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No. 113,098

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

NAVID YEASIN,

Appellee,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

Parties in an agency action before the district court under the Kansas Judicial 

Review Act may appeal the district court's decision to the appellate courts, just as parties 

do in other civil cases. An appellate court then exercises the same statutorily limited 

review as though the petition for review had been directly filed in the appellate court.

2.

Appellate courts no longer apply the doctrine of operative construction or extend 

deference to an agency's or board's statutory interpretation.

3.

An appellate court exercises unlimited review on questions of statutory 

interpretation without deference to a university's interpretation of its student code.

Appeal from Douglas District Court; ROBERT W. FAIRCHILD, judge. Opinion filed September 25, 

2015. Affirmed.
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Sara L. Trower, associate general counsel and special assistant attorney general, for appellant. 

Terence E. Leibold, of Petefish, Immel, Heeb & Hird, LLP, of Lawrence, for appellee.

Stephen Douglas Bonney, for amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Kansas.

Don Saxton, for amici curiae Student Press Law Center and Foundation for Individual Rights in 

Education.

Maureen A. Redeker and Peter J. Paukstelis, for amicus curiae Kansas State University.

Before GREEN, P.J., HILL, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, District Judge, assigned.

HILL, J.: During the summer break of 2013, Navid Yeasin engaged in 

reprehensible, demeaning, and criminal behavior with W., who is also a University of 

Kansas student. In addition, Yeasin posted a series of puerile and sexually harassing 

tweets on his account. None of this conduct occurred on campus or at a University 

sponsored or supervised event. The Student Code, the rules by which the University can 

impose discipline upon its students, deals only with conduct on campus or at University 

sponsored or supervised events. We therefore hold that the University had no authority to 

expel Yeasin. We affirm the district court's similar ruling and dissolve the stay order 

issued in this case. 

The dating relationship of two students deteriorates. 

Yeasin and W. met during the fall semester of 2012 when both students were 

enrolled in the same geology class at the University of Kansas. They dated off and on 

from November 2012 through May 2013. Their relationship was turbulent. 

In late June 2013, Yeasin drove W. to see her therapist. While she was at her 

therapy session, Yeasin stayed in the car and read text and Facebook messages on W.'s 
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phone. When W. returned, Yeasin angrily confronted W. about some messages she had 

sent to another man. The argument continued as they drove around Olathe. W. told 

Yeasin she did not want to spend the day with him and to take her back to her car. Yeasin 

became angry again but agreed. 

Once at W.'s car, Yeasin took W.'s phone, locked the car doors, and then drove 

away with W. Yeasin told W. that he was going to make her pay for what she had done. 

W. repeatedly asked Yeasin to let her out of the car, and he refused. Yeasin also refused 

to return W.'s phone and physically prevented her from taking her phone back. When W. 

told Yeasin that she was scared and to take her home, Yeasin responded, "'[N]o, not until 

you pay the consequences for what you've done and make sure you'll never do this 

again.'" Sometime between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m., Yeasin took W. back to the parking lot 

where her car was parked. W. left when a friend picked her up in the parking lot around 

10 p.m. Yeasin called W. around 1 a.m. threatening her, and at one point told her he 

"would make it so that [W.] wouldn't be welcome at any of the universities in Kansas." 

W. reported this confrontation to the police. The State charged Yeasin with 

criminal restraint, battery, and criminal deprivation of property. Yeasin subsequently 

entered into a diversion agreement with the State on the criminal charges in August 2013. 

In a companion case, the Johnson County District Court issued a final order of protection 

from abuse directing Yeasin to have no contact with W. for 1 year. 

Yeasin's victim complains to the University authorities. 

Back on campus in August 2013, W. filed a complaint with the Office of 

Institutional Opportunity and Access. Generally known by the acronym IOA, it is the

office responsible for investigating complaints of discrimination and harassment at the 

University. 
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On August 8, 2013, an IOA investigator, Jennifer Brooks, interviewed W. 

regarding her complaint. The IOA opened an investigation. That same day, Yeasin 

tweeted, "On the brightside you won't have mutated kids. #goodriddens." About a week 

later, IOA Investigator Steve Steinhilber interviewed Yeasin regarding the complaint. 

Steinhilber advised Yeasin of his rights and responsibilities during the investigation. 

After considering the Johnson County District Court's final protection from abuse 

order, the IOA decided to issue a no-contact order because Yeasin had engaged in 

abusive and threatening behavior that made W. afraid to be on campus and continued to 

post tweets regarding W., which were creating further distress and fear. Specifically, the 

no-contact order warned Yeasin of possible expulsion:

"You are hereby informed that this 'no contact' order means that you understand 

you are prohibited from initiating, or contributing through third-parties, to any physical, 

verbal, electronic, or written communication with [W.], her family, her friends or her 

associates. This also includes a prohibition from interfering with her personal 

possessions. . . . Moreover, retaliation against persons who may pursue or participate in a 

University investigation, whether by you directly or by your associates, is a violation of 

University policy. 

"A violation of this ruling could result in . . . formal removal from the premises 

and a recommendation for further conduct sanctioning; including, but not limited to, 

suspension and expulsion from the University."

That same evening, Yeasin tweeted, "'Jesus Navid, how is it that you always end 

up dating the psycho bitches?' #butreallyguys." The next day, on August 15, 2013, Yeasin 

tweeted, "'Oh right, negative boob job. I remember her.'" A week later on August 23, 

2013, Yeasin tweeted, "'If I could say one thing to you it would probably be "Go fuck 

yourself you piece of shit." #butseriouslygofuckyourself #crazyassex.'" Then, on 

September 5, 2013, Yeasin tweeted, "'Lol, she goes up to my friends and hugs them and 

then unfriends them on Facebook. #psycho #lolwhat.'" 
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On September 6, 2013, W. told Brooks about the August 23, 2013, tweet Yeasin 

posted. That same day, Brooks sent Yeasin an email to clarify that even though the 

August 23, 2013, tweet Yeasin posted did not identify W. by name, the tweet was a form 

of communication in violation of the no-contact order. Brooks gave Yeasin a second 

warning that "[g]oing forward, if you make any reference regarding [W.], directly or 

indirectly, on any type of social media or other communication outlet, you will be 

immediately referred to the Student Conduct Officer for possible sanctions which may 

result in expulsion from the University." (Emphasis added.)

Some 7 hours later, on September 7, 2013, Yeasin tweeted, "lol you're so obsessed 

with me you gotta creep on me using your friends accounts #crazybitch." Then, on 

September 13, 2013, Yeasin tweeted, "30 Reasons to Love Natural Breasts 

totalfratmove.com/30-reasons-to-. . .via@totalfratmove #doublenegativeboobjob." 

On September 17, 2013, the IOA Executive Director Jane McQueeney, concerned 

that Yeasin's "behavior was escalating" and that he did not understand the no-contact 

order, conducted a follow-up interview with Yeasin. 

At that interview, McQueeney reiterated to Yeasin that both the protection order 

and no-contact order forbade direct and indirect contact with W. Yeasin acknowledged 

understanding the no-contact order as meaning he was not to contact W. and stated, "'the 

twitter thing was a lapse on my part.'" Yeasin expressed that it had not occurred to him 

that a tweet would be a violation of the protection order or no-contact order and that he 

had not intended his tweets to reach W. Yeasin stated that he did not post any other 

tweets about W. after receiving the September 6, 2013, email from Brooks. Yeasin did 

admit to posting the August 8, 2013, and August 23, 2013, tweets and confirmed they 

were both about W. However, he claimed that the September 7, 2013, tweet using the 

hashtag "crazybitch" referred to someone else, not W., and that only the hashtag 

"#crazyassex" or "#psycho" would be referring to W. Yeasin acknowledged that the 
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August 8, 2013, tweet might have been referring to W.'s "'spine thing'" and that he knew 

W. had gotten breast implants and had inherited a rib cage deformity but claimed that the 

September 13, 2013, tweet was not about W., her medical issues, or her surgery. Yeasin 

told McQueeney that he would not tweet anything that could be perceived as being 

directed at W. and he recognized doing so was a violation of both the protection order 

and the no-contact order.

The IOA completed its investigation and issued a report to Tammara Durham, 

Vice Provost of Student Affairs. The report recommended that disciplinary action should 

be taken against Yeasin. The IOA report concluded that "while some of the conduct in 

this case occurred off campus this past summer," the preponderance of the evidence 

nevertheless showed that Yeasin's conduct had affected the on-campus environment for 

W., thus violating the University's sexual harassment policy. The IOA also found that 

Yeasin knowingly and purposefully violated the no-contact order by continually 

"harassing" W. on social media even after being informed that this indirect contact was in 

violation of that no-contact order. The IOA communicated its findings and 

recommendations to Yeasin the same day and reiterated to him that the no-contact order 

remained in effect. 

After receiving the IOA report, the Director of Student Conduct & Community 

Standards, Nicholas Kehrwald, set a formal hearing and gave notice to Yeasin. Pointing 

to the IOA's findings, Kehrwald repeated the allegations against Yeasin and specified that 

Yeasin's conduct violated Article 22.A.1 of the Student Code, the University's sexual 

harassment policy, and the no-contact order. Kehrwald complained of Yeasin's conduct 

off campus having an effect on campus:

"[R]epeatedly posting demeaning tweets referenced at [W.], physically restraining [W.] 

in your car on July 1, 2013. IOA's finding was based on the fact that you held [W.], 

against her will, for three hours in your car, yelled at [W.], called her demeaning names, 
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and threatened suicide when she attempted to break-up with you. The record also 

indicates that you have had electronic communications directed at [W.] after August 14, 

2013. While some of these actions have occurred off-campus, the record demonstrates the 

relationship and behavior has had on-campus [effects] for [W.]" 

Kehrwald advised Yeasin that a formal student conduct hearing would be held on 

November 4, 2013, and the no-contact order remained in effect. 

On October 23, 2013, Yeasin tweeted, "'At least I'm proportionate.' #NDB #boobs 

@MorganLCox." 

At the student conduct hearing, the hearing panel told Yeasin that the charges 

against him were for violating Article 22.A.1 of the Student Code and the University's 

sexual harassment policy. The hearing panel then reviewed the written documents from 

the case file and then heard from W., IOA Executive Director McQueeney, IOA 

Investigators Steinhilber and Brooks, and Yeasin. 

The hearing panel found that Yeasin more likely than not had violated both Article 

22.A.1 and the University's sexual harassment policy. 

In the panel's view, Yeasin's behavior threatened the physical health, welfare, and 

safety of W. Specifically, the panel focused on Yeasin's off-campus actions: 

"Yeasin physically restrained [W.] in his car, yelled at her for hours and 

demonstrated hostile, controlling and unstable behavior, making [W.] afraid for her 

safety. [W.] repeatedly expressed during the time she was restrained in the car, 'I am 

scared. I am scared for my safety. [. . .] I do not feel safe.'" 

Then, citing various tweets Yeasin posted after the no-contact order and the September 7, 

2013, tweet Yeasin posted after receiving the September 6, 2013, email from the IOA 
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clarifying the no-contact order, the hearing panel also found that Yeasin had violated the 

no-contact order: 

"Yeasin repeatedly followed and attempted to make unwanted contact, including 

but not limited to physical or electronic contact with [W.] via text message, twitter and in 

person after the no-contact order had been delivered to Yeasin, and after IOA had made 

clarification with Yeasin that any reference regarding W., directly or indirectly, was a 

violation of the no-contact order." 

In concluding that Yeasin violated the University's sexual harassment policy, the 

hearing panel found "the behavior of Yeasin is unwelcome, based upon sex or sex 

stereotypes, and are so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that they have the 

purpose or effect of substantially interfering with [W.'s] academic performance or 

participation in the University's programs and activities." 

To support its findings, the panel cited Yeasin's off-campus conduct towards W. 

on June 29, 2013, his threat towards W. on the morning of June 30, 2013, "indicating he 

would make the University of Kansas campus environment so hostile, W. would not 

attend any university in the state of Kansas," and statements made by W. about the 

impact of her relationship with Yeasin and his actions. 

The hearing panel recommended that Yeasin be expelled permanently and banned 

from the University campus until W. graduated. 

After reviewing the complaint, the evidence presented at the formal hearing, and 

the hearing panel's sanction recommendations, Vice Provost Durham agreed with the 

hearing panel. The University expelled Yeasin and banned him from campus for violating 

Article 22.A.1 and the University's sexual harassment policy. In her November 13, 2013, 

decision letter, Vice Provost Durham found: 
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 Yeasin's "conduct on June 28, 2013 and subsequent electronic 

communication was so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it 

interfered with [W.'s] academic performance and equal opportunity to 

participate in and benefit from University programs and activities";

 Yeasin's tweets referencing W. both on and after August 14, 2013, violated 

the no-contact order and the September 6, 2013, clarifying email; 

 the combination of Yeasin's conduct on June 28, 2013, and violation of the 

no-contact order and the September 6, 2013, clarifying email qualified as a 

violation of the University's sexual harassment policy, specifically 

"unwelcome comments about W.'s body, unwelcome physical closeness, 

and unwelcome jokes or teasing of a sexual nature";

 Yeasin's behavior threatened the physical health, welfare, and safety of W. 

in violation of Article 22.A.1; and

 Yeasin's conduct "created an imminent threat of danger to W. on campus 

and unreasonably obstructed and interfered with her learning environment." 

Yeasin appealed his expulsion to the University Judicial Board. The Board denied 

him any relief. With this denial, Yeasin had exhausted his administrative remedies. He

then sought judicial review of the University's actions.

How the district court handled this matter. 

After pointing out that the University presented no evidence that the conduct set 

forth as the basis for the alleged Article 22 Student Code violation occurred on campus or 

at a University sponsored event, the district court found that the Student Code, as written, 

did not apply to off-campus conduct. Specifically, Article 22 of the Student Code stated 

that the misconduct in question must occur on campus or at University sponsored events. 

The language relied upon by the University from Article 20—"or as otherwise required 

by federal, state or local law"—was ambiguous as to providing notice of what conduct 
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was subject to disciplinary action. Article 18, in contrast, provided specific notice when 

the University may initiate proceedings for conduct violating federal, state, or local law 

and that such conduct must occur on campus. 

Next, given its finding that the University erroneously interpreted the Student 

Code by applying it to off-campus conduct, the district court found that the University's 

decision that Yeasin violated Article 22 was not supported by substantial evidence 

because it failed to establish that Yeasin's conduct occurred on campus or at a universitysponsored event. 

The district court ordered that the University readmit Yeasin, reimburse or credit 

Yeasin for his fall 2013 semester tuition and fees that he paid, and pay the transcript fees. 

However, the court issued a stay order at the University's request.

The University appeals the district court's grant of relief to Yeasin, and Yeasin 

cross-appeals the district court's stay of judgment. The American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation of Kansas; the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Inc., and 

Student Press Law Center; and Kansas State University each submitted an amicus curiae 

brief in support of Yeasin. 

We list the pertinent rules and policies. 

This action is brought as a judicial review of agency actions according to the 

Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 77-601 et seq. Parties in an agency 

action before the district court under the KJRA may appeal the district court's decision to 

the appellate courts, just as parties do in other civil cases. K.S.A. 77-623. We exercise the 

same statutorily limited review as though Yeasin's petition had been directly filed in this 

court. See Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. Powell, 290 Kan. 564, 567, 232 P.3d 856 (2010). 

Contrary to the University's wishes, we no longer apply the doctrine of operative 
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construction or extend deference to an agency's or board's statutory interpretation. In 

Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 296 Kan. 552, 559, 293 P.3d 723 (2013), the 

court held that the doctrine of operative construction has been abandoned, abrogated, 

disallowed, disapproved, ousted, overruled, and permanently relegated to the history 

books where it will never again affect the outcome of an appeal. In re Tax Appeal of 

LaFarge Midwest, 293 Kan. 1039, 1044, 271 P.3d 732 (2012). Thus, this court exercises 

unlimited review on questions of statutory interpretation without deference to the 

University's interpretation of its Student Code. See Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch., 

Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs., 290 Kan. 446, 457, 228 P.3d 403 (2010).

The University's Student Code and sexual harassment policy controls the issues 

arising in this case. The purpose of the Student Code is to outline the rights of students 

and many of the standards of conduct expected within the University's community. The 

Student Code advises that students must "adhere to all published rules, regulations and 

policies" and the failure to do so may subject a student to disciplinary action. The record 

on appeal discloses that posttrial, the University advised the district court that in light of 

its decision, the Student Code has been revised. Those revisions are not in the record and 

they did not affect the district court's decision. We do not consider those revisions either. 

The Student Code and the various University policies create a comprehensive 

regulatory scheme for the discipline of students. The following specific provisions of the 

Student Code bear on the issues presented in this case.

Under the Bill of Rights section, Article 2.A guarantees the right of freedom of 

expression. Article 2.C recognizes the right of a student to be "free from harassment or 

discrimination based on . . . sex." That article also directs the aggrieved student to 

University policies on sexual harassment for further guidance and clarifies that the IOA is 

responsible for inquiries regarding the University's nondiscrimination policies. 
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Article 18, under the heading "Violation of Law and University Discipline," 

describes the University's ability to hold a student accountable for his or her conduct that 

violates the law and the Student Code. The University can proceed against a student and 

not wait for the outcome of any prosecution: 

"If a violation of federal, state or local law occurs on campus and is also a 

violation of a published University regulation, the University may institute its own 

proceedings against an offender who may be subjected to criminal prosecution. 

Proceedings under the Code may be carried out prior to, simultaneously with or following 

civil or criminal proceedings without regard to the pendency of civil or criminal litigation 

in court or criminal arrest and prosecution." (Emphasis added.) 

Article 20, which falls under the heading "Privacy," is situated between two 

articles describing a student's right to privacy and the protection of a student's educational 

records. It provides: "The University may not institute disciplinary proceedings unless 

the alleged violation(s) giving rise to the disciplinary action occurs on University 

premises or at University sponsored or supervised events, or as otherwise required by 

federal, state, or local law." (Emphasis added.) 

Article 22 is under the heading "Conduct of Students and Organizations." It 

describes when a student's nonacademic misconduct is subject to disciplinary action by 

the University. Violations of policies, rules, and regulations can lead to discipline: 

"Students . . . are expected to conduct themselves as responsible members of the 

University community. While on University premises or at University sponsored or 

supervised events, students and organizations are subject to disciplinary action for 

violations of published policies, rules and regulations of the University and Regents, and 

for the following offenses: . . . . (Emphasis added.) 

One of those offenses is described in Article 22.A.1, which states a student commits an 

offense against a person when a student
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"[t]hreatens the physical health, welfare, or safety of another person, places 

another person in serious bodily harm, or uses physical force in a manner that endangers 

the health, welfare or safety of another person; or willfully, maliciously and repeatedly 

follows or attempts to make unwanted contact, including but not limited to physical or 

electronic contact, with another person. This prohibition includes, but is not limited to, 

acts of sexual assault." 

Article 22.F.2 describes the limitations of sanctioning a student for nonacademic 

misconduct and states: "No sanctions or other disciplinary measures may be imposed 

against a student . . . by the University concerning non-academic conduct other than that 

. . . prescribed in this code." 

We turn to the University's policy prohibiting sexual harassment. It states: 

"Sexual harassment is a violation of . . . federal and state law. Specifically, sexual 

harassment is a form of illegal discrimination in violation of . . . Title IX of the Education 

Amendments of 1972." The policy further describes sexual harassment, in part, as: 

"'[C]onduct which includes physical contact, advances and comments made in person 

and/or by phone, text message, email or other electronic medium, that is unwelcome; 

based on sex or gender stereotypes; and is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive 

that it interferes with a person's academic performance, employment or equal opportunity 

to participate in or benefit from University programs or activities.'" 

These are the rules we have to work with. 

Faced with a serious complaint of sexual harassment involving two students, the 

University took prompt action. It investigated the circumstances, separated as best it 

could the antagonists and removed the cause of the conflict through expulsion. The 

trouble is, the Student Code did not give the University authority to act when the 

misconduct occurred somewhere other than its campus or at University sponsored or 
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supervised events. There is no proof in the record that Yeasin posted the tweets while he 

was on campus.

Through every step of the disciplinary proceedings, the University relied on 

Article 22 of the Student Code as the basis for Yeasin's discipline. But, on appeal, the 

University cherry-picks a small phrase from Article 20 to argue that it did indeed have 

the authority to expel Yeasin for his actions in Johnson County during the summer and 

for his tweets in violation of the no-contact order. 

The University asks us to find that the district court should have interpreted the 

phrase "or as otherwise required by federal, state or local law" found in Article 20 to 

mean that the University's jurisdiction to discipline a student for violating Article 22.A. 

extended to a student's off-campus conduct. The University argues that this interpretation 

of Article 20 is consistent with the obligations imposed on it under Title IX. 

The University does not dispute that it used its student disciplinary procedure, i.e.,

the Student Code, instead of some separate grievance procedures to resolve Title IX 

complaints regarding sexual harassment grievances. 

The 2011 "Dear Colleague Letter" specifically warned that if the recipient to Title 

IX funds relies on student disciplinary procedures for Title IX compliance, it should have 

its Title IX coordinator review the recipient's disciplinary procedures to ensure that the 

procedures comply with the requirements of Title IX and then the recipient should 

"implement changes as needed." 

The University's fears of federal reprimands arising from Title IX are not without 

some merit. The "Dear Colleague Letter" sent to various educational institutions across 

the country in 2011 is filled with advice, illustrations, and implicit warnings. The loss of 
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federal funding which the U.S. Department of Education suggests is a possibility, would 

be calamitous.

In particular, one example from the letter is pertinent to this case. It deals with the 

effect of off-campus events and the on-campus environment:

"Schools may have an obligation to respond to student-on-student sexual 

harassment that initially occurred off school grounds, outside a school's education 

program or activity. If a student files a complaint with the school, regardless of where the 

conduct occurred, the school must process the complaint in accordance with its 

established procedures. Because students often experience the continuing effects of offcampus sexual harassment in the educational setting, schools should consider the effects 

of the off-campus conduct when evaluating whether there is a hostile environment on 

campus. For example, if a student alleges that he or she was sexually assaulted by another 

student off school grounds, and that upon returning to school he or she was taunted and 

harassed by other students who are the alleged perpetrator's friends, the school should 

take the earlier sexual assault into account in determining whether there is a sexually 

hostile environment. The school also should take steps to protect a student who was 

assaulted off campus from further sexual harassment or retaliation from the perpetrator 

and his or her associates."

Note the letter does not direct the school to take action off-campus. Instead, the 

letter clearly advises that the school must take steps to prevent or eliminate a sexually 

hostile environment. It seems obvious that the only environment the University can 

control is on campus or at University sponsored or supervised events. After all, the 

University is not an agency of law enforcement but is rather an institution of learning.

The University believes that to comply with Title IX requirements it must, and 

did, extend its jurisdiction to disciplining its students for off-campus misconduct. In 

contrast, Kansas State University contends in its amicus curiae brief that Title IX does 

not require a school to sanction students for off-campus conduct. 
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To resolve this first issue we need not address whether Title IX requires a recipient 

to Title IX funds to discipline off-campus conduct. Instead, the extent that a Title IX 

recipient believes it exerts jurisdiction over student conduct to comply with its Title IX 

obligations must be reflected in the language chosen for its student disciplinary 

procedures or separate procedures to resolve such complaints. In other words, if we are to 

agree that the University's jurisdiction to discipline students extended to off-campus 

misconduct, we must find that power clearly arises from the express framework of the 

Student Code and not because we simply accept that the authority should be there based 

on the University's own interpretation of Title IX.

In contrast to the University's position, Yeasin argues the University cannot claim 

Article 20 gave it jurisdiction to discipline him for off-campus conduct for two reasons. 

First, he argues the phrase the University relies upon in Article 20 is ambiguous, and 

second, the University expelled him for violating Article 22, which expressly contradicts 

any such interpretation of Article 20. Since Article 22 is the more specific section of the 

Student Code that clearly indicates where the prohibited misconduct must occur, it 

controls. 

Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation. In 

determining whether a conflict between Article 20 and Article 22 exists and how to 

resolve any such conflict, it is useful to consider certain fundamental principles of 

statutory interpretation. When we deal with cases involving enactments of the legislature, 

the most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature 

governs, if that intent can be ascertained. Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 

Kan. 605, 607, 214 P.3d 676 (2009). An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain 

legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their 

ordinary meanings. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 

906, 918, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013). 
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When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court does not speculate as 

to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily 

found in it. In re Tax Appeal of Burch, 296 Kan. 713, 722, 294 P.3d 1155 (2013). But 

when the statute's language is ambiguous, appellate courts can employ canons of 

construction to construe the legislature's intent. Northern Natural Gas Co., 296 Kan. at 

918.

Keeping these principles in mind, the claimed conflicts between the Student Code 

can be resolved. A careful reading of the plain language of the Student Code clarifies 

where the student conduct that is subject to discipline must occur. 

The University argues that the Article 20 phrase "or as otherwise required by 

federal, state or local law" nullifies the language preceding it which indicates that it can 

only institute disciplinary proceedings for conduct "on University premises or at 

University sponsored or supervised events." The University suggests that the "or" must 

be read disjunctively rather than conjunctively. Basically, this argument means Article 20 

is simply making a list of separate alternatives. 

Clearly, there are no words in the last phrase of the sentence that mentions where 

these violations of other laws may occur to be punishable. The phrase is merely a 

reference to the laws that could be violated. This portion of Article 20 is a series of "or's," 

joining phrases of equal stature: "on University premises or at University sponsored . . . 

or supervised events . . . or as otherwise required by federal law . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The sentence makes a list of alternatives. There is nothing in the language of the article, 

or the punctuation, that compels us to hold that the last "or" in this series should be read 

any differently than those that come before it. 

Our interpretation, which adds no language to the Article, creates no ambiguity 

here. The intent is clear. If there is a violation of some federal, state, or local law not 
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specified in the Student Code that occurs on University premises or at University 

sponsored or supervised events, the University can institute disciplinary proceedings 

against the offender. This interpretation is consistent with Article 18 of the Student Code. 

Other authorities can prosecute violations of those laws that occur elsewhere. The "other" 

authority here, of course, was the Johnson County District Attorney filing charges against 

Yeasin for his deplorable treatment of W. 

If we construed Article 20 as the University wants, we must insert words to the 

effect "for conduct wherever committed." The phrase then becomes, "or as otherwise 

required by federal, state, or local law for conduct wherever committed." If that is what 

the drafters of the Student Code meant, the article could have been written in that fashion. 

Unlike the preceding language in Article 20, the phrase "or as otherwise required by 

federal, state or local law" does not specify where the conduct subject to disciplinary 

proceedings under federal, state, or local law must have occurred to be punishable by the 

University. 

Furthermore, Article 20 is one of three articles located in section 16 of the Student 

Code entitled, "Privacy." This section deals with matters of confidentiality, not 

jurisdiction. Article 19 advises students that they surrender none of their privacy rights by 

joining the University. Article 21, in turn, deals extensively with the private nature of 

educational records and how the University will treat them. Within the context of privacy 

concerns, Article 20 advises students of procedural limitations. If its purpose was to 

establish when the University may institute disciplinary action or enunciate the 

University's jurisdiction, it lacks any heading to that effect. If that was the intended 

purpose, it would have been placed with or included in Article 18 in the section of the 

Student Code entitled, "Violation of Law and University Discipline." 

We must also point out that the phrase "required by law" does not even attempt to 

list what type of conduct that is subject to federal, state, or local law, is being regulated,
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or by affirming that the conduct relates in some way to the University's Title IX policies. 

The University vainly tries to pile all of this onto a phrase that is simple and 

straightforward. 

Appellate courts strive to give effect, if possible, to the various provisions of an 

entire act with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony.

Northern Natural Gas Co., 296 Kan. at 918. The University's argument that Article 20 

suggests that the University may take disciplinary action for student conduct wherever it 

occurs, when required by federal, state, or local law, ignores all of the other pertinent 

articles in the Student Code. In other words, the University cannot reconcile its 

interpretation of the language in Article 20 with the language in Article 18 or Article 22.

More importantly, the University expelled Yeasin for conduct specifically 

violating Article 22 and its published sexual harassment policy. Article 20, with its 

reference to federal, state or local law, must be read in context within its place in the 

overall regulatory scheme for disciplining students for nonacademic misconduct that is 

found in the Student Code. We note that a student's conduct in violation of the 

University's published sexual harassment policy falls under Article 22, which states, 

"students . . . are subject to disciplinary action for violations of published policies" of the 

University. 

Article 22 specifically directs that the only nonacademic misconduct subject to 

disciplinary action or expulsion is misconduct that occurs on campus or at a University

sponsored event. The Student Counsel did not choose to rely solely on Article 18 to 

clarify its jurisdiction and eliminate the phrase, "[w]hile on University premises or at 

University sponsored or supervised events," nor did it expand on this phrase by referring 

to the public law component of Article 18 and clarifying where alleged violations falling 

under this language must occur. 
20

Generally, specific provisions control over general provisions regarding the same 

subject. See Ft. Hays St. Univ., 290 Kan. at 463. Because Article 18 and Article 22 both 

concern alleged violations of student conduct the University seeks to discipline, and they

contain more specific language directing that the University's authority only extends to 

on-campus or at University sponsored events than the general provision in Article 20 that 

gives no indication as to where the misconduct must occur, the more specific statutes 

control. 

The district court did not err in interpreting the Student Code to mean it applies 

only to student conduct that occurs on campus or at University sponsored activities. 

Accordingly, because the University erroneously interpreted the Student Code as giving it 

jurisdiction to discipline Yeasin for off-campus conduct and does not dispute that 

Yeasin's conduct giving rise to his expulsion did not occur on campus or at University 

sponsored events, this court need not address the second issue, i.e., whether the 

University's decision to expel Yeasin was supported by substantial evidence. 

Similarly, given our conclusion that the district court did not err in granting 

Yeasin's petition, we need not address the other questions before us, i.e., whether Title IX 

permits the University to extend its jurisdiction to discipline student conduct occurring 

off campus and whether Yeasin's tweets were protected speech under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

As a final note, in view of our holding, Yeasin's cross-appeal concerning the 

propriety of the district court's stay order is now moot. 

We affirm the district court's grant of relief, and the stay order is hereby lifted.