alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ben Gooden *v.*R. P. Gresham.

Appeal — Final Judgment or Order.

The overruling of defendant’s motion to dismiss the proceedings and .set the same aside, is not a final order or judgment from which an appeal can he prosecuted.

APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT.

March 13, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

The order appealed from in this case reads as follows:

“This cause, having been submitted to the court on motion of the defendant to dismiss the proceedings herein and set aside the same, and the court now being sufficiently advised thereon, overruled said motion, to the overruling of which the defendant excepts and prays an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which is granted.”

For appellee, it is insisted, that this is not a final order or judgment from which an appeal can be prosecuted to this court. *561In *Maysville & Lexington Railroad Co. v. Punnett,*15 B. Mon. 38, this court held that a final order either terminates the action itself, decides some matter litigated by the parties, or operates to divest some right in such manner as to. put it out of the power of the court making the order, after the expiration of the term, to place the parties in their original position. Now it is perfectly manifest that in overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss the proceedings and set aside the same, the court below did not terminate the action, decided no matter litigated, and it did not operate to divest the party of any right or deprive the court of the power to place the parties in their original position after the expiration of the term, because the court could, either at that or the next term of the court, have gone on and disposed of the case just as if no such order had been made and, indeed, could, at any time', have reconsidered said motion. But if appellant’s motion had prevailed, all the court could have done would have been to dismiss his appeal on his own motion, for the jurisdiction of the circuit court being strictly appellate, if on trial of the appeal it should have adjudged that the county court erred. It could have only reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for such judgment to be rendered as it might have directed. *Helm, etc., v. Short, etc., 7*Bush 623.

*Scott, Holman, Bradley, for appellant.*

*James, for appellee.*

Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4267 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4267

      To reduce until December 31, 2006, the duty on sorbic acid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 4, 2004

   Mr. Holt introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To reduce until December 31, 2006, the duty on sorbic acid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY REDUCTION OF DUTY ON SORBIC ACID.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.34.11       Sorbic acid (CAS   1.5%         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         No. 110-44-1)                                                      31/2006
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         2916.19.20)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Exhibit 32
        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
        The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Principal Accounting Officer of Cygni Systems Corporation (the Company), hereby certifies that, to his knowledge on the date of this certification:
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

| | 1. | The annual report of the Company for the period ended April 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                            

| |  | 
| |  | 

|Date: | July 25, 2005 |     |                    
|----- | ------------- | --- | -------------------
|      |               | By: | /s/ Claude Pellerin
|      |               |     |                    
|      |               |     | Name:              
|      |               |     | Title:             

|
|
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 231 (Tuesday, December 2, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71420-71421]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28356]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions of Shares of a Bank 
or Bank Holding Company

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec.  225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank or bank 
holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the 
notices are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
    The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal 
Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for 
inspection at

[[Page 71421]]

the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express 
their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for that notice or 
to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must be received not 
later than December 16, 2014.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (Adam M. Drimer, Assistant Vice 
President) 701 East Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23261-4528:
    1. GCP III EVB LLC, a limited liability company; Greenhill Capital 
Partners III, L.P., a limited partnership; Greenhill Capital Partners 
(Cayman Islands) III, L.P., a limited partnership; Greenhill Capital 
Partners (GHL) III, L.P., a limited partnership; Greenhill Capital 
Partners (Employees) III, L.P., a limited partnership; GCP Managing 
Partner III, L.P., a limited partnership; GCP Managing Partner III GP, 
L.P., a limited partnership; GCP Capital Partners Holdings LLC, a 
limited partnership; GCP Capital Partners Holdings Inc., a corporation; 
GCP Capital Partners LLC, a limited partnership; Robert H. Niehaus, all 
of New York, New York, and Boris Gutin, Montclair, New Jersey; to 
acquire voting shares of Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc., and thereby 
indirectly acquire voting shares of EVB, both in Tappahannock, 
Virginia.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 26, 
2014.
Michael J. Lewandowski,
Associate Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2014-28356 Filed 12-1-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
#### Southern National Insurance Company *v.*Lofton.

Opinion delivered January 7, 1929.

*840
      *Martin K. Fulk,*for appellant.

*Oscar Winn,*for appellee.

McHaney, J.

Appellee brought this action to recover on an accident insurance policy issued by appellant to her husband, Ira Lofton, deceased, in which she was named as, the beneficiary. The policy provided protection against accidental death in the sum of $500 “by violent, external and accidental means.” The insured was an employee of the Dixie Cotton Oil Company, and, on November 18, 1926, while he was asleep, one Son Lewis, a foreman in the employ of the Dixie Cotton Oil Company, applied to the insured’s body and over his heart, an electrical shocking machine, which so severely shocked him that he died a few minutes thereafter. Son Lewis did not intend to injure him, but only intended to wake him up'or to play a joke on him. There was a verdict and judgment for appellee.

The only contention made for a reversal of this case is made under clause “T (1) ” which is as follows: ‘ ‘ The company’s liability for death or disability, due directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, to ** ***; (b) injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured for private or personal reasons; * . * * then in all such cases benefits shall be ten per cent, of the amount otherwise payable under this contract. ’ ’

It is the contention of appellant that, under this clause in the policy, its liability should be limited to $50, for which amount appellant offered to confess judgment, and which it asked be entered here. This contention is based upon the fact that Son Lewis intentionally applied the device to the body of the insured, which shocked him, and from which shock he died, and that, under the “limited coverage” clause above quoted, the company is only liable for ten per cent, of the full amount, where he received the injury at the hands of another, which was intentionally inflicted upon him for private or personal reasons.

*841We cannot agree with, appellant in this contention. Numerous cases are cited by counsel for appellant from other jurisdictions, which he insists tend to support this contention, but this court has held directly to the contrary in the recent case of *Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Tilley,*176 Ark. 525, 13 S. W. (2d) 20. In that case the administrator of the insured was permitted to recover on an accident policy for the insured’s death, who was shot by his wife, and who was the beneficiary under the policy, where the jury found that the killing was intentional but not justified, and that such killing was accidental within the meaning of the policy. In this case it is true that the device was intentionally applied to the body of the insured by Son Lewis, but the result was wholly unintentional. His death therefore was accidental within the meaning’ of the policy. The injuries inflicted upon the insured by Son Lewis were not intentional injuries, therefore, within the meaning of the limited coverage clause.

We find no error, and the judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1



Certification of Principal Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)





I, Joel Dupré, Chief Executive Officer of Cordia Corporation (the Registrant) do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period June 30, 2006 of the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report):

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



By:/s/ Joel Dupré



Joel Dupré

Chief Executive Officer



August 14, 2006









*

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Cordia Corporation and will be retained by Cordia Corporation and furnished to the Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Kevin McGrattan, Ph.D.

Mathematician

Building and Fire Research Labo

National Institute of Standards and Tec

U.S. Department of Commerce

kevin.mcgrattan@nist.gov

Federal Building and Fire Safety Inves

of the World Trade Center Disast

Simulation of the Fires in WTC 

June 22, 2004
Overview Overview

• Development and validation of the Fire Dyna

for use in the WTC investigation is complete

• Numerical simulations of fires in WTC 1, 2 a

using the latest information provided by the aand photo analysis teams

• A set of “standard fires” has been developed 

possible outcomes of the calculations
Goal: numerically simulate the fires within WT

so that the uncertainty in the calculations is le

uncertainty in the initial and boundary con
FDS Prediction of 

Compartment

Temperature

3 W
Layout of typic

Walk-through of 

94th floor, WTC 1

(animation)
Model Inputs Model Inputs

• Initial Conditions:

• Damage to building exterior/interior• Jet fuel distribution• Combustible load (furniture mass per uni

• Boundary Conditions:

• Window breakage• Wind• Thermal properties of furnishings
Upper Layer Temperatures, WTC 1
Upper Layer Temperatures, WTC 7
Summary of 

Fire Activity 

WTC 1

North Face
WTC 1, Floor 94, 10 min after im
WTC 1, Floor 95, 40 min after im
WTC 1, Floor 96, 30 min after im
Maximum Credible Fire Maximum Credible Fire 

– Undamag

Undamag

• Sprinkler system is compromised, overwhelm

present

• No active firefighting• Combustible building contents averaging 10 • Floor-to-floor fire spread to next upper floor a• Ventilation from windows broken by fire and 

of air leakage between floors
“Standard” Fires Standard” Fires

• Towers

• Exterior wall: maximum observed duration• Exterior wall: maximum observed expanse• High threat to a building corner• Full floor: relatively undamaged floor (e.g., W• Full floor: damage to the tenant space and th

• E-119 time-temperature curve (spatially unifo

• WTC 7

• Mechanical space (floors 5-6): largest possib

• Tenant space (floors 7+): high combustibles l
Summary Summary

• FDS has been “frozen” and the documentati• Numerical simulations of fires within WTC 1, 

been performed with a variety of initial and bconditions to assess sensitivity of results

• A set of “standard” fires has been defined to 

outcomes

• Simulations will be re-run using results of air

study 
Kevin McGrattan, Ph.D.

Mathematician

kevin.mcgrattan@nist.gov

Federal Building and Fire Safety Inves

of the World Trade Center Disast

Simulation of the Fires in WTC 

Thank you
<PAGE>   1
                                   EXHIBIT 23



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation of our report dated February 12, 1997,
which is incorporated in this Annual Report of Texas Equipment Corporation on
Form 10-K.




/s/ KILLMAN, MURRELL & COMPANY, P.C.

Killman, Murrell & Company, P.C.

March 25, 1998
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]



# United States Court of Appeals

**For the First Circuit**

No. 00-2095 DANNY M. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. TOWN OF CHELMSFORD, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge ] Before Selya, Circuit Judge , Campbell and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges .
Danny M. Kelly on brief pro se. Leonard H. Kesten , Deidre Brennan Regan and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten on brief for appellee Town of Chelmsford.
June 14, 2001Per Curiam . After affording plaintiff an

opportunity to file an amended complaint which "clearly and concisely" set forth his claims, and after two hearings on the matter, the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. Reviewing the dismissal de novo in light of the briefs and the record, we see no error. The complaint failed to understandably state a cognizable claim for relief and some of the relief demanded was not within the court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff's memorandum response to the court's order to clarify suggested that plaintiff was unable or unwilling to cure the deficiencies.

Affirmed .
Exhibit 99.1
                                 ------------


                      COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                             OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                    ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                   CWABS, INC.
                    ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES TRUST 2004-5
                   ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-5


     The undersigned do hereby certify that they are each an officer of
Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP
(a "Master Servicer"), and do hereby further certify pursuant to Section 3.16
of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned Series (the
"Agreement") that:

      (i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the
      preceding calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer
      under the Agreement has been made under our supervision; and

      (ii) To the best of our knowledge, based on such review, the Master
      Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement
      throughout such year.

/s/ Joseph M. Candelario                       Dated: March 29, 2005
------------------------


JOSEPH M. CANDELARIO
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT



/s/ Mark Wong                                  Dated: March 29, 2005
-------------

MARK WONG
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
[Cite as Claren v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 2011-Ohio-5962.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

PAUL CLAREN, Case No. 2008-08744 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Judge Joseph T. Clark 

Magistrate Anderson M. Renick 

 v. 

MANSFIELD CORRECTIONAL 

 INSTITUTION, JUDGMENT ENTRY

 Defendant. 

{¶1} On August 19, 2011, the magistrate issued a decision recommending 

judgment for defendant. 

{¶2} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) states, in part: “A party may file written objections to a 

magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the 

court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 

53(D)(4)(e)(i).” Plaintiff timely filed his objections. 

{¶3} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) further provides, in part: 

{¶4} “(ii) Specificity of objection. An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be 

specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection. 

{¶5} “(iii) Objection to magistrate’s factual finding; transcript or affidavit. An 

objection to a factual finding * * * shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence 

submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a 

transcript is not available.” 

{¶6} Plaintiff’s objections are not specific and, to the extent that he objects to the 

magistrate’s factual findings, he did not file a transcript of the evidence relevant to his 

objections. 

{¶7} Furthermore, upon review of the record, the magistrate’s decision and the 

objections, the court finds that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues 
Case No. 2008-08744 - 2 - JUDGMENT ENTRY

and appropriately applied the law. Therefore, the objections are OVERRULED and the 

court adopts the magistrate’s decision and recommendation as its own, including 

findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Judgment is rendered in favor 

of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all 

parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 _____________________________________ 

 JOSEPH T. CLARK 

 Judge 

cc: 

 

Christopher P. Conomy 

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Paul Claren 

930 North Ella Street, Apt. 15 

Orrville, Ohio 44667-1145 

Filed September 30, 2011 

To S.C. reporter November 18, 2011