MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 23 Docket: Lin

- 18

- 38 Argued : October	11,	2018 Decided: February	12,	2019
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

GUARDIANSHIP	OF	PATRICIA	S.

HJELM ,	J. [¶1] Michael Zani and	Peter	Zani appeal	from a judgment issued	by the Lincoln	 County	 Probate	 Court	 ( Avantaggio,	 J. ) denying	 their	 petition	 to	 be appointed	 co

- guardians	 of	 their	 mother, Patricia	 S., who	 is	 an	 incapacitated adult,	and	instead appointing Kar i n	Beaster	and	Nancy	Carter	as co - guardians even	 though	Beaster	and	Carter	had	not	 filed	petitions	 to	be	appointed

. The
Zanis contend that the	court	erred by (1) appointing	Beaster	and	Carter when they	 had	 not	 complied	 with	 the	 statutory	 requirements applicable	 to	 a guardian ship	 petition , see 18

- A M.R.S.	 §	 5

- 303(a)	 (2017) ; 1 ( 2 ) not	 giving the Zanis	priority	for	appointment as	guardians pursuant	to 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 311(b) (2017) ;	 and ( 3 )	 determining	 that	 appointment	 of	 Beaster	 and	 Carter	 as

co - guardians	 is	 in	 the	 mother’s	 best	 interest

. We vacate	 the	 judgment	 and

1 Effective	July	1,	2019,	the	current	Probate	Code	found	in	T itle	18

- A will be	repealed in	its	entirety and	replaced	with	a	new	Probate	Code to	be codified	in T itle	18

- C. See P.L.	2017,	ch.	402. All	citations in this	opinion are	to	the	Code	currently	in	effect.2 remand	for	further	proceedings	because	Beaster	and	Carter	had	not	fulfilled the pretrial	 filing requirements of section 5

- 303

. In	 the	 interest	 of	 judicial economy,	we	also	address	the	Zanis’	claim	of	statutory	priority.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	following fact s are set	out in	the	procedural record	and	in	the court’s	 findings ,	 which	 were	 issued after	 a	 testimonial	 hearing and are supported	 by	 competent	 record	 evidence. See Oliver v. E. Me. Med. Ctr. , 2018 ME 123, ¶ 2, 193 A.3d 157

. [¶ 3 ] As	all	parties agree,	t he	Zanis’	mother

— in	significant	part	because of	the	complexity	of	care	she	needs

— is	incapacitated	to a	degree that	supports the	appointment	of	a	guardian. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§ 5

- 101 (1 ) ,	(2) (2017)

. The Zani s both	 reside	 in	 California. Although	 t hey	 are “ accomplished	 and	 competent professionals	who	are	concerned	for	their	mother’s	best	interest s , ” they have been	largely	estranged from	their	mother for	a	significant	period.		Since	1979,
Michael	 has only had	 infrequent	 contact	 with his	 mother , and there	 was	 a
twelve

- year	period when	they	had no	contact	at	all. Michael has	organized	and overseen	the	care	provided	to	his	mother , but his phone	conversations with his
mother are	 difficult and often	 end	 with	 the	 mother	 becoming	 upset	 and
stressed to	 the point that she requires	 medication. Peter ’s	 contact	 with	 his3 mother	has	been	very	limited

— he last	saw	his	mother	in	2010,	and	before	that,
in	1991

— and	she	has	told	him	“not	to	come”	to	see	her. Peter ’s	involvement	in
his	mother’s	care	has been	limited	to talking with	Michael	about it

. [¶ 4 ] The	Zanis vetted	and	hired Beaster	and	Carter	to	assist	the	mother

. Beaster	has	a	degree	in	geriatric	social	work,	is	a	crisis	responder,	and	has	been involved	in	hospice	care	and	private	duty	care	fo r	approximately	fifteen	years

. S he	has	been	“an	integral	part”	of	the	team	caring	for the	mother since	March
of 2017 , and , among other things ,	 oversees	 the	 administration	 of	 all
medication s prescribed	to the	mother

. Carter	has	worked	for the	mother for more	 than	 five	 years and provid es hands

- on, in

- home	 care

. Carter is responsible	 for scheduling	 the	 staff that provide s the	 mother	 with
around

- the

- clock	care

. Beaster	and	Carter have nearly	daily	contact	with the
mother , and each	has spent	more	time	with	her	in recent months	than	both	of the	Zanis	have	in	years. The	mother	considers	both	Beaster	and	Carter	to	be
her	 friends

— they	know	her well , and she trust s them

. The	mother	has	been consistently	and	increasingly	opposed	to	the	appo intment	of	her	sons to	be her guardians	since	October	of	2017 ,	which	was	two	months	before	the	hearing	was
held

.4 [¶ 5 ] In	August	of 2017,	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services filed	a	petition	seeking the	appoint ment	of the	mother’s	adult	stepson as her guardian	 and	 conservator. See 18

- A M.R.S.	 §	 5

- 303(a)

. In	 support	 of	 the petition, the	 Department	 submitted	 reports prepared	 by a	 primary	 care provider	and	a	psychiatrist,	who	had	each	examined	the	mother	and	concluded that	 she	 was	 incapacitated. On	 the	 Department’s	 request	 for	 the	 court	 to appoint	 a	 temporary	 guardian, the	 court	 held	 an	 expedited	 hearing	 and appointed	 the	 stepson	 as	 temporary	 guardian

. See 18

- A M.R.S.	 § 5

- 310

- A(a) (2017)

. The	 court	 also	 appointed	 a	 guardian	 ad	 litem for	 the	 mother. See
18

- A M.R.S.	§ 5

- 303(b) (2017)

. [¶ 6 ] The	 Zanis	 opposed	 the	 Department’s	 petition	 and	 filed	 a

cross - petition	 to	be	appointed	permanent	co

- guardians. Prior	 to the hearing on	 the	 guardianship	 petitions filed	 by	 the	Department	 and	 by	 the Zanis,	 the Department’s	nomination	of	the	mother’s	stepson	as	guardian	was	withdrawn, leaving	only	 the	Zanis’	petition	 to	be	adjudicated. 2 Although	 the	Department subsequently	 took	 the	 position	 that	 Beaster	 and	 Carter	 should	 be	 appointed

2 Also	prior	 to	 the	hearing,	 the	parties	stipulated	 to	 the	appointment	 of	a	third	person	as	 the mother’s	conservator. 18

- A	M.R.S.	 §	5

- 410(a)	(2017)

. The conservatorship	is	not	at	issue	in	 this appeal.5

co - guardians,	 the Department	 did	 not	 file	 a	 new	 or	 amended	 petition nominating	them ,	and Beaster	and	Carter did	not	file	petition s on	their	own

. [¶ 7 ] I n	December	of 2017,	 the	court	held	a	contested	 full

- day	hearing , where	the	mother ,	the	Zanis,	and	the	Department were represented	by	counsel

. T he	court	heard	testimony	from Michael Zani , Peter Zani , t he	mother, Beaster, Carter,	 and the GAL

. During	 her	 testimony,	 the	 mother	 confirmed that	 she
wanted Beaster	and	Carter to be	appointed	her	co

- guardians , and	Beaster	and
Carter both testified	that	they	were	willing	to	be	appointed	to	that	position

. [¶ 8 ] At	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 hearing,	 the	 court	 directed the	mother’s attorney	to	file	acceptances	of	appointment and a guardianship	plan	on	behalf
of	Beast er	and	Carter , see 18

- A	M.R.S.	§ § 5

- 303(a), 5

- 305	(2017) ,	and they	did
so	 two	 weeks	 later. The	 Zanis	 objected	 and	 moved	 to	 strike	 the	 filings

— a motion	the	court	later	denied

— and	in	their	written	summation	they objected

to the appointment of Beaster and Carter on the merits. [¶ 9 ] I n early January of 2018,	the	court	entered	a	judgment	appointing
Beaster	and	Carter	as the	mother’ s	co - guardians after	determining	 that	 their appointment wa s	in the	mother’s best	interest because	they	are	“trusted	and qualified”	and	had	been	chosen	by	the	Zanis themselves to	serve	as	the	mother’s caregivers

. The	court also concluded ,	for	several	reasons	it	articulated in	both6 its	 judgment	 and	 an	 order	 on	 the	 Zanis’	 motion	 for	 further	 find ings, see
18

- A M.R.S.	§	5

- 304(c)	(2017) , that	it wa s	not	in the	mother’s best	interest	to
have	Michael Zani or	Peter Zani, either individually	 or	jointly, appointed	her guardian or	co - guardians

. T he	Zanis filed	a timely	appeal	to	us. See 18

- A	M.R.S. § 1

- 308	(2017) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(2)(B)

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 0 ] T he	Zanis argue on	appeal that the	court	erred by (1) appoint ing
Beaster	 and	 Carter	 as	 co

- guardians because	 they	 had	 not	 filed nominating petitions,	guardianship	plans,	or	acceptances	prior	to the hearin g ; ( 2 )	not	giving the	 Zanis,	 as	 the	 mother’s	 adult	 children, priority	 for	 appointment ;	 and ( 3 ) determining	that	the	appointment	of	Beaster	and	Carter	is	in	the	mother’s
best interest

. Fo r	the	reasons	discussed	below, we	vacate	the	judgment	based

on the	 first	 of	 these	 challenges

— the	 procedural	 deficiencies	 affecting	 the
court’s	consideration of	Beaster	and	Carter as	possible	guardians .		In order	to
promote judicial	 economy	 and efficiency	 in	 the	 ultimate	 resolution	 of	 this

matter ,	we	also	address	the	Zanis’	assertion	that	they	are	entitled	to	statutory priority	over	Beaster	and	Carter

. 3

3 Because	additional	evidence	may	be	presented	to	the	court	on	remand,	we	do	not	address	the sufficiency	of	the	present	record	to	support	the	court’s	best

- interest	determination.7
A. Guardianship Petition	Procedure [¶ 1 1] The	central	question	presented	on	this	appeal	is	whether, during
the	course	of a	proceeding on	a	petition	for	appointment ,	the	court	is statutorily authorized	 to	 appoint as	 guardian a third	 party who has	 not	 satisfied	 the requirements	that	the	petitioning party	him	or	herself must	satisfy

. This	calls
for	us	to	construe 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 311(a)	(2017), which	states	in pertinent part
that “[a]ny	 competent	 person	 or	 a	 suitable	 institution	 may	 be	 appointed guardian	of	an	incapacitated	person

. ” The	court concluded	that the	breadth	of the	phrase	“[a]ny	competent	person”	means	that	the person	who	is	ultimately appointed to	 be guardian	 need	 not	 have	 filed	 the material required	 of	 the original	petitioner .		We	disagree. [¶1 2 ] “Statutory	 construction	 is	 a	 quest ion	 of	 law	 that	 we	 consider
de novo
. ” Guardianship	of	Thayer ,	2016	ME	52,	¶	13,	136	A.3d	349

. Our “single goal”	in	interpreting	a	statute	is	to	give	effect	to	legislative	intent. Dickau	v.	Vt

. Mut.	Ins.	Co. ,	2014	ME	158,	¶	19,	107	A.3d	621

. To determine legislative intent,

we first determine if the statute’s language is “plain and unambiguous.” Id. If

so, we construe it according to that plain and unambiguous meaning. State	v.
Mourino ,	2014	ME	131,	¶	8,	104	A.3d	893

. If , however, “ the statutory language
is ambiguous, meaning that it is reasonably susceptible to multiple8 interpretations, or is silent on a particular point, we will then consider other
indicia of legislative intent including the purpose of the statute.” Davis v.
McGui re , 2018 ME 72, ¶ 17, 186 A.3d 837 (quotation marks omitted ); see also Thayer , 2016 ME 52, ¶ 13, 136 A.3d 349 ( stating that we must “consider the provision at issue in light of the entire relevant statutory scheme in order to
arrive at a harmonious result” (quotation marks omitted ) ) ; Adoption	 of
Tobias D. ,	 2012	 ME	 45,	 ¶	 15 ,	 40	 A.3d	 990

. W e construe the Probate Code liberally so as to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which include,
among others, simplifying and clarifying the law that affects the affairs of incapacitated persons
. S ee 18

- A M.R.S. § 1

- 102(a) , (b)(1) (2017)

. [¶1 3 ] The	reference	in	section	5

- 311(a)	to	“[a]ny competent person”	is ambiguous.	 	 Taken	 in	 isolation,	 that	 phrase	 could	 be	 read

— as	 the	 court	 did
here

— to	 include even a	 person	 who	 has	 not	 filed	 a	 petition and	 the accompanying material otherwise	 required to	be	appointed	guardian.		When viewed	in	the	context	of	the	full	statutory	framework	governing	the	process	by which	 guardians	 are	 appointed,	 however,	 the	 statute	 may	 a lso	 be	 construed more	 restrictively	 so	 as	 to	 limit	 those	 persons	 or	 institutions	 the	 court	 can appoint	 to	 those	 who	 have	 complied	 with	 the statutory pre - adjudicatory

process imposed	 on formal	 guardian applicants .	 	 Based	 on	 the	 procedural9 predicate s to	the	appointment	of	a	guardian,	we	conclude	that	the	Probate	Code authorizes	 the	court	 to	appoint	as	guardian	only	a	person	who	has	complied with	 the	 statutory filing requirements	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 other	 interested persons	 a	meaningful	 opportunity	 to be	 heard at	 trial and	 that	 provides	 the court	 with	 important pretrial information	 about	 the	 prospective	 guardian’s comprehensive plan	for	the incapacitated	person

. [¶1 4 ] W e	begin	with	the	fundamental	notion	that	the	appointment	of	a guardian	 affects	 the incapacitated	 person’s	 fundamental	 liberties. Oliver , 2018 ME	123,	¶	28, 193	A.3d	157 ; see also Guardianship of Helen F. , 2013 ME 18, ¶ 4, 60 A.3d 786

. In	recognition	of	that ,	t he	Probate	Code prescribes	a	series	of procedural	steps that operate	to safeguard	th ose fundamental	liberty	interests

. S ee 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 303; Guardianship	of	Hughes ,	1998	ME	186,	¶¶ 9,	13

- 14 ,	715
A.2d	919

. [¶1 5 ] For a	guardianship to	be	established , “[t]he	incapacitated	person or	any	person	interested	in	his	welfare	may petition	for	a	finding	of	incapacity and	appointment	of	a	guardian.” 4 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 303(a). Unless	the	allegedly incapacitated	person	is	already	represented	by counsel ,	the	court	is	required	to appoint “one	or	more	of” a	visitor,	a GAL , or an	attorney to	represent	her in	the

4 “Petition”	is	defined	as “a	written	request	to	the	court	for	an	order	after	notice.” 18

- A M.R.S. § 1

- 201(31) (2017)

.10 proceeding .		18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 303(b).		Upon	the	filing	of	a	petition,	the P robate
C ourt	 must	 schedule	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 incapacity, id. ,	 and	 at	 least fourteen	 days’	 notice	 of	 the	 hearing	 is	 to	 be	 provided	 to	 the	 reportedly incapacitated	person	and	that	person’s	adult	children, 18

- A M.R.S.	§	5

- 309(a), (c)	(2017 )

. 5 [¶1 6 ] The	Probate	Code	 also	 requires a prospective	guardian	 to	 file a guard ianship	 plan and	 a	 series	 of	 reports	 relating	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 the allegedly	incapacitated person .		As	to	the former , the	statute	provides: The	person	nominated	to	serve	as	guardian	shall	file	a	plan	which, where	 relevant,	 shall	 include,	 but	 not	 be	 limited	 to,	 the	 type	 of proposed	 living	 arrangement	 for	 the	 ward,	 how	 the	 ward’s financial	 needs	 will	 be	 met,	 how	 the	 ward’s	 medical	 and	 other reme dial	needs	will	be	met,	how	the	ward’s	social	needs	will	be	met and	 a	 plan	 for	 the	 ward’s	 continuing	 contact	 with	 relatives	 and friends.
18

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 5

- 303(a). Regarding	 the	 reports,	 t he	 allegedly	 incapacitated person	must	be	examined	by	a	physician	or licensed	psychologist , who must
then submit	a written report	to	the	court. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 303(b). Additionally, an	 appointed visitor	 or GAL is	 required	 to interview both the	 allegedly

5 A s	a	condition	to	the	appointment,	the nominated guardian	is	required	to	execute	an	acceptance, by	which	the	guardian	submits	to	the	court’s	jurisdiction	in	any matter	related	to	the	guardianship. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 305 (2017)

. As	we	note	above, see	supra ¶ 8 ,	this	was	one	of	the	instruments	that, after	the	hearing	was	completed,	the	court	directed	Beaster	and	Carter	to	file.11 incapacitated	 person	 and	 the petitioner , and submit	 a written report to	 the
court.		18

- A	M.R.S.	§ 5

- 303(c) (2017)

. “E xcept	as	otherwise	provided	by	law,	all reports	and	plans	required	by	this	section	shall	be	submitted	to	the	court,	and all	 parties	 of	 record,	 at	 least	 10	 days	 before	 any	 hearing	 on	 the	 petition.”
18

- A M.R .S.	§ 5

- 303(d) (2017)

. [¶1 7 ] These	 procedural	 requirements	 have	 two	 primary	 effects	 in anticipation	 of	 the	 guardianship	 hearing	 conducted	 by	 the	 court.	 	 First, the
reports of the evaluations required by section 5

- 303 provide the participants
and the court with information about the circumstances and needs of the allegedly incapacitated person. Second

— and importantly here

— the comprehensive guardianship plan allows the participants and, ultimately, the

court to assess the adequacy of the prospective guardia n’s proposals to meet
those reported needs. The overall effect of the pretrial guardianship process therefore is to provide important information to the participants

— including
the allegedly incapacitated person — and to the court , to allow an appropriate
and thorough consideration and adjudication of the substantial interests at
stake in a guardianship proceeding. [¶1 8 ] Here,	prior	 to	 the	guardianship	 hearing,	 reports	were	 filed	by	a physician ,	 a	psychologist, and	 the GAL ,	 thereby	meeting	 those	aspects	 o f	 the12 statutory	process. The	requirement	of	a guardianship plan	was	not	satisfied, however,	 because even	 though	 the	 court	 ultimately	 appointed Beaster	 and
Carter to	serve	as	co

- guardians, they had not submitted such	a	plan,	much	less even	 a	 petition	 for the	 court	 to	 appoint	 them	 as	 guardians

. See 18

- A	 M.R.S. § 5

- 303(a)

. It	appears	 that	b y the time the hearing was held, the Zanis were

aware that their mother opposed their petition to be appointed her

co - guardians

. 6 Further, the GAL did	speak	with	Beaster	and	Carter	in	preparing his	report,	and Beaster and Carter both testified at the hearing

. Nonetheless,
Beaster and Carter had no t filed a plan describing how they proposed to care for the mother , meet the mother’s social needs , and address the other issues
that the Legislature requires a prospective guardian to articulate. Rather, the statutorily mandated plan was not filed until the court directed Beaster an d
Carter to do so after the hearing

— too late for the Zanis to develop evidence or otherwise respond to it in an evidentiary setting

. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§ 5

- 309(a),	(c). [¶1 9 ] Each	 of	 the	 procedural	 requirements that may lead	 to	 the appointment	 of	 a	 guardian promotes	 the	 overall	 purpo se	 of	 guardianship

6 Beaster	testified	that	in	October

— two	months	before	the	hearing

— the	mother	had	told	her	that she	did	not	want	Michael	Zani	to	be	appointed	as	her	guardian	and	instead	wanted	Beaster	and	Carter to	serve	as	guardians.		She	also	testified	that	a s	late	as	se veral	days before	the	hearing,	the	difficult relationship	between	Michael	Zani	and	the	mother	created	such	significant	problems	in	her	ability	to care	for	the	mother	that	she	had	reservations	about	her	willingness	to	be	appointed.13 proceedings

— providing	 “for	 the	 care	 of	 persons	 who	 are	 unable	 to	 care	 for themselves,”	Hunt, Maine	Probate	Law Part	3	at	252	(1999) ,	and accounting	for the	 person’s	 best	 interest, 18

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 5

- 311(b) ,	 while	 also maintaining sensitivity	 to	 the	 person’s	 autonomy	 to	 the	 extent	 allowed	 by	 the	 person’s circumstances, see Oliver , 2018 ME 123, ¶ 32, 193	A.3d	157 (noting that the limiting language of 5

- 304(a) is directed to the court’s exercise of authority in setting the terms of a guardianship in a way that does not interfere with an individual’s autonomy); see	 also Guardianship of Collier , 653 A.2d 898, 902 (Me. 1995) (stating that the appointment of a full guardian “should not be done
without careful consideration of the prospective ward’s specific needs”). As a central element of t he legislatively prescribed process that can result in the imposition of a guardianship, the prospective guardian must submit a plan of

care for the allegedly incapacitated person. See 18

- A	M.R.S.	 § 5

- 303(a)

. T he

persons whom the court ultimately appointed co - guardians did not do that
here

. As	 a	 result,	 t h e post	 hoc	 process used	 instead	 by	 the	 court to fill this

p rocedural void deprived	the	Zanis	of	a	meaningful	opportunity	to	be	heard	on
the	merits	of Beaster	and	Carter’s undocumented	interest and	willingness	to be appointed	co

- guardians	and	the nature	of	their plan	of	care	for	the	mother.14 [¶ 20 ] We	therefore	vacate	the	judgment	and	remand	this	action	for	the

court to hold	a	hearing that	will allow	the	parties	to augment	the	record on	the

matters generated	by	the	plan	submitted	post

- trial	by	Beaster	and	Carter

. B. Statutory Priority	of	Guardians [¶ 2 1] Although	we	vacate	the	judgment	for	the	reason	discussed	above, in	the	interest	of	judicial	economy we	proceed	to address the	Zanis’	contention
that the	court also erred	by	 failing	 to	give them,	 as	 the	 adult	children	 of	 the incapacitated	person, priority	for	appointment	pursuant	to	section	5

- 311

— an issue	 that the	 parties	 have	 fully	 briefed	 and	 argued

. Clark	 v.	 Int ’ l	 Paper	 Co. , 638 A.2d	65,	66	(Me.	1994)

. This	calls	for	us	to	interpret section	5

- 311 , which
we	do de	novo

. S ee Thayer ,	2016	ME	52, ¶	13,	136 A.3d 349

. [¶ 22 ] A s	 discussed, see supra ¶ 11 , a bsent	 some	 exceptions,	 “[a]ny
competent	person

. . . may	be	appointed	guardian	of	an	incapacitated	person.”
18

- A	M.R.S.	§	5

- 311(a)

. Section	5

- 311	goes	on	to list a	number	of groups	that are	 to	be	given	priority	when	 the	court	appoints a	guardian

. See 18

- A	M.R.S. § 5

- 311(b)

. One	 of	 th ose categories	 of persons is	 “[a]n	 adult	 child	 of	 the incapacitated	person ,”	which here would	include	either	or	both	of	the	Zanis. 7

7 The	three	categories of	people who	are	statutorily entitled	to higher	priority	than	an adult	child comprise a	person	or	institution	nominated	in	writing	by	the	incapacitated	person, t he	spouse	of	the incapacitated	 person,	 and	 the	 domestic	 partner	 of	 the	 incapacitated	 person. 18

- A	 M.R.S. § 5

- 311(b) (1)

- (2

- A) (2017)

. None	of	these	categories is pertinent	here.15
See 18

- A M.R.S.	§ 5

- 311(b) (3)

. The	plain	language	of	that	statute ,	however, also explicitly	provides that	the	court’s	application	of	any	of	these	priorities	remains “[s]ubject	 to	 a	 determination	 by	 the	 court	 of	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the incapacitated	 person.” 18

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 5

- 311(b) ; s ee	 also Hunt, Maine	 Probate
Law §	5.311	at	263	(1999)	(“The	Maine	Legislature,	deviating	slightly	from	the Uniform	 Probate	 Code	 version	 of	 this	 section,	 specifically	 provided	 an overriding	priority	that	the	appointment	made	must	be	in	the	best	interest	of the	incapacitated	 person

. . . .”). The	 unambiguous	 terms	 of	section	5

- 311(b)
undermine	the	Zanis’	assertion	to	the contrary	and	make	clear	that the	court
does not	err	as	a	matter	of	law if it appoints	as	guardian someone	who	does	not have	statutory	priority but	whose	appointment	will be in	 the	best	interest	of the	incapacitated	person

. III. CONCLUSION [¶ 23 ] In	 this	 action,	 the	 court	 acted	 with	 compassion	 and	 sensitivity toward	the	mother,	consistent	with	the	goals	of	the	Probate	Code. The	court erred,	however,	by	not	allowing	additional	process	generated	by	Beaster	and Carter’s	 post

- trial	 submission of	 a	 guardianship	 plan

— a	 document	 that, pursuant	 to	 statute,	 should	 have	 been	 filed	 before	 the	 hearing ,	 given	 that Beaster	and	Carter	presented	 them selves	a s candidates	 for	appointment	and16 that	the	court	ultimately	appointed	them	as	co

- guardians .		We	therefore	vacate the	judgment	and	remand	for	further	proceedings	consistent	with	this o pinion,
see	supra ¶ 20. The	entry	is: Judgment	 vacated

. Remanded for	 further proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion

.

Sarah	 I.	 Gilbert,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 and	 Laura	 P.	 Shaw,	 Esq.,	 Camden	 Law	 LLP, Camden,	for	appellants	Michael	Zani	and	Peter	Zani Stephen	W.	Hanscom,	Esq. (orally) ,	Hanscom,	Collins &	Hall,	P.A.,	Rockland,	for appellee	D epartment	of	Health	and	Human	Services Philip	S.	Cohen,	 Esq. (orally) ,	Cohen,	Cohen	&	Hallowell,	P.C.,	Waldoboro,	 for appellee	Patricia S.

Lincoln County	Probate	Court	docket	number	2017

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