[Cite as State v. Conn, 2020-Ohio-2757.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ADAMS COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 19CA1104 

 : 

vs. : 

: DECISION AND 

JUSTIN CONN, : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy Masters, Assistant State Public 

Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. 

C. David Kelley, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kris. D. Blanton, 

Adams County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

Smith, P.J. 

{¶1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas Court 

judgment that denied Appellant, Justin Conn’s, motion to vacate a judicial-sanction 

sentence imposed after a post-release control violation. On appeal, Conn contends 

that the trial court erred by failing to vacate his void judicial sanction. Because we 

conclude the trial court satisfied all of the statutorily mandated terms to impose 

post-release control, we reject the arguments raised under Conn’s sole assignment 
Adams App. 19CA1104 2 

of error. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

FACTS 

 {¶2} A review of the record before us reveals that Conn was originally 

sentenced on July 24, 2002, to twelve years in prison for felonious assault and 

escape in Adams County Common Pleas Court Case No. 20020030. That 

sentencing entry contained the following language regarding post-release control: 

The Court has further notified the defendant that post release control is 

MANDATORY in this case up to a maximum of five (5) years. If the 

defendant violates a Post Release Control Sanction or any condition 

imposed by the Parole Board under Revised Code Section 2967.28, the 

Parole Board may impose a more restrictive sanction, a prison term not 

to exceed nine (9) months or a maximum cumulative prison term for all 

violations not to exceed one-half of the stated prison term originally 

imposed. The defendant is ordered to serve as part of this sentence any 

term of post release control imposed by the Parole Board, and any 

prison term for violation of that post release control.1

 (Emphasis 

added.) 

 

1

 On December 29, 2004, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry in Case No. 20020030 that contained identical 

language to the July 24, 2002 sentencing entry. 
Adams App. 19CA1104 3 

The record before us contains nothing to indicate Conn directly appealed his 

2002 convictions and/or sentences, however, the record does indicate that 

Conn was released from prison and placed on post-release control in 2013. 

 {¶3} In September of 2014, Conn was indicted by the Adams County Grand 

Jury in Case No. 20140187 for one count of breaking and entering, one count of 

vandalism, one count of theft, and one count of complicity.2

 Subsequently on 

October 2, 2014, a bill of information was filed in Case No. 20140190 charging 

Conn with five different counts of fifth-degree-felony breaking and entering, all of 

which involved separate victims.3

 At the time these charges were filed in 2014, 

Conn remained on post-release control from his convictions in Case No. 20020030. 

 {¶4} Although these two cases were not formally consolidated at the trial 

court level, they were handled together. Conn entered into a plea agreement with 

the State on October 3, 2014, whereby he pled guilty to the breaking and entering 

charge in Case No. 20140187 in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 

counts in that indictment. The agreement further provided that Conn would plead 

guilty to all five breaking and entering charges contained in Case No. 20140190 by 

way of a bill of information. The agreement also contained a provision for a 

recommended aggregate prison term of forty-two months “PLUS any sentence for 

 

2

We take this information and additional information contained in the facts portion of this decision from our recent 

decision issued in connection with Conn’s appeal from Case No. 20140187, identified as State v. Conn, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 19CA1094, 2020-Ohio-370. 

3

 Conn’s present appeal is from the judicial-sanction sentence imposed in Case No. 20140190. 
Adams App. 19CA1104 4 

post release control violation (consecutive 1487 days)[.]” There is no indication 

from the record before us that Conn appealed these convictions or sentences. 

 {¶5} On December 16, 2016, Conn filed a motion to vacate the judicialsanction sentence of 1,487 days that was imposed in Case No. 20140187. 

Subsequently, on June 10, 2019, Conn also filed a motion to vacate the judicialsanction sentence of 1,487 days in Case No. 20140190, which was the same 

judicial-sanction sentence imposed in Case No. 20140187 as part of the plea 

agreement Conn entered into with the State. Citing State v. Burns, 4th Dist. 

Highland No. 11CA19, 2012-Ohio-1626 in support, Conn argued that because the 

trial court did not properly impose post-release control in Case No. 20020030, his 

post-release control sanction is void and he cannot be subject to a judicial-sanction 

sentence. In both of his motions to vacate, Conn argued that the trial court should 

have notified him of mandatory post-release control for five years, not for “up to” 

five years. The trial court denied the motion to vacate filed in Case No. 20140187 

on April 22, 2019. Conn immediately appealed the trial court’s denial of that 

motion to this Court. The trial court thereafter denied the motion to vacate filed in 

Case No. 20140190 on October 28, 2019. 

 {¶6} In its decision, the trial court specifically noted that the signed change 

of plea documentation in Case No. 20020030 provided, under the post-release 

control section, as follows: 
Adams App. 19CA1104 5 

“[i]f I am sentenced to prison for a Felony I or Felony sex offense, after 

my prison release, I will have 5 years of post release control under 

conditions determined by the Parole Board. * * * If the violation is a 

new felony, I could receive a prison term of the greater of one year or 

the time remaining on post release control, in addition to any other 

prison term imposed for the offense.” 

The trial court further noted that Conn was also mandatorily informed at the time 

of his release from prison that he was under mandatory post-release control 

supervision for a period of five years. The trial court acknowledged the dispute 

over the “up to” versus “a period of” language and indicated that it hoped that this 

Court would “revisit” the analysis included in State v. Burns, supra, State v. 

Adkins, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 14CA29, 2015-Ohio-2830, (overruled by State v. 

Mozingo, 2016-Ohio-8292, 72 N.E.2d 661 (4th Dist.), and State v. Mozingo, supra. 

The trial court granted Conn’s appeal bond and the present appeal followed. 

 {¶7} The record indicates that although Conn filed a motion with this Court 

requesting that the two appeals be consolidated, the motion was denied because the 

appeal from Case No. 20140187 had already been submitted for a decision. In 

fact, as noted above, this Court already issued its decision on that matter in State v. 

Conn, supra. Thus, the present appeal proceeded through the appellate process 

separately and is now before us for decision. In his current appeal, Conn raises a 
Adams App. 19CA1104 6 

single assignment of error, and it is identical to the assignment of error raised in his 

first appeal. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO VACATE 

JUSTIN CONN’S VOID JUDICIAL SANCTION.” 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

 {¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Conn contends that the trial court erred 

by failing to vacate the void judicial-sanction sentence imposed in underlying Case 

No. 20140190. More specifically, Conn argues that his sentence is void because 

the 2002 sentencing entry (Case No. 20020030) did not properly impose postrelease control because it used the language “post release control is 

MANDATORY in this case up to a maximum of five years.” (Emphasis added). 

 {¶9} In one of its more recent decisions in a long line of cases addressing 

post-release control, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in State v. Grimes, 151 

Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, as follows: 

It is settled that ‘a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of 

postrelease control at the sentencing hearing’ and that ‘any sentence 

imposed without such notification is contrary to law.’ State v. Jordan, 

104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23. 

Concomitantly, because a court is generally said to speak only through 
Adams App. 19CA1104 7 

its journal, id. at ¶ 6, the trial court is ‘required to incorporate that notice 

into its journal entry imposing sentence,’ id. at ¶ 17. 

Grimes at ¶ 8. 

 {¶10} The sentencing entry must also contain the following information: 

(1) whether the postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) 

the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the 

effect that the Adult Parole Authority * * * will administer the 

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by 

the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the 

offender to the consequences set forth in that statute. 

Grimes at ¶ 1. 

 {¶11} “When a court fails to properly impose post-release control for a 

particular offense, the offending portion of the sentence is void, must be set aside, 

and is subject to review and correction.” State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 

15CA12, 2016-Ohio-2781, ¶ 41, citing State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-

Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 27-29; State v. Triplett, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 

10CA35, 2011-Ohio-4628, ¶ 4. This Court has previously held that the use of the 

phrase “up to” instead of “a period of” when imposing a mandatory term of postrelease control results in a failure to properly impose post-release control that 

renders the imposition void. State v. Burns, supra, ¶ 9, 11. However, in the 
Adams App. 19CA1104 8 

decision issued by this Court from Conn’s appeal from the 20140187 case, which 

is essentially factually identical to this case and raised this identical legal 

argument, we departed from our prior reasoning in Burns in favor of a “totality-ofthe-circumstances approach.” Conn at ¶ 20. 

 {¶12} In determining to depart from our prior precedent, we relied on cases 

from our sister districts, primarily the Seventh and Tenth Districts, which have 

held “that the use of the ‘up to’ language does not render the post-release control 

provision of the sentence void.” Conn at ¶ 13. In Conn, we noted that the Tenth 

District “follows an approach that appears to be a ‘totality-of-the-circumstancestest[,]’ ” in that it “concludes that a ‘trial court sufficiently fulfilled its statutory 

obligations when its oral and written notifications, taken as a whole, properly 

informed the defendant of post-release control.’ ” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting State v. 

Boone, 2012-Ohio-3653, 975 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.); State v. Mays, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-113, 2010-Ohio-4609, appeal not allowed, 127 Ohio 

St.3d 1535, 2011-Ohio-376, 940 N.E.2d 987; State v. Townsend, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 10AP-983, 2011-Ohio-5056. In Conn, we observed that the Tenth 

District considers all of the following when determining whether a defendant was 

properly informed of post-release control: “(1) judgment entries that alone may be 

insufficient to properly impose post-release control; (2) other documents, such as 

plea agreements; and (3) sentencing hearing transcripts.” Conn at ¶ 13, citing 
Adams App. 19CA1104 9 

Boone at ¶ 25. See also State v. Maser, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-129, 2016-

Ohio-211, ¶ 16 (concluding that post-release control was properly imposed despite 

the use of the phrase “up to” where the defendant signed a form during the 

sentencing hearing informing him he was subject to a mandatory five-year term of 

post-release control). 

 {¶13} Ultimately, after our review of Boone, Mays, Townsend, Maser, and 

many more cases, we stated in State v. Conn, supra, that “we now believe that the 

totality-of-the-circumstances approach is the better approach in these cases” and 

thus we held that: 

we should depart from our previous ruling in State v. Burns, 4th Dist. 

Highland No. 11CA19, 2012-Ohio-1626, and, instead, hold that a mere 

technical deficiency in the sentencing entry, such as the inclusion of the 

“up to” language, does not automatically render the post-release control 

sanction void when the record, as a whole, reveals that the trial court 

sufficiently complied with the statutory requirements to impose postrelease control. 

Conn at ¶ 20, additionally relying on State v. Sullivan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

17AP-94, 2017-Ohio-2943; State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1135, 

2011-Ohio-6231, ¶ 21; Strong v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 11AP-52, 2011-Ohio-5615, ¶ 21; State v. Zechar, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 
Adams App. 19CA1104 10 

MA 0111, 2018-Ohio-3731, ¶ 20; State v. Smith, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 

17MA0174, 2018-Ohio-4562, ¶ 10; State v. Bartee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97411, 

2012-Ohio-3944, ¶ 17. 

 {¶14} Just as in Conn’s first appeal, the record currently before us reveals 

that the trial court’s decision states that Conn signed a plea agreement in Case No. 

20020030 that stated: “[i]f I am sentenced to prison for a Felony I or Felony sex 

offense, after my prison release, I will have 5 years of post-release control under 

conditions determined by the Parole Board.” Although the judgment entry from 

Case No. 20020030 is part of the record before us, neither the sentencing transcript 

nor the change of plea documentation in Case No. 20020030 is a part of the record 

before us. Without the transcript we presume that the trial court properly notified 

Conn of his post-release control obligations. See State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, 

¶ 20, citing Natl. City Bank v. Beyer, 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 160, 729 N.E.2d 711 

(2000); State v. Gann, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-07-153, 2011-Ohio-895, 

¶ 18; State v. Hernandez, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-09-123, 2010-Ohio2056, ¶ 12. See also, State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95086, 2011-Ohio345, ¶ 9 (finding the court must presume the defendant was properly notified of 

post-release control obligations when not provided with the transcript of the 

sentencing hearing) and State v. Bunn, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17MA0125, 2019-

Ohio-2703, ¶ 19 (“The judgment entry from that case was properly made a part of 
Adams App. 19CA1104 11 

the record before us. However, the sentencing transcript in that case is not a part 

of our record and there is no claim that the advisement at the sentencing hearing 

was inadequate”). 

 {¶15} In light of our foregoing discussion, and consistent with our prior 

holding in State v. Conn, supra, we conclude that the trial court’s sentencing 

entry’s “up to” language at issue in the present appeal does not require the 

conclusion that the trial court improperly imposed the post-release control 

sanction. This is because we believe that the record, when taken as a whole, 

indicates that the trial court sufficiently complied with all requirements and placed 

Conn on notice that he was subject to a mandatory five-year post-release control 

term. Conn, supra, at ¶ 22. Thus, because we believe that the trial court satisfied 

all of the statutorily mandated terms to impose post-release control, Conn’s sole 

assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Adams App. 19CA1104 12 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON 

BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR 

THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days 

upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow 

Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during 

the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it 

will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure 

of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 

forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses 

the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of 

such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. & Hess, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court, 

 __________________________________ 

 Jason P. Smith 

Presiding Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
Adams App. 19CA1104 13 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the Clerk.