UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

BRET DAVID LANDRITH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; 

CATHERINE A. REIN; BANK OF 

AMERICA CORPORATION; 

COUNTRYWIDE HOMELOAN, INC.; 

CWALT, INC.; ALTERNATIVE LOAN 

TRUST 2007-OA7; BAC HOME 

LOANS SERVICING, LP; 

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL; 

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS; 

KPMG LLP; STEPHEN E. 

SUMMERS;REALTY EXECUTIVES 

OF KANSAS CITY; SOUTH & 

ASSOCIATES, PC; BRYAN CAVE, 

LLP, 

 Defendants-Appellees 

No. 13-3080 

(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-02352-EFM-DJW) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 10, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge. 

 

 Bret Landrith appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims under the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) 

& (d), 1964(c), and its imposition of filing restrictions. The parties are familiar with 

the facts, so we do not recite them here. 

 The district court applied collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), but we affirm 

for another reason that defendants raised below. Landrith has no standing to bring 

this suit because he has no ownership interest in the real property that underlies his 

RICO claims (the Property). See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006)

(“[S]tanding for private individuals under RICO requires a plaintiff to have been 

injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Landrith’s purported interest in the Property 

arises from a quitclaim deed that the former owner executed after a sheriff’s sale and 

the expiration of the statutory redemption period. By that point, the former owner 

had no interest in the Property to convey to Landrith, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2414, 

and the quitclaim deed did not transfer to Landrith any cause of action that the former 

owner might have had regarding the foreclosure on the Property, see Colver v. 

McInturff, 212 P. 88, 88-89 (Kan. 1923). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of the lawsuit. 
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 As for the filing restrictions, Landrith failed to file any response or objections 

to the district court court’s order notifying him of the proposed injunction. “We do 

not review claims on appeal that were not presented below.” Pignanelli v. Pueblo 

Sch. Dist. No. 60, 540 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008). 

 Landrith’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs is denied. 

The district court’s judgment and injunction are affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 John C. Porfilio 

 Circuit Judge