Filed 10/13/21 P. v. Soto CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES SOTO,

Defendant and Appellant.

B304485

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. LA085911)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Nicholas J. Webster,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

In 2012, appellant James Soto, a founding member of the 

Mexican Mafia, was released from prison. In 2013, he began 

threatening Timothy Cullen to obtain money from Cullen’s 

marijuana dispensary business. In 2019, a jury convicted Soto of 

one count of extortion by threat or force in violation of Penal 

Code1 sections 519 and 520 and found true the allegation that the 

offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 

within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)2. The 

true finding on this allegation extended the statute of limitations 

on the underlying offense, which would have otherwise expired.

Soto appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending 

the evidence is insufficient to prove the Mexican Mafia is a 

criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22. He 

contends the evidence shows the Mexican Mafia is a “prison” 

gang and section 186.22 applies only to “street” gangs. In the 

alternative, he contends the necessary predicate offenses proven 

by the People are insufficient to support the jury’s true findings 

because (1) they are not the type of crimes the STEP Act was 

intended to prevent; and (2) they were committed before the 

Mexican Mafia changed its character and mission in 1992 to 

become active on the streets, at which point it became a 

“different” gang. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Section 186.22 is part of the California Street Terrorism 

Enforcement and Prevention Act. (§ 186.20.) This act is 

commonly referred to as the STEP Act, and also includes section 

186.21, which is discussed throughout this opinion.
3

BACKGROUND

In 2011, Tim Cullen ran a marijuana dispensary in Valley 

Village, sometimes referred to as North Hollywood. Individuals 

claiming to be members of the Mexican Mafia threatened to 

destroy his business and kill him unless he paid them money. He 

paid.

In 2013, an acquaintance told Cullen that appellant Soto

wanted to speak with him. Cullen met appellant at a hotel. 

Appellant said he was a founding member of the Mexican Mafia. 

He was upset that individuals had been demanding money from 

Cullen in the name of the Mexican Mafia. Appellant said they 

were going to get to the bottom of it “because nobody uses the 

Mexican Mafia name like this.” Cullen said appellant made it 

sound like the threats for money were wrong and the individuals 

should not have been making the threats. He believed the 

demands for money would end.

After the meeting, the individuals stopped demanding 

money from Cullen. Cullen then learned that he was now 

supposed to be paying money to appellant. One day, appellant 

came to Cullen’s place of business with Jose “Dreamer” Rodriguez 

and Jaime “Cholo” Garcia, who Cullen learned were also 

members of the Mexican Mafia. They told Cullen he now owed 

them money for protection. Cullen gave appellant $3,000. 

Thereafter, Cullen was supposed to pay the men 50 percent of his 

business profits. Cullen believed he was paying the money to 

appellant, but Garcia would collect it. Cullen made a few 

payments to Garcia totaling about $30,000.

At some point, appellant was arrested on unrelated 

matters, and Cullen started avoiding Garcia and the others. 

Cullen believed it was his chance to get away. At around the 
4

same time, the city began new rules for Proposition D compliance 

and Cullen had to move his shop to a new location.

From December 14 to December 15, 2013, Cullen moved 

much of his business to a new location. On December 15, after 

Cullen failed to show up at a meeting arranged with Garcia, 

Garcia broke into an outside area at Cullen’s old dispensary and 

stole marijuana plants and packaged trimmings which had not 

yet been relocated. Garcia was assisted by Jose “Shooter” 

Sanchez, who had sometimes accompanied Garcia and Rodriguez 

when they collected money. The men’s theft was caught on 

surveillance cameras. At that point, Cullen decided to call the 

police.

After his arrest on federal drug charges on December 10, 

2013, Rodriguez agreed to cooperate with the People. He testified 

at trial under a grant of use immunity and provided background 

information on Cullen’s extortion.

Rodriguez explained that appellant, a founding member of 

the Mexican Mafia, was released from prison in 2012 and moved 

to Visalia. Appellant was in his late 70s. Rodriguez, an associate 

of the Mara Salvatrucha 13 gang (MS 13), had been picking up 

collections for one Ruiz Geraldo Vega. Vega told Rodriguez about 

the Mexican Mafia and implied he was a member. When 

problems arose with Vega over collections in West Los Angeles, 

Rodriguez decided to go to Visalia and speak with appellant to 

confirm whether Vega was a member of the Mexican Mafia.

After meeting with appellant, Rodriguez decided to give 

appellant Vega’s share of the money Rodriguez collected. This 

earned appellant’s love and respect.

At some point before Rodriguez became a Mexican Mafia 

member, he learned that a person claiming to be part of the
5

Mexican Mafia was forcing Cullen to pay protection money. 

Appellant was also made aware of this situation.

In 2013, appellant sponsored Rodriguez to become a 

member of the Mexican Mafia. Jaime Garcia became a member 

of the Mexican Mafia the same day. Garcia was originally a 

member of the East Side Trece gang.

Rodriguez, Garcia and appellant then began “taxing” 

Cullen. “Somehow, [appellant] got, like, an agreement with 

[Cullen] to get some of the money monthly . . . getting half of 

whatever . . . the dispensary was producing.” Rodriguez, Garcia 

and appellant split the money equally. Rodriguez explained that 

the person or persons who had previously been obtaining money 

from Cullen “went away” once they heard appellant was involved.

Rodriguez explained Cullen paid them money because 

paying Mexican Mafia members was like insurance to protect the 

dispensary. As Mexican Mafia members, they got out word that 

the dispensary was theirs, relying on the fear of the Mexican 

Mafia among criminal elements to guarantee the dispensary’s 

safety. After appellant was arrested in 2013, he sent messages to 

Rodriguez directing him to keep doing what they were doing. 

Cullen was not free to end the arrangement. If Cullen tried to 

renege, the Mexican Mafia would take his property. Rodriguez, 

however, did not think robbing Cullen was a good idea. The 

robbery happened after Rodriguez was in federal custody.

The prosecution also offered expert testimony by Rene 

Enriquez, another former member of the Mexican Mafia. 

Enriquez joined the Mexican Mafia while in prison in 1985. At 

that time, the Mexican Mafia was a prison gang that exerted 

power and control inside prison.
6

Enriquez testified that the Mexican Mafia began at the 

Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, California, in 1956. 

According to Enriquez, the gang was violent and non-member 

prisoners needed protection from it. In the 1970s, a “large” 

number of Mexican Mafia members were paroled from state and 

federal prison. They organized to deal drugs on the street. At 

some point, they were indicted and the Mexican Mafia essentially 

was dormant on the street until about the 1990s. However, the 

gang remained active within prison.

In 1988, during this “dormant” period, Enriquez, a “main 

Mexican Mafia Member,” was paroled. Upon release, Enriquez 

joined up with Hubert Ruiz and Jaco Paella to form a “crew.” He 

met with two known Mexican Mafia members and told them he 

wanted to demand protection money from drug dealers and 

others engaged in criminal activity in Boyle Heights. Enriquez 

then proceeded to do so. In 1989, Enriquez discovered that 

Cynthia Galavon, a drug distributor for his crew, had been 

stealing drugs. He ordered her killed because she “violated the 

edict and disrespected the Mexican Mafia.” On orders of the 

gang, Enriquez also killed David Gallegos, a Mexican Mafia 

member on the gang’s hit list, with assistance from Ruiz and 

Paella. By 1992, Enriquez was in county jail.

In 1992, to obtain power outside prison, the Mexican Mafia 

entered into an agreement with Southern California street gangs. 

The gangs would carry out criminal activities for the Mexican 

Mafia, with the power of the Mexican Mafia behind them.

In 2013, when the events in this case occurred, the Mexican 

Mafia had 125 to 150 members. The gang’s primary activities 

were murder, extortion, assault, and narcotics distribution. 

A black hand was a key symbol of the Mexican Mafia. The 
7

number 13 used alone signified a person had been sponsored to 

join the Mexican Mafia. The Mexican Mafia also used Aztec 

imagery, particularly Quetzalcoatal Nahuatl, a two-head serpent. 

Another symbol of the Mexican Mafia was a Mayan marriage 

symbol consisting of two lines and three dots.

Given a hypothetical based on the facts of this case, 

Enriquez opined that the extortion of Cullen was committed for 

the benefit of the Mexican Mafia because it would enhance its

reputation and provide members with money. In response to a 

hypothetical which further assumed that a “legitimate” Mexican 

Mafia member had two younger Mexican Mafia members retrieve 

the money on their collective behalf, Enriquez opined the crime 

would be at the direction of the Mexican Mafia and in association 

with the Mexican Mafia.

The defense offered the testimony of its own gang expert, 

Martin Flores. In response to a hypothetical that tracked the 

facts of this case, Flores opined the crime was not committed to 

benefit the Mexican Mafia, but was committed by individuals 

taking advantage of an opportunity for their own interests.

Appellant also testified in his own behalf. He admitted he 

was one of the first 12 members of the Mexican Mafia. He did not 

sponsor or make anyone a member of the Mexican Mafia. 

Appellant did not ask anyone to commit a crime for him. 

Rodriguez and Garcia would sometimes give him money, but he 

never asked for the money and did not know its source. Cullen 

gave appellant money once for doing a favor. He asked Cullen if 

that meant they were partners and Cullen said yes. Appellant 

assumed he had a consensual agreement with Cullen to protect 

his dispensary.
8

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the Mexican Mafia is not a “criminal 

street gang” within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision 

(b), and even if it currently qualifies as such a gang, it did not 

qualify at the time of the predicate acts used to prove the section 

186.22 enhancement.

A. A Gang Which Is Founded in Prison May Satisfy

Section 186.22’s Definition of a Street Gang

Soto contends section 186.22, subdivision (b), by its plain 

language, only applies to “criminal street gangs.” (Italics added.) 

He contends the Legislature’s intent to limit the scope of section 

186.22 to “street” gangs is further shown by the language in 

section 186.21.

Appellant attaches significance to the Legislature’s use of 

the phrase “criminal street gang” in section 186.22. (Italics 

added.) He acknowledges the STEP Act “fails to distinguish 

between street gang and prison gangs,” but contends that the 

term “street gang” has a “common or plain” meaning and because

the Legislature selected that term it “should not be interpreted to 

include other types of gangs.” Notably, appellant does not 

elaborate on what the “common or plain” meaning of the term is, 

apart from claiming it does not embrace a prison gang.

When a statute provides a specific definition of a term, the 

term “must be understood as it is defined, not in its colloquial 

sense.” (People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 871.) Put 

differently, “[t]he plain and commonsense meaning governs 

‘unless the statute specifically defines the words to give them a 

special meaning.’ ” (Jackson v. LegalMatch.com (2019) 

42 Cal.App.5th 760, 768, italics added.)
9

The California Supreme Court has described the phrase 

“criminal street gang” as “a term in colloquial usage that is 

nonetheless given a specific meaning in the STEP Act. The STEP 

Act defines a ‘criminal street gang’ as an ‘ongoing organization, 

association, or group.’ (§ 186.22[, subd.] (f).) That ‘group’ must 

have ‘three or more persons,’ and its ‘primary activities’ must 

consist of certain crimes. (Ibid.) The same ‘group’ must also have 

‘a common name or common identifying sign or symbol,’ and its

members must be proven to have engaged in a ‘pattern of 

criminal gang activity’ by committing predicate offenses.” (People

v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 (Prunty).) Because the 

Legislature has defined a criminal street gang by its 

organizational or associational characteristics and its criminal 

activities, with no requirements as to the gang’s geographic 

origins or its members’ geographic location, we must understand 

the term as defined, not in any colloquial sense described by 

appellant.

We recognize the Legislature used the phrase “street gang” 

elsewhere in the STEP Act, notably in the title of the Act and in 

section 186.21, entitled “Legislative findings and declarations.” 

Thus, we cannot simply disregard the Legislature’s use of the 

word “street.” The rules of statutory interpretation require us, “if 

possible, to give effect and significance to every word and phrase 

of a statute.” (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 588.) 

Indeed, “[w]e must presume that the Legislature intended ‘every 

word, phrase and provision . . . in a statute . . . to have meaning 

and to perform a useful function.’ ” (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 

16 Cal.4th 469, 476.)
10

Appellant has urged us to consider section 186.21, although 

we each focus on different parts of that section.3 Appellant 

focuses on the following sentence in section 186.21: “The 

Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is 

in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs 

whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of 

crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods.” 

Appellant contends this sentence evidences a legislative intent 

that the STEP Act apply only to “street” gangs who operate in 

“neighborhoods” against “peaceful” individuals and not to prison 

gangs who commit crimes against gang members or the 

3 Section 186.21 provides: “The Legislature, however, 

further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis 

which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members 

threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the 

peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both 

individually and collectively, present a clear and present danger 

to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. 

The Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street 

gangs operating in California, and that the number of gangrelated murders is increasing. The Legislature also finds that in 

Los Angeles County alone there were 328 gang-related murders 

in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 

80 percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in 

enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of criminal activity 

by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal gang 

activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, which 

together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs. 

The Legislature further finds that an effective means of 

punishing and deterring the criminal activities of street gangs is 

through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities 

acquired, accumulated, or used by street gangs.”
11

incarcerated. We find the Legislature’s statement descriptive of 

a problem, not restrictive or prescriptive of its solution.4

We find that the next sentence of section 186.21 more 

clearly explains the Legislature’s focus and concerns: “These 

activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear and 

present danger to public order and safety.” The meaning of the 

Legislature’s selection of the word “street,” is found here, in its 

concern with “public” order and safety. In light of this concern, 

the phrase “street gangs” serves the useful function of describing 

gangs whose members commit crimes “in the streets,” where they 

pose a danger to “public” order and safety. Thus, a gang which 

was founded in prison may be considered a street gang if its 

members commit crimes outside prison, where the crimes pose a 

danger to public order and safety. Because our Supreme Court 

4 In the 30 years since the STEP Act became law, the 

California Supreme Court and every Court of Appeal in 

California have routinely affirmed true findings on section 186.22 

gang allegations where the victim is a gang member. If the 

Legislature’s statement was intended to limit the scope of 

section 186.22 to “peaceful citizens,” by now the Legislature 

would have made that intent clear by amending the statute. It 

has not done so.

Similarly, the descriptive nature of the Legislature’s 

reference to crimes in “neighborhoods” is shown by an 

examination of subdivision (e), which defines a pattern of 

criminal activity. The Legislature has included crimes in section 

186.22, subdivision (e) which do not require physical proximity to 

the victim and which may take place entirely electronically, such 

as information theft or money laundering. The inclusion of these 

crimes is not consistent with an intent to limit the application of 

section 186.22 to crimes committed in a victim’s neighborhood.
12

has made clear that a criminal street gang may be “a 

geographically dispersed group” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 

p. 85), not all members need be on the streets.

B. The Predicate Offenses Satisfy the Sameness and 

Other Requirements of the STEP Act.

Appellant argues that the predicate offenses proved by the 

prosecution were insufficient to support the gang enhancement 

because (1) they involved a gang member killing another member 

of the same gang for violating gang rules and (2) they occurred 

while the Mexican Mafia was a prison gang only and cannot be 

used against the “street” gang Mexican Mafia.

1. Intragang Crimes

Appellant contends that the predicate murders do not 

involve innocent people who are being victimized in their 

neighborhoods. Therefore they are not the type of crime the 

STEP Act seeks to prevent and cannot qualify as predicate 

offenses.

“The statute does not exempt from its scope those predicate 

offenses committed by gang members as part of internal gang

disputes or power struggles.” (In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 

228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1004 [competent proof that one member of 

gang shot another would suffice to show predicate offense for a 

pattern of criminal gang activity].) “Intragang violence threatens 

public order and safety much the same as criminal conduct 

directed specifically against persons outside the gang.” (Ibid.)

2. Sameness

Appellant claims there are two different Mexican Mafia 

gangs, the prison gang founded in the 1950s and a street gang 

founded in 1992 when the Mexican Mafia entered into an 
13

agreement with Southern California street gangs to extend its

reach outside prison. He contends the “sameness requirement” of 

section 186.22, subdivision (f) precludes the predicate murders 

committed in 1989 by members of the original prison Mexican 

Mafia from being used to prove the existence of the street 

Mexican Mafia.

Our Supreme Court has explained that the STEP Act 

“requires that the gang the defendant sought to benefit, the 

individuals that the prosecution claims constitute an 

‘organization, association, or group,’ and the group whose actions 

the prosecution alleges satisfy the ‘primary activities’ and the 

predicate offense requirements of section 186.22[, subd.] (f), must 

be one and the same.” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 75–76.)

We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a gang

enhancement using the same standard applied to a conviction. 

(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 331.) We review “ ‘ “the 

whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, 

evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from 

which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Wilson (2008) 

44 Cal.4th 758, 806.) “ ‘We presume every fact in support of the 

judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from 

the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify 

the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not 

warranted simply because the circumstances might also 

reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.] The 

standard is the same whether the prosecution relies on direct or 

circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 331.)
14

While appellant correctly identifies the legal requirement 

of sameness, he is mistaken about the facts of this case. 

Enriquez testified a large number of Mexican Mafia members 

were released from prison in the 1970s, engaged in drug 

trafficking for a period of time, and were arrested and 

imprisoned. Thus, the Mexican Mafia had a long history of street 

crime. Appellant points out that Enriquez testified that after the 

1970s parolees were re-incarcerated, the Mexican Mafia went 

dormant until 1992, when the Mexican Mafia entered into an 

agreement with street gangs to expand its power on the streets. 

We question the relevancy of this dormancy, as it could occur in 

any gang with a large number of imprisoned members.

5

We will assume for the sake of argument that the Mexican 

Mafia could not be considered a criminal street gang once it went 

dormant on the streets, and the recommencement of criminal 

activity on the street by the Mexican Mafia meant that a new 

criminal street gang was formed. However, this does not assist 

appellant.

Although Enriquez testified the Mexican Mafia was 

dormant until 1992, Enriquez also testified he was released from 

prison in 1988 as “a main Mexican Mafia Member.” As set forth 

in more detail in the Background section above, Enriquez then 

5 Section 186.22, subdivision (f) does require a criminal 

street gang to be an “ongoing organization, association or group” 

but appellant quotes this phrase only as part of his summary of 

the overall subdivision (f) definition of a criminal street gang. He 

does not rely on it to show the significance of his dormancy 

argument and does not offer any argument about the meaning of 

the word “ongoing” in this context. There is no dispute that the 

Mexican Mafia was an ongoing organization in prison during this 

time.
15

formed a crew, sought permission from the Mexican Mafia to 

commit illegal activities, and then engaged in extortion and drug 

dealing. In 1989, Enriquez learned Cynthia Galavon, a drug 

distributor for his crew, had been stealing drugs. He ordered her 

killed because she “violated the edict and disrespected the 

Mexican Mafia.” Enriquez was also ordered to kill David 

Gallegos, a Mexican Mafia member on its hit list. He did so with 

assistance from his crew. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the true finding, Enriquez’s testimony about his 

own activities proved that the Mexican Mafia recommenced 

criminal activity on the street in 1988. The predicate offenses of 

murder do not pre-date the re-birth of the street Mexican Mafia;

they are a result of that re-birth.

To the extent appellant alternatively contends the Mexican 

Mafia became a different gang as a result of the 1992 agreement 

with Southern California street gangs, we do not agree. While 

the Mexican Mafia may have worked through “street” gangs in 

other instances, it did not lose its existing identity and did not 

work through a “street” gang in this case. The People’s theory 

was that the Mexican Mafia was itself a unitary criminal street 

gang, and acted as such in the present case. As we have 

discussed at some length, the People relied on predicate acts by 

Mexican Mafia members; offered expert testimony that the 

Mexican Mafia was an ongoing organization with a common 

name and identifying symbols; proved that appellant, Rodriguez 

and Garcia were Mexican Mafia members who personally 

committed the charged extortion at the direction of and in 

association with appellant, a founding member; and offered 

expert testimony that the extortion benefited the Mexican Mafia.
16

DISPOSITION

The judgement of conviction is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

OHTA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.