1 Filed 3/5/14 Nash v. Vincent CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JAMES NASH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. MARLEU VINCENT et al., Defendants and Respondents. A133271
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC10500027)

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs James Nash and Diane Lamber t-Nash appeal from an order of the San Francisco Superior Court granting a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction on defendants Marleu Vincent and Pauline Arbot, 1 residents of Montreal, Canada. Defendants appeared speci ally to contest juri sdiction over them in plaintiffs’ action for injuries suffered when plaintiff James Na sh fell two stories after a balcony railing on defendants’ ho me collapsed while plaintiffs were visiting. We shall
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs and defendants have been friends for many years. Defendants are Canadian citizens, who live in Montreal, Provin ce of Quebec, Canada. They have friends who live in California, with whom they corre spond by e-mail. Otherw ise, they have no

1 Pauline Arbot is also known as Pauline Arbour.2 regular contact in this state. Plaintiffs m oved to California in 1977 and have lived in San Francisco for nearly 35 years. Lambert-Nash and Arbo t maintained telephone and e-mail communications on a regular basis (at least monthly for about the past 10 years). At defendants’ invitation, plaintiffs visited th em numerous times at defendants’ Canadian property. In September 2008, on one of the Nash es’ visits to defendants’ Quebec home, plaintiff James Nash was severely injured wh en he fell to the ground from a balcony. Plaintiffs alleged on information and belie f that the fall was caused by rotted wood. When he leaned against the railing, it gave wa y, causing him to fall to the ground below. On May 20, 2010, plaintiffs filed a co mplaint for damages against defendants in San Francisco Superior Court, alleging defendants’ Canadi an home was negligently built
and maintained. 2 Plaintiff Lambert-Nash also alleged a cause of action for loss of consortium arising from her husband’s injuries and for emotional distress she suffered as a result of witnessing her husband’s fall. The complaint sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Jurisdiction is alleged in the complaint based upon allegations that defendants “consented to jurisdiction in the California Su perior Court . . .” and that they “have regular and systematic contacts with the St ate of California.” The complaint does not allege what those contacts might be. On June 13, 2011, defendants were serv ed with the Summons and Complaint, as
well as other documents. On July 12, 2011, defendants specially appeared and filed their motion to quash service of summons and complaint. They a sserted that service was improper under the Hague Service Convention; that defendants did not consent to the California court’s jurisdiction; and that defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to establish general jurisdiction.

2 Plaintiffs also included as a defenda nt, ACS Recovery Sy stems (ACS), which they maintain was a collection service retained by plaintiffs’ health insurer. ACS was not a party to the motion to quash below and is not a party to this appeal.3 Plaintiffs opposed the motion to quash. They asserted that “in an abundance of caution” they were “having the Summons and Complaint re-served by an expert in Hague Convention Service” and expected proper servi ce would be completed before hearing on the motion to quash, which they argued would m oot any original defect s in service. (On July 26, 2011, two weeks before the motion to quash hearing, plaintiffs apparently served defendants with the documents required by the Hague Service Conv ention.) Plaintiffs did not reassert their allegati on that defendants had consented to jurisdiction. Rather, they principally relied upon “specific” ju risdiction, asserting that when minimum contacts are analyzed under that concept, out-of-state defenda nts’ contacts with the forum need not be “continuous and systematic” where defendants purposefully established
contacts in California and where plaintiffs’ cause of action aros e out of or was related to
the defendants’ contacts with California. Plai ntiffs maintained such was the case here, based upon the defendants’ “extensive and expa nsive communications with [p]laintiffs in California, including a standing invitation” to visit defendants’ property in Canada, as plaintiffs had done many times before, and which was the place where James Nash was injured. Plaintiffs also a sserted the relative burdens on defendants of litigating in San Francisco would be minimal, but the burdens on pl aintiffs of litigati ng in Canada would
be extreme.
Vincent and Lambert-Nash filed declara tions more specifically addressing the question of personal jurisdicti on and defendants’ motion to quash. There is nothing in the declarations indicating that defendants ever consented, either verbally or in writing, to the jurisdiction of the California courts and their declaration flatly denies defendants consented to jurisdiction It is undisp uted that aside from telephone and e-mail correspondence to keep in touc h with friends who reside in California, defendants have no regular contact with the state. In her declaration, plaintiff Lamber t-Nash states she and defendant Arbot maintained telephone and e-mail communications on a regular bases (at least monthly) over the last 10 years; that plaintiffs were at defendants’ property at defendants’ invitation and have a standing invitation to visit; that they have not visited defendants4 since the accident, due to plaintiffs’ serious health issues; that plaintiffs and defendants have ongoing communications; and that plaintiffs seek only compensation from defendants’ insurer, not from defendants persona lly. Lambert-Nash also states that, not long after the injury, James Nash was flown back to San Francisco, “where he has undergone extraordinary medical treatment, much of which continues.” His “ability to ambulate is still severely comp romised.” She describes the treatment Nash has received
and will continue to receive and states that such treatment “has involved as many as twenty, separate healthcare providers with diffe rent functions.” She further states that
Nash is in need of “continuous medical tr eatment and follow-up appointments for the
foreseeable future and that it would create substa ntial hardship for us to have to travel to Canada for extended litigation while [he] is undergoing this necessary treatment which needs to be ongoing and integrat ed.” She also states plainti ffs cannot afford the financial expense of travel to Canada to litigate the cas e and that they would be severely burdened by their health limitations, including her own health issues. Finally, she also states that as Nash’s pre-injury employment was in the Bay Area, all evidence relating to his sizeable earnings loss is in the Bay Area. Following a hearing, the court granted defendants’ motion to quash on the ground that “[p]laintiffs failed to m eet their burden of proving suffi cient minimum contacts with the State of California to subject [defendants’ ] to the Court’s jurisd iction. Additionally, [p]laintiffs presented no evid ence of [defendants’] allege d contractual consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, when serving [defendants], (Canadian citizens residing in Montreal, Quebec), [p]laintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of the [Hague Service Convention].” Notice of entry of the court’s order wa s filed on September 1, 2011, and this timely appeal followed.5 DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erre d in granting defendants’ motion to quash
service of summons.
A. Standard of Review “When a defendant moves to quash service of summons for lack of specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff bear s the initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts justifying th e exercise of jurisdiction. Once the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable. When the evidence is not in conflic t, whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. ( Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 ( Snowney ).)” ( Roman v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 677-680 ( Roman ).)
B. The law—“minimum contacts” California courts may exercise jurisdicti on on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitutions of the United States and Californi a. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses unde r state law and federal due process are the same. [Citations.]” ( Dole Food Company, Inc. v. Watts (2002) 303 F. 3d 1104, 1110 ( Dole ).) “Federal constitutional due process requi rements dictate that a foreign defendant
must have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that mainte nance of suit against the foreign defendant in the fo rum state would not offend ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” [Citations.]’ ( Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [( International Shoe )].) If a defendant has su fficient contacts with the forum state, it may be subject to suit there on all claims, wherever they arose (general jurisdiction). If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not sufficient to support general jurisdiction, the defendant may noneth eless be subject to special jurisdiction, which depends on an assessment of the ‘ “r elationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” ’ ( Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408,6 414-415; see also Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc . (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445-448 ( Vons ).)” ( Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 677-678.) “ ‘When determining whether specific ju risdiction exists, courts consider the “ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” [Citation.] A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non resident defendant only if: (1) “the defendant has purposefully availed himsel f or herself of forum benefits” ( Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446); (2) “the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the]
defendant’s contacts with the forum’ ” [citations]; and (3) “ ‘the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with “fair pl ay and substantial justice” ’ ” ( Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472- 473 [( Burger King )].)’ [Citation.]” ( Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062; accord, Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.)
“Once it has been decided that a defe ndant purposefully established minimum contacts with a forum, ‘he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable’ in order to defeat personal jurisdiction [Citation.]” ( Dole, supra, 303 F.3d at p. 1114, citing Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 477.) 3 Although plaintiffs argue that defendant s maintained regular, extensive contacts with them for decades, th ey do not appear to assert the c ourt erred in finding against them on either the “consent” or “gener al jurisdiction” grounds. Ra ther, they argue they made a prima facie case of defendants’ minimum contact s with California suffi cient to satisfy the requirements for asserting “speci fic jurisdiction” over defendants. Plaintiffs also assert

3 In determining “reasonableness” courts must consider factors including, the extent of defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum; the burden on defendant in defending in the forum; the extent of conf lict with the sovereignt y of the defendant’s state; the forum state’ s interest in adjudicating the dis pute; the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; the importance of the forum to plai ntiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and the ex istence of an altern ative forum. (See CE Distribution, LLC. v. New Sensor Corp. (9th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1107, 1112; Schwarzer et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Proced ure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 3:142.)7 more broadly that the exercise by California of personal jurisdictio n over defendants in this case “comports with ‘fair play and substa ntial justice.’ ” We therefore focus on the “specific jurisdiction” formulation of the minimum contacts analysis. C. “Specific jurisdiction” In asserting that they made a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs rely on their history of e-mail and other co ntacts with defendants, the open invitation extended by defendants to visit defendants’ On tario property, and that plaintiffs’ injuries
occurred as a result of such a visit. In addition, plaintiffs point to numer ous factors that they urge demonstrate California’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case is “reasonable” and comports with due process standards of “fair play and substantial justice.” ( International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 316.) Among the “fairness” and “reasonableness” factors plaintiffs proffer, are their assertion that the case is “essentially only about damages” and thus, virtually all of the evidence (including health care provi ders, evidence of James Nash’s economic damages and the plaintiffs, themselves) is located in California; the economic and physical burden on plaintiffs to travel to Canada to litigate, especially given their health issues; and the numerous differences plain tiffs assert exist between Canadian and California law with respect to the right to ju ry trial, the collatera l source rule, insurer “bad faith” jurisprudence, and the length of time in taking the case to trial, among other things, that plaintiffs maintain result in “massive legal disa dvantages” to plaintiffs in a case where economic damages to da te may approach policy limits. However, these additional factors relati ng to the “reasonableness requirement”— the requirement of “fair pl ay and substantial justice”— are not part of the initial “minimum contacts” analysis. Rather, they are part of the considerations at play only after plaintiffs have carried their burden of sh owing at least “minimum contacts,” should
defendants maintain that despite such “minimum contacts,” the presence of other considerations would render jurisdiction “unreasonable.” ( Dole, supra, 303 F.3d at p. 1114; see Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476 [“Having determined that defendants
did establish minimum contacts with Californi a, we finally must consider whether the8 assertion of specific jurisdiction is fair. [C itation.] In this conn ection, a court ‘must
consider the burden on the defe ndant, the interests of the foru m State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determin ation “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaini ng the most efficient resoluti on of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” ’ [Citations.]”]; see Schwarzer et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶¶ 3:116.5, 3:141 [if plaintiff establishes both that the out-of-state defendant purposefu lly directed its activities toward residents of the forum
and that plaintiff’s cause of action “arises out of” or “results from” the defendant’s forum-related contacts, defendant must come forward with a “com pelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would be “unreasonab le” to defeat jurisdic tion, such that the assertion of jurisdiction in the forum state in the particular case would not “comport with fair play and substantial justice”].)
Defendants’ only contacts with California at evid ence in this case are the regular telephone and e-mail communications between defendants and plaintiffs (“at least monthly”) over many years and, arguably, thatplaintiffs have a “standing invitation to
visit defendants in Canada” and were at the property at defendants’ invitation. We are not persuaded that by such casual phone and e-mail contac ts defendants “purposefully availed” themselves of forum benefits. ( Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447.) Nor are we persuaded that any of the plaintiffs’ causes of action is “related to” or “arises out of” these contacts with California. ( Ibid. )
In order to establish minimum contac ts under the “specific jurisdiction” formulation, “the nonresident defendant must have purposefully directed its activities at forum residents, or purposefully availed its elf of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law. [Citations.]” (Schwarzer et al., Cal. Prac tice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 3:117, citing Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 253-254; Kulko v. Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 94.) This requi rement “assures that a nonresident will be aware that it is subject to suit in the forum state. It can then protect against the9 costs of litigating there by purchasing insurance; or, if the costs and ri sks are too great, by severing its connections with the forum state. [Citation.]” ( Id. at ¶ 3:118, citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 2 97.) Unlike business contacts or commercial relationships where pu rposeful availment results in concrete
benefits or invocation of the protections of the forum law su ch that the nonresident will be aware that it may be subject to suit in the forum state, the type of personal
communications at evidence in the instant case would not pu t defendants on notice that they might be haled into court in California fo r injuries suffered by the visiting friends in
their Canadian home. Nor can we conclude here that the plai ntiffs’ causes of action are sufficiently
“related to” or “arise out of” defenda nts’ contacts with the forum. ( Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447.) Although the tests are related, the Supr eme Court has not yet
decided what constitutes sufficient “relatedness” for specific jurisdicti on. (Schwarzer et al., Cal Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 3:136.) However, California has rejected the “but for” test, which would substantially expand the scope of limited jurisdiction, in favor of a “substa ntial connection” test, holding “that the relatedness requirement is satisfied if ‘there is a substantial nexus or connection between
the defendant’s forum activ ities and the plaintiff’s cl aim.’ [Citation.]” ( Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068; accord, Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 680.)
In Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 670, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that a university’s contacts with Calif ornia were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. In that case, a student who ha d been recruited to play football at Liberty University in Virginia was allegedly a ssaulted by his roommate before falling and suffering brain injuries. Plaintiff contended the university had purpos ely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Califor nia. The appellate court rejected that contention, stating: “[T]he only conduct pl aintiff has established was that Liberty’s recruiting coordinator visited plaintiff in Ca lifornia to recruit him to play football for Liberty, and thereafter, Liberty mailed plai ntiff a scholarship agreement and amended10 scholarship agreement that pl aintiff executed in California. That conduct does not establish ‘purposeful availment.’” ( Id. at p. 680.) In examining the second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction—the relatedness requirement—the Roman court observed that the California Supreme Court in Snowney,

supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 1062, had rejected a “but for test” and other tests and “had adopted ‘ “a substantial connection” test a nd held that the relatedness requirement is
satisfied if “there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.” [Citation.]’ ” ( Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 679-680.) The Court of A ppeal found the controversy was “unrelated to and does not arise from Liberty’s contacts with California. Plaintiff’s claims are for personal injuries based on alleged activities that took pl ace entirely within Virginia.” ( Id . at p. 680.) That is even more true in this case, where there was no evidence defendants ever traveled to California, no contract between the parties was involved, and the relationship between the casual and personal e-mail a nd phone contacts here were even more
attenuated than that between th e University that recruited th e student to play football in Virginia and defendants here, who extended an “open invitation” to plaintiffs to visit. Any doubt on this score wo uld be put to rest by Walter v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 677. In that case, the appella te court overturned the trial court’s refusal to grant a motion to quash serv ice of summons in a breach of contract action brought by a California woman against a New Jersey reside nt. The lawsuit maintained that the New Jersey resident, in a series of telephone ca lls, had induced the plaintiff to leave her job and apartment in California to become his companion and co nfidante by promising that he would support her for the rest of her life, provide her with medical insurance, pay her a large sum of money and buy her a car. ( Id. at p. 679.) The trial court found the plaintiff had established the defendant’s “min imum contacts” with California in that the
defendant’s conduct had caused or resulted in substantial econ omic effect in California, little or none in New Jersey, that the “[d]efen dant contacted plaintiff not infrequently or even occasionally, but innume rable times over a period of months, making telephone calls from New Jersey to plaintiff in Califor nia,” and that the defendant sent money from11 New Jersey to plaintiff in California. Cons equently, the trial court found the defendant had “ ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at a resident of the forum, and hence ha[d] ‘fair warning’ that California would seek to assert jurisdiction over such a claim. [Citation.]” ( Id. at p. 680.) The Court of Appeal re versed on the gro unds that the New Jersey resident did no business in California and never traveled here, that the contract alleged was not to be performed in California, and that if breached, the contract breach occurred in New Jersey, not California. 4 Although the plaintiff invoked jurisdiction on
the basis that defendant’s act had “caused an effect” in this state, the appellate court observed that, “an act ‘having an effect’ in the forum state is not necessarily synonymous
with an act which ‘affects’ a Cali fornia resident. [Citation.]” ( Id. at pp. 680-681.) In a statement directly relevant to this case, th e appellate court concluded: “[The defendant]
had no connection with Californi a whatsoever, other than his telephone calls to plaintiff, and he certainly could not have anticipated being ‘haled into Court’ here should the agreed-to arrangement prove unsatisfactory.” ( Id . at p. 681.) “The fact that [the defendant] called [the plaintiff] in Californi a ‘innumerable times over a period of months’
is likewise insufficien t to establish our court’s juri sdiction over a nonresident. [Citations.] The fact that real party gave up her job and apartment ‘in California’ is irrelevant; it is [the defendant’s] activity, and not that of [the plain tiff], which is the key
element in the determination of jurisdiction. [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 682.) Finally, the Court of Appeal acknowledged it was “not unmindf ul of the fact that plaintiff asserts she
cannot afford to maintain a lawsuit in New Jersey while [defendant], she claims, is

4 The appellate court also distinguished other cases in which the “effects” test was found to provide sufficient basi s for jurisdiction, such as Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783—a libel action involving the publication of a story containing libelous statements concerning the California activities of a Ca lifornia resident, read by thousands of individuals in this state, where the focal point of the story and the harm suffered were in California. “Such is not the case here. . . . This is a private dispute between two individuals which neither the general popula tion of California nor the California courts have any particular interest (aside from pr oviding a forum for plaintiff, a California resident.)” ( Walter v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.)12 wealthy and can afford to defend the present action in California. We sympathize with plaintiff but cannot resolve a constitutional i ssue based upon sympathy for a litigant.” ( Id. at p. 682.) Similarly, in Inselberg v. Inselberg (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 484, telephone calls between Michigan defendants and the plaintiff’s daughter in California, that could have played some role in inducing the daughter to le ave her father and return to the defendants in Michigan, were held insuffi cient to support juri sdiction over defendants in California, even where the defendants were alleged to have furnished the cost of transportation to the daughter to help her to leave. ( Id. at pp. 489-490.) Defendants argue that minimum contacts ma y be created by the non-resident’s use of e-mail or telephone, citing Hall v. LaRonde (1997) 56 Cal. App.4th 1342 ( Hall ). There, LaRonde, a New York resident, was alle ged to have breached a contract for sale of licenses for the use of a computer software application. All business between Hall (the California plaintiff) and LaRo nde was conducted via electr onic mail and telephone. In finding sufficient minimum contacts to allow the assertion of personal jurisdiction in California, the appellate court observed: “L aRonde’s contacts with California consisted of more than simply purchasing a software module from Hall. LaRonde worked with Hall to integrate the module into LaRonde’s software pack age. Even after the initial adaptation was finished, LaRonde continued to work with Hall to m odify the module for new and existing software. In addition, the contract contemplated that LaRonde would make continuing royalty payments to Hall. Thus, LaRonde created a ‘ “continuing obligation[]” ’ between himself and a resident of California. ( Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 475-47 6.) [¶] LaRonde’s contacts with California were more than ‘ “random,” “fortuitous,” or “a ttenuated.” ’ [Citation.] . . . LaRonde purposefully derived a benefit from the interstate activities. [Citation.] It is fair to require that he account in California for the c onsequences that arise from such activities.” [Citation.]” ( Hall, supra , at p. 1347.)
Hall is clearly distinguishable as involving business acti vities in which electronic communications played a key role in the parties’13 conduct of business and in carrying ou t their respective obligations under the contract between them, such that the court co uld conclude that the defendant “purposely derived a benefit from interstate activities.” ( Hall, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) Jamshid-Negad v. Kessler (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1704, relied upon by plaintiffs, is also clearly distinguishable. There, the plaintiffs alleged that the nonresident defendants’ son, who was atte nding a campus of the University of California, attempted to break into their apartmen t, while intoxicated. ( Id. at p. 1707.) The appellate court held that “in light of the Legislature’s intent to protect California c itizens from the willful misconduct of minors by specifically regulating parental supervision, that nonresident parents who send their minor child to obtain an education at a public institution cause a
sufficient effect in California to enable its courts to exerci se specific personal jurisdiction over them.” ( Id. at pp. 1706-1707.) The court invoke d the “effects” test described as follows: “ ‘[W]e conclude it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant intentionally causi ng “effects in the state by an omission or act done elsewhere” whenever (a) the effects are of a na ture “that the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation,” or (b) the defendant has, in connection with his causing such effects in the fo rum state, invoked “the benef its and protections of its laws.” ’ ( Quattrone v. Superior Court (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 296, 306.)” ( JamshidNegad v. Kessler , at p. 1708.) Neither condition applie s to the facts of the instant case. On the evidence presented here, we must c onclude that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing facts justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants. Because plaintiffs have not sh own defendants had th e “minimum contacts” with California required to support the exer cise of personal juri sdiction, we do not
examine whether defendants neverthele ss could show that jurisdiction was
“unreasonable.” 5 Nor do we address the que stion of proper service of process under the Hague Convention.

5 We hereby deny plaintiffs’ pending requ est for judicial notice filed June 19, 2013, relating the current status of plaintiffs ’ action against defendants in Montreal and counsel’s estimate of the ea rliest possible trial date.14 DISPOSITION The order quashing service of summons is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.15 _____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Haerle, J.

_____________ ____________ Richman, J.