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Filed 11/5/15 P. v. Johnson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JEREMY CASE JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

E061732

(Super.Ct.No. SWF1200642)

O P I N I O N

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy F. Freer, Judge. 

Affirmed with directions.

Jeremy Case Johnson, in pro. per.; and Elizabeth Garfinkle, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jeremy Case Johnson of assault with 

force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 1; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4))

1

and 

 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2

found true an allegation he had committed the offense while out on bail (§ 12022.1).

 

After a bifurcated jury trial thereafter, the jury found true allegations defendant had 

suffered one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (c)(1)) and 

one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to an 11-year 

determinate term of incarceration consisting of the following: the upper term of four 

years on the substantive offense, doubled pursuant to the strike prior; two years 

consecutive on the out-on-bail enhancement; and one year consecutive on the prior prison 

term enhancement.

After trial counsel filed the notice of appeal, this court appointed appellate counsel 

to represent defendant. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende

(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a 

statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and identifying four potentially arguable 

issues: (1) whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the assault was 

likely to cause great bodily injury; (2) whether the court should have awarded defendant 

additional custody credits for time he spent incarcerated on another case while the current 

case was pending; (3) whether defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to argue unspecified mitigating factors at sentencing; and 

(4) that the abstract of judgment should be amended to reflect the court imposed the 

upper term of four years, not eight.

Defendant was offered the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which 

he has done. In his brief, defendant contends (1) the court erroneously denied his Penal 
3

Code section 995 motion to set aside the information; (2) the court erroneously denied his 

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge to the judge; (3) he was prejudiced by 

the lack of an African-American on the jury or in the jury venire pool; (4) the court erred 

in neglecting to instruct the jury with the instruction on simple battery, instead of simple 

assault, as a lesser included offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily 

injury; (5) substantial evidence failed to support the requisite element that his assault was 

likely to cause great bodily injury; (6) insufficient evidence supported the true finding on 

the prior strike allegation; (7) the court erroneously denied defense counsel’s request for 

a Marsden2 hearing; (8) the court erred in considering the victim’s gender because it was 

not an element of the crime; (9) the court should have sentenced defendant to one-third 

the midterm on the substantive offense as defendant contends it was a subordinate count 

to the other case in which he had already been sentenced; and (10) the court erred in 

failing to award him custody credits for time he spent incarcerated in another case while 

this case was pending. We shall direct the superior court to correct the abstract of 

judgment to reflect it sentenced defendant pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, 

subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDRAL HISTORY

On March 16, 2012, the People charged defendant by felony complaint with 

assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1; § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and 

felony vandalism (count 2; § 594, subd. (b)(1)). The People additionally alleged 

 

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
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defendant had committed the offenses while released on bail (§ 12022.1) and had 

suffered a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and prior strike conviction (§§ 667, 

subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).

On July 19, 2012, the court held the preliminary hearing. A Riverside County 

sheriff’s deputy testified that on February 15, 2012, at around 11:17 p.m., he responded 

to a call regarding a fight in progress at a Walmart store in Lake Elsinore. 

The deputy spoke with the victim, who informed him that two men had been 

arguing and yelling obscenities in the electronics department of the store. She and other 

employees attempted to get the men to leave the store. Initially they refused. However, 

as they eventually began to exit the store through the exit doors, one of the men struck the 

victim with a closed fist on the left side of her head hard enough to knock her into the 

wall which caused her to fall to the ground. The strike ripped an earring out of her ear. 

The victim experienced dizziness, pain, and a visible injury to her ear. She was treated 

by paramedics at the scene, but declined transportation to the hospital.

Another deputy sheriff who responded to the call testified that a male patron 

informed him he witnessed a man punch an employee. The deputy reviewed the 

surveillance videotape and identified defendant as the individual who punched and 

knocked the employee to the ground.

A third deputy also responded to the call. The deputy spoke with the assistant 

manager, who informed him that prior to punching the victim, defendant was riding 
5

around in an electric shopping cart bumping into displays and shelves all over the store,

which damaged the cart.

In the middle of the preliminary hearing, defendant requested, and the court 

granted, a Marsden hearing. The court denied the Marsden request.3

Defense counsel argued that the evidence that defendant threw a single punch was 

insufficient to support the force likely to cause great bodily injury element of the charge. 

The court found probable cause to support the count 1 charge, but found the evidence 

insufficient to support the count 2 charge. The court discharged defendant on the count 2 

charge. 

On July 31, 2012, the People charged defendant by information with assault with 

force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 1; § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and alleged 

defendant had committed the offense while out on bail (§ 12022.1), had suffered one

prior strike conviction, and had suffered one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The 

court arraigned defendant on the information on August 2, 2012.

On September 7, 2012, the court relieved defendant’s public defender and 

appointed him private counsel. On February 13, 2013, defense counsel filed a motion to 

set aside the information contending the People adduced insufficient evidence at the 

preliminary hearing that defendant used force likely to cause great bodily injury. The 

People filed opposition.

 

3

 We ordered that the record be augmented to include a transcript of the Marsden

hearing as it was not contained in the record on appeal as originally filed. 
6

On March 14, 2013, defense counsel filed a motion to be relieved as counsel of 

record due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court granted the 

motion.

On June 12, 2013, defendant’s newly retained counsel filed a second motion to set 

aside the information, incorporating the first motion. The People filed opposition. The 

court denied the motion after a hearing on July 2, 2013.

On September 18, 2013, defendant’s retained counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel of record due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court 

granted the motion.

On May 12, 2014, the court indicated it had gone over the case with the People, 

including watching the surveillance videotapes, in order “to get a feel for the strength and 

weaknesses of the case.” This was in response to the People’s offer of a plea agreement 

for nine years’ incarceration. Defendant personally asked the court: “What exactly was 

the conduct and what you saw?” The court responded: “Do you want the Court’s 

assessment?” The defendant replied: “Yes, I do.”

The court provided the following assessment: “It was a cheap shot, cold-cocked a 

woman right in—smashed her face. It looked like you caught her with everything you 

had. And I can’t tell you how strong you are. I just know—I can kind of size people up 

when they come into the courtroom. You look like a fairly strong, muscular guy, and it 

looked like you got caught in a moment of anger and fury. You caught that woman with 

everything that you had, outright punched her . . . right to the side of her face. [¶] . . . 
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[¶] . . . I’m just saying as a fact finder what I saw, what I observed was a full-blown 

punch to the side . . . of the head where that woman went down like a bag of potatoes 

instantly.”

When asked by defendant if the court’s consideration of his size and the victim’s 

gender would prejudice the court, the court responded it would not, but the court would 

consider the videotape when rendering sentence if the jury convicted defendant. 

Defendant responded that his size and the victim’s gender were irrelevant. The court 

replied that those factors were “very relevant” to sentencing. 

Defense counsel then asserted defendant wished to challenge the judge for 

prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The court responded: “It’s 

untimely. The [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 will be untimely . . . .” “So when 

the case is assigned under [section] 170.6, Code of Civil Procedure, once the case [is] 

assigned to this department, if there was a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 

[challenge] that needs to be filed, when I assign the case to this department for trial 

purpose[s], that’s when the [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 [challenge] had to be 

made.” “It has to be made at that time, at the time of—the assignment that is made, and 

it’s assigned, the case, to—in this department, and you were present here when the 

assignment was made.”
8

Voir dire took place between May 13 and 15, 2014.4 The deputy swore in the jury 

on May 15, 2014. After the court read the jury introductory instructions, defendant 

stated: “In . . . regard to the jury, Your Honor, I don’t feel I would receive a fair trial due 

to the fact there is not one person of color” “or ethnic background” on the jury.5 The 

court responded that it was the bailiwick of defense counsel to participate in venire to 

ensure a fair jury composition.

Defendant requested additional time to find counsel who “is willing to represent 

me fairly . . . .” Defense counsel stated: “I interpret that as a request for a Marsden

motion.” The court disagreed, but asked defendant: “Are you making a motion to have 

your attorney relieved as attorney of record?” Defendant responded: “No, I’m not.”

At trial, the overnight manager at the Walmart store testified that on February 15, 

2012, she heard a commotion in the electronics department. Defendant was in an 

electronic courtesy scooter crashing into counters and displays. The People played 

several surveillance videotapes of the incident.6

The manager asked defendant to leave. Defendant became “belligerent. He was 

cussing and was using foul language and telling me he wasn’t going to leave the store.” 

 

4

 We ordered augmentation of the record to include voir dire due to defendant’s 

contention that the venire pool’s purported lack of ethnic and racial diversity was 

prejudicial. The reporter’s transcript of the voir dire does not reflect at all upon the racial 

or ethnic makeup of the venire panel.

5

 The probation officer’s report lists defendant’s race as “Black.”

6

 We requested, received, and reviewed the surveillance videotapes. 
9

Defendant eventually began heading for the front of the store. The manager called the 

police, who told her to track defendant to ensure he left the store; she did.

Defendant’s cousin attempted to get defendant to leave the store by pulling him. 

His cousin said: “‘You don’t want to go back to jail.’” Defendant fought his cousin off, 

pushing him. Defendant lunged at the support manager. A customer intervened, getting 

into “a physical fight with him, and put him to the ground in a headlock.”

Defendant “b[r]ought his hand up and smacked me in the . . . side of the face.” 

However, the manager did not suffer any injuries as it was a soft hit.

As he was leaving through the exit doors, defendant hit the sensor on the side of 

the door. His cousin and another man “grabbed him and pushed him out of the exit 

doors.” The overnight manager saw the victim hit the wall and fall to the ground. She 

informed police defendant hit one of her associates.

The victim testified she was working at the store that night when there was a 

commotion in the electronics department involving two men arguing and yelling. One of 

the men was defendant. Defendant was asked to leave. He became angry, yelled, used 

foul language, and belittled the employees. Defendant pushed, punched, and scattered 

merchandise on the shelves to the floor. 

When defendant was in the vestibule between the two sets of exit doors, he hit and 

rattled the sensors which align the doors. Defendant then “swung his arm and his fist and 

his hand and struck me across the back of the—about the head, had struck me on the ear 

and on the side of the neck.” The victim said she believed the hit was openhanded. The 
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victim hit the wall with her right shoulder and slid down the wall to the floor. The People 

played video surveillance of the hit.

The victim held her face in pain. She became dizzy and nauseous. The victim’s 

earring had been knocked out of her ear. She had ringing in her ear and burning on the 

back of her neck. The victim sustained swelling and scratches to her face. Pressure built 

up in the ear on which she had been hit and she could not hear out of that ear very well. 

She refused treatment at the scene.

The following day, the victim was still “very dizzy,” had stiffness in her neck and 

shoulder, and the side of her face was sensitive to touch. Nevertheless, she returned to 

work the day after the incident. The victim experienced a continuous headache for 

several days to a week. She saw a physician the following week when she was still 

experiencing dizziness, headaches, muffled hearing, and sensitivity to touch. She failed a 

hearing test. The victim failed a subsequent hearing test with a workers’ compensation 

doctor and was referred to a specialist. The dizziness and headaches subsided about a 

month after the incident. 

The victim was diagnosed with barotrauma, for which she was told there was no 

remedy. She was told to obtain a hearing aid, have surgery, or seek a second opinion. 

She is still seeking treatment through her personal physician. 

The victim received an audiogram in which she tested within normal limits. She 

was cleared to return to normal work duties and one medical report indicated she was in 

full recovery. 
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After the People rested, defense counsel consulted with defendant about whether 

defendant would testify. Defendant apparently decided he wanted to testify. Defense 

counsel asked the court: “Can I do a Marsden on myself so I can put something on the 

record?” The court responded: “No, you can’t do that.” 

The next day, during discussion of jury instructions, defense counsel requested 

instruction on an unspecified lesser included offense. The court stated: “There has to be 

some substan[]tive evidence or substantial evidence to warrant presenting a lesser 

included instruction. But while I don’t see [it], from what I have observed—a rational[] 

fact finder . . . can make the opposite determination . . . from the Court. I don’t see that is 

likely, but it’s within the realm of evidence . . . and . . . I’ll go ahead and give that.”

The next day, defense counsel indicated defendant was not going to testify after 

all. The court advised defendant of his right to testify or not to do so. Defendant stated 

he understood and wished not to testify. The parties stipulated defendant was out of 

custody on bail for a felony offense on February 15, 2012.

The parties indicated there was no objection to instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 875, the standard pattern jury instruction for assault with force likely to 

cause great bodily injury. With respect to CALCRIM No. 915, the lesser included 

offense of simple assault, the court noted: “I think the evidence is borderline whether or 

not there is substantial evidence to warrant giving a lesser offense. It is a necessarily 

lesser included offense. While this Court may have a different reasoning pattern, it’s not 

inconceivable that a jury could ultimately arrive [at] a different conclusion than the 
12

Court. So I’m going to give [CALCRIM No.] 915 out of an abundance of caution.” 

There was no objection. The court instructed the jury with both CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 

915. 

During their closing statement, the People played the surveillance videotapes. 

During closing argument, defense counsel argued the jury should find defendant guilty of 

the lesser included offense of simple assault. Defense counsel repeatedly conceded an 

assault had occurred: “There’s no question what we saw on the video was an assault. 

There’s no question about it.” “We have already indicated that was an assault that you 

saw . . . .” “That is an assault but that isn’t something that is likely to result in a great 

bodily injury.” “It is an assault.” Defense counsel conceded the victim had been “hit” 

and “slap[ped].”

After the jury convicted defendant on count 1 and found the out-on-bail 

enhancement true, jury trial commenced on the prior strike and prior prison term 

allegations. Upon the testimony of a forensic specialist, the People introduced and 

admitted into evidence a certified copy of a section 969b packet of defendant’s prior 

convictions. The jury found the prior conviction allegations true. 

In the probation report received on June 18, 2014, the probation officer noted that 

defendant had been arrested on February 16, 2012, and released on bail on February 17, 

2012. On February 24, 2012, defendant sustained a misdemeanor conviction for which 

he was sentenced to 180 days of custody imposed concurrently with that which he had 

received in another case. On February 24, 2012, defendant had been convicted of a 
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felony offense and several misdemeanor offenses with true findings on attached prior 

strike and prior prison term allegations. Defendant received a sentence of 44 months in 

prison. He was released on postrelease community supervision on May 21, 2013. On 

May 21, 2013, defendant was taken into custody in the current matter after his 

conviction. Defendant was released on July 11, 2013. On October 2, 2013, defendant 

was alleged to have violated his release in another matter, release was revoked, and he 

was returned to custody. On October 9, 2013, defendant admitted his violation and 

received 88 days of custody. 

The probation officer noted that “defendant believes he should be sentenced to 

one-third the middle term plus the enhancements because the District Attorney did not 

file the case until after he was already a sentenced prisoner in another matter.” The 

probation officer additionally informed the court that “following the defendant’s release 

on bail in the instant matter, the defendant was sentenced to state prison in an unrelated 

matter. On March 21, 2013, a Declaration and Order for Transportation of the defendant 

was signed by the Court and the defendant’s custody was transferred from the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [(CDCR)] to the Riverside County 

Sheriff’s Department on April 4, 2013. Based upon the paperwork received from the 

[CDCR], this date represents when the defendant was subsequently released on postrelease community supervision and began local custody credit in the instant matter.” The 

probation officer found no circumstances in mitigation, recommended imposition of the 
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upper term on count 1, and computed total custody credits of 165 days, consisting of 83 

days actual and 82 days conduct credit.

On June 19, 2014, the date originally set for sentencing, defense counsel noted that 

defendant “is of the belief that because this case . . . was filed while he was serving—

finishing up a state prison pr[ior] commitment that this case should be sentenced at . . .

[one third] the mid-term as opposed to a full-term case . . . .” Defense counsel personally 

observed: “My sense is if he is a sentenced prisoner and he is being sentenced on a new 

case, that it would run consecutive to the prison case he already has at one-third the midterm.” The court asked for briefing on the issue and asked for an additional 

memorandum from probation regarding the issue. 

The court noted that “[d]uring the trial, [defendant], my recollection was that—

you made a remark that there were . . . no minorities or African/Americans on the jury. It 

is true on the jury of 12, and then the alternate, that ultimately sat on the case, there were 

no African/Americans, at least what the Court could determine by race, or last name, or 

anything of that nature. But just so the record is clear, by surname and by their 

appearance—that’s all the Court can go on—just by the initial appearance, there [were] 

. . . three individuals that appeared to be . . . Hispanic . . . .” The court also observed 

another juror appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent. “The Court also did note there 
15

were three in the jury panel that came up. There was at least three jurors. They just 

weren’t called because of the random selection.”7 

With respect to defendant’s peremptory challenge against the judge, the court 

noted: “You asked me to take a look at the videotape . . . [s]o that the Court could have 

at least an understanding of what the case was.” The court observed that after having 

viewed it, at that point in time, three or four times, the court’s opinion of what had 

occurred had not changed. The minute order reads that the court discussed 

“[d]efendant[’]s request of the Court[’]s opinion after the Court reviewed the video and 

defendant[’]s subsequent request to file a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 

[challenge] after the Court gave the defendant his opinion of the video.” The court 

reiterated that defendant’s request to exercise a peremptory challenge was denied as 

untimely. The court additionally found a factual basis for the jury’s findings on 

defendant’s prior offenses.

In the probation memorandum filed July 25, 2014, the probation officer added a 

statement that “[a]lthough the defendant is not entitled to all the local custody time 

pursuant to In re Joyner [(1989) 48 Cal.3d 487], if the Court wishes to grant all the local 

custody time the credit for time served would [be] 179 days actual plus 178 day[s] 

pursuant to . . . Section 4019 for a total of 357 days.” The probation officer 

 

7

 The court did not specify what race or ethnicity the three potential jurors were 

on the venire panel. 
16

recommended an award of 264 days of custody credits, consisting of 132 days of actual 

and 132 days of conduct credit.

At the sentencing hearing on August 7, 2014, the court noted: “An issue arose 

during our last sentencing hearing in which the Court asked for any additional briefing, 

and it had to do with an issue at that time that the defendant actually raised it then 

through his attorney, resulting in a question as to whether or not there had to be a—or the 

defendant was eligible for full and consecutive sentencing because of the disposition that 

occurred in case [No.] SWF10000435. [¶] The probation officer sent a memorandum to 

the Court indicating no additional credits are being approved, and that the defendant was 

not eligible for any resentencing, according to the cases that are set forth here. I have not 

received any additional briefing. My research had indicated that the defendant isn’t 

eligible for full and consecutive sentencing.” 

The People observed that “the fact that the defendant’s term of imprisonment for 

his prior felony case had been completed, he is not eligible for one-third the mid-term.” 

Defendant personally contended the instant case was subordinate to his prior conviction 

and sentence.

Moving on to sentencing, the court exposited: “I would point out that the video 

was very clear to the Court that the victim . . . was not involved in actually removing the 

defendant from the Walmart. She was the manager or assistant manager standing by the 

doorway. She said nothing to provoke, nor detain him, nor—did not physically enter into 

any type of altercation with the defendant. It was, if you will, a blow to the face [to] an 
17

unsuspecting victim.” The court noted there were no circumstances in mitigation. 

Defense counsel submitted.

Defendant interrupted the court to request a Marsden hearing. The court 

responded: “Please don’t talk, or I am going to have you removed from the courtroom to 

finish the sentencing.” The court imposed sentence as noted above granting defendant 

total credits of 264 days as recommended by the probation officer.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Section 995 Motion

Defendant requests review of the court’s denial of his section 995 motion. We 

find no basis for reversal.

“[S]ection 995 allows a defendant to challenge an information based on the 

sufficiency of the record made before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. 

[Citation.] In reviewing the denial of a . . . section 995 motion to set aside an 

information, we ‘in effect disregard[] the ruling of the superior court and directly 

review[] the determination of the magistrate holding the defendant to answer.’ [Citation.]

Insofar as the . . . section 995 motion rests on issues of statutory interpretation, our 

review is de novo. [Citation.] Insofar as it rests on consideration of the evidence 

adduced, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the information [citations]

and decide whether there is probable cause to hold the defendants to answer, i.e., whether 

the evidence is such that ‘a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the 
18

defendant’s guilt’ [citations].” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1071-

1072.)

Here, a sheriff’s deputy testified the victim and another employee told him 

defendant struck the victim with a closed fist on the left side of her head hard enough to 

knock her into the wall which caused her to fall to the ground. The victim testified the 

punch ripped her earring out. She experienced dizziness, pain, and a visible injury to her 

ear. The victim was treated by paramedics at the scene. This was sufficient evidence for 

the court to find a strong suspicion defendant had assaulted the victim with force likely to 

cause great bodily injury. (People v. McCaffrey (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 611, 616-617 

[whether a blow of a fist is such force as likely to produce great bodily injury is a 

question for the fact finder].)

B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 Challenge

Defendant contends the court erroneously denied his Code of Civil Procedure 

section 170.6 challenge. We disagree. 

“‘The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an 

appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] 

§ 170.3, subd. (d).) The standard of review is abuse of discretion and ‘[a] trial court 

abuses its discretion when it erroneously denies as untimely a motion to disqualify a 

judge pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.6.’” (Hemingway v. Superior 

Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1153.)
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“If directed to the trial of a criminal cause that has been assigned to a judge for all 

purposes, the motion shall be made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge by a 

party within 10 days after notice of the all purpose assignment, or if the party has not yet 

appeared in the action, then within 10 days after the appearance.” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) It shall not be grounds for disqualification that the judge has “in 

any capacity expressed a view on a legal or factual issue presented in the proceeding 

. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.2, subd. (b).)

Defendant forfeited appellate review by failing to challenge the ruling by filing a 

petition for writ of mandate. Moreover, defendant invited any error by requesting the 

court’s assessment of the case. Furthermore, the court acted appropriately in denying the 

challenge as untimely because defendant did not issue the challenge within 10 days of 

notice of assignment or within10 days of his first appearance. Finally, the court’s 

expression of its views on the factual issue presented, at defendant’s request, is not 

grounds for disqualification. 

C. Racial Composition of Venire Pool and Jury

Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the lack of racial and ethnic diversity on 

the jury and the venire pool. 

“[A] prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement requires proof (1) 

that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the 

representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and 

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
20

underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection 

process.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 859.) “The second prong ‘requires 

a constitutionally significant difference between the number of members of the 

cognizable group appearing for jury duty and the number in the relevant community.’

[Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Initially we note defendant forfeited his challenge to the racial and ethnic 

composition of both the venire pool and the jury by failing to raise the issue below prior 

to the swearing in of the jury. No motion was made below challenging the exercise of 

any of the People’s challenges on the basis of race. Defendant did not raise the issue of 

the final racial composition of the jury until after it had been sworn. (People v. Morrison

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 709-710.) Moreover, defendant’s contention that the jury did not 

contain a single member of anyone of color or “ethinic background”8 was contradicted by 

the court’s indication the jury included three Hispanic individuals and one Middle 

Eastern individual.

Furthermore, defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing on any of the 

essential prongs to challenge the constitutionality of the venire pool. Nothing in the 

record provides us with the racial and ethnic constitution of the venire pool. The only 

information we have as to the racial composition of the jury and venire panel is that 

provided by the court. The court stated that the jury contained no African-Americans; 

 

8

 We interpret defendant’s use of the word “ethnic” to mean anyone of an 

ethnicity not representative of the majority in the community or anyone who is not White. 

All individuals, including Caucasians, are of some ethnic background. 
21

however, the court noted that it did appear to have three Hispanics and one Middle 

Eastern individual. The court appears to have indicated that there were three Black 

individuals on the venire panel. Defendant is not entitled to a jury which contains a set 

number of members who share his own racial background; rather, defendant may only 

challenge the exclusion of members of racial minorities from the jury on the basis of race 

alone. (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 913-914) Likewise, defendant has 

failed to establish that the venire pool was not representative of the racial composition of 

the community and that such underrepresentation was due to the systematic exclusion of 

any group. (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 859.) Thus, defendant’s 

challenge to the racial and ethnic composition of the jury and venire pool fails. 

D. Instructing With CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery, as a Lesser Included Offense of 

Assault With Force Likely to Cause Great Bodily Injury

Defendant contends the court should have instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 

960, the standard instruction on simple battery, as a lesser included offense of assault 

with force likely to cause great bodily injury. We disagree. 

First, the court already instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 915, the lesser

included offense of simple assault. Second, the court has no duty to instruct on its own 

motion on simple battery as a lesser included offense of assault with force likely to cause 

great bodily injury. Here, defense counsel did not request instruction with CALCRIM 

No. 960. (See People v. Yancy (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 371, 376 [where circumstances 

warrant, the court is required to instruct on simple assault as a lesser included offense of 
22

assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury].) Third, instruction with 

CALCRIM No. 960 as a lesser included officense of assault with force likely to cause 

great bodily injury is required only where requested and when the evidence is such that it 

is unclear whether the defendant beat or merely touched the victim. (Id. at p. 374.) Here, 

both the testimony and the surveillance videotape made it clear defendant did not merely 

touch the victim, but threw a punch which caused the victim to be knocked into a wall 

and fall to the ground causing the victim lasting pain, among other symptoms. There was 

no evidence which would support instructing with CALCRIM No. 960. Finally, during 

his closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly conceded defendant had committed an 

assault, not a battery.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence the Hit Was Likely to Cause Great Bodily Injury 

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the element of 

count 1 requiring that the assault be likely to cause great bodily injury. We disagree. 

“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine 

the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to 

the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is 

reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. 

[Citation.]’” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105-106.) “Whether assaultive 

force reaches a level of that likely to produce great bodily injury is a question of fact for 
23

the jury. [Citations.]” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 861, fn. 3, 

disapproved on another ground in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1010-1011; 

People v. McCaffrey, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at pp. 616-617 [whether a blow of a fist is 

such force as likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for the fact finder].)

Here, the People adduced sufficient evidence that defendant’s blow to the victim 

was likely to cause great bodily injury. As noted above, both the testimony and the 

surveillance videotape reflect defendant threw a punch which caused the victim to be 

knocked into a wall and fall to the ground causing the victim lasting pain, among other 

symptoms. Although the victim later characterized the strike as openhanded, she initially 

testified defendant struck her with his “fist.” The victim’s initial testimony is supported 

by the surveillance videotape. 

Moreover, even though the People were not required to prove the victim sustained 

any injury (People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 928 [“[A] single conviction of assault

by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury . . . does not require, as an 

element, the actual infliction of great bodily injury”]), they adduced evidence the victim 

incurred substantial, long-lasting injuries. The victim testified she incurred pain, 

dizziness, and nausea which lasted several days to a week. She experienced loss of 

hearing in her left ear which lasted months. This was sufficient evidence from which the 

jury could reasonably conclude defendant’s assault upon the victim was likely to cause 

great bodily injury.
24

F. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the True Finding on the Prior Strike Conviction

Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the true finding that he had 

previously pled to an offense which qualified as a prior strike conviction. We disagree. 

An abstract of judgment included in the certified section 969b packet admitted into 

evidence at defendant’s jury trial established defendant pled guilty to a charge of felony 

criminal threats (§ 422) on April 26, 2006, for which he was sentenced to three years’ 

incarceration. A forensic specialist testified the section 969b packet contained an abstract 

of judgment which reflected defendant had been convicted on April 26, 2006, for felony 

criminal threats. A conviction for criminal threats qualifies as a prior strike conviction. 

(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(38) [conviction for criminal threats in violation of § 422 qualifies as 

a prior serious felony].) Thus, the People adduced sufficient evidence defendant had a 

prior conviction which qualified as a strike. 

G. Marsden

Defendant contends the court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for a 

Marsden hearing. We disagree. 

The trial court is required to conduct a Marsden hearing whenever defendant

indicates through defense counsel a desire for substitute counsel. (People v. Sanchez

(2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89-90.) However, there is no requirement that the court grant such 

a hearing when defense counsel requests the hearing based solely on a desire to “put 

something on the record.” Here, neither defendant nor defense counsel indicated any 
25

desire of defendant for substitute counsel. Thus, the court was not required to provide a 

Marsden hearing. 

H. Consideration of the Victim’s Gender

Defendant complains he was prejudiced by the court’s purported improper 

consideration of the victim’s gender. We disagree. A victim’s particular vulnerability is 

an appropriate factor to consider in aggravation when the court sentences a defendant. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).) The court may also consider whether the offense 

involved a threat of great bodily harm or other act disclosing viciousness or callousness. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).)

Here, defendant requested the court’s assessment of his case after the court had 

watched the surveillance videotape of the incident. The court noted defendant had 

punched an unsuspecting woman in the face. Defendant asked if this would prejudice the 

court. The court correctly stated it would neither consider the victim’s gender nor 

defendant’s size in making any ruling during trial, but that it could consider those factors 

in sentencing.

In imposing the upper term, the court noted defendant punched the victim, who 

was not involved in removing defendant from the store, while she was doing nothing 

more than standing by as defendant exited the store. It is not at all clear whether the 

victim’s gender entered into the court’s sentencing calculus. Nevertheless, the court 

could correctly determine the victim was particularly vulnerable, at least in part based on 

her gender and size, and that defendant’s act threatened great bodily injury and was 
26

conducted with a degree of callousness and viciousness. Thus, the court acted within its 

discretion in considering the circumstances involved in defendant’s attack on this 

particular victim when imposing the upper term. 

I. Sentencing to One-third the Midterm

Defendant contends the instant case was subordinate to another previous, 

unspecified conviction upon which he had already been sentenced. Thus, he maintains 

the court should have sentenced him in the instant matter to one-third the midterm rather 

than a full, consecutive, upper term. 

Courts may not impose consecutive upper term sentences on current convictions 

which are subordinate to others. (§§ 669, 1170, 1170.1.) However, where the court is 

sentencing a defendant in a case in which sentence on his prior offenses has already been 

imposed and served, the respective cases are not concurrent with one another, the latter 

case is not subordinate to the prior offenses, and sentence on the latter case is not 

imposed consecutively, but separately from those the defendant received in the prior 

cases. (See People v. Riggs (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131.)

Here, although defendant was arrested and charged in the prior cases after being 

charged in the instant case, defendant had already completed the sentence imposed in the 

prior cases. Thus, because defendant’s sentences in the prior cases were completed, the 

instant case was not subordinate to those cases, and the court could impose the full 

sentence separately, rather than consecutively. 
27

J. Custody Credits

Defendant contends he was entitled to custody credits for all the time he spent in 

custody during the pendency of the instant matter, including for time spent in custody on 

other matters. We disagree. 

“[A] period of time previously credited against a sentence for unrelated offenses 

cannot be deemed ‘attributable to proceedings’ resulting in a later-imposed sentence 

unless it is demonstrated that the claimant would have been at liberty during the period 

were it not for a restraint relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence. In 

other words, duplicative credits against separately imposed concurrent sentences for 

unrelated offenses will be granted only on a showing of strict causation.” (In re Joyner

(1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 489.)

In the instant matter, defendant has failed to demonstrate whether the time he 

spent in custody on other matters was attributable to the proceedings in this case. 

Likewise, he has failed to demonstrate he would not have remained in custody in his 

other matters were it not for a restraint related to the instant case. Nothing in this record 

reflects defendant’s other convictions bore any relation to the instant proceedings. 

Moreover, the record fails to reveal whether defendant received custody credits when 

sentenced in his other matters. If so, then defendant would be barred from receiving 

duplicative credits. Even if not, defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to 

those credits. Defendant has failed to demonstrate any relation between his custody in 
28

the other cases and the instant proceedings and, therefore, is not entitled to custody 

credits acquired in those cases. 

Under People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent 

review of the record and find no arguable issues.9 

III. DISPOSITION

The superior court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect it 

sentenced defendant pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12. 

The trial court shall forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

KING

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

 

9

 We agree with counsel’s contention that the abstract of judgment must be 

corrected, but we disagree with the specified manner of correction. Had the clerk simply 

checked the box indicating the sentence had been imposed pursuant to sections 667, 

subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12, the indication on the document that defendant had been 

sentenced to the upper term of eight years would have been correct because it would have 

included the doubling of the upper term of four years pursuant to the aforementioned 

statutes. However, the clerk did not check that box. Thus, it appears the court simply 

imposed an illegal upper term of eight years without resort to the prior strike finding. We 

shall direct the court to correct the abstract of judgment by checking the box indicating 

the sentence was imposed pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12.
29

Acting P.J.

MILLER

J.