Filed 9/18/14 In re N.A. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re N.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B254885 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK01210)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa Sullivan, Judge. Affirmed. Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Da wyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 This appeal concerns one of mothe r’s three children – N.A., who was three years old at the time the juvenile court took jurisdiction over her and her two siblings. It is undisputed that mother placed the child ren at substantial risk of harm. N.A.’s father T.A. (father) argues that jurisdicti on was unwarranted because he was awarded custody of N.A., and she was safe in his care . We reject father’s contention that the juvenile court was required to terminate juri sdiction, and affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

1. Petition In a single count petition, the Los Ange les County Department of Children and Family Services alleged: “The children [K .S.], [N.A.], and [T.A.’s ] mother [S.S.] has mental and emotional problems including diagnoses of Schizoaffective Disorder, Major Depression with suicidal and homi cidal ideation, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, paranoia and visual hallucinations which renders the mother incapable of providing the children with regular care and supervis ion. On numerous prior occasions, the mother was hospitalized fo r the evaluation and treatment of the mother’s mental and emotional problems. On prior occasions, th e mother failed to take the mother’s psychotropic medication as prescribed. The mother failed to follow through with psychiatric services for over 5 years. Remedial services failed to resolve the family problems in that the mother continues to fail to follow-through with psychiatric services and mental health coun seling. The mother’s mental and emotional problems endanger the children’s physical health and safety, placing the children at risk of physical harm, damage and danger.”

2. Detention The detention report indicated that mother made homicidal and suicidal ideations after giving birth to T.A. Moth er also had a history of mental illness.

Mother admitted to homicidal hallucinations and paranoid thinking. She had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, depr ession, and posttraumatic stress disorder.3 Mother confirmed she suffered from mental il lness and stated that she stopped taking her medication because she was pregnant. With respect to father, a referral wa s generated after mother accused him of threatening to kill her. Fath er denied the allegation, a nd DCFS found it inconclusive.

Father said he found out ab out mother “being crazy when the police came to the home because she had destroyed the tires on [his ] car and would not calm down.” Father refused to comply with a voluntary case plan recommended by DCFS. With mother’s approval, N.A. was placed in father’s care. But while father was grocery shopping with N.A. mother “snatched” N.A. Father called the sheriff’s department. The court found a prima facie basis for detaining the children. N.A. was released to father. Prior to detention, N.A. lived with mother, and father visited her on

the weekends. 3. Jurisdiction In its jurisdictional report, DCFS expl ained that father denied knowing mother

suffered from mental illness un til he “saw the paperwork” presumably referring to the reports in this case. DCFS wanted to furt her investigate an alle gation by K.S. (N.A.’s sister) that father beat mo ther and put a gun to her head. Maternal grandmother reported that father was verbally abusive toward mother when mother lived with

father. Mother expressed an interest in reunifying with her children.

No witness testified at the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Father did not contest jurisdiction but his counsel argued with respect to disposition, claiming that jurisdiction shou ld be terminated because fa ther provided a safe home for N.A. who was no longer at risk. Fathe r’s counsel acknowledged that if a family law order included visitation, DCFS “w ould have to assi st with that.” The court rejected father’s request to te rminate jurisdiction. The court declared the children, including N.A ., dependents of the court un der Welfare and Institutions4 Code section 300. The court ordered N.A. removed from mother’s custody and placed in father’s custody. The court ordered DCFS to provide father with a written visitation

schedule to facilitate N.A.’s visits with her siblings and mother. DCFS was ordered to provide mother reunification services.

DISCUSSION Father argues the court was required to terminate jurisdiction over N.A. as soon as it placed N.A. in his custody. We disagree. 1. Jurisdiction Father does not dispute that mother placed N.A. at risk, warranting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but argues that because N.A. was safe in his custody the juvenile court should not have taken jurisdiction over her. Father relies on In re

Phoenix B. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 787 ( Phoenix B .) and In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525. We conclude the juvenile court properly took jurisdiction over N.A., even though she was releas ed to father’s custody.

Phoenix B . involved the review of a juven ile court’s decision to refrain from asserting jurisdiction after the department of social services concluded there was no basis for the detention of the child Phoenix. ( Phoenix B., supra , 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 792.) The mother was involuntarily hosp italized and Phoenix ha d been released to her father’s care. ( Id . at p. 791.) The court explained that when “the child’s welfare warrants dependency and the required jurisdic tional findings can be sustained, courts will go forward with the proceedings even wh ere there is an ‘innocent’ parent.” ( Id . at p. 793.) However, in Phoenix B. , the department decided to dismiss the dependency proceedings because father cared for Phoenix and theref ore “there was no basis for assuming dependency jurisdiction.” ( Ibid .) This case is distinguishable from Phoenix B. because DCFS did not dismiss the dependency petitio n and review is not from an order de clining to assume jurisdiction. The procedural posture is signifi cant because here father did not challenge the5 assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary , his counsel acknowledged that father was “not involved in the jurisdiction.” Thus, father’s reliance on Phoenix B. is misplaced. Even if father had challenged jurisdicti on in the trial court, we would conclude jurisdiction was warranted. At that time th ere were allegations that K.S. accused father of putting a gun to mother’s head. 1 Our record does not show that this allegation was substantiated, but its serious nature warran ted further investigation to

ensure that N.A. was not at risk of harm. Additionally, it is significant that father refused to participate in voluntary maintena nce services because such refusal impeded DCFS’s opportunity to ensure N.A.’s safety in father’s custody.

In re A.J. is similarly unhelpful to father. In that case a mother challenged the juvenile court’s decision to terminate jurisd iction after placing the child A.J. with her father. ( In re A.J., supra , 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 527 .) At a contested disposition hearing, the department recommended that A.J. be placed with her father and that the juvenile court terminate jurisdiction. ( Id . at pp. 531-532.) A.J. told the social worker

that she wished to live with her father. ( Id . at p. 533.) The juvenile court utilized its inherent authority to order A.J. placed with her father. ( Id . at p. 537.) It did not immediately terminate jurisdiction but provide d the parties two months “to ensure that all satisfactory arrangements for A.J.’s care and education in Hawaii had been successfully put in place before finalizing its order.” ( Id . at p. 540.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction. ( Id . at p. 543.) Although In re A.J. suggests that a juvenile court may terminate jurisdiction when a child is placed with a noncustodial parent, it does not hold that termination was required. Here, father fails to show that the court’s discretionary decision to retain jurisdiction requires reversal. Moreover, the f act that father did not contest jurisdiction in the juvenile court further supports the conclusion that reversal of jurisdiction on appeal is unwarranted.

1 K.S could have been reporting allegations made by mother, which father denied. Father also denied owning a gun.6 2. Disposition Father’s failure to contest jurisdiction is understandable in li ght of his counsel’s argument at the dispositional phase that cust ody should be awarded to father and that the court should terminate juri sdiction as to N.A. only. As father acknowledges, Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2 governs the retention of jurisdiction when, as here , the court removes a child from a custodial parent and places the child wi th a noncustodial parent. The juvenile court has three options: (1) it can terminate its jurisdiction, (2) order the noncustodial parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the j uvenile court and order a home visit within three months, or (3) order the parent assume custody subject to the supervision of the juvenile court. (§ 361.2, su bd. (b).) Under the last scen ario, the juvenile court “may order that reunification services be provided to the parent or guardian from whom the child is being removed, or the court may orde r that services be pr ovided solely to the parent who is assuming physi cal custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without court supervision, or that serv ices be provided to both parents . . . .” (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) In making its disposition and rejecting fath er’s request to terminate jurisdiction, the court expressed concern that father wa s unaware mother had any mental health problems. The court was concerned father would not be able to protect N.A. when

mother is unstable. The court wanted to ensure that mother had adequate visitation

and that N.A. had visits with her siblings. Father fails to demonstrate the court acted outside its discretion in concluding contin ued jurisdiction was warranted. Although father correctly points out that other appellate courts have affirmed the termination of jurisdiction when a noncustodial parent is aw arded custody, father fails to show that result was compelled in this case. 2

2 In In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4t h 1069, 1071, the court affirmed the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion to terminate ju risdiction after a child was placed with her noncustodial parent who did “‘everything . . . asked’ ” of him “‘and more’” including7 DISPOSITION The juvenile court orders are affirmed.

FLIER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

voluntary services. ( Id . at p. 1075.) In In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1447, we affirmed an order terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody to the children’s father.