alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 28, 2010 

0127 

Order 

 

January 28, 2010 

137111 (147) 

 

ANTHONY PELLEGRINO, Individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate of 

Shirley Ann Pellegrino, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137111 

 COA: 274743 

Wayne CC: 03-325462-NI 

AMPCO SYSTEMS PARKING, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion to strike portions of the defendant’s brief on 

appeal is DENIED.
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<CASH>                                             886
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</TABLE>
10163.

#### Whatley, administrator, *v.*Mitchell.

Decided September 18, 1919.

Trover; from city court of Monroe—Judge Stone. September 19, 1918.

*R. L. & H. Q. Cox,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. W. Roberts,*contra.

Stephens, J.

1. While delivery is essential to a valid gift of personalty, actual manual delivery is not required. The mere fact that the donee of personalty allows possession of the property to remain with the donor, will not necessarily defeat the gift. Accordingly, where the evidence shows that a grandfather, whose grandchild lived in the house with him, had stated that he had given to such grandchild a certain heifer, and the heifer continued to remain on the premises and in the lot of the donor where both the donor and the donee resided, the donee and his wife working for the donor, such evidence is sufficient to authorize the inference that the subject-matter of the alleged gift was delivered to the donee, aaid that the donor parted with his title and relinquished all dominion and ownership over the property, thereby constituting a valid gift.

2. For the reasons above stated the exception to the-charge of the court contained in the sole special ground of the motion for a new trial is without merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
#### G. W. Harrington *v.*R. Stevens et al.

Frauds, Statute of — Agreement Affecting Real Estate.

Wliere two persons as partners engaged in the erection of a house, and one desiring to withdraw from the undertaking after partly finishing the house, having surrendered his rights in the property to his partner on certain conditions, with the understanding that the title to the property «hoúld be conveyed to his partner, the contract was within the statute of frauds and can not be enforced.

APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 27, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin :

Whether there was a valid and enforceable contract between Harrington and January, is the only important question to be determined in this case.

It appears that Harrington, after taking possession of the lot and commencing to build the house and make other improvements upon it, gave it up to his partner, January, who partly finished the house and made other improvements at his own expense, and that Harrington repeatedly declared in conversation in effect, that being unable to complete the house and keep it, he had let January take it off his hands, who was to pay his three notes for purchase money and aid him with lumber for fitting up another house to live in; but there is no evidence that this arrangement was expressed in writing; and the circuit court, it seems, only regarded the proof as sufficient to show a parol agreement that January should, on paying off the notes to1 Stevens & Co., have the title conveyed to him, and this was construed by the court as not within the statute of frauds for the reason that it provided for a conveyance by the *165original vendors, or holders of the title, to January, and did not import an agreement on the part of Harrington to. convey.

*Stevenson & Myers, for appellant.*

*Boyd, for appellees.*

The decision can not be sustained. Waiving the objection taken as to the competency of the evidence, it certainly proves only a verbal contract, and whether that was meant or intended as a sale by Harrington.to January, and an obligation on the part of Harrington to get and convey the title, or that he would provide or permit the holders of it to make the deed directly to January, it was nevertheless substantially a contract for the sale and conveyance of land, ‘which, not being in writing, could not be enforced as against Harrington, and it, of course, imposed no obligation on the holders of the legal title.

The court should have adjudged relief to the plaintiff, as it did, but should also have rescinded the agreement between Harrington and January upon such equitable terms of adjustment as were usual in such cases.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a judgment in conformity to this opinion.
Exhibit 11

                    COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
                                   (unaudited)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                          For the three months             For the three months
                                                                  ended                           ended
                                                               December 31                     December 31
                                                                  1997                            1996
                                                                  ----                            ----
<S>                                                             <C>                             <C>    

Net income (loss)                                               $ (9,820)                       $ 111,136
-----------------                                               =========                       =========

Basic earnings per share

   Weighted-average number of
     common shares outstanding                                  6,784,390                       6,679,766
                                                                =========                       =========
Basic earnings (loss) per share                                 $     -0-                       $     .02
-------------------------------                                 =========                       =========

Diluted earnings per share                                        Note
--------------------------                                        ----
   Shares:
   Weighted-average number of common
      shares outstanding                                                                        6,679,766
    Excess of shares issuable for the
     assumed exercise of options and 
     warrants over the number of shares possible
     of  repurchase  using the  proceeds  from the  
     exercise of such options and warrants, at the 
     average market price (treasury stock method)                                               1,735,484
                                                                                                ---------
    Weighted-average number of common
      and common equivalent shares
      outstanding                                                                               8,414,250
                                                                                                ---------
Diluted earnings per share                                                                      $     .01
--------------------------                                                                      ---------


</TABLE>

Note
----
   A computation would be antidilutive.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4828

To direct the Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue a rule banning 

children’s toys containing mercury. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 13, 2004

Ms. WATSON (for herself and Mr. BURTON of Indiana) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL

To direct the Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue 

a rule banning children’s toys containing mercury.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. TOYS CONTAINING MERCURY AS BANNED HAZ4 ARDOUS PRODUCTS. 

5 (a) PRODUCT BANNED.—Not later than 6 months 

6 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Consumer 

7 Product Safety Commission shall, pursuant to section 8 

8 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2057), 

9 promulgate a rule under section 9 of such Act, declaring 
2

•HR 4828 IH 

1 mercury-containing toys to be banned hazardous products 

2 under such Act. 

3 (b) DEFINITION OF MERCURY-CONTAINING TOYS.—

4 As used in this Act, the term ‘‘mercury-containing toy’’ 

5 means any toy or other product that contains mercury and 

6 is designed primarily for, or marketed primarily to chil7 dren.

Æ
#### Hester O’Brien *v.*D. H. Edmonson.

Bills and Notes — Interest—Presumption.

A court can not presume that the parties, in the renewal of a note, erred in the calculation of the interest due.

APPEAL PROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 10, 1873.

*T. F. Hargis for appellant.*

*Cunningham, Palin, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

In this case it was incumbent upon appellee to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the debt for $325, which was afterwards embraced in the note of July 1, 1870, for $449.73, was credited prior to the 1st of June, 1866. The theory of ap-pellee is that the first note bore date April, 1866. Appellant claims that the date was December, 1866.

The personal recollection of the witnesses testifying on either side is widely different, so much so that it woud be impossible to conclude, from the statements based upon recollection alone, that appellee had made out his case.

It is clear, however, that the note for $449.73, was the renewal of a note for $325, that this first note bore interest at the rate of 8 per. cent, per annum, and that this interest was annually compounded. If the first note was dated in December, 1866, compound interest at 8 per cent, up to July 1, 1870, the date of the last note, would increase the amount then due to a few cents less than $432, or near $18.00 less than the amount of the note of July 1, 1866.

Upon the controversy, if we accept the theory of appellee that the date of the first note due was April, 1866, then interest at 8 per cent., annually compounded, makes the amount due .July 1, 1866, very nearly if not the exact amount of the note of July, 1870.

We can not assume that the parties erred in their calculation of interest due when the last note was executed; and without so assuming the results above stated led necessarily to the conclusion that the date of the first note was April, 1866. We must therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
: —
INMATE NAME DEMELREUS Hel
INMATE REG #_b¥433-OS3 ~

UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY

P.O, BOX 1002

THOMSON, IL 61285

au a

2 SUL 2081 PM we

/g° At thyl Lain ‘dohastor
US. Déstel ef Cu udje
US DAT Court

= a3 2a batt

iigostog lesa Gf pf ggian
#### T. A. Berryman v. Willis Brumback & Walker.

Chattel Mortgages — Presumption.

Debts, to secure which, a lieu has beeu taken upon other property, can not be presumed to be without a prior mortgage to secure merchandise sold and to be sold.

APPEAL PROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT.

December 15, 1873.

*Lcmckum, for appellant.*

*Berrynian, Drane, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The five hundred dollar note described in the mortgage of Sept. 6, 1870, was not produced, and there is no evidence tending to show that any such note was ever in existence. Except for the statements in appellant’s petition that this mortgage was executed to secure Walker for goods and merchandise sold and to be sold to Brum-back, there would be nothing in the record from which we could conclude that there was any consideration whatever for its execution. The debt of Brumback for $150, secured by the mortgage of Jan. 3, 1871, and the debt of Delaney for $50, secured by mortgage of the same date, are clearly not embraced by the mortgage of Sept. 6, 1870. It is not so alleged in appellees’ pleadings; and the fact that a lien was taken upon other property to secure these debts, rebuts any presumption that it was intended by the parties that the tobacco, embraced in the mortgage of Sept. 6, should also' be held bound for the payment of these debts.

The most that Walker can claim is a prior lien upon the tobacco for the goods sold to Brumback before the levy of appellant’s attachment. After the amount of his account up to the levy of the attachment, and the costs of the proceedings are paid, the remainder of the four hundred dollars for which the tobacco sold, should be paid to appellant. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a judgment conformable to this opinion.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          237103
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    22308
<ALLOWANCES>                                      2950
<INVENTORY>                                     144337
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1072723
<PP&E>                                         9442417
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2666058
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 9597764
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2626093
<BONDS>                                        5372417
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1494640
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              237103
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<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (1494283)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (1494283)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.72)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.72)
        

</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00052-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021-005719-1

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

DAVID MARTIN ORTIZ, Appellant

V.

KAYLYNN SYLVIA, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant’s brief was due July 6, 2022. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(a). On July 21, 

2022, we notified Appellant that his brief had not been filed as the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure require. We stated that we could dismiss his appeal for want of 

prosecution unless, within ten days, Appellant filed a brief along with an 

accompanying motion reasonably explaining the brief’s untimeliness. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 10.5(b), 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). More than thirty days have passed, but we have not 

received a response.

Because Appellant has failed to file a brief, we dismiss his appeal for want of 

prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam

Delivered: August 31, 2022
<PAGE>   1

   
                                                                        Ex. 23.2

              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the use of our reports included herein and to the reference to our
firm under the heading "Experts" in the Registration Statement.



/s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

November 25, 1998
Kansas City, Missouri
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              26
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,608
<ALLOWANCES>                                        50
<INVENTORY>                                        124
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,052
<PP&E>                                          33,182
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,041
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  17,008
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,723
<BONDS>                                          5,019
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,017
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,617)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    17,008
<SALES>                                         10,083
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,083
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,747
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 374
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,018
<INCOME-TAX>                                       766
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,252
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,252
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 10.14

SCHEDULE OF SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS

(a)    
The following named executive officers have entered into an Employment Agreement with the Company that is substantially identical to the Employment Agreement included as Exhibit 10.13 to the
Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K and that differs only with respect to the name of the person on the Agreement and the effective date of the Severance Agreement amended, restated and superseded by the Employment Agreement:

Timothy A. Dawson
                                            
William L. Smith

(b)    
The following named executive officers have entered into an Employment Agreement with the Company that is substantially identical to the Employment Agreement included as Exhibit 10.13 to the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K and that differs only with respect to the name of the person on the Agreement and with respect to Section 3.e.(vii) thereof:

C. E. McCraw
                                             
Robert E. Jones

Section 3.e.(vii) of Mr. McCraw's and Mr. Jones's Employment Agreement reads in its entirety as follows:

(vii)     the Company will, at its own expense and until the earlier of Executive's 65th
birthday and the tenth anniversary of the Termination Date, provide Executive with life insurance, disability and accidental death and dismemberment benefits at the highest level provided to Executive since the Effective Date hereof, provided that Executive has executed and delivered to the Company (and not revoked) the Release;
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

April 24, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 132927 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 132927 

 COA: 262679 

Kent CC: 04-002119-FC 

COREY WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0416 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 24, 2007 

 Clerk
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 333-31700 and 333-48386) pertaining to the Aperian, Inc. 2000
Stock Option Plan, the Aperian, Inc. 2000 Stock Incentive Plan and the
Registration Statements (Form S-3 No. 333-31726, 333-92413, 333-44666 and
333-63406)of Aperian, Inc. and the related Prospectus' of our report dated May
25, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Aperian, Inc.
included in this Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended March 31, 2001,
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

                                             /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                             ---------------------

Austin, Texas
June 27, 2001