[Cite as Bressler v. Nunemaker, 2017-Ohio-5804.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

JAMIE L. BRESSLER : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Petitioner - Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

CHAD L. NUNEMAKER : Case No. 17-CA-06 

 : 

 Respondent- Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, Case No. 2016 

DR 00927 DF 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 11, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Respondent-Appellant 

STEVEN J. KOKENSPARGER STEPHEN B. WILSON 

Kokensparger Ryan Legal Group 35 South Park Place, Suite 150 

140 Mill Street, Suite B Newark, Ohio 43055 

Gahanna, Ohio 43230 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-06 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant Chad L. Nunemaker appeals a judgment of the Licking County 

Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, granting appellee Jamie L. Bressler 

a civil protection order (CPO) for a period of two years. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} The parties lived together for about three years prior to separating in 2016. 

On September 2, 2016, appellee filed a petition for a civil protection order against 

appellant. An ex parte order was issued the same day, and the matter was set for hearing 

before a magistrate. 

{¶3} The hearing was held before a magistrate on October 14, 2016. The 

magistrate denied the CPO, finding that appellee’s alleged fear that appellant would harm 

her now that the relationship had ended was not credible, and that there was evidence 

that the relationship was not as volatile as she attempted to make it appear. The 

magistrate found that appellee did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

appellant committed a recent act of domestic violence as defined by R.C. 3113.31(A)(1). 

The trial court approved the magistrate’s decision and entered judgment dismissing the 

ex parte order. 

{¶4} Appellee filed objections. After reviewing the evidence presented at the 

hearing, the trial court filed a detailed opinion rejecting the magistrate’s decision and 

issuing the CPO. The court first concluded that there is no requirement that a petitioner 

prove a recent act of domestic violence, as espoused by the magistrate. The court further 

concluded upon a review of the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing that 

appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly caused, 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-06 3 

attempted to cause or recklessly caused bodily injury to her, committing an act of 

domestic violence as defined by R.C. 3113.31; that appellant placed appellee in fear of 

imminent physical harm by the threat of force or by committing a violation of R.C. 

2903.211 or 2911.211, and that appellee is in danger of domestic violence by appellant. 

{¶5} Appellant assigns a single error: 

{¶6} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A CIVIL PROTECTION 

ORDER TO PETITIONER, JAMIE L. BRESSLER.” 

{¶7} Appellant argues that the court’s decision is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

{¶8} Civ. R. 65.1 governs civil protection orders. When the matter is referred to 

a magistrate, the magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing 

does not constitute a magistrate’s order or a magistrate’s decision under Civ. R. 53(D) 

and is not subject to the requirements of Civ. R. 53. Civ. R. 65.1(F)(3)(b). Upon review 

of a magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing, the court may 

modify or reject the magistrate’s order. Civ. R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(iii). The court’s order is a 

final, appealable order; however, a party must file timely objections to the order pursuant 

to division (F)(3)(d) of the rule prior to filing an appeal. Civ. R. 65.1(G). 

{¶9} Appellant argues that the court erred in rejecting the magistrate’s denial of 

the civil protection order because the magistrate found appellee’s testimony to not be 

credible, and the magistrate was in a better position than the trial court to determine the 

credibility of witnesses. However, a trial court need not defer to the magistrate's 

determinations regarding witness credibility. In the matter of A.M., 2nd Dist. Greene No. 

2009-CA-06, 2010-Ohio-948, ¶13. Although the instant case proceeded under Civ. R. 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-06 4 

65.1 rather than Civ. R. 53, nothing in Civ. R. 65.1 suggests that upon objections, the 

court is required to defer to the magistrate’s determination of credibility. Civ. R. 

65.1(F)()3)(c)(iii) gives the court the authority to modify or reject the magistrate’s order, 

without any restrictions on the court’s ability to reach its own conclusions concerning 

credibility. 

{¶10} In Ohio, a person seeking a civil protection order under R.C. 3113.31 must 

prove domestic violence or danger of domestic violence by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997). Generally, a 

judgment supported by competent and credible evidence going to all the elements of the 

case must not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Masitto v. Masitto (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 488 N.E.2d 857 (1986). In 

addition, the decision on whether to grant a civil protection order lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Olenik v. Huff, 5th Dist. Ashland App. No. 02-COA-058, 2003-

Ohio-4621, ¶ 21. “The parameters of a trial court's discretion must also encompass the 

determination of whether a CPO is actually necessary to ensure the family member's 

protection.” Rader v. Rader, 5th Dist. Licking App.No. 07CA5, 2007-Ohio-4288, ¶ 19. In 

order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140(1983). 

{¶11} Appellee testified that appellant was physically abusive during the 

relationship, both when they were living together and when they lived separately. She 

testified that she continued the relationship despite the violence because appellant would 

apologize or blame his actions on medication or stress. During the instances of violence, 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-06 5 

appellant would grab her by the wrists. She testified that he would explain to her that 

due to his job, he knew of ways to dispose of a body so it would not be found, and that 

he would tie bricks to her and sink her in a body of water. She testified that he discussed 

ways that he could poison her. 

{¶12} Appellee testified about several acts of domestic violence which occurred 

in 2016, the year in which she filed the petition for a protection order. She testified that 

in January, 2016, appellant kicked in a door to her residence, prompting her to call the 

police. She testified that in April of 2016, he grabbed her by the wrists and slammed her 

into various items in the home, resulting in a cut to her lower leg. She further testified 

that in July of 2016, appellant pinned her against the door, grabbing her groin area and 

squeezing. She testified that the incident resulted in bruising, and a photograph showing 

bruising consistent with her testimony was admitted into evidence. 

{¶13} The video admitted into evidence was taped by appellant, and offered into 

evidence by appellant. As noted by the court, the video does not show an act of domestic 

violence, but it is not clear whether portions of the video were deleted. The video 

demonstrates that appellant was angry with appellee, both because he was taping the 

encounter and because he refused to apologize for the way he had treated her. She 

recounts various ways in which he has assaulted her and asks for an apology. She is 

seen in the video gesturing toward the door, claiming that it is likely a person outside had 

heard her being slammed into the door. Appellant does not apologize, and also does not 

admit or deny assaulting her. As noted by the court, appellant’s lack of response to her 

allegations on the video is unusual, and he was unable to explain how the bruising 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-06 6 

demonstrated by the photos occurred other than to deny that any domestic violence took 

place. 

{¶14} The trial court’s decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 

and the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the civil protection order. 

{¶15} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Licking County 

Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division is affirmed. Costs are assessed to 

appellant. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

John Wise, J. concur.