UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4398

ALPHONSO RAVON MORRISON, a/k/a

Fat Boy, a/k/a Ravon,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.

Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge.

(CR-99-70)

Submitted: June 4, 2002

Decided: July 16, 2002

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Sean P. Devereux, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen

C.F. Shappert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Alphonso Morrison appeals his conviction and life sentence,

imposed after a jury trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and five

kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

846 (1994). Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

Morrison first contends the district court erred in denying his

motion for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and competency

hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241 (West 2000). Morrison contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion by

holding him to a higher standard of proof than that required by

§ 4241. We doubt that the court applied the wrong standard, as it

quoted the correct standard in the text of its order. In any event,

because Morrison failed to present sufficient evidence of incompetency under the "reasonable cause" standard of § 4241, any supposed

error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 

Morrison next contends the district court erred in imposing a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which provides for a mandatory term of life imprisonment for one who is

convicted of an offense involving fifty grams or more of cocaine base

or five kilograms or more of cocaine, after having previously been

convicted of two or more felony drug offenses. We find Morrison’s

two prior distribution convictions, arising from acts occurring three

weeks apart, although consolidated for sentencing, resulted from two

separate episodes of criminal conduct and were properly considered

as two separate convictions for sentencing purposes. See United

States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1996). 

Finally, Morrison contends the district court erred in determining

his sentencing guidelines range. Specifically, Morrison contests the

two-level firearm enhancement, imposed pursuant to U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (2000), for possessing a firearm during

a drug offense. We have reviewed the record and find an adequate

factual basis to support the enhancement. At any rate, even with the

firearm enhancement Morrison’s maximum possible guidelines sen2 UNITED STATES v. MORRISON
tence was less than the mandatory minimum sentence to which he

was subject under § 841. Thus, the calculation of his guidelines range

had no impact on his sentence. 

Accordingly, Morrison’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON 3