alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mason L. Baldwin v. George L. Sheldon et al.

*Witt**— Construction—Helease *of debts of legatees.*

A will declared that “all the foregoing legacies are intended and5‘ declared to be for the individual estate of the said legatees, exclusive' of any indebtedness to me at this date or others. ” *Held*that this did not release legatees from any indebtedness .due from them to the-testator, but meant that their legacies should be paid them irrespective of their debts, which might be left to be collected in the ordinary-way.

A testator’s intent to forgive a debt due him from a legatee should bet-clear and unambiguous to warrant that construction. -

Error to Kalamazoo.

Submitted April 21.

Decided June 21.

Assumpsit. Defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

*Severens, Tryon do Banney*for appellants.

Brown, *Howard do Boos*for appellee.

Marston, J.

This is an action of *assumpsit*brought to-recover upon a promissory note for $1100 dated January lstr 1S80, and given by defendants to Edgar Sheldon.

Edgar Sheldon died November 4th, 1880, leaving a wilF dated December 30th, 1878, in which numerous bequests-' were made, and among them, one of $200 each to the above-named defendants, his nephews. After the bequests the-following clause was in the will: “All the foregoing-legacies are intended and declared to be for the individual1*581•«state of the said legatees, exclusive of any indebtedness to ■ me at this date, or others.”'

The defendants claim that by this clause they are released ■from payment of the note in suit or any part thereof.

No such construction can be given to the will. The «lause in question is awkwardly drawn, but its meaning is mot after all doubtful. Whether the intention of the testador could be fully and effectually carried out is a question mot arising on this record.

The intention clearly was, that the bequests made shouldIbe exempt from the debts of the legatees, and should any of ■¡them be indebted to the estate of the testator, the legacy -.should be paid notwithstanding such indebtedness, leaving ithe debt due the estate to be collected as a part of the assets <of his estate' in the ordinary manner. In this respect he was willing that an indebtedness to him or to his estate should stand as would one to third parties *“*or others.”

No other construction could be given this clause in the will without destroying other provisions. If this note were mot collected the legacies could not be paid in full from the .assets: the court so finds. The effect of such a construction would be to prevent the testator, during his life-time, from loaning to any of the legatees any money, unless he intended ■¡thereby, if not collected during his life-time, to have the -•debt cancelled by tliis clause. The deceased certainly could ¡have had- no such intention, and the language used will warrant» no such construction. In order to forgive a debt the provision indicative of such an intent should be clear and ¡unambiguous.

The conclusion arrived at by the court below was correct .and the judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Cooley and Campbell, JJ. concurred.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


To the Shareholders of
       ALLTEL Corporation:


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the use of our report
dated January 16, 1998, with respect to the Chicago SMSA Limited Partnership,
included in this Form 10-K, into ALLTEL Corporation's previously filed
Registration Statements, File Nos. 2-99523, 33-35343, 33-48476, 33-54175,
33-56291 and 33-65199. Such Chicago SMSA Limited Partnership financial
statements are not included separately in this Form 10-K.



                                               /s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Chicago, Illinois
March 24, 1999
                                       82
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00241-CV

IN RE Deborah Lindsey PARHAM

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 29, 2015

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On April 21, 2015, relator Deborah Lindsey Parham filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

and a motion for emergency stay pending a ruling on the mandamus petition. The court has 

considered the petition for writ of mandamus and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the 

relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus and the motion for emergency stay 

are denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2013-PC-3933, styled In the Guardianship of Juanita E. Byrd, An 

Incapacitated Person, pending in the Probate Court No. 1, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Kelly M. Cross 

presiding.
January 26, 1971

Honorable W. S. (Bill)Heatly Chairman of theAppropriations Committee House of Representatives Austin, Texas Dear Mr. Heatly: Opinion No. M-775 Re: Construction ofArticle 4357, Vernon's Civil Statutes.

Your request for an opinion on the above subject matter asks the following question:

"As Chairman of theAppropriations Committee of the House, I respectfully request an interpretation of Article 4357 with specific reference to the timewhen appropriated funds lapse." The pertinent provision ofArticle 4357 reads:

,, ....No claim shall be paid from appropriations unless presented to the Comptroller for payment within two (2)years from the close of the fiscal year forwhich such appropriations were made, but any claim not presented for payment within such period may be presented to the Legislature as other ciaims forwhich no appropriations are available.

......" (Emphasis added.) InAttorney General's Opinion V-1416 (1952) itwas held: "
....we are of the opinion that the 'fiscal year forwhich such appropriations were made' should be construed tomean the fiscal year during which the appropriated funds became available for disbursement. .....*
-3776-Honorable W. S. (Bill)Heatly, page 2 (M-775)

See also Attorney General's Opinions WW-1518 (1962).WW-280 (1957)and O-4259 (1942). You are therefore advised, for example, that moneys appropriated for the,fiscal year ending August 31, 1969, do not lapse until August 31, 1971, andmoneys appropriated for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1970, do not lapse until August 31, 1972. It isnoted that Article 4357 also provides: "It is specifically provided, however, that as to all appropriations relating to new construction contracts, and to repair and remodeling projects which exceed the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), including in either instance furniture and other equipment, architects' and.engineering fees and other related costs, any claim may be presented forpayment within four (4) years from the close of the fiscal year for which such appropriations were made." These last quoted provisions, however, have no application toyour request, since the request apparently does not involve appropriations for "new construction contracts" or "repair and remodeling projects." Attorney General's Opinion WW-1518 (1962). SUMMARY

Under theprovisions of Article 4357, Vernon's Civil Statutes, moneys appropriated for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1969, do not lapse until August 31, 1971, and moneys appropriated for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1970, do not lapse until August 31, 1972. /?

Attorney General of Texas 2' -3777-c I

Honorable W. S. (Bill)Heatly, page 3
Prepared by John Reeves Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Kerns Taylor, Chairman W. E.Allen, Co-Chairman Jack Goodman Melvin Corley Arthur Sandlin J. C. Davis MEADE F. GRIFFIN Staff Legal Assistant NOLA WHITE First Assistant ALFRED WALKER Executive Assistant (M-775)

-3778-
#### Henry Cline *v.*D. W. Edwards.

Assignments — Action by Assignee.

An assignee has no right of action at law against a remote assignor.

Assignments — -Substitution of Assignee to Rights of Assignor.

-If the immediate -assignor is a non-resident, or if nothing can be recovered from him in the prosecution of a suit with due diligence, the holder of the assigned note may, by a proceeding in equity, be substituted to the -rights of his assignor against a remote assignor.

APPEAL, FROM McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT.

February 21, 1874.

*L. W.*Gastes, *for appellant,*

- — , *for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

An assignee has no right of action at law against a remote assignor. He must look to the party who assigned to him-. If the immediate assignor be a nonresident, of if after suit prosecuted with proper diligence nothing can be recovered from him, the holder of the assigned note may, by a proper proceeding in equity, be substituted to his rights against a remote assignor, or possibly he may upon proper averments- be allowed to use his assignor’s name in a suit at law, against any one bound to him by a contract of assignment. The petition in this case fails to disclose any- of the above suggested reasons for joining the remote assignor, Cline* as a co-defendant with Vittetoe. No cause of action being set out against Cline, the judgment as to him is erroneous. It is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 30, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-30253 Summary Calendar

CARINE LILIANE UMUZAYIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus HIPOLITO ACOSTA, Interim District Director, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Houston, Texas, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(02-CV-1338-R)

-------------------- Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-Appellant Carine Liliane Umuzayire appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her declaratory-judgment action for
lack of subject-m atter jurisdiction. Umuzayire argues that the district court had jurisdiction to review her asylum application.
Because Umuzayire is required to exhaus t her administrative remedies by renewing her request for asylum in the context ofremoval proceedings, the district court did not have jurisdiction

over the present case. S ee Kashani v. Nelson , 793 F.2d 818, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1986). As the district court lacked jurisdiction, we too lack jurisdiction and therefore must dismiss Umuzayire’s appeal.
AFFIRMED DISMISSED.
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 2, 

2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-19-00428-CV

HILARIO R. HERNANDEZ A/K/A HILARIO RAMOS HERNANDEZ, 

Appellant 

V.

CHRISTINA M. FOOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TEMPORARY 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF BELINDA G. HERNANDEZ, 

DECEASED, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 & Probate Court 

Brazoria County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. PR39396 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This is an attempted appeal from an interlocutory order signed in an 

ancillary probate matter. The order appealed is not a part of the record in the 

underlying case. There is no final judgment or interlocutory order from which an 
2 

appeal may be taken in this case. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 

195 (Tex. 2001). 

On June 12, 2019, appellant filed a motion to consolidate this appellate 

cause with his appeal from the ancillary probate matter containing an appealable 

interlocutory order. Appellees filed a response requesting that we dismiss this 

cause appellate cause for lack of jurisdiction. Because there is no appealable order 

or final judgment in this cause, we dismiss this appeal and deny appellant’s motion 

to consolidate. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Hassan.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated condensed financial statements for the six-months ended November
30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,498,746
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,604,482
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    419,485
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,685,983
<PP&E>                                       1,051,336
<DEPRECIATION>                               (584,769)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,615,316
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,811,939
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,350
<COMMON>                                        51,297
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,584,730
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,615,316
<SALES>                                      5,975,575
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,975,575
<CGS>                                        1,369,287
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,369,287
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,204,851
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,562
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                397,875
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            397,875
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   397,875
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01


</TABLE>
IIB 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H.R. 4381

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 2811 Springdale Avenue in Springdale, Arkansas, as the ‘‘Harvey and Bernice Jones Post Office 

Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

HR 4381 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. HARVEY AND BERNICE JONES POST OFFICE 

2 BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 2811 Springdale Avenue in 

5 Springdale, Arkansas, shall be known and designated as 

6 the ‘‘Harvey and Bernice Jones Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the Harvey and Bernice 

11 Jones Post Office Building.

Passed the House of Representatives September 7, 

2004. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
OSAC Standards Bulletin 1 March 2019

BULLETIN SUMMARY

OSAC Standards Bulletin

March 2019

This Bulletin provides an update on forensic science standards that are moving through the development 

process at standards developing organizations (SDOs), and those that are moving through the Registry 

Approval Process at the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science (OSAC).

Please consider providing comments on documents that are open for comment.

OSAC Registry Standards open for comment: 0 Items

SDO Documents open for comment: 0 Items

OSAC REGISTRY NEWS

New Approved Standards on OSAC Registry

ADA 1088-2017D Human Identification by Comparative Dental Analysis was Approved for the 

OSAC Registry (Odontology Subcommittee, March 7, 2019)

Standards Moving Through the OSAC Registry Approval Process

This section only lists standards that moved from one step in the OSAC Registry Approval Process to another 

during the last month. A list of all standards currently under consideration is available on the OSAC website.

No standards have progressed through the Registry Approval Process this month.

STANDARDS DEVELOPING ORGANIZATION (SDO) NEWS

New Work Proposals for New or Revised Standards

ASTM International E30.12 Digital and Multimedia Evidence

• WK67164 – Revision of E2916-18 - Standard Terminology for Digital and Multimedia EvidenceExamination.
OSAC Standards Bulletin 2 March 2019

New or Revised Standards

American Academy of Forensic Science (AAFS) Standards Board (ASB):

ANSI/ASB Best Practice Recommendation 006, Best Practice Recommendations for DNA Analysis for

Human Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents

ANSI/ASB Best Practice Recommendation 009, Best Practice Recommendations for the Examination

of Human Remains by Forensic Pathologists in the Disaster Victim Identification Context

ANSI/ASB Standard 045, Standard for Stature Estimation in Forensic Anthropology

ASTM International:

ASTM E2917-19 Standard Practice for Forensic Science Practitioner Training, Continuing Education,

and Professional Development Programs

OTHER NEWS

Save the Date: Research Innovation to Implementation in Forensic Science Symposium (RI2I)

On June 19-20, 2019, NIST will convene a symposium to discuss what the forensic science community can do 

differently to bring new technologies online faster. How can we reduce the obstacles to successful innovation? 

For crime laboratories, transferring forensic science research into practice is a challenging problem.

Thousands of research papers are published in forensic science journals every year, yet many innovations 

never make it to the crime laboratory. Check back for registration information.
#### John Joyes v. Edwin Barrow.

Use and Occupation — Surrender of Premises — Rent.

Failure of a tenant to surrender the premises in as good condition as he agreed to do does not imply a promise to continue to pay rent, nor render him liable for the use of the premises after the surrender of them.

AiPPEAiL FROM JEFFERSON OO'URT OF COMMON PLEAjS.

November 1, 1873.

*Pat Joyes, for appellant.*

-, *for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

This action was instituted to recover for use and occupation of the lot named in the lease of April 1, 1870.

The proof shows that the lessee abandoned the possession at the expiration of the term. He may have failed to leave the premises in as good order as he consented to do, but from his failure in this regard the law will not imply a promise to continue the payment of rent.

It is not necessary that Barrow should deny at all that he failed to surrender the lot in good order. The action was not for the recovery of damages on that account, but for the use and occupation of the lots, and he does deny, specifically and unequivocally, that he used or occupied it in any manner during the period named in the petition.

Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4
 
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
 
The Board of Directors
Chancellor Media Corporation of Los Angeles:
 
We consent to the inclusion in this Registration Statement on Form S-4 of
Chancellor Media Corporation of Los Angeles of our report dated February 13,
1997, except for Note 15 as to which the date is February 19, 1997, on our
audits of the consolidated financial statements of Chancellor Radio Broadcasting
Company and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1995 and 1996 and for each of the
three years in the period ended December 31, 1996. We also consent to the
reference to our firm under the caption "Experts".
 
                                            PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
 
Dallas, Texas
November 5, 1998
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4523 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4523

     To provide that children's sleepwear shall be manufactured in 
            accordance with stricter flammability standards.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 8, 2004

 Mr. Andrews introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To provide that children's sleepwear shall be manufactured in 
            accordance with stricter flammability standards.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Children's Sleepwear Safety Act of 
2004''.

SEC. 2. REVOCATION OF STANDARDS.

    (a) In General.--Without regard to any other law, not later than 90 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission shall amend its standards under the Flammable Fabrics 
Act (15 U.S.C. 1191 et seq.) to revoke the amendments to the standards 
for the flammability of children's sleepwear sizes 0 through 6X and 7 
through 14 (contained in regulations in parts 1615 and 1616 of title 
16, Code of Federal Regulations) issued by the Commission on September 
9, 1996 (61 Fed. Reg. 47,634).
    (b) Effective Date.--Sleepwear manufactured or imported before the 
effective date (as established by the Commission) of the Commission's 
revocation required by subsection (a) shall not be considered in 
violation of the Flammable Fabrics Act if it complied with the 
Commission rules in effect at the time it was manufactured or imported.
                                 <all>
```
Reddit - r/cybersecurity community

Post by: u/calculatetech

In Response to: u/nist

I understand this may be outside the bounds of a "framework", but just publishing policy templates and

guides would be HUGE for SMB. The biggest gripe my clients have is every supplier has their own forms to

fill out. If there's a standardized set of rules, why aren't there standardized forms to complement them?

And better yet, a database that can be referenced with supplier compliance status so we don't need the

forms.