THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Josie M. Bostick, Respondent, 

v. 

Earl A. Bostick Sr., Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2022-000894 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Beaufort County 

Michèle Patrão Forsythe, Family Court Judge 

Opinion No. 28226 

Heard May 21, 2024 – Filed July 31, 2024 

REVERSED 

J. Michael Taylor, of Taylor/Potterfield, of Columbia; 

and H. Grady Brown III, of Brown & Norton, LLC, and 

Bridget Hillebrand Norton, both of Beaufort, all for 

Petitioner. 

John Ryd Bush Long, of John R. B. Long, PC, of 

Augusta, GA, for Respondent. 

JUSTICE KITTREDGE: In this domestic relations appeal, we examine whether 

the goodwill in a particular dental practice constitutes personal or enterprise 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

goodwill. We reverse the court of appeals' decision and reinstate the family court's 

decision, for the goodwill in the dental practice in this case bears all the hallmarks 

of personal goodwill (nonmarital property), and no evidence was presented to the 

family court upon which it could have concluded the goodwill was enterprise 

goodwill (marital property). 

I. 

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. (Husband) and Josie Bostick (Wife) married in 1970. Soon 

after, Husband became a dentist and opened his own practice. Over the course of 

his career, Husband developed two prosperous dental practices in South Carolina: 

Sea Island Dentistry in Beaufort and Earl Bostick Sr., D.M.D. and Associates, P.A. 

in Ridgeland. 

In 2009, due to various health concerns, Husband downsized his workload by selling 

the Sea Island practice to another dentist, the proceeds from which he received in 

installment payments. Husband maintained the Ridgeland practice at that point and 

continued to work. 

After about forty-five years of marriage, the parties separated, and Wife filed for 

divorce in 2017. Prior to trial, Husband sold the Ridgeland practice for a total sales 

price of $569,000. According to the sales contract, the lion's share of the total sales 

price—$424,140—was paid in exchange for the goodwill in the practice and a 

restrictive covenant not to compete,1 with the remaining portion of the sales price 

securing the practice's hard assets. 

At trial, the parties stipulated to an equal division of the marital estate. They further 

stipulated that the value of the Ridgeland practice was $569,000—the total sales 

price represented in the sales contract.

2 However, Husband and Wife contested 

1 Specifically, the restrictive covenant precluded Husband's ability to "[s]olicit 

business . . . or attempt to convert to other providers of the same or similar services 

as provided by Buyer, any customer, client or account Buyer or with which Bostick 

has had any contact during the term of ownership of Seller." Husband also agreed 

he would not engage in or be financially interested in any business or group 

(competitor or customer) similar to or in competition with the buyer within a fifteenmile radius. 

2 Although that stipulation did not contain a breakdown of the total sales price, Wife 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

whether the goodwill in the Ridgeland practice was personal goodwill (nonmarital 

property) or enterprise goodwill (marital property), and, therefore, whether the value 

of that goodwill was subject to equitable division.3 

Following trial, the family court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of one year's 

continuous separation. Relevant to this appeal, the family court concluded the 

goodwill component of the total sales price of the Ridgeland practice was a 

nonmarital asset, finding it was paid in exchange for personal goodwill attributable 

to Husband's professional status pursuant to our decision in Moore v. Moore, 414 

S.C. 490, 779 S.E.2d 533 (2015). 

Wife appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the family court's goodwill 

determination. Bostick v. Bostick, 436 S.C. 434, 872 S.E.2d 859 (Ct. App. 2022). 

Subsequently, we granted Husband a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' 

decision. 

II. 

In appeals from the family court, this Court reviews factual and legal issues de novo. 

Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) (citations 

omitted). Thus, we have jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with our own view 

of the preponderance of the evidence. Moore, 414 S.C. at 497, 779 S.E.2d at 536. 

This broad scope of review, however, does not require us to disregard the findings 

of the family court, which is in a superior position to make credibility 

determinations. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651–52 (2011). 

III. 

A. 

In divorce proceedings, the family court must identify, value, and apportion the 

marital estate. Gardner v. Gardner, 368 S.C. 134, 136, 628 S.E.2d 37, 38 (2006) 

(citation omitted). Once the family court identifies goodwill in a spouse's business 

did not offer any evidence to dispute the value of the goodwill in the Ridgeland 

practice being the amount reflected in the sales contract. 

3 The parties agreed to treat the remaining proceeds from the Sea Island sale as 

marital property. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as an asset, the question then becomes whether and to what extent such goodwill 

should be considered a marital asset subject to equitable division. Moore, 414 S.C. 

at 509, 779 S.E.2d at 543. Answering that question requires a fact-based 

classification of the goodwill as personal or enterprise in nature, for enterprise 

goodwill is a marital asset subject to equitable division, while personal goodwill is 

a nonmarital asset excluded from equitable division. Id. at 512, 779 S.E.2d at 544. 

Generally, enterprise goodwill is that which exists independently of one's personal 

efforts and will survive one's involvement with the business. Id. at 509–10, 799 

S.E.2d at 543 ("[E]nterprise goodwill attaches to a business entity and is associated 

separately from the reputation of the owners . . . ." (citation omitted)). 

In contrast, personal goodwill is associated with individuals: it is that part of 

increased earning capacity that results from the reputation, knowledge and skills of 

individual people. Id. at 510, 799 S.E.2d at 543 (citation omitted). For that reason, 

"the goodwill of a service business, such as a professional practice [such as 

dentistry], consists largely of personal goodwill." Id. (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted); see Donahue v. Donahue, 299 S.C. 353, 360, 384 S.E.2d 741, 745 (1989) 

(reversing family court's division of the goodwill of husband's dental practice 

because "[t]he very nature of a professional practice is that it is totally dependent 

upon the professional" (citation omitted)); Dickert v. Dickert, 387 S.C. 1, 7, 691 

S.E.2d 448, 451 (2010) (rejecting a claim that the goodwill in the dental practice was 

enterprise goodwill and, thus, finding the goodwill was properly excluded from the 

marital estate). The personal characteristics of the owner are also important to 

ascertaining personal goodwill, including the owner's personal reputation, 

community visibility, age and health, and work habits, as well as the owner's 

education, experience in the industry, judgment, ability, and special skills or talents. 

Moore, 414 S.C. at 514, 799 S.E.2d at 545 (citation omitted). 

B. 

As an initial matter, we emphasize that Wife did not present any evidence to the 

family court upon which it could have possibly determined the goodwill component 

of Husband's dental practice was enterprise goodwill.

4 See id. at 513, 779 S.E.2d at 

4 To be clear, we do not fault Wife's attorney for the failure to present evidence in 

this regard, for it appears he was retained less than a week before trial and was 

merely the last in a string of family court attorneys retained by Wife in this matter. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

545 ("The spouse claiming that goodwill should be included in the marital estate 

bears the burden of proving the goodwill at issue is enterprise goodwill and, thus, is 

properly considered marital property." (citations omitted)). In the absence of 

contrary evidence, we are left solely with the evidence presented by Husband 

regarding the nature of the goodwill in the Ridgeland practice. 

In particular, Husband submitted evidence demonstrating he established and solely 

owned the Ridgeland practice—which bore only his name—for decades prior to its 

sale. After opening his practice, Husband devoted considerable time to immersing 

himself in the community with an aim at promoting his business and shaping his 

reputation as a dentist.

5 For example, Husband joined the Rotary Club and the 

Chamber of Commerce, attending a number of events for both organizations. 

Moreover, Husband created marketing materials—which included his name and 

photograph—and advertised his practice in church brochures, on the radio, and on 

television. He also printed promotional booklets and calendars to disseminate in the 

community. Finally, Husband nurtured his established patient-base by periodically 

contacting his patients individually by, for example, sending Christmas cards. These 

efforts, among many others, were successful in building and maintaining a thriving 

dental practice with loyal patients. All of this evidence compellingly points to the 

goodwill being personal to Husband. 

Of additional significance is the presence of Husband's covenant not to compete, 

which the purchaser required in the sale of the Ridgeland practice. See id. at 515, 

779 S.E.2d at 546 ("While a covenant not to compete may be present in any 

transaction, the market-driven necessity for a covenant is manifest where personal 

goodwill is involved." (emphasis added)). Husband's impending retirement does not 

diminish the importance of the covenant not to compete in the goodwill analysis, or 

render it a "hollow promise," as erroneously found by the court of appeals. The 

dental practice's success and reputation existed solely because of Husband's 

professional skill and broad, community-focused outreach. That being the case, any 

prudent purchaser of the business would insist on a covenant not to compete— 

Husband's age and health notwithstanding—to close the door on any possibility of 

5 Given the nature of dentistry—a service-based profession—the Ridgeland dental 

practice's continued patronage largely depended on the Husband's personal 

relationships with his patients. See Donahue, 299 S.C. at 360, 384 S.E.2d at 745 

("[T]he very nature of a professional practice is that it is totally dependent upon the 

professional."); Dickert, 387 S.C. at 7, 691 S.E.2d at 451 (same). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Husband's association with or endorsement of a competitor. 

These undisputed facts clearly establish the goodwill in the Ridgeland practice was 

personal: Husband's name, reputation, and visibility in the community were critical 

to the success of the Ridgeland practice prior to its sale, the continuity of which the 

purchaser ensured by requiring Husband to enter a restrictive covenant not to 

compete.6 The facts of this case fit neatly—and unequivocally—within the personal 

goodwill template set forth more extensively in Moore. Accordingly, we hold the 

family court properly excluded the value of the goodwill from the sale of the 

Ridgeland practice from the marital estate. 

C. 

Significantly, like the family court, the court of appeals found the goodwill 

associated with the Ridgeland practice was personal in nature, finding "it closely 

follows the factors set out in Moore." However, the court of appeals reached a 

different result, casting Moore aside on the incorrect basis that it was limited to 

"ongoing" businesses. While the facts of Moore involved a business in which one 

spouse would remain as the sole owner of the business following the parties' divorce, 

nowhere in our decision did we suggest the classification of goodwill hinged upon 

whether one of the spouses would remain in the business. We reject the notion that 

personal goodwill is present only when one spouse remains in the business. We 

view the Moore situation, involving an "ongoing" business, as an outlier, for the 

typical situation is that which was presented here: one or both of the spouses' 

business is sold to a third party, and neither spouse remains in the business following 

their divorce. This reality reaffirms the importance of a covenant not to compete in 

determining the nature of the goodwill.

7 

6 Once again, Wife presented no evidence to establish the goodwill associated with 

the Ridgeland practice was enterprise goodwill, nor did she refute Husband's 

evidence demonstrating the goodwill was personal. On the contrary, Wife admitted 

that patients were drawn to the practice because of Husband's efforts in the 

community. She further testified that she marketed Husband's dental skills 

personally, telling potential patients he was a "painless dentist." 

7 As a final note, we further reject the suggestion that the parties' treatment of 

proceeds from the Sea Island sale—occurring roughly nine years before the parties' 

divorce—has any impact on the analysis of the goodwill in the Ridgeland practice 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IV. 

In conclusion, Wife failed to meet her burden of proving the goodwill associated 

with the Ridgeland practice constituted marital property, leaving only the 

uncontradicted evidence establishing that that goodwill at issue here was personal in 

nature. Therefore, we hold the value of the personal goodwill in the dental practice 

was properly excluded from the equitable division of the marital estate. For those 

reasons, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and reinstate the judgment of the 

family court.

8 

REVERSED. 

BEATTY, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Jan Benature Bromell 

Holmes, concur. 

or otherwise forecloses Husband's ability to argue that goodwill is personal, 

nonmarital property. As then-Judge Hill noted in dissent, "The parties may have had 

many reasons to treat the sales differently." 

8 Our decision moots the anticipated remand from the court of appeals on the 

alimony and attorney's fees issues, which the court ordered based upon the change 

in the equitable distribution flowing from its erroneous decision regarding the 

goodwill in Husband's dental practice.