FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2023-3374

LT Case No. 2019-CF-003140-A 

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VINZETT LAMAR WATKINS, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

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3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County. 

Lawrence J. Semento, Judge. 

Vinzett Lamar Watkins, Sneads, pro se. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A. 

Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

June 7, 2024

HARRIS, J.

In September 2021, Appellant, Vinzett Watkins pled no 

contest to a charge of Writing Threats to Kill or to do Bodily Injury. 

He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days 

in jail, followed by two years of probation. A year later, an amended 

affidavit of violation of probation was filed, alleging that Appellant 

violated probation conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5. A violation of probation 
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(VOP) hearing was conducted, and the court found that Appellant 

had in fact violated probation. 

Appellant subsequently filed a Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850 Motion for Postconviction Relief raising three 

grounds: that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to disqualify the trial court judge; that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue that the threatening letter was a forgery; and 

that his plea was involuntary. The court entered an order 

summarily denying Appellant’s motion. 

The standard of review for a summary denial of a rule 3.850 

motion is de novo. Lebron v. State, 100 So. 3d 132, 133 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2012). The trial court must grant an evidentiary hearing 

unless the allegations are not pled with sufficient detail, are 

conclusively refuted by the record, or are legally insufficient. Id. 

Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be successful, the 

defendant must establish both deficient performance and 

prejudice. Deficient performance “requires showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was not 

ineffective and it is up to the defendant to present evidence to 

overcome this presumption. Id. at 689.

To establish prejudice when a defendant has entered a plea, 

the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Grosvenor v. 

State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that 

a defendant would have proceeded to trial in lieu of a plea, the 

court should look at “the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the plea, including such factors as whether a particular defense 

was likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant 

and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the difference 
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between the sentence imposed under the plea and the maximum 

possible sentence the defendant faced at trial.” Grosvenor, 874 So. 

2d at 1181–82.

Appellant first argued that counsel was ineffective for 

allowing him to be prosecuted in Lake County. Because Appellant 

was charged with writing a threatening letter to a Lake County 

judge, he argued that he could not be prosecuted in Lake County. 

Appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to disqualify Judge Metz from his case, and had counsel 

done so, Appellant would not have entered his plea and would have 

proceeded to trial.

The postconviction court noted the general standard for 

disqualification of a judge, that adverse rulings are not a sufficient 

basis, and concluded that Appellant’s proposed motion for 

disqualification would not have been meritorious; therefore,

counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such a motion. The 

court also generally found that Appellant had not articulated a 

claim satisfying the relevant legal standards.

Generally, “disqualification is required where the facts 

alleged and established, which must be taken as true, would place 

a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and 

impartial proceeding.” Erlinger v. Federico, 242 So. 3d 1177, 1181 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Kline v. JRD Mgmt. Corp., 165 So. 3d 

812, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)). However, “[g]eneral and speculative 

assertions about a judge’s attitude will not warrant relief.”

Erlinger, 242 So. 3d at 1181 (citing Krawczuk v. State, 92 So. 3d 

195, 201 (Fla. 2012)). Rather than cite to any specific facts, 

Appellant merely argued that because the victim had been a judge 

in the county, all judges in that county had to be disqualified. This 

sort of sweeping generalization is insufficient to warrant 

disqualification, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to file 

the motion. Accordingly, we conclude that this ground was 

properly denied. 

Appellant next argued that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to argue that the threatening letter was actually forged. According 

to Appellant, he told counsel the letter had been forged, and 

identified several witnesses who would testify that forgery was an 
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ongoing problem at the correctional facility wherein he was held. 

Appellant listed three officers from the prison, as well as the 

victim. Had those witnesses been called, Appellant argued, he 

would not have entered a plea and would have proceeded to trial. 

On appeal, Appellant notes that the court did not specifically 

address this ground in its order and argues that the ground should 

either be addressed or set for an evidentiary hearing. Insofar as 

forgery would mean someone else made the letter, it would 

sensibly be a valid defense to the convicted crime. § 836.10(2), Fla. 

Stat. (2021). Furthermore, with no records attached by the 

postconviction court, there is no record by which this claim could 

be conclusively refuted. See Henry v. State, 305 So. 3d 803, 805–06 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing Nordelo v. State, 93 So. 3d 178, 184 

(Fla. 2012)). Although Appellant is challenging the underlying 

conviction, not the revocation proceedings, the motion is 

nonetheless timely from both judgments. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for this ground to be explicitly 

addressed below. See Robertson v. State, 862 So. 2d 102, 103–04 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Finally, Appellant argued that his plea was involuntary. 

According to Appellant, he was never informed that if he violated 

probation, he could be sentenced up to the statutory maximum for 

the crime. He was also unaware he would later be designated a 

violent felony offender of special concern. 

As with ground two, this ground was not explicitly addressed 

in the trial court’s order. The only record provided here, attached 

by Appellant rather than the court, is the written plea agreement, 

and that form does not cover the ramifications for violating 

probation. As there are no records conclusively refuting this 

ground, the summary denial of this ground is also reversed and 

remanded for reconsideration. See Smith v. State, 968 So. 2d 675, 

677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

We affirm the summary denial of the first ground, see

Krawczuk, 92 So. 3d at 201 (quoting Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 

982 (Fla. 2009)), but reverse and remand for reconsideration of 

grounds two and three. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D). 
5 

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with 

instructions. 

SOUD and PRATT, JJ., concur. 

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

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