alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MANDATE

THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE 216TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KERR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on July 19, 2017, the cause upon appeal to revise 

or reverse your judgment between

In the Interest of D.B.M., a Child, Appellant

V.

No. 04-17-00064-CV and Tr. Ct. No. 16246A

was determined, and therein our said Court of Appeals made its order in these words:

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s 

judgment is AFFIRMED. No costs are assessed because appellant is indigent.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth 

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of 

Texas, with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on September 27, 2017.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

____________________________

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DISTRICT, AT SAN ANTONIO

No. 04-17-00064-CV

In the Interest of D.B.M., a Child

v.

(NO. 16246A IN 216TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KERR COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

REPORTER'S RECORD

FILING

$388.70

$205.00

PAID

INDIGENT

KERR COUNTY

INDIGENT

Balance of costs owing to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF 

TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of 

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and 

payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of the COURT OF APPEALS for 

the Fourth District of Texas, this September 27, 2017.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

____________________________

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<RESTATED>
[LEGEND]
     THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE
     FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S  FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR
     ENDED  SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
     SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
[/LEGEND]
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<CURRENCY>                      U.S. DOLLARS
       
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<PERIOD-START>                  OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                           1
<CASH>                                  600
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                       882,967
<ALLOWANCES>                       (49,500)
<INVENTORY>                       1,097,570
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  2,088,103
<PP&E>                            7,488,786
<DEPRECIATION>                  (2,371,131)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   10,897,345
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             3,360,065
<BONDS>                           4,051,212
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     10,897,345
<SALES>                          14,077,841
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</TABLE>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

WILLIAM DAVID HAHN , Appellant,

v.

ERICA HAHN, BROOKE HAHN, ALAN WEINSTEIN, as Trustee, WAYNE
KAPLAN , and WAYNE KAPLAN, P.A., Appellee s

.

No. 4D 17

- 3919

[ April 10, 2019 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Carol

- Lisa Phillips, Dale Ross, and David A. Haimes

, Judge s ; L.T. Case No. CACE 2009

- 039029 (11)

.

Meah Rothman Tell of Meah Ro thman Tell, P.A., Lauderhill, for appellant.

John P. Seiler and Steven A. Wahlbrink of the Law Offices of Seiler, Sautter, Zaden, Rimes & Wahlbrink, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees Erica Hahn and Brooke Hahn.

Wayne Kaplan of Wayne Kaplan, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees Wayne Kaplan and Wayne Kapla n, P.A.

W EISS , D ALIAH H., Associate Judge

.

A p pellant raises multiple points on appeal. Points one, two

, and five

, as numbered in appellant’s brief, pertain to Erica and Brooke Hahn. Points thr ee, four, six

, and seven address Wayne Kaplan and Wayne Kaplan, P.A. On all issues involving the Hahns, we affirm without discussion

. On the remaining issues concerning Wayne Kaplan and Wayne Kap lan, P.A., we dismiss the appeal due to the pendency of a counterclaim in the lower court

. See Mendez v. W. Flagler Family Ass’n

, 303 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974)

.
Affirmed in part ; dismissed in part

.

W ARNER and G ROSS , JJ.

, concur.2 * * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Order entered September 15, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00779-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.D., L.M.D., AND L.M.D., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-30073-2016

ORDER

Before the Court is appellee Texas Department of Family and Protective Services’ 

September 14, 2016 unopposed motion for extension of time in which to file its appellee brief. 

Appellee’s brief was due on September 14, 2016. Appellee requests a seven-day extension of 

time.

We GRANT appellee’s September 14, 2016 motion for extension of time to file its brief 

and extend the deadline for appellee’s brief to September 21, 2016. 

/s/ DOUGLAS S. LANG 

JUSTICE
#### Hamilton Busby et al. *v.*W. S. Downey's Adm'r et al.

Partnership — Personal Property.

Where a temporary partnership was formed for the purpose of speculating in a hotel property hy purchasing and reselling it, the chancellor properly refused to treat the property as personalty,

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE -CIRCUIT COURT.

March 27, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The rule by which to determine whether real estate held by partners is to be treated as personalty, is stated by this court, in the case of Cornwall v. Cornwall, 6 Bush 369, as. follows:

“When the property is bought with partnership funds, to be used in carrying on and facilitating the partnership, business and purposes, and is used as a means of continuing and enlarging the partnership business and operations and profits, it is then partnership property, impressed with the characteristics, of personalty for any and ’all purposes, not only between the partners inter se, and the firm and its creditors, but also as to distribution between the administrator, distributees and heirs.” We are not aware that the English rule has been more closely approximated by any American court, and the doctrine is certainly carried as far as any American authority will demand.

The facts of this case do not bring the property in contest within this rule. The hotel'property was not purchased with partnership-funds, nor for the purpose of carrying on partnership business. The controlling motive animating the purchases was the expectation of a resale of the property at an advanced price. The partnership in the hotel business was a mere incident to the contemplated speculation. It is evident that the purchasers did nor expect to engage for any considerable time in carrying on the business of hotel-keeping, and that was the only business in which they were ever engaged as partners, at all. The property was not purchased to be used as a means of continuing o-r enlarging partnership- business that was intended to be b-ut temporary in its character. Upon *625the contrary, this temporary partnership'was formed to advance the object of the purchase, a resale of the property for a profit.

*Buckner, Breckenridge & Buckner, for appellants.*

*Darnell, for appellees.*

The chancellor, therefore, properly refused to treat it as personalty. We can not say that Mrs. Busby is prejudiced by the failure Of the chancellor to cause to be distributed to her one-third of the value of the hotel furniture. The record shows that her deceased husband’s estate is still indebted on the purchase price of the hotel, and it does not show that after the payment of this indebtedness, there will be any personal estate left to be distributed.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                      22,354,857
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         100,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             1,500,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                222,081,622
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                    772,546,727
<ALLOWANCE>                                 11,079,008
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           1,032,568,127
<DEPOSITS>                                 834,296,139
<SHORT-TERM>                                97,720,482
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                         13,009,279
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,177,425
<OTHER-SE>                                  86,364,802
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>           1,032,568,127
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             15,288,459
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            3,530,149
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                30,431
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            18,849,039
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           9,423,512
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          10,717,048
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        8,131,991
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  630,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               6,815
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              3,941,397
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,157,621
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   4,157,621
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,778,621
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .38
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.47
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                   502,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                            10,448,496
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      188
<RECOVERIES>                                       700
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                           11,079,008
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         9,606,230
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                      1,472,778


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         455,158
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  292,937
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,191,548
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,086,248
<PP&E>                                         726,241
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,744,592
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,112,366
<BONDS>                                        164,936
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,699
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,453,591
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,744,592
<SALES>                                      6,641,100
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,641,100
<CGS>                                        1,680,736
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,680,736
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                160,785
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            160,785
<DISCONTINUED>                               (103,125)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    57,660
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                          OF CORPORATE GENERAL PARTNER

            PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, James M. Seneff, Jr., the Chief Executive Officer of CNL Realty
Corporation,  the  corporate  general  partner of CNL Income Fund VI, Ltd.  (the
"Partnership"),  has executed this  certification  in connection with the filing
with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  of the  Partnership's  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  June 30,  2003 (the  "Report").  The
undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.



Date:  August 5, 2003                    /s/ James M. Seneff, Jr.
                                         -----------------------------
                                         Name:  James M. Seneff, Jr.
                                         Title:   Chief Executive Officer

                                         A  signed   original  of  this  written
                                         statement  required  by Section 906 has
                                         been  provided  to CNL Income  Fund VI,
                                         Ltd. and will be retained by CNL Income
                                         Fund  VI,  Ltd.  and  furnished  to the
                                         Securities  and Exchange  Commission or
                                         its staff upon request.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                  Certification of Principal Executive Officer
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)


         I, Lorie M. Guerrera, Chief Accounting Officer of Cordia Corporation
(the "Registrant") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
for the period June 30, 2003 of the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.


                                                    By: /s/ Lorie M. Guerrera
                                                        ------------------------
                                                        Lorie M. Guerrera
                                                        Chief Accounting Officer

August 14, 2003

-------------------

*    A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
     been provided to Cordia Corporation and will be retained by Cordia
     Corporation and furnished to the Securities Exchange Commission or its
     staff upon request.
#### Christian Burns *vs.*Patrick O’Rourke.

At special term, December, 1866.

Before Robertson, Ch. J.,

A pleading which sets up mere partial intoxication or weakness of mind at the • time of executing an instrument, in order to avoid its obligations, is not sufficient unless some circumstances of fraud or undue influence are added. The intoxication must be so complete as to deprive the party of the use of his reason, or the mental infirmity must amount to senile demency, to constitute hy themselves a defense.

*JP. J. McCahill,*for the defendant.

*I. S. Washburn,*for the plaintiff.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JERRY GRANT FRYE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 16188

D.C. No. 4:14

- cv

- 05470

- YGR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 24, 2017 **

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Jerry Grant Frye appeals pro se from the district

court’ s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims

arising out of his criminal conviction. We have juris diction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# F ILED

MAY 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 16188

§ 1291. We review de n ovo a district court’ s dis missal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Frye’s action challenging his

continuing confinement as barred under Heck v. Humphrey

, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

See id. at 481

- 8 6 (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who

challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier

release or damages arising from his allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

confinement ). Because the district court did not specify whether the dismissal of

Frye’s action was with or without prejudice , we treat the dismissal as being

without prejudice

. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa , 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir.

1995) (dismissals under Heck are without prejudice ).

The district court properly dismissed Frye’s original complaint because it

failed to comply w ith Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), included claims that were Heck

barred, and failed to identify how defendan ts’ conduct caused Frye’s alleged

constitutional injuries. See McHenry v. Renne

, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179

- 80 (9th Cir.

1996) (complaint must forth simple, concise and direct averments as required

under Rule 8(a)(2)); Heck

, 512 U.S. at 481

- 86; Taylor v. List , 88 0 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989) (liability under a § 1983 claim arises “only upon a showing of

personal participation by the defendant”).

The district court di d not abuse its discretion in denying Frye’s motions for3 16

- 16188

appointment of counsel

. See Palmer v. Valdez , 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009)

(setting forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement for

appointment of counsel ).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court

. See United

States v. Elias , 921 F.2d 870, 8 74 (9th Cir. 1990) (“ Documents or facts not

presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 7409** 

CARL D. GORDON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.
DIRECTOR FRED S C HILLING, Health Services Director of Virginia Department of Corrections; MARK AMONETTE, Chief Physician of the Virginia Department of Corrections , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke

. Norman K. Moon , Senior District Judge. ( 7:15

- cv - 00095

- NKM

- RSB )

Submitted : February 3, 2017 Decided: March 3, 2017

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Carl D. Gordon, Appellant Pro Se. Nancy Hull Davidson , Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Carl D. Gordon seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motio n for summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (20 12 ), and certain interlocutory and collateral
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (20 12 ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.

B eneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 , 545

- 46 (1949). The
order Gordon seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with
oral a rgument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately prese nted in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED