[Cite as State v. Reyes, 2018-Ohio-494.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105794

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

 LUIS A. REYES 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-16-611804-A 

BEFORE: Kilbane, P.J., Laster Mays, J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2018 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Mark Stanton 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

By: Frank Cavallo 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Anna Woods 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Luis A. Reyes (“Reyes”), appeals his sentence for 

attempted aggravated arson and domestic violence. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm. 

{¶2} In December 2016, Reyes was charged in a twelve-count indictment with ten 

counts of aggravated arson, one count of attempted aggravated arson, and one count of 

domestic violence. 

{¶3} In March 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement with the state of Ohio, Reyes 

pled guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated arson and one count of domestic 

violence. The trial court referred Reyes to the probation department for a presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”) and set this matter for sentencing in April 2017. 

{¶4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court referenced the PSI and heard 

testimony from Captain Schroeder of the Cleveland Fire Department Arson Unit. It was 

adduced from the PSI and Captain Schroeder’s statement that Reyes, following an 

argument with his girlfriend, poured gasoline on his girlfriend and the basement floor of 

his home and threatened to burn the house down. Reyes’s girlfriend’s daughter heard her 

mother’s screams for help and intervened by smacking a lighter out of Reyes’s hand before 

he was able to light it. Several other family members were sleeping upstairs at the time of 

this incident. Cleveland Police officers arrived at Reyes’s home and were able to detect 

the strong odor of gasoline at the front door emanating from the basement. The arson 
investigator from the Cleveland Fire Department determined that Reyes had poured so 

much gasoline that “it was too rich to ignite right then.” 

{¶5} The parties agreed that the attempted aggravated arson in Count 11 merged 

with the acts of attempted aggravated arson charged in Counts 1 and 2. The state elected 

to seek sentencing on Counts 1 and 2. The trial court sentenced Reyes to five years on 

each of Counts 1 and 2 and ordered these sentences to run consecutive to each other for a 

total of ten years. The trial court sentenced Reyes to time served on the domestic violence 

count. 

{¶6} Reyes now appeals, raising the following single assignment of error for our 

review: 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences without support 

in the record for the requisite statutory findings under R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 

2929.12, and R.C. 2929.14. 

{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Reyes argues that the record does not support 

the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C). 

{¶8} Our standard of review of a felony sentence is found in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), 

which states in relevant part: 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * 

* or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court 

for resentencing * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the 

following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under * * 

* [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)] * * *; 
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶9} We note that under R.C. 2929.14(A), prison terms are to be served 

concurrently, subject to certain exceptions. A trial court may, in its discretion, order that 

a defendant consecutively serve multiple prison terms for convictions of multiple offenses, 

provided the court make certain statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

Specifically, the trial court must find that (1) “consecutive service is necessary to protect 

the public from future crime or to punish the offender,” (2) “consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the 

offender poses to the public,” and (3) if one of three statutory factors set forth in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) applies. Id.

{¶10} Here, the trial court made the first two findings and further found that the 

factors of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c) applied in relation to the third required finding: 

I find that a consecutive prison term is necessary to protect the community 

and to punish you, the offender, and it’s not disproportionate, and I find that 

the harm is so great or unusual that a single term does not adequately reflect 

the seriousness of your conduct as I find that there were multiple victims in 

this case. 

You poured gasoline on the floor of a dwelling, of a home, in the early 

morning hours of the night, not to mention putting gasoline on your 

girlfriend or spouse at any given moment that home and your wife could 

have gone up in flames. So that’s why I find that a consecutive sentence is 

necessary as there were multiple victims and the risk of harm is so serious in 

this case, and your criminal history shows that a consecutive sentence is 

necessary to protect the public. 

Also, I find that at least two of the multiple offenses were commited as part 

of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of 

conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of your conduct. 
{¶11} Reyes contends that the record does not support the trial court’s findings in 

relation to the third prong of the required consecutive sentence findings. Specifically, he 

challenges the trial court’s findings that his “criminal history shows that * * * consecutive 

sentence[s are] necessary to protect the public” and that the offenses to which he pled 

“were committed as part of [a course of conduct], and the harm caused by [this course of 

conduct] was so great or unusual that no single prison term * * * adequately reflects the 

seriousness of [his] conduct.” Reyes contends that because his prior record is limited to 

misdemeanor convictions and contains no violent offenses or crimes that “harmed a person 

or property,” his criminal history does not demonstrate that consecutive sentences are 

warranted under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c). He also argues that his conduct merely created a 

“risk of harm,” rather than actual harm and therefore, consecutive sentences are not 

warranted under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). 

{¶12} Reyes did not dispute the details of his conduct adduced at the sentencing 

hearing. At sentencing, the trial court addressed Reyes as to the seriousness of this 

conduct: 

[Y]ou created an extremely dangerous situation and an extremely serious 

risk to a number of people by pouring gasoline all over the floor of this 

house and pouring it on the victim in this case, and having so many other 

people be in this house. You should be so thankful that this house didn’t go 

up in flames which would carry a signficant risk to people who even lived 

around you. 
{¶13} As the trial court aptly noted, Reyes’s conduct was very serious and 

presented an extremely dangerous situation. Reyes’s argument that his conduct is 

somehow less serious because the gasoline he poured did not actually ignite is 

unpersuasive. This does not diminish the physical and psychological harm suffered by his 

victims. 

{¶14} The trial court also read a portion of Reyes’s criminal record from the PSI 

on the record. While Reyes’s criminal history prior to this matter is not violent and not as 

serious as the offenses to which he pled guilty in the present matter, his record is, 

nonethless, lengthy and indicates a substance abuse problem, which, according to his 

girlfriend’s statement to the fire investigator, precipitated the domestic violence underlying 

the present offenses. 

{¶15} Upon review of the record in this matter, we cannot clearly and convincingly 

find that the trial court’s findings that the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c) are unsupported by the record. Accordingly, Reyes’s sole 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been 
affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR