****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v

. JOSE

MORENO-HERNANDEZ (SC 18919)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued March 17—officially released June 30, 2015 Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Stacey Haupt Miranda, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion ZARELLA, J. The present appealrequires usto define the scope ofliabilityunderourcriminalattemptstatute, General Statutes § 53a-49. Section 53a-49 (a) makes it

acrime foranindividual, actingwiththe intentrequired forthe commission ofthe predicate crime, to intentionally engage in conduct that would constitute the crime ifthe attendantcircumstanceswere ashebelievedthem to be; General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1) (attendant circumstances subdivision); orto intentionallytake a substantialstepinacourseofconductplannedtoculminate in the commission ofthe crime. General Statutes § 53a49 (a) (2) (substantial step subdivision). In the present case, the defendant, Jose Moreno-Hernandez, was charged with, inter alia, attempt to commit murder under only the attendant circumstances subdivision, and ajury found him guilty as charged. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion forajudgment ofacquittalbecause the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had attempted to commit murder under the attendant circumstances subdivision. The defendant concedes that thejurywouldhave foundhimguiltyunderthe substantial step subdivision if he had been charged under that subdivisionbutclaimsthatthe attendantcircumstances subdivision is simply inapplicable in the present case. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the early morning hours ofMarch 27, 2009, the victim1 finished her shift at the Temple Grill, a restaurant in the city of New Haven, where she worked as a waitress. As she was leaving, the defendant, who worked at the restaurant as a dishwasher, asked her for a ride home, and the victim agreed. The defendant gave the victim directions to where he lived, but, after forty-five minutes of driving, the victim was lost and they still had not yet arrived at the defendant’s home. The victim eventually pulled over, apologized, and asked the defendant to get out ofher car. At that point, the defendant began making sexual advances toward the victim, and, when she resisted, he struck her in the face. The defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim inside the car and physically assaulted her when she resisted. The victim attempted to call 911 and escape multiple times, but the defendant stopped her each time.
After assaulting the victim inside her car, the defendantdrovethe carto apublicparkandforcedthevictim to a remote area in the woods. There, the defendant continued to sexually and physically assault the victim. At a certain point, the defendant told the victim that he was going to kill her, and he struck her with his fist andatreebranch, kickedherwithhisboots, andtwisted her head and neck. The victim stopped reacting to thedefendant’s blows in an attempt to lead him to believe that she was dead. Finally, after the defendant stopped striking the victim and left, she ran from the park to a nearby house and called the police. The police apprehended the defendant within hours, and he confessed to physically and sexually assaulting the victim. The defendant told police that he had tried to kill the victim because he thought she would reportthe sexual assault and that, when he left the park, he thought that he had killed her.
The defendant was charged with five counts of first degree sexual assault in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), one count of first degree kidnapping inviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), one count of first degree assault in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), and one count of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a54a (a) and 53a-49 (a) (1). While the state was proceeding with its case against the defendant, the trial court held a charging conference with the parties at which it raised sua sponte the question of whether the state had presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of attempt to commit murder in light of the fact that the defendant

was charged under the attendant circumstances subdivision and not the substantial step subdivision, as is far

more common. That same day, the state moved to amend the long form information pursuant to Practice Book § 36-18 to charge the defendant with attempt to commit murder in violation ofthe substantial step subdivisioninsteadofthe attendantcircumstances subdivision. Thetrialcourtdeniedthestate’smotion, reasoning that the state should not be allowed to amend the long form information when it would not have been aware of the potential deficiency if the court had not raised the issue sua sponte.
When the state rested its case, the defense rested without presenting any evidence and moved for ajudgment ofacquittal with respect to the attemptto commit murder charge, which the trial court denied. With respectto that charge, the trial courtinstructedthejury only on the attendant circumstances subdivision. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of eighty years incarceration. At the sentencing hearing, the trial courtalso deniedthe defendant’spostconviction motion for a new trial with respect to the sexual assault, assault, and kidnapping charges, and his motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the attempted murder charge. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only to situations in which it is impossible for an individual to commit the intended crime due to a mistake of fact.2 That wasnot the situation in the present case, according to the defendant, because he could have killed the victim; his actions simplyfell short ofcausingherdeath. Inmaking this argument, the defendant relies primarily on our decisions in State v. Gonzalez, 222 Conn. 718, 609 A.2d 1003 (1992), and State v. Cox, 293 Conn. 234, 977 A.2d 614 (2009), in which we interpreted the differences between the attendant circumstances and substantial step subdivisions as ‘‘significant.’’ Id., 241.
The state concedes that, were we to interpret the attendant circumstances subdivision as requiring evidence ofimpossibility, then areasonablejury could not have foundthe defendant guilty underthat subdivision. The state claims, however, that the attendant circumstances subdivision is not limited only to impossibility situations, butalsoissatisfiedwhenanindividualwould have completed the intended crime but for certain intervening circumstances. Applying this interpretation to the present case, the state argues that it presented sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant believed that he had done all that was necessary to kill the victim but did not actually do so because of an intervening circumstance, namely, that the victim pretended to be dead.3 In making this argument, the state relies on the concurring opinion in Gonzalez, as well

as our decision in State v. Green, 194 Conn. 258, 480 A.2d 526 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 964, 83 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1985), both of which indicated that certain conduct can satisfy both the attendant circumstances andsubstantialstep subdivisions. SeeState

v. Gonzalez, supra, 222 Conn. 729–30 ( Peters, C. J., concurring in thejudgment); Statev. Green, supra, 275.
We conclude thatthe attendant circumstances subdivision is not limited onlyto impossibility situations and that, in the present case, the state presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of attempt to commit murder under the attendant circumstances subdivision.4 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency ofthe evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view ofthe evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view ofthe evidence that supports thejury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev. Cox, supra, 293 Conn. 245.
To resolve the defendant’s sufficiency of evidenceclaim, we must interpret § 53a-49 (a). ‘‘Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which

we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Statev.Brown, 310 Conn. 693, 702, 80A.3d878 (2013). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to considerthetext ofthe statute itselfandits relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence ofthe meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.

. . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, tothelegislativepolicyitwas designedto implement, andto its relationship to existing legislation and commonlawprinciples governingthe same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buckland, 313 Conn. 205, 224, 96 A.3d 1163 (2014), cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 992, 190 L. Ed. 2d 837 (2015).
‘‘In interpreting the [statutory] language

. . . however, we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by ourpreviousjudicial interpretations ofthe language and the purpose of the statute.’’ Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93–94, 70 A.3d 1 (2013); see alsoHummel

v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (holding that § 1-2z does not require this court to overrule priorjudicial interpretations of statutory schemes, even ifnot based on plain meaning rule). Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining the text of § 53a-49 (a) and our prior decisions interpreting it.
Section 53a-49 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty ofan attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission ofthe crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime ifattendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting

a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission ofthe crime.’’ In order to determine whether the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only in impossibility situations, as the defendant claims, we turn next to our prior decisions interpreting this statute.
A review of our case law reveals that we have decisionsthatimplicitlycontradictoneanotherwithrespect to whether the attendant circumstances subdivision islimited to impossibility situations. In Green, a case in whichthe defendantcouldhave completedtheintended crime, we determined that the jury could have found the defendant guiltyunderthe attendant circumstances subdivision. See State v. Green, supra, 194 Conn. 275. In Gonzalez, anothercase inwhichthe defendant could have completed the intended crime, we reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on the attendant circumstances subdivision. See State v. Gonzalez, supra, 222 Conn. 724–25. The court was divided in Gonzalez, and Chief Justice Peters wrote a concurring opinion, in which she relied on Green in stating that the attendant circumstances subdivision applied to the defendant’s conduct, even though it was not an impossibility situation, because the defendant was mistaken about the attendant circumstances. Id., 729–30 ( Peters, C. J., concurring in thejudgment). The majority in Gonzalez did not respond to ChiefJustice Peters’ critique or address Green

. Since Green and Gonzalez were decided, we have relied on Gonzalez at least once, in Cox

. See State

v. Cox, supra, 293 Conn. 241–42.
The Appellate Court likewise also has issued decisionsthatimplicitly conflictwith one anotherregarding whether the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only to impossibility situations. Compare State

v. Rodriguez, 139 Conn. App. 594, 616–17, 56 A.3d 980 (2012) (upholding conviction for attempt to commit first degree assaultunderattendant circumstances subdivision when police prevented defendant from stabbing victim by shooting defendant), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 902, 60 A.3d 286 (2013), State v. Williams, 44 Conn. App. 231, 238, 689 A.2d 484 (there was sufficient evidence for finding of guilt under attendant circumstances subdivision becausejurors ‘‘could have reasonably found that the defendant struck the victim in the head with a baseball bat a sufficient number of times to believe that she would die’’), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 918, 692A.2d815 (1997), andStatev. Gilchrist, 25 Conn. App. 104, 110–11, 593 A.2d 507 (there was sufficient evidence for finding of guilt under attendant circumstances subdivision when defendant shot victim in mouthbutvictim survived), cert. denied, 220 Conn. 905, 593 A.2d 970 (1991), with State v. Carter, 141 Conn. App. 377, 385, 61 A.3d 1103 (attendant circumstances subdivision requires proof that defendant’s conduct ‘‘progressed so far as to constitute the final step in a
course ofconductplanned to culminate in the commission of the crime’’), cert. granted, 308 Conn. 943, 66 A.3d 886 (2013), and State v. Rodriguez, supra, 617–18 ( Lavine, J., concurring) (interpretingattendant circumstances subdivision as applying only to impossibility situations and urging this court to reconsider Green).
Not only do we have conflicting decisions, but those decisions, namely Green and Gonzalez, include little substantive analysis to support their conclusions. Forinstance, in Green, the court did not expressly decide that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies beyond impossibility situations but, rather, implicitly reached that conclusion by determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction under the attendant circumstances subdivision when the defendant clearly could have completed the intended crime. See State v. Green, supra, 194 Conn. 271, 274–77. In Gonzalez, the court expresslyaddressed the scope of the attendant circumstances subdivision; State v. Gonzalez, supra, 222 Conn. 724; but, as the

concurrence in Gonzalez noted, did not cite to any authority to support its conclusion that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only when a perpetrator fails to accomplish the intended crime due to a mistake of fact that ‘‘render[ed] the commission ofthe crime impossible.’’ Id.; see id., 729 ( Peters, C. J., concurring inthejudgment). Moreover, the majorityin Gonzalez failed to acknowledge the fact that it was implicitly contradicting Green, letalone explainwhyitwas choosing to do so. Thus, neither of these cases provides us with a sufficient analytical framework to resolve the present case but, rather, offers only conclusions without explanations. We decline to blindly adopt either of those conclusions and instead undertake a full review of the attendant circumstances subdivision to determine its scope. We begin our review by examining the text of the attendant circumstances subdivision and conclude that itis susceptibleto morethan one reasonable interpretation. Onthe onehand, thetextsuggeststhatthe subdivision is limited to impossibility situations insofar as it refers to the attendant circumstances, or the lack thereof, as the reason why the intended crime was not completed, instead of the actor’s conduct. Ifthe attendant circumstances necessary to commit the crime

were not present, as the language of the attendant circumstances subdivision requires, then it is reasonable to conclude that it was impossible to commit the intended crime. On the other hand, the attendant circumstances subdivision does not include the term ‘‘impossible’’anddoesnotexpresslylimititsapplication to impossibility situations. Thus, the statute also can reasonablybereadas applyingto anysituationinwhich

anindividual engages in conductthat ‘‘would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be’’; General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1); regardless ofwhether it was possible for the individual to have completed the intended crime. The text of the attendant circumstances subdivision alone therefore is insufficientto resolve the issue presented. Accordingly,

we turn to extratextual sources relating to the statute.
The extratextual sources that resolve the issue presentedarethe commentaryto § 53a-49andthecommentary to the criminal attempt provision of the Model Penal Code on which § 53a-49 was based. In 1969, thelegislature enacted § 53a-49 as part ofa revision to this state’s substantive criminal law, as recommended by the Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes (commission). See Public Acts 1969, No. 828, § 50; see also State v. Desimone, 241 Conn. 439, 456, 696 A.2d 1235 (1997). In the commission’s comments to the Penal Code, the commission stated that § 53a-49 ‘‘is based, in part, [on] theModelPenalCode.’’ Commissionto Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-49 (West 2012) comment, p. 76. The Model Penal Code provision on which § 53a-49 is based is § 5.01 (1), as the language of the attendant circumstances and substantial step subdivisions of § 53a-49 (a) is almost identical to that of the attendant circumstances and substantial step provisions in § 5.01 (1).5 Compare General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1) and (2), with Model Penal Code § 5.01 (1) (a) and (c). Although neither the commission nor the legislature directly addressed the issue of whether the attendant circumstances subdivision is limited to impossibility situations, the drafters ofthe Model Penal Code did. In their comments to § 5.01, the drafters first made clear that § 5.01 (1) (a), the analogueto the attendant circumstances subdivision of§ 53a-49 (a) (1), applies inimpossibility situations. See generally 1 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1985) § 5.01, comment (3), pp. 307–20 (Model Penal Code and Commentaries). The drafters also noted, however, that, ‘‘when [an] actorhas done all that he believes to be necessary to commit the offense in question, he has committed an attempt’’ under § 5.01 (1) (a). Id., comment (4), p. 321. In providing examples ofsuch scenarios, the drafters stated that § 5.01 (1) (a) covers ‘‘cases where the contemplated victim is fired upon but the shots miss or the victim is saved by a miraculous operation.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. In both of these examples, the perpetrator failed to complete the intended crime not because it

was impossible to do so, but because his actions were insufficient to do so or because some intervening circumstance prevented him from doing so. Thus, there is no questionthatthe drafters ofthe Model Penal Code intended § 5.01 (1) (a) to applynot onlyto impossibility situations, but also to situations in which a perpetrator fails to complete the intended crime for some reason other than impossibility.
The comments to § 5.01 (1) ofthe Model Penal Code

are consistent with the broad purpose of § 53a-49 of penalizingindividualswho have demonstratedthatthey pose a threat to society, albeit without completing the intended crime. We previously have stated that the drafters of the Model Penal Code ‘‘belie[ved] that the proper concern ofthe law ofattempts is the dangerousness ofthe actor, as apersonmanifesting afirm disposition to commit a crime, not the dangerousness of his conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 181 n.29, 891 A.2d 897, cert.denied, 549 U.S. 821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006); accord UnitedStates v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment (3) (b), pp. 315–16 (‘‘[t]he law of attempts

. . . should be concerned with manifestations of dangerous character as well as with preventativearrests’’). Surely, apersonwho, withtheintent to commit a crime, goes so far as to ‘‘[i]ntentionally [engage] in conduct which would constitute the crime ifattendant circumstances were as he believes them to be’’; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1); has demonstrated his dangerousness to society because he has taken every step necessary to complete the crime but simply has been thwarted for one reason
oranother. Ifanything, anindividual generallywillhave demonstrated his dangerousness to agreater extent by engaging in such conduct in situations in which it was possible to have completed the intended crime than in situations inwhichitwas not. Cf. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2003) § 11.5 (a), pp. 240–41 (discussing inherent impossibility situations in which perpetrator employs means so ineffective to attempt intended crime, his conduct is harmless). Thus, interpreting the attendant circumstances subdivision as applying only to impossibility situations would contravene the purpose of § 53a-49 because it would allow individuals who have demonstrated their dangerousness to society by attempting to commit a crime that

was possible to complete to nevertheless escape criminal liability.
In sum, the legislature based the attendant circumstances subdivision of § 53a-49 (a) (1) on § 5.01 (1) (a) ofthe Model Penal Code, and the drafters ofthe Model Penal Code made clear that § 5.01 (1) (a) is not limited to impossibility situations. Moreover, interpreting that subdivision as applying beyond impossibility situations is consistent with the overarching purpose of § 53a-49. Accordingly, we conclude that the attendant circumstances subdivision is not limited to impossibility situations. Applying this interpretation to the present case, and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the guiltyverdict, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guiltyofattemptto commitmurderinviolation of§ 53a54a (a) and the attendant circumstances subdivision of § 53a-49 (a) (1). The state presented evidence that the defendant admitted to the police that he brutally assaulted the victim with the intent to kill her and that he believed that he had killed her. It is reasonable to view this evidence as supporting the conclusion that the defendant acted with the requisite intent to commit murder under § 53a-54a (a) and that he intentionally engagedinconductthatwouldhave constitutedmurder ifthe attendant circumstances had been as he believedthem to be, namely, that the victim was actually dead, rather than pretending to be dead. Thus, we conclude thatthe statepresentedsufficientevidence and, accordingly, uphold the defendant’s conviction of attempt to commit murder.
The defendant argues, contrary to our conclusion, that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies onlyto impossibilitysituationsforanumberofreasons,
none of which we find persuasive. First, the defendant argues that, in Gonzalez and Cox, we unequivocally established that the attendant circumstances subdivision is limited to impossibility situations and that those decisions control in the present case. With respect to Gonzalez, we agree that this court decided that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only to impossibility situations. See State v. Gonzalez, supra, 222 Conn. 724–25. We conclude that this issue warrants reconsideration, however, because,

as we previously discussed, Gonzalez provided little authority to support its conclusion and failed to acknowledge that we previously had drawn the opposite conclusion, albeit implicitly, in Green

. Indeed, the court in Gonzalez did not cite to any authority to support its conclusion that the attendant circumstances subdivision applies only when a perpetrator fails to complete acrime ‘‘solelybecausethe ‘attendantcircumstances’ were not as the perpetrator believed them to be, rendering the commission ofthe crime impossible.’’ Id. The court in Gonzalez cited to a 1971 reference manual to the Penal Code that provides that the attendantcircumstancessubdivisionis‘‘directedat’’impossibility situations and the substantial step subdivision is ‘‘directed at’’ situations in which the intended crime is notcompletedforsomereasonotherthanimpossibility. D. Borden, ‘‘Inchoate Offenses,’’inJudicialDepartment, Reference Manual: Connecticut Penal Code Title 53a (1971) § 5, pp. 5-5, 5-6; see State v. Gonzalez, supra, 724–25. This reference manual, however, provides no authorityforits interpretation of§ 53a-49, andit contradicts the comments to § 5.01 (1) of the Model Penal Code, the provision on which § 53a-49 (a) was based. Thus, we are convinced that Gonzalez was incorrect insofar as it determined that the attendant circumstances subdivision is limited to impossibility situations. We therefore overrule Gonzalez with respect to that determination.
With respect to Cox, the defendant incorrectly relies

on that decision because the court’s holding in that

case did not turn on whether it was possible for the defendant to have committed the intended crime. In Cox, the defendant, Willie Cox, was seated in the backseat of a car fleeing a bank robbery when he raised his

arms ‘‘aggressive[ly]’’ toward a police officer. (Internal quotationmarksomitted.)Statev. Cox, supra, 293 Conn. 237. Cox was convicted of attempt to commit assaultof a peace officer after the trial court instructed the jury only on the attendant circumstances subdivision. Id., 239–40. On appeal, this courtreversedthejudgment of conviction on the basis that the state had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that Cox had made a mistake of fact. Id., 246–47. Although the state had introduced evidence that Cox had been in possession of a gun, it failed to establish that the gun had been loaded or in working condition, or that Cox even had attempted to use it. Id., 246.
Cox therefore is not inconsistent with our holding in the present case. In Cox, the court interpreted the attendant circumstances subdivision as requiring evidence that the defendant was mistaken about certain attendant circumstances surrounding the alleged attempt. See id. We agree with that interpretation, and, inthepresentcase, the defendantsatisfiesthatstandard because he mistakenly believed that his actions were sufficient to kill the victim. In Cox, the court quoted Gonzalez forthe proposition thatthe attendant circumstances subdivision is limited to situations of impossibility but did not rely on that principle in reaching its holding. Id., 241–42. Likewise, the court’s characterization of the differences between the attendant circumstances and substantial step subdivisions as ‘‘significant’’ was immaterial to its holding and was unsupported, beyond a citation to Gonzalez

. Id., 241. Thus, Cox provides no additional support for the defendant’s position, and we overrule Cox only to the extent that it relied on Gonzalez in reaching its conclusion.
Inadditiontorelyingon Gonzalezand Cox, the defendant also relies on two decisions ofNew Jersey’s intermediate appellate court, namely, State v. Condon, 391 N.J. Super. 609, 615, 919 A.2d 178 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 192 N.J. 74, 926 A.2d 857 (2007), and State v. Kornberger, 419 N.J. Super. 295, 302, 16A.3d 1107 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 208 N.J. 368, 29 A.3d 741 (2011). New Jersey’s criminal attempt statute also is based on § 5.01 of the Model Penal Code, and, in Condon and Kornberger, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court interpreted a provision that is identical in all material respects to the attendant circumstances subdivision of§ 53a-49 (a) (1) as requiring an individual to have ‘‘complete[d] an ‘impossible’ crime’’ ratherthan merelytohavetakenasubstantialsteptowardcompleting the intended crime. State v. Kornberger, supra, 302, citing State v. Condon, supra, 617. These cases do not support the defendant’s position in the present case becausetheydistinguishedtheattendantcircumstances subdivisionfromthe substantial step subdivisiononthe basis ofthe degree to which each requires the intended crime to have been completed, not on the basis of whetheritwaspossibleto completethe intendedcrime. Finally, the defendant claims that we must interpret the attendant circumstances subdivision as applyingonlyto impossibilitysituationsbecauseto interpretthat subdivision otherwise wouldrenderitsuperfluous. See, e.g., Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010) (‘‘[a statute] must be construed, ifpossible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The attendant circumstances subdivision would be superfluous, according to the defendant, insofar as anyone who ‘‘engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as hebelievesthemto be’’; General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1); would necessarily have taken

a ‘‘substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’ General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2). The state concedes that, under its interpretation of the statute, the attendant circumstances subdivision always would be subsumed by the substantial step subdivision. The implication of the defendant’s argument is that we should read the attendant circumstances subdivision as applying only to impossibility situations, and the substantial step subdivision as applying only when an individual fails to complete the intended crime for some reason other than impossibility, as the court did in Gonzalez; see State v. Gonzalez, supra, 222 Conn. 724–25; so that the two subdivisions serve distinct purposes. Although the substantial step subdivision may subsume the attendant circumstances subdivision, the two subdivisions are not coextensive. The substantial step subdivision criminalizes certain conductthatwouldfall short ofviolating the attendant circumstances subdivision. That is, the substantial step subdivision covers situations in which an individual has not engaged in conduct that would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believed them to be, but, rather, onlyhastakenasubstantialsteptowardcommittingthe crimethatisstronglycorroborative ofhis criminal intent. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment (1), p. 299. For instance, apickpocket who reaches into an empty pocket would be guilty ofattemptto commit larcenyunderboth subdivisions; see id., comment (3) (c), pp. 317–18; but a pickpocket who is apprehended immediately before reaching into the empty pocket could be found guilty under only the substantial step subdivision and not the attendant circumstances subdivision. Thus, the distinction betweenthetwo subdivisionsisthe degree ofcompleteness each requires in the course of an actor’s conduct. The fact thatthe substantial step subdivision subsumes the attendant circumstances subdivision most likely

was an intentional effort by the drafters of the Model Penal Code to ensure the elimination ofthe impossibilitydefensebycoveringeverypossible scenarioinwhich it could arise. Nevertheless, the defendant’s proposed solution of distinguishing the two subdivisions from one anotherbyinterpretingtheattendantcircumstancessubdivision

as applying onlyto impossibility situations andthe substantialstep subdivisionasnotapplyingto impossibility situations belies the language of § 53a-49 (a) and the commentary thereto. See General Statutes § 53a-49 (a); Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, supra, comment, p. 76. The legislature intended both subdivisions to eliminate the defense of impossibility. Indeed, both subdivisions include language that makes an actor’s guilt dependent on his subjective beliefs, which prevents adefendantfromescapingliabilitybyclaiming that it was objectively impossible to commit the intended crime. Compare General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (1) (‘‘if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be’’), with General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2) (‘‘under the circumstances as he believes them to be’’). The commission’s comment to § 53a-49 makes clear that the legislature intended both subdivisions to have this effect: ‘‘[Section 53a-49] sweeps aside anyconsideration of the defense of impossibility

. . . . Under subdivisions

. . . (1) and (2), the liability ofthe actor turns
on his purpose, considered in light of his beliefs, and not on what is actuallypossible under existing circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added.) Commission to Revise the CriminalStatutes, supra, comment,p. 76; seealsoModel Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment (3) (c), pp. 317–18 (Model Penal Code provisions on which attendant circumstances and substantial step subdivisions were based both applyto impossibility situations). Thus, the language of § 53a-49 (a) and the relevant commentary disprove the defendant’s claim that one subdivision applies to impossibility situations and the otherdoes not. Both subdivisions applyto impossibility situations, as well as to situations inwhich itwaspossible for the perpetrator to have committed the intended crime. We therefore reject the defendant’s claim that the attendant circumstances subdivision must be interpreted as being limited to impossibility situations.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 In accordance with our policy ofprotecting the privacy interests of the victims ofsexual assault, we decline to identifythe victim or others through whomthevictim’sidentitymaybeascertained. SeeGeneralStatutes § 54-86e.

2 For ease ofreference, we refer to these scenarios as impossibility situations. For a complete discussion of what constitutes a situation in which it is impossible to commit a certain crime, see 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2003) § 11.5 (a), pp. 230–41, which distinguishes between factual, legal and inherent impossibility.

3 Alternatively, the state argues that, ifwe were to interpret the attendant circumstances subdivision as requiring evidence of impossibility, then the defendant’s conviction nevertheless should be upheld under the substantial step subdivision because the jury necessarily had to find that the requirements ofthat subdivision were satisfied in orderto find the defendant guilty under the attendant circumstances subdivision. The state further argues that, even if this court disagrees with the foregoing argument, it should remand the case for a new trial on the attempt to commit murder charge because the trial court improperly denied the state’s motion to amend the long form information to charge the defendant with attempt to commitmurder under the substantial step subdivision.

4 Thus, we need not considerthe state’s alternative arguments for upholding the defendant’s conviction or for remanding the case for a new trial on the attempted murder charge.

5 Comparing the full text ofthe provisions reveals their similarity. General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of an attempt to commit

a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances

as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’ In comparison, § 5.01 of the Model Penal Code provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Definition ofAttempt. Apersonis guiltyofanattemptto commitacrime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: ‘‘(a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime ifthe attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or ‘‘(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part; or ‘‘(c)purposelydoesoromits to do anything that, underthecircumstances

as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 1 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1985) § 5.01 (1), pp. 295–96. Thus, itis apparentthatthe legislature, in enacting § 53a-49 (a), essentially adopted § 5.01 (1) (a) and (c), but not § 5.01 (1) (b). Section 53a-49 (a) (1) parallels § 5.01 (1) (a), and § 53a-49 (a) (2) parallels § 5.01 (1) (c).