alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Wm. Dugan et al. *v.*Clinton Griffith et al.

Appeal — Reversal—Judgment for Sale of Deceased’s Land.

A judgment of sale of a decedent’s land was reversed, wliere there were unapplied assets in the hands of the administrator and there was no showing as to their insufficiency.

Equity — Master Commissioner — Basis of Finding.

A master commissioner has no right to act upon anything appearing in the record of another case which is not introduced as evidence and made an exhibit of the record.

APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

April 3, 1874.

OpinioN by

Judge Lindsay:

It is necessary, upon the present appeal, to decide as to the effect the failure to bring all the parties before the court would have had upon the judgment, if it were otherwise correct.

The master’s report shows that Griffith, the administrator of Harrison, had in his hands certain notes, accounts, etc., part of the assets of the estate of the intestate, Dugan. No reason is given why these claims were not collected and applied to the satisfaction of the debts before a sale of the land was decreed. If they are worthless, that fact should be proven.

There is no evidence whatever, in the record, to sustain the claim of $3,536.12 allowed to. Griffith. The master bases his claim upon what appears in the case of Griffith v. Wells. The record of that *652case is not an exhibit in this, and the master had no right to act upon anything therein appearing. We have no means of knowing whether or not the evidence relied on sustains the opinion of the master; nor do we know whether these appellants, or any of them, or their ancestor, Dugan, or either of his administrators, were parties to the action of Griffith v. Wells, or in any way bound by anything therein appearing. The same objection applies to the claim of $422.47 allowed to parties said to be co-sureties with Griffith and the intestate on the bond of Harrison. The names of these parties are not even given.

*L. P. Little, for appellants.*

*Sweeney & Stuani't, for appellees.*

For these errors the judgment of sale rendered September 23, 1871, must be reversed. This reversal has the effect of opening the entire cause, so far as the indebtedness of .the intestate is concerned. The cause should be recommitted to the master, and all creditors allowed another opportunity to prove their claims. In the meantime the proper parties to the action instituted by Crab-tree and Griffith, should all be brought before the court.

The reversal does not affect the order confirming the sales of the realty. The purchasers are not made parties to the appeal, and we cannot therefore inquire into the propriety of the action of the court on this branch of the case. The • cause is remanded for further proceedings as herein indicated.
#### M. W. Ferguson et al. *v.*J. W. Dougherty.

Bills and Notes — Notice of Protest.

Where a notary, upon diligent inquiry, obtained the information that the indorser of a bill lived without the city limits, the depositing of notice of protest in the post office, which was post-paid and addressed to the surety, on the evening of the day the bill was protested, shows sufficient diligence on the part of the notary in giving the notice.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

January 10, 1874.

*Pirtle & Caruth, for appellants.*

*Seymour & Abbott, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

Duncan, the notary public who protested the bill, proves he did not know the residence of appellant; that when he delivered the notice to Welman, the endorser of the bill, he enquired for appellant, and Welman informed him he was at the Willard Hotel; he went there and enquired for him, was informed he was not there, and had not been there; he then looked at the city directory to ascertain his residence, which was there given “On Shelbyville Pike, near city limits,” and having learned from Mr. Ferguson’s acquaintances that he resided outside of the city limits, he deposited the notice in the postoffice, postage paid, in Louisville, directed to appellant, on the evening of the day the bill was protested, about 5 or 6 o’clock.

If the notary had known that appellant resided in the city it would have been his duty to have delivered the notice to him in person; but he states he did not know that fact, and he exercised due and reasonable diligence to ascertain his residence, and to notify him of the dishonor of the bill. At least, the course he pursued with the information he had, after the diligence he exercised to ascertain the residence of appellant, is' sufficient to discharge him.

And perceiving no errors in the ruling of the court below in giving and refusing instructions, let the judgment be affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-7825

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

NATHANIEL RENARD CHILES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CR-94-7, CA-01-36-7)

Submitted: February 11, 2002 Decided: February 28, 2002

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nathaniel Renard Chiles, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph William Hooge

Mott, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Renard Chiles seeks to appeal the district court’s

orders denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West

Supp. 2001) and his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed

the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny Chiles’ motion for a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Chiles, Nos. CR-94-7; CA-01-36-7

(W.D. Va. July 12 & Oct. 25, 2001). We also deny Chiles’ motion to

expedite his appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JASON LEE JENNEN,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-30016

D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00081-LRS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 16, 2013** 

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

Jason Lee Jennen appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the nine-month custodial term and the 25-month term of supervised release

imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Jennen contends that the district court erred procedurally by (1) presuming

FILED

OCT 23 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
that a within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable; (2) failing to explain adequately

why it rejected the sentencing recommendations of both parties in favor of the

sentence selected; and (3) relying improperly upon rehabilitation in selecting a

sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608

F.3d 1103, 1108 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The record reflects that the

district court did not presume the reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence

and that it considered the arguments of both parties and adequately explained its

reasons for the sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc). Furthermore, the record reflects that the court considered

Jennen’s need and desire for rehabilitation in the appropriate context of evaluating

the need for a supervised release term, rather than in determining whether to

impose a prison term or the length of that term. See United States v. Grant, 664

F.3d 276, 280, 282 (9th Cir. 2011).

Jennen also argues that the overall sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

We review for abuse of discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007), and find none. The sentence imposed is substantively reasonable in light

of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) factors, including

the need to deter and to protect the public. See id.

AFFIRMED.

2
2

R. Christopher Goodwin & Associates, Inc. Contains Privileged Information -- Do Not Release

Chapter 1: Introduction

Helix B

Helix A

Radio Transmitter 

Building WWV

Radio Transmitter 

Building WWVB

0 100

Meters

0 500

Feet

Aerial Overview

Scale 1:10,000



Service Layer Credits: Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community

Q:\Project_Data\Prj_3185_NIST_CO_HI_RadioTowers\MXD\NIST_CO_Aerial_Locator.mxdDate: 12/4/2019 Time: 10:08:04 AM User Name: kwest

Project Area

Antenna

National Institute of

Standards and Technology Fort Collins, CO
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7392

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CURTIS JAMES LAY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:97-cr-00313-PJM-1)

Submitted: December 13, 2012 Decided: December 18, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Curtis James Lay, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Slaymaker Sale, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Curtis James Lay appeals the district court’s orders

denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for a sentence 

reduction and his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed 

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. 

Lay, No. 8:97-cr-00313-PJM-1 (D. Md. July 30, 2012; Dec. 4, 

2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
April 25, 2022 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Applied Cybersecurity Division 

Cybersecurity Framework 

100 Bureau Drive, Stop 2000 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899 

Submitted via email to CSF-SCRM-RFI@nist.gov 

RE: Evaluating and Improving NIST Cybersecurity Resources: The 

Cybersecurity Framework and Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk 

Management; NIST-2022-0001 

NIST ACD CSF Team: 

The Operational Technology Cybersecurity Coalition (OT Cyber Coalition) appreciates 

the opportunity to submit feedback to the teams at the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST) working on potential updates to the Cybersecurity Framework 

(CSF). 

The OT Cyber Coalition is a diverse group of leading cybersecurity vendors, founded by 

Claroty, Forescout, Honeywell, Nozomi Networks, and Tenable. Representing the entire 

OT lifecycle, the OT Cyber Coalition believes that the strongest, most effective 

approach to securing our nation’s critical infrastructure is one that is open, vendorneutral, and allows for diverse solutions and information sharing without compromising 

cybersecurity defenses. 

As a foundational cybersecurity standard, the impact of the existing guidance and any 

future guidance is monumental. In order to help better inform the community of 

stakeholders that will rely on the NIST CSF, we offer the following feedback that 

incorporates perspectives gained from every sector and phase of the cybersecurity 

lifecycle. While we have responded to specific questions, the ultimate goal of our 

feedback is to promote a standards-based approach that allows for vendor- and 

technology-neutral solutions to be adopted by anyone, anywhere, and in any sector. 

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EXHIBIT 23.1
 
 
 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
   We have issued our report dated June 29, 2010 with respect to the consolidated financial statements included in the Annual Report of Mexco Energy Corporation on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 for the year ended March 31, 2010.  We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements of Mexco Energy Corporation on Form S-8 (File No. 333-131835, effective February 14, 2006) and on Form S-8 (File No. 333-165296, effective March 5, 2010).
 /s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP
 
 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 January 28, 2011
#### James Moore *v.*Wm. Wilson et al.

Injunction — Recovery on Bond.

'In an action on an injunction bond, plaintiffs can recover only to the extent that they show they have been injured, and in order to recover plaintiffs must allege facts under which such proof may be admitted.

APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT.

March 4, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:.

The bond obligates the surety to pay such damages as. the parties may have sustained, in the event the injunction was dissolved. There is no allegation in tire amended petition that appellees have lost their debt by, reason of the injunction, or that English was at the time of the judgment solvent, and during the' delay caused by the injunction had become insolvent.

If he is solvent, as the appellant alleges,, the appellees have lost nothing; if he was insolvent before or at the time of the execution of the injunction bond, they can recover damages only to the extent they can show by their proof that they have been.injured ; and in order to do this they .must allege a state of case under which such proof may be admitted.

The parties may be allowed to amend their pleadings. The *552judgment of the court below is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### W. R. Thompson *v.*Mary Fenley.

Vendor and Purchaser — Incumbrance—Waiver.

Where a purchaser of land accepted a deed for the land, it was held that he did not waive his right to insist that the incumbrance on the title should be removed before he should be required to pay the purchase money, although the purchase money notes have been assigned, after the vendor -has become insolvent.

Vendor and Purchaser — Defense—Insolvency.

In an «action on purchase money notes, it was held that the purchaser was not deprived of his defense because he did not specifically allege that the vendor was insolvent on the date the notes fell due.

APPEAL FROM: LOUISVILLE CHANCERY.

June 23, 1873.

On Petition for Rehearing.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

In the cases of *Ridgway v. Collins,*3 A. K. Marshall 410, and *Robbins v. Holley,*1 T. B. Monroe 191, there was no connection between the demands sought to be set off against each other. In each case the court notices this fact, and gives it as one of the reasons why relief will not be granted.

In the case of *Daviess v. Newton,*5 J. J. Marshall 89, the court recognizes the right, where the demands are connected, to have them set off, even though the assignor of the note had removed from the state or become insolvent after notice of assignment. In this case the demands are not only connected and growing-out of the same *28transaction, but Thompson defends upon a ground always recognized in equity. He is resisting the specific execution of a contract for the sale of realty, because of defect of title and the insolvency of his vendor. When Thompson accepted Pearson’s deed, he did not waive his right to insist that incumbrances on the title should be removed before paying the purchase money. In case his warrantor became insolvent before the same became due and payable, Pearson could not deprive him. of this right by assigning the note. Appellant sued on the note three days after it was due. Thompson answered a month afterwards setting up Pearson’s insolvency. His answer was treated as good and the cause prepared and tried upon its merits. This court is of opinion that a good defense was made out and is not disposed to deprive Thompson of the benefit of the defense because* he did not specifically allege that P'earson was insolvent on the day the note fell due, it being evident that the chancellor and the appellee regarded and treated the pleadings as sufficiently specific and direct. It is not shown that Thompson executed the note for the purpose of enabling Pearson to raise money by selling them.

*Bullitt, Booth, for appellant.*

*Seymour, Abbott, for*appellee.»

The record before this court shows that Thompson states in his first deposition that “he was told that Mr. Abbott had said that the note could *not*be renewed.” It is counsel and not this court who are mistaken as to this fact.

The petition for a rehearing must be overruled.
10694.

#### Raburn *v.*The State.

Decided October 14, 1919.

Luke, J.

The special grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit. There is evidence to support the verdict, and a new trial was properly refused.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, G. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*

*281Accusation of intoxication on highway; from city court of Carrollton—Judge Beall. May 26, 1919.

*Leon*Hood, for plaintiff in error.

*Willis Smith, solicitor,*contra.
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 14, 

2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00439-CV

LONNIE L. MOORE, Appellant 

V.

BRAND ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, ET AL, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 333rd District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-52197 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This is an appeal from an order signed March 14, 2018. On June 11, 2018, 

appellant filed a notice of non-suit. We construe the filing as a motion to dismiss the 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted. 

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown.
Mimicking cellular micro-environments with synthetic designer materials

Joerg Lahann

Chemical Engineering Department

University of Michigan

Our improved understanding of molecular biology, microfabrication, and materials

chemistry has stimulated crossfertilization of two fields that had limited overlap even a 

few decades ago: biotechnology and materials engineering. In my presentation, I will 

discuss current advances in the design of multifunctional biomaterials and biointerfaces 

including three distinct examples under research in the Lahann group: (i) Chemically 

and biologically active coatings with one or multiple advanced functions can be 

synthesized by chemical vapor deposition (CVD) polymerization [1,2] as well as CVD 

co-polymerization [3]. (ii) Multicompartmental particles that exhibit a wide range of sizes, 

shapes and compartments can be prepared using electrohydrodynamic co-jetting [4,5]. 

(iii) Patterned microfibers can be synthesized via electrospinning that have to potential

to provide spatially controlled guidance of cells in three dimensions [6].

[1] J. Lahann et al., Science 2003, 299, 371-374; [2]; [1] H. Nandivada et al., Angew. 

Chem. 2006, 45, 20, 3360-3363 [2] H.Y. Chen et al., PNAS, 2007, 104, 1173-11178;

[3] Y. Elkasabi et al., Advanced Materials 2006, 18, 1521-1526. [4]K.-H. Roh et al., 

Nature Materials 2005, 4, 759-763. [5] S. Bhaskar et al. Angew. Chem. 2009 (in press). 

[6] S. Bhaskar & J. Lahann JACS 2009 (in press).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1067

RACHAEL G. ROGERSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle, District

Judge. (CA-94-161-4-BO)

Submitted: October 31, 1996 Decided: November 18, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas B. Brandon, III, Williamston, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Raymond E. Dunn, Jr., Andrew D. Jones, DUNN, DUNN, & STOLLER, New

Bern, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Rachael G. Rogerson appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant in her diversity slip-andfall claim. We affirm.

Rogerson contends that the district court improperly excluded

an affidavit tending to show that the alleged dangerous condition

resulting in her accident was a common result of the Defendant's

cleaning procedures. We find that even if this affidavit were

admitted it demonstrates only that if the condition existed it may

have been created by the Defendant's negligence. There is, however,

no evidence that the alleged dangerous condition actually existed

prior to Rogerson's fall. Accordingly, because Rogerson cannot

prove its existence, she cannot prove that it was created by the

Defendant's negligence or that the Defendant failed to correct the

condition after actual or constructive notice of its existence. See

France v. Winn-Dixie Supermarket, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 25, 25 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1984), review denied, 327 S.E.2d 889 (N.C. 1985) (providing

standard). We therefore affirm the district court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED