The Honorable Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Chief Judge of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. 

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3396

CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 1,

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:10-cv-04852—David H. Coar, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2011—DECIDED MARCH 29, 2011

Before MANION and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

CLEVERT, District Judge.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Facing significant budget

deficits, the Chicago Board of Education was forced to
2 No. 10-3396

lay off nearly 1,300 teachers in several stages during

June, July, and August of 2010. Although some of those

teachers have been re-hired, many have not, even as new

vacancies have arisen within the Chicago Public School

system. The teachers contend that they have a due

process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to an

opportunity to show that they are qualified to fill new

vacancies as they arise for a reasonable period of time.

We agree. The district court entered an injunction requiring the Board to collaborate with the Union to promulgate regulations to establish recall procedures pursuant to Section 34-18(31) of the Illinois School Code. While

we agree that the Board should promulgate the regulations, there is nothing in Section 34-18(31) that requires cooperation with the Union. We therefore direct

the court to modify the injunction to make it conform

to this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Board of Education of the City of Chicago

(the “Board”) is organized under Article 34 of the Illinois

School Code and is charged with the governance of the

Chicago Public School system. The Board employs over

40,000 persons, over half of whom are teachers. Appellee

Chicago Teachers’ Union (the “Union”) is the teachers’

exclusive bargaining representative.

Facing significant budget deficits on the eve of the 2010-

2011 school year, the Board was forced to lay off

nearly 1,300 teachers. The Board implemented its layoffs through a series of resolutions issued over the sum-
No. 10-3396 3

mer. On June 15, 2010, the Board passed a resolution

authorizing the “honorable termination” of tenured

teachers.

The Board passed a second resolution on June 23, 2010,

authorizing schools to first lay off teachers who were

under remediation and whose last performance ratings

were negative. Although the Board suggested to the

media that the layoff largely involved teachers with

unsatisfactory evaluations, most of the teachers laid off

had “excellent,” “superior,” or “satisfactory” ratings.

All laid-off teachers received notice of their termination. Along with their notices, the Board gave the

teachers information on how to search and apply for

vacant teaching positions within the Chicago Public

School system. The notices also pointed the teachers to a

website listing vacancies and included invitations to

attend a résumé and interviewing workshop and two

job fairs that were open solely to displaced teachers.

However, not all vacancies were listed on the website, and

laid-off teachers were not given preference for other

teaching jobs.

Throughout the summer, the Board laid off 1,289

teachers in several phases that ended on August 31,

2010. However, the record indicates that at least some

persons were hired to fill teaching positions that became

available during the summer. The teachers hired to fill

those positions were not tenured teachers.

Due to an increase in federal funding in August 2010,

the Board recalled approximately 715 tenured teachers

who had been laid off or given notices. The teachers were

not recalled pursuant to an official recall policy. As the
4 No. 10-3396

The Union subsequently withdrew Counts III, IV, and V of 1

the Complaint. Count II, which challenged the Board’s decision

to discharge 25 to 50 teachers who were chosen allegedly

for discharge because of a single “unsatisfactory” evaluation,

is not at issue in this appeal.

Board’s Labor Relations Officer, Rachel Resnick, stated

in her deposition, “A teacher who is laid off may be

rehired, but we have no recall policy.”

Since the layoff ended, more vacancies have opened

up within the Chicago Public School system. Natural

labor needs compel the Board to hire hundreds of new

teachers every year. The laid-off teachers who were not

rehired complain that many of those positions have

been filled with new hires instead of with laid-off

tenured teachers.

On August 10, 2010, the Union filed a five-count complaint. Three days later, it filed a motion for a prelim- 1

inary injunction. On September 15, 2010, the district

court held a hearing to simultaneously address the

Union’s motion for a preliminary injunction and its

request for a permanent injunction. The court found that

the teachers had a property interest proceeding from 105

ILCS 5/34-18(31) that was protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and that

entitled them to some kind of retention procedure.

The court then found that, in addition to succeeding on

the merits, the Union met the remaining three requirements for obtaining a permanent injunction. First, it

concluded there was no adequate remedy at law because
No. 10-3396 5

the teachers sought an opportunity to be considered for

a position, and it would be impossible to place a monetary

value on that opportunity. Second, the balance of the

equities favored the Union because the Board would

suffer no injury as the Union did not seek to restore the

teachers to their former positions but merely to have the

Board implement a procedure for the retention of laidoff teachers. Third, there could be no conceivable harm

to the public resulting from the consideration of tenured

teachers for existing vacancies. The court therefore entered an injunction: (1) directing the Board to rescind

the discharges of tenured teachers under the Board’s

June 15, 2010 resolution; (2) directing the Board to promulgate, in consultation with the Union and after goodfaith negotiations, a set of recall rules compliant with 105

ILCS 5/34-18(31) within 30 days; and (3) enjoining the

Board from conducting future layoffs in a similar

manner until recall rules had been promulgated. 

The Board appealed. On October 13, 2010, the Board

filed a motion to stay the permanent injunction pending

the outcome of this appeal, which the district court

granted. The Union subsequently filed a motion to expedite this appeal, which was granted.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s legal determinations

de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. Pro’s Sports

Bar & Grill, Inc. v. City of Country Club Hills, 589 F.3d

865, 870 (7th Cir. 2009).
6 No. 10-3396

A. Due Process Claim

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection

of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that

a person has already acquired in specific benefits.” Bd.

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). To prevail on

a claim for deprivation of property without due process, a plaintiff must establish that she holds a protected

property interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 546-47 (1985). Property interests are not

created by the Constitution, but are “created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such

as state law.” Id. at 561. Property interests may arise by

way of statutes, regulations, municipal ordinances, or by

way of an express or implied contract, such as “rules or

understandings that secure certain benefits and that

support claims of entitlement to benefits.” Covell v.

Menkis, 595 F.3d 673, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2010).

An individual has a property interest in a benefit if she

has more than an “abstract need” for, or “unilateral

expectation” of, that benefit. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The

individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.

Id. In the employment context, a property interest exists

“when an employer’s discretion is clearly limited so

that the employee cannot be denied employment unless

specific conditions are met.” Buttitta v. City of Chicago,

9 F.3d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 1993). If a court determines

that an individual holds a protected property interest,

the question becomes what process is due. Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 541.
No. 10-3396 7

In Illinois, tenured teachers cannot be discharged

except for cause:

Appointments and promotions of teachers shall

be made for merit only, and after satisfactory

service for a probationary period . . . appointments

of teachers shall become permanent, subject to removal for cause in the manner provided by

Section 34-85. 

105 ILCS 5/35-84 (emphasis added). Section 34-85 provides: “No teacher employed by the board of education

shall after serving the probationary period specified in

section 34-84 be removed except for cause.” (emphasis

added).

Thus, tenured teachers in Illinois have a property

interest in their continued employment. See Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 535-39 (state statute providing that classified

civil service employees were entitled to retain their positions during good behavior and prohibiting dismissal

except for bad behavior created a property interest in

continued employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 601 (1972) (written contract with an explicit tenure

provision evidenced a formal understanding that supported a teacher’s claim of entitlement to continued

employment). If a tenured teacher is fired without

cause, this is a deprivation of property, and the teacher

need only show that it was done without due process

of law to prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Bigby v. Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 1985).

“The usual though not exclusive modern meaning of

[due process] is notice of charges and an opportunity for a
8 No. 10-3396

hearing . . . .” Id. at 1058. We have, however, recognized

that there is “an exception to a hearing right when [a]

discharge is caused by reorganization.” Misek v. City of

Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1986). Illinois courts

have also found that pre-termination hearings are unnecessary before good faith economic layoffs. See Land v.

Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 757 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)

(“Land I”) (finding that teachers who were placed in

reassignment pool for 10 months but could not find jobs

were not entitled to pre-termination hearings before

being terminated). Similarly, we have found that a pretermination hearing is not necessary before a layoff so

long as adequate post-termination procedures are available “to [determine] whether the termination under the

auspices of a [layoff is] permissible or not” and whether

it is “being used to mask an individualized, merit-based

action.” Lalvani v. Cook County, 396 F.3d 911, 915-17 (7th

Cir. 2005) (“Lalvani II”). But the teachers here do not

claim (although they suggest) that the layoffs were

pretextual. Instead, they argue that they are entitled to

an opportunity to show that they are qualified for vacancies that continue to arise within the Chicago Public

School system.

We have not yet considered whether tenured teachers

are entitled to consideration for reassignment. We came

close to answering that question in Mims v. Bd. of Educ.,

523 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs in Mims

were female civil service employees of the Board who

were laid off because of a shortage of funds and sought

an opportunity to demonstrate their qualifications after
No. 10-3396 9

learning that six men were hired to temporarily fill their

positions. Id. at 713-15. We found that although “a layoff

is less drastic than a discharge and may not require all

the procedural safeguards necessary before termination

through discharge, [the laid off] plaintiffs had a property

interest in their continued employment, not just in their

status as civil servants.” Id. at 715. We stated: 

Plaintiffs at least were entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate that they were capable

of performing the work assigned to the six temporary employees. The issue of whether plaintiffs

could perform the work, unlike that of the need

to cut back due to loss of federal funding, was

one on which plaintiffs might have been able to

contribute information and valid persuasion,

possibly resulting in a temporary continuation

of employment. 

Id.

In Mims, however, the plaintiffs, unlike the teachers

here, also claimed that they were entitled to a pre-layoff

hearing. Id. at 714. We found that the Board failed in

its duty to establish a procedure by which an employee

could obtain review of a layoff decision to ensure that

it was not for an impermissible reason or to demonstrate that he or she should have been retained. Id. at 715.

Therefore, Mims, while guiding our analysis, does not

provide a definitive answer.

To determine whether the teachers have a property

interest that entitles them to an opportunity to be con-
10 No. 10-3396

Although these protections were removed from Section 34-84, 2

both Appendix H of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and Section 504.2 of the Chicago Public Schools Policy

Manual (“Layoff Policy”) provide for a retention procedure

for teachers whose services are no longer required due to a

drop in student enrollment or the closure of an attendance

(continued...)

sidered for new vacancies, we look to Illinois law. See

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47. Prior to 1995, Section 34-84

of the Illinois School Code provided that “reserve teachers” had various recall rights. A reserve teacher was

defined as “a teacher not on administrative payroll, who

has a rating of satisfactory or better and whose service

is no longer required because of a decrease in student

membership, a change in subject requirements within

the attendance center organization, or the closing of an

attendance center.” 105 ILCS 5/34-1.1 (1994). Reserve

teachers were given the opportunity to apply for

filling new and vacant teaching positions in the school

system through a process collectively bargained by the

Board and the Union. 105 ILCS 5/34-84 (1994). If a reserve

teacher was not selected to fill a vacant position, the

teacher would be employed by the Board in a position

that was collectively bargained. A certified reserve

teacher not selected for a vacancy would be appointed on an interim basis for a teaching position.

Reserve teachers also had the right to remain employed

by the Board and receive full salary and benefits for a

period of 25 school months, after which time they could

be honorably terminated from service. Id. 2
No. 10-3396 11

(...continued) 2

center. The Layoff Policy provides that teachers whose

services are no longer required are to be given a “notice of

removal.” Teachers continue to receive full pay and benefits

for a limited period of time. Upon notice of removal, the

teacher receives a list of all unencumbered vacant positions

for which he or she is qualified. During the first thirty school

days after notice of removal, the tenured teacher is permitted

to interview at schools of his or her choosing without being

assigned additional duties. School principals are obligated to

interview tenured teachers who apply unless the position is

filled before the interview takes place. The Board is also obligated to offer teachers “interim assignments.” If the teacher

remains in the interim position for more than 60 days, he

or she is permanently assigned to that position. Even if the

teacher does not have an interim assignment, the teacher may

work as a substitute teacher. If after 10 school months the

tenured teacher has not been appointed to a permanent position, he or she is honorably terminated.

In 1995, the Illinois School Code underwent a significant revision. All statutory references to reserve

teachers, along with their recall rights under Section 34-84,

were deleted, and 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) was added.

Section 5/34-18(31) provides in relevant part that:

The board . . . shall have power . . . to promulgate

rules establishing procedures governing the

layoff or reduction in force of employees and the

recall of such employees, including, but not

limited to, criteria for such layoffs, reductions in

force or recall rights of such employees and the

weight to be given to any particular criterion.
12 No. 10-3396

Such criteria shall take into account factors including, but not limited to, qualifications, certifications, experience, performance ratings or evaluations, and any other factors relating to an employee’s job performance.

The Board concedes that “[p]rior to the 1995 amendments, if CPS honorably dismissed or laid off a teacher,

the teacher had a clearly delineated property interest

in continued employment, which was set forth in Section 34-84.” The Board argues, however, that Section 34-

18(31) is an authorizing statute and does not compel it

to promulgate regulations, and therefore, the teachers

are not entitled to be recalled. The Board also contends

that the teachers cannot have a property interest in a

recall procedure because a procedural safeguard for a

property interest cannot itself create a property interest.

While it is true that Section 34-18(31) is not crystal clear,

it contemplates that the Board will promulgate rules

“governing the layoff . . . and the recall of such employees,”

not layoffs alone. (emphasis added); see also Powell v.

Jones, 305 N.E.2d 166, 171 (Ill. 1973) (explaining that a

layoff is “not, ordinarily, viewed as a permanent situation”). The statute further limits the Board’s discretion

by requiring it to take various criteria (qualifications, certifications, experience, performance ratings, and

evaluations) into account.

Although there are no Illinois cases directly on point,

those cases that have examined the relationship between Sections 34-84, 34-85, and 34-18(31) do not suggest

that tenured teachers do not have a right to be con-
No. 10-3396 13

sidered for vacancies, but, rather, that it is now the

Board’s responsibility, instead of the legislature’s, to

formulate procedures governing layoff and recall. In

Land I, the Illinois Appellate Court considered whether

tenured teachers who were allowed 10 months to find

alternate employment pursuant to the Board’s layoff

policy but were unable to find new positions during that

time were entitled to a hearing prior to being terminated.

757 N.E.2d at 915-16. The court explained that prior to

the 1995 amendments, Section 34-84 gave the Board the

authority to lay off tenured teachers, but that this

authority was subject to “an explicit set of restrictions,”

which gave “reserve teachers” 25 months to obtain

an alternative position before they could be honorably

terminated from service. Id. at 920. The 1995 amendments “simply eliminated all provisions referring to

‘reserve teachers’ and added subsection 31 to section 34-

18, granting the power to the Board to promulgate its

own procedures ‘governing the layoff or reduction in

force of employees.’ ” Id. After examining the Illinois

School Code both before and after the 1995 amendments, the court concluded that “the amendments regarding layoffs were procedural changes, not substantive changes.” Id.

The court also made two relevant findings. First, it

concluded that the layoffs were not governed by sections

34-84 and 35-85 and the hearing procedures contained

in those sections. Id. Second, the court found that

neither the Board’s policy nor Section 34-18(31) created

a property interest in the teachers’ continued employ-
14 No. 10-3396

The Court reversed in part for the trial court to determine 3

whether the Board properly delegated its authority to decide

whom to lay off. Id. at 261. The Court also noted that the

Board’s policy was not a “procedure” as provided in Section 34-

18(31). Id.

ment, meaning that the notice and hearing procedures

required in cases of discharges “for cause” were inapplicable to layoffs. Id. at 925. The court emphasized that

to require a pre-layoff hearing would “hang an anvil”

around the Board’s neck. Id.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate

court’s finding that the Board had the authority to lay off

tenured teachers. In Land v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 781 3

N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ill. 2002), (“Land II”), the Court explained

that it had long been established that among the

unenumerated powers of the Board was the authority

to lay off employees in good faith for lack of work. Prior

to 1995, “limits on that power were set out in section 34-

84.” Id. The 1995 amendments did not eliminate or

reduce the Board’s power. Id. “Instead, by deleting

the layoff provision from section 34-84 and adding

section 34-18(31), the legislature gave the Board the

authority to formulate and implement its own procedures regarding layoffs rather than binding the Board

to a legislatively mandated procedure.” Id.

Neither the 1995 amendments nor the Illinois cases

construing them suggest that tenured teachers are not

entitled to an opportunity to show that they are qualified for vacancies after an economic layoff. Although
No. 10-3396 15

in Land I the court found that the teachers could not

hold on to their positions indefinitely by virtue of being

tenured, the court did not decide whether the teachers

were entitled to be recalled, as the teachers in that case

were placed in a reassignment pool for 10 months and

only argued that they could not be subsequently terminated. Land I, 757 N.E.2d at 925. Further, Land I is not

controlling on the question of whether the teachers have

a federal constitutionally protected property interest

because, although the teachers’ rights derive from state

law, it is federal law that determines whether those

rights constitute a property interest for purposes of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Town of Castle Rock v.

Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005).

Contrary to the Board’s contention, the language used

in Land I and Land II suggests that the Board now has

the authority to formulate its own procedure for layoff

and recall, not that the Board may simply have no procedure whatsoever. These limits on the Board’s discretion, along with tenure, which, as we recognized in Mims,

gave plaintiffs a property interest in their continued

employment and entitled them to an opportunity to

demonstrate that they were capable of performing temporary work, give rise to a legitimate expectation that

tenured teachers who are laid off will be given the opportunity to show that they are qualified for new

vacancies for a reasonable period of time. For, as Mims

implicitly recognizes, if a “permanent” appointment

means anything, it at least means that if vacancies arise

during or shortly after a layoff, the teachers who originally held “permanent” appointments should be given
16 No. 10-3396

The Board also contends that Section 4.5 of the Illinois 4

Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5/4.5, also suggests

that tenured teachers have no property interest following

an economic layoff. Section 4.5 concerns “subjects of collective

bargaining” and states that a decision to lay off employees is

(continued...)

a meaningful opportunity to show that they remain

qualified to fill those positions.

And, although it is true that an entitlement to nothing

but procedure cannot be the basis for a property

interest, detailed procedural requirements are relevant

to whether a substantive property interest exists. Teigen v.

Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1081 (10th Cir. 2007); see also

Buttitta, 9 F.3d 1198, 1202-04 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that

a provision in the Illinois Pension Code setting forth the

procedure to be followed in determining whether an

officer receiving disability benefits should be returned

to active duty created in police officers “an interest in

being returned to the department for an opportunity to

demonstrate their fitness for active duty”); Deen v.

Darosa, 414 F.3d 731, 735-36 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that

policy directive that gave officers a right to appear

before a board to show that they could return to full

duty gave officer an interest in an opportunity to show

that he could return to full duty). Here, the limits on

the Board’s discretion found in Section 34-18(31) along

with the teachers’ right to a “permanent” appointment,

give rise to a legitimate expectation that laid-off teachers

will be considered for vacancies for a reasonable period

of time.4
No. 10-3396 17

(...continued) 4

a “permissive” subject of bargaining between the Board and the

Union. 115 ILCS 5/4.5. Because this case does not concern the

Board’s duty or lack thereof to bargain with the Union, but

instead concerns whether the teachers have a right to be

considered for vacancies, Section 4.5 is not relevant to the

issue before us. 

Having found that the teachers have a cognizable

property interest, we now turn to the question of what

process is due to them. Whether an employee has

received all the process that would have been due in

connection with his or her termination is a question of

federal law. Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 793 (7th

Cir. 2001) (“Lalvani I”). The fundamental requirement of

due process is “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Baird v. Bd. of

Educ. for Warren Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 205, 389 F.3d 685,

(7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

348-49 (1976)). The flexible approach to due process

adopted in Mathews requires the court to weigh “the

significance of the private interest at issue and the risk

of an erroneous deprivation of that interest under the

procedures employed by the state, against the probable

benefits of any additional procedural protections and

the state’s interest in avoiding the fiscal and administrative burdens that those additional protections would

impose.” Lalvani I, 269 F.3d at 793; see generally Chaney

v. Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg’l Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d

623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We apply the Mathews analysis

to both the pre-deprivation and post-deprivation phases

of [a plaintiff’s] case.”).
18 No. 10-3396

The teachers also contend that they are entitled to preference

5

for vacancies. But the availability of a post-termination

procedure by which the teachers can show that they are

qualified for vacancies is all that is necessary to satisfy due

process. There is no guarantee of a particular substantive

outcome.

The district court found that many vacancies were not

6

listed on the website. 

The teachers contend that they are entitled to a recall

procedure. We agree. The teachers should be given a 5

meaningful opportunity to show that they are qualified

for new vacancies for a reasonable period of time. See

Buttitta, 9 F.3d at 1204 (finding that a police officer

was given all process due to him because the police

department gave him an opportunity to show he was

qualified for active duty).

We have previously acknowledged that an employee’s

interest in retaining his or her job is substantial. Lalvani I,

269 F.3d at 793 (citing Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481

U.S. 252, 263 (1987)). The Board contends that the

teachers received all of the process that was due to them

because it held two job fairs and a résumé workshop

and pointed the teachers to a website listing vacancies. 6

However, the Board’s contention cannot be squared

with the Board’s several admissions on the record that

it has “no recall procedure in place.” The Board simply

has not established a procedure whereby laid-off

teachers can demonstrate their qualifications for new

teaching positions, nor has the Board announced the
No. 10-3396 19

This is not an empty formality, as the dissent asserts. While it 7

may turn out that not every laid-off teacher is rehired, the

teachers will get the benefit of the recall procedure enacted

by the Board pursuant to Section 34-18(31). 

criteria to be used in evaluating teachers who apply

for teaching jobs. Without any procedures for recall,

the risk of deprivation to the teachers is significant.

Recognizing that it lacked the institutional competence

to define the exact contours of those procedures, the

district court found that the Board, in light of Section 34-

18(31), would be in a better position to do so. We

agree. In enacting Section 34-18(31), the Illinois General

Assembly contemplated that the Board would promulgate regulations establishing such procedures, presumably without incurring excessive costs. Requiring the

Board to promulgate regulations under Section 34-18(31)

gives teachers the benefit of a procedure by which they

can demonstrate their qualifications for new positions,

without imposing excessive administrative and fiscal

costs on the Board.7

B. Scope of Injunctive Relief

We review the district court’s entry of preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.

Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power of Ill., L.L.C., 546 F.3d

918, 935 (7th Cir. 2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
20 No. 10-3396

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC, 129

S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The standard for a permanent

injunction is the same as for a preliminary injunction

except that the plaintiff must show actual success on

the merits. Id. at 381. Although courts use the terminology “irreparable harm,” when the issue is whether

to grant a permanent injunction, the burden is on the

plaintiff to show that damages are inadequate. Walgreen

Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).

The teachers succeeded on the merits. The district

court’s evaluation of the other factors was also sound.

Damages would not adequately compensate the teachers

because it would be difficult to place a value on the opportunity to demonstrate their qualifications for vacant

positions. The balance of the equities tips in favor of the

teachers because they have a substantial interest in remaining employed and requiring the Board to promulgate the rules contemplated by Section 34-18(31)

would not impose significant burdens. Nor would requiring the Board to allow the teachers to show that they

are qualified for vacancies negatively impact the public.

However, the scope of the district court’s injunction

should have been narrower. The district court ordered

the Board to consult with the Union in promulgating

regulations under Section 34-18(31). Although consultation with the Union may expedite the process of promulgating the rules, there is nothing in Section 34-18(31)

that requires cooperation with the Union, and we

decline to impose such a requirement.
No. 10-3396 21

The dissent contends that the teachers are now left in “a state 8

of limbo.” But as evidenced by the Board’s Layoff Policy

dealing with school closings, there is nothing unusual about

the teachers maintaining a connection to the schools after

being laid off. It makes no difference that the teachers are not

drawing a salary or receiving benefits.

The district court also ordered that the teachers’ discharges be rescinded. The teachers concede and we

agree that they are not entitled to back pay or to be

placed on the payroll going forward. However, the teachers must have some connection to the Chicago Public

School system in order for the Board’s regulations to

apply to them. We do not reverse the decision of the

district court in rescinding the discharges, but clarify

that the teachers are still considered to be laid-off teachers. As the district court explained, Section 5/34-18(31)

contemplates unique rights for laid-off, as opposed to

terminated, employees. Rescinding the discharges only

allows the teachers to take advantage of the opportunity

to show their qualifications for new vacancies for a reasonable period of time. In this context, their “laid-off”

status does not implicate past or future payment

or benefits.8

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s finding that tenured, laidoff teachers have a residual property right in the event

of an economic layoff. We also direct the court to

redraft its injunction to conform with this opinion.
22 No. 10-3396

MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part, concurring in

part. The court’s decision takes a vague enabling statute

giving the Board the power to make recall procedures

and turns it into an affirmative right for Union members

to have recall procedures. Not only does it give Union

members the right to these procedures, it elevates these

procedures to the place of property rights, covering them

with the guarantees of the Due Process Clause. Therefore,

I have two principal points of disagreement with the

court’s decision. First, neither the statute nor the surrounding conditions that the court’s opinion alludes to

gives the Union members the right to recall procedures.

Second, even if the statute provided the Union members

with the right to recall procedures, a person’s right to

certain procedures is not itself a property right that

the Due Process Clause protects. Wallace v. Robinson,

940 F.2d 243, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Promises

of particular procedures [ ] do not create legitimate

claims of entitlement.”).

I.

For reasons not in the record, the Union never

negotiated with the Board to secure recall rights in the

case of an economic layoff. It was not an oversight, since

it did negotiate for and secure recall rights in the case of

non-economic layoffs. When an economic layoff came

around last summer the Union filed a grievance,

claiming the layoff violated its contract with the Board.

The arbitrator disagreed, finding that the Board complied with the collective bargaining agreement. While
No. 10-3396 23

the Union appealed the arbitrator’s decision, it also

took its case to federal court. It didn’t claim that the

layoffs violated the contract or deprived its members of

their due process rights. Rather, it claimed that its members were entitled to recall procedures from the layoff

and that the Board violated their due process rights by

not creating them. It wanted to make sure that every

time a position opens up, laid-off teachers would—in

the words of the district court—have “a foot in the

door.” Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. II, 2010 WL

3927696, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Normally these procedures

would be included in a collective bargaining contract,

but again the Union never negotiated for them. So, the

Union argued that although the procedures were not

included in the collective bargaining agreement, they

were nevertheless guaranteed to its members through

the enabling statute that gives the Board the power to

create these recall procedures. The district court agreed

and this court affirms, finding the Union members have

a property interest in yet-to-be-created recall procedures that the Due Process Clause protects.

The Due Process Clause protects property interests.

To say someone has a property interest is to say they

have a legitimate claim of entitlement, that is, something

more than “an abstract need or desire” and “more than a

unilateral expectation.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 765 (2005) (quotation omitted). Such an

interest cannot be vague, transitory, or uncertain; it

must be affirmatively created, explicit, and secure. Burell

v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2004); Reed

v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983).
24 No. 10-3396

In other words, there must be a “legally enforceable

right.” Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir.

2009). And to have such a right, there must be “explicitly

mandatory language” linking “specified substantive

predicates” to prescribed outcomes. Miller v. Crystal Lake

Park Dist., 47 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1995).

The Union argues that its members have a right to

the recall procedures contemplated in Section 5/34-18(31).

The district court read “5/34-18(31) as vaguely providing

a property interest in some sort of retention procedure.”

Chicago Teachers Union, supra *8. Here, the court’s

opinion does not rest on the statute alone, which it notes

is “not crystal clear.” Op. at 12. Rather, in two ways it

finds a right to recall procedures: first, in the limits

Section 5/34-18(31) places on the Board’s discretion, and

second, in the residual and undefined interest the

members have in their jobs after being laid off. Op. at 16.

But neither a “vague” statute alone, nor a “vague” statute

plus some residual interest in a person’s former job,

gives the Union members a right to recall procedures.

The Supreme Court is clear on that point: “Nor can someone be safely deemed ‘entitled’ to something when

the identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.” Gonzales,

545 U.S. at 763.

Section 5/34-18(31) does not provide the Union

members with an entitlement. It is an enabling statute,

an authorizing statute that gives the Board the power to

create a recall process. It says that the Board “shall

have power” “[t]o promulgate rules” for layoffs and

recalls; it then provides criteria to guide the formation of
No. 10-3396 25

these rules. 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31). The statute does not

specify what recall procedures must be made or that

they are required in all cases, just that the Board has the

power to create them. In other words, the Board may

create recall procedures but is not required to do so. That

is the nature of an enabling statute. See Norman J. Singer,

3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, §§ 57:1 et al. (7th ed.

2008) (discussing enabling or authorizing statutes and

their attributes). As the court notes, the Board has not

chosen to create procedures for recall during an economic

layoff.

Significantly, though, the Board has enacted recall

procedures when teachers are laid off because of a school

closing. These detailed procedures, including ten months

of pay and benefits, are discussed in footnote 2 of the

court’s opinion. While the Board has enacted recall procedures when a school closes, there may be good reason

for the Board to exercise its authority and choose not to

enact such procedures when an economic crisis compels

layoffs. In an economic crisis, the Board may want as

much flexibility as possible and choose to avoid the

cumbersome task of determining how to sift through

2,000 laid-off applicants vying for the 200 jobs that may

open up during the school year—not to mention the

grievances that would naturally follow. It may prefer

to have everyone apply and let the principals make their

own hiring decisions. Regardless of the reasons, there

is nothing in the enabling statute that specifies that

recall procedures are required.

Not surprisingly, we have previously dealt with the

question of whether an enabling statute creates a
26 No. 10-3396

property right, notably in Hohmeier v. Leyden Community

High Schools Dist. 212, 954 F.2d 461, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1992).

There, the school board had a “duty” to “adopt and

enforce all necessary rules for the management and

government of the public schools of their district.” Id.

We held that although the Board could create a property entitlement under the statute, it had not. Like Section 5/34-18(31), the statute in Hohmeier had criteria for

the Board to use when making its rules. In contrast to the

court’s holding today, there we found that the criteria

“suggests that the policy is intended to guide the

internal management of the school system, rather than to

create enforceable rights against the district.” Id. at 465 (emphasis added). Further, in Hohmeier, as here, the statute

gave the Board the discretion to determine what rules to

promulgate. Id. And we held that since there was no

binding obligation that the plaintiffs could enforce, there

was no property interest for the Due Process Clause

to protect. Id. at 464.

Looking at the text of Section 5/34-18(31), we should

arrive at the same conclusion. The language at issue here

is, as the district court put it, “vague”; it is uncertain

and lacks binding force. Undeterred, the court notes that

while the statute is “not crystal clear,” the limits it

places on the Board’s discretion help create an expectation for Union members in recall procedures. In its words:

Here, the limits on the Board’s discretion found

in Section 34-18(31) along with the teachers’ right

to a “permanent” appointment, give rise to a

legitimate expectation that laid off teachers will
No. 10-3396 27

Further, the context of this statute cuts against any inference

1

in favor of tenure rights. We have dealt with the changes

made to this statute in several cases over the years. Shegog v. Bd.

of Educ., 194 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1999); Hearne v. Chicago Bd.

of Educ., 185 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999); Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of

(continued...)

be considered for vacancies for a reasonable

period of time.

Op. at 16. But the criteria listed in Section 34-18(31)

do not create a right, nor do they limit the Board’s discretion. When formulating the rules, the Board is supposed

to “take into account factors including, but not [ ] limited

to, qualifications, certifications, experience, performance

ratings or evaluations, and any other factors relating to

an employee’s job performance.” Id. (emphasis added). This

legislative criteria does not give tenured teachers a right

to recall procedures. The statute does not provide a

guarantee that after any layoff the most qualified or most

experienced will be recalled; all it provides is that if the

Board makes such recall rules, it will take into account

factors that include qualifications and experience and

“any other factors relating to an employee’s job performance.” 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31). When a statute limits the

decisionmaker’s discretion so that a prescribed outcome

will follow from certain factors, then a right is created.

Miller, 47 F.3d at 867; Wallace, 940 F.2d at 247. The mere

fact that the Board will consider a non-exclusive list of

things, primarily focused on performance with no

mention of tenure, does not mean that a certain outcome will follow. The Union members can’t reasonably 1
28 No. 10-3396

(...continued) 1

Educ., 64 F.3d 1098 (7th Cir. 1995). And in Hearne, we discussed how the changes aimed only at Chicago Public Schools—

which at the time this statute was passed “was in the throes

of an education crisis”—eroded the teachers’ tenure rights.

Hearne, 185 F.3d at 772-73.

read the statute and infer—from the fact that the Board

will consider qualifications, certifications, and job performance when making recall procedures—that they have

a substantive entitlement to recall procedures. See

Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 765 (“If she was given a statutory

entitlement, we would expect to see some indication of

that in the statute itself.”). And “[a] misunderstanding of

one’s entitlements, even if reasonable, does not enlarge

those entitlements.” Upadhya v. Langenberg, 834 F.2d 661,

665 (7th Cir. 1987).

There are two other components to the court’s finding

that the teachers have the right to recall procedures:

first, its analysis of the Illinois case law interpreting the

statute; and second, the declaration that teachers have a

right to a permanent appointment, with some residual

interest after termination. Under the first, the court concludes its examination of Land I and Land II by noting:

Neither the 1995 amendments nor the Illinois cases

construing them suggest that tenured teachers

are not entitled to an opportunity to show that they

are qualified for vacancies after an economic layoff.

Op. at 14 (emphasis added). That statement, indeed

much of the court’s reasoning, inverts the proper analysis.

It is not that the law must not take away a right; rather,
No. 10-3396 29

the law must guarantee it. Nor is it the duty of the Board

to show that the teachers do not have a particular

right; rather, it is incumbent on the Union to show that

its members have one. And to have such a right the

members must have much more than an expectation of

something that the Illinois cases have not taken away.

The Union members must show that “state law has affirmatively created an expectation that a particular employment relationship will continue unless certain defined

events occur.” Burell, 378 F.3d at 647 (quotation omitted).

That has not happened here.

Second, the court repeatedly invokes the concept of

tenure and the case of Mims v. Board of Education, 523

F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1975), as suggesting that the Union

members have a residual right to recall procedures. Op.

at 9, 14-15. This suggestion is misguided. First, rights of

this sort do not come from federal case law; “they are

created and their dimensions are defined by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent

source such as state law.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 758; see

also Goros v. County of Cook, 489 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir.

2007) (“State law defines property; federal law defines

the process that is due.” (quotation omitted)). Second, in

Mims the plaintiffs were film servicers who were laid

off after the program was cut, but before they were laid

off there were still some temporary jobs available in

dismantling the program, and the plaintiffs were not

given a chance to demonstrate they were capable of

doing the temporary positions. Mims stands for the unremarkable proposition that due process was not followed

when the plaintiffs were laid off without a hearing.
30 No. 10-3396

This point is clear in Land I, which the court discusses at 2

length. There, the Illinois Court of Appeals was looking at

whether a traditional right to continued employment existed

in the language of Section 34-18(31), and it held it was not there:

The plaintiffs have failed to cite to any authority—and

we are unable to locate any—to support their claim that

both section 34-18(31) of the Code and the Board’s

layoff policy created a property interest in their continued employment. 

Land v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 757 N.E.2d 912, 925 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2001), rev. in part on other grounds, 781 N.E.2d 249

(continued...)

Mims, 523 F.2d at 715. That case has no bearing on what

rights the Union members have under this statute to

recall procedures. And that case does not suggest—let

alone hold—that under Illinois law after a person is laid

off he has some residual rights in his former job.

Here, the teachers are all laid off; in the Board’s words,

they have been honorably discharged. The point is they

no longer have a job, and the process they are owed under

the Due Process Clause has been honored—the teachers

have not claimed they were laid off without due process. No property rights followed the teachers out the door.

Mims does not suggest that once an employee has been

terminated she retains some residual rights in her former

employment. No case holds that. To be clear, the teachers

have a property interest in their jobs, but once they lose

their jobs, and the process that attaches to it is honored,

they have no more rights that the Due Process Clause

protects.

2
No. 10-3396 31

(...continued) 2

(Ill. Sup. Ct. 2002). In Land I, once the employee was terminated, that was it: he had no more property rights.

The court’s instructions on remand also illustrate this

fact. Under the court’s direction, the layoffs are rescinded,

yet the teachers do not get back pay or get placed back

on the payroll; they are not contractual employees who

enjoy salaries and benefits. Op. at 18-19. They have an

uncertain and undefined connection to the schools;

they’re just connected with the school in a state of

limbo—undefined by statute or contract, the product

of judicial fiat. Since neither Section 34-18(31) nor the

teachers’ contract creates such a residual right which

would define a member’s status, the court must order

one. So, on remand, the teachers now have the opportunity—along with every other applicant—to show their

qualifications for new vacancies. Even after rescinding

the discharges, that “opportunity” is not a right, because

there is no guarantee that the teacher will be rehired.

They just have a chance, like everyone else. See Reed, 704

F.2d at 948 (noting “property is what is securely and

durably yours . . . , as distinct from what you hold

subject to so many conditions as to make your interest

meager, transitory, or uncertain”). Nothing more.

In sum, neither the statute, nor anything else the court

cites to, gives the Union members a legitimate claim

to recall procedures in the case of an economic layoff.

Thus, I respectfully submit that the court has erred in

finding such a right.
32 No. 10-3396

II.

My second point of disagreement is more fundamental:

Even if the Union members’ expectations from a vague

statute could create a right to recall procedures, recall

procedures are not substantive property rights. From

the briefs and the district court’s order, the Union’s

demand was minimal. The Union wants to ensure

its members have a chance to show principals their qualifications—they want special access, or in the

words of the district court, they want a “foot in the

door.” They want a process for hiring teachers that will

favor the laid-off tenured teachers.

Here, the court finds that the Union members have a

right to recall procedures, the ones that the Board is

empowered to create under Section 5/34-18(31) but has

not yet created. The court holds that these yet-to-becreated recall procedures constitute a property right that

the Due Process Clause protects. So, to ensure that the

Union members are not deprived of their property (i.e.,

the recall procedures) without due process, the court

has ordered the Board to create recall procedures (which

is, again, the so-called property). The logic is circular. A

process (here, the recall procedures) is not an end in

itself. The Due Process Clause protects the property

right, not the process. It bears noting the Supreme

Court’s position on the danger of conflating property

rights with procedure:

The point is straightforward: the Due Process

Clause provides that certain substantive rights—

life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived
No. 10-3396 33

except pursuant to constitutionally adequate

procedures. The categories of substance and procedure

are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause

would be reduced to a mere tautology. “Property”

cannot be defined by the procedures provided for

its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)

(emphasis added). Illustrating the Supreme Court’s point,

the court’s opinion notes: “Without any procedures

for recall, the risk of deprivation to the teachers is significant.” Op. at 19. But what is the deprivation that the

teachers would suffer? It would be nothing more than

their right to “recall procedures.” And procedures are not

protected property rights: “Process is not an end in

itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate

claim of entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,

250 (1983).

By looking at the statute this way, the court conflates

the property with the process. Our precedent is clear on

this point: “Promises of particular procedures [ ] do not

create legitimate claims of entitlement.” Wallace, 940

F.2d at 248. A statute that merely provides procedures

does not include a substantive right. Cain v. Larson, 879

F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is by now well-established that in order to demonstrate a property interest

worthy of protection under the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause, a party may not simply

rely upon the procedural guarantees of state law or

local ordinance.”). And “a contract that creates merely
34 No. 10-3396

a right to procedure does not create a property right

within the meaning of the due process clause.” Campbell

v. City of Champaign, 940 F.2d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir. 1991)

(quotation omitted). Here, the Union doesn’t even have

an articulated procedure—it has only the hope of a procedure. That is not the stuff of property rights.

And even the court’s remedy does not give a substantive entitlement; on remand all the teachers are given is

a procedure: the court requires that their names be

placed on a list. But having your name on a list is not a

property right. It is a formality. Olim, 461 U.S. at 250

(noting a property right is not “the right to demand

needless formality”).

III. 

The Union failed to bargain over and secure recall

procedures for its members when there is an economic

layoff. Faced with this reality after the layoff, it has tried

to create a property right out of the statute that empowers

the Board to make such procedures. The district court

and this court have acquiesced, finding that the Due

Process Clause protects what amounts to a vague and

amorphous expectation of recall procedures, but the

Due Process Clause protects neither vague expectations

nor procedures. The substance and form of recall procedures during an economic layoff should be resolved at

the bargaining table; it is not for us, fifteen years after

the statute was passed, to remedy that by calling the

expectation of “recall procedures” property rights and

placing them under the protection of the Due Process
No. 10-3396 35

I do agree with the court’s opinion that the district court 3

overstepped its bounds by ordering the Board to negotiate

with the Union over the substance and form of recall procedures. To the extent that the Court’s opinion modifies

the district court’s order on that point, I fully concur.

3-29-11

Clause. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent with respect

to the finding a property right, and concur with the

judgment modifying the district court’s injunction.3