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MARY MARGARET FARREN v. J. MICHAEL FARREN

(AC 37079)

(AC 37080)

Beach, Alvord and Keller, Js.

Argued September 9—officially released, December 29, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Genuario, J.)

RyanC. McKeen, with whom wereAllison M. McKeen

and, on the brief, J. Michael Farren, self-represented,

for the appellant (defendant) in AC 37079.

Allison M. McKeen, with whom was Ryan C. McKeen,

for the appellant (defendant) in AC 37080.

Ernest F. Teitell, with whom were Marco A. Allocca

and, on the brief, Paul A. Slager, for the appellee

(plaintiff).
Opinion

BEACH, J. For the purposes of General Statutes § 52-

2121 and Practice Book § 17-43,2 an involuntary commitment, on the surface, would seem to constitute reasonable cause for absence from trial and to warrant the

granting of a motion to open a default judgment. The

facts of the present case, however, are not ordinary. The

issue in the present matteris not whether an involuntary

commitment may be reasonable cause for a party’s

absence at trial but whether an involuntary commitment

must constitute reasonable cause, even where the trial

court suspects that the absentee party orchestrated his

own involuntary commitment after years of dilatory

tactics. We conclude that an involuntary commitment

does not necessarily constitute reasonable cause, and

the trial court is not required to find reasonable cause

from an involuntary commitment standing alone.

This decision concerns two appeals, AC 37079 and

AC 37080, arising from the same underlying case, a civil

action for money damages. In AC 37079, the defendant,

J. Michael Farren, appeals from the trial court’s denial

of his motion to open the default judgment entered

against him, contending that the denial was an abuse

of discretion. In AC 37080, the defendant appeals from

the default judgment itself. He claims that the trial

court’s rulings violated various constitutional rights,

including the equal protection and due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions and the sixth

amendment of the federal constitution. We do not agree

with the defendant’s claims in either of his appeals.

The relevant facts and procedural history of these

appeals are as follows. On the evening of January 6,

2010, the defendant and the plaintiff, Mary Margaret

Farren, both lawyers, were at their home in New

Canaan. The defendant and the plaintiff had been married for twelve years and had two young daughters. The

plaintiff recently had served a complaint seeking to

dissolve the parties’ marriage. The parties met in their

home to discuss the action, which the plaintiff refused

to withdraw, despite the defendant’s request that she

do so. That night, the defendant physically assaulted

the plaintiff with his hands, fists, and a flashlight, and

said that he was going to kill her. The plaintiff lost

consciousness from repeated blows to her head. When

she regained consciousness, the defendant continued

to hit her and attempted to strangle her. He also pulled

out large amounts of her hair. Ultimately, the plaintiff

and the children managed to escape from the defendant

and to flee the home. Shortly after these events, and

in addition to the marital dissolution action, the plaintiff

initiated this civil action against the defendant to compensate her for the injuries that she suffered.3 The state

also filed criminal charges against the defendant.

The civil trial was originally scheduled to begin on
January 10, 2012. Significant delays resulted when the

defendant repeatedly moved for continuances,

instructed his counsel to withdraw,4 and moved to transfer the case to another judicial district. On December

2, 2013, the day before voir dire was to begin, the court

denied yet another of the defendant’s motions for a

continuance. The defendant warned that, ‘‘I am currently under psychiatric treatment, and I really need to

get a session in this week. . . . I really need that time.

. . . I may not be able to be here . . . .’’ The court

reassured the defendant that it would try to accommodate his ‘‘interests.’’ Jury selection began the following

day, on December 3, 2013, and it concluded by the end

of the day on December 5, 2013. Evidence was to begin

on Monday, December 9, 2013.

At 4:07 p.m., on Sunday, December 8, 2013, the defendant sent an e-mail to the courtreading: ‘‘I’m in Hartford

Hospital for treatment. Under the circumstances, travel

to Stamford is impossible. Mike Farren.’’ On the morning of December 9, 2013, a court officer replied to the

e-mail, advising the defendant to provide the court with

a letter from his treating physician that included the

reason for the hospitalization and its anticipated duration. The court briefly recessed to provide the defendant

an opportunity to reply to the e-mail. By the conclusion

of the recess, however, the defendant had not replied.

The plaintiff moved for the entry of a default judgment.

The trial court took the motion under advisement and

continued the trial until the following morning.

The following morning, the trial court still had not

received further communication from the defendant.

The court then granted the motion for default, citing

several reasons: the case had been continued multiple

times while pending for almost four years, the jury

had been selected, and the trial court had given the

defendant an opportunity to provide medical documentation to avoid the entry of default. In entering the

default, the trial court also stated that ‘‘the court may

wish to vacate . . . the default, and may allow the

defendant to participate in the balance of the trial, or

it may make other rulings’’ should the defendant arrive

during the hearing in damages stage. The trial then

continued as a hearing in damages. See Practice Book

§17-33 (a)

On December 11, 2013, during the hearing in damages, the court received a letter on letterhead of the

Institute of Living, a division of Hartford Hospital. The

letter appeared to be signed by a clinician and read:

‘‘Please be advised that John Farren . . . was admitted

to the hospital on 12/08/2013. The discharge date has

yet to be determined.’’ The trial court had no additional

information regarding the defendant’s status. The plaintiff continued to present evidence in the case. At the

conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, on December 17,

2013, the jury reached a verdict in the amount of $28.6
million in favor of the plaintiff. The court rendered

judgment in accordance with the verdict and extended

the time to file posttrial motions until January 31, 2014.

The defendant filed a motion to open the judgment

on January 31, 2014. In his motion, the defendant stated

that he had been absent because on December 8, 2013—

the day before trial—he was involuntarily committed

to the Institute of Living for fifteen days pursuant to

an emergency certificate. He stated that during this

period of commitment, he had not been permitted to

communicate with the court. The defendant attached

the following documents in support of his motion: (1)

a physician’s emergency certificate dated December 8,

2013, at 11:15 p.m.; (2) Institute of Living’s application

for the involuntary commitment of the defendant as a

person with psychiatric disabilities; (3) a letter dated

December 17, 2013, that was addressed to the Stamford

Superior Court—where the defendant’s criminal case

was pending—that notified the court that the defendant

‘‘was admitted to the hospital on 12/08/2013 for treatment of severe depression. We are not prepared to

discharge him at this time’’; and (4) a decree of the

Hartford Probate Court dated December 26, 2013, denying the Institute of Living’s application for involuntary

commitment. The plaintiff objected to the motion, protesting that the defendant orchestrated his hospitalization and emergency commitment to delay the trial.

At a preliminary hearing on the motion, the court

found that the seriousness of the defendant’s alleged

reason for his unavailability and the plaintiff’s objection

warranted the court’s entry of a scheduling order providing for expedited discovery, the filing of exhibits and

lists of witnesses by both parties, and an evidentiary

hearing. The defendant responded by filing objections

to the discovery of Probate Court records, his medical

records, and his medical providers. The court sustained

the objections.

At the evidentiary hearing on May 6, 2014, the defendant did not present any witnesses. His evidence consisted only of the four documents that had been

attached to his motion to open, the motion itself, and

a copy of General Statutes § 17a-500, which relates to

commitment under an emergency certificate. The plaintiff did not present any evidence.

When the evidentiary hearing concluded, the court

denied the defendant’s motion to open the judgment,

stating: ‘‘The truth is that this court simply does not

know whether or not the defendant orchestrated his

involuntary commitment . . . in order to delay the trial

of his civil action.’’ The court found that the defendant

did not meet his burden to show reasonable cause for

missing the trial because he did not testify; he did not

call his sister to testify, the person who, according to

the emergency certificate, had requested his commitment; he did not call any of his doctors to testify; and
he did not allow any discovery of his medical records,

the disclosure of the transcript and exhibits from the

Probate Court proceeding in which the Probate Court

denied the Institute of Living’s application for the involuntary commitment of the defendant, or any other medical information.

The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion

to open in AC 37079, and he appealed from the entry

of the default judgment in AC 37080.

I

AC 37079

In his first appeal, AC 37079, the defendant claims

that the court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to open the default judgment. The defendant

essentially claims that the court: (1) misunderstood the

law governing involuntary commitment in that it failed

to conclude that his involuntary commitment to the

Institute of Living was reasonable cause for not

attending the trial, (2) erred when it ignored the conclusions of medical and psychiatric professionals and

instead substituted its own lay observations and, relatedly, did not give proper weight to the evidence of his

commitment, (3) did not provide him an opportunity

to clarify, to supplement, or to certify the documents

accepted by the trial court as evidence, and (4) improperly created a unique and unlawful burden of proof for

parties with mental or psychiatric disabilities. We do

not agree.

We review the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

motion to open for an abuse of discretion. ‘‘A motion

to open and vacate a judgment . . . is addressed to

the [trial] court’s discretion, and the action of the trial

court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it acted

unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. . . .

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The manner in which

[this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so

long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dziedzic v. Pine

Island Marina, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 644, 651–52, 72

A.3d 406 (2013), quoting Walton v. New Hartford, 223

Conn. 155, 169–70, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992).

A trial court’s determination of whether to grant a

motion to open judgment is informed by § 52-212. To

obtain relief under § 52-212, the moving party must

make a two part showing that: ‘‘(1) a good defense

existed at the time an adverse judgment was rendered;

and (2) the defense was not at that time raised by

reason of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pachaug Marina &

Campground Assn., Inc. v. Pease, 149 Conn. App. 489,

493, 89 A.3d 423 (2014); see also Practice Book § 17-

43; Berzins v. Berzins, 105 Conn. App. 648, 651–52, 938
A.2d 1281, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156

(2008). The movant has the burden of satisfying each

of these two requirements. Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160, 167, 475 A.2d

310 (1984). The failure to satisfy either requirement is

fatal to the motion to open. Dziedzic v. Pine Island

Marina, LLC, supra, 143 Conn. App. 652.

In the present matter, the court engaged in this two

part inquiry when it considered the defendant’s motion.

It concluded that the defendant satisfied the first

requirement by showing that he had a defense, in part,

to the plaintiff’s claim of damages.5 As to the second

requirement, the court concluded that the defendant did

not meet his burden of showing that he had reasonable

cause for his absence from the trial. On the basis of

the record before us, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion when it rendered its decision

denying the defendant’s motion to open the judgment.

We shall consider the defendant’s four claims in turn.

A

First, the defendant claims that the court misunderstood the law governing involuntary commitment by

not finding that an involuntary commitment, standing

alone, was reasonable cause for not attending the trial.

The defendant refers to General Statutes § 17a-502,

which provides in subsection (a) that before a person

can be involuntarily committed under an emergency

certificate, a physician must conclude that the person

has ‘‘psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself

or others . . . and is in need of immediate care and

treatment . . . .’’ Subsection (b) provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[a]ny person admitted and detained . . .

shall be examined by a physician specializing in psychiatry not later than forty-eight hours after admission.’’

General Statutes § 17a-502 (b). The defendant argues

that the fact that he was involuntarily committed pursuant to § 17a-502 was itself reasonable cause for his

absence because, by operation of law, he was unable

to attend the trial.

Neitherthe court northe plaintiff appeared to dispute

that the defendant was involuntarily committed at the

Institute of Living for the duration of the trial. The court

did not find in its memorandum of decision on the

defendant’s motion to open that such commitment, by

itself, was necessarily sufficient to prove that the defendant had reasonable cause for missing the trial. Instead,

the court, in its discretion, decided that in light of the

defendant’s previous attempts to delay the trial, the

involuntary commitment could constitute reasonable

cause only if it was the result of bona fide mental health

or medical issues, whereas ‘‘if the defendant intentionally feigned symptoms to cause his involuntary commitment, that would not constitute reasonable cause.’’

At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant offered
scant evidence of a bona fide mental health emergency.

He exercised his right to protect from disclosure evidence—medical records, doctors’ names and qualifications, notes from psychiatric sessions—that might have

helped to demonstrate that he had suffered a bona fide

medical emergency the night before the trial. Although

the defendant was within his right to block the disclosure of his medical information, this choice left the

court with little probative evidence by which to determine whether a bona fide medical emergency had

occurred. None of the documentary evidence that the

defendant did offer at the hearing was certified or

authenticated. Nevertheless, the court gave the defendant latitude and admitted the defendant’s exhibits. The

court did not find the evidence illuminating, although

it noted that the emergency certificate was the most

significant. The court was not persuaded by this document, however, because ‘‘the content of the emergency

certificate is based almost entirely on the . . . out-ofcourt statements made by the defendant . . . .’’

On appeal, the defendant argues that he did not need

to present additional evidence to prove a bona fide

medical emergency because he could not have been

committed had not the medical staff at the Institute of

Living thought he was suicidal and a hazard to himself.

The commitment, he argued, should have been viewed

as conclusive of reasonable cause. Without additional

evidence, however, the trial court had no information

about the staff, their qualifications, whether the mandates of § 17a-502 were followed, whether the defendant underwent the obligatory examination forty-eight

hours after he was admitted, or whether his doctors

based their decision to commit him on anything other

than his self-reported statements.

If we were to accept the defendant’s argument that

his involuntary commitment pursuant to § 17a-502 constituted automatic reasonable cause forfailing to attend

the trial, the court then would have no discretion to

assess the evidence before it. We will not require the

court to accept an unauthenticated document that,

although presumably issued in accordance with the law,

may be based entirely on self-reported statements by

the party moving to open the default judgment. Our

decision today does not, as the defendant suggests,

dissuade people from seeking mental health treatment

for fear of having their medical records disclosed and

their medical histories revealed at an evidentiary hearing to determine whether they have reasonable cause

for missing trial.6

In the present case, the defendant

was given ample opportunity to gather evidence about

the Institute of Living’s procedures, to solicit testimony

from doctors or administrators, and to authenticate his

emergency certificate. The defendant did not pursue

any of these avenues or any others, and the court was

not bound to accept the defendant’s unsworn argument

that the dictates of § 17a-502 were objectively followed
without manipulative or deceptive conduct by the

defendant.7

Even where parties have provided evidence regarding

medical conditions in support of motions to open, we

have recognized trial courts’ exercises of discretion. In

Stephen v. Hoerle, 39 Conn. App. 253, 664 A.2d 817,

cert. denied, 235 Conn. 928, 667 A.2d 555 (1995), we

upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant the plaintiff’s

motion to open the judgment even though the plaintiff

claimed that she could not attend a deposition because

she suffered from agoraphobia. The court admitted into

evidence and considered two psychiatric reports and

an affidavit from the plaintiff. Id., 257–58. Despite the

reports and a sworn statement from the plaintiff, we

did not conclude that the court abused its discretion

when it determined that her agoraphobia was not a

reasonable cause for her absence from the deposition.

Id. In the present case, the court had less evidence

before it in support of the defendant’s claim that he

had suffered a bona fide medical emergency.

The defendant urges us to distinguish Stephen on the

ground that a refusal to attend a deposition due to

agoraphobia is ‘‘much different from the inability to

attend a proceeding due to physical restraint . . . .’’

We do not categorically distinguish between various

mental illnesses and the limitations they may impose.

Agoraphobia perhaps may constitute reasonable cause

for missing a court appointment in some circumstances,

but the defendant here did not provide a record on

which we can practically draw reasonable comparisons

or distinctions to the facts in Stephen. The court in

the present case did not abuse its discretion by not

concluding that the documents that were submitted

with the motion to open constituted reasonable cause

on their face.

B

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion by not according proper weight to the emergency certificate, by ignoring the Institute of Living’s

application to the Probate Court to have the defendant

involuntarily committed, and by substituting instead its

own observations.

The court had discretion to weigh the evidence before

it. ‘‘[T]he trial court, as trier of fact, determine[s] who

and what to believe and the weight to be accorded

the evidence. The sifting and weighing of evidence is

peculiarly the function of the trier.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Burns v. Adler, 158 Conn. App. 766,

803, 120 A.3d 555, cert. granted on other grounds, 319

Conn. 931, A.3d (2015). ‘‘Because it is the trial

court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine

credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . .

In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the

record to determine whether the [court] could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .

Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . .

in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Morgillo v. Empire Paving, Inc., 158

Conn. App. 399, 409, 118 A.3d 760 (2015); see also

McCarthy v. Ward Leonard Electric Co., 104 Conn. App.

535, 542, 935 A.2d 189 (2007) (upholding trial court’s

denial of motion to open when it decided that ‘‘given

the history of this matter and [the party’s] course of

dealing in this matter, the court does not find her affidavit credible’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The court acted within its discretion when it weighed

the emergency certificate, which contained little of significance apart from the documents that relied on the

defendant’s self-reported statements, against the following considerations: (1) the defendant e-mailed the

court that he would not attend the trial seven hours

before the issuance of the emergency certificate and

his involuntary commitment; (2) the findings in the

emergency certificate were based on self-reported

statements; (3) the defendant ‘‘consistently and aggressively’’ tried to postpone the trial priorto his involuntary

commitment; (4) the trial court’s observations of the

defendant in the week preceding the trial did not indicate that he was anything other than ‘‘articulate, composed, and in control of himself’’; and (5) the Probate

Court did not find that the defendant had a psychiatric

disability warranting involuntary commitment. On

these grounds, the court concluded that it ‘‘simply does

not know whether or not the defendant orchestrated

his involuntary commitment on Sunday, December, 8,

in order to delay the trial of his civil action.’’ Given its

thoughtful findings on the matter, we do not conclude

that the court abused its discretion by affording the

emergency certificate limited weight.8

The defendant also asserts that the court did not

give proper consideration to the Institute of Living’s

application to the Probate Court seeking to have the

defendant involuntarily committed. This document is

saddled with many of the same evidentiary deficiencies

as the emergency certificate: the defendant did not provide a foundation for the unauthenticated document,

the plaintiff did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the physician who completed the application, and

the application appears to be based upon the selfreporting of the defendant. This document does suggest

that the Institute of Living was unwilling to release the

defendant on December 19, 2013, but it is not dispositive

as to whether the defendant suffered a bona fide mental

health emergency on December 8, 2013; this application

is further evidence that the defendant was actually committed—a fact not in dispute. Thus, the court did not

abuse its discretion by not considering the Institute of

Living’s application as dispositive of the critical mental

health or psychiatric disability issue.
The defendant’s related argument that the court substituted its own observations of the defendant for the

medical opinions of trained professionals is unfounded

and not supported by the record. After it noted that the

defendant had appeared competent during voir dire,

the court specifically stated: ‘‘Of course the court itself

has no special expertise in evaluating persons that may

have mental health issues. The court recites its own

observations of the defendant in evaluating the defendant’s out-of-court statements contained in the defendant’s exhibits.’’ Because the court was free to weigh

the evidence before it, it was proper for the court to

rely on its own observations of the defendant for the

limited purpose described.

C

The defendant next claims that the court erred by

not providing the defendant ‘‘with an opportunity to

clarify, supplement or, if necessary, certify the documents that were accepted by the trial court as evidence,

even though requiring the certification of the hospital

and Probate Court documents . . . is itself an unreasonable burden of proof under [Practice Book] § 17-

43.’’ This claim fails on two bases. First, the court did

not require that the defendant certify the hospital and

Probate Court documents. On the contrary, the court

showed great leniency in allowing these documents into

evidence without certification or the establishment of

a proper foundation. Second, the defendant had ample

opportunity to provide the court with the evidence it

deemed necessary to grant the motion to open, and he

also had knowledge of the specific evidence that the

trial court wanted.

Additional facts inform the resolution of this claim.

At the conclusion of the hearing in damages, on December 17, 2013, the court rendered judgment and extended

the time to file motions to January 31, 2014. On the last

day of this extension, January 31, 2014, the defendant

filed his motion to open the judgment. The court held

a preliminary hearing on the motion on March 5, 2014.

At that hearing, the court clearly articulated what it

considered to be the factual issue at stake: ‘‘The defendant assert[ed] that . . . he was in a suicidal state the

day before the evidence in this trial was to be taken

and that consistent with that state, he was involuntarily

committed and had no ability to leave the Hartford

Hospital.’’ Meanwhile, the plaintiff adopted the position

that ‘‘what occurred [on] December 8 was part of a

scheme to delay the trial and was, in part, effectively

orchestrated by the defendant to delay the trial.’’ The

defendant, then, knew precisely what the burdens and

issues would be at the evidentiary hearing.

At the preliminary hearing, the court ordered the

defendant to produce the following: ‘‘a list of witnesses

and exhibits he intends to call or introduce at the evi-
dentiary hearing . . . a signed authorization allowing

the plaintiff’s counsel to obtain a complete copy of the

transcript of the December 26 Probate Court hearing

and exhibits or documents used during that hearing,

a signed authorization of all records concerning the

defendant’s treatment at the Institute of Living from

June 1, 2013, to the present time, a full list of mental

health care providers that the defendant sought treatment from between June 1, 2013, to the present time,

and a signed authorization for the release of medical

records for any such provider.’’ Perhaps anticipating

that the defendant might assert a privilege or object to

these requests, the court also warned that ‘‘the defendant cannot have it both ways. The defendant cannot

assert a privilege and then introduce partial testimony

that could lead to an incomplete picture of his treatment

that would [be] unfair . . . .’’ The evidentiary hearing

did not occur until May 6, 2014—over two months from

the date of this preliminary hearing.

We disagree with the defendant’s argument that he

did not have an opportunity adequately to prepare or

to clarify his evidence for the hearing; rather, he had

more than two months in which to do so. The defendant

had been on notice for two months that he would be

expected to provide evidence to support his assertion

that he was in a suicidal state on December 8, 2013.

He was also thoroughly informed ofthe plaintiff’s counterarguments and the court’s intention to ascertain

whether he suffered a bona fide mental health emergency. Additionally, the defendant knew that his ability

to show reasonable cause would be compromised if he

refused to disclose the requested information regarding

his medical history. The court did not abuse its discretion by not giving the defendant additional time to prepare for the evidentiary hearing.

D

Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly created a unique and unlawful burden of proof

applicable to parties with mental or psychiatric disabilities who move to open judgments. He posits that it is

‘‘unlikely’’ that a trial court would require a party who

was defaulted as a result of a cardiac emergency to

subpoena his cardiologist and to disclose his medical

records to prove a bona fide emergency, and, as such,

the court in the present matter required the defendant

to prove that he suffered a bonafide emergency only

because his illness was psychiatric in nature. We are

not persuaded by this comparison. In other cases, we

have affirmed the denial of motions to open based on

physical illnesses and emergencies. See Searles v.

Schulman, 58Conn. App. 373, 753A.2d 420, cert. denied,

254 Conn. 930, 761 A.2d 755 (2000); Brunswick School,

Inc. v. Hutter, 53 Conn. App. 455, 730 A.2d 1206 (1999).

It appears that the defendant is not urging us to impose

an equal burden, but is in fact asking us to create a
relaxed standard for parties who have psychiatric disabilities, a standard that deems treatment of or commitment for mental illness as per se reasonable cause. We

need not create a new, separate standard for parties

relying on psychiatric disabilities, and, consequently,

we reject the defendant’s proposal to create a different

standard and his claim that the trial court imposed a

unique burden on him because of his mental illness.

We previously have affirmed trial courts’ decisions

to deny motions to open when the moving party has

claimed reasonable cause for absence because of medical issues. For example, in Brunswick School, Inc. v.

Hutter, supra, 53 Conn. App. 455, we upheld the trial

court’s denial of a motion to open despite the defendant’s claim that an ongoing medical condition prevented him from appearing to defend the action. In that

case, on the day of the trial, the defendant filed a letter

in which he requested another continuance because

he needed time to address his hypertension. Id., 460.

‘‘Significantly, however, the defendant had been diagnosed with hypertension three weeks prior to . . . the

date of trial, but he did not inform the trial court of his

continuing ill health until the day of trial.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) Id. In support of his motion, ‘‘the defendant

had provided outdated medical documentation . . .

including a hospital record of admission . . . three

months prior to the trial, and a letter from a physician

indicating that the defendant had hypertension.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Id. We held that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by basing its decision to deny

the motion, in part, on the defendant’s failure to produce

current evidence of his illness. Id.; accord Jaquith v.

Revson, 159Conn. 427, 432, 270A.2d 559 (1970)(upholding court’s refusal to grant motion to open because

defendant did not set forth facts showing that her ‘‘history of illness and cause for seclusion’’ was reasonable

cause for not complying with court order).

The defendant’s reliance on Brunswick School, Inc.,

undermines his contention that the court imposed a

unique burden on him because he suffered from a psychiatric disability rather than a physical ailment.9 We

held in Brunswick School, Inc., that the defendant’s

failure to provide a ‘‘current report’’ was a proper basis

for the court’s refusal to grant his motion to open.

Brunswick School, Inc. v. Hutter, supra, 53 Conn. App.

460. In the present case, the defendant did not offer

into evidence any report from any physician—outdated

or otherwise—and effectively blocked the plaintiff and

the court from obtaining any information pertaining to

the commitment at all. If a medical report, albeit an

outdated one, may provide insufficient reasonable

cause, then the court in the present matter ought not

be held to have abused its discretion by failing to be

persuaded by an unauthenticated emergency certificate

and application for involuntary commitment to the Probate Court.
In Searles v. Schulman, supra, 58 Conn. App. 373,

we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it denied a motion to open after the movant

claimed that a medical issue constituted reasonable

cause for not attending a scheduled trial management

conference. There, the plaintiff, who had delayed the

trial in the past by filing voluminous pretrial motions,

argued in her motion to open that she had missed the

conference because she had had out-of-state medical

appointments. Id., 377. She did not present any evidence

in support of her contention that she actually had

appointments, nor did she offer any reasoning as to

why these appointments could not be rescheduled. Id.

The court’s decision to deny the motion to open was

not an abuse of discretion, because the plaintiff did not

substantiate her claims with evidence. Id.

Likewise, in the present matter, the defendant, who

had attempted to postpone the trial ‘‘consistently and

aggressively,’’ moved to open the judgment but did not

provide persuasive evidence as to his mental state on

December 8, 2013. The court did not abuse its discretion

by refusing unquestioningly to accept unsubstantiated

claims of a medical emergency. The refusal was neither

based on insensitivity to the defendant’s mental health

nor grounded in bias against mental illness; as Searles

demonstrates, trial courts previously have had the discretion to find that nonpsychiatric, medical issues do

not comprise reasonable cause for the purposes of § 52-

212 ifthe issues receive insufficient evidentiary support.

The burden imposed upon the defendant in the present case is not dissimilar to or at odds with previous

burdens imposed by trial courts when parties have been

unable to attend trial due to medical emergencies, and

thus the defendant’s claim that the trial court’s decision

was biased and rooted in stigma against mental illness

is plainly without merit. If we were to adopt the defendant’s reasoning, we would compel trial courts to relinquish their discretion and find that commitment or any

paperwork pertaining to a psychiatric disability constitutes per se reasonable cause under § 52-212. After considering the defendant’s four claims in AC 37079 and

making ‘‘every reasonable presumption in favor of [the

court’s] action’’; Walton v. New Hartford, supra, 223

Conn. 169; we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion

to open the default judgment, and we affirm that judgment of the court.

II

AC 37080

In his second appeal, AC 37080, the defendant claims

that the trial court: (1) violated provisions of the federal

and state constitutions by entering a default judgment

and proceeding with a hearing in damages when the

court knew that the self-represented defendant was
involuntarily committed pursuant to § 17a-502, (2) violated the equal protection and due process clauses of

the federal and state constitutions as well as the sixth

amendment to the federal constitution by denying the

defendant reasonable access to his funds and preventing his expert from conducting an independent

medical examination of the plaintiff, and (3) either violated the equal protection and due process clauses of

the federal and state constitutions and the sixth amendment to the federal constitution or abused its discretion

when it denied the defendant’s request to continue the

trial until after his criminal trial had concluded. We do

not agree.10

A

The defendant first claims that the court violated

various constitutional rights by entering a default and

proceeding with a hearing in damages despite knowing

that the self-represented defendant was involuntarily

committed. This argument is based on the faulty premise that when the court entered the default, it actually

knew that the defendant was involuntarily committed

and that the commitment was based on a bona fide

medical reason. The record does not contain any evidence that the trial court had knowledge that the defendant was involuntarily committed, that he was

restrained at the Institute of Living against his will, or

that he was unable to communicate with the court during the trial. At the time the default was entered on

December 10, 2013, the only information that the court

had as to the defendant’s location was his e-mail correspondence from December 8, 2013, in which he stated

that he was being treated at Hartford Hospital and that

‘‘[u]nder the circumstances, travel to Stamford is

impossible.’’

Relatedly, the defendant asserts that the court violated his constitutional rights when it did not declare

a mistrial upon learning of his involuntary commitment.

Although the court did receive correspondence from

the Institute of Living after the default was entered and

was discouraged from further communication with the

defendant, the court was never specifically informed

that the defendant had been involuntarily committed

until after the trial. Thus, because of the faulty underlying factual premise, we reject the defendant’s first constitutional claim without further analysis.

B

The defendant’s second constitutional claim is that

the court violated his equal protection, due process, and

sixth amendment rights to prepare his defense when he

was not permitted to access his funds to hire counsel,

and when the court prevented his expert from conducting an independent medical examination of the plaintiff.

At various points in his civil, criminal, and family cases,

the defendant was represented by counsel. He filed
several motions for order of payments to cover attorney’s and expert fees, and each motion was subsequently denied. Such denials, the defendant argues, left

him ‘‘no choice but to proceed pro se,’’ in contravention

of his constitutional rights.

The record does not support the defendant’s claims.

On September 26, 2012, the defendant’s lawyer in the

present case moved to withdraw as counsel. The court

denied the motion on November 2, 2012, listing several

concerns: the motion was made ‘‘on the eve of trial,’’

the court doubted the defendant’s ability to address

discovery and court orders to be prepared for the trial,

the lawyer’s claim of financial hardship did not warrant

the lawyer’s withdrawal, and the defendant was subject

to court monitoring and was restricted in the amount

of contact that he could have with the plaintiff as a

result of court orders in his criminal case, effectively

preventing him from deposing the plaintiff. Despite the

court’s refusal to let counsel withdraw, the defendant

filed an appearance in lieu of counsel on April 10, 2013.

The plaintiff objected to the appearance, but the court

overruled the objection after ensuring that the defendant understood the ramifications of filing an appearance in lieu of counsel. Indeed, the defendant referred

to his choice to represent himself as ‘‘my right.’’ The

court did not deny the defendant access to counsel or

deprive him of representation; in fact, the court

attempted to dissuade the defendant from forgoing ‘‘the

guidance and advice of a seasoned trial attorney.’’

The record also does not support the defendant’s

argument that his expert was wrongfully prevented

from conducting an independent medical examination

of the plaintiff.11 We do not address this issue, however,

because we affirmed in part I of this opinion the judgment denying the motion to open the default judgment,

and a holding beneficial to the defendant on this issue

would offer no practical relief.

C

Finally, the defendant claims that the court violated

his equal protection, due process, and sixth amendment

rights when it denied his request to continue the civil

trial. The defendant sought a continuance of his civil

trial until after his criminal trial, because he worried

that he would be forced to ‘‘choose between defending

himself at the civil trial, in which case he risked incriminating himself at the criminal trial, or invoking his fifth

amendment rights at the civil trial, in which case he

risked the jury drawing a negative inference.’’

Typically, we analyze the denial of a continuance in

terms of whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App.

525. If the denial of a continuance has interfered with

a constitutional right, however, we apply a due process

analysis. Id. It is well established that it is not an auto-
matic constitutional violation to deny a request for a

continuance of a civil trial pending the outcome of a

criminal trial. See id., 527. The defendant claims that

the denial of the continuance forced him ‘‘to balance

the unenviable choice between presenting a defense

and self-incrimination.’’ As in Tyler,

12 we hold that the

court did not abuse its discretion. Even if there was

a constitutional violation, however, any violation was

harmless because the defendant did not attend his trial;

hence, the failure of the court to grant a continuance

did not force the defendant to choose between his constitutionalrights and presenting a defense in the present

civil action. We therefore reject the defendant’s claim

that the court abused its discretion by not granting his

request for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the

default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 52-212 authorizes the trial court to open a default

judgment upon ‘‘written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby,

showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in

whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment . . .

and that the . . . defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other

reasonable cause from . . . making the defense.’’

2 Practice Book § 17-43 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any judgment rendered . . . upon a default . . . may be set aside . . . upon the written

motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause,

or that a . . . defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition

of such judgment . . . and that [the movant] was prevented by mistake,

accident, or other reasonable cause from . . . appearing to make the same.’’

3

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she sustained personal injuries

and losses including: ‘‘a fracture of the maxillary sinus; a fracture of the

jaw; severe facial abrasions, contusions and lacerations, paresthesia and

neurasthenia; lacerations of the scalp from her forehead to the back of her

skull; poor control suggestive for a vestibular pattern, nystagmus with vision

denied in several positions, vestibular abnormality, vestibular weakness,

and defect of the vestibular ocular reflex, some or all of which suggest an

uncompensated vestibular deficit; contusions to her neck, back, arms and

body; scarring . . . emotional trauma, distress and anxiety, including her

fear of imminent death by being killed.’’

4 At various points throughout this case, the defendant has been selfrepresented. The defendant, although a lawyer, claims not to have had

previous litigation experience.

5

In her appellate brief, the plaintiff argues that the court erred when it

found that a good defense existed at the time of the judgment, which satisfied

the first requirement. We need not consider this argument. Because the

defendant must meet both requirements of the two part test, and we affirm

the court’s conclusion that he did not meet the reasonable cause prong of

the test, resolution of whether the good defense prong was satisfied would

have no practical effect.

6 The defendant perhaps could have applied for a protective orderto shield

from the public sensitive medical information that he did not want released.

7 The defendant argues that it is implausible to imagine that he could in

effect fool a team of doctors into committing him, because he had no

background in psychiatry. He also contends that the evidence ‘‘demonstrates

that [he] did not actually want to be committed.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

If the defendant had testified under oath, such factual protestations could

have been considered by the court, but, as the record stands, the court was

not obligated to give them any weight, nor was it bound to accept them as

support forthe argument that the mere fact of one’s involuntary commitment

constitutes automatic reasonable cause.

8 Both the defendant and the plaintiff referred to Milliun v. New Milford

Hospital, 310 Conn. 711, 733–34, 80 A.3d 887 (2013), to support their respective positions. Milliun addressed the circumstances in which the statements

in medical records may be admitted as expert evidence of causation in a
medical malpractice action, which differs from the issue in the present case.

Milliun is not controlling in this matter because here the court was dealing

with the weight to accord documents, not their admissibility.

9 The defendant suggests that distinctions between the present appeals

and Brunswick support his position in two respects. First, the defendant

in Brunswick did not inform the court until the day of trial that he was ill,

whereas here the defendant alerted the court one week prior to the evidence

portion of the trial that he would like time to receive psychiatric care, but

there was no indication that there would be interference with the trial

schedule. Second, the defendant in Brunswick provided outdated documentation of his condition, but the defendant here provided a more current,

although entirely conclusory, document about his involuntary commitment.

We are not persuaded that these distinctions make a difference in the

outcome of the present case.

10 When a party’s constitutional rights are at stake, we employ a plenary

standard of review. ‘‘When an act is shown by reliable facts to affect a

specific constitutional right . . . the analysis should turn on whether a due

process violation exists rather than whether there has been an abuse of

discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler,

115 Conn. App. 521, 525, 973 A.2d 163, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 920, 979 A.2d

493 (2009) (quoting In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 604, 767 A.2d

155 (2001)). Whether a party has been deprived of ‘‘due process rights is a

question of law, to which [this Court must] grant plenary review.’’ Matthew

W. v. Dept. of Children and Families, 143 Conn. App. 813, 821, 71 A.3d

603 (2013).

11 The defendant alleges that the court was ‘‘losing patience’’ with him

and thus ‘‘imposed a number of conditions on the examination,’’ including

that the examination take no more than one day. The examination never

took place, however, because the defendant’s expert said that the examination could not be completed in the time allotted. The court did not prevent

the expert witness from conducting his examination, but, rather, it imposed

reasonable limitations on the scope of the examination.

12 ‘‘The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the

trial judge . . . . In [federal case law, Superior Court decisions, and cases

from other jurisdictions], the courts held that when there are parallel civil

and criminal proceedings, the courts have discretion to stay discovery in a

civil proceeding or to stay the action in its entirety if required by the interests

of justice.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v.

Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App. 528 (holding that court did not abuse

its discretion by refusing to continue divorce proceeding until conclusion of

defendant’s criminal proceeding—even if defendant had to assert privilege

against self-incrimination during divorce proceeding, thereby potentially

affecting division of marital property).