alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


   
     We hereby consent to the use in the Prospectus constituting part of this
Amendment No. 2 to the Registration Statement on Form S-4 of Southern Foods
Group, L.P. and SFG Capital Corporation of our report dated March 31, 1998
relating to the consolidated financial statements of Southern Foods Group, L.P.,
and of our report dated December 17, 1997 relating to the statements of revenues
and expenses and of cash flows of Meadow Gold Dairy Operations, which appear in
such Prospectus. We also consent to the application of our report dated March
31, 1998 to the Financial Statement Schedule for the three years ended December
31, 1997 listed under Item 21(ii) of this Registration Statement when such
schedule is read in conjunction with the financial statements of Southern Foods
Group L.P. referred to in our report. The audits referred to in such report also
included this schedule. We also consent to the reference to us under "Experts"
in such Prospectus.
    



PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP

   
Dallas, Texas
June 15, 1998
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,471
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 489,2222
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  6,316,199
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,956,594
<PP&E>                                       9,729,290
<DEPRECIATION>                             (3,673,861)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,660,907
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,784,298
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     6,815,972
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,660,907
<SALES>                                      1,582,558
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,582,558
<CGS>                                          914,671
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  730,366
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (137,027)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (80,082)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (79)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (80,082)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (80,161)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.02)


</TABLE>
#### T. R. Green et al. *v.*Jno. D. Preston & Bro.

Attachment — Endorsement on Petition by Clerk.

The failure of a clerk to indorse on the petition at the time of its filing, does not, ipso facto, destroy the validity of attachment.

APPEAL PROM HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT.

March 28, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The only explanation T. R. Green offers for sending portions of his stock of groceries to Mobile and St. Louis, is that he was advised to send whisky to Mobile 'by James, the agent for appellees. This explanation is inconsistent with the statement made by him while on the way from Milburn to Columbus, that he was taking it to the latter place to return to his merchants because it was not the quality he had ordered.

When we connect this statement with the fact that the three arid óne-half barrels in controversy were not sold at Mobile, but were shipped bade to Columbus to the address of his brother, William Green, we can scarcely escape the conclusion that the whisky was sent away for the purpose of getting it into the possession of William Green with a shadow of claim of ownership-, in order that it might be held against T. R. Green’s creditors. The claim- of William Green was not made out. He does not distinctly allege that anything was owing him on account of the mortgage debts, at the time he claims to have purchased the whisky. He attempts to *630show that he was to pay on it by entering a credit 'on this mortgage debt. Neither his petition nor the mortgage exhibited show any such credit, nor does he prove in any way that it was ever given.

*Bradley, for appellants.*

*Moss, for appellees.*

Considering all the facts developed we cannot adjudge that the court below, which seems to have been substituted for a jury, decided against the weight of the evidence on this branch of the controversy.

The failure of the deputy clerk at Columbus to endorse on the petition the time it was filed, did not *ipso*facto• destroy the validity of the attachment. Upon motion to quash for" this reason, the court should have allowed the endorsement to be made. The statute on this subject is directory, and not mandatory.'

Judgment affirmed.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4328

To suspend temporarily the duty on 3-Cyclohexene-1-carboxylic acid, 6-[(di2-propenylamino)carbonyl]-,(1R,6R)-rel-, reaction products with 

pentafluoroiodoethane-tetrefluoroethylene telomer, ammonium salt. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 11, 2004

Mr. FORBES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on 3-Cyclohexene-1-carboxylic acid, 6-[(di-2-propenylamino)carbonyl]-,(1R,6R)-

rel-, reaction products with pentafluoroiodoethanetetrefluoroethylene telomer, ammonium salt.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 4328 IH 

1 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON 3-CYCLOHEXENE-1-

2 CARBOXYLIC ACID, 6-[(DI-2-

3 PROPENYLAMINO)CARBONYL]-,(1R,6R)-REL-, 

4 REACTION PRODUCTS WITH 

5 PENTAFLUOROIODOETHANE6 TETREFLUOROETHYLENE TELOMER, AMMO7 NIUM SALT. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

9 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

10 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

11 new heading:

‘‘ 9902.38.42 3-Cyclohexene-1-carboxylic 

acid, 6-[(di-2-

propenylamino)carbonyl]-

,(1R,6R)-rel-, reaction products with 

pentafluoroiodoethanetetrefluoroethylene telomer, 

ammonium salt (CAS No. 

392286–82–7) (provided for 

in subheading 3809.92.50) .. Free No Change No Change On or Before 

12/31/2007 ’’. 

12 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

13 subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn 

14 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day 

15 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**Consent of Independent RegisteredPublic Accounting Firm**

 

 

The Board of Directors

MOCON, Inc.:

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registrationstatement (No. 33-42255, 33-49752, 33-58789, and 333-90116) on Form S-8 ofMOCON, Inc. of our reports dated February 23, 2005, with respect to theconsolidated balance sheets of MOCON, Inc. as of December 31, 2004 and 2003,and the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders’ equity, andcash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31,2004, and related financial statement schedule, which reports appear in theDecember 31, 2004, annual report on Form 10-K of MOCON, Inc.

 
|   |   |   |   | /s/ KPMG LLP |   |   |   |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|--------|--------|--------|

 

 

Minneapolis, Minnesota

March 29, 2005

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4616 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4616

  To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend for four years the 
  operation of the demonstration project of the Secretary of Veterans 
     Affairs to guarantee hybrid adjustable rate mortgages for the 
             construction or purchase of homes by veterans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 18, 2004

  Mrs. Davis of California (for herself, Mr. Evans, and Mr. Michaud) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend for four years the 
  operation of the demonstration project of the Secretary of Veterans 
     Affairs to guarantee hybrid adjustable rate mortgages for the 
             construction or purchase of homes by veterans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans' Adjustable Rate Home Loan 
Extension Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2. FOUR-YEAR EXTENSION OF HYBRID ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE 
              GUARANTEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM.

     Subsection (a) of section 3707A of title 38, United States Code, 
is amended by striking ``during fiscal years 2004 and 2005''and 
inserting ``during fiscal years 2004 through 2009''.
                                 <all>
```
10577.

#### Bailey *v.*McClendon *et al.*

Jenkins, P. J.

This case is a contest as to whether or not certain materials tarnished by the plaintiff to the defendants were included in a contract *Á*purchase and sale, or whether they were furnished as extras. While the evidence is conflicting, it does not fail to authorize the finding for the defendant as made by the jury. Even though the evidence admitted over objection may have been, as contended, irrelevant, it was necessarily harmless, and therefore its admission would not authorize setting the verdict aside. The reference by the trial judge to the contentions as “set up” by the defendant could not, when taken in the connection in which the words were used, he construed as an expression of the court’s opinion as to what had or had not been proved.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Smith, JJ,, concur.*

*474Complaint; from Haralson superior court—Judge Irwin. April 5, 1919.

*J. S: Edwards, Taylor Smith,*for plaintiff.

*M. BuMard, Griffith & Matthews,*for defendants.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### DEC 31 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT BARTON LEE MURPHY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOSEPH BROOKS, Respondent-Appellee. No. 97-1175 (D.C. No. 97-S-186) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Mr. Murphy appeals the district court's dismissal o f his 28 U.S.C. § 2241-2-

petition for writ of habeas corpus. We exercise ju risdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Before going to prison, Mr. Murphy sold drugs. As a result of this activity, he was convicted of a number of federal drug-relate d offenses and sentenced to ten years in federal custody. In 1992, he escaped and eventually fled to Mexico. He was recaptured, brought back to the United State s, and held in the El Paso County Jail. While in the El Paso facility, Mr. Mu rphy developed a bad rash, which he contends was not properly treated. Mr. Murphy, whose jailhouse avocation appears to be litigation, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court. In the petition, he requested a sentence reduction to comp ensate for the alleged medical mistreatment. The district court dismissed his complaint, finding "28 U.S.C. § 2241 is not an appropriate vehicle to obtain relief for the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement to which[Mr. Murphy] was subjected." We review de novo a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition. See Bradshaw v. Story , 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). Mr. Murphy provides no authority whatsoever to buttress his request for a1 Indeed, it appears Mr. Murphy has filed these cla ims in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Texas. -3- sentence reduction based on mistreatment by prison authorities. This court has already ruled that medical mistreatment claims are "not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." United States v. Sisneros , 599 F.2d 946, 947 (10th Cir. 1979) (discussing a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedin g). As the court pointed out in Sisneros , Mr. Murphy must "resort to the Federal Tort Claim s Act or a Bivens type action" to obtain a remedy for the alleged wro ngs of which he complains. 1 Id. Mr. Murphy is no longer incarcerated at the El Paso County Jail, and his § 2241 motion does not challenge the constitutional validity of his current confinement. As such, the district court properly dismissed this petition.

The decision below is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED . Entered for the Court WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7715

BRIAN K. JAMISON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District

Judge. (CA-96-311-R)

Submitted: February 13, 1997 Decided: February 27, 1997

Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian K. Jamison, Appellant Pro Se. Wirt Peebles Marks, IV, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Jamison v. Director, Virginia Dep't

of Corr., No. CA-96-311-R (W.D. Va. Oct. 30, 1996). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### E. F. Gallagher *v.*Elizabeth A. Mitchell.

Principal and Agent — Liability of Pension Agent.

■Where a pension agent paid the money to persons not entitled to receive it and thus put it! beyond the power of the person entitled to it to collect it, an action will lie against the agent therefor.

Evidence — Receipt—Burden of Proof.

Where a copy of a receipt is offered in evidence and its execution is denied) the burden is on the proponent to show that the other party signed it.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

June 9, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

Ordinarily, an agent of the state or government whose duty it is to receive and pay out moneys to those entitled, can not be -made liable in an ordinary action, by the party entitled, for failing to pay over; but in a case like this, where, by the neglect or misfeasance of the agent, he has placed it beyond the power of the party to collect that to which she was justly and legally entitled, an action will lie. The appellant was the agent to recover and pay out the pension money. The appellee was entitled to a pension. The money had been set apart to her and the agetit of the government directed to pay it. He takes the money and pays it to those not entitled to receive it. He is credited by the amount in his settlement with the government, and reports having paid the money over *723to the appellee, when, as was adjudged by the court below, it had not been paid, or at least not paid to the appellee.

*Elliott, Hays, for appellant.*

*S. McKee, for appellee.*

This was a conveyance of appellee’s money to the use of appellant. There was no question made as to the jurisdiction in the court below, and it cannot now be made in this court. The receipt relied on is not filed with the answer, but only what purports to be a copy of the same, with the proceedings under which appellant claims to have paid the money. When the receipt was offered as evidence, it was proper for the appellee to deny its execution in her deposition; and the burden of proof was on the appellant to show that she signed it.

Judgment affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BENITA ARCHARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-0746-CG-N

)

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

)

Defendant. )

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the court’s order entered this date granting defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this case is

DISMISSED with prejudice. Costs are to be taxed against the plaintiff.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:08-cv-00746-CG-N Document 42 Filed 05/12/10 Page 1 of 1
OSAC Registry Standards – Laboratory Implementation Declaration

Forensic Science Laboratory: _____________________________________________

Address: _________________________________________________________ 

_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

Declaration:

The forensic science laboratory has implemented all of the applicable OSAC Registry Standards in

the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual(s) and/or Quality Manual. 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual(s)

Quality Manual

The forensic science laboratory has implemented the applicable OSAC Registry Standards in

the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual(s) and/or Quality Manual of the following 

sections: 

SECTION REGISTRY STANDARDS

Anthropology

Bloodstain Pattern Analysis

Crime Scene Investigation

Digital Evidence

Disaster Victim Identification

DNA

Dogs and Sensors

Facial Identification

Fire and Explosion Investigation

Fire Debris and Explosives

Firearms and Toolmarks

Footwear and Tire

Forensic Document Examination

Friction Ridge

Geological Materials

Gunshot Residue

Materials (Trace)

Medicolegal Death Investigation

Odontology

Seized Drugs

Serology/General Biology

Speaker Recognition 

Toxicology

Video/Imaging Technology Analysis

Wildlife Forensics 

Other 

Laboratory Director: Date: 

November 2019
11509.

#### Washington *v.*The State.

Decided July 13, 1920.

Rehearing denied July 29, 1920.

Bloodworth, J.

There is no merit in any of the special grounds of the motion for a new trial; the evidence is ample to support the verdict, which is approved by the trial judge, and the judgment is

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*

*423Conviction of assault with intent to rape; from Emanuel superior court — Judge Hardeman. April 5, 1920.

As to the argument of counsel the court instructed the jury as follows: “ In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant the court instructs you now that the opinion of counsel in the case is .not to control you at all. Assertions by counsel, either way, about a party’s guilt or innocence is a matter that the jury has no right to consider. The jury passes on the evidence; the province of counsel is to discuss the evidence and not express any opinion about what its conclusion ought to be; that is for the jury to pass on.” Error in so charging is alleged in the motion for a new trial, the movant contending that the court thereby curtailed the right of argument of counsel for the movant, and that it was violative of the provisions of the constitution of this State that “ No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State in person, by attorney, or both” (art. 1, sec. 1, par. 4), and that “Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this State shall have the privilege and *benefit*of counsel” (art. 1, sec. 1, par. 5). In a note to this ground of the motion the judge states that the charge complained of therein was given because the solicitor-general, at the conclusion of his argument, expressed his personal opinion that the defendant was guilty, and the defendant’s counsel objected to this expression of opinion and moved for a mistrial.

On the presumption of innocence the court charged as follows: “Hnder the law of this State every man who is charged with crime, when he pleads not guilty, is presumptively not guilty. That is a presumption of law, that he is not guilty. That is not a conclusive presumption. If it was, that would end the case as a matter of course. That is a mere prima facie presumption, what is known as a rebuttable presumption. There are presumptions of law and presumptions of fact; that is a presumption of law as to his innocence.” It is alleged that this was error because the doctrine as to the presumption of innocence is not stated therein as clearly and correctly as the movant was entitled to have it presented, and it tended to confuse the jury and failed to safeguard the interests of the accused to the degree that the law demands.

*Alfred Herrington Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Walter F. Gray, solicitor-general,*contra.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11** 
**- 7071** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff

– Appellee ,

v.

JOHN ANDREW SPEAGLE, SR. ,
Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the Uni ted States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Statesville

. Richard L. Voorhees , District Judge. ( 5:05

- cr
- 00234

- RLV

- CH

- 2 )

Submitted : December 15, 2011 Decided: December 20, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS , Circuit J udges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

John Andrew Speagle, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circ uit.2 PER CURIAM:
John Andrew Speagle, Sr., appeals the district court’s
order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for

reduction of sentence based on the Government’s failure to file

a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 5K1.1 moti on for
a downward departure. Because Speagle’s claim is not a proper

basis for a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(2) , see USSG

§ 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A), we affirm the district court’s order. * We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

content ions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* We may affirm a district court’s judgment on any grounds apparent from the record. See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenvill e Cnty. , 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002).