In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 23, 2022

S22A0744, S22A0745. JONES v. THE STATE.

 BETHEL, Justice.

A Coffee County jury found Samuel Edward Jones guilty of 

malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting 

death of Terrance Gibson. In these consolidated cases, Jones

appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the 

jury on voluntary manslaughter and that his trial counsel provided 

constitutionally ineffective assistance.1 We disagree with both 

 1 Gibson’s death occurred on November 18, 2018. On January 30, 2019, 

Jones was indicted by a Coffee County grand jury for malice murder, two 

counts of influencing a witness, and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. On November 4, 2020, the trial court entered a judgment of nolle 

prosequi on the firearm-possession charge. On November 18, 2020, Jones was 

indicted by a Coffee County grand jury for an additional count of possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of a crime.

The court held a bifurcated trial in May 2021. At the trial on the three 

remaining counts of the 2019 indictment, the trial court granted Jones’s motion 

for a directed verdict on the second count of influencing a witness, and the jury 

found Jones guilty of malice murder and the first count of influencing a 
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contentions and affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial showed the following. In October 2018, 

Jones was in a relationship with Danielle Wilson. Danielle lived 

with her mother, Adrece Wilson, at Adrece’s house. Adrece’s other 

daughter, Desiree, and Adrece’s boyfriend, Demichael Green, also 

lived in the house. 

In mid-October, Gibson had a conflict with Adrece in the front 

yard of her house during which the two argued and Gibson 

discharged a firearm several times. After the conflict, Adrece went 

back inside the house, and Jones and Green came outside. Jones and 

Green accosted Gibson, and both fired shots at Gibson as Gibson

 

witness. At the trial on the sole count of the 2020 indictment, the same jury 

found Jones guilty of possession of a firearm by convicted felon during the 

commission of a crime. The trial court then sentenced Jones to life in prison 

without the possibility of parole for malice murder, five years concurrent for 

influencing a witness, and 15 years consecutive for the firearm-possession 

count. On May 14, 2021, Jones filed motions for new trial in both cases, which

he later amended through new counsel. Following a hearing on February 11, 

2022, the trial court denied the motions, as amended. On February 14, 2022, 

Jones filed notices of appeal in these cases. These cases were docketed to this 

Court’s April 2022 term, submitted for decisions on the briefs, and consolidated 

for opinion.
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walked away.

Approximately one month after this confrontation, on 

November 18, Jones was riding in a car with Desiree with Adrece 

driving. As they were about to return Jones to his residence, they 

noticed Gibson walking down a nearby street. Adrece testified that 

Jones got out of the car and “had some kind of words” with Gibson. 

Though she could not hear what the two said, she did hear Gibson 

say, “No, no, no,” before attempting to run away from Jones. Jones

then shot at Gibson. Gibson fell but then got back up and continued 

running. Gibson was shot once in the back and died from his injury. 

A witness observed Jones running from the general area where

he heard gunshots fired and then saw Jones run to a house. The 

witness directed police officers to the house, where they spoke with 

Jones after the incident. Jones told one of the officers that he had 

gone to a store, come back to this house, and was about to take out 

the trash when he heard gunshots.

The police arrested Jones on December 7, 2018. Following his 

arrest, Jones spoke with Desiree by phone from jail and told her that 
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he was going to send her a letter containing a story she needed to 

memorize. The letter, which was admitted into evidence at trial,

instructed Desiree that her story was that she did not see any 

shooting on November 18 and that she later learned of the shooting 

on social media. The letter also instructed her to say that Green was 

in the car with them and that Green got out of the car while Jones 

remained in the vehicle. 

At trial, the State introduced a second letter addressed to 

Desiree that had been found in Jones’s jail cell during a search. In 

that letter, Jones told Desiree that “all you saying is, we left the 

store to drop [Jones] off home.” Desiree was to say that when they 

got close to his house, Jones told Adrece to stop the car, and he got 

out of the vehicle and ran “back up the street.” When Adrece turned 

the car around to follow Jones, Desiree saw a truck “coming down 

fast” and saw a black handgun fired out of the truck’s passengerseat window, at which time Desiree put her head down. In the letter, 

Jones further instructed Desiree to say that she never got out of the 

car and never saw the person’s face who was shooting but saw a 
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“black hand” come out of the window. She was also to say that she 

heard lots of shots fired, that she “never saw the victim,” that she

“did see another person walking during the time of the shooting” but 

could not make out who he was because his back was turned, that 

she did not know where Jones “went or was doing at the time the 

shots went off,” and that she should answer that she “d[id] not 

remember” or “d[id] not know” to any questions she got “trapped on.” 

Finally, the letter told Desiree to say that Green had previously shot 

at “GB.” 

While he was in jail, Jones also spoke with Adrece’s sister, 

Sharon, over the phone. Jones offered to give her money he expected 

to receive from a lawsuit in exchange for Sharon persuading Adrece 

to change her statement that she saw Jones shoot Gibson. 

Antonio Stewart, another inmate, testified that, while Jones 

was awaiting trial, Jones told him that while riding with Adrece and 

his girlfriend’s sister, he saw Gibson walking, got out of his car, and 

shot at him. Jones also told Stewart that he then ran back to his 

house, entered through a window, and hid the firearm, which he 
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later buried. After Stewart talked to the police, Jones instructed 

another person, Shelby Henderson, to create an email address and 

send a threatening email to Stewart prior to the trial.

2. Jones first argues that the trial court committed plain error 

by declining to instruct the jury on his requested pattern charge for 

the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.2 The trial court 

declined to give the charge, stating, “I don’t think the facts fit.” 

Later, after the giving of the final charge to the jury, Jones did not 

object to the trial court’s decision not to give an instruction on 

voluntary manslaughter. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) (“Any party who 

objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge 

the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the 

 2 The pattern jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter provides as 

follows:

For voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove that the 

Defendant (1) caused the death of another person (2) under 

circumstances that would otherwise be murder (3) and acted only 

because of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion that resulted 

from serious provocation (4) which was sufficient to excite such 

passion in a reasonable person. If you decide that enough time 

passed between the provocation and the killing for a reasonable 

person to have “cooled off” and regained judgment, then the killing 

is not voluntary manslaughter. 

Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 2.10.41.
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grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate. Such 

objections shall be done outside of the jury’s hearing and presence.”). 

We therefore review Jones’s claim of error regarding the failure to 

give a voluntary manslaughter charge for plain error only. See 

OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object in accordance with subsection 

(a) of this Code section shall preclude appellate review of such 

portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge 

constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the 

parties. Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was 

not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of 

this Code section.”).

A failure to charge amounts to plain error only to the 

extent that the failure was erroneous, the error was 

obvious, the failure to charge likely affected the outcome 

of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 789 

(2) (809 SE2d 765) (2018). “We need not analyze all of the elements 

of this test when, as in this case, the defendant has failed to 
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establish one of them.” (Citation omitted.) Early v. State, 313 Ga. 

667, 672 (2) (b) (872 SE2d 705) (2022). 

“A voluntary manslaughter charge is required when there is 

slight evidence that the defendant acted ‘solely as the result of a 

sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious 

provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.’” 

Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 5-6 (2) (799 SE2d 196) (2017) (quoting 

OCGA § 16-5-2 (a)), overruled on other grounds by Worthen v. State, 

304 Ga. 862 (823 SE2d 291) (2019).

In reviewing this issue in conjunction with Jones’s motion for 

new trial, the trial court adhered to its decision to forgo a charge on 

voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the charge was not 

required because there was no evidence supporting it. Considering 

the evidence presented at trial, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion.

Jones points to evidence that he and Gibson were 

“members of rival gangs” and had been in a “shootout” only a month 

before Gibson’s death. Jones also relies on Adrece’s testimony that 
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just before Gibson was shot by Jones, Jones and Gibson had a 

“violent exchange” immediately prior to the shooting. Even 

assuming, arguendo, that Jones’s assertions were correct, the trial 

court was authorized to find as a matter of law that the month-long 

interval between the shootout between Jones and Gibson and the 

murder was a sufficient cooling-off period such that the earlier 

confrontation “did not constitute even slight evidence of 

provocation.” Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 373 (2) (627 SE2d 562) 

(2006) (where the purported provocation was a month-old beating by 

the victim, the trial court could conclude, as a matter of law, that 

the incident did not constitute even slight evidence of provocation 

necessitating a voluntary manslaughter charge due to the cooling off 

period). See also Hatchett v. State, 259 Ga. 857, 858 (1) (388 SE2d 

694) (1990) (three-week interval between defendant’s discovery of a 

love letter to the victim and the alleged shooting sufficient to 

authorize the trial court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the 

discovery did not constitute provocation warranting a voluntary 

manslaughter charge because of the “lengthy cooling off period”).
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Moreover, as for evidence of the “violent exchange” between 

Jones and Gibson before the shooting, Adrece’s testimony was that 

after Jones left the vehicle and confronted Gibson, the two “had some 

kind of words” and that Gibson said “No, no, no,” before attempting 

to run away from Jones, who shot at him. This Court has previously 

stated that “[a]s a matter of law, angry statements alone ordinarily 

do not amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA 

§ 16-5-2 (a).” Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 331 (2) (737 SE2d 73) 

(2013). See also Orr v. State, 312 Ga. 317, 321 (2) (862 SE2d 513) 

(2021) (same); Jones, 301 Ga. at 6-7 (2) (evidence that appellant 

appeared to exchange angry words with rival gang members prior to 

shooting did not support voluntary manslaughter instruction).

Thus, we cannot say that the trial court clearly or obviously erred in 

concluding that there was no evidence of serious provocation, and 

therefore we conclude that the trial court did not plainly err in 

declining to give a charge on voluntary manslaughter.

3. Jones next argues that his conviction for malice murder 

should be reversed because he received ineffective assistance at trial 
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due to his counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s refusal to 

charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Because Jones cannot 

establish that his counsel was constitutionally deficient, his claim 

fails.

In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, 

[Jones] must prove both that his trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable 

probability that the trial result would have been different 

if not for the deficient performance. If an appellant fails 

to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 

80 LE2d 674) (1984) test, the reviewing court does not 

have to examine the other prong. In reviewing the trial 

court’s decision, we accept the trial court’s factual 

findings and credibility determinations unless clearly 

erroneous, but we independently apply the legal 

principles to the facts.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lyons v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 25 

(8) (843 SE2d 825) (2020). 

As we explained above in Division 2, even if Jones’s trial 

counsel had preserved an objection to the trial court’s failure to give 

an instruction on voluntary manslaughter by objecting as set forth 

in OCGA § 17-8-58 (a), such an objection would have been meritless, 

as there was no basis for the trial court to instruct the jury on 
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voluntary manslaughter. Trial counsel’s performance is not deficient 

where he fails to make a meritless objection. See Lyons, 309 Ga. at 

27 (8) (b) (“Failure to lodge meritless objections does not support an 

ineffective assistance claim.”). This claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel therefore fails.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.