United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1518

___________

Thomas Jacobs, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

United Steelworkers of America, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 5, 2002

Filed: November 12, 2002

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Jacobs appeals an adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims

against the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). Jacobs claims the USWA

discriminated against him based on his age, race, and national origin, and that it

retaliated against him for raising complaints about discrimination. We review the

grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party and affirming if there are no disputed issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
*

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

-2-

First, Jacobs claims the USWA discriminated against him on the basis of his

age. Jacobs’s age discrimination claim, however, is barred by Minnesota’s one-year

statute of limitations. See Winkels v. George A. Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567, 570

(8th Cir. 1989) (cases filed in state court are governed by state procedural rules);

Minn. Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3 (2000) (statute of limitations for age discrimination

claims is one year). Jacobs did not raise claims of age discrimination in his EEOC

complaint; he did not claim he suffered from age discrimination after he resigned; and

he did not serve the USWA with notice of the lawsuit until June 27, 2002–more than

one year after his employment ended. See Ochs v. Streater, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 858,

859 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (a lawsuit begins when the defendant is served with

notice). The district court*

 properly concluded Jacobs’s age discrimination claim is

time-barred. 

Second, Jacobs asserts the USWA discriminated against him on the basis of his

race and national origin (Hispanic and Native American) when it failed adequately

to grieve Jacobs’s complaints about his employer. Title VII and the Minnesota

Human Rights Act (MHRA) both prohibit labor organizations from discriminating

against their members on the basis of race and national origin. See, e.g., Thorn v.

Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 01-3085, 2002 WL 31155112, at *3 (8th Cir. Sept.

30, 2002). In Thorn, we explained the limits of unions’ obligations under Title VII

and the MHRA:

A labor organization is liable for an employer’s discrimination in the

workplace if it causes or attempts to cause the employer to discriminate, §

2000e-2(c)(3); or if the union ‘purposefully acts or refuses to act in a manner

which prevents or obstructs a reasonable accommodation by his employer,’ 

. . . or if the union ‘pursue[s] a policy of rejecting disparate-treatment

grievances’ meant to vindicate employee rights protected by Title VII . . . . 

. . . .
-3-

Though the Unions were prohibited from causing or assisting unlawful

discrimination by Thorn’s employer, nowhere in either statute do we find

language imposing upon unions an affirmative duty to investigate and take

steps to remedy employer discrimination. 

Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted). Jacobs raises many concerns about his

employer’s actions, but we cannot say Jacobs suffered discrimination or retaliation

at the hands of the USWA. Thus, we conclude the district court properly granted

summary judgment on Jacobs’s claims of race and national origin discrimination, and

on his claims of retaliation.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. See

8th Cir. R. 47B. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.