[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Rahab, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-1401.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-1401

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. RAHAB, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Rahab, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-1401.] 

Criminal law—Sentencing—Right to trial by jury—Vindictiveness—There is no 

presumption of vindictiveness when, after trial, a trial court sentences a 

defendant to a longer prison term than was offered by the state in plea 

negotiations—An appellate court may reverse such a sentence for 

vindictiveness only if, after review of the entire record, it finds clearly and 

convincingly that the sentence was based on actual vindictiveness—Actual 

vindictiveness not found—Judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2015-1892—Submitted February 9, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 

No. C-150186. 

_________________ 

 
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DEWINE, J.

{¶ 1} Malik Rahab turned down a plea deal that would have sent him to 

prison for three years. A jury found him guilty, and a judge sentenced him to six 

years in prison. This, he says, constituted an impermissible “trial tax”; in other 

words, the judge increased Rahab’s sentence in retaliation for the exercise of his 

constitutional right to a jury trial. To support his claim, he points to comments 

made by the trial judge that he maintains should give rise to an inference that the 

court was acting vindictively. 

{¶ 2} The First District Court of Appeals rejected Rahab’s argument, 

concluding on the record before it that the trial court had based its sentence on the 

facts of the case and the defendant’s prior history rather than on his decision to go 

to trial. We allowed Rahab’s discretionary appeal. 145 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2016-

Ohio-899, 46 N.E.3d 702. 

{¶ 3} Resolution of this appeal turns on whether we adopt the presumption 

of vindictiveness urged by Rahab. We decline to do so: we hold that there is no 

presumption of vindictiveness when a defendant rejects a plea bargain and is 

subsequently sentenced to a harsher term. The burden is on the defendant to show 

the judge acted vindictively. And an appellate court may reverse a sentence for 

vindictiveness only if, upon its examination of the entire record, it clearly and 

convincingly finds the sentence was based on actual vindictiveness. Applying this 

standard, we do not find Rahab has demonstrated actual vindictiveness, and so we 

affirm the judgment below. 

I. A Rejected Plea, a Trial, and a Sentence 

{¶ 4} Rahab was charged with burglary. Before his jury trial was to begin, 

the trial court asked about plea negotiations. The state recounted that it had offered 

Rahab a three-year agreed sentence if he would plead guilty as charged but that he 

had rejected the offer. The court confirmed with Rahab that he wanted to reject the 

plea offer, and the trial commenced. 
January Term, 2017 

3

{¶ 5} The burglary victim, Christina Hewitt, testified at trial. One 

morning—shortly after she and her husband had moved into their home—she 

noticed that a living-room window was open and her purse missing. Though a 

fingerprint lifted from the window matched Rahab’s, he told the police that he had 

never been at the home. The jury found Rahab guilty. Following a sentencing 

hearing, the court imposed a six-year prison term. 

{¶ 6} Rahab appealed, arguing that his sentence was contrary to law 

because the trial court had punished him for exercising his right to a jury trial rather 

than accepting the plea offer. In affirming, the court of appeals relied upon its 

decision in State v. Stafford, 158 Ohio App.3d 509, 2004-Ohio-3893, 817 N.E.2d 

411, which held that a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a court involves 

itself in unsuccessful plea negotiations and then, following trial, sentences a 

defendant to a greater sentence than was offered. Acknowledging that the trial 

court had not involved itself in plea negotiations, the court concluded, “The record 

establishes that the trial court based Rahab’s sentence on his personal history and 

the facts of the case * * * rather than as punishment for exercising his right to a jury 

trial.” 

II. Proof of Vindictiveness 

{¶ 7} Rahab argues that the trial court vindictively imposed a sentence in 

retaliation for the exercise of his right to a jury trial, in violation of his due-process 

rights under the United States Constitution. 

{¶ 8} “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows 

him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.” Bordenkircher v. 

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), citing North 

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) 

(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There is no question, then, 

that a sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional 

right to a jury trial is contrary to law. See State v. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140, 147, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989). The more difficult question is how a defendant proves 

vindictiveness. 

{¶ 9} Rahab seeks to relieve himself of the burden of proving that the trial 

court’s sentence in his case amounted to a punishment for his decision to go to trial. 

He argues instead that the court’s statements during sentencing gave rise to an 

inference that it sentenced him vindictively and that the inference could be rebutted 

only by “an unequivocal statement as to whether the decision to go to trial was or 

was not considered in fashioning the sentence,” see State v. Scalf, 126 Ohio App.3d 

614, 621, 710 N.E.2d 1206 (8th Dist.1998). Thus, he is asking this court to presume 

vindictiveness based on the court’s statements. Amicus curiae the Ohio 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers would have us go even further and find 

that a presumption of vindictiveness arises whenever a court imposes a sentence 

that is harsher than was offered during plea negotiations. In its view, then, anything 

greater than a three-year sentence for Rahab would be presumptively contrary to 

law. But vindictiveness on the part of a sentencing judge has been presumed in 

only a narrow class of cases. 

A. The Pearce Presumption and its Limits 

{¶ 10} The presumption that we are urged to apply has its underpinnings in 

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 

23 L.Ed.2d 656. Ordinarily, appellate courts defer to trial courts’ broad discretion 

in making sentencing decisions. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-

564, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984); see also Williams v. New York, 337 

U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). The sentencing statute and 

case law reflect this deference. See R.C. 2953.08(G); State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio 

St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23. Pearce marked a departure 

from the traditional rule. See Wasman at 564. 

{¶ 11} In Pearce, the defendant had successfully appealed and then, upon 

retrial and conviction for the same offense, received a harsher sentence. The court 
January Term, 2017 

5

held that a presumption of vindictiveness arose when the judge imposed a more 

severe sentence after the second trial. See Pearce at 726. The presumption could 

be rebutted by affirmative, nonvindictive reasons for the sentence on the record. 

Id. “Due process of law,” the court reasoned, “requires that vindictiveness against 

a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part 

in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” Id. at 725. 

{¶ 12} Pearce may have appeared to herald “a rule of sweeping dimension.” 

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). But 

the United States Supreme Court has sharply limited application of its “ ‘judicially 

created means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution]’ ” (brackets 

sic) to a narrow set of cases—“where its ‘[remedial] objectives are thought most 

efficaciously served’ ” (brackets added). Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138, 

106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986), quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 

487, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). As that court has explained, 

The imposition of punishment is the very purpose of virtually all 

criminal proceedings. The presence of a punitive motivation, 

therefore, does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing 

governmental action that is fully justified as a legitimate response to 

perceived criminal conduct from governmental action that is an 

impermissible response to noncriminal, protected activity. Motives 

are complex and difficult to prove. As a result, in certain cases in 

which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the 

exercise of a legal right, the Court has found it necessary to 

“presume” an improper vindictive motive. Given the severity of 

such a presumption, however—which may operate in the absence of 

any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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response to criminal conduct—the Court has done so only in cases 

in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. 

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372-373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 

(1982). 

{¶ 13} So narrow is the application of the Pearce presumption that it has 

been referred to as an “oddity” and “an anomaly in our law, which ordinarily 

‘ “presum[es] * * * honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” ’ ” 

(Ellipsis sic.) Plumley v. Austin, 135 S.Ct. 828, 190 L.Ed.2d 923 (2015) (Thomas, 

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 

556 U.S. 868, 891, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 

dissenting), quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 

712 (1975). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has refused to extend the 

presumption to situations in which a defendant is sentenced more harshly after 

seeking a de novo trial with a superior court in a two-tier trial system, Colten v. 

Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-118, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972); in which 

a jury resentences a defendant to a greater term of imprisonment following a retrial, 

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-28, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973); 

and in which a prosecutor brings felony charges arising out of the same incident for 

which the defendant had refused a misdemeanor plea, Goodwin at 381-384. 

{¶ 14} Nor has the United States Supreme Court applied the presumption to 

situations in which a harsher sentence is imposed after a defendant successfully 

moves to vacate his guilty plea and proceeds to trial. Smith, 490 U.S. at 801-802, 

109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865. In determining whether to apply the 

presumption, the Smith court returned to considering whether there was a 

“ ‘reasonable likelihood’ * * * that the increase in sentence is the product of actual 

vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Id. at 799, quoting Goodwin 

at 373. In concluding that there was no such reasonable likelihood, the court 
January Term, 2017 

7

distinguished cases like Pearce in which the judge “can be expected to operate in 

the context of roughly the same sentencing considerations after the second trial as 

he does after the first.” Smith at 802. In contrast, when the defendant has initially 

tendered a plea, more information bearing on sentencing will be available to the 

judge after trial. Id. at 801. For example, during the trial, the court may gain further 

insight into the crime itself and the defendant’s “moral character and suitability for 

rehabilitation.” Id. 

{¶ 15} Further, the court noted that Pearce had been decided before 

“important developments in the constitutional law of guilty pleas.” Smith at 802. 

Among these developments were the recognition that a “guilty plea may justify 

leniency,” id., citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 

L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), that a prosecutor may offer a more lenient sentence as part of 

the plea-bargaining process, id., citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363, 98 

S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, and that a defendant may receive a more lenient sentence 

in return for a guilty plea, id., citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 221-223, 

99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). “[A]fter trial,” the court explained, “the 

factors that may have indicated leniency as consideration for the guilty plea are no 

longer present.” Smith at 801. 

B. No Presumption of Vindictiveness Following Plea Negotiations 

{¶ 16} Guided by these United States Supreme Court decisions, we 

consider whether Rahab’s case fits within the narrow band of cases in which 

vindictiveness is presumed. We conclude that it does not: there is not a reasonable 

likelihood that a sentence that is harsher than the one offered during plea 

negotiations is the product of actual vindictiveness. See Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 

109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865. As in Smith, a trial court that sentences a 

defendant following a jury trial—in a case in which there has not been a previous 

jury trial—has more information upon which to base its sentencing decision than 

does the court that imposes an agreed sentence arising out of plea negotiations. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 17} Furthermore, as the court made clear in Smith, there are legitimate 

reasons a defendant who rejects a plea may end up receiving a harsher sentence. 

Acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate sentencing consideration. Id. at 801. 

Moreover, a plea bargain is, after all, a bargain. In the bargain, the prosecutor 

achieves certain benefits: a foregoing of the risk that the defendant will be found 

not guilty, relief from the burden of trying the case and a concomitant ability to 

devote prosecutorial resources to other cases, and limitations on the defendant’s 

right to appeal an agreed sentence, see R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). In return, the 

prosecutor is able to offer the defendant certain sentencing considerations. Both 

sides exchange risk about the outcome for an enhanced degree of certainty. For the 

bargain to be worth anything to the defendant (at least in most cases), the defendant 

must have a reasonable probability of receiving a more lenient sentence than he 

would following trial and conviction. 

{¶ 18} Thus, when a defendant receives a harsher sentence following his 

rejection of a plea offer, there is not a “reasonable likelihood” that the sentence was 

based on actual vindictiveness. We decline to apply a presumption of 

vindictiveness, and instead hold that Rahab must prove actual vindictiveness. See 

Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424. 

III. The Record as a Whole Does Not Clearly and Convincingly Show 

the Sentence was the Result of Actual Vindictiveness

{¶ 19} Having declined to presume that the trial court acted with 

vindictiveness, we begin our review of Rahab’s sentence as we do in any other 

appeal—with the presumption that the trial court considered the appropriate 

sentencing criteria. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d at 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220. We then 

review the entire record—the trial court’s statements, the evidence adduced at trial, 

and the information presented during the sentencing hearing—to determine 

whether there is evidence of actual vindictiveness. We will reverse the sentence 

only if we clearly and convincingly find the sentence is contrary to law because it 
January Term, 2017 

9

was imposed as a result of actual vindictiveness on the part of the trial court. See 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 

N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. 

{¶ 20} Rahab insists that even before the trial started, the court’s statements 

indicated that it was bothered by his decision to go to trial: 

Sir, you understand that the State is offering to do an agreed sentence 

of three years in prison. The charge that you’re facing now, sir, 

carries a potential sentence of 2 to 8. There’s the presumption that 

you go to prison, okay? And if you didn’t take the agreed sentence 

and you were found guilty, it would be up to the Court to sentence 

you. And the Court does not look highly on cases where people 

don’t take responsibility and accept that they did something wrong 

if they’re found guilty. 

You understand that? Meaning it probably would be more. 

I’m not going to fool you. You understand? 

{¶ 21} As Rahab sees it, the court’s words constituted a threat—one that it 

carried out when it imposed a sentence harsher than the state’s offer. We disagree. 

Rather than threatening Rahab with more time in prison should he exercise his right 

to a jury trial, the court was ensuring that he understood the choice he was making. 

Rahab was charged with a second-degree felony, R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and (D), for 

which there is a presumption of a prison term of two, three, four, five, six, seven, 

or eight years, R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) and 2929.14(A)(2). The three-year term offered 

by the state in its plea bargain was at the low end of the range of seven possible 

terms. Indeed, the only way that he could have received a lesser sentence is if the 

court had imposed the minimum term. The court’s statements allowed Rahab to 

intelligently evaluate whether he wanted to risk the possibility of a greater sentence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

{¶ 22} Nevertheless, Rahab maintains that the court’s statements following 

the trial betray a vindictive motive. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

referred to a letter that Rahab had written in which he claimed that he had wanted 

to admit to the crime all along and that he had gone to trial only because his attorney 

made him. The court expressed its confusion with Rahab’s claim and asked why 

he had not then accepted the plea agreement offered by the state. Rahab answered, 

“I didn’t think it was worth what I did, three years.” 

{¶ 23} The trial court was troubled by Rahab’s response: 

Eight years. I told you that when they offered you three. So, 

you know, I’m a little perplexed that you’re saying you didn’t think 

three was fair and you’re telling me that your attorney made you go 

to trial. And now you’re telling me that you did it. You did it, didn’t 

you, right? 

When Rahab agreed that he had committed the burglary, the court continued, 

Okay. So I don’t understand why you wouldn’t admit to that 

and plead to that, and you had to have a trial, or why you wouldn’t 

take the three years because I can sentence you to eight. 

Makes no sense to me. So I don’t know what you talked 

about with your attorney, but—too late. You went to trial. You 

gambled, you lost. You had no defense. And you even admit that 

you did it, and yet you put this woman through this trial again. 

You traumatized her by breaking into her house. And then 

you had to traumatize her again to relive it and go to trial. I don’t 

get it. 

 
January Term, 2017 

11 

{¶ 24} The court expressed skepticism about Rahab’s claim that he had told 

his attorney that he did not want to go to trial, reminding Rahab that it was his 

choice to go to trial. When Rahab said he was sorry, the court told him, “I sure 

wish I would have heard that before the trial.” 

{¶ 25} And when Rahab’s brother addressed the court about his difficult 

upbringing and suggested that Rahab did not deserve an eight-year sentence simply 

because he had made a bad decision, the court again emphasized that it was 

discounting Rahab’s remorse: 

He went to the trial with a prove-it defense. He had 

absolutely no defense. They had his fingerprints. He gambled, he 

lost. I’m sorry, you know right from wrong, but it just does not—

it’s like, yeah, now that it’s all over, oh, I’m sorry I got caught, I’m 

sorry I got—I went to trial and I lost. Too late. Too late. To me, 

too late. 

 

{¶ 26} The court returned to its gambling theme one more time before 

announcing the sentence: 

Well, guess what, you lost your gambling. You did this. 

You had no defense, and you wouldn’t take responsibility. You 

wanted to go to trial. All right, big winner you are. 

{¶ 27} The court’s intemperate statements are troubling. No court should 

give the appearance that it is chiding a defendant for exercising his constitutional 

right to a jury trial. But the statements can’t be read in isolation. Rather, we must 

review the entire record. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

{¶ 28} True, the court refers to Rahab gambling and losing when he chose 

to reject the plea offer and go to trial. But when read in the context of the sentencing 

hearing, it seems likely that the court was not taking Rahab to task for going to trial 

but rather for acting contrite and admitting his crime only after he had been found 

guilty. Genuine remorse is one factor to be considered by the court when it makes 

its sentencing decision. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). More concerning was the court’s 

statement that Rahab had put the victim through the trauma of a trial. The 

sentencing court is to consider how the defendant’s criminal conduct—not his 

exercise of constitutional rights—impacted the victim. See R.C. 2929.11(B). 

{¶ 29} But the court had information beyond the victim’s trauma to 

consider before imposing sentence. Rahab’s case manager from a drug-treatment 

program told the court that Rahab had not fared well in treatment. Rahab had 

started and quit several jobs, against the advice of the program’s employees. Rahab 

was “difficult” to work with and “noncompliant in a lot of different areas.” Due to 

Rahab’s problems in treatment and his burglary conviction, the case manager 

explained that Rahab could not remain in the program. 

{¶ 30} Further, the assistant prosecuting attorney disclosed that Rahab, who 

was 19 at the time of sentencing, had been adjudicated delinquent on 22 occasions 

as a juvenile. One of the adjudications was for robbery. 

{¶ 31} Not all the information considered by the court was adverse to 

Rahab. The court’s discussion of Rahab’s childhood with his brother had an 

impact: the court told Rahab that it had been persuaded by his brother’s comments 

to impose less than the eight-year maximum sentence. 

{¶ 32} In short, the trial court had a great deal of information to consider 

before it imposed the sentence—Rahab’s lack of genuine remorse, the impact of 

his conduct on the victim, his poor performance in treatment, his lengthy juvenile 

record, and his difficult upbringing. No doubt it would have been better had the 

court’s words not hinted at a frustration with Rahab’s rejection of the plea bargain. 
January Term, 2017 

13 

But given the record before us, we are not convinced that the court sentenced Rahab 

based on vindictiveness, rather than on the evidence of his prior record, insincere 

remorse, and the impact of his crime on the victim. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the court of appeals. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 33} We hold that there is no presumption of vindictiveness when, after 

trial, a court sentences a defendant to a longer term than was offered by the state in 

plea negotiations. An appellate court may reverse a sentence for vindictiveness 

only if, after review of the entire record, it finds clearly and convincingly that the 

sentence was based on actual vindictiveness. Having reviewed the record in this 

case, we do not find that the court vindictively sentenced Rahab. We therefore 

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

FRENCH, J., concurs. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in judgment 

only. 

HOOVER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 

O’NEILL, J. 

MARIE MORALEJA HOOVER, J., of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, 

sitting for FISCHER, J. 

_________________ 

HOOVER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

{¶ 34} I concur in the majority’s holding that there is no presumption of 

vindictiveness on the part of the trial court when a defendant rejects a plea bargain 

and is subsequently sentenced to a harsher term. I also agree with the majority that 

an appellate court may reverse a sentence for vindictiveness only if, upon its 

examination of the entire record, it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence 

was based on actual vindictiveness. Nonetheless, I write separately because I find 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

that the record in this case clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the trial court 

sentenced Rahab vindictively. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the 

First District Court of Appeals. 

{¶ 35} It has long been recognized that a defendant is guaranteed the right 

to a trial and should never be punished for exercising that right or for refusing to 

enter a plea agreement. State v. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140, 543 N.E.2d 1220 

(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. Any increase in the sentence based upon the 

“defendant’s decision to stand on his right to put the government to its proof rather 

than plead guilty is improper” and violates the right to due process. State v. Scalf, 

126 Ohio App.3d 614, 620-621, 710 N.E.2d 1206 (8th Dist.1998); see also United 

States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187-1188 (9th Cir.1973) (a sentence based on 

a defendant’s refusal to accept a plea bargain, even if only in part, infringes upon 

the defendant’s right to trial). A trial court cannot enhance a sentence because a 

defendant elects to require the government to prove his guilt, “ ‘no matter how 

overwhelming the evidence of [defendant’s] guilt.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Scalf at 621, 

quoting United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir.1975). 

{¶ 36} The majority concludes that Rahab’s sentence was not based on 

vindictiveness but rather on the evidence of his prior record, his perceived lack of 

remorse, and the impact of his crime on the victim. I disagree with the majority’s 

evaluation of the evidence contained in the record. 

{¶ 37} As discussed in the majority opinion, the record is replete with 

“intemperate statements” from the trial court. Majority opinion at ¶ 27. These 

statements concern the trial court’s dissatisfaction with Rahab’s choice to exercise 

his right to a jury trial and cannot simply be ignored. 

{¶ 38} Of particular concern are the trial court’s remarks made prior to trial. 

At that time, the trial court had not yet had the benefit of hearing evidence, nor did 

it know of Rahab’s prior criminal history or apparent lack of remorse; yet it had 

already determined that Rahab would receive a harsher sentence if he rejected the 
January Term, 2017 

15 

state’s offer and exercised his right to a jury trial. The majority contends that this 

remark was an attempt by the trial court to ensure that Rahab understood the choice 

that he was making by rejecting the state’s offer. I respectfully disagree. Rather, I 

interpret the trial court’s remark as a threat to Rahab: either take the plea bargain 

offered by the state and forego your right to a trial or suffer a longer sentence upon 

a finding of guilt by the jury. Couple this remark with the trial court’s statements 

at sentencing, which repeatedly mention Rahab’s rejection of the plea bargain and 

his decision to “gamble” and go to trial, and I think it is effusively clear that the 

trial court acted vindictively when it sentenced Rahab. Nothing in the entire record 

convinces me otherwise. 

{¶ 39} The majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not act vindictively 

in this case creates a nearly impenetrable barrier to proving actual vindictiveness. 

If the trial court’s actions in this case do not amount to vindictiveness, then what 

behavior would satisfy that burden? The majority’s decision, in my view, may have 

a chilling effect on the willingness of criminal defendants to exercise their 

constitutional rights to trial. 

{¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s finding that 

Rahab has not demonstrated actual vindictiveness. As previously stated, however, 

I otherwise concur in the majority’s decision. 

 O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Demetra 

Stamatakos and Joshua Thompson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 

 Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 

Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Repper, Pagan & Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, urging reversal for 

amicus curiae the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 

Peter T. Reed, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney 

General Michael DeWine. 

_________________