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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41462

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN A. COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Opinion No. 108

Filed: December 19, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Melissa Moody, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to seal court record, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge

Jonathan A. Collins appeals from the order of the district court denying Collins’ motion 

to seal his court record. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Collins was charged by criminal complaint with lewd conduct with a minor child under 

sixteen after a three-year-old child allegedly told her mother that Collins touched her 

inappropriately. After Collins waived a preliminary hearing, an information was filed alleging 

lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. Collins subsequently moved to suppress 

statements made by him, including statements during a police interview, alleging that the 

statements were coerced and made in violation of Miranda.

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 Prior to a hearing on the motion to 

 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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suppress, Collins filed a notice of intent to use evidence that would be subject to Idaho Rule of 

Evidence 404(b). Specifically, the Rule 404(b) evidence was that the child’s mother had made a 

false statement after she committed the offenses of driving under the influence and leaving the 

scene of an accident. More importantly, there was also evidence that the mother had filed a false 

police report, claiming she had been kidnapped and raped. A day before the hearing on the 

motion to suppress, the State filed a motion to dismiss because, “In the interest of justice, the 

State no longer wishes to proceed with this matter.” The court entered an order dismissing the 

charge.

More than eighteen months after the lewd conduct charge was dismissed, Collins filed a 

motion to seal the court record. See Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i) (providing authority 

for a court to seal a record). Collins averred that he had been denied employment on two 

occasions due to public access to the case, that he feared parolees and probationers with whom 

he attended meetings could harm him if they discovered the charge, and that the court record 

contained statements that may be libelous. The district court conducted a hearing at which 

Collins rested on his brief and the State deferred to the court. After stating that it was a “very, 

very close call,” the court found that the public interest in disclosure outweighed Collins’ 

interests in having the court record sealed. However, the court noted that it would reconsider its 

ruling if Collins could show evidence that the prosecution had filed the charge in bad faith or for 

an improper purpose, or that probable cause did not exist at the time the charge was filed. The 

court subsequently entered an order summarizing its discussion at the hearing and denying the 

motion to seal. Collins appeals from this order.

II.

ANALYSIS

Under Idaho’s public records law, “[e]very person has a right to examine and take a copy 

of any public record of this state and there is a presumption that all public records in Idaho are 

open at all reasonable times for inspection except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.” 

Idaho Code § 9-338(1). However, section 9-340A(2) recognizes that records contained in court 

files of judicial proceedings may be exempted from disclosure, under rules promulgated by the 

Idaho Supreme Court. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Idaho Court Administrative 

Rule 32 to define when public access to judicial records may be denied. Doe v. State, 153 Idaho 
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685, 687, 290 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Ct. App. 2012). This Court recently explained the policy behind 

Rule 32:

Rule 32 reflects the recognized policy that “the public has a right to 

examine and copy the judicial department’s declarations of law and public policy 

and to examine and copy the records of all proceedings open to the public” 

consistent with the public’s constitutional right to know what transpires in 

criminal proceedings. Indeed, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, 

“[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 

information from which members of the public may draw.” Richmond 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-56 (1980) (quoting First Nat’l 

Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). In the context of criminal 

proceedings, the public has a right, protected by the First Amendment, to know 

what goes on in its courts. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.

Striking a balance between the public’s constitutional right to access 

criminal records and the privacy rights of individuals, Rule 32 exempts from 

disclosure highly private information such as presentence investigations reports, 

most unreturned warrants, documents that would identify jurors on a Grand Jury, 

and jury questionnaires.

State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 336, 325 P.3d 673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014). 

Under Rule 32(i), any interested person may move the court to seal a part of or all of the 

record in any judicial proceeding. Rule 32(i) requires that the court conduct a hearing on the 

motion. In ruling upon the motion, the court must “determine and make a finding of fact as to 

whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates.” I.C.A.R. 32(i). A party 

seeking to seal the record bears the burden of demonstrating that the party’s privacy interest 

predominates over the public interest in disclosure. See State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504 n.1, 

272 P.3d 474, 476 n.1 (2012). For the court to seal the court record, the court must first make 

one or more of the following determinations in writing:

(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or 

statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a 

reasonable person, or 

(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the 

court finds might be libelous, or 

(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the 

dissemination or publication of which may compromise the financial security of, 

or could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to, a person 

having an interest in the documents or materials, or compromise the security of 

personnel, records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or 

(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might 

threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or
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(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or 

materials to preserve the right to a fair trial.

I.C.A.R. 32(i). When the court is considering whether to seal the record, Rule 32(i) directs the 

court to consider “the traditional legal concepts in the law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of 

privacy, defamation, and invasion of proprietary business records as well as common sense 

respect for shielding highly intimate material about persons.” Id. If the court seals the record, “it 

must fashion the least restrictive exception from disclosure consistent with privacy interests.” Id. 

We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny relief under Rule 32(i) for an 

abuse of discretion. Gurney, 152 Idaho at 503, 272 P.3d at 475; Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 

P.3d at 677. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 

court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 

of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Gurney, 

152 Idaho at 503, 272 P.3d at 475; State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 

(1989).

On appeal, Collins argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion to seal because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. 

Specifically, Collins contends that the district court did not consider that the documents or 

material in Collins’ court record contain facts or statements that might be libelous. Collins also 

asserts that the court did not adequately consider the financial loss suffered by him. Finally, 

Collins argues that the district court did not adequately consider that public access to the court 

record may threaten his safety. We address these in turn.

A. Libelous Statements

Collins contends that the district court did not consider that the documents or materials in 

Collins’ court record contain facts or statements that might be libelous. See I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2). 

Specifically, Collins asserts that the child’s mother had a history of lying to police and her 

history “indicates that she was also lying about Collins’ alleged lewd conduct.” The State argues 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion because even if the mother lied before, it does 

not mean that she lied about this charge. In addition, the State refers this Court to statements 
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Collins made during a police interview in which he acknowledged touching the child’s genitalia, 

over the child’s clothing.

During a recorded police interview, Collins acknowledged touching the child’s genitalia, 

over the child’s clothing, for a second. Collins even demonstrated on a doll how he touched the 

child, and he stated that after he touched the child, he thought to himself, “Oh sh*t, that 

shouldn’t have happened.” The recorded police interview was included on a DVD that was 

attached to Collins’ memorandum in support of his motion to suppress or dismiss. However, the 

motion to suppress or dismiss argued that the statements were coerced, not consensual, and made 

in violation of Miranda. Although a hearing was scheduled on this motion, the hearing never 

occurred because the State moved to dismiss the case prior to the hearing.

In considering a party’s privacy interest and comparing it to the public’s interest in 

disclosure, and determining whether to seal the record, the court considering the motion to seal 

must examine the court record in conjunction with the motion and any argument or evidence 

presented at the hearing. Because Collins specifically moved the court to seal the record while 

contending that the record contained libelous statements, the entire record is relevant to 

considering whether the statements are libelous. In this case, Collins’ statements during the 

police interview, which are a part of the court record, acknowledging that he inappropriately 

touched the child indicate that the record does not contain libelous statements from the mother. 

Because Collins has not shown that there is any libelous information in his court record, we 

cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in considering Collins’ argument about the 

court record containing libelous statements. See Allen, 156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at 678 

(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Allen’s motion to seal 

his court record because he “failed to show, either to the district court or on this appeal, that there 

is any libelous information in his criminal file”). 

B. Financial Loss

Collins also asserts that the court did not adequately consider the financial loss suffered 

by him. In his motion, Collins asserted that two prospective employers had denied him 

employment because of “his association” with this case “due to public access to this case on the 

repository.” See I.C.A.R. 32(i)(3). Because of this financial loss, Collins contends on appeal 

that the court should have sealed the record. The State argues that the court did not abuse its 
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discretion, contending that Collins has simply asserted that the district court did not give his 

financial loss argument the weight Collins’ desires. 

Relevant to this issue, two facts weigh in favor of Collins’ privacy interest. Unlike other 

Rule 32(i) appeals that have arisen with claims that the party’s financial loss should be 

considered, this case does not involve a conviction, but involves a dismissal of the charge prior 

to trial. In addition, Collins alleged that his financial loss was due to the public access to the 

repository data, implying that if the record was sealed (and thus no longer available in the 

repository) he would not have been denied employment. The dismissal and Collins’ assertion of 

financial loss weigh in favor of his privacy interest. Compare Doe, 153 Idaho at 690, 290 P.3d at 

1282 (recognizing that Doe’s claim of financial loss--that his current employer’s clients refused 

to allow him to work on their projects when background checks revealed that he was a convicted 

felon--should have been considered by the district court and weighed against the public interest 

in disclosure), with Allen, 156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at 678 (addressing Allen’s claim that his 

felony conviction made it more difficult for him to obtain employment and concluding that Allen 

“did not, however, explain how the sealing of his record would make any difference”). 

Even though Collins asserted facts that weigh in favor of his privacy interest, one other 

significant fact weighs against Collins’ privacy interest and weighs in favor of the public’s 

interest in disclosure. This is the fact that Collins acknowledged during the police interview that 

he had inappropriately touched the child. With this fact, we are persuaded that the district court 

adequately considered and weighed Collins’ privacy interest while accounting for the financial 

loss suffered by Collins, as compared to the public interest in disclosure.

C. Safety

Finally, Collins argues that the district court did not adequately consider that public 

access to the court record may threaten his safety. See I.C.A.R. 32(i)(4). Specifically, Collins 

asserted in his motion that he “regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous with parolees and 

probationers who[m], he fears, could harm him if they were to discover he had once been

charged with a sex offense.” The State argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying the motion to seal, because Collins’ assertion is mere speculation and because the 

district court adequately considered Collins’ privacy interest.

Collins did not provide evidence of or assert that he had actually suffered harm as a result 

of the court record nor demonstrate a credible threat to his safety due to the court record. Rather, 
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Collins only speculated on what may happen to him, without any basis in fact. This argument is 

too speculative to warrant any relief under Rule 32(i). Moreover, even if the argument were to 

weigh in favor of Collins’ privacy interest, this privacy interest is outweighed by the public 

interest in disclosure due to Collins’ statements acknowledging that he inappropriately touched 

the child. Therefore, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in considering 

Collins’ argument concerning his safety.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collins’ motion to seal the court 

record. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Collins’ motion to seal the court record.

Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON, CONCUR.