No. 14489 

IN THE SUPREME COUKI' OF THE STATE OF PKNTANA 

1979 

IN RE THE M7muAGE OF JACrnA MAE 

-SCPJ, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal frm: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

Honorable R. D. Whillips, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Gale R. Gustafson, Conrad, Mntana 

For Respondent: 

David H. Nelson, Brady, bbntana 

Sut=anitted on briefs: February 28, 1979 

Decided: lRAR L 1379 

Filed : @O;r 7 

- - $cfjQ 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Appellant Jacinta Mae Jermunson filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage against Dennis Carter Jermunson on 

February 2, 1978, after approximately four years of marriage. On March 6, 1978, she filed an amended petition, and 

the matter was heard the same day by the Honorable Ronald D. 

McPhillips. The parties agreed to the entering of a decree 

of dissolution reserving with the court rulings on the 

question of property and support for petitioner. 

On March 24, 1978, the district judge entered findings 

of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree. Determination of 

the property rights were reserved until a later date. The 

property settlement was decreed by the District Court on 

July 14, 1978. From these findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and decree petitioner appeals. 

Two issues are presented on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in its distribution of 

marital property? 

2. Did the District Court err in failing to provide 

maintenance for a period sufficient to enable petitioner to 

obtain appropriate education or training? 

The parties were married on February 8, 1974. At the 

time of the marriage petitioner had not finished high school. 

She did not attend school during the marriage, although 

schooling was available to her. She had no marketable 

skills or vocational training and no outside income other 

than a job she has held. Petitioner desires to obtain 

vocational training to become a nurse. 

Respondent is a high school graduate and has had training in the military as a diesel mechanic. At the present 
time he farms some 80 acres of land which was given to him 

by his father. He is employed by his father as a farmer and 

is capable of doing outside carpentry, backhoe work and 

general repair work. The parties had an adjusted gross 

income in 1977 of $14,601.59. 

During their marriage the parties lived in a mobile 

home located in Brady, Montana. This mobile home was purchased for $8,900 for use as the marital home. Payments 

were made on the mobile home during the course of the marriage. 

During the marriage, the parties paid for a 1972 Thunderbird automobile which had previously been purchased by the 

husband and his father and also had paid for a 1974 Jeep 

pickup. They acquired personal property in the course of 

their marriage and approximately 70 percent of this property 

was taken by respondent when the marriage failed. 

Prior to the marriage, as noted, respondent had acquired 

80 acres of land from his father, a 1968 Ford truck, tool 

box, motorcycle, snow mobile, a Willy's C-J Jeep, a dishwasher, and a dryer. Petitioner contributed to the assets 

of the family by her homemaking, aiding her husband's work 

at times, and contributing some of her small income to the 

marriage. 

Directing our attention to the first issue, we find no 

error in the trial court's distribution of the marital 

property. Both parties were young when married. Petitioner 

was not out of high school and did not possess any property 

other than wedding gifts. Respondent, five years older than 

petitioner, had acquired some property and had been given 

property by his father. In four years of marriage, the 

parties acquired little property other than personal items 
which were divided by the trial judge at the time of the 

dissolution. Due to indebtedness on the part of the couple, 

property was acquired and sold. At the time of the dissolution, the court estimated that the parties were in debt in 

excess of $20,000. This figure was in error, however, and 

the total debt amount, according to the transcript, was 

approximately $11,000. The court required respondent to 

assume that debt, so petitioner is left free of any debts 

that accumulated during the marriage. 

Since the adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 

Act which became effective in Montana on January 1, 1976, 

this Court has had numerous cases which control the distribution of marital property according to the Act. See Vivian 

v. Vivian (1978), Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 35 St.Rep. 

1359; In re Marriage of Reilly (1978), Mont. , 577 

P.2d 840, 35 St.Rep. 451; and In re Marriage of Johnsrud 

(1977) Mont. , 572 P.2d 902, 34 St.Rep. 1417. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion and followed the statutes and case law in Montana. We find no 

merit to this first issue. 

As to the second issue, whether or not the trial court 

abused its discretion in awarding petitioner $1,500 at the 

time of the dissolution, we find no abuse of discretion. 

The trial court found, and properly so, that the parties had 

acquired no net worth during the course of their marriage. 

Petitioner claims she is not receiving her just due from the 

marriage in the amount of $1,500 and that the amount is 

insufficient. Petitioner should recognize, however, that 

under section 36-103, R.C.M. 1947, now section 40-2-102 MCA, 

she has a joint and mutual obligation to pay for the necessities of the marriage. The District Court required respon- 
dent to assume all debts, freeing petitioner of these obligations which approximate $5,500 (her one-half of an $11,000 

indebtedness). 

The District Court considered all the facts and determined neither party at fault. We find no error in the 

District Court's award of $1,500 to petitioner. 

In not awarding maintenance to petitioner under section 

48-322, R.C.M. 1947, now section 40-4-203 MCA, again the 

trial court is required to balance the needs of the parties. 

Here the court found that the parties were both capable of 

working and that no maintenance was required. 

This Court in Porter v. Porter (1970), 155 Mont. 451, 

457, 473 P.2d 538, held that: 

". . . a reviewing court is never justified in 

substituting its discretion for that of the trial 

court. In determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, the question is not whether 

the reviewing court agrees with the trial court, 

but, rather, did the trial court in the exercise 

of its discretion act arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceed the 

bounds of reason, in view of all the circumstances, 

ignoring recognized principles resulting in substantial injustice. " 

Here the District Court did not act arbitrarily or 

exceed the bounds of reason. The judgment at the District 

Court is affirmed. 

! 

We concur: