T h is c o u rt c o n so lid a te d th e p e tit io n e r’ s tw o c a se s. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te mb er 24, 200 8

MIC HAE L H. PA LME R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Sul livan Cou nty Nos. C53,731; C53,471 R obert H. M ontgomer y, Jr., Judge

No. E2007-02538-CC A-R3- PC - Filed Mar ch 10, 2009

The pe titioner, Michael H. Palmer , appea ls the dismis sal of hi s pro se pe titions for post-c onviction 1

re lie f i n th e Cr imi na l Co urt for Sul liv a n Coun ty. He c la ims to ha ve e nte re d guil ty ple a s to re c kle ss endange rment and te lephone ha rassment a nd to have e ntere d a nolo contende re ple a to assault. On
appea l, he contends that the trial court erre d in dismi ssing the petitions wit hout appointing counsel and in re fusing to rescind the or der dis m i s s i n g t h e post -convic tion petitions . We a ffirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed

J OS EP H M. T I P TO N , P.J., delivered the opinion of the c ourt, in which D AVI D H. W ELL ES and J ERRY L. S MIT H , JJ., joined.

Ben H. Houston, Knoxville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Michae l H. Palmer.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l an d R eporter; Cameron L. H yder, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gre eley Wells, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; and Tere sa Ann Nelson, Assistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Th e brie f r e c or d r e ve a ls the fo llo wi ng fa c ts. Th e pe tit ion e r f ile d tw o mo tio ns “ fo r p os t sentenc e re lief” f

rom his three convictions in two case s. The trial court treated them a s petitions for post-conviction re lief and issued order s, filed May 23, 2007, stating that the petitioner did not verify his petitions under oath an d did not comply with the requireme nts set out in Tennessee Code An no ta te d s e c tio ns 40 -3 0- 10 4 a nd-1 06 , b ut the tria l c ou rt gran te d th e pe tit ion e r f if te e n d a ys in which to file a mended pe titions conforming to the require ments of the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Act. In the se same or ders, the trial court a dmonished the petitioner that failure to submitamende d petitions complying wit h the Act would r esult in dismiss al of the petit ions. The petiti oner did not submit anything further to the trial c ourt, which dismissed the petitions in orders filed A ugust 8, 2007.-2-

At some point there afte r, t he petiti oner obta ined counse l, who, on August 28, 2007, filed two motions “to set aside order dismiss ing petitioner’s petiti on for post-c onviction relief and to grant the
pe tit ion e r l e a ve to f

ile a n [ a me nd e d] pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n re lie f w ith in 3 0 d a ys .” Th e State responde d to this m otion, and a hearing wa s set. At the hea ring, the petitioner’ s counsel informe d the trial court that the petit ioner had injured hi s knee and would not be at the he aring. The trial court allowed the pa

rties to continue the hearing (to set aside the order dismiss ing the petitions) to ensure the petitioner’s presenc e. The trial court and the petit ioner’s c ounsel discussed the thirty-day notice of app e a l pe ri od , an d a new he ari ng date wa s set fo r O c tob e r 1 2, 20 07 , at w hic h th e pe tit ion e r a ga in did not appea

r. His counsel stated that the petitioner did not attend a schedule d bail hearing ear lier that wee k. The trial c ourt issued order s denying the motions to set aside the order s dismiss ing the
pe tit ion s.

We note that the petitioner’s notices of appea l r efe r only to appea ls of the orde rs denying the motions t o set aside the dismissal order s. The petitioner’ s brief, however

, assails both the dismiss al of the po st- c on vic tio n c a se s a ndthe de nia l of themot ion s to set aside thedis mis sa ls. Th e State responds to both contentions. Although the dismissal orders ar e not includ ed i n t h e notices of
ap p e a l, th e y w e r e a d d r e s s e d b y b o thp ar ti e s

. T h e f il in g o f a n o ti c e o f ap p e a l, h o w e v e r , is n ot jurisdictional in cr i minal case s, and we waive the filing of the notices of a ppeal in the inter est of justice of the or ders dismissing the post-conviction petitions. T.R.A.P . 4(a)

. The pe titioner contends the tria l court er red by dismissing the pro se peti t ions without appointing counsel as he claims the court wa s require d to do by Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-30 -10 7 ( 20 06 ). He a sse rt s th a t he is i nd ige nt, a nda s su c h, wa s e nti tle d to app oin te d c ou ns e l. Relying on St ate v. Swanson, 749 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1988) , he ar gues that whe n “ a c olo ra ble claim is prese nted in a pro se petition, dism issal without appointment of counsel to dr aft a competent petition is rarely

proper

. ” Id. The S tate responds that the trial court properly dismissed the petitions beca use the pe titioner did not comply with C ode sec tions 40-30-104(d) and (e) (2006) and that the
tr ia l c ou rt wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to app oin t c ou ns e l be c aus e the pe tit ion e r d id n ot a lle ge a c olo ra ble c la im for r elief.

We agre e with the State under the circ umstances of this case. Ac cording to Code sec tion 40- 30 -1 06 (b ) ( 20 06 ), a

tr ia l c ou rt ma y su mma

ri ly dis mis s a

pe tit ionthat f

a ils “ to s ta te a

fa c tua l ba sis ” for the r elief de manded. The petitioner is r equire d to c omply with the require ments listed in Code section 40-30- 104 (2006), including listing all claims for relief known to the petitioner and ve rifying under oath that all claims have been presented in a petiti on, as we ll as explaining why a gr ound for relief was not pre sented in an e arlier proce eding. T.C.A. § 40-30-104( d)-( e) ( 2006).

In the pre sent ca se, the pe titioner has not sta t ed a fa ctual basis for post-conviction re lief,
exp lain e d w h y a n a ll e g e d g r o u n d f o r r e li e f w a s n o t p r e s e n te d a t a n e ar li e r p r o c e e d in g , or ver ified

e a c h p e tit ionun de r o a th. Se e T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 10 6( d) ; id

., § 4 0- 30 -1 04 (d ), (e ). Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that he pled guilty to char ges of phone har assment and r eckle ss endange rment and that he pleade d

no lo co nte nd e re to dom e sti c a ssa ult

. He c la ims he e nte re d his ple a s on the a dv ic e of his a tto rn e ys , bu t he stat e s t h a th e i s i n n o c e n to f t h e c r i m e s ; t h ath e n e v e r s a w c o p i e s o f

t h e c o m p l a i n t s a ga ins t him; that his wife, the complainant, participated in a c onfer ence with hi m and his attorney a nd advised him to plead guilty, and that he did not know she was the complainant a gainst him; and that the crimes did not take place in Sulli van C ounty. “Post-conviction re lief is not a forum to re view-3-

err ors of law as a substitute for dire ct appe al.” State v. Mc Clint ock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Te nn. 1987). The Post -Conviction Relief Act states t hat “[a] bare allegation that a constit utional right has been violate d and mer e conc l u s i o n s of law sha ll not be sufficient to wa rra nt any furthe r pr oc e e din gs .” T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 10 6( d) . Co ntr ary to a pp e llate c ou ns e l’ s a sse rt ion s, the pe tit ion e r d id not allege de ficienc y and pre judice in hi s claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, and he did not explain why he did not waive any of his alleged c onstitut ional defe cts by not using the time grante d to him by the trial court to amend his pe tition and to verify the f actua l allegations by oath. “The re is no constituti onal right to an attorne y in state post-conviction proc eedin g s

. ” C oleman v. Th omp so n, 50 1 U .S. 72 2, 75 2 (1 99 1)

. Invie w o f the pe tit ion e r’ s f a ilu reto c omp ly w iththe Pos tConviction Proce dure A ct’s re quirements, the tria l court could ha ve prope rly dismissed the petitions at that point. T.C.A. § 40-30-106(d) . Howev er , t he trial c ourt allowed the petitioner fifte en days in wh ic h to a me nd the pe tit ion

. T. C.A

. § 4 0- 30 -1 06 (d ). Th e pe tit ion e r c ho se no t to a va il h ims e lf of this option, although he did subse quently obtain counsel. The re cord a lso refle cts that although the petitioner did not appe ar to ha ve bee n incar cer ated at the time of his two he arings to se t aside the ord e r d is mi s s in g h is p e ti ti o n s f o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

, h e d id n o t a tt e n d e ith e r h e ar in g. The petitions were pr operly dismissed.

The pe titioner contends the tria l court er red in re fusing to rescind its order dismiss ing the pro se petitions for post-convic tion r elief. As noted above, howeve r, the trial court pr operly dismissed the pe tit ion s a ft e r aff

or din g th e pe tit ion e r t ime in wh ic h to con fo rm his pe tit ion s to th e re qu ir e me nts of the Post-Conviction Relief Act. See Powell v. State, 8 S.W.3d 631, 633 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1998) (af firming summary dismiss al of petition for post-conviction re lief whe n petition “ do e s n ot c on ta in

a c le ar a nd sp e c if ic state me nt of the g ro un ds up on wh ic h re lie f is s ou g ht, no r d oe s it c on ta in a fu ll disclosure of the fac tual basis of the g rounds asser ted”)

. The pe titioner insist s that he has pr esente d a color able c laim for re lief, spec ifically that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive. In his brie f, the
pe tit ion e r c ite s Ric kman v. State to sa y that a “ pe tit ion se ts fo rth a c olo ra ble c la im if it a lle ge s f

a c ts showing that the conviction resulted from an abridgment of a constitutional right and demonstrates that the ground for

relief was not pre viously determined or w aived.” Id., 972 S.W.2d 6 8 7, 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citation omitted). Howeve r, the pe titioner does not satisfy the Rickman criter ia to avoid the summary dismis s al of his petit ions for post-convic tion relief. Althoug h the petitioner states that his constitutional rights have bee n abridg ed, he ha s failed to “demonstrate[] t hat the g round for relief was not previously deter mined or waived.” State v. Rickman, 972 S.W .2d at 693; acc ord T.C.A. § 40-30-104(e)

. His failure to comply with the proc edura l requisites prec ludes

a cour t from findingthat the petitioner ha s prese nted a c olorable c laim for re lief.

Based on the fore going and the rec ord as a whole, we aff irm the trial court’s dismiss ing the petitions for post-conviction re lief.

___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRES IDIN G JUDGE