June 2019 

Overview and Analysis of 

Technology Transfer from Federal 

Agencies and Laboratories 

Prepared for 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Technology Partnerships Office 

100 Bureau Drive 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899 

Prepared by 

Albert N. Link 

University of North Carolina at Greensboro 

Zachary T. Oliver 

RTI International 

Gretchen B. Jordan 

360 Innovation LLC 

Christopher Hayter 

Arizona State University 

RTI Project Number 0214999 
_________________________________ 

RTI International is a registered trademark and a trade name of Research Triangle Institute.

RTI Project Number 

0214999 

Overview and Analysis of 

Technology Transfer from Federal 

Agencies and Laboratories 

June 2019

Prepared for 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Technology Partnerships Office 

100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, MD 20899 

Prepared by 

Albert N. Link 

University of North Carolina at Greensboro 

Zachary T. Oliver 

RTI International 

Gretchen B. Jordan 

360 Innovation LLC 

Christopher Hayter 

Arizona State University 
iii

Acknowledgments 

The authors wish to thank the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST) Technology Partnerships Office for 

supporting this project. We are grateful to the Federal 

Laboratory Consortium and the Interagency Work Group on 

Technology Transfer for allowing our team to present periodic 

updates of this study. We would also like to thank the following 

agencies and their Technology Transfer Offices for their 

indispensable participation in this study: 

 Department of Commerce, NIST 

 Department of Defense, Air Force 

 Department of Defense, Army 

 Department of Defense, Navy 

 Department of the Interior, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 

 Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 

Administration 

 Department of Health and Human Services, Center for 

Disease Control 

 Department of Health and Human Services, National 

Institutes of Health 

 U.S. Department of Agriculture 

The authors would also like to acknowledge Brian Lim, Joshua 

Fletcher, and Jacob Moore for their tireless data support. Lastly, 

we would like to acknowledge the individuals in the following 

table who led each case study: 
iv 

Case Study Topic Author(s) 

DOC, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Christopher Hayter 

(Arizona State University) 

Department of Defense (DoD), Air 

Force 

Attenuating Custom 

Communications Earpiece System 

(ACCES) 

Kyle Clarke-Sutton (RTI) 

DoD, Army Japanese Encephalitis Virus (JEV) 

Vaccine 

Michael Hogan (RTI) 

DoD, Navy Port Security Barrier System (PSB) Zack Oliver (RTI) 

Department of Interior (DOI), U.S. 

Bureau of Reclamation 

Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool Christopher Hayter 

(Arizona State University) 

DOT, Federal Highway 

Administration 

Mobile Solution for Assessment and 

Reporting (MSAR) 

Zack Oliver (RTI) and 

Gretchen Jordan (360 Innovation) 

Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), Centers for 

Disease Control 

Human Microvascular Endothelial 

Cell Lines (HMEC-1) 

Christopher Hayter 

(Arizona State University) 

HHS, National Institutes of Health Human Papillomavirus (HPV) 

Vaccine 

Troy Scott (RTI)and 

Zack Oliver (RTI) 

USDA, Agricultural Research 

Service 

Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses Gretchen Jordan (360 Innovation) 
v 

Contents 

Chapter Page 

 

 Acknowledgments iii 

 Executive Summary ES-1

 1 Introduction 1-1

 2 Technology Transfer Policies toward U.S. Federal 

Agencies and Laboratories 2-1

 3 Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology 

Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 3-1

3.1 Literature Review Methods ....................................... 3-2

3.2 Academic Literature ................................................ 3-2

3.3 Policy Literature ..................................................... 3-6

 4 Public Domain Information on Technology Transfer 

across Federal Agencies 4-1

 5 Approach to this Multiple-Agency Study 5-1

5.1 Guiding Logical Framework ...................................... 5-1

5.1.1 The Logic Model ........................................... 5-2

5.1.2 Research Questions ...................................... 5-5

5.2 Our Approach to Engaging Federal Agencies ............... 5-6

 6 Summary of Primary and Secondary Data 6-1

6.1 Primary Data ......................................................... 6-1

6.2 Secondary Data ..................................................... 6-3
vi

6.3 Record Linkage ...................................................... 6-3

 7 Geospatial Analysis of Technology Transfer 

Partners 7-1

7.1 Federal Laboratory Locations ................................... 7-2

7.2 Licenses ................................................................ 7-3

7.3 CRADAs ................................................................ 7-4

7.4 Comparison of the Geospatial Distribution of 

Licenses and CRADAs .............................................. 7-7

 8 Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed PublicSector Technology 8-1

8.1 Characteristics of Licensees ..................................... 8-2

8.2 The Relationship between Company Sales and 

Licensed Public-Sector Technology ............................ 8-8

 9 Toward an Understanding of Cooperative R&D 

Agreements with Federal Laboratories and 

Company Size 9-1

 10 Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer 

from Federal Laboratories 10-1

10.1 Framework for the Case Studies .............................. 10-3

10.1.1 Characteristics of Factors that Influence the 

Success of Technology Transfer Efforts ........... 10-3

10.2 Case Study Approach ............................................. 10-4

10.3 Case Study Benefits and Beneficiaries ...................... 10-6

10.3.1 DOC NIST Framework for Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Cybersecurity ......................... 10-7

10.3.2 DOI Bureau of Reclamation Flexible 

Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool ............................. 10-8

10.3.3 DoD Air Force Attenuating Custom 

Communications Earpiece System (ACCES) ..... 10-9

10.3.4 DoD Army Japanese Encephalitis Vaccine—

Walter Reed Army Institute for Research ...... 10-10

10.3.5 DoD Navy Facilities Engineering Port 

Security Barriers (PSB) .............................. 10-11

10.3.6 DOT FHWA Mobile Solution for Assessment 

and Reporting (MSAR) ................................ 10-12

10.3.7 HHS CDC HMEC-1 Cell Line ......................... 10-13

10.3.8 HHS NIH Human Papillomavirus (HPV) 

Vaccine .................................................... 10-14
vii

10.3.9 USDA Turfgrass Varieties ............................ 10-15

10.4 Technology Transfer Success Factors and 

Challenges ......................................................... 10-16

10.5 Summary of Lessons Learned from the Case 

Studies .............................................................. 10-22

 11 Conclusions 11-1

 References R-1

 Appendixes 

 Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies 

Toward U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the 

Present ................................................................. A-1

 Academic Literature on Technology Transfer from 

U.S. Federal Agencies and Laboratories ..................... B-1

 Policy Literature on Technology Transfer from U.S. 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories ............................ C-1

 Description of the NETS Database ............................. D-1

 Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer 

and Commercialization ............................................ E-1

 Case Study of DOC NIST Transfer: Cypersecurity 

Framework .............................................................F-1

 Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece 

System ................................................................. G-1

 Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine .......................... H-1

 Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port 

Security Barrier System ........................................... I-1

 Case Study of DOI U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 

Technology Transfer: Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic 

Tool ...................................................................... J-1

 Case Study of DOT Federal Highway Administration 

Technology Transfer: Mobile Solution for 

Assessment and Reporting ....................................... K-1

 Case Study of HHS Center for Disease Control 

Technology Transfer: Human Microvascular 

Endothelial Cell Lines (HMEC-1) ................................. L-1

 Case Study of HHS National Institutes of Health 

Technology Transfer: Human Papillomavirus 

Vaccine ................................................................. M-1
viii

 Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service 

Technology Transfer: Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses ............. N-1
ix

Figures 

Number Page

 4-1. Graphical Description of Federal Patent Applications 

Filed, by Fiscal Year across Participating Agencies .............. 4-3

 4-2. Graphical Description of Federal Patents Issued, by 

Fiscal Year across Participating Agencies ........................... 4-4

 4-3. Graphical Description of Newly Executed Federal 

Licenses, by Fiscal Year across Participating Agencies ......... 4-5

 4-4. Description of Newly Executed Federal CRADAs, by Fiscal 

Year across Participating Agencies .................................... 4-6

 5-1. A Logic Model for Transfer of Technology from Federal 

Laboratories ................................................................. 5-2

 7-1. Federal Laboratories Associated with the Federal 

Agencies Participating in this Study .................................. 7-2

 7-2. Locations of Licensees in the Continental United States 

(1978—2017), by Five Participating Federal Agencies ......... 7-4

 7-3. Locations of CRADA Partners in the Continental United 

States (1978—2017), by Six Participating Federal 

Agencies ...................................................................... 7-6

 7-4. Number of CRADAs by State in the Continental United 

States (1978—2017) ...................................................... 7-7

 8-1. Percentage of Licensee Organizations by Sector, at Time 

of License (1990–2014) .................................................. 8-5

 8-2. Manufacturing: Percentage of Licensee Companies at 

Time of License (1990–2014) .......................................... 8-6

 8-3. Professional Technical and Scientific Services 4-Digit 

NAICS: Percentage of Licensee Companies at Time of 

License (1990–2014) ..................................................... 8-7

 8-4. Percentage of Licensees with an Increase in Company 

Sales After the License Started (1990–2014) .................... 8-10

 8-5. Mean and Median Percentage Change in Company Sales 

(1990–2014) ............................................................... 8-11
x

 8-6. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, 

by Employment Quartiles and Agency (1990–2014) ........... 8-13

 9-1. Percentage of Companies Involved in a CRADA by 

Sector, at Time of CRADAa (1990–2014) ........................... 9-3

 10-1. Federal Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

Logic Model with Contingencies ....................................... 10-4

 10-2. Common Success Factors ............................................ 10-21
xi

Tables 

Number Page 

 5-1. Engagement with the Government, Evaluation, and 

Academic Community ..................................................... 5-7

 6-1. Description of Technology Transfer Data Collected from 

Participating Agencies, by Agency and by Years of 

Availability .................................................................... 6-2

 6-2. Record Linkage Match Rate: Percentage of 

Administrative Technology Transfer Records Matched to 

NETS Database, by Participating Federal Agency ................ 6-5

 7-1. Percentage of Administrative License Records 

Successfully Geocoded, by Agencya .................................. 7-3

 7-2. Percentage of Administrative CRADA Records 

Successfully Geocoded by Agency .................................... 7-5

 8-1. Descriptive Statistics of Licensee Companies, at Time of 

License (1990–2014) ..................................................... 8-4

 8-2. Percentage of Licenses by Type of Licensee Company 

(1990–2014) ................................................................ 8-4

 8-3. Data Reduction Protocols and Affected Companies, by 

Agency (1990–2014) ..................................................... 8-8

 8-4. Descriptive Information on the Percentage Change in 

Companies’ Sales, by Agency (1990–2014) ....................... 8-9

 8-5. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, 

by Percentage Change Quartiles and Agency (1990–

2014) ......................................................................... 8-10

 8-6. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, 

by Employment Quartiles and Agency (1990–2014) ........... 8-12

 9-1. Data Reduction Protocols and Affected Companies, by 

Participating Federal Agency ........................................... 9-2

 9-2. Employment Quartiles (CRADAs with any number of 

company employees) ..................................................... 9-4

 9-3. Employment Quartiles (CRADAs with 500 or fewer 

employees) ................................................................... 9-4

 10-1. Interviewees by Type of Stakeholder ............................... 10-6

ES-1 

Executive Summary 

The purpose of this report is to present a series of analyses of 

technology transfer activities across federal agencies and their 

research laboratories. 

Public support of efforts to transfer technology from federal 

agencies to private and public organizations has long had 

bipartisan support from both Congress and the White House. To 

emphasize this point, and thus to provide context for this study 

(Chapter 2), we first provide an overview of federal technology 

policies as they relate to U.S. federal agencies and their 

research laboratories. The lesson learned from this overview is 

that such policies have been promulgated without political bias 

over at least the past four decades. In addition, this overview 

provides some institutional context for this study. 

With this context in mind, we then provide a summary of the 

relevant academic and policy literatures related to technology 

transfer (Chapter 3). This review concludes with the 

observation that not only have there been a few systematic 

studies describing technology transfer activities across federal 

agencies, but also that those studies have not been 

encompassing or detailed in their descriptive analyses of 

economic impacts associated with federal technology transfer. 

We conclude that the reason for both of these limitations is 

associated with the lack of relevant public domain data related 

to the process of technology transfer at a level of aggregation 

(i.e., at the agency and/or laboratory level) that facilitates 

understanding both the genesis of the technology transfer 

process beginning with intramural research and development 

(R&D) investments and concluding with metrics that describe 

the paths through which technology leaves an agency or 

laboratory and enters into another organization, as well as the 

economic impact of transferred technology on the recipient 

organization. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

ES-2

This study advances our understanding of technology transfer 

across federal agencies and laboratories in several ways. First, 

we describe publicly available information and data on 

technology transfer mechanisms from federal agencies and 

laboratories (Chapter 4). The source of this information is the 

annual versions of the Federal Laboratory (Interagency) 

Technology Transfer Summary Reports, prepared by the 

Technology Partnerships Office at NIST and submitted to the 

Office of the President and to Congress. The technology 

transfer mechanisms that are described are the same 

mechanisms that have been emphasized in the extant academic 

and policy literature: patent applications, patent issues, 

licenses, cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs), publications, 

and public software downloads of open-source governmental 

software. Although an understanding of these mechanisms does 

provide insight about technology transfer activities from within 

to outside organizations, and to some extent across agencies 

and their research laboratories, that understanding, in the 

absence of information about how the transferred technology is 

used by the adopting organizations, is insufficient to offer 

insight about trends and nuances associated with technology 

transfers. 

As an initial step in that direction, an approach was developed 

to provide a logical framework to bound the study and the 

information we obtained from federal agencies and laboratories 

that agreed to participate in this study: (1) disaggregated 

information and related data on their technology transfer 

efforts and (2) background information on what they 

considered to be a particularly successful technology transfer 

effort for a case study (Chapter 5). 

The disaggregated data were sufficient only for a preliminary 

look at elements of the economic consequences associated with 

the technology transfer from the participating federal agencies 

and laboratories; the background information on successful 

technology transfer efforts was sufficient to develop illustrative 

case studies (Chapter 6). 

One characterization of the disaggregated data related to the 

geospatial distribution of organizations to which federal agency 

technology is transferred (Chapter 7). Using National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) data, there is suggestive 

evidence that CRADA activity occurs closer to the participating 
Executive Summary 

ES-3

agency than does licensing activity. Regardless, the geospatial 

analysis in Chapter 7 does illustrate that technology transfer 

activities are national in scope. 

The disaggregated data allowed for a descriptive analysis of the 

sales growth associated with organizations to which agencies 

licensed technology (Chapter 8). We conclude that licensed 

technologies from a federal agency and laboratory have an 

overall positive association with the sales of private-sector 

company licensees. However, the available data do not allow us 

to control for company or other economic factors that are also 

associated with sales growth. 

As stated in 15 USC 3710a(c)(4)(A), CRADA preference to 

small companies is required: ‘‘The laboratory director in 

deciding what cooperative research and development 

agreements to enter into shall—(A) give special consideration 

to small business firms, and consortia involving small business 

firms; ....’’ Our analysis of available disaggregated data 

confirms that this is the case (Chapter 9). On average, the 

majority of CRADAs were with small companies measured in 

terms of number of employees. 

The case studies we conducted to complement the main 

analysis were structured to conform to a logical framework 

designed to document successful technology transfer efforts 

through the identification of specific outcomes and impacts 

associated with a technology transferred from a federal 

laboratory, accounting for contingencies that served as success 

factors (Chapter 10). The case studies illustrate that bringing 

innovations derived from federally transferred technology to the 

private-sector marketplace takes time as well as the federal 

laboratories’ long-term commitment to investments in R&D. 

Federal laboratory management may facilitate the success of 

technology transfer by providing resources, championing the 

to-be-transferred technologies, and instilling a culture in the 

federal laboratory that values such activity. Lastly, the federal 

laboratory’s co-development of a transferred technology with 

individuals or companies with supplementary expertise 

increases the likelihood that the transferred technology will 

have market success. 

1-1 

1 Introduction 

This report summarizes efforts by researchers at RTI, the 

University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG), Arizona 

State University (ASU), and 360 Innovation 

 to assemble data related to technology transfer activities 

across federal agencies and laboratories, 

 to use those data to provide an overview and analyze 

the use of technology transfer mechanisms across 

federal agencies and laboratories, and 

 to present suggestive estimates of the economic impacts 

associated with technology transfer activities from 

federal agencies and laboratories. 

These objectives were realized through the use of agency 

technology transfer data provided by the Technology 

Partnerships Office at NIST and the collection and analysis of 

technology transfer data from participating federal agencies1

and from information collected through nine case studies of 

successful technology transfers from federal agency 

laboratories. 

As background, the Interagency Workgroup on Technology 

Transfer (IAWGTT) is charged with making recommendations to 

the Department of Commerce for improving technology transfer 

across federal agencies.2 These recommendations are to include 

improved practices related to current technology transfer 

programs and standards for assessing the effectiveness of 

these programs, new or creative approaches to technology 

transfer that might serve as model programs for federal 

agencies, new criteria to assess the effectiveness and impact on 

1 Agencies for which technology transfer data at the laboratory level 

were collected and the types of data collected are listed in 

Table 6-1. 2 The IAWGTT comprises technology transfer representatives from 

each involved agency, of which there are 11. Its purpose is to 

discuss best practices in technology transfer from federal agencies. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

1-2

the nation’s economy of planned or future technology transfer 

efforts, and methods for an assessment of CRADAs. The 

IAWGTT is coordinated by the director of the Technology 

Partnerships Office at NIST.3

On October 28, 2011, President Barack Obama sent a 

Presidential Memorandum, Accelerating Technology Transfer 

and Commercialization of Federal Research in Support of HighGrowth Businesses, to the heads of executive departments and 

agencies.4 Prefacing the memorandum was the following policy 

statement: 

Innovation fuels economic growth, the creation of 

new industries, companies, jobs, products and 

services, and the global competitiveness of U.S. 

industries. One driver of successful innovation is 

technology transfer, in which the private sector 

adapts federal research for use in the marketplace. 

One of the goals of my Administration’s “Startup 

America” initiative, which supports high growth 

entrepreneurship, is to foster innovation by 

increasing the rate of technology transfer and the 

economic and societal impact from federal R&D 

investments. This will be accomplished by 

committing each executive department and agency 

that conducts R&D to improve the results from its 

technology transfer and commercialization 

activities. The aim is to increase the successful 

outcomes of these activities significantly over the 

next 5 years, while simultaneously achieving 

excellence in our basic and mission focused 

research activities. 

In the memorandum, President Obama directed heads of 

executive departments and agencies to take three actions: 

 Establish performance goals, metrics, and evaluation 

methods, as well as implement and track progress 

relative to those goals. 

3 NIST also has a statutorily defined role as the host agency for the 

Federal Laboratory Consortium (Zielinski, 2014). 4 See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/10/28/presidential-memorandum-acceleratingtechnology-transfer-and-commerciali.
Chapter 1 — Introduction 

1-3

 Streamline the federal government’s technology transfer 

and commercialization process. 

 Facilitate commercialization of federal laboratory 

technologies through local and regional partnerships. 

In November 2012, the IAWGTT prepared a response to the 

President’s October 2011 memorandum.5 Comments from 11 

agencies formed the basis of the IAWGTT’s response report.6

The responding agencies affirmed the need for the actions 

specified in the President’s memorandum, and agencies 

acknowledged that “it is the impact of their technology transfer 

activities that is important, rather than tallies of output. 

However, no efficient way to consistently measure impact in the 

aggregate or to calibrate the impact of one technology transfer 

activity over another has been identified.”7

Prior to President Obama’s memorandum, agencies were 

already involved in performance planning as directed by the 

GPRAMA (Government Performance and Results Modernization 

Act of 2010, Public Law 111-352): 

Not later than the first Monday in February of each 

year, the head of each agency shall make available 

on a public website of the agency, and notify the 

President and the Congress of its availability, a 

performance plan covering each program activity 

set forth in the budget of such agency ... and 

provide a description of how the performance goals 

are to be achieved ... 

Building on the concept of public accountability as quantified 

through meeting performance goals, President Donald Trump 

set forth the President’s Management Agenda, which “sets out a 

long-term vision for effective and modern government 

5 See https://www.nist.gov/tpo/agency-responses-presidentialmemorandum

6 These agencies were the Department of Agriculture (USDA), 

Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), 

Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) (separate reports for Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention [CDC], Food and Drug Administration [FDA], and 

National Institutes of Health [NIH]), Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), Department of Interior (DOI), Department of 

Transportation (DOT), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA). 7 See https://www.nist.gov/tpo/agency-responses-presidentialmemorandum, p. 2. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

1-4

capabilities that work on behalf of the American people” 

(undated, p. 7). 

To begin to fulfill this vision, the Agenda identifies CrossAgency Priority (CAP) Goals. As related to this study, CAP Goal 

14 is designed to improve the transfer of federally funded 

technologies from the lab to the market. Three goals listed in 

the Agenda are associated with this priority: 

 Improve the transition of federally funded innovations 

from the laboratory to the marketplace by reducing the 

administrative and regulatory burdens for technology 

transfer and increasing private-sector investment in 

later-stage R&D. 

 Develop and implement more effective partnering 

models and technology transfer mechanisms for federal 

agencies. 

 Enhance the effectiveness of technology transfer by 

improving the methods for evaluating the return on 

investment (ROI) and economic and national security 

impacts of federally funded R&D and using that 

information to focus efforts on approaches proven to 

work (undated, p. 49). 

Motivating the third bullet above is the following observation: 

The Federal Government invests approximately 

$150 billion annually in research and development 

(R&D) conducted at federal laboratories, 

universities, and other research organizations. For 

America to maintain its position as the leader in 

global innovation, bring products to market more 

quickly, grow the economy, and maintain a strong 

national security innovation base, it is essential to 

optimize technology transfer and support programs 

to increase the return on investment (ROI) from 

federally funded R&D (undated, p. 48). 

The Trump Administration’s support for enhancing technology 

transfer from federal laboratories was recently reiterated in the 

July 31, 2018, memorandum from the Office of Management 

and Budget, “FY 2020 Administration Research and 

Development Budget Priorities:” 

Federally funded R&D can lead to transformative 

products and services that solve problems from the 

boardroom to the classroom. Agencies should 
Chapter 1 — Introduction 

1-5

continue to focus on the basic and early-stage 

applied research that provides the fundamental 

building blocks of new technological advances and 

expand efforts that empower the private sector to 

accelerate the transfer of research discoveries from 

the laboratory to the marketplace. 

The remainder of this report is outlined as follows. 

In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of U.S. technology 

transfer policies as they relate to federal agencies and their 

laboratories. Historically, U.S. technology transfer policies have 

been broadly supported by both parties in Congress. An indepth discussion of these enabling policies is in Appendix A. 

This chapter provides context for the importance of the 

measurement of technology transfer across federal agencies 

and laboratories. 

In Chapter 3, we review the relevant academic and policy 

literature related to technology transfer across federal agencies 

and laboratories. This review also provides both academic and 

policy contexts for our findings in later chapters. 

In Chapter 4, we describe public domain technology transfer 

information for the seven agencies and their laboratories that 

participated in this study.8 This information, reported by the 

Technology Partnerships Office, can be used to characterize 

technology transfer activities from federal agencies. These data 

are used in later chapters to offer observations about economic 

impacts that might relate to “the effectiveness of technology 

transfer” (Agenda, undated, p. 49). 

In Chapter 5, we present the logic model that bounded our data 

collection efforts and the emphasis of the case studies. This 

model represents the framework that we followed throughout 

this study. It highlights not only data collection but also the 

framework for case studies about successful technology 

transfers by federal laboratories. 

In Chapter 6, we describe the disaggregated data that were 

collected from the seven participating agencies. We matched 

these data to various categories of data from secondary 

sources to use in latter chapters. 

8 The agencies that participated in this study are DOC, DoD, HHS, DOI, 

DOT, EPA, and USDA. See the Acknowledgments section above. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

1-6

In Chapter 7, we describe the geospatial distribution of agency 

technology transfer partners as measured by the location of the 

partner organization.9 Our findings in this chapter offer a 

characterization of the proximity of the spillover of R&D-related 

technology transfer activities. 

In Chapter 8, we explore the relationship between both the 

timing of the execution of licenses and the subsequent 

trajectory of the sales of the licensees. Licensing is one of 

several technology transfer mechanisms used by federal 

agencies and their laboratories described in Chapter 4, and 

measuring the association between licensing activity and the 

sales of licensees offers suggestive evidence of the economic 

impact of licensing. 

In Chapter 9, we examine CRADA activity, and in particular, we 

explore the propensity of agencies to engage in CRADAs with 

smaller-sized companies as directed in President Obama’s 

memorandum. CRADAs are another technology transfer 

mechanism used by federal agencies and laboratories described 

in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we offer a characterization of 

federal CRADA efforts across partner companies, with an 

emphasis on the size of the partner companies. 

In Chapter 10, we chronicle the case studies’ findings in terms 

of the factors that contributed to their technical and market 

success. These case studies offer a qualitative understanding of 

technology transfer activities that is not evident through 

empirical measures of technology transfer activities that are 

already captured in the Technology Partnerships Office’s annual 

reports to the President and the Congress; Federal Laboratory 

Technology Transfer. 

Finally, in Chapter 11, we summarize our overall findings from 

this study. 

9 We use the word partners broadly to refer to the external partners 

for each CRADA as well as licensees. 
2-1 

2 

Technology Transfer 

Policies toward U.S. 

Federal Agencies 

and Laboratories 

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the federal 

government’s technology transfer policies as they relate to 

federal agencies and laboratories. More detail about the 

historical evolution of these policies is captured in Appendix A.10

President Carter’s Domestic Policy Review in 1979 emphasized 

the importance of the transfer of technical knowledge:11

Often, the information that underlies a technological 

advance is not known to companies capable of 

commercially developing that advance. I am 

therefore taking several actions to ease and 

encourage the flow of technical knowledge and 

information. These actions include establishing the 

Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology at 

the National Technical Information Service to 

improve the transfer of knowledge from Federal 

laboratories .... 

President Carter’s charge was, in part, motivation for the 

passage of the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980, Public 

Law 96-480. This legislation is generally considered to 

10 This chapter and Appendix A draw directly from Link and Oliver 

(2017). 11 See President Carter’s Industrial Innovation Initiatives Message to 

the Congress on Administration Actions and Proposals (October 31, 

1979): http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31628

This message to Congress was in response to the productivity 

slowdown throughout the U.S. economy as discussed in Appendix A. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

2-2

be the first public policy to address the transfer of 

technology developed in federal laboratories to the 

private sector. 

The stated purpose of the Act is to: 

improve the economic, environmental, and social 

well-being of the United States by ... promoting 

technology development through the establishment 

of centers for industrial technology ... [and to 

encourage] the exchange of scientific and technical 

personnel among academia, industry, and Federal 

laboratories. 

The Act emphasizes that there is a need for a national policy 

supporting domestic technology transfer and supporting the use 

of the science and technology (S&T) resources of the federal 

government. 

The Act also makes clear that it is the responsibility of each 

federal laboratory to establish an office as well as mechanisms 

to transfer its technology to those organizations that will 

benefit: “The Federal Government shall strive where 

appropriate to transfer Federally owned or originated 

technology to State and local governments and to the private 

sector.” 

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Public Law 96,517, a complement 

policy initiative to the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980, permitted 

universities, small businesses, and nonprofit organizations to 

patent and license technologies directly developed from 

federally funded research or developed though cooperative 

agreements. 

To enhance the technology transfer mission of federal agencies 

and laboratories, a bipartisan Congress, with support of 

President Ronald Reagan, amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act 

of 1980 in 1986 with the passage of the Federal Technology 

Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA), Public Law 99-502. Whereas the 

Stevenson-Wydler Act made explicit the technology transfer 

responsibilities of federal agencies and laboratories, the FTTA 

facilitated technology transfer by permitting the laboratories to 

enter into CRADAs with public and private organizations. The 

FTTA also established the Federal Laboratory Consortium for 

Technology Transfer (FLC) and the National Bureau of 

Standards (NBS, which later became NIST) as the host agency. 
Chapter 2 — Technology Transfer Policies toward U.S. Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

2-3

The FLC would, among other things, “develop and ... administer 

techniques, training courses, and materials concerning 

technology transfer to increase the awareness of Federal 

laboratory employees regarding the commercial potential of 

laboratory technology and innovations ....” 

Federal agencies and laboratories have traditionally transferred 

their technology in the form of patents, licenses to laboratorydeveloped technologies, and CRADAs, as well as through 

publications, standards, and other modes. Many of these 

technology transfer mechanisms and other metrics are reported 

at the agency level in the federal laboratory Technology 

Transfer Report to the President and the Congress, which is 

prepared by the Technology Partnerships Office at NIST on 

behalf of the agencies and using data gathered from the 

agencies. Metrics presented in these reports are discussed in 

Chapter 4. The limitations of these metrics, which are defined 

by federal legislation, to describe fully the technology transfer 

process from federal agencies and laboratories and the 

potential economic impact of transferred technology were a 

motivation for this study. 

3-1 

3 

Academic and Policy 

Literatures on 

Technology Transfer 

from Federal 

Agencies and 

Laboratories 

Summary 

■ The academic literature (in Section 3.2) on technology transfer 

is limited. Existing studies find that CRADAs and patenting 

activity increased in response to federal policy changes in the 

1980s. Authors suggest that laboratory activity was more 

responsive to the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 than 

to earlier legislation in the way that observed levels of 

technology transfer activity increased. 

■ The policy literature (in Section 3.3) on technology transfer has 

focused on governance models, mechanisms, best practices, 

barriers to cooperative research, and technology transfer’s role 

in economic development. On the whole, this literature suggests 

more efficient and effective ways for using federal S&T assets.

The literature that is focused on technology transfer 

mechanisms can be divided into two broad areas for summary 

purposes: the academic literature and the policy literature.12

12 We use the term policy to refer to papers authored by government 

agencies or the U.S. Congress, papers commissioned by 

government agencies, or papers with a primary focus on federal 

technology transfer that were written for a nontechnical audience. 

The literature review that follows draws directly from Link and 

Oliver (2017). 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-2

 3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODS 

We conducted a literature review on identified peer-reviewed 

journal articles based on the research experience of the authors 

of this study. The initial compilation of articles was 

complemented with online desktop research using various 

publication search engines, web-search engines, and specific 

websites such as the FLC. Search terms included combinations 

of the following words and phrases: federal laboratory, 

technology transfer, CRADAs, licenses, patents, impact, effect, 

and economic. 

We selected for review and inclusion in this report the articles 

that were focused specifically on technology transfer 

mechanisms and their associated metrics. We eliminated 

articles that were historical overviews or institutional case 

studies. Thirteen journal articles and working papers from the 

academic literature and 12 articles and reports from the policy 

literature are summarized briefly below and in greater detail in 

Appendices B and C, respectively. 

 3.2 ACADEMIC LITERATURE13

The early academic research on technology transfer from 

federal laboratories was by Ham and Mowery (1995, 1998) and 

then later by Mowery (2003). Because of data constraints, their 

approach to the study of a single technology transfer 

mechanism, CRADAs, was case based, and it involved a small 

sample of five collaborations between DOE and companies. 

Ham and Mowery (1995) pointed out some limitations of 

CRADAs as a technology transfer mechanism, while Ham and 

Mowery (1998) described some characteristics that are 

fundamental to CRADA success. Ham and Mowery (1995) also 

emphasized that laboratories do not possess a panacea of onthe-shelf technology that is ready to be transferred to privatesector partners. Instead, they described a more realistic 

framework for considering CRADAs that is defined by three 

13 The paucity of academic scholarship about technology transfer from 

federal laboratories relative to the scholarship on university 

technology transfer is, in our view, due to researcher problems in 

obtaining data from federal laboratories on relevant technology 

transfer metrics. 
Chapter 3 — Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology Transfer from 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-3

broad classes of cooperative activity: (1) transfer, (2) codevelopment, and (3) R&D services.14

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of articles began to 

bring together disaggregated datasets related to federal agency 

technology transfer activities. These studies were limited to 

specific agencies that were willing to share information. For 

example, Jaffe et al. (1998) and Jaffe and Lerner (2001) 

undertook a significant data collection effort for their empirical 

study of NASA and DOE patenting. Their two papers concluded 

that the federal policy changes in the 1980s were followed by 

increased patenting activity at both NASA and DOE. Jaffe and 

Lerner (2001) found that as a result of this increase, federal 

laboratories reached parity with universities in terms of patents 

per R&D dollar without an overall decline in patent quality. 

Using NASA data, Jaffe et al. (1998) established that patent 

citations are a reasonable, but still noisy, measure of 

technology spillovers.15 Furthermore, geographic proximity 

between a company and the laboratory increases knowledge 

spillovers as measured by citations. 

The study by Adams et al. (2003) represents a novel approach 

to the study of technology transfer. They examined R&D 

activity in industrial laboratories in an effort to identify activity 

conducted in cooperation with federal laboratories and to 

identify the nature of those collaborations. They found that 

CRADAs lead to higher levels of company patenting than did 

other mechanisms because of the intensive collaboration 

between laboratories and companies. Mowery (2003) pointed 

out that the technology transfer data used by Adams et al. 

(2003) are limited to relatively large, publicly traded companies 

because of data constraints, so generalizations should be made 

with caution.16

Link et al. (2011) represents a longitudinal study of overall 

patenting activity at two federal laboratories: NIST and 

separately at Sandia National Laboratories (combined). They 

14 Relatedly, Guston (1998) described and documented the use of 

CRADAs at NIH. 15 Anecdotally, some patents are cited at the recommendation of 

lawyers and may have nothing to do with technology transfer. For 

some discussion of “defensive” citation, see Hall and Ziedonis 

(2001). 

16 For another detailed overview of the CRADA literature, refer to 

Mowery (2003). 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-4

examined the trend in patenting in these laboratories in 

response to the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the FTTA, and they 

inferred from the time series that the latter Act had the greater 

impact on patenting. 

Stevens et al. (2011) developed an approach for exploring the 

social value of intramural research that had been transferred to 

private-sector partners. Specifically, they investigated the 

degree to which successful drug discovery and development 

projects were derived from public-sector research. Public-sector 

research institutions were defined as all universities, research 

hospitals, nonprofit research institutes, and federal laboratories 

in the United States. They did not identify the mechanism by 

which public-sector research was transferred to the private 

sector, but given that they attributed technology to publicsector research institutions based on patents, it is likely that 

the method of transfer was a license negotiated between the 

public sector and the company. They found that medical 

technologies derived from public-sector research (likely through 

licenses) are expected to have a significant therapeutic effect; 

more than half are used in treating cancer or infectious 

diseases. 

Chatterjee and Rohrbaugh (2014) built on the work by Stevens 

et al. (2011) by analyzing NIH’s Intramural Research Program’s 

(IRP’s) contribution compared with that of all other publicsector research institutions collectively referred to as 

extramural public-sector research institutions.17 Overall, their 

study found that NIH’s intramural contributions are 

disproportionately larger than their level of research funding. 

For example, the NIH IRP contributed 14.4% of new drugs 

brought to market based on 11.2% of research funds. 

Within the last few years, several other important papers on 

technology transfer have been published. A working paper by 

17 Chatterjee and Rohrbaugh (2014) do not account for funding 

sources for extramural public-sector research institutions. They 

describe funding sources as follows: “The extramural institutions 

are primarily funded under a competitive peer review system with 

grants and contracts from federal agencies and foundations. They 

receive additional funding from state governments, foundations and 

corporate sponsors. In contrast, the NIH IRP is funded prospectively 

by the U.S. government to conduct research within the mission of 

each of the NIH institutes and centers. Unlike recipients of grants 

and contracts, peer review of each principal investigator’s 

laboratory in the NIH-IRP is conducted retrospectively by outside 

expert review panels.” (p. 54) 
Chapter 3 — Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology Transfer from 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-5

Chan (2014), for example, represents a novel approach to 

linking licensing to the amount of citations (albeit, a noisy 

indicator) that the licensed patents receive relative to 

nonlicensed patents. Studying more than 800 licensed patents 

at DOE since 2000, he infers that licensing increases the annual 

citation rate to a patent between 20% and 37%. Over 80% of 

subsequent patents that cite a licensed patent come from 

companies other than the licensee company, which means that 

the impact of licensing is quite broad and is not concentrated 

within the licensee company. 

Recently, Popp (2016a) investigated the role of government 

research and government funding in private-sector publications 

and patenting as well as the flows between these two sectors. 

He estimated that an additional $1 million in government 

funding leads to one to two additional publications on 

alternative energy technologies but with lags of up to 10 years 

between initial funding and publication. He also found that wind 

publications are the most likely to be cited by a patent. 

In a companion publication based on two decades of scientific 

articles on renewable energy,18 Popp (2016b) found that 

renewable energy articles most highly cited by other scientific 

articles are also more likely to be cited by future patents. 

Therefore, journal-to-journal citations might be a good indicator 

of the impact of an article on technology development. He also 

found that government publications are more likely to be cited 

by patents than publications from universities and other 

institutions. In other words, research performed at government 

institutions (e.g., federal laboratories) has an important role in 

translating between basic and applied research. 

Finally, Chen et al. (2018) used a dataset of CRADA activity at 

NIST over the years 1978 through 2014 to explore several 

research questions: Did the FTTA have an impact on CRADA 

activity at NIST? Is CRADA activity at NIST a cyclical 

phenomenon? At what frequency do private-sector companies 

engage in CRADA activity with NIST? They characterize this last 

research question as an exploratory test of the relationship 

between company size and the propensity to engage in a 

CRADA. The authors found suggestive evidence that the FTTA 

began to influence NIST’s CRADA activity within 2 to 3 years 

18 Specifically, Popp (2016b) focused on biofuels, solar energy, and 

wind energy. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-6

after its passage and that CRADA activity moves with the 

business cycle. The authors also found that most companies 

that were engaged in CRADA activity were engaged only once; 

only the larger companies continued to engage over time in 

CRADAs with NIST. 

Summarizing the academic literature, CRADAs and patenting 

activity increased in response to federal policy changes in the 

1980s, perhaps more in response to the FTTA than to earlier 

legislation. Also, there is some evidence that certain technology 

transfer mechanisms are complementary in terms of uptake; 

federal technology transfer can have an outsized role in certain 

contexts, company size matters in terms of patterns of 

partnering with federal agencies and laboratories, and research 

funding and legislation do affect the volume of technology 

transfer activity. 

 3.3 POLICY LITERATURE 

A policy literature on federal technology transfer developed in 

parallel to the academic literature. Many of the same key 

agencies—DoD, DOE, and NASA—are discussed in it. While 

some of the same themes emerge at times, there are different 

emphases in each. While the peer-reviewed literature is very 

focused on mechanisms and associated metrics and on teasing 

out the effect of various factors, the non-peer-reviewed 

literature tends to focus on barriers to accomplishing specific 

goals of technology transfer such as partnerships with the 

private sector for commercialization and contributions to 

regional economic development. This literature is, in general, 

very DOE-centric, with relatively little attention paid to the rest 

of the federal laboratory system. The non-peer-reviewed 

literature also documents success stories and provides guidance 

to research managers both in the laboratory and in the 

technology transfer office (TTO). 

The policy literature includes two major categories of 

publications: 

1. Assessments of technology transfer activities, 

mechanisms, and policies based on qualitative and 

quantitative data on performance or effectiveness 

2. Best practice documents for government researchers 

and technology transfer practitioners who are involved 

in developing and transferring technology 
Chapter 3 — Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology Transfer from 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-7

Assessments of technology transfer have been conducted by 

both internal and external evaluation teams. Most of the policy 

literature is qualitative, descriptive, or based on secondary 

sources. However, a major quasi-internal evaluation effort, 

commissioned by the U.S. Congress, was undertaken by NIH in 

the early 1990s. It is titled Technology Transfer and the Public 

Interest and focused on the usefulness of CRADAs as a 

collaborative mechanism.19 It is important to point out that at 

the time of the NIH report, CRADAs had only then been 

recently established by the FTTA in 1986. The NIH Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) found the CRADA mechanism was 

useful for collaboration by helping to pool public and private 

resources, protecting the intellectual property (IP) rights of the 

government, and facilitating technology transfer to the private 

sector. The NIH OIG also identified several challenges for 

managing CRADAs such as a mismatch between some CRADA 

projects and what the mechanism was intended to accomplish 

(i.e., technology transfer out of federal laboratories); a lengthy 

and complex process for establishing CRADAs; limited 

oversight; and the pricing of products that emerge from 

CRADAs, which is out of the control of federal laboratories. 

After a decade lull in the commission of policy reports from 

2000 to 2010, there has been a flurry of assessment activity. A 

series of three reports was published between 2011 and 2013 

by the Science and Technology Policy Institute within the 

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) (IDA, 2011; 2013a; 

2013b). These reports explore barriers to technology transfer, 

identify innovative strategies and best practices, and discuss 

measurement issues. The first report, entitled Technology 

Transfer and Commercialization Landscape of the Federal 

Laboratories, commissioned by the Economic Development 

Administration within DOC and by NIST, examined the entire 

landscape of technology transfer mechanisms across the federal 

laboratory system. IDA focused their descriptive analysis on 

licenses, CRADAs, user facility agreements, work for others, 

and partnership intermediary agreements (IDA, 2011). 

A second IDA report, entitled Exemplar Practices for 

Department of Defense Technology Transfer, published in 2013 

(IDA, 2013a), was commissioned in response to an executive 

order, by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in 

19 NASA does not engage in CRADA activity. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-8

conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget. This 

report outlined policies that could address barriers to 

technology transfer from federally sponsored aeronautics R&D 

programs to civil and national security applications. The 

barriers that could be addressed fall into four broad categories: 

coordination and awareness of the National Aeronautics 

Research and Development Policy plans, communication and 

liaison among stakeholders, maturity of new technology, and 

institutional practices and culture. 

The final IDA report, entitled Expediting the Transfer of 

Technology from Government Laboratories into the Aeronautics 

Industry, also published in 2013, documents seven broad 

categories of best practices for DoD laboratories ranging from 

organizational structure to use of mechanisms for outreach and 

marketing (IDA, 2013b). These best practices might be useful 

outside of the immediate DoD laboratory domain as well. 

In 2013, NIST commissioned a literature review on technology 

transfer research and evaluation to help inform its response to 

the 2011 Presidential Memorandum previously discussed. 

Bozeman (2013) made several recommendations about 

measurement issues including the need to identify expected 

ranges of impact; better scientific and technical human capital 

metrics, relating process reforms to activities; and the use of 

logic models and mapping techniques. A major finding of 

Bozeman’s study is that relatively few studies assess the impact 

of federally developed technologies. Most of the literature on 

technology transfer impact involves academic institutions or 

federal extramural projects. 

In 2013 and 2014, the Information Technology and Innovation 

Foundation (ITIF) and the Brookings Institution published 

reports that emphasized ways in which DOE’s laboratories could 

be reinvigorated, perhaps through improved technology 

transfer activities. The ITIF (2013) suggested an overhaul of 

the entire management model of the laboratories, arguing that 

DOE’s laboratories have adhered to a cold-war era model that 

has not kept up with “the pace of innovation and the complexity 

of national challenges” (p. 5). This slowness to change is 

perhaps a result of institutional factors and inefficiencies such 

as duplicative regulations, micromanagement, and biases 

against technology transfer to the private sector. The ITIF 

recommended that laboratories move to a model focused on 
Chapter 3 — Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology Transfer from 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-9

contractor accountability (rather than micromanagement), 

recognizing that funding and management are aligned with 

innovation goals and providing incentives and flexibility to push 

more technology to market. 

The Brookings report makes the argument for enhancing the 

connections between federal laboratories and their regions to 

improve the laboratories as a regional economic development 

asset (Andes et al., 2014). The authors believe that DOE should 

reconsider its ability to engage locally given that regional 

clusters have grown in economic importance. To enhance 

connection to the region, Andes et al. argue that laboratories 

should open up to small companies (i.e., referred to as smalland medium-sized enterprises or SMEs) and increase the 

relevance of their work to emphasize regional effects. Finally, 

the report emphasizes the need for greater flexibility in 

oversight and funding, similar to the emphasis of the ITIF 

report. 

Partially in response to reports by ITIF, Brookings, and others 

(e.g., National Academies studies), DOE’s Argonne National 

Laboratory commissioned a report focused on enhancing 

partnership. Their report was released in 2016 by Innovation 

Associates. The report highlights a few exemplary cases where 

laboratories have attempted to address barriers to partnerships 

and commercialization. Major barriers include overcentralization and a lack of experimentation by laboratories 

about how they approach these issues, mixed messages about 

the importance of technology transfer including a lack of 

funding and incentives, aversion to risk, and a lack of 

commercialization experience/capacity for research staff. In 

many ways, these barriers require a culture change as much as 

a policy change. The report also discusses ways to enhance 

partnerships by leveraging existing programs and federal 

resources such as the Small Business Innovation Research 

(SBIR) program, the Small Business Technology Transfer 

(STTR) program, the National Network for Manufacturing 

Innovation (NNMI), and the Manufacturing Extension Program 

(MEP). 

TechLink—a partnership intermediary of DoD—released a study 

in 2016 of DoD licensing activities from 2000 to 2014 that 

attempted to quantify the economic contributions of these 

licenses. Using surveys of licensees, the study found $20.4 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-10

billion in total sales of new products and services resulting from 

these licenses. Sixty-nine percent of this total derived from a 

single license of the respiratory syncytial virus antibody that 

was developed by the Uniformed Services University of the 

Health Sciences within DoD. 

There is also a body of publicly available best practices 

documents for practitioners. As one example, a year 2000 

document released by DOE was written to help scientists get 

their ideas to market using a more intentional approach toward 

the innovation process. 

The FLC periodically publishes a desk reference, the most 

recent of which is Technology Transfer Desk Reference: A 

Comprehensive Guide to Technology Transfer (2013). The desk 

reference is written as a primer and comprehensive reference 

for TTO staff. It specifically addresses issues in CRADAs and IP. 

The Desk Reference enumerates the benefits of involvement in 

technology transfer, as selectively quoted from the Desk 

Reference: 

 For the government, benefits can be derived 

from technology moving out of the laboratories, 

as well as technical expertise coming into the 

laboratories. Technology transfer activities can 

be used to assist with accomplishing missionoriented R&D, for example, when academic or 

industrial researchers provide needed expertise 

on collaborative efforts, thus leveraging all 

parties’ research dollars. In the other direction, 

the government as a whole benefits when 

technology moves out of the laboratories. 

 Federally funded R&D is being put to new or 

expanded uses. This also results in a better ROI 

and expedites the rapid movement of 

technology to the field. 

 The government and individual laboratories also 

benefit financially to the extent that technology 

transfer provides royalty payments to the 

government. 

 For industry, involvement in technology transfer 

projects can provide an increased awareness of 

government needs, giving commercial 

companies the opportunity to better serve 

government customers. As is the case for the 

government partner, the business partner can 
Chapter 3 — Academic and Policy Literatures on Technology Transfer from 

Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-11

leverage R&D costs by building on the relevant 

R&D that has already been done in or through 

new collaborations with the federal laboratories, 

resulting in improved and more cost-effective 

technology development. Business partners may 

also benefit by using government facilities (e.g., 

for product testing) rather than building new 

facilities, and making use of the expertise of 

federal scientists and engineers. 

 Researchers at universities and nonprofit 

organizations can benefit financially from 

various parts of the entire technology transfer 

spectrum, e.g., as participants in proposals and 

joint ventures for R&D grants. Individual 

researchers may benefit intellectually from the 

close contact with leading technologists in both 

government and industry. 

 For the individual scientist or technologist in a 

federal laboratory, benefits include possible 

financial gain from awards and royalty 

payments, in addition to the personal 

satisfaction and professional recognition gained 

from holding a patent or participating in the 

launch of a new product. The collaboration with 

other scientists and technologists from industry 

and academia may improve the employee’s 

ability to accomplish mission tasks and will 

provide the knowledge that one is a strong 

contributor to government-mandated technology 

transfer processes. 

 While federal technology transfer benefits 

national economic growth and competitiveness, 

these national-level benefits are a compilation of 

those realized at local, regional, and state 

levels. State and local government economic 

development efforts are supported and 

enhanced by partnering with federal labs via 

technology transfer initiatives. (FLC, Desk 

Reference, 2013, pp. 6–7) 

Another FLC reference is the Mechanisms Matrix (2008). It 

documents various technology transfer authorities, the agencies 

that use them, and websites accessible for additional 

information. Finally, the FLC Playbook (undated) describes 15 

“plays” ranging from rewarding researchers to working through 

foundations. Each “play” outlines details, key questions to 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

3-12

consider, and specific agency examples. This is also intended to 

be a helpful reference resource for TTO staff. 

Summarizing the policy literature, many of the policy reports 

have focused on barriers associated with technology transfer 

from federal agencies and their laboratories, and best practices 

in the aggregate and at the agency level. Much like the 

academic literature, the quantitative analysis summarized 

above has focused on CRADAs and patents perhaps because 

information on those mechanisms is more readily available. 
4-1 

4 

Public Domain 

Information on 

Technology Transfer 

across Federal 

Agencies 

Summary 

■ The Technology Partnerships Office at NIST documents a number 

of technology transfer mechanisms and metrics by agency and by 

fiscal year in its annual Federal Laboratory (Interagency) 

Technology Transfer Summary Report to the Office of the President 

and to Congress. 

■ The number of reported patent applications, patents issued, newly 

executed licenses, and newly executed CRADAs varies by agency. 

■ In general, the values of these technology transfer metrics have 

increased over time. 

As previously discussed, the Technology Partnerships Office at 

NIST prepares and delivers to the Office of the President and to 

Congress each year a summary report on agencies’ technology 

transfer activities. This annual summary report is entitled 

Federal Laboratory (Interagency) Technology Transfer 

Summary Report.20

The foreword to the FY 2015 summary report states: 

This report fulfills the requirement of Title 15 of the 

United States Code, Section 3710(g) (2), for an 

annual report summarizing the use of technology 

transfer authorities by federal agencies. It highlights 

20 These summary reports are publicly available at 

https://www.nist.gov/tpo/federal-laboratory-interagencytechnology-transfer-summary-reports. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

4-2

the achievements of federal technology transfer and 

includes data on the use of specific transfer 

authorities. Future editions of this report will be 

used to continue to keep the President and the 

Congress informed of the on-going efforts of Federal 

laboratories to expand our technology transfer 

efforts in partnership with U.S. industry, academic 

institutions, non-profit foundations, and state, local 

and tribal governments. These efforts will continue 

to play a vital role in building the Nation’s economic 

strength. 

A tabular description of mechanisms and metrics that describe 

each agency’s recent technology transfer activities, along with a 

select number of examples of successful technology transfer 

efforts, is included in each summary report. The tabular 

descriptions only provide information on the scale of technology 

transfer activity by agency and not on their economic impact. 

In this chapter, we focus on patents, licenses, and CRADAs 

from 2003 through 2014, although other mechanisms are 

described in the summary reports such as invention disclosures 

and licensing income. Patents, licenses, and CRADAs are 

generally viewed as the primary technology transfer 

mechanisms from federal laboratories, and they are the 

mechanisms generally referred to in the literatures summarized 

in Chapter 3. Publications, while not included in this chapter, 

are another important mechanism of technology transfer 

(specifically, knowledge transfer). 

These three technology transfer mechanisms for the seven 

agencies that participated in this study are illustrated for 2003 

through 2014 in the following figures to provide general 

information on levels of activity.21,22 The underlying data are in 

the technology transfer summary reports, as noted above. 

Figure 4-1 shows the number of patent applications by year, 

Figure 4-2 shows patents issued by year, Figure 4-3 shows the 

number of licenses by year, and Figure 4-4 shows the number 

of CRADAs by year across these agencies. 

21 The agencies represented in these figures are DOC, DoD, HHS, DOI, 

DOT, EPA, and USDA. 22 Technology transfer metrics on these mechanisms are not available 

separately for CDC, NIH, and FDA within HHS. Similarly, metrics on 

these mechanisms are not available separately for the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy within DoD. 
Chapter 4 — Public Domain Information on Technology Transfer across Federal Agencies 

4-3

Figure 4-1. Graphical Description of Federal Patent Applications Filed, by Fiscal Year across 

Participating Agencies 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

4-4

Figure 4-2. Graphical Description of Federal Patents Issued, by Fiscal Year across 

Participating Agencies 
Chapter 4 — Public Domain Information on Technology Transfer across Federal Agencies 

4-5

Figure 4-3. Graphical Description of Newly Executed Federal Licenses, by Fiscal Year across 

Participating Agencies 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

4-6

Figure 4-4. Description of Newly Executed Federal CRADAs, by Fiscal Year across 

Participating Agencies 
Chapter 4 — Public Domain Information on Technology Transfer across Federal Agencies 

4-7

Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show that DoD is the most active of the 

seven agencies in the filing of patent applications and patents 

issued. HHS is the most active agency in the issuance of new 

licenses (Figure 4-3). DOC is the most active agency in forming 

CRADAs (Figure 4-4). 

Using annual data on new patents issued along with data on 

each agency’s contemporaneous annual inflation-adjusted 

federal R&D allocations,23 we approximated the correlation 

between the percentage change in new patent applications and 

the percentage change in R&D. This elasticity measure, a 10% 

increase in an agency’s federal R&D allocations, is associated 

with a 9.98% increase in patents issued.24 This elasticity is not 

an economic impact measure. It is a descriptive measure that 

reflects the approximate relationship between internal R&D and 

a dimension of internal agency activity. 

The data reported in the summary reports and illustrated in the 

figures above are by themselves insufficient to use statistically 

to infer insight on the economic impacts associated with 

technology transfer from federal agencies. The chapters that 

follow offer an initial step forward in that direction in two ways. 

First, using disaggregated data provided by the agencies that 

participated in this study, we drew relationships that suggest 

elements of economic benefits from transferred technologies. 

Second, using case study information, we provide specific 

examples of economic impacts associated with some of the 

more successful agency transfer efforts selected in collaboration 

with participating agencies. 

23 Federal R&D data, adjusted for inflation, across the seven agencies 

and over time are available from 

https://www.aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd#Agency. 24 This estimate comes from the estimation of a log-log ordinary least 

squares regression model on the panel of data on new patent 

applications for the seven agencies involved in this study over the 

years of available data. Held constant in the regression model is a 

binary control for instances when patents issued are 0 for a given 

year in a given agency. 

5-1

5 

Approach to this 

Multiple-Agency 

Study 

This chapter describes our approach to this multiple-agency 

study of their reported technology transfer activities. We 

conducted economic analyses of technology transfer at two 

levels, both based on having access to data provided by the 

seven agencies in support of this study: (1) broad empirical 

analyses and (2) agency-level mission-specific case studies. 

Economic analyses, couched in terms of both case studies and 

empirical inquiries that follow, were conducted by examining 

agency data and pooled administrative agency data (licenses 

and CRADAs) to approximate (discussed in each relevant 

chapter) the economic and social value of technology transfer 

activities. Per feedback received from agencies in the first year 

of this study, all administrative data provided to us from the 

seven participating agencies are confidential and were to be 

used by the study authors only for this effort. The use of these 

data is discussed in detail in the relevant chapters that follow. 

In addition to conducting broad empirical analyses using pooled 

data, we conducted one case study of successful technology 

transfer for each participating agency. 

 5.1 GUIDING LOGICAL FRAMEWORK 

Once the purpose of this study was defined and the literature 

reviews completed, it was necessary to specify the process of 

technology transfer and its effects. Following good practices in 

evaluation, we developed a logical framework to guide the 

collection of quantitative information about technology transfer 

activity in the laboratories of various agencies and to focus the 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

5-2

development of case studies on successful technology transfer 

efforts. A logical framework includes a logic model or “theory of 

change” and the research questions that follow from that 

model. Data needed to answer these questions were then 

determined. Data collection and analysis are discussed in 

Chapter 6 for the quantitative study and Chapter 10 for the 

case studies. 

 5.1.1 The Logic Model 

The logic model in Figure 5-1 is a simple linear representation 

of what is generally understood to be a nonlinear process with 

many feedback loops, contingent on different characteristics of 

the technology, market, actors, and context. However 

simplistic, it is a useful pedagogical device for this study to 

ensure consistency in our approach to each agency and in our 

reporting of each agency’s technology transfer efforts. 

Figure 5-1. A Logic Model for Transfer of Technology from Federal Laboratories 
Chapter 5 — Approach to this Multiple-Agency Study 

5-3

The term outcomes in a logic framework is actually a sequence 

of short-, intermediate-, and long-term outcomes that result 

from reaction to and use of the outputs, meaning the direct 

results of a program’s activities. Impact is defined several 

ways. Some use impact as only that part of observed outcomes 

that can be credited to the program. More frequently people 

use impact interchangeably with outcomes, particularly with 

longer-term outcomes. The logic model in Figure 5-1 has the 

following five basic elements plus contingencies and external 

influences: 

 the R&D expenditures, planning, implementation, and 

results of that R&D from discovery to proof of 

application and technical disclosure in a federal 

laboratory 

 the transfer of an R&D-based object (technical 

knowledge and/or a prototype technology), and the 

process and mechanisms of transfer 

 the receipt and use of that object by the recipient who 

adds resources to use the transferred object from the 

general technical infrastructure or to further specific 

technology development and commercialization of what 

resulted from the technology transfer 

 the collaborations and intermediaries involved in the 

transfer 

 and the technical, social, and economic outcomes for 

both private and public benefits associated with the 

transferred object 

To summarize, R&D in federal laboratories leads to an object 

that is transferable. After the transfer, resources (physical 

capital and human capital) are added by the recipients in an 

effort to put the object to use as a product, process, service, or 

practice that has economic benefit. Collaborators or 

intermediary supporting organizations are often involved in one 

or more steps along the way. 

The model also calls out “contingencies,” or characteristics, of 

each instance of technology transfer that will affect the timing, 

parties involved, and size and type of outcome/impact of the 

transfer. Characteristics have been defined for each element of 

the logic model; that is, characteristics will vary depending on 

the laboratory and the specific R&D, the object transferred and 

transfer mechanism, the transfer recipient and demand 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

5-4

environment, and the agency mission and a broad notion of the 

pathways to economic and or social value. 

The characteristics for the eight aspects or contingencies 

influencing technology transfer success are shown in the logic 

model. Five contingencies are from Bozeman (2013). The three 

we have added are preceded by an asterisk in the bulleted list 

below. The contingencies that must be considered are as 

follows: 

 Transfer agent: Transfer agents are the innovating 

institutions. The national laboratories (the subject of this 

report) vary widely and are characterized by such 

factors as technological niche, mission, sector, scientific 

and technical human capital, resources, geographic 

location, organizational design, management style, and 

political constraints. The nature of the R&D leading up to 

the transfer varies. 

 Transfer object: Characteristics of the technology 

transferred vary in terms of type. It may be software or 

hardware, for example. Other characteristics to examine 

include what they in terms of value to potential users, 

such as comparative advantage, compatibility, 

complexity, and observability. 

 *Technology transfer support: This category includes 

characteristics of agency and laboratory leadership, 

allocation of resources for technology transfer, and the 

capabilities and actions of technology transfer staff. 

 Transfer media: The way in which the technology is 

handed off to private or public entities varies. Federal 

laboratories typically employ cooperative research 

agreements, licensing, open-source software, material 

transfers, publications, and occasionally business startups. 

 Technology recipient: Characteristics of the entities 

that acquire the innovation depend on the type of 

innovation acquired and vary in terms of resources and 

areas of expertise, geographic location, size, and power 

to make and implement decisions. 

 *Transfer collaborations and intermediaries: The 

extent to which other entities are involved in the 

development, transfer, and commercialization varies, as 

do the characteristics of those entities. It also depends 

on the type of innovation being transferred. 

 Demand environment: This category is the nature of 

the target market’s demand for the specific innovation, 
Chapter 5 — Approach to this Multiple-Agency Study 

5-5

such as level of existing demand for a comparable 

technology. It could also include characteristics of the 

existing supply chain and required supporting 

technology and infrastructure. The demand market may 

be obscure, as is the case for innovations for the 

common good. 

 *External influences: In addition to the other 

categories of contingencies, many other factors outside 

of a program’s efforts or control can either drive or 

restrain success. For example, there may be unexpected 

technical breakthroughs, a competing technology may 

enter the market first, regulations may support 

adoption, or cultural norms or an economic recession 

might slow adoption. 

 5.1.2 Research Questions 

We developed two sets of research questions, one for the broad 

empirical analysis and one for the case studies. There is some 

overlap between questions, but they are mostly distinct in order 

to be complementary. The empirical analyses cover a much 

wider range of technologies and are thus more broadly 

representative of technology transfer activities than individual 

case studies. The case studies demonstrate consideration of 

contingencies of successful technology transfer to a much 

greater degree than do the empirical analyses. 

Broad Empirical Analysis Research Questions 

The broad empirical analyses explore the extent to which 

technology transfer has resulted in regional-, industry-, and 

company-level associations. Specifically, our driving research 

questions for the empirical analysis are: 

1. Is the geographic location and volume of technology 

transfer activity of an agency’s research facility related 

to industry growth in the region? 

2. What is the scope of geographical influence of each 

agency’s research facilities? 

3. Is participation in observable technology transfer 

activities related to company growth? 

4. What technology transfer trends have occurred over 

time? 

Case Study Research Questions 

The seven main research questions follow the logic model from 

left to right, with the seventh question wrapping back to assess 

the federal laboratory’s contribution to observed outcomes. All 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

5-6

of the research questions apply to the qualitative case studies, 

which look in-depth at individual instances of technology 

transfer. The seven questions are: 

1. What is the “technology” and how does it perform when 

compared with the next best alternative? 

2. What federal lab/agency is involved in the research and 

technology development of this technology and what has 

that involvement been over time? 

3. Who else was involved in the R&D, aside from federal 

entities, before and during the technology transfer and 

what is known about their interactions with their federal 

counterparts? 

4. What were the circumstances surrounding the federal 

transfer of the technology to the private (or public) 

sector? 

5. What has happened to the technology since its federal 

transfer to another party? What benefits, if any, 

occurred as a result of the technology transferred being 

adopted and/or commercialized? 

7. What did the federal technology development and 

transfer effort contribute to observed outcomes (after 

the technology was in private-sector hands) and how did 

contextual factors contribute to these observed 

outcomes? 

 5.2 OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGING FEDERAL 

AGENCIES 

Table 5-1 shows our efforts to solicit support from all 

appropriate federal agencies to share their disaggregated 

technology transfer data with our research team in an effort to 

prepare as complete a picture as possible of technology transfer 

from U.S. federal agencies and their laboratories to other 

parties. 

The activities in Table 5-1 describe the process through which 

our team attempted to collect limited laboratory-specific 

technology transfer data, and that information is described in 

the remaining chapters of this report. 
Chapter 5 — Approach to this Multiple-Agency Study 

5-7

Table 5-1. Engagement with the Government, Evaluation, and Academic Community 

Activity Description Date(s) 

Project kickoff Discussed NIST’s vision for the study, 

expectations, and timeline. 

February 17, 

2016 

Initial outreach to agencies’ 

points of contact 

Email outreach. Early 2016 

Briefing for the IAWGTT Initial presentation of the study’s scope to the 

entire Interagency Workgroup on Technology 

Transfer in Washington, DC. 

May 11, 2016 

Workshop entitled 

“Opportunities and Best 

Practices for Technology 

Transfer from Federal 

Laboratories” 

Invitation-only workshop in Phoenix, AZ, with 

Agency TTOs. Solicited feedback on study scope 

and data collection activities that would be 

required of participating agencies. The goal of this 

meeting was to build buy-in for a common set of 

research questions of interest to agencies. 

November 3, 

2016 

Technology Transfer Society 

presentation 

Presented study goals and solicited feedback from 

the academic community at the Technology 

Transfer Society Annual Conference in Phoenix, 

AZ. 

November 4, 

2016 

Other IAWGTT activities Multiple presentations by Courtney Silverthorn, 

Deputy Director, Technology Partnerships Office 

at NIST, presented multiple times to the IAWGTT; 

emails; etc. 

Altered study scope according to feedback from 

the agency TTOs. 

Transfer of requested 

microdata on CRADAs, 

licenses, and other 

mechanisms 

NIST and EPA provided data in 2016, while most 

of the other participating agencies provided data 

starting in December 2017. 

Primarily 

between 

December 2017 

and April 2018 

Selection of case studies and 

interviews 

Selected case studies for participating agencies 

and began primary data collection through 

interviews. 

October 2018 to 

May 2018 

One-on-one communications 

with agencies 

Conference calls, webinars, emails, etc., to garner 

buy-in, gather data, answer/ask questions, and 

coordinate. 

Early 2016 to 

July 2018 

Presentation at the FLC Briefed the technology transfer community about 

progress on the study and preliminary findings. 

April 25, 2018 

Presentation at American 

Evaluation Association 2018 

Conference 

Presentation of the scope of the study to the 

Research, Development, and Technology Topical 

Interest Group consisting mainly of professional 

evaluators. 

October 28, 

2018 

Feedback from agencies on 

case studies and results 

April 2018 to 

2019 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

5-8

It is worth noting that one of the initial concepts for this study 

was that in the process of collecting administrative data to be 

used in our own analyses, we would set up a data infrastructure 

similar in spirit to the Census Bureau’s Research Data Centers, 

where researchers could access the administrative data in a 

secure environment with preapproved research plans and 

protocols. Researchers would only be allowed to publish 

summary results and parameters as to protect the 

confidentiality of the administrative data. 

After much discussion with agencies, our team, in consultation 

with NIST, abandoned the data infrastructure concept. Data 

constraints and privacy concerns proved to be too large of an 

issue to address within the scope, budget, and timeline 

afforded this project. CRADA and license partners’ identities, for 

example, are considered to be confidential and sensitive 

information by multiple agencies. 

Therefore, throughout the process of engagement, learning 

about constraints, and securing buy-in, we moved away from 

the data infrastructure concept and refocused its efforts toward 

using the data provided by the participating federal agencies 

solely for a set of common research questions of interest. 

We were able to obtain some level of participation in the study, 

whether through contributions of administrative data or case 

study topics from the 10 agencies. 
6-1

6 

Summary of 

Primary and 

Secondary Data 

Summary 

■ A motivation for linking technology transfer data with companylevel data sources using company names and addresses is that 

data linkage facilitates descriptive and empirical analyses of 

technology transfer partners in lieu of conducting direct surveys. 

■ We linked technology transfer metrics with company names and 

address information to the National Employment Time-Series 

(NETS) database, a proprietary database with longitudinal 

company-level information. 

This chapter describes key features of both the primary and 

secondary data collected for this study as well as the 

methodology developed to link these data. 

 6.1 PRIMARY DATA 

We requested the following administrative data from each 

agency: 

 Patent data including the patent number, laboratory 

name(s), and inventor name(s) and affiliation(s) 

 License data including the license title, license type 

(e.g., exclusive, nonexclusive, and partially exclusive), 

laboratory name(s), start date, end date, licensee 

company/organization name(s), licensee address(es), 

cumulative license revenue to date, and associated 

patent(s) 

 Completed cooperative agreement data (e.g., 

CRADAs and others) including the agreement title, 

agreement type, laboratory name(s), agency 

researcher(s), start date, end date, external 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

6-2

company/organization name(s), company/organization 

address(es), external researcher name(s) 

Completeness of the information provided by the agencies to us 

varied widely based on the availability of historical information 

and other agency resources and perceived data constraints due 

to confidentiality concerns. Some fields were not provided, and 

for those fields that were provided there was often missing 

information. 

Table 6-1 summarizes the technology transfer mechanism 

information provided to us by the agencies and the associated 

years. USDA did not provide information directly but referred us 

to the Federal Register in which USDA disclosed the intent to 

exclusively license a technology. Technology transfer data are 

also time sensitive and are known to vary depending on the 

time of year of data collection.25

Table 6-1. Description of Technology Transfer Data Collected from Participating Agencies, 

by Agency and by Years of Availability 

Agency Patent Data Licensing Data CRADA Data 

DOC: NIST 1968–2014 1981–2015 1978–2015 

DoD: Air Force 1997–2017 1993–2017 1998–2017 

DoD: Army 1945–2017 1995–2017 1995–2017 

DoD: Navy — — 1988–2017 

DOI: U.S. Bureau of 

Reclamation 1984–2012 2000–2010 2009–2017 

DOT — — 2014–2016a

EPA 1986–2015 1999–2016 1984–2016 

HHS: CDC — 1989–2004 1988–2017 

HHS: NIH 1948–2017 1977–2017 1987–2017 

USDA — 1994–2017 — 

a DOT provided only a small sample of CRADA data, and we could not determine its representativeness. 

25 See footnote 6, page 10 of FY2015 Federal Technology Transfer 

report for additional details. 
Section 6 — Summary of Primary and Secondary Data 

6-3

 6.2 SECONDARY DATA 

Our secondary data source for this study is the NETS Database, 

provided by Walls & Associates and Dun & Bradstreet. The 

NETS Database provides time-series data on companies 

including 

 sales performance, 

 industry, and 

 location. 

The NETS Database includes more than 58 million companies 

from 1990 through 2014 and includes over 390 data fields. This 

database was used to identify licensees and CRADA partners 

using a consistent linkage methodology across participating 

agencies. 

 6.3 RECORD LINKAGE 

A major motivation for linking technology transfer data with 

other data sources is that the linkage facilitates descriptive and 

empirical analyses of technology transfer partners without 

having to conduct direct surveys. This approach allows for 

reliance on reported information from companies that is within 

the NETS Database. 

We linked federal technology transfer data with the NETS 

Database to provide a longitudinal history on companies that 

are engaged in licensing and/or cooperative research with 

government agencies. 

We accomplished this through a series of steps including: 

 Standardizing company names and address fields in the 

technology transfer data and the NETS Database, 

 Operationalizing a matching algorithm to link the 

technology transfer data to the NETS Database, 

 Reviewing manually all of the linked records above a 

certain score threshold to assess the quality of the 

match, and 

 De-duplicating data when multiple matches were 

returned. 

Outside of working with agencies to shape the project and 

determining which agencies wanted to participate in the study, 

data cleaning and record linkage were the most resourceintensive aspect of this study. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

6-4

The record linkage program we used for this project is a 

general-purpose “fuzzy” linkage package in Stata statistical 

software called reclink2,26 which we tailored to this project. 

“Fuzzy” linkage refers to the fact that the fields that are used 

for linkage are not spelled precisely the same across datasets. 

We opted for a linkage algorithm that placed greater weight on 

address information than on company name. Our rationale for 

this approach was that an address is a more unique identifier of 

a company than is the company’s name itself (which was more 

likely to be similar to other company names). However, both 

company name and address are needed together. If one was 

missing, we were unable to link to the NETS Database. We 

confirmed that weighting the address more heavily yielded 

better matching results, based on some comparisons we 

conducted with subsamples of data that were matched with 

different algorithms weights and manually reviewed for 

accuracy. 

For the records that had sufficient information to be matched 

with the NETS Database (that is company name and address 

information), we were able to match 68% of the name and 

address records to companies in the NETS Database. 

In an effort to ensure preciseness of the matches, we used a 

two-stage approach to linking the data. First, the matching 

algorithm generated a similarity score between records in the 

administrative data and the NETS Database, and we imposed a 

criterion to eliminate the most likely nonmatches. Specifically, 

we used manual review of matches and assigned a manual 

review category based on the quality of the match. The 68% 

match rate represents records that were assessed by a human 

reader as being in one of the categories “definitely a match” or 

“very likely a match.” 

Table 6-2 shows our match rate by participating federal agency 

by technology transfer mechanism. This table shows how well 

the linkage algorithm worked across agencies. 

26 See Wasi and Flaeen (2015) for more information. 
Section 6 — Summary of Primary and Secondary Data 

6-5

Table 6-2. Record Linkage Match Rate: Percentage of Administrative Technology Transfer 

Records Matched to NETS Database, by Participating Federal Agency 

Agency 

License Data CRADA Data 

No. of 

Records 

No. High 

Quality 

Matches % 

No. of 

Records 

No. High 

Quality 

Matches % 

DOC: NIST 122 80 66% 3,601 1,359 38% 

DoD: Air Force — — — 

DoD: Army — — — 1,557 1,293 83% 

DoD: Navy — — — 3,050 2,671 88% 

DOI: U.S.

Bureau of 

Reclamation 

— — — 19 5 26% 

DOT — — — — —— 

EPA 37 25 68% 485 288 59% 

HHS: CDC 

HHS: NIH 921 703 76% 2,073 1,649 80% 

USDA 

Total 1,080 808 Mean= 

75% 

10,785 7,265 Mean= 

67% 

7-1

7 

Geospatial Analysis 

of Technology 

Transfer Partners 

Summary 

■ There are 181 physical laboratory locations within the 10 

agencies participating in this study. 

■ Since 1978, there has been at least one CRADA partner located 

in each state. California, Massachusetts, and Maryland are home 

to the largest number of CRADA partners. 

■ While key data linking specific CRADAs to specific laboratory 

locations are unavailable in many cases, analysis of available 

NIST data suggests that cooperative research is more important 

regionally than are licenses, which tend to be more 

geographically dispersed. NIST CRADA partners are roughly 3 

times more likely to be located within a 500-mile radius of 

NIST’s Gaithersburg, Maryland, location than are NIST licensees. 

In this chapter, we explore the geospatial distribution of federal 

technology transfer partners including licensees and CRADAs. 

The data used in this chapter included any administrative 

record with address information for the partner organization 

that could be geocoded to a latitude and longitude regardless of 

whether that record could be linked with the NETS Database. 

Geocodes were derived from available geographic information 

in the administrative records. 

In most cases, the administrative data provided by the 

participating federal agencies did not link activities to individual 

federal laboratories, but rather activities were linked to the 

agency as a whole. Therefore, the geospatial analysis that 

follows should be viewed as descriptive. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

7-2

 7.1 FEDERAL LABORATORY LOCATIONS 

Depending on the specific definition of a federal laboratory that 

is used, the number of laboratories can vary drastically. 

Because it is out of the scope of this study to develop a precise 

and broadly agreed upon definition of a federal laboratory, we 

use the FLC’s membership list to illustrate the geographic reach 

of a laboratory’s technology transfer and to provide context for 

the maps of partners that follow in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. 

Figure 7-1 shows the FLC’s membership list mapped, limited to 

the set of agencies participating in this study. There are 181 

physical laboratory locations across the 10 agencies 

participating in this study.

Figure 7-1. Federal Laboratories Associated with the Federal Agencies Participating in this 

Study 
Section 7 — Geospatial Analysis of Technology Transfer Partners 

7-3

 7.2 LICENSES 

Table 7-1 shows the number of administrative records (defined 

below) provided by each participating federal agency and the 

number of the records that were able to be geocoded based on 

data quality. Five agencies provided sufficient address 

information to geocode their administrative records. Overall, 

68% of all license records were able to be geocoded to a 

latitude and longitude pair. If DoD Air Force and DoD Army are 

excluded because they did not provide sufficient information to 

be geocoded, then the percentage geocoded is 81% (not shown 

in Table 7-1). 

Figure 7-2 displays the locations of licensees by agency.27

There is often overlap between where laboratories are located 

and where licenses are located. However, licensees span a 

broader range of locations. The geographic relationship 

between licensing and federal laboratory location is explored in 

Section 7.3. 

Table 7-1. Percentage of Administrative License Records Successfully Geocoded, by 

Agencya

DoD Air 

Force 

DoD 

Army EPA NIH NIST USBR USDA Total 

No. of records 156 183 53 1,280 185 5 229 2,091 

No. geocoded — — 49 1,074 125 4 175 1,427 

Percentage geocoded — — 92% 84% 68% 80% 76% 68% 

a As noted in Table 5-2, DoD Navy did not provide licensing data for this study. 

27 Individual agency maps are available from RTI upon request. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

7-4

Figure 7-2. Locations of Licensees in the Continental United States (1978—2017), by Five 

Participating Federal Agencies 

 7.3 CRADAS 

Table 7-2 shows the number of administrative records provided 

by each agency and the number of records that were able to be 

geocoded based on data availability. Six agencies provided 

sufficient address information to geocode their administrative 

records. Overall, 70% of all CRADA records were geocoded to a 

latitude and longitude pair. If DoD Air Force and DOT are 

excluded because they did not provide sufficient information to 

be geocoded, then the percentage geocoded is 75% (not shown 

in Table 7-2). 
Section 7 — Geospatial Analysis of Technology Transfer Partners 

7-5

Table 7-2. Percentage of Administrative CRADA Records Successfully Geocoded by Agency 

DoD Air 

Force 

DoD 

Army 

DoD 

Navy DOT EPA NIH NIST USBR 

Grand 

Total 

No. of records 1,038 2,821 3,904 37 823 2,747 3,779 26 15,175 

No. geocoded — 754 3,691 — 492 2,302 3,303 25 10,567 

Percentage — 27% 95% — 84% 84% 87% 96% 70% 

Figure 7-3 displays the locations of CRADA partners in the 

continental United States by agency. Obvious concentrations 

appear in urban areas, especially along the northeastern 

seaboard, and around the San Francisco Bay area and southern 

California coast. However, there are strong clusters elsewhere. 

One downside to the number of CRADA partners as a measure 

of activity is that it does not capture the degree of intensity 

(i.e., the scale of resources invested) of any individual 

cooperative R&D project. However, we do not have data on the 

amount of funding or research hours allocated to different 

projects that could be used as a proxy for intensity. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

7-6

Figure 7-3. Locations of CRADA Partners in the Continental United States (1978—2017), by 

Six Participating Federal Agencies 

Based on available data, we identified at least one CRADA 

partner in every state including Alaska and Hawaii (see 

Figure 7-4). California, Massachusetts, and Maryland are home 

to the largest number of CRADA partners because of a variety 

of contributing factors, including but not limited to, large 

populations and company clusters in California, high-tech 

company clusters and human capital strengths in the greater 

Boston area of Massachusetts, and proximity to federal 

agencies in Maryland. 
Section 7 — Geospatial Analysis of Technology Transfer Partners 

7-7

Figure 7-4. Number of CRADAs by State in the Continental United States (1978—2017) 

a Location based on location of CRADA partner, not the location of the federal laboratory. For CRADAs with multiple 

partners, the location of the primary partner listed on the CRADA was used. Each CRADA is only counted once. 

 7.4 COMPARISON OF THE GEOSPATIAL 

DISTRIBUTION OF LICENSES AND CRADAS 

Although key data linking specific CRADAs to specific laboratory 

locations are incomplete in many cases, analysis of NIST data 

suggests that cooperative research is more prevalent regionally 

than are licenses, which tend to be more geographically 

dispersed. Specifically, NIST CRADA partners are roughly 3 

times more likely to be located within a 500-mile radius of the 

NIST Gaithersburg, Maryland, location than are NIST licensees. 

RI:84 

DE:174 

DC:131 

8-1

8 

Toward an 

Understanding of 

the Relationship 

between Company 

Sales and Licensed 

Public-Sector 

Technology 

Summary 

■ This chapter is exploratory and uses available data for a small 

number of laboratories. We analyze relationships between firm 

growth and firms having licensed technologies. We do not have 

definitive information about the relationship between the 

licensed technologies and commercialized products and services. 

Therefore, we can only provide suggestive information about the 

growth of firms engaging with laboratories and not about the 

commercial success of technology originating in the laboratories. 

■ The manufacturing sector and the professional, scientific, and 

technical services sector (using North American Industry 

Classification System [NAICS] category designations) are the 

two dominant industries engaged in licensing technologies from 

participating agencies and partnering with them on CRADAs. 

■ Based on EPA, NIH, and NIST data, evidence suggests that 

having a license from a federal lab has a positive effect on the 

sales of private-sector licensees, but the percentage changes 

cannot be attributed entirely to the licenses. 

■ The detected sales effect does not vary systematically across 

companies of varying sizes. 

■ Further research is needed to more definitively answer the 

question of the economic impact of licenses on private-sector 

sales.

■ Most of the CRADAs with a federal agency involved small 

companies. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-2

In this chapter, we first explore the licensee’s sales before and 

after it licensed a technology from a federal agency, and then 

we explore the size characteristics of a federal agency’s 

CRADAs partners.28 These were separate analyses, but both 

represent new suggestive information about aspects of federal 

agency technology transfers. 

Organizations license technologies with the purpose of 

incorporating them into products, services, and processes that 

could directly or indirectly serve to increase sales.29 The 

licenses that we explore in this chapter include federal patent 

licenses and biologic material licenses. 

We emphasize that the analysis in this chapter is exploratory 

because many factors can affect a company’s sales over time 

other than the introduction of a licensed technology. We do not 

have sufficient information on other possible factors to infer 

from our descriptive findings that the difference between sales 

after the license began compared with before the license began 

is due entirely to the presence and effect of the licensed 

technology, if at all. However, our exploratory analysis does 

suggest that, taking inflation into account, on average, the 

company’s sales increased significantly after it acquired the 

licensed technology.30

 8.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF LICENSEES 

The primary data on federal licenses to private-sector 

companies in support of the analysis in this chapter were 

provided by three of the seven agencies that participated in this 

study, namely EPA, NIH, and NIST.31 Licensing data for EPA 

cover the period 2000 through 2015; for NIH, the licensing data 

cover the period 1975 through 2017; and the NIST data cover 

28 We use the terms organization or establishment because of 

differences in the organizational structure of the units of 

observation in the NETS Database, as discussed below. 

29 The Government Accountability Office (2018) recently released a 

report with recommendations to improve the licensing of patented 

federal laboratory innovations. 

30 Future studies might investigate possible covariates associated with 

increases and decreases in company sales after a technology was 

licensed from a federal laboratory. 

31 Table 5-2 shows that more agencies provided licensing data than 

EPA, NIH, and NIST. However, those agencies did not provide either 

the company name that licensed the technology and/or the 

company’s location; thus, those data could not be matched to the 

NETS data (discussed below and in Appendix D) to obtain relevant 

sales information. 
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-3

the period 1981 through 2015. We know from each agency’s 

licensing data the date that each license started, meaning the 

date that a technology was transferred to a private-sector 

company through a licensing arrangement. We do not know 

when or if the company that licensed the technology 

incorporated it into a product or process that gained traction in 

the market. 

We first matched the agency-reported licensee information to 

corresponding information in the NETS Database, which is the 

source of our sales data. The NETS Database provides 

information on company sales over the period 1990 through 

2014 for all companies that were operating for all or a part of 

that period of time. For the following descriptive statistics, we 

focus on the characteristics of licensees at the time of licensing. 

The following tables and figures in this section document the 

characteristics of licensees that were matched to the NETS 

Database. Characteristics described include: 

 sales (nominal), 

 employment, 

 type of company, 

 sector (2-digit NAICS), and 

 industry (3- and 4-digit NAICS). 

At the time of licensing, EPA licensees tend to be smaller than 

NIH and NIST licensees as measured by average sales and 

average levels of employment. At the median, however, EPA 

licensees tend to be similar in size to NIH and NIST licensees 

(see Table 8-1). Companies varied widely in terms of sales at 

the time the license was granted, from $3,000 in sales to more 

than $2 billion in sales. Employment at the time the license was 

granted ranged for the licensees from a single employee to 

more than 12,000 employees. 

The companies in the NETS Database that were matched to the 

data provided by the participating agencies included a variety 

of types, from headquarters to branch locations to stand-alone 

operations (single company). Table 8-2 includes a breakout of 

the types of companies by agency. In some cases (21% of 

companies), we had to aggregate the separate enterprises 

within a company in the NETS Database to arrive at information 

for the overall company. Detailed definitions are included in 

Appendix D. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-4

Table 8-1. Descriptive Statistics of Licensee Companies, at Time of License (1990–2014) 

 EPA NIH NIST 

Sales ($) 

Average 28,529,719 46,369,342 47,637,546 

Median 4,234,550 4,491,700 4,080,000 

Minimum 20,000 3,000 28,300 

Maximum 169,700,000 2,067,686,272 540,995,008 

Employment 

Average 160 269 392 

Median 47 43 35 

Minimum 1 1 1 

Maximum 1,000 12,284 6,029 

Table 8-2. Percentage of Licenses by Type of Licensee Company (1990–2014) 

 EPA NIH NIST 

Headquarters 18% 31% 25% 

Branch 5% 6% 11% 

Stand-alone 14% 42% 27% 

Aggregateda 64% 20% 37% 

a Aggregated records are entities that are combinations of companies of various types (headquarters, branches, 

and stand-alone) that are present in the NETS Database at the same physical location but have different time 

series for sales and employment. Additional detail is provided in Appendix D. 

Figure 8-1 shows the composition of licensees by agency in 

terms of the industry sectors at the time of licensing based on 

NAICS codes. The manufacturing sector and the professional 

scientific, and technical services sector are the two dominant 

sectors engaged in licensing technologies from EPA, NIH, and 

NIST. Deleted from Figure 8-1 are organizations in the public 

administration sector (NAICS 92) and universities. We excluded 

these organizations because they do not represent examples of 

technology transfer from government to the private sector. 

In the manufacturing sector, chemical manufacturers (such as 

biopharmaceutical companies) comprise the majority of NIH 

licensees. Computer and electronic product manufacturers 

comprise the majority of NIST licensees. Finally, machinery 

manufacturers comprise the majority of EPA licensees (see 

Figure 8-2). 
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-5

Figure 8-1. Percentage of Licensee Organizations by Sector, at Time of License 

(1990–2014) 

Source: Analysis of 2-Digit NAICS codes from the NETS Database 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-6

Figure 8-2. Manufacturing: Percentage of Licensee Companies at Time of License 

(1990–2014) 

Source: Analysis of 3-digit NAICS codes from the NETS Database. 
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-7

In the professional scientific, and technical services sector, 

scientific R&D service companies comprise the majority of NIST 

and NIH licensees, while architectural and engineering service 

companies comprise the majority of EPA licensees (see 

Figure 8-3). 

Figure 8-3. Professional Technical and Scientific Services 4-Digit NAICS: Percentage of 

Licensee Companies at Time of License (1990–2014) 

Source: Analysis of 4-digit NAICS codes from the NETS Database. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-8

 8.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPANY 

SALES AND LICENSED PUBLIC-SECTOR 

TECHNOLOGY 

Protocols were adopted to arrive at a final sample of companies 

to which an agency had licensed a technology and for which 

sufficient years of sales data are available. Table 8-3 describes 

the protocols that we adopted for the data reduction process. 

We followed the protocols described in Table 8-3 for the 

analysis of each agency’s licensing data. First, we adjusted all 

sales figures to constant dollars ($1,000) referenced to 2010 

using the gross national product implicit price deflator.32

Second, we calculated for each company the mean value of 

inflation-adjusted sales before the license started and the mean 

value of inflation-adjusted sales after the license started (the 

year the license started is treated as a year after the license 

started). Third, we calculated for each company the percentage 

change in mean inflation-adjusted sales as: 

[(mean inflation-adjusted sales after the license started less 

mean inflation-adjusted sales before the license started) / 

mean inflation-adjusted sales before the license started]. 

Table 8-3. Data Reduction Protocols and Affected Companies, by Agency (1990–2014) 

 EPA NIH NIST 

Number of license records provided by the agency that could be 

matched to a company using the NETS Database (excludes 

companies in the public administration sector and universities) 

25 703 80 

Less number of matched companies for which any sales data 

were not available both before and after the license started 

−2 −221 −19 

Less number of matched companies for which less than 3 

consecutive years of data were available on sales before the 

license started as well as after the license started (we include the 

year of the license as a year after the license started) 

−4 −92 −10 

Less number of matched companies with missing sales data 0 0 −1 

Outliers or questionable dataa 0 −1 0 

Companies in the final sample 19 389 50 

a One stand-alone company that licensed a technology from NIH had a sales increase after the license started by 

1,118,700.6%. We deemed this company to be an outlier and we deleted it; we suspect that its sales data were 

not reported correctly in the NETS Database. 

32 For the source of information on implicit price deflators, see 

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-9

Table 8-4 reports, by agency, the mean of the percentage 

change in inflation-adjusted sales for all companies, for those 

companies that had an increase in mean inflation-adjusted 

sales, and for those companies that had a decrease in inflationadjusted sales.

For EPA, of the 14 companies for which the mean inflationadjusted sales increased after the license started, the mean 

percentage increase was 172.9%. For the 5 companies for 

which the mean inflation-adjusted sales decreased after the 

license started, the mean percentage decrease was 18.8%. 

For NIH, of the 297 companies for which the mean inflationadjusted sales increased after the license started, the mean 

percentage increase was 513.1%. For the 92 companies for 

which the mean inflation-adjusted sales decreased after the 

license started, the mean percentage decrease was 33.5%. 

For NIST, of the 26 companies for which the mean inflationadjusted sales increased after the license started, the mean 

percentage increase was 161.3%. For the 24 companies for 

which the mean inflation-adjusted sales decreased after the 

license started, the mean percentage decrease was 29.2%. 

The percentage changes in company sales, by participating 

federal agency of the licensed technology, are in Figure 8-4. 

Table 8-4. Descriptive Information on the Percentage Change in Companies’ Sales, by 

Agency (1990–2014) 

 EPA NIH NIST 

Number of companies that had an increase in inflationadjusted sales after the license started compared with 

before 

14 297 26 

Number of companies that had a decrease in inflationadjusted sales after the license started compared with 

before 

5 92 24 

Mean of the percentage change in inflation-adjusted sales 

for all companies 

122.5% 384.0% 69.9% 

Sales Increase 

Mean of the percentage increase in inflation-adjusted sales 

for those companies that had a mean sales increase after 

the license started compared with before the license started 

172.9% 513.1% 161.3% 

Sales Decrease 

Mean of the percentage decrease in inflation-adjusted sales 

for those companies that had a mean sales decrease after 

the license started compared with before the license started 

18.8% 33.5% 29.2% 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-10

Figure 8-4. Percentage of Licensees with an Increase in Company Sales After the License 

Started (1990–2014) 

To further describe the percentage changes in inflationadjusted sales, Table 8-5 shows the distribution of percentage 

changes in sales by quartile and by agency. The first quartile 

for NIH is a positive percentage change, whereas the first 

quartiles for EPA and NIST are negative percentage changes. 

For NIH, the maximum value for a company’s percentage 

change is 18,333.8%.33

Table 8-5. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, by Percentage Change 

Quartiles and Agency (1990–2014) 

Quartile EPA (n=19) NIH (n=389) NIST (n=50) 

1Q −2.00% 2.20% −22.30% 

2Q (median) 26.70% 74.40% 3.30% 

3Q 184.90% 233.40% 113.40% 

4Q (maximum) 976.90% 18,333.80% 493.90% 

33 The next highest value of a company’s percentage change in sales is 

16,448.3%; thus, we do not consider the former value an outlier. 
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-11

The percentage changes in Table 8-4 and in Figure 8-4 merely 

suggest that the licensed technology is positively associated 

with inflation-adjusted company sales (our research only shows 

a correlation). Thus, generalization from these descriptive 

relationships should be made with caution. Figure 8-5 shows 

the overall mean and median percentage change in company 

sales by agency of the licensed technology. 

As emphasized above, the percentage increases and decreases 

in company sales cannot be attributed to the presence of a 

licensed federal technology. Other factors that we cannot 

control for are lags between when the license started and the 

licensed technology becoming an integral part of a company’s 

products, sales, or processes; whether the licensed technology 

became a product or process integral to the company’s sales; 

managerial differences across companies in all aspects of the 

Figure 8-5. Mean and Median Percentage Change in Company Sales (1990–2014) 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

8-12

company’s operations; and changes in market and economic 

conditions, although converting sales into inflation-adjusted 

sales accounts in part for changes in economic conditions over 

time. 

We also considered the relationship between company size and 

the percentage change in sales after licensing. Using the 

number of company employees at the time the license started 

as an indicator of company size, we computed percentage 

changes in inflation-adjusted company sales by employment 

size quartiles (see Table 8-6 and Figure 8-6). For EPA, the 

percentage change in mean inflation-adjusted company sales 

increases with company size for the smaller 50% of the 

companies, and then it decreases for larger companies. There is 

no similar pattern among the NIH companies. Among the NIST 

companies, the percentage change in mean inflation-adjusted 

company sales continually increases for the larger 75% of the 

companies. 

In summary, one should not generalize from the qualitative 

information in this chapter, or if one does, any generalizations 

should be offered cautiously. Nevertheless, the qualitative 

information in this chapter may possibly be a starting point for 

more detailed studies of the sales impact of licensed federal 

technology to private-sector companies. Surveys of the 

relevant companies for primary source information would 

confirm what we suspect to be a relationship between licensing 

and increased sales of the licensed company. 

Table 8-6. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, by Employment Quartiles 

and Agency (1990–2014) 

Quartile EPA (n=19) NIH (n=389) NIST (n=50) 

1Q 272.4% 594.7% 103.2% 

2Q (median) 437.3% 333.1% 25.3% 

3Q 105.8% 447.4% 108.8% 

4Q (maximum) 54.3% 154.4% 356.5% 
Section 8 — Toward an Understanding of the Relationship 

between Company Sales and Licensed Public-Sector Technology 

8-13

Figure 8-6. Comparison of Percentage Changes in Company Sales, by Employment 

Quartiles and Agency (1990–2014) 

9-1

9 

Toward an 

Understanding of 

Cooperative R&D 

Agreements with 

Federal 

Laboratories and 

Company Size 

Summary 

■ Descriptive data show that federal agencies have a higher 

propensity to conduct cooperative R&D with smaller-sized 

companies than with larger-sized companies. 

In this chapter, we investigate the propensity of private-sector 

companies to engage in CRADA activity with a federal 

laboratory. Information was provided by the participating 

agencies on their CRADA activity by year. For each CRADA, we 

also know the year in which the CRADA began and the 

employment size of the private-sector company at the time 

they participated. 

Our hypothesis is that smaller-sized companies are more active 

in CRADA activity than larger-size companies. Motivating this 

hypothesis is Title 15 of the U.S. Code. Therein it states in § 

3710a. Cooperative research and development agreements, 

that: “Each Federal agency may permit the director of any of its 

Government-operated Federal laboratories ... (1) to enter into 

cooperative research and development agreements on behalf of 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

9-2

such agency ... with industrial organizations ...” And, in 15 USC 

3710a(c)(4)(A), it states that “The laboratory director in 

deciding what cooperative research and development 

agreements to enter into shall—(A) give special consideration 

to small business firms, and consortia involving small business 

firms; ...” Our analysis suggests the legally mandated 

propensity of the participating federal agencies to engage in 

CRADAs with small firms. 

The six agencies that provided information on their CRADA 

activities are : DoD, U.S. Army and U.S. Navy; DOI, Bureau of 

Reclamation; EPA; NIST; and NIH. 

Table 9-1 shows the data reduction process. The tabular 

analysis that follows relates to the bottom two rows of the 

table. For example, of the 512 companies that could be 

matched to NETS data, 128 of them met the protocols and had 

at the time the CRADA was initiated 500 or fewer employees 

(which defines a small firm herein). 

Figure 9-1 shows the distribution of CRADAs across 2-digit 

NAICS sectors. 

Table 9-1. Data Reduction Protocols and Affected Companies, by Participating Federal 

Agency 

DoD Army DoD Navy DOI Bureau of Reclamation EPA NIH NIST 

Number of agency provided CRADAs that 

were matched to NETS data 

512 2,579 4 181 1,542 1,217 

Less CRADAs with missing information on 

NAICS codes and employment levels 

152 2,105 3 120 1,068 704 

Less CRADAs that involved a public agency 

or university or medical school 

136 1,883 3 99 1,058 653 

Less CRADAs with more than 500 

employees 

128 1,689 2 87 915 568 
Section 9 — Toward an Understanding of Cooperative R&D Agreements 

with Federal Laboratories and Company Size 

9-3

Figure 9-1. Percentage of Companies Involved in a CRADA by Sector, at Time of CRADAa

(1990–2014) 

a For readability, this figure excludes any sector with less than 1% of companies. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

9-4

Table 9-2 shows the distribution of employment quartiles for 

each agency according to the protocols above, except for the 

small firm criterion. Table 9-3 shows the distribution of 

employment quartiles after implementing the small firm 

criterion. 

Table 9-2. Employment Quartiles (CRADAs with any number of company employees) 

Quantile 

DoD Army (n=136) DoD Navy n=1,883) DOI Bureau of Reclamation (n=3) EPA (n=99) NIH (n=1,058) NIST (n-653) 

1Q 9 9 1 8 12 11 

2Q (median) 31 35 20 20 60 45 

3Q 103 150 1,009 175 200 250 

4Q (maximum) 3,170 21,300 1,009 29,186 5,000 19,000 

Table 9-3. Employment Quartiles (CRADAs with 500 or fewer employees) 

Quantile 

DoD Army (n=128) DoD Navy n=1,689) DOI Bureau of Reclamation (n=2) EPA (n=87) NIH (n=915) NIST (n-6568) 

1Q 8 7 1 6 9 9 

2Q (median) 28 25 11 15 42 30 

3Q 99 100 20 60 160 113 

4Q (maximum) 460 500 20 425 500 500 
10-1

10 

Case Studies of 

Successful 

Technology Transfer 

from Federal 

Laboratories 

Summary 

■ Government R&D that leads to federal laboratory technology 

transfer serves the public through new innovations and their 

economic, environmental, and health benefits. 

■ Bringing innovations derived from federal transferred technology 

by the company into the market takes time as well as a longterm commitment to investments in R&D. It also takes a 

commitment from individuals, both federal and private, with 

expertise in the transferred technology. 

■ Federal laboratory management can facilitate the successfulness 

of technology transfer by providing resources and a culture that 

values such activity. 

■ Potential federal innovations can come from nonresearch staff as 

well as research staff if the organization is structured to allow it. 

Generally, allowing nonresearch staff to be involved in the 

innovation process requires some decentralization of decisionmaking authority. 

■ Clear market need accelerates the transfer and later adoption of 

the innovation. 

■ Co-development by federal labs of a transferred technology with 

individuals of companies with supplementary expertise appears 

to increase the likelihood that the federal transferred technology 

will have market success. 

Mission-specific case studies, one for each participating agency, 

are included as an integral part of this study. They document 

outcomes and impacts of federal technology development and 

transfer from the federal laboratories. They also document 

federal TTO support, transfer mechanisms (including knowledge 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-2

transfers) used, and the contexts in which the transfer 

occurred. 

Based on available information, we document observed 

outcomes in each case study and trace how the federal agency 

and laboratory support, as well as other factors, contributed to 

these outcomes. Each participating federal agency worked with 

the project team to select a case study topic for greatest 

relevance and value to the agency. Participating agencies had 

the opportunity to review their draft case studies before 

publication. Nine reviewed case studies are presented in this 

report. 

Anticipating that a broad range of federal technologies could be 

transferred from federal agencies and federal laboratories, we 

followed a case study protocol to ensure consistent definition of 

terminology and a consistent logic and line of inquiry, despite 

heterogeneity in the underlying technologies, agencies, and 

mechanisms.34 Many scenarios are possible in efforts to develop 

and commercialize technologies for societal impact in alignment 

with federal agencies’ missions, particularly those that involve a 

handoff from government-funded R&D to the private sector. 

Each case study investigates and reports important milestones 

and contextual factors along the developmentcommercialization-adoption path of the federal transferred 

technology; each also reports the contribution of agency 

activities to observed progress and success. Agency activities 

may be specific programs, approaches, R&D effort, and 

technology transfer activities. 

Because the case studies were conducted by different members 

of the team, consistent use of terminology is important to 

ensure comparisons across the various studies. Common 

terminology is as follows. 

Technology may be hardware or software; a service such as 

calibration or certification; a technical standard, measurement 

tool, or dataset; a process, practice, or business model; or 

knowledge or know-how. In addition to a stand-alone item, the 

technology may be a component that is embedded in a new or 

existing product, process, practice, or policy. 

34 Case studies conducted with the same evaluation protocol allow for 

easier comparison and synthesis across studies. 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

10-3

Commercialization is defined here as “at least one technology 

sold (or utilized) in the market.” There are different ways of 

categorizing stages in the development of a new technology, 

including the stages of the stage-gate process (Cooper, 2008): 

preliminary and detailed investigation, development, validation, 

and commercial launch or the sequence of clinical trials for a 

new biomedical innovation. 

Success may be represented in the form of improved 

capabilities, improved knowledge, and new hypotheses on 

which future innovation can build, where innovation is defined 

as introduction to the market of something new or improved 

that adds value (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development and Eurostat, 2005). 

Innovation is interpreted to mean market or nonmarket 

adoption of a technology. 

 10.1 FRAMEWORK FOR THE CASE STUDIES 

Fundamental to our evaluation planning and implementation is 

a logic model. The logic model guiding this study was discussed 

in Chapter 5 and is reproduced here as Figure 10-1. 

 10.1.1 Characteristics of Factors that Influence the Success of 

Technology Transfer Efforts 

As stated in Chapter 5, the model also calls out “contingencies,” 

or characteristics, of each instance of federal technology 

transfer that affect the timing, parties involved, and size and 

type of outcome/impact of the transfer. Characteristics have 

been defined for each element of the logic model, and 

characteristics will vary depending on the laboratory and the 

specific R&D, the object transferred and transfer mechanism, 

the transfer recipient and demand environment, and the agency 

mission and a broad notion of the pathways to economic and or 

social value. 

The characteristics for the eight aspects or contingencies 

influencing federal technology transfer success are shown in the 

logic model. Five are from Bozeman (2013), and the three we 

have added are preceded by an asterisk: 

 transfer agent 

 transfer object 

 *technology transfer support 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-4

Figure 10-1. Federal Technology Transfer and Commercialization Logic Model with 

Contingencies 

 transfer media 

 technology recipient 

 *transfer collaborations and intermediaries 

 demand environment 

 *external influences 

Detailed descriptions of each contingency are included in 

Chapter 5. 

 10.2 CASE STUDY APPROACH 

The objective of the case studies was to provide documentation 

of successful federal technology transfer activities through the 

identification of specific outcomes and impacts associated with 

a technology transferred from a federal laboratory. The case 

study information template used in each case study included 

the following seven broad questions: 

1. What is the “technology” and what does it do compared 

with the next best alternative? 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

10-5

2. What is the history of federal lab/agency involvement in 

the research and technology development of this 

technology? What was the mechanism for the 

technology transfer? 

3. Who else was involved in the R&D before and during 

transfer and what is known about their interactions? 

4. What were the circumstances surrounding the federal 

transfer of the technology to the private (or public) 

sector? 

5. What has happened since the transfer of the 

technology? 

6. What benefits occurred as a result of its 

commercialization/adoption? 

7. What did the federal technology development and 

transfer effort contribute to observed outcomes and how 

did contextual factors contribute to these observed 

outcomes? 

Appendix E is a stand-alone document describing the protocol 

we followed for these case studies. It includes our full interview 

guide with detailed subquestions within each of the seven broad 

questions. Information related to these questions was initially 

collected from a review of documents,35 the extant literature, 

and relevant websites, but the primarily source of information 

came from interviews with knowledgeable individuals familiar 

with key aspects of the case.36

Our findings were based primarily on content analysis of all the 

listed data sources. Analysis of benefits involved summarizing 

existing information on use or sales. When possible, other 

economic, social, environmental, and national security benefits 

were considered. 

Our team spoke (generally through telephone interviews) with 

over 40 individuals across the nine case studies. As 

Table 10-1demonstrates, those interviewed included major 

35 Documents included 1) published papers and histories written by the 

technology developers, 2) writings by relevant technology and 

market experts found through web searches, 3) websites about and 

for the technology and related subjects, and 4) published licensing 

and royalty information and studies of economic impact where 

those had been done by others. 

36 Such individuals included the government inventor(s), those 

involved in the technology transfer, and the recipient of the 

transferred object and/or co-developers in industry. Most case 

studies included at least five interviews. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-6

Table 10-1. Interviewees by Type of Stakeholder 

Case Study 

Type of Stakeholder 

Total 

Government 

Technology 

Development and 

Transfer 

Universities 

and 

Intermediaries Industry Other 

DOC, NIST 2 — 1 — 3 

DOI, USBR 1 — — — 1 

DoD, Air Force 2 — 3 1 6 

DoD, Army 3 — 1 — 4 

DoD, Navy 4 1 2 — 7 

DOT, FHWA 2 — — 4 6 

HHS, CDC 2 — — — 2 

HHS, NIH 3 3 — — 6 

USDA, Agricultural 

Research Service 

(ARS) 

3 3 2 — 8 

Total 22 7 9 5 43 

Note: Counts include some unstructured interviews that provided critical information, as well as a few structured 

email exchanges when we were unable to arrange a time for a telephone interview. 

stakeholder groups. The interviewers had more participation 

from licensees and other industry partners for some of the case 

studies. 

 10.3 CASE STUDY BENEFITS AND 

BENEFICIARIES 

As expected, reported benefits and beneficiaries of the 

technologies studied reflect the agencies’ missions as well as 

the sectors specific to their individual missions. To summarize: 

 In all nine cases, the transfer of the federal technology 

contributed to achieving the agency mission. 

 In all nine cases, the public benefited either directly or 

indirectly from the transferred technology. 

 In eight of the nine cases, industry was involved and 

benefited from that involvement (CDC was not one). 

 In six of the nine cases, government personnel and/or 

processes were the direct recipient of the federal 

technology transferred (NIST, DOI, Air Force, Army, 

Navy, DOT). In other words, the government was 

developing solutions for its own needs and the transfer 

of the technology to the private sector helped bring 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

10-7

additional resources and capacity to scale up the 

technology for use and/or opened up the opportunity for 

the private sector to commercialize the technology for 

use outside of the government. 

 In two of the nine cases, the broader research 

community (i.e., government, industry, and universities) 

benefited directly from the transfer of the technology 

(CDC, USDA). 

The federal technology transferred and its benefits and 

beneficiaries for each case are summarized in Box 10-1. The 

counterfactual as seen by interviewees when they were asked 

“what would likely have happened without the government R&D 

and transfer” is also briefly stated. Where data were reported 

by interviewees that quantified benefits or where such data 

were estimated by the case study author, these are also 

reported in the table. Complete case studies are in 

Appendices E through M. 

 10.3.1 DOC NIST Framework for Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Cybersecurity 

In 2013, NIST, directed by a presidential executive order and 

led by the Information Technology Laboratory ITL, convened 

hundreds of public- and private-sector actors, including 

companies, associations, and government agencies, to create 

the Framework comprising standards, guidelines, and practices 

that help organizations reduce cyber risk while avoiding 

regulatory requirements. The Cybersecurity Framework, 

Version 1.0, was released in the open literature in February 

2014, a guidance document in May 2015, and Framework 

Version 1.1 in April 2018. 

The Framework evaluates the level of effort taken by an 

organization to reduce risk related to a cyberattack; a 

cybersecurity community actively shares lessons learned about 

specific threats and responses. Standards generate a public 

good the private sector could not create. Users of standards 

reduce their risks and associated risks for the public/their 

customers of cyberattack and accompanying costs. Such 

cyberattacks threaten national security or interrupt electric 

power or communication. Without the Framework, each 

government agency and other types of organizations would be 

left to establish their own cybersecurity protocols and strategies 

without a common reference. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-8

Initially meant to improve cybersecurity in government, the 

Framework and its growing adoption continue to improve 

overall cybersecurity. According to NIST, 30% of organizations 

in the United States had implemented the Framework by 2015 

with a projected 50% by 2020. These organizations represent 

16 critical infrastructure sectors and 20 state governments. 

Further, a recent report finds that 28% of U.S. companies now 

require their vendors to follow the accepted Cybersecurity 

Framework, a supply chain response. 

Cyberattacks disproportionately affect larger companies, and 

estimates of the average cost of an adverse cyber event range 

from $2.7 million to $21 million per event. The Framework has 

not only provided federal agencies with an important 

benchmark and the user community, but it has also given 

weight to federal agency resource requests in terms of 

cybersecurity budget and staffing 

 10.3.2 DOI Bureau of Reclamation Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic 

Tool 

Jim DeHaan and the research group at the Bureau of 

Reclamation (the Bureau) saw the need for a diagnostic tool for 

large hydroelectric generators located on hydroelectric dams, 

developed it, and filed an invention disclosure report with the 

Bureau’s TTO in 2000. The patent was awarded in 2002. During 

that period, the R&D group manufactured several flexible 

fluxprobes for use in the field. The Bureau then approached Iris 

Power, who agreed to work with the Bureau to transfer and 

further develop the technology, signing a nonexclusive licensing 

agreement with the Bureau for the flexible fluxprobe, as well as 

a entering into a CRADA. Iris Power made several functional 

improvements to the flexible fluxprobe, which it continues to 

offer to customers, companies, cooperatives, and governments 

that possess large-scale hydroelectric generation facilities. 

The fluxprobe is a diagnostic tool for large hydroelectric 

generators located in hydroelectric dams. The tool attaches 

inside the rotor mounts of the generator and detects magnetic 

fields associated with the wear and tear of insulation. This 

diagnostic tool lowers a challenge of maintenance for these 

dams, both publicly and privately operated, reduces downtime, 

which translates into lower maintenance costs and more 

generation capacity. The Bureau of Reclamation operates many 

dams for the benefit of the public. It is unlikely that the private 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

10-9

sector would have developed the device on their own, or if they 

had, they would have taken a significantly longer period of time 

to do so. 

The flexible fluxprobe and generator rotor monitor reduce the 

time required for offline component evaluation, improve 

diagnosis accuracy and maintenance schedules, and reduce the 

risk of catastrophic component failure. These benefits, in turn, 

translate into collective reduction of generator downtime, with 

operational savings and more reliable power generation. The 

agency also received modest licensing revenues of nearly 

$40,000 as of 2015, from Iris Power that were used to continue 

its technology transfer activities and provide incentives to 

inventors to further develop new, useful dual-use technologies. 

By inventing the flexible fluxprobe to improve the operation and 

lifespan of government-owned hydroelectric power facilities, the 

Bureau of Reclamation created a new technology that also 

lowered the development costs for industry. Iris Power agreed 

to license the flexible fluxprobe because the technology aligned 

well with its corporate mission for helping its clients manage 

and maintain large-scale power equipment. Although the 

flexible fluxprobe is a low-volume product (about 366 units 

were sold by 2015), it enhances the products and services Iris 

Power offers. Iris Power has made functional improvements to 

the technology and developed complementary services, such as 

installation of the flexible fluxprobe, and it offers the device as 

part of larger product and service bundles to power generation 

companies around the world. 

 10.3.3 DoD Air Force Attenuating Custom Communications 

Earpiece System (ACCES) 

ACCES was developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory’s 

(AFRL) 711th Human Performance Wing (711 HPW) and 

Westone, a hearing protection technology company, through a 

CRADA. ACCES improved on an existing Westone earmold 

technology. Westone introduced it the enhanced technology 

commercially in 2007. 

ACCES includes a silicone custom-molded earpiece that joins 

with a speaker cable to deliver audio to the user at very high 

altitudes and detaches easily if the pilot needs to eject. Air 

Force pilots of fighter aircraft using this system have reduced 

their risk of hearing loss due to extreme noise, increased their 

ability to communicate with others during flight, and experience 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

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less risk of injury if they eject from the aircraft while wearing 

this earpiece. The requirements of the Air Force for supply of 

the ACCES technology are likely too small of a market to have 

triggered private-sector investment in R&D. 

Initially, the Air Force pilots’ use of ACCES earpieces was 

limited to use in fighter jets, but over time the ACCES 

technology was certified by the Air Force for use across a 

variety of airframes. Additionally, pilots’ use of the ACCES 

technology began to spread to other aircraft crew members’ 

and ground crew personnel’s use. Air Force personnel of 

approximately 10,000, were likely users of the ACCES product 

from 2007 to 2017. For this time frame, we estimate this 

population of potential users in the Air Force to be over 88,000 

individuals, suggesting an estimated market penetration of 

11% within the Air Force. ACCES not only protects hearing and 

reduces hearing loss and its associated costs, but also improves 

pilot retention and user effectiveness in times where safety, 

awareness, and effective communication are paramount. 

Although the Air Force remains the dominant purchaser of 

ACCES, Westone also markets the product to other branches of 

the military, friendly foreign militaries, law enforcement, and 

the commercial space industry. From 2007 to the end of 2017, 

Westone sold 13,755 ACCES units. 

 10.3.4 DoD Army Japanese Encephalitis Vaccine—Walter Reed 

Army Institute for Research 

The JEV vaccine was developed in the DoD laboratory at Walter 

Reid Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) under a CRADA. In 

1998, CJ Corp and WRAIR filed a patent application for a U.S. 

patent. That same year, CJ Corp left the partnership with 

WRAIR and sublicensed the rights to the vaccine to VaccGen. 

WRAIR and VaccGen moved the vaccine through Phase I and 

Phase II clinical trials, and the product received a patent in 

2001. CDC selected the WRAIR/VaccGen/Intercell AG 

partnership to bring the new vaccine (IXIARO) to market, 

guaranteeing availability to DoD for purchase of the vaccine 

immediately upon Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 

approval, which they did in 2009. 

This FDA-approved vaccine protects U.S. military personnel and 

contractors stationed in specific parts of Asia for extended 

periods of time. The vaccine protects them from contracting 

JEV, a mosquito-borne illness in the same family as West Nile 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

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and Zika. The U.S. military personnel, contractors, and families 

who accompany them are protected against sickness and a 

brain disease that can cause death, by a vaccine less toxic and 

more effective than alternatives, none of which are FDA 

approved. Producers and sellers of the vaccine receive revenue. 

Without the military’s demand for the vaccine, it would not 

have been developed. There is no U.S. domestic market for this 

vaccine, because the virus is not endemic. 

The IXIARO vaccine provides significant health and commercial 

benefits but is small in the broader context of JEV vaccines 

across the globe. As of 2014, 12 different JEV vaccines were on 

the global market, with most produced by China, Japan, Korea, 

and India. Of these vaccines, IXIARO is the only JEV vaccine 

approved in the United States and in many of its military allies 

including European countries and Canada. WRAIR’s careful 

development of a safe, efficacious vaccine resulted in a safer 

product than its predecessor’s and competitors’ vaccines with 

fewer concerns about toxicity. Thus, use of IXIARO is 

considered safe not only for U.S. service personnel, but for 

their families as well; its use lowers the risk of military families 

in East Asia contracting the disease. Its exclusive approval for 

use in the United States allows IXIARO to dominate the JEV 

vaccine market there but also makes the vaccine more 

expensive to produce and less likely to be competitive outside 

of the primary U.S. market. Producers of the vaccine have been 

successful. DoD has been using the vaccine since 2011 and 

signed a 1-year contract with Valneva in 2017, worth nearly 

$40 million, to supply IXIARO to DoD. 

 10.3.5 DoD Navy Facilities Engineering Port Security Barriers 

(PSB) 

Researchers at the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center 

(NAVFAC NFESC), building on earlier work by Navy researchers, 

developed a step-change improvement in PSBs. They 

negotiated a patent license agreement with Harbor Offshore in 

2004, giving Harbor Offshore the exclusive rights to market the 

patented PSB technology for commercial uses. The Navy 

retained IP rights over the technology for their own use. A 

second company, Truston, was able to negotiate a coexclusive 

license with the Navy in 2009. By 2016, variations of the new 

PSB technology had replaced the previous, now inferior, 

security system in all 24 Navy homeports. 
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The PSB system acts as a both a visible and physical deterrent 

to access port waters and greatly reduces the likelihood of 

unauthorized access to waterfront assets by small surface 

watercraft. In addition to the physical deterrent, the PSB 

system also acts to dissipate kinetic energy produced by a 

collision. The barriers protect waterfront assets and people 

present in the area for the Navy and nonmilitary users and thus 

lower the risk of attack and the accompanying economic costs 

and lives lost. The industry that produces and sells PSB 

receives revenue. Without the government R&D and technology 

transfer, the private sector would have eventually developed 

other solutions, but their systems would not likely have been as 

extensively tested as PSB. 

The bulk of U.S. Navy PSB purchases occurred between 2004 

and 2012, as the Dunlop system installations were replaced 

with the PSB system and as PSB systems were installed at 

Naval facilities with no prior marine barrier system. There are 

clear national security benefits evident because the fence 

“makes us a harder target.” PSB has also been used to protect 

other high-value assets such as cruise ships, nuclear power 

plants, dams, and offshore oil rigs. Where PSBs are deployed, 

risks posed to human safety and loss of human life in both 

military and nonmilitary settings are reduced. 

Harbor Offshore and Truston have developed portfolios of 

products related to the PSB technology, which has resulted in 

cumulative sales of about $185 million. The use of this 

technology reduces the economic risks and costs associated 

with an attack on a large hydroelectric facility or waterside 

nuclear energy plant. Such an attack on a hydroelectric facility 

would cause disruption in the availability of electricity and 

probable rise in prices due to the power shortage. Use of this 

technology also has the potential to reduce environmental risks. 

Where these are employed for offshore drilling and/or nuclear 

energy applications, it may reduce unintended leakage of oil 

and chemicals into waterbodies, were an attack to occur. 

 10.3.6 DOT FHWA Mobile Solution for Assessment and 

Reporting (MSAR) 

A staff member at the DOT Federal Highway Administration saw 

a need, designed a solution with the target users, and 

contracted with a private-sector IT company Run Solutions to 

develop the software application to provide disaster 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

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assessments more efficiently. Prior to DOT approval, the 

software was piloted in the field and licensed for free beginning 

in 2016 for use in the Federal Emergency Relief program with 

state partners and the Emergency Relief for Federal Owned 

Roads program. 

This software application helps officials capture disaster 

damages to transportation infrastructure in the field by using 

ubiquitous smartphone and tablet technology and providing 

near real-time accessibility to assessments and intelligent 

routing for approvals. Federal and state governments can 

assess damages more quickly and efficiently and at lower cost 

to better inform decisions on funds to repair damages. Repairs 

completed more quickly translates to less social and economic 

disruption. Without the MSAR, many states likely would have 

developed processes using similar technology eventually or 

kept using their own processes. Cumulative development costs 

of better solutions would have been higher and there would be 

no overarching standard and little sight for FHWA into the realtime status of damages in a multistate region. 

Pilot testing of the MSAR demonstrated a potential total labor 

savings of 17.5 hours (reduction from 63 hours to 44.5 hours) 

per damage assessment report. This frees up staff time for 

other activities. For Hurricane Harvey alone, TX DOT and local 

agencies documented over 900 sites in under 5 weeks. FWHA 

and TxDOT reported 17,500 labor hours of savings for this 

event alone. 

Ancillary benefits provided by MSAR include improved reporting 

functions enabled by having standardized, digitized information 

stored in a single place. This eases the burden for federal, 

state, and local governments of reporting to congressional 

inquiries about the cost of recent natural disasters like 

Hurricane Harvey. 

 10.3.7 HHS CDC HMEC-1 Cell Line 

The Human Microvascular Endothelial Cell Line (HMEC-1) was 

invented by Paco Candal in 1990 at CDC in Atlanta, Georgia. 

The NIH filed patents on behalf of CDC but, in the process, the 

agency learned that prior publication about the HMEC-1 cell line 

invalidated its ability to patent the invention. Nonetheless, CDC 

distributed the HMEC-1 cell line widely to hundreds of groups, 

especially nonprofit research organizations, through material 
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transfer agreements (MTAs), and these organizations further 

developed the HMEC line. 

The HMEC-1 cell line provides a faster and lower cost process 

for producing endothelial cells that researchers use to 

understand how diseases spread in the body. The availability of 

this cell line to researchers improves their capabilities and 

productivity to study diseases or test new drugs. The discovery 

was driven by an individual researcher, Paco Candal. Given the 

obvious need for an alternative process, some improvement 

would eventually have occurred. 

The HMEC-1 cell line multiplies rapidly, allowing for rapid 

production of the specified cells. Its creation aided CDC to 

better serve and uphold its health mission of protecting the 

U.S. public from the spread of communicable diseases and 

other public health threats. Further, CDC’s dissemination of the 

HMEC-1 cell line to other government laboratories, universities, 

and companies—typically through MTAs and licensing 

agreements—further led to improved research productivity and 

health outcomes. 

 10.3.8 HHS NIH Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccine 

The National Cancer Institute’s (NCI’s) research collaborations 

with academic and industry colleagues and the German Cancer 

Research Center are credited with contributing to a rapidly 

evolving HPV knowledge base at a critical time for the HPV 

vaccine’s development. Although Merck and Medimmune both 

licensed NCI’s technology in 1997 (their nonexclusive licenses 

were converted to coexclusive licenses in the agreements 

following the patent-interference proceedings), this vaccine was 

brought to market by GSK using the NCI method of production. 

HPV causes an estimated 610,000 cancers each year 

worldwide: 80% of these in less developed countries; in North 

America, 26,000 of the 1.6 million new cancer cases each year 

are attributable to HPV. Cervical cancer is the most common 

type of cancer attributable to HPV and the fourth leading cause 

of female cancer mortality. The vaccine was approved by FDA 

and was added to the United States’ routine vaccination 

schedule for girls 11 or 12 years old and is recommended for 

girls and women aged 9 to 26. Today at least one of the two 

major HPV vaccines is licensed in more than 100 countries. In 

addition to the health benefits generated by this vaccine 
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including lives saved, it also results in reduced medical costs 

and provides income to producers/suppliers of the vaccine. 

 10.3.9 USDA Turfgrass Varieties 

Scientists at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) ARS 

in Tifton, Georgia, developed the first seedless warm weather 

Bermuda grasses with characteristics that made them best 

sellers for their various uses. This study covers five turfgrasses 

patented and released by ARS and the University of Georgia 

through licenses between 1998 and 2014. The ARS and 

University of Georgia licensed their most recently developed 

turfgrasses to a company owned by Georgia sod producers, 

which then sublicenses to other producers. 

This case study examined five varieties of certified, quality 

turfgrasses for recreation and home lawns, each with specific 

characteristics (e.g., can mow very short for golf greens, uses 

38% less water) that are certified before sale. The producers in 

Georgia and elsewhere profit; many people are employed; and 

installation of this turf results in aesthetic, health, and 

environmental benefits. Related research is funded by licensing 

income. Without the innovative method of creating mutants 

from which to find grasses with improved characteristics 

desirable for their environmental and economic benefits, these 

five new varieties likely would not have been found or 

developed. 

Total royalties collected on just the five turfgrasses between 

1998 and 2017 was $9,700,000. Royalties for the five 

turfgrasses were almost triple the cost of all research on all 

grasses at Tifton. These royalties fund continued research. A 

2012 study specific to Georgia concluded that turfgrass and 

related industries directly contribute $4.0 billion in output and 

indirectly another $3.8 billion for a total of $7.8 billion to 

Georgia’s over $700 billion economy; is the source of 87,000 

full- and part-time jobs, the majority of which are related to 

landscape maintenance, while 6,324 jobs are in agriculture; 

and contributes $4.6 billion in earnings and value added each 

year. 

As the primary vegetative covers for home lawns, schools, 

parks, roadsides, sports fields, golf courses, and commercial 

and public buildings and spaces, turfgrasses also have 

environmental and health benefits. The National Turfgrass 
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Federation 2006 report provided some specifics. A 2,500 square 

foot lawn absorbs carbon dioxide and releases enough oxygen 

for a family of four; a healthy lawn absorbs rainfall and reduces 

runoff up to 80 times more efficiently than imperious surfaces 

such as driveways; to reduce injuries, over 90% of National 

Football League players prefer natural turf to artificial turf. The 

same safety benefits apply to all levels of athletic activity, 

including school playgrounds, and turfgrasses that use water 

and nitrogen more efficiently and are pest-resistant reduce the 

use of irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticide, particularly as these 

become costlier or less available. 

 10.4 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SUCCESS FACTORS 

The nine case studies provide insight into success factors and 

challenges associated with the transfer of technology from 

federal laboratories. The discussion below is organized by the 

above discussed success factors. The factors highlighted are 

thought to be the primary or secondary factors as based on 

information from interviewees, conclusions from analysis of 

interviews, and other secondary research such as reviews of 

program documents. The generalizability of results is limited 

because of the way cases were selected (nonrandom) and the 

small sample. However, our findings are consistent with 

previous literature. 

The transfer agent and R&D include characteristics of the 

innovating institutions and characteristics of both the 

researchers involved and the R&D that precedes the transfer. 

In most cases, the federal laboratory researchers had many 

years of expertise related to the technology transferred. The 

USDA researchers were part of a century of research 

developing improved turfgrasses. Army researchers had 

developed vaccines similar to the JEV vaccine. In about half the 

cases, federal researchers had direct experience related to the 

relevant “market” or access to the end-user perspective. For 

example, NIST had trusted relationships with industry for 

developing standards and guidelines. The FHWA has its own 

staff in the states and working relationships with related state 

and federal organizations that would ultimately be customers 

for the technology. For another four cases, it appeared that the 

government being the primary end user sped development and 

adoption of the technology. The presence of a person who 

consistently championed developing the technology over a 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

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period of time was important in more than half these cases. 

Below are some details related to the transfer agent.

 Six of the nine had specific government research 

expertise and S&T resources (Navy, USDA, NIST, Army, 

NIH, and CDC). 

 Five of the nine had a champion who advocated for the 

technology (DOT, Army, Air Force, DOI, and NIH). 

 Four of the nine had market-related expertise, such as 

infrastructure or regulatory expertise (NIST, Army, DOT, 

and USDA). 

 Three of the nine credited success to the key 

researchers being based within the government agency 

as critical (Navy, NIH, and USDA), although in most 

cases at least some of the key researchers for each case 

study were federal employees.37

The transfer object relates to the characteristics of the 

technology transferred in terms of type (such as software or 

hardware) and in terms of characteristics that influence 

perception of its value by potential users. In four of the nine 

cases, the characteristics of the technology itself were very 

important for its easy transfer and adoption by users. The 

earpieces developed for Air Force fighter pilots were designed 

to solve specific problems of working at high altitudes and 

detaching in case of ejection from the plane. Extensive input 

from people who would be using the cellphone or tablet 

technology to assess damage to highway infrastructure meant 

its design met their needs. NIH involvement in developing the 

HPV vaccine and the Tifton turfgrasses was similarly designed 

with an understanding of the target market’s needs and 

interests. 

The transfer media and transfer support vary and relate to 

how the technology is handed off to private or public entities. 

Somewhat typical for federal laboratories are cooperative 

research agreements, licensing, open-source software, material 

transfers, publications, and occasionally business start-ups that 

license federal technology. In the nine case studies presented 

for this project, seven federal laboratories transferred their 

underlying patents of the transferred technologies to industry 

by licensing. The NIST cybersecurity framework was put 

directly into the public domain, somewhat unique for NIST’s 

37 DOT MSAR may be the only exception. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-18

work in standards, which are usually established by standards 

development organizations (SDOs). CDC transferred its HMEC-1 

cell line using MTAs after it was determined it could not be 

patented because of earlier HMEC-1 publications. Two other 

agencies used publications as one means of transfer, and 

CRADAs were part of the transfer process in three of the cases. 

Probably because of the number of years passing since the 

transfers occurred and the limited number of interviews 

conducted, specific assistance in the transfer process from TTOs 

was not reported and could not be included as a primary factor 

for success in any of the nine cases. In the USDA case, the 

agency turned the licensing process over to the University of 

Georgia, and multiple interviewees for that case study cited the 

university’s expertise as a success factor. 

The transfer recipient characteristics include the level of 

available resources and areas of expertise, capacity, geographic 

location, and company size. Of the nine case studies presented, 

five licensing laboratories cited the preexisting expertise of 

their industry partners as a success factor. For the DOT case 

study, DOT relied on the experience of the end users, who 

knew the old system and were involved early in designing and 

testing the new system. The pharmaceutical industry with its 

large expertise in vaccines invested early in NIH development 

of the HPV vaccine. The company that helped develop the 

flexible fluxprobe diagnostic tool already had both technical and 

manufacturing expertise in that area. The company working 

with the Air Force modified an existing item in their product 

line. The growers who licensed the new turf varieties from 

USDA/University of Georgia were experienced in growing and 

marketing certified turfgrasses. 

The transfer collaborations and intermediaries of the 

transferred technologies, the extent to which other entities are 

involved in the transfer and commercialization and the 

characteristics of those entities, affect successful transfer. In all 

nine of the case studies presented, these sorts of partnerships 

were major contributors to successful technology transfer. In 

seven of the nine case studies, federal laboratory researchers 

(NIST, DOI, Army, Navy, Air Force, NIH, and DOT) codeveloped 

their technologies with industry partners and licensees. In the 

other two cases studies (CDC and USDA), federal laboratories 

codeveloped the technologies with university researchers. In 

three case studies (NIST, DOT, and NIH), federal researchers 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

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codeveloped the subject technologies with other governments 

or end users. The federal laboratories involved in the 

development of both the HPV and JEV vaccines also relied on 

external partners to help fund development. 

The demand environment is the nature of the target market’s 

demand for the innovation, characteristics of the existing 

supply chain and required supporting technology and 

infrastructure, and relevant government policy. The first 

success factor from the demand environment in all nine of the 

case studies indicated there was a clear public need for the 

transferred technology for various reasons. In a few case 

studies, there were no alternative technologies; in others, the 

public’s next best alternative fell short of the need because of 

shortage, poor performance, or regulatory requirements. In six 

of the case studies, the federal laboratory’s R&D priorities were 

driven by the agency. A second factor easing successful 

transfer in all nine case studies was that the transferred 

technology was absorbed into a “market” that already existed 

so that the licensed company did not have to spend time and 

resources building supply chains or physical infrastructure. 

The external influences are factors outside of the federal 

laboratory’s control that can either drive or restrain success. 

For example, a company outside of the technology transfer 

relationship may achieve an unexpected technical 

breakthrough, or a competing technology may enter the market 

first. Federal regulations may support adoption or cultural 

norms, or an economic recession might slow adoption. Given 

the limited nature of the data we collected for these historical 

case studies, we were unable to complete a careful examination 

of external influences. It does appear, however, that the federal 

laboratories’ technology transfer success was achieved in part 

by their acting on external driving events, such as the Navy’s 

reaction to attacks on Navy ports, the Army’s need for an FDAapproved JEV vaccine, overwhelming evidence of the public’s 

need for a vaccine against HPV, and the public’s increasing 

need for a more drought-resistant turf. 

Figure 10-2 provides a summary of the common success factors 

across these different categories of the logic model. 

In addition to the individual success factors, in many cases it 

was the combination of multiple factors working together that 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

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drove technology development, transfer, and adoption. Here 

are some examples. 

 For the DOC NIST case, NIST’s history of working with 

industry and their reputation as a “trusted” facilitator 

were key factors in the adoption of the Framework. NIST 

also hired former industry experts to lead the initiative. 

Further, the industry’s adoption of the Framework was 

voluntary; industry eventually participated because they 

viewed the Framework as preferable to a federal 

regulation that might mandate some type of costly or 

inflexible response to cyberattacks. 

 For the DOI Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau had a 

prior working relationship—prior CRADA and a licensing 

agreement—with a private-sector company that knew 

the technical area and had manufacturing capabilities 

and access to markets in the United States and abroad. 

The Bureau of Reclamation also had a staff of capable 

technicians aware of the dam operators’ realities and 

problems who serve as intermediaries between the field 

and laboratory staff and facilities. 

 For the DoD Air Force case study, the Air Force’s R&D 

priorities were driven by the pilots’ specific needs that 

the Air Force was willing to pay for. A champion within 

the Air Force pursued filling that need. A company, 

already present in the market with similar noisedampening earpieces for musicians, heard of the Air 

Force’s need and was able to modify its existing 

equipment. For the DoD Army case, WRAIR has a 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

10-21

Figure 10-2. Common Success Factors 

Note: A case could have multiple success factors within a category. External influences varied greatly and were not 

necessarily common. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

10-22

lengthy history of vaccine research, dating back to World 

War I, including extensive experience developing 

vaccines for the virus type of Japanese encephalitis. 

Private industry partners helped fund the necessary 

clinical trials. The Army had no alternative vaccines—

none were on the market that were FDA approved, a 

requirement for any vaccine used for U.S. military 

personnel. For the USDA ARS case study, two awardwinning researchers had worked in this area, one 

following in the footsteps of the other. The second 

developed a novel technique to make mutants of the 

sterile/seedless grasses and generated a test field of 

27,000 plants they researched. The University of 

Georgia has a very experienced licensing organization, 

coupled with a state-run seed corporation that oversees 

growing the initial grasses sold, experienced nearby turf 

producers, and a state crop inspection requirement and 

testing group that certifies quality, all factors that 

provided a market advantage to producers. 

Although these case studies are presented because the federal 

laboratory’s technology transfer to a company or other entity 

was successful, each transfer of the technology faced 

challenges along the way. Because the interviews and written 

accounts of success of the raconteurs tended to emphasize 

what went right rather than what went wrong in the technology 

transfer case studies, our discussion here on challenges is likely 

to be incomplete and limited. 

 10.5 SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 

CASE STUDIES 

To summarize: 

1. Government R&D that leads to federal laboratory 

technology transfer to the private sector may serve the 

public through new innovations and economic, 

environmental, and health benefits (see sections in case 

study Appendices F through N). 

2. Bringing innovations derived from federally transferred 

technology to the private-sector marketplace takes time 

as well as the federal laboratories’ long-term 

commitment to investments in R&D. It also takes a 

commitment from individuals with expertise in the 

transferred technology. 

3. Federal laboratory management may facilitate the 

successfulness of technology transfer by providing 

resources, championing the to-be-transferred 
Section 10 — Case Studies of Successful Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories 

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technologies, and instilling a culture in the federal 

laboratory that values such activity. 

4. Potential innovations may come from nonresearch staff 

and research staff, if the organization is structured to 

allow it. Generally, for the federal laboratory 

management to allow nonresearch staff to be involved in 

the innovation process requires some decentralization of 

decision-making authority. 

5. Where an end user is involved in the technology 

development or transfer process, their perception of a 

clear market need helps to accelerate the transfer and 

later adoption of the federally developed innovation. 

6. The federal laboratory’s co-development of a transferred 

technology with individuals or companies with 

supplementary expertise increases the likelihood that 

the transferred technology will have market success. 

Based on our initial and general findings from the case studies 

(given that the case studies were selected based on the market 

or other success of the transferred technology), we share two 

observations for federal agencies and laboratories to potentially 

improve and help evaluate their technology development and 

transfer activities: 

1. Incorporate a periodic review of policies and practices 

related to technology transfer and innovation based on 

lessons learned from those reviews, as well as any 

advances in the practice of technology transfer garnered 

from academic and policy studies. Although there may 

be separation between TTOs and lab directors, the 

federal laboratory management should work with both 

groups to integrate periodic reviews of policies and 

practices across functions. 

2. Incorporate successful and unsuccessful activities into 

internal playbooks to capture lessons learned for present 

and future staff involved in laboratory research and staff 

involved in technology transfer. 

11-1

11 Conclusions 

This study has drawn together, using existing data on 

technology transfer mechanisms, case studies, and third-party 

data sources,38 information to describe technology transfer 

activities in federal agencies. This study identifies patterns of 

technology transfer we found and patterns of technology 

transfer that remain to be studied. 

The patterns of federal technology transfer that we identified 

include the following: 

 There are 181 physical federal laboratory locations 

associated with the 10 agencies participating in this 

study. 

 Since 1978, there has been at least one CRADA partner 

located in each state. California, Massachusetts, and 

Maryland are home to the largest number of CRADA 

partners. 

 Although key data linking specific CRADAs to specific 

federal laboratory locations were unavailable in many 

cases, our analysis of available NIST data suggests that 

cooperative research agreements are more prevalent 

regionally than are licenses, which tend to be more 

geographically dispersed. NIST CRADA partners are 

roughly 3 times more likely to be located within a 500-

mile radius of NIST’s Gaithersburg, Maryland, location 

than are NIST licensees. 

 NIH and NIST tend to have a more skewed size 

distribution of licensees than EPA, but at the median 

38 The information used came from the Technology Partnerships 

Office’s annual reports to the President and the Congress, data 

collected from the NETS Database, data from the FLC on federal 

laboratory locations, and additional data extracted from several 

public databases such as the Federal Register, and the open-source 

geocoding web platform provided by Texas A&M University 

GeoInnovation Center. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

11-2

licensees across agencies are similar in median company 

size, as measured by sales and employment. 

 The manufacturing sector and the professional scientific, 

and technical services sector are the two dominant 

sectors of the economy in which companies classified as 

such are engaged in licensing technologies from federal 

agencies and partnering with federal agencies on 

CRADAs. 

 Based on EPA, NIH, and NIST licensing data, the 

evidence suggests that licensed technologies from a 

federal agency may have a positive effect on the sales of 

the private-sector company licensees, but the 

percentage changes cannot be readily attributed to the 

licenses, although the correlation exists. 

 The sales effect of a licensed technology from a federal 

agency, if there is one, does not seem to vary 

systematically across companies of varying sizes. 

 Descriptive data show that federal agencies have a 

higher propensity to engage in cooperative R&D with 

smaller-sized companies than larger-sized companies as 

mandated. 

 Case studies describe the nonlinear nature of 

interactions between the private sector and laboratories 

and the factors key to successful transfer. 

Many of these observations have not been frequently 

documented. Given the potential insight provided by this study, 

several patterns of technology transfer remain to be studied, 

including the following: 

 In-depth research is needed to answer the question of 

the economic impact of federal licenses, if any, on 

private-sector sales. 

 The role of federal agency R&D investments throughout 

the technology transfer process should be examined in 

greater detail. If the technology transfer process 

currently entails scientific discovery, inventions, 

invention disclosures, patent applications, patents 

issued, and licensing, then the follow-on elements of the 

process to be examined should include an understanding 

of role R&D spending plays in this process. Where in this 

discovery-to-licensing process is the greatest potential 

economic impact for the marginal federal R&D dollar 

invested? 

 If scientific discovery-to-patents issued process 

describes a supply of technical knowledge or even a new 
Section 11 — Conclusions 

11-3

technology made available to the private and public 

sectors, then observed licensing activity may describe or 

be an indicator of a market clearing given the demand 

for technical knowledge and new technology from the 

private and public sectors. This raises the question: How 

do private- and public-sector potential licensees become 

aware of potentially relevant technical knowledge or a 

new technology available from federal agencies? In 

addition, how does this market for technical knowledge 

or new technology work in practice? 

 A CRADA may potentially be seen as evidence of 

complementary supply and demand for technical 

expertise from both federal lab and private entity CRADA 

partners to be shared between them. How do privateand public-sector potential CRADA partners learn about 

a federal laboratory’s relevant technical expertise? In 

addition, through what channels (e.g., R&D channels) do 

federal laboratories develop technical knowledge that is 

relevant to private- and public-sector CRADA partners? 

 From existing federal agency technology transfer 

metrics, as reported by the Technology Partnerships 

Office, we have attempted to describe the extent to 

which private- and public-sector organizations license 

technical knowledge and new technology from federal 

laboratories and the extent to which private- and publicsector organizations partner with federal laboratories 

through CRADAs. In Chapter 8, we explored, to the 

extent to which the data allowed, the possible 

correlation between company sales and licensing 

activities. Information on the dynamics of how 

companies may benefit over time from having licensed 

technical knowledge or a new technology from an 

agency’s laboratory or from having engaged in a CRADA 

is still unknown. Where these activities have been 

observed, what are, qualitatively and quantitatively, the 

realized benefits, if any, to a company from licensing 

federal technical knowledge or a new federal technology 

from an agency’s laboratory or from participating in a 

CRADA? How do those realized benefits, if any, compare 

to the benefits that would have been realized (through 

the counterfactual methods) had the company pursued 

other methods to obtain the same level of technical 

expertise? 

It is important to note that in studying patterns of technology 

transfer where CRADAs and licenses are employed, it provides 

a narrow view of technology transfer. Other mechanisms of 

technology transfer that can be further studied for impact 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

11-4

include publications, the students visiting a federal laboratory 

for postdoctoral training and their subsequent positions, 

student interactions with federal laboratory staff, adoption of 

documentary standards by the private sector, and laboratory 

personnel’s interactions with SDOs to name a few. It is 

important to note that any impacts of technology transfer occur 

outside of the laboratory and in the marketplace or the public 

domain. The most accurate economic impact studies are those 

that, like the case studies presented, examine and follow one 

federal technology from the lab to the marketplace. 
R-1

References 

Adams, James D., Eric P. Chiang and Jeffrey L. Jensen (2003). 

“The Influence of Federal Laboratory R&D on Industrial 

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1003-1020. 

Andes, Scott, Mark Muro, and Matthew Stepp (2014). “Going 

Local: Connecting the National Labs to their Regions to 

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Washington, DC. 

Argonne National Laboratory and Innovation Associates (2016). 

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Bozeman, Barry (2013). “Technology Transfer Research and 

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Chan, Gabriel A. (2014). “The Commercialization of Publicly 

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Chatterjee, Sabarni K. and Mark L. Rohrbaugh (2014). “NIH 

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Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) (2013a). “Exemplar 

Practices for Department of Defense Technology 

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Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) (2013b). “Expediting the 

Transfer of Technology from Government Laboratories 

into the Aeronautics Industry,” IDA Paper P-4952, 

Alexandria, VA. 

Jaffe, Adam B. and Josh Lerner (2001). “Reinventing Public 

R&D: Patent Policy and the Commercialization of 

National Laboratory Technologies,” RAND Journal of 

Economics, 32: 167-198. 

Jaffe, Adam B., Michael S. Fogarty, and Bruce A. Banks (1998). 

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Impact of NASA and Other Federal Labs on Commercial 

Innovation,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 46: 183-

205. 

Kerrigan, Jack E. and Christopher J. Brasco (2002). “The 

Technology Transfer Revolution: Legislative History and 

Future Proposals,” Public Contract Law Journal, 31: 277-

291. 

Link, Albert N. and Zachary T. Oliver (2017). “Public Sector 

Innovation: Technology Transfers from U.S. Federal 

Laboratories,” University of North Carolina at 

Greensboro working paper. 

Link, Albert N., Donald S. Siegel, and David D. Van Fleet 

(2011). “Public Science and Public Innovation: Assessing 

the Relationship between Patenting at U.S. National 

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Resource Management Research Programs: A Broader 

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Agricultural Research. Retrieved from: 

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Metcalf, Harold (1994). “Lessons from History: Origins of the 

Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer, 

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Development,” Nature Energy, 1: 1-8. 

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of Knowledge from Different Energy Research 

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Stevens, Ashley J., Jonathan J. Jensen, Katrine Wyller, Patrick 

C. Kilgore, Sabarni Chatterjee, and Mark L. Rohrbaugh 

(2011). “The Role of Public Sector Research in the 

Discovery of Drugs and Vaccines,” The New England 

Journal of Medicine, 364: 535-541. 

TechLink (2016). National Economic Impacts from DoD License 

Agreements with U.S. Industry: 2000–2014, TechLink: 

Bozeman, MT. 

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The Stata Journal, 15(3): 672–697. 

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Technology Partnerships Office. Accessed at 

https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/direc

tor/paul_NIST-MBDA-PZ-110414.pdf. 
A-1

Historical Overview 

of Technology 

Transfer Policies 

Toward U.S. Federal 

Laboratories from 

1979 to the Present 

As part of President Carter’s Domestic Policy Review in 1979, 

he emphasized the importance of the transfer of technical 

knowledge (1979, unnumbered pages):39

Often, the information that underlies a technological 

advance is not known to companies capable of 

commercially developing that advance. I am 

therefore taking several actions to ease and 

encourage the flow of technical knowledge and 

information. These actions include establishing the 

Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology at 

the National Technical Information Service to 

improve the transfer of knowledge from Federal 

39 See President Carter’s Industrial Innovation Initiatives Message to 

the Congress on Administration Actions and Proposals (October 31, 

1979): http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31628. 

This message to Congress was in response to the productivity 

slowdown throughout the U.S. economy that began in the early 

1970s. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

A-2

laboratories; and, through the State and Commerce 

Departments, increasing the availability of technical 

information developed in foreign countries. 

In October 1980, Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler 

Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Public Law 96-480. This Act 

of 1980 states that Congress finds and declares that 

Technology and industrial innovation are central to 

the economic, environmental, and social well-being 

of citizens of the United States. Technology and 

industrial innovation offer an improved standard of 

living, increased public and private sector 

productivity, creation of new industries and 

employment opportunities, improved public services 

and enhanced competitiveness of United States 

products in world markets. Many new discoveries 

and advances in science occur in universities and 

Federal laboratories, while the application of this 

new knowledge to commercial and useful public 

purposes depends largely upon actions by business 

and labor. Cooperation among academia, Federal 

laboratories, labor, and industry, in such forms as 

technology transfer, personnel exchange, joint 

research projects, and others, should be renewed, 

expanded, and strengthened. ... No comprehensive 

national policy exists to enhance technological 

innovation for commercial and public purposes. 

There is a need for such a policy, including a strong 

national policy supporting domestic technology 

transfer and utilization of the science and 

technology resources of the Federal Government. It 

is in the national interest to promote the adaptation 

of technological innovations to State and local 

government uses. Technological innovations can 

improve services, reduce their costs, and increase 

productivity in State and local governments. The 

Federal laboratories and other performers of 

Federally funded research and development 

frequently provide scientific and technological 

developments of potential use to State and local 

governments and private industry. These 

developments should be made accessible to those 

governments and industry. There is a need to 
Appendix A: Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies Toward 

U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the Present 

A-3

provide means of access and to give adequate 

personnel and funding support to these means. 

Thus, as stated, the purpose of the 1980 Act is: 

... to improve the economic, environmental, and 

social well-being of the United States by ... 

promoting technology development through the 

establishment of centers for industrial technology ... 

[and to encourage] the exchange of scientific and 

technical personnel among academia, industry, and 

Federal laboratories. 

And the 1980 Act makes clear that it is the responsibility of 

each federal laboratory to establish an office as well as 

mechanisms to transfer its technology to those organizations 

that will benefit: 

It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 

Government to ensure the full use of the results of 

the Nation’s Federal investment in research and 

development. To this end the Federal Government 

shall strive where appropriate to transfer Federally 

owned or originated technology to State and local 

governments and to the private sector. ... Each 

Federal laboratory shall establish an Office of 

Research and Technology Applications. Laboratories 

having existing organizational structures which 

perform the functions of this section may elect to 

combine the Office of Research and Technology 

Applications within the existing organization. 

Regarding the functioning of these offices: 

It shall be the function of each Office of Research 

and Technology Applications to prepare an 

application assessment of each research and 

development project in which that laboratory is 

engaged which has potential for successful 

application in State or local government or in 

private industry [and] to provide and disseminate 

information on Federally owned or originated 

products, processes, and services having potential 

application to State and local governments and to 

private industry. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

A-4

To enhance the technology transfer mission of federal 

laboratories, Congress amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 

1980 in October 1986 with the passage of the FTTA of 1986, 

Public Law 99-502. The 1986 Act states: 

Each Federal agency may permit the director of any 

of its Government-operated Federal laboratories to 

enter into cooperative research and development 

agreements [CRADAs] on behalf of such agency 

with other Federal agencies; units of State or local 

government; industrial organizations (including 

corporations, schools and partnerships, and limited 

partnerships, and industrial development 

organizations); public and private foundations; 

nonprofit organizations (including universities); or 

other persons (including licensees of inventions 

owned by the Federal agency); and to negotiate 

licensing agreements ... for Government-owned 

inventions made at the laboratory and other 

inventions of Federal employees that may be 

voluntarily assigned to the Government. 

The 1986 Act also established the Federal Laboratory 

Consortium for Technology Transfer and the NBS, which later 

NIST) as the host agency.40 The FLC would: 

... develop and (with the consent of the Federal 

laboratory concerned) administer techniques, 

training courses, and materials concerning 

technology transfer to increase the awareness of 

40 The FLC, while formalized through the Federal Technology Transfer 

Act of 1986, can be traced to the formation of the Department of 

Defense Technology Transfer Consortium. Eleven Department of 

Defense laboratories were involved when the FLC was formed in 

1970 (Metcalf, 1994). The FLC dates its organization to 1974 

https://www.federallabs.org/History The spirit of the idea behind 

the DoD Federal Laboratory Consortium was highlighted in 

President Nixon’s address to Congress on March 16, 1972 (quoted 

from Metcalf, 1994, p. 15): “The ability of the American people to 

harness science in the service of man has always been an important 

element in our national progress. But the accomplishments of the 

past are not something we can rest on. They are something we 

must build on. I am, therefore, calling today for a strong new effort 

to marshal science and technology in the work of strengthening our 

economy and improving the quality of the American way of life. I 

am outlining ways in which the Federal Government can work as a 

more effective partner in the great task.” See also 

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3773.
Appendix A: Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies Toward 

U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the Present 

A-5

Federal laboratory employees regarding the 

commercial potential of laboratory technology and 

innovations; furnish advice and assistance 

requested by Federal agencies and laboratories for 

use in their technology transfer programs (including 

the planning of seminars for small business and 

other industry); [and] provide a clearinghouse for 

requests, received at the laboratory level, for 

technical assistance from States and units of local 

governments, businesses, industrial development 

organizations, not-for-profit organizations including 

universities, Federal agencies and laboratories, and 

other persons. 

As an additional incentive for federal laboratory scientists to be 

proactive in the identification and transfer of their technologies, 

the 1986 Act stipulated that 

... any royalties or other income received by a 

Federal agency from the licensing or assignment of 

inventions under agreements entered into ... shall 

be retained by the agency whose laboratory 

produced the invention and shall be disposed of as 

follows: The head of the agency or his designee 

shall pay at least 15 percent of the royalties or 

other income the agency receives on account of any 

invention to the inventor (or co-inventors) if the 

inventor (or each such co-inventor) was an 

employee of the agency at the time the invention 

was made. 

Thus, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 

made explicit the technology transfer responsibilities of federal 

laboratories. To enhance the ability of the laboratories to 

transfer their technologies to state and local governments and 

private industry, the FTTA of 1986 also facilitated technology 

transfer by permitting the laboratories to enter into CRADAs 

with public and private organizations. 

The Technology Transfer Act of 1986 made clear that 

government-owned, government-operated laboratories 

(GOGOs) could enter into CRADAs, but the Act was not specific 

about government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

A-6

(GOCOs).41 The National Competitiveness Technology Act of 

1989, Public Law 101-189 (Section 3131), amended the 

Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980 to authorize GOCOs to enter into 

CRADAs:42

The purposes of this part [of the Act] are to— 

(1) enhance United States national security by 

promoting technology transfer between 

Government-owned, contractor- operated 

laboratories and the private sector in the United 

States; and 

(2) enhance collaboration between universities, the 

private sector, and Government-owned, 

contractor-operated laboratories in order to 

foster the development of technologies in areas 

of significant economic potential. 

A CRADA, according to the FTTA of 1986, Public Law 99-502, is 

... any agreement between one or more Federal 

laboratories and one or more non-Federal parties 

under which the Government, through its 

laboratories, provides personnel, services, facilities, 

equipment, or other resources with or without 

reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal 

parties) and the non-Federal parties provide funds, 

personnel, services, facilities, equipment, or other 

resources toward the conduct of specified research 

or development efforts which are consistent with 

the missions of the laboratory ... 

CRADAs, as a mechanism for technology transfer, are 

advantageous to both parties.43 A definition of CRADAs is given 

in the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer’s 

41 “Federal labs are typically managed under two general models: the 

GOGO model and the government-owned, contractor-operated 

(GOCO) model. GOGO laboratories are usually owned or leased by 

the federal government and staffed by Federal employees who are 

supported by non-Federal contract employees. GOCO laboratories 

are institutions where the facilities and equipment are owned by the 

Federal Government, but the staff is employed by a private or 

public contractor that operates the laboratory under a contract with 

the Federal Government” (FLC, 2013). See also footnote 1 in 

Chapter 1 above. 42 See also Kerrigan and Brasco (2002). 

43 See Chen et al. (2017) for a systematic analysis of CRADA activity 

at NIST over time. 
Appendix A: Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies Toward 

U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the Present 

A-7

Technology Transfer Desk Reference: A Comprehensive Guide 

to Technology Transfer (2013):44

[CRADAs] ... provide Federal laboratories with an 

extremely flexible vehicle to facilitate the transfer of 

commercially useful technologies from Federal 

laboratories to the nonfederal sector. ... An intimate 

working relationship between Federal and 

commercial researchers will allow the Federal side 

to understand commercial needs and allow ideas 

from the commercial sector to flow into Federal 

laboratories. (pp. 33–36) 

More formally (FLC, 2013): 

A CRADA provides both parties with a number of 

benefits, including: 

 A means to leverage research budgets and 

optimize resources 

 A means for sharing technical expertise, 

concepts, and information 

 Protection from disclosure by the federal 

government of any proprietary information 

brought to the CRADA by the partner 

 Ability for federal and nonfederal scientists and 

engineers to work together 

 Access for the nonfederal partner to expertise in 

a wide range of disciplines within the federal 

laboratory system 

 Agreement by the partners to share IP that 

results from the effort or agreement to the 

44 Title 15, Chapter 63, § 3710a of the U.S. Code gives agencies 

authority to enter into CRADA agreements; “Each Federal agency 

may permit the director of any of its Government-operated Federal 

laboratories, and, to the extent provided in an agency-approved 

joint work statement or, if permitted by the agency, in an agencyapproved annual strategic plan, the director of any of its 

Government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories—(1) to enter 

into cooperative research and development agreements on behalf of 

such agency (subject to subsection (c) of this section) with other 

Federal agencies; units of State or local government; industrial 

organizations (including corporations, partnerships, and limited 

partnerships, and industrial development organizations); public and 

private foundations; nonprofit organizations (including universities); 

or other persons (including licensees of inventions owned by the 

Federal agency) (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-

title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap63-sec3710a.pdf).
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

A-8

retention by one of the partners of an exclusive 

license to patentable research 

 Protection of information resulting from the 

CRADA from disclosure under Freedom of 

Information Act requests for up to five years. 

(pp. 33-36). 

CRADAs offer many additional benefits to the laboratories, the 

laboratory scientist, and the private-sector partner (FLC, 2013). 

 For the laboratory, the CRADA: 

– Allows a flexible mechanism for transferring the 

results of federally funded R&D to the private sector. 

– Allows private-sector parties to provide funds as well 

as other resources to assist with the 

commercialization of technology. 

 For the laboratory scientist or engineer, the CRADA: 

– Affords an opportunity for federal personnel to 

provide expertise to private-sector parties in the 

commercialization of their work. 

– Allows the inventing scientists or engineers to 

receive a percentage of the royalties generated as a 

result of commercialization of any subject 

invention(s). 

 For private-sector parties, the CRADA: 

– Allows nonfederal partners an opportunity to obtain 

rights to commercialize the results of government or 

joint R&D. 

– Provides for effective leveraging of resources 

through a team effort. 

– Provides access to federal expertise. 

In 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued what might be 

regarded as the first formal statement of U.S. technology 

policy. Therein, he did address the importance of transferring 

R&D results from federal laboratories to the private sector. 

Specifically, in U.S. Technology Policy (Executive Office of the 

President, 1990): 

A nation’s technology policy is based on broad 

principles that govern the allocation of technological 

resources ... The goal of U.S. technology policy is to 

make the best use of technology in achieving the 

national goals of improved quality of life for 
Appendix A: Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies Toward 

U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the Present 

A-9

Americans, contained economic growth, and 

national security ... While the government plays a 

critical role in establishing an economic environment 

to encourage innovation, the private sector has the 

principal role in identifying and utilizing technologies 

for commercial products and processes ... 

Government policies can help establish a favorable 

environment for private industry [by taking steps 

to]: 

 Improve the transfer of federal laboratories’ 

R&D results to the private sector. Where 

appropriate, these laboratories should give 

greater consideration to potential commercial 

applications in the planning and conduct of R&D, 

and these efforts should be guided by input from 

potential users. To achieve this goal, there much 

be a closer working relationship among these 

laboratories, industry, and universities. Defenserelated laboratories can make major 

contributions which still providing adequate 

safeguards for classified information. 

 Promote increased industry-Federal laboratoryuniversity collaborations, including personnel 

exchanges, to help convert Federally-supported 

R&D into new technologies that the private 

sector can then turn into commercial products 

and processes. 

 Promote and encourage access by U.S. industry 

to Federal laboratories within the guidelines 

established by the FTTA of 1986 (P.L. 99-502), 

other existing legislation, and Executive Order 

12591. 

 Expedite the diffusion of the results of Federallyconducted R&D to industry, including licensing 

of inventions and removal of barriers to 

commercialization of Federally developed 

computer software. 

 Encourage direct laboratory-industry interaction 

within broad, flexible Federal guideline, since 

effective technology transfer occurs at the 

operational level. (pp. 2-6) 

Federal laboratories have traditionally transferred their 

technology in the form of patents, licenses to laboratory-
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

A-10

developed technologies, and CRADAs.45 Specific emphasis on 

these measures and other measures of technology transfer 

gained attention in response to the October 2011 Presidential 

Memorandum—Accelerating Technology Transfer and 

Commercialization of Federal Research in Support of HighGrowth Businesses. And, in November 2012, the IAWGTT 

prepared a response to the President’s memorandum in which 

agencies acknowledged the need for an in-depth study of their 

technology transfer practices. 

To give context to the IAWGTT’s response, the origin of the 

Interagency Workgroup on Technology Transfer traces to 

President Reagan’s April 10, 1987, Executive Order 12591: 

(a) Within 1 year from the date of this Order, the 

Director of the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy46 shall convene an 

interagency task force, comprised of the heads 

of representative agencies and the directors of 

representative Federal laboratories, or their 

designees, in order to identify and disseminate 

creative approaches to technology transfer 

from Federal laboratories. The task force will 

report to the President on the progress of and 

problems with technology transfer from Federal 

laboratories. 

(b) Specifically, the report shall include: 

(1) a listing of current technology transfer 

programs and an assessment of the 

effectiveness of these programs; 

(2) identification of new or creative approaches 

to technology transfer that might serve as 

model programs for Federal laboratories; 

(3) criteria to assess the effectiveness and 

impact on the Nation’s economy of planned 

or future technology transfer efforts; and 

45 Academics have traditionally studied patenting activity in federal 

laboratories, perhaps because such data were more readily 

available from third-party sources than licensing or CRADA data. 

For one example, see Link et al. (2011) for a longitudinal study of 

NIST’s and Sandia National Laboratories’ patent applications from 

1970 through 2009. See Chapter 4 and the literature reviews 

therein. 

46 The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), created in 

1976, is a department within the Executive Office of the President. 

See Hart (2014) for a historical overview of the OSTP. 
Appendix A: Historical Overview of Technology Transfer Policies Toward 

U.S. Federal Laboratories from 1979 to the Present 

A-11

(4) a compilation and assessment of the 

Technology Share Program established in 

Section 2 and, where appropriate, related 

cooperative research and development 

venture programs. 

Executive Order 12591 applied across federal agencies. Since 

1987, the Office of Technology Policy within the Technology 

Administration of the Department of Commerce submitted to 

Congress biannual reports as required by the FTTA of 1986: 

Two years after the date of the enactment of this 

subsection and every two years thereafter, the 

Secretary shall submit a summary report to the 

President and the Congress on the use by the 

agencies and the Secretary of the authorities 

specified in this Act. 

Currently, these reports are prepared and submitted through 

the Technology Partnerships Office at NIST. The source for the 

Technology Partnerships Office reports is each agency’s report, 

all of which are now prepared annually. Under the Technology 

Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000, Public Law 106-404: 

Each Federal agency ... shall report annually to the 

Office of Management and Budget ... on the 

activities performed by that agency and its Federal 

laboratories ... The report shall include ... an 

explanation of the agency’s technology transfer 

program for the preceding fiscal year and the 

agency’s plans for conducting its technology 

transfer function ... [I]nformation on technology 

transfer activities for the preceding fiscal year [shall 

include] (i) the number of patent applications filed; 

(ii) the number of patents received; (iii) the number 

of fully-executed licenses which received royalty 

income in the preceding fiscal year ... (iv) the total 

earned royalty income ... [and] (vii) any other 

parameters or discussion that the agency deems 

relevant or unique to its practice of technology 

transfer. 

We refer to the Technology Partnerships Office’s annual 

summary reports in Chapter 4. We used the agency-by-agency 

data therein to illustrate trends in selected technology transfer 

activities. 

B-1

Academic Literature 

on Technology 

Transfer from U.S. 

Federal Agencies 

and Laboratories 

B-3

Author(s) Research Question(s) Relevant Finding(s) Dat

Ham and Mowery (1995) 

Is the CRADA mechanism effective in improving industry-government cooperative R&D at DOE? What limitations do CRADAs have? 

■ The “treasure chest” model of DOE labs—labs 

having a large amount of on-the-shelf technology ready for industry application—is somewhat unrealistic. A more realistic conceptual framework for understanding the utility of CRADAs includes three broad types of projects: (1) transfer, (2) co-development, and (3) R&D services. 

■ Limitations of CRADAs include a slow approval 

process, limited support from government researchers after prototype development, and lack of senior researcher engagement. 

Case studieinterviews scientists, DOE’s LawNational Lapartner com

Ham and Mowery (1998) 

How do CRADAs operate in different settings? How to improve and evaluate CRADAs? 

■ Characteristics fundamental to CRADA success 

include the degree of flexibility of the project, quality of relationships among partners, and the government researcher’s knowledge of the outside party’s needs and objectives. Unsurprisingly, companies also need to possess the capacity to absorb and apply the results of the collaboration. 

■ CRADAs closely related to the laboratory’s 

historic mission are more likely to be successful than projects that are not closely related to their mission. 

Case studieinterviews scientists, DOE’s LawNational Lapartner com(same data 

Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) 

Are patent citations useful in measuring the impact of NASA and other federal labs on commercial innovation? 

■ Trends are consistent with increased emphasis 

in commercializing federal laboratory technology since the 1980s. 

■ Patent citations are a valid but noisy measure 

of technology spillovers; two-thirds of cites to patents of NASA-Lewis’ Electro-Physics Branch were evaluated as involving spillovers. Furthermore, patent citations cannot capture all spillovers. 

■ Evidence is consistent with the consensus from 

the literature that geographic proximity between companies and labs fosters spillovers. Yet, patent citations underestimate geographic spillovers. 

Patents grapatent offic1994 were categories: assigned to other federpatents, anof 13,997 oto inventor
B-4Author(s) Research Question(s) Relevant Finding(s) Dat

Jaffe and Lerner (2001) 

Did the statutory changes of the 1980s have a significant impact on technology transfer from the national laboratories? 

■ Patenting increased dramatically after the 

policy changes of the 1980s without a substantial decline in patent quality. Federal labs reached parity with universities in terms of patents per R&D dollar. 

■ There is also a positive impact on patenting if a 

university is the lab manager. 

■ CRADAs increase benefits to industry as 

measured by patenting and also increase industry-funded R&D. 

General infFederally FDevelopmeDOE betweranging frocharacterisnumber of executed, nand license patents aw1996 that elaboratorie

Adams, Chiang, and Jensen (2003) 

How does federal laboratory R&D affect private-sector industrial research? 

■ The impact of federal labs on industrial 

patenting and R&D varies with the interaction mechanism. There is suggestive evidence that CRADAs may be more beneficial to companies than other interactions with federal labs, which suggests that intensive interaction fosters greater impact as measured by patenting. 

■ Government contractor interactions have little 

impact on industrial patents and R&D. 

A 1996–19industrial laon R&D, painteractionperformers220 industlaboratoriecompaniesintramural federal lab

Mowery (2003) Literature review: What is 

known about the characteristics of CRADAs, federal support for CRADAs, and their effectiveness? 

■ The author reviewed findings and limitations of 

the past literature on effectiveness of CRADAs. 

■ In general, more information is needed to 

examine the effectiveness of CRADAs. Calls for better information about agency expenditures used to support CRADAs, characteristics of partners involved, and reasons for terminating CRADAs. 

Literature. published bScience FoDepartmen

Link, Siegel, and Van Fleet (2011) 

Is there evidence of the impact of the StevensonWydler Act and/or the FTTA on patenting activity at U.S. national laboratories? 

The Stevenson-Wydler Act did not stimulate an increase in patenting applications by scientists at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) or NIST. However, the FTTA and the delegation of internal 

resources to support technology transfer did have positive effect on patenting activity at the two labs. 

Patent appapplication$2009) froat SNL and 
B-5

Author(s) Research Question(s) Relevant Finding(s) Dat

Stevens et al. (2011) 

To what degree has publicsector research contributed to the applied-research phase of drug discovery? 

Research carried out by public-sector research institutions can be traced forward to 153 drugs, vaccines, or new indications that were approved by FDA. These drugs are expected to have a disproportionately large therapeutic effect as indicated by their treatment areas. 

Author-asssuccessful developmefrom publicPrimary soOrange BooTrademark database, Recombinadatabases 

Chatterjee and Rohrbaugh (2014) 

To what degree has the NIH IRP’s contributed to drug commercialization relative to extramural public-sector research institutions? 

NIH’s IRP’s contributes disproportionately to drug commercialization relative to research budgets despite roughly similar shares of budget allocated to basic versus applied research. 

Data from plus intern

Chan (2014) What is the relationship 

between transferring federally funded inventions to the private sector and the subsequent rate of innovation spillovers? 

Technology transfer has a large positive effect on the rate of spillovers with the following evidence: ■ Licensing increases the annual citation rate to a 

national laboratory patent by 31–48%. 

■ Over 75% of subsequent innovation after a 

licensed patent occurs outside of the licensing company. 

■ Over 8

since 2Nationa(BrookLaboraBerkeleLaboraNorthwLaboraEnergy Labora
B-6Author(s) Research Question(s) Relevant Finding(s) Dat

Popp (2016a) What is the time lag 

between energy R&D and successful research outcomes (publications)? Do large increases in research funding result in marginally lower quality projects? 

■ At least a decade is needed to realize the full 

effect of public R&D funding. Also, public R&D funding has a strong influence on new publications, while other demand characteristics are apparently less important. 

■ There is evidence of reduced publication quality 

(as measured by citations) as the number of publications increases, except for in the solar energy technology area. This is consistent with previous research that showed that large R&D funding increases in short time periods result in adjustment costs for public researcher institutions because of constraints such as the pool of scientific talent. 

■ Journa

1991 to technoenergy energy

■ Agency 

energy 

Popp (2016b) ■ Are scientific articles 

cited frequently by other articles also more likely to be cited by patents in clean energy? 

■ Which institutions 

produce the most valuable research in energy? Are there differences across technologies? 

■ Scientific articles cited frequently by other 

articles also receive more citations by patents, so the count of journal-to-journal citations could be a good indicator for the impact of an article on technology development. 

■ Government patents are cited the most 

frequently by researchers among all patents. Government research articles are also more likely to be cited by future patents. Universities play a larger part in solar and biofuel research than in wind research. 

■ Journa

technoenergyfrom thWeb of Collect

■ Patents 

solar ethe onlby Delp

Chen, Link, and Oliver (2018) 

Did the FTTA have an impact on CRADA activity at NIST? Is CRADA activity at NIST a cyclical phenomenon? At what frequency do privatesector companies engage in CRADA activity with NIST? 

There is suggestive evidence that the FTTA began to influence NIST’s CRADA activity within 2 to 3 years of after its passage, and there is suggestive evidence that CRADA activity moves with the business cycle. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that most companies that were engaged in CRADA activity were engaged only once; it was only the larger companies that continued to engage over time in CRADAs with NIST. 

Data on CRover the ye2014. 
C-1

Policy Literature on 

Technology Transfer 

from U.S. Federal 

Agencies and 

Laboratories 

C-3

Author(s) Description Relevant Finding(s) Dat

IDA (2011) Large-scale descriptive summary 

study of federal laboratory technology transfer performance. 

■ The length of negotiation time and 

complexity of administration are rated as top barriers to forming CRADAs with federal labs by industrial collaborators. 

■ Describes other barriers to industry-lab 

interaction caused by CRADA regulation such as advanced payment, indemnification, and U.S. competitiveness requirement. 

Discussions transfer peagencies a

IDA (2013a) Identifies what the National 

Science and Technology Council can do to help expedite the transition of federal aeronautics R&D products to civil and national security applications. 

■ Barriers to CRADA collaboration and 

technology transfer include the length of time, complexity of collaboration rules, a tendency of laboratory TTOs to focus on agreements with larger companies, geographic distance, uncertainty of research outcomes, and a lack of funds. 

■ Recommendations include bundling 

CRADAs for several related projects to reduce administrative time, standardizing administrative procedures for CRADAs, and clarifying IP rights early. 

Literature. comments Register. Inleaders frocompaniesroundtableaeronauticslaboratorie

IDA (2013b) What are the exemplar practices 

of DoD laboratories? 

■ The report selected 24 exemplar 

practices categorized into seven categories ranging from organizational structure to use of mechanisms to outreach and marketing. 

■ Best practices include tailoring the 

CRADA agreement to fit specific purposes, tracking the overall process of and status of individual CRADAs and licenses, and creating a handbook for partners. 

42 intervielaboratory and Technostaff, DoD other stake
C-4Author(s) Description Relevant Finding(s) Dat

Bozeman (2013) Addresses conceptual issues in 

analysis of technology transfer, including definitions of technology transfer and technology. Develops a model to analyze stakeholders’ role in technology transfer activity and effectiveness of technology transfer activity. 

Based on previous literature, refined the following criteria for technology transfer effectiveness: ■ Out-the-door technology transfer 

mechanisms. 

■ Assessment of market impact and 

economic development of the transferred technology, including its impact on regional and national economic growth. 

■ Political reward the technology transfer 

generates. 

■ Scientific and technical human capital 

the technology transfer builds. 

Primarily pstudy availScience, as unpublishefrom 2001–

ITIF (2013) How can National Laboratories 

better meet their mission and produce useful technologies that benefit the American economy? 

Argues that DOE laboratories suffer from inefficiencies such as duplicative regulations, micromanagement, and biases against technology transfer to the private sector. Recommends greater accountability for contractors operating labs, better alignment (between funding, management, and innovation goals), and incentives and flexibility to push more technology to market. 

NA 

Andes et al. (2014) How can DOE laboratories 

contribute to synergistic regional clusters that drive technology development? 

Argues that labs should enhance their connections with the regions in which they are located to be a regional economic development asset. To enhance connection to the region, they argue that labs should open up to SMEs and increase the relevance of their work to regions. The report also emphasized the need for greater flexibility in oversight and funding. 

Literature 
C-5

Author(s) Description Relevant Finding(s) Dat

DoD Licensing Study (TechLink, 2016) 

Evaluates the extent to which DoD license agreements active during the 2000–2014 period contributed to new economic activity and job creation in the United States. 

Finds that DoD license agreements generated $20 billion in total sales of new products and services, $3.4 billion in sales of new products to the U.S. military, $49 billion in total economic output nationwide, $1.6 billion in new tax revenues, and nearly 183,000 full-time jobs created or retained. 

■ Surveye

with Doactive dperiod. 

■ Used an 

to estimoutput. 

Argonne National Laboratory (2016) 

Summary of national laboratory best practices for industry partnerships, technology transfer, and commercialization. 

■ Major barriers are over-centralization, 

lack of experimentation, mixed messages about importance of technology transfer, aversion to risk, and lack of commercialization experience/capacity for research staff. 

■ The report also discusses ways to 

enhance partnerships by leveraging existing programs and federal resources such as the SBIR program, the STTR program, the NNMI, and the MEP. 

Literature 

Federal Laboratory Consortium (2013) Desk Reference 

A primer and reference document for federal TTO staff. 

Comprehensive guide for practitioners that addresses issues in CRADAs and other mechanisms, IP, and marketing outreach. 

Predecessoguides with technology the Leahy-Invents Ac

Federal Laboratory Consortium (2017) T2 Playbook 

Shares the efforts and authorities that have been used in the best practices at federal labs across the country. 

There are 15 “plays” in the report; each play includes a concept of best practices, agency example, and guidance on how to implement the best practice. To name a few of the best practices: ■ Understand the needs, goals, and tasks 

of all the players. 

■ Agencies can encourage 

entrepreneurship internally by using reinstatement rights. 

■ Ensure the effectiveness of the 

organization structure, staff, and resources, etc. 

Experiencethe U.S. 

D-1

Description of the 

NETS Database 

The NETS Database was constructed by Walls & Associates 

using information from Dun & Bradstreet. The starting point for 

the NETS Database was 25 annual snapshots (taken every 

January) of the full Duns Marketing Information file that 

followed over 58.8 million companies over the years 1990 

through 2014. These snapshots were taken to determine which 

companies were active in January of each year in question. 

Other archival files (e.g., the Credit Rating file) were used to 

provide annual raw company data that allowed Walls & 

Associates to create time-series information (over 350 fields) in 

numerous categories. 

In the NETS Database, companies are classified in three 

categories: 

 Headquarters: A headquarters is a business location 

that has branches or divisions reporting to it and is 

legally responsible for those branches or divisions. If the 

headquarters is more than 50% owned by another 

corporation, it is also a subsidiary. If it owns more than 

50% of another corporation, then it is also a parent. 

 Branch: A branch is a secondary location of a business. 

It has no legal responsibility for its debts, even though 

bills may be paid from the branch location. It has the 

same legal business name as its headquarters, although 

branches frequently operate under a different trade 

style. A branch may be located at the same address as 

the headquarters if it has a unique industry and unique 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

D-2 

operations. In such cases, the branch appears to be a 

second location alongside the headquarters record. 

 Stand-alone: An organization is not a member of a 

legal family tree. The organization has no parent 

company, no subsidiaries, or no branch/division 

locations. 

And we calculated a fourth category: 

 Aggregated: This category was created for this study. 

It refers to entities that are combinations of companies 

of various types (headquarters, branches, and standalone) that are present in the NETS Database at the 

same physical location but have different time series for 

sales and employment. In these cases, we could not 

distinguish which company licensed the technology from 

the federal government, so we aggregated them into a 

single entity for analysis. For these entities, we added 

together company metrics (e.g., sales) and assigned an 

industry code (North American Industry Classification 

code) for each year based on the company with the 

largest sales each year. 
E-1

Template for Case 

Studies of Technology 

Transfer and 

Commercialization 

 E.1 PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT 

The case study approach documented in this appendix may be 

used as a template to chart the progress and success of a 

particular occurrence of a federal laboratory’s technology 

transfer to the private sector, and in the private sector’s followon efforts to develop and commercialize the transferred 

technology. This template is intended to be a useful starting 

point for future case studies of technology transfer, but it would 

need to be tailored according to the unique objectives of future 

case studies. 

The case studies in this report provide examples of the ways 

that different federal labs have achieved technology transfer 

success in different settings and scenarios and act as potential 

guideposts based on the best practices of the federal lab 

highlighted in the particular case study. The way that these 

case studies have been structured provides a model that an 

evaluator may follow to design their technology transfer study 

to investigate and report important milestones and contextual 

factors along the development-commercialization-adoption path 

and the contribution of the program/effort to observed progress 

and success. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-2 

This protocol aims to be useful for federal organizations that 

are either conducting or contracting out technology transfer 

case studies to document the success of their technology 

transfer efforts. We believe that the protocol described was 

used successfully in this NIST-sponsored study, as illustrated 

by the nine case studies included herein, completed for multiple 

federal agencies and about very different technologies and 

transfer recipients. It was important that our multiple case 

study principal investigators followed a common protocol for 

cost-effectiveness and quality assurance and to preserve 

reporting consistency and analysis across the case studies. For 

us, the case studies as conducted using the same evaluation 

protocol allow for easier comparison or synthesis across 

studies, but just as no two snowflakes are alike, no two case 

studies describing successful technology transfer are alike. 

 E.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THESE CASE 

STUDIES 

Like any evaluation, these case studies47 begin by defining the 

purpose of the particular case study. The case studies were 

conducted using this protocol to investigate and qualitatively 

describe outcomes (which some refer to as impacts) of the 

subject technology transfer from the federal laboratory. This 

includes the federal laboratory’s technology development and 

transfer, the TTO’s support, the transfer mechanisms used, and 

the context in which these occurred. The case studies attempt 

to document the observed outcomes and tell the story of how 

federal agency and laboratory support, as well as other factors, 

contributed to the observed outcomes. 

We anticipated a broad range of technologies that could be 

transferred from federal agencies and federal laboratories and 

structured the case study protocol to include broad but 

consistent definitions of terminology and a consistent logic and 

line of inquiry, despite heterogeneity in the underlying 

technologies, agencies, and mechanisms.48 Many scenarios are 

47 For general information, see Harrison, Helena et al. Case Study 

Research: Foundations and Methodological Orientations. Forum 

Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 

[S.l.], v. 18, n. 1, Jan. 2017. ISSN 1438-5627. Available at: 

<http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/

2655/4079>. Date accessed: 09 May 2017. 

48 Case studies conducted with the same evaluation protocol allow for 

easier comparison and synthesis across studies. 
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-3

possible in federal efforts to develop and transfer technologies 

to the private sector for commercialization to achieve societal 

impact. We structured each case study so that important 

milestones and contextual factors along the developmentcommercialization-adoption path are investigated and reported. 

Each case study also covers the contribution of federal agency 

activities to observed progress and success of the technology 

transferred. Federal agency activities may include programs, 

approaches, R&D efforts, and technology transfer activities. 

We attempted to use consistent terminology; it is important to 

ensure quality implementation of the described protocol. 

Common terminology is as follows. 

Technology may include hardware or software; a service such 

as calibration or certification; a technical standard, 

measurement tool, or dataset; a process, practice, or business 

model; or knowledge or know-how. In addition to a stand-alone 

item, technology may also be a component that is embedded in 

a new or existing product, process, practice, or policy. 

Commercialization is defined here as “at least one technology 

sold (or used) in the market.” There are different ways of 

categorizing stages in the development of a new technology, 

including the stages of the Stage-Gate process (Cooper, 2008) 

(preliminary and detailed investigation, development, 

validation, and commercial launch) or the sequence of clinical 

trials for a new biomedical innovation. 

Success may be represented in the form of improved 

capabilities, improved knowledge, and new hypotheses on 

which future innovation can build, where innovation is defined 

as introduction to the market of something new or improved 

that adds value (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development and Eurostat, 2005). 

Innovation is interpreted to mean market or nonmarket 

adoption of a technology. 

 E.3 GUIDANCE ON SELECTION OF CASE 

STUDIES 

Although there may be implicit criticism when the choice of 

case studies is limited to cases of success, that is, cases where 

there has been progress toward commercialization or actual 

commercial launch, there are practical reasons for choosing 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-4 

successful cases. Because of the extreme variation in 

technologies, markets, and contexts in the possible cases to 

choose from, even if technology transfer failures were included, 

the broader study’s findings and observations do not include 

generalized conclusions about the overall population of federal 

technology transfer efforts. Case studies in which a federal 

technology has been transferred and commercialized, generally 

qualitatively describe and usually quantify the social and 

economic benefits that the transferred technology delivers; part 

of the story includes the research and financial contributions of 

the federal laboratory that transferred the technology. The 

stories also educate readers on the steps and challenges 

involved in R&D and innovation and provide federal technology 

managers with ideas about what may be better methods. 

The preference may be to select cases where the federally 

funded laboratory or university-developed technologies have 

had an impact on some aspect of the economy or society, if 

possible, in sync with the mission of that federal laboratory. 

Possible cases may be identified through interviews with federal 

managers with a view of past work. 

Preferably, the mechanism for federal transfer to the private (or 

sometimes public) sector is clear, but the transfer mechanism 

can differ across the case studies. Federal transfer may occur 

through licenses, CRADAs, use of laboratory services or 

materials, entrepreneurial spin-offs/start-ups by federal 

scientists or external organizations licensing federal technology, 

or other mechanisms. It may make sense to choose a certain 

case for analysis because the particular transfer mechanism 

plays a large role in technology transfer at the organization. In 

this context, the case study may add richness to reported 

quantitative data on that federal transfer mechanism. 

We used two selection criteria considered important to 

complete high-quality case studies with no undue expense. 

Ideally, 1) information for the proposed case study is readily 

available, and there is a good trail of historical data on the 

transferred technology’s development and commercialization 

and the federal laboratory’s contribution to the eventual private 

or public-sector use. The other important criterion is 2) 

information about the transferred technology’s “performance” 

(such as speed, efficiency), cost, and how the technology 

compares to what it replaces (next best alternative) is also 
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-5

needed. We recommend not pursuing duplicate case studies 

where data are available because the federal technology 

transfer story has been studied and reported previously. 

Second, they recommend that the available data should include 

the names of individuals or organizations who were involved in 

the technology transfer, their roles and timing, and how they 

may be contacted, whether in the federal laboratory or the 

transferee’s premises. 

 E.4 FRAMEWORK FOR THE CASE STUDIES 

 A Logical Framework Guided these Case Studies 

Once the purpose of these case studies was defined, following 

good practice in evaluation, the next step was to develop a 

general logical framework to guide each case study. A logical 

framework includes a logic model or “theory of change” and the 

research questions that follow from that model. Data required 

to answer the research questions are then determined. Findings 

and observations are organized around the research questions, 

that is, organized along the pathway from inputs, activities, and 

outputs to technology transfer and from the sequence of 

observed outcomes and any benefits stemming from those 

outcomes. 

 The Logic Model Template 

The logic model in Figure E-1 is a simple linear representation 

of what is generally understood to be a nonlinear process with 

many feedback loops, contingent on different characteristics of 

the transferred technology, market, actors, and context. 

However simplistic, it is a useful pedagogical device for 

researchers using this protocol to adopt for the case being 

studied. Hopefully using a logic model ensures a quality study, 

and if multiple studies are being conducted, using this generic 

logic model provides consistency in the approach to each case 

study and the reporting of multiple technology transfer efforts. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-6 

Figure E-1. Technology Transfer and Commercialization Logic Model with Contingencies 

One point on terminology is important to note. The term 

outcomes in this logical framework is a sequence of short-, 

intermediate-, and long-term outcomes that result from 

reaction to and use of the outputs of activities associated with 

the transferred technology. Impact is defined several ways. 

Some use impact as only that part of observed outcomes that 

can be credited to the results the transferred technology 

produces. Often, impact is used interchangeably with 

outcomes, particularly with longer-term outcomes. 

The logic model in Figure E-1 incorporates five basic elements 

plus contingencies that delineate possible internal and external 

influences on the elements of the model. The five elements are 

the following: 

 R&D expenditures, planning, implementation, and 

results of that R&D from discovery to proof of 

application and technical disclosure within an R&D 

organization 

 Transfer of an R&D-based object (e.g., technical 

knowledge and/or a prototype technology) and the 

process and mechanisms of transfer 

 Receipt and use of that object by the recipient who adds 

resources to use the transferred object to further 

Transfer Object

Transfer Media

Transfer Support

Economic and Societal 

Outcomes/ Impact

S&T Infrastructure

‐ S&T Knowledge, Tools

‐ S&T Human Capital

‐ Standards, Testing

Private or Public Sector 

‐New Products, 

Processes, Practices, 

Applications

‐ Private and Public 

Value

Transfer Agent 

Pre‐Transfer R&D

Collaborations

Transfer Recipient

Demand Environment

Object Used ‐‐

Infrastructure, 

Development, 

Commercialization, 

Deployment

Object 

Transferred

Research & 

Development

Many Feedback Loops

Contingencies –Characteristics of

Collaborations, Intermediaries

External 

Influences
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-7

specific technology development and commercialization 

or to add to the general technical infrastructure 

 Collaborations and intermediaries involved before, 

during, or after the transfer 

 Technical, social, and economic outcomes for both 

private and public benefits associated with using the 

commercialized version that stems from the transferred 

object 

To summarize, R&D in federal laboratories may lead to an 

object that is transferable. After the federal transfer of the 

technology, the recipient company of the technology 

transferred adds resources (physical capital and human capital) 

to employ the object for use as a product, process, service, or 

practice and that object may have economic and/or social 

value. Collaborators or intermediary supporting organizations 

may be involved in one or more steps along the way. 

 Contingencies: Factors that Influence the Success of 

Federal Technology Transfer Efforts 

Our generic logic model, developed in this NIST-funded study, 

was based in large part on the Bozeman (2013) published 

paper that proposes a logic model with contingencies, factors 

that differ and heavily influence the timing, parties involved, 

and size and type of outcome/impact of the technology 

transfer. We added three factors to Bozeman’s five and 

expanded one. The additions are noted with an asterisk (*). 

The usefulness of these eight contingencies was established in 

the case study interviews completed for this NIST-funded 

study. 

Note that contingencies have been developed for each element 

of the logic model; characteristics will vary depending on the 

federal laboratory involved and the specific R&D, the object 

transferred and the transfer mechanism, the transfer recipient 

and the demand environment, the federal agency’s mission, 

and a broad notion of the pathways to possible economic and or 

social benefits. The contingencies that were considered in this 

study, and should be considered in developing a case study, for 

data collection, analysis, and reporting are as follows: 

 Transfer agent and *pretransfer R&D: Transfer 

agents are the innovating institutions. The national 

federal laboratories (the subject of this report) vary 

widely and are characterized by such factors as 

technological niche, mission, sector, scientific and 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-8 

technical human capital, resources, geographic location, 

organizational design, management style, and political 

constraints. The nature of the federal R&D leading up to 

the transfer varies in terms of the stage of development 

or presents incremental or radial change to the current 

state of the technology. 

 Transfer object: Characteristics of the technology 

transferred vary in terms of type. It may be software or 

hardware, for example, or a vaccine. What are its 

characteristics in terms of value to potential users: 

comparative advantage over next best alternatives, 

compatibility, complexity, trialability, and 

observability.49

 *Technology transfer support: This category includes 

characteristics of federal agency and laboratory 

leadership, the allocation of resources for the technology 

transfer, and the capabilities and actions of the federal 

technology transfer staff. 

 Transfer media: The way in which the federal 

technology is handed off to private or public entities 

varies. Typical for federal laboratories are cooperative 

research agreements, licensing, open-source software, 

material transfers, and occasionally business start-ups. 

 Technology recipient: Characteristics of the entities 

that acquire the innovation vary in terms of resources 

and areas of expertise, capacity, geographic location, 

and size. 

 *Transfer collaborations and intermediaries: The 

extent to which other entities are involved in the 

development, transfer, and commercialization varies, as 

do the characteristics of those partners, collaborators, or 

other entities. 

 Demand environment: This category is the nature of 

the target market’s demand for the federal innovation, 

such as the level of existing demand for a comparable 

technology. It may also include characteristics of the 

existing supply chain and any required supporting 

technology and infrastructure. 

 *External influences: In addition to the other 

categories of contingencies, other factors outside of the 

federal laboratory’s or its TTO’s efforts or control can 

either drive or restrain successful transfer. For example, 

there may be unexpected technical breakthroughs by 

third parties, a competing technology may enter the 

49 E. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 2005. 
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-9

market first, federal regulations may support adoption, 

or cultural norms or an economic recession may slow 

adoption. 

 E.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA COLLECTION, 

AND ANALYSIS 

The objective of the case study analysis is to capture and 

describe successful technology transfer activities by identifying 

specific outcomes/impacts associated with the technology 

transferred from the federal laboratory. The case study protocol 

followed by us for these case studies, included in the broader 

study, involves the following seven broad research questions: 

1. What is the technology to be transferred, and what does 

it do for whom when compared with the next best 

alternative it would replace? 

2. What is the history of federal lab/agency involvement in 

the research and technology development of this 

technology? 

3. Who else was involved in the R&D before, during, and 

after the federal transfer and what is known about their 

interactions? 

4. What were the circumstances surrounding the federal 

transfer of the technology to the private (or public) 

sector? 

5. What has happened since the transfer of the federal 

technology? 

6. What benefits occurred as a result of 

commercialization/adoption of the transferred 

technology? 

7. What did the federal technology development and 

transfer effort contribute to observed outcomes and how 

did contextual factors contribute to these observed 

outcomes? 

Detailed questions within each of the seven broad questions 

used by us are provided here as fodder for future case studies 

of technology transfer. We found that interviews with 

knowledgeable federal personnel familiar with key aspects of 

the case study are key. Typically, we interviewed principal 

investigators, TTO staff, and companies or public-sector 

organizations that were recipients and follow-on investors in 

the technology. Because the role a federal lab, collaborating 

partner, or company transfer recipient plays influences 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-10 

perspective, data on the role played and organization type are 

attached herein to the data collected. The other source of data 

may be from review of program documents, the extant 

literature, and relevant websites. 

1. What is the “technology” and what does it do compared 

with the next best alternative? 

a. What is its function, who uses it, and for what 

purposes? 

b. How does it relate to the agency mission? 

2. What is the history of federal lab/agency involvement in 

the R&D of this technology? 

a. When and how did the federal lab or agency first 

take up this technology (e.g., past project, 

stakeholder idea)? 

b. What resources did the lab and agency provide for 

this R&D effort? 

c. Who funded/did what portion of the R&D (at what 

stages of technology development) and when? It 

includes before, during, and after transfer. 

d. While the lab/agency was developing this 

technology, what improvements did they make and 

validate in the technology’s performance and cost? 

e. At the time the lab/agency transferred the 

technology, how far along was the technology toward 

meeting the technology performance and cost goals 

for market entry? What was the technology transfer 

mechanism? 

f. If appropriate, what IP was produced (e.g., invention 

disclosure, patents, copyrights) by the federal lab 

prior to transfer? 

g. What, if anything, was done by the federal lab or 

TTO staff to develop a “business case” for this 

technology (identify markets, investor 

interest/funding, IP created, potential transfer 

agreements, market interest, attractiveness)? 

h. Was the lab/agency involved in demonstrating fullscale prototypes in realistic and/or operating 

settings? What was the result of this federal 

test/validation? 

i. What was the business case for the federal 

technology at the time of transfer? 
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-11

j. What factors internal to the federal lab/agency 

enabled development and demonstration of the 

federal technology? This may include other enabling 

technologies, related past experience, etc. 

3. Who else was involved in the R&D before and during 

transfer and what is known about their interactions with 

federal labs and outside parties? 

a. Who were the federal lab’s R&D partners, when were 

they involved, and what private partner support was 

provided in terms of investment (funds, in kind)? 

b. Were any intermediaries such as small business 

assistance programs involved and, if so, what were 

their roles? 

c. What was the form, frequency, and continuity of 

interactions between the federal labs and outside 

parties? 

4. What were the circumstances surrounding the transfer 

of the federal technology to the private (or public) 

sector? 

a. What was the mechanism of federal transfer (e.g., 

license, CRADA, start-up company, standard)? 

b. What was the involvement of the TTOs at the lab and 

agency levels? 

c. Who was the federal technology transferred to? What 

were the characteristics of that/those entities (e.g., 

organization type, size, any past experience with the 

lab/agency and with this or related technologies)? 

5. What has happened since the transfer of the federal 

technology? 

a. What is the technology development and validation 

progress (stages, proximity to technology 

performance and cost goals). 

b. What is the business case progress (identified 

markets, investor interest/funding, IP created, 

transfer agreements, market interest, 

attractiveness)? 

c. Has the technology been commercialized, that is, at 

least one sold or otherwise adopted by a market? By 

whom? What market? 

d. Have there been post-launch technology 

refinements? 

e. What were the drivers and constraints to adoption on 

both supply (production/supply chain) and demand 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-12 

(comparative advantage, compatibility, cultural 

norms) sides? 

f. At what volume is the technology produced? What is 

the volume of sales over the relevant time frame if 

the technology is sold? 

g. What technology did this technology replace (next 

best alternative)? 

6. What benefits accrued as a result of the technology’s 

commercialization/adoption? 

a. Who benefits from that commercialization and how? 

b. What kind of benefits/impacts are there? Economic, 

environmental, health, national security, other? 

c. What occurs because of the per-unit performance 

and cost of the new technology as compared to what 

it replaces (e.g., reduced energy use, emissions, cost 

and time to replace short-span bridges)? 

d. What benefits accrue to the producer of the 

technology and to the accompanying supply chain 

(e.g., revenue, skills, able to meet requirements or 

standards, advantage in new markets)? 

e. Have those personnel involved in the federal R&D 

and/or transfer of the technology made use of the 

technical or business knowledge accumulated or 

lessons learned about the process in later work? 

f. Have there been any unanticipated outcomes from 

the federal technology development, transfer, and 

commercialization, either positive or negative? Has it 

furthered follow-on technologies? 

7. What did the federal technology development and 

transfer effort contribute to observed outcomes and how 

did contextual factors contribute to these observed 

outcomes? 

a. Did the federal laboratory and agency (1) accelerate 

how quickly the technology was developed and 

commercialized relative to what may have happened 

in the absence of the federal laboratory and agency? 

(2) Improve the quality of the technology above 

what others would have accomplished without the 

federal lab? (3) Help expand the technology into new 

markets? 

b. Overall, how much credit does the federal laboratory 

and agency deserve for the benefits/impacts that 

accrued from this transferred technology? Would it 
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-13

have happened without them? Select one of the 

choices below. 

i. It would not have happened without them. 

ii. Much of the credit. The federal lab and agency 

were the main contributing factor, but there were 

other factors as well. 

iii. About half of the credit. The federal lab and 

agency were a major contributing factor as were 

other factors. 

iv. Only some of the credit. The federal lab and 

agency were a contributing factor, but other 

contributing factors played a greater role. 

v. None of the credit (it would have happened 

without them in the same time frame). 

c. Summarize who did what prior to and post-transfer, 

and over the development and market absorption 

time frame, and what was the influence of each 

entity as measured by funds in, timing, and degree 

of contributions. 

d. What other plausible explanations (contributing 

factors) are there for the occurrence of the observed 

outcomes post-transfer? 

e. What would have happened with this technology if 

the federal lab and agency had NOT been involved 

with it? Would it have been developed at all?50

 Menu of Possible Indicators 

One way to respond to the questions posed above is to provide 

indicators, qualitative as well as quantitative. To help guide 

data collection, We developed Table E-1, which provides a 

menu of possible indicators that may be collected related to 

these case studies of technology transfer and commercialization 

and their related benefits. The categories mirror Questions 1 

through 6. Our underlying method is not to try to collect all 

these data but to be aware of what to look for depending on the 

specifics of the case study and on the evaluator’s budget and 

the evaluation effort’s time frame. 

50 Question 7e is best posed to a third-party technology or market 

expert. 
E-14Table E-1. Menu of Possible Indicators for the Evaluation Questions 

Menu of Possible Indicators for the Evaluation Questions 

Characteristics of the Technology and Target Market  Technology name, sector (e.g., energy, security)  Technology “functions”—aspects that give it comparative 

advantage (e.g., speed, durability, flexibility, size, efficiency) 

 Who is expected to use it, for what purposes  Expected benefits of use  Expected time to market or date entered the market 

Partners, Others Involved in R&D Before, DTransfer  Research collaborations, partnerships formed  Industry engagement, co-funding, funding for  Interconnections: Frequency, duration, value e

— With other technology developers, interm

application users 

— Across functions with developers, manuf

Inter-sectoral- 

 Level of integration (e.g., co-located, bounda

Agency/Laboratory R&D and Demonstration History  Lab/Agency inputs and resources; amount/source of funds for 

R&D 

 Expenditures on research support activities, such as database 

development, research equipment, facilities, methods 

 Depth, breadth of knowledge base and skill set of researchers 

and technologists, teams, TTO, organizations 

 Lab R&D conducted on this technology  Research project size, duration, stage (investigation, prototype 

development/scale, validation) 

 New knowledge advances (publications, technical challenges 

overcome) 

 New technology development advances (movement through 

stage gates or readiness levels) 

 Milestones met, preferably milestones for reaching next 

technical readiness level 

 Business case progress (e.g., interviewed potential customers, 

identified market and product advantage) 

 Progress on goals for technology function/performance and 

cost, proximity to those goals 

 IP created, ownership of it – Number of invention disclosures, number of patent applications – Number of patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc., received 

Development/Commercialization Since TranCommercial launch 

 Product commercialized; policy/practice imple

behavior changed – New "technology" commercialization/diffu

chain develops, adoption of new process t

Post-launch stages:  Volume of production, sales  Share of the target market using the technol Technology/product refinements in performaAdoption infrastructure (potential and actual): 1. Business 2. Government procurement 3. Public groups (engagement, awareness, particmentions) 4. Market readiness in four domains:  the availability of program information (know

market, amount of use of decision support todecisions) 

 the improvement in economic attractiveness 

supply chain (influence on policy, codes, govamount of incentives offered, taken) 

 the increase in supply chain capacity (manuf

total cost (installation, operating), financing 
E-15

Menu of Possible Indicators for the Evaluation Questions 

Funding received (or under discussion) for future work on the technology, source of funds 

 the improvement in economic attractiveness 

users (payback period, consumer characteris

Transfer of the Technology  Date of formal handoffs to or take up by partners, others, and 

transfer mechanism 

 Interactions with the TTO, patent support office  Transfer agreements underway or signed, by type – Number of licenses granted – Number of citations of patents (normalized by patent class) – Value of IP to company that licensed it – Revenue from licenses of IP generated by program Start-up launched or contemplated (e.g., entrepreneurial leave taken) 

Benefits of Commercialization Specific to this technology: 

– Per-unit benefit compared with next best alte– Revenue, number of jobs created based on c

technologies 

– Tax revenue generated based on commercia– Competitiveness (e.g., open new markets) – Modeled monetized benefits, benefit-to-cost Depending on the affected sector(s): Economic (e.g., income levels, energy cost savinproduction levels, jobs); social (quality of life, he(e.g., pollution reduced); security, safety, other 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

E-16 

 Analysis of Timeline and Contribution 

We set up this protocol to conduct historical tracing analysis—

who did what over a period of time that led to the benefits 

accrued, from the transfer of the technology from federal 

laboratories, and what other contextual factors were major 

influences. By conducting this tracing in an evaluation based on 

a well-founded logic model (also called a theory of change), Our 

protocol allows for contribution analysis. This is a form of 

attribution analysis that tracks progress along the logic model 

and investigates plausible explanations for observed outcomes 

other than the technology transferred being studied.51

A useful graphic for historical tracing is a timeline showing the 

major milestones in the federal transfer and commercialization 

of the technology. The example in Figure E-2 depicts actions of 

the federal agency above the timeline and the actions of 

partners and others below the timeline. 

Figure E-2. Timeline for USDA ARS R&D on Improved Turfgrasses 

51 Mayne J, & Stern E. (2013). Impact evaluation of natural resource 

management research programs: a broader view. (ACIAR Impact 

Assessment Series Report No. 84). Canberra: Australian Centre for 

International Agricultural Research. Retrieved from: 

http://aciar.gov.au/files/ias84.pdf

1936 2009 2014 1997‐98 1986

Coastal 

forage 

grass

1943 1960

Machinery 

invented

Tifway TifBlair,

TifEagle,

TifSport

TifGrand TifTuf

1970

Mutants 

made

Marketing, 

distribution 

channels

1887 – UGA founded

1914 – UGA Coop. 

Extension

1928 – ARS hires 

forage agronomist

Federal 

Seed Act

GA Seed 

Development 

Commission 

Golf Assoc. 

invests

Turf Grass 

Group 

UGA 

Research 

Foundation

GA Crop 

Improvement 

Assoc. (certifies)

Patten Seed 

Company

W. Hanna joins 

ARS Tifton

W. Hanna 

only with 

UGA

Tifgreen

Tifdwarf

G. Burton 

joins ARS

Research 

Team 

Award

FLC Tech 

Transfer 

Award

B. Schwartz 

joins UGA

Licensees, sub‐licensees produce, 

promote, sell next generation

Tifway & Tifdwarf

dominate market
Appendix E: Template for Case Studies of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 

E-17

Another helpful template that aids historical tracing and 

contribution analysis for technology transfer efforts is shown in 

Table E-2. This template is more useful for internal analysis 

than for reporting. Table E-2 depicts a matrix that summarizes 

data categories collected across the historical timeline of federal 

development and adoption: who did what during each phase is 

listed for each row. 

Table E-2.Template for Collecting and Analyzing Technology Commercialization Information 

Categories of 

Information 

Needed for 

Additionality 

(Attribution) 

Assessment 

Technology Timeline 

Capabilities 

for Tech 

Maturation 

Preliminary 

& Detailed 

Investigation 

Develop 

Components, 

System 

Validate/ 

Demonstrate 

Commercialize or 

Utilize 

Market 

Receptivity, 

Adoption 

History of the 

technology/market 

 

What agency did 

What others did 

(rival explanations—

Private sector and 

other nations) 

What others did 

(rival explanations—

US & state 

government) 

 

The agency effect 

 

Description of 

agency Influence 

and its strength 

Basis of evidence of 

influence 

F-1

Case Study of DOC 

NIST Transfer: 

Cypersecurity 

Framework 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-2 

DOC – NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Federal agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology 

Laboratory: Information Technology Laboratory 

Collaborating entities: Various entities through public comment and 

workshops 

Transfer object: Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 

Cybersecurity: The Framework uses business drivers 

to guide cybersecurity activities and considers 

cybersecurity risks as part of the organization’s risk 

management processes.52

Inventor(s): Not applicable 

Invention disclosure date: Not applicable 

Transfer mechanisms: Framework reference guide 

Key dates: Version 1.0 released on February 12, 2014 

Version 1.1 released on April 16, 2018 

Transfer recipients: Government and industry 

Impact summary: As of 2015, 30% of organizations in the United States 

had implemented the Framework, and that 

percentage is projected to increase to 50% by 2020. 

A recent report found that 28% of U.S. companies 

now require vendors to follow the Framework. The 

wide adoption of the Framework helps prevent and 

mitigate cyberattacks. Estimates of the average cost 

of these attacks range from $2.7 million to $21 

million per event. 

52 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-3

 F.1 BACKGROUND 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 

established and maintains the Framework for Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Cybersecurity (hereafter the Framework),53 a 

voluntary tool—that is, a type of reference guide—used by 

government and industry designed to improve cybersecurity 

within critical infrastructure. According to the Committee on 

National Security Systems, cybersecurity is the prevention of 

damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, 

electronic communications systems, electronic communications 

services, wire communication, and electronic communication, 

including information contained therein, to ensure its 

availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 

nonrepudiation.54

The basis for the Framework came from a presidential 

executive order in 2013 (Executive Order 13636) that 

designated NIST as the implementing agency.55 NIST, led by its 

Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), convened hundreds 

of public- and private-sector entities, including companies, 

associations, standards development organizations, and 

government agencies, to create the Framework. The resulting 

Framework comprises standards, guidelines, and practices that 

help organizations identify, assess, manage, and communicate 

cybersecurity risks. 

An organization can use the Framework as a key part of its 

process for managing cybersecurity risk, including: 

1. Reviewing cybersecurity practices in an organization; 

2. Establishing or improving a cybersecurity program; 

3. Communicating cybersecurity requirements to 

stakeholders; 

53 See https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework for more information 

about the Framework. 54 https://rmf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CNSSI-4009.pdf 55 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialexecutive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networkscritical-infrastructure/. Specifically, the executive order states: 

“Effective immediately, each agency head shall use The Framework 

for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the Framework) 

developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

or any successor document, to manage the agency’s cybersecurity 

risk.” 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-4 

4. Informing decisions about buying products and services; 

and 

5. Identifying opportunities for new or revised standards 

and practices. 

Cybersecurity threats emerge continuously and take advantage 

of weaknesses in large-scale online networks. For example, a 

cybersecurity vulnerability in one organization might be shared 

or create exposure in other organizations, thus weakening the 

strength of the overall network. The Framework was designed 

to help individual organizations understand and improve their 

own internal cybersecurity strategies. The Framework was also 

designed to create collective resistance to cyber threats among 

hundreds of organizations through the continuous exchange of 

knowledge. The Framework improves individual organization 

and collective cybersecurity using three key tools: the 

Framework core, Framework implementation tiers, and profile. 

 F.1.1 Framework Core 

The Framework core provides a set of activities to achieve 

specific cybersecurity outcomes, as well as reference examples 

for organizations to achieve those outcomes. Drawing from 

common elements of cybersecurity across critical infrastructure 

sectors,56 the core helps guide individual organizations that 

seek to reduce the risk of cyber-related threats. The core 

comprises five concurrent and continuous functions designed to 

protect computers and networks: Identify, Protect, Detect, 

Respond, and Recover (see Figure F-1). Embedded within the 

five functions are 23 categories—and individual subcategories—

that provide specific outcomes of technical and/or management 

cybersecurity activities. Using simple, nontechnical language, 

the core enables communications not only between an 

organization’s leadership and cybersecurity professionals, but 

also communication among organizations. 

56 According to the Department of Homeland Security, the 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors are those whose assets, systems, and 

networks, whether physical or virtual, are so vital that their 

incapacitation would have a debilitating effect on the safety and 

security of the United States. For more detail, see 

https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-5

Figure F-1. NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core 

 F.1.2 Framework Implementation Tiers 

Framework implementation tiers provide a progressive set of 

characteristics that describe how an organization views 

cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to manage that 

risk. Tiers range from Partial (Tier 1) to Adaptive (Tier 4), 

describing the degree to which an organization’s cybersecurity 

practices are informed by its business needs and integrated into 

its overall risk management practices. Tier 1 organizations 

typically manage risk in an ad hoc, reactive manner, whereas 

Tier 4 organizations generally adapt quickly to changes in the 

risk environment and share their lessons learned with other 

organizations. However, achieving a higher-level tier can be 

costly and challenging for an organization. Organizations can 

choose an acceptable level of cyber risk and craft a 

commensurate cybersecurity response based on their 

respective feasibility to implement, as well as their threat 

environment, business goals, current risk management 

practices, and legal and regulatory requirements. In other 

words, while organizations are encouraged to move toward 

higher tiers, these tiers do not represent levels of cybersecurity 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-6 

protection, but are instead a tool for identifying goals and 

making organizational decisions about cybersecurity. 

 F.1.3 Profiles 

A profile provides a snapshot of an organization’s cybersecurity 

strategy relative to the desired outcomes identified by the 

Framework core. Two profiles, current and target, illustrate 

existing and future cybersecurity strategies based on 

organizational requirements, objectives, risk appetite, and 

resources. Once profiles are established, the organization 

compares its current and target profiles, thus providing a 

mechanism for identifying gaps in cybersecurity strategy. 

Organizations can then use these gaps to update targets for 

corrective action, estimate their cost, and prioritize next steps. 

Viewed collectively, these three Framework elements present a 

prioritized, flexible, and cost-effective approach that helps 

promote the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure,57

among other sectors important to the economy and national 

security of the United States and beyond. 

 F.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

Established in 1901 as the National Bureau of Standards, the 

NIST mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial 

competitiveness by advancing measurement science, 

standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic 

security and improve our quality of life. NIST has a long history 

of advancing its mission by partnering with industry, academia, 

and other government agencies. Although NIST has been 

involved in cybersecurity since the 1970s, its role in the 

Framework began with Executive Order 13636, Improving 

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, signed by President Barack 

Obama in February 2013. The Executive Order was issued in 

response to the growing cyber threat to critical infrastructure 

and the recognition that the national and economic security of 

the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the 

nation’s critical infrastructure. 

The Executive Order sought to develop a Framework to reduce 

cyber risks to critical infrastructure. It recognized that much of 

57 The Framework was developed originally to help owners and 

operators of critical infrastructure understand and manage 

cybersecurity risk. There are 16 defined critical infrastructure 

sectors. 
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-7

the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned, operated, and 

managed by the private sector. The Executive Order directed 

NIST to engage in an open consultative process with diverse 

public and private stakeholders to develop the Framework. 

NIST was chosen to lead the creation and implementation of 

the Framework given its track record of establishing and 

managing public-private partnerships, rapport with industry, 

and flexibility in responding to government mandates. The 

Executive Order required NIST to construct and implement the 

Framework within 1 year. 

When the Executive Order was released on February 12, 2013, 

it established the following objectives for the Framework that 

NIST, in turn, used as design criteria: 

 Identify security standards and guidelines applicable 

across sectors of critical infrastructure; 

 Provide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performancebased, and cost-effective approach; 

 Help owners and operators of critical infrastructure 

identify, assess, and manage cyber risk; 

 Enable technical innovation and account for 

organizational differences; 

 Provide guidance that is technology neutral and enables 

critical infrastructure sectors to benefit from a 

competitive market for products and services; 

 Include guidance for measuring the performance of 

implementing the Cybersecurity Framework; and 

 Identify areas for improvement that should be 

addressed through future collaboration with particular 

sectors and standards-developing organizations. 

Tasked with these objectives, NIST needed to establish a 

Framework that was applicable to 16 different critical 

infrastructure sectors and that could be customized to fit a 

variety of industries and perspectives. NIST leaders architected 

and executed an open, transparent, and inclusive process to 

understand the mission and business objectives of critical 

infrastructure owners and operators, understand their 

cybersecurity needs and challenges, and use this information to 

inform development of the Cybersecurity Framework. 

The first step in this process was to send a request for 

information in the Federal Register to help identify, refine, and 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-8 

guide the many interrelated considerations, challenges, and 

efforts needed to develop the Framework. In response to their 

request, NIST received 250 written responses.58 NIST staff then 

planned and hosted facilitated open and public workshops in 

Washington, DC; Pittsburgh; San Diego; Dalla; and Raleigh, 

every 6 weeks for 8 months. Workshops were all announced 

publicly through the Federal Register and were open to the 

public. These meetings were well attended by industry; 

nonprofits; federal, state, and local governments; international 

governments and industry; standards-developing 

organizations; and other interested stakeholders. NIST’s prior 

work in cybersecurity and its strong relationship with industry 

enabled NIST to attract interest and eventual support for the 

Framework. 

The workshops provided a mechanism to iteratively gather 

stakeholder ideas and feedback to guide the establishment and 

refinement of the Framework. The purpose and result of the 

workshops include the following: 

 Workshop 1: The purpose of the first workshop was to 

present NIST’s objectives for the Framework, 

understand the cybersecurity challenge, and understand 

possible features of the Framework. 

 Workshop 2: This workshop introduced participants to 

the facilitated group discussion format and allowed them 

to provide some general ideas about what the 

Framework should include. Further, the workshop 

provided a forum for them to express concerns that 

included the possibility that the voluntary Framework 

might become mandatory, sensitivities related to 

privacy, and previous frustrations of working with 

government. 

 Workshops 3 and 4: After the second workshop, NIST 

staff created a working draft of the Framework, posted it 

for online comment, and presented it at Workshops 3 

and 4. The draft not only provided an opportunity for 

industry and government stakeholders to see how the 

Framework was taking shape, but also provided another 

opportunity—during Workshops 3 and 4—for comment, 

additions, and edits. 

58 See https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi-framework-reducingcyber-risks-critical-infrastructure-2013 for original RFI comments. 
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-9

 Workshop 5: The fifth workshop provided participants 

with a final opportunity to provide refinements to the 

working Framework document. 

At the end of this iterative, year-long process—through multiple 

workshops, versions, comments, and rounds of edits—NIST 

finalized and released the Cybersecurity Framework, Version 

1.0, on February 12, 2014. After its release, NIST personnel 

worked with associations, companies, and government agencies 

to raise awareness regarding the Framework and provide 

education as to its possible uses. NIST also created a guidance 

document (IR-8170) in May 2017 that describes approaches to 

using the Cybersecurity Framework within federal agencies. 

NIST released Version 1.1 of the Framework on April 16, 2018. 

Cybersecurity is a constantly changing field in response to 

continuously evolving threats. Specifically, the update provides 

new areas for inclusion in the Framework, including 

management of risk in supply chains, identity and 

authentication, and self-assessment of cybersecurity risk with 

the Framework. 

 F.3 IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION 

The creation, development, and dissemination of the 

Cybersecurity Framework have led to several benefits for 

industry, government, and society. The case study illustrates 

the importance of long-standing agency connections with 

industry, providing mechanisms to receive stakeholder 

feedback and incorporate it into a solution, and continuously 

updating solutions within rapidly changing technological 

environments—in this case, cybersecurity. The sections below 

describe benefits of the Framework in greater detail. 

Growing Adoption: The Cybersecurity Framework and its 

growing adoption improve overall cybersecurity. NIST has had 

strong public engagement from external organizations with 

over 10,000 webcast participants and over 500,000 downloads 

of the Framework spanning 30 countries as of January 2019.59

Not only is their engagement, there are also signs of adoption. 

A report finds that 28% of U.S. companies now require their 

59 https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/cybersecurity-frameworkimpacts
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-10 

vendors to follow the Cybersecurity Framework.60 In short, 

while organizations can customize the Framework to their 

unique contexts, the Framework provides a common 

benchmark among all sectors and encourages the integration of 

these sectors into robust information-sharing networks. 

Through these networks, organizations can rapidly share and 

learn lessons about various cyber threats and the efficacy of 

efforts to mitigate them. 

Improved Communication: One of the biggest challenges for 

cybersecurity professionals was the lack of a common language 

between them and noncybersecurity professionals. The 

Framework gives cybersecurity professionals a common 

language to communicate with their organization’s leaders and, 

importantly, a plan for implementing that strategy. The 

Framework also enables stakeholders to have crossorganizational and cross-sector communication, thus 

strengthening herd resistance. The Framework has elevated the 

importance of cybersecurity and, as a result, cybersecurity has 

become a strategic priority in many organizations. 

Industry Benefits: A typical U.S. firm experiences 130 

cybersecurity breaches each year. While many breaches are 

thwarted, the cost to the firm of successful breaches is 

significant. Cyberattacks disproportionately affect larger 

companies, and estimates of the average cost of an adverse 

cyber event for a larger company range from $2.7 to $21 

million per event.61 Cyberattacks are also growing among small 

and medium-sized companies, with average damages to them 

ranging from $7,000 to $32,000, although researchers believe 

cyber events are underreported among these companies.62

Given the substantial costs of cyber events, the Framework has 

been of value to sectors, industries, and individual 

organizations. For example, the U.S. Telecom Association 

facilitated the involvement of companies from the 

communications sector in the development and update of the 

Framework and has promoted the use of the Framework among 

its member companies since its release.63 Further, the National 

60 https://newsroom.cisco.com/press-releasecontent?articleId=1818259

61 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/TheCost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf

62 Ibid. 

63 https://www.ustelecom.org/news/oct-2017-cscc-letter-gao
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-11

Association of Insurance Commissioners endorsed the 

Framework given its emphasis on risk management and 

mitigation.64 According to NIST officials, the Framework process 

allows organizations to provide input to the Framework while 

benefiting from the systematic way of viewing cybersecurity 

and from input of others. This works much in the same way the 

standards process works between NIST and standards 

development organizations (SDOs). 

According to interviewees from industry, the Framework 

provides an approachable way for stakeholders to conduct 

security and privacy assessments. Most importantly, it allows 

users to customize their cybersecurity strategies based on their 

specific needs and contexts. The adoption of better 

cybersecurity practices among businesses in the long-term 

means protecting their brand, maintaining customers, 

decreasing the cost of cybersecurity, and working with others 

to solve complex cybersecurity challenges. 

Through the Multi-Association Framework Development 

Initiative (MAFDI), 32 industry associations are working 

together to focus on ways to maintain and promote the 

Framework, demonstrating its importance. Specifically, MAFDI 

seeks to (1) engage multiple stakeholders in the maintenance, 

improvement, and use of the Framework; (2) share information 

across sectors on specific NIST framework activities, including 

experiences with regulators and other stakeholders; 

(3) promote the Framework as an international model; and 

(4) bring key influencers from government to hear association 

and industry perspectives on cybersecurity and the 

Framework.65

State, county, and local governments have adopted the 

Framework to guide their cybersecurity decisions and 

anecdotally have begun to require that responding companies 

possess knowledge and experience with the Framework. This 

trend in public sources is also driven by the adoption of the 

Framework by third-party public- and private-sector auditors as 

“best practice” in cybersecurity strategy. 

Benefits Among Governments: The Cybersecurity 

Framework gives governments a way to standardize and put 

64 https://artemissecure.com/cybersecurity-guidance-from-theinsurance-industry-endorses-nist-Framework/

65 https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg5-finalreport031517pdf
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

F-12 

into place measures that could prevent and reduce the impact 

of cyberattacks. The Framework has not only provided federal 

agencies an important benchmark, but it has also given weight 

to resource requests in terms of cybersecurity budget and 

staffing. State, country, and local governments have also 

adopted the Framework, which has significantly contributed to 

building stronger network-based protections among all levels of 

government. With some modification, the Framework has also 

been adopted in other countries such as Israel, Italy, Japan, 

and Philippines. 

Interestingly, it may be among local governments where future 

opportunities for implementation of the Framework may lie. For 

example, many county governments run hospital systems. 

When establishing a cybersecurity strategy, most local 

government officials not only focus on ways to protect against 

cyberattacks and diminish the impact of cyber events, but they 

must also concern themselves with privacy requirements 

associated with the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act. 

Improves the Visibility and Reputation of NIST: The 

creation and implementation of the Framework led NIST to 

deeper engagements with industry and other organizations on a 

variety of technical issues relating to cybersecurity. Increased 

NIST engagement with the public results in better public 

participation in other forms of NIST cybersecurity guidance and 

development of better practice guides at the National 

Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. Further, NIST’s role as an 

effective honest broker, growing trust that the Framework was 

not a prelude to regulation, and the quality of NIST’s 

engagement with industry have added to the reputation of NIST 

and heightened awareness of its work among industry. In 

short, the Framework resulted in benefits to the private and 

public sectors as well as to NIST. 

Extended Mechanisms for Industry Engagement at NIST:

When creating the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST built on its 

long-used model of industry engagement. Regarding technical 

issues, NIST frequently hosts public workshops to create a draft 

publication, issues and provides a period of open comment from 

the public on the publication, and then publishes the final 

product. During the creation of the Framework, NIST built 

further on this model by: 
Appendix F: Case Study of DOC National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Transfer: Cybersecurity Framework 

F-13

 Hosting multiple meetings in various locations around 

the country, thus increasing the substantive and 

geographic range of stakeholder participation; 

 Facilitating group discussions at the workshops to give 

participants a voice and reconcile different suggestions; 

 Using the Federal Register notices to transmit all related 

requests for information (RFI) and requests for comment 

(RFC), publicly posting all RFI and RFC responses, and 

publicly posting all related analyses and responses to 

public comments, all to improve transparency; and 

 Hosting follow-up workshops to ensure that NIST’s 

analysis was accurate and to provide a venue for 

additional stakeholder input. 

Although these additional mechanisms are not always used for 

NIST or government initiatives, they were used because the 

Framework development required substantial private-sector 

involvement and needed to be voluntarily adopted by a myriad 

of organizations to ensure national impact. 

G-1

Case Study of DoD 

Air Force 

Technology 

Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom 

Communications 

Earpiece System 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

G-2 

DoD – Air Force Attenuating Custom 

Communications Earpiece System (ACCES®)

Federal agency: Department of Defense, Air Force 

Laboratory: Various NIH researchers, universities, and research 

centers 

Collaborating entities: Westone Laboratories, Inc. (a hearing protection 

technology company) 

Transfer object: Airforce Attenuating Custom Communications 

Earpiece System (ACCES®) 

Inventor(s): John Allan Hall (HPW) 

Karl Cartwright (Westone) 

Kris Cartwright (Westone) 

Invention disclosure date: Information not provided 

Transfer mechanisms: CRADA 

Exclusive license 

Key dates: Patent filed April 24, 2006 

Commercialization in 2007 

Transfer recipients: Westone 

Impact summary: ACCES earpieces were used by 10,000 Air Force 

users between 2007 and 2018 with an estimated 

market penetration of 11% within the Air Force. 

ACCES protects and reduces hearing loss and aids 

pilot retention and user effectiveness. From 2007 to 

the end of 2017, Westone sold 13,755 ACCES units. 
Appendix G: Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

G-3

 G.1 BACKGROUND 

In 2006, the Federal Lab Consortium (FLC) awarded Air Force 

Research Laboratory (AFRL) 711th Human Performance Wing 

(711 HPW) an award in Excellence for Technology Transfer for 

its Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

(ACCES®). The FLC recognized the 711 HPW for its effective 

use of federal investment through a CRADA to commercialize a 

high-impact product to both military and nonmilitary users. 

ACCES addresses the pilot’s need for enhanced hearing 

protection and facilitates operational effectiveness in high-noise 

environments in times where safety, awareness, and 

communication are of paramount importance. Finally, the lowcost ACCES device saves the federal government money by 

proactively protecting its most important investment—the men 

and women who serve and use ACCES. 

ACCES was developed by the AFRL’s (AFRL) 711 HPW and 

Westone Laboratory (now Westone, a hearing protection 

technology company) through a Collaborative Research and 

Development Agreement (CRADA). Since being commercialized 

in 2007, Westone has sold nearly 14,000 ACCES units to the 

U.S. Air Force (USAF), foreign air forces, commercial pilots, and 

law enforcement.66 For the purposes of this study, the research, 

development, commercialization, and adoption of ACCES are 

discussed in the context of USAF usage, which makes up 91% 

of the current ACCES user base. 

In the absence of the ACCES technology, pilots and crew 

typically use hearing protection that has remained unchanged 

for decades—a combination of foam ear plugs and earmuffs. 

The ACCES technology addresses the shortcomings of the foam 

ear plugs by providing both a better fit and a channel for 

unimpeded radio communications. 

 G.1.1 Technical Details 

ACCES is a hearing protection device that integrates a voice 

communications cable into a pair of custom-molded earpieces 

created from silicone to precisely fit a user’s ears. The molded 

earpiece (see Figure G-1) extends into the ear canal to provide 

an isolating seal and to deliver audio to the user. 

66 Aggregated, de-identified sales data provided for this case study, 

courtesy of Westone. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

G-4 

Figure G-1. The ACCES Custom-Molded Earpiece Attached to a Speaker Cable 

Source: Westone 

The 711 HPW U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine67

designed ACCES using an existing Westone technology. 

Westone has been designing and manufacturing custom 

earpieces for hearing protection, hearing aids, audio for 

musicians, and communications systems since 1959. Their 

existing earpieces, however, could not be used by the USAF for 

three reasons: 

1. Changes in altitude during flight can cause dangerous 

levels of pressure in the ear, damaging the eardrum. 

2. The audio cable needed to connect securely to the 

earpiece but at the same time be able to disconnect 

rapidly from the rest of the aircraft equipment in the 

event of an emergency ejection. 

3. Existing earmold products did not extend far enough 

into the ear to provide adequate and consistent sound 

isolation for the USAF’s use cases. 

The 711 HPW solved the pressure problem by adding small 

capillary vents (Item 26, Figure G-2) to what became the 

ACCES earmolds to allow for pressure in the ear to adjust to 

changing conditions outside the ear. The 711 HPW received a 

patent for the venting device in the ACCES earpiece and an 

additional patent for designing a connection mechanism that 

allows for ACCES to be quickly disconnected from the rest of 

the aircraft in the event of an emergency ejection (Item 14, 

67 The 711 HPW U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine is the 

premier institute for research, education, and worldwide operational 

consultation in aerospace medicine. 
Appendix G: Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

G-5

Figure G-2). Finally, the ACCES earpiece extended threequarters of the way into the ear canal, as opposed to onequarter of the way for earpieces that Westone produces in 

other applications. 

Because the ACCES earpiece is customized, the earpiece 

component is sold in raw material form to create an impression 

of the user’s ears. Outside of the USAF, ACCES users can go to 

a Westone-authorized dealer to have the earpieces fitted. 

Within the USAF, Westone’s primary market for ACCES, 

Westone provides training to aviation physiologists on base, 

who create the ear impressions for service members. 

ACCES, like other hearing protection technologies, is more 

effective at protecting users against certain frequencies, 

particularly high-frequency sounds. Mid- to high-frequency 

sounds are the most commonly experienced noises by user 

pilots, the settings for which the ACCES earpiece is designed. 

Figure G-2. Illustration of ACCES from Patent Filing (Adapted from U.S. Patent Filing 

US7784583B1) 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

G-6 

 G.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

The seeds of ACCES were planted in 2000 at the National 

Hearing Conservation Association (NHCA) conference. John 

Hall, a 711 HPW research audiologist, attended the conference 

and shared that the USAF had identified a need for pilot and 

crew equipment that both protected hearing from aircraft noise 

and facilitated clear communications between pilots, air crew, 

and ground crew. 

John Hall’s presentation at the NHCA conference amounted to a 

request for help from the private sector to generate ideas that 

would solve their problem. After the fact, Westone approached 

711 HPW and proposed a collaboration with the Air Force 

Medical School to develop technology that met USAF’s needs 

using existing Westone earpieces as a starting point. 711 HPW 

and Westone formed a CRADA. By 2001, the first ACCES 

prototype was developed. 

As described in the background section above, the design 

modifications to create an earpiece that would meet the needs 

of pilots and crew members focused on the following: 

1. Testing of different ear depths to enhance protection 

from the extreme noise levels created by military 

aircraft while maintaining user comfort, 

2. Provision for easy detachment of speaker cables in the 

event of an emergency ejection, and 

3. Accommodation for rapid changes in pressure 

experienced by pilots by adding a capillary vent to each 

earpiece. 

In 2003, the design of ACCES was finalized and 711 HPW began 

testing the unit. By the end of 2006, test pilots were using 

ACCES, and it was ready to be marketed commercially by 

Westone. The first production units shipped in early 2007 to the 

USAF. 
Appendix G: Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

G-7

Figure G-3. Timeline of ACCES Technology Research, Development, and Commercialization 

As part of the CRADA between 711 HPW and Westone, 711 

HPW owns the patents on the ACCES technology but granted 

exclusive license to Westone to manufacture and market ACCES 

technology. Initially, use of ACCES earpieces within the USAF 

was limited to pilots’ use in fighter jets, starting with the F-22. 

However, over time ACCES technology became certified for use 

across a variety of airframes within the USAF. In addition, use 

of ACCES technology by USAF pilots spread to other aircraft 

crew members and ground crew. 

Although the USAF remains Westone’s dominant purchaser of 

ACCES, accounting for 91% of sales, the company does market 

the product to other branches of the military, friendly foreign 

militaries, law enforcement, and the commercial space industry. 

From 2007 through 2017, Westone sold a total of 13,755 

ACCES units. At a cost of $300 per unit, the USAF has spent an 

estimated $3.75 million providing ACCES to service members.

Currently, the USAF uses ACCES in a limited number of 

airframes and some ground crew operations. The USAF and 

Westone have the opportunity to expand adoption through the 

certification of ACCES technology on other airframes and its use 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

G-8 

in more roles on the ground. Other service members who 

experience excessive noise on the job may find use of ACCES 

effective, including: 

 Fighter pilots and crews across all airframes, 

 Bomber pilots and crews across all airframes, 

 Training pilots and crews, 

 Air mobility command pilots and crews, and 

 All flight line ground crew and maintainers. 

Using data provided by the USAF, we estimate this population 

of potential users in the USAF to be over 88,000 individuals, 

suggesting an estimated market penetration of 11% within the 

USAF. 

 Alternatives to ACCES 

As previously mentioned, foam earplugs are the most common 

form of hearing protection for individuals working around 

aircraft. Users find them difficult to insert reliably every time, 

and foam ear plugs block all noise equally, including radio 

communications. To hear the communications in their helmet 

clearly, some users cut the plugs in half, keep them loose in the 

ears, or turn up the volume of the speaker (CNN, 2006). Other 

crew members remove ear plugs altogether to communicate, 

thereby exposing their ears to loud external noises in the 

process (Schutte, 2005). 

ACCES technology provides significant improvements over foam 

earplugs, but it does have some shortcomings. For users, 

Westone custom makes the ACCES earplugs; for Westone to 

make them, they must make personal ear impressions of the 

customer. This product cannot be bought off the shelf. Results 

may vary across individuals, and the ear impressions require 

manual refining in some cases. These limitations reduce the 

rate of adoption. 

Some R&D efforts have focused on active noise cancellation and 

reduction (ANR) technology for hearing protection. ACCES does 

a good job of attenuating noise across a broader range of 

frequencies, whereas ANR is mostly effective at reducing noise 

from low-frequency energy. 
Appendix G: Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

G-9

 G.3 IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION 

Based on interviews with individuals involved with the 

development and marketing of ACCES, We found it unlikely that 

this product would have been developed without interest and 

investment by the USAF, in part because the application 

addressed a problem specific to the USAF; therefore, the 

market was relatively narrow (i.e., pilots, air crew who 

experience rapid pressure changes at altitude, and ground crew 

around military and commercial aircraft exposed to unsafe 

noise levels over extended periods). ACCES provides service 

members clear communications experience, while protecting 

them against hearing loss and related injuries. 

Clear communications and operational effectiveness: A 

fighter pilot interviewed for this study noted that before using 

ACCES he had to turn the volume up on his communications 

equipment to its maximum level and still struggled to hear. 

With ACCES, the user is able to maintain volume at 

approximately half the maximum level and can hear very 

clearly. 

To address the service members’ need to hear radio 

communication traffic, the ACCES the earpiece incorporates a 

communications speaker into the design, so all audio 

communications are fed directly into the wearer’s ear canals. 

This feature allows users to hear much more clearly at a 

significantly lower radio volume. The built-in speaker not only 

reduces strain on the users’ ears and allows them to maintain 

full hearing protection, but also improves operational 

effectiveness by helping them hear more clearly, which could 

save lives during combat situations. The user interviewed for 

this study noted that it was “almost impossible” to hear at all 

while flying in an F-22 without the ACCES earpiece. 

Hearing protection and enhanced quality of life: Military 

aircraft pilots, crew members, and ground crews are often 

exposed to dangerous levels of noise over extended periods of 

time. Military aircraft lack the same level of sound insulation as 

civilian aircraft; combat aircraft in particular have louder 

engines operating relatively close to the pilots compared with 

civilian aircraft. Additionally, ground crews operate in closer 

vicinity to military aircraft during peak noise periods, such as 

takeoff, than ground crews working in commercial settings. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

G-10 

In 2016, over 2.8 million U.S. veterans reported suffering a 

hearing-related disability caused by their service. Tinnitus and 

hearing loss were the two most commonly reported disabilities, 

affecting over 227,000 new veterans in 2016 alone (VBA, 

2016).68 Hearing-related injuries can limit a service member’s 

ability to serve, can affect his/her long-term quality of life, and 

also represent a significant expense for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA), which supports disabled service members 

with disability compensation payments in retirement. 

One common cause of hearing-related injuries experienced by 

USAF service members is the engine noise from military 

aircraft. Noise levels above 85 dB can cause hearing-related 

damage, and jet engine noise can reach as high as 150 decibels 

(dB) (OSHA, 2017; Schutte, 2005). ACCES technology has the 

potential to reduce noise by an average of 30 dB (Westone, 

2016). The decibel scale is logarithmic, so 150 dB is eight times 

louder than 120 dB. Earmuffs, used over the ear with the 

ACCES earpiece inserted, provide extra protection. 

Ultimately, users of ACCES technology protect against hearingrelated injuries, which has the potential to improve their quality 

of life over the long term. 

Cost savings to the government: Between 1977 and 2007, 

the VA spent an estimated $6.7 billion on disability payments 

for service-related hearing loss. In addition to the cost of caring 

for veterans with a hearing-related disability, such injuries can 

shorten the career of a service member, which lessens the 

value of the investment that the military made in training that 

individual. Although service training costs vary across roles, the 

USAF expends $6 million to train one fighter pilot. In addition, 

the USAF is currently facing a severe fighter pilot shortage, 

which makes pilot retention an even greater priority (Pawlyck, 

2017). 

68 Breakdowns of disability claims by branch of service were not 

available for this study 
Appendix G: Case Study of DoD Air Force Technology Transfer: 

Attenuating Custom Communications Earpiece System 

G-11

 REFERENCES 

CNN. (2006, January 11). When wild blue yonder gets too loud: 

Air Force turns to earplug technology used by rockers. 

Retrieved from 

https://web.archive.org/web/20060118171254/http:// 

www.cnn.com:80/2006/TECH/ptech/01/11/military.earpl

ugs.ap/index.html. 

Occupational Health and Safety Administration [OSHA]. (2017). 

Occupational Noise Exposure: How Loud is Too Loud?

Retrieved from 

https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/noisehearingconservation/

#loud. 

Pawlyck, O. (2017, November 10). Air Force pilot shortage 

climbs to 2K pilots, general says. Retrieved from 

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/11/09/airforce-pilot-shortage-climbs-2k-pilots-general-says.html. 

Schutte, J. (2005). Hear ye, hear ye. Outreach Prospective of 

the Air Force Office Outreach Program Office. Article 

provided by author. 

Skillings, J. (2006, January 12). High-tech earplugs say “Shh!” 

to jet engines. Retrieved from 

https://www.cnet.com/news/high-tech-earplugs-sayshh-to-jet-engines/. 

Veterans’ Benefits Administration [VBA] (2016). Annual 

Benefits Report FY 2016. Retrieved from 

https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/ABR-IntroAppendix-FY16-062717.pdf. 

Westone (2016). Westone Laboratories, Inc.: ACCES 

Presentation [PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved from 

https://www.westone.com/store/downloads/access/ACC

ES_Overview_PPT_V5.pptx. 

H-1

Case Study of DoD 

Army Technology 

Transfer: Japanese 

Encephalitis Virus 

Vaccine 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

H-2 

DoD – Army Japanese Encephalitis Virus 

Vaccine

Federal agency: Department of Defense, Army 

Laboratory: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) 

Collaborating entities: CheilJedang Corp (CJ Corp), VaccGen International, 

Valneva (formerly Intercell AG) 

Transfer object: IXIARO, Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) vaccine 

Inventor(s): Hyun Su Kim (CJ Corp) 

Wang Don Yoo (CJ Corp) 

Soo Ok Kim (CJ Corp) 

Sung Hee Lee (CJ Corp) 

Sang Bum Moon (CJ Corp) 

Sun Pyo Hong (CJ Corp) 

Yong Cheol Shin (CJ Corp) 

Yong Ju Chung (CJ Corp) 

Kenneth H. Eckels (WRAIR) 

Bruce Innis (WRAIR) 

Joseph R. Putnak (WRAIR) 

Leonard N. Binn (WRAIR) 

Ashok K. Srivastava (WRAIR) 

Doria R. Dubois (WRAIR) 

Invention disclosure date: Information not provided 

Transfer mechanisms: CRADA 

Key dates: Patent US6309650 filed June 15, 2000; approved 

October 30, 2001. 

FDA approves IXIARO JEV vaccine on March 30, 

2009. 

DoD begins purchasing IXIARO JEV vaccine in 2011. 

Transfer recipients: Intercell AG (merged with Vivalis SA in 2013 to form 

Valneva) 

Impact summary: IXIARO is the only JEV vaccine approved for use in 

the United States and for many of its allies, including 

the European Union and Canada. The IXIARO vaccine 

is safe, effective, and has lower risks of adverse 

allergic reactions than its global competitors. The 

DoD uses IXIARO to vaccinate U.S. service personnel 

and their families who are assigned to JE endemic 

areas of Asia. In January 2019, Valneva signed a new 

$59 million contract to supply IXIARO JEV vaccine to 

the DoD. 
Appendix H: Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine 

H-3

 H.1 BACKGROUND 

The development, technology transfer, and commercialization 

of IXIARO, a Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) vaccine, in the 

1990s and 2000s highlights the unique expertise of federal 

research laboratory assets and how the public and private 

sectors can work together to develop new health technologies. 

Ixiaro was invented by researchers from the Department of 

Defense (DoD) Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 

(WRAIR) and scientists from CheilJedang Corp (CJ Corp). The 

limited North American market for the vaccine, mainly military 

personnel and their families, meant that a public-private 

partnership was essential for its development and deployment 

to the market. 

JEV is a mosquito-borne virus in the same family as West Nile, 

dengue, yellow fever, and Zika viruses. Symptoms of JEV 

include fever, headache, and seizures. In rare cases, the virus 

progresses to encephalitis, an infection of the brain that kills 

about one in four people who get it and often leaves those who 

survive permanently disabled (Fischer, 2010). 

There are more than a dozen JEV vaccines available worldwide, 

but the WRAIR vaccine is the only vaccine currently approved 

by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Although 

there was a JEV vaccine on the U.S. market when research 

began in 1995, IXIARO is a second-generation JEV vaccine that 

helped address specific U.S. military needs by protecting 

personnel living in Asia (see Figure H-1) or for longer-term 

travelers likely to visit rural or agricultural areas69 (Defense 

Health Agency, DoD, 2017). 

The IXIARO JEV vaccine, a Vero cell-derived, inactivated 

vaccine, offers an incremental improvement to other vaccines 

on the market. It shows similar levels of efficacy as other JEV 

vaccines, along with a lower likelihood of mild or severe 

adverse allergic reactions. As this case study shows, improved 

safety and a reliable supply chain made its development 

valuable to DoD. 

69 JEV is more common in rural areas than urban ones, likely because 

those areas are more conducive to mosquito breeding, survival, and 

transmission. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

H-4 

Figure H-1. Geographic Distribution of Japanese Encephalitis 

Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015). 

https://www.cdc.gov/japaneseencephalitis/maps/index.html

The limited market for a JEV vaccine in the United States meant 

it was unlikely that a public-sector or private-sector entity alone 

would have pursued the development of an FDA-approved 

product. This case illustrates how public-private collaboration 

brought the vaccine to market to address a specific military 

need and a niche U.S. civilian need. 

 H.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

The IXIARO JEV vaccine is neither the first nor the only FDAapproved JEV vaccine, but it is a significant advancement in 

safety and efficacy over previous technologies. Researchers in 

Japan first developed a JEV vaccine in the 1930s derived from 

virus grown in mouse brains. The FDA approved a mouse 

brain–derived JEV vaccine in 1992 under the commercial name 

JE-VAX, manufactured by Biken in Japan. U.S. and Canadian 

clients, including the DoD, used JE-VAX until the early 2000s. 

The mouse brain–derived vaccine was effective, but its 
Appendix H: Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine 

H-5

composition made it more likely to provoke mild to severe 

allergic reactions in vaccine recipients. Although the DoD 

recommended the use of the Biken vaccine, it was not 

mandatory to be administered to military personnel serving in 

JE endemic areas because of the risk of such allergic adverse 

events. 

In the 1980s and 1990s, DoD WRAIR conducted extensive 

vaccine research. Its experience in developing military vaccines 

dates to work on typhoid immunizations in World War I, and its 

work on Flavivirus vaccines (the variety needed to combat JEV) 

has its origins in the first dengue vaccines in World War II. 

As shown in Figure H-2, in 1995, CJ Corp, a large South Korean 

conglomerate with expertise in vaccines, entered into a 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) 

with WRAIR to develop a purified, inactivated JEV vaccine. In 

addition to their complementary research expertise, there were 

several motivating factors for the CJ Corp-WRAIR CRADA: 

 WRAIR obtained an attenuated strain of JEV (SA14-14-

2) virus from researchers in China in the 1980s. 

 Although WRAIR was given a green light from DoD to 

conduct research, they did not receive direct funding 

from DoD and needed to recruit a commercial partner. 

 WRAIR had the necessary infrastructure and know-how 

to work within FDA regulations and DoD, thus providing 

a less risky pathway for a commercial partner to access 

the military as a potential customer. 

Although WRAIR researchers in the 1990s articulated a military 

need for a new JEV vaccine because of allergic reaction risks 

and reliable production and quality issues associated with JEVAX, a JEV vaccine was not a top DoD R&D priority at the time. 

WRAIR was given the green light to pursue development in its 

own facilities but had to find financial support elsewhere. As 

part of the CJ Corp-WRAIR CRADA, CJ Corp provided all the 

funding for the early-stage development from 1995 to 1998. 

WRAIR researchers explained that the project would not likely 

have advanced without a private-sector partner during these 

early years. 

In 1998, CJ Corp and WRAIR filed for a U.S. patent. The same 

year, CJ Corp abandoned the CRADA with WRAIR and 

sublicensed their rights to the vaccine and its patent to 

VaccGen International, a small pharmaceutical brokerage with 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

H-6 

considerable expertise in development, regulatory approval, 

and commercialization of vaccines. WRAIR and VaccGen 

continued the development program under a new CRADA 

between the parties to move the vaccine through Phase 1 and 

Phase 2 clinical trials. All vaccine supplies for these clinical trials 

were produced at WRAIR’s Pilot BioProduction Facility under 

Good Manufacturing Process (GMP) conditions. Furthermore, all 

subjects in the trials were recruited at the WRAIR Clinical Trials 

Center, and clinical samples were tested by WRAIR personnel. 

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a 

patent to WRAIR and CJ Corp as assignees for the vaccine as 

developed (USA Patent No. 6309650B1, 2001). WRAIR and 

VaccGen published preclinical results in 2001 showing the 

efficacy of the new JEV vaccine in mice (Srivastava, 2001). 

Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 results showed excellent safety and 

immunogenicity of the vaccine in a small sample of human 

subjects (Lyons, 2007). The parties believed these results 

justified that the vaccine was ready for a larger Phase 3 

evaluation, pending FDA consent. Because Phase 3 trials and 

subsequent manufacturing required significant capital 

investment and infrastructure, VaccGen recruited Intercell AG, 

an Austrian biotechnology firm, into the project in 2003 to help 

with vaccine manufacturing and the large-scale clinical trials. 

With the prospect of FDA approval for the vaccine becoming 

increasingly likely, Intercell AG purchased a GMP-compliant 

vaccine production facility in Scotland. 

Because results from Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials were strong 

and there was a clinical correlate for efficacy in humans already 

established from previous trials with JE-VAX, FDA allowed 

Intercell and WRAIR researchers to use immune biomarkers to 

show clinical efficacy in humans, in lieu of conducting a fullscale efficacy Phase 3 trial. Furthermore, FDA permitted 

Intercell AG and WRAIR to do a passive transfer experiment, 

where they transferred serum produced by vaccinated 

individuals into mice and demonstrated its efficacy. The 

research team believes that the combined use of a clinical 

correlate in Phase 3 trials and the passive transfer experiment 

saved approximately 5 years and $100 million of the 

development process. 

Meanwhile, the manufacturer of JE-VAX removed the product 

from the U.S. market in 2006 for undisclosed reasons. This 
Appendix H: Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine 

H-7

meant that once existing stocks of JE-VAX were exhausted, 

there would be no other available FDA-approved JEV vaccine 

option. This circumstance made the vaccine availability issue 

more pressing for DoD, which eventually guaranteed the 

vaccine’s purchase immediately upon FDA approval of the 

WRAIR/VaccGen/Intercell AG product. DoD’s selection of the 

WRAIR group’s product was due in no small part to a promise 

by Intercell AG to expedite the process and bring the vaccine to 

market ahead of schedule. In 2007, 1 year later, Intercell AG 

applied for a biologics license application from FDA. This was a 

request for permission to introduce or deliver for introduction a 

biologic product into interstate commerce. The application was 

approved by FDA in March 2009 under the brand name IXIARO. 

DoD’s remaining stock of Biken lasted until 2011, 5 years after 

the manufacturer removed it from the market, at which point 

they began purchasing IXIARO. The delay in purchasing by DoD 

caused a significant financial impact for Intercell AG, which had 

incurred the cost to expedite the process for DoD. In 2013, 

shortly after DoD began purchasing IXIARO, Intercell AG and 

Vivalis merged to form Valneva, and Valneva has manufactured 

the vaccine since then. 

With IXIARO on the market and steady purchasing by DoD, 

Intercell, with support from WRAIR, encouraged DoD to reexamine their recommendations for use of the vaccine.70

Specifically, they advocated for expanded use of IXIARO by 

modification of occupational risk assessments of service 

members and no dependent recommendation for JEV 

immunization to “required” for service members and “highly 

recommended” for dependents. In 2015 to 2016, all branches 

of the military updated their JE vaccination policies to require 

the JEV immunization for service personnel, service members’ 

families, and other government service travelers heading to 

east and southeast Asia (Defense Health Agency, DoD, 2017). 

70 Although Biken had been highly recommended, it was not mandated 

because of concerns about adverse reactions to the vaccine. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

H-8 

Figure H-2. Product Development Timeline 

Notes: Phase I—testing of drug on healthy volunteers for dose-ranging; Phase II—testing of drug on patients to 

assess efficacy and side effects; Phase III—testing of drug on patients to assess efficacy, effectiveness, and 

safety. Abbreviations: CJ—CheilJedang; CRADA—Collaborative Research and Development Agreement; DoD—

Department of Defense; FDA—Food and Drug Administration; JEV—Japanese encephalitis virus; WRAIR—Walter 

Reed Army Institute of Research. 

 H.3 IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 

The health and commercial impacts of the IXIARO vaccine are 

significant but small in the broader context of JEV vaccines 

across the globe. As of 2014, 12 different JEV vaccines were on 

the global market, with most coming from China, Japan, Korea, 

and India. Although half of the global vaccines are inactivated 

vaccines like IXIARO, IXIARO is the only JEV vaccine approved 

for use in the United States and in many of its military ally 

countries, including the European Union and Canada (World 

Health Organization, 2014), partly because of the strict FDA 

standards for biologics, which, while allowing Ixiaro to be the 

only JEV vaccine available in the United States by keeping out 

noncompliant competitors, also makes it more expensive to 

produce and less able to compete outside of the primary U.S. 

market. It is more expensive to produce an effective JEV 

vaccine that complies with FDA regulations than one that does 

not, and in a small market any efficiency gains from economies 

of scale are unlikely. 
Appendix H: Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine 

H-9

Commercial impact: The commercial impact of the JEV 

vaccine, although small compared with many blockbuster 

pharmaceuticals, is still significant. After waiting a couple of 

years after FDA approval for DoD to exhaust their inventories of 

JE-VAX, Intercell began selling the IXIARO vaccine to DoD in 

2011. In 2013, Intercell merged with Vivalis to form Valneva, 

which took over sales of the vaccine. In 2019, following several 

years of growing sales to DoD and a 2015 change in military 

recommendations that required JEV vaccination, Valneva signed 

a 1-year $59 million contract with DoD to supply IXIARO to 

DoD (Valneva SE, 2017). Since the private market for the 

vaccine in the United States is small, DoD purchasing is a 

critical source of sales for Valneva. Today, DoD requires that all 

military personnel spending over 30 days in Japan and the 

Korean Peninsula be vaccinated with IXIARO against JEV. 

Human health and risk reduction: The JEV vaccine has had 

a beneficial impact on human health through increased 

immunization and lower risk of adverse reactions. On that 

front, WRAIR’s careful development of a safe, efficacious 

vaccine deserves credit. The local tolerability profile of IXIARO 

was more favorable than its mouse brain–derived predecessors 

in clinical trials with fewer risks to vaccine recipients. Previous 

vaccines had shown 91% efficacy, along with low but significant 

occurrences of side effects including anaphylaxis and neural 

tissue damage (Lyons, 2007). To that end, IXIARO has a 

broader population reach, making immunization against JEV 

possible in virtually all populations that are at risk for JEV, 

including children and seniors. Efficacy trials in the vaccine’s 

development, for example, demonstrated the product to be 

safe and efficacious in young children as of 2 months, healthy 

adults, and older adults alike (Chowdhury, Lin, & Horne, 2013). 

The risks of using the IXIARO vaccine proved lower and the 

benefits higher than using other vaccines, leading to DoD’s 

change in the designation for the IXIARO vaccine, making its 

use required in military overseas populations in vulnerable 

areas. As of 2017, use of the vaccine is considered safe not 

only for U.S. service personnel, but for their families as well, 

lowering the risk of JEV infection for relevant military families in 

Asia. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

H-10 

 H.3.1 Conclusions 

The successful development of the IXIARO vaccine by WRAIR, 

CJ Corp, VaccGen, and Valneva was the result of several 

factors, including the prior experience of WRAIR working with 

both Vero cell and Flavivirus vaccines; the successful 

collaboration between WRAIR and private-sector partners; and 

the bottom-up leadership from the research team at WRAIR, 

who continued to move the project forward in the early years 

despite limited DoD support. The IXIARO vaccine project lasted 

approximately 15 years at WRAIR: from the initial research and 

development through clinical trials and licensing to DoD’s 

agreement to purchase and widely use the vaccine. The process 

of develop IXIARO highlights the role of public-private 

collaboration under WRAIR’s CRADA arrangement to overcome 

market obstacles in the lengthy, complex, and expensive 

process of vaccine development for a niche use. 

In total, 16 WRAIR researchers worked on the product, all of 

whom leveraged considerable experience with Flavivirus 

vaccines and long histories of developing military vaccines. 

Moreover, without the WRAIR research team’s interest in 

developing a new JEV vaccine, it is unlikely that DoD would 

have shown any interest in another JEV vaccine until the Biken 

vaccine was no longer available with no ready substitute. Thus, 

WRAIR’s foresight was as crucial as their research.

Today, the IXIARO vaccine is a success story because it 

addresses a specific need for a JEV vaccine for U.S. military 

personnel stationed in Asia, who are vulnerable to the JEV 

virus, and replaces the prior vaccine, which is no longer 

available on the U.S. market. It has a more favorable local 

tolerability profile and is at least as effective than its mouse 

brain–derived predecessor, providing a public health benefit to 

U.S. military personnel, their families, and U.S. military allies 

including Canada, the European Union, and Israel. This vaccine 

was able to be brought to market through joint contributions 

from public and private players throughout the development 

process. WRAIR’s extensive vaccine development experience 

was a major contribution to the vaccine’s success as was the 

private-sector commitment and funding. 
Appendix H: Case Study of DoD Army Technology Transfer: 

Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine 

H-11

 REFERENCES 

Chowdhury, M., Lin, T.-L., & Horne, A. D. (2013). Statistical 

Review and Evaluation: BLA STN 125280. Silver Spring, 

MD: Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Defense Health Agency, DoD. (2017, September 25). Japanese 

Encephalitis and Japanese Encephalitis Vaccine.

Retrieved from Immunization Healthcare: Health.mil: 

http://www.health.mil/vaccines

Fischer, M. M. (2010). Japanese Encephalitis Vaccines: 

Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on 

Immunization Practices (ACIP). Atlanta: Centers for 

Disease Control. 

Kim, H. S., Yoo, W. D., Kim, S. O., Lee, S. H., Moon, S. B., 

Hong, S. P., . . . Dubois, D. R. (2001). USA Patent No. 

6309650B1.

Lyons, A. e. (2007). A Phase 2 study of a purified, inactivated 

virus vaccine to prevent Japanese encephalitis. Vaccine, 

3445-3453. 

Srivastava, A. e. (2001). A purified inactivated Japanese 

encephalitis virus vaccine made in vero cells. Vaccine, 

4557-4565. 

Valneva SE. (2013). Quarterly Report Valneva SE, Q3 2013.

Lyon. 

Valneva SE. (2017, November 7). Valneva Signs $39.6 Million 

IXIARO Supply Contract with US Government.

World Health Organization. (2014). Background Paper on 

Japanese Encephalitis Vaccines. World Health 

Organization. 

I-1

Case Study of DoD 

Navy Technology 

Transfer: Port 

Security Barrier 

System 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-2 

DoD – Navy Port Security Barrier System

Federal agency: Department of Defense, Navy 

Laboratory: Physical Security Equipment Program, later the AntiTerrorism Force Protection-Ashore Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command 

Collaborating entities: Harbor Offshore (a marine construction firm), Truston 

Transfer object: Port security barrier (PSB) system 

Inventor(s): Laurence G. Nixon (Navy) 

Stephen Slaughter (Navy) 

Robert J. Taylor (Navy) 

William Seelig (Navy) 

Invention disclosure date: Information not provided 

Transfer mechanisms: Exclusive licenses 

Key dates: Patent US6681709B1 filed March 12, 2003 

Patent US7401565B2 filed November 6, 2006 

Exclusive licenses with Harbor Offshore through 

2006. Harbor Offshore’s license became 

nonexclusive, and Truston negotiated a co-exclusive 

license with the Navy in 2009. 

Transfer recipients: Harbor Offshore, Truston 

Impact summary: Between 2004 and 2012, the Navy replaced Dunlop 

systems at Naval facilities with PSB systems. The PSB 

system is a maritime barrier security system suitable 

for military and civilian use. The PSB system provides 

physical security protection to Navy facilities and is 

designed to protect against attacks on them. PSB is 

also used to protect other high-value assets like 

cruise ships, nuclear power plants, dams, and oil rigs. 

Harbor Offshore and Truston have developed 

portfolios of products related to PSB technology, 

resulting in cumulative sales of approximately $185 

million. 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-3

 I.1 BACKGROUND 

The Port Security Barrier system (PSB), a heavy-duty surface 

water fencing barrier system, was developed by Navy 

researchers in the early 2000s in response to the USS Cole 

terrorist attack that killed 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injured 39 

others in Yemen in October 2000. This case study explores how 

the Navy developed the technology, transferred it to Harbor 

Offshore and other private companies by patent licensing 

agreements, and Harbor Offshore commercialized the PSB, 

selling it to the Navy to protect waterside assets. These 

included both military—Navy ships, port infrastructure—and 

nonmilitary assets—cruise ships, nuclear power plants, dams, 

offshore oil rigs—from waterborne craft terrorism threats. This 

example highlights how technologies originally developed for 

military security can also be deployed to protect commercial 

assets. 

Data, research tools, and expertise from previous Navy 

research programs combined with PSB’s abrupt increase in 

priority level and associated research funding provided the 

fertile grounds from which the Navy was able to rapidly develop 

and pilot the PSB technology between 2000 and 2001. Over 

time, the Navy, through its ongoing procurement relationships 

with small marine construction businesses and existing 

programs, licensed the technology to them also for production 

of PSB to protect cruise ships, dams, nuclear power plants, and 

offshore rigs. The Navy has continued to use the PSB 

technology for military purposes and bid out PSB installations to 

various vendors. The movement of key people among the 

various organization involved played an important role in 

transferring know-how. 

 I.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

Through its PSB technology, a floating barrier system, the U.S 

Navy protects its assets and vessels from potential waterborne 

attacks. Acting as a physical and visible deterrent, the PSB 

system reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access to 

waterfront assets by small surface watercraft,71 thus 

discouraging attacks. It can also dissipate the kinetic energy 

from a high-speed small surface watercraft collision through 

71 Based on analyses of stopping force. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-4 

specially designed netting connected to an underwater mooring 

system. 

According to one of its inventors, the PSB technology as a 

physical floating barrier is a key component of an integrated 

port security system, involving high-value military assets. 

Waterfront military bases and assets have historically been 

vulnerable to threats, especially bases located near 

civilian/pedestrian boat traffic. Vulnerable areas like these 

make it difficult to monitor potential threats from small, highspeed watercraft. However, military bases with land-based 

access have multiple layers of security and closely controlled 

access points. Port security vulnerability gained public 

awareness in October 2000: the USS Cole was attacked by a 

small watercraft, manned by terrorists, packed with bulk 

explosives, which killed 17 servicemen (Carter, 2017). The port 

in Yemen, where the USS Cole was attacked, had no physical 

barrier system installed. 

Before the PSB technology, to prevent unauthorized access by 

water, the Navy and harbor masters employed techniques 

largely involving harbor security boats, sensors and detection 

systems, lines of demarcation (made up of buoys, rope, and 

warning signs), and inferior inflatable barrier systems. 

The PSB technology is composed of a nylon capture net 

attached to a urethane plastic pontoon base, vertical steel 

pylons, underwater moorings, and deadweight anchors (Report 

to Congress on DoD Office of Technology Transition, 2005). 

Initially, an individual section of PSB fencing measured about 

50 feet across. The original design is capable of stopping a 

large incoming 10,000-pound boat (the equivalent to an 

offshore racing boat), traveling about 50 to 60 knots, and 

delivering the equivalent of over 1 million-foot pounds of 

energy (Nixon, n.d.). The PSB technology is able to dissipate 

such high levels of force because of its pontoon design, with its 

above water netting connected to an underwater mooring 

system. 

On average, the PSB construction costs about $1,000 per foot 

of barrier, including manufacture and installation, according to 

two interviewees. Thus, a PSB quarter-mile system would cost 

about $1.3 million. Of course, the cost of PSB installation varies 

based on specific features of the installation, and the natural 

and built environment where it will be installed. The Navy has 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-5

Figure I-1. PSB and PSB Variants 

Standard PSB PSB-T 

PSB-V 

Source: PSB, PSB-T, and PSB-V images from Nixon.

several PSB variants with different specifications, dependent on 

use and location (see Figure I-1 for images). The low-cost PSB 

(PSB-T) and very low-cost PSB (PSB-V) are cheaper and easier 

to deploy than the standard PSB. The PSB-V is designed to act 

as a temporary barrier to protect lower value assets. 

The Chief of Naval Operations had a specific overarching design 

requirement for the system: “to prevent direct unauthorized 

access to vessels and critical assets in ports.” This was a 

shortcoming of existing port security measures. The PSB 

technology complements and reinforces other forms of port 

security such as water patrol, short-range radar, active use of 

security camera footage, other sensors, lines of demarcation, 

and signage. Figure I-2 depicts how the PSB technology factors 

into overall port security. A line of demarcation buoys and often 

warning signage indicate the edge of the “warning zone,” and 

the boat barrier system marks the edge of the “threat zone.” 

One PSB inventor described the idea behind the PSB was to 

have a layered system akin to the various security perimeters 

that are common in terrestrial military bases. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-6 

Figure I-2. Waterfront Zones and PSB 

Source: Reproduced from Cofer (2017) 

According to one lead Navy inventor, another important PSB 

requirement was that the system would not be lethal. Thus, the 

barrier was designed to arrest watercraft with some damage 

possible, while avoiding fatalities in the case of a hypothetical 

accidental civilian boating collision with the PSB. 

Another key design feature is that the structure is passive; the 

PSB technology has no sensors, motion detection radar 

systems, cameras, artillery, or other active technology 

incorporated. This reduces the initial investment and ongoing 

operations costs of PSB. In addition, for most installations, the 

PSB technology allows for a gating function. Thus, connection 

points can be manually disconnected, and the PSB can be 

moved by a tugboat for ingress/egress of Navy ships. 

Furthermore, the PSB technology has significant advantages 

over the predecessor physical barrier system that the Navy 

phased out once the PSB gained traction. 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-7

I.2.1 Alternative to PSB: The Dunlop Barrier 

The only other readily available technology at the time the PSB 

was invented was the Dunlop antiboat barrier.72 Developed in 

the United Kingdom, the Dunlop barrier was an inflated 

cylinder-shaped barrier that measured 82 feet long by 8 feet in 

diameter. It was designed to be deployed around waterside 

facilities and assets regarded as vulnerable to maritime attacks 

(Navy, 2003). However, the Dunlop barrier systems had some 

key deficiencies. First, boats are able to go over cylindershaped barriers. During the 1860s Civil War, the Union was 

able to get a steam launch over a Confederate log boom (Elliot, 

1994). Full-scale boat attack tests conducted by the Navy in 

the 1980s demonstrated that when a boat hits a cylindershaped object, like the Dunlop barrier, the cylinder starts to roll 

and acts like as a conveyor belt carrying the boat over the 

barrier. Second, the Dunlop barrier was prone to deflating and 

had to be regularly reinflated when it lost air. Third, because of 

its cylindrical design and large surface area above the water, 

the Dunlop barrier was susceptible to high-wind loading and 

thus to being moved from its intended position. Fourth, security 

personnel were unable to see through the Dunlop barrier, which 

greatly reduced their situational awareness and operational 

effectiveness. Table I-1 summarizes these Dunlop barrier 

shortcomings and how the PSB technology addresses them. 

Various design features make the PSB superior to the Dunlop at 

a roughly similar cost.73 The PSB is a solid structure, for 

instance, that does not require regular inflation. Second, the 

PSB links and connectors are robust to withstand a variety of 

wind and wave conditions, including hurricane-force winds of 

100 to 125 knots. Third, PSB testing shows that it can dissipate 

the energy of 99.9% of pedestrian watercraft (U.S. Navy, 

2003). Finally, the PSB’s design and netting allow patrols to 

retain the visibility of any potential security threats on the other 

side of the barrier. 

72 Since the PSB has been developed, other alternatives have emerged 

such as the Halo Barrier system marketed by Halo Maritime 

Defense Systems, which the Navy also played a role in developing. 

For more information, see https://www.onr.navy.mil/en/MediaCenter/Press-Releases/2014/Halo-Barrier-Protect-Navy-Port. 73 A report by Targosz (2003) listed the cost for the Dunlop at $951 

per foot, while the PSB was only $800 per foot. But later expert 

interviews indicated that the true cost of the PSB was closer to 

$1,000 per foot. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-8 

Table I-1. Dunlop Barrier vs. PSB Technology 

Shortcomings of the Dunlop Barrier Features of the PSB that Address Shortcomings 

■ Low boat stopping ability. ■ Solid material construction (noninflatable). Able 

to stop 99.99% of boats with lengths less than 

65 feet in the United States. 

■ Regular deflation. ■ Withstands hurricane conditions. 

■ Net allows wind to pass through, reducing loads. 

■ High wind loading resulting in movement 

from intended position. 

■ Solid construction helps reduce maintenance. 

■ Limits visibility, which poses a security risk. ■ Netting allows visibility. 

 I.2.2 Commercialized Versions of the PSB Technology 

After negotiating licenses with the Navy at different points in 

time, Harbor Offshore and Truston became the Navy’s two 

commercialization partners who brought the PSB technology to 

market for all nonmilitary uses. Harbor Offshore, for its part, 

offers three versions of the barrier: 

 The Floating PSB-T U.S. Navy Model 

 Floating Barrier PSB 600TM 

 The Floating Barrier PSB 5500TM 

The PSB-T is the main variant used by the U.S. Navy. Although 

both the PSB 600 and the PSB 5500 are continuous net capture 

systems supported on a pontoon structure, the PSB 5500 has 

an ultimate stopping energy of 9.1 million foot-pounds of force, 

whereas the PSB 600 has an ultimate stopping energy of 5.9 

million foot-pounds of force. The PSB 5500 is regarded as 

heavy-duty ready, while the PSB 600 is considered the global 

standard (Harbor Offshore Factsheet, undated). 

Truston offers different models of PSB systems and customizes 

them to the unique locations of their buyers. Different versions 

of the system are designed for and endure environmental 

factors such as soil conditions, tidal ranges, and currents. Other 

factors taken into consideration when designing and choosing a 

PSB model, include ship traffic, barrier terminations, and gates 

(Truston, 2018). 

 I.2.3 Technology Timeline 

The PSB technology evolved over 15 to 20 years from a set of 

ideas and principles to a superior port security product and a 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-9

commercially viable product through several (somewhat 

overlapping) phases of activity, as described below. 

 Early Testing, Conceptualization 

The origin of the PSB technology can be traced back to the late 

1980s. No similar port security barrier existed at the time the 

Navy began PSB-related R&D in the late 1980s. According to 

one Navy inventor of the PSB, other U.S Navy engineers had 

completed initial investigations on barriers and were wrapping 

up their work when the Navy conceived of a subsequent fullscale project test of a system designed to stop a high-speed 

boat. In the 1990s, Navy researchers Dwayne Davis74 and Chip 

Nixon developed the basic idea of a capture net capable of 

stopping a high-speed boat. The Navy conducted testing and 

data collection in the San Diego Bay. This earlier testing of the 

PSB predecessor provided critical data and insight used in 

developing the later PSB version in the early 2000s. 

 The Mobile Offshore Base Program 

In addition to the early testing of the PSB predecessor, the 

Navy had a separate experimental research program to develop 

a large semisubmersible floating series of connected platforms 

called a Mobile Offshore Base (MOB). These connected 

platforms were developed to support military operations and 

receive aircraft in parts of the world without fixed U.S. bases.75

The MOB program’s chief engineer, Bob Taylor, was later one of 

the lead inventors for the PSB. Although no MOB was ever built, 

this naval research program delivered many spillover benefits 

for PSB development. One of the most important challenges 

both mobile offshore bases and the PSB technology faced was 

the ability to withstand the ocean environment and storm 

conditions. 

The Navy MOB program involved experts from over 50 

commercial, academic, and government agencies, whose 

purpose was to establish the feasibility and cost of an MOB 

(MOB Project Team, 2000). Although the Navy found that the 

74 Although Dwayne Davis was involved in initial testing of capture 

nets, he was not an inventor on last patents. 75 The MOB program was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research 

from FY1997 to FY2000 and built on a DARPA project called 

Maritime Platforms Technology Program that was funded from 

FY1993 to FY1995. The initial concept emerged as early as the 

1970s when the U.S. began losing key aspects of its overseas 

logistical network (MCA Engineers, 1999). 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-10 

MOB was technically feasible, it was never built probably 

because the estimated price tag was $4 billion to $8 billion 

(MOB Project Team, 2000). Nevertheless, the Navy developed a 

set of powerful modeling tools and expertise under the MOB 

program that provided for the rapid development of the PSB 

technology. 

 Rapid Development and Piloting 

Nearly a decade after the U.S. Navy initially tested the fullscale boat impact in the San Diego Bay, they showed renewed 

interest in developing a PSB system, following a terrorist attack 

on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000. The Navy destroyer was 

rammed by two al-Qaida members piloting a small boat 

containing explosives, which blew a hole in the ship’s hull. 

Seventeen American sailors were killed, and nearly three dozen 

more were injured (Burns and Meyers, 2000). 

The Navy began full-scale development of the PSB system in 

the early 2000s. They assembled a team that aimed to refine 

the basic floating security concept, prototype it, test it, and 

pilot it. Originally part of the Physical Security Equipment 

Program, the PSB program later became the Anti-Terrorism 

Force Protection-Ashore program76 when the Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command (NAVFAC) took over the project and 

accelerated its pace of development. 

Chip Nixon, William Seelig, and Robert Taylor, designated team 

leader, constituted the engineering team and were all from the 

Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NAVFAC NFESC). 

Steve Slaughter, a commercial structural engineer brought on 

under the contract, was a key team member and the fourth 

patent holder of the PSB technology. Other support staff 

rounded out the team. 

Development of the PSB technology by the team proceeded 

rapidly during this starting phase in late 2000. The team was 

able to take the PSB system from the conceptualization stage 

to detailed design in just 10 months. The Navy conducted initial 

testing at the base in Norfolk, VA. The U.S. Naval Academy 

even got involved and performed a variety of scale-model tests 

to validate key design features and performance. 

76 The ATFP-Ashore program requirements were given by Commander 

Fleet Forces Command and Commander Navy Installation 

Command. 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-11

The Office of Naval Research provided substantial funding in 

April 2001, and the Navy installed the first PSB system at the 

southern entrance of the U.S Navy Submarine Base in Kings 

Bay, Georgia, in November 2001 (Report to Congress on DoD 

Office of Tech Transition, 2005). In the interceding months, the 

9/11 terrorist attacks further exacerbated the public interest 

and policy imperative to find better measures against all kinds 

of potential terrorist attacks. The Navy’s initial testing and 

piloting successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of PSB 

technology. 

 Navy Deployment 

Once the Navy installed the PSB at several sites and 

demonstrated its superiority to the Dunlop barrier, it began 

phasing out the Dunlop barriers at homeports around the world. 

According to one PSB inventor, the Navy faced some initial 

challenges with securing buy-in from leadership who controlled 

the deployment of barrier systems, but they were won over by 

the PSB’s superior performance. Between 2002 and 2008, the 

Navy phased out most Dunlop barriers. All 24 U.S. Navy 

homeports around the world currently have some variant of the 

PSB system installed, making them substantially more secure 

than before. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-12 

Figure I-3. The Evolution of Navy Port Security Barriers 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-13

 Licensing and Commercialization for Nonmilitary Uses 

Once the Navy piloted and installed the PSB system, they filed 

for the initial set of two patents in 2003 to protect their 

intellectual property. Prior to the development of the PSB 

system, the Navy had limited physical barrier options available 

to adequately defend against boat-based terrorist attacks in 

both military and nonmilitary settings. These vulnerabilities 

were glaringly obvious. The Navy partnered with outside 

companies to make the PSB technology available to nonmilitary 

sectors.77

Harbor Offshore, a marine construction company, initially 

catalyzed the licensing discussions with the Navy for the PSB 

technology. Harbor Offshore was familiar with the Navy 

because of Harbor’s participation in the Navy’s small business 

set-aside procurement program for marine construction. The 

Navy and Harbor Offshore negotiated a patent license 

agreement in 2004, which gave Harbor Offshore the exclusive 

rights to market the patented PSB technology for commercial 

uses. The Navy retained the rights over the technology for their 

own use. 

In 2009, the Navy’s original license with Harbor Offshore, after 

the first 5 years, converted to a nonexclusive right for Harbor 

to continue selling the PSB technologies; Truston, a second 

firm, negotiated a co-exclusive license with the Navy in 2009. 

Two major players were selling the PSB technology for 

commercial applications. The patents included in the Navy’s 

license agreements with the two firms included U.S. patent 

6,681,709 and U.S. patent 7,401,565.78

Although the Navy’s entering into co-exclusive licenses may 

have created some challenges, it ensured that two companies 

would be deploying PSB technology into the marketplace. 

 Additional Development 

Over time, the Navy and its private partners have made 

additional improvements to the PSB technology. The Navy and 

77 According to our interviewees, technology transfer efforts had little 

to do with the Navy’s needs for procuring the system for its own 

use. The Navy was able to solicit bids for fabricating and deploying 

the Navy-developed PSB technology through existing procurement 

mechanisms regardless of whether it licensed the technology. 

78 Truston also licensed two patents in 2016 related to mooring 

systems: U.S. patent 8,453,590 and U.S. patent 8,726,826. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-14 

its licensees switched to plastic for the pontoon base, replacing 

the steel, to limit the corrosion of the steel with constant 

contact with salty ocean water. Additionally, the parties 

replaced the original 50-foot PSB model with a 40-foot variant, 

because these fit more easily into standard shipping containers, 

reducing transport costs. 

 I.3 IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 

Deployment of the PSB technology at Navy homeports around 

the world, accompanied by its commercialization by private 

firms, has resulted in a variety of impacts. 

Protection of waterside military assets: First and foremost, 

the Navy’s deployment of the PSB technology at U.S. 

homeports has provided national security benefits. As one 

Lieutenant Commander said, “the fence makes us a harder 

target” (Taylor, 2005). The PSB system serves as a physical 

obstacle that acts as a deterrent for a malicious person or 

group of persons considering a waterside attack. The PSB 

technology also signals the specific area beyond which access is 

restricted. Military personnel are able to be more certain about 

the potential intentions of someone attempting to breach the 

barrier. The PSB system provides clear national security 

benefits over the predecessor Dunlop barrier, once the 

standard. 

Quantifying the risk reduction the PSB provides from attack is a 

speculative exercise, so we relied on existing literature. 

According to Taylor (2005),79 the PSB is capable of stopping 

99.99% of small watercraft, relative to the Dunlop barrier 

system, which is capable of stopping about 97.00% of small 

watercraft (Taylor, undated). Thus, the marginal benefit in 

probability terms is a reduction in the probability of failure of 

0.299%.80

79 Taylor (2005) cites Bhattracharya and Basu (1999) who in their 

paper describe the annual probability of failure and the monetary 

consequences of failure in different settings. In this framework, 

some risks are deemed acceptable, while other risks are marginally 

acceptable or unacceptable. 

80 The annual probability of an attempted attack is 10%. The 

difference in probability of failure conditional on an attack between 

the Dunlop barrier and the PSB is 2.99%. Thus, the marginal 

benefit of PSB per year is 10%*2.99% (0.10 * 0.0299) or 0.299%. 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-15

Reduction of economic risks: Similarly, economic risks are 

associated with potential waterside attacks on high-value 

nonmilitary economic assets such as cruise ships, nuclear 

power plants, dams, and offshore oil rigs. The total monetary 

impact from risk reduction is beyond the scope of this analysis 

but would depend on the expected magnitude of lives lost in a 

failure and the expected economic costs from a failure. 

Fortunately, there is not much historical data on small 

watercraft attacks, but a couple of prominent examples include 

the Iraqi oil terminal attacks in which three lives were lost and 

the USS Cole attack referenced earlier in which 17 lives were 

lost. The estimated cost of the USS Cole attack was $250 

million. 

Reduction of risks posed to human safety: Deterring or 

physically stopping waterborne attacks helps us protect our 

most important asset—human capital—reducing the risk of the 

lost human life or serious injury in both military and nonmilitary 

settings where the PSB is deployed. 

Economic impact on licensees: Harbor Offshore and Truston 

have developed portfolios of products around the PSB 

technology, resulting in cumulative sales of about $185 million. 

The Transportation Security Administration commissioned the 

first nonmilitary use of the PSB to protect the Queen Mary 2 

cruise ship when it arrived in Port Everglades, Florida, from its 

maiden voyage. Harbor Offshore installed the PSB technology 

under the Navy license (Zynsys, 2004). The Iraq Coalition 

Provisional Authority commissioned Harbor Offshore to install 

the PSB technology to protect two key Iraqi oil platforms. The 

U.S. Navy provided the site design. Harbor Offshore provided 

the following high-level sales data to us: Overall, Harbor 

Offshore has earned about $100 million in cumulative sales of 

PSB products.81 They also segmented sales based on whether 

the installation was for Navy or non-Navy82 purposes. Based on 

this high-level data, Harbor Offshore has deployed at least $25 

million of PSB technology for nonmilitary purposes. This is 

equivalent to nearly 5 miles of PSB technology. An additional 

benefit to DoD comes in the form of dividends; the commercial 

sales of PSB yield licensing revenues to it. 

81 Profit margins were not available. 

82 Non-Navy sales may include other military sales, but detailed data 

were not available. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-16 

Table I-2. Harbor Offshore PSB Sales 

Navy Marine Barrier 

Revenues 

Non-Navy Marine 

Barrier Revenues 

PSB technology licensed from the U.S. Navy 65–75% Less than 2% 

PSB technology proprietary to Harbor Offshore 0% Greater than 25% 

Source: Harbor Offshore

Truston did not provide data directly to us. Truston’s global military and commercial sales of the PSB are more than 

$85 million (Carter, 2017).83 Truston has sold over 20 miles of their barriers at dozens of locations worldwide. 

 I.3.1 Conclusions 

The Navy developed the PSB technology in rapid response to 

terrorism crises in the early 2000s, and it has been deployed 

for both national defense purposes and nonmilitary commercial 

applications. The individuals interviewed had slightly different 

perspectives about the role of the federal laboratory and 

agency in the benefits that have accrued from the PSB 

technology. According to the inventors that we interviewed, the 

Navy’s development of the PSB and the transfer of the 

technology were the primary reasons why this technology was 

developed when it was. One inventor thought that it could have 

eventually been developed by a private company but not within 

the compressed schedule that the Navy was able to 

accomplish: 

It probably would have happened otherwise, but it 

is very doubtful that it could have been done in the 

extremely compressed schedule that we had. It is 

also likely that the configuration would have 

differed. 

One of the licensees stated that the PSB technology simply 

would not have happened without the Navy invention. A 

representative from the other licensee agreed that the Navy 

was critical in the initial PSB development. Specifically, the 

initial development would not have occurred or occurred as 

rapidly if not for the Navy’s compressed schedule. Once the 

PSB product was introduced to the commercial market, this 

licensee believed that further adaptations, upgrades, and 

variations occurred as his firm addressed the marketplace 

needs. 

83 Contract awards to Truston under the Navy IDIQ MAC contract have 

been in excess of $30 million since January 2010. 
Appendix I: Case Study of DoD Navy Technology Transfer: Port Security Barrier System 

I-17

Despite these slight differences interviewees made in describing 

the Navy’s contributions, the Navy’s intramural research 

program was clearly the party responsible for the first patented 

pontoon barrier for port security and the period of PSB 

accelerated development. Based on our primary and secondary 

research, three primary factors enabled the rapid development 

and piloting of PSB technology in 2000 and 2001. First, prior 

Navy research and testing on PSBs in the early 1980s and 

1990s provided it with information critical to the focused 

development efforts of the early 2000s. Second, naval research 

on the MOB program created fundamental knowledge and 

simulation tools for wave and current modeling, instrumental to 

understanding how different floating structures and connections 

between them behave in a variety of conditions. Finally, the 

Office of Naval Research provided a new stream of funding after 

the USS Cole attack, which recatalyzed research efforts, 

expanded the team working on the PSB, led to the piloting of 

PSB technology in a very short time frame, and eventually led 

to the ultimate installation of PSB technology in Navy ports 

around the world. The Navy’s licensing of the PSB technology to 

private-sector companies made its commercial applications 

available to the public and enabled additional development by 

the licensees. 

 REFERENCES 

Bhattacharya, B., Basu, R., & Ma, K. T. (2001). Developing 

target reliability for novel structures: the case of the 

Mobile Offshore Base. Marine structures, 14(1-2), 37-

58.Accessed at 

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951

833900000241

Burns, John F. and Myers, Steven L. (October 13, 2000). The 

Warship Explosion: The Overview; Blast Kills Sailors on 

U.S. Ship in Yemen. New York Times. Accessed at 

http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/13/world/thewarship-explosion-the-overview-blast-kills-sailors-onus-ship-in-yemen.html. 

Carter, T. (2017, December 4). Small boats, big problems: 

Navy blocks attacks from the sea with floating barriers. 

Retrieved from https://techlinkcenter.org/truston-portsecurity/. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

I-18 

Zynsys (2004). Navy License Enhances Homeland Port Security. 

Far West Bulletin—Spring 2004 Issue. Accessed at

http://www.zynsys.com/flcfw/fwnews/fwarch/fw041a.ht

m

Harbor Offshore Factsheet. (undated). 

MCA Engineers (1999, December 20). Mobile Offshore Base 

Science and Technology Program: An Independent 

Review. 

MOB Project Team (2000, December). Mobile Offshore Base 

(MOB) Science and Technology Program Final Report. 

Nixon, C. (n.d.) Various Port Security Barrier images. 

Nixon, C. (n.d.). PORT SECURITY BARRIER (PSB) SUMMARY.

Targosz, Leopold J. (2003). The Challenge of Force Protection. 

[Presentation]. Accessed at 

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/20

03/homeland/targ.ppt. 

Taylor (2005, April 21). Fabrication and Installation of Security 

Barriers to Protect Two Offshore Oil Platforms. Al Basara 

& Khawar al-Amaya. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts Office of 

Technology Transition. (2006). REPORT TO CONGRESS 

on the activities of the DoD Office of Technology 

Transition. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts Office of 

Technology Transition. (2006). REPORT TO CONGRESS 

on the activities of the DoD Office of Technology 

Transition. 

Truston Technologies, Inc. (2018). Port Security Barriers. 

Retrieved from https://www.truston.us/port-security-barriers 
J-1

Case Study of DOI 

U.S. Bureau of 

Reclamation 

Technology 

Transfer: Flexible 

Fluxprobe 

Diagnostic Tool 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

J-2 

DOI – USBR Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool

Federal agency: Department of the Interior—U.S. Bureau of 

Reclamation 

Laboratory: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 

Collaborating entities: Iris Power LP (company focused on managing and 

maintaining large-scale power equipment) 

Transfer object: Fluxprobe diagnostic tool 

Inventor(s): Jim Dehaan (USBR) 

Umberto Milano (USBR) 

Malin Lester Jocobs (USBR) 

Invention disclosure date: 2000 

Transfer mechanisms: CRADA 

Exclusive license converted to nonexclusive license 

after 3 years 

Key dates: Patent US6466009B1 filed June 6, 2001 

Iris Power LP enters into a license agreement and 

CRADA in 200. 

Transfer recipients: Iris Power LP 

Impact summary: The flexible fluxprobe reduces offline time for 

component evaluation, improves diagnosis accuracy, 

maintenance schedules, and reduces the risk of 

catastrophic component failure. DOI also received 

nearly $40,000 in licensing fees as of 2015. Although 

the flexible fluxprobe is a low-volume product, with 

366 units sold by 2016, it enhances the products and 

services Iris Power offers. Iris Power has made 

functional improvements to the technology and 

developed complementary services, and it offers the 

device as part of larger product and service bundles 

to companies around the world. 
Appendix J: Case Study of DOI U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Technology Transfer: 

Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool 

J-3

 J.1 BACKGROUND 

The flexible fluxprobe is a technology invented in 2000 by Jim 

DeHaan, Umberto Milano, and Malin Lester Jacobs, electrical 

engineers at the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) within the 

Department of Interior, that detects magnetic fields within the 

generators that generate power in hydroelectric dams. The 

device is relatively inexpensive, small, flexible, and light and 

can be installed relatively easily (see Figure J-1). As water 

flows through a hydroelectric dam, it turns a turbine which, in 

turn, turns the generator rotor. The generator comprises two 

main elements: 1) the rotor consisting of field poles, the 

rotating portion of the generator, and 2) stationary coils 

mounted to a stator, the stationary portion of the generator, 

that surrounds the field poles. Direct current is applied to the 

field poles generating a magnetic field. When the turbine turns 

the rotor, the field poles move over the stator coils that 

generate electricity. Generators are connected to power lines 

that transmit electricity to surrounding regions. 

Over time, thermal and mechanical stresses cause components 

within the generator rotor and stator, including the electrical 

insulation that is a part of the rotor field poles, to degrade. As 

components degrade, electrical shorts occur. These electrical 

shorts affect the magnetic fields in the generator and 

eventually lead to significant vibrations in the rotor. If 

unaddressed, these rotor vibrations may increase and lead to 

an unscheduled shutdown of the generator or, worse, failure of 

components within the generator. Repairing failed generators 

can run into millions of dollars for the owners. Unscheduled 

generator downtime means less power generation capacity and, 

according to USBR officials, an estimated $100,000 of lost 

revenue is possible per large generator per day for a large 

hydroelectric power plant generating unit. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

J-4 

Figure J-1. The Flexible Fluxprobe 

In the past, the most common way for a power plant worker to 

evaluate the condition of the rotor winding insulation associated 

with hydroelectric power generation was the pole-drop test. A 

pole-drop test can only be employed by the worker when the 

generator is shut down for maintenance. The test is time 

consuming to perform and may not detect some shorts only 

present when the rotor is spinning at normal speeds. Further, 

plant owners may have planned maintenance shutdowns for 

large generators every 5 years, at which time a pole-drop test 

would be administered. Given that degradation can occur 

rapidly to rotors, regular maintenance intervals may not be 

scheduled often enough to allow for technicians to predict 

future failures. 

The invention of the flexible fluxprobe in 2000 enabled USBR to 

evaluate the condition of the rotor winding when the unit is in 

operation. Thus, USBR is better able to understand the 

electrical/mechanical condition of its more than 200 generators 

located in 53 hydroelectric power generation facilities. 
Appendix J: Case Study of DOI U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Technology Transfer: 

Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool 

J-5

According to USBR officials, it has thus helped to reduce the 

cost of power generation for the United States by identifying 

potential rotor failures before they lead to an unscheduled 

generator shutdown. Furthermore, the licensing of the flexible 

fluxprobe to industry by USBR allowed the technology to be 

used by other public and private hydroelectric power generation 

organizations and helped reduce overhead costs for the USBR 

itself. This led to further savings for the American taxpayer. 

 J.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

The USBR is one of a number of bureaus within the Department 

of Interior. It was established in 1902 to promote the economic 

development of 17 states in the American West. The mission of 

USBR is to manage, develop, and protect water and related 

resources in an environmentally and economically sound 

manner. USBR has advanced this mission over time by 

constructing and operating canals, dams, and power plants 

within these 17 western states. In addition to channeling water 

to farms and rapidly growing cities, USBR is also the second 

largest producer of hydroelectric power in the United States, 

operating 53 hydroelectric power generation facilities.84

In the early 1900s, USBR was a pioneer in the design and 

construction of hydroelectric dams. Faced with challenging 

geographies and climates, USBR developed unique technologies 

that could efficiently and reliably produce electricity. It did so 

by establishing the Research and Development Office in 

Denver, Colorado. Today, the Research and Development Office 

works with USBR engineers to create technical solutions to help 

Reclamation better fulfill its mission. In the case of 

hydroelectric power generation, USBR engineers work with the 

Research and Development office to find, develop, and deploy 

technical solutions for current hydropower issues, such as how 

to extend the service life of generators that were installed in 

the early to mid-1900s. The Research and Development Office 

is staffed with scientists who focus on technical solutions and 

engineers who spend much of their time in the field where they 

are learn about operational problems and can test potential 

solutions. They also spend time working with other engineers 

84 The Army Corps of Engineers, which operates approximately 700 

dams, is the largest single dam operator in the United States. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

J-6 

and scientists from similar agencies around the world, as well 

as private-sector scientists and engineers. 

Reducing generator downtime evolved as an important USBR 

objective in the late 1990s. This goal was driven by increasing 

demand for power from growing western populations and the 

aging of power generation equipment, much of it installed in 

the 1930s and 1940s. Facility operators were especially 

concerned about the degradation of hydroelectric generators 

including the rotor components. Although the condition of the 

rotor components was able to be evaluated during scheduled 5-

year maintenance cycles, there was concern about the age of 

the generators and the potential for degradation between 

maintenance cycles. The inability of work crews to monitor the 

operational conditions of field poles inside a generator with 

greater frequency decreases generator reliability that may 

result in more frequent generator breakdowns and prolonging 

generator downtime. Although techniques such as the poledrop test were available to evaluate component degradation in 

the early 1990s, these approaches were not 100% accurate and 

could only be performed by plant staff when generators were 

offline for maintenance. 

Jim DeHaan, an electrical power engineer who joined USBR in 

1991, along with other USBR engineers, sought to create an 

inexpensive way to sense rotor component failure and 

developed the flexible fluxprobe. The fluxprobe comprises a 

flexible substrate—a material on which the circuits are 

embedded—and a sensor. The flexible fluxprobe is placed into 

the hydroelectric generator between the field poles and stator 

coils. The flexible fluxprobe does not affect the performance of 

the generator but detects the change in the magnetic field 

caused by shorts in the rotor pole insulation. Once the 

fluxprobe is attached to the generator, engineers and 

technicians can manually record the signal with data acquisition 

equipment and visually interpret the results while the generator 

is running. 

After the flexible fluxprobe was developed, DeHaan filed an 

invention disclosure report to the Research and Development 

office in 2000. USBR filed for a patent, which was awarded in 

2002 (U.S. Patent No. 6,466,009: “Flexible Printed Circuit 

Magnetic Flux Probe”). As the fluxprobe was being patented, 
Appendix J: Case Study of DOI U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Technology Transfer: 

Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool 

J-7

USBR manufactured several flexible fluxprobe prototypes for 

use in the field. 

 J.2.1 Partnership with Iris Power 

After the flexible fluxprobe was developed in the late 1990s and 

patented in 2002, Iris Power LP played an important role in the 

further development of derivative technologies that used the 

fluxprobe and eventual commercialization of the device. Iris 

Power was established in 1990 to develop sensors and 

instruments to help clients understand the condition of large 

electrical machines, manage maintenance schedules, and 

extend the operational life of those machines. Engineers from 

USBR, including Mr. DeHaan, had experience working with Iris 

Power personnel and the products and services they provide. 

Through this relationship, Iris Power learned of the 

development of the fluxprobe. 

After the patent for the flexible fluxprobe was granted in 2002, 

USBR personnel approached Iris engineers with their invention 

to see if they would be interested in licensing the technology to 

improve the monitoring of generator rotors. In addition to 

legislative mandates, beginning with the Stevenson-Wydler Act 

in 1980 and the Technology Transfer Act in 1986, to transfer 

government-developed technologies to industry, USBR was also 

seeking to take advantage of manufacturing capabilities and 

efficiencies in the private sector. If USBR could not find an 

industry partner, it would need to further develop and 

manufacture the generator rotor monitoring equipment at 

relatively high cost. USBR staff thought that their partnership 

with Iris Power might offer a potential solution. 

Iris Power was indeed interested in the flexible fluxprobe and 

agreed to work with USBR to transfer and further develop the 

government-owned technology. It did so by signing a licensing 

agreement85 with USBR for the flexible fluxprobe and 

establishing a CRADA with USBR. The CRADA was meant to 

enable USBR staff to continue to work with Iris Power to further 

develop the flexible fluxprobe. USBR and Iris Power were 

motivated to enter into these agreements based on their prior 

85 Iris Power enjoyed an exclusive license for 3 years specifically 

related to use of generator and motor conditioning monitoring. The 

license was then converted to a nonexclusive license for the same 

field of use. This arrangement is specific to the field of turbines and 

large or small generators. USBR is currently receiving royalties.
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

J-8 

technical cooperation. In addition, the flexible fluxprobe fit into 

Iris’s line of commercial products and services that were 

designed to help clients maintain large electrical equipment. 

Given that Mr. DeHaan and his colleagues had already 

constructed schematics for the flexible fluxprobe as part of their 

patent and used these to produce prototypes to monitor 

generator rotors, it was relatively easy for USBR to transfer the 

underlying technology to Iris Power through licensing 

agreements. 

As Iris Power began to develop a similar technology in the early 

1990s, under the USBR-Iris Power CRADA it worked with Mr. 

DeHaan and other USBR staff to develop and refine their 

generator rotor monitoring system. In the process, Iris Power 

made several functional improvements to their system that 

helped automate detection within hydroelectric generators. 

First, Iris Power developed a portable instrument and 

accompanying software that digitize the voltage signal from the 

fluxprobe and then display high-resolution interpretations of the 

data. As part of its development efforts in the 1990s, Iris Power 

also added a rotational sensor that allows identification of poles 

with a short. Finally, Iris Power included flexible fluxprobe 

installation in its client service offerings and packaged those 

installations with other diagnostic solutions. Today, Iris Power 

continues to offer these products and services to its customers, 

companies, cooperatives, and governments that possess largescale hydroelectric generation facilities. 

 J.3 IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 

The transfer, development, and commercialization of the 

flexible fluxprobe technology have led to several benefits for 

industry, government, and society. This case study illustrates 

the importance of public-private partnerships to solve technical 

problems that have both economic and social benefits. The 

sections below describe these benefits in greater detail. 

Lowers Development Costs for Industry: By inventing the 

flexible fluxprobe to improve the operation and lifespan of 

government-owned hydroelectric power facilities, USBR created 

a new technology that not only benefited publicly owned 

hydroelectric power facilities and thus its customers, but also 

helped lower the development costs for industry. Technical 

change occurs slowly in the power generation industry; thus, 
Appendix J: Case Study of DOI U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Technology Transfer: 

Flexible Fluxprobe Diagnostic Tool 

J-9

market-driven incentives for innovation, including industry 

investment in R&D, are lower compared with other, more 

rapidly changing industries. For example, representatives from 

Iris Power indicated that if USBR had not invented the flexible 

fluxprobe, it was unlikely that they would have developed the 

device on their own, or if they had, it would have taken a 

significantly longer period of time. 

Benefits to Industry and the Economy: Iris Power agreed to 

license the flexible fluxprobe from USBR because the 

technology aligned well with Iris Power’s corporate mission to 

help its clients manage and maintain large-scale power 

equipment. Although flexible fluxprobes are a low-volume 

product (about 366 units were sold by 2015), its addition to Iris 

Power’s product offerings enhanced the product and services of 

Iris Power. Iris Power has developed complementary services, 

such as installation of the flexible fluxprobe, and offers the 

device as part of larger product and service bundles to power 

generation companies around the world. 

Industry Technology Development and 

Commercialization: Iris Power not only licensed the flexible 

fluxprobe and established a CRADA with USBR, but also worked 

with USBR staff to further develop and manufacture the rotor 

monitoring technology. In the process, Iris Power made several 

functional improvements to the technology, including the 

addition of a monitor and analytical software to allow its clients 

to automate the detection of rotor component problems in large 

hydroelectric generators. Although Iris Power may not have 

funded the initial development of the flexible fluxprobe, USBR 

staff who were interviewed said that they would not have been 

able to make such substantial improvements to rotor 

monitoring technology and were not in a position to market and 

sell it. 

Improved Power Generation Efficiencies: The invention 

and subsequent further industry development of the flexible 

fluxprobe and generator rotor monitor have enabled 

government, industry, and cooperatively operated hydroelectric 

power generation facilities to run more efficiently. Specifically, 

the flexible fluxprobe provides facility operators with diagnostic 

capabilities that allow them to detect component degradation 

among generators. This capability reduces the time required by 

plant staff for offline component evaluation, improves the 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

J-10 

diagnosis accuracy and maintenance schedules, and reduces 

the risk of catastrophic component failures. These benefits 

collectively reduce generator downtime, resulting in operational 

savings and more reliable power generation to government, coop, and industry-run facilities. Although Americans who receive 

their electricity from hydroelectric facilities have enjoyed 

indirect benefits from the transfer and development of the 

technology, so have residents of other nations, such as China, 

Canada, and Brazil whose power operators have purchased the 

flexible fluxprobe and generator rotor monitor from Iris Power. 

Benefits to USBR: The transfer, development, and 

commercialization of the fluxprobe enabled USBR to fulfill its 

agency and Congressional mandate (i.e., the Stevenson-Wydler 

Act) for transferring technologies developed through publicly 

funded R&D. Through its CRADA with Iris Power, USBR worked 

with Iris Power to develop its invention further, the flexible 

fluxprobe and generator rotor monitor that, in turn, allowed the 

agency to benefit from improved diagnostic capabilities from 

the devices it purchased for its hydroelectric power generation 

facilities. In addition, USBR was able to take advantage of the 

development and manufacturing capabilities of Iris Power, thus 

reducing overhead costs for the agency; in the absence of Iris 

Power, USBR would have needed to develop and manufacture 

the flexible fluxprobe and rotor monitor itself. The agency also 

received modest licensing revenues (nearly $40,000 as of 

2015) from Iris Power that were used to continue its technology 

transfer activities and provide incentives to USBR inventors to 

further develop new, useful technologies. 
K-1

Case Study of DOT 

Federal Highway 

Administration 

Technology 

Transfer: Mobile 

Solution for 

Assessment and 

Reporting 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

K-2 

DOT Federal Highway Administration – Mobile 

Solution for Assessment and Reporting

Federal agency: Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) 

Laboratory: FHWA 

Collaborating entities: Various state DOTs 

Transfer object: Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting 

(MSAR) 

Inventor(s): Sergio Mayorga (FHWA) 

Invention disclosure date: Not applicable 

Transfer mechanisms: Licenses 

Key dates: Texas DOT acquired 50 MSAR licenses in 2016 

MSAR piloted in six states as of 2017 

Texas DOT has used MSAR for six separate events as 

of early 2018 

Transfer recipients: State DOTs (FL, GA, MI, MN, TX, WV) 

Impact summary: MSAR helps officials provide near real-time 

assessments of damage to infrastructure, allowing 

federal and state governments to assess damages 

more quickly and cheaply. Faster assessment and 

repair mean less social and economic disruption. Pilot 

testing of MSAR has demonstrated a total labor 

savings of 17.5 hours (reduced from 18 hours to 0.5 

hours) per damage assessment. 
Appendix K: Case Study of DOT Federal Highway Administration Technology Transfer: 

Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting 

K-3

 K.1 BACKGROUND 

This case study reviews the Federal Highway Administration’s 

(FHWA) Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting (MSAR), 

a cloud-based mobile software solution that is used when 

disasters cause unexpected damage to the U.S. transportation 

infrastructure. MSAR was conceptualized by FHWA federal staff, 

who performed a detailed user needs assessment and 

researched solutions in the market. FHWA adapted a 

commercial off-the-shelf solution to speed up delivery 

timelines. Run Consultants, the private-sector IT solutions 

provider, adapted their solution to address FHWA workflow 

requirements and deployed it within 6 months. MSAR was 

licensed to state partners and made available to federal lands 

management agencies free of charge. 

In this case study, we outline how FHWA program staff brought 

the concept to reality and the impacts the MSAR had on 

emergency response operations for FHWA. FHWA had and 

continues to have a key champion for this technology in Sergio 

Mayorga, Emergency Relief for Federal Owned Roads (ERFO) 

Program Manager. From a previous role at Caltrans, Mr. 

Mayorga was very familiar with emergency relief (ER) processes 

required to document damages and request federal aid. Mr. 

Mayorga pushed for technology that would transform the data 

capture, approvals, and oversight for the ER and ERFO 

programs. FHWA leadership supported technology development 

through the Accelerating Market Readiness program. 

MSAR allows field users to capture information in a streamlined 

fashion using ubiquitous smartphone and tablet technology, 

thus providing near real-time accessibility to damage 

assessments and intelligent and flexible routing for approvals. 

MSAR has yielded significant efficiencies compared with the 

status quo—a cumbersome process relying on paper forms, 

scanned documents, and emails and FTP sites. Additionally, 

MSAR enables precise, rapid reporting and visibility into the 

scale of transportation damages resulting from events ranging 

from flooding, to earthquakes and forest fires, and even to 

manmade natural disasters. 

 K.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

MSAR is a cloud-based mobile platform that allows field 

personnel to rapidly perform Damage Inspection Reports 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

K-4 

(DDIRs) and Damage Survey Reports (DSRs)—henceforth 

damage assessment reports unless specifically noted—in the 

field to assist federal lands management agencies and states in 

the event of a disaster. It provides several primary functions 

that benefit both FHWA and its partners: 

1. Streamlined data collection at damage sites, including 

photos and GPS locations, while disconnected from the 

internet; 

2. Streamlined, flexible approvals routing; and 

3. Real-time reporting features. 

These functions are significant improvements over the old way 

of doing business and have yielded a variety of benefits for DOT 

FHWA and its partners who are responsible for coordinating ER 

efforts within the federal highway system. Benefits include the 

following: 

 Increased government efficiency in terms of labor hour 

savings for each damage assessment report, 

 Increased data quality and transparency 

 Improved turnaround time between when the event 

occurs and when funding for repairs is authorized 

(particularly important for large events or smaller 

jurisdictions), and 

 Improved real-time situational awareness across all 

stakeholders at all levels (i.e., for ER state DOT and 

local agency officials, FHWA division office, and FHWA 

headquarters. For ERFO, federal lands management 

agency units, regional offices, Federal Lands Highway 

Division, and FLH headquarters). 

MSAR was developed because there was a critical need that 

FHWA program manager—Mr. Mayorga—recognized after a few 

years working in the realm of ER. Mr. Mayorga recognized a 

need for a completely new way of approaching damage 

assessment. 

 K.2.1 Illustrative Example: The Old Damage Assessment 

Reporting Process 

Imagine capturing information about flood damage to a federal 

highway after waters have receded to a safe enough level to 

promote entry to the specific site. You have a camera, a global 

positioning device, a notepad, a laptop, and several other 

devices. You take 10 to 20 pictures of the site from different 

angles, record the geolocation of the site, make handwritten 
Appendix K: Case Study of DOT Federal Highway Administration Technology Transfer: 

Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting 

K-5

notes and sketches, and take measurements of various aspects 

of the site alongside a co-inspector. Later that evening, after 

having inspected five other sites in the area, you set up shop in 

your hotel room, and you seam everything together manually: 

upload the pictures to the computer and type up handwritten 

notes, measurements, and geolocation. You also have to make 

some new sketches because your sketches from the field were 

rough and then scan and upload the new sketches. 

The process has just begun. Additional information needs to be 

captured by your colleagues in the office. Once that is 

complete, your office emails the documents to your 

counterparts at the FHWA division office. The FHWA division 

office notices some discrepancies, provides markups of the 

pdfs, and sends them back. You have to then revise the 

documents and resend them. Once the package is finally 

approved, the documents are signed by the division office and 

further routed via email to the appropriate state and federal 

signatories. Several months later, the FHWA has reimbursed 

the appropriate partners for the damage repair. The state had 

decided to proceed with the necessary repairs instead of 

waiting for reimbursement and drew down from its reserve 

maintenance funds. In this hypothetical, they ended up 

delaying repair of other maintenance projects on secondary 

state-owned roads, also damaged during the flooding. 

The hypothetical above presents a common situation states 

face, although some of them do outsource their damage 

assessment and reporting process. With a paper-based system 

or one managed by a contractor, the FHWA would have had 

difficulty responding quickly to a congressional request for 

damage estimates by county, congressional district, or roadway 

over the past 10 years. Until MSAR was rolled out at FHWA, 

FHWA had to pull together these types of damage estimates in 

an ad hoc fashion. 

MSAR has been making the old way of doing things quickly 

obsolete as federal lands partners and states adopt it. 

Stakeholders throughout this process gain substantial 

efficiencies during the course of their ER efforts. Leveraging 

ubiquitous smartphone and tablet technology, MSAR has 

streamlined the old way of doing business by centralizing data 

capture on mobile devices and storing all data in the cloud so 

that field users, system administrators, and FHWA program 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

K-6 

managers have simultaneous real-time access to damage 

assessment information from a variety of computing platforms. 

Without action by FHWA, it would have taken significantly more 

time for states to develop their own software solutions, and 

even then those solutions would not be standardized. 

 K.2.2 The Scale of Transportation Emergency Relief Efforts 

FHWA receives approximately $100 million per year in regular 

appropriations for ER. It also receives special congressional 

appropriations from year to year depending on the frequency 

and scale of weather and other events affecting the 

transportation infrastructure. 

Two ER programs−the ER program with state partners and the 

ERFO program with federal lands partners−have been 

implementing MSAR to streamline the data capture, approvals, 

and reporting of transportation infrastructure damages. MSAR 

has been piloted and fully adopted in a handful of states 

through the ER program (see Section K.3) and has been rolled 

out to most federal lands agencies86 through the ERFO 

program. 

 K.2.3 Use and Adoption of MSAR 

The FHWA has not mandated the adoption of MSAR; they have 

focused on educating state and federal lands partners about the 

technology through piloting and training activities. To date, 

MSAR has been piloted in 12 states and 7 federal lands 

agencies. The outreach program also engaged over 10 states 

that are interested in piloting MSAR. 

States are still learning about MSAR and are in the early 

adoption phase. States that tend to be prone to emergency 

events have shown the most interest to date. Texas has been 

the lead early adopter and has completely phased out their old 

process in favor of MSAR. 

In FY 2017, MSAR was used across 32 events to document over 

$714 million in damages. There are over 2,840 assessments in 

86 Tribal transportation facilities, federal lands transportation facilities, 

and other federally owned roads that are open to public travel such 

as Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Energy, Department of 

Defense (Military Installation roads), and Surface Deployment and 

Distribution Command (Defense Access roads). 
Appendix K: Case Study of DOT Federal Highway Administration Technology Transfer: 

Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting 

K-7

MSAR for the year, which translates into a savings of over 

52,540 labor hours and $4.2 million in cost avoidance.87 

 Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) 

Texas’ experience as an early pilot state for MSAR was positive. 

As a result, TxDOT acquired 50 MSAR licenses at a cost of 

$1,000 per license in March 2016 for use throughout the state. 

The prior practice in Texas, according to the FHWA Emergency 

Relief coordinator there, was to conduct services through 

emails and SharePoint sites, an inefficient process. As of early 

2016, TxDOT had used MSAR for six separate events, including 

two major flooding events. This includes 418 damage 

assessments, $51 million in damages for permanent repairs, 

and $57 million in damages for emergency repairs. Texas is 

having its local government partners, such as Houston, use the 

platform. 

TxDOT stressed the high value of the MSAR reporting 

functionality; its ability to provide real-time information at one’s 

fingertips rather than having to pull data together manually. 

TxDOT has also experimented with MSAR use for FEMA-related 

reporting, which would be a potential future application of this 

platform. 

 Federal Lands 

Federal lands agencies have implemented MSAR rather quickly 

compared with their counterpart states because, as part of the 

federal government, they incur no license fees. 

 K.3 IMPACTS FROM TECHNOLOGY 

DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT 

Through MSAR implementation, the FHWA DOT has experienced 

various operational improvements, as have regional and 

location stakeholders. MSAR has also delivered improved 

reporting and situational awareness for all parties involved and 

faster turnaround times for reimbursement decisions for 

damage assessments. 

Operational improvements for FHWA: The primary impact 

from MSAR is a streamlined damage and assessment reporting 

process, driven by streamlined data collection at damage sites, 

87 Personal communication. Lisa Seyler, Run Consultants. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

K-8 

flexible and smart routing, and access to synchronized data 

from all parties involved. 

While no methodology was provided to us, pilot testing of MSAR 

demonstrated labor savings of 18.5 labor hours per DDIR/DSR 

for public-sector employees to process applications for FHWA 

funds (a reduction from 63 hours to 44.5 hours). Although the 

process in every state is different, we were able to establish 

manual clerical activities performed by each stakeholder group 

and identify the tasks that are automated by MSAR, which frees 

up staff time for higher-value activities. 

For Hurricane Harvey alone, TX DOT and local agencies 

documented over 900 sites in under 5 weeks. FWHA and TxDOT 

reported 17,500 labor hours of savings for this event alone. If 

we conservatively assume an average hourly wage rate of $80 

per hour,88 the resulting “soft” cost savings thus far have been 

$1.4 million. Projecting MSAR cost savings 10 years into the 

future, if there continue to be 1,750 DDIRs/DSRs per year in 

future years, cumulative cost savings over the next 10 years in 

present value terms would be more than $25.9 million.89

Improved reporting and situational awareness: Another 

major benefit MSAR implementation provides is the improved 

reporting functions for FHWA across regional boundaries. States 

have developed their own tools for damage assessment and 

reporting processes that have not been interoperable. Although 

most states have not adopted MSAR, FHWA is using MSAR as 

an information management tool and entering and/or uploading 

data from states themselves. 

Once data are in the platform, MSAR provides standardized, 

digitized information stored in an easy-to-query way. Two 

system administrators pointed to this as a significant benefit for 

responding to ad hoc requests such as congressional inquiries 

about the impact and financial needs of states affected by 

recent natural disasters like Hurricane Harvey, Maria, and Irma. 

The ability to provide leadership and appropriation committees 

88 The hourly rate is based on Federal GS 11/12 project reimbursable 

employees and/or equivalent state-level employees who commonly 

collect disaster data in the field and/or manipulate the data in an 

office environment following its manual collection. The $80 rate 

includes management overhead and leave reserve. 

89 Personal communication. Lisa Seyler, Run Consultants. 
Appendix K: Case Study of DOT Federal Highway Administration Technology Transfer: 

Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting 

K-9

timely and accurate damage estimates enables them to 

effectively advocate for disaster relief needs. 

Improved information quality: Because of its ease of use 

and design as an all-in-one application, MSAR generates fewer 

data quality issues by field staff, who in the past would have 

had to translate data from handwritten field notes and other 

data collection methods into forms back at the office. Not only 

does MSAR improve ease of data collection, but it also ensures 

minimum standards for data entered into the system. 

Faster response times for FHWA reimbursements: Another 

major benefit MSAR provides to state and federal land partners 

is faster response times from FHWA. Because MSAR streamlines 

damage assessment and reporting for these partners, they are 

able to obtain federal funding to repair infrastructure in a 

timelier manner. 

If something is incorrect in a damage report, it can quickly be 

returned under the MSAR platform, thus avoiding the additional 

printing, signing, and scanning of documents that prior 

processes required. The MSAR platform also provides greater 

transparency in the routing process, and problems and 

bottlenecks can more easily be identified. Where MSAR is 

implemented, faster reimbursement from FHWA to the state or 

county for repairs occurs, leading to faster repairs even in those 

states with inadequate transportation budgets to front the cost 

of repairs. This may result in fewer hardships for the people 

and businesses affected by damaged highway infrastructure 

and fewer losses for drivers who are forced to use detours. 

 K.3.1 Conclusions 

Without the development of MSAR, it is likely that most states 

and federal lands agencies would still be relying on old 

systems. Although FHWA has licensed MSAR to a handful of 

states that are actively using MSAR for damage assessment 

and reporting, FHWA’s use of MSAR to centralize data 

management of all DDIRs/DSRs expands its importance. By 

using MSAR in this way, FHWA is able to provide near real-time 

reporting for stakeholders like Congress. 

The importance of a champion for this technology cannot be 

understated—an FHWA program manager identified the clear 

need for a software platform and guided the technology from 

concept to development by working with private-sector 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

K-10 

partners. Another primary factor for MSAR’s success has been 

FHWA’s collaborative approach to its planning and 

development: this has involved key stakeholders from ER and 

ERFO programs, as well as FHWA’s internal IT department (to 

ensure compliance with federal cybersecurity guidelines). FHWA 

and its partners involved users early on for up-front needs 

assessments, and the platform has been further refined with 

ongoing usage feedback from pilot states. 

MSAR’s expanding adoption has benefitted from the fact that 

the federal government itself is the customer—for instance, the 

ERFO program.90 For the ERFO program, the cost of adoption is 

reduced because there are no licensing fees. The FHWA’s close 

working relationships with its partners—state partners and 

federal lands management agencies—has inspired a level of 

trust between the parties and an understanding of their mutual 

needs. 

There are also two major technology characteristics that made 

MSAR successful. First, MSAR is interoperable across common 

personal computing platforms from desktop computers to 

mobile devices. The interoperability feature mitigated a major 

potential barrier to adoption. Second, MSAR leverages the 

Salesforce.com Government Cloud platform, which is highly 

scalable and FedRAMP approved. The platform undergoes 

regular security assessments by FHWA as well as other federal 

agencies leveraging the platform. 

Overall, MSAR as a technology is still early in its life cycle but 

appears to be quite promising based on cumulative experiences 

with the platform. MSAR’s rate of adoption promises to 

increase, should the cost model be adapted to different state 

partners’ financial, budgetary, and event risk constraints. 

Continued technology transfer activities include outreach, 

training, and refining of the system with early user feedback 

will encourage adoption by the next round of states. 

90 https://flh.fhwa.dot.gov/programs/erfo/
L-1

Case Study of HHS 

Center for Disease 

Control Technology 

Transfer: Human 

Microvascular 

Endothelial Cell 

Lines (HMEC-1) 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

L-2 

HHS – CDC Human Microvascular Endothelial 

Cell Lines (HMEC-1)

Federal agency: Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention 

Laboratory: CDC—Atlanta campus 

Collaborating entities: Research collaborator: Emory University 

Transfer object: Human Microvascular Endothelial Cell Lines (HMEC-1) 

Inventor(s): Paco Candal 

Edwin Ades 

Thomas Lawley 

Invention disclosure date: Disclosed to CDC November 1990 

Transfer mechanisms: Material transfer agreements and licenses 

Key dates: Discovery of HMEC-1 published in 1992 

Transfer recipients: Various institutions, universities, and companies 

Impact summary: The HMEC-1 is a faster and lower cost process for 

producing endothelial cells that researchers use to 

understand how diseases spread in the body. The cell 

line improves the capability and productivity of 

researchers studying diseases and testing new drugs. 

The cell line allows CDC to better serve its public 

health mission, and the dissemination of this 

technology has led to improved research productivity 

and health outcomes. 
Appendix L: Case Study of HHS Center for Disease Control Technology Transfer: 

Human Microvascular Endothelial Cell Lines (HMEC-1) 

L-3

 L.1 BACKGROUND 

In 1990, researchers at the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, invented a new way to 

grow endothelial cells, what they termed the Human 

Microvascular Endothelial Cell Line (HMEC-1). Invented by 

Francisco J. (Paco) Candal, Edwin Ades, and Thomas Lawley, 

the HMEC-1 is the first immortalized human microvascular 

endothelial cell line that retains the morphologic, phenotypic, 

and functional characteristics of normal human microvascular 

endothelial cells. CDC selected the cell line for this study as an 

example of transferring foundational knowledge to society. 

Endothelial cells are critical to the function of the human body; 

they line the interior surface of blood and lymphatic vessels. 

Vascular endothelial cells, which function as endothelial cells 

that maintain direct contact with blood, have several unique 

functions including fluid filtration, maintenance of vessel tone, 

and repair of damaged vessels (hemostasis). 

Production of endothelial cells is important for scientific 

research. Endothelial cells are used in research that seeks to 

understand basic body functions. Further, these cells are used 

to test the impact of various diseases and viruses on the 

human body, especially tissue structure. For example, 

researchers use endothelial cells to understand how diseases 

are spread through the body, such as the spread of tumors 

through the bloodstream or lymphatic vessels. Industry 

researchers use endothelial cells to test the efficacy of new 

drugs on disease targets, such as cancer. 

Scientists typically produce endothelial cells by extracting cells 

from human foreskin, as well as lung and brain materials and 

bone marrow, and then grow the cells under laboratory 

conditions. Unfortunately, traditional methods for reproducing 

endothelial cells taken directly from cell donors—termed 

primary cells—are relatively slow and labor intensive. Further, 

endothelial cells produced using traditional techniques die 

relatively quickly and vary in quality and uniformity, thus 

creating challenges for controlled experiments and follow-on 

efforts to reproduce scientific results. 

HMEC-1 continues to be an important contribution to science 

because the cell line—that is, the source material and 

techniques for reproducing it—results in cells that multiply 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

L-4 

uniformly and rapidly, providing researchers with endothelial 

cells that satisfy their research requirements. The development 

of the HMEC-1 cell line provided an important research 

breakthrough to allow CDC to better serve its public health 

mission of protecting the American public from the spread of 

communicable diseases and other public health threats. 

Further, CDC’s dissemination of the HMEC-1 cell line to other 

government laboratories, universities, and companies—through 

both academic publications and material transfer agreements 

(MTAs)—similarly led to increased research productivity and 

improved health outcomes. Today, researchers can purchase 

the HMEC-1 cell line on the market through purveyors such as 

Thermo Fisher Scientific91 and American Type Culture 

Collection.92

 L.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

CDC works 24/7 to protect America from health, safety, and 

security threats, both foreign and in the United States. Whether 

diseases start at home or abroad, are chronic or acute, curable 

or preventable, human error or deliberate attack, CDC fights 

disease and supports communities and citizens to do the same. 

To accomplish its mission, CDC conducts critical science, 

provides health information that protects our nation against 

expensive and dangerous health threats, and responds when 

these arise. 

Today, CDC is administratively located within the U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Its 

contemporary mission includes health security, occupational 

health, the identification and surveillance of threatening 

diseases both domestically and abroad, and responses that help 

halt their spread. CDC employs thousands of talented 

researchers and clinicians to support this mission; their 

response times and research productivity are critical enabling 

factors. 

Paco Candal worked as section chief for CDC’s Scientific 

Resources Division for 18 years. His research group was 

responsible for producing different types of cell lines—including 

91 https://www.thermofisher.com/us/en/home/technicalresources/cell-lines/h/cell-lines-detail-159.html

92 https://www.atcc.org/en/Products/All/CRL3243.aspx#generalinformation 
Appendix L: Case Study of HHS Center for Disease Control Technology Transfer: 

Human Microvascular Endothelial Cell Lines (HMEC-1) 

L-5

endothelial cells—to grow parasites and viruses to support 

CDC’s mission. As mentioned, traditional techniques grow 

endothelial cells from human tissue. Not only are techniques for 

growing endothelial cells difficult and costly, Mr. Candal also 

realized in the 1980s that the technique had not advanced for 

decades. In discussions with his supervisor, Dr. Edwin Ades, 

and Thomas Lawley, an academic researcher at the nearby 

Emory University, Mr. Candal thought of different ways to 

speed up production of endothelial cells. Further, he and his 

colleagues sought to “immortalize” endothelial cells, that is, 

find ways for these cells to live longer because these cells are 

difficult to isolate in pure culture, are fastidious in their in vitro 

growth requirements, and have a very limited lifespan. 

Mr. Candal experimented with different ways to produce 

endothelial cells in the 1980s. His first experiments focused on 

inserting various types of DNA into cells to change their genetic 

structure. However, these cells only lived 2 to 3 weeks. He then 

tried a different approach: he inserted cells with DNA from 

viruses known to cause cancer. The modified cells reacted by 

dividing faster and living longer. The researchers also noticed 

that the cells were forming colonies surrounded by a 

monolayer, which meant that the cell colonies could be isolated 

and reproduced. In other words, the cells could be produced 

quickly and effectively for research purposes. 

After the invention of the HMEC-1 line, the National Institutes 

of Health (NIH), also administratively located within HHS, filed 

patents on behalf of CDC. In the process, the agency learned 

that the prior publication about HMEC-1 invalidated its ability to 

patent the invention, and further patent prosecution was 

ceased. Nonetheless, CDC published the results of its discovery 

and distributed the HMEC-1 cell line widely to hundreds of 

groups, especially nonprofit research organizations, through 

MTAs. A representative list of institutions and universities that 

received HMEC-1 under MTAs include the University of 

Edinburgh, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Rega Institute for 

Medical Research, The Heart Research Institute, and the 

University of North Carolina. These organizations not only used 

the cell line in various types of research, but they also 

improved on the cell line to create new, unique cell lines that 

better fit their research needs. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

L-6 

CDC also facilitated sharing of HMEC-1 with a variety of 

companies for use in drug discovery and research and 

development. This sharing was subject to Biological Material 

Licenses (BMLs), which provided back to CDC revenues to 

support additional research at CDC and to reward the inventors 

who created HMEC-1. CDC used the substantial proceeds from 

the BML revenues to maintain the cell line and continue to 

make it widely available. For example, CDC earned nearly $18 

million in royalties from licenses with a representative list of 

licensees including Bristol-Myers Squibb, Cryptome 

Pharmaceuticals, and Lexicon Genetics, Inc.93

In all, sharing of HMEC-1 with institutions, universities, and 

companies shows that even nonpatented research tool 

technologies can have a positive impact on the research 

community. Taking into account all sharing paradigms (MTAs 

and BMLs), a total of 360 transfers of the HMEC-1 cell line have 

occurred since April 2018. 

 L.3 IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 

CDC’s development and issuance of the HMEC-1 cell line 

provide an example of a foundational knowledge transfer, 

benefitting several aspects of society. 

Contributions to scientific knowledge: The discovery by the 

CDC researchers of the HMEC-1 cell line was first published in 

1992 in the Journal of Investigative Dermatology. Entitled 

“HMEC-1: the establishment of an immortalized human 

microvascular endothelial cell line,”94 the publication has been 

cited 1,292 times (see Figure L-1), as of mid-2018 representing 

an effective transfer of knowledge. Other related articles that 

discussed the HMEC-1 cell line were published in esteemed 

journals that were also often cited. These include such 

academic journals as Proceedings of the National Academy of 

Sciences (157 citations), Infection and Immunity (129 

citations), The Journal of Immunology (92 citations), and 

93 A portion of this revenue is for patent prosecution cost 

reimbursement (for the time the patents were still under 

prosecution). 

94 Full citation is Ades, E.W.; Candal, F.J., Swerlick, R.A.; George, V.J.; 

Summers, S.; Bosse, D.C.; Lawley, T.J., 1992. HMEC-1: 

establishment of an immortalized human microvascular endothelial 

cell line. Journal of Investigative Dermatology. 99(6): 683-690. 
Appendix L: Case Study of HHS Center for Disease Control Technology Transfer: 

Human Microvascular Endothelial Cell Lines (HMEC-1) 

L-7

Microvascular Research (72 citations), and further illustrate the 

reach of this discovery. 

Figure L-1. Cumulative Citations to Paper Over Time 

Contributions to research practice: CDC’s HMEC-1 line 

provides researchers from universities, government agencies, 

and life science companies with uniform, reproducible 

endothelial cells that, compared with primary cells, are less 

expensive, reproduce more quickly, live for longer periods of 

time, and retain their primary cell characteristics for a greater 

duration. 

Cell lines such as HMEC-1 are unlikely to replace research and 

medical use of primary cells completely. According to experts 

interviewed for this case study, universities and companies 

continue to use primary cells for advanced drug research. 

However, CDC’s discovery of the HMEC-1 cell line provided an 

important complement to primary endothelial cells and allowed 

researchers to expand the scope of their experiments and 

validate experiments using primary cells at a relatively lower 

cost. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

L-8 

Economic and social benefits: Although data are not 

available to quantify the economic and social benefits of the 

HMEC-1 cell line, experts interviewed for this case study 

indicated that there are such benefits. These economic and 

social returns of the cell line include greater research 

productivity in university, government, and industry 

laboratories, leading to the greater scientific understanding of 

the human body. By enhancing research productivity, the 

HMEC-1 cell line likely leads to faster diagnoses of diseases that 

affect microvascular endothelial cells and accelerates their 

treatment. 
M-1

Case Study of HHS 

National Institutes 

of Health 

Technology 

Transfer: Human 

Papillomavirus 

Vaccine 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

M-2 

HHS - NIH Human Papillomavirus Vaccine

Federal agency: Department of Human and Health Services, National 

Institutes of Health 

Laboratory: National Cancer Institute, various universities, and 

research centers 

Collaborating entities: Merck & Co., Medimmune, SmithKline Beechem (later 

GSK) 

Transfer object: Human papillomavirus vaccine 

Inventor(s): John T. Schiller (NIH) 

Douglas R. Lowy (NIH) 

Invention disclosure date: Information not provided 

Transfer mechanisms: Nonexclusive licenses converted to co-exclusive licenses 

Key dates: A valid method for producing HPV VLPs developed and 

patent application filed in 1992 by NIH NCI 

NIH NCI nonexclusively license NIH VLP technology in 

1997 to Merck and Medimmune 

Merck presents results of HPV vaccine clinical trials in 

2001 

Transfer recipients: Merck & Co., Medimmune, SmithKline Beechem (later 

GSK) 

Impact summary: HPV causes an estimated 610,000 cancers each year, with 

80% of these occurring in less developed countries. 

Today, at least one HPV vaccine is licensed in more than 

100 countries. In addition to health benefits, this vaccine 

has reduced medical costs and provides significant income 

to providers/suppliers. 
Appendix M: Case Study of HHS National Institutes of Health Technology Transfer: 

Human Papillomavirus Vaccine 

M-3

 M.1 BACKGROUND 

Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually 

transmitted infection in the United States, infecting 42% of 

people aged 15 to 59 in 2008 (Satterwhite et al., 2013). 

Although most infections cause no symptoms and go away on 

their own within a few years, some last longer and can progress 

to genital warts or cancer, depending on the HPV type. Among 

the more than 200 identified HPV types, 15 are linked to 

cancer. Of those, HPV type 16 (HPV-16) and HPV-18 are the 

most common, accounting for 70% of cervical cancers. HPV-6 

and HPV-11 cause 90% of genital warts but do not cause 

cancer.95 

HPV causes an estimated 610,000 cancers each year 

worldwide, 80% of these in less developed countries; in North 

America, 26,000 of the 1.6 million new cancer cases each year 

are attributable to HPV.96 Cervical cancer, the most common 

type attributable to HPV and the fourth leading cause of female 

cancer mortality, causes an estimated 528,000 new cases and 

266,000 deaths per year worldwide.97 In the United States, the 

American Cancer Society estimates that in 2018 about 13,000 

women will be diagnosed with invasive cervical cancer and 

about 4,000 women will die from the disease.98

In June 2006, Gardasil, developed and manufactured by Merck, 

became the first HPV vaccine approved by FDA; the vaccine 

covers HPV types 6, 11, 16, and 18. Later that year, the HPV 

vaccination was added to the U.S.’s routine vaccination 

schedule for girls 11 or 12 years old and recommended for 

women aged 9 to 26. A second vaccine, Cervarix, developed by 

Medimmune and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and manufactured by 

GSK, was approved in Europe in September 2007 and in the 

United States in October 2009; it covers HPV types 16 and 18. 

Merck’s Gardasil 9, approved by FDA in October 2016, covers 

95 See Bosch et al. (1995) and Kyrgiou and Shafi (2009). HPV-16 also 

accounts for approximately 95% of HPV-positive oropharyngeal 

cancer, a subset of head and neck squamous cell cancers including 

tumors in the mouth, sinuses, and throat; 22,000 new cases are 

diagnosed every year (Forman et al., 2012). Incidence of HPVpositive oropharyngeal cancer is on the rise in the United States 

and Europe (Berman and Schiller, 2017). 96 These estimates, from Forman et al. (2012), are for 2008. 

97 These estimates, from Bruni et al. (2017), are for 2012. 

98 See https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cervical-cancer/about/keystatistics.html. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

M-4 

an additional five HPV types linked to cancer: 31, 33, 45, 52, 

and 58. Today, at least one of these vaccines is licensed in 

more than 100 countries. 

Clinical trials and registry-based observational studies have 

shown HPV vaccines to be safe and highly effective in 

preventing HPV infections.99 Among young women in the United 

States, the prevalence of HPV types 6, 11, 16, and 18 has 

declined by more than half since the introduction of Gardasil.100 

These vaccines and their profound public health impacts are the 

product of inspired and inspiring efforts by numerous scientists 

in university, government, and industry settings. The principal 

players include scientists at the German Cancer Research 

Center, NIH’s National Cancer Institute (NCI)), Georgetown 

University, and the University of Rochester in the United 

States; Queensland University in Australia; and the 

pharmaceutical companies Medimmune, GSK, and Merck.101 To 

highlight policy considerations concerning public investment in 

medical research and technology transfer from federal 

laboratories, this case study describes NCI’s role in the context 

of the entire body of work on HPV: a global collaboration 

among government, universities, and industry. 

 M.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

Establishing a causal link between HPV and anogenital cancers 

was a critical first step in developing a vaccine. Dr. Harald zur 

Hausen at the University of Heidelberg and Dr. Alexander 

Meisels at Saint-Sacrement Hospital in Quebec City, Canada, 

are credited with providing the earliest strong evidence of such 

a link (Schmeck, 1985); for his work, Dr. zur Hausen was 

awarded a Nobel Prize in 2008.102

By the mid-1980s, following the seminal work of Meisels and 

zur Hausen, a consensus was building among scientists that 

papillomaviruses were involved in the development of 

anogenital cancers, notably cancers of the cervix and vulva, 

with some researchers already saying the evidence “comes as 

99 See Muñoz et al. (2010), Lehtinen et al. (2012, 2013, 2015, 2017), 

Rana et al. (2013), and Luostarinen et al. (2017). 100 See Markowitz et al. (2013, 2016) and Hariri et al. (2015). 101 Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum is referred to throughout as the 

German Cancer Research Center. 102 For an excellent review, see zur Hausen (1991). 
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close to proving a cause and effect relationship as is possible 

short of developing a vaccine against the virus and proving that 

it prevents the cancers” (Schmeck, 1985, C1). In the United 

States, laboratories studying the links between 

papillomaviruses and cancer were set up at the NCI (headed by 

Dr. Peter M. Howley and Douglas R. Lowy), Georgetown 

University (led by Dr. A. Bennett Jenson, Dr. Wayne D. 

Lancaster, Dr. Robert J. Kurman, and Dr. Gregorio Delgado), 

and the University of Minnesota (led by Dr. Anthony J. Faras 

and Dr. Ronald S. Ostrow). Abroad, the German Cancer 

Research Center was one of several laboratories studying the 

potential linkage. By the end of the 1980s, these laboratories’ 

research efforts—together with case-control and longitudinal 

epidemiology studies conducted by NCI, the National Institute 

of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), International 

Agency for Research on Cancer, Danish Cancer Society and 

others—had further strengthened the evidence of a causal link, 

but a vaccine was still more than a decade away. 

 M.2.1 Virus-like Particles: Production and Immunogenicity 

With HPV as with other viruses, viral DNA is surrounded by a 

protein coat, or capsid (Figure M-1). HPV vaccines work by 

presenting a person’s immune system with virus-like particles 

(VLPs) made only from assemblages of one capsid protein 

without the harmful DNA inside. The immune system learns to 

produce antibodies that bind the capsid proteins; if presented 

with the actual virus, these antibodies then bind the actual 

virus if exposed to it in the future. 

In the early 1990s, this mechanism was still unproven. The 

problem facing researchers who believed it could work was to 

develop a practical method of producing capsid proteins and 

show that capsid proteins produced by that method could 

stimulate the production of antibodies capable of neutralizing 

the actual live virus from causing an infection. There was a 

flurry of basic research on this mechanism in the early 1990s: 

 At the International Papillomavirus Workshop in Seattle, 

in July 1991, Ian Frazer and Jian Zhou of Queensland 

University presented a method of producing HPV-16 

VLPs by expressing the capsid proteins L1 and L2 in a 

vaccinia virus system; their results were published later 

that year (Zhou et al., 1991). 
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Figure M-1. Stylized Depiction of HPV Virus: Capsid Exterior (left, background) and Capsid 

Cross Section and Interior (right, foreground) 

Source: Artistic rendering by the author. The depictions of the capsid are based on the cryo-electron microscopy 

images of Cardone et al. (2014). The stylized viral DNA molecule was composed using Microsoft PowerPoint. This 

figure is released under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported 

license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0). 

 In September 1992, Shin-Je Ghim, A. Bennett Jenson, 

and Richard Schlegel of Georgetown University reported 

having produced the L1 protein of HPV-1 and shown that 

it shared antigenic characteristics of the actual HPV-1 

virus in that it reacted selectively with certain kinds of 

antibodies (Ghim et al., 1992). 

 In December 1992, a multidisciplinary team of NIH 

researchers reported having produced VLPs of bovine 

papillomavirus (BPV) and HPV-16 using only the viruses’ 

L1 capsid proteins; using an in vitro assay, the BPV VLPs 

were shown to stimulate the production of unexpectedly 

high levels of neutralizing antibodies; the HPV-16 VLPs 

were shown to react selectively with HPV-16 antibodies 

(Kirnbauer et al., 1992). The NIH team included NCI 

researchers, including Doug Lowy and John Schiller, and 

structural biologists from the National Institute of 

Arthritis, Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS). 
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 In 1993, Robert Rose, William Bonnez, and Richard 

Reichman of the University of Rochester and Robert 

Garcea of the Dana Farber Cancer Institute reported 

having produced HPV-11 VLPs from the virus’s L1 capsid 

protein that reacted selectively with HPV-11 antibodies 

(Rose et al., 1993); Rose, Reichman, and Bonnez (1994) 

then showed that these VLPs could stimulate the 

production of neutralizing antibodies. 

Unresolved questions surrounded HPV-16 and the feasibility of 

sufficient production of capsid protein VLPs for use in 

vaccines.103 Answers came from the NCI group in 1993 with the 

help of Matthias Dürst and Lutz Gissmann of the German 

Cancer Research Center (Kirnbauer et al., 1993): the HPV-16 

L1 gene used for the earlier research was found to have a 

mutation that inhibited self-assembly. The DNA had been 

isolated from a cervical carcinoma; the researchers theorized 

that a mutation was possible, obtained a new sample from a 

precancerous lesion, and compared the DNA to confirm and 

characterize the mutation. The L1 capsid proteins expressed 

from the new DNA sample assembled more efficiently as a 

result of the mutation, increasing the VLP yield 1,000-fold and 

achieving results comparable to those observed with BPV 

previously.104 

103 Zhou et al. (1991) had reported needing both L1 and L2 capsid 

proteins for particle formation; the particles they produced 

appeared smaller than ordinary HPV-16 capsids and were differently 

shaped, and Zhou et al. (1991) were silent on the particles’ 

immunogenicity (i.e., their tendency to bind with or stimulate the 

production of neutralizing antibodies). Kirnbauer et al. (1992) had 

been able to produce HPV-16 VLPs with L1 alone, although in much 

smaller numbers compared with the analogous BPV VLP production 

system. The lower yield was both perplexing and concerning, 

presenting practical difficulties for the production of HPV-16 VLPs in 

sufficient quantities to be useful as a vaccine or as a research tool. 104 Kirnbauer et al. (1993) speculated that the discrepancy between 

Zhou et al. (1991) (i.e., no VLP production without L2) and 

Kirnbauer et al. (1992) (i.e., VLP production with L1 only, albeit 

lower-yield) may be attributable to differences in the expression 

systems used: the baculovirus system used by Kirnbauer et al. 

generally produces more recombinant protein than does the 

vaccinia virus system used by Zhou et al.; in the vaccinia system, 

the concentration of L1 proteins expressed alone may have been 

insufficient for VLP formation, while the concentration of L1 and L2 

proteins, when coexpressed, may have been sufficient. Adding to 

the mystery, the HPV-16 DNA used by Zhou et al. (1991) was later 

discovered not to have been the mutant strain used by Kirnbauer et 

al. (1992) but rather a strain identical to that used by Kirnbauer et 

al. (1993), according to Frazer and Cox (2006). Frazer and Cox 

(2006) maintain that the particles produced by Zhou et al. (1991) 
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With methods established to produce HPV VLPs from L1 

proteins and encouraging indications that vaccines made from 

these particles might be effective at neutralizing HPV, 

researchers still needed to prove the concept in animal models 

and develop the research tools necessary for human testing.105

 N.2.2 Early Commercial Interest and Licensing

At the same time as the VLP research in the early 1990s, 

biopharmaceutical companies were intrigued by the possibility 

of developing a vaccine to prevent cancers and had begun to 

and invest in early-stage research and acquire intellectual 

property (IP) rights related to the development of cancer 

vaccines: 

 Kathrin Jansen and other Merck scientists returned from 

the 1991 Seattle workshop impressed with the 

presentation by Zhou and Frazer and asked for 

resources to begin developing a commercial vaccine for 

HPV using VLPs. Merck had previously developed a yeast 

expression system and purification technology to 

produce a VLP-based vaccine against hepatitis B, and 

scientists familiar with that technology believed it could 

be adapted to produce an HPV vaccine. In 1995, Merck 

acquired IP rights from CSL, an Australian biotechnology 

company that had licensed the Queensland University 

team’s technology.106 In late 1997, Merck also obtained 

a nonexclusive license to the NIH VLP technology. 

 In the United States, Medimmune licensed L1 vaccine 

technology from Georgetown University in 1995 and 

(nonexclusively) from NIH in early 1997. Medimmune 

was familiar with the VLP approach, having previously 

licensed VLP technology from NIH to develop a 

parvovirus vaccine. Praxis Biologics, a small 

biotechnology company in the Rochester area, had 

licensed VLP technology from the University of Rochester 

but relinquished those rights after being acquired in 

1994; Medimmune licensed the Rochester team’s 

technology in 1995. In late 1997, Medimmune partnered 

would therefore have been immunologically equivalent to those 

produced by Kirnbauer et al. (1993), notwithstanding their different 

size and shape; no immunological tests confirming this assertion 

were ever published. 

105 Namely, serological assays to determine whether antibodies 

produced in response to vaccination could neutralize HPV. 

106 Aforementioned method of producing HPV-16 VLPs by expressing 

the capsid proteins L1 and L2 in a vaccinia virus system. 
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with SmithKline Beecham (later to become GSK) to 

develop HPV vaccines. 

These IP rights would eventually come into conflict. The USPTO 

declared initial interferences in 1997 and declared six two-way 

interferences among the claims of the four teams—NIH, 

Queensland, Georgetown, and Rochester—in 2001, setting up a 

series of hearings to determine which of the claims in the four 

teams’ patent applications would ultimately be afforded 

protection. At issue was which of the four teams had been first 

to invent a method for producing HPV VLPs suitable for an HPV 

vaccine.107 

At least one valid patent was needed to bring the technology to 

market. Under the first-to-invent rule then governing the U.S. 

patent system, this required all four parties to present their 

best case: a valid, enforceable patent required a solid rationale 

for who most deserved the patent on a given claim. Under the 

final judgements entered into 4 years later on September 20, 

2005, each of the four teams was entitled to a patent for some 

but not all of its claims.108 

After the decision in 2005, everyone cross-licensed their rights; 

under the cross-licensing agreements, future revenues from 

HPV vaccines would be shared among the four teams and the 

German Cancer Research Center.109 By this time, the vaccines 

were outperforming all expectations in clinical trials; the 

compelling clinical evidence of the vaccines’ effectiveness 

107 The interference proceeding that ensued would have unfolded 

differently today. With the America Invents Act of 2011, the United 

States switched its patent system from a first-to-invent rule to a 

first-to-file rule, where priority is given to whomever files a valid 

application first, bringing the United States in line with international 

standards. Under a first-to-file rule, disputes may still arise over 

whether the application filed first satisfied the enablement 

requirement: whether it described the claimed invention in 

sufficient detail to enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the 

claimed invention (35 U.S.C. § 112). 108 Papers 263 and 264 in interference 104,776, accessed on January 

5, 2018, through the USPTO interference web portal: 

https://acts.uspto.gov/ifiling/. On August 20, 2007, part of the 

2005 ruling was overturned, awarding the Queensland team 

(Frazer) priority over Georgetown (Schlegel), based on the earlier 

filing date of Frazer’s first provisional patent application in Australia 

instead of the later international filing date. The effect of the 2007 

ruling on the claims to which the respective teams were entitled 

patent protection was not investigated for this report. 

109 Personal communication, Shmilovich. 
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helped to motivate the parties to reach agreement and so 

remove a major obstacle to bringing the vaccines to market. 

 N.2.3 Animal Challenge Studies: Proving the Concept 

Successful proof-of-concept studies carried out in the mid1990s were pivotal to unlocking the next level of private 

investment. In these, termed animal challenge studies, VLPs 

made either from L1 proteins or both L1 and L2 proteins of 

papillomaviruses specific to rabbits, cows, and dogs were used 

to vaccinate those animals. The animals were then tested for a 

protective immune response, either by exposing the vaccinated 

animals to the live virus or by transferring the serum of 

vaccinated animals to unvaccinated ones and then exposing 

those animals to the live virus to test whether the serum that 

had been passively transferred contained functional antibodies. 

NCI-led teams published rabbit and cow studies (Breitburd et 

al., 1995; Kirnbauer et al., 1996), a Merck team published a 

rabbit study (Jansen et al., 1995), and a Medimmune and 

Georgetown University team published a canine study (Suzich 

et al., 1995).110 All four studies showed the vaccines worked to 

stimulate a protective response in the animals’ immune 

systems. The concept was proven. 

One principal barrier to human testing remained. Researchers 

needed a means of testing the effectiveness of an HPV vaccine 

without exposing people to a live virus that could cause cancer; 

they needed an in vitro assay in which serum from vaccinated 

people could be tested for its ability to neutralize the live virus. 

That assay was developed by Richard Roden at NCI. Using this 

assay, NCI researchers showed that antisera111 raised by 

vaccination against specific HPV types in mice were highly 

protective against the HPV type in the vaccine but did not 

neutralize other HPV types, suggesting that VLP vaccines would 

110 Suzich et al. (1995) was unique among these four studies in 

showing protection against mucosal as opposed to skin infections. 

This was significant because it more closely modeled the most 

dangerous mode of infection in people: high-risk HPV types induce 

cancer at mucosal sites, not skin sites. 111 Blood fluids containing antibodies against specific antigens. 
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be type-specific and highlighting the importance of developing 

multivalent vaccines (Roden et al., 1996).112,113

With the concept of a VLP papillomavirus vaccine proved in 

animal challenge studies and a quantitative in vitro HPV assay 

available, the researchers were set for vaccine development to 

begin in earnest—moving into clinical trials. 

 N.2.4 Clinical Trials: Making History 

In September 1998, Medimmune reported the success of a 

first-in-human study of a VLP vaccine against HPV-11 in 65 

healthy adult volunteers; Richard Reichman of the University of 

Rochester Medical Center and the principal investigator of the 

vaccine trial presented the results at the 38th Interscience 

Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (ICAAC) 

in San Diego, California. Injections of the vaccine were well 

tolerated. HPV-neutralizing antibodies were induced in nearly all 

volunteers at the higher doses and in all 10 volunteers 

receiving all three injections at the highest dose (Evans et al., 

2001). 

The first-in-human study of a VLP vaccine against HPV-16 soon 

followed. NCI researchers partnered with Johns Hopkins 

University to perform the study in 72 healthy adult volunteers. 

The HPV-16 L1 VLP vaccine was well tolerated and found to be 

highly immunogenic even without an adjuvant, a substance 

typically added to vaccines to enhance their effectiveness; most 

volunteers who received the vaccine produced levels of 

neutralizing antibodies roughly 40 times higher than is 

observed in response to natural infection (Harro et al., 2001). 

Larger clinical efficacy trials followed. In September 1999, 

Merck launched a pilot trial of monovalent HPV-16 vaccine in 

2,409 volunteers (ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT00365378); 

in May 2000, Merck launched the first trial of its quadrivalent 

112 We are grateful to William Bonnez for pointing out the earlier 

development of an in vitro neutralization assay for HPV-11 by 

Smith, Foster, Hitchcock, and Isseroff (1993). 113 In a personal communication, a lead epidemiologist involved in the 

Gardasil clinical efficacy trials explained that at this time most 

available vaccines were developed and initially used prior to having 

the tools needed to determine whether effective neutralizing 

antibodies had been generated; thus, although serological 

neutralization assays enabled first-in-human dose-finding trials of 

the HPV vaccines, helping to gain regulatory approval for the larger 

clinical efficacy studies that followed, a regulatory pathway to 

approval could have existed even in their absence. 
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vaccine in 1,158 volunteers (NCT00365716). After launching 

two smaller trials in 1999 and 2000, GSK launched a trial of its 

bivalent vaccine in 1,113 volunteers in January 2001 

(NCT00689741). The success of these and subsequent trials led 

to the regulatory approval of Gardasil and Cervarix in 2006 and 

2007.114

The results of Merck’s monovalent HPV-16 efficacy trial were 

the first to be announced. Dr. Laura Koutsky of the University 

of Washington, a lead epidemiologist on the study, told no one 

beforehand that she planned to present the results as part of 

her talk at the 19th International Papillomavirus Conference in 

Brazil in September 2001, then she stunned the audience: 41 

cases of HPV-16 infection were observed in that clinical trial; 41 

cases in the placebo group and zero in the vaccinated group 

(Neill, 2018). In a recent interview, John Schiller, who 

moderated the session, recounts the impact of the talk: “We 

were all . . . dumbfounded when she was finished. I remember 

afterwards saying, ‘Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve just seen 

history’” (Neill, 2018, p. 3).115 

Today, Gardasil is among Merck’s largest revenue generators: 

from 2015 through 2017, Gardasil (including both the 

quadrivalent and 9-valent versions) was Merck’s third-highestselling pharmaceutical preparation, generating roughly $2 

billion per year.116 Cervarix accounted for 15% of GSK’s £3.5 

billion global vaccine sales in 2011; in 2017, Cervarix 

contributed £134 million to GSK’s £5.2 billion global vaccine 

sales.117

114 See Koutsky et al. (2002), Harper et al. (2004), Future II Study 

Group (2007), and Descamps et al. (2009). 115 The initial trial of the quadrivalent Gardasil was so successful it was 

stopped early so that participants in the placebo group could also 

be offered the vaccine 

(https://www.cancer.gov/research/progress/discovery/hpvvaccines). Grady (2003) provides some insight into the close 

collaboration between Dr. Kathrin Jansen and Dr. Laura Koutsky 

behind the vaccine development effort by Merck. The pivotal 

Gardasil trial included 12,000 patients (Future II Study Group, 

2007). 

116 Merck’s 2017 Form 10-k, accessed at 

https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. 117 GSK’s 2011 and 2017 annual reports. 
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 M.3 IMPACT OF HPV VACCINES 

The NCI summarizes the effectiveness of HPV vaccines: 

HPV vaccines are highly effective in preventing 

infection with the types of HPV they target when 

given before initial exposure to the virus—which 

means before individuals begin to engage in sexual 

activity. 

In the trials that led to the approval of Gardasil and 

Cervarix, these vaccines were found to provide 

nearly 100% protection against persistent cervical 

infections with HPV types 16 and 18 and the cervical 

cell changes that these persistent infections can 

cause. Gardasil 9 is as effective as Gardasil for the 

prevention of diseases caused by the four shared 

HPV types (6, 11, 16, and 18), based on similar 

antibody responses in participants in clinical studies. 

The trials that led to approval of Gardasil 9 found it 

to be nearly 100% effective in preventing cervical, 

vulvar, and vaginal disease caused by the five 

additional HPV types (31, 33, 45, 52, and 58) that it 

targets. In a 2017 position paper, the World Health 

Organization stated that the HPV vaccines have 

equivalent efficacy. The Cervarix vaccine has been 

found to provide partial protection against a few 

additional HPV types not included in the vaccine 

that can cause cancer, a phenomenon called crossprotection. 

To date, protection against the targeted HPV types 

has been found to last for at least 10 years with 

Gardasil, at least 9 years with Cervarix, and at least 

6 years with Gardasil 9. Long-term studies of 

vaccine efficacy that are still in progress will help 

scientists better understand the total duration of 

protection. (National Cancer Institute, 2018) 

 M.3.1 NIH Contributions 

It is impossible to know when or whether an HPV vaccine would 

have been developed without the contributions of NIH 

researchers and the transfer to the private sector of the 

technology they developed. Reading only recent accounts by 

Merck-affiliated scientists (Bryan et al., 2016; Scolnick, 2018), 
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one could be forgiven for thinking public research investment 

played only a minor role. A broader assessment points to a 

different conclusion: public investment—in both the NIH 

Intramural Research Program and extramural research funding 

of university faculty—likely had profound impacts. 

Although Merck and Medimmune both licensed NCI 

technology—their nonexclusive licenses being converted to coexclusive licenses in the agreements following the patentinterference proceedings—the vaccine GSK brought to market 

relied more directly on the NCI method of producing VLPs: the 

HPV VLPs in Cervarix are produced in what is essentially a 

scaled-up version of the baculovirus expression system 

developed by the NCI team in the early 1990s, while Merck’s 

Gardasil uses a yeast expression system. For argument’s sake, 

say that without the NCI efforts only Gardasil would have been 

developed. In this case, the NCI efforts could be credited with 

creating competition, plausibly spurring faster development of 

Gardasil by Merck, making it available to patients sooner, and 

helping to contain prices once both vaccines were launched—

not only saving patients and payers money but also increasing 

patients’ access to vaccination as health systems base coverage 

decisions on cost-effectiveness. 

Much is made of the high rates of attrition among drug 

development projects—the large number of projects that are 

abandoned for every new drug approved. Some of this attrition 

is due to technical failure—a drug candidate that is discovered 

to have unacceptable side effects or be ineffective; some is due 

to the changing priorities and market strategies of companies. 

Had either Merck or Medimmune/GSK faltered or decided to 

stop or delay their development programs, the NCI team was 

prepared to move all the way through Phase III with its own 

vaccine; that was in fact the longer-term goal when NCI 

partnered with Johns Hopkins for the first Phase I trial. 

Perhaps this backstopping proved unnecessary in this case—the 

net below a trapeze artist who does not fall. But perhaps it was 

more than that. Given NCI’s commitment to pursue its own 

vaccine development program through to the end, Merck and 

Medimmune/GSK would have known that if they encountered 

problems in their own development programs, they would be 

able to compare with the NCI results to diagnose whether the 

problem was unique to their vaccine candidate (a poorly 
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tolerated adjuvant, say) or fundamental to an HPV VLP vaccine. 

In either case, the companies would have a capable partner to 

help overcome the problem. This knowledge would have made 

the development programs appear less risky and therefore 

more attractive to the companies. It is impossible to know 

whether at any point in the development of Gardasil or Cervarix 

this difference was pivotal to sustaining the private-sector 

efforts; similar considerations surely are pivotal in many other 

drug development programs. 

Similar speculation applies to the major milestones in the 

vaccines’ development. Between 1991 and 1994, four research 

teams produced HPV VLPs by similar but not identical methods; 

three of the teams showed that the L1 protein they produced 

shared antigenic properties of the live virus. Would Merck and 

Medimmune have continued to invest if NCI had not shown BPV 

VLPs could stimulate the production of remarkably high levels 

of neutralizing antibodies and that VLPs of HPV-16 specifically 

(the most common HPV type linked to cancer) reacted with 

neutralizing antibodies? In 1995 and 1996, four animal 

challenge studies proved the concept of VLP papillomavirus 

vaccination. Given the other two, how important were the NCI 

rabbit and bovine studies? Having four studies with the same 

positive result is more convincing than having two, but did it 

make a difference to private investment decisions in this case? 

Likewise, one can only speculate about the impact of the Roden 

et al. (1996) in vitro neutralization assay, used for the first 

clinical trial of an HPV-16 VLP vaccine, conducted by NCI and 

Johns Hopkins University. Merck almost certainly would have 

used this assay to validate the higher-throughput neutralizing 

antibody competition assays it developed for its clinical trials—

alternative assays were either much more cumbersome or, in 

the case of HPV-16, nonexistent—although publications do not 

confirm the link between Roden’s assay and Merck’s (Yeager, 

2000; Smith et al., 2008). Pseudovirus neutralization assays 

developed later at NCI (Pastrana et al., 2005) were used to 

develop Merck’s competitive Luminex assay (Smith et al., 

2008). To be sure, the development of progressively more 

convenient and flexible neutralization assays involved 

numerous incremental contributions from many researchers. 
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 M.3.2 Summary and Emerging Research 

The HPV vaccines now licensed and saving lives in more than 

100 countries are the product of global collaborative efforts 

among scientists in academia, federal laboratories, and 

industry. While there are multiple research entities involved and 

attribution nearly impossible, NCI had prominent contributions 

to the development of the first two commercial vaccines against 

the cancer-causing HPV-16 and HPV-18 at every major 

milestone: 

 NCI researchers were the first to demonstrate 

production of VLPs from papillomavirus L1 capsid 

proteins; 

 they were the first to show, using the BPV model, that 

papillomavirus VLPs could stimulate the production of 

antibodies that prevented infection by the live virus; 

 they were the first to demonstrate production of HPV-16 

L1 VLPs and show that they reacted with and generated 

neutralizing antibodies; 

 they licensed VLP technology to both Medimmune and 

Merck; 

 they were among the first to prove the concept of a VLP 

vaccine with animal challenge studies; 

 they developed the first in vitro HPV-16 neutralization 

assay; and 

 in partnership with researchers at Johns Hopkins 

University, they conducted the first clinical trial of an 

HPV-16 VLP vaccine. 

In addition to NCI’s formal technology transfer efforts, NCI’s 

research collaborations with academic and industry colleagues 

are credited with contributing to a rapidly evolving HPV 

knowledge base at a critical time for the vaccines’ development. 

A lead epidemiologist in the Gardasil clinical efficacy trials 

stated: 

Of great help to the rest of us was their timely 

sharing of methods and results from both completed 

and ongoing work. I always learned useful and 

intriguing information from my discussions with 

them.118 

118 Personal communication. 
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In turn, Dr. Schiller is full throated in his acknowledgement of 

the basic research contributions of the academic teams and the 

“invaluable contributions of Merck, Medimmune, and GSK in 

bringing these vaccines to market.”119

Doug Lowy and John Schiller attribute the success of NCI teams 

in large part to features of the NIH Intramural Research 

Program (IRP). The IRP affords researchers considerable 

autonomy: review is mostly retrospective, so researchers can 

pursue opportunities without having to ask for permission or 

resources in advance. In the case of the HPV vaccine 

development effort, this meant that NCI teams were able to 

stay involved with successive stages of development: from the 

production and immunogenic analysis of VLPs, through animal 

challenge studies and the development of clinical research 

tools, through clinical trials, through efforts today to transfer 

VLP production and vaccine manufacturing technology to drug 

manufacturers in developing countries. 

The autonomy afforded by IRP also enabled the researchers to 

take a broader view of the impact of their work. They were able 

to be less focused on expedient publication than most academic 

researchers, and they were able to be less focused on licensing 

a specific product than industry researchers. From the 

beginning, they chose the baculovirus expression system to 

produce VLPs because it was an established production system, 

several clinical trials having already been done with materials 

produced in such systems, and they reasoned there would be a 

regulatory path forward if VLPs worked as they hoped. In 

clinical trials, they were able to pursue questions in the broader 

public interest: How is the cost-effectiveness of vaccination 

likely to vary with age?120 How effective is a vaccine without an 

adjuvant?121 How effective is a single dose compared with the 

recommended three? In general, NIH clinical trials can explore 

questions company-sponsored trials would not and 

consequently place richer sets of information in the public 

domain. 

119 Personal communication with Dr. Schiller. 120 The older a person is the more likely they are to have been exposed 

to HPV and already be producing antibodies. 121 An adjuvant is a (typically proprietary) substance added to vaccines 

by the manufacturer to increase their effectiveness and extend the 

duration of protection. 
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Another helpful feature of the IRP was ready access to 

multidisciplinary expertise. NCI researchers were able to 

collaborate with NIH researchers outside their institute—

particularly at NIAID and NIAMS—and partner outside NIH, for 

example with Johns Hopkins University for the HPV-16 Phase I 

trial. 

The ongoing impact of the NCI technology transfer related to 

HPV VLPs becomes even more apparent when one looks beyond 

Gardasil and Cervarix. Doug Lowy and John Schiller at NIH, in 

particular, have championed HPV vaccine implementation in a 

global public health arena, facilitating technology transfer to 

vaccine manufacturers in developing countries (Lowy and 

Schiller, 2006; Schiller and Lowy, 2006). The long-time 

collaborators are working with emerging-country manufacturers 

to produce the current-generation vaccine and with companies 

in India to take less-expensive next-generation vaccines into 

clinical trials. 

NCI researchers have also shown that, unlike L1 VLPs, short 

chains of HPV L2 capsid proteins can stimulate the production 

of antibodies that neutralize a wide range of papillomaviruses, 

raising the possibility of a pan-HPV vaccine (Pastrana et al., 

2005). Finally, NCI, along with researchers in Costa Rica, is 

exploring lower dosing options for low-resource settings that 

provide similar protection against HPV (Safaeian et al., 2018). 

Doug Lowy and John Schiller continue to ask the question: 

“what’s next?” 

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Berman, T. A., & Schiller, J. T. (2017). Human papillomavirus in 

cervical cancer and oropharyngeal cancer: One cause, 

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Appendix M: Case Study of HHS National Institutes of Health Technology Transfer: 

Human Papillomavirus Vaccine 

M-19

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Appendix M: Case Study of HHS National Institutes of Health Technology Transfer: 

Human Papillomavirus Vaccine 

M-21

Lehtinen, M., Paavonen, J., Wheeler, C. M., Jaisamrarn, U., 

Garland, S. M., Castellsagué, X., ... & Chow, S. N. 

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oncology, 13(1), 89-99. 

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papillomavirus vaccines and beyond. Nature reviews 

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Paavonen, J., ... & Struyf, F. (2015). Characteristics of a 

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1290. 

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D., Harjula, K., ... & Pukkala, E. (2017). Ten-year 

follow-up of human papillomavirus vaccine efficacy 

against the most stringent cervical neoplasia end-point—

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randomized trials. BMJ open, 7(8), e015867 

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papillomavirus vaccines. The Journal of clinical 

investigation, 116(5), 1167-1173. 

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women following HPV vaccine introduction in the United 

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208(3), 385-393. 

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6/11/16/18 vaccine on all HPV-associated genital 

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Cancer Institute, 102(5), 325-339. 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

M-22 

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Appendix M: Case Study of HHS National Institutes of Health Technology Transfer: 

Human Papillomavirus Vaccine 

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N-1

Case Study of USDA 

Agricultural 

Research Service 

Technology 

Transfer: TiftonBred Turfgrasses 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

N-2 

USDA – ARS Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses

Federal agency: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research 

Service 

Laboratory: Agricultural Research Service Tifton 

Collaborating entities: University of Georgia (UGA) College of Agricultural 

and Environmental Sciences (CAES), the UGA 

Research Foundation and Innovation Gateway, 

Georgia Seed Development, Georgia Crop 

Improvement Association, New Concept Turf, and The 

Turfgrass Group, Inc. 

Transfer object: Tifton-bred turfgrasses 

Inventor(s): Glenn Burton, USDA-ARS, 1936–2003 

Wayne Hanna, USDA-ARS 1971–2003, UGA 2003– 

date 

Invention disclosure date: TifSport®, TifEagle, TifGrand®, and TifTuf® were 

patent protected; while TifBlair was protected by 

Plant Variety Protection Certificate. 

Transfer mechanisms: Licenses 

Key dates: TifBlair, TifSport, and TifEagle were released for sale 

in 1997 and 1998. TifGrand was released in 2009 and 

TifTuf in 2014. 

Transfer recipients: Licensed sod producers, golf course and athletic field 

owners, associated businesses, homeowners, and all 

users of the turf 

Impact summary: Total royalties collected by USDA-ARS and UGA on 

just five varieties of certified quality turfgrasses 

between 1998 and 2017 was $9,700,000, nearly 

triple the federal share of costs of all research on all 

grasses at Tifton. 
Appendix N: Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service Technology Transfer: 

Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses 

N-3

 N.1 BACKGROUND 

Turfgrasses are the primary vegetative covers for home lawns, 

schools, parks, roadsides, sports fields, golf courses, and 

commercial and public buildings and spaces. Turfgrasses have 

aesthetic and recreational value that generates physical and 

mental health benefits as well as economic and environmental 

value. Scientists at the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in Tifton, Georgia, 

developed the first seedless warm weather Bermuda grasses 

with characteristics that made them best sellers for their 

various uses. Before the ARS Tifton research took place in the 

1940s, little was known about producing, planting, and 

managing grasses that produce little or no seed. This case 

study covers five turfgrasses developed collaboratively and 

released by ARS and the University of Georgia between 1998 

and 2014 that are descendants and improved versions of those 

initial grasses, including the very popular TifWay released in 

1965. The new turfgrasses are replacing the initial versions, 

generating improved private and public value. These 

turfgrasses were extensively tested for important 

characteristics in a variety of real-world conditions that 

researchers knew were important to different users, as well as 

for safety and the environment. This emphasis on research that 

serves the agricultural industry and the public is aligned with 

USDA’s research and extension mission. 

The study also describes a systems approach to technology 

transfer and market promotion that is perhaps unique to U.S. 

agriculture. This system is a collaboration of the ARS Tifton, 

University of Georgia (UGA) College of Agricultural and 

Environmental Sciences (CAES), the UGA Research Foundation 

and Innovation Gateway, Georgia Seed Development, Georgia 

Crop Improvement Association, and Georgia sod producers. The 

technology transfer system integrates plant breeding research, 

IP protection and strategic licensing, product quality control, 

and cooperative marketing to customers in Georgia and around 

the world. The five Tifton turfgrasses are selling well, as 

indicated by more than $9 million in royalty payments. While 

quantitative data on the economic and environmental impact of 

the five specific Tifton turfgrasses are not available, aggregate 

studies show large benefits where the five turfgrasses clearly 

play a role. Environmental benefits of turf from reduced 

erosion, carbon dioxide reduction, reduced rainfall runoff, and 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

N-4 

reduced sports injuries have been documented. The golf 

industry in the United States generates $20 billion in net 

income annually and more than 480,000 jobs, as reported in a 

2008 study. A 2014 study of the turfgrass production and 

related industry in Georgia calculated that the industry 

contributed $4 billion in output into Georgia’s $700 billion 

economy. While not all of these impacts are attributable to 

USDA, the golf industry in particular likely would not have 

grown without the new turf. This case study documents the 

history, outcomes, and impact of technology development and 

transfer of “Tifton turf” from the USDA-ARS research laboratory 

through the Research Foundation of their collaborators at the 

UGA to sod producers and the context in which these occurred. 

 N.1.1 Tifton Turfgrasses 

Before the ARS Tifton research took place in the 1940s, little 

was known about producing, planting, and managing grasses 

that produce little or no seed. Four of the five turfgrasses that 

are the subject of this study are warm-weather sterile 

bermudagrasses that stem from ARS-Tifton research on 

bermudagrasses going back to 1928 and improve upon them. 

The other is a warm-weather centipede grass that can be sold 

as seed or sod. Sterile grasses are vegetatively propagated 

from sprigs, produce no pollen, and result in a vegetative cover 

that stays very uniform over time. These grasses propagate by 

rhizomes, the creeping underground stems forming new roots 

and shoots, and stolons, horizontal branches from the base of a 

plant that produces new plants from buds at its tip or nodes. 

When cut from the parent plant, the rhizome or stolon forms a 

new plant, unlike many roots that die. 

For vegetative turfgrasses including the five that are the 

subject of this study, there are no federal or state standards. 

The purity of seeds is regulated and can be tested in a 

laboratory, but the purity of vegetative grasses can only be 

seen by visual inspection of the grass over multiple years. 

Uniformity of color, resistance to weeds and drought, and other 

traits are not usually visible immediately upon planting. 

According to the people who were interviewed, certification of 

the quality of the Tifton turfgrasses became important starting 

in the 1980s when more alternative grasses came on the 

market. 
Appendix N: Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service Technology Transfer: 

Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses 

N-5

The five turfgrasses central to this study are listed below in the 

order in which they were released for sale. 

 TifBlair centipedegrass, a warm-season grass that 

forms a thick sod, was released by USDA-ARS in 1997. 

It does well on highway roadsides or commercial and 

residential lawns. 

 TifEagle third-generation hybrid bermudagrass, 

developed exclusively for golf greens, was released by 

ARS in 1998. It can tolerate two to threw mowings per 

day at heights as low as 1/8-inch with no loss of stand 

density. Research shows TifEagle also recovers more 

quickly from mechanical injury, has better color, and is 

extremely cold hardy, drought tolerant, and disease 

resistant. 

 Tift 94 TifSport® hybrid bermudagrass was released by 

ARS in 1998. Athletic field managers and golf course 

superintendents report outstanding regrowth from 

normal play and injury to the grass. TifSport has good 

drought tolerance, stays green longer but also recovers 

faster in the spring, and has shown to be a 

nonpreference by mole crickets, which damage turf in 

warm weather. 

 ST-5 TifGrand® hybrid bermudagrass, developed to 

produce a superior turf cover in full sun and to thrive in 

limited light environments, was jointly released by ARS 

and UGA in 2009. It has a significantly reduced fertilizer 

requirement, reduced water requirement, and an 

increased cold tolerance. Three of the stadiums for the 

World Cup for Soccer held in Brazil were planted with 

TifGrand. 

 DT-1 TifTuf® hybrid bermudagrass, a drought-tolerant 

bermudagrass using 38% less water than its 

predecessor, was jointly released by ARS and UGA in 

2014. It also exhibits wear resistance, persistence in the 

shade, and widespread adaptability. The Federal 

Specialty Crop Research Initiative has identified TifTuf® 

as the most drought-tolerant bermudagrass, becoming 

the new standard. TifTuf greens up early and maintains 

its color well into the fall. 

 N.2 TECHNOLOGY NARRATIVE 

The 90-year timeline in Figure N-1 summarizes when important 

people and organizations began their involvement in the 

technology’s development and when the five turfgrasses and 

their significant predecessors were released. The research and 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

N-6 

development are above the timeline, and market players and 

actions are below the timeline. Tracing the history of 

development and technology transfer shows how initial 

research discoveries require corresponding inventions of 

technology to plant sprigs and new organizations to grow initial 

sod for sale and to certify and promote its origins and quality. 

The following sections describe this history in more detail. 

Figure N-1. Historical Development of Tifton Turf and the Turf Industry in Georgia and 

Beyond 

 N.2.1 History of Lab/Agency Involvement 

 Background on Research Organizations and Researchers 

This study demonstrates well how research builds on past 

research. In 1895, USDA established the Division of 

Agrostology to study native and foreign grasses and appointed 

Frank Lamson-Scribner as the first agrostologist. In this role, 

he expanded the number of species in the grass garden on the 

National Mall in Washington, DC. He also hired field agents to 

collect grasses throughout the United States. In the Division’s 

first annual report, Mr. Lamson-Scribner listed 16 species that 

the Division’s research determined had the most potential for 

lawns.122

In 1916, USDA established a turf garden in Arlington, VA. The 

goal of the turf garden was to study turfgrass diseases, 

122 T.T. Taylor, 1957. Turfgrass- Its Development and Progress. USGA 

Journal and Turf Management 10:30. 

1936 2009 2014 1997‐98 1986

Coastal 

forage 

grass

1943 1960

Machinery 

invented

Tifway TifBlair,

TifEagle,

TifSport

TifGrand TifTuf

1970

Mutants 

made

Marketing, 

distribution 

channels

1887 – UGA founded

1914 – UGA Coop. 

Extension

1928 – ARS hires 

forage agronomist

Federal 

Seed Act

GA Seed 

Development 

Commission 

Golf Assoc. 

invests

Turf Grass 

Group 

UGA 

Research 

Foundation

GA Crop 

Improvement 

Assoc. (certifies)

Patten Seed 

Company

W. Hanna joins 

ARS Tifton

W. Hanna 

only with 

UGA

Tifgreen

Tifdwarf

G. Burton 

joins ARS

Research 

Team 

Award

FLC Tech 

Transfer 

Award

B. Schwartz 

joins UGA

Licensees, sub‐licensees produce, 

promote, sell next generation

Tifway & Tifdwarf

dominate market
Appendix N: Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service Technology Transfer: 

Tifton-Bred Turfgrasses 

N-7

fertilizers, propagation, and selection of superior types. 

Research focused on creeping bentgrass because of its 

tolerance to heavy traffic and low mowing, which makes it an 

ideal grass for golf courses and sports fields.123

In 1919, the Georgia state legislature created a 206-acre 

agricultural experiment station in Tifton, affiliated with the 

University of Georgia. As an integral component of the Tifton 

Campus research, extension, and teaching efforts, the Coastal 

Plain Experimental Station now includes 7,000 acres in south 

Georgia with four research farms and centers. Both UGA and 

USDA-ARS scientists are based at the station, a partnership 

that dates to 1924.124 In 1928, USDA-ARS established the 

initial bermudagrass introduction nursery with Tifton 

bermudagrass they had discovered growing in a nearby cotton 

field. 

In 1936, when Glenn Burton, a USDA-ARS geneticist, came to 

the Tifton Station, “little if anything was known about breeding 

and improvement of bermudagrass” (Hanna and Anderson, 

2008). Glenn Burton spent his nearly 70-year career at ARS in 

Tifton. He authored 777 publications from 1936 to 2003. 

Another prolific researcher, Wayne Hanna, was at ARS Tifton 

from 1971 to 2003, an adjunct faculty at UGA from 1980 to 

2002, and part-time faculty there since 2003. Dr. Hanna is 

author or coauthor of over 670 scientific papers and holds 24 

plant patents. 

USDA-ARS has consistently collaborated with researchers in the 

UGA College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences 

(CAES). Dr. Hanna moved his employment to UGA in later 

years. Initially the IP for new turf varieties belonged to the 

USDA-ARS, but eventually new varieties developed at UGA by 

UGA researchers from experiments initiated at ARS were jointly 

owned by USDA-ARS and UGARF. The IP for TifBlair, TifSport, 

and TifEagle are 100% owned by ARS. UGARF had (still has 

with TifBlair) exclusive license to ARS’s rights in those varieties 

until patents expired, including the right to sublicense. The IP is 

owned jointly between ARS and UGARF for TifGrand and TifTuf 

123 F. Lamson-Scribner, 1896.Useful and Ornamental Grasses. USDA, 

Division Agrostology, Grass and Forage Investigations, Bulletin 3. 124 http://www.caes.uga.edu/research/experiment-stations/coastalplain-station.html 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

N-8 

because the researchers that developed the grass were 

employed by UGA CAES and ARS. 

USDAARS Tifton and the UGA CAES continue to work together 

and collaborate on turf research, with individuals from either 

organization having different specialties. ARS still does crop 

genetics and breeding research in Tifton, Georgia, with funding 

from USDA. Their objective is to improve the productivity, 

quality, and persistence of warm-weather grasses grown for 

forages, bioenergy, and turf, as well as develop improved 

production strategies to meet life-cycle objectives including 

carbon sequestration.125

The CAES Institute of Plant Breeding, Genetics and Genomics 

was approved by the Georgia Board of Regents in 2008 and 

includes 19 plant breeders located on UGA campuses at Athens, 

Griffin, and Tifton. Along with North Carolina State University, 

the University of Florida, Texas A&M University, and Oklahoma 

State University, the Institute has 2009–2014 and 2016–2019 

grants from USDA to develop drought- and salt-tolerant 

grasses. UGA also received funds for turf research under the 

USDA Specialty Crop Research Initiative in 2017. According to 

UGA researcher Brian Schwartz, “Over 81 laboratory, 

greenhouse, and field evaluations were underway at UGA in 

2017 to maintain the pipeline that has provided leading 

turfgrass cultivars for over half a century.” 

 Development of New Grasses 

Glenn Burton, the USDA-ARS geneticist, developed the initial 

new hybrid grasses from Tift bermudagrass and two hay-type 

bermudagrasses from South Africa. One of the plants that 

emerged from his research in 1943 was called “Coastal.” In the 

testing process it became evident that it might be possible to 

vegetatively propagate bermudagrass commercially, which has 

advantages of uniformity. Burton and others invented tools for 

the planting, including a two-row planter. Coastal was widely 

used for hay and grazing. 

The success of Coastal set the stage for development and use 

of all the Tifton sterile vegetative turfgrasses (Hanna and 

Anderson, 2008). In 1946, the U.S. Golf Association (USGA) 

Green Section gave USDA-UGA a $500,000 grant126 to 

125 https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/project/?accnN=434018 126 Equivalent to $6,300 in 2017 adjusted for inflation. 
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supplement forage grass research to develop a better 

bermudagrass to replace existing sand greens or seeded 

bermudagrass greens. Plugs from the best parts of the best 

greens were planted along with by-products of the pasturebreeding program, and plots were tested and visually inspected 

and rated for sod density, color, frost and drought tolerance, 

resistance to weeds and diseases, and overall turf quality. 

Tiflawn bermudagrass was released in 1952, and it was crossed 

with a more fine-leafed grass, the best of which was Tifline, 

which was completely sterile. Better bermudagrass kept coming 

with Tifgreen and then Tifway, which was released to the public 

in 1960. Tifdwarf, a natural mutant of Tifgreen, was discovered 

and tested in this same time period and proved to tolerate 

lower mowing than Tifgreen and thus worked well as faster 

putting greens (Burton, 2005). Tifway covers more golf 

courses, athletic fields, and lawns than any other turf variety in 

the world127 but is being rapidly replaced by TifTuf. 

The growth of the turf industry involved a collaborative effort 

between research and industry. As reported in a 2008 historical 

account, “What we have in turf today did not just happen. It 

took hard work, cooperation, invention, risk, entrepreneurship, 

financing, promotion, and so on” (Hanna and Anderson 2008). 

Important players were Patten and Roquemore of Patten Seed 

Company and Jensen of Southern Turf Nurseries, who from the 

mid-1950s promoted the grasses traveling by car, advertising 

and promoting to Sears and other garden stores (Hanna and 

Anderson, 2008). Out of necessity, the industry invented 

machinery in the late 1950s for digging, planting, and 

fumigation for golf courses and sports fields. In the 1950s and 

1960s, USDA-ARS completed numerous dies on mowing heights 

and fertilizer types, and this information was used by industry 

and helped them attain healthier grasses. 

The ARS continued turfgrass research, and the results are the 

varieties that are the specific focus of this case study. The 

sterile triploid hybrids cannot be improved through conventional 

plant breeding methods. They can be modified using more 

sophisticated methods, which was done in Tifton in the late 

1970s and in the 1980s by Wayne Hanna: it resulted in the 

release of TifBlair, TifSport, and TifEagle. TifSport had improved 

127 http://extension.uga.edu/topic-areas/field-crop-forage-turfgrassproduction/turfgrass.html 
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cold resistance and density and began to replace Tifway. 

TifEagle, which can be mowed daily, began to replace Tifdwarf. 

TifTuf, released in 2014, is expected to quickly be a best seller 

in large part because it uses 38% less water to maintain quality 

turf. 

 N.2.2 Transfer of the Turfgrasses to the Turf Industry 

 A Systems Approach 

As the turfgrass ecosystem matured in Georgia, the entities 

involved developed a systems approach for the transfer of new 

ARS-UGA cultivars to the private sector, reflecting the nature of 

the product and the market. This ecosystem integrates plant 

breeding research, IP protection, quality control certification, 

and marketing to customers in Georgia and around the world. 

This ecosystem is shown in Figure N-2. Researchers at USDAARS and UGA CAES develop and test the new varieties of 

turfgrasses and give them to UGARF to patent or otherwise 

protect the IP. UGARF works with Georgia Seed Development 

(GSD) to grow the initial fields of grasses that can be sold, and 

the Georgia Crop Improvement Association inspects and 

certifies those foundation fields and all fields grown by licensed 

sod producers. As the GSD website states, “By working 

together, these four entities advance the knowledge of plant 

genetics, address anti-piracy issues and ensure the very best 

varieties are available to satisfy increasing global demand for 

crop output.” A description of the players and the process 

follows. 

 UGA CAES The University of Georgia College of 

Agricultural and Environmental Sciences (including 

USDA-ARS collaborations) has a peer-reviewed process 

during which data are reviewed on a potential new plant 

cultivar. If the data support the claims of improvement 

over available cultivars, then the release committee 

recommends to release the cultivar for 

commercialization. 

 The University of Georgia Research Foundation 

Inc. (UGARF) was established in 1978. Located on the 

UGA Athens campus, UGARF owns the IP developed by 

all UGA employees.128 It is responsible for protecting IP 

and for strategically managing UGA-CAES plant material 

licenses. USDA-ARS licenses its rights to the plant 

128 https://research.uga.edu/ugarf/ 
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material it has developed collaboratively with UGA 

employees to UGARF to license and manage. Through 

Innovation Gateway,129 UGARF protects, markets, and 

licenses its IP portfolio throughout Georgia, the United 

States, and across the globe.

 Georgia Seed Development (GSD) was created in 

1959 by the Georgia state legislature as a state 

commission to produce seed and plant stock from 

improved plant varieties developed by scientists at UGACAES and provide the seed and sprigs for commercial 

use. In 1997, the same year the first of the five grasses 

in this study was released for license and sale, UGARF 

and GSD developed an agreement on the licensing and 

distribution of plant varieties developed by USDA-ARS 

and UGA plant breeders. GSD now manages royalty 

assessment and fee collection for plant varieties licensed 

by UGARF/GSD. In 2008, the Georgia state legislature 

amended the GSD’s charter to allow them to be a 

nonprofit public corporation and to offer services to plant 

breeding operations in other states.130

 The Georgia Crop Improvement Association (GCIA) 

was established in 1946 to provide a quality assurance 

program that maintains the varietal quality and purity in 

Georgia, including certain UGARF-licensed 

varieties. GCIA is a member of the Association of Seed 

Certifying Agencies. GCIA developed the standards for 

certification that turfgrass contains no noxious weeds, 

common bermuda, and other contaminating turfgrass 

varieties. They train inspectors in Georgia and other 

states. UGARF turfgrass licenses require that licensees 

sell only certified turfgrass to customers. GCIA does the 

inspections in the state of Georgia, and out-of-state 

licensees have their turf fields inspected by their 

respective state’s certifying agency. 

129 https://research.uga.edu/gateway/ 130 http://gsdc.com/about-us/systems-approach/ 
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Figure N-2. Systems Approach Integrates Research, Licensing, Quality Control, and 

Marketing 

Source: Georgia Seed Development website 

 Certification 

Certification of the quality of the turf became important to 

sellers and customers starting in the 1980s when alternative 

grasses came on the market. The quality of the turf can only be 

seen by visual inspection over more than a year of growth. This 

is unlike verifying the quality of seeds, which can be done 

immediately and where there is regulation for seeds such as 

cotton and wheat under the Federal Seed Act, as well as many 

other state regulations. The Federal Seed Act, P.L. 76-354 

(August 9, 1939) requires accurate labeling and purity 

standards for seeds in commerce and prohibits the importation 

and movement of adulterated or misbranded seeds.131 The Act 

also requires that all agricultural states establish crop 

improvement associations. These crop improvement 

associations inspect and certify the quality of vegetative crops, 

as discussed earlier. 

Certified grasses provide the end consumer with the assurance 

that they are receiving varietal purity, although they may pay 

more for this assurance. Especially when planting large areas 

131 https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/fsa 
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that are used for generating revenue such as golf courses and 

athletic fields, planting the wrong turf can be a very costly 

error. “When told of the benefits of certified sod, consumers we 

have surveyed say they would be willing to pay $20 to $25 

more per 500-square-foot pallet,” according to the Annual 

Georgia Sod Producers Inventory Survey conducted by Clint 

Waltz, University of Georgia Cooperative Extension turfgrass 

specialist, and the Georgia Urban Ag Council. 

 Licensing and Marketing 

TifSport, TifEagle, TifGrand, and TifTuf discussed in this case 

study have been patented, while TifBlair has been protected by 

Plant Variety Protection Certificate. The more recent varieties 

have also been trademarked to protect them when the patent 

runs out. The IP for the first three varieties introduced belongs 

to USDA-ARS. TifGrand and TifTuf are jointly owned by USDAARS and UGARF. UGARF is the owner of IP for UGA inventions 

or co-inventions. USDA-ARS has consistently collaborated with 

UGA researchers. Dr. Hanna moved his employment to UGA in 

2003. 

UGARF licensing was very new when TifEagle and TifSport were 

released in 1998–1999. UGARF exclusively licensed ARS’s rights 

to these early varieties and then sublicensed their rights 

nonexclusively to multiple sod producers to maximize the 

opportunity for broad market penetration. In addition to 

requiring certification as a part of their licenses, a small 

percentage of the sales royalty was set aside by UGARF for a 

coordinated advertising campaign for the variety to benefit all 

the growers. UGARF employed an outside company to 

coordinate the advertising efforts, which were voted on and 

directed by the growers themselves. This worked well at the 

time. As more competition came from other turf cultivars, 

UGARF switched to an exclusive licensing model for the new 

ARS-UGA varieties TifGrand and TifTuf because extensive 

advertising expenditures are necessary in the current 

marketplace and that was most effectively done by a single 

licensee rather than by group decisions of multiple licensed 

producers. Everyone interviewed agreed that this model has 

been successful thus far. 

After release in 2009 and 2014, TifGrand and TifTuf were both 

exclusively licensed to New Concept Turf by UGARF in a 

competitive RFP process. New Concept Turf is a company 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

N-14 

formed and owned by successful sod producers of the earlier 

“Tif” turf cultivars. New Concept Turf has a contract with an 

affiliated company, The TurfGrass Group (TTG), to market and 

sublicense TifGrand and TifTuf to producers. The Turfgrass 

Group, Inc. was founded in 1997 by two men who had been in 

the sod business in Georgia since the mid-1980s and were 

committed to its growth and development. Each producer 

within the New Concept Turf license has a separate sublicense 

to produce. The Turfgrass Group chooses to limit the number of 

licensed certified producers in each geographic area to help 

ensure each is profitable.132 The Turfgrass Group provides 

oversight of the sublicensed growers to ensure quality and 

genetic purity, along with UGARF’s continued requirement that 

UGA turf cultivars only be sold as certified turfgrass. According 

to one of its founders, TTG has come up with a unique model 

for structuring sublicenses that helps licensees manage the 

capital costs, time to establish a new field, and other risks of 

growing a new crop. 

Marketing by TTG is “intense, widespread and continuous,” 

addressed to professionals and professional associations across 

the country at the national, regional, state, and sometimes 

local levels. Media include print advertising, direct mail, press 

releases, articles, e-mail campaigns, trade show exhibits, web 

sites, and participation in online forums. TTG also asks all 

licensed growers to use a label they provide on every invoice 

setting forth the patent and the prohibition of unlicensed 

propagation. TTG offers all marketing designs to licensed 

growers for their own marketing purposes at no charge. 

 Recognition for Excellence 

This systems approach yielded recognition and awards. To 

name a few: 

 Researchers at ARS Tifton were recognized for all their 

innovative work by the USDA Forage and Turfgrass 

Research Team Award in 1986. The development and 

testing were not just done in Georgia. To test in 

different soils and climates and to receive opinions from 

other experts, the ARS and ARS-UGA teams tested the 

cultivars across the southern half of the United States on 

university test fields and private properties such as golf 

courses. 

132 http://theturfgrassgroup.com/ 
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 USDA-ARS researchers in Tifton received the Federal 

Laboratory Consortium Award for Excellence in 

Technology Transfer in 2001 for developing greener, 

more durable Bermuda grasses for athletic fields and 

golf courses. 

 ARS researchers in Tifton also received the USDA 

Outstanding Technology Transfer Award in 2002. 

 Current Status of Market and Research 

If turf growing on home lawns, parks, golf courses, athletic 

fields, and sod farms are counted, estimates are that between 

40 million133 and 50 million acres134 of turf are grown in the 

United States. This compares to between 72 million and 75 

million acres of soybeans and corn and 64 million acres of 

hay/forage crops. For the state of Georgia, facts put out by 

CAES on the Georgia Turf website state that at 1.8 million 

acres, turfgrass is one of the largest agricultural commodities in 

the state of Georgia. 

According to the lead Bermuda grass researcher at UGA, Brian 

Schwartz, in 2017 there were 22 farms producing TifGrand on 

about 1,000 acres. TifTuf production has expanded rapidly, and 

there were 47 producers in the United States and 

internationally growing it on approximately 4,000 acres 

(Schwartz, 2017). The 2014 Center for Agribusiness and 

Economic Development Farm Gate Value Report compiled by 

UGA reported nearly 24,562 acres used for producing 

sod/stolens. The value of the production was $104.3 million, a 

15% increase from 2013. In 2016, the Georgia Crop 

Improvement Association reported 7,530 acres of certified 

grass in production, which is a 15% increase from 2015. This 

7,530 acres in production represents four warm-season species 

(bermudagrass, centipedegrass, seashore paspalum, and 

zoysiagrass) and one cool-season species (tall fescue).135

 N.3 IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 

Beyond the well-established link between crop research and 

agricultural productivity improvements, the following describes 

the impact of USDA turfgrasses on consumers, the 

environment, the public sector, and industry. 

133 http://gsrpdf.lib.msu.edu/ticpdf.py?file=/2000s/2006/060926.p

134 USDA NASS Census of Agriculture 2002 

135 http://caes2.caes.uga.edu/commodities/turfgrass/georgiaturf/ 

Industry/1420_Facts.htm
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Consumer benefits: Turfgrasses are the primary vegetative 

covers for home lawns, schools, parks, roadsides, sports fields, 

golf courses, and commercial and public buildings and spaces. 

Turfgrasses have direct benefits for the people using them and 

involved in producing and selling the grasses and related 

products and services. As stated above, estimates are that this 

is between 40 million and 50 million acres of turf in the United 

States. 

Environmental impacts: Turfgrasses also produce 

considerable environmental benefits. In a 2013 article 

reviewing the literature on the benefits and issues of turfgrass, 

Steir et al. stated that turf research emphasis has changed 

from improving aesthetic quality to improving the 

environmental impact of turf management. Turfgrasses have a 

proven ability to mitigate runoff from urban environments, 

absorb atmospheric pollutants, provide evaporative cooling that 

translates into energy savings and improved comfort, 

remediate contaminated soils, increase property values, deter 

pests, and enhance mental health. 

At the same time, there are some environmental concerns with 

turf management practices regarding water consumption and 

pollution, human and environmental risks from pesticide 

application, fossil fuel use and emissions, mowing injuries, lack 

of suitable habitat for most wildlife species, lack of land 

application for crop production, and the potential of turfgrasses 

to invade natural areas. 

Direct public returns from royalties paid by licensees:

One measure of economic impact of turfgrass research is the 

comparison of the research expenditures to the royalties 

received from licensing products of the research. Because this 

turfgrass research, which initially was done at USDA-ARS 

Tifton, then collaboratively by USDA-ARS and UGA, and then by 

UGA building on the initial and collaborative work, it is not 

possible to separate public benefits between federal and state 

effort. Licensing royalties are shared for each of the five 

cultivars in proportion to the employment of the developers of 

that cultivar. 

Managers of the ARS program estimate that about 20% of 

USDA funding for research on grasses in Tifton went to 

research on turfgrasses, including the five of interest in this 

study. This funding totaled $1,186,000 for the fiscal years 
Appendix N: Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service Technology Transfer: 

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N-17

between 1994 and 2000 and $2,574,000 between 2001 and 

2012 for a combined total of $3,760,000. According to UGARF, 

total royalties collected on just the five turfgrasses between 

1998 and 2017 was $9,700,000.136 Therefore, royalties for the 

five turfgrasses were almost triple the federal cost of all 

research on all grasses at Tifton. The UGA expenditures are not 

included in this calculation. Note that about half of the royalties 

that UGA receives go back into CAES research programs, as do 

a percentage of royalties received by USDA-ARS. 

Impact on the sports and recreation industry: We find that 

the Tifton turfgrasses are used widely in golf courses across the 

southern United States as well as in other sports, such as in 

soccer fields, including some fields where the World Cup has 

been played. The golf industry was an early adopter of these 

licensed and certified turfgrasses for economic reasons. 

 N.3.1 Conclusions 

Two exceptionally productive USDA-ARS researchers and their 

ARS and UGA colleagues pioneered the worldwide success of 

Bermuda turfgrasses starting in the 1950s. Tifway 

bermudagrass, one of the initial sterile hybrid bermudagrasses 

developed at the Coastal Plain Experiment Station in Tifton, 

Georgia, covers more golf courses, athletic fields, and lawns 

than any other turf variety in the world.137 TifBlair is a warmweather centipede grass that thrives in poor soil with little 

maintenance and is very useful for roadside planting. Further, 

in the last 20 years, ARS and UGA researchers have developed 

third-generation sterile hybrid bermudagrasses including the 

four highlighted in this case study that have improved on 

characteristics that made the initial vegetative turfgrasses very 

successful. The newest of these introduced in 2014, TifTuf is 

expected to be a best seller in large part because it uses 38% 

less water to maintain quality turf. TifEagle has replaced 

Tifdwarf because it provides the fastest putting green surface 

available anywhere. TifSport provides exceptional turf for 

athletic fields, as does TifGrand, which does well in the shade. 

These grasses have been extensively tested for important 

characteristics in a variety of real-world conditions that 

researchers knew were important to the different users, as well 

136 All figures in this paragraph are in nominal dollars. 

137 http://caes2.caes.uga.edu/commodities/turfgrass/georgiaturf/ 

Industry/1420_Facts.htm 
Overview and Analysis of Technology Transfer from Federal Agencies and Laboratories 

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as for safety and environmental considerations. This emphasis 

on research that serves the agricultural industry and the public 

is aligned with the USDA research and extension mission. 

The turf industry in Georgia invented new equipment to dig, 

plant, and fumigate the vegetative turf, and the industry 

developed distribution channels and sales. The acres planted 

and the number of sod producers and geographic distribution of 

sod producers for these Tifton turfgrasses have expanded 

substantially over the years. Growers have formed producers’ 

groups for each variety to combine forces to promote that 

variety in the market. The federal- and state-supported 

institutions that are part of the agricultural market also played 

important roles. Georgia Seed Development, originally a state 

commission and now a nonprofit public corporation, is the 

intermediary that grows the initial fields of turf that will then be 

sold to licensed producers 2 years later. The Georgia Crop 

Improvement Association and similar associations in other 

states employ experts to inspect and certify turf of all licensed 

producers prior to sales. This is important because the quality 

of turf sold to a customer is only determined by visual 

inspection over multiple years. 

UGA’s Research Foundation and Innovation Gateway handles all 

the IP protection and licensing for cultivars developed by USDAARS Tifton and UGA CAES researchers. UGARF has the 

expertise, years of experience, and relationships with the other 

actors to be highly effective in transferring the new cultivar 

releases to industry so they achieve the broadest possible 

benefits to all stakeholders. The technology transfer system 

integrates plant breeding research, IP protection, quality 

control, and marketing to customers in Georgia and around the 

world. 

The royalties of $9.7 million received by ARS and UGA between 

1998 and 2017 from licensing the five turfgrasses are almost 

triple USDA research expenditures of $3.7 million on all grasses 

at Tifton between 1994 and 2012. These royalties go back to 

the ARS and UGA Tifton in percentages dependent on where 

the inventers were employed. Although quantitative data on the 

economic and environmental impacts of the five specific Tifton 

turfgrasses are not available, aggregate studies show large 

benefits to turfgrass producers, turf users, associated 

businesses, and the general public where the five turfgrasses 
Appendix N: Case Study of USDA Agricultural Research Service Technology Transfer: 

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N-19

clearly play a role. Environmental benefits delivered by 

turfgrasses from reduced erosion, carbon dioxide reduction, 

reduced rainfall runoff, and reduced sports injuries have been 

documented. As of 2008, the golf industry in the United States 

generated $33 billion in gross output and $20 billion in net 

income annually, and more than 480,000 jobs, as reported in a 

2008 study. Without the unique turfgrasses that enhance 

golfing where they are used, golfing as an industry would 

generate fewer revenues. A 2014 study of the turfgrass 

production and the related industry in Georgia calculated that 

the industry contributed $4 billion in output to Georgia’s $700 

billion economy. 

 PUBLISHED REFERENCES 

Burton, Glenn W. 1991. A History of Turf Research at Tifton. 

USGA Green Section Record. Accessed at 

http://gsrpdf.lib.msu.edu/ticpdf.py?file=/1990s/1991/91

0512.pdf.

Hanna, Wayne W., and William F. Anderson.2008. Development 

and Impact of Vegetative Propagation in Forage and Turf 

Bermudagrasses. Celebrate the Centennial, A 

Supplement to Agronomy Journal. Accessed at 

https://pubag.nal.usda.gov/pubag/downloadPDF.xhtml?i

d=43284&content=PDF.Sharing 

Schwartz, Brian. 2017. Tifton Turfgrass Breeding Impact 

Statement. CAES, UGA Impact Statement Database. 

Accessed at 

https://secure.caes.uga.edu/impactStatements/index.cf

m?referenceInterface=IMPACT_STATEMENT&subInterfac

e=detail_main&PK_ID=7179.