Docket No. 88670–Agenda 5–November 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

								HAROLD RICHARDSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 19, 2001.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the

court:

	Defendant, Harold Richardson, was convicted of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 1994)) and aggravated

criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–14(a)(2) (West 1994))

following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, and

sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 34 and 6 years

respectively. On direct appeal, defendant sought a new sentencing

hearing, arguing that the trial court improperly considered multiple

victim impact statements in violation of the Rights of Crime

Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and that the provision of the Act prohibiting its use as a

ground for appellate relief was unconstitutional. The appellate

court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No. 1–98–1348

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed

defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

	The evidence adduced at trial established that defendant and

several others participated in the sexual assault, beating and

strangulation of Nina Glover. At sentencing, the State presented

the written victim impact statements of Glover’s two daughters and

of her mother. Defendant argues before this court that the trial

court’s consideration of three victim impact statements violates the

plain language of the Act. We agree.

	“In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task is

to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). The language of the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the

language is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort

to aids of statutory construction. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42. Further, a statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Because the construction of a statute is a question of

law, our review is de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d at 457.

	Section 6(a) of the Act sets forth the right of the victim to

present a victim impact statement for the court’s consideration at

the sentencing of a defendant convicted of a violent crime. 725

ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1998). The statutory definition of “crime

victim,” for purposes of section 6(a), includes “a single

representative who may be the spouse, parent, child or sibling of a

person killed as a result of a violent crime perpetrated against the

person killed.” 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). It is therefore

clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute that,

while Nina Glover’s parent or either of her two children could have

qualified as the “crime victim” under section 3(a)(3), the trial court

did not comply with the Act where it accepted and considered the

victim impact statements of all three persons rather than of “a

single representative” of the deceased. 720 ILCS 120/3(a)(3)

(West 1998); see People v. Benford, 295 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700 (1998).

	Having found a violation of the statute, the issue before this

court becomes whether the trial court’s improper consideration of

multiple victim impact statements entitles defendant to a new

sentencing hearing. Defendant acknowledges section 9 of the Act,

which states: “Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating

a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.”

725 ILCS 120/9 (West 1998). Defendant contends that section 9

is unconstitutional because it violates two provisions of the Illinois

Constitution of 1970, the separation of powers clause set forth in

article II, section 1 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1), and the right to

appellate review guaranteed by article VI, section 6 (Ill. Const.

1970, art. VI, §6). However, it is unnecessary to address these

arguments because we find another provision of our state

constitution dispositive of this issue.

	Article I, section 8.1, of the Illinois Constitution (the

Amendment), an amendment adopted November 3, 1992, is

entitled “Crime Victim’s Rights” and states, in part, that “[c]rime

victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as provided by law: *** [t]he right to make a statement to the court at sentencing.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§8.1(a)(4). Thus, here, because section 3(a)(3) of the Act defines

“crime victim” to mean “a single representative *** of a person

killed,” the Amendment would allow for only one victim impact

statement to be made to the court at sentencing. 725 ILCS

120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). However, like the Act, the Amendment

further provides: “Nothing in this Section or in any law enacted

under this Section shall be construed as creating a basis for

vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any

criminal case.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(d). Thus, defendant is

prohibited by our constitution from seeking appellate relief on the

ground that more than one victim impact statement was presented

and considered at his sentencing.

	The United States Constitution does not require the states to

grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review

alleged trial court errors. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 827, 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985). Illinois, however, has

granted criminal defendants the right to appeal “final judgments of

a Circuit Court,” in article VI, section 6, of our state constitution.

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Thus, it is incumbent upon this court

to harmonize, if practicable, article I, section 8.1(d), and article VI,

section 6, which initially appear to be in conflict. See Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200, 203 (1973).

	All parts of the constitution must be construed together and,

although one article or section is entitled to the same weight as any

other article or section, the whole must be construed so that the

general intent will prevail. People ex rel. Wellman v. Washburn, 410 Ill. 322, 328 (1951); see also Herget National Bank v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2d 405, 410 (1985). Additionally, while one clause will not

be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the

two can be made to stand together (Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d at 203), a specific constitutional provision will prevail over a general

section if the two are incompatible (Walker v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543, 556 (1976)). Further, as this court stated in Wellman:

		“The bill of rights incorporated in our constitution is a

restatement and adoption of the very principles upon which our freedom is based and is generally admitted to be

our greatest heritage. Where any act of the legislature or

other provision of the constitution, in a particular case,

tends to infringe upon the rights thus preserved, we must

assume that it was the intent of the framers thereof that

there should be no curtailment of such rights.” Wellman, 410 Ill. at 328-29.

	Considering the above stated principles, we find that article I,

section 8.1(d), as part of the bill of rights and as the more specific

provision, must be read as a limitation on the appellate jurisdiction

granted by article VI, section 6. See In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192 (1999). As the titles of the Amendment and the Act

suggest, their drafters intended them to serve “as a shield to

protect the rights of victims,” and expressly delineated that their

provisions “not be used as a sword by criminal defendants seeking

appellate relief.” See Benford, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 700. We therefore hold, based on its plain and explicit language, that article

I, section 8.1(d), specifically removes victims’ rights from the

spectrum of issues which a criminal defendant may appeal.

	Defendant agrees that section 8.1(d) operates to restrict

appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases if the basis for relief is “any

law enacted under” the Amendment. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§8.1(d). However, defendant contends that section 3(a)(3) of the

Act is not a law enacted “under” the Amendment because the

statutory restriction on who constitutes a crime victim set forth in

section 3(a)(3) precludes it from being a law that “enforce[s]” the

Amendment, as required by section 8.1(b). Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§§§8.1(b), (d). We disagree. While section 8.1(b) states that “[t]he

General Assembly may provide by law for the enforcement of this

[Amendment],” this language does not establish a test for

determining which pieces of legislation trigger the protections of

section 8.1(d). Although section 3(a)(3) of the Act was amended

effective January 1, 1994, to limit the definition of crime victim to

“a single representative” of the deceased, section 3(a)(3) is still a

law which enforces the Amendment. See 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3)

(West 1994). As we have noted, section 8.1(a) states that crime

victims, “as defined by law,” are entitled to the rights set forth in

the Amendment “as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(a). Thus, defendant cannot avoid the constitutional preclusion

of appellate relief by claiming that section 3(a)(3), a law defining

“crime victim” as contemplated by section 8.1(a), was not enacted

to enforce the Amendment.

	Finally, we believe it important to note that the prohibition on

appellate relief for violations of the Act or the Amendment does

not alleviate the trial court’s responsibility to exercise appropriate

discretion at sentencing. This court has found that the Act does not

require the consideration at sentencing of any and all victim impact

evidence without regard for its relevance or materiality. See People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 49, 53 (1998) (the Act “does not contemplate, and we will not condone, an expansion of victim

impact statements to include evidence from victims other than the

victims of the offense on trial”; such evidence is irrelevant and

therefore inadmissable). Indeed, the portion of the Act which

provides that “[t]he court shall consider any statements made by

the victim” is not mandatory in nature and does nothing to indicate

what weight should be given to victim impact evidence, nor does

it indicate what sentence should be imposed. 725 ILCS 120/6(a)

(West 1998); People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 539 (1989).

	This court has further warned that Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), which

established the admissibility of victim impact evidence at

sentencing, “ ‘ “does not give the prosecution a free rein to

introduce and argue anything it wants.” ’ ” Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 48, quoting People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 338 (1992). “ ‘In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that

it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.’ ”

Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 338, quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.

	In the instant case, however, defendant has not made a

substantial showing that his right to due process was violated by

the introduction of multiple victim impact statements at his

sentencing. It is well established that where a sentencing hearing is

conducted before the trial court rather than a jury, the court is

presumed to consider only competent and relevant evidence in

determining sentence. People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494, 508 (1995). As the appellate court observed, the State herein did not

argue the content of the three victim impact statements as a factor

in aggravation and, although the trial court stated that it had read

the same statements at a codefendant’s sentencing hearing, the

court did not mention the statements when imposing defendant’s

sentence. Therefore, we hold that while the trial court erred in

admitting and considering multiple victim impact statements,

defendant has offered nothing to support a finding that the

statements unduly prejudiced the trial court such that defendant’s

sentencing hearing was rendered fundamentally unfair. See

Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d at 508.

	Accordingly and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the appellate court.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:

	Although I agree with the majority that the judgment of the

appellate court should be affirmed, I disagree with the majority’s

conclusion that the trial court improperly considered three victim

impact statements in violation of the plain language of the Rights

of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)). As the majority recognizes, this court must look to

the language of the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and

must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary

meaning. Slip op. at 1. In finding that the trial court improperly

considered three victim impact statements, the majority focuses on

section 3(a)(3) of the Act, which defines a crime victim as a “single

representative” of the deceased. 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West

1998). Based upon that definition, the majority then concludes that

the trial court “did not comply with the Act where it accepted and

considered the victim impact statements of all three persons rather

than of  ‘a single representative’ of the deceased.” Slip op. at 2,

quoting 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998).

	I believe that a plain reading of the statute compels a different

conclusion in this case. Section 6(a) of the Act provides that where

“a victim of [a] violent crime is present in the courtroom at the time of the sentencing ***, the victim upon his or her request shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the

defendant’s criminal conduct *** has had upon the victim.”

(Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1998). Reading

section 3(a)(3) of the Act together with section 6 of the Act, then,

only a single representative of Nina Glover could have requested

an opportunity to address the court at sentencing regarding the

impact of defendant’s crime. Such a situation, however, was not

presented in this case.

	Here, it was the State that presented the written victim impact

statements of Nina Glover’s two daughters and her mother. Slip

op. at 1. I agree with Justice Miller, writing separately in a prior

decision of this court, that section 6 of the Act “applies when the

victim, on his or her own initiative, wishes to address the

sentencing court; section 6 does not purport to limit the evidence

that the prosecution may otherwise introduce in aggravation.”

People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 55 (1998) (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). During the aggravation and mitigation

phase of a sentencing hearing, a sentencing judge has wide

discretion concerning the sources and types of evidence used to

assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be

imposed. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). The only limitation on the admission of evidence is that the evidence must be

reliable and relevant. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 322.

	Because the three victim impact statements at issue in this case

were introduced by the State in aggravation, section 6 of the Act

did not limit the trial court’s consideration of those statements. To

hold otherwise “threatens to severely limit the prosecution’s ability

to present relevant, reliable evidence in aggravation” and

“transforms what was designed to provide a benefit to victims and

witnesses into a shield for their offenders.” Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 56 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The trial

court’s decision to admit multiple victim impact statements in this

case was a matter of discretion. Of course, the trial court must

exercise appropriate discretion at sentencing and must consider the

relevance and materiality of victim impact evidence. Slip op. at 5.

There is no evidence in this case, however, that the trial court

abused its discretion in considering the victim impact statements. Consequently, I believe that the trial court did not violate the Act

when it considered multiple victim impact statements, and I

disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it holds to the

contrary.