UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4674

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LACHARLES ANTHONY CLARK, a/k/a LaCharles Anthonyo Clark,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-4675

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LACHARLES ANTHONY CLARK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00112-TDS-1; 1:08-cr00351-TDS-1)

Submitted: January 11, 2024 Decided: January 24, 2024

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Before WYNN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Leslie C. Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. 

Hairston, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, LaCharles Anthony Clark appeals his convictions of 

conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846, and 

distribution of heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Clark

also challenges the district court’s decision to sentence him to 96 months of imprisonment,

and to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to an additional 24 months of

imprisonment. For the reasons below, we affirm.

First, Clark asserts that the district court plainly erred by permitting a witness to 

give hearsay testimony about Clark’s drug dealing with her son. Because Clark did not 

object to the testimony below, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). We will reverse only if (1) the 

district court committed an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects the 

defendant’s substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. An error ‘affects the defendant’s 

substantial rights’ if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of 

the proceeding. United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1113 (4th Cir. 2021). Even if 

these prerequisites are met, however, “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the 

forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not 

exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 

While a hearsay statement is generally inadmissible, it may be admitted when the 

government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed of which 

the defendant and the declarant were members, and that the declarant’s statement was made 

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during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Squillacote,

221 F.3d 542, 563 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 904–05 (4th Cir.

1996). We need not decide whether the testimony at issue qualified as an admissible coconspirator’s statement made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, because we 

conclude that even if there was an error, it had no effect on Clark’s substantial rights. The 

witness’ testimony, which the district court found credible, about Clark being the only 

person to sell her son drugs during the period at issue was based primarily on her personal 

knowledge. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not affect the outcome of the 

proceeding.

Second, Clark contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. 

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, construing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence to support the 

verdict. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 384 (4th Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence 

is that which “a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support 

a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014)). In this analysis, we are “‘not entitled to 

assess witness credibility’ and must ‘assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence 

in the prosecution’s favor.’” United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 404 (4th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018)). “We consider both 

circumstantial and direct evidence, and allow the government all reasonable inferences that 

could be drawn in its favor.” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The defendant “bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient 

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evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d 

at 219 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations, 

alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted)). We have reviewed the record and 

conclude that the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.

Third, Clark contends that the upward variant sentence imposed by the district court 

based on its assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors is substantively 

unreasonable. “In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we ‘examine[] 

the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion 

in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).’” 

United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010)). While this court considers the 

extent of the variance, the fact that we “might reasonably have concluded that a different 

sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). And variant sentences are generally reasonable 

when “the reasons justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United 

States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

But the greater the variance, the reasons cited by the court must be more compelling. Id. 

at 220. We conclude that the court properly evaluated the seriousness of Clark’s criminal 

conduct, the need for deterrence given Clark’s long criminal history, and the need to protect 

the public. We find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence.

Lastly, Clark contends that the 24-month revocation sentence for violating his 

conditions of supervised release by engaging in the criminal conduct at issue here should 

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be vacated, because the two underlying convictions are unsustainable. But because we 

have determined that Clark’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence, there is no 

merit to Clark’s argument.

For all these reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentence and the judgment and 

commitment order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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