1

Filed 4/20/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RUEGG & ELLSWORTH et al.,

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF BERKELEY et al., 

Defendants and Respondents,

CONFEDERATED VILLAGES OF 

LISJAN et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

 A159218

 (Alameda County Super. Ct.

 No. RG18930003)

Ruegg & Ellsworth and Frank Spenger Company applied to the City of 

Berkeley (City) for approval of a mixed-use development pursuant to 

Government Code section 65913.4, which provides for streamlined, 

ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified 

requirements and conditions. The City denied the application for failure to 

meet several statutory requirements. Appellants now appeal the trial court’s 

denial of the petition for writ of mandate by which they sought to require the 

City to grant their application. For the reasons explained herein, we will 

reverse the judgment and remand with directions for the trial court to grant 

the writ petition.
2

BACKGROUND

In 2015, appellants submitted an application for a mixed-use

development at 1900 4th Street (Spenger’s parking lot) in Berkeley with 135 

apartments over approximately 33,000 square feet of retail space and 

parking. The project site is the block bordered by Hearst Avenue on the 

north, University Avenue on the south, Fourth Street on the east, and the 

Union Pacific Railroad tracks (Third Street) on the west. 

The development site is part of a three-block area the Berkeley 

Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission) designated a City of 

Berkeley Landmark in 2000, as the location of the West Berkeley Shellmound

(CA-ALA-307) (Shellmound).1 The Shellmound is listed in the California 

Register of Historical Resources. 

As described in the City’s landmark application, the Shellmound “is 

believed to have been one of the first of its kind at the Bay’s edge, built ca 

3,700 B.C.,” 1,000 years before the first pyramid.

2 Shellmounds were “sacred 

burial sites for the average deceased mound-dweller,” slowly constructed over 

thousands of years from daily debris and artifacts left by the tribelet 

communities that lived on the site. “The importance of the shellmounds 

should not be underestimated.” Shellmounds contained “ritual burials 

exhibiting a variety of deliberate, traditional positioning and use of burial 

goods” and “[e]ven to this day, native descendants value these mounds as 

1 The landmark area extends north to south from Hearst Avenue to 

University Avenue and east to west from 4th Street to I-880. 

2 A 2017 letter from a University of California Berkeley professor of 

Anthropology states that the Shellmound is the earliest known shellmound 

site in the region, first occupied about 4,900 years ago and used for the next 

3,700 years, and sporadically revisited after that. It is #307 of “no less than 

four hundred and twenty-five shellmounds on or near the shoreline of the 

Bay” recorded by Archaeologist N.C. Nelson in 1907 and 1908. 
3

sacred resting sites of their early ancestors.” In 1950, a University of 

California Berkeley archeologists removed “numerous artifacts and 95 

human burials” from the Shellmound. Other findings from the Shellmound 

include a section of the floor of a “large, presumably ceremonial house,” 

firepits, burials revealing ceremonial red paint and “mortuary goods,” animal 

burials, food debris, and artifacts providing information about diet and 

means of food collection, shell beads, and stone and bone tools. 

The decision approving the West Berkeley Shellmound as a City 

landmark states that the Shellmound “is most highly significant to native 

descendants as a sacred burial ground,” its “cultural resource lies in its age, 

the fact that it is the oldest and one of the largest mounds established around 

the bay, that it represents ancient culture, that it was built by the earliest 

humans in the area,” that “it is recognized that this historical resource has 

yielded and is likely to yield information ‘important in prehistory or history,’ ”

and that “the Shellmound plays an important role in the history of the 

changing shoreline and the change in attitude towards the use of natural 

resources.” The landmark designation does not include any above ground 

buildings or structures; it included “the site itself and all items found 

subsurface including artifacts from the earliest native habitation, such as but 

not limited to native tools, ornaments, and human burials.” 

Nothing remains of the Shellmound above ground. As described in a 

November 2016 Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) prepared for the 

Berkeley Planning and Development Department (Department) in connection 

with appellants’ 2015 application, by the mid-20th century, “most of the 

Shellmound had been systematically demolished by development and related 

ground disturbance. Shellmound materials were scattered throughout the 

surrounding area as agricultural fertilizer and for road-building and paving.” 
4

A 1950 survey reported that the “original dimensions and exact limits of the 

Shellmound could not be determined because most of it had been removed,” 

but it “seems to have covered an elliptical area, conservatively estimated at 

350 x 600 feet, with its long axis paralleling Strawberry Creek.” The portion 

remaining in 1950 measured 45 by 100 feet. Its highest point was 15 feet 

above ground, but it had been higher, as “the peak had been cut down and 

leveled to serve as the base for a water tank,” and it extended three feet 

below ground.

One of the questions in this case is whether the Shellmound was 

actually located on the project site. According to the historical reviews 

documented in the administrative record, a 1949 survey placed the 

Shellmound between Hearst and University and between Second and Fourth 

Streets. A report prepared for appellants in January 2017, by Geosphere 

Consultants, Inc., contains several historical maps of the area, including an 

1856 United States Coast and Geodetic Survey map showing one shellmound 

to the east of the project site and one to the west of the site; the same is true 

on a 1957 United States Geological Survey map. Based on these and other 

maps, as well as exploratory borings, the report concluded the shellmounds 

were in “close proximity to” but did not “encroach onto the project site.” 

Graphics and video consultants for interveners Confederated Villages 

of Lisjan (CVL), using the 1856 and 1957 maps and a 2018 “OpenStreetMap,” 

created a series of maps that show the shellmound to the west of the project 

site “mostly within the block west of the Project site” but extending into the 

northwest corner of the project site.

A map from a 1907 manuscript shows the Shellmound on much of 

the project site and extending to the east of Fourth Street. 
5

As related in a 2002 “Cultural Resources Inventory” prepared for the 

City by Garcia and Associates (lead author Christopher Dore), in 1999 Allen 

Pastron of Archeo-Tec placed and evaluated borings within the northeastern 

quadrant of the Spenger’s parking lot, near the intersection of Fourth Street 

and Hearst Avenue, and found “no evidence to suggest that remnants of the 

West Berkeley Shellmound exist” in that area. Pastron conducted additional 

testing in 2000, and found two “culturally sensitive areas” containing

“prehistoric deposits” of silt or silty clay “interspersed with flecks of charcoal, 

a relatively small quantity of fish and mammal bone, a few pieces of fireaffected rock, several possible stone artifacts and ubiquitous amounts of 

shell,” one in the northwestern quadrant of the parking lot at depths of five to 

nine feet, and the other in the east-central portion of the site at depths of six 

to nine feet. Pastron opined that material from the six- to eight-foot layer of

Boring #19, in the northwest quadrant, “probably represents a remnant of 

CA-ALA-307,” although there were no tools, prehistoric artifacts, or “other 

signs found that this is assuredly part of CA-ALA-307.” Pastron concluded 

the data was insufficient to determine whether the “areas of prehistoric 

cultural sensitivity represent zones of primary or secondary archeological 

deposition.” He stated, however, that because it appeared “certain that the 

heart of the West Berkeley Shellmound (CA-ALA-307) was situated directly 

to the west of the present project area, across the Union Pacific Railroad 

tracks” and “the site’s original horizontal boundaries were quite extensive, 

but never precisely determined . . . it is possible that the recently identified 

cultural deposit may represent an undisturbed, or at least minimally 

disturbed, remnant of the eastern edge of the West Berkeley Shellmound 

(CA-ALA-307).” 
6

In 2001, a geoarchaeological investigation conducted in connection with 

the Cultural Resources Inventory found intact primary deposits of 

shellmound material in several locations adjacent to the project site on 

Fourth Street, University Avenue, and Hearst Avenue. The report noted, 

with reference to Pastron’s findings, that “the cultural levels in the parking 

lot are more deeply buried than the shell levels on 4th Street.”

In 2014, Archeo-Tec conducted another investigation of the Spenger’s 

parking lot site, again overseen by Pastron, in consultation with Andrew 

Galvan, a Native American resource consultant and member of the Ohlone 

Tribe. The investigation included excavation of 20 trenches in the central 

portion of the project site and two larger ones in the northwest portion, 

placed to “extensively sample” areas identified in the 2000 excavation as 

“potentially containing shellmound material,” and use of ground-penetrating 

radar to pinpoint the “most likely areas of potentially intact midden.” 

Archeo-Tec did not find “intact shellmound” or “primary shellmound deposits”

anywhere within the project site, and the “culturally derived deposits” 

recovered appeared to be “redeposited,” “not in primary context.” The report 

explained that test trenches 21 and 22 were opened to “overlap the area 

previously penetrated by Boring #19 (see Pastron 2000), which indicated a 

high potential of finding intact shellmound deposits.” No artifacts were 

recovered from trench 21. The investigators stated that, “[u]pon closer 

examination,” they determined Boring #19 “probably did not originally 

contain intact shellmound between 5 and 9 feet below surface level” because 

they “only encountered a thin layer of crushed shell,” which they believed was

“most likely a redistributed remnant of the West Berkeley Shellmound (for 

the purposes of road building and agricultural soil improvement, described 

elsewhere) and not the intact shellmound itself.” In trench 22, the 
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investigators found “a historic period bottle embedded in the shellmound 

material, which suggests that the material was redeposited relatively 

recently and is thus not in original context.” 

The 2014 data led the investigators to conclude that Shellmound 

materials identified within the parking lot during testing in 1999 and 2000,

were in “secondary deposition,” having “probably originated from the West 

Berkeley Shellmound” but “moved from their original location onto the 

project site as a consequence of natural creek deposition or in the late 19th or 

early 20th century during one of many episodes of human-induced 

topographic modification.” The investigators stated, “we think it is not 

possible that the culturally derived deposits we encountered were 

undisturbed remnants of the eastern edge of the West Berkeley Shellmound. 

Indeed, based on available evidence . . . it is most parsimonious to interpret 

the shellmound deposits encountered as highly disturbed, secondarily 

emplaced and probably intentionally distributed, for purposes of road 

building and agricultural soil enhancement.” 

The 2014 report acknowledges it could not “eliminate with absolute 

certainty the possibility that significant historic and pre-contact cultural 

materials exist within the footprint of the Spenger’s Parking Lot site” but the

investigators were “confident . . . that this possibility is quite low.” Still, “[i]n 

consideration of the known long occupation of the area by the Ohlone people 

and others before them, and in accordance with the known proximity of one of 

the most important precontact shellmounds in the state of California (i.e., the 

West Berkeley Shellmound),” the investigators recommended monitoring of 

“all project related ground disturbance below the historic fill layer (which we 

find in the Spenger’s Parking Lot in excess of approximately 4 feet below the 

present ground surface)” by a qualified archaeologist and a representative of 
8

the Ohlone people, and a site-wide ground-penetrating radar (GPR) survey 

prior to full-scale ground-disturbance and demolition.” 

The DEIR, after review of these and other investigations, stated that 

although “National Register or California Register-eligible shellmound 

deposits” had not been identified on the project site in previous excavations, 

“the possibility exists that intact shellmound deposits could be present in 

areas that have not been previously excavated” and “excavation could 

potentially unearth previously unidentified intact shellmound deposits that 

contribute to the resource’s significance under the National Register and 

California Register. These impacts would have a substantial adverse change 

on a historical resource due to the destruction of those critical aspects of 

integrity that qualify it as a City Landmark and for listing in the National 

Register and California Register.” The DEIR concluded that without 

mitigation measures, the project would have significant impacts including 

“[a]dverse changes in the significance of a historical resource, the West 

Berkeley Shellmound (City Landmark #227) during ground disturbing 

activities.” The mitigation measures, which the DEIR stated would reduce 

the impacts to “a less-than-significant level,” included an archaeological 

survey with ground-penetrating radar to identify areas most likely to yield 

shellmound material; cultural awareness and sensitivity training for 

construction contractors prior to ground disturbance; archaeologist review of 

utility plan prior to issuance of demolition or grading permits to assess 

potential impacts of, and mitigation measures for, utility excavations; and 

monitoring of all ground-disturbing activities by an archaeologist and a 

representative of an Ohlone Tribe. 

Galvan, as president of the Board of Directors of Ohlone Indian Tribe, 

Inc., commented that the DEIR was “accurate with respect to the 
9

archeological rigor and methodology” to which the site had been subjected

and asked that the mitigations be “vigorously enforced throughout earth 

working activities.” The Commission, however, based on “extensive public 

testimony” and review of written testimony and documentation, commented 

that the DEIR was “seriously deficient,” particularly with respect to cultural 

resources.

On April 5, 2018, appellants asked the City to suspend processing of 

the use permit and California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)

documentation for the project effective March 8, 2018. 

Meanwhile, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 35 (Senate Bill 35), 

effective January 1, 2018, adding section 65913.4 to the Government Code.3 

(Stats. 2017, ch. 366, § 3.) Section 65913.4 requires a “ministerial approval 

process” for certain affordable housing projects when a locality has failed to 

provide its share of “regional housing needs, by income category.” (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(4)(A).)4

Section 65913.4, subdivision (a), provides that if a proposed 

development satisfies all of the “objective planning standards” enumerated in 

the statute, it is subject to a “streamlined, ministerial approval process” and 

“not subject to a conditional use permit.” Among the objective planning 

standards, as relevant here, and as worded at the time of appellants’ 

3 Further statutory references will be to the Government Code unless 

otherwise specified.

4 The Housing Element Law (§ 65580 et seq.) establishes a system by 

which the state’s need for housing is determined on a regional basis, with a 

share allocated to each locality in the region and the locality responsible for 

developing a plan to provide its share of the regional housing needs 

assessment (RHNA). (§§ 65584.01, 65584.05, 65583, subd. (c), 65583.2, 

65588.)
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application,5 the development must be “a multifamily housing development 

that contains two or more residential units” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(1)); the 

development must be “located on a site that satisfies all of the following: 

[¶] . . . [¶] (C) A site that is zoned for residential use or residential mixed-use 

development, or has a general plan designation that allows residential use or 

a mix of residential and nonresidential uses, with at least two-thirds of the 

square footage of the development designated for residential use” (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(2)(C));

6 and the development must be “consistent with objective 

zoning standards, objective subdivision standards, and objective design 

review standards in effect at the time that the development is submitted to 

the local government pursuant to this section” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5)).

Additionally, the development must not be located on a site where any of the 

following apply: “The development would require the demolition of a historic 

structure that was placed on a national, state, or local historic register.” 

(§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C).) 

If the local government determines that a development submitted 

pursuant to section 65913.4 is “in conflict with any of the objective planning 

standards specified in subdivision (a), it shall provide the development 

proponent written documentation of which standard or standards the 

5 Section 65913.4 has been amended a number of times. This opinion 

will refer to the statute in effect at the time of appellants’ application and 

point out relevant subsequent changes as necessary.

6 An amendment to section 65913.4 in 2020, among other things, 

changed the relevant language of subdivision (a)(2)(C), as indicated in italics: 

“The development and the site on which it is located satisfy all of the 

following: . . . (C) It is zoned for residential use or residential mixed-use 

development, or has a general plan designation that allows residential use or 

a mix of residential and nonresidential uses, and at least two-thirds of the 

square footage of the development is designated for residential use.” (Stats. 

2020, ch. 194, § 1, italics added.)
11

development conflicts with, and an explanation for the reason or reasons the 

development conflicts with that standard or standards,” within 60 days for a 

development of up to 150 housing units or within 90 days for a development 

containing more than 150 housing units. (§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(1), now 

subd (c)(1).) “If the local government fails to provide the required 

documentation pursuant to paragraph (1), the development shall be deemed 

to satisfy the objective planning standards specified in subdivision (a).” 

(§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(2), now subd. (c)(2).)

On March 8, 2018, appellants submitted an application pursuant to 

section 65913.4 for development at the 1900 4th Street site of 260 dwelling 

units, 50 percent of which would be “affordable to low-income households,” 

over approximately 27,500 square feet of retail space and parking.

In May 2018, an attorney representing CVL informed the City of his 

client’s intent to sue if the City found the project was subject to ministerial 

approval under section 65913.4. 

On June 5, 2018, the Department provided appellants the written 

response required by section 65913.4, subdivision (b)(2) (“90-day letter” or 

“June 2018 letter”), stating that Senate Bill 35 does not apply to the project 

“to the extent it impinges on legitimate municipal affairs (preservation of a 

designated City landmark) but nevertheless detailing the Department’s 

analysis of the statutory objective standards. The Department determined

that several components of the application were inconsistent with the criteria 

for streamlined approval and that further information was needed as to 

others. As relevant here, the Department stated that the project conflicted 

with the City’s Affordable Housing Mitigation Fee (AHMF) requirements and 

Landmarks Preservation Ordinance (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5)); that if the 

Shellmound or another historic structure was beneath the site, the project 
12

could require demolition of a historic structure that was placed on a historic 

register (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C)); and that the project potentially conflicted 

with the City’s requirements that a project meet applicable performance 

standards for off-site impacts and not exceed amount and intensity of use 

that can be served by available traffic capacity (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5)).

After appellants responded to each of the City’s points, the Department 

denied the application for ministerial approval. Its September 4, 2018 letter 

first explained that Senate Bill 35 could not constitutionally be applied to the 

project because of the City’s right, as a charter city, to govern itself with 

regard to municipal affairs, including protection of local landmarks. Second, 

the letter explained that if Senate Bill 35 applied, the project did not satisfy 

the requirements for ministerial approval due to conflict with the City’s 

AHMF requirements with respect to very low-income units, conflict with the 

City’s requirements regarding traffic impacts, and fact that the project might 

require demolition of historic structure that has been placed on a state and 

local historic register. The Department stated that appellants’ original 

application had been placed on hold and they were welcome to reactivate that 

project or reapply under a standard use permit for the revised project. 

On November 28, 2018, appellants filed a petition for writ of mandate 

and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and the 

Department. Appellants sought orders declaring Senate Bill 35 

constitutional as to the project and requiring the City to issue the ministerial 

permit for which they applied, alleging that denial of the permit violated both 

section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) (Gov. Code, 

§ 65589.5). The petition challenged respondents’ assertion that Senate 

Bill 35 unconstitutionally impinged on the City’s authority over municipal 

affairs, argued the AHMF and traffic requirements were not objective 
13

standards under Senate Bill 35, and argued the Shellmound was not a 

“structure” within the meaning of the statute and was not located on the 

project site. Appellants filed a supplemental petition and complaint on 

December 17, 2018, in order to bring before the court guidelines for the 

streamlined ministerial approval process issued on November 29, 2018, by 

the California Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD 

Guidelines). 

On February 4, 2019, the trial court granted CVL leave to intervene.

7

Opposing the petition, the City argued the state could not interfere 

with its authority over municipal affairs under the Home Rule doctrine; 

Senate Bill 35 did not preempt the City’s historic protection authority; 

appellants failed to demonstrate the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and 

without any evidence in determining appellants did not establish the project 

would not require “ ‘demolition of a historic structure’ placed on a historic 

register’ ” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C)); Senate Bill 35 does not apply to mixeduse developments, and could not be so applied without violating the home 

rule doctrine; the project does not comply with the City’s AHMF Ordinance

and does not satisfy objective traffic standards; and the City did not 

disapprove the project under the HAA. CVL argued Senate Bill 35 does not 

preempt the City’s discretionary zoning controls protecting its landmarks and 

7 CVL is not listed as a federal or state recognized tribe. (NCSL,

Federal and State Recognized Tribes (updated Mar. 2020) 

<https://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-staterecognized-tribes.aspx#federal> [as of Apr. 20, 2021].) In requesting 

intervention, CVL stated that Confederated Villages of Lisjan is a traditional 

Native American tribe with over 85 members, and Confederated Villages of 

Lisjan, Inc. is a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation formed in 

2017 to “ ‘protect and promote the rights of Ohlone people of the East Bay 

Area, including education, health, cultural and religious rights.’ ” 
14

the City’s determination that the project might require demolition of a 

historic structure that has been placed on a historic register was supported 

by substantial evidence. 

After a hearing in September 2019, the court filed its order denying the 

petition on October 21, 2019. The court denied the petition for two reasons: 

The City’s determination that the project would require demolition of a 

historic structure was not “entirely without evidentiary support,” and section 

65913.4 does not apply to mixed-use developments. The trial court did not 

reach the other grounds respondents8 raised in support of the denial of 

ministerial approval.

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial, arguing that 

recent amendments to section 65913.4 demonstrated the trial court should 

have reviewed the City’s conclusion that the project would destroy a 

historical structure for substantial evidence rather than applying a more 

deferential standard of review, and also demonstrated the statute applies to

mixed-use developments. The trial court denied the motion. Judgment was 

entered on December 19, 2019. 

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Section 65913.4 is one of a number of measures the California 

Legislature has adopted to address the crisis of insufficient housing in the 

state. Declarations of the statewide importance of housing in general, and 

affordable housing in particular, have appeared in legislation for decades. 

(E.g., §§ 65580, subd. (a), as enacted in 1980, Stats. 1980, ch. 1143, p. 3697,

see Stats 1999, ch. 967; 65913 [“there exists a severe shortage of affordable 

8 We refer to the City and Planning Department collectively as 

respondents. We refer to intervener CVL separately.
15

housing, especially for persons and families of low and moderate income” and 

“there is an immediate need to encourage the development of new housing”].)

Some 30 years ago, the Legislature amended the HAA to include a 

number of findings regarding affordable housing, including that the “lack of 

affordable housing is a critical problem which threatens the economic, 

environmental, and social quality of life in California” (§ 65589.5, subd. 

(a)(1)), the “excessive cost of the state’s housing supply is partially caused by 

activities and policies of many local governments that limit the approval of 

affordable housing, increase the cost of land for affordable housing, and 

require that high fees and exactions be paid by producers of potentially 

affordable housing” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)), “among the consequences of 

those actions are discrimination against low-income and minority households, 

lack of housing to support employment growth, imbalance in jobs and 

housing, reduced mobility, urban sprawl, excessive commuting, and air 

quality deterioration” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(3)), and “[m]any local governments 

do not give adequate attention to the economic, environmental, and social 

costs of decisions that result in disapproval of housing development projects, 

reduction in density of housing projects, and excessive standards for housing 

development projects” (§ 65589.5, subds. (a)(1)–(a)(4), added by Stats. 1990, 

ch. 1439, § 1).9 Among other things, the Legislature prohibited a local 

government from disapproving housing development projects affordable to 

low and moderate-income households unless it found one of a number of

enumerated conditions by substantial evidence. (§ 65589.5, subd. (d).) The 

Legislature stated, “This section shall be applicable to charter cities, because 

9 After subsequent amendments, these provisions appear in the current 

statute as section 65589.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A) through (a)(1)(D).
16

the Legislature finds that the lack of affordable housing . . . is a critical 

statewide problem.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (g).)

The Legislature added a number of additional findings in 2017, 

effective January 1, 2018. (Stats. 2017, ch. 368, § 1.5; Stats. 2017, ch. 373, 

§ 1.5; Stats. 2017, ch. 378, § 1.5.) These include:

“California has a housing supply and affordability crisis of historic 

proportions. The consequences of failing to effectively and aggressively

confront this crisis are hurting millions of Californians, robbing future 

generations of the chance to call California home, stifling economic 

opportunities for workers and businesses, worsening poverty and 

homelessness, and undermining the state’s environmental and climate 

objectives.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(A).)

“While the causes of this crisis are multiple and complex, the absence of 

meaningful and effective policy reforms to significantly enhance the approval 

and supply of housing affordable to Californians of all income levels is a key 

factor.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(B).)

“California’s housing picture has reached a crisis of historic proportions 

despite the fact that, for decades, the Legislature has enacted numerous 

statutes intended to significantly increase the approval, development, and 

affordability of housing for all income levels, including this section.”

(§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(J).)

“The Legislature’s intent in enacting this section in 1982 and in 

expanding its provisions since then was to significantly increase the approval 

and construction of new housing for all economic segments of California’s 

communities by meaningfully and effectively curbing the capability of local 

governments to deny, reduce the density for, or render infeasible housing 
17

development projects and emergency shelters. That intent has not been 

fulfilled.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(K).)

Section 65589.5, subdivision (a)(2)(L), states, “It is the policy of the 

state that this section be interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford 

the fullest possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision 

of, housing.”

Senate Bill 35, enacting section 65913.4, was filed with the Secretary of 

State on the same day as the bill amending section 65589.5 as just described. 

As with section 65589.5, the Legislature stated that the changes made by 

Senate Bill 35 would apply to charter cities because “ensuring access to 

affordable housing is a matter of statewide concern, and not a municipal 

affair.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 366, §§ 3 [subd. (h)(4)]10 and 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.) 

Like section 65589.5, section 65913.4 contains a provision declaring the state 

policy “that this section be interpreted and implemented in a manner to 

afford the fullest possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and 

provision of, increased housing supply.” (§ 65913.4, subd. (n).) Senate Bill 35 

added “[s]treamlining housing approvals during a housing shortage” to a list 

of “reforms and incentives” the Legislature has provided “to facilitate and 

expedite the construction of affordable housing.” (§ 65582.1, subd. (p); Stats. 

2017, ch. 366, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.) 

Our interpretation of section 65913.4 is necessarily guided by these

Legislative pronouncements, as our primary task is to effectuate the 

Legislature’s intent.

10 Senate Bill 35 defined “locality” and “local government” as meaning 

“a city, including a charter city, a county, including a charter county, or a city 

and county, including a charter city and county.” (§ 65913.4, former subd. 

(h)(4), now subd. (k)(6).)
18

I.

A.

In denying the petition under section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C), the 

trial court applied the deferential standard of review applicable under Code 

of Civil Procedure section 1085,11 commenting that the City’s determination 

the project “would require the demolition of a historic structure” was 

“strongly contradicted by the results of [appellants’] 2014 archeological 

research” but holding it was “not entirely without evidentiary support.” The 

court noted that Pastron’s 2000 study of the site determined that “remnants 

in the 6-to-8 foot layer of one sample, labeled Boring 19, ‘probably represents 

a remnant of [the Berkeley Shellmound,]’ ” and a “1949 survey, based on an 

earlier 1907 survey, placed the Berkeley Shellmound on the site.’ ” The court 

held it was “not unreasonable for the City to determine that a pre-contact 

shell midden such as the Berkeley Shellmound is an immovable work built 

up by human artifice, and that it falls within the meaning of the term 

‘structure’ ” and “[i]n the context of the buried or ruined remnants of an 

historic structure, the plain meaning of the term ‘demolish’ includes 

destructive excavation that would destroy the historical or archeological 

integrity of the remnants of the structure.” Since the City’s determinations 

that remnants of the Shellmound existed on the site and that the project 

11 Trial court reviewed the City’s decision pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1085 rather than Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 

because the decision whether to grant a permit under Senate Bill 35 is a 

“ministerial decision that does not require an evidentiary hearing.” Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1094.5 applies where the administrative decision was 

made “as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to 

be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the 

determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or 

officer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) 
19

would require destructive excavation at least 10 feet underground (as 

indicated on diagrams for underground parking 11 feet below ground level) 

were not “entirely lacking in evidentiary support,” the court concluded the 

City did not abuse its discretion in determining the project would require 

demolition of a historical structure. 

The standard of review for traditional mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1085), calls for the court to determine whether “the agency’s decision was 

arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to 

established public policy, unlawful or procedurally unfair.” (California Public 

Records Research, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 800, 806.) 

Under this deferential standard of review, the court’s role is to “ensure that 

the administrative agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and 

has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choices 

made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.” (Golden Drugs Co., Inc. v. 

Maxwell-Jolly (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1471; O.W.L. Foundation v. City 

of Rohnert Park (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 568, 586.) The appellate court

applies the same standard of review as the trial court, reviewing the agency’s 

action de novo. (American Board of Cosmetic Surgery v. Medical Board of 

California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 534, 547–548; Friends of the Old Trees v. 

Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1393.)

Arguing that the trial court erred in deferring to the City’s factual 

determination that the project would require “ ‘demolition of a historic 

structure’ ” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C)), appellants first contend section 

65913.4 requires the reviewing court to determine whether substantial 

evidence supported the applicant’s position (not the City’s). This argument is 

based upon a 2019 amendment, Assembly Bill No. 1485 (Assembly Bill 1485) 

(Stats. 2019, ch. 663, § 1), appellants describe as establishing a “ ‘substantial 
20

evidence’ standard in favor of [appellants].” Although this amendment did 

not become effective until after the City’s and trial court’s decisions, 

appellants argue it should apply because it only clarified rather than changed 

the law. Further, they argue it should govern our review, because it became 

effective before we rendered our decision in this case.

Entirely apart from reliance upon the statutory amendment, appellants 

argue the deferential standard of review applied by the trial court is 

inappropriate here because it effectively nullifies the legislative intent in 

section 65913.4 by insulating from review the fact-finding underlying an 

agency’s determination whether its ministerial duty to approve a project is 

triggered. We find this argument compelling and for that reason find it 

unnecessary to determine whether the 2019 amendment applies 

retroactively.12

The California Supreme Court has stated that “the discretion granted 

an agency by the legislation authorizing its duties, and hence the appropriate 

standard of review, may vary depending on the language and intent of that 

legislation.” (San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of 

San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 669 (San Francisco Fire Fighters).) The 

12 Assembly Bill 1485 added former subdivision (b)(3) (now subd. (c)(3))

to section 65913.4: “For purposes of this section, a development is consistent 

with the objective planning standards specified in subdivision (a) if there is 

substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that 

the development is consistent with the objective planning standards.” (Stats. 

2019, ch. 663, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The parties dispute whether this 

amendment changed the law—which, in respondents’ view, would otherwise 

require the highly deferential review generally applicable under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1085. If it merely clarified existing law, as appellants 

maintain, it would present no retroactivity issue. (McClung v. Employment 

Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 471–472 (McClung), quoting 

Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western 

Security Bank).)
21

court in San Francisco Fire Fighters was reviewing the city’s determination 

that its charter did not require submission to arbitration of a dispute over a 

rule changing promotion procedures. The charter required binding 

arbitration of disputes between the city and unions representing firefighters, 

but stated an exception for “ ‘any rule, policy, procedure, order or practice . . .

which is necessary to ensure compliance with federal, state or local antidiscrimination laws, ordinances or regulations.’ ” (Ibid.) The court 

explained, “If it can be discerned that the Charter gives the City very little 

discretion to determine what is necessary to ensure compliance, then some 

kind of more rigorous independent review would be required in order to 

prevent the City from circumventing what was intended to be a strict 

limitation on its authority. In other words, the Charter provision may define 

the scope of the City’s discretion, and this in turn shapes not only what is to 

be reviewed but how it should be reviewed: legislation with a narrow 

definition of necessity would not be served by a deferential standard of 

review. But if it can be inferred from the authorizing legislation that a 

municipality has been granted considerable discretion to determine what is 

necessary to accomplish a valid legislative goal, a more deferential standard 

of review is appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 669–670.)

Section 65913.4 expressly limits local governments’ authority over 

applications for development of affordable housing projects meeting the 

specified criteria: Applications under section 65913.4 are for a “streamlined, 

ministerial approval process” based on “objective planning standards.” 

(§ 65913.4, subd (a).) “ ‘A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is 

required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of 

legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning 

such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.’ 
22

[Citation.]” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School 

Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) “Objective” means “[o]f, relating to, or 

based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual’s 

perceptions, feelings, or intentions” (Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)), 

“based only on facts and not influenced by personal feelings or beliefs.” 

(Macmillan Dict. Online (2021)

<https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/objective> [as 

of Apr. 20, 2021.) The Legislature’s choice of language makes obvious its 

intent to constrain local governments’ discretion.

13

Respondents point to Soderling v. City of Santa Monica (1983) 142 

Cal.App.3d 501 (Soderling) as confirming that a reviewing court must defer 

to the agency’s underlying factual determinations even in a ministerial duty 

case. In Soderling, the city’s planning commission had approved tentative 

subdivision maps for condominium conversion projects subject to specified 

conditions; when the petitioner requested approval of final maps, some of the 

conditions, including installation of smoke detectors, had not been completed. 

(Id. at pp. 503–504.) Rejecting the petitioner’s argument that denying 

approval was a breach of the city’s mandatory duty under the Subdivision 

Map Act (§ 66410 et seq.), Soderling stated, “the city council retained 

discretion only to determine whether there had been substantial compliance 

with the conditions; thereafter, performance of its mandatory statutory duty 

required disapproval of petitioner’s final maps.” (Soderling, at p. 509.)

13 Section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(5), defines “objective zoning 

standards” and “objective design review standards” as “standards that 

involve no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and are 

uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or 

criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or 

proponent and the public official prior to submittal.” 
23

Respondents characterize this quotation from Soderling as “describ[ing]

the deference due to the agency’s factual determinations as a matter of 

agency discretion.” In fact, there was no disputed factual question in 

Soderling, as the petitioner admitted not having complied with the 

conditions. But, in any event, the situation in Soderling differs significantly 

from the present case. The question there was whether the petitioner had 

complied with conditions imposed by the local agency pursuant to its 

discretion under the Subdivision Map Act, which the court noted “implicitly 

recognizes the breadth of local powers with respect to regulation of ‘the 

design and location of buildings in such a [condominium] project by or 

pursuant to local ordinances.’ ” (Soderling, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 507.) 

Deference to the city’s factual determinations in that context would be 

consistent with the reasoning of San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 38 

Cal.4th at page 669, as the governing statute gave the city broad discretion to 

determine appropriate conditions for approval of a subdivision map. In the 

present case, the City was not given discretion to impose conditions and then 

determine whether they were satisfied: It was required to approve the

development project if the conditions specified by the Legislature were met. 

The specific issue here—whether the development project “would 

require the demolition of a historic structure that was placed on a national, 

state, or local historic register”—has both a legal and a factual component. 

Whether the Shellmound is a “structure” within the meaning of section 

65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C), is a question of statutory interpretation, a 

legal issue we review de novo. (California Advocates for Nursing Home

Reform v. Smith (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 838, 864.) Whether the Shellmound 

exists on the project site is a question of fact. For the reasons stated above, 

we find the highly deferential standard of review applied by the trial court 
24

inappropriate here. It is unnecessary for us to further define the proper 

standard because, as we will discuss, we find no evidence in the record that 

the project “would require the demolition of a historic structure that was

placed on a . . . historic register.” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C).)

B.

Section 65913.4 does not define the term “structure.” Dictionary 

definitions include “something (such as a building) that is constructed” 

(Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2021) <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/structure> [as of Apr. 20, 2021]), “something that 

consists of parts connected together in an ordered way” and “something that 

has been built” (Collins English Dict. Online (2021) 

<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/structure> [as of 

Apr. 20, 2021].) Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines “structure” as 

“[a]ny construction, production, or piece of work artificially built up or 

composed of parts purposefully joined together” and provides the illustration, 

“a building is a structure.” Public Resources Code section 5024 (concerning 

inventory and list of state-owned historical resources) defines “structure,” for 

purposes of that section and Public Resources Code section 5024.5 (notice of 

proposed actions affecting historical resources on master list), as “an 

immovable work constructed by man having interrelated parts in a definite 

pattern of organization and used to shelter or promote a form of human 

activity and which constitutes an historical resource.” (Pub. Resources Code, 

§ 5024, subd. (h).)14

14 It is perhaps worth observing that the historical structure provision 

appears within a section of the statute otherwise exclusively concerned with 

potential demolition of housing:
25

Appellants maintain the Shellmound is not, and never has been, a 

“structure,” only a “mound” or “heap” that was not “constructed with 

interrelated parts in a definite pattern of organization.” More significantly, 

they argue that even if the Shellmound was at some time in the past a 

“structure,” what currently remains are no more than remnants that cannot 

be viewed as a “structure” for purposes of section 65913.4. 

Respondents quote the 2002 Cultural Resources Inventory’s description 

of the Shellmound as having been “constructed continuously” between 3030 

B.C. and 780 A.D. and statement that shellmounds were “repeatedly used as 

both residential locales and long-term repositories for the dead, and perhaps 

as socio-political centers.” Emphasizing that the “remaining portion of a 

“(7) The development is not located on a site where any of the following 

apply:

(A) The development would require the demolition of the following 

types of housing:

(i) Housing that is subject to a recorded covenant, ordinance, or law 

that restricts rents to levels affordable to persons and families of moderate, 

low, or very low income.

(ii) Housing that is subject to any form of rent or price control through 

a public entity’s valid exercise of its police power.

(iii) Housing that has been occupied by tenants within the past 10 

years.

(B) The site was previously used for housing that was occupied by 

tenants that was demolished within 10 years before the development 

proponent submits an application under this section.

(C) The development would require the demolition of a historic 

structure that was placed on a national, state, or local historic register.

(D) The property contains housing units that are occupied by tenants, 

and units at the property are, or were, subsequently offered for sale to the 

general public by the subdivider or subsequent owner of the property.” 

(§ 65913.4, subd. (7)(A)–(D).)
26

cultural resource does not lose its value by virtue of the fact that a significant 

portion of it has been destroyed,” respondents argue that the “historic 

structure” provision in section 65913.4 demonstrates the Legislature did not 

intend to “eviscerate historical preservation efforts,” including protection of 

“relics” such as the “remainder” of the Shellmound. 

Respondents urge us to construe section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C), 

in pari materia with historic preservation statutes. “It is a basic canon of 

statutory construction that statutes in pari materia should be construed 

together so that all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. 

[Citations.] Two ‘ “[s]tatutes are considered to be in pari materia when they 

relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of person[s] [or] things, 

or have the same purpose or object.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lexin v. Superior Court

(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090–1091.)

Respondents urge that historical preservation statutes “sweep broadly 

in order to protect cultural resources, in whichever form the relic appears” 

and we should construe section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C) the same way. 

Their examples include title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations

section 7.3, subdivision (a)(3)(i), which includes “subsurface structures” and 

“middens” in the definition of “[a]rchaeological resource”;

15 Health and Safety 

Code section 18955, which defines “qualified historical building or structure,”

for purposes of the State Historical Building Code, as “any structure or 

property, collection of structures, and their related sites deemed of 

importance to the history, architecture, or culture of an area by an 

appropriate local or state governmental jurisdiction”; and Government Code 

section 37361, which provides that a city “may provide for places, buildings, 

15 Contrary to respondents’ representation, the regulation does not 

“defin[e] structures to include ‘subsurface structures,’ including ‘middens.’ ”
27

structures, works of art, and other objects, having a special character or 

special historical or aesthetic interest or value, special conditions or 

regulations for their protection, enhancement, perpetuation or use . . . .”

CVL, to the same end, advocates an interpretation of the term 

“structure” that includes the site upon which a historical structure is or was 

located. In addition to the examples provided by respondents, CVL points to 

a provision in the CEQA Guidelines stating that “[a]ny object, building, 

structure, site, area, place, record, or manuscript which a lead agency 

determines to be historically significant or significant in the architectural, 

engineering, scientific, economic, agricultural, educational, social, political, 

military, or cultural annals of California may be considered to be an 

historical resource” (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 14, § 15064.5, subd. (a)(3)), and to 

the National Historic Preservation Act, which defines “historic property” to 

mean “any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object 

included on, or eligible for inclusion on, the National Register, including 

artifacts, records, and material remains relating to the district, site, building, 

structure, or object” (54 U.S.C. § 300308). CVL urges that the landmark 

preservation provisions of the Berkeley Municipal Code refute appellants’ 

“attempt to isolate ‘structures’ from their surrounding ‘sites’ or ‘properties’ ” 

by defining “structure of merit” as including “structures, sites and areas, 

including single structures or sites, portions of structures, groups of 

structures, man-made or natural landscape elements, works of art, or 

integrated combinations thereof, having a special character, or special 

historical, architectural or aesthetic interest or value.” (Berkeley Mun. Code,

§ 3.24.060.B.)

All these examples highlight the importance state and local 

government has attached to historical preservation. But section 65913.4 is 
28

not a historical preservation statute. In asking us to construe 65913.4, 

subdivision (a)(7)(C), in pari materia with historical preservation statutes, 

respondents and CVL seek to have statutes and regulations whose primary 

purpose is to afford protection to historical and cultural resources dictate the 

interpretation of a statute whose primary purpose is to expedite approval of 

affordable housing developments. To be sure, the historic structure exception 

in section 65913.4 indicates the Legislature did not intend to require 

ministerial approval of affordable housing projects at the expense of all 

historical preservation. It stated a limited exception, however, which 

cautions against giving that exception its broadest possible meaning.

Moreover, the provisions that respondents and CVL see as requiring a 

broad definition of the term “structure” in section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a)(7)(C), do not in fact define that term. In fact, the examples point to 

distinctions respondents and CVL attempt to elide, between “structure” 

(which may or may not be a cultural resource) and “cultural resource” (which 

may or may not be a structure), as well as between “structure” and “site.” 

Respondents confuse the issue, for example, in misrepresenting the 

California Supreme Court as having stated that “ ‘historic structures’ . . .

include ‘historical resources’ that are ‘historically or archaeologically 

significant . . . or [are] significant in the cultural annals of California.’ 

(Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 186.)”

What the court actually said was the opposite—that “historical resource” may 

include “structures”: “ ‘ “Historical resource” includes, but is not limited to, 

any object, building, structure, site, area, place, record, or manuscript which 

is historically or archaeologically significant, or is significant in the 

architectural, engineering, scientific, economic, agricultural, educational, 
29

social, political, military, or cultural annals of California.’ ” (Friends of Sierra 

Madre, at p. 186, quoting Pub. Resources Code, § 5020.1.) 

Without question, the Shellmound is an important historical and 

cultural resource. But section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C), uses the term 

“structure,” not “resource” or “site.” The Legislature is certainly aware of the 

distinctions between these terms. Indeed, recent amendments to section 

65913.4 add protections for “potential tribal cultural resources” that, 

according to the legislative findings, were not included in Senate Bill 35 due 

to the Legislature’s “oversight.”16 Assembly Bill No. 831 (Assembly Bill 831), 

effective September 28, 2020, added to section 65913.4. provisions requiring 

the local government to engage in “scoping consultation” with California 

Native American tribes “traditionally and culturally affiliated with the 

geographic area,” if requested by such a tribe upon notice of the intended 

project application. (§ 65913.4, subd. (b); Stats. 2020, ch. 166, § 3, eff. Sept. 

25, 2020; Stats. 2020, ch. 194, § 1.5, eff. Sept. 28, 2020.) These amendments, 

in effect, permit a tribe to insist that a proposed project go through the 

standard discretionary review process, requiring compliance with CEQA and 

its provisions for tribal consultation (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21080.3.1, 

16 Assembly Bill 831 incorporated amendments made by Assembly Bill 

No. 168 (Assembly Bill 168). (Stats. 2020, ch. 194, § 2.) The first two 

legislative findings in Assembly Bill 168 stated, “(a) There was an oversight 

in Senate Bill 35 (Chapter 366 of the Statutes of 2017), in that it did not 

consider the potential destruction of tribal cultural resources, listed on 

registers or potential. [¶] (b) The Legislature desires to correct that 

oversight without losing any of the protections of the Assembly Bill 52 

(Chapter 532 of the Statutes of 2014) process, which is contained within the 

California Environmental Quality Act.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 166, § 1.) 
30

21080.3.2) that would be avoided under the ministerial approval process.

17

As amended, section 65913.4 thus protects “tribal cultural resources”

potentially threatened by a proposed project differently from “a historic 

structure that was placed on a . . . historic register” and would be demolished 

by a proposed project: The former may obtain ministerial approval if the 

17 Under section 65913.4, as amended by Assembly Bill 831, if the tribe 

and local government agree that “no potential tribal cultural resource would 

be affected by the proposed development,” the application can proceed with 

the ministerial approval process. (§ 65913.4, subd. (b)(2)(A).) If the tribe and 

local government agree that a “potential tribal cultural resource could be 

affected by the proposed development” and document an enforceable 

agreement regarding “methods, measures, and conditions for tribal cultural 

resource treatment,” the ministerial process can proceed and the local 

government must ensure the agreement is included in the requirements and 

conditions for the project. (§ 65913.4, subd. (b)(2)C).) If the parties do not 

document such an agreement, the application is not eligible for the 

ministerial process. (Ibid.)

The CEQA consultation process requires the lead agency to consult 

with a California Native American tribe “traditionally and culturally 

affiliated with the geographic area of the proposed project,” if requested by 

such a tribe upon notice of the proposed project, prior to release of a negative 

declaration, mitigated negative declaration or environmental impact report. 

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.3.1, subd. (b).) If requested by the tribe, the 

consultation must include alternatives to the project, recommended 

mitigation measures or significant effects on tribal cultural resources. (Pub. 

Resources Code, § 21080.3.2, subd. (a).) The consultation may include 

“discussion concerning the type of environmental review necessary, the 

significance of tribal cultural resources, the significance of the project’s 

impacts on the tribal cultural resources, and, if necessary, project 

alternatives or the appropriate measures for preservation or mitigation that 

the California Native American tribe may recommended to the lead agency.” 

(Ibid.) Consultation is considered concluded when either the parties agree to 

measures to mitigate or avoid a significant effect on a cultural resource, if a 

significant effect exists, or a party, acting in good faith, determines mutual 

agreement cannot be reached. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.3.2, subd. (b).)
31

affected tribe does not object, while the latter is ineligible for ministerial 

approval at all.

There is no evidence in the record that the Shellmound is now present

on the project site in a state that could reasonably be viewed as an existing 

structure, nor even remnants recognizable as part of a structure. The 

strongest evidence of any intact portion of the Shellmound on the site, and 

the evidence to which the trial court pointed in upholding respondents’ 

decision, is the statement from Pastron’s 2000 study that material from the 

six- to eight-foot layer of Boring #19, in the northwest quadrant of the project 

site, “probably represents a remnant of CA-ALA-307.” But the remnant at 

issue was at best a fragment of whatever structure once existed: The report 

described the material as “gray/black, dry, densely compacted clayey silt, 

containing a significant amount of mussel and clam shell fragments and little 

oyster shell fragments, as well as some mammal bone” and noted, “[n]o tools 

or other prehistoric artifacts encountered, nor were any other signs found 

that this is assuredly part of CA-ALA-307.” In 2014, Pastron reported that 

“[u]pon closer examination, we determined that Boring #19 probably did not 

originally contain intact shellmound between 5 and 9 feet below surface level” 

and that the “thin layer of crushed shell” was “most likely a redistributed 

remnant of the West Berkeley Shellmound” and “not the intact shellmound 

itself.” 

These findings are consistent with the fact that, in designating the 

Shellmound as a City landmark, the City designated not a structure per se 

but a site—the three-block area in which the Shellmound was historically 

located, including “the site itself and all items found subsurface including 

artifacts from the earliest native habitation, such as but not limited to native 
32

tools, ornaments, and human burials.”18 The section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a)(7)(C) exception is for a “structure” placed on a historical register, not for a 

site where a structure once existed. 

Additionally, this exception is for a project that will “require demolition 

of a historical structure.” There is no evidence in the record of a structure 

that could be demolished by appellant’s project. There may well be remnants 

and artifacts that could be disturbed, but that is not the issue under 

section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C) of the statute. With regard to tribal 

cultural resources, the DEIR for the 2015 project concluded impacts on the 

Shellmound would be reduced to “a less-than-significant level” by the 

mitigation measures appellants had agreed to, and appellants confirmed in

connection with the 2018 application that they intended to provide 

“archeological and tribal monitoring during all ground-disturbing activities” 

despite there being no requirement for CEQA compliance under 

section 65913.4. 

Respondents’ determination that appellants’ project would require 

demolition of a historic structure that was placed on a historic register cannot 

be upheld on this record.

C.

CVL argues that if we reverse the decision denying ministerial 

approval, Assembly Bill 831’s tribal cultural resource protections should be 

applied to the project despite the fact that they were not enacted until long 

after appellants’ application, respondents’ denial and the trial court 

18 The Planning Department’s letter to appellants explaining its 

analysis of the 2018 application acknowledges this point, referring to the 

landmarked “area” and “site.”
33

proceedings.19 Respondents disagree: The City and the Department concur 

with appellants that Assembly Bill 831 (and Assem. Bill 168) “are not at 

issue and do not affect the outcome of the appeal,” as they were not in effect 

when the City made its decision on the development application and 

“[n]either AB 831 nor AB 168 include language that they were intended to 

apply retroactively.’ ”

As all the parties recognize, “ ‘[g]enerally, statutes operate 

prospectively only.’ ” (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 475, quoting Myers v. 

Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 (Myers).) “[A] 

statute that interferes with antecedent rights will not operate retroactively 

unless such retroactivity be ‘the unequivocal and inflexible import of the 

terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature.’ (United States v. 

Heth (1806) 3 Cranch 399, 7 U.S. 399, 413; accord, Myers, supra, at p. 840.) 

‘[A] statute may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language 

of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication 

that the Legislature intended retroactive application.’ (Myers, supra, at 

p. 844.)” (McClung, at p. 467.)

In CVL’s view, the newly added statutory provisions can be applied

here because they are procedural rather than substantive and, if they are 

19 As earlier noted, CVL was not a recognized tribe at the outset of 

these proceedings. (See fn. 7, ante, at p. 13.) We grant CVL’s request for 

judicial notice of a September 11, 2019, letter from the Native American 

Heritage Commission stating that as of August 12, 2019, CVL has met the 

criteria to be included on its Tribal Consultation list. CVL is now entitled to 

notice and an invitation to participate in a scoping consultation with regard 

to applications for development under section 65913.4 in a geographic area 

with which CVL is traditionally and culturally affiliated. (§ 65913.4, subd. 

(b)(1)(A)(ii); Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.3.1.) Accordingly, CVL maintains 

it has a right to participate in any such consultation conducted for appellants’ 

project.
34

considered substantive, it is clear the Legislature intended the new 

provisions to apply retroactively. As to the former point, the California 

Supreme Court has rejected the procedural/substantive distinction CVL 

advances: “Some courts have thought changes categorized as merely formal 

or procedural present no problem of retrospective operation. . . . California 

has rejected this type of classification: ‘In truth, the distinction relates not so 

much to the form of the statute as to its effects. If substantial changes are 

made, even in a statute which might ordinarily be classified as procedural, 

the operation on existing rights would be retroactive because the legal effects 

of past events would be changed, and the statute will be construed to operate 

only in futuro unless the legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears.’ 

[Citations.]” (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, fn. 4.) If 

respondents’ denial of ministerial approval for appellants’ 2018 application 

did not comply with section 65913.4 and appellants were in fact entitled to 

approval under the statute at that time, it would manifestly alter “the legal 

effects of past events” to now require them to start the application process 

anew in order to provide an opportunity for tribal consultation that was not 

part of the statutory process when the application was submitted, processed 

and decided. 

CVL argues that legislative intent to apply Assembly Bill 831 to all 

unapproved projects is demonstrated by subdivision (b)(8) of section 65913.4, 

which states that “[t]his subdivision shall not apply to any project that has 

been approved under the streamlined, ministerial approval process provided 

under this section before the effective date of the act adding this subdivision.” 

According to CVL, this interpretation is necessary to avoid rendering the 

provision superfluous: Without it, CVL maintains, because Assembly Bill 

831 is “remedial and procedural in nature,” it would apply to all projects,
35

approved and unapproved, save only where such application would 

unconstitutionally interfere with vested rights. CVL finds further evidence of 

retroactive intent in the fact that the Legislature did not adopt an 

amendment sought by opponents of Assembly Bill 831 that would have 

“clarif[ied] that its provisions only apply to applications submitted after the 

bills effective date” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 

analysis of Assem. Bill No. 831 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 25, 

2020, p. 9, italics added), and in references in the legislative history to the 

need to “continue” to protect tribal cultural resources.

CVL’s view that expressly making Assembly Bill 381 non-retroactive for 

approved projects clearly demonstrates intent to make it retroactive for all 

unapproved ones ignores the difference between an application that has not 

yet been decided and one that has been wrongly denied. Whatever the merits 

of CVL’s retroactivity argument with regard to ministerial approval 

applications pending prior to the effective date of Assembly Bill 831 (a 

question this appeal does not present), it makes no sense, and would be 

manifestly unfair, to say that a project which should have received 

ministerial approval under the law in effect at the time it was denied must 

begin the application process anew as a result of the local government 

erroneously denying approval.20 If appellants’ application in fact satisfied the 

statutory objective criteria, Berkeley’s refusal to approve the application 

interfered with a constitutionally protected property interest which would be 

20 As appellants point out, CVL threatened to sue if Berkeley approved 

the application under section 65913.4. Under this scenario, Assembly Bill 

831 unquestionably would not have applied to the project. But, under CVL’s 

reasoning, once the application was denied—even though erroneously—

Assembly Bill 831 would require appellants to start their application process 

over upon successfully challenging the denial.
36

defeated if Assembly Bill 831 were applied retroactively. “When a person has 

a legally enforceable right to receive a government benefit provided certain 

facts exist, this right constitutes a property interest protected by due 

process.” (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 207.) This 

includes “a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval” where the 

agency lacks discretion to withhold its approval (Clark v. City of Hermosa 

Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1180), as a local government does where 

an application satisfies the objective criteria specified in section 65913.4. 

The inference CVL draws from the Legislature’s failure to adopt a 

proposed amendment that would have made Assembly Bill 831 inapplicable

to any application submitted prior to its effective date (rather than, as 

enacted, any previously granted approval) is contrary to the rule that the 

Legislature’s intent for a statute to apply retroactively must be “very clear.” 

(Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 841.) A Senate Housing Committee analysis 

of Assembly Bill 168 noted that the bill provided the scoping consultation 

process would not apply to a project that had been approved before the bill’s 

effective date but was “not clear as to whether this process would apply to 

pending SB 35 applications.” (Sen. Com. on Housing, Analysis of Assem. Bill 

No. 168 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 2020, p. 10.) The 

analysis stated, “The committee may wish to consider asking the author to 

amend the bill on the Senate Floor to clarify that Assembly Bill 168 shall 

apply to any pre-applications submitted to a local government as of the 

effective date of the bill.” (Ibid.) Despite being so informed that the bill was 

not clear as to retroactive application to pending development applications, 

the Legislature did not alter the provision stating the new provisions were 

not applicable to approved applications. “ ‘[A] statute that is ambiguous with 
37

respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be unambiguously 

prospective. [Citations.]” (Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 841.)

CVL’s reliance on comments in the legislative history advancing the 

need to “continue” protections for tribal cultural resources is not persuasive. 

Even CVL does not contend Assembly Bill 831 clarified existing law. The 

Legislature obviously saw a need to make projects threatening tribal cultural 

resources ineligible for ministerial approval and, with Assembly Bill 831,

intended to correct its failure to include such provisions in Senate Bill 35. 

Statements such as “it is important that we continue to honor the 

consultation process with Native American tribes and protect tribal cultural 

resources” (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 168, 3d Reading 

(1019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 25, 2020, pp. 8–9) and that the 

author would work with stakeholders to craft language “to ensure that tribal 

cultural resources continue to be protected” (Sen. Com. on Environ. Quality, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 168 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 

2019, p. 7) simply underscore the fact that the protections sought to be added 

to section 65913.4 existed prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 35 for 

standard, discretionary development projects. For example, one of the 

comments CVL quotes goes on to urge “restoring the right of tribal 

governments to engage the development process under SB 35.” (Sen. Rules 

Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 168, 3d Reading (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Aug. 25, 2020, p. 9.)

CVL also argues that denying retroactive application of Assembly Bill 

831 requires attributing to the Legislature an intent to “deprive California 

tribes of the consultation procedures provided in CEQA for projects submitted 

for SB 35 processing during the roughly three-year time period between the 

effective date of SB 35 on January 1, 2018, and that of AB 831” on September 
38

28, 2020. We disagree. Assembly Bill 831 was intended to correct an 

oversight. In making its provisions inapplicable to projects previously 

approved under section 65913.4, the Legislature demonstrated its recognition 

that developers may have obtained protected interests in projects approved 

meanwhile. That the Legislature allowed for some projects to proceed despite 

not having been subjected to tribal consultation with respect to potentially 

threatened cultural resources does not mean the Legislature intended to 

“deprive” tribes of protections, only that it was also accounting for the 

interests of those who relied upon section 65913.4 prior to Assembly Bill 831’s 

effective date.

D.

Respondents argue that applying section 65913.4 in the present case 

would impermissibly interfere with the City’s “home rule” authority over 

historic preservation. 

“Charter cities are specifically authorized by our state Constitution to 

govern themselves, free of state legislative intrusion, as to those matters 

deemed municipal affairs.” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of 

California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 555 (State Building & 

Construction).) To determine whether a matter comes within a charter city’s 

home rule authority, we must determine four issues: “whether the city 

ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized as a 

‘municipal affair’ ”; whether there is “ ‘an actual conflict between [local and 

state law]’ ”; “whether the state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide 

concern’ ”; and “whether the law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of 

that concern” and “ ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in 

local governance.” (Id. at p. 556, quoting California Fed. Savings & Loan 

Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16–17, 24 (California Fed. 
39

Savings).) “ ‘If . . . the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute 

is one of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its 

resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the conflicting charter 

city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto and the Legislature is 

not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from addressing the statewide 

dimension by its own tailored enactments.’ ” (State Building & Construction, 

at p. 556, quoting California Fed. Savings, at p. 17.)

The first three parts of the “home rule” test are not really in dispute. 

First, respondents argue that protection of local landmarks is a classic 

municipal affair akin to zoning, which is recognized to be a local matter. 

(DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 774 [adoption and 

amendment of general plan is local, not statewide, concern]; Center for 

Community Action & Environmental Justice v. City of Moreno Valley (2018) 

26 Cal.App.5th 689, 704–705 [acknowledging “municipal nature” of planning 

and zoning laws].) Section 37361, subdivision (b), authorizes cities to 

“provide for places, buildings, structures, works of art, and other objects, 

having a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value, 

special conditions or regulations for their protection, enhancement, 

perpetuation or use . . . . ” Appellants do not suggest local historical 

preservation is not a municipal concern. 

Second, there is an actual conflict between section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a)(7)(C), and the City’s Landmark Preservation Ordinance. The City’s 

municipal code authorizes the Commission to designate “structures, sites and 

areas . . . having a special character, or special historical, architectural or 

aesthetic interest or value” as a landmark or historic district (Berkeley Mun. 
40

Code, § 3.24.060.A)21 and requires approval by the Commission for “any 

construction, alteration, or demolition for which a City permit is required” in 

a “designated landmark, in a designated historic district or structure of 

merit . . . .” (Berkeley Mun. Code, § 3.24.200.) Approval “may be granted 

only upon determination that the proposal conforms to” specified criteria, 

which include that the proposed work will not “adversely affect the special 

character or special historical, architectural or aesthetic interest or value of 

the landmark and its site, as viewed both in themselves and in their setting.” 

(Berkeley Mun. Code, § 3.24.260.C.1.a.) Government Code section 65913.4, 

subdivision (a)(7)(C), conflicts with these provisions, as the statute would 

allow construction in a designated landmark without requiring approval by 

the Commission if the statutory criteria are satisfied. Respondents make no 

argument to the contrary.22

Third, section 65913.4 patently addresses a matter of statewide 

concern. As earlier described, the Legislature has repeatedly emphasized in 

express findings and declarations that the lack of affordable housing in the 

21 The code defines the Commission’s authority as extending to 

“structures, sites and areas, including single structures or sites, portions of 

structures, groups of structures, man-made or natural landscape elements, 

works of art, or integrated combinations thereof, having a special character, 

or special historical, architectural, or aesthetic interest or value.” (Berkeley 

Mun. Code, § 3.24.060.A.) It defines “structure of merit” in the same terms: 

“For the purposes of this chapter, structure of merit includes structures, sites 

and areas, including single structures or sites, portions of structures, groups 

of structures, man-made or natural landscape elements, works of art, or 

integrated combinations thereof, having a special character, or special 

historical, architectural or aesthetic interest or value.” (Berkeley Mun. Code,

§ 3.24.060.B.)

22 Respondents argue only that section 65913.4 as interpreted by the 

trial court does not conflict with the City’s historical preservation authority, 

because the trial court found section 65913.4 did not apply. 
41

state is a crisis and that legislation including section 65913.4 and the HAA is 

intended to address that crisis by encouraging and facilitating the 

construction of housing in general and affordable housing in particular. 

Although legislative declarations of intent to preempt local law are not 

determinative (DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 783), courts 

“accord ‘great weight’ to the Legislature’s evaluation” of what constitutes a 

matter of statewide concern (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136) and 

“ ‘defer to legislative estimates regarding the significance of a given problem 

and the responsive measures that should be taken toward its resolution.’ ” 

(City of El Centro v. Lanier (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503, quoting 

California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 24.)

As observed by the court in Anderson v. City of San Jose (2019) 42 

Cal.App.5th 683, 709–710, judicial decisions have long “recognized the 

statewide dimension of the affordable housing shortage in relation to various 

impositions by the state into the realm of local affairs. (See Green v. Superior 

Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 625, [citing ‘enormous transformation in the 

contemporary housing market, creating a scarcity of adequate low cost 

housing in virtually every urban setting’]; Buena Vista [(1985)]175 

Cal.App.3d [289,] 306, [finding ‘need to provide adequate housing’ is a 

statewide concern and rejecting home rule challenge to state provision that 

mandated charter city to include certain actionable components in its 

‘housing element’]; Bruce v. City of Alameda (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 18, 22 

[‘locally unrestricted development of low cost housing is a matter of vital 

state concern’]; Coalition Advocating Legal Housing Options v. City of Santa 

Monica (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 451, 458 (City of Santa Monica) [noting the 

Legislature and courts have declared housing to be a matter of statewide 

concern].)”
42

The statewide nature of the issue is reflected in the manner by which 

the Legislature has attempted to address it. Under the Housing Element 

Law, the state’s existing and projected housing need is determined by the

California Department of Housing and Community Development on a 

regional basis (§ 65584.01); regional councils of governments allocate the 

need to individual localities (§ 65584.05); and each locality must develop a 

plan of action (the housing element) for meeting its share of the regional 

housing need, including rezoning if necessary. (§§ 65583, subd. (c), 65583.2, 

65584.05, 65588.) Section 65913.4 applies only if a city fails to meet its 

RHNA goals. (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(4).)

Section 65913.4 addresses the crisis level statewide lack of affordable 

housing by eliminating local discretion to deny approval where specified 

objective planning criteria are met, consistent with the legislative statement 

of intent, in the contemporaneous amendments to the HAA, to “significantly 

increase the approval and construction of new housing for all economic 

segments of California’s communities by meaningfully and effectively curbing 

the capability of local governments to deny, reduce the density for, or render 

infeasible housing development projects and emergency shelters,” which 

intent had “not been fulfilled” despite prior versions of the HAA. (§ 65589.5, 

subd. (a)(2)(K).) It is difficult to think of any way the subject and purpose of 

this statute could be seen as anything other than a matter of statewide 

concern. 

Respondents do not dispute this. They argue, however, that this 

statewide interest in increasing the amount and availability of affordable 

housing does not “automatically translate into a statewide interest in 

eliminating local landmark preservation authority” and the Legislature “has 

not expressed any interest in overriding charter cities’ historic preservation 
43

authority.” This framing of the issue is inapposite: The question is whether 

the purpose of the ministerial approval statute is a matter of statewide 

concern, not whether there is a statewide interest in a specific impact it has 

on a municipal function. That is, the constitutionality of section 65913.4 does 

not turn on there being a statewide interest in limiting local historical 

preservation authority but rather on whether the statewide interest in 

increasing affordable housing sufficiently justifies the legislation’s impact on 

that authority.

Respondents cite Fielder v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 

137 as an example of a statewide interest that “did not translate” to a 

statewide interest in overriding municipal authority. Fielder held that state 

legislation prohibiting local governments from imposing real estate transfer 

taxes did not prevent a city from imposing such a tax. The court recognized 

that due to “escalating ad valorem property tax rates and inflationary 

increases in assessed valuation,” “easing the burden of property taxation” had 

been a matter of legislative concern for many years. A citywide transfer tax, 

however, would have no impact on “remediation of the recognized evils which 

undergird the state’s interest in controlling ad valorem real property 

taxation” because it was a one-time burden on the “privilege of disposing of 

one’s property and realizing its actual . . . value” that did not “upset the 

delicate balance of a vulnerable group of citizens in the manner that local 

variations in the ad valorem property tax rate or assessment practices 

would.” (Id. at p. 145.) Applying the principle that “ ‘ “the sweep of the 

state’s protective measures may be no broader than its interest” ’ ” (id. at 

p. 146, quoting California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 25), Fielder 

concluded that the transfer tax was “purely local in its effects” and not a 

matter of statewide concern, and the statute’s “substantial interference in 
44

[the city’s] ability to levy an excise tax far exceed[ed] the state’s interest in 

regulating ad valorem property taxes.” (Fielder, at p. 146.)

The present case does not involve any such mismatch between the state 

interest purportedly justifying interference with local authority and the 

subject of municipal authority with which the statute interfered. Here, the 

City’s ability to exercise discretion over development on a City landmarked 

site directly interferes with the purpose of section 65913.4 to the extent an 

affordable housing project on this site would otherwise meet the criteria for 

ministerial approval. The relevant question is whether the statute is 

reasonably related to resolving the statewide interest it addresses and does 

not unduly interfere with the City’s historical preservation authority. (State 

Building & Construction, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556.)

There is clearly a “direct, substantial connection” between section 

65913.4 and the Legislature’s purpose of expediting and increasing approvals 

of affordable housing developments. The ministerial approval statute was 

intended to decrease delays and local resistance to such developments, and 

does so by removing local governments’ discretion to deny applications for 

affordable housing developments meeting specified objective criteria. Its 

interference with local governance is narrowed, first, by the fact that it 

applies only if the city has failed to meet its RHNA obligations. (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(4).) The many detailed requirements for application of the statute 

further demonstrate its relatively narrow scope.

23 

23 In brief, the development site must be in a highly urbanized area 

(§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(2)(A) & (B)) and must not be in a number of specified 

locations, including a coastal zone, specified farmland, or land subject to 

agricultural protection or preservation, wetlands, designated high fire hazard 

zone, designated hazardous waste site, earthquake fault zone, special flood 

hazard area, regulatory floodway, land subject to a natural resource 
45

Respondents’ position, in essence, is that the Legislature has 

overreached because its interest in increasing affordable housing can be 

accomplished without interfering with local authority over historical 

preservation. But historical preservation is precisely the kind of subjective 

discretionary land use decision the Legislature sought to prevent local 

government from using to defeat affordable housing development. The 

Legislature long ago called attention to the role of local governments in 

contributing to the “excessive cost of the state’s housing supply” with 

“activities and policies . . . which limit the approval of affordable 

housing . . . .” (§ 65589.5, former subd. (a)(2), now subd. (a)(1)(B)), added by 

Stats. 1990, ch. 1439, § 1.) In 2017, the Legislature expressed obvious 

frustration in its findings that “California’s housing picture has reached a 

crisis of historic proportions despite the fact that, for decades, the Legislature 

has enacted numerous statutes intended to significantly increase the 

approval, development, and affordability of housing for all income levels, 

including this section” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(J)) and that “the Legislature’s 

intent in enacting [section 65589.5] in 1982 and in expanding its provisions 

since then was to significantly increase the approval and construction of new 

protection plan, habitat for protected species, or land under a conservation 

easement (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(6)) or subject to specified laws governing 

mobile home and recreational vehicle occupancy (§ 65913.4, subds. (a)(10)); 

the development must not require demolition of specified housing or of a 

historical structure that was placed on a historic register (§ 65913.4, subd. 

(a)(7)), must be consistent with existing objective zoning, subdivision and 

design review standards (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5), (a)(9)), must include 

specified percentages of affordable housing, which must remain at affordable 

levels for a set duration (45 years for owned units, 55 years for rental units) 

(§ 65913.4, subds. (a)(3)(A), (a)(4)(B)), and must comply with specified 

requirements for payment of at least the prevailing wage for the geographic 

area and use of a skilled and trained workforce for construction (§ 65913.4, 

subds. (a)(8), (a)(9)).
46

housing for all economic segments of California’s communities by 

meaningfully and effectively curbing the capability of local governments to 

deny, reduce the density for, or render infeasible housing development 

projects and emergency shelters. That intent has not been fulfilled.” 

(§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(K), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 378, § 1.5.)

As we have discussed, we view the legislative findings contained in 

section 65589.5 as relevant in construing section 65913.4, which was enacted 

at the same time as the 2017 amendments to section 65589.5 and deals with 

an aspect of the same issue. With respect to appellants’ project and the City 

landmarked Shellmound site, in light of the Legislature’s long history of 

attempting to address the state’s housing crisis and frustration with local 

governments’ interference with that goal, and the highly subjective nature of 

historical preservation, the intrusion of section 65913.4 into local authority 

over such preservation is not broader than necessary to achieve the purpose

of the legislation.24

We conclude the trial court erred in denying appellants’ petition 

pursuant to section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(7)(C).

II.

The second basis upon which the trial court denied appellants’ petition 

for writ of mandate was that section 65913.4 does not apply to mixed-use

developments. The court noted that the only mention of commercial or 

mixed-use development in section 65913.4 is in subdivision (a)(2)(C), which, 

as enacted in 2017 and in effect throughout the proceedings below, provided: 

24 As the present case involves the City’s historical preservation 

authority only with regard to the Shellmound and its site, we have no 

occasion to consider the validity of any intrusion section 65913.4 might make 

into local historical preservation authority over other historical and cultural 

resources. 
47

“The development is located on a site that satisfies all of the following: 

[¶] . . . [¶] A site that is zoned for residential use or residential mixed-use 

development, or has a general plan designation that allows residential use or 

a mix of residential and nonresidential uses, with at least two-thirds of the 

square footage of the development designated for residential use.”25

Rejecting appellants’ view that the two-thirds requirement “relates to a 

proposed project rather than to a site for a proposed project,” the trial court 

read this language as “provid[ing] restrictions as to sites on which a project 

can be located and still be eligible for SB 35 streamlined approval,” limiting 

streamlined approval to projects on “mixed-use sites which require minimum 

two-thirds residential use.”

26

25 As amended by Assembly Bill 831, paragraph (2)(C) of section 

65913.4, subdivision (a), now provides: “(2) The development and the site on 

which it is located satisfy all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶ (C) It is zoned for 

residential use or residential mixed-use development, or has a general plan 

designation that allows residential use or a mix of residential and 

nonresidential uses, and at least two-thirds of the square footage of the 

development is designated for residential use.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 194, § 1.5, 

italics added.)

26 The court explained its conclusion as follows: “The court reads the 

last phrase of the subsection as a subordinate clause that acts to modify the 

immediately preceding independent clause that is, it describes a general plan 

designation with a mixed-use provision, limiting the applicable SB 35 sites to 

mixed-use sites which require minimum two-thirds residential use by square 

feet. Another textual clue is that SB 35 applies only when the project is a 

‘multifamily housing development.’ (Gov. Code, § 65913.4, subd. (a)(l).) The 

context and structure of the mixed-use zoning provision also indicate that the 

two-thirds proviso is part of a restriction on ‘the site’ rather than the 

development project itself. (Gov. Code, § 65913.4, subd. (a)(2) [‘The 

development is located on a site that satisfies all of the following . . .’]; c.f., 

e.g., § 65913.4(a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(10) [listing other requirements and restrictions 

on the site of the development project].) When the authors of SB 35 wanted 

to place limitations on the development project itself rather than its site, they 
48

A.

Appellants first contend the trial court erred in denying their writ 

petition on this basis because it was not one of the reasons the City provided 

for its denial of ministerial approval. Section 65913.4 requires that if a local 

government determines a proposed development “is in conflict with any of the 

objective planning standards specified in subdivision (a), it shall provide the 

development proponent written documentation of which standard or 

standards the development conflicts with, and an explanation for the reason 

or reasons the development conflicts with that standard or standards” 

(§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(1), now subd. (c)(1)) and, if it fails to do so, “the 

development shall be deemed to satisfy the objective planning standards 

specified in subdivision (a).” (§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(2), now subd. (c)(2).) 

As earlier described, the Department’s 90-day letter informed 

appellants that Senate Bill 35 did not apply to the project “to the extent it 

impinges on legitimate municipal affairs (preservation of a designated City 

landmark)” but nevertheless provided the department’s analysis of each of 

the statutory objective standards and its determination that several 

components of the application were inconsistent with the criteria for 

streamlined approval or that further information was needed. The conflicts 

specified in the letter were with the statutory requirement for consistency 

expressly described the requirement as one that the ‘development satisfies’ 

rather than one that the site satisfies. (See, e.g., § 65913.4(a)(4) [‘The 

development satisfies both of the following’ affordable housing minimums], 

(a)(5) [The development . . . is consistent with objective zoning standards, 

objective subdivision standards, and objective design review 

standards . . . .’ ”) 
49

with objective zoning and design review standards (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5))27

and with the requirement that the development not require demolition of a 

historic structure (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(7)(C)). Other potential conflicts were 

identified. The analysis of section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), did not 

indicate any inconsistency.28

Appellants contend that because respondents failed to identify any 

conflict with section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), in the 90-day letter, the 

project had to be deemed to comply with that standard pursuant to section 

65913.4, former subdivision (b), now subdivision (c). Furthermore, appellants

argue the trial court erred in upholding the denial on a basis not relied upon 

by respondents in denying ministerial approval. “ ‘ “[A]n agency’s order must 

be upheld, if at all, ‘on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency 

itself.’ ” ’ (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2000) 85

Cal.App.4th 86, 96; see Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery 

Corp. (1947) 332 U.S. 194, 196.)” (New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Public 

Utilities Com. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 784, 820.)

27 Regarding the zoning and design conflicts, the letter directed, “See 

Attachment A for additional explanation.” Attachment A, entitled “Objective 

City of Berkeley Standards Applicable to the 1900 Fourth Street Project,” 

sets out numerous standards from the Berkeley Municipal Code and General 

Plan, with the City’s analysis of conflicts and potential conflicts. 

28 With respect to section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), the letter 

stated: “City analysis: Zoning District CW West Berkeley Commercial 

District Permitted uses include mixed-use developments incorporating 

residential and retail or residential use and other permitted use Berkeley 

Municipal Code Chapter 23E64. The site is designated Avenue Commercial 

with a Development Node overlay in the Berkeley General Plan. The site is 

also designated General Commercial within the West Berkeley Plan and is 

subject to Urban Design and Preservation Element policies protecting 

culturally important sites.” 
50

Respondents assert they fully complied with their obligation under 

section 65913.4 to inform appellants of any conflict with objective planning 

standards and maintain their contention that the statute does not apply to 

mixed-use projects is a legal argument which was not required to be included 

in the June 2018 letter. This position is puzzling, as the first point made in 

the letter was a legal argument—that section 65913.4 did not apply to the 

project because the statute impinged on municipal affairs with regard to 

preservation of a designated City landmark. It also defies at least the spirit, 

if not the letter, of section 65913.4, subdivision (b)(1)), which requires local 

governments to carefully explain any determination that a proposed 

development conflicts with “any of the objective planning standards specified 

in subdivision (a).” (§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(1), now subd. (c)(1).) Section 

65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), is one such standard. Respondents’ 90-day 

letter gave appellants no notice that the City believed there was any conflict 

with respect to the mixed-use aspect of their application.

In any event, this point is ultimately inconsequential. It is clear to us 

that the trial court misinterpreted section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), and

that the ministerial approval statute does apply to mixed-use developments 

that meet its criteria. Regardless of whether the project should be deemed 

consistent with section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(2)(C), due to the 

Department’s failure to raise any conflict with that provision in its June 2018 

letter, the record confirms that under a proper reading of the statute, the 

project is consistent with the standard.

B.

Respondents argue that nothing in section 65913.4 authorizes its 

application to mixed-use projects. They describe 65913.4 as containing

project-specific, site-specific, development-specific and applicant-specific 
51

requirements, and point out that the project-specific requirement for “a 

multifamily housing development that contains two or more residential 

units” (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(1)) says nothing about mixed uses. The only 

reference to mixed-use appears in subdivision (a)(2), which at the time of the 

application, administrative decision and trial, began, “The development is 

located on a site that satisfies all of the following . . .” Consequently, in 

respondents’ view, subdivision (a)(2)(C) must be read as requiring that the 

site for the proposed project be zoned for, or have a general plan designation 

allowing, residential use or residential mixed-use development, with the 

zoning or general plan designation also mandating that at least two-thirds of 

the square footage of any development be designated for residential use.

This is a strained and unreasonable reading of the statutory language 

that makes no sense in light of the statute’s purpose. Section 65913.4 

consistently uses “the development” to refer to the project that is the subject 

of an application for ministerial approval. (E.g., § 65913.4, subds. (a)(5) [“The 

development . . . is consistent with objective zoning standards . . .”]; (a)(6) 

[“The development is not located on a site that is any of the following . . .”], 

italics added.) On the other hand, the statute uses “a development” when 

referring to development projects generally. (E.g., § 65913.4, subds. (a) 

[“A development proponent may submit an application for a development that 

is subject to the streamlined, ministerial approval process . . .”]; (a)(5)(B) 

[“A development shall be deemed consistent with the objective zoning 

standards . . . if . . .”]; (b)(1) [“[i]f a local government determines that a 

development submitted pursuant to this section is in conflict with any of the 

objective planning standards . . . it shall provide the development proponent 

with . . .”], italics added.) Reading “the development” in subdivision (a)(2)(C)

as referring to any development rather than the subject of a particular 
52

application would be inconsistent with the otherwise clear pattern in the 

statutory language. 

Moreover, respondents’ interpretation would be inconsistent with the 

purpose of section 65913.4 to encourage and expedite the processing of 

affordable housing projects. The statute expressly directs that it be 

“interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest possible 

weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision of, increased 

housing supply.” (§ 65913.4, former subd. (l), now subd. (n).)

29 Respondents’ 

interpretation would discourage development of affordable housing by 

limiting the applicability of the streamlined approval process to projects on 

sites with a minimum residential requirement for mixed-use developments

even if the development itself is at least two-thirds residential. Here, 

respondents’ interpretation would make the proposed project ineligible for 

ministerial approval despite it being 88 percent residential and located on a 

site zoned for mixed uses.

Subdivision (a)(2)(C) of section 65913.4 is far more naturally read—

semantically and logically—as requiring that the site for a proposed 

development be zoned for, or have a general plan designation allowing, either 

residential or mixed-use, and that at least two-thirds of the proposed 

development must be residential. 

This interpretation is consistent with the HAA, which defines 

“[h]ousing development project” as “a use consisting of . . . [¶] “[r]esidential 

units only” or “[m]ixed-use developments consisting of residential and 

nonresidential uses with at least two-thirds of the square footage designated 

for residential use.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (h)(2).) The two-thirds residential 

29 Subdivision (l) was added to section 65913.4 as part of amendments 

effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 840, § 2.)
53

requirement was added to section 65589.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2018) by 

amendments filed with the Secretary of State on the same date as Senate 

Bill 35. (Stats. 2017, ch. 368, § 1.5; Stats. 2017, ch. 373, § 1.5; Stats. 2017, 

ch. 378, § 1.5.) As statutes in pari materia, addressing the same subject and 

advancing the same goal, sections 65589.5 and 65913.4 should be construed 

together. (Lexin v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1090.) The 

language used in section 65589.5 to describe the type of mixed-use

development meeting the statutory definition of “housing development 

project”—“with at least two-thirds of the square footage designated for 

residential use”—is precisely that used in section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a)(2)(C), with reference to mixed-uses. This is a strong indication the phrase 

was intended as a limitation on the type of development subject to ministerial 

approval, not the site upon which the development is located.

Indeed, this was the interpretation adopted by the City Manager,

whose explanation to the City Council of the project application and 

requirements of section 65913.4, stated, with respect to subdivision (a)(2)(C):

“Zoning and Residential Uses. The development must be located on a legal 

parcel or parcels that are zoned for residential uses. At least 2/3 of the floor 

area of the proposed building must be dedicated to residential uses.” It is 

also the interpretation accorded by the DHCD Guidelines, which were issued 

pursuant to the authority granted by section 65913.4, former subdivision (i),

now subdivision (l).

30 Respondents argue the DHCD Guidelines are 

30 “The department may review, adopt, amend, and repeal guidelines to 

implement uniform standards or criteria that supplement or clarify the 

terms, references, or standards set forth in this section. Any guidelines or 

terms adopted pursuant to this subdivision shall not be subject to Chapter 

3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 

Government Code.” (§ 65913.4, former subd. (i), now subd. (l).) 
54

inapplicable to this case because they issued on November 19, 2018, 

subsequent to the Department’s June 2018 letter, and expressly state that 

they apply to applications submitted on or after January 1, 2019 (DHCD 

Guidelines, § 101(b)). Even if not directly applicable, however, it is worth 

observing that our interpretation is consistent with that of the agency 

charged with clarifying the terms and standards set forth in section 65913.4. 

The DHCD Guidelines state that “[t]o qualify to apply for the Streamlined 

Ministerial Approval Process,” “[a]t least two-thirds of the square footage of 

the development shall be designated for residential use.” (DHCD Guidelines, 

§ 400(b).)31

Our interpretation is confirmed by subsequent amendments to section 

65913.4. Assembly Bill No. 101 (Assembly Bill 101), effective July 31, 2019, 

added a sentenced to subdivision (a)(2)(C) of section 65913.4 that can only 

refer to a specific proposed development: “Additional density, floor area, and 

units, and any other concession, incentive, or waiver of development 

standards granted pursuant to the Density Bonus Law in Section 65915 shall 

be included in the square footage calculation.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 159, § 8.) 

“Density bonus” refers to an increase over the otherwise maximum allowable 

residential density which must be granted when the applicant for a housing 

development agrees to provide a certain amount of low-income (or other 

specified types of) housing, and is calculated for a given housing development 

based upon the percentage of units of the specified type in that development. 

31 The Guidelines further state that “[b]oth residential and nonresidential components of a qualified mixed-use development are eligible for 

the Streamlined Ministerial Approval Process. Additional permitting 

requirements pertaining to the individual business located in the commercial 

component (e.g. alcohol use permit or adult business permit) are subject to 

local government processes.” (DHCD Guidelines, § 400(b).)
55

(§ 65915, subds. (b)(1), (f).) The amendment’s directive regarding calculation 

of square footage would make no sense if the two-thirds requirement was for 

zoning; without a specific proposed development, there would be no density 

bonus and concessions to calculate. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest—which 

is entitled to “great weight” (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership 

(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1170)—explained that existing law “authorizes a 

development proponent to submit an application for a housing development 

that is subject to a streamlined, ministerial approval process . . . if the 

development satisfies specified objective planning standards,” one of which is 

that “at least 2/3 of the square footage of the development be designated for 

residential use,” and Assembly Bill 101 “would require that the calculation to 

determine whether 2/3 of the square footage of the development is designated 

for residential use include additional density, floor area, and units, and any 

other concession, incentive, or waiver, granted pursuant to the Density Bonus 

Law.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 101 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) 

par. (4).) 

Similarly, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Assembly Bill 1485 

(Stats. 2019, ch. 663, § 1; Stats. 2019, ch. 844, § 5.3), which specified that 

calculation of the development’s square footage does not include underground 

space, stated, “Existing law requires that at least 2/3 of the square footage of 

a development receiving approval pursuant to these provisions must be 

designated for residential use. [¶] This bill would provide that ‘square 

footage,’ for these purposes, does not include underground space, such as 

basements or underground parking garages.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. 

Bill No. 1485 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) par. (2).)

Finally, Assembly Bill 831 amended section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a)(2)(C), to read: “(2) The development and the site on which it is located
56

satisfy all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (C) It is zoned for residential use or 

residential mixed-use development, or has a general plan designation that 

allows residential use or a mix of residential and nonresidential uses, and at 

least 2/3 of the square footage of the development is designated for 

residential use.” (Italics added.) This simple change of language removes 

any reasonable doubt that the 2/3 requirement applies to the development 

submitted for approval and not the zoning applicable to the site. 

According to the bill’s author, “AB 831 clarifies that the 2/3 residential 

requirement in SB 35 applies only to a project and not the project’s site or its 

zoning.” (Sen. Com. on Housing, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 831 (2019-2020 

Reg. Sess.) as amended July 21, 2020, p. 4.) In fact, this clarification appears 

to have been occasioned by the trial court’s decision in the present case. The 

committee report further explains: “Clarifying the 2/3 requirement. SB 35 

provides that 2/3 of a project must be residential (i.e. authorizes certain 

mixed-use projects) to qualify for streamlined approval. In its guidelines, 

HCD interprets the language this way. Recently in an SB 35 lawsuit, a 

superior court judge interpreted SB 35 streamlining to apply only to mixeduse projects in the narrow circumstance where the site’s zoning calls for at 

least 2/3 residential. According to the sponsors, there is likely not a zoning 

district in the state that would meet this requirement. This bill clarifies the 

author’s intent that the 2/3 residential requirement apply to the proposed 

project itself, not the zoning.” (Sen. Com. on Housing, Analysis of Assem. 

Bill No. 831 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 21, 2020, p. 6.)

Respondents argue these amendments are inapplicable to the present 

case because they were adopted and became effective subsequent to the 

denial of ministerial approval. But “a statute that merely clarifies, rather 

than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively even if applied to 
57

transactions predating its enactment.” (Western Security Bank, supra, 

14 Cal.4th at p. 243.) The 2019 amendments addressed how to calculate the 

square footage specified in subdivision (a)(2)(C) of section 65913.4; they did 

not change the underlying requirement that “at least two-thirds of the square 

footage of the development” be designated for residential use. The 2020 

amendment made a non-substantive change in language that served only to 

clarify the statute in response to a court’s decision. The amendments did not 

“change the legal effect of past actions” (Western Security Bank, at p. 252)

and therefore can properly be applied to this case. They demonstrate 

unequivocally what the language of the statute, in our view, indicated all 

along: that the ministerial approval statute applies to mixed-use

developments that designate at least two-thirds of their square footage to 

residential use.

Here, the application specified that the residential area of the 

development would occupy 88 percent of the space (254,888 gross square feet 

of the project’s total 286,809 square feet). It thus satisfied the requirement 

that at least two-thirds of the total square footage be designated for 

residential use. 

C.

Respondents further argue that applying section 65913.4 to mixed-use

developments interferes with the City’s home rule authority to regulate 

commercial uses. The Berkeley Municipal Code requires a use permit, with 

public hearing, where the retail space in a mixed-use development comprises 

20,000 square feet or more. (Berkeley Mun. Code, § 23E.64.030.) The 2018 

application describes the proposed project as including approximately 27,500 

square feet of retail space and parking. Because section 65913.4, subdivision 

(a), provides for a ministerial approval process under which the proposed 
58

development “is not subject to a conditional use permit,” respondents 

maintain it interferes with charter cities’ traditional land use authority to 

determine whether particular commercial uses should be subject to 

appropriate conditions of approval such as security measures, hours of 

operations, noise restrictions, light pollution and emissions controls. 

“ ‘Land use regulation in California has historically been a function of 

local government under the grant of police power contained in California 

Constitution, article XI, section 7.’ [Citation.]” (DeVita v. County of Napa, 

supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 782; IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of 

Supervisors (1991) 1 Cal.4th 81, 89 [“The power of cities and counties to zone 

land use in accordance with local conditions is well entrenched.”].) 

Respondents argue that the Legislature’s interest in increasing the supply of 

affordable housing does not require it to intrude upon local authority over 

commercial uses, and the Legislature has not expressed any intention to 

preempt local authority over such uses.

The extent to which section 65913.4 interferes with local regulation of 

commercial uses appears to be fairly minimal, and incidental to the statute’s 

purpose of facilitating development of affordable housing. While the overall 

“multifamily housing development” eligible for ministerial approval is not 

subject to a conditional use permit, nothing in section 65913.4 requires or 

allows ministerial approval of a development that includes commercial uses 

conflicting with local zoning. To the contrary, to be eligible for ministerial 

approval, the proposed development must be “consistent with objective 

zoning standards, objective subdivision standards, and objective design 

review standards” established by the locality. (§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5).) 

Nothing in section 65913.4 exempts the businesses that would occupy the 

commercial portion of appellants’ project from permit and licensing 
59

requirements for their particular operations. In light of the limited extent of 

any intrusion into municipal authority over commercial uses, and narrowly 

delineated circumstances in which section 65913.4 applies, we conclude the 

statute—which, as we have said, is reasonably related to resolving the 

statewide interest in alleviating delays and obstacles to development of 

affordable housing projects—does not unduly interfere with the City’s land 

use authority. (State Building & Construction, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556.)

III.

Respondents additionally denied ministerial approval due to asserted 

conflicts with “objective zoning standards, objective subdivision standards, 

and objective design review standards in effect at the time that the 

development is submitted to the local government pursuant to this section”

(§ 65913.4, subd. (a)(5)). Respondents found two such conflicts, one with the 

City’s AHMF requirements with respect to very low-income units (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(5)), and the other with the City’s requirement that the project meet 

applicable performance standards for off-site impacts and not exceed the 

amount and intensity of use that can be served by available traffic capacity 

(Ibid.). 

A.

The stated purpose of the City’s AHMF is to mitigate the impacts of 

new market-rate rental units on the need for affordable housing. (Berkeley 

Mun Code, § 22.20.065.A.8.) Berkeley Municipal Code section 22.20.065.C 

requires the AHMF, or a portion of it, to be paid if a development does not 

provide 20 percent of the total units at rates affordable to low and very low-
60

income households,32 with 50 percent of the below market rate units 

affordable to very low-income households. Appellants’ project includes 50 

percent low-income units—considerably more than the 20 percent total below 

market rate units required by the municipal code. Respondents denied the 

project application on the ground that the proposed project failed to comply 

with the “objective requirements” of the AHMF ordinance in that it does not 

include any very low-income units, appellants claimed they were exempt from 

the fee requirement but had not formally requested an exemption and “the 

City cannot accept an application that summarily declares that the AHMF 

will not be paid.”

33 

Appellants contend the AHMF ordinance cannot be used as a basis for 

denial of their application for ministerial approval because section 65913.4 

requires ministerial approval for a project meeting the specified objective 

32 “Low-income household” is defined as household income of no more 

than 80 percent of the area median income (AMI) (Berkeley Mun. Code,

§ 22.20.065.B.4); “very low-income household” is defined as household income 

of no more than 50 percent of AMI (Berkeley Mun. Code, § 22.20.065.B.7). 

33 The September 2018 denial letter stated, “Municipal Code Section 

22.20.065 requires that applicants for rental housing projects either pay the 

specified AHMF or designate a percentage of the proposed housing units as 

affordable to low-income (“LI”) and very low-income (“VLI”) households. The 

Project application asserts that ‘the Project is exempt from the City’s 

affordable housing mitigation fee at this time . . . by providing 50 of its units 

for low-income households.’ . . . However, the application does not provide 

the requisite number of VLI units that are required by Municipal Code 

Section 22.20.065.C.4, nor have you undertaken any formal process to 

request an exemption from the AHMF. Thus, you have not established that 

the Project is exempt from the AHMF, and the City cannot accept an 

application that summarily declares that the AHMF will not be paid. The 

development application thus fails to comply with the objective requirements 

of Municipal Code Section 22.20.065, rendering SB 35 inapplicable to the 

Project.” 
61

planning standards, and a mitigation fee is not a standard. As appellants 

observe, the development and site characteristics and requirements described 

in section 65913.4 as “objective planning standards,” and the statute’s

requirements for consistency with “objective zoning standards, objective 

subdivision standards, and objective design review standards,” refer to 

objective criteria or benchmarks a given development may or may not satisfy. 

(See Merriam-Webster Dict. Online, supra, <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/standard> [as of Apr. 20, 2020] [a standard is 

“something set up and established by authority as a rule for the measure of 

quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality or point of reference”].) A 

mitigation fee does not establish such a criterion: It is a “monetary exaction” 

imposed to “defray the cost of public facilities needed to serve the growth 

caused by the project.” (Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda (2019) 35 

Cal.App.5th 290, 294.) 

Respondents obscure the issue with subtle mischaracterizations of both 

appellants’ argument and the AHMF ordinance. According to respondents,

appellants “contend that the 2018 Application satisfied the Affordable 

Housing Mitigation Fee Ordinance,” which respondents describe as requiring 

that at least 50 percent of affordable units be set aside for very low-income 

households “unless the developer opts instead to pay a mitigation fee.” But 

appellants have never claimed to satisfy the ordinance; they maintain they 

are not required to satisfy it. And the ordinance imposes a mitigation fee on 

new rental housing development which the applicant “may elect to avoid” by 

providing the requisite amount of affordable housing. (Berkeley Mun. Code,

§ 22.20.065.C.2.) By reversing the direct object of the ordinance and its 

provision of an alternative to avoid that object, respondents are able to argue 

that appellants did not meet the “objective criterion” established by the 
62

ordinance and, therefore, the application for ministerial approval could be 

denied. 

The AHMF itself, as opposed to the provision of sufficient affordable 

housing to avoid it, is not a “standard” with which a proposed development 

can be inconsistent. The decision whether to pay the fee or avoid it by 

providing the required number and type of housing is not required at the 

time of application; the election may be made until the date the first building 

permit for the development is issued. The fee must be paid “at the issuance 

of a Certificate of Occupancy.” (Berkeley Mun. Code, § 22.20.065.C.1.) 

Whether the City could grant approval under section 65913.4 and 

subsequently enforce Berkeley Municipal Code section 22.20.065 is a question 

not presented in the current posture of this case. It is sufficient for us to hold 

that the AHMF ordinance did not provide respondents with a valid basis for 

denying ministerial approval due to conflict with an objective planning 

standard.

Appellants argue persuasively that the statewide interest served by 

section 65913.4 should not be defeated where a project complies with the 

standards for ministerial approval set forth in the statute and a local 

ordinance requires a lower percentage of low-income housing, albeit with an 

included component of required units for very low-income households.34 

34 The affordable housing percentage specified in the City’s AHMF 

ordinance is both more and less stringent than what section 65913.4 requires: 

It is more stringent in requiring half of a development’s low-income housing 

to be affordable for very low-income households, but its total affordable 

housing requirement—20 percent of the units in a development—is 

considerably less than the 50 percent low-income housing required by section 

65913.4 for a locality that has not met its RHNA share. While section 

65913.4 expressly provides for its requirements to give way to more stringent 

local ordinances in some circumstances, the situation posed by the AHMF is 
63

Section 65913.4, as we have said, was intended to expedite processing of 

applications for low-income housing developments by curbing local resistance 

and delays. Respondents’ reliance upon Berkeley Municipal Code section 

22.20.065 to deny ministerial approval to a project providing 50 percent lowincome housing frustrates the purpose of section 65913.4.

35

not one of them. For example, section 65913.4 provides for a local ordinance 

to prevail over the statute’s requirement that a proposed development

provide at least 10 percent of its units to low-income households where the 

locality has not met its RHNA for above moderate-income housing if the local 

ordinance requires more than 10 percent low-income housing. (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(4)(B)(i)(I).) For localities within the San Francisco Bay Area, 

section 65913.4 requires dedication of 20 percent of a development’s units to 

households making “below 120 percent of the area median income with the 

average income of the units at or below 100 percent of the area median 

income,” but provides for a local ordinance to apply if it “requires greater 

than 20 percent of the units be dedicated to housing affordable to households 

making at or below 120 percent of the area median income, or requires that 

any of the units be dedicated at a level deeper than 120 percent.” (§ 65913.4, 

subd. (a)(4)(B)(i)(II)(ia).) Where, as here, a project’s eligibility for ministerial 

approval is pursuant to section 65913.4, subdivision (a)(4)(B)(ii), the statute 

specifies that its requirement of 50 percent is superseded by a local ordinance 

“that requires greater than 50 percent of the units be dedicated to housing 

affordable to households making at or below 80 percent of the area median 

income”—but, unlike subdivision (a)(4)(B)(i)(II)(ia), it does not say the same 

for local ordinances requiring provision of housing for households at even 

lower income levels.

35 The City’s municipal code provides a formula for determining a 

proportional discount to the AHMF for projects that include low-income and 

very low-income units comprising less than 20 percent of the total units. 

Respondents found that appellants did not qualify for a discounted AHMF 

because the project did not include any very low-income units. Appellants 

argue that imposing the full AHMF fee on a project providing 50 percent 

affordable housing units is plainly excessive. 

“When a local agency imposes any fee or exaction as a condition of 

approval of a proposed development, as defined by Section 65927, or 

development project, those fees or exactions shall not exceed the estimated 
64

B.

The 90-day letter informed appellants that the project “potentially” 

conflicted with the “objective standards” that it “[b]e capable of meeting any 

applicable performance standards for off-site impacts” and “[n]ot exceed the 

amount and intensity of use that can be served by available traffic capacity 

and potential parking supply” (Berkeley Mun. Code, § 23E64.090) and stated

that an updated traffic analysis was required and the City “has ‘Guidelines 

for Development of Traffic Impact Reports’ which includes methodology and 

the requirement to identify feasible mitigation measures and provide 

mitigation.” The 90-day letter made no mention of any specific criterion for 

measuring traffic impacts, and the Guidelines for Development of Traffic 

Impact Reports (Traffic Guidelines) referenced in the letter are not part of 

the administrative record.36 The letter thus failed to comply with the 

reasonable cost of providing the service or facility for which the fee or 

exaction is imposed.” (§ 66005, subd. (a); Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda

supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 294.) When the City’s formula is applied to a 

project with a combined total of 20 percent low and very low-income units, 

the resulting fee is zero, reflecting the determination that this proportion of 

affordable housing units offsets the costs imposed by the project. The same 

formula suggests that the 50 percent affordable housing provided by 

appellants’ project would have a substantial positive impact. While this does

not account for the lack of very low-income housing, appellants suggest that if 

low-income housing is assumed to be half as mitigating as very low-income 

housing, in effect lowering the proportion of affordable housing in their

project from 50 to 25 percent, the City’s formula would still result in a 

positive impact. Given our conclusion that the AHMF ordinance does not 

establish an objective standard with which a proposed development can be 

found inconsistent, we find it unnecessary to resolve the excessiveness issue.

36 Appellants responded that section 65913.4 did not require a traffic 

analysis but nevertheless provided a “Focused Transportation Impact 

Analysis,” which concluded the “project trips would not cause any significant

impacts at the intersections evaluated in the 2016 DEIR under Existing Plus 
65

statutory requirement that the City provide, within 90 days of application, 

“written documentation of which standard or standards the development 

conflicts with, and an explanation for the reason or reasons the development 

conflicts with that standard or standards.” (§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(1),

now subd. (c)(1).) “If the local government fails to provide the required 

documentation pursuant to paragraph (1), the development shall be deemed 

to satisfy the objective planning standards specified in subdivision (a).” 

(§ 65913.4, former subd. (b)(2), now subd. (c)(2).) 

Respondent’s September 2018 denial letter clarified that the issue was 

with cumulative traffic impacts.37 This explanation, however, came too late 

to allow appellants to attempt to address the asserted conflict.

38 

Furthermore, its only reference to anything like an objective criterion for 

Project conditions” and the “project would not cause a significant impact on 

safety or emergency access.” 

37 The letter stated that even the original, smaller, 2015 project “was 

found to contribute to exceedances of street capacity in cumulative scenarios, 

in conflict of the City’s Guidelines,” citing the portions of the DEIR 

concerning traffic impacts, and that “[w]hen analyzed pursuant to the City’s 

Guidelines for Development of Traffic Impact Reports (i.e., an ‘external and 

uniform benchmark or criterion’), it is not clear that the Project would meet 

these performance standards under cumulative traffic conditions.” 

38 The 90-day letter mentioned cumulative impacts only in an 

attachment summarizing the impacts and mitigation measures discussed in 

the DEIR, which include four intersections found to have significant impacts 

under “Cumulative Plus Project Conditions.” The DEIR’s findings are not in 

themselves “objective standards”; they are conclusions CEQA requires to be 

considered in making discretionary decisions with potential environmental 

impacts. In the CEQA context, even where significant impacts are 

determined to be unavoidable, a lead agency can still approve the project if it 

determines the unavoidable impacts are acceptable due to overriding 

economic, legal, social, technological or other benefits of the project. (Pub. 

Resources Code, §§ 21002, 21081; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15092, 15093.)
66

assessing cumulative traffic was in a footnote relating the DEIR’s description 

of a portion of the City’s Traffic Guidelines, and that description overstated 

the definitiveness of the criterion mentioned, omitting qualifying language 

that appears in the Traffic Guidelines themselves.

39 Even on this appeal, 

while arguing that appellants did not demonstrate the project would satisfy 

objective “cumulative traffic criteria,” respondents do not describe a specific 

criterion for assessing cumulative traffic impacts. To the extent the criterion 

stated in the Traffic Guidelines can be considered an “objective zoning 

standard” within the meaning of section 65913.4, we are led to it only 

through respondents’ citation to the DEIR, which in turn refers to the Traffic 

Guidelines—which, again, are not even part of the administrative record.

39 The denial letter quotes the DEIR’s statement that the traffic related 

findings were based on “City of Berkeley criteria, which state that an impact 

would occur only if the intersection meets peak hour signal warrants, 

operates at LOS F, and adds more than 10 vehicles to the critical 

approach/movement.” The Traffic Guidelines, as we have noted, are not a 

part of the administrative record. As they appear through the City’s website, 

however, the statement to which the DEIR refers appears less definitive. The 

Traffic Guidelines state, with respect to unsignalized intersections: “Unlike 

for signalized intersections, it is difficult to establish fixed significance 

thresholds for unsignalized intersections, particularly those with only sidestreet stop control. In general, mitigations are required if a movement is at 

LOS F, the peak hour signal warrant is met, and a minimum of 10 vehicles is 

added to the critical movement. Nevertheless, as delays increase dramatically 

once LOS F is reached, consideration should be given to the number of new 

trips added by a project and other factors, such as the feasibility of 

alternative routes and the proximity of adjacent traffic signals.” (Italics

added.) Thus, what reads as an objective standard as described in the DEIR 

appears to leave room for interpretation—and discretion—as actually stated 

in the City’s guidelines.
67

In these circumstances, respondents’ assertion that the project does not 

comply with zoning standards with regard to traffic is an insufficient basis 

for its denial of ministerial approval under section 65913.4.40

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court 

with directions to grant the petition for writ of mandate.

Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.

40 Our conclusion that the City’s denial of appellants’ application for 

ministerial approval failed to comply with section 65913.4 makes it 

unnecessary for us to address respondents’ and CVL’s additional contention 

that the City’s denial violated the HAA.
68

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

Ruegg & Ellsworth et al. v. City of Berkeley et al. (A159218)
69

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch

Attorneys for Appellants: Reed Smith

Raymond A. Cardozo

Brian A. Sutherland

Holland & Knight

Jennifer L. Hernandez

Daniel R. Golub

Emily Martinez Lieban

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

on behalf of Appellants: Matthew Gelfand

Attorneys for Respondents: Berkeley City Attorney’s Office

Farimah F. Brown

City Attorney

Christopher D. Jensen

Associate City Attorney

Burke, Williams & Sorensen

Kevin D. Siegel

Megan A. Burke

Deepa Sharma 

Attorney for Interveners and Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe

Respondents: Thomas N. Lippe

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

on behalf of Respondents and

Interveners and Respondents: Courtney Ann Coyle

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell

Matthew G. Adams

Sara A. Dutschke

Sharee Williamson, Pro hac vice
70

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colantuono Highsmith & Whatley

Michael G. Colantuono

Matthew T. Summers

Sharee Williamson, Pro hac vice