IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 )

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 08-0111-WS-M 

 ) 

2 parcels of real property consisting of 30 ) 

acres, more or less, together with its ) 

building, appurtenances, improvements, ) 

fixtures, attachments and easements, that ) 

would constitute the residence, curtilage ) 

and outlying property in Mobile County, ) 

Alabama, purportedly in the name of ) 

Cherie Marceaux. ) 

 ) 

Defendants. )

ORDER

 This closed civil forfeiture action comes before the Court on claimant David M. Young’s 

pro se filing styled “Motion to Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal Motion for Stay” (doc. 35). 

 On May 4, 2009, this Court entered an Order of Forfeiture (doc. 27) directing that the 

defendant parcels of real property be forfeited to the Government for disposition according to 

law pursuant to the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) and 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1)(A). That 

Order specifically noted the following relevant facts: (a) the Complaint alleged that those parcels 

were subject to forfeiture because David Mark Young had used them to commit or facilitate 

commission of violations of the Controlled Substances Act by cultivating, storing, packaging and 

selling large quantities of marijuana, and secreting the proceeds of such sales, on that property; 

(b) the Government gave actual notice of this civil forfeiture action to Cherie Marceaux, who is 

Young’s spouse and the sole owner of those parcels according to deeds recorded in probate 

court; (c) Marceaux expressly informed the Government that she had received notice and did not 

wish to file a claim or oppose forfeiture of the property; (d) the Government duly complied with 

its publication obligations under applicable civil forfeiture requirements; and (e) no other 

claimants (including Young) came forward during the designated period. Judgment of Forfeiture 

(doc. 28) was entered contemporaneously with the Order of Forfeiture. 

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 Nearly 14 months later, after being taken into custody and pleading guilty to federal 

criminal charges in this District Court dating back to 2006, Young finally came forward in this 

action and filed a motion for injunction to halt the forfeiture of these two parcels on the ground 

that he had never consented to such forfeiture in his related criminal proceedings. (See doc. 33.) 

On June 29, 2010, this Court entered an Order (doc. 34) denying Young’s motion. The June 29 

Order explained that Young’s withholding of consent to criminal forfeiture was irrelevant given 

the already-completed civil forfeiture of that property, and that Young appears to have neither a 

cognizable interest in the subject parcels nor standing to object to the forfeiture. Young is now 

appealing the June 29 Order to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In connection with that 

appeal, Young requests a stay of the underlying order and judgment of forfeiture in this case. 

 Where an appellant files a motion for stay pending appeal, that appellant must show: “(1) 

a likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) irreparable injury to the 

[appellants] unless the stay is granted; (3) no substantial harm to other interested persons; and (4) 

no harm to the public interest.” In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings (FGJ 91-9), Cohen, 975 

F.2d 1488, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 

1986) (reciting same factors). As the party seeking a stay, Young bears a heavy burden to show 

that this extraordinary remedy is warranted. See Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453 (“[t]he grant of 

an emergency motion to stay the trial court’s mandate is thus an exceptional response”);

McCammon v. United States, 584 F. Supp.2d 193, 197 (D.D.C. 2008) (“granting a stay pending 

appeal is always an extraordinary remedy, and ... the moving party carries a heavy burden to 

demonstrate that the stay is warranted”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Gay 

Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (stay pending 

appeal “is considered extraordinary relief for which the moving party bears a heavy burden”) 

(citation omitted); see generally Nken v. Holder, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1757, 173 L.Ed.2d 

550 (2009) (noting that stay of a final order pending review amounts to “intrusion into the 

ordinary processes of administration and judicial review”) (citation omitted). 

 It is well established that the likelihood of success on the merits is ordinarily the “most 

important” factor in the analysis and requires, at a minimum, a showing of a “substantial case on 

the merits,” even upon a strong showing of the other three factors. Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453; 

see also Nken, 129 S.Ct. at 1761 (“It is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be 

better than negligible” and “more than a mere possibility of relief is required.”) (citations 

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omitted); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2009) (as to first factor, movant 

must at least raise “serious legal questions going to the merits, so serious, substantial, difficult as 

to make them a fair ground of litigation”) (citation omitted); Fullmer v. Michigan Dep’t of State 

Police, 207 F. Supp.2d 663, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (movant seeking a stay of judgment pending 

appeal “must ordinarily demonstrate to a reviewing court that there is a likelihood of reversal” 

and “is always required to demonstrate more than the mere possibility of success on the merits”) 

(citations omitted). 

 In light of the defects identified in the June 29 Order, and Young’s failure to address 

them in any meaningful way in subsequent filings, the Court is of the opinion that Young has no 

substantial case on the merits, and that he has not demonstrated more than a negligible chance of 

success on appeal. In particular, he has not explained why his failure to consent to criminal 

forfeiture of the property makes any difference at all to the validity of already-concluded civil 

forfeiture proceedings. Nor has Young identified any facts or evidence that he owns the 

property, that he possessed some cognizable legal interest in it at the time of forfeiture, or that he 

otherwise has standing to contest the civil forfeiture. Finally, Young has presented no facts or 

argument that reasonably call into question the validity of the civil forfeiture proceedings, or that 

suggest the presence of some legal or procedural defect that invalidates or taints the order and 

judgment of forfeiture entered on May 4, 2009. At best, Young offers conclusory statements that 

he disagrees with unspecified facts in the June 29 Order, that he disputes the existence of subject 

matter jurisdiction for unspecified reasons, and that he disagrees that the civil forfeiture was 

conducted properly, all without saying why. Such vague and unsupported statements fall well 

short of meeting Young’s burden for issuance of a stay pending appeal. 

 Simply put, Young has failed to satisfy his heavy burden of demonstrating entitlement to 

the extraordinary remedy of a stay pending appeal, inasmuch as he has failed to make any 

showing whatsoever of a likelihood of success on the merits that is better than “negligible” or a 

“mere possibility.” Accordingly, his Motion to Stay (doc. 35) is denied, whether viewed 

through the lens of Rule 8(a)(1), Fed.R.App.P., or Rule 62(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of July, 2010. 

 s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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