alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William V. Thomas et al. *v.*John I. Smith.

Parties — Petition to Be Madte Party After Final Judgment.

Under Section 257, Civil Code Practice, one was held entitled to be made a party to an action, although a final judgment has been rendered between the original parties to the action at the previous term of court.

APPEAL FROM HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT.

February 27, 1874.

*G. W. Williams, Bush, for appellants.*

*E. Et. Brown, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

Conceding that the judgment enforcing the rule against Thomas was final and beyond the control of the court at a subsequent term, as between the plaintiff and Thomas and Scott, yet we are of the opinion that, as the fund in litigation had not been, paid over when the appellant, Wallace, offered to file his petition, and asked thereby to be made a party, claiming the debt on Thomas by assignment prior in date to the levy of the order of attachment, he was entitled to be so admitted as a party by the express provisions of Sec. 257, Civi'l Code of Practice, there being* nothing in the judgment against Thomas to conclude him from, litigating the right to collect the debt as between him and Smith; and the court, therefore, erred in rejecting the petition of Wallace to be made a party.

Wherefore the judgment as to Wallace is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsitent with this opinion.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ZHANTEVEZ TRA’JA JACKSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-2081

[April 18, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562022CF001609A. 

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 20 2 3

- 1517

_____________________________
E LIJAH P ASSMORE , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. Francis J. Allman, Jr. , Judge

. June 13, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , R OBERTS , and R AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Elijah Passmore , pro se , Appellant.2 Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend , Assistant Attorney General
, Tallahassee
, for Appe ll ee

.
#### The Louisville, New Albany, and St. Louis Air Line Railway Company et al. *v.*Duvall.

Trespass.—Statute.-—yudgment.—The rule at common law, that, in an action of trespass against several defendants, a verdict and judgment might be rendered for or against one or more of them, has not been narrowed by the statute.

*Same.—Súfreme*Cozirt.—The Supreme Court may reverse or affirm a judgment in whole or in part. Where in an action for trespass, a judgment was rendered over a motion for a new trial, against two defendants who had pleaded severally, this court reversed the judgment as to one, against whom there was no evidence, and affirmed it as to the other.

APPEAL from the Floyd Common Pleas.

Pettit, C. J.

The appellee sued the appellants for trespass on his lands, charging that the appellants threw down his fences and let In cattle which ate up the grass, and browsed on his shrubbery, and destroyed his fruit trees, etc.

The appellants answered separately by the general denial. Trial by jury and verdict for the appellee. Appellants separately moved fora new trial, for the reason that the evidence does not warrant, support, or justify the verdict. This motion was overruled, and proper exception taken; and this ruling is assigned for error. We have very carefully read and examined the evidence, and there is not a particle of it that warranted a verdict against the railway company; but there is evidence that might warrant a verdict against Reed.

In actions of trespass the doctrine of the- common law *247was that a verdict and judgment might be given and rendered against one or more defendants and for one or more of them. This rule has not been narrowed, but enlarged, by our statute, so as to include actions on contract as well as actions for trespass. 2 G. & H. 217, sec. 366. “Though all the defendants have been summoned, judgment maybe rendered against any of them, severally, where the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment against such defendants, if the action had been against them severally.” . 2 G. & H. 218, sec. 368. “Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as between themselves.” See the notes under these two sections. This court may reverse or affirm a judgment in whole or in part. 2 G. & H. 276, sec. 569 and notes.

*G. V. Howk, W. W. Tttley,*and *M. C. Kerr,*for appellants.

*D. C. Anthony,*for appellee.

The court below properly refused a new trial as to Reed, but improperly refused it as to the railway company, there being no evidence against it.

The judgment is affirmed as to Reed, at his costs, and reversed as to the railway company, at the costs of the appellee, with instructions to the court below to grant the railway company a new trial.
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Kenneth L. Hignett, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Morgan’s Foods, Inc.; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this annual report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisannual report; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and15d-14) for the registrant and we have:
a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;
b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures as ofFebruary 27, 2005 (the “Evaluation Date”); and
c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which couldadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialdata and have identified for the registrant’s auditors any material weaknesses in internalcontrols; and
b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and
6.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have indicated in this annual report whetheror not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that couldsignificantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation,including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses.     Date: May 31, 2005   /s/ Kenneth L. Hignett            Kenneth L. Hignett,        Senior Vice President,        Chief Financial Officer & Secretary
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40628

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LUIS DURON JUAREZ, also known as “Canoco”,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CR-41-3

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Luis Duron Juarez has moved for 

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Juarez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 17, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-40628 Document: 00513384419 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2016
No. 15-40628

2

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 15-40628 Document: 00513384419 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2016
EXHIBIT
32.2




ARTICLE
II









ARTICLE
III  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Kiwibox.Com, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 (the "Form 10-Q"), I, Craig S.
Cody, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, as of the date hereof,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of myknowledge, that the
Company's Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in the Form 10-Q, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
      August 16, 2010
            By:
            /s/ Craig S. CodyCraig
      S. CodyChief Financial
      Officer
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

    METROPOLITAN MORTGAGE & SECURITIES CO., INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK
                              DIVIDENDS

        The ratio of adjusted earnings to fixed charges and preferred
stock  dividends  was  computed using the  following  tabulations  to
compute adjusted earnings and the defined fixed charges and preferred
stock dividends.
                                                Year Ended
                                               September 30
                                            (Dollars in Thousands)
                                  1996    1995     1994     1993      1992
<S> <C>                       <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
Income (loss) before extra-
    ordinary item................$ 8,038$6,303  $ 5,478   $8,303  $ 2,927
Add:
    Interest.....................18,788 16,381   19,895   19,442   21,299
    Taxes (benefit) on income....4,235   3,108    4,422    1,871      213
Adjusted Earnings...............$31,061 $25,792  $28,365  $32,167  $26,097



Preferred stock dividend require-
    ments........................$3,868$ 4,038  $ 3,423   $3,313  $ 3,399
Ratio factor of income after
    provision for income taxes to
    income before provision for
    income taxes................. 66%      67%      66%      66%      64%
Preferred stock dividend factor on
    pretax basis.................5,880   6,006    5,220    5,020    5,311
Fixed Charges
    Interest.....................18,788 16,381   19,895   19,442   21,299
    Capitalized Interest.........2,468   2,730    2,152    3,013      270
    Fixed charges and preferred
    stock dividends.............$27,136$25,117  $27,267  $27,475  $26,880
Ratio of Adjusted Earnings to
    Fixed Charges and Preferred
 Stock Dividends..............         1.14        1.03      1.04      1.17           .97
</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SANDEE BRYAN MARION

 CHIEF JUSTICE

KAREN ANGELINI

MARIALYN BARNARD

REBECA C. MARTINEZ

PATRICIA O. ALVAREZ

LUZ ELENA D. CHAPA

JASON K. PULLIAM

 JUSTICES

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

CADENA-REEVES JUSTICE CENTER 

300 DOLOROSA, SUITE 3200

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205-3037

WWW.TXCOURTS.GOV/4THCOA.ASPX

KEITH E. HOTTLE 

CLERK OF COURT

TELEPHONE

(210) 335-2635

FACSIMILE NO.

(210) 335-2762

January 23, 2015

Nissa M. Dunn

4040 Broadway, Suite 440

San Antonio, Texas 78209

Cathleen Lockhart

310 South St. Mary’s Street, Ste. 1900

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Harold Joseph Lotz, Jr.

1210 Nacogdoches Road

San Antonio, Texas 78209

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 04-14-00289-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 2013-CI-17554

Style: Legend Oaks–-South San Antonio, LLC d/b/a Legend Oaks 

Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center–-South San Antonio v. 

Emma Molina on Behalf of the Estate of Adella Rocamontes

Dear Counsel,

Please be advised the panel in this case has changed. The original panel was Chief 

Justice Catherine Stone, Justice Karen Angelini, and Justice Luz Elena Chapa. The updated 

panel consists of Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Luz Elena Chapa, and Justice Jason Pulliam. 

The submission date remains the same.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to 

contact me.

 

Very truly yours,

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

_____________________________

Margaret E. Adams

Legal Assistant, Fourth Court of Appeals

210.335.3854
exv10wxly



 






Exhibit 10(l)




Employment Arrangement with Kevin A. Mayer




     Kevin A. Mayer is employed as Executive Vice President, Corporate Strategy, Business
Development and Technology, on an at will basis. He receives an annual salary of $525,000 and is
eligible to receive an annual bonus under the Company’s Management Incentive Bonus Program approved
by the Compensation Committee of the Board on September 19, 2004. In addition, as an executive
officer of the Company, his bonus awards for fiscal years 2006 and beyond are subject to compliance
with certain financial test(s) pursuant to the Company’s 2002 Executive Performance Plan. Mr.
Mayer is also eligible to receive equity awards pursuant to the Registrant’s stock incentive plans,
including the 2005 Stock Incentive Plan, and awards under such plans will be made pursuant to the
forms of agreement previously filed by the Registrant or pursuant to such forms as may hereafter be
filed from time to time. Certain of these awards may also be subject to financial test(s) under
the 2002 Executive Performance Plan. Mr. Mayer is also eligible for the perquisites and other
benefits generally available to all employees having a title of Vice President or above, as well as
$1 million of excess liability coverage.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

         As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in this registration statement on Form S-3, to be
filed on or around June 15, 1998, of our report dated January 31, 1996, on the
Consolidated Financial Statements of UUNET Technologies, Inc. included in
WorldCom Inc.'s Current Report on Form 8-K dated August 25, 1996, as amended by
Form 8-K/A filed on November 4, 1996, and to all references to our Firm included
in this registration statement.

                                                          ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Washington, D.C.,
June 12, 1998.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2237

PRISCILLA HINES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

US GOVERNMENT; SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION;

SANDY CRANKS; TIMOTHY ROBERTSON; WILLIAM WAXMAN, Director; OFFICE OF HEARINGS & APPEALS;

CAROLYN W. NEYMAN, Assistant Commissioner;

GORDON SHERMAN; KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CA-97-561-5-BO)

Submitted: February 25, 1999 Decided: March 8, 1999

Before HAMILTON, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Priscilla Hines, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Dickerson Kocher,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory

and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections,

434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361

U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). In civil actions in which the United States

or an officer or agency thereof is a party, parties have sixty days

within which to file in the district court notices of appeal from

judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only

exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends

the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on December 22, 1997;

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on July 7, 1998, which is

beyond the sixty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a

timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 236 (Tuesday, December 9, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 73074]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28791]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions of Shares of a Bank 
or Bank Holding Company

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec.  225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank or bank 
holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the 
notices are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
    The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal 
Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for 
inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons 
may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for 
that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must 
be received not later than December 26, 2014.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Dennis Denney, Assistant 
Vice President) 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, Missouri 64198-0001:
    1. The Joseph P. Kennedy and Marybeth Kennedy Trust, and Jay 
Kennedy, trustee, both of Frankfort, Kansas; Nancy Padden, individually 
and as trustee of the Nancy C. Padden Trust, and Jon Padden as trustee 
of the Nancy C. Padden Trust, all of Marysville, Kansas; to retain 
voting shares of First Frankfort Bancshares, Inc., and thereby retain 
voting shares of First National Bank in Frankfort, both in Frankfort, 
Kansas.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 4, 
2014.
Michael J. Lewandowski,
Associate Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2014-28791 Filed 12-8-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
#### Patricia YARBROUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NORFOLK, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 01-1330.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 2001.

Decided May 23, 2001.

Patricia Yarbrough, pro se. M. Wayne Ringer, Norfolk, VA, for appellee.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Patricia Yarbrough appeals the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the City of Norfolk and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint alleging claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment and retaliation for having engaged in protected conduct. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Yarbrough v. City of Norfolk,*No. CA-00-358-2 (E.D.Va. Feb. 8, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>
"This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Resort
Income Investors, Inc.'s Form 10-QSB for the six months ended June 30, 1998
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such Form 10-QSB."
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>         6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                     106,186 
<SECURITIES>                               330,935 
<RECEIVABLES>                              642,059 
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0    
<INVENTORY>                                   0    
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         3,004,180 
<PP&E>                                        0    
<DEPRECIATION>                                0    
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           3,004,180 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      315,698 
<BONDS>                                       0    
<COMMON>                                 2,688,482 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0    
<PREFERRED>                                   0    
<OTHER-SE>                                    0    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             3,004,180 
<SALES>                                       0    
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           159,238 
<CGS>                                         0    
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 0    
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           288,996 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0    
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            0    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (129,758)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  0    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (129,758)
<DISCONTINUED>                                0    
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0    
<CHANGES>                                     0    
<NET-INCOME>                              (129,758)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (0.03)

<FN>

NOTE:  The above captions are specified in Exhibit 27, and contemplate
that the entity is a going concern.  As discussed in Note 1 to the
Company's unaudited financial statements, the Company is in the process of
liquidation as of June 30, 1998.  The amounts above are presented with the
caption that, in management's judgment, most closely correlates to
respective financial statement captions used in the Company's financial
statements.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>