DAN MORALES 

ATTORSEY CESERAL 

QBffice of tfie !Zlttornep 

&date of Qexae 

October 7,1993 

@eneral 

Mr. Jack W. Garison 

BxecutiveDirector 

Texas Department of Licensing 

and Beg&ion 

P.O. Box 12157 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

Harris County Attorney 

1001 Preston, Suite 634 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Opiion No. DM-259 

Re: Whetheramemberofanappraissl 

review board may appear before the 

boardeitherinacapachyasawurtappointed receiver or a registered 

property tsx we without violsthtg 

con&t-of-intmst laws and related 

questions (BQ-507, JD# 18811) 

Dear Mr. Garison and Mr. Driscotl: 

Eachofyouhas~ustodetamineametheramrmberofMappraisalmiew 

board or an appraisal district board may paform certain professional services. 

Mr.Driswll asks whether a member of an apprsissl review board may repmsem a 

taxpayer in connection with the valuation of a certain tract or parcel of land in the board 

member’s capacity as a court-appointed receiver of the same tract or parcel of land. Mr. 

Garison a&s whether an appraisal review board member may pet%orm property tax 

consulting services, in the ssme or a ditferent appraisal district, without violating contlictof-interest laws. Mr. Garison also a&s whether an appraisal district board member may 

perfom property tax consulting servicq either in the ssme or a different appraisal district. 

An appraisal review board generally consists of three members, Tax Code 

4 6.41(b), who meet to exsmine and approve appraisal records that the chief appraiser hss 

submitted to the appraisal review board. Id 58 6.42(b), 41.01. Section 41.41 of the Tax 

Code provides a property owner with a right to protest several hinds of actions before an 

appraisal review board: 

(1) determinstion of the appraised value of the ownefs property 

or, in the case of land apprsised as provided by Subchapter C, D, or 

E, Chapter 23, determinstion of its appraised or msrhet value; 

(2) unequal apprsissl of the owner’s property; 

(3) inclusion of the own&s property on the appraisal records; 

(4) denial to the property owner in whole or in psrt of a partial 

exemption; 

p. 1345 
Mr. Jack W. Gsrison - Page 2 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

(5) determination that the owner’s land does not qualify for 

appraisal as provided by Subchapter C, D, or E. Chapter 23; 

(6) identification of the taxing units in which the ownet’s 

property is taxable in the case of the appraisal district’s appraisal roll; 

(7) determination that the property owner is the owner of 

property; 

(8) a determinauon that a change in use of land appraised under 

Subchapter C, D, or E, Chapter 23. has ocaured, or 

(9) any other action of the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or 

appraisal review board that applies to and adversely affects the 

property owner. 

See ah id. $8 41.411, 41.42, 41.43. Following notice and a hearing, see id. $5 41.45, 

41.46. 41.461, the appraisal review board must determine the protest and, if necessary, 

correct the appraisal records to conform with its determination. See id. $41.47(b). 

Mr. DriscoU asks about the propriety of an appraisal review board member 

mpment& a taxpayer in a capacity as the court-appointed receiver of the taxpayer% 

property, which lies in the appraisal review board’s jurisdiction. Jn his brief, Mr. DriscoU 

CXplGlS: 

A receiver holds property for the be-n&t of the owner and the 

receivds actions are generally in accordance with the best interests 

of the property owner. The receiver is also entitled to reasonable 

compensation for his services as receiver. . . . 

In the situation at hand, the member bad been appointed receiver 

by the judge of the 247th District Court of Harris County, Texas[,] in 

1984. The judge of the 247th ordered that the receiver sell the 

property using “prudent real estate practices” and that the proceeds 

be distributed between the husband and wife. 

Subsequently, the receiver was appointed to serve on the Harris 

CountyAppraisalBeviewBosrdin1989andagainin 1991.. . 

On December 9, 1992[,] the property owner notified the 

appraisal district that the review board member would be handling [a] 

protest and withdrew his approval of the 1992 market value which 

had previously been settled with a district appraiser. Footnote 

omitted.] 

p. 1346 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 3 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

Mr. Driscd particularly asks about the applicabiity of section 6.412(a) of the Tax 

Code and section 36.08 of the Pensl Code. Under section 6.412(a) of the Tax Code, an 

individual is ineligible for service on an appraisal review board if the individual is “related 

within the second degree by consanguinity or affhdty, as determined under Article 5996h, 

Revised Statutes,1 to an individual who is engaged in the business. . of representing 

property owners for compensation in proceedings under this title in the appraisal district 

for which the appraisal review board is established.” (Footnote added.) The legislature 

enscted section 6.412(a) in 1989. see Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 796. 4 12. at 3595, and 

amended the subsection in 1991 by adding the language “as determined under Article 

5996h, Revised Statutes,” see Acts 1991,72d Leg., ch. 561, Q 45, at 1988. 

Former article 559611, V.T.C.S., see slrpro note 1, which the legislature also 

enacted in 1991 by the passage ofHouse Bill 1345, see Acts 1991,72d Leg., ch. 561, Q 1. 

at 1979-80-&e same bii that amended section 6.412(a) of the Tax Code-provides that 

relationships by wnsanguinity or aflinity must be determined using the civil Jaw method. 

See Gov’t Code 8 573.021. The Government Code provides for the calculation of degree 

of relationship as follows: 

Sec. 573.022. (a) DE TERMINATJON OF CONSANGUINITY. Two individuals are related to each other by wnsanguinity if: 

(1) one is a descendant of the other, or 

(2) ifthey shsre a wmmon ancestor. 

. . . 

Sec. 573.023. (a) COMPUTATION OF DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY. The degree of relationship by wnsanguinity 

between an individual and the individual’s descendant is determined 

by the number of generations that separate them. A parent and child 

are related in the first degree, a grandparent and grandchild in the 

second degree, a great-grandparent and great-grandchild in the third 

degree and so on. 

. . 

Sec. 573.024. (a) DETERMINATION OF AFFINITY. Two 

individuals are related to each other by affinity if: 

(1) theyaremsrriedtoeachother;or 

‘In 1993 the .ticven@tird Legislah~t repealed V.T.C.S. Miclc S9%h. See Acts 1993, 73d 

l&g., ch. 268. The lnamial in that srlicle was oxiitied as chspter 573 ofthc Gavcrnment cnde. 

p. 1347 
Mr. Jack W. Carbon - Page 4 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

(2) the spouse of one of the individuals is related by 

wnsanguinity to the other individual. 

By definition, the determination of degree of a relationship by wnsanguinity or by athnity 

assumes a relationship between twopersons. Thus, for purposes of calculating the degree 

of a relationship by wnsanguinity or by &My, a person may not be related to hhnself or 

herself We do not believe the legislature envisioned that section 6.412(a) of the Tax 

Code would apply to a situation in which a member of the appraisal review board is the 

“individual who is engaged in the business. . . of representing property owners for 

wmpensation in proceedings under this title in the appraisal district for which the appraisal 

review board is established.” See also infra note 11 and accompanying text (describing 

legislative history of Tax Code section 6.035(a)). Jn our opinion, therefore, section 

6.412(a) of the Tax Code is inapplicable to the situation before us here.2 

Additionally, section 36.08 of the Penal Code is inapplicable. Section 36.08 

prohibits gifrs to public servants in ceriain circumstances; it does not prohibit a public 

servsnt from receiving adequate compensation for services the individual performed in an 

unofficial capacity. See Penal Code $5 36.08, 36.10(a)(l). See genera&v Attorney 

Generd Opinion H-551 (1975). 

We believe that section 41.69 of the Tax Code governs this situation. Section 

41.69 precludes a member of an appraisal review board from participating in the 

determination of certain taxpayer protests: 

A member of the appraisal review board may not participate in 

the determination of a taxpayer protest in which he is interested or in 

which he is related to a party by atlinity within the second degree or 

by wnsan8uinity within the third degree, as determined under Article 

5996h, Revised Statutes.3 Footnote added.] 

The legislature added section 41.69 to the Tax Code in 1979. See Acts 1979,66th Leg., 

ch. 841, Q 1, at 2309. 

To fully answer your question, we must deduce the meaning the legislature 

intended when it used the word “interested” in section 41.69 of the Tax Code. 

2Suxion 41.69 nf the Tax CQ& pmhibils P member of an appmial review bard from 

psrtioipaing in the determination of a tapnyu protest in which the member pusonally is intaemd or in 

which the member is mlated within a prohiiited degree tc a parry h&vat to the pmtest. See infio 

(qootiq Tax Gxk @on 41.69). Clearly, ifthe legislatun wanted to write section 6.412(a) to apply to a 

situation in which the appraisal review board member was personally im~lvcd as well as a situation in 

which the member was mlated to an individual rqescn~ proper& owners before the appraisal review 

bosrd, the legislatote could have done so. 

p. 1348 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 5 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

U~&or&unately, we found no legislative history indicating the kinds of situations in which 

the legislature envisioned that an appraisal review board member might have an interest in 

a taxpayer protest. We look, therefore, to similar wnstitutionsl and statutory provisions 

in existence in 1979, of which we presume the legislature was aware. See Attorney 

General Opiion V-1215 (1951) at 2. 

The majority of the provisions we exsmined, however, modify the word “interest” 

in such a way as to affect the interpretation of the provision. See, e.g., Tex. Con.% art. 

III, 5 18 (prohibiting legislator from being “interested, either directly or indirectly” in 

certain contracts with state), art. III, $22 (requiring legislator with “personal or private 

interest” in proposed legislation to disclose interest and refrain from voting on proposal); 

Gov’t Code 5 573.058(a) (requiring state board or commission member with “personal or 

private interest” in matter before board to disclose interest and to refrain f?om voting on 

matter); Local Gov’t Code 5 81.002 (requiring newly appointed wunty judge or county 

commissioner to at&-m that he or she “will not be interested, directly or indirectly” in 

wntract with or claim against county). We found one provision, article V, section 11 of 

the Texas Constitution, that uses the word “interest” without any attendant modifiers, and 

we believe this provision and the judicial interpretation of this provision are instructive for 

our purposes here. 

Article V. section 11 forbids a judge from sitting in any case in which the judge 

“may be interestad,. . . or when he shall have been counsel in the case,” among other 

things. “Interest” has been construed to refer to a direct personal or pecuniary interest in 

the case. See Tex. Cons& art. V, 5 11 interp. commentary; City of Oat Cltflv. Stoe, 79 

S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tar. 1904) (and cases cited therein); Attorney General Opiion 

DM-109 (1992) at 34 (and cases cited therein). We accordingly interpret section 41.69 

of the Tax Code to apply whenever a member of an appraisal review board has a direct 

personal or pecuniary interest in the determination of a taxpayer protest before the 

appraisal review board. In our opinion, a member of an appraisal review board who, as a 

paid, court-appointed receiver, is representing a taxpayer in a protest before the appraisal 

review board has, as a matter of law, a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the result.4 

Section 41.69 of the Tax Code accordingly precludes the membe?s participation in the 

appraisal review board’s determination of the protest. 

p. 1349 
Mr. Jack W. G&on - Page 6 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

We note that chapter 171 of the Local Government Code also may apply in this 

situation. Chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, which regulates wnflicts of 

interest of local public official-$ including a member of an appraisal review board, requires 

a local public official, prior to a vote or decision on any matter involving a business entity 

or real property in which the official has a substantial interest, to disclose the nature and 

extent of the interest. Local Gov’t Code 5 171.004(a); see 35 D. BROOKS, COUNTY AND 

SPECIAL Dl8TRRX LAW 8 18.37, at 632-33 (Texas Practice 1989). Jn certain specified 

circumstances, the official also must abstain from tbrther participation in the matter.6 Id. 

Chapter 171 of the Local Government Code expressly preempts common-law wntlictsfinterest rules as they apply to local public officials. Local Gov’t Code 6 171.007(a); see 

also Attorney General Opinions JM-1187 (1990) at 4; JM-424 (1986) at 4. 

Under chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, an official has a substantial 

interest in a business entity if 

(1) the person owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock or 

shares of the business entity or owns either 10 percent or more or 

SS,CMM ormore of the fair market value of the business entity; or 

(2) 5nds received by the person gem the business entity exceed 

10 percent of the person’s gross income for the previous year. 

Local Goti Code 5 171.002(a); see also Anomey General Opiion JM-.I187 at 2-3. 

Notably, section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code applies to any local public 

official who has a substantial interest in a business entity or real property that is involved 

in a matter before the governmental body. On the other hand, section 41.69 of the Tax 

Code applies only to members of an appraisal review board, but it applies to a taxpayer 

protest in which a member has a direct personal or pecuniary interest, regardless of the 

quantity of the interest. Thus, if a member of an appraisal review board is interested in a 

particular taxpayer protest before the board but that interest is not a “substantial interest” 

Section 171.001(l) oftbe Local Govermnem Code detines “local public of&id’ as .a member 

iist% ?z? 

bodyoranotherofliax,wbelherelected,appointed,paid,orun@d,ofany 

. . exerch responsibilities beyond those that am advisory in nahue.” 

%ection 171.004(a)(l) quires a local public o5icial lo abstain from participation in a matter 

kforcthgovcnunentalbodyofwhich(heofficialisamemkrifthcoff~cialhasasubstantialintaatina 

budacssentity,and”actionmthemancrwill~aspecialeconomic~:eamthcbusinmmtitythatis 

distinguishble from the tied on the public.” See infro (dclining “sobstantial inter&). Similarly, 

section 171.004(a)(2) mquires a local public official to abstain from participation in a matter before the 

gwanwntal~ofwhichthofflcialiramcmbcriftbc~~hara~intcrcninrtal 

pmperly, sod ‘it is reasonably foreseeable that an action on the matter will have P special economic effect 

on lbe value of lhe property, distinguishable from its e&cl on the public.’ Id. (same). 

Failure to comply with the requirements section 171.004 articulates may am&uIe a class A 

mi2demeanor. Local GJVV code 0 171.003. 

p. 1350 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 7 

Honorable Mike DriscoU 

W-259) 

within the context of chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, section 171.004(a) 

authorizes the member to participate in the determination of the protest, while section 

41.69 of the Tax Code prohibits the members participation. Additionally, even if the 

member has a substantial interest, section I71.004(c) may authorize the member to 

participate after disclosing the nature and extent of the interest, while, & section 41.69 

of the Tax Code prohibits the member’s participation. To the extent of any wnflict 

between section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code as it applies to a member of an 

appraisal review board and section 41.69 of the Tax Code, section 41.69 prevails because 

it applies specificsUy to members of an appraisal review board. See 67 TEX. JUR 3d 

Stitufes 8 126. at 719-24 (explaining that if general provision of statute irreconcilably 

wnflicts with special or local provision, special or local provision generally prevails); id. 

8 136, at 752 (stating that if general statute and more detailed enactment conflict, latter 

generally prevails). 

Mr. G&son’s questions involve a registered property tax wnsuhant. Article 8886, 

section 2(d)(7), V.T.C.S., authorizes a registered property tax wmukant to perform or 

supervise the performance of the following services: 

(A) preparing a property tax rendition or report for another 

person under Chapter 22, Tax Code; 

(B) representing another person in a protest under Subchapter 

C, Chapter 41, Tax Code; 

(C) wnsuhing or advising another person wnwming the 

preparation of a property tax rendition or report under Chapter 22. 

Tax Code, or wncerning a matter the person may protest under 

Subchapter C. Chapter 41. Tax Code; 

(D) negotiating or entering into an agreement with an appraisal 

district on behalf of another person wnceming a matter that is or 

may be the subject of a protest under Subchapter C, Chapter 41, Tax 

Code; or 

Q acting as the designated agent of a property owner in 

accordance with Section 1.111, Tax Code.7 

V.T.C.S. art. 8886. 0 I(a)(7) (footnote added; footnote deleted). An appraisal review 

board hears matters protested under subchapter C, chapter 41 of the Tax Code. See id. 

5 l(a)(7)(C). Thus, a property tax wnsultsnt will have occasion to represent taxpayers 

before an appraisal review board. 

7Scaionl.llldthcTaxCodcauthorizerapmpcrty-tode+i~~apasonu,rctast& 

owner’s agent for any purpose under title 1 of the Tax Code (chapters l-43) in ameuion wi(h the 

property or property owner and provides the m&cd by which a property - may so designate. 

p. 1351 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 8 

Honorable Mike Hriscoll 

(DM-259) 

Initially, Mr. Garison asks whether a registered property tax wnsultsnt may serve 

as a member of an appraisal review board.* We are unaware of any statutory or wmmonlaw provision that prohibits a registered property tax wnsultant from serving as a member 

of an appraisal review board. Of wurse, section 41.69 of the Tax Code limits a member’s 

participation in a taxpayer protest in which the member has a direct personsl or pecuniary 

interest. In our opinion, a member of sn appraisal rev& board who performs property 

tax consulting services in a taxpayer protest that is before the appraisal review board has, 

as a matter of law, a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the matter. 

Accordingly, section 41.69 of the Tax Code prohibits the member’s participation in the 

determination of the protest.9 Neither section 41.69 nor any other law of which we are 

awsre limits a member of an appraisal review board from performing property tax 

wnsulting services before an appraisal review board of snother district, however. 

Mr. Garison also asks whether a registered property tax wnsuhant may serve as a 

member of an appraisal district board, and conversely. whether a member of an appraisal 

district board may perform property tax wnsulting services, in the ssme or a ditferent 

appraisal district, without violating wntlict-of-interest laws.rO Section 6.01(a), (b) of the 

Tax Code establishes in each county an appraisal district, which has the responsibility of 

appraising property in the district for ad vulorem tax purposes of the taxing units in the 

appraisal district. See Tax Code 6 1.04(12) (defining “taxing unit”); see also Attorney 

Generd Cpiion JM-3060 (1989) at 1. A five-member board of directors governs each 

appraisal district. Tax Code 4 6.03(a); see also Attorney General Opiion JM-1060 at 1. 

The duties of the appraisal district board are largely administrative; for example, the 

appraisal district board must appoint a chief appraiser, who serves as the chief 

administrator of the appraisal office, Tax Code 8 6.05(c), and approve an annual budget 

for the appraisal district, id. 8 6.06. Members of the public may wmment on any issue 

*A0 wt amoider all nf Mr. Oarimn’s qwsUon9, we me a- that article 8886, section 6(a), 

V.T.C.S.. reqdms the wmmimioner of licensing and regulation to “establish standa& of practice, 

condw4 snd ethico” for registered pmperty tax con&ants. Title 16, se&on 66.20(f) of the Texas 

Mminidrativecode~ulatathecodeofahicstowhichcschngistrrcdpropertytax~~mmust 

submit. Tbecodeofcthics~contDinraoprwisionrthatapplyto~ofthcrituationraboutwhich 

Mr. Oarioon asks IO nor opinion, bownm, anick 8886, section 6(a). V.T.C.S., authorizes UK 

commissi~ to promulgate such pmvisions. 

9Forthcreasonsstated~,wcQnocw~dat&applicabilityofchapal7loftbcW 

Ooemmal Cnde. See swpro wtcs 5,6 mui accompanying text (discussing chapter 171 and ampring 

Gavcrnaent Codesection 171.004(a)tithTaxCodesection41.69). 

l”Additionally, Mr. G&son asks whdher the state eIhics law, Oovemment Code chap&r 572, 

formerly V.T.C.S. akcle 6252~9b. Acts 1993,73d Leg., ch. 268.0 1,46, pmhiiits a member ofeilher an 

appraisaldiariaboardoran~praisalrcvicwboardfromprfonningpropcrtytaxwnsulting~~ia 

lhe same or a di&mnt dihct, or wnvcrscly, a r@tered pmperIy tax wnsultant from serving on either 

board. The otstc ethics law applies only to slaIe officers and state employee see Gov’t Code $572.001 

(formerly V.T.C.S. art. 6252~9b, 8 1); it does not apply, therefore, to a member of an appraisal dislricl 

bC4Ud0rflp@.9dlCWbOiUd. 

p. 1352 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 9 

Honorable M&e Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

within an appraisal district board’s jurisdiction, see id. 5 6.04(d), and may 6le complaints 

with the board, see id. 0 6.04(f). (g). B ecause a registered property tax consultant is 

authorized to represent a property owner for any purpose under title 1 of the Tax Code 

see V.T.C.S. art. 8886, 8 I(a)(7)(E); Tax Code 5 1.11 l(a), a property tax consultant may 

have occasion to represent a properly owner before an appraisal district board. 

We End no wngict-of-interest law that prohibits a registered property tax 

wnsuhant from serving as a member of an appraisal district board. Regarding the 

propriety of an appraisal district board member performing property tax wnsulting 

services either in the same or a different appraisal district, we note initiaUy that section 

6.035(a) of the Tax Code parallels section 6.412(a) by making ineligible for service on a 

appraisal district board an individual “related within the second degree by wnsan8uinity or 

silinity, ss determined under Article 5996h, Revised Statutes, to an individual who is 

engaged in the business. . of representing property owners for wmpensation in 

proceedings under this title in the appraisal district.” The legislature enacted section 

6.035(s) by mews of the same bii that enacted section 6.412(a). See Acts 1989. 71st 

Leg., ch. 796, 8 4, at 3592. The legislature subsequently amended section 6.035(a) 

expressly to reference article 599613 V.T.C.S., by means of the same bii similarly 

amending section 6.412(a). See Acts 1991, 72d Leg., ch. 561, 5 43, at 1987. But see 

supra note 1. For the reasons discussed in connection with section 6.412(a), see stcpra 

notes l-2 and accompanying text, we believe that section 6.035(a) does not apply to a 

situation in which a member of an appraisal district board is “an individual who is engaged 

in the business of apprsking propetty for compensation for use in proceedings under this 

title or of representing property owners for wmpcnsation in proceedings under this title in 

the appraisal district.“tr 

zr Hemiogs on H.B. 24.95 Before the House Subacun. en Ways & Mesns, 71st Leg. (Apr. 

mement 0fRepmatsnve Vsligura) (rape svsilsble from Hcuss &aminee 8erviw OfIke). 

kIdditionoOy, Rqmentstive Vsllgom mawted for the mbanamttlce the drauanaam in Mentgomcry 

County, which evidently pmmptcd him to iatmdwe House Bit 2495. He wted that th Montgomry 

~Ehid~suwasnunorcdto~rrlativsinthcappraisalwwboccdimtErcaivad 

pmfemtM trcatmcot Id. One of the board members “a. sqportu of IRcpnscntatin Valigura’r],* 

stsohsdavaygmdspprstsslbusinw. Id. RcprcscntativeVsligurafchthstwpencnccmin8before 

tbeapprairaldimidboardforprotcztorforvpluatioasrbouldreceive~typeofprrfaentiplmatmcnl 

Id. We believe that Rsprescntative Valigura’testtmony s lauds firrtkr suppcn tc ear wnclusion that 

&on 6.035(a) cd lhc Tsx Cede applies cmly to sttustions in which a relative of a board mcmk is 

iovolved in the appraisal business; the legislsturc did not intend the s§ion to sppty in a stmstion in 

which the board member him&for herself is involved in the appraisal business. 

p. 1353 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 10 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

(DM-259) 

We believe that chapter 171 of the Local Government Code governs the situation 

about which Mr. Garison asks.12 Under chapter 171, a member of an appraisal district 

board must, prior to a vote or decision on any matter involving a business entity or real 

property in which the member hss a substantial interest, disclose the nature and extent of 

the interest and possibly to abstain from tinther participation in the matter.‘3 See supra 

notes 5, 6 and accompanying text (discussing chapter 171 and comparing Gov’t Code 

# 171.004(a) with Tax Code § 41.69). However, whether, for purposes of chapter 171 of 

the Local Government Code, a member of an appraisal district board has a substantial 

interest in a business entity and therefore must comply with section 171.004(a) is a 

question involving the resolution of facts; such a question cannot be determined in the 

opinion process. Gn the other hand, we are unaware of any statute that limits a member 

of an appraisal district board from performing property tax wnsultant services before the 

appraisal district board of another district. 

SUMMARY 

Pursuant to section 41.69 of the Tax Code, a member of an 

appraisal review board may not participate in the determination of a 

taxpayer protest before the appraisal review board in which the 

member, acting as a paid, court-appointed receiver of a tract of 

property in the appraisal district, represented a property owner 

becsuse the member has, as a matter of law, a direct personal or 

pecuniary interest in the outcome of the protest. Siarly, section 

41.69 of the Tax Code precludes a member of an appraisal review 

board from participating in the deterrninstion of a taxpayer protest if 

the member performed property tax wnsuhing services in the protest 

RepmmnMvc Valigura’s bill, House Bii 2495, was left pending before the damunit& of the 

HouseCommiltceonWaysandMcans. Howcver,thcHouseChmitteeonWaysandMeansincorporatcd 

into its wmmittce substiMe for House Bill 432 subrtantially similar language to that House Bill 2495 

propodforIhcacws&ion6.035ofUuTaxCdc. Furhnnorc,thcwmmitt~ddutepmpodtbc 

addition d section 6.412(a) 10 the Tax Code, rhe language of which is atbaaotially similar lo the 

lwgosge of section 6.035(a). Rqmsatalivc Stila, lhe author of House Bill 432, wnsi6ered House Bill 

432tobe’anomnibusbilltbat...willdeanupthcproblanrofadministration~financingd 

appmiddiaricIsiathcatatc.’ 

12Section 41.69 ofthe Tax Code &es not apply Ime beta= that section applies to the members 

ofanapp&salreviewbmrd,noItothcmanbcrsofanappraisaldistriaboard 

Whis office has 9tated that a member of an appraisal district board is a local public official for 

7 of chapter 171 of tie Local Government Code. See Anorney General Opinion JM-1187 (1990) 

p. 1354 
Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 11 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

W-259) 

because the member therefore has a direct personal or pecuniary 

interest in the determination of the protest. 

Section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code requires a 

member of an appraisal district board who has perfomxd property 

tsx wnsulting services in a taxpayer protest before the appraisal 

district board to disclose the nature and extent of the men&z’s 

interest, but only ifthe member hss a substantial interest in a business 

entity or real property involved in the matter. The determinstion of 

whether an appraisal district board member hss such a substantial 

interest involves the resolution of facts; it is therefore outside the 

scope of the opinion process. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texss 

WILL PRYOR 

First Assistant Attorney Genersl 

MARYJCJZLJD 

Deputy Attorney Genersl for Lit&ion 

RENEA HICKS 

State Solicitor 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, opinion Committee 

Prepared by Kymberly K. Oltrogge 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 1355