-1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0026n.06 F iled: Janu ary 9, 2008 No. 06-5693 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

JOE CL AR K

M ITC HELL , P etitioner -Appellee,

v. JOH N REES, Respondent-Appellan t, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O N A P P E A L F R O M T H E U N I T ED STA TES DI STR IC T C OU RT F OR THE M ID DL E D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge, and BATCHEL DER and GIBBONS , Circuit Judges

. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Respondent-a ppellant J ohn Rees, war den of the Corre ctions Corporation of Ame rica , South C entra l Correc tional Fac ility , appe al s the district court’s g rant of a writ of habea s corpus to petitioner- appellee J oe Clark Mitche ll. Respondent arg ues that the district court e rre d by g ranting Mitchell’s Rule 60(b) moti o n fo r re l i ef f rom judg ment b e c a u s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt r e li e d o nth is c o u rt’ s p r io r

d e c is ion, Mitchell v. Re es (“ Mi tc he ll I ”), 114 F.3d 571 ( 6th Cir. 1997), which wa s err oneously decide d. For the following rea sons, w e reve rse the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt

. I. Mitchell was convic ted in Tenne ssee state court in 1986. Mi tc he ll I , 1 1 4 F

. 3 d a t5 7 2

- 7 3

. In Ap ri l 1 9 9 3 , Mitchell filed a ha beas pe tition i n fede ral district cour t pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254At the time Mitchell filed his petition, 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d) ( 1994) provided: 1 I n any proce eding instit uted in a Fe dera l c ourt by an application for a writ of habeas c or pu s b y a person in c ustody pursuant to the judgme nt of a State court, a deter mination after a

hear ing on the merits of a fac tual issue, made by a State cour

t of compe tent jurisdiction in a proce eding to which the applicant for the w rit and the S t at e o r a no ff

i ce r o r a g e n t t h e r eo f w er e p ar t i es , ev i d en ce d b y a w ri t t en fi n d i n g, wr itt e n o pin ion , o r o the r r e lia ble and a de qu a te wr itt e n ind ic ia , s ha ll b e pr e su me d to be cor rec t, unless the applicant sha ll establish or it shall otherwise appe ar, or the responde nt shall admit-- (1) that the me rits of the fa ctual dispute we re not re solved in the State court h ea ri n g; (2) that the f

actf indin g p ro cedur e employ ed by the State cour

t was not ad eq u at e t o af

fo rda f u l l an d fa i r h ea ri n g; (3) that the material fa cts wer e not ade quately develope d at the S tate cour t h ea ri n g; (4) that the State c ourt lacke d jurisdiction of the subjec t matter or ove r the p er s o no f t h e ap p l i ca n ti nt h e S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g; (5 ) t hat th e a pp lic ant wa s an ind ig e nt and the State c ourt , in de pr ivatio n of his c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht, fa ile d to a pp oin t c ouns e l to re pr esent him in t he State co u rt p ro ce ed i n g; (6) that the a

pplicant did not rec eive a full, fair, a

nd adequate hea

ring in the State court proc eeding ; or (7 ) t hat th e a pp lic ant w a s o the rw ise de nie d d ue pr oc e ss o f l aw i n th e State co u rt p ro ce ed i n g; (8) or unless that part of the rec ord of the S tate court proce eding in which the deter mination of such fa ctual issue wa s made, pe rtinent to a dete rmination of the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt su c h f a c tua l de te rm inatio n, is produce d as provided f

or hereinaf

ter, and the Fe dera l court on a c onsideration of such pa

rt of the r ecor d as a w hole conc ludes that such fa ctual deter mination is not fairly

supported by

the re cord: And in an evide ntiary

hear ing in the pr ocee ding in the F eder al cour t, when due pr oof of such fac tual deter

mination ha s been ma de, unless the e x istence of one or more of the circ umstances r espec tively set forth in par ag raphs number ed (1) to ( 7), inclusive, is shown by

the applica

nt, otherwise a p pear s, or is admitted by the re spondent, or unless the cour

t conclude s pursuant to the provisions of par ag raph numbe red ( 8) that the re c or d in

the State c ou rt pr oc e e din g , c on sid e re d a s a wh ole , d oe s n ot f

a ir ly su pp or t su c h f a c tua l de te rm inatio n, the burd e n s ha ll r e st u po n t he app lic ant t o establish by

convincingevidenc e that

the fa ctual dete rmination by the State cour

t was -2- (1994). Id. at 575. The district court dismiss ed all of Mi tchell’s claims, except for a claim under

1e rr on e ou s.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1994)

. -3- B a ts o n v . Ke n tuc ky , 4 76 U.S. 79 (1986), that Af rica n Americ ans had be en excluded unconstitutionally

from the state court jury

. Mi tc he ll I , 1 1 4 F. 3 d

at 5 7 5

. Af

t er a m agi s t ra t e j u d ge conducte d an evidentiar

y hear ing on the issue, the district court c oncluded that a Batson violation had occ urre d and conditionally g rante d Mitchell’s petition. I d. On ap p eal, this court r ever sed, concludingthat the district court lac ked jurisdiction to conduct an e videntiary hear ing beca

use it had not identified a fa ctor in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) that allowed it to dispense with the pre sumption of cor rec tness for the f

actua l findings of

the state c ourts. Id. at 577-78. Ex cluding the fac ts adduce d at the evide ntiary

hear ing, a

nd presuming the cor

rec tness of the state c ourts’ fa ctual finding s, the court determined that Mitchell failed to esta blish a Batson violation. Id. at 578-79. This court found

no e rr or in t he dis mis sa l of

Mit c he ll’ s o the r cl a ims bu t re mand e d the c a se to the dis tr ic t court fo r i t to d e te rm ine wh e the r Mitc he ll co uld e sta bli sh ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l for fa ilure to r a ise the Batson claim at trial or on dir ect a ppeal. Id. at 579 & n.13. On re mand, the district cour t held that the state c ourt rec ord demonstrated that at Mitchell’s trial, his counsel had failed to make a Batson c ha lle ng e and , a s a re su lt, the pr os e c uto r h a d f a ile d to state on the re cord a

ny rea son for his s triking the Afric an Amer ican. Mitchell v. Re es (“ Mitchell II

”), 36 F. App’ x 752, 753 (6th Cir. 2002). Ther efor e, the dist rict cour t held that “the state court re cord demonstrated ine ffe ctive ass i s t an ce of counsel, a

nd that ineffe ctive assistanc e wa s cause for the failure to develop the state court re cord.” Id. The district cour t then conclude d that the evidenc e develope d in the ear lier fe dera l court evide ntiary hear ing suf

fice d to prove the Batson claim, which-4-

in turn suffice d to demonstrate pr ejudice f rom trial counse l’s ineffe ctive assistanc e. Id. This court

reve rsed, holding that the di strict court’s c onclusion was dire ctly contra ry to Mi tc he ll I

, and holding further that there was no ba sis in law for the district cour t’s ‘per fe ct l y ci rcula

r conc lusion’ that Mitchell’s failure to de velop the re cord in the state post-convic tion pr oc e e din g s w a s c a us e d b y his trial counsel’s ineffe ctive assist ance . I n Mi tc he ll I , this court found that the state c ourt’s conc lusion that a Batson violation w as n o t es t ab l ished in the state cour t rec ord wa s fairly

supported by

that

rec ord. Id. at 753-54. This court remanded the “matter with instructions to t he district cour t to enter ju d g me n t d e n y in g th e p e ti ti o nf o r a w r it o f h a beas corpus.” Id. at 754. The district c ourt enter ed judgme nt in accor dance with the mandate on Ma rch 14, 2002. On September

13, 2000, this court issued its opini on in Ab du r’ Ra hm an v . B e ll , 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000), in which it held that the district cour t has the inhere nt authority to conduct an evidentiar y hear ing. Id. at 70 5. I n do ing so , the c ourt no te d th a t “

Mi tc he ll [] . . . is overbroa d in that it fails to recog nize the inherent a uthority th at a d i s t rict cour

t alway s has in habea s case s to order evidentiar y hear ings . . . .” Id. at 706. On J uly 28, 2005, this court issued its opini on in Harries v. Be ll , 4 17 F .3 d 6 31 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) , in wh ic h it c on fi rm e d th a t “

Mi tc he ll c on fl ic ts w ithSixth C ir c uit and Supreme Court prec edent.” Id. at 635. Fur therm o re, on J une 23, 2005, the Supre me Court issued its opini on in Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524 (2005), in w hich the Supreme Court held that a motion for re lief fr om judgme nt under Fede ral Rul e of Civil Procedur e 60(b) by a habe as petitioner is not automatically

treated as a

succe ssive habea s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id. at 538. I n response to these ca ses, on Dec ember 9, 2005, Mitchell fi l ed a motion for relief from jud g me nt purs ua

nt t o Ru le 60 (b )( 6) , a

rguin g tha

t Mi tc he ll I

err oneously

denied him an e videntiary hear ing a nd reque sting that the district c ourt reope n the case and g rant the he aring . The district cour t-5-

c on c lud e d th a t Mi tc he ll’ s mo tio n w a s n ot a su c c e ssi ve ha

be a s p e tit ion

and that the de c isi on

in Mi tc he ll I was in er ror. I t al s o co n cl u d ed that the facts of the case constituted an “e x traordina ry circ umstance” and satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b)( 6). There fore , it g rante d an evide ntiary hear ing, a dopted the fa ctual finding s of the ea rlier f eder al cour

t evidentiary

hear ing, a

nd g rante d Mitchell’s petition beca

use of the Batson violation.

I I

. As a thr e sh old ma tte r, re sp on de nt arg ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt do e s n ot h a ve the po we r t o

rec onsider its judgme nt under Rule 60(b) beca use Mitchell is c halleng ing a judgme nt of this court not the d is tr ic t c o u rt. “ U n d e r th e d o c tr in e o f la w o f th e c a s e , f

in d in g s ma d e a t o n e point in the litigation bec ome the law of the ca se for subsequent st ag es of that same litigation.” United States v. Moore d , 38 F.3d 141 9 , 1 4 21 (6th Cir. 1994). “A c omplementary theory , the mandate rule, require s lower c ourts to adher e to the commands of a superior c ourt.” Id. ; see also United States v

. Cam pb e ll , 1 68 F .3 d 2 63 , 2 65 (6 th C ir . 199 9) (ex pl ain ingthat “ the mand a te ru le is a sp e c if ic application of the law-of -the-c ase doc trine”) . Howeve r, these r ules are not without ex ce ption. Moored , 38 F.3d at 1421. T he Supreme Court ha s reje cted the proposition “that an appe llate cour t’s mandate b a r s th e tr ia l c o u rt f r o m late r d is tu

r b in g th e ju d g me n t e n te r e d in a c c o r d an c e w ith the mandate.” Standard Oil Co. o f Ca l. v. United States , 4 29 U. S. 1 7, 18 (1 97 6) ; see also Ritter v. Sm ith , 8 1 1 F

. 2 d 1 3 9 8 , 1 4 0 1

- 0 4 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) ( c i t e d f a v o r a b l y b y Go nzalez , 545 U.S. at 534) (af firming the district court’s Rule 60( b) re consideration in a habea s case of judg ment made pur suant t o ap p el l at e court’s ma

ndate in lig ht of subsequent c hang e in controlling law). A n issue alre ady decide d may

be re opened in limited circ umst an ce s , such as whe re the re is “substantially differ entB e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , Mitc he ll ar g ue d tha t the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s e qu ita

ble po we rs ov e r i ts 2 own judg men t derived f

rom Article I I Iof the Constituti on and 28 U.S.C. § 2243 provided base s se pa rate fr om R

ule 60 (b ) f

or pr ov idi ngre lie f. Mit c he ll d oe s n ot r a ise the se argume nts on a pp e a l. -6- eviden c e r a is e d

o ns u b s e qu e n t t

r ia l; a s u b s e qu e n t c o n tr ar

y v ie w o f th e la w b y th e c o n trolling authority ; or a clea

rly err oneous decision which would work a manifest injustice.” Moored , 38 F.3d at 1421 (interna l quotation marks omi tted). Here, the subse quent ruling s by this court in Harries and Abdur’Rahman expli citly adopted a

contra ry view of t h e d i s t ri ct cour t’s authority

to gr ant an evidentiar y hear ing from t hat adva

nced in Mi tc he ll I

and c on fi rm that Mi tc he ll I

was e rrone ous when decide d. S

e e H a r ries , 41 7 F.3 d at 63 5; Abdur’Rahman , 226 F.3d at 705-06. Rely ing upon the

e vid e nc e a dd

uc e d f ro m th e e vid e nti ary

he ari ng, th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Mi tc he ll demonstrated a Batson vio la tio n, a c on c lus ion

wh ic h thi s c ourt ha s ne ve r re je c te d. Gi ve n the se fa c ts, t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtw a s n o tb o u n d b y Mi tc he ll I

. Stil l, before Mitchell’s motion can be c onsidered on its merits, Mitchell must overcome two proce du ra l h u rd les: (1) his Rule 60(b) motion must not be a sec ond or succ essive habeas petition prohibited by

AEDPA and ( 2) he must satisfy the re quirements of Rule 60( b). 2 A m oti on un de r R ule 60 (b ) m ay

be tr e a te d a s a

seco nd or

su c c e ssi ve ha

be a s p e tit ion

if

nece ssary to e nforc e the require ments of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See G onzalez , 545 U.S. at 529, 531- 32. I f , u n d e r th is s ta

n d ar d , a 6 0 ( b ) mo ti o n w e r e f o u n d to b e a s u c c e s s iv e h a b e a s p e ti ti o n , such a finding would require application of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which would serve as a jurisdictional bar to the 60(b) motion. See, e .g. , Post v. Bradshaw , 422 F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the petiti o n er ’s 6 0 (b) was barr ed by § 2244(b) be cause the motion was in fac t a succ essive habeas petition). I n order

for § 2244( b) to be implicated, a R u l e 6 0 (b) moti on must constitut e a “ habea s corpus a pplic at i on” by

containing a “c laim.” Gonzalez , 545 U.S. at 530. A Rule 60(b) motion-7-

contains a claim if it asser ts a federa l basis for relief from a st ate court’s j udg ment of convic tion, id. , by “see k[i ng ] t o add a ne w g round for relief ,” or “ attack[ing ] t he fe dera l court’s pre vious resolution of a c la im on theme rit

s ,” id. at 532. Howeve r, no claim is pr esente d if a Rule 60(b) motion attacks “some de fec t in the integr ity of the fe deral habea s proce eding s,” id. , s uc h a s “ a sse rt [ing ] that a previous ruling which pre cluded a merits deter

mination was in err or—for example, a denial for such

rea sons as failure to exhau s t , p ro ce d u ral de fault, or statute- of-limitations bar,” id. a t5 3 2 n . 4

. In sh or t, a Rul e 60 (b ) m oti on

is n ot a su c c e ssi ve ha

be a s pet iti on

“ if it d oe s n ot a sse rt , o r r e a sse rt , c la ims of er ror in the movant’ s state conviction.” Id. at 538. He re , M itc he ll’ s Ru le 60 (b ) mot io n argue s th a t Mi tc he ll I err oneously

denied him an

e vid e nti ary

he ari ngand

re qu e sts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt re op e n th e c a se and g ra

nt the he ari ng . Th is is no t a “ c la im” be c a

us e it do e s no t a sse rt an e rr or in t he state c on vic tio n a

nd wo uld no t c on sti tut e a fe dera l basis for re lief. Respondent a rg ues that this case is disti ng uishable fr om case s in which a limita ti o n s b ar

a p p li e s b e c a

u s e h e r e th e c o u r

t a c tu a ll y d e c id e d M it c h e ll ’ s o r ig in a l c la im o nthe merits. Whil e this may

be true , the foc us of the inquiry is not on whether the c ourt rea ched the merits of the orig inal petition but on whether the Rule 60( b) motion contains a cla im. I f it does not contain a claim, i t is not a habeas petiti on, succe ssive or otherw ise. See G onzalez , 545 U.S. at 530. B e c a us e Mit c he ll’ s Rule 60 (b ) m oti on c ha lle ng e s o nly

the jud g me nt o n th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng , it does not make a

claim but rathe r asse rts an er ror in the f

eder al habe as proc eeding. There fore , Mitchell’s Rule 60(b) motion is not subject to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Although Mitche ll’s Rule 60(b) motion d oes not constitute a sec ond or succ essive habe as pe t i t i o n , i n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l , h e s t i l l m u s t s a t i s f y t h e r e qu i r e m e n t s an d l i m i t a t i o n s o f R u l e 6 0 ( b ) t o preva il. See id. at 534-35. R u l e 6 0 (b ), i n rele vant par t, allows a par

ty to seek re lief fr om a final-8-

judgme nt for: “( 1) mistake, inadver tance , surprise, or excusable ne g lect . . . ; or (6) any other re ason justify ing relief from the operation of judgme nt.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b). A district c ourt’s dec ision to gr ant re lief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is r eviewe d for a n abuse of discretion. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. T rs. of the UMW

A Combined Bene

fit Fund , 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001)

. “A district court abuses its discre tion when it ap p l i es t he incor rec t leg al standar d, misapplies the corr ect leg al standard, or

relies upon c l ea rl y er roneous f indings of f

act.” Schenc k v. City of Hudson , 114 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 1997). I t was an a

buse of discretion to gr ant re lief under Rule 60(b)(6) beca

use Mitchell’s motion should have be en b rought under Rule 60( b)(1) . Rule 60(b)(6) is interprete d narr owly , permitting relief only in “extraordinar

y circ umstances.” Lilj eberg v . Health Serv s. Acquisition Cor

p. , 486 U. S. 84 7, 86 3- 64 (1 98 8) ; Ab du r’ Ra hm an v . B e ll , 4 9 3 F

. 3 d 7 3 8 , 7 4 1 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 7 )

. Sp e cifica lly , a motion may

not be broug ht under Rule 60(b) (6) if it i s p re m i s ed o n one of the g rounds for r elief

enumer ated in cla

uses (b)( 1) throug h (b)( 5). Lilj e be rg , 486 U.S at 863 & n.11. Her e, Mitchell see ks relief beca use Mi tc he ll I

was “ totally wr o n g” an d t he cour t made a “ patent er

ror in deny

ing a n evidentiar y hear ing.” The c ases upon whic h he re lies for this proposition confirm that the Mi tc he ll I d ec i s i o nwa s an erro r w h en d ec i d edan d n o ta c o rr ec td ec i s i o nab ro gat edb y a s u b s eq u en tch an ge in the law. See H

arries , 417 F.3 d at 635; Abdur’Rahman , 226 F.3d at 705-06. I n fac t, Mi tc he ll I must be considere d an error be cause the later panels of this cour

t lacked the power

to overrule the decision of the pr ior pane l. Com pa re Sa lm i v . S

e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A panel of this Court cannot overr ule the dec ision of another pa nel.”) with Habich

v . City of D e ar bo rn , 33 1 F .3 d 52 4, 53 0 n. 2 (6 th Cir

. 20 03 ) (“ Whe n an op ini on of thi s c ourt c on fl ic ts wi th a n e arl ie r p re c e de nt, we are bo un d b y the e arl ie st c a se .” ). As it i s c le ar t hat Mi tchel l’ s RuleFe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 6(b) states in r eleva nt pa rt “[a cour

t] may not ext end the 3 time for takingany

action under

Rule[] . . . 60(b), e x cept to the e x tent and under the conditions stated in [ it] .” -9- 60(b) moti on alleg es a mistake ma de by this court in Mi tc he ll I

, ra the r tha n a c ha ng e in the law, his motion is proper ly

made pur suant to Rule 60(b)(1)

. Abdur’Rahman , 4 91 F .3 d at 74 1; Piercev. United Mine W

orkers of Am. W

elfare &R et

. Fund for 1950 & 1974 , 770 F.2d 449, 451 ( 6th Cir. 1985) (“T h i s C o u rt h as rec og nized a claim of leg al er ror a s subsumed in the cate g ory of mistake under Rule 60( b)(1 ). ”)

. There fore , the district court a bused its discretion by

g ranting relief

under Rule 60(b)(6)

. See M

cCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc

. , 298 F.3d 586, 595- 96 (6th Cir. 2002). Construing Mitchell’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), it must be denied a s untimely filed. A m oti on ma de purs ua

nt to Rul e 60 (b )( 1) mus t be ma de “ no t mor e tha n on e y e ar a ft e r t

he jud g me nt,

or de r o r p ro c e e din g wa s e nte re d o r ta ke n. ” F e d. R. Civ. P. 60( b)

. Th is time lim it i s ju ri sd ic tio na l, Arrie ta v . B att

ag lia , 461 F.3d 861, 864 ( 7th Cir. 2006), and the di s trict court doe s not have the discretion to extend the period of limitation, Sm ith v. Sec’ y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 776 F.2d 13 30 , 13 32 -3 3 ( 6th

Cir . 1 98 5) ; se e als o Fe d. R. Civ. P . 6(b). Mitchell argues, and the district court 3 deter mined, that his motion was ti mely filed because, prior t o the J une 2005 S upreme Court decision in Gonzalez , relief

from judg ment under Rule 60( b) wa s treated as a succe ssive habea s petition under McQ ueen v . Scroggy , 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996). Whil e enf orce ment of the time limit m ay seem unfair, “ [t ]he ge nera l purpose of Rule 60( b) is to strike a prope r bala nce b et we en the conf

licting principles that litigation must be broug ht to an end and that justi ce must be done.” Charter Tw p. of Muske gon v. City of Muske

gon , 303 F.3d 755, 760 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (interna l quotation marks and alteration omitted). Such balanc ing nece ssarily cre ates situations in which an a lleg ed injustice ca n-10-

no longe r be r emedied. T he one- y ear deadline f

or see king c erta in gr ounds of re lief also “limi t[ s] t he friction betwe en Rule 60(b) and the successive- petition prohibiti ons of AEDPA.” Gonzalez , 545 U.S. at 534-35. There is no question that Mitchell’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed more than a y ear afte r the district cour

t’s judgme nt. There fore , having found the motion to have been untimely filed,

we re ve rs e the de c isi on

of the dis tr ic t c ourt

.