2023 IL App (4th) 230237-U 

NO. 4-23-0237 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

ANDREW DONNELL COE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

McLean County 

No. 14CF1141 

Honorable 

John Casey Costigan, 

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 

successive petition for postconviction relief at the third stage of postconviction 

proceedings was not manifestly erroneous.

¶ 2 Following a March 2023 third-stage evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the 

successive petition for postconviction relief of defendant, Andrew Donnell Coe. Defendant, on 

appeal, argues the court erred when denying his petition because the newly discovered testimony 

demonstrates his actual innocence, warranting a new trial. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In October 2014, defendant was charged by indictment as follows: count I alleged 

on September 3, 2014, defendant criminally conspired with Darrell Harris to commit unlawful 

delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i), 405.1 (West 2014)); count II alleged 

on September 3, 2014, defendant committed unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (id.

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

December 4, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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§ 401(d)(i)); count III alleged on September 23, 2014, defendant committed unlawful possession 

of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (id.); count IV alleged on September 23, 2014, 

defendant committed unlawful possession of a controlled substance (id. § 402(c)); and count V 

alleged on September 23, 2014, defendant committed obstruction of justice (720 ILCS 

5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014)). 

¶ 5 Prior to trial, the State dismissed count I. Defendant waived appointed counsel 

and the matter proceeded to a jury trial in April 2016, where defendant represented himself. 

Because defendant, on appeal, is only challenging his conviction on count II, we provide only 

those facts relevant thereto. 

¶ 6 A. Jury Trial 

¶ 7 Detective Kevin Raisbeck of the Bloomington Police Department testified 

Richard Velez came to the police station because Velez’s roommate, defendant, was selling 

cocaine. Velez signed an agreement to be a confidential source. On September 3, 2014, Velez 

called defendant with the speaker function on to arrange the purchase of cocaine. The detective 

recognized the voice as sounding “very similar” to defendant’s voice. He heard defendant say he 

had seven grams to sell.

¶ 8 Thereafter, Velez, with Raisbeck still present, began making phone calls to 

defendant’s alleged source, Corey, to arrange a direct purchase from Corey. A controlled 

purchase was arranged. Velez was searched to confirm no narcotics or money were present. 

Velez was given $200 of marked currency. Raisbeck drove Velez near the agreed-upon meeting 

location. While waiting, Velez received a call from defendant. Defendant stated Corey had been 

“scared” by an unmarked police vehicle in the area but he would “take care” of Velez. A new 

meeting location was arranged near Locust and Catherine Streets in Bloomington. Raisbeck 
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stated defendant lived at 9091⁄2 West Mulberry Street, which was approximately a block and half 

from the new meeting location. Velez called defendant to tell him to hurry up and that he had 

$200. Velez left and returned less than 10 minutes later with several bags of purported cocaine 

and the $200. Raisbeck found it odd that Velez returned with the $200. Raisbeck secured the 

bags of cocaine into evidence. Defendant then called Velez and said he needed the $200 to pay 

Corey. Velez texted defendant to say he was on his way to give him the $200. Raisbeck drove 

Velez to the area of Locust and Catherine Streets and observed Velez walk toward 9091⁄2 West 

Mulberry Street. Velez returned approximately eight minutes later without the $200. A 

subsequent search of Velez and the unmarked police vehicle revealed no narcotics or money was 

present.

¶ 9 Velez had been wearing a concealed recording device that recorded two phone 

calls and an in-person meeting. When presented with the first phone call recording of Velez’s 

conversation with defendant to facilitate the exchange of the $200, Raisbeck identified the voices 

on the recording as Velez’s, his own, “a person that answered the phone initially,” and 

defendant’s. On the second phone call recording of Velez’s conversation with defendant to check 

on defendant’s arrival status for picking up the $200, Raisbeck identified the voices on the 

recording as his own, Velez’s, and defendant’s. On the in-person meeting recording of Velez’s 

conversation with defendant to give him the $200, Raisbeck identified the voices on the 

recording as his own, Velez’s, defendant’s, and “some voices that were in the background of the 

residence.”

¶ 10 The State sought to admit these recordings. Defendant objected to the foundation 

of the recordings. The trial court permitted defendant to conduct limited cross-examination of

Raisbeck on the foundation. Regarding the in-person recording, defendant asked Raisbeck if the 
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voice he heard could have been someone other than defendant. Raisbeck stated, “It could have 

been. But like I said, it sounded very similar to what I know [defendant’s] voice to sound like.” 

Defendant asked if Velez spoke with anyone else besides defendant during the in-person 

recording. Raisbeck responded “[Velez] may have talked to Mr. Harris, who actually provided 

the drugs to Mr. Velez. But I think that conversation was brief.” Defendant asked if he had heard 

Harris’s voice on the recording. Raisbeck could not recall if he had heard Harris’s voice “or if 

that was just the voices in the background.”

¶ 11 The trial court admitted the recordings and the State resumed its direct 

examination of Raisbeck. Raisbeck was asked to identify the voice heard saying “did you rob 

someone, did you rob an—expletive[?]” Raisbeck said, “That’s the voice that I believe is very 

similar to [defendant’s] voice.”

¶ 12 After several unsuccessful attempts, on September 8, 2014, Raisbeck contacted 

defendant. Defendant agreed to meet with Raisbeck on September 9, 2014, at the area of Locust 

and Catherine Streets. Raisbeck said he wanted to recruit defendant as a confidential source to 

investigate Corey. Defendant admitted he sold cocaine for Corey and explained their financial 

arrangement. Defendant provided Raisbeck with a description of Corey and Corey’s phone 

number. Defendant was not arrested and was permitted to leave. 

¶ 13 On cross-examination, Raisbeck stated Velez physically received the cocaine 

from Harris. Velez eventually paid defendant for the cocaine. Raisbeck did not see defendant 

with Harris on September 3, 2014. Defendant asked Raisbeck if his voice was the same as on the 

recording. Raisbeck said he could not be “a hundred percent sure,” but he attributed any 

distinction to hearing it in person versus on a recording. He believed it was “similar.” When 

asked to specify a percentage, Raisbeck said “[v]ery high” and “95 percent.”
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¶ 14 Neither Velez nor Harris testified at trial. After the conclusion of the evidence and 

closing arguments, the jury was instructed on legal accountability: 

 “A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person when, 

either before or during the commission of the offense, and with the intent to 

promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, 

abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or 

commission of the offense.”

¶ 15 Regarding count II, the instruction read:

 “A person commits the offense of Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled 

Substance when he, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, knowingly 

delivers a substance containing a controlled substance.

 To sustain the charge of Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled Substance, the 

State must prove the following proposition: 

 That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he was legally responsible, 

knowingly delivered a substance containing cocaine, a controlled substance.”

¶ 16 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. In July 2016, defendant was 

sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 years’ imprisonment for counts II and III and 3 years’ 

imprisonment for count V. 

¶ 17 B. Direct Appeal and Initial Postconviction Petition

¶ 18 Defendant filed a direct appeal. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions and 

sentences. People v. Coe, 2019 IL App (4th) 160713-U, ¶ 113. In January 2018, while his direct 

appeal was pending, defendant filed a postconviction petition, which the trial court summarily 

dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed. 
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People v. Coe, No. 4-18-0461 (Apr. 29, 2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 19 In August 2019, while his appeal from his initial postconviction petition was 

pending, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of 

the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)). Defendant attached to his 

petition an affidavit from Antoine Parker, which read:

“On September 3, 2014 late evening I was at apartment 9091⁄2 W. Mulberry, 

Bloomington, IL with a[n] associate of mine name Darrel nickname Rello. While 

at the apartment I witnessed Rello arrange a drug deal over his cell phone with 

some guy he addressed by Richard. Rello asked me to walk with him down the 

back alley of the apartment which I did but then I returned to the apartment 

without Rello. After Rello returned to the apartment, approximate two hours later 

while we were in the kitchen a tall slim guy about my height walked through the 

front door into the kitchen and handed Rello some money before I left to smoke a 

ciggarrette [sic] on the front porch. I voluntarily offered to sign a[n] affidavit 

regarding what I know and witnessed. [Defendant] was not at this apartment when 

this transpired.”

¶ 20 Defendant claimed Parker’s affidavit proved his innocence of count II. Defendant

relied on the following: (1) Raisbeck admitted that Harris, not defendant, had delivered the 

cocaine to Velez on September 3, 2014, (2) the State alleged defendant was legally responsible 

for the drug transaction because defendant accepted the $200 as payment for the cocaine, 

(3) Raisbeck was not present and did not see Velez give the $200 to defendant at the residence 

located at 9091⁄2 West Mulberry Street, (4) Parker stated “a tall slim guy about [Parker’s] height 
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walked through the front door into the kitchen and handed [Harris] some money,” and 

(5) according to Parker, defendant was not present at 9091⁄2 West Mulberry Street when the 

transaction occurred.

¶ 21 The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing (1) the petition was untimely, 

(2) the “tall slim guy” was unidentified and it was unclear why he handed Harris money, 

therefore, it could not be evidence of such a conclusive character that it would probably change 

the result on retrial, and (3) the evidence in Parker’s affidavit could have been discovered prior 

to trial by the exercise of due diligence. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss 

defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. The court found the petition was untimely. The court found 

Parker’s affidavit did not support defendant’s actual innocence, stating, “[T]here was still 

sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find defendant guilty by way of accountability.” 

Finally, the court found, if defendant had exercised due diligence, he could have discovered 

Parker before the trial. The court noted Harris and Velez were known to defendant prior to trial, 

and if Parker was with Harris and Velez as Parker stated, Parker’s presence would have been 

disclosed by defendant interviewing and subpoenaing Harris and Velez. Defendant did not 

appeal the dismissal.

¶ 22 C. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 23 In October 2020, defendant filed a successive petition for postconviction relief, 

the pleading at issue in this appeal, reasserting his actual innocence regarding count II. 

Defendant denied being in Harris’s apartment on September 3, 2014, and denied making a drug 

deal with Velez. Defendant submitted his own affidavit averring that he had spoken with Harris 

by phone, wherein Harris made various admissions. He stated: 
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“Mr. Harris confessed to me that on September 3, 2014 [Velez] paid him $200 at 

apartment 9091⁄2 W. Mulberry for crack cocaine he gave to [Velez] on Locust 

Street. Harris admitted that he lied about my involvement surround the September 

3, 2014 drug deal because he was threatened by an interrogating officer with 

prison time. Harris admitted that he originally told the detective who interrogated 

him that I wasn’t even at the apartment or that I gave him drugs to sell but that the 

officer kept telling him that I did and as a result he went along with the story and 

falsely accused me of giving him drugs to keep from going to prison.” 

¶ 24 Defendant also submitted a second affidavit from Parker, wherein Parker averred 

he could not have been discoverable by defendant at the time of the trial because (1) Parker was 

in Bloomington only during the afternoon of September 3, 2014, (2) Parker returned to 

Belleville, Illinois, that evening, (3) neither Harris nor defendant knew Parker’s Belleville 

address, and (4) Parker had not been to Bloomington since September 3, 2014. Parker further 

stated defendant was not present at 9091⁄2 W. Mulberry Street on September 3, 2014, when 

Parker “observe[d] [Velez] pay [Harris] a drug payment following a drug deal.” Parker “watched 

[Harris] set this deal up over the phone.” Parker continued: “[Defendant] is innocent and had 

nothing to do with this crime because I was there.” Defendant also attached Parker’s previous 

affidavit filed with his section 2-1401 petition.

¶ 25 In December 2020, the trial court denied defendant leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. The court found the new affidavits still had not precluded a guilty 

verdict on a theory of accountability. Additionally, the court was unconvinced Parker could not 

have been discovered earlier by defendant’s due diligence. Defendant appealed.
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¶ 26 On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s dismissal. People v. Coe, 2021 IL 

App (4th) 210031-U. We found Parker’s affidavits were new evidence, and, when Parker’s 

second affidavit was taken as true, he could not have been discoverable by defendant’s due 

diligence. Id. ¶ 43. Furthermore, Parker’s affidavits, taken as true, would make Raisbeck’s 

identification of defendant’s voice unreliable. Id. ¶ 44. Defendant’s “guilty verdict on count II

rested heavily on Raisbeck’s voice identification [of defendant].” Id. We concluded because 

Raisbeck’s testimony and Parker’s averments cannot both be true, and that the court must take 

Parker’s affidavits as true at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, Parker’s affidavits 

“undermine confidence in Raisbeck’s voice-identification testimony and probably would change 

the outcome on count II.” Id. We remanded the matter for further proceedings pursuant to the 

Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 et seq. (West 2020)). Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 27 D. Evidentiary Hearing 

¶ 28 On remand, defendant proceeded pro se. The State moved to dismiss defendant’s 

petition, arguing he had not shown a substantial deprivation of his constitutional rights. The trial 

court denied the State’s motion and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing in March 

2023. 

¶ 29 Parker testified he was at 9091⁄2 West Mulberry Street on September 3, 2014. 

Parker was there with Harris. Parker witnessed Harris arrange a drug deal over the phone with 

Velez. Parker confirmed a “tall slim guy” came to the residence and handed Harris some money. 

Parker confirmed defendant was never at the residence where Harris arranged and delivered 

cocaine to Velez. Parker confirmed on September 3, 2014, only Harris, Velez, and himself were 

present during the “drug deal.” Parker did not recall anyone else being present when Velez came 

to pay Harris. Parker eventually left Bloomington to go back to Belleville. Parker stated he had 
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known Harris for approximately 20 years and was in Bloomington on September 3, 2014, to 

prepare for “a Memorial Day.” 

¶ 30 On cross-examination, the State noted differences in Parker’s handwriting 

between the two affidavits in defendant’s petition. Parker stated he wrote both the affidavits. 

When asked how Parker’s handwriting had changed, Parker stated, “I mean I don’t see anything 

wrong with it. That’s the way I write.” The State introduced a certified copy of Parker’s 

conviction for armed robbery in Madison County case No. 14-CF-1908. The State directed 

Parker’s attention to an affidavit within the exhibit that Parker identified as an affidavit he wrote. 

The State noted Parker had written his name differently in three separate affidavits: Parker’s

affidavit within the certified copy of conviction, Parker’s first affidavit for defendant’s section 

2-1401 petition, and Parker’s second affidavit for defendant’s successive postconviction petition. 

Parker admitted it was a “possibility” due to a learning disability. Parker could not recall the 

color of the West Mulberry residence nor what was next to the house on either side or across the 

street. Parker admitted the armed robbery he was in prison for occurred on September 6, 2014. 

Parker stated he met defendant for the first time when they were in prison together. 

¶ 31 The trial court admitted an affidavit from Raisbeck with attached police reports. 

Therein, Raisbeck documented interviewing Harris on September 29, 2014, where Harris stated 

defendant gave him cocaine in the alley near the West Mulberry residence and told him to take it 

to Catherine and Locust Streets and “give it to the guy.” Harris followed defendant’s 

instructions. When Harris returned, defendant asked Harris where the money was and Harris told 

defendant that he did not tell Harris to get any money. Harris was shown a photograph that he 

identified as defendant. The court admitted a verification of incarceration record for Parker from 

the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). The court also admitted Parker’s certified copy 
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of conviction for impeachment purposes. The court admitted defendant’s exhibits: Parker’s two 

affidavits. Defendant presented no rebuttal evidence to the State’s evidence.

¶ 32 The trial court found defendant’s new evidence was unlikely to change the result 

at a new trial. The court found defendant’s new evidence “highly suspect and not [credible].” 

The court noted:

“Mr. Parker was in Bloomington one time only for one night and just so happened 

to be at the place where the drug deal which [defendant] was convicted took 

place. Mr. Parker states no reason as to why he was in Bloomington. He has 

presented no detail as to when he came or how he got here. He does not state who 

he came to see or what time he left. He remembers specifically the names of the 

individuals involved in the drug transaction and knows specifically that 

[defendant] was not there. Yet, he does not remember anything about the color of 

the house or what surrounded the house. He recalled all of this approximately 4 

years after the fact, while him and [defendant] were serving IDOC sentences in 

the Danville Correction Center. This testimony and evidence in the Court[’]s view 

is not [credible].”

¶ 33 The trial court denied defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 34 This appeal followed.

¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 36 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court’s findings following the evidentiary 

hearing were manifestly erroneous. Defendant argues Parker’s testimony was sufficiently 

credible to warrant a new trial.
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¶ 37 The Act provides a criminal defendant the means to redress substantial violations 

of his constitutional rights that occurred in his original trial or sentencing. People v. Crenshaw, 

2015 IL App (4th) 131035, ¶ 23. The Act contemplates the filing of only a single postconviction 

petition and expressly provides that “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not 

raised in the original or an amended petition is [forfeited].” 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2022). The 

trial court may grant a defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition if the 

defendant demonstrates (1) cause for his failure to bring a claim in the initial petition and 

(2) prejudice results from that failure. Crenshaw, 2015 IL App (4th) 131035, ¶ 28.

¶ 38 However, when a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive 

postconviction petition, he is excused from showing cause and prejudice. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 

2d 319, 330 (2009). To succeed on a claim of actual innocence in postconviction proceedings, a 

defendant must present evidence that is (1) new and could not have been discovered prior to trial 

through due diligence, (2) material to the issue of defendant’s innocence, (3) noncumulative of 

the evidence presented at trial, and (4) sufficiently conclusive that it would probably change the 

result on retrial. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96. At the third stage of postconviction 

proceedings, the defendant has the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional 

violation. People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002). Following a third-stage evidentiary 

hearing, where fact-finding and credibility determinations are involved, the trial court’s decision 

will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 

(1998). A ruling is manifestly erroneous only if it contains an error that is clearly evident, plain, 

and indisputable. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333. 

¶ 39 Defendant specifically contends (1) the trial court incorrectly placed too much 

emphasis on Parker’s inability to recall unimportant details, (2) Parker’s testimony corroborated 
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trial evidence, and (3) Parker’s testimony would have had an effect on the jury’s verdict because 

it would have undermined Raisbeck’s identification of defendant’s voice on the recordings, 

which was the sole evidence implicating defendant in the drug transaction. 

¶ 40 In reaching its conclusion, the trial court considered the pleadings, evidence, and 

arguments. The court found the evidence was not of such a conclusive character that it would 

likely change the result of defendant’s conviction at a new trial. The court based its decision 

largely on finding Parker’s testimony lacked credibility. We do not find the court’s determination

manifestly erroneous. 

¶ 41 The trial court must consider whether the new evidence “undercuts the court’s 

confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty verdict.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97.

“[T]he new evidence supporting an actual innocence claim need not be entirely dispositive to be

likely to alter the result on retrial.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 56. “Probability, not 

certainty, is the key as the trial court in effect predicts what another jury would likely do, 

considering all the evidence, both new and old, together.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97.

“[T]he conclusiveness of the new evidence is the most important element of an actual innocence 

claim.” People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47. 

¶ 42 The trial court’s emphasis on Parker’s inability to recall details about the West 

Mulberry residence was proper, as these were not unimportant details. At the evidentiary 

hearing, “the trial court acts as a fact-finder, making credibility determinations and weighing the 

evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Carter, 2021 IL App (4th) 180581, ¶ 58. 

“Any time a trial court serves as a fact finder, perhaps the single most important thing the court 

can do is say whom it believes and whom it does not. When the trial court favors us with such a 

finding, we are at the height of our deference to that court.” Id. ¶ 68. Parker’s testimony served to 
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prove defendant’s contention that he was never present at the residence on September 3, 2014, 

which was largely gleaned from defendant’s leading questions predicated on Parker’s affidavits. 

Therein, Parker’s memory recall was detailed and specific. Parker’s testimony was only 

consistent with the trial evidence insomuch as it confirmed Velez had received the cocaine from 

Harris. However, when Parker was confronted with open-ended questions on cross-examination 

by the State, his ability to recall details of any kind immediately fell apart. The court’s finding 

that Parker’s testimony lacked credibility was not manifestly erroneous.

¶ 43 We also cannot say that Parker’s testimony at trial would have likely influenced

the jury’s verdict by undermining Raisbeck’s identification of defendant’s voice on the 

recordings. At trial, the State had to prove that defendant, or one for whose conduct he was 

legally responsible, namely Harris, knowingly delivered cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 

2014); 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2014). Parker’s testimony at a new trial would require a jury to 

believe that defendant did not aid or abet Harris in delivering Velez the cocaine or receiving the 

$200 from Velez because defendant was not there on September 3, 2014. Parker’s testimony 

does not negate what Raisbeck testified he heard on the recordings; it only creates a conflict in 

the evidence for a jury to resolve.

¶ 44 The evidence showed defendant admitted to Raisbeck he sold cocaine and that 

Raisbeck recognized defendant’s voice when Velez was arranging a controlled purchase for 

cocaine. Three recordings purporting to show defendant’s voice were admitted into evidence and 

published for the jury to hear for themselves. Defendant’s entire contention on appeal is that 

Parker’s testimony undermines the State’s sole evidence implicating him: Raisbeck’s voice 

identification of defendant on the recordings. This is simply not true. The jurors would have also 

been able to compare Raisbeck’s identification of defendant’s voice with their own assessment 
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based on hearing the recordings and defendant’s voice at trial, where defendant spoke in 

abundance when representing himself. Defendant, himself, even attempted to distinguish the 

sound of his voice at trial from that of the recordings when cross-examining Raisbeck. The jurors 

did not need to rely solely on Raisbeck’s identification but could also make their own 

independent assessments of the recordings to determine whether or not it was defendant’s voice

on the recordings. “When evaluating evidence and choosing from among competing inferences, 

jurors are entitled to take full advantage of their collective experience and common sense.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v Rudd, 2020 IL App (1st) 182037, ¶ 58.

¶ 45 Considering all the evidence, old and new, we find Parker’s testimony was not of 

such a conclusive character that it undercut the trial court’s confidence in the factual correctness 

of the jury’s original guilty verdict. Therefore, we conclude the court’s judgment was not

manifestly erroneous.

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 48 Affirmed.