F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R O B E L A. A F E W

E R K I , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

A N A Y A L A W G R

O U P ; L O S A

N G E L E S F E D E R A L C R E D I T U N I O N , Defendants-Appellees. N o. 15-56510

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07132- RGK-J PR

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 7, 2017 Pasadena, California

F iled Aug ust 18, 2017

B efore: Richard R. Clifton and J o hn B . Owens, Circuit J udg es, and J ohn Antoon I I
, * District J udg e.
Opinion by

J udg e Clifton

* T h e Ho n o rab le J o h n A n to o n II, Un i ted S tates District J u d g e f o r th e Mid dle District o f

Flo rid a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.A F E W E R K I V

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SUMMARY * *

F air Debt Collection P r actices Act

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of the defendants in an action u nder the F air Debt Collection Practices A c t a nd California’s Rosenthal F air Debt Collection Practices Act.

A debt collector f

iled a complaint in state court to collect

an unpaid credit card debt, but the complaint overstated both the debtor’s principal d u e and the applicable interest rate. The panel held that the false statements m a d e b y the d ebt

c o l l e ctor were m a t er i a l b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d h a v e disadvantag e d a hy

pothetical debt o r i n deciding how to respond to the complaint. The panel therefore v a ca t e d the
g rant of summary

judg ment as to the F DCPA claim.

The panel affirmed the district court’s g rant of summary judg ment on the Rosenthal Act claim on the a lternative
g round that the debt collector corrected the misstatements within fifteen day s of d iscovering the violation a n d t h us satisfied the requirements necessary to avail itse lf o f a defense under the Rosenthal Act.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A F E W E R K I V

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COUNSEL

Abbas Kaz erounian ( arg ued), Kaz erouni L aw G r o u p A PC, Costa Mesa, California; Robert L

. Hy de, J oshua B . Swig art, and Sara F

. K

hosroabadi, Hy de & Swig art, San D i e go, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J onathan A. Malek (arg

ued), Anay a L aw Group, W estlake Villag e, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

CL I F TON, Circuit J udg e :

The fe d e r al F air D ebt Collection Practices A ct (“F DCPA”), 1 5 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., prohibits d ebt collectors f

r om making f

alse statements when at t e m p t ing to collect debts from consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 169 2 e

. N o t all false statements are actionable, however. To constitute a violation o f the F DCPA, a false statement must be “material.” Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc.
, 592 F .3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010).

W h at makes a false statement material or i m material in the debt collection world? Material false statements, we have held, are those that could “cause the least sophisticated debtor
to suffer a disadvantag e in charting a course of action in
response to the collection effort.” Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc.
, 755 F .3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). This appeal requires u s to cons i d e r the materiality of modest overstatements of an amount due and an interest rate.A F E W E R K I V

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H er e , a debt collector filed a c omplaint in state court t o collect a n unpaid credit card d ebt, but the complaint overstated both the debtor’s principal due and the applicable interest rate. T he debtor sued the d e bt collector in federal
court for violations o f the F DCPA a n d of California’s R osenthal F air Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act ” )
, C a l. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. The district court g ranted summary judg ment t o the debt collector o n both claims because it concluded that the e rrors in the complaint

were not mat e r i a l

. W e conclude, however, that the false
st a t e ments made by the debt collector in this case were material because they could h ave d isadvantag ed a h y pothetical d ebtor in deciding how to respond to the complaint. Accor d i ng ly
, we vacate the g rant of summary judg ment as to the FD C P A claim and remand for f urther proceeding s.

As for the Rosenthal Act c laim, we affir m t h e g r ant o f
summary jud gm e n t on an alternative g round. The d ebt collector c orrected the misstatements with i n f ifteen day s o f discovering the violation and thus satisfied the requirements
necessary to avail itself of a defense under the Rosenthal Act.

I. Background

L os Ang eles F ederal Credit Union (“L AF CU”) was owed
money by Plaintiff Robel Afewerki, a credit card customer o f L AF CU who had fallen behind on pay ments. L A F CU hired Anay a L a w Group to collect the debt and correctly informed Anay a L aw Group that the principal due was $26,916.08 a nd that the debt was subject to a 9.65 percent interest rate. A n a y a L aw Group filed a complaint on behalf of L AFC U
ag ainst Afewerki o n May 6, 2014, in L o s Ang e les County Superior Court alleg ing that the p rincipal of Afewerki’s d ebtA F E W E R K I V

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was $29,916.08 ($3,000 more than he in fact owed) and that the debt was subject to an interest rate of 9.965 percent (a fig ure that was 0.315 percent too hig h ). Anay a L aw Group served the complaint directly o n A fewerki, who was not represented by

counsel at that time.

Giv en this circumstance, Afewerki retained a lawy er, w ho
sent a demand for a b ill o f particulars to Anay a L a w G ro u p

on J u ne 6, 20 1 4

. As she later set out in a declaration, an Anay a L a

w Group attorney d i s covered the e rrors in the complaint for the first time on J une 16, 2014, while preparing

a response to the dema nd. She asserted that the errors were inadvertent. Two day s later, o n J u n e 18, 2014, Anay a L aw Group filed a notice of errata correcting the errors.

Rely ing on two statutes that prohibit debt collectors from making f alse representations in connectio n with efforts to collect consumer debts, Afewerki filed this lawsuit in federal
court. Specifically
, in his first a mended complaint, Afewerki alleg ed a v iolation of the F DCPA a g ainst Anay a L aw Group and a violation of the Rosenthal Act ag ainst both Anay a L aw Group and L AF CU. 1 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17.

Each of the parties moved f o r summary judg ment. The district c o u r t g ranted D efendants’ motion for summary judg ment and d enied Afewerki’s motion for summary judg ment, concluding that the er r o rs i n the state court

1 A f ew erk i did n o t su e L A FCU u n d er t he F D CP A

. Un der th e F D C P A, a cred ito r co llectin g d eb ts o n its o w n b eh alf is n o t a “ deb t

co llecto r.” 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 6 92 a (6 ); Hen so n v. S an ta n d er Co nsu mer US

A In c. , 1 3 7 S. Ct. 1 7 1 8 , 1 7 21 (2 0 1 7 ).A F E W E R K I V

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complaint were “not material.” The district court r e affirmed its decision after Afewerki filed a motion for reconsideration.

Notice of appeal was timely filed. W e have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Discussion

W e review de n ovo a gr an t of summary judg ment. Tourgeman
, 755 F .3d at 1118. W e also r e v iew de novo a district court’s interpretation of the F DCPA. Id. at 1119.

A. Materiality under FDCPA and Rosenthal Act

The d istrict court determined that D efendants were not liable under either the F DCPA o r the Rosenthal Act because it concluded that the complaint’s m i s statements of the principal owed and interest rate w ere “not material.” Even if Afewerki ha d n o t appeared and L AF CU had been g ranted default judg ment in the state court case, t h e d istrict court believed that L AF CU would have been required to prove the

am o u n t owed prior to e ntry of judg ment, so the judg ment ultimately entered would have been in the correct a mount. I n

a d d i tion, the district court noted that Afewerki had n o t presented evidence that h e would have proceeded differently had the complaint alleg e d the co r rect principal amount a nd interest rate. We conclude, however, that the false statements made by the debt collector in this case were material because they could have disadvantag ed the least sophisticated debtor in responding to the complaint.

The F DCPA prohibits debt collectors fro m using “any false, deceptive, or misl e ad i ng representation o r means in
connect ion with the collection of any debt.” 15 U .S.C.A F E W E R K I V

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§ 1692e. Specifically
, 15 U .S.C. § 1 692e(2) prohibits “[ t] he false representation of

. . . the character, a mount , o r l eg al

s tatus o f any debt.” The Rosenthal Act incorporates th e s e pr ohibitions by reference. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 (“[ E] very debt collector collecting or attempting to c ollect a

c onsumer debt shall c omply with the p rovisions of Se c t i o n s 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, o f

. . . Title 15 of the U nited States Code.”). The complaint tha t w a s f iled misrepresented the amount of the debt owed by Afewerki.

The tex t of the F DCPA does not itself establish e ither the l e a st sophisticated debtor standard or the materiali t y requirement, nor does the statute define thes e t e rms. The F DCPA’s b r oad prohibition on misleading statements poses the question, “ Mis l e a d i n g to whom? ” W e answered this question in 1982, when we ex plained that, “[ i] n evaluating the tendency of lang uag e to deceive, [ we] should look not to the most s o p h isticated readers but to the least.” Baker v. G

. C. Servs. Corp.
, 6 77 F .2d 7 75, 7 78 (9th Ci r

. 1 982). W e concluded that the F D C PA does not ask the subjective question of whether an individual p laintiff w a s actually misled b y a communication. Rather, it as k s t he objective question o f whether the hy pothetical least sophisti c a ted debtor w ould l i k e ly have b een misled. “I f the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misl ed b y a communication from a d ebt collector, the debt collector has violated the Act.” G uerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC
, 499 F .3d 926, 9 3 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). W e recog niz e d that “the least sophisticated debtor
may be uninformed, naive, an d g ullible.” Tourgeman
, 755 F .3d at 1119. To b e sure, “her interpretat i on of a collection notice cannot b e biz arre or u nreasonable,” id.
, but it is still the perspective o f the least sophisticated debtor that
counts.A F E W E R K I V

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More recently
, in Donohue v

. Quick Collec t, Inc.
, 592 F .3d at 1033–34, we adopted the materiality r equirement

as a “c o rollary ” to the least sophisticated debtor standard. W e held “that false but non-material representations are not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer a nd
t herefore are not actionable under §[ ] 1692e.” Id. a t 1 0 3 3

. B y asking whether f

alse st atements w ere material, we took the le ast sophisticated debtor standard that we h ad long applied to misleading statem e n t s and ex panded it to other conduct covered by the F DCPA. I n doing so, we followed the lead of the Seventh Circui t , w h i c h ex plained that the F DCPA “is d esig ned to provide informat i o n that helps

consumers to choose intellig ently
, and b y definit i o n immaterial information neither contributes to that objective (if the statement is c orrect) nor undermines it (if the statement is incorrect).” Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC
, 557 F .3d 755, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2009). Other circuits have als o a d o p t ed a materiality requirement f

or F DCPA claims. See, e.g. , J ensen

v. Pressler & Pressler
, 7 91 F .3d 413, 4 2 1 (3d Cir. 2 015); Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., I nc. , 776 F .3d 567, 5 71 (8th Cir. 2 015); Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone
, 561 F .3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2009).

I n Donohue
, a debt collector filed a complaint that listed

a principal d

ue of $270.99 and interest due of $32.89, which, the complaint indicate d
, was calculated at a 1 2 percent interest rate. 592 F .3d at 1033. I n reality
, the $32.89 included finance charg es assessed by the creditor in addition
t o t he 12 percent interest rate. Id. W h ile the complain t ’s characteriz ation o f the a mount was literally false, we determined that it did not matter. The total amount due was

cor r ect, and the mistake, we concluded, would “not a ffect a consumer’s ability to mak e i n t e llig e nt decisions.” Id. at 1034.A F E W E R K I V

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W e h ave applied this concept in subsequent cases. F o r

ex a mple, we held that a v oicemail messag e th a t f a i l ed to fulfill a statutory requirement to identify each communication

as being from “a debt c ollector” was not a material violation when the debtor clearly kne w who the debt collector was because the two had ex chang ed e ig ht emails and a phone c all in the two preceding weeks. Davis v. Hollins Law
, 832 F .3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2016).

Nevertheless, the materiality requirement r emains a fairly

narrow ex c eption to the g eneral rule requiring accuracy in communications fro m d e b t collectors. Thus, we concluded that misidentification of a consume r ’s orig inal creditor in a dunning letter was material because such a mistake could lead
to “confusion and del a y in try ing to contact the proper party concerning pay

ment on the loan

. ” Tourgeman
, 755 F .3d at 1121 ( orig inal brackets omitted). W ithout knowing the identity of the orig inal c reditor, we ex plained, a debtor mig ht be frustrated in an attempt to discover ho w h e incurred the debt or to obtain his pay

ment records. I

d.

Material false representations, then
, a r e those that could “cause the least sophisticated d ebtor to suffer a d isadvantag e in charting a course o f action in response to the collection effort.” I d. I mmaterial false representations, by contrast, a re those that are “literally false, but meaning ful only to the ‘hy pertechnical’ reader.” Id. To the e x tent that a Rosenthal Act claim is de r i v a t i v e o f a 15 U.S.C. § 1692e claim, as is
true in this case, false statements are also subject to the materiality requirement for purposes of the Rosen t hal A ct claim. See Davis , 832 F .3d at 966 n.3.

B e cause the materiality i n q u i ry focuses on the objective question of how the least sophisticated debtor could h aveA F E W E R K I V

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reacted to a misstatement, the question o f w hat Afewerki himself w ould actually have done d ifferently had Anay a L aw Group not misstated the amount o f h i s debt is irrelevant in determining materiality . As we have explained:

[ A] consumer possesses a rig ht of action even where the defendant’s conduct has not c aused him or her to suffer any pec u n i a r y o r emotional harm. An F DCPA plaintiff need
not even have actually been misled o r d e c e i v e d b y t h e d e b t c o l l e c t o r ’ s representation; instead, liability de p e nds on whether the hypot h etical “least sophisticated debtor” likely

would be misled.

Tourgeman
, 755 F .3d a t 1117–18 ( c i t a tions omitted). The district court’s determination that Afewerki wou l d not have proceeded differently absent the error mig ht mean that he did
not suffer a ctual d amag es and mig ht d isqua l ify him from obtaining such d amag es, but that determination does not

mean that overstating his debt by $3,000 and overstating the applicable interest rate were “mere technical falsehoods.” Id. at 1119.

There are a number of circumstances in which the errors in the complaint filed by Anay a L aw G r o u p mig ht have impacte d t he least sophisticated debtor. The F ourth Circuit recently considered a similar ca s e , P owell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC
, 782 F .3d 119 (4th Cir. 2014). I n that
case, a judg ment f

o r a consumer’s credit card debt was assig ned to a deb t c o l l e c t or. Id. a t 1 21. The debt collector filed an assig nment o f judg ment with the court that reported

a p r i ncipal amount of $11,727.99 instead of the correct

a m o unt of $10,497.21. Id. at 1 22. I t also stated that t h eA F E W E R K I V

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debtor had not made any pay ments even thoug h she had made $2,700 in pay

ments. Id. Thus, the assig nment over-reported
t h e amount the debtor owed by $3,930.78. A fter the deb t o r

c halleng e d the assig nment, the debt collector f ile d a n amended assig nment of judg ment to correct the errors. Id. The F ourth Circuit determined that the misstatement i n the initial assig nment w a s a material misrepresentation because “the least sophi s t i ca t e d consumer could be led to d ecide to pay f ar more than she otherw i s e w o uld have paid.” Id. at 127.

W e ag ree and conclude that Anay a L aw Group’s $3,000

o v e rstatement of the principal due in the state court complaint, 2 ex acerbated by the statement of an inflated interest rate, was material. J ust a s in Powell
, the fact that the debt collector corrected it s m i stake after the debtor

c halleng e d it does n ot mean that a less sophisticated deb t o r would have been so lucky

. Unlike th e debtor in Donohue
, who was served with a complaint that was c o r r e c t in stating the a mount owed, the least sophisticated debtor in A fewerki’s position would not have had the opti o n t o a void the lawsuit by simply “pa[ y ing ] the accuratel y stated sum to settle [ the] debt.” 592 F .3d at 1 0 3 4 ; s e e also id. (“[ A] pply ing an incorrect rate of interest w o u l d lead to a real injury

. . . .”). Rather, the least sophisticated debtor in Afewerki’s position, concerned that he had been sued, may well have simply p aid the a mount demanded in th e complaint and would have overpaid by

approx imately

$3,000.

2 Def en d an ts co n ten d t h a t a co m plain t is n ot a co m

m u n icatio n w i th

a d eb to r su

b j ect to th e p ro h i b itio n s o f th e FDCP A

. W e ex p licitly h eld in Do n o h u e , h ow ev er, th at “ a co m p lain t serv ed d i rectly o n a co n s u m e r to f acilitate deb t- co llect i o n ef f o rts is a co m

m u n icatio n su

b j ect to th e req u irem en ts o f

§ [] 1 6 9 2 e.” 5 9 2 F.3 d at 1 03 1

– 3 2

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There are o ther circumstances in which th e e r r o r s in the complaint An a y a L aw Group filed mig ht have impacted the least sophisticated debtor. One circumstance d iscussed by the district court and the p ar t i e s is the possibility that the state court case could h a v e proceeded to default judg ment. Contrary to Anay a L aw G roup’s arg ument, it is not c ertain that L AF CU would have been required to submit copies o f its
accounts or otherwise would have proved that the a m o unt it
soug h t was correct prior to entry of a default judg ment. The Appellate Division o f the L os Ang eles County Superior Court has hel d t h at a credit card company a ttempting to collect a debt from a customer need n ot submit documentary evidence in order to obtain a clerk’s default judg ment for a definite

sum. HSBC Bank Nev., N. A. v. Aguilar
, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 211 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2012). This decision could have g uided proceeding s in the L os Ang eles County Superior Court had Afewerki’s case proceed e d t o default judg ment. Thus, the least sophisticated debtor in Afewe r k i ’ s position mig ht n ot only have been misled as to the amount owed, but could also h a v e h ad a judg ment for an inflated amount entered ag ainst him.

F or these reasons, we c o n c l u de that the incorrect
statement of the princ i p al due in the state court complaint, which w as further inflated by the incorrect interest rate, was material. 3

3 A lth o u g h “ [t]h e FDCP A is a strict liab ility statu te th at m ak es deb t

co llecto rs liab l e f

o r v io latio n s th a t a r e n o t k n o w in g o r in ten t io n al,” Do n o h u e , 5 9 2 F.3 d at 1 0 30
, th e statu te p ro v id es f o r a b o n a f

id e e r r or d ef en se, 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 6 9 2 k ( c ); see a lso Cal. Civ

. Co d e § 17 8 8.3 0 (e). Def en d an ts h av e n o t attem

p ted to in v o k e th at d ef

en se, h o w ev er.A F E W E R K I V

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B. Rosenthal Act Defense

Althoug h we disag ree w ith the district court’s conclusion that the misstatements w ere not material, which was the basis

on which the district c o urt g ranted summary judg ment to Defendants, “[ w] e may affirm on any basis supported by

the record.” Fisher v. Kealoha
, 855 F .3d 1 067, 1069 (9 t h Cir. 2017). W e conclude that Defendants are en t i t led to the benefit o f a separate defense under the Rosenthal Act, and on that b asis we affirm the d istrict court’s g rant of summary judg ment to Defendants as to the Rosenthal Act claim.

California Civil Code § 1788.30(d) states:

A debt collector shal l h a ve no civil liability under this title if, w ithi n 15 day s either a fter dis c o v e r ing a violation which is able to be cured, or after the r eceipt of a written n o tice of such violation, the debt collector notifies the d e btor of the violation, and makes whatever adjustments or correction s a re necessary to cure the violation with respect to the debtor.

Defendants arg ue they a re absolved of liabil i t y under the Rosenthal Ac t because they corrected their error in accordance w ith this p rovision and served Afewerki with notice of the correction. Defendants pleaded this defense in their ans w e r a

nd arg u ed it in their motion for summary judg ment before the district court.

An a ttorney from Anay a L a w Group filed a declaration in the district court stating that the errors w er e i n advertent a nd that she discovered the errors only w hile reviewing the file toA F E W E R K I V

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respond to Afewer

k i ’ s demand for a bill of particulars. The notice o f e rrata was filed on J une 1 8
, 2014, which was within fifteen day s of J u ne 6, 2014, w h en the demand for a b ill o f particulars was served. According ly
, Defendants satisfied the criteria to invoke the defense provided by § 1788.30(d).

A fe w erki d oes not cite any evidence to contradict th e declaration by the Anay a L a w G roup attorney

. I nstead, Afewerki a

rg ues that § 1788.30(d) was eliminated in 1999 b y California Civil Code § 1788.17, which states:

Notwithstanding any other provi s ion of this title, every debt collector c o llecting o r at t empting to collect a consumer debt shall

. . . be subject to the remedie s i n Section 1692k o f[ ] Title 15 of the United States Code.

The California Supreme Court has not addressed the impact of § 1788.17 on § 1788.30(d), n or have the California Courts of Appeal done so in a published opini o n

. “W hen a state’s hig hest court has not y et ruled o n an issue, w e must reasonably determine the result that the hig hest state court would re a c h i f it were deciding the c ase.” Gonzales v

. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC
, 8 4 0 F .3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2016).

Afewerk i arg ues that leg islative history documents
sug g est that, in approving § 1788.17, the California leg islature intended to remove the § 1788.30(d) defense. W e must start, however, w ith the tex t of the statute, a nd when the
sta t utory “lang uag e is unambig u ous, the plain meaning controls.” Voices of the W etlands v. State W

ater Res. Control Bd.
, 257 P.3d 81, 93 (Cal. 2 011). The tex t of § 1788.17 does

n o t s u p p o r t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n A f e w e r k i u r g e s

.A F E W E R K I V

. A N A Y A L A W G R

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S ec t ion 1788.17 makes debt collectors “subject to t h e remedies in Section 1692k” but say s nothing about defenses. Section 1788.30(d) is a defense, not a remedy

. To be sure, t here are remedies included in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k that we r e not available under the R o senthal Act prior to enactment o f § 1788.17. F or ex ample, as Afewerki notes, § 1788.17 made class remedies available under the Rosenthal Act. Gonzales

v. Arr o w F

in. Servs., LLC
, 660 F .3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011). The 1 9 9 9 amendment also permitted individuals suing under the Rosenthal Act to claim statutory damag es without
reg ard to whether a debt collector acted knowing ly

. Compare C a l

. C i v

. C o d e § 1 7 8 8

. 3 0 ( b )
, w i t h 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 169 2 k ( a ) ( 2)(A). B ut, ag ain, these are remedies, not defenses.

F urthermore, as we ex p lained in a previous decision, § 1788.17 did not delete § 1788.30, but rather nullified some of § 1788.30’s limitations on remedies to the ex tent that those limitations d id not apply to the remedies descr i b e d in § 1692k. Gonzales
, 660 F .3d at 1 065. T h e r e i s nothing in § 1692k that would sug g est nullificat i o n of § 1788.30(d)’s defense for cured violations. A c co rding ly
, it appears to us that the defense p rovided by § 1788.30(d) remains available under the Rosenthal Act. “California, of course, remains free
to tell us if, in this respect, w e [ a] re wrong .” Evans v. Chavis
, 546 U .S. 189
, 2 0 0 (2006). I n the absence of such direction, however, we conclude that Defendants are not l i a b l e under the Rosenthal Act because D efendants cured the violation within fi f

t e e n d ay s of discovering it. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(d). On this basis, we affirm the district court’sA F E W E R K I V

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g rant of summary judg ment to Defendants as to the Rosenthal Act claim. 4

III. Conclusion

On the F D CPA claim, we vacate the district c o u rt’s
summary judg ment in f

avor of Anay a L aw Group. A s to the Rosenthal Act claim, we affirm the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of Defendants. W e remand for f u r t her
pr o c e e d ing s on the F DCPA claim. B ecause Anay a L aw Gr o u p i s the o nly d efendant sued under the F DCPA c laim, L AF CU will no long e r

be part of the case on remand.

AF F IRMED IN P A R T , VACATED IN P ART, AND REMANDED.

4 Becau se w e af

f irm o n th is g ro u

n d
, w e d o n o t co n sid er Def en d an ts’

co n ten tio n th at law f

irm s are n ot “ d eb t co llecto rs” su b j ect to t h e Ro sen th al A ct. A d d itio n ally
, Def

en d an ts seek su

m m ary af f ir m an ce o n th e g ro u n d th at th e ex cerp ts o f reco rd A f ew erk i su b m itted w ere in ad eq u ate. A lth o u g h th e ex cerp ts o f reco rd w ere d ef icie n t, see 9 th Cir. R. 3 0

- 1 .4 (c)(ii),

su m m ary af f irm an ce is n o t an ap p ro p riate rem ed y f o r th ese o m issio n s, see 9 th Cir. R. 3 0

- 2 (d etailin g th e actio n s th e co u rt m ay tak e w h en th e

ex cerp t s o f

reco rd o m i t

req u ired m aterials).