National Construction Safety T

National Construction Safety T

Technical Investigation: Technical Investigation: 

The Station Nightclub, W. Warw

The Station Nightclub, W. Warw

William Grosshandler

Presented to the NCST Federal Advisory Commit

August 27, 2003
Where and what

• Station Nightclub, West Warwick, RI• pyrotechnics ignited wall covering on stage• rapid spread of flames and smoke• captured on WPRI-TV video• main entrance became blocked by people trying to escap

• 100 fatalities 

Timing

• fire occurred 2/20/03

• NIST reconnaissance team on site 2/22/03• report back to NIST director 2/25/03• NCST established 2/27/03

• W. Grosshandler, Chief, Fire Research Division, NIST (Lead 

• N. Bryner, Leader, Fire Fighting Technology Group, NIST• D. Madrzykowski, Fire Fighting Technology Group, NIST• K. Kuntz, Fire Studies Specialist, FEMA/USFA• C. Porreca, Boston Group Supervisor, Arson/Explosives, (A

Overview Overview
Rationale to form Investigative Tea

Rationale to form Investigative Tea

NIST Authorized by Act to assess building performance aemergency response and evacuation procedures in wake failures that result in high number of casualties:

• 100 people died in fire (one-in-three occupants)• Rapid spread of fire and smoke requires technical invest

determine how the life safety features of building may ha

egress

• Depending upon findings, potential exists to mitigate futu

failures like this with changes in building practices and/or 

standards, codes, and regulations

• Technical competencies required for successful investiga

available at NIST and its community of collaborators

• Funds on hand are sufficient to conduct an investigation
Working with Local, State and Federal O

Working with Local, State and Federal O

• MOUs established with other federal agencies, including 

(description of role of ATF to be given by Chris Porreca

)

• MOU being discussed with National Association of State 

Marshals (NASFM) to establish generic protocols

• Investigative priority relinquished to criminal investigatio

conducted by RI Attorney General's office

• NCST investigation being conducted independently of cr

investigation
Evidence Repository Evidence Repository 

Warehouse

• materials removed from fire scene• civil litigation evidence• approximately 717 items (includes item held at NC

request)

Access efforts are on hold pending federal court's resol

of jurisdictional issues in civil action; NCST hopes to benefit in future from evidence in repository 
1. Establishment of initial conditions

2. Materials testing3. Reconstruction of thermal and tenability envir4. Determination of occupant behavior and egre5. Documentation of emergency response6. Examination of the impact of sprinklers on su7. Identification of building and fire codes that w

revision

Update on Specific Tasks Update on Specific Tasks
1. Establishment of Initial Conditio

1. Establishment of Initial Conditio

Documentation Acquired/Required

• Construction drawings on file for building• Fire alarm system plan with type of heat detectors and location• Recent photographs or videos of inside and outside of the buildin

Geometry (75% established)

• Dimensioned Floor Plan • Vent locations, doors, windows, and HVACDoor locations • Ceiling height above stage and in sunroom (configuration and con

Materials and Building Contents (20% established)

• Ceiling Tiles – wood fiber based or non-combustible?• Wall Lining – fraction covered by wood panel and fraction covere• Sample of an acoustic foam for small scale tests on heat release • Was more than one type of “foam” used; i.e. rigid foam as oppose

flexible “egg crate” foam?

• Was foam painted or treated in any way?
2. Materials Testing 2. Materials Testing

Objectives:• Develop source term data for modeling• Assess material burning behavior to determine a correlat

materials in the nightclub

Current Approach:

• Cone Calorimeter• Corner Experiments• Ignition Experiments• Compartment Experiment

Future Considerations:

• Comparative Experiments with actual samples from scen
Cone Calorimeter Experiments Cone Calorimeter Experiments

3 types of convoluted foam have been tested

2 – ether based polyurethane foams1 – ester based FR polyurethane foam

Incident Heat Flux: 35 and 70 kW/m

2
Panel Experiments Panel Experiments

Small flame ignitionInside and outside corner configurationMeasuring HRR, mass loss and heat flu
Pyrotechnics Pyrotechnics 

“Gerbs”

• White color• 15 second duration• 15 foot Throw

Examine ignition propertiesPlan to measure heat flux to 

surface
3. Reconstruction of Therm

3. Reconstruction of Therm

and Tenability Environme

and Tenability Environme

Construction• Similar dimensions to stage area of nightclub (~ 36 ft x 24 ft 

• Convoluted non-fire retarded polyurethane foam, plywood pa

• Carpeted stage & drummer’s platform, gypsum ceiling over d

area

Measurements: Temperature, 

CO, CO

2, O

2, HCN, Heat Flux, 

Heat Release Rate
Objective: to better understand impediments to 

egress encountered by occupants• Comparison of life safety features in structure with requireme

the Life Safety Code.

• Egress of occupants calculation using simple hydraulic-type 

well as more complex behavior-based models to compare to 

predictions from FDS.

• Examination of parameters that affected egress, including ha

recognition and response, location and identification of exits, 

condition of exits, and changing conditions inside structure (i

and heat build-up, loss of lighting)

4. Determination of 4. Determination of 

Occupant Behavior and Egress Occupant Behavior and Egress
Preliminary Evacuation Calculations Preliminary Evacuation Calculations

Three evacuation models used in analysis

• Simulex• CRISP• EVACNET4

Simulex model
Preliminary Evacuation Calculations Preliminary Evacuation Calculations

Two hypothetical occupancy rates examined:

• 317 people; tables, chairs removed from 3 lounge areas

• 404 people (fire warden present); tables, chairs remove

2 different egress scenarios:

• All four exits available for use in evacuation

• 90% of occupants travel to front exit (familiar route); 

other 10% (staff) use all 4 exits

Results:

• All four exits available, 317 people: 100 – 128 seconds

• All four exits available, 404 people: 150 seconds

• 90% occupants to front exit, 317 people: 270 seconds• Prediction of doorway pile-up beyond capability of all cu

models
Solicitation announced for experts to

• help document egress events (including building 

timeline from video and photographic records, field data

interviews conducted by the media, and other oral and written accounts from building occupants, emergency 

responders, and other witnesses);

• help document role of life safety features in the structur

assisting safe egress; and

• compare/contrast egress process and outcome to othe

similar events.

Solicitation for Egress Study Solicitation for Egress Study
Collect emergency response data in cooperatio

local fire department to document procedures aoperation of equipment; identify successful opeand technical difficulties.

5. Documentation of Emergency 5. Documentation of Emergency 

Response (USFA lead) Response (USFA lead)

6. Impact of Sprinklers on Survivab

6. Impact of Sprinklers on Survivab

Impact on survivability will be examined had spsystem been installed, all other conditions beinsame.
• Solicitation announced for experts to

(1) review national model building and fire codes that wo

governed the building design, construction, and modi

structural and fire safety systems; 

(2) identify substantive and relevant differences, if any, a

historical requirements and provisions of current natiobuilding and fire codes; and 

(3) document practices and procedures used for the oper

maintenance of and modifications to structural and firsystems. 

7. Building and Fire Codes that Warrant R

7. Building and Fire Codes that Warrant R
• Team to recommend specific areas for improvem

model building and fire codes, standards and pr

warranted) based upon technical findings from a

possibly including

• areas covered by Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs

101-2003

3⁄4 sprinklers in clubs with occupant loads > 3003⁄4 crowd managers and staff training for occupant loads 3⁄4 prohibit festival seating without approved life safety e

• the role of the phenomenon of crowd-crush on minimu

and size of exits

• guidance on inspection practices and design-in-depth 

systems