1 Filed 2/5/14 Maktab Tarighat etc. v. Asisi CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MAKTAB TARIGHAT OVEYSSI SHAHMAGHSOUDI, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. KAMRAN AZIZI et al., Defendants and Appellants. A138115
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG 10547879)

Appellants Kamran Azizi and Hediyeh Shoa r Azizi (Defendants) appealed from an order that imposed monetary sanctions on th eir attorney. Because Defendants were not aggrieved by the order and the aggrieved atto rneys did not appeal the order, we dismiss the appeal.
I. B ACKGROUND In 2010, Maktab Tarigh at Oveyssi Shahmaghsoudi (MTO), a Sufi religious school, sued Defendants for allegedly em bezzling funds from the school. Carl A.
Lindstrom substituted in as Defendants’ co unsel in June 2012, and James A. Otto
associated in as cocounsel for Defendants in September 2012. Between July 2012 and March 2013, the parties litigated discove ry matters and MTO filed a motion for
sanctions. On March 1, 2013, the trial court issu ed a six-page order that included the following language: “Mr. Lindstrom and Mr. O tto shall pay sanctions in the amount of2 $10,500 to MTO for the time wasted by MTO and their counsel at the Azizi deposition and for the time spent on th is motion. Sanctions are payable immediately.” On March 6, 2013, a notice of appeal wa s filed. The notice states, “NOTICE IS
HEREBY GIVEN that . . . KAMRAN AZIZ I AND HEDYEH SHOAR appeal[] from the following judgment or order in this case, whic h was entered on . . . March 1, 2013.” The notice is signed by Otto on the signat ure line for “SIGNATU RE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY.” In the caption section of the fo rm, Otto identifies himself as the attorney for “Kamran Azizi and Hediyeh Shoar.” Nothin g on the face of the notice indicates that Otto intended to appeal th e order on his own behalf.
II. D ISCUSSION “Any party aggrieved” may appeal “[f]rom an order directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorn ey for a party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Code Civ. Proc ., §§ 902, 904.1, subd. (a)(12).) Defendants do not argue that they were personally aggrie ved by the sanctions order. Therefore, their appeal of the order must be dismissed.
Otto and Lindstrom did not include them selves as appellants in the notice of appeal. Therefore, the sanction ruling is not reviewable in this appeal. ( Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39, 42 ( Calhoun ); Taylor v. Varga (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 750, 761, fn. 12; Laborde v. Aronson (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 459, 465, disa pproved on other grounds by Musaelin v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 520; In re Marriage of Knowles (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 35, 38, fn. 1; see
also 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Choong (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1276–1277 [citing
Calhoun for rule but not applying it on th e facts of the case at bar].) Otto and Lindstrom argue that we should liberally construe the notice of appeal to include them as appellants. They note that they identified themselves as “appellants” in applications to extend time to fi le their opening brief and in th eir opening brief; they cite Otto’s poor health as an explanation for his error in omitting the attorneys’ names from the notice of appeal; and they argue MTO has not been prejudiced by th e error. They cite cases that hold generally that public polic y favors deciding appeals on their merits and3 that notices of appeal should be liberally construed. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) However, none of the case s holds that a notice of appeal can be “liberally construed” to in clude an unnamed appellant, much less than an unnamed appellant who is a trained atto rney and who filed the notice of appeal himself (or whose associate in law filed the notice). (See Jarkieh v. Badagliacco (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 426, 431, 433 [relieving appellant of proced ural default in preparing record]; Litzmann v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 203, 205 [deeming nonconforming petition for review to be timely fi led on the date it was submitted]; Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65, 67–68 [c onstruing premature notice of appeal from nonappealable order sustaining demurrer as notice of a ppeal from ensuing appealable judgment]; Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59–60 [construing ambiguous notic e of appeal to include appeal from default judgment]; Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 20–21 [construing notice of appeal from order denying a new trial as no tice of appeal from judgment].)
III. D ISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Defendan ts shall bear MTO’s costs on appeal.4 _ ____________ ____________ Bruiniers, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Jones, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Simons, J.