COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

September 9, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP2450-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF5564

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JUSTIN JACKSON,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: DENNIS R. CIMPL, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded 

with directions. 

Before Blanchard, Dugan and Donald, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Based on guilty pleas, Justin Jackson was convicted

of possession of a firearm by a felon and threatening a law enforcement officer. He 

appeals the judgment of conviction and the order denying a motion for 

postconviction relief. In his postconviction motion, Jackson contended that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to inform 

him, before he decided to enter the pleas, that he had a potentially meritorious 

motion to suppress evidence. Following a Machner hearing, the circuit court denied

the motion based on a determination that trial counsel did not perform deficiently in 

failing to recommend that Jackson pursue a suppression motion.1 We agree with

Jackson that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the potential 

suppression issue. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying postconviction relief, 

and direct that the circuit court hold the suppression hearing that Jackson now seeks.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The criminal complaint charged that on December 8, 2016, in West 

Allis, Jackson possessed a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of WIS. STAT. § 941.29(1m)(a) (2017-18), and intentionally threatened to 

cause bodily harm to a law enforcement officer, in violation of WIS. STAT.

§ 940.203(2).2 The complaint alleged in pertinent part that: Jackson was pulled 

over in a traffic stop; he was placed under arrest on a warrant; and in a search of the 

car police discovered a loaded pistol. Jackson did not move to suppress evidence 

obtained as a result of the search of his vehicle.

 

1

 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

3

¶3 In April 2017, Jackson entered pleas of guilty to both counts and, at 

the same hearing, was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two and one-half years 

of initial confinement and two and one-half years of extended supervision, to be 

served consecutively to a revocation sentence in a separate case. 

¶4 In June 2018, Jackson filed a motion for postconviction relief. 

Jackson alleged that his trial counsel had “rendered constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by failing to file a suppression motion challenging the search of the car.” 

The motion attached a report by an officer summarizing the stop, arrest, and search. 

Jackson relied on the report as the factual basis to request a Machner hearing and a 

suppression hearing. The State’s response also relied on the same police report for 

relevant allegations of fact. 

¶5 The circuit court held a Machner hearing in November 2018, at which 

the two witnesses were trial counsel and Jackson. The parties and the circuit court 

all appeared to rely entirely on the police report for relevant allegations of fact

regarding the stop, the arrest, and the search at the Machner hearing, and neither 

side offered any evidence regarding those events that was different from or 

additional to the allegations contained in the report. Notably, for reasons we discuss 

below, the State has at no point disputed that, as the report reflects, Jackson was 

arrested and secured in the back of a squad car before the car search began. 

¶6 We now summarize pertinent portions of the police report in detail. 

Police Report

¶7 According to the report, at 11:50 p.m. on a Thursday night the officer 

pulled over a car, driven by Jackson, for traveling approximately forty miles per 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

4

hour in a thirty miles per hour zone. After Jackson stopped his car, the officer saw 

Jackson

reaching around inside the vehicle. It appeared to me from 

behind the vehicle, with my patrol squad car spot light

illuminat[ing] ... the rear of the vehicle that [Jackson] was 

moving very directly towards the passenger side of the 

vehicle as though concealing something and trying to

conceal his motions beneath my field of vision. I have made 

thousands of traffic stops and observed movements from 

driver[]s of numerous different types of vehicles for such 

things [as] registrations and ID cards prior to my 

approaching the vehicle. I am able to say that these 

movements were different[;] there was a furtive nature to the 

movements that made it appear that Jackson was attempting 

to conceal something and conceal his motions by crouching 

down and moving more quickly than normal.

I immediately drew my firearm and began to order 

the driver to stop moving around and to show me his hands. 

Jackson placed his hands outside the front driver’s side window. The officer asked 

Jackson to step out of the car. Jackson responded “that he did not wish to step out 

of the vehicle and said that he did not consent to a search of his vehicle.” The officer 

then told Jackson that he “needed to step out of the vehicle because I was not sure 

what he was reaching for just prior to my approaching the vehicle and making 

commands.”

¶8 The officer further stated in the report that he opened the driver’s door 

of the car, at which time 

Jackson began to step out of the vehicle. As Jackson was 

standing in the threshold of the front driver’s door I asked 

him to step to the rear of the vehicle and [I] grabbed his arm 

to escort him to the rear of the vehicle. Jackson said no and 

I felt that he was displaying resistive tension in his arm 

where I was holding on to it. I accessed my conductive 

electrical weapon ... and began to draw it as he finally began 

to step to the rear of the vehicle. Jackson came to the rear of 

the vehicle and consented to a search of his person.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

5

Jackson explained to the officer that his fiancé owned the car. The officer “asked 

Jackson to sit on the curb” and then, after he apparently complied, the officer asked 

Jackson if he was “on paper for anything.” Jackson responded that he was “on 

parole.”

¶9 The officer further stated in the report that he obtained identification 

information from Jackson and learned by running this information through the 

police system that Jackson had an outstanding warrant. The officer arrested Jackson 

on that warrant, and placed him in the rear of the squad car. Jackson said that “the 

warrant was a mistake.” The officer explained to Jackson that the officer “would 

double check the warrant [through] the computer and that [Jackson] needed to get 

into the squad car.” The officer had to tell Jackson “numerous times to place his 

feet inside the squad car before he would comply” sufficiently for the officer to 

safely close the squad door. The officer confirmed the active warrant through 

various data systems, and saw that Jackson was “on felony parole.”3

¶10 The officer further stated in the report that, with Jackson secured in 

the squad car, the officer searched the car and found a loaded semiautomatic 

handgun in the glove compartment. The officer reported that, “from the movements 

[of Jackson] that I observed” immediately following the stop, “it was reasonable for 

me to believe” that Jackson “was making furtive movements reaching towards” the 

glove compartment immediately following the stop. 

¶11 The police report addresses other events, which allegedly occurred 

only after the search of the car began or after the search ended, and which do not 

 

3

 However, the report further reflects that, later, the officer asked a dispatch operator to 

confirm the warrant and “learned that the warrant entry [that the officer] observed attached to the 

name of Jackson was kept in the system through error.”
No. 2018AP2450-CR

6

have any bearing on the arguments presented by the parties in this appeal. For 

context we note that the report alleges that the officer heard Jackson violently kick 

the squad car and that Jackson threatened law enforcement. But, so far as is alleged 

in the only report referenced by the parties, all of this alleged activity began after 

the officer started searching the car.

4

Machner Hearing

¶12 Jackson testified at the Machner hearing that he had no memory of 

trial counsel discussing with him the possibility of filing a motion to suppress 

evidence. He further testified that, if trial counsel had told him that she could file a 

potentially successful suppression motion, then he would have pursued that option, 

and also that he entered guilty pleas only because he believed that he did not have 

any other “choice but to take the [plea] deal” offered by the prosecution. 

¶13 Trial counsel testified that she concluded while representing Jackson 

that he did not have a potentially successful motion to challenge the search of the 

car for the following reasons, and that she discussed her reasoning with Jackson

before he decided to enter guilty pleas. First, under the doctrine of inevitable 

discovery, the discovery of the gun fit an exception to warrant requirement because 

the car would have inevitably been towed and lawfully searched by police. Second, 

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), could not apply to support a suppression 

motion here, because, in the words of trial counsel, “the officer thought that there 

was a valid warrant [for Jackson] at the time that the search was conducted and [the 

 

4

 The State makes no argument that trial counsel could have provided deficient 

performance in failing to identify a potential winning suppression argument as to only one of the 

counts of conviction (felon in possession or threatening a law enforcement officer) and not the 

other.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

7

officer] was operating on” the belief that he could validly arrest Jackson on a 

warrant.

5

 Third, WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r) permits law enforcement to search any 

property under the control of a person on extended supervision based on a 

reasonable belief that he or she has engaged in criminal activity or violated a 

condition of supervision, and the furtive movements allegedly observed by the 

officer might have triggered § 302.113(7r) because the officer knew that Jackson 

was on extended supervision.

6

Circuit Court Ruling

¶14 The circuit court concluded that trial counsel in her testimony 

“correctly analyzed” the law to conclude that Jackson “would not prevail on a 

motion to suppress.” The court suggested that it believed that trial counsel had 

reasonably counseled Jackson by relying on all three of the points she made in her 

 

5

 As we address in more detail below in responding to an argument by the State, this is a 

non sequitur. The test in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), is not concerned with the validity 

of an arrest of a vehicle occupant. Gant holds that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent 

occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 

compartment at the time of the search or if the vehicle contains evidence of the offense resulting in 

the arrest. Id. at 343. Trial counsel attempted to explain her reasoning on this topic as being related 

to the search incident to arrest doctrine, which is in fact one focus in Gant, but she did not provide 

any recognizable interpretation of Gant as potentially related to the alleged facts here. 

While on the topic of Gant, we note for context that our supreme court has adopted “the 

reasoning in Gant as the proper reading of Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 

(protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures),” so that under both the state and federal 

constitutions the vehicular search incident to arrest rule permits a search “only if the person arrested 

is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search,” 

and when it is “‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 

vehicle.’” See State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶27, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 (citation 

omitted).

6

 At one point in her testimony, trial counsel asserted a qualification to her answer on the 

topic of WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r). She testified to the understanding that § 302.113(7r) “by itself” 

did not give the officer here authority to search the car. However, she did not explain what she 

meant by this.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

8

testimony at the Machner hearing and denied the postconviction motion on that 

basis.

DISCUSSION

¶15 Jackson argues the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the warrantless search of his car and that he is entitled to a suppression 

hearing. We agree that Jackson has shown that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance and that as a consequence Jackson’s case must be remanded for a 

suppression hearing.

¶16 The pertinent ineffective assistance of counsel standards are well 

established:

“Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is 

guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel.” The 

same right is guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the 

Wisconsin Constitution. Whether a defendant was denied 

effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and 

fact. The factual circumstances of the case and trial 

counsel’s conduct and strategy are findings of fact, which 

will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; whether 

counsel’s conduct constitutes ineffective assistance is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. To demonstrate 

that counsel’s assistance was ineffective, the defendant must 

establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that 

the deficient performance was prejudicial. If the defendant 

fails to satisfy either prong, we need not consider the other.

State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (citations 

omitted).

¶17 Also firmly established are the following pertinent Fourth 

Amendment standards:

The Fourth Amendment protects against 

“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

9

Seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable 

unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement. The State bears the burden to prove that one of 

the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.

State v. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25, ¶12, 392 Wis. 2d 232, 944 N.W.2d 8 (citations 

omitted). “Unless an exception applies, a search without a warrant is per se

unreasonable.” State v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, ¶10, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 

N.W.2d 920 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). As is evident 

from the background summary above, the State does not contend that the officer had 

a warrant to search the car when he was pulled over for allegedly speeding.

¶18 Consistent with the standards we have just quoted, we now address in 

turn deficient performance and prejudice before ending on remedies.

I. DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE

¶19 The deficient performance that Jackson must prove is addressed under 

the following pertinent standards:

Whether trial counsel performed deficiently is a 

question of law we review de novo. To establish that 

counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant must 

show that it fell below “an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” In general, there is a strong presumption 

that trial counsel’s conduct “falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” 

Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38 (citations omitted).

¶20 Jackson contends that trial counsel performed deficiently because she 

relied on misunderstandings of the law in counseling him about his likely prospects 

at a suppression hearing. The State argues that trial counsel’s performance was not 

deficient because she gave him advice that was, in one particular part, correct and 

that in any case her counsel on the potential suppression motion issue did not fall 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

10

below “an objective standard of reasonableness” under the deficiency standards 

referenced above. We conclude that trial counsel failed to provide correct advice 

and that this was deficient performance. 

¶21 On appeal, the State expressly disavows two potential grounds to 

justify the car search referenced by trial counsel in her Machner hearing testimony 

and by the circuit court in denying the postconviction motion: the search incident 

to arrest doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine. In fact, on the search 

incident to arrest topic, the State’s brief on appeal fails even to mention Gant or 

allude in any way to the holding of that case that police may search a vehicle incident 

to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or the vehicle 

contains evidence of the offense resulting in the arrest.7 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 

¶22 The State’s only developed argument is based on the protective search 

exception to the Fourth Amendment. That is, the State argues that trial counsel did 

not perform deficiently because she correctly told Jackson that the State would be 

able to show at a suppression hearing that the officer had reasonable suspicion based 

on specific and articulable facts that Jackson was dangerous and might gain 

immediate control of a weapon, justifying a protective search under a recognized 

Fourth Amendment exception. See State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶24, 299 Wis. 2d 

675, 729 N.W.2d 182 (police may conduct a protective search of the passenger 

compartment of a vehicle during a traffic stop if the officer reasonably believes that 

 

7

 The State here does not argue that the offense providing the basis for arrest here (a 

warrant based on unpaid court fees) supplied the basis for the officer to believe that the car 

contained relevant evidence justifying a warrantless vehicle search under Gant. Trial counsel took 

the position in her Machner hearing testimony that she could only “speculat[e]” about whether the 

officer might have found evidence of failure to pay a court fee in the car. 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

11

the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons in the 

passenger compartment); citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) 

(applying the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to the validity of 

protective searches executed during a roadside stop).

8

¶23 This court has had the opportunity to summarize the applicable 

standards as follows:

Whether a law-enforcement officer may “conduct a 

protective search” of a car is “decide[d] on a case-by-case 

basis, evaluating the totality of the circumstances, whether 

an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify a protective 

search in a particular case.” State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 

49, ¶9, 334 Wis. 2d 379, ... 799 N.W.2d 775 ... (quotation 

marks and quoted source omitted). “[R]easonable 

suspicion” is a “commonsense” concept that implicates 

“factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 

which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 

act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) 

(quotation marks and quoted sources omitted). Thus, there 

must be a balance between danger and privacy, and when 

law-enforcement officers make a traffic stop, the danger is 

significant. See Buchanan, [334 Wis. 2d 379, ¶18] (“As we 

have frequently noted, traffic stops are dangerous for law 

enforcement, and permitting a limited search is a reasonable 

way to balance the competing interests involved.”); State v. 

Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶36, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 19, 758 N.W.2d 

775 ... (“Warrantless searches are presumed to be 

unconstitutional. Our jurisprudence has established several 

exceptions to this constitutional rule, based on a balance 

between the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests and the government’s promotion of its 

legitimate interests.”) (internal citation omitted).

 

8

 We question whether trial counsel clearly testified at the Machner hearing that she 

understood and conveyed to Jackson that the protective search doctrine was a basis for denial of a 

potential motion to suppress. However, Jackson does not make this point. For purposes of 

resolving this appeal we assume without deciding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient 

for the sole reason that she failed to identify this as an issue while representing Jackson; that is, we 

assume that in her testimony she did identify the protective search doctrine as a basis to sustain the 

search and that she provided that advice to Jackson before he entered his pleas of guilty. 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

12

State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, ¶7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 N.W.2d 411 (2011).

¶24 The problem with the State’s argument is that the need to strike a

“balance” described in Sutton between “danger” and “privacy” plainly could not 

apply here for a simple reason. On the facts assumed by the parties and the circuit 

court, Jackson was under arrest and sitting in the back of the squad car before the 

search began. Therefore he could not return to the car to gain control of any weapon 

that might be there. “[T]he sole justification [for] a protective search under Terry 

[v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),] is the protection of the police officers and others 

nearby.” Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶37 n.13. It cannot be argued that the search 

of the car here was necessary to protect anyone under the assumed facts. 

¶25 We made a similar point in Sutton itself. There, the protective search 

rationale applied in part because, at the time of the search, the driver of a vehicle

who had been stopped for a traffic violation had not been arrested and therefore 

could “freely” obtain a weapon from the van. Sutton, 338 Wis. 2d 338, ¶¶2, 8. Put 

differently, under the reasoning of Sutton, the significant potential dangers that 

generally exist for law enforcement when they conduct traffic stops based on 

occupants possibly accessing weapons in vehicles, which is emphasized in cases

such as Buchanan, evaporates when all occupants are unable to access the vehicle.

¶26 This was essentially the same point we made in State v. Williams, 

2010 WI App 39, ¶23, 323 Wis. 2d 460, 781 N.W.2d 495 (“Williams 2010” to 

distinguish a separate case with the same name referenced below). As we noted in 

Sutton, in Williams 2010 we determined that a warrantless search of a vehicle was 

justified by officer safety because there was a distinct possibility that Williams 

would return to the vehicle. See Sutton, 338 Wis. 2d 338, ¶8. In contrast to Sutton

and Williams 2010, the facts on this topic here resemble those in Gant, in which the 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

13

driver’s car was searched without a warrant or consent after he had been arrested, 

handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.

¶27 The State cites to plainly inapplicable case law, such as the Long case

itself, which generally extended the rationale of Terry to protective searches during 

automobile stops. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1046. Under such precedent as Long, 

police have authority to search a vehicle passenger compartment when they have 

reasonable suspicion that an individual is “dangerous” and might return to the 

vehicle to “gain immediate control of weapons.” See id. at 1049. Gant confirms 

that Long, while still good law for that proposition, does not apply when the vehicle 

occupant is under arrest and cannot access the vehicle. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 346-

47 (distinguishing Long).9

¶28 In some situations, application of these rules may be difficult because 

there is ambiguity about whether a recent vehicle occupant could have regained

access to the vehicle to obtain a weapon. But not so on the facts assumed by the 

parties here. After a routine stop for speeding 10 miles over the limit, the only 

occupant of the vehicle was arrested and securely detained based on what the officer 

then reasonably believed was a valid outstanding warrant. Stated in terms of the 

legal test, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer here could not have had 

 

9

 The facts of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), readily illustrate the difference 

between the situations in which recent vehicle occupants have the ability to return to the vehicle 

and possibly access a weapon at the time of the search and those in which they lack that ability. 

After Long was pulled over, he met officers at the rear of his vehicle. See id. at 1035-36. Officers 

observed a large knife through the open front passenger door of his vehicle. Id. Long was not 

under arrest at the time of the search. Id. In explaining its rationale, the court in Long explained 

that, “[j]ust as” in Terry, in which “a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the brief 

control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect 

in Long’s position break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile.” 

Id. at 1051.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

14

reasonable suspicion that the arrested and squad-car-detained Jackson may have 

been able to gain immediate control of a weapon from the car. Thus the officer 

could not have been justified in carrying out a protective search to ensure officer 

safety.

¶29 This defeats the only argument clearly advanced by the State on 

appeal. While discussing facts pertinent to its protective search argument, the State 

makes a passing reference to WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r).10 If the State intends to 

make an argument based on § 302.113(7r) it is undeveloped and we do not address 

it further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 

1992). 

¶30 Both sides give considerable attention to Johnson, in which our 

supreme court held that the behavior of the occupant of a stopped vehicle, which

police testified was a signal to them of the possibly dangerous concealment of a 

weapon or contraband, was not sufficient to justify a protective search. See 

Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶¶2-7, 34-47. The police in Johnson could not lawfully 

conduct a protective search of a stopped car because they lacked “‘specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

 

10

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 302.113(7r) is located within the chapter addressing prisons, in the 

section addressing “[r]elease to extended supervision for felony offenders not serving life 

sentences,” and states in its entirety:

A person released under this section, his or her residence, 

and any property under his or her control may be searched by a 

law enforcement officer at any time during his or her period of 

supervision if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is 

committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime or a 

violation of a condition of release to extended supervision. Any 

search conducted pursuant to this subsection shall be conducted in 

a reasonable manner and may not be arbitrary, capricious, or 

harassing. A law enforcement officer who conducts a search 

pursuant to this subsection shall, as soon as practicable after the 

search, notify the department.
No. 2018AP2450-CR

15

reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Id., ¶21 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 

However, we have explained why the State’s argument based on the protective 

search exception has no starting point, and therefore all of this argument by the 

parties is irrelevant. 

¶31 Summing up on the deficiency issue, Jackson has shown that his trial 

counsel was deficient in failing to provide him with a correct understanding of his 

opportunity, based on the assumed facts, to potentially prevail at a suppression 

hearing, relying on an argument that the State is not able to show that the warrantless 

search of the car was permitted under any recognized exception to the Fourth 

Amendment.11

II. PREJUDICE

¶32 The prejudice that Jackson must prove to establish ineffective 

assistance is addressed under the following standards:

Whether any deficient performance was prejudicial 

is also a question of law we review de novo. To establish 

that deficient performance was prejudicial, the defendant 

must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.”

Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶39 (citations omitted).

 

11

 In a brief, pro forma argument, the State asserts, “[a]t the very least, counsel reasonably 

thought that a suppression motion would have been denied,” and “[e]ven if [she] was incorrect,” 

her thinking “was reasonable.” We reject as undeveloped the apparent suggestion that either the 

pertinent law was unsettled or that trial counsel was, through no fault of her own, deprived of 

information that would have allowed her to give correct advice. We rely on law that was well 

settled at the time and there is no suggestion that counsel did not have the police report on which 

our analysis rests. 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

16

¶33 The State effectively concedes that, if trial counsel was deficient in 

failing to correctly analyze the potential suppression issue, then Jackson was 

prejudiced in failing to have the opportunity for a suppression hearing. The State 

argues only that a suppression motion would necessarily have been “meritless” on 

the assumed facts for reasons that we have rejected. 

III. REMEDIES REQUIRED BY THIS APPEAL

¶34 Jackson requests that we reverse the order denying the postconviction 

motion and remand with directions that the circuit court hold a suppression hearing.

We grant those requests.

¶35 The State does not pose any objection to a suppression hearing that 

we have not rejected. In particular, it does not raise any procedural or other 

objection to a suppression hearing in the event that we reject its arguments regarding 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the suppression issue. Accordingly, we 

remand for a suppression hearing and all ordinary proceedings to resolve the case 

that would follow a suppression hearing.

¶36 We emphasize again that, following the parties and the circuit court 

at the time of the Machner hearing, all of our discussion in this opinion has been 

based on the only allegations of fact in the record, namely, those contained in the 

police report attached to Jackson’s postconviction motion. It will be for the circuit 

court at the suppression hearing to determine the range and types of evidence to be 

permitted and to resolve all arguments advanced by either side.

¶37 Whether suppression is required, and if so precisely what evidence 

must be suppressed, are issues that need to be litigated in the circuit court based on 

the evidence presented by the parties or agreed to by stipulation. Trial counsel 
No. 2018AP2450-CR

17

should have filed a suppression motion and, consistent with the legal principles that 

we apply above, the circuit court should have ordered a hearing on that motion. We 

also express no opinion about appropriate further remedies to follow in the event 

that evidence is suppressed following a suppression hearing, because that would be 

premature.

CONCLUSION

¶38 For all of these reasons, we reverse the order denying the 

postconviction motion and remand with directions that the circuit court proceed to 

a suppression hearing.

By the Court.—Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded 

with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.