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Filed 9/14/21 P. v. Sierra CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SOCORRO SIERRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A159738

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SCR-718066)

A jury convicted defendant Socorro Sierra of first degree felony murder

with kidnapping special circumstances, kidnapping, and possession of a 

controlled substance with a firearm. On appeal, defendant claims (1) there 

was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping special circumstance 

finding and the kidnapping conviction; (2) the prosecutor committed

misconduct during closing argument; and (3) the trial court abused its 

discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a witness. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged by third amended information with first degree

murder with kidnapping special circumstances (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),

190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B))

1; kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)); and possession of a

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
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controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,

subd. (a)). Firearm enhancements were alleged as to the first two charges

(§12022.53, subd. (d)). 

Defendant’s post-arrest interview was videotaped and played for the 

jury. During the interview, defendant stated he had a marijuana business 

with his “good friend” Jose Martinez: Martinez would trim marijuana 

obtained from growers and defendant would find the buyers. Around May 

2018, the business relationship deteriorated. Martinez was “not comfortable” 

with defendant and wanted to cut defendant out of the business and continue

alone. Defendant, however, felt Martinez owed him a debt from a particular 

deal involving 109 pounds of marijuana. Martinez said he returned the 

marijuana because the grower came back, having not been paid. Defendant 

did not understand, as the marijuana had been trimmed and defendant had 

lined up the buyers. Defendant wanted to be compensated for his work, and 

asked Martinez for either $16,000 or $5,000 plus 20 pounds of marijuana.

Martinez told defendant to give him time and he would make monthly 

payments on the debt. 

A few weeks later, defendant picked up two men in his car, telling them 

they were going somewhere for “business.” Defendant drove to a parking lot 

where he saw Martinez, started discussing the money owed, and then asked 

Martinez to get into the car because his voice was “getting louder.” Martinez 

agreed, but said he could not be gone too long, as he had to go somewhere. 

Rather than staying in the immediate vicinity, defendant drove up a windy 

road and parked by a bridge near a creek. 

When detectives asked defendant why he had not remained in the 

parking lot, he said he drove “that way” in order to “scare” Martinez into 

taking him seriously and paying the money. Defendant further stated
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Martinez seemed scared while they were driving, asking why they were going

that way and holding up his cell phone to show that he was not calling 

anyone. Martinez finally told defendant to stop, and when defendant pulled 

over Martinez got out of the car. Defendant also got out of the car, and put a 

gun in his back waistband. Defendant and Martinez continued talking, but 

when he saw Martinez had a pocket multi-tool in his hand, he shot him once 

in the head. 

Defendant subsequently led police to Martinez’s body, which defendant

had moved and buried on the property where he lived using a backhoe rented 

for that purpose. 

Upon his arrest, defendant was in possession of a nine-millimeter 

handgun, ammunition, and expended casing, as well as methamphetamines 

and marijuana. The forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy of 

Martinez testified that the expended bullet recovered from Martinez’s brain 

was consistent with a nine-millimeter bullet. The DOJ’s criminalist testified 

that the casing’s firing pin impressions were consistent with test firings from

the recovered handgun. 

Video surveillance screenshots showed defendant’s car driving past 

Martinez’s house several times on the morning of the murder. And 

surveillance footage showed Martinez entering a commercial parking lot a 

few minutes before defendant arrived and parked next to Martinez’s truck. 

Martinez then approached defendant’s car, and defendant’s car left the 

parking lot a few minutes later. The prosecution also presented video footage 

recreating the driving route to the bridge and depicting the remote area.

One of the two other men in the car testified for the prosecution. The 

day before the shooting, defendant had picked him and his housemate up to 

help build a tractor ramp. The witness had used methamphetamines the day 
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before; in fact, he was using drugs regularly at the time. When defendant 

picked the two up the following day, the witness thought they would be going 

back to finish the work. Instead, defendant drove to another town, Martinez

got in the car, and they drove for approximately 15 minutes over a freeway 

and up to a bridge in a remote area with no houses or people around. While 

Martinez got into the car voluntarily, he looked scared as they were driving 

over the freeway and fidgeted with the door handle. The witness believed

defendant’s car doors locked when it reached a certain speed. During the 

drive, defendant said something in Spanish the witness could not 

understand, and then the witness’s housemate took Martinez’s phone. After

Martinez and defendant exited the car, the witness heard a gunshot. When 

defendant returned to the car, he was smiling as he put the bullet casing up 

to a necklace on the rearview mirror and turned on music. Later, the 

witness’s housemate told the witness that defendant wanted him to move 

Martinez’s truck from the parking lot to another location, threatening that if 

the witness did not move it, his daughter might “come missing.” 

The witness further testified he had been charged with kidnapping and 

being an accessory after the fact, but pled guilty to the accessory charge in 

exchange for his testimony and received a one-year jail sentence with three 

years of probation. At the time of trial, the witness was in custody for failure 

to report to probation. He testified regarding his criminal history, which 

included one felony conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle and two 

misdemeanor convictions for possession of stolen property. Before trial, the 

People successfully moved in limine to exclude reference to the fact the 

witness had originally been charged with murder, since the count was 
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dismissed following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. 

Sess.) (SB 1437).

2 

During her closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed the elements for

first degree murder, including an intent to kill. She then argued defendant 

“tricked the victim into getting into the car.” Defense counsel objected. The 

court overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued that defendant had

“tricked” Martinez by making him believe it would be just a short drive, but 

instead had scared him by driving a long way to an extremely remote location 

with two other men and taking away his phone. She argued “all of these 

actions” showed defendant had “the intent to kill.” The prosecutor then 

moved to the elements for the kidnapping charge and special circumstance. 

She stated: “So they tricked him to get into the car. Under the law, that 

alone does not make it kidnapping.” She continued: “I am not telling you it 

is kidnapping from the moment he got into the car. . . . It does become 

kidnapping when he withdraws the consent. When does that happen? When 

he becomes scared. When he goes outside of what he reasonably expected to 

happen.” 

The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true the

kidnapping special circumstance and firearm enhancements. The trial court

sentenced defendant to life without parole on the murder count, consecutive

to a term of 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement, and four years on

the possession count. The sentence on the kidnapping count was stayed. 

2 SB 1437 was enacted in 2018 and took effect on January 1, 2019. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Among other changes, SB 1437 amended section 189 

to limit liability for murder under a felony murder or natural and probable 

consequences theory to a person who is the actual killer, has the intent to kill

and aids or abets the actual killer, or is a major participant in the underlying 

felony and acts with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 

1015, §§ 1, 3.); see § 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).)
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DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Defendant maintains the kidnapping special circumstance finding and

conviction must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence to

establish that he detained Martinez “by force or fear.” 

“In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we

review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which

is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.

Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 712.) “ ‘To assess the evidence’s sufficiency,

we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142,

italics omitted.) Reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it 

appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 

evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 

331.)

Section 207, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who forcibly, or by

any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests

any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or

county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” The

phrase “or by any other means of instilling fear” was added in 1990 to expand

the definition of the crime. (Stats. 1990, ch. 55, § 1, p. 393; Assem. Com. on

Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1564 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Jan. 16, 1990, pp. 2–3.)
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Prior to that amendment, however, courts had already agreed force

need not be physical to constitute kidnapping: it could be accomplished

through threats of force or “the giving of orders which the victim feels

compelled to obey because he or she fears harm or injury from the accused

and such apprehension is not unreasonable under the circumstances.”

(People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 (Stephenson).) Courts had

also agreed kidnapping could be established where a victim initially agrees to

accompany the defendant, but his or her liberty is subsequently restrained by

threat or force. (People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814.)

After the amendment, the California Supreme Court discussed the two

bases for kidnapping—use of force or fear to compel asportation—in People v.

Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 326–327 (Majors). The court explained

asportation by fraud alone, not force or fear, is insufficient to constitute

kidnapping because “the circumstances suggest the victim exercised free will

in accompanying the perpetrator.” (Id. at pp. 327, 331.) While declining to

delineate the precise parameters of the language “ ‘any other means of

instilling fear,’ ” the court explained that a kidnapping may occur where fear

accomplishes the same thing as force: in other words, the victim is compelled

by fear of “ ‘harm or injury from the accused.’ ” (Id. at pp. 333–334.) The

court distinguished that type of fear from “fear the perpetrator will not

attend a high school prom with the victim, or other fears substantially

removed from the use of force.” (Id. at p. 334.)

Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant

restrained Martinez “by means of instilling fear” and thus satisfied the

definition of kidnapping under section 207. During his post-arrest interview,

defendant admitted he drove Martinez a considerable distance to a remote

area with the explicit intent to scare him. Defendant further admitted his
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plan worked: Martinez was scared while they were driving, asked where

they were going, and told defendant to stop. The passenger witness similarly 

testified that Martinez looked scared and began fidgeting with the door 

handle, but the witness believed the doors locked at a certain speed. The 

witness also testified defendant said something in Spanish and thereafter, 

the witness’s housemate took Martinez’s phone. The jury could reasonably 

infer from this testimony that defendant ordered Martinez to relinquish his 

phone and thus maintained control of Martinez in his moving vehicle. 

In sum, the totality of the evidence amply supports a finding that 

Martinez did not assent to driving to the remote locale and to remaining in 

the car of his own “free will,” but rather, did so out of fear and because 

defendant had essentially trapped him in the car. (Majors, supra, 33 Cal.4th

at p. 331; see Stephenson, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 660.)

No Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant also maintains the prosecutor committed reversible

misconduct when she argued in closing that defendant had “tricked”

Martinez into getting into the car. 

“ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial

misconduct are well established.’ ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)

A prosecutor’s behavior violates the federal Constitution “ ‘ “ ‘when it

comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such

unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) 

“ ‘Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial

fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it

involves “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to

persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
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In reviewing a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, “we must view the

statements in the context of the argument as a whole.” (People v. Cole (2004)

33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203.) Moreover, a prosecutor has “ ‘wide latitude to discuss

and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and whether ‘the inferences

the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.’ ” (Ibid.) The

relevant question is “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury

construed or applied any of the complained-of-remarks in an objectionable

fashion.’ ” (Ibid.)

Here, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by

(1) arguing facts not in evidence, and (2) wrongly suggesting to the jury that 

defendant’s purported trickery amounted to kidnapping. Both contentions 

fail. 

First, the prosecutor relied on defendant’s admissions during his postarrest interview: Martinez had told defendant he could not be too long 

because he had to go somewhere, but defendant nevertheless drove out of 

town to a remote locale because he wanted to scare Martinez. Accordingly, 

the prosecutor did not rely on facts not in evidence, and this evidence was 

sufficient to support an argument that defendant led Martinez into believing 

the drive would be short and thereby tricked him into getting into the car. 

Second, it is not reasonably likely the prosecutor’s argument led the 

jury to misunderstand the requisite elements of kidnapping. (People v. Cole,

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) The prosecutor first discussed the intent to kill

element of the first degree murder charge. Then, turning to the kidnapping

charge, she correctly told the jury: “So they tricked him to get into the car. 

Under the law, that alone does not make it kidnapping.” Accordingly, the 

prosecutor did not misstate the law.
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Even if the prosecutor had committed misconduct (which she did not), 

defendant has not demonstrated that it is reasonably probable a result more 

favorable to defendant would have occurred absent the claimed misconduct. 

(People v. Castillo (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 364, 386.) Defendant claims he 

was prejudiced because a juror could have believed the kidnapping was 

established when Martinez was “tricked” into getting into the car. The 

prosecutor, however, explicitly stated otherwise, telling the jury that, alone, 

was not sufficient to establish kidnapping. Rather, the prosecutor went on to 

explain that the kidnapping occurred during the drive: “I am not telling you 

it is kidnapping from the moment he got into the car. . . . It does become 

kidnapping when he withdraws the consent. When does that happen? When 

he becomes scared. When he goes outside of what he reasonably expected to 

happen.” Moreover, the jury was correctly instructed on the law using the 

CALCRIM No. 1215 instruction on kidnapping, and also instructed counsel’s 

arguments are not the law. Additionally, there was abundant evidence to 

support the kidnapping special circumstance and conviction. 

No Abuse of Discretion in Limiting Cross-Examination

Defendant lastly claims the trial court abused its discretion in 

precluding cross-examination of the passenger witness regarding his original 

murder charge. 

The constitutional right of confrontation “includes the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility.” (People 

v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 (Quartermain).) The confrontation 

clause, however, guarantees only “an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 

whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 

474 U.S. 15, 20.) Trial courts retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits 
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on cross-examination based on, among other things, marginal relevance or 

potential confusion of the issues. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 

673, 679.) A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the 

credibility of a witness violates the confrontation clause only when “a 

reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of 

the witness’s credibility had the excluded cross-examination been permitted.” 

(Quartermain, at p. 624.)

Defendant maintains that had the jury been aware of the original 

murder charge, it would have had a different impression of the witness’s 

credibility because, at the time the witness entered his plea, the 

constitutionality of SB 1437 was “unsettled” and could have influenced the 

witness to “go to the police and tailor his testimony to favor himself.” 

To begin with, this argument rests on speculation that the witness

might have known or been told about the new law before he went to the

police. “[E]xclusion of evidence that produces only speculative inferences is 

not an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684; see 

Evid. Code, § 352.) 

In any event, a reasonable jury would not have received a significantly 

different impression of the witness’s credibility had such cross-examination 

been permitted. (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623–624.) The 

witness testified he was originally charged with kidnapping but pled to the 

lesser accessory charge as part of his plea deal. He also testified regarding 

another potential reason to cooperate—or give a biased account—beyond the 

dismissal or reduction of charges against him: defendant had threatened his

daughter. Thus, the jury was well aware the witness had a motive for 

favoring himself in his account of what happened. 
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Moreover, the witness testified on several other topics related to his 

credibility, including his drug use, criminal history, and current custody 

status for violating probation. (See People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 

102, 137 [impeaching effect of drug use during critical events was properly 

placed before jury]; Evid. Code, § 788 [felony conviction may be shown by 

examination to attack witness credibility]; People v. Valenzuela (1984) 

151 Cal.App.3d 180, 194 [jury may draw inference of diminished credibility 

for incarcerated witness].) 

Accordingly, the trial court acted well within its direction in precluding

cross-examination on the witness’s original murder charge. 

Even if the trial court had abused its discretion (which it did not), any 

such error was harmless. (People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47–48.) 

Defendant claims he was prejudiced because the witness’s credibility was 

“critical” to the prosecution’s case on the kidnapping count and special 

circumstance. Not so. As we have discussed, defendant’s own admissions

that he drove a considerable distance into a remote locale in order to scare 

Martinez and that Martinez appeared scared, supported the conviction and 

finding. The witness’s testimony did not contradict any of these statements, 

but instead corroborated that defendant did drive to a remote area and 

Martinez, indeed, looked scared. The physical evidence, forensic evidence, 

and surveillance evidence also all corroborated defendant’s admissions. 

Accordingly, on this record, any error in restricting cross-examination of the 

passenger witness was harmless.

Having considered and rejected each of defendant’s claims on the 

merits, we likewise reject his assertion that the cumulative effect of the 

supposed errors requires reversal. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 

383.)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A159738, People v. Sierra