In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1313

ADAM DELGADO,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the  

Merit Systems Protection Board.

No. CH‐1221‐14‐0737‐W‐1

____________________

SUBMITTED OCTOBER 31, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018

AMENDED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING, JUNE 19, 2018

____________________

                                                   We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments,

and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 16‐1313

Before ROVNER, WILLIAMS,** and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This federal whistleblower case

presents our first review of a decision of the Merit Systems

Protection Board since Congress expanded judicialreview be‐

yond the Federal Circuit, at least temporarily. Petitioner

Adam Delgado is a special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. He alleges that his super‐

visors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions

that another agent had improperly shot at a fleeing suspect,

provided an inaccurate report of the incident, and testified

falsely about it in a federal criminal trial.

Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office

of Special Counsel (OSC), the federal office charged with in‐

vestigating allegations that an agency has violated the Whis‐

tleblower Protection Act by retaliating against its employee

for, as relevant here, disclosing “any violation of law, rule, or

regulation.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The

OSC declined to investigate. It told Delgado that he had not

made a disclosure protected by the statute and that he had

failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations

of retaliation.

Delgado then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection

Board, but the Board dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdic‐

tion. The Board reasoned that Delgado had not satisfied the

requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special

Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” See

5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). According to the Board, Delgado could

                                                  ** Circuit Judge Williams retired on January 16, 2018 and did not par‐

ticipate in the decision of this appeal. The petition for review is being re‐

solved by a quorum of the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
No. 16‐1313 3

not prove that he made a “protected disclosure” or gave the

OSC enough information to launch an investigation. Delgado

has petitioned for judicial review of the dismissal of his ap‐

peal. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a). We find that the OSC and the

Board applied unduly stringent and, we believe, arbitrary re‐

quirements on Delgado.

First, the Board dismissed Delgado’s appeal because he

did not include a copy of his complaint to the OSC. Applicable

statutes and rules do not impose that requirement, and if

there were any question about what Delgado submitted to the

OSC, the easiest way to answer it would be to obtain the com‐

plaint from the OSC itself.

Second, the OSC rejected Delgado’s complaint on the

ground that he failed to offer sufficient evidence that he made

a disclosure protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). We disa‐

gree. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either ex‐

plicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or pro‐

vided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of

consideration by superiors. Either version would be a pro‐

tected disclosure.

Third, the OSC rejected Delgado’s complaint because he

did not provide definitive proof that he was a victim of retal‐

iation. We hold that, like other statutes with exhaustion pro‐

visions, the Whistleblower Protection Act requires only that a

complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity

to enable the agency to investigate. The Act itself and its im‐

plementing regulations do not require a whistleblower to

prove his allegations before the OSC—otherwise, what need

could there be for an investigation? The Board thus erred in

finding that Delgado failed to exhaust administrative reme‐
4 No. 16‐1313

dies with the OSC. We grant the petition for review and re‐

mand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion, without commenting on the ultimate merit of

Delgado’s underlying accusations or his claim of unlawful re‐

taliation.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The “All‐Circuit Review” provision of the Whistleblower

Protection Enhancement Act took effect in December 2012.

See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). It expanded judicial review from

the Federal Circuit to “any court of appeals of competent ju‐

risdiction” beginning December 2012, subject to a five‐year

sunset. The statute instructs us to review the record and to set

aside any Board action, findings, or conclusions found to be

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance

with law, obtained without proper procedures, or unsup‐

ported by substantial evidence. § 7703(c). The Board’s conclu‐

sion that Delgado failed to exhaust his remedies before the

OSC was not based on any factual findings made after an ev‐

identiary hearing, so whether the issue is treated as jurisdic‐

tional or not, we review the conclusion de novo. See Waldau v.

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 19 F.3d 1395, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also

Aviles v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 799 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir.

2015).  

A. Delgado’s Disclosures of Alleged Wrongdoing

This case is not Delgado’s first experience with whistle‐

blowing at ATF. In 2011 the agency settled a previous case

Delgado had brought before the Board concerning events in

Puerto Rico. As part of the settlement, ATF agreed to transfer

him to the Chicago Field Division. Delgado contends that he

has endured a hostile work environment from the start and
No. 16‐1313 5

learned shortly after arriving that a former co‐worker in

Puerto Rico had tipped off a Chicago agent, Chris Labno,

about the reason for his transfer. Delgado says that his fellow

agents’ acrimonious behavior, including one supervisor’s fre‐

quent use of the word “rat” while he was in earshot, led him

to complain informally soon after arriving.   

Delgado’s current complaint stems from an incident in

January 2012, about six months after he joined ATF in Chi‐

cago. Delgado was conducting surveillance with other agents

while Special Agent  Labno, who was undercover, tried to buy

heroin from one Robert Jefferson. Delgado watched as two

other men (not Jefferson) approached Labno in his under‐

cover vehicle and robbed him of the purchase money at gun‐

point before any heroin was delivered. Delgado reports that

he then saw Labno jump from the car and shoot twice in the

direction of the fleeing thieves, an action he believes was “not

justified and ... could have placed responding agents and in‐

nocent bystanders at risk of being injured.”  

The armed robber was caught, but federal prosecutors

concluded that he had colluded with Jefferson, the original

target of the undercover operation. Both men were charged

with robbing Special Agent Labno of money belonging to the

United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a). At Jefferson’s trial, pros‐

ecutors called as witnesses Delgado, Labno, and two other

agents who had participated in the surveillance. The agents

were not permitted to hear one another’s testimony, but dur‐

ing closing arguments, Delgado learned that Labno’s version

of events differed significantly from that of his colleagues. Jef‐

ferson’s defense lawyer outlined the discrepancies and, ac‐

cording to Delgado, said “something along the lines of, ‘I am

not saying Labno is lying but ... .” Delgado also reports that
6 No. 16‐1313

a court security officer approached him during a break from

closing arguments and criticized the agents for being unable

to “get your stories straight.”  

Although Delgado never obtained a transcript of Labno’s

testimony, he learned more about its substance when he

found online the district court’s decision denying a motion for

acquittal that Jefferson had filed. Jefferson’s motion had ar‐

gued that the “degree to which the testimony of the govern‐

ment’s own witnesses completely contradicted Agent Labno

... renders this portion of [his] testimony so unreliable that no

reasonable jury could have relied upon it.” See United States

v. Jefferson, No. 12 CR 50, 2014 WL 222726, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan.

21, 2014). The district judge agreed that Labno’s testimony

conflicted with that of his colleagues, but she denied the mo‐

tion because it was “not for the court to assess the credibility

of witnesses.” Id.

Delgado had written an incident report immediately after

the shooting. Even before Jefferson’s trial, he says, other

agents were critical of his report. Then, shortly after Jeffer‐

son’s conviction, someone left at his desk training materials

on report writing, which he interpreted as dissatisfaction with

his report. He also found holes that appeared to have been

made with a knife in a suit he left hanging in his office. Del‐

gado further alleges that after the trial, Labno created a

presentation based on the incident to train fellow agents on

the use of weapons. He included a slide labeling the United

States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois

“Cowards‐R‐US” because it did not charge all of the defend‐

ants with the charges Labno deemed appropriate.  

By Delgado’s account, on more than one occasion he re‐

ported all of this to his supervisors but nothing was done. On
No. 16‐1313 7

one occasion that has been the focus of the administrative pro‐

cess, Delgado told two superiors, John Durastanti and Ray‐

field Roundtree, of Special Agent Labno’s conflicting sworn

testimony. Delgado says that he made clear to his superiors at

least that he believed Labno might have committed perjury in

his trial testimony. In at least one version submitted to the

Board itself, Delgado told the Board he believed Labno did

commit perjury.

Two days later, Roundtree called Delgado to his office to

tell him that his own boss, the Special Agent in Charge of the

Chicago Field Division, had been informed about Delgado’s

allegation but declined to pursue the matter because Delgado

“had no proof” and “did not review the transcript of Labno’s

testimony.” Durastanti then told Delgado not to speak to

other agents about his suspicions and asked whether Delgado

understood the significance of what he was saying. Delgado

confirmed that he did. No investigation was begun or other

action taken. Delgado believes that Labno, who had been

“publicly lauded” by the Special Agent in Charge, may have

received improper preferential treatment.

After disclosing his allegations against Labno, Delgado

contends, he was routinely excluded from ongoing investiga‐

tions by his group, threatened with a transfer, denied multiple

promotions for which he was highly qualified, demoted from

his position as acting group leader, removed from the Joint

Terrorism Task Force, and involuntarily detailed to another

city for work.  

B. Delgado’s Formal Whistleblower Complaint

Delgado then filed a formal complaint with the Office of

Special Counsel invoking the Whistleblower Protection Act to
8 No. 16‐1313

seek protection from retaliatory treatment. A critical point in

this appeal is that Delgado’s original complaint itself is not in

the record. Delgado used the OSC’s e‐Filing System, which in‐

structs whistleblowers to type information into a webform.

See OSC e‐Filing, File a Complaint, https://osc.gov/pages/file‐

complaint.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). The instructions ap‐

parently did not then inform the person filing a complaint

that he or she would be unable to retrieve a copy of the com‐

plaint when it was filed in this manner, nor did they inform

the person that a copy of the complaint would be needed to

pursue further review before the Merit System Protection

Board. (The on‐line instructions now advise the complainant

to save a copy of everything sent to the OSC because it may

be needed in the event of an appeal, but even now they do not

say that an appeal will be dismissed unless the complainant

can produce a copy.)

Delgado asserts that he submitted with his formal com‐

plaint a document detailing the substance of the allegations

we have recounted above, along with the court order denying

Jefferson’s motion for acquittal. The OSC complaint process

allows for such additional documents and attachments.

The following month the OSC made a preliminary deter‐

mination to close Delgado’s case. It sent him a letter acknowl‐

edging his allegations of retaliation and briefly recounting the

underlying factual predicate found in his formal complaint:

In your complaint, you state that in January 2012, you

participated in the surveillance of Agent Labno while

he was conducting an undercover deal with a suspect.

During the surveillance an incident ensued and Agent

Labno discharged his weapon. You prepared a report

documenting your surveillance; you later learned that
No. 16‐1313 9

some agents were critical of you because of the con‐

tents of your report. You state that during the criminal

trial of the suspect in July 2013, the defense attorney

contrasted Agent Labno’s testimony with Agent

Marano’s and your testimony. You state Special Agent

in Charge (SAC), Ford, Assistant Special Agent

(ASAC), Nichols, and another ASAC were also present

during the closing arguments. To your knowledge, nei‐

ther ATF‐Internal Affairs (IA) nor any other agency

was contacted concerning these discrepancies. You

again reported the discrepancies between your account

and Labno’s to John Durastanti and Mr. Roundtree on

February 4, 2014.  

According to the OSC examiner, however, Delgado did

not allege in his complaint “a disclosure protected by the stat‐

ute” because, in the examiner’s view, what Delgado had told

his ATF superiors about Special Agent Labno‘s testimony in‐

volved merely an “accounting of events [that] may have dif‐

fered,” not a “violation of any law, rule, or regulation.” See 5

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (prohibiting federal agencies from engag‐

ing in personnel actions on account of “any disclosure of in‐

formation by an employee or applicant which the employee

or applicant reasonably believes ... evidences any violation of

any law, rule, or regulation”). In other words, the examiner

concluded on the merits that Delgado’s disclosure was not pro‐

tected by the statute. She also told Delgado he had “not

demonstrated a causal connection between the disclosures

you identified and the ATF’s decisions” because “there is no

indication that either [disclosure] resulted in any investiga‐

tion, or that any official suffered adverse impact because of

the report.”
10 No. 16‐1313

Delgado responded, challenging the examiner’s interpre‐

tation of his complaint and insisting that he “clearly alleged

... that there may have been a violation of law when SALabno

provided false testimony.” But the same OSC examiner then

sent a second letter conveying the agency’s final decision to

close his case. The examiner continued to fault Delgado for

not providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate a nexus be‐

tween his disclosure and the retaliatory actions he alleged

were taken against him.

C. Delgado’s Appeal to the Board

Delgado appealed that decision to the Merit Systems Pro‐

tection Board, which hears many appeals brought by federal

employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221. With his appeal,

Delgado tendered the two letters he received from the OSC,

plus a thirteen‐page, single‐spaced declaration, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1746, detailing his allegations. He also included a copy of

the district court’s order denying Jefferson’s motion for a judg‐

ment of acquittal in the criminal case, which sets out in great

detail the conflicts between the testimony of Labno and Del‐

gado and the other agents. Delgado maintains that he submit‐

ted all of this same information to the OSC, but he apparently

cannot prove that to the satisfaction of the Board without a

copy of his original complaint to the OSC.

The same day that Delgado filed his appeal, an adminis‐

trative judge issued an order stating that “the Board might

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without addressing

the merits of the case” and directing Delgado to “file a state‐

ment, accompanied by evidence” listing information relevant

to his complaint. Yet all of the information demanded by the

administrative judge already was included in Delgado’s dec‐

laration. The order further instructed that, if Delgado did not
No. 16‐1313 11

submit a copy of his original OSC complaint along with that

agency’s rejection letter (the latter having been tendered al‐

ready), then his “response must be in the form of an affidavit,

sworn statement, or declaration under penalty of perjury.”

Demonstrating what seems like considerable patience by

that point, Delgado did not simply remind the administrative

judge that a declaration with the requested information al‐

ready was before the Board. Instead, he submitted an addi‐

tional ten‐page response relating again all of the requested in‐

formation (and all of the factual allegations recited earlier in

this opinion). Delgado also asserted that he had submitted the

same information to the OSC. But unlike Delgado’s initial sub‐

mission to the Board, his response to the administrative judge

was not sworn. Delgado also did not submit a copy of the

webform complaint he had filed with the OSC, but he did in‐

clude the “e‐Filing” confirmation.

With this detailed information available, the administra‐

tive judge then dismissed Delgado’s appeal for lack of juris‐

diction. The judge concluded that Delgado had failed to prove

that he exhausted his remedies with the OSC as required by 5

U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). The judge conceded that it was “evident

from the record the appellant asked the OSC to review allega‐

tions of reprisal.” But, the judge continued, Delgado had not

provided a copy of his OSC complaint—the one submitted by

webform. Consequently, the judge said: “Nothing in the in‐

formation provided indicates the appellant gave the OSC a

sufficient basis to pursue an investigation which might lead

to corrective action.” The administrative judge apparently re‐

fused to consider the extensive information Delgado had pro‐

vided. The judge instead faulted him for not including a copy

of the webform he completed on the OSC’s website. The judge
12 No. 16‐1313

justified this refusal by telling Delgado that the “sufficiency

of the appellant’s claim to the OSC must be judged by the

statements he made to the OSC, not a later characterization of

his disclosures to the Board.”

Delgado petitioned for review by the full Board, which de‐

nied his petition and affirmed the administrative judge’s ini‐

tial decision. Delgado then filed this petition for judicial re‐

view.

II.   Analysis

Delgado’s petition for review requires us to address three

distinct aspects of the finding that he did not properly exhaust

remedies before the Office of Special Counsel. The first is

whether the Board properly found that Delgado’s failure to

submit a copy of his original complaint to the OSC was fatal

to his appeal to the Board.  We conclude that the Board’s find‐

ing was arbitrary and capricious. The second is whether Del‐

gado’s complaint to the OSC sufficiently claimed he made a

disclosure protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). We conclude

that it did. The third is whether Delgado’s complaint to the

OSC sufficiently claimed that he had been the victim of un‐

lawful retaliation for his protected disclosure. We find that he

did, at least sufficiently to warrant investigation.

A. The Exhaustion Requirement—Complaint Needed?

The Whistleblower Protection Act instructs a whistle‐

blower to “seek corrective action from the Special Counsel be‐

fore seeking corrective action from the Board.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 1214(a)(3). The Act itself and Board regulations do not pro‐

vide any substantive explication. But the Board, applying its

understanding of Federal Circuit precedents, interprets this

rather unremarkable administrative exhaustion statute in a
No. 16‐1313 13

manner unlike any we have encountered in other federal stat‐

utory schemes.  

First, in determining whether a whistleblower has ex‐

hausted remedies with the OSC, the Board refuses to consider

any materials that the complainant cannot prove were submit‐

ted to the OSC. This is so, the Board insists, because “the test

of the sufficiency of an employee’s charges of whistleblowing

to the OSC is the statement that the employee makes in the

complaint requesting corrective action ... not the employee’s

post hoc characterization of those statements.” See Ellison v.

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 7 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also,

e.g., Kukoyi v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R. 404, 409

(MSPB 2009).  

That explanation seems reasonable at first. But recall that

the OSC instructs federal employees wishing to file a formal

complaint to type allegations into a webform on the agency’s

website. While saving a copy of the form before submission is

listed as a “best practice” elsewhere on the site (and perhaps

is an obvious step for a lawyer), the agency did not even warn

pro se whistleblowers that failure to do so would risk dismis‐

sal of any appeal.  

Under the Board’s approach, however, a whistleblower

who failed to anticipate this need (or who overlooked the

lukewarm suggestion added later to the website) would be in

practice unable to appeal an adverse OSC decision. The Board

will refuse to consider the allegations of an appellant who,

like Delgado, attests to the information submitted to the OSC

but lacks a copy of the complaint to corroborate his claim. See,

e.g., Abou‐Hussein v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. AT‐1221‐11‐0850‐

W‐1 (MSPB Aug. 1, 2013) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction

and declining to consider detailed chronology appellant said
14 No. 16‐1313

he provided OSC because he lacked “evidence to support his

bare assertion” that OSC received the document); Engler v.

Dep’t of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 109, 113 (MSPB 1995) (declining

to accept appellant’s affirmation that “Chronology of Events”

attached to appeal was included in OSC complaint).

The Board has issued regulations detailing what must be

included in an appeal to invoke a whistleblower’s right to a

hearing. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1209.6(a)(1), 1201.24(a)(1)–(9). No‐

where do those regulations require a copy of the original com‐

plaint submitted to the OSC.

Even if the Board is correct in placing on the appellant the

burden to prove exhaustion, see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1)—ex‐

haustion is an affirmative defense in most other contexts, after

all—this approach is not sound. Instructing a whistleblower

to file a complaint via a simple webform and then dismissing

a later appeal because he failed to print and retain a copy sets

an arbitrary trap for unwary federal employees.

And even if we assume the complaint itself is essential, we

cannot understand why the OSC does not or could not simply

forward a copy to the Board from OSC records. We are not

aware of other situations in federal administrative law where

the contents of the record before an agency (here, the OSC)

are determined by what the appealing party submits to the

reviewing body rather than by simply obtaining a copy of the

agency record from the agency itself. (Compare, for example,

the processes for judicial review of decisions by the Commis‐

sioner of Social Security or the Board of Immigration Appeals,

where the filing of a petition for judicial review prompts the

agency to forward the agency record to the reviewing court.)  

The OSC’s record should be far more reliable than even a

sworn statement from an appealing party about the contents
No. 16‐1313 15

of that record.  No doubt there are other easy solutions to this

apparently fatal defect in appeals to the Board. Without a

clear legal requirement for a copy of the original complaint,

the Board’s dismissal for failure to include a copy of the orig‐

inal complaint is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discre‐

tion. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1).1

B. Protected Disclosure?

The second issue is whether Delgado claimed sufficiently

to the OSC (and then to the Board) that he made a protected

disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) of information which

Delgado “reasonably believe[d] evidences – any violation of

any law, rule, or regulation . . . .”  

                                                  1 In its petition for rehearing, the Board noted that Congress has pro‐

hibited it from directly obtaining records from OSC and prohibited OSC

from releasing its records to the Board, including whistleblower com‐

plaints. It is not at all clear that the Board is correct. See 5 U.S.C. § 1212(b)

(allowing federal agency to disclose record to another agency with written

request or permission from person to whom record pertains). Even if the

Board is correct, that would only exacerbate the “Catch‐22” character of

the administrative process for whistleblowers. Under this process, whis‐

tleblowers must present their OSC complaints to the Board to prove they

presented identical claims to OSC, but the Board and OSC in this case pro‐

vided no means for a whistleblower to do so. The petition for rehearing

also argues that we have misunderstood the Board’s requirements for

proving administrative exhaustion by concluding that an appellant must

provide a copy of the OSC complaint to the Board. In lieu of an OSC com‐

plaint, the Board asserts, an appellant may provide “any correspondence

submitted to OSC, or an affidavit, sworn statement, or declaration under

penalty of perjury.” But Delgado did just that. He submitted a detailed,

sworn declaration about the claim he presented to OSC, but the Board still

found he had not exhausted administrative remedies at OSC.
16 No. 16‐1313

Defending its conclusion that Delgado failed to exhaust

before the OSC, the Board argues:

Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, he did not al‐

lege perjury—which would be a violation of law—to

his supervisors. Perjury is defined as a willful state‐

ment under oath that the person giving the testimony

believes to be untrue. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Simply

claiming that a difference in testimony exists does not

amount to an accusation of perjury, because it does not

ascribe to the person giving the testimony a willful mo‐

tivation to tell a knowingly untrue statement. The pe‐

titioner’s claim ... left open the possibility that his co‐

worker was merely mistaken in his testimony, which

would not have been perjury, or any other violation of

law.

As we read this argument, the Board takes the position that

Delgado failed to make a protected disclosure to his ATF su‐

pervisors because he did not allege that Special Agent Labno

had the mens rea necessary for a criminal perjury conviction.

With respect, we must reject that position, which signals

that the Board was applying the wrong standard to Delgado’s

appeal. See Drake v. White, 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008);

Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Mithen

v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, 500 (MSPB 2015)

(plaintiff’s disclosure was protected where he disclosed per‐

ceived abuse of authority; he reasonably believed federal

power was improperly delegated to non‐federal employee);

Linder v. Dep’t of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, 22 (MSPB 2014) (to be

protected, disclosure must be “specific and detailed,” not a

“vague allegation of wrongdoing,” but plaintiff need not cor‐

rectly label the legal category of wrongdoing or be ready to
No. 16‐1313 17

prove action was taken with unlawful intent); Benton‐Flores v.

Dep’t of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, 433–34 & n.3 (MSPB 2014)

(disclosure was protected where plaintiff reasonably believed

information showed risks to safety and security and viola‐

tions of unspecified laws, rules, or regulations); Shannon v.

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, 232 (MSPB 2014) (re‐

versing dismissal of complaint: “the test for protected status

is not the truth of the matter disclosed but whether it was rea‐

sonably believed”), citing S. Rep. No. 112–155, at 8, reprinted

in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 598 (“cornerstone” of § 2302(b)(8) is

that “employee need not ultimately prove any misconduct to

qualify for whistleblower protection. All that is necessary is

for the employee to have a reasonable belief that the infor‐

mation disclosed evidences a kind of misconduct listed in sec‐

tion 2302(b)(8).”).

To invoke the Whistleblower Protection Act’s protections,

a whistleblower is not required to claim knowledge that each

element of a crime has been committed. The Act forbids retal‐

iation based on any disclosure that an employee “reasonably

believes evidences” a violation of law. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Del‐

gado alleged he was retaliated against after disclosing what

he reasonably believed to be evidence of his co‐worker’s will‐

fully false testimony,regardless of whether he could state con‐

fidently that the co‐worker in fact acted willfully.  

Finally, the Board maintains that its administrative judge

properly refused to consider the lengthy declaration Delgado

tendered with his appeal, even though in it “he did specifi‐

cally allege that he disclosed perjury by a co‐worker.” The

Board reasoned that the document “contained no indicia of

any kind that it also served as his complaint to OSC.” In other
18 No. 16‐1313

words, the Board was unwilling to accept Delgado’s sworn as‐

sertion that he presented the same substantive allegations to

the OSC, since he cannot prove independently that the docu‐

ment contained precisely the same details he submitted to the

OSC. And because on appeal Delgado states candidly that he

made slight corrections and updates to the original document

before submitting it to the Board, the Board insists, “he has

effectively conceded that he failed to meet his burden of proof

regarding exhaustion.”

With respect, we believe this reasoning takes bureaucratic

rigidity to a dysfunctional level. Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3),

Delgado had to prove only that he “sought corrective action,”

not that he gave the OSC every scrap of information he pos‐

sessed.

Delgado does not claim that he told his ATF supervisors

that he had definitive proof that Labno committed perjury in

the criminal trial. After all, there are many possible explana‐

tions for discrepancies between the testimony of different wit‐

nesses that do not involve criminal intent to lie. Honest differ‐

ences in perception, memory, and viewpoint often produce

differences in testimony, even as between law enforcement of‐

ficers trained to observe and to testify accurately.

Nevertheless, Delgado’s submission to the Board makes

clear that he informed his ATF supervisors that Labno might

well have committed perjury and that an investigation was

called for. That is sufficient for the disclosure to be protected

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See, e.g., Drake v. Agency for Int’l

Development, 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (plaintiff re‐

ported activities that could lead observer to conclude that
No. 16‐1313 19

agency employees were intoxicated on duty; ALJ erred by re‐

quiring plaintiff to prove that other employees were actually

intoxicated in violation of law).

C. Applying Exhaustion Requirement to Each Fact?

Delgado’s appeal also failed before the Board for a third

reason, which was also based on an arbitrary requirement im‐

posed by the Board’s treatment of the exhaustion require‐

ment. The Board relied on a series of Federal Circuit decisions

interpreting the Whistleblower Protection Act’s command to

“seek corrective action from the Special Counsel” to mean

that “the employee must inform the Special Counsel of the

precise ground of his charge.” E.g., Ward v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added); see also

Mintzmyer v. Dep’t of the Interior, 84 F.3d 419, 422 (Fed. Cir.

1996) (affirming Board determination that employee failed to

exhaust four specific claims of agency retaliation that were

not included in charge to OSC); Ellison, 7 F.3d at 1036–37

(agreeing that Board lacked jurisdiction because petitioner

failed to inform OSC that claim of reprisal was based on pro‐

tected disclosure to Inspector General; employee told OSC

only of unprotected agency grievance). In Ward itself, the

court affirmed the Board’s refusal to consider additional epi‐

sodes of allegedly wasted funds on travel by different person

that were not presented in the OSC complaint: “An allegation

of a specific alleged travel impropriety—here Dr. Kamely’s

authorization of Dr. DeFrank’s trip to Portugal—was not suf‐

ficient notice to the Special Counsel that Dr. Ward also was

challenging other travel related activities of Dr. Kamely.” 981

F.2d at 526.
20 No. 16‐1313

We have no disagreement with that general point, at least

as stated by our colleagues on the Federal Circuit. But as ap‐

plied by the Board in Delgado’s case and others, exhaustion

seems to be determined separately for each fact an employee

alleges rather than for each claim of protected disclosure or

retaliation. See, e.g., Daniels v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 105

M.S.P.R. 248, 253–54 (MSPB 2007) (concluding that Board

lacked jurisdiction to review agency’s proposed removal of

whistleblower because it occurred three weeks after OSC

closed her complaint and thus was not specifically presented,

even though removal was consistent with complaint, which

alleged campaign of retaliation including threat of “removal

of all duties”); Reeves v. Dep’t of the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 337,

341–42 (MSPB 2005) (dismissing for failure to exhaust sol‐

dier’s claim that disclosure of gross waste of training funds

resulted in poor performance evaluation because he neglected

to tell OSC “the precise actions he reported” and how he “rea‐

soned that the managers’ actions constituted gross waste”).

As the Board applies this framework, a whistleblower effec‐

tively forfeits reliance on any factual detail not presented first

to the OSC, and if the facts the employee presents do not es‐

tablish a conclusive case, there is no need for the OSC to in‐

vestigate. As the Board explained in Delgado’s case, it agreed

with the administrative judge that “nothing [Delgado] had

provided indicated that he gave OSC a sufficient basis to pur‐

sue an investigation that might lead to corrective action.”

The source of this unusually stringent approach is not

clear to us. The exhaustion language in the statute is simple

and brief. The employee must “seek corrective action from the

Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the

Board.” See 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). We do not see why this di‐
No. 16‐1313 21

rective should be read to require a federal employee (who typ‐

ically is not trained in the law) to present to the OSC a per‐

fectly packaged case ready for litigation. The directive surely

cannot mean that an agency whose mission is to investigate

must be given upfront all the information necessary to prove

a complaint.

Another recent case, Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

illustrates this problem in practice. 121 M.S.P.R. 154, 160–68

(MSPB 2014). Clarke, a physician, filed an OSC complaint con‐

taining eight specific disclosures of wrongdoing at the Veter‐

ans Administration. The OSC responded with an email seek‐

ing “more detailed information” within 10 days. (What ex‐

actly the agency wanted is unclear.) Dr. Clarke responded

with a detailed narrative, but it covered only two of the eight

disclosures due to “the time constraints imposed by OSC.”

OSC then declined to investigate—at all.

Dr. Clarke appealed, and the Board affirmed dismissal.

The Board decided that Dr. Clarke had failed to exhaust the

six disclosures not included in his response to the OSC’s

email—over the dissent of the Vice Chairman, who thought

that Dr. Clarke’s initial complaint contained plenty of detail,

regardless of whether the agency had later requested even

more information. Id. at 165–68. Remarkably, however, the

majority grounded its finding of failure to exhaust on the

OSC’s “determination that it might need further information

in order to pursue an investigation,” a conclusion that the

Board thought should be entitled to deference under Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984). Clarke, 121 M.S.P.R. at 160 n.8.  

This novel determination prompted the OSC to file its own

brief as amicus curiae asking the Federal Circuit to overturn
22 No. 16‐1313

the Board’s conclusion that Dr. Clarke had failed to exhaust.

The OSC contended that the Board had disregarded the un‐

ambiguous statutory language of the exhaustion requirement

without understanding “all of the relevant factors that OSC

considers in marshaling its limited resources” when deciding

whether to investigate a particular complaint among the

thousands it receives annually. Brief for U.S. Office of Special

Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Clarke v.

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

The OSC also argued that the Board’s reliance on its deci‐

sion not to investigate was untenable for two reasons. First,

the Whistleblower Protection Act itself forbids the Board from

considering such determinations. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(f),

1214(b)(2)(E). Second, Congress specified during passage of

the Act “that whistleblowers who seek the OSC’s help not be

penalized by any OSC decision not to pursue their cases.” See

S. Rep. No. 100‐413, at 10 (1988). Notwithstanding the

agency’s opposition, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed

the Board’s decision that Dr. Clarke had failed to exhaust his

remedies before the OSC, but it did so in a non‐precedential

order. Clarke v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed.

Cir. 2015).  

As Clarke illustrates, the Board’s stringent application of

the Whistleblower Protection Act’s exhaustion requirement

can effectively prevent all but the savviest federal whistle‐

blowers from receiving a hearing on the merits.2 We think

                                                  2 This view is supported by a recent report from the Government Ac‐

countability Office on the implementation of the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012—a comprehensive amendment to the Act in‐

tended to “clarify the breadth of disclosures that are afforded protection,

expand the right to bring reprisal claims for certain protected activities,
No. 16‐1313 23

Congress intended the exhaustion requirement simply to give

the OSC and the employing agency a chance to resolve issues

without litigation.

The correct approach, we conclude, is to interpret the Act’s

requirement more consistently with other statutory exhaus‐

tion schemes. The Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, bars

suit against the United States for money damages “unless the

claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropri‐

ate Federal Agency and his claim shall have been finally de‐

nied by the agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a)

(confirming that “claim shall be deemed ... presented when a

Federal agency receives from a claimant” notice of the inci‐

dent and a sum certain for damages on Standard Form 95).

To satisfy that important requirement, a claimant is not re‐

quired to submit evidence or to include every detail that

might be necessary to prove at trial. Instead, courts construe

pro se administrative complaints generously and deem ex‐

hausted any claim fairly implicit in the facts that would be

clear to a legally sophisticated reader. Buechel v. United States,

746 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2014); accord, e.g., Lopez v. United

States, 823 F.3d 970, 975–76 (10th Cir. 2016); Goodman v. United

States, 298 F.3d 1048, 1055–57 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing FTCA

                                                 

and enhance the remedies available to federal whistleblowers.” U.S. Gov’t

Accountability Office, Whistleblower Protection: Additional Actions

Would Improve Recording and Reporting of Appeals Data (2016), at 1–2,

available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681269.pdf. The GAO found

that, despite the WPEA’s enhanced protections, the Board adjudicated on

the merits only 15% of whistleblower appeals during the three years after

passage of the expansion. Id. at 12–13. To be fair, roughly one third of ap‐

peals were either withdrawn or settled. But the data show that the Board

consistently dismissed more than half of all contested appeals without a

hearing. Id.
24 No. 16‐1313

notice requirement as “minimal” and confirming that a “skel‐

etal” description of the alleged harm will suffice). “All that is

required is sufficient notice to enable the agency to investi‐

gate,” Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 426 (7th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff is not prohib‐

ited from later buttressing the exhausted claim with addi‐

tional details or evidence. After the claimant provides enough

information to put a legally sophisticated reader on notice, it

is up to the agency “to fill in the gaps, to the extent possible.”

Buechel, 746 F.3d at 761.

Perhaps even closer to the whistleblower issue is the

standard used to determine whether a particular claim as‐

serted in court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., has been exhausted before the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. Like the Whistle‐

blower Protection Act’s exhaustion scheme, Title VII requires

a plaintiff to exhaust a discrimination claim through an

agency that is charged with investigating but that will not be

a defendant in a later civil suit on the merits of the claim.

The Supreme Court held long ago that although Title VII

requires the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC before

filing suit, exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement and

may thus be waived or subject to estoppel and equitable toll‐

ing. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392–98

(1982). The Court also has instructed that “technicalities are

particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which lay‐

men, unassisted by trained lawyers initiate the process.” Lego

v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).3  

                                                  3 The Federal Circuit and the Board treat the exhaustion requirement

in 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) as jurisdictional. E.g., McCarthy v. Merits Systems
No. 16‐1313 25

With these principles in mind we have held that, because

most complaints “are completed by laypersons rather than by

lawyers, a Title VII plaintiff need not allege in an EEOC

charge each and every fact that combines to form the basis of

each claim in her complaint.” Cheek v. Western & Southern Life

Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994). We regard “a theory

raised in court to fall within the scope of an administrative

complaint if it is reasonably related to the charges actually set

forth in the administrative filing.” Dear v. Shinseki, 578 F.3d

605, 609 (7th Cir. 2009); accord, e.g., Sydnor v. Fairfax County,

681 F.3d 591, 595–96 (4th Cir. 2012); Williams v. New York City

Housing Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2006). Even a charge

that is not explicit in an employee’s complaint will be deemed

exhausted if “the current claim reasonably could have devel‐

oped from the EEOC’s investigation of the charges before it,”

meaning that “the EEOC charge and the complaint must de‐

scribe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.”

Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005). Federal em‐

ployees alleging discrimination are subject to additional pre‐

conditions within the employing agency, see 42 U.S.C.

                                                 

Protection Bd., 809 F.3d 1365, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Miller v. FDIC, 122

M.S.P.R. 3, 9 (MSPB 2014). We see nothing in the statutory language

(“shall seek corrective action from the Special Counsel before seeking cor‐

rective action from the Board”) mandating that conclusion, particularly in

light of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence requiring clear signals

that a rule is truly jurisdictional rather than a “case‐processing rule” that

need not be enforced as jurisdictional rules. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.

Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).

Cf. Acha v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 841 F.3d 878, 883 n.3 (10th Cir. 2016) (ex‐

plaining court’s view that § 1214(a)(3) remains jurisdictional). Neither

party has briefed the question, however, and we need not decide it be‐

cause we conclude Delgado exhausted his claim before the OSC.
26 No. 16‐1313

§ 2000e‐16(c), but since the scope of the exhaustion require‐

ment is the same, federal employees’ complaints receive the

same generous construction. Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d

1093, 1099–1100 (7th Cir. 2013). We see no statutory or other

reason it should be substantially more difficult for a federal

employee to exhaust a claim of retaliation under the Whistle‐

blower Protection Act than a charge of discrimination under

Title VII.

The OSC examiner also faulted Delgado for not providing

evidence showing “a causal connection between the disclo‐

sures you identified and the ATF’s decisions” because “there

is no indication that either [disclosure] resulted in any inves‐

tigation, or that any official suffered adverse impact because

of the report.” This conclusion seems to have been worded as

if Delgado were required to allege that Labno suffered ad‐

verse impact. That could not be correct. The issue is retaliation

against the alleged whistleblower, not against the target of his

disclosures.  “Congress passed the whistleblower statute pre‐

cisely because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistle‐

blowers within their ranks.” Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Mac‐

Lean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 920 (2015).

The pertinent inquiry is of course whether Delgado him‐

self suffered adverse action as a result of his disclosures of

Labno’s possible perjury and reckless firing of his weapon.

Delgado’s complaint specifies adverse actions he suffered be‐

cause of his disclosures, including denied promotions, a

threat of an unwelcome transfer, and a hostile work environ‐

ment. Neither OSC northe Board has identified any particular

problem with Delgado’s allegations on this score. He pro‐

vided enough specifics forthe OSC to investigate if it had cho‐

sen to do so, including identifying specific adverse actions
No. 16‐1313 27

and specific responsible supervisors. Delgado’s complaint

does not prove that the relevant decisions were motivated by

a desire to retaliate against him for his disclosures, but he

needed only to provide a sufficient basis for investigation. He

did so.  

It is undisputed that Delgado gave the OSC a copy of the

district court’s order denying Jefferson’s motion for a judg‐

ment of acquittal. When the OSC’s initial letter is read in con‐

junction with the court’s order, it is clear that the OSC under‐

stood that Delgado claimed he suffered retaliation after tell‐

ing superiors he suspected that Special Agent Labno had lied

at Jefferson’s trial. Indeed, the OSC’s letter by itself includes

enough information to know Delgado had tried to “seek cor‐

rective action” from OSC, as required by the statute. Delgado

even responded to that first letter, challenging the OSC exam‐

iner’s understanding of his complaint and insisting that he

“clearly alleged  that there may have been a violation of law

when SA Labno provided false testimony.” Everything else

submitted by Delgado in this case—his declaration to the

Board, his response to the administrative judge’s demand for

information to establish the Board’s jurisdiction, and even his

brief in this court—is consistent with the OSC’s stated under‐

standing of Delgado’s complaint.  

We hold that Delgado satisfied the Whistleblower Protec‐

tion Act’s exhaustion requirement by presenting the OSC with

sufficient information to permit a legally sophisticated reader

to understand his charge of retaliation and to investigate it

further. The absence of a copy of his initial complaint should

not prove fatal before the Board, at least if other sufficiently

reliable evidence demonstrates exhaustion, such as the OSC’s

response letters, an affidavit or declaration attesting to the
28 No. 16‐1313

complaint’s substance, or a copy of Delgado’s complaint itself

from the OSC’s own files.

The petition for review is GRANTED, and the case is

REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.