IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0398-WS-M

 )

$66,000.00, MORE OR LESS, etc., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider request for entry of

default. (Doc. 25). Default is sought against potential claimant Rodriguez-Hernandez (“the

claimant”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) for his failure to serve a verified

statement of interest pursuant to Supplemental Admiralty Rule C(6)(a). (Doc. 18). The Court

denied the plaintiff’s previous effort in this regard for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff’s failure to

address whether the claimant had received “service of the Government’s complaint” so as to start

Rule C(6)(a)’s clock; and (2) its failure to address whether Rule 55(a) applies to civil forfeiture

actions. (Doc. 20).

As set forth in a prior order, the claimant was represented by North Carolina counsel in

the administrative proceedings; the plaintiff sent counsel the complaint and warrant for arrest in

this action, which counsel received; and counsel thereafter represented the claimant’s interests in

this lawsuit. (Doc. 15). The plaintiff cites three cases in which process in civil forfeiture

proceedings was served on the claimant’s counsel rather than on the claimant directly. (Doc. 25

at 2). In none of these cases, however, did the claimant challenge the propriety of service. Thus,

none stands for the proposition that service on counsel automatically satisfies Rule C(6)(a). On

the contrary, binding precedent holds that “service of process is not effectual on an attorney

solely by reason of his capacity as attorney.” Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir.

1971). 

The plaintiff next quotes from the Court’s prior order concerning the degree of contact

counsel has had with both the administrative and judicial proceedings and asks the Court to

Case 1:05-cv-00398-WS-M Document 26 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 3
1

The reach of such a rule would be breathtaking. Any lawyer representing her client

before the EEOC, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, or any other of the

myriad administrative agencies in this country would be automatically constituted an agent for

service of process in judicial proceedings growing out of the administrative proceedings, at least

if she thereafter served as counsel in the judicial proceeding.

-2-

conclude from these facts that counsel “had full authority to act on [the claimant’s] behalf in all

matters pertaining to this judicial forfeiture action,” presumably including acceptance of service

of process. (Doc. 25 at 3-4). The plaintiff provides, and the Court is aware of, no authority for

the proposition that representation of a client before and after litigation is commenced, standing

alone, constitutes an attorney an authorized agent for the service of process.1

 On the contrary,

“[w]hen the agent is the individual’s attorney, numerous courts have held that the validity of

service of process upon the attorney depends upon actual authority on the part of the attorney to

receive process on behalf of the individual.” United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72

F.3d 1160, 1164 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1995). Thus, for example, service of process on a civil forfeiture

claimant’s criminal counsel fails without a further showing that “[the claimant’s] criminal

defense attorney was authorized to accept service for him in the civil forfeiture action.” United

States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Bigam v.

Bigam, 812 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)(wife’s attorney was not agent for service of

process of husband’s divorce complaint even though she was then representing the wife in the

wife’s earlier-filed divorce action); Beck v. Beck, 306 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. App. 1983)(“An

attorney who generally handles the legal affairs for an individual is not an agent of that person

for the service of process unless he makes an appearance in the law suit for him.”)(emphasis in

original).

Finally, the plaintiff suggests that the time periods of Rule C(6)(a) should run from the

date of entry of the Court’s prior order concluding that the plaintiff’s attempts at service of

process satisfied the dictates of due process. (Doc. 25 at 5). Rule C(6)(a), however, specifies the

potential triggers of a claimant’s responsibility to file a verified statement of interest, and

satisfaction of due process is not one of them. The plaintiff has cited no authority in support of

its argument, and the Court will not attempt to supply the deficiency.

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied,

Case 1:05-cv-00398-WS-M Document 26 Filed 05/22/06 Page 2 of 3
-3-

without prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to seek entry of default once service by publication is

completed on or about June 2, 2006. (Doc. 21). 

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of May, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00398-WS-M Document 26 Filed 05/22/06 Page 3 of 3