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STATE v. A.D.

Cite as 305 Neb. 154

State of Nebraska, appellee, 

v. A.D., appellant.

State of Nebraska, appellee, 

v. C.M., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed February 28, 2020. Nos. S-19-583, S-19-678.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question 

that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate 

court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a 

conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of 

law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

3. Statutes. Where it is possible to harmonize apparently conflicting statutes, a court should do so.

4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a lower court lacks the power, 

that is, the subject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a 

claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to 

determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the 

lower court.

5. ____: ____. When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the 

appeal must be dismissed.

Appeals from the County Court for Sarpy County: Robert 

C. Wester and Todd J. Hutton, Judges. Appeals dismissed.

Dennis P. Marks, Deputy Sarpy County Public Defender, 

and Mitchell S. Sell, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellant A.D.

Todd A. West, Sarpy County Public Defender, Dennis P. 

Marks, Deputy Sarpy County Public Defender, and Mitchell S. 

Sell, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellant C.M.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

05/15/2020 12:08 AM CDT
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STATE v. A.D.

Cite as 305 Neb. 154

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E. 

Duffy for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Papik, J.

Appellants in both of these consolidated appeals contend 

that the county court erred by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide motions to transfer their felony criminal cases 

to juvenile court. We conclude that the county court correctly 

found it lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer to 

juvenile court. Because the county court lacked jurisdiction, we find that we too lack jurisdiction and dismiss the 

appeals.

BACKGROUND

In both of these consolidated cases, the State filed complaints in county court charging appellants with felonies. The 

State charged A.D. with first degree sexual assault, a Class II 

felony. The State charged C.M. with possession of a stolen 

firearm, a Class IIA felony. Both offenses were alleged to have 

been committed when appellants were older than 14 years old 

but younger than 18 years old.

Both A.D. and C.M. filed motions asking the county court 

to transfer their respective cases to juvenile court under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1816 (Cum. Supp. 2018) and 43-276 (Reissue 

2016). In both cases, the State argued that the county court did 

not have jurisdiction to decide a motion to transfer to juvenile 

court in felony cases. And in both cases, after a hearing, the 

county court issued orders stating that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to transfer to juvenile court and 

scheduled preliminary hearings.

Before a preliminary hearing was held in either case, 

appellants filed notices of appeal. We moved the appeals 

to our docket and consolidated them for oral argument and 

disposition.
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STATE v. A.D.

Cite as 305 Neb. 154

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Both appellants claim that the county court erred in one 

respect: by holding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on their 

respective motions to transfer to juvenile court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual 

dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, 

which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision. Green v. Seiffert, 304 

Neb. 212, 933 N.W.2d 590 (2019).

[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which 

an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 

Griffith v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 304 Neb. 287, 934 

N.W.2d 169 (2019).

ANALYSIS

This case presents multiple jurisdictional arguments. 

Appellants argue that the county court erred by finding it 

lacked jurisdiction to decide their motions to transfer to juvenile court. The State contends that the county court correctly 

determined it lacked jurisdiction of the motions to transfer to 

juvenile court in felony cases. Alternatively, the State contends 

that the orders at issue are not final and appealable, an argument we discuss briefly below.

Final Order.

In State v. Bluett, 295 Neb. 369, 889 N.W.2d 83 (2016), 

we held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer to 

juvenile court was not a final, appealable order. In response 

to our decision, the Legislature amended § 29-1816 to provide 

that “[a]n order granting or denying transfer of [a] case from 

county or district court to juvenile court” may be appealed 

to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, provided a party files a 

notice of appeal within 10 days of the entry of such an order. 

§ 29-1816(3)(c). See 2017 Neb. Laws, L.B. 11, § 1. See, also, 

State v. Uhing, 301 Neb. 768, 919 N.W.2d 909 (2018). Both 
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Cite as 305 Neb. 154

appellants filed notices of appeal within 10 days of the county 

court orders at issue, but the State argues that the county court 

declined to rule on the motions to transfer, as opposed to granting or denying them, and that thus, the orders are not covered 

by § 29-1816(3)(c) and are not appealable.

It is unnecessary to resolve whether the orders appealed from 

were orders “denying transfer” for purposes of § 29-1816(3)(c). 

Even if they were, we find that we lack jurisdiction over these 

appeals and are obligated to dismiss them for another reason, 

as we explain in more detail below.

County Court Jurisdiction Over 

Motions to Transfer Felony 

Cases to Juvenile Court.

As noted above, appellants’ central argument in these appeals 

is that county courts have jurisdiction to decide motions to 

transfer felony cases to juvenile court. Any case in which the 

scope of a county court’s authority is at issue must begin with 

the understanding that county courts are statutorily created 

courts which possess limited jurisdiction. See In re Estate of 

Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016). More specifically, county courts have only that jurisdiction which has 

been granted to them through specific legislative enactment. 

See id. And while county courts have been given jurisdiction 

of criminal matters classified as misdemeanors or infractions 

via Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517 (Cum. Supp. 2018), that statute 

does not provide for county court jurisdiction over felonies. In 

State v. Schanaman, 286 Neb. 125, 835 N.W.2d 66 (2013), we 

cited § 24-517 for the proposition that county courts cannot try 

felony cases.

While we were correct in Schanaman to note that § 24-517 

does not generally grant county courts jurisdiction over felonies, other statutes do authorize county court judges to play 

a role in felony matters. For example, in those counties that 

do not have separate juvenile courts, county court judges 

can, sitting as a juvenile court, preside in proceedings against 
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juveniles who are alleged to have committed a felony. See, 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(12) (Supp. 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-246.01(1)(d) and (2)(b) (Reissue 2016). See, also, In re 

Interest of Tyrone K., 295 Neb. 193, 887 N.W.2d 489 (2016). 

Another statute authorizes county court judges to act as a district judge in Class IV felony cases, even without the consent 

of the parties. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-312 (Reissue 2016). 

The authority of the county court to act as a juvenile court or 

district court as described is not at issue in these appeals.

Our opinion in Schanaman, supra, discussed another function county courts are authorized to serve in felony cases. As 

we noted, “a felony charge generally originates by complaint 

in county court, but after a preliminary hearing and probable cause finding, the county court must bind the defendant 

over to the district court.” Id. at 131, 835 N.W.2d at 70. The 

authority of county courts to conduct preliminary hearings 

in felony cases referred to in Schanaman is derived from 

other statutes. As we explained in State v. Wilkinson, 219 

Neb. 685, 686, 365 N.W.2d 478, 479 (1985), when a county 

court judge conducts a preliminary hearing, he or she is acting as an “examining magistrate,” pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 29-201, 29-504, and 29-506 (Reissue 2016), and has only 

the authority to discharge the defendant or, upon a probable 

cause finding, bind the defendant over to the district court for 

further proceedings.

The county court concluded in these matters that its authority was limited to conducting a preliminary hearing and that 

thus, a motion to transfer to juvenile court could only be 

decided by the district court in the event probable cause was 

found and the case was bound over. Appellants argue that the 

county court misunderstood its authority and that it is authorized to decide a motion to transfer to juvenile court even in 

felony cases.

In support of this argument, appellants rely on several 

statutes that they contend provide such authority. First, they 

direct us to § 43-246.01(3), a statute that provides that juvenile 
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STATE v. A.D.

Cite as 305 Neb. 154

courts shall have “[c]oncurrent original jurisdiction with the 

county court or district court” in several categories of cases. 

One such category is cases involving juveniles that were 

younger than 18 years old and were 14 years old or older 

“when an alleged offense punishable as a Class I, IA, IB, IC, 

ID, II, or IIA felony was committed.” § 29-1816(1)(a)(ii). See 

§ 43-246.01(3)(c).

Appellants also find support for their position in § 29-1816, 

the statute discussing motions to transfer to juvenile court, and 

invoke the following portions of that statute:

(1)(a) The accused may be arraigned in county court or 

district court:

(i) If the accused was eighteen years of age or older 

when the alleged offense was committed;

(ii) If the accused was younger than eighteen years 

of age and was fourteen years of age or older when an 

alleged offense punishable as a Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II, 

or IIA felony was committed;

(iii) If the alleged offense is a traffic offense as defined 

in section 43-245; or

(iv) Until January 1, 2017, if the accused was seventeen years of age when an alleged offense described in 

subdivision (1) of section 43-247 was committed.

(b) Arraignment in county court or district court shall 

be by reading to the accused the complaint or information, unless the reading is waived by the accused when 

the nature of the charge is made known to him or her. The 

accused shall then be asked whether he or she is guilty or 

not guilty of the offense charged. If the accused appears 

in person and by counsel and goes to trial before a jury 

regularly impaneled and sworn, he or she shall be deemed 

to have waived arraignment and a plea of not guilty shall 

be deemed to have been made.

(2) At the time of the arraignment, the county court or 

district court shall advise the accused, if the accused was 

younger than eighteen years of age at the time the alleged 
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STATE v. A.D.

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offense was committed, that the accused may move the 

county court or district court at any time not later than 

thirty days after arraignment, unless otherwise permitted 

by the court for good cause shown, to waive jurisdiction 

in such case to the juvenile court for further proceedings 

under the Nebraska Juvenile Code.

Appellants contend that §§ 43-246.01 and 29-1816 give 

county courts the power to decide motions to transfer to 

juvenile court in felony cases. They contend that by its plain 

language, § 43-246.01(3)(c) gives county courts concurrent 

jurisdiction of cases involving juveniles charged with the enumerated felonies. If that were not enough, they contend that 

§ 29-1816(1)(a) authorizes county courts to conduct arraignments in those cases. And finally, they argue that the advisement at arraignment required by § 29-1816(2) indicates that 

the accused may seek transfer in either county court or district court.

The State interprets each of these statutes differently. It 

argues that each time the statutes mentioned above refer to 

“county court or district court,” they do so against the backdrop of the jurisdiction that has been granted to those respective courts. So, according to the State, § 43-246.01(3)(c) 

should not be read to give county courts and district courts 

(along with juvenile courts) concurrent jurisdiction over all of 

the enumerated categories of cases, but to give juvenile courts 

concurrent jurisdiction with county courts over those cases for 

which the county court has jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with district courts over those cases for which the district 

court has jurisdiction.

The State urges us to interpret § 29-1816 in a similar fashion. It argues that statute should be understood to give county 

courts the authority to arraign defendants and decide motions 

to transfer to juvenile court in cases in which it has jurisdiction over the underlying charge and to give district courts the 

same authority in cases in which it has jurisdiction over the 

underlying charge. Under the State’s interpretation, the county 
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STATE v. A.D.

Cite as 305 Neb. 154

court could not entertain the motions to transfer to juvenile 

court, because it did not have jurisdiction to try these cases 

in which appellants were charged with Class II and Class IIA 

felonies. Although it does not appear we were addressing this 

particular issue, language in one of our recent opinions is consistent with the State’s interpretation. See State v. Tyler P., 299 

Neb. 959, 967, 911 N.W.2d 260, 266-67 (2018) (“in deciding 

whether to grant the requested waiver and to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court, the court having jurisdiction over 

a pending criminal prosecution must carefully consider the 

juvenile’s request in the light of the criteria or factors set forth 

in § 43-276”) (emphasis supplied).

Appellants contend that their interpretation gives effect to 

the plain language of the statutes at issue and that the State’s 

does not. In our view, however, both sides present plausible 

interpretations of the plain language of the statutes if that language is viewed in isolation. Statutes, however, are not properly interpreted in isolation. See State v. Jedlicka, ante p. 52, 

___ N.W.2d ___ (2020). Rather, when interpreting a statute, 

well-established principles of statutory interpretation require a 

court to take account of context and of other statutes pertaining 

to the same subject. See id. As we will explain below, those 

principles lead us to conclude that the State’s interpretation is 

correct and that county courts have not been given authority to 

decide motions to transfer to juvenile court in cases in which 

they lack jurisdiction to try the case.

First, we note that the interpretations offered by appellants sweep much more broadly than they are willing to 

acknowledge. Appellants assert repeatedly that § 43-246.01(3) 

gives county courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving juveniles who are between 14 and 18 years old accused 

of Class I and Class II felonies. Appellants attempt to cabin 

their argument, however, by conceding that county courts cannot decide the merits of these felony cases and contending 

that this case involves only the authority of a county court to 

decide a motion to transfer to juvenile court. But appellants’ 
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textual argument cannot logically stop at a motion to transfer 

to juvenile court. If county courts truly have concurrent jurisdiction over cases in which juveniles are accused of Class I 

and Class II felonies, they have jurisdiction to decide not only 

motions to transfer but also the merits of such cases.

In addition, if, as appellants contend, the authority to 

arraign defendants given to county courts and district courts in 

§ 29-1816(1)(a) is made without reference to existing jurisdictional limitations, county courts’ authority would be expanded 

in another way. One type of case listed in that statute is one in 

which “the accused was eighteen years of age or older when 

the alleged offense was committed.” § 29-1816(1)(a)(i). Under 

appellants’ interpretation then, county courts would have the 

authority to conduct an arraignment and, presumably, accept a 

guilty plea in any case in which a defendant 18 years of age or 

older was charged with a felony.

Interpreting the statutes discussed above as appellants suggest would significantly expand the authority of county courts 

over felony cases. While § 24-517 does not confer jurisdiction 

over felony cases to county courts, appellants’ interpretations 

would result in county courts having jurisdiction to try certain felony cases and to conduct arraignments in many others. One would expect such significant expansions of county 

court authority to be stated in much clearer terms. As the U.S. 

Supreme Court memorably observed, legislative bodies do “not 

alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague 

terms or ancillary provisions—[they do] not, one might say, 

hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking 

Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S. Ct. 903, 149 L. Ed. 2d 

1 (2001).

Appellants’ interpretation has other problems. As the State 

points out, it creates conflicts with other statutes. Section 

43-246.01(3)(b) states that the juvenile court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the county court or district 

court as to juveniles described in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(9) 

(Reissue 2016). That section refers to adoption or guardianship 
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Cite as 305 Neb. 154

proceedings for a child over which the juvenile court already 

has jurisdiction. Under appellants’ interpretation of § 43-246.01, 

the district court would have concurrent jurisdiction over such 

adoption proceedings. Section 24-517(11), however, provides 

that if a separate juvenile court already has jurisdiction over 

the child to be adopted, the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the separate juvenile court. No mention is made of 

the district court.

[3] Where it is possible to harmonize apparently conflicting 

statutes, a court should do so. Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls 

City, 302 Neb. 548, 924 N.W.2d 678 (2019). Interpreting the 

references to “county court or district court” in §§ 43-246.01 

and 29-1816, in light of the jurisdiction granted to those courts 

elsewhere, results in no such conflicts. This interpretation also 

still allows juvenile offenders to seek transfer to juvenile court 

when the county court does not have jurisdiction to decide the 

case. It merely requires that in such cases, they seek transfer in 

the district court after the case is bound over.

Perhaps recognizing the problems posed by their reliance on 

§§ 43-246.01 and 29-1816, appellants shifted course in their 

reply brief and primarily argued that county courts have jurisdiction to decide motions to transfer to juvenile court in felony 

cases by analogizing to county courts’ authority to conduct 

preliminary hearings in felony cases. Appellants suggest that 

just as a county court can find probable cause and bind over 

a felony case to district court for disposition of the merits, it 

should be able to decide that a case alleging a felony should 

be transferred to juvenile court for further proceedings. But 

appellants’ analogy is flawed. As noted above, county courts 

have authority to conduct preliminary hearings in felony cases 

because statutes specifically authorize them to do so. Those 

same statutes cannot be interpreted to authorize county courts 

to decide motions to transfer to juvenile court. See §§ 29-201, 

29-504, and 29-506.

Finally, we note that throughout their briefing and again in 

oral argument, appellants have emphasized that juveniles will 
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benefit from having a transfer motion decided as soon as possible and that such motions can be resolved sooner in felony 

cases if they can be decided in county court. All of this may 

be true, but it is also a policy argument about whether county 

courts should have the power to decide motions to transfer 

to juvenile court in felony cases. That is a question for the 

Legislature to resolve rather than this court. See Rogers v. 

Jack’s Supper Club, 304 Neb. 605, 614, 935 N.W.2d 754, 762 

(2019) (“[b]ut we are not tasked with selecting what we believe 

is the best policy”). Our role is limited to deciding whether 

the Legislature has given county courts the authority to decide 

motions to transfer to juvenile court in these cases. For all the 

reasons discussed herein, we conclude it has not.

[4,5] When a lower court lacks the power, that is, the subject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a claim, 

issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to 

determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented 

to the lower court. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 

N.W.2d 73 (2016). When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the appeal must be dismissed. Id. Because the 

county court lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer, 

we lack jurisdiction over these appeals and must dismiss.

CONCLUSION

Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the 

appeals.

Appeals dismissed.