[J-81-2022] [MO – Mundy, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SOUTH BETHLEHEM ASSOCIATES, LP

v.

ZONING HEARING BOARD OF 

BETHLEHEM TOWNSHIP, 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CENTRAL PA EQUITIES 30, LLC

APPEAL OF: SOUTH BETHLEHEM 

ASSOCIATES, LP

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No. 41 MAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated January 

29, 2021 at No. 321 CD 2020 

Affirming the Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Northampton 

County dated February 14, 2020 at 

No. C48-CV-2019-6785

ARGUED: November 30, 2022

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: May 16, 2023

In this discretionary appeal, Appellee Central PA Equities 30, LLC (“Appellee”) 

sought two variances from the Zoning Hearing Board of Bethlehem Township (the 

“Board”). Appellant South Bethlehem Associates, LP (“Appellant”) appeared at the 

hearing and opposed the variances sought by Appellee. After finding that Appellant had 

standing, the Board granted the variances. Appellant appealed to the trial court, which

agreed that Appellant had standing but affirmed on the merits. However, on further 

appeal, the Commonwealth Court found that Appellant lacked standing to appeal because 

it was not an aggrieved party, and affirmed solely on those grounds. The Majority finds 

that Appellant was a proper party before the Board pursuant to Section 908(3) of the 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 2

Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (“MPC”)1 and thus, had standing to challenge 

Appellee’s requested variances before the Board. However, the Majority finds that in 

order to appeal to the trial court (and thus, subsequently to the appellate courts), Appellant

was required to make a showing of aggrievement by the grant of the variances and that 

Appellant failed to do so. 

For the reasons that follow, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s application 

of the traditional aggrieved party standard to find that Appellant lacked standing to secure 

judicial review. Consistent with longstanding precedent related to zoning appeals, I would

hold that a party sufficiently establishes that they are aggrieved for purposes of appeal to 

the courts when they have been granted party status before the Board and the Board 

reaches an adverse decision. Accordingly, I must also respectfully disagree with the 

Majority’s decision to apply Section 908(3) of the MPC, as I believe the proper course 

would have been to remand to the Commonwealth Court to conduct that inquiry, given its 

failure to do so in the first instance. In short, I believe that the trial court conducted the 

proper analysis into Appellant’s standing to first challenge the variances before the Board 

and then seek judicial review of the Board’s adverse decision granting the challenged 

variances. As such, I would vacate the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand to

that court for application of the proper standard.

I. Background

A detailed recitation of the facts and the parties’ arguments is helpful to 

understanding the disposition that I would reach in this case. Appellant owns the 

Courtyard Marriot hotel located at 2220 Emrick Boulevard in Bethlehem Township, 

Northampton County. Appellee seeks to construct, at 2401 Emrick Boulevard, a 107-

room, four-story hotel on a 3.482-acre property located approximately 1000 feet away

1 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, §§ 101-1202, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 3

from Appellant’s hotel. The properties are located in the same industrial park in the “Light 

Industrial/Office Campus (Phased) Zoning District,” where a hotel use is permitted as of 

right. However, per the Bethlehem Township Zoning Code (“Zoning Code”), certain 

requirements must be met for Appellee’s proposed development. The northern and 

eastern sides of the property border Cook Drive and Emrick Boulevard; therefore, fiftyfoot setbacks from the street rights-of-way are required. In addition, the western side 

borders the residential Madison Farms complex, which includes a thirty-nine-unit 

apartment structure with fourteen vehicular garages. The proximity of these multiple 

residential units within 175 feet of the proposed hotel triggered both a 150-foot setback 

requirement and the mandate for construction of an earth berm within the setback. 

In order to be relieved from these requirements, Appellee sought two variances 

under the Zoning Code. The first was a dimensional variance from Section 275.91(M)(4)

of the Zoning Code, which, specifically, requires a 150-foot setback from the lot lines of 

any dwelling, residential or agricultural district boundary, or municipal park. Appellee

proposed a seventy-four-foot setback, i.e., a variance of seventy-six feet. The second 

variance request sought a complete waiver from Section 275.91(M)(5), which mandates

the construction of the earth berm within the setback area. Appellee sought a waiver from 

this mandate because a utility easement for power lines along the western edge of the 

property precludes grading changes, which will make the construction of a berm

impractical.

At a May 29, 2019 hearing before the Board, Appellee presented the testimony of 

two witnesses, as well as nine exhibits. In addition, Timothy Stevens, Esquire, appeared 

as counsel for the sole objector. When introducing himself, Attorney Stevens 

misidentified his client as South Mountain Associates, LP, rather than South Bethlehem 

Associates, LP. Nonetheless, the Board accepted Attorney Stevens’ representation that 
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his client owned the Courtyard Marriott at 2220 Emrick Boulevard, located approximately 

two blocks away from the subject property and within the same industrial park. Id. at 12-

13. At its first opportunity at the hearing, Appellee challenged the objector’s standing 

because they were “not within the requisite notice under the township zoning ordinance”2

and were “merely appearing as a competitor in opposition to another hotel being 

proposed.” N.T., 5/29/2019, at 14. When the Board attempted to allow Attorney Stevens

to participate and defer a decision on standing, counsel for Appellee, Catherine Durso, 

Esquire, reiterated her objection to standing, stating that “there is a difference between 

being able to ask questions and being given party status and standing, especially when 

you are more than 1000 feet away and you are a competitor.” Id. at 34. After some 

discussion, the Board then overruled Appellee’s objection to standing and found that 

Attorney Stevens’ client was “a party of record.” Id. at 34-35. As the Board explains in 

its present brief, such rejection was based upon its application of Section 908(3) of the 

MPC, which provides:

The parties to the [zoning board] hearing shall be the 

municipality, any person affected by the application who has 

made timely appearance of record before the board, and any

other person including civic or community organizations 

permitted to appear by the board. The board shall have power 

to require that all persons who wish to be considered parties 

enter appearances in writing on forms provided by the board 

for that purpose.

53 P.S. § 10908(3).

Based on Section 908(3), the Board deemed Attorney Stevens’ client a “party” and 

allowed him to participate. Attorney Stevens’ participation at the hearing was limited to 

2 Section 275-12 of the Zoning Code requires that written notice of the hearing before 

the Board shall be provided to lot owners within 400 feet of the lot lines of the subject 

property. There is no dispute that Appellant’s property is approximately 1000 feet away 

from the site of Appellee’s proposed hotel and that Appellant was, thus, not entitled to 

automatic notice.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 5

his cross-examination of Appellee’s witnesses and legal argument in opposition to the 

variances. When the Board chair questioned Attorney Stevens as to whether he had any 

evidence he wished to present, counsel responded, “I just have my legal argument and 

my case law. My evidence would be my case law.” N.T., 5/29/2019, at 60. Attorney 

Stevens also indicated that he wished to submit exhibits, but the Board rejected his 

request to do so because he was not presenting a witness. Id. at 60-61. Ultimately, 

although the Board was unpersuaded by Appellee’s challenge to Appellant’s standing, 

the Board voted unanimously to grant the variances over Appellant’s substantive 

objections. 

Appellant appealed to the trial court, and Appellee maintained its challenge to 

Appellant’s standing and additionally argued that Appellant lacked standing to appeal to 

the trial court. The trial court found that Appellant had standing in both regards, and

without taking additional evidence, affirmed the decision to grant the variances. As to

standing, the court relied on caselaw from the Commonwealth Court for the proposition

that standing to appeal is established by an Appellant’s participation at the zoning hearing 

board proceedings as a party/objector. Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/2020, at 7-8 (citing Grant 

v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Twp. of Penn, 776 A.2d 356, 358-59 (Pa. Commw. 2001)

(“[I]ndividuals who have party status before the board may seek an appeal to the trial 

court as a party aggrieved.”); Johnson v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Richland Twp., 503 A.2d 

1117, 1119 n.1 (Pa. Commw. 1986) (noting that appellants were “members of an 

organization known as the Richland Concerned Citizens, and appeared as objectors at 

the hearing before the Board”)). Thus, the trial court considered whether Appellant was 

properly found to be a “party” before the Board based on Section 908(3) the MPC as “any 

person affected by the application who has made timely appearance of record before the 

board.” Id. at 8 (quoting 53 P.S. § 10908(3)). Applying this standard, the trial court found 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 6

that Appellant was a party to the Board proceedings, and consequently possessed 

standing to appeal, because Appellant: (1) appeared at the May 29, 2019 hearing via 

counsel; and (2) was “affected by the application” due to its “close proximity” just “two 

blocks” from Appellee’s property. Id. (quoting Laughman v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of 

Newberg Twp., 964 A.2d 19, 22 (Pa. Commw. 2009) (stating that when a “property is 

located in close proximity to the subject property ... , the zoning decision is presumed to 

have an effect on the property owner’s property”)). Notwithstanding this finding that 

Appellant was a party before the Board and thus had standing to appeal, the trial court 

affirmed the Board’s decision to grant the variances, over Appellant’s substantive 

objections.

Appellant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and Appellee maintained that 

Appellant neither had standing to appear as a party/objector before the Board nor 

standing to appeal to the courts. A unanimous panel of the Commonwealth Court 

“affirm[ed] the [Board’s] decision on different grounds than those of the trial court.” S. 

Bethlehem Associates, LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bethlehem Twp., 321 C.D. 2020, 

2021 WL 303046, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Jan. 29, 2021) (non-precedential decision). Unlike 

the lower tribunals, the Commonwealth Court found that “the issue of standing” was

“determinative,” and it did not reach the substantive issues raised by Appellant pertaining 

to the legality of the variances. Id. at *1. In further contrast, the Commonwealth Court 

treated the present dispute as hinging on a traditional standing inquiry. It did not consider 

the impact of the Board’s finding that Appellant was a “party” pursuant to the MPC and 

Zoning Code and that Appellant did not prevail before the Board. In fact, the 

Commonwealth Court did not mention the MPC at all, let alone cite any provision of it or 

reference its definition of “party.” 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 7

Rather, with regard to standing, the Commonwealth Court explained that “[o]ther 

than municipalities, persons who fail to appear or otherwise object before the zoning 

hearing board lack standing and cannot appeal an adverse decision to the trial court.” Id. 

at *2 (citing Leoni v. Whitpain Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 709 A.2d 999 (Pa. Commw. 

1998)). Additionally, the Commonwealth Court stated, based solely on citation to our 

decision in Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, that “a party must demonstrate that he 

or she is an aggrieved person in order to have standing to appeal.” Id. (citing Spahn v. 

Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1149 (Pa. 2009)). Further, the court explained

that while an adjoining neighbor who testifies in opposition to an application generally will 

have standing, more than mere proximity to the property is required to establish aggrieved 

party status. Id. (citing Soc’y Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning Hearing 

Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Phila., 951 A.2d 398, 404 (Pa. Commw. 2008); In re 

Application of Brandywine Realty Tr., 857 A.2d 714 (Pa. Commw. 2004)). To be 

aggrieved, a person must have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the matter. 

Id. (citing William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (Pa. 

1975)). 

As the above demonstrates, the Commonwealth Court simply drew a distinction 

between standing to appear before the Board as a party/objector (by citation to Leoni) 

and standing to appeal to the courts (by citation to Spahn, SCRUB, etc.). However,

although the parties presented distinct arguments as to standing to appear as a 

party/objector and standing to appeal, the Commonwealth Court did not specify whether 

it conducted these distinct inquiries, and it did not further elaborate upon the distinction. 

Apparently in regard to Appellant’s standing to appear before the Board, the court noted 

that Appellant was neither Appellee’s next-door neighbor nor within a radius to receive 

automatic notification of the application. Id. (citing N.T., 5/29/2019, at 12-13). Rather, 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 8

the court observed, counsel only asserted in support of standing that Appellant’s proximity 

established an “implied interest in the current applicant’s intent to place a hotel just two 

blocks away from our hotel.” Id. (quoting N.T., 5/29/2019, at 13). On the other hand, the 

Commonwealth Court acknowledged that Appellant participated at the Board hearing,

“limited to its attorney’s cross-examination of Appellee’s witnesses and legal argument in 

opposition to the variances,” and that the Board accepted counsel’s representation that 

his client owned the Courtyard Marriott at 2220 Emrick Boulevard. Id. (citing N.T., 

5/29/2019, at 12-13). As such, the Commonwealth Court did not make a finding that 

Appellant was not a proper party/objector before the Board. 

Relative to standing to appeal the Board’s decision, the Commonwealth Court 

explained that it had previously held that a zoning appeal cannot be used as a method to 

deter free competition, but that a competitor is not precluded from establishing 

aggrievement under such precedent. Id. (citing In re: Farmland Indus., Inc., 531 A.2d 79, 

84 (Pa. Commw. 1987)). To establish aggrievement in such a case, the asserted negative 

impact must originate from the variances sought and not simply from the competition 

expected from an incoming business. Id. Absent such aggrievement, the court stated it 

would reject a competitor’s use of the zoning process “to impede the location of a 

competitor in its trading area.” Id. (citing In re: Farmland Indus., Inc., 531 A.2d at 84). 

The court found that Appellant “failed to articulate, let alone substantiate a particular harm 

that it would suffer from the reduced setbacks, nor from the waiver of the berm 

requirement.” Id. The court reiterated that Appellant’s property did not border the 

proposed site and that Appellant did not establish that it would be able to view either the 

reduced setback or the absence of an earth berm from its property. Id. As such, the 

Commonwealth Court concluded that Appellant “failed to meet its burden to establish 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 9

standing” and therefore declined to address Appellant’s substantive objections to 

Appellee’s application. Id. 

In sum, the Commonwealth Court was faced with two questions: (1) whether 

Appellant had standing to appear before the Board as a party/objector and (2) whether 

Appellant had standing to appeal to the trial court. The Commonwealth Court only 

decided that Appellant did not have standing to appeal to the trial court because it was 

not aggrieved by Appellee’s requested variances. The Commonwealth Court did not find

that the Board erred in finding that Appellant was a proper party/objector with standing to 

oppose the variances at the May 29, 2019 Board hearing. This fact notwithstanding, the 

Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order affirming the Board’s grant of the 

variances, albeit “on different grounds than those of the trial court.” Id.3

Appellant petitioned this Court for discretionary review, alleging, among other 

reasons, that the Commonwealth Court’s standing inquiry was deficient pursuant to the 

MPC. We granted review of the following two issues:

(1) Whether the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 

erroneously applied an aggrieved party standard that was 

repealed by the legislature and replaced by a provision 

granting [Appellant] the right to appeal since it was deemed a 

party and opposed the proposed zoning relief during the 

underlying [zoning hearing board] hearing.[4]

3 I question the appropriateness of the Commonwealth Court’s disposition. It did not 

consider the merits of the appeal because of its conclusion that Appellant lacked standing. 

Under the circumstances, the appropriate disposition was dismissal of the appeal.

4 The Majority limits its analysis to consideration of whether Appellant had traditional 

standing to appeal to the courts, see Majority Opinion at 4 (“We granted allocatur limited 

to whether the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that Appellant lacked standing to 

seek judicial review”), although it also seems to accept the Board’s conclusion that 

Appellant was a party pursuant to Section 908(3). See id. (citing N.T., 5/29/19, at 34-35) 

(“The ‘any other person’ language is quite broad, and while we need not determine its 

limits (if any) at this juncture, the record reflects Appellant attained objecting-party status 

before the Board pursuant to this provision.”). However, the first issue over which we 

(continued...)
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 10

(2) Whether the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 

erroneously entered an order dismissing the appeal due to 

lack of standing pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure] 1114(b)(7)] where [Appellant,] who was located 

only two (2) blocks from the subject property[,] had a right to 

an appeal even if an aggrieved party standard is applied.

S. Bethlehem Associates, LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bethlehem Twp., 275 A.3d 484 

(Pa. 2022) (per curiam).

5

II. Parties’ Arguments

In support of its argument that the Commonwealth Court erred by concluding that 

it lacked standing, Appellant focuses upon the MPC as the basis for standing to appear

before a zoning board. It highlights that the General Assembly repealed the portions of 

the MPC that required application of an “aggrieved party” standard in favor of an “affected 

party” standard, as was applied by the Board and trial court. Specifically, Appellant

argues that Section 1007 of the MPC previously provided for an aggrieved party standard,

but that section, along with Sections 1003 to 1011 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §§ 11003-11011,

were repealed and replaced on December 21, 1988. Appellant maintains that Section 

908 now governs standing in relation to zoning board appeals and that through Section 

908, the General Assembly broadened the standing to appeal a zoning decision to any 

party opposing the granted zoning relief at the time of the zoning board hearing. See 53 

P.S. § 10908(3) & (9). Appellant observes that Section 908(3) of the MPC provides that 

granted allocatur, and the accompanying argument presented by Appellant, 

encompasses the question of the application of Section 908(3). See infra pp. 10-11 

(Appellant’s argument regarding Section 908(3)) & pp. 15-18, 23-25 (explaining that 

“party” status under Section 908(3) is a prerequisite to standing to appeal to the courts).

5 The language of the first question over which we granted review (i.e., the reference to 

“the right to appeal”) further reflects our conclusion that the Commonwealth Court’s 

decision was based solely on a finding that Appellant lacked standing to appeal to the 

trial court.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 11

“the parties to the [zoning board] hearing shall be the municipality, any person affected 

by the application who has made timely appearance of record before the board, and any

other person including civic or community organizations permitted to appear by the

board.” Further, Section 908(9) refers to the right of a non-prevailing party to appeal to a 

court of competent jurisdiction.

Applying the “affected party” standard set forth in Section 908(3), Appellant

maintains that the record establishes that Appellant owns a competing hotel within two 

blocks of the subject property and that Appellant is, therefore, affected by the application. 

Further, Appellant notes that it timely made an appearance of record before the Board at 

the May 29, 2019 hearing through counsel, counsel’s mistaken identification of his client 

notwithstanding. In addition, Appellant explains that the record also reflects that Appellant

was a “person ... permitted to appear by the [zoning hearing] board,” which alone satisfies 

Section 908(3)’s standing requirement. See N.T., 5/29/2019, at 33-34; 53 P.S. § 

10908(3). Appellant faults the Commonwealth Court for disregarding these facts and 

instead relying upon authority that predated the current provisions of the MPC to find that 

Appellant lacked standing. Appellant asks the Court to vacate the order of the 

Commonwealth Court and remand the matter for consideration of the merits of Appellant’s 

challenge to the requested variances.6 

The Board, as a technical appellee, maintains that it correctly determined that 

Appellant had standing to appear before it at the May 29, 2019 zoning hearing in

opposition to Appellee’s request for two dimensional variances. First, the Board agrees 

6 Alternatively, Appellant argues that even if the aggrieved party standard is applied, the 

Commonwealth Court erred in dismissing the appeal due to a lack of standing because 

Appellant’s hotel is located only two blocks from the subject property, and testimony was 

elicited from Appellee’s expert that a smaller hotel could be built or other uses could have 

been employed at the subject property in a manner more consistent with the existing 

zoning ordinance regulations, which would be less detrimental to Appellant’s hotel.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 12

with Appellant that Appellant appeared at the May 29, 2019 Board hearing through its 

legal counsel, Attorney Stevens, and that his misidentification of his client is immaterial. 

Second, the Board explains that its standing determination was properly predicated upon 

its review of Section 275-12 (E) of the Zoning Code, which defines a party in precisely the 

same manner as Section 908 of the MPC:

Parties. The parties to the hearing shall be the Township, any 

person affected by the application who has made timely 

appearance of record before the Zoning Hearing Board and 

any other person including civic or community organizations 

permitted to appear by the Zoning Hearing Board. The Zoning

Hearing Board shall have power to require that all persons 

who wish to be considered parties enter appearances in 

writing on forms provided by the Zoning Hearing Board for that 

purpose. 

Bethlehem Township Zoning Code, § 275-12 (E). See also 53 P.S. § 10908(3).

The Board notes that while the MPC and Zoning Code do not define the term

“person,” Pennsylvania courts have consistently held with regard to zoning appeals, that

a corporation is a legal person that is separate and distinct from its shareholders. Bradley 

v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of New Milford, 63 A.3d 488, 492 (Pa. Commw. 2013) (citing

Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954)). Further, the Board explains 

that its determination at the May 29, 2019 hearing that Appellant had standing was

predicated upon two factors: (1) Appellant entered its timely appearance at the time of 

the initial hearing, see Appeal of Greco, 254 A.2d 6, 7 (Pa. 1969) (“There is but one way

to become a party litigant in a court and that is by appearing in the proceedings.”); and 

(2) the Board was convinced by Appellant’s argument at the hearing that it was “affected 

by the application” because Appellant owns the hotel located approximately two blocks 

from the proposed construction site. The Board notes that it was cognizant of the fact 

that when a “property is located in close proximity to the subject property ... the zoning 

decision is presumed to have an effect on the property owner’s property” as a matter of 
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law. Laughman, 964 A.2d at 22. Thus, because Appellant satisfied the definition of 

“party” under the MPC and Zoning Code, the Board stands by its finding that Appellant

had standing to appear before it as a party/objector. As such, the Board maintains that 

Appellant, as a party, was free to appeal the Board’s decision to the courts. On the other 

hand, the Board stands by its decision to grant the variances and, therefore, urges this 

Court to reverse the Commonwealth Court only with regard to Appellant’s standing.

Appellee maintains that the Commonwealth Court was correct to apply the 

aggrieved party standard. Appellee contends that Section 908 of the MPC did not 

broaden standing. In support of its claim that the aggrieved party standard is the only 

applicable standard, Appellee points to Section 913.3 of the MPC, which is entitled 

“[p]arties appellant before the board” and provides that “[a]ppeals under [S]ection 

909.1(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8) and (9) may be filed with the board in writing by the 

landowner affected, any officer or agency of the municipality, or any person aggrieved.” 

Id. § 10913.3 (footnote omitted). See also 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), 

(9) (relating to the zoning board’s jurisdiction to hear certain types of appeals). Appellee 

also points to Section 1002.1-A(c) of the MPC, which provides that “[a]ppeals under this 

section shall only be permitted by an aggrieved person who can establish that reliance 

on the validity of the challenged decision resulted or could result in a use of property that 

directly affects such person’s substantive property rights.” 53 P.S. § 11002.1-A(c). 

Appellee then explains that to establish “aggrieved” status, a party must have a 

substantial, direct and immediate interest in the claim sought to be litigated. Laughman, 

964 A.2d at 22. A substantial interest is one in which there is some discernable adverse 

effect to some interest other than the abstract interest all citizens have. Pittsburgh Trust 

for Cultural Res. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Adjustment for the City of Pittsburgh, 604 A.2d 

298, 303 (Pa. Commw. 1992). A direct interest requires a showing that the matter 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 14

complained of causes harm to the parties’ interest. Id. Immediacy requires that the 

interest is something more than a remote consequence and centers on a causal nexus 

between the action complained of and the injury to the party challenging it. Id.

Applying the aggrieved party standard, Appellee argues that Appellant has no 

substantial, direct and immediate interest but rather, has pursued an improper land use 

appeal simply to avoid commercial competition from another hotel. Appellee explains 

that Appellant does not have a direct interest in the requested relief because Appellant

would not be impacted by the setback and earthen berm variances, which are along a

common property line with Madison Farms, an unrelated development.7 Appellee

highlights that Appellant’s property does not adjoin its property and that Appellant’s 

property is not located within the radius to have received the required automatic 

notification of Appellee’s zoning hearing. Further, Appellee alleges that at the Board 

hearing, Appellant did not testify, did not put on any witnesses, and did not present

evidence or argument regarding how it would be harmed by the requested variances, but 

instead admitted that its objections were based on competition from a new hotel. Thus, 

Appellee insists that Appellant failed to show that it would be affected by the requested 

relief, much less that Appellant is aggrieved.

Appellee additionally focuses on Attorney Stevens’ identification of his client at the 

May 29, 2019 Board hearing as South Mountain Associates, LP. Appellee notes that

South Mountain Associates is an active Pennsylvania limited partnership, is not a party 

to this appeal and is not the Appellant. Building on this premise, Appellee maintains that

although Appellant filed the subsequent appeals of the Board’s grant of the variances to 

the trial court, Commonwealth Court and this Court, Appellant did not participate in the 

7 Appellee notes that no one connected with Madison Farms appeared at the May 29, 

2019 Board hearing to object to the proposed variances.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 15

May 29, 2019 Board hearing.8 Thus, Appellee concludes that the Commonwealth Court 

properly determined Appellant failed to show that it had standing to file this appeal.

Alternatively, Appellee submits that even if this Court disagrees with the Commonwealth 

Court, Appellant lacks standing to bring the present appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 501, on the 

ground that Appellant was not aggrieved by the Commonwealth Court’s order.

III. Analysis

The questions raised in this appeal involve the appropriate standard to be applied 

in determining the standing of a party to object to a request for relief from a zoning hearing 

board. Although the Commonwealth Court’s opinion is somewhat muddled in this regard, 

the answer to the predicate question of standing before the Board controls the 

subsequent question of standing to appeal to the Common Pleas and Commonwealth 

Courts. 

Issues involving standing present a pure question of law. Fumo v. City of Phila., 

972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009) (citing In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 

2006)). As with all questions of law, this Court’s standard of review is de novo and its 

scope of review is plenary. Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 186 A.3d 375, 

385 (Pa. 2018). In deciding this appeal, an interpretation of the MPC is required guided 

by the Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501–1991. The Act provides that a 

court’s proper role in interpreting and construing a statute is to determine the intent of the 

General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, when the language of a statute is 

clear and free from all ambiguity, a court should not disregard the letter of the statute in 

order to pursue its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). When the words of a statute are 

unambiguous, the plain language is the “paramount indicator of legislative intent.” Snyder 

8 I will not further consider this argument. The record is clear that the Board understood 

the proper identity of Appellant in the proceedings.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 16

Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 1056, 1071 (Pa. 2018), order amended on 

reconsideration, 203 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019). 

“The requirement of standing under Pennsylvania law is prudential in nature, and 

stems from the principle that judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying 

controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract.” City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 

838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003)). As 

this Court more recently explained:

The touchstone of standing is “protect[ing] against improper 

plaintiffs.” In re Application of Biester, [] 409 A.2d 848, 851 

([Pa.] 1979). To do so, courts require a plaintiff to 

demonstrate he or she has been “aggrieved” by the conduct 

he or she challenges. In re Hickson, [] 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 

([Pa.] 2003). To determine whether the plaintiff has been 

aggrieved, Pennsylvania courts traditionally examine whether 

the plaintiff’s interest in the outcome of the lawsuit is 

substantial, direct, and immediate. Robinson Twp.,

[Washington Cnty. v. Commonwealth,] 83 A.3d [901,] 917

[(Pa. 2013)]. “A party’s interest is substantial when it 

surpasses the interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to 

the law; it is direct when the asserted violation shares a causal 

connection with the alleged harm; finally, a party’s interest is 

immediate when the causal connection with the alleged harm 

is neither remote nor speculative.” Commonwealth, Office of 

Governor v. Donahue, [] 98 A.3d 1223, 1229 ([Pa.] 2014).

Firearm Owners Against Crime v. Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467, 481 (Pa. 2021). 

As discussed by Appellee (but overlooked by the Majority), standing to appeal to 

this Court and the Commonwealth Court implicates Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 501, which provides in full that “[e]xcept where the right of appeal is enlarged 

by statute, any party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a fiduciary whose estate 

or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.” Pa.R.A.P. 501.

9 Although Rule 501 

9 I note that the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to the courts of common pleas 

vested with jurisdiction to decide an appeal from local agency adjudications unless that 

(continued...)
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 17

references aggrievement, such aggrievement is generally established by virtue of the fact 

that a party did not prevail before the lower court. The requirement prevents a prevailing 

party from filing an appeal and therefore placing the appellate court in the position of 

providing an impermissible advisory opinion. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm’n, 830 A.2d 941, 948 (Pa. 2003). Put simply, pursuant to Rule 501, a prevailing 

party cannot be aggrieved by a grant of relief, while in general, a non-prevailing party is 

obviously aggrieved by an adverse decision. See, e.g., Almeida v. W.C.A.B. (Herman 

Goldner Co.), 844 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. Commw. 2004) (holding, in spite of claimant’s 

objection to the WCJ’s finding that claimant did not suffer a disc herniation, claimant could 

not be aggrieved without diminution in his benefits, unless subsequently altered by some 

further decision and order); Interest of K.C., 156 A.3d 1179, 1182 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(finding government agency demonstrated it was an aggrieved party because the trial 

court denied it the full relief requested).

Although not governed by Rule 501, the same has long been true of appeals from 

zoning board decisions to the trial court. In fact, as the trial court noted, it is a common 

refrain in Pennsylvania zoning jurisprudence that standing to appeal a zoning board’s 

decision is established when it is based upon the appellant’s unsuccessful participation 

at the zoning hearing board proceedings as a party/objector. See, e.g., In re Larsen, 616 

A.2d 529, 592 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam) (explaining that when a person is permitted to 

appear in opposition to an application to a zoning hearing board and permitted to crossexamine witnesses and present evidence, he or she is a party to those proceedings and 

is entitled to appeal an adverse decision as an aggrieved party), superseded on other 

grounds by constitutional amendment as stated in In re Angeles Roca First Judicial 

court has specifically adopted those rules. Thompson v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Horsham 

Twp., 963 A.2d 622, 625 n.6 (Pa. Commw. 2009).
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 18

District Philadelphia Cnty., 173 A.3d 1176, 1184 (Pa. 2017); Thompson v. Zoning Hearing 

Bd. of Horsham Twp., 963 A.2d 622, 625 (Pa. Commw. 2009) (holding that because 

Thompson appeared and participated as a party before the board without objection by 

the landowner, he necessarily was aggrieved by the Board’s adverse decision and had

standing to appeal that decision to the trial court, even though Thompson had no direct, 

immediate, substantial or pecuniary interest in the matter); Grant, 776 A.2d at 358-59 

(“[I]ndividuals who have party status before the board may seek an appeal to the trial 

court as a party aggrieved.”); Baker v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 367 A.2d 819, 823 (Pa.

Commw. 1976); Active Amusement Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 479 A.2d 697, 700

(Pa. Commw. 1984) (holding that the board’s permitting Active to appear before it through 

its counsel qualified Active under the MPC as a “party” and the adverse decision of the 

board rendered Active a party “aggrieved” for purposes of appeal to the courts). In other 

words, a non-prevailing party before the zoning board is, in essence, automatically 

“aggrieved” (i.e., establishes an interest that is substantial, direct, and immediate) for 

purposes of appeal to the courts by virtue of the adverse decision reached by the zoning 

board.10

This longstanding body of caselaw notwithstanding, the Commonwealth Court 

found that Appellant lacked standing to appeal to the trial court because it did not satisfy 

the traditional test for standing, i.e., that its interest was substantial, direct and immediate. 

Specifically, the Commonwealth Court found that Appellant lacked standing to appeal the 

10 The Majority posits that in relevant part, the MPC is “silent on the prerequisites for 

appealing to court[,]” and “that the Legislature intended for the courts of this 

Commonwealth to determine for themselves who would possess standing to initiate 

judicial proceedings to review a final decision rendered by a local zoning board.” See

Majority Opinion at 6-7. If the General Assembly so intended, then this long line of 

caselaw demonstrates that the courts of this Commonwealth long ago determined that 

such standing to appeal to the trial court would be conferred consistent with Pa.R.A.P. 

501 to a non-prevailing party before the board.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 19

Board’s decision to the trial court because Appellant did not establish that it was aggrieved 

by the grant of the specific variances at issue. To require such a showing by Appellant, 

the court relied on Spahn for the proposition that “a party must demonstrate that he or 

she is an aggrieved person in order to have standing to appeal” to the trial court. S. 

Bethlehem Associates, LP, 2021 WL 303046, at *1 (citing Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1149). This 

reliance was misplaced. In Spahn, the appeal arose from the General Assembly’s 

enactment of Section 17.1 of the First Class City Home Rule Act (“Home Rule Act”), 53 

P.S. § 13131.1.11 The specific issues raised in the appeal were whether the General 

Assembly removed general taxpayer standing from the Philadelphia Code by enacting 

Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act; whether such action violated the single subject rule 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and whether the Appellants had standing to pursue 

zoning challenges “under traditional notions of standing.” Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1136. This 

Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that following the enactment of Section 17.1, 

taxpayer standing was no longer viable under the Philadelphia Zoning Ordinance. Id.

Relevant for present purposes, in a footnote, the Spahn Court stated:

Appellants SCRUB and the civic organizations also assert 

that they have standing because they participated in the 

hearings before the [Philadelphia zoning b]oard. According to 

Appellants, the Commonwealth Court has allowed standing to 

a party based upon mere participation as objectors before a 

zoning board. See Johnson v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Richland 

Twp., [] 503 A.2d 1117 ([Pa. Commw.] 1986); Baker v. Zoning 

Hearing Bd. of West Goshen, 367 A.2d 819 (Pa. Commw.

1976). This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the 

effect of Section 17.1, which, as discussed previously, limited 

11 Section 17.1 provides that “[i]n addition to any aggrieved person, the governing body 

vested with legislative powers under any charter adopted pursuant to this act shall have 

standing to appeal any decision of a zoning hearing board or other board or commission 

created to regulate development within the city. As used in this section, the term

‘aggrieved person’ does not include taxpayers of the city that are not detrimentally harmed 

by the decision of the zoning hearing board or other board or commission created to 

regulate development.” 53 P.S. § 13131.1.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 20

standing to “aggrieved persons” as defined by William Penn

and its progeny.

Id. at 1150 n.12.

The Spahn Court’s stated reason for rejecting the previously well-established 

party-status based standing to appeal a zoning board decision and instead requiring an 

additional showing of traditional aggrievement was solely based on Section 17.1. 

Pertinently, the Spahn Court provided the following interpretation of Section 17.1:

The language of this section is clear. The intent of Section 

17.1 was to give the specific power of standing to appeal a 

decision of a zoning hearing board within a city of the first 

class to the governing body vested with legislative powers 

and to “aggrieved persons.” Notably, the statute does not 

define the term “aggrieved person” except to state what an 

aggrieved person is not—a taxpayer that has not been 

detrimentally harmed by a zoning decision, i.e., taxpayers 

generally. Moreover, Section 17.1 is contained in the First 

Class City Home Rule Act and Philadelphia presently is the 

only city of the first class in Pennsylvania. Thus, the plain 

language of the section leads to the inescapable conclusion 

that the General Assembly intended to limit standing to appeal 

a zoning decision in the City to two classes—the governing 

body and aggrieved persons—while specifically excluding the 

broader category of taxpayers.

Id. at 1143 (emphasis added). 

Obviously, Section 17.1 and Spahn only apply to cities of the first class in the 

Commonwealth, i.e., Philadelphia. Our decision in Spahn does not impact the analysis 

in the present case, and the Commonwealth Court’s reliance upon it was misplaced. 

Therefore, I would reaffirm the longstanding rule that a non-prevailing objector may 

establish standing to appeal to the trial court when the objector has obtained party status 

before the zoning hearing board. Thus, I would hold that the Commonwealth Court erred 

in requiring Appellant to prove that it was traditionally aggrieved by the Board’s grant of 

the variances to Appellee by establishing a substantial, direct and immediate interest in 

the issuance of the variances. Rather, the question of whether Appellant had standing to 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 21

appeal to the trial court (and in turn, to the Commonwealth Court and this Court pursuant 

to Rule 501) should be answered affirmatively if the two established conditions are met:

(1) the Board properly allowed Appellant to appear and participate at the hearing; and (2) 

Appellant did not prevail before the Board. 

Appellee argues that Section 913.3 of the MPC12 governs. Appellee’s Brief, 

5/31/2022, at 9-10. However, Appellee fails to recognize that the Board hearing at issue 

was an original proceeding and not an appeal of a prior decision by a municipal officer. 

Section 913.3 only applies to the latter situation. The first appeal in the course of these 

proceedings, and thus, first stage at which Appellant was an appellant, was in its appeal 

to the trial court. As the trial court explained, by its plain terms, Section 913.3 “only 

governs appeals before the zoning hearing board,” and further, does not apply to “appeals 

before the courts of common pleas.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/2020, at 7 n.9. 

As to standing to appeal to the trial court, Appellee argues that Appellant’s appeal 

rights are controlled by Section 1002.1-A(c) of the MPC. Appellee’s reliance here is 

misplaced. Section 1002.1-A applies only to “all appeals challenging the validity of a land 

use decision on the basis of a defect in procedures prescribed by statute or ordinance.” 

12 Section 913.3 provides:

§ 10913.3. Parties appellant before the board 

Appeals under section 909.1(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8) and 

(9)1 may be filed with the board in writing by the landowner 

affected, any officer or agency of the municipality, or any 

person aggrieved. Requests for a variance under section 

910.22 and for special exception under section 912.13 may be 

filed with the board by any landowner or any tenant with the 

permission of such landowner.

1 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9).

2 53 P.S. § 10910.2.

3 53 P.S. § 10912.1.

53 P.S. § 10913.3.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 22

53 P.S. § 11002.1-A(a). Section 1002.1-A(c) provides that “[a]ppeals under this section 

shall only be permitted by an aggrieved person who can establish that reliance on the 

validity of the challenged decision resulted or could result in a use of property that directly 

affects such person’s substantive property rights.” Id. § 11002.1-A(c). Appellant raises 

no such procedural defect claim, such as, for example, a failure to provide any notice 

allegedly required by the MPC. Rather, Appellant has raised substantive challenges to 

the Board’s grant of the variances. Thus, Section 1002.1-A(c) and its aggrievement 

requirement are simply not implicated.

Appellant urges that the Board and trial court correctly determined its standing to 

participate in the Board hearing based on Section 908(3), which provides:

The parties to the hearing shall be the municipality, any 

person affected by the application who has made timely 

appearance of record before the board, and any other person 

including civic or community organizations permitted to 

appear by the board. The board shall have power to require 

that all persons who wish to be considered parties enter 

appearances in writing on forms provided by the board for that 

purpose.

Id. § 10908(3). 

I agree with the Majority to the extent that it finds that the Board was correct to 

employ Section 908(3). See Majority Opinion at 5. The language of the MPC is clear.13 

The MPC provides that the procedures set forth in Article X-A are the “exclusive mode for 

securing review of any decision rendered pursuant to Article IX.” 53 P.S. § 11001-A. 

13 As I would find that the present language of the MPC is unambiguous as to the proper 

inquiry into Appellant’s standing, there is no need to consider the effect of former Article 

X, which included multiple references to aggrievement and the repeal of which Appellant 

heavily relies. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain language is the best 

indicator of legislative intent. Snyder Bros., Inc., 198 A.3d at 1071. Thus, there is no 

need to resort to other sources such as former versions of the MPC. Cf. 1 Pa.C.S. § 

1921(c) (“When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General 

Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters ... [t]he former law, 

if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.”).
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 23

Within Article IX, the procedure for hearings, including who may be a “party,” before the 

zoning hearing board is set forth, under the title “Hearings,” in Section 908 of the MPC, 

53 P.S. § 10908. Section 908 contains no references to aggrievement and does not use 

any form of the word “aggrieved.” Instead, Section 908(3) defines parties as: the 

municipality, a person affected by the application who has made timely appearance 

before the Board, and any other person including civic or community organizations 

permitted to appear before the Board.

On the other hand, I disagree with the Majority’s decision to allow the Board’s 

application of Section 908(3) in this case to stand. Given my feelings regarding standing 

to secure judicial review, I would remand to the Commonwealth to apply Section 908(3), 

given its failure to consider Section 908(3) in any manner. On the other hand, as the 

Majority concludes that a Section 908(3) party must additionally prove aggrievement to 

secure judicial review, the Majority finds that Appellant satisfied Section 908(3)’s definition 

of party (and thus, its standing to challenge the variances before the Board) but affirms 

the Commonwealth Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal for lack of standing. The 

Majority implies that the Board correctly found that Section 908(3) was satisfied based on 

the provision that a party “shall be ... any other person including civic or community 

organizations permitted to appear by the board.” See Majority Opinion at 5 (quoting 53 

P.S. § 10908(3)). See id. (citing N.T., 5/29/19, at 34-35) (“The ‘any other person’

language is quite broad, and while we need not determine its limits (if any) at this juncture, 

the record reflects Appellant attained objecting-party status before the Board pursuant to 

this provision.”)). However, I believe this issue requires further consideration of whether 

the ejusdem generis doctrine limits application of this provision to “any other person” of 

the same class as “civic or community organizations.” Notwithstanding this interpretative

issue, it is possible that the Board correctly concludes that Appellant was a “person 
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 24

affected by the application who has made timely appearance of record before the board.” 

53 P.S. § 10908(3).

In my view, the question as to whether Appellant met one of these requisites to 

become a party to the hearing under Section 908 should instead be directed to the 

Commonwealth Court in the first instance. If the question is answered in the affirmative

by that court, then Appellant should be found to have standing to appeal to the trial court 

because Appellant did not prevail before the Board.14 See, e.g., Larsen, 616 A.2d at 592; 

Thompson, 963 A.2d at 625; Grant, 776 A.2d at 358-59; Baker, 367 A.2d at 823; Active 

Amusement Co., 479 A.2d at 700.

15 Because Appellant did not prevail in the trial court, 

14 As the Commonwealth Court aptly stated in Baker:

Having appeared and participated as a party before the 

[b]oard, [the appellant] was necessarily aggrieved by the 

adverse decision of the [b]oard. To hold otherwise would 

reduce to a nullity for purposes [of] appeal [the] obtaining of 

the status of a party before zoning hearing boards.” 

Baker, 367 A.2d at 823.

15 I am unpersuaded by the Majority’s reliance on Hickson. See Majority Opinion at 8-

10. The Majority suggests that its disposition is consistent with Hickson, “where Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 506 (then-Rule 106) was silent with regard to a citizen’s standing to 

seek judicial review of prosecutorial inaction on a private criminal complaint,” because the 

MPC is silent with regard to the ability of a party to seek judicial review. Id. at 9-10 (citing 

Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243). However, as explained, the MPC is not silent as to appeals 

to court, as the Majority suggests. The MPC provides that the procedures set forth in 

Article X-A are the “exclusive mode for securing review of any decision rendered 

pursuant to Article IX.” 53 P.S. § 11001-A (emphasis added). When enacting Article XA, the General Assembly expressly provided for two scenarios where aggrievement would 

be required for an appeal to the zoning board/court, and if it wished to require such 

aggrievement in all cases, it would have said so. See discussion infra pp. 20-23. Thus, 

Hickson, which involved a discrete rule that was truly silent as to standing to appeal to 

the courts, is readily distinguishable from the present case, which involves a statutory 

scheme that is not silent in this regard.

I also take issue with the Majority’s reference to the Local Agency Law and its “appealto-court” provisions. See Majority Opinion at 7 n.4; 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 751-752. The Majority 

acknowledges that none of the parties raised the Local Agency Law. See id. I presume 

(continued...)
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 25

it would also have standing to appeal to the Commonwealth Court, which would defeat 

the argument presently raised by Appellee. 

The Commonwealth Court incorrectly applied an aggrieved party standard instead 

of Section 908. Applying the incorrect test for standing, it found that Appellant lacked 

standing to appeal to the courts because Appellant’s economic concerns related to its 

hotel business did not rise to the level of aggrievement. However, within the context of 

the MPC, the General Assembly, as is its prerogative, limited the application of the 

traditional aggrieved party standard to certain circumstances, and those circumstances 

are not presented here. Thus, the Commonwealth Court erred. The trial court found that 

Appellant was properly a party under Section 908(3) of the MPC and that it had standing 

to appeal because it did not prevail before the Board. As the Commonwealth Court did 

not conduct this inquiry, I would find that we are constrained to remand to the 

Commonwealth Court for an analysis of whether the trial court properly applied Section 

908(3) to the facts of the present case. If the trial court correctly determined that the 

Board properly applied Section 908(3) by making Appellant a party to the hearing, then 

the Commonwealth Court would be required reach the merits of the appeal.

that the parties did not do so for good reason, as it appears that the Local Agency Law 

and its aggrievement requirement, like Hickson, would only apply if the MPC were silent 

as to standing to appeal to the courts. Cf. Nernberg v. City of Pittsburgh, 620 A.2d 692, 

694 n.5 (Pa. Commw. 1993) (noting Local Agency Law applied based on court’s finding 

that Pittsburgh was not subject to the MPC at all, as both a city of the second class and 

a municipality within a county of the second class); Metal Green, Inc. v. City of Phila., 266 

A.3d 495, 515 (Pa. 2021) (plurality) (stating, in the context of a Philadelphia Zoning Board 

of Adjustment decision, that Local Agency Law governed review of zoning board decision, 

but did so in determining standard of review for reviewing court, not related to standing). 

See also discussion of Spahn, supra pp. 17-19.
[J-81-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 26

Having concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred by misapplying the law, I 

would vacate its order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.16 

As the Majority reaches the opposite conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Wecht joins this dissenting opinion.

16 As I would find that the Commonwealth Court erred in applying the traditional aggrieved 

party standard to deny Appellant’s appeal, I would not reach the second question 

presented, which asks whether Appellant was otherwise an aggrieved party, and express 

no opinion as to whether the facts of this case could also support a finding of traditional 

aggrievement (i.e., whether Appellant’s competition-based claims rise to the level of an 

interest that is direct, immediate and substantial). In this vein, and contrary to the 

Majority’s disposition, the Commonwealth Court’s Farmland decision is not relevant to my 

analysis, given that it relates to the application of the traditional aggrieved party standard.