In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00226-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 352nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 352-301866-18

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

DRUE ALLEN HOLLIS, Appellant

V.

PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY, PROBATE COURT NO. 2

OF TARRANT COUNTY, TARRANT COUNTY SHERIFF BILL E. WAYBOURN,

AND TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A JPS HEALTH 

NETWORK, Appellees
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Drue Allen Hollis attempts to appeal from the trial court’s 

interlocutory order1 granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees Probate Court 

No. 1 of Tarrant County, Probate Court No. 2 of Tarrant County, Tarrant County

Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn, and Tarrant County Hospital District d/b/a JPS Health 

Network (collectively, Tarrant County).

2 The trial court signed the interlocutory order 

on May 31, 2019, making Hollis’s notice of appeal due June 20, 2019. See Tex. R. App.

P. 26.1(b) (stating that a notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal must be filed within 

20 days after the judgment or order signed), 28.1(a) (stating that appeals from 

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The trial-court clerk has informed us that parties and claims remain pending in 

the trial court and that the trial court has not signed a final judgment.

2

We have jurisdiction to consider appeals from final judgments or from 

interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Here, Tarrant County’s summary-judgment 

grounds included governmental, judicial, and official immunity. Thus, had Hollis’s 

notice of appeal been timely, we would have had jurisdiction to consider this appeal 

insofar as the trial court could have dismissed some of Hollis’s claims on immunity 

grounds. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (providing for an 

appeal from an interlocutory order granting a governmental unit’s plea to the 

jurisdiction); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004) 

(observing that an interlocutory appeal may be taken under section 51.014(a)(8) 

whether a jurisdictional argument is presented in a plea to the jurisdiction or a 

summary-judgment motion because the right of appeal is tied to the substance of the 

issue raised and not to any particular procedural vehicle); Liverman v. Denton Cty., 

No. 02-17-00240-CV, 2017 WL 6377437, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 14, 

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing portion of appeal from order granting 

jurisdictional plea that complained of trial court’s dismissal of claims against 

government officials in their individual capacities but addressing portion of appeal 

that complained of dismissal of claims against governmental unit and government 

officials in their official capacities).
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interlocutory orders are accelerated appeals). Hollis filed his notice of appeal on June 

21, 2019, one day late.

On July 18, 2019, we notified Hollis of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction 

over this appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely. We warned Hollis that we 

would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless he or any party desiring to 

continue the appeal filed a response by July 29, 2019, showing a reasonable 

explanation for the late filing of the notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 

26.3(b), 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We have received no response.

The time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and absent a timely-filed 

notice of appeal or motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal, we must 

dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. 2, 25.1(b), 26.1, 26.3, 28.1(b); Jones v. City of 

Houston, 976 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex. 1998); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 

617 (Tex. 1997). A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an 

appellant acting in good faith files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by rule 

26.1, but within the 15-day period in which the appellant would be entitled to move to 

extend the filing deadline under rule 26.3. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; Verburgt, 

959 S.W.2d at 617; see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 26.3, 28.1(b). But even when an 

extension motion is implied, an appellant is still required to provide a reasonable 

explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; 

Linville v. Leuty Ave. Apartments, No. 02-18-00186-CV, 2018 WL 3763934, at *1 (Tex. 
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App.—Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see also Tex. R. 

App. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A), 26.3(b).

Here, Hollis’s notice of appeal was untimely but was filed within the 15-day 

period in which an extension is implied. Even so, Hollis was still required to provide 

an explanation for needing an extension. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677; Verburgt, 

959 S.W.2d at 617; Linville, 2018 WL 3763934, at *1. Because he did not, his notice of 

appeal is untimely. See Linville, 2018 WL 3763934, at *1. Accordingly, we dismiss the 

appeal for want of jurisdiction.3 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Jones, 976 S.W.2d 

at 677; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 917; Linville, 2018 WL 3763934, at *1.

Per Curiam

Delivered: August 30, 2019

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We dismiss Tarrant County’s “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” as 

moot.