[Cite as In re H.H., 2021-Ohio-1732.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In the Matter of: : 

[H.H. : No. 20AP-362 

 (C.P.C. No. 17JU-13502)

 : 

J.H., Father, (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 Appellant]. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 20, 2020 

 

On brief: Emily L. McDonnell, for Franklin County Children 

Services. 

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and George 

Schumann, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

DORRIAN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, J.H., father of H.H., appeals the June 25, 2020 decision and 

judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic 

Relations, Juvenile Branch, which overruled appellant's objection to the juvenile court 

magistrate's January 27, 2020 decision granting the motion of appellee, Franklin County 

Children Services ("FCCS"), to place H.H. in a planned permanent living arrangement 

("PPLA"). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On November 6, 2017, FCCS filed a complaint alleging H.H. was a dependent 

child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C).1 On November 8, 2017, the juvenile court magistrate 

 

1 We note that FCCS indicated this was the first refiling of the complaint. 
No. 20AP-362 2 

held a hearing at which the following individuals were present: J.H., who was represented 

by counsel; Trish Stephens, FCCS liaison; Robert Petty, guardian ad litem for H.H., and an 

assistant prosecuting attorney. On the same date, the juvenile court magistrate filed an 

order granting temporary custody of H.H. to FCCS and an entry containing findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, which were incorporated into the magistrate's order. The 

magistrate found that FCCS assumed custody of H.H. from J.H. and placed H.H. in 

residential treatment for evaluation due to a significant mental health diagnosis. The 

magistrate found J.H. stated H.H. could not return home without a significant change in 

behavior. As a result, the magistrate found reasonable efforts had been made to prevent 

the removal of H.H. from the home. 

{¶ 3} On January 19, 2018, Brian M. Furniss, acting as H.H.'s guardian ad litem 

("GAL Furniss"), filed a report and recommendation. On January 22, 2018, the juvenile 

court magistrate held a hearing on the dependency complaint. On February 13, 2018, FCCS 

filed a case plan. On February 15, 2018, the juvenile court magistrate filed a decision, which 

was approved and adopted by the juvenile court, finding H.H. to be a dependent minor 

under R.C. 2151.04(C), approving and adopting the case plan, and granting temporary court 

custody of H.H. to FCCS. 

{¶ 4} On February 20, 2018, FCCS filed a semi-annual review. On July 13, 2018, 

FCCS filed a motion for PPLA pursuant to R.C. 2151.415 and Juv.R. 14 and 19. On 

August 15, 2018, GAL Furniss filed a report and recommendation. On November 7, 2018, 

FCCS filed a semi-annual review. On December 11, 2018, the juvenile court magistrate held 

a hearing on FCCS's July 13, 2018 motion for PPLA. On December 17, 2018, the juvenile 

court magistrate filed a decision amending FCCS's July 13, 2018 motion for PPLA at the 

request of FCCS to reflect a request for extension of temporary court custody and granting 

such motion. 

{¶ 5} On January 31, 2019, FCCS filed a second motion for PPLA pursuant to R.C. 

2151.415 and Juv.R. 14 and 19. On March 21, 2019, GAL Furniss filed a report and 

recommendation. On March 22, 2019, the juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on 

FCCS's January 31, 2019 motion for PPLA. On March 26, 2019, the juvenile court 

magistrate filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 27, 2019, the juvenile 

court magistrate filed a decision, which was approved and adopted by the juvenile court, 
No. 20AP-362 3 

amending FCCS's January 31, 2019 motion for PPLA at the request of FCCS to reflect a 

request for extension of temporary court custody and granting the motion for a second 

extension of temporary court custody. 

{¶ 6} On July 3, 2019, FCCS filed a third motion for PPLA pursuant to R.C. 2151.415 

and Juv.R. 14 and 19. On August 14, 2019, GAL Furniss filed a report and recommendation. 

On November 7 and December 16, 2019, the juvenile court magistrate held hearings on 

FCCS's July 3, 2019 motion for PPLA. 

{¶ 7} At the hearing, Rachel Buchhop, program coordinator at Genacross Family 

and Youth ("Genacross"), testified that H.H. had been placed at Genacross in 2017. Prior 

to arriving at Genacross, H.H. had been at Nationwide Children's Hospital. Providers at 

Nationwide Children's Hospital recommended H.H. be placed in a residential treatment 

facility. 

{¶ 8} According to Buchhop, H.H., who was 17 years old at the time of the hearings, 

displayed thinking ability consistent with a five or six-year-old child and was unable to care 

for herself. H.H. received medications four times a day to treat mood swings in which she 

displayed verbal and physical aggression, sleeping issues, attention deficit and 

hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), and behavioral outbursts. H.H.'s behavioral outbursts 

included physical violence, dangerous behavior with imaginary friends, and sexual 

improprieties. H.H. received residential schooling due to her behavioral issues. H.H. had 

an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"). H.H. was supervised at all times, including 

constantly being within the line of sight of monitoring personnel. According to Buchhop, 

H.H.'s behavior had "drastically" become worse over the last year while at Genacross. 

(Nov. 7, 2019 Tr. at 39.) 

{¶ 9} Buchhop testified that H.H. received regular phone calls from her two 

grandmothers; however, H.H.'s grandmothers had never physically visited Genacross. 

According to Buchhop, H.H. preferred to speak with her grandmothers instead of J.H. 

Buchhop stated that J.H. had not attended semi-annual reviews or met with H.H.'s medical 

providers. At the time of the hearing in November 2019, J.H. last visited H.H. at Genacross 

in February 2019. 

{¶ 10} Buchhop expressed concern with H.H. returning home with J.H. due to the 

presence of H.H.'s younger siblings in the home. H.H. physically attacked and targeted 
No. 20AP-362 4 

younger children at Genacross and made homicidal comments toward younger children 

when she was agitated. According to Buchhop, H.H. wished to be placed with her 

grandmothers. 

{¶ 11} Carrie Metzker, a district representative from Columbus City Schools, 

testified that she participated in creating three IEPs for H.H. According to Metzker, J.H. 

was invited to participate in but did not attend any meetings regarding the creation of 

H.H.'s IEPs. 

{¶ 12} J.H. testified he has four children, including H.H. According to J.H., he 

moved H.H. from Kansas to Ohio in May or June 2017. In July 2017, he entered into a 

voluntary custody agreement with FCCS. 

{¶ 13} According to J.H., H.H. had been prescribed and was taking 1,200 milligrams 

of Seroquel before they moved to Ohio. The doctor who prescribed H.H. that amount of 

Seroquel had not seen H.H. since she was approximately five or six years old. After moving 

to Ohio, J.H. had difficulty filling H.H.'s prescription for Seroquel because H.H. did not see 

a psychiatrist. J.H. believed H.H.'s behavior would be better if she again received the 

amount of Seroquel that she had been prescribed in Kansas. J.H. acknowledged the 

amount of Seroquel H.H. had previously been prescribed was 50 percent higher than the 

maximum dosage recommended by the Food and Drug Administration. 

{¶ 14} J.H. stated he had not completed any parenting classes in Ohio although he 

had been required to do so under the case plan. J.H. did not recall that the case plan 

required him to be involved with H.H.'s medical appointments and admitted he had not 

attended any of H.H.'s medical appointments since H.H. had been placed at Genacross. 

J.H. disputed Genacross' records that he had only been to Genacross to visit H.H. three 

times. According to J.H., he had visited H.H. at Genacross between seven to ten times. J.H. 

agreed that H.H. had been placed in seven different treatment facilities or hospitals to his 

knowledge. 

{¶ 15} J.H.'s two youngest children, who were approximately two and one-half years 

old and 15 months old respectively, lived with J.H., J.H.'s wife, and his wife's father and 

stepmother. According to J.H., if H.H. was returned to his custody, she would have her 

own room, while J.H., his wife, and the two other children would stay together in another 
No. 20AP-362 5 

room. According to J.H., he was self-employed at the time of the hearing. Neither J.H. nor 

his wife had a driver's license. 

{¶ 16} Emily Brown testified she was previously the FCCS caseworker assigned to 

H.H.'s case from July 24, 2017 until November 20, 2018. According to Brown, H.H.'s case 

began due to H.H. experiencing suicidal and homicidal ideations. Specifically, after H.H.'s 

now two-year-old sibling was born, H.H. stated she wanted to kill her sibling, her family, 

and herself. FCCS entered into a voluntary agreement with J.H. on July 20, 2017. After 

entering into the agreement, H.H. was admitted to Nationwide Children's Hospital for a 

period of 37 days, during which time H.H. was diagnosed with unspecified mood disorder, 

autism spectrum disorder, and intellectual disability. 

{¶ 17} According to Brown, J.H. was involved with H.H.'s medical treatment during 

her time as H.H.'s caseworker. Specifically, J.H. believed H.H. was undermedicated and 

requested 1,200 milligrams of Seroquel to be prescribed for H.H. Brown conveyed this 

request to a physician, but it was rejected by the physician as unethical. Brown testified 

that Seroquel had been discontinued for H.H.'s treatment and that H.H. was instead 

receiving Latuda for behavioral issues. 

{¶ 18} According to Brown, FCCS provided J.H. with bus passes and cab fare to visit 

H.H. Of the five appointments Brown scheduled for J.H. to visit H.H., J.H. attended only 

two. Brown never observed interactions between J.H. and H.H. According to Brown, H.H. 

was consistent in her wish to live with her grandmother. H.H. did not wish to live with J.H. 

Brown testified that H.H.'s mother had never been involved with the case while Brown was 

H.H.'s caseworker. 

{¶ 19} Brown testified that alternatives to PPLA were considered. Brown referred 

H.H. to the Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities. If H.H.'s behavior no 

longer required placement in a residential facility, Brown considered it possible for H.H. to 

live in Franklin County with services from the Franklin County Board of Developmental 

Disabilities. 

{¶ 20} Gloria Butler, an FCCS caseworker, testified she became the caseworker for 

H.H.'s case on November 20, 2018. Butler testified H.H. was diagnosed with ADHD and 

was receiving Latuda for behavioral issues. According to Butler, J.H. had not 

communicated with her about H.H.'s medical diagnoses and H.H.'s ongoing needs during 
No. 20AP-362 6 

her time as H.H.'s caseworker. J.H. had not attended any meetings about H.H.'s treatment 

to Butler's knowledge. According to Butler, J.H. was provided with information on 

parenting classes but did not complete them. Butler scheduled five appointments and 

provided transportation for J.H. to visit H.H.; however, J.H. only attended one of the visits. 

Butler believed that PPLA was the most appropriate result because H.H.'s grandmother 

was unable to care for her and it was recommended that H.H. remain in a structured 

environment. 

{¶ 21} Furniss testified he was appointed GAL for H.H. Furniss had not had an 

opportunity to review any interaction between H.H. and J.H. because J.H.'s visits were 

"rather sporadic." (Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 60.) 

{¶ 22} When asked whether H.H. was able to understand the nature of the 

proceedings in order to ascertain her wishes, GAL Furniss replied that H.H. is "at that level 

of development [where] I think [H.H. is] able to understand what she wants." (Dec. 16, 

2019 Tr. at 62.) Regarding H.H.'s wishes, GAL Furniss testified as follows: 

The last time I was up there I did not as[k] [H.H.] the -- the 

wishes. For [H.H.], I think it kind of - - your ability to ask those 

kinds of things depends on the day and how she's doing on a 

given day. When I was up there the last time [H.H.] wanted - - 

[H.H.] kind of sets the tone for what she wants to talk about. 

The last time [H.H.] wanted to talk about going apple picking, 

which is what they were gonna (sic) be doing the next day. * * * 

So I did not address that with her. I had talked to her previously 

in the case, but not about - - not specifically about the PPLA. 

(Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 60-61.) When asked again about whether he had discussed H.H.'s 

wishes, GAL Furniss replied "[a]gain not - - not at the last visit but - - but previously * * * 

[H.H. has] been happy to be where she is." (Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 62.) GAL Furniss testified 

that Genacross had "done * * * a good job in my opinion of accommodating [H.H.'s] needs 

and wants to the point that she's happy there." (Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 63.) When asked on 

cross-examination whether he had specifically discussed PPLA with H.H., GAL Furniss 

replied "I have not and I have not felt that it would be productive to try to do that." (Dec. 16, 

2019 Tr. at 65.) 

{¶ 23} GAL Furniss did not believe J.H. would be able to provide a safe and stable 

home for H.H. due to her specific needs. Furthermore, GAL Furniss believed it would not 

be appropriate to place H.H. in J.H.'s home around her younger siblings because of H.H.'s 
No. 20AP-362 7 

aggression toward younger children. GAL Furniss believed PPLA was "exactly what [H.H.] 

needs." (Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 63.) 

{¶ 24} On January 27, 2020, the juvenile court magistrate filed a decision, which 

was approved and adopted by the juvenile court, granting FCCS's July 3, 2019 motion for 

PPLA pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(5). 

{¶ 25} On February 3, 2020, the juvenile court magistrate held a hearing. On 

February 6, 2020, J.H. filed an objection to the January 27, 2020 magistrate's decision. On 

February 12, 2020, FCCS filed a case plan. On February 14, 2020, the juvenile court 

magistrate filed a decision, which was approved and adopted by the juvenile court, 

approving and adopting the case plan as an order of the court. On June 5, 2020, J.H. filed 

a supplemental objection to the January 27, 2020 magistrate's decision. On June 22, 2020, 

FCCS filed a memorandum contra J.H.'s objection to the January 27, 2020 magistrate's 

decision. On June 25, 2020, the juvenile court filed a decision and judgment entry 

overruling J.H.'s objection to the magistrate's decision. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 26} J.H. appeals and assigns the following sole error for our review: 

The juvenile court erred in overruling the defendant-appellant 

father's objection to the magistrate's decision granting planned 

permanent living arrangement (PPLA) of the minor child 

under R.C. 2151.415(C)(1)(a), as neither the juvenile judge nor 

the magistrate considered the best interest factors under R.C 

2151.414(D)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), as required by R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1) and R.C. 2151.415(C)(1). 

III. Analysis 

{¶ 27} In his sole assignment of error, J.H. argues the juvenile court erred in 

overruling his objection to the magistrate's January 27, 2020 decision granting FCCS's 

motion for PPLA because the juvenile court failed to consider the best-interest factors 

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). 

A. Applicable Law 

{¶ 28} "The right to parent one's child is a fundamental right protected by the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution." In re L.W., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-586, 2018-Ohio2099, ¶ 6. See also In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 
No. 20AP-362 8 

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("[T]he right to raise one's children is an 'essential' and 'basic civil 

right.' "). "Parents have a 'fundamental liberty interest' in the care, custody, and 

management of the child." Id. at 157, quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 

(1982). However, parental rights are not absolute and are always subject to the ultimate 

welfare of the child. In re E.B., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-352, 2017-Ohio-2672, ¶ 19, citing In re 

K.M., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-64, 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 15, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio 

St.2d 100, 106 (1979); In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 20. 

{¶ 29} R.C. 2151.415 provides for a children services agency that has been given 

temporary custody of a child, pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A), to file a motion seeking an order 

of disposition for the child. In re M.W., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-524, 2011-Ohio-6392, ¶ 26, 

citing In re S.W., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1368, 2006-Ohio-2958, ¶ 35. Among six potential 

orders of disposition, R.C. 2151.415(A)(5) provides for a children services agency to file a 

motion with the juvenile court seeking "[a]n order that the child be placed in a planned 

permanent living arrangement." "Planned permanent living arrangement" is defined as an 

order of a juvenile court to which both of the following apply: 

(a) The court gives legal custody of a child to a public children 

services agency or a private child placing agency without the 

termination of parental rights. 

(b) The order permits the agency to make an appropriate 

placement of the child and to enter into a written agreement 

with a foster care provider or with another person or agency 

with whom the child is placed. 

R.C. 2151.011(B)(38). 

{¶ 30} "Legal custody" is defined as: 

[A] legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have 

physical care and control of the child and to determine where 

and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to 

protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child 

with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to 

any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. An 

individual granted legal custody shall exercise the rights and 

responsibilities personally unless otherwise authorized by any 

section of the Revised Code or by the court. 

R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). 
No. 20AP-362 9 

{¶ 31} R.C. 2151.353 governs the orders of disposition that may be granted by a 

juvenile court for a child adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child. Pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.353(A)(5), a juvenile court may order a child to be placed in PPLA provided 

that: 

[A] public children services agency or private child placing 

agency requests the court to place the child in a planned 

permanent living arrangement and if the court finds, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that a planned permanent living 

arrangement is in the best interest of the child, that the child is 

sixteen years of age or older, and that one of the following 

exists: 

(a) The child, because of physical, mental, or psychological 

problems or needs, is unable to function in a family-like setting 

and must remain in residential or institutional care now and 

for the foreseeable future beyond the date of the dispositional 

hearing held pursuant to section 2151.35 of the Revised Code. 

(b) The parents of the child have significant physical, mental, 

or psychological problems and are unable to care for the child 

because of those problems, adoption is not in the best interest 

of the child, as determined in accordance with division (D)(1) 

of section 2151.414 of the Revised Code, and the child retains a 

significant and positive relationship with a parent or relative. 

(c) The child has been counseled on the permanent placement 

options available to the child, and is unwilling to accept or 

unable to adapt to a permanent placement. 

See R.C. 2151.415(C)(1). Thus, on a motion from a children services agency, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that PPLA is in the best interest of the child, the child 

is at least 16 years old, and that one of the specified conditions exist. See In re A.B., 110 Ohio 

St.3d 230, 2006-Ohio-4359, ¶ 33 ("A planned permanent living arrangement places a child 

in limbo, which can delay placement in a permanent home. Because the General Assembly 

intended to encourage speedy placement, R.C. 2151.353 places limitations upon the use of 

planned permanent living arrangements.").

{¶ 32} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) governs the juvenile court's consideration of best-interest 

factors, providing as follows: 

In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held 

pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of 

division (A)(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of 
No. 20AP-362 10 

section 2151.415 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider 

all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the 

child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-ofhome providers, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the 

maturity of the child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the 

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month 

period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one 

or more public children services agencies or private child 

placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) 

of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was 

previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in 

another state; 

(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement 

and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this 

section apply in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶ 33} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). The additional factors referenced by R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(e) are: 

(7) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one 

of [a list of criminal offenses]. 

(8) The parent has repeatedly withheld medical treatment or 

food from the child when the parent has the means to provide 

the treatment or food, and, in the case of withheld medical 

treatment, the parent withheld it for a purpose other than to 

treat the physical or mental illness or defect of the child by 

spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the 

tenets of a recognized religious body. 

(9) The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm 

two or more times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has 

rejected treatment two or more times or refused to participate 
No. 20AP-362 11 

in further treatment two or more times after a case plan issued 

pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code requiring 

treatment of the parent was journalized as part of a 

dispositional order issued with respect to the child or an order 

was issued by any other court requiring treatment of the 

parent. 

(10) The parent has abandoned the child. 

(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily 

terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this 

section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code, or 

under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or 

the United States that is substantially equivalent to those 

sections, and the parent has failed to provide clear and 

convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior 

termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent 

placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety 

of the child. 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11). Pursuant to R.C. 2151.415(C)(2)(a), a court issuing an 

order placing a child in PPLA "shall issue a finding of fact setting forth the reasons for its 

finding." 

B. Analysis 

{¶ 34} Here, J.H. does not challenge the juvenile court's resolution of the bestinterest factors but, rather, argues that the juvenile court's analysis failed to comport with 

the statutory requirements. Specifically, J.H. asserts the juvenile court erred by considering 

factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), (2), and (3) instead of the best-interest factors under R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1). 

{¶ 35} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not 

require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e)." In re A.M., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 31. Thus, 

although a juvenile court need not "include in its decision a written discussion of or express 

findings regarding each of the best-interest factors," a court reviewing such decision "must 

be able to discern from the magistrate's or juvenile court's decision and the court's 
No. 20AP-362 12 

judgment entry that the court satisfied the statutory requirement that it consider the 

enumerated factors." Id.2

{¶ 36} Here, the juvenile court stated that "[i]n determining the best interest of a 

child, the court shall consider all relevant factors and considerations including those under 

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), (2), and (3)."3 (June 25, 2020 Decision at 13.) The juvenile court's 

 

2 We encourage juvenile courts to clearly articulate that they have considered all relevant best-interest factors 

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and make findings on the same. See A.M. at ¶ 42 (stating that "it is preferable 

for a juvenile court to provide some discussion or analysis of the best-interest factors to aid in appellate review 

and to increase confidence in its decision"). If we are unable to discern from the record whether the juvenile 

court has complied with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), consistent with A.M., we must remand in order to effectuate 

meaningful appellate review. 

3 R.C. 3109.04, a section of Title 31 of the Revised Code, which governs Domestic Relations, applies "[i]n any 

divorce, legal separation, or annulment proceeding and in any proceeding pertaining to the allocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities for the care of a child." R.C. 3109.04(A). R.C. 3109.04(F) provides a list of 

factors for a court to consider when determining whether shared parenting is appropriate and allocating 

parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children, including, in part, the best interest of the child. 

We are mindful that the Supreme Court in A.M. recognized it was important that a juvenile court acknowledge 

the applicable statutory framework. See A.M. at ¶ 40 ("When the record indicates that a juvenile court, in 

response to timely filed objections, has undertaken an independent review of the evidence, has acknowledged 

the applicable statutory framework, has adopted the magistrate's findings of fact, and has made the required 

conclusions upon clear and convincing evidence, we can only conclude that the court has satisfied its 

obligation under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d)."). (Emphasis added.) While the juvenile court in its decision overruling 

J.H.'s objection discusses R.C. 2151.415(C), it did not refer to the best-interest factors it was required to 

consider under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and, instead, pointed to R.C. 3109.04(F). Notwithstanding the juvenile 

court's erroneous reference to R.C. 3109.04(F), it is clear the juvenile court was not applying the factors in 

R.C. 3109.04(F) as cited below. Because the juvenile court cited R.C. 2151.415(C) and we are able to discern 

from the juvenile court's decision that it considered the appropriate factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), we find 

the juvenile court's erroneous reference to R.C. 3109.04(F) to not be prejudicial. 

Specifically, R.C. 3109.04(F) provides: 

(1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, whether on an original decree 

allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree 

allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but 

not limited to: 

(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; 

(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding 

the child’s wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning 

the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court; 

(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other 

person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; 

(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; 

(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; 

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation 

and companionship rights; 

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that 

are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor; 

(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being 
No. 20AP-362 13 

decision included extensive findings of fact and a thorough examination of the factors it 

considered in reaching its conclusions of law. Furthermore, the court specifically noted 

that it considered "all relevant factors" in determining the best interest of H.H. (June 25, 

2020 Decision at 13.) Thus, although the juvenile court did not specifically point to the 

factors it was required to consider under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), pursuant to A.M., we must 

nevertheless consider whether the juvenile court's decision supports the conclusion that it 

satisfied the statutory requirement to consider the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors. 

1. Child's Interactions and Relationships 

{¶ 37} The first factor in determining whether an order granting PPLA is in the 

child's best interest requires considering the interactions and interrelationships of the child 

with their parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and others. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). 

J.H. contends the juvenile court did not adequately consider this factor. However, the 

 an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been 

adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator 

of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any 

member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a 

violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who 

at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the 

subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the household of either 

parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the 

time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of 

the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and 

whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being 

an abused child or a neglected child; 

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has 

continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an 

order of the court; 

(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside 

this state. 

(2) In determining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the children, the court shall 

consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the factors enumerated in division (F)(1) of 

this section, the factors enumerated in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, and all of the following 

factors: 

(a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, with respect to the children; 

(b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the 

child and the other parent; 

(c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domestic violence, or parental 

kidnapping by either parent; 

(d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the proximity relates to the practical 

considerations of shared parenting; 

(e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the child has a guardian ad litem. 

(3) When allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children, the court shall not 

give preference to a parent because of that parent’s financial status or condition.
No. 20AP-362 14 

magistrate's decision and the juvenile court's decision overruling J.H.'s objection contain 

factual findings regarding H.H.'s interrelationships. The juvenile court found in part that 

"H.H. was voluntarily removed from the care of [J.H.] due to homicidal and suicidal threats 

to herself and family, including a young sibling." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 16.) 

Furthermore, the juvenile court found that "[s]ince [H.H.'s] placement at Genacross, [J.H.] 

has only visited with [H.H.] three times." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 16.) Therefore, we 

find the magistrate's decision and the juvenile court's decision overruling J.H.'s objection 

demonstrate the court satisfied its duty to consider the best-interest factor under R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(a). 

2. Child's Wishes 

{¶ 38} The second factor in determining whether an order granting PPLA is in the 

child's best interest requires considering the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by 

the child or through the child's guardian ad litem. The court must give due regard to the 

child's maturity. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). The magistrate's decision notes GAL Furniss' 

testimony that H.H. "need[ed] * * * structured residential treatment." (Jan. 27, 2020 Mag.'s 

Decision at 2.) In his March 21, 2019 report, GAL Furniss stated that H.H. "is cognitively 

delayed to the point that she cannot comprehend PPLA." (Report at 2.) At the PPLA 

hearing, GAL Furniss testified to H.H.'s understanding of the proceedings and wishes: 

[FCCS Counsel]: [D]o you believe that [H.H. is] able to 

understand the proceedings that are going on when you try to 

talk to [H.H.] about them? 

[GAL Furniss]: [H.H. is] - - at that level of development I think 

[H.H. is] able to understand what she wants. 

[FCCS Counsel]: And have you discussed them with [H.H.]? 

[GAL Furniss]: Again, not - - not at the last visit but * * * 

previously [H.H. has] been happy to be where she is. * * * 

[H.H.] will fixate on things and the facility has really kinda (sic) 

given her a lot of leeway to have her particular passion at the 

moment. * * * [T]hey have done a - - a good job in my opinion 

of accommodating [H.H.'s] needs and wants to the point that 

[H.H. is] happy there. 

* * * 

[FCCS Counsel]: [W]hat is your opinion or your 

recommendation regarding [FCCS's] motion for * * * PPLA? 
No. 20AP-362 15 

[GAL Furniss]: Regarding the PPLA, I think it's * * * exactly 

what [H.H.] needs. [H.H. is] a kid that I would envision aging 

out at 21, given her special needs. * * * [I]n this case I think 

everybody sees that [H.H.], given [H.H.'s] level of 

development, needs to be in that structured environment for as 

long as we can possibly have her there. 

* * * 

[FCCS Counsel]: Has [H.H.] ever consistently stated that she 

wanted to return home to [J.H.]? 

[GAL Furniss]: To my knowledge, she has not. 

(Dec. 16, 2019 Tr. at 62-64.) In addition to adopting the magistrate's decision, the juvenile 

court referred to the testimony of GAL Furniss in its decision overruling J.H.'s objection, 

including specifically noting GAL Furniss' testimony that "Genacross accommodates 

[H.H.'s] needs and [H.H.] is happy there." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 10.) Additionally, 

the juvenile court found that H.H. "want[ed] to live with Maternal Grandmother, however 

Maternal Grandmother has stated that health reasons would prevent her from taking 

custody of [H.H.]." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 5-6.) Therefore, based on the facts and 

circumstances of this case, we find the magistrate's decision and the juvenile court's 

decision overruling J.H.'s objection demonstrate the court satisfied its duty to consider the 

best-interest factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). 

3. Custodial History 

{¶ 39} The third factor in determining whether an order granting PPLA is in the 

child's best interest requires considering the child's custodial history, including whether 

they have been in the temporary custody of a public service agency for 12 or more months 

of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). 

{¶ 40} The magistrate found that "FCCS was given temporary custody by this Court 

on August 17, 2017 after the expiration of a 30-day agreement between [J.H.] and FCCS 

due to [H.H.] mental health concerns. [H.H.] was placed at Genacross, near Toledo, for 

residential treatment under the 30-day agreement in July 2017 and has remained there 

since." (Jan. 27, 2020 Mag.'s Decision at 2.) In its decision overruling J.H.'s objection, the 

juvenile court found that "[o]n July 20, 2017, [J.H.] voluntarily entered into a thirty day 

Temporary Order of Custody to [FCCS]. [H.H.] was placed in Genacross, a residential 

facility located in Whitehouse, Ohio where she remains today. On January 22, 2018, 
No. 20AP-362 16 

Temporary Court Custody was granted to FCCS and [H.H.] was to remain at Genacross." 

(June 25, 2020 Decision at 5.) Therefore, we find the magistrate's decision and the juvenile 

court's decision overruling J.H.'s objection demonstrate the court satisfied its duty to 

consider the best-interest factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). 

4. Provision of a Legally Secure Permanent Placement 

{¶ 41} The fourth factor in determining whether an order granting PPLA is in the 

child's best interest requires considering the child's need for a legally secure placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of PPLA to a public agency. 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). The magistrate found returning H.H. to J.H.'s custody would not 

be in H.H.'s best interest for the following reasons: 

The core component of the case plan for [J.H] was for him to 

be involved in [H.H.'s] treatment and therefore learn [H.H.'s] 

needs. This has not happened. Initially, [J.H.] has only visited 

with [H.H.] three (3) times during [H.H.'s] stay at Genacross 

despite FCCS efforts to arrange visits. [J.H.] has also not 

participated in any treatment meetings with Genacross or 

attended any of the three (3) Individualized Education Plan 

(IEP) meetings held regarding [H.H.]. His lack of 

understanding of [H.H.'s] needs is demonstrated in his 

testimony that [H.H.] is simply undermedicated, while those 

closely involved in [H.H.'s] treatment (Genacross, FCCS, and 

the GAL) all testified to [H.H.'s] need for structured residential 

treatment. 

FCCS has made reasonable efforts to prevent [H.H.'s] removal 

from home. FCCS has attempted to engage [J.H.] in [H.H.'s] 

treatment. Returning [H.H.] home was considered, but not an 

option given [J.H.'s] demonstrated lack of understanding of 

[H.H.'s] needs and the recommendation for residential 

treatment. Placement and casework services were provided by 

[FCCS] to the family of [H.H.], but the removal of [H.H.] from 

home continues to be necessary because the circumstances 

giving rise to the original filing have not been sufficiently 

alleviated. 

(Jan. 27, 2020 Mag.'s Decision at 2.) Furthermore, the magistrate found that "[H.H.], 

because of mental health needs, is unable to function in a family-like setting and must 

remain in residential care." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 3.) 

{¶ 42} In its decision, the juvenile court found that "FCCS considered all other 

possible dispositions." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 15.) Regarding the possibility of 
No. 20AP-362 17 

returning H.H. to J.H.'s custody, the court found that "[J.H.] has not engaged with [H.H.'s] 

medical providers or those involved with [H.H.'s] educational planning since [H.H.] was 

admitted to Genacross. Therefore, [J.H.] does not have sufficient understanding of [H.H.'s] 

medical, mental health and educational needs." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 16.) 

Furthermore, the juvenile court found that "[d]ue to [H.H.'s] mental and psychological 

needs as stated in the findings of fact herein, the evidence overwhelmingly reflects that 

[H.H.] cannot function in a family like setting and residential treatment is in [H.H.'s] best 

interest." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 15-16.) Based on "detailed accounts of [H.H.'s] 

disturbances and behaviors and the care necessary to keep [H.H.] and those around her 

safe" provided by "qualified professionals," the court concluded that "[t]he evidence is 

overwhelming that [PPLA] is in the best interest of [H.H.]." (June 25, 2020 Decision at 17.) 

Therefore, we find the magistrate's decision and juvenile court's decision overruling J.H.'s 

objection demonstrate the court satisfied its duty to consider the best-interest factor under 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). 

5. Other Factors 

{¶ 43} The fifth factor in determining whether an order granting PPLA is in the 

child's best interest requires considering whether any of the factors listed in R.C. 

2151.414(E)(7) through (11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). J.H. argues it was not 

"fundamentally fair" for the juvenile court to not acknowledge this factor. (J.H.'s Brief at 

38.) Although the juvenile court did not specifically cite any of the R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) 

through (11) factors, we have previously stated that "[d]ue to the nature of the factors set 

forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11), they will not apply in every case." L.W. at ¶ 32. This 

court has affirmed decisions finding a grant of custody to an agency to be in a child's best 

interest without explicit consideration of those factors where they did not apply, or 

decisions where the juvenile court only considered certain of the R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) 

factors that were applicable to the particular case. Id. See In re J.A.G., 10th Dist. No. 08AP823, 2009-Ohio-821, ¶ 16, fn.1 ("The trial court did not consider the fifth R.C. 2151.414(D) 

factor as the factors [found] in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) do not apply to J.R.G. and her 

children."); In re J.S., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-615, 2006-Ohio-702, ¶ 32 (juvenile court 

magistrate found that only R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) factor applied to the case and juvenile court 

did not err by considering that factor); In re M.R.D., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-324, 2005-Ohio-
No. 20AP-362 18 

5705, ¶ 30 (holding that most of the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) did not 

apply under the facts of the case and there was some evidence that some of the parent's 

children had been involuntarily removed from her care). Here, the record does not reflect 

that any of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) apply, and no party has 

argued otherwise. Therefore, as the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) were 

inapplicable to the matter at hand, we cannot find in this instance that the court's failure to 

make findings regarding those factors is prejudicial error. See In re D.S., 10th Dist. No. 

07AP-479, 2007-Ohio-6781, ¶ 13 ("It is not prejudicial for a court to fail to mention or 

consider factors that are irrelevant to the case at hand."); A.M. at ¶ 36. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, we overrule J.H.'s sole assignment of error. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 45} Having overruled J.H.'s sole assignment of error, we affirm the June 25, 2020 

decision and judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of 

Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch. 

Judgment affirmed. 

SADLER and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.