Shelton Alexander v. Tamara Alexander , No. 1320, September Term 2020. Opinion by

Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

.

CUSTODY AND VISITATION

– Under Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 9

- 105, the court can deny make

- up time to a parent wh o has unjustifiably been denied visitation access, if the court finds that such a denial is in the best interests of the child.Circuit Court for Frederick County

Case N o
. 10

- C

- 13

- 002794
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND
No. 1320 September Term, 20 20

______________________________________

SHELT ON ALEXANDER

v.
TAMARA ALEXANDER

_______ ___________________ __ __________ Friedman , Ripken , Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) , JJ.

_________________________ _ ____________

Opinion by Salmon , J.

______________________________________ Filed: July 28, 2021Shelton Alexander ( “ Father ” ) and Tamara A le xander ( “ Mother ” ) were married in

2004. A son ( “ S

. ” ) was born to the marriage in August of 2006. The marriage was ended

on J uly 2 8, 20 14 when the Circuit Court fo r Frederick Cou nty , Maryland entered a final judgment of divorce. Fathe r appealed from t h e entry of that judg ment, but this Court
affirmed i t in an unreported o pinion

. Alexander v. Alexander , No. 2189, Sept. Term,
2 0 14 (file d July 1 6, 2015). More litigation followed, most of it concerning custody and visitati on issu es. In
2 017, Father m o v ed to modify custody , visitation and child support and in October of that

year, Mo ther filed a counter

- motion asking th e court t o grant her sole legal and primary physical custody of S. An eleven

- day merits hearing was held on th at matt er , which
ended on Au gust 8 , 2019.
On September 3 , 2019 , the Circuit Court for F rederick County file d a custody
order ( “ the final custody order ” ) that granted Mother sole legal and primary ph ysical custody of S. Father was grante d access to S

. every o ther weekend from af t e r schoo l o n Friday until Monday morning, plus every Wednesda y e vening from 6:30 P.M. to 8:15 P.M., so that S. could attend a c hurch youth group . The court set forth in its order a detailed holiday schedule and gra nted each party two

- we ek blocks of summe r a c cess in July , with th e orders of the bl ocks alternating year
- to

- year
. Father appealed that order , but we affirmed the judg m ent in another unr eported opinion

. Alex a nder v. Alexander , No. 1417, September Term, 20 19 ( filed June 1, 2 020 )

. While the las t

- m entioned a ppeal was still pend i ng, Mother , on March 18, 2020,
sent Father an email that read:2

Given [ S

. ’ s ] Diabetes and th u s his vulnerability to getting serious complications from COV ID

- 19 if he contracts the Coronavirus , I plan on ke eping him here a t hom e unt il the CD C C oronavirus gu i delines are li fted and schools are back in session. We can discuss make up time once it is
s afe to do so.
Dur ing the next few days , several emails betw een Father and Mother were exchanged. Fa ther to ok the pos ition th at Mother h ad no right to disobey a court or der
and that o beying th e visitation order would not endanger S. ’ s health

. Mother m a intained
that because she had been given the author ity to make medical decisions for S

. , she had the right to ensure his safety by halti ng, temp orarily , Fat he r ’ s right to have visit ation with
his son. Therefore, she announc ed that Father ’ s weekend visita t ion with S., scheduled for March 20, 2020, w ould be ca nceled as we ll as fu ture vi sitation until school reopened.
She wrote in a n e mai l to Father dated March 19, 2020 : I do agree wit h you that waiting for school to resume might be an untenable resolutio n , so I have come up with a creative solution to ensure you and [S.] stay connected, yet we keep him as safe as possible. I will g ive you extended Facet ime/virtual time w ith him o v er the weekend for gaming or for you to just spend time with him. This is a good way to put his health first , yet keep you two connected

. I a lso would like everyone in both households to get tested fo r the Coronavirus as soon as testing is ava i lable for the general public. R ight now, they are prioritizing testing for those w i th sy mptoms , so I am not sure when testing will become available. However, can we agree that we will al l get tested and share t he results when te sting bec omes available?
W e can cont inue to evaluate this situation on a daily basis. The parties did n ot r esolve their differences and on March 27, 2020, Father filed

an “ E mergency M otion to E nforce C ourt ’ s O rder R egarding A ccess D u ring COVID [

- ] 19
P andemic ” ( “ th e emergency motio n ” ). In the emergency mot ion, Father had two main3

complaints. T he first was t hat alm ost i mm ediately aft er the September 3, 201 9 final custody order was d ocketed, Mother curtailed “ Wednesday evening access an d extra

cu rricular activities [

. ] ” Se condly, F ather alle ged that he was being depr ived of his right
to visitatio n beca use Fre d erick County public schools and all of Ma rylan d publ ic schools were currently closed until April 24, 2020 because of COV ID

- 19 , a nd Mother had

a dvised him by e mail that she was “ keeping [ S

. ] in [ her ] house until all restrictions are
lift ed and the kids are allowed to go back to school

. ” Fa ther also all eged that d esp ite
Mo ther ’ s claims of “ health concerns, ” she had recently trav el e d t o New Orlea ns for

M ardi G ra s and had bee n “ diag n o sed with bronc hitis af ter her return ” from that city

. Father asked the cour t to grant his eme rgency motion and to sign an order : 1) requiring mother to immediately comply with the terms of the final cust o dy order ; 2) grant ing
Fa t her ex t ra visi tati on as “ m ake

- up ti me ” for the perio d that Mother had wi t hheld
visitation ; and, 3) gra n t hi m “ attorney ’ s fee s
. ” Mother, by counsel, filed an opposition to Father ’ s emergency motion in which
she alleged that she w as justified in w ithholding visitat i o n because of the ri sk to S. ’ s health presented by the COV ID

- 19 pan demic. S he maintained t h at “ since the publi c schools were closed after March 13, 2020, ” “ neither [ she ] nor [ S. ] ha [ d ] left their
residence and no other in dividual (s) have ente red the residen c e. ” She also noted that Maryland Governor Lawrence Hog an , Jr. had, on M arch 30, 2020, i s sued an executiv e order for the safety of all citi zens that requi red , during the COVID

- 19 pandemic , all

“ non
- essential ci tizens to remain in their homes beginning on Ma r c h 30, 202 0 at 8:00
P.M. except for the performance of essential activities as further defined by th e O rder. ”4

Mother denied Father ’ s allegation that she had violated the provisi on of the final c ustody
order concer n in g Wednesday n igh t access. Lastly, Mo t h er allege d that she had offered
Father “ da y for day make u p time ” once the pandemic pr o blem abated but Father had rejected t hat offer

. On April 1, 2020, Father filed a reply to Mother ’ s opposition. He alleged th a t S. ’ s type 1 diab et es was we ll controlle d

. He also asserted that literature provided by the
Ame rican Dia b etes Association mad e “ it clear that a diabetic is not at a greater r isk of having severe complications from COVID

- 19 than the general populatio n if th e diabetes is manag e d well. ”
The issue s r aised in the motion for an emergency order w ere hear d in the Circ uit
Court for Fr e derick County on Sep te mber 1 0, 202 0

. The motions jud g e was the same judge w ho had conducted the eleven

- day hearing th at resulte d in the September 3, 2019
fi n al cust o dy order.
F ather cal led Mother as a n adverse witness and he also testified. Father als o
called two other witnesses, but their testimony is not relevant to the issue s raised in this appeal . At the conclusi on of the he aring, the motions judge de live red a n oral opinion , which was followed by a written order that was docketed on December 22, 2 0 20. T he order read, in material part, a s foll ows:

ORDER ED, that Defendant ’ s [Fa ther ’ s] Emergency Motion to Enforce Court ’ s O rd er Regarding Access D u ring COVID [

- ] 19 P a ndemic be, and the same is hereby DENIED; an d it is further, ORDERED, t hat on each F riday which begins Defe ndant ’ s weekend access, while th e mino r child is in school virtually, the Defendant shall pick up the min or child at 3:30 P.M., an d ther eafter , wh e n school resumes in the5

classroom, De fendant sh all pi ck up the m inor child after scho o l on the Friday which b egins his weekend access, as pro vided in this [c] ou rt ’ s Final Order entered on Sept ember 3, 201 9; and i t is further,
ORDERED , that each party ’ s re q uest for an award of attorney ’ s fees be, and the same is hereby DENIED; and it is f u rther, ORDERED, that al l other provisions of this [c] ourt ’ s Fin al Order,
e ntered on Septemb er 3, 20 19 , no t in consist ent with t he provisions of this Order, s hall remain in f

ull for ce and effect. In this timely app eal, Father, acting pro se , raises th e following questions: 1 (1) Did th e circuit court err in d enying Fa ther mak e
- u p time based upon an incorrect legal premis e? (2) Did th e motions judge abuse her discret ion when she con s ulted with a m agistrate judge prior to announc ing her decision that she
wou l d not award Father make

- up time ? (3) Did the motions judge abuse her di screti on i n de nying the motion to e n f orce Wednesd ay
- night ac c ess , which Mother denied in part f or ov er a year? (4) Did the circuit court err in modifying the court

- ordered access for Fa t her and a buse its discretion in den ying the motion to enforce th e w eek end

- a cc ess pick

- up time afforded Father ? (5) Did t he motion s j udge abuse her discretion in denying a ttorn ey f ees to F ather ?

1 In his brief , Fath e r d i d not list any questi ons presented. But he d id make four arguments that we have converted into ques ti ons presented; th e arguments were : 1 ) “ The [c]ourt abused its disc retion in consulting with a [m] agistrate and den ying [a]ppe l lant make

- u p time based upon a n incorrect l egal premise ” ; 2) “ The [c]o urt erred in modifying the court

- ordered a ccess for [a]ppe ll ant a n d abused its dis cretion in denying t he motion to enforce Wedne sday

- night access, which [a]ppellee denied i n pa rt for ov e r a year ” ; 3 )

“ The [c]o u rt erred i n modifying the court

- or de red access fo r [a]ppellant and abused its discre tion i n denying the mo tion to enforce the week end

- access pi ck

- up t ime afforded [a]ppellant ” ; a nd 4) “ The [c]ourt abused its discretion in d eny ing t h e awarding o f attorney f ees to [a]pp e llant

. ”6

Mother , pro se , filed a brief asking us to affirm the order filed on December 2,
2 020. 2

I
. Background Facts Both Father and Mother live in the city of Frederick. Since th eir d ivorce, t he parties h ave enga g e d in almost cons tant li t igati on concerni n g matters of custody and visitation. While they are both very g o od parents, the trial j udge found that the two are incapable of cooperating with one another concerning child rearing i ssues
. A t t he time of the hearing, S

. was 14 years ol d and a student a t Tusc aro r a Hi gh
School in Frederick where he excels academicall y
. In 2018, S

. was diagn osed as suffering from t y pe 1 d iabetes , which , fortunately , has been kept under good control

. In Marc h o f 2020, Mother became concerned that S . wou ld c o n tr act the

c oronavirus . More specif ically, she feared that if he did contra c t that virus , he was more likely than others to have severe medical consequen ces due to his diabetes. She felt that
he r fear wa s s ubstantiated by medical literature that sh e r ev i ewe d. Beca u se of that fear, with one exception, M other and S . did not leave their house for any reason from M arch

2 In her brief, Mother recites several “ facts ” that are unsupported by anything in the record. In his reply brief, Father does th e same, although to a lesser exten t. In this opinion we have ignored all fac t ual allegat i ons by the p arties that are n ot supported by the record.7

18 to May 5 , 2020. 3 During that period, Frederick County public schools were clo sed
due t o t he COVID

- 19 pandemi c
. As mentioned, o n Mar ch 18, 2020, Mo t her informed Father that she was denying
him the visitation tha t he was entitled to unde r the final custody order. Under the terms

o f that order, Father w as entitled to have we ekend visitatio n w ith S. starting o n Friday , March 20, 202 0 aft er school until the following Monday at 8: 00 A.M. Father was also
entitled to w eekend visitation on alte rnating week ends thereafter. As a consequenc e of
Mother ’ s actions , Father was also denied acc ess for t he 2020 Easter weekend 4 and S. ’ s Spring break fro m sch ool that y e ar. On May 14, 2 020, Governor Hogan announced that he was r e laxing the she lter in place order that previously was in effect. Mother notif ied Fat her on that da te that she
would al low S. to r e sume visitation with Father on Friday , Ma y 15, 2 020

. She also t o ld
Father at that time that because he had missed 18 days o f access to S., she would allow
him to have 18 straight days of visitation , i.e., from May 1 5 , 2020 until June 8, 2020.
Father r ej e cted that of

fer

. At the hearing concerning Fa ther ’ s motion t o enf orce, counsel for Fath er attempted to undermine M ot her ’ s conten tion that she withheld access because she feared

3 The one exception occurred on May 3, 2020. On that da te , S. ’ s half

- sister , who lives with Father, celebr ated her first birthday

. On May 3, 2020, Mother drove S. past Father ’ s hous e with the h o pe of h a v in g S. participate in a “ drive

- by ” celebrat i on of his sister ’ s birthday. Because the parties di d not coope ra te, S. did not get to see his sister that day.

4 In 2 020, Easter Sunday w as on April 12, 2020.8

for S. ’ s health. Father ’ s counsel suggest ed, by his questioning , t hat Mo th e r had jeopardized S. ’ s health by going to M ardi G ras in New Orl e a ns in 20 2 0 d urin g the pandemi c where she caught bronchitis a nd thereafter, refus ed to quarantine in Maryland
when she returned from Louisiana . Mother t estified that she had bro nc hitis in F e b rua r y 2020, that M

ardi G ras ended on Februar y 25, 2020 and that she wa s in New Orleans after

t he Mardi Gras cel ebration from March 5 to March 9, 2020. She also testified that to her knowledge, no person had contracted coronavirus in New Orlean s while s h e was there. 5
Mother testified that she cut off Father ’ s access b e cause , as t he p ar ent w ith decision making authority concer n ing medical issues, she feared for S. ’ s sa fety. To compensate Father, she contended that she substantiall y inc reased S

. ’ s virtu al time with
Father. In that regard, Mother introduced a ch art whic h , if a ccura te , show ed extensive
virtual contact be tween Fa t her a nd S. in the March 18 to May 1 5 , 2020 period

. According to Mother, in the last

- mentioned period, S. and Father sp ent many ho u rs virtually with one another ; i.e., on the te lephone, on Facebook or playi ng comp uter

games. Father testified that t he cha r t in troduced by Mother was inaccurate in that it
overstated the amount of virtual contact

. According to Father, there w ere ma ny d a ys during the appro ximate two

- month period when he was denied teleph o ne and othe r types
of virtual contact with S.
Mother t estified that when she offered 18 days make

- up time on May 14, 2020 , Father replied by email that she c ould “ p i ck [S.] u p on Mon da y [May 18] , as stated by the

5 The parties stipulate d that t he f i rst “ presum p tive case relati ng to C OVID

- 19 ” in New Orleans wa s announced on March 9, 2020

.9

court order ” and that he would “ get dir e ctio ns from the [c]ourt on the ma k e
- up time

. ” In
his te s timo ny at the hearing , Father asked the court to award him access to S. for 10 weekends straight (rather than every oth e r weeken d ) , plus acc ess to S. for Ea ster 2021

. M oth er testified that she no l on ger b eliev ed t he court should award make

- up time.
She explained that her reasons were the same as those that her c ounsel talked about in his openi ng statement, viz

. :
I offe r ed him ba c k the 18 d ays [ 6 ] the mo ment that I could. He refused it, stopped all n egotiations, and said he wants t o go to litigati on an d have the [c]ourt decide. So, I just don ’ t think that that ’ s an appropriate way to , to co
- parent. During Mother ’ s te s timony , c o unsel for Father ask ed several questions as to
whether Mother had abided by the f ollo wing provision in the final c ustody ord e r : ORDERED, that [Mother] be, and she i s h ereb y awarded the s ole physical care and custody of the minor child, subjec t to rig ht s of visitation, as expressly deli neated herein, afforded to [Father] as fo l lows:

* * * B. Every We d nes day evening from 6:30 P.M. until 8:15 P.M., f or the express purpose o f attend in g the Youth Group acti vity at [Father ’ s] church. [Mother] shall drop off and p ick up the m inor child at Church. This access need not occur in the event of illness or inj ur y of th e minor chi ld ; u nforeseen emergent conditions; the imposition of a snow em er g ency p lan for Fre derick County

. . . . The youth group mentioned in the final custody orde r was one th at Fathe r
condu c te d , i n his c apacity as the youth pastor for his churc h

. In response to Father ’ s

6 Previously, Mother i n her testimony spoke of 21 da ys of make

- up time but that off er in cluded three days of visitation ( st arting May 15, 2020) to wh i ch Father w a s alread y e n title d.10

complaint that Mother did not take S. to t he yout h g roup meetings at 6:30 P.M . but
instead de livered him to the meetings at 7:00 P.M

. , Mother te stified t hat because the

yo u th g r oup meeting sometimes started at 6:45 P.M. and som etim es at 7:00 P.M., h er
habit was to deliv er S. to the church at the a ctual s ta r ting time . Mother testifie d that currently the youth group meetings were being held v irtual ly due to the pande mic and S.

“ a t tended those meet ings. ”
In re gard to the youth gr oup meeting, Father stress ed that Mother intentionally disobeyed the court o rd e r by ignoring the requirement that she s hould deliver S. to the meeting at 6:30 P

. M

. Neverthe less, he did not contradict Mo t her ’ s testimony as to when the youth meetings starte d no r did he contend th at S. w a s ever late for a youth gro up meeting

. Alth ou g h th e motions judge did not say so explic itly, s he i nd icated by her

comments at t h e evidentiar y hearing , that she did not co n sider M other ’ s “ l ate ” arrival at
the youth group meeting to b e a serious viol ation of the final custody order because ,

a c cording t o the judge, the intent of the provision was to e nsure that S. attend the
ch urch ’ s youth group meeting

– not to prov id e Fa the r with extra visitation rights

. Also , beca use at the time of the September 10, 20 20 h earing the Wednesday meetings were
b eing he ld virt ual ly , the issue of when Mother d elivered S. to the meetings did not appear

t o be a curren t problem.
At the hearing , i t was undisputed that Mother intentionally withheld visitation
from Father f

or abou t tw o months. Father contende d that M other w as no t justified in doing so. The motion s judge said that because of the pandemic, Mo t her should h ave filed11

a motion and requ e s ted a modification of the final order ; nevertheless, the judge indicated
that M othe r ’ s actions were perhaps understandab l e becau se at the time she withheld visitation, the danger s posed by the pandemic wer e truly f r ightening an d at that point, no

one kne w the dangers posed by the C OVID

- 19 crisis. 7

T h ere was one other issue in cont ention at the September 10 hearing

. The f ina l

cu st o dy order provided that Father, b egin ning Sept ember 6, 2019, had a right of v isitation
with S. : [ E ] very other weekend from a ft er school on Friday until Mond ay at the beginning of the school day , i f schoo l is in sess ion that day or 8:00 A.M., wh i chever oc c urs first. The [F ather] . . . shall pick up the minor child from
s chool on Friday a nd d eliver the m inor child to school on M on day if school is in s ession th at date

. . . . In the summer, [Father] shall r e tri eve the minor child from the [Mother ’ s] resi de n ce at 3:30 P.M. o n Friday.
Father ’ s compl aint was that prior to the p andemic, at the s c ho o l that S. attended,
classes st o pped at 3:30 P.M. o n Friday, but since the pandemic , S. ’ s virtual classes ended

at noon but Mother refused to allow S. t o be pic ke d up until 3:30 P.M. Father ’ s position
was that this deprived him of over three hours o f v i sitation eac h w eeken d that he had a

7 Af te r admonishing Mother fo r disobeying p rovisions of the final custody order by means of “ se lf

- help , ” the judge went on to say: [t] hat being said, I reco gnize that we were facing something that was wholly different than anyone had ever fa c ed before maybe in 191 9, or whate v er it was, with the f l u pandemic they had going around, but, in our li fe times, we had n ever experienced this. It was very scar y and I
u nders tand that. And I un derstand that [S.] is, in fact, in t h e very comp r omised grou p . He also is younger, which, you know, I thi nk is prov i ng out now that the younger you are the better o ff you are to some degree, but he is in the group that is more he avily affected by this vi rus as we know it today.12

rig ht of access
. At the hearing , Mother ’ s testimony as to wh y she did no t al low Father to pick up S. earlier on Frida y s was b as e d on th e school schedule . That schedule provided
that between 8:30 A.M. and noon , classes and o ther a ct ivities were to b e c o nduc te d virtually ; thereafter, a one
- half hour lunch break was t o beg i n
. The school schedule then spelled out what was t o occur d u ring the periods between 12:30 and 1:45 P. M. U nder t he heading “ Student Support , ” the sch e dule for that time period rea d:

• Virtual F2F [Face to Face] Instruction

• Intervention

• On

- Line Resource and Service Delivery

• IEP/EL Skill Recovery
A cti v it i es for th e period between 1:45 P.M. and 3:30 P.M ., were listed under the heading
“Self

- Direc t ed Studen t Work Tim e ” a s follows:

• Readi n g and research ing

• Complet ing projects

• Responding to teacher feedback

• Engaging in online lessons and practice
Mother e x p l a ined t h a t she kept S. until 3:30 P.M. on Fridays because the school schedule
indicated that school wa s o pen until 3:3 0 P.M. In her w o rds, “ [i] f the y [the high school
authorities ] intended kids to stop at 12:00 , they would have ended at 12:00 . A n d , so , I just w an t to pr otect that ti m e , so [S.] has the ti me to do his work

. ” Put another way, according to Mothe r, t he school had i ssued a s chedule that states that between 1:45 and
3:30 P. M. , “ Monday through Friday there ’ s supposed to be self

- di rect ed s tudent work
ti me , ” and she abided by that sched ule. Father , in his testimony, contended that under the

s c hool schedule , between 12:30 and 3: 3 0 P. M., S. was supposed to be doing homework ,13

and that S. could do his home work at Father ’ s house just as conveniently a s at Mot he r ’ s
residence.
Additional facts will be set forth in order to answer the question s presented.
I I
. Make

- Up Time
F ather c o n tend s that the motions judge abused her discretion in denying him
make

- up time because the court ’ s denial was based on “ an inco rr e ct legal premise. ” In
h er oral ruling co ncerning make

- up time, the tri al j udge said:

[Father] want s make

- up time, and th a t ’ s w her e I ge t to this isn ’ t a contract case. If this were a contract case, I could say writ e a check for X amount of d ollars, a n d that will remedy this prob lem . My concer n is what is b est for [S.], and I g ave a cust o dy order that I believed was neces s a ry for [ S. ’ s] b est interest last year. I still believe that schedule is necessary for [S. ’ s] best interest. You [S. ’ s p a rents] ca n not communicate histor ically

. T hrough [man y] days of trial [in 2 019 , it has] be c ome very, ver y clear, even about basic medi c al decisions you can ’ t co mmunicat e, you ca n ’ t agree. I can ’ t, in good conscience, say that in order to rectify this, I g o away fr o m what I already deci ded what was in [S. ’ s] best intere st

. So , therefore, I ’ m no t going to giv e you any make

- up time, bec a use it ’ s not about making yo u whole

. It is a bout [S. ’ s] daily life, and I understand [ S

. ] was harmed by not seeing you , I ’ m not d i sagreeing with that. We were all harmed [b y COVID

- 19] . All of these kids t hat are sitting at de s ks in their home are being ha r med. Some of that is there ’ s nothin g anyone can do a bout it. Nobody likes it, but there ’ s nothing anyone can do abo u t it, b ut I found previously that th e schedule I outl ined was what was necessary giv en th e le v el of distrus t and discord between the t w o o f you, and I still find that that ’ s accu rate

. So , th erefore, the motion for make

- up time is denied, but I am go i ng to caut io n [Mother] very strongly that a motion is requ ired [t o change the f inal custo dy or der]

. So le legal o r whatever, does not giv e you authority to say I ’ m ov err iding the visitation schedule that this [c] ourt ordered, that is not accurate. You must f ile a m ot i on, but, again, the acrim ony and distru st14

is s o great that I don ’ t find a mo di fi ca t ion o f the order I had entered to mak e
- up visitat ion is appropriate. (Emphasis added.) Father takes issue with the part of the judge ’ s op inion wh ere she s aid , “ I ’ m n o t going to give you any make

- up t ime , because it ’ s [th e decision as to whether or not t o

a ward make

- up time ] not about making y ou whole. It i s about [S. ’ s] daily life [

. ] ” In

s upport of his contention that the aforementioned stateme nt was not “ su p po rted by law , ”
Father directs our attention to Maryland Code (20 19 Repl. Vol. ), Family Law Artic l e , §
9

- 105 , w h ich provides: In any custody o r visitation proceeding, if the court determines that a party to a custody or visitati on orde r has u nju stif iabl y denied o r interfered with visitatio n granted by a custody or visit at ion ord er, the court may , in
a d dition to any other remedy availab l e to the court and in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child , take any or all of the follo wing actions : (1) ord er that the visitation be resch eduled; (2) modify the custody o r vi sitatio n or der to require addi t ional terms o r conditions design e d to ensure future compliance with the order; or (3) assess costs or counsel fees against the party who has unjustifi ably d e nied or i n terfered with visitation rig hts

. (Emphasis added.)
As can be seen , i n en ac ting § 9

- 105, t he Ge neral As s embly used the w o rd “ may. ”

“ T he w ord ‘ may ’ is generally c onsidered to be permissive, as o pposed to mandatory, langu age. ” Board of Physi c ian Qua li t y Ass uran ce v. Mulla n , 381 M d. 157, 166 (2004) ;
B rodsky v. Brodsky , 31 9 Md . 9 2, 98 (1990)

. S e e also Planni n g Comm. v
. Silk o r Development Corp ., 246 Md. 516 , 522

- 24 (1967) (absent clear legislative indication to15

the contrary, “ may ” is generally p resumed t o apply in a “ per missive sense. ” ). Because
the legislat u re used the wo rd “ may , ” and because t h ere is no ind i cation that the
l egislature di d not intend the word to be in terp reted as permissive, it w as not mandatory
that the court award make

- up ti m e when , a s here, one parent unjustifiably denies another
visitat ion. Th us, in o rder for Father to prev a il as to the first questi on pr e sented, he mu st
demonstrate that the motions judge abused her d i scretion in not granting him make

- up
time. The analyti c al para di g m by which we assess whether a trial court ’ s actions c onstitute an abu se o f discretion has bee n stated frequ ently. In Wi lson v. John Cra ne, Inc. , 385 Md. 185 (2005), for example, we iterat e d [t ]h e re is an abuse of discretion “ where no reasonable person would take the vie w adopted by the [tr i al] court[ ] ”

. . . o r wh en t he court act s “ without reference to any guiding principles. ” An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ru l ing u nder co ns i deration is “ clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inference s be fore the court[ ] ”

. . . or when t he ruli n g is “ v iolative of f act and logic. ” Questions within the discretion of the trial court are

“ much better decided by th e tri al ju d ges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should be d istu rbed where it i s apparent tha t some serio u s er r or or abus e of discretion or autocratic action has occurred. ” In sum, to be reversed “ [t]he decision under consid eratio n has to b e well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and bey ond the fringe of wh a t that court [] deems mini m a ll y acceptable. ”
385 Md. at 198

- 99 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 , 347 Md. 295, 312

- 13 ( 1997 )). An abuse of disc re t ion, therefore, “ should only be found in the extra ordi nary, exceptional, or most e g regiou s case. ” Wi lson , 385 Md. a t 199

.
Pasteur v. Skevofilax , 396 Md. 405, 418

- 19 (2007).16

Relying on § 9

- 105, appellant contends that “ Maryland law spe cifi e s that or d ering
the reschedu ling of visitation is just one of the remed i es a va i lable to th e court for the

purpos e of maki ng the party , whi ch was unjustifiably denied visitation, whole

. ” ( e mphasis added )

. Cont rary to what is implied in the above argume nt, the sta tu t e does not specify that the purpose of § 9

- 105 is to “ make whole ” t he party th a t is unjustifia bly
denied visitation. The st a tute simply gi ves the court the option of ordering make

- up time , bu t the court is not required to exercise that option. In fact , t he st atute provi d es that in order to exercise the opt i on , such an award m us t be “ consiste n t with t he best interest s of
th e c h ild [.] ” Here, t he motion s judge explained that she did not believe it to be in the best
interest s of S. to order make

- u p time. T h e court ’ s decision was understandable . After all, at the time of the Septem ber 10, 2020 hearing, approximately three and on e
- half months had expi r ed since Mother allow ed Father to resu me visi tation in accordance with
the court order. After tha t lapse of time , arguably at least, it mi ght well be disruptive t o
S. ’ s rout ine i f, rat her than keeping him on the every other week en d v i sita tion schedule
with Fa ther, t he court ordered that Father have access for ten straight weekends as Father requested.
It is t r ue, as the motions judge stat ed, that M other ’ s action s in denying visitation to
Father fo r almost two months was harmful t o S

. But t hat does not necessari ly m ean that
the harm could be eras ed or even ameliorated by order in g make

- up time , nor do e s it me a n
that it would be in S. ’ s best interest s to do so

. Fa t her disagre es, arg uing that:17

The [c] ourt ma kes the conf using argu me n t that withhol ding m ake

- up time fro m th e Defendant is in the best interests of the child b ecause the court believed the s chedule o r dered in September 2019 was in the child ’ s best interest s the previo us year and that the court could not go away from what
w a s already deci ded a year earlier. Howe ver, this was not a modification of custody hearin g . This simple hearing wa s to e nforce th e court order and provide missed like

- time back to the Ap p ellant, whi ch the Appe llee initially
recomm ended to the [c] ourt in i ts motion Plaint iff ’ s Preliminary Opp osit ion to Defendant ’ s Emergency Motion to Enforce Cou r t ’ s Order Re gar ding Access D u ring Co vi d [

- ] 19 Pandemic , “ that the [c] ourt provide for make

- up time bet w een the Def endant and the minor child, day

- for

- day. ” (Refe r ences to transcript om itted. ) Contrary to t he i mplication in the above argument, the trial judge did not misinterpret t he stat ut e . It is clear that the trial judg e knew what remedies were availa b le
to her u nder § 9

- 10 5 of the Family Law Article . M oreo v er, there i s no indi ca tion that the judge w as confused as to whether she could change what had been p reviously ordered.
As earl ie r mentioned, t he wording of the statute m a kes it clear that it is w i thin the co urt ’ s
disc r etion as to whether to uti lize any o f the remed ies set forth in § 9

- 10 5. And, whether,
as her e, b oth parties agreed at one time that make

- up time should be ordered , t he court

wa s not bound by an y such agreement

. For the above reasons, we hold that Father has not met his heavy burden of sh o wing that the trial judge abuse d her discretion by refusing
to grant him make

- up time.
III.

The Judge ’

s Conversation w i th t

he Ma g istrate
I n her oral opi nion, the m otions judge expla in ed at length t hat the p artie s could not

com m unicate o r atte mpt to work t hings out because they were “ entrenched in the fight

. ”
T he judge then said:18 I was talking to one of o ur m agis trates a bout th is case, and s he said, and I think it is real ly appropriate , t his isn ’ t a contract case where t he purpose of damages in a contr a ct case is t o mak e you whole ; that ’ s not the p urpose of a child custody case . The pu r pose of a c hild cus tod y cas e is [to decide w hat is in ] the best in terest [s] of [S.]
Father a rgues that the motions judge abused her discretion by “ consulting with a [ m ] agistrate ” p rior to r e ndering her decision. Appel lant ’ s precise argume nt in t his reg ard
is a s follows:
T he [c] ourt is requir ed to make its own independent decision as to the ultimate disposition of any case although it can be guided by a magistrate ’ s r ecommendatio n . The Do m ingue[s]

- K irchner standard, requi res the court to conduct an “ in d ependent re view of th e re cord and of the f acts found . . . and apply its independent judgment in r eaching its conclusions. ” In this
case , the court heard both parties and then con s u lted wit h a magistrate behind closed doors to determine tha t “ this isn ’ t a contract ca se where th e purposes of dam ag es in a contract case is to make you (Appellant) whole. ” Besides the fact that the [m ] agistrate did not hear either party an d was not pre s ent in th e court room to hea r the ca se a nd could not logi cally or with integr i ty make an educated de ci sion in just a few minutes, the court ’ s decisi on to follow the recom mendations of a [m] agistrate that was neither present for the hearing no r known to ei t her party is an abuse of discr etion. (Ref erence to transcript omitted. )
When the judge ’ s remarks ar e read in c on text, it is c lear that the judge made her own indepe ndent decision as to wheth er to award make

- up time. What the m agistrate j u dge said was legally c o rrect and, i n essence, the trial j udge simply said that s he agreed
with the m agistr ate judge ’ s l egal anal ys is. In other w ords, contrary to Father ’ s argument,
the recor d does not suppor t his con tention that the trial judge, rather t h an rendering an
inde pe n dent decision, allowed a m agistrat e judge to make the dec ision , as to wh e ther to

gra nt m ake

- up time , for he r.19 IV. Wednesday Night Youth Group Meeting Father argues that t he trial judge “ erred in modifying the court

- ordered acces s for [Father] and abus e d its di scretion in denying the motion to enforce Wednesday

- nig ht

access, w h i ch [ Mother] denied in part f or over a year. ” This arg u ment concerns the fact
that Mother b rought S. to Father ’ s church ’ s youth group at 6:45 P.M. and some t imes at
7:00 P .M

. , rat h e r than at 6:30 P.M., which was the time set forth in the final custody
ord e r . It was c lear fr om the tes ti mony that , w ith one exception , Mother deliver e d S. to
the me eting s at the time those meetings actu ally started , which was alw a ys after 6:30
P.M. The one exception was on Wednesday, March 18, 2020, when Mother, due to the

pa n d emic, did n ot deli ver S. to th e meeting at all.
At the hea ring, Father never indica ted that S. was ever late for the youth group meetings

. I nstead , he t o ok the rigid p osition t h at Mother ’ s conduct cons tituted a
violat ion of h is right to access . But, in a collo quy w ith Fat her ’ s co un sel, the motions judge indicated that she believed , as the author of the order at iss ue, that th e purpose of
that pro visio n w a s to e nsure t h at S. cou l d attend the m eeti ng of the youth group , which Father happ ened t o lead, but t h e provisi on was no t intend ed to grant additional vis i t at ion as that term is usually understood

. In this appeal, Father points out , accurately , that the provision at i ssu e appe a rs in
the section of the final custody order that governs “ vi sita tion. ” Nev e r theless, e v e n

assu ming, ar

gu endo , that Mother was wrong in f ailing to deliver S. to th e yo uth gro up meetings at 6:30 P .M., by the time of the September 2 0 20 hearing, t h ose meeti n gs were20

all being held virtually an d , as far as shown by the record, S. was o n time for t he virt ual

meet in gs. In other words, the problem had been resolved. Because S. never was late for the youth group meetings , it is impossible to see how it would be i n S. ’ s best interest s to
award make

- up time on the grounds that S. d id not ar r ive at the youth g roup mee ti ngs
earlier than th e sc hed u led start t i me
. And, aside from awarding make

- up time, there was nothing else the judge could h av e done to reme d y this “ w r ong. ” 8 Father also argues that the trial judge erre d in “ mod ifying the court

- o r dered

acce ss ” ins ofar a s it concerns the Wednesda y night meetings. The short answer to that
contention is that t here was no such modification in the c ourt ’ s Dece mb e r 22, 202 0 orde r. This is shown by the last paragraph of that order quoted, supra , at pa g e five.
V

. Friday Pick

- U

p Time Father next argues that the court “ erred in modifying the court

- ordered access fo r [Father] and abused its discretion in denying th e motion t o e nforce the weekend

- access pick

- up time afforded [ Father]. 9 This argument conc e r ns the p ar t of th e fin al custody order ( see page 1 , supra ) stating that Father ’ s w eekend visitation started “ a f ter school ” on

“ Friday [ s ]

. ” Father co n tend s that si n ce visita t ion resumed on May 15, 2020, S. has been taught virtually and those virtual sessions e n d ed at noon ; t he r e f ore, he asserts that Mother

8 Father never asked the judge t o hold Mother in contempt.

9 I n his motion to enforce, Fat h er failed to allege tha t Mother denied him a ccess time by altering the Friday pick

- up hours. The reason for this failure is that the probl em did not arise until student s , such as S. , began att e nding s chool virtually

– which was after the date the Father filed hi s motion to enfor ce.21

acted improperly in not allowing him to pick S. up at noon
. But i f Mother ’ s testimo ny

was cre dit e d, authoritie s at S. ’ s s chool published a schedule that showed that S. ’ s school day was not finished at noon o n Fridays

. Studen t s were re quired t o do schoolwork until
3:3 0 P. M. on Fridays

. In this regard, the motions ju dge orally ruled as follows:

I l ooked at the [ final cus t ody] order. T he cour t order says that, when school is in session, he will retr iev e the child from sc hoo l. It does say in the summer it will be 3:30 . Right no w or maybe, I don ’ t know, he may have virtual face

- to

- fa c e instruction, he may have o n li ne reso u rce and
s ervice still over, he may have some of these blocks fill ed in that maybe
a r en ’ t being utiliz ed ri ght now, I ’ m not sure, but the school d ay e nds at 3:30 p.m. , and that is when the parties will exchange [S.]

. It doesn ’ t end at 12 o ’ clock

. It does n ’ t end at 11: 20

. The school day ends at 3:30, and th at is when the parties will ex c h ange [S.] ; that w as t he easier part.
Father complains that when his attorney was making his ope ning statement, the motions judge a gre e d that t h e school day e nded a t 1 2 :00 P. M. T he record shows that the judge did not make a ruling at that point

. Read i n conte x t, t he mot i o ns judge was simply making inquiry as to Father ’ s position as t o when the school day ended.
Father also contends that Mot he r ackno wledged that “ sc h o ol ended at 12:00 P.M

. ”
As can be seen from the re
- cap of Mother ’ s testimony set fort h ab ove , Mot her ma d e no such acknowledgment. She testified , based on the sch ool schedule , that th ere is

“ suppose d to be self

- directed student wo r k time ” Monda y through F riday between 1: 45
and 3:30 P.M. , and if the school intended the day to end at 12:00 P.M., the scho o l s y st em

wo uld not have it on its schedule that school e nded at 3:30 P.M.
There was merit in Mother ’ s position

. I f a student obe y ed the school schedule, it is clear that he or she was not allowed to play games or pursue other recreational
activit i es between 1 2:30 P.M. and 3:30 P.M

. on Fridays. In stead, unt il 3:30 P.M., the22

school day was not finished because students were supposed t o engage in s uch thing s as

“ V irtual F2F I nstruction s ” and [r]es ponding to teacher feedback. ” Because the school day was not fi n i shed, Father had no right to pick up S. at noon even if Father was correct
when he said that S. could do schoolwo rk at his ho m e just as wel l as at Mo t her ’ s. We
therefore ho ld that the judge was not clearly erroneous wh en she found that the pick

- up
time f o r Father ’ s weekend visitation was 3:30 P.M

. and not noon

. Fath er m akes a related argument that advances some of the same c o ntentions tha t
we have a lready considered and re j ected. He phrases his argument as follows :
As [Father] stated th at school en de d a t noon, and as [Mother] acknowledged that school ended at noon b ut d id not want to release him because the ch ild had homew o rk , and as th e court ac k nowledged that school ended at noon, the child should have been released to [Father] at noon per the cou rt or d er. The fact that the child may or may not have homewor k at th e en d of the school day is ir relevant to the pick

- up time o f the child. Fur thermo r e , the modification of the court order was not requested by either party in any motion a nd adds further co nfu s ion regarding the pick

- up time o f the child. Cur rently, there is more litigation of the pick

- up time [ 10 ] because school e n ds at 12PM as verified b y the child ’ s p rincipal and documentation , but the [Mother ] refuses to release the child to the [Father] , co m i ng up with her own arbitrary end

- of

- scho ol time of 2:30 P

. M. [ si c]

. The [c] ourt continues to be silent on the i ssue, dec l ining to rule on e way o r t he other, assumedly until t he school year is over and the motio n becomes moot. Mo difying the cou rt or de r abs e nt a motion to do so, so that [Father ’ s ] already limite d time wi th t he child is further reduced by 3 hours ev ery
- other

- w eekend, is an abuse of d iscretion. The above argum ents are inconsistent in that Father contends , on the one hand , that the m ot ions j u dge decl ined to make a ruling as to the time the school da y ended a nd,

10 Wh ile his a ppeal was pending, Father, on February 5, 2021, filed a “ Motion to Modify Acces s / Pick

- Up Time. ”23

on the other han d, complains that the court , wi t hout request, modified t he prior order
insofar as it dea lt with the issue of the Friday pick

- up time. In any event , as already

me ntione d ( see page 5 , supra ) , the court , in its December 22, 2020 order, seco nd

p aragraph, d id decide the pick

- up time issue a n d the court d i d so for g ood reason
inasmuch as Father ’ s atto rney specifically asked the c ourt to decide that issue. 11
C ontrary to Fathe r ’ s argument, the court did not modify the order in such a way as to gi ve Father less visi tation than that to which he w as entitled

. In stead, t he order simply
announced the co urt ’ s ruling concerning an issue that aro se after the motion for an

emer g e ncy or d er was filed and had de v eloped into a n other so urce of d isagree ment
b etween the parties

. After reviewing the school sc h edule that wa s introduc e d into evidence together with th e testimony o f th e parties , the motions judge concluded that the
school da y for S . ended at 3:30 P.M. on Fridays, which was the same time that i t ended in Septem ber 2019, when the final cust ody order was filed. T h e school s chedule (d efendant ’ s exhibit 1) su pport ed the j udge ’ s conclusion that school ended at 3:30 P.M.

11 In his opening stateme n t, Father ’ s c ounsel sai d : [F ather] has been asking if he could pick him up early on Frida ys. I t hink when the parties testif

ie d before you before at the custody trial , [M other] said she ’ s not wanting to d o anything to keep him from having time with hi s da d, and he ’ s been ask i ng if he could pick him up early on Friday. And, so, that ’ s someth ing [Fat her] would ask the [ c ] ourt to a ward

. [ Mother] has been indicating that she wants him to pick him up at 3: 30

. So , that ’ s the parties ’ positions, he ’ d like t he noo n, she ’ d like the 3:30, unless she ’ s changed since they last e

- mailed each other.24

We hol d that t h e judg e did not abuse her discretion when she resolved th is minor dispute or w hen she signed the December 22, 2020 ord e r that reflec t ed that r e soluti on
. VI. Attorney ’ s Fees
F athe r contend s th at the trial judge erred in failing to award him atto rn ey ’ s f e es. In support of that contention, he directs our attention to Family Law A r ticle, § 12

- 103 which provides: (a) The cou r t may awar d to either p arty the costs and counsel fees that a re j ust and proper under all the circumstances in any case in which a person:

* * * (2) files any form of proceeding:

* * * (iii) to enforce a decree of custody or v isitation. (b) Before a court may award costs and co unsel fees under this se ction, the court shall co ns ider : (1) t he financial sta tu s of e a ch party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial ju stifi c ation for bringing, maintaining, or defen d ing the pr o ceeding. (c) Upon a finding by the court that there was an absence of substantial justification of a party for prosecu ti ng or de f end ing the proceeding, and absent a finding by the court of good cause to th e cont rary, the court shall award to the other part y costs and c ounsel fees. (Emphasis added.)25

Here , the motions j udge did not make a finding that Mother l acked sub st antial just i fication in defending against Father ’ s motion to enforce. Th e judge explained her
reason f o r denying both partie s their req u est for att o rney ’ s fees , by say ing:
As to attorney ’ s fees, [Mother] sho uld have filed a motion [to modify custody or der ] and she di d not. [Father] should have communic ated with her, and he did not. When she said I ’ ll give you 18 days , I wo u ld n ’ t have d one that , w h ich is clear here today. He should have said, instead of, no, you took away Easter, and you took awa y m y time, and the f i rst birthday of my other child, so we ’ ll let the [c ] ourt decide. He should have said I want t he next 10 week e nds straigh t , and I wan t next Easter, w ill you do that. She probably would have agree d, but he wanted to come to court, because , again, it ’ s about the fight, and it ’ s an awful expensive way to spend your life. It ’ s a horrible way for [S. ] to spe nd h is l i fe. So, both reques t s f

or attorney ’ s fees ar e denied.
A s can b e seen , Family Law Article Section 1 2

- 103(a) (2)(iii) st ate s that the “ court

may aw a rd

. . . counsel fees ” in “ any form o f proceeding ” that a person files “ to enforce a
decree of c us tody or visitati o n. ” ( e mphas i s ad de d )

. Whether to award attorney ’ s fees under § 12

- 103(a) is a decision that rests in the discret ion o f the trial or motions ju d ge.
Petrini v. Petrini , 336 Md. 453, 46 8 (1994).
Father contends that the judge abused her disc r etio n in fa i ling to awa r d him

attor ne y ’ s fees because he “ provided a mple evidence that he attem pted to work out a
solution wit h [M other] prior to filing any p roceeding in court. ” The emails that were exchanged between the parties prior to March 27, 2020 , the date wh e n the emerg e ncy
motion was filed , pr ovided no evi dence that Father “ attempted to work out a solution ”
with Mot her. He offered no compromise. I n st ead, both parties announc ed their p ositions
and there after refused to budge . More important, an d as stresse d by the mot i ons judge,26

once the emergency moti on w as fi led , Father made no at tempt to resolve the mat ter
witho ut fur th er litigation . Mother off e red Father day

- for

- day make

- up time from M ay 1 5 to June 8, 2020, but Father did not even bother to mak e a coun t eroffer . T h e motions judge did not abuse her discret ion in finding, in effect , that by failing t o make a

cou nter of f er , Father did not have subs t antial justification for contin uing to litigate the
make

- up t ime issue , which was by far the main i ssu e t hat s e parat ed the parties

. Father argues that he was justified in filing the March 27, 2020 emergency motion.
This is t ru e. But t his does not necess a rily mean that M other , in light of the pandemic, did not have substantial justification in defen d ing a g ainst the emergen c y motion. After all, as the trial judge pointed out ( see page 11 note 6 , s upra ) , the COVID

- 19 pande mic cr eated

grave and deadly risks that co u ld not have been anticipated by anyone at the time the final custody ord er was signed. T he court fa u l t ed Mother only for what she failed to do, i.e., file a motion to modify the custody order ba sed on the health conc er ns th at arose
because of the pandemi c
. T he court , with ampl e support in the record, found that both parties failed to compro m ise because t h e y put th e urge to fight one another in court o ver
S. ’ s best i nter e s t s , and a s a consequence, bo th parti es were at f ault : Mother, becau se she
did not f i le a motion to modify , a nd Father , because once he filed the emergency mo tion,
he made no attempt to r esolve t h e m atter

. Father also takes issue with the judge ’ s statement that Father “ did not
communicate with” Moth er . According to Father, this “ is c lear err or as [he] both testified to communicating with [Mother ] and exhibited multiple ema i ls and text me ssage s
be t ween the two parties. ” There was evidence in t he record to support the motion judge ’ s27

statement that, p ri or to filing the emergency motio n , Fath er f ailed to commun icate with
Mother. F or example, in one of the emails that Mother s e nt to Fathe r sh ortly be f ore the emergency motion was filed, Mother expressed concern about the fact that Father ’ s step son, who l iv ed with Father , worked at a McDo n ald ’ s restaurant. Mot her ’ s concern

was t hat because the st epson worked in such a public pla c e, the step s on might be exposed
to the coronaviru s , and S. , if he stayed in the same house wit h the s tep son , might contract
the vi rus. It turn ed out that by the ti m e Mother expressed concer n ab out the st epson ’ s
expos u re , the lat ter had already stopped wo r king at McD o nald ’ s. Bu t in the email exchange that prece ded the filing of the emergen cy motion, Father nev er attempted to
allev ia te Mother ’ s concerns by sending her a n email telling he r this. Next, Father takes issue with the following se ntence set fo r th in the j u dge ’ s oral

o pi n ion

. The offending s ente nce is : “ when she [ Mother] said I ’ ll give you 18 days, I
wouldn ’ t have done th at, which is clear here today. ” Fath e r ’ s complaint is that th e trial judge gave no ex planation as to why she “ wo uld not do t h at. ” We d i s agree. In h er o ral opinion , the judge said that it was not in the be st interest s of S. , after regular vi sitation
ha d been r estored, to interrupt the rhyth m of the usual a lternate weekend (Friday to
M onday) visitation sc hedu le.
Last ly, Fat h e r takes iss u e wit h the s tatem e nt in the judge ’ s opinion in which she opined that Father : “ s h ould ha ve said I want the next 10 we ek ends straight, and I want next Easter, w ill you do that? She [Mother] probably would ha ve agreed , but he wan te d

to come to c o urt , becaus e , again, it ’ s abo u t the fight and i t ’ s an awful expensive way to spend your life. ” Father ’ s precise criticism of th at statement is that it overlooked the fa c t28

that Father was compelled to file the emergency motion. The ju d ge p lainly did not

o verlook tha t fact. She was s i mply making the point that once litigation had co mmenced , F ather showed no inclination to comp romi s e but just wanted to continu e to litigat e
. The history of this case and the trial transcript amply s upport ed t he trial judge ’ s view of
Fa t her ’ s motiv e s
. I n summary, the motions judge had discretion as to whether to award attorney ’ s
fees to Father under § 12

- 103(a) of the Family Law A rticle. T o prove that the judge
abused her discretion in failing to award attorney ’ s fees , Fat h er was requ i red to show that

“ n o reas onable person would take the view adopted by the [t rial] court. ” Wil son v.
Crane , Inc ., 3 85 Md. 185 , 198 (200 5). In this ca s e, Father has not made such a showing

.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE P AID BY APPELLANT.