Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jerry Drook

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Marjorie Newell 

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of L.S. (Minor Child)

J.S. (Mother),

Appellant,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee.

April 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A02-1609-JT-2282

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Dana J. 

Kenworthy, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27D02-1511-JT-22

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 2 of 18

Statement of the Case

[1] J.S. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parent-child 

relationship with her son, L.S. Mother argues that the Indiana Department of 

Child Services (“DCS”) did not present sufficient evidence proving that there 

was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in L.S.’s removal 

from or reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied. She 

also argues that DCS did not present sufficient evidence to show that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child’s wellbeing. Concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to L.S.

Facts

[3] L.S. was born in August 2007. DCS became involved with Mother and L.S. on 

December 9, 2011, after receiving a report regarding poor living conditions at 

Mother’s home. The prior day, the Marion Police Department (“the police”) 

had gone to Mother’s house after receiving a report that L.S.’s father (“Father”) 

had died in the family’s house. Upon arriving at the house, the police had 

found the house filled with piles of trash, food, clothing, rodents, and rodent 

excrement. The house was later condemned and torn down by the city. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 3 of 18

[4] During DCS’s initial interview with Mother, the DCS caseworker noticed that 

four-year-old L.S. seemed to have some developmental delays, including an 

inability to verbally communicate and a lack of eye contact. Mother was aware 

that she should have had L.S. tested for autism, but she had never had an 

evaluation performed. Mother also told DCS that she had various medical 

conditions that made it difficult for her to maintain her house.1 Mother agreed 

to have L.S. evaluated to determine his needs, and she agreed to participate in 

recommended services. 

[5] At that time, DCS left L.S. in Mother’s care and placed her on a six-month 

Informal Adjustment program. As part of this Informal Adjustment program, 

Mother was required to do the following: keep in contact with the DCS family 

case manager (“FCM”); allow the FCM to visit Mother’s home to monitor 

compliance; provide appropriate care for L.S. and ensure that he was attending 

services and school; meet all of L.S.’s medical and mental health needs; provide 

L.S. with a safe home environment; participate in an intensive family 

preservation program; complete a parenting assessment and follow all 

recommendations; and complete a psychiatric evaluation and follow all 

recommendations. 

[6] During the Informal Adjustment period, DCS assisted Mother with having L.S.

evaluated, and he was diagnosed with autism. After being diagnosed, L.S. 

started to receive services, such as occupational, physical, and speech therapies. 

 

1

For example, Mother had back pain, kidney problems, high blood pressure, and fibromyalgia.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 4 of 18

In March 2012, L.S. began to receive Social Security disability benefits. DCS 

provided services to aid Mother in obtaining suitable housing and meeting 

L.S.’s special needs. Specifically, Melissa Helton (“Helton”) provided homebased services to Mother and worked with her on finding a job, obtaining 

housing, and parenting a child with special needs. Helton met with Mother on 

a weekly basis. 

[7] Mother was generally compliant with services, such as participating in homebased services and completing her psychiatric evaluation and parenting 

assessment. Nevertheless, DCS continued to have concerns about Mother’s 

supervision and care of L.S. Additionally, Mother had not provided a stable 

home environment, as Mother and L.S. had been living in a shelter since the 

beginning of the Informal Adjustment period. Also, Mother had not obtained 

employment and had no source of income other than L.S.’s disability benefits. 

At times, she had difficulty budgeting these funds.

[8] By May 2012, Mother had not yet completed the requirements of the Informal 

Adjustment program, and DCS had continued concerns about Mother’s care 

and supervision of L.S. For example, service providers who provided homebased services reported that Mother was frequently lying around, was feeding 

L.S. only junk food, was not bathing him regularly, was allowing him to 

wander around, and was not working with L.S. on his therapeutic skill-building 

activities. L.S.—who was almost five years old—was still not potty-trained, 

could not speak, and did not know how to use utensils to eat. DCS was also 

concerned about Mother’s apparent lack of motivation to budget her money 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 5 of 18

and move out of the shelter, despite the assistance that service providers had 

offered. DCS requested to extend Mother’s Informal Adjustment program for 

an additional three months, and the trial court granted DCS’s request.

[9] Prior to the expiration of the Informal Adjustment extension, DCS filed a 

petition alleging that L.S. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) in August 

2012. In the petition, DCS alleged, in part, that Mother was not consistently 

supervising L.S. or working with him to help him with his autism; was unable 

to provide housing and had been living in a shelter with L.S.; and had failed to 

follow up on recommendations from her parenting assessment and psychiatric 

evaluation and seemed unmotivated to do so. The trial court then appointed a 

court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) to represent L.S.’s best interests. 

[10] During the CHINS hearing held in November 2012, Mother admitted that L.S. 

was a CHINS and that she needed assistance in providing for his needs. The 

trial court determined that then five-year-old L.S. was a CHINS and allowed 

him to stay in Mother’s care. At that time, Mother had just moved out of the 

shelter and into an apartment. The trial court ordered that L.S. was to continue 

receiving physical, occupational, and speech therapies. The trial court also 

ordered Mother to, among other things: maintain safe and appropriate 

housing; cooperate and maintain contact with DCS and service providers;

continue home-based services; allow DCS to make unannounced visits to her 

home to ensure the safety of L.S.; secure and maintain a stable source of 

income; ensure that L.S. was enrolled in and attending school; meet L.S.’s 

medical and mental health needs in a timely manner; obey the law; and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 6 of 18

continue to actively participate in home-based services, parenting education, 

and counseling. 

[11] A few months later, in February 2013, DCS removed L.S. from Mother’s care 

on an emergency basis due to her lack of appropriate supervision of L.S. and 

failure to meet his needs. Specifically, on two occasions, Mother had failed to 

answer the door when the school bus driver brought L.S. home and to the door, 

resulting in L.S. being taken back to school. Mother told DCS that she had 

taken some cold medicine and did not wake up. DCS placed L.S. in relative 

care and later in foster care. DCS allowed Mother to continue to receive 

payment of L.S.’s disability benefits, which were her only source of income, so 

that she could use it to work toward reunification with L.S.

[12] Thereafter, Mother was compliant with services, attended her visits with L.S., 

worked on skill-building activities with L.S., moved into an apartment and 

child-proofed it for L.S., and cooperated with DCS. Mother also attended 

individual therapy and participated in home-based services to work on parent 

education, budgeting, and nutrition. Helton, the home-based services provider, 

noted in an April 2013 monthly progress report that Mother was willing to 

work with services, had gotten housing and kept it clean, had been working 

with L.S. on his therapy tasks, and was doing well in her supervised visits. 

[13] In late May 2013, DCS returned L.S. to Mother’s care, and the CHINS case 

remained open with all previous services and requirements in place. At that 

time, Mother agreed to set up a safety plan for L.S., which was set up to address 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 7 of 18

DCS’s ongoing concerns regarding Mother’s care of L.S. The safety plan 

included obtaining safety equipment for Mother’s apartment, keeping the 

bathroom door closed so that L.S. would not get into the toilet water, putting a 

deadbolt on the top of the front door so that L.S. could not leave the apartment 

alone, supervising L.S. at all times, ensuring that he attended school and all 

therapies, and working with L.S. on skill-building activities.

[14] However, thereafter Mother did not consistently take L.S. to his required 

therapy appointments. Also, Mother was living with a woman, T.K., who had 

a DCS case of her own. DCS told Mother that T.K. was not an appropriate 

person to be living in the same home as L.S. and warned Mother that T.K. 

should not live with Mother because Mother was the only person on the lease. 

Also, T.K. interfered with the home-based services provider’s ability to work 

with Mother. 

[15] Nevertheless, DCS continued to recommend that L.S. remain in Mother’s care. 

Following a permanency hearing in August 2013, the trial court accepted 

DCS’s recommendation but noted that it had “serious reservations regarding 

continued placement with Mother.” (Ex. Vol. 61). The trial court conditioned 

this continued placement on Mother’s compliance with the requirements that 

she keep all appointments for L.S., not unilaterally stop services, and get T.K. 

to move out of her apartment. 

[16] Mother had T.K. move out of the apartment in September or October 2013. 

Mother did better with home-based services after T.K. moved out. However, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 8 of 18

Mother continued to be unemployed and continued to have difficulties 

budgeting funds. In January 2014, she was evicted from her apartment for 

failing to pay her rent. Thereafter, she moved into another apartment. 

[17] In March 2014, the trial court held a periodic hearing and, thereafter, removed 

L.S. from Mother’s care due to her failure to comply with L.S.’s case plan and 

to ensure that he received his necessary therapies. L.S. never returned to 

Mother’s care. The trial court found that “Mother’s excuses for lack of 

compliance with [L.S.’s] services [were] not credible” and stated that her 

“efforts in this matter [were] minimal.” (Ex. Vol. 63). After L.S. was removed 

from Mother’s care, DCS placed him in therapeutic foster care and stopped 

L.S.’s disability benefits from going to Mother. DCS provided Mother with 

visitation, individual therapy, and home-based services to assist her with 

obtaining employment and housing. 

[18] Thereafter, Mother had supervised visitation with L.S. Additionally, Mother 

participated in services and sought out some services on her own, including 

individual counseling and nutritional consulting. DCS had concerns about 

Mother because she participated in services but did not seem to make any 

concrete progress. Mother still had no employment and no source of income. 

She had applied for Social Security on her own behalf but was denied benefits. 

Also, Mother was charged with two crimes, including a “hit and run” and theft 

from a Walmart. (Vol. 2 Tr. 250).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 9 of 18

[19] Following a February 2015 permanency hearing, the trial court issued an order, 

noting that Mother had been participating in services and supervised visitation 

but that she was “unable to demonstrate that she ha[d] received maximum 

benefits of services with regard to providing a stable environment for [L.S.].” 

(Ex. Vol. 74). The trial court also approved DCS’s plan to move towards 

termination of parental rights. DCS continued to provide the same services to 

Mother. 

[20] In the subsequent months, Mother continued the same pattern of attending 

services but failing to get the maximum benefit from them. Mother continued 

to have supervised visitation with L.S., but she would occasionally doze off for 

short periods during those visits. She also fell asleep for longer periods of time 

during visits. For example, during a June 2015 visit, Mother fell asleep for 

almost thirty minutes. While Mother was sleeping, L.S. walked around the 

room, took chalk from the chalkboard, and put it in his mouth. Mother also 

did not show up for all visitation sessions. Additionally, she did not obtain 

employment and was unable to provide a stable environment for L.S. 

[21] On December 14, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to L.S. At that time, Mother did not have employment or housing of her 

own and was living in T.K.’s apartment. DCS continued to provide Mother 

with services and visitation with L.S.

[22] The trial court held termination hearings on May 4, May 13, and June 7, 2016. 

At the time of the termination hearings, L.S. was eight years old. DCS had 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 10 of 18

been involved with L.S. and Mother since December 2011, and L.S. had been 

removed from Mother’s care since March 2014. 

[23] At the time of the first two hearings, Mother was living in a shelter and had 

been living there since April 2016. Prior to moving into the shelter, Mother had 

lived in her car for a short period and had also lived with friends. Mother had 

not maintained independent housing since March 2015. By the time of the last 

hearing in June, Mother was living in a motel, which was funded by her 

parents, and she testified that she was not allowed to return to any local shelter. 

Moreover, Mother was unemployed and had never obtained employment 

during the course of DCS’s involvement with her. In fact, the last time Mother 

had employment was in 2002. Additionally, Mother had been on probation for 

a “hit and run” conviction since December 2014, and she had a pending theft 

charge that she was hoping would be dismissed. (Vol. 2 Tr. 250). 

[24] During these hearings, Mother’s service providers testified that Mother loved 

L.S. and had a bond with him. However, they also testified regarding their 

concerns with Mother’s lack of consistent employment and housing and its 

effect on Mother’s ability to effectively parent L.S. and attend to his special 

autism needs that required constant supervision. 

[25] For example, the CASA, Ellen Schramm (“CASA Schramm”), testified that 

Mother was “very loving” with L.S. (Vol. 2 Tr. 162). However, CASA 

Schramm also testified that, since she had been assigned as the CASA for L.S. 

in October 2015, Mother had not been able to make the overall necessary 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 11 of 18

progress or changes to provide a stable home for L.S. CASA Schramm also 

testified that L.S. was doing well in his foster home and that it was in L.S.’s best 

interest to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

[26] Additionally, FCM Stroup, who had been Mother’s FCM from July 2013 to 

October 2014, testified that she was never concerned about whether Mother 

loved L.S. and that Mother “adore[d] him.” (Vol. 2 Tr. 131). FCM Stroup’s 

concern with Mother was that she had a “lack of progress despite constant 

services.” (Vol. 2 Tr. 104).

[27] FCM Amy Shutters (“FCM Shutters”), who had been Mother’s FCM from 

December 2011 to July 2013, testified that Mother generally participated in 

services during the initial part of the CHINS proceeding but that she would 

fluctuate between making progress and lacking motivation. FCM Shutters 

testified that Mother attended services but did not always benefit from them.

[28] FCM Cassandra Brubaker (“FCM Brubaker”), who had been Mother’s FCM 

since January 2015, testified that that L.S. requires constant supervision and 

that Mother was not ready to have L.S. returned to her “[d]ue to [Mother’s] 

lack of housing and financial stability and the poor decision-making of who she 

allows in her life.” (Vol. 3 Tr. 122). 

[29] Kami Hawke (“Hawke”), who had supervised Mother’s visits with L.S. since 

August 2015, testified that Mother and L.S. were “definitely very loving 

towards each other” and had a “strong bond.” (Vol. 2 Tr. 140). Hawke, 

however, voiced her concern about Mother’s struggles to stay awake during 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 12 of 18

some visits and testified that, during one visit in April 2016, Mother “actually 

fell asleep for about 20 minutes of the visit[.]” (Vol. 2 Tr. 141).

[30] Julia Knapp (“Knapp”), a family consultant who provided case management 

for Mother, testified that she had worked with Mother since July 2015 to help 

her meet her goals of finding employment and obtaining stable housing. Knapp 

testified that Mother was cooperative with services, but Knapp did not believe 

that Mother could care for L.S. at that time. Knapp testified that Mother was 

“frequently unable to really move around very much” and that her “motor skills 

[were] kind of slow, almost like she’s tired or lethargic almost.” (Vol 3 Tr. 46). 

[31] During the hearing, Mother testified that she did not have any source of 

income. She testified that she had relied on her parents for money for the prior 

two years. Mother also admitted that she had nodded off during visits with 

L.S. and acknowledged that L.S. required constant supervision. Mother 

testified that her numerous medications made her drowsy and that she 

sometimes had difficulty staying awake during the day. She testified that she 

had applied for Social Security disability based on a physical disability and 

mental health disability, that she had been denied, and that she was appealing 

that decision. She testified that her physical issues included back pain, 

fibromyalgia, asthma, irritable bowel syndrome, acid reflux, insomnia, and 

migraines and that she had been diagnosed with a personality disorder, 

depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 13 of 18

[32] Following the hearing, the trial court entered a detailed order involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.S. In relevant part, the trial court 

concluded that the conditions that resulted in L.S.’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home would not be remedied and that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child’s well-being. Mother 

now appeals.

Decision

[33] Mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering the involuntary termination 

of her parent-child relationship with L.S. “Although parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, the law allows for termination of these rights when 

parties are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibility as parents.” In re 

A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). See also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 

1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of termination of parental rights is not to 

punish parents but to protect children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied. 

[34] In reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132. We 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id. Where the trial 

court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. Id. We must determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set 

aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 14 of 18

erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support 

the conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[35] When DCS seeks to terminate parental rights, it must plead and prove, in 

relevant part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, 

been adjudicated a child in need of services . . . .

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). These allegations must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1133. If the trial court “finds that the 

allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court 

shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis 

added). 

[36] Mother argues that DCS failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability 

that: (1) the conditions that resulted in L.S.’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home will not be remedied; and (2) continuation of the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 15 of 18

parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child’s well-being.2 We note, 

however, that INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. 

Thus, DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence only 

one of the three conditions in subsection (B). See Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005). We will, therefore, 

discuss only whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in L.S.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will 

not be remedied. 

[37] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the 

conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then, second,

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to evaluate a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include 

parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, 

failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and 

 

2 DCS argues that Mother has waived appellate review of her challenge to the trial court’s determination 

under INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B), contending that Mother did not challenge both the conditions 

remedied subsection and the threat to the well-being subsection. While Mother’s arguments on both 

subsections are not the epitome of completeness or detailed arguments, we decline to find that Mother has 

waived her appellate challenge to this statutory determination. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 16 of 18

employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services offered 

to the parent by DCS and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of 

whether conditions will be remedied. Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due 

regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a 

parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of her future behavior.” E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 643. 

[38] Our review of the evidence reveals that DCS initially became involved with 

Mother and L.S. due to the deplorable condition of Mother’s home, which was 

later condemned by the city and torn down. At that time, DCS worked with 

Mother, who was unemployed and had moved L.S. into a shelter, to place her 

on an Informal Adjustment program that allowed her to maintain care and 

custody of L.S. During the Informal Adjustment period, it became clear to 

DCS that L.S. needed to be evaluated for autism and needed special services. 

After L.S.’s evaluation, DCS arranged for L.S. to receive physical, 

occupational, and speech therapies. During the Informal Adjustment period 

and the CHINS proceeding, DCS worked with Mother to provide home-based 

services to assist her in obtaining housing and employment. Mother, however, 

was unable to sustain stable housing or obtain employment. Indeed, as of the 

last day of termination hearings, Mother still had no employment and no stable 

housing and was living in a motel that was paid for by her parents. 

Additionally, Mother also lacked consistency in ensuring that L.S. was getting 

his required therapies. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 17 of 18

[39] Here, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that the conditions that resulted 

in L.S.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would not be 

remedied. The trial court provided numerous, detailed findings relating to this 

conclusion and then summarized these findings as follows:

[L.S.]’s involvement in the system began in December 2011. 

Since that time, he has been removed from Mother’s care twice. 

The most recent removal has lasted for over two years. Mother 

has had approximately four and one-half years to accomplish the 

steps necessary to be reunified with [L.S.], but has made very 

little progress. Children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents 

to work toward preservation and reunification. . . . [L.S.] has 

waited for four and one-half years for his Mother to make 

progress, and he should not be expected to wait any longer.

(App. 39) (emphasis in original). The trial court did not err by concluding that 

that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in L.S.’s 

removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied.

3

 

 

3 Mother also challenges one finding from the trial court’s fifty findings. Specifically, she challenges finding 

number 41, in which the trial court stated as follows:

Mother undoubtedly loves [L.S.], and shows affection toward him. Mother and [L.S.] are 

clearly bonded. However, her pattern of behavior over the past four and one-half years demonstrates that 

she is either unable or unwilling to provide the consistent care and attention that [L.S.] needs to be safe and 

healthy. Instead, Mother has demonstrated that she primarily depends on others to take care of 

her needs. 

(App. 37) (emphasis added). Mother challenges only the italicized sentence in finding number 41. She 

interprets the sentence to mean that the trial court was determining that L.S. was “harmed or injured or 

abandoned” while in her care, and she disputes that there was any evidence that her care ever “created any 

unsafe or unhealthy situations” for L.S. (Mother’s Br. 20). 

We, however, do not interpret the specific portion of finding number 41 as Mother does. In fact, the sentence 

is more of a conclusion by the trial court based on the evidence that L.S. had autism—which required various 

therapies and constant supervision—and that Mother—who had no employment, no consistent source of 

income, and no stable housing—had not always been consistent in working on skills with L.S. and getting 

him to his required therapies and had occasionally had difficulty staying awake during visitations. Mother 

does not challenge the evidence supporting this conclusion. Thus, we conclude her argument is without 

merit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-JT-2282 | April 27, 2017 Page 18 of 18

[40] We conclude there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial 

court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to L.S. We reverse a 

termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear error’—that which 

leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). 

We find no such error here and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

[41] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.