COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Frank and McClanahan 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

LUCY DAVIS HANSEN, N/K/A 

 LUCY ROCKWOOD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗ BY 

v. Record No. 2092-03-1 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 

 JUNE 15, 2004 

EUGENE WILLIAM HANSEN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

Peter V. Chiusano (Kimberly L. Stegall; Willcox & Savage, on brief), for 

appellant. 

Eugene W. Hansen, pro se. 

 Lucy Davis Hansen, now known as Lucy Rockwood, appeals an order denying her 

motion to declare default for Eugene William Hansen’s failure to sell certain real property in the 

City of Norfolk within a reasonable time and distribute a portion of the proceeds in accordance 

with the parties’ agreement. She contends that the evidence established at the hearing on the 

motion did not support the trial court’s decision. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial 

court. 

I. Background 

When reviewing a chancellor’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences. 

Wright v. Wright, 38 Va. App. 394, 398, 564 S.E.2d 702, 704 (2002); Donnell v. Donnell, 20 

Va. App. 37, 39, 455 S.E.2d 256, 257 (1995). 

 ∗

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
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Lucy Rockwood and Eugene William Hansen divorced in 2002. Prior to the divorce, the 

parties had entered into a “Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement.” That agreement 

provided that Rockwood was to receive sufficient funds from the sale of an historic property in 

downtown Norfolk, owned by Hansen, to bring her investment portfolios up to $600,000. 

Rockwood used the portfolio income to pay her living expenses. 

The agreement also included a requirement that Hansen was to provide Rockwood with 

reports regarding the status of the property and efforts toward sale if the property did not sell 

within six months of the agreement. At the end of 2001, because Hansen had not yet sold the 

property, Rockwood filed a motion to reopen the case and compel compliance with the 

agreement, which the court granted. After more than a year of discovery and discovery-related 

motions, Rockwood filed a motion to declare default for failure to sell the property contending 

that a reasonable time had passed for the sale of the property and that Hansen was not acting in 

good faith. 

At the hearing on the motion, Rockwood attempted to show that: the agreement required 

Hansen to sell the property; Hansen had delayed selling the property and had withdrawn equity 

from it; Hansen was dragging his feet and not actively marketing the property; the property 

should have been sold within 18-24 months of its listing for sale; and the asking price was too 

high. 

Rockwood called Hansen, William C. Overman, a real estate agent responsible for 

marketing the property, and Michael Myers, a real estate broker familiar with the Norfolk 

market. Hansen testified that the agreement did not require him to sell the property. He stated 

that the agreement “says upon the sale. It doesn’t call for a sale.” He also testified that the 

property had been continuously for sale since 1997 and that he had received two unsuccessful 

contracts, one for an amount in excess of the current asking price. He admitted that he had 
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refinanced the property, but because of the refinance, the property had positive equity for the 

first time. 

Overman testified that he did not believe that the asking price for the property was too 

high. He stated that “1.3 million is the asking and we need room for appreciation and . . . 

negotiation.” He also confirmed that the building had been aggressively marketed and that 

Hansen aggressively desired to sell the building. Overman testified that a building could be 

priced using a number of methods, including using valuations of comparable properties, 

replacement value, or a cash-flow basis. He opined that by using any of the methods the 

building was not overpriced. Overman also testified that the valuations of the properties in the 

area had escalated substantially over the past three years. He said that because the property was 

fully leased, likely buyers would be investors, and buyers who would be interested “from the 

owner/occupant standpoint” are “pretty much knock[ed] out.” 

Myers testified that a building normally sells within a year-and-a-half, and if it doesn’t, 

the likely reason is that the property is priced too high. Myers said that in his opinion the 

building was priced too high. However, he also admitted that he had not done a complete 

appraisal of the building and that he had not thoroughly inspected the property. He also testified 

that because the property was fully leased, any likely buyers would be investors. 

Rockwood testified on her own behalf. She stated that the purpose of the investment 

portfolio was to provide her with funds for everyday living expenses. On cross-examination, she 

stipulated that the agreement provided no time period in which the building was to be sold. 

In ruling, the trial court stated: 

I can’t find that [Hansen]’s not actively trying to market this 

property. It is unfortunate as far as Ms. Rockwood’s view is 

concerned that the property has not been sold, but there just is no 

indicia here from which I could make a finding that he’s dragging 
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his feet and not actively trying to market this, so that being the case 

I am going to deny [the] motion. 

This appeal followed. 

II. Analysis 

Where a “court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and 

will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” 

Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va. App. 241, 244, 372 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1988) (citing Martin v. 

Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). In this 

case, the record shows ample evidence to support the decision of the chancellor. The appellant’s 

evidence included testimony that the property was not overpriced, that Hansen was aggressively 

marketing the building, and that he was not dragging his feet. Rockwood stipulated that the 

agreement did not provide a time period in which the building was to be sold. Therefore, we 

cannot say that the decision of the trial court was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

Rockwood requests the Court to award her attorney’s fees and costs and expenses 

incurred on appeal. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 

(1996). Upon a review of the record, we find the litigation addressed appropriate and substantial 

issues and that Hansen did not generate unnecessary delay or expense in pursuit of his interests. 

Therefore, the request is denied. 

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court to deny the motion to declare default for 

Hansen’s failure to sell the Freemason Street property in the City of Norfolk is affirmed. 

Affirmed.