. 

The Attorney General of Texas 

August 31, 1982 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. BOX 12546 

Austin. TX. 76711. 2546 

5121475.2501 

Telex 91Ol674.1367 

Telecopier 51214750266 

1607 Main St., Suite 1400 

Dallas, TX. 75201.4709 

2141742.8944 

4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 

El Paso, TX, 799052793 

915/533-3464 

1220 Dallas Ave., Suite 202 

Houston, TX. 77002.6966 

7131650.0666 

606 Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 

6061747-5236 

4309 N. Tenth, Suite B 

McAlten, TX. 76501-1665 

5121662.4547 

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 76205.2797 

5121225.4191 

An Equal Opportunity/ 

Affirmative Action Employer 

Honorable Henry Wade 

Criminal District Attorney 

601 Elm Street 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Opinion No.MW-509 

Re: Longevity pay for deputy 

sheriffs 

Dear Mr. Wade: 

Your question concerns article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., which provides 

in pertinent part as follows: 

(a) The commissioners court of each county in 

this state with a population of not less than 

150,000... shall provide longevity pay for each 

commissioned deputy of the sheriff's department in 

accordance with this Act. 

(b) Each commissioned deputy shall receive, in 

addition to his regular compensation, longevity 

pay of not less than $5 per month for each year of 

service in the department. Years of service in 

excess of 25 do not count for the purposes of this 

subsection. 

You inform us that the policy of the Dallas County Commissioners Court 

is to calculate a deputy sheriff's "longevity pay" on the basis of his 

latest period of continuous employment in the department. You ask 

whether this policy is permissible, or whether article 3912f-7 

requires pay to be computed on the basis of the total number of years 

in which a deputy is employed in the department. 

Article 3912f-7 states that "longevity pay" shall be provided "in 

accordance with this Act." "[Tlhis Act" provides that the amount of 

such pay shall be "not less than $5 per month for each year of service 

in the department." (Emphasis added). This language is quite 

straightforward. Applied literally, it would preclude the policy in 

effect in Dallas County. 

You in effect contend, however, that the phrase "for each year of 

service in the department" should not be construed literally, but 

should be treated as if it reads as follows: "for each year of 

[continuous] service [during the most recent period of employment] in 

p. 1838 
. 

Honorable Henry Wade - Page 2 cm- 509 

the department." Essentially, you argue that: (1) the purpose of 

article 3912f-7 is not merely to provide deputies with additional 

compensation, but is to reward continuous employment and thereby 

create an incentive for deputies to remain in the same sheriff's 

department; and (2) the legislature's choice of the word "longevity," 

which is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "long 

continuance; esp. seniority," indicates that it had continuous, and 

not total service in mind when it enacted the statute. Webster's New 

Collegiate Dictionary 678 (5th ed. 1977). 

For the following reasons, we conclude that there is in this 

instance no legitimate basis for departing from the literal language 

of the statute. 

As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Sweeny Hospital District v. 

w, 378 S.W.Zd 40 (Tex. 1964), courts will rewrite statutes only 

"when necessary to give effect to legislative intent, provided the 

intent... is clearly disclosed by the remainder of the statute." 

(Emphasis added). See State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.Zd 107 

(Tex. 1964). In this instance, we are not persuaded that the 

legislature's intent in enacting article 3912f-7 must have been to 

reward only continuous employment. It could just as plausibly have 

been to reward deputies for their total experience in a department, 

whether acquired on a piecemeal basis or not, in order to encourage 

experienced officers to return to service. Since the statute does not 

"clearly disclose" that the legislature's intent was to reward only 

continuous employment, we decline to add to the statute the words 

which would be "necessary to give effect to that intent." Sweeny 

Hospital District v. Carr, a. 

Your second argument places too much emphasis upon the word 

"longevity" and not enough upon the other words in the statute. Even 

if we assume arguendo that "longevity pay" usually suggests pay based 

upon uninterrupted seniority or length of continuous service, it does 

not follow that the term has this meaning in all contexts. When 

construing statutes, one must look not just to isolated words, but to 

the entire act. Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977); Ex parte 

Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1974). When article 3912f-7 is 

considered in its entirety, it becomes clear that in the context of 

this statute the term "longevity" has been defined by the legislature 

toean a prescribed amount of money "for each year of service in the 

department" without modification. 

It has been suggested that Attorney General Opinion MW-100 (1979) 

requires a different result. However, that opinion merely addressed 

the question of whether a period of military service which comes 

between two periods of service with the state is to be counted for 

longevity purposes under article 6813d, V.T.C.S. Neither it nor other 

opinions of this office, see, e.g., Attorney General Opinions M-250 

p. 1839 
I I 

Honorable Henry Wade - Page 3 (MW- 509 

(1968); M-886 (1971). even touch upon the question of whether two 

interrupted periods of employment are to be combined for longevity 

purposes under either article 6813d or article 3912f-7. 

You also ask whether article 3912k, V.T.C.S., which provides that 

county commissioners shall fix the amount of compensation for deputies 

paid wholly from county fund, controls over article 3912f-7. Article 

3912k was adopted at the Sixty-second Legislative Session, while 

article 3912f-7 was adopted at the Sixty-third Legislative Session. 

Since article 3912f-7 is the more recent and more specific statute, it 

controls article 3912k where the two conflict. 

In summary, we conclude that article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., requires 

that deputy sheriffs be given "not less than $5 per month for each 

year of service in the department," whether or not such service is 

continuous. See Taylor v. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service 

Commission, 616.W.Zd 187 (Tex. 1981). 

SUMMARY 

Article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., requires that deputy 

sheriffs be given "not less than $5 per month for 

each year of service in the department," whether 

or not such service is continuous. 

Very truly yours, 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

RICHARD E. GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Jon Bible 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Rick Gilpin 

Patricia Hinojosa 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 1840