IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

BHAJANPAL S. CHOPRA,

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0086

Filed December 20, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. C20160619

The Honorable Richard D. Nichols, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney

By Nicolette Kneup, Tucson

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Nesci & St. Louis, P.L.L.C., Tucson

By Michelle L. Behan and Joseph P. St. Louis

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
STATE v. CHOPRA

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Vásquez and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

M I L L E R, Judge:

¶1 The state appeals the superior court’s order in a special 

action arising out of the justice court’s ruling directing the state to 

disclose the results of other blood tests in the same test batch as 

defendant Bhajanpal Chopra’s. Determining the superior court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining special action jurisdiction, we 

affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In February 2015, Chopra was charged in justice court 

with driving while impaired by alcohol to the slightest degree and 

driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more. Law 

enforcement officers collected a blood sample from Chopra during 

the course of their investigation. The state alleged a test of the blood 

sample showed Chopra’s blood alcohol concentration surpassed the 

legal limit. 

¶3 Chopra moved for disclosure of “all chromatograms 

and batch data generated for every sample tested” on the same date 

as Chopra’s sample, in order to determine “whether the results of 

laboratory testing conducted in this case are reliable.” The state 

opposed the motion, arguing other people’s test results were 

irrelevant to Chopra’s case, and that Chopra’s request amounted to a 

mere “fishing expedition.” The trial court granted Chopra’s motion 

and ordered disclosure. 

¶4 The state challenged that ruling by special action in the 

superior court. After oral argument on the petition, the court 

concluded in a signed minute entry: “The court finds that the trial 

court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. 
STATE v. CHOPRA

Opinion of the Court

3

Given the limited nature of the disclosure required, this Court 

declines to accept jurisdiction.” The state now appeals. 

Jurisdiction

¶5 Chopra argues we lack appellate jurisdiction, pointing 

out that no subsection of A.R.S. § 13-4032, the statute governing state 

criminal appeals, authorizes an appeal in this situation. The state 

did not file a reply, but in its opening brief cites A.R.S. § 12-2101 as 

authority for this court’s jurisdiction. The applicability of § 13-4032

to an appeal by the state from an adverse special action ruling in the 

superior court has not been addressed previously. Although in 

many circumstances a party’s failure to respond to an argument is 

regarded as a concession to the proponent’s claim, we are required 

to examine our own jurisdiction independently. Ghadimi v. Soraya, 

230 Ariz. 621, ¶ 7, 285 P.3d 969, 970 (App. 2012). 

¶6 A party may appeal as prescribed by law. See Ariz. 

Const. art. VI, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031; see also State v. 

Bayardi, 230 Ariz. 195, ¶ 6, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065 (App. 2012) (“Our 

appellate jurisdiction is purely statutory.”). In this circumstance, 

however, the parties disagree whether the more general appeal 

statute, § 12-2101, or the more specific state criminal appeal statute, 

§ 13-4032, applies. It is true that, in general, the more specific statute 

controls over the less specific statute. See, e.g., Pinal Vista Props., 

L.L.C. v. Turnbull, 208 Ariz. 188, ¶ 23, 91 P.3d 1031, 1037 (App. 2004). 

Moreover, there is internal consistency to Chopra’s contention that 

an appeal from a special action in a criminal case is analogous to an 

appeal challenging a criminal conviction or dismissal of a 

conviction. Cf. A.R.S. §§ 13-4032, 13-4033. And, if this case was 

pending in superior court rather than a court of limited jurisdiction, 

a discovery ruling of this type could not be challenged by the state 

via direct appeal in this court; rather, the exclusive remedy would be 

a special action petition. See, e.g., State v. Bejarano, 219 Ariz. 518, 200 

P.3d 1015 (App. 2008). 

¶7 Nevertheless, an appeal from a special action in the 

superior court is civil in nature. This is so even if, as here, the 

underlying proceeding is criminal. See, e.g., Urs v. Maricopa Cty. 

Attorney’s Office, 201 Ariz. 71, 31 P.3d 845 (App. 2001) (hearing as 
STATE v. CHOPRA

Opinion of the Court

4

civil appeal superior court’s grant of relief on special action petition 

concerning right to jury trial for defendant charged with 

misdemeanor reckless driving). Accordingly, this court has 

previously looked to § 12-2101 rather than § 13-4032 for jurisdiction 

in state appeals from superior court special actions in DUI cases. 

See, e.g., State v. Cooperman, 230 Ariz. 245, ¶¶ 2, 5, 282 P.3d 446, 448, 

449 (App. 2012); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, ¶¶ 4-5, 129 

P.3d 471, 473 (App. 2006). 

¶8 Paragraph (A)(1) of § 12-2101 permits appeal “[f]rom a 

final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding 

commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court 

from any other court,” subject to an inapposite exception. Likewise, 

Rule 8(a), Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act., provides “[a] decision of a Superior 

Court in a special action shall be reviewed by appeal where there is 

an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by that means.” 

See also Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 234 Ariz. 196, ¶ 12, 

319 P.3d 1002, 1006 (App. 2014) (Rule 8(a) “gives [this] court 

procedural flexibility to expedite our review of a superior court’s 

special action decision, either by processing the case as an ordinary 

appeal, a modified appeal, or a special action within this court”).

We conclude that § 12-2101(A)(1) grants us appellate jurisdiction 

over the superior court’s final judgment in a special action. Accord

Cooperman, 230 Ariz. 245, ¶¶ 2, 5, 282 P.3d at 448, 449; Bohsancurt, 

212 Ariz. 182, ¶¶ 4-5, 129 P.3d at 473.

Analysis

¶9 We conduct a bifurcated review of a superior court’s 

ruling on a petition for special action. Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of 

Psychologist Exam’rs, 210 Ariz. 177, ¶ 22, 108 P.3d 956, 961 

(App. 2005). We first determine whether the superior court accepted 

special action jurisdiction. Id. If it declined special action 

jurisdiction, we determine only whether it abused its discretion by 

doing so. Id. If it accepted special action jurisdiction, then we 

review the decision on the merits. Id. 

¶10 The state argues we should review the superior court’s 

decision “on its merits” because the court determined the trial court 

had not abused its discretion. Chopra argues, however, that the 
STATE v. CHOPRA

Opinion of the Court

5

superior court declined special action jurisdiction. We agree with 

Chopra. The court’s order plainly stated, “[T]his Court declines to 

accept jurisdiction.” Although the order also included a finding that 

“the trial court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of 

discretion,” we agree with Chopra that this statement is reasonably

regarded as a partial explanation of the court’s rationale for 

declining special action jurisdiction, as opposed to a ruling on the 

merits. Cf. Amos v. Bowen, 143 Ariz. 324, 327, 693 P.2d 979, 982 

(App. 1984) (special action jurisdiction may be appropriate if trial 

court has committed plain and obvious error). 

¶11 Because the superior court declined jurisdiction over the 

state’s special action, the only question before us is whether such 

declination was an abuse of discretion. See Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 

64, ¶ 2, 22 P.3d 57, 58 (App. 2001). We conclude it was not, for the 

very reasons the declination order suggested. Chopra argued in the 

trial court that he should have access to the whole batch of 

chromatograms as a matter of fairness and due process because the 

state’s expert would review the whole batch in the course of his or 

her technical review. The superior court reasonably could have 

concluded that the trial court did not clearly err by accepting this 

argument, thus undermining one possible reason to accept special 

action jurisdiction—to correct a plain and obvious error. Cf. Amos, 

143 Ariz. at 327, 693 P.2d at 982. 

¶12 Furthermore, the superior court emphasized the 

“limited nature of the disclosure required” in declining jurisdiction, 

indirectly indicating that the discovery request in this case was not a 

matter of statewide importance. Cf. Sanchez v. Gama, 233 Ariz. 125, 

¶¶ 4-5, 310 P.3d 1, 3 (App. 2013) (special action jurisdiction may be 

warranted as to issues of statewide importance). The court’s 

conclusion as to this jurisdictional consideration also was not a clear 

abuse of discretion. 

¶13 Finally, the superior court did not abuse its discretion 

when it followed the general practice declining special action 

jurisdiction in a discovery dispute. See Jolly v. Superior Court, 

112 Ariz. 186, 188, 540 P.2d 658, 660 (1975) (“The fact that this Court 

does not routinely entertain petitions for extraordinary relief on 

discovery matters is apparent by the paucity of occasions in the past 
STATE v. CHOPRA

Opinion of the Court

6

on which we have accepted jurisdiction over such actions.”); see also

Yuma Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 175 Ariz. 72, 74, 852 P.2d 1256, 

1258 (App. 1993) (special action relief generally not appropriate 

mechanism for resolving discovery disputes); Lang v. Superior Court, 

170 Ariz. 602, 604, 826 P.2d 1228, 1230 (App. 1992) (same).

Disposition

¶14 We affirm the superior court’s ruling.