SECOND DIVISION

									September 18, 2001

No. 1--00--3766

FONZY WATSON, Special Administrator

of the Estate of LATONIA FLEMING,

Deceased, and unborn Baby Fleming, 

		Plaintiff-Appellant,

				v.

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, a

corporation, 

		Defendant-Appellee,

(HENRY L. MERCHANT,

		Defendant).	

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

Honorable

David R. Donnersberger, 

Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff Fonzy Watson, special administrator of the Estate of

Latonia Fleming, deceased, and unborn Baby Fleming, appeals from an

order of the circuit court granting defendant Enterprise Leasing

Company's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to

section 2--619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (725 ILCS 5/2--619

(West 1998)).1  On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary judgment because there was

ample evidence creating a material question of fact on the issue of

proximate cause; specifically, on the question of foreseeability

that the automobile in which decedent Latonia Fleming was a

passenger would be operated by someone other than the individual

who rented it from defendant.  Plaintiff also contends that the

trial court erred in denying her request to file a second amended

complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

	STATEMENT OF FACTS

	On June 26, 1998, Milton Pillow, on behalf of Dawn Monroe,2 rented a car from defendant,3 through its agent Erika Brown, who knew Dawn's brother Dan Monroe.  On July 3, the rental car was

taken from Dawn, either with or without permission,4 by her brother-in-law Arenzo Borden.  Later that evening, the car was

taken from Borden, with or without permission,5 by Henry Merchant, a 17-year-old.  While driving the car under the influence of

alcohol and marijuana and with Latonia Fleming as a passenger,

Merchant crossed two lanes of traffic on the expressway and slammed into a wall, killing Fleming.

	On July 29, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint against

Enterprise, Merchant, and Borden, alleging negligent entrustment

against Enterprise and negligence against Merchant and Borden,

contending that Enterprise rented the car to Borden who allowed

Merchant to operate it.  On October 6, defendant filed a motion to

dismiss, contending that it did not negligently entrust the vehicle

to Merchant, but rather had only entrusted the car to Pillow.  On

October 15, the trial court entered an order, pursuant to

plaintiff's motion, voluntarily dismissing Borden as a defendant

and granting plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.  On the

same day, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Enterprise

and Merchant, alleging negligent entrustment against Enterprise, in

that it leased the vehicle to Pillow, and that Merchant was

negligent.

	On October 6, 1999, plaintiff filed her response to

defendant's motion to dismiss.  On November 20, defendant filed its

reply, on December 29, plaintiff filed her surresponse, and on

January 4, 2000, defendant filed its surreply.  

	Various deposition testimony was offered in support of and in

opposition to defendant's motion.  Erika Brown testified that she

was the branch manager for defendant's car leasing office located

in Worth, Illinois.  She knew Dan Monroe because they had worked

together.  Brown had been trained not to lease a car to anyone

under the age of 21, but defendant would rent to an individual who possessed a traffic ticket only if the ticket was valid, i.e., the court date had not yet expired, the individual possessed a picture

identification, and the ticket was not for driving under the

influence.	

	Brown further testified that Dan called her in March 1993,

stating that his sister Dawn would be calling to rent a car. 

According to Brown, this call was made so that Dawn could receive

the 33% family discount.  Brown also stated that she never met Dawn

until June 26, 1998, when Dawn walked into the office.  Brown

further stated that Dawn had not called prior to this time to

reserve a car.

	On June 26, Dawn came into the Worth office with Milton

Pillow.  According to Brown, it was her understanding that Dawn was

to rent a car.  However, when she asked Dawn for her license, Dawn

handed her a traffic ticket and state identification card.  Because

the ticket was old and Dawn was under 21, Brown advised Dawn that

she could not rent a car to her.  Dawn then asked Pillow to rent

the car, which he agreed to do.  Brown filled out the contract and

included Dan's name as an additional driver.  She also wrote in

Dan's driver's license number, which she retrieved from a computer. 

Brown stated that she included Dan as an authorized driver because

Dawn said she needed the car to help him move.  Brown gave Pillow

an employee discount.  Both Dawn and Pillow gave her money, after

which she went out to the car to write down the mileage and gas

level.  Brown then gave the keys to the car to Pillow, who drove the car off the lot.  Dawn drove the car in which the two had

arrived in at the Worth office.  Brown denied knowing that Dawn was

going to subsequently drive the leased car and stated that Dawn

advised her that Dan would be driving it.  Brown specifically

stated that she told both Pillow and Dawn that Dawn was not to

drive the car.

	Subsequently, Brown received a telephone call from Pillow

extending the rental period until July 3.  A couple of days after

July 3, Brown received a call from a state trooper during which he

informed her that the leased car had been in an accident.  On July

6, Dan called her, stating that he knew nothing about the rental

agreement.  Because of this, Brown crossed Dan's name off the

contract and took his name out of the computer.  When she learned

the car had been in an accident, Brown computed the additional

charges for the car at the regular price, without the family

discount.  On July 7, Brown spoke with Dawn, who stated that she

borrowed the car from Pillow and that her brother-in-law, who was

riding with her, had taken the car from her and left her at a

store.

	Dawn Monroe testified that Pillow was a friend of her

mother's.  Dawn possessed an Illinois driver's license, but had

received a traffic ticket, which she never "followed up on."  At

the time of her deposition, she did not know the status of her

driver's license.  She further stated that Borden was her brother-

in-law and she did not know Merchant or Fleming.

	Dawn also testified that she first met Brown on June 26, but

had spoken with her on the telephone prior to that time.  She

further stated that Dan had told her to call Brown.  When Dawn

first spoke to Brown at the end of April, she told Brown she wanted

to rent four cars because a group of individuals wanted to go to

Atlanta to see "Freaknic."  Dawn did not rent a car at that time

because the group flew to Atlanta.  Dawn also stated that, in

April, she advised Brown of her age, i.e., that she was 20.  Dawn next spoke with Brown approximately one week prior to renting the

car in June.  Dawn told Brown that she needed to rent a car for

approximately one week.  Dawn stated that she did not tell Brown

that she needed the car to help her brother move and that, at this

time, she reminded Brown that she did not have a driver's license

and she only had a traffic ticket.

	Dawn further testified that on June 26, Pillow drove her to

the rental office.  Upon arriving there, Dawn again reminded Brown

that she did not have a driver's license.  Brown stated that that

was "okay."  After proceeding to the rental counter, Brown told

Dawn that she could not rent the car to her, so Dawn asked Pillow

to rent the car.  Pillow agreed and the paperwork was filled out. 

Brown advised the two that Dawn could not drive the car off the

lot, that Pillow had to do so.  Dawn paid Brown $140, after getting

$20 from Pillow.  According to Dawn, there was never any discussion

of whether Dan was to be listed as an additional driver and she

denied that Brown stated that she could not drive the car; Brown only stated that Dawn could not drive the car off the lot.  Dawn

also stated that she specifically told Brown that she would be

driving the car and also told her that, if she needed the car for

a longer period of time, she would call Brown and let her know.

	Dawn further stated that after she and Pillow left the rental

lot, they proceeded to a cash station where she retrieved the money

she owed Pillow.  Dawn then drove the rental car and Pillow drove

his own car.  Subsequently, Dawn had Pillow call and extend the

rental period.  She had Pillow call because she was on her "way

out" and did not have time to call.  

	Dawn also stated that on Friday, July 3, she and Borden went

to a store and, while she was in the store, Borden took the car

from her and drove off, leaving her stranded.  Dawn denied giving

Borden permission to drive the car.  Dawn did not report the car

stolen because she believed Borden would return with it soon.

	On cross-examination, Dawn testified that Brown advised her

she could not rent the car to her because another person was in the

office at the time.

	Milton Pillow testified that it was his understanding, when he

took Dawn to the car rental office, that she would sign for the

car.  However, when they began the process, Brown advised Dawn she

could not rent to her because she had a ticket.  Pillow denied that

Brown stated it was because Dawn was under 21 years old.  Pillow

did not recall Dan ever being mentioned when he signed the

contract, and he believed that Dawn would be the primary driver.  Pillow signed the contract only as a favor.  Pillow denied Brown

ever stated that Dawn could not drive the car, although she did

indicate that Pillow had to drive the car off the lot.  When Pillow

saw "Dan's" name on the contract, he assumed it meant Dawn.

	Arenzo Borden testified that he never possessed a valid

driver's license.  He knew both Dawn and Merchant.  On July 3,

Borden drove Dawn to a store, at her request, in the rental car. 

En route, he picked up a friend.  Because the friend was drunk,

Borden intended to take him home.  While driving to the friend's

house, Dawn saw another friend driving by.  According to Borden,

Dawn jumped out of the car, got into the friend's car, and left

with him.  Rather than taking his friend home, Borden decided to

stop by his brother's house.  After speaking to his brother, Borden

began talking to Merchant and Fleming, who invited him into

Merchant's apartment.  There were others already present in the

apartment, drinking.  Borden remained at the apartment with the

group, drinking and smoking marijuana.  Approximately two and one-

half hours later, "Pumpkin" came down and asked Borden to drive her

to a restaurant and then to her boyfriend's home.  The group talked

for approximately one-half hour and then Borden, "Heath," Merchant,

and Pumpkin left.  After stopping at a sub shop, Borden dropped

Pumpkin off and then went to a liquor store.  Merchant and Borden

went into the store, while Heath remained in the car because he was

too drunk to walk.  En route back to Merchant's apartment, Borden

dropped Heath off.  Borden and Merchant returned to the apartment, where the other ladies had remained, and the group resumed drinking

and smoking marijuana.  

	At some point in the late evening, Borden used the restroom. 

Before doing so, he removed his key chain from his neck, which

contained the key to the rental car, and put it in his hat.  He

then placed the hat on top of a speaker or radio.  When he came out

of the bathroom, Merchant and Fleming were gone.  The group told

him they had gone to a restaurant.  At this time, Borden noticed

that his hat was on the floor and his keys were gone.  Borden was

mad and upset when he learned Merchant had taken the car because it

was not his and Dawn did not know these people so she would not

have given Merchant permission to drive the car.

	On cross-examination, Borden stated that when the group first

went out that day, he had allowed Merchant to drive the car through

a park.

	Katrice Merchant, Merchant's cousin, was among the group of

people at the apartment on July 3.  She stated that Fleming was

hungry and asked Borden to take her to a restaurant.  At this time,

Merchant stated that he would drive her.  While Borden was giving

Merchant the keys, Katrice attempted to grab them, stating she

would drive Fleming because Merchant and Borden were too drunk to

drive.  Merchant took the keys in any event.  Katrice denied that

Merchant stole the keys and reiterated that Borden put the keys in

Merchant's hand. 

	Henry Merchant testified that Borden had given him the keys to the car so that he and Fleming could go to a restaurant.  According

to Merchant, he asked Borden 15 times to take them, but Borden

refused.  Katrice then volunteered to take them, but she was

refused.  Merchant admitted that he was intoxicated, but stated

that he was capable of walking, seeing, and driving a car. 

Merchant also admitted that prior to this time, the group had been

drinking and smoking marijuana.  Merchant and Fleming went to a

restaurant, got food, went to a store to buy liquor and cigars, and

then intended to go to his house and "chill" for awhile.  The last

thing he remembered was getting on the expressway ramp--he blanked

out as they entered it.  Thereafter he remembered waking up in the

hospital.  Merchant did not know that the car was a rental and

stated that Borden told him it was his.  Merchant never had a

driver's license and learned to drive by stealing cars as a

juvenile.  Merchant denied that he took the keys.  

	On February 18, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's amended

complaint with prejudice.  At the hearing, the court stated that,

even assuming plaintiff alleged that defendant entrusted the

vehicle to Dawn, which it did not believe plaintiff had done, and

that Dawn was incompetent, it was not Dawn's incompetence that was

a proximate cause of the accident since Merchant was driving under

the influence which was the proximate cause of the accident. 

	On February 24, defendant filed a motion for a Rule 304(a)

finding and, on February 28, plaintiff filed a motion for

"rehearing" and a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  On May 25, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion

for rehearing and her motion for leave to amend her complaint.  At

this hearing, plaintiff indicated that, at the hearing on February

18, the court indicated that it had a doubt whether plaintiff's

complaint alleged a connection between Enterprise and Dawn and she

contended that the amended complaint remedied that concern.  The

court then indicated that the question was whether the second

amended complaint cured the defect.  The court concluded that the

second amended complaint did not cure the defect, finding that the

complaint alleged negligent entrustment to Dawn but that this had

no effect on the court's prior dismissal of plaintiff's first

amended complaint because the court found that even if plaintiff

alleged negligent entrustment to Dawn, Dawn's incompetency was not

the proximate cause of the accident--Merchant's intoxication was. 

On October 19, an agreed order was entered, granting defendant's

motion to add Rule 304(a) language to the court's February 18

order.  This appeal followed.

	ANALYSIS

	A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the

pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file

establish that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and,

therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.  735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1998); Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 530, 675 N.E.2d 897 (1996).  We review the trial court's granting of such a motion de novo.  McNamee v. State of Illinois, 173 Ill. 2d 433, 438, 672 N.E.2d 1159 (1996).

	Section 390 of Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:

		"One who supplies directly or through a third

person a chattel for the use of another whom

the supplier knows or has reason to know to be

likely because of his youth, inexperience, or

otherwise, to use it in a manner involving

unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself

and others whom the supplier should expect to

share in or be endangered by its use, is

subject to liability for physical harm

resulting to them."  Restatement (Second) of

Torts §390, at 314 (1965).  

This principle is known as negligent entrustment.  With respect to

automobiles, a person may be liable for the negligent entrustment

of a vehicle "where that person entrusts the vehicle to one whose

incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have

been known by the entrustor of the vehicle."  Rainey By and Through Rainey v. Pitera By and Through Pitera, 273 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237, 651 N.E.2d 747 (1995).  There are two primary considerations in a

negligent entrustment action: "(1) Whether the owner entrusted his

car to an incompetent or unfit driver, and (2) Whether the

incompetency was a proximate cause of the accident."  Taitt v. Robinson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132, 639 N.E.2d 893 (1994).  Entrustment may be given by either express or implied permission. 

Rainey, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 237.  "Implied permission exists when a course of conduct or relationship between the parties includes a

mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances

signifying permission" or the giving of consent.  Rainey, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 237.

	The issue of proximate cause is generally a question for the

trier of fact.  First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257, 720 N.E.2d 1068 (1999).  In negligent entrustment

actions, the alleged incompetence of the driver must be a proximate

cause of the negligent act that caused the injury (King v. Petefish, 185 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634, 541 N.E.2d 847 (1989)), and the entrustor is liable, but only if his conduct is the legal cause

of the complained of bodily harm.  Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§390, comment c, at 316.  

	Proximate cause consists of two distinct requirements: cause

in fact and legal cause.  First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58.  As stated in First Springfield Bank & Trust:

		"Cause in fact exists where there is a

reasonable certainty that a defendant's acts

caused the injury or damage.  [Citation.]  A

defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the

plaintiff's injury only if that conduct is a

material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.  [Citation.]  A

defendant's conduct is a material element and 

a substantial factor in bringing about an

injury if, absent that conduct, the injury

would not have occurred.  [Citation.]  'Legal

cause,' by contrast, is essentially a question

of foreseeability.  [Citation.]  The relevant

inquiry here is whether the injury is of a

type that a reasonable person would see as a

likely result of his or her conduct."  First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258.

The supreme court has further provided that:

		"[I]f the negligence charged does nothing more

than furnish a condition by which the injury

is made possible, and that condition causes an

injury by the subsequent, independent act of a

third person, the creation of the condition is

not the proximate cause of the injury. 

[Citations.]  The test that should be applied

in all proximate cause cases is whether the

first wrongdoer reasonably might have

anticipated the intervening efficient cause as

a natural and probable result of the first

party's own negligence."  First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 257.

In other words, 

			"[t]he only time an entrustee's act of

negligent entrustment cannot be considered

part of the proximate cause of the injury is

when the causal chain has been broken by a

superseding, intervening force.  [Citation.] 

Whether or not an intervening or superseding

cause is sufficient to cut off the proximate

cause of a defendant's act of negligence in

Illinois depends on if the defendant could

reasonably foresee the intervening act. 

[Citation.]  In order to escape liability the

defendant must demonstrate the intervening act

was unforeseeable as a matter of law."  King, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 640.

If the defendant's conduct is so remote from the events leading to

a plaintiff's injury that it can be said, as a matter of law, such

conduct was not a contributing legal cause, the defendant is not

liable.  King, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 641. 

	Plaintiff contends that there is ample evidence to raise a

question of fact on the issue of foreseeability that the vehicle

would be operated by someone other than Dawn.  According to

plaintiff, the trial court necessarily, pursuant to its ruling,

found that it was not reasonably foreseeable, as a matter of law,

that Dawn would allow someone else to drive the car.  Plaintiff argues that there is ample evidence to allow a fact finder to

conclude that defendant knew or should have known that the car

could be operated by an unauthorized driver.  According to

plaintiff, defendant admits as much in paragraphs 5 and 13 of its

contract.6  Plaintiff also argues that the negligence of defendant in entrusting the car to Dawn set in motion one of the conditions

that caused the accident and, when combined with the negligence of

Merchant, who was a foreseeable user, caused the accident.

	Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to address each

of the elements of a cause of action for negligent entrustment in

her complaint.  First, the complaint failed to allege that

defendant entrusted the vehicle to Merchant or Borden and failed to

allege that defendant knew or should have known that Merchant or

Borden was an unfit or incompetent driver.  Additionally, defendant

argues that there is no factual nexus between itself and Merchant. 

Defendant also "vehemently" denies that it entrusted the vehicle to

Dawn.  According to defendant, it did not entrust the car to a group of people; rather, it entrusted the car to Pillow.

Ultimately, defendant contends that it was not reasonably

foreseeable that Pillow would allow Dawn to operate the vehicle,

that Borden would take the vehicle from Dawn, and that Merchant

would take the vehicle from Borden and operate it while under the

influence of alcohol and drugs--a criminal act. 

	Plaintiff responds that the crucial issue here is

foreseeability, which defendant ignores.  Plaintiff argues that

there was a material question of fact for the jury because

defendant warned against the use of the car by an unauthorized

driver and, therefore, it was aware that an unauthorized driver

could operate the car.  Ultimately, plaintiff argues that the issue

is whether defendant, when it entrusted the car to Dawn, knew or

should have known that the vehicle could be involved in an accident

caused by the negligence of the entrustee or some other driver.

	Initially, despite the fact that the contract clearly was

between defendant and Pillow, there is a question of fact whether

defendant entrusted the car to Dawn.  Portions of Brown's

deposition testimony could support such a conclusion. 

Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the rental and Brown's

conduct after the accident are certainly questionable.  As such,

one could not say, as a matter of law, that defendant did not

impliedly acquiesce and give permission to Dawn to use the vehicle. 

Nonetheless, the issue is irrelevant based on our resolution of the

proximate cause issue.

	We agree that the element of cause in fact of a negligent

entrustment claim has been satisfied.  As plaintiff contends, but

for defendant's negligent entrustment, the car would not have been

on the road and the accident would not have happened.  All cause in

fact requires is, "absent [defendant's] conduct, the injury would

not have occurred."  First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258.  Clearly, absent defendant renting this car to either Pillow

or Dawn, the accident would not have occurred.

	The crux of the issue in this case, however, is legal cause,

which revolves around foreseeability.  We agree with plaintiff,

based on paragraphs 5 and 13 of defendant's contract, that it would

be reasonably foreseeable that a rental car may be driven by an

unauthorized driver.  This is particularly true in the instant case

because if one believes that Brown knew Dawn would be driving the

car, defendant would know that an unauthorized driver would be

operating it since Dawn was listed nowhere on the contract.  If,

assuming Brown, and therefore defendant, knew Dawn would drive the

car and Dawn caused the accident, this would be sufficient to avoid

summary judgment.  However, Dawn was not operating the vehicle and

did not cause the accident.

	Here, the vehicle was taken from Dawn, either with or without

permission, by Borden and then taken from Borden, either with or

without permission, by Merchant.  Merchant, who was 17 years old,

then drove the car after drinking and smoking marijuana all day

long.  The "entrustment" in this case is, at least, two times removed.  Additionally, the accident occurred due to a criminal

act--Merchant driving while under the influence.  See Alamo Rent-A- Car, Inc. v. Hamilton, 216 Ga. App. 659, 660, 455 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1995) ("[a]ny negligence on Alamo's part *** was superseded here

by the unauthorized criminal acts of [the unauthorized driver]"). 

To impose foresight on defendant under the particular circumstances

present in this case would render it liable for anyone who drove

the car, thus making it strictly liable.  It is not reasonably

foreseeable, assuming the car was entrusted to Dawn, that the car

would be taken from her by another and then taken by another who

then engaged in criminal conduct, nor is it reasonable to conclude

that this is the purpose or intent of the negligent entrustment

doctrine.  While it is true that defendant furnished a condition,

by renting the car, and the condition caused injury by the

subsequent, independent act of Merchant, the creation of the

condition by defendant is not the proximate cause of plaintiff's

injuries.  Defendant's negligent entrustment, if any, was so remote

that, as a matter of law, such conduct was not a contributing legal

cause of plaintiff's injuries.  Accordingly, we find that the trial

court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant.

	In addition, because plaintiff could never plead sufficient

allegations to establish that defendant's conduct was a proximate

cause of the accident, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint.

	CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit

court of Cook County.

	Affirmed.

	CERDA and WOLFSON, JJ., concur.