alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 6790

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. MIRACLE SMITH , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond

. Robert E. Payne , Senior District Judge. ( 3:08

- cr - 00283

- REP

- RCY

- 2; 3:17

- cv - 00403

- REP )

Submitted : August 24 , 2017 Decided: August 29, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge , and SHEDD and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Miracle Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Mira cle Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s order recharacterizing her 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012) motion as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and denying relief

on her § 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Co ckrell , 537 U.S. 322,
336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a const itutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at
484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Smith has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argume nt would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
Community Resilience Workshop - Data Needs for Resilience Planning and Decision-Making

13

Speaker Biographies and Abstracts

Keynote Speaker:

Sandi Fowler, City of Cedar Rapids, IA, Deputy City Manager 

Sandi Fowler has served in the City Manager’s Office since 2008, was 

promoted to Assistant City Manager in December 2012, and was recently 

named Deputy City Manager. In twenty-eight years with the City of 

Cedar Rapids, Fowler has also served as the Assistant to the Public Safety 

Commissioner (1990-1999), Neighborhood Liaison (2000-2008), and 

Assistant to the City Manager (2008-2012).

In February 2014, Fowler’s responsibilities were expanded to include 

supervision of the Development Services Departments which include 

Public Works, Building Services, Community Development, Transit, and 

the Development Services Team. Fowler provided leadership to City 

facility flood recovery projects and served as project lead for the City Hall renovation and City 

Services Center building.

Fowler received a BBA in Management from Mount Mercy University in 1993, and a Master’s

Degree in Public Administration from Upper Iowa University in 2008. In 2015, Fowler attended 

the Senior Executives in State and Local Government Program at Harvard University, John F. 

Kennedy School of Government.

Abstract 

Cedar Rapids: Data and Tools Used in Planning and Carrying Out a Successful Resilience 

Strategy 

June 2008 brought to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, a millennial flood that surpassed the Cedar River’s 

flood stage by nearly 20 feet, 11 feet above the 79-year-old record. A city with 130,000 

population, the disaster resulted in $5.4 billion in community-wide damage, more than 310 City 

facilities damaged or destroyed, and more than 10 square miles of the city underwater, including 

downtown and nearby neighborhoods. The past ten years have seen a $1.064 billion recovery 

that included more than 1,400 buyouts of residential and commercial property to remove 

residents from harm’s way, and the revitalization of city facilities and the community. Cedar 

Rapids has worked tirelessly to leverage data about area residents, properties destroyed, and 

rebuilding that needed to occur to successfully recover from this major disaster. Today, Cedar 

Rapids is continuing to build back stronger and better through the funding and construction of a 

$550 million flood control system. The data and tools Cedar Rapids used, and those they wished 

they had, will be shared as part of this community’s success story.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

CHARLES ROBINSON, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-00488-WS-B 

J.C. GILES, : 

Defendant. : 

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issue 

raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 

made under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly, 

this Court certifies that the issues Petitioner seeks to raise on appeal are Awithout arguable merit 

either in law or fact,@ Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); Bilal v. Driver, 

251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001), and are therefore not brought in good faith. In light of 

that certification, Petitioner=s Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 22) is hereby 

DENIED. 

DONE this 22nd day of June, 2010. 

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE ________ 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00488-WS-B Document 24 Filed 06/22/10 Page 1 of 1
11750.

#### Adams *v.*The State.

Decided November 9, 1920.

Indictment for larceny of hog; from Wilkinson superior court — Judge Park. July 19, 1920.

The court charged in substance that the jury would be authorized to convict the accused if the evidence satisfied their minds that the hogs were stolen from the prosecutor and were found in the recent possession of the defendant, and if the defendant or the evidence in the case failed to give a reasonable explanation of this possession. This part of the charge was complained of as expressing an opinion that these facts would prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It was further contended that the court erred in using the words “ recent possession ” and not explaining that it is the possession of the recently stolen hog that .would require an explanation.

*Sibley & Sibley,*for plaintiff in error.

*Doyle Campbell, solicitor-general, A. Y. Clement,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

1. The sufficiency of the description of the hogs alleged to have been stolen was brought in question by demurrer to the indictment, in which they were described as “ one red and black spotted sow hog of value $10, one white and black spotted sow hog of value $10, one red and black spotted male hog of value $10, one dark red male hog of value $10, and two white and black spotted sow hogs, of value of $10 each; all of the value of sixty and no/100 dollars and of the personal goods of O. A. Allen.” Under the ruling in *Garrett*v. *State,*21 *Ga. App.*801 (1) (93 S. E. 513), and the cases therein cited, the . court did not err in overruling the demurrer.

'2. There is no merit in any of the grounds of the amendment to the motion for a new trial. There was some evidence to support the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge, and the judgment must be

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, PHILIP L. GOULDING, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of MONONGAHELA POWER COMPANY.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I
are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants
other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.



|                        |  |  |  |                            
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------
|                        |  |  |  | /s/ Philip L. Goulding     
|                        |  |  |  | Philip L. Goulding         
|Date: February 27, 2007 |  |  |  | Principal Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned officer of MONONGAHELA POWER COMPANY (the Company), hereby certifies, to such
officers knowledge, that the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|               |  |                                                                  
|-------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|March 11, 2004 |  | /s/    PAUL J.
EVANSONPaul J. Evanson
Principal Executive Officer
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TYLER, TEXAS 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 

OFRUBYRENEEBYROM 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ CAUSE NUMBER 12-15-00033-CV 

§ 

§ 

§ 

FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLEE'S BRIEF 

NOW COMES JILL CAMPBELL PENN in the above styled and numbered cause, and 

files this motion for the Court to extend the time for filing of the Appellee's Brief pursuant to the 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and for good cause shows the following: 

I. 

The Appellee's Brief is currently due in the Court of Appeals on June 1 7, 2015. Appellant's 

Briefwas filed on May 18, 2015. 

II. 

Appellee seeks an extension of time until July 17, 2015, to file Appellee's Brief. There 

have been no previous extensions of time requested or granted with regard to the filing of 

Appellee's Brief. 

III. 

It has not been possible for Counsel to complete the brief due to a busy court schedule, 

including preparation for a hearing in Cause No. 2009-31036-211; a civil commitment hearing in 

Page 1 of 3 

ACCEPTED

12-15-00033-CV

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

6/15/2015 1:38:00 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 6/15/2015 1:38:00 PM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
Cause No. F-2013-1515-C; seeking emergency reliefin Cause No. 15-04677-431 and preparing 

for hearing in that cause and companion Cause No. 15-03526-442. In addition, Counsel is 

preparing to file for emergency relief in three other family law cases. 

This motion is made in good faith and is not a dilatory tactic. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Jill Campbell Penn prays that the Court 

grant the Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellee's Brief, and that the deadline for filing 

the briefbe extended until July 17, 2015. 

I verify that the facts stated above are true. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Joseph F. Zellmer 

State Bar Number 22258515 

620 West Hickory Street 

Denton, Texas 76201 

Telephone: 94 3-2674 

Facsimile: 4 I 82-7174 

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this the \)~of ~ , 

2015, to certify which witness my hand and seal of office. 

Notary Public, State of Texas 

Page 2 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 

This is to certify that I left a message for Appellant's Counsel Joe Shumate on June 15, 

2015, in regard to the First Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellee's Brief, and at the 

time of filing have not received a response from Mr. Shumate. 

Joseph F. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this the 151h day of June, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 

above and foregoing First Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellee's Brief was served on 

Joe Shumate, by eservice. 

Page 3 of 3
Title: Big data and self-driving labs in small-angle neutron scattering

Abstract:

We are in the midst of a revolution in experimental science. Advances in computing, sources, and data 

acquisition pipelines have enabled the collection of data at rates orders of magnitude faster that even a 

decade ago, while machine learning approaches have enabled unprecedented levels of autonomy in 

experimental execution. In neutron science, this has manifested in event-mode data and the numerous 

advanced techniques enabled by event mode data acquisition: stopped-flow mixing, stroboscopic 

measurements, and more. Autonomy is perhaps best exemplified by the Autonomous Formulation Lab 

at the NCNR, which can use SANS with robotic sample preparation and Gaussian process regression to 

map a phase diagram of a self-assembling systems with up to 25x fewer samples than a grid search 

approach. This forthcoming data tsunami is no match for manual fitting approaches using graphical 

software: new tools are needed. This module will focus on equipping students with foundational skills 

for working with massive scattering datasets programmatically, explore the self-assembly of a block 

copolymer micelle system autonomously using the AFL, and introduce some best practices for 

programmatic fitting of hundreds of individual datasets using the SasView/sasmodels API.
11654.

#### Jordan *v.*Fowler.

Decided October 13, 1920.

Action for damages; from Cobb superior court — Judge Blair. June 16, 1920.

On general demurrer the trial judge dismissed the action, “being of tire opinion that an allegation of special damage is necessary to the setting forth of a cause of action, and that no cause of action is s.et forth.”

*Clay & Blair,*for plaintiff.

*Abbott & Wallace,*for defendant.

Smith, J.

In a petition for slander, where the petition alleged that the defendant, in the presence of third persons, used the following language, referring to the plaintiff: “William Pinkney Jordan is a low down lying yellow dog; ” “William Pinkney Jordan is a low down yellow son of a bitch;” “William Pinkney Jordan is a damn low down yellow rotten dog,” and the petition failed to allege any special damage to the plaintiff from these statements, which he alleged were false and malicious, the case came under the fourth division of section 4433 of the Civil Code (1910), which section, defining “slander,” concludes as follows: “fourth, any disparaging words productive of special damage flowing naturally therefrom. In the latter ease, the special damage is essential to support the action.” The court therefore did not err in sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing the suit. See *Ford*v. *Lamb,*116 *Ga.*655 (42 S. E. 998), and cases there cited; *Jones*v. *Bush,*131 *Ga.*421 (62 S. E. 279); *Dallon*v. *Higgins,*34 *Ga.*433; *Morris*v. *Evans,*22 *Ga. App.*11 (95 S. E. 385).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
11635.

#### WIDINCAMP *et al. v.*McCALL.

Decided November 2, 1920.

1. Testimony as to what the witness “ found out that cotton was worth ” in a named place on a certain day was admissible over the objection that it was hearsay.

2. Exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to give certain requested instructions to the jury will not be considered where the whole charge given to the jury is not sent up to this court and it does -not appear that the charge failed to cover substantially the requested instructions. And this court will not order that the charge given be sent up under section 6149 (4) of the Civil Code where it does not appear that the charge was in writing or on file in the office of the clerk of the trial court.

Trover from Tattnall superior court — Judge Sheppard. May 1, 1920.

*Elders & DeLoach,*for plaintiffs in error.

W. *T. Burkhalter,*contra.

Smith, J.

1. The court did not err in admitting, over the objection that it was hearsay, the testimony of a witness as follows: “I went to the Bluff to carry one load of cotton and I found out that cotton was worth more in Eeidsville that same day, and I went back that evening and I told Mr. Bdd that night.” The real purport of the testimony of the witness was that he went to Eeidsville and, after an investigation, found out that the market price of cotton on that date, the date of the alleged sale from the plaintiff to the defendant, was higher than the defendant had represented to the plaintiff. “Direct testimony as to market value is in the nature of opinion evidence. One need not be an expert or dealer in the article, but may testify as to value, if he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.” Civil Code (1910), § 5875. “The question of the value of an article is peculiarly for the jury, and that body is not absolutely bound by the opinions or estimates of *734the witness on that subject.” *Minchew*v. *Nahunta Lumber Co.,*5 *Ga. App.*154 (3) (62 S. E. 716).

2. The remaining ground of the amendment to the motion for a now trial contains a copy of a request to charge, the refusal of which is alleged to have been error. Under the following ruling of this court this ground of the motion will not be considered: “Where error is assigned upon a refusal of the trial judge to give certain requested instructions to the jury, and it is not shown that the request was not substantially covered by the charge given by the court, and the entire charge was not brought up, this court is unable to determine whether such refusal was erroneous or not; and where it does not appear, from the bill of exceptions or from the record brought up, that the charge of the court was reduced to writing or was on file in the office of the clerk of the court below (Penal Code, §§ 1056, 1057), this court will not order it sent up under section 6149 (4) of the Civil Code.” *Sovereign Camp*v. *McDaniel,*20 *Ga. App.*430 (4) (93 S. E. 105).

3. There was evidence to sustain the verdict, and, it having the approval of the trial judge, this court will not reverse his judgment overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 431 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 431

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 
 Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used 
              predominantly within an Indian reservation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 28, 2003

  Mr. Sullivan (for himself, Mr. Cole, Mr. Lucas of Oklahoma, and Mr. 
   Stupak) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 
 Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used 
              predominantly within an Indian reservation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF INDIAN EMPLOYMENT CREDIT AND 
              DEPRECIATION RULES FOR PROPERTY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS.

    (a) Employment Credit.--Section 45A of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by striking subsection (f).
    (b) Depreciation Rules.--Subsection (j) of section 168 of such Code 
is amended by striking paragraph (8).
                                 <all>
```
### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-51012

JOE W. AND DOROTHY DORSETT BROWN FOUNDATION; CHAMBERS MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

versus FRAZIER HEALTHCARE V, L.P.; FRAZIER HEALTHCARE III, L.P.; FRAZIER AFFILIATES III, L.P.; TREVOR MOODY; ALAN FRAZIER; STEVEN TALLMAN; GUY MAYER; NATHAN EVERY; JEFFERY NUGENT, Defendants–Appellees.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas No. 1:11-CV-807

Before SMITH, GARZA, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Aug ust 12, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-51012 Document: 00512337887 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/12/2013No. 12-51012

The plaintiffs, who were former sh a r e h o l d e r s , s u e d , a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f fiduciary duty and related c laims arising from a merger. Th e district court dismissed, corr e c t l y c o n c l u d i n g that the claims were derivative and n ot direct under Delaware law. The c ourt e xplained its ruling i n a thoro u g h and impressive twelve-page order entered August 27, 2012. We have r eviewed t h e briefs, the a pplicable law, a nd pertinent portions of the record and have h eard the arguments of counsel. The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED, essenti a l l y for the reasons carefully s et forth by the district court.

2 Case: 12-51012 Document: 00512337887 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/12/2013