1

National Construction Safety Team (NCST)

Advisory Committee Meeting

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Gaithersburg, Maryland

September 28, 2017

Meeting Summary

Advisory Committee Members:

James (Jim) R. Quiter Arup, Committee Chair

Ross Corotis University of Colorado, Boulder

Jeremy Isenberg AECOM (retired)

Reginald DesRoches Rice University

Paul A. Croce FM Global (retired)

James Harris JR Harris and Company, Committee Vice Chair

Jeanette Sutton University of Kentucky

Gary Klein Wiss, Janney, Elster Associates, Inc.

NIST Representatives, Guests, and Contractor Support:

Kent Rochford Acting Director, NIST

Howard Harary Director, Engineering Laboratory, Designated

Federal Officer, NIST

Judith Mitrani-Reiser Director, Disaster and Failure Studies Program

Long Phan Group Leader, Structures Group, NIST

Marc Levitan Acting Director, National Windstorm Impact

Reduction Program (NWIRP) R&D, NIST

Erica Kuligowski Leader, WUI Fire Group, NIST

Jason Averill Chief, Materials and Structural Systems Division,

NIST

Therese McAllister Leader, Community Resilience Group, NIST

Stephen Cauffman Research Engineer, Community Resilience

Group, NIST

Nelson Bryner Chief, Fire Research Division, NIST

Michael Newman Senior Communications Officer, Public Affairs

Office, NIST

John van de Lindt Professor, Colorado State University (NIST COE)

Walter Peacock Professor, Texas A&M University (NIST COE)

Dan Cox Professor, Oregon State University (NIST COE)

Frank Gayle Deputy Director, Office of Advanced

Manufacturing, NIST

Ben Davis Management and Program Analyst, Community

Resilience Group, NIST

Melissa Banner Administrative Assistant, Community Resilience

Group, NIST

Mat Heyman Consultant, Applied Research Associates
2

Summary of Discussions

I. Opening Remarks, Introduction, and Agenda Review

Judith Mitrani-Reiser opened the meeting, and then Committee members and other

attendees introduced themselves. Following a review of safety procedures, MitraniReiser introduced Kent Rochford, who provided opening remarks.

Rochford thanked Committee members for their time, commitment and

willingness to serve, noting that their contributions will make an important

difference. Since the last Advisory Committee meeting, he said, NIST has worked to

implement recommendations made by the Committee and Mitrani-Reiser had joined

NIST as Director of the Disaster and Failure Studies Program. Rochford also told the

Committee that NIST has conducted reconnaissance missions related to several

recent hurricanes. NIST is now engaged in post-deployment reviews. Rochford

thanked departing Committee members Isenberg, Croce, and Quiter for their

commitment during their tenure.

Jim Quiter, Chair of the Committee, welcomed Committee members and meeting

attendees and acknowledged Jeremy Isenberg’s previous service as Chair. Quiter

said that the main output, and an important part of the meeting, will be the work on

the Committee’s annual report with recommendations to NIST, which would be

discussed later in the day. Quiter reviewed the agenda and asked Howard Harary to

provide NIST’s responses to the Committee recommendations, included in the

Committee’s 2016 report.

II. NIST Responses to NCST Advisory Committee’s 2016 Report

Harary thanked the Committee for its 2016 report — both for its support for NIST’s

work as well as specific NCST-related recommendations. He briefly reviewed the

NCST Act and the Advisory Committee’s charter.

Harary then reviewed, at a high level, NIST’s specific responses to the Advisory

Committee’s recommendations: [See presentation slides.]

1. Expertise at NIST

The Committee had noted the special expertise possessed by NIST staff and their

building safety orientation, and strongly suggested that an ability to investigate

tornado events other than Joplin (MO) and wildland-urban interface (WUI) fires

would be highly beneficial.

Harary assured the Committee that the decision to deploy an NCST Team is not

dependent on the expertise that already exists at NIST. The NCST Act requires that

at least one member of the Team be a NIST employee. Other team members can be

experts from the private sector, universities, representatives of professional

organizations with appropriate expertise, and appropriate federal, state, or local

officials. In addition, the NCST Act allows for the procurement of temporary or

intermittent services by experts and consultants. In sum, he told members, NIST is
3

required to engage other parts of the government, private sector, and universities to

provide necessary expertise.

2. Criteria for Deploying NCST Teams

The Committee had urged NIST to review the deployment criteria in the context of

apparent climate change and to consider ways of stretching its resources, perhaps

by reducing the length and complexity of reporting in order to conduct more

investigations.

Harary said that the NCST Act is focused on the impact that hazards have on

buildings and subsequent challenges in evacuation and emergency response

procedures; the Act does not focus on the type of hazard that resulted in a building

failure. The NCST Act specifies the two criteria the NIST Director must consider in

determining whether to deploy a Team under the Act: building failure and

substantial loss of life or significant potential for substantial loss of life.

He explained that NIST scores all events and uses a filter to help decide about

potential employments. During his tenure, Harary said, NIST had not seen a

situation where it had wanted to do an investigation. He acknowledged that while

there are always financial limitations, NIST is committed to doing studies where

there is something really important to learn.

3. Safety of Teams

The Committee had suggested that coordination with local fire departments before

and during any NIST deployment is prudent. It also had recommended that in the

longer term, safety training of the type undertaken quarterly by FEMA search and

rescue teams be considered. Participation by NIST personnel in the safety training

of other agencies may be feasible, according to the Committee.

Harary said that NIST agreed with these recommendations. He advised the

Committee that NIST employees who deploy as part of an NCST preliminary

reconnaissance or an NCST investigation must complete a set of safety training

courses. Those courses are updated with guidance from the EL Safety Professional

and NIST’s Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment (OSHE) Office, borrowing

material from other agencies whenever needed. NIST employees with NCST

credentials, issued by the NIST Director, are expected to discuss the status of their

safety training with their managers twice each year during regular reviews, he said.

NIST has investigated Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) online

training, with search and rescue as an example. He said that NIST is considering

incorporating several of those elements into its own training, and that procedures

for teams’ safety is coordinated with fire departments.

4. Longitudinal Studies

The Committee reiterated its recommendation that NIST consider following up on

past investigations. One reason is to assess and update amendments to the

deployment criteria, which include consequences to resilience. According to the

Committee’s report, revisiting a damaged site, possibly six months after an event,
4

permits exploring changes in building safety that have been implemented and

whether damage models are reliable for resilience planning.

Harary said that NIST agreed with this recommendation. He noted that longitudinal

studies for NCST investigations would allow better tracking of the impact of

recommendations on improvements of building standards, codes, and practices. A

follow-up of NCST investigations, even not at the original site, could prove beneficial

to promote best practices across multiple hazards. Harary informed the Committee

that the DFS program and the WUI group have and will study the effectiveness of

public messaging in the context of the Joplin NCST investigation and the evacuation

in the Gatlinburg (TN) WUI fire. He said that NIST is interested in doing this follow

up regardless of whether it happens under the NCST or NIST’s Organic Act.

Harary assured that Committee that NIST is very interested in taking each of its

recommendations to heart in going forward. He and the NIST team believe that

many of the suggested changes are possible, including those that address the criteria

for undertaking an investigation. Harary noted that NIST would like to engage the

Committee in greater detail in reviewing those criteria and being an essential part of

the process, which could require the group to meet more than annually.

Committee Discussion of the NIST Response to the 2016 Report

Committee members and NIST representatives discussed other issues in a questionand-answer format. These topics were responded to briefly by NIST staff and in 

more detail in subsequent presentations and discussions, as described below.

Q. Paul Croce asked whether NCST investigations were restricted to buildings rather 

than any other type of structure. 

A. Harary and Mitrani-Reiser confirmed that the NCST statute restricted NIST to 

investigating building-related failures under that authority. Harary told Committee 

members that they could recommend that Congress broaden the scope of NCST 

investigations if they believed that to be appropriate.

Q. Ross Corotis asked whether NIST had other units that could support non-building 

related investigations.

A. Harary and Mitrani-Reiser confirmed that there were other authorities NIST 

could use for non-building structures. NCST, however, offers certain authorities —

such as subpoena power — that were not otherwise available as an investigatory 

tool.

Q. Reginald DesRoches asked whether NIST could investigate a building failure 

outside the United States.

A. Mitrani-Reiser responded that NIST’s decision criteria for the NCST allowed the 

agency to consider investigations outside the United States if those countries have 

similar standards and practices. Harary added that NIST would take into account the 

ability of the other country to conduct an investigation.
5

Q. Isenberg remarked that he was uncertain as to the effectiveness of

recommendations sent to Congress, and asked whether there is a chance of any real 

impact.

A. Harary agreed that the likelihood of recommendations being reviewed and acted 

upon depended on individual staff and members of Congress. As an positive 

example, he pointed to the Advisory Committee on Earthquake Hazards Reduction 

(ACEHR) as having successfully influenced Congressional interest and actions. 

Harary noted that there are several key members of Congress who especially care

about earthquakes and federal agency activities. He told the Committee that ACEHR 

recommendations had translated into legislative proposals calling for 

improvements, expansions, and requirements to the underlying statute. Harary also 

cited the much-talked about window of outrage after a tragic event as being a time 

when recommendations tended to receive greater attention; he noted that this may 

be such a time with the recent hurricanes and fires. 

Q. Quiter asked Mitrani-Reiser to explain the criteria for undertaking an 

investigation. 

A. Mitrani-Reiser previewed a portion of her later presentation and described the 

two major considerations: quantitative and qualitative.

The quantitative aspect is divided into two sections. The first addresses the 

event consequence and physical impact:

• substantial loss of life or disabling injury

• significant potential for loss of life (exposed population)

• magnitude of the hazard

• consequences to resilience (physical damage)

The second part of the quantitative score takes into account evacuation and 

emergency response challenges:

• evacuation/emergency response challenges

• applicability of international events (code enforcement, similarity of

practices)

Mitrani-Reiser also described the six qualitative considerations:

• unique new knowledge that may potentially be gained

• potential impact on standards, codes, and practices

• availability of sufficient resources

• how site conditions would affect the safety of field personnel

• whether NIST had been requested by others (federal, state, local) to

undertake a study

• whether NIST would have primary authority and would NIST collaborate

with other agencies or assume primary authority and expertise

Mitrani-Reiser informed the Committee that the quantitative answers and the sum

of the qualitative scores are used to determine whether a threshold has been

reached for reconnaissance. That threshold has been exceeded twice recently, and
6

as a result NIST sent out reconnaissance teams in response to Hurricanes Harvey

and Irma. Croce said that he was heartened by those actions.

III. Progress on Implementation of Joplin Tornado Investigation

Recommendations and Discussion

Summary of Progress on Joplin Recommendations

Mitrani-Reiser briefly reviewed NIST’s Joplin Tornado investigation and its 16

recommendations [See presentation slides.] calling for:

• Nationally accepted standards for tornado–resistant design and design

methodologies

• Uniform national guidelines that enable communities to create safe and

effective public sheltering strategies, tornado shelter standard for existing

buildings, and installation of tornado shelters in new and existing buildings

• National codes and standards and uniform guidance for clear, consistent,

recognizable, and accurate emergency communications and joint plans by

emergency managers, the National Weather Service (NWS), and the media to

make sure that accurate and consistent emergency alert and warning

information is communicated in a timely manner

• Research, technologies and strategies to advance tornado wind

measurements, strengthen emergency communications, increase warning

time, derive more accurate tornado hazard maps, and improve public

response

She highlighted specific implementation recommendations and progress to date:

• Significant progress on development of tornado hazards maps.

• ASCE/SEI/AMS Tornado Wind Speed Estimation Standard Committee has

begun subcommittee balloting of draft chapters (R2 and R4)

• New NFPA 1616 Standard on Mass Evacuation, Sheltering, and Reentry

Programs published in 2017, including major contributions from NIST on

building safety considerations and emergency communications (R8)

• Report demonstrating minimal economic impact of proposed restrictions on

aggregate-surfaced roofing in tornado prone regions (R10)

• Workshop on Outdoor Siren Policies, in collaboration with the Fire

Protection Research Foundation (FPRF) and the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (R13)

• Continued progress and operational pilot testing on Forecasting a Continuum

of Environmental Threats (FACETS)

Quiter noted that there appeared to be a lot more progress since last year’s update,

which Mitrani-Reiser confirmed.
7

Tornado Hazard Characteristics and Associated Wind Field Performance of

Buildings, Shelters, Designated Safe Areas, and Lifelines

Long Phan reviewed performance-based design for tornadoes and three specific

recommendations (R3, R5, R6). For context, he noted that national model building

codes, standards, and practices seek to achieve life safety for the hazards considered

in design. He added that tornado hazards are not currently considered in the design

of buildings, except for safety–related structures in nuclear power plants, storm

shelters, and safe rooms.

Regarding R5, NIST recommended that nationally accepted performance-based

standards for the tornado-resistant design of buildings and infrastructure be

developed in model codes and adopted in local regulations to ensure the resiliency

of communities to tornado hazards. Phan noted that NIST had not recommended

that every building be designed to be tornado proof. Standards should take into

account tornado hazard characterization, performance objectives, and evaluation

tools. He presented an example of a tornado performance objectives matrix now

under consideration by ASCE and reported that NIST is continually working with the

ASCE Technical Committee on Performance Based Design. Phan reviewed the

Committee’s progress and priorities. He also reviewed the ASCE 7-22 Development

Cycle, including membership status and organizations with representatives on the

Wind Load Subcommittee. NIST will lead the working group that will develop a

proposed new chapter on tornado loads. Committee meetings will begin work in

late 2017 or early 2018.

Phan noted that new tornado hazard maps under development were critical, and he

reviewed an ongoing research and development project on tornado hazard

mapping. NIST has made a new award to ARA, Inc., under the NIST Disaster

Resilience Research Grants Program, that will inform development of wind load

design methods. He described that project, pointing out that existing tornado hazard

maps do not account for biases and increased risk of strike on large spatial systems,

such as communities, rather than individual buildings. Phan said that the

contractor is three years into a four-plus year effort that is scheduled to be

completed in 2019.

Phan reviewed the process for developing tornado maps, and singled out some of 

the difficulties. He noted that the research team had found inaccurate data in 

previously available tornado databases. A particular problem is that tornadoes in 

sparsely populated areas caused the data to be inaccurate. An EF-5 could be listed as 

EF-0 if there were no or few structures subject to damage. 

Phan also informed the Committee that before 1976, there was no F-scale, and 

subsequent changes in the characterization of tornadoes corrupted the database for 

design purposes. He said that an augmented tornado database for the years 1950-

2016 had been produced, and data were augmented and made consistent with the 

newer database. NIST has also has produced an initial set of tornado hazard 

classification zones in the U.S., using an advanced algorithm developed previously 
8

for nuclear power plant site tornado hazard analysis. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) will be co-funding modeling work with NIST.

Phan referred to this mapping work as Version 1.0. He noted that it was difficult to

get ASCE approval for proposals unless there are reference reports, journals, and

conference papers. Accordingly, NIST will publish the analysis and data underlying

the maps.

Q. Gary Klein asked what kinds of economic and risk analyses are anticipated to

make sure that while we can do these things, we should do these things.

A. Phan said that ASCE-7 might or might not require a critical facility to be designed

to a particular level. NIST can do an economic study to see if the life safety

improvements help factor in costs and benefits additional costs, and he said that the

agency will monitor that going forward.

Q. Klein remarked that this seems like a topic that is broader than ASCE-7 is

equipped to deal with.

A. Averill said that the NIST Office of Applied Economics (OAE) has been included

on some of the recent deployment teams to get their additional insights on what

they see in the field and economic considerations that might be included in future

conclusions and recommendations from deployments. He pointed to a second

dimension: even if NIST is successful in advancing the standards process, there is

the additional step of actual local adoption, and good economic analyses could

persuade municipality decision-making. He cited an economic study that was

completed in time for Memphis’ deliberation whether to adopt national seismic

standards; that analysis helped persuade opinion, and the standards were adopted.

Q. Isenberg asked whether NIST could envision a time when hospitals will be

required to upgrade to meet tornado standards, similar to the situation in California

with earthquakes.

A. Phan responded that this could well be a future outcome, citing the results of the

Joplin investigation’s examination of how hospitals performed. Mitrani-Reiser

added that there will always be risk choices that the public will have to make. She

cited the experience with Hurricane Sandy and issues regarding the safe evacuation

of health care facilities. Phan reminded the Committee that NIST is recommending

strengthened tornado resistance for structures in high hazard zones rather than for

the entire country.

Update on Performance of Buildings, Shelters, Designated Safe Areas, and

Lifelines

Marc Levitan updated the Committee on standards, codes, and guidance

development work as a result of the Joplin Tornado investigation recommendations,

highlighting completed progress [See presentation slides.] He addressed both

existing and new standards and reported on completed work that will bring

significant changes to the 2018 International Existing Building Code and the 2018

International Building Code regarding tornado shelters.
9

Among other things, he noted that advancing FEMA P-431 regarding the selection of

refuge areas in buildings required additional research and development. He also

reported that after a nearly three-year effort, NIST had fostered a Memorandum of

Understanding between ASCE and the American Meteorological Society (AMS).

Levitan said involving AMS was considered critical for adoption and implementation

of this standard even though it is not a standards developing organization (SDO). He

told the Committee that for the EF-Scale, there is a whole new set of damage

indicators based in science and engineering that will be taken into account. This

includes new damage indicators (DI) for vehicles and structures. Levitan

emphasized, however, that there are still huge uncertainties associated with

estimates. Among other things, tornadoes often do not hit larger buildings, so

experts have to rely on damage to residences, which is where most damage occurs.

There are more than 100 committee members working on the ASCE standard on

wind speed estimation in tornadoes; NIST and the NWS proposed and co-chair the

committee whose scope includes multiple methods of wind speed estimation.

One recommended code change stemming from NIST’s Joplin investigation was not

successful in 2016: a proposed prohibition of aggregate used as surfacing for roof

covering and aggregate, gravel, or stone used as ballast on buildings in a tornadoprone region. Developed in coordination with the Building Code Advisory

Committee (BCAC) and with input from FEMA, the proposed ICC change was

defeated in October 2016. NIST had completed research and produced a publication

on the economic impact of the proposed code change showing a negligible cost

impact. Levitan reviewed the results of that study and said that NIST intended,

through the code process, to build support for the proposed change in the future.

Regarding the Joplin report’s recommendation (R8) (guidelines to enable

communities to create safe and effective public sheltering strategies), Levitan

pointed to previous successes with FEMA’s incorporation of NIST-developed

guidance and singled out the new NFPA 161-2017 Standard for Mass Evacuation,

Sheltering, and Re-entry.

Levitan also highlighted recent progress in implementing the recommendation

(R16) regarding NOAA’s grid-based threat communication related to forecasting a

continuum of environmental threats (FACETS). That new grid-based threat

communication paradigm has been redesigned and infused with social and

behavioral science considerations. This multi-year exploration/development effort

tackles the limitations of the current tornado warning system based on polygons. He

said that even with polygons, forecasters still notify many areas without a real

threat. Now NOAA is aiming for more probabilistic guidance, and Levitan compared

it to what the public sees in hurricane guidance. There is still a human element in

these estimations, but in the future these warnings are expected to be based more

on numerical models and continuous updates in an automated fashion. Levitan

reviewed expected benefits of the more sophisticated, specific, and actionable

system.
10

Discussion:

Q. Jim Harris noted the recent advances in recognizing flaws in the tornado database

and suggested that we can make better judgments regarding classifying events in a

particular EF category. He asked Levitan for his assessment of whether

improvements in our knowledge would have come about if the Joplin tornado had

not happened and if NIST had not conducted its investigation.

A. Levitan said that the Joplin event and NIST’s subsequent investigation were the

catalysts that jumpstarted the recent improvement-oriented activities and had truly

gotten this issue onto the radar screen of the NWS — especially the need to better

understand the wind field structure, not just the obvious forecasting aspects.

Q. Croce said that NIST made a lot of progress in this work resulting from the Joplin

tornado. He noted that NIST’s presentations are oriented around the

recommendations and questioned whether it might be better to present material in

terms of new versus existing construction. He also suggested focusing on single and

two-family structures since larger buildings apparently are not affected as often —

perhaps splitting recommendations and actions into residential buildings and

everything else.

A. Levitan clarified that the focus on residential structures is used to determine

damage indicators and to help grade the tornadoes simply as a practical matter

since it is those structures where damage occurs most frequently considering their

preponderance — not that other structures are not at risk. Regarding the suggestion

that NIST focus on new versus existing construction, he noted that many of the tools

and information being developed for new construction are also important in retrofit

solutions. He cited a storm shelter standard that addresses new buildings, which ICC

now has agreed to include in standards relating to retrofits.

Q. Croce said that there clearly were issues about feasibility and that communities

needed better guidance to be able to properly protect people.

A. Levitan responded that NIST wanted to help develop overall guidance,

information, and a range of options so that communities can make more informed

choices. Levitan also stated that ARA is doing explicit modeling of different kinds of

construction connections. The intention is to develop a front-end application to pull

information that can be used to assess damage that will indicate the severity of

weather conditions. That would enable NWS personnel on the ground to select a few

key building features and enter the data, including photos, thereby enabling them to

develop more refined wind estimates based on damage indicators (DI).

Q. Jeanette Sutton said that she was encouraged to hear about the work with NOAA

and map development. She asked how this is being worked within NOAA to

communicate key information to the end user.

A. Levitan said that there is a real challenge with constructing maps that can be

understood and properly used by the public to make decisions. For example, even if

the building has been maintained, a homeowner may want to know whether their

house is built to withstand a category 4 hurricane. That is a huge challenge.

NOAA/NWS is heavily involved with NIST in this work.
11

Q. Sutton expressed concern about changing the EF scale and the difficulty of

educating the public based on preconceived notions. Being able to visualize the risk

(e.g., cars being lifted up if the event is at a particular point on the scale) may help

people to better understand the risk.

A. Levitan said that NIST probably will not recommend changing the EF scale and

that the team’s aim is to improve the estimation of the actual wind speeds; perhaps

an event that was classified an EF-2 now will be slotted as an EF-3. More

information and more and better tools will help to better classify these events. Erica

Kuligowski endorsed Sutton’s comment about the importance of actually showing

the public what is meant by these higher winds and these categories.

Pattern, Location, and Cause of Fatalities and Injuries, and Associated

Performance of Emergency Communications Systems and Public Response

Kuligowski updated the Committee on a NIST project to develop guidance for

community-wide public alerts in emergencies. She said that NIST was focusing on

NFPA1600 and NFPA 1616 as a basis for annexes for codes. [See presentation

slides.]

The goal of this work is to minimize the confusion and improve the response to

outdoor siren systems and short message alerts. In the Joplin investigation, NIST

observed different communities using varied siren protocols and documented

reports of confusion among the public as to what was happening and how it affected

them, individually. Development of a guidance document would be a successful

outcome for this work.

Kuligowski explained the purpose of alerts (capture attention) versus warnings

(provide details of the emergency). NIST has found that the alerting systems seem to

be doing a little of both. Those studying these issues are trying to improve alerting

systems in an effort to make sure that both alerts and warnings are provided to the

public.

The Fire Protection Research Foundation (FPRF) Project Panel is key to this work,

with broad membership including federal departments and agencies as well as local

and state emergency managers, siren and alarm manufacturers, and sociology and

communications researchers, among others. NIST’s role is to contribute relevant

research.

Kuligowski reviewed the technical approach and project objectives, and the

considerable progress that has been made in the first two years of the effort.

In Year 1, NIST had reviewed 53 different outdoor siren warning systems, FEMA

guidance for sirens, and current siren policies. NIST also produced a key technical

report and worked with FPRF and NOAA on a workshop for emergency managers

and NWS representatives from 13 jurisdictions; participants discussed education

efforts and all-clear communications (e.g., protocols like testing all-clear tests on the

same day in all communities) and began developing guidance on usage of outdoor

silent systems for the 2019 edition of NFPA 1600. NIST also developed guidance on
12

public alerts and warnings and the use of social media to support emergency

communications; some of that guidance was successfully proposed for

incorporation into the new NFPA 1616.

NIST is now completing its second year of work on this subject. Kuligowski

highlighted the agency’s review of human response to emergency-based short

message alerts and its development of preliminary findings and guidance. She noted

that most research to date has focused on Wireless Emergency Alerts and Twitter.

The key to moving forward, Kuligowski told the Committee, is to identify ways to

expand the restrictions on character length so that important information can be

accessed in one place. Kuligowski said that as of September 2016, the FCC had put

out a mandate to expand messaging to 360 characters — which will make this work

even more important. The relevant research must be available to provide guidance

regarding these longer messages.

NIST, NOAA, and FPRF joined in organizing a workshop earlier in the month with 16

participants across the U.S., including emergency managers, public

information/communications experts, and NWS warning coordination

meteorologists. The goal in assembling this collection of short-message super users

was to get feedback on research findings and translating these into real-world

applications. The session gathered information on lessons learned and the

possibilities of standardized messages (templates).

Kuligowski reviewed next steps, including: finalizing NIST technical reports and a

guidance document on public alerts (outdoor siren systems and short message

alerts), providing biannual pg 9 - delteupdates to the FPRF project panel and NFPA

1600 and 1616 committees, and beginning an extended project examining the use of

social media for disaster response and recovery. She stressed that use of social

media for recovery was especially significant. Focusing initially on Facebook and

Twitter, NIST has a college intern working on this project using information and

experiences from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

Kuligowski then reviewed FY 2018 project objectives regarding WUI fires that also

involved the DFS program based on the (non-NCST) initial reconnaissance to

Gatlinburg:

1) situational awareness and decision-making surrounding the need to evacuate

affected communities,

2) emergency communications between fire incident managers and public, and

3) public response (including causes of deaths)

Discussion

Q. Harris inquired about plans to study events in Puerto Rico.

A. Kuligowski confirmed that NIST is interested in studying this event in the context

of emergency communications.

Q. Croce suggested that NIST might want to add Mexico City into its scope.

A. Kuligowski acknowledged that NIST was interested in that disaster, as well.
13

Q. Klein noted that Kuligowski had not mentioned radio communications and said

that if the grid is down, people can still operate radios; that is important in Puerto

Rico right now. He asked about how public safety and communications officials can

assure that the information provided via radio is accurate and reliable.

A. Kuligowski advised that there is already guidance regarding radio

communications in NFPA’s emergency communications chapter, although there is

room to provide more information regarding radio for community alert purposes.

NIST has focused on short communications because adequate information was not

already available.

General Discussion of Progress on Joplin Recommendations

Mitrani-Reiser invited the Committee to engage NIST in an active discussion to help

members digest the information presented and to allow the Committee to develop

and refine content for its upcoming report.

Q. Isenberg asked about other types of hazards and how NIST addressed risks.

A. Mitrani-Reiser said that the NIST Community Resilience program is taking a

hazard-agnostic approach. That program focuses on the community’s social and

economic needs and the physical infrastructure systems that contribute to resiliency

on a community scale. She cited the NIST Community Resilience Planning Guide for

Buildings and Physical Infrastructure Systems as a good way to put a wrapper around

that. The Guide recognizes that each community is different and that some

communities face multiple hazards while others face one prevailing hazard, which is

an appropriate way to address the issue.

Q. Isenberg inquired whether NIST is empowered to address lifelines.

A. Mitrani-Reiser responded that lifelines were not explicitly covered under NCST,

but that NIST can address them under other authorities. For example, in the

reconnaissance in Florida recently, lifelines were key. Averill added that NIST could

address certain aspects of lifelines from a broader perspective of building failures.

Q. Following up, Isenberg said that he did not believe that HAZUS included lifelines

for flood events, which he termed a glaring omission; it struck him that NIST may be

able to influence a change.

A. Levitan said that he was on the steering committee for the hurricane HAZUS

model, which addressed coastal-based flooding. He noted that there were separate

flood and earthquake models. To Isenberg’s further question about whether there

were specific provisions in HAZUS related to flooding damage to lifelines, Averill

said that the CoE is specifically addressing this issue.

Q. Klein noted that there had been much discussion about government responses to

disaster events, but there also had been a tremendous public and private

organization response. Some efforts are very helpful, others are misguided. He

asked whether NIST has a plan to study this in the context of proper mobilization of

private industry.
14

A. Kuligowski said that NIST speaks with emergency managers regularly because

they can collect information about all response activities; Klein remarked that the

problem is broader. Terri McAllister informed the Committee that the event

response is handled directly by FEMA, so NIST has not focused a lot on that aspect,

other than studying communications and how that affects the recovery process. The

research by the CoE and NIST focuses on the decisions and actions before the hazard

event, and how that affects and promotes recovery (including the social and

economic functions, rather than just the physical recovery of buildings). MitraniReiser cited NIST’s interactions with the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters

(VOADs) in the field.

Q. Sutton asked about coordination with the National Science Foundation (NSF)

especially since one of the criteria for deployments and investigations is whether

something new could be learned.

A. Mitrani-Reiser said that she and NIST more broadly are very well plugged into

related NSF’s activities and that there is a huge amount of coordination among

government agencies on these efforts; NIST plays a very active role.

IV. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Ethics Guidance

Jeffrey Harrington, Senior Attorney, Ethics Law and Programs Division, U.S.

Department of Commerce, briefed members on their responsibilities and limitations

as members of a federal advisory committee.

Harrington answered a number of procedural questions from Committee members.

He also fielded a question from Klein regarding the use of information learned as a

result of his NCST Advisory Committee work. Harary added that members were

entitled to use any information that was available to the public; that included

information presented during this and other NCST Advisory Committee meetings

that were not closed —and such meetings would rarely, if ever, be closed.

V. Public Comment Period

There were no advance requests from the public to speak, nor were there any

members of the public in attendance who asked to speak.

VI. Disaster and Failure Studies Program Updates

Mitrani-Reiser provided an overview and vision of the program, dividing its

responsibilities and objectives into three parts: Statutory, Procedures, and Research.

She remarked that one high-priority activity has been to establish strategic

relationships in advance of any events so that NIST can be well prepared and make

the best use of time in the field. [See presentation slides.]

The collection of procedures relating to disaster investigations is large; she has

reviewed and revised details, including study objectives, field and safety protocols,

human subject protocols, and Paperwork Reduction Act requirements.

After her first year in the position, Mitrani-Reiser said that she is now current on all

steps required to be well-prepared for a deployment and investigation. She plans to
15

update procedures at least annually and expects to continuously improve and to

inform NCST protocols by best practices at NIST and elsewhere.

Regarding equipment for data collection, she noted that when a disaster happens

the NCST team needs to make very quick decisions. Even the basic matter of sharing

data and how to manage that data (e.g., including rights to use photos taken inside

homes) requires advance planning. She also agreed with the Committee’s prior

comments that being in the field allows NIST to test and evaluate these data

collection procedures and then to incorporate those findings into the set of

procedures used for future investigations.

Mitrani-Reiser noted that it was very important to determine and agree on the kinds

of things NIST should be measuring in deployments. Before deployment, team

members critically review whether they are collecting the right measurements in

the field to answer the right question. Working with everyone at NIST who is

conducting research in specific areas (e.g., wind, fire, structures, community

resilience), Mitrani-Reiser said that she would like to do more research specifically

on disaster-related measurements. She is involved in coordinating throughout the

agency and with the NIST Center of Excellence (CoE) at the Center for Risk-Based

Community Planning. Each time there is an event, she told Committee members, she

reaches out to NIST’s partners to be sure that they know what NIST is doing and

vice-versa.

Mitrani-Reiser summarized the distinctions between NCST statutory requirements

and the DFS research program, reiterated where NCST falls within the broader DFS

effort.

Regarding DFS research, Mitrani-Reiser described work being led by the NIST. Part 

of the CoE’s activities involves doing field investigations to validate their modeling. 

When Hurricane Matthew hit the east coast in October 2016, DFS and CoE agreed 

that there was a significant resilience element. NIST/DFS and CoE co-deployed to 

test existing protocols (safety, data management in the field) and to prepare for the 

next deployment. In addition, a structured survey was used for damage assessment 

and population displacement. Mitrani-Reiser reviewed a heat map indicating 

damage and contours indicating dislocation and showing graphically that the 

disaster affected people differently in terms of demographics. This was not an NCST 

investigation, but it improved NIST’s preparedness for the next deployment.

She also noted that NIST is funding researchers at the University of California at San

Diego on the use of UAV swarms for post-event damage data collection. This has

created another cooperative agreement with an academic partner and supplements

and complements NIST resources in the field. In addition, summer students

explored best practices in sampling protocols, looking back 40 years.

Mitrani-Reiser expanded on her earlier presentation and reviewed criteria and the

components for quantitative scoring as well as the qualitative considerations. She
16

followed with a review of the disasters that had taken place since the last Advisory

Committee meeting and how each scored using those criteria.

Mitrani-Reiser reported that there had been three deployments since the Committee

last met: 

• Texas: Hurricane Harvey (multiple locations)

• Florida: Hurricane Irma (multiple locations)

• College Park, MD, for the Fuse-47 Apartment fire

She noted that the Fuse-47 fire had not scored very high using the NCST decision

criteria, but the issue of fires in wood-framed in buildings while still under

construction appears to be a chronic issue. Taken together as a family of events, this

event merited greater attention and a pilot study.

Mitrani-Reiser told the Committee that NIST was still monitoring hurricane damage

in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, but that access issues would not permit a

NIST deployment at this time even if a decision to deploy were made. FEMA and

other response agencies are having difficulty gaining access due to the

infrastructural deficiencies and safety challenges that remain. Similarly, NIST is still

monitoring reports from the Puebla Earthquake (Mexico).

Committee members were told that key NIST staff had just returned from

deployments and that the agency soon would be gathering those involved to review

and evaluate preliminary data. NIST then will decide whether to conduct any

investigations.

Mitrani-Reiser said that there were two anomalies among the incidents reviewed

and rated by NIST using the design criteria, and she used them to explain the

qualitative criteria. First, in London, the Grenfell Tower scored high but NIST does

not have the authority to conduct an investigation on its own. The United Kingdom

has not asked NIST to investigate. Answers to the qualitative questions contributed

to NIST’s decision not to deploy there. For example, the cladding used in this

construction would not be allowed in current construction in the United States. (See

below for a related update and Committee discussion of NIST’s related fire

activities.)

The Gatlinburg WUI fire in Tennessee attracted NIST’s interest, especially since the

number of fatalities for a WUI fire was relatively high. Most deaths appeared to be

related to improper evacuations.

Review of recent deployments:

Florida/Hurricane Irma Preliminary Reconnaissance

In the case of Hurricane Irma in Florida, which followed on the heels of Harvey in

Texas, Mitrani-Reiser said that NIST had to evaluate deployments to Harvey

knowing that IRMA deployments also might happen in the near future. That played

an import role in the decision making. In addition, FEMA gave NIST Mission
17

Assignments to provide wind field maps (provided by ARA under contract) for

Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. These maps allowed for comparisons of actual

and design wind speeds: the actual wind speeds were near the design wind speed in

US Virgin Islands (USVI), but were lower than the design wind speeds in Florida.

Mitrani-Reiser reported that approximately 7-8 months earlier, she had restarted

the Disaster Working Group (DWG) at NIST with representation from nearly every

group in the Engineering Laboratory (EL) as well as safety, legal affairs, public

affairs, congressional affairs, and contracting representatives. Consequently, all key

parties at NIST already were well engaged and understood the issues. When Harvey

and Irma happened, it was easy to get feedback by calling a DWG meeting. That

provided ideas about what NIST could learn from Irma, in the context of the

investigation as well as the staff’s other ongoing and planned work. The Advisory

Committee already had recommended that NIST consider ways to focus its

investigations more tightly, and Mitrani-Reiser told members that the agency did

that through the DWG. She gave as an example a decision to consider solar panel

connections as well as infrastructure systems in the deployments.

NIST sent two teams of four staff each to Florida (lower Keys and southern Florida).

These were multidisciplinary. For example, NIST recognized that economists have a

very different perspective on disasters, so they were incorporated into the teams.

In addition, 40 people were at NIST supporting the teams; they became a virtual

team. Where it is sometimes especially challenging to conduct some of the data

gathering and work while in the field (e.g., providing a map), the home team can do

that easily.

Mitrani-Reiser stressed that there are many opportunities for cross-pollination and

support across NIST. Moreover, due to advance relationship building, there has been

a lot of cooperative work with other agencies. Aerial photography provided by

NOAA is an example of the benefit of those relationships.

Texas/Hurricane Harvey Preliminary Reconnaissance

Averill reviewed the Hurricane Harvey storm track and intensities and the on-theground damage (including structures and autos). There are widely variable loss

projections, he said, but it will be one of the highest dollar loss events in U.S. history.

NIST’s deployment was coordinated and conducted with the FEMA Pre-MAT team.

Averill told the Committee that two NIST teams deployed because the hurricane had

become two different kinds of events. Winds in the Rockport area were a great

concern, and they were accompanied by 14-16 in. of rainfall and storm surges. NIST

needed to get a team there quickly before repairs were made. Their focus was on

understanding why certain structures failed.

Houston was mostly a flood rather than a wind event; it experienced 30-52 in. of

rainfall over a 5-6 day period. In that area, the NIST team needed to wait until the

storm waters moved out. West Houston was selected for the team’s focus, and it
18

joined up with universities and a private contractor (ARUP). That area was selected

in part because it included two reservoirs that were intended to protect Houston

from flooding. In West Houston, where the cause of building failures was clear, the

NIST team was interested primarily in better understanding the resilience aspects

and community recovery.

Mitrani-Reiser led the home team for the staff deployed in Texas, Averill reported.

He provided details about the teams’ activities and its initial observations about

damage. [See presentation slides.]

Decisions about potential subsequent deployment to Texas will be made once

observations from Irma — and possibly Maria, which did damage in the USVI and

Puerto Rico — also are available. In each deployment, Averill noted, NIST has an

opportunity for team members to evaluate field protocols.

Q. Isenberg asked whether NIST had collected any data that would shed light on the

impact and wisdom of the mayor’s non-evacuation orders.

A. Averill reported that simply by walking around and doing observations, team

members gathered anecdotal local perspectives — but they did not gather enough

data to provide any systematic assessments of this issue. He said that this issue is on

the table for a possible systematic study if NIST re-deploys.

Center of Excellence (CoE) for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning

John van de Lindt and Walter Peacock provided an overview of the NIST-funded

CoE’s field study in Lumberton, NC. The CoE’s field studies are community

resilience-oriented versus disaster-driven. Van de Lindt reviewed CoE’s three

thrusts and then focused on the Center’s field studies and how they supported the

center’s larger work. The CoE looks at key metrics that require field study data, as

well as metrics that do not require field study data. In all cases, these data support

the validation of CoE models. [See presentation slides.]

Peacock reported that more than two dozen individuals from CoE-affiliated

institutions and NIST participated in the field study of Lumberton, which suffered

extensive damage in October 2016 from flooding caused by Hurricane Matthew. He

provided additional details. The CoE field study leads wanted to combine both social

science and engineering components in a field study, and they were able to achieve

that goal. The study team looked at both heavily and lightly/non-flooded areas. Van

de Lindt and Peacock also reviewed other aims of CoE/NIST collaborative field

studies.

Q. Croce asked about the long-range goal of the CoE.

A. Van de Lindt explained that for the CoE, the underlying objective is to develop the

science that explains community resilience. At the same time, the Center is

developing the IN-CORE model to improve future studies as the science develops.
19

Q. Croce followed up and asked whether the CoE expects to become involved with a

potential model resilience code. 

A. Van de Lindt said that right now, codes and standards addressed single buildings

and structures. At some point the CoE expected to draft something more expansive

and on a community scale with a resilience focus. The exact timing remains to be

determined. Also, the Center might choose to address this either by sector or at the

community level.

Q. DesRoches asked whether the CoE was leveraging others’ efforts in developing

IN-CORE.

A. Van de Lindt confirmed that the Center had taken that approach and was trying

not to reinvent the wheel. He said, however, that if the CoE incorporated work by

others, it will want to validate and potentially update that work.

VII. Fire Research Program Updates

Bryner reviewed recent fires in buildings under construction as well as the Grenfell

Tower fire in London. [See presentation slides.]

Bryner remarked on the number of structural fires under construction that resulted

in extensive property damage but relatively few civilian deaths. He reviewed the

series of large (block-sized) urban fires. He told the Committee that it was difficult

to do investigations of these fires because there is not much left to study. Bryner

noted that building and fire codes are designed to protect life, not property.

Protections in buildings under construction are not activated until the property is

occupied.

Bryner then provided detailed information about the Fuse 47 apartment fire in

College Park, MD. There were many unresolved issues, including how the fire spread

to the attic space and speculation about whether fire barriers in the attic would have

limited spread. Fire sprinklers were installed but not yet operating at the time of the

fire. Bryner reported that townhouses have fire barriers in place during

construction, but apartment units have few barriers in place while they are being

built.

Bryner summarized the fire at the Grenfell Tower in the North Kensington area of

West London. NIST had not investigated this fire, and Bryner noted that the type of

fascia materials used there are not permitted under current U.S. codes. Moreover, no

UK authorities requested NIST’s assistance. He reported that the building’s window

frames had been replaced using vinyl, which may have contributed to the aggressive

fire spread. There are at least 400 similar structures in London. The building relied

on a single stairwell, another design feature not permitted under U.S. codes.

VIII. Appreciation for Departing Members

Harary expressed NIST’s special appreciation for three members of the Advisory

Committee whose terms conclude after several years of service: Isenberg, Croce, and

Quiter. He presented each with a certificate of appreciation to note their work while

members of the Committee.
20

IX. NCSTAC Discussion: Information Requested By the Committee

Mitrani-Rieser reviewed the Committee’s previous requests and provided additional

details of how NIST addressed the issues. In several instances she reiterated

Harary’s earlier responses to the Committee report and the ensuing discussion. [See

presentation slides.]

Criteria for deployment teams and potential growth

Committee Members earlier had several questions and initial observations 

regarding recommending criteria for deployment teams: What are the difficulties in 

getting people on the team now, and are there gaps in expertise? Does NIST see 

areas where investigations could grow and where they could make a greater 

impact?

She stressed the value of the Disaster Working Group (DWG) at NIST, which she has

re-energized. She described the virtual team approach when deploying for a disaster

event; among other things, virtual teams provide an opportunity to train junior staff

in field deployments and to tackle multidisciplinary questions across NIST, bringing

greater impact.

Mitrani-Reiser also pointed to the Fuse-47 fire deployment as an example of a pilot

study for a potential NCST area of growth: chronic events. This is something that

NIST will be paying greater attention to in the future.

Looking back at previous NIST deployments

The Committee had asked whether the deployment process could be improved by 

studying past investigations before NCST was in place and suggested that reviewing 

about a dozen investigations might be appropriate in terms of assessing scope and 

expertise. The Committee requested a listing of the principal investigator of each 

prior investigation of the type that would qualify for an NCST investigations if those 

incidents were to occur in the future.

Mitrani-Reiser reviewed a selection of past NIST failure investigations, ranging from

the 9/11 airliner crash into the Pentagon and two major tornadoes, a hurricane, two

earthquakes, a nightclub building fire, and the collapse of an apartment building

under construction. She noted the NIST leads for these projects and their

backgrounds and said that the agency has a broad range of expertise — but

reiterated that in-house expertise will not be the deciding factor.

Safety procedures

The Committee had asked for a copy of the First Level Hazard Review (FLHR) for 

failure study deployments in order to review and comment on the current NIST 

safety procedures for National Construction Safety Teams. This should include the 

DFS SOP as it is a part of the FLHR. 

Mitrani-Reiser reviewed safety procedures, citing the extensive manual of

procedures, and advised the Committee that NIST has in place a Hot Team with
21

NCST credentials that is always on stand-by for deployment. Members of this team

are expected to be current on safety training at all times. She emphasized the value

of making sure that staff regularly check-in with their supervisors regarding the

status of their safety training and preparedness. One current procedure is to provide

deploying team members with a one-page description of safety-related threats and

issues that they may encounter in the field.

Q. Referencing the recent reconnaissance deployments to Texas and Florida, and

some of the early information shared with the Committee, DesRoches said that it

would be very helpful to document how lessons learned during any deployment had

made an impact on mitigating certain types of problem issues.

A. Averill said that this was a very good observation that would apply primarily for

actual investigations. He said that NIST needed to be sure that conclusions were

based on information gathered from valid sampling. If NIST decides to return to

Houston to conduct a more in-depth deployment, the agency would want to take

that approach so that NIST could document what appeared to work in terms of

building performance and what did not work well. Mitrani-Reiser added that FEMA

looks at these sorts of things in the field and that NIST’s ability to collaborate with

them will help in assessments made during reconnaissance deployments as well as

from longer term studies.

Q. Sutton asked whether NIST had included a focus on emergency communications,

alerts, and warnings in its review of fires in buildings under construction or the

Grenfell fire.

A. Bryner responded that since the Fuse-47 building was not yet occupied, there

were no alerts. He suggested that it might be more useful to examine the evacuation

of a senior citizen home across the street from Fuse-47 in light of issues regarding

pros and cons of such evacuations of difficult-to-move occupants.

Q. Klein raised the issue of whether NIST might recommend that codes and

standards be strengthened to cover buildings prior to occupancy.

A. Nelson pointed out that NFPA has a standard for buildings under construction,

although it might not always be implemented. He suggested that there may be

opportunities for improvement there — and that the ICC might well be receptive if

the science can be done, and its effectiveness can be demonstrated.

Q. Croce said that he was stunned by the devastation in Joplin. He congratulated

NIST for making significant progress but remained concerned about the pace of that

progress; he urged that NIST do what it could to move things along more quickly. He

requested NIST to look at the whole process from the start of its investigation to the

time when it made recommendations. Croce suggested issuing interim reports or

perhaps just findings before recommendations were proposed if that would speed

the process.

A. Mitrani-Reiser noted NIST’s close collaboration with FEMA and its Mitigation

Assessment Team (MAT) program was designed to issue reports very quickly. Codeploying and participating as part of their MAT activities, NIST has an opportunity

to quickly issue information based on its work in the field. She said that it is
22

important to leverage the work of others and to manage expectations. MitraniReiser also referred to the Advisory Committee’s recommendation regarding more

targeted investigations and agreed that if the scope of NIST’s work was more tightly

focused, the agency could work more quickly. She said that NIST was focusing on

that approach now. Averill added that there is precedent for issuing interim reports

to keep the public updated. That includes several reports issued to the Committee

and subsequently made public. At the same time, he said, NIST does not want to lose

something that NCST investigations have contributed; all NCST investigation reports

have advanced the state of the art and laid the foundation to effect important

changes. Levitan noted that in the Joplin investigation, NIST published its

investigation plan and then an observation report. Phan said that in terms of time to

achieve implementation of recommendations, NIST needs to work with the

appropriate standards developing organization (SDO), and that was out of the

agency’s control. He gave as an example the 10-year time for the NWS to adopt

changes in the tornado F and EF scale.

Q. Corotis suggested that there appeared to be a potential conflict for the agency’s

officials regarding their decisions about whether or not to launch an investigation

since there were no resources specifically set aside for these deployments and all of

the involved staff would have other projects to carry out. He asked about ways to

address this issue that would relieve that natural tension.

A. Harary said that he, Mitrani-Reiser, and others had discussed this issue recently,

and he assured members that resource availability would never interfere with his

decisions about whether or not to launch an investigation; he pledged to make

necessary funds available. Mitrani-Reiser noted that part of reinvigorating the DWG

at NIST is engaging everyone before deployment so that she, as Director of the DFS

program, can understand their research interests. She said that the goal is to

reinforce individuals’ responsibilities rather than distract them from their areas of

research interest.

Q. Corotis agreed with this approach and stated that it would not be wise to wait

until Congress acts.

A. Harary said that NIST had the IDIQ contract tools available. He noted that in case

of a national emergency, FEMA can reach out to any federal agency and direct that

organization to do something specific. This is exactly what happened during

Hurricane Irma when NIST was asked to generate wind field maps within a matter

of days. NIST mobilized its DWG and was able to push through a procurement action

quickly to get those maps drawn so that FEMA could allocate resources for the

mitigation assessment.

Q. Isenberg asked whether Congress had provided NIST funding explicitly for any

particular investigations.

A. Averill reported that Congress appropriated $16 million to FEMA with the

direction to transfer those funds to NIST for the World Trade Center investigation.

Q. Corotis asked for assistance in accessing previous Commission-related NCST

reports and other documents.
23

A. Mitrani-Reiser reported that all documents are online, and provided Committee

members with an orientation to the relevant website.

X. NCST Advisory Committee Preparation of Annual Report and Adjournment

The Committee reviewed the day’s presentations and discussions and produced a

near-final draft with final text on the key issues and recommendations. The Chair

was charged by the Committee with final formatting of the report.

Quiter thanked members for their participation and closed the meeting at 5:00 p.m.