### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary17, 200 6 S es sio n
RIC HAR D S CHN EIDE R, TA JUA NA CH ESHIER , JA MIE P AGE , and THE GAN NET T SA TELLIT E INF ORM ATION NE TWOR K, d/b/a THE

JAC KSON SU N v. THE C ITY O F JA CKS ON
A Rule 3 Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Madison Coun ty No. 62846 Jam es F . Butler, Chancellor

No. W2005-01234-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 14, 2006

Th is c a se inv olv e s th e Te nn e sse e Pub lic Re c ords A c t. T he plaint if f n e ws pa pe r s ou g ht a c c e ss t o investigative re cords ge nerated by local law e nforc ement during the cour se of c riminal inves ti g ati o n s

. T h e n e w s p ap e r a ls o s o u g h t f

in a n c ia l d o c u me n ts r e lati n g to a li c e n s e a g r e e me nt betwee n t h e m u n i cipal government and a private base ball franchise. The municipal g overnme nt ref u s ed t o d i s cl o s e t h e c ri m i n al i n v es t i gat i v e r ec o rd s an d fa i l ed t o re s p o n d t o t h e n ew s p ap er ’s wr itten reque sts for the base ball fra nchise doc uments. The new spaper filed sui t against the municipal g overnme nt in the Madison CountyChance ry Court. After a

show-ca use hea ring , the trial court ruled that the Public Recor ds Act re quired the disclosure of both types of doc uments, and aw arde d the newspa

per attorney ’s fe es. The municipa l gove rnment appe als. As to the criminal investig ative
rec ords, we rec og nize the common-law law enfor ceme nt privilege , and on that basis we vacate the jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt , r e ve rs e the a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, a nd re ma nd fo r fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s. Reg arding the baseball franchise documents, we find that, insofar as the documents wer e not in the possessi o n o f t h e m unicipal g overnme nt at the time of the ne wspape r’s re quests, they wer e not subject to the Public Records Act at that time, and on that basis we va cate the trial court’s awa rd of
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndre ma ndfo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court is Vacat ed in p art, R ever sed in p art, and Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

L ewis L. C obb, J ackson, Te nnessee , and Sara E. Ba rnett, Jackson, Tennesse e, for defe ndant/appellant City

of Jackson.

Cha r le s M

. Pu r c e ll , Ja c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e , a n d M a tt S. Sh e p h e r d , Ja c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e, for plaint if f/ app ell e e s Ri c ha

rdSc hn e ide r, Ta

juana Che sh ie r, Jami e Pa g e , a ndtheGann e tt Sate lli te I nformation Ne twork.-2- OP IN ION
This appea l is the result of seve ral unsucc e s s f u l attempts bya Jackson, Tenne ssee ne wspape r, Plaintiff/Appel lee, The Jack son Sun , to gain acc ess to two types of doc uments from the Def endant/Appe llant, Cit y

of Jackson, Tennesse e (“ City ”). The first categ ory of doc u me n ts to which The Jack son Sun s o u g h t a c c e s s ar e p o li c e “ f ie ld in te r v ie w ” c ar d s

. T h e fi el d i n t er v i ew ca rd s are g ener ated b ypolice off

icer s, on patrol, while the of fice rs interview suspects, witnesses, a nd informants. Eac h car d is small, but contains a substantial amount of information. For example, the
car ds contain a date, time, and rea son for the investig ative stop, the investig ating office r’s na me and number, the suspe ct’s name , addre ss, phonenumber, date of birth, ra ce, se x , heig ht, weig ht, driver’ s license numbe r, social se curity number, e y e color , h air color, the location of the interview, the i n t erviewee ’s clothing description, the interviewee ’s vehicle y ear , make, model, lice nse number, license ty pe, license y ear , license state, and vehicle color. The c ards f reque ntly include a photog raph of the su bje c t.

The se cond categ ory

of docume nts to which The Jack son Sun soug ht acc ess ar e fina ncial do c ume nts re la ting to the op e ratio n o f a pr of e ssi on a l ba se ba ll t e a m. In N ov e mbe r 2 00 4, the City
e nte re d in to a

Sta diu m Lic e ns e a ndUs eA g r e e m e n t ( “ A g r e e m e n t ” ) w i thL ozin ak B a se ba ll Pr op e rt ie s, LL C (“L ozinak Base ball”). Under the ag ree ment, L ozinak B aseba ll a g ree d to ope rate a class “A A”
m i n o r l e a g u e b a s e b a l l t e a m , t h e W e s tT e n n e s s e e D i a m o n d J a x x , i n a s t a d i u mo w n e d b y t h e C i t y. The Ag ree ment addre ssed the financ ial documents related to L ozinak B aseba ll’s ope rat i o n o f t he D iamo n d Ja xx:

N. B o o k s , Re c o r d s , a n d A c c o u n ti n g s

. . . . T h e Ci ty s h a ll h a v e th e r ig ht to make inspections of the books and rec ords of [L ozinak Base ball] from tim e to time for purposes of ve rifying the acc urac y of t he accounting proce dures and reve nues to be derive d by

the City from the St adium. The Ci ty ’s right of i nspection shall be subjec t to it s agre e me nt t o ( i) re fr a in f ro m ma kin g c op ie s o f any

of [L ozin ak B a se ba ll’ s]
rec ords except as pe rmitted by [L oz i n ak Baseba ll] , such permission not to be
unrea sonably

withheld, delay ed or conditioned and (ii) hold all information obtained
as a r esult of such inspec tion confi d ential and to not disseminate any such information to any

third party

without [ L ozinak Base ball’s] approval except as otherwise r equire d under the Tenne ssee Ope n Records L aw. Thus, under the Ag ree ment, the financ ial rec ords reg arding the Diamond J axx wer e to be g ener ated by L ozinak B aseba ll and maintained in the possession of L ozinak Base ball. The City had the right to i ns pe c t th e re c or ds a nd , w iththepe rm iss ionof L ozin ak B a se ba ll, make c op ie s o f the re c or ds

. Th e Ag re e me nt a lso inc lud e d te rm inatio n p ro c e du re s. Th e Ag re e me nt p ro vid e d th a t if L ozinak Base ball and the Diamond J axx suffe red ope rating losses in ex ce s s o f $ 150,000 per y ear for two successive y ear s, then L ozinak Ba seball had the rig ht to terminate the Ag ree ment, provided L ozinak Base ball g ave the Citynotice of the terminati o n an d documentation of the losses. UponA t t ri al , t he p art i es s t i p ul at ed t hat t he C ity was i n po ss ess i o n of t he p ho t o graphs, t hat t he reque st s fo r t he 1

r ec or ds w er e r ec ei v ed by t h e Ci t y , an d t h at t h es e r ec or ds we r e made or r ec ei v ed i n c on n ec t i on w i t h t h e t r an s ac t i on of

o ff ic ia l b u sin e ss.
-3- re c e ivi ng no tic e of

te rm inatio n, the City the n ha d forty -f ive day s in whic h to exer c ise a n o pti on to purcha se the team and the fr anchise

.
T h e r e q u e s t s f

o r a c c e s s t o t h e t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f d o c u m e n t s b y The Jack

son Sun wer e made pursuant to the Te nnessee Public Records Ac t, Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 10-7-503(a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s:
10-7-503. Re cords, open to pub lic insp ection – E xceptions. -- (a) Ex cept a s provided in § 10-5- 504(f) , all state, county and municipal re cords and all rec ords maintained by the T en n es see pe rforming a rts cente r mana g ement
c or po ratio n, e xce pt any pu bli c do c ume nts auth orize d to be de str oy e d b y thec ou nty public rec ords commission in acc ordanc e with § 10-7-404, shall at all times, during business hours, be ope n for pe rsonal inspec tion by an y citizen of Tennesse e, and those in char g e of suc h rec ords shall not ref use such rig ht of

inspection to any

citizen, unless otherwise pr ovided by state law.
T.C.A. § 10-7-503( a)( 2005 Supp.). As to both c ateg ories of doc uments reque sted, The Jack son Sun submitt ed a w ritten reque st to the Ci ty . None of the documents in either

cate g ory wer e produc ed when the reque st w as made. We f irst r ecount the fac ts and the ensuing leg al proc eeding s, and then
a na ly ze e a c h c a te g ory

of do c ume nts un de r the Te nn e sse e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t.

I. F ACTS & P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

On J uly 30, 2004, Plaintiff/Appellee Ta juana Cheshier, a reporter for The Jack son Sun , submitt ed a w ritten reque st to the Cit y ’s police de partment for acc ess to photogr aphs take n during routine police inve stigatory business. I n pertinent part, Cheshier’s letter re quested “ acc ess to photos taken since J anuary 2004 of pedestria ns and motorists in which office rs applied the pract i ce of ‘re asonable suspici o n ’ i n o rd er to photog raph the m, although the y wer e not ar

rested f or a c rime.” The letter specifie d that Cheshier soug ht the documents pursua nt to the Tennesse e Public Records Ac t. T he City

de c lin e d to ho no r C he sh ie r’ s r e qu e st. 1

On Octobe r 26, 2004, the leg al counse l for The Jack son Sun sent the City a second w ritten reque st, se eking acc ess to “ all photogr aphic or dig ital image s and/or copie s of any documents in the possession of the City

of Jackson . . . of any

an d al l persons photog raphe d or interview ed by the Jac ks on Pol ic e of

fi c e rs a s p art

of a ll ‘ fi e ld i nte rv ie ws .’ ” Th e re qu e st f ro m The Ja ckson Sun’s
a tto rn e y e xpla ine d th a t The Jack

son Sun had re ason to believe that Cityp olice off icer s had conduc ted 369 field interview s in 2004, that the officers g ener ated f ield interview c ards ba sed on information
o b tain e d d u r in g th o s e f

ie ldin te r v ie w s , th a t s o me c ar d s w e r e c o mp le te w ith p h o to g r ap h s , a n d that
no arr ests or cha

rg es we re le vied ag ainst any of the individuals interviewe d.C ount I I I per t ai ned t o 91 1 emerg enc y t apes r el at i ng t o a cr i mi nal i nci dent

. T he t r i al cour t hel d t hat t he t apes 2

wer e par t of

a pen di ng i nv es t i gat i on and wer e not s ubj ect t o di s cl osu r e u nder t he P ubl i c Records Act

. T hi s r ul i ng ha s
n ot be en a ppea l ed.
-4- The Oc tober 26, 2004 letter to the Cityfrom counse l for The Jack son Sun a ls o reque sted information re lating to the West Tenne ssee Diamond J axx profe ssional baseba ll team. The letter reque sted, “Should the owner s of the Diamond Jax x pro v i d e the City with any

‘notices of reloc ation,’ . . . the City

provide to The [ Jack

son ] Sun copies of the notices, along with any related documents.”

I n response to the October 26, 2004 letter, the City ag ain declined to pr oduce or disclose the police fie ld interview c ards. The Citydid not respond to the re quest for documents re lating to the D iamo n d Ja xx.
On De c e mbe r 14 , 2 00 4, Pla int if f/Ap pe lle e Jami e Pa g e , a no the r r e po rt e r f ro m The Jack

son Sun , s e nt a

le tte r t o th e City ’s Ma y or , Charl e s Fa rm e r, re qu e sti ng a c c e ss to “ a ll f inanc ia l st a te me nts betwee n the West Tennessee Diamond J axx and the c ity of J ackson, or any financ ial documentation relating to the f

inancial a g ree ment betwee n the t wo parties, including but not limited to, any financ ial state me nt( s) de mon str a tin g ho w theJaxx hav e los t a t le a st $ 15 0, 00 0 a y e ar o ve r the la st t wo ba se ba ll
se a so ns

. . . . ” On c e a g a in, theCity didno t ho no r this re qu e st.

On J anuary

26, 2005, the G an n et t S atellite I nformation Ne twork, the publisher of The Jack son Sun , Richard Schne ider, e x ecutive e ditor of The Jack son Sun , T a

juana Che sh ie r, Jami e Pag e, and The Jack

son Sun (c oll e c tiv e ly , “ Pe tit ion e rs ” ) f ile d a la ws uit

a g a ins t th e City

pu rs ua nt t o Tenne ssee’ s Public Records Act. The petiti on contained three counts; howeve r, onl y Count Iand Cou nt II area t is su e on thi s a

pp e a l. 2

Count Iof the pe tition allege d that, during 2004, th e C ity , by and throug h the police de pa rt me nt, c omp ile d a

pp ro xima te ly

36 9 f ie ld i nte rv ie w c ard s a ft e r i n t e rv i e w i n g v a ri ou s in div idu a ls in J ackson, Te nnessee . The pe tition not ed that Jack son Sun reporter Ta

juana Cheshier

submitt ed to the Citya Public Records A ct re quest for the photogr aphic imag es and doc umentary information obtained by the C ity incident t o the field interviews. The petiti on claimed that the f ield interview
c ard s w e re pu bli c re c or ds , a ndthat th e City vio la te d th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t by de c lin ing to d isc los e the m. Th e pe tit ion a sse rt e d tha t the City ’s failu re to dis c los e the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s w a s w ill fu l, and that the Petitioners we re the ref ore e ntitled to attorney ’s fe es under the Public Records Ac t.

Cou nt I I of the pe tit iona sse rt e d th a t The Jack son Sun had made two r equests to the City for financ ial information re lating to the D iamond J axx baseba ll t ea m and any notices of r elocation. First, in the October 2004 letter from counsel for the Petitioners, the Petitioners r equeste d disclosure of all notices of

reloc ation that the City had rec eived f rom the Diamond Jax x owner ship, L ozinak Ba seball. Second, on D ece mber 12, 2004, Jack son Sun re po rt e r Jami e Pa g e su bmi tte d a pub lic
rec ords re quest to the C ity for a Diamond J axx “Statement of Oper ations.” The petition allege d that this “Statement” had be en submitted to the Cityby repr esentatives of the Di am o n d J ax x

. TheT h e C h a n c e llo r’s sc h e d u ling o f t h e he a rin g w a s in c o n fo rm ity w ith the re q u ire m e n ts o f T e n n e sse e ’s P u b lic 3
R eco rds A ct , whi ch p rovides: “ U p o n f i l i ng of t he p et i t i o n, t he co urt shal l , up o n reque st o f t he p et i t i o ni ng pa rt y , i ss ue
a n o rd e r re q u iring the d e fen d a n t o r re sp o n d e n t p a rty o r p a rtie s to im m e d ia te ly a p p e a r a n d sh o w c a u se , i f t h e y ha v e a n y, why t he p et i t i o n s ho ul d not b e grant ed

. ” T

. C

. A

. § 1 0

- 7

- 5 0 5 (b) (19 9 9 ).
-5- Jack son Sun b e li e v e d th a t th e “ St a te me n t” d e tail e d f in a n c ia l l o s s e s s u f

f e r e d b y th e D iamo n d Ja xx. T h e p e ti ti o n a v e rr e d th a t th e Ci ty h a d s imp ly f a il e d to r e s p o n d to th e r e q u e s t f o r th e D iamo n d Ja xx financ ial documents.

Th e Pe ti ti on ers soug ht m a nd a tory inj un c tiv e re lie f andda ma g e s f or the City ’s failu re to d is c lo s e th e f

ie ldin te rview c ar d s a n d it s f a il u r e to r e s p o n d to th e r e q u e s ts f o r th e D iamo n d Ja xx do c ume nts . T he Pe tit ioner s als o s ou g ht atto rn e y ’s fe e s f or theCity ’s a lle g e dly

wi llf ul f a ilu re to discl o s e t h e docume nts requeste d. On J anuary 26, 2005, the same day the petition was filed, Chanc e llo r Ja me s B utl e r o f the Ma dis on Cou nty Chanc e ry Co urt set the c aus e fo r an im me diate h ea ri n g. 3

I n the City ’s re sponse t o the petit ion, the C ity asserted t hat t he field interview ca rds soug ht by the Petitioners wer e privileg ed and the ref ore not subjec t to t h e d isclosure re quirements of the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. A s to the Di a mon d J a xx fi na nc ia l re c or ds , the City a sse rt e d th a t th e do c ume nts
wer e private prope rty , belong ing to L ozinak Base ball. Consequently , the Cityarg ued, the Dia mond Jaxx doc ume nts we re no t pu bli c re c or ds su bje c t to dis c los ur e un de r the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t.

On Februa

ry 7, 2005, the C hance ry Court held t he show-c ause he aring on the petition. At the he ari ng , th e City a dmi tte d to re c e ivi ng Ta juana Che sh ie r’ s July

20 04 le tte r. Ad dit ion a lly , b oth parties stipulated that none of the re quested re cords we re pr ovided to The Jack son Sun , o r any

of its ag ents, in response to the July , October , or De cembe r re quests. I n reg ards to the October 26, 2004 letter re questing that the Cityprovide The Jack son Sun with any

Diamond J axx reloc ation notices
or re lated docume nts, the City ’s counse l arg ued that, at the time of t h e re q u est , the Cityhad not
rec eived any

notice of r elocation from L ozinak Base ball.

At the hearing , the Cityproduce d sevente en fie ld interview c ards, out of the estimated 369 in exis tence for 2004, as a repr esentative sample of the cards for the court to re view in c am e ra . The Ci ty o f f e r e d to p r o d u c e a ll o f th e c ards f or in c am e ra inspection, but the trial court found that the repr esentative sample wa s sufficient to rule on the ca se. The City also produce d at the hearing a Notice of Termination of the Stadium L icense and Use Ag ree ment betwee n the C ity and L ozinak Ba seball. The Cit y informed the trial court that the Notice and the acc ompany ing financ ial information wer e delivere d to the City ’s May or on January 28, 2005, two day s afte r the Petitioners filed the instant law suit. The Cityasserted that it was not in possession of the documents whe n the Pet i t i o n er s reque sted ac cess in their O ctober 2004 and De c e mbe r 2 00 4 le tte rs

.-6-

The Notice of Te rmination letter, date d J anuary 28, 2005, was fr om Robert L ozinak, the President of L ozin ak Ba seball, to May or Charle s Fa rmer, the City ’s May or. The N otice invoked Article V I of the Nove mber 2002 Ag ree ment betwee n the C ity and L ozinak Base ball. I t asserte d that L ozinak Base ball had incurred a “Signif icant Operating L oss” during t he 2004 fiscal y ear , and stated that it ha d s us ta ine d o pe ratin g los se s in e xce ss o f $ 15 0, 00 0 f or tw o co ns e c uti ve y e ars

. As a re su lt, the No tic e state d, L ozin ak B a se ba ll w a s e xer c isi ng its c on tr a c tua l rig ht to termin a te the Ag re e me nt, and intended to r elocate the team following the conc lusion of the 2005 baseba ll season. Pursuant to the Ag re e me nt w iththeCity , L ozin ak B a se ba ll a tta c he d to the No tic e fi na nc ia l do c ume ntatio n to support its asserted g rounds for te rmination. The fina ncial docume ntation attache d to the Notice of Termination letter

was the sam e fi n ancial information which the City had a r ight to inspec t under Artic le V( N) of

theAg re e me nt.

At the hea ring , the Cityproduce d the Ag ree ment. The City also produce d a F ebrua

ry 3, 2005 letter to the City

from the attorney

for the West Tennessee Diamond J axx , admonishing the Citynot to disclose the financ ial documents that ac companied the J anuary 28, 2005 Notice of Termination, essentially

asserting the c onfidentiality clause of Article V(N) (ii) of the A g ree ment.

At the hea

ring , the trial court admitted into evidence the Ag ree ment, the J anuary 28, 2005 letter, and the Februa

ry 3, 2005 letter. The trial court found that the l etters were rele vant t o the issue of the City ’s willfulness in ref using to disclose t he documents soug ht in the Petitioners’ Octobe r and De c e mbe r r e qu e sts

. At the outset of the show- cause hearing, the Cityarg ued that it should not be re quired to g rant the newspa

per’ s reque st for ac ces s t o t h e fi eld interview car ds because they wer e prote cted unde r Rule 16 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure , as we ll as a common-law law enf orce ment privileg e. As to the Diamond J axx documents, t he C ity acknow ledg ed that the not ice of relocation
wa s a p u b li c d o c u me n t a n d d id n o t c o n te s t it s d is c lo s u r e

. I t main tain e d , h o w e v e r , th at the
acc ompany ing f

inancial information, documenting the org anization’s losses over two conse cutive y ear s, was not y et subject to disclosure, b ec ause the Ag ree ment g rante d the Citya forty -five day pe ri od in wh ic h to e le c t to pu rc ha se the ba se ba ll te a m. To su pp ort thi s p os iti on , th e City po int e d to an exception to the Tennessee Public Recor ds Act for rec ords re g arding the value of property which a go v er n m en t al en t i t y

i s co n s i d er i n g ac q u i ri n g.
Th e City the n c a lle d f

ou r w itn e sse s to te sti fy

abo ut the field in ter view c ard s. Th e fi rs t witness was Commander Dennis May s, division commander and le g al advisor f or the City

of J ackson Police D epartment. Commander May s asserted that the fie ld interview c ards a re an integ ral pa rt of the po lic e de pa

rt me nt’ s in ve sti g a tiv e st rate g y . H e e xpla ine d th a t th e c ard s a reuti lize d to identify potential witnesses, suspec ts, and informants, as we ll as the g eog raphic locations of criminal activity . May s also testified t hat, i f t he cards were made publ ic, they would reve al the depa rtment’s tactics a nd proce dures f

or g athering information such a s the police de partment’s strateg ic dec isions to w or k s pe c if ic g e og ra ph ic loc a tio ns a ndto a dd re ss p art ic ula r c ri me s.-7-

Commander May s expl ained the pr ocess by which the car ds are g ener ated and how they are uti lize d. Af

te r a po lic e of

fi c e r e nc ou nte rs a c iti zen , the of fi c e r mig ht me moria lize the c on ta c t w ith
a field interview car d. Some of the enc ounters ar e voluntary , while others a re Terry stops, based on
rea sonable suspicion. The cards recor d rele vant i nformation about the contact with the individual and also further the br oader objective of

fac ilitating the sharing o f i n t el l i gence within the police department. May s expl ained that the interview ca rds ar e “de signe d to be a c entra l repository for inf orma tio n th a t of

fi c e rs a c qu ir e [wh ile ] p e rf ormin g the ir du tie s.

. . . [Th e c ard s] a llo w O ff ic e r Ato use Officer B’ s work produc t. . .to work his or her ow n case s. I t’s nothing diff ere nt than if. . .two office rs sit in a coff

ee shop and have a

discussion.”
Commander May s testified that the fie ld interview c ards c an re tain their investig atory value long a fter the subject of the f ield interview c ard cea sed being a suspec t. For e x ample, he said, it was plausible that there would be anothe r i n ci d en t i n the same loc ation at a late r date , and the police
wo uld us e the fi e ld int e rv ie w ca rd s to ide nti fy ind ivi du a ls w ho fr e qu e nt the loc a le to f indva lua ble
source s of information.
The City next called to testify Lieutenant Mike Holt, the commander of the violent crimes unit of the J ackson Police Depa rtment. He explained that the Cityhad bee n using the field interview
car ds to share intellig encesince the e arly 1990' s. Acc ording to L ieutenant Holt, the c ards se rve sever al purposes, but a

re e specia lly valuable for identify ing suspects. He note d that contac ts often do no t te ll the po lic e the ir c or re c t name . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e int e rvi ew card s, c omp le te wi th bio g ra ph ic a l data

a ndof te n in c lud ing ph oto g ra

ph s, pr ov e inv a lua

ble fo r i de nti fi c a tio n p ur

po se s.
As an e x ample, L ieutenant Holt explained how the f ield interview c ards e nabled police of fi c e rs to a pp re he nda

se ri a l r apis t:

A: We ha d a g e og ra

ph ic are a wh e re [the ra

pe s we re ] oc c ur

ri ng a nda pe ri odof tim e du r i n g t h e d a y t h a t i t w a s o c c u rr i n g

. W e s t ar t e d o u t b y e xa m i n i n g t he fi e ld int ervi ews that ha d b e e n d on e his toric a lly in that are a

a nda lso by

e xami nin g fi e ld interviews th at were done by teams of of

fice rs that wer e wor

king in that a

rea specific ally

armed with a description of the suspect. Throug h that we de veloped
sever al po s sible individuals who had a criminal hist ory that would be consistent—phy sical desc ription that would be consistent t h at ultimately wer e e lim inate d b e c aus e the y

we re e ith e r i nc arc e rate d o r e lim inate d b y DN A. Ul tim a te ly we did h av e an i n dividual that was field interviewed w ho. . .we wor ked fr om that field interview and dete rmined that he had.

. .not only [a] criminal history that was consistent, but a method of operation that was consistent in prior ca s es ; and ultimately , using that field interview and his historica l inf ormation and some other info rma tion obtaine d a sea

rch w arr ant, obtained blood which D NA wa s ext rac ted and
c omp are d a ndide nti fi e d th e su sp e c t. * * * Prior to him being stopped, he was not on the radar. He wa s not any body that we ha d focuse d on in that investigation.-8-

Q: So was thi s prac tice of [using] field interview car ds an important part in solvi ng that c ri me a ndpr e ve nti ng fu tur e ra pe s? A : A b s o l u t e l y.

L ie ute na nt H olt

sa id that he be li e ve d th a t pu bli sh ing the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s w ou ld e na ble c ri min a ls to avoid detec tion, and by reve aling potential witnesses, would lea d to witness i n t i midation or ph y sic a l ha

rm to s uc h w itn e sse s. The City ’s next witness was L ieutenant Patrick Wi llis, commander of the g ang enfor ceme nt unit for the J ackson Pol ice De partment. Lieutenant Willis echoe d the conc erns r aised by Lieutenant Holt that witnesses would be e ndang ere d by reve alin g th e ir

id e n tities, a nd explained that gang s posed
a pa rt ic ula rl y sig nif ic a nt ri sk

. I n his e xpe ri e nc e wi th the g a ng e nf or c e me nt u nit , Lie ute na nt Wi lli s sa id, g a ng ret ali ati on a g a ins t su sp e c te d in fo rm a nts is c omm on . Wil lis a lso te sti fi e d th a t th e fi e ld interview c ards a

re valuable for identify ing gang members. Ty pically , he explained, g ang members
us e str e e t name s su c h a s “ L itt le D” or “ D Mo ne y ,” a nd g a ng s wi ll g ive se ve ra l in div idu a ls i n th e ir
or g a ni z ati on thesa me str e e t name . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s, c omp le te wi th b i o gra p h i ca l d at a a n d p h o t o gra p h s , ar e ef fe ct i v e to o l s fo r i d en t i fy i n g s u s p ec t s as m em b er s o f agan g.
The City ’s final witness at the show-ca use hearing was Chief Richard Staples, the Chief of the J ackson Police D epartment. Chief Staples reiter ated that the f ield interview c ards a

re utilized to “ me moria lize the c on ta c t that a po lic e of fi c e r ha s wi th a n ind ivi du a l wh o he ha s re a so na ble suspicion to believe may be invol ved in some criminal act,” and that the cards are used to identify p o te n ti a l w it n e s s e s a n d d e v e lo p s o u r c e s f o r in f o r mati o n

. H e a s s e r te d th a t th e p o li c e h a v e been sharing this type of information “fore ver,” and the f ield int ervie w ca

rds have proven to be an eff ective tool for

sharing informati o n

. C h i ef Staples sha red the fea

rs expressed by

previous wi tne sse s, that di sc los ing the c ard s to the pu bli c c ou ld e nd a ng e r w itn e sse s a ndinf orma nts , a ndc hil l the public’s willingne ss to disclose information to the police.

On Fe b ru ar y

2 3 , 2 0 0 5 , t h e t ri al j u d ge se n t t h e pa rt i es a le t t er s et t i n g fo rt h h i s ru l i n gs , fi n d i n gs of fa ct, and c onclusions of law. In the letter, the trial court found that: (1) the City was in possession of all of the doc uments the Petitioners r equeste d; ( 2) the Cityreje cted the Petitioners’ reque sts for the field intervie w ca

rds, and did not respond to the request for the Diamond Jax x documents prior to the filing of

the l aw s u i t ; (3 ) t here was no e vidence in the rec ord that any of the fie ld interview
car ds sought by

the Petitioners wer e part of an ong oing c ri m i n al investig ation; (4) Te nnessee ’s Public Records Ac t did not c ontain any exception or privileg e as to any of the documents to which the Petitioners reque sted ac cess; and, ( 5) public policy favor s the rig ht of cit i z en s to acc ess the
rec ords of g overnme ntal ag encie s. I n response to the City ’s ar g ument that the field intervie w ca rds
are privileg ed fr om disclosure, the trial c ourt stated:
[T] he courts have be en vig ilant in upholding [t he] clear leg islative mandate [of the Public Records Ac t] , even in the fac e of se rious countervailing c onsiderations. The [C ity ] in the i ncident case arg ues t hat the fie ld interviews ar e wor k product a nd that i f c r i m i n a l s h a v e a c c e s s t o t h i s w o rk p r o d u c t , p o l i c e w o rk

w i l l b e m o r e d i f

f i c u l t

. ItA s t o t he f i el d i nt ervi ew card s, t he t ri al co urt noted t hat t here was “ a subst ant i al legal q uest i o n . .

. whi ch o ught 4

t o be s et t l ed .

. . by a h i gh er cour t

. ”

The J ack s on Sun re q u e ste d this inj u n c tive re lief in the c o m p la int. 5

-9- should be noted, howe ver, tha t w h il ethe leg islature excepted a ll investigative r ecor ds of theTe nn e sse e B ur e au o f Inv e sti g a tio n, theof fi c e of Te nn c are I ns pe c tor Ge ne ra l, and other specific exemptions , the leg islature did not except inves t i gati ve files of municipal police depa

rtments. Whil e ther e have been f orce ful arg uments in other
case s from police de partments. . .that subjec ting these types of files t o public scrutiny
wo uldr e s u l ti n g r e a t e r

r e l u c t a n c e o f

w i t n e s s e s t o c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y t o t a l k w ith
auth oriti e s, a ndto a c on c omi ta nt re du c tio n in the e ff e c tiv e ne ss of la w e nf

or c e me nt, the c ou rt s h a ve re fu se d to c re a te a pu bli c po lic y

e xce pti on to the le g isl a tiv e ma nd a te of a c c e ss. Th e c ou rt s have e mph a size d that the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t pr ov ide s th a t a ll ag ency rec ords be ope n for ins p ection unless specifically exempted. When Ten nesse e Cod e An no ta te d § 10 -7 -5 03 wa s e na c te d b y the19 57 le g isl a tur e , it provided that ‘all st ate, county and muni cipal records’ shall be open for inspec tion ‘unless otherw ise provided by law or r eg ulations made there to.’ I n 1984, the leg islatu re amende d the statute to provide that ‘ all state, county and municipal
re c or ds sh all be op e n f

or ins pe c tio n u nle ss p ro vid e d b y state statut e s. ’ B y

thi s amendment, the Court r easons that the leg islature rese rved to itself a lone the powe r to make public policy exceptions to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 10-7- 503 for
mun ic ipa l la w e nf

or c e me nt f

ile s.
On thi s b a sis , th e tria l c ou rt or de re d th e City to imme diate ly c omp ly wi th the Pe tit ion e rs ’ r e qu e sts for a cce ss to the field interview c ards and the Diamond Jax x documents. I n addition, the t rial court 4 iss ue d a perman ent inj un c tio n r e qu ir ing the City to r e sp on d inwriti ng to a ll f utu rewritt e n p ub lic
reco rds r e qu e sts fr om The Jack son Sun o r

i t s a g e n t s , e xp l a i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e c o r d s o u g h two uld be produced a nd, if not, the basis for nondisclosure

. The trial court also order ed the Cityto pay the 5 Petitioners’ attorney ’s fee s and costs. On Fe bruary 28, 2005, this letter was incor porate d into a final order . On Marc h 28, 2005, the trial court issued another letter ruling in w hich it f ound, in pa

rt, that the Citywas not in possession of s ome of the Diamond J axx documents until after the lawsuit was filed. Ne verthe less, the trial court as s es s ed a total of $6,190 in attorney ’s fe es, comprise d of two
se pa rate a wa rd s a s to e a c h ty

pe of do c ume nt n ot d iscl os ed, against the City . T his wa s a lso inc or po rate d in to an o rd e r. F ro m th e se or de rs , th e City no w a pp e a ls.
On appe al, the City contends that the t rial court err ed in hol ding that the field interview car ds
are public rec ords, available for public inspection under Tenne ssee’ s Public Rec ords Act. Second, t h e C i t y a s s e r t s t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t e rr e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e C i t y ’ s f

a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e the fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s a ndDi a mon d J a xx do c ume nts wa s w ill fu l w ith in the me a nin g of Te nn e sse e ’s Pub lic R e c o r d s A c t , a n dt h e r e f

o r e e rr e d i n a w ar d i n g a t t o r n e y’ s f e e s a g a i n s tt h e C i t y.-10- II. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

T h e fa ct s p ertinent to t his appea l are not in disput e. Resolution of the issues on appe al require s interpre tation of Tenne ssee’ s Publi c Rec ords Act a nd application of the Act to the fa cts of the case. This prese nts a question of law

. Me mphis Pub l’ g Co. v . Che ro ke e Chil

dre n & Fa mily Se rv s. , 87 S.W .3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002) . We review question s of law de novo , without any presumption of correc tness in the trial court’ s findings. Id

. I nterpre tation of the Public Records Ac t require s that this C ourt asce rtain the intent of the G ener al Ass embl y in enac ting the A ct, without restric ting or

expanding the applicability of the statute bey ond its intende d scope. Id

. (c i t i n g Ow e ns v . St ate , 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ).

III . A NA LY SIS

A. The F ie ld In te r vie w Ca r ds

As to t h e fi el d interview c ards, the City arg ues that the trial c ourt failed to c onsider a sig nif ic a nt ame nd me nt t o th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. As no te d by the tr ia l cou rt in i ts l e tte r r uli ng , in 1984, the statute wa s amende d to rea d that “all state, c ounty and municipal re cords” shall be open for inspec tion “unless otherwise pr ovided by state statutes,” w hich was inter prete d by the Tenne ssee Supreme Court a s the leg islature rese rving “to itself alone the power to ma ke p u b l i c p o l i cy exception[ s]” to the Act. Mem ph is Pu bl ’g Co. v . Ho lt , 710 S.W .2d 513, 517 (Tenn. 1986) . The Citypoints out, however, that in 1991, af ter the Hol

t op ini on wa s is sued , th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y a g a in ame nd e d th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. T his a me nd me nt m od if ie d th e Ac t to re a d th a t st a te , c ou nty and municipal re cords sha ll be open for inspection “unless other wise provided by state law .” 1991 Tenn. Pub. Acts 369. The City arg ues that this lang uag e broade ns the exemption from disclosure,
a ndthat th is b ro a de r e xemp tio n w a s n ot c on sid e re d b y the tria l c ou rt

.
Re ly ing on thi s br oa de r l a ng ua g e , th e City c on te nd s th a t th e fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s f a ll w ith in Rule 16(a) (2) of

the Tenne ssee Rules of C ri m i n al P roce dure, w hich states that “this rule doe s not authorize the discovery

or inspection of . . . internal . . . documents m ad e by. . . law enf orce ment office rs in connec tion with the investigation or pr osecution of the c ase. . . .”
Additionally , the Cityargu es t h at the fie ld interview c ards a re e x empt from disclosure pursuant to the common-la w law e nforc emen t p riv il e g e , which it asserts protects fr om disclosure law enfor ce ment techniques and proce dures, the ide ntityof conf idential source s and other pe rsons inv olv e d ininv e sti g a tio ns , a ndoth e rw ise pr e ve nts in te rf e re nc e wi th an in ve sti g a tio n. Th e City describes this as a qualified privileg e, under which the public interest in nondisclosure is balanc ed ag ainst the nee d of t he petiti oner for acce ss to the information. I n this case, the City contends, the pu bli c int e re st i n n on dis c los ur e ou tw e ig hs theme dia ’s ne e d f or a c c e ss t o th e fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s.

Furthermore , the C ity contends that the field interview cards a re pr otected unde r a c ommonlaw “inf ormant privileg e,” de scribed a s a “sub- set” of thecommon-law e nforc ement privileg e.T he Library of C o ngres s b ears a p o rt i o n of t hi s st at em ent o n an ext eri o r wall o f t he Jam es M ad i son B ui l d i ng. 6

-11- We consider f

irst the g enesis and e volution of Tennessee ’s Public Records Ac t. We then
c on sid e r w he the r the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s a ree xemp t f

ro m th e dis c los ur e . A ft e r that , we wi ll
a dd re ss the a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n th e Di a mon d Jaxx doc ume nts

. 1. Evolu tion of

P ubl ic Rec ords Act

The Americ an public’s rig ht of acc ess to inf ormation about its g overnme nt is lar g ely derive d from an E ng lish tradition of a public rig ht of ac cess to, among other things, judicial re cords a nd proce eding s. Se e Ric hmond N e wsp ap e rs, Inc . v . V

irg inia , 4 48 U. S. 5 55 , 5 66 (1 98 0) ; se e ge ne ra lly S I MON G R EE NL EA F , G R EE NL EA F ON E VI DENCE § 471 (15th ed. 1892). T he Eng lish tradition of
c o n d u c t i n g p u b l i c tr i a l s a n d p e r m i t t i n g p u b l i c a c c e s s t o p u b l i c d o c u m e n t s h a s a l o n g h i s t o r y, trac eable as far back as the Norman Conquest. Ric hmond N e wsp ap e rs , 4 48 U. S. at 56 5; se e als o H AR OL D L. C RO SS , T HE P EO PLE ’ S R I GHT TO K NOW 25 (Columbia Univ. Press 1953).
The importanc e of transpare ncy in gove rnment proceeding s was a f undamental tene t of Americ an democ rac y

established by

our F oref

ather s. J ames Madison onc e wr ote: “A popular Government, without popular information, or the me ans of acquiring it, is but a P rolog ue to a Far ce or a Tr ag edy ; or perha

ps both. Knowledg e will fore ver g overn ig noranc e: And a pe ople who mea n to be their own G overnour s, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge g ives.” L etter from James M ad i s o n t o W .T. Ba rry (Aug . 4, 1822), 9 W RI T I N G S O F J A M ES M ADI S ON (Hunt Ed. 1910) 103. 6

I n1978, the United S ta

te s Su p r e me

Court acknowle dg ed the e x istence of a common-la w rig ht of ac cess. Ni

xo n v . W ar ne r Co mm unic ations , 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1 9 7 8 ). Shortly there afte r, the Sup re me Cou rt

de ve lop e d a

str a in o f p ub lic a c c e ss j urisp ru de nc e tying fu nd a me nta l F ir st Amendment rig ht s t o the rig ht of public ac cess to court proce eding s and docume nts. See, e.g. , Ric hmond Ne wsp ap e rs , 4 48 U. S. 5 55 ; Pre ss- Ente rp ris e Co. v . Sup e rio r Ct . o f C ali fo rnia , 4 64 U. S. 50 1, 50 3 ( 19 84 ); Gl

ob e Ne wsp ap e r Co . v . Sup e rio r Ct

. , 457 U. S. 5 96 (1 98 2) . T he ri g ht o f a c c e ss wa s d e fi ne d inle g isl a tio n s uc h a s th e fe de ra l Fr e e do m of I nf orma tio n A c t a ndits state de ri vativ e s. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2002).

Tenne ssee’ s Publi c Rec ords Act, Te nnessee Code Annotated § 10- 7-101, et seq. , has bee n described as a c odification of the public a cce ss doctrine. Ballard v. Hertzke , 924 S.W .2d 652, 661 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . U nd e r the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t, p ub lic re c or ds arepr e su me d o pe n f or pu bli c inspection. See, e .g. , State v. Cawood , 134 S.W. 3d 15 9, 16 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; Swif t v . Ca mpbe ll , 159 S

. W

. 3 d 5 6 5 , 5 7 0 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p . 2 00 4) ; s ee also The Tennessean v. Electric Power Bd. of Na shv ill e , 979 S.W .2d 297, 305 (Tenn. 1998) (ac knowled gi n g the Public Records Ac t’s “cle ar ma nd a te in f

a vo r o f d isc los ur e ” ). Th e Ge ne ra l As se mbl y dir e c te d that the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t “ sh a ll be broadly construed so as to g ive the fullest possible public acc ess to public rec ords.” T.C.A. § 10- 7-505(d) (1999). This pr esumption that documents are availablefor inspec tion is not absolute and may be over come by

a showing that t h e docume nts sought ar e not subject to the statute or arePar t I of t h e Publ i c Rec or ds Act s et s ou t a s epa r at e def i n i t i on of “ r ec or ds ” wh i ch i s di f

fer en t f r om t h e def

i n i t i on 7
in P a rt II I. See T .C .A . § 1 0 -7 -1 0 1 (1 9 9 9 ). T h e T e n n e sse e S u p re m e C o u rt h a s d e te rm ine d tha t t h e d e finiti o n in P a rt I

o f t h e P u b lic R e c o rd s A c t wa s n o t i n te n d e d to a p p ly t o o the r p a rts o f the A c t, a n d m a y b e the re su lt o f a “‘c o m p iler ’s

er r or, occu r r i ng i n t he r enu mb er i ng o f t he 19 80 ed i t i on o f

t he C od e. ’ ” M em phi s Publ ’ g Co. v . Cher okee Chi l dr en & F am i l y Ser vi ces , I nc. , 8 7 S.W

. 3 d 67 , 75 n. 6 (T enn. 20 0 2 ) ( q uo t i ng C re a tive R e sta u ra n ts, In c . v. C ity o f M e m p h is , 795 S.W

. 2 d 67 2 , 67 5 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 0 ))

. -12- otherwise e x empt from disclosure . To overc ome the pre sumption of acce ss, the statute requir es the g overnme nt to just ify

nondisclosure of the re cords by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. T.C.A. § 10- 7- 50 5( c ) ( 19 99 ); Swi

ft , 1 59 S.W. 3da t 57 0; Thom pson v. Reynolds , 858 S.W .2d 3 2 8 , 3 2 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Un de r the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t, o nly do c ume nts wi thi n th e stat ut ory de fi nit ionof

“ pu bli c re c or d” are re qu ir e d to be open for pu bli c ins pe c tio n. Th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t de fi ne s “ pu bli c re c or d” a s “ a ll d oc ume nts , p ape rs , le tte rs , ma ps , b oo ks , p ho tog ra

ph s, mic ro fi lms , e lec tr on ic data proce ssing f

iles and output, films, sound recording s, or other material, re g ardle ss of phy sical form o r c h ar a c t e r i s t i c s ma d e or rec eive d pursuant to law or ordinanc e or in connec tion wi th the tra ns ac tio n o

f of fic ial bu sin e ss by an g overnme ntal ag ency .” T.C.A. § 10-7-301( 6) (Supp. 2005) 7 (empha sis added).

Tenne sse eCo d eA n n o ta

te d §10-7-503 mandates that public rec ords “sha ll at all times, during business hours, be open f

or per sonal inspection by

any citizen of Tennesse e, and those in char g e of such r e c o r d s s h a ll n o t r e f u s e s u c h r ig h t o f in s p e c ti o n to a n y c it iz e n , u n le s s o th e r w is e p r o v id ed by state law.” T.C.A. § 10-7-503( a) ( Supp. 2005). This section has under g one a numbe r of amendments that indicate the evolvi n g l egislative view of the scope of its mandate. In its ini tial form, the public re cords statutes e x cepte d only two types of r ecor ds from disclosure—me dical
rec ords of

patients in state hospitals and military rec ords implicating the security of the United States. Swi

ft , 1 59 S.W. 3da t 57 1 ( c iti ng Ac t of Ma r. 18 , 195 7, c h. 28 5, § 2 , 1 95 7 T e nn . Pu b. Ac ts 93 2) . Si nc e 19 57 , a n inc re a sin g nu mbe r of sp e c if ic e xemp tio ns a nde xce pti on s h a ve be e n a dd e d to the Public Records Ac t. Id.

I n addition, the languag e of the mandate in se ction 10-7-503( a) ha s underg one a transformation. As orig inally enac ted, the statute pe rmitted the nondiscl o s u re o f publ ic re cords “whose confide ntiality was ‘provided by law or reg ulations made pursua nt thereto.’” Id . (citing Act of Mar . 18, 1957, ch. 285, § 1, 1957 Tenn. Pub. Ac ts 932)

. I n 1984, the exception was na rrowe d, permitting the nondisclosure of a public rec ord onl y

when a “state statute” made the r ecor d confide ntial. Id . (citing Act of May 17, 1984, ch. 929, § 1, 1984 Te nn. Pub. Acts 890).

The c urre nt v er s i o n of the Ac t’s mandate w as ena cted in 1991. The 1991 amendment broade ns the categ ory of documents which a re e x empt from the mandate of disclosure , stating that p u b l i c r e c o r d s s h a l l b e o p e n f o r i n s p e c t i o n “ u n l e s s o th e r w i s e p r o v i d e d b y state law .” T.C.A. § 10-7- 503(a) (Supp. 2005). This chang e indicate d that “statutes we re not th e sole source of exceptions from the public r ecor ds statutes’ disclosure r equire ments” and “ broade ned the pe rmissible sources of exceptions from disclosure. . . .” Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 571. I n the statute’s c urre nt “state law ”-13-

form, then, nondisclosure of a public rec ord i s justified when the doc ument is protected unde r not only state statutes, but also the Te nnessee Constit ution, common law, state statutes, court rules, or administrative rules and reg ulations. See, e .g. , Bal lar d , 9 24 S.W. 2da t 66 2; Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 5 7 1

– 7 2 (c i t i n g Fry e v . Bl ue Rid ge Ne uro sc ie nc e Ctr

., P. C. , 7 0 S. W. 3 d 7 1 0 , 7 1 3 ( T e n n . 2002); Tennessee Sm all Sch. S

ys. v. Mc Wherter , 851 S.W .2d 139, 148 (Tenn. 1993) ; Emery v . So uthe rn Ry. , 8 66 S.W. 2d55 7, 56 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 3) ; Kog an v. Te nne sse e Bd. of

De ntis try , 2 0 0 3 WL 23 09 38 63, at *5 –6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . D e c . 3 0, 20 03 )) . A pp lying the br oa d “ state la w” e xce pti on in section 10-7- 503(a) , courts have held that a number of docume nts and information ar e exempt from disclosure unde r state law; examples include documents sea led by a prote ctive orde r, Bal

lar d , 924 S.W .2d at 662, and an attorney ’s work pr oduct, Arnol d v. City of Chattan ooga , 19 S.W .3d 779, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
The pre -1991 ver sion of the Tennessee Publ ic Recor ds Act wa s interpre ted by the Tenne ssee Supreme Court in Me mphis Publ ’g Co. v . Ho lt , 710 S.W .2d 513 (Tenn. 1986) . I n Hol t , the Court considere d the question of whe ther c losed police investigative files were subject to disclosure unde r the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t a nd Rul e 16 (a )( 2) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re . T he fi le soug ht to be examined in Hol t related to the “Shannon Street I ncident” in January 1983, in which occupants of a re sidence on Shannon Street in Memphis, Tennesse e, took a police off icer hostag e. Eventually

a shootout occur

red; seven occupants of the re sidence and the hostag e police of fice r died in the incident. There was a police investigation of the incident, which w as later closed. Id. at 515.

I n N ov e mbe r 1 98 4, ne arl y tw o y e ars a ft e r the inc ide nt, a loc a l new sp ape r sou g ht ac c e ss t o the c los e d p oli c e inv e sti g a tiv e fi le . A ft e r a c c e ss to th e fi le s w a s d e nie d, the ne ws pa pe r f ile d s uit under the Public Records Ac t. I n analy zing the statute, the Hol t court noted that it mandated disclosure of a ll public recor ds “unless otherw ise provided by state statute.” Id.

I n addition to severa l other ar g uments, the d ef en d an t Cit y

soug ht to ex empt the files fr om dis c los ur e un de r R ule 1 6( a )( 2) of theTe nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re , w hic h s ta te s th a t it does not authorize the discove ry and inspec tion of reports or internal doc uments of law e nforc ement office rs “in connec tion with the investig ation or prose cution of the c ase. . . .” The Hol t court found the Rule inapplicable beca use the fi l e at i s s u e wa s a closed f ile, not pertinent to any

pending or contemplated c riminal investigation. Id. at 517.

The de fendants urg ed the Hol t court to adopt a

public policy

exception to the Public Record A c t , ar g u i n g t h a t d i s c l o s u r e o f s u c h p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e f i l e s w a s c o n tr ar y

t o p u b l i c p o l i c y

. In considering this arg ument, the court noted the 1984 amendme nt of Section 10-7-503, na rrowing the
e xemp tio n f

ro m di sc los ur e by

pr ov idi ng that a ll p ub lic re c or ds wo uld be op e n for ins pe c tio n “ un le ss otherwise pr ovided by

state statute.” Id. I nterpre ting the 1984 ve rsion of t he Act, the court declined to adopt a publi c poli cy

exception and held that “a public officia l can justify ref using a Tenne ssee citizen acce ss to a g overnme ntal rec ord only by proving by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the
rec ord in controve rsy

comes within a statutory exemption.” Id. at 517-18.T he l aw enf orce ment p r i vi l ege i s al s o r el at ed t o, an d t o s om e e xt ent over l aps wi t h, ot her pri vi l ege s der i ved 8
f r om t he exe cut i ve pri vi l ege , s uch as t he i nv es t i gat i ve pri vi l ege , t he i nv es t i gat ory f i l e pri vi l ege , t he s t at e s ecr et s pri vi l ege , t he del i bera t i ve proces s pri vi l ege , an d t he gover nment i nf ormat i on pri vi l ege

. Se e, e. g. , Boyd v. Ci t y and Count

y of San F r anci s co , 2 o 0 0 6 W L 1 1 4 1 2 5 1 , a t * 4 -5 (N .D

. C a l. M a y 1 , 2 0 0 6 ); R az v. M i l l er , 38 9 F.Sup p

. 2 d 10 5 7 (W

. D

. A rk. 20 0 5 ); Sw i ft , 159 S. W

. 3d a t 578; a n d In re M a rria g e o f D a n ie ls , 24 0 Il l

. A p p

. 3 d 31 4 , 32 9

- 3 3 (I l l

. A p p

. C t

. 19 9 2 ).
-14- I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t th e P ub li c Re cords Ac t w a s a me nd e d in19 84 to provide that public rec ords shall be open for inspection “unless provide d by state statutes,” and noted that the Tenne ssee Supre me court declined to adopt a public policy exception to the Act in Me mphis Pub lis hing Co. v . Ho lt

. The trial court did not mention the 1991 amendment to the P ublic Records A c t, a n d ap p e ar e d to ap p ly th e 1 9 8 4 v e r s io n w h ic h w a s in terpre ted in Holt . T his wa s e rr on e ou s. We must consider, then, whe ther the field i nterview car ds are protec ted from disclosure throug h an exemption under state law , not limi ted to an exemption under state sta tute
.
At the sh ow -c aus e he ari ng in the tria l c ou rt be low , a lth ou gh th e City arg ue d th a t th e fi e ld investigative car ds could be used to inve stigate or deter crime, it did not introduce into evidence any pr oo f that a ny

of thec ard s w e re pe rt ine nt t o a n o ng oin g inv e sti g a tio n at th a t ti me . T he re fo re , a s in Hol t , Rule 16 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedu re wo u l d n o t be applica ble. Hol t , 710 S.W .2d at 517. We look, then, at whether the field interview car ds are exempt from disclosure under some other “ state law,” considering first the common-law law enf orce ment privileg e.
2. Law Enf

orce m ent P rivilege

I n this case, the City

asks this Court to recog nize the common-law law enfor ceme nt investigative privileg e (he reina fter r efe rre d to as the “la w enf orce ment privileg e”) as a c ommon-law privileg e in Tennessee, and to hold that it exempts the field interview c ards f rom disclosure unde r section 10-7- 503(a) of the Public Recor ds Act. The la w enfor ceme nt privileg e shields from disclosure information that would be contra ry to the public interest in t he ef fec tive functioning of law enf orce ment. Ros se r v . City of Phi lad e lph ia , 2 00 5 WL

22 05 92 0, a t *1 (E .D

. P a. 2 00 5) ; see United Stat es v. My erson , 856 F.2d 481, 484 ( 2d Cir. 1988).

Rooted in th e fe d er al common l aw, the la w enf orce ment privileg e is derive d from the executive privileg e. See Black v. She r a to n Corp. of Am erica , 564 F.2d 531, 541–42 ( D.C. Cir. 8 19 77 ) ( ob se rv ing that th e la w e nf or c e me nt p ri vil e g e “ a sse rt e d here sh ares wi th tho se ty pic a lly la be le d ‘ e xec uti ve ’ a

jus tif ic a tio n r oo te d inthe ne e d to min imi ze d isc los ur e of do c umen ts w ho se reve lation might impair the ne cessa ry functioning of a de partment of t h e ex ec utive branc h.”). Exe c uti ve privi le g e is an o ft e n lo os e ly -u se d te rm re fe rring to se ve ra l re la te d, bu t di sti nc t, p ri vil e g e s. 26A C H A RLES A L AN W R I GH T & K EN N ET H W. G R A H AM , F ED ER AL P

RA C T I C E AN D P ROCEDURE § 5673 (2005). Give n the nomenclatur e problems inhere nt in any discussion of executive privileg e, we ref er to e xec uti ve privi le g e wi thi n th e br oa de r c on c e pt o f g ov e rn me nta l privi le g e s.

I n 1875, the United States Supreme Court, in Totten v. United States , explained: “I t may be stateda s a

g e n e r a l p r in c ip le , th a t p u b li c p o li c y f o r b id s th e main te n a n c e o f

a n y s u it ina c o u r t of jus tic e , th e tr ia l of w hic h w ou ld i ne vit ably le a d to the dis c los ur e of matte rs wh ic h th e la w i tse lfR eco gni zed unde r f ed eral co m m o n l aw, t he l aw enf o rcem ent p ri vi l ege i s al so co d i f i ed , “i nco rpo rat ed i nt o t he 9

var i ous s t at e a nd f

eder al f r eedom of

i nf ormat i on ac t s

. ” U ni t ed Stat es v. M ye r s on , 8 5 6 F.2d 4 8 1 , 4 8 3

- 8 4 (2d C i r. 19 8 8 );

se e a lso In re M a rria g e o f D a n ie ls , 607 N

. E. 2d 1255, 1263- 64 (I l l

. A pp. 1992). For ex ampl e, t h e I l l i n oi s Fr ee dom of Inf o rma t i o n A ct s p eci f

i cal l y exem p t s f

rom i nspecti o n:

R ecor ds com pi l ed by

. . . an y l aw e nf orce ment or c orr ect i onal ag enc y for l aw e nf orce ment pur po s es
or for i n t er n al ma t t er s of a pu bl i c body , bu t on l y t o t h e ex t en t t h at di s cl os u r e wou l d: (i ) i nt erf ere wi t h pe nd i ng or act ual l y and reas o nab l y co nt em p l at ed l aw enf o rcem ent p ro c e e d ing s c o n d u c te d b y a n y law e n fo rc e m e n t o r c o rr e c tio n a l ag e n c y; * * * ( i v) un avoi dabl y di s cl ose t he i dent i t y of a c onf i dent i al s our ce or c on fi d ent i al i nf ormat i on f

ur ni s hed onl y by t he conf i dent i al s our ce; (v) d i sc l o se un i q ue o r sp ec i ali ze d i nv esti ga t i ve t ec hn i q ue s o t he r t ha n tho se gen er al l y us ed and known or di s cl ose i nt er nal d ocument s of cor r ect i onal ag enc i es
r el at ed t o de t ec t i on , obs er v at i on or i n v es t i g at i on o f i n ci den t s of

c r i me or
m isc o n d u c t; * * * ( vi i ) en dange r t he l i fe or phy s i cal s af et y of l aw e nf orce ment per s onnel or any ot her per s on ; or (vi i i ) ob st ruct an ongo i ng cri m i nal i nvest i gat i o n.

Il l

. R ev. Stat

. 19 8 9 , ch. 11 6 , pa r. 20 7 (1)(c), ci t ed i n In re M a rria g e o f D a n ie ls , 607 N

. E. 2d a t 1263- 64.
-15- reg ards a s confidential, a nd respe cting which it will not allow the confidenc e to be viol ated.” Totten v. Uni ted States , 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). Arg uably , based in lar g e part on the holding in Totten
a ndthi s p art ic ula

r e xce rp t, a g e ne ra l ac kn ow le dg me nt e me rg e d th a t a n e xec uti ve , o r g ov e rn me nta l, privileg e to withhold various information fr om the public is nece ssary to e ffe ctively administer the Ex ecutive br anch. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds , 3 45 U. S. 1 (1 95 3) ; United Stat es v. N ixon , 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Car l Ze iss Stif

tung v . V .E. B. C ar l Z e iss , J e na , 40 F.R.D. 318 (D .D.C. 1966);
com pare M A RK J. R O ZELL , R ES T OR I N G B AL AN CE T O T

HE D EBA T

E O VER E

XEC UT I VE P RI VI L EG E : A
RE S PO N S E T O B ERGER , 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J . 541 (2000) with R A O U L B ER GER , E XE C UTI VE P R I VI L EG E : A C O N ST I T U T I O N A L M YT H 1 (1974) (ar g uing that the executive privileg e does not ha ve a Constituti onal basis, but is instea d “a product of the ninetee nth century , fashioned by a succ ession of pre s i d en t s who cr eate d ‘pre cede nts’ to suit t he occ asion.”). T he executive privilegeis not absolute, howeve r; it is a qualified privileg e, limit ed whe n the public intere st so demands. Ma the ws v . P y le , 251 P.2d 893, 896–97 (Ariz. 1952). I n apply ing the executive privileg e in a g iven ca se, the trial court must weig h the public intere st protected by the privileg e ag ainst the public interests served by disclosure. Black , 564 F.2d at 545. “A demonstrated, spec ific nee d for mate rial may prevail over a g ener alized assertion of pri v i l ege, but the c laimant must make a showing of nec essity sufficie nt to outweig h the adve rse e ffe cts the produc tion would eng ender .” Id . (citations omitted).

The law enfor ceme nt privilege protec ts f rom disclosure the f

iles of law e nforc ement off icer s wh e n d isc los ur e of

the do c ume nts mig ht i mpair the fu nc tio nin g of la w e nf or c e me nt. Rosser , 2005

9 WL 22 05 92 0, a t *1 ; Mo rri

se y v . City of

Ne w York , 171 F.R.D. 85, 90 (S. D. N. Y. 1997); se e als o Tuite v . He nry , 9 8 F .3 d 1 41 1, 14 16 -1 9 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 6) ; In re Se ale d Ca se , 856 F.2d 268, 271- 72 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 8) ; Black , 5 6 4 F

. 2 d 5 3 1 ( D

. C

. C i r

. 1 9 7 7) ; Tri-Star A irlin es, Inc. v. Willis Careen-16-

Corp. of Los Angeles , 7 5 F .Su pp .2 d 8 35 , 8 40 (W. D. Te nn . 1 99 9) ; In re the Ma rri ag e of Da nie ls , 60 7 N .E .2 d 1 25 5, 12 64 –6 5 (Ill. Ap p. Ct. 19 92 ); Rafuse v. Stryker , 8 13 N. E. 2d55 8, 56 2- 63 (M a ss. Ap p. Ct. 20 04 ); V

an H ine v . De p’ t of State of the Commonwe alt h of Pe nnsy lv ani

a , 856 A.2d 204, 208–09 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). “The purpose of [t he law enfor ceme nt] privileg e is to pre vent dis c los ur e of

la w e nf or c e me nt te c hn iqu e s a ndpr oc e du re s, to p re se rv e thec on fi de nti a lit y of so ur c e s, to protect witness a nd law enf orce ment personne l, to safeg uard the privac y of individuals involved in an investi g ation, and otherwise to preve nt interfer ence with an investig ation.” United Stat es v. Myerson , 856 F.2d 481, 484 ( 2d Cir. 1988).

The law enfor ceme nt privileg e is not limi ted to ong oing inve stigation s

. Nat’l Cong. for Pue rto Ric an Ri

ght s v . City of

Ne w York , 1 94 F.R .D. 88 , 95 (S .D . N .Y . 2 00 0) ; Morrisey , 171 F. R

. D. at9 0 (c i t i n g Borchers v. Com m ercial Un i o n A s s ur. Co. , 874 F.Supp. 78, 80 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)). The privileg e may apply to closed investig ative files when disclosure of information may imp a ir the abil ity

of la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs to co nd uc t futur e inv e sti g a tio ns or wo uldoth e rw ise endang er w itnesses or off

icer s. Black , 564 F.2d at 546 (stating, “ We rejec t plaintiff’s contention that the public intere st in nond i s closure c an be disre g arde d simplybeca use the princ ipal investigation inv olv e d h e re ha s a

pp are ntl y be e n c on c lud e d. ” ); Na t’ l Cong. fo r Pue rto Ric an Ri ght s , 194 F.R.D.
a t 95 ; Morrisey , 171 F.R.D. at 90.

Th e pa rty a sse rt ing the la w e nf

or c e me nt p ri vil e g e mus t make a th resho ld s ho wi ng that it applies. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. C orp. , 222 F.R.D. 51, 66 (E.D.N.Y

. 29004). To asse rt the privi le g e , c ou rt s h a ve art ic ulate d th re e re qu ir e me nts wh ic h mu st b e me t:
(1) there must be a formal claim of privileg e by the head of the departme n t h aving control over

the re quested information; (2) assertion of the privileg e mus t be base d on actua l personal c onsideration by that officia l; and (3) the inf ormation for w hich the privi le g e is c la ime d mu st b e sp e c if ie d w itha n e xpla natio n wh y it pr op e rl y fa lls within the scope of the privileg e.
In re Sea le d Ca se , 8 56 F .2 d 2 68 , 2 71 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also United States v. Rey nolds , 3 4 5 U

. S. 1 , 7

- 8 ( 1 9 5 3 )

. T h e p u rp o s e o f th e c o n d it io n s is to ma k e c e r tain that the privileg e is asserted in a deliberate and rea sonably specific manner

. In re Se ale d Ca se , 856 F.2d at 2 7 1 (c i t i n g Friedm an v. Bache Halsey StuartShi elds, Inc. , 738 F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

As wit hma n y g o v e rn me n ta

l p riv ile g es, the law enfor ceme nt privileg e is qualified, r ather than absolute; conseque ntly , the court must weig h the public’s intere st in nondisclosure of the privileg ed documents ag ain s t the petitioner’s ne ed for the information. Beretta U.S.A. Cor p. , 222 F.R.D. at 66 ; se e als o United Stat es v. Le ggett & Platt, In c. , 542 F.2d 655, 658–60 (6th Cir. 1976) (re fer ring to a “ qu a lif ie d g ov e rn me nta l of

fi c ia l in fo rm a tio n p ri vil e g e ” ); Ma c Wa de v . Ke lly , 230 F.R.D. 379, 381 (S.D. N.Y. 2005) ; F

r a n k e n h a u s e rv . Riz

zo , 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E .D. Pa. 1973) (a pplication of l a w e n f o r c e m e n ti n v e s t i g a t i v e p r i v i l e g e b a l a n c i n g t e s ti n f e d e r a l c i v i l r i g h t s l i t i g a t i o n )

. C o u r ts have e mphasized that “[t] he proc ess of indentifying and weighing the competing int ere sts cannot be avoided.” In re Se ale d Ca se , 856 F.2d at 272.-17-

Th e se min a l ca se on the we ig hin g of su c h c omp e tin g int e re sts is Fra nke nhaus e r v . Ri zzo , 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a fede ral civil rig hts case in which the plaintiffs soug ht to recove r damag es for

the death of a familymember w h o wa s s h o t an d k i lled by police. Id. at 339. The plaintiffs soug ht to discover witness stateme nts and the re ports of t he extensive police investig ation of the incide nt. Id. at 340-41. The Frankenh auser c ou rt re c og nize d the ne e d to bal a nc e the pu bli c int eres t in the c on fi de nti a lit y of theg ov e rn me nta l in fo rm a tio n a g a ins t th e ne e d o f the lit ig a nt t o obtain the information. Id. at 344. It stated:
[W]he n e xec uti ve privi le g e is a sse rt e d, the c ou rt mus t ba lanc e the pu bli c int e re st i n the c on fi de nti a lit y

of g ov e rn me nt i nf

orma tio n a g a ins t the ne e ds of a lit ig a nt t o o btain data, not otherwise available t o him, with which to pursue a non- frivolous cause of
a c tio n. Ne e dle ss t o s a y , th e ba la nc ing ta sk wi ll o ft e n b e dif fi c ult a ndthe ing re die nts of the tes t wi ll vary

from ca se to ca se. In the context of discovery of police investigation files in a civil rig hts case, how ever , at least the f ollowing considerations should b e examined: (1) the e x tent to which disclosure w ill thwart g overnme ntal proce sses by

discourag ing c itiz ens fr om g iving the g overnme nt information; (2) the impact upon per sons who have g iven i nformation of ha ving the ir identities disclosed; (3) the de g ree to which g overnme ntal self-e valuation and c onsequent prog ram imp ro ve me nt w ill be c hil le d b y dis c los ure; (4) whe the r the inf orma tio n s ou g ht i s fac tual data or evaluative summary ; ( 5) whether the party seeking the discovery

is an
a c tua l or po te nti a l de fe nd a nt i n a ny c ri min a l pr oc e e din g e ith e r pe nd ing or re a so na bly likely to follow from the incident in que stion; (6) whether the police investig ation has been c ompleted; (7) whe ther a ny intradepa

rtmental disciplinary

proce eding s have arisen or may arise f rom t h e i n v es t igation; (8) whetherthe plaintiff’s suit is nonfrivo lou s a nd br ou g ht in g oo d fa ith ; (9) wh e the r the inf orma tio n sou g ht i s a va ila

ble th roug h other discove ry

or fr om other sourc es; and (10) the importance of the information soug ht to the plaintiff’s ca se.
Id. T h is li s t h a s b e e n d e s c r ib e d a s “ il lu s tr a ti v e o f th e f a c to r s ” to b e c o n s id e r e d inb a lan c in g the competing interests in a g iven ca se. In re Se ale d Ca se , 856 F.2d at 272.
The pa rties have cited o n l y o n e Tenne ssee c ase that has addre ssed the law e nforc ement privileg e, Swif

t v . Ca mpbe ll , 159 S.W .3d 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). The Jack son Sun char acte rizes Swi ft as having considere d and re jected a doption of the law enfor ceme nt privilegein Tennesse e; the Citydescr

ibes the Swi

ft court a s simplyhaving declined t o rec og nize it i n that case . I n Swi ft , the
c ou rt re vie we d a

fe de ra l pu bli c defe nd er’s atte mpt to g a in a c c e ss, un de r the Te nn e sse e Pub lic Records Act, to a state assistant district attorney g ener al’s files pre pare d in the defe nse of a writ of

e rro r c oa m n ob is pro ce ed i n g in a fe dera l court. Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 568–69. I n resisting disclosure, the defe ndants arg ued that the doc uments were protec ted under , inte r a lia , Rule 16 of the Tenne ssee Rul es of Criminal Procedur e and the l aw enforc ement privileg e. Id. at 569-70. The Swi ft court fir st considere d in detail the State’s asse rtion that the d o cuments were c overe d by the Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 16( a)( 2) exception of records from disclosure. Rule 16(a )(2) pr ov ide s:-18-

(2) In for ma tio n No t Su bje c t to Di sc los ure
. Ex cept a s provided in (A) , (B ), and ( D) of subdivision (a)(1) , this rule does not authorize the discove ry or insp ec t i on of reports, memoranda, or

other interna l State documents made by the district attorney g ener al or other

State ag ents or law e nforc ement off icer s in connec tion with the investigation or prosec ution of t he case, or of st atements made by State Wit nesses or pr os pe c tiv e State Witn e sse s. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2) . The Swi ft court rec og nized the e arlier holding in Hol

t , discussed su

pr a , that Rule 16(a) (2) doe s not pro t ec t i n v es tigative files from disclosure unless the documents a re rele vant to a pending or conte mplated criminal action. Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 574-75

. After revie wing Tenne ssee c ases inter preting Rule 16, the Swi ft court observed t h at those ca ses demonstrated that Tennesse e courts would not p ermit a litigant to “use the public re cords statutes to o btain m or e dis c ov e ry than T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 6 p e rm its wh e n a c ri min a l in vest igat io n is in prog ress, a

criminal prose cuti on is pending , or whe n a prisoner is collatera lly

attacking his or her conviction in state court under the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t.” Id. at 575. Finding no rea son to d if fe re nti a te be tw e e n s ta te po st- c on vic tio n pro c e e din g s and fe de ra l hab e a s c or pu s p ro c e e din g s, the Swi ft c ou rt he ld that th e do c ume nts we reno t pu bli c re c or ds su bje c t to dis c los ur e un de r the pu bli c rec ords statute beca

use they wer e cove red by

Rule 16 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure

. Id. at 576.

Af t er holding that the documents we re shielde d from disclosure under Rule 16, the Swi ft court a ddresse d briefly

the S t at e’ s al ternate theory that the documents we re a lso protected f rom disclosure unde r the law enfor ceme nt privileg e:
The State a lso invokes what it calls the ‘law enfor ceme nt investigative privileg e’ a s a basis for not re leasing the re cords soug ht by Ms. Swift. I t points t o no Tenne ssee la w, statut ory

or oth e rw ise , th a t pu rp orts t o re c og nize thi s privi le g e , a nd it l ike wi se do es n o t explain how the contours of this privileg e diffe r fr om the provisions of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (2).

. . . Weighe d ag ainst the clea r state policy

favoring the op e nn e ss of g ov e rn me nta l re c or ds , the State ’s e ff orts to c on vin c e us to r e c og nize thi s ne w privi le g e fa ll sh ort.

. . . [W]e wi ll l e a ve it t o th e c ri min a l c ou rt s to a dd re ss this new privilege

. When public rec ords claims are involved, we will c ontinue to rely on Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16.

Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 578 (c itations omi tted). I n a footnote, the court noted that other jurisdictions wh ic h h a d r e c og nize d th e privi le g e didso to pr e ve nt dis c los ur e of la w e nf or c e me nt t e c hn iqu e s, to prese rve th e c o n f

id e n ti a li ty o f s o u r c e s , to p r o te c t w it n e s s e s a n d p r e v e n t in te r f e r e n c e w ith an investigation. The Swi

ft court observed, “ba sed on this description, there appea rs to be a substantial overla p betwee n this privilege and Te nn. R. Crim. P . 16(a) (2).” Id . at 578 n.15.

I n Swi ft , this Court clea

rly declined to rec og nize the law e nforc ement privileg e. Howe ver, this portion of the Court’s decision appe ars to be la rg ely dicta, since it affirme d the trial court’s judgme nt de ny ing acc ess to the documents based on Rule 16(a) (2). Therewas little discussion of-19-

the policy considerations underly ing the law enf orce ment privileg e, and no indica tion that there we re any documents at issue that would have been cover ed by the law enfor ceme nt privilege that wer e not also cover ed by Rule 16(a) (2). Unde r those cir cumstance s, the Swi ft court unde rstandably

declined to adopt the privileg e at that time, leaving it “to t he criminal courts to addre ss this new privilege .” Id. at 5 7 8. I n this case, howe ver, w e ar e squar ely prese nted with the issue of disclosure of do c ume nts no t c ov e re d b y Rul e 16 . T he re fo re , w e c a nn ot l e a ve it to the c ri min a l c ou rt s to a dd re ss another day , but must consider it now.

As no ted rep e a te dly

by thi s Co urt, ande mph a size d b y thetr ia l c ou rt

be low , th e Pub lic Records A ct was intended to be broad, an “all enc ompassing le g islative attempt to cover a ll printed matter cre ated or rec eived by g overnme nt in its off icial ca pacity .” Swi

ft , 159 S.W .3d at 571 (quoting Bd. of Edu. o

f M em p h i s City Schools v. Mem phis Pu bl’g Co. , 5 85 S.W. 2d62 9, 63 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 79 )) . I nd e e d, the Ac t itse lf ma nd a te s a br oa d c on str

uc tio n “ so a s to g ive the fu lle st p os sib le
a c c e ss t o p ub lic re c or ds .” T. C.A . § 10 -7 -5 05 (d ). I n the fa c e of thi s c le ar l e g isl a tiv e po lic y , u nle ss an exemption is clearly

mandated, “ we must requir e disclosure even i n t h e fa ce of ‘serious counter vailing c onsiderations.’ ” Swi ft , 1 5 9 S

. W

. 3 d at5 7 2 (q u o t i n g Mem phis Publ’g Co. v. City of Me mphis , 871 S.W .2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994) ). More over, the rec og niti o n of privileg es fr om disclosure is “strong ly

disfavore d beca

use they are in derog ation o f t h e sear ch for truth.” In re Ma rri ag e of Da nie ls , 607 N.E.2d at 1262. B eca use privileg es work to “ protec t interests which a re outside of the truth-se eking proce ss,” they must be strictly

construed. Id.

No tw ith stand i n g th e s ew e i g h ty f a c t o r s m i ti g ati n g i nf

a vo r o f d isc los ur e , c ou rt s h a ve g e ne ra lly
a c te d to pr e ve nt i nte rf

e re nc e wi th the e sse nti a l g ov e rn me nta l f un c tion of cri min a l in ve sti g a tio ns

. Id. I nd e e d, the imp orta nc e of the of t- re c ite d ob

je c tiv e s of the la w e nf

or c e me nt privi le g e c a n h ard ly be under stated: preve nting disclosure of law e nforc ement tec hniques and proc edure s, p ro t ecting wi tne sse s a ndla w e nf

or c e me nt pe rs on ne l, g ua

rd ing the priva c y of

tho se inv olv e d ininv e sti g a tio ns , and other wise pre venting interfe renc e with an investig ation. Se e U ni ted States v. Myerson , 856 F.2d 48 1, 48 4 ( 2dCir . 1 98 8) ; Black v. S heraton Corp. of Am erica , 564 F.2d 531, 545 ( D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is indeed a public interest in minimi zing di sclosure of documents that would tend to re veal la w e nf or c e me nt i nv e sti g a tiv e te c hn iqu e s o r s ou rc e s. ” ); Otterson v

. N a t’ l R

. R. P

a s s e ng er Corp. , 228 F .R. D. 20 5, 20 7 ( S.D . N .Y . 2 00 5) ; In re Ma rri ag e of Da nie ls , 607 N.E.2d at 1265.
Given the importance of the i ntere sts protec ted by the l aw enforc ement privileg e, we find that it must be re cog nized under Tenne ssee c ommon law. Se e In re Marri ag e of Da nie ls , 607 N. E. 2da t 12 64 (“ We .

. . no te that no oth e r j urisd ic tio n w hi ch has faced th is i ssu e ha s r e fu se d toB ut s ee M acl ay v. Jon es , 5 4 2 S .E .2d 8 3 (W .V a. 2 0 0 0 ), i n w hich t he W est V i rginia co urt st ated t ha t “W est 10
V i rgi ni a is n o t a m o n g th e group of st at es t hat have cho sen t o recognize a quali f i ed pri vi l ege fo r l aw enf o rcem ent i nv es t i gat ory mat er i al s

. ” Id. at 85. T he M acl ay co ur t went o n t o, howev er , i n e f fect , appl y t he pri vi l ege , hol di ng t hat wh en t h e t r i al c ou r t i s a s k ed t o pe r mi t di s cov er y of i nt ernal pol i ce i n v es t i g at or y ma t er i al s , t h e mat er i al s w ou l d be di s cl os ed on l y i f

t h e par t y ’ s n ee d for t h e mat er i al s “ ou t we i g h s t h e pu bl i c i n t er es t i n mai n t ai n i n g t h e con f i den t i al i t y of

su c h info rm a tio n ,” a n d instr u c ting the lo w e r c o u rt to “c o n sid e r w h e the r a n y p e r c e iv e d a d v e rs e e ff e c ts to the p u b lic i nt er es t i n mai nt ai ni ng conf i dent i al i t y ca n e i t her be el i mi nat ed or r educe d t hr ough t he us e of an appropri at el y dra wn prot ect i ve order

. ” Se e M acl ay , 542 S. E. 2d a t 90.
-20- adopt or re cog nize the [ law enf orce ment] privil eg e.”) ; see also Black , 5 6 4 F

. 2 d a t 542 (the 10 privileg e is “roote d in common sense as w ell as common law.” )
We must address, howeve r, the paramete rs of the l aw enforc ement privil eg e. The Jack son Sun arg ues that information which is not part of a c urre nt, ongoing investigation should not be shielded fr om discovery , and notes that the City made no showing that the field intervie w ca rds wer e pa rt of a c ur re nt i nv e sti g a tio n. I nd e e d, it i s u nd isp ute d th a t th e fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s a rese pa rate fr om the fi le s o n matte rs un de r i nv e sti g a tio n; s ub je c ts o f the c ard s ma y or

ma y no t be inv olv e d in an ong oing inve stigation as a subject, witness, sourc e or informant. The law enfor ceme nt privileg e, howeve r, is clea

rly not restricte d to only

ong oing inve stigations; i f it were , as noted in Swi ft , there
wo uldbe lit tle po int

to r e c og nizi ng a privi le g e wh os e c on tou rs do no t sig nif ic a ntl y dif

fe r fr om R ule 16(a) (2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure

. Swi ft , 159 S.W .3d at 578 n.15. I n a number of instance s, t h e privileg e is applica ble to documents which a re not ne cessa

rily files on the investigation of a specific suspect or a specific c rime. See, e.g. , Ma c Wa de v . Ke lly , 230 F.R.D. 379, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (plaintiff subway riders f iled suit under Section 1983 to invalidate police pr og ram of

rand oml y

se arc hin g su bw a y

ri de rs ’ b a c kp a c ks in e ff

ort to de te c t a ndde te r t e rr orism ; information on the fr equenc y and location of subway s ea rche s cover ed by law enf orce ment privi le g e ); Na t’ l Co ng. fo r Pue rto Ric an Ri ght s , 194 F.R.D. at 94 (plaintiff civil rig hts org anization
acc used police of

suspicionless stops of y oung black and Hispanic men, soug ht police memoranda
on plans fo r d e plo y me nt , id ent it yof of fi c e rs , la w e nf

or c e me nt s tr a te g y

a ndta c tic s; c ou rt

he ld privi le g e app lie d to do c ume nts on inv e sti g a tory te c hn iqu e s a ndstr a te g ie s) ; see also Black , 564 F.2d at 546. Ther efor e, we hold that the common-law law enforce ment privileg e is not limi ted to ong oing investigations. Se e Na t’ l Co ng. fo r Pue rto Ric an Ri ght s , 194 F.R.D. at 95 (“An inve stigation need not be ong oing for the law enforce ment privileg e to apply as ‘the ability of a la w enf orce ment ag ency to conduct future investigations may be ser i o u s l yimpaired if c erta in information is revea led’” (citations omitted)).

We hold that the law enf

orce ment privileg e is applica ble to the field interview car ds at issue in th is c a s e

. A t th e s h o w
- c au s e h e ar in g inth e tria l c o u r t b e lo w , Po li c e D e p ar tm e n t s upervisory personne l, inc luding the Chief of the Police Depa rtment, the division commander, the commander of the violent crimes unit, and the commander of t he gang enfor ceme nt unit, all testi fied ba sed on persona l knowledg e, desc ribing the information in the field interview cards and explaining how they
wer e used to identify

suspects, witnesses, informants, to gather information on t h e l o cations of criminal or g ang -re lated activity , and how disclosure of the car ds would g ive criminals information
on po li ce tac tic s a ndle a d to int imi datio n o r e ve n p hy sic a l ha rm to w itn e sse s a ndinf

orma nts

.-21-

Clearly , the City has met the re quirements for asserting the privilege

. See Rey nolds , 345 U.S. at 7-8; In re Se ale d Ca se , 856 F.2d at 271.
At this point , then, “the c ou rt m u s t b alanc e the public inter est in the confide ntialityof g ov e rn me nta l in fo rm a tio n a g a ins t th e ne e ds of [the ] liti g a nt t o o btain d a ta , n ot oth e rw ise a va ila ble to him. . . .” Frankenh auser , 59 F.R.D. at 344. At the hearing be low, the Cityoffe red c ompelling testimonyon sever al of the applicable factors, such as the extent to which disclosure would thwart la w e nf or c e me nt, the po te nti a l f

or ha rm to w itn e sse s a ndinf

orma nts re su lti ng fr om h a vin g the ir identities disclosed and the de g ree to which the coope ration of persons interviewe d would be chilled by such disclosure. From the re cord, w e know that much of the information in the field interview
car ds is factua l, although w e do not know if some of it is evaluatory , such as the police office r’s
c o m m e n t s

. C l e ar l y, t h e l a w s u i tb y The Jack son Sun is “ non-frivolous a nd broug ht in good f aith.” Id. Howeve r, bec ause the trial court did not recog nize or apply the law e nforc ement privileg e, the
rec ord does not include evidence on the i mportance of t he field interview cards to the ne wspape r or whether the information soug ht is available fr om other sourc es. Id.

Th e r e f o r e , w h i l e t h e c o n c e r n s r a i s e d b y t h e C i t y ar e g r a v e a n d w e i g h h e a v i lya g a ins t disclosure, the r ecor d is insufficient fo r t h i s Court to eng ag e in the nec essary weig hing of

the
c omp e tin g int e re sts . In li g ht o f this , w e mus t va c a te the or de r o f the tria l c ou rt re qu ir ing the City to g ive the n ew s p ap er ac cess to the f ield interview c ards and rema nd the cause to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this Opini on. I n addition, in v i ew of the a bove holding , the
a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s fo r the City ’s failu re to dis c los e the fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s is re ve rs e d. Al l
rema ining issues a s to the field interview car ds are prete rmitted.

B. The Diam ond Jaxx Docume nts

The sec ond issue the Cityraises on a ppeal is the trial court’s awa rd of attorney ’s fee s to The Jack son Sun f

o r th e Ci ty ’ s w il lf

u l f a il u r e to r e s p o n d to th e r e q u e s ts f o r th e D iamo n d Ja xx do c ume nts

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g wa s b a se d inpa rt on its fi nd ing that th e City ha d n o le g a l ba sis for r efusing to respond to The Jack son Sun’s re p ea t ed re q u es t s fo r t h e d o cu m en t s

. Af t era h ea ri n g, the tr ia l c ou rt

a wa rd e d a jud g me nt f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to thePe tit ion e rs

.
Tenne ssee Code Annotated §10-7-505(g ) of the P ublic Records A ct provides f or the a war d of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s:

I f the c ou rt

fi nd s that the g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty , o r a g e nt the re of , r e fu sin g to d isc los e a record, knew that such re cord w as public and w illfullyref used to disclose it, such court may , in its di scre tion, assess all rea sonable c osts involved i n o btaining the
rec ord, including rea sonable attorney ’s fe es, against the nondisclosing g overnme ntal
e n t i t y. T.C.A. § 10-7-505( g ) (1999). The require ment that the failure to disc lose be willful and knowing is sy nony mous to a bad fa ith requireme nt. Arnol d v. City of Chattan ooga , 19 S.W .3d 779 , 789-22-

(Tenn. Ct

. App. 1999). Conseque ntly , a g ood faith belief that the re fusal to disclose is justified limit s the availability of attorney ’s fe es. See The Tennessean v. City of Le banon , 2004 WL 290705,
a t *9 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. F e b. 13 , 2 00 4) . I f the wi thh old ing g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty a c ts w itha

g oo d f a ith belief that the rec ords ar e ex cepte d from the disclosure requireme nts of t he P ublic Records A ct, an
awa rd of attorney ’s fe es is not w arr anted. Te nnessee courts will not impute to the gove rnment “a duty to forete ll an uncert ain juridicial future .” Me mphis Publ ’g Co. v . City of Me mphis , 871 S.W .2d 681, 689 (Tenn. 1994)

.
I n th is c a se , to de te rm inewh e the r an award of att orne y ’s fe e s w a s p ro pe r, we mus t f ir st
asce rtain whe ther ther e was in fac t a viol ation of t he P ublic Records A ct with respe ct to the Diamond J axx documents. On Oc tober 26, 2004, the le tter fr om coun s el for The Jack son Sun to the City stated: “should the owne rs of the Diamond J axx provide the City with any ‘notices of

reloc ation,’ that the Cityprovide to The [ Jack son ] Sun copies of the notices, along with any related documents.” I t is undisput ed that, at that time, the City had not y et received the reque sted documents fr om the te a m’ s o wn e r, L ozin ak Ba se ba ll. On De c e mbe r 14, 20 04 , a re po rt e r f ro m The Jack

son Sun se nt a letter to May or Fa

rmer reque sting “ac cess to a ll f inancial statements betwe en the West Tenne ssee Diamond J axx and the Cityof Jackson, or any financ ial documentation . . . including but not lim ited to, any financ ial statement(s) de monstrating how the J axx have lost at le ast $150,000 a y ear over the last two baseba ll seasons.”

On Janu ary

26 , 200 5, thi s law su it wa s file d, a lle g ing that th e City wi llf ull y faile d to dis c los e the Diamond Jax x documents re quested. The Notice of Termination and

th ea c companying f

inancial information wer e deliver ed to the City two day s later, on January 28, 2005. On Februa

ry 3, 2005, counsel for

the Diamond Jax x sent the City a letter admonishing the City not to disclose the financ ial documentation, re ly ing on the confide ntialityclause in the Ag ree ment. Both the J anuary 28, 2005 No t i ce an d t h e F eb ru ar y

3 , 2 0 0 5 l et t erwe re p ro d u ce d at t h e Fe b ru ar y 7 , 2 0 0 5 s h o w- ca u s e h ea ri n g; the fi na nc ia l do c ume ntatio n w a s a lso pr od uc e d at th a t ti me . T he tria l c ou rt or de re d th e City

to produce the re maining D iamond J axx documents in its Febr uary 28, 2005 letter ruling . On Marc h 28 , 2 00 5, thetria l c ou rt

iss ue d a no the r l e tte r r

uli ng in w hic h it

fo un d, in p art :
Withre fe re nc e to the Di a mon d Jaxx doc ume nts , it is c le ar f ro m th e re c or d th a t so me fo the fina ncial documents and the letter of intent wer e not in the possession of the [C ity ] unt il after the lawsuit was filed. The re was a ppare ntly other doc uments in the po sse ssi on of the[City ] re la tin g to the Di a mon d Jaxx iss ue wh ic h th e y didpo sse ss, bu t w hic h w e re no t fu rn ish e d un til a ft e r the la ws uit wa s fi le d, a lth ou g h tw o r e qu e sts ha d b e e n ma de prior

to the su it.

The trial c ourt did not elaborate on which doc uments were in the City ’s possession prior to the filing of the law suit, but awarde d attorney ’s fe es on this issue in the amount of $3,085.

The P ubli c Re c o r d s A c t s tate s b r o a d ly th a t p u b li c r e c o r d s ar e to b e “ o p e n f o r p e rsonal ins pe c tio n b y

a ny c iti zenof

Te nn e sse e

. . . . ” T. C.A . § 10 -7- 50 3(a)

. Th e te rm “ pu bli c re c or d” is define d as “doc uments . .

. made or rec eived pursuant to la w or ordina nce or in connec tion with theT here was no showing b el o w, a n d th e P e tit i o ners do not argue on ap p eal , t hat Lo zi nak B aseba l l was “ t he 11
f un ct i onal equi val ent of a g over nment al ag enc y

. ” S ee M em p h i s P u b l ’g C o . v. C h ero k ee C h i l d ren & F a m i l

y S erv i ce s, I nc. , 87 S.W

. 3 d 67 , 79 (T enn. 20 0 2 ).
-23- transac tion of officia l business by any g overnme ntal ag ency

. ” T

. C

. A. § 10-7-301( 6). Unde r the express terms of the statute, then , the document be comes a public rec ord whe n it is “made or
r e c e i v e d ” b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y.

I t is undisput ed that the Dia mond J axx documents in question were g ener ated by L ozinak B a s e b a l l

. T h e r e f

o r e , t h e y b e c a m e “ p u b l i c r e c o r d s ” o n l y w h e n r e c e i v e d b y t h e C i t y. 11

A s t o e a c h r e q u e s tm a d e b y The Jack son Sun , th e Ci ty w a s r e q u ir e d o n ly to p r o d u c e the public rec ords re sponsive to the reque st which wer e in its possession at the time of the re quest. The f i r s t r e q u e s tb y The Jack

son Sun asked the Cityto give it acce ss to any notices of r elocation and
re la te d d oc ume nts “ sh ou ld the ow ne rs of theDi a mon d Jaxx pr ov ide theCity ” wi th s uc h d oc ume nts

. Under the lan gu age of the Public Recor ds Act, the City was re quired to produc e re sponsive documents in its posses sion at that time. No lang uag e in the Ac t indicates that a c itiz en, or a newspa per, is entitled to expect the g o v er n m en tal entity to retain a

“continuing reque st” for responsive documents that may come into its possession i n the future . Governmental entities rec eive inn ume ra ble re qu e sts fo r doc ume nts pu rs ua nt to the Ac t, rang ing fr om d oc ume nts re la te d to hig hly publicized matters to munda ne reque sts. The Ac t does not place upon the g overnme ntal entity the duty to c ontinue indefinitely to look for re sponsive documents that may come into its possession at
so me po int

a ft e r the date it r e c e ive d th e re qu e st.

I n its March 28, 2005 letter , the trial court indicated t h at t h e Cityhad “some ” fina ncial d o c u m e n t s i n i t s p o s s e s s i o n a tt h e t i m e o f a tl e a s to n e o f t h e r e q u e s t s b y The Jack son Sun . The trial court did not identify

the documents to which it re fer red. TheCityalleg es that any of the fina ncial inform at ion reg arding the Diamond Jax x would have f allen under

the rubric of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 10- 7-504(a )(6) , which exempts from disclosure “ state ag ency rec ords containing opinions of value of r eal a nd persona l propert y i n t en d ed to be a cquire d for a public purpose. . . .” Since the City

was at the time considering acquiring the team, pursuant to the terms of its Ag ree ment wi th L ozin ak B a seb all , th e Ci ty arg ue s, a ny

do c ume nts in i ts p os se ssi on a t th a t ti me wo uldfa ll within this exemption.

Since th e tria l c o u r t d idn o t i d e n ti f y th e d o c u me n ts it

f o u n d to h a v e b e e n inth e City ’s p o s s e s s i o n a t t h e t i m e o f a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e r e q u e s t s b y The Jack

son Sun , we c annot know fr om the appellate rec ord whether these documents wer e arg uably subject to the exemption in section 10-7- 504(a) (6). I f the City

withheld the documents ba s ed o n a g ood faith belief that they wer e exempt from disclosure pursuant to this statutory p ro vision, an awa rd of attorney ’s fe es would not be appropriate. See Memph is Publ’g Co. , 871 S.W .2d at 689.

Since we a

re una ble on this r ec o rd t o d et ermine whether the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es wa s appropriate as to any of the Dia mond J axx documents, we must remand to the trial c ourt on this issue-24-

as we ll, for reconsider ation and appropriate findings of fac t. On remand, an award of attorney ’s fe es would be wa

rranted only

for knowing ly

and willful l y wi thholding docume nts responsive to the Petitioners’ reque sts, without a good f aith belief that the documents wer e exempt from disclosure, and only as t o responsive documents in the C ity ’s pos session at the time it rec eived the r equest. On this basis, the awar d of attorne y ’s fe es as to the Diamond J axx documents must be vacated and the
cause rema nded for

further proce eding s on this is sue.

I n a dd iti on , the tr ia l cou rt iss ue d a perma ne nt an d mand a tory inj un c tio n r e qu ir ing the City to re sp on d in writi ng to a ll fu tur e writt e n pu bli c re c or ds re qu e sts fr om The Jack son Sun , o r i ts a g e nts , explaining whethe r the re cord soug ht would be produc ed an d , if not, the basis for nondisclosure

. We find no authority under the Act for a permanent, mandatory injunction such as this. I n view of
our holding in this case , the injunction must be vacated as well. All othe r issues raised on ap peal as to the Diamond Jax x documents ar e pre termitted.

IV . C ON CL USI ON

The trial c ourt’s judg ment ordering the Cityto disclose the field in t er view ca rds to the Petitioners is vacate d and the cause rema nded to the trial court f or further proc eeding s on this is sue. The a war d of attorne y ’s fe es to the Petitioners for the City ’s failure to disclose the fie ld interview
c ard s is re ve rs e d. Th e a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a s to the Di a mon d Jaxx do c ume nts is v a c a te d a s w e ll, and the cause rema nded for further proce eding s on this issue. Additionally , the tr i al court’s mandatory

injunction ag ainst the C ity is vacated. Costs of t his appea l are taxed one-half a g ainst the Respondent/Appellant C ity of Jackson and one- half a g ainst the Petitioner/Appellees Richa rd Sc hn e ide r, Ta

juana Che sh ie r, Jami e Pa g e , a ndthe Gann e tt Sate lli te I nf orma tio n N e tw or

k, a ndthe ir
s u r e t i e s , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.



### ___________________________________ HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE