J-S43030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARTIN TISDALL

Appellant No. 2898 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0308871-1998

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED AUGUST 28, 2015

Appellant, Martin Tisdall, appeals pro se from the order entered 

September 19, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

which dismissed his PCRA1 petition. We affirm. 

On November 22, 1999, Tisdall entered a guilty plea to four counts 

each of robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. 

On March 1, 2000, the trial court sentenced Tisdall to 321⁄2 to 65 years in 

prison, to be followed by 60 years’ probation. Tisdall sought to modify his 

sentence, and later moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied 

both motions. Tisdall did not file a direct appeal.2 

____________________________________________

1

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Defense counsel was permitted to withdraw his representation and new 

counsel subsequently sought to challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness. The 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On January 22, 2013, Tisdall filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, and appointed counsel filed a Petition to Withdraw 

and a Turner/Finley3 no-merit letter. The PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss Tisdall’s PCRA petition as untimely; Tisdall 

filed an amended PCRA petition in response thereto. The PCRA court later 

dismissed the petition and granted appointed counsel permission to 

withdraw. This timely pro se appeal followed. 

Before we may address the merits of a PCRA petition, we must first 

consider the petition’s timeliness because it implicates the jurisdiction of 

both this Court and the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 

A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011). “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has 

jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. (citation omitted). The 

PCRA “confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 

980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). This is to “accord finality to the 

collateral review process.” Id. (citation omitted). “A petition for relief under 

the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

trial court denied Tisdall’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims following a 

hearing, and this Court affirmed that decision on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 833 A.2d 1151 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Table) 

(unpublished memorandum). 

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). 
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one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, 

and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the 

petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.” 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Section 9545 provides, in relevant part, as follows.

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a 

second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within 

one year of the date the judgment becomes final, 

unless the petition alleges and the petitioner 

proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was 

the result of interference by government 

officials with the presentation of the claim in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated 

were unknown to the petitioner and could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right 

that was recognized by the Supreme Court of 

the United States or the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the 

date the claim could have been presented. 

...
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

Instantly, Tisdall’s judgment of sentence became final on March 31, 

2000, 30 days following the imposition of sentence when the time for filing a 

direct appeal expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Thus, Tisdall’s petition filed 

January 22, 2013, is patently untimely and he must plead and prove in his 

petition one of the three enumerated statutory exceptions to the time-bar. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

In his amended PCRA petition, Tisdall asserts that he “cannot be held 

legally responsible for filing a late PCRA petition because he was rendered 

mentally disabled as a direct result of his severe [gunshot] wound to the 

head.” Amended PCRA Petition, 8/18/14 at 2. Regrettably, Tisdall does not 

inform this Court when he sustained this gunshot wound. He claims, 

however, that his alleged incompetency qualifies under the after-discovered 

facts exception to the PCRA time-bar exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

Appellant relies on the case of Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 

2003). Cruz provides no relief.

In Cruz, appellant shot and killed three people and injured four others, 

and then attempted suicide and shot himself in the head. According to a 

psychiatrist, the self-inflicted gunshot wound left appellant “lobotomized” 

and unable to express emotions or to discuss the facts of the case in any 

discernible manner. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that “mental 

incompetence at the relevant times, if proven, may satisfy the requirements 
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of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), in which case, the claims defaulted by operation of 

that incompetence may be entertained.” 852 A.2d at 288 (emphasis in 

original). The Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine 

whether “(1) [Cruz] was and remained incompetent throughout the period 

during which his right to file a PCRA petition lapsed; and (2) [Cruz’s] current 

petition was timely filed within 60 days of his becoming sufficiently 

competent to ascertain the facts upon which his underlying claims are 

predicated.” Id.

Tisdall’s allegation of incompetence is contradicted by the record. 

Prior to sentencing, the trial court had prepared a psychiatric report and 

mental status evaluation. When reviewing the report at sentencing, the trial 

court noted that although Tisdall had previously sustained a gunshot wound 

to the back of the head, the bullet did not affect any brain structure and 

“defendant denies any neurological sequela from these gunshot wounds.” 

N.T., Sentencing, 3/1/00 at 49. The report further indicated that Tisdall 

“does not display any neurological deficits” and “does not show any signs of 

organicity or cognitive defects.” Id. at 51-52. 

As there simply is no evidence to substantiate Tisdall’s claim of 

incompetency, or that the incompetency caused Tisdall to be unable to 

timely file a PCRA petition, this claim cannot qualify as a fact which was 

previously unknown and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of 
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due diligence. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed Tisdall’s 

petition. 

Order affirmed. Appellant’s Request for Court to Take Judicial Notice 

denied. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2015