alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Maritime Commission

          - [Docket No. 14-16]

Notice is given that a complaint has been filed with the Federal Maritime Commission (Commission) by Baltic Auto Shipping, Inc., hereinafter “Complainant,” against Michael Hitrinov (“Hitrinov”) and Empire United Lines Co., Inc. (“EUL”), hereinafter “Respondents.” Complainant states that it is an Illinois corporation. Complainant alleges that Respondent EUL is a licensed NVOCC, and Respondent Hitrinov is “the sole principal and officer of EUL.”

Complainant alleges that Respondents have violated the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. 41102, 41104, 40501, and 46 CFR part 515, in connection with shipment of over 4000 used automobiles over a five year period and charging rates “in excess of the amounts set forth in EUL's tariff.” Complainant alleges it “has sustained and continued to sustain injuries and damages in excess of $400,000.”

Complainant seeks that Respondents “be required to answer the charges herein; that after due hearing, an order be made commanding said respondent to pay to Complainant by way of reparations for the unlawful conduct . . . with interest and attorney's fees or such other sum as the Commission may determine to be proper as an award of reparation; and that such other and further order or orders be made as the Commission determines to be proper in the premises.”

                    The full text of the complaint can be found in the Commission's Electronic Reading Room at                     *www.fmc.gov/​14-16.*

This proceeding has been assigned to the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The initial decision of the presiding officer in this proceeding shall be issued by December 1, 2015 and the final decision of the Commission shall be issued by June 1, 2016.

Karen V. Gregory,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2014-28539 Filed 12-4-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

May 20, 2004

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-40951

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 PlaintiffAppellee,

versus

TERESA ANN BRACK,

 DefendantAppellant.

---------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:02-CR-20-1

----------------------------------------------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS AND STEWART, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:*

Counsel appointed to represent Teresa Ann Brack in this direct criminal appeal has moved

for leave t o withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967). Brack respo nded to counsel’s motion, arguing that the Government breached the plea

agreement by failing to move for a downward departure at sentencing in order that she would receive
 

a 40-month sentence, as she was promised. She also maintains that she has a valid ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, Brack requests the appointment of substitute appellate

counsel.

This court generallydoes notreviewineffective-assistance-of-counselclaims ondirect appeal;

this case presents no exception. See United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002). Brack’s motion for appointment of substitute counsel is DENIED.

Our independent review ofthe record, counsel’s brief, and Brack’sresponse showsthat there

are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4817 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 5, 2004 

Received 

AN ACT 

To facilitate the resolution of a minor boundary encroachment on lands of the Union Pacific Railroad Company 

in Tipton, California, which were originally conveyed by 

the United States as part of the right-of-way granted 

for the construction of transcontinental railroads. 
2 

HR 4817 RDS 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RELEASE OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN 

4 CERTAIN RAILROAD GRANT LANDS IN TIP5 TON, CALIFORNIA. 

6 (a) PROPERTY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 

7 ‘‘property’’ means that portion of the existing building lo8 cated at 615 North Burnett Road in Tipton, California, 

9 which encroaches upon land that, subject to a reversionary 

10 interest, was conveyed by the United States pursuant to 

11 the Act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat. 292). 

12 (b) RELEASE OF INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.—There 

13 is hereby released, without consideration, all right, title, 

14 and interest of the United States in and to the surface 

15 portion of the property. The United States retains any 

16 subsurface mineral rights held by the United States as of 

17 the date of the enactment of this Act associated with the 

18 property. 

19 (c) INSTRUMENT OF RELEASE.—The Secretary of 

20 the Interior shall execute and file in the appropriate office 

21 a deed of release, amended deed, or other appropriate in-
3 

HR 4817 RDS 

1 strument effectuating the release of interests made by sub2 section (b). 

Passed the House of Representatives October 4, 

2004. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
# Fourth Cour **t of Appeals**
**San Antonio, Texas**

September 13, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00559

- CR

Stanley Foster BAKER, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 15

- 1755

- CR

- A Honorable W.C. Kirkendal l, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The trial court imposed sentence on July 20, 2016 , and Appellant is currently
incarcerated

. A ppellant timely filed a notice of appeal and indicated he will represent himself on appeal. T he appellate record is due on September 19, 2016.

In Appellant’s letter of September 6, 2016, filed on September 12, 2016 , he states he has “been denied access to the jail law library computer and books since July 3, 2016.” He also asks
“the court for a n extension of all filing deadlines until [he has ] adequate access to all required law material and paperwork for [his] appeal.”

Appellant’s general motion for an extension of time for all filing deadlines in this appeal is DENIED without prejudice to Appe llant seeking an extension of time for a specific deadline.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and a ffixed the seal of the said court on this 13th day of September, 2016

.___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION  EXTRACTED
FROM  THE  REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER
30,  1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE  TO  SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>  0000839437
<NAME> AMFAC/JMB HAWAII, INC.

       
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2
 
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
 
The Board of Directors
Chancellor Media Corporation of Los Angeles:
 
We consent to the inclusion in this Registration Statement on Form S-4 of
Chancellor Media Corporation of Los Angeles of our reports dated February 10,
1998, except for Notes 2(b) paragraphs 1 and 3-5 as to which the date is
February 20, 1998 and 9(a) as to which the date is March 13, 1998, on our audits
of the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of
Chancellor Media Corporation of Los Angeles and Subsidiaries as of December 31,
1997 and for the year then ended. We also consent to the reference to our firm
under the captions "Experts".
 
                                          PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
 
Dallas, Texas
November 5, 1998
Exhibit 32.2CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002     I, Kenneth L. Hignett, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary ofMorgan’s Foods, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that: (1) The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the period ended February 25,2007 (the “Report”), which this certification accompanies, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.     /s/ Kenneth L. Hignett     Kenneth L. Hignett, Senior Vice President,  Chief Financial Officer and SecretaryMay 29, 2007
50
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-2548

_____________________________

ALBERT J. ROBINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Belated Appeal—Original Jurisdiction.

September 18, 2019

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is denied as untimely. See Fla. 

R. App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(A).

ROWE, OSTERHAUS, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Albert J. Robinson, pro se, Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
10417.

#### James *v.*Sullivan, guardian.

Stephens, J.

Upon the call of this ease there being no representation for the plaintiff in error, by brief or otherwise, and it being plainly apparent that the writ of error was prosecuted for delay only, the motion of the defendant in error that the record be opened, the *298judgment therein affirmed, and damages of ten per "Cent, for delay be awarded him, is granted. (Civil Code, § 6249).

Decided October 20, 1919.

Motion for new trial; from Douglas superior court—Judge Bartlett. December *27,*1918.

*J. B. Hutcheson,*for defendant in error.

*Judgment affirmed, with damages.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.*
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<PAGE>
 
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</TABLE>
#### Kromer, Appellee, *v.*Kear, Appellant.

(No. 4318

— Decided August 8, 1949.)

*Mr. E. Searles Morton,*for appellee.

*Mr. Henry A. Beinhard,*for appellant.

By the Court.

This cause is submitted on motion by the plaintiff-appellee for an order dismissing the appeal on the following grounds:

1. The appeal is noted as one on questions of law and fact and the same is not in a chancery case.

2. That no notice of appeal was filed within 20 days after the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.

The record discloses that the action is one in forcible entry and detainer, which is not a chancery case and is, therefore, not appealable on questions of law and fact. See *Shafer*v. *Stein,*78 Ohio App., 47, 62 N. E. (2d), 297.

Now considering the second branch of the motion, the appellant would be permitted under Section 11564, General Code, to perfect his appeal on questions of law providing the notice of appeal was filed within the-*310statutory period. The appellee contends that it was not and therefore this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The record discloses that the action arose in the Municipal Court of Columbus, and on appeal on questions of law to the Court of Common Pleas the judgment was affirmed on April 30,1949. On May 5, 1949, a motion for a new trial was filed which was overruled on June 6, 1949. The notice of appeal was filed on June 14, 1949. The question here presented is when the statutory 20-day period begins to run. We are aware of no provision in the Code for the filing of a motion for a new trial in appellate court in a case where the appeal is on questions of law only. Section 11575, General Code, defines a new trial as follows: “A new trial is a re-examination, in the same court, of the issues, after a final order, judgment or decree by the court.”

A trial is a formal examination of the matter in issue on a cause before a competent tribunal for the purpose of determining such issue, which may be one on law or fact or both. The trial was, therefore, had in the Municipal Court and Section 11575, General Code, requires that the new trial, if granted, must be in the same court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of Section 12223-7, General Code, with reference to the filing of notice of appeal within 20 days after the entry of an order overruling or sustaining a motion for a new trial, means a motion for a new trial in the trial court. Such provisions do not refer to a motion for a new trial in an appellate court, where the appeal is on questions of law only. Since the notice of appeal was not seasonably filed, the motion to dismiss will be sustained.

*Motion sustained.*

Miller, P. J., Hornbeck and Wiseman, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary information extracted from the
Balance sheet and Income statement dated December 31, 1995 on Form 10-QSB,
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such Form 10-QSB dated
December 31, 1995.
</LEGEND>
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<CGS>                                          812,990
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              80,922
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<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.17)
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</TABLE>
#### MOSELEY *et al. v.*PHŒNIX MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (four cases).

*492Nos. 6851, 6852, 6853, 6854.

December 13, 1928.

*W. T. Burkhalier,*for plaintiffs in error.

*B. L. Williams Jr.*and *Lankford, Rogers & Newton,*contra.

Gilbert, J.

These are claim cases, all controlled by the same issue. The evidence demanded a finding of facts as follows: The four claims were for portions of land formerly owned by A. S. Moseley, father of the claimants, and conveyed by him to the latter. Subsequently to such conveyances, Mrs. Louvenia V. Moseley, wife of A. S. Moseley and mother of claimants, applied, through Howard M. Smith & Company, for a loan of $15,000, offering as security 1691 acres of described land which included all of the land conveyed as above stated to claimants by their father. There were oustanding liens on the lands. Mrs. Moseley’s application for the loan contained the following statement: “My husband originally purchased it [the land] and gave it. off to our children. But in order to get the liens paid oil they conveyed it to me. I will put it in loan and pay oil old liens, and we will all live on it and work it and pay off new loan together.” The application also contained the sworn statement that the applicant was in peacable possession of the land, that the title had never been questioned, and that the loan was granted upon the representations made by applicant. The loan was granted, a note was signed, and a deed to secure the same, covering all of the land, was duly executed by the applicant, with the knowledge of all of the four claimants, who themselves executed to their mother separate warranty deeds conveying their interests in the land for a consideration of five dollars and love and affection. The-four claimants also executed a joint deed to their mother, for a consideration of ten dollars, conveying all of their interest in the entire tract of 1691 acres, being the same land later described in the security deed. These deeds of the claimants were made for the purpose of enabling their mother to secure the loan. The deeds were executed in the office of the attorney who prepared all of the instruments for obtaining the loan, *493and after being so executed such deeds were left on the desk of the attorney, and all were promptly recorded. The money was obtained from the Phcenix Mutual Life Insurance Company in 1919, interest thereon to be paid annually, and the principal payable December 1, 1923. The debt was not paid. The lender sued on the note to judgment, and fi. fa. issued on November 30, 1926. Proper escrow deed was executed and filed by the holder of the security deed, for the purpose of effecting a levy and sale to satisfy the judgment. Claims were filed, and upon the trial the court directed a verdict against the claimants. The plaintiffs in error concede that the controlling point is whether the deeds executed by them to their mother were “delivered” so as to render such deeds effective to convey title out of them. The rulings will be found in the headnotes.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
EXHIBIT
32.1





TELVUE
CORPORATION





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
sec. 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of TelVue Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jesse Lerman, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: 08/14/09
              
              /s/
      Jesse LermanJesse
      LermanPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer