We note that appellant’s name in the indictment in Cause No. 11-07-00372-CR was Andrew Crawford Collier and that 1

appellant’s name in the indictment in Cause No. 11-07-00373-CR was Andrew Crawford Collier, Jr.

Opinion filed July 23, 2009

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

____________

Nos. 11-07-00372-CR & 11-07-00373-CR

__________

ANDREW CRAWFORD COLLIER, JR., Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 8298D & 7540D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In Cause No. 11-07-00372-CR, the trial court convicted Andrew Crawford Collier, Jr., upon 1

his plea of guilty, of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The trial court assessed his

punishment at ten years confinement. In Cause No. 11-07-00373-CR, the trial court convicted

appellant, upon his plea of guilty, of possession of cocaine. The trial court placed appellant on

community supervision for four years. The State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community
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supervision alleging numerous violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision

including: committing the offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, using

alcohol, and using marihuana. Appellant pleaded true to those three allegations, and the trial court

revoked appellant’s community supervision and assessed punishment at four years confinement.

We affirm.

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress. A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302,

307 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,

an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We must give great deference to the

trial court’s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Torres v. State,

182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). We also give deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact

when those rulings turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.

 Where such rulings do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial

court’s actions de novo. Id.

Officer Chad Jenkins, a special operations agent for the Abilene Police Department, testified

that he received information from a confidential informant that a black male driving a tan, mid1980s model Cadillac was selling crack cocaine in the 1400 block of Mesquite. The informant also

gave Officer Jenkins the man’s approximate age, height, and weight. On January 29, 2007, the

confidential informant contacted Officer Jenkins with additional information that the same black

male was seated in the Cadillac in the 1400 block of Mesquite and was wearing a baseball cap, tan

jacket, and blue jeans. The informant stated that the black male was in possession of crack cocaine

that was inside a black plastic trash bag. Officer Jenkins went directly to the location and saw a

black male wearing clothing that matched the description. He was sitting in a vehicle that matched

the information. Appellant’s physical description also matched that given by the informant.

Officer Jenkins testified that he and Agent Steve Rogers passed by the vehicle and noted a

license plate number. Officer Jenkins planned to return to the station and obtain a search warrant.
3

However, when Officer Jenkins drove by the location a second time, he saw the black male leaving

the residence of a known drug dealer. Officer Jenkins and Agent Rogers decided to make contact

with the individual when he entered the public roadway. Appellant identified himself to the officers

after they went up to him. The officers told appellant they had reason to believe he was in

possession of cocaine and requested consent to search appellant. Appellant denied consent to search.

Officer Jenkins then informed appellant that he had probable cause to believe appellant was in

possession of cocaine and that he was going to conduct a search. Appellant then yelled to the people

inside of the residence. The officersthought appellant might run away, and they grabbed him by his

clothing. Officer Jenkins reached into appellant’s pocket and found a black plastic trash bag

containing crack cocaine. Officer Jenkins arrested appellant and advised him of his rights. Upon

a further search of appellant, Officer Jenkins found $632. Appellant denied consent to search his

vehicle. Officer Jenkins called for assistance in securing the vehicle while he left the scene to obtain

a search warrant for appellant’s vehicle.

Appellant specifically argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because he was searched pursuant to an unlawful arrest. However, Officer Jenkins testified that he

found the drugs in appellant’s pocket prior to placing appellant under arrest. The drugs were not

found as a result of a search incident to arrest. 

Circumstances short of probable cause may justify a temporary detention for the purpose of

investigation. Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Myers v. State, 203

S.W.3d 873, 882-83 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. ref’d). A temporary detention is justified when

the detaining officer has specific articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from

those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in

criminal activity. Myers, 203 S.W.3d at 882-83. The articulable facts used by the officer must create

some reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some

suggestion to connect the detainee with the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual

activity is related to crime. Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558. 

Officer Jenkins received specific information that appellant was in possession of drugs.

Officer Jenkins received a detailed description of appellant and hislocation. Officer Jenkins verified

the information he received and then saw appellant leaving a house where Officer Jenkins knew
4

drugs were sold. Officer Jenkins had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant. After detaining

appellant, the officers physically restrained appellant when it appeared as though he might attempt

to run away. While restraining appellant, Officer Jenkins reached into appellant’s pocket and found

crack cocaine. We must now determine whether Officer Jenkins had probable cause to search

appellant.

Probable cause to search exists when the totality of the circumstances allows a conclusion

that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at a particular location. Dixon v.

State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Probable cause is a fluid concept that turns on

the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts. Id. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213

(1983), the Supreme Court developed the totality-of-the-circumstances test to replace the “twopronged test” of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 616. Under the Gates

test, the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” prongs of Aguilar for assessing the usefulness of an

informant’s tips are not independent. Id. They are relevant considerations in the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations,

and a deficiency in one may be compensated for by a strong showing as to the other. Id.

Officer Jenkins received information from a “qualified” confidential informant.

Officer Jenkins was familiar with the informant and had worked with the informant in the past. The

informant provided Officer Jenkins with detailed information of appellant’s recent whereabouts and

with his possession of crack cocaine. An informant’s firsthand observation of criminal activity

provides a strong basis for the informant’s knowledge of the facts he relays. Id. at 617. The

informant gave Officer Jenkins numerous verifiable details such as appellant’s location, physical

description, clothing description, and the make and model of the vehicle. Officer Jenkins went

immediately to the location and verified the details given by the informant. Officer Jenkins saw

appellant in the described vehicle at the location the informant provided. Soon thereafter,

Officer Jenkins observed appellant leave a residence where drugs were sold.

Officer Jenkins corroborated the details given by the informant prior to detaining appellant.

Corroborating the existence of the cocaine before police may search for that cocaine is neither

necessary nor, in many cases, possible. Id. at 619. Officer Jenkins had probable cause to believe
5

appellant had crack cocaine in his possession; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying

appellant’s motion to suppress. See id. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is overruled.

In Cause No. 11-07-00373-CR, appellant pleaded true to four violations of his community

supervision as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. Two of the allegations involved the

conviction in Cause No. 11-07-00372-CR. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion

to suppress in Cause No. 11-07-00372-CR. Moreover, appellant pleaded true to two other

allegations. Proof of a violation of a single term or condition of community supervision is sufficient

to support a trial court’s decision to revoke. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App.

1980). We have considered all of appellant’s arguments on appeal, and all are overruled.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

July 23, 2009

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.