In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN GRISANTI,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.

No. 4:16-cr-00018-TWP-VTW-1 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 22, 2019

____________________

Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Adrian Grisanti was 

convicted of child-pornography offenses and destruction of 

evidence. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm 

on both issues. We have already held that the good-faith exception applies to the same warrant at issue in this case, which 

authorized the use of a sophisticated technique to identify users of a child-pornography website. See United States 
2 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2018). Grisanti’s reasons 

for reconsidering Kienast are not persuasive. Also, his sentence was not unreasonable and the district court did not 

make any procedural error.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The Federal Bureau of Investigation gained control of a 

child-pornography website called “Playpen.” The FBI kept 

Playpen running for two weeks from a server in Newington, 

Virginia, to locate people who distributed and viewed child 

pornography on the site. Because Playpen allowed visitors to 

use it anonymously, the FBI applied to a magistrate judge in 

the Eastern District of Virginia for a warrant authorizing the 

use of a “Network Investigative Technique,” or “NIT,” to 

identify the site’s users. When a user logged into Playpen, the 

NIT installed malware on the user’s computer and relayed 

identifying information about that computer back to the FBI’s 

server in Virginia. An affidavit supporting the warrant application explained this to the magistrate judge. 

Exactly where these searches would occur was not quite 

as clear. The application said that the property to be searched 

was “located in the Eastern District of Virginia.” The application’s “Place to be Searched” addendum stated, though, that 

the NIT would be “deployed” on a server “located at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia” to obtain 

information from “activating computer[s]”—those of “any 

user” who logged into Playpen. And the supporting affidavit 

added that the NIT “would cause an activating computer—

wherever located—to send” information to the Virginia 

server. Based on these representations, the magistrate judge 

issued a warrant authorizing the use of the NIT to search 
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 3

property “located in the Eastern District of Virginia” to obtain 

information from the computers of Playpen users. 

When Grisanti logged into Playpen from his work computer in Indiana, the NIT malware was installed and sent 

identifying information to the FBI. Using that information, the 

FBI obtained additional search warrants in Indiana and found 

evidence of child pornography on Grisanti’s work computer. 

Before the FBI could complete its investigation, however, 

Grisanti learned of the inquiry. He destroyed the hard drive 

and a flash drive. He was charged in the Southern District of 

Indiana with destruction of evidence and several child-pornography offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 2252A(a)(2)(A), & 

2252A(a)(5)(B).

Grisanti moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the NIT warrant. Judge Pratt agreed with him that the 

warrant was invalid because the magistrate judge had exceeded her jurisdiction by authorizing searches outside of the 

Eastern District of Virginia, in violation of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C § 636(a)(1), and the version of Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) in effect when the warrant 

was issued in 2015. Judge Pratt denied the motion to suppress, 

however, concluding that the FBI agents had relied on the 

warrant in good faith.1

A jury found Grisanti guilty of all charges. The Presentence Report proposed a Sentencing Guideline range of 108 to 

135 months in prison. Judge Pratt later adopted that calculation without objection. In Grisanti’s sentencing memoran-

 1 As noted in Kienast, 907 F.3d at 527 n.1, Rule 41 was amended in 2016 

to permit magistrate judges to issue warrants like the NIT warrant here. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(6)(A).
4 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

dum, he requested a 78-month sentence, arguing that he had 

an “addiction” to child pornography and needed treatment. 

He also cited the “Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool,” 

the “Correlates of Admission of Sexual Interest in Children” 

assessment, and other research to argue that he is unlikely to 

recidivate because he is “white, employed, and had no previous criminal history,” and had not committed any so-called 

“contact offenses.”2

At the sentencing hearing, Grisanti’s attorney argued that 

Grisanti had “compartmentalized” his criminal behavior and 

was otherwise a “good, loving husband” and “caring employee.” The judge raised her concern that Grisanti had defended himself by blaming others and still failed to take full 

responsibility. Even though Grisanti accepted that he had “an 

addiction or a criminal problem,” the judge noted, he would 

not be able to “get better” if he refused to accept that he had 

an “issue” that “needs treatment”—he would be “just like” 

another defendant whom the judge had sentenced earlier that 

day for his second conviction for child pornography. The 

judge also questioned Grisanti’s argument about low risk of 

recidivism and specifically whether race had “anything to do 

with being a child pornographer.” The judge asked further if 

a psychologist had assessed Grisanti. Defense counsel answered that Grisanti had not been evaluated and agreed with 

 2 See Angel Wyatt Eke et al., Scoring Guide for the Child Pornography 

Offender Risk Tool (CPORT): Version 2, ResearchGate (2018); Angel Wyatt 

Eke et al., Scoring Guide for the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool 

(CPORT): Version 2, ResearchGate (2018); Michael Seto et al., Contact Sexual 

Offending by Men with Online Sexual Offenses, 23 Sexual Abuse: A Journal 

of Research & Treatment 124 (2011). 
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 5

the judge that, “for him to be in a position to not reoffend, yes, 

he has to be prepared to get help and treatment.” 

The court then heard the remainder of counsel’s arguments, Grisanti’s allocution, and the government’s argument 

for a sentence of 135 months, at the high end of the guideline 

range. The judge sentenced Grisanti to 120 months in prison. 

In explaining the decision, she emphasized the seriousness of 

the crime: Grisanti possessed more than 600 images of child 

pornography—some involving prepubescent children—and 

then destroyed the evidence to thwart the investigation. He 

knew his actions were wrong, the judge continued, but if he 

had a problem, he never sought treatment for it and instead 

blamed others when he was caught. Finally, the judge agreed 

with Grisanti that he “could fulfill much of his untapped potential and move on with his life” if he got some treatment. 

II. The Motion to Suppress and the Good-Faith Exception

The NIT warrant at issue here has led to many prosecutions and has been attacked by defendants across the country. 

Grisanti joins them, challenging the denial of his motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained through its use. He acknowledges that in United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 

2018), we held that the good-faith exception applies to agents 

who relied on this very warrant. Ten other circuits have 

agreed with that conclusion: United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 

316, 321–24 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 

118–21 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 

215–18 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 

689–91 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Ganzer, 922 F.3d 579, 

587–90 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 

967–71 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 

1051–52 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 
6 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

1109, 1117–20 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Workman, 

863 F.3d 1313, 1317–21 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Taylor, 

935 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019).

Grisanti argues, however, that the good-faith exception 

should be deemed categorically inapplicable to warrants that 

are issued “without jurisdiction” and thus, he contends, “void 

ab initio.” In Kienast, 907 F.3d at 528, we found that this argument is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), which applied the 

good-faith exception to a search based on a warrant that already had been recalled. Accord, Eldred, 933 F.3d at 120 (applying Herring to the NIT warrant); Werdene, 883 F.3d at 216 

(same); Ganzer, 922 F.3d at 587 (same); Moorehead, 912 F.3d 

at 969 (same); Horton, 863 F.3d at 1051 (same); Henderson, 

906 F.3d at 1119 (same); Workman, 863 F.3d at 1318 & n.1 

(same); Taylor, 935 F.3d at 1290–91 (same). Even if the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction or some other degree of authority to issue a warrant that reached beyond the Eastern District 

of Virginia, we must consider whether the good-faith exception applies.

“[W]hen an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted 

within its scope,” the good-faith exception generally applies 

even if the warrant turns out to be invalid. United States 

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984). Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the officer misled the issuing judge with 

knowingly false information or reckless disregard of the 

truth, or if a reasonable officer would know from the face of 

the warrant that it was invalid or that the search goes beyond 

its scope. Id. at 923; see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564–
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 7

65 & n.8 (2004) (denying officer qualified immunity where 

warrant omitted items to be seized).3

In Kienast, the defendants argued that the good-faith exception should not apply because a well-trained officer would 

have known that the magistrate judge lacked authority to authorize searches of computers across the country and therefore would have recognized that the NIT warrant was facially 

invalid. We rejected that argument. 907 F.3d at 528. Grisanti 

concedes that if the warrant invalidly authorized a nationwide search, then the magistrate judge is to blame. He argues, 

though, that the FBI is “not faultless” for having sought and 

executed such an expansive warrant “from a magistrate judge 

with limited territorial jurisdiction.” This argument, however, 

is no different from that presented in and rejected by Kienast.

Characterizing the extent of the magistrate judge’s power to 

issue the NIT warrant as an unsettled and difficult question, 

we concluded in Kienast that the FBI could have reasonably 

believed that the magistrate judge had the requisite authority. 

Specifically, because Rule 41(b)(4) permits a magistrate judge 

to authorize the installation of a “tracking device” within her 

district to track movement outside the district, so too might a 

magistrate judge be able to permit an electronic search of 

property outside the district. Id. at 529. Suppressing the evidence from the NIT warrant would be inappropriate because 

penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s arguable error rather than his own “cannot logically contribute to the 

 3 Leon also held that the good-faith exception is unavailable when the 

magistrate judge “wholly abandoned” her neutral judicial role or when 

the warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” 

468 U.S. at 923 (citations omitted). Grisanti does not rely on these grounds.
8 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Kienast, 

907 F.3d at 528, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921.4

Grisanti raises other grounds for declining to apply the 

good-faith exception, which we did not address in Kienast. 

First, he argues, the FBI obtained the warrant in bad faith 

because the affidavit assured the magistrate judge that the 

“property” to be searched was “located in the Eastern District 

of Virginia,” though the FBI planned to search computers 

anywhere in the world. Without dwelling on the rather 

slippery question of just where the searches would take place, 

we find that the affidavit sufficiently informed the magistrate 

judge that the FBI would be obtaining identifying information 

from computers outside her district—“wherever located.” 

See McLamb, 880 F.3d at 690–91; Horton, 863 F.3d at 1051–52; 

Taylor, 935 F.3d at 1292; see also United States v. Spears, 

673 F.3d 598, 605–07 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying good-faith 

exception where omissions and inconsistencies were 

immaterial). The difference between the affidavit and a more 

detailed description of how the software would work does 

not allow an inference that the agents intentionally 

misrepresented or recklessly omitted material information to 

mislead the magistrate judge. See United States v. Daniels, 

906 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2018); Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; 

see also Taylor, 935 F.3d at 1292 (holding that application and 

 4 Kienast did not actually decide whether Rule 41(b)(4) confers this 

power on magistrate judges, but all circuits that have answered the question have concluded that issuance of the warrant by the magistrate judge, 

as opposed to a district judge, violated both Rule 41 (before the 2016 

amendment) and the Fourth Amendment. See Werdene, 883 F.3d at 211–

14; Horton, 863 F.3d at 1046–49; Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1113–17; Taylor, 

935 F.3d at 1286–88. As in Kienast, however, we need not decide that underlying issue.
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 9

affidavit for NIT warrant “sufficiently disclosed bounds of 

intended search”). If the magistrate judge had had concerns 

about geography, the application made clear that the FBI 

sought permission to use the equipment in Virginia to obtain 

information from users’ computers wherever they were 

located. The application also provided ample information to 

have prompted further questions before the NIT warrant was 

issued if geographic limits had been a concern.

Second, Grisanti argues that the government cannot rely 

on the good-faith exception because the agents knowingly exceeded the scope of the warrant, which purportedly authorized searches only within the Eastern District of Virginia. The 

good-faith exception does not apply to a search that clearly 

exceeds the scope of a warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921–22; 

see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 555 (2012) 

(examining, in qualified-immunity context, officer’s good 

faith in construing validity and scope of warrant); Groh, 

540 U.S. at 561 n.4. Although the NIT warrant did not specifically authorize searches outside the Eastern District of Virginia, it permitted agents to obtain information from any computer used to log into Playpen. On this basis, the First, Second, 

Third, and Ninth Circuits have all held that a reasonable agent 

could rely on the NIT warrant as permitting the use of the 

software and equipment in Virginia to obtain information 

from computers outside the magistrate judge’s district. Levin, 

874 F.3d at 323; Eldred, 933 F.3d at 119; Werdene, 883 F.3d 

at 217; Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1119. We agree.

Our view that the agents did not unreasonably exceed the 

scope of the warrant also comports with the Supreme Court’s 

standard for demonstrating objective bad faith in executing a 

warrant. The defendant must show “conscious or flagrant” 
10 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

disregard of the warrant’s scope. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 

448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980). The question is whether the officers’ 

execution of the warrant was “objectively understandable and 

reasonable.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987) (applying good-faith exception to officer’s reliance on warrant 

with ambiguous scope); see also Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. 

at 555 (applying similar standard in examining whether ambiguous warrant was facially invalid). “The NIT warrant specifies into which homes an intrusion is permitted (those where 

the activating computers are located), and on what basis (that 

the users in those homes logged into Playpen).” Levin, 

874 F.3d at 323. We cannot infer that agents believed themselves to be cabined in the Eastern District of Virginia but flagrantly disregarded that boundary when the stated purpose 

of the warrant, as issued, was to uncover the unknown locations 

of anonymous users. Finally, we recently concluded that the 

Fourth Amendment does not require a tracking warrant to 

specify a geographic scope at all (even if other laws do). 

See United States v. Brewer, 915 F.3d 408, 413–14 (7th Cir. 

2019). Under the circumstances, the FBI agents could have 

reasonably believed that “any” computer used to log into 

Playpen was within the scope of the warrant, not just those in 

the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court did not err 

by denying the motion to suppress.

III. Sentencing

Grisanti argues that the district court erred procedurally 

by sentencing him based on improper comparisons to an unrelated defendant and unfounded speculation that he had a 

medical condition that would inevitably cause him to commit 

another child-pornography offense. The government responds in three parts: (1) Grisanti waived this argument by 
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 11

assenting to the judge’s remarks; (2) Grisanti invited any error 

by asserting that he had an addiction; and (3) the judge did 

not err by accepting Grisanti’s argument that he had an illness 

and encouraging him to obtain treatment. 

We agree with the government that Grisanti invited the 

judge’s comments about his purported addiction and the 

need for and possible benefit of treatment. Grisanti asserted 

just that in his sentencing memorandum and again at the 

hearing. “A party may not ‘invite’ error and then argue on 

appeal that the error for which he was responsible entitles him 

to relief.” United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 

2011) (alterations and citations omitted). Grisanti’s choice to 

focus on an asserted need for professional help was “purposeful; it was part of a strategy” to mitigate his culpability for his 

crimes. See United States v. Addison, 803 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 

2015). “It is not our job to rescue [Grisanti] from the consequences of that strategic choice.” Id.

Grisanti counters that he may have agreed that he had an 

addiction, but he never suggested that he was likely to commit more crimes. See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 

505–06 (2006) (addressing argument on appeal where party’s 

contentions were not inconsistent with earlier position). Yet 

the risk of future crimes seems to be where his addiction argument pointed. Even if Grisanti did not invite the judge’s remark about becoming a repeat offender, there was no error 

here. The judge did not rely on conjecture, extraneous factors, 

or her own medical opinion that Grisanti has an addiction 

that is likely to cause future crimes. In fact, the judge asked 

whether a psychologist had evaluated him. Rather than suggest that Grisanti would inevitably commit new crimes, the 

judge expressed optimism that he could succeed and realize 
12 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

his potential. She did not find that Grisanti suffers from an 

illness beyond his control that would render attempts at treatment futile. See United States v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1008, 1012 

(7th Cir. 2011). And judges “routinely” make predictions 

about a defendant’s future conduct, so the judge did not err 

by reasoning that Grisanti might reoffend if he did not get 

treatment. See United States v. Kluball, 843 F.3d 716, 720 

(7th Cir. 2016). Indeed, a judge must consider any need for 

“correctional treatment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). The 

judge’s statements also do not show that she equated Grisanti 

with the other defendant she mentioned, who had just been 

sentenced for a second offense. In context, the judge was only 

commenting on her desire that Grisanti obtain treatment and 

avoid reoffending. 

Grisanti also asserts that the judge erred by failing to address what he now calls his “principal” mitigation argument, 

that he deserved a shorter sentence because he had not committed a “contact sex offense.” Grisanti never mentioned this 

point at the sentencing hearing. Neither the district judge nor 

we can treat it as central to his plea for leniency. Grisanti advanced this contention in his sentencing memorandum as 

part of his broader argument that he was unlikely to reoffend, 

a subject that the judge addressed at length. A judge must 

“meaningfully” consider the defendant’s principal arguments, but that requirement “does not apply mechanically.” 

United States v. Hancock, 825 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2016), 

quoting United States v. Estrada-Mederos, 784 F.3d 1086, 1091 

(7th Cir. 2015). The district judge discussed the studies that 

Grisanti cited about recidivism and the reasons he argued that 

he was unlikely to offend; the explanation was sufficient. 
Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576 13

We must also note that Judge Pratt properly rejected 

Grisanti’s suggestion—based on the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool and the Correlates of Admission of Sexual 

Interest in Children assessment—that he is less likely to commit future crimes because he is white. Subject to constitutional 

limits, sentencing judges have broad discretion about the information they may consider when deciding on an appropriate sentence. See Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175 

(2017), citing Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487–89 

(2011); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661. But imposing different sentences based on race would violate the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sentencing 

Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10; United States v. Campbell, 

813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court in 

other contexts has permitted consideration of race to offset 

negative effects of past discrimination and to combat harmful 

stereotypes. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 

328–30 (2003) (upholding public law school’s affirmative action program). On the other hand, the use of actuarial tools 

that use race as a factor for assessing probabilities of future 

crimes, like the studies cited by Grisanti, carry “the potential 

to reify, rather than ameliorate, extant racial disparities.” 

See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables & Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. Rev. 1329, 1387 

(2011). The Supreme Court has also recognized that some sentencing differentials “foster[] disrespect for and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system because of a widely-held 

perception that [they] promote[] unwarranted disparity based 

on race.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98, 101 (2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States Sentencing Commission report and holding that courts may sentence based on policy considerations). The district judge did 
14 Nos. 18-2993 & 19-1576

not err by recoiling from Grisanti’s reliance on studies that 

factor in race. 

Finally, Grisanti contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the application of U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2, which applies to his child-pornography offenses, resulted in an unreasonably long guideline range. He asserts 

that some federal courts routinely vary below this guideline 

on the ground that it is “flawed.” See United States v. Halliday, 

672 F.3d 462, 473 (7th Cir. 2012). A sentencing court may reject 

any guideline on policy grounds as long it acts reasonably in 

doing so. E.g., United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 

(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A sentencing court cannot, however, 

be required to accept a policy argument that rejects a guideline. 

To sustain the presumption that a within-guideline sentence 

is reasonable, “a district court need provide only a justification ... adequate to allow for meaningful appellate review 

and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United 

States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting 

United States v. Pilon, 734 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, 

the judge appropriately discussed Grisanti’s history and characteristics (describing a “deceitful” man who was “not naïve” 

about his actions), the seriousness of his crimes and the need 

to protect the public (noting that he had worked near children 

and the offense involved prepubescent children), and the 

need to promote respect for the law (observing that he destroyed evidence and implicitly blamed his wife and co-workers). And though the judge commented on Grisanti’s defense, 

she properly declined to view as an aggravating factor his decision to exercise his right to go to trial. 

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.