alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 The amendment to § 1447(c) impacted only remand orders for procedural defects. My position is therefore unaffected by the amendment. I am in accord with the jurisdictional analysis in the Allstate dissent, also written subsequent to the amendment. BLACK, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. This is a classic example of the old adage that "bad facts make bad law." The case is difficult because the district court erroneously remanded it to state court, but I believe the majority stands to do even greater harm in attempting to rectify this mistake. As stated in the dissent of the opinion relied upon by the majority, In re Allstate Ins. Co. , 8 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993): The majority opinion expands our power to review remand orders, contrary to the will of Congress in section 1447(c) and of the Supreme Court in Thermtron Products

. Id. at 224 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In my view, the issue in this case is jurisdictional. 1The jurisdictional nature of a remand order cannot hinge on the depth of the district court's inquiry into jurisdiction. Even when a remand order is erroneous, § 1447(d) prohibits appellate review if the district court issued the order under § 1447(c). Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer , 96 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1976). By classifying the issue in this case as procedural rather than jurisdictional, the majority circumvents this rule by allowing appellate review of a district court's remand order issued under § 1447(c) to determine if jurisdiction "factually" exists. Such a practice permits an end run around Thermtron Products and undermines judicial discretion.
<PAGE>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.2

                                    GUARANTEE

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, KELLOGG COMPANY, a Delaware corporation (herein called the
"Guarantor"), hereby unconditionally guarantees payment of the within Promissory
Note (herein called the "Note") when and as the same shall become due and
payable without any requirement that the holder first proceed against Kellogg
Canada Inc.

The Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this Guarantee and notice of
non-payment of the Note. The unconditional obligation of the Guarantor hereunder
will not be affected, impaired or released by any extension of time for the
payment of the Note or by any other matter or thing whatsoever which would
release a guarantor.

Corporate action has been duly taken to authorize execution of this Guarantee.

This Guarantee shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
Delaware.

The date of this Guarantee is the date of the Note.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, KELLOGG COMPANY has caused this Guarantee to be executed by
its Senior Vice President, either manually or by facsimile signature.

                                    GARANTIE

CONTRE VALEUR RECUE, KELLOGG COMPANY, societe du Delaware, (ci-apres la
"Garante"), garantit sans condition le paiement du billet (ci-apres le "Billet")
lorsqu'il devient exigible et sans que le porteur n'ait a exercer d'abord un
recours contre Kellogg Canada Inc.

La Garante renonce a l'avis d'acceptation de la Garantie et a l'avis de
non-paiement du Billet. L'obligation sans condition de la Garante ne sera en
rien diminuee par un delai de grace pour le paiement du Billet ou par toute
autre chose qui pourrait liberer un garant.

Toutes les mesures necessaires ont ete prises pour autoriser la signature de la
Garantie.

La Garantie est regie par les lois du Delaware, et s'interprete en consequence.

La date de la Garantie constitue la date du Billet.

EN FOI DE QUOI, KELLOGG COMPANY a fait signer la Garantie par son vice-president
et son vice-president et tresorier par signature manuscrite ou en fac-simile.

                                 KELLOGG COMPANY

by / par /s/ Joel Wittenberg
**Exhibit        24**

|   | Re: ALLTEL                Corporation                                                                                     |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                Commission File No. 1-4996           |
|   |                1934 Act Filings on Form 10-K        |
|   |                               Authorized Representatives |

|   |   | Peter Bridgman                       April                  14, 2006                           Date |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----

|   | Re: ALLTEL              Corporation                                                                                     |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                Commission File No. 1-4996         |
|   |                1934 Act Filings on Form 10-K      |
|   |                             Authorized Representatives |

|   |   | John W. Stanton                              9/15/06                        Date |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
#### Jas. C. Patton *v.*Commonwealth.

Receiving Stolen Goods — When Offense Complete.

The offense of receiving stolen goods is complete when the accused, with unlawful intent, receives from the thief goods which accused knows were .stolen, and the asportation of the goods by the person so receiving them, does not constitute an element of the offense.

Receiving Stolen Goods — Instruction.

In a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, an instruction that although the jury might believe that the goods were received in M. county, if accused voluntarily brought them into H. county, accused may be tried in the latter county, was held to be erroneous.

APPEAL PROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 17, 1873.

*McCleary, West, for appellant.*

*McClinlock, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Legislation has made the reception of stolen goods a substantive offense in Kentucky. The receiver is treated as he was under the common law, and earlier English statutes, as a compromiser of felony, or the accessory after the fact to the theft.

So even as a person receives, with unlawful intent, from, a thief, goods that he knows to have been stolen, the offense is complete. The asportation by him of the stolen goods does not enter into the offense as an element; and as it is not necessary to prove that, either before or after the unlawful reception, he had normal manual control of them, or actually did assume such control, or in any way changed their location, neither will the proof of such facts authorize a conviction upon the idea that a removal of the stolen goods is a continuation or renewal of the offense of receiving stolen goods.

Whether a removal of such goods, renders the receiver liable to conviction as a party to the larceny, we need not decide, as that question does not arise under the indictment in this case.

It results, therefore, that the court erred in instructing the jury, that, although they might believe that the stolen goods were received in Menefee county, voluntarily bringing them within Harrison county rendered the accused liable to be tried and convicted in that county.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial conformable to this opinion.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-4520

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus TERRY LEON HIGHSMITH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (CR-01-63-F) Submitted: January 16, 2003 Decided: January 22, 2003 Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Terry Leon Highsmith appeals his 180-month sentence imposed pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000), for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). Highsmith’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal because the predicate convictions were not alleged in the indictment. We have reviewed the record and find this appeal foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Sterling , 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 2606 (2002). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER WITHDRAWING MEDIATION ORDER

Appellate case name: Union Pacific Railroad Company v. In the Estate of Geronimo, 

Gutierrez, deceased and Amelia Gutierrez and Adrian Gutierrez, 

Individually in their Capacities as Dependents of Geronimo Gutierrez, 

deceased and Amelia Gutierrez, in her capacity as Administratrix of 

the Estate of Geronimo Guti

Appellate case number: 01-12-01029-CV

Date motion filed: December 17, 2012

Type of Motion: Objection to Mediation

Party filing motion: Appellee

Trial court case number: 380337401

Trial court: Co Civil Ct at Law No 4 of Harris County

It is ORDERED that Appellee’s objection to mediation is granted. We withdraw 

our Mediation Order dated November 30, 2012.

Judge’s signature: /s/ James P. Sharp, Jr.

X Acting individually 

Date: December 18, 2012i

 

i

Absent emergency or a statement that the motion is unopposed, must wait ten days before acting on motion except for 

motion to extend time to file a brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a).

Note: Single justice may grant or deny any request for relief properly sought by motion, except in a civil case a single justice 

should not: (1) act on a petition for an extraordinary writ or (2) dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or a motion 

for rehearing. TEX. R. APP. P. 10.4(a).
**Exhibit      10(o)(14)**

|   | (b) | For                an Employee who was an employee of Virginia Cellular LLC or related                entity                ("Virginia Cellular") immediately prior to the closing date (as defined                in                the Purchase Agreement between Virginia Cellular, Inc., B2 Inc.,                M1 Inc.,                M3 Inc. and WWC License LLC and Alltel Communications, Inc. dated                as of                March 24, 2006) and became an Employee on such closing date, the                Employee's period or periods of employment with Virginia                Cellular. |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (c) | For                an Employee who was an employee of Southern Illinois Cellular Corp.                or                related entity ("First Cellular") immediately prior to the closing                date                (as defined in the Stock Purchase Agreement dated as of February                17, 2006                by and among Southern Illinois Cellular Corp. and Crosslink Wireless,                Inc., Egyptian Communication Services, Inc., Hamilton County                Communications, Inc., HTC Holding Co., MJD Services Corp., Shawnee                Communications, Inc., and Wabash Independent Networks, Inc. and Alltel                Communications, Inc.) and became an Employee on such closing date,                the                Employee's period or periods of employment with First                Cellular. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
EXHIBIT 23(a)


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the Registration  Statements on
Form S-8 (File No.  333-37576 and  333-37582)  of our report dated  September 2,
2005, except for the second paragraph of Note 6 and the second paragraph of Note
11, as to which the date is  September  23, 2005,  relating to the  consolidated
financial  statements of DRYCLEAN USA,  Inc.  appearing in the Company's  Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005.


                                            MORRISON, BROWN ARGIZ & FARRA LLP


Miami, Florida
September 23, 2005


                                       46
January 26, 1971 

Honorable W. S. (Bill) Heatly 

Chairman of the Appropriations 

Committee 

House of Representatives 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Mr. Heatly: 

Opinion No. M- 775 

Re: Construction of Article 

4357, Vernon's Civil 

Statutes. 

Your request for an opinion on the above subject matter 

asks the following question: 

"As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House, I respectfully request an 

interpretation of Article 4357 with specific 

reference to the time when appropriated funds 

lapse." 

The pertinent provision of Article 4357 reads: 

,, . . ..No claim shall be paid from appropriations unless presented to the Comptroller for 

payment within two (2) years from the close of the 

fiscal year for which such appropriations were made, 

but any claim not presented for payment within such 

period may be presented to the Legislature as other 

ciaims for which no appropriations are available. 

. . . . . . " (Emphasis added.) 

In Attorney General's Opinion V-1416 (1952) it was held: 

" . . . . we are of the opinion that the 'fiscal 

year for which such appropriations were made' should 

be construed to mean the fiscal year during which 

the appropriated funds became available for disbursement. . . ...* 

-3776- 
Honorable W. S. (Bill) Heatly, page 2 (M-775) 

See also Attorney General's Opinions WW-1518 (1962). WW-280 

(1957) and O-4259 (1942). 

You are therefore advised, for example, that moneys appropriated for the,fiscal year ending August 31, 1969, do not lapse 

until August 31, 1971, and moneys appropriated for the fiscal 

year ending August 31, 1970, do not lapse until August 31, 1972. 

It is noted that Article 4357 also provides: 

"It is specifically provided, however, 

that as to all appropriations relating to 

new construction contracts, and to repair 

and remodeling projects which exceed the 

sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), 

including in either instance furniture and 

other equipment, architects' and.engineering fees and other related costs, any claim 

may be presented for payment within four (4) 

years from the close of the fiscal year for 

which such appropriations were made." 

These last quoted provisions, however, have no application 

to your request, since the request apparently does not involve 

appropriations for "new construction contracts" or "repair 

and remodeling projects." Attorney General's Opinion WW-1518 

(1962). 

SUMMARY 

Under the provisions of Article 4357, 

Vernon's Civil Statutes, moneys appropriated 

for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1969, do 

not lapse until August 31, 1971, and moneys 

appropriated for the fiscal year ending 

August 31, 1970, do not lapse until August 31, 

1972. /? 

Attorney General of Texas 

2' 

-3777- 
c I 

Honorable W. S. (Bill) Heatly, page 3 

Prepared by John Reeves 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman 

Jack Goodman 

Melvin Corley 

Arthur Sandlin 

J. C. Davis 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

ALFRED WALKER 

Executive Assistant 

(M-775) 

-3778-
> 
Exhibit 23

 

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

 

 

 

To the Shareholders of 

    ALLTEL    Corporation: 

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation    of our report dated January 21, 2002 included (or incorporated by reference)    in this Form 10-K, into the Company's previously filed Registration    Statements, File Nos. 333-60804, 333-94267, 33-48476, 33-54175, 33-56291,    33-65199, 333-88907, 333-88923 and 333-90167.

 

 

/s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN  LLP

                        

 

 

 

 

Little Rock, Arkansas

March 5, 2002
No. 15,647.

#### Bonnel *v.*Shirley et al.

Filed April 26, 1892.

*Practice.*— Supreme *Court.*— Insufficiency *of Brief.*— Where a brief filed in • the Supreme Court contains nothing but a bare assertion of errors, no question is presented thereby for the consideration of the court.

From the Carroll Circuit Court.

*C. S. Wesner*and *O.*D. *Wesner,*for appellants.

McBride, J.

The brief filed by counsel for the appellant contains nothing whatever by way of argument, or citation of authority. Nor is there even a suggestion of any reason, or ground, for holding the action of the court below erroneous.

We find nothing in it but a bare assertion of error. Such a brief presents no question for our consideration. *Harrison*v. *Hedges,*60 Ind. 266; *Bray*v. *Franklin Life Ins. Co.,*68 Ind. 6; *Landwerlen*v. *Wheeler,*106 Ind. 523, and many other cases.

Judgment affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6567

MAURICE CORTEZ PROCTOR, Petitioner - Appellant, versus VANESSA ADAMS, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, District Judge. (CA-04-1414-1) Submitted: December 22, 2005 Decided: December 29, 2005 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Maurice Cortez Proctor, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).PER CURIAM: Maurice Cortez Proctor, a federal prisoner, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), raising a claim under Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Though the district court construed the § 2241 petition as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), Proctor clearly intended to file a § 2241 petition. Proctor argues on appeal that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his detention, contending that his Crawford claim should be considered in the context of his § 2241 petition. Because Proctor does not meet the standard under In re Jones , 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000), we affirm the denial of relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### James Olds *v.*A. G. Harlowe et al.

Trial — Instruction—Ambiguity.

An instruction should be refused if it is difficult to understand tbe meaning of the languagei used.

Gifts — Actual Delivery.

To constitute a valid gift, there must be an actual delivery of tbe thing so far as it is capable of delivery.

APPEAL, PROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT.

November 14, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

The court, on motion of appellees, instructed the jury “that if they believed the horse belonged to the plaintiff at the time of the transfer of the possession to James Olds, the latter acquired *303thereby no title to the property, and they must find for plaintiffs.”

*McMannama & Blackwell, for appellant.*

*Grover Montgomery & Revill, for appellees.*

Appellant then asked the court, by instruction No. 1, to tell the jury if they found from the evidence that the horse mentioned in the proof was the property of Ben Olds, and by him for a valuable consideration passed to the defendant, the law is for him and the jury should so find.

There was evidence conducing to show that Ben Olds, for a valuable consideration, had traded the horse to appellant, who must be regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consideration from Ben Olds; and! if the horse was the property of the latter when he traded him to appellant, his title was good, so that the proposition of law submitted in the instruction asked by him was the converse of the one given by the court on motion of appellee; but the court, as the bill of exceptions shows, refused to give the one asked by appellant, which was an error prejudicial to appellant. It appears from the bill of exceptions that instruction No. 2 was asked for by appellant, and was refused, and we think correctly. It is difficult to understand what meaning is intended to be conveyed by the language used.

The authorities on the subject are to the effect that to constitute a valid gift of a chattel, there must be a delivery at the time to the donee, and the property in the thing should immediately pass from and be irrevocable by the donor, and his control over it cease. The delivery, if is true, must be in accordance with the nature of the thing that is the subject of the gift, but there must be an actual delivery so far as the thing is capable of delivery.

But for the error indicated the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to award a new trial and for further proceedings consistent herewith.