IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1963

Filed February 22, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF T.O.,

Minor Child,

S.S., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, William S. 

Owens, Associate Juvenile Judge.

A biological father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his 

one-year-old son. AFFIRMED.

Monte M. McCoy of McCoy Legal Services, Centerville, for appellant 

father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd (until 

withdrawal) and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Julie DeVries of DeVries Law Office, P.L.C., Centerville, guardian ad litem 

for minor child.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

At the center of this termination-of-parental-rights appeal is T.O., a child 

with special needs who turns two years old in March 2017. His biological father, 

Steven, appeals the juvenile court order severing the parent-child relationship.1 

The court cited Steven’s substance abuse and mental health as concerns in the 

termination order. On appeal, Steven argues the record lacks sufficient evidence 

T.O. “could not be returned to the father’s care and custody within a reasonable 

period of time following the termination hearing.” Steven also contends 

termination was not in the child’s best interests.

After our independent review,2 we agree with the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that the State offered clear and convincing evidence T.O. could not be 

returned to Steven’s care “at the present time” under the terms of Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(h) (2016) and termination was in the child’s best interests, as 

measured by the criteria in section 232.116(2). Accordingly, we affirm. 

At his birth in March 2015, T.O. tested positive for marijuana. In May

2015, his mother, Katie—who had a history of mental-health issues and 

substance abuse—voluntarily placed T.O. with family friends. These caregivers 

noticed concerning physical symptoms, including muscle stiffness and possible 

seizures, which medical professionals believed could be linked to T.O.’s drug-

 

1 The order also terminated the parental rights of T.O.’s mother, Katie, and legal father, 

Richard. They are not parties to this appeal.

2 We review child-welfare cases de novo. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 

2016). Although we are not bound by the fact-findings of the juvenile court, we give 

them weight, particularly as to witness credibility. See id. Proof of the grounds for 

termination must be clear and convincing. Id. Evidence is “clear and convincing when 

there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law 

drawn from the evidence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 

703, 706 (Iowa 2010)).
3

affected birth. T.O. began receiving Early ACCESS services from the Area 

Education Agency.3 In July 2015, the court adjudicated T.O. as a child in need of 

assistance (CINA) and confirmed his out-of-home placement, where T.O. 

remained for the duration of the CINA case. 

At the time of T.O.’s birth, Katie was married to Richard but living with 

paramour Steven. Katie reported Steven could be T.O.’s father. In August, the 

Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) noted Steven believed he was the 

baby’s father. In September 2015, Richard was ruled out as T.O.’s biological 

father. Steven took a paternity test in February 2016 and, on March 2, 2016, 

received results showing a 99.9% probability he was T.O.’s father.

Even before the paternity test, Steven had been participating in DHS 

services. He was in substance-abuse treatment for a short time in 2015 but left 

because he wanted a new evaluation. In May 2016, Steven submitted to a 

random drug test. He told the provider the test would be clean, but it returned 

positive for marijuana and PCP (phencyclidine). At a substance-abuse 

assessment after the positive test, Steven admitted he had been using marijuana 

and methamphetamine. He participated in a residential treatment program for 

twelve days in August 2016. His counselor reported Steven was “adamant”

about discharging, and she graded his prognosis for staying clean as “guarded”

 

3 Early ACCESS is Iowa’s early intervention system funded through Part C of the 

Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See What Is Early 

ACCESS?, Iowa Family Support Network, http://www.iafamilysupportnetwork.org/earlyaccess-iowa/what-is-ea/what-is-early-access (last updated Sept. 30, 2016). The Act 

aims to lower the likelihood of delays in development and improve outcomes of children 

before they enter school. See id.
4

based on her opinion that he rushed through treatment, not taking time to work 

through his issues.

In July 2016, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights. 

While the petition was pending, Steven was arrested for public intoxication and 

entered a guilty plea. The juvenile court held a termination hearing in September 

2016. The case worker testified Steven was fairly consistent with his weekly 

supervised visits with T.O. and the two appeared to be forming a bond. Steven 

testified he suffered from severe depression and anxiety, acknowledging when 

he did not take his prescribed medication, he had used controlled substances to 

“numb it.” Steven introduced a report purporting to be from his current outpatient 

provider, but the report did not provide “much insight” to the juvenile court as to 

Steven’s progress.

On November 2, 2016, the juvenile court issued its order terminating 

Steven’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).

4

 The court decided it was 

“clear based on the evidence presented” that Steven had not “corrected or 

addressed the issues that gave rise to the adjudication” and that T.O. could not 

be placed with him “at this time and be protected from the type of harm” that 

caused T.O. to be adjudicated CINA. The court also found termination to be in 

T.O.’s best interests. Steven appeals those findings.

 

4 Under this provision, the court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child if: (1) the 

child is three years old or younger, (2) the child has been adjudicated a CINA under 

section 232.96, (3) the child has been out of the parent’s custody for at least six of the 

last twelve months or the last six consecutive months and any trial period in the home 

has been under thirty days, and (4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the 

child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 

232.102 at the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). “At the present time” refers to 

the point of the termination hearing. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014).
5

 Steven disputes the juvenile court’s conclusion he was not in a position to 

care for T.O. at the time of the hearing. Steven notes he had “successfully 

discharged” from a residential treatment program and engaged in outpatient 

treatment. He extols his efforts to obtain counseling, manage his medication, 

secure stable housing and employment, as well as attend visitation with T.O. 

Finally, Steven claims he was “not afforded a reasonable opportunity to establish 

himself as an appropriate caregiver for his child” because paternity testing was 

not complete until eight months after the CINA adjudication.

The juvenile court addressed the timing of the paternity test. The court 

found it significant that Steven was living with Katie when the DHS became 

involved, acknowledged he was likely T.O.’s father, and engaged in services 

before the paternity testing. See In re J.S., No. 14-1077, 2014 WL 4635529, at 

*5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014) (giving some consideration to time before 

paternity was established because father cannot ignore intimate relationship with 

mother, knowledge of her pregnancy, and child’s birth). The court concluded it 

was “quite clear Steven has had ample services to work toward reunification.” 

The court further noted even if it only considered Steven’s progress since 

paternity was established, he still had six months to remedy his parenting 

deficiencies, without sufficient improvement. 

We recognize Steven has taken positive steps in addressing his mentalhealth and substance-abuse problems. But his approach was too hurried and 

superficial to instill confidence in his ability to assume the responsibility of 

parenting T.O. full time. We share the juvenile court’s conclusion that at the time 

of the termination hearing, the risk of harm to T.O. was too high to order 
6

reunification with Steven. We also find it persuasive that T.O.’s guardian ad litem 

did not believe T.O. could be safely placed in Steven’s care. See A.M., 843 

N.W.2d at 112.

We next turn to Steven’s best-interests argument. According to Steven, 

termination is not in T.O.’s best interests because Steven has “been consistent 

with visits, the visits have gone well, and he was actively engaged services.” 

These assertions are more about the father than the son.

Our determination of best interests must track Iowa Code section 

232.116(2). See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting court’s use 

of an unstructured best-interests test). That provision focuses our attention on 

the child’s safety; the best placement for furthering his long-term nurturing and 

growth; and his physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2). T.O. may face some developmental challenges, but 

according to the record, he has been receiving quality care in his current 

placement and would be a good candidate for adoption. By the time of the 

termination hearing, T.O. had been away from his biological parents for more 

than one year, virtually since he was born. We conclude the child’s safety and 

his physical and emotional needs will be best served by terminating Steven’s 

parental rights and allowing T.O. to move toward a permanent home. 

AFFIRMED.