alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Doffin *v.*Guyer.

Evidence.—Stamp.—An objection to the introduction in evidence of a ■written contract, on the ground that the United States revenue stamp required by law . affixed thereto was cancelled only with the initials of the party signing the Contract, without the date, was properly overruled.

APPEAL from the Tippecanoe Common Pleas..

Downey, J.

This was an action by the appellee against the appellant,, founded on a contract in writing, by which the appellant bound himself to pay the residue of a designated sum, after applying the proceeds of certain personal property thereto. Issues were formed; there was a trial by jury; verdict for the plaintiff; a motion fora new trial made by • the defendant overruled, and judgment on the verdict.

- The only question made in this court is, that the common pleas erred in admitting in evidence the instrument on which the action is founded. The objection to its admissibility/ *216made by counsel for the appellant, was, that it is not duly •stamped, and the stamp properly cancelled. The required stamp was affixed, but it was cancelled only with the initials of the party, without the date. This objection was properly overruled. See *Adams*v. *Dale,*29 Ind. 273. Other cases have since been decided by this court, holding that a stamp was not necessary to the validity of the contract.

*y. A. Stem,*for appellant.

*H. W. Chase*and *% A. Wilstach,*• for appellee.

The judgment is affirmed, with five per cent, damages and costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0418

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

RYAN CLINTON BLOOMER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including April 12, 2024 within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 6 2024

03/06/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0418
#### W. C. Whittaker *v.*Samuel Kesler.

Venue — Failure to Obtain Special Judge.

It was held that the circuit court should not change the venue of a cause until there had been a failure to' obtain *sn*special judge by any of the modes provided by law.

APPEAL PROM HENRY ’CIRCUIT COURT.

June 17, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

It was error on the part of the Shelby Circuit Court to change the venue of this cause until there had been a failure to obtain a special judge in either of the modes prescribed by law, i. e., by agreement of the parties, or by an election by the members of the bar in attendance upon the court. *Smith v. Blakeman,*8 Bush 476.

It was also error on the part of the Henry Circuit Court to overrule the motion to remand the case.

This case differs from that of *Brown & Whittaker v. Epperson*in this: The appellant excepted to the action of the Shelby court *7in changing the venue, and moved the Henry Court to remand the case, and excepted to its order overruling that motion.

*Walker, Drone, for appellant.*

*J. C. Beckhatn% for appellee.*

For these reasons the judgment must be reversed. The cause is remanded with instructions to the Henry Circuit Court to remand it to Shelby County.

In the last named court appellant may tender his amended petition, and it will be proper to consider the question of law arising on the facts as therein alleged as though it had not been offered in the Henry Court.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Bonne Santo, Inc., as Assignee of David Olivier, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>All Car Rent A Car, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Gabriel &amp; Shapiro, LLC (Steven F. Palumbo of counsel), for appellant.Miller, Leiby &amp; Associates, P.C. (Eve Pachter of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered February 4, 2016. The order granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUO).</p><p>Plaintiff's sole argument—that defendant is precluded from raising its proffered defense—lacks merit, as defendant timely mailed both initial and follow-up EUO requests and initial and follow-up requests for written verification (<i>see</i> 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.6 [b]), thereby tolling its time to pay or deny the claims at issue (<a href="../2017/2017_51886.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Longevity Med. Supply, Inc. v Citiwide Auto Leasing</i>, 58 Misc 3d 142</a>[A] 2017 NY Slip Op 51880[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2017]; <i>Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.</i>, 38 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50258[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2013]).</p><p>Accordingly, the order is affirmed.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: November 02, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
nist.gov/nice

Computing and Cybersecurity Certifications have been used to detail the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) needed for key roles in information technology and cybersecurity since the late 1980’s. The primary focus of a professional certification program 

is to provide an independent assessment of the KSAs required for performance of an occupational role or specific work-related tasks. 

The certification awarded is a quality benchmark and designates that participants have demonstrated the requisite KSAs and other 

requirements established by the certification program provider. 

10% higher with an intermediate certification (e.g. Security+)

26% higher with an advanced certification (e.g. CISSP)

45%+ higher with an expert certification (e.g. CISM)1

IN THE WORKPLACE

94% of survey respondents reported that

their certified team members brought 

added value above and beyond the cost of 

certification.2

there are approximately 215,371 job openings

requesting certifications such as Security+, CIPP, 

CISSP, GIAC, CISA, and CISM as of 2018.3

3 is the average number 

of certifications IT 

practitioners hold.2

the difference between 

salaries of certified 

and noncertified IT staff 

is nearly $8,400 or 11.7%.2

of the employed 

U.S. population 

MORE THAN

GLOBALLY ON A NATIONAL LEVEL

IN THE U.S.

AFTER DEVELOPING NEW SKILLS

from acquiring certifications or other training, survey respondents reported a 9 to 16% pay raise.2

COMPARED TO

• provide hands-on learning and performance-based 

assessments.

• validate competencies to perform work roles.

• supply learners with portable and stackable credentials.

• ensure continued competence in an evolving field through 

renewal requirement.

beginner-level salaries in IT, the salary 

premium for specializations such as Security 

and Network Technologies is:

holds a license or certification on top of any 

academic degrees they may hold.1

1 https://www.burningglass.com/wp-content/uploads/BurningGlass_certifications_2017.pdf

2 http://images.globalknowledge.com/wwwimages/pdfs/2017_Global_Knowledge_SalaryReport.pdf

3 http://cyberseek.org/heatmap.html 

Certification Programs:

The Value Of

Certifications
EXHIBIT (21)

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT  

Mueller Transportation, Inc., a Missouri Corporation, was incorporated on October 15, 1996, and is a wholly owned subsidiary that began operations effective January 1, 1997.  Its accounts have been included in the Consolidated Financial Statements filed herein.  

Mueller Field Operations, Inc., a Missouri Corporation, was incorporated on January 28, 1998, and is a wholly owned subsidiary that began operations effective January 28, 1998.  Its accounts have been included in the Consolidated Financial Statements filed herein.  

10-K & EXHIBITS - PAGE 171
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4492 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4492

 To amend the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 to 
 extend the authorization for certain national heritage areas, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 2, 2004

Mr. Regula (for himself, Mr. LaTourette, Mr. Burns, Mr. Wilson of South 
   Carolina, Mr. Ryan of Ohio, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Engel, Mr. Wamp, Mrs. 
Lowey, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Tierney, Ms. Hart, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Spratt, Mr. 
  Meehan, Mr. Norwood, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Barrett of South Carolina, Mr. 
 Rahall, Mr. McNulty, Mr. DeMint, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Clyburn, Mr. 
 Sweeney, Mr. Doyle, Mr. Brown of South Carolina, Mr. Murtha, and Mr. 
Ney) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 
                              on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 to 
 extend the authorization for certain national heritage areas, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION EXTENSIONS.

    The Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 (Public 
Law 104-333) is amended--
            (1) in the items in the table of contents relating to title 
        VIII of Division II, by striking ``Canal National Heritage 
        Corridor'' each place it appears and inserting ``National 
        Heritage Canalway''; and
            (2) in Division II--
                    (A) in each of sections 107, 208, 310, 408, 507, 
                607, 707, 811, 910, by striking ``September 30, 2012'' 
                and inserting ``September 30, 2027'';
                    (B) in each of sections 108(a), 209(a), 311(a), 
                409(a), 508(a), 608(a), 708(a), 812(a), by striking ``a 
                total of $10,000,000'' and inserting ``a total of 
                $20,000,000'';
                    (C) in section 909(c), by striking ``not more than 
                $10,000,000'' and inserting ``not more than 
                $20,000,000''; and
                    (D) in title VIII, by striking ``Canal National 
                Heritage Corridor'' each place it appears and inserting 
                ``National Heritage Canalway''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 5.1


                                 August 24, 1998


AMRESCO, INC.
700 North Pearl Street
Suite 2400, LB 342
Dallas, Texas 75201-7424


         Re:      Registration Statement on Form S-8 of AMRESCO, INC.


Gentlemen:

         I have acted as counsel for AMRESCO, INC., a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), in connection with the above referenced Registration Statement on
Form S-8 (the "Registration Statement") being filed by the Company with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") under the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, and covering 3,000,000 shares of common stock, par value
$0.05 per share (the "Common Stock"), that may be offered and sold to the
employees of the Company pursuant to the AMRESCO, INC. 1998 Stock Option and
Award Plan (the "Plan"). This Opinion Letter is rendered pursuant to Item 8 of
Form S-8 and Item 601(b)(5) of Regulation S-K.

         This Opinion Letter is governed by, and shall be interpreted in
accordance with, the Legal Opinion Accord (the "Accord") of the ABA Section of
Business Law (1991). As a consequence, it is subject to a number of
qualifications and exceptions, definitions, limitations on coverage and other
limitations, all as more particularly described in the Accord, and this Opinion
Letter should be read in conjunction therewith.

         Subject to the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the 3,000,000 shares
of Common Stock issuable under the Plan and covered by the Registration
Statement, when delivered to participants in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Plan, will be legally and validly issued, fully paid and
nonassessable.

         The opinion expressed herein is limited to the laws of the State of
Delaware as codified in the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.
This Opinion Letter is provided to you for your benefit and for the benefit of
the Commission, in each case, solely with regard to the Registration Statement,
may be relied upon by you and the Commission only in connection with the
Registration Statement, and may not be relied upon by any other person or for
any other purpose without the prior written consent of the undersigned.

         I hereby consent to the filing of this Opinion Letter as an exhibit to
the Registration Statement and the use of my name wherever appearing in the
Registration Statement.

                                        Very truly yours,


                                        /s/ L. Keith Blackwell
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        L. Keith Blackwell
                                        General Counsel
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



I, Oren G. Shaffer, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Qwest Corporation;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;



b) Evaluated the
effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this
report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: February 16, 2006



|                                         
|-----------------------------------------
|/S/    OREN G. SHAFFER                   
|Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Officer
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CRUZ ELENA GUERRA,

APPELLANT

V.

OSCAR R. QUEZADA, M.D. AND

EL PASO HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,

LTD. D/B/A DEL SOL MEDICAL

CENTER,

APPELLEES §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 16

- 00302

- CV

Appeal from the

210th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2014

- DCV1504 )

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on Appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal and

concludes that the appeal should be dismissed, in accordance with the opinion of this Court. We

therefore dismiss the appeal. Costs of the appeal are taxed against Appellant. This decision shall

be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2017.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### Gypsy L. ROGERS, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 01-3115.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 11, 2001.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 2001.

Before RADER and DYK, Circuit Judges, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Gypsy L. Rogers petitions for review of the November 17, 2000, decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), No. DC-844E-00-0768-I-1, affirming the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) denial of Ms. Rogers’ application for disability retirement. Because Ms. Rogers raises no issues within the jurisdiction of this court, this court *dismisses.*

I.

Ms. Rogers resigned from her position as an accountant with the United States Department of State on March 7, 2000. *916Before her resignation, Ms. Rogers submitted a timely application for disability retirement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System. In her application, Ms. Rogers alleged that she was unable to perform her job duties due to pain in her left foot and leg, hips, and back.

On June 19, 2000, OPM denied Ms. Rogers’ application. OPM found that Ms. Rogers did not show a disabling medical condition that prevented her from performing the essential duties of her position. Ms. Rogers requested OPM to reconsider its decision. On August 18, 2000, OPM affirmed .its initial decision. Ms. Rogers next appealed OPM’s denial of her application for disability benefits to the Board. On November 17, 2000, the Board affirmed OPM’s denial of Ms. Rogers’ application.

II.

This court may not review the factual underpinnings of OPM’s disability retirement decisions. *Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,*470 U.S. 768, 791, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985); *Anthony v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,*58 F.3d 620, 624-26 (Fed.Cir.1995). Instead, this court may only review such OPM decisions to determine whether “there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error ‘going to the heart of the administrative process.’ ” *Id.*(quoting *Scroggins v. United States,*184 Ct.Cl. 530, 397 F.2d 295, 297 (1968)).

On appeal, Ms. Rogers makes two arguments. First, Ms. Rogers asserts that the medical evidence she submitted to OPM and the Board was never “reviewed by anyone qualified to do so.” In other words, Ms. Rogers argues that neither the Board nor OPM gave proper weight to her medical evidence. Second, Ms. Rogers argues that the Board did not “take into account [her] addendum showing how OPM construed [her] claim to affect a denial.” These are precisely the kind of arguments that this court is not empowered to consider because they question squarely the “factual underpinnings” of the disability determination in Ms. Rogers’ case.

CONCLUSION

This court dismisses Ms. Rogers’ petition for lack of jurisdiction.
<PAGE>

             STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE




                                                                   EXHIBIT 11.01

         METROPOLITAN MORTGAGE & SECURITIES CO., INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                   COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
                (Dollars in thousands except per share amounts)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                Year ended September 30,
                           --------------------------------------------------------
                             1999        1998        1997        1996        1995
                           --------    --------    --------    --------    --------
<S>                        <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>

Earnings:
 Net income                $16,275     $10,327     $ 9,668     $ 8,038     $ 6,303
 Preferred dividends        (3,642)     (3,732)     (4,113)     (3,868)     (4,038)
                           -------     -------     -------     -------     -------
Net income available to
 common stockholders       $12,633     $ 6,595     $ 5,555     $ 4,170     $ 2,265
                           =======     =======     =======     =======     =======
Weighted average number
 of common shares
 outstanding                 129         130         130         130         131
                           =======     =======     =======     =======     =======
Net income per common
 share                     $97,933     $50,728     $42,733     $32,073     $17,288
                           =======     =======     =======     =======     =======
</TABLE>