alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6642

OVELL T. BARBER,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of 

Corrections,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, Senior 

District Judge. (2:10-cv-00482-JBF-TEM)

Submitted: September 19, 2011 Decided: September 28, 2011

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ovell T. Barber, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson Vorhis, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ovell T. Barber seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

(2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record and 

conclude that Barber has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 31.3

                    Certification of Chief Executive Officer
            Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

I, John Kennedy, Chief Financial Officer of Mediscience Technology Corp.,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Mediscience Technology
Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent
to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: June 13, 2005                               Name: ss John Kennedy
                                                        ---------------
                                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-2326

SPGGC, LLC; METABANK; U.S. BANK N.A.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

KELLY A. AYOTTE,

New Hampshire Attorney General,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on May 30, 2007, is amended

as follows:

The citation on page 18, lines 21-22 should

read: "supra note 4."
<PAGE>   1

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549


                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT

                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
                        SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934



    Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):  April 20, 1998



                      AMERICAN HEALTH PROPERTIES, INC.
           (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

                                      

            DELAWARE                  1-9381               95-4084878
   (State or other jurisdiction     (Commission          (IRS Employer
         of incorporation)          File Number)       Identification No.)



     6400 SOUTH FIDDLER'S GREEN CIRCLE, SUITE 1800      
                 ENGLEWOOD, COLORADO                              80111
         (Address of principal executive offices)               (Zip Code)



     Registrant's telephone number, including area code:  (303) 796-9793
<PAGE>   2
Item 5.  Other Events.


         On April 20, 1998, the Company announced its results for the three
month period ended March 31, 1998. Attached as Exhibit 99.1 is summary financial
information for the Company for the three months ended March 31, 1998.


Item 7.  Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information and Exhibits.


         (c) Exhibits

99.1             American Health Properties, Inc. Financial Highlights, first
                 quarter ended March 31, 1998.


         Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.


Date:  April 20, 1998                             AMERICAN HEALTH PROPERTIES,
                                                  INC.
                                                  (Registrant)


                                                  By: /s/ Michael J. McGee
                                                      Michael J. McGee
                                                      Treasurer


                                      -2-
<PAGE>   3
                                 Exhibit Index

Exhibit No.                       Description
-----------                       -----------

   99.1          American Health Properties, Inc. Financial Highlights, first
                 quarter ended March 31, 1998.
#### Harris & Kilby *v.*Commonwealth.

Bail — Breach óf Bond.

The mere failure of the defendant to be present in court at the time the prosecution against him terminated does not constitute a breach of.the bond.

APPEAL PROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

December 10, 1873.

*Harrison, Knott, for appellant.*

*Thompson, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

It seems to,us that,.when the' prosecution was-terminated in January, 1873, by the acquittal and discharge of Kilby, and the conviction of Harris and judgment against him., without any order of the court forfeiting the bond for his appearance and submission of himself to the orders and process of the court in the case, the utmost remaining liability of Harris or Kilby on the bond, was that Harris would perform so much of the judgment as was enforceable -against him. That liability was only enforceable at a subsequent term of the court, by a direct proceeding on the bond for some alleged breach of its stipulations; and, in our opinion, the mere failure of Harris to appear in court at a time when the prosecution against him was ended, did not constitute such a breach of the bond. The order of forfeiture was therefore erroneous, and the judgment founded on it was necessarily so.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4556

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

1115 South Clinton Avenue in Dunn, North Carolina, as the ‘‘General 

William Carey Lee Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 14, 2004

Mr. ETHERIDGE (for himself, Mr. BURR, Mr. COBLE, Mr. MCINTYRE, Mr. 

HAYES, Mr. MILLER of North Carolina, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. TAYLOR of 

North Carolina, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. 

PRICE of North Carolina, and Mr. WATT) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Government Reform 

A BILL

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 1115 South Clinton Avenue in Dunn, North 

Carolina, as the ‘‘General William Carey Lee Post Office 

Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. GENERAL WILLIAM CAREY LEE POST OFFICE 

4 BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 1115 South Clinton Avenue in 
2

•HR 4556 IH 

1 Dunn, North Carolina, shall be known and designated as 

2 the ‘‘General William Carey Lee Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the General William Carey 

7 Lee Post Office Building.

Æ
#### *C.*W. Roads *v.*Thos. B. Whitcock's Adm’r.

Limitation of Actions — Release of Surety.

Where a creditor received money from the administrator of his debtor in the mistaken belief that his debt was satisfied, and under such belief allowed the statute of limitations to run against the surety, he cannot thereafter have recourse against the surety for the debt.

*115APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT.

September 23, 1873.

McPherson, Chctmplin, *for appellant.*

*Phelps &*Son> *for appellee.*

'Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

There is no reason why the statute of limitation is not available as a defense in this action. The appellee was the surety on the note and there has been no period since its execution that appellant could not have instituted an action upon it against the surety save the time in which he was precluded by the statute from suing his administrator (six months). If suit had been instituted within the seven years against the principal, the surety might have secured himself in his liability as such. It is true the appellant -had received the money from the administrator of the principal and supposed that his debt was satisfied. This, however, does not stop the statute from running. It is also conceded that - the money was paid through á mistake by the administrator and received by the appellant without any knowledge of the condition of his deceased intestate, but ignorance of his rights is no response to the statute, and if there was any obstruction it was caused by the act of those over whom the appellant had no control. The substance of the defense, that the appellant supposed the estate of the principal was ample to pay the debts, and for that reason no effort was made to compel the surety to pay; that he had good cause for believing this when he had, in fact, received the money is certain, but still no such exception is to be found in the statute that can relieve him from an honest mistake indulged in by himself and his debtor, without the knowledge even of the surety.

The judgment is *affirmed.*
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO

. 09

- 1 7

- 00 326

- C R



### ____________________

EX PARTE BILLY WAYNE BARTON

________________________________________ _______________ ______________

On A ppeal from the 258th District Court

Polk County, Texas

Trial Cause No

. 24667

________________________________________ ________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

O n September 11 , 2017, we notified the parties that the appeal would be

dismissed for want of prosecution unless arrangements were made for filing the

record or the appellant explained why he needed more time for filing the record. See

Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). The appell ant did not file a response. It appears that the

appellant is not entitled to proceed without payment of costs. See Tex. R. App. P.

20.2. There being no satisfactory explanation for the failure to file the record, the

appeal is dismissed for want of prosec ution. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b).

APPEAL DISMISS ED.2 ________________________________ STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Submitted on October 17, 2017

Opinion Delivered October 18, 2017

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

APPOINTMENT TO THE CONTINUING 

LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD

:

:

:

:

:

No. 863

SUPREME COURT RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2020, Tuan M. Samahon, Esquire, Bucks

County, is hereby appointed as a member of the Continuing Legal Education Board for a 

term of three years, commencing January 1, 2021.
Gold Medal for Leadership:

Douglas Montgomery

Scott Rose

The group is recognized for its leadership in the design, standardization, test, and deployment of Domain 

Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) technologies for the Internet. Guided by an identified 

national priority to secure the Domain Name System, the group developed and executed a strategic plan 

to develop and deploy anew trust infrastructure for the Internet and to ensure that the U.S. Government 

was a significant adopter. This multiyear effort culminated with the deployment of DNSSEC in the .gov

domain, thus significantly improving the security and stability of government information networks.
#### Wm. Piatt & Wm. Watts *v.*John Piatt's Adm'r.

Executors and Administrators — Assignee of Claim.

The estate of an assignee of a claim can not be held to lose the benefit of the assignment merely because the personal representative failed to become a party to the suit in which the assignor was prosecuted, and which he might well believe would secure the rights of the estate.

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT.

January 17, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge-Peters :

By a transfer in writing dated April 18, 1861, Jacob- Piatt and his wife, for the expressed consideration of $900, assigned to John Piatt all their interest in a judgment which then had been recovered against David Piatt, executor of Robert Piatt, deceased, and all their interest in the estate of said testator.

After that judgment was rendered, and said assignment was made, said judgment was reversed, and upon entering the mandate of the court, it seem® that Jacob Piatt prosecuted the claim against the executor, which finally resulted in a judgment for a much smaller amount than was the first judgment; but there is neither allegation nor evidence that the contract for his assignment was ever rescinded, or that John Piatt or his representative had abandoned their claim to it. Cauby proves he was. present when the contract was made; that the consideration named in the writing was. actually paid in his presence, partly in money and partly in a debt which Jacob owed John Piatt.

It does not appear that Jacob; was indebted to appellants- when he assigned the claim to John Piatt and we can not conclude that the estate of the assignee should lose the benefit of the assignment merely because the personal representative failed to become a party *343to the suit which his assignor was prosecuting, and which he might well believe would secure his right.

*Drme, for appellants.*

*Rodman, for appellee.*

Judgment *affirmed.*

Judge Pryor not sitting.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 32

  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER and PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                             PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Report (as defined under the preceding Certification
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, Peter Lamoureux,
President of Everest Asset Management, Inc. , the general partner of the Everest
Fund, L.P. (the "Fund"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Fund.

                                   By:  /s/ Peter Lamoureux
                                        ---------------------------------------
                                   Name:    Peter Lamoureux
                                   Title:   Director, President and Treasurer
                                   November 1, 2004

                                                                             E-3
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ZETH TRAWICK,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D16-2367

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed August 25, 2017

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Volusia County,

Raul A. Zambrano and Margaret W. 

Hudson, Judges.

Tiffany Gatesh Fearing, of Suncoast Legal 

Group, P.L., Spring Hill, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Zeth Trawick ("Appellant") appeals the denial of two grounds of his twelve-ground

motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.850. We affirm the denial of the first challenged ground without discussion. However, 
2

we reverse the summary denial of the second ground and remand for an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Throughout his trial for second-degree murder, Appellant maintained that he killed 

the victim in self-defense. Nonetheless, the jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial court 

sentenced him to life in prison.1 Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion for 

postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to obtain exculpatory photographs and proceeding to trial without them. 

Specifically, he argued photographs of his hands and arms, taken by the DeLand Police 

Department, would have depicted a fresh cut, purportedly made by the victim's knife 

during the altercation that resulted in the victim's death. Appellant argued these 

photographs would have demonstrated that he had defensive wounds from attempting to 

deflect an attack. The trial court summarily denied this claim. 

The record on appeal contains evidence that trial counsel otherwise explored 

Appellant's self-defense theory and cross-examined the medical examiner concerning the

injuries to both the victim and Appellant. However, this evidence does not conclusively 

refute Appellant's claim that the introduction of the photographs would have bolstered his 

self-defense argument, especially in response to the State's introduction of photographs 

of the victim's defensive injuries and testimony from two witnesses denying the existence 

of Appellant's injury. Thus, we reverse the trial court's summary denial of this ground and 

remand for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. See Saunders v. State, 186 So. 3d 55, 

 

1 We per curiam affirmed Appellant's direct appeal of the judgment and sentence. 

Trawick v. State, 46 So. 3d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
3

57 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("Because claim 2 is not conclusively refuted by the attached 

record, we remand for an evidentiary hearing.").

AFFIRMED in Part; REVERSED in Part; REMANDED with Instructions.

ORFINGER, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

         As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in this registration statement on Form S-3, to be
filed on or around June 15, 1998, of our report dated May 27, 1998 on the
Consolidated Financial Statements of WorldCom, Inc. included in WorldCom Inc.'s
Current Report on Form 8-K dated May 28, 1998 (filed (May 28, 1998) and to all
references to our Firm included in this registration statement.

                                                            ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Jackson, Mississippi,
June 12, 1998.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   12-31-96
<PERIOD-END>                        09-30-96
<CASH>                               287,412
<SECURITIES>                         0
<RECEIVABLE>                        2,564,402
<ALLOWANCES>                        380,060
<INVENTORY>                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                    2,613,426
<PP&E>                               393,115
<DEPRECIATION>                        292,881
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      2,731,687
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               3,136,509
<BONDS>                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0
<PREFERRED>                         0
<COMMON>                            65,292
<OTHER-SE>                         (473,114)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        2,731,687
<SALES>                            12,803,812
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   12,803,812
<CGS>                               9,609,495
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      12,976,096
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   (20,678)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                23,794
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (175,400)
<INCOME-TAX>                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               (175,400)
<DISCONTINUED>                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                    0
<CHANGES>                           0
<NET-INCOME>                      (75,400)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     (.025)
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (.025)
        

</TABLE>