IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-759

Filed 16 April 2024

Swain County, No. 21JA29

IN THE MATTER OF: L.C.

Appeal by respondents from Order entered 5 January 2023 by Judge Donna F. 

Forga and Order entered 18 April 2023 by Judge Tessa Sellers in Swain County 

District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2024.

Kristy L. Parton for petitioner-appellee Swain County Department of Social 

Services.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP, by Sam J. Ervin, IV,

for the guardian ad litem. 

Jeffrey William Gillette for respondent-appellant caretaker.

Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo and Deputy Parent Defender Annick 

Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant mother.

FLOOD, Judge.

Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker appeal from the trial court’s 5 

January 2023 Order adjudicating L.C. (“Layla”)1 a neglected juvenile. Upon review, 

we dismiss Respondent-Caretaker’s appeal. As to Respondent-Mother’s appeal, we

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. See N.C.R. 

App. P. 42(b). 
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vacate the trial court’s Adjudication and Disposition Orders and remand to the trial 

court for entry of new orders.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 16 November 2021, Swain County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 

obtained nonsecure custody of Layla upon filing a petition alleging she was a 

neglected and dependent juvenile. The petition documented a history of substance 

abuse concerns, alleging there had been three prior Child Protective Services (“CPS”) 

assessments based on reports of substance abuse. First, the petition alleged DSS 

received a CPS report in August 2019 after Respondent-Mother and Layla both tested 

positive for illegal substances, including methamphetamine and THC, at the time of 

Layla’s birth. The petition alleged DSS’s assessment resulted in a determination of 

“Services Not Recommended” since Respondent-Mother and her live-in girlfriend, 

Respondent-Caretaker, refused to submit to drug screens, and Layla was healthy and 

well cared for in a home where Respondent-Caretaker’s mother served as a sober 

caregiver.

The petition further alleged DSS received additional reports of substance 

abuse by Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker in Layla’s presence on 19 

December 2019, 28 December 2020, and 9 February 2021. The petition provided DSS 

closed its second assessment based on the December 2019 report with a 

determination of “Services Not Recommended” because the substance abuse 

allegations could not be proven. DSS’s third assessment focused on reports from 
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December 2020 and February 2021 that Respondent-Mother was “shooting up” in the 

home, Layla had grabbed a needle, Layla had stepped on Respondent-Mother’s “meth 

pipe,” and Layla had “mimicked shooting up drugs by holding a Children’s Tylenol 

syringe to her arm.” The petition alleged DSS’s third assessment resulted in a 

decision of “Services Recommended” for substance abuse treatment for RespondentMother, but services were declined. 

The petition provided DSS most recently received a CPS report on 30 October 

2021 after Respondent-Mother gave birth to twins prematurely at thirty-one weeks 

and tested positive for fentanyl, methamphetamine, amphetamine, benzodiazepines, 

and THC when she was admitted.2 DSS reported that it initiated a case with 

Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker on 31 October 2021 at the hospital in 

Buncombe County, North Carolina. The petition alleged Respondent-Mother and 

Respondent-Caretaker denied use of any illegal substances besides marijuana, and 

Respondent-Mother was “agitated and irate” at DSS’s initiation of the case and 

refused drug screens for herself and the children. DSS reported Layla was found to 

be safe in the care of Respondent-Caretaker’s mother. 

The petition also detailed DSS’s follow up visit with Respondent-Mother on 12 

November 2021. The social worker reported Respondent-Mother “was clearly 

impaired on some type of substance[] and was hostile and exhibited bizarre behavior.” 

2 Respondent-Mother relinquished her rights to Layla’s twin siblings, and they are not subjects 

of this appeal. 
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The social worker further reported that Respondent-Mother refused a request to drug 

screen Layla as part of DSS’s assessment, informing the social worker there was no 

need to screen Layla because she would test positive for methamphetamine and 

marijuana due to “spore to spore” contact with Respondent-Mother. 

Based on Respondent-Mother’s disclosure, DSS provided Respondent-Mother 

and Respondent-Caretaker a safety plan providing a Temporary Safety Provider 

(“TSP”) for Layla to ensure she had a sober caregiver and was not exposed to 

substance abuse. The petition alleged Respondent-Mother initially “refused the 

[TSP] and ejected the [social workers] from her home,” but the social worker was then 

able to speak with Respondent-Caretaker, who agreed to the safety plan and 

convinced Respondent-Mother to agree to Layla’s placement with RespondentCaretaker’s mother as a TSP. Respondent-Mother signed a safety plan on 12 

November 2021 that provided for a TSP and prohibited Respondent-Mother’s and 

Respondent-Caretaker’s unsupervised contact with Layla. 

The petition alleged just days later, on 15 November 2021, that RespondentCaretaker’s mother informed DSS she was unable to continue as the TSP for Layla, 

that she had already told Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker she was 

unable to continue as the TSP before contacting DSS, and that Respondent-Mother 

and Respondent-Caretaker had taken Layla from the TSP in violation of the safety 

plan without indicating where they were going. Social workers searched for Layla 

and eventually found Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker downtown in 
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Bryson City, North Carolina, pushing Layla in a stroller. DSS assumed twelve-hour 

custody of Layla, filed the petition, and obtained nonsecure custody of Layla the 

following day.

The petition came on for an adjudication hearing on 7 December 2022.3 On 5 

January 2023, the trial court entered an Adjudication Order that adjudicated Layla 

to be a neglected juvenile. The trial court did not adjudicate Layla dependent. The 

initial disposition hearing was continued until 8 February 2023, after which the trial 

court entered a Disposition Order on 18 April 2023 that continued Layla’s custody 

with DSS. Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker timely appealed from the 

Adjudication and Disposition Orders. 

II. Jurisdiction

“Any initial order of disposition and the adjudication order upon which it is 

based” may be appealed directly to this Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(3) (2023).

III. Analysis

A. Respondent-Caretaker’s Standing to Appeal

Although not addressed in briefing, we are compelled to first address the issue 

of Respondent-Caretaker’s standing to appeal the Adjudication and Disposition 

3 The parties indicate the trial court had previously conducted an adjudication and disposition 

hearing on the petition and had entered orders from which Respondent-Mother had appealed. It was 

discovered during the preparation of the appeal, however, that the recording equipment had 

malfunctioned, and the proceedings could not be transcribed. The parties and the trial court agreed 

to set aside the initial adjudication and disposition. 
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Orders. See In re T.B., 200 N.C. App. 739, 741–42, 685 S.E.2d 529, 531–32 (2009)

(“Although [the r]espondent’s brief does not address the issue of standing, we are 

compelled to address this issue.”). “Standing is jurisdictional in nature and 

consequently, standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and found to 

exist, before the merits of the case are judicially resolved.” In re M.S., 247 N.C. App. 

89, 92, 785 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets 

omitted). Respondent-Caretaker has the burden of establishing standing as the 

appealing party invoking this Court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 92, 785 S.E.2d at 592. 

“The right to appeal in juvenile actions arising under Chapter 7B is governed 

by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a).” In re P.S., 242 N.C. App. 430, 432, 775 S.E.2d 370, 

371, cert. denied, 368 N.C. 431, 778 S.E.2d 277 (2015). Under that section, “[a]ny 

initial order of disposition and the adjudication order upon which it is based” may be 

appealed directly to this Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(3). But the right to 

appeal an order under section 7B-1001 is afforded only to the following:

(1) A juvenile acting through the juvenile’s guardian ad 

litem previously appointed under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B601 [2023].

(2) A juvenile for whom no guardian ad litem has been 

appointed under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-601 . . . .

(3) A county department of social services.

(4) A parent, a guardian appointed under [N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§] 7B-600 [2023] or Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, 

or a custodian as defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-101 

[2023] who is a nonprevailing party.
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(5) Any party that sought but failed to obtain termination 

of parental rights.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1002 (2023) (emphasis added). 

As an initial matter, we note Respondent-Caretaker would not have been able 

to become Layla’s parent by adoption in North Carolina unless RespondentMother’s—and any potential biological father’s—parental rights were terminated. In 

Boseman v. Jarrell, the biological mother and her female partner were able to obtain 

a decree of adoption by the female partner as sharing in parentage with the biological 

mother based upon an erroneous interpretation of North Carolina’s adoption law 

recognized at that time in Durham County. 364 N.C. 537, 541, 704 S.E.2d 494, 497 

(2010). Our Supreme Court held the adoption decree was void ab initio because the 

petitioner was “seeking relief unavailable under our General Statutes[,]” and “the 

adoption proceeding at issue in this case was not ‘commenced under’ Chapter 48 of 

our General Statutes.” Id. at 546, 704 S.E.2d at 501.

This case presents a similar situation to the extent the trial court simply 

accepted without question Respondent-Mother’s and Respondent-Caretaker’s 

declaration of Respondent-Caretaker’s legal status as “father.” Like the Supreme 

Court in Boseman in addressing adoption, as to paternity here, 

we recognize that many policy arguments have been made 

to this Court that the [claim of paternity] in this case ought 

to be allowed. However, adoption is a statutory creation.

Accordingly, those arguments are appropriately addressed 

to our General Assembly. Until the legislature changes the 

provisions of Chapter 48, we must recognize the statutory 
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limitations on the adoption decrees that may be entered.

Because the adoption decree is void, [the] plaintiff is not 

legally recognized as the minor child's parent. 

Id. at 548–49, 704 S.E.2d at 502 (citation omitted). Likewise, here, the trial court 

had no authority to create a new method of establishing paternity or RespondentCaretaker’s status as a parent, without compliance with North Carolina’s statutes. 

It is clear in this case that Respondent-Caretaker is not the juvenile, a courtappointed guardian ad litem (“GAL”), a county department of social services, a 

parent, a guardian appointed under any statute, a custodian as defined in section 7B101, or a party who unsuccessfully sought termination of parental rights.

Respondent-Caretaker is a “caretaker” as defined by section 7B-101(3):

(3) Caretaker.--Any person other than a parent, guardian, 

or custodian who has responsibility for the health and 

welfare of a juvenile in a residential setting. A person 

responsible for a juvenile's health and welfare means a 

stepparent; foster parent; an adult member of the 

juvenile's household; an adult entrusted with the juvenile's 

care; a potential adoptive parent during a visit or trial 

placement with a juvenile in the custody of a department; 

any person such as a house parent or cottage parent who 

has primary responsibility for supervising a juvenile's 

health and welfare in a residential child care facility or 

residential educational facility; or any employee or 

volunteer of a division, institution, or school operated by 

the Department of Health and Human Services.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(3) (2023). 

Early in this case, the trial court began referring to Respondent-Caretaker as 

“Respondent/father” and as a “parent” and treating her as Layla’s legal father. 
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Although the Petition identified Respondent-Caretaker as “the female live-in 

girlfriend of . . . Respondent[-]Mother[,]” it also alleged she was identified as the 

child’s father on her birth certificate. The trial court apparently relied upon the 

report of the birth certificate to treat Respondent-Caretaker as “father.”4 Although 

Respondent-Caretaker’s role in acting as a parent to Layla is not in dispute, it is also 

undisputed that Respondent-Caretaker is a woman, and she is not the father of the 

child either legally or biologically. 

The terms “father” and “parent” are not defined in Chapter 7B. But as this 

Court recently held in Green v. Carter, No. COA22-494, 2024 WL 1171919, at *1 (N.C. 

Ct. App. 19 Mar. 2024), the term “father” is a gender-specific term, and a man’s status 

as “father” of a child is based either upon his biological participation in the child’s 

creation and birth or upon an adjudication of paternity or parental status based upon 

specific methods as defined by statute. “[A] ‘father’ is the male parent of a child, 

whether as a biological parent, by adoption, by legitimation, or by adjudication of 

paternity.” Id. at *1. The terms “father” and “parent” as used in Chapter 7B of the 

North Carolina General Statutes are indistinguishable from the same terms as used 

in Chapter 50. Although we recognize that some other states may define parentage 

differently, there is no indication that the law of any state other than North Carolina 

4 There is no birth certificate for Layla in our Record on appeal, and it was not presented as 

evidence at the hearings relevant to the orders on appeal.
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may be relevant to Respondent-Caretaker’s alleged status as a “father.” The 

Affidavits of Status of Minor Child as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-209, and DSS 

records in evidence here, indicate that Layla was born in Buncombe County. The 

first report to DSS regarding Layla was upon her birth in August of 2019, when 

“Swain DSS received a CPS report with allegations that [Respondent-Mother] had no 

prenatal care and tested positive for Methamphetamine, Amphetamine, and THC at 

[Layla’s] birth.” Layla was born in North Carolina and has resided in North Carolina 

her entire life. 

We also recognize that a birth certificate can create a rebuttable presumption 

of paternity. Respondent-Mother was not married when Layla was born and at the 

time of the hearing was still unmarried. Layla’s birth certificate would be governed 

by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-101:

(f) If the mother was unmarried at all times from date of 

conception through date of birth, the name of the father 

shall not be entered on the certificate unless the child's 

mother and father complete an affidavit acknowledging 

paternity which contains the following:

(1) A sworn statement by the mother consenting to the 

assertion of paternity by the father and declaring that the 

father is the child's natural father and that the mother was 

unmarried at all times from the date of conception through 

the date of birth;

(2) A sworn statement by the father declaring that he 

believes he is the natural father of the child;

(3) Information explaining in plain language the effect of 

signing the affidavit, including a statement of parental 

rights and responsibilities and an acknowledgment of the 

receipt of this information; and
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(4) The social security numbers of both parents.

The State Registrar, in consultation with the Child 

Support Enforcement Section of the Division of Social 

Services, shall develop and disseminate a form affidavit for 

use in compliance with this section, together with an 

information sheet that contains all the information 

required to be disclosed by subdivision (3) of this 

subsection.

Upon the execution of the affidavit, the declaring father 

shall be listed as the father on the birth certificate, subject 

to the declaring father's right to rescind under [N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §] 110-132. The executed affidavit shall be filed with 

the registrar along with the birth certificate. In the event 

paternity is properly placed at issue, a certified copy of the 

affidavit shall be admissible in any action to establish 

paternity. The surname of the child shall be determined 

by the mother, except if the father's name is entered on the 

certificate, the mother and father shall agree upon the 

child's surname. If there is no agreement, the child's 

surname shall be the same as that of the mother.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-101 (2023) (emphasis added).

If Respondent-Caretaker were a man, the name listed on the birth certificate 

as “father” could be used to establish at least a rebuttable presumption of paternity. 

See In re J.K.C., 218 N.C. App. 22, 37, 721 S.E.2d 264, 274 (2012) (“If a child born to 

a marriage is presumed to be legitimate, we see no reason why a similar presumption 

should not arise where a child’s birth certificate identifies its father, as our statutory 

scheme requires a determination of paternity by affidavit or judicially before the 

father’s name can be shown on the birth certificate. Of course, this presumption can 

be rebutted, but in this case, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption raised by 
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the birth certificates.”). But there can be no presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, of 

paternity for a woman. Paternity as defined by North Carolina law is simply not 

possible for a woman; only maternity is possible for a woman. See Carter, at *6

(“While North Carolina statutes do address legitimation and adjudication of paternity 

in North Carolina General Statutes Chapter 49, Articles 2 and 3, these statutes 

address male parents—fathers—and they do not address maternity.” (citations 

omitted)).

Thus, as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 “mother” is the female parent of a 

child and “father” is the male parent of a child, either biologically or by adoption or 

other legal process to establish paternity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4. The mother and 

father are also referred to as “parents.” The definition of “parent” for purposes of 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 is the same for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 7B, 

including N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a). A woman cannot become a “father” as defined 

by the law of North Carolina merely by having her name listed on a birth certificate, 

even with the collusion of the birth mother. Even if we assume both RespondentMother and Respondent-Caretaker filed affidavits as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§130A-101(f), falsely declaring that Respondent-Caretaker is Layla’s “natural 

father,” Respondent-Mother testified at the adjudication hearing in December 2022 

in this action that Respondent-Caretaker “is not the biological father of [Layla]” and 

“she’s not the sperm donor.” Respondent-Mother also identified by name a man she 
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believed was “a possibility maybe” as the biological father but she had not had contact 

with him “in a few years.”5 

The Record, therefore, does not show that Respondent-Caretaker has any legal 

status or rights as a father or as a parent under Chapter 7B. Notwithstanding this 

lack of legal status or rights, the trial court appointed counsel for RespondentCaretaker, apparently based upon the idea that she was a “parent.” Under N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-1101.1, only a “parent” has a right to court-appointed counsel: “(a) The 

parent has the right to counsel, and to appointed counsel in cases of indigency, unless 

the parent waives the right. The fees of appointed counsel shall be borne by the Office 

of Indigent Defense Services.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(a). Since the General 

Assembly has established a right to appointed counsel for parents only, providing 

that the Office of Indigent Defense Services, and ultimately the taxpayers of North 

Carolina, pay for the representation of indigent parents, there is no statutory 

authority for the trial court to appoint counsel for any parties other than the parents. 

Lastly, there is no indication in the Record that Respondent-Caretaker was ever 

appointed as Layla’s legal guardian or custodian. Respondent-Caretaker is therefore 

not one of the parties with a right to appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1002.

5 In the DSS Court Summary for the disposition hearing, filed 8 February 2023, DSS noted 

regarding paternity that “Paternity for [Layla] has not been identified. Respondent-Mother states the 

possibilities of paternity are ‘endless.’” DSS also noted Respondent-Caretaker was listed on the birth 

certificate as “father.”
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As an “adult member of the juvenile’s household[,]” “other than a parent, 

guardian, or custodian[,]” Respondent-Caretaker is properly classified as a 

“caretaker” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(3). Since a caretaker does not have 

standing to appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1002, we dismiss RespondentCaretaker’s appeal. 

B. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal

On appeal, Respondent-Mother challenges specific findings of fact and the trial 

court’s adjudication of Layla as a neglected juvenile. She does not challenge the trial 

court’s Disposition Order. Nevertheless, if we vacate the Adjudication Order, the 

Disposition Order based thereon must also necessarily be vacated. 

1. Standard of Review

“We review an adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807 [2023] to determine 

whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing 

competent evidence and whether the court’s findings support its conclusions of law.” 

In re M.H., 272 N.C. App. 283, 286, 845 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2020) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence which 

should fully convince.” In re D.S., 286 N.C. App. 1, 11, 879 S.E.2d 335, 343 (2022) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If such evidence exists, the findings 

of the trial court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support a finding 

to the contrary.” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007), 

aff’d as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “Unchallenged findings of fact 
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are binding on appeal.” In re K.W., 272 N.C. App. 487, 490, 846 S.E.2d 584, 588 (2020). 

“[W]e review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.” In re N.K., 274 N.C. App. 5, 

8, 851 S.E.2d 389, 392 (2020) (quoting In re M.H., 272 N.C. App. at 286, 845 S.E.2d 

at 911). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely 

substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court].” In re K.S., 380 N.C. 60, 64,

868 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

determination that a child is ‘neglected’ is a conclusion of law we review de novo.” In 

re J.C.M.J.C., 268 N.C. App. 47, 51, 834 S.E.2d 670, 674 (2019).

2. Findings of Fact

Respondent-Mother challenges findings of fact 5, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24. 

Many of her arguments do not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

findings. She instead challenges the findings as irrelevant to the adjudication of 

neglect. We address each of the challenged findings. 

The trial court found in Finding of Fact 5 “there was a prior report in 2019, 

when [Layla] was born, that she was born with methamphetamine and THC in her 

system.” Respondent relies on In re S.D.A., 170 N.C. App. 354, 612 S.E.2d 362 (2005), 

to argue the finding should be struck because “[a]n unsubstantiated report cannot 

form the basis of an adjudication.” Notably, Respondent-Mother does not argue the 

finding is not supported by evidence, and for good reason. Respondent-Mother 

testified DSS became involved at Layla’s birth on 8 August 2019 because she and 

Layla tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. Finding of Fact 5 is thus 
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supported by the evidence. Furthermore, while this Court held in In re S.D.A., 170 

N.C. App. at 361, 612 S.E.2d at 366 that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to 

adjudication based on an unsubstantiated report, that is not what happened in this 

case, and In re S.D.A. in inapplicable. DSS did not file the petition and the trial court 

did not proceed to adjudication based on the January 2019 report. DSS filed the 

petition based on its assessment following its receipt of a CPS report in October 2021 

and its investigation in October and November 2021. The fact that DSS received a 

report upon Layla’s birth in 2019 is relevant to establish the history of DSS’s 

involvement, but Respondent-Mother is correct that the prior report alone is 

insufficient to support the adjudication. See In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 9, 822 S.E.2d 

693, 698 (2019) (considering the historical facts of the case in combination with 

factors indicating a present risk to the child and holding “the clear and convincing

evidence in the record must show current circumstances that present a risk to the 

juvenile”). Moreover, we note the trial court did not address in Finding of Fact 5 the 

veracity of the prior report, and our consideration of the finding is therefore limited 

to the fact that “there was a prior report in 2019, when [Layla] was born, that she 

was born with methamphetamine and THC in her system.” 

Challenged Findings of Fact 8 and 9 address Respondent-Mother’s response to 

a social worker’s request to drug screen Layla. The findings relate to unchallenged 

Finding of Fact 7, in which the trial court found a social worker went to RespondentMother’s home on 12 November 2021 to follow up on a report, at which time 
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Respondent-Mother “reported that substance abuse had been an issue for her” and 

“admitted she was a prior heroin addict and admitted to using multiple drugs, 

including crystal meth, marijuana, benzos and other medications.” 

In Finding of Fact 8, the trial court found, “when asked if the [R]espondent[-

M]other would allow [Layla] to be screened for drugs, [Respondent-Mother] stated, 

‘no’ and that . . . DSS was only good for breaking up families.” Respondent-Mother 

contends this finding fails to account for evidence that she offered to have Layla 

tested by her own provider. Respondent-Mother, however, does not dispute she 

refused to allow DSS to drug screen Layla, and the social worker’s testimony about 

the encounter supports the finding, which is therefore binding. 

In Finding of Fact 9, the trial court found “[R]espondent[-M]other relayed that 

[Layla] may test positive for controlled substances due to ‘spore to spore’ contact, but 

the court has no information or knowledge of what that term means.” The trial court’s 

finding that Respondent-Mother asserted Layla “may test positive” is directly 

supported by testimony from both Respondent-Mother and the social worker. 

Respondent-Mother does not challenge the first portion of the finding but takes issue 

with the trial court’s finding that it had no knowledge of what “spore to spore” meant. 

A review of the testimony shows that both Respondent-Mother and the social worker 

testified about “spore to spore”—Respondent-Mother stating she meant touch, and 

the social worker testifying that she understood Respondent-Mother to mean skin-toskin. Because there was an explanation of “spore to spore,” the trial court’s finding 
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that it “has no information or knowledge of what that term means” is not supported 

by the evidence. We cannot disregard the trial court’s uncertainty about RespondentMother’s disclosure, however, which is evident in the finding. 

Respondent-Mother also challenges Finding of Fact 18, in which the trial court 

found “[R]espondent[-]Mother testified that she could not remember much after 

[Layla] was taken from her because she drank a lot of fireballs to the point that she 

was blacking out and found herself in the bathtub without knowledge of how she got 

there.” The finding is based on Respondent-Mother’s testimony about her actions 

during the week following the filing of the petition and Layla’s placement in 

nonsecure custody. Although Respondent-Mother eventually objected to the GAL’s 

questioning on the basis that her actions were post-petition and irrelevant, and 

although the trial court sustained the objection, Respondent-Mother did not move to 

strike the testimony that supported the finding. Respondent-Mother is nevertheless 

correct that the finding concerns post-petition evidence and is irrelevant for 

adjudication purposes. 

“The adjudicatory hearing [is] a judicial process designed to adjudicate the 

existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” In re L.N.H., 

382 N.C. 536, 543, 879 S.E.2d 138, 144 (2022) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802

(2023)). “This inquiry focuses on the status of the child at the time the petition is 

filed, not the post-petition actions of a party.” Id at 543, 879 S.E.2d at 144. Thus, 

“post-petition evidence generally is not admissible during an adjudicatory hearing for 
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abuse, neglect or dependency.” In re V.B., 239 N.C. App. 340, 344, 768 S.E.2d 867, 

869 (2015) (citing In re A.B., 179 N.C. App. 605, 609, 635 S.E.2d 11, 15 (2006)). While 

the prohibition on post-petition evidence is not absolute, the limited instances in 

which this Court has upheld the admission of post-petition evidence have involved 

“fixed and ongoing circumstance[s]” relevant to the existence or nonexistence of 

conditions alleged in a juvenile petition, such as mental illness or paternity. In re 

G.W., 286 N.C. App. 587, 594, 882 S.E.2d 81, 88 (2022) (citation omitted). Since 

Finding of Fact 18 concerns specific actions by Respondent-Mother following the filing 

of the petition, the finding is irrelevant to prove the allegations in the petition, and 

we will disregard it in our review of the adjudication of neglect. See, e.g., id. at 596, 

882 S.E.2d at 89 (holding evidence of post-petition drug use and drug screens were

irrelevant for purposes of adjudication).

The trial court found in challenged Finding of Fact 19 that “during at least one 

interaction with the social worker,[] [R]espondent[-M]other was irate, threatened [a 

relative of Respondent-Caretaker], and admitted to a willingness to threaten [the 

relative].” We first note the finding is directly supported by Respondent-Mother’s 

testimony that she threatened Respondent-Caretaker’s cousin when the cousin 

inquired about the social worker’s visit. Respondent-Mother does not dispute she 

made the threat but instead argues the finding is improperly considered for 

adjudication purposes because the threat was not alleged in the petition, and there 

was no evidence Layla was present for the threat. We are not fully persuaded the 
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Opinion of the Court

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finding does not relate to conditions alleged in the petition. Although there was no 

allegation of the specific threat, the petition included allegations that RespondentMother was “agitated and irate” with DSS’s involvement. The finding that she was 

irate and threatened a relative during an interaction with a social worker is 

illustrative of Respondent-Mother’s interactions with DSS and her mental state prior 

to DSS’s filing of the petition, which is relevant to the adjudication. 

In Finding of Fact 20, the trial court found Respondent-Mother “refused to 

supply to the court information regarding where she had obtained the valium that 

she took.” Again, Respondent-Mother does not argue the finding is not supported by 

the evidence, and the Record supports the finding and shows Respondent-Mother was 

ultimately held in contempt for her refusal to answer. We nevertheless agree with 

Respondent-Mother that the finding is irrelevant for an adjudication of the existence 

or nonexistence of the conditions alleged in the petition since her refusal occurred at 

the adjudication hearing and was not a basis for DSS filing the petition. See In re 

L.N.H., 382 N.C. at 543, 879 S.E.2d at 144; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802. 

Consequently, we will not consider the finding in reviewing the adjudication of 

neglect. 

Respondent-Mother also challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 23 that she 

“could not convey to the court any clear timeline as to how long [Layla’s] siblings were 

in the NICU after their birth.” This finding is a direct reflection of RespondentMother’s testimony at the adjudication hearing and is therefore supported by the 
IN RE: L.C.

Opinion of the Court

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evidence. Respondent-Mother argues, however, this portion should be struck or 

disregarded because it concerns Layla’s siblings, who were not subjects of the 

adjudication. While this portion addresses Respondent-Mother’s knowledge of the 

siblings’ hospitalization, more generally this portion is relevant to RespondentMother’s mental state and ability to care for a child during the period DSS was 

investigating the case in October and November 2021, just prior to the filing of the 

petition. This portion of Finding of Fact 23 is thus relevant to Layla’s adjudication. 

Lastly, Respondent-Mother challenges Finding of Fact 24—“it is contrary to 

the best interests of the juvenile to return to the home of the respondent parents [sic] 

at this time”—as a dispositional finding that was not appropriate for adjudication. 

Respondent-Mother asserts Conclusion of Law 4, which similarly addresses Layla’s 

best interests, should also be struck. While protecting the best interests of a child is 

a goal in all stages of an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding, it is the 

dispositional stage where the trial court designs a plan to ensure the wellbeing of the 

child based on a determination of the child’s best interests. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 

7B-900–901(a) (2023); see also In re K.W., 272 N.C. App. at 491, 846 S.E.2d at 589

(explaining that the trial court determines a child’s placement based on the best 

interests of the child at the dispositional stage). Since Finding of Fact 24 is clearly

made for purposes of disposition and not adjudication, we will disregard it in 

reviewing the adjudication of neglect. We note, however, the trial court’s inclusion of 

Finding of Fact 24 and Conclusion of Law 4 in the Adjudication Order was not error 
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Opinion of the Court

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since the initial dispositional hearing required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901 was 

continued, and the finding supported the court’s interim dispositional ruling. 

3. Neglect

Respondent-Mother next challenges the trial court’s conclusion Layla was a 

“neglected juvenile in that she resides in an environment injurious to her welfare and 

she does not receive appropriate care, supervision or discipline from her parent, 

guardian, custodian or caretaker.” Respondent-Mother argues the conclusion is not 

supported by the trial court’s findings of fact because there were no findings showing 

Layla suffered any physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or that there was a 

substantial risk of impairment to Layla. We agree the trial court’s findings were 

insufficient to support the adjudication of neglect.

Relevant to this case, a “neglected juvenile” is defined in the Juvenile Code to 

include “[a]ny juvenile less than [eighteen] years of age . . . whose parent, guardian, 

custodian, or caretaker . . . [d]oes not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline 

. . . [or c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious to the 

juvenile’s welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). To adjudicate a child neglected, 

“[t]his Court has consistently required that there be some physical, mental, or

emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a 

consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.” In re 

D.B.J., 197 N.C. App. 752, 755, 678 S.E.2d 778, 780 (2009) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Similarly, in order for a court to find that the child 
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Opinion of the Court

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resided in an injurious environment, evidence must show that the environment in 

which the child resided has resulted in harm to the child or a substantial risk of 

harm.” In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. 352, 354, 797 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2016) (citation 

omitted).

“It is well-established that the trial court need not wait for actual harm to occur 

to the child if there is a substantial risk of harm to the child in the home.” In re 

D.B.J., 197 N.C. App. at 755, 678 S.E.2d at 780–81 (quoting In re T.S., III, 178 N.C. 

App. 110, 113, 631 S.E.2d 19, 22 (2006), aff’d per curiam on other ground, 361 N.C. 

231, 641 S.E.2d 302 (2007)). “[T]he trial court [has] some discretion in determining 

whether children are at risk for a particular kind of harm given their age and the 

environment in which they reside.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 210, 644 S.E.2d 

588, 592 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court 

has also directed that although “there is no requirement of a specific written finding 

of a substantial risk of impairment . . . the trial court must make written findings of 

fact sufficient to support its conclusion of law of neglect.” In re G.C., 384 N.C. 62, 69, 

884 S.E.2d 658, 663 (2023).

It is this additional required element of findings sufficient to support a 

conclusion of physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or a substantial risk of such 

impairment, that Respondent-Mother argues is lacking in Layla’s adjudication. 

Respondent-Mother does not deny that the evidence and findings establish she “has 

struggled with substance abuse during [Layla’s] entire lifetime[.]” She nonetheless 
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Opinion of the Court

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contends her substance abuse alone is insufficient to support the adjudication of 

neglect where there were no findings to support a determination that her substance 

abuse resulted in Layla’s physical, mental, or emotional impairment or a substantial 

risk of impairment. See In re Phifer, 67 N.C. App. 16, 25, 312 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984) 

(holding “[a] finding of fact that a parent abuses alcohol, without proof of adverse 

impact upon the child, is not a sufficient basis for an adjudication of termination of 

parental rights for neglect”); see In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. at 356–57, 797 S.E.2d at 

519 (reversing an adjudication of neglect where there was no evidence a child suffered 

impairment or substantial risk of impairment as a result of the mother’s alcohol 

abuse while the child was in the care of another adult).

DSS and the GAL maintain that, even though the trial court did not make an 

explicit determination that Layla suffered impairment or was at substantial risk of 

impairment, the totality of the evidence on the conditions in the home clearly 

supported such a determination. They argue the substance abuse in the instant case 

was more substantial than the abuse in In re Phifer and In re K.J.B., on which 

Respondent-Mother relies. They additionally argue the condition of the home, 

Respondent-Mother’s erratic and threatening behavior when dealing with DSS, and 

Respondent-Mother’s and Respondent-Caretaker’s violation of a safety agreement 

with DSS all support a determination that Layla suffered a substantial risk of 

impairment.
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Opinion of the Court

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Because the trial court did not make a specific finding of impairment or 

substantial risk of impairment, we must review the trial court’s findings to see if the 

evidence supports the ultimate finding. See In re B.P., 257 N.C. App. at 433, 809 

S.E.2d at 919. DSS and the GAL are correct that this Court “is required to consider 

the totality of the evidence to determine whether the trial court’s findings sufficiently 

support its ultimate conclusion that [Layla] is a neglected juvenile.” In re F.S., 268 

N.C. App. 34, 43, 835 S.E.2d 465, 471 (2019). But this Court cannot assume findings 

of fact the trial court did not make, even if there is evidence to support such findings. 

Only the trial court has the duty to evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence 

and based upon that evaluation, to make findings of fact. See In re A.H.D., 287 N.C. 

App. 548, 564, 883 S.E.2d 492, 504 (2023) (“The trial court has the duty of 

determining the credibility and weight of all the evidence, and only the trial court can 

make the findings of fact resolving any conflicts in the evidence.”); see, e.g., In re 

D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 330, 838 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2020) (“[I]t is the duty of the trial 

judge to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The trial judge's 

decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the inferences drawn 

from the evidence are not subject to appellate review.” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up)).

Upon review of the evidence and Order in this case, however, we agree with 

Respondent-Mother that the trial court’s findings are inadequate to support a 
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Opinion of the Court

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determination Layla suffered physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or that she 

was at substantial risk of impairment.

We first note that many of the trial court’s findings of fact are essentially 

recitations of evidence. For example, six of the findings of fact state that RespondentMother “testified,” “reported,” or “offered evidence” of various things. Even 

considering all of the findings in the context of the adjudication order, it is not clear 

if the trial court actually found these “facts” to be true or if the findings are simply 

findings that Respondent-Mother testified about these things. Although “[t]here is 

nothing impermissible about describing testimony” the trial court must “ultimately 

make[ ] its own findings, resolving any material disputes.” In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. 

App. 438, 446, 615 S.E.2d 704, 708 (2005), aff'd in part, rev. dismissed in part, 360 

N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006). Here, some of the findings “describe testimony” but 

do not make the trial court’s actual determination about that testimony clear. 

The trial court’s findings do clearly establish that substance abuse was the 

predominant issue in this case. The trial court found DSS had multiple prior 

encounters with the family involving Layla based on reports of substance abuse. The 

trial court found the prior reports included a 2019 report that Layla was born with 

methamphetamine and THC in her system, and a 2020 report that Layla had grabbed 

a needle and that Respondent-Mother was selling drugs out of the house. The trial 

court also found Respondent-Mother admitted to more recent drug use prior to the 

birth of Layla’s twin siblings, including taking half a valium and smoking marijuana 
IN RE: L.C.

Opinion of the Court

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regularly. The trial court found Respondent-Mother “could not convey to the court 

any clear timeline as to how long [Layla’s] siblings were in the NICU after their 

birth[,]”and when DSS followed up on a report of substance abuse on 12 November 

2021, just days before filing the petition, “[R]espondent[-M]other reported that 

substance abuse had been an issue for her” and “admitted that she was a prior heroin 

addict and admitted to using multiple drugs, including crystal meth, marijuana, 

benzos, and other medications.” 

The trial court’s findings also reflect Respondent-Mother’s unwillingness to 

work with DSS. The trial court found Respondent-Mother refused DSS’s request to 

drug screen Layla and “relayed that [Layla] may test positive for controlled 

substances[.]” The trial court also found Respondent-Mother and RespondentCaretaker initially refused to sign a safety plan with DSS, eventually agreed to the 

safety plan, and then violated the safety plan days later by removing Layla from the 

TSP. The trial court found DSS located Layla with Respondent-Mother and 

Respondent-Caretaker and without a suitable supervisor.

These findings are the extent of the trial court’s findings concerning substance 

abuse in the home and Respondent-Mother’s unwillingness to work with DSS. The 

findings do not address the impact on Layla as required to support an adjudication of 

neglect. See In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. at 355, 797 S.E.2d at 518–19 (citing In re 

E.P., 183 N.C. App. 301, 304–05, 645 S.E.2d 772, 774, aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 82, 
IN RE: L.C.

Opinion of the Court

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653 S.E.2d 143 (2007) (“[A] parent’s substance abuse problem alone [does] not support 

an adjudication of neglect.”)).

Notably, the trial court did not find the prior reports of substance abuse 

involving Layla were true and did not make any findings about the results of DSS’s

assessments to show whether Layla was harmed or at a substantial risk of harm. It 

is also notable that the petition filed by DSS alleged DSS closed the case on the 2019 

report that Layla was born with substances in her system with a decision of “Services 

Not Recommended” because Layla was healthy, well cared for, and resided in a home 

where Respondent-Caretaker’s mother was a sober caregiver, indicating Layla was 

not harmed or at risk of substantial harm at the time. Evidence at the adjudication 

hearing showed Layla was often in the care of Respondent-Caretaker’s mother, who 

was a sober caregiver. There were no findings that drug use occurred in Layla’s 

presence, Layla was exposed to controlled substances, or Layla was ever without a 

sober caregiver. 

DSS asserts the trial court appropriately inferred Layla was exposed to drug 

use based on Respondent-Mother’s assertion that Layla “may test positive for 

controlled substances due to ‘spore to spore’ contact,” as found in Finding of Fact 9. 

While the trial court determines the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, see In 

re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. at 343, 648 S.E.2d at 523, here the trial court made no 

findings in the Adjudication Order that Layla was exposed to drug use, although the 

evidence would allow that inference. Finding of Fact 9, itself, is not a finding Layla 
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Opinion of the Court

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was exposed to drug use. The trial court furthermore cast doubt on RespondentMother’s assertion that Layla “may test positive” by finding the court was uncertain 

what Respondent-Mother meant by “spore to spore contact[.]” 

Similarly, while the trial court found Respondent-Mother and RespondentCaretaker violated the safety plan, and Layla was found in their care without a 

suitable supervisor, the trial court did not make findings as to the impact on Layla. 

No evidence was presented that Layla was harmed or at a substantial risk of harm 

due to the violation of the safety plan. The evidence at the adjudication hearing was 

that the TSP informed Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker that she could 

no longer care for Layla, before the TSP informed DSS of the same, and that 

Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Caretaker picked Layla up to go to a doctor’s 

appointment. There is no evidence or findings that Layla was adversely affected by 

the safety plan violation. 

DSS and the GAL also argue evidence the home was a safety concern and 

Respondent-Mother had exhibited threatening behavior supported a determination 

that Layla was impaired or at a substantial risk of impairment. The trial court 

addressed in Findings of Fact 11 and 19 the condition of the home and RespondentMother’s threat. 

To place Finding of Fact 11 in context, we note some additional findings:

10. The social worker returned to the home on November 

12, 2021 for a second visit. At that time . . . [R]espondent[-

]Mother and [Respondent-C]aretaker were offered a safety 
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Opinion of the Court

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plan which was admitted into evidence as DSS 1.

11. That there was discussion about rats in the building

and holes in the walls of [Respondent-Mother's] home. 

[R]espondent[-M]other believed the rats would come out of 

the holes in the walls and cabinets and try to bite her.

12. That a DSS worker was present in the home on the 1st

occasion for 1.5 hrs. and the second occasion for 45 minutes.

In Finding of Fact 11, the trial court found “there was discussion about rats in the 

building and holes in the walls[.]” The court further found Respondent-Mother 

“believed the rats would come out of the holes in the walls and cabinets and try to 

bite her.” While the finding shows there was a discussion about “rats in the building 

and holes in the walls” between Respondent-Mother and the social worker, the trial 

court did not find the home was unsuitable or unsafe for Layla, and no evidence was 

presented showing the condition of the home put Layla at risk. In fact, based on the 

evidence it seems this finding regarding rats indicates some sort of hallucination by 

Respondent-Mother that rats would come out of the walls and bite her, not that the 

home was actually so infested by rats that it would pose a physical threat to anyone 

in the home. Either possibility could indicate a risk of substantial harm to the child; 

a parent who is suffering from hallucinations from drug impairment or mental illness 

may be unable to care for a child due to her mental impairment, while a parent who 

allows such an extensive rat infestation that rats pose a physical threat to a child 

presents an entirely different type of risk. From the trial court’s findings, we cannot 
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Opinion of the Court

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ascertain if it determined that these facts indicated either type of risk of harm, or 

some other sort of risk, to Layla. 

The Safety Assessment by DSS on 12 November 2021 indicates the only two 

“safety indicators” DSS considered on that date as exposing Layla to physical harm 

or a “plausible threat to cause serious physical harm” were (1) being a “drug-exposed 

infant/child” and (2) “a current, ongoing pattern of substance abuse that leads directly 

to neglect and/or abuse of the child.” As to this latter factor, the social worker noted, 

“substance use has been identified as a pattern, but [Respondent-Caretaker’s mother] 

is the sober caregiver of the household.” Notably, the Safety Assessment found no 

safety indicators related to “physical living conditions” as “hazardous and 

immediately threating to the health and/or safety of the child.” The Safety Plan 

presented by DSS on 12 November 2021 addressed only substance abuse issues and 

did not include any requirements for remediation of any conditions at RespondentMother’s home.

The testimony as to Respondent-Mother’s comments about the rats was 

conflicting. Respondent-Mother testified that she told the social worker about rats 

coming in the house and holes in the floor: 

Q. Okay. You said that you were showing her rats and holes 

in the walls?

A. Yes.

Q. Where are the rats in relation to -- where were the rats?

A. Outside of our home. We had had an issue with very 

large, large rats coming from the brewery across the street 

and had been to social services three or four times trying to 
IN RE: L.C.

Opinion of the Court

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get help with the landlord.

Q. Okay. And where were the holes in the walls that you 

were showing?

A. They were in the flooring where I fell through when I 

was pregnant. 

In contrast, the social worker characterized Respondent-Mother’s comments about 

rats that day as indicating she may be impaired by substances:

A. She was speaking very erratically. She was moving her 

arms a lot. She wasn't -- she couldn't stay focused like on 

the topic.

Q. Did she appear to be in any kind of distress?

A. It depends on what you call distress.

Q. What -- how would you characterize it?

A. I wouldn't say she's in distress. I thought that she might 

be using substances at the time.

Q. Okay. Did she mention to you anything about rats in 

[the] building or holes in the wall?

A. Yes, she did.

Q. Under -- how did that -- how did those -- subject come 

up?

A. We were doing the home check of the home and she had 

mentioned that there was a rat problem and that rats

would come out the cabinets and the holes and try to bite

her.

The evidence, therefore, would allow the trial court to make findings regarding the 

type of risk posed by Respondent-Mother’s erratic behavior and claims about rats in 

the house, but the findings do not clarify the nature of any potential risk to Layla. 

Regarding Respondent-Mother’s threatening behavior, the trial court found in 

Finding of Fact 19 that, “during at least one interaction with the social worker, 

[R]espondent[-M]other was irate, threatened [Respondent-Caretaker’s cousin], and 

admitted to a willingness to threaten [the cousin].” Again, there is no indication 
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Opinion of the Court

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Respondent-Mother’s behavior affected Layla. The evidence at the hearing was that 

Layla was in the care of Respondent-Caretaker’s mother and not present at the time 

of the interaction. Although there was evidence that would allow the trial court to 

make clearer findings about Respondent-Mother’s threatening behavior, the findings

about the condition of the home and Respondent-Mother’s threatening behavior do 

not support a determination that Layla suffered impairment or was at substantial 

risk of impairment.

In short, the Adjudication Order lacks specific findings regarding the impact 

on Layla of the substance abuse, the violation of the safety plan, the condition of the 

home, or Respondent-Mother’s erratic or threatening behavior. DSS largely relies on 

testimony from the adjudication hearing to argue the evidence supported a 

determination Layla was impaired or at substantial risk of impairment. The trial 

court, however, failed to make findings based on much of the evidence presented in 

support of the conditions alleged in the petition. While this Court has held there is 

no error when “there is no finding that the juvenile had been impaired or is at a 

substantial risk of impairment . . . if all the evidence supports such a finding[,]” In re 

B.P., 257 N.C. App. at 433, 809 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting In re Padgett, 156 N.C. App. 

at 648, 577 S.E.2d at 340), we have consistently reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary 

findings, as opposed to reweighing the evidence, to determine whether the findings 

show impairment or a substantial risk of impairment. 
IN RE: L.C.

Opinion of the Court

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Because the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusion Layla is 

neglected due to the lack of findings addressing impairment of the juvenile or 

substantial risk of impairment, we vacate the adjudication of neglect and remand for 

the trial court to make additional findings of fact to address whether and how 

Respondent-Mother’s drug abuse, mental or emotional impairment, or threatening 

behavior have harmed Layla or have placed her at a substantial risk of harm. 

Although the findings of fact are not sufficient to indicate that Layla suffered 

physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or that there is a substantial risk of such 

impairment, the evidence in the Record could potentially support such findings. We 

therefore must vacate the trial court’s adjudication order and remand for the trial 

court to make appropriate findings of fact regarding any impairment of Layla or 

substantial risk of impairment. See In re J.C., 380 N.C. 738, 747, 869 S.E.2d 682, 

688 (“Without commenting on the amount, strength, or persuasiveness of the 

evidence contained in the record, we merely conclude that we cannot say that remand 

of this case for the trial court's consideration of the evidence in the record utilizing 

the proper ‘clear, cogent, convincing’ standard of proof would be ‘futile,’ so as to 

compel us to conclude that ‘the record of this case is insufficient to support findings 

which are necessary to establish any of the statutory grounds for termination.’” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV. Conclusion
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Opinion of the Court

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Having vacated the Adjudication Order and remanded for entry of a new order,

we must also vacate and remand the Disposition Order based thereon. See In re 

K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. at 357, 797 S.E.2d at 519 (citing In re S.C.R., 217 N.C. App. 

166, 170, 718 S.E.2d 709, 713 (2011)).

VACATED and REMANDED.

Judges STROUD and STADING concur.