1

Filed 1/12/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA J. O’NEIL et al., )

)

Plaintiffs and Appellants, )

) S177401

v. )

) Ct.App. 2/5 B208225

CRANE CO. et al., )

) Los Angeles County

Defendants and Respondents. ) Super. Ct. No. BC360274

____________________________________)

This case involves the limits of a manufacturer’s duty to prevent 

foreseeable harm related to its product: When is a product manufacturer liable for 

injuries caused by adjacent products or replacement parts that were made by others 

and used in conjunction with the defendant’s product? We hold that a product 

manufacturer may not be held liable in strict liability or negligence for harm 

caused by another manufacturer’s product unless the defendant’s own product 

contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant participated substantially in 

creating a harmful combined use of the products.

Defendants Crane Co. (Crane) and Warren Pumps LLC (Warren) made 

valves and pumps used in Navy warships. They were sued here for a wrongful 

death allegedly caused by asbestos released from external insulation and internal 

gaskets and packing, all of which were made by third parties and added to the 

pumps and valves post sale. It is undisputed that defendants never manufactured 

or sold any of the asbestos-containing materials to which plaintiffs’ decedent was 

exposed. Nevertheless, plaintiffs claim defendants should be held strictly liable 

and negligent because it was foreseeable workers would be exposed to and harmed 
2

by the asbestos in replacement parts and products used in conjunction with their 

pumps and valves.

Recognizing plaintiffs’ claims would represent an unprecedented expansion 

of strict products liability. We decline to do so. California law has long provided 

that manufacturers, distributors, and retailers have a duty to ensure the safety of 

their products, and will be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a defect in 

their products. Yet, we have never held that these responsibilities extend to 

preventing injuries caused by other products that might foreseeably be used in 

conjunction with a defendant’s product. Nor have we held that manufacturers 

must warn about potential hazards in replacement parts made by others when, as 

here, the dangerous feature of these parts was not integral to the product’s design. 

The broad rule plaintiffs urge would not further the purposes of strict liability. 

Nor would public policy be served by requiring manufacturers to warn about the 

dangerous propensities of products they do not design, make, or sell.

BACKGROUND

I. Defendants’ Pump and Valve Products on Navy Warships

During World War II, defendants sold parts to the United States Navy for 

use in the steam propulsion systems of warships. These propulsion systems were 

vast and complex. Massive boilers generated steam from seawater. The steam 

flowed through a maze of interconnected pipes to power the ship’s engines and 

provide energy for use throughout the vessel. A single ship contained several 

miles of piping. Because the steam flowing through this system was extremely hot 

and highly pressurized, the pipes and attached components required insulation to 

prevent heat loss and protect against accidental burns. Navy specifications 

required the use of asbestos-containing insulation on all external surfaces of the

steam propulsion systems. Asbestos insulation was also used as an internal sealant 

within gaskets and other components of the propulsion system. The Navy 

preferred asbestos over other types of insulating materials because it was 

lightweight, strong, and effective. Indeed, asbestos was considered to be such an 
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important resource that a 1942 federal regulation ordered its conservation for the 

war effort. (Conservation order No. M-123, 7 Fed.Reg. 2472 (Mar. 31, 1942).) 

Plaintiffs’ expert admitted there was no acceptable substitute for asbestos until at 

least the late 1960’s. Warships could not have been built without it.

The Navy’s Bureau of Ships oversaw the design and construction of 

warships. Naval engineers created specifications that provided detailed design, 

material, and performance requirements for equipment to be used on board. 

Equipment that did not conform with the Navy’s specifications was rejected. 

Product manufacturers were required to comply with naval specifications, 

including those mandating the use of asbestos. 

Crane produced valves for Navy ships according to these strict military 

specifications. The steam propulsion system in a typical warship included 

hundreds of valves of different sizes and functions. In general, valves controlled 

the flow of steam from one point to another through the system. Packing materials 

inside valves were used as sealants, to protect against leakage of high-pressure 

steam or liquids. Although cotton packing was sometimes used for coldertemperature applications, the majority of packing used on Navy ships contained 

asbestos. Gaskets were also used inside the valves to seal the joints between metal 

surfaces. Although some gaskets were made of metal, the gaskets used in valves, 

flanges, or pump casings generally contained asbestos. During the early 1940’s, 

Navy specifications required that the internal gaskets and packing materials in 

valves contain asbestos. At that time, asbestos was the only insulating material 

that could withstand the extremely high temperatures and pressures produced by a 

warship’s steam propulsion system. Following mandated Navy specifications, 

Crane used asbestos in its valves and packing. However, no evidence was 

presented that asbestos, as opposed to some other type of insulation material, was 

needed in order for the valves to function properly. Indeed, Crane made some 

valves of corrugated iron, which contained no asbestos. Crane did not 
4

manufacture the asbestos packing or gaskets used in its valves. It purchased these 

components from Navy-approved vendors. 

Warren supplied pumps. Navy ships contained hundreds of pumps used for 

various purposes. In the steam propulsion system of a warship, pumps moved 

liquids and condensed steam. Like Crane, Warren built its pumps for specific 

ships in accordance with stringent naval specifications. Most of these pumps had 

internal gaskets and packing that contained asbestos.1 One Warren pump also had 

asbestos insulation around a valve stem, but it was covered with a layer of sheet 

metal. The pumps were not made or shipped with external insulation. As with 

Crane’s valves, no evidence was presented that Warren’s pumps required the use 

of internal components made with asbestos in order to operate.

Once the parts were received, shipbuilders integrated them into a complex 

steam-propulsion system. Pumps and valves were connected to other components, 

such as boilers and piping, with asbestos-containing flange gaskets. Neither Crane 

nor Warren produced these flange gaskets. All metal components of the steampropulsion system, including miles of piping, were then covered in a layer of 

asbestos insulation. This insulation was made and sold by other companies, most 

notably Johns Manville. Neither Crane nor Warren produced the external 

insulation. The valves and pumps did not need external insulation in order to 

function. 

The gaskets and packing inside Crane’s valves and Warren’s pumps were 

replaced during routine maintenance. No evidence was presented that Warren 

ever made or sold these replacement parts. Crane did not manufacture asbestos 

packing or gaskets. Although Crane did at one time sell replacement packing and 

gaskets for use in maintaining and repairing its valves, these products were 

generally shipped under the label of the packing or gasket manufacturer and often 

 

1 However, pumps that were not used for high-temperature applications often 

had no asbestos-containing parts. For example, some pumps contained gaskets 

made of plant fiber, with plastic packing. 
5

shipped directly from that manufacturer to the customer. There was no evidence 

that the Navy ever purchased replacement gaskets or packing materials from 

Crane.

II. Plaintiff’s Exposure to Asbestos

Patrick O’Neil served on the USS Oriskany (Oriskany) from 1965 to 1967. 

The Oriskany was a large “Essex class” aircraft carrier carrying up to 4,000 crew 

members. The ship was authorized in 1942, launched in 1945, and commissioned 

to active service in 1950. Crane and Warren supplied equipment for the 

Oriskany’s steam propulsion system in 1943 or earlier, at least 20 years before 

O’Neil worked aboard the ship. 

Among his other duties on the Oriskany, O’Neil supervised the enlisted 

men who repaired equipment in the engine and boiler rooms. This work exposed 

him to airborne asbestos fibers. Asbestos-containing products are not dangerous 

when intact. The health hazard arises when the products are cut or damaged, 

releasing asbestos fibers that can be inhaled. (See San Francisco Unified School 

Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1325.) To access a piece 

of equipment, repairmen first had to remove the outer layer of insulation, which 

generated large amounts of asbestos dust. Removal of the flange gaskets 

connecting pumps and valves to other components also produced asbestos dust, as 

did removal and replacement of the packing and gaskets inside pumps and valves. 

A coworker testified that O’Neil encountered dust from all of these sources. As 

early as 1922, the Navy was aware that airborne asbestos could potentially cause 

lung diseases. Its industrial hygienists conducted studies on the health effects of 

asbestos exposure from the prewar period until well into the 1960’s. Nevertheless, 

the Navy did not warn seamen about the hazards of working with asbestos-
6

containing materials and did not advise them to wear respirators or take other 

precautions during dusty work.2

To the extent O’Neil was exposed to dust generated during work on pumps 

and valves, no evidence was presented that any of the asbestos-containing dust 

came from a product made by Crane or Warren. Neither company manufactured 

or sold the external insulation or flange gaskets that repairmen removed. 

Although Crane’s valves and Warren’s pumps contained internal asbestoscontaining gaskets and packing when the Oriskany was built, these original 

components had been replaced long before O’Neil boarded the ship 20 years later. 

There was no evidence that any of these replacement parts were made by Crane or 

Warren. 

In 2004, nearly 40 years after he worked on the Oriskany, O’Neil 

developed mesothelioma, a fatal cancer of the lining of the lung caused by 

asbestos exposure. He died just over a year later, at age 62. In 2006, O’Neil’s 

family filed a wrongful death complaint raising strict liability and negligence 

claims against several companies that had allegedly supplied asbestos-containing 

products to the Navy. 

Following the close of evidence, Crane moved for nonsuit on all causes of 

action. Among other things, Crane argued there was no evidence O’Neil had been 

exposed to asbestos from any Crane product, and no evidence that any product 

defect or failure to warn by Crane was a substantial factor in causing O’Neil’s 

mesothelioma. Warren joined Crane’s motion and also sought nonsuit on the 

ground that no evidence showed O’Neil had been exposed to any asbestos from 

the repair or maintenance of a Warren pump. In response, plaintiffs’ counsel 

argued that even if O’Neil was not exposed to asbestos released from a Crane or 

 

2 The Navy is immune from liability for injuries arising from the use of 

asbestos in shipyards and warships. (Collins v. Plant Insulation Co. (2010) 185 

Cal.App.4th 260, 270; Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States (3d Cir. 1990) 919 

F.2d 888, 892-893.)
7

Warren product, these manufacturers bore responsibility for his injuries because 

their products originally included asbestos-containing components, and it was 

foreseeable that these parts would wear and be replaced with other asbestoscontaining components, and that these repair and maintenance procedures would 

release harmful asbestos dust. 

The trial court granted the motions and dismissed all claims against Crane 

and Warren.3 The court found there was no evidence defendants’ products were 

inherently dangerous except for the undisturbed internal asbestos components 

some contained. Further, although the nonsuit motions did not raise this ground, 

the court found that the component parts doctrine shielded defendants from 

liability because the Navy integrated defendants’ nondefective products into a 

larger, sophisticated system, and defendants did not control or participate in this 

integration process. (See Artiglio v. General Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 

830; Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, p. 130.) On appeal, this decision was 

reversed.

The Court of Appeal held that the component parts defense applies only to 

manufacturers of “multiuse or fungible products” designed to be altered and 

incorporated into another product. It then concluded defendants’ products did not 

meet these requirements. The Court of Appeal also rejected defendants’ argument 

that they could not be found strictly liable because they did not manufacture or 

supply the asbestos-containing products that caused O’Neil’s mesothelioma. The 

court announced a broad definition of strict products liability: “[A] manufacturer 

is liable in strict liability for the dangerous components of its products, and for 

dangerous products with which its product will necessarily be used.” Even though 

it was replacement gaskets and packing that caused O’Neil’s disease, the court 

concluded these replacement parts were “no different” from the asbestos-

 

3 The court also dismissed claims against Yarway Corporation, a pump 

manufacturer that had moved for nonsuit on the same grounds asserted by Crane 

and Warren. In January 2009, plaintiffs dismissed their appeal against Yarway. 
8

containing components originally included in defendants’ products. The court 

remarked, “If respondents had warned the hypothetical original user, or protected 

that person by avoiding defective design, subsequent users, too, would have been 

protected.” The Court of Appeal asserted defendants’ products were defectively 

designed “because they required asbestos packing and insulation.” This factual 

assertion is unsupported by the record. Trial evidence established that the 

requirement for asbestos derived from military specifications, not from any 

inherent aspect of defendants’ pump and valve designs.4

We granted review and now reverse.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing a judgment of nonsuit, “we must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. ‘[C]ourts traditionally have taken a very restrictive 

view of the circumstances under which nonsuit is proper. The rule is that a trial 

court may not grant a defendant’s motion for nonsuit if plaintiff's evidence would 

support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. [Citations.] [¶] In determining whether 

plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider 

the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must 

be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must 

give “to the plaintiff[’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . 

indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in 

plaintiff[’s] favor . . . .” ’ [Citation.] The same rule applies on appeal from the 

grant of a nonsuit. [Citation.]” (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 

1214-1215.)

I. Strict Liability

Strict liability has been imposed for three types of product defects: 

manufacturing defects, design defects, and “ ‘warning defects.’ ” (Anderson v. 

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995.) The third category 

 

4 Defendants raised this issue in a petition for rehearing, which was denied.
9

describes “products that are dangerous because they lack adequate warnings or 

instructions.” (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 428.) A 

bedrock principle in strict liability law requires that “the plaintiff’s injury must 

have been caused by a ‘defect’ in the [defendant’s] product.” (Daly v. General 

Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 733.)

Plaintiffs argue defendants’ products were defective because they included 

and were used in connection with asbestos-containing parts. They also contend 

defendants should be held strictly liable for failing to warn O’Neil about the 

potential health consequences of breathing asbestos dust released from the 

products used in connection with their pumps and valves. These claims lack 

merit. We conclude that defendants were not strictly liable for O’Neil’s injuries 

because (a) any design defect in defendants’ products was not a legal cause of 

injury to O’Neil, and (b) defendants had no duty to warn of risks arising from 

other manufacturers’ products.

A. No Liability Outside a Defective Product’s Chain of Distribution

From the outset, strict products liability in California has always been 

premised on harm caused by deficiencies in the defendant’s own product. We first 

announced the rule in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 

57, 62 (Greenman): “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 

places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, 

proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” (Italics added.) We 

explained that “[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries 

resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 

products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 

protect themselves.” (Id. at p. 63.) A year later, we extended strict liability to 

retailers, reasoning that, as an “integral part of the overall producing and 

marketing enterprise,” they too should bear the cost of injuries from defective 

products. (Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, 262; see also 

Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 130 [listing other entities in the 
10

chain of commerce to whom strict liability has been applied]; Elmore v. American 

Motors Corp. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 578, 586 [extending the protection of strict 

liability to bystanders].)

Strict liability encompasses all injuries caused by a defective product, even 

those traceable to a defective component part that was supplied by another. 

(Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 261.) However, the reach 

of strict liability is not limitless. We have never held that strict liability extends to 

harm from entirely distinct products that the consumer can be expected to use 

with, or in, the defendant’s nondefective product. Instead, we have consistently 

adhered to the Greenman formulation requiring proof that the plaintiff suffered 

injury caused by a defect in the defendant’s own product. (Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson 

Corp., supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 131-135.) Regardless of a defendant’s position in the 

chain of distribution, “the basis for his liability remains that he has marketed or 

distributed a defective product” (Daly v. General Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d 

at p. 739), and that product caused the plaintiff’s injury.

In Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1189, the plaintiff 

was injured when she fell in a hotel bathtub. We concluded it would be improper 

to impose strict liability on the hotel proprietor for injuries caused by an alleged 

defect in hotel premises that the proprietor did not build or market. (Id. at 

p. 1188.) We stressed that strict products liability should be imposed only on 

those entities responsible for placing a defective product into the stream of 

commerce. (Id. at pp. 1198-1199.) Because those outside the marketing 

enterprise “generally ha[ve] no ‘continuing business relationship’ with the 

manufacturer of the defective product,” they “cannot exert pressure upon the 

manufacturer to make the product safe and cannot share with the manufacturer the 

costs of insuring the safety” of the product’s user. (Id. at p. 1199.) We also 

observed that, although many potentially defective products are used in a hotel or 

restaurant setting, “[t]he mere circumstance that it was contemplated customers of 

these businesses would use the products . . . or be benefited by them does not 
11

transform the owners of the businesses into the equivalent of retailers of the 

products. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1199-1200.) The mere foreseeability of injury to 

users of a defective product was not sufficient justification for imposing strict 

liability outside the stream of commerce.

In this case, it is undisputed that O’Neil was exposed to no asbestos from a 

product made by the defendants. Although he was exposed to potentially high 

levels of asbestos dust released from insulation the Navy had applied to the 

exterior of the pumps and valves, Crane and Warren did not manufacture or sell 

this external insulation. They did not mandate or advise that it be used with their 

products. O’Neil was also exposed to asbestos from the replacement gaskets and 

packing inside the pumps and valves. Yet, uncontroverted evidence established 

that these internal components were not the original parts supplied by Crane and 

Warren. They were replacement parts the Navy had purchased from other 

sources.5

It is fundamental that the imposition of liability requires a showing that the 

plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an act of the defendant or an instrumentality 

under the defendant’s control. (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 

588, 597.) “A manufacturer is liable only when a defect in its product was a legal 

cause of injury.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.) 

Although the internal gaskets and packing originally supplied with defendants’ 

products contained asbestos, none of these original parts remained on board the 

Oriskany by the time O’Neil arrived decades later. Accordingly, even assuming 

the inclusion of asbestos makes a product defective, no defect inherent in 

defendants’ pump and valve products caused O’Neil’s disease.

Nor does the record support plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ products were 

defective because they were “designed to be used” with asbestos-containing 

 

5 Although Crane did at one time sell replacement gaskets and packing, there 

is no evidence the Navy ever purchased these replacement parts from Crane or 

installed them on the Oriskany. 
12

components. The products were designed to meet the Navy’s specifications. 

Moreover, there was no evidence that defendants’ products required asbestoscontaining gaskets or packing in order to function. Plaintiffs’ assertion to the 

contrary is belied by evidence that defendants made some pumps and valves 

without asbestos-containing parts. As alternative insulating materials became 

available, the Navy could have chosen to replace worn gaskets and seals in 

defendants’ products with parts that did not contain asbestos. Apart from the 

Navy’s specifications, no evidence showed that the design of defendants’ products 

required the use of asbestos components, and their mere compatibility for use with 

such components is not enough to render them defective.6

Plaintiffs and some amici curiae also suggest that defendants’ products 

were defective because they became hot during high-temperature applications, and 

this heat “baked on” the thermal insulation, causing asbestos in the insulation to 

become “friable.” Friable insulation materials may crumble and release respirable 

asbestos fibers into the air. (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & 

Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325.) Of course, a high operating temperature 

was unavoidable given the intended use of these pumps and valves. Because 

transferring heat was integral to the products’ functioning, it cannot be labeled a 

“defect.” (See Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. i, p. 352 [for strict liability to apply, 

“[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 

 

6 A stronger argument for liability might be made in the case of a product 

that required the use of a defective part in order to operate. In such a case, the 

finished product would inevitably incorporate a defect. One could argue that 

replacement of the original defective part with an identically defective one 

supplied by another manufacturer would not break the chain of causation. 

Similarly, if the product manufacturer specified or required the use of a defective 

replacement part, a stronger case could be made that the manufacturer’s failure to 

warn was a proximate cause of resulting injury. In both contexts, however, the 

policy rationales against imposing liability on a manufacturer for a defective part it 

did not produce or supply would remain. (See post, at pp. 29-30.) These difficult 

questions are not presented in the case before us, and we express no opinion on 

their appropriate resolution.
13

contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 

knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics”].) Moreover, the 

product that had the propensity to become friable and release a hazardous 

substance was the asbestos-containing thermal insulation made by other 

manufacturers and applied by others to defendants’ pumps and valves. The 

defective product in this setting was the asbestos insulation, not the pumps and 

valves to which it was applied after defendants’ manufacture and delivery.

B. No Duty to Warn of Defects in Another Manufacturer’s Product

Plaintiffs also argue that defendants had a duty to warn O’Neil about the 

hazards of asbestos because the release of asbestos dust from surrounding products 

was a foreseeable consequence of maintenance work on defendants’ pumps and 

valves.

1. General Principles

“Generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers about 

the hazards inherent in their products. (Anderson [v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 

Corp.], supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1003.) The requirement’s purpose is to inform 

consumers about a product’s hazards and faults of which they are unaware, so that 

they can refrain from using the product altogether or evade the danger by careful 

use. (Ibid.) Typically, under California law, we hold manufacturers strictly liable 

for injuries caused by their failure to warn of dangers that were known to the 

scientific community at the time they manufactured and distributed their product. 

[Citations.]” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64-65.) 

However, we have never held that a manufacturer’s duty to warn extends to 

hazards arising exclusively from other manufacturers’ products. A line of Court 

of Appeal cases holds instead that the duty to warn is limited to risks arising from 

the manufacturer’s own product.

In Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 634, 636-637, an 

explosion resulted from a leak in the propane gas tubing system attached to the 

defendant’s nondefective stove. The Court of Appeal held that the stove 
14

manufacturer had no duty to warn about the potential for gas leaks from other 

products, even though the explosion was ignited by a flame on the stove. It 

explained: “The use of any product can be said to involve some risk because of 

the circumstances surrounding even its normal use. Nonetheless, the makers of 

such products are not liable under any theory, for merely failing to warn of injury 

which may befall a person who uses that product in an unsafe place or in 

conjunction with another product which because of a defect or improper use is 

itself unsafe.” (Id. at p. 638.) In Blackwell v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (1984) 157 

Cal.App.3d 372, 375, workers were injured by the explosion of a tank car filled 

with sulfuric acid. The plaintiffs alleged the tank car was defective because it 

allowed pressure to build in the cargo compartment. They further claimed the 

sulfuric acid supplier had a duty to warn them of possible harm from a defective 

container. (Id. at p. 377.) The court rejected this theory, explaining that “[w]hile 

failure to warn may create liability for harm caused by use of an unreasonably 

dangerous product, that rule does not apply where it was not any unreasonably 

dangerous condition or feature of defendant’s product which caused the injury. 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

The decision in Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 

Cal.App.3d 357 is relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants had a duty to warn 

O’Neil of the hazardous nature of replacement gaskets and packing. In Powell, 

workers were injured in an explosion caused by use of an electric buffer with 

lacquer thinner. (Id. at p. 361.) Although they had used the defendant’s lacquer 

thinner earlier in the job, on the day of the explosion they were using thinner made 

by another manufacturer. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the workers’ 

argument that the defendant should be liable for failing to warn them about the 

flammable nature of lacquer thinner, noting, “no reported decision has held a 

manufacturer liable for its failure to warn of risks of using its product, where it is 

shown that the immediate efficient cause of injury is a product manufactured by 

someone else.” (Id. at p. 362.) The defendant owed a duty to warn about 
15

hazardous characteristics of its own lacquer thinner, and had breached that duty by 

failing to provide a warning, but it bore no liability because “the immediate 

efficient cause” of the workers’ injuries was the explosion of a product made by 

someone else. (Id. at p. 363; see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d 

at p. 597.)7

So too here. Crane and Warren gave no warning about the dangers of 

asbestos in the gaskets and packing originally included in their products. 

However, O’Neil never encountered these original parts. His exposure to asbestos 

came from replacement gaskets and packing and external insulation added to 

defendants’ products long after their installation on the Oriskany. There is no 

dispute that these external and replacement products were made by other 

manufacturers. “[N]o case law . . . supports the idea that a manufacturer, after 

selling a completed product to a purchaser, remains under a duty to warn the 

purchaser of potentially defective additional pieces of equipment that the 

purchaser may or may not use to complement the product bought from the 

manufacturer.” (In re Deep Vein Thrombosis (N.D.Cal. 2005) 356 F.Supp.2d 

1055, 1068.)8

 

7 Although the Powell court expounded at length on the legal and policy 

rationales for limiting a manufacturer’s duty to warn to harms arising from its own 

product, and endeavored to describe the limited circumstances under which 

liability for failure to warn could extend to injuries caused by a “generically 

identical” product with the same risks as the manufacturer’s product (Powell v. 

Standard Brands Paint Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 363-365), the court did 

not decide whether such liability could be imposed in the case before it because 

this theory had not been pleaded in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 365-366.)

8 In In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, passengers who allegedly developed injury 

from defective airline seating sued the airplane manufacturer, Boeing Company. 

The evidence showed that Boeing manufactured planes with no installed seating; 

instead, airlines purchased seating from a separate manufacturer and installed the 

seats without Boeing’s involvement. (In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, supra, 356 

F.Supp.2d at pp. 1058-1059.) The district court held Boeing had no duty to warn 

the airlines or passengers about the risk of injury from unsafe seating designs. (Id. 

at pp. 1067-1069.)
16

Decisions from other jurisdictions are in accord. Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire 

& Rubber Co. (1992) 79 N.Y.2d 289 [591 N.E.2d 222] (Rastelli) and Baughman v. 

General Motors Corp. (4th Cir. 1986) 780 F.2d 1131 (Baughman) both involved 

injuries resulting from the explosion of a multipiece wheel rim during a tire 

change. In Rastelli, the plaintiff sued the tire manufacturer, arguing that Goodyear 

should have warned about the inherent dangers of multipiece rims because its tires 

were compatible for use with such rims. (Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d at p. 225.) New 

York’s highest court refused to impose such a duty based solely on foreseeability. 

The court stressed that Goodyear had no control over the defective rim’s 

production or marketing, it derived no benefit from the rim’s sale, and Goodyear’s 

own product did not create the defect or combine with the rim to create a 

hazardous condition that did not previously exist. (Id. at pp. 225-226.) The 

plaintiff in Baughman sued a vehicle manufacturer on the theory that, even though 

General Motors did not make the wheel that exploded, the company shipped its 

trucks with a similar type of wheel that was also dangerous. (Baughman, at 

p. 1132.) A federal court of appeals rejected this argument for the same reasons 

expressed by the New York court: “Where, as here, the defendant manufacturer 

did not incorporate the defective component part into its finished product and did 

not place the defective component into the stream of commerce, the rationale for 

imposing liability is no longer present. The manufacturer has not had an 

opportunity to test, evaluate, and inspect the component; it has derived no benefit 

from its sale; and it has not represented to the public that the component part is its 

own.” (Id. at pp. 1132-1133; see also Brown v. Drake-Willock Internat., Ltd.

(1995) 209 Mich.App.136, 145, 149 [530 N.W.2d 510, 514, 516] [manufacturer of 

a dialysis machine had no duty to warn about the health risks of formaldehyde 

used to clean the machine].)
17

2. Application in the Asbestos Context

a. The Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co. Decision

In 2009, the First District Court of Appeal addressed the very question 

presented here. In Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 564, 571-572 (Taylor), a serviceman developed mesothelioma from 

his exposure to asbestos on a warship. Like O’Neil, Taylor worked in the ship’s 

engine room. In the course of his duties, Taylor sometimes removed and replaced 

the internal gaskets, packing, and insulation pads used in pumps and valves. 

(Ibid.) After his death, Taylor’s family sued the manufacturers of these pumps 

and valves.9 They argued, as plaintiffs do here, “that a ‘manufacturer has a duty to 

warn of hazards arising from the foreseeable uses of its product, even if that 

hazard arises from the addition of a product that, although manufactured by 

another, is used in the normal and intended operation of the defendant’s 

product.’ ” (Taylor, at pp. 572-573.) The Court of Appeal determined that pump 

and valve manufacturers could not be held strictly liable for failing to warn about 

the dangers of asbestos exposure. It gave three reasons for this conclusion.

“First, California law restricts the duty to warn to entities in the chain of 

distribution of the defective product.” (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) 

Based on authorities discussed above, including Peterson v. Superior Court, 

 

9 Crane and Warren were among the defendants. (Taylor, supra, 171 

Cal.App.4th at p. 570, fn. 1.) Some commentators have observed that, due to the 

bankruptcies of Johns Manville and other major suppliers of asbestos-containing 

products, asbestos personal injury litigants have shifted their focus in the past 

decade to “ever-more peripheral defendants,” like pump and valve manufacturers. 

(Calnan & Stier, Perspectives on Asbestos Litigation: Overview and Preview

(2008) 37 Sw.U. L. Rev. 459, 463; see also Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos 

Litigation (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2005) p. xxiii 

<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf> [as of January 

12, 2012] [in the late 1990’s, bankruptcy-related litigation stays drove plaintiffs 

“to press peripheral non-bankrupt defendants to shoulder a larger share of the 

value of asbestos claims and to widen their search for other corporations that 

might be held liable”].)
18

supra, 10 Cal.4th 1185, and Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th 548, 

the Taylor court observed that our strict products liability precedents have 

recognized “a bright-line legal distinction” imposing liability only on those entities 

responsible for placing an injury-producing product into the stream of commerce. 

(Taylor, at p. 576.) The pump and valve manufacturers could not be strictly liable 

for failure to warn, the court concluded, because these companies “were not part 

of the ‘chain of distribution’ of the gaskets, packing, discs, and insulation that Mr. 

Taylor encountered.” (Id. at p. 579.)

Second, in a related holding, the Court of Appeal determined that “in 

California, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of defects in products supplied by 

others and used in conjunction with the manufacturer’s product unless the 

manufacturer’s product itself causes or creates the risk of harm.” (Taylor, supra, 

171 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court rejected the notion that a manufacturer has 

a duty to warn whenever the intended use of its product will expose consumers to 

risks arising from the product of another. (Id. at p. 580.) Relying on analogous 

failure to warn cases, the court concluded that, in general, a manufacturer’s duty to 

warn is limited to the dangerous propensities of its own products. (Id. at pp. 580-

583; see Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 634, Blackwell v. 

Phelps Dodge Corp., supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 372; Powell v. Standard Brands 

Paint Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 357; see also In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 

supra, 356 F.Supp.2d 1055.) “Although a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn 

when the use of its product in combination with the product of another creates a 

potential hazard, that duty arises only when the manufacturer’s own product 

causes or creates the risk of harm.” (Taylor, at p. 580.)

Third, the Taylor court determined that the component parts doctrine 

provided an alternate basis for concluding the pump and valve manufacturers 

owed no duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos. (Taylor, supra, 171 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 584-586.) The component parts doctrine provides that the 

manufacturer of a component part is not liable for injuries caused by the finished 
19

product into which the component has been incorporated unless the component 

itself was defective and caused harm. (Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 473, 480-481; Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5(a), p. 130; Taylor, at 

p. 575.) Based on evidence that the pumps and valves were designed to operate 

“as part of a larger ‘marine steam propulsion system’ ” (Taylor, at p. 584), the 

court concluded the manufacturers could be held liable only if defects in these 

components caused injury or if the manufacturers participated in the integration of 

their pumps and valves into the ship’s propulsion system. (Id. at p. 585.) Because 

neither of these requirements was met, the manufacturers could not be held liable 

for asbestos-induced injuries. (Ibid.)10

b. Out-of-state Decisions

As additional support for its holdings, the Taylor court discussed a pair of 

asbestos cases from Washington state and a federal case from Ohio. These 

decisions are instructive.

In Simonetta v. Viad Corp. (2008) 165 Wn.2d 341, 345 [197 P.3d 127, 129] 

(Simonetta), the Washington Supreme Court proposed to answer “whether under 

the common law a manufacturer can be held liable for failure to warn of the 

hazards of another manufacturer’s product.” When Simonetta served as a fireman 

and machinist aboard a Navy vessel from 1958 to 1959, he performed 

maintenance on a seawater evaporator manufactured by the defendant’s 

predecessor. The evaporator was insulated with asbestos mud and cloth, and

Simonetta had to remove this insulation to service the machine. (Id., 197 P.3d at 

p. 130.) Over 40 years later, Simonetta developed lung cancer and sued. He 

claimed the evaporator manufacturer had a duty to warn about the dangers of 

 

10 In so finding, the court rejected an argument that the component parts 

doctrine shields only manufacturers of “fungible, multi-use components.” (Taylor, 

supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 584.) We express no opinion on whether the pumps 

and valves used in marine propulsion systems are “fungible,” or whether the 

component parts defense is limited to fungible products.
20

respirable asbestos because it knew or reasonably should have known that asbestos 

would be used to insulate its product and would have to be removed in the course 

of normal maintenance and repairs. (Ibid.) An intermediate appellate court 

accepted this argument, holding that “ ‘when a product requires the use of another 

product and the two together cause a release of a hazardous substance, the 

manufacturer has a duty to warn about the inherent dangers.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Washington’s highest court disagreed. It held that the duty to warn, in negligence 

or strict liability, extends only to those entities in the chain of distribution of a 

hazardous product. (197 P.3d at pp. 133-134, 138.) Because the hazardous 

product was the asbestos insulation applied to the evaporator, not the evaporator 

itself, and because the defendant did not manufacture, sell, or supply this asbestos 

insulation, the defendant had no duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos 

exposure. (Id. at p. 138.)

While Simonetta speaks to liability for injuries arising from external 

insulation, its companion case, Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings (2008) 165 

Wn.2d 373 [198 P.3d 493] (Braaten), also addressed the problem of injuries 

arising from asbestos-containing replacement parts. Braaten, a pipefitter on Navy 

ships, was exposed to asbestos from 1967 until the early 1980’s. Braaten 

performed regular maintenance on steam pumps and valves, which required him to 

remove and replace asbestos-containing external insulation, gaskets, and packing. 

(Id., 198 P.3d at p. 496.) He developed mesothelioma in 2003 and sued several 

pump and valve manufacturers, arguing they had a duty to warn him about the 

dangers of exposure to asbestos in external insulation and in replacement packing 

and gaskets. Although the defendants’ products had originally included asbestoscontaining packing and gaskets, these parts had been replaced several times before 

Braaten encountered the pumps and valves. The defendants did not manufacture 

or sell these replacement parts. (Id. at pp. 495-496.) The Washington Supreme 

Court concluded that the holding in Simonetta applied equally to internal asbestoscontaining components made by others: “[T]he general rule that there is no duty 
21

under common law products liability or negligence principles to warn of the 

dangers of exposure to asbestos in other manufacturers’ products applies with 

regard to replacement packing and gaskets. The defendants did not sell or supply 

the replacement packing or gaskets or otherwise place them in the stream of 

commerce, did not specify asbestos-containing packing and gaskets for use with 

their valves and pumps, and other types of materials could have been used.” 

(Braaten, at pp. 495-496.) Accordingly, the court held that pump and valve 

makers had no duty to warn about the risks of exposure to asbestos, either from 

thermal insulation applied to their products by the Navy or from replacement 

gaskets and packing materials. (Id. at p. 503.)

The Simonetta and Braaten decisions both discussed Lindstrom v. A-C 

Product Liability Trust (6th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 488 (Lindstrom), a case involving 

very similar facts. Lindstrom, a merchant seaman, developed mesothelioma after 

years of working in the engine rooms of numerous ships. (Id. at p. 491.) After the 

federal district court dismissed his claims against certain pump and valve 

manufacturers, Lindstrom appealed. As in the Washington cases, and here, 

Lindstrom alleged he was exposed to asbestos-containing gaskets and packing 

materials when he worked on pumps and valves, but the evidence established that 

all of this exposure was to replacement parts manufactured by other companies. 

The gaskets and packing originally supplied with the pumps and valves had been 

replaced several times before Lindstrom worked on the defendants’ products. (Id. 

at pp. 494-497.) The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of 

the pump and valve manufacturers, ruling insufficient evidence connected 

Lindstrom with asbestos released from the defendants’ products. “Lindstrom 

almost certainly could not have handled the original packing or gasket material, 

and this fact compels the conclusion that any asbestos that he may have been 

exposed to in connection with [the defendant’s] product would be attributable to 

some other manufacturer.” (Id. at p. 495.) The court did not consider whether a 

duty to warn could ever extend to replacement parts, but rejected Lindstrom’s 
22

claims as simply lacking in causation. It reasoned that a manufacturer “cannot be 

held responsible for material ‘attached or connected’ to its product” (ibid.) or 

otherwise “incorporated into its product post-manufacture.” (Id. at p. 497; see also 

Stark v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (6th Cir. 2001) 21 Fed.Appx. 371, 378, 

381.)

The issue of liability for replacement parts has also arisen in other types of 

asbestos cases. In Ford Motor v. Wood (1998) 119 Md.App. 1, 33 [703 A.2d 

1315, 1330], family members of mechanics who died of mesothelioma sued an 

auto manufacturer for failing to warn about the dangers involved in replacing 

asbestos-containing brakes and clutches on its vehicles. It was undisputed that the 

mechanics were exposed to asbestos from replacement parts and not from the 

original brakes and clutches shipped in Ford vehicles. (Ibid.) A Maryland 

appellate court refused to hold Ford strictly liable and rejected the plaintiffs’ 

belatedly raised failure to warn theory, concluding Ford had no duty to warn about 

the dangers of a product it did not place into the stream of commerce. (703 A.2d 

at p. 1332.) 11 Similarly, a federal court in Illinois refused to hold an aircraft 

manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a repairman’s exposure to asbestoscontaining replacement parts. (Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (S.D.Ill. 

1989) 721 F.Supp. 1019.) The district court found it of no moment that the 

defendant had originally installed asbestos chafing strips on its airplanes because 

these strips had been replaced many times before the repairman’s exposure, and 

the defendant did not supply the replacement strips. (Id. at pp. 1029-1030.)

Reliance on the “adjacent products” theory of liability was stretched 

perhaps the farthest in Macias v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (2010) 158 Wn.App. 

 

11 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion on appeal, the case had not been tried or 

submitted to the jury on the theory that Ford had a duty to warn about hazards in 

replacement brakes and clutches. (Ford Motor v. Wood, supra, 703 A.2d at 

pp. 1330-1331.) The court observed that, even assuming the issue had been 

properly preserved, “we would not find liability under that theory as a matter of 

law.” (Id. at p. 1331.)
23

931 [244 P.3d 978]. Macias, a tool keeper, used respirators made by different 

companies to mitigate exposure to asbestos and other toxic dust and fumes. (Id., 

244 P.3d at p. 979.) When Macias developed mesothelioma, he sued the respirator 

makers for failing to warn him about the dangers of exposure to asbestos dust. On 

discretionary review from a denial of summary judgment, the Washington 

appellate court observed that the connection between the defendants’ products and 

the plaintiff’s asbestos exposure was “even more remote” than in Simonetta and 

Braaten. (Macias, 244 P.3d at p. 982.) Because the respirator manufacturers did 

not manufacture, sell, or supply the asbestos that harmed Macias, and thus were 

not in the chain of distribution of a harmful product, the court held they had no 

duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos. (244 P.3d at p. 983.) The court 

stressed that a duty to warn arises when the manufacturer is in a harmful product’s 

chain of distribution. It declined to extend that duty when the purpose of the 

defendant’s product is to prevent exposure to a hazardous substance. The 

foreseeability that customers will have such exposure is not enough to establish a 

duty to warn: “The respirator manufacturers’ ability to foresee that their products 

would be used in tandem with hazardous substances like asbestos, and that 

cleaning and maintaining their respirators might expose workers to asbestos, does 

not give rise to a duty to warn under [Rest.2d Torts] section 388 where the 

respirator manufacturers were not involved in manufacturing, supplying, or 

distributing the asbestos.” (Ibid.; see also Simonetta, supra, 197 P.3d at p. 131, fn. 

4 [“ ‘Foreseeability does not create a duty but sets limits once a duty is 

established.’ ”].)

3. Plaintiffs’ Authorities Are Distinguishable

The Court of Appeal here disagreed with Taylor and ignored the out-ofstate decisions discussed above. Instead, the court relied on its own prior decision 

in Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co. (2004) 129 

Cal.App.4th 577 (Tellez-Cordova), and two other Court of Appeal opinions, as 

support for its conclusion that “a manufacturer is liable in strict liability for the 
24

dangerous components of its products, and for dangerous products with which its 

product will necessarily be used.” (Italics added.) The reliance is misplaced. 

These cases do not support the broad expansion of strict liability law proposed in 

the second clause of the Court of Appeal’s holding.

In DeLeon v. Commercial Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1983) 148 

Cal.App.3d 336, 340 (DeLeon), the question was whether “custom-made factory 

equipment which is safe to use in some locations [is] ‘defective’ because in a 

particular location its use may bring the operator in contact with an adjacent 

rotating line shaft built and maintained by the plant owners.” DeLeon was injured 

when she was cleaning the defendant’s shaker bin and her arm became tangled in 

an exposed rotating line shaft located above the bin. (Id. at pp. 340-341.) She 

sued both her employer, which had designed and installed the line shaft, and the 

manufacturer of the shaker bin. On appeal from the manufacturer’s dismissal on 

summary judgment, the court found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the 

bin’s designed proximity to the line shaft presented an “ ‘excessive preventable 

danger.’ ” (Id. at p. 344.) Because the intended use of the bin included periodic 

cleaning, the court reasoned that the bin’s dimensions and its placement near an 

exposed line shaft arguably constituted design defects and gave rise to a duty to 

warn. (Id. at pp. 346, 348-349.)

In some respects, DeLeon’s facts resemble those presented here. Like 

DeLeon, O’Neil suffered a foreseeable injury not from the defendant’s product, 

but from another manufacturer’s product located nearby. An important difference, 

however, is that the bin manufacturer in DeLeon was heavily involved in creating 

the dangerous condition that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury. DeLeon’s injury 

resulted not from any intrinsic defect in the bin or the line shaft, but in the 

dangerous proximity of these two products. The bin manufacturer contributed to 

this dangerous condition because it designed the bin specifically for use in the 

particular site where it was located. (DeLeon, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at pp. 341-

342, 345.) The bin’s designer visited the site but “never noticed the shaft 
25

overhead, did not know what it was,” and did not investigate to determine whether 

it presented a safety hazard. (Id. at p. 341.)

The DeLeon court itself observed that the case did not pose “a clear-cut 

legal question of component part liability,” but instead presented “a factual issue 

of [the manufacturer’s] involvement in design which will permit variations in the 

applicable rules of law depending upon how the trier of fact determines the extent 

of [the manufacturer’s] design responsibility.” (DeLeon, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 343.) The case is distinguishable on its facts and offers no rule of law 

supporting plaintiffs’ position. “There is nothing in DeLeon that suggests that a 

manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn of the dangerous qualities of

another manufacturer’s product.” (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 589-

590.)

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 

Cal.App.4th 1218 likewise fails. Firefighter Wright was injured when a deck gun 

he was using broke loose from its mounting assembly under high water pressure. 

(Id. at pp. 1222-1223.) Even though the deck gun itself did not break or “fail” in 

the accident, the Court of Appeal found a triable issue as to whether the gun was 

defectively designed because it did not include a “flange” mounting system and 

was not compatible for use with this safer mounting system. (Id. at p. 1229.) The 

court also concluded that the deck gun manufacturer could be liable for failing to 

warn users about the danger that could result from a foreseeable mismatch of the 

deck gun with inadequate attachment parts. (Id. at p. 1236.) Wright is factually 

distinguishable because the plaintiff was injured due to a failure of the entire deck 

gun assembly, of which the defendant’s product was a component part. His injury 

was not traceable to a single product made by another manufacturer; it was 

allegedly caused by a foreseeable failure of the entire system to withstand high 

water pressure. An interpretation of Wright that would require a manufacturer to 

warn about all potentially hazardous conditions surrounding the use of a product, 

even when those hazards arise entirely from the product of another manufacturer, 
26

reaches too far. There is no precedent in California law for such a broad 

expansion of a product manufacturer’s duty.

Finally, the Court of Appeal below maintained that the result here was 

controlled by its prior decision in Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 577. 

We disagree. Tellez-Cordova is distinguishable on its facts, and its holding does 

not create a broader duty for manufacturers to warn about hazards arising solely 

from other products.

Tellez-Cordova developed lung disease from breathing toxic substances 

released from metals he cut and sanded and from abrasive discs on the power tools 

he used. (Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 579.) He sued 

manufacturers of these tools, arguing they were “specifically designed” to be used 

with abrasive discs for grinding and sanding metals, and it was therefore 

reasonably foreseeable that toxic dust would be released into the air when the tools 

were used for their intended purpose. (Id. at p. 580.) Relying on Garman v. 

Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 634, and Powell v. Standard Brands 

Paint Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 357, the tool manufacturers argued California 

law imposed no duty on them to warn of hazards in the product of another. 

(Tellez-Cordova, at p. 585.) The tools themselves released no hazardous dust; the 

dust came from the abrasive discs that were attached to the tools and the metals 

they contacted. However, the Court of Appeal remarked that this argument 

“misse[d] the point,” because the intended purpose of the tools was to abrade 

surfaces, and toxic dust was a foreseeable by-product of this activity. According 

to the complaint’s allegations, “the tools had no function without the abrasives 

which disintegrated into toxic dust,” and “the abrasive products were not 

dangerous without the power of the tools.” (Ibid.)

The facts in Tellez-Cordova differed from the present case in two 

significant respects. First, the power tools in Tellez-Cordova could only be used in 

a potentially injury-producing manner. Their sole purpose was to grind metals in a 

process that inevitably produced harmful dust. In contrast, the normal operation of 
27

defendants’ pumps and valves did not inevitably cause the release of asbestos dust. 

This is true even if “normal operation” is defined broadly to include the dusty 

activities of routine repair and maintenance, because the evidence did not establish 

that defendants’ products needed asbestos-containing components or insulation to 

function properly. It was the Navy that decided to apply asbestos-containing 

thermal insulation to defendants’ products and to replace worn gaskets and 

packing with asbestos-containing components. Second, it was the action of the 

power tools in Tellez-Cordova that caused the release of harmful dust, even 

though the dust itself emanated from another substance. Tellez-Cordova is 

arguably an example of a “case where the combination of one sound product with 

another sound product creates a dangerous condition about which the 

manufacturer of each product has a duty to warn [citation].” (Rastelli, supra, 591 

N.E.2d at p. 226.) The same is not true here. The asbestos dust that injured 

O’Neil came from thermal insulation and replacement gaskets and packing made 

by other manufacturers. Nothing about defendants’ pumps and valves caused or 

contributed to the release of this dust. The Court of Appeal here characterized 

Tellez-Cordova as holding “that a manufacturer is liable when its product is 

necessarily used in conjunction with another product, and when danger results 

from the use of the two products together.” In this case, neither requirement was 

met. Defendants’ pumps and valves were not “necessarily” used with asbestos 

components, and danger did not result from the use of these products “together.” 

The hazardous dust to which O’Neil was exposed resulted entirely from work 

performed on asbestos products that defendants did not manufacture, sell, or 

supply. The Court of Appeal’s extension of Tellez-Cordova beyond its unique 

factual context could easily lead to absurd results. It would require match 

manufacturers to warn about the dangers of igniting dynamite, for example.

Moreover, as noted, California law does not impose a duty to warn about 

dangers arising entirely from another manufacturer’s product, even if it is 

foreseeable that the products will be used together. Were it otherwise, 
28

manufacturers of the saws used to cut insulation would become the next targets of 

asbestos lawsuits. Recognizing a duty to warn was appropriate in Tellez-Cordova

because there the defendant’s product was intended to be used with another 

product for the very activity that created a hazardous situation. Where the 

intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable 

to expect the manufacturer to give warnings. Conversely, where the hazard arises 

entirely from another product, and the defendant’s product does not create or 

contribute to that hazard, liability is not appropriate. We have not required 

manufacturers to warn about all foreseeable harms that might occur in the vicinity 

of their products. “From its inception, . . . strict liability has never been, and is not 

now, absolute liability. As has been repeatedly expressed, under strict liability the 

manufacturer does not thereby become the insurer of the safety of the product’s 

user. [Citations.]” (Daly v. General Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 733.)

4. Conclusion

We reaffirm that a product manufacturer generally may not be held strictly 

liable for harm caused by another manufacturer’s product. The only exceptions to 

this rule arise when the defendant bears some direct responsibility for the harm, 

either because the defendant’s own product contributed substantially to the harm 

(see Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 585), or because the defendant 

participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products (see 

DeLeon, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 343).

Plaintiffs here seek to expand these exceptions to make manufacturers 

strictly liable when it is foreseeable that their products will be used in conjunction 

with defective products or replacement parts made or sold by someone else. 

However, the foreseeability of harm, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for 

imposing strict liability on the manufacturer of a nondefective product, or one 

whose arguably defective product does not actually cause harm. (Cf. Peterson v. 

Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1199-1200 [refusing to extend strict 

liability to hotel operators based on “[t]he mere circumstance that it was 
29

contemplated” that occupants would use potentially defective products installed in 

their rooms].) Generally, foreseeability is relevant in a strict liability analysis to 

determine whether injury is likely to result from a potential use or misuse of a 

product. (See Daly v. General Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 733.) That the 

defendant manufactured, sold, or supplied the injury-causing product is a separate 

and threshold requirement that must be independently established. Moreover, in 

strict liability as in negligence, “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an 

independent tort duty.” (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552; cf. Artiglio 

v. General Electric Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838-839 [foreseeability of 

harm from a finished product is not sufficient to impose a duty to warn on a 

component part manufacturer]; Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 586 [same].) 

Generally, foreseeability is relevant in a strict liability analysis to determine 

whether injury is likely from a potential use or misuse of a product. (See Daly v. 

General Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 733.)

The question whether to apply strict liability in a new setting is largely 

determined by the policies underlying the doctrine. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglas Corp., supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 995.) “[T]he strict liability doctrine 

derives from judicially perceived public policy considerations and therefore 

should not be expanded beyond the purview of these policies.” (Bay Summit 

Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 774.) The 

conclusion we reach here is most consistent with the policies the strict liability 

doctrine serves. Although “an important goal of strict liability is to spread the 

risks and costs of injury to those most able to bear them” (Anderson, at p. 1003), 

“it was never the intention of the drafters of the doctrine to make the manufacturer 

or distributor the insurer of the safety of their products. It was never their 

intention to impose absolute liability.” (Id. at pp. 1003-1004.) Like the landlords 

and hotel owners we excused from strict liability in Peterson v. Superior Court, 

supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 1199, product manufacturers “generally ha[ve] no 

‘continuing business relationship’ ” with each other. (See Vandermark v. Ford 
30

Motor Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 263.) This means that a manufacturer cannot be 

expected to exert pressure on other manufacturers to make their products safe and 

will not be able to share the costs of ensuring product safety with these other 

manufacturers. (Peterson v. Superior Court, at p. 1199.) It is also unfair to 

require manufacturers of nondefective products to shoulder a burden of liability 

when they derived no economic benefit from the sale of the products that injured 

the plaintiff.

A contrary rule would require manufacturers to investigate the potential

risks of all other products and replacement parts that might foreseeably be used 

with their own product and warn about all of these risks. “It does not comport 

with principles of strict liability to impose on manufacturers the responsibility and 

costs of becoming experts in other manufacturers’ products.” (Braaten, supra, 

198 P.3d at p. 502.) Such a duty would impose an excessive and unrealistic 

burden on manufacturers. (See Baughman, supra, 780 F.2d at p. 1133; see also 

Braaten, at p. 502 [evidence showed that more than 60 types of packing were 

approved for naval use].) Perversely, such an expanded duty could also 

undermine consumer safety by inundating users with excessive warnings. “To 

warn of all potential dangers would warn of nothing.” (Andre v. Union Tank Car 

Co., Inc. (1985) 213 N.J. Super. 51, 67 [516 A.2d 277, 286].)

II. No Duty of Care to Prevent Injuries from Another Manufacturer’s

Product

Defendants also moved for nonsuit of plaintiffs’ negligence claims. 

Although the Court of Appeal declined to address these claims, plaintiffs continue 

to assert negligence as an alternative basis for liability. Because the negligence 

issue here concerns the scope of defendants’ duty, and the existence of duty is a 

pure question of law (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 477), we 

need not remand to the Court of Appeal for an initial determination.

“ ‘ “[D]uty” is not an immutable fact of nature “ ‘but only an expression of 

the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
31

particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Parsons v. 

Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472.) Courts of this state have 

traditionally considered several factors in determining the existence and scope of 

duty: “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 

plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s 

conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 

conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 

defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care 

with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 

insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 

Cal.2d 108, 113.)

Plaintiffs stress that foreseeability is the critical inquiry in evaluating 

whether a duty of care is owed. (See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 

California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434.) However, as noted, “foreseeability alone 

is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty.” (Erlich v. Menezes, supra, 21 

Cal.4th at p. 552; see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 399.) 

Instead, the recognition of a legal duty of care “ ‘depends upon the foreseeability 

of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of 

liability.’ ” (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) In some 

cases, when the consequences of a negligent act must be limited to avoid an 

intolerable burden on society, “policy considerations may dictate a cause of action 

should not be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.” (Elden v. Sheldon

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 274; see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., at p. 398.) “In 

short, foreseeability is not synonymous with duty; nor is it a substitute.” (Erlich v. 

Menezes, at p. 552.)

Assuming that a manufacturer can “reasonably be expected to foresee the 

risk of latent disease arising from products supplied by others that may be used 

with the manufacturer’s product years or decades after the product leaves the 
32

manufacturer’s control” (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 594),12 we 

nevertheless conclude strong policy considerations counsel against imposing a 

duty of care on pump and valve manufacturers to prevent asbestos-related disease.

The factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at page 113, 

do not support a finding of duty in this case. The connection between defendants’ 

conduct and O’Neil’s injury is extremely remote because defendants did not 

manufacture, sell, or supply any asbestos product that may have caused his 

mesothelioma. O’Neil did not work around defendants’ pumps and valves until 

more than 20 years after they were sold, and he did not develop an injury from the 

replacement parts and surrounding insulation until nearly 40 years after his 

workplace contact. All of these circumstances attenuate the connection between 

defendants’ products and the alleged injury. Furthermore, little moral blame can 

attach to a failure to warn about dangerous aspects of other manufacturers’ 

products and replacement parts.13 Nor would imposing a duty of care in this 

context be likely to prevent future harm. There is no reason to think a product 

manufacturer will be able to exert any control over the safety of replacement parts 

or companion products made by other companies. Manufacturers may also have 

scant ability to influence their customers’ choices about other products. In this 

case, for example, the evidence showed defendants had no control over the Navy’s 

purchasing choices or specifications, either at the time they provided pumps and 

valves for warships or later, when replacement parts were needed. In contrast, 

 

12 But see Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 779: 

“Generally speaking, where the injury suffered is connected only distantly and 

indirectly to the defendant’s negligent act, the risk of that type of injury from the 

category of negligent conduct at issue is likely to be deemed unforeseeable.”

13 Indeed, there can be little doubt that defendants’ conduct was “of high 

social utility.” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 474.) 

Defendants’ pumps and valves were important components in the steam 

propulsion systems of warships that were vital to our country’s national defense 

during World War II and later periods.
33

recognizing a duty of care would clearly impose a significant burden on 

defendants and all other companies that could potentially be held liable for injuries 

caused by products they neither made nor sold. Because the recognition of such a 

duty could lead to an overabundance of potentially conflicting product warnings, 

consumers could also suffer harm from the broad expansion of liability plaintiffs 

seek. Finally, it is doubtful that manufacturers could insure against the 

“unknowable risks and hazards” lurking in every product that could possibly be 

used with or in the manufacturer’s product. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglas Corp., supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1003, fn. 14.)

In short, expansion of the duty of care as urged here would impose an 

obligation to compensate on those whose products caused the plaintiffs no harm. 

To do so would exceed the boundaries established over decades of product 

liability law. “ ‘[S]ocial policy must at some point intervene to delimit liability’ 

even for foreseeable injury. . . .” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., supra, 15 

Cal.4th at p. 476.) The same policy considerations that militate against imposing 

strict liability in this situation apply with equal force in the context of negligence. 

(Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 596.)

Because defendants owed O’Neil no duty of care, the trial court properly 

entered nonsuit on plaintiffs’ negligence claims.
34

DISPOSITION

The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded 

for entry of a judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendants.

CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

LIU, J. 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion O’Neil v. Crane Co.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 177 Cal.App.4th 1019

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S177401

Date Filed: January 12, 2012

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Elihu Berle

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Waters Kraus & Paul, Paul C. Cook, Michael B. Gurien; The Ehrlich Law Firm and Jeffrey Isaac Ehrlich 

for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Brayton ♦ Purcell, Alan R. Brayton, Gilbert L. Purcell, Lloyd F. Leroy and Richard M. Grant for American 

Merchant Marine Veterans as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kazan, McClain, Lyons, Greenwood & Harley, James L. Oberman and Michael T. Stewart for John and 

Diane Allen, Robert and Beverly Lindenmayer, Joan Tommaney and Darrell and Suzanne Turner as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Marc I. Willick for Mesothelioma Applied Research Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs 

and Appellants.

Terrence M. Johnson; Girardi | Keese, Thomas V. Girardi; Cronin & Co. and Thomas C. Cronin for 

International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Allied Workers as Amici Curiae on behalf of 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Simon, Eddins & Greenstone and Brian P. Barrow for Tamara Merrill and Edward Walton as Amici Curiae 

on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Jason R. Litt, Curt Cutting, K&L Gates, Raymond L. Gill, Robert E. 

Feyder, Geoffrey M. Davis, Paul J. Lawrence and Nicholas P. Vari for Defendant and Respondent Crane 

Co.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, James P. Cunningham, Laurie J. Hepler and Gonzalo C. Martinez for 

Defendant and Respondent Warren Pumps LLC.
Page 2 – S177401 – counsel continued

Counsel:

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrans and Kevin Underhill for Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Association of Manufacturers, NFIB 

Small Business Legal Center, American Tort Reform Association, National Association of Mutual 

Insurance Companies, Association of California Insurance Companies, American Insurance Association, 

American Petroleum Institute and American Chemistry Council as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants 

and Respondents.

Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Clinton J. McCord, Stephen J. Landes, Douglas L. Prochnow and Rana 

H. Janney for Rockwell Automation, Inc., and Invensys PLC as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 

Respondents.

Debevoise & Plimpton, Roger E. Podesta, Erich O. Grosz; Gordon & Rees, Michael J. Pietrykowski and 

Don Willenburg for Ingersoll Rand Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Bates White and Charles E. Bates as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants 

and Respondents.

Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 

Respondents.

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Frederick D. Baker and Brian R. Thompson for Caterpillar, Inc., as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Jeffrey Isaac Ehrlich

The Ehrlich Law Firm

411 Harvard Avenue

Claremont, CA 91711

(909) 625-5565

Nicholas Vari

K&L Gates

10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, 7th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90067

(310) 552-5000

Laurie J. Hepler

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough

44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 989-5900