alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4327 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4327

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 7450 Natural Bridge Road in St. Louis, Missouri, as the ``Vitilas 
                  `Veto' Reid Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 11, 2004

    Mr. Clay (for himself, Mr. Akin, Mr. Gephardt, Mr. Skelton, Ms. 
  McCarthy of Missouri, Mr. Graves, Mr. Blunt, Mrs. Emerson, and Mr. 
   Hulshof) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 7450 Natural Bridge Road in St. Louis, Missouri, as the ``Vitilas 
                  `Veto' Reid Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. VITILAS ``VETO'' REID POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 7450 Natural Bridge Road in St. Louis, Missouri, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Vitilas `Veto' Reid Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the Vitilas 
``Veto'' Reid Post Office Building.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

                         MOBILE GAS SERVICE CORPORATION
                       COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                     (in thousands, except per share data)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                       1997        1996        1995
                                                      ------      ------      ------
<S>                                                   <C>         <C>         <C>
PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE, AS SHOWN ON
  CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME

Earnings applicable to common stock                   $8,126      $8,631      $4,028
Average common shares outstanding                      3,230       3,217       3,208
Incremental shares resulting from assumed
  exercise of stock options                               25           8
Average common shares, as adjusted                     3,255       3,225       3,208
Primary earnings per share(1)                         $ 2.50      $ 2.68      $ 1.26 

FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

Earnings applicable to common stock                   $8,126      $8,631      $4,028
Average common shares outstanding                      3,230       3,217       3,208
Incremental shares resulting from assumed
  exercise of stock options                               43          13
Average common shares, as adjusted                     3,273       3,230       3,208
Fully diluted earnings per share(2)                   $ 2.48      $ 2.67      $ 1.26 
</TABLE>

------------
(1)  Pursuant to footnote 2 to paragraph 14 of APB Opinion No. 15, the Company
     is not required to include common stock equivalents resulting from stock
     options when the effect is less 3%. The Company has chosen to reflect the
     effect of such options within the computation of its earnings per share.

(2)  This calculation is submitted in accordance with Regulation S-K Item
     601(b)(11) although not required to be shown in the Consolidated Statements
     of Income pursuant to footnote 2 to paragraph 14 of APB Opinion No. 15
     because it results in dilution of less than 3%.
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States **Court of Appeals** 
**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

RAISSA DJUISSI KENGNE, Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, Defendant

- Appellee

______________________

2022

- 2175

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in No. 1:22

- cv

- 02297

- SEG, Judge Sarah Elisabeth Geraghty.

______________________

Before D YK

, R EYNA , and C HEN

, Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM

.
O R D E R

After receiving no response to this court’s November 16, 2022, order to show cause, we now dismiss.

Raissa Djuissi Ke n gne filed this civil action allegingclaims against the Georgia Power Company over her service and account. She also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). On June 10, 2022, the assigned magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to deny her IFP status and dismiss the case. Ms. Kengne filed Case: 22-2175 Document: 3 Page: 1 Filed: 02/28/2023KENGNE v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 2

objections from that report with th e district court and a notice of appeal that was transmitted to both the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and this

court

. The district court thereafter adopted the report and

recommendation.

This case is not within the limited aut hority granted tous by Congress to review federal district court decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). That jurisdiction generally extends only to cases arising under the patent laws, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); civil actions on review to the district

cou rt from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,

see § 1295(a)(4)(C); or certain damages claims against the United States “not exceeding $10,000 in amount,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). This case does not fall into any of thos e categories.

Although this court may transfer a case to the appropriate regional circuit “if it is in the interest of justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 1631, we conclude that transfer here is not appropriate. The Eleventh Circuit has already dismissed M s

. Kengne’s materially identical appeal

. See Kengne v. Ga.

Power Co. , No. 22

- 12828, slip op. at 1 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2022). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not an appealable judgment and the premature notice of appeal does

not “ perfect the appeal as of the date of the district court’s judgment.” Perez

- Priego v. Alachua C n t y . Clerk of Ct. , 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

Accordingly,

I T I S O RDERED T HAT :

(1) The appeal is dismissed. Case: 22-2175 Document: 3 Page: 2 Filed: 02/28/2023KENGNE v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 3

(2) Each party shall bear its own costs.

February 28 , 2023

Date F OR THE C OURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court Case: 22-2175 Document: 3 Page: 3 Filed: 02/28/2023
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 25, 2013

d1118 

# Order

Clerk November 25, 2013

147597

STATE PACKARD, LLC

, and ARCH

REALTY CO.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v SC: 147597

COA: 308546

Washtenaw CC: 10

- 000665

- CK

ARTISAN BISTRO, LLC,

Defendant,

and

ALVIN F. RICE, JR.

, Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 6, 2013 order of

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that

the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4632 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4632

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 19504 Linden Boulevard in St. Albans, New York, as the ``Archie 
                    Spigner Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 21, 2004

Mr. Meeks of New York (for himself, Mr. Bishop of New York, Mr. Israel, 
  Mr. King of New York, Mrs. McCarthy of New York, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. 
 Crowley, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Weiner, Mr. Towns, Mr. Owens, Ms. Velazquez, 
 Mr. Fossella, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Serrano, Mr. Engel, Mrs. 
 Lowey, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. McNulty, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. McHugh, 
 Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Reynolds, Mr. Quinn, Ms. Slaughter, and 
Mr. Houghton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 19504 Linden Boulevard in St. Albans, New York, as the ``Archie 
                    Spigner Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ARCHIE SPIGNER POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 19504 Linden Boulevard in St. Albans, New York, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Archie Spigner Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the Archie 
Spigner Post Office Building.
                                 <all>
```
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TRUEPOSITION INC.,

Appellant

v.

POLARIS WIRELESS, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1330

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in No. IPR2013-

00323.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

MICHAEL J. BONELLA, Condo Roccia Koptiw LLP, 

Philadelphia, PA, argued for appellant. Also represented 

by MICHAEL JORDAN. 

JASON PAUL DEMONT, Kaplan, Breyer, Schwarz & Ottesen, LLP, Matawan, NJ, argued for appellee. Also 

represented by KENNETH OTTESEN; VINCENT MCGEARY,

MICHAEL CUKOR, McGeary Cukor LLC, Morristown, NJ;

BRAD PEDERSEN, Patterson Thuente Pedersen, P.A., 

Minneapolis, MN. 
 

JOSEPH MATAL, Office of the Solicitor, United States 

Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for 

intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by THOMAS 

W. KRAUSE, SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, JEREMIAH HELM. 

______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (DYK, BRYSON, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

December 15, 2015 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

 Date Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Clerk of Court
#### Providence Mounts *v.*R. Dunville’s Heirs et al.

Divorce — Effect of Decree.

A decree of divorce is -binding upon all other tribunals or proceeding, direct or collateral, whether between the same parties and other privies or between strangers.

APPEAL PROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT.

April 17, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

In Bishop-, on Marriage and D-ivorce,- Sec. 754, it is said: “Whatever be the authority of the court which pronounces a sentence of divorce or of nullity, to revise or reverse it on a proceeding instituted for that purpose, still, while it remains a sentence, it is, if free from fraud and collusion, binding on that tribunal in all collateral proceedings, and- upon all other tribunals, in all proceedings direct *689and collateral, whether between the same parties, and their privies, or between strangers, not only in the country where the sentence was rendered, but in all foreign countries.” The jurisdiction of the court that pronounced the sentence divorcing appellant and his wife, over the subject-matter, can not be questioned.

*Cook & Givens, for appellant.*

*D. H. Hughes, Bush, for appellees.*

The divorce dissolved the marital relation and restored Mrs. Mounts to her exclusive right to her land; and our statutory law provides that a divorce destroys the husband’s potential right to curtesy. Susan E. Hays v. Sanderson and Wife, 7 Bush 489.

Petition overruled.
IIB 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4608

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 22, 2004

Received 

SEPTEMBER 7, 2004

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

AN ACT

To name the Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic located in Peoria, Illinois, as the ‘‘Bob Michel Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

HR 4608 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. NAME OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

2 OUTPATIENT CLINIC, PEORIA, ILLINOIS. 

3 The Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic 

4 located in Peoria, Illinois, shall after the date of the enact5 ment of this Act be known and designated as the ‘‘Bob 

6 Michel Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clin7 ic’’. Any reference to such outpatient clinic in any law, 

8 regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of the 

9 United States shall be considered to be a reference to the 

10 Bob Michel Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient 

11 Clinic.

Passed the House of Representatives July 21, 2004. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
#### John Dale *v.*Chas. M. Fleming.

Trial — Submission to Court.

The transfer of a cause not involving any equitable issues, to the equity docket, in effect submits the law and the facts to the court.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

September 11, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The parties voluntarily substituted the court for a jury in the trial of this action. There is no equitable issue involved, and the transfer of the cause to the equity side of the docket was in effect submitting the law and facts to the court.

*75
      *Cole, for appellant.*

*Phister, Andrews, for appellee.*

We perceive no reversible error in the court’s finding. Dale’s charge for feeding Fleming’s stock is so outrageous as to throw a shade of suspicion upon his whole account, and hence he can not complain that the court required strict proof before allowing any of it. We are also of opinion that there was no palpable wrong done to Fleming.

The denials in Fleming’s answer are certainly as specific as the allegations of the petition. Neither pleading would have been held good upon demurrer, but they were treated as good by the parties.

Judgment on both the appeal and cross-appeal *affirmed.*
Opinion issued December 4, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00570-CV

———————————

IN RE JOE BRAYBOY, III, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Joe Brayboy III filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking 

release from his alleged illegal confinement in the Harris County Jail.1

The petition is denied. Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.

 

1 The underlying case is In the Interest of J.E.B., a Child, cause number 2004-66585, 

pending in the 311th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Alicia 

Franklin presiding.
2

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          589992
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   145444
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    2253063
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               3695147
<PP&E>                                         6495154
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2518808
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 9075041
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           839329
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        825649
<OTHER-SE>                                     3916934
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   9075041
<SALES>                                       16072448
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              16072448
<CGS>                                         12613342
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 15696002
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (26767)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              115550
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 287663
<INCOME-TAX>                                    106978
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    180685
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .22


</TABLE>
SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LOREN K. BRAZELL, Appellant,
vs. DEBRA BRAZELL, Respondent. No. 67932 

# FILED
JAN 15 2016

TRACE K. LINDEMAN CLERK gc SUPREME COURT EV ? "-- 2jea r EPUTY CLERK 

### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is a pro se appeal from a district court post-divorce decree order awarding attorney fees. Second Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Washoe County; Frances Doherty, Judge.

On appeal, appellant challenges the award of $10,215.01 in attorney fees to respondent. In granting respondent's request for attorney fees, the district court reasoned that appellant had submitted multiple motions seeking the same relief that had been denied on past occasions. The court noted that it had previously cautioned the parties that "it may award fees in the future if needless litigation is necessitated by either party." Although appellant argues that he was not aware of that admonishment until shortly after he filed his motion, the district court recognized that appellant could have withdrawn his motion or chosen not to file multiple supplemental motions thereafter.

Additionally, respondent submitted an affidavit in support of the requested fees under 

### Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The district court stated that it carefully reviewed respondent's affidavit and the attached billing statements along with appellant's reply in opposition. The district court

(0) 1347AJ. Hardesty

Saitta Pickering noted counsel's efforts in representing respondent throughout many portions of the litigation process, made findings as to the Brunzell factors, and determined that $10,215.01 was an appropriate award of fees. Id. at 349, 455 P.2d at 33. We have considered appellant's arguments and reviewed the record on appeal, and we conclude that appellant has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the attorney fees. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005) (stating that an award of attorney fees in a divorce proceeding is within the district court's sound discretion). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1

cc: Hon. Frances Doherty, District Judge, Family Court Division Loren K. Brazell Debra Brazell Kelli Anne Viloria Washoe District Court Clerk
'On December 4, 2015, respondent filed a notice of substitution of counsel requesting that respondent, in pro se, be substituted in place of her attorney Kelli Anne Viloria, Esq. We construe the notice as a motion to withdraw, and we grant the motion. See NRAP 46(e)(3). The clerk of this court shall remove Kelli Ann Viloria, Esq., and the Law Offices of Kelli Anne Viloria as counsel of record for respondent.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947A 

### ..)e
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4828 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4828

   To direct the Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue a rule 
              banning children's toys containing mercury.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 13, 2004

   Ms. Watson (for herself and Mr. Burton of Indiana) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To direct the Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue a rule 
              banning children's toys containing mercury.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TOYS CONTAINING MERCURY AS BANNED HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS.

    (a) Product Banned.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product Safety Commission shall, 
pursuant to section 8 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 
2057), promulgate a rule under section 9 of such Act, declaring 
mercury-containing toys to be banned hazardous products under such Act.
    (b) Definition of Mercury-Containing Toys.--As used in this Act, 
the term ``mercury-containing toy'' means any toy or other product that 
contains mercury and is designed primarily for, or marketed primarily 
to children.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 24

                          POWER OF ATTORNEY

      We, the undersigned directors of Questar Gas Company, hereby
severally constitute D. N. Rose and S. E. Parks, and each of them
acting alone, our true and lawful attorneys, with full power to them
and each of them to sign for us, and in our names in the capacities
indicated below, the Annual Report on Form 10-K for 2000 and any and
all amendments to be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by Questar Gas Company, hereby ratifying and confirming
our signatures as they may be signed by the attorneys appointed
herein to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for 2000 and any and all
amendments to such Report.

      Witness our hands on the respective dates set forth below.

  Signature                          Title                    Date


 /s/ R. D. Cash              Chairman of the Board            2-13-01
 R. D. Cash



 /s/ K. O. Rattie            Vice Chairman                    2-13-01
 K. O. Rattie



 /s/ D. N. Rose             President & Chief                 2-13-01
 D. N. Rose                 Executive Officer
                                Director


 /s/ W. Whitley Hawkins         Director                      2-13-01
 W. Whitley Hawkins



 /s/ Robert E. Kadlec           Director                      2-13-01
 Robert E. Kadlec



 /s/ Dixie L. Leavitt           Director                      2-13-01
 Dixie L. Leavitt



 /s/ Gary G. Michael            Director                      2-13-01
 Gary G. Michael



 /s/ Harris H. Simmons          Director                      2-13-01
 Harris H. Simmons