Filed 10/25/22 Ma rriage of G ibson CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinio n has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the Marriage of J AMES and KARRIE GIBSON

. B 307240

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17PSFL00745 ) JAMES GIBSON , III

,
Respondent

,

v.

KARRIE GIBSON

,
Appellant

.

APPEAL f

r om a judgment of the Superio r Co ur t o f
Los A nge le s Cou nty
, Bruc e G. Iwasaki , Judge. Af firmed.
Cliff Dean Schn ei de r , for Appellant.2 L aw Offices of Michael Labrum and Michael Labrum

, for Respondent

.

_____________________________________________

IN TRO DUCTIO N
This appeal is f

rom a judg ment disso lving the m arriage
betw een a ppellant Karrie Gibson and r espon dent J ame s Gib son

. In the proceedings be low, appellant represented
herself. Based on her pretrial misconduct the trial cou rt de em e d appell ant a vexa tious litigant and impose d evidence preclusion san ct ion s

. At tria l, respondent was the sole
witness . A pp ellant questio ned respondent on cross

examination and recr oss

- examination

. The court ended e ach

exa minati on after appellant persisted

, i n the f ac e of repea ted
admonitions

, in asking irrelevant ques tions

. On appeal,

a p pellant ( now repres ented by counsel) contends the c ourt abused its discre tion in allowing her inadequate time for

cross

- ex amination

. W e conclu de : (1) appellant has forfeited
her contention by failing t o support it with reasoned analys is
and c i tations to relevant portions of the recor d ; and ( 2) on the meri ts, appellant h as failed to show th e co urt abuse d its
discr etion in declining to allow additional time for cr oss

examination

. Accordingly, we affirm.

BA CKGROUND
A. Appellan t ’

s Pretrial Misconduc t
I n September 2017, respondent filed a petition for
dissolutio n of the parties ’ marriage

. Appellant , proceeding3

in pro pria per sona , requested and receive d a tempor ary award of s pousal support pending tria l. A pp ellant a lso

rec eived an awa rd of $5,000 for th e purpose of retai ning

co unsel, but ne ver did so. In June 2 019, the trial court ( Judge Sarah J. Heidel ) ordered appellant to pay approximately $1,500 in

respo ndent’s atto rney fees a nd costs as dis cov ery sanctions, finding appel lant had acted with th e “ specific intent to delay the proceedings.” T he c ourt scheduled a trial re adiness
conferenc e, at w hich appellant failed to appear

. In Oc tober

20 19, the c our t ( Judge La wrence P. Riff) issued an order for

ap pellant t o show cause why the court should not impose evidence pre clusion sanctions against her

. T hat same
month

, respondent filed a motion for order s deeming appellant a vexa tious liti gant and requ iring he r to obtain judicial per mission b efore fil ing new litigation in pro pria

per sona , under Code of Civil Procedure section s 391, subdivision (b)(3)

, and 391.7

. In J anuary 2020

, after a hearing on its order to sh ow

cause , th e court ord ered tha t due to app e l lant ’ s

non complian ce with pre tr ial and t rial readin ess orders, appellant would be precluded at trial from calling witnesses,
movi ng e x hibits into evid ence , and test ifyi ng on financial
issues. In F ebruary 2020, af ter a hearing o n respondent ’ s vexatious litigant motion

, the court (Jud ge Heidel) granted
the motion and issued a pref iling order. The court found appellant was a vexatious litigant because sh e h ad : (1) fil ed

10 unm e r i torious mo tions ; (2) fai led to appear at several4

hearings on her own motions ; ( 3 ) acted in discovery with the intent to delay ; ( 4 ) fa il ed to use her $5,000 award for the purpose it was made, viz., to r etain cou nsel ; a nd ( 5 ) adm itt ed
to respo nde nt th at s h e intended to fo rc e him to incur
excessive attorney fees.

B. Trial In March 2020, the court ( Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki ) preside d o ver a two

- day bench trial. Respondent was the

so le witnes s. On direct examinat i on, resp ondent testified

p rima r i ly ab ou t facts relevant to four disputed issu es : (1) the

proper division of the parties ’ community property and
de bts ; (2) whether appellant ’ s tempor ary award of spousal
support should be term inated; ( 3) whether appellant s h ould
be ordered to r e i mbu rse respondent for vario us payments he had made to the community from his separate property; and (4) whether appellant sh ould be ordered to pay a share of

r espondent ’ s attorney fees as sanctions for her vexat ious litigation conduc t (in add ition to the f ee s previously or dered as discovery sanctions, whic h remained unpaid). On the second day of tr ial, appellant cross

- examin ed responden t. The court sust ained rele v ance obje ctions to

m any of appel lant ’ s q uestions

. 1 The cou rt repeatedly
admonished app ellant to ask relevan t questions, specified

re levant t opics , and ad vised he r that it would end her cross

1 Th ese included : “ Am I a l iar ? ” “

Are you a liar ? ” and “ Why did yo u date and ultim ately marry me ? ”5

examination if she persiste d in asking ir relevant ques t ion s. After ap pellant receiv ed a n answer to another question, the

co urt observed that ap pellant was “m outhing someth ing to
the witness” and a dmo nished her that it would end her

cross

- ex amination if she persisted in s uch misconduct

. W hen app ellant responded by arguing that she had been

“ ma lig ned,” the court end ed her cross

- examination. T he

cou rt assured a ppellant she w ould be allowe d to ask additional, app r opriate questions on recross

- e xamination

. Following r edire ct e xam ination, appellant co ndu cted

recross. Ap p ell a n t received answers to over 3 0 questions ( s ome rephrased by the court in a manner she confi rme d to be acc urate )

. The court sustained objections to appellant ’ s other questions , most fr equen tly on relevance ground s

. A gain, t he c o urt repeatedly tol d appellant that it would end
her examination if she persisted in ask ing irrelevant questions. When appellant pro test ed the court ’ s su staining
of another rele van ce obj ection, the co urt ende d the
examination. Appellant then exited the courtroom ; although the court rep eatedly asked her to stay an d advised her that
trial would proceed in her absence, she re s ponded only by expressing an intent to sue t he cour t for racial
dis criminatio n and “ shouting at t h e court ” from the

courtroom entrance

. 2

2 A ppell ant cites no s upport in the record for her assertion s that she was allowed only 20 minutes for rec ro ss

- examination

. Ap pellan t began her cross

- ex amination at 9:10 a.m. and ex ited (Fn. is continued on the next page. )6 T he court co ndu cted its own e xamination of respondent

, aft er which respondent rested his case

. The
court announced its findings and o rd ered respondent to submit a pro posed judgment

. R espondent s ubmitted a proposed judgment, to which ap pellant filed no objection.
The c ourt entered the proposed judgment of dissolution

. The judgme nt contained detail ed fi ndings c oncern ing the
d i sp u t ed issues addressed in respondent ’ s testimony

, viz

., division of the pa rties ’ c ommunity property and debt,

s pousal support, respondent’s reque sted reimbursements, and respondent’s requested award of attorney fees.
A ppellant timel y ap p e al ed

.

DISCUS SION Ap pellant contend s the t rial court abused its discre tion
in allowing her inadequate time for cross

- ex amination of respondent

. As t his court h as long recognized: “‘ A trial cour t has a clear duty to supe rvise the conduct of the trial to the

e nd th at it m ay not b e unduly protracted and that other litigants too may have their day in court. In carrying out this duty the court may confin e cross

- exam ination within

reaso nable limi ts a n d may curtail cross

- exami nation which relates to matters already cove red, or w hich a re irrelevant. These are matters clearly within the court’s di scretion and

the court room ( i mm ediat ely af t er re cross ) one ho ur and 35 minutes later

, at 1 0:45 a.m

. The record does not di s close the precise duration of cro ss

- and recr oss

- examination.7

only a manifest abuse thereof will require a reve r sal.’” ( Do llinger v. San Gabri el Lanes ( 1962 ) 205 Cal.App.2d 705

, 710

- 711 ; see a lso Pe ople v . Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535

, 579 [ in capital murder case, notwithstanding defendant’s constitutional right to con fr ont wi t nesses , “ “‘the trial court
retai ns wide la titu d e in restricting cross

- ex amination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusin g of the issues, or of m arginal
releva n ce’” ”

] .)
We co nclude appellant has forfeited her challenge to
the trial court ’ s exerci se of d isc retion by failing t o support her conte ntio n w ith reasoned analysis and citations to relevant portions of the recor d

. ( See Hernandez v. First
St udent, Inc. (2 019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [ “‘[T] o demonstrate error, an appellant must s upply the reviewing
court with some cogen t ar g u ment supported by leg al analysis and citation to the record ’ ” ].) Appellant cites none of respondent’s testimony on di rect examinati on

. S he cites no question she asked respondent in the time allowed fo r

cros s

- and recross

- e xamination , and no answer he p r o vided

. She suggests no additional question she migh t have asked if
allowed more time

. She cites no finding by the co urt to which s uc h a n additional question might have been relevant. In short, she d oes not explain why her time for cross

examinatio n w a s assertedly inadequate

, much less h ow th is inadequacy is reflected in the re cord. It is not this court ’ s duty to scour the r ecord un gu ide d or to develop appella nt ’ s argument for her. (See ib id. [ “ We m ay and d o ‘ dis regard conclusory argumen ts that ar e no t supported by pertinen t8

legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusion s he wants us to ad opt ’ ” ] ; WFG Natio nal Title Insurance Company v. Wells Fargo
Bank , N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 8 81, 894 [“Rather than scour the record unguid ed , we may dec ide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on app e al when it is not
supporte d by accurate c it at i o ns to the record”] .) Acc o rd ing ly,

we conclude that by filing a deficient a ppel late b rief

, appellant has for fei ted her ch allenge to the court ’ s exercis e

o f discre tion

. W e further c onclud e appellant has failed to show

, o n the merits

, th at th e court a b us ed i ts discret ion in decli ning
to allow he r addition al time for cross

- examinati on

. A ppellant concedes the court demonstrated patience with
her on recross

, during which it assi sted her in rephrasing

sever al quest i ons

. During the time allo wed fo r r e cr os s alone

, ap pellant recei ved answers to over 3 0 qu estions. Appellant
does not dispute that h er other questions were irrelevant o r otherwise improper

, as deter min ed by the court in its unchallenged e vid entia r y rulings

. The co urt ended

app ella nt ’ s t i me f

o r cros s

- exami nation only after appellant persis ted , in the face of repeated admon itions

, in askin g irrelevant questions

. Appellan t ’ s conduct reasonably could
h ave led the court to determine that allowing a d d i tiona l time
for c ross

- examin ati on w ould yield no material evidence. Appel lant identifies noth in g in the reco rd to support a
cont ra ry expectation. This failure is fatal to her claim that
the court ab used it s discretion

. (See Kelly

- Zurian v. Wohl9

Sho e C o

. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397

, 412 [ t r ial court acte d
within its discretion in limiting time for cross

- examinati on , where a p pellant “fail[ed] to specify on which iss ues the cross

examination was inade qua te”] ; D ollinger v. San Gabriel
Lanes

, supra , 205 Ca l. A p p .2d at 710 [ t rial court acte d w it hi n it s discreti on in sustaining obje ctions to questions pose d on

cross

- exam i n ation

, where “ it [wa]s not shown how the questions asked would establish any relevan t or materia l

evidence ”] .) 3 In sum, we conclude that in a d di tion to

3 T he cases ci ted by appellant do not a ss i st her. Several upheld limi t ations o n c ro ss

- examination or other me ans of present ing evidence . (See Kelly

- Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co.

, sup ra , 22 Cal.App.4th at 412 ; Rosenthal v. Rosenthal (1961) 197 Cal.App.2 d 289

, 302

- 305 [trial court acted wi thin its discretion in limiting time for a ttorney f ee he aring over party ’ s objecti o n that he desired additional t ime to p resent evi dence ] ; Gantne r v. Gantner (195 2) 39 Cal.2d 272

, 278

- 279 [ trial court exhibited no bias a t child custody hearing in r eject ing party ’ s proffered document and question t o wi t n e ss , where “nothing more [wa]s sho wn than that t he trial judge refused to allow [ pa rty ] to d evelo p immaterial matters”] .) Another undermin es appellant ’ s suggestion that sh e was entitled to addition al time mere ly because she was proceeding in pro pria p e r son a

. (Se e Lombardi v. Citizens N

ational T

rust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles (1 955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206

, 207

- 210 [trial court pro pe rly declined to explain to sel f

- re presented plaintiff h ow to lay fo unda tion for docume nt, ev en though plain tiff ’ s failure t o do so resulted in granting of defense motio n for nonsuit].) Finally, a ppellant ’ s

rem aining cases a re inapp osite , as th ey concerned ab sent witnesses who were not sub ject to any cross

- examination

. (See Pointer v. Texas (1965) 38 0 U.S. 400

, 406

- 408 [ crim i n a l d efendant’s confrontation rights wer e vio lated at trial by (Fn. is continued on the next page. )10

fo rfeiting her con te nti on b y filing a def icient appel late b rief, appellant has failed to s how the cou rt abused it s discretion
in declining to allow her additional time for cross

examination. 4

admission of victim’s pr eliminary hear ing testimony in lie u of calling vi ctim as witness ]; Greene v. McE lroy (1959) 360 U.S. 474

, 475

- 499, 50 8 [ fed eral agency improperly revoked plaintif f ’ s

se c u r it y clear ance on basis of st atements f rom i ndividual s who were neither identified nor called as wit nesses ].)

4 W e n eed not address re spondent ’ s argum ent th at appell ant forf eited her o bjection on appeal by fail ing to raise it in the trial

co urt

.11 DISPOSITION The judgmen t is affir med. Resp ondent i s a wa rded hi s
costs on a ppeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

COLLINS, J.