National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS 

OF THE 

NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY 

TEAM ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

DECEMBER 2004 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress

1

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

2004 Annual Report to Congress of the 

National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

1.0 Executive Summary

Pursuant to Public Law 107-231Section 11(b)-Annual Report, the National Construction 

Safety Team Advisory Committee (the Committee) presents its 2004 Report on the 

implementation of the National Construction Safety Team Act (the Act) by the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (See Attachment I for Committee’s 

Charter). 

The Committee met three times during 2004, predominantly in open sessions, during 

which it reviewed progress on the two continuing investigations involving the 2001 

World Trade Center building collapses following a terrorist attack and the Station 

nightclub fire in February 2003 in which 100 persons were killed. During open sessions, 

the Committee received and took under advisement a number of recommendations and 

comments from the public. 

In addition to providing technical advice on the investigations, the Committee continued 

review of NIST’s leading hypothesis of the most likely sequence that led to the collapse 

of the two World Trade Center towers as well as the subsequent recommendations for 

implementing future code changes. At year-end, the Committee was reviewing the 

conclusions of the Station Night Club fire investigation. Further comments and 

recommendations on both investigations and the investigation of the World Trade 

Center 7 collapse (scheduled to be completed in 2005) will be addressed by the 

Committee either in an interim report to Congress or in our 2005 Annual Report. 

The Committee continues to be very concerned that the Congress did not address two 

issues identified and reported last year to Congress. We reiterate that successful 

implementation of the Act is dependent on approval of these two funding 

recommendations by Congress now: 

 Creation of a National Construction Safety Team Office within the Building and Fire 

Research Laboratory of NIST with permanent staff and initial funding of $2,000,000. 

 Establishment of a Safety Team Investigation reserve fund of $2,000,000 to be used 

at the discretion of the Director of NIST to fund investigations. 

This report also includes additional recommendations and comments needed to further 

the successful implementation of the Act. 
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2.0 Committee Activities

2.1 Committee Membership 

With one exception, the Committee’s membership remained unchanged during 2004. 

The term of Dr. John L. Bryan, Professor Emeritus of the Fire Protection and Life Safety 

Department at the University of Maryland, expired. Although Dr. Bryan was eligible for 

an additional term, he reluctantly declined a new appointment. The Committee thanks 

Dr. Bryan for his many contributions and wise advice to the Committee's work during 

our inaugural year. Attachment II lists the Committee’s current membership. 

2.2 Summary of Committee Meetings 

2.2.1 The Committee met three times during the year at NIST facilities in Gaithersburg, 

MD. The Committee received and took under advisement public comments at all three 

meetings. Detailed minutes of the three meetings and public comments either have 

been or will be posted on the NIST Web Site by the end of January 2005. 

2.2.2 Most Committee organizational matters were resolved during 2003. The Final 

Interim Rule outlining the procedures governing implementation of the Act was 

published in April of 2004. Therefore, recommendations made by Committee members 

during the three 2004 meetings were almost exclusively concerned with the two ongoing Safety Team investigations. Because the advice offered to NIST during the year 

was very detailed, technically specific and often dependent on extensive background 

technical information, full explanations of the recommendations are not included in this 

report. Attachments III and IV contain brief summaries of recommendations made 

during the Committee's June and October meetings. 

2.2.3 Summaries of the Three Committee Meetings 

2.2.3.1 June 2004 Meeting 

2.2.3.1.1 NIST Comments on the Recommendations in the Committee’s 2003 

Report to Congress: Dr. Hratch Semerjian, Acting Director of NIST reported on 

the status of the recommendations contained in the Committee’s 2003 Annual 

Report to Congress. Dr. Semerjian indicated there was general agreement 

within NIST with the recommendations calling for the development of procedures 

for conducting investigations pursuant to the Act. There was also agreement on 

the need to seek relief from Federal Regulations that might impact the speed of 

response and improved awareness on the part of local authorities, including 

those authorities involved in criminal prosecutions, of the Act and NIST’s role in 

conducting Safety Team Investigations. Dr. Semerjian indicated that because of 

the workload associated with the World Trade Center investigation, limited 

progress was made in implementing those recommendations. He also 

commented that NIST had recently signed an MOU with the Chemical Safety 

Board that spelled out the roles of each agency in events where both agencies 
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had jurisdiction. The Committee noted the cooperation that had developed 

between NIST, the Chemical Safety Board, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms and other Federal agencies as a positive step in helping NIST staff gain 

the necessary skills to investigate incidents more effectively while helping assure 

cooperation where jurisdictional issues might exist. 

Dr. Semerjian also addressed the Committee’s recommendation that a Safety 

Team Office be established within the Building and Fire Research Laboratory 

with both permanent staff funding and a discretionary fund under the control of 

the Director of NIST to further the implementation of the Act and permit rapid 

decisions and deployment of Safety Teams to an event site. Dr. Semerjian 

reported that such funding was “...not...likely to occur anytime soon.” The 

Committee was extremely disappointed and agreed that fulfillment of this 

recommendation was necessary if the Act was to be successfully implemented in 

the future. Therefore, it was agreed this recommendation would be carried over 

into the Committee’s 2004 Report to Congress. 

2.2.3.1.2 Clarification of the Committee’s 2003 Report to Congress: In the 

Committee’s 2003 Report to Congress, the Committee addressed the issue of 

whether Safety Team investigations should be made following a natural disaster. 

Examples were given of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes and 

other windstorms and floods. Committee member Williams, citing the high 

frequency of wild fires in the Western United States during 2003 disagreed with a 

comment in the report that no major natural disasters had occurred during the 

year. He recommended that wild fires, especially wild fires at the urban-wild land 

interface, be specifically addressed as falling within the scope of the Act. The 

Committee re-visited this matter, agreed with Professor Williams and further 

concluded that based on the Act, any event, regardless of cause – natural or 

man-made -- “...causing a failure of a building or buildings that has resulted in 

substantial loss of life or that posed a significant potential for loss of life” warrants 

a Safety Team investigation. In the particular case of urban-wild land interface 

fires, the Committee noted that in some cases other Federal agencies may have 

jurisdiction over such fires while other fires might be managed by local 

authorities. The Committee noted close cooperation would be necessary 

between NIST and these agencies and authorities but also recognized NIST has 

developed such cooperative agreements in the past.

2.2.3.1.3 Briefings 

2.2.3.1.3.1 World Trade Center Investigation: The majority of the meeting 

concerned discussions regarding the interim findings NIST published on June 18, 

2004. The discussions were wide-ranging with Committee members questioning 

the assumptions associated with aircraft impact into the two towers, the effect of 

the impact on fire proofing, underlying design details that led the buildings to 

perform the way they did and other matters associated with the original design. 
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Several technical suggestions were made for NIST’s consideration in finalizing 

the early hypothesis on factors that led to the global collapse of the buildings. 

In addition to reviewing the details of the collapse of the two towers, the 

Committee received a briefing on the progressive collapse of WTC 7. Unlike 

certain unique design features of the two towers, WTC 7 was of a more 

conventional design. The Committee agreed the preliminary working hypothesis 

seemed reasonable. Unfortunately, however, because of the need to dedicate 

personnel to the tower investigations, the Committee subsequently agreed with 

NIST’s proposal to defer completion of the WTC 7 investigation until mid-2005. 

2.2.3.1.3.2 Station Nightclub Fire Investigation: The Committee was briefed on 

the progress of the investigation into the deadly fire at the Station Night club in 

West Warwick Rhode Island in February 2003. Experimental and computational 

models simulating the fire were reviewed. In addition to the technical 

presentation by NIST staff, Mr. Kenneth Kuntz of the U.S. Fire Administration 

reported on his site investigation as well as the preliminary findings of the 

emergency response. 

The Committee had no specific suggestions regarding the experimental or 

modeling work, but again, the Committee expressed concern that because of the 

criminal investigation that was underway, their was a lack of access to first party 

witnesses to the event. Lacking direct and timely access to eyewitnesses will 

hinder future investigations, especially investigations that do not have the 

fortuitous advantage of video of the first few moments of the event. It is likely 

some of the future events that fall within the purview of the Act will involve 

criminal investigations. Therefore, lack of timely access to evidence and 

eyewitnesses could hamper the effectiveness of future Safety Teams by 

compromising their ability to gather needed data. 

2.2.3.1.3 Public Comments Received: The Committee received and took under 

advisement comments from Mr. David Lau of Continental Container Corporation, 

Mr. Jake Pauls of Consulting Services in Building Use and Safety, Mr. Robert 

Polk representing the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) and 

Professor Zia Razzaq of Old Dominion University. Mr. Lau questioned the failure 

mechanism associated with the collapse of WTC 7 and also indicated the failure 

of the central core of the two WTC towers had to be explained. Mr. Pauls was 

critical of the effort in assessing egress performance from the two WTC towers 

and suggested that NIST use the techniques developed by him, while also 

cautioning NIST not to accept at face value information provided through 

interviews. Mr. Polk reiterated NASFM’s support of the Act and NIST’s role in 

investigating building failures while urging NIST to cooperate with the Safe 

Building Coalition, sponsored by NASFM and other public and private sector 

organizations. Professor Razzaq presented a brief technical paper outlining his 

analysis of why the structure of the WTC towers failed. 
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2.2.3.2 October 2004 Meeting

2.2.3.2.1 Briefings: The Committee received detailed technical presentations on 

the leading hypotheses for the collapse of the two World Trade Center towers 

developed from NIST’s investigation. Emphasis was given to the fire modeling 

and the prediction of fire spread throughout the towers before their collapse. The 

leading collapse hypotheses differ somewhat from an earlier working hypothesis. 

Studies of the egress of the towers and WTC-7 building occupants before the 

collapse and the many communications issues associated with emergency 

responders before and after the collapse were re-visited with new insights and 

potential recommendations. 

The Committee received a preliminary format for consideration of potential 

recommendations resulting from these investigations. The format under 

consideration was as follows: 

(a) Findings From the Investigation Objectives – Building performance, 

evacuation and emergency response, and procedures and practices; 

(b) Whether the Finding Was Unique to September 11, 2001 -- Initial or 

post-impact conditions and/or associated with building construction; 

(c) What Technical Solutions are Needed; and 

(d) Whether The Risks are Associated with All Buildings or Selected 

Building Types. 

The Committee provided substantial and significant input to help NIST develop 

reasonable and practical recommendations. NIST will continue to develop the 

recommendations for consideration by the Committee. 

2.2.3.2.2 Station Nightclub Fire Investigation: The investigation is complete and 

preliminary recommendations have been formulated. The Committee was 

briefed on these recommendations and will provide comments after reviewing the 

final report. 

2.2.3.2.3 Public Comments Received: The Committee received and took under 

advisement comments from Mr. Jake Pauls of Consulting Services in Building 

Use and Safety, Professor James Quintiere of the University of Maryland, 

Ms. Sally Regenhard representing the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, Mr. Robert 

Polk representing the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM), and 

Mr. Richard Kuchnicki representing the International Code Council. Mr. Pauls 

provided 42 specific questions raised by the June 2004 Progress Report that he 

would like answered in the final report. Professor Quintiere's comments focused 

on the fire temperatures and duration, and their relationship to the collapse 

mechanism. Ms. Regenhard provided many comments on the June 2004 

Progress Report. In general, she is concerned that the final report must have 

more specificity and that it provide a narrative of the investigations and not a 
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series of task reports. Mr. Polk provided additional information on their efforts to 

improve passive fire requirements in the model building codes. He provided 

copies of code change proposals submitted to the ICC. Mr. Kuchnicki described 

the ICC model code process to support Mr. Polk’s statements. 

2.2.3.3 November 2004 Meeting

2.2.3.3.1 Briefings: The Committee held a one-day meeting in November 

specifically to discuss recommendations arising from the World Trade Center 

investigation. 

Although portions of the meeting were held in open session, a portion of this 

meeting was held in closed session to permit the Committee to review NIST’s 

preliminary recommendations associated with building codes and supporting 

standards, emergency evacuation from buildings, response of fire, police and 

medical resources to an incident and communication problems identified during 

the World Trade Center incident. 

Specifically, the Committee reviewed NIST’s proposal to structure 

recommendations in four key areas: Increased Structural Integrity; Enhanced 

Fire Protection (both suppression and fire proofing); Improved Building 

Evacuation (including egress system design, emergency communications to 

occupants, occupant preparedness and egress technology); and Improved 

Emergency Response (including access and firefighting, emergency 

communications and command and control). The Committee addressed the 

matter of increased public awareness of building safety issues and that 

engineering and architectural education and practice should place inclusion of 

safety issues in undergraduate, graduate and continuing education curricula at a 

higher level of importance. Increased awareness and improvement in discipline 

and practice can be particularly important in landmark structures such as tall or 

signature buildings. The Committee encouraged NIST to include specific 

recommendations in these areas in the final draft report. 

2.2.3.3.2 Other Agenda Items: During the open portion of the meeting, the 

Committee reviewed the processing of its 2004 report to Congress. During this 

discussion, NIST announced the draft report on the Station Nightclub fire would 

be distributed within a few days to the Committee for review and comment. 

Because the final draft report on the World Trade Center tower collapses and 

World Trade Center 7 would not be available until early in 2005 and the summer 

of 2005, respectively, it was agreed that the Committee would address these 

reports and any significant public response to them during mid-year 2005 or in 

the Committee’s 2005 Annual Report to Congress. 

2.2.3.3.3 Public Comments: Also during the open session, the Committee 

received public comments from Mr. Jake Pauls of Consultant Services in Building 

Use and Safety; Professor James Quintiere of the University of Maryland; and 

Chief Peter Hayden of the New York City Fire Department. In addition, the 
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Committee received a copy of a paper by retired New York Battalion Chief Arthur 

Scheuerman offering his thoughts on the collapse of the towers and the 

appropriate measures that should be taken into consideration in future building 

design. Mr. Pauls reiterated his concern about the egress portion of the 

investigation and made suggestions to improve the investigation in these areas. 

He also distributed a letter from the Skyscraper Safety Campaign that protested 

the closing of the meeting later in the day when preliminary recommendations 

were to be discussed. Dr. Quintiere expressed concern over some of the 

preliminary findings and suggested that the investigation had not developed 

sufficient physical evidence to document the current hypotheses. Dr. Quintiere 

also expressed his belief that the use of bar joist framing for the floor systems 

was the prime reason the towers collapsed the way they did. Chief Hayden 

apprised the Committee of the many significant changes and improvements the 

New York fire department had made since the attack on the towers on 

September 11, 2001, and on future enhancements planned in the near future. 

2.3 Committee Comments on Implementation of the Act and Investigations

2.3.1 Action on Committee Recommendations: Communications between the 

Committee and NIST management and staff remain open and candid on both sides and 

the exchange of information has been excellent. NIST, as Dr. Semerjian noted during 

his remarks at the Committee’s June meeting, had not been able to address several 

Committee recommendations during 2003 because of the intensity of the World Trade 

Center investigation and the corresponding absence of staff needed to address these 

suggestions. The Committee re-affirms these recommendations as necessary to fully 

implement the Act. 

2.3.2 Response to Potential Safety Team Investigations: The Committee continues to 

be very concerned about NIST’s inability to address significant building design and 

safety events because of shortage of both personnel and other resources needed to 

launch Safety Team investigations. Last year, the Committee reported on two specific 

incidents involving a crowd crush during an egress situation and a multi-death fire in a 

governmental office building. During 2004, the country again experienced a rash of wild 

fires at the urban-wilderness interface and several major hurricanes that wreaked havoc 

in the southeastern United States. As this report was being prepared, a suspected 

arson fire in a housing development under construction destroyed numerous structures 

and a high-rise office building fire in which no fatalities occurred. Although at this writing 

there are insufficient details on either incident to draw any conclusions, the housing 

development fire was reminiscent of the concerns raised in 2003 by representatives of 

the Prince William County, Virginia, fire department about ‘community fires’. The 

response of the fire department to the high-rise fire was credited in the press with 

helping evacuate the building and minimizing structural damage. NIST must have the 

ability to investigate all such incidents because of the potential for gaining a greater 

understanding of potential loss of life that might occur in similar events. The ability to 

investigate reported success stories (such as the recent high rise fire) would allow NIST 
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to better understand and report on improvements that can be shared with the public, the 

architectural and engineering communities and code and standards bodies. 

3.0 Dissemination and Technical Assistance Program

An important aspect of NIST’s implementation of the Act is the Dissemination and 

Technical Assistance Program (DTAP). DTAP’s objectives are to provide input to the 

development of Codes and Standards as well as to the field of building and safety 

sciences. The Committee is working with NIST to specifically identify the appropriate 

code and standards bodies as well as appropriate educational, architectural and 

engineering societies to effectively transfer information that can improve education and 

professional practice in a variety of fields. Presently, the Committee has no specific 

comments or recommendations regarding DTAP, but anticipates that considerable effort 

will be required in this area in 2005 and 2006. 

4.0 Committee Recommendations 1

4.1 NIST Implementation of the NCST Act 

The Committee commends NIST on the progress made during 2004 on the two active 

investigations. The Committee also notes the continuing outreach efforts NIST has 

made to keep the public informed of its progress and plans. Although these efforts have 

been successful, several issues identified in our 2003 Report remain outstanding and 

those as well as the need for the development of a comprehensive procedures manual 

should be addressed as soon as practical: 

4.1.1 Overall Implementation of the Act: While the Final Rule for the "Procedures for 

Implementation of the NCST Act" has been established, it is critical that NIST quickly 

develop a set of detailed protocols for conducting the investigation itself. While the 

Interim Final Rule speaks about investigations, it lacks detail. A comprehensive 

procedures manual is called for. 

For example, the Final Rule speaks of collecting and analyzing physical evidence but 

provides no specifics on how this is to be accomplished. A procedures manual would 

detail the specific test or analysis technique to be used for a particular type of evidence. 

Investigation procedure manuals of the National Transportation Safety Board and the 

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board would provide good models for 

the preparation of a NCST Procedures Manual. National guidelines such as the 

National Fire Protection Association's Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations

(NFPA 921) are also useful. 

2004-4.1.1.1 Develop and maintain a detailed investigation procedures manual 

covering such basic investigating topics as selection and preservation of evidence, 

 

1

 Recommendations are numbered by the year of introduction in the Annual Report to Congress (2004 for new 

recommendations introduced this year, 2003 for recommendations reported last year, etc.). 
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eyewitness interviewing, scenario development, etc. that will enable Safety Team 

investigators to consistently and accurately conduct forensic investigations into any 

event covered by the Act. 

4.1.2 Timeliness: Forensic investigations are extremely dependent on the timeliness of 

on-site, first-hand examination of the physical evidence and access to eyewitnesses. It 

is imperative that Safety Teams be able to respond to an incident in as timely a manner 

as possible to gather and preserve crucial evidence and data. 

2003-4.1.2.1 Review and seek relief from those Federal regulations and procedures 

(e.g., the Paperwork Reduction Act, etc.) that could affect the rapid deployment of 

Safety Teams to a site or impede access to information needed to complete a 

thorough and timely Safety Team investigation. 

2003-4.1.1.2 Develop ‘first call’ investigating teams who are prepared on a 

moment’s notice to visit the site of an incident within the 48 hours required by the 

Act, and following reconnoitering the site, report to the Director as soon as possible 

on the advisability of a Safety Team investigation. Consider retaining individuals as 

members of the reconnaissance team who know local authorities to improve 

immediate access to an investigation site. 

4.1.3 Cooperation with Local Authorities: The Act is clear that when the Attorney 

General determines a criminal act may be involved in a building failure, the criminal 

investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency takes priority over a Safety 

Team investigation. The Act is also clear that Safety Teams are expected to work 

cooperatively with local authorities, other Federal agencies and other research 

organizations in conducting an investigation. Some of these investigators may take 

possession of evidence needed to complete the Safety Team investigation. The 

Committee cannot emphasize enough how critical timely access to information held by 

local authorities is to a Safety Team investigation. In both the World Trade Center and 

the Station Nightclub fire, greater familiarization by local authorities with NIST’s Safety 

Team responsibilities might have accelerated the release of information. Because the 

Act is new, many local authorities may not know of the Safety Team initiative and the 

assistance available to them from NIST. 

2003-4.1.3.1 Institute a program designed to educate local authorities on the Act 

and NIST’s role in investigations so that these authorities will look to NIST for 

positive assistance in conducting and investigation by working with and through 

them, rather than independently. 

2003-4.1.3.2 Where delays occur in gathering information, collecting physical 

evidence or gaining access to eyewitnesses, NIST should use the power provided 

by the Act to subpoena documents and to hold public meetings to solicit testimony 

in order to facilitate and improve future investigations. 
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4.2 World Trade Center Investigation

The WTC Safety Team addressed most of the suggestions made by the Committee 

during 2004 during their investigation and analysis. While complete agreement was not 

attained on every technical issue, these differences did not affect the Committee’s 

overall understanding of the leading hypotheses of the investigation. During the first 

half of 2005, the Committee will closely follow public discussion after the release of the 

draft investigation report (as well as the completion of the WTC-7 report). If necessary, 

the Committee will prepare an interim report summarizing its assessment of the 

investigation and offer any improvements it feels will strengthen implementation of the 

Act. Therefore, recommendations have not been submitted at this time.

4.3 Station Nightclub Fire and Research Programs 

4.3.1 As described the Committee’s 2003 report, the Station Nightclub fire investigation 

was slowed by the lack of access to certain key pieces of information. Although this 

problem was mitigated to some degree by the large amount of information available in 

the press and through media videotapes, the investigation would benefit from having 

access to both the physical evidence being held by law enforcement authorities and 

individual attorneys. During 2004, both NIST and the Department of Commerce 

reviewed and reported to the Committee ways in which Safety Team investigations 

could work with local authorities in cases where a criminal investigation might be 

involved. In such cases, the Committee remains concerned about delays in the 

investigation, especially being able to interview survivors of an incident in a timely 

fashion but recognizes the constraints that criminal investigations present. 

The Station Nightclub fire and the incident at a Chicago nightclub a few days earlier in 

February 2003 clearly indicates that the factors affecting crowd egress during 

emergencies are not well understood. Therefore, the Committee continues to 

recommend that: 

2003-4.3.1.1 A research project be initiated to study evacuation decision-making 

and human behavior during major building emergencies, including the 

phenomenon of crowd crush as seen in the Chicago nightclub and the Station 

Nightclub incidents. 

4.4 Objectives of the Act and Program Funding 

The Committee is disappointed that Congress has not appropriated the necessary 

funding to provide the necessary resources as recommended by the Committee in its 

2003 Report needed to support the investigative activities envisioned under the National 

Construction Safety Team Act (Public Law 107-231). While the investigation for the 

World Trade Center disaster was specifically funded and the final report will be available 

in 2005, other building failures such as those that occurred during the hurricanes of 

2004 were not investigated owing to this shortage of resources. Until a permanent 
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Office within NIST is established, the Committee is concerned that this will limit the 

ability of NIST to conduct thorough Safety team investigations in the future and to 

develop needed building technologies that could improve life safety nationwide. 

The Committee wishes to stress that because disaster events are by their very nature 

unpredictable, funds must be set aside for immediate post-disaster reconnaissance and 

the collection of perishable data. Rapid and thorough data collection is essential for 

successful investigations; expert teams must be able to mobilize and begin collecting 

data within 24 hours of an event. Experience shows unequivocally that unless 

investigators are deployed immediately, evidence necessary for forensic studies is 

typically lost or destroyed. To ensure that teams are able to go into the field 

immediately after disasters occur, funding must be available on an ongoing basis. 

For example, the 2004 Congressional supplemental appropriation for hurricane disaster 

relief did provide funding for post-event investigations, but unfortunately, those monies 

became available too late to allow for the collection of essential perishable data. While 

supplemental appropriations can and should be used to augment investigations where 

such use is warranted, separate funding should be provided specifically for the initiation 

of investigations immediately following events that have resulted in (or that could have 

caused) major loss of life. 

The Advisory Committee reiterates its 2003 recommendations regarding post-event 

investigations and urges Congress to appropriate the recommended funding as soon as 

possible. Those recommendations are: 

2003-4.4.1. Section 15 of the Act authorizes the use of NIST funds otherwise 

authorized by law to carry out this Act. This should provide sufficient funds for the 

immediate post-event observation, but will not provide sufficient funds to perform the 

Investigation to achieve the objectives of this Act. Nor is there sufficient time for the 

Director of NIST, through the Department of Commerce, to request a special 

appropriation for the selected Investigation. Annual funds should be made available 

to the Director of NIST to cover one year of investigations. This would provide time 

to request a supplemental appropriation to fund the Investigation. On that basis the 

following recommendation is made: 

2003-4.4.2 Establish a National Construction Safety Team Office within the Building 

and Fire Research Laboratory at NIST with annual funding in the amount of 

$2,000,000 and an additional $2,000,000 reserve fund appropriated for use by the 

Director of NIST to initiate major investigations of building failures in a timely manner 

as required by the Act. This investigation reserve fund should be maintained yearto-year so that investigations can begin promptly and not have to await final budget 

or appropriation approvals. 
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ATTACHMENT I 

CHARTER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 

NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

 

ESTABLISHMENT: 

In accordance with the requirements of Section11 of the National Construction Safety 

Team Act (P. L. 107-231), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Secretary of Commerce 

hereby establishes the National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee, 

hereinafter referred to as the Committee, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act, 5 USC App. 2. 

OBJECTIVES AND DUTIES: 

The Committee will act in the public interest to: 

 1. Advise the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

hereinafter referred to as the NIST, on carrying out the Act by: 

 a. Providing advice on the functions of National Construction Safety Teams, hereinafter 

referred to as Teams, as described in section 2(b)(2) of the Act. b. Providing advice on 

the composition of Teams under section 3 of the Act. c. Providing advice on the 

exercise of authorities enumerated in sections 4 and 5 of the Act. d. Providing such 

other advice as necessary to enable the Director to carry out the Act. 

 2. Review and provide advice on the procedures developed under section 2(c)(1) of the 

Act. 

 3. Review and provide advice on the reports issued under section 8 of the Act. 

 4. Function solely as an advisory body, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act. 

MEMBERS AND CHAIRPERSON: 

1. The Director of NIST shall appoint the members of the Committee, and they will be 

selected on a clear, standardized basis, in accordance with applicable Department of 

Commerce guidance. Members shall be selected on the basis of established records of 

distinguished service in their professional community and their knowledge of issues 

affecting the National Construction Safety Teams. Members shall serve as Special 

Government Employees. Members serve at the discretion of the NIST Director. 

 2. Members shall reflect the wide diversity of technical disciplines and competencies 

involved in the National Construction Safety Teams investigations. Members will be 

drawn from industry and other communities having an interest in the National 

Construction Safety Teams investigations, such as, but not limited to, universities, state 

and local government bodies, non-profit research institutions, and other Federal 

agencies and laboratories. 

3. The Committee shall consist of not fewer than 5 nor more than 10 members. The 

term of office of each member of the Committee shall be three years, except that 
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vacancy appointments shall be for the remainder of the unexpired term of the vacancy 

and that the initial members shall have staggered terms such that the committee will 

have approximately 1/3 new or reappointed members each year. Members who are not 

able to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of the Committee will have their membership 

terminated. 

 4. Any person who has completed two consecutive full terms of service on the 

Committee shall be ineligible for appointment for a third term during the one year period 

following the expiration of the second term. 

 5. The Director of NIST shall appoint the Chair from among the members of the 

Committee. The Chair’s tenure shall be at the discretion of the Director of NIST. 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS: 

 1. The Committee shall report to the Director of NIST. 

 2. The Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) within NIST will provide staff 

support for the Committee. 

 3. The Committee shall meet at least once per year at the call of the Chair. Additional 

meetings may be called whenever one-third or more of the members so request it in 

writing or whenever the Chair or the NIST Director requests a meeting. 

 4. Members of the Committee shall not be compensated for their services, but will, 

upon request, be allowed travel and per diem expenses in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

5701 et seq., while attending meetings of the Committee or subcommittees thereof, or 

while otherwise performing duties at the request of the Chair, while away from their 

homes or regular places of business. 

 5. The Committee shall provide an annual report through the Director of BFRL and the 

Director of NIST, to the Secretary of Commerce for submission to the Committee on 

Science of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation of the Senate, to be due at a date to be agreed upon by the 

Committee and the Director of NIST. Such report will provide an evaluation of National 

Construction Safety Team activities, along with recommendations to improve the 

operation and effectiveness of National Construction Safety Teams; and an assessment 

of the implementation of the recommendations of the National Construction Safety 

Teams and of the Committee. In addition, the Committee may provide reports at 

strategic stages of an investigation, at its discretion or at the request of the Director of 

NIST, through the Director of the BFRL and the Director of NIST, to the Secretary of 

Commerce, to be due on dates to be agreed upon by the Committee and the Director of 

NIST. 

 6. The Committee may establish subcommittees subject to the provisions of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Department of Commerce Committee 

Management Handbook. Subcommittee members shall be selected from the parent 

committee. 

 7. The annual cost of operating the Committee is estimated at $175,000, which 

includes 0.5 work years of staff support. 

 8. The Committee shall not act in the absence of a quorum, which shall consist of a 

simple majority of the members of the Committee not having a conflict of interest in the 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

14

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

matter being considered by the Committee, except that, if the number of members on 

the Committee is even, half will suffice. 

 9. NIST will report to the Committee actions taken in response to recommendations by 

the Committee. 

DURATION: 

While the duration of the Committee is continuing, the Charter shall be renewed every 

two years from the date of filing. 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

15

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

ATTACHMENT II 

National Construction Safety Team 

Advisory Committee - 2004

John M. Barsom, President 

Barsom Consulting, Ltd. 

Pittsburgh, PA 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 

David S. Collins, President 

The Preview Group, Inc. 

Cincinnati, OH 

Term Expires: March 31, 2007 

Glenn P. Corbett, Professor 

Public Management - Fire Science 

John Jay College of Criminal Justice 

New York, NY 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 

Philip J. DiNenno, President 

Hughes Associates, Inc. 

Baltimore, MD 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 

Paul M. Fitzgerald, Chair 

Executive Vice President (retired) 

FM Global, Johnston, RI 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 

Robert D. Hanson, Professor Emeritus 

University of Michigan 

Walnut Creek, CA 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 

Charles Thornton, Co-Chairman and Managing Principal 

The Thornton-Tomasetti Group, Inc. 

New York, NY 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

16

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Kathleen J. Tierney, Director 

Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center 

Institute of Behavioral Science 

University of Colorado at Boulder 

Boulder, CO 

Term Expires: March 31, 2007 

Forman A. Williams, Professor 

Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering and 

Director, Center for Energy Research 

University of California at San Diego 

San Diego, CA 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

17

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

ATTACHMENT III – RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY 

JUNE 2004 COMMITTEE MEETING 

June 2004 Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

Formal Recommendations

The Committee Chair will develop a 

calendar and issue it to all members for 

agreement on how to process the 2004 

Annual Report to Congress, including full 

review by all members before issue. 

NA NA Paul Fitzgerald 

Informal Suggestions

NIST should find out the occupancy load 

and egress width for Windows on the 

World. 

Accept This information has been included 

in draft report NCSTAR 1-1, the 

Project 1 investigation report. 

H.S. Lew 

R. Bukowski 

NIST should coordinate the fire alarm 

system report with the results of interviews 

from Projects 7 and 8. 

Accept Observations of fire alarm system 

performance from Projects 7 and 8 

have been added to draft report 

NCSTAR 1-1, the Project 1 

investigation report. 

W. Grosshandler 

NIST should provide a rationale for using 

the combustible load of 4 lb/ft2 and provide 

comparison with other studies of 

combustible loads in the final report. 

Accept Both the rationale and comparison 

have been included in draft report 

NCSTAR 1-5, the Project 5 report. 

There is also a sensitivity check 

using Fire Dynamics Simulator. 

R. Gann 

NIST should explain why the fire modeling 

analysis of the floor truss considered the 

temperature at a height above the floor 

rather than at the floor level. 

Accept This explanation has been included 

in the draft Project 5 investigation 

reports. 

K. McGrattan 

NIST should explain the rationale for using 

the 21⁄2 in. fireproofing and make it 

defensible; check measurements in audit 

reports versus photographs. 

Accept Method was explained to the 

Advisory Committee after the June 

meeting and has been included in 

the draft Project 6 investigation 

reports. 

J. Gross 

NIST should determine whether the splice 

plates in WTC 7 were welded or bolted. 

Accept This will be provided. The WTC 7 

work is deferred until the 

investigation of the WTC towers is 

completed. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should provide the thermal-structural 

analysis of the initiating mechanism of 

WTC 7 to Robert Hanson when completed. 

Accept This will be provided. The WTC 7 

work is deferred until the 

investigation of the WTC towers is 

completed. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should consider the behavior of more 

conventional floor truss systems, e.g., 

confirm the failure of the floor truss by 

analyzing the WTC 2 mechanical floors as 

W27 wide flange sections. 

Decline This is not within the scope of the 

investigation. It will be suggested 

for follow-on research, however, 

based on final findings and 

recommendations. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should document the elevator 

conditions on 9/11/01, including the time 

that the elevators were functioning. 

Accept This information has been included 

in draft report NCSTAR 1-7, the 

Project 7 investigation report. 

J. Averill 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

18

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

June 2004 Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

In the final report, use a timeline to put 

important events into perspective relative 

to what was going on; write in a narrative 

format. 

Accept The approach to final report 

organization was presented at the 

October 19-20, 2004, NCST AC 

meeting. It is explained in the 

main investigation report. 

R. Gann et al. 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

19

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

ATTACHMENT IV – RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY 

OCTOBER 2004 COMMITTEE MEETING 

October 2004 Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

Informal Recommendations

NIST should consider adding topical 

reports to support the Investigation 

Program Report for Project 2. 

Accept Two technical topical reports on 

baseline analysis and aircraft 

impact are being prepared, in 

addition to draft report 

NCSTAR 1-2, the Project 2 report. 

F. Sadek 

Informal Suggestions

NIST should identify factors that could 

have delayed or prevented collapse. 

Accept A list of factors will be identified. All 

NIST should identify factors that could 

have reduced or minimized the loss of life. 

Accept A list of factors will be identified. All 

NIST should consider the hierarchy of 

importance of the roles (e.g., architect, 

structural engineer, fire protection 

engineer, mechanical engineer) in 

designing the core of a tall building. 

Accept NIST will consider this in 

formulating its recommendations. 

Model codes are starting to define 

Design Professional in Responsible 

Charge (106.3.4.1 IBC 2003) and 

Principal Design Professional 

(103.3.1.2 ICCPC 2003) who 

would be an architect for the 

design of a high-rise building. 

AIA could develop a practice 

guide to discuss this hierarchy. 

H.S. Lew 

R. Bukowski 

NIST should list the range of uncertainties 

in all steps of the investigation. For 

example, NIST should include a statement 

on the range of uncertainties in the material 

properties and the estimates of damage. 

Accept Uncertainties will be addressed and 

defined in the final reports as 

appropriate. 

R. Gann et al. 

NIST should recommend that building 

codes be changed to include a requirement 

that a building can demonstrate it can 

survive burnout without collapse. 

Accept NIST will consider this in 

formulating its recommendations. 

Requires the definition of design 

fires and associated limit states. 

Several organizations have task 

groups working this issue. 

H.S. Lew 

R. Bukowski 

NIST should clearly state why the 

simulation has the landing gear hung up in 

the core rather then exiting the building. 

Accept The draft Investigation Program 

Report for Project 2 includes a 

comparison between the simulation 

results and observables, including 

the landing gear exiting the towers. 

F. Sadek 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

20

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

October 2004 Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

NIST should qualify the statement that the 

amount of recovered steel is sufficient for 

its investigation. 

Accept NIST has modified the wording in 

its reports to: 

“The collection of steel from the 

WTC towers is sufficient for 

determining the quality of the steel 

and for determining mechanical 

properties as input to models of 

building performance.” 

F. Gayle 

In the analysis of the core column tensile 

tests (shown in the meeting presentation), 

three low yield data points were found. 

NIST should explain the reasons for these 

results (e.g., compression, damaged steel) 

in its report. 

Accept This is addressed by adding a 

comment directly on the graphs (a 

statement about expected 

distributions and loss of yield 

point). 

F. Gayle 

NIST should make a statement regarding 

the availability of fire alarm and detection 

systems that perform at levels exceeding 

minimum code requirements. 

Accept This explanation has been included 

in the draft report NCSTAR 1-4, 

the Project 4 investigation report. 

W. Grosshandler 

NIST should clearly state that the intent of 

the fire dynamics modeling is to show 

overall trends (e.g., not matching 

observables window by window with 

model results). We need to be clear with 

the public on expectations for the models. 

Accept NIST has stated this in draft report 

NCSTAR 1-5, the Project 5 

investigation report. 

R. Gann 

NIST should consider conducting further 

insulation tests with the use of charges to 

fully explore the time-scale range for 

dynamic removal of insulation. 

Partially 

accept. 

NIST is examining further tests 

with ballistics, rather than charges. 

J. Gross 

W. Grosshandler 

Model the floor failure on floor 82 east 

face of WTC 2 

Accept Under way as part of the global 

analyses. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should include examples of 

observations from the impact zones that 

show core column buckling, creep, and 

shortening. 

Accept In progress as part of the global 

analyses. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

Alternate collapse hypotheses (e.g., floor 

sagging) should be included in the report 

with the analytical reasons in favor of them 

or against them. 

Accept In progress as part of the collapse 

hypothesis evaluation. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should provide an explanation for the 

kink at floor 106. 

Accept In progress as part of the global 

analyses. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 

NIST should include a section in its main 

report to discuss the truss floor system and 

put it into context. For example, cite the 

performance of the floor in the 1975 fire; 

the performance of floors on September 

11, 2001; and the Underwriters 

Laboratories tests. Note that NIST is not 

condemning nor endorsing such systems 

for high rises. Clarify that this type of 

floor system is commonly used in twostory buildings and rarely used in tall 

buildings. 

Accept This issue is being addressed in the 

draft Project 6 investigation reports 

and the main report. 

J. Gross 

T. McAllister 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2004 Report to Congress 

21

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

October 2004 Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

NIST should discuss the remoteness 

criteria for stairwells in terms of the 1968 

code language so that the recommendation 

is understandable. 

Accept The 1968 remoteness criteria, 

along with current remoteness 

requirements, have been included 

in the draft report NCSTAR 1-7 

(the Project 7 investigation report), 

adding context to the subsequent 

recommendations. 

J. Averill