Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1605-CR-984 | January 26, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Appellate Clinic

Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 

School of Law

Joshua C. Woodward

Certified Legal Intern

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Wallace Henderson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

January 26, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1605-CR-984

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, 

Judge

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G06-1509-F5-32403

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1605-CR-984 | January 26, 2017 Page 2 of 9

 

Case Summary

[1] Wallace Henderson appeals his conviction for level 5 felony knowing failure to 

reside at the address registered with the sex offender registry. He challenges the 

trial court’s admission of a witness verification form as well as the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Henderson is a convicted sex offender subject to Indiana’s sex offender 

registration requirements. In August 2013, he was convicted of class D felony 

failure to register as a sex offender. In May 2015, he was convicted of level 5 

felony failure to register as a sex offender. In the summer of 2015, he was out 

of the Department of Correction (“DOC”) on parole and was homeless. 

Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-12(c), he was required to report in 

person to the Marion County Sheriff’s Department every seven days to register 

the temporary address where he would be staying during those seven days. On 

July 13, 2015, Henderson registered his address as 520 East Market Street, the 

street address for Wheeler Mission (“Wheeler”).

[3] Wheeler is a homeless shelter that provides meals and a bed for its registered 

residents. Unless a resident is enrolled in a special program, he is permitted to 

stay only ten nights per month inside the shelter. Residents must register with 

Wheeler each day, and Wheeler’s curfew is 4:30 p.m. Registration as a resident 
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of Wheeler is distinct from registration with the Sheriff’s Department as a sex 

offender.

[4] According to Wheeler’s records, Henderson was a resident from July 13, 2015 

through July 16, 2015, having registered with Wheeler on each of those four 

days. From July 13 through August 24, 2015, Henderson reported weekly to 

Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Rolley Ferguson, each time listing his address 

as Wheeler’s street address. According to Deputy Ferguson, he looked for 

Henderson at Wheeler several times but could not locate him, and on August 

27, 2015, Wheeler verified that Henderson was not a registered resident. When 

Henderson reported to the Sheriff’s Department on August 31, 2015, and again 

listed his address as Wheeler’s street address, Deputy Ferguson told him that he 

had evidence that Henderson was not staying there. According to the deputy, 

Henderson responded, “Well, I’m going back there.” Tr. at 49. Later that day, 

Deputy Ferguson discovered an active arrest warrant on Henderson related to 

his parole. Shortly thereafter, Henderson returned to the Sheriff’s Department 

and indicated that he had missed curfew and could not check in to Wheeler. 

The deputy arrested him on the active warrant. 

[5] On September 9, 2015, Deputy Ferguson visited Wheeler and inquired 

concerning Henderson’s history as a resident at the shelter. Shift Supervisor 

John Hamblen consulted the shelter’s computer records and determined that 

Henderson had not been a resident at Wheeler since July 16, 2015. Hamblen 

signed a witness verification form to that effect. 
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[6] The State charged Henderson with four counts of level 5 felony failure to 

register as a sex offender with a prior conviction, one of which was dismissed

on the State’s motion.

1

 A bench trial ensued, and the trial court found 

Henderson guilty on the remaining three counts, two of which were merged due 

to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court entered judgment on Count I –

knowing failure to reside at the address registered with the sex offender registry.

[7] Henderson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court acted within its discretion in 

admitting the witness verification form.

[8] Henderson maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

witness verification form signed by Hamblen. We review rulings on the

admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion resulting in 

prejudicial error. Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court 

misinterprets the law. Id. To determine whether an error prejudiced the 

defendant, we assess the probable impact of the challenged evidence upon the 

jury, in light of all the other evidence that was properly presented. Id. If 

 

1

 Count I – knowingly not residing at the address registered with the sex offender registry; Count II – failing 

to update his registered address within seventy-two hours of changing his address (merged); Count III –

making a material misstatement or omission while registering as a sex offender (merged); and Count IV –

failing to register as required between September 1 and September 9, 2015 (dismissed on State’s motion). 
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substantial independent evidence of guilt supports the conviction, the error is 

harmless. Id.

[9] Henderson particularly asserts that the witness verification form, admitted as 

State’s Exhibit 1, was inadmissible on hearsay grounds. Hearsay is a statement 

not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing and offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). 

Indiana Evidence Rule 802 excludes hearsay unless otherwise allowed under 

Indiana’s evidentiary rules or other law. Exceptions to the rule against hearsay 

include:

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an 

act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from 

information transmitted by – someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 

activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, 

whether or not for profit; 

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the 

custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that 

complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting 

certification; and

(E) neither the source of information nor the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Ind. Evid. Rule 803(6). 
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[10] Henderson asserts that the witness verification form, admitted as a business 

record under Rule 803(6), was actually a public record subject to specific 

limitations found in Rule 803(8)(B)(i). This subparagraph prohibits the 

admission of “investigative reports by police and other law enforcement 

personnel, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case.” 

The reason for this exclusion is that observations by police 

officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the

defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in 

other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation 

between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.

Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).

[11] While Henderson correctly notes that the challenged form is captioned as a 

Sheriff’s Department investigative form, the information contained therein is 

not attributable to Deputy Ferguson or any other law enforcement personnel. 

Rather, the source of the information was Wheeler’s computer records, which it 

kept in the ordinary course of business and according to strict protocols. The 

information was merely transcribed from those records by Wheeler’s dayshift 

supervisor and does not include any narrative or observations by law 

enforcement personnel. As such, neither the source of the information nor the 

method or circumstances surrounding its preparation indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(6)(E). Simply put, the witness 

verification form is Wheeler’s business record transcribed on a law enforcement 

form. Supervisor Hamblen, a sixteen-year employee at Wheeler, testified at 

length concerning the rules and procedures surrounding Wheeler’s resident 
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registration and recordkeeping, and on appeal, Henderson does not challenge 

the foundation for admitting Hamblen’s statements on the form as a business 

record. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the 

witness verification form. 

Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to support Henderson’s 

conviction.

[12] Henderson also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction. 

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh 

evidence nor judge witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 

2007). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most 

favorable to the judgment and will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable 

fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence “overcome every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

[13] Henderson was convicted under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-17, which states 

that a sex offender who knowingly or intentionally does not reside at the sex 

offender’s registered address or location and has a prior unrelated conviction for 

failure to register commits level 5 felony failure to register. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-

17(a)(5), -(b). Henderson stipulated to the prior unrelated conviction but claims 

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he failed to reside 

at Wheeler’s address during the six weeks between July 20 and August 24, 

2015.
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[14] Specifically, Henderson asserts that the State failed to establish his knowing 

failure to reside at Wheeler because the State did not introduce any evidence

that he had not been sleeping outside Wheeler on the sidewalk, alley, or parking 

lot during those six weeks.2 The evidence most favorable to the judgment and 

introduced during trial, includes Deputy Ferguson’s in-depth explanation 

concerning the dual purposes of the sex offender registry: to promote public 

safety by alerting neighbors when a sex offender is living in the area and to 

provide law enforcement with a means of locating the offender. Tr. at 42. The 

deputy also testified as to how the registered address works in the case of a 

homeless sex offender. Id. He explained that the offender must provide a 

location where he can be found, such as a certain corner of a certain 

intersection and that if the offender indicates that he lives in a tent, he must 

specify a location where the tent will be placed. Id. Deputy Ferguson

emphasized that he personally registered Henderson with the sex offender 

registry on July 13, 2015, and that Henderson did not specify that he was 

homeless but instead merely listed a street address that happened to be 

Wheeler’s street address. Id. at 43. Henderson signed the form, which was 

titled, “TEMPORARY RESIDENCE/HOMELESS OFFENDER FORM,” 

 

2

 In conjunction with this assertion, we note Henderson’s argument that certain comments by the trial court 

during closing argument amounted to improper burden-shifting. He correctly observes that the trial court 

mentioned his decision not to testify at trial, but he admits that he did not contemporaneously object to the 

trial court’s comments. As such, he waived the issue absent a showing of fundamental error. Delarosa v. 

State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010). Because he did not allege fundamental error in his principal appellate 

brief but instead raised it for the first time in his reply brief, Henderson has waived consideration of this 

claim. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (appellant must allege fundamental error in his 

principal appellate brief and may not raise it for first time in reply brief). 
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under the same street address (Wheeler’s) every week from July 13 through 

August 24, 2015. State’s Ex. 4. The deputy testified that he visited Wheeler at 

the stated street address on August 27, 2015, and learned that Henderson had 

not been registered there for over a month. Tr. at 44-45. As a result, he 

confronted Henderson when Henderson came in to sign the registry on August 

31, 2015, stating, “I have information that you’re not staying there,” to which 

Henderson replied, “Well, I’m going back there.” Id. at 49. After Deputy 

Ferguson arrested Henderson on the active parole warrant, he visited Wheeler 

again on September 9, 2015, and obtained a witness verification form indicating 

that Henderson had not been a resident of Wheeler since July 16, 2015. 

[15] We find the evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that 

Henderson knowingly failed to reside at the temporary address that he had 

listed with the sex offender registry. In the face of the deputy’s accusation,

Henderson’s response that he was going back to the mission betrays his 

knowledge that he was not currently a resident there. Moreover, the 

documentary evidence corroborates the trial testimony that Henderson had not 

registered with Wheeler as a resident for six weeks. Henderson’s arguments 

amount to invitations to reweigh evidence, which we may not and will not do. 

The evidence is sufficient to support Henderson’s conviction. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.