AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed December 29, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01361-CV

STEPHAN GONZALEZ, JESSIE GONZALEZ, AND LENA MARTINEZ 

D/B/A MARTINEZ OFFICE SOLUTIONS AND NOTARY SERVICES, Appellants

V.

STEPHANIE GONZALEZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-04009

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang-Miers, Brown, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers

This case concerns three commercial properties in Dallas, Texas owned by appellee 

Stephanie Gonzalez. Stephanie filed suit against members of her family and a notary after 

Stephanie learned that two fraudulent deeds had been filed purporting to transfer title to her 

properties first from Stephanie to her brother and then from Stephanie’s brother to her uncle. 

After a nonjury trial during which witnesses from both sides testified, the trial court found in 

favor of Stephanie. With respect to Stephanie’s claim for declaratory judgment and trespass to 

try title, the trial court declared the two deeds at issue to be null and void. With respect to 

Stephanie’s claim for violation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002 

(relating to fraudulent claims against real property) against her father, appellant Stephan 

Gonzalez, the trial court awarded Stephanie $10,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive 
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damages. And with respect to Stephanie’s civil conspiracy claim, the trial court awarded 

Stephanie $10,000 in actual damages jointly and severally against (i) Stephan, (ii) Stephanie’s 

uncle, appellant Jessie Gonzalez, and (iii) the person who notarized the deeds, appellant Lena 

Martinez d/b/a Martinez Office Solutions and Notary Services. 

In seven issues on appeal appellants argue that (1) the trial court “erred in failing to 

dismiss, setting, and trying the cases after it was non-suited,” and (2) the evidence is insufficient 

to support Stephanie’s claim for civil conspiracy against Jessie and Lena. Because all dispositive 

issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We 

resolve appellants’ issues against them and affirm. 

APPELLANTS’ FIRST ISSUE

In their first issue appellants argue that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss 

Stephanie’s case after it was nonsuited. Appellants’ complaint arises from the following 

exchange that occurred after counsel stated their appearances on the record at the beginning of a 

trial setting in October 2013:

THE COURT: Prior to going on to the record, the Court informed counsel that it 

was ready to proceed on the trial that is scheduled for this morning. 

I understand from you, Mr. Tafel [counsel for Stephanie], that you 

are nonsuiting the plaintiff’s claims, correct, sir?

MR. TAFEL: Correct, Your Honor.

. . . .

THE COURT: . . . Is there anything further that we need to make a record about, 

counsel?

MR. TAFEL: No, Your Honor.

On appeal, appellants argue that it was an abuse of discretion to subsequently try the case 

in June 2014 and render judgment in favor of Stephanie because Stephanie’s oral motion for 

nonsuit immediately “extinguished” her claims. 
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We must first determine the threshold issue of whether appellants preserved their 

complaint for appellate review. See In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, 

no pet.). Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must timely present the 

complaint to the trial court and seek a ruling on the complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (as 

prerequisite to presenting complaint for appellate review, record must show (1) party presented 

timely request, motion, or objection to trial court sufficient to make trial court aware of 

complaint, and (2) trial court ruled or refused to rule); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex.

2003). “Without a proper presentation of the alleged error to the trial court, a party does not 

afford the trial court the opportunity to correct the error.” Birnbaum v. Law Offices of G. David 

Westfall, P.C., 120 S.W.3d 470, 476 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). In this case, not 

only did appellants not object when the case was reinstated, they affirmatively indicated that they 

did not object. As a result, this issue was not preserved for appellate review.

Even if this issue had been preserved for our review, however, we would resolve it 

against appellants. The record shows that immediately after Stephanie’s counsel told the trial 

court that Stephanie was nonsuiting her claims, (1) Stephanie addressed the court off the record 

and told the trial court that she did not want to nonsuit her claims, and (2) appellants’ counsel 

indicated that he did not object to a reinstatement:

THE COURT:We are back on the record[.] After the Court went off the record 

earlier and Mr. Tafel indicated that he was nonsuiting the 

plaintiff’s claim in the above cause number, the Court was advised 

by Ms. Gonzalez, who appeared in open court and advised the 

Court that she had not given the authorization for the nonsuiting of 

her case. Accordingly, the Court is reinstituting her case, and I 

understand that, Mr. Tafel, you have no opposition to same; is that 

correct, sir?

MR. TAFEL: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:And Mr. Perez [counsel for appellants], I further understand you 

have no opposition under the circumstances to the Court 

reinstating the nonsuited matter, correct, sir?
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MR. PEREZ: I have no objection if the Court has—[Stephanie] has that authority 

and the Court can withdraw the notice of nonsuit. . . .

It is well settled that a plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary pretrial nonsuit of the plaintiff’s 

claims “is absolute and cannot be denied.” Griffin v. Miles, 553 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism’d by agr.). As a result, as a general rule, a nonsuit 

extinguishes the plaintiff’s claims immediately. See, e.g., In re Greater Houston Orthopaedic 

Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Granting a 

nonsuit is a ministerial act, and a plaintiff’s right to a nonsuit exists from the moment a written 

motion is filed or an oral motion is made in open court, unless the defendant has, prior to that 

time, sought affirmative relief.”) But in this case, the motion for nonsuit was essentially a 

misstatement by Stephanie’s counsel made without his client’s authority. Moreover, counsel for 

both sides indicated that they did not oppose a reinstatement. We resolve appellants’ first issue 

against them. 

APPELLANTS’ REMAINING ISSUES

In their remaining six issues, combined into one argument in their brief, appellants appear 

to challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting Stephanie’s civil 

conspiracy claim against Jessie and Lena. Appellants phrase their issues as follows (including 

duplicate issues V and VI):

II. There is no evidence that Jessie Gonzalez was involved in any meeting of 

the minds to accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful purpose by 

unlawful means.

III. There is insufficient evidence that Jessie Gonzalez was involved in any 

meeting of the minds to accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful 

purpose by unlawful means.

IV. It is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to find 

that Jessie Gonzalez was involved in any meeting of the minds to 

accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful purpose by unlawful means.

V. Lena Martinez was involved [sic] in any meeting of the minds to 

accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful purpose by unlawful means.
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VI. Lena Martinez was involved [sic] in any meeting of the minds to 

accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful purpose by unlawful means.

VII. It is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to find 

that Lena Martinez was involved in any meeting of the minds to 

accomplish any unlawful purpose or lawful purpose by unlawful means.

With respect to these six issues, appellants’ entire argument is limited to four sentences 

contained in a single paragraph:

[Stephanie] has failed to sustain her burden of proof as to an essential element of 

conspiracy, i.e. a meeting of the minds to accomplish an unlawful purpose by 

unlawful means or lawful purpose by unlawful means. Schlumberger Well Sur. 

Corp. vs. Nortex Oil and Gas Corp., 435 SW2d 854 (Tex. 1968). Great National 

Life Ins. Co. v. Capa, Tex 377 S.W. 2d 632 (Tex. 1964). [Stephanie] must 

establish that [Jessie and Lena] had actual knowledge the fraudulent making or 

recording of a deed was to occur. (Schlumberger, supra). There is no evidence of 

such actual knowledge. Alternatively there is insufficient evidence thereof and/or 

such a finding would be against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence.

Under our rules of appellate procedure an appellant’s brief must contain a clear and 

concise argument that includes appropriate citations to legal authority and to the appellate record. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Appellants have not met that requirement. Although they generally 

cite to two cases, they do not cite to a specific page or proposition within those cases or 

otherwise explain why those cases are relevant. Appellants also do not identify or discuss the 

appropriate standard of review, nor do they cite the appellate record or identify or analyze any of 

the evidence presented in the trial court. Appellants also do not refer to or analyze any of the 

trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. As a result, appellants’ remaining issues

present nothing for our review. See id.; see also Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,

315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“Only when we are provided with 

proper briefing may we discharge our responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision 

that disposes of the appeal one way or another.”); Santillan v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 166 

S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (complaint waived on appeal because 
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appellant did not discuss applicable standard of review or facts and authorities supporting 

complaint). 

CONCLUSION

We resolve appellants’ issues against them and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

141361F.P05

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEPHAN GONZALEZ, JESSIE 

GONZALEZ, AND LENA MARTINEZ 

D/B/A MARTINEZ OFFICE SOLUTIONS 

AND NOTARY SERVICES, Appellants

No. 05-14-01361-CV V.

STEPHANIE GONZALEZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-04009.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers. 

Justices Brown and Schenck participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Stephanie Gonzalez recover her costs of this appeal from 

appellants Stephan Gonzalez, Jessie Gonzalez, and Lena Martinez D/B/A Martinez Office 

Solutions and Notary Services. 

Judgment entered this 29th day of December, 2015.