Present: All the Justices 

PENINSULA CRUISE, INC. 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 980728 February 26, 1999 

NEW RIVER YACHT SALES, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 In this appeal we consider whether the circuit court 

erred in refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

Florida corporation pursuant to Code § 8.01-328.1, the longarm statute. 

 Peninsula Cruise, Inc., filed its amended motion for 

judgment against New River Yacht Sales, Inc. The plaintiff 

sought to recover, among other things, the cost of repairs 

made to a sport fishing boat it had purchased from New River 

Yacht Sales. The defendant filed responsive pleadings, 

including a special plea which asserted that the court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over it. The defendant contended that 

it does not transact and has not transacted business in 

Virginia, nor has it engaged in any other activity that would 

satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-328.1. The litigants 

agreed to certain stipulated facts, and the circuit court held 

that it lacked a "sufficient basis upon which to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with" 
Code § 8.01-328.1. The circuit court dismissed the action, 

and the plaintiff appeals. 

 The following stipulated facts are relevant to our 

disposition of this appeal. Edward H. Shield, president of 

Peninsula Cruise, contacted the defendant's employees 

regarding the purchase of a sport fishing boat. Shortly 

thereafter, Shield went to the defendant's premises in Fort 

Lauderdale, Florida to inspect the boat. Shield made 

arrangements to have a marine surveyor inspect the boat in 

Fort Lauderdale. The parties agreed that certain improvements 

and repairs to the boat were necessary. Shield gave the 

defendant a check as a deposit for the boat and returned to 

Virginia. 

 After Shield returned to Virginia, he contacted the 

defendant's employees to discuss the status of the repairs and 

improvements to the boat and to make delivery arrangements. 

The defendant's employees, who were in Florida, prepared an 

itemization of the repairs to be performed on the boat, fixed 

the purchase price of the boat at $275,000, and identified the 

delivery point for the boat as Charleston, South Carolina. 

 The defendant's employees left Fort Lauderdale with the 

boat en route to South Carolina. However, the boat developed 

an oil leak and sustained damage to the propeller. "For 

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additional consideration, [the] [d]efendant agreed to deliver 

the vessel all the way to Virginia." 

 The defendant's employees delivered the boat to the 

plaintiff in Virginia. "Thereafter, the parties spoke by 

telephone while [p]laintiff was in Virginia and [d]efendant 

was in Florida, and [d]efendant advised [p]laintiff that it 

should have the necessary repair work done and forward copies 

of repair invoices to the [d]efendant for consideration for 

reimbursement. The repair work was done in Virginia." 

 Code § 8.01-328.1(A) states in part that "[a] court may 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts 

directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from 

the person's . . . 1. [t]ransacting any business in this 

Commonwealth . . . ." The plaintiff contends that the circuit 

court erred in failing to exercise personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant because the defendant transacted business in 

Virginia pursuant to Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(1), and that the 

defendant had sufficient contacts with Virginia to satisfy the 

requirements of due process. The defendant, however, asserts 

that its delivery of the boat to Virginia does not constitute 

"transacting business" within the meaning of the long-arm 

statute, and that it did not have sufficient contacts with 

Virginia to satisfy the requirements of due process. 

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 We have stated that "[i]t is manifest that the purpose of 

Virginia's long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over 

nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this 

State to the extent permissible under the due process clause." 

John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 

736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971); accord Krantz v. Air 

Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205, 427 S.E.2d 326, 328 

(1993); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 259, 

377 S.E.2d 388, 391, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); 

Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 

(1968). We have held that Code § 8.01-328.1 "is a single-act 

statute requiring only one transaction in Virginia to confer 

jurisdiction on our courts." Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 237 Va. 

at 260, 377 S.E.2d at 391; I.T. Sales, Inc. v. Dry, 222 Va. 6, 

9, 278 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1981); John G. Kolbe, Inc., 211 Va. at 

740, 180 S.E.2d at 667. 

 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

federal constitution protects a person's liberty interest in 

not being subject to the binding judgment of a forum unless 

that person has certain minimum contacts within the territory 

of the forum so that maintenance of an action against that 

person does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

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471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). The circumstances of each case 

must be examined to ascertain whether the requisite minimum 

contacts are present. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 

U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Witt v. Reynolds Metals Co., 240 Va. 452, 

454, 397 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1990). 

 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 

291-92 (1980), the United States Supreme Court discussed the 

limitations that the Due Process Clause imposes upon the power 

of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a 

non-resident defendant: 

 "As has long been settled . . . a state court 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant only so long as there exist 

'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the 

forum State. . . . The concept of minimum contacts, 

in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but 

distinguishable, functions. It protects the 

defendant against the burdens of litigating in a 

distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to 

ensure that the States, through their courts, do not 

reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their 

status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 

 The protection against inconvenient litigation 

is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' 

or 'fairness.' We have said that the defendant's 

contacts with the forum State must be such that 

maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 

 . . . The relationship between the defendant and 

the forum must be such that it is 'reasonable . . . 

to require the corporation to defend the particular 

suit which is brought there.' . . . Implicit in 

this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding 

that the burden on the defendant, while always a 

primary concern, will in an appropriate case be 

considered in light of other relevant factors, 

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including the forum State's interest in adjudicating 

the dispute . . . ." 

 The Supreme Court observed that "[t]he limits imposed on 

state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role as 

guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been 

substantially relaxed over the years. . . . [T]his trend is 

largely attributable to a fundamental transformation in the 

American economy." Id. at 292-93. Explaining the reason for 

this expansion in the permissible scope of state jurisdiction 

over foreign corporations and other non-residents, the Supreme 

Court stated: 

"Today many commercial transactions touch two or 

more States and may involve parties separated by the 

full continent. With this increasing 

nationalization of commerce has come a great 

increase in the amount of business conducted by mail 

across state lines. At the same time modern 

transportation and communication have made it much 

less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself 

in a State where he engages in economic activity." 

McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 

222-23 (1957). 

Accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293; Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). 

 We hold that Code § 8.01-328.1(A) authorized the circuit 

court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 

The defendant transacted business in this Commonwealth within 

the meaning of the long-arm statute. Even though the 

defendant had initially agreed to deliver the boat to South 

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Carolina, the defendant was paid additional consideration to 

deliver the vessel to Virginia. The defendant's employees 

physically transported the boat within Virginia's boundaries 

and delivered the boat to the plaintiff in Virginia. The 

defendant's employees had telephone conversations with the 

plaintiff, discussed the status of repairs and improvements to 

the boat, and, after the defendant's employees had physically 

transported the boat to Virginia, the "[d]efendant advised 

[p]laintiff that it should have the necessary repair work done 

and forward copies of repair invoices to the [d]efendant for 

consideration for reimbursement." The repair work was 

performed in Virginia. 

 We conclude that the defendant, by taking these actions, 

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within this Commonwealth, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of Virginia's laws. Maintenance of 

this action in Virginia "does not offend traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice" because the defendant, 

through its purposeful acts, had sufficient contacts with this 

Commonwealth. The defendant's contacts with this Commonwealth 

make it reasonable for the defendant to be required to defend 

the plaintiff's action in this State. 

 We reject the defendant's contention that our decision in 

Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain and Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 

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Va. 533, 238 S.E.2d 800 (1977), compels a different result. 

In Danville Plywood Corp., we held that the long-arm statute 

did not grant a circuit court personal jurisdiction over a 

non-resident defendant. Danville Plywood, a Virginia 

corporation which operated a manufacturing plant in Danville, 

sold plywood panels to Plain and Fancy Kitchens, Inc. 

(Kitchens), a foreign corporation. Kitchens operated a 

manufacturing facility in Pennsylvania. Danville Plywood's 

representative in Pennsylvania solicited a sales order from 

Kitchens. As a result of the solicitation, Kitchens placed an 

order with Danville Plywood for more than 500 plywood panels 

to be shipped, F.O.B. Danville, to Kitchens. Danville Plywood 

delivered the panels to a common carrier which transported 

them to Kitchens' facility in Pennsylvania. Kitchens refused 

to pay for the materials, alleging that some of the panels 

were defective. Danville Plywood filed an action in Virginia. 

Id. at 534, 238 S.E.2d at 801-02. 

 We held that the long-arm statute did not permit the 

circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kitchens 

because Danville Plywood failed to establish that Kitchens had 

sufficient contacts in Virginia to satisfy the requirements of 

due process. We also pointed out that "[w]hile the risk of 

loss of panels shipped F.O.B. Danville passed from Plywood to 

Kitchens when the panels were placed in the possession of the 

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common carrier at Danville . . . and while technical 

acceptance of the order may have occurred in Virginia by 

Plywood's delivery of the panels to the carrier, this evidence 

is insufficient to establish that Kitchens had the necessary 

'minimum contacts' . . . ." Danville Plywood Corp., 218 Va. 

at 535, 238 S.E.2d at 802. 

 Here, unlike the facts in Danville Plywood Corp., the 

defendant, through its purposeful conduct, did have the 

necessary minimum contacts. As we have already stated, the 

defendant was paid additional consideration to perform in 

Virginia a portion of its contract with the plaintiff. The 

defendant performed its contractual obligations in part by 

delivering the vessel in this Commonwealth. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit 

court and remand this case for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded. 

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