending time with the children and (2) the amount of child support awarded as 

part of the divorce decree “was neither fair nor equitable in retrospect.” Father 

contended that he “bore the brunt of the cost” of providing for the children and the fact 

that he needed to reside in North Olmsted so that the children could continue to attend 

school in the district increased his financial burden. Father further contended that, at the 

time of the original support order, mother had represented that she would be unable to 
support the children at a level consistent with the child support guidelines “due to her 

health and intent to retire” but that this “has [not] proven to be true.” Mother opposed 

the motion. 

{¶6} In March 2017, mother filed a motion to show cause why father should not be 

held in contempt for (1) claiming H.G. as a dependent on his 2016 tax return, (2) failing 

to provide one-half of the transportation for H.G.’s visitation with mother and (3) failing 

to reimburse mother for certain expenses in accordance with the parties’ shared parenting 

plan. 

{¶7} In April 2017, the magistrate held a hearing on father’s motion to modify 

child support. Father and mother appeared pro se at the hearing.3

 Each parent testified 

in narrative form. Father cross-examined mother, and the magistrate asked additional 

questions of each party. Mother declined to cross-examine father. 

 3 Mother and father were both originally represented by counsel. Mother discharged her 

counsel in February 2017. Father discharged his counsel a month later. Each parent proceeded pro 

se at the hearing on father’s motion to modify support.

{¶8} Father testified that he was “currently unemployed,” having lost his job as a 

machine operator at Superior Roll Forming Co. Inc. (“Superior Roll Forming”) in March 

2017 after he showed up late for work. Father testified that he had worked there for 

two-and-a-half years prior to his termination. Father testified that he had “63 resumes 

out” and hoped to find a new position within the next two weeks. He testified that his 
“best prospect” was to “get a job through a temp agency,” as this was how he had 

obtained his prior position. 

{¶9} Father testified that although the shared parenting plan provided for the 

parents to have equal time with H.G., one week on and one week off, H.G. never spent 

more than one weekend a month with mother. He further testified that N.G. had spent 

no more than two weekends with mother in the past year. He also claimed that mother 

had failed to pay her share of the children’s school fees and expenses, including her share 

of a $900 school Disney World trip for N.G. 

{¶10} Mother testified that she is employed as a respiratory/pulmonary function 

therapist technologist at the Cleveland Clinic and that she provides health insurance 

coverage for the children through her employment. She testified that when the parties 

first divorced, they followed the alternating week schedule set forth in the shared 

parenting agreement for H.G. She further testified that after she remarried and moved to 

Mentor in December 2015, it made more sense for H.G. to stay with father during the 

week because H.G. was very involved in band activities at school and all of her friends 

were in North Olmsted. Mother explained that she also missed some weekend visitation 

with H.G. due to mother’s medical issues. 

{¶11} Mother testified that she provides all transportation for her parenting time 

with H.G. and disputed father’s claim that she did not pay her share of the children’s 

school expenses. She testified that while father paid for N.G.’s Walt Disney trip, she 

gave N.G. $200 for his expenses. She further testified that she paid $375 for H.G.’s 
school trip to Washington, D.C., certain of her band expenses, H.G.’s glasses and other 

noncovered medical expenses for which she was not reimbursed by father. She testified 

that she also worked “volunteer hours” at the school, which reduced the cost of N.G.’s 

trip and the cost of H.G.’s band uniform. Mother stated that she has continuing medical 

expenses and that she paid an average of $337 per month for noncovered medical 

expenses and prescription costs in 2016. 

{¶12} At the hearing, father and mother each introduced one exhibit. Father’s 

exhibit consisted of copies of paystubs from Superior Roll Forming for the periods ending 

December 13, 2015 and December 25, 2016, additional paystubs from Superior Roll 

Forming from March to June 2016, a W-2 form for 2016, his federal income tax returns 

for 2014, 2015 and 2016, a post-decree affidavit of income and expenses and a proposed 

child support worksheet. Mother’s exhibit consisted of paystubs from the Cleveland 

Clinic for December 29, 2016 to March 9, 2017, a summary of her benefit elections and 

costs (including health insurance coverage information), a W-2 form for 2016, her federal 

income tax returns for 2014 to 2016, select medical records, a post-decree affidavit of 

income and expenses and a proposed child support worksheet.4

 4

 The proposed child support worksheets father and mother submitted as part of their exhibits 

at the April 28, 2017 hearing were not included in the record received by this court on appeal. 

Likewise, the copy of father’s 2014 federal income tax return in the record was incomplete. This 

court, sua sponte, ordered appellant to supplement the record with complete copies of (1) the proposed 

child support worksheet and 2014 federal income tax return that were included in father’s Exhibit A 

and (2) the proposed child support worksheet that was included in mother’s Exhibit 1. On August 

17, 2018, father filed copies of his 2014 federal income tax return and a proposed child support 

worksheet dated February 9, 2017. The proposed child support worksheet submitted was unsigned. 
{¶13} In their closing statements, father asserted that his former attorney had 

submitted a proposed child support worksheet which calculated mother’s monthly support 

obligation as $730 for N.G. and H.G. He argued that mother should be required to pay 

$730 per month as retroactive child support for N.G. and H.G. and $584 per month in 

child support for H.G. following N.G.’s emancipation.5

{¶14} Mother requested a downward deviation of $200 per month from the 

standard child support obligation calculated under the child support guidelines due to her 

ability to provide suitable housing and her out-of-pocket medical expenses and 

prescription costs.6

 

 

For purposes of appeal, we assume this is a copy of the proposed child support worksheet that was 

admitted at the hearing as part of father’s Exhibit A 

5 N.G. became emancipated on June 3, 2017. 

6

 The parties agreed that the justification for the deviation previously granted as “an offset on 

the house” no longer applied. 

{¶15} On June 27, 2017, the magistrate issued his decision. The magistrate 

granted father’s motion to modify child support, increasing the amount of child support 

mother was required to pay from $66.67 per child per month ($133.34 per month total) to 

(1) $272.11 per child per month ($544.22 per month total) as child support for N.G. and 

H.G. for the time period May 17, 2016 to June 3, 2017 and (2) $384.83 per month as child 

support for H.G. effective June 4, 2017. 

{¶16} Concluding that the total earnings listed on the parties’ paystubs included 

contributions by their employers for health insurance benefits that were “not actual cash 
viii

available for purposes of child support,” the magistrate used the amounts listed as social 

security wages on the parties’ W-2 forms in calculating the parties’ child support 

obligations, believing it to be “the fairest determination of income for purposes of 

completing the child support computation worksheet.” 

 {¶17} Although the magistrate found that father had lost his job and “fallen on a 

difficult period,” he also found that father had “created this dilemma” himself by being 

habitually late to work. The magistrate, therefore, used information regarding father’s 

earnings in 2016, when he was still employed by Superior Roll Forming, in calculating 

the parties’ child support obligations. The magistrate found that father had a total gross 

income of $51,158.62 in 2016 and that mother had a total gross income of $48,955.48 in 

2016. 

{¶18} Using this information, the magistrate completed two child support 

computation worksheets (1) for N.G. and H.G. for the time period May 17, 2016 (when 

father filed his motion to modify support) until June 3, 2017 (the date N.G. graduated 

from high school) and (2) for H.G. after N.G.’s emancipation (effective June 4, 2017). 

Although the paystubs submitted by the parties suggest that both mother and father’s 

2016 earnings included at least some overtime, the magistrate did not distinguish between 

the parties’ regular earnings and overtime earnings when calculating the parties’ child 

support obligations using the applicable child support computation worksheet. The 
magistrate included all overtime earnings as annual gross income under section 1a of the 

child support computation worksheet. 

{¶19} The magistrate calculated the mother’s standard support obligation under the 

child support computation worksheet as $579.22 per month ($6,950.68 annually) when 

providing support for N.G. and H.G. and $419.83 per month ($5,037.95 annually) when 

providing support for only H.G. Given that the calculated child support amount was 

more than 10 percent greater than the existing child support order, the magistrate 

concluded that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred that warranted 

modification of the existing child support order. 

{¶20} The magistrate rejected mother’s request for a deviation based on her 

parenting time and ability to maintain suitable housing but granted a downward deviation 

of $35 per month for the transportation costs she incurred in exercising her visitation with 

H.G. retroactive to the date father filed his motion to modify child support. The 

magistrate also rejected mother’s request for a deviation based on her personal medical 

expenses but considered the “strain on [mother’s] finances” resulting from those expenses 

as grounds to “rebut the statutory re-payment of 20 percent on the retroactive child 

support arrearage” and ordered her to pay an additional $25 per month towards the 

retroactive arrearage ($409.83 per month in total) until the balance was paid in full. 

{¶21} On July 3, 2017, mother withdrew her motion to show cause without 

prejudice. 
x

{¶22} Father filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On August 29, 2017, 

the trial court overruled the father’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision 

without modification. 

{¶23} Father appealed. On January 16, 2018, this court, sua sponte, dismissed 

the appeal for lack of a final appealable order because the trial court had failed to issue an 

entry that separately set forth the trial court’s own judgment. On January 24, 2018, the 

trial court issued a new, separate judgment entry. This court then granted father’s motion 

to reinstate the appeal. 

{¶24} In his appeal, father raises the following six assignments of error (which he 

designates as “contentions”) for review: 

Contention #1: 

[T]he court of domestic relations disregards procedural due process. 

Contention #2: 

[T]he court of domestic relations disregarded Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedures [sic]. 

Contention #3: 

[T]he court of domestic relations disregards Ohio Revised Code. 

Contention #4: 

[T]he court of domestic relations disregards the best interest of the child. 

Contention #5: 

[T]he court of domestic relations places an unequal value on volunteer 

services. 

Contention #6: 

[T]he use of “Pro se” standard disregards any justification for it. 
xi

{¶25} For ease of discussion, we address father’s assignments of error out of order 

and together where appropriate. 

Law and Analysis 

Standard of Review 

{¶26} We review a trial court’s decision on matters of child support for abuse of 

discretion. Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 9. 

Under an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s decision will be reversed only if it 

is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983); see also In re C.A.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104052 

and 104054, 2016-Ohio-5633, ¶ 17 (abuse of discretion “‘describ[es] a judgment neither 

comporting with the record, nor reason.’”), quoting Klayman v. Luck, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 97074 and 97075, 2012-Ohio-3354, ¶ 12; In re K.R.B., 2017-Ohio-7071, 95 N.E.3d 

799, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). 

Modification of Mother’s Child Support Obligation 

Calculation of Gross Income

{¶27} We address father’s third assignment of error first. In his third assignment 

of error, father argues that the magistrate improperly calculated the parties’ gross income 

when completing the child support computation worksheets. Specifically, father 

contends that the trial court erred in (1) including all of the overtime he earned in 2016 in 

his annual gross income and (2) using the parties’ social security wages when calculating 

the parties’ annual gross income. 
{¶28} The starting point in calculating a parent’s child support obligation is 

parental income, i.e., “gross income” for those who are employed to full capacity or gross 

income plus potential income for those who are not employed to full capacity. See, e.g., 

Bodrock v. Bodrock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104177, 2016-Ohio-5852, ¶ 10, citing 

Morrow, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, at ¶ 11, and Serra v. Serra, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-528, 2016-Ohio-950, ¶ 9. For purposes of calculating 

child support, “gross income” is defined in R.C. 3119.01(C)(7). in relevant part as 

follows: 

“Gross income” means, except as excluded in division (C)(7) of this 

section, the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during 

a calendar year, whether or not the income is taxable, and includes 

incomefrom salaries, wages, overtime pay, and bonuses to the extent 

described in division (D) of section 3119.05 of the Revised Code; 

commissions; royalties; tips; rents; dividends; severance pay; pensions; 

interest; trust income; annuities; social security benefits, including 

retirement, disability, and survivor benefits that are not means-tested; 

workers’ compensation benefits; unemployment insurance benefits; 

disability insurance benefits; benefits that are not means-tested and that are 

received by and in the possession of the veteran who is the beneficiary for 

any service-connected disability under a program or law administered by 

the United States department of veterans’ affairs or veterans’ 

administration; spousal support actually received; and all other sources of 

income. 

 * * * 

R.C. 3119.05(A) requires that parents’ incomes “be verified by electronic means or with 

suitable documents, including * * * paystubs, employer statements, * * * tax returns, and 

all supporting documentation and schedules for the tax returns.” 
xiii

{¶29} The determination of gross income is a factual finding, which is subject to 

review on appeal to determine whether it is supported by competent, credible evidence in 

the record. Bodrock at ¶ 12, citing Serra at ¶ 10, and Jajola v. Jajola, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 83131, 2004-Ohio-370, ¶ 8. 

Overtime Earnings

{¶30} Father argues that the magistrate erred in including all of his 2016 overtime 

as gross income when calculating the parties’ child support obligations. He contends 

that the magistrate should have, instead, used the three-year average of his overtime. 

R.C. 3119.05(D) provides: 

When the court * * * calculates the gross income of a parent, it shall include 

the lesser of the following as income from overtime and bonuses: 

(1) The yearly average of all overtime, commissions, and bonuses received 

during the three years immediately prior to the time when the person’s child 

support obligation is being computed; 

(2) The total overtime, commissions, and bonuses received during the year 

immediately prior to the time when the person’s child support obligation is 

being computed. 

The child support computation worksheet tracks this language and provides for the 

inclusion of overtime pay as determined by these methods in annual gross income “if 

there exists a reasonable expectation that the total earnings from overtime and/or bonuses 

during the current calendar year will meet or exceed the amount that is the lower of the 

average of the three years or the [last calendar year] amount.” 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

{¶31} As evidence of his income, father submitted his paystubs from Superior Roll 

Forming for the period ending December 13, 2015 and December 25, 2016, various other 

paystubs from Superior Roll Forming from March to June 2016, his W-2 from 2016 and 

his tax returns from 2014 to 2016. Father’s paystub for the time period ending 

December 24, 2016 shows total “gross earnings” of $53,290.96, broken down into 11 

different “earnings” categories — 401ER, ATTEN, DLFE, DT, GNSHR, HOL, OT, PTO, 

REG, RETRO and SHFT. It also includes several handwritten notes, including the 

following: 

I worked my a** off. 

47 Saturdays worked 

31 Sundays worked 

5 Saturday[s] off work 

21 Sundays off 

10 vacation days 

36 days off total 329 days worked 

Father’s paystubs from 2016 list his hourly rate as $14.03 or $15.54. His 2016 federal 

tax return lists $50,086 in total “[w]ages, salaries, tips, etc.” 

{¶32} Father’s paystub for the period ending December 13, 2015 similarly shows 

total “gross earnings” of $21,292.64 broken down into 11 different earnings categories — 

401ER, ATTEN, BONUS, DLFE, DT, GNSHR, HOL, OT, PTO, REG and SHFT. It 

lists his hourly rate as $14.03. It also includes a handwritten note: “No Double Time 

(Sundays) offered in 2015. No Overtime until Oct, started being offered at end of the 
year.” His 2015 federal income tax return reports $30,986 in total “[w]ages, salaries, 

tips, etc.”7

 

 7

 It is not clear from the record what accounts for the $9,693.36 difference in earnings 

between the $30,986 in total “[w]ages, salaries, tips, etc.” reported on father’s 2015 federal income 

tax return and the $21,292.64 listed on the December 2015 paystub. Copies of the W-2 forms 

associated with father’s 2015 federal tax returns were not submitted.

{¶33} Father’s 2014 federal income tax return reports $12,702 in total income. 

The source of this income is not clear from the record. No paystubs or W-2s were 

introduced from 2014 and father offered no testimony regarding where he was working in 

2014 or the source(s) of his income in 2014. 

{¶34} As the magistrate pointed out in his decision, father offered no testimony or 

other evidence explaining the different pay categories referenced on his paystubs, or 

specifically, what portion of his earnings constituted overtime or bonuses. On the 

proposed child support worksheet father submitted, dated February 9, 2017, he listed 

$31,117 as his annual gross income. It is not clear from the record how this sum was 

calculated. Although father testified that he earned overtime in both 2015 and 2016, and 

it appears from the documentation submitted (listing his hourly rate) that father earned a 

substantial amount of overtime or bonuses in 2015 and 2016, in section 1b of his 

proposed child support worksheet, he listed “0.00” as the “[a]mount of overtime, bonuses, 

and commissions” for each of the last three years. The trial court, therefore, could only 

speculate as to the specific overtime and bonus component included in his earnings 

during these years. Father did not offer any testimony or other evidence regarding 
whether he could reasonably expect to earn similar overtime or bonuses based on his job 

prospects in the future. 

{¶35} As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to use the 

three-year average of father’s overtime and bonuses when calculating his gross income. 

See, e.g., Worley v. Worley, 5th Dist. Licking No. 06-CA-63, 2007-Ohio-252, ¶ 6-13 

(where father failed to provide trial court with evidence relative to his income or overtime 

for the three previous years and only guessed as to the overtime component included in 

his income, trial court was “free to rely on the evidence presented” and did not err in 

including overtime pay in father’s gross income when calculating his child support 

obligation under R.C. 3119.05(D)); Lanzillotta v. Lanzillotta, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. 

C-120796 and C-120835, 2013-Ohio-4050, ¶ 18-23 (where record was clear that mother 

had earned a substantial amount of overtime in year in which child support obligation was 

being computed and provided no evidence other than her testimony that the overtime was 

not likely to occur in the future, trial court was required to include mother’s overtime pay 

in calculating her gross income); see also Wildman v. Wildman, 5th Dist. Licking No. 

12-CA-21, 2012-Ohio-5090, ¶ 16-21) (where father did not provide any information 

regarding his bonus and overtime income from 2008 to 2010, forcing trial court to rely on 

a 2011 paystub, trial court did not err in extrapolating defendant’s gross income under 

R.C. 3119.01(C)(7) based on the limited evidence provided); Benjelloun v. Benjelloun, 

12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-01-004, 2012-Ohio-5353, ¶ 11-15 (trial court was required 

to take father’s bonuses into account in determining his gross income for child support 
purposes where the only evidence presented, father’s paystubs, indicated that he had 

received two bonuses in 2011 with the possibility of receiving a third). 

Use of Social Security Wages in Calculating Gross Income

{¶36} Father also contends that the magistrate erred in using the amount listed as 

social security wages on the parties’ 2016 W-2 form to calculate the parties’ child support 

obligations. He contends that this was unfair because the magistrate already 

“compensated the [mother] for having to pay for the court ordered health care of the 

children” by deducting the cost of the children’s health insurance on line 20 of the child 

support computation worksheet. 

{¶37} As stated above, the magistrate used the amount listed as social security 

wages on the parties’ 2016 W-2 forms in calculating the parties’ gross income after 

determining that the total earnings listed on the parties’ paystubs included their 

employer’s contributions for their health insurance benefits. 

{¶38} Father did not object to the magistrate’s finding that the parties’ total 

earnings as reflected on their paystubs included employer-paid health insurance 

contributions or to the exclusion of those amounts from the parties’ gross income in 

calculating their child support obligations below. 

{¶39} However, father did not specifically object to the magistrate’s decision on 

that basis. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that “exceptfor a claim of plain error, a 
party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion * * * unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as 

required” by the rule. See also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) (“An objection to a magistrate’s 

decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.”) He has, 

therefore, waived all but plain error. See, e.g., Huntington Natl. Bank v. Cade, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103674, 2016-Ohio-4705, ¶ 9; Huntington Natl. Bank v. Blount, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98514, 2013-Ohio-3128, ¶ 10-11. Review for plain error is to be 

conducted “with the utmost caution.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 

679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). The doctrine is limited to those “extremely rare cases” in 

which “exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest 

miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have 

a materially adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial 

proceedings.” Id.; see also Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Conway, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

106315, 2018-Ohio-2229, ¶ 16. Father has not argued plain error on appeal and 

following our careful review of the limited record before us on this issue, we cannot say 

that this is the “extremely rare case” where this court is required to apply the plain error 

doctrine to avoid a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” See, e.g., Hahn v. Hahn, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 96984, 2012-Ohio-594, ¶ 21 (where father did not object to the portions of 

the magistrate’s decision concerning calculation of the parties’ respective incomes and 

order of child support and did not demonstrate that exceptional circumstances existed that 

required application of the plain error doctrine, father was precluded from raising claims 
that the trial court erred in its calculation of the parties’ income and in failing to order 

mother to pay child support to father on appeal); see also Phillips v. Hostetler, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 28397, 2017-Ohio-2834, ¶ 18-21 (overruling father’s assignment of error 

where, although father challenged his child support obligation below, he failed to raise 

the specific grounds he was attempting to argue on appeal below and did not argue plain 

error). 

{¶40} Even if we were to conclude that the magistrate committed the error claimed 

by father, such error does not “seriously affect the basic fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying 

judicial process itself.” Goldfuss at syllabus. Accordingly, it does not rise to the level 

of plain error. See, e.g., Hancock v. Crook, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-332, 

2014-Ohio-5106, ¶ 11; see also Trombley v. Trombley, 9th Dist. Medina No. 

17CA0012-M, 2018-Ohio-1880, ¶ 10 (where mother did not specifically object to manner 

in which the magistrate calculated mother and father’s income and did not argue plain 

error, she failed to preserve issue for appellate review); Blevins v. Blevins, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 14AP-175, 2014-Ohio-3933, ¶ 23-24 (appellant’s claim that the trial court 

erred by reducing appellee’s child support obligation without cause and against the best 

interest of the children did not raise plain error). Accordingly, we overrule father’s third 

assignment of error. 

Deviation for Transportation Expenses 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

{¶41} In his first assignment of error, father argues that the trial court erred in 

granting mother a $35 per month downward deviation for the transportation costs 

associated with mother’s parenting time with H.G. because (1) mother was not exercising 

her parenting time with H.G. and (2) mother withdrew her motion to show cause (which 

alleged, in part, that father had failed to provide his one-half of the transportation for 

H.G.’s visitation with mother). He further argues that the trial court’s decision to grant 

mother a downward deviation violates due process because he was “denied any chance 

for oral argument on the deviation.” Father’s arguments are meritless. 

{¶42} The trial court may order child support that deviates from the amount of 

child support calculated under the basic child support schedule and worksheet if the court 

determines that it would be unjust or inappropriate and not be in the best interest of the 

child because of the extraordinary circumstances of the parents or any other factor set 

forth in R.C. 3119.23. See R.C. 3119.22-3119.24, 3119.79. 

{¶43} “[E]xtraordinary circumstances of the parents” includes: 

(1) The amount of time the children spend with each parent; 

(2) The ability of each parent to maintain adequate housing for the children; 

(3) Each parent’s expenses, including child care expenses, school tuition, 

medical expenses, dental expenses, and any other expenses the court 

considers relevant; [and] 

(4) Any other circumstances the court considers relevant. 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

R.C. 3119.24(B). The factors set forth in R.C. 3119.23 a court may consider in 

determining whether to grant a deviation include “extraordinary costs associated with 

parenting time” and “[a]ny other relevant factor.” R.C. 3119.23(D), (P). 

{¶44} In this case, the magistrate found the “presumed correct amount of child 

support” as calculated using the child support schedule and worksheets to be “unjust and 

inappropriate and not in the children’s best interest” and granted mother a “slight 

downward deviation” for her transportation costs based on the following findings: 

In this case mother’s request for a deviation due to the parenting time, 

including any extraordinary costs is seemingly not warranted for the reason 

that she re-located to Mentor, Ohio. It is undisputed that she exercised 

parenting time with [N.G.] sparingly. [H.G.] is at her home at most 

every-other weekend. However, it does appear that mother remains very 

involved in [H.G.’s] activities at school. Conversely, [mother] also is 

apparently providing the transportation for [H.G.]. She has a contempt 

motion pending against father for his alleged refusal to provide his one-half 

of the transportation for [H.G.] for parenting time. There is a travel 

expense for both travel and return from Mentor to North Olmsted. It is 

likely 40 miles each way, which would equate to 160 miles every other 

weekend when mother is exercising her parenting time, where she is solely 

providing the transportation or about 320 miles per month with 

two-weekend parenting time. That is approximately one-tank of gasoline 

and wear and tear or about $35.00 per month. It would be about one half 

of that expense if father was providing his one-half share of the parenting 

time. A $35.00 per month deviation is appropriate in this regard. It also 

would be appropriate to apply same retroactive to the date of filing of the 

motion. 

In ruling on father’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court found that 

these findings were “fully supported by the evidence.” 

{¶45} On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting mother a $35 per month downward deviation for the transportation 
costs she incurred in exercising her visitation with H.G. Mother testified that H.G. 

generally spent one or two weekends a month with her and that she provided the 

transportation for both ways from father’s house in North Olmsted to mother’s house in 

Mentor. The magistrate’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence in the 

record. 

{¶46} With respect to father’s due process argument, the record reflects that father 

had an opportunity to present his own evidence relevant to his motion to modify child 

support as well as an opportunity to cross-examine mother regarding her testimony. He 

also had an opportunity to present a closing argument at the hearing and filed written 

objections to the magistrate’s decision relating to the transportation costs issue. Those 

objections were fully considered and overruled by the trial court in its August 29, 2017 

judgment entry. Accordingly, father has shown no violation of due process. 

{¶47} Father also argues that the magistrate had “no authority” to rule on mother’s 

motion to show cause because mother withdrew it. However, the magistrate did not rule 

on mother’s motion to show cause. That motion had been referred to another magistrate 

and was not decided as part of the April 2017 hearing. Whether mother was entitled to a 

deviation for her transportation costs was a separate issue from whether father should be 

held in contempt for his alleged failure to provide one-half of the transportation for 

mother’s visitation with H.G. (and the other issues raised in mother’s motion to show 

cause). Simply because mother dismissed her motion to show cause after the magistrate 
issued his decision did not preclude the trial court from granting a deviation for mother’s 

transportation costs. Father’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Evidence Submitted in Support of Motion to Modify Child Support 

{¶48} In his second assignment of error, father complains about the length of time 

it took the trial court to resolve his motion to modify child support and the trial court’s 

finding that “[t]he evidence of record is limited.” He contends that the trial court 

violated the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure because it “never collected the documents to 

make an informed decision according to * * * R.C. 3199 — calculation of child support” 

and that the trial court “could have fixed the lack of evidence and verified the claims 

made by the plaintiff” when it reviewed the magistrate’s decision and ruled on his 

objections. Once again, father’s arguments are meritless. It is not the role of the 

magistrate or the trial court to “collect” or present evidence in support of a party’s claims. 

 Although a trial court “may hear additional evidence” before ruling on objections to a 

magistrate’s decision, it may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that 

the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for 

consideration by the magistrate. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). No such showing was made in 

this case. 

 {¶49} In addition, although it may have taken the trial court longer than father 

would have liked to resolve his motion, we cannot say this constituted an abuse of 

discretion. Father’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

Value of Volunteer Services
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

{¶50} In his fifth assignment of error, father asserts that the trial court erred in 

“plac[ing] an unequal value on [the] volunteer services” mother provided in contributing 

towards the children’s extracurricular activity expenses as compared with the $900 in 

cash he paid for N.G.’s Walt Disney trip. We disagree. The magistrate found that 

mother had participated in a program through the school, which allowed her to perform 

volunteer work in lieu of making certain cash payments towards the children’s band 

expenses. The magistrate’s finding is supported by competent, credible evidence in the 

record. There is nothing in the record that suggests that the magistrate placed an 

“unequal value” on this volunteer work in calculating the parties’ modified child support 

obligations or abused its discretion in failing to order mother to pay additional child 

support based on father’s contributions toward the children’s school fees and expenses. 

While father testified that he paid $900 toward N.G.’s Walt Disney trip, mother testified 

that, in addition to the volunteer work she performed, she gave N.G. $200 toward 

expenses on the Disney trip, paid $375 for H.G.’s school trip to Washington, D.C. and 

paid for H.G.’s glasses and other noncovered medical expenses for which she was not 

reimbursed by father. We overrule father’s fifth assignment of error. 

Accommodation for Pro Se Parties

{¶51} In his sixth assignment of error, father challenges the trial court’s 

application of the long-standing principle that “[p]ro se litigants are presumed to have 

knowledge of the law and legal procedures, and are held to the same standard as litigants 

who are represented by counsel.” The record reflects that father originally had counsel 
in this case but discharged him prior to the hearing in this matter. Father fails to explain 

how the trial court’s application of this principle amounts to an error in this case. 

Accordingly, we disregard this assignment of error. App.R. 12(A)(2), 16(A). 

Father’s Remaining Assignment of Error

{¶52} In his fourth assignment of error, father reiterates certain of the arguments 

he made in his previous assignments of error, asserting that the trial court unfairly favored 

mother over the children and failed to act in the “best interest of the child.” For the 

reasons stated above, we overrule father’s fourth assignment of error. 

{¶53} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
[Cite as Gue v. Girardi, 2018-Ohio-3788.]

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

____________________________________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

TIM McCORMACK, J., and 

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR