SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4278-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TERRANCE MITCHELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted February 28, 2022 – Decided March 10, 2022

Before Judges Rose and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 93-03-1244.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Terrance Mitchell appeals from an October 8, 2019 order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm because the petition was untimely filed and otherwise lacked 

merit. 

Following a jury trial in 1993, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes

charged in an Essex County indictment, including murder, felony murder, 

robbery, and weapons offenses for bludgeoning to death a stranger in her car 

near defendant's East Orange home. The State's proofs at trial included 

defendant's post-arrest statement to police, explaining the victim had 

approached him, looking to purchase drugs. Defendant detailed the manner in 

which he killed the victim, including her fruitless struggle to escape his clutches. 

He also confessed to his girlfriend and her stepbrother, who both testified on 

behalf of the State at trial. Defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the 

incident. 

Defendant was sentenced in December 1993 to an aggregate term of life 

imprisonment with a forty-year parole disqualifier. We affirmed defendant's

convictions and sentence, State v. Mitchell, No. A-1052-94 (App. Div. June 5, 

1997), and the Supreme Court denied certification, No. 44,371 (Sept. 8, 1997). 
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Nearly twenty-five years after the judgment of conviction (JOC) was 

entered, defendant filed a petition for PCR, asserting trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to: (1) permit defendant to testify on his own behalf at 

the pretrial Miranda1 hearing; and (2) secure a plea agreement to an aggregated 

thirty-year prison term with a fifteen-year parole disqualifier. Acknowledging 

his petition was untimely, defendant generally claimed "various" mental health 

issues and loss of legal documents while incarcerated excused his two-decade 

delay in filing for PCR. Thereafter assigned counsel filed a supplemental 

submission, expounding upon defendant's assertions. No documents or 

transcripts were appended to defendant's petition. 

Following argument, Judge James W. Donohue reserved decision. Shortly 

thereafter on October 8, 2019, the judge issued a cogent written opinion, denying 

PCR as time barred and otherwise lacking in merit. Judge Donohue squarely 

addressed the issues raised in view of the requirements set forth in Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting the filing of a PCR petition five years after entry of the 

JOC unless the defendant demonstrates "excusable neglect" and "a reasonable 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true[,] 

enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice"). 

Because defendant failed to "provide any documentation in support of his 

assertions" regarding his "mental health concerns and location transfers," the 

judge found defendant failed to establish excusable neglect for the lengthy delay 

in filing for PCR. The judge further found "the State would be severely 

prejudiced by being required to recall witnesses to testify as to matters that took 

place over two decades ago." See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)

("The court should consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to 

the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether 

there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits."); see also State 

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997). 

Notwithstanding the time bar, the PCR judge also denied defendant's 

petition on the merits under the framework established in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant seeking PCR on 

ineffective assistance of counsel grounds to demonstrate: (1) the particular 

manner in which counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that the 

deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial); see also State v. Fritz, 105 

N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). 
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Citing controlling precedent, Judge Donohue first rejected defendant's 

contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call defendant as a 

witness at the Miranda hearing. Referencing State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 

273, 323 (App. Div. 1983), the judge found "whether [defendant] should have 

testified at the suppression hearing," was a "deferential matter[] of trial strategy, 

well within the province of trial counsel." The judge was persuaded defendant's 

"uncorroborated testimony that he had used illicit drugs prior to giving his 

statement would have been unlikely to persuade the trial court to suppress." 

The PCR judge also found unavailing defendant's argument that trial 

counsel "failed to secure a plea agreement" to reduce his exposure at trial. The 

judge found compelling the State's contention that defendant failed to support 

his claims with "a transcript, written plea offer, or affidavit of trial counsel." 

Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case on either claim,

the PCR judge concluded defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

See e.g., State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 310-11 (2014); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 

451, 462 (1992). This appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR] 

COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD THE 
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DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WAS TIME 

BARRED.

POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR] 

COURT'S DECISION THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE WHEN 

HE FAILED TO CALL THE DEFENDANT AS A 

WITNESS AT HIS SUPPRESSION HEARING.

POINT III

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR] 

COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD THE 

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS NOT 

INEFFECTIVE DURING PRE-TRIAL 

PROCEEDINGS.

We have considered defendant's arguments in view of the applicable law 

and the record, and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the 

reasons articulated by Judge Donohue in his well-reasoned decision. 

Affirmed.