alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **0 -**  **2367**

JOHN M. DICKSON, JR. , P laintiff

- Appell ant ,
v. ROY CHERRY, Superintendent; T. D. HATCHETT, Captain; L. NICHOLS, Sergeant; KIM BUDD, Correctional Officer; S. PIERSO N, Correctional Officer; E. FELDER, Correctional Officer; WILLIAMS, Correctional Officer; SWAIN, Correctional Officer; ALLEN, Correctional Officer; JOHN/JANE DOE(S), Correctional Officers , Defendant s – Appell ees . Appeal from the United States Distri ct Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith , District Judge. ( 2 : 1 0

- c v - 0 0 22 4

- RBS

- DEM )

Submitted : May 2 6 , 2011 Decided: May 31, 2011

Before KING , SHEDD, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and d ismiss ed i n part by unpublished per curiam opinion
.
John M. Dickson, Jr. , Appellant Pro Se
. Samuel Lawrence Dumville, NORRIS, ST. CLAIR & LOTKIN, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee s . Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURI AM: John M. Dickson, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order s denying relief on his 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint and his subsequent motion s for extension of time to file a notice of appeal and for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bow l e s v. Russell , 551 U.S. 2 0 5, 2 1 4 ( 2007 ). The district court’s order denying relief on Dickson’s
§ 1983 complaint was entered o n November 2, 2010
. Dickson filed his notice of appeal on December 6, 2010. Because Dickson failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, w e dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdicti on . With respect to the district court’s order den ying Dickson’s motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal and his motion for reconsideration , Dickson ’s notice s of appeal w ere timely filed. We have r eviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons3 stated by the district court. Dickson v. Cherry , No. 2:10

— cv 00224

- RBS

- DEM (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 1, 2011 & entered Feb. 2, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ad equately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART
#### Clarke *v.*Jenson *et al.*

No. 6538.

December 15, 1928.

*W. A. Slaton,*for plaintiff:. *Tutt & Brown,*for defendants.

Russell, C. J.

1. An administrator’s deed which recites that he offered for sale a certain tract of land belonging to the estate of the deceased, containing 100 acres, more or less, and “especially sold subject to the widow’s dower therein,” and which witnesses a sale of “said lot or tract of land (the widow’s dower excepted),” evidences a sale of the reversionary estate in the land out of which dower was assigned. *Hawkins*v. *Johnson,*131 *Ga.*347, 355 (62 S. E. 285); *Fletcher*v. *Hall,*135 *Ga.*28 (68 S. E. 793); *Knight*v. *Wood,*146 *Ga.*753 (92 S. E. 281).

2. The judge, to whom the case was submitted for determination upon all questions of law and fact, did not err in rendering judgment for the defendants. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 MAY-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                         62
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    8
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               93
<PP&E>                                         1,081
<DEPRECIATION>                                 735
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 439
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          233
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       149
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,127
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   439
<SALES>                                        305
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               307
<CGS>                                          13
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  326
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             134
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (19)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (19)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.01)
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</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4381 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  2d Session

                               H. R. 4381

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2811 Springdale Avenue in Springdale, Arkansas, as the ``Harvey and 
                 Bernice Jones Post Office Building''.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4381

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2811 Springdale Avenue in Springdale, Arkansas, as the ``Harvey and 
                 Bernice Jones Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HARVEY AND BERNICE JONES POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 2811 Springdale Avenue in Springdale, Arkansas, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Harvey and Bernice Jones Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the Harvey and 
Bernice Jones Post Office Building.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 7, 2004.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```
```

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      Pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned,  Anthony J. Miceli, Chief Financial
Officer of United Capital Corp.,  (the  "Company"),  does hereby  certify,  with
respect to the Annual  Report of the Company on Form 10-K/A for the period ended
December 31, 2006 (the "Report") that:

1.    The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material
      respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of the
      Company.

Dated: April 27, 2007

                                          By:   /s/ Anthony J. Miceli
                                              ----------------------------------
                                                Anthony J. Miceli
                                                Chief Financial Officer
```
10473.

#### HUTCHESON *v.*THE STATE.

A conviction under section 442 of the Penal Code (1910), on the charge of being in an intoxicated condition on the public highway, “made manifest by indecent condition or acting,” was authorized by evidence that the accused, a woman, was found drunk and asleep, with a man “sorter lying on” her, both under a quilt, on the back seat of an automobile on a public highway, and that she was too drunk to walk.

Decided June 27, 1919.

Accusation of misdemeanor; from .city court of Wrightsville— Judge Blount. February 22, 1919.

*B. E. Moye, G. A. Pair cloth,*for plaintiff in error.

*0. 8. Glaxton, solicitor,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

Ludie Hutcheson was indicted under section 442 of the Penal Code of 1910, for being intoxicated on a public highway; the accusation alleging that said intoxicated condition was “made manifest by indecent condition or acting.” The evidence showed that the accused was found drunk and asleep, with a man “sorter lying on” her, both under a quilt and on the *55back seat of an automobile, which was on a public highway. The evidence further showed that she was too drunk to walk. In *Davis*v. *State,*14 *Ga. App. 572*(81 S. E. 907), we find the following: “The Standard Dictionary (1913), p. 1247, defines ‘indecent’ as ‘offensive to common propriety;’ ‘offending against modesty or delicacy; unfit to be seen or heard; or immodest; gross; obscene.’ For this reason we held in *Howell*v. *State,*13 *Ga. App.*75 (81 S. E. 247), that one who was lying in a public highway, on his back, stretched out drunk and unable to get out of the road, his head near the middle of the road and his feet toward the side, so that he had to be dragged to one side in order to permit the passage of vehicles, was drunk under such circumstances as that his drunkenness was manifested by an indecent condition within the meaning of the statute.” The second headnote in *Sullivan*v. *State,*17 *Ga. App.*122 (86 S. E. 287), is as follows: “In such a ease, the question as to whether one’s condition is such as to offend public decency is purely a question of fact, and must be determined by the jury, who' can take into consideration all the circumstances of the case. *Lovett*v. *State,*13 *Ga. App.*71, 74 (78 S. E. 857).” See also *Ford*v. *State,*10 *Ga. App.*442 (73 S. E. 605).

Applying the foregoing rulings to the facts of this ease, the jury were fully authorized to find that the intoxicated condition of the accused was “made manifest by indecent condition or actings,” and, as the motion for new trial contained the general grounds only, a new trial was properly refused.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
#### Wm. Baker *v.*W. A. Branham et al.

Parties — Petition to be Made Party.

A petition by one to be made a party to an action was held to show tbat tie petitioner was directly interested in the litigation, and entitled to be made a party.

APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT.

December 4, 1873.

*Drone, for appellant.*

*for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

It is alleged in the petition of William Baker to be made a party, that Cull, one of the firm of Cull, Baker & Co., paid off the judgment on the note in controversy to Mastín & Branham, the original holders, and took from them their receipt *therefor;*that Cull then sold the note or the benefit of the claim to the petitioner, Baker, and assigned to him the receipts of Mastín & Branham. If this be true Baker is directly interested in the litigation, and should have been made a party to the estate.

The judgment of the court below in refusing to allow him to be made a party is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAR 15 2001

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARTIN RONQUILLO-HERRERA,

also known as MARTIN H.

RONQUILLO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-3221

(D.C. No. 00-CR-10008-01-JTM)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

The defendant was convicted, following the entry of a guilty plea, of

unlawful reentry of a deported alien. The government recommended a three point
-2-

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, and moved for a

downward departure of two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. At the

sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued for a more extensive departure. The

district followed the government’s recommendation and granted its motion for the

two level departure, sentencing the defendant to 60 months incarceration. We

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a more

extensive downward departure. Defense counsel has filed an Anders Brief and a

motion to withdraw, suggesting that the court is without jurisdiction to review the

sentence. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The defendant has not

filed a response to the brief and motion submitted by counsel, although he was

provided with a copy of counsel’s response and given an opportunity “to raise any

points he chooses.” Anders, 360 U.S. at 744.

It is well established that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the extent

of a downward departure. United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d 1217, 1230 (10th

Cir. 1999). See also United States v. McHenry, 968 F.2d 1047, 1048-49 (10th

Cir. 1992) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s

decision to reduce only the defendant’s criminal history category and not the base

offense level as well in deciding to grant a downward departure). The defendant

does not point to any error of law or misapplication of the sentencing guidelines. 
-3-

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) & (2) (a defendant may appeal a sentence which “was

imposed in violation of the law,” or “as the result of an incorrect application of

the sentencing guidelines....”). Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to entertain

this appeal.

Defense counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the appeal is 

DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

                             UTILICORP UNITED INC.
              STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                             For the Year Ended
                                                                                 December 31,
Line No.                                                                  1995      1994      1993
--------                                                                ----------------------------
<S>                                                                     <C>          <C>      <C>
          Earnings available for common shares:
(a)       Earnings available for common shares as reported                  77.7      91.4      79.5
(b)       Elimination of interest on convertible subordinated
            debenture, net of tax                                            .22       .55       .64
(c)       Elimination of dividends on cumulative
            convertible preference stock                                       -       .93      4.88
                                                                        ----------------------------

(d)       Fully Diluted Earnings Available                                  77.9      92.9      85.0
                                                                        ----------------------------
                                                                        ----------------------------

          Weighted average common shares outstanding:
(e)       Primary weighted average shares outstanding
             as reported                                                   45.08     43.97     40.74
(f)       Assumed conversion of convertible subordinated
             debenture                                                       .39       .55       .66
(g)       Assumed conversion of cumulative convertible
             preference shares                                                 -       .66      2.87
                                                                        ----------------------------

(h)       Fully diluted weighted average shares
             outstanding                                                   45.47     45.18     44.27
                                                                        ----------------------------
                                                                        ----------------------------
          Earnings Per Common Share:
             Primary (a/e)                                                 $1.72     $2.08     $1.95
             Fully Diluted (d/h)                                            1.71      2.06      1.92

</TABLE>
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in 

the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the 

citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computergenerated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of 

Appeals.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41139

LAZARO LLANES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LARRY H. MILLER CASA CHRYSLER,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

Daniel E. Ramczyk, District Court Judge

Lazaro Llanes

Albuquerque, NM

Pro Se Appellant

Snell & Wilmer LLP

Todd E. Rinner

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

YOHALEM, Judge.

{1} Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, appeals the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Defendant. In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we proposed to 

summarily affirm. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, and Defendant filed a 

memorandum in support, both of which we have duly considered. Remaining 

unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition, we affirm. 

{2} In his memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff maintains that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment. [MIO 1-2] Plaintiff has failed, however, to assert any 
new facts, law, or argument that persuade this Court that our notice of proposed 

disposition was erroneous. See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 

754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, 

the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors 

in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421, 759 P.2d 

1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come 

forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier 

arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3, 297 P.3d 374. We therefore refer 

Plaintiff to our analysis contained therein.

{3} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and 

herein, we affirm.

{4} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

WE CONCUR:

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge
<PAGE>   1

                                                               EXHIBIT 23.1

                         [GRANT THORNTON LETTERHEAD]



We have issued our reports dated November 2, 1995 accompanying the consolidated
financial statements incorporated by reference or included in the Annual Report
of Microdyne Corporation on Form 10-K for the year ended October 1, 1995. We
hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the
Registration Statements of Microdyne Corporation on Forms S-8 (dated December
27, 1991, February 28, 1992, May 6, 1992, and March 3, 1995).

        /s/ GRANT THORNTON
        ------------------

Vienna, Virginia
December 22, 1995
United States Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For:

Montana

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international system of units (SI), documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented measurement procedures, successfully 

completed training and proficiency tests, documented calibration intervals, submitted a quality management system, and 

demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate.

The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State 

Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. 

Scope

(Rev.: September 2021)

Mass Echelon III

25 kg to 1 mg

2500 lb to 0.001 lb

8 oz to 0.03125 oz

Weight Carts

5000 lb to 2000 lb

2023

____________________________________

Katrice Lipa, Chief

NIST Office of Weights and Measures

Effective Dates: 2023-02-01 to 2024-02-01
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O . 09
- 20
- 00265
- CV

__________________ IN RE COMMITMENT OF THOMAS RAY PILGRIM

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 435 th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 14
- 05
- 04994
- CV

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Thomas Ray Pilgrim was civilly committed for sex offender treatment as a sexually violent predator. See In re Commitment of Pilgrim , No. 09

- 14

- 00528

- CV, 2015 WL 3897877 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont June 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). On November 1 2 , 2020, Pilgrim filed a pro se notice of appeal with the Montgomery County District Clerk appealing an order signed on October 7, 2020, that denied his request for removal to less restrictive housing and supervision

. We questioned our jurisdiction over this appeal, and both parties filed responses. Generally, the trial court retains jurisdiction while the commitment order remains in effect, and we lack appellate jurisdiction when a committed person is still2 under the trial court’s supervision and when the trial court does not make an otherwise interlocutory order appealable

. See In re Commitment of Cortez , 405 S.W.3d 929, 932 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2013, no pet.). Pilgrim has not identified a signed order by the trial court that is appealable at this time. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 4 3

. 2 (f).
APPE AL DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM

Submitted on December 16 , 2020 Opinion Delivered December 17 , 2020 Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.