### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 19
, 200 4 S es sio n

KEI TH ROB ERT ALLE N, ET AL 

### . v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Tennessee Claim s Com m ission No. 99,001,933 William Baker, C om m ission er

No. M2003- 00905-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 3, 2004

The Claims Commi ssion awar ded dama g es to Plaintiffs individuallyand as a dminist rato rs of the Estate of the ir son, Robert Keith Allen. The state was held liable under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 9-8- 307(a) (1)( I ) and ( J ). We aff irm the judg ment of the Claims Commi ssion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Tennessee Claim s Com m ission Affir m e d and R e m ande d

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael E

. M o o re, Sol icitor Gene ral; Da wn J ordan, and Rebec ca L

y ford, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.

R. Curtis M abbitt, Muskeg on, Michig an and Ri ch ar d T. Matthews, Columbia, Tenne ssee, f or the appellee s, Keith Robert Allen, a nd wife, Car ol E liz abeth Allen, I ndividually and as Administrators of the Estate of Robert Ke ith Allen.

OP IN ION

Th is c a se c e nte rs aro un d a fata l tr a ff

ic a c c ide nt t hat occ ur

re d o n Campb e lls vil le Pik e in Maury County
, Tenne ssee on J une 19, 1998. Campbellsville Pike is a state-c onstructed and maintained public hig hway

trave rsing in pertinent part southern Maury Countyand n o rt h er n Giles Cou nty . O bs e rv ing that th e re wa s li ttl e se ri ou s c on tr ov ers y as to th e fa c ts o f the c a se , th e Cla ims Commi ssion found:

OnJune 19 th, 19 98 , A llen and Jef fr e y Ma y fi e ld l e ft

Al le n’ s h ome to g o to

c hu rc h inCol umb ia . L ate r they wen t to a loc a l Wa l- Ma

rt ; th e n th e y

le ft the Wal

Mart t o g o b a c k to A ll e n ’ s h o me

. M a y f ie ld w a s d r iv in g

. T h e ir r o u te took the m southbound [ on Campbellsville Pike.] I t had bee n raining , they had their ve hicle’s headlig hts on, and they enter ed an “S” curve portion of t he highway

. I n the sec ond-2-

turn o f this str e tc h o f h ig hw a y , th e re ar o f the pic ku p truc k the y we redrivi ng in s lid off the rig ht side of the paveme nt. May field lost c ontrol of the truck, a nd it headed toward a ditch on the left side of

the hig hway

. The truc k crosse d the ce nter line a nd went into the ditch. The right f ront whee l hit a culvert; the pickup truc k rolled over
, ending upside down in the northbound lane of the hi g hway with the passenge r side of the truc k fac ing south.

May field wa s able to g et out of t h e t ruck, but Allen w as trappe d inside. May field spoke to Allen while he tried to g et Allen out. At t his point, May field saw a northbound ve hicle coming , and he was able to g et out of its way befor e it hit the upside-down truc k in which Allen wa s still trappe d.

Adam Kinney

was the driver of that northbound vehicle. He wa s on his way to work whe n he came around a curve on Campbellsville Pike. Kinney testified that he sa w the he a dli g hts of

theMay fi e ld t

ru c k. B ut i t w a s p hy sic a lly imp os sib le fo r h im to see those he adlig hts because the truc k’s lights we re pointed in a diffe rent dire ction; he may have se en the he adlig hts of a sout hbound vehicle which had stopped to re nder assistance , or he may just ha ve seen the upside-down truck in his own hea dlights and be c ome c on fu se d inthee xcit e me nt. Th is C omm iss ionfi nd s th a t K inn e y didtry to sto p h is v e hic le ; un fo rtun a te ly that e ff ort pr ov e d un su c c e ssf

ul, a nd Ki nn e y ’s ve hic le

cra shed into the May field pickup truc k. Allen was killed in this collision.

Plaintiffs broug ht suit i n the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion based upon Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ) and ( J ), which p rovi de that the state may be held liable in tort (subject to monetary

limit ations provided else wher e in the statute) f or:
(I) Ne gl i gen c e i n p l an n i n g an d p ro gra m m i n g fo r, i n s p ec t i o n o f, d es i gn of , pre pa ratio n of pla ns fo r, app ro va l of pla ns fo r, a ndc on str uc tio n o f, pu bli c ro a ds
, streets, hig hway s, or bridg es and similar struc tures, and ne g lige nce in maintenance of hig hway s, and bridg es and similar struc tures, desig nated by the depa rtment of transportation as being on the state sy stem of hig hway s or the st at e s y stem of int e rs ta te hig hw ay s;
(J) Dang er o u s conditions on state maintained hig hway s. The cla imant

un de r this su bs e c tio n mu st e sta bli sh the fo re se e abil ity

of the ri sk a ndno tic e g ive n to the prope r state of

ficials at a ti me s ufficie ntly prior to the i njury for the state to have take n a pp ro pria te me a su re s;

The most critica l issue presente d on appea l in this case is “discr etionary function immunity .” Whil e the instant appe al was pe nding this court decided Phillip L ucas, et al. v. State of Tenne ssee , and M ic h a e l E

. Co ll ins, e t al. v. State of Tennessee
, No

. M 2 0 0 2 -0 2 8 1 0 -C OA -R 9 -C V- S

. W

. 3 d

_____, 2004 WL 223373 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004) perm.a pp.denied J une 21, 2004). I n Lucas
, afte r extensive

c on sid e ratio n o f T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 9 -8 -3 07 (d ), thi s Co urt c on c lud e d th a t:-3- Sub je c t to mon e tary c aps a nd lim itatio ns to ac tua l dama g e s a ndc ou rt c os ts, t h e C l a i m s C o m m i s s i o n A c tw a s a s w e e p i n g ab r o g a t i o n o f

s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. He mb re e v . S tate , 925 S.W .2d 513 (Tenn

. 1 9 96). It was the same broad w aiver of

sovere ign immunity

as wa s eff

ecte d in Savage
, 899 P.2d 1270 (Wash.1995). By way of exception to this broad abrog ation, the leg islature g ave ba ck to the state the rig ht to plead absolute immunity

. T h e leg islature spec ifically prohibited the state f

rom relying on “ g ood faith” immunity . The controlling point is that no matter how one

ma y de fi ne “ dis c re tiona

ry fu nc tio n” immun ity

it c a nn ot b e de fi ne d a s a n a bs olu te imm un ity , a ndsin c e the statut e re stric ts the state to the de fe ns e of abs olu te immun ity only , it necessa

ri l y fo l l ows that the State simply cannot r ely

on “discre tionary f u n c t i o n ” i m m u n i t y.

2004 WL 223373, *20 (Tenn.Ct.App. F eb. 4, 2004).

The supre me court having denied pe rmission t o ap p eal and direc ted the publication of the

c ou rt of app e a ls’ op ini on pu rs ua nt to Supr e me Cou rt Rul e 4( D) , the de c isi on is c on tr oll ing auth ority in this case, and the defe nse base d on “discre tionary function” imm unity is not available to the state.

Since the briefs of the parties in this case wer e filed on Aug ust 15, 2003 and September 11, 2003 respe ctively

and the Lucas opinion was not relea sed until Febr uary 4, 2004, no mention of Lucas could be made in the briefs. I n arg ument of the case at bar , on Marc h 19, 2004, the state wa s fa ce d with the Lucas opinion and, while not abandoning the issue of “ discretionary function” immunit y at least pe nding any ac t i on by the supreme court on the Luc as appea l, the state wa s
c o m p e l l e d t o r e d i r e c ti t s ar g u m e n t

. R e s o u r c e f u l c o u n s e l f

o r t h e s t a t e p i c k e d u p o n t h e “ d u t y” discussion in Lucas wher ein this Court determined that on re mand Plaintiff still had the bur den under principles set forth in Doe v . Linder Const r. Co., Inc.
, 84 5 S.W. 2d 17 3, 17 8 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ; Staples

v . C. B. L. & Assoc., Inc

. , 1 5 S. W.3 d 8 3, 89 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Mc Clu ng v . D e lta Sq ua re Ltd . P ar tne rsh ip
, 937 S.W .2d 891, 895 (Te n n

. 1 9 9 6 ) a nd McCall v. W ilder , 9 13 S.W. 2d15 0, 15 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) , to

e s t ab l i s h a

d u t y o w i n g t o t h e p l a i n t i f f b y t h e d e f

e n d a n t

. W e c o n c l u d e d t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e “ d u t y” question in Lucas b y

o b s er v i n g:
Thus, under g ener al tort law princ iples, the fea sibili ty and costs assoc iated wi th c or re c tin g a da ng e ro us c on dit ionor

takin g oth e r s te ps to a vo id i nju ry be c aus e of that c on dit ionwo uldbe factors rel eva nt t o a de te rm inatio n o f duty , n ot a ba r t o
rec overy by an inj u re d p l ai n tiff. Our Supre me Court has applied tra ditional tort theories to cla ims under the Claims Comm ission Act, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9 -8 -3 0 7(c)

. Se e Ste wart v . S tate , 3 3 S. W. 3 d 7 8 5
, 7 9 3 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ap p ly ing

c omm on la w pr inc ipl e s of as su mpt ion of a du ty wh e re on e is n ot l e g a lly imp os e d to a claim for neg lige nt control).

2004 WL 223373, *20 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004) ( footnote omitted).

The diff iculty with the pos i t i o n of the state is that the “ duty ” issue wa s never raised in the tr ia l c ou rt no r in the iss ue s a sse rt e d b y the state on app e a l in thi s Co urt. It ari se s f or the fi rs t ti me-4-

in oral ar g ument subsequent to the re lease of the Lucas opinion. The “duty ” issue is not depende nt

on the a va ila

bil ity of the de fe ns e of

“ dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n” imm un ity bu t, by g e ne ra l to rt princ ipl e s, is an integ ral pa

rt of Plaintiffs’ burde n of proof

. Staples v. C.B.L. & Assoc., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). I n analy zing this “duty ” ele ment of Plaintiffs’ burde n of proof the supreme court ha s held:

Duty

is the leg al obligation a defe ndant owes to a plaintiff to conform to a

rea sonable pe rson standar d of ca re in orde r to protec t a g ainst unrea sonable risks of harm. Se e Mc Clu ng v

. De lta Sq ua re Ltd . P ar tne rsh ip , 9 37 S.W. 2da t 89 4; Mc Cal l v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d at 153. I n as s es s i n g whether a duty is owed in a pa

rticular

c a se , c ou rt s mu st ap ply a ba la nc ing app ro a c h, ba se d upo n pri nc ipl e s of f a ir ne ss, to identify whether the risk to the pl aintiff was unrea sonable. See Turner v . Jordan , 957 S.W .2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1997) . This Court has stated t hat a “ risk is unreasona ble and g ives rise to a duty to act with due ca re if the fore seea

ble proba bilityand g ravity

of h ar mp o s ed b y

d ef en d an t ’s co n d u cto u t we i gh t h e b u rd en u p o n d ef en d an tt o en gage in a lternative conduct that would ha ve pre vented the ha rm.” McCall v. W

ilder , 913 S.W. 2da t 15 3; Ri c e v . Sab ir , 979 S.W .2d at 308. The c ourt must consider seve ral fa ct o rs i n d et er m i n i n g wh et h era r i s k i s an u n re as o n ab l e o n e, i n cl u d i n g:

the fore seea

ble pr o b ab ilityof the ha rm or injury

occur ring ; the possible mag nitude of the potent i al harm or injury ; the importance [or] social value of the a ctivity eng ag ed in by

defe ndant; the usefulness [of] the conduct to defe ndant; the feasibility of alternative, safe r conduct and the relative costs and burdens associate d with that conduct; the r elative use fulness of the safe r conduc t; and the re lative

sa fe ty of a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t.
Coln v. City of Savannah , 966 S.W. 2d 34 , 39 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; McCall v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d at 153.

Id. at 89.

Exist e nc e of a “ du ty ” is the fi rs t e le me nt o f any tort c a se wh e the r the a c tio n is br ou g ht a g a ins t private or g ov e rn me nta l e nti tie s. Th e fa c t that c e rt a in of the fa c tor s in vo lve d inthe “ du ty ” a na ly sis (the fea sability of alternative, safe r conduct and the re lative costs and bur dens assoc iated with that

c on du c t) ma y

a lso be c on sid e re d inde te rm ini ng wh e ther o r n ot an a ff e c te d g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty is eng ag ed in a “ discretionary function” is coinc idental an d n o t re l at ed to t he “duty ” ana ly sis. The “duty ” discussion in Lucas is no t re le va nt i n th e c a se a t ba r. Th is c a se ha s a lr e a dy

be e n trie d o n it s merits in the Claims Commissi on and comes befor e this Court on direc t appea l. Direc t appea ls from the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion are g overne d by the Tenne ssee Rules of A p p el l at e Proce dure. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 9- 8- 40 3( a )( 1)

. Ap pe llate re vie w i s de novo upon the record of the Commis sion with a pre sumption of corre ctness of the Commi ssioner’s F indings of f act. S a n de r

s v . S tat e , 783 S.W .2d 948, 951 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1989).-5-

Lucas was be fore the court prior to trial on the merits pursua nt to the gra nt by this Court of

a T

. R

. A

. P

. ru l e 9 i n t e r l o c u t o r y ap p e a l l i m i t e d s o l e l y t o t h e i s s u e o f d i s c r e t i o n ar y f u n c t i o n i m m u n i t y. On re mand in Lucas
, a ll iss ue s e xce pt dis c re tio na ry fu nc tio n im mun ity

re ma ine d v ia

ble . It w a s in the context of the rema nd and the anticipated trial on the merits that the “duty ” discussion occ urre d in Lucas

.
The interve ning issuanc e and a ffirma nce of Lucas while this case w as on appe al provides no b as i s fo r ex cepting the instant controver sy from the g ener al rule that issues not raised in the trial

c ou rt bu t in ste a d r a ise d f

or thefi rs t t im e on app eal wi ll n ot b e c on sid e re d b y the app e llate c ou rt

. Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit Union
, 81 0 S .W.2d14 7, 15 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) ; Lawrence v. Sta nfo rd , 6 55 S.W. 2d92 7, 92 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; City of Elizabethton v. Carter Co.
, 321 S.W .2d 822, 82 7 ( 19 58 ); Harrison v. Shrader , 569 S.W .2d 822, 827 (1978).

Th e on ly oth e r i ssu e raise d by the state on app e a l is wh e the r the Cla ims Com mis sio n p ro pe rl y fo un d th a t th e State of

Te nn e sse e had no ti ce o f an a lle g e d d a ng e ro us c on dit ion . T he Cla ims C o m m i s s i o n h el d t h e s t at e l i ab l e i n t h i s ca s e, u n d erb o t h p ro v i s i o n s o f t h e s t at u t e f i n d i n g:

This Comm ission concludes that the State’s conduct about the ma intenance of that part of Campbellsville Pi ke that is rele vant t o t h i s cl aim constituted “neg lige nce in maintenance of highw ay s,” as that phrase appea rs in Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ), an d t hat the State’s c onduct re sulted in the

e xiste nc e of

“ da ng e ro us c on dit ion s on state ma int a ine d h ig hw a y s, ” a s th a t ph ra se is used in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 9-8-307(a )(1) (J).

The notice issue is a

pplicable only as a prer equisite to liability of the state unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( a)( 1)(J). Notice is not a fac tor in de termining the liability of the state under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 9-8-307(a )(1) (I ).

On April 14, 2004, the Eastern Section of this Court decided a case strikingly

simil ar to the

case at bar

involving the notice issue and the same provisions of the Te nnessee Claims C ommissi on Act. Alice June Atkins & Clara Olli e Nee dham v. State of Tennesse e , No. E-2003- 01255-COA-R3- CV 2004 WL

787166 (Tenn.Ct.App. April 14, 2004). I n that case the Claims Com miss i on
e mph a size d th e sig nif

ic a nc e of theno tic e pr ov isi on in wh a t wa s tre a te d as by the Cou rt of Ap pe a ls as a T.R.C.P. 41.02(2) motion at the conc lusion of the plaintiff’s proof

.

At the close of

plainti ff s ’ proof on the Motion by the State of a

direc ted verdic t, the Commi ssioner held on the issue of notice that there was no e vidence of notice to the State as r equire d in T enn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a) (1)( c) and (J), and the action was dismiss ed as to these sections for failure to prove notice to the S tate of a dang erous c ondition. The case proce eded to judgme nt on plaintiffs’ claim under § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ).

Atkins , at *3.-6-

At the conc lusion of the trial the C o m m i s s i o n er took the matter under advisement a nd

a ft e rw ard s is su e d h is j ud g me nt e sta bli sh ing the lia

bil ity of the state ba se d on a fi nd ing that th e state

w a s 1 0 0 % a t f

a u l t f o r t h e a c c i d e n tu n d e r

T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 9

- 8

- 3 0 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( I)

. In aff irming the judgme nt of the Claims Comm ission thi s Court held:

Neg lige nce and proxi mate ca use ar e fac t questions, unless the evidence and

re a so na bleinf e re nc e s th e re fr om a

reso fr e e of

c on fl ic t th a t a ll r e a so na

ble min ds mus t ag ree upon the conc lusion. W ill iam s v . B ro wn , 860 S.W .2d 854, 857 (Tenn. 1993) ; Ea ton v . M

cLai n , 891 S.W .2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1994) . I n this case the Commissioner h ad the opportunityto see a nd observe eac h witness and asse ss her c redibility . He

me tic ulo us ly

re vie we d e ve ry

wi tne ss ande xhibi t in seriatum in a 42 pag e opinion. The Commissioner assessed the weig ht and cr edibility of the e x perts as w ell as the other witnesses in his capa city as the trier of fac t, and chose betwee n conflicting and competing t es t i m ony

. Se e ge ne ra lly, Kr ic k v . Ci ty of L awre nc e bu rg , 945 S.W .2d 70 9, 71 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; State v. Flake , 88 S.W .3d 540 (Tenn. 2002)

. The e vidence in thi s reco rd do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t hi s f ind ing of fa ult . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(d). Realty Shop v . R.R. W estminster Holding , 7 S.W

. 3d 581, 596 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999), citing
, Estate of H

aynes v . Braden , 835 S.W .2d 19, 20 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). I n view of our

finding s, we pr etermit the plaintiffs’ appea l of the Commissi oner’ s exclusion of the expert opinion portions of a State e mploy ee’ s deposition.

Id. at *6.

I n the instant claim Commi ssioner W.R

. Ba ker detailed his finding s of fac t and conc lusions

o f l a w i n a c ar e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d 2 9 p a g e o p i n i o n

. H e f o u n d t h e s t a t e l i ab l e u n d e r b o t h s e c t i o n s ( I) and (J) of the statute.

The proof in this case shows, wi t h o u t contradic tion, that the roadway wher e this acc ident

occur red w as extremely

slick and particularly

so when the surfa ce was wet. I nvestig ative off icer s Di a z a nd Wray te sti fi e d to the sli pp e ry c on dit ion of the ro a dw a y a t the tim e of the a c c ide nt a s d id

w i t n e s s e s M a yf

i e l d a n d K i n n e y. T h e S t a t e d o e s n o t d i s p u t e t h e s l i p p e r y c o n d i t i o n o f t h e h i g h w a y.

The slippery condition of the road being undisputed, the Claims Commissi on focuse d on the quest i o n o f wh y t h e roadw ay was so slick. The f

ocus of the inquiry

turned to disputes in expert testim ony and disputes betwe en g ener al spec ifications for r oad surf ace materia ls and contra ct docum e n ts man d a ti n g a

v ar ian c e w ith s u c h g e n e r a l s p e c if ic a ti o n s

. T h e Cl a im s Co mm is s ioner

a c c e pte d th e e xpe rt

e vid e nc e of

Pla int if fs in p re fe re nc e to the e xpe rt e vid e nc e of

fe re d by De fe nd a nt. I n so doing the Cla i m s C o m m i s s i o ner ma de a c redibility call which a s in Atkins & Needham v. Sta te must be g iven prope r def ere nce on a

ppeal. Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald
, 9 7 1 S. W. 2 d 25, 29 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998).

I t is undisput ed that 100% limestone wa s us ed as t he coa rse a g g reg ate on the portion of Campbellsville Pi ke involved in the ac cident. The state, throug h its e x pert testimony , asserted that-7-

such coa rse a g g reg ate wa s acc eptable for construction of this roa d surfa ce. T he expert testimony for Plaintiffs asserted to the c ontrary and further asserted that the Tennesse e Standar d Specifications for Road and Bridge Constructions in eff ect at the time the road was surfa ced in 1984 did not a llow for 100% limest o n e agg reg ate. The state counte red w ith the arg ument that a discre pancy exis ted betwee n the plans used for this hig hway and the spe cifications contained in the Tenne ssee Standar d Spe c if ic a tio ns fo r R oa d a ndB ri dg e Con str uc tio n and th at in su c h c a se s th e su rf a c e a g g re g a te specifie d in the plans prevailed over g ener al roa d specific ations.

Plaintiffs ex pert, Char les Hug hes, wa s a resear ch civil eng ineer holding a Master’ s Deg ree in Civi l Eng ineering f

rom the Uni versity

of Virg inia, having been e mploy ed for thirty -three y ear s
as a c ivil engine er in the r esea rch a rm of the Department of Tra nsportation of the State of V irg inia. He ha d r e tir e d in19 91 fr om t he S tate o f V ir g ini a a ndwa s a

se lf -e mpl oy e d c on su ltant i n a sp ha lt quality assura nce at the time he testified in this case. In testify ing r eg arding the Tenne ssee Standar d Specifications for Road and B ridg e Cons t ru ct i o n and also ba sed upon his own experienc e Mr. Hug hes testified:

Q. I n describing the ty pe of ag g reg ate that can be used in a CW m ix , does it allow one hundre d perc ent (100%) limestone? A. I t say s, coar se ag g reg ate. And then they define coar se ag g reg ate that contains a numbe r four

(No. 4) sie ve, which is a

bout a quarter of an inch. Anything larg er tha n a quarte r inch, they consider to be coar se ag g reg ate. And that is a g ener al standard.

. . . . THE WI TNESS: (Rea ding) Coarse ag g reg ate. Ag g reg ate reta ined on a number four (No. 4) sieve shall be crushe d stone, crushe d g rave l, crushed sla g , or combinations of these materials produc ed in sizes desig nated in subsec tion 903.22. So it d o e s n o t l im it

th e u s e o f

li me s to n e inth a t m ix. B Y M R. L OH R: Q. Now let me a sk y ou - - TH E WITN ESS: Th e se mixe s. Q. L et m e ask y ou based upon - - not upon these standa rds but upon y our pr of e ssi on a l e xpe ri e nc e a nd backg ro un d, do y ou se e a nythi ng ina pp ro pria te wi th

u s in g a h u n d r e d p e r c e n t ( 1 0 0 % ) li me s to n e f o r th e a g g r e g a te o n a

b a s e mi x? A. Not a base or a le veling course

. Q. Okay . And is the re a section in that spe cification in that exhibi t that de a ls w ithsu rf

a c e la y e rs ? A. Yes. Okay . Section 903.08 on pag e 721. Ag g reg ates for bituminous road mix surfa ce course. And t hen there i s - - well, t hat i s - - that is the one I wanted to - - Q. Well, Ig uess I was looking at Section 411. A. Okay , g o back to 411? Q. L et’s g o back to 411. A

. O k a y

. 4 1 1 is a s p h a lt c o n c r e te s u r f

a c e , p ar e n th e s is
, h o t m ix.-8- . . . . Q. What ki ndof

g ra de s d o th e y

a llo w f or su rf a c e mixe s? A. I t say s asphalt ce m en t used with ag g reg ate g rading D and F in a pr e pa ratio n o f a sp ha lt c on c re te su rf a c e mixe s. Q. Okay . So th er e y o u have not - - Doe s it allow for CW mi x es to be

u s e d a s a s u r f a c e mi x? A. No, it doe sn’t. There is nothing in here . Nothing in this section about

a CW mi x. Q. I f y ou we re to l oo k f or , s a y , a D, a D mix, wh a t ty pe of a g g re g a te is allowed ther e? A. We hav e t o go back ove r to the middle ag g reg ate, whic h is 903.11. 903.11 is ag g reg ate for asphalt concr ete surfac e courses. And t hat i s pag e 723. It has

coar se ag g reg ate. And unde r g rading D, it say s the middle ag g reg ate sha ll consist of crushe d g rave l, crushed g ranite, c rushed slag
, crushe d quartzite, crushe d calc are ous sandstone, cr

ushed g neiss, in combination with n at u ra l sand or sand ma nufac tured from g rave l, slag or ca lcar eous sandstone.

And th en t here is a gradi ng F. Q. L et me bac k up on the g rading D for a s u rfac e mix , does it allow limestone? A. I t say s the use of car bonate rocks s uch as lim estone a nd dolomite or oth e r ag g re g a te s te nd ing to p oli sh un de r t ra ff ic wi ll n ot b e pe rm itt e d inthe c oa rs e ag g reg ate and will be permitted only to the extent specified ther ein of th e fine ag g reg ate. Q. So for the coa

rse a g g reg ate, c an y ou use lim es t o n e o n a D surf ace mi x? A. No. Q. Ok a y , n ow , y ou sa id the reis a lso a n E su rf a c e mix, rig ht? A. Right. I t say s Gra ding D is to be used a s a surfa ce f or traf fic lane s, the min e ra l a g g re g a te sh a ll be - - wh e n Gr a din g E i s to be us e d a s th e su rf a c e fo r t ra ff ic lanes, the mineral ag g reg ate shall be composed of not le ss than fifty perc ent (50%)

no r m or e than fifty -f

ivepe rc e nt ( 55 %) c ru sh e d li me sto ne a ndno t mo rethan f if ty perc ent (50%) or not le ss than forty -five pe rce nt (45%) natural sand, slag sand, sand

ma nu fa c tur e d f

ro m g ra ve l or

a ny c omb inatio n o f the se mate ri a ls e xce pt h e re in specifie d. Q. Now eve n if y ou wer e to put a Gra de E mix on the surfa ce, a Gra de E s ur fa c e mix, d oe s th a t a llo w a hu nd re d p e rcent (100% ) l ime sto nefo r the c oa rs e ag g reg ate? A. No, it does not. I t limi ts it t o fifty -five pe rce nt (55%). Q

. Okay . I n th is c a s e , th e s u r f a c e c o u r s e th a t w a s o n th e r o a d w a y , the CW mix , it had what for

the coa rse a g g reg ate? A. I t had limestone as the c oarse ag g reg ate and the per cent wa s a hundre d perc ent (100%) limestone, the coa rse a g g reg ate.-9- Q. Does that, in y our opinion, comply with t h e s p ec i fications that we have - - that Tenne ssee ha s with reg ard to - - as outlined in Ex hibit 13? A. I t do e sn ’t . It do e s n ot. Q. Okay . Now setti n g a s id ethe specific ations that the State of Te nnessee has, in y our opinion, should a roadw ay such as this ever be built with a hot mix plant mix bituminous surfa ce in whic h the larg e ag g reg ate is a hundred per cent ( 100%) limestone? A. No. I

cou l d n ’t - - I

don’t think that they

oug ht to use a hundre d perc ent (100%) limestone on a mix of this type on a r oadway of this type. Q. What is t he most - - the larg est perc entag e of limestone that should - - that, in y our opinion, should be used? A. Th e y

a llo w f if ty -f iv e perce nt ( 55 %) ; my

e xpe ri e nc e sa y s th a t f

if ty perc ent (50%) is the max imum that shoul d be used. Q. Okay

. Now why should y ou not use a hundred p er ce n t (1 00%) lim e sto ne a s th e larg e a g g re g a te on a ro a dw a y lik e thi s? A. L ime sto ne is kno wn , g e ne ra lly kn ow n u nd e r th e ma ny state specific ations, as bec oming sli ppery

. I t tends to polish, which means that the surfa ce of i t will polish like a gem, a prec ious stone, and become sl ippery

. I t doesn’t have any macr o text ure to it so there is no - - nothing there to gr ab the tire

.

Gr e g oryMa

rt in D un c a n, e xpe rt

wi tne ss t e sti fying fo r the state , h e ld a Ma ste r’ s D e g re e in civil eng ineering f

rom Auburn Unive rsity

and wa s employ ed by

the Tenne ssee Department of Transportat i o n . Whil e he, a long w ith other experts for the state , maintained that 100% limestone ag g reg ate wa s proper ly

used in construc tion of thi s portion of Campbellsville Pi ke, he a cknowledg ed the we ll kno wne ff

e c t of tim e a ndtr a ff

ic on 10 0% lim e sto ne a g g re g ate us e d inro a d s ur fa c e s.
Q. The thing with limestone is that when it wea rs, the microte x ture g oes off and it justkind of - - That may be an exagg eration, but it - - it kind of just wears smooth. And those little - - those littl e pot marks we ar of f and it bec omes smooth; ri g ht? A. As a - - As a func tion of time and traf fic. Q. Wel l, y e ah. An d, the n, wh e n th a t mi c ro te xtur e - - wh e n it los e s it s mic ro te xtur e , th e n it

sta rt s b e c omi ng sli pp e ry , d oe sn ’t it? A. The mea sured c oeff icient of friction can g o d o wn as - - as the

a g g re g a te po lis he s a ndwe ars

. Q. Does Te nnessee have a trig g er va lue for c oeff

icient of friction? A. We d on ’t

ha ve a - - a tr ig g e r in va lue that w he n y ou re a c h th is l e ve l, y ou - - y ou mus t do thi s o r y ou mus t do a c e rt a in thin g or

- - or a nythi ng lik e that. Q. You do have a leve l, though, whe re if y ou g et below it t hat that letter is g e ne rate d o r s ome thi ng lik e that? A. Rig ht. We - - We take a n in fo rm a tio na l app ro a c h to it. Ou r M a te ri a ls and Te sts Divisi on does not set up projec ts for repaving or re construction or any thing like that. And we ta

ke a value of thirty -five ( 35%) to be a level whe re the reg ional-10-

eng ineer that is r es p o n s ible for that a rea of roa dway s needs to - - to become a war e that the - - that a roa d wa y i s at t his level of friction. I t is not a y ou must repave or y ou mus t mi c ro su rf

a c e or y ou mus t impr ov e it or a nythi ng lik e that, it is mor e a , th is is an a re a that y ou may

ne e d [to] watc h for a fe w y e ars to se e if it c on tin ue s to - - to g o down or - - or if this is about where it levels off.

The testimony thus e stablishes that the state wa s awa re that 100% limestone ag g reg ate ha d been use d in surfac ing this portion of Campbellsville Pike and wa s awa re that time, wear , and roa d conditions would produce c onditions such as fac ed Allen and May field on the e vening of June 19, 1998. The Commission concluded that “the state’s conduc t about the maintenance o f that part of Campbellsville Pi ke that is rele vant to this claim constituted ‘neg lige nce in mainte nance of highw ay s,’ as that phra se appe ars in Te nnessee Code Anno t ated section 9-8-307(a )(1) (I ).” When the evidenc e is co n s i d ere d with proper de fer ence to the cre dibilit y determination made by

the Com mis sio ne r the e vid e nc e do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e fi nd ing s o f the tr ia l c ou rt re la tiv e to 307(a) (1)( I ).

As was the c ase in At

k ins & Ne edh am v . S tate , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 9-8- 307(a) (1)( I ) is a prope r basis for finding liabilityof the state wi t h o u t re gard to Tennessee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 9 -8 -3 07 (a )( 1) (J) . T he pr ov isi on s r e qu ir ing “ no tic e ” are on ly app lic able to subsection (J) and not to subsection (I ). I n view of our hol ding as to the l iabilityof the state unde r subsection (I ) it is not necessary to further consider the liabilityof the state unde r subsec tion (J ) but it suffices us to say

that we do not find that the e vidence preponde rate s aga i n s t t h e finding of the Claims C ommissi on that the state ha d notice of the exis tence of “dang erous c onditions on st atemaintained hig hway s,” within the meaning of subsection (J). Aside from the state’s knowledg e of the prope nsity of 100% limestone ag g reg ate in r oad surfa ces to be come slippery with wear

and tea r, the Claims Com mission found:

The a necdota l reports of the condition of this stretch of Campbellsville Pike and of othe r incidents re sulting fr om the slick nature of the highw ay

surfa ce support the conclusion that the slickness of the highw ay was a long -standing problem rather than just an isolated instance

. Since 1992 Mr. and Mrs. Boy d had li ved on a portion of C ampbellsville Pike

near wher e the a ccide nt in question occurr ed and ha d had the opportunityto observe the condition of the hig hway ’s surfa ce. M r. Bo y d compar ed the c ondition of the hig hw a y ’s su rf

a c e a ft e r a

rain t o a c ov e ri ng of ic e

. Mr . B oy d a lso te sti fi e d n ot o nly to ha v i n g h a d r e p e a t e d d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g c o n tr o l o f h i s o w n v e h i c l e o n t his highw ay , but also to his having wi t n es s ed another driver [lose] control, go of f the road, and flip his vehicle at be tween 25 and 35 miles an hour on this hig hway . The simil arity of this inc ident to that involving Allen is obvious. Mrs. Boy d testified that it w a s d if fi c ult e ve n to stand on the ro a d’ s su rf a c e a ft e r a

rain, a ndhe r t e sti mon y

is consistent with the testimony of the ey e witnesses about the condition of the road on the day of the e ve nts in q ue sti on

. She a lso repo rt e d h a vin g skidd e d inhe r c ar o n th is road at thirtymiles an hour.-11- Os c ar S ims sim ila

rl y te sti fi e d th a t this hig hw a y be c a me so sli c k af te r a rain that an individual would have difficulty standing on it. He had complaine d to Statehig hw a y maint e na nc e pe rs on ne l abou t th e da ng e ro us ly sli c k c on dit ionof

thi s highw ay on two separ ate oc casions bef ore A llen’s death. Serg eant Dia z testified t hat, i n his y ear s of experienc e as a law-e nforc ement office r, he ha s never

seen another roa d become as slick as Campbellsville Pike. Offic er Wray

ref err ed to the slick conditio n of Campbellsville Pike as

c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e i n t h e c o m m u n i t y. Con s i s t e n tw i t h t h i s t e s t i m o n y , i n O c t o b e r 1 9 9 3 t h e M au r y

C o u n ty L eg islative body

had passe d a re solutio n stating that Campbellsvill e Pike was hazardous, and r equesting the State to take a ction to addre ss this haz ard. Kinney testified to having been w arne d on the very day in question about the tendenc y of Campbellsville Pike to become slick. Moreove r, this anecdota l e vidence supports, and in turn is supported by , the scientific e vidence noted above , and the e y e-w itness testimonyabout conditions on the day of the fatal ac cident in question. The testimony of Mr. B oy d, that the number of ac cidents on t hat porti on of C ampbellsville Pike near their home incr ease d eac h y ear afte r 1992 (whe n they

first moved i n to this hom e), supports the testimonyof Hu g he s th a t th e lim e sto ne a g g re g a te us ed to re su rf a c e thi s h ig hw a y

in 1 98 4 w ou ld g row prog ressively more polished and slick over time. The testimonyof Mrs. B oy d, that th e ra t e o f acc idents occur ring on the half- mile stretch of Campbe llsvil le Pike i m m e d i a t e l y n o r t h o f

t h e c o u n t y

l i n ed i m i n i s h e d a f

t e r t h e r e s u r f a c i n g o f t h a tr o a d w a y, supports the conc lusion drawn fr om the skid-meter te st resul ts that the limestone coating applied during 1984 was the cause of t he sl ickness, and that the new c oating ap p l i ed t o t h e f

i rs th al f m i l e o f t h i s s tre t ch o f h i g h wa y d u ri n g t h e e ar l y

1 9 9 0 's

corr ecte d the problem.

The evidenc e established that the acc ident in issue occur red north of the half- mile stretch of the ro a d th a t w a s r e su rf

a c e d inthee arl y

19 90 ' s. Th e pr oo f do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t the Cla ims Commi ssion’s determination that the state ha d “notice” of the da ng erous c ondition of this portion of Campbellsville Pike under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( a)( 1)(J). As the state doe s not take issue on appe al with the determination that Pl ain t i ff suffe red damag es in the amount of $259,800 we will not disturb the finding as t o damag es. The judgment of the Claims Com mission is i n a ll re sp e c ts a ff

ir me d a nd c os ts are a sse sse d to the State of Te nn e sse e

. Th e c a se is re ma nd e d to the Cla ims c omm iss ionfo r e nf or c e me nt o f the jud g me nt.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE