### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs,

April 18, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANDR EW CHARLES HELTON
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 98-B-1052 Seth Norman, Judge

No. M1999-01405-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 13, 2000

The Defendant, Andrew Charles Helton, was indicted, along with co-defendants Shirl ey Crowell a nd Shayne Cochran , for two counts of premeditated murder and two counts of felony murder for the shooting deaths of Robert Cole and Michael Chatman. After the trial court granted a motion for a judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charg

es, the Defenda

nt was convicted b

y a jury of first degree murder for the death of Robert Cole and of second degre e murder for the death of

Michael Chatman. The Defendant w as sentenced to

mandatory life

imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty-three yea rs imprisonment for the second degree murder conviction. The Defendant

now appeals and argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain crime scene and autopsy photographs

into evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to t

he Defendant' s contentions and th us affirm his conv

ictions.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Criminal C

ourt Affirmed.

R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , J., delivered the opini on of the cour t, in which J ERRY L. S MITH , J. and J OHN E VERETT W ILLI AMS , J., joined. Jeffrey A. DeVasher (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender, and Ross Alderman (at trial), Metropolitan Public Defender, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Andrew Charles Helton.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Da

vid H. Findley

, Assistant Attorne

y General , Criminal Justi ce Divisi on, Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General, Pamela Anderson, AssistantDistrict Attorney General, and T.J. Hay cox, Assistant District Attorney General for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
FACTUAL BACKGROUND-2-

Prior to the evening of November 28, 1997, the Defendant had known victim Micha e l Chatman for

about eleven years. However, it was not until the Defendant g ot divorcedthat he and Chatman began to socialize on a regular basis. During the months before the killings, the Defendant testified tha t he and Cha tma n wo uld see e ach o the r at lea st a cou ple of t ime s a w eek. A few days before Than ksgiving, 1997, the Defendant testified that Chatman came to his house, pushed hi m against the wall, and accused

the Defendant of trying to "cross him out with his girlfriend." A friend broke the fight up, and according to the Defendant, Chatman "broke down . . . and started crying."

The next time the Defendant saw Chatman was on theevening of November 28, 1997. On that night, the Defendant was at home not feeling very well when Michael Chatman called and a sked the Defendant to come over. The Defendant declined, and Chatman offered to come

over and bring the Defendant some food. Chatman went to the Defendant's apartment with food and a bottle o f Crown Royal whiskey. The two men drank for a short

time and then decided to go out. They went to Shayne Coch

ran's house, an

d then all three me

n went to Bailey

's SportsBar in Rivergate. At Bailey' s, the men met up with Robert Cole and decided to go to the home of Leslie Hebert, a friend of Cochran's. Allison Dowell and Hebert's roommate were also present when the men arrived. After staying at Hebert's house for awhile, the Defendant, Cochran, Chatman, Cole, Hebert, and Dow ell went to an after-hours clu b downtown called "The Ch urch."

When the group arrived at The Church, the Defendant took off his

jacket and left it in the car that Chatman had been driving. The Defendan t testified that the

jacket containe

d approximately $200.00 in cash and a small amount of marijuana. At The Church, the Defendant be came separated from the group. Thi nk ing that the Defendant might have gone home, Cochran, Chatman, Cole, Hebert, and Dowell left The Church and went to the Defendant's apartment. Cochran hid a Crown Royal bag full of cocaine and pills behind one of the buildings at the Defend ant's apartment complex and then retrieved it shortly thereafter. The group wa ited outside the Defendant's ap artment f or a brief period of time and then went to Chatman's apartment in Antioch. When the group arrived at C hatman's apa rtment, Ch atman's roommate took his car, which Chatman had been driving all evening, and went to work. Without a car, the two women had no way to get home so they paged the Defendant, hoping that he would take them home. The Defendant testified that he was on his way to his apartment in a

cab he shared w

ith Shirley Cr

owell, Chatman's ex-girlfriend

whom the Defendant encountered at The Church, when he got a page from Cochran and Chatman. The Defendan t testifi ed that he ca lled Chatm an's apartment, and Chatmanasked him to come over because Hebert and Dowell needed a ride home. Crowell, who hadrecently broken up withChat man, agre ed to ride with the Defendant to pick up Hebert and Dowell, but said that she would not go inside.

The Defendant even

tually arri ved at Chatman's apartment and testified that he aske d Chatman about his jacket that he

left in the car. Ch

atman told the Def

endant that C och ran had gotten the jacket out of the car

and that it was in the living room. When the Defendant retrieved his jacket, he realized that

several items, including $200.00 and some marijuana, were missing. The Defendant-3-

talked briefly with Cochran outside while Chatman went upstairs to change clothes. After changing clothes, Chatman came back downstairs about the time that the Defendant came inside. Although the Defendant's story differs as to what occurred next, Hebert and Dowell testified that the Defendant began to accuse Cha tm an of stealing. Dowell testified that the Defendant and Chatman were arguing

"kind of loud." D

owell also

noticed that the Defendant had a gun strapped
on his shoulder underneath his jacket. When Chat man denie d the allegation , Hebert and Dow

ell testified that

the Defendant pulled out a gun and shot Chatman. Acco

rding to Hebert

and Dowell, Chatman did not touch the Defendant before he started shooting. Hebert testified that the Defendant just began shooting for no apparent reason.

Soon after the Defendant began shooting, Hebert ran outside, and D

owell ran to

the back of the apartment. Dowe

ll testified that she

saw the first shot a

nd could hear mor

e shots as s he wa s running to the ba

ck of the apartme

nt. At one point, Dowell testified t hat the Defenda

nt walked to the back of the apartment where she was, looked at her for a moment, and then returned to the front of the ap artme nt. In fear that shemight be shot for hiding, Dowell went to the front of the apartment and saw the Defe

ndant shoot Chatman

one more time in the

mouth. Dowell

then ran outside and found Hebert hidi

ng in the bushes.

Hebert testified that she was hiding outside with a view of the a

partment. She saw

Dowell
run outside and saw Chatman lying on the floor and Cole sitting on the living room couch. Hebert testified that Cole remained sitting on the living room couchduring the entire confrontation between the Defendant and Ch

atman. This

is contrad ictory to the D efendant's testimony that Cole had been involved in the fight. The Defendant testified that

Cole was pulling at the Defendant's pockets and claimed that he shot Cole only to make him let go.

After the killings, the Defendant and Cochran got into the Defendant's car. Cochran asked Hebert and Dowell to get in also. Hebert and Dowell got into the car and saw that Shirley

Crowell
was also present. After driving a sho rt distance in the parking lot , the Defendant r

eturned to Chatman's apartment a nd retrieve d Dowell's p urse as well as the gu n that he had used to shoot Chatman and Cole. Crowell m ade some threatening statements to Hebert and Dowell. Hebert testified that the Defen dant told her and Dowell , "I am sorry y'all had to see that."

When police arrived a

t Chatm an's apartm

ent after the shooting, Chatman was found lying
on the floor near

the front door, and Cole was found lying on the living room couch. Both Chatman and Cole had been shot m ultiple times. The police were able to get a descripti on of the Def endant's
car from neighbors and within minutes were in pursuit. During the pursuit, Crowell threw the gun outof the car window. The Defendant, upon realizing that the police were behind him, put the car i n neutral and got out of the car. Everyone fled fr om the car, except for Hebert, who jumped int o the front seat to stop the car from rolling. All of the occupa nts of the car, inc

luding the Defe

ndant,
were found and taken into police custody. The police also found the nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun on a sidewalk near the Defendant's car.-4-

Both victims were pronounced dead upon arriving at nearby hospitals. Autopsies performed
on the victims revealed

the following: (1) Chatman had a "contact" wound to his lower left abdomen,
a "close-range" wound to his upper left abdomen, and a contusion to the right side of his head; (2) Cole had a "close-range" gunshot wound to the left ey ebrow and additional gunshot wounds on the right side of the head and on the scrotum; and (3) both victims tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol.

The Defendant w

as convicted by

a jury of fi

rst degree murder for the death of Robert Cole and of second degree

murder for the death of Michael Chatman. The Defendant now contends that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. In addition, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting a number of crime scene and

autopsy phot

ographs into evidence.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support either his conviction for first

degree murder

or his conviction for second degree murder. Viewing the evidence in the light most favora

ble to the State, we conc

lude that the evide

nce is sufficien

t to support both convictions.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, this Cou

rt must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in det ermining "whether 'any rational trier of fact co

uld have found the

essential elemen

ts of the crime bey

ond a reasonable dou bt.' " State v. Meade , 942 S.W. 2d 561, 564 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 199 6) (quotin g Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (19 79)). Beca use the pres ump tio n of inn ocen ce i s re pla ced b y a presumption of guilt upon conviction, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that t he evidence presented at trial was insufficient. McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Te nn
. 1963). This Court will not dist urb a verdict of g

uilt for lack of suf

ficient evidenc

e unless the facts containedin the record and any inferen ces which may be drawn from the facts are insufficient, as
a matter of l aw, for a rati onal trier o f fact to fin d the defend ant gu il ty bey ond a reasonable

doubt. Statev. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). On appeal, this Court m ust afford the State "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Id. (citing State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). This Court will not reweigh o r reeva luate the evidence. State v. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1982) (citing Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d at 835). A crimina l conviction shall

be set aside where the evidence is "insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). A. First Degree Murder

The Defendant a rgues that the e vidence presen

ted at trial was ins

ufficient to suppo

rt a conviction for first degree murder. Specifically, the De fendant argues that he did not act wi th premeditation when shooting Robert Cole. We disagree.-5-

First degree murde

r is the premedita

ted and intentiona

l killing of anoth

er person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). Once a homicide has bee

n established, it

is presumed to be second degree murder, and the State has th e burden of provi

ng premeditatio

n to rais e the offense to first degree murder. State v. Hall , 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Nesbit , 978 S.W.2d 872, 898 (Tenn. 1998)). Pre meditati on is defined as "an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). "Premeditation" means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to theact itself. It is not necessary that

the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The me ntal state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free fr om ex citement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Id. Premeditation is the process of t hink ing about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct. See State v. Brown , 836 S.W.2d 530, 540-41 (Tenn. 1992).

The exi ste nce o f pr eme dit ati on i s a q ues tio n of fact for the jur y t o determi ne and may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense. State v. Rosa, 996 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Brown , 836 S.W.2d at 539). T he use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim and
a defendant's calmness after the crime may support the existence of premeditation. Id. (citing State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the State, a jury

could have reas

onably found that the Defendant

shot and killed victim Cole after the exercise of r

eflection and jud

gment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -13-202(a)(1) , (d). It is u ndisputed that t

he Defendant shot both of the victims. Allison Dowell testified that when the Defendant left the scene the first time, Cole was still sitting on t he co uch . Do wel l's t est imo ny is sub sta nti ate d by that of Janet D ixon, a resident of the adjoining townhouse, who tes tified that she hea

rd "three poppin

g sounds," a ca

r pull away

and come back, and then more popping sounds. Hebert also testified that when she came back to the front of the apartment af

ter Chatma

n had been shot, she saw Cole sitting on the couch. No evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's testimony tha t he shot Cole

immediately after he shot Chatman because Cole wou ld not let go of the

Defendant's p

ockets. Cole was unarm ed when the Defendant shot hi

m.
The testimony at t

rial also indicate

d that t he Defendant was unusually calm after the shootings. The Defendant testified that when he went back into the apartment and retrieved the gun, the victims were convulsing and in pain; yet he did not call for an ambulance. I nstead, the Defendant got into his car an d drove away. In the car, he told Hebert and Dowell that he was sorry that they had to see what had happened. Hebert testified that the Defendant was the "calmest out of everybody there." These circumsta

nces indicate a c

almness immediate

ly following

the killings, whic

h supports
a finding of premeditation. See Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 660. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that the jury acted unreasonably in f inding that the Defenda

nt acted with a pre

viously formed intent to kill when he shot Cole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d).-6- B. Second Degree Murder

The Defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him for seconddegree mu

rder. Specifically

, the Defendant a

rgues that the of

fense amounted to , at most, voluntary manslaughter, t

hat is, an "intent

ional or knowing k

illin g of another in a state of passion produced by adequat

e provocation suf

ficient to lead a r

easonable pers

on to act in an ir

rational manner." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a). However, it is the opinion of this Court that there was ample evidence in the record to establish that the D efe ndant knowingly shot and killed Chatman withoutthe adequate pr

ovocation to redu

ce the conviction

to voluntary

mansl aughter. Witnesses Hebert and Dowel l both testi fied that the Defendant was the one who confronted Chatman and accused him of stealing. Other than the Defendant's own test imony, there is no evidence that Chatman provoked or attacked the Defendant.

Whether acts constitute a k

nowing killing, s

o as to support a

conviction for second degree murder, or a killing due to adequate provocation, so as to supp ort a con viction for voluntary manslaughter, is a question for the jury. State v. Johnson , 909 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In this

case, the jury was

instructed on both the offense of voluntary manslaughter and that of second degree

murder and deter

mined that t

he Defen dant was guilty of second degree murder

. It was within the jury's prerog ative to reject the notion of provocation. See id.
II. THE PHOTOGRAP HS

The Defendant arg

ues that the trial c

ourt erred in adm

itting certain c

rimescene and autops

y photographs into evidence. I t is within the discre

tion of the trial co

urt to admit photog

raphs into evidence, and such a ruling shall not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Banks , 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Ten n. 1978). Evidenc e shall be excluded

where the proba

tive value is
s ubstantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair pre judice. Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Beca use th e probative value of

the photographs outweighs any potential prejudicial effec ts, we find that the trial court correctly allowed the photographs to be admitted into evidence.
A. Crime Scene

Photographs

The Defend ant argues th at the trial court erred i n admitti ng into evid ence several photogr aph s of the crime scene. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403. T he basis of

this argument is that the pictures were unduly gruesome and should not have been a dmitt ed because othe

r less inflammatory evidence could have been used instead. We disagr ee.
The trial court did not a

buseits discretion in admit ting photograp

hs of the crime sc

ene into evidence. All of the crime scene photographs we

re relevant to th

e location of the v

ictims'bodies and to other key evidence

in this case. One photograph was admitted to show where Cole's body w as found be cause the manner and location in which Cole was shot was in dispute. Two other c rim e scene photographs were pr obative of the dam age done to the r

oom that may h

ave resulted fr

om a-7-

scuffle. These photogra

phs contain placa

rds pointing out w

here v arious pieces of evidence were locatedin the room and thus are probative of the location in which evidence was found at the scene. The final crime scene photograph that was objected to shows a bullet hole in one of the pillows on the couch. This photog

raph was used to a

ssist Detective Tim Mason with his testimony at trial and
was also probative of the manner and location in which Cole was shot. The photographs admitted into evidence are not unduly gruesome and thus not unfairly prejudicial. Although it is unfo rtunate that the photographs of the room, and the furniture therein, contained blood stains from the murders, the probative val

ue of the living r

oom layout out

weighs any

prejudicial eff

ect. B. Autopsy Photogr

aphs

The Defendant argues that the trial cour t e rred in admitting

autopsy phot

ographs of both victims. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the medica l testimony presen

ted by the

State adequately

described the degree and extent of the victims' injuries, reducing the probative value of the pictures. However, it is the opinion of this Court that the probative v alue of the photographs outweighed any prejudicial effects and thus were properly admitted into evidence.

The Tennessee Supre

me Co urt has held that photog raphs of a corps

e are "admissib

le in murder prosecut

ions if they are relevant to the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying

character." Banks , 564 S.W.2d at 950-51 . However, wher e medical testimon

y adequate

ly describes the degree or

extent of injuries, s

uch photograph

s should generally be excluded. State v. Collins , 986 S.W.2d 13, 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

In this case, the autopsy photographs were used by the State to show en

try and exit wo

unds,
as well as the range at which the victims were shot. This evidence directly re lates to th e State's position regarding the manner in which the victims were killed. The number and location of the wounds were relevant

to the State's argument that the shootings wer

e premeditated a

nd intentional. We therefore conc

lude that the trial

court did not err b

y admi tting autops y photographs of the victims.
CONCLUSION

We conclude that the evidence presented at trial is suf ficient to support both of the De fendant's convictions. On the basis of the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury coul d hav e found that the Defendant was guilty of sec ond d egree murder for the knowing killing of Michael Chatman and of first degree murder for the premeditated murder of Robert Cole. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial cour t properly a

dmitted into

evidence the photographs at issue. The probative value of the photographs outweighs any potential prejudicial effects. Finding no error in the record before us, we af

firm the judgmen

t of the trial cour

t.

The judgment of the trial court is accordingly AFF IRMED.-8- ___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE