NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JACE FRANK EDEN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

GERALDINE A. DEUBLEIN, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0048

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900CV201500304

The Honorable Ralph E. Hatch, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jace Frank Eden, Show Low

Plaintiff/Appellant

Moore Law Firm, PLLC, Show Low

By Nicholas D. Patton

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 1-23-2018
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Jace Frank Eden appeals the superior court’s order declaring 

him a vexatious litigant. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2013, Geraldine A. Deublein, as Trustee of the Geraldine 

Ann Deublein Living Trust dated August 10, 2005, filed an application for 

a preliminary injunction and a complaint for a declaratory judgment 

regarding the validity of an easement benefiting her property and a request 

for a permanent injunction enjoining the named defendants in that case—

including Branding Iron Plaza, L.L.C., of which Eden was a member—from 

blocking the easement. The case was assigned case number CV2013-00190

in Navajo County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the validity 

of the easement and enjoined the defendants from blocking the easement. 

The resulting judgment became final.

¶3 In August 2014, Eden filed case number CV2014-00435 in 

Navajo County against Deublein, Tiffany Cywinski, and others, alleging 

that the easement in the above case was invalid. The defendants in that case 

moved to dismiss, arguing Eden’s case was barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. In December 2015, the superior court granted the motion to 

dismiss, and this court affirmed the order dismissing Eden’s complaint. See 

Eden v. Deublein, 1 CA-CV 15-0854, 2017 WL 929747, at *2-3, ¶¶ 6, 13 (Ariz. 

App. Mar. 9, 2017) (mem. decision).

¶4 While case number CV2014-00435 was pending, Eden filed 

this case, numbered CV2015-00304, on July 17, 2015, again naming 

Deublein, Cywinski, and others as defendants. This case was also 

dismissed by the superior court as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

Before dismissal, however, the Presiding Judge of Navajo County 

authorized the superior court to declare Eden a vexatious litigant, and in 

the order dismissing this case, the court did so, referencing case numbers 

CV2013-00190 and CV2014-00435.
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN, et al.

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¶5 Eden timely appealed, and in August 2016, this court 

dismissed the portions of Eden’s appeal not related to the issue of Eden 

being a vexatious litigant and directed the parties to brief only that issue.

Because the part of the superior court’s order designating Eden a vexatious 

litigant is in effect an order granting an injunction, we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12–2101(A)(5)(b)

(2016).

1 See Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 13 n.8, ¶ 16 (App. 2012).

ANALYSIS

¶6 Eden argues the superior court erred in declaring him a 

vexatious litigant.2 We disagree.

¶7 Courts in Arizona possess inherent authority to restrict a 

vexatious litigant’s ability to initiate additional lawsuits. Madison, 230 Ariz. 

at 14, ¶ 17. Because a litigant’s access to courts is a fundamental right, 

however, “such orders must be entered sparingly and appropriately.” Id.

(citation omitted).

¶8 The superior court may, upon its own motion or the request 

of a party, “designate a pro se litigant a vexatious litigant,” if it “finds the 

pro se litigant engaged in vexatious conduct.” A.R.S. § 12-3201(A), (C) 

(2016). This designation prohibits the litigant from filing “a new pleading, 

motion or other document without prior leave of the court.” A.R.S. § 12–

3201(B). Vexatious conduct includes but is not limited to: (1) the repeated 

filing of court actions solely or primarily for the purposes of harassment, 

(2) unreasonably expanding or delaying court proceedings, (3) court actions 

brought or defended without substantial justification, or (4) the repeated 

 

1 We cite the current version of all statutes because no revisions 

material to our decision have occurred since the court’s order.

2 Eden has twice been designated a vexatious litigant in Navajo 

County Superior Court, once in November 2015 (the order at issue in this 

appeal) and again in April 2016 in case number CV2015-00417. On March 

23, 2017, this court issued a memorandum decision affirming the April 2016 

order declaring Eden a vexatious litigant. Eden v. City of Show Low, 1 CACV 16-0373, 2017 WL 1090896, at *3-4, ¶¶ 13-17 (Ariz. App. Mar. 23, 2017) 

(mem. decision). Eden was also declared a vexatious litigant by this court 

in Administrative Order 2017-02, filed May 9, 2017, and his appeal in this 

case was dismissed, but was later reinstated by order of this court.
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN, et al.

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filing of documents or requests for relief that have been the subject of 

previous rulings by the court in the same litigation. A.R.S. § 12-3201(E).

¶9 Because we treat the superior court’s order as a grant of 

injunctive relief, we review it for an abuse of discretion. See Ahwatukee 

Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n v. Turner, 196 Ariz. 631, 634, ¶ 5 (App. 2000); see 

also De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing a 

vexatious-litigant order for an abuse of discretion).

¶10 In its order, the superior court found Eden “filed 34 pro-se 

frivolous filings” in that court in case number CV2013-00190, and then 

attempted to challenge the resulting order in that case through a petition 

for special action in this court and a petition for review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, but his attempts were denied. The superior court also 

noted “[a]s further evidence of the harassing nature of Jace Eden’s pro-se 

complaint in this case” that Eden filed case number CV2014-00435, which 

was based upon the same issues previously adjudicated in CV2013-00190. 

Finally, Eden filed this case (case number CV2015-00304), again based upon 

the same issues and facts previously litigated in CV2013-00190. The 

superior court recognized that Eden had two cases pending in the Court of 

Appeals “on an issue that has already been adjudicated to final judgment 

in a third case.” The superior court reasoned that, with Eden’s history of 

frivolous filings, it could not “permit him to harass the named Defendants 

by filing frivolous lawsuits against them over issues already adjudicated in 

the Courts.”

¶11 The superior court properly took judicial notice of the record

in the other actions tried in that same court. Visco v. Universal Refuse 

Removal Co., 11 Ariz. App. 73, 74 (1969). On appeal, however, Eden has 

failed to provide this court with the record for CV2013-00190 and CV2014-

00435, and as the appellant, Eden bore the responsibility of ensuring that 

the record on appeal is complete. See id. at 76. When the record is 

incomplete, we presume substantial evidence exists in the complete record 

to support the superior court’s findings and exercise of discretion. Id.

¶12 We are able, however, to access and take judicial notice of the 

electronic records provided this court in the numerous other appeals and 

special actions filed by Eden related to the underlying easement issue, 

including the electronic record from CV2014-00435, which this court 

utilized in deciding Eden v. Deublein, 1 CA-CV 15-0854, 2017 WL 929747.

The record provided this court overwhelmingly supports the superior 

court’s order, not only in terms of the sheer volume of documents and 

pleadings repeatedly filed by Eden, but also in terms of their obviously 
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN, et al.

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frivolous and harassing nature, given that the underlying easement issue is 

res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s declaration of Eden 

as a vexatious litigant, and that Eden is barred from bringing another matter 

related to the real property and easement addressed by the superior court’s 

previous orders unless a new injury occurs.3

¶13 The appellees request attorneys’ fees and costs related to this 

appeal, and although they have not cited ARCAP 25 or A.R.S. §§ 12–349

(2016) and 12–350 (2016) as support for their request, we conclude that an 

award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to these authorities is appropriate. Based 

on our review of the record and the briefing on appeal, Eden brought this 

action and filed this appeal without substantial justification. See A.R.S. 

§ 12–349(A)(1), (F). Our conclusion is supported by the same reasoning 

relied upon by this court in Eden v. City of Show Low, 1 CA-CV 16-0373, 2017 

WL 1090896, at *4, ¶ 18. See also Ariz. Ct. App. Admin. Order No. 2017-02.

Accordingly, we award reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal to the 

appellees as a sanction against Eden under ARCAP 25 and A.R.S. §§ 12–349

and 12-350, as well as taxable costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341 (2016), 

contingent upon the appellees’ compliance with ARCAP 21.

 

3 This court’s May 9, 2017 administrative order continues to be in full 

force and effect. Accordingly, pursuant to that administrative order, Eden 

may not file any petitions for special action or similar filings in this court 

addressing issues regarding any part of the parcel of real property 

identified as parcel, tract, or plot map references 210-14-018A, 210-14-018B, 

210-14-020B, and 210-14-060 and ingress/egress and utility easements 

regarding that specific parcel of real property without first obtaining leave 

of this court. In seeking leave to file such a petition for special action or 

similar filing, Eden must file, for the attention of the Chief Judge of this 

court, a request for leave that identifies the specific issues to be raised in the 

proposed petition or similar filing, that identifies the specific official action 

or order of which review is sought, and that attaches the proposed petition 

for special action or similar filing. Any such petition for special action or 

similar filing made without leave of this court will be dismissed by this 

court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 

25. In considering whether to grant any request by Eden for leave to file 

such a petition for special action or similar filing, this court will consider, 

inter alia, whether the petition or similar filing raises a non-frivolous 

challenge to an official action or order.
EDEN v. DEUBLEIN, et al.

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CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm the superior court’s order declaring Eden a 

vexatious litigant.