*

The Honorable Ralph Erickson, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2141

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of North Dakota.

Vincent Barker Bean, also known as *

Lance Bean, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 7, 2005

Filed: July 14, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, FAGG, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Vincent Barker Bean guilty of being a felon in possession of a

firearm and being a fugitive from justice in possession of a firearm, and the district

court*

 sentenced Bean to 60 months imprisonment and three years supervised release.

On appeal, Bean’s counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the district court’s refusal to
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suppress evidence, and the district court’s refusal to grant Bean’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal for speedy-trial violations. We affirm.

Bean was not denied a speedy indictment or a speedy trial. Bean was not

formally arrested until after his indictment was filed, and the ensuing periods of

excludable delay occurred based primarily on continuances to afford time for pretrial

motions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161; Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326

(1986); United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789, 795 & n.8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 857 (2003). We also conclude the district court properly denied the motion to

suppress the firearm, upon finding the firearm was seized by foreign police who did

not act as agents of their American counterparts, and whose conduct was not

conscience-shocking. See United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir.

2001) (standard of review), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 849 (2002); United States v.

Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 573 (10th Cir. 1985) (exclusionary rule does not require

suppression of evidence seized by foreign police unless conduct shocks judicial

conscience, or foreign officers acted as agents for their American counterparts), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986). 

The evidence of Bean’s convictions, viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, see United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard

of review), shows that Bean, a convicted felon and a fugitive, was stopped in his

vehicle across the border between North Dakota and Canada when he failed to yield

at a customs checkpoint. Hidden in a firewall compartment under the hood of his

vehicle was a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce. In interviews with

authorities in Canada and the United States, Bean acknowledged he knew of the gun’s

presence in the vehicle. This evidence amply supports Bean’s convictions. See 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (2) (felon-in-possession and fugitive-in-possession elements);

United States v. Abfalter, 340 F.3d 646, 654 (8th Cir. 2003) (constructive possession

of firearm), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1134 (2004); United States v. Stroh, 176 F.3d 439,
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440 (8th Cir. 1999) (reviewing court neither weighs evidence nor assesses credibility

of witnesses). 

Finally, we reject Bean’s pro se challenge to the denial of his motion to

suppress statements he made after the Canadians returned him to United States

customs officials, because an officer testified Bean had made the statements after

waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the district

court credited the officer’s testimony. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 815-

16 (8th Cir. 2001). Likewise, Bean’s challenge to the district court’s discretionary

denial of his downward departure motion fails because the district court's decision is

not reviewable. See United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2005) (denial

of downward departure unreviewable where district court was aware of its authority

to depart). We do not address Bean's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,

because they are not properly before us in this direct criminal appeal. See United

States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998). 

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. We grant counsel’s

motion to withdraw, and deny Bean’s pro se motion for substitute appellate counsel.

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