COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

CLINTON QUESENBERRY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2637-04-2 PER CURIAM APRIL 12, 2005 RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Theodore J. Markow, Judge (Richard G. White, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Sarah M. Denham, Assistant C ity Attorney; Herb ert H. Jones, Guardian ad litem for the infant child, on brief), for appellee.
Clinton Quesenberry appeals th e trial judge’s decision term inating his residual parental rights to his son, born January 6, 2000. He contends th e evidence was insuffic ient to support this decision because the Richmond Depa rtment of Social Services faile d to make reasonable efforts to assist him in obtaining services and referrals du ring his incarceration and in adequately investigated placement with relativ es as an alternative to termination of his parental rights. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude th at this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Background We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below, and we grant to that evidence all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Co unty Dep’t of Human
Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (19 91). So viewed, the evidence established that

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - the child was placed into the custody of the Depart ment two days shy of hi s second birthday, based on an emergency removal order. His mother was hospitalized for her mental illness, and Quesenberry’s whereabouts were unknown. Two weeks after the Department obtained custody, Jamie Gray , a foster care worker, spoke with Quesenberry. Following that contact, an initial foster care plan was prepared with the goal of placing the child with a re lative. The relative unde r consideration was Quesenberry. As part of the plan, Quesenberry was asked to complete sixteen parenting gro up sessions, obtain and maintain appropriate housing and employmen t, obtain a substance abuse assessment and any necessary treatment, provide names of relatives to and cooper ate with the Department, sign necessary releases for the Department, and be responsi ble for child support an d provide income verification. To assist Quesenberry with meeting these re quirements, Gray referred him to service providers in Richmond and Dublin, where Quesenberry wa s residing and where the initial foster care plan had been approved. Quesenberry failed to co mplete any of these requirements, and he attended only one of five scheduled visits with the chil d between January an d April of 2002. In April 2002, Quesenberry wa s convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was incarcerated from April 2002 until January 2004. Although services were available in the facility where Quesenberr y was incarcerated, he co mpleted only one substance abuse group and a class entitled “productiv e citizenship,” a service not required by the foster care plan. The record also indicates he contacted the child’s mother the day before tr ial and asked where he could buy marijuana. During Quesenberry’s incarceration, the Depart ment changed the foster care plan to include a primary goal of return home, w ith a concurrent goal of adopti on. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Richmond approved that plan . Gray sent numerous letters to Quesenberry while he was incarce rated. The letters a dvised Quesenberry to obtain the mandated- 3 - services listed in the initial foster care plan and advised him that he c ould complete th e requirements in Richmond or Pulaski upon his release from incarceration. Ques enberry did not respond to these letters. Gray sent another letter advising Quesenbe rry to contact her upon his release regarding the plan for the child’s adoption. Two weeks after his release, Quesenberry contacted Gray and inquired about services and visi tation. The Department scheduled two visitations, but Quesenberry failed to appear fo r either visitation. On May 11, 2004, the juvenile district cour t terminated Quesenberry’s parental rights. Although notified of the hearing, Quesenberry failed to appear . Quesenberry appeal ed to the circuit court. In June 2004, Gray sent Quesenberry anothe r letter reiterating the serv ices that he needed to complete and included names and telephone numbers of six differen t resources in Pulaski County where he was living. Gray speci fically recommended that he pa rticipate in a STEP parenting program and an educational workshop about children with special needs. In he r letter, Gray also informed Quesenberry that she was leaving the Department and that her supervisor, Cheryl Williams, would assist him until a new social worker wa s assigned to the case. During the time Gray handled the case, she ex plored whether there we re relatives who could assume the care of the child. Quesenberry’s mother said she could not care for the child but suggested that Gray contact Ques enberry’s aunt. When initially contacted, Ques enberry’s aunt said she was not interested. Later, Qu esenberry told Gray that his a unt had changed her mind. When Gray again contacted Quesenberry’ s aunt, she was ambiva lent about assuming re sponsibility for the child. Nevertheless, Gray continued investigating her as a potential relative placement and conducted a home study. The home study revealed th at she is elderly and reli es upon her sister and brother-in-law for transportation an d that her brother-in-law is listed in the sexual abuse registry. Following the home study, the Depart ment did not approve her as a potential relative placement.- 4 - On July 29, 2004, Qu esenberry telephoned W illiams and told her he was unaw are of what services he needed to co mplete in order to be re united with the child. W illiams sent him a letter reiterating all the informa tion that Gray had sent hi m in previous letters an d the name and telephone number of the new social worker as signed to his case. As of the ci rcuit court trial date, Quesenberry had not contacted the social worker. At trial, Quesenberry denied receiving any le tters from Gray, but ac knowledged receiving a letter from Williams. Quesenberry testified he telephoned Gray and his last social worker several times but his calls were not returned. He said he would visit the child as often as allowed if he could get transportation. Analysis When considering term ination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 12 8, 409 S.E.2d at 463. On review, “[a] trial cour t is presumed to have thorou ghly weighed al l the evidence, considered the statutory require ments, and made its determinat ion based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) provides in pertinent part that residual pa rental rights may be terminated if the court finds by cl ear and convincing evidence that te rmination is in the child’s best interest and that the parent has fa iled, without good caus e, to maintain conti nuing contact with the child and to provide for or substantially plan fo r the child within six months of the child’s placement in foster care, notw ithstanding efforts by agenci es to communicate with the parent and to strengthen the parent-child bond. Code § 16 .1-283(C)(2) requires proof by cl ear and convincing evidence that (1) termination is in the best interests of the ch ild, (2) “reasonable and appropriate” services have- 5 - been offered to help the parent “substantially remedy the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” and (3), despite those services, the parent has failed, “without good cause,” to remedy those conditions “within a re asonable amount of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care.” The evidence supports the tr ial judge’s findings. Quesenbe rry failed to ma intain contact with the child or provide for his future, and failed to demonstrate a w illingness or ability to alter the circumstances that necessitated the child’s continued foster placement. The child has been in foster care more than half of his life. Although Quesenberry claims otherw ise, the record proved that the Department offered him reasonable and appropriate services and that Quesenberry has failed to use those services. The Department was not required “to force its services upon an unwilling or uninterested parent.” Harris v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs ., 223 Va. 23 5, 243, 288 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1982). Without good cause, Quesenberry has been unable or unwilling, with in the thirty months since the child was placed in foster car e prior to trial, to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of the Department. “It is clearly not in the best interest s of a child to spend a lengthy period of ti me waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” Kayw ood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (19 90). In addition, the record established that the Department investigated placing the child with relatives and found that either the relatives would not accept resp onsibility for the child or could not provide a suitable home environment. The record supports the trial judge’s findi ng that the Department presented clear and convincing evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and- 6 - 16.1-283(C)(2) and establishing that termination of Quesenberry’s residual parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.