alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.9(b)

 Schedule of Secured Convertible Notes (refinancings through October 31, 2005)
        Issued by NCT Group, Inc. to Carole Salkind and Outstanding as of
                                October 31, 2005


                                                              Conversion
    Issue Date         Due Date          Principal               Price
    ----------         --------          ---------               -----
     05/18/05          11/18/05      $    485,934.02            $0.0123
     06/10/05          12/10/05         1,465,534.55            $0.0100
     07/08/05          01/08/06        27,129,266.96            $0.0120
     08/01/05          02/08/06        13,349,878.22            $0.0101
     08/10/05          02/10/06        18,681,625.40            $0.0100
     08/24/05          02/24/06           979,259.94            $0.0080
     09/26/05          03/26/06         3,255,753.98            $0.0060
     09/30/05          03/30/06           444,872.73            $0.0050
     10/18/05          04/18/06           968,035.46            $0.0049
     10/31/05          04/30/06         1,625,612.05            $0.0044

                                    ------------------
                                     $ 68,385,773.31
                                    ==================
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss.1350



In connection with the filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission of BBJ Environmental Technologies,
Inc.s (the Company) Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 (the Report), the undersigned, the Executive Chairman, acting Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies in my
capacity as an officer of the Company, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of ss.13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The above certification is given as of the date of the Report
and is limited to the periods covered by the Report.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Certificate on November 10, 2003.



By:

/s/ Robert G. BakerRobert G. Baker, Executive Chairman, actingChief Executive Officer




A signed
original or this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission of its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-10531

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

KEVIN DEANTHONY TERRY, also known as Detroit, also known as Darrell,

also known as KD,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:11-CR-52-1

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and OWEN and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.1

PER CURIAM:**

Kevin Deanthony Terry appeals the sentence imposed after revocation of

his supervised release. Terry argues that his 18-month sentence is unreasonable

because the district court relied on a prohibited sentencing factor, his need for

a support system and a place to live, to impose or lengthen the sentence.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 29, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

1 Graves, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment only.

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-10531 Document: 00512191523 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2013
No. 12-10531

Because Terry did not object to the reasonableness of his sentence based

upon the district court’s reference to his homelessness/rehabilitative needs, our

review of that issue is limited to plain error. See United States v. Garza, ___

F.3d ___, No. 11-10543, 2013 WL 398760 at *4 (5th Cir.Feb. 1, 2013). In Tapia

v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011), the Supreme Court held in the

context of an appeal from an initial sentencing that a district court “may not

impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a

treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” We have now

concluded that the holding in Tapia applies with equal force in the context of a

revocation sentencing. Garza, 2013 WL 398760 at **2-3.

The district court in this case stated that an 18-month sentence was

proper because it would afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and give

Terry, who was homeless, a support system and a place to live. This statement

was the district court’s sole remark regarding Terry’s particular needs. As the

record does not indicate that the district court imposed or lengthened Terry’s

prison term for the purpose of making him eligible for any rehabilitative

program, no Tapia error occurred. See United States v. Receskey, 699 F.3d 807,

811-12 (5th Cir. 2012). Even if the district court’s mention of Terry’s need for

a support system and a place to live could be construed as a reliance on his

rehabilitative needs in imposing sentence, there is no error. In light of the

district court’s statement that it imposed the sentence to provide adequate

deterrence and to protect the public, the record does not indicate that Terry’s

need for treatment was a dominant factor in the court’s sentencing analysis. See

Garza, 2013 WL 398760 at **3-4; Receskey, 699 F.3d at 812. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 12-10531 Document: 00512191523 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/29/2013
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  the  undersigned,  A.  F.  Petrocelli,  Chairman,
President and Chief Executive  Officer of United Capital Corp. (the  "Company"),
does hereby  certify,  with respect to the Annual  Report of the Company on Form
10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report") that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  March 21, 2005
                                      /a/ A. F. Petrocelli
                                      ------------------------------------
                                      A. F. Petrocelli
                                      Chairman, President and
                                      Chief Executive Officer
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GAIL RENITA ALLEN,

Defendant,

and

FELDER SERVICES, INC., 

and its successors or assigns,

Garnishee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CRIM. NO. 08-00378-001-CG

FINAL ORDER OF WAGE GARNISHMENT 

This matter comes before this Court on the Joint Motion for Entry of Final 

Order of Wage Garnishment filed January 22, 2014, (Doc. 30). The parties have 

agreed and stipulated to the entry of this Final Order of Wage Garnishment. 

It is therefore ORDERED that the Joint Motion be GRANTED as set out 

below:

1. The Garnishee, Felder Services, Inc., shall pay into the hands of the U.S. 

Clerk of Court, at least monthly, the lesser of:

a. 18% per pay period

b. All amounts of Defendant’s disposable earnings in excess of thirty 

times the federal minimum hourly wage.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a).

Case 1:08-cr-00378-CG-C Document 31 Filed 01/23/14 Page 1 of 3
2

To calculate the disposable earnings, the Garnishee will subtract the 

following from wages, commissions, bonuses, and income:

1. Federal Income Tax

2. Federal Social Security Tax;

3. Medicare

4. State Adjusted Gross Income Tax;

5. County Option Tax (if any).

Checks should be made payable to, and mailed to:

Clerk of Court

U.S. District Court

113 St. Joseph Street

Mobile, AL 36602

Ref: Gail Renita Allen/08-00378-001

2. These garnished sums are to be applied upon the Judgment rendered in this 

case on May 20, 2009, in the amount of $52,200.00, upon which there is an 

unpaid balance of $50,586.74 as of January 23, 2014. These deductions are to 

continue until the unpaid balance, plus accruing interest, if any, is fully paid 

and satisfied or until the garnishee no longer has possession or control of 

salary, wages, or other compensation belonging to the defendant. 

3. Garnishee will notify the United States Attorney’s Office, Attn: Financial 

Litigation Unit, 63 S. Royal Street, Suite 600, Mobile, Alabama 36602, within 

ten (10) days of defendant's termination or resignation.

4. Plaintiff, United States, will make an annual accounting to the Garnishee 

and Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §3205(c)(9)(A). 

Case 1:08-cr-00378-CG-C Document 31 Filed 01/23/14 Page 2 of 3
3

5. The United States will conduct a bi-annual review of Defendant’s financial 

condition and ability to pay, and may request this Court amend the wage 

garnishment percentage withheld.

6. This Order shall take effect after all prior orders of garnishment, if any, have 

been satisfied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(8), judicial orders and 

garnishments for the support of a person shall have priority over this Writ of 

Garnishment. As to any other writ of garnishment or levy, this Writ of 

Garnishment has prior over writs which are issued later in time.

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2014.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:08-cr-00378-CG-C Document 31 Filed 01/23/14 Page 3 of 3
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-2967

_____________________________

SALINA TUCKER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

___________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Robert Wheeler, Judge.

January 26, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

JAY, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized 

motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF MAGNITUDE  INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         000838796
<NAME>                        Magnitude Information Systems, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                      1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jul-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                           680,866
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    465,647
<ALLOWANCES>                                       6,646
<INVENTORY>                                        8,670
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,780,084
<PP&E>                                           295,032
<DEPRECIATION>                                   176,978
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3,052,035
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,142,013
<BONDS>                                          374,890
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                          490
<COMMON>                                           1,619
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,520,018
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   3,052,035
<SALES>                                          601,790
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 601,790
<CGS>                                            126,394
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,046,219
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,761,420
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               148,934
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (2,481,177)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (2,481,177)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (2,481,177)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      (0.17)



</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-21-00007-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF H.S., a Child

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019PA01861

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ALVAREZ, JUSTICE CHAPA, AND JUSTICE VALENZUELA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant is unable to afford payment of costs; no costs are taxed in this appeal.

SIGNED June 23, 2021.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the balance
sheet of CNL Income Fund VI, Ltd. at September 30, 1997, and its statement of
income for the nine months then ended and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to the Form 10Q of CNL Income Fund VI, Ltd. for the nine months ended
September 30, 1997.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       5,012,000<F2>
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  349,682
<ALLOWANCES>                                   273,873
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                      22,759,789
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,213,693
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,418,874
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  29,274,896
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,418,874
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,370,790
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  511,548
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                13,102
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,593,029
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,593,029
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,593,029
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F2>Cash balance includes $3,392,257 in restricted cash.
<F1>Due to the nature of its industry, CNL Income Fund VI, Ltd. has an
unclassified balance sheet, therefore, no values are shown above for current
assets and current liabilities.
</FN>
        



</TABLE>
#### Tobe Bligh *v.*Commonwealth.

Homicide — Instruction.

An instruction that if the jury believe from, the evidence that W. was killed as charged, and that the accused was voluntarily present and “approved” of the killing of W., such voluntary presence and approval render him equally guilty with the actual perpetrator of the homicide, without stating what acts would constitute aiding, abetting or other participation in the' crime, was held erroneous.

APPEAL, PROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT.

March 12, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

The only questions to be determined in this case, are as to the correctness of the action of the court in giving and refusing instructions to the jury.

In the first, second and sixth instructions which were given, the court, upon the hypothesis that Chiles was shot and killed by Williams, told the jury, in substance and effect, for their guidance in passing on the question of the guilt or innocence of the appellant, as a principal in the second degree, that if from the evidence they should believe that Williams was guilty as charged, and that the appellant was at the time voluntarily present and “approved” of the killing, such voluntary presence and approval rendered him equally guilty with the actual perpetrator of the homicide. ■

*577
      *W. Howell, for appellant.*

*J. R. Robinson, Attorney-General, for appellee.*

It is a familiar and well established principle that: “To constitute principals in the second degree, there must be, in the first place, a participation in the act committed, and in the second place, presence, either actual or constructive, at the time of the commission.” Wharton on Crim. Law, 4th -edition 120. This court declared in the case of Plummer v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush 76, that the mere fact of the presence of an accused party at the commission of a crime by another, and his “consent” to the act committed, did not, of themselves, constitute a participation in the act; and it was misleading and erroneous to so instruct the jury as to authorize the finding of a verdict of “guilty,” without defining to them what acts were legally sufficient to constitute an aiding, abetting, or other actual participation in the commission of the act. We do not think that the word “approve,” as used in the instructions in this case, 'imparts more than the mere consent in its usual and ordinary acceptation. It results that, in our opinion, the court erred to the appellant’s prejudice, in giving the particular instructions we have indicated.

The law governing the action of the jury, in the event that they should have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s having been proved to be guilty, does not appear to have been properly given to the jury, although the court was substantially asked to do so in one of the instructions which were offered for the defendant and refused: On this subject the court should have instructed the jury in accordance with Sec. 236, Criminal Code of, Practice.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial in conformity to this opinion.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 7, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50304 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ANTONIA RODRIGUEZ, also known as Paula Rodriguez, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:04-CR-1621-ALL

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Antonia Rodriguez raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Edward Dowling v. David Bergin.

*Specific performance*— Agreement *with party not holding full title.*

A father verbally gave his son a tract of land and put him in possession, and the son made improvements on it, and grew a crop of wheat. A person seeking to buy the land bargained with the son, whose rights he knew, but failing to agree with him, closed a contract with the father which it was agreed should be kept from the son’s knowledge. The father afterwards refused to give a deed except subject to his son’s claim for the wheat crop, and the purchaser filed a bill against him for'specific performance. *Held,*that the bill was properly dismissed. The son was not a party and could not be bound by a decree. Complainant knew the father could not sell such interests as the son owned, and having no equities could not ask a court of equity to create complications in the title, but should be left to seek a remedy at law.

Appeal from Livingston.

Submitted October 18.

Decided October 26.

Specific performance. Complainant appeals.

Dismissal affirmed.

*Waddell <& Montague*for complainant.

*D. Shields*and *H. H. Harmon*for defendant.

Campbell, J.

Dowling brought a suit in equity in Livingston county for specific performance. The contract was in writing and free from ambiguity, but the grantor, who is defendant, refused to give a warranty deed, except subject to his son’s claim for the wheat crop on the place.

It appears that a son of defendant had been in possession of the tract of forty acres in dispute, as part of a larger tract, which the father had verbally given him and put in his possession, and on which he had made improvements. It was known by complainant to be his in that sense, and all the preliminary bargaining for the property was between complainant and the young man. They did not come to an agreement, and complainant then went secretly to the father *189and got Mm to close a contract, wMeh it was agreed should not be made known to the son.

The son was entitled to possession, and owned the wheat. Upon the facts in this case it is by no means clear that he was not equitable owner of the land. Complainant knew that the father could not sell such interests as the son owned, or deprive Mm of any of Ms rights. Under such circumstances we tMnk he must seek his legal remedy against the father, and not ask a court of equity to enforce it by creating complications in the title. The son is not a party to this suit and cannot be bound by the decree, and the complainant has no equities, whatever may be his rights at law.

The decree dismissing the bill should be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.