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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

DEVIN M. ROSSITER, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-11300 

Trial Court No. 1KE-11-197 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2568 — September 15, 2017 

Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, 

Ketchikan, Trevor N. Stephens, Judge. 

Appearances: Marjorie Mock, under contract with the Public 

Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, 

Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and 

Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, 

Superior Court Judge. * 

Judge MANNHEIMER, writing for the Court. 

Judge ALLARD, concurring. 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska 

constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Following a jury trial, Devin M. Rossiter was convicted of second-degree 

murder for stabbing a man. Rossiter was also convicted of tampering with evidence for 

later cleaning the push-knife he used in this stabbing. 

In this appeal, Rossiter argues that his murder conviction should be 

reversed because the prosecutor made improper arguments to the jury. For the reasons 

explained here, we agree that the prosecutor made a number of improper arguments and 

that the cumulative effect of those arguments undermined the fundamental fairness of 

Rossiter’s trial. We therefore reverse Rossiter’s conviction for second-degree murder. 

Underlying facts 

On March 12, 2011, eighteen-year-old Devin Rossiter was in a trailer park 

in Ketchikan; he was rifling through someone else’s car, apparently looking for 

cigarettes. 

This car belonged to the elderly parents of Nick Stachelrodt. When 

Stachelrodt saw what Rossiter was doing, he went to the car and pulled Rossiter out. As 

Stachelrodt pulled Rossiter out of the car and into the driveway, Rossiter began to 

struggle with Stachelrodt. Rossiter later told the police that he “flipped out” because he 

was afraid Stachelrodt was going to harm him. During this struggle, Rossiter used a 

push-knife (a small dagger with a perpendicular grip) to stab Stachelrodt, once in the 

chest and once in the neck. The stab wound to Stachelrodt’s chest severed an artery, and 

Stachelrodt died at the scene. Rossiter later used mouthwash or alcohol to clean off his 

knife. 

Based on this incident, Rossiter was indicted for second-degree murder and 

tampering with evidence. 1 At his trial, Rossiter’s attorney argued that Rossiter should 

AS 11.41.110(a)(1)-(2) and AS 11.56.610(a)(1), respectively. 

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be acquitted of second-degree murder because he stabbed Stachelrodt in self-defense, 

under the fear that Stachelrodt was going to kill or seriously harm him. The defense 

attorney argued in the alternative that Rossiter was guilty only of manslaughter because 

he acted in the heat of passion. 2 

Prior to delivering the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor furnished 

the defense attorney and the trial judge with copies of a PowerPoint presentation (both 

text and photographs) that the prosecutor intended to show to the jury during his 

summation. Some of the prosecutor’s slides addressed Rossiter’s defenses to the murder 

charge. 

One of these slides read, “Nick Stachelrodt did not deserve to die”. The 

next slide then told the jurors: 

The only way you can find the defendant not guilty of Murder in the 

Second Degree is: 

– you disagree [with the preceding slide, and] Nick Stachelrodt 

deserved what he got 

(self-defense / heat of passion) 

Rossiter’s attorney objected to this slide, arguing that it impermissibly 

shifted the burden of proof from the State to his client. The trial judge overruled this 

objection, concluding that the slide did not, on its face, shift the State’s burden of proof. 

The judge told the defense attorney that if the prosecutor actually made a burden-shifting 

argument during his summation, the defense attorney should renew his objection. 

Throughout the prosecutor’s summation, he repeatedly emphasized that the 

question before the jury was whether Nick Stachelrodt deserved to die. The prosecutor 

began his summation with a picture of Nick Stachelrodt that described him as “married 

[for] 25 years”, a “father of three”, a “grandfather of one”, and a “caretaker for his 

See AS 11.41.115(a) and (f)(2). 

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parents.” This picture of Stachelrodt was followed by a mugshot-like picture of Devin 

Rossiter that described him as a person who was “planning on leaving Alaska” and 

“celebrating leaving Alaska.” 

The prosecutor then proceeded to argue that the jury was required to 

convict Rossiter of murder unless the jurors concluded that Stachelrodt deserved to die. 

Here is one example: 

Prosecutor: What is the offensive thing that Nick 

Stachelrodt did? Because believe me, if you convict 

Mr. Rossiter of anything other than murder in the second 

degree, or [if you] acquit Mr. Rossiter, send him home, then 

you have to conclude that Nick Stachelrodt did something 

horrible to deserve what happened to him. 

Later, in his summation, the prosecutor told the jurors: 

Prosecutor: Nick Stachelrodt did not deserve to die 

[for pulling Rossiter out of the car]. The only way that you 

can find [that] the defendant is not guilty of murder in the 

second degree is if you disagree with that premise — that 

Nick Stachelrodt did not deserve to die for what he did. 

. . . 

So the only way you can find him not guilty of murder 

in the second degree is if you [conclude that] Nick 

Stachelrodt deserved what he got — or you misunderstand 

the law. 

Still later in his summation, the prosecutor told the jurors that the essence 

of a claim of self-defense was that “the guy deserved it.” And still later, the prosecutor 

told the jurors: 

Prosecutor: [I]f you conclude that I have not proven 

the absence of self-defense here, then [what] you’re saying[is 

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that] Nick Stachelrodt deserved what he got, and Devin 

Rossiter walks out the door. Please don’t let that happen. 

Finally, toward the end of his argument, the prosecutor returned to his 

theme that Nick Stachelrodt was a good man who did not deserve to die. The prosecutor 

told the jury that “[w]e should be thankful that there are such people as Nick 

Stachelrodt”: 

Prosecutor: I’m not going to get all preachy and 

“it takes a village” on you. But I will say, Nick Stachelrodt’s 

pulling this young man out of the car and not responding with 

name-calling or violence or threats, but with “we need to 

talk” and “you need to learn to respect your elders”, that 

there’s nothing that could even be remotely criticized about 

that, let alone justified his being murdered. 

The jury found Rossiter guilty of second-degree murder, and Rossiter now 

argues that his trial was rendered unfair by the combination of the PowerPoint slides and 

the various statements made by the prosecutor. 

More specifically, Rossiter argues that the prosecutor’s slides and 

statements to the jury mischaracterized the law of self-defense and impermissibly shifted 

the burden of proof to the defense, by implying that the jury should presume Rossiter’s 

guilt unless the jurors affirmatively found that Nick Stachelrodt “deserved what he got.” 

As we explain in this opinion, we agree with Rossiter that the prosecutor 

grossly mischaracterized the law of self-defense. Because we conclude that the 

prosecutor’s misstatements of the law probably affected the jury’s verdict, we reverse 

Rossiter’s conviction. 

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Why we reverse Rossiter’s murder conviction 

The prosecutor’s PowerPoint slides and his statements to the jury 

significantly mischaracterized the law of self-defense. 

We acknowledge that, even though Rossiter’s attorney objected to portions 

of the prosecutor’s slide presentation, the defense attorney did not object to the 

prosecutor’s closing argument — despite the trial judge’s express invitation for him to 

do so. Accordingly, to the extent that Rossiter now argues that the prosecutor’s final 

argument misstated the law of self-defense, or impermissibly disparaged the defense 

theory of the case, Rossiter must show plain error. But we conclude that Rossiter has 

met this burden. 

When a defendant charged with homicide raises a claim of self-defense, the 

question for the jury is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant used 

deadly force (1) in reasonable response to an actual threat of unlawful and imminent 

death, serious physical injury, sexual assault, robbery, or kidnapping, or (2) under the 

reasonable belief (even if mistaken) that he or she was about to be subjected to unlawful 

death, serious physical injury, sexual assault, robbery, or kidnapping. 3 

The availability of self-defense does not hinge on whether the deceased 

“deserved to die”. The prosecutor’s argument was a gross distortion of the law of selfdefense. Indeed, because our law declares that self-defense is established if the 

defendant made a reasonable mistake regarding the need to use deadly force, there will 

be times when a homicide will be justified by self-defense even though the victim 

actually did nothing to assault the defendant. 

See AS 11.81.330, AS 11.81.335, and AS 11.81.340; David v. State, 698 P.2d 1233, 

1235 (Alaska App. 1985). 

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But in the prosecutor’s summation to the jury, he repeatedly told the jurors 

that Rossiter’s claim of self-defense would be valid in only one circumstance: only if 

Nick Stachelrodt deserved to die. This error was so obvious, and so egregious, that the 

trial judge was required to intervene — even if Rossiter’s attorney had never objected. 

We also conclude that the prosecutor engaged in another form of improper 

argument by suggesting that Rossiter’s claim of self-defense was a ruse invented by his 

defense counsel. As we explained earlier, the defense theory of self-defense was that 

Rossiter reacted in fear that Stachelrodt would kill or seriously injure him, or perhaps 

rape him. Here is how the prosecutor responded to this claim: 

Prosecutor: [O]f all the things that [defense counsel] 

could emphasize in his opening statement, why would he talk 

about sexual assault instead of simply assault — a serious 

assault ... [?] Well, the [defense attorney’s] emphasis on 

sexual assault is because if you come to the conclusion that 

you don’t like Nick Stachelrodt, [if] you think he’s a bad 

man, [then] it’s easier for you to come to the conclusion that 

Devin Rossiter was justified in killing him. And that should 

offend you a little bit. Because what Nick Stachelrodt’s 

family doesn’t know, but [what] I know, is that no matter 

how good a life you lead, no matter what you do with your 

life, if you are killed randomly by a drunk nineteen-year-old 

who’s going through your car, a lawyer will stand up in a 

court of law and say that you were trying to rape someone. 

That should strike you as ... [a] somewhat offensive 

argument. 

This Court has previously drawn a distinction between (1) permissible 

prosecutorial argument that a defendant’s version of events is not credible, given the 

evidence in the case, and (2) impermissible argument that “disparages the legitimacy” 

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of the legal theory or defense asserted by the defendant. 4 The prosecutor’s argument in 

Rossiter’s case fell into this latter category. The prosecutor implied that Rossiter’s 

defense attorney — indeed, defense attorneys in general — would connive to advance 

false claims of self-defense, hoping that jurors would view the victim in a bad light and 

would conclude that the victim was not worthy of the law’s protection. In other words, 

the prosecutor’s argument was “designed to awaken in the jury a suspicion that the 

[defense was] merely a subterfuge employed by the defendant to evade responsibility for 

his acts.” 5 This is not permitted. 

The remaining question is whether the prosecutor’s improper argument 

requires reversal of Rossiter’s murder conviction. As we have explained, the prosecutor 

repeatedly asked the jury to employ an incorrect formulation of the law of self-defense. 

He framed the issues to be decided as a referendum on the value of the victim’s life. And 

he suggested that the whole issue of self-defense was the subterfuge of a conniving 

defense attorney. Having carefully considered the record, we conclude that the 

inflammatory and misleading nature of the prosecutor’s PowerPoint presentation and 

closing argument undermined the fundamental fairness of Rossiter’s trial. We believe 

that these improper remarks appreciably affected the jury’s decision. 6 

Accordingly, we REVERSE Rossiter’s conviction for second-degree 

murder. 

4 See Williams v. State, 789 P.2d 365, 369 (Alaska App. 1990). 

5 State v. McDonald, 472 A.2d 424, 425-26 (Me. 1994), discussed in Rogers v. State, 

280 P.3d 582, 594 (Alaska App. 2012). 

6 Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 634 (Alaska 1969) (holding that, for instances of 

non-constitutional error, the test for harmlessness is whether the appellate court “can fairly 

say that the error did not appreciably affect the jury’s verdict”). 

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Judge ALLARD, concurring. 

I agree with the majority opinion that the prosecutor’s closing arguments 

were improper and constituted a gross distortion of the law. I write separately only to 

point out that Rossiter’s conviction for second-degree murder was not a foregone 

conclusion and that manslaughter was a plausible verdict in this case. A conviction for 

second-degree murder required the State to prove not only that Rossiter acted recklessly 

when he killed Stachelrodt (and that he did not do so in self-defense), but also that 

Rossiter acted “under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of 

human life” 1 — i.e., that Rossiter’s actions constituted “the type of heightened 

recklessness that is equivalent to purposeful or knowing homicide.” 2 

1 AS 11.41.110(a)(2).
 

2 Jeffries v. State, 169 P.3d 913, 917 (Alaska 2007).
 

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