## FILL - D APPEALS Is10t it IN THE COURT 

### OF APPEALS OF THE 

### STATE OF

# WASHIlN, 4, ,

# T 10 

### til DIVISION II JOSHUA L. FAW, a single person, Appellant,
AIM 

### TARA MILLAM, individually; JEFFREY L. MILLAM, individually; and TARA MILLAM 

### and JEFFREY L. MILLAM,formerly wife and husband, and the marital community composed thereof, Respondents,
and KYLE S. PARKER,

### individually; "JANE 

### DOE" PARKER, individually; and KYLE S. PARKER and " JANE DOE" PARKER, 

### husband and wife, andthe marital community composed thereof, Defendants. 12 MIbD- M

l J 1 ill C At `

01 ! I J ' 1 1 [ ]

HUNT, J. — 

### Joshua L. Faw appeals the superior court's summaryjudgment dismissal of his tort claims against Tara Millam and herhusband, Jeffrey L. Millam. Faw's claims arise from

a collision with a Toyota Paseo driven 

### by Kyle S. Parked, given to him 

### by Tara Millam. Faw 

### argues that (1) there were genuine issues of material fact about whether the Millams owned the 

### vehicle or had negligently entrusted it to Parker at the time ofthe accident, precluding summary judgment; (2) the trial court erred in ruling admissible under ER 1003 the " Bill of Sale" ( gifting the Paseo from Tara Millam to Parker as an acceptable duplicate ofthe original; and (3) the trial

1 Faw' s claim against Parker is not at issue in this appeal.No. 42840 - 7 -II
court erred in 

### failing to address whether the Pasco was the.Millams' community property. We 

# affirmthe superiorcourt'ssummaryjudgmentdismissal ofFaw'sclaimsagainstthe Millams.2 FACTS 

### On August 3, 2009, Kyle S. Parker was racing another driver on a public street in Pierce 

## County,driving a 1992 Toyota Pasco, which Tara Millam had given him several weeks earlierin Oklahoma. 

### Parker' s Pasco crossed the center line and struck Joshua Faw's oncoming vehicle, 

## causing Fawnumerous serious and permanent injuries, and disabling him for life. Parker,whose Washington driver's license had been previously suspended, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge ofvehicular assault based on this incident and was sentenced tojail.

On 

### January 19, 2010, Faw filed a personal 

### injury action against Parker3, " Jane Doe" Parker, Tara Millam, and " John Doe" Millam4, 

### alleging that, as the Pasco' s owner, Tara' had 

## negligently entrusted itto Parker. The Millams moved for summaryjudgment,arguing thatthey no longer owned the Pasco atthe time ofthe accident. In support oftheir motion, Tara submitted 

### a declaration, exhibits, and deposition statements asserting that ( 1) she was friends with Parker and his brother, who had helped her move from Washington to Oklahoma in February 2009, driving a U -

Haul; ( 2) she and Parker had gone together to the Oklahoma Department of 

### Licensing, surrendered their Washington driver' s licenses, and received Oklahoma driver' s

2 

### Accordingly,we need not address Faw's other arguments. 3 Although Faw' s complaint referenced a " Jane Doe" 

### Parker, nothing in the record before us reflects that Kyle Parker is or was married.
4 

### Faw's original complaint referred to Tara Millam's former husband as " John Doe" Millam; but 

### his second amended complaint refers to Tara's former husband as Jeffrey L. Millam. 

### We use Tara Millam's firstname forclarityas necessary. We intend no disrespect.

2No. 42840 - 7 -II licenses; ( 3) she did not know that Parker's Washington driver' s license had been suspended; ( 4) when the Parkers' van suffered an engine malfunction, she had purchased them a 1992 Toyota Paseo, which Tara drove only once; ( 5) on 

### July 13, 2009, she had written a " bill of sale "6 that purported to gift the Paseo to Kyle Parker,7 Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 174; ( 6) the Paseo and Kyle 

### Parker were insured under her (Tara's) insurance policy when the Parker brothers drove it to 

### Washington; and ( 7) on July 30, she had informed her insurer that she no longer owned the Toyota Paseo and instructed her insurer to remove the Paseo and Kyle Parker from her policy.8 The Millams also submitted Parker' s declaration that there were no conditions attached to Tara' s 

### gift ofthe Paseo to him and no expectations that he would return it to her. 

### The superior court granted summaryjudgmentto the Millams and dismissed Faw's action against them for the 

### following reasons: ( 

### 1) under Oklahoma law (which controlled ownership of the Paseo), Parker was the owner at the time of the accident9; ( 2) there was " no evidence that 

### Tara Millam knew or had any reason to know that Kyle Parker was reckless, heedless or incompetent in the operation of [the] automobile "; (3) under Washington law (which controlled 

### whetherthe Millams were liable to third party Faw in Washington), Fawfailed to raise a genuine

6 

### The Millams presented acopy ofthis bill ofsaleto the court.
7 Tara and Parker declared that the document submitted as a copy of the " bill of sale" was authentic and was a true copy of the original created 

### by Tara Millam. CP at 14. The original bill of sale" had been in the Paseo' s glove compartment, that the police had seized the vehicle, and thatthe document had been destroyed when the car was crushed. CP at 54. 

### 8 The Millams also submitted an Allstate Insurance representative' s declaration that Tara Millam 

### had removed Parker and the Paseo from her insurance policy because she said that she no longer owned it. 9 The superior court did not expressly rule on the admissibility of the " Bill of Sale," which 

### purportedly reflected Tara's gift ofthe Paseo to Parker.

3No. 42840 - 7 -II issue of material fact about Tara's knowledge of Parker' s competence to drive; and ( 4) the Millams were not liable to Faw as a matter of law.

### 10 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 25. 

### Faw appealed the superior court's summary judgment dismissal of his action against the Millams.11 ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINSTTHE MILLAMS Faw argues several grounds to support his contention that the superior court erred in 

### dismissing his claims against the Millams. He contends that the Millams owned the Paseo, negligently entrusted it to Parker,. and, therefore, were liable to Faw for his injuries. These arguments fail. 

### We review de novo summaryjudgment orders, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court and treating all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, Faw. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards 

### Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 ( 2004). 

## Summaryjudgment is properwhere there is no genuine issue asto any material fact,the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw, and a reasonable person could reach only one
conclusion. Saddle Mountain Minerals, LLC v. Joshi, 152 Wn.2d 242, 248 - 49, 95 P.3d 1236 2004); 

### Lamon v.McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn.2d 345, 350, 588 P.2d 1346 ( 1979).

10 

### Accordingly, the superior court did not reach the issue ofwhether the Paseo was the Millams' separate or community property. 

## 11 Our court initiallytreated Faw's notice ofappeal as apetition fordiscretionary review under RAP 6.2. Our court commissioner later re-converted this petition to a notice of appeal.
rdNo. 42840 - 7 -II 

### A. No Third Party Liability Based on Vehicle Ownership Faw first argues that, under either Oklahoma or Washington law,12 the Millams should be 

## held liable for his injuries because they were the owners ofthe Paseo.when it collided with his vehicle. The record does not support this underlying factual assertion. 1. Oklahoma and Washington laws To resolve choice - of - law problems in tort cases, " Washington has adopted the ` most significant relationship' rule." Zenaida-Garcia v. 

### Recovery Sys. Tech., Inc., 

### 128 Wn.App. 256, 259 - 60, 115 P. 3d 1017 ( 2005) ( quoting Martin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 

### 114 Wn. App. 823, 828, 61 P.3d 1196 (2003)). " Under this approach, the rights and liabilities ofthe parties are 

### determined bythe local law ofthe state which,with respectto that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." 

### Zenaida - Garcia, 128 Wn. App. at 260 ( citing Johnson v. Spider 

### Staging 

### Corp., 87 Wn.2d. 577, 580, 555 P.2d 997 ( 1976)).

Here, although the accident occurred in Washington, the superior court ruled that the 

### most significant relationship concerning ownership of the Paseo was in Oklahoma; thus, Oklahoma law applied. We agree. It was uncontroverted that Tara delivered the Paseo to Parker in Oklahoma and that Parker drove the Paseo in Oklahoma with an Oklahoma license before 

### leaving forWashington. We agreewiththe superior courtthat conveyance ofthe Paseo occurred

12 Faw argues that Oklahoma law controls in this case, but that the outcome would be the same even if Washington law was applied. 5No. 42840 - 7 -II in Oklahoma, Oklahoma had the "` most significant relationship"' 13 with this conveyance, and, 

## therefore,Oklahomalawgovernedownership ofthe Paseo.14

2. Transfer ofvehicle to Parker before leaving OklahomaforWashington Faw argues that, even if Tara had intended to transfer the Paseo to Parker, she failed to 

## comply with Oklahoma's statutory requirements for vehicle transfers and, thus, remained the

owner, liable to 

### third parties such as Faw. 15 Faw notes, for example, the lack of evidence that Parker obtained insurance for the Paseo, as required 

### by OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1112(3)( a). This 

### argument does not defeat the superior court' s conclusion that Tara conveyed ownership of the Paseo to Parker. Even if Parker failed to obtain insurance, this failure would not have operated 

### to transferownership ofthe Paseo or liability backto Tara.



## 13 Zenaida -

Garcia,.128 Wn.App. at259 - 60 (quoting Martin, 114Wn.App.at 828). 14 We note, however,that our conclusion would be the same even ifWashington law controlled, because both states follow the Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC) for sales and inter vivos gifts. In re Marriage ofZier, 136 Wn.

### App. 40, 47, 147 P.3d 624 (2006) (

### citing Sinclairv. Fleischman, 54 Wn. 

### App. 204, 207, 773 P.2d 101 ( 1989)) ( " The elements of a completed gift are ( 1) an intention of the donor to give; ( 2) a subject matter capable of 

### delivery; ( 3) 

### a delivery; and (4) acceptance 

### by the donee. ") and Cluckv. Ford,2007 OK CIV APP 3, 152 P.3d 279 (The elements of an inter vivos gift are "( 1) a donor competent to make the gift, (2) freedom ofwill on his or her part, (3) an intention 

### by the donor to make the gift, (

### 4) a donee capable ofaccepting the gift, and (5) 

### delivery 

### by the donor and acceptance 

### by the donee." ( 

### citing Davis v. Nat'l BankofTulsa, 1960 OK 151, 353 P.2d 482)). 

## 15 More specifically, Faw argues that the Millams failed (1) to sign a statement disclosing the odometer reading as required 

### by OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1107 and § 1112, ( 2) to sign and to notarize a release of interest and warranty of title as required 

### by OKLA. STAT. tit. 47 § 1107(a), and ( 3) to deliver the signed and notarized certificate to Parker, the transferee. See Br. of Appellant at 15 -16 ( Faw' s brief actually cites OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 

### 1007 (governing parking for physically disabled persons), which we assume meant § 1107 ( 

### governing requirements for certificate holders inthe event ofsale ortransfer ofownership ofmotor vehicle titles).
GNo. 42840 - 7 -II 

### First,under Oklahoma law, it is not necessary for avehicle transferee to obtain insurance 

## on anewly acquired vehicle in orderforthe transferorto avoid liability. See OKLA. STAT.tit.47, 1107.

### 16 Second, although Faw is correct that the holder of a certificate oftitle is presumed to be the vehicle owner, this presumption is rebuttable. See Heinrich v. Titus - Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wn.

### App. 147, 162, 868 P.2d 169 ( 1994). That Tara' s name remained on the Paseo' s title at the time of Parker' s collision was insufficient to trigger her 

### liability to Faw. Under both Oklahoma
and Washington law, certificates of title are not necessary to establish ownership. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §

## 2-40117; Heinrich,73 Wn.App.at 162.18

16 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1107 requires "[ t]he purchaser or transferee of the vehicle [to] present 

### the assigned certificate of title and the insurance security verification to the vehicle to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, or one of its motor license agents." OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1107. 

## This statutory requirement obligated Parker, not Tara, to obtain insurance and, thus, had no bearing onthe Millams' liability forthe Paseo after its transferto Parker. 

## 17 Under Oklahoma law,it is notnecessaryforthe sellerto delivertitle before he orshe conveys ownership: "[ 

### t]he sale of [an] automobile [is] complete upon delivery ofthe carwith the intent to sell." 

### Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 1969 OK 114, 457 P.2d 548, 551 ( citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2 -

401); see also Green v. Harris, 2003 OK 55, 70 P.3d 866, 871 n.1 l (certificates oftitle are " 

### merely intended to protect against theft and facilitate recovery and aid in enforcement of motor vehicle regulation "; 

## legal ownership of title is not dispositive of liability for negligent entrustment of a vehicle); 

### City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Finch, 205 OK 340, 237 P.2d 869, 872 1951); In re Foster, 1980 OK 37, 611 P.2d 232, 234 ( "[ M]otor vehicle certificates of title in 

### Oklahoma are documents ofconvenience ratherthan documents ofownership. "). 

## 18Washington courts havetaken an evenstrongerstand,holding: T]he transfer of a vehicle may be valid despite the failure to transfer the certificate properly. 

### Title and registration certificates are only rebuttable prima facie evidence of automobile ownership. In [Washington] State, the [ Uniform 

### Commercial Code] provisions, not the certificate of title statutes, govern who holds title to a vehicle. Heinrich, 73 Wn. 

### App. at 162 ( citations omitted); see also 

### Beatty v. Western Pac. Ins. Co., 74 Wn.2d 530, 542 - 43, 445 P.2d 325 ( 1968). And under Title 62A RCW, which codifies Washington' s enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, " title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on 

### by the parties." RCW 62A.2-401( 1).
7No. 42840 - 7 -II Third, regardless of whether Oklahoma or Washington law applies, the record supports the trial court' s conclusion that Tara gave the Paseo to Parker in Oklahoma, before he drove it to Washington and collided with Faw. Both Parker and Tara stated in their declarations that, shortly before Parker left for Washington, ( 1) Tara gave the Paseo to Parker, without conditions

or expectation of return; and ( 2) she created and signed a " bill of sale" memorializing this transfer on 

### July 13, 2009. 19 CP at 289. 

### Consistent with this transfer ofownership, as previously noted, Tara contacted her insurance company, informed them that she no longer owned the
vehicle, and removed both the Paseo and Parker from her policy. There is no disputed issue of material fact that Tara conveyed the Paseo to Parker before he left for Washington.

19 This Bill of Sale stated, " 

### I,Tara A. Millam do hereby give to Kyle S. Parker my 1992 Toyota Paseo License # 713AVU VIN # JT2EL45F7NOO85520 as a gift for the sum of $ 0.00." CP at 

### 89. Tarafurther declared that she had given Parker the original "bill ofsale" and had kept a copy for herself. CP at 289.

Although, as we explain in the next section of this analysis, the superior court neither 

### expressly ruled nor relied on the admissibility of this document, we note that in its order of 

## summary judgment, the superior court included this bill of sale in the list ofdocuments it had considered in making its decision. 

### Assuming, therefore, that the superior court considered this 

### bill ofsale, itwould have been admissible attrial to showthe parties' intent to convey the Paseo from Tara to Parker. ( 

### Under ER 1002, a party must produce the original ofthe document it seeks to admit in order to prove its contents. But, because the bill of sale was admissible to show the parties' intent, rather than to prove the document' s operable terms, ER 1002 would not prohibit 

### the superior court from admitting a copy in lieu ofthe original.) 

### The language of the bill of sale strongly supported Tara's statement in her declaration that she intended to give the Paseo to Parker:

The elements of a completed gift are ( 1) an intention of the donor to give; ( 2) a subject matter capable of 

### delivery; ( 3) a 

### delivery; and ( 4) 

### acceptance by the donee. In re Zier, 136 Wn. 

### App. at 47 ( citing Sinclair, 54 Wn. 

### App. at 207). 

### After purchasing the Paseo, 

### she delivered it to Parker, who accepted it by taking possession and driving it to Washington. Nothing in the record suggests that Tara expected Parkerto return the Paseo orthat 

### there were any conditions attached to her gift; Parker's declaration also supports the conclusion that the Paseo was a gift from Tara to him and that he was not expected to return it. And again, as we explain in the next section, Faw failed to support his allegations that the " Bill of Sale" was a ruse to defeat 

### liability. Br. ofAppellant at 9.No. 42840 - 7 -II 3. Bill of Sale In his opening brief, Faw assigns error to the superior court' s " admission" of the document entitled " bill of sale" into evidence. Br. ofAppellant at 4. He asserts that "the Bill of Sale was manufactured 

### by the defendants after the accident in an attempt to avoid 

### liability " 20 and

a copy was inadmissible under ER 1002, which requires the original. We do not address this issue for several reasons. 

## Although Faw briefly questioned the admissibility and authenticity ofthe " Bill of Sale" below,he provided no facts or authorityto support his argument below,and he neither requested nor received from the superior court a definitive ruling on the admissibility ofthe bill of sale. On the contrary, rather than addressing its admissibility on the record,21 the superior court ruled, 

### There's no evidence or reasonable inference that' s before the Court that anybody owned the
vehicle on the date ofthe accident, August 3rd, 2009, but Kyle Parker. "22 VRP at 25.

In general, we do not review " a matter on which the trial court did not rule." Meresse v. Stelma, 100 Wn.

### App. 857, 867, 999 P.2d 1267 (2000) (citing RAP 2.4( a)). See also RAP 2.5( a). Instead, we usually limit our review to matters on which the trial court did rule. Snohomish 

### County Builders Ass' n v. Snohomish Health Dist., 

### 8 Wn. App. 589, 593, 508 P.2d 617 ( 1973).

20 Br. ofAppellant at 9. 

## 21 As we have previously noted, the only suggestionthatthe superiorcourt may have impliedly ruled on the bill ofsale was its inclusion in its summaryjudgment list ofdocuments considered. 22 Despite Faw's unsupported claim that the " Bill of Sale" was fraudulent, Br. ofAppellant at 9, 

### as we have previously noted, solid evidence in the record supports the superior court's finding that Parker was the owner ofthe Paseo atthe time of his collision with Faw.
6No. 42840 - 7 -II Here, Faw did not ask the superior court to strike the bill of sale; therefore, we do not further consider this assignment of error. 

### We hold,therefore, thatthere was no material issue offactthatTara conveyed ownership of the Paseo to Parker as a valid inter vivos gift before he drove it to Washington and collided 

## with Faw.23 Thus, Faw'sthird party ownership liability claim againstthe Millams fails because they did not ownthe Paseo atthetime ofthe accident.



### B. No Third Party Liability Based on Negligent Entrustment Faw next argues that the superior court erred by dismissing his negligent entrustment
claim. His 

### theory is that, even ifTara was no longer the owner, (1) Parker was incompetent, as a matter of law,to operate the vehicle in Washington, a fact about which Tara was aware when she entrusted the vehicle to Parker, because she knew that his Washington driver's license was suspended and that he had a criminal record; and (2) thus, the Millams should be held liable for Parker' s 

### having caused Faw' s injuries. Faw, however, presented no evidence below to support these factual assertions, so this argument also fails. 

### The relatively narrow negligent entrustment theory of liability arises out of the negligence chain of causation principle:24 

## 23 Fawalso arguesthatatransfer ofavehicle between partiesto a contractmaybe recognized as valid betweenthemselves, but not as to athird party. Br. ofAppellant at20. Because he cites no authorityto supportthis proposition,we do notfurther consider it. RAP 10.3(a)(6). 24 The general rule in Washington is that "[ i]fthe defendant' s original negligence continues and contributes to the 

### injury," as it might when a transferor negligently entrusts a vehicle, " the 

### intervening negligence of another is an additional cause. 

### It is not a superseding cause and does not relieve the defendant of 

### liability." 

### Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wn. App. 231, 242, 115 P.3d 342 ( 2005) ( citing Doyle v. Nor - West Pac. Co., 23 Wn. 

### App. 1, 6, 594 P.2d 938 ( 1979); 

### Eckerson v. Ford's Prairie Sch. Dist.No. 11, 3 Wn.2d 475, 483 -84, 101 P.2d 345 ( 1940)).

10No. 42840 -7 -II A] n owner or other person in control of a vehicle and responsible for its use 

### who entrusts the vehicle to another, may be held liable for damages resulting from the use of the vehicle.... 

### where he knew, orshould have known in the exercise of 

### ordinary care, that the person to whom the vehicle was entrusted [ is reckless, heedless, or incompetent]." Cameron v. Downs, 32 Wn. 

### App. 875, 878, 650 P.2d 260 ( 1982) ( emphasis added) ( quoting Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn.

### App. 509, 514 -15, 524 P.2d 255 ( 1974)). 

### This theory may apply even if 

### the actual owner ofthe vehicle is notthe registered owner. Cameron, 32 Wn.App. at 878 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 ( 1965)).

Regardless ofwhether Parker' s license to operate a vehicle in Washington was or was not actually suspended at the time ofthe accident,25 the record does not support Faw' s assertions that 

### Tara knew about this suspended license, Parker's criminal record, or any propensity to drive 

### recklessly, heedlessly, or incompetently, essential facts for establishing the Millams' liability
under a negligent entrustment 

### theory. 

### Faw points only to Parker' s deposition answer to an ambiguous compound question to support his assertion that Tara knew his Washington license 

## had been suspended.26 Fawignores Tara's later clarification that she knewonlythat Parker had

25 In his deposition, Parker testified that his Washington license had been suspended "[ a] couple years ago" but that he was licensed in Oklahoma. CP at 37. 

## 26Seethefollowingexcerptsfrom Parker's deposition:

COUNSEL] Now, I presume that Tara Millam knew you didn't have a Washington license; is that correct? PARKER] Yes. CP at 37.

COUNSEL] Was [ Jeff Millam] aware that you were unlicensed — or you were suspended to drive a vehicle in Washington? PARKER] No. COUNSEL] But Tara was? PARKER] Yes. CP at 53. Parker further testified that Tara knew he did not have a Washington license and that she knew he had an Oklahoma license when she gave him the Paseo.
11No. 42840 - 7 -II surrendered his Washington license when he obtained his Oklahoma license and that she had no 

## knowledgethathisWashingtondriving privilegeshadbeensuspended.27 Moreover,Fawoffered no competent evidence below to support his assertion that Tara knew or should have known that Parker was incompetent to drive. These unsupported assertions are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact to defeat summary judgment. KS Tacoma Holdings, LLC v. Shorelines 

### Hearings Bd., 166 Wn.App. 117, 126, 272 P.3d 876, review denied, 174 Wn.2d 1007 (2012). 

## Moreover,eventaking the facts inthe light mostfavorableto Fawon summaryjudgment, the record shows that Tara not only did not know about Parker's suspended license, but also had

reason to believe that Parker was a competent driver: ( 1) 

### She had witnessed his driving first 

## hand when he and his brother had previously driven a U - haul trailer to help her move from

27 

## Contrary to Faw's assertions because of counsel's compound question, Tara's deposition statements do not establish that she knew Washington State had suspended Parker's driver's license. 

## During Tara's deposition, she stated that she knew only that Parker had surrendered a Washington license to receive an Oklahoma license; she denied knowing that Parker's license had been suspended in Washington. 

### See, e.g.,the following exchange between Faw's counsel and Tara:

COUNSEL] 

### Well, my understanding is that Kyle Parker was suspended from his privilege to drive in the state of Washington at that time, and,that is his testimony. 

### Do you have anyfacts to dispute that? TARA] 

### The only fact I have is that he surrendered a valid Washington license to get an Oklahoma license. COUNSEL] But you don't know it's valid, do you? TARA] No, sir, I don't, but I would imagine that the state of Oklahoma would have noticed. COUNSEL] 

### Well, Mr. Parker specifically said you knew he was suspended from 

### driving in Washington, so you are contradicting his testimony; is that correct? TARA] 

### All I know is we went down to the Department of Licensing at the same time. We both surrendered Washington driver' s licenses and were given our Oklahoma licenses. CP at 170 -

71.

12No. 42840 - 7 -II Washington to Oklahoma, and ( 2) together, she and Parker had turned in their respective 

### Washington driver's licenses and had obtained Oklahoma licenses (demonstrating only that she knew he no longer had a Washington license but believed that he had a valid Oklahoma license when she gave him the Paseo before he drove it to Washington).

I]t is not the function ofan appellate court to substitute itsjudgment for that ofthe trial
court or to weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses." Davis v. 

### Dep' t ofLabor & Indus., 94 Wn.2d 119, 124, 615 P.2d 1279 ( 1980) ( citing Beeson v. Atlantic - Richfield Co., 88 Wn.2d 499, 563 P.2d 822 ( 1977)). 

### Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Faw, we hold that the record contains no genuine issue of material fact about whether Tara knew, or had 

### reason to know, that Parker was a reckless or incompetent driver. See City of Walla Walla v. 401, 333.44, 164 Wn. 

### App. 236, 256, 262 P.3d 1239 ( 2011) ( 

### citing Tae T. Choi v. Sung, 154 Wn.

### App. 303, 313, 225 P.3d 425, cert. denied, U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 925, 178 L. Ed. 2d 752 2011)).

## Accordingly,we hold that Fawraised no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and,therefore,the superior court properly granted the Millams' summary judgment dismissal of Faw's negligent
entrustment claim. H. MILLAMS' MARITAL SEPARATION 

### Finally, Faw argues that the Paseo should be considered community property of the Millams and that we should reject their claims that their marriage was defunct at the time ofthe Paseo' s purchase and Parker' s accident. Because the superior court ruled that the Millams neither owned the Paseo nor were liable for Faw' s injuries as a matter of law, it did not reach this

13No. 42840 - 7 -II 

### issue. Because we affirm the superiorcourt,we similarly do not reach this issue.

We affirm. 

### A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Hunt, J. N17- - r,.,,,.

14