Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 1 of 19

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Amanda Peters, as Natural Parent of Isabelle Meyer, Deceased,

Appellant-Plaintiff

v.

Girl Scouts of Southwest Indiana, Inc., Girl Scouts of the United 

States of America, Inc., Benjamin Brassard, and Cynthia Meyer,

Appellees-Defendants

February 28, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-1342

Appeal from the Perry Circuit Court

The Honorable M. Lucy Goffinet, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

62C01-2007-CT-279

Opinion by Judge Tavitas

Judges Pyle and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 2 of 19

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Amanda Peters (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s 

dismissal of Benjamin Brassard (“Father”) and Cynthia Meyer 

(“Grandmother”) from a Child Wrongful Death Statute (“CWDS”) action 

brought by Mother against the Girl Scouts of Southwest Indiana (“Girl 

Scouts”).1

 The trial court dismissed Father’s and Grandmother’s claims based 

upon their failure to file claims within the two-year period prescribed by the 

CWDS, but Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by doing so. 

We conclude that Father and Grandmother failed to file timely claims, and 

accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Although Mother raises multiple issues, we address the following dispositive 

issue, which we restate as whether Father’s and Grandmother’s claims were 

untimely under the CWDS. 

Facts

[3] The facts here are undisputed. Eleven-year-old Isabelle Meyer tragically died 

on June 24, 2019, after a tree fell and struck her at a camp operated by the Girl 

1 In November 2022, Mother settled her CWDS claim against the Girl Scouts of the United States of 

America, Inc. Girl Scouts of the United States of America, Inc., was thereafter dismissed from the action 

with prejudice by the parties’ agreement in February 2023 and is not a party to this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 3 of 19

Scouts in Perry County. At the time, Grandmother and her husband, Stanley 

Meyer, were the court-appointed guardians of Isabelle.

[4] On July 10, 2020, Mother, as natural parent and personal representative of 

Isabelle’s estate, filed a complaint against the Girl Scouts pursuant to the 

CWDS. The trial court later granted Mother’s motion to amend the complaint 

to remove references to Mother as personal representative. 

[5] In October 2020, the Girl Scouts filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s action due 

to Mother’s failure to join a party needed for just adjudication under the CWDS 

and Indiana Trial Rule 19. The Girl Scouts argued that Mother failed to join 

Father in the CWDS action, that Father was an indispensable person, and that 

the action was subject to dismissal as a result of Mother’s failure. 

[6] In response, on November 17, 2020, Mother requested permission to file a 

second amended complaint to add Father as a defendant in the action, pursuant 

to the CWDS, which the trial court granted. Service was not perfected upon 

Father until July 2021; Father filed an answer on August 9, 2021. The trial 

court then denied the Girl Scouts’ motion to dismiss. 

[7] On June 8, 2022, Mother requested permission to file a third amended 

complaint to add Grandmother as a defendant in the action due to her 

guardianship of Isabelle; the trial court granted the motion.2

 Grandmother 

2 Grandmother’s husband was co-guardian, but he was not added to the action.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 4 of 19

never filed an answer to the third amended complaint and has never appeared 

in the action. On July 8, 2022, the Girl Scouts filed a motion to dismiss 

Grandmother. The Girl Scouts argued that: (1) Grandmother is not an 

appropriate defendant under the CWDS; (2) Grandmother failed to make a 

claim within the two-year statute of limitations; and (3) Mother’s addition of 

Grandmother as a defendant long after the statute of limitations expired did not 

preserve Grandmother’s claim. Mother responded that Grandmother’s claim 

was allowed under the CWDS and that Grandmother’s claim was not subject to 

the statute of limitations because Mother’s complaint was timely filed.

[8] The Girl Scouts then filed a motion to dismiss Father in August 2022. The Girl 

Scouts argued that Father failed to timely assert his claim pursuant to the 

CWDS because he did not pursue an action himself and did not file his answer 

to Mother’s complaint until forty-six days after the statute of limitations 

expired. Accordingly, the Girl Scouts argued that Father’s claim under the 

CWDS should be dismissed. In response, Mother argued that Father’s claim 

was derivative of Mother’s claim and that it was, thus, timely.

[9] On May 5, 2023, the trial court granted the Girl Scouts’ motions to dismiss 

Father and Grandmother. Mother filed a motion to certify the order for 

interlocutory appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14, which the trial court 

granted. We accepted interlocutory jurisdiction, and Mother now appeals.3

3 We held oral argument in this matter on January 24, 2024. We thank counsel for their presentations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 5 of 19

Discussion

I. Standing

[10] Before addressing the issues raised by the parties, we must note our concerns 

with the odd procedural posture in this case. Below, Grandmother did not 

enter an appearance in this action, and Father filed only an appearance and 

answer. Neither Father nor Grandmother responded to the motions to dismiss. 

Father and Grandmother are automatically parties to this appeal pursuant to 

Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A). Neither, however, has filed an appearance or 

presented arguments on appeal. 

[11] Although the order at issue dismissed Father and Grandmother, the Notice of 

Appeal was filed by Mother’s counsel. Throughout the Appellant’s Brief, 

Mother identifies herself as the Appellant, but all of Mother’s arguments on 

appeal relate to the dismissal of Grandmother’s and Father’s claims; none of 

the arguments on appeal relate to Mother’s claims. We note that the standing 

doctrine “focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to 

invoke the court’s power.” Campbell v. El Dee Apartments, 701 N.E.2d 616, 621 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “The standing rule bars litigants from asserting the right 

or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury themselves.” Id.; 

see also Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234, 1238 (Ind. 2023)

(“Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met if the party 

shows it ha[s] suffered or [is] in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as 

a result of the complained-of conduct.”) (internal citations and quotations 
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omitted). Accordingly, it is unclear how Mother can assert the rights or legal 

interests of Father and Grandmother in this matter. 

[12] As for the absence of an appearance for Father or Grandmother in this matter, 

at the oral argument, Mother’s counsel asserted that he also represents Father 

and Grandmother. See Peters v. Girl Scouts of Southwest Indiana, Inc., et al., 23ACT-1342, Jan. 24, 2024 Oral Argument at 4:23, 6:03. Counsel’s appearance in 

this appeal, as shown in part below, however, does not indicate that he 

represents Father or Grandmother. 

Id., June 15, 2023 Appearance by Attorney.4

 In her Reply Brief, Mother asserts 

that “there is no impropriety associated with [Mother, Father, and 

Grandmother’s] determination that their interests are best advanced collectively 

at this stage of the proceedings . . . .” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 10. It is unclear, 

however, how counsel could represent Mother—the plaintiff—and also 

4 Given counsel’s appearance for Mother only, we are perplexed by counsel’s statement at oral argument that 

he represents Mother, Father, and Grandmother.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 7 of 19

represent Father and Grandmother—who are defendants in this litigation. See

Ind. Prof. Conduct Rule 1.7.

5

[13] We acknowledge that we have allowed one party to present arguments 

regarding the dismissal of another party where the first party is prejudiced by 

the dismissal. See Smith v. Walsh Constr. Co. II, LLC, 95 N.E.3d 78, 88 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2018) (“As a general matter, the dismissal of a co-defendant from a case 

subjects remaining defendants to greater potential liability, which creates 

sufficient prejudice to confer standing upon a co-defendant to appeal such a 

ruling.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. We also 

acknowledge, as the Girl Scouts have pointed out, that “some confusion” exists 

regarding the CWDS statute. Appellee’s Br. p. 16. Accordingly, to the extent 

5 This Rule provides:

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 

involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 

materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a 

third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a 

lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and 

diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 

another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 

before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Prof. Cond. R. 1.7 (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 8 of 19

Mother is somehow prejudiced by the dismissal of Father and Grandmother 

from the action, we will address the arguments presented on appeal.

II. Standard of Review

[14] Mother’s arguments relate to the rights of Father and Grandmother, whom the 

trial court dismissed from the underlying suit upon the Girl Scouts’ motions. A 

motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency 

of the complaint. Price v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 

2017). We “accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id. We review 

motions to dismiss de novo, and we will affirm a dismissal if the allegations 

“are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances.” Id. We 

also will affirm a dismissal if the decision “is sustainable on any basis in the 

record.” Id. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted is an appropriate means of raising the statute of limitations.” 

William F. Braun Milk Hauling, Inc. v. Malanoski, 192 N.E.3d 213, 217 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2022). 

[15] Moreover, the parties’ arguments require this court to interpret the CWDS. 

“When interpreting an unambiguous statute, we accord words their plain 

meaning.” Ind. Off. of Util. Consumer Couns. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 200 N.E.3d 

915, 919 (Ind. 2023). When reviewing an ambiguous provision in a statute, the 

“primary goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the 

Legislature with well-established rules of statutory construction.” Id. “[W]e do 

not presume that the Legislature intended language to be used in a statute to be 

applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Id. “The 
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CWDS must be strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common 

law.” Johnson v. Harris, 176 N.E.3d 252, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. 

III. Father and Grandmother were required to file claims, and they 

failed to do so in a timely manner.

[16] The trial court dismissed Father and Grandmother because they did not file 

claims before the two-year time constraint for filing a CWDS claim expired. 

“[A]ny CWD[S] claim must be brought no later than two years of the date of 

death; that is what the plain language of the statute provides.” Ellenwine v. 

Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657, 666 (Ind. 2006). Like the Wrongful Death Act, the 

CWDS “creates an enforceable right of action, ‘unknown to the common law,’

only if commenced within the prescribed timeframe” and “the statute is 

regarded as a non-claim statute.” Brugh v. Milestone Contractors, LP, 202 N.E.3d 

1091, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Blackford v. Welborn Clinic, 172 N.E.3d 

1219, 1224 (Ind. 2021)) (discussing the Wrongful Death Act), trans. denied. As 

with the Wrongful Death Act, the two-year period under the CWDS “is not a 

statute of limitation but a condition precedent to the existence of the claim.” 

Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2014).

[17] “While ‘statutes of limitation create defenses that must be pleaded and may be 

waived,’ a non-claim statute is self-executing and ‘imposes a condition 

precedent to the enforcement of a right of action.’” Blackford, 172 N.E.3d at 

1225 (quoting Bahr v. Zahm, 37 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ind. 1941)). If a party fails to 

file a claim within the prescribed time, “no enforceable right of action is 
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created.” Id. Thus, although the parties refer to the two-year period as a statute 

of limitations, it is actually a condition precedent to the existence of a claim.

[18] Here, Isabelle died on June 24, 2019; Mother filed her action on July 10, 2020, 

well within the two-year time constraint. Mother added Father as a defendant 

in November 2020, but service was not made upon Father until July 2021. 

Father did not file an answer until August 9, 2021. Accordingly, although 

Father was added as a defendant well within the two years, service of the 

complaint and his answer were not made until after the two-year time 

constraint expired. As for Grandmother, she was not added as a defendant 

until June 2022, well after the two-year time period, and she has never 

answered or filed an appearance in this litigation.

[19] Mother, however, argues that neither Father nor Grandmother were required to 

“bring a claim” to be entitled to an apportionment of damages under the 

CWDS. Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Because they were not required to bring a 

claim, Mother argues that “it necessarily follows that their failure to do so 

within two years of Isabelle’s death does not estop their right to [a] damages 

apportionment arising from a claim timely brought and maintained by 

[Mother].” Id. at 13. Thus, according to Mother, the CWDS does not require a 

parent or guardian named as a defendant to file an answer in order to receive an 

apportionment of damages. Rather, Mother claims that such parties would 

only need to assert their claims in some form prior to settlement or a trial. 

Under Mother’s argument, if Mother’s claim was timely, the two-year time 
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constraint would never bar Father’s and Grandmother’s apportionment of 

damages.

[20] Mother’s argument requires an interpretation of the CWDS, codified at Indiana 

Code Section 34-23-2-1, which provides:

(c) An action may be maintained under this section against the 

person whose wrongful act or omission caused the injury or 

death of a child. The action may be maintained by:

(1) the father and mother jointly, or either of them by 

naming the other parent as a codefendant to answer as to 

his or her interest;

(2) in case of divorce or dissolution of marriage, the person 

to whom custody of the child was awarded; and

(3) a guardian, for the injury or death of a protected 

person.

(d) In case of death of the person to whom custody of a child 

was awarded, a personal representative shall be appointed to 

maintain the action for the injury or death of the child.

* * * * *

(i) Damages awarded under subsection (f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(C), 

and (f)(3)(D) inure to the benefit of:

(1) the father and mother jointly if both parents had 

custody of the child;
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(2) the custodial parent, or custodial grandparent, and 

the noncustodial parent of the deceased child as 

apportioned by the court according to their respective 

losses; or

(3) a custodial grandparent of the child if the child was not 

survived by a parent entitled to benefit under this section.

However, a parent or grandparent who abandoned a deceased 

child while the child was alive is not entitled to any recovery 

under this chapter.

(Emphasis added).

[21] Only one action for Isabelle’s death is allowed under the CWDS. See, e.g.,

Hanna v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 963 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)

(“Pursuant to the CWD[S], it is apparent that the parents of a minor child can 

maintain a single, joint claim for the death of their minor child. In other words, 

nothing in the statute permits each parent to maintain a separate wrongful 

death claim in his or her own right.”), trans. denied. Thus, where, as here, one 

parent has filed a CWDS action, the statute requires that the other parent be 

added as a “codefendant to answer as to his or her interest.” See Ind. Code § 

34-23-2-1(c)(1). 

[22] Here, Mother added both Father and Grandmother as defendants. The Girl 

Scouts complain that the CWDS does not allow a guardian to be named as a 

codefendant. We acknowledge that the CWDS does not require the guardian—

here, Grandmother—who may also maintain an action, to be added as a 
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codefendant. Although the CWDS requires a parent to add the other parent as 

a codefendant, we conclude that nothing in the CWDS prevents the parent 

from also joining the guardian as an indispensable party under Trial Rule 19.

6

 

A guardian could also file a motion to intervene7 pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 

24.

8

6 We noted in City of Terre Haute v. Simpson, 746 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, that:

[T]he [CWDS]’s parental joinder provision is analogous to the joinder provisions under Trial 

Rule 19, under which actions are subject to dismissal if an indispensable person needed for just 

adjudication is not joined in the action as a party. As under Trial Rule 19, an individual parent 

asserting a claim under the [CWDS], while having standing to maintain an action, must join the 

deceased child’s other parent as a party or face dismissal of the action for failure to comply with 

the plain requirements of the statute.

(footnote omitted). 

Despite the comparison in Simpson between the CWDS and Indiana Trial Rule 19, we note that Indiana Trial 

Rule 19 addresses the joinder of indispensable parties and provides, in part: “If [an indispensable party] has 

not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to 

do so, he may be made a defendant.” Thus, under the CWDS, the parent not bringing the action must be 

added as a “codefendant,” but Trial Rule 19 requires that the parent be joined as a “plaintiff” or a defendant 

if he or she refuses to be joined as a plaintiff. Accordingly, under Trial Rule 19, Mother should have joined 

Grandmother as a plaintiff or a defendant if she refused to be joined as a plaintiff.

Although not raised by the parties, the differences between the CWDS and Trial Rules raise concerns that 

portions of the statute conflict with our Trial Rules. Our Supreme Court has held that if a statute is a 

“substantive law, then it supersedes [our Trial Rules], but if such statute merely establishes a rule of 

procedure, then [our Trial Rules] would supersede the statute.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 588 (Ind. 

2022). “We have long held that laws are substantive when they establish rights and responsibilities, and laws 

are procedural when they ‘merely prescribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be 

exercised and enforced.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Ind. 1959)). 

Because the parties do not raise the issue, however, we do not address it further.

7

 The difference between joinder and intervention has been described as follows:

“Joinder” is a method by which one may be compelled to become a party whereas 

“intervention” is a method by which an outsider with an interest in a lawsuit may come in as a 

party on their own application. . . . The only difference between intervention of right and 

joinder is which party initiates the addition of a new party to the case.

59 AM. JUR. 2D PARTIES § 144 (footnotes omitted).

8 Although not at issue here, confusingly, a “guardian” may maintain an action under the CWDS, but a 

“guardian” is not entitled to an apportionment of damages. Similarly, a “custodial grandparent” is entitled 

to an apportionment of damages, but a “custodial grandparent” may not maintain an action unless the 
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[23] Despite the addition of Father and Grandmother as parties to the litigation, 

Mother argues that it was unnecessary for Father and Grandmother to file a 

claim in the action until the case was ready for settlement or trial. Mother’s 

argument, however, is inconsistent with our basic trial rules and procedures. 

We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a party claiming damages 

from the defendant may simply show up any time before settlement or trial and 

assert a right to damages. 

[24] To the contrary, Indiana Trial Rule 4(A) provides that “[t]he court acquires 

jurisdiction over a party or person who under these rules commences or joins in 

the action, is served with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected 

to the power of the court under any other law.” Trial Rule 8(A) notes that: 

“To state a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, a pleading must contain: (1) a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a 

demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled. . . .” Typically, a person 

joined as an indispensable party under Trial Rule 19 or intervening under Trial 

Rule 24 would file a pleading to assert their claim if any, i.e., an answer, 

counterclaim, and/or a cross-claim pursuant to the trial rules. Accordingly, we 

conclude that, pursuant to the trial rules, Father and Grandmother were 

required to file a claim to assert their rights to any damages in the litigation. 

custodial grandparent is also the guardian. Under the CWDS, an aunt, for example, who is the child’s 

guardian, would not be entitled to an apportionment of damages.
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[25] Here, although Father asserted his rights in an answer after the two-year time 

constraint expired, Grandmother has never filed a claim or even an appearance 

in the litigation. In fact, Mother concedes in her Reply Brief that, should 

Mother’s appeal be dismissed, Father and Grandmother “will not have a right 

to maintain [Mother’s] claim, and the statute of limitations will bar them from 

filing an independent claim of their own.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8. Mother, 

however, contends that, because her complaint was timely, Father’s and 

Grandmother’s “right to an apportionment of damages arising therefrom is not 

subject to a statute of limitation dismissal.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Mother cites 

no relevant authority, including any trial rules, for this proposition. 

[26] In addressing these issues, both Mother and the Girl Scouts discuss King v. 

King, 610 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. There, after the death 

of his child, the custodial parent filed a CWDS action and named the 

noncustodial mother as a defendant, among others. The mother’s attorney 

entered an appearance but later withdrew. Two years and three days after the 

child’s death, the mother’s new attorney filed the mother’s answer to the 

complaint. The answer, however, listed the wrong cause number, and the 

father and other defendant denied having received the answer. The father later 

settled the action, and the case was dismissed. The mother later filed a motion 

for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied.

[27] On appeal, the mother argued that the dismissal of the case was erroneous 

because she did not receive notice of the settlement. We held that the mother 

was not entitled to notice of the settlement because “she failed to timely express 
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an interest in the proceedings in general and in the possible damage award in 

particular. In short, she made no appearance.” King, 610 N.E.2d at 262. After 

her first attorney withdrew his appearance, the mother did not enter a pro se 

appearance, have another attorney enter an appearance, file an answer, or 

“assert an interest in any possible wrongful death proceeds.” Id. By the time 

the mother hired another attorney and filed an answer, the two-year “statute of 

limitations” had already expired.

[28] The mother also argued that, “because [the father] filed his claim within the 

two year period and because [the father] named her in that claim, [the mother] 

must also be considered as having timely asserted a claim.” Id. at 263. This 

Court rejected that argument and held: “[The mother] did nothing even 

remotely suggesting she wished to share in any damages until three days after 

the limitation period passed. We know of no authority supporting the bald 

proposition that a parent or guardian automatically asserts a wrongful death 

claim merely by being named a defendant, and [the mother] offers no authority 

for the assertion.” Id.

[29] The mother also argued that the damages subsection of the CWDS9 required 

the trial court to apportion damages between the parents and that the CWDS 

does not specifically require a parent to file an answer. This Court also rejected 

that argument and held: “Neither of these propositions relieve[s] a party 

9 Then Indiana Code Section 34-1-1-8(h), see now Indiana Code Section 34-23-2-1(i).
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wishing to assert either a wrongful death claim or an interest in any proceeds 

recovered from actually asserting the appropriate pleading in the first instance 

and in a timely fashion.” Id.

The only way [the mother] could prevail is if her misfiled answer 

could be deemed to have “related back” to [the father’s] timelyfiled claim. Again, however, we find no authority supporting the 

proposition, and again, [the mother] offers none. Neither do we 

find a compelling rationale to adopt such a rule in this case or 

ones like it. We note that under traditional relation-back 

analysis, a party’s [later] pleading or amendment is examined to 

determine the degree to which it is logically or equitably 

connected to a document the party had filed earlier. Here, of 

course, [the mother] filed nothing prior to the expiration of the 

limitation period.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

[30] In summary, this Court held in King as follows:

That a non-custodial parent must still timely assert his or her 

interest in any damages in order to avail himself or herself of 

those damages is neither unduly burdensome nor inconsistent 

with the statutory scheme and standard rules of pleading and 

practice.

Finally, we wish to emphasize that our holding today, that a noncustodial parent must timely and affirmatively assert his or her 

interest in a share of any wrongful death of child damages 

recovered, must necessarily be limited to those situations in 

which the non-custodial parent has been given notice of the 

custodial parent’s wrongful death claim. We have no occasion to 

address the situations in which the custodial parent maintains a 

wrongful death of child action but does not inform the non-
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custodial parent of the action’s existence or in which the 

custodial parent does not file suit in the first instance.

Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted). This Court ultimately concluded that the trial 

court properly denied the mother’s motion for relief from judgment because the 

mother was legally barred from recovering damages.

[31] We reach the same conclusion here. Under our trial rules, Father and 

Grandmother were required to assert a claim to be entitled to an apportionment 

of damages. Neither Father nor Grandmother asserted their claims within the 

CWDS’s two-year time constraint, and Mother presents no relevant authority 

for the proposition that Father’s and Grandmother’s claims were timely simply 

because Mother’s complaint was timely. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Father and Grandmother.

Conclusion

[32] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Girl Scouts’ motions 

to dismiss Father and Grandmother. Accordingly, we affirm.

[33] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Gabriel A. Hawkins

Cohen & Malad, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1342 | February 28, 2024 Page 19 of 19

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE – GIRL SCOUTS OF SOUTHWEST INDIANA, INC.

Adam S. Glass

Danny E. Glass

Fine & Hatfield

Evansville, Indiana