SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4098-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PHILIP S. PATRICK,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted January 6, 2021 – Decided

Before Judges Whipple and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-02-0181.

The Anthony Pope Law Firm, PC, attorney for 

appellant (Annette Verdesco, on the brief).

Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Albert Cernadas, Jr., Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 19, 2021
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Defendant, Philip S. Patrick, appeals from an April 16, 2019, order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing.

We previously set forth the facts in this matter in State v. Patrick, A-5597-

13 (App. Div. Oct. 18, 2016) (slip op. at 2-11) and need only repeat the pertinent 

facts and procedural history. After a jury convicted defendant of first-degree 

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) to (2), second-degree possession of a weapon 

(firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), and third-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon (handguns), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), defendant 

was sentenced to an aggregate fifty-five years, subject to eighty-five percent 

parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant raises the following issue on appeal: 

POINT ONE: The Trial Court Committed Reversible 

Error in Denying Appellant's Motion for [PCR].

Defendant's April 12, 2018, PCR petition raised several assertions of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including his lawyer's failure to

adequately address the issue of accomplice liability. Defendant also asserted 

his trial counsel should have objected to certain testimony from prosecution 

witnesses Edwin Price, a jailhouse informant, and Shameka Monroe, defendant's 

girlfriend. He also believes his attorney should have objected to remarks made 
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by the prosecutor in closing. Finally, defendant asserts his counsel was 

ineffective because he called no witnesses during trial. Defendant argues 

counsel should have called defendant's mother as a fact witness, along with a 

doctor who opined defendant had post-traumatic stress disorder. Having 

reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm for the reasons Judge Daniel R.

Lindemann expressed in his thorough written opinion and add the following 

comments.

To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant must show that (1) counsel 

"made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" of the United States 

Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced his or her rights to a 

fair trial such that there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Id. at 687, 694; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland

standard).

Judge Lindemann correctly applied these principles and thoroughly 

addressed each asserted error raised in the PCR petition, searching the record 
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for demonstration of a reasonable probability that if counsel had done these 

things the result of the trial would have been different. He ultimately concluded 

they would not.

The record fully supports Judge Lindemann's findings and conclusions 

that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing was not necessary or warranted.

Affirmed.