Present: All the Justices 

ALAN J. CILMAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 022458 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 June 6, 2003 

VIRGINIA STATE BAR 

FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 

 This is an appeal by an attorney from an order of the 

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Board) suspending his 

license to practice law in this Commonwealth for a period of two 

years. The Board imposed the suspension upon determining that 

the attorney had failed to comply with the provisions of former 

Part 6 § IV Paragraph 13(K)(1) of the Rules of this Court. 

Paragraph 13 was rewritten and amended effective September 18, 

2002, and former subparagraph (K)(1) became designated as 

subparagraph (M). Although the proceedings before the Board 

were conducted prior to that date, the former and current 

versions of the Rule are substantially the same for purposes of 

conducting our analysis of this appeal. Accordingly, we will 

refer to the current version of the Rule and, for brevity, cite 

it as “Paragraph 13(M)” in this opinion. The dispositive issue 

is whether an attorney subject to the sanctions permitted by 

Paragraph 13(M) is entitled, in accordance with the provisions 

of Code § 54.1-3915, to have that issue tried before a threejudge court upon making a timely demand for such a trial. 
BACKGROUND 

 In at least four proceedings prior to May 2002, Alan Jay 

Cilman, a member of the Virginia State Bar (the Bar), was the 

subject of a disciplinary complaint brought by the Bar. Three 

of those proceedings were conducted before the Board. In each 

instance, upon Cilman’s failure to comply with the initial terms 

of the Board’s order, his license to practice law was 

administratively suspended for varying periods of time. In a 

fourth proceeding, Cilman made a timely demand that the 

proceedings before the Board be terminated and that further 

proceedings be conducted before a three-judge court in 

accordance with the provisions of Code § 54.1-3935 (Chief 

Justice of this Court to designate three circuit court judges to 

hear and decide certain cases involving attorney misconduct). 

The duly convened three-judge court ultimately imposed a oneyear suspension of Cilman’s license to practice law. 

 In each of these proceedings, Cilman was advised of the 

requirements of Paragraph 13(M) that he give notice of his 

suspension, by certified mail, to his current clients, and to 

all opposing counsel and presiding judges in pending litigation. 

Cilman was further advised that he was required to provide the 

Bar with proof of compliance with these notice requirements and 

he was provided a form on which to supply that proof. In 

addition, Cilman was also advised that, under Paragraph 13(M), 

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the Board would determine his compliance with these notice 

requirements and that the Board could impose further sanctions 

if Cilman failed to comply.1 

 On May 2, 2002, the Bar issued a notice and motion to show 

cause seeking the revocation or an additional suspension of 

Cilman’s license to practice law on the ground that he had 

failed to comply sufficiently with the notice requirements of 

Paragraph 13(M) as directed in the prior proceedings in which 

his license had been suspended. The motion to show cause was 

served on Cilman by mail on May 17, 2002. On May 20, 2002, 

Cilman responded to the motion to show cause by letter in which 

he requested that the matter be heard before a three-judge 

court. 

 By order entered May 24, 2002, the Board denied Cilman’s 

request for a three-judge court, finding that Paragraph 13(M) 

vested the Board with the sole authority to decide issues 

concerning the adequacy of compliance with the notice 

requirements of this paragraph. The matter proceeded to a 

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 The order of the three-judge court provided that “pursuant 

to the provisions of [Paragraph 13(M)]” Cilman was directed, 

among other things, to comply with the notice requirements of 

that paragraph. The Bar contends this language was sufficient 

to direct that compliance issues would be reviewed by the Board. 

We disagree. However, for the reasons subsequently addressed in 

this opinion, the question whether the court intended for 

compliance issues to be determined by the Board is not critical 

to our analysis in this appeal. 

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hearing before the Board on June 28, 2002. Cilman renewed his 

request for a hearing before a three-judge court, and the Board 

again denied his request. 

 Because the dispositive issue in this appeal does not 

invoke our consideration of the merits of the Bar’s complaint 

against Cilman, we need not recount the evidence that was 

adduced during the June 28, 2002 proceedings. In brief, the 

Board found the evidence sufficient to sustain the allegation 

that Cilman had not complied sufficiently with the notice 

requirements of Paragraph 13(M) as he was directed in any of the 

prior proceedings in which his license had been suspended. By 

order entered on August 9, 2002, the Board suspended Cilman’s 

license to practice law in the Commonwealth for a further period 

of two years. This appeal of right by Cilman followed. 

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal, Cilman asserts fourteen assignments of error to 

the proceeding against him before the Board. However, we need 

not address each of these assignments of error in light of the 

conclusion we reach regarding the issue whether the Board erred 

in denying Cilman’s timely demand for a three-judge court to 

decide the Bar’s complaint against him in this case. 

The provisions of Code § 54.1-3915 are clear and 

unambiguous: 

4
 Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this 

article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules 

or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing 

the professional conduct of attorneys which are 

inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate 

any rule or regulation or method of procedure which 

eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with 

the discipline of attorneys. In no case shall an 

attorney who demands to be tried by a court of 

competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule 

or regulation adopted under this article be tried in 

any other manner. 

(Emphasis added). 

Similarly, the authority conferred on the Board by 

Paragraph 13(M) to resolve issues arising under this Rule as 

they relate to an attorney whose license to practice law has 

been suspended or revoked is plain. In clear and unambiguous 

terms, Paragraph 13(M), in pertinent part, provides that: 

The Board shall decide all issues concerning the 

adequacy of the notice and arrangements required 

herein, and the Board may impose a sanction of 

Revocation or additional Suspension for failure to 

comply with the requirements of this subparagraph. 

 Cilman contends that the above quoted provision of 

Paragraph 13(M) with regard to the authority of the Board is in 

conflict with the provisions of Code § 54.1-3915, which he 

further contends grants an attorney subject to discipline for a 

violation of any rule the right to have the matter tried before 

a three-judge court. The Bar responds that Paragraph 13(M) is 

not in conflict with Code § 54.1-3915 because the enforcement 

proceedings under Paragraph 13(M) are administrative in nature 

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and are not separate disciplinary proceedings for the violation 

of a rule.2 Rather, according to the Bar, such proceedings are 

merely the continuation of prior proceedings in which an 

attorney has waived his right to demand a three-judge court or 

has been ordered by a three-judge court to submit to the Board’s 

authority for the administrative oversight of a disciplinary 

sanction imposed by the court. Thus, the Bar concludes that an 

attorney subject to further disciplinary proceedings for an 

alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements of 

Paragraph 13(M) is not entitled to have the matter determined by 

a three-judge court. While we agree with the Bar that Paragraph 

13(M) and Code § 54.1-3915 are not in conflict, we disagree with 

the Bar’s conclusion that an attorney subject to discipline for 

an alleged violation of Paragraph 13(M) is not entitled to have 

the matter determined by a three-judge court. 

 Under well-established principles, rules promulgated by 

this Court under statutory authority are to be construed in a 

manner consistent and harmonious with that authority. When a 

statute and a rule of this Court address the same or a related 

subject matter, the proper construction of the rule “avoids any 

conflict between rule and statute and permits the two to work 

 2

 In the present case, the proceeding before the Board was 

given its own docket number. During oral argument of this 

appeal, counsel for the Bar was unable to offer an explanation 

for why this was done. 

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alongside each other in . . . a harmonious manner.” Clark v. 

Butler Aviation, 238 Va. 506, 512, 385 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1989). 

Accordingly, we will construe Paragraph 13(M) in a manner 

consistent with the requirement of Code § 54.1-3915 that we not 

“promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which 

eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the 

discipline of attorneys.” 

 The sanctions of “Revocation or additional Suspension” of 

an attorney’s license to practice law in the Commonwealth 

permitted by Paragraph 13(M) are significant and obviously 

intended to be additional means to discipline an attorney 

determined to have failed to comply with the requirements of 

this Rule. And Code § 54.1-3915 could not be more plain or 

express in providing that “[i]n no case shall an attorney who 

demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the 

violation of any rule . . . be tried in any other manner.” 

Nothing within the provisions of Paragraph 13(M) purports to 

“eliminate[] the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the 

discipline of attorneys” or to bar an attorney from having an 

alleged violation of this Rule tried by a three-judge court upon 

making a timely demand for such a proceeding. Rather, in proper 

context, Paragraph 13(M) merely contemplates and directs that 

the Board shall have the initial authority to decide issues of 

compliance with this Rule’s notice requirements. However, when 

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an attorney makes a timely demand for the matter to be tried by 

a three-judge court, the proceedings before the Board shall 

terminate, and the Bar shall proceed against the attorney in 

such a court as provided in Code § 54.1-3935. See former Part 6 

§ IV Paragraph 13(c)(6)(a)(ii)(currently, Part 6 § IV Paragraph 

13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b)). 

 In short, it is the right of any attorney subject to 

additional discipline for the alleged violation of Paragraph 

13(M) to demand to have the case tried by a court of competent 

jurisdiction, which removes any conflict between this Rule and 

Code § 54.1-3915. When the demand is timely made, such demand 

terminates the Board’s authority to continue the proceeding 

before it. It is of no moment that the alleged violation of 

this Rule arises from the attorney’s failure to comply with a 

prior order of the Board or from a prior order of a three-judge 

court. Accordingly, we hold that when Cilman made a timely 

demand that his alleged violations of Paragraph 13(M) be tried 

before a three-judge court, the Board’s authority in the matter 

terminated and it had no authority to enter its order of August 

9, 2002, which is the subject of this appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the order of the Board 

and remand the case with directions that further proceedings be 

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conducted in accord with the provisions of Part 6 § IV Paragraph 

13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b) and Code § 54.1-3915. 

Reversed and remanded. 

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