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<S>                                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                             12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                         JAN-31-2001
<PERIOD-END>                                              JAN-31-2001
<CASH>                                                      8,510,045
<SECURITIES>                                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                              14,208,689
<ALLOWANCES>                                                  218,365
<INVENTORY>                                                13,085,969
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                           37,412,259
<PP&E>                                                     29,076,147
<DEPRECIATION>                                             16,066,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                             69,151,341
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                      12,957,995
<BONDS>                                                     9,933,014
<COMMON>                                                      720,658
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                               0
<PREFERRED>                                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                                 46,340,708
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                               69,151,341
<SALES>                                                    81,203,550
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                           81,203,550
<CGS>                                                      53,242,396
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                              68,689,664
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                            694,112
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            12,344,503
<INCOME-TAX>                                                4,570,783
<INCOME-CONTINUED>                                          7,773,720
<DISCONTINUED>                                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                     0
<CHANGES>                                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                                7,773,720
<EPS-BASIC>                                                      1.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                    1.26


</TABLE>
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 11016 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

V

. JOHN FLATO , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:13

- CR

- 358

- 1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent John Flato has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011)

. Flat o has filed a response. We have revi ewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein , as well as Flato ’ s response

. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 1, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-11016 Document: 00513215457 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/01/2015No. 14

- 11016

2 issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leav e to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 14-11016 Document: 00513215457 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/01/2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

BRYANT WHITNEY, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 678 EAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED. 

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Exhibit 23.2

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-19011,
No. 333-71373, No. 333-42276, No. 333-45534, No. 333-73652, No. 333-89176, and No. 333-141458) and on Form S-3 (No.
333-138023, No. 333-134666, No.333-130977, No. 333-130423, No. 333-129141, No. 333-128020, No. 333-128019, No.
333-123902, No. 119645, No. 333-102244, No. 333-76432, No. 333-69652, No. 333-33612, No. 333-89257, No. 333-84587,
No. 333-81311, No. 333-79753, No. 333-76395, and No. 333-141454) of Microvision, Inc. of our report dated March 16,
2006, relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule of Lumera Corporation, which appears in this
Form 10-K/A.

/s/  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Seattle, Washington 
April 3, 2008

---
10541.

#### Bowman *v.*The State.

Decided October 14, 1919.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Sumter superior court—Judge Littlejohn. April 5, 1919.

*John A. Fort,*for plaintiff in error.

*Jule Felton, solicitor-general,*contra.

Luke, J.

In the light of the qualifying notes of the trial judge, and when the entire evidence is considered, there is nothing in either of the two grounds of the amendment to the motion for a new trial which would authorize this court to set aside a verdict supported by the evidence and approved by the trial judge.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
#### W. E. N. Mark *v.*John McGeorge.

Slaves — Emancipation Proclamation.

Tiie emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1864, did not apply *to*slaves held in Kentucky, nor to slaves owned by persons residing in Virginia, unless they were held in slavery in that state.

Slaves — Freedom—Loss by Owner.

The owner of slaves at the time they were set free by amendment to the Federal Constitution must bear the loss.

APPEAL PROM HARLAN 'CIRCUIT COURT.

December 19, 1872.

*L. Farmer, for appellant.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

From the agreed facts it appears that the slaves, the’consideration for the undertaking sued on, left Virginia prior to June, 1862, and remained in Kentucky up to January, 1864, when they were sold to appellee.

The proclamation of emancipation issued’ by President Lincoln on the 1st day of January, 1864, whatever may have been the legal • effect, did not apply to slaves held in Kentucky, nor to slaves owned by persons residing in Virginia, unless they were held in slavery in that state.

It is therefore manifest that these slaves ,were n-ot freed until December, 1865, when the 13th article of amendment to the Federal Constitution became a part - of the, instrument.

When freed they were the property of appellee and he must bear the loss. The warranty contained in the bill O'f sale executed by appellant was not broken or violated by the abolition of slavery. He did not warrant against a change in the fundamental law of the general government.

Inasmuch as the undertaking sued on was executed upon a lawful consideration, and’ as the charge of fraud is wholly unsustained, even allowing appellee’s answer as amended to import such a- charge, the courts can not refuse to enforce it.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial upon principles; consistent with this opinion.

—--, *for appellee.*
10387.

#### Barksdale *v.*The State.

Decided July 22, 1919.

Indictment for robbery; from Fulton superior court—Judge Humphries. February 15, 1919.

*Fred F. Harrison, H. A. Allen, W. I. Heyward,*for plaintiff in error.

*John A. Boylcin, solicitor-general, F. A. Stephens,*contra.

Stephens, J.

1. Where one is indicted for the offense of robbery by force as well as by intimidation, a general verdict of guilty will be applied to the count in the indictment charging robbery by force, since the latter is the higher grade of the offense. *Moran*v. *State,*125 *Ga.*33 (53 S. E. 806).

2. “Eoree,” in the sense in which it is used in defining the offense of robbery, consists in personal violence or that degree of "force that is necessary to remove articles so attached to the person or clothing as to create resistance, however slight. 2 Bishop’s Criminal Law, § 1167. In the absence of any evidence of such “force,” the verdict finding the defendant guilty of robbery by force is without evidence to support it.

3. Evidence that the defendant held a pistol in a threatening and intimidating manner over the victim of an alleged robbery, while his confederates ran their hands through the pockets of the victim, and without violence relieved the latter of his money and other loose valuables unattached to the person or clothing, authorizes a conviction of robbery by intimidation, but hot of robbery by force, the robbery having been accomplished without “force.” See *Tanner*v. *State,*post, 132 (100 S. E. 44)

4. The assignment of error upon an excerpt from the charge of the court, contained in the only ground of the amendment to the motion for a new trial, is without merit.

5. The verdict is without evidence to support it, and the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, P. J., <md Bloodworth, J., concur.*
PERSONASA

INTERNETAOFATHINGSAADVISORYABOARDA(IOTAB)A

Investment

Risk

Infrastructure

Standards

Policies

Access

Transparency

PERSONA CATEGORIES

Manufacturer Developer

Implementer Administrator

16 BARRIERS TO IOT ADOPTION

Maturity/Complexity

Change resistance

Cybersecurity

Data Privacy

Legal / Regulatory

Trust

Training / Education

Interoperability

Environmental Factors

Operator Consumer
#### P. B. Cooper *v.*B. J. Cooper's Adm'r.

Depositions — Of Deceased Witness — Use on Subsequent Trial.

The deposition of a deceased witness, which was used on the former trial may be used in the subsequent trial involving the same issues.

Evidence — Burd'en of Proof.

The burden is on the plaintiff to establish his claim-, and upon the defendant to establish his cross-demand or set-off against the plaintiff.

APPEAL PROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

September 13, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The depositions of the witnesses who had died prior to the last trial having been taken between the same parties upon a former trial upon the same issues were competent to be read as testimony and are certainly more satisfactory as to what the witnesses stated than when such statements are reduced to writing by counsel and made part of the bill of evidence, although either might have been offered and read.

The answers filed by the appellant and appellee, the one to the original and amended petition, and the other to the set-off, and both in substance pleas of payment, and the only issues to be tried were: Had the appellants paid the claims sought to be recovered in the original petition, and had the appellee satisfied that relied upon by way of set-off.

The paragraph in the answer alleging that it was agreed that the claims of appellant should be set off agáinst the claims of appellee and the balance due either way to be paid to the party entitled is either a plea of payment or set-off.

If a set-off, it is admitted by the answer, and payment relied on, a.nd if regarded as a plea of payment no answer was required.

The administrator of Benj. Cooper assumed the burden of showing that he had paid the account relied on as a set-off.

The court properly refused to instruct the jury that if it was agreed by the parties that one account should settle the other they must find for the defendant. The plaintiff was required to- show *85that the defendants had been paid and in some other way than with the claims he, the plaintiff, was seeking to recover.

Harrison, *for appellant.*

Hill, *for appellees.*

The issue was fairly presented -to- the jury and conflicting testimony upon the questions made. This is the third verdict upon these same issues, and after a careful consideration of the facts proven we think the verdict was right and certainly not so- palpably against the evidence as to require this- court to interfere.

The depositions read show upon their face that they were taken touching the same issues and between the same parties.

Judgment *affirmed.*

Judge Hardin not sitting.
**EXHIBIT 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER****PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002****(18 U.S.C. 1350)**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wells Real Estate Fund III, L.P. (the“Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Leo F. Wells, III, Chief Executive Officerof the corporate General partner of the Registrant, hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that, to the best of his knowledge and belief:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

|                                                                                                                                   |   |   |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/ LEO F. WELLS,III  **Leo F. Wells, III****Chief Executive Officer****November 13, 2002**   
 
56 |
NINTH AMENDMENT TO
                         LICENSE AGREEMENT AND GUARANTEE


                  Ninth Amendment to License  Agreement and Guarantee made as of
the 10th day of January,  1996, by and between  MIKHAIL  BARYSHNIKOV,  c/o Edgar
Vincent/Cynthia  Robbins Associates,  124 East 40th Street, Suite 304, New York,
New York 10016 (hereinafter "Baryshnikov"),  RICHARD BARRIE FRAGRANCES, INC., 15
Executive Boulevard, Orange, Connecticut 06477 (hereinafter "Licensee" or "RBF")
and  RICHARD  BARRIE  of  1  Compo  Beach  Road,  Westport,   Connecticut  06880
("Barrie").

                              W I T N E S S E T H:

                  WHEREAS,  the  parties  hereto  have  entered  into a  license
agreement dated June, 1987 (sic)  ("Original  License  Agreement") as amended by
Amendments to License  Agreement  and  Guarantee  dated January 23, 1989 ("First
Amendment"),  February  28, 1989  ("Second  Amendment"),  June 21, 1989  ("Third
Amendment"),   May  1,  1990  ("Fourth   Amendment"),   July  16,  1991  ("Fifth
Amendment"),  February 14, 1992 ("Sixth  Amendment"),  March 31, 1993  ("Seventh
Amendment")  and March 15, 1995  ("Eighth  Amendment")  (collectively,  "License
Agreement"), and

                  WHEREAS, the parties desire to further amend the
License Agreement; and

                  WHEREAS, pursuant to the schedule set forth in the
Eighth Amendment, Licensee was required to achieve Minimum


<PAGE>


Net Sales of Articles of $7,250,000 in calendar year 1995 and Licensee  achieved
actual Net Sales of Articles of a lesser amount; and

                  WHEREAS,  Licensee desires that Baryshnikov  waive the Minimum
Net Sales of Articles  requirement  for calendar  year 1995 and  Baryshnikov  is
willing to grant such a waiver.

                  NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:

                  1.       Waiver.  Baryshnikov hereby waives any right
to terminate the License Agreement on the basis of Licensee's failure to achieve
Minimum Net Sales of Articles of $7,250,000 in calendar year 1995.

                  2.       Full Force and Effect.  It is hereby agreed
that the License Agreement, except as specifically modified
herein, remains in all respects in full force and effect.

                  IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the undersigned have executed this Ninth
Amendment as of the date first written above.


                                            RICHARD BARRIE FRAGRANCES, INC.


                                            By:________________________________
                                               Richard Barrie, President


                                            -----------------------------------
                                                   Mikhail Baryshnikov


                                            -----------------------------------
                                                   Richard Barrie



                                                   2

<PAGE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>                
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 10-QSB
     and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                  1
<CURRENCY>                                    US Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           SEP-30-1997         
<PERIOD-START>                              OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                DEC-31-1996          
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                               1
<CASH>                                        9,223
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                               771,458 
<ALLOWANCES>                                 53,000  
<INVENTORY>                                 885,936 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          1,704,271
<PP&E>                                    6,011,707    
<DEPRECIATION>                            2,229,363
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                            7,216,759    
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     2,141,287    
<BONDS>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0     
<PREFERRED>                                       0
<COMMON>                                     66,850    
<OTHER-SE>                                3,056,769    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>              7,216,759    
<SALES>                                   3,111,222    
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          3,111,222    
<CGS>                                     2,191,121    
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             2,191,121    
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            724,248  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              1,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           82,467 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             112,386  
<INCOME-TAX>                                  1,250
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         111,136  
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                111,136 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   .02  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   .02
        




</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2




SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350




In connection with the Annual Report of HuntMountain Resources Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tim Hunt, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.




TIM HUNTTim Hunt(Principal Financial Officer)




Date:  November 9, 2010
#### Mrs. Galliac *v.*F. Nugent.

Husband and Wife — Wife’s Liability for Medical Attention to Daughter.

Where a feme covert procured medical attention for her daughter, and the services were rendered on the credit of the mother and she induced the doctor to continue his services for the daughter after the mother had become discovert, the mother may be held liable for the services rendered.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

June 8, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

Mrs. Galliac was not legally bound to comply with her promise to pay Nugent for medical attention to her daughter, because she entered into' the agreement whilst a *feme covert.*Still, the promise created a moral obligation; and as she continued the employment after she became discovert, and by her ratification of the original agreement, possibly induced Nugent to continue his services, and as she has undoubtedly promised to pay the entire bill since the removal of her disability, the court below did not err in rendering judgment against her.

The statute on frauds does not apply in this case. The credit was *720originally given to Mrs. Galliac. There is nothing to show that Nugent at any time looked to the husband or daughter for payment.

*Jno\ Williams, for appellant.*

*McKee, for appellee.*

Judgment affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

Bar Docket No. 18949

In the Matter of BRANDY LEEANN SUTTON,

Respondent.

ORDER OF DISBARMENT

In a letter signed November 12, 2021, respondent Brandy Leeann Sutton, an 

attorney admitted to practice law in the state of Kansas, voluntarily surrendered her

license to practice law in Kansas, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 230 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. 

R. 284). 

At the time of her voluntary surrender, Sutton's law license had been suspended 

since December 1, 2017. In re Sutton, 307 Kan. 95, 405 P.3d 1205 (2017). Sutton also 

had two complaints from former clients pending against her for violations of Kansas 

Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 366) (safekeeping property), 5.5 

(2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 406) (unauthorized practice of law), and 8.4 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

426) (misconduct).

This court finds that the surrender of Sutton's license should be accepted and that 

Sutton should be disbarred.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Brandy Leeann Sutton is disbarred from the 

practice of law in Kansas, and her license and privilege to practice law are revoked. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Judicial Administration strike the name 

of Brandy Leeann Sutton from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas

effective the date of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any pending board proceeding or case terminates

effective the date of this order, but the Disciplinary Administrator may direct an 

investigator to complete a pending investigation to preserve evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be published in the Kansas Reports, 

that the costs herein shall be assessed to Sutton, and that Sutton forthwith shall comply 

with Supreme Court Rule 231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286). 

Dated this 27th day of December 2021.