[Cite as Slak v. Strozier, 2024-Ohio-286.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

Hewen Slak Court of Appeals No. L-23-1074

Appellant Trial Court No. CVG-22-16132

 

v.

Shareen Strozier DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: January 26, 2024

* * * * *

Douglas A. Wilkins, for appellant.

* * * * *

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} In this forcible entry and detainer action, appellant, Hewen Slak, appeals the 

March 3, 2023 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court overruling her objections to the 

December 27, 2022 magistrate’s decision that granted a judgment for possession to 

appellee, Shareen Strozier. For the following reasons, we affirm.
2.

I. Background and Facts

{¶ 2} In 2018, Slak, as landlord, and Strozier, as tenant, entered into a lease 

agreement for a house in Toledo. The term of the lease was from August 1, 2018, to 

February 28, 2022. Under the lease, Strozier agreed to pay Slak $650 per month in rent 

and a “water fee” of $100. 

{¶ 3} On January 1, 2020, the parties signed a second document, titled “TCC 

Lease with option to purchase plan” (“2020 document”).1 The document says, in its 

entirety:

TCC Lease with option to purchase plan2

Site: 1208 Parkside, Toledo OH 43607

 3 BR/1 Bath, 1212 sq ft

Sales Price: $25,000 Late fee: $5 /day

Monthly Rent: $650

Real Estate Taxes: $327/half year Hazard Insurance: $400/year

 Paid by Lessee Paid by Lessor

The $2000.00 Non-Refundable Option Consideration Fee (NROCF) will be 

paid up front as the security deposit, Lessee will then be able to apply that 

NROCF in this Lease with Option To Purchase plan utilizing the Nonrefundable Option Consideration Fee (NROCF) of $2,000.00*

1 Slak attached a “TCC Lease with option to purchase plan” signed in March 2021 to her 

brief. This is not the same “TCC Lease with option to purchase plan” admitted into 

evidence by the trial court, which was signed in 2020, nor is there any evidence that the 

2021 version was ever presented to the trial court. Because the 2021 document was not 

properly filed with, admitted into evidence by, or proffered to the trial court, it is not part 

of the record before us, and we cannot consider it. Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169, 

205 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) (“An exhibit attached to a party’s appellate brief—but 

not filed with the trial court—is not part of the record.”). 

2 All formatting, emphasis, and errors are in the original document.
3.

No pre-payment penalty applies, therefore optional accelerated payoff/transfer of deed, may be exercised. Hazard Insurance will be paid by 

Lessor/ Optionor/ Seller (L/O/S). Lessee will then be able to apply that 

NROCF in this lease with.

For simplicity and to ensure that maximum payment credit is earned, 

it is suggested that Lessee have all payments automatically transferred to 

L/O/S’s checking account to avoid any chance late payments.

Schedule of On-Time Payments & Credits.

12-month illustration below assumes all monthly payments are 

received On-Time.

On-Time payment credit will not be granted for payments after 

5-day grace period.

Schedule of Payments & Credits:

12-month illustration below assumes all monthly payments are 

received.

Year Credit, 30% Months Payment Credit/Year

2020 $195.0 12 $2,340

2021 $195.0 12 $2,340

2022 $195.0 12 $2,340

2023 $195.0 12 $2,340

2024 $195.0 12 $2,340

2025 $195.0 12 $2,340

2026 $195.0 12 $2,340

2027 $195.0 12 $2,340

2028 $195.0 12 $2,340

Total credit $21,060

Faith Money 2,000

Balance due to close 1,940

 25,000

The 2020 document does not indicate whether it is intended to supplement or replace the 

2018 lease.
4.

{¶ 4} Slak and Strozier did not enter into another lease agreement when the 2018 

lease expired in February 2022.

{¶ 5} On October 31, 2022, Slak served Strozier with a notice of “[t]ermination of 

month-to-month tenancy” in which she told Strozier that her tenancy would terminate on 

November 30, 2022. On December 5, 2022, Slak served Strozier with a three-day notice 

to leave the premises, as required by R.C. 1923.04. In the three-day notice, Slak listed 

“TERMINATION OF LEASE” as the reason she was asking Strozier to leave the house. 

When Strozier did not leave, Slak filed the underlying eviction action.

{¶ 6} At the December 2022 eviction hearing before the magistrate, Slak and 

Strozier each testified. Slak said that she and Strozier signed the 2020 document, which 

she characterized as an option to purchase the property during the term of the 2018 lease. 

Slak drafted the 2020 document. According to Slak, Strozier could only exercise the 

purchase option if she was current in her rent payments. The schedule at the bottom of 

the 2020 document showed that Strozier could receive a credit toward the purchase price

if she paid her rent on time, and would lose any credit if her rent was late. At the time of 

the hearing, Strozier had not exercised her option, and Slak thought that Strozier could 

not exercise the option because she owed Slak money.

{¶ 7} Slak also testified about a spreadsheet, dated more than three months before 

the hearing, that she compiled regarding Strozier’s rent and tax payments. Based on her 

records, Slak believed that Strozier owed her approximately $3,500 to cover back rent, 
5.

late fees, and unpaid property taxes from January 2020 to mid-September 2022.3 The 

spreadsheet showed that Strozier would frequently not pay $650 for rent each month. 

Some months she paid nothing, some months she paid less than $650, and some months 

she paid more. Slak said that the amount she claimed that Strozier owed was the “net due 

delinquent” amount after accounting for all payments made by Strozier or on her behalf. 

{¶ 8} Slak asked for a judgment for possession of the property because Strozier’s 

month-to-month tenancy was properly terminated.

{¶ 9} In her testimony, Strozier claimed that Slak’s records were inaccurate and 

her rent was paid in full. She believed that Slak was “looking at somebody else’s 

information * * *” and said that she had proof of her payments to Slak. She also said that 

she had provided Slak proof of her payments when Slak asked for it. Despite Strozier 

saying, “I have proof of all payments right here in front of me[,]” her attorney did not ask 

her about any specific payments or attempt to enter any documents into evidence.

{¶ 10} Regarding the 2020 document, Strozier thought that the option to purchase 

plan was still in effect and that she was in compliance with the document’s terms. She 

said that Slak “promised [her] to buy” the house and believed that she “only owe[d] 

$11,700 on that house * * *.”

3 Based on notes on Slak’s rent ledger and some of Strozier’s testimony, it seems that 

Slak filed an eviction case against Strozier earlier in 2022 for nonpayment of rent, but 

dismissed that case after giving Strozier notice of terminating her month-to-month 

tenancy.
6.

{¶ 11} In his decision, the magistrate marked the check box next to “Defendant in 

default under (written) (oral) lease since _______[,]” but did not specify what type of 

lease or list a date of default. The magistrate also indicated that the notice to vacate was

lawfully served. Under the section for the magistrate’s findings, he wrote down details of 

the parties’ arguments, but did not make any factual findings. Finally, the magistrate 

marked the check box indicating that a judgment for possession be entered in Strozier’s 

favor. The trial court’s entry adopting the magistrate’s decision simply said, “[t]he 

Magistrate’s decision of December 27, 2022 is hereby adopted[,]” and granted Strozier a 

judgment for possession.

{¶ 12} Slak filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. She argued that the 

magistrate erred by entering judgment in Strozier’s favor by (1) finding that the option to 

purchase remained in effect, which prevented Slak from seeking a judgment for 

possession; (2) ignoring Slak’s spreadsheet showing that Strozier owed her money; and 

(3) not granting her possession despite her properly terminating Strozier’s month-tomonth tenancy.

{¶ 13} In her response, Strozier argued that Slak wrongfully terminated a lease 

that was “entwined with” the option to purchase because the option should remain open 

“until the normal provided time of paying the leasehold agreement expires * * *” so that 

Strozier could have the opportunity to exercise her option.
7.

{¶ 14} In its judgment entry overruling Slak’s objections, the trial court found that 

the 2020 document was ambiguous because the parties signed it before the 2018 lease 

expired and did not sign another lease after the 2018 lease expired, it referred to monthly 

rent payments of $650, it included new obligations for Strozier (including paying a 

$2,000 security deposit and paying the property taxes), and the “schedule of payments 

and credits shows that the agreement could be binding from the date of signing up until

sometime in the year 2028.” Because the agreement was ambiguous, the court construed 

it against Slak, the drafter, and found that it was “a monthly lease lasting until 2028, 

unless [Strozier] should not be current on payments.”

{¶ 15} Regarding the parties’ conflicting testimony about Strozier’s rent 

payments, the court explained that the evidence before it consisted of Slak’s exhibits 

from the hearing, no exhibits from Strozier, and “less than twelve brief pages of recorded 

testimony transcribed from the hearing.” Although the court noted that it had to conduct 

an independent review of the magistrate’s decision, it also said that it was allowed to rely 

on the magistrate’s credibility determinations because the magistrate saw the witnesses 

testify. Based on the “limited evidence” before it—that is, “[w]ith no evidence being 

entered at all by [Strozier], and [Slak’s] sworn word only supported by a document 

drafted by [Slak] herself * * *”—the trial court determined that the magistrate’s 

credibility determinations were necessary to resolve whether Strozier was current with 
8.

her rent. The court concluded that “it appear[ed] that the magistrate gave greater 

credibility to [Strozier’s] testimony, * * *” which the court accepted.

{¶ 16} Based on that information, the trial court concluded that “[Slak] did enter 

into an agreement which was an ambiguous and somewhat open-ended Lease with 

Option to Purchase and that [Slak] is now bound to the terms of the agreement.” The 

court found Slak’s objections not well-taken.

{¶ 17} Slak now appeals, raising one assignment of error:

The Lower Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Failing to Grant Slak 

Judgment for Possession[.]

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 18} In her assignment of error, Slak argues that the trial court incorrectly found 

that the 2020 document extended the term of Strozier’s lease. She contends that an 

unexercised option does not prevent a landlord from terminating a month-to-month 

tenancy or seeking to evict a tenant after a lease is terminated or breached; that is, she 

claims that Strozier’s option did not affect the 2018 lease or change Strozier’s status as a 

month-to-month tenant after the 2018 lease expired. Slak also contends that she followed 

the steps necessary to evict an at-will tenant, and Strozier’s payment of rent was 

“immaterial” to the outcome of the eviction action. She also points out the trial court’s 

“incongruous” findings that the 2020 document made Strozier a month-to-month tenant 

until 2028, but that Slak can only evict Strozier for failing to pay rent.
9.

A. Standard of review

{¶ 19} Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on objections to a magistrate’s 

decision only for an abuse of discretion. Baker v. R/A Cab Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L19-1031, 2019-Ohio-4375, ¶ 10. “However, even if a case was initially heard by a 

magistrate, the appropriate standard of review in a contract case is whether the trial court 

erred as a matter of law.” Gray v. Nunez, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1276, 2009-Ohio989, ¶ 23.

{¶ 20} A lease is a contract, and, like any other contract, it must be construed to 

carry out the intent of the parties. Tillimon v. Jankowski, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-91-262, 

1992 WL 114606, *2 (May 29, 1992). We presume the parties’ intent is reflected in the 

plain language of the lease. Id.; Beverage Holdings, LLC v. 5701 Lombardo, LLC, 159 

Ohio St.3d 194, 2019-Ohio-4716, 150 N.E.3d 28, ¶ 13. If the contract language is clear 

and unambiguous, a court must enforce the terms as written, without turning to evidence 

beyond the four corners of the agreement. Beverage Holdings at ¶ 13. In that case, 

construing the document is a matter of law that we review de novo. Nationwide Mut. 

Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 (1995). 

Similarly, the question of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law that we review 

de novo. Yarder v. Scherer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1035, 2003-Ohio-6744, ¶ 17.

{¶ 21} However, if a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact, 

which we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. Abuse of discretion means that the trial 
10.

court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Askew v. 

Goldhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610, 665 N.E.2d 200 (1996). We will not substitute our 

judgment for the trial court’s regarding findings of fact that are supported by some 

competent, credible evidence in the record. Ozdemir v. Boldt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-

1022, 2018-Ohio-5008, ¶ 17, citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 

279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus.

B. The legal import of the 2020 document controls the resolution of this case.

{¶ 22} This case is a forcible entry and detainer action, which is “solely a 

possessory action.” Haas v. Gerski, 175 Ohio St. 327, 330, 194 N.E.2d 765 (1963). That 

is, it is only used to determine which party has the right to present possession of the 

property. Eckart v. Newman, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-18-006, 2019-Ohio-3211, ¶ 9. 

Thus, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Strozier or Slak had the right to present 

possession of the house. Slak argues that she has the right to possess the property 

because Strozier was occupying the house as a holdover tenant after the 2018 lease 

expired, and she properly terminated her holdover tenancy.

{¶ 23} When a tenant whose lease has expired continues to possess the leased 

property, the tenant becomes a holdover tenant. Kazmaier v. Fat Jacks, LLC, 6th Dist. 

Wood Nos. WD-09-048 and WD-09-057, 2010-Ohio-3627, ¶ 18. When a tenant holds 

over, the landlord has the option to either treat the tenant as a trespasser or hold her to a 

new lease term. Steiner v. Minkowski, 72 Ohio App.3d 754, 762, 596 N.E.2d 492 (6th 
11.

Dist.1991), citing Craig Wrecking Co. v. S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc., 38 Ohio App.3d 

79, 81, 526 N.E.2d 321 (10th Dist.1987). If the holdover tenant continues to pay rent per 

the lease terms, and the landlord accepts the rent, the law implies a contract for a new 

lease term. Craig Wrecking at 81. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the new, implied 

lease term is governed by the same terms as the original lease. Id. When the original 

lease called for payment of monthly rent, the holdover term is for a month-to-month 

periodic tenancy. Kazmaier at ¶ 18, citing Cesta v. Manfredi, 101 Ohio App.3d 326, 329, 

655 N.E.2d 755 (11th Dist.1995). A month-to-month tenancy can be terminated by either 

party giving the other at least 30 days’ notice. R.C. 5321.17(B).

{¶ 24} Here, the evidence shows that Strozier continued to reside in the house 

beyond February 2022, when the 2018 lease would have expired, and Slak continued to 

accept rent from Strozier. If the parties had not entered a separate agreement in 2020—

during the term of the 2018 lease—our analysis would be complete; no one disputes that 

Slak gave Strozier 30 days’ notice before filing the underlying forcible entry and detainer 

action, which would be sufficient to terminate a holdover tenancy. Instead, we must 

analyze the 2020 document to determine what impact, if any, it had on the parties’ 

obligations—which depends upon whether it is an option contract, as Slak argues, or a 

new lease, as the trial court concluded.

{¶ 25} An option contract is an agreement in which the owner of property grants 

another person the privilege, without the obligation, to purchase the property at a set price 
12.

and within a set time. Wolf v. Miller Diversified Consulting, LLC, 6th Dist. Wood No. 

WD-07-049, 2008-Ohio-1233, ¶ 22. It consists of an offer to buy, sell, or perform (which 

becomes a contract if the offeree properly accepts it), combined with a binding agreement 

to leave the offer open for a specific period of time. Shrock v. Spognardi, 2015-Ohio4555, 46 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), citing Cent. Funding, Inc. v. CompuServe 

Interactive Servs., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-972, 2003-Ohio-5037, ¶ 38. 

{¶ 26} A lease is an agreement that conveys a right to possess real property for a 

limited term, under specified conditions, and in consideration of rent. Id. at ¶ 15, citing 

Eller Media Co. v. DGE, Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 83273 and 83286, 2004-Ohio4748, ¶ 35; and Fadelsak v. Hagley, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 02CA41, 2003-Ohio-3413, ¶ 

9. Leases and options to purchase are contracts that are independent of each other, even 

if they are signed at the same time or contained in the same document. Garrido v. Empty 

Nester Homes, Ltd., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-518, 2004-Ohio-108, ¶ 14, citing 

Ahmed v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.2d 271, 277, 418 N.E.2d 406 (6th Dist.1979).

{¶ 27} If the 2020 document is an option contract, it exists independent of the 

2018 lease. That is, the 2018 lease remained valid until it expired in February 2022 and 

Strozier was occupying the property as a holdover tenant when she received the 30-day 

notice to vacate. But, if the 2020 document is a new lease, that means that Strozier was 

not a holdover tenant. Instead, she was occupying the property pursuant to the new lease 
13.

agreement. We must, therefore, review the 2020 document to determine its legal 

significance.

C. The 2020 document is ambiguous.

{¶ 28} The first step in our review is determining whether the 2020 document is 

clear and unambiguous. When we review a contract, we read the document as a whole 

and presume that the parties’ intent is reflected in the language of the document. Kelly v. 

Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 411 (1987), paragraph one of the 

syllabus. “As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal 

meaning.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 

N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11. When the contract language is clear and unambiguous, we can only 

consider the writing itself to determine the parties’ intent. Id.

{¶ 29} On the other hand, a contract is ambiguous if its meaning cannot be 

determined from the four corners of the document, or if its language is susceptible to 

more than one reasonable interpretation. LublinSussman Group LLP v. Lee, 2018-Ohio666, 107 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of 

law that we review de novo. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 73 Ohio St.3d at 108, 652 

N.E.2d 684.

{¶ 30} In this case, we find that the 2020 document is ambiguous. Slak argues 

that “[t]he terms of the Lease and Option are clearly unambiguous[,]” and nothing in the 

2020 document extended the term of the lease, so the trial court erred by finding that 
14.

Strozier was entitled to possession of the house. But the 2020 document is not “clearly” 

an option contract, as Slak claims. Nor is it clearly a lease agreement. In fact, it contains 

elements of both an option contract and a lease agreement, but does not clearly and 

unambiguously fall into either category.

{¶ 31} To start, the agreement is not clearly an option contract. The 2020 

document does not contain an explicit offer from Slak to sell the home to Strozier. It 

implies that a sale is contemplated—for example, by using “option to purchase” in its 

title, including a “Sales Price,” and referring to the possibility of “accelerated payoff/transfer of deed”—but nowhere in the document did Slak state that she wanted to 

offer the property for sale to Strozier, if Strozier chose to buy it. The 2020 document also 

lacks a term indicating how long Slak agreed to leave the offer open (i.e., the period in 

which Strozier was able to exercise her option to purchase). The “Schedule of Payments 

& Credits,” which is described in the 2020 document as an “illustration” of how Slak’s 

rent payments could be applied (presumably to the sales price), lists credit amounts 

through 2028. This could indicate that Strozier is able to exercise the option to purchase 

through 2028, but it is unclear from the four corners of the document if that is what the 

parties intended. Strozier also paid a “Non-Refundable Option Consideration Fee” that 

the 2020 document refers to as both a “security deposit” and “Faith Money,” and says 

“Lessee will then be able to apply that [fee] in this Lease with Option to Purchase plan 

utilizing the [fee] * * *.” Whether that payment was meant to be consideration for an 
15.

option contract, a security deposit for a lease agreement, or something else, and how or 

when the fee might apply to the parties’ agreement, is entirely unclear.

{¶ 32} But the 2020 document is not clearly a lease, either. Notably, the 2020 

document does not explicitly address Strozier’s right to possession of the house. And, 

although the document includes “Lease” in its title, refers to the “Lessor” and “Lessee,” 

mentions a “security deposit,” lists a “Monthly Rent” and late-payment fee, and refers to 

a payment “grace period,” it does not have the same level of specificity about the terms 

and conditions controlling Strozier’s use and occupancy of the property as the parties’ 

2018 lease.

{¶ 33} On the whole, we find that the 2020 document cannot be given a definite 

legal meaning and is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Westfield 

Ins., 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 11; LublinSussman 

Group, 2018-Ohio-666, 107 N.E.3d 724, at ¶ 20. Thus, we agree with the trial court that 

the 2020 document is ambiguous.

D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the 2020 document.

{¶ 34} Next, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

interpreting the 2020 document.

{¶ 35} An ambiguity in a contract creates an issue of fact that the court must 

resolve using extrinsic evidence. LublinSussman at ¶ 17. The outside evidence can help 

clarify the circumstances surrounding the agreement, what the parties intended to 
16.

accomplish with the agreement, and what the parties thought the agreement meant. Id. at 

¶ 21, citing Mosier v. Parry, 60 Ohio St. 388, 54 N.E. 364 (1899), paragraph one of the 

syllabus. If the extrinsic evidence does not clarify the meaning of the contract, the court 

will strictly construe the ambiguous language against the party that drafted the contract. 

Id.; Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 314, 667 N.E.2d 949 (1996).

{¶ 36} Here, the parties did not present much evidence of their intent at the 

eviction hearing. The extrinsic evidence relating to the 2020 document that they did 

present included (1) Slak’s understanding that the 2020 document was an option contract 

giving Strozier the option to purchase the house; (2) Slak’s belief that Strozier could 

exercise her option only if she is current with rent payments; (3) Slak’s testimony that 

Strozier did not and could not exercise her option to purchase; (4) Strozier’s 

understanding that Slak “promised [Strozier] to buy” the house and that the purchase plan 

in the 2020 document was in effect; and (5) Strozier’s belief that she had paid more than 

half of the purchase price under the plan, and was current on all payments, but Slak had 

confused her records with some other tenant’s. Nothing in this evidence clarifies what 

the parties intended when they signed the 2020 document.

{¶ 37} As a result, the trial court construed the 2020 document against Slak, the 

drafter, and determined that it was “a monthly lease lasting until 2028, unless [Strozier] 

should not be current on payments.” Based on the poorly-drafted agreement and the 

minimal evidence presented at the eviction hearing, this interpretation was not 
17.

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and was supported by some competent, 

credible evidence. The agreement contemplates Strozier paying monthly rent and refers 

to monthly payments and credits through 2028, which—in the absence of any contract 

language or extrinsic evidence more clearly explaining the parties’ intent—could 

reasonably be construed as the parties agreeing to Strozier’s use and occupancy of the 

home for nine years on the condition that she timely pay rent of $650 per month and 

property taxes of “$327/half year.”

{¶ 38} Therefore, we find that the trial court’s interpretation of the 2020 document 

was not an abuse of discretion.

E. The trial court’s conclusions about late payments was not an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 39} Finally, we must determine whether the trial court’s finding that Strozier 

was current on her payments—and, consequently, in compliance with the terms of the 

2020 document as the court interpreted it—so that she was entitled to possession of the 

property.

{¶ 40} In its decision, the trial court said that it chose to rely on the magistrate’s 

credibility determinations because of the lack of evidence presented at the eviction 

hearing. This was an appropriate course of action. A trial court is permitted to rely on 

the magistrate’s credibility determinations when it conducts its independent review of the 

magistrate’s decision. Rodriguez v. Frietze, 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA14, 2004-Ohio7121, ¶ 27. And, “[a]s the trier of fact, the magistrate [i]s free to believe or disbelieve 
18.

any witness.” Habib v. Shikur, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-735, 2018-Ohio-2955, ¶ 19. 

Although the magistrate did not put any explicit credibility determinations in his 

decision, based on the scant evidence in the record, it is fair to assume (as the trial court 

did) that the magistrate found Strozier more credible because he issued judgment in her 

favor. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA41, 2015-Ohio-2852, ¶ 36 

(upholding trial court’s decision based on its implicit determination that one party’s 

testimony was more credible than the other’s). This was not an abuse of discretion, and 

therefore, was not reversible error.

{¶ 41} In sum, the 2020 document—which the parties signed during the term of 

the 2018 lease and was potentially effective through 2028—is ambiguous as a matter of 

law because the parties’ intent cannot be determined from its four corners and it is 

reasonably susceptible to two or more interpretations. The trial court concluded, based 

on the evidence presented to the magistrate, that extrinsic evidence did not clarify the 

parties’ intent when they signed the agreement, so the court construed the 2020 document 

against its drafter, Slak. This decision is supported by some competent, credible evidence 

in the record and is not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court relied on the 

magistrate’s implicit credibility determination—which it was permitted to do—to find 

that Strozier was current with her financial obligations under the 2020 document and was 

thus entitled to possession of the property. Again, this was not an abuse of discretion.
19.

{¶ 42} Because the trial court correctly determined that the 2020 document is 

ambiguous and did not abuse its discretion in construing the parties’ agreement, Slak’s 

assignment of error is not well-taken.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, the March 3, 2023 judgment of the Toledo 

Municipal Court is affirmed. Slak is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to 

App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.