96-343

 No. 96-343

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

NEIL J. LYNCH and CHARLOTTE F. LYNCH,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

DEAN REED and BARBARA REED,

 Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Silver Bow,

 The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellants:

 David R. Paoli, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

 R. Lewis Brown, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Gary L. Walton; Poore Roth & Robinson, Butte, Montana

 Scott W. Reed, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah

 Submitted on Briefs: May 22, 1997

 Decided: August 28, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Neil J. and Charlotte F. Lynch (the Lynches) appeal from the judgment and

underlying jury verdict of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, in 

favor

of respondents Dean and Barbara Reed (the Reeds). The Lynches also appeal rulings of

the District Court denying them the opportunity to present certain evidence to the 

jury

regarding construction safety standards. We affirm in part, reverse in part and 

remand

to the District Court for further proceedings.

 We address the following issues on appeal:

 1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?

 2. Did the District Court commit reversible error by excluding employment 

safety

 regulations including OSHA and ANSI from the trial of the case?

 3. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new trial on

the basis that they were denied an opportunity to fully cross-examine the Reeds' 

expert

 witness?

 4. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new trial on

the basis that their expert witness was not permitted to testify as to the basis of 

his

expert opinions?

 5. Are the Lynches entitled to a new trial because of defense counsel's remarks

 regarding Neil Lynch's prior motorcycle accident? 

Factual and Procedural History

 In 1991 the Reeds began construction of a retirement cabin on property they had

purchased at Georgetown Lake. The Reeds contracted with Dale Fredlund, a Butte log

home builder to excavate the foundation and install the log home package. Dean Reed

(Reed) had been working part time for Fredlund erecting log home packages at

Fredlundþs property. In exchange for Reed's help in erecting the Reed log home

package, Fredlund reduced the overall price of the package.

 After the excavation was completed, Reed contracted with two masonry companies

for the construction of the foundation. Once the foundation was completed, Reed

contracted with two carpenters for the installation of the floor joists and floor 

decking. 

When the floor decking was completed, two openings were left in the decking. One was

for the installation of the stairway from the basement and the other was for the

installation of a fireplace. After the carpenters had completed their work, Fredlund

returned to the site to begin the installation of the log home package in accordance 

with

his contract with the Reeds.

 Reed and Neil Lynch (Lynch) were acquaintances and would periodically discuss

the progress of the cabin. Lynch agreed to come to the construction site and help 

with

the erection of the log home package. At this point in the construction, the log 

walls

were approximately eleven courses high. When this type of log home is erected, the

doorways and windows are cut into the walls after the walls have been erected. 

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Consequently, a person must go through the basement to access the interior of the 

cabin.

 On September 25, 1991, Lynch arrived at the Reeds' property and gained access

to the main floor of the cabin by entering the basement and climbing up an extension

ladder. The extension ladder passed through the opening in the floor which had been 

left

for the future installation of the stairs. The stairway opening in the floor 

decking was

approximately four feet wide by eight feet in length. Two sheets of plywood covered

approximately one-half of the stairway opening. The fireplace floor hole opening was

covered with plywood, logs and saw horses.

 After Lynch was on the main floor of the cabin, Reed instructed him to wait 

while

Reed and Fredlund retrieved another log from outside the cabin. While Lynch was

waiting, he decided to move the plywood that was next to him on the floor and set it 

up

against the wall, out of the way. Lynch approached the piece of plywood, picked it 

up

with both hands, raised it to his chest and stepped forward in an effort to push it 

toward

the wall he was facing. Once he stepped forward, he fell into the hole that the 

loose

piece of plywood had covered. Lynch fell approximately eight feet to the basement's 

dirt

floor; he was paralyzed as a result of the accident. 

 The Lynches filed suit to recover damages for the personal injuries suffered by

them as a result of Neil Lynch's accident. Before trial, the District Court granted 

the

Reeds' motion in limine restricting the Lynches from presenting evidence on 

construction

site safety standards. The court further denied the Lynches' attempts to introduce 

the

standards during trial and limited Lynches' cross-examination of Reeds' expert. 

Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Reeds.

 After entry of judgment for the Reeds, the Lynches moved for a new trial. The

motion was received by the court but, due to a clerical error, was not filed with 

the clerk

of court. Thereafter, the Lynches filed a brief in support of their motion for new 

trial. 

Two days later the Lynches filed a notice of appeal. In an order dated July 31, 

1996, the

District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Lynches' 

motion for

new trial by virtue of the notice of appeal. The Lynches appeal from the judgment

entered on the jury verdict and other orders of the District Court.

Discussion

 1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?

 The Reeds contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal 

because the

Lynches filed their notice of appeal while their motion for new trial was still 

pending in

the District Court. According to Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., a notice of appeal filed

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before disposition of a Rule 59 motion for new trial has no effect. On July 31, 

1996, the

District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Lynches' "motion"

because of the subsequent filing of the notice of appeal. The Reeds argue that 

because

the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion, the

Lynches' motion for a new trial was deemed denied on August 11, 1996, and, pursuant

to Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., the Lynches were required to re-file a notice of appeal 

no

later than thirty days after their motion for a new trial was deemed denied. The 

Reeds

contend that because the Lynches did not re-file a notice of appeal, this Court does 

not

have jurisdiction to hear their appeal.

 In its order ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the "motion" for 

new

trial, the District Court stated: "Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Support of 

Plaintiffs' Motion

for a New Trial; however, Plaintiffs never filed a Motion for a New Trial." The

Lynches argue that this order led them to believe that the clerical error in failing 

to file

the motion for a new trial with the District Court was fatal to that motion and that,

therefore, their notice of appeal was timely filed. We agree. Because the motion 

for

new trial was never filed it was a nullity and the Lynches' subsequent notice of 

appeal

was timely filed. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

 2. Did the District Court commit reversible error by excluding employment

 safety regulations including OSHA and ANSI from the trial of the case?

 

 The standard of review of a district courtþs discretionary ruling is whether the

district court abused its discretion. Durbin v. Ross (1996), 276 Mont. 463, 477, 916

P.2d 758, 767; State v. Santos (1995), 273 Mont. 125, 137, 902 P.2d 510, 517. The

abuse of discretion standard applies to trial administration issues, post-trial 

motions and

similar rulings. Montana Rail Link v. Byard (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 337, 860 P.2d 

121,

125.

 The Reeds submitted a motion in limine requesting that the Lynches be restricted

from mentioning any construction site safety standards. The District Court granted 

the

Reeds' motion in limine in several respects. The District Court ruled that 

Occupational

Safety and Health Administration Regulations (OSHA), American National Standard

Safety Requirements (ANSI), and Montana's Construction Site Health and Safety Act

were inadmissible on the issue of the Reeds' negligence because the "safety 

standards in

question do not have the force of law. . . ." The District Court had the 

opportunity to

analyze this issue at various junctures since the Lynches persistently raised the 

issue

throughout the trial.

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 The Lynches' argument on appeal focuses on the District Court's exclusion of

OSHA and ANSI regulations, and we will therefore discuss only those regulations. The

Lynches argued to the District Court, and argue here, that the Reeds' failure to 

comply

with OSHA regulations and ANSI standards is evidence of their negligence and, thus,

admissible. The Reeds, on the other hand, contend that OSHA and ANSI are not

applicable to an individual who is constructing his own private residence.

 The Lynches argue that in granting the Reeds' motion in limine regarding safety

standards, the court incorrectly relied on Hackley v. Waldorf-Hoerner Paper Products

Co. (1967), 149 Mont. 286, 294-95, 425 P.2d 712, 716, for the proposition that

"evidence of safety standards that do not have the force of law are inadmissible on 

the

issue of negligence." In Hackley, this Court considered two rulings by the district 

court

in which the district court had refused the use of evidence on safety standards for 

any

purpose. The first issue considered by this Court was whether the district court 

had erred

in refusing to permit any testimony on the "minimum Safety Standards for the

Construction Industry, section 41-1702, R.C.M. 1947. . . ." Hackley, 425 P.2d at 

716. 

The Court began its analysis by examining the language of the statute at issue. The

statute in Hackley, as the OSHA regulations here, spoke in terms of an "employer's

duty." The Courtþs decision that evidence of the statutory safety standard was 

properly

excluded was based on its conclusion that the statute imposed "no duty" on the 

defendant

because it was not an employer of the injured person. Hackley, 425 P.2d at 716.

 The second issue this Court analyzed involved the district court's refusal to 

admit

industry safety standards. This Court affirmed the district court's exclusion of the

standards on the basis that advisory material "not having the force of law, is not

admissible on the issue of negligence." Hackley, 425 P.2d at 716.

 The Lynches argue that Hackley is no longer good law in Montana and is not

applicable to this case for two reasons: it was ruled on prior to the adoption of the

standards and codes in question, and it was based on an annotation which has since 

been

superseded. The Lynches point out that in Hackley, this Court, following the 

majority

rule set forth in 75 A.L.R. 2d 778, affirmed the district court's refusal to admit 

standards

promulgated by the American Standards Association. However, that annotation has been

superseded by 58 A.L.R. 3d 148 which states that "the modern trend toward greater

admissibility of these codes and standards has apparently been great enough to make 

it

unwise to attempt to identify any majority or minority rule." 

 The Lynches argue that this Court recognized Hackley's shortcomings in Runkle

v. Burlington Northern (1980), 188 Mont. 286, 613 P.2d 982. The Runkle decision

acknowledged that post-Hackley decisions "seem to be moving toward acceptance in

evidence of such advisory material with certain qualifications. Such treatises may 

be

admitted upon the foundation that they (1) show what is feasible to the jury, or (2) 

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show

what the defendant knew or should have known about safety precautions." Runkle, 613

P.2d at 993.

 However, the Court in Runkle also established the following rule for 

admissibility

of industry standards and codes:

 Unless the codes or standards are adopted by a governmental agency so as

 to have the force of law, they are not to be admitted as conclusively

 determining the standard of care imposed upon the defendant, nor as

 substantive evidence of negligence, unless coupled with a showing of

 general acceptance in the industry concerned.

Runkle, 613 P.2d at 993 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We interpret this 

rule as

providing two separate tests for the admissibility of codes or standards: 1) a code 

or

standard sought to be admitted for the purpose of "conclusively determining the 

standard

of care imposed upon the defendant" must have been adopted by a governmental agency

so as to have the force of law; 2) where a code or standard does not have the force 

of

law, it may nevertheless be admitted as substantive evidence of negligence if it is 

coupled

with a showing of general acceptance in the industry concerned.

 In interpreting the rule from Runkle in this manner we must necessarily overrule

Hackley, insofar as it holds that evidence of codes or standards of safety issued by

governmental bodies as advisory material but without the force of law, are never

admissible on the issue of negligence.

 Under the rule in Runkle we must first determine whether OSHA or ANSI have

"the force of law" as applied to the Reeds. The regulations interpreting OSHA 

provide

in part that "[a]ny employer employing one or more employees would be an 'employer

engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees' and, therefore, he is

covered by the Act as such." 29 CFR 1975.4. The Lynches argue that the Reeds are

covered by OSHA under this definition of employer because the Reeds "employed a crane

operator-laborer, cement and brick mason, and carpenters" and because the 

construction

of the Reeds' cabin falls under the broad category of businesses that are in a class 

of

activity that as a whole "affects" commerce. 

 The Lynches argue that OSHA was developed to protect any person rightfully on

the job site, not just employees, and therefore Lynch was a person covered under the 

Act. 

Cases cited by the Lynches in support of their theory that OSHA protections encompass

non-employees discuss the "multi-employer doctrine," which has developed as a means

of apportioning liability at multi-employer work sites where one employer has 

created a

hazard and some employees, but not necessarily its own, are exposed to the hazard. 

See

Arrington v. Arrington Bros. Const., Inc. (Idaho 1989), 781 P.2d 224 (holding that an

employer's OSHA duties may run not only to his own employees, but to any other

employees or persons in general on a multi-employer worksite); Teal v. E.I. DuPont 

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de

Nemours and Co. (6th Cir. 1984), 728 F.2d 799 (recognizing employers' and commercial

general contractors' duties under OSHA to protect all employees on a multi-employer

worksite); see also Anthony Crane Rental, Inc. v. Reich (D.C. Cir. 1995), 70 F.3d 

1298. 

We find these cases inapplicable to the instant case because the Reeds' log cabin

construction project is not a "multi-employer worksite." Furthermore, all of the 

cases

cited by the Lynches require that, before employers are obligated to protect all 

persons

rightfully on the worksite, it must first be established that the employer is deemed

responsible for complying with OSHA regulations at all. Teal, 728 F.2d at 804.

 Accordingly, the first question to be answered is whether the Reeds are 

employers

under the Act. OSHA defines employer as "a person engaged in a business affecting

commerce who has employees." 29 U.S.C. 625(5). In the instant case, the

uncontroverted facts are that Lynch was not an employee of the Reeds at the time of 

the

accident and that the other workers on the site were independent contractors. It 

has been

held that OSHA does not apply to an owner where the worker on the owner's property

is an independent contractor and not an employee of the owner. Cochran v. 

International

Harvester Co. (W.D. Ky. 1975), 408 F.Supp. 598; see also Ellis v. Chase

Communications, Inc. (6th Cir. 1995), 63 F.3d 473, 478 (holding the "multi-employer

doctrine" of Teal inapplicable to a non-employer defendant whose status was "no 

different

than a property owner hiring a contractor to perform work on its property"). But see

Williams v. Kopco (D. Kan. 1997), 162 F.R.D. 670 (relying on Teal in holding that

independent contractors are in the class of persons OSHA regulations were designed to

protect). Given that none of the persons assisting Reed in the construction of the 

cabin

was Reed's employee, Reed is not an "employer" under OSHA. We therefore hold that

OSHA was not applicable to the Reeds and thus did not have the force of law.

 Likewise, ANSI requirements do not apply. Section 1.1 of the standards 

provides:

 This standard is intended to provide protection to persons in all places

 where there is danger of persons or materials falling through floor or wall

 openings, or from stairways, platforms, or runways. This standard applies

 to temporary or emergency conditions as well as to permanent conditions. 

 It does not apply to construction work covered by American National

 Standard Safety Requirements for construction A10 Series, or to private

 residences.

Thus, by its own terms, the ANSI standards do not apply to the construction at the

Reedsþ private residence. 

 Under the second test in Runkle, if standards do not have the force of law, they

may still be admissible to show negligence if coupled with a showing that they are

generally acceptable in the industry concerned. The Lynches argue that OSHA 

standards

are generally acceptable in the construction industry and thus should have been 

admitted. 

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We hold, however, that construction of an individual's private cabin undertaken by a 

noncommercial owner-builder is not part of the "construction industry" as a whole and

therefore the District Court properly excluded evidence of ANSI and OSHA standards. 

 The Lynches have failed to show that the District Court abused its discretion in

precluding evidence of OSHA regulations and ANSI standards. Therefore, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Reeds' motion in limine nor in 

its other

rulings excluding admission of these safety standards except as discussed in the next

issue. 

 3. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new

 trial on the basis that they were denied an opportunity to fully cross-

 examine the Reeds' expert witness?

 

 The standard of review of a district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial 

is

the same as our standard for reviewing discretionary trial court rulings; that is, 

whether

the district court abused its discretion. Hando v. PPG Industries, Inc. (1995), 272 

Mont.

146, 149, 900 P.2d 281, 282.

 During direct examination, the Reeds' expert witness testified that the Reeds 

had

met minimum safety standards. The court refused to allow the Lynches an opportunity

to fully cross-examine the expert regarding that testimony. The Lynches claim that 

their

cross-examination was unduly restricted in that they should have been allowed to 

crossexamine the expert regarding matters raised on direct examination and that they 

should

have been allowed to examine the witness regarding the basis of his expert testimony.

 In relevant part, the direct examination of the Reeds' expert was as follows:

 Q. Do you think that, and in your opinion, what the Reeds did would

 meet the minimum safety standards?

 

 A. Yes, in my opinion.

 

 Q. And what they did, is it customary in the industry?

 

 A. Yes, it is.

 

 The Lynches contend that they should have been allowed to cross-examine the

expert with regard to the opinion expressed during his direct examination. "It is

axiomatic that a witness may be cross-examined on any subject raised or fact stated 

on

direct examination." Hando, 900 P.2d at 283; Rule 611(b)(1), M.R.Evid. Accordingly,

the Lynches argue that they should have had the opportunity to fully cross-examine 

the

Reeds' expert regarding his knowledge of "minimum safety standards," including OSHA

and ANSI, as they provide the minimum safety standards for the construction industry.

 The Reeds claim that the Lynches were afforded an opportunity to fully crossexamine the Reeds' expert in regard to his statement regarding minimum safety 

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standards. 

They point to the following questions and answers during the cross-examination:

 Q. Mr. Walton asked you about minimum safety standards and whether

 those had been met in this case. What minimum safety standards are you

 referring to?

 

 A. Well, I don't know if they would be actual minimum safety

 standards. Itþs kind of a common sense, case-by-case scenario.

 

 Q. Well, when you answered Mr. Walton's questions, you apparently

 had an understanding of what minimum safety standards there were.

 

 A. Well, I would consider any, any protection would be a, a safety

 standard. If youþve got one protection, it would be a minimum safety

 standard.

 

 Q. Do you know that you erect a railing as a minimum safety standard

 on a floor hole opening like this.

 

 The Reeds objected to this question and, outside the presence of the jury, the

Lynches claimed that the door had been opened for them to inquire of the witness

concerning "minimum safety standards" and that they could impeach the witness on his

knowledge of OSHA standards. In response to the Lynches' argument, the court stated:

"You have the right to cross-examine him. You can ask him what he understands. 

You've asked him that . . . . I made a ruling in regards to this OSHA thing, and I'm

going to stand by that decision . . . ." After the bench conference, the Lynches' 

counsel

continued with cross-examination as follows:

 Q. Clay, I think when we broke, we were talking about minimum safety

 requirements.

 

 A. Yes.

 

 Q. And would you tell me, please what you mean when you say

 minimum safety requirements.

 

 A. By minimum, would be just something to make something safer

 would be a minimum requirement.

 

 Q. Okay. But your knowledge as to what are minimum safety

 requirements is based on your experience, correct?

 

 A. Yes, it is.

 

 The Reeds argue that the Lynches fully cross-examined their expert on what he

meant by a minimum safety standard. They argue that the expert's definition of a

minimum safety standard was entirely consistent with his opinion that the Reeds had 

met

such a standard. We disagree. The witness was testifying as an expert on 

construction

site safety standards. By stating that the Reeds had met the minimum safety 

standards,

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he opened the door to cross-examination on his knowledge of minimum safety standards

in the industry, not simply on any one person's common sense perception of safety

standards. "Minimum safety standards" implies something more than mere subjective

determinations on a case-by-case basis. When the Reeds' expert testified as to

"standards," he left the jury with the impression that the Reeds had complied with an

objective, rather than a subjective, gauge. In the construction industry, the 

objective

standards are embodied in the OSHA and ANSI regulations. The Lynches were

prejudiced when the court denied them the latitude to cross-examine the expert about 

his

knowledge of the safety standards in the industry. Due to the prejudice arising 

from this

error, the Lynches are entitled to a new trial.

 In order to avoid confusion as to our rulings on Issues two and three, we

summarize the two holdings as follows: In Issue number two we held that OSHA and

ANSI standards are not admissible to prove negligence in a case of an individual 

owner

constructing his own home. However if, despite the inadmissibility of such 

evidence, the

owner offers expert testimony that he did comply with "the minimum safety standards,"

then he has chosen to inject that issue into the case. Opposing counsel then must be

afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the expert as to his understanding of those

"standards." Thus, although evidence of the standards is not admissible against an

owner-builder as substantive evidence of negligence, such evidence may be legitimate

fodder for cross-examination depending upon the scope of the defendant's expert's

testimony. Due to the court's restricting of the cross-examination of the Reeds' 

expert,

the jury was left with the impression that the Reeds had complied with "the minimum

safety standards." This prejudiced the Lynches' case, and they are entitled to a 

new trial.

 4. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new

 trial on the basis that their expert witness was not permitted to testify as to

 the basis of his expert opinions?

 

 The Lynches claim that they are entitled to a new trial because their expert was

not permitted to testify regarding the basis of his expert opinions. While the 

Lynches'

expert was permitted to base his opinion on OSHA, ANSI, and other applicable safety

standards, he was not permitted to testify that those standards formed the basis of 

his

opinion. The Lynches claim that Rules 703 and 705, M.R.Evid., provide that an expert

may base his or her opinion on inadmissible evidence and may testify as to the basis 

of

that opinion. While we agree that the Rules of Evidence allow an expert to base his 

or

her opinion on inadmissible evidence, we do not agree that the rules mandate that an

expert testify as to the basis of that opinion. Rule 703 provides that inadmissible 

evidence

may be relied on by experts in forming their opinions and Rule 705 provides that 

experts

may be required to disclose the facts or data underlying their opinions. As 

mentioned

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before, the admissibility of evidence must, in every case, be left largely to the 

sound

discretion of the trial court. Cech v. State (1979), 184 Mont. 522, 531-32, 604 

P.2d 97,

102; Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons' Co. (1982), 201 Mont. 425, 655 P.2d 482. The trial

court's discretion includes wide latitude in determining the admissibility of expert

testimony. Durbin, 916 P.2d at 767; Cash v. Otis Elevator Co. (1984), 210 Mont. 319,

332, 684 P.2d 1041,1048. 

 The Lynches' expert was allowed to testify as to the substance of OSHA and ANSI

standards; he was merely prohibited from identifying the source of the standards. 

The

Lynches' expert testified more than once that, in his opinion, safety practices that 

could

have been undertaken by the Reeds included installing a guardrail around the opening,

securing the plywood in place, or building a temporary floor. It was only when the

expert identified those practices as "standard practices" that the Reeds' counsel 

objected,

and the court foreclosed the expert from identifying the specific standards. The 

Lynches'

expert was not, as claimed by the Lynches, prevented from lending his special 

expertise

to the issues before the jury. The jury was permitted to weigh the opposing 

opinions of

the two experts and, therefore, the Lynches were not denied a fair trial on the 

basis of

this alleged error. 

 5. Are the Lynches entitled to a new trial because of defense counsel's

 remarks regarding Neil Lynch's prior motorcycle accident?

 

 The final pretrial order listed five legal issues the parties sought to have 

decided

before the commencement of trial. The first issue was: "Whether the fact of and

settlement of litigation arising out of Neil Lynch's 1984 motorcycle accident should 

be

excluded at trial." On the morning of trial the Lynches moved that no mention be 

made

of "the facts and settlement of litigation arising out of Neil Lynch's 1984 

automobile

accident." When the Reeds' counsel inquired as to the scope of the motion and 

whether

it included Lynch's receipt of disability benefits, the Lynches' counsel replied: 

"It's

everything." The court excluded evidence of the settlement but left open the 

question of

whether evidence of Lynch's resulting injuries might be admissible.

 In cross-examining Lynch about his mental distress claim, the Reeds' counsel

asked Lynch the following question, which was objected to by the Lynches' counsel:

"And you associated that mental distress, however, not with this accident, but your

motorcycle accident, correct?" It is clear that this was a legitimate line of crossexamination relating to the nature of Lynch's motorcycle injuries, an issue which the

court earlier had ruled would be handled as it came up. Therefore the Reeds' counsel

did not violate the court's exclusionary rule as to the settlement of the motorcycle

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accident suit. We affirm the District Court on this issue.

 In summary, we hold that the District Court did not err in excluding evidence of

OSHA and ANSI standards as substantive evidence of the Reeds' negligence in its order

granting the Reeds' motion in limine. However, since the Reeds opened the door to 

the

minimum safety standards during direct examination of their expert, the District 

Court

abused its discretion in preventing the Lynches from fully cross-examining the Reeds'

expert on these standards, and the Lynches are therefore entitled to a new trial. We

affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for a new trial.

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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