NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LONGINO ALBERTO LAZO-FLORES, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-70515 

Agency No. A099-534-850 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 8, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Longino Alberto Flores Lazo,

1

also known as Longino Alberto 

Lazo-Flores, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 Petitioner has explained that his correct family name is Flores Lazo, and we refer 

to him by this name in this memorandum disposition. 

FILED

APR 12 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

denial of asylum, withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) 

relief. We review questions of law de novo, Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 

F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2007), and we review for substantial evidence all factual 

findings, Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition. 

1. In the immigration context, “motions for recusal are governed by . . . the 

constitutional due process requirement that the hearing be before a fair and impartial 

arbiter.” Vargas-Hernandez, 497 F.3d at 925 (quoting Matter of Exame, 18 I. & N. 

Dec. 303, 306 (BIA 1982)). Flores Lazo has not shown that he was denied a fair and 

impartial hearing when the immigration judge (“IJ”) consulted the record to 

determine whether it was complete. See Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is an IJ’s duty to develop the record fully and fairly.”); see also

Acewicz v. I.N.S., 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the IJ’s 

questioning regarding an element of petitioners’ claim was not evidence of bias). 

Additionally, Flores Lazo has neither demonstrated that “an incorrect or incomplete 

translation prevented him from presenting relevant evidence,” nor “that a better 

translation would have made a difference in the outcome.” Acewicz, 984 F.2d at

1063. We therefore deny the petition as to Flores Lazo’s due process claims. See 

id.

2. In determining whether an applicant for asylum has testified credibly, an IJ

considers “the totality of the circumstances,” including “the inherent plausibility of 
3 

the applicant’s” account “and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C). Substantial evidence supports the 

BIA’s determination that Flores Lazo’s testimony was not credible. Flores Lazo

failed to mention in his declaration that he was beaten by his persecutors, even 

though the beating represented Flores Lazo’s only allegation of physical harm. See 

Alvarez-Santos v. I.N.S., 332 F.3d 1245, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 

substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination where 

petitioner excluded from his declaration the “pivotal” event of his stabbing). 

Further, Flores Lazo was unable to explain plausibly why his testimony about a 

shooting he witnessed diverged significantly from a police report describing the 

same incident, which Flores Lazo submitted as evidence. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that substantial evidence supported the 

adverse credibility determination where petitioner failed to explain plausibly why a 

police report differed from his account of a break-in), abrogated on other grounds 

by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Because the 

record does not compel a conclusion that Flores Lazo testified credibly, we deny the 

petition as to his asylum and withholding claims. See Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review where substantial evidence 

supported BIA’s adverse credibility findings and petitioners therefore failed to carry 

their burden of showing entitlement for relief). 
4 

3. “An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to 

CAT protection.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010)). Where a petitioner has 

been found not credible, his “CAT claim rests on country conditions reports and 

other corroborating evidence in the record including the letters from his family and 

acquaintances.” Id. Here, the BIA’s determination that Flores Lazo did not establish 

eligibility for CAT protection is supported by substantial evidence. Flores Lazo and 

his relatives were never tortured, and Flores Lazo’s country conditions evidence 

does not evince a particularized risk of torture. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 

1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (concluding that human rights reports 

did “not indicate that [petitioner] would face any particular threat of torture beyond 

that which all citizens of” his home country face). Accordingly, we conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief, and we also deny 

the petition as to this claim. See id. at 1053.

PETITION DENIED.