alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### F. T. Crutchfield, Ex’r, *v.*A. Spray et al.

Vendor and Purchaser — Sale and Conveyance by Equitable Owner.

An equitable owner of land has the right to sell and convey it, . where it is not in the possession of another.

Vendor and Purchaser — Purchase at Execution Sale — Title of Purchaser.

Where at the time of the sale and purchase .under execution, the grantees of an equitable owner of the land were in possession and the deed of the convej^ance by the equitable owner was registered, the purchaser at execution sale obtained nothing more than he would have acquired by purchase from the former equitable owner.

APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

April 1, 1874.

OpinioN by

Judge Lindsay:

Although Spray did not hold the legal title to the realty now claimed by Tatman & Co. and Dowdle, yet, as the equitable owner, he had the right to sell and convey it. The statute authorizes the owner to convey any interest in lands not in the adverse possession of another. Sec. 2, Chap. 24, Rev. Stat. So soon as the deeds to Tatman & Co. and Dowdle were acknowledged and lodged for record in the proper office, they were notice to all the world of the claims of the appellees. Sec. 9, ib.

The sheriff and the plaintiffs, in executions issued on judgments against the grantor, Spray, were as much bound to take notice of these conveyances as any one else. It results, therefore, that Crutchfield acquired no greater right under his execution purchase than he would have acquired under a purchase from Spray by private contract. Besides this, it may fairly be inferred from the petition that the vendees were in actual possession at the time of the levy and sale. This of itself was notice to Crutchfield. It does not avail appellant that the debt for which the land was sold was secured by- a vendor’s lien on said lands; the ancestor did not attempt to enforce his lien. He was content with a judgment at law, sued out his execution, and attempted through the instrumentality of that court to make his debt. The legal rights he thus secured are subordinate to those of appellees, and he can receive no assistance at the hands of the chancellor so long as the execution sale remains in force.

*640*Sweeney & Stuart, for appellant.*

*L. P. Little, for appellees.*

The court below properly held that it had no power to set aside the execution sale. The execution issued from the .Henderson Circuit Court was not void; neither it, nor any regular proceeding had under it, can be disregarded or annulled by the Daviess Circuit Court.

The facts stated in the petition do not authorize the Daviess Circuit Court to grant appellees any character of relief. The judgment of said court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition is therefore affirmed.
11594.

#### PAYNE *v.*CHAL-MAX MOTOR COMPANY.

Decided October 5, 1920.

1. An implied warranty against defects in the thing sold is excluded by a provision in the written contract of sale that the vendor does not warrant the property except as to title.

2. The defendant having appeared and made defense, it was proper to overrule the motion to dismiss the declaration in attachment.

Attachment; from city court of Albany — Judge Clayton Jones. May 11, 1920.

*Claude Payton,*for plaintiff in error,

cited: 142 *Ga.*836; 17 *Ga. App.*575; Civil Code (1910), § 4135, 4136, 4137; 12 *Ga. App.*259; 11 *Ga. App.*302; 134 *Ga.*288; 76 *Ga.*629; 100 *Ga.*588; Civil Code (1910), § 5103.

*Lippitt & Burt,*contra,

cited: 146 *Ga.*46; 142 *Ga.*836; 12 *Ga. App.*-259; Civil Code (1910), § -5121; 134 *Ga.*544, 549; 143 *Ga.*380.

Bloodworth, J.

1. Mrs. Lois Payne bought an automobile, signed a contract of purchase, and gave a series of notes. On default of the payment of a portion of the notes an attachment for the balance of the purchase-price was issued and levied, and a declaration was filed. Pleas ^tting up that the automobile was defective and not suited to the purpose intended were amended so as to show that the defendant elected “to rely on the state*678ments in her answer of implied warranty” only. The contract contained the following: “The vendor does not warrant said property except that the title to same is in the vendor and free from incumbrance.” This is a definite and complete contract between the parties, and amounts to an express refusal to make any warranty except as to the title to the property and that it was not incumbered, and this refusal to warrant is so broad that it extended to and covered any implied warranty, and no defect in the automobile for which the notes were given could be pleaded by way of defense. The court properly sustained the motion to strike the plea. *Harrell*v. *Holman,*21 *Ga. App.*159 (93 S. E. 1021), and cases cited. See, in this connection, *Mansor*v. *Zemurray,*22 *Ga. App.*441 (96 S. E. 233).

2. The defendant having appeared and made defense, the court properly overruled the motion to dismiss the declaration in attachment. “It is well settled that in a suit by attachment for purchase-money, where the defendant has voluntarily appeared and pleaded to the merits of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to proceed for a verdict and general judgment, even though the attachment be subject to dismissal.” *Flagg*v. *Hitchcock,*143 *Ga.*380 (3) (85 S. E. 125). See also Civil Code 1910), § 5121; *McDonald*v. *Rimes,*137 *Ga.*732 (1) (74 S. E. 266).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, C, J., and Luke, J. concur.*
No. 87-6603.

#### Smith *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
EX-10.17



 EXHIBIT 10.17 

December 31, 2014 
 Daniel Schulman 

c/o eBay Inc. 
 2065 Hamilton Avenue 

San Jose, California 95125 
 Dear Dan: 

This letter will serve as an amendment to the employment offer letter between you and eBay Inc. (the “Company”) dated September 29,
2014 (the “Letter”). Among other items, the Letter describes an equity clawback make-good payment (the “Equity Clawback Make-good Payment”) to cover the pre-tax income you would be required to repay your current employer
for amounts realized in the 24 months prior to your termination of employment, up to a total amount of $10,496,388. You agreed to work with the Company’s counsel to negotiate with your now former employer to avoid the imposition of the clawback
to the extent possible, and have done so. 
 In the course of negotiations, your prior employer claimed that it was entitled to a greater
amount in repayment, on the grounds that additional awards would be encompassed under the employer’s clawback agreements. The Company and you have disputed that claim, and the parties have now come to a compromise to resolve any and all claims
of your former employer. As a result, the amount of the Equity Clawback Make-good Payment will be in the amount of up to $13,800,000.00. 

Except as specifically set forth in this amendment, all other terms and conditions of the Letter will remain in full force and effect. 

Very truly yours, 
  

	
	/s/ John Donahoe
	John Donahoe
	President and Chief Executive Officer
	eBay Inc.
	
	ACCEPTED:
	
	/s/ Daniel Schulman
	Daniel Schulman
	
	December 31, 2014
AO 245D (Rev. 12/03) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations (7911)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

AMENDED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

V. (For Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release)

MARSHALL LANCE SHADDIX CASE NUMBER: 1:05-CR-00132-002

USM NUMBER: 09064-003

THE DEFENDANT: Patrick D. Finnegan, Esquire

Defendant's Attorney

admitted guilt to violation of supervision conditions: Statutory and 2 as set forth in the 

Petition dated 10/13/2015.

was found in violation of supervision condition: 

Violation Number Nature of Violation

Date violation

Occurred

Statutory

2

New Offense

Technical

08/29/2015

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 2 of this judgment. The sentence is 

imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has not violated condition(s) and is discharged as to such violation(s) 

condition.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this 

district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, 

costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

January 19, 2015

Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

January 28, 2016

Date

X

Case 1:05-cr-00132-CG-D Document 150 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 2
Judgment 2

AO 245D (Rev. 12/03) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations: Sheet 2 - Imprisonment

Defendant: MARSHALL LANE SHADDIX

Case Number: 1:05-CR-00132-002

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be 

imprisoned for a total term of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS.

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: That the 

defendant be imprisoned at an institution where mental health treatment program is available.

1

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at .m. on .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau 

of Prisons:

before 2 p.m. on .

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

Defendant delivered on to at __________________

with a certified copy of this judgment.

 UNITED STATES MARSHAL 

By _________________________________

 Deputy U.S. Marshal

 1 Recommendation to delay designation removed.

X

X

Case 1:05-cr-00132-CG-D Document 150 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRUCE LAMAR HILL, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 08-00448-KD-C

ANTHONY WEAVER, et al., :

Defendants. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issue

raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly, it

is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be and is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

DONE this 16th day of March, 2010.

s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:08-cv-00448-KD-C Document 21 Filed 03/16/10 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM MANAGEMENT'S
UNAUDITED JUNE 30, 1999 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         358,498
<SECURITIES>                                   403,609
<RECEIVABLES>                                  255,306
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  7,858,561
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,875,974
<PP&E>                                       1,039,742
<DEPRECIATION>                                  27,496
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,052,726
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,987,249
<BONDS>                                      2,933,351
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       886,204
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,245,922
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,052,726
<SALES>                                      1,491,175
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,491,175
<CGS>                                        1,110,193
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,110,193
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               488,711
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              34,744
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (142,473)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (142,473)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.002)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.002)


</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS SINCLAIR, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0214-CG-B

WARDEN JERRY FERRELL, :

Respondent. :

JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the petition for habeas corpus

relief is hereby DENIED, that JUDGMENT is entered in favor of respondent, Warden Jerry

Ferrell, and against petitioner, Thomas Sinclair, and that the petitioner is not entitled to a

certificate of appealability.

DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of April, 2010.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00214-CG-B Document 18 Filed 04/13/10 Page 1 of 1
11307.

#### Branson *v.*Townsand.

Decided September 17, 1920.

Action for slander; from city court of Hinesville-—-Judge W. C. Hodges. January 5, 1920. .

*Dorsey & Mills,*for plaintiff.

*Ben A. Way,*for defendant.

Jenkins, P. J.

Being unable to say, as a matter of law, that the trial judge abused his discretion in this, the first grant of a new trial, this court will not interfere. Civil Code (1910), § 6204; *Holland*v. *Williams,*3 *Ga. App.*636 (60 S. E. 331); *Smith*v. *Maddox-Rucker Banking Co.,*8 *Ga. App.*288 (1) (68 S. E. 1092).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ., concur.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrone LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-7786.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted April 27, 2001.

Decided May 3, 2001.

Tyrone Lee, pro se.

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Tyrone Lee appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint. Appellant’s case was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Appellant that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Appellant failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. *See Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir.1985); *see also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Appellant has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-1193-19

DELFINO ORTEGA, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

ERATH COUNTY

Per curiam. YEARY, J.,filed a dissenting opinion in whichSLAUGHTER, J.,joined.

 

O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to twenty years

in prison. In the bill of costs, the trial court assessed Appellant a $25 time payment fee. See

TEX.LOCAL GOV’TCODE § 133.103. On appeal, the Court of Appeals struck a portion of that

fee as being unconstitutional. Ortega v. State, No. 11-19-00081-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS
ORTEGA - 2

9199 (Tex. App. – Eastland Oct. 18, 2019). 

The State has filed a petition for discretionary review arguing that the time payment

fee was prematurely assessed. We recently handed down our opinion in Dulin v. State, Nos.

PD-0856-19 & PD-0857-19, 2021 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 273 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 31,

2021), in which we held that the time payment fee was assessed prematurely because the

pendency of appeal suspends the obligation to pay court costs. 

Accordingly, we grant ground one of the State’s petition for discretionary review,

vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals

for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The State’s other grounds are refused.

DATE DELIVERED: MAY 12, 2021

DO NOT PUBLISH
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Patricia G. Kriss, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Entropin, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and we have:



(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
is made known to us by others within this entity, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on such evaluation; and



(c) disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.



Date: August 15, 2004



|                                         
|-----------------------------------------
|/s/ Patricia G. Kriss                    
|Patricia G. Kriss Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             427,083
<SECURITIES>                                        14,075
<RECEIVABLES>                                      231,541
<ALLOWANCES>                                        30,000
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   694,165
<PP&E>                                          12,660,288
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,593,768
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,303,847
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,186,621
<BONDS>                                                  0
<COMMON>                                            25,039
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,184,176
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,303,847
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,881,671
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,139,585
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,257,914)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       103,524
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1,361,438)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1,361,438)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (5.44)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (5.44)
        


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4860 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4860

To amend title 49, United States Code, to allow States to regulate tow 
                           truck operations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 19, 2004

Mr. Moran of Virginia introduced the following bill; which was referred 
         to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 49, United States Code, to allow States to regulate tow 
                           truck operations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 
14501(c)(2)(C) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking 
``the price of'' and all that follows through ``transportation is'' and 
inserting ``the regulation of tow truck operations''.
                                 <all>
```