THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD 

NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY 

PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Charles E. Strickland, III, Latisha D. Strickland and 

Justin R. Dillon, Petitioners,

v. 

Marjorie E. Temple, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-000990 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal From Lexington County 

The Honorable James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-015 

Submitted March 7, 2018 – Filed April 4, 2018 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Frederick Ivey Hall, III, of The Rick Hall Law Firm, 

LLC, of Lexington, for Petitioners. 

Rolland E. Greenburg, III, of Rolland E. Greenburg, III, 

PA, and Spencer Andrew Syrett, both of Columbia, for 

Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to review an order of 

dismissal of the court of appeals. We grant the petition, dispense with further 

briefing, and remand to the court of appeals. 

Petitioners filed this action to foreclose on an equitable interest in real property 

and/or terminate a conditional sales agreement and bond for title. The master-inequity terminated the agreement after respondent conceded she had no equitable 

interest in the property. Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for a separate award 

of attorney fees and Rule 11 sanctions. The master signed and filed an order 

denying petitioners' requested relief on June 4, 2015. The master's assistant emailed a clocked copy to counsel for both parties the same day. A second clocked 

copy of the order, this time along with a Form 4, was e-mailed to counsel on June 

16. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, 

on June 26. On September 1, the master denied petitioners' Rule 59(e) motion, but 

found that the motion was timely filed. Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal on 

September 28. The court of appeals found that petitioners' appeal was untimely 

and granted respondent's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals found the ten day 

period to file a motion for reconsideration began on June 4, when the order was 

first e-mailed to the parties, making petitioners' Rule 59(e) motion untimely, and 

ultimately making petitioners' appeal untimely, as the post-trial motion did not 

operate to toll the thirty day period for service of the notice of an appeal. See Rule 

59(e), SCRCP ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later 

than 10 days after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order."); Rule 

203(b)(1), SCACR ("When a timely . . . motion to alter or amend the judgment . . . 

has been made, the time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed and shall run from 

receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion."). 

In dismissing petitioners' appeal, the court of appeals cited Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

v. Fallon Properties South Carolina, LLC, 413 S.C. 642, 776 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 

2015), in which the court of appeals found that an e-mail from the office of the 

master-in-equity with the order on appeal attached constituted written notice of 

entry of the order under Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, and dismissed the appeal because 

the appellants served their notice of appeal more than thirty days after receipt of 

the e-mail. This Court recently issued an opinion affirming, as modified, the court 

of appeals decision in Wells Fargo, supra. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fallon 

Properties S.C., LLC, Op. No. 27773 (Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 2018). We held that 

an e-mail providing written notice of entry of an order or judgment for purposes of 

Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR triggers the time to appear as long as the e-mail is 
received from the court, an attorney of record, or a party. However, we also held 

that our ruling on this issue is to apply prospectively, and therefore remanded the 

case to the court of appeals to allow the appeal to proceed on its merits. 

The same rationale applies in the case at hand. Accordingly, we reverse the order 

of the court of appeals and remand this matter for a ruling on the merits of 

petitioners' appeal. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, and JAMES, JJ., concur. FEW, J., 

not participating.