F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

D A N I E L W A L K

E R , individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

F R E D M E Y E R , I

N C ., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee. N o. 18-35592

D.C. No. CV 17-1791 YY

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oreg on Michael H. Simon, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 11, 2019 A nchorag e, Alaska

F iled March 20, 2020

B e fore: A. W allace Tashima, W illiam A. F letcher, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J u dg e TashimaW A L K E R V

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SUMMARY *

F air Credit Reporting Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of a

n a ction under the F air Credit Reporting Act, w hich requires employ ers who obtain a c onsumer report

on a job applicant to first provide the applicant with a “ clear and conspicuous dis cl osure” that the employ er may obtain such a report, and to provide this d isclosure “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.”

Reversing the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, o f plaintiff’s c laim under 1 5 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), the panel h e l d that the d isclosure provided by defendant violated th e F CRA’s standalone disclosure requirement
, w h ich does not allow for the inclusion of any ex traneous information in th e

consumer report disclosure. A ddressing what q u alifies a s part of the disclosure, the p anel held that, bey ond a plain
statement d isclosing “that a consumer report may be obtained for employ

ment purposes,” some concise ex planation of what the phrase means may be included. The panel remanded, leaving it for the district court t o d e c ide in the first instance whether the remaining lang uag e in d efendant’s disclosure satisfied the “clear and conspicuous” requirement.

Affirming the dismissal o f pl a i n t iff’s claim under § 1681b(b)(3)(A)
, t he F CRA’s pre-adverse action notice requirement, the panel h eld that th e r i g h t provided b y the F CRA to dispute inaccurate information in a c onsumer report

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.W A L K E R V

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does no t require employ ers to p rovide job applicants o r employ e es wi th an o pportunity to discuss their consumer reports directly with the employ er. I nstea d
, the F CRA

r equires that an employ er provide, in a pre-adverse ac t i o n notice to the consumer, a description of the consumer’s rig ht
to dispute with a consumer reporting ag ency the completeness

or accuracy of any item o f informatio n c o n t a ined in the consumer’s file at the consumer reporting ag ency

.

COUNSEL

Steven L

. W oodrow (arg ued) and Patrick H. Peluso, W o odrow & Peluso L L C, Denver, Colorado; Neal W eing art, J ones & Swartz PL L C, Port l a n d, Oreg on; f or PlaintiffAppellant.

Fa i th C. W hittaker ( arg ued) and Michael B

. Matting ly
, D i nsmore & Shohl L L P, Cincinnati, Ohio; Michael Porter and T ay lor D. Ric h man, Miller Nash G raham & Dunn L L P, Portland, Oreg on; for Defendant-Appellee.

OP INION

TASHI MA, Circuit J udg e:

The F air Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et s eq

. (“F CRA ” ), protects consumers’ privacy rig hts by requiring employ er s w ho o btain a consumer report on a job applicant
to first provide the applicant with a “ clear and c onspicuous disclosure” t h a t the employ er may obtain such a report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b ( b ) (2)(A)(i). That disclosure must be provided “in a document that c onsists solely of theW A L K E R V

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disclosure.” I

d. W e recently held that because of this “ clear statutory lang uag e that the disclosure d ocument must consist ‘solely ’ o f t h e disclosure,” Syed v. M -I, LLC
, 853 F .3d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 2017), the F CRA’s disclosure requirements do

n ot allow for the inclusion of any ex traneous information i n the consumer report di s c losure, even if such information is related to the disclosure. See G ilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC
, 913 F .3d 1 169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2019). Given that the disclosure document m a y contain only the § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) disclosure, we now address as a matter o f first impression what qualifies as part of that “disclosure

. . . that a consumer report may be o btained f or employ

ment purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

W e hold that bey ond a plain statement disclosing “that a

consumer r eport may be obtained for employ ment purposes,”

some concise ex p lanation of what that phrase means may be incl u d e d a s part of the “disclosure” required b y § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). F or ex ample, a co mpany could briefly describe what a “consumer report” entai ls, h ow it will be “obtained,” and for which ty pe of “employ

ment purposes” it
may be used. See id.

W e also hold that the rig ht provided b y t h e FCRA to dispute inaccurate information in a consumer report does not requ i re employ ers to provide job applicants or employ ees with an opportunity to discuss their consumer reports directly with the e mploy e r

. S

ee id. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). I nstead, the F CRA requires t h a t an employ er provide, in a pre-adverse action notice to the consumer, a description of the consumer’s righ t t o dispute with a consumer reporting ag ency the completeness or accuracy of any item of i n formation contained in the consumer’s f ile a t the consumer reporting
ag ency

. See id. §§ 1681g (c)(1)(B )(iii), 1681i.W A L K E R V

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According ly
, we a f

firm in part, reverse in p a rt a nd remand.

I.

I n March 2017, P l a i ntiff-Appellant Daniel Walker (“W alker”) applied for a j o b at one o f Defendant-Appellee F red Mey er I nc.’s (“F red Mey er”) supermarkets. Shortly a fter submitting h is application, Walker was hired—co nting ent upon satisfactory results o n a backg round check—as an associate at a F red Mey er store in Portland, Oreg on.

As part of the hiring process, W alker was p resented with several disclosure a

n d a cknowledg ment forms, including two documents concerning an inv e s t ig ation of his backg round. On e o f these d o cuments was a Disclosure Reg arding Consumer Reports and I n vestig a tive Consumer Reports (the “Disclosure”), which informs new hires that F red Mey er will investig ate their backgr o u n d u sing an employ ment backg round reporting c o mpany , General I n formation Services, I nc. (“GI S”). Specifically
, t h i s D isclosure, which is the subject of this litig a tion
, c o n s isted of the following
parag ra p h s, followed by a sig nature line to acknowledg e receipt:

W e ([ t] he K

rog er f a mily of companies) will obtain one or more cons u m er reports o r investig ative c onsumer reports (or both) about
y ou for e m

p l o y m ent purposes. These purposes may include h i r ing
, contract, assig nment, promotion, reassig nment, and termination. T h e reports will include information about
y our ch aracter, g eneral r eputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living

.W A L K E R V

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W e w i ll obtain these reports throug h a

consumer reporting ag ency

. The co nsumer reporting ag e n cy is General I nformation Services, I nc. GI S’s address is P.O. B ox 353, Chapin, SC 29036. GI S’s telephone number is (866) 265-4917. GI S’s websi te is at www.g eninfo.com.

To prepare the reports, G I S ma y investig ate
y our education, work h istory
, pr o fessional licenses a nd c redentials, references, address history
, s o cial security number validity
, rig ht
to work, crimina l r e cord, lawsuits, driving record and any other information with public or private information sources.

You may inspect GI S’s f i l e s about y ou ( in
person, by mail, or b y phone ) by providing identification to G I S. I f y ou do, GI S will provide y ou h e l p to understand the files, i n c l u d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t r ai n e d personnel and a

n ex planati o n of any codes. Another person may acc o m pany y ou b y providing identification.

I f GI S obtains any information b y interview,
y ou have the rig h t to obtain a comp lete a nd
accurate disclosure of the scope and nature o f the investig ation performed. 1

1 N o p ar t y d i s p u t es th at th is is th e lan g u ag e of th e Disclo su re p r e s en ted to W alk er. A s th e m ag istrate j u d g e n o ted
, th e tex t of t h e Disclo s u re m ay b e c o n sid ered at th e m o tio n

- to

- d ism iss stag e u n d er th e in co rp o ratio n

- by

- ref

eren ce d o ctrin e, b ecau se, alth o u g h W alk er d id n o tW A L K E R V

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Second, W alker was also presented with an Authoriz ation Reg ardi ng Consumer Reports and I nvestig a tive Consumer Reports (the “Aut h o r i z ation”), w hich seeks a new hire’s authoriz ation for GI S to conduct such an investig a t i o n throug h a variety of means, including “any public or priv a t e information source.” W alker sig ned both these documents in order to proceed with this employ ment opportunity
, but he alleg edly found the documen t s confusing and was therefore unable meaning fully to evaluate and understand the nature o f the report that F r ed Mey er intended to obtain about him.

Several weeks late r, G I S sent W alker a letter (the “preadverse action n otice”), d ated A p r i l 3, 2017. The letter provided W a lker with a copy of the consumer report that GI S had procured about him, ex plained that F red Mey er uses such reports “in evaluating individuals f o r e mploy

ment as F red Mey er team members,” a

nd notified W alker that F red Mey er “has or will be c ompleting their review of y o ur a pplication within the nex t few day s, and may take a c t ion based on the enclosed report.” T h e letter then inf o rmed W alker that he could dispute the accuracy or completeness o f the consumer report with G I S directly by f illi n g out a request form within five business day s. H owever, t h e letter provided no option f or or information about discussing the report with F r e d Mey er itself.

attach th e do cu m en t t o h is p lead in g s, h e ref eren ced it th ro u g h o u t h is

c o m p lain t. S ee Kn ievel v. ES

PN
, 3 9 3 F.3 d 1 0 68
, 1 0 7 6 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (n o tin g th at a co u rt m ay “ t ak e i n to acco u n t d o cu m en ts w h o se co n ten ts are alleg ed in a co m

p lain t an d w

h ose au th en ticity n o p a r t y q u estio n s, b u t

w h ich are n o t p h

y sically attach ed t o th e [p lain tif f’s ] p l ead in g .” (in tern al
q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )); Un i ted S t a tes v. Ritch ie
, 3 4 2 F.3 d 9 03
, 9 0 8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (ex p lain in g th at th e co u rt m ay “ treat su ch a d o cu m en t as p art o f t h e co m p lain t, a n d th u s m ay assu m e th at its co n ten ts are tru e f or p u rp o s es o f

a m o t io n to d ism iss u

n d er Ru le 1 2(b )(6 )”).W A L K E R V

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F ive business day s later, GI S sent W alker a second letter, dated April 1 0, 2017, informing him that F red Mey er h ad decided, based on the consumer report, not to continue his employ ment. I n the letter, GI S stated that it did n ot make the decision to terminate W a lker’s employ ment, and that i t was unable to provide him with an e x planation o f the dec i s i o n. L ooking for a

nswers, W alker contacted his Human Resources Manag e r at F red Mey e r, w ho told him that she was neither

aware of the consumer report nor of the fact that W a l k e r’ s employ ment was being

terminated.

On November 8, 2017, Walker file d a putative class action compl aint ag a inst F red Mey er, alleg ing that F red Mey er had willfully violated the F CRA by : ( 1) providing an unclear disclosure f

orm encumbered by e x tra n eous information, in violation of 1 5 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A); a nd (2) f ailing to noti f

y W a lker in the pre-adverse action notice, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 681b(b)(3), that he could discuss the consumer report obtained about him d i rectly with F red Mey er.

On December 28, 2017, F red Mey e r f i l e d a motion to dismiss pursuant to F e d eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arg uing that W alker h ad f ai l e d t o state a claim because the conduct described in the c o mplaint d id not violate the F CRA. Spec i f i c a lly
, F red Mey e r a

rg ued that its disclosure form

s a t i s f i e d t h e FC R A ’ s co n s u m e r r e p o r t d i s c l o s u r e requirements, and that the F CRA did not require that Walker

ex p licitly be provided with t h e o p p o rtunity to discuss his consumer report with F red Mey er prior to his termination. 2

2 Fred Mey er also m o v e d t o d ism iss W alk er’ s seco n d claim

co n cern i n g th e p re- ad v erse actio n n o tice u n d er Ru le 1 2 (b )(1 ), arg u in g th at W alk er lack ed A rticle III stan d in g to b rin g t h a t claim b ecau se h e n ev erW A L K E R V

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Adopting in part a m ag istrate judg e’s finding s a nd recommendations r eg arding F red Mey er’s motion to dismiss, the district court g ranted the motion and dismissed W a lker’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. I n par t i c ular, the district court ruled that F red Mey er’s Disclosure met the F CRA’s disclosure requirements because it was not overshadowed by e x t r a n eous information. As to W a lker’s second claim, the district court c o n cl u ded that the F CRA does n ot require that pre-adverse action notices inform

an employ e e how to c o n tact and discuss his consumer report di r e c t ly with his employ er. W alker timely appealed the district court’s order of dismissal.

II.

W e h ave jurisdiction u nder 28 U.S.C

. § 1291, and we review de n ovo the g rant of a Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Syed
, 853 F .3d a t 499

. I n s o doing
, we accept all well-pleaded factual allega t i ons in the complaint a s true and construe the pleading s in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. I n d e termining whether the complaint’s alleg ations state a claim for relief, we review de

novo the district court’s cons t r u ct i on of the F CRA, because the interpretation of a statute is a question of law. See id.

III.

W a lker a rg ues that the district c o u r t erred by g ranting F red Mey er ’ s Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss because,

av ailed h i m self o f th e o p p o rtu n ity t o d i sp u t e th e co n ten ts o f h is co n su m er rep o rt. T h e district co u rt rej ected th is arg u m en t, ru lin g th at Walk er h ad alleg ed a su f

f icien tly p articu larized an d co n crete i n j u ry to estab lish A r

ticle III stan d in g

.W A L K E R V

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under the correct interpretation of the F CRA’s requirements, both the Disclosure and the pre-adverse action n otice v iolated the F CRA. W e address each o f W a lker’s two claims in turn.

A.

To protect consumers’ privacy rig hts, the F CRA requires that an employ er who obtains a c onsumer report a bout a job applicant first provide the ap p l i cant with a standalone, clear and conspicuous disclosure of its intention to d o so, a nd obtain the applicant’s consent:

[ A] per son may not procure a consumer report, or c a u s e a consumer report to be procured, f

o r employ

ment purposes with respect to any

consumer, unless—

(i) a clear and conspi c u o u s disclosure has been made in writi n g t o the consumer at any time before the report is p rocured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists

s olely of the disclosure, that a cons u m e r report may be o btained f or employ

ment purposes; and

(ii) th e consumer has authoriz ed in writing (which authoriz ation may b e made o n the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). Walker arg ues that, contrary to this provision, the D i s c l o s ure d ocument did not consist “solely of the disclosure ” because it c ontained ex traneous information, particularly about investig ativ e consumerW A L K E R V

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reports, and that such ex traneous inf o r mation also v iolated the “clear and c onspicuous” requirement because it rendered the Disclosure “muddled” and “ c onfusing to consumers.” 3 Thus, b oth the “clear and conspicuous” requirement and the “solely ” requirement, a lso known as the “stan d a l o ne requirement,” are at issu e

. W e must decide whether those requirements disallow the inclusion of any of the information included in the Disclosure.

1.

First, as to the standalone disclosure requirement, w e noted in Syed that “ [ t] he ordina r y meaning of ‘solely ’ is ‘[ a] lone; sing ly ’ or ‘[ e] ntirely ; ex clusively ,’” a nd we held that the standalone requirement was una m b i g u o u s a n d meant what it said. Syed
, 8 53 F .3d at 5 00–01 (quoting American Heritag e Dictionary of the Eng lish L ang uag e 1666 (5th ed. 2011)); see Gilberg
, 913 F .3d at 1175 (ex plaining th e b asis for Syed ’s conclusion that “the statute meant w hat it said”). Thus, Ninth Circuit precedent read s t he F CRA as mandating that a

3 B ecau s e W alk er sig n ed a sep arate au t h o rizatio n f

o rm , W alk er d oes

n o t claim th at Fred Mey er fa i l e d to p ro p erly secu re h is au th o rizatio n to

o b tain a co n s u m er rep o rt as req u ired b y 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 6 8 1 b (b )(2 )(A )(ii). Ho w ev er, W al ke r d oes arg u e th at th e lan g u ag e o f Fred Mey er’ s

au th orizat i o n f

o rm “ u n d ersco res th e co n f u s in g an d d i stractin g n atu re of Fred Me y e r ’s d isclo su

re f o rm , th ereb y rein f

o rcin g Walk er’ s claim f

or

v io latio n o f § 16 8 1 b (b )(2 )(A )(i),” i.e., h is clai m t h at th e Disclo su

re

v io lated th e FCRA

. W h ile it m ay b e tru e th at th e au th o rizat io n f o rm

am p l if ies an y co n f

u sio n alleg e d l y created b y th e D isclo su re, th e

au th orizatio n f

o rm is n o t relev an t to th e d i sclo s u re f o rm stan dard set f

orth in t h e statu te w h e r e, as h ere, th e au th o rizatio n is n o t in clu d ed in th e Disclo s u re. Eith er th e Disclo su re m eets th e “ clear an d co n sp icu o u s” an d

“ s tan d alo n e” req u irem en ts, o r it d o es n o t; th at d eterm i n atio n d o e s n o t d ep en d o n w

h at is in a sep arate au th o rizatio n f o rm

. S ee 15 U.S.C. § 1 6 8 1b (b )(2 )(A ).W A L K E R V

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disclosure f

orm contain nothing more than t h e disclosure itself. 4 Simply put, “the [ disclosure] form should not c ontain
any ex traneous information.” See U.S. F ed. Trade Comm’n, Advisory O pinion to Haux w e l l
, 1998 W L 34323756, at *1 (J une 12, 1998). 5

4 T h e statu te p ro v id es an ex p ress ex cep ti o n p erm ittin g th e req u ired

au th orizatio n to b e in clu d ed in th e d isclo su re f o rm as w ell. T h at ex cep tio n is n o t at issu e h ere b ecau se Fred Mey er p ro v id ed its au th o rizatio n in a sep arate f o rm

. S ee 1 5 U .S.C. § 1 6 8 1 b(b )(2 )(A )(ii); S yed
, 8 5 3 F.3 d at 4 9 7
, 5 0 0

– 0 1

.

5 T h e FT C’ s ad v i so ry o pin i o n s are n o t b in d in g o r p reced e n t i a l
, b u t

can p ro v id e h elp f

u l in s ig h t. F o r ex am

p le, th e FT C h as n o t ed th at “ [t]h e

reaso n f or req u irin g th at th e d isclo su re b e in a stan d alo n e d ocu m en t is to p r ev en t co n s u m ers f

ro m b ein g d i stracted b y o th er in f o rm atio n s i d e

- b y

- s i d e

w ith t h e d isclo su

re.” U .S. Fed

. T rad e Co m m ’ n , A d v iso ry Op in io n to L eath ers, 1 9 9 8 W L 34 3 2 37 2 5
, at * 1 (Sep t. 9
, 1 9 9 8 ). A s th e FT C

ex p lain ed :

[W ] e b eliev e th at it w as th e in ten t o f th e d raf ters to

a s s u r e t h a t t h e r e q u i r e d d i s c l o s u r e a p p e a r

co n s p icu o u sly in a d o cu m en t u n en cu m b ered b y an y

o th er in f o rm atio n

. T h e reaso n f

o r sp ecif y in g a stan dalo n e disclo s u re w as so th at co n su m ers w i l l n o t b e d istracted b y ad d i tio n al i n fo rm atio n at th e tim e th e d isclo su re is g iv en

. W e b eliev e th at in clu d in g an

au th orizatio n in th e sam e do cu m en t w ith th e d i sclo su re

. . . w i l l n o t d istract f

ro m th e disclo su

re itself ; t o th e

co n t rary , a c o n su

m er w h o is req u ired to au th o rize
p ro cu rem en t o f th e rep o rt o n th e sam e do cu m en t w ill b e

m o re lik ely

to f o cu s on th e d isclo su

re. Ho w ev er, su ch

a d o cu m en t sh o u ld i nc l u de n o th in g m o re th an th e d isclo su r e an d th e au th o rizatio n f o r o b tain in g a

co n s u m er rep o rt.

U

. S

. Fed

. T rad e Co m

m ’ n , A d v iso ry Op in io n to Steer, 1 9 9 7 W L 3 3 7 9 1 2 2 7 , at * 1 (Oct. 2 1 , 1 9 9 7 ).W A L K E R V

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Here, the district c ourt held, based on s ev e r a l district
court opinions and F TC a dvisory opinions, that F red Mey er’s d i s c l o sure c omplied with the F CRA’s standalone requirem e n t because “ some additional information” may be included in an F CRA disclosure, as long as t h e information is “closely related to the F CRA d isclosure,” and f ocuses the applicant’s attention on the F CRA d isclosure rather than detracting from it. Afte r this case was appealed, however, the N inth Circuit decided Gilberg
, which foreclos e s the district court’s interpretation that the F CRA contains an implied e x c eption allowing the inclusion of information that is “ closely related”
to the disclosure. See Gilberg
, 913 F .3d at 1176 (ex plaining that Syed “forecloses” such an approach and sug g esting that, in a ny c ase, such a standard would be d ifficult to implement, and would be inappropriate b e c ause “even ‘related’ information may

distract or confuse the reader”). 6

I n lig ht of G ilberg
, a disclosure form violates the F CRA’s standalone r e q u irement if it c ontains any ex traneous information bey o nd the disclosure required b y the F CRA.

6 Sp ecif ically
, th e Gilb erg co u

rt read S yed as sig n alin g th at th e FCRA

“ s h o u ld n ot b e read to h av e im p l ied ex cep tio n s,” esp ecially w h en an

ex cep tio n w o u ld b e co n trary to th e FCRA ’ s p u rp o se. Id

. at 1 1 7 5 (citin g S yed
, 8 5 3 F .3 d at 5 0 1– 0 3 ); see a l so S yed
, 8 53 F.3 d at 5 0 1 (ex p lain in g t h at,

“ i n lig h t o f C o n g ress’ s ex p ress g ran t o f p erm issio n f o r th e in clu sio n o f an

au th orizatio n , t

h e f am iliar j u dici a l m ax i m exp ressio u n iu s est exclu s io

a lteriu s co u n s els ag ain st f i n d in g ad d itio n al, im

p lied
, ex ce p t i o n s,” an d

n o tin g th at “ [a]n im

p lied ex cep tio n to an ex p ress statu te is j u stif iab le o n ly

w h en it co m

p o rts w ith th e basic p u rp o s e o f th e statu te”). Gilb erg th en

w en t o n to h old t

h at, ev en w

h ere a d ef

en d an t arg u es th at an y ad d itio n al in f o rm atio n in i t s d isclo s u re f o rm is co n sisten t w ith th e co n g ressio n al
p u rp o s e o f th e FCRA
, “ p u rp o se d o es n o t ov errid e p lain m ean in g ,” an d th e

m ean in g o f “ so lely ” is p lain . 9 13 F.3 d at 1 1 7 5 . A s a resu lt, th e Gilb erg

co u rt co n clu d ed th at “ Syed h o ld s th at th e stan d alo n e req u ir em en t f o reclo ses im

p licit ex cep tio n s .” Id

. at 1 1 7 6

.W A L K E R V

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See Gilberg
, 913 F .3 d a t 1176 (holding that the defendant violated the standalone requirement where it s d isclosure “contain[ e d] ex traneou s and irrelevant information bey ond what [ the] F CRA itself requires”). As F red Mey er points out, if an F CRA d isclosure may o n ly contain the disclosure that is required by the statute, the que s t ion then becomes what lang uag e counts a s part of the “disclosure” itself. The statute requires a standalone “disclosure

. . . t hat a consumer report may be obtained for employ ment p u r p oses,” but does not further define t h e t e rm “ disclosure” or ex plain what informa t i on can be considered p art of that “disclosure” for
p u r p oses of the standalone requirement. See 1 5 U.S. C

. §§ 1681a, 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

W e now hold that bey ond a plain statement disclosing “that a consumer report ma y b e o btained for employ ment purposes,” some concise ex planat i o n of what that phrase

means may be included as part o f the “disclosure” required b y § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). F or ex ample, a co mpany could briefly describe w hat a “consumer report” entails, 7 h o w it will be “obtained,” and for which ty pe of “employ

ment purposes” it

7 Su ch an allo w an ce f

o r a b rief d escrip tio n o f co n su m er rep orts w ou ld alig n w ith p rio r FT C g u id an ce. In its ad v iso ry o pin io n to Co f f ey , th e FT C

ex p lain ed :

It i s o u r v iew th at Co n g ress in ten d ed th at th e d i sclo su re

n o t b e en cu m

b ered w ith ex tran eo u s in f o rm atio n

. Ho w ev er, so m e ad d itio n al in f o rm atio n , su ch as a b rief d escrip t io n o f th e n atu re o f th e co n su m er rep o rts

co v er e d b y th e d isclo su re, m ay b e in clu d ed if th e in f o rm atio n do es n o t co n f

u se th e co n s u m er o r d etract f ro m th e m an d ated d isclo su

re.

Fed

. T rad e Co m

m ’ n , A d v iso ry Op in i o n to Co f f ey , 1 9 9 8 W L 3 4 3 2 3 7 4 8
, at * 2 (Feb . 1 1 , 1 9 9 8 ).W A L K E R V

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may be used. 8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Such i n f o rmation would f

urther the purpose of the disclosure b y helping the consumer understand the disclosure. See Sy ed
, 853 F .3d at 501 (noting that Cong ress’ purpose to protect

consumers from improper invasions o f privacy would be frustrated in the abse n ce of a clear disclosure because job applicants would not understand w hat they were authoriz ing ).

W ith this standard in mind, we t u r n to the tex t of the Disclosure to d etermine whether it impermissibly c o n tained

ex traneous information bey ond the § 1 681b(b)(2)(A)(i) disclosure itself. The first parag raph provides:

W e ([ t] he K

rog er family o f companies) will obtain one o r more consumer reports o r investig ative c onsumer reports (or both) about
y ou f o r e m p l oy ment purposes. These purposes may include h iring
, c o ntract , assig nment, promotion, reassig nment, and termination. The re p o r ts will include information about
y our c haracter, g eneral reputatio n , personal characteristics, and mode of living

.

This lang u ag e provides the required disclosure that consumer reports may be obtained for e mploy ment purpo s e s , see id.
, and then, in accordance with the standard we set forth above, helpfully ex plains what tho s e “employ ment purposes” may

8 Of co ur s e , an y su ch ex p lan atio n sh ou ld n o t b e co n f u sin g o r so

ex ten siv e as to d e t r act f

ro m t h e d isclo su

re. In o th er w o rd s, it m

u st still

m eet th e sep arate “ clear an d co n s picu o u s” req u irem en t, d iscu ssed f u rth er b elo w

. S ee 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 6 8 1 b(b )(2 )(A )(i).W A L K E R V

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include and what ty

pe of information may be included in the “consumer report.” 9

W a lker arg ues that the first parag raph of F red Mey er’s Disclosure n onetheless violates th e FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement because it mentions investig ative

consumer r eports in addition to con s umer reports; he contends that informatio n about investig ative consumer reports qualifies as impermissible ex traneous inf o r m ation. W e disag ree. The F CRA defines an investig ative consumer report as “ a co n s u m e r report or portion thereof in which information on a c o nsumer’s character, g eneral r e putation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is o btained throug h personal interviews with nei g h bors, friends, or a ssociates o f the consumer

. . . .” 1 5 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (emphasis added). B ecause investig ative reports are a subcateg ory or specific ty pe o f consumer report, disclosing t h at an investig ative

consumer report may be obtained for e m p loy ment purposes does not violate the F C R A ’s mandate that nothing be included in the disclosure document other than a “disclosure

. . . that a consumer r eport will be obtained for employ ment

9 T h e Disclo su

re’ s l an g u ag e ex p l a i n in g t h at rep o rts w ill in clu d e in f o rm atio n ab o u t th e co n su

m er’ s “ ch aracter, g en eral rep u tatio n , p erso n al ch aracteristics, an d m o d e o f liv in g ” track s th e lan g u ag e o f th e FCRA

. T h e FCRA d ef

in es “ co n su

m er rep o rt” as co n cern in g “ co m m u n icatio n of an y in f o rm atio n b y a co n su m e r rep ortin g ag en cy b earin g o n a co n su m er’ s cred it w o rth in ess, cred it stan d in g , cred it cap acity
, ch a ra cte r, g en era l
rep u ta tio n , p e rso n al ch a ra cteristics, o r mo d e o f l ivin g .” 15 U.S.C. § 1 6 8 1 a(d )(1 ) (em

p h asis ad d ed ); see a l

s o i d

. § 1 6 8 1 a(e) (statin g th at in v estig ativ e co n su

m er rep o rts also co n ce r n in f o rm atio n ab o u t a

co n su m er’ s “ ch ara c t e r, g en eral rep u t atio n , perso n al ch aracteristics, or

m o d e o f liv in g ”).W A L K E R V

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purposes.” 1 0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). A s long as the information about i n vestig ative reports is limited to disclosing that such reports may be obtained for employ ment purposes, and providing a very brief description of what that

m e a n s , t h e i n c l u s i o n o f s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n i n a § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) disclosure does n o t run afoul of the standal one requirement. Accord F ed. Trade Comm’n, Advisory Opinion to W illner, 1999 W L 33932153, a t *1, *2 (Mar. 25, 1999) (noting that the § 1681b(b)(2)(A) disclosure “includes a l l ty

pes of c o nsumer reports (including
, but not limited to, investig ative reports)” a nd sug g esting that it could therefore include a “very limit e d ” and “brief” disclosure
reg arding investig a tive consumer reports specifically ). F o r the foreg o ing reasons, the first parag r aph o f Fr e d Mey er’s disclosure form can be c o n sidered part of t h e “disclosure” itself for purposes of the F CRA’s s t an d alone requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

The second and third parag raphs of F red Mey ers’ Disclosure ex plain:

W e will obtain these r e p o r ts throug h a

consumer reporting ag ency

. The consumer reporting ag e n cy is General I nformation Services, I nc. GI S’s address is P.O. B ox 353, Chapin, SC 29036. GI S’s telephone number is

10 O f co u rse, an y d iscu ssio n o f in v estig ativ e co n su m er rep o r t s m

u st

n o t be co n f

u sin g —it is st i l l s u b

j ect to th e clear an d co n sp icu o u s req u irem en t. T h u s, W alk er’ s arg u m en ts th at th e d isclo su re statem en t’ s lan g u ag e co n f

u sin g ly “b lu rs th e lin e b etw een co n su m er rep o rts an d in v estig ativ e rep o rts” su ch t h at th e read er c a n n ot u n d erstan d w h at in f o rm atio n w ill b e o b tain ed ab ou t h im
, in clu d in g b y o m ittin g an y

m en tio n o f cred it w o r t h in ess o r cred it cap acity in th e f irst an d th ird
p arag rap h s, are b etter d irected to t h e clear an d co n sp icu o u s req u irem en t.W A L K E R V

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(866) 265-49 17. GI S’s website is at www.g eninfo.com.

To prepare the r e ports, GI S may investig ate
y ou r education, work h istory
, professional licenses a nd credentia l s , references, address h istory
, social security number validity
, righ t t o work, criminal record, lawsuits, driving record and any other information with public or private information sources.

These parag raphs elucidate w hat it means to “obtain” a

consumer report by providing helpful information about w ho will provide such a report to F red Mey er and what private a nd public information about the applicant will b e ex amined to

cr e a t e a “consumer report.” As a result, this lang uag e also does not violate the F CRA’s requirement that the disclosure consist solely of a “ disclosure

. . . that a consumer report will be obtained for employ

ment purposes.” 1 1 See 15 U .S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

F inally
, the fourth a

n d fifth parag raphs of F red Mey er’s Disclosure inform the consumer that:

Y o u m ay inspect GI S’s files about y ou (in
person, by mail, or b y p hone) by providing identificatio n t o G I S. I f y ou do, GI S will provide y ou help to understand t h e files, i n c l u d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t r ai n e d personnel and a

n ex pla n a tion of any codes. Another person may accompany y ou b y providing identification.

11 S ee f o o tn o te 1 0
, su

p ra

.W A L K E R V

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I f GI S obtains any informatio n by interview,
y ou have the rig h t to obtain a complete and
accurate d isclosure of the scope and nature o f the investig ation performed.

These parag raphs appear to have been included in g ood faith in order to provide a dditional useful information a bout an applicant’s rig hts to obtain and inspect informati o n a b out GI S’ investig ation o f

, and file about, the applicant. This lang uag e, ho w ever, may “pull[ ] the applicant’s attention
away from his p rivacy rig hts protec t e d b y the F CRA b y calling h is attention to the r ig hts” that h e has to inspect GI S’s files. See S

yed
, 8 53 F .3d a t 502; see a lso Gilberg
, 913 F .3d
at 1175–76 (noting that additional information a bout rig h t s under state laws, and references to ex traneous documents like

a summary of rig hts u nder t h e FC R A, was “ as likely to confuse a s it [ wa] s to inform,” and h o lding that the inclusion of such information violated the standal o ne disclosure

r e q u i rement). Thus, while we u nderstand F red Mey er’s

reason for p roviding this information t o job applicants, we hold that it should h ave been pro v i ded in a separate document, beca use the information cannot reasonably be deemed part of a “disclosure

. . . that a consumer report will be obtained for employ m ent purposes.” 15 U .S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

B e cause t his a dditional information means that the Di sclosure does not “consist[ ] solely o f the disclosure,” we hold that th e f

o u r th and fifth parag raphs of the Disclosure violate the F CRA’s standalone disclosure requirement.W A L K E R V

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2.

Second, as to the “clear and conspicuous” r e q u i rement,

we ex plained in Gilberg t h a t “ clear means ‘reasonably understandable’” and “[ c] on s p i cu o us means ‘readily noticeable to the consumer’” in t h i s contex t. G ilberg
, 913 F .3d at 1176 ( quoting Rubio v. Ca p i tal One Bank
, 613 F .3d 1 195, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), and adopting its “clear and c onspicuous” a

n aly sis from the Truth I n L en d ing A ct contex t). The Gilberg court assumed, without deciding
, “that clarity and conspicuousness under [ the] F CRA present questions of law rathe r than fact.” Id. at 1177. The Court then held that th e defendant’s disclosure form was not clear because it “contain[ ed] lang uag e t h a t a reasonable person would not u nderstand” and “would confuse a reasonable reader because it combine[ d] federal and state disclosures.” Id.

Here, despite the fact that S yed made clear that the “standalone” a

nd “clear and conspicuous” requirements a re distinct, the district court did not ex plicitly addr e s s w h ether the Disclosure was “ c lear and conspicuous,” instead focusing

ex c lusively on the standalone require m e n t

. See Syed
, 853 F .3d at 503 (“[ T] he que s t i o n o f whether a disclosure is ‘clear and conspicuous’ within the meaning of Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) is separate from the question o f whether a document consists ‘s o l e l y ’ of a disclosure

. . . .”). Reg ardless, bec a u s e G ilberg was not decided until a fter the district court issued its order, the d istrict court did not have an opportunity to analy

z e the Di s c l osure under the “clear a nd conspicuous” standa r d set forth in Gilberg

. Nor d id theW A L K E R V

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parties have the o p p o rtunity fully to brief that standard on appeal, due to the timing o f Gilberg

. 1 2

As a result of these c i r c u

m s t a n ces—and because W a lker’s
arg uments abo u t lack of clarity are not addressed b y Gilberg —we decline to reach the issue of w hether the f i rst throug h third p arag raphs of the D isclosure satisfy the F CRA’s “clear and conspicuous” requirement. 1 3 See 15 U .S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). W e leave it to the district c o u rt to determine in the first instance w hether the lang uag e of those
parag raphs is sufficiently c lear u nder the reasonable person standard set forth in G ilberg

. 1 4

B.

The F CRA mandates that, before an e mploy er may take adverse action ag ainst an employ ee o r job applicant based on a consumer report, the employ er must provide the consumer with “a c opy of the report” and “a description in writing o f the r ig hts of the c onsumer

. . . as prescribed by the B ureau [ o f Consumer F inancial Protection] u nder section 1681g (c)(3) o f th i s t i t l e.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). According to W a lker, “[ o] n e of these rig hts
, m e n t ioned e x plicitly in the

12 W alk er’ s o p en in g brief w as f i led b ef ore Gilb erg w as decid ed
, an d th eref o re d o es n o t ad d ress Gilb erg ’ s “ clear an d co n sp icu o u s” stan d ard

.

1 3 W alk er’ s arg u m en ts h av e t o d o m ore w ith lack o f clarity f ro m

o m ittin g , m isrep resen tin g , o r f ailin g to ex p lain cer t a i n i n f o rm atio n th an

w ith lack o f clarity f

ro m th e actu al lan g u ag e u s e d i n t h e in f o rm atio n p ro v id ed

. S

ee Gilb erg , 9 13 F.3 d at 1 17 7

.

1 4 A s in Gilb erg , w e d o n o t d ecid e w h eth er th e d isclo s u re’ s clarity

u n d er th e FCRA p resen ts a qu estio n o f l aw o r f act. S ee Gilb erg , 91 3 F.3 d at 1 1 7 7

.W A L K E R V

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statute, is the rig ht to dispute the information contained in the report.” (Citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(B )(i)(IV).) Walker

c o n tends that the rig ht to dispute encompasses not just a n opportunity to correct erroneous information in a cons u m e r report, b ut also an opportunity to discuss the report w it h a current or prospective employ e r —that is, an opportun i t y t o chang e the employ er’s mind—before adverse action is taken. B ecause F red Mey er’s pre-adverse action notice did not advis e Walker of a rig ht to speak directly with F red Mey er—rather than with GI S 1 5 —about a ny neg ative items in his consumer report, W a lker ar gues that F red Mey er’s preadverse action notice v i o l a ted the F CRA. The district court concluded that the F C R A provides no r ig h t or r equirement that a p r e-adverse action notice include information about contacting a consumer’s e mploy er directly

. Thus, the crux o f the issue is the substantive ex tent o f any rig ht to dispute that the F CRA may provide, which § 168 1b(b)(3)(A)(ii) would require be included in the summary o f rig hts that accompanies a pre-adverse action notice from an employ er.

To assess W a lker’s arg ument, we must look to the statute. W e c o n c l u d e that while the F CRA does provide a rig ht to dis pute inaccurate information in a consumer report, W a lker’s interpretation that such a rig ht mand a t e s an opportunity for W alker to discuss h i s consumer r eport with F red Mey er directly is u nsupported b y the tex t of the F CRA. F irst, the lang uag e of § 1681b(b)(3)(B )(i)(IV)—the provision

15 Walk er arg u es th at d eleg atin g discu s sio n of h is co n su m er rep o rt to GIS, a t h ird p arty th at h as “ n o au th o rity o r ab ility to r e co n sid er th e p lan n ed ad v e r s e actio n ,” is “ p u rely p erf u n cto ry an d co n trav en es th e p u rp o s e o f

th e p re- ad v erse actio n

n o tice req u i rem en t.” He ad v o cates an in terp retatio n o f t

h e FCRA t

h at w o u ld req u ire a p re- ad v erse actio n n otice
to n o tif y recip ien ts o f a “ rig h t to d i sp u t e in accu racies or d iscu s s th e rep o rt

w ith th e p arty task ed w ith

m ak in g th e em

p l o y m en t d ecisio n .”W A L K E R V

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that W alker cites as providing the relevant rig ht to dispute—undermines W alker’s arg ument that the rig ht to dispute r e quires more than an opportunity to interact with a t hird party like GI S. That provision requires, in cer t a i n circumstances, that an employ er ta k i n g adverse action provide notice “that the consumer may

. . . dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of
any infor m a t i on in a report.” I d. (emphasis added). B y its
tex t, this provision thus only r equires notice of an opportunity for W alker to dispute his r eport with GI S, the consumer reporting ag ency

—not with F red Mey er directly

.

W a lke r ’ s reliance on this provision is also u navailing because it likely does n o t a pply to h im. Subparag raph C provides that the cited notice requirement in subparag raph B shall apply “only if

. . . the cons u mer is apply ing for a position over which the Secretary of T r a nsportat i o n h as the
power to establish qualifications and ma x imum hours o f service

. . . or a position subject to safety reg ulation by a State transportation ag ency ; and

. . . a s o f the time at which the
person procures the report or causes the r eport to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in
connect i on with that employ ment a p p lication h as been b y mail, telephone, computer, o r other similar means.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added). W alker, however, alleg ed that his “job was not one reg ulated by the Department of Transportation.”

Nor d o the other relevant F CRA provisions provide a rig ht to discuss a consumer report directly with an employ er prior to a dverse action. As discussed above, 1 5 U

. S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) mandates that, before an employ er may take adverse action ag ain s t an employ ee or job applicant b a s e d on a consumer report, the employ er must provide t h eW A L K E R V

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consumer with “a d e s c r i p t ion in writing of the rig hts of the

consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the B ureau under section 1681g (c)(3) of this title.” 1 5 U .S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). I n turn, the referenced § 1 681g (c)
p r o vides that the summary of r ig hts shall include, am o n g

o t her thing s, a d escription of “the rig ht of a consu m e r t o dispute information in the f ile of the consumer u n der section 1681i o f this title.” Id. § 1681g (c)(1)(B )(iii). Section 1681i, in turn, deals with the procedures that must be followed when

a c o n sumer seeks to disput e with a consumer reporting
ag ency the completeness or accuracy of any item o f information contained in the consumer’s file at the consumer reporting ag ency

. See id. § 1681i (“Procedure in c ase o f disputed accuracy

”); see also id. § 1681m(a)(4 ) ( B ) (requiring
, if adverse action is taken ag ainst a consumer, an employ er to provide “notice of the c onsumer’s rig ht

. . . to dispute, under section 1681i o f this title, with a consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a

consumer report furnished by the ag ency ” (emphasis added)). S ec tion 1681i, however, does not provide any rig hts or procedures for discussing a report directly with an employ e r. 1 6 See generally id. § 1681i. N or does W alker c ite
any other provision that does so.

B e y ond failing to cite a particular provision o f the F CRA that establishes a rig ht to dispute a report with an employ er directly
, as opposed to w ith a consumer report i n g ag ency , W a lker also does not cite any b inding case law that sug g ests that the rig ht to dispute is broader than what is set forth in the

16 Ev en in its pro v isio n s th at d iscu ss th e d e l e tio n o f disp u ted or in accu rate in f

orm atio n , § 1 6 8 1 i states t

h at th e co n su

m er rep o rtin g ag en cy

m u st n o tif y em p lo y ers th at in fo rm atio n h as b een d eleted on ly if th e

co n su m er m ak es a req u est th at it d o so

. See id

. § 1 6 8 1 i(d ).W A L K E R V

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statute. To support his arg ument, W a lker cites several district
court cases a

nd F TC advisory opinions, but n o n e of these

sources is bindin g. Moreover, while W alker quotes some favorable lang uag e from these sources, the cited materials do
not directly address the precise issue raised here, n or do they

ex p licitly h old that th e r i ght to dispute includes a rig ht to discuss an accurate but ne ga t i v e c onsumer report directly with one’s employ er. See Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC , 193 F

. Supp. 3d 623, 637–38 (E.D. V a. 2 0 16) (citing to 15 U .S.C. § 1681b(b)(3 ) and holding that the plaintiff had alleg ed
concrete injuries on behalf of a n adverse actio n sub-class because, where the defendants ha d “[ taken] adverse employ ment action w ithout p roviding the informa tion
g uaranteed b y t he statute,” the sub-class members were “deprived of the opportunity to ex plain any neg ative records in their c onsumer reports and discuss the issues raised in their

r e p orts with D efendants before suffering adverse e m p l o y m e n t action”); Magallon v. Robert Half Int’l, I nc. , 311 F .R.D. 625, 633–34 (D. Or. 2015) (ex p laining
, f or purp o s es of class certification motion in a case where defendant failed to provide p laintiff any p re-adverse action notice, that the F CRA requires an employ er to p rovide a p r e-adverse action notice far enoug h in advance before taking adverse action to g ive the applicant a “real” opportunity to r espond and “meaning f ully
contest o r ex plain the contents o f t h e report” so that the applicant may attempt t o “chang e the employ er’s mind”); U.S. F e d. Trade Comm’n, Advisory Opinion to L ewis, 1998 W L 34323760, a t *1 (J une 11, 199 8 ) (referencing
, in the
contex t of a ddressing “how long

. . . the employ er [ must] w ait after providing a copy o f the report before taking the adverse action
, ” t h a t the purpose of the r elevant provisions is “to allow consumers to discuss the report with employ ers before adverse a ction is taken”); U.S. F ed. Trade Comm’n, A dvisory Opinion t o C offey
, 1998 WL 34323748, at *2 (same); U.S.W A L K E R V

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F ed. Trade Comm’n, Advisory Opinion to W eisberg
, 1997 W L 33791228, at *1 (J une 27, 1997) ( n o t i n g that “[ t] he dispute rig h ts are among the most important the F CRA g ives
to consumers,” but ref

e r e ncing “ the consumer’s rig ht to dispute inaccurate or incomplete information with the [consumer reporting agency] ” (emphasis added)). 1 7

I n sho r t , W alker does not show that, despite the seeming ly unambig uous tex t of the statute, there is p recedent that nonetheless r equires that a c onsumer be g iven an opportunity to discuss h is c o n s umer report directly with his employ e r prior to adverse actio n

. I n f act, our c ases a

nd various leg islative history materials track the lang u ag e of the
statute and indicate that the F CR A ’ s rig ht to dispute was aimed at correcting errors in consumer reports, which perhaps

ex p lains why the statute provi d es a rig ht to dispute inaccuracies with the c onsumer repor t i ng a g ency , b u t does
not ex plicitly require an opportunity to discuss the report with the employ er itself.

F or ex a mple, we have e x plained that the F RCA’s disclosure provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), “promotes error correction by providing applicants with an opportunity
to warn a prospective employ er of errors in the report before the employ er decides ag ainst hiring the applicant on the basis of i n formation contained in the report.” Syed
, 853 F .3d
at 497. We noted that “[ t] his opportunity is p a rticularly import a n t gi ven that, in practice, the F CRA d oes not otherwise provide an o p portunity for a j ob applicant o r

17 H ere, t h e p arties d id n o t raise, an d w e t h e r e fo re d o n o t d ecid e,

w h eth er an em

p l o y er m u st w ait a reaso n ab le p erio d o f tim e af ter s en d in g

a p re- ad v erse actio n n o t i c e bef o re m ak in g a f

in al d ecisio n an d tak in g ad v erse actio n

. S

ee, e.g

. , Ma g allo n , 3 11 F.R.D. at 6 3 3

– 3 4

.W A L K E R V

. F R

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employ e e to dispute his c o nsu m e r report b e fore adverse action is taken.” Id. at 497 n.2.

Similarly
, the leg islative history ex plains that “[ t] he driving force behind the [ 1996 amendments to the F CRA]

was the sig nificant amount of inaccurate information that was b e i ng reported by consumer reporting ag encies a nd th e difficul t i e s that consumers faced g etting such errors corrected.” S. Rep. No. 108-166, at 5–6 (2003). T o address this issue, the F CRA amendments “require[ d] that employ ers, before taking an adverse action based on a consumer report, provide the curren t o r prospective employ ee with

. . . a reasonable opportunity to r espond to any information that is disputed by the consumer.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 35 (1995); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103

- 4 8 6 (1994) (ex plaining

same under “Ex planation of L e gislation” – Section 103

– “Employ ment Purposes”). T hese s o u r c es, h owever, do not mention any rig ht to d iscuss directl y w i t h an employ er a

consumer report that is accurate but contains n eg ative information.

B e cause the tex t o f the statute, the leg islative history
, a nd

our precedent do not require that a consumer be provided an opportunity to discuss h i s c o nsumer report directly with his employ e r before adverse action is taken ag ainst him, we hold that the p re-adverse a c tion notice that W alker received did not violate the F CRA.

IV.

B e cause the f

ourth and fifth p arag r aphs of the Disclosure violate the F CRA’s sta n dalone disclosure requirement, we

reverse the district court’s dismissal of W alker’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). W e l ea v e for the district courtW A L K E R V

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to decide in the first instance whether the remaining lang uag e of the Disclosure satisfies the separate “clear a nd conspicuous” requirement provided in that same section. W e affirm, however, the district court’s dismissal of W a lker’s
p r e

- a d v e r s e a c tion notice claim u n d er 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 1681b(b)(3)(A), because no authority provides the alleg ed rig ht on which that claim rests.

AF F IRMED in part, REVERSED in p a r t, a nd REMANDED. No Costs.