2022 WI App 37

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2021AP708-CR

Complete Title of Case: 

†Petition for Review filed

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CATTI J. MEISENHELDER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.†

Opinion Filed: June 15, 2022

Submitted on Briefs: April 14, 2022

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Neubauer, Grogan and Kornblum, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of Susan E. Alesia, assistant state public defender of Madison. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of Sonya K. Bice, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, 

attorney general. 
2022 WI App 37

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 15, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP708-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF126

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CATTI J. MEISENHELDER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Calumet County: 

JEFFREY S. FROEHLICH, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Kornblum, JJ. 

¶1 GROGAN, J. Catti J. Meisenhelder appeals from a judgment entered 

after she pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine, contrary to WIS. STAT.

§ 961.41(3g)(g) (2019-20). Meisenhelder contends the circuit court erred when it 

denied her motion to suppress, which alleged that police lacked probable cause to 
No. 2021AP708-CR

2

search a small metal canister on her keychain while searching her purse pursuant to 

her arrest for retail theft. She believes the search violated the Fourth Amendment1

because, according to her, the canister was too small to contain a weapon or any 

evidence of a crime. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2019, a Walmart loss prevention officer caught Meisenhelder 

stealing merchandise. Walmart notified Appleton Police about the retail theft, and 

Officer Jordan Woelfel and Officer Derek Anderson were dispatched to the store. 

When the officers arrived, they saw that Walmart loss prevention officers had 

detained Meisenhelder in the loss prevention office. One of the loss prevention 

officers reported that Meisenhelder had concealed two items in her purse—a bottle 

of mouthwash and an eyeliner, worth a total of $18.18—and had attempted to leave 

the store without paying for them. These two items were on the desk in the office 

when the police arrived. 

¶3 The police told Meisenhelder they would need to search her purse to 

see if there were any additional stolen items inside, and Meisenhelder consented to 

the search. While searching the purse, one of the officers found a metal canister 

about the size of a “12 gauge shotgun shell” attached to her keys. The canister, 

which was “slightly wider in diameter ... than a 12 gauge shotgun shell” was 

opaque, making it impossible to view its contents. The officer unscrewed the 

canister cap and found a bag with suspected methamphetamine inside. Police then 

read Meisenhelder her Miranda2rights, and she subsequently stated that she 

 

1

 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
No. 2021AP708-CR

3

believed the substance in the canister was methamphetamine. Police did not find 

any additional stolen merchandise inside the purse. When asked whether she had 

any other items on her person the police needed to know about, she gave the police 

several “dime-sized bags from her back pants pocket[,]” which contained residue 

suspected to be from methamphetamine. The officers arrested Meisenhelder, and 

the State charged her with misdemeanor retail theft, possession of 

methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

¶4 Meisenhelder filed a motion seeking to suppress “any and all evidence 

obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, including but not limited to any 

controlled substances located in the purple vial-sized container with a screw-on top 

and any derivative evidence, including all statements made after the unlawful 

search.”3 

¶5 The circuit court denied the motion, relying on State v. Sykes, 2005 

WI 48, ¶2, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277, which upheld the search of Sykes’ 

wallet incident to a lawful arrest. The circuit court here concluded that the search 

of Meisenhelder’s purse was “carried out [as] a valid search incident to arrest[.]” 

Subsequently, Meisenhelder entered into a plea bargain with the State where she 

agreed to plead no contest to the possession charge, and the other two charges would 

be dismissed and read in. 

¶6 The circuit court accepted Meisenhelder’s plea and withheld sentence. 

It placed her on eighteen months’ probation and allowed her to be discharged early 

if approved by her agent. As a condition of probation, the court imposed but stayed 

 

3

 Meisenhelder refers to the canister as a “vial.” However, having observed the “vial” in 

our review of the bodycam video, we refer to the “vial” as a “canister” throughout this opinion, as 

we believe “canister” is a more accurate description based on the item’s metal material, size, and 

dimensions.
No. 2021AP708-CR

4

four months of jail time with Huber release privileges. Judgment was entered. 

Meisenhelder now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 An order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence presents 

a question of constitutional fact, which requires a two-step analysis on appellate 

review. State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶10, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541. 

“First, we review the circuit court’s findings of historical fact under a deferential 

standard, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous. Second, we 

independently apply constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Robinson, 

2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (internal citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

¶8 Meisenhelder argues that the police did not have probable cause to 

open the small metal canister attached to her keychain during the search of her purse 

because, she asserts, it was too small to contain a weapon or evidence of a crime. 

Meisenhelder relies on State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 

N.W.2d 411 (2011), where this court held the warrantless search of vials police 

found during a protective search of Sutton’s car during a traffic stop violated the 

Fourth Amendment. Id., ¶¶2, 7-11. The State responds that the search of 

Meisenhelder’s canister did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was a 

search incident to arrest, and Meisenhelder was within reaching distance of her 

purse. The State cites to numerous cases concluding that when a suspect is searched 

incident to arrest, police can search anything on “‘the arrestee’s person’” and “‘the 

area from within which [the suspect] might gain possession of a weapon or 

destructible evidence.’” See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 
No. 2021AP708-CR

5

2016) (alteration in original; citations omitted). We conclude the law permitted the 

search of the canister in Meisenhelder’s purse. 

A. Fourth Amendment and Search Incident to Arrest Principles

¶9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” and that 

“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 

Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution likewise provides that “[t]he right 

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 

unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” and that “no warrant shall 

issue but upon probable cause[.]” WIS. CONST. art. I, § 11.

¶10 “A [search or] seizure conducted without a valid warrant is 

presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶24, 345 Wis. 2d

563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)). 

The “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness[.]’” 

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Whether a search is exempt 

from the warrant requirement involves balancing “the degree to which it intrudes 

upon an individual’s privacy and ... the degree to which it is needed for the 

promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 

295, 300 (1999). 

¶11 In balancing these interests, courts have concluded that warrantless 

searches may comport with the Fourth Amendment if a search falls within a 

recognized exception. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). One 

well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment includes the search incident 
No. 2021AP708-CR

6

to a lawful arrest. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014); State v. Bauer, 

2010 WI App 93, ¶6, 327 Wis. 2d 765, 787 N.W.2d 412.

¶12 The law permits a warrantless search incident to arrest because 

searching the arrested person and the area within her reach is recognized as 

reasonable. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Chimel

explained:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 

officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 

weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist 

arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 

might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 

addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 

search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in 

order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area 

into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 

or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like 

rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is 

arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one 

concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is 

ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s 

person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—

construing that phrase to mean the area from within which 

he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible 

evidence.

Id. An arrestee has lessened privacy interests because an arrest “significantly 

diminish[es]” the suspect’s privacy interests. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386; Mincey v. 

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1978). The reasonableness of the search-incidentto-arrest exception includes closed containers found on an arrestee’s person, see 

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973), and since United States v. 

Robinson, courts have repeatedly recognized as lawful the searching of objects 

found on an arrestee’s person. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 

(7th Cir. 1993) (allowing search of address book); United States v. Molinaro, 877 

F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing search of wallet). Thus, the warrantless search 
No. 2021AP708-CR

7

of an arrestee’s person and items found on the arrestee’s person does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment.4 The Supreme Court directs that “a search incident to the arrest 

requires no additional justification[,]” Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, because “the fact 

of arrest alone justifies the search.” Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631-

32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

¶13 The search-incident-to-arrest exception also permits police to search 

items not actually located on the person but also in the area within the arrestee’s 

reach. “The scope of a search incident to arrest is confined to ‘the area from within 

which [the suspect] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence[.]’” 

Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶20 (first alteration in original; citation omitted). A search 

may precede an arrest so long as the officer had probable cause to arrest prior to the 

search. Id., ¶2 (holding search was lawful because “law enforcement had probable 

cause to arrest ... for a crime prior to the search”). 

B. Application 

¶14 The search at issue here arose incident to Meisenhelder’s arrest for 

stealing items at a Walmart store, and the search occurred in Walmart’s loss 

prevention office. Meisenhelder, relying primarily on Sutton, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 

contends that the search of the canister conducted incident to her arrest violated her 

Fourth Amendment rights. In Sutton, this court held that police needed a warrant 

to search two “cylindrical and opaque” vials discovered in the map pocket of 

Sutton’s car during a protective search after a traffic stop for failure to wear a 

seatbelt. Id., ¶¶5, 11. Police searched Sutton’s car because they saw the car make 

 

4

 This general principle does not apply to a cell phone, which the United States Supreme 

Court declared may not be searched under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. See Riley v. 

California, 573 U.S. 373, 385-86 (2014). 
No. 2021AP708-CR

8

“two distinct rocking motions”—movement the police thought could be Sutton 

trying to “retrieve or conceal a weapon[,]” which caused them to fear for their safety. 

Id., ¶4. Sutton held that the search of the car itself complied with the Fourth 

Amendment because it was reasonable for the police to make sure “there was no 

gun or other weapon” in the car. Id., ¶8. But Sutton went on to conclude that

because the cylinders were too small to house a weapon, and the police did not have 

“‘probable cause to believe there [was] a connection between the [opaque cylinders] 

and criminal activity[,]’” id., ¶¶10-11 (first and second alterations in original; 

citation omitted), the search of the cylinders violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Sutton decided that Sutton’s suppression motion should have been granted and 

reversed his judgment of conviction. Id. 

¶15 Sutton does not control here. First, the search in Sutton was not based 

on the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Rather, the police conducted a protective 

search based on the officer’s concern that Sutton may have had a weapon in the car 

and “because Sutton was not under arrest and could freely return to [his vehicle].” 

Id., ¶8. Second, the search in Sutton involved concerns only about a weapon, and 

the cylinders involved in Sutton were too small to house a weapon. Thus, the 

officers’ “legitimate reason to be concerned that there might be a gun or other 

weapon[,]” which justified looking in the vehicle itself, did not apply to the 

cylinders. Id. When the officers found the cylinders in the car’s map pocket, the 

analysis shifted to the plain-view exception and whether probable cause existed to 

reasonably believe that the cylinders “were connected to ‘criminal activity.’” Id., 

¶9.

¶16 Here, it is undisputed that the police had probable cause to arrest 

Meisenhelder for retail theft. The search of the contents of her purse constituted a 

lawful search incident to arrest. It is of no import that the probable cause for the 
No. 2021AP708-CR

9

retail theft arrest also led to drug-related charges being filed. See Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 

742, ¶¶22, 34 (“That the arrest led to drug-related charges being filed, not to a charge 

for criminal trespass, does not negate that probable cause to arrest existed prior to 

the search.”). The search-incident-to-arrest exception permitted the police to search 

both Meisenhelder’s person and objects within her reach. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 

762-63; Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶¶14, 21. The circuit court found that 

Meisenhelder’s purse was “in the immediate area and used in the commission of the 

alleged offense.” That finding, based on this court’s viewing of the officers’ 

bodycam video of the entire incident, is not clearly erroneous. Meisenhelder was 

not handcuffed while the officer searched her purse, and she was located within 

reaching distance of her purse in Walmart’s very small loss prevention office.5 It is 

undisputed that Meisenhelder had placed the items she attempted to steal in her 

purse—she was using her purse to conceal stolen merchandise. We are further not 

convinced that the presence of four officers in the loss prevention office with 

Meisenhelder somehow negated Meisenhelder’s ability to reach her purse. See

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (search incident to arrest permissible 

when “arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance ... at the time of the 

search”). 

¶17 Additionally, the bodycam video provided this court with the 

opportunity to see the actual size of the canister. Although the canister is small—

described as the size of a twelve-gauge shotgun shell but a little wider—it is not so 

 

5

 Meisenhelder also relies on United States v. Maddox, 614 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010), but 

Maddox involved much different facts. It involved the search of a keychain in Maddox’s vehicle 

after Maddox had been handcuffed and placed in the police squad car. Id. at 1047. The court held 

that “this was not a search of Maddox’s person incident to arrest” because after Maddox was 

handcuffed and placed in the squad car, the keychain was no longer on his person or in his 

immediate control. Id. at 1048. Additionally, Maddox is not binding on this court. See State v. 

Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 95, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993) (“State courts are not bound by the decisions 

of the federal circuit courts of appeal or federal district courts.”). 
No. 2021AP708-CR

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small that it could not have contained additional stolen merchandise. At the 

suppression hearing, when asked whether the cylinder was too small to hide stolen 

merchandise, the officer testified, “you can put very small things into that vial”[,]

and “[i]t can be used to ... hold a lot of small things.” Having viewed the size of 

the cylinder, it appears to be of sufficient size so as to have hidden a variety of small 

objects. 

IV. CONCLUSION

¶18 The circuit court correctly denied the suppression motion here 

because the search of Meisenhelder’s purse and its contents, including the small 

metal canister attached to her keychain, constituted a valid search incident to her 

arrest for retail theft. When police have probable cause to arrest a person, the law 

recognizes as reasonable the search of the person and anything within her reach. 

See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. The purse was within Meisenhelder’s reach, and 

it is undisputed that she used her purse to conceal merchandise she attempted to 

steal. The search of the canister, which could have contained stolen merchandise, 

was not unreasonable.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.