alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3(i)(A)

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                     OF THE
                                RESTATED CHARTER
                                       OF
                   ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK

                UNDER SECTION 1206 OF THE NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW
                 AND SECTION 805 OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW


The undersigned, being the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Vice
President, Secretary and General Counsel of Allstate Life Insurance Company of
New York, do hereby certify and set forth:

{1}  The name of the corporation is Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York.
     The corporation was previously named PM Life Insurance Company. The name
     under which the corporation was originally incorporated was Financial Life
     Insurance Company.

{2}  The Charter of the corporation was filed with the New York State Insurance
     Department on January 25, 1967. The Charter was restated (pursuant to
     Section 1206 of the Insurance Law and Section 807 of the Business
     Corporation Law) on May 16, 1978.

{3}  The Restated Charter of Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York is
     hereby amended, pursuant to Section 801 (b) (7) of the Business Corporation
     Law, to amend the Ninth Article to increase the total capital from Two
     Million Dollars ($2,000,000) to Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars
     ($2,500,000) by increasing the aggregate number of shares which the
     corporation shall have authority to issue from 80,000 to 100,000. The
     amendment will read as follows:

     NINTH: The amount of capital of the corporation shall be Two Million Five
     Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000) and shall consist of one hundred
     thousand (100,000) shares, par value twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per
     share."

{4}  The Certificate of Amendment of the Restated Charter was approved by the
     Board of Directors at a Special Meeting which was held October 29, 1999 and
     by written consent, dated October 29, 1999, of the sole holder of all
     outstanding shares of the Corporation entitled to vote thereon.






     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed and signed this
Certificate of Amendment and affirmed it as true under penalty of perjury this
17th day of December, 1999.



                                    -----------------------------
                                    LOUIS G. LOWER, II
                                    Chairman of the Board of Directors


------------------------------
MICHAEL J. VELOTTA
Vice President, Secretary
 and General Counsel



Sworn to before me this 17th day of December, 1999.


--------------------------
Ingrid Bohlender
Notary Public
Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted
           Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
31, 2006 (the "Report") of FMS Financial  Corporation  (the  "Company") as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission,  we, Craig W. Yates,  President and
Chief  Executive  Officer,  and  Channing L.  Smith,  Vice  President  and Chief
Financial  Officer,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350, as adopted,
pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S>                                    <C>


/s/Craig W. Yates                        /s/Channing L. Smith
-------------------------------------    ------------------------------------------
Craig W. Yates                           Channing L. Smith
President and Chief Executive Officer    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)            (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)

Date: May 12, 2006                       Date: May 12, 2006

</TABLE>
Exhibit
      32 .1




Certification
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Imagenetix, Inc. (the
      "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William P.
      Spencer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.





Dated:
                November 12, 2008
            s/WILLIAM
                P. SPENCERWilliam
                P. SpencerChief
                Executive Officer and President
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH BROWN

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 3714

[ March 21, 2019 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County ; Cynthia L. Cox

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 312010CF000427A, 312010CF000461A, and

312010CF000462A.

Christopher Rudolph Brown, Crawfordville, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER

, L EV INE and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00497-CR

EDUARDO TREVINO

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the

144th District Court of Bexar County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 99-CR-4085

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 21, 2019
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-8065

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KELVIN FLEMING,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (1:94-cr-00093-LMB; 1:06-cv-01341-LMB)

Submitted: March 22, 2007 Decided: March 30, 2007

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kelvin Fleming, Appellant Pro Se. Dennis Michael Kennedy, Assistant

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Kelvin Fleming seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is

not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Fleming has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Donnie E. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-5085.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: May 7, 2001.

Before CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, LINN, Circuit Judge.

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.

Donnie E. Price appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, which held on summary judgment that the Department of Veteran Affairs (“the Department”) had not breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing or its contractual obligations in connection with Price’s purchase of a distressed Department property and its subsequent demolition by the City of Chicago. We *affirm.*

On appeal, Mr. Price alleges that the Department breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because (1) an advertisement listing the subject property for sale indicated that there were no code violations present or demolition proceedings pending even though the Department was aware that such code violations were actually present and that such demolition proceedings were actually pending at the time the advertisement was published, (2) Mr. Price was never informed about the pending demolition proceedings by any Department personnel, and (3) Mr. Price was never given a copy of the installment contract he signed relating to the subject property.

We have fully reviewed the thorough opinion of the Court of Federal Claims. We have carefully examined the arguments presented by the parties in their briefs, and have considered in full the arguments made by the parties at oral argument.

For the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Federal Claims, we agree that the Department did not breach a duty of good faith and fair dealing because there was no express substantive obligation of the contract to inform Mr. Price that there were code violations and ongoing demolition proceedings nor did the Department breach its other contractual obligations in this case.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 239 (Friday, December 12, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 73949]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29187]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board

[Docket No. FD 35884]


Union Pacific Railroad Company--Temporary Trackage Rights 
Exemption--BNSF Railway Company

    BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), pursuant to a written trackage rights 
agreement dated November 24, 2014, has agreed to grant temporary 
overhead trackage rights to Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) between 
milepost 579.3 near Mill Creek, Okla., on BNSF's Creek Subdivision and 
milepost 631.0 near Joe Junction, Tex., on BNSF's Madill Subdivision, a 
distance of approximately 51.7 miles.
    The transaction may be consummated on or after December 28, 2014, 
the effective date of the exemption (30 days after the verified notice 
of exemption was filed). The temporary trackage rights will expire on 
November 30, 2015. The purpose of the temporary trackage rights is to 
allow UP to move loaded and empty unit ballast trains to be used for UP 
maintenance of way projects.
    As a condition to this exemption, any employees affected by the 
acquisition of the temporary trackage rights will be protected by the 
conditions imposed in Norfolk & Western Railway--Trackage Rights--
Burlington Northern, Inc., 354 I.C.C. 605 (1978), as modified in 
Mendocino Coast Railway--Lease & Operate--California Western Railroad, 
360 I.C.C. 653 (1980), and any employees affected by the discontinuance 
of those trackage rights will be protected by the conditions set out in 
Oregon Short Line Railroad--Abandonment Portion Goshen Branch Between 
Firth & Ammon, in Bingham & Bonneville Counties, Idaho, 360 I.C.C. 91 
(1979).
    This notice is filed under 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(8). If it contains 
false or misleading information, the exemption is void ab initio. 
Petitions to revoke the exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d) may be filed 
at any time. The filing of a petition to revoke will not automatically 
stay the effectiveness of the exemption. Petitions for stay must be 
filed no later than December 19, 2014 (at least seven days before the 
exemption becomes effective).
    An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to Docket No. 
FD 35884, must be filed with the Surface Transportation Board, 395 E 
Street SW., Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, a copy of each 
pleading must be served on Jeremy M. Berman, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 1400 Douglas Street, STOP 1580, Omaha, NE 68179.
    Board decisions and notices are available on our Web site at 
``WWW.STB.DOT.GOV.''

    Decided: December 9, 2014.

    By the Board, Rachel D. Campbell, Director, Office of 
Proceedings.
Brendetta S. Jones,
Clearance Clerk.
[FR Doc. 2014-29187 Filed 12-11-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P
#### G. W. Sinton *v.*H. D. Pope.

Attachment — Attachment and Sale of Decéased's Property.

If property of a deceased person, has been attached and sold under the attachment, it is too late for the personal representative of the deceased to establish his claim to the property for rent due the deceased prior to the attachment.

APPEAL, FROM LOUISVILLE, CHANCERY COURT.

December 20, 1873.

*333Opinion by

Judge Peters :

Appellant sued McCormick for debt, and sued out his attachment, which was levied on McCormick’s property. The attachment, was sustained, the attached effects sold; and after the proceeds were paid to the court’s receiver, and he by the judgment had paid it to appellant, appellee filed his petition, alleging that the goods and chattels attached and sold were, at the time the attachment was levied, on the premises belonging to his testator, Charles D. Pope, leased to defendant, McCormick; and there was then due to him, as the executor of said Pope, on account of rent, $75. Thus he was entitled to a lien on said attached property, of which he alleges appellant had notice, notwithstanding which he had withdrawn from the proceeds of the sale of the property paid into court, $85, the balance of said proceeds after payment of costs; and he on that statement asked a rule against appellant to show cause why he should not pay the money over to him. The response having been adjudged insufficient, the rule was made absolute against appellant, and he has appealed.

After the conversion of the effects into money by the order of the chancellor, he adjudged, in effect, that appellant was entitled to all that was left after payment of costs, and directed his receiver to pay the same to him, which was a payment pro tanto of appellant’s debt. Appellee, if he had a lien on. tne effects attached, might, before the sale or payment of the money was made, have filed his petition, setting.forth the facts on which his claim to a prior lien was founded, and being made a party, would have had the right to have his claim investigated, and a judgment rendered settling the rights of all parties; but after a sale of the property, and especially after a sale and payment of the money to appellant, he was too late, and the opportunity to have such investigation was lost. Sec. 257, Civil Code. There was no evidence of Pope’s demand for rent presented until after the judgment was rendered and the money paid over. It is true that the commissioner of the court, who sold the attached effects, states that he filed therewith C. D. Pope’s claim for rent, but that constitutes no evidence of such claim.

*334
      *Brozün, for appellant.*

*Boyle, for appellee.*

Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss appellee’s petition.
NO. 07-10-00306-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL A NOVEMBER 24, 2010

JAMES S. JONES, M.D., APPELLANT

v. HARDEMAN COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS; SCOTT NAIL, AMANDA DARLING AND WYLIE TABOR, APPELLEES

FROM THE 46TH DISTRICT CO URT OF HARDEMAN COUNTY; NO. 10,565; HONORABLE DAN MIKE BIRD, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before us is the motion of appellees to dismiss the appeal of appellant James S. Jones, M.D. Our consideration of the mo tion is guided by the following procedural history of this case.
This appeal is accelerated. The deadli ne for filing Jones’s brief was September 20, 2010. When the brief was no t filed we notified Jones in writing that unless his brief was filed on or before October 14, along with a motion to extend time for filing the brief,2 his appeal was subject to dismissal wi thout notice for want of prosecution. 1 Jones did not file a brief but filed a motion for additiona l time to file his brief, requesting an extension until October 18. We granted the motion and order ed the brief due October 18, but Jones did not file his brief. By lette r of October 25, we orde red Jones to file his brief and a motion for extension of time for filing the brief on or before November 4. Jones has made no response to our order.
On November 1, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal asserting Jones has not timely prosecuted his appeal and di d not comply with an order of the Court. 2 According to the certificate of conference a ttached to the motion, counsel for appellees was unable to confer with counsel for J ones about the motion by telephone but left a message which received no response. We hel d the motion for more than ten days but Jones has filed no response.
Because Jones did not timely file his br ief and did not comply with an order of the Court, we grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. [Civ]. P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b),(c).

Per Curiam

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b).

2 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b)(c).
Exhibit 32

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT


     I, Photios T. Paulson,  Chief Executive  Officer of Vasomedical,  Inc. (the
"Company"),  certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1)  the Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three months
          ended  August  31,  2004  (the  "Report")   fully  complies  with  the
          requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Dated: October 7, 2004

                                           /s/ Photios T. Paulson
                                               Photios T. Paulson
                                               Interim Chief Executive Officer




     I,  Thomas W. Fry,  Chief  Financial  Officer  of  Vasomedical,  Inc.  (the
"Company"),  certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1)  the Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three months
          ended  August  31,  2004  (the  "Report")   fully  complies  with  the
          requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Dated: October 7, 2004

                                           /s/ Thomas W. Fry
                                               Thomas W. Fry
                                               Chief Financial Officer
NIST Developing a Privacy Framework

Robert Thibadeau, Ph.D.

Privust LLC & Carnegie Mellon University

I recently completed a serious book on this subject that is titled “How to Get Your Privacy Back” 

available exclusively on Amazon Kindle, Paperback, or Audible. This book provides a scientific theory of 

human privacy to motivate all the arguments regarding how privacy must be developed to be successful 

in the current age. The book is a systematic, novel, theory of privacy but is written for any reader. 

Examples of some of the results of the theory:

1. Privacy is existential for Homo sapiens. There is a reason for this which is explained by the 

theory.

2. The theory asserts that Natural Language itself is most fundamentally a privacy mechanism 

which is innate, and unique, to Homo sapiens.

3. Every human being is a privacy expert and lives every day controlling their own privacy in 

extremely sophisticated ways. Both Science and Law barely touch the surface of what people 

already know expertly.

4. Natural Language is what gives privacy, and the control of privacy, global reach across the world. 

It scales to any scale of organization.

5. Privacy and lies are intimately connected through Natural Language. Lies are a natural means of 

protecting privacy.

6. To achieve privacy (personal and organizational) the only option is negotiated contracts, not fiat 

contracts (i.e., the “AGREE” button).

7. Both the Law and Technology are greatly simplified subsets of what natural language can 

accomplish. We must engineer Human dialog in any privacy solutions. There are ways to do this 

that have never been mentioned in the literature (either legal, or scientific). But there are 

historical human experiences that teach us how to do this and how it has worked in the past.

8. We propose, and predict, a legal system for the whole Internet be established to put Lies in 

Internet Jail (not people). The way this can work with enterprise privacy management is 

described in detail.
Exhibit 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The
Board of Directors and Shareholders of Aquila, Inc.:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference into Aquila Inc.'s previously filed registration statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-88280 and 333-67822) and on Form S-8
(Nos. 333-92294, 333-68042, 333-68040, 333-68044, 333-67820, 333-66233, 033-45525, 033-50260, 333-19671, 333-91305, 333-94955, 333-30742, and 333-77703) of our reports dated February 27,
2007, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Aquila, Inc. as of December 31, 2006 and 2005, and the related consolidated statements of income, common shareholders' equity,
comprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2006, and all related financial statement schedules, management's assessment of the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2006, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2006, which
reports appear in the December 31, 2006, annual report on Form 10-K of Aquila, Inc. Our report refers to Aquila, Inc.'s adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, and amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88,
106, and 132 (R) and adoption of FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(Revised), Share-Based Payments, replacing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.

Kansas
City, Missouri
February 27, 2007

---



QuickLinks
10750.

#### Smith *v.*Jones Brothers.

Decided March 11, 1920.

Levy and claim; from city court of Carrollton — Judge Beall. June 23, 1919.

*Smith & Smith,*for plaintiff in error.

*Boykin & Boykin,*contra.

Smith, J.

The evidence supported the verdict, and, there being no error of law committed, the court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and, Stephens, J., concur.*