COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DENNIS GLENROY SIMMONDS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2710-99-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 SEPTEMBER 26, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

Richard S. Miller, Judge 

 William F. Quillian III for appellant. 

 Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Dennis Glenroy Simmonds was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession of cocaine. As a result of the conviction, the trial 

court revoked Simmonds' suspended sentence previously imposed in 

an unrelated conviction. Simmonds has appealed from each 

judgment. 

 On appeal, Simmonds argues that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress the cocaine. He contends that 

the search for the cocaine was unreasonable because the officers 

lacked probable cause to forcibly remove the cocaine from his 

mouth. Simmonds further contends that the trial court erred by 
- 2 - 

finding that he violated the conditions of a previously 

suspended sentence and erred in revoking the suspended sentence. 

We disagree. 

I. BACKGROUND

 In November 1998, Lynchburg Police Department Investigator 

R.A. Davidson was told that Chaka Herbert Raysor, who was wanted 

on nine counts of murder as well as other offenses, was in the 

Lynchburg area. During the ensuing investigation, Davidson 

learned that Raysor had been associated with Barbara Nowlin, 

also known as "B." Davidson was told by a reliable, 

confidential informant, that Davidson could purchase cocaine 

from Nowlin. 

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on March 24, 1999, Davidson 

received a call from the informant stating that Nowlin would be 

at a local Subway shop with cocaine that she would be selling to 

the informant. Davidson arrived at the Subway shop and observed 

Nowlin's car. Davidson also observed a male passenger in 

Nowlin's car, whom he thought might be Raysor. However, the 

passenger was the defendant. 

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Davidson observed the 

confidential informant arrive and go behind the Subway shop to 

conduct the drug transaction with Nowlin. "Almost 

instantaneously" after the drug sale, the informant notified 

Davidson of the sale and of the fact that Nowlin was still in 
- 3 - 

possession of cocaine. Davidson notified vice investigators to 

stop Nowlin's vehicle and also notified the tactical unit that 

he believed Raysor was in the vehicle. The officers stopped 

Nowlin's vehicle moments later. 

 Investigator Wayne Duff made what he characterized as a 

"high risk felony vehicle stop" of Nowlin's vehicle. The 

uniformed officers had their weapons drawn; they gave verbal 

commands from covered positions for Nowlin and the passenger to 

raise their hands and exit the vehicle. Rather than exiting the 

vehicle as instructed and despite repeated orders to show his 

hands, Simmonds remained in the vehicle and repeatedly reached 

under the passenger seat and out of the view of the officers. 

 The officers approached the vehicle and physically removed 

Simmonds from the car. Once they had him out of the car, the 

officers forcibly placed Simmonds, who continued to struggle, on 

the ground in a prone position. Duff approached Simmonds and 

immediately recognized that he was not Raysor. Duff also 

noticed that Simmonds was making chewing motions and that he had 

a "chalky white powdery substance around his lips." Under the 

circumstances and based on Investigator Duff's experience, he 

concluded that the substance was probably cocaine and that 

Simmonds was attempting to ingest it. Duff was aware that 

swallowing cocaine posed a significant health hazard that may be 

fatal. Duff informed another officer what he observed and the 
- 4 - 

two officers commanded Simmonds to stop chewing, which Simmonds 

ignored. The officers applied pressure to Simmonds' throat to 

prevent him from swallowing. They tried to force Simmonds' 

mouth open, but he "clamped" it shut and continued to chew. 

After struggling for several seconds, one of the officers 

sprayed a burst of "cap-stun" in Simmonds' face. At that point, 

Simmonds spit out chunks of an off-white substance, clear 

plastic bags, and a brown paper bag. The white substance was 

determined to be cocaine. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

 Simmonds argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress the cocaine. He contends that the search was 

an impermissible bodily intrusion. He contends that even if he 

was lawfully seized, the officers acted unreasonably when they 

forcibly removed the drugs from his mouth. 

 When we review a trial court's denial of a suppression 

motion, "[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to 

. . . the prevailing party below, and we grant all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence." Commonwealth 

v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991) 

(citation omitted). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's 

findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without 

evidence to support them." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 
- 5 - 

193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). "However, we 

consider de novo whether those facts implicate the Fourth 

Amendment and, if so, whether the officers unlawfully infringed 

upon an area protected by the Fourth Amendment." Hughes v. 

Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 454, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000) 

(en banc) (citing McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261). 

1. The Stop

 "When the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an 

occupant, this constitutes a 'seizure' of the person for Fourth 

Amendment purposes, even though the function of the stop is 

limited and the detention brief." Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 

234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988). 

A police officer may conduct an 

investigatory stop of a vehicle when he or 

she has an "articulable and reasonable 

suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or 

that an automobile is not registered, or 

that either the vehicle or an occupant is 

otherwise subject to seizure for violation 

of law." 

Commonwealth v. Spencer, 21 Va. App. 156, 159, 462 S.E.2d 899, 

901 (1995) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 

(1979)). "Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is 

dependent upon both the content of information possessed by 

police and its degree of reliability." Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 330 (1990). "To determine whether an officer has 

articulated a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity, a 
- 6 - 

court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including 

the officer's knowledge, training, and experience." Freeman v. 

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 661, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995) 

(citation omitted). Further, when determining the existence of 

reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect that is based, at least 

in part, on an informant's tip, we again look to the totality of 

the circumstances. See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 179, 

186-87, 402 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1991). The court should conduct a 

"balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various 

indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an 

informant's tip." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983). 

In "applying the 

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis," the 

Supreme Court has "consistently recognized 

the value of corroboration of details of an 

informant's tip by independent police work." 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 241. When making a 

warrantless arrest, an officer "'may rely 

upon information received through an 

informant, rather than upon direct 

observations,'" so long as the officer has 

reasonable grounds to believe the 

informant's statement is true. Id. at 242 

(citation omitted). 

McGuire v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 584, 594-95, 525 S.E.2d 43, 

48 (2000). 

 Here, the officers received a tip from a reliable informant 

that "B" would be arriving at a Subway restaurant and that she 

would have drugs. Shortly after receiving the tip, Davidson 

went to the Subway shop and saw a female driving a car that 
- 7 - 

Davidson knew to be leased to Nowlin. Davidson observed 

Nowlin's car drive behind the Subway shop and park alongside 

another vehicle. Davidson then observed the occupants of both 

vehicles engage in a hand-to-hand transaction. Immediately 

after the transaction, the informant called Davidson and 

informed him that the woman driving Nowlin's car was in 

possession of cocaine. Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the evidence sufficiently proved that the police 

had a reasonable suspicion that Nowlin was driving the car and 

that she possessed cocaine. Therefore, the stop of Nowlin's car 

for the purpose of obtaining more information and investigating 

the suspected crime was not unlawful. 

2. The Seizure of Simmonds

 Following a lawful traffic stop, an officer may order the 

driver, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) 

(per curiam), and any passengers to exit the car, see Maryland 

v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997). In Wilson, the United 

States Supreme Court held that "an officer making a traffic stop 

may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of 

the stop." Id. at 415. The Court reasoned that: 

danger to an officer from a traffic stop is 

likely to be greater when there are 

passengers in addition to the driver in the 

stopped car. While there is not the same 

basis for ordering the passengers out of the 

car as there is for ordering the driver out, 
- 8 - 

the additional intrusion on the passenger is 

minimal. 

Id. at 414-15. 

 Here, the officers, in effecting the stop of Nowlin's car 

upon the belief that she had just engaged in a drug sale and was 

still in possession of drugs, were permitted to order Simmonds 

out of the car. Believing that Nowlin had just committed a 

felony, they ordered the occupants to raise their hands and to 

exit the vehicle. The officers repeatedly ordered Simmonds to 

show his hands; but instead, Simmonds repeatedly reached under 

the passenger's seat. The officers forcibly removed Simmonds 

from the car, placed him on the ground in the prone position, 

and handcuffed him. 

 Handcuffing Simmonds after he was removed from the car was 

not illegal and did not transform the investigatory detention 

into an arrest. "Brief, complete deprivations of a suspect's 

liberty, including handcuffing, 'do not convert a stop and frisk 

into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are 

reasonable to the circumstances.'" Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 

Va. App. 851, 857, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993), aff'd on reh'g en 

banc, 18 Va. App. 454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994). Despite repeated 

orders to show his hands, Simmonds twice reached under the car 

seat. Even after he was forcibly removed from the car, he still 

continued to struggle with the officers. Based upon the 

suspected drug activity, Simmonds' refusal to show his hands and 
- 9 - 

exit the car on command, and his furtive movements, the officers 

were reasonable in forcibly removing Simmonds from the car and 

in handcuffing him. 

3. The Search

If an officer has reason to believe that a 

person is committing a felony in his 

presence by possessing contraband or a 

controlled substance, the officer has 

probable cause to arrest the individual 

without a warrant. When an officer has 

probable cause to arrest a person, the 

officer may search the person, particularly 

where the evidence is of a highly evanescent 

nature. 

Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 304, 456 S.E.2d 534, 

536-37 (1995) (citations omitted). "Trained and experienced 

police officers . . . may be able to perceive and articulate 

meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 

untrained observer." Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 

616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1989) (citations omitted). 

 Investigator Duff's observations, in light of his training 

and experience, gave him probable cause to believe that Simmonds 

had cocaine in his mouth that he was attempting to ingest to 

avoid detection. Before forcibly removing Simmonds from the 

vehicle, Simmonds made "ducking motions" out of the officers' 

view. Once Simmonds was removed from the vehicle and physically 

restrained, Duff noticed a "chalky white powdery substance 

around [Simmonds] lips" and he was making a chewing motion. The 

officers had the additional reason to believe that the substance 
- 10 - 

was cocaine because the driver of the vehicle had reportedly 

just sold cocaine and still possessed cocaine in the vehicle. 

Duff testified that based on his experience he knew that people 

commonly try to dispose of cocaine by chewing and swallowing it. 

Duff further testified that when people ingest cocaine, the 

cocaine leaves a white chalky substance on the lips. Simmonds 

ignored orders to open his mouth and spit out the contents. 

Simmonds resisted when officers applied pressure to his throat 

and attempted to forcibly open his mouth. The officers acted 

reasonably in administering a burst of "cap-stun" to force 

Simmonds to spit out the drugs because there was a risk that 

Simmonds would destroy the evidence and jeopardize his own 

health. See Buck, 20 Va. App. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 537 

(finding officers' use of physical force to cause defendant to 

expel drugs was reasonable where defendant was destroying 

evidence and creating a danger to his own health and safety); 

see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) 

(stating that in deciding whether an intrusive body search is 

permissible, the court must consider whether the officer had a 

clear indication that incriminating evidence would be found, 

whether exigent circumstances existed if no warrant was 

obtained, and whether the officer extracted the evidence using a 

reasonable method and in a reasonable manner). Based on the 

objective, reasonable belief that Simmonds was committing a 
- 11 - 

crime, the officers had probable cause to arrest Simmonds, 

thereby rendering the forcible search and removal of the drugs 

from his mouth lawful. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by 

denying Simmonds' motion to suppress the cocaine. 

B. Revocation of Suspended Sentence

 Simmonds had previously been convicted of felonious assault 

and battery of a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to 

two years imprisonment, with one year and six months suspended 

upon the condition that he be of good behavior for a period of 

three years. As a result of his conviction for possession of 

cocaine, the trial court found that Simmonds violated his 

probation and revoked his suspended sentence. 

 On appeal, Simmonds argues that the trial court erred in 

finding that he violated his probation and in revoking his 

suspended sentence for assaulting a police officer because the 

cocaine conviction was on appeal and had not become final. 

 Pursuant to Code § 19.2-306, "[t]he court may, for any 

cause deemed by it sufficient which occurred at any time within 

the probation period, . . . revoke the suspension of sentence 

and any probation." 

"A revocation . . . must be based on 

reasonable cause but a court has broad 

discretion in making such a determination." 

Patterson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1046, 

1048, 407 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1991) (citation 

omitted). "To put the matter another way, 
- 12 - 

the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

. . . revocation is a matter within the 

sound discretion of the trial court, . . . 

reversible only upon a clear showing of an 

abuse of such discretion." Slayton v. 

Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38 S.E.2d 

479, 484 (1946); see Holden v. Commonwealth, 

27 Va. App. 38, 41, 497 S.E.2d 492, 493 

(1998). 

Resio v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 616, 621, 513 S.E.2d 892, 895 

(1999). 

 "[A]n alleged violation upon which revocation is based need 

not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Patterson, 12 Va. 

App. at 1048, 407 S.E.2d at 44. "[E]vidence that 'the trier of 

fact in a criminal proceeding found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that [a] defendant violated a state law is sufficient . . . to 

support' revocation of a suspended sentence, notwithstanding the 

pendency of such conviction on appeal." Resio, 29 Va. App. at 

622, 513 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting Patterson, 12 Va. App. at 1049, 

407 S.E.2d at 45). 

 Here, Simmonds conceded that he was convicted of possession 

of cocaine and that the conviction was a violation of his 

suspended sentence. The trial court, therefore, based solely on 

the felony conviction, properly revoked Simmonds' suspended 

sentence subject to the conviction being upheld on appeal. 

Because we have upheld Simmonds' conviction for possession of 

cocaine, which was the basis for the revocation, we uphold the 
- 13 - 

revocation of the suspended sentence. See Patterson, 12 Va. 

App. at 1049, 407 S.E.2d at 45. 

Affirmed.