IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, A 

NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, A 

DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY, 

Res • ondent. 

No. 82078 

FILED 

APR 2 9 2022 

ELIZABETH A. BROWN 

CLERK Of SUPREME COURT 

By 

DEpunt cum 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order granting summary 

judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Mary Kay Holthus, Judge." 

In a previous appeal, we vacated the district court's summary 

judgment in favor of respondent. See SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Nationstar 

Mortg., LLC, No. 75890, 2019 WL 5490994 (Nev. Oct. 24, 2019) (Order 

Vacating and Remanding). We did so because we could not determine 

whether the district court had addressed the merits of appellant's motion to 

strike, which sought to exclude Dean Meyer as a witness and his 

accompanying declaration from evidence. Id. at *1. 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted in this appeal. 

- 13 to 3 8 
On remand, appellant deposed Mr. Meyer, after which both 

parties again sought summary judgment and appellant again sought to 

strike Mr. Meyer's declaration and supporting documents. The district 

court again granted summary judgment for respondent, concluding that 

respondent was servicing the loan secured by the first deed of trust on 

behalf of Freddie Mac, such that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (2012) (the Federal 

Foreclosure Bar) prevented the HOA's foreclosure sale from extinguishing 

the deed of trust. Cf. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. 

Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 134 Nev. 270, 272-74, 417 P.3d 363, 367-68 (2018) 

(holding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116 and 

prevents an HOA foreclosure sale from extinguishing a first deed of trust 

when the subject loan is owned by the Federal Housing Finance Agency or 

when the FHFA is acting as conservator of a federal entity such as Freddie 

Mac or Fannie Mae). In doing so, the district court denied appellant's 

motion to strike, reasoning that respondent's late disclosure of Mr. Meyer 

as a witness was harmless in light of appellant's ability on remand to depose 

him. NRCP 37(c)(1) (2005) (recognizing that discovery sanctions are not 

warranted if an untimely disclosure was harmless). 

Appellant again contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying its motion to strike and by instead considering Mr. 

Meyer's declaration and supporting evidence. See Foster v. Dingwall, 126 

Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2010) (reviewing a district court's decision 

regarding discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion); Daisy Tr. v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Nev. 230, 234, 445 P.3d 846, 850 (2019) (reviewing a 

district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion). In 

particular, appellant contends that even though it was able to depose Mr. 

2 
Meyer, appellant was still harmed because Mr. Meyer did not produce and 

was not prepared to discuss the original promissory note or the loan 

servicing agreement between respondent and Freddie Mac. We are not 

persuaded by this argument, as Daisy Trust expressly held that production 

of these documents is unnecessary. 135 Nev. at 234-36, 445 P.3d at 850-51. 

Nor are we persuaded by appellant's related argument that this court's 

decision in JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. SFR Investments Pool 

1, LLC, 136 Nev. 596, 475 P.3d 52 (2020), "altered the legal landscape such 

that Daisy Trust has implicitly been overturned. Accordingly, the district 

court was within its discretion to consider Mr. Meyer's declaration and 

supporting evidence to support its conclusion that Freddie Mac owned the 

loan secured by the deed of trust at the time of the HOA's foreclosure sale. 

Appellant alternatively contends that remand is necessary 

because it should be able to seek money damages based on the United States 

Supreme Court's opinion in Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).2We 

decline appellant's invitation to remand again, as appellant raised its 

Collins-based argument for the first time on appeal, and appellant has not 

explained why it was unable to previously make arguments similar to those 

asserted by the plaintiffs in Collins. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 

Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not 

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. 

Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 

2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause 

restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated 

the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still 

had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 

3 
.. 

J. 

Cadish 

(2006) (observing that it is appellant's responsibility to present cogent 

arguments). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.3 

.gc.214)11 

Parraguirre 

Sr. J. 

cc: Hon. Mary Kay Holthus, District Judge 

Hanks Law Group 

Jacqueline A. Gilbert 

Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP/Atlanta 

Fennemore Craig P.C./Reno 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

4