F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

I S L A M I C S H U R

A C O U N C I L O F S O U T H E R

N C A L I F O R

N I A ; C O U

N C I L O N A M E R

I C A N I S L A M I C R E L

A T I O N S

- C A L I F O R

N I A ; I S L A M I C C E N T E R O F S A N G A B R I E L V A L L E Y ; I S L

A M I C C E N T E R O F H A W

T H O R N E ; W E S T C O A S T I S L

A M I C C E

N T E R ; H U M

A N A S S I S T A

N C E A N D D E V E L O P M E

N T I N T E R N A T I O N A L , I N C

. ; M U Z A M M I L S I D D I Q I ; S H

A K E E L S Y E D ; H U S S A M A Y L O U S H ; M O H A M M E D A B D U L A L E E M ; R

A F E H U S A I

N , Plaintiffs-Appellees
,

v

.

F E D E R A L B U R E A U O F I N V E S T I G A T I O N ; U

N I T E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F J U S T I C E , Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 12-55305

D.C. No. 8:07-cv-01088- CJ C-AN

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Cormac J . Carney , District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 26, 2013—Seattle, W ashing tonI S L A M I C S H

U R A C O U N C I L O F S O

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F iled J uly 31, 2013

B efore: Mary M. Schroeder, Richard C. Tallman, and Milan D. Smith, J r., Circuit J udg es.
Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY *

Sanctions/F ed. R. Civ. P . 11(c)

The panel reversed the district court’s order g ranting the I slamic Shura Council of Southern California’s mo t i o n for

s a n c t i ons under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), a n d vacated the district court’s order awarding fees.

The p anel noted that before Shura Council filed its motion for sanctions, the F B I had already “corrected” the challeng ed pleading s a

nd provided all the additional documents i t w a s oblig ated to provide under the F reedom of I nformation A ct (F OI A) to the district court in a n in camera proceeding

. S h u ra Council moved for sanctions long after the district
court h ad ruled on the a dequacy of the g overnment’s eventual compliance with F OI A, and a fortiori a f ter it had ruled the F B I ’s orig inal response had been inadequate and misleading

. The panel held that the motions for sanctions should not have been g ranted because it was made a f ter the “judicial rejection of the o ffending contention.” Advisory Committee’s N otes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.I S L A M I C S H

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COUNSEL

S t u art F

. Delery
, Acting Assistant Attorney General, An d r e B irotte, J r., U nited S t a t e s Attorney
, B eth S. B r inkmann (arg ued), D eputy Assistant A t t o rney General, Michael S. Raab and Daniel Tenny
, D epartment of J ustice, Washing ton, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.

Ahilan T. Arulanantham (arg ued), ACL U F oundati o n o f Southern California, L os Ang eles, California, for Plaint i ffsAppellees.

Clare Pastore, USC G ould School of L aw, L os Ang eles, California, for Amici Curiae Professors of L eg al Ethics.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

The F ederal B ureau of I n vestig ation (“F B I ”) appeals the district court’s order g ranting the I sl a mic Shura Council o f Southern California’s (“Shura Coun c i l ”) motion for sanctions under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). See I s l a m i c Shura Council of S

. Cal. v. FBI

, 278 F .R

. D

. 5 3 8
, 548 (C.D. Cal. 2 011). The F B I arg ues that the sanctions order must be reversed b ecause the F B I c o u l d not avail itself of the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2). W e ag ree, a nd consequently reverse the district court’s award o f sanctions. 1

1 T h e f actu al an d p ro ced u ral h isto ry of th is case is d escrib ed in t h e d istrict co u rt’ s o rd er g ran tin g Sh u ra Co u n cil’ s m o tio n f

o r san ctio n s. S

ee Isla mic S h u ra Co u n cil
, 2 7 8 F.R.D. at 5 3 9 –4 2 ; see a lso Isla m i c S hu raI S L A M I C S H

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“An app e llate court should apply a n abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its rul i ng o n a n e r roneous view of the l a w or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evid e n c e

. ” Id.

A party may move for Rule 1 1 sanctions if its a d v e r s a r y makes a frivolous filing or otherwise makes a contention for

an improper purpose. G.C. & K.B. Investments, I n c. v

. W ilson
, 326 F .3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003). Such a motion
may not be filed, h o w ever, unless there is strict compliance with Rule 1 1 ’ s safe harbor provision. See Holgate v

. Baldwin
, 425 F .3d 671, 6 78 ( 9th Cir. 2 005) (holding that we “enforce [ Rule 11’s] safe harbor provision strictly ”); see also Ridder v. City of S

pringfield
, 109 F .3d 2 8 8
, 296 (6th Cir. 1997) ( noting that “Rule 11 cases emerg ing in the wake o f the 1993 a mendments [ to Rule 11] have found [ compliance with] the ‘safe h arbor’ provision to be an a b solute requirement.”). That provision provides that a ny motion f

or sanctions must be served on the offending party a t least 21 d a y s b efore the motion is filed with the court. F ed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The safe harbor provision further dictates that the motion may not be f iled if the offending party tim e l y “ w ithdraw[ s] o r

a p p r opriately correct[ s] ” the c h a lleng ed contention during the safe ha rbor period. Id. The purpose of the safe harbor provision is to g ive the offen d i n g p arty an opportunity to correct or withdraw its probl e m a t i c pleading
, a nd “ thereby
escape sanctions .” Barber v. M iller
, 146 F .3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in orig inal).

Co u ncil o f S

. Ca l

. v

. F

B I (“ Isla mic Sh u r

a Co u ncil II

”), 6 3 5 F.3 d 1 1 6 0
, 1 1 6 2

– 6 3 (9 th

Cir. 2 0 1 1 ).I S L A M I C S H

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R u l e 11 is intended to deter baseless filing s in distric t court and imposes a d

uty of “reasonable inqu i r y ” so that
any thing filed with the court is “ w ell g rounded in fact, leg ally
t e nable, and not interposed for any improper purpo s e

. ” C o o t e r & Gell
, 496 U.S. at 393 (internal quotation ma r k s omitted). Therefore, fee sanctions compensate a party f or the

c o s t s o f enforcing the rule when the party taking th e challeng ed position has refused to withdraw or cor r e ct it. F ed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Motions f or Rule 11 attorney ’s fees
cannot be g r anted after the d istrict court has d e c ided the merits of the underly i n g d ispute g iving rise to the questionable filin g. This is because once the c ourt has decided the underly ing dispute, the motion fo r f e e s cannot

serve Rule 11’s purpose of judicial e conomy

. See A dvisory Committee’s Notes to t h e 1 9 93 Amendments to Rule 11 (noting that a party may not move for Rule 11 sanctions a fter “judicial rejection of the offending contention”).

Shura Council arg ues that its motion complied with the safe h arbor provision of Rule 1 1. Shura Council notes that it served its motion for sanctions on th e F B I 25 day s before it filed the motion with the district c ourt. Shura Council f urther notes that the F B I did not withdraw or correct its challeng ed
p l eading s d

u ring this 25-day period. What Shura Counc i l fails to o bserve, however, is that the F B I had already “corrected” the challeng ed pleading s and prov i d e d all the information it was oblig ated to provide to the district cou rt before Shura Council filed its motion for sanctions. The F B I informed the c o u r t of the e x istence of additional documents previously in an in camera proceeding

. Islamic Shura Council , 278 F .R.D. at 541. The district court ruled that the F B I should h ave told the court about these documents at the
p l e a d ing stag e of the litig ation, when the F B I r esponded to Shura Council’ s 2007 F OI A complaint with redactedI S L A M I C S H

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d o c u m ents the F B I claimed were “outside the scope” o f Shura Council’s request. Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v

. F BI
, 779 F

. Supp. 2d 1114, 1 125 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see a l s o Islamic Shura Council II

, 635 F

. 3d at 1166.

No party now disputes, however, that the F BI p r o vided the district court with a complete and accurate account of the facts of this c ase during the in camera sessions. T he district
court concluded t h a t, in lig ht of the F B I ’ s in camera submission s , Shura Council was “not entitled to any f urther information rega r d ing the Government’s previous searches for doc u m e n t s , and that the Government need not conduct

a ny additional searches f

o r responsive d ocuments.” I slamic Shura Council
, 278 F .R.D

. at 542. Shura Council h as not appealed that determination.

Shura Council moved for sanctions long after the district
court h ad ruled on the adequacy of the g overnment’s eventual compliance with F OI A, and a fortiori after i t had ruled the F B I ’s o rig inal response had been inadequate and misleading

. S e e Islamic S

hura Council II

, 635 F .3d at 1163. W e recog niz e that because of th e i n ca mera nature o f the proceeding s, Shura Counc i l c ould not have moved for sanctions before the inadequacy of the F B I ’ s orig inal

r esponse was made k

nown to the court. Nevertheless, the motion f or sanctions was made after “judicial rejection of the offending contention.” Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11. T h e m otion for sanctions should not have been g ranted.

The order g ranting th e m o tion for sanctions is REVERSED a

nd the order awarding

fees VACATED

. Each party

shall bear its own costs.