IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Wiggins, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 559 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: October 7, 2016

Pennsylvania Board of Probation :

and Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: February 3, 2017 

Petitioner Robert Wiggins (Wiggins) petitions for review of an order 

of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board). The Board denied 

Wiggins’ administrative appeal of the Board’s March 9, 2016 order, which 

formally recommitted Wiggins as a convicted parole violator and recalculated his 

maximum release date. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order of the 

Board. 

Wiggins’ conviction and parole history originally resulted in a 

maximum sentence date of October 2, 2016. Before that date, on 

February 4, 2015, while Wiggins was on parole, he was charged with possession 

with the intent to deliver, criminal attempt delivery of a controlled substance, 

criminal use of communication facility, possession of a controlled substance, and 

possession of drug paraphernalia. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 23-24.) On 
2

May 7, 2015, Wiggins pled guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or 

deliver cocaine, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed. (Id. at 33-34.) The 

guilty plea specified that charge entailed a maximum penalty of 10 years and/or a 

$100,000 fine. (Id. at 19.) On August 26, 2015, the trial court sentenced Wiggins 

to 18 to 36 months confinement. (Id. at 33-34). 

On August 20, 2015, the Board provided Wiggins with notice that it 

scheduled a parole revocation hearing for September 9, 2015. (Id. at 11.) The 

notice identified the new criminal conviction as being for the offense of felony 

possession with the intent to deliver. Also on August 20, 2015, Wiggins admitted 

to the May 7, 2015 conviction for felony possession with the intent to deliver and 

waived his right to counsel and to the revocation hearing. (Id. at 13.) Thereafter, 

the Board recommitted Wiggins as a convicted parole violator with no credit for 

his time at liberty on parole. (Id. at 39-46). The Board determined that the new 

conviction fell within the 18 to 24 months presumptive range for backtime, based 

on the conviction for manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 

manufacture or deliver cocaine, and it imposed 18 months backtime. 

(Id. at 41-42.) The Board recalculated Wiggins’ maximum sentence date to 

September 30, 2018, and determined that Wiggins would be eligible for reparole 

on March 23, 2017. (Id. at 50.)

Wiggins, pro se, filed for administrative relief asserting that: (1) he

never forfeited any parole liberty; (2) the Board never conducted a hearing; (3) the 

Board erred in calculating backtime; and (4) the Board does not have the authority 

to change the maximum date of a judicially-imposed sentence. (Id. at 52-57.) On 

March 9, 2016, the Board denied Wiggins relief. (Id. at 59-60.) 
3

Wiggins, now represented by counsel, filed a petition for review of 

the Board’s decision. On appeal,1 Wiggins argues that his due process rights were 

violated as a result of the Board not holding a revocation hearing. Wiggins 

challenges his waiver of the revocation hearing on the ground that the waiver form

only indicated that he was convicted of felony possession with intent to deliver and 

did not specify that he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. 

Accordingly, Wiggins argues, he could not make a knowing waiver of the hearing, 

and the signed waiver and admission cannot constitute sufficient evidence of the 

new conviction. Wiggins also argues that the Board applied the incorrect 

presumptive range for the May 7, 2015 conviction. 

In response, the Board argues that it did not violate Wiggins’ due 

process rights because it relied on his waiver of a revocation hearing and his 

admission of the new conviction. Specifically, the Board argues that these waiver 

and admission forms provide the Board with sufficient evidence to recommit a 

parole violator. In support of this argument, the Board contends that this Court has 

upheld the Board’s reliance on such waiver and admission in prior cases. The 

Board further argues that given the admission of the May 7, 2015 conviction, the 

Board properly applied the 18 to 24 months presumptive range to calculate the 

maximum release date.

First, we reject Wiggins’ challenge to the validity of his waiver of a 

revocation hearing and counsel. Wiggins argues that the hearing and counsel 

waiver form that he signed provided insufficient specificity of the charge against 

 

1 Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704. 
4

him. According to Wiggins, by not specifying the drug he was charged with and 

corresponding presumptive range, the Board precluded him from making a 

knowing waiver when he signed the waiver form. This argument lacks merit. On 

May 7, 2015—prior to his August 20, 2015 waiver of a revocation hearing—

Wiggins pled guilty to the charge of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The 

guilty plea also specified that the maximum term of imprisonment was 10 years.2 

Presumptive ranges for convicted parole violators are set forth in the Board’s 

regulations, specifically at 37 Pa. Code § 75.2. For drug offenses, the range is 

based upon the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense. Based on his own 

guilty plea, Wiggins knew when he signed his waiver form that he was convicted

of felony possession with intent to deliver cocaine and that the offense carried a 

statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. Moreover, there is no 

requirement that the notice or waiver indicate the presumptive recommitment 

range of backtime associated with a conviction. Thus, we conclude that Wiggins’ 

August 20, 2015 waiver was knowing, and the Board did not violate his due 

process rights by failing to conduct a hearing. 

Wiggins’ argument that the Board erred in determining backtime and 

recalculating his reparole eligibility date is equally without merit. Backtime is 

defined as: “The unserved part of a prison sentence which a convict would have 

been compelled to serve if the convict had not been paroled.” 37 Pa. Code § 61.1. 

Statutory presumptive recommitment ranges provide the Board with guidelines for 

determining the amount of backtime to impose. Here, the 18 months that the 

 

2

Section 13(f)(1.1) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of 

April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(1.1). 
5

Board imposed is within and is even on the low end of the presumptive range. 

Both this Court and our Supreme Court have ruled that where the amount of 

backtime does not exceed the presumptive range, courts will not review the 

Board’s imposition of backtime. Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

574 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. 1990); Lotz v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 548 A.2d 1295, 

1296 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), aff’d, 583 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1990). We likewise decline to 

review the Board’s imposition here. Moreover, applying 18 months of backtime to 

the September 23, 2015 recommitment date yields the proper parole eligibility date 

of March 23, 2017. The Board, therefore, properly calculated the date for reparole. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board. 

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Wiggins, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 559 C.D. 2016

:

Pennsylvania Board of Probation :

and Parole, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3rd day of February, 2017, the order of the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is AFFIRMED. 

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge