Filed 7/2/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B297213

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA051184)

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION

 [NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT] 

THE COURT*

It is ordered that the opinion filed June 10, 2020 be modified as 

follows:

On page 4, the following language is added after the last sentence 

of footnote 1, ending with “additional contention.”: “If, on remand, the 

juvenile court transfers the case to criminal court, appellant will be able 

to reassert this contention on appeal from the reinstatement of his 

sentence.”

The modification does not change the judgment.

_________________________________________________________

*MANELLA, P.J. WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.
Filed 6/10/20 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B297213

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA051184)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Conditionally 

reversed and remanded with directions.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 
2

Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo 

and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.

______________________________________

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was 

convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years 

old, and was sentenced to life without the possibility of 

parole (LWOP). Appellant later successfully petitioned for a 

writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence in light of an 

intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court. 

The trial court held a resentencing hearing and again 

imposed the LWOP term. On appeal, we reversed the new 

sentence and remanded for another resentencing in light of 

yet another intervening decision by the Supreme Court. At 

the second resentencing, the trial court again imposed the 

LWOP sentence. 

In the interim, the electorate passed Proposition 57, 

the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.” Among 

other things, Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from 

charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. 

(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 

(Lara).) “Instead, they must commence the action in 

juvenile court. If the prosecution wishes to try the juvenile 

as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct . . . a ‘transfer 

hearing’ to determine whether the matter should remain in 
3

juvenile court or be transferred to adult court. Only if the 

juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the 

juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” (Ibid.) The 

California Supreme Court has held that Proposition 57 

applies retroactively to cases not yet final at the time it was 

enacted. (Lara, supra, at 304.)

In this appeal, appellant claims he is entitled to a 

transfer hearing under Proposition 57 because his judgment 

is not yet final. Respondent asserts that appellant is not 

entitled to the benefit of the new law’s retroactive 

application for two reasons. First, respondent argues that 

appellant’s judgment of conviction became final long before 

Proposition 57’s enactment, and his subsequent habeas and 

resentencing proceedings did not reopen its finality for 

purposes of that measure. Second, respondent contends that 

our Supreme Court’s holding in Lara concerning Proposition 

57’s retroactive application does not apply to appellant 

because he is now too old to benefit from rehabilitation as a 

juvenile. 

Because appellant’s original sentence was vacated and 

his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57’s 

primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender’s 

sentence, we conclude that the measure applies to preclude 

imposition of sentence on appellant as an adult, absent a 

transfer hearing. Regardless of his current age, appellant 

fits within our Supreme Court’s holding that the voters 

intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. 

Accordingly, we conditionally reverse appellant’s sentence 
4

and remand for appellant to receive a transfer hearing in the 

juvenile court.1

BACKGROUND

In 1998, appellant was charged with first degree 

murder with special-circumstance allegations and conspiracy 

to commit murder. He committed the offenses that same 

year, when he was 16 years old. He was tried as an adult, 

following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be 

dealt with under juvenile court law. 

The following year, a jury found appellant guilty as 

charged, and the court imposed the then-mandatory 

sentence of LWOP. On appeal, this court reversed one of the 

special-circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed. The 

California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for 

review in 2001, and he did not petition for a writ of 

certiorari. 

In 2014, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, seeking resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama

(2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465, which held that mandatory LWOP 

sentences for those under the age of 18 at the time of their 

crimes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 

1 Appellant also challenges his LWOP sentence as 

unauthorized under Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), 

which affords juveniles sentenced to an LWOP term an 

opportunity to parole after incarceration for 25 years. In light of 

our conditional reversal of his sentence, we need not address this 

additional contention. 
5

and unusual punishments. The trial court agreed appellant 

was entitled to resentencing, vacated appellant’s sentence, 

and following a resentencing hearing, again imposed the 

LWOP term. 

While appellant’s appeal from his resentencing was 

pending, the United States Supreme Court decided 

Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 

718], which among other things, clarified its holding in 

Miller v. Alabama. Because the trial court had exercised its 

resentencing discretion without the guidance of Montgomery, 

we reversed and remanded the matter for a new 

resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 

Cal.App.5th 656, 661, 674.)

In 2019, on remand from this court, the trial court held 

a second resentencing hearing and once again sentenced 

appellant to LWOP. Appellant timely appealed. He 

contends that in light of Proposition 57, enacted after our 

opinion on appeal from his first resentencing, he is entitled 

to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Principles

1. Proposition 57

At the time appellant was charged in 1998, “‘a child 

could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial 

determination . . . that he or she was unfit to be dealt with 

under juvenile court law.’” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 305.) 

Absent such a determination, “‘any individual less than 18 
6

years of age who violate[d] the criminal law [came] within 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court . . . .’” (Ibid.) 

“Amendments to [the Welfare and Institutions Code] in 1999 

and 2000 . . . changed this historical rule. Under the 

changes, in specified circumstances, prosecutors were 

permitted, and sometimes required, to file charges against a 

juvenile directly in criminal court, where the juvenile would 

be treated as an adult.” (Lara, supra, at 305.)

In November 2016, voters passed Proposition 57, again 

changing the procedure for charging juveniles. (Lara, supra, 

4 Cal.5th at 303, 305.) According to the text of this measure, 

it was intended to “[s]top the revolving door of crime by 

emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles” and to 

“[r]equire a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether 

juveniles should be tried in adult court . . . .” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, 

§ 2, p. 141, (2016 Voter Guide).) The voters mandated that 

Proposition 57’s provisions be “broadly construed to 

accomplish its purposes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, at § 5, 

p. 145.) 

“‘Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the 

Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing 

by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors . . . can still be 

tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge 

conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such 

as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, 

prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be 
7

rehabilitated.’”2 (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 305.) “Only if the 

juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the 

juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” (Id. at 303.) 

While Proposition 57’s transfer hearing is similar in 

some respects to the fitness hearing conducted prior to the 

1999 and 2000 amendments, there are key differences. 

Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or older who were 

accused of certain offenses, including murder, were subject 

to a rebuttable presumption that they were unfit for juvenile 

court treatment. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) No 

such presumption applies in transfer hearings under 

Proposition 57, and the People have the burden to show that 

the juvenile should be treated as an adult. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 707, subd. (a); Castillero, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at 

398; J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 715.) 

In addition, in fitness hearings under prior law, a juvenile 

court could retain jurisdiction over a juvenile age 16 or older 

accused of certain offenses, including murder, only if it found 

the individual suitable for juvenile court treatment under 

each of five criteria. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, 

subd. (c) [court must find juvenile suitable “under each and 

every one of the above criteria”].) In a transfer hearing 

under current law, the court must consider those five 

2 Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 

Reg. Sess.) further amended the applicable provisions of the 

Welfare and Institutions Code (People v. Castillero (2019) 33 

Cal.App.5th 393, 399 (Castillero)), but those changes are not 

relevant to this appeal. 
8

criteria, but has broad discretion in applying them, and need 

not find that all five support juvenile court treatment. (See 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3) [“the court shall 

consider the criteria specified”]; Castillero, supra, at 398 

[court has broad discretion to apply these statutory 

criteria].)3

One Court of Appeal to consider the effect of 

Proposition 57 concluded that its primary benefit to juvenile 

defendants is in potentially affording them the dispositions 

rendered in juvenile court, rather than the generally much 

more severe criminal sentences in adult court.4 (People v.

3 The five statutory criteria are: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal 

sophistication exhibited by the minor” which may include 

consideration of such factors as “the minor’s age, maturity, 

intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health 

at the time of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or 

failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal 

behavior, . . . and the effect of the minor’s family and community 

environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal 

sophistication”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated 

prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) 

“[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4) “[s]uccess of 

previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the 

minor”; and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense 

alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.”

4 “‘There is no “sentence,” per se, in juvenile court. Rather, a 

judge can impose a wide variety of rehabilitation alternatives 

after conducting a “dispositional hearing,” which is equivalent to 

a sentencing hearing in a criminal court. [Citations.] In the 

more serious cases, a juvenile court can “commit” a minor to 

juvenile hall or to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) . . . . DJJ 

(Fn. continued on the next page.)
9

Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569, 612, (Cervantes) 

disapproved on another ground in Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 

314-315.) Indeed, the court noted that “adult criminal 

sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being ‘tried in 

adult court.’” (Cervantes, supra, at 612.) Despite its 

conclusion that Proposition 57 did not apply retroactively (a 

holding disapproved by Lara, as discussed below), Cervantes

held that the purposes and features of Proposition 57 

mandated that on remand for resentencing, a juvenile 

offender could not be “‘sentenced in adult court’” without a 

prior transfer hearing. (Cervantes, supra, at 612.) 

2. Retroactive Application of Ameliorative 

Statutes

Whether a statute operates retroactively or only 

prospectively is a matter of legislative intent. (People v. 

Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319.) In In re Estrada (1965) 

63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), our Supreme Court concluded that 

statutory amendments mitigating punishment for an offense 

applied retroactively to a petitioner who at the time of 

enactment, had committed the offense but had not yet been 

commitments can range from one year or less for nonserious 

offenses, and up to seven years for the most serious offenses, 

including murder. [Citation.] A minor committed to DJJ must 

generally be discharged no later than 23 years of age. 

[Citation.]’” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 306-307.) Under certain 

circumstances, that discharge may be further delayed. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, §§ 1780, 1782.)
10

convicted and sentenced. (Id. at 742-743, 748.) The court 

reasoned that when the Legislature makes an ameliorative 

change to criminal law, it must have determined the former 

law was too severe. (Id. at 744-745.) As a result, absent 

indications of a contrary intent, “[i]t is an inevitable 

inference that the Legislature must have intended that the 

new statute . . . should apply to every case to which it 

constitutionally could apply.” (Id. at 745.) According to the 

court, an ameliorative criminal statute may be 

constitutionally applied to acts committed before its passage, 

“provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is 

not final.” (Ibid.) Thus, under Estrada, absent indications 

of the legislative body’s contrary intent, courts presume it 

intended an ameliorative statute to apply retroactively to all 

nonfinal judgments. (See ibid.) 

Applying this rule in Lara, our Supreme Court 

concluded that Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative 

change to the criminal law. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 309.) 

Finding no contrary indications, it further concluded the 

voters intended Proposition 57 “‘to extend as broadly as 

possible.’” (Lara, supra, at 309.) Accordingly, the court held 

Proposition 57 applied retroactively to “all juveniles charged 

directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the 

time it was enacted.”5 (Lara, at 304.) As discussed further 

5 While Lara expressly addressed juveniles charged directly 

in adult court, courts have held that its ruling extends equally to 

individuals who, like appellant, received a fitness hearing under 

the former law’s standards. (Castillero, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at 

(Fn. continued on the next page.)
11

below, if, at a retroactive transfer hearing, the juvenile court 

finds a defendant would have been fit for juvenile court 

treatment, the defendant’s sentence must be reversed, and 

the juvenile court must then treat the convictions as juvenile 

adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. (Lara, 

at 310, 313.)

3. Final Judgments

Under Estrada, “[t]he key date [for retroactivity 

purposes] is the date of final judgment.” (Estrada, supra, 63 

Cal.2d at 744.) A retroactive ameliorative statute applies in 

a given case if it “becomes effective prior to the date the 

judgment of conviction becomes final . . . .” (Ibid.) The court 

did not specify when a judgment becomes “final” for 

retroactivity purposes. 

Several months before Estrada, however, the 

California Supreme Court discussed the finality of a 

judgment in In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 (Spencer). In 

ruling on a habeas petition raising federal constitutional 

challenges, the Spencer court noted the United States 

Supreme Court had defined the point of finality as “‘where 

the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of 

appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari . . . 

elapsed . . . .”’ (Id. at 405, quoting Linkletter v. Walker

(1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622, fn. 5.) Finality therefore denoted 

399; People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316, 324-325 

(Garcia).)
12

“that point at which the courts can no longer provide a 

remedy to a defendant on direct review.” (Spencer, supra, at 

405.) Our Supreme Court has since applied this definition of 

finality to the Estrada retroactivity rule, stating that an 

amendatory statute applies in “‘any [criminal] proceeding 

[that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet 

reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to 

review it.’” (People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 (Rossi), 

quoting Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230; accord, 

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [for purposes of 

Estrada rule, “‘a judgment is not final until the time for 

petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court has passed’” (quoting People v. Nasalga

(1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5)].)

This rule of finality is easy to apply in a typical case, 

where a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced, the 

judgment is affirmed on appeal, a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court is either denied or never filed, and 

a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 

is likewise denied or never filed. But questions have arisen 

as to how this rule applies in different procedural settings. 

In People v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 96 (Jackson), a 

capital defendant’s judgment of death became final when he

failed to seek certiorari. (Id. at 97, 98.) In a subsequent 

habeas corpus proceeding, the California Supreme Court 

reversed his death sentence and remanded for a penalty 

retrial. (Id. at 97.) The defendant was again sentenced to 

death, and in the automatic appeal, sought to raise both 
13

guilt-phase and penalty-phase claims based on Escobedo v. 

State of Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 (Escobedo), decided after 

his original judgment became final but before his penalty 

retrial. (Jackson, supra, at 98-99.) Because Escobedo

applied retroactively only to judgments not yet final at the 

time it was decided (In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372), 

our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s attempt to 

challenge his convictions based on that decision, noting that 

it had reversed only the defendant’s death sentence: “The 

scope of this retrial is a matter of state procedure under 

which the original judgment on the issue of guilt remains 

final during the retrial of the penalty issue and during all 

appellate proceedings reviewing the trial court’s decision on 

that issue.” (Jackson, at 99; accord, People v. Kemp (1974) 

10 Cal.3d 611, 614 (Kemp) [applying Jackson to preclude 

capital defendant’s Escobedo-based challenge to his final 

judgment on guilt following penalty retrial].)6 At the same 

6 Our Supreme Court recently observed that “[i]n criminal 

actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘“sentence”’ are generally 

considered ‘synonymous’ [citation], and there is no ‘judgment of 

conviction’ without a sentence [citation].” (People v. McKenzie

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 (McKenzie).) Jackson’s distinction 

between the “judgment on the issue of guilt” and the “penalty” for 

purposes of finality appears to depart from that rule. (Jackson, 

supra, 67 Cal.2d at 99.) As we are aware of no non-capital case 

applying Jackson’s rule, it is conceivable this distinction stems 

from the unique nature of capital trials, which are subject to 

bifurcated guilt and penalty phases. (See Phillips v. Vasquez (9th 

Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 1030, 1033, fn. 1 [describing Kemp and 

Jackson as holding “that a conviction under California’s 

(Fn. continued on the next page.)
14

time, however, the court agreed that the defendant could 

rely on Escobedo to challenge his new sentence, 

notwithstanding that his “conviction was final” before that

case was decided. (Jackson, supra, at 100.) 

Jackson therefore established that a collateral 

proceeding may reopen the finality of a sentence for 

retroactivity purposes, even while the conviction remains 

final. While Jackson involved the retroactivity of 

constitutional law, rather than an ameliorative statute, it 

applied the same definition of finality later applied in Rossi. 

(See Jackson, supra, 67 Cal.2d at 98 [“A judgment becomes 

final when all avenues of direct review are exhausted”], 

citing, inter alia, Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 405.)

B. Analysis

Appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing 

under Proposition 57, asserting its provisions apply 

retroactively to him. He maintains we should therefore 

conditionally reverse his judgment and refer the matter to 

the juvenile court. Appellant argues his judgment is not yet 

final because we reversed his sentence and remanded the 

case for resentencing in 2016, and he is now appealing from 

bifurcated process for adjudicating death penalty cases is a final 

judgment”].) Yet the interest in retaining the finality of 

convictions despite ongoing sentencing proceedings applies in 

other contexts as well. Because we conclude that Proposition 57 

applies retroactively to appellant’s resentencing, we need not 

decide whether Jackson applies to non-capital cases. 
15

that resentencing. Respondent counters that appellant’s 

judgment became final in 2001, when he originally 

exhausted direct appeal procedures. Respondent contends 

the reopening of appellant’s sentencing following his 

successful habeas petition had no effect on the finality of his 

“judgment of conviction,” and therefore does not entitle him 

to the benefit of Proposition 57’s retroactive application. 

We begin with the simple observation that appellant’s 

sentence is not final: the superior court vacated his original 

sentence and resentenced him, we then reversed his new 

sentence and remanded for another resentencing, and 

appellant has taken this direct appeal from his second 

resentencing. Because appellant’s sentence is still pending 

on direct appeal, his judgment is not final under our 

Supreme Court’s definition of finality for retroactivity 

purposes. (See Jackson, supra, 67 Cal.2d at 100; McKenzie, 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at 46; Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 304.)

Respondent does not suggest that appellant’s sentence 

is entirely immune to challenges based on retroactive 

changes to the law. Instead, citing the Jackson/Kemp rule, 

respondent contends that appellant’s judgment remains final 

as to his conviction and all other matters not encompassed 

by his resentencing, including “pretrial proceedings under 

Proposition 57,” such that he may not benefit from that 

measure’s retroactive operation. We disagree.

Assuming the rule established in these capital cases 

applies in other contexts, it would not preclude appellant’s 

claim based on Proposition 57 because that measure affects 
16

his sentencing, independent of its potential effect on his 

convictions. As the Cervantes court observed, a juvenile 

disposition is far more advantageous to the defendant than a 

criminal sentence for the same offense: indeed, “adult 

criminal sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being 

‘tried in adult court . . . .’” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 

at 612.) 

Based on the purposes underlying Proposition 57 and 

the substantially more severe consequences of sentencing in 

adult court for many juvenile felons, the court in Cervantes

concluded that a juvenile felon may not be “‘sentenced in 

adult court’” without a prior transfer hearing. (Cervantes,

supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Thus, even before its ruling 

that Proposition 57 was not retroactive was disapproved in 

Lara, the Cervantes court recognized that a defendant may 

not be resentenced on remand without a prior transfer 

hearing. (Cervantes, supra, at 612.) Lara left undisturbed 

Cervantes’s conclusion about Proposition 57’s application to 

sentencing.

In Lara itself, the court stated that “[o]nly if the 

juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the 

juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” (Lara, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at 303.) Relying on this language, the court in 

People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 (Ramirez) 

held that on a limited remand for resentencing, “the trial 

court was required to consider the effect of Proposition 57 

and issue any related orders,” thereby rejecting the People’s 

contention that the defendant’s request for a transfer 
17

hearing exceeded the scope of a limited remand. The 

Ramirez court explained that although it had remanded the 

defendants’ case for resentencing in light of intervening 

precedent, “the trial court had jurisdiction to consider any 

and all factors that would affect sentencing,” including 

Proposition 57. (Ramirez, supra, at 64.) 

Because Proposition 57’s primary ameliorative effect is 

on a juvenile offender’s sentence, independent of the 

convictions, we conclude it applies retroactively to 

appellant’s nonfinal sentence and requires that he receive a 

transfer hearing.7 (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 303; 

Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 64; Cervantes, supra, 9 

Cal.App.5th at 612.) Any resulting effect on appellant’s 

convictions would be a mere byproduct of his required 

treatment as a juvenile, should the juvenile court decide that 

he would have been fit for such treatment. (See Lara, supra, 

at 306 [“‘there are no “conviction[s]” in juvenile court’”]; Welf. 

& Inst. Code, § 203 [“An order adjudging a minor to be a 

ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of 

a crime for any purpose”].) A juvenile court’s decision in a 

retroactive transfer hearing to treat the defendant as a 

juvenile does not disturb the jury’s findings; rather, the court 

must treat the defendant’s convictions as juvenile 

7 For similar reasons, we reject respondent’s contention that 

appellant’s claim should be denied because it falls outside the 

scope of our prior limited remand for resentencing. (See Ramirez, 

supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 64.)
18

adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. (See 

Lara, supra, at 309-310, 313; see also id. at 309-310 

[“‘Nothing is to be gained by having a “jurisdictional 

hearing,” or effectively a second trial, in the juvenile 

court’”].) And we see no reason why juvenile court treatment 

should open the jury’s adjudications to challenge under new 

rules to which they would not otherwise be subject.

Respondent argues that Lara’s conclusion about 

Proposition 57’s retroactivity nevertheless does not apply to 

appellant because “Lara considered the specific circumstance 

of a defendant who had been charged but not sentenced.” 

Respondent maintains it is unlikely the voters intended the 

provisions of Proposition 57 to apply to those, like appellant, 

far removed from their teenage years and for whom 

treatment as a juvenile would likely result in release from 

custody. These assertions, however, are at odds with our 

Supreme Court’s determination of the electorate’s intent --

that Proposition 57 should apply retroactively to “all 

juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment 

was not yet final at the time it was enacted.” (Lara, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at 304.) It is not for us to say, at this time, whether 

appellant should be treated as a juvenile offender -- only that 

our Supreme Court’s pronouncement that Proposition 57 

should apply “as broadly as possible” encompasses appellant, 

regardless of his current age. (Lara, supra, at 308; see 

Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 60-61 [affirming referral 

for transfer hearing for defendant who was 28 years old]; 

Garcia, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 321, 330 [ordering transfer 
19

hearing for defendant who was over 40 years old].) 

Moreover, we see no reason why the juvenile court cannot 

adapt Proposition 57’s criteria to assess whether a person

like appellant, who committed a crime as a minor but is now 

an adult, should or should not have been tried as an adult. 

(See Lara, supra, at 313 [courts can implement retroactive 

transfer hearings “without undue difficulty,” and the 

potential complexity in providing such hearings “is no reason 

to deny [them]”].) 

Our conclusion that Proposition 57 applies 

retroactively to appellant’s sentence is consistent with our 

Supreme Court’s determination in Lara that the voters 

intended Proposition 57 “‘to extend as broadly as possible’” 

(Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 309), i.e., “to every case to which it 

constitutionally could apply” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 

745). Respondent offers no basis for concluding that this 

ameliorative amendment may not be applied constitutionally 

to appellant’s sentence. Accordingly, we conclude appellant 

is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing under 

Proposition 57. 
20

DISPOSITION

In Lara, the court approved the remedy one Court of 

Appeal had ordered for a juvenile defendant who had been 

convicted and sentenced without having received a transfer 

hearing. (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at 310, 313.) We afford 

appellant a similar remedy. 

Appellant’s sentence is conditionally reversed. The 

matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to refer 

the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing, to 

determine if it would have transferred the case to adult 

criminal court had it originally been filed in juvenile court in 

accordance with current law.

If the juvenile court determines it would not have 

transferred appellant to criminal court under current law, it 

shall treat appellant’s convictions as juvenile adjudications 

and impose an appropriate disposition. If the juvenile court 

determines it would have transferred appellant to adult 

criminal court, it shall transfer the case to criminal court, 

which shall then reinstate appellant’s sentence. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.