alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 7727** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. TRENITA ASHLOCK , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News . Robert G. Doumar , Senior District Judge. ( 4:11

- cr - 00049

- RGD

- TEM

- 1; 4:12

- cv - 00133

- RGD )

Submitted : February 20, 2014 Decided: February 26, 2014

Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Trenita Ashlock, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Lamont Creighton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Brian James Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia; Jerome M. Maiatico, UNITED STATES DEPARTMEN T OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Trenita Ashlock seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on h er 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dis positive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ashlock has not made the requisite show ing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
___________ No. 91-2369

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Samuel L. Dowdy, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 11, 1992 Filed: July 23, 1996

___________ Before BOWMAN, MAGILL and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge. This matter was remanded to the district court for specific fin dings, with jurisdiction retained by the court. The district court has no w certified its findings and has recommended that judgment be entered for th e United States against Mr. Dowdy in the amount of $12,000. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the district court judgment in the amount of $152,173 and remand with directions that the dis trict court enter judgment against Mr. Dowdy in the amount of $12,000.
A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00270-CR

Mike Palacios, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-DC-09-206640, HONORABLE WILFORD FLOWERS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Mike Palacios has filed a pro se notice of appeal from his conviction for

the offense of driving while intoxicated. The district court has certified that this is a plea-bargain

case, the defendant has no right of appeal, and the defendant has waived the right of appeal. See

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

__________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop

Dismissed

Filed: July 9, 2010

Do Not Publish
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

                In connection withthe Annual Report of MOCON, Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Dane D. Anderson, Chief Financial Officer of MOCON,Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that, to the best of myknowledge:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of MOCON, Inc.

 

 

Date: March 31, 2005

| /s/ Dane D. Anderson    |
|-------------------------|
| Dane D. Anderson        |
| Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 237 (Wednesday, December 10, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 73403]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28854]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service


Open Meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Joint Committee

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: An open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Joint Committee 
will be conducted. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel is soliciting public 
comments, ideas, and suggestions on improving customer service at the 
Internal Revenue Service.

DATES: The meeting will be held Wednesday, January 28, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Billups at 1-888-912-1227 or 
(214) 413-6523.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) 
that an open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Joint Committee 
will be held Wednesday, January 28, 2015, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time via 
teleconference. The public is invited to make oral comments or submit 
written statements for consideration. For more information please 
contact Ms. Billups at 1-888-912-1227 or 214-413-6523, or write TAP 
Office 1114 Commerce Street, Dallas, TX 75242-1021, or post comments to 
the Web site: http://www.improveirs.org.
    The agenda will include various committee issues for submission to 
the IRS and other TAP related topics. Public input is welcomed.

    Dated: December 3, 2014.
Otis Simpson,
Acting Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.
[FR Doc. 2014-28854 Filed 12-9-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND TRUST CORPUS OF SAN
JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST AS OF JUNE 30, 1998, AND THE RELATED CONDENSED
STATEMENTS OF DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME AND CHANGES IN TRUST CORPUS FOR THE SIX-MONTH
PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       1,918,871
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,918,871
<PP&E>                                     133,275,528
<DEPRECIATION>                              79,855,904
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              55,338,495
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,918,871
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  53,419,624
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                55,338,495
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,386,995
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               538,094
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             17,848,901
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         17,848,901
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                17,848,901
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### William E. Cummin, administrator v. George Wilcox.

*Amendment of Ml of particulars*— Failure *of evidence.*

The objection that the evidence did not tend to prove a demand set forth in the bill of particulars cannot be considered by the Supreme Court if it was not made below.

A plaintiff may properly be allowed to amend his bill of particulars where the evidence does not tend to prove a demand set forth therein.

Error to Shiawassee.

Submitted January 12.

Decided January 18.

Assumpsit by Cummin, as administrator of the estate of . Alexander Cummin, against Wilcox, who had purchased goods of decedent. There had been mutual dealings *502between decedent arid Wilcox, and after trie allowance of an offset to tbe latter, there was proved to be a balance due from him for which the suit was begun. Plaintiff recovered in justice’s court, and defendant had judgment in the circuit court on appeal. Plaintiff brings error.

Reversed..

*Albert R. McBride*for plaintiff in error.

*James M. Qoodell*for defendant in error.

Marston, J.

There was evidence given and offered in this case tending to show that the estate represented by the-plaintiff had a claim against the defendant which the latter had admitted to be correct. This evidence was practically ruled out and exceptions taken. In support of the ruling-it is said in counsel’s brief in this court that this evidence-did not tend to prove the demand set forth in plaintiff’s bill of particulars. This may. have been the case but no such objection seems to have been made in the court below. If it had, an amendment doubtless would have been permitted.

Judgment reversed with costs and new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.
Exhibit 32.1
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. §1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
     In connection with the Quarterly Report of AMDL, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for theperiod ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Gary L. Dreher, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.    /s/ Gary L. Dreher   Gary L. Dreher Chief Executive Officer May 12, 2005
22
### IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 22

- 00374

- CV

KEVIN KING AND SCOTT MCAFEE

, Appellant s

v.

ELAWAN DILEO SOLAR, LLC; ELAWAN ENERGY, SL; BOSQUE COUNTY, TEXAS; BOSQUE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS COURT, MARVIN WICKMAN, TERRY TOWNLEY, LARRY PHILLIP, AND RODNEY LAIRDON IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; CLIFTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ALEX MONTES, DR. SKYLAR BIZZELL, JULIE NEW, COURTNEY MAYFIELD, MATT DOMEL, JOSH RITZMANN, AND DR. JAN
ZUEHLKE IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS; AND GLENN HEGAR

, Appellee s

From the 220th District Court Bosque County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV22

- 221

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Kevin King a nd Scott Mc A fee moved to dismiss their appeal. 1 In the

motion, appellants assert they no longer wish to pursue their appeal.

1 Appellants actually move to withdraw their notice of appeal . The R ules of A ppellate P rocedure have been amended to label what the appellants want to do as a dismissal of the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1.King v. Elawan Dileo Solar, LLC , et al. Page 2 The Court takes no position on and expressly does not affirm appellants’

reservation of the right to appeal certain orders in an appeal from a final judgment in the

underlying case.

The Court dismisses the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(a).

There being no agreement as to costs, costs are taxed against appellants Kevin

King a nd Scott Mc A fee

. Id . (d).

TOM GRAY Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith Motion granted Appeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed December 21 , 2022 [CV 06 ]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noe MARALES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-5465.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 30, 2001.

*269Before BOGGS and CLAY, Circuit Judges; GWIN, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

*ORDER*

Noe Marales, Jr., appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence. The parties have expressly waived oral argument pursuant to Rule 34(j)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit, and we agree that oral argument is not necessary. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).

Marales entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute it, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment to be followed by two years of supervised release.

In his timely appeal, Marales argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because state authorities violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 by executing a search warrant of his motel room at 5:41 a.m., without prior authority to execute the warrant during nighttime hours.

With motions to suppress, we uphold the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous; the court’s legal conclusions we review de novo. *United States v. Watkins,*179 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir.1999). In denying Marales’s motion to suppress, the district court concluded that, because no federal agents were involved in the search, Fed. R.Crim.P. 41 was not applicable. Nevertheless, the court also concluded that, if it was assumed that Rule 41 did apply, the state officers committed a de minimis violation of the rule because they entered the motel room at 5:41 a.m.-only nineteen minutes before daytime hours began. *See*Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(h) (stating that “daytime” begins at 6:00 a.m.).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not err. When federal officers are not involved in obtaining or executing a challenged search warrant, Rule 41(a) does not apply. *See United States v. Bennett,*170 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir.1999); *United States v. Shields,*978 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir.1992). It is undisputed that no federal officers or agents participated in obtaining or executing the warrant that authorized the search of Marales’s motel room.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                               TELVUE CORPORATION

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 U.S.C. sec. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of TelVue Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jesse Lerman,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: November 15, 2010                 /s/ Jesse Lerman
                                        ----------------
                                        Jesse Lerman
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff

KEVIN O. CRUMP v. Record No. 0537-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM COLONIAL MASONRY, INC. NOVEMBER 21, 1995 AND NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Gregory E. Camden (Rutter & Montagna, on briefs), for appellant. William C. Walker; Donna White Kearney (Taylor & Walker, on brief), for appellees.

Kevin O. Crump appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying his application seeking compensation for an occupational disease on the basis that he failed to prove that his bilateral pneumonitis was a disease within the meaning of "disease" under the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). We reverse the commission's decision based upon our holding in Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan , 21 Va. App. 65, 461 S.E.2d 431 (1995).

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. In Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East , 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), we defined "disease" as: any deviation from or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may- 2 -
2 be known or unknown.

"[T]he definition enunciated in Piedmont [has been recognized by this Court] as the general and accepted meaning of the term 'disease,' a term which is presumed to be known by the legislature and is employed by it without restriction in Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401." Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan , 21 Va. App. 65, 68, 461 S.E.2d 431, 435 (1995). Pneumonitis is defined as "inflammation of the lungs." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1039 (26th ed. 1985). Using this general medical definition of pneumonitis, as we did for carpal tunnel syndrome in Perdue , we find that it places pneumonitis within the definition of disease set forth in Piedmont and approved of in Perdue

. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins , 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We uphold the commission's factual findings if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co. , 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). As in Perdue , Crump's condition did not present as an obvious, sudden, mechanical or structural change in his body. Rather, credible evidence supported a finding that this condition constituted a disease as defined in Piedmont . We conclude that the commission erred in finding that Crump's pneumonitis is not a condition characterized as a "disease" within the meaning of the- 3 - 3 Act. Accordingly, we reverse the commission's decision and remand this case for the commission to consider whether Crump's condition arose out of and in the course of his employment as required by the Act. Reversed and remanded.
11081, 11082.

11083.

#### Bank of Baconton *et al. v.*DeBerry *et al.;*and *vice versa.*Cowan *v.*Bank of Baconton.

Decided March 3, 1920.

Trover; from city court of Camilla — Judge Burson. September 26, 1919.

*Peacock*& *Gardner, C. E. Crow, J. W. Gardner, J. W. Hill,*for plaintiff in error.

*Johnson & Warren, E. E. Cox, E. M. Davis,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

Bpon all tlie facts of the case the court did not err in awarding a nonsuit.

*Judgment on main hill of exceptions, affirmed; cross-hills dismissed.*

*Luke and Bloockworth, JJ., concur.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6727

CHARLES ROBERT BAREFOOT, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JIMMY THORTON; JOHN CORNLEY, Chief Deputy; KEM

PICKETT, Captain; GEORGE DEWEY HUDSON, JR.,

District Attorney, Sampson County; JAMIE B.

ASKINS, Assistant District Attorney; JAMES

FREEMAN, Assistant District Attorney;

LIEUTENANT SILVESTER WILSON; MARVIN POLK;

KEVIN JOHN MCREAINY; EARL BUTLER; DONNIE

HARRISON; W. STVEDA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior

District Judge. (5:06-ct-03109-H)

Submitted: August 3, 2007 Decided: August 15, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Robert Barefoot, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Charles Robert Barefoot, Jr. appeals the district court’s

order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. Barefoot v. Thorton, No. 5:06-ct-03109-H

(E.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED