PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2283

___________

ZACHARY WILSON, 

 Appellant

v.

SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS;

DONALD VAUGHN, Superintendent of the State 

Correctional Institution at Graterford

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-02-cv-00374)

District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova

___________

Argued January 15, 2014

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and 

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 16, 2015)
2

Michael Wiseman, Esq. [Argued]

P.O. Box 120

Swarthmore, PA 19081

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

Thomas W. Dolgenos, Esq. [Argued]

Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney

3 South Penn Square

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Attorney for Defendants-Appellees

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

Appellant Zachary Wilson holds the remarkable 

distinction of having received writs of habeas corpus vacating 

not one, but two murder convictions. These victories have 

been Pyrrhic, however, as Wilson has remained incarcerated 

since the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decided to 

prosecute him anew for both crimes. After his rearraignment 

in state court, Wilson promptly returned to federal court and 

filed motions seeking to bar a retrial. The District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Wilson’s motions 

and he filed this appeal.
3

I

The facts underlying Wilson’s convictions have no 

bearing here, but the unusual procedural posture of the case 

requires us to describe in some detail what transpired in the 

state courts and in the District Court. 

Wilson was convicted in 1984 by a jury in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas of murdering 

David Swift and was sentenced to life in prison. Four years 

later, a different Philadelphia jury convicted him of an 

unrelated crime: the murder of Jamie Lamb. Wilson was 

sentenced to death for that offense, in part because of his 

previous conviction for murdering Swift. 

After Wilson exhausted his direct and collateral 

appeals in state court, he filed a federal habeas petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his conviction in the Swift 

case was unconstitutional because the jury was empaneled in 

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). On April 

19, 2004, the District Court granted the writ, stating:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. IT IS 

FURTHER ORDERED that [Wilson’s] 

convictions of May 16, 1984 for First Degree 

Murder and Possessing an Instrument of Crime 

. . . are VACATED. The Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania may retry [Wilson] on these 

charges within 180 days of the date of this 

Order.
4

Wilson v. Beard, 314 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 

The District Court’s opinion in support of its order noted that 

Wilson was on death row for his conviction in the Lamb 

murder. Id. at 439. The Commonwealth appealed the order of 

the District Court and we affirmed. Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 

653 (3d Cir. 2005). 

At no point during the federal court proceedings in the 

Swift case did the Commonwealth ask the District Court to 

stay its order pending appeal or for an extension of the 180-

day period established by the District Court. Yet Wilson was 

neither retried nor released because he was on death row for 

the Lamb murder. Between November 2, 2005, and February 

18, 2010, there was no activity in the case. 

After the District Court vacated Wilson’s conviction 

for the Swift murder and while that order was under review 

by our Court, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

seeking to invalidate his conviction for the Lamb murder. 

This time, Wilson claimed the Commonwealth violated Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory 

information that would have allowed him to impeach the 

three main witnesses against him. The District Court 

conditionally issued a writ in August 2006, stating that the 

Commonwealth “may retry [Wilson] on these charges within 

180 days of the date of this Order,” Wilson v. Beard, 2006 

WL 2346277, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2006). Once again, the 

Commonwealth appealed and we affirmed the order of the 

District Court. Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Soon after we affirmed the District Court’s order 

granting Wilson habeas relief in the Lamb case, the 

Commonwealth moved to retry him for the Swift murder, 

nearly five and a half years after the District Court had 
5

vacated that conviction. On January 22, 2010, the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas appointed 

counsel for Wilson in connection with the Swift retrial, and 

on February 16, 2010, he was arraigned.1

Two days later, Wilson filed a motion to enforce writ 

of habeas corpus in the District Court, seeking to prevent the 

Commonwealth from retrying him because it waited more 

than 180 days to do so. The District Court held argument on 

the motion to enforce and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. 

Prior to the scheduled hearing, Wilson filed a motion seeking 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.2 As with his motion to enforce, Wilson contended 

the Commonwealth should be barred from retrying him 

because it had failed to do so within the 180 days required by 

the District Court’s order. In the alternative—that is, if the 

Court interpreted “may retry . . . within 180 days” as “retry 

within 180 days or else release him”—Wilson requested an 

unconditional writ barring any retrial for the Swift murder. 

App. 12-13. 

The District Court held four evidentiary hearings on 

the motions, after which the parties filed proposed findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. The District Court heard final 

argument on April 11, 2012. 

 

1 The Commonwealth also moved to retry Wilson for 

the Lamb murder, arraigning him in October 2010.

2 The relevant portion of Rule 60(b) reads: “On motion 

and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 

the following reasons:

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
6

Nine days later, Judge Padova issued a thorough 

opinion denying Wilson’s motions. Wilson v. Beard, 2012 

WL 1382447, *1 (E.D. Pa. April 20, 2012). He observed that 

Wilson “cite[d] no authority for the proposition that we may 

bar his retrial based solely on the Commonwealth’s failure to 

retry him within 180 days,” and he opined that Wilson’s

arguments “evidence[d] a misunderstanding of the nature of a 

conditional writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at *5. According to the 

District Court, the Commonwealth’s failure to retry Wilson 

within 180 days automatically converted the conditional writ 

to an absolute writ, which meant that after the deadline 

passed, the Commonwealth could no longer imprison Wilson 

based on the Swift murder conviction. Id. This was unavailing 

to Wilson, however, because he “was not held in custody in 

connection with his conviction for the Swift murder at any 

time after the [w]rit became absolute in this case.” Id. at *6.

In the District Court’s view: “between January 7, 1988 and 

June 9, 2010, he was held as a convicted prisoner awaiting 

execution for the murder of Jamie Lamb. Since June 9, 2010, 

Wilson has been held as a pretrial murder defendant in 

connection with his retrials for both the Swift and Lamb 

murders.” Id. Accordingly, the District Court held that its 

order granting the writ simply returned Wilson to the position 

he was in before his incarceration: under indictment for the 

crime. Id. Thus, even though the Commonwealth “failed to 

commence proceedings related to the retrial within the 180 

day time period,” it did not violate the terms of the writ. Id.

The District Court then denied Wilson’s Rule 60(b) 

motion, which had sought essentially the same relief as the 

motion to enforce, but on more complex grounds. There, 

Wilson argued that he should not suffer a retrial “because the 

Commonwealth’s delay in commencing the proceedings 
7

related to his retrial . . . created extraordinary circumstances 

which may be remedied only by such relief.” Id.

Wilson claimed extraordinary circumstances for three 

principal reasons. First, “the Commonwealth delayed 

commencing his reprosecution for the Swift murder for more 

than five years after [the District Court] granted the [w]rit.” 

Id. at *7. Second, “during the time in which the 

Commonwealth delayed his retrial, his mental condition 

deteriorated to such an extent that he is no longer competent 

to stand trial.” Id. Finally, his attorneys “recently discovered 

that the prosecution committed a Brady violation at his trial 

with respect to [a key prosecution witness, whose] mental 

condition has deteriorated so dramatically since 2005 that he 

would not be competent to testify at Wilson’s retrial or to be 

cross-examined about the alleged Brady issue.” Id. The 

Commonwealth opposed these claims on the merits, but also 

argued that they constituted a Sixth Amendment speedy trial 

claim that had to be exhausted in state court. Id.

The District Court agreed with the Commonwealth, 

both procedurally and substantively, observing that “[t]he 

prejudice Wilson claims he will suffer as the result of the . . . 

delay is clearly the kind of prejudice the speedy trial right was 

designed to protect against.” Id. at *8. Because Wilson’s 

claims of delay were new claims that arose after the District 

Court issued the writ in 2004 and were unrelated to the 

Batson claim that formed the basis for his petition, they had 

to be exhausted in state court. Id. at *9. The District Court 

also rejected Wilson’s arguments that he was not required to 

exhaust his Rule 60(b) claims and that there was no remedy 

available to him in state court. Id. at *11–12. Alternatively, 

the District Court held that even if Wilson’s claims did not 
8

have to be exhausted, he had not established extraordinary 

circumstances. Id. at *19.

After Wilson appealed only the District Court’s denial 

of his Rule 60(b) motion, we asked counsel to brief the 

following issues presented by this appeal’s unique procedural 

posture: (1) whether a certificate of appealability is required 

and “whether Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009), bears on 

that issue;” (2) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to 

adjudicate the motion to enforce and the Rule 60(b) motion; 

and (3) whether the Commonwealth complied with the 

District Court’s conditional habeas order by vacating 

Wilson’s conviction on the Swift murder. 

II

We begin, as we typically do, with the question of 

jurisdiction. Although neither party claims the District Court 

lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s motion to enforce 

or his Rule 60(b) motion, “federal courts have an independent 

obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 

jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 

jurisdictional questions that the parties . . . elect not to press.” 

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 

1202 (2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

514 (2006)).

A

The parties assert that because Wilson is not appealing 

the denial of the motion to enforce, the question of whether 

the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain that motion is 

now moot. We agree, though it is worth noting that the 

District Court had the power to adjudicate the motion to 
9

enforce. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 

2007) (holding that district courts have “continuing 

jurisdiction to address alleged noncompliance with 

conditional writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Mickens-Thomas 

v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2004)). 

The question of the District Court’s jurisdiction over 

Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion is not so clear. The issue arises 

frequently after a petitioner is denied a writ of habeas corpus, 

but this appears to be our first opportunity to consider it after 

a petition was granted. Although we have found no

controlling authority directly on point, the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (per 

curiam), suggests that the District Court had jurisdiction to 

adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion. In Pitchess, a state 

prisoner (Davis), won conditional habeas relief and the state 

promptly moved to retry him. Id. at 483–84. In advance of the 

retrial, Davis learned that physical evidence had been 

destroyed in a routine purge after his original trial but before 

the conditional writ had issued. Id. at 484. Davis then filed a 

Rule 60(b) motion in the district court “seeking to ‘modify’ 

its prior conditional writ of habeas corpus and replace it with 

an order granting an absolute writ and enjoining any retrial on 

the pending state charges.” Id. at 484–85. The district court 

granted the motion, concluding that the destruction of

evidence not only violated Brady, but also constituted an 

incurable defect that precluded Davis from ever receiving a 

fair trial on the charges. Id. Following an affirmance by the 

Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Davis 

had failed to exhaust state remedies on his destruction-ofevidence claim. Id. at 486–87, 490. 

In its adjudication of the merits of Davis’s appeal, the 

Supreme Court never suggested that the District Court lacked 
10

jurisdiction to hear his Rule 60(b) motion. Likewise, in its 

most recent case interpreting the rule, the Supreme Court 

noted that “Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to 

play in habeas cases,” including cases in which the writ has 

been granted. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005). 

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had jurisdiction 

to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion. 

B

We next consider our jurisdiction given that the 

District Court denied a certificate of appealability (COA)

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The Commonwealth claims a 

COA is required; Wilson disagrees. 

In Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340–41 (3d Cir. 

1999), we held that a COA is required to appeal the denial of 

a Rule 60(b) motion. However, the vitality of that decision is 

undermined somewhat by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Harbison v. Bell, which stated that the COA requirement 

“governs final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas 

corpus proceeding—a proceeding challenging the lawfulness 

of the petitioner’s detention.” 556 U.S. at 183. Not all orders 

in habeas cases fit that description, including the motion at 

issue in Harbison, which was “[a]n order that merely denies a 

motion to enlarge the authority of appointed counsel.” Id.; see 

also Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(suggesting a COA may not be necessary to appeal the denial 

or dismissal of “a valid Rule 60(b) motion,” as opposed to 

one seeking habeas-style relief). 

Irrespective of the impact of Harbison, this appeal 

does not require us to revisit our decision in Morris v. Horn. 

As Wilson argues, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in D’Ambrosio 
11

v. Bagley—which conflicts with the District Court’s decision 

in this case—demonstrates that the issue Wilson presents is 

“debatable among jurists of reason.” See Lozada v. Deeds, 

498 U.S. 430, 432 (1991) (per curiam). We therefore grant a 

COA limited to whether the District Court properly denied 

Wilson’s motion to enforce and his Rule 60(b) Motion.

Accordingly, our jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

§ 2253.3

III

Turning to the merits of Wilson’s appeal, the first and 

most important legal principle guiding our inquiry is that we 

analyze Rule 60(b) motions in the habeas context based on 

the substance of the claim, not the form. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 

at 530–32. We exercise plenary review over the District 

Court’s legal conclusion that Wilson had to exhaust state 

remedies. Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 

1991) (“[I]n a federal habeas corpus proceeding the 

determination of whether state remedies have been exhausted 

and whether exhaustion should be excused involves the 

application and interpretation of legal precepts.” (citations 

omitted)). 

 

3 The Commonwealth relies on Eddleman v. McKee, 

586 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2009), to argue that we lack 

jurisdiction over this appeal because the Commonwealth 

complied with the writ the District Court issued. As far as the 

motion to enforce is concerned, our precedent forecloses the 

argument. See Gibbs, 500 F.3d at 205–206. And as for the 

Rule 60(b) motion, Eddleman does not apply as it was not a 

Rule 60 case.
12

A

The crux of Wilson’s argument is that he need not 

exhaust state remedies because he demonstrated 

“extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b). We 

disagree.

“The power of a court to invoke Rule 60(b) to vacate 

its own earlier judgment is unquestioned.” Budget Blinds, Inc. 

v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the 

Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 60 applies only to 

the extent it does not conflict with other statutes. See 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529. Because Wilson’s Rule 60(b) 

motion raises new substantive claims unrelated to the original 

habeas petition, he must exhaust the claims in state court 

before a federal court can hear them unless “(i) there is an 

absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) 

circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 

protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(B). The exhaustion requirement is not

jurisdictional, “but rather addresses federalism and comity 

concerns by ‘afford[ing] the state courts a meaningful 

opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without 

interference from the federal judiciary.” Coady v. Vaughn, 

251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986)). The 

state can waive the exhaustion requirement by failing to raise 

it, Mickens-Thomas, 321 F.3d at 376 n.2, but that did not 

happen here. “The habeas petitioner has the burden of 

proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.” Coady, 

251 F.3d at 488. 

In Pitchess, the case we cited previously in support of 

our jurisdictional holding, the Supreme Court made clear that 
13

the exhaustion requirement applies to new claims that a 

successful habeas petitioner may raise in a Rule 60(b) motion. 

421 U.S. at 490. In that case, Davis obtained a writ of habeas 

corpus, but returned to the district court seeking additional 

relief on a new constitutional claim after the state moved to 

retry him. Id. at 484–85. Like Wilson here, Davis filed a Rule 

60(b) motion seeking to “modify” the prior order “and replace 

it with an order granting an absolute writ and enjoining any 

retrial on the pending state charges.” Id. at 485. Reversing the 

lower courts, the Supreme Court held that Davis was “entitled 

to no relief based upon a claim with respect to which state 

remedies have not been exhausted.” Id. at 490. In doing so, 

the Court rejected the very same argument Wilson makes: 

that claims raised in a Rule 60(b) motion need not be 

exhausted. Id. at 489. 

Wilson’s attempt to avoid exhaustion in state court is 

foreclosed by Pitchess. His claims relating to the delayed 

retrial—which the District Court properly characterized as 

speedy trial claims—have never been presented to the state 

courts and are unrelated to the Batson violation for which he 

was granted habeas relief. As the District Court rightly noted, 

it would be improper for the federal courts “to intervene in 

[Wilson’s] state court criminal proceedings to prevent the 

state court from committing possible future violations of his 

Constitutional rights.” Wilson, 2012 WL 1382447 at *19.

B

Wilson attempts to distinguish Pitchess by relying 

heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in D’Ambrosio v. 

Bagley, 656 F.3d 379, 390 (6th Cir. 2011). In that case, 

D’Ambrosio received a conditional writ of habeas corpus 

because of a Brady violation. Id. at 381. The order required 
14

the state to either set aside his conviction and sentence or 

conduct another trial within 180 days. Id. The state moved to 

retry him within the time allotted, but shortly before retrial 

was set to begin, the state notified the defense team about 

additional evidence, which caused the court to delay the trial 

beyond the 180-day window. Id. This prompted the state to 

ask the federal district court to extend the deadline for the 

retrial. Id. D’Ambrosio replied by asking the federal court to 

grant an unconditional writ and bar his reprosecution. Id. at 

381–82. The federal court partially granted D’Ambrosio’s 

motion by issuing an unconditional writ because of the state’s 

continued misconduct. Id. at 382. The court declined to bar 

retrial, however, because D’Ambrosio could not demonstrate 

prejudice from the delay and the court had confidence in the 

state’s ability to provide a fair retrial. Id. 

Around the time the district court declined to bar 

retrial, the state’s key witness died, which required the 

exclusion of his prior testimony under the Confrontation 

Clause. Id. D’Ambrosio then filed a Rule 60(b) motion asking 

the District Court to vacate its earlier order and bar his 

reprosecution in light of the witness’s unavailability, as 

D’Ambrosio had planned to cross-examine the witness about 

the previously withheld Brady material. Id. The district court 

agreed, vacating a portion of its original judgment and 

reasoning that the circumstances were sufficiently 

“extraordinary” to bar D’Ambrosio’s reprosecution. Id. at 

383. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court 

had jurisdiction to grant the Rule 60(b) motion, vacate its 

prior judgment, and issue an unconditional writ of habeas 

corpus. Id. 

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion relied in part on its 

decision in Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, which noted that 
15

although the state usually is not precluded from retrying a 

successful habeas petitioner, “in extraordinary circumstances, 

such as when the state inexcusably, repeatedly, or otherwise 

abusively fails to act within the prescribed time period . . . a 

habeas court may forbid[] reprosecution.” 453 F.3d 362, 370 

(6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

D’Ambrosio met that standard, the court reasoned, because 

his Rule 60(b) motion relied on the same Brady claims that 

formed the basis of his original habeas relief. That fact 

distinguished D’Ambrosio from Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789 

(6th Cir. 1985), a decision of the Sixth Circuit that ordered 

exhaustion in state court when a petitioner sought an 

unconditional writ based on a speedy trial issue distinct from 

the Confrontation Clause claim raised in his original petition. 

Id. at 389. 

Although Wilson accurately describes D’Ambrosio, we 

are unpersuaded by that opinion. As Judge Boggs opined in 

dissent: “Pitchess makes clear that Rule 60(b) cannot be used 

to circumvent section 2254’s exhaustion requirement, and its 

holding directly controls this case.” D’Ambrosio, 656 F.3d at 

393. We need not repeat the reasons underlying Judge 

Boggs’s dissent because it suffices to say that they are 

essentially the same reasons we have articulated regarding 

Wilson’s duty to exhaust his state court remedies.

But even assuming that D’Ambrosio was correct, 

Wilson’s case is readily distinguishable. Unlike D’Ambrosio 

(but like the petitioner in Fisher), Wilson does not reprise his 

Batson claim in federal court. Rather, he makes what the 

District Court rightly characterized as an entirely new claim, 

namely, that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy 

trial. Wilson has never presented this claim to the state courts 

and, unlike in D’Ambrosio—where the death of the key 
16

witness demonstrated that no state retrial could rectify the 

Brady violation at issue in the original trial—Wilson does not 

contend that the Batson error that tainted his original trial will 

be repeated at his retrial. This critical factual distinction 

renders D’Ambrosio unhelpful to Wilson. 

C

Finally, Wilson argues that even if exhaustion is 

required, it would be futile. Wilson Br. 33. Specifically, 

Wilson notes that his health has deteriorated so much since 

2004 that he may no longer be competent to stand trial. Id. at

22–25. His “longstanding-delusional disorder” has 

intensified, and according to his expert, he is “not able to 

meaningfully assist counsel in the development of a defense 

that is important to the continuance of this proceeding.” Id. at 

23–24. Wilson also contends that the Commonwealth’s main 

witness against him in the Swift case has also “suffered a 

significant and debilitating deterioration in his mental health 

during the period of delay” and consequently may be 

unavailable as a witness on retrial. Id. at 25–26. Wilson 

argues that the Commonwealth is responsible for these 

delays—first, by concealing the evidence underlying his 

Batson claim for ten years, and then by waiting more than 

five years after the District Court granted habeas to move to 

retry him. 

We express no opinion regarding the merits of these 

claims, since our task is to determine which court should 

adjudicate them in the first instance. As Wilson admitted 

during oral argument in the District Court, he can “raise both 

a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim and a state law speedy 

trial claim pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 600 in the state court.” Wilson, 2012 WL 1382447 
17

at *11. This is inadequate, Wilson insists, because forcing 

him to exhaust his new claims in state court “would subject 

him to the very harm that he sought to prevent when he filed 

the [Rule 60(b)] Motion.” Wilson Br. at 29. Reduced to its 

essence, Wilson’s argument “assumes, ultimately, either the 

incompetence or the bad faith of [the] state judiciary.” 

Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). But 

as we have stated, “[b]y requiring exhaustion, federal courts 

recognize that state courts, no less than federal courts, are 

bound to safeguard the federal rights of state criminal 

defendants.” Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 

2005) (quoting Jones v. Keane, 329 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 

2003)). And although the exhaustion requirement in habeas 

cases recognizes exceptions for “extraordinary 

circumstances,” it presumes adequate state remedies. Moore 

v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975). Without more, 

we have held, “[n]othing in the nature of the speedy trial right 

. . . qualif[ies] it as a per se ‘extraordinary circumstance’” 

exempt from the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 446.4

 

4 Our sister courts have reached the same conclusion. 

See, e.g., Eddleman, 586 F.3d at 413 (reversing district 

court’s decision to bar retrial, describing it as 

“effectively . . . adjudicat[ing] a speedy-trial claim that had 

never been presented to, much less ruled upon, by the . . . 

state courts”); Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353–54 (10th 

Cir. 1993) (holding that successful habeas petitioner 

complaining of delay in retrial may have speedy trial claim, 

but would have to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Moore v. 

Zant, 972 F.2d 318, 320 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that 

successful habeas petitioner can assert speedy trial rights 

related to the state’s post-habeas delays in his upcoming state 
18

IV

For the reasons stated, we hold that the District Court 

had jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion 

filed after he had been issued a writ of habeas corpus. We 

also hold that the District Court did not err when it required 

Wilson to exhaust in state court the new claims he raised in 

his Rule 60(b) motion. We will affirm the judgment of the 

District Court.

 

proceedings); Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789, 791–92 (6th Cir. 

1985) (indicating that speedy trial claims, including those 

stemming from delay in retrying successful habeas 

petitioners, are ordinarily subject to exhaustion and listing 

other cases that held the same).