FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ;

DALIA PADILLA-LÓPEZ; MAYRA 

MÚÑOZ-LARA; BRENDA GASTÉLUMSIERRA; LESLIE ORTIZ-GARCÍA;

RICARDO NERI-CAMACHO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CURTIS GILES, an individual; DAVID 

FUNK, an individual; FUNK DAIRY,

INC., an Idaho corporation; 

SHOESOLE FARMS, INC., an Idaho 

corporation; DOES, 1–10,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35526

D.C. No.

1:17-cv-00001-

DCN

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 4, 2020

Portland, Oregon

Filed April 18, 2022
2 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit 

Judges, and Jennifer Choe-Groves,* Judge.

Opinion by Judge Collins

SUMMARY**

Forced Labor

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of defendants on claims of violation of 

federal statutory prohibitions on forced labor, reversed the 

district court’s decision declining to retain supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims, and remanded.

Plaintiffs were six citizens of Mexico who were recruited 

to work as “Animal Scientists” at Funk Dairy in Idaho under 

the “TN Visa” program for “professional” employees 

established under the North American Free Trade 

Agreement. But when plaintiffs arrived at the dairy, they 

were instead required to work substantially as general 

laborers. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ bait-and-switch 

tactics violated applicable federal statutory prohibitions on 

forced labor by, among other things, abusing the TN Visa 

program in order to coerce plaintiffs to provide menial 

physical labor.

* The Honorable Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge for the United States 

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 3

For purposes of their summary judgment motion, 

defendants conceded that all plaintiffs believed that their 

ability to remain lawfully in the U.S. depended on their 

continued employment at Funk Dairy. The panel concluded 

that in light of that concession and its obligation, on review 

of a grant of summary judgment to defendants, to construe 

the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a 

reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy knowingly 

obtained plaintiffs’ labor by abusing the TN Visa process in 

order to exert pressure on plaintiffs to provide labor that was 

substantially different from what had been represented to 

them and to federal consular officials. The panel held that, 

so construed, Funk Dairy’s conduct violated the provisions 

of Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibit 

forced labor and trafficking of persons into forced labor. 

Plaintiffs therefore asserted triable causes of action under the 

civil suit provision of Chapter 77, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Because the panel held that the district court erred in 

dismissing plaintiffs’ federal claims, the panel also reversed 

the district court’s decision to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under Idaho state law.

COUNSEL

Edgar Iván Aguilasocho (argued) and Mario Martinez, 

Martinez Aguilasocho Law Inc., Bakersfield, California; 

Natalie Camacho Mendoza, Camacho Mendoza Law, Boise, 

Idaho; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David P. Claiborne (argued) and Katie L. Vendenberg, 

Sawtooth Law Offices PLLC, Boise, Idaho, for DefendantsAppellees.
4 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

Stuart A. Raphael, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; Sarah L. Bessell, Human Trafficking 

Legal Center, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Human 

Trafficking Legal Center.

Melia Amal Bouhabib and Elizabeth Leiserson, Texas 

RioGrande Legal Aid Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, for 

Amicus Curiae Aurora Bedolla.

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs are six citizens of Mexico who were recruited 

to work as “Animal Scientists” at Defendant Funk Dairy, 

Inc. (“Funk Dairy”) in Idaho under the “TN Visa” program 

for “professional” employees, established under the North 

American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). But when 

Plaintiffs arrived at the dairy to perform such professional 

services, they were instead required to work substantially as 

general laborers. After leaving Funk Dairy’s employ, 

Plaintiffs brought this suit alleging a variety of claims under 

federal and Idaho law. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that 

Defendants’ bait-and-switch tactics violated applicable 

federal statutory prohibitions on forced labor by, inter alia, 

abusing the TN Visa program in order to coerce Plaintiffs to 

provide menial physical labor. The district court, however, 

granted summary judgment to Defendants on the federal 

claims and declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over 

the state law claims.

For purposes of their summary judgment motion, 

Defendants expressly conceded that all Plaintiffs believed 

that their ability to remain lawfully in the U.S. depended on 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 5

their continued employment at Funk Dairy. In light of that 

concession and our obligation to construe the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that a 

reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy knowingly 

obtained Plaintiffs’ labor by abusing the TN Visa process in 

order to exert pressure on Plaintiffs to provide labor that was 

substantially different from what had been represented to 

them and to federal consular officials. So construed, Funk 

Dairy’s conduct violated the provisions of Chapter 77 of 

Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibit forced labor and 

trafficking of persons into forced labor. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1589(a)(3), 1590(a). Plaintiffs therefore asserted triable 

causes of action under the civil suit provision of Chapter 77. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Because the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

federal claims, we also reverse its decision to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment 

and remand the case. 

I

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment 

for Defendants, we recount the facts of this case in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 

946 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2019).

A

Defendant Funk Dairy, which is owned by Defendant 

David Funk and his wife, is a dairy operation near the town 

of Murtaugh in Twin Falls County, Idaho. The dairy’s 

principal business is producing and selling raw milk, and its 
6 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

operations are managed by the Funks’ son-in-law, Defendant 

Curtis Giles. The Funks also own and operate a separate 

entity, Defendant Shoesole Farms, Inc., which has farmland 

nearby. Funk Dairy buys feed from Shoesole Farms, Inc., 

and in return, it supplies the farm with manure to use as 

fertilizer. Giles, however, is not involved with the 

management of Shoesole Farm, Inc.

In April 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”) completed an audit of Funk Dairy and 

concluded that 78 percent of its employees were aliens who 

lacked sufficient documentation to confirm their eligibility 

to work in the U.S. In 2014, in order to address “labor 

issues” in Idaho and to recruit and retain employees, Giles 

inquired about the “TN Visa” program that he had heard 

about while attending conferences. To set the subsequent 

events concerning Funk Dairy’s use of the TN Visa program 

in context, we first briefly recount the basic contours of that 

program.

B

The TN Visa program, established “pursuant to the 

provisions of Section D of Annex 1603” of NAFTA, allows 

a citizen of Mexico or Canada to be admitted to the United 

States for the purpose of “engag[ing] in business activities at 

a professional level as provided for in such Annex.” See

8 U.S.C. § 1184(e)(2).1 The referenced Section D states that 

1 In early 2020, Congress amended the relevant statutory language 

to reflect the adoption of a new trade agreement superseding NAFTA. 

See United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement Implementation Act, 

Pub. L. No. 116-113, § 503(c), 134 Stat. 11, 71 (2020). Unless otherwise 

noted, all references to the applicable statutes and regulations are to the 

versions in effect at the time of the underlying events in this case in 

2015–2016.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 7

the program only applies to a “profession set out in 

Appendix 1603.D.1,” see NAFTA, Annex 1603.D.1, 

December 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612, 666, and that Appendix 

lists dozens of different professions, see NAFTA, Appendix 

1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 668–70. The work must be 

performed for “a United States entity,” which may include 

an “individual,” see 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(b), but that entity need 

not be the formal “employer” of the visa holder, see id. 

§ 214.6(d)(3)(ii), (h)(1). A person granted a TN Visa may 

be admitted “for a period not to exceed three years.” Id. 

§ 214.6(e). The visa may be extended for additional periods 

of up to three years upon application of the “United States 

employer” of the beneficiary or, in the case of a foreign 

employer, the “United States entity” for which the work is 

performed. Id. § 214.6(h)(1). So long as the alien remains 

qualified for a TN Visa and “continues to be engaged in TN 

business activities for a U.S. employer or entity at a 

professional level,” there “is no specific limit” on the 

number of extensions that may be granted. Id. 

§ 214.6(h)(1)(iv).

A Mexican citizen must apply for the TN Visa “at a

United States consular office” and “must present 

documentation sufficient to satisfy the consular officer . . . 

[1] that the applicant is seeking entry to the United States to 

engage in business activities for a United States employer[] 

or entity[] at a professional level, and [2] that the applicant 

meets the criteria to perform at such a professional level.” 

8 C.F.R. § 214.6(d)(3). The proof “may be in the form of a 

letter from the prospective employer[] in the United States, 

and must be supported by diplomas, degrees or membership 

in a professional organization.” Id. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii). The 

documentation must also address and “fully affirm” the 

following five points:
8 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

(1) the qualifying “profession” from the list 

in Appendix 1603.D.1;

(2) a “description of the professional 

activities, including a brief summary of 

daily job duties, if appropriate, in which 

the applicant will engage in [sic] for the 

United States employer/entity”;

(3) the “anticipated length of stay”;

(4) the “educational qualifications or

appropriate credentials” demonstrating 

that the alien “has professional level 

status”; and

(5) the “arrangements for remuneration for 

services to be rendered.”

Id. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii)(A)–(E).

After acquiring a TN Visa and coming to the United 

States, a TN Visa holder is allowed to seek to change 

employers if the worker finds a new employer eligible to 

sponsor him or her. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(i). An employer 

is not required to notify the Government when a worker with 

a TN Visa ends his or her employment. See U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 402.17-5(A)(8) 

(2017 ed.) (“There is no requirement that the TN employer 

or worker notify the [Government] of the termination of the 

employment relationship.”).
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 9

C

1

In the fall of 2014, Giles traveled to Mexico with the 

intention of recruiting workers for Funk Dairy who would 

qualify for visas under the TN Visa program. There, he 

recruited Plaintiffs César Martínez-Rodríguez (“Martínez”), 

Dalia Padilla-López (“Padilla”), Mayra Múñoz-Lara 

(“Múñoz”), Brenda Gastélum-Sierra (“Gastélum”), Leslie 

Ortiz-García (“Ortiz”), and Ricardo Neri-Camacho (“Neri”), 

who are all citizens of Mexico, to work for Funk Dairy. All 

of the Plaintiffs had completed four-year college degrees and 

were licensed to work in Mexico as either animal scientists 

or veterinarians.

Giles gave presentations at several different Mexican

universities, describing employment opportunities at Funk 

Dairy. Although the presentations were nominally open to 

anyone interested in attending, Giles made clear that he was 

only interested in applicants who had already graduated and 

been licensed in veterinary medicine or animal science. 

Thus, for example, at the presentation Neri attended, there 

were initially 80 to 100 attendees, but most of them left early 

after they heard that Giles was only looking for veterinary 

doctors who had already graduated and had a license.

After attending one of these presentations, each Plaintiff 

was interviewed by Giles. During these interviews, Giles 

avoided providing specifics about the type of work that 

Plaintiffs would perform if they were hired by Funk Dairy. 

For example, when interviewing Gastélum, Giles “evaded 

[questions] regarding the activities of the job, the job duties 

and the details.” Giles told Gastélum they “would talk about 

that later,” after she arrived in Idaho. Giles similarly told 
10 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

Ortiz that they would discuss the specific tasks of her job 

after she was selected.

Despite Giles’ evasive answers regarding the specific job 

duties, Plaintiffs developed, over the course of the hiring 

process, a general sense of what they thought the job would 

entail. Neri understood that the job would be “to supervise 

the quality of the milk, check on or supervise the workers 

and the machinery, the quality of the feed, and the care of 

the animals.” Padilla understood that the job would involve 

“checking the quality of the milk and the milking, not be a 

milker.” Gastélum, Ortiz, Múñoz, and Martínez however, 

did not testify as to any clear understanding of what duties 

would be expected, other than that the position was to be an 

“Animal Scientist.” Giles also described the general 

operations of the dairy and informed Plaintiffs that the work 

would include “practical, hands-on experience with dairy 

animals,” but he did not suggest that it would be physically 

demanding.

Plaintiffs also left the presentations and interviews with 

a general understanding of the amount of work, 

compensation, and other benefits that came with the jobs. 

Plaintiffs’ recollections varied somewhat, but they generally 

understood that each of them would work 130 to 144 hours 

in two-week pay periods, receive at least $10 per hour with 

the opportunity for raises, and receive a $2,000 bonus and 

six days of paid vacation after one year. Plaintiffs also 

believed, again with varying recollections, that some of their 

housing and their transportation costs would be covered by 

Funk Dairy.

Each Plaintiff received a job offer, and each Plaintiff 

accepted. After Plaintiffs accepted the positions, Giles 

arranged for legal counsel to assist them in securing TN 

Visas. Among the dozens of professions that are eligible for 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 11

TN Visas under NAFTA is “Animal Scientist.” See

NAFTA, Appendix 1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 669; see also

8 C.F.R. § 214.6(c). To qualify for admission as an animal 

scientist, the alien must have at least a “Baccalaureate or 

Licenciatura Degree,” see NAFTA, Appendix 1603.D.1, 

32 I.L.M. at 669; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(b), (c). To obtain 

the TN Visas, Plaintiffs needed to submit applications to the 

U.S. Department of State for entry as animal scientists.

Funk Dairy’s agents prepared the applications for 

Plaintiffs and provided supporting letters to the U.S. 

Embassy in Mexico. Each letter stated that the respective 

Plaintiff would be employed by Funk Dairy “in the 

professional-level position of animal scientist for a threeyear period commencing in October 2014 at an annual salary 

of at least $25,000.” The letters described the specific tasks 

that Plaintiffs would be expected to perform and stated that, 

“[d]ue to the sophisticated, professional nature of the above 

duties, the person filling this position must hold at minimum 

a Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Science, Dairy Science, 

Veterinary Medicine, or a closely related field.”

U.S. consular officials also interviewed each Plaintiff in 

Mexico. Funk Dairy’s legal counsel prepared Plaintiffs for 

the interviews, and specifically instructed at least one of 

them (Padilla) to tell U.S. consular officials that she would 

not be milking cows at Funk Dairy. Ultimately, each 

Plaintiff obtained a TN Visa authorizing entry into the U.S. 

for professional employment with Funk Dairy as an animal 

scientist.

All of the Plaintiffs understood that their employment 

was “at-will.” Defendants stipulated for purposes of 

summary judgment that all Plaintiffs understood that “if their 
12 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

employment with Funk Dairy ended, their Visa would expire 

and they would be subject to removal back to Mexico.”2

2

Upon arrival at Funk Dairy between November and 

December 2014, Plaintiffs learned that the activities listed in 

Funk Dairy’s supporting letters to the U.S. Embassy 

constituted only a portion of their responsibilities. Thus, 

although Plaintiffs performed at least some of the “Animal 

Scientist” activities listed in those letters, Plaintiffs were also 

required to perform varying amounts of unskilled, 

nonprofessional labor that was not materially different from 

the work done by the dairy’s general laborers. On at least 

one occasion, Ortiz directly complained to Giles that her 

work did not amount to animal science. In fact, Funk 

Dairy’s employment records listed each Plaintiff’s position 

as “Milker,” “Outside Help,” or simply “Calves.” And in a 

worker’s compensation injury report, Padilla’s occupation 

was listed as “General Dairy Worker.”

Plaintiffs received compensation resembling what Giles 

had described, but in several other respects the terms were 

not as expected. Neri never received his $2,000 bonus or six 

2 Thus, for example, Gastélum testified that she thought “we 

couldn’t leave our job[s] because [Giles] would return us to Mexico.” 

Padilla and Muñoz thought that if their employment at Funk Dairy 

ended, they would be required to return to Mexico. Ortiz understood that 

Funk Dairy had the power to have her deported. And Martínez thought 

that if his employment ended, his visa would expire. Although Neri 

testified at his deposition that he was not aware that he “would have had 

to go back to Mexico” if his employment ended, we accept for purposes 

of this appeal Defendants’ factual concession that Neri, like the other 

Plaintiffs, also believed that his visa status and ability to stay in the U.S. 

were tied to his employment at Funk Dairy.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 13

paid days of vacation. Gastélum, Múñoz, Padilla, and Ortiz 

were shorted vacation pay in varying amounts.

Funk Dairy also did not cover transportation and housing 

expenses as Plaintiffs had expected. For example, Funk 

Dairy initially paid for Martínez’s airfare to fly to Idaho but, 

contrary to Giles’s representations, the cost of that airfare 

was deducted from Martínez’s paycheck. Each Plaintiff 

ultimately had to find his or her own transportation to and 

from work. Upon Plaintiffs’ arrival, Funk Dairy had housing 

ready near the dairy, and at least five Plaintiffs received one 

or more free months of housing.3 After the first one or two 

months, Funk Dairy began to require Plaintiffs to pay rent. 

Martínez’s housing was in a basement that lacked heating 

and was infested with mice and spiders. Giles also did not 

allow the four female Plaintiffs (Gastélum, Múñoz, Ortiz, 

and Padilla), who initially lived together in a house owned 

by Funk Dairy, to have visitors, and Giles had someone 

watch their house to ensure that this rule was followed. 

Ultimately, only Padilla stayed in that house—Gastélum, 

Ortiz, and Múñoz found different housing.

Giles, who oversaw Plaintiffs and their working 

conditions, was often unwilling to accommodate Plaintiffs’ 

health needs or provide appropriate medical care for 

workplace injuries. Although Giles knew that Neri had 

diabetes, Neri was not allowed consistent breaks or a 

regularly scheduled lunch. Although some Plaintiffs had 

been told that they would have the option to work up to 

12 hours per day, six days a week, the reality was that 12-

hour shifts, six days a week were mandatory, and some 

Plaintiffs stated that Giles regularly denied rest, meal, and 

bathroom breaks. At times, workers at the dairy used a 

3 Martínez could not remember whether he paid rent his first month.
14 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

bucket to relieve themselves due to the lack of facilities in 

parts of the farm. When Padilla fractured her finger at work, 

Giles refused to change her work schedule or allow her a day 

off, telling her that she “had nine other fingers.” When a 

hydraulic bar in the milking parlor cut off part of Múñoz’s 

finger, Giles delayed Múñoz from reaching an emergency 

room by instructing the on-duty employee en route with her 

to a hospital to return to the dairy to collect the severed 

portion, take her to a cheaper hospital, and switch drivers to 

an off-duty employee. The resulting delay prevented Múñoz 

from having the severed portion reattached.

Giles made numerous references to deportation 

throughout Plaintiffs’ employment. He specifically told at 

least three Plaintiffs (Gastélum, Ortiz, and Múñoz) that if 

their employment with Funk Dairy ended for any reason, 

they would be deported or otherwise required to leave the 

U.S. He also told several Plaintiffs that they would be 

returned to Mexico if they discussed their rate of pay with 

other dairy workers, and he expressly threatened Ortiz with 

deportation when she complained to him that her work at 

Funk Dairy did not amount to “animal science.”

Funk Dairy and Giles did not restrict Plaintiffs’ ability to 

travel. All Plaintiffs obtained Idaho driver’s licenses and 

motor vehicles for personal transportation, and neither Funk 

Dairy nor Giles interfered with their vehicle use or driver’s 

licenses. Each Plaintiff also had a passport, and several even 

made trips to Mexico and California. But Funk Dairy 

sometimes refused to grant requests for time off.

Funk Dairy and Giles generally did not censor or control 

Plaintiffs’ phone and email communications with others. 

But some Plaintiffs said that they were unable to 

communicate electronically when they first arrived because 

the housing provided by the dairy did not have a phone or 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 15

computer, and Plaintiffs initially lacked the financial means 

to get phones.

After around a year of employment, Martínez, Ortiz, and 

Gastélum were “released” because they did not “meet[] 

[Funk Dairy’s] expectations.” Neri quit after eight months 

of employment, and Padilla and Múñoz each quit a little after 

a year of employment. Neri quit because of health problems 

related to his diabetes and because he “didn’t feel the 

activities [he was] doing were related to animal science.” 

Padilla quit because she had to return to Mexico to take care 

of her ill mother. Múñoz quit because she had a lot of pain 

in the finger that had been injured and “could no longer 

continue to work under those climate conditions or the work 

conditions.” Plaintiffs complained to ICE about their 

treatment at Funk Dairy, and ICE undertook an investigation 

into whether Funk Dairy had abused the TN Visa program. 

The investigation did not result in any further action by ICE.

D

In January 2017, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, 

alleging claims under federal and Idaho law.4 In their 

operative first amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert two 

claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), which creates a civil 

cause of action for victims of violations of the various 

prohibitions on forced labor contained in Chapter 77 of Title 

18 of the U.S. Code. First, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants 

obtained their labor in violation of the prohibition on forced 

labor in 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Second, Plaintiffs alleged that 

Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1590 by trafficking them 

4 Plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction based solely on the federal-questionjurisdiction statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and did not invoke the district 

court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
16 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

into the U.S. for forced labor. Plaintiffs also asserted six 

claims under Idaho law—namely, intentional fraud, 

concealment, false promise, negligent misrepresentation, 

breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing.

The district court granted summary judgment to 

Defendants on Plaintiffs’ two federal claims, concluding that 

Plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence to 

establish that Defendants had violated either § 1589 or 

§ 1590. After disposing of the federal claims, the district 

court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Having thus dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims, the district 

court did not consider Defendants’ alternative argument that, 

if any claims survived, Funk Dairy was the only proper 

defendant. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II

Section 1595(a) of Title 18 authorizes any “individual 

who is a victim of a violation of this chapter”—i.e., Chapter 

77 of Title 18—to “bring a civil action” seeking “damages 

and reasonable attorneys fees” from “the perpetrator,” as 

well as from others who benefitted in specified ways from 

the violation.

As noted earlier, Plaintiffs here alleged two violations of 

Chapter 77: (1) forced labor in violation of § 1589(a); and 

(2) trafficking a person into forced labor in violation of 

§ 1590(a). By its terms, the trafficking statute invoked in 

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action requires proof that the 

perpetrator “knowingly recruit[ed], harbor[ed], 

transport[ed], provide[d], or obtain[ed] by any means, any 

person for labor or services in violation of this chapter.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (emphasis added). Here, the predicate 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 17

“violation of this chapter” on which Plaintiffs’ trafficking 

claim is based is the same forced-labor violation alleged in 

the first cause of action. Moreover, Defendants’ sole 

argument in support of affirming the summary judgment on 

the trafficking claim is that Plaintiffs have not adequately 

established a predicate violation of § 1589(a)’s prohibition 

on forced labor. Accordingly, the viability of both of 

Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action rests dispositively on 

whether Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to 

establish all of the elements of a violation of § 1589(a).

In addressing that question, we begin with the text of the 

statute. Section 1589(a) imposes criminal punishment on: 

[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the 

labor or services of a person by any one of, or 

by any combination of, the following 

means—

(1) by means of force, threats of force, 

physical restraint, or threats of physical 

restraint to that person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of 

serious harm to that person or another 

person;

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse 

of law or legal process; or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern 

intended to cause the person to believe 

that, if that person did not perform such 

labor or services, that person or another 

person would suffer serious harm or 

physical restraint.
18 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). Establishing the statute’s actus reus

thus requires proof that the defendant “provide[d] or 

obtain[ed] the labor or services of a person” by one or more 

of the four enumerated means. Id. In addition, it must be 

proved that the defendant acted with the requisite mens 

rea—i.e., “knowingly.” Id.; see also United States v. Dann, 

652 F.3d 1160, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the 

elements of a charge under § 1589(a)(4)).

The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to 

present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to either the actus reus or mens rea

requirements of § 1589(a). See Frudden v. Pilling, 877 F.3d 

821, 828 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Summary judgment is appropriate 

when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-movant, there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 

Reviewing de novo, see id., we disagree as to both 

requirements.5

III

In contending that they have satisfied § 1589(a)’s actus 

reus requirement, Plaintiffs rely on three of the four 

statutorily enumerated means of committing forced labor—

namely, those set forth in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of that 

5 Because the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had wholly 

failed to present sufficient evidence of a violation of § 1589(a), it 

declined to resolve Defendants’ fallback argument that summary 

judgment should at least have been granted to some of the separate 

Defendants. Because we conclude that Plaintiffs presented sufficient 

evidence that Funk Dairy violated § 1589(a), we reverse the district 

court’s broader ruling and leave it to that court to address on remand, in 

light of our ruling, whether to grant summary judgment to the other 

separate Defendants. See infra note 13.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 19

subsection. Because Plaintiffs pleaded only a single forcedlabor cause of action in their operative complaint, the district 

court’s dismissal of that claim was erroneous if Plaintiffs 

presented sufficient evidence to establish that Defendants 

engaged in any one of these three means with the requisite 

mens rea. We conclude that the evidence in the summary 

judgment record would permit a reasonable jury to find that 

Funk Dairy knowingly “obtain[ed] the labor” of Plaintiffs 

through the particular means enumerated in § 1589(a)(3), 

namely, abuse of law or legal process.6 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(a)(3).

The actus reus requirement of § 1589(a)(3) can be met 

by showing that the defendant “provide[d] or obtain[ed] the 

labor or services of a person . . . by means of the abuse or 

threatened abuse of law or legal process.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(a)(3). Section 1589(c) defines the crucial phrase 

“abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” to mean:

the use or threatened use of a law or legal 

process, whether administrative, civil, or 

criminal, in any manner or for any purpose 

for which the law was not designed, in order 

to exert pressure on another person to cause 

that person to take some action or refrain 

from taking some action.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1). In the context of the claims alleged 

here, the language of § 1589(a)(3), coupled with this 

definition, requires each Plaintiff to prove three elements: 

(1) that Funk Dairy used a law or legal process in a manner 

6 As discussed below, we leave it to the district court on remand to 

reconsider, in light of our decision, whether Plaintiffs’ alternative 

reliance on § 1589(a)(2) and (a)(4) is also viable. See infra note 13.
20 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

or for a purpose for which it was not designed; (2) that Funk 

Dairy did so “in order to exert pressure” on the Plaintiff to 

cause him or her to provide labor; and (3) that Funk Dairy 

obtained the Plaintiff’s labor “by means of” the pressure 

created by that abuse—i.e., that the resulting pressure caused

the Plaintiff to provide the labor that Funk Dairy obtained.7 

See, e.g., Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 687 F.3d 

1173, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs have presented 

sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find all three 

elements.

A

Defendants do not contest that the TN Visa program 

qualifies as a “law or legal process” for purposes of § 1589. 

Instead, the central question concerning the first element is 

whether, in obtaining Plaintiffs’ employment through that 

program, Funk Dairy used the TN Visa program in a 

“manner” and “for [a] purpose for which [it] was not 

designed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1).

1

In addressing this issue, we must first identify what does 

and does not count as an objective for which the TN Visa 

program was designed.

A defining feature of that program, as reflected in the 

text of NAFTA and the implementing statute, is the 

7 Plaintiffs’ operative complaint makes clear that the relevant 

“action” that Plaintiffs were caused to take by Defendants’ alleged 

exertion of pressure was the provision of their labor. The complaint 

likewise makes clear that Plaintiffs rely on the theory that Defendants 

actually “abuse[d]” a law or legal process, rather than that they 

“threatened” to do so.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 21

temporary admission of Mexican or Canadian nationals “to 

engage in business activities at a professional level.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1184(e)(2) (emphasis added); see also NAFTA, 

Annex 1603.D.1, 32 I.L.M. at 666 (similar). Given this 

evident “design[]” of the TN Visa program, Plaintiffs may 

properly establish the requisite abuse of that program by 

showing that Funk Dairy sponsored Plaintiffs’ applications 

in order to obtain labor that was not at a “professional level.”

But we cannot similarly say that the “design[]” of the TN 

Visa program extends to all aspects of employment beyond 

this fundamental distinction between professional and 

nonprofessional labor. Apart from that key limitation, the 

TN Visa program itself generally does not purport to specify, 

or to regulate, the substantive terms of employment of such 

admitted professionals. As a result, the mere fact that a 

sponsoring employer later breaches its employment 

agreement with a TN Visa holder would not, standing alone, 

be sufficient to establish that the employer has thereby used 

that visa program in a manner or for a purpose for which it 

was not designed. A forced labor claim requires more than 

a “bad employer-employee relationship[].” Dann, 652 F.3d 

at 1170. Accordingly, without more, the contention that 

Funk Dairy did not provide all of the employment benefits 

that Plaintiffs were promised—such as free transportation, 

free housing, or specified vacation time—does not itself 

provide a basis for concluding that Funk Dairy abused the 

TN Visa process.8

8 Defendants’ failures to provide such promised benefits might be 

relevant to the scope of damages available for a violation of § 1589(a)(3), 

as well as to one or more of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. We have not 

been presented with any such issues and do not decide them.
22 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

We therefore focus on whether Plaintiffs adequately 

supported their contention that Funk Dairy used the TN Visa 

program to obtain labor from them that did not qualify as 

“business activities at a professional level.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1184(e)(2). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, after 

representing to them and to U.S. consular officials that 

Plaintiffs were being hired to perform the “professional 

activities” of an “Animal Scientist,” 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(c), 

(d)(3)(ii)(B), Funk Dairy required Plaintiffs, upon arrival in 

Idaho, to work substantially as general laborers. Plaintiffs 

presented sufficient evidence to support this contention.

2

As explained earlier, the applicable regulations require a 

TN Visa applicant to provide “documentation,” typically “in 

the form of a letter from the prospective employer(s) in the 

United States,” affirming five specified matters: (1) the 

qualifying “profession of the applicant” from the list in the 

relevant NAFTA Appendix; (2) a “description of the 

professional activities” that the applicant would be 

performing, “including a brief summary of daily job duties, 

if appropriate”; (3) the “anticipated length of stay”; (4) the 

applicant’s “professional level status,” as shown by his or 

her “educational qualifications” or other “appropriate 

credentials”; and (5) the “arrangements for remuneration.” 

8 C.F.R. § 214.6(d)(3)(ii)(A)–(E); see also supra at 7–8. To 

fulfill this requirement, Funk Dairy’s agents submitted 

almost identically worded letters, signed by Giles, in support 

of each Plaintiff’s application.

In discussing the first of the five required elements, Funk 

Dairy’s letters stated that the dairy “wish[ed] to employ 

[Plaintiffs] in the professional-level position of Animal 

Scientist,” which is one of the qualifying professions listed 

in the relevant NAFTA Appendix. Addressing the second 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 23

element (“professional activities”), the letters asserted that

Plaintiffs would “help develop, implement, and oversee 

effective animal reproduction, nutrition, animal health, and 

related dairy industry programs relating to effective herd 

management.” The letters further elaborated on the tasks 

Plaintiffs would perform as follows:

Applying advanced theoretical and practical 

knowledge and skills in the field of animal 

science, [Plaintiffs] will be responsible for 

performing artificial insemination, 

sick/pregnant cow treatment, fresh cow 

monitoring, calving, colostrum handling, 

feed evaluation/preparation, and related 

professional duties including monitoring 

milk cleanliness/ concentration, and 

monitoring the transfer of antibodies in calf 

blood.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ professional qualifications for 

these tasks (the fourth element), the letters stated:

Due to the sophisticated, professional nature 

of the above duties, the person filling this 

position must hold at minimum a Bachelor’s 

degree in Agricultural Science, Dairy 

Science, Veterinary Medicine, or a closely 

related field (please note that English 

language fluency is not required given the 

specific nature of the above duties and 

because the animal scientist will report to 

bilingual supervisory personnel on-site).

The letters concluded by stating that Funk Dairy “hereby 

guarantee[s] that we will comply with all terms of 
24 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

[Plaintiffs’] TN status for the duration of [their] employment 

with us.”9

Plaintiffs’ testimony likewise supports the conclusion 

that, during the recruiting process, Funk Dairy represented 

that the “Animal Scientist” jobs being offered would qualify 

for the TN Visa program for professionals. Plaintiffs 

testified that as a result of the initial on-campus 

presentations, their job interviews, and the visa application 

process, they understood that Funk Dairy was hiring 

“Animal Scientists,” even though Giles was vague on the 

details on what that meant. See supra at 9–10. Moreover, to 

the extent that some of the Plaintiffs developed a more 

specific understanding of what the animal scientist position 

entailed, it was affirmatively inconsistent with the view that 

they were being hired to perform general labor. For 

example, Neri testified that his understanding was that the 

job “was to supervise the quality of the milk, check on or 

supervise the workers and the machinery, the quality of the 

feed, and the care of the animals.” Padilla testified that she 

left her initial interview “under the impression that [the job] 

was going to be checking the quality of the milk and the 

milking, not be a milker.” With other Plaintiffs, such as 

Gastélum and Ortiz, Giles actively evaded supplying details 

about what an “Animal Scientist” would do at Funk Dairy. 

That evasion, too, supports a reasonable inference that Funk 

Dairy’s actions created a misleading impression that the 

contemplated work would involve—as the letter to the 

9 The letters addressed the third and fifth elements by stating that 

Plaintiffs’ annual salary would be “at least $25,000” and that the 

anticipated length of stay was a “three-year period.” Plaintiffs have not 

contended in this court that these representations were inaccurate.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 25

Embassy put it—“duties” of a “sophisticated, professional 

nature.”

Plaintiffs also testified that Funk Dairy’s agents, in 

helping to prepare Plaintiffs for their interviews with U.S. 

consular officials, told Plaintiffs to describe the jobs in terms 

that matched how Funk Dairy had characterized them in the 

letters to the Embassy. For example, Padilla testified that 

Funk Dairy’s agents instructed her to say that Plaintiffs were 

being hired “as animal scientists in the reproduction area, 

nutrition, and animal health.” She was specifically 

instructed to tell the consular officials that she would not “be 

milking.” During Padilla’s interview, the consular officials 

asked her what work she would be doing for Funk Dairy, and 

Padilla answered, “animal scientist,” just as Funk Dairy had 

instructed.

Plaintiffs also presented sufficient evidence to permit a 

rational jury to find that the job that Plaintiffs were actually

asked to perform upon their arrival in Idaho could not fairly 

be described as that of an “Animal Scientist.” For example, 

in Funk Dairy’s own internal employment records, 

Plaintiffs’ occupations were all listed as “Milker” (Martínez, 

Padilla, and Múñoz), “Outside Help” (Ortiz and Neri), or 

“Calves” (Gastélum). In a worker’s compensation report 

that was completed when Padilla was injured on the job, her 

occupation was listed as “General Dairy Worker.”

Furthermore, Plaintiffs all testified about the substantial 

volume of general labor that they were required to perform. 

Ortiz described her job duties as lifting, moving, and feeding 

baby cows, folding towels, cleaning equipment, connecting 

milking hoses, transporting cows, picking up trash, washing 

feeding basins, and removing feces. Múñoz stated that her 

duties included milking cows, cleaning bottles, feeding 

cows, and otherwise helping the milkers to milk. Martínez 
26 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

testified that his job duties included transporting cows, 

feeding calves, cleaning the feeding area, removing manure 

with a shovel, and cleaning the water basins. Neri said that 

his tasks included keeping animal areas clean, cleaning the 

water basins, feeding calves, and removing feces. Padilla 

testified that her duties included cleaning equipment, 

attaching milking machines, and distributing milk to calves. 

In other words, Padilla was assigned to “the actual task of a 

milker”—despite having been specifically instructed by 

Funk Dairy’s agents to tell U.S. consular officials that she 

would not be a milker. And although Gastélum’s testimony 

was somewhat vague on this subject, she stated that she was 

required to spend several hours per week transporting calves 

with a truck and trailer, that she spent several hours each day 

performing miscellaneous additional activities, and that the 

work was “much more physical” than what animal science 

entailed.

Defendants note that each Plaintiff also acknowledged 

performing some of the tasks of an “Animal Scientist” as 

described in the letters to the Embassy, such as artificial 

insemination, administering vaccines, and collecting blood 

samples. But the fact that Plaintiffs performed some such 

tasks would not preclude a reasonable jury from nonetheless 

concluding that, viewing Plaintiffs’ work duties as a whole, 

Plaintiffs were employed substantially as general laborers 

and that the “Animal Scientist” tasks constituted a limited 

portion of their duties.

Given the evidence of a sharp disparity between the 

“sophisticated, professional” tasks that Funk Dairy 

described during the TN Visa process and the general labor 

Funk Dairy subsequently demanded of Plaintiffs, a 

reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy used the TN Visa 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 27

program “in [a] manner” and “for [a] purpose for which [it] 

was not designed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1).

B

Plaintiffs also presented sufficient evidence to allow a 

rational jury to conclude that Funk Dairy abused the TN Visa 

program “in order to exert pressure” on Plaintiffs “to cause” 

them to provide labor different from what they had agreed to 

provide. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1). In particular, three 

categories of evidence in the record would support such a 

finding.

First, Funk Dairy’s abuse of the TN Visa program placed 

Plaintiffs in a bait-and-switch situation in which Plaintiffs 

journeyed from Mexico to Idaho with one set of work 

expectations, only to be required upon arrival to perform a 

substantial volume of menial work. As a practical matter, 

the resulting situation would be expected to, and did, exert 

substantial pressure on Plaintiffs to go along with providing 

labor that was very different from what they had agreed and 

expected to perform. Given the record evidence showing 

that Giles evaded supplying any specifics about job tasks and 

that he helped to foster a belief that the work would be 

professional in nature, a reasonable jury could find that Funk 

Dairy acted “in order to exert” that “pressure.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(c)(1). That is, the jury could find that the inherently 

coercive pressure of Funk Dairy’s bait-and-switch was 

intended rather than incidental.

Second, Giles made statements to each Plaintiff that 

fostered a belief that, if the Plaintiffs did not go along with 

what Funk Dairy wanted—which would include its bait-andswitch—they would be sent back to Mexico. For example, 

Giles told multiple Plaintiffs that if they discussed their pay 
28 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

with their coworkers, they would have to return to Mexico.10 

On one occasion when Ortiz missed a day of work, Giles told 

her “[she] should thank God that [Giles] didn’t deport [her] 

without [her] belongings, just like that.” On another 

occasion, when Ortiz expressed disappointment that the 

work that she was doing did not amount to animal science, 

Giles mentioned deportation. Gastélum, Ortiz, and Múñoz 

testified that Giles repeatedly said that if their employment 

ended with the dairy farm, he would return them to Mexico 

or they would be deported. Indeed, Giles explicitly told 

Múñoz that, if her employment ended with Funk Dairy, he 

would be required to report that fact to the United States 

Government. Padilla similarly believed that if she left her 

employment with Funk Dairy, the dairy would have to report 

that to the Government. Although only Ortiz mentioned 

hearing a comment that specifically linked deportation to 

complaints that the work demanded was not “animal 

science,” that is not dispositive. A jury could reasonably 

conclude that, when Funk Dairy threatened deportation to 

ensure compliance with one of its demands, Funk Dairy 

thereby reinforced the same understanding in Plaintiffs with 

respect to its other demands—including its demand for nonanimal-science general labor.

Third, some of Giles’s deportation-related statements did 

not accurately describe the law or the TN Visa program’s 

requirements. The relevant regulations expressly allow the 

holder of a TN Visa, while in the U.S., to apply to change 

employers if the visa holder finds a new employer to sponsor 

him or her. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(i). Furthermore, an

employer is not required to notify DHS when a worker with 

10 Plaintiffs’ pay was generally higher than many of the other 

numerous Funk Dairy employees that were, like Plaintiffs, classified as 

“Milker,” “Outside Help,” or “Calves.”
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 29

a TN Visa ends his or her employment, despite Giles’s 

suggestion to the contrary.11 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 402.17-5(A)(8) (“There is 

no requirement that the TN employer or worker notify the 

Department of the termination of the employment 

relationship.”). Giles made statements to some of the 

Plaintiffs that erroneously suggested that the opposite was 

true. By fostering false beliefs about the immigration 

consequences of failing to comply with what Funk Dairy 

wanted, Giles exacerbated the pressure to go along with the 

bait-and-switch inherent in Funk Dairy’s abuse of the TN 

Visa program.

Taken together, this evidence supports a reasonable 

inference that Funk Dairy acted so as to exert pressure on 

Plaintiffs to cause them to acquiesce in supplying the 

nonprofessional labor that Funk Dairy demanded upon their 

arrival.12

11 Defendants argue that they had a duty under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A) to report any change in Plaintiffs’ employment status, 

but that is wrong. Given that the regulations explicitly allow TN Visa 

holders to apply in the U.S. to work at other employers and given that 

the State Department expressly disavows any employer obligation to 

report a termination of a TN Visa holder, an employer who fires a TN 

Visa holder does not thereby cause that person to acquire an immediate 

unlawful status, nor does that employer thereby harbor or conceal the 

alien.

12 Because the relevant violation of § 1989(a) at issue here is 

obtaining labor by means of the abuse of law or legal process, see

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3), it is irrelevant whether the individual statements 

that Giles made to the Plaintiffs would also qualify as actionable “threats 

of serious harm” under § 1589(a)(2). Cf. Headley, 687 F.3d at 1179–80

(addressing claim based on alleged threats of “serious harm” in violation 

of § 1589(a)(2) and an alleged scheme to cause the plaintiffs to believe 
30 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

C

We also conclude that the record would support a 

reasonable inference that Funk Dairy obtained the 

nonprofessional labor that Plaintiffs were tasked with 

performing “by means of” the pressure created by Funk 

Dairy’s abuse of the TN Visa program. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589(a)(3).

As we have recognized, the phrase “by means of” refers 

to familiar principles of causation and requires a proximate 

causal link between one or more of the unlawful means 

enumerated in § 1589(a) and the labor actually obtained. 

Headley, 687 F.3d at 1179–80. In Headley, where the 

alleged violation rested on threats of “serious harm,” and an 

alleged scheme to cause the plaintiffs to fear “serious harm” 

if they did not perform the labor, see id. at 1178–79 (citing 

§ 1589(a)(2), (4)), the causation inquiry necessarily focused 

on whether the requisite causal link was shown between the 

“serious harm” feared and the labor that was obtained, id. 

at 1179–80. And because the definition of “serious harm” 

requires a showing of a harm “that is sufficiently serious, 

under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a 

reasonable person of the same background and in the same 

circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or 

services in order to avoid incurring that harm,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(c)(2) (emphasis added), the causation inquiry turned 

that they would suffer “serious harm” in violation of § 1589(a)(4)); 

Dann, 652 F.3d at 1169 (noting that the Government limited its criminal 

case to an alleged scheme to cause fear of “serious harm” under 

§ 1589(a)(4) and relying on the distinct definition of “serious harm” 

contained in § 1589(c)(2)). As explained below, we leave any such 

additional issues to be addressed anew by the parties and the district court 

on remand. See infra note 13.
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 31

on whether sufficient evidence of compulsion of labor had 

been shown. See 687 F.3d at 1178–81.

In light of the distinct statutory definition of “abuse . . . 

of law or legal process,” the causation question in this case 

is whether Funk Dairy’s abuse of the TN Visa program “in 

order to exert pressure” on Plaintiffs to provide 

nonprofessional labor that was different from what Plaintiffs 

had voluntarily agreed to perform can reasonably be found 

to have caused Plaintiffs to provide that labor. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(c)(1); see also id. § 1589(a)(3). We conclude that a 

reasonable jury could find that the substantial coercive 

pressures created by Funk Dairy’s bait-and-switch abuse of 

the TN Visa program proximately caused Plaintiffs to 

provide different, nonprofessional labor instead of the 

professional work they had agreed to. Indeed, Defendants 

conceded that all Plaintiffs subjectively believed that, if they 

were fired by Funk Dairy, they would be required to return 

to Mexico. See supra at 11 & n.2. That fact, coupled with 

the objectively coercive circumstances discussed above, 

amply supports an inference that Funk Dairy’s misconduct 

caused Plaintiffs to provide menial labor that was different 

from the professional animal-science work they had agreed 

to perform. Cf. Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 

93 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff, who was 

required to work overtime without extra pay, stated a claim 

for violation of § 1589(a)(3) by alleging that the defendant 

told the plaintiff he “would cancel or withdraw his 

immigration sponsorship”).

Defendants argue that any inference of causation is 

conclusively refuted by the fact that several Plaintiffs 

ultimately left employment with Funk Dairy of their own 

volition. The district court similarly reasoned that “[i]f Funk 

Dairy was truly forcing Plaintiffs to perform labor, they 
32 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

would not have allowed three Plaintiffs to quit, nor 

terminated three Plaintiffs themselves.” We reject this 

flawed reasoning. The fact that Funk Dairy’s coercive 

pressures were not indefinitely successful in obtaining the 

sought-after nonprofessional labor from Plaintiffs would not 

preclude a jury from reasonably finding that it was initially

successful for a significant period of time. That partial 

success is sufficient to establish the requisite causation as to 

the labor thereby obtained.

Defendants also contend that, given Plaintiffs’ ability 

freely to communicate and to travel, their circumstances did 

not involve the sort of conditions that are comparable to 

“modern-day slavery.” This argument ignores the breadth 

of the statutory language of § 1589, which we have 

previously observed was enacted to abrogate, as a practical 

matter, the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of 

“involuntary servitude” in United States v. Kozminski, 

487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (construing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 

1584 (1982 ed.)). See Dann, 652 F.3d at 1169. The fact that 

Plaintiffs were not reduced to slave-like peonage does not 

mean Funk Dairy did not violate the particular prohibition 

set forth in § 1589(a)(3).

IV

In addition to satisfying all three elements of the actus 

reus required under § 1589(a)(3), Plaintiffs also presented 

sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that 

Funk Dairy acted with the requisite mens rea.

To demonstrate scienter, the employee must show that 

the employer “knowingly . . . obtain[ed] the labor or 

services” of the employee “by means of” one of the four 

statutorily enumerated methods. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4) 

(emphasis added). The scienter element requires proof that 
MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES 33

the defendant knew (1) that the enumerated “circumstance 

existed” and (2) that the defendant was obtaining the labor 

in question as a result. United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 

706, 711 (7th Cir. 2008). That is, the employer must have 

intended the coercive pressure and its effects on the 

employee. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (stating that the 

defendant must have “intended” to cause the victim to be 

placed in the enumerated coercive circumstance). We have 

little difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs presented sufficient 

evidence of mens rea under these standards.

As discussed earlier, the particular elements of the actus 

reus at issue here under § 1589(a)(3) already incorporate an 

element of scienter inasmuch as “abuse . . . of law or legal 

process” requires a showing that Funk Dairy abused the TN 

Visa program “in order to exert pressure” on the Plaintiffs 

to provide the different labor requested. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(c)(1) (emphasis added). Consequently, the same 

evidence discussed earlier amply supports the conclusion 

that (1) Funk Dairy knew of the coercive pressures that were 

inherent in its abuse of the TN Visa program and in its 

references to deportation upon termination; and (2) Funk 

Dairy intended for Plaintiffs to succumb to those pressures.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to 

establish a forced labor claim under § 1589(a)(3). The 

district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment 

to Defendants as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.13 And 

13 As noted earlier, Plaintiffs also sought to defend the sufficiency 

of their first cause of action on the alternative grounds that Funk Dairy’s 

actions violated § 1589(a)(2) and § 1589(a)(4). To the extent that 

Plaintiffs on remand elect to continue to rely upon these alternative 

theories as well, we leave it to the district court to re-evaluate those 

theories in light of our decision and after receiving the parties’ additional 

input. We likewise leave it to the district court to address in the first 
34 MARTÍNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ V. GILES

because Defendants have presented no grounds for rejecting 

Plaintiffs’ § 1590(a) trafficking-into-forced labor claim 

other than their contention that Plaintiffs failed to prove a 

predicate forced-labor violation of § 1589(a), the district 

court necessarily erred in granting summary judgment to 

Defendants on that claim as well.

V

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ first and second 

causes of action. Because the district court erred in 

dismissing those federal claims, we likewise reverse its 

decision declining, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to retain 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

instance whether Plaintiffs’ theory of liability applies equally to each 

Defendant. The district court declined to definitively decide that issue 

in light of its (erroneous) ruling that Plaintiffs’ federal claims failed as 

against all Defendants.