FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

HILARY BOWE RICKS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

J. T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MICHAEL WHITE, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A05-1406-CR-243

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Daniel Pflum, Judge

Cause No. 49G20-1305-FC-29580

January 16, 2015

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Michael White (White), appeals his conviction for Count I, 

possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6; Count II, possession of 

marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-11; and his adjudication as an habitual 

substance offender, I.C. § 35-34-1-5.

We affirm.

ISSUE

White raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court 

properly admitted the evidence discovered following White’s stop and arrest. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2013, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Jana Goode (Officer 

Goode) was driving home in her personal vehicle on Keystone Avenue in Indianapolis, 

Indiana, after her shift had ended. At the intersection of Keystone Avenue and 25th

Street, Officer Goode observed a tan car exit a fast-food restaurant parking lot directly in 

front of her car. The tan car drove forward into traffic, hitting a red car in the left lane. 

Without stopping or exiting his car, the driver of the tan car, later identified as White, 

backed up, and then pulled forward in between Officer Goode’s car and the red car, 

driving away north-bound on Keystone Avenue. Officer Goode reported the incident, 

turned her car around, and started following White. When White turned north onto 

Ralston Avenue, Officer Goode lost sight of him. 
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Officers Adam Mengerink (Officer Mengerink) and Dustin Keedy (Officer Keedy) 

responded to Officer Goode’s radio report of the accident and stopped White’s car at the 

intersection of Fall Creek and 30th Street. Officer Goode arrived at the stop and informed 

the Officers what she had observed. All three officers noticed front-end damage to 

White’s car, as well as red paint markings on the front bumper. 

During the stop, both Officer Mengerink and Officer Keedy smelled a strong odor 

of raw marijuana on White’s person when he exited the car, as well as an odor of burnt 

marijuana inside White’s vehicle. The officers arrested White for leaving the scene of an 

accident. Following White’s arrest, Officer Keedy searched White but found no

marijuana on his person. The officers searched the car and did not locate any marijuana 

inside the vehicle. Meanwhile, Officer Goode returned to the location of the accident,

but the red car was no longer there.

After being placed in custody, White was transported to the Arrestee Processing 

Center (APC). At the APC, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Brent Doughty (Deputy 

Doughty) performed a pat-down search of White. Because of the strong smell of 

marijuana emanating from White, Deputy Doughty also subjected White to a strip search. 

The strip search was done in private, with two deputies present. During this search, 

Deputy Doughty discovered two baggies near White’s buttocks inside his underpants. 

The baggies contained raw marijuana, as well as 3.1992 grams of cocaine. 

On May 7, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging White with Count I, 

possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-6; Count II, possession of 

marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-11; Count III, failure to stop after an 
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accident with an unattended vehicle, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 9-26-1-3, -8(b); and 

Count IV, trafficking with an inmate, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-44.1-3-5. On 

April 2, 2014, the State amended the Information, adding Count V, alleging White to be 

an habitual substance offender, I.C. § 35-34-1-5.

On August 26, 2013, White moved to suppress the evidence discovered following 

his arrest. On November 6, 2013, White amended his motion to suppress, asserting that 

he was arrested under the wrong Indiana Code section and without probable cause. On 

May 16, 2014, after a combined suppression hearing and bench trial, the trial court 

denied White’s motion to suppress, found that probable cause to arrest him existed, and 

that the subsequent search was legal. The trial court declared White guilty of Count I, 

possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, and Count II, possession of marijuana, a Class A 

misdemeanor. After White stipulated to the charge, the trial court adjudicated him an 

habitual substance offender. That same day, the trial court sentenced White to six years 

executed on Count I, enhanced by six years for the habitual offender adjudication, and a 

one year concurrent sentence on Count II, for an aggregate sentence of twelve years 

executed. 

White now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

White contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the 

evidence resulting from White’s arrest and strip search. Our standard of review for the 

admissibility of evidence is well settled. The admission or exclusion of evidence lies 

within the trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great deference on appeal. 
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Whiteside v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We will reverse a trial 

court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An 

abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In reviewing the admissibility of 

evidence, we consider only the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling and any 

unrefuted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Id. 

In essence, White makes two assertions: first, he disputes the legality of the arrest 

pursuant to I.C. § 35-33-1-1(a)(3), and second, White argues that he was subjected to a 

strip search at the APC in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and his rights 

pursuant to the Indiana Constitution. 

A. Probable Cause 

Pursuant to I.C. § 35-33-1-1(a)(3), a law enforcement officer may arrest a person 

when the officer has probable cause to believe the person failed to stop after a property 

damage accident under I.C. § 9-26-1-2. 

Probable cause to arrest exists when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has 

knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe 

that the suspect has committed the criminal act in question. Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 

1183, 1192 (Ind. 2004) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 

L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967)). The amount of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause 

requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis. Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345, 348 

(Ind. 1999). It is grounded in notions of common sense, not mathematical precisions. 

Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. 1998). As such, the probable cause standard 
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is a “practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical 

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 

technicians, act. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983)). Because it deals with probabilities and depends on 

the totality of the circumstances, the probable cause standard is incapable of precise 

definition or quantification into percentages. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. However, the 

substance of the definition of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and 

this belief of guilt must be particularized with respect of the person to be searched or 

seized. Id. (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 

(1979)). 

Contesting the existence of probable cause, White claims that the amount of 

evidence available to stop and arrest him for failure to stop after a property damage 

accident only rose to the less demanding standard of reasonable suspicion. “Reasonable 

suspicion . . . is satisfied where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, 

together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily 

prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” 

Billingsly v. State, 980 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We disagree. 

Officer Goode observed White strike a red car while exiting from a parking lot 

into Keystone Avenue, and fleeing the scene. She reported the incident and followed 

White. Even though other officers stopped White, Officer Goode caught up with him and 

informed the other officers of her observations. All three officers noticed the front-end 

damage on White’s car, including the “red paint from the other car [which] had 
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transferred over to the bumper” of White’s car. (Transcript p. 12). Although there was 

“old” damage to White’s front bumper, the “red paint transfer” looked “fresh.” (Tr. p. 

38). Officer Goode testified that the area with the red paint was “consistent with the area 

of [White’s] vehicle that [she] previously saw strike the red vehicle.” (Tr. p. 21). Based 

on the evidence, we conclude that the officers had a reasonable belief that White had 

failed to stop after a property damage accident and therefore his arrest was supported by 

probable cause.1 See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.

B. Strip Search

Next, White contends that the strip search at APC violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent 

part: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .” As a general rule, 

the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches. Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 

878 (Ind. 2010). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden 

of proving that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement; a 

search incident to arrest is one such exception. Id. 

Thus, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a person if the search is 

incident to a lawful arrest. Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001). In such 

situations, the search and the arrest must be “substantially contemporaneous,” and the 

 

1 Because we find that the officers had probable cause to stop White, we will not address White’s 

alternative argument that in case no probable cause to arrest White for leaving the scene of a property 

damage accident existed, the “smell of marijuana on his person” did not justify the arrest. (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 11).
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search must be confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Townsend v. State, 460 

N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. 1984). The requirement of a contemporaneous search has been 

interpreted liberally, however, and Indiana courts have validated searches that do not 

occur until the arrestee arrives at a law enforcement facility, as long as the items searched 

are “found on the person of an arrestee” or are “immediately associated with this person.” 

Edwards, 759 N.E.2d at 629. Therefore, here, because White’s arrest was supported by 

probable cause, the contested strip search can be evaluated as a search incident to a 

lawful arrest.

Nevertheless, both Indiana case law and federal precedents place limits on 

searches incident to an arrest. The United States Supreme Court has held that once a 

lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a “full search” of the arrestee for 

weapons or concealed evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 

467, 38 L.Ed.2d 428 (1973). No additional probable cause for the search is required, and 

the search incident to arrest may “involve a relatively extensive exploration of the 

person.” Id. at 227 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 

(1968)). However, such a search would be unreasonable, and therefore a violation of the 

Fourth Amendment standard, if it were “extreme or patently abusive.” Id. at 236. In 

Edwards, 759 N.E.2d at 629, our supreme court rejected the “general proposition that a 

routine, warrantless strip search incident to a lawful misdemeanor arrest is reasonable.” 

Rather, carefully delineating the parameters, the Edwards court concluded that “[t]o the 

extent a search is conducted on the basis of jail security, the indignity and personal 

invasion necessarily accompanying a strip search is simply not reasonable without the 
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reasonable suspicion that weapons or contraband may be introduced into the jail.” Id. at 

630. The circumstances surrounding the arrest, rather than the offense itself, may give 

rise to a reasonable suspicion, and if so the search is justified. Id. 

During the stop both officers noticed a strong odor of raw marijuana on White’s 

person when he exited the car, as well as an odor of burnt marijuana inside White’s 

vehicle. Despite patting down White and searching his car, the officers did not locate any 

marijuana. Upon his arrest, White was transported to the APC. At the APC, Deputy 

Doughty conducted a strip search of White because of “the strong odor of what appeared 

to be maybe marijuana.” (Tr. p. 55). He reiterated that the odor raised a concern of 

contraband trafficking in the jail, possibly resulting in “violence within the jail.” (Tr. p. 

56). Deputy Doughty conducted the search in private and located two baggies in White’s 

underwear. We conclude that although the underlying arrest constituted a misdemeanor, 

the strip search incident to White’s arrest was justified because of the officers’ reasonable 

suspicion that weapons or contraband would be introduced into the jail due to the 

lingering odor of marijuana which engulfed White even after having been transported to 

the APC. See Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied

(noting that the odor of raw marijuana indicates that it has not been smoked and therefore 

still may be in the defendant’s possession). The strip search did not violate White’s 

Fourth Amendment rights.2

CONCLUSION

 

2 Because we affirm the trial court based on the Fourth Amendment, we will not address White’s Indiana 

Constitution argument. 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted 

evidence following White’s arrest and search. 

Affirmed. 

VAIDIK, C.J. and BAKER, J. concur