alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY'S DECEMBER 31, 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          12,800
<SECURITIES>                                         0<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                  756,400
<ALLOWANCES>                                    76,100
<INVENTORY>                                      6,800
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               718,100
<PP&E>                                       8,363,100
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,425,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,072,500
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          679,700
<BONDS>                                        993,800
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,721,800
<OTHER-SE>                                    (251,300)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,072,500
<SALES>                                              0<F2>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,384,800
<CGS>                                                0<F3>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,349,800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (14,400)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              82,900
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                966,500
<INCOME-TAX>                                   336,700
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            629,800
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   629,800
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00
<FN>
<F1>WE HAVE NOT STATED SECURITIES SEPARATELY IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT MATERIAL. WE HAVE INCLUDED THEM IN THE "CASH" TAG.
<F2>NET SALES OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS IS NOT MORE THAN 10% OF TOTAL OPERATING
REVENUES. WE THEREFORE HAVE NOT STATED THESE SALES SEPARATELY IN THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, PER REGULATION S-X, RULE 5-03(B).  WE HAVE INCLUDED 
THESE SALES IN THE "TOTAL REVENUES" TAG.
<F3>WE HAVE INCLUDED COST OF TANGIBLE GOODS SOLD IN OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES
IN OUR FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THE "TOTAL COST" TAG, PER
REGULATION S-X, RULE 5-03(B).
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### The Madison Avenue Baptist Church, plaintiffs, *vs.*The Baptist Church in Oliver Street, defendants.

1. In a petition of a religious corporation to a court for leave to sell its real estate, allegations that the receipts and income of such corporation are insufficient either to provide for the payment of its liabilities, or to meet current expenses are not to be deemed *untrue,*merely because although it appeared that the current expenses and interest account of the corporation ran behind its receipts and income, at the rate of $3000 per year, a great part of the indebtedness of the corporation was held by members of the church, who never called for interest upon such indebtedness; provided they never released their right to claim such interest.

2. An allegation in such a petition that a plan, or the terms of a projected union, (of two religious societies, who were plaintiffs and defendants,) have been agreed on by a committee composed of members appointed by the corporate bodies respectively, is not to be deemed so untrue, as to deprive the court of jurisdiction, because it appeared that one body at a corporate meeting adopted and ratified, separately, the action of its *committee*appointed to confer with the committee appointed by the other, which had previously agreed on the plan in question. In such case the plan of union is to be considered as if, without the intervention of any committees, it had been proposed in the first instance at such corporate meeting, and adopted.

3. To constitute a corporate meeting, whose acts and resolutions shall be binding, there need not be present a majority of all the corporators. Where the corporators are indefinite, such of them as assemble pursuant to a regular call for *650a meeting, will constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and a majority of that quorum can pass resolutions binding on the body itself.

4. The fact that some persons were present at a corpprate meeting who were not corporators, will not vitiate the proceedings of the meeting, unless it appear that such persons voted, and that their votes were necessary to carry the resolutions which were claimed to be passed.

5. Whether the pew hirers of a religious body were more or less numerous than was stated in such a petition is immaterial; since any allegation as to the consent of the pew hirers might have been stricken out of the petition without affecting the jurisdiction of the court.

. 6. Where, although possibly a majority of the whole number of the corporators of the plaintiffs may not have affirmatively authorized the proceedings, the evidence does not show that more than four or five objected; a resolution having that effect, passed at a corporate meeting, is ample authority-for the trustees to make the application; they having under that authority, passed a resolution directing the application to be made. It is unnecessary to show an authority originally by a majority of the whole number of corporators.

(Heard before Jones, J.

at special term, October, 1866;

decided January, 1867.)
#### Peter Murrell *v.*Milton Ritter.

Vendor and Purchaser — Rescission of Purchase — Improvements—Interest —Rent.

Where a vendor under a parol contract of sale elected not to abide hy the agreement, interest should he allowed on the cost of improvements made by the purchaser, from the date of such election, and the purchaser should he required to account for rents from the same date.

APPEAL PROM BARREN CIRCUIT' COURT.

October 23, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

While this court inclines to concur with the circuit court that the award of Porter I. Bohannon settles equitably and correctly the rights of the parties, and that the testimony ¡in this record supports his finding, yet we are of the opinion that the judgment of said court is more unfavorable to¡ Murrell than it should be.

Murrell denies that he 'had notice of the award, or knowledge of the fact that one had been agreed upon by the arbitrators. There is no- proof whatever that he had such knowledge. It was therefore impossible for him to comply with it, either by accepting the fifty dollars as purchase price for the lot, or paying three hundred dollars for the improvements made by Ritter; yet the court, upon his election to pay for the improvements, adjudges him to pay the three hundred dollars with interest from Feb*235ruary 4, 1870, and allows him no credit .for rents, although Ritter has remained in possession of and enjoyed the identical improvements for which Murrell is required to pay.

*Scott, for appellant.*

*Jones, for appellee.*

The rule in cases like this, is that the vendee shall pay rent for the premises in their improved condition from the time the vendor gives him legal notice that he repudiates the contract, and that the vendor shall pay for the improvements made with interest from the same time.

From all that appears in the record, the institution of this action was the first authoritative information appellee received, after the agreement to arbitrate, that appellant had finally determined not to comply with the oral agreement to sell.

Hence interest should be allowed on the three hundred dollars, the value of the improvements from that time, September 20, 1870; and appellee should be required to account for rents from the'same date. •'

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a judgment conformable to the views herein set out.
EXHIBIT
      10.1

    


    ADDENDUM
      TO PROMISSORY NOTE

    


    THIS
      ADDENDUM TO PROMISSORY NOTE (this " Addendum") is dated November 18, 2005,
      between MICROHELIX, INC., an Oregon corporation (the "Borrower"), and MARTI
      D.
      LUNDY (the "Lender").

     

    A. Borrower
      made a Promissory Note dated April 8, 2005 (the "Note") in favor of the Lender
      in the principal amount of $1,250,000.00; and

     

    B. The
      parties desire to amend the Note pursuant to the terms of this
      Addendum.

     

    For
      good
      and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
      acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:

     

    1.  Continuing
      Effectiveness.
      Except
      as modified herein, all of the terms, conditions, covenants, and restrictions
      set forth in the Note shall remain in full force and effect among the
      parties.

     

    2.  Payment.
      Section
      1 of the Note shall be amended in its entirety to read as follows: "Subject
      to
      the terms and conditions of this Note, Borrower promises to pay to the order
      of
      Lender the principal amount of One Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
      ($1,250,000), together with interest on the unpaid principal mount from the
      date
      of this Note. The first six payments are due on May 8, 2005, June 8, 2005,
      July
      8, 2005, August 8, 2005, September 8, 2005, and October 8, 2005, and these
      payments shall be interest-only payments in the amount of $10,416.67 each.
      A
      payment in the amount of $23,482.16 each shall be due on November 8, 2005 and
      December 8, 2005 that includes an interest payment of $10,417.67 and a principal
      payment of $13,064.49. A payment in the amount of $43,482.16 shall be due on
      January 8, 2006 and subsequent payments of $43,482.16 each are due on the eight
      day of each following month until April 8, 2008, at which time the unpaid
      principal amount, together with accrued interest is due in its entirety."
      Section 1 of the Note as amended herein shall remain in full force and effect
      among the parties.

    
      	 	 	 
	 	BORROWER:
	 	 
	 	MICROHELIX, INC., an Oregon
              corporation 
	 
 	 
 	 
 
	 	By:  	/s/ Tyram
              H. Pettit
	 	
              
Tyram
              H. Pettit
	 	Title: President
              & CEO


    

    
      
        	 	 	 
	 	LENDER:
	 
 	 
 	 
 
	 	  	/s/ Marti
                D. Lundy
	 	
                
Marti
                D. Lundy
#### J. H. Wilson, Ex’r, *v.*Julius Soloman et al.

Bills and Notes — Holder of Equitable Interest.

One wko holds an equitable interest in a note occupies an attitude no better than the person under whom he claims.

Vendor and Purchaser — Purchase-Money N'ote — Taking' Personal Security.

The mistake of a payee of a purchase-money note as to the effect of taking personal security on the note, must operate against the! payee and the equitable owner of the note claiming under her, and not against the purchaser of the land who believed he was acquiring an unincumbered title.

APPEAL PROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT.

June 12, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The petition in this case fails to set out the date at which Wilson became invested with the equitable title to the note sued on. There is no proof in the record tending to show the time when the note was sold to him. From the petition in the case of Glass v. Johnson, which was filed January 12, 1863, it may fairly be inferred that Mrs. Glass thén owned the note.

The credit endorsed on the note for $166.11, is without date, and although it appears that the payment was made to Wilson, there is nothing before us leading to the conclusion that it was made prior to the sale by Soloman to Hearne. The fact that Wilson failed after Hearne’s defense, has been fully disclosed; to set out in his *730pleadings, or to attempt to show by proof, the date of the sale of the note to him, is enough of itself, in a case like this, to authorize the presumption that the disclosure of the true date of the transaction would operate to his prejudice. The chancellor had the right to conclude that Mrs. Glass held and owned the note at the time Soloman sued and conveyed to Mrs. Hearne.

*M. T. Carpenter, for appellant.*

*Harwood, for appellees.*

It is immaterial whether Mrs. Glass was- or was not mistaken as to the legal effect of taking personal security on the note; it is evident from her petition against Soloman, that she did not claim a lien on the realty to secure the payment of this note, and that Mrs. Hearne believed, and had the right to believe, when she accepted the conveyance from Soloman and paid the purchase price to Mrs. Glass, that she was securing an unincumbered title. The mistake of Mrs. Glass must be allowed to operate to> the prejudice of herself and Wilson, who claims under her, and not to that of Mrs. Hearne, who was in nowise responsible for such mistake.

Mrs. Glass could not have asserted the lien herein claimed, and Wilson occupies an attitude no more favorable than she would have done, had she sued for her own benefit. The petition was properly dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.
IoT Advisory Board Agenda 

February 27, 2024

11:00 AM Chair Opening Remarks

• Timeline review

• Current status of the baseline report walkthrough

• FWG feedback and comments

• Review new Approval/Rejection Process

• Report structure

• Themes and mapping overview 

• Review the six themes

• Review/approve mapping of findings and recommendations to theme

• Pass One

• Review/approve key recommendations and enabling recommendations (blocks)

• Identify enabling recommendations for Pass Two discussions

February 28, 2024

11:00 AM Chair Opening Remarks

• Pass Two

• Review/approve select enabling recommendations

• Discuss/Review Report Structure and Content

• Overall report

• Intro content section

• Findings content

• Gaps?

• Actions

• Close
EXHIBIT 23


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 No. 33-86882 pertaining to the Michigan Financial Corporation Employee
Savings and Stock Ownership Plan and No. 033-59425 pertaining to the Michigan
Financial Corporation Stock Option Plan of our report dated January 16, 1998, on
the 1997 consolidated financial statements of Michigan Financial Corporation and
subsidiaries incorporated by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 1997.



                                                   Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP


Grand Rapids, Michigan
March 20, 1998
United States Department of Commerce 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For:

Massachusetts 

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international system of units (SI), documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented measurement procedures, successfully

completed training and proficiency tests, documented calibration intervals, submitted a quality management system, and

demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate.

The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State 

Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. 

2024 Scope

Mass Echelon III Volume Transfer, II

1000 lb to 0.001 lb 100 gal

30 kg to 1 mg 50 gal

8 oz to 0.03125 oz 5 gal

50 oz t to 0.005 oz t

NIST Office of Weights and Measures 12 oz ap to 0.5 gr

Effective Dates: 2024-02-01 to 2025-01-31

NOTE: This Scope does not cover 

calibrations at remote or field locations.

____________________________________

Katrice Lippa, Chief

(Rev.: September 2021)
#### J. B. Glass *v.*Mary A. Glass.

Marriage — Involuntary—Cohabitation—Ratification.

Although, a marriage may not have been voluntary on the part oí the husband, yet subsequent cohabitation with the woman and recognition of her as his wife, constitutes a legal and binding ratification of the marriage.

Divorce — Costs and Attorney’s Fees.

Where, in an action for divorce, it does not appear that the wife is wholly at fault, and she is the successful party, the husband is liable for the costs and attorneys’ fees.

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT..

March 27, 1874.

*Harufood, for appellant.*

*J. C. Beckham,, Robert, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin :

The evidence is unsatisfactory upon the question of fact, whether before the marriage of the parties there did or did not exist between them an agreement to marry; but the fácts and circumstances attending the marriage are such as to lead us to conclude that it was constrained, and not voluntary on the part of the appellant, however reprehensible his conduct may have previously been; nevertheless, we must decide from, the conclusive evidence of his subsequent cohabitation with the appellee and recognition of her as his lawful wife, that they constituted a legal and binding ratification of the marriage, and the court therefore properly dismissed the petition seeking to have it adjudged null and void.

The only remaining question is as to the 'judgment for costs, including $150 for the payment of attorney’s fees. The suit was in effect for a divorce *a vinculo-*for force and duress in obtaining the marriage. Sec. 1, Art. 3, Chap. 47, Rev. Stat. The allowance of $150 does not appear from the evidence to be unreasonable, and the wife, not appearing to be wholly in fault, and being, moreover, the successful party, the statute is imperative that the husband should pay the expenses of the litigation, including the allowance for attorney’s fees. Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
****EXHIBIT 32(a)****

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with the Annual Report of DRYCLEAN USA, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael S. Steiner, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act        of 2002 that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (2) | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

September 25, 2009

 

 

|   | /s/ Michael S. Steiner |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   | Michael S. Steiner          |
|   | Principal Executive Officer |
|   |                        |
EXHIBIT 32(a)

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection  with the Annual  Report of DRYCLEAN USA, Inc. (the  "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Michael S. Steiner,
Principal  Executive  Officer of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002 that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

September 27, 2004


                                                /s/ Michael S. Steiner
                                                --------------------------------
                                                    Michael S. Steiner
                                                    Principal Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guy Carmichael CRENSHAW, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-7812.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 31, 2001.

Decided June 6, 2001.

*236Guy Carmichael Crenshaw, pro se. Anthony Paul Giorno, Office of the United States Attorney, Roanoke, VA, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Guy Carmichael Crenshaw appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion for relief filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1994), and his motion for reconsideration. Our review of the record and the district court’s opinions discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *United States v. Crenshaw,*Nos. CR-96-47; CA-99-424-7 (W .D. Va. Nov. 21 *&*Dec. 14, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*