1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022

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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE

NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

ET AL

. v . HARPER ET AL

.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 21–1271. Argued December 7, 2022—Decided June 27, 2023

The Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution requires “the Legisla

ture” of each State to prescribe the rules governing federal elections. Art. I, §4, cl. 1. This case conc erns the claim that the Clause vests state legislatures with authority to set rules governing federal elec

tions free from restrictions impose d under state law. Following the 2020 decennial census, North Carolina’s General Assembly drafted a new federal congressional map, which several groups of plaintiffs chal

lenged as an impermissible partisan gerrymander in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court found partisan gerry

mandering claims nonjusticiable under the State Constitution, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Harper v. Hall , 380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499 ( Harper I ). While acknowledg ing that partisan gerrymandering claims are outside the reach of federal courts, see Rucho v. Common Cause , 588 U. S. ___, ___, the State Supreme Court held that such questions were not beyond the reach of North Carolina courts. The court also rejected th e argument that the Federal Elec

tions Clause vests exclusive and independent authority in state legis

latures to draw federal congressional maps. The court enjoined the use of the maps and remanded the case to the trial court for remedial proceedings. The legislative defend ants then filed an emergency ap

plication in this Court, citing th e Elections Clause and requesting a stay of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision. This Court de

clined to issue a stay, but later granted certiorari.

After this Court granted certiorari, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision addressing a remedial map adopted by the trial
court. Harper v. Hall, 383 N. C. 89, 125, 881 S. E. 2d 156, 181 ( Harper II

). The North Carolina Supreme Co urt then granted the legislative2 MOORE v. HARPER

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defendants’ request to rehear that remedial decision in Harper II . The court ultimately withdrew the opinion in Harper II concerning the re

medial maps and overruled Harper I , repudiating its holding that par

tisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution. The court dismissed pl aintiffs’ claims but did not rein

state the 2021 congressional plans struck down in Harper I under the State Constitution. This Court has entertained two rounds of supple

mental briefing on jurisdictional qu estions in light of the state court’s rehearing proceedings.
Held : 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Harper I that adjudicated the Federal Elections Clause issue. A corollary to this Court’s jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies” is that there must exist a dispute “at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U. S. 66, 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to withdraw Harper II and overrule Harper I does not moot this case. Prior to the appeal and rehearing proceedings in Harper II , the court had already entered the judgment and issued the mandate in Harper I

, and the legislative defendants ackn owledged that they would remain bound by Harper I ’s decision enjoining the use of the 2021 plans. When the North Carolina Supr eme Court “overruled” Harper I as part of the rehearing proceedings, it repudiated Harper I ’s conclusion that parti

san gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution. But the court did not purport to alter or amend the judg

ment in Harper I enjoining the use of the 2021 maps. Were this Court
to reverse Harper I , the 2021 plans would again take effect. Because the legislative defendants’ path to complete relief runs through this Court, the parties continue to have a “personal stake in the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit” sufficient to maintain this Court’s jurisdic

tion. Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U. S. 165, 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This Court also has jurisdicti on to review the judgment in Harper I under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), which provides that jurisdiction in this Court extends to “[f]inal judgments . . . rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” Cox Broadcasting Corp.

v. Cohn , 420 U. S. 469, identified categories of cases in which a deci

sion of a State’s highest court wa s considered a final judgment for §1257(a) purposes despite the anticipation of additional lower court proceedings, including “cases . . . in which the federal issue, finally de

cided by the highest court in the St ate, will survive and require deci

sion regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.” Id.

, at 480. Harper I is such a case. Because subsequent proceedings have3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

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neither altered Harper I ’s analysis of the federal issue nor negated the effect of the Harper I judgment striking down the 2021 plans, that is

sue both has survived and requires decision by this Court. Pp. 6–11.

2. The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent au

thority in state legislatures to set th e rules regarding federal elections. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, famously proclaimed this Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitu

tion. But Marbury did not invent the concept of judicial review. State courts had already begun to impose restraints on state legislatures, even before the Constitutional Conv ention, and the practice continued to mature during the founding era. James Madison extolled judicial review as one of the key virtues of a constitutional system, and the concept of judicial review was so en trenched by the time the Court de

cided Marbury that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it as one of so

ciety’s “fundamental principles.” Id. , at 177.. The Elections Clause does not ca rve out an exception to that fun

damental principle. When state le gislatures prescribe the rules con

cerning federal elections, they remain subject to the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. Pp. 11–26. (a) In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant , 241 U. S. 565, this Court examined the Elections Clause’s app lication to a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the State’s voters to reject, by popular vote, any law enacted by the State’s Gene ral Assembly. This Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court’s determin ation that the Federal Elections Clause did not preclude subjecting legislative ac ts under the Clause to a popular referendum, rejecting the contention that “to include the ref

erendum within state legislative po wer for the purpose of apportion

ment is repugnant to §4 of Arti cle I [the Elections Clause].” Id. , at 569. And in Smiley v. Holm , 285 U. S. 355, this Court considered the effect of a Governor’s veto, pursuant to his authority under the State’s Con

stitution, of a congressional redistricting plan. This Court held that the Governor’s veto did not violat e the Elections Clause, reasoning that a state legislature’s “exercise of . . . authority” under the Elections Clause “must be in accordance wi th the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id ., at 367. The Court high

lighted that the Federal Constitution contained no “provision of an at

tempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in wh ich the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.” Id. , at 368.

This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smi

ley in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n , 576 U. S. 787, a case concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative to amend th e State Constitution and to vest redistricting authority in an inde pendent commission. Significantly4 MOORE v. HARPER

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for present purposes, the Court embr aced the core principle espoused in Hildebrant and Smiley : Whatever authority was responsible for re

districting, that entity remained su bject to constraints set forth in the State Constitution. The Court dismissed the argument that the Elec

tions Clause divests state constituti ons of the power to enforce checks against the exercise of legislative power.

The basic principle of these cases—reflected in Smiley ’s unanimous command that a state legislature may not “create congressional dis

tricts independently of” requiremen ts imposed “by the state constitu

tion with respect to the enactment of laws,” 285 U. S., at 373—com

mands continued respect. Pp. 15–18. (b) The precedents of this Court have long rejected the view that legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely federal in char

acter, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution. The argument to the contrary does not account for the Framers’ un

derstanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents th at give them life. Thus, when a state legislature carries out its federal constitutional power to pre

scribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking body created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity as

signed particular authority by the Federal Constitution. Both consti

tutions restrain the state legi slature’s exercise of power.

This Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker , 146 U. S. 1, in which the Court analyzed the Constitution’s similarly worded Electors Clause, is inapposite. That decisi on did not address any conflict be

tween state constitutional provisions and state legislatures. Nor does Leser v. Garnett , 258 U. S. 130, which involved a contested vote by a state legislature to ratify a federal constitutional amendment, help pe

titioners. That case co ncerned the power of state legislatures to ratify amendments to the Federal Constitu tion. But fashioning regulations governing federal elections “unquest ionably calls for the exercise of lawmaking authority.” Arizona State Legislature , 576 U. S., at 808, n. 17. And the exercise of such author ity in the context of the Elections Clause is subject to the ordinary co nstraints on lawmaking in the state constitution. Pp. 18–22. (c) Petitioners concede that at least some state constitutional pro

visions can restrain a state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections Clause , but they read Smiley and Hildebrant to differen

tiate between procedural and substantive constraints. But neither case drew such a distin ction, and petitioners do not in any event offer a defensible line between procedure an d substance in this context. Pp. 22–24. (d) Historical practice confirms that state legislatures remainCite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 5

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bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority under the Elections Clause. Two state constitutional provisions adoptedshortly after the founding expressly constrained state legislative action under the Elections Clause. See Del. Const., Art. VIII, §2 (1792); Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810). In addition, multiple state constitutions at the time of the founding regulate d the “manner” of federal elections by requiring that “elections shall be by ballot.” See, e.g. , Ga. Const., Art. IV, §2. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—from which theFramers borrowed—provided that “delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislat ure of each state shall direct.” Art. V. Around the time the Articl es were adopted, multiple States regulated the appointment of delega tes, suggesting that the Framers did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action from state constitution al provisions. See, e.g. , Del. Const., Art. XI (1776). Pp. 24–26. 3. Although the Electi ons Clause does not exem pt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints impo sed by state law, federal courts must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review. This Court has an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of state law do not evade federal law. For exampl e, States “may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing tr aditional property interests.” Phillips

v. Washington Legal Foundation , 524 U. S. 156, 167. While the Court does not adopt a test by which stat e court interpretations of state law can be measured in cases implicating the Elections Clause, state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves th e power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections. The Court need not decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court strayed beyond the limits deri ved from the Elections Clause, as petitioners did not meaningfully pres ent the issue in this Court. Pp. 26–29. 380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499, affirmed.

R OBERTS , C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , K AVANAUGH , B ARRETT , and J ACKSON , JJ., joined. K

AVANAUGH , J., filed a concurring opinion. T HOMAS , J., filed a dissenting opinion in which G ORSUCH , J., joined, and in which A LITO , J., joined as to Part I._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 21–1271

TIMOTHY K. MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL ., PETITIONERS

v. REBECCA HARPER, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[June 27, 2023]

C HIEF J USTICE R OBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Several groups of plaintiffs challenged North Carolina’s congressional districting map as an impermissible partisan gerrymander. The plaintiffs brought claims under North Carolina’s Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll elections shall be free.” Art. I, §10. Relying on that provision, as well as the State Constitution’s equal protection, free speech, and free assembly clauses, the North Carolina Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiffs and struck down the legislature’s map. The Court concluded that North Caro

lina’s Legislature deliberately drew the State’s congres

sional map to favor Republican candidates. In drawing the State’s congressional map, North Caro

lina’s Legislature exercised authority under the Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution, which expressly re

quires “the Legislature” of each State to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of ” federal elections. Art. I, §4, cl. 1. We decide today whether that Clause vests state leg

-2 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court
islatures with authority to se t rules governing federal elec

tions free from restrictions imposed under state law.

I The Elections Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa

tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Ibid . The Clause “imposes” on state legislatures the “duty” to prescribe rules governing federal elections. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. , 570 U. S. 1, 8 (2013). It also guards “against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives” by authorizing Congress to prescribe its own rules. Ibid.

A
The 2020 decennial census showed that North Carolina’s population had increased by ne arly one million people, en

titling the State to an additional seat in its federal congres

sional delegation. U. S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Ap

portionment Results (2021) (Table A). Following those results, North Carolina’s General Assembly set out to re

draw the State’s congressional districts. North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, Inc. v. Representative Destin Hall , 21 CVS 015426 etc. (Super. Ct. Wake Cty., N. C., Dec. 3, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a–261a, rev’d and re

manded on other grounds, Harper v. Hall , 380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499 (2022) ( Harper I ). The General Assembly also drafted new maps for the State’s legislative districts, including the State House and the State Senate. Id. , at 328–329, 868 S. E. 2d, at 513. In November 2021, the As

sembly enacted three new maps, each passed along party lines. Id. , at 329, 868 S. E. 2d, at 513; see N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §120–1 (2021) (State Senate); §120–2 (State House); §163–201 (U. S. House of Representatives).3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court Shortly after the new maps became law, several groups of plaintiffs—including the North Carolina League of Con

servation Voters, Common Cause, and individual voters— sued in state court. The plaintiffs asserted that each map constituted an impermissible partisan gerrymander in vio

lation of the North Carolina Constitution. Harper I , 380 N. C., at 329–330, 868 S. E. 2d, at 513–514. 1 At trial before a three-judge panel of the Wake County Superior Court, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony and other evidence to support their claims that North Carolina’s General Assem

bly drew state legislative and federal congressional maps to favor Republican candidates. Id. , at 332, 868 S. E. 2d, at 515. The trial court agreed, finding that the General As

sembly’s 2021 congressional districting map was “a parti

san outlier intentionally and carefully designed to maxim

ize Republican advantage in North Carolina’s Con

gressional delegation.” Id. , at 345, 868 S. E. 2d, at 522 (in

ternal quotation marks omitted) . But the court denied re

lief, reasoning that the partisan gerrymandering claims “amounted to political questions that are nonjusticiable un

der the North Carolina Constitution.” Id. , at 348, 868 S. E. 2d, at 524. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislative defendants violated state law “beyond a reasonable doubt” by enacting maps that constituted parti

san gerrymanders. Id. , at 353, 868 S. E. 2d, at 528. It also rejected the trial court’s conclusion that partisan gerryman

dering claims present a nonjusticiable political question. Ibid. The Court acknowledged our decision in Rucho v. Common Cause , which held “that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.” 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 30);

——————

1 The plaintiffs also asserted that North Carolina’s Legislature dis

criminated on the basis of race and raised other claims under the North Carolina Constitution. Harper I , 380 N. C., at 350–352, 868 S. E. 2d, at 526–527. Those claims are not at issue today.4 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

see Harper I , 380 N. C., at 360–361, 868 S. E. 2d, at 532– 533. But “simply because the Supreme Court has concluded partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable in fed

eral courts,” the court explained, “it does not follow that they are nonjusticiable in North Carolina courts.” Id. , at 361, 868 S. E. 2d, at 533. The State Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the Elections Clause in the Fed

eral Constitution vests excl usive and independent author

ity in state legislatures to draw congressional maps. Id. , at 390–391, 868 S. E. 2d, at 551–552. After holding that the 2021 districting maps “substan

tially infringe upon plaintiffs’ fundamental right to equal voting power,” the Court struck down the maps and re

manded the case to the trial “court to oversee the redrawing of the maps by the General Assembly or, if necessary, by the court.” Id. , at 403, 868 S. E. 2d, at 559. The Court en

tered judgment on February 15, 2022. Harper v. Hall

, No. 413PA21, App. to Pet. for Cert. 306–309. Two days later, the General Assembly adopted a remedial congres

sional redistricting plan. See 2022 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 3, §2. But the trial court rejecte d that plan and adopted in its place interim maps developed by several Special Masters for use in the 2022 North Caroli na congressional elections. North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, Inc. v. Rep

resentative Destin Hall , 21 CVS 015426 etc. (Super. Ct. Wake Cty., N. C., Feb. 23, 2022), App. to Pet. for Cert. 278a–279a, aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, Har

per v. Hall , 383 N. C. 89, 881 S. E. 2d 156 (2022) ( Harper II ). On February 25, 2022, the legislative defendants filed an emergency application in this Court, citing the Elections Clause and requesting a stay of the North Carolina Su

preme Court’s decision. We declined to issue emergency re

lief but later granted certiorari. 597 U. S. ___ (2022).5 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court

B Following our grant of certiorari, the North Carolina Su

preme Court heard an appeal concerning the trial court’s remedial order. In December 2022, the Court issued a de

cision affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case. As relevant, it agreed with the trial court’s deter

mination that the General Assembly’s remedial congres

sional plan “fell short” of the requirements set forth in Har

per I

. Harper II , 383 N. C., at 125, 881 S. E. 2d, at 181. The legislative defendants sought rehearing, requesting that the North Carolina Supreme Court “withdraw” its re

medial opinion in Harper II . Pet. for Rehearing in Harper

v. Hall , No. 413PA21, p. 25 (Jan. 20, 2023) (Pet. for Rehear

ing). They also asked the Cou rt to “overrule” its decision in Harper I , although they conceded that doing so would not “negate the force of its order striking down the 2021 plans.” Pet. for Rehearing 24. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted rehearing in Harper II , and we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing concerning our jurisdiction over this case in light of that decision. Following the parties’ submission of supplemental briefs in this Court, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision granting the requests made by the legislative de

fendants. The Court withdrew its opinion in Harper II , con

cerning the remedial maps, and “overruled” its decision in Harper I . See Harper v. Hall , ___ N. C. ___, 886 S. E. 2d 393 (2023). Relying on our decision in Rucho and on a re

newed look at the constitutional provisions at issue, the Court repudiated Harper I ’s conclusion that partisan ger

rymandering claims are justiciable under the North Caro

lina Constitution. See ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 431. The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the plain

tiffs’ claims with prejudice. Id. , at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 401. But it did not reinstate the 2021 congressional plans that Harper I had struck down under the North Carolina Con

-6 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court
stitution. ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448. In

stead, the Court provided the General Assembly with the “opportunity to enact a new set of legislative and congres

sional redistricting plans, guided by federal law, the objec

tive constraints in Article II, Sections 3 and 5 [of the North Carolina Constitution], and this opinion.” Id. , at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 448. The Court did not revisit Harper I ’s con

clusion that the Federal Elections Clause does not shield state legislatures from review by state courts for compli

ance with state constitutional provisions. ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 422 (“The General Assembly exercises [re

districting] authority subject to the express limitations in our constitution and in federal law.”). We invited the par

ties to submit additional supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the Court’s decision on our jurisdiction.

II Before turning to the merits, we must “determine as a threshold matter that we have jurisdiction.” Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller , 486 U. S. 174, 178 (1988). The Con

stitution provides for our ju risdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. That constitutional require

ment ensures that the parties before us retain a “personal stake” in the litigation. Baker v. Carr , 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). As “[a] corollary to th is case-or-controversy require

ment,” there must exist a dispute “at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U. S. 66, 71 (2013) (in

ternal quotation marks omitted). Mootness doctrine “ad

dresses whether an intervening circumstance has deprived the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the law

suit.” West Virginia v. EPA , 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 15) (alterations and internal quotation marks omit

ted). The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to with

draw Harper II and overrule Harper I does not moot this7 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court case. The plaintiffs here sought to enjoin the use of the 2021 plans enacted by the legislative defendants. Harper I granted that relief, and in do ing so rejected the Elections Clause defense at issue before us. 380 N. C., at 403, 868 S. E. 2d, at 559. Prior to both the appeal and rehearing proceedings in Harper II , the North Carolina Supreme Court had already entered the judgment and issued the mandate in Harper I . See App. to Pet. for Cert. 306–309. And the time during which the defendants could seek re

hearing as to that judgment had long since passed. See N. C. Rule App. Proc. 31(a) (2023) (requiring that a rehear

ing petition be brought within 15 days of the issuance of the mandate). Recognizing this reality, the legislative defend

ants did not ask the North Carolina Supreme Court to dis

turb the judgment in Harper I as part of the rehearing pro

ceedings. They instead ackn owledged that they would remain bound by Harper I ’s decision enjoining the use of the 2021 plans. See Pet. for Rehearing 24 (“[O]verruling Harper I will not negate the force of its order striking down the 2021 plans.”). The North Carolina Supreme Court “overruled” Harper I

, thereby granting the specific relief requested by the legis

lative defendants. As a result, partisan gerrymandering claims are no longer justiciable under the State’s Constitu

tion. Harper , ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449. But although the defendants may now draw new congressional maps, they agree that the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled only the “ reasoning of Harper I ” and did not “dis

turb . . . its judgment nor . . . alter the presently operative statutes of North Carolina.” Second Supp. Letter Brief for Petitioners 3. In other words, although partisan gerryman

dering claims are no longer viable under the North Carolina Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court has done nothing to alter the effect of the judgment in Harper I en

joining the use of the 2021 maps. As a result, the legislative defendants’ path to complete re lief runs through this Court.8 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court Were we to reverse the judgment in Harper I —a step not taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court—the 2021 plans enacted by the legislative defendants would again take effect. The parties accord ingly continue to have a “per

sonal stake in the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit.” Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quota

tion marks omitted). A North Carolina statute with specific application to this proceeding confirms that the controversy before us remains live. Under state law, if “the United States Supreme Court . . . reverses” the decision in Harper I , the 2021 maps will again become “effective.” 2022 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 10, §2. We have previously found such trigger provisions—in North Carolina, no less—sufficient to avoid mootness under Article III. See Hunt v. Cromartie , 526 U. S. 541, 546, n. 1 (1999) (“Because the State’s 1998 law provides that the State will revert to the 1997 districting plan upon a favora

ble decision of this Court . . . this case is not moot.”). We also have jurisdiction to review the judgment in Har

per I under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). That statute provides for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” Ibid. We have, however, “recur

ringly encountered situations in which the highest court of a State has finally determined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are further proceed

ings in the lower state courts to come.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975). Cox Broadcasting delineated “at least four categories of such cases in which the Court has treated the decision on the federal issue as a final judgment for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. §1257,” despite “additional proceedings anticipated in the lower state courts.” Ibid. As relevant, the second category includes those “cases . . . in which the federal is

sue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of9 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court future state-court proceedings.” Id. , at 480. Harper I fits within this second category of cases de

scribed in Cox Broadcasting . By striking down the 2021 congressional plans enacted by the General Assembly, Har

per I “finally decided” the “federal issue” whether the Elec

tions Clause insulates state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law. See 380 N. C., at 390–391, 868 S. E. 2d, at 551–552. That issue both has survived and requires decision because subsequent pro

ceedings have neither altered Harper I ’s analysis of the fed

eral issue nor negated the effe ct of its judgment striking down the 2021 plans. In its decision “overruling” Harper I

, the North Carolina Supreme Court in fact reaffirmed that it retains the authority to re view congressional districting plans for compliance with state law. Harper , ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 422. That the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Har

per I does not affect the judgment in that case for purposes of §1257(a). “[T]he res judicata consequences of a final, un

appealed judgment on the merits” are not “altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.” Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie , 452 U. S. 394, 398 (1981). The North Carolina Supreme Court has said much the same. East Carolina Lumber Co. v. West , 247 N. C. 699, 701, 102 S. E. 2d, 248, 249 (1958) (“An erroneous or irregular judgment binds the parties thereto until cor

rected in a proper manner.”). That Court did not purport to alter or amend in any way the judgment in Harper I . In short, the record before us shows that Harper I “finally de

cided” the Elections Clause issue, which has survived sub

sequent proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court such that it continues to “requi re decision” by this Court. Cox Broadcasting , 420 U. S., at 480. J USTICE T HOMAS sees it differently. He correctly ob

-10 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court serves that the North Carolina Supreme Court has now dis

missed the plaintiffs’ claims wi th prejudice. He posits, therefore, that the legislative defendants “are not injured by the judgment of Harper I .” Post , at 5 (dissenting opin

ion). But the record before us belies that notion. Harper I enjoined the use of the 2021 maps in subsequent elections in North Carolina. Well after the time for seeking rehear

ing as to that judgment passed, the legislative defendants instead sought rehearing with respect to Harper II , a dis

tinct decision concerning remedies. The defendants stead

fastly maintained in rehearing proceedings before the North Carolina Supreme Court that “overruling Harper I [would] not negate the force of its order striking down the 2021 plans.” Pet. for Rehearing 24; see also Legislative De

fendants’ Supp. Brief on Rehearing in Harper v. Hall

, No. 413PA21–2, p. 56 (N. C., Feb. 17, 2023) (“[T]he Court’s dictate that the 2021 plans may not be used ‘in any future elections’ would not be vacate d.”). With those concessions on the record, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision “overruling” Harper I , and—by contrast—“with

draw[ing]” its decision in Harper II

. Harper , ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449. And mirroring their representa

tions before the North Carolina Supreme Court, the legis

lative defendants now maintain in this Court that they con

tinue to remain bound by the judgment in Harper I

. In an effort to cast doubt on these consistent representa

tions by the injured party before us, J USTICE T HOMAS con

tends that the legislative defendants have already received complete relief because nothing now prevents the imple

mentation of the 2021 maps. Post , at 15 (dissenting opin

ion). For the reasons stated above, that would come as a surprise to both the legislative defendants and the North Carolina Supreme Court. The dissent also emphasizes that several of the plaintiffs contest our jurisdiction. Post , at 6. But that has been their position from the very beginning,11 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court
and it did not prevent our granting certiorari. The conces

sions offered by the legislativ e defendants as part of the re

hearing proceedings, the recent opinion issued by the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the legislative defendants’ briefing in this Court all tell the same story: Harper I con

tinues to enjoin the use of the 2021 maps. Following the dissent’s logic and dismissing th is case as moot would fore

close the one path to full relief available to the legislative defendants: A decision by th is Court reversing the judg

ment in Harper I

. This Court has before it a judgment issued by a State’s highest court that adjudicates a federal constitutional is

sue. The defendants did not ask the North Carolina Su

preme Court to vacate that judgment, that court did not purport to do so, and the defendants now concede that they remain bound by it. Cox Broadcasting considered our exer

cise of jurisdiction where the “federal issue . . . will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.” 420 U. S., at 480. Unlike cases in which we must anticipate what the future might hold, we now know the resolution of the anticipated state court pro

ceedings. The record shows that Harper I finally decided the Elections Clause question, the judgment in that case continues to bind the parties before us, and the 2021 con

gressional maps would again take effect in North Carolina were we to reverse. Accordin gly, we have jurisdiction under both Article III and §1257(a).

III The question on the merits is whether the Elections Clause insulates state legislat ures from review by state courts for compliance with state law. Since early in our Nation’s history, courts have recog

nized their duty to evaluate the constitutionality of legisla

tive acts. We announced our re sponsibility to review laws12 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court that are alleged to violate the Federal Constitution in Marbury v. Madison , proclaiming that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Marbury confronted and rejected the argument that Congress may exceed con

stitutional limits on the exercise of its authority. “Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions,” we rea

soned, “contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legis

lature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.” Ibid. Marbury proclaimed our authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitution, but it did not fashion this concept out of whole cloth. Before the Constitutional Con

vention convened in the summer of 1787, a number of state courts had already moved “in isolated but important cases to impose restraints on what the legislatures were enacting as law.” G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, pp. 454–455 (1969). Although judicial review emerged cautiously, it matured throughout the founding era. These state court decisions provided a model for James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and others who would later defend the principle of judicial review. In the 1786 case Trevett v. Weeden , for example, lawyer James Varnum challenged a Rhode Island statute on the ground that it failed to provide the right to a jury trial. Alt

hough Rhode Island lacked a written constitution, Varnum argued that the State nevertheless had a constitution re

flecting the basic historical righ ts of the English. And, he contended, the courts must honor “the principles of the con

stitution in preference to any a cts of the General Assembly.” J. Varnum, The Case, Trevett v. Weeden, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary History 424 (1971). Varnum won, to the dismay of the State’s legisla

ture, which replaced four of the five judges involved. W. Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury , 58 Stan. L. Rev.13 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court 455, 478 (2005). His arguments were published as a pam

phlet, which “may well have been the most prominent dis

cussion of judicial review at the time of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention.” Id. , at 477. The North Carolina Supreme Court played its own part in establishing judicial review. In Bayard v. Singleton , the court considered the constitutionality of a 1785 Act by the State’s General Assembly that prevented British loyalists from challenging property seizures before a jury. 1 Mort. 48 (1787). The court held the Act “abrogated and without any effect,” for “it was clear” t hat the legislature could not pass an Act that “could by any means repeal or alter the constitution.” Id. , at 50. Otherwise, the legislature “would at the same instant of time, destroy their own existence as a Legislature, and dissolve the government thereby estab

lished.” Ibid. James Iredell, who would later serve as an inaugural Justice of this Court, penned at the time an open letter “To the Public” expounding a robust concept of judi

cial review. 2 Life and Correspondence of James Iredell 145 (1846). “[T]he power of the Assembly,” he wrote, “is limited and defined by the constitution.” Id. , at 146. The legisla

ture, after all, “is a creature of the constitution.” Ibid. North Carolina and Rhode Island did not stand alone. See, e.g. , Holmes v. Walton (N. J. 1780), described in A. Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 Am. Hist. Rev. 456 (1899); State v. Parkhurst , 9 N. J. L. 427, 444 (1802) (citing Holmes as holding that a statute providing for a six-person jury was “unconstitutional”). All told, “[s]tate courts in at least seven states invalidated state or local laws under their State constitutions before 1787,” which “laid the foundation for judicial review.” J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions 13 (2018). The Framers recognized state decisions exercising judi

cial review at the Constituti onal Convention of 1787. On July 17, James Madison spoke in favor of a federal council of revision that could negate laws passed by the States. He14 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court lauded the Rhode Island judges “who refused to execute an unconstitutional law,” lamenting that the State’s legisla

ture then “displaced” them to substitute others “who would be willing instruments of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 28 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). A week later, Madison extolled as one of the key virtues of a constitutional system that “[a] law violating a constitution established by the peo

ple themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.” Id. , at 93. Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massa

chusetts, also spoke in favor of judicial review. (Known for drawing a contorted legislative district that looked like a salamander, Gerry later became the namesake for the “ger

rymander.”) At the Convention, he noted that “[i]n some States the Judges had [actually] set aside laws as being agst. the Constitution.” 1 id ., at 97 (alteration in original by James Madison). Such judicial review, he noted, was met “with general approbation.” Ibid. Writings in defense of the proposed Constitution echoed these comments. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Ham

ilton maintained that “courts of justice” have the “duty .

. . to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Con

stitution void.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). “[T]his doctrine” of judicial review, he also wrote, was “equally applicable to most if not all the State govern

ments.” Id. , No. 81, at 482. State cases, debates at the Convention, and writings de

fending the Constitution all advanced the concept of judicial review. And in the years im mediately following ratifica

tion, courts grew assured of th eir power to void laws incom

patible with constitutional provisions. See Treanor, 58 Stan. L. Rev., at 473, 497–498. The idea that courts may review legislative action was so “long and well established” by the time we decided Marbury in 1803 that Chief Justice Marshall referred to judicial re view as “one of the funda

mental principles of our society.” 1 Cranch, at 176–177.15 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court

IV
We are asked to decide whether the Elections Clause carves out an exception to this basic principle. We hold that it does not. The Elections Clause does not insulate state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial re

view.

A We first considered the interplay between state constitu

tional provisions and a state legislature’s exercise of au

thority under the Elections Clause in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant , 241 U. S. 565 (1916). There, we examined the application to the Elections Clause of a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the State’s voters “to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law enacted by the Gen

eral Assembly.” Id. , at 566. In 1915, the Ohio General As

sembly drew new congressional districts, which the State’s voters then rejected through such a popular referendum. Asked to disregard the referendum, the Ohio Supreme Court refused, explaining t hat the Elections Clause—while “conferring the power therein defined upon the various state legislatures”—did not preclude subjecting legislative Acts under the Clause to “a popular vote.” State ex rel. Da

vis v. Hildebrant , 94 Ohio St. 154, 163, 114 N. E. 55, 58 (1916). We unanimously affirmed, rejecting as “plainly without substance” the contention that “to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportion

ment is repugnant to §4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].” Hildebrant , 241 U. S., at 569; see also Hawke v. Smith , 253 U. S. 221, 230–231 (1920) (describing Hildebrant as holding that “the referendum provision of the state constitution when applied to a law redistricting the State with a view to representation in Congress was not unconstitutional”). Smiley v. Holm , decided 16 years after Hildebrant , con

sidered the effect of a Governor’s veto of a state redistricting16 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court plan. 285 U. S. 355, 361 (1932). Following the 15th decen

nial census in 1930, Minnesota lost one seat in its federal congressional delegation. Th e State’s legislature divided Minnesota’s then nine congressional districts in 1931 and sent its Act to the Governor for his approval. The Governor vetoed the plan pursuant to his authority under the State’s Constitution. But the Minneso ta Secretary of State never

theless began to implement the legislature’s map for up

coming elections. A citizen sued, contending that the legis

lature’s map “was a nullity in that, after the Governor’s veto, it was not repassed by the legislature as required by law.” Id. , at 362. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed. In its view, “the authority so given by” the Elections Clause “is unrestricted, unlimited, and absolute.” State ex rel. Smi

ley v. Holm , 184 Minn. 228, 242, 238 N. W. 494, 501 (1931). The Elections Clause, it held, conferred upon the legislature “the exclusive right to redistri ct” such that its actions were “beyond the reach of the judiciary.” Id. , at 243, 238 N. W., at 501. We unanimously reversed. A state legislature’s “exercise of . . . authority” under the Elections Clause, we held, “must be in accordance with the method which the State has pre

scribed for legislative enactments.” Smiley , 285 U. S., at 367. Nowhere in the Federal Constitution could we find “provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.” Id. , at 368. Smiley relied on founding-era provisions, constitutional structure, and historical practice, each of which we found persuasive. Two States at the time of the founding provided a veto power, restrictions that were “well known.” Ibid. (cit

ing provisions in Massachusetts and New York). Subjecting state legislatures to such a limitation “was no more incon

gruous with the grant of legislative authority to regulate congressional elections than the fact that the Congress in17 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court
making its regulations under the same provision would be subject to the veto power of the President.” Ibid. ; see also Wesberry v. Sanders , 376 U. S. 1, 6 (1964) (Congress does not have “exclusive authority” under the Elections Clause, independent of other federal co nstitutional provisions). And “long and continuous inte rpretation” as evidenced by “the established practice in the states” provided further support. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 369. We noted that many state constitutions had adopted provisions allowing for ex

ecutive vetoes, “and that the uniform practice . . . has been to provide for congressional districts by the enactment of statutes with the participation of the Governor wherever the state constitution provided for such participation.” Id.

, at 370. This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hilde

brant and Smiley in a case considering the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative. Voters “amended Arizona’s Constitution to remo ve redistricting authority from the Ar

izona Legislature and vest that authority in an independent commission.” Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Inde

pendent Redistricting Comm’n , 576 U. S. 787, 792 (2015). The Arizona Legislature challenged a congressional map adopted by the commission, arguing that the Elections “Clause precludes resort to an independent commission .

. . to accomplish redistricting.” Ibid. A divided Court rejected that argument. The majority reasoned that dictionaries of “the founding era . . . capaciously define[d] the word ‘legis

lature,’ ” id. , at 813–814, and concluded that the people of Arizona retained the authority to create “an alternative leg

islative process” by vesting the lawmaking power of redis

tricting in an independent commission, id. , at 817. The Court ruled, in short, that although the Elections Clause expressly refers to the “Legislature,” it does not preclude a State from vesting congressional redistricting authority in a body other than the elected group of officials who ordinar

ily exercise lawmaking power. States, the Court explained,18 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court “retain autonomy to establish their own governmental pro

cesses.” Id. , at 816. The significant point for present purposes is that the Court in Arizona State Legislature recognized that what

ever authority was responsible for redistricting, that entity remained subject to constraints set forth in the State Con

stitution. The Court embraced the core principle espoused in Hildebrant and Smiley “that redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the refer

endum and the Governor’s veto.” 576 U. S., at 808; see also id. , at 840–841 (R OBERTS , C. J., dissenting) (recognizing that Hildebrant and Smiley support the imposition of “some constraints on the legislature” ). The Court dismissed the argument that the Elections Clause divests state constitu

tions of the power to enforce ch ecks against the exercise of legislative power: “Nothing in [the Elections] Clause in

structs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.” 576 U. S., at 817–818 (majority opin

ion). The reasoning we unanimously embraced in Smiley com

mands our continued respect: A state legislature may not “create congressional districts independently of ” require

ments imposed “by the state cons titution with respect to the enactment of laws.” 285 U. S., at 373.

B The legislative defendants and the dissent both contend that, because the Federal Constitution gives state legisla

tures the power to regulate congressional elections, only that Constitution can restrain th e exercise of that power. Brief for Petitioners 22; post , at 17 (opinion of T HOMAS , J.). The legislative defendants cite for support Federalist No. 78, which explains that the wielding of legislative19 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court power is constrained by “the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised.” The Federalist No. 78, at 466; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. This argument simply ignores the precedent just de

scribed. Hildebrant

, Smiley , and Arizona State Legislature each rejected the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections. The argument advanced by the defendants and the dis

sent also does not account for the Framers’ understanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents that give them life. Leg

islatures, the Framers recognized, “are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators.” 2 Farrand 88. “What are Legislatures? Crea

tures of the Constitution; they owe their existence to the Constitution: they derive thei r powers from the Constitu

tion: It is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance , 2 Dall. 304, 308 (Pa. 1795). Marbury confirmed this understanding, 1 Cranch, at 176– 177, and nothing in the text of the Elections Clause under

mines it. When a state legislature carries out its constitu

tional power to prescribe rules regulating federal elections, the “commission under which” it exercises authority is two

fold. The Federalist No. 78, at 467. The legislature acts both as a lawmaking body created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity assigned particular author

ity by the Federal Constitution. Both constitutions restrain the legislature’s exercise of power. Turning to our precedents, the defendants quote from our analysis of the Electors Clause in McPherson v. Blacker

, 146 U. S. 1 (1892). That Clause—similar to the Elections Clause—provides that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a [specified]20 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court Number of Electors.” Art. II, §1, cl. 2. McPherson consid

ered a challenge to the Michigan Legislature’s decision to allocate the State’s electora l votes among the individual congressional districts, rather than to the State as a whole. We upheld that decision, explaining that in choosing Presi

dential electors, the Clause “leaves it to the legislature ex

clusively to define the method of effecting the object.” 146 U. S., at 27. Our decision in McPherson , however, had nothing to do with any conflict between provisions of the Michigan Con

stitution and action by the St ate’s legislature—the issue we confront today. McPherson instead considered whether Michigan’s Legislature itself directly violated the Electors Clause (by taking from the “Sta te” the power to appoint and vesting that power in separate districts), the Fourteenth Amendment (by allowing voters to vote for only one Elector rather than “Electors”), and a particular federal statute. Id. , at 8–9 (argument for plaintiffs in error). Nor does the quote highlighted by petitioners tell the whole story. Chief Justice Fuller’s opinion for the Court explained that “[t]he legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State .” Id. , at 25 (emphasis added); see also ibid. (“What is forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or required of the legislative power un

der state constitutions as they exist.”). The legislative defendants and J USTICE T HOMAS rely as well on our decision in Leser v. Garnett , 258 U. S. 130 (1922), but it too offers little support. See post , at 17, 20– 21. Leser addressed an argument that the Nineteenth Amendment—providing women the right to vote—was in

valid because state constitutional provisions “render[ed] in

operative the alleged ratifications by their legislatures.” 258 U. S., at 137. We rejected that position, holding that when state legislatures ratify amendments to the Constitu

tion, they carry out “a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution,” which “transcends any limitations21 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court sought to be imposed by the people of a State.” Ibid. But the legislature in Leser performed a ratifying func

tion rather than engaging in traditional lawmaking. The provisions at issue in today’ s case—like the provisions ex

amined in Hildebrant and Smiley —concern a state legisla

ture’s exercise of lawmaking power. And as we held in Smi

ley , when state legislatures act pursuant to their Elections Clause authority, they engage in lawmaking subject to the typical constraints on the exercise of such power. 285 U. S., at 367. We have already distinguished Leser on those grounds. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 365–366. In addition, Leser cited for support our decision in Hawke v. Smith , which sharply separated ratification “from legislative action” un

der the Elections Clause. 253 U. S., at 228. Lawmaking under the Elections Clause, Hawke explained, “is entirely different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution.” Id. , at 231. Hawke and Smiley delineated the various roles that the Constitution assigns to state legislatures. Legislatures act as “Consent[ing]” bodies when the Nation purchases land, Art. I, §8, cl. 17; as “Ratif[ying]” bodies when they agree to proposed Constitutional amendments, Art. V; and—prior to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment—as “electoral” bodies when they choose United States Senators, Smiley

, 285 U. S., at 365; see also Art. I, §3, cl. 1; Amdt. 17 (provid

ing for the direct election of Senators). By fulfilling their constitutio nal duty to craft the rules governing federal elections, state legislatures do not con

sent, ratify, or elect—they make laws. Elections are com

plex affairs, demanding rules that dictate everything from the date on which voters will go to the polls to the dimen

sions and font of individual ballots. Legislatures must “pro

vide a complete code for cong ressional elections,” including regulations “relati[ng] to noti ces, registration, supervision22 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and cor

rupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election re

turns.” Smiley , 285 U. S., at 366. In contrast, a simple up

or-down vote suffices to ratify an amendment to the Consti

tution. Providing consent to the purchase of land or elect

ing Senators involves similarly straightforward exercises of authority. But fashioning re gulations governing federal elections “unquestionably calls for the exercise of lawmak

ing authority.” Arizona State Legislature , 576 U. S., at 808,

n. 17. And the exercise of such authority in the context of the Elections Clause is subject to the ordinary constraints on lawmaking in the state constitution. In sum, our precedents have long rejected the view that legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely fed

eral in character, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution.

C Addressing our decisions in Smiley and Hildebrant , both the legislative defendants and J USTICE T HOMAS concede that at least some state constitutional provisions can re

strain a state legislature’s ex ercise of authority under the Elections Clause. But they read those cases to differentiate between procedural and substantive constraints. Brief for Petitioners 24; post , at 21–22 (opinion of T HOMAS , J.). Smi

ley , in their view, stands for the proposition that state con

stitutions may impose only procedural hoops through which legislatures must jump in crafting rules governing federal elections. This concededly “f ormalistic” approach views the Governor’s veto at issue in Smiley as one such procedural restraint. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62. But when it comes to sub

stantive provisions, their argu ment goes, our precedents have nothing to say. This argument adopts too cramped a view of our decision in Smiley . Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion for the Court23 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court drew no distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” restraints on lawmaking. It turned on the view that state constitutional provisions apply to a legislature’s exercise of lawmaking authority under the Elections Clause, with no concern about how those provisio ns might be categorized. 285 U. S., at 367–368; see also Hildebrant , 241 U. S., at 569–570. The same goes for the Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature . The defendants attempt to cabin that case by arguing that the Court did not address substantive limits on the regulation of federal elections. But as in Smiley , the Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature discussed no difference between procedure and substance. The dissent reads Smiley and Arizona State Legislature in a different light. J USTICE T HOMAS thinks those cases say nothing about whether a State can impose “substantive lim

its” on the legislature’s exercise of power under the Elec

tions Clause. Post , at 21. But in Smiley , we addressed whether “the conditions which attach to the making of state laws” apply to legislatures ex ercising authority under the Elections Clause. 285 U. S., at 365. We held that they do. “Much that is urged in argume nt with regard to the mean

ing of the term ‘Legislature,’ ” we explained, “is beside the point.” Ibid. And we concluded in straightforward terms that legislatures must abide by “restriction[s] imposed by state constitutions . . . when exercising the lawmaking power” under the Elections Clause. Id. , at 369. Arizona State Legislature said much the same, emphasizing that, by its text, nothing in the Electi ons Clause offers state legisla

tures carte blanche to act “in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.” 576 U. S., at 818. The defendants and J USTICE T HOMAS do not in any event offer a defensible line between procedure and substance in this context. “The line betw een procedural and substantive law is hazy.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U. S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part); see also Shady Grove24 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U. S. 393, 419–420 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Many rules “are rationally capa

ble of classification as either.” Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U. S. 460, 472 (1965); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman , 486 U. S. 717, 726 (1988) (“Except at the extremes, the terms ‘sub

stance’ and ‘procedure’ precisel y describe very little except a dichotomy.”). Procedure, after all, is often used as a vehi

cle to achieve substantive ends. When a governor vetoes a bill because of a disagreement with its policy consequences, has the governor exercised a pr ocedural or substantive re

straint on lawmaking? Smiley did not endorse such murky inquiries into the nature of constitutional restraints, and we see no neat distinction today.

D Were there any doubt, historical practice confirms that state legislatures remain bound by state constitutional re

straints when exercising authority under the Elections Clause. We have long looked to “settled and established practice” to interpret the Constitution. The Pocket Veto Case , 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929). And we have found histor

ical practice particularly pertinent when it comes to the Elections and Electors Clauses. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 369 (Elections Clause); Chiafalo v. Washington , 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 12–14) (Electors Clause). Two state constitutional provisions adopted shortly after the founding offer the strongest evidence. Delaware’s 1792 Constitution provided that the State’s congressional repre

sentatives “shall be voted for at the same places where rep

resentatives in the State legislature are voted for, and in the same manner.” Art. VIII, §2. Even though the Elec

tions Clause stated that the “Places” and “Manner” of fed

eral elections shall be “prescribed” by the state legislatures, the Delaware Constitution ex pressly enacted rules govern

-25 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court ing the “places” and “manner” of holding elections for fed

eral office. An 1810 amendment to the Maryland Constitu

tion likewise embodied regulations falling within the scope of the Elections and Electors Clauses. Article XIV provided that every qualified citizen “shall vote, by ballot, . . . for electors of the President and Vice-President of the United States, [and] for Representatives of this State in the Con

gress of the United States.” If the Elections Clause had vested exclusive authority in state legislatures, unchecked by state courts enforcing provisions of state constitutions, these clauses would have been unenforceable from the
start. Besides the two specific prov isions in Maryland and Del

aware, multiple state constitutions at the time of the found

ing regulated federal elections by requiring that “[a]ll elec

tions shall be by ballot.” Ga. Const., Art. IV, §2 (1789); see also, e.g. , Pa. Const., Art. III, §2 (1790); Ky. Const., Art. III, cl. 2 (1792); Tenn. Const., Art. III, §3 (1796); Ohio Const., Art. IV, §2 (1803); La. Const., Art. VI, §13 (1812). These provisions directed the “manner” of federal elections within the meaning of the Elections Clause, as Madison himself explained at the Constitutional Convention. See 2 Farrand 240 (“Whether the electors should vote by ballot or vivâ voce” falls within the “great latitude” of “regulating the times places & manner of holding elections”). The legislative defendants discount this evidence. They argue that those “by ballot” provisions spoke only “to the offices that were created by” st ate constitutions, and not to the federal offices to which th e Elections Clause applies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. We find no textual hook for that strained reading. “All” meant then what it means now. In addition, the Framers did not write the Elections Clause on a blank slate—they instead borrowed from the Articles of Confederation, which provided th at “delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legisla

ture of each state shall direct.” Art. V. The two provisions26 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court closely parallel. And around the time the Articles were adopted by the Second Continental Congress, multiple States regulated the “manner” of “appoint[ing] delegates,” ibid. , suggesting that the Framers did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action from state con

stitutional provisions. See Del. Const., Art. XI (1776); Md. Const., Art. XXVII (1776); Va. Const., cls. 3–4 (1776); Pa. Const., §11 (1776); N. C. Const., Art. XXXVII (1776); Ga. Const., Art. XVI (1777); N. Y. Const., Art. XXX (1777); S. C. Const., Art. XXII (1778); Mass. Const., pt. 2, ch. IV (1780); N. H. Const., pt. II (1784). The defendants stress an 1820 convention held in Massa

chusetts to amend the Common wealth’s Constitution. Af

ter a Boston delegate proposed a provision regulating the manner of federal elections, Joseph Story—then a Justice of this Court—nixed the effort. In Story’s view, such a pro

vision would run afoul of the Elections Clause by “as

sum[ing] a control over the Legislature, which the constitu

tion of the United States does not justify.” Journal of the Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates 110 (1853). But Story’s comment elicited little discussion, and reflects the views of a jurist who, although “a brilliant and accomplished man, . . . was not a member of the Found

ing generation.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U. S. 779, 856 (1995) (T HOMAS , J., dissenting).

V A Although we conclude that the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints im

posed by state law, state courts do not have free rein. “State courts are the appropriate tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise.” Murdock v. Memphis , 20 Wall. 590, 626 (1875). At the same time, the Elections Clause expressly vests power to carry out its provisions in “the Legislature”27 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court
of each State, a deliberate choice that this Court must re

spect. As in other areas where the exercise of federal au

thority or the vindication of federal rights implicates ques

tions of state law, we have an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of that law do not evade federal law. State law, for example, “is one important source” for de

fining property rights. Tyler v. Hennepin County , 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 5); see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972) (property rights “are created and their dimensions are defined by ex

isting rules or understandings that stem from an independ

ent source such as state law”). At the same time, the Fed

eral Constitution provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Amdt. 5. As a result, States “may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests.” Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation , 524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998); see also Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980) (holding that States may not, “by ipse dixit , . . . transform private property into public property without compensation”). A similar principle applies with respect to the Contracts Clause, which provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Art. I, §10, cl. 1. In that context “we accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court.” Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand , 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938). Still, “in order that the constitutional mandate may not be

come a dead letter, we are bo und to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made.” Ibid. ; see also General Mo

tors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U. S. 181, 187 (1992). Cases raising the question whether adequate and inde

pendent grounds exist to support a state court judgment in

volve a similar inquiry. We have in those cases considered whether a state court opinion below adopted novel reason

ing to stifle the “vindication in state courts of . . . federal28 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court constitutional rights.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter

son , 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958). Running through each of these examples is the concern that state courts might read state law in such a manner as to circumvent federal constitutional provisions. Therefore, although mindful of the general rule of accepting state court interpretations of state law, we have tempered such defer

ence when required by our duty to safeguard limits imposed by the Federal Constitution. Members of this Court last discussed the outer bounds of state court review in the present context in Bush v. Gore

, 531 U. S. 98 (2000) ( per curiam ). Our decision in that case turned on an application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. , at 104–105. In separate writings, several Justices addressed whether Florida’s Su

preme Court, in construing provisions of Florida statutory law, exceeded the bounds of ordinary judicial review to an extent that its interpretation violated the Electors Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined in a concurring opinion by J USTICE T HOMAS and Justice Scalia, acknowledged the usual deference we afford state court interpretations of state law, but noted “areas in which the Constitution re

quires this Court to undertake an independent, if still def

erential, analysis of state law.” Id. , at 114. He declined to give effect to interpretations of Florida election laws by the Florida Supreme Court that “impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required.” Id. , at 115. Justice Souter, for his part, considered whether a state court inter

pretation “transcends the limit s of reasonable statutory in

terpretation to the point of supplanting the statute enacted by the ‘legislature’ within the meaning of Article II.” Id. , at 133 (Souter, J., joined by St evens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). We do not adopt these or any other test by which we can measure state court interpretations of state law in cases im

plicating the Elections Clause. The questions presented in29 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

Opinion of the Court
this area are complex and cont ext specific. We hold only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatur es to regulate federal elec

tions.

B
We decline to address whether the North Carolina Su

preme Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause. The legislative defendants did not mean

ingfully present the issue in their petition for certiorari or in their briefing, nor did they press the matter at oral argu

ment. See Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal. , 522 U. S. 192, 206–208 (1997); see also California v. Texas , 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 10). Counsel for the defendants expressly dis

claimed the argument that this Court should reassess the North Carolina Supreme Court’s reading of state law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (“We’re not asking this Court to second-guess or reassess. We say take the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision on face value and as fairly reflecting North Carolina law . . . .”). When pressed whether North Caro

lina’s Supreme Court did not fairly interpret its State Con

stitution, counsel reiterated that such an argument was “not our position in this Court.” Id. , at 54. Although coun

sel attempted to expand the scope of the argument in rebut

tal, such belated efforts do not overcome prior failures to preserve the issue for review. See this Court’s Rule 28 (“[C]ounsel making the opening argument shall present the case fairly and completely and not reserve points of sub

stance for rebuttal.”).

* * * State courts retain the authority to apply state constitu

tional restraints when legisl atures act under the power con

ferred upon them by the Elections Clause. But federal30 MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court courts must not abandon their own duty to exercise judicial review. In interpreting state law in this area, state courts may not so exceed the bounds of ordinary judicial review as to unconstitutionally intrude upon the role specifically re

served to state legislatures by Article I, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution. Because we need not decide whether that occurred in today’s case, the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court is affirmed. 2

It is so ordered.

——————

2 As noted, supra , at 5–6, the North Carolina Supreme Court withdrew the opinion in Harper II , which addressed both the remedial maps devel

oped by the General Assembly and an order by the trial court implement

ing an interim plan for the 2022 elections. The remedial order, having been withdrawn, is not before us, and our decision today does not pass on the constitutionality of any particular map adopted by the state
courts._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

K

AVANAUGH , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 21–1271

TIMOTHY K. MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL ., PETITIONERS

v. REBECCA HARPER, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[June 27, 2023]

J USTICE K AVANAUGH , concurring. I join the Court’s opinion in full. The Court today correctly concludes that state laws governing federal elections are subject to ordinary state court review, including for compliance with the relevant state constitution. Ante , at 15, 26, 29. But because the Elections Clause assigns authority respecting federal elections to state legislatures, the Court also correctly concludes that “state courts do not have free rein” in conducting that review. Ante , at 26. Therefore, a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause is subject to federal court review. Ante , at 26–30; see also Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 531 U. S. 70, 76–78 (2000) (unanimously concluding that a state court’s interpretation of state law in a federal election case presents a federal issue); cf. Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature , 592 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2020) (K AVANAUGH , J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (slip op., at 9, n. 1). Federal court review of a stat e court’s interpretation of state law in a federal electi on case “does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures .” Bush2 MOORE v. HARPER

K

AVANAUGH , J., concurring

v. Gore , 531 U. S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). The question, then, is what standard a federal court should employ to review a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause— whether Chief Justice Rehnquist’s standard from Bush v. Gore ; Justice Souter’s standard from Bush v. Gore ; the Solicitor General’s proposal in this case; or some other standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s st andard is straightforward: whether the state court “impermissibly distorted” state law “beyond what a fair reading required.” Ibid. As I understand it, Justice Souter’s standard, at least the critical language, is similar: whether the state court exceeded “the limits of reasonable” interpretation of state law. Id. , at 133 (dissenting opinion). And the Solicitor General here has proposed another similar approach: whether the state court reached a “truly aberrant” interpretation of state law. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. As I see it, all three stand ards convey essentially the same point: Federal court review of a state court’s interpretation of state law in a federal election case should be deferential, but deference is not abdication. 1 I would adopt Chief Justice Rehnquist’s straightforward standard. As able counsel for North Carolina stated at oral argument, the Rehnquist standard “best sums it up.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 131. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s standard should apply not

——————

1 I doubt that there would be a material difference in application among the standards formulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and the Solicitor General, gi ven the similarities in the three standards, at least as described above. To be sure, different judges may reach different conclusions in an individual case about whether a particular state court interpretation is impermissible under the chosen standard. But I doubt that the pr ecise formulation of the standard— assuming it is Chief Justice Rehnquist ’s, Justice Souter’s, or the Solicitor General’s—would be the decisive fa ctor in any such disagreement.3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

K

AVANAUGH , J., concurring only to state court interpretations of state statutes, but also to state court interpretations of state constitutions. And in reviewing state court interpretations of state law, “we necessarily must examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the [state] court.” Bush , 531 U. S., at 114 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). Petitioners here, however, have disclaimed any argument that the North Carolina Supreme Court misinterpreted the North Carolina Constitution or other state law. See ante , at 29. 2 For now, therefore, this Court need not, and ultimately does not, adopt any specific standard for our review of a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause. See ante , at 28 (“We do not adopt these or any other test by which we can measure state court interpretations of state law in cases implicating the Elections Clause”). Instead, the Court today says simply that “state courts do not have free rein” and “hold[s] only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review.” Ante , at 26, 29. In other words, the Court has recognized and articulated a general principle for federal court review of state court decisions in federal election cases. In the future, the Court should and presumably will distill that general principle into a more specific standard such as the one advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist. With those additional comments, I agree with the Court’s conclusions that (i) state laws governing federal elections are subject to ordinary state co urt review, and (ii) a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause is in turn s ubject to federal court review.

——————

2 Instead, petitioners make the br oader argument, which the Court today properly rejects, that the Elec tions Clause bars state courts from reviewing state laws for compliance with the relevant state constitution._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 21–1271

TIMOTHY K. MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL ., PETITIONERS

v. REBECCA HARPER, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[June 27, 2023]

J USTICE T HOMAS , with whom J USTICE G ORSUCH joins, and with whom J USTICE A LITO joins as to Part I, dissenting. This Court sits “to resolve not questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’ ” Arizona Christian School Tui

tion Organization v. Winn , 563 U. S. 125, 132 (2011); see U. S. Const., Art. III, §1. As a corollary of that basic consti

tutional principle, the Court “is without power to decide moot questions or to give advisory opinions which cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before it.” St. Pierre v. United States , 319 U. S. 41, 42 (1943) ( per curiam ). To do so would be to violate “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.” Flast v. Cohen

, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). The opinion that the Court releases today breaks that thread. It “affirms” an interlocutory state-court judgment that has since been overruled and supplanted by a final judgment resolving all claims in petitioners’ favor. The is

sue on which it opines—a federal defense to claims already dismissed on other grounds—can no longer affect the judg

ment in this litigation in any way. As such, the question is indisputably moot, and today’s majority opinion is plainly advisory. Because the writ of certiorari should be dis

missed, I respectfully dissent.2 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting

I Here is the case before us in a nutshell: A group of plain

tiffs sued various state officials under state law. The de

fendants raised both state-law and federal-law defenses. In the interlocutory judgment below, the State Supreme Court rejected both defenses and re manded for further proceed

ings. We granted review to co nsider the defendants’ federal defense. But then, in subsequent proceedings, the state court revisited defendants’ al ternative state-law defense and held that it was meritorious. As a result, the court fi

nally adjudicated the whole case in the defendants’ favor, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. This is a straightforward case of mootness. The federal defense no longer makes any difference to this case— whether we agree with the defense, disagree with it, or say nothing at all, the final judgment in this litigation will be exactly the same. The majority does not seriously contest that fact. Even so, it asserts jurisdiction to decide this freefloating defense that affects no live claim for relief, reason

ing that a justiciable case or controversy exists as long as its opinion can in any way “alter the presently operative statutes of ” a State. Ante , at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). By its own lights, the majority “is acting not as an Article III court,” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski , 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (R OBERTS , C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3), but as an ad hoc branch of a state legislature. That is em

phatically not our job. Compare U. S. Const., Art. III, §1, with N. C. Const., Art. II, §1.

A To review the history of this case is to demonstrate that the question presented is moot. In 2021, the North Carolina General Assembly passed an Act to redistrict the State forelections to the U. S. House of Representatives. Plaintiffsrespondents filed an action in st ate court, seeking to enjoin state elections officials (defendants-respondents here) from3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting conducting elections in accord with the Act. 1 They based their claim for relief on the North Carolina Constitution, which they argued prohibits excessive partisan gerryman

ders. Petitioners, state legislators representing North Caro

lina’s interest in the enforcement of the Act, see N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–72.2 (2021); Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP , 597 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 2, 8–9), raised defenses under both state and federal law. As relevant here, they argued: (1) that partisan-gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) that the State Constitution cannot restrict the General Assembly’s con

gressional districting legisl ation under the federal Elec

tions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, cl. 1. Initially, a three-judge trial court endorsed petitioners’ state-law defense and entered a final judgment dismissing plaintiffs-respondents’ claims with prejudice. But, on ap

peal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that judgment. See Harper v. Hall , 380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499 (2022) ( Harper I ). In Harper I , the court held that the 2021 Act violated the State Constitution, enjoined its im

plementation, and remanded the case to the trial court for remedial proceedings. In doing so, Harper I rejected both petitioners’ state-law justiciability defense and their fed

eral Elections Clause defense. Petitioners then sought this Court’s review of Harper I insofar as it rejected their federal defense. From the start, they faced a significant jurisdictional question. Our appel

-

——————

1 Technically, there were two state-co urt actions below. These actions have been consolidated at every stag e and can be regarded as one action for all relevant purposes. For simplicit y, I will use the singular. Also for simplicity, I focus here on plaintiffs-respondents’ challenge to the 2021 congressional districting map, putting aside their parallel challenges to the Assembly’s 2021 State House and State Senate maps.4 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting late jurisdiction over state courts is limited to “[f]inal judg

ments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). But Harper I was “a classic example of non-finality”; it was an order that resolved the issue of liability and remanded for remedial proceedings. Taylor v. Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of New Rochelle , 288 F. 2d 600, 602 (CA2 1961) (Friendly, J.). Thus, under the normal rules, Harper I would not be “reviewable by this Court.” Jefferson v. City of Tarrant , 522 U. S. 75, 81 (1997). Nonetheless, this Court’s precedents have recognized “a limited set of situations” in which “finality as to [a] federal issue ” permits our review, even in the absence of a final judgment as to the case

. O’Dell v. Espinoza , 456 U. S. 430 (1982) ( per curiam ) (emphasis added). In granting certio

rari, we relied on one of those doctrinal exceptions, prem

ised on the assumption that “the federal issue” in this case would “survive and require de cision regardless of the out

come of future state-court proceedings.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U. S. 469, 480 (1975).

As it turned out, that assumption was wrong. After Har

per I , on remand, the trial court adopted a remedial district

ing plan for the 2022 elections. Petitioners then appealed that order, taking the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court for a second time. Initially, the North Carolina Su

preme Court released an opinion applying Harper I and af

firming the trial court’s decree. Harper v. Hall

, 383 N. C. 89, 881 S. E. 2d 156 (2022) ( Harper II ). But then, after granting petitioners’ request for rehearing, the court “re

visit[ed] the crucial issue in this case: whether claims of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable under the state constitution.” Harper v. Hall , ___ N. C. ___, ___, 886 S. E. 2d 393, 399 (2023) ( Harper III ). After reexamining “the fundamental premises underlying the decisions in both Harper II and Harper I ,” the court “h[e]ld that partisan ger

-5 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissentingrymandering claims present a political question that is nonjusticiable under the North Carolina Constitution.” Id. , at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 400–401. It concluded: “This Court’s opinion in Harper I is overruled. We affirm the three-judge panel’s [original] 11 January 2022 Judgment concluding, inter alia , that claims of partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable, polit

ical questions and dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. This Court’s opinion in Harper II iswithdrawn and superseded by this opinion. The threejudge panel’s 23 February 2022 order addressing the Remedial Plans is vacated. Plaintiffs’ claims are dis

missed with prejudice.” Id. , at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449.
In short, this case is over, and petitioners won. The trial court’s original final judgment in favor of petitioners, af

firmed by the State Supreme Court in Harper III , repre

sents “the final determination of the rights of the parties” in this case. N. C. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(a) (2023). Harper I has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims for relief have been dismissed on adequate and independent state-law grounds. As a result, petitioners’ alternative Elections Clause defense to those claims no longer requires decision; the merits of that defense simply have no bearing on the judgment between the parties in this action. That is the definition of mootness for an issue. It follows that no live controversy remains before this Court. For any case or contro versy to exist here, petitioners must be injured by the judgment below, and we must be able to redress that injury by acting upon that judgment. See, e.g. , Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media

, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4); see also Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cranch 75, 86 (1807) (“The criterion [of] appel

late . . . jurisdiction, is that it revises and corrects the deci

sions of another tribunal”). But petitioners are not injured by the judgment of Harper I at all, nor could we redress any6 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting injury to petitioners by doing anything to it. Whether we accept or reject petitioners’ Elections Clause defense, plaintiffs-respondents’ claims remain dismissed. As far as this case is concerned, there simply is nothing this Court could decide that could make any difference to who wins or what happens next in any lower court. That is the defini

tion of mootness for an appellate proceeding. The United States understands this. See Supplemental Letter Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3 (May 11, 2023) (“[T]he question this Court granted certiorari to de

cide is now moot because the Co urt’s resolution of that ques

tion could not affect the dispositio n of this case”). So do the elections officials whose conduct Harper I once enjoined. Supplemental Brief for State Respondents 1 (May 11, 2023) (“[T]his case is moot”). So, too, do the plaintiffs-respondents who started this case in the first place. See Letter Brief for North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, Inc., et al. 2 (May 11, 2023) (“The North Carolina Supreme Court’s February 2022 judgment reversing the same January 11, 2022 trial-court judgment that the North Carolina Supreme Court just affirmed is now a nullity”); Supplemental Letter Brief for Rebecca Harper et al . 1 (May 11, 2023) (“Petition

ers have won a full victory in state court”). As one group of plaintiffs-respondents put it, “there is no non-frivolous ba

sis for jurisdiction here.” Ibid.

B The majority does not contest that the Elections Clauseissue in this case was only a defense to plaintiffsrespondents’ claims for relief. Nor does it deny that Harper III overruled Harper I and affirmed the very same trialcourt judgment that Harper I had reversed. And it concedes that, as a result, plaintiffs-respondents’ claims have been dismissed in full on state-law nonjusticiability grounds. Thus, the majority does not contend that its opinion on the7 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting Elections Clause issue could make any difference to the fi

nal judgment “adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties” in this case. N. C. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b). That should be the end of the discussion. Be

cause the question presented “cannot affect the rights of [the] litigants in the case before [us],” we “are without power to decide” it. North Carolina v. Rice , 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) ( per curiam ). Nonetheless, the majority finds that the judgment below still presents a live Article III case or controversy; it then further concludes that the question presented has survived and requires decision under Cox Broadcasting

. 2 See ante , at 6–11. In doing so, it relies extensively on petitioners’ “representations” that they “remain bound by the judgment in Harper I .” Ante , at 10; see also ante , at 5, 7, 11. But, of course, parties’ mere representations that they are injured never carry their “burden of demonstrating that they have standing” in this Court. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 15) (emphasis added). Nor can such representations affect our “independent obligation to assure ourselves that jurisd iction is proper before pro

ceeding to the merits.” Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. , 554 U. S. 316, 324 (2008). To ensure that it has jurisdiction here, the majority must explain how petitioners’ federa l defense could still affect “the rights of [the] litigants in th[is] case.” Rice

, 404 U. S., at 246. It fails to do so. Instead, it mostly points to irrele

-

——————

2 In this case, these two inquiries ar e identical, making the majority ’s bifurcated analysis somewhat artifici al. To say that an issue “will sur

vive and require decision,” as Cox Broadcasting uses the phrase, simply means that it will not become moot, generally through some other issue independently resolving the case (precisely what happened here). See,
e.g. , Pierce County v. Guillen , 537 U. S. 129, 141, n. 5 (2003); Florida v. Thomas , 532 U. S. 774, 779 (2001); Jefferson v. City of Tarrant , 522 U. S. 75, 82–83 (1997); Cox Broadcasting, 420 U. S., at 478, 480–481, and n. 9.8 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting vant facts about the procedural history of this case and mis

applies civil-procedure rules as if Harper I and Harper III did not involve the same case. But the error that actually drives the majority’s conclusion is much deeper. The ma

jority evidently thinks that when Harper I held the 2021 Act unconstitutional, it entered a “judgment” affecting the 2021 Act as a statute , independent of its application to the legal rights of the litigants in this case. And the majority thinks that to reverse Harper I ’s “judgment” would “negate the force of its order striking down” the Act, thus “alter[ing] the presently operative statutes of North Carolina.” Ante

, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, of course, the judicial power does not “opera te on legal rules in the ab

stract”; it operates on the rights and liabilities of contend

ing parties with adverse legal interests. California v. Texas , 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8) (internal quo

tation marks omitted). The majority’s reasoning cannot be squared with the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the case-or-controversy requireme nt, or the nature of judi

cial review. I start by clearing away some of the brush. True, Harper III did not expressly “revisit” the Elections Clause issue,
ante , at 6; true as well, petitioners did not obtain rehearing of Harper I , see ante , at 7. But none of that matters because Harper III ’s final judgment mooted the Elections Clause is

sue in this case by dismissing plaintiffs-respondents’ claims on alternative state-law grounds. 3 Likewise, the idea that

——————

3 Incidentally, the majority seriou sly errs when it says that Harper III “reaffirmed” Harper I ’s Elections Clause holding, ante , at 9, apparently referencing Harper III ’s statement that “[t]he General Assembly exer

cises [redistricting] authority subjec t to the express limitations in our constitution and in federal law,” ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 422; see also ante , at 6. The only “express limitations” Harper III meant were “Article II, Sections 3 and 5,” of the State Constitution, which address only state-legislative districts. ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 422. As Harper III acknowledged, “there is no provis ion in the state constitution9 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting
Harper III did not “alter or amend in any way the judgment in Harper I ,” ante , at 9, is both irrelevant and incorrect. It is irrelevant because our jurisdiction requires a case , and this case is over no matter what becomes of the empty husk of Harper I ’s interlocutory judgment. It is incorrect because Harper I ’s judgment—reversing th e trial court’s original judgment and remanding the case—was completely ne

gated by Harper III ’s affirmance of the same trial-court judgment. In the same vein, the majority’s suggestion that Harper I has any “res judicata conseque nces” is completely inappo

site. Ante , at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Res judicata is the principle that “[a] final judgment on the mer

its of an action” bars relitigation “in [a] second action” of the same claim or of issues actua lly litigated and necessary to the judgment in the first action. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie , 452 U. S. 394, 398 (1981); see also Taylor v. Sturgell , 553 U. S. 880, 892 (2008). Harper I was not a final judgment (as the majority concedes by applying Cox Broadcasting ), so res judicata simply has nothing to do with it. Nothing decided by Harper I was res judicata in the second state-court appeal, see Southern R. Co. v. Clift , 260 U. S. 316, 319 (1922), nor would Harper I ’s interlocutory Elections Clause holding have any res judicata effect in a future action between these parties, see Restatement (Sec

ond) of Judgments §27, and Comment h , and Illus. 13 and 14 (1980) (only issue determinations essential to a final

—————— regarding redistricting of congressional districts.” Id. , at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 419. To the extent that Harper III suggests any view about whether such provisions would be bind ing if they existed, it seems to suggest agreement with petitioners. See ibid. (“The Federal Constitu

tion . . . commits drawing of congressional districts to the state legisla

tures subject to oversight by the Congre ss of the United States”). But, of

course, Harper III had no need to decide that question, because its statelaw justiciability holding fully determ ined the judgment in this action, thus mooting petitioners’ altern ative Elections Clause defense.10 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting judgment have preclusive effect; if a defendant obtains a fi

nal judgment based on one defense, the court’s rejection of alternative defenses is not preclusive in a later action). At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the clearest proof that Harper I was not a final judgment is Harper III —which “re

visit[ed]” Harper I ’s determination of a “crucial issue in this case,” ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 399; overruled Har

per I ’s determination of that issue; and affirmed the very same final judgment for petitioners that Harper I had re

versed. 4 How could petitioners still be injured, and what more could this Court possibly do for them? The majority sug

gests that the interlocutory injunction issued in Harper I still harms petitioners, see ante , at 7, 10–11, but that idea is untenable. To start, the ma jority overlooks that the in

junction only ran against the conduct of defendantsrespondents—the state officials who actually implement election laws—not petitioners as legislators. See Berger

, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). Next, the majority fails to consider what it would mean if the injunction is still bind

ing: that defendants-respondents are liable to “be held in contempt and put in jail” if they ever implement the 2021 Act, Richmond Cty. Bd. of Ed. v. Cowell , 254 N. C. App. 422, 426, 803 S. E. 2d 27, 30–31 (2017), even though Harper III dismissed this suit’s challenge to the Act as “beyond the reach of [North Carolina’s] courts,” ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). That

——————

4 These facts refute the majority’s dismissive reference to Harper III as “a distinct decision concerning remedies,” as well as any suggestion that Harper III was “another case” than Harper I for res judicata purposes. Ante , at 9–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Harper I and Harper III involved exactly the same case, and there is “only one final judgment per case.” Chaka v. Lane , 894 F. 2d 923, 924 (CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J.); see also Insurance Co. v. Dunn , 19 Wall. 214, 225 (1874) (“To say that there can be two final judgments upon the same pleadings, in the same cause, in the same court, . . . involves a solecism”). In this case, it was
not Harper I

.11 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting idea defies both common sense and civil procedure. A court simply does not go on enforcing an interlocutory injunc

tion—and imposing contempt sanctions for disobedience— after reaching a final judgment dismissing every relevant claim for relief. Rather, the interlocutory injunction (like all interlocutory orders) merges into the final judgment fully “adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabil

ities of all the parties” to the case. N. C. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b) (emphasis added). “With the entry of [ Harper III ’s] final judgment, the life of [ Harper I ’s] injunction came to an end, and it no longer ha[s] a binding effect on any one.” Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers , 562 F. 2d 141, 144 (CA2 1977). In any event, the majority’s analysis plainly does not turn on the belief that any defendant remains liable to potential contempt sanctions and jail time. Instead, its animating idea (uncritically borrowed from petitioners) is that Harper I ’s “judgment” operated against the 2021 Act as a statute

. The majority describes Harper I ’s “judgment” interchange

ably as “enjoining the use of the 2021 ma[p]” and “striking down the 2021 pla[n].” Ante , at 7, 9. It then reasons that reversing that “judgment” would “negate the force of its or

der striking down the 2021 pla[n],” thus “alter[ing] the presently operative statutes of North Carolina” such that the 2021 Act would “again take effect.” Ante , at 7–8 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). The majority regards this aspect of Harper I ’s “judgment” as entirely independent of Harper III ’s final resolution of the claims in this case. See
ante , at 5–8, 10–11. And it finds its theory “confirm[ed]” by a proviso in a remedial redistricting Act, passed immedi

ately after Harper I , stating that the 2021 Act would “again become effective” if this Court reversed Harper I

. Ante , at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). In short, the “case or controversy” that the majority thinks is still before us has nothing to do with the parties’ rights and liabilities on the claims asserted in this action; rather, it is simply whether12 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting a particular legislative Act, which Harper I supposedly made inoperative, will again be “operative” or “effective” as
a state statute. Ante , at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted). This reasoning bears no conne ction to the judicial power of this Court or the court below. Judicial power is the power to adjudicate “definite and concrete” disputes “touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” Rice , 404 U. S., at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted), by “determin[ing] the respective rights and liabilities or du

ties” of the parties before a court in a particular case, Ni

cholson v. State Ed. Assistance Auth. , 275 N. C. 439, 447, 168 S. E. 2d 401, 406 (1969). Thus, a judgment binds the rights of the parties in that case, see Taylor , 553 U. S., at 892–893, and it awards remedies that “operate with respect to [those] specific parties,” California , 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding any case, the court must “ascertai[n] and declar[e] the law applicable to the controversy”; this duty, in turn, implies “the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enact

ment” in deciding the case. Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923); accord, Nicholson , 275 N. C., at 447, 168 S. E. 2d, at 406; Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 176–178 (1803). But this negative power of judicial review is not a “power per se to review and annul acts of [legisla

tion] on the ground that they are unconstitutional,” Mellon

, 262 U. S., at 488; “to change or to repeal statutes,” Person

v. Doughton , 186 N. C. 723, 725, 120 S. E. 481, 483 (1923); or to issue orders that “operate on legal rules in the ab

stract,” California , 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts of law simply do not ren

der “judgments” that toggle stat utes from “operative” to “in

operative” and back again, as if judicial review were some sort of in rem jurisdiction over legislative Acts. Indeed, such a conception would contradict the most basic13 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting premise of judicial review itself. “[A]n unconstitutional pro

vision is never really part of the body of governing law,” for “the Constitution automatically displaces [it] from the mo

ment of [its] enactment.” Collins v. Yellen , 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 35) (emphasis added). Thus, when a court holds a statute unconstit utional, it is emphatically not depriving it of any legal force that it previously pos

sessed as an Act. The court is only deciding “a particular case” “conformably to the constitution, disregarding” a stat

ute that cannot “govern the case” because it is already “void.” Marbury , 1 Cranch, at 178; accord, Bayard v. Sin

gleton , 1 N. C. 5, 7 (1787) (holding that the unconstitutional “act on which [a party’s] motion was grounded . . . must of course, in that instance, stand as abrogated and without any effect”). “That is the classic explanation for the basis of judicial review” set forth in Marbury and Bayard , and it re

mains “from that day to this the sole continuing rationale for the exercise of this judicial power.” Mackey v. United States , 401 U. S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The majority’s theory thus fails twice over, both as a de

scription of Harper I ’s “judgment” and as an explanation of how any justiciable controversy could exist in this Court. The only power that the North Carolina courts exercised at any stage of this case was that of “determin[ing] the respec

tive rights and liabilities or duties of litigants in [the] con

troversy” before them. Nicholson , 275 N. C., at 447, 168 S. E. 2d, at 406. Harper I ’s judgment line did not read: “Stricken down,” referring to the 2021 Act, but instead: “Re

versed and remanded,” referri ng to the lower court judg

ment and the case between these parties. 380 N. C., at 404, 868 S. E. 2d, at 560 (some capitalization deleted). The ju

dicial power operates upon parties and cases, not statutes,14 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting

and Harper I was no exception. 5 Even if it were, we would st ill have no case or controversy in front of us. A freestanding “judgment” of statutory inval

idation—neutralizing the 2021 Act in some manner trans

cending the final determinatio n of the parties’ respective rights in this case—would not be a judicial action within the meaning of Article III, and it could not be reviewed in this Court. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. , 211 U. S. 210, 226–227 (1908). “We sit as a court of law, not a council of revision,” and “[o]ur powers of judicial review are judicial, not legislative, in nature.” Mackey , 401 U. S., at 697 (opin

ion of Harlan, J.). The only power that we ever could have exercised here was to modify the adjudicated rights and li

abilities of the parties with respect to the claims in this ac

tion. Because we plainly canno t do so, no matter what we think about the Elections Clause, this proceeding is moot.

——————

5 Nor did Harper III , despite agreeing with petitioners in all other re

spects, anywhere endorse their belief that some “order striking down the 2021 [Act]” would survive a decision overruling Harper I and dismissing this lawsuit with prejudice. Ante , at 5 (internal quotation marks omit

ted). To the extent that the majority imputes that idea to Harper III , it again seriously misreads that decision. See n. 3, supra . The majority states that Harper III “did not reinstate the 2021 congressional pla[n] that Harper I had struck down.” Ante , at 5 (citing Harper III , ___ N. C., at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448). But the part of Harper III that the majority cites had nothing to do with North Carolina’s congressional plan. Instead, it considered whethe r two state-constitutional provisions, which require that state-legislature districting plans “remain unaltered” until the next census after they have become “established,” N. C. Const., Art. II, §§3(4) and 5(4), prevented the Assembly from revising the 2021 state plans that Harper I had rejected. See Harper III , ___ N. C., at ___– ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448. In determining that the 2021 state plans were never “established,” Harper III did not mean that Harper I some

how still restrains those plans; rath er, it indicated that those plans them

selves do not restrain the Assembly go ing forward. Ab solutely nothing in Harper III suggests that the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judg

ments act directly upon legislative enactments—“striking them down” today and “reinstating” them tomorrow—or that the 2021 congressional map remains subject to any restraint left over from Harper I

.15 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting And the idea that we could still decide petitioners’ moot fed

eral defense because it could “alter the presently operative statutes of North Carolina”—even if it cannot affect the ul

timate judgment in this action —is wholly foreign to Article III. Ante , at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). In that light, the post- Harper I remedial Act and its “trig

ger provisio[n]” plainly can ma ke no difference to our juris

diction or lack thereof. Ante, at 8. When passed, that Act was essentially a change in the State’s conduct under judi

cial constraint (the result of Harper I ), but with the de

clared intention of resuming the original conduct if that constraint were removed. That declaration kept the contro

versy alive while the constraint still existed, as in Hunt v. Cromartie , 526 U. S. 541, 545, n. 1 (1999). But, after Har

per III , there is no more constraint in this case. Harper I has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims have been dismissed in a final judgment. Nothing about this case prevents the State from either enacting or implement

ing any districting plan. If “the presently operative statutes of North Carolina” need to be “alter[ed],” that is the General Assembly’s job, not ours. Ante , at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, petitioners have fully pre

vailed in this case, and plaintiffs-respondents have not ob

tained any enforceable relief that could affect the conduct of future elections. Indeed, to the extent the trigger provision adds anything to the majority’s analysis, it only underscores the absence of a justiciable case or controversy. 6 A state legislature is

——————

6 I assume here that the majority is reading the provision correctly, though it is far from clea r that this is actually th e case. As relevant, the provision stated that the remedial redistricting plan “is effective contin

gent upon its approval or adoption by the [trial court],” “unless the United States Supreme Court or any ot her federal court reverses or stays [ Harper I ] . . . (or [ Harper I ] is otherwise enjoined, made inoperable, or ineffective), and in such case [the 2021 Act] is again effective.” 2022 N. C.16 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting free to condition the effectiveness of a change in state law on external events, including this Court’s actions in cases properly before it. But, as should be obvious, such a trigger provision cannot be the entire basis of an Article III case or controversy. Where, as here , the Court cannot affect the adjudicated rights and liabilities of the parties in the case below, a state legislature cannot manufacture a justiciable controversy by providing that state law will change in some way depending on how this Court answers a moot question. That would simply be a roundabout way of asking this Court to render an advisory op inion. But “federal courts cannot give answers simply because someone asks.” Uzueg

bunam , 592 U. S., at ___ (R OBERTS , C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 12). That is true when the request comes from Con

gress, see Muskrat v. United States , 219 U. S. 346, 360–361 (1911), and it is equally true when the request comes from a state legislature. 7

—————— Sess. Laws 3, p. 10, §2. The majori ty’s reading is based on three suppo

sitions that it does not justify. Th e first is that this provision has any reference at all to events after the 2022 elections, to which the remedial Act was exclusively directed. The se cond is that the dependent clause following “unless” is applicable even though, under the main clause, the remedial plan was never “adopt[ed]” by the trial court and thus never became “effective.” The third is that Harper III did not “otherwise . . . ma[ke]” Harper I “inoperable, or ineffective.”

7 The idea of deciding an issue to determine whether a statute shall be effective is not unprecedented, but th e precedents do not aid the major

ity. At times, state legislatures ha ve enacted laws contingent on statecourt opinions approving their constitu tionality—in fact, such legislation produced the first two opinions addre ssing the Elections Clause question here (which both reached the opposite conclusion from today’s majority). See Act No. 5, 1863 Vt. Acts & Resolves p. 7, approved, Opinion of Judges , 37 Vt. 665 (1864); 1864 N. H. Laws p. 3061, approved, In re Opin

ions of Justices , 45 N. H. 595 (1864); see also In re Plurality Elections , 15 R. I. 617, 8 A. 881 (1887) (similar situ ation and conclusion). Those opin

ions have always been understood as “advisor y opinions.” See, e.g. , In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88 , 115 Vt. 524, 528–529, 64 A. 2d 169, 171–172 (1949); Goodell v. Judith Basin County , 70 Mont. 222, 231, 22417 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting
In sum, there is no issue before this Court that can affect the judgment in this action. As such, the question pre

sented is moot, and the writ of certiorari should be dis

missed.

II I would gladly stop there. The majority’s views on the merits of petitioners’ moot Elections Clause defense are of far less consequence than its mistaken belief that Article III authorizes any merits conclusion in this case, and I do not wish to belabor a question that we have no jurisdiction to decide. Nonetheless, I do not find the majority’s merits reasoning persuasive. The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1. The question presented was whether the people of a State can place state-constitutional limits on the times, places, and manners of holding congressio nal elections that “the Legis

lature” of the State has the power to prescribe. Petitioners said no. Their position rests on three premises, from which the conclusion follows. The first premise is that “the people of a single State” lack any ability to limit powers “given by the people of the United States” as a whole. McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (1819). This idea should be uncontrover

sial, as it is “the unavoidable consequence of th[e] suprem

acy” of the Federal Constitution and laws. Id. , at 436. As the Court once put it (in a case about the Article V ratifying power of state legislatures), “a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution . . . transcends any limitations

—————— P. 1110, 1112 (1924). Such advisory opinions may be authorized by some state constitutions, but Article III gives this Court no such power.18 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting sought to be imposed by the people of a State.” Leser v. Garnett , 258 U. S. 130, 137 (1922). The second premise is that regulating the times, places, and manner of congressional elections “ ‘is no original pre

rogative of state power,’ ” so that “such power ‘had to be del

egated to, rather than reserved by, the States.’ ” Cook v. Gralike , 531 U. S. 510, 522 (2001) (first quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §627 (3d ed. 1858) (Story); then quoting U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U. S. 779, 804 (1995)). This premise is firmly supported by this Court’s precedents, which have also held that the Elections Clause is “the exclusive delega

tion of ” such power, as “[n]o othe r constitutional provision gives the States authority over congressional elections.” Cook , 531 U. S., at 522–523; see also United States v. Clas

sic , 313 U. S. 299, 315 (1941) (“While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representati ves in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by [the Elections Clause]” (citations omitted)).

The third premise is that “the Legislature thereof ” does not mean the people of the State or the State as an undif

ferentiated body politic, but, rather, the lawmaking power as it exists under the State Constitution. This premise com

ports with the usual constitu tional meanings of the words “State” and “Legislature,” as well as this Court’s prece

dents. “A state, and the legislature of a state, are quite dif

ferent political beings.” Story §628. “A state, in the ordi

nary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens . . . organized und er a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution.” Texas v. White , 7 Wall. 700, 721 (1869). “ ‘Legislature,’ ” on the other hand, generally means “ ‘the representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.’ ” Smiley v. Holm , 285 U. S. 355, 365 (1932) (quoting Hawke v. Smith , 253 U. S. 221, 227 (1920)).19 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting To be sure, the precise constitutional significance of the word “Legislature” depends on “the function to be per

formed” under the provision in question. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 365. Because “the function contemplated by” the Elec

tions Clause “is that of making laws,” id. , at 366, this Court’s Elections Clause cases ha ve consistently looked to a State’s written constitution to determine the constitu

tional actors in whom lawmaking power is vested. See Ar

izona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistrict

ing Comm’n , 576 U. S. 787, 795–796, 814 (2015); Smiley

, 285 U. S., at 363; Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant , 241 U. S. 565, 566–568 (1916). 8 The definitions that most precisely explain this Court’s holdings were given in a state-court case that anticipated Hildebrant and Smiley by several years: “[T]he word ‘Legislature,’ as used in [the Elections Clause] means the lawmaking body or power of the state, as established by the state Constitution,” or, put differently, “that body of persons within a state clothed with authority

——————

8 The only complications with this a pproach have arisen where a State Constitution did not vest the legislat ive power wholly in a single repre

sentative body, as the Federal Cons titution appears to presuppose. Thus, in Hildebrant , the Court rejected as nonjusticiable an argument “that to include the referendum with in state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment” was “repugna nt to” the Elections Clause. 241 U. S., at 569. Somewhat similarly, in Arizona State Legislature , the Court faced a State Constitution “in wh ich the people of a State exercise legislative power coextensive with the authority of an institutional legis

lature,” 576 U. S., at 819, with the majority “see[ing] no constitutional barrier to a State’s empowerment of its people by embracing that form of lawmaking,” id. , at 808–809. As relevant to identifying the State’s “Leg

islature,” the majority opinion emph asized that Arizona’s written Con

stitution “ ‘establishes the electorate of Arizona as a coordinate source of legislation’ on equal footing with th e representative legislative body,” id.

, at 795 (alteration omitted), and thus held that “lawmaking power in Ar

izona includes the in itiative process,” id. , at 793; see also id. , at 814. No such complications exist in North Ca rolina, where the State Constitution simply provides that “[t]he legislativ e power of the State shall be vested in the General Assembly.” Art. II, §1.20 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting

to make the laws.” State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley , 26 S. D. 5, 10–11, 127 N. W. 848, 850–851 (1910). If these premises hold, then petitioners’ conclusion fol

lows: In prescribing the times, places, and manner of con

gressional elections, “the lawmaking body or power of the state, as established by the state Constitution,” id. , at 10, 127 N. W., at 850, performs “a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution,” which thus “transcends any lim

itations sought to be imposed by the people of a State,” Le

ser , 258 U. S., at 137. As shown, each premise is easily sup

ported and consistent with this Court’s precedents. Petitioners’ conclusion also mirrors the Court’s interpreta

tion of parallel language in the Electors Clause 9 in McPher

son v. Blacker , 146 U. S. 1 (1892): “[T]he words, ‘in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,’ ” “operat[e] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power.” Id. , at 25. 10 The majority rejects petitioners’ conclusion, but seem

ingly without rejecting any of the premises from which that conclusion follows. Its apparent rationale—that Hilde

brant

, Smiley , and Arizona State Legislature have already foreclosed petitioners’ argument—is untenable, as it re

quires disregarding a principled distinction between the is

sues in those cases and the question presented here. In those cases, the relevant state-constitutional provisions ad

dressed the allocation of la wmaking power within each

——————

9 The Electors Clause prov ides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” for the election of the President and Vice President. Art. II, §1, cl. 2.

10 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion of ambiguity, see ante , at 20, this statement can only have meant th at the state legislature’s power to direct the manner of appointing elec tors may not be limited by the state constitution. No other “limitation upon the State” is possible, for, as the McPherson Court said just a few sentences earlier, “the constitution of the State” is the only “authority” that ordinarily “limit[s]” “[t]he legisla

tive power.” 146 U. S., at 25

.21 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting State; they defined what acts , performed by which constitu

tional actors, constituted an “exercise of the lawmaking power.” Smiley

, 285 U. S., at 364; cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 2 (describing the processes upon completion of which a bill “become[s] a Law”). In other words, those cases ad

dressed how to identify “the Legi slature” of each State. But, nothing in their holdings speaks at all to whether the peo

ple of a State can impose substantive limits on the times, places, and manners that a proc edurally complete exercise of the lawmaking power may validly prescribe. These are simply different questions: “T here is a difference between how and what .” J. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of StateLegislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 495, 503 (1962). This is not an arbitrary distinction, but one rooted in the logic of petitioners’ argument. No one here contends that the Elections Clause creates state legislatures or defines “the legislative proce ss” in any State. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 369. Thus, while the Elections Clause confers a lawmaking power, “the exercise of th[at] authority must” follow “the method which the State has prescribed for legislative en

actments.” Id. , at 367. But, if the power in question is not original to the people of each State and is conferred upon the constituted legislature of the State, then it follows that the people of the State may not dictate what laws can be enacted under that power—precisely as they may not dic

tate what constitutional amen dments their legislatures can ratify under Article V. See Leser

, 258 U. S., at 137. 11 Ac

-

—————— 11 The majority states that Smiley “already distinguished” Leser as in

volving a nonlawmaking function. Ante , at 21. But Smiley distinguished the “electoral,” “ratifying,” and “con senting” functions of state legisla

tures from their “lawmaking” functi on under the Elections Clause, 285
U. S., at 365–366, only to explain why the last function must be “exer

-22 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting cordingly, if petitioners’ premises hold, then state constitu

tions may specify who constitute “the Legislature” and pre

scribe how legislative power is exercised, but they cannot control what substantive laws can be made for federal elec

tions. The majority indicates that it does not perceive this dis

tinction between “substantive” and “procedural” rules, see
ante , at 23–24, 12 illustrating its doubts with a rhetorical question: “When a governor vetoes a bill because of a disa

greement with its policy consequences, has the governor ex

ercised a procedural or substantive restraint on lawmak

ing?” Ante , at 24. The answer is straightforward: The power of approving or vetoing bills is “a part of the legisla

tive process” because it is “a part in the making of state laws.” Smiley

, 285 U. S., at 368–369; see also INS v. Chadha , 462 U. S. 919, 933, 951, 954, 957, n. 22, 958 (1983) (repeatedly referring to bica meralism and presentment as

—————— cise[d] . . . in accordance with the [State’s] method . . . for legislative en

actments,” id. , at 367, including “the participation of the Governor wher

ever the state constitution provided fo r such participation as part of the process of making laws,” id. , at 370. Nothing in Smiley even hints that a federally delegated power fails to “t ranscen[d] limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State” si mply because it is a lawmaking func

tion. Leser , 258 U. S., at 137.

12 This admission carries troubling im plications for other fields, as comparable “distinction[s] between procedure and substance [are] not unknown in the law.” United States v. Kras , 409 U. S. 434, 463, n. 6 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For example, our habeas corpus juris

prudence has long distinguished “sub stantive” constitutional rules from “procedural” ones. Schriro v. Summerlin , 542 U. S. 348, 352, 353 (2004). Our sentencing appellate review jurisprudence similarly recognizes a distinction between the “procedura[l] sound[ness]” of a sentencing deci

sion and “the substantive reasonablen ess of the sentence imposed.” Gall

v. United States , 552 U. S. 38, 51 (2007). And, no less essential a statute than the Rules Enabling Act presupposes a meanin gful distinction be

tween “rules of practice and proced ure” and matters of “substantive right.” 28 U. S. C. §§2072(a) and (b). Indeed, the constitutionality of the Act rests upon this very distinction. See Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U. S. 460, 470–472 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. , 312 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1941).23 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting the “procedure” or “procedure s” of lawmaking). A Gover

nor’s motives for vetoing a certain bill are irrelevant to the effect of the veto as part of th e legislative process, just as the motives that may lead one house of the legislature to reject a bill passed by the other house are irrelevant to the effect of its doing so. Put simply, when this power is con

ferred on the Governor of a State, it “makes him in effect a third branch of the legislature .” T. Cooley, General Princi

ples of Constitutional Law 50 (1880) (emphasis added); ac

cord, Arizona State Legislature , 576 U. S., at 833 (R OBERTS , C. J., dissenting) (noting that “approving [and] vetoing bills” are “legislative functions”); Chadha , 462 U. S., at 947 (explaining that “lawmaking” is “a power . . . shared by both Houses and the President”); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States , 175 U. S. 423, 453 (1899) (noting that Presi

dential approval “is legislativ e in its nature”); cf. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 150 (1765) (“[T]he king is himself a part of the parliament”). This is a question of who , not what , and thus is “a matter of state polity” as far as the Elections Clause is concerned. Smiley , 285 U. S., at 368. But substantive constraints on what the lawmaking power can do (gubernatorial approval included) demand an entirely different justification—one that the majority never provides. It does not overrule Cook and Thornton to hold that the power to prescribe times, places, and manners for congressional elections is an original power of the people of each State. Nor does it hold that the people are themselves “the Legislature” to which the Federal Constitution dele

gates that power. See ante , at 17–18. Indeed, the majority devotes little attention to the source and recipient of the power described in the Elections Clause, notwithstanding their direct relevance to the question presented. Instead, the majority focuses on the power of state courts to exercise “judicial review” of Elections Clause legislation. See ante , at 11–15, 26–30. But that power sheds no light24 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting on the question presented. In every case properly before it, any court—state or federal—must ascertain and apply the substantive law that properly governs that case. Thus, the court naturally must apply the Federal Constitution rather than any statute in conflict with it. The court must also apply the state constitution over any conflicting statute en

acted under a power limited by that constitution. Petition

ers’ argument, however, is that legislation about the times, places, and manner of congressional elections is not limited by state constitutions—because the power to regulate those subjects comes from the Federal Constitution, not the peo

ple of the State. Right or wrong, this question has nothing to do with whether state cou rts have the power to conduct judicial review in the first place. To say that “state judicial review” authorizes applying state constitutions over con

flicting Elections Clause legislation, ante , at 15, is simply to assume away petitioners’ argument.

III The majority opinion ends wi th some general advice to state and lower federal courts on how to exercise “judicial review” “in cases implicating the Elections Clause.” Ante

, at 28. As the majority offers no clear rationale for its inter

pretation of the Clause, it is impossible to be sure what the consequences of that interpretation will be. However, judg

ing from the majority’s brief sk etch of the regime it envi

sions, I worry that today’s opinion portends serious troubles ahead for the Judiciary. The majority uses the separate writings in Bush v. Gore

, 531 U. S. 98 (2000) ( per curiam ), as a loose touchstone for the kind of judicial review that it apparently expects federal courts to conduct in future cases like this one. On its face, this is an awkward analogy, for there is a significant differ

ence between Bush and Harper I . In Bush , the state court’s judgment was based on an interpretation of state statutory law, enacted by the state legislature. Thus, the relevant25 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting Electors Clause question was whether, in doing so, the state court had departed from “the clearly expressed intent of the legislature,” 531 U. S., at 120 (Rehnquist, C. J., concur

ring), “impermissibly distort[ing]” the legislature’s enact

ments “beyond what a fair reading required,” id. , at 115. In Harper I , by contrast, there was no doubt that the state court departed from the clearly expressed intent of the leg

islature; it rejected the legisl ature’s enactment as unconsti

tutional. By doing so, today’s majority concludes, Harper I did not commit per se error, as the Elections Clause permits state courts to apply substantive state-constitutional provisions to the times, places, and manner of federal elections. At the same time, state courts are wa rned that they operate under federal-court supervision, lest they “transgress the ordi

nary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regu

late federal elections.” Ante , at 29. Thus, under the major

ity’s framework, it seems clear that the statutoryinterpretation review forecast in Bush (or some version of it) is to be extended to state constitutional law. In this way, the majority opens a new field for Bush -style controversies over state election law—and a far more un

certain one. Though some state constitutions are more “proli[x]” than the Federal Constitution, it is still a general feature of constitutional text that “only its great outlines should be marked.” McCulloch , 4 Wheat., at 407. When “it is a constitution [courts] are expounding,” ibid. , not a de

tailed statutory scheme, the standards to judge the fairness of a given interpretation are typically fewer and less defi

nite. Nonetheless, the majority’s framework appears to de

mand that federal courts deve lop some generalized concept of “the bounds of ordinary judicial review,” ante , at 28; ap

ply it to the task of constitu tional interpretation within each State; and make that concept their rule of decision in26 MOORE v. HARPER

T HOMAS , J., dissenting some of the most politically acrimonious and fast-moving cases that come before them. In many cases, it is difficult to imagine what this inquiry could mean in theory, let alone practice. For example, suppose that we were reviewing Harper I under this framework. Perhaps we could have de

termined that reading justiciable prohibitions against par

tisan gerrymandering into the North Carolina Constitution exceeded the bounds of ordinary judicial review in North Carolina; perhaps not. If not, then, in order to ensure that Harper I had not “arrogate[d]” the power of regulating fed

eral elections, ante , at 29, we would presumably have needed to ask next whether it exceeded the bounds of ordi

nary judicial review in North Carolina to find that the spe

cific congressional map here violated those prohibitions. Af

ter all, in constitutional judgments of this kind, it can be difficult to separate the rule from the fact pattern to which the rule is applied. We have held, however, that federal courts are not equipped to judge partisan-gerrymandering questions at all

. Rucho v. Common Cause , 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 30). It would seem to follow, a forti

ori

, that they are not equipped to judge whether a state court’s partisan-gerrymandering determination surpassed “the bounds of ordinary judicial review.” Even in cases that do not involve a justiciability mis

match, the majority’s advice invites questions of the most far-reaching scope. What are “the bounds of ordinary judi

cial review”? What methods of constitutional interpreta

tion do they allow? Do those methods vary from State to State? And what about stare decisis —are federal courts to review state courts’ treatment of their own precedents for some sort of abuse of discretion? The majority’s framework would seem to require answers to all of these questions and

more. In the end, I fear that this framework will have the effect of investing potentially large sw aths of state constitutional law with the character of a federal question not amenable27 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting to meaningful or principled adjudication by federal courts. In most cases, it seems likely that the “the bounds of or

dinary judicial review” will be a forgiving standard in practice, and this federalization of state constitutions willserve mainly to swell federal-court dockets with stateconstitutional questions to be quickly resolved with generic statements of deference to the state courts. On the other hand, there are bound to be exce ptions. They will arise hap

hazardly, in the midst of quickly evolving, politically charged controversies, and the winners of federal elections may be decided by a federal co urt’s expedited judgment that a state court exceeded “the bounds of ordinary judicial re

view” in construing the state constitution. I would hesitate long befo re committing the Federal Ju

diciary to this uncertain path. And I certainly would not do so in an advisory opinion, in a moot case, where “the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle , 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). I respectfully dissent.