[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13200

____________________

NICOLE OWENS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF GEORGIA, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STUDENT 

ACHIEVEMENT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-05683-MHC

____________________

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 2

Before LUCK, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to answer a question of first 

impression about the Rehabilitation Act. We have held that, to 

trigger an employer’s duty to provide an accommodation under 

the Rehabilitation Act, a disabled employee must (1) make a 

specific demand for an accommodation and (2) demonstrate that 

such an accommodation is reasonable. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 

F.3d 1249, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2016). But we have never addressed

what information a disabled employee must provide to her 

employer to trigger the employer’s duty to accommodate her 

disability.

This appeal presents that question. Following her c-section 

childbirth in July 2018, Nicole Owens informed her employer, the 

State of Georgia, Governor’s Office of Student Achievement 

(“GOSA”), that she would need to work remotely for several 

months. In support of this request, Owens provided GOSA two 

notes from her physician, which mentioned Owens’s c-section 

delivery, stated that she was “doing well,” and concluded that she 

“may” telework until November 2018. Owens separately informed 

GOSA that she was seeking to telework due to childbirth-related 

“complications” but provided no detail about the nature of these

complications or how they would be accommodated by

teleworking. Finding this information insufficient to support

Owens’s accommodation request, GOSA asked Owens to either 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 3

submit additional documentation or return to the office. When 

Owens failed to do either, GOSA terminated her employment.

Owens sued GOSA for (1) failure to accommodate in 

violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) retaliation in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act; and (3) pregnancy discrimination under the 

Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The district court granted 

summary judgment for GOSA on all three claims. As to the first 

claim, the district court reasoned that Owens failed to establish a

prima facie case of failure to accommodate because she never 

notified GOSA of her disability or connected that disability with 

her requested accommodation. As to the other claims, the district 

court concluded that Owens failed to establish that GOSA’s 

proffered reasons for terminating her were pretext for 

discrimination.

We agree with the district court. We hold that, as part of her 

initial burden to establish that a requested accommodation is 

reasonable under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must put her 

employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks an 

accommodation and provide enough information to allow her 

employer to understand how the accommodation she requests 

would assist her. Because Owens did not identify any disability 

from which she suffered or give GOSA any information about how

her requested accommodation—teleworking—would

accommodate that disability, the district court correctly granted 

summary judgment. We conclude that Owens’s other claims fail 

for the lack of evidence that GOSA’s proffered reasons for 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 4

terminating her were pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

I. 

Nicole Owens began working for GOSA in 2016 as a web 

content specialist and served in this role without reprimand until 

her termination in 2018. Although GOSA employees were allowed 

to work from home one day per week, Dr. Cayanna Good—

GOSA’s Executive Director—did not favor full-time teleworking 

because she believed it impeded effective staff supervision and 

support. As Executive Director, Good was GOSA’s ultimate 

decisionmaker for both accommodation requests and firing of 

GOSA staff.

In early 2018, Owens informed GOSA that she had a “highrisk pregnancy” and wanted to take time off under the Family 

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) until her due date.GOSA sent Owens 

a letter approving her FMLA request. The approval letter stated 

GOSA’s policy that an employee taking FMLA leave is “required to 

present a medical release before returning to work” containing 

“any restrictions and the duration of same.” But the policy does not 

specify whether “returning to work” meant returning to the 

physical office. Owens was on FMLA paid leave from early 2018 

until July 20, 2018. 

Owens gave birth via c-section on July 18, 2018. Thereafter, 

Owens notified her immediate supervisor, Rosaline Tio, that she 

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was experiencing childbirth-related complications arising from her 

c-section, which required two blood transfusions.

On August 3, 2018, Tio informed Owens that Owens had 

exhausted her paid FMLA leave and was being placed on unpaid 

leave as of July 20, 2018. Owens responded that same day, 

informing GOSA that she would return to work remotely on 

August 6, 2018. She attached a note from her physician, which 

stated that Owens “delivered a baby by cesarean on 7/18/2018,” 

“is doing well,” and “may return to work via tele-work from her 

home.” 

Good believed this note qualified as a “medical release” for 

Owens to “return to work” under GOSA’s FMLA policy. Owens, 

too, admits that this note cleared her to return to work, though 

only in a remote capacity. 

Good was unaware at the time of this initial telework 

request that Owens was experiencing any medical complications 

that would prevent her from working in the office. Nonetheless, 

because she knew that “most childcare facilities don’t accept infants 

younger than six weeks,” Good allowed Owens to telework 

temporarily so that Owens could make childcare arrangements. 

Because Good believed that Owens’s August 3 telework request 

was unrelated to any health complications, Good did not require 

Owens to provide additional medical documentation before 

approving her temporary teleworking arrangement. Owens thus 

resumed work remotely on August 6, 2018. The parties agree that, 

at that time, Owens was no longer on FMLA leave. 

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Owens routinely communicated with Tio about her postdelivery medical appointments. Knowing Owens had her six-week 

“milestone appointment” scheduled for September 11, 2018, Tio 

wrote Owens on September 12, asking how the appointment went. 

Owens responded that, because of complications from her csection delivery, she would need to continue teleworking until 

November 5, 2018. Owens attached a second doctor’s note dated 

9/11/2018, which stated only that Owens “may return to work 

November 5, 2018” and “may continue to telework at home until 

then.” The note said nothing about Owens’s medical conditions or 

the medical necessity of teleworking. 

Tio forwarded this information to Good and Felicia Lowe, a 

Human Resources Director in the Office of Planning and Budget, 

which carried out GOSA’s human resources functions. Because 

Owens’s second doctor’s note stated only that Owens “may” 

telework, not that she “must,” Good believed it was ambiguous

and lacked enough information for her to evaluate Owens’s 

accommodation request. Because Tio had expressed concerns with 

Owens’s productivity and responsiveness while teleworking, Good 

found it important to ensure that Owens’s teleworking 

accommodation was necessary, not merely her own personal 

preference. 

At Good’s direction, Lowe called Owens and told her that 

she needed to submit additional documentation to show her 

telework request was medically necessary. Owens followed up 

with Lowe that same day after speaking with her doctor’s nurse. 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 7

She told Lowe that if GOSA required more detail than “just an 

appendage” to the September 11 note stating its contents were 

“medically advised,” GOSA would need to provide the doctor’s 

office with an information request form. 

Accordingly, on September 20, 2018, Lowe sent Owens 

reasonable accommodation paperwork for her and her physician 

to complete. The accommodation paperwork asked for

information verifying Owens’s disability and the limitations caused 

by that disability, describing how those limitations restrict Owens’s 

ability to perform her job functions, and identifying any workplace 

accommodations that would permit Owens to perform these job 

functions. Included with the reasonable accommodation 

paperwork was an “Employee Release” for Owens to sign that 

would authorize GOSA to acquire medical information from 

Owens’s doctor directly. There is no evidence that Owens ever 

completed or returned this release to GOSA. 

On September 24, 2018, Owens forwarded the reasonable 

accommodation paperwork to her doctor’s records and release 

department for completion. Owens knew it could take the records 

department up to twenty days to fulfill such requests, but she never 

informed GOSA of this timeline. 

Although GOSA did not initially provide Owens a deadline 

for returning the completed paperwork, Lowe contacted Owens 

on October 1 and told her that if she did not either submit the 

documentation to GOSA by the next day, October 2, or return to 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 8

the office on October 3, “business decisions would need to be 

made.” 

Owens emailed Lowe on October 2, stating that she had not 

received the completed paperwork from her doctor and would be 

unable to return to the office the next day. Owens wrote that she 

had called her doctor’s office “numerous times” trying to expedite 

the paperwork and had “notified everyone that the process to get 

paperwork signed by the office typically takes time” but that she 

could not “expedite internal processes out of [her] control.” 

Lowe shared this email with Good, who decided to give 

Owens another week to submit her paperwork or return to the 

office. Lowe informed Owens of this extension and sent her “an 

official and final request” for “details to assist in determining the 

continued allowability of teleworking.” This final request 

memorandum informed Owens that “[f]ailure to provide the 

completed reasonable accommodation documentation” by 

October 10, 2018, or “to return to the worksite” by October 11, 

2018, “may result in termination of your employment.”

Owens called her doctor’s office daily trying to expedite her 

paperwork request and informed GOSA of these efforts. In the 

meantime, Good and Tio began outlining a proposed teleworking 

plan for Owens, should her reasonable accommodation paperwork 

reveal that teleworking was a reasonable accommodation for her 

disability. And Tio had arranged to discuss this new teleworking 

protocol with Owens on October 10.

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On the evening of October 10, after hearing no word from 

Owens about her paperwork or whether she planned to return to 

the office the next day, Tio sent Good a memorandum 

summarizing Tio’s interactions with Owens related to her 

accommodation request. Tio also emailed Owens to ask if she 

would be coming into the office the next day. Owens did not 

respond. Instead, on October 11, Owens emailed Lowe, stating 

that she had not obtained her paperwork from her doctor and 

would not be returning to the office that day. Later that morning, 

Good fired Owens for failing to return her medical documentation 

or return to the office as instructed. 

Based on these events, Owens sued GOSA alleging failure to 

accommodate and retaliation, in violation of Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and discrimination, in 

violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e(k). The district court granted summary judgment for GOSA 

on all three claims. 

The court reasoned that Owens never triggered GOSA’s 

accommodation obligations under the Rehabilitation Act because 

the information neither identified a specific disability nor explained 

how telework would accommodate it. And, even if Owens 

triggered GOSA’s accommodation duties, the court determined 

that her accommodation claim still failed because she caused a 

“breakdown” in the “interactive process” between her and GOSA. 

The district court also reasoned that, even if Owens established a 

prima facie case of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act and 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 10

discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, both 

those claims failed because she did not show that GOSA’s stated 

reasons for firing her were pretext for discrimination. The district 

court entered final judgment in GOSA’s favor. Owens timely 

appealed.

II. 

We review an appeal from summary judgment de novo.

Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 

Although we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, drawing “all justifiable inferences” in that 

party’s favor, “inferences based upon speculation” are not 

justifiable. Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). Thus, where “the nonmoving 

party presents evidence that is ‘merely colorable or not 

significantly probative,’” the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Stephens v. Mid–Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 

1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014)).

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III. 

A.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), 

prohibits covered employers from discriminating against 

employees based on their disabilities. Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 

1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). In employment discrimination cases, 

the standards for determining whether an employer violates the 

Rehabilitation Act “shall be the standards applied under title I of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) 

and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201 to 12204 

and 12210)” relating to employment. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). “[T]hus, 

cases involving the ADA are precedent for those involving the 

Rehabilitation Act.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (citing Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir. 

2000)).

“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 

[Rehabilitation] Act, an individual must show that (1) he has a 

disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) he 

was subjected to unlawful discrimination as the result of his

disability.” Sutton, 185 F.3d at 1207–08 (citations omitted). 

Unlawful discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act includes 

failing to provide reasonable accommodations for employees’ 

known disabilities. Boyle, 866 F.3d at 1289 (citing Lucas v. W.W. 

Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

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The Rehabilitation Act does not require employers to 

speculate about their employees’ accommodation needs. Instead, 

we have held that to trigger an employer’s duty to provide a 

reasonable accommodation, the employee must (1) make a specific 

demand for an accommodation and (2) demonstrate that such 

accommodation is reasonable. Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255–56; 

see Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284–86 (11th Cir. 1997).

Only after the employee provides this information must the 

employer “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the 

employee to discuss the employee’s specific limitations, explore

potential accommodations, and select the most appropriate 

accommodation for both the employer and the employee. See 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); see also D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale 

Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1021 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Gaston v. 

Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 

1999)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1435 (2021); Willis, 108 F.3d at 284–

86.

Owens argues that she triggered GOSA’s accommodation 

duties when she informed GOSA that she was requesting a 

teleworking accommodation for childbirth-related complications. 

We disagree. By informing GOSA of her need to telework 

following her childbirth, Owens made a specific demand for an 

accommodation in satisfaction of the first part of our failure-toaccommodate test. But the second part of our test—demonstrating

that the requested accommodation is reasonable—requires that an 

employee put her employer on notice of the disability for which 

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she seeks an accommodation and provide enough information to 

allow an employer to understand how the accommodation would 

address the limitations her disability presents. Because Owens did 

neither, we conclude that Owens did not demonstrate that her 

requested accommodation was reasonable.

1. 

We have not specifically addressed how an employee who 

makes a demand for an accommodation can meet her obligation to 

demonstrate that her requested accommodation is reasonable. But 

we believe that an employee must do at least two things: identify 

her disability and suggest how the accommodation will overcome 

her physical or mental limitations.

First, our caselaw and the statutory text establish that an 

employee must identify her disability before an employer is 

obligated to engage in an interactive process about 

accommodating that disability. We have held that a plaintiff cannot 

sustain a prima facie case of disability discrimination without proof 

that her employer knew of her disability. Morisky v. Broward 

Cnty., 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996). Our requirement that 

disabled employees notify their employers of their disability flows

from the Rehabilitation Act’s text, which imposes a duty on 

employers to accommodate only disabilities that are “known” to 

them. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)

(incorporating § 12112); see also 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9 

(“[A]n employer would not be expected to accommodate 

disabilities of which it is unaware.”). It is “evident that an employee 

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cannot be fired ‘because of’ a disability” in violation of the statute

“unless the decisionmaker has actual knowledge of the disability.”

Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2005). 

In most cases, to identify a disability, an employee must 

provide at least some information about how a physical or mental

condition limits her functioning. The statutory text defines a 

disability as a physical or mental impairment that limits a major life 

activity, such as “performing manual tasks, . . . lifting, bending, 

speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 

communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a), (2)(a)

(defining disability under the ADA). Consistent with that 

definition, the statute requires employers “to make reasonable 

accommodation only to the physical or mental limitations” caused 

by the employee’s physical or mental condition. 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 

1630, App. § 1630.9 (emphasis added). Accordingly, to put her 

employer on notice of her disability, an employee must identify—

at least in broad strokes—the limitations her mental or physical 

condition imposes.

Second, we believe an employee must provide her employer 

enough information to assess how her proposed accommodation 

would help her overcome her disability’s limitations. We have held 

that “[a]n accommodation can qualify as ‘reasonable’ . . . only of it 

enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the 

job.” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255–56 (citing LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft 

House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998)). The same 

accommodation might be appropriate for one disability and 

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inappropriate for another, and the same disability may require 

different accommodations for different employees. See Ward v. 

McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Few disabilities are 

amenable to one-size-fits-all accommodations.”). Accordingly, an

employee must link her disability to her requested accommodation 

by explaining how the requested accommodation could alleviate 

the workplace challenges posed by her specific disability.

The bottom line is that employees must give employers 

enough information to respond effectively to an accommodation 

request. We have made clear that “an employer is not required to 

accommodate an employee in any manner that the employee 

desires—or even provide that employee’s preferred 

accommodation.” D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022, cert. denied, 141 S. 

Ct. 1435 (2021). Therefore, when an employee triggers an 

employer’s accommodation duties, the employer must expend 

time and expense to explore the universe of reasonable 

accommodations, identify one that is mutually agreeable to the 

parties, and implement it. To begin this interactive process, “an 

employer needs information about the nature of the individual’s 

disability and the desired accommodation.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 31. 

The type and extent of information that an employee must 

provide will depend, of course, on the particulars of each case. The 

link between the disability and the requested accommodation may

often be obvious. “[A]n employee confined to a wheelchair,” for 

instance, “would hardly need a doctor’s report to show that she 

needed help in getting to her workstation if this were accessible 

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only by climbing a steep staircase.” Id. at 32 (quoting Langon v. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 

1992)). But in other circumstances, the link between a person’s 

limitations and the requested accommodation will be unclear 

without additional information. Because this information is 

“typically possessed only by the individual or her physician,” id., it 

is reasonable that the employee inform her employer how the 

accommodation she seeks will address her limitations before 

requiring the employer to initiate the interactive process.

Even so, we expect an employee’s informational burden to 

be modest. Although “[v]ague or conclusory statements revealing 

an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on 

notice” of its accommodation duties, Morisky, 80 F.3d at 448, an 

employee is not required to provide her employer with detailed or 

private information about her disability to initiate the employer’s 

duty to engage in an interactive assessment about the need for an 

accommodation. We recognize that “[d]isabled employees . . . may 

have good reasons for not wanting to reveal unnecessarily every 

detail of their medical records because much of the information 

may be irrelevant to identifying and justifying accommodations, 

could be embarrassing, and might actually exacerbate workplace 

prejudice.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d 

Cir. 1999). Rather, to trigger an employer’s accommodation duties,

a disabled employee need only identify a statutory disability and 

explain generally how a particular accommodation would assist 

her.

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2. 

Owens argues that she sufficiently notified GOSA of her 

disability and linked that disability to her telework request. She 

points to her doctor’s statement that she had delivered a child by csection and may work remotely until November and her statement 

that she experienced “childbirth-related complications,” requiring 

“two blood transfusions.” We disagree that this information was 

sufficient. 

Courts and regulators have recognized that neither 

childbirth nor pregnancy qualifies as a disability under the statute. 

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) (“Other conditions, such as 

pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are 

also not impairments.”); Farrell v. Time Serv., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 

1295, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“It is clearly established that pregnancy 

per se does not constitute a disability under federal law.”) 

(collecting cases). “Disability” is a statutory term, which the 

Rehabilitation Act defines as “a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Boyle, 866 

F.3d at 1288 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102)). To be sure, a pregnancy- or childbirth-related 

impairment may qualify as a disability, but only if that impairment 

substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 

1630.2(h). But the conditions themselves are not disabilities. 

Although Owens’s unspecified “childbirth-related 

complications” may have caused a disability, Owens never 

identified what that disability was. She points to her c-section and 

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blood transfusions as information identifying a disability, but these 

are medical procedures and treatments, not disabilities. See 

cesarean section, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

(2016) (“a surgical procedure . . . for delivery of offspring”); blood 

transfusion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2016) (“a 

medical treatment in which someone’s blood is put into the body 

of another person”). As with childbirth-related complications, such 

procedures or treatments may cause a disability, but Owens failed 

to identify any such disability in her communications with GOSA.1

There is no obvious limitation on functioning that arises from 

having had a c-section or a blood transfusion five or six weeks 

earlier.

Having failed to identify a disability, Owens also failed to 

explain to GOSA why teleworking would accommodate her

disability. Although her doctor’s recommendation that she 

telework qualifies as a demand for a specific accommodation, it 

does not explain how that accommodation would alleviate any 

physical or mental limitation. 

1 By way of comparison, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 

enforcement guidance identifies several specific pregnancy-related 

impairments that it says could be sufficiently severe to substantially limit a 

person’s functions. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-NVTA2015-2, Questions and Answers about the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on 

Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (June 25, 2015), 

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-about-eeocsenforcement-guidance-pregnancy-discrimination-and (all internet materials as 

visited Sept. 27, 2022, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

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Viewed in its entirety, and in the light most favorable to 

Owens, the information Owens provided GOSA amounts to 

nothing but “[v]ague or conclusory statements revealing an 

unspecified incapacity.” Morisky, 80 F.3d at 448. Because such 

information is not enough to trigger an employer’s duties under 

the Rehabilitation Act, Owens’s claim that GOSA discriminated 

against her by failing to provide her reasonable accommodations 

fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, we need not decide whether 

her claim fails on the ground that she caused a breakdown in the 

interactive process. Cf. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1256.

B.

Owens also maintains that the district court erred when it 

granted GOSA summary judgment on Owens’s retaliation and 

pregnancy discrimination claims on the ground that she failed to 

show pretext. We disagree.

In addition to imposing liability for failing to provide 

reasonable accommodations, the Rehabilitation Act also prohibits 

retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected activity. 

29 U.S.C.§ 794(a). Further, Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy 

Discrimination Act, prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 

(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Because both claims are governed 

by the same legal framework, see Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 

161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (citing 

Cash, 231 F.3d at 1305 n.2), we address them together. 

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Where, as here, a plaintiff claims discrimination or 

retaliation based on circumstantial evidence, we ordinarily apply 

the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).2 See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. 

Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 

2004)); Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 

1280, 1294 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 

948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020)). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Alvarez, 

610 F.3d at 1264 (citing Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087); Tolar, 997 F.3d 

at 1294 (citing Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325). If the plaintiff satisfies 

this burden, the burden of production then shifts to her employer 

to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264 (citing Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087); Tolar, 

997 F.3d at 1294 (citing Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325). If the employer 

proffers even one such reason, the burden then shifts back to the 

plaintiff, who must show that the reason given by the employer 

2 Alternatively, we have said that, even if a plaintiff fails to satisfy her burden 

under the McDonnell Douglas framework, she may still defeat summary 

judgment by presenting “a convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that 

“raises a reasonable inference that the employer discriminated” against her. 

Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 

Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (describing 

types of relevant circumstantial evidence under Smith). Owens does not argue 

that she satisfies this alternative framework on appeal.

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 21

was a mere pretext for discrimination. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264

(citing Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087); Tolar, 997 F.3d at 1294 (citing 

Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325). “Importantly, throughout this entire 

process, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the 

employee.” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 

2013). 

To establish pretext and avoid summary judgment, the 

plaintiff “must present ‘significant probative’ evidence,” Mayfield 

v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(citations removed), “sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder 

to conclude that the discriminatory animus was the ‘but-for’ cause 

of the adverse employment action,” Sims, 704 F.3d at 1332 (citing 

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)). This 

evidence must reveal “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable 

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Jackson v. Ala. 

State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th 

Cir. 1997)).

Our review on this issue is limited. We “do not sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business 

decisions.” Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 

(11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 

F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988)). Nor may we analyze whether an 

employer’s proffered reasons “are prudent or fair,” Damon v. 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 22

Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th 

Cir. 1999), or find pretext “by simply quarreling with the wisdom 

of th[ose] reason[s],” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 

1295, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 

F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)). We have made clear that an 

“employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, 

a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as 

its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v. WLCY 

Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984). If 

the evidence shows that the “employer[] w[as] dissatisfied with [the 

plaintiff] for . . . non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or 

unfairly so,” the employer is entitled to summary judgment. 

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (citing Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470). 

Here, even assuming Owens established a prima facie case 

of retaliation and pregnancy discrimination, both claims still fail 

because Owens has not shown that GOSA’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing her—failing to return her reasonable 

accommodation paperwork or return to the office as requested—

were pretextual. 

Owens argues that GOSA’s first reason—Owens’s failure to 

submit her reasonable accommodation paperwork by GOSA’s 

deadline—was pretextual because Owens made every effort to 

expedite her doctor’s paperwork process (a process outside of her 

control); GOSA knew of these efforts; and, in any event, GOSA did 

not need this information to make an informed decision about

Owens’s accommodation request. We disagree. The undisputed 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 23

evidence negates any inference that GOSA’s request for additional 

information, or its choice to fire Owens after she failed to abide by 

that request, were motivated by illegal discrimination. 

We already concluded that Owens failed to provide GOSA 

with sufficient information to allow it to adequately assess Owens’s 

accommodation request. GOSA was therefore within its right to 

request additional information from Owens before deciding 

whether to approve her teleworking accommodation. 

The evidence also demonstrates GOSA’s genuine interest in 

obtaining this information and establishesthat GOSA was prepared 

to approve Owens’s accommodation request upon its receipt. Not 

only did GOSA extend Owens’s deadline for submitting her 

paperwork, but GOSA had already begun preparing a teleworking 

plan for Owens in anticipation of receiving it. 

This evidence establishes that GOSA fired Owens, not for 

any discriminatory reason, but rather because Owens kept GOSA 

in the dark as to when it could expect to receive Owens’s 

paperwork or what that paperwork would reveal about her 

medical condition. Owens never communicated with GOSA 

directly about how telework would reasonably accommodate any 

childbirth-related disability. She also failed to submit GOSA’s

medical release, which would have authorized GOSA to contact 

Owens’s doctor directly. Finally, she neglected to share with GOSA 

that her doctor had a 20-day turnaround for paperwork requests.

An employer is not required to wait indefinitely for necessary 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 24

information supporting an accommodation request. A reasonable 

jury could not find pretext here. 

Next, Owens argues that GOSA’s second proffered reason 

for firing her—failing to return to the office after several 

warnings—was also pretextual because it was implausible, 

incoherent, and inconsistent, given GOSA’s own policy required

employees on FMLA leave to submit a medical release before 

returning to work. Owens argues that, under this policy, she was 

not permitted to return to work, as her doctor cleared her to work 

only remotely. Because we conclude that GOSA’s first reason for 

firing Owens was not pretextual, Owens’s retaliation and 

pregnancy discrimination claims fail as a matter of law even if she 

is correct that GOSA’s second reason is suspect. Wascura v. City of 

South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 

employer is entitled to summary judgment unless the employee 

establishes that “each of the [employer’s] proffered reasons is 

pretextual”).

In any event, we disagree that this second reason for firing 

Owens was pretextual. GOSA’s FMLA policy did not require an 

employee to be released to return to the physical office; it required 

only that she be released “to return to work.” The parties agree 

that Owens’s August 3 doctor’s note released her to return to work 

in a remote capacity, and that Owens was no longer on FMLA 

leave once she began teleworking on August 6. And by requiring 

that an employee’s medical release specify any “restrictions” on an 

that employee’s return, GOSA’s FMLA policy contemplates the 

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21-13200 Opinion of the Court 25

possibility of “returning to work” in a limited capacity, such as 

remotely. Owens was thus free to return to work under GOSA’s 

medical release policy. 

And no matter what we believe the policy requires, the

evidence that Good believed Owens was medically released to 

return to work under the policy forecloses Owens’s pretext 

argument. The pretext analysis centers on the employer’s 

subjective beliefs; “the employee’s beliefs” or even “reality as it 

exists outside of the decision maker’s head” is irrelevant. Alvarez, 

610 F.3d at 1266 (citing Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th 

Cir. 1997)); see also Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. And Good’s belief that 

Owens had been medically released to return to work is entirely 

consistent with her decision to fire Owens for failing to return to 

the office. 

Because the evidence shows Good was “dissatisfied” with 

Owens “for . . . non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or 

unfairly so,” Owens has not shown pretext, and both her retaliation 

and pregnancy discrimination claims fail as a matter of law. See 

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (citing Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470).

IV. 

For these reasons, the district court is AFFIRMED.

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