2022 IL App (1st) 220426-U 

FIFTH DIVISION

 July 21, 2023 

No. 1-22-0426 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 18 CR 60170 

 ) 

ANTON ASEVES, ) Honorable 

 ) Peggy Chiampas, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion in limine and by 

making a finding of great bodily harm requiring the defendant to serve at least 85% 

of his sentence.

¶ 2 On December 9, 2021, following a jury trial, the defendant-appellant, Anton Aseves, was 

convicted of armed robbery and aggravated battery with a firearm. On March 15, 2022, the trial 

court sentenced Mr. Aseves to concurrent terms of 28 years for the armed robbery conviction and 

13 years for the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction, requiring him to serve 85% of that 

sentence. On appeal, Mr. Aseves argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion in 
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limine to admit other crimes evidence; and (2) making a finding of great bodily harm for his armed 

robbery conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of 

Cook County. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On May 18, 2019, a grand jury indicted Mr. Aseves on five counts of attempted first degree 

murder of Vladimir Radanovich, one count of aggravated battery of Vladimir Radanovich, one 

count of armed robbery of Victor Guevara, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and four 

counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. On June 16, 2021, Mr. Aseves filed his amended 

motion in limine, which in relevant part, sought to introduce testimony from two detectives who 

investigated two uncharged robberies, which occurred nearby within an hour after the robbery for 

which Mr. Aseves was charged. The witnesses each identified the offender as a black man, and 

the detectives’ investigation determined that the same vehicle was identified as having been used 

in all three robberies, evidenced by the matching license plate. The victims of the two uncharged

robberies were shown a photograph array, containing Mr. Aseves’ photograph, and were unable 

to identify him as the offender. Mr. Aseves contended that, since the same person most likely 

committed all the robberies, the failure of those victims to identify him was exculpatory evidence, 

showing that he did not commit the charged robbery. 

¶ 5 The State responded by arguing that the evidence was irrelevant since Mr. Aseves was not 

charged for the other robberies. The trial court denied that portion of Mr. Aseves’ motion in limine

without explanation. 
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¶ 6 The case proceeded to a jury trial on December 7, 2021. During the trial, the State called 

Mr. Guevara, Mr. Radanovich, and Elizabeth Hernandez as witnesses, as well as Chicago Police 

Department officers. 

¶ 7 Mr. Guevara testified that on March 12, 2018, at approximately 1 p.m., he parked his work 

truck on 36th Street near Winchester Avenue. When he exited his truck and headed westbound on 

36th Street to inspect a leaky gutter, he saw two individuals walking toward him from across the 

street. The taller individual was Mr. Aseves, and Mr. Guevara described him as a black man, 

wearing a coat and hat, with a tattoo beneath his eye and another on his neck. Mr. Guevara stated 

that Mr. Aseves pulled out a firearm, a long-barreled revolver, and told him to empty his pockets. 

Mr. Guevara took out his cell phone, keys, and approximately $25 and threw it onto the ground. 

The other offender picked up the items, while Mr. Aseves continued to point the firearm at Mr. 

Guevera. As Mr. Aseves and his co-offender walked away, Mr. Radanovich came out of an 

apartment building, located on the same side of the street as Mr. Guevara. Mr. Radanovich asked 

if Mr. Guevara had been robbed. Mr. Aseves then turned around and demanded that Mr. 

Radanovich empty his pockets, and Mr. Radanovich declined, walking quickly across the street 

into another apartment building. Mr. Guevara stated that he ran to his car and saw Mr. Aseves and 

his co-offender follow Mr. Radanovich into the apartment building. After 30 seconds, Mr. Aseves 

and his co-offender ran out of the building and down 36th Street on foot. Mr. Guevara jumped into 

his truck and followed the offenders and saw them jump into a dark blue minivan. Mr. Guevara 

then went back to where he was robbed and saw Mr. Radanovich hobbling in pain. Mr. Radanovich 

showed him that he had been shot and was bleeding. The police arrived on the scene and Mr. 

Guevara told them what occurred. On March 21, 2018, Mr. Guevara viewed a photograph array 
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and identified Mr. Aseves and the van he saw Mr. Aseves enter. On cross-examination, Mr. 

Guevara described Mr. Aseves as having a darker complexion and being black. 

¶ 8 Mr. Radanovich testified that on March 12, 2018, at approximately 1:15 p.m. he left his 

sister’s apartment and saw two men walking away from Mr. Guevara. The man on the right turned 

around and pointed a long-barreled firearm at him. He described the man with the firearm as 

African-American and made an in-court identification of Mr. Aseves as the man with the firearm. 

After Mr. Aseves pointed the firearm at him, Mr. Radanovich moved as quickly as he could to an 

apartment building with an open front door. Having one prosthetic knee, however, he was not able 

to move quickly. He walked into an empty apartment and once he reached a wall inside the 

apartment, he turned around and saw Mr. Aseves pointing a firearm at him. As Mr. Radanovich 

tried to locate a way to escape, he turned around and Mr. Aseves shot him in the right buttock, 

causing Mr. Radanovich to fall. On March 21, 2018, he was shown a photograph array and he 

identified Mr. Aseves as the person who shot him. When asked why he told the detective that he 

was 60 percent sure Mr. Aseves was the shooter, he testified that he told the detective that because 

he was scared. He stated that though he did not have a gun pointed at him on March 21, 2018, 

having a gun pointed at him was difficult “psychologically.” 

¶ 9 Elizabeth Hernandez also testified that she knew Mr. Aseves and that he was living with 

her on March 12, 2018. She stated that she owned a blue Chrysler Town & Country minivan and 

noticed that her keys to the minivan were missing from the place that she normally keeps them on 

March 12, 2018. She further testified that she found them later in the afternoon on March 12, 2018. 

¶ 10 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Aseves not guilty as to the attempted 

murder count but guilty of the armed robbery of Mr. Guevara and aggravated battery with a firearm 
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of Mr. Radanovich counts. Mr. Aseves filed a motion for a new trial, citing the denial of the pretrial 

motion in limine and sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. 

¶ 11 On March 15, 2022, during the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a finding of severe 

injury and that Mr. Aseves be sentenced to consecutive sentences. The State asked, alternatively, 

that the court make a finding of great bodily harm on the armed robbery conviction and that Mr. 

Aseves serve at least 85% of his sentence. The court found that there was no severe injury but did 

make a finding of great bodily harm. The court ruled that the sentence would be concurrent and 

required Mr. Aseves to serve 85% of his sentence since Mr. Aseves’ conduct led to great bodily 

harm to someone other than the defendant. The court sentenced Mr. Aseves to 13 years on the 

armed robbery conviction along with the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement. He was also 

sentenced to a concurrent term of 13 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated battery with a firearm 

conviction, resulting in a total sentence of 28 years’ imprisonment. Immediately, after the 

sentencing hearing, Mr. Aseves filed his notice of appeal. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 We have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Mr. Aseves filed a timely notice of appeal. 

See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 14 On appeal, Mr. Aseves argues that the court erred by denying his motion in limine to admit 

testimony from two Chicago Police Department detectives detailing two uncharged robberies and 

by making a finding of great bodily harm as to the armed robbery conviction. 

¶ 15 “Courts generally prohibit the admission of [propensity] evidence to protect against the 

jury convicting a defendant because he or she is a bad person deserving punishment. [Citations.] 

Defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence evaluated solely on the basis of the charged 
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crime.” People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). “Evidence of other crimes is objectionable 

not because it has little probative value, but rather because it has too much.” People v. Manning, 

182 Ill. 2d 193, 213 (1998). 

¶ 16 “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 

person in order ** to show action in conformity therewith ***. Such evidence may [however] be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 

“Evidence of other crimes in which a defendant may have participated is not admissible to show 

the defendant’s propensity to commit crime. Such evidence, however, is admissible if relevant for 

any other purpose such as modus operandi, proof of motive, intent, identification, or absence of 

mistake.” People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (1994). 

¶ 17 “The use of other-crimes evidence to show identity, on the other hand, links the defendant 

to the offense at issue through some evidence, typically an object, from the other offense.” People 

v. Quintero, 394 Ill. App. 3d 716, 726 (2009). If other-crimes evidence is offered for a relevant 

purpose, “it is admissible only when the other crime has a threshold similarity to the charged crime. 

[Citation.] The threshold requirement increases the relevancy of the evidence and ensures that it is 

not used solely to establish the defendant’s criminal propensities.” Quintero, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 

725-26. 

¶ 18 “An accused may, within certain limits, attempt to prove that someone else committed the 

crime with which he is charged.” People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 126. “The 

test of admissibility is whether the evidence fairly tends to prove the particular offense with which 
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the defendant is charged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 

121364, ¶ 126. 

¶ 19 In People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 351 (1994), and People v. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d 134, 142 

(1981), the defendants sought to admit other crimes evidence to show modus operandi and support 

their claims of innocence of the charged offense. In Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 350, the defendant was 

convicted of rape, murder, and kidnapping. The victim was a 10-year-old girl, who was kidnapped 

from her home before being raped in his car and bludgeoned to death by several blows to the head.

Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 319. Her body was found several days later blindfolded in the underbrush on 

the Illinois Prairie Path near Illinois Route 5. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 319. The defendant sought to 

introduce the statement of someone named Brian Dugan, an individual who confessed to killing 

the victim of the crime for which the defendant was charged. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 331. The trial 

court admitted Mr. Dugan’s statement. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 335. 

¶ 20 The defendant also sought to bring in evidence of Mr. Dugan’s other crimes, since it 

corroborated Mr. Dugan’s confession and was similar to the defendant’s charged crime but the 

trial court denied that request. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 340. In Mr. Dugan’s other crimes, he kidnaped 

or attempted to kidnap girls and young women between the ages of eight and 27 years old. Cruz, 

162 Ill. 2d at 341-42. In the kidnappings he raped the victims in his car in a secluded area and in 

some of those incidents he also killed the victim by either bludgeoning them in the head or 

drowning them. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 341-42. The supreme court ruled that the other crimes evidence 

was admissible as probative evidence of whether Mr. Dugan’s statements asserting his guilt were 

accurate and reliable to show that someone else committed the crime instead of Mr. Cruz. Cruz, 

162 Ill. 2d at 352 (stating the distinct similarities between the underlying crime and the other 
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crimes evidence made the other crimes evidence admissible to show modus operandi of another 

offender). 

¶ 21 “[W]here a defendant seeks to introduce other-crimes evidence to exculpate himself, there 

is usually no need for the trial court to be concerned with balancing probative value against 

prejudicial effect.” Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 350. “[W]here defendant offers other-crime evidence, it 

should be admitted if it contains significant probative value to his defense. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d at 143. 

¶ 22 In determining whether the other crimes evidence should be admitted, there must be a 

significant commonality of facts, sufficient to indicate that the perpetrator of both was the same.

Tate, 87 Ill. 2d at 142-43. In Tate, 87 Ill. 2d at 140, the supreme court ruled that the facts did not 

meet that threshold. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d at 142 (stating that the court should not have admitted the other

crimes evidence since the details of the underlying crime were not so distinct as to link it to the

other crime since the details were typical of most shoplifters). 

¶ 23 “The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and that court’s decision may not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” 

Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s decision 

is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by 

the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. The abuse of 

discretion standard of review is the most deferential standard of review in the law. People v. 

Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881, ¶ 77. 

¶ 24 We note that Mr. Aseves fails to cite any cases where a defendant is seeking to introduce 

other crimes evidence as exculpatory evidence. “A reviewing court is entitled to have issues 

clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented.” Obert v. Saville, 
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253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). “[I]t is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the 

burden of argument and research, [citations] it is neither the function nor the obligation of this 

court to act as an advocate or search the record for error.” Obert, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 682. 

Nevertheless, we choose to review the issue on the merits. 

¶ 25 Mr. Aseves sought to introduce the other crimes evidence to suggest an unknown offender 

committed the crime for which he was charged. The proffer made in the motion in limine indicated 

that the detectives would testify that two robberies were committed within an hour of the robbery 

of Mr. Guevara, which involved two black men in the same vicinity. Additionally, the detectives 

would testify that, though the victims of the uncharged robberies said the offender was a black 

man, they were not able to identify Mr. Aseves in a photograph array. The detectives further stated 

that the same blue minivan was at the scene of each of the three robberies. Mr. Aseves’ counsel 

argued that the evidence would show that each of the robberies had likely been performed by the 

same person and the failure to identify Mr. Aseves in the other two robberies suggested that he did 

not commit the charged robbery. 

¶ 26 On appeal, Mr. Aseves suggests that the jury would find it incredulous that two different 

groups of black men were committing these robberies almost simultaneously, and we agree. The 

State disagrees however that the only logical inference would be that Mr. Aseves did not commit 

the charged offense rather than infer that he committed all three. Mr. Aseves also argues on appeal 

that the introduction of the evidence would not have subjected him to any additional prejudice 

because he was not charged with those two other robberies. 

¶ 27 While this court will not engage in a probative versus prejudicial impact balancing test 

regarding the other crimes evidence, since Mr. Aseves sought to introduce the evidence, it is 
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impossible to extricate the evidence from a prejudicial analysis. As the evidence showed at trial, 

Mr. Aseves had the most access to the vehicle used in the commission of the offense and was 

unequivocally identified by Mr. Guevara as the individual with the firearm. People v. SiguenzaBrito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009) (the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, may 

constitute evidence sufficient to support a conviction). As a result, the jury could have likely found 

the other crimes evidence showed Mr. Aseves’ guilt instead of exonerating him for the charged 

crime. The only relevance the other crimes evidence had was if it was perceived as evidence of his 

innocence. However, if the jury was inclined to reach the opposite conclusion, that other crimes 

evidence had no relevance to the jury and would most likely lead the jury to make improper 

conclusions. See Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having 

any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). Thus, the trial court 

was correct in its assessment that the other crimes evidence should be excluded, as it lacked 

relevance since he was not charged with those other crimes. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 

133881, ¶ 77. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 

the other crimes evidence. 

¶ 28 Mr. Aseves next asserts that the trial court erred by making a finding of great bodily harm 

regarding his armed robbery conviction. He argues that the evidence is clear that Mr. Guevara, the 

charged victim of the armed robbery count, was unharmed and he concedes that he inflicted great 

bodily harm on Mr. Radanovich. His argument turns on the interpretation of “a victim” in section 

3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 
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¶ 29 Since this issue on appeal involves statutory construction, “which is a question of law, our 

review is de novo.” People v. Salley, 373 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109 (2007). The primary objective of 

statutory construction is to discern the legislature’s intent, and the best way to ascertain that intent 

is the plain language of the statute. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. When the statutory 

language is ambiguous, a court may use other interpretive aids such as legislative history to resolve 

the ambiguity. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 135 (2005). However, where the statute 

is clear and unambiguous, courts may not resort to aids of statutory construction. (Emphasis 

added.) Powell, 217 Ill. 2d at 135. 

¶ 30 “[A] prisoner serving a sentence for *** armed robbery *** with a category I weapon or 

category II weapon, when the court has made and entered a finding *** that the conduct leading 

to conviction *** resulted in great bodily harm to a victim” shall serve no less than 85% of their 

sentence. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2020). A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed 

under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 331 (2008). 

¶ 31 We initially note that the trial court made a finding of great bodily harm regarding both 

convictions and Mr. Aseves failed to object to that finding as to the armed robbery conviction nor 

did he file a posttrial motion. As a result, he forfeits review of this issue. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 

2d 539, 544 (2010). We review whether his forfeiture falls under the plain error exception. 

¶ 32 An exception to the forfeiture rule exists in situations where the alleged error rises to the 

level of plain error. People v. Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 102853, ¶ 19. Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) provides that “substantial or what have become known as plain 

errors may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Under the plain error doctrine, 
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a reviewing court may consider forfeited errors if the evidence was closely balanced or “the error 

was so egregious that [the] defendant was deprived of a substantial right and thus a fair trial.” 

Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 102853, ¶ 19. First, a defendant must prove there was a clear or obvious 

error. Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 102853, ¶ 19. The burden of persuasion rests with the defendant, 

and the first step is to determine whether any error occurred. Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 

102853, ¶ 19. “Generally, sentencing decisions are a matter entirely within the discretion of the 

circuit court which reviewing courts will not disturb absent an abuse of that discretion.” People v. 

Robinson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1071 (2008).

¶ 33 In Salley, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 110, the Second District reviewed section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of 

the Unified Code of Corrections, which addresses sentence credit for good behavior. In that case, 

the court stated that the legislature’s word choice of “a victim” versus “the victim” “encompasses 

anyone who is injured by the defendant’s conduct during the offense in question,” not just the 

direct victim of the offense. Salley, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 110. To come to that conclusion, the court 

analyzed the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 2004)), which 

prior to 2006, defined a “crime victim” as “any person against whom a violent crime as been 

committed.” (Emphasis in original.) Salley, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 111 (quoting 725 ILCS 120/3(a) 

(West 2004)). We agree with the Second District’s interpretation.

¶ 34 Here, as defined in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, at the time of 

sentencing, the definition of a “crime victim” was modified to define victim as “any natural person 

determined by the prosecutor or the court to have suffered direct physical or psychological harm 

as a result of a violent crime perpetrated or attempted against that person.” 725 ILCS 120/3(a) 

(West 2020). As stated in Salley, the plain language of section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the Unified Code 
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of Corrections means the trial court can look to see if the defendant, by his conduct during the 

commission of the crime, caused great bodily harm to any victim not just the victim of the offense. 

¶ 35 Mr. Aseves argues that the named victim of the armed robbery, Mr. Guevara, was not 

harmed, even though he concedes that he inflicted great bodily harm on Mr. Radanovich. He argues 

that “[a]n event is proximately caused by a defendant’s actions if they are a direct and foreseeable 

consequence” and the liability stops where the foreseeable chain of consequences is broken. The 

cases that he cites are felony murder cases where an individual died, and the question is whether 

that death occurred during the defendant’s attempt to flee the underlying crime. Mr. Aseves further 

argues that the shooting of Mr. Radanovich was an unforeseeable consequence of his decision to 

rob Mr. Guevara. He states that, by the time of the shooting, the robbery was completed since Mr. 

Aseves and his co-offender had stolen the items and had made their way to escape. 

¶ 36 We review this case under an abuse of discretion standard which is the most deferential 

standard on appeal. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881, ¶ 77. We are asked to consider whether the 

trial court’s rationale that the shooting was a foreseeable result of Mr. Aseves’ actions was 

“arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable.” Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. Given the fact that Mr. Aseves had 

just robbed Mr. Guevara and was walking away when Mr. Radanovich intervened, we cannot say 

that it is unreasonable to find the two incidents were related. Mr. Aseves does not deny that he 

caused great bodily harm to Mr. Radanovich when he shot him, and the trial court found that the 

great bodily harm was part of the underlying robbery of Mr. Guevara. We cannot say the court 

abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Radanovich was a victim under the definition of the statute 

for the armed robbery conviction. As a result, the trial court did not err when it made a great bodily 

harm finding as to the armed robbery conviction. Since no error occurred, the court’s finding 
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cannot be considered plain error, and therefore, Mr. Aseves’ forfeiture stands. Thus, we affirm Mr. 

Aseves’ convictions and sentence, as well as the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.