alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Theophilus N. Glover v. First Universalist Parish of Dowagiac.

*Adoption of payment by substitution.*

*&.*debtor may adopt a payment made in bis bebalf by some one else; and an unwritten arrangement whereby tbe creditor accepts the debtor’s debtor may be valid if clearly made out and all concerned agree in it, and if tbe conditions are fulfilled by one of tbe parties.

¿Payment by substitution is matter of defence to an action for tbe debt, and open to reply.

Error to Cass.

Submitted June 14.

Decided June 21.

.Assumpsit. Plaintiff brings error.

Eeversed.

*■John Wooster,*and *Spafford Try on*for appellant

*F. J. AUoell*for appellee.

Campbell, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant for ministerial ■service, and there was apparently no dispute on the trial *596except as to one item of credit of $50. One of the subscribers to make up his salary was one Chaplain, who appears-to have acted as a preacher, but not over that congregation. Defendant introduced testimony on which the judge found that plaintiff had an arrangement to which the defendant was a party, whereby plaintiff agreed with Chaplain to» accept his services as a preacher in payment of his dues of $50, and relieve defendant of that amount. Plaintiff claims-that on the evidence there was no legal proof of such an arrangement, and no consideration for accepting Chaplain’s-promises as a discharge of defendant. He also disputed the-truth of the claim.

There was evidence tending to show not only conversations indicating such an arrangement, had with several-members of the congregation, but also that directions were-given by plaintiff to the collector .of the defendant, and! acted on, not to collect the amount from Chajdain, because-of such an arrangement. It seems to us that if this- was clearly made out-it would be a proper defense, whatever might be-the rule had there been no more than an executory 'agreement with Chaplain. Payment made on behalf of a party by some one else may be adopted by the debtor, and at® arrangement to accept the debtor’s debtor may be valid if" clearly made out, and if all agree this need not necessarily be in writing. But an unftdfilled verbal agreement withe which the original debtor has in no way become consenting: or cognizant, could hardly be a discharge of the principal,. The testimony is not for us to pass on, and we make no» remark on it, because it was clearly error not to allow plaintiff to rebut it. The payment by substitution was matter of" defence and open to reply. The finding of the court as well, as some of the testimony for the defence covered some-ground on which rebutting evidence was shut out. The-facts ought to have been left open to full inquiry and! explanation.

The judgment must be reversed» with- costs and a new: trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.
#### R. B. Nunn and Wife *v.*Mary O’Brien.

Bills and Notes — Estoppel—Statement of Articles for Which Note Was Given.

■Where a note contains a statement of the articles sold, and for which the note was givén, to the extent that the statement is contradictory to the petition, the statement must control.

Bills and Notes — Pleading—Variance.

Where the allegations of a petition on a note were inconsistent - with the statement which fwas made a part of the note, it was held that a demurrer was properly sustained to the petition.

APPEAL PROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

October 9, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

It is sought by the amended petition to charge the estate of Mrs. O’Brien upon the ground that the note was given for necessaries for herself and family sold to her and delivered upon her credit.

*170
      *Sweeney & Stout, for appellant.*

*Thos. B. B-otts, for appellee.*

The note includes a statement of the articles sold, in the form of the account between Cheaten, the assignor, and his debtor. This statement is not only an exhibit, but as it is attached to and explains the note, it is essentially part and parcel of the foundation of the action.

It was not only proper to consider it upon demurrer but to the extent that it is inconsistent with or contradictory of the statements in the amended petition it controlled.

The account shows that the articles were charged to John O’Brien, the husband, and not to the appellee. The note, although a joint and several obligation, is signed first by the husband. In the case of *Gatewood v. Bryan,*7 Bush 509, where the note was signed first by the wife, and showed on its face that it was given for necessaries for “Myself and family,” the fact that the account, when produced on the trial, manifested that the goods, when sold, were charged to the husband, was held sufficient to rebut this admission and to establish that the credit was extended to the'husband. Here the paper sued on showed that the goods, when sold, were charged to the husband, and that when the wife’s name first became connected with the transaction, by the execution of the note, twelve months’ credit without interest was given.

Considering the statements of the amended petition in connection with the note and account, the court would not have rendered judgment if it had been confessed, because of the fact that the exhibits sufficiently controverted the truth of the averments by which ap-pellee was sought to be charged. It follows, therefore, that if the demurrer had been overruled, Mrs. O’Brien might have safely gone to trial without answering. This, of itself, demonstrates conclusively that the court' below did not err in sustaining the demurrer. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the remaining questions presented by the argument of counsel. As appellants fail to amend further, his petition was properly dismissed. Judgment is *affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER and PRINCIPAL
       FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
          OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of the Everest Fund, L.P.
(the "Partnership"), for the quarter ended June 30, 2008,
as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter Lamoureux, President
of Everest Asset Management, Inc., the general partner of
the Everest Fund, L.P. (the "Fund"), hereby certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Fund.



      By:  /s/ Peter Lamoureux
         ----------------------
      Name: 	Peter Lamoureux
      Title: 	Director, President and
      		Treasurer

     August 14, 2008


							E-3
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEFEXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, James W. Bernau,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of WillametteValley Vineyards, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31,2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such 10-Qfairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of Willamette Valley Vineyards Inc.

 
| Date: May 28, 2008                                                                            |                                                            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| By:                                                                                                |          /s/ James W. Bernau |   |
| Name:                                                                                              |  James W. Bernau                                           |   |
| Title:             Chief  Executive Officer |                                                            |
|                                                                                                    |                                                                 |  |  |
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

May 20, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-11170

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 99-00938 CV-ASG

RICHARD FEINGOLD, individually and 

ex rel. United States of America,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

PALMETTO GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

ADMINISTRATORS, JOHN DOE, etc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(May 20, 2008)

Before ANDERSON, HULL and SILER,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

_______________

*Honorable Eugene Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by

designation.
2

After oral argument and careful consideration, we readily conclude that the

judgment of the district court is due to be affirmed. With respect to Counts III and

IV of the complaint, we conclude that we are bound by our prior panel opinion in

United States ex rel. Body v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 156

F.3d 1098 (11 Cir. 1998). Accordingly, defendants are immune with respect to th

the allegations of Counts III and IV.

With respect to Counts I and II, we conclude that the district court committed

no reversible error in dismissing those counts for failure to comply with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
Nick Bartlow, Don Waymire 

{nbartlow,dwaymire}@brtrc.com 

BRTRC 

Gregory Zektser 

zektser_gregory@bah.com 

Booz Allen Hamilton 

InternaGonal Biometric Performance Conference, March 2‐4, 2010 
Background 

• Ceilings on performance accuracy, populaGon coverage, 

relaGvely high failure‐to‐enroll rates, and ease of 

circumvenGon are tradiGonal shorSalls of uni‐modal 

biometric systems which oTen lead to the adopGon of 

mulG‐biometric systems 

• The trend toward mulG‐biometric systems has been 

parGcularly prevalent in the USG (i.e. DHS IDENT, FBI NGI, 

DoD ABIS) 

• The increase in the quanGty of mulG‐biometric systems 

(parGcularly large scale) escalates the importance of 

having suitable means for evaluaGon 
Historical Basis of EvaluaGon 

• Historically, mulG‐

biometric systems have 

aimed at increasing the 

extent in requirements 

associated with 4 of the 

original 7 characterisGcs of 

a biometric system were 

met 

• Technology may now 

afford improvements 

across all 7 characterisGcs, 

but can we look at more?   

Characteris*c 

1  Universality 

2  Uniqueness 

3  Permanence 

4 

5 

Measurability 

Performance 

6  Acceptability 

7  CircumvenGon 
An Increased Level of Granularity 

Characteris*cs 

• Building upon the original 7 

characterisGcs, we increase the 

level of granularity and propose 

9 more 

The foundaGon of a holisGc 

evaluaGon scheme can be 

achieved through quanGficaGon 

and the applicaGon of an 

objecGve funcGon 

Come see more and provide 

your thoughts at the poster 

session!  

•

•

Acceptability 

Accuracy 

Availability 

CircumvenGon 

Convenience 

Cost 

9  Legality 

10  Measurability 

11  Mobility 

12  Permanence 

13  Privacy 

14  Scalability 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Efficiency 

Interoperability 

15  Uniqueness 

16  Universality
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8
(File Nos. 333-125701, 333-104724 and 333-152732) and Forms S-3 (File Nos. 333-162555, 333-148069,
333-129784 and 333-114258) of Mines Management, Inc. and to the incorporation by reference therein of our report dated March 31, 2011 with respect to the
consolidated financial statements of Mines Management, Inc. included in its Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

/s/
Tanner LLC

Salt
Lake City, Utah
March 31, 2011

---



QuickLinks
ALPHONSO JAMES, SR.

,

Petitioner,

v.

JULIE L. JONES, S ecretary, Florida

Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTIO N FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 2333

Opinion filed June 8, 2016.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

-- Original Jurisdiction

.

Alphonso James, Sr.

, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel,

Department of Corrections, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED.

LEWIS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
---

Exhibit 32.1





SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350




I, A. Bruce O’Connor, hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the periodic report being filed herewith containing financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that information contained in said periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Middlesex Water Company for the period covered by said periodic report.




/s/ A. Bruce O’ConnorA. Bruce O’ConnorChief Financial Officer





Date:   March 9, 2011





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Middlesex Water Company and will be retained by Middlesex Water Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.3


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
   
We consent to the inclusion in Amendment No. 2 to the Registration Statement on
Form S-1 (File No. 333-49389) and related Prospectus of Cooperative Computing,
Inc. of our report dated October 23, 1996 on our audits of the consolidated
financial statements of Triad Systems Corporation as of and for the years ended
September 30, 1995 and 1996. We also consent to the reference to our firm under
the Caption "Experts".



                                               /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

San Jose, California
July 24, 1998
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Sean M. Cary, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report of Willamette Valley Vineyards Inc. on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such 10-QSB fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of Willamette Valley Vineyards
Inc.

Date: May 13, 2005
By:    /s/ Sean M. Cary
Name: Sean M. Cary
Title:   Chief Financial Officer
#### Ravi KALIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY of New York, Martin Tamny, Yolanda Moses, Frank Grande and David Lavallee, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 00-9276.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 21, 2001.

*23Neal Brickman, New York, NY, for appellant.

Carol Fischer; Marion Buchbinder, of counsel, Attorney General’s Office, The State of New York, New York, NY, for appellees.

Present NEWMAN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, UNDERHILL,* District Judge.

*

 Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Ravi Kalia timely appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court on September 11, 2000 that granted defendant-appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Kalia’s complaint. For substantially the reasons stated in Judge Martin’s thoughtful Opinion and Order, *see Kalia v. City University of New York,*No. 98 Civ. 441, 2000 WL 1262905 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 5, 2000), we affirm.

We have considered all of plaintiff-appellant’s arguments and conclude that they are without merit.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
#### Lewis Laudeman *v.*J. S. Gallager.

Appeal — Reversal—Surplusage.

Refusal to strike out certain words as surplusage is not cause for reversal, where the ruling could not have prejudiced the rights of appellant.

Gaming — Construction of Statute.

■Section 5, ch. 42, R. S., relating to betting or wagering, comprehends any betting or wagering, whether upon a “game, sport, pastime,” or an election.

APPEAL, FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 6, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

We regard the petition as sufficient, and whether the court erred or not in refusing to strike out certain words of it as surplusage, we cannot see that the error could have prejudiced the rights of the appellant; and such error cannot, therefore, be a cause of reversal, if, in fact, the ruling of the court was erroneous.

It is insisted for the appellant that according to the first section of Chap. 42 of the Revised Statutes, and on the authority of the. case of Love v. Harris et al., 18 B. Mon. 122, that betting on an election not being a “game, sport, or pastime,” and yet betting on the result of an .election being unlawful and against public policy, the law, in the absence of statutory regulations, will not aid either party, even as against a mere stakeholder for them'. But *560■whether this would be so or not, under Sec. 1, supra, of the chapter referred to, we cannot doubt that in a case like this, the stakeholder’s liability is fixed by the 5th section of the chapter, which, in defining the character for betting referred to, is broader than the first section, and comprehends “any bet or- wager,” whether upon a “game, sport, pastime,” or an election. Hutchings & Co. v. Stillwell, 18 B. Mon. 776.

*Kinney, for appellant.*

*Mundy, for appellee.*

It seems to us, therefore, that according to the substantial allegations of the petition, which are admitted by ■ the answer, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the $200 placed by him- in the defendant’s hands.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
10811.

#### Smith v. The State.

Decided November 4, 1919.

Indictment for assault with intent to rape; from Wilcox superior court—Judge Gower. July 8, 1919.

The instruction, referred to in the decision was as follows: “I charge you further that if any threats of violence have been shown to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, that such threats of violence or serious physical and bodily harm, if so shown to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, may be sufficient to overthrow the will of the woman, and no actual force would be necessary to constitute the offense as charged, if all the other elements of the offense are shown to your satisfaction.” It was contended that this was error because applicable only to cases in which the charge is rape and in which the evidence shows consummation of the rape, *347and not to cases in which merely an attempt to commit' rape is charged and the woman did not yield either to force or threats. It was further contended that the province of the jury was invaded by the instruction that such threats “may be sufficient,” etc.

*346Broyles, C. J.

1. The single excerpt from the charge of the court complained of, while slightly inaccurate and perhaps inapplicable to a case of assault with intent to rape, does not, under all of the facts of the ease and the entire charge of the court, require a new trial. The charge of the court was a very exhaustive and fair presentation of the law of the case, and clearly and fully presented all the contentions of the defendant, and gave him the benefit of all the defenses offered or which could have been offered by him.

2. The verdict was amply authorized by tlie evidence, and the court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Imke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*

*347
      *Eldridge Gutts, M. B. Gannon,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. B. Wall, solicitor-general,*contra.
#### Cone *v.*Eubanks.

No. 6725.

November 17, 1928.

Gilbert, J.

1. Where a judgment was attacked on the ground that the defendant was a non-resident of the State at the date of suit, and that the only return of service was by leaving a copy “at his most notorious place of abode” in the county where the suit was brought, and that the judge rendering the judgment was not legally qualified to do so, affidavit of illegality would lie. *Planters Bank*v. *Berry,*91 *Ga.*264 (18 S. E. 137); *McKnight*v. *Wilson,*158 *Ga.*160 (3) (122 S. E. 702); *Bedingfield*v. *First National Bank,*4 *Ga. App.*197 (61 S. E. 30). In these circumstances the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law, and for that reason the court did not err in refusing equitable interference. *Williams*v. *Hinson,*143 *Ga.*740 (85 S. E. 868); *Williamson*v. *Williamson,*154 *Ga.*788 (115 S. E. 805).

2. In the present case the defendant in the city court of Decatur (the plaintiff in error) filed an affidavit of illegality based upon the ground that the judgment against him was void, because at the time the suit was filed and at the time the judgment was rendered he was a non-resident of the State, and because the judge who presided at the trial was without jurisdiction, “nothing appearing in said judgment that the legal judge of said court was disqualified, absent, or unable for any cause to preside, . . . said judgment being signed by a judge who is a non-resident of said county and in no wise qualified.” No question is now raised which was not raised by the affidavit of illegality and adjudicated on that trial. “A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered.” Civil Code (1910), § 4336.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*386
      *Peek, Randolph & Wimberly*and *Morris Maclcs,*for plaintiff.

*Augustine Sams,*for defendant.