alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0162

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JOHN CHRISTOPHER RYAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until September 7, 2022, to 

prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief. 

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

August 8 2022

08/08/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0162
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   244,190
<SALES>                                        468,845
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               468,845
<CGS>                                          239,664
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (10,869)
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<INCOME-TAX>                                    37,919
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#### Carrie Noyes v. Mary E. Foster.

*Garnishment of claim pending suit therefor.*

A claim pending before a justice of the peace cannot be garnished in a proceeding before another justice.

Error to "Washtenaw.

Submitted Apr. 18.

Decided Apr. 25.

*274Assumpsit before a justice ou a promissory note. Defendant Foster pleaded the general issue. The suit was adjourned from time to time and when brought to trial defendant filed a plea *puis darrein*setting forth that she had been garnished in a suit against the plaintiff before another justice. The justice disregarded the plea and gave judgment for plaintiff which, on appeal to the circuit, was affirmed. Defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

*Sawyer <& Knowlton*for appellant.

A garnishee is ■ chargeable from the service of summons even though the principal defendant has already begun suit for the debt: see *Howell v. Freeman*3 Mass. 121; *Locke v. Tippets*7 Mass. 149; *Thorndike v. De Wolf*6 Pick. 120; *Foster v. Jones*15 Mass. 185; *Kidd v. Shepherd*4 Mass. 238; *Trombly v. Clark*13 Vt. 118; unless the suit has gone beyond the stage where recovery in garnishment can be pleaded: *Foster v. Dudley*30 N. H. 463; but *see Gridley v. Harraden*14 Mass. 497; *Burnham v. Folsom*5 N. H. 566; *Wallace v. M’ Connell*13 Pet. 136 ; a plea *puis darrein*of the pendency of garnishment proceedings suspends the action: *Near v. Mitchell*23 Mich. 384; *Johnson v. Kibbee*36 Mich. 269; and the plea may be made at any time before the case is submitted : *Browne v. Beardsley*3 Cai. 172; as well in a justice’s court as in one of record: *Resseguie v. Brownson*4 Barb. 541; *West v. Stanley*1 Hill 69; and plaintiff should demur or join issue; *Morgan v. Dyer*10 Johns. 161.

*F. D. Kinne*for appellee.

A demand in suit cannot be reached by garnishment unless by statutory permission:' *Bingham v. Smith*5 Ala. 651; *Wood v. Lake*13 Wis. 84.

Marston, J.

We need not critically examine the several provisions of the statute relating to garnishee proceedings in justice’s court, as we are clearly of opinion that the reason advanced in *Sievers v. Woodburn Sarven Wheel Co.*43 Mich. 275, against garnishing a judgment rendered by a justice, is equally applicable here.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Cooley and Campbell, JJ. concurred.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.5

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

   
We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" and (i) to
the use of our report dated July 2, 1997, with respect to the consolidated
financial statements of Cobb Theatres, L.L.C. for the year ended December 31,
1996 included in the Current Report on Form 8-K/A (Amendment No. 1) of Regal
Cinemas, Inc. and (ii) to the use of our report dated October 23, 1996, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements of Cobb Theatres, L.L.C. for
the years ended August 31, 1996 and 1995 included in the Annual Report (Form
10-K) for the year ended August 31, 1996 of Cobb Theatres, L.L.C., filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, in Amendment No. 1 to this Registration
Statement (Form S-4 No. 333-64399) and related Prospectus of Regal Cinemas, Inc.
for the registration of $400,000,000 of its senior subordinated notes.
    


                                                       /s/  ERNST & YOUNG LLP
                                                       ----------------------

   
Birmingham, Alabama
October 13, 1998
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 15, 2001 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JERRY W. JORDAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 96-C-1641 Seth Norman, Judge

No. M1999-00813-CCA-R3-CD Filed October 11, 2001

JOE G. RILEY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority opinion in all respects except for the failure to charge the lesserincluded offense. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to charge reckless

homicide was error, I would find the failure to charge the lesser offense harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

Our supreme court has held that, by finding a defendant guilty of the highest offense to the

exclusion of the immediately lesser offense, all other lesser offenses were necessarily rejected. State

v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998). Although the jury convicted the defendant of

second degree murder as opposed to the “highest offense” charged of first degree murder, the

Williams rationale applies. Since the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder and

not voluntary manslaughter, it necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses below second degree

murder. The rejection of all other lesser offenses includes reckless homicide, which was not

charged, and criminally negligent homicide, which was charged. 

I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no evidence of adequate

provocation in the record. Based upon the evidence introduced at trial, I would conclude that it was

a question for the jury whether the defendant was adequately provoked. See State v. Johnson, 909

S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

The recent case of State v. Bowles, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2001), found harmless error in

the failure to charge sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated rape, for which the

defendant was convicted. The court noted the trial court charged the lesser-included offenses of rape

and aggravated sexual battery, and “[e]ither of these lesser-included offenses would be considered

more serious than sexual battery. . . . [I]t seems highly improbable that it would have chosen to [find

defendant guilty of sexual battery] when it had declined to consider other, more serious lesserincluded offenses.” Id. at ___. 
-2-

The jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder and declined to consider voluntary

manslaughter, which is a “more serious offense” than reckless homicide. I, therefore, would

conclude the failure to charge reckless homicide was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would

remand for a hearing on the Batson issue. 

___________________________________ 

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS HUMBERTO DEPAZ FRANCO, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-72024 

Agency No. A071-585-624 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2020**

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Carlos Humberto Depaz Franco, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions 

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his 

motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the 

denial of a motion to reopen. Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 13 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

(9th Cir. 2015). We deny the petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Depaz Franco’s untimely 

motion to reopen for failing to demonstrate he acted with the due diligence 

required for equitable tolling. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also Avagyan 

v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (due diligence requires that petitioner 

took reasonable steps to investigate prior counsel’s suspected error, or, if petitioner 

was ignorant of counsel’s shortcomings, made reasonable efforts to pursue relief). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1

2

3

4

5

CTE Start­up Toolkit

NICE K12 Subgroup

History

This section will provide statistics of current programs being offered, industry need

for talent, the evolution of CTE, etc..

Curriculum Opportunities / Development

This section will answer the following question: We decided to start a CTE

Program, where do we begin.  This section would include curriculum options that

are pre-built, custom development, articulated credit opportunities, dualenrollment, early middle college, etc.

Marketing / Program Creation Challenges

This section will provide suggested tips on marketing a newly developed program that is

often misunderstood.  This will also include an FAQ for challenges that will be faced when

creating a CTE program.  This could include funding possibilities, community awareness

concepts, and a How-To Build a successful Advisory Committee.

Curriculum Delivery / Best Practices

This section will target examples of successful programs and teacher training opportunities.

Delivery models examples will include blending learning, competency based instruction, and

virtualized versus offline environments.  Examples of delivery timelines could include single

semester, multiple semester, multiple year, half day vs block scheduling, etc...

Additional Opportunities

This section will target competitions, after-school clubs, Career Technical Student

Organizations, National Technical Honor Society, etc..
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–————

No. 01-5376 September Term, 2002

00cv02560

Filed On: February 4, 2003

TULARE COUNTY, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

–————

BEFORE: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Edwards, Sentelle,

Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, Circuit

Judges, and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc,

and the absence of a request by any member of the court for

a vote, it is
2

ORDERED that the petition be denied.*

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

 BY:

 Deputy Clerk

* A separate statement of the panel is attached.
1

Statement of the Panel

PER CURIAM: Contrary to Tulare County’s argument, the

court examined the complaint against a no more rigorous

standard of pleading than that of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The

court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for example, of

Count III of the complaint because it contained no factual

allegations that any part of the Monument lacked scientific or

historical value. The allegation that Sequoia groves comprise

only six percent of the Monument might well have been

sufficient if the President had identified only Sequoia groves

for protection, but he did not; the Proclamation covered

natural resources present throughout the Monument area. It

was therefore incumbent upon Tulare County to allege that

some part of the Monument did not, in fact, contain natural

resources that the President sought to protect. That, and

nothing more, is what led the court to conclude that the

complaint did not identify improperly designated lands ‘‘with

sufficient particularity.’’
10511.

#### Yates & Gladney *v.*Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.

Decided October 20, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Carrollton—Judge Beall. April 7, 1919.

*Leon Hood,*for plaintiff in error.

*'Boykin &*Boykin, contra.

Smith, J.

1. The only ground of the motion for a new trial other than those which complain of the verdict assigns error upon the refusal of the court to order a nonsuit. This exception will not be considered, since the motion for a new trial, which was overruled, assigns error on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it. See *Collins*v. *Strickland,*21 *Ga. App.*542 (3) (94 S. E. 1035), and cases there cited.

2. The evidence authorized the verdict, and there was no error in refusing a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                      DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                           MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                                         105
<SECURITIES>                                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    0
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                   208
<SALES>                                                          0
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<INCOME-TAX>                                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                            (9)
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                               (1.21)
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<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                      17,998,603
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             7,500,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                190,801,947
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                    621,140,249
<ALLOWANCE>                                  8,671,582
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             848,138,028
<DEPOSITS>                                 698,076,367
<SHORT-TERM>                                81,031,865
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          9,692,018
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             848,138,028
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             12,075,811
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,897,766
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                80,704
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            15,054,281
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           7,309,057
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           8,345,292
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,708,989
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  525,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              29,886
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              3,560,547
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,087,242
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   3,087,242
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,082,242
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.00
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                   3.449
<LOANS-NON>                                    516,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                      7000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             8,146,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                     1,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            8,672,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         7,803,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        869,000
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1






                                                                      EXHIBIT 15

October 28, 1997

Koger Equity, Inc.
3986 Boulevard Center Drive
Jacksonville, Florida 32207

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial
information of Koger Equity, Inc. and subsidiaries for the periods ended
September 30, 1997 and 1996, as indicated in our report dated October 24, 1997;
because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on such financial
information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 1997, is
incorporated by reference in Registration Statement No. 33-55179 on Form S-3,
Registration Statement No. 33-54617 on Form S-8, Registration Statement No.
333-20975 on Form S-3, Registration Statement No. 333- 23429 on Form S-8, and
Registration Statement No. 333-37919 on Form S-3.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.



DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
Jacksonville, Florida
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

S.L.P, o/b/o E.M.P., a minor child, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-3541 ) R.A.P., ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed April 20, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County; Leigh F. Hayes, Judge. Susan M. Bodden of Bodden Law Firm, Port Charlotte, for Appellant. Pamela T. Calderon, Venice, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation
by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 No. 333-144680, No.
333-43837, No. 333-43839, No. 333-72939 and No. 333-102701, and Form S-3, No.
333-81037) of Siebert Financial Corp. and in the related prospectus of our
report dated March 31, 2010 with respect to the consolidated financial
statements of Siebert Financial Corp. and our report dated February 25, 2010
with respect to the financial statements of Siebert, Brandford, Shank &
Co., L.L.C. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2009.

/s/ Eisner LLP

New York, New
York
March 31, 2010

---