J-S33023-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROSHA CHARLES WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 1350 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001615-2006

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2016

Appellant, Rosha Charles Williams, appeals pro se from the order 

entered on August 12, 2015, which dismissed his fourth petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. We affirm.

In 2006, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession of a 

controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended 

license.1 Appellant was found guilty of these charges and, on May 24, 2007, 

Appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of three to eight years 

in prison. On August 4, 2010, an en banc panel of this Court affirmed 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a), 

respectively.
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Appellant’s judgment of sentence and, on March 29, 2011, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa. 2011).

On April 29, 2011, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. Following the 

appointment of counsel, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on 

October 28, 2011. This Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order on May 17, 

2012. Commonwealth v. Williams, 50 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum).

In the ensuing years, Appellant filed multiple pro se papers in the 

court of common pleas, along with (at least) two additional pro se PCRA 

petitions. All of Appellant’s attempts for relief were denied.

On April 16, 2015, Appellant filed the current PCRA petition in the 

court of common pleas. On April 29, 2015, the PCRA court provided 

Appellant with notice that it intended to dismiss the PCRA petition, as it was 

untimely and Appellant failed to plead any exception to the PCRA’s one-year 

time-bar. PCRA Court Order, 4/29/15, at 1. The PCRA court finally 

dismissed Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition on August 12, 2015. PCRA Court 

Order, 8/12/15, at 1. 

Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s 

August 12, 2015 order. We now affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s patently 

untimely, serial PCRA petition.
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The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited 

statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition, 

including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the 

date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the] 

petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the 

timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 

947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, 

since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, 

we are required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are 

able to consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 

731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:

the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from 

considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)

(stating that “given the fact that the PCRA's timeliness 

requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no 

court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach 

the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is 

filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 

737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a 

petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this 

Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] also held that even where 

the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the 

PCRA timing mandate, th[e court would] consider the issue 

sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our 

subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested 

relief.

Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003).
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In the case at bar, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 

2011, when his time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1). As Appellant did 

not file his current petition until April 16, 2015, the current petition is 

manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead and 

prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar 

applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. 

Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a 

statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the 

petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements of the relied-upon 

exception).

Appellant did not properly plead any exception to the PCRA’s one-year 

time-bar. Thus, Appellant’s petition is time-barred and our “courts are 

without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). Therefore, we affirm the 

PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition without a 

hearing.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2016