2024 IL App (1st) 221002

No. 1-22-1002 

September 27, 2024 

 FIFTH DIVISION 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

SAM THOMPSON, as Administrator of the ) 

Estate of Lynda Parker, deceased, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ) 

SERVICES, an Administrative Agency and ) 

DULCE QUINTERO, in her Official Capacity ) 

as Secretary, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellee. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 20 CH 6969 

The Honorable 

David B. Atkins 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Navarro concurred.

 OPINION

 

¶ 1 Plaintiff Sam Thompson is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Lynda Parker

and an employee of the nursing home where Parker lived until she died. Defendant Illinois 

Department of Human Services (the Department) denied both Parker’s request for benefits and 

a subsequent request to reopen the case. The benefits at issue here are long-term care benefits 

from the Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) program administered by the 

Department. The original denial of benefits was never appealed. This appeal is an appeal from
No. 1-22-1002 

2 

the Department’s denial of Parker’s subsequent request to reopen the case. After a hearing, the 

administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction, and the circuit court 

affirmed the dismissal on the same ground. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Lynda Parker, born April 1, 1936, was admitted to Southgate Nursing and 

Rehabilitation Center (Southgate), in Metropolis, Illinois, on November 9, 2015. On May 6, 

2018, Parker signed a document authorizing Jennifer Christian to represent her in her benefits 

appeal. Christian was Southgate’s Business Office Manager. Although this document was not 

signed until 2018, Christian appears to have represented Parker since 2016. 

¶ 4 On February 11, 2016, Parker, through her representative, submitted an application for 

long-term care benefits to the Department. On June 6, 2016, the application was denied based 

on her failure to submit verification information that was required to determine her eligibility.

The missing information included: (1) statements for a Grand Rapids bank account for 

February 2016 and from February 2015 through July 31, 2015; (2) an itemized prepaid burial 

contract showing services and goods provided and showing whether the contract was or was 

not irrevocable; and (3) a 2016 tax bill for a homestead property. It is undisputed that 

information was outstanding at the time of the denial and that notice of the June 2016 denial 

was received in a timely fashion by Parker. 

¶ 5 At a subsequent hearing, Christian conceded that an appeal of the denial was not filed 

within 60 days. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.10(f)(1)(“the appeal must be filed within 60 days 

after the Department’s action to notify”). Christian testified: “I had no idea that I had to file 

an Appeal. I thought that if I did a reopen, I did not know that they both *** coincided.” 

Christian acknowledged: “I’ve learned a lot since then. Back then I was not aware that a reopen 
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3 

and an Appeal[,] you had to do both.” Christian “just thought you did the reopen and they 

actually did do a reopen and you just waited on them to do” it. However, Christian admitted 

“that’s not how it works, which I’ve learned now.” 1

¶ 6 On June 24, 2016, Parker through her representative submitted a request to reopen her 

case, with additional information. The request was submitted via email to the Department’s 

Medical Field Office (MFO). The MFO acknowledged that, on November 28, 2016, it also 

received a copy of a receipt from the funeral home, but it found that this document did not 

indicate how the contract was funded, whether it was prepaid, and whether it was irrevocable. 

¶ 7 Almost four years after submitting the reopen request, counsel for Parker filed on May 

7, 2020, an appeal seeking review of the Department’s alleged inaction regarding Parker’s 

reopen request. On July 13, 2020, a hearing on this appeal was held and then was continued 

on Parker’s motion. The hearing reconvened on August 6, 2020, when Parker’s motion for a 

continuance was again granted. The record was left open until September 1, 2020, to permit 

both sides to submit supporting exhibits. 

¶ 8 At the hearing, Christian testified, as did a representative of the Department. The 

Department’s representative was Cory Kistner, a casework manager. Kistner testified that, 

while the Department had not mailed a written notice of its denial of Parker’s reopen request, 

the case files indicated that the case worker reviewed the reopen request on October 21, 2016, 

and called Southgate. The date of October 21, 2016, was less than four months after Christian 

submitted the request on June 24, 2016, Kistner testified that the case files established that, 

when the case worker called Southgate on October 21, he was transferred into Christian’s 

1

When asked whether she was aware at the time that there was a time limit on how long a claimant had to 

file an appeal after the issuance of a decision, Christian admitted: “not at the time. I had no idea.” 
No. 1-22-1002 

4 

voicemail. On her voicemail, he left a message indicating that the case did not qualify for a 

reopen request and that a new application would have to be filed. Kistner testified that another 

application was filed in February 2019, and that this application was denied and appealed, but 

that this appeal was later withdrawn. Christian testified that she had no notes of any voicemail 

message and that, had she received such a message, she would have logged it in her file.

Christian testified that communication to and from the Department was done mainly through 

email and that is how she expected to receive information. 

¶ 9 Apparently finding Kistner’s testimony credible, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 

found: 

“In this case *** the Department Representative provided credible, consistent 

testimony that the Department received and reviewed the reopen request. The 

Representative further demonstrated that the assigned caseworker subsequently 

provided notice apprising the facility that the request was denied. It is noted that the 

Department Representative’s testimony was supported with internal case notes, created 

in the normal course of business.

The relevant inquiry is therefore whether Appellant was entitled to written notice 

that the Department denied the reopen request.” 

¶ 10 Noting that the Illinois Administrative Code (Code)2 requires written notice of the 

disposition of an application, the ALJ found that no written notice was required here, because 

the denial of a request to reopen was not “a disposition, that is, it was not a determination on 

eligibility.” With respect to the original denial of benefits, the ALJ found that the “period for 

an appeal submission is unaffected by Appellant’s Representative’s unfamiliarity with the 

2 When using the term “Code,” we are referring to Title 89 which governs “Social Services.” 
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5 

appeal process outlined by the Administrative Code.” The ALJ found that it lacked jurisdiction 

and dismissed the appeal. Grace B. Hou, the Secretary of the Department adopted the ALJ’s 

decision as the final administrative decision. 

¶ 11 On November 24, 2020, Parker “through her attorney-in-fact,” who at that time was 

her son Shane Parker,” filed a “complaint for administrative review” with the circuit court. On 

July 6, 2022, the circuit court issued a four-page memorandum order affirming the 

administrative decision. The circuit court found that, since the underlying decision concerned 

whether or not to re-open the case, and not the disposition of an application, written notice was 

not required by section 10.270 (a) of the Code (requiring “written notice” of the “disposition 

of an application”). The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision, and a notice of 

appeal was filed on July 6, 2022, which was within 30 days of the circuit court’s decision. 

¶ 12 Parker died on February 24, 2023. Thus, when discussing arguments in our analysis 

section below, we refer to her estate and its representatives simply as plaintiff.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, plaintiff alleges that the decision violates her due process right to be heard 

by dismissing her appeal as untimely and thereby denying her a fair hearing; that the decision 

deprived her of a constitutionally protected property right, where her appeal was timely, since 

time limits do not begin to run until there is proper notice; that there is a conflict between state 

and federal law; and that the requested documents were provided, rendering any decision to 

the contrary against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 15 I. We Review the Agency’s Order and Record

¶ 16 Before this court, plaintiff appeals the circuit court’s decision on her complaint for 

administrative review. However, “ [w]hen a party appeals the circuit court’s decision on a 
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6 

complaint for administrative review, the appellate court’s role is to review the administrative 

decision rather than the circuit court’s decision.” Walker v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 140087, 

¶ 34. “As a court of review, we are limited to considering the evidence submitted in the 

administrative hearing.” Walker, 2015 IL App (1st) 140087, ¶ 35. The burden of proof in an 

administrative proceeding is on the plaintiff in the proceeding who, in our case, was Parker 

and her representatives. Walker, 2015 IL App (1st) 140087, ¶ 35. Thus, on this appeal, we are 

reviewing the decision of, and the record before, the Department. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 

2020) (“No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, 

determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.”). 

¶ 17 Before the trial court and before this court, plaintiff raised arguments concerning 

federal statutes and regulations that were not raised before the ALJ. Since we review the ALJ’s 

decision, these arguments have been, as the Department argues and we explain below, forfeited

for our review. Although the circuit court reviewed plaintiff’s federal claims, finding them 

meritless in two lines, the circuit court’s decision to summarily review these claims does not 

bind us, since our review is de novo with respect to the circuit court’s decision, and we owe no 

deference to the circuit court’s legal findings. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 526 (2004). 

¶ 18 The case primarily relied on by the circuit court to review these claims was Arvia, 209 

Ill. 2d. The Arvia court began by noting “the general rule” that “issues or defenses not raised 

before the administrative agency are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

administrative review.” Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 526. Nonetheless, the Arvia court found no waiver 

on the circumstances before it, where the circuit court had found a state statute unconstitutional 

on its face and where the statute in question restricted the scope of the administrative hearing, 

thereby “dissaud[ing] a party from raising other issues and defenses before the Secretary of 
No. 1-22-1002 

7 

State.” Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 527. While acknowledging the general rule, the Arvia court 

explained that: “[a] facial challenge to a statute, however, presents an entirely legal question 

that does not require fact-finding by the agency or application of the agency’s particular 

expertise.” Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 527. By contrast, in her brief to this court, plaintiff stated that 

she was not making a facial challenge.

3 In addition, she argued that the alleged conflict with 

federal Medicaid law stemmed from the Department’s “failure to inform Plaintiff of a decision 

on her request.”4 This allegation challenges the Department’s ‘fact-finding” since it found that 

she had, in fact, been informed, and it also implicates the Department’s “particular expertise”

on benefits law, since she alleges conflicts with comparable federal law. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 

527. These differences take plaintiff’s case out of the purview of the Arvia case. 

¶ 19 Arvia ended its discussion of waiver with a warning to litigants “to raise all claims 

before the administrative tribunal—even those outside of the agency’s authority to decide—or 

risk waiver on review.” Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 532. Plaintiff failed to heed this advice, and, for 

the foregoing reasons, we find her federal-conflict claims waived for our consideration. 

¶ 20 II. Standard of Review: Factual Finding

¶ 21 As noted above, there was a factual dispute before the ALJ, about whether the 

Department’s caseworker did, or did not, inform Christian by voicemail of the Department’s 

denial of Parker’s request to renew. This question is separate and apart from the legal question 

of whether the Department was statutorily required to send a written notice of some kind, such 

3 Plaintiff’s brief states: “The [state] policy on its face does not appear to present a constitutional 

deprivation. It was the ALJ’s application of the statute in this case to deny Plaintiff her right to a fair hearing that 

results in the deprivation.” 4 Plaintiff’s brief asserts throughout that she received no notice, and that it was this fact that denied her 

constitutional rights and created an alleged conflict with federal Medicaid law. For example, the argument section 

of her brief asserts that “DHS issued no notice of action to Plaintiff.” Similarly, the brief later states: “The failure to 

inform Plaintiff of a decision on her request prompted the appeal filed on May 6, 2020.” 
No. 1-22-1002 

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as a letter or email. The ALJ found for the Department on both questions: that Christian had, 

in fact, been informed by voicemail, and that this voicemail notice was legally sufficient for 

the denial of a request to renew, since such a denial was not the disposition of an application. 

¶ 22 With respect to an agency’s factual findings, a court of review must start with the 

presumption that they are “prima facie true and correct.” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020) (“The 

findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be prima facie

true and correct.). An agency’s findings of fact and credibility determination may not be 

overturned unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Parikh v. Division of 

Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 28. A finding is against the manifest 

weight only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 

28. If an issue is merely one of conflicting testimony or witness credibility, then the agency’s 

determination should stand. Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 28. 

¶ 23 In the case at bar, Christian testified that, if she had received a voicemail she would 

have made a note, while Kistner testified that the Department’s case file indicated that the case 

worker had left a message on Christian’s voicemail indicating that the case did not qualify for 

a reopen request and that a new application would have to be filed. The ALJ resolved this 

factual dispute in favor of the Department, and we cannot find this result against the manifest 

weight of the evidence where it was supported by Kistner’s testimony and documentary 

evidence from the Department’s case files. Thus, we proceed with the rest of our analysis with 

the understanding that plaintiff was informed of the denial of the reopen request. As noted 

above, this is a separate question from whether written notice was required. 

¶ 24 III. Standard of Review: Legal and Mixed Questions 
No. 1-22-1002 

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¶ 25 Plaintiff’s initial brief asserted no notice, while plaintiff’s reply brief seemed to shift 

the argument to assert no notice or no written notice. Since we already found that the ALJ’s 

factual finding was not against the weight of the evidence, we now turn to the arguments 

regarding written notice. 

¶ 26 Plaintiff alleges that the lack of written notice of the reopen denial violated statutory 

requirements and that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction violated her due process right to be 

heard. Questions of statutory interpretation and questions of due process are questions of law, 

to which we apply a de novo standard of review. Wisam 1, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control 

Commission, 2014 IL 116173, ¶ 24 (whether a claimant before an administrative agency was 

“provided with the necessary due process is a question of law which this court reviews de 

novo”); Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 

(2008) (“an agency’s interpretation of the meaning of the language of a statute constitutes a 

pure question of law” to which we apply a de novo standard of review). An agency’s decision 

on a question of law is not binding on a reviewing court and, thus, “the court’s review is 

independent and not deferential.” Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. 

¶ 27 To the extent that the questions in front of us pose a mixed question of law and fact, 

we review the agency’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 

211. “ ‘ Clearly erroneous’ ” denotes an intermediate level of deference that is between de novo

review and manifest weight review. Koehler v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 405 Ill. App. 

3d 1071, 1079 (2010). It “means that the agency’s decision will be reversed only where the 

reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

Koehler, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. 

¶ 28 III. Written Notice and the Statute
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¶ 29 Plaintiff claims that, by dismissing as untimely her appeal of her request to renew, the 

Department deprived her of due process by denying her a hearing. However, a court should 

always address nonconstitutional issues first. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006) (“cases 

should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional 

issues only as a last resort”). Thus, before analyzing her constitutional claim, we discuss 

whether the Department failed to give her statutorily sufficient notice. Plaintiff claims a 

voicemail was not enough, and the Department found that it was. 

¶ 30 With statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the statute’s drafters. VC&M, Ltd. v. Andrews, 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30. The most 

reliable indicator of the drafters’ intent is the language they chose to use in the statute itself. 

VC&M, Ltd., 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30. The drafters’ language should be given its plain and 

ordinary meaning (VC&M, Ltd., 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30), and the statute that they crafted should 

be read as a whole (Watson v. Legacy Health Care Financial Services, L.L.C., 2021 IL App 

(1st) 210279, ¶ 38 (an act must be read in its entirety) . Looking at the Code as a whole and 

reading the various relevant sections convinces us that written notice was not statutorily 

required. 

¶ 31 First, section 10.270(a) provides: “Every applicant for assistance shall be sent or given 

a written notice of disposition of the application[.]” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.270(a). At issue here 

was not an “application,” but a request to reopen the case. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.270(a); Flachs 

v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 2021 IL App (4th) 200340-U, ¶ (“[t]he 

Department’s decision not to reopen plaintiff’s application cannot be properly understood as a 

‘disposition of the application’ for purposes of the Code”). Plaintiff’s application had a final 

and appealable disposition in a prior proceeding, and Christian admittedly received the 
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required written notice of the disposition but did not appeal in 60 days. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 

10.270(a); 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.10(f)(1) (“For a public assistance issue, the appeal must be 

filed within 60 days after the Department’s action to notify the client[.]”). 

¶ 32 Second, section 10.282(a) draws a distinction between “notification” and “written 

notification.” 89 Ill. Adm Code 10.282. Section 10.282(a) provides, in relevant part: 

 “Day one of the 60 day time period shall be the day following: 

(1) The date on a written notification of a decision on an application *** 

(2) The date of the Department’s notification of a denial of a request[.]” 

89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.282. 

The above language contemplates “a written notification of a decision on an application,” but 

only “notification” of the “denial of a request,” thereby indicating that written notification is 

not required for the denial of a request. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.282 

¶ 33 Lastly, Section 10.282(b) provides that the “60-day time limitation does not apply when 

the Department fails [1] to send a required written notification, [2] fails to take action on a 

specific request, or [3] denies a request without informing the client.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 

10.282(b) (bracketed numbers added). For the denial of a request, the period is tolled only if 

the Department does so “without informing the client.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.282(b). 

“[I]nforming the client,” thus, appears to be all that is required when the Department denies a 

request. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 10.282(b). As we already explained above, the ALJ’s factual 

finding that the Department had informed plaintiff by leaving a voicemail was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 34 To counter this plain statutory language, plaintiff cites Southgate Nursing & 

Rehabilitation Center v. Illinois Department of Human Services, No. 19 CH 2782 (Cir. Ct. 
No. 1-22-1002 

12 

Cook Co. Oct. 10, 2019). As a circuit court case, it has no precedential value. Delgado v. 

Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 224 Ill. 2d 481, 488 (2007) (“Under 

Illinois law, the decisions of circuit courts have no precedential value[.]”). Even if it did, it is 

readily distinguishable from the case at bar because, in that case, the claimant received no 

notice at all. 

¶ 35 In the prior Southgate case, both Christian and Kistener appeared to testify at the 

administrative hearing, as they did here. Southgate, No. 19 CH 2782, at 3-4. However, in the 

prior case, Kistener indicated that Southgate was not informed that its request to reopen had 

been denied, whereas in the case at bar, Kistener testified that the caseworker had contacted 

Southgate to inform it of the denial. As a result, the circuit court in the prior case found that 

the Department had failed to notify the plaintiff, and that the 60-day time limit did not apply 

where the Department “ ‘denies a request without informing the client.’ ”5 Southgate, No. 19 

CH 2782, at 11 (quoting 89 Ill. Admin. Code 10.282). Thus, the cited circuit court case is both 

non-precedential and factually different in significant respects. 

¶ 36 Where the statutory language is plain, where the drafters’ scheme is consistent 

throughout several sections, and the cited case is both distinguishable and nonprecedential, we 

can find no statutory violation. 

¶ 37 IV. Due Process

¶ 38 Plaintiff is correct in that “a cause of action is a species of property protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 444 U.S. 

422, 428 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the federal due process clause as 

5 The circuit court criticized the Department, noting that its failure to respond at all “leaves the 

applicant completely in the dark.” Southgate, No. 19 CH 2782, at 11.
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preventing the states from denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory 

procedures, when such action would be the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be 

heard. Logan., 444 U.S. at 429-30. However, nothing prevents a state from erecting reasonable 

procedural requirements, and a state “certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim 

for failure to comply with reasonable procedural” requirements. Logan., 444 U.S. at 437

(emphasis in original). 

¶ 39 In the case at bar, plaintiff filed an application with her claim and received prompt 

written notification of its denial. The State gave her every right to appeal but she did not. 

Instead of filing an appeal within the statutorily-required 60 days, plaintiff submitted only a 

discretionary request to reopen—a choice which Christian later candidly admitted was a 

mistake. Flachs, 2021 IL App (4th) 200349-U, ¶ 37 (“[t]he Department affords applicants the 

opportunity” to submit a reopen request “only as a matter of administrative grace”). The 

Department notified Christian promptly by voicemail of its denial of plaintiff’s request, as 

determined after an evidentiary hearing at which all sides testified and submitted documents. 

In the case at bar, where plaintiff was afforded appellate rights, hearings and prompt 

notifications, it is impossible to find a violation of constitutional due process. Flachs, 2021 IL 

App (4th) 200349-U, ¶ 37 (finding no denial of due process although the Department did not 

provide written notice of its denial of a reopen request). 

¶ 40 CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. We find, first, that any arguments regarding federal statutes and regulations were 

waived for failure to bring them before the Department, particularly where the Department has 

expertise in this area and plaintiff was also challenging the Department’s fact-finding. Second, 
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the ALJ’s factual finding that plaintiff was informed of the denial of her request to reopen was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where it was supported by testimony and 

documentary evidence that the ALJ found to be credible. Third, reviewing the statute as a 

whole and reading the various relevant sections together established that written notice was 

not statutorily required for the denial of a reopen request. Lastly, we cannot find a deprivation 

of constitutional due process, where plaintiff received written notice of the disposition of her 

application and failed to exercise the appellate rights afforded to her, and where she received 

prompt notification of the denial of her request to reopen, as well as a full evidentiary hearing 

on the notification issue. That the ALJ found the other side more credible is not a due process 

issue. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.