IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 130A03-2

Filed 25 September 2020

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

QUINTEL MARTINEZ AUGUSTINE

On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order 

dismissing defendant’s motion for appropriate relief in which defendant asserted

claims under the Racial Justice Act entered on 25 January 2017 by Judge W. Erwin 

Spainhour in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 

26 August 2019. 

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Danielle Marquis Elder and Jonathan 

P. Babb, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for the State-appellee.

Gretchen M. Engel and James E. Ferguson II for defendant-appellant.

Jeremy M. Falcone, Paul F. Khoury, Robert L. Walker, and Madeline J. Cohen 

for Former State and Federal Prosecutors, amicus curiae.

Carlos E. Mahoney, Jin Hee Lee, and W. Kerrel Murray for NAACP Legal 

Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., amicus curiae.

Janet Moore for National Association for Public Defense, amicus curiae.

Burton Craige and Bidish Sarma for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, 

amicus curiae.

Grady Jessup for North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, amicus curiae.

Cynthia F. Adcock for North Carolina Council of Churches, amicus curiae.
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Lisa A. Bakale-Wise and Irving Joyner for North Carolina State Conference of 

the NAACP, amicus curiae.

Professors Robert P. Mosteller & John Charles Boger, amicus curiae.

Joseph Blocher for Social Scientists, amicus curiae.

HUDSON, Justice.

Pursuant to defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, we review whether 

double jeopardy bars review of the judgment entered in this matter. For the reasons 

stated in State v. Robinson (Robinson II), No. 411A94-6, 2020 WL 4726680 (N.C. Aug. 

14, 2020), we hold that it does. We also conclude for the reasons stated in this Court’s 

decision in State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658, 843 S.E.2d 106 (2020), that the retroactive 

application of the 2012 Amended Racial Justice Act (RJA), and the 2013 repeal of the 

RJA violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in both (1) the 

Federal Constitution, and (2) the North Carolina Constitution as interpreted by our 

prior decision in State v. Keith, 63 N.C. 140, 1869 WL 1378 (1869). Accordingly, we 

vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the reinstatement of defendant’s 

sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

Factual and Procedural Background

The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder on 

15 October 2002 in the Superior Court, Cumberland County. On 22 October 2002, he 

was sentenced to death. Defendant then appealed as of right to this Court from the 

judgment sentencing him to death under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a). On direct appeal, we
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found no error in defendant’s trial and affirmed his conviction and death sentence. 

State v. Augustine (Augustine I), 359 N.C. 709, 740, 616 S.E.2d 515, 537 (2005). 

On 9 August 2010, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR)

challenging his death sentence under the RJA in the Superior Court, Cumberland 

County. At the time that defendant filed his MAR, the RJA prohibited any person 

from being “subject to or given a sentence of death . . . that was sought or obtained on 

the basis of race.” North Carolina Racial Justice Act, S.L. 2009-464, § 1, 2009 N.C. 

Sess. Laws 1213, 1214 [hereinafter Original RJA] (codified at N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-2010, 

-2011 (2009)) (repealed 2013). At that time, the RJA allowed defendants to prove that 

“race was the basis of the decision to seek or impose a death sentence” in their cases 

if they could present evidence that “race was a significant factor in decisions to seek 

or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial 

division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.” Id., § 1, 

2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214. To meet this burden of proof, defendants were allowed 

to offer statistical evidence. Id.

Also in August 2010, Marcus Reymond Robinson filed an MAR pursuant to the 

RJA in the Superior Court, Cumberland County.1 Robinson’s MAR hearing was held 

before Judge Gregory A. Weeks from 30 January through 15 February 2012. The trial 

court received evidence for thirteen days from thirteen witnesses, including: (1) 

 

1 Robinson’s appeal is the subject of our decision in State v. Robinson, No. 411A94-6, 

2020 WL 4726680 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2020).
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Barbara O’Brien, an associate professor at Michigan University College of Law who 

conducted an empirical study of peremptory strike decisions in capital cases in North 

Carolina and concluded that race was a significant factor in those decisions in North

Carolina, the former Second Judicial Division, and Cumberland County at the time 

of Robinson’s trial; (2) George Woodworth, a professor emeritus of statistics and of 

public health at the University of Iowa who concurred with Professor O’Brien’s 

testimony; (3) Samuel R. Sommers, an associate professor of psychology at Tufts 

University who concurred with the testimonies of Professor O’Brien and Professor 

Woodworth; (4) Bryan Stevenson, a professor of law at the New York University 

School of Law and the director of the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, 

Alabama, who testified that he found dramatic evidence of racial bias in jury selection 

in capital cases in North Carolina at the time of Robinson’s trial; and (5) the 

Honorable Louis A. Trosch Jr. a district court judge in Mecklenburg County who was 

previously a public defender in Cumberland County and has trained judges to 

recognize implicit bias. 

After the MAR hearing, the trial court entered an order on 20 April 2020

granting Robinson’s MAR. In the 167-page order, the trial court made extensive 

findings, including that

[t]he RJA identifies three different categories of racial 

disparities a defendant may present in order to meet the 

“significant factor” standard, any of which, standing alone, 

is sufficient to establish an RJA violation: evidence that 

death sentences were sought or imposed more frequently 
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upon defendants of one race than others; evidence that 

death sentences were sought or imposed more frequently 

on behalf of victims of one race than others; or evidence 

that race was a significant factor in decisions to exercise 

peremptory strikes during jury selection. N.C.[G.S.] § 15A2011(b)(1)–(3). It is the third category, evidence of 

discrimination in jury selection, that was the subject of the 

nearly three week long evidentiary hearing held in this 

case. 

In the first case to advance to an evidentiary hearing 

under the RJA, Robinson introduced a wealth of evidence 

showing the persistent, pervasive, and distorting role of 

race in jury selection throughout North Carolina. The 

evidence, largely unrebutted by the State, requires relief in 

his case and should serve as a clear signal of the need for 

reform in capital jury selection proceedings in the future.

The trial court concluded that Robinson was entitled to relief under the RJA as 

follows: “The [c]ourt . . . concludes that Robinson is entitled to have his sentence of 

death vacated, and Robinson is resentenced to life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole.” 

On 15 May 2012, following the trial court’s decision in Robinson’s case, 

defendant Augustine, Christina Shea Walters,

2 and Tilmon Charles Golphin3 each 

filed a Motion for Grant of Sentencing Relief arguing that the evidence that 

established that Robinson was entitled to relief under the RJA also entitled them to 

relief in their cases. The State responded and requested that the trial court either (1) 

 

2 Walters’s appeal is the subject of our opinion in State v. Walters, No. 548A00-2 (N.C. 

Sept. 25, 2020).

3 Golphin’s appeal is the subject of our opinion in State v. Golphin, No. 441A98-4 (N.C.

Sept. 25, 2020).
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deny relief entirely, or (2) order an evidentiary hearing. On 11 June 2012, the trial 

court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for 23 July 2012. 

On 2 July 2012, the General Assembly amended the RJA. An Act to Amend 

Death Penalty Procedures, S.L. 2012-136, §§ 3–4, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 471, 472

[hereinafter Amended RJA]. In the lead-up to defendant’s evidentiary hearing, the

General Assembly’s amendments to the RJA made changes to (1) the burden of proof 

that defendants were required to meet in order to obtain relief, and (2) the types of 

evidence that could be used to satisfy that burden of proof. Id. Specifically, the 

Amended RJA allowed relief only if a defendant could demonstrate that “race was a 

significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county or 

prosecutorial district at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.”

Amended RJA, § 3, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 472 (emphasis added). This provision of 

the Amended RJA was narrower than the Original RJA, which also granted relief if 

a defendant could demonstrate that “race was a significant factor . . . [in] the judicial 

division[ ] or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.”

Original RJA, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214 (emphasis added). Further, the 

Amended RJA defined the relevant time period as “10 years prior to the commission 

of the offense to the date that is two years after the imposition of the death sentence.” 

Amended RJA, § 3, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 472–73. In addition, while the Original 

RJA allowed defendants to satisfy their burden of proof through statistical evidence, 

the Amended RJA stated that “[s]tatistical evidence alone is insufficient to establish 
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that race was a significant factor.” Amended RJA, § 3, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 472.

Finally, the Amended RJA repealed N.C.G.S. § 15A-2011(b)

4 and added N.C.G.S. § 

15A-2011(d), which provided that

[e]vidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a 

significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the 

sentence of death in the county or prosecutorial district at 

the time the death sentence was sought or imposed may 

include statistical evidence derived from the county or 

prosecutorial district where the defendant was sentenced 

to death, or other evidence, that either (i) the race of the 

defendant was a significant factor or (ii) race was a 

 

4 The Original RJA provided that

[e]vidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a 

significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of 

death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial 

division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought 

or imposed may include statistical evidence or other evidence, 

including, but not limited to, sworn testimony of attorneys, 

prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members 

of the criminal justice system or both, that, irrespective of 

statutory factors, one or more of the following applies:

(1) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more 

frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of 

another race. 

(2) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more 

frequently as punishment for capital offenses against persons of 

one race than as punishment of capital offenses against persons 

of another race. 

(3) Race was a significant factor in decisions to exercise 

peremptory challenges during jury selection. 

North Carolina Racial Justice Act, S.L. 2009-464, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213,

1214.
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significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory 

challenges during jury selection.

Amended RJA, § 3, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 472. In Ramseur, we held that each of 

these provisions of the Amended RJA constituted impermissible ex post facto laws

that could not be applied retroactively. 374 N.C. at 682, 843 S.E.2d at 121.

On 3 July 2012, defendant Augustine, Walters, and Golphin filed amendments

to their motions for sentencing relief pursuant to the Amended RJA. On 6 July 2012, 

the trial court scheduled the evidentiary hearing for 1 October 2012.

The evidentiary hearing on the amended motions was held on 1 October 2012 

through 11 October 2012 before Judge Gregory A. Weeks. On 13 December 2012, the 

trial court entered an order granting the MARs filed by defendant, Walters, and 

Golphin. In the opening paragraphs of the order, the trial court emphasized that “race 

was, in fact, a significant factor in the prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes during 

jury selection, and [the trial court] therefore grants Defendants’ motions for 

appropriate relief pursuant to the RJA, vacates their death sentences, and imposes 

sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole” under the Amended RJA. 

The lengthy order contained numerous findings of fact, including the following: 

130. Having considered testimony from Coyler, 

Russ, and Dickson [Cumberland County prosecutors] in 

conjunction with all of the foregoing evidence, the [c]ourt 

concludes that their denials that they took race into 

account in Cumberland County capital cases are 

unpersuasive and not credible. Their contention that they 

selected capital juries in a race-neutral fashion does not 

withstand scrutiny and is severely undercut by all of the 
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evidence to the contrary. The evidence of Coyler’s raceconscious “Jury Strikes” notes in Augustine, Coyler and 

Dickson’s conduct in the Burmeister and Wright cases, 

Russ’ use of a prosecutorial “cheat sheet” to respond to 

Batson objections, and the many case examples of 

disparate treatment by these three prosecutors, together, 

constitute powerful, substantive evidence that these 

Cumberland County prosecutors regularly took race into 

account in capital jury selection and discriminated against 

African-American citizens. 

131. Finally, this [c]ourt would be remiss were it to 

fail to acknowledge the difficulties involved in reaching 

these determinations. Coyler, Russ, and Dickson each 

represented the State in Cumberland County for over two 

decades. During that time—as judges testified in this 

proceeding—these prosecutors gained reputations for good 

character and integrity. The [c]ourt first notes that its 

conclusion that unconscious biases likely operated in their 

strike decisions does not impugn the prosecutors’ 

character. The [c]ourt additionally finds that there is no 

evidence that any of these prosecutors acted with racial 

animus towards any minority venire member. To the 

extent that the actions of these prosecutors were informed 

by purposeful bias, the [c]ourt finds that such bias falls 

within the category of “rational bias,” and was motivated 

by the prosecutors’ desire to zealously prosecute the 

defendants, rather than racial animosity. 

In the final conclusion of law, the trial court stated that 

[i]n view of the foregoing, the [c]ourt finally concludes 

based upon a preponderance of the evidence that race was 

a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose 

Defendants’ death sentences at the time those sentences 

were sought or imposed. Defendants’ judgments were 

sought or obtained on the basis of race.

As a consequence, the trial court concluded by ordering the following:
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The [c]ourt, having determined that Golphin, 

Walters, and Augustine are entitled to appropriate relief 

on their RJA jury selection claims, concludes that 

Defendants are entitled to have their sentences of death 

vacated, and Golphin, Walters, and Augustine are 

resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole. 

The [c]ourt reserves ruling on the remaining claims 

raised in Defendants’ RJA motions, including all 

constitutional claims.

On the same day, the trial court entered a separate Judgment and Commitment, 

sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The State 

neither appealed nor otherwise sought review of the separate Judgment. However, 

the State sought review by this Court of the trial court’s decisions granting relief to 

defendant, Robinson, Walters, and Golphin pursuant to two separate petitions for 

writ of certiorari. We allowed both petitions. 

On 18 December 2015, we issued separate orders addressing the review of the 

petitions for certiorari. In Robinson’s case, this Court vacated the trial court’s order 

granting relief under the RJA and remanded his case to the trial court. State v. 

Robinson (Robinson I), 368 N.C. 596, 597, 780 S.E.2d 151, 152 (2015). This Court 

concluded that the trial court erred in granting relief because it abused its discretion 

by denying the State’s third motion to continue the evidentiary hearing on Robinson’s 

MAR. Id. at 596, 780 S.E.2d at 151. In a separate order, we vacated the trial court’s 

order granting relief to Augustine, Walters, and Golphin, and remanded the three
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cases to the trial court as well. State v. Augustine (Augustine II), 368 N.C. 594, 780 

S.E.2d 552 (2015). The remand order entered by this Court stated the following:

After careful review, we conclude that the error 

recognized in this Court’s Order in State v. Robinson, [368 

N.C. 596, 780 S.E.2d 151 (2015)], infected the trial court’s 

decision, including its use of issue preclusion, in these 

cases. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is vacated. 

Furthermore, the trial court erred when it joined these 

three cases for an evidentiary hearing. These cases are 

therefore remanded to the senior resident superior court 

judge of Cumberland County for reconsideration of 

respondents’ motions for appropriate relief. Cf. Gen. R. 

Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 25(4), 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 22. 

We express no opinion on the merits of respondents’

motions for appropriate relief at this juncture. On remand, 

the trial court should address petitioner’s constitutional 

and statutory challenges pertaining to the Act. In any new 

hearings on the merits, the trial court may, in the interest 

of justice, consider additional statistical studies presented 

by the parties. The trial court may also, in its discretion, 

appoint an expert under N.C. R. Evid. 706 to conduct a 

quantitative and qualitative study, unless such a study has 

already been commissioned pursuant to this Court’s Order 

in Robinson, in which case the trial court may consider that 

study. If the trial court appoints an expert under Rule 706, 

the Court hereby orders the Administrative Office of the 

Courts to make funds available for that purpose.

Augustine II, 368 N.C. at 594, 780 S.E.2d at 552–53.

In June 2013—during the pendency of the State’s appeals to this Court in 

Robinson I and Augustine II—the General Assembly repealed the RJA.5 This repeal 

came after we allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari in Robinson I on 

 

5 Act of June 13, 2013, S.L. 2013-154, § 5.(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws. 368, 372.
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11 April 2013, but before we allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari in 

Augustine II on 3 October 2013. The repeal applied retroactively to any MAR filed 

before the repeal’s effective date. Act of June 13, 2013, S.L. 2013-154, § 5.(d), 2013 

N.C. Sess. Laws 368, 372. However, the repeal’s savings clause exempted from the 

repeal all cases in which there was

a court order resentencing a petitioner to life imprisonment 

without parole pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of 

Chapter 15A of the General Statutes prior to the effective 

date of this act if the order is affirmed upon appellate 

review and becomes a final Order issued by a court of 

competent jurisdiction.

Id. (emphasis added). Conversely, the savings clause specifically made the repeal’s 

retroactivity provision

applicable in any case where a court resentenced a 

petitioner to life imprisonment without parole pursuant to 

the provisions of Article 101 of Chapter 15A of the General 

Statutes prior to the effective date of this act, and the Order 

is vacated upon appellate review by a court of competent 

jurisdiction.

Id. (emphasis added). 

On remand from our orders in Robinson I and Augustine II, the trial court held 

a single hearing for the four defendants’ cases; the hearing was not scheduled as an 

evidentiary hearing, and no evidence was taken. Prior to the hearing, all counsel were 

notified that the trial court had ordered that the hearing would only involve

arguments on the following single question of law:

Did the enactment into law of Senate Bill 306, Session Law
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2013-14, on 19 June 2013, specifically Sections 5. (a), (b) 

and (d) therein, render void the Motions for Appropriate 

Relief filed by the defendants Augustine, Walter[s], 

Golphin and Robinson pursuant to the provisions of Article 

101 of the General Statutes of North Carolina? 

After the hearing, the trial court dismissed the MARs filed by all defendants

concluding that they were voided by the repeal of the RJA. Defendant Augustine filed 

a petition for writ of certiorari requesting review of the trial court’s ruling on 30 May 

2017. We allowed the petition on 1 March 2018. 

Analysis

For the reasons stated in this Court’s decision in Robinson II, “the retroactivity 

provision of the RJA Repeal violates the double jeopardy protections of the North 

Carolina Constitution.” 2020 WL 4726680, at *12. Furthermore, the judgment 

entered by the trial court sentencing defendant Augustine to life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole was and is a final judgment. Therefore, double 

jeopardy bars further review. Id. In addition, for the reasons stated in Ramseur, we 

conclude that the retroactive application of the RJA repeal violates the prohibitions 

against ex post facto laws contained in both (1) the United States Constitution, and 

(2) the North Carolina Constitution as interpreted by our prior opinion in Keith, 63 

N.C. 140, 1869 WL 1378. Ramseur, 374 N.C. at 658–83, 843 S.E.2d at 106–22.

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order ruling that the repeal of the RJA voided 

defendant’s MAR and remand to the Superior Court, Cumberland County, for the 

reinstatement of defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
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VACATED AND REMANDED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice DAVIS concurring in result.

For the reasons stated in Justice Ervin’s concurring opinions in State v. 

Golphin, No. 441A98-4 (N.C. Sept. 25, 2020), and State v. Walters, No. 548A00-2 

(N.C. Sept. 25, 2020), I concur in the result only.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in State v. Robinson, No. 

411A94-6, 2020 WL 4726680 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2020), and State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 

658, 843 S.E.2d 106 (2020), I respectfully dissent.