NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES E. ROBINSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DUNGARVIN NEVADA, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-15312 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00902-JAD-PAL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. 

James E. Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in his employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Zetwick v. County of 

Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 20 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-15312 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s 

race, age, and disability discrimination claims, as well as on Robinson’s retaliation 

claim, because Robinson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were

pretextual. See Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 

2014) (burden-shifting framework applies to disability discrimination claim under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act); Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 932 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (burden-shifting framework applies to age discrimination claims under 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 

F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2004) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII 

retaliation claims); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 

1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII race 

discrimination claims ); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and 

substantial).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s 

genetic information discrimination claim because Robinson failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant terminated or 

discriminated against Robinson because of Robinson’s genetic information. See 42 

U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (noting that employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire, or to 
3 18-15312 

discharge, any employee” based on genetic information). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s 

tortious discharge claim because Robinson’s Title VII retaliation claim provided 

him with an “adequate, comprehensive, statutory remedy.” Ozawa v. Vision 

Airlines, Inc., 216 P.3d 788, 791 (Nev. 2009) (Nevada does “not recognize an 

action for tortious discharge when a plaintiff has an adequate, comprehensive, 

statutory remedy”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim because Robinson failed 

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant engaged in 

extreme and outrageous conduct. See Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141, 

1145 (Nev. 1983) (elements of IIED claim under Nevada law).

We do not consider Robinson’s contention regarding violations of the Fair 

Credit Report Act because Robinson failed to allege such a claim in his operative 

complaint. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (court 

does not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal).

AFFIRMED.