[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10409

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODERICK CHESTER, 

a.k.a. C-Rod,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00020-MTT-CHW-2

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10409

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Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Roderick Chester appeals his convictions for possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine, and distribution of 

methamphetamine. We denied his appointed counsel’s Anders

motion and ordered briefing on two issues: (1) whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support Chester’s conviction for 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (2) whether the 

district court abused its discretion by denying Chester’s motion for 

a mistrial based on a witness’s statement that Chester had a 

pending murder charge in state court. We now address the merits 

of his appeal and, finding no error, affirm Chester’s convictions.

I.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 

1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2015). We will affirm a conviction “unless 

there is no reasonable construction of the evidence from which the 

jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted).

To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must 

show that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or 

ammunition, (2) the defendant was a felon, (3) the defendant knew 

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22-10409 Opinion of the Court 3

that he was a felon, and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or 

affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 

852 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1345 (11th 

Cir. 2021). On appeal, Chester challenges only the first element—

knowing possession.

Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive. 

United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th Cir. 2011). The

government proves constructive possession by showing “that the 

defendant (1) was aware or knew of the firearm’s presence and 

(2) had the ability and intent to later exercise dominion and control 

over that firearm.” Id. Constructive possession can be proved 

through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.

After a lawful traffic stop and search, police discovered a 

handgun and some loose marijuana on the front bench seat of 

Chester’s truck, under a folded-down center armrest. Chester was 

driving the truck at the time, with his wife in the front passenger 

seat. Chester argues that the government introduced no evidence 

at trial showing either that he knew of the firearm’s presence or 

that he intended to exercise control over it.

These arguments are unsuccessful. Constructive possession 

of a firearm can be proved through circumstantial evidence. We 

have repeatedly held that a defendant’s ownership of or control

over a vehicle is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to infer both 

a defendant’s knowledge of a firearm found within the vehicle and 

his intent to exercise control over it. See, e.g., United States v. 

Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright, 

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392 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gunn, 369 

F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). The jury was permitted to make 

the same inferences here—Chester was driving the vehicle when 

the police found the handgun next to the driver’s seat. And the fact 

that Chester’s wife was also present does not change our calculus—

a defendant’s possession can be either exclusive or “in association 

with others.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 596 

(11th Cir. 2020).

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial 

for abuse of discretion. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1274. “It has long been 

the settled rule in this Circuit that error in the admission of 

evidence under most circumstances may be cured by withdrawing 

the evidence from the jury’s consideration and instructing the jury 

to disregard it.” United States v. Troise, 483 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir. 

1973); see also United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 

2020) (“When the district court gives a curative instruction, we 

presume that the jury followed it.”). Therefore, if the district court 

gives a curative instruction in response to a prejudicial statement 

made to the jury, we will reverse “only if the evidence is so highly 

prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s admonition.” 

United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(quotation omitted). This requires “a reasonable probability that, 

but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 

2007).

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At Chester’s trial, in response to an unrelated question from 

the prosecution, one of the government’s witnesses mentioned 

that she saw online that Chester “was booked for murder in Bibb 

County.” After a brief sidebar, both parties and the district court 

agreed that “instead of dwelling on” the statement then, they 

would move on to avoid drawing further attention to it by the jury. 

Then, after the close of evidence, the district court gave the jury a 

curative instruction, telling them that the witness was “mistaken,” 

that there was “no evidence or contention here that Mr. Chester 

was involved in anything like that,” and that they “must 

completely disregard” the statement.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Chester’s motion for a mistrial. United States v. Newsome is 

instructive. There, the government itself told the jury in its 

opening statement that the defendant—charged only with 

possessing a firearm as a convicted felon—had allegedly shot his 

wife. 475 F.3d at 1223. The district court instructed the jury that 

the lawyer’s statement was not evidence and denied the 

defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Id. This Court affirmed, 

reasoning that after the curative instruction, “the prosecutor’s 

single statement did not inflict the kind of prejudice necessary to 

warrant a mistrial” and that the defendant could not “show a 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different 

absent the prosecutor’s statement.” Id. at 1227; see also United States 

v. Smith, 517 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming denial of a 

mistrial after the district court instructed the jury to ignore a 

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witness’s hearsay statement that the defendant’s co-conspirator

“had shot a man”). 

Here, the offending statement was made a single time in 

passing and, when the record is viewed as a whole, was clearly not 

a significant or material part of the overall trial. There was also 

significant independent evidence supporting Chester’s three 

convictions. Therefore, after the district court properly instructed 

the jury to disregard the witness’s statement, we are confident that 

it did not carry a substantial prejudicial effect and that Chester

cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome would 

have been any different even if it had not been made.

* * *

AFFIRMED.

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