NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

LAURIE ARORA, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

RAJEEV ARORA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0354 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2015-051095

The Honorable Roy C. Whitehead, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Burt Feldman & Grenier, Scottsdale

By Mary K. Grenier

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Owens & Perkins, PC, Scottsdale

By Max Nicholas Hanson

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
ARORA v. ARORA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge James P. Beene joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Laurie Arora (“Wife”) appeals from a decree of dissolution, 

challenging the amount and duration of spousal maintenance awarded her 

by the superior court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Wife and Rajeev Arora (“Husband”) divorced in April 2016 

after 23 years of marriage. The parties were able to resolve all issues 

pre-trial except for spousal maintenance and attorneys’ fees. 

¶3 At trial, Wife testified that physical limitations prevent her 

from working full time, and she requested spousal maintenance of $4500 or 

$5000 per month for eight years. Husband disputed Wife’s entitlement to 

spousal maintenance and challenged the reasonableness of her claimed 

monthly expenses. The superior court awarded Wife spousal maintenance 

of $3000 per month for four years. 

¶4 Wife timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review an award of spousal maintenance for abuse of 

discretion. Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App. 2007). We view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s 

award and will affirm if there is any reasonable evidence to support it. Id.

1

 

1 Wife suggests we must consider de novo whether the court 

erroneously applied the statutory factors in setting the amount and 

duration of the award. We disagree. The court’s balancing of the statutory 

factors is a matter within its substantial discretion, and we apply a 

deferential standard of review to that assessment. See Rainwater v. 

Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993).
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¶6 The superior court found that Wife was entitled to spousal 

maintenance because she “lack[ed] sufficient property to support herself.” 

The court did not find that Wife cannot be self-sufficient through 

appropriate employment. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A) (identifying four statutory 

grounds for spousal maintenance award). 

¶7 A spousal maintenance order “shall be in an amount and for 

a period of time as the court deems just.” A.R.S. § 25-319(B). In setting the 

amount and duration of an award, the court is to consider “all relevant 

factors,” including 13 specifically enumerated factors. Id. Although the 

superior court made specific findings regarding each statutory factor, Wife 

contends it failed to properly consider evidence of physical limitations that 

prevent full-time employment and asserts that the court’s findings do not 

comport with the ultimate award. We conclude otherwise.

¶8 Wife has a Bachelor of Science degree in physical therapy and 

is licensed to practice in Arizona. At the time of trial, she was employed as 

a physical therapist, earning $40 per hour. Wife testified at one point that 

she was working “anywhere from 24 to 30 hours” per week, but later 

testified she was working 20–25 hours per week.

2 Wife testified she was 

not working additional hours because she was only certified by a few 

insurance companies and could not treat all of her employer’s patients. She 

explained that insurance companies require physical therapists to complete 

a credentialing process before treating their insureds. Wife testified she was 

completing the credentialing process to increase her patient load, and her 

goal was to work 32 hours per week; on an annualized basis, she would 

then be earning more than $5500 per month. 

¶9 Wife testified she does not believe she can work full time in 

her current occupation because she experiences pain, tingling, and 

numbness in her arm, back, and leg, and these symptoms worsen when she 

works long hours. In its ruling, the court noted that Wife has limited 

earning potential in her current occupation. 

¶10 Wife maintains the court erred in applying its findings 

because she works only 20–24 hours per week, and her income is thus $3500 

per month, not $5000. But the record contains evidence that Wife was 

 

2 Wife’s February 2016 Affidavit of Financial Information (“AFI”) is 

also inconsistent — stating in one place that she works 25–32 hours per 

week and in another that she works 20–32 hours each week. Additionally, 

contrary to her trial testimony, Wife’s AFI reflects that she has a gross 

monthly income of $5200.
ARORA v. ARORA

Decision of the Court

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working up to 32 hours per week at the time of trial. Moreover, as 

discussed, Wife testified she worked reduced hours because she was still 

undergoing the credentialing process and claimed she intended to work 32 

hours per week upon attaining those credentials. There was no evidence 

Wife is physically unable to work 32 hours per week. 

¶11 We also reject Wife’s assertion that the court erred by not 

taking into account the time she would need to change to a less physically 

demanding career. The court clearly considered that evidence, as it noted 

twice in its findings that Wife had considered returning to school to obtain 

an advanced degree that would allow her to be employed in a less 

physically demanding field. The court also found that four years of 

maintenance “will allow Wife the time that she needs to secure additional 

employment and arrange for any training she needs to secure appropriate 

employment.” 

¶12 Although reasonable minds might differ regarding the 

amount and duration of the award, “[a] difference in judicial opinion is not 

synonymous with ‘abuse of discretion.’” Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 

37 (App. 1982); see also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46 (1982) 

(appellate court will affirm spousal maintenance award if any reasonable 

construction of the evidence justifies it). The superior court properly 

considered the A.R.S. § 25-319(B) factors, and its rulings are supported by 

competent evidence. Leathers, 216 Ariz. at 376, ¶ 9. 

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the spousal maintenance 

award. Husband requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny his
ARORA v. ARORA

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request. Husband, however, is entitled to recover his taxable costs on 

appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 

21.