IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-18-00153-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF P.L.F. III, A CHILD

From the County Court at Law No. 2

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. CC-D20170269

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In four issues, appellant, P.L.F. II, challenges the trial court’s order terminating his 

parental rights to his son, P.L.F. III. Specifically, appellant contends that the Texas 

Department of Family & Protective Services failed to proffer clear and convincing 

evidence in support of the predicate and best-interest grounds for termination of his 

parental rights. Because we overrule appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an involuntary termination proceeding brought under section 161.001 of the 

family code, the Department must establish: (1) at least one ground under subsection (1) 
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 2

of section 161.001; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(West Supp. 2017); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both 

elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of 

the child as determined by the trier of fact. See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 

S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West Supp. 2017). Evidence is clear and 

convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as 

to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2008). Due 

process demands this heightened standard because termination results in permanent, 

irrevocable changes for the parent and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); 

see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting the standards for termination 

and modification).

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental-termination cases, we 

determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm 

belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 

570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding 

and judgment. Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable 

factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all contrary evidence that a reasonable 

factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is 
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 3

contrary to the finding. Id. In other words, we consider evidence favorable to termination 

if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable 

factfinder could not. Id. We cannot weigh witness-credibility issues that depend on the 

appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is within the province of the 

factfinder. Id. at 573-74. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, 

we defer to the factfinder’s determinations as long as they are reasonable. Id. at 573.

In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the factfinder’s 

findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 

108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent committed the predicate 

ground alleged and that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the 

best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1); see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable 

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder 

could not reasonably have formed a firm belief in the truth of its finding, then the 

evidence is factually insufficient. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

II. THE PREDICATE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF APPELLANT’S PARENTAL 

RIGHTS

In his first three issues, appellant contends that the evidence supporting the 

predicate grounds for termination—sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), and (b)(1)(O) of 

the Family Code—is insufficient. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), 
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 4

(b)(1)(O). However, a review of the Clerk’s Record reveals that the trial court’s order of 

termination also included an additional predicate ground for termination under section 

161.001(b)(1)(P) that appellant does not challenge on appeal.1

A finding of only one ground for termination alleged under section 161.001(b)(1) 

is sufficient to support a judgment of termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 

2003). Therefore, to be successful on appeal, appellant is required to establish that the 

trial court’s findings on all of the Department’s pleaded grounds are unsupported by the 

evidence. See Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). When a parent does not challenge an independent 

ground that may support an order of termination, we do not address the sufficiency of 

the evidence of any of the predicate grounds for termination. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 

at 361-62. Rather, we must overrule the challenges the parent has chosen to assert. See 

In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361-62; Fletcher, 277 S.W.3d at 64.

 

1 Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) provides that the court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it 

finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent:

used a controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, in a 

manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and:

(i) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or

(ii) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, 

continued to abuse a controlled substance . . . .

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(P) (West. Supp. 2017).
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Because appellant does not challenge every ground upon which the trial court 

could have based its decision to terminate his parental rights, we do not address the 

unchallenged findings or the grounds raised in his brief.2 Accordingly, we overrule 

appellant’s first three issues. 

III. BEST INTEREST

In his fourth issue, appellant complains that the Department did not proffer clear 

and convincing evidence demonstrating that termination of his parental rights is in the 

best interest of P.L.F. III. In other words, appellant argues that the evidence supporting 

the best-interest ground is not supported by legally- and factually-sufficient evidence. 

We disagree.

In a parental-rights-termination case, the best interest of the child is assessed using 

a non-exhaustive list of factors. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). 

These factors are: (1) the child’s wishes; (2) his emotional or physical needs now and in 

the future; (3) emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the 

parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody; (5) programs available to help those 

parties; (6) plans for the child by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the 

 

2 The Department points out that the trial court orally pronounced the predicate grounds for 

termination being under subsections (D), (E), and (O); however, the signed termination order also included 

subsection (P) as a predicate termination ground as pled by the Department. Nevertheless, as we outline 

in the best-interest section of this memorandum opinion, there is ample evidence establishing by clear and 

convincing evidence the predicate grounds for termination under subsections (D), (E), and (O). Therefore, 

we are not persuaded by appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the predicate 

grounds for termination.
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 6

proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that indicate that the existing 

parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuses for the acts or omissions of 

the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The Department need 

not prove all nine Holley factors as a “condition precedent” to termination; the absence of 

some factors does not bar the factfinder from finding that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. And while no one factor is controlling, the analysis 

of a single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interest. In re J.O.C., 47 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2001, no pet). 

The record reflects that P.L.F. III was five years old at the time of trial and that he 

is currently placed with his maternal grandmother, K.B., and his two half-siblings. CPS 

caseworker Mary Bertelsen testified that P.L.F. III has bonded with his half-siblings and 

K.B. and that the child desired to remain in K.B.’s home. Both K.B. and Bertelsen stated 

that P.L.F. III has little to no bond with appellant and is not even aware that appellant is 

his father. Bertelsen stated that the current placement is in the best interest of P.L.F. III. 

Additionally, P.L.F. III has special needs on account of his diagnosis of ectodermal 

dysplasia, which prevents him from regulating his own temperature and causes him to 

have very thin hair, no teeth, and difficulty sweating. As a result of his diagnosis, P.L.F. 

III requires special medical care, adequate air conditioning, and close monitoring from 

his caregiver. A failure to provide the foregoing could be fatal.
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 7

At the time of trial, appellant’s whereabouts were unknown, and despite multiple 

opportunities for visitation, appellant has only seen P.L.F. III once or twice a year for 

several years.3 During the course of the child’s life, appellant has been unable to maintain 

a steady residence and has lived in several different states, including Florida, California, 

Colorado, Texas, and Georgia. K.B. noted that appellant has not provided any financial 

support for this child, other than “ridiculous presents, nine pounds of gummy bears. Just, 

you know, toys and stuff like that, yes. Stuff that he enjoys a lot but.” On the other hand, 

the child’s needs are being met at the current placement with K.B. She takes the child to 

his doctor’s appointments, provides stability, and has enrolled him in the Head Start prekindergarten program.

And finally, the record demonstrates that appellant has engaged in domestic 

violence and drug abuse shortly before and after P.L.F. III’s birth. Indeed, while she was 

pregnant with P.L.F. III, the birth mother reported that appellant pushed her and jumped 

on top of her, causing her to give birth to P.L.F. III thirteen weeks prematurely. The 

domestic violence allegedly continued once the child was released from the hospital and 

the family moved to Florida. While in Florida, appellant pushed the birth mother, 

causing a television to almost fall on P.L.F. III. After this incident, the birth mother 

returned to Texas with the child.

 

3 Appellant’s attorney, not appellant, was present for the trial in this matter.
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Upon returning to Texas, the birth mother began using illegal drugs. Bertelsen 

testified that appellant admitted to providing the birth mother with needles so that she 

could abuse heroin. K.B. recounted that appellant “took pills, he did crack, he did 

methamphetamines, and heroin, and marijuana, and even some synthetic type of 

marijuana, too . . . .” In any event, during the pendency of this case, appellant was 

ordered to complete a service plan that included participation in a mental-health 

assessment, which he failed to do, and completion of a drug-treatment program. 

Appellant successfully completed the drug-treatment program in February 2017; 

however, in May 2017, appellant submitted to a drug test and tested positive for 

marihuana.

Based on our review of the record, we find that the above-mentioned evidence 

touches on several of the Holley factors. See 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. We therefore conclude 

that the evidence presented was legally- and factually-sufficient for a factfinder to 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination of appellant’s parental rights 

was in the best interest of P.L.F. III. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; see also In re H.R.M., 

209 S.W.3d at 108; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourth 

issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 
In the Interest of P.L.F., a child Page 9

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 19, 2018

[CV06]