COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Lemons 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

KELLY PAIGE EDWARDS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2362-97-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 SEPTEMBER 22, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 

John M. Folkes, Judge 

 David B. Hargett (Joseph D. Morrissey; 

Morrissey, Hershner & Jacobs, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 The trial judge convicted Kelly Paige Edwards of operating a 

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See Code 

§ 18.2-266. Edwards contends that the trial judge erred (1) by 

failing to suppress the arresting officer's testimony concerning 

the basis for stopping Edwards' vehicle and (2) by refusing to 

permit defense witnesses to testify concerning events related to 

the stop. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction. 

 I. 

 Edwards first contends that "the trial [judge] err[ed] by 

failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic 

stop when the arresting officer, who did not offer any testimony 

as to his knowledge, training, and experience, merely observed 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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[Edwards'] tires touch the centerline, and therefore the officer 

did not possess a legally sufficient 'reasonable articulable 

suspicion' that [Edwards] was engaged in criminal activity." 

 When we review a trial judge's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we consider de novo the ultimate questions of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See Shears v. 

Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996). 

"In performing such analysis, we are bound by the trial [judge's] 

findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without 

evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences 

drawn from those facts by [the trial judge] and local law 

enforcement officers." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 

198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997). 

 At the suppression hearing, Police Officer Doss testified 

that he saw two vehicles in a business complex at 1:30 a.m., when 

all the businesses were closed. As the vehicles left the parking 

area, the officer followed one of the vehicles onto Route 17. 

When the officer saw the vehicle "cross or touch the centerline a 

few times," he activated the video camera mounted in his vehicle. 

 The officer followed the vehicle as it entered another parking 

lot. When the vehicle left the parking lot, the officer followed 

it on several other roadways. The officer observed the vehicle 

cross the center line again. Later, he saw the vehicle straddle 

the yellow line as it made a "wide right" turn. The officer 

stopped the vehicle to investigate whether the driver was under 
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the influence of alcohol. As the officer testified, the trial 

judge and the other participants at the trial viewed the 

videotape. 

 When the officer approached Kelly Edwards, the driver of the 

vehicle, the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from 

the interior of the vehicle. Edwards admitted that she drank 

several beers that evening, consuming the last beer two hours 

before the stop. The officer demonstrated to Edwards a "finger 

count test" that he intended to use to judge Edwards' sobriety. 

While testifying, the officer admitted that he did not properly 

demonstrate the test. The officer also testified that when 

Edwards exited her vehicle, she swayed as she walked to the rear 

of her vehicle. After Edwards took a preliminary breath test, 

the officer arrested her for driving under the influence of 

alcohol. 

 In our review of Edwards' claim that the trial judge 

improperly overruled Edwards' motion to suppress the evidence, we 

are guided by the following principles: 

 "'When the police stop a motor vehicle and 

detain an occupant, this constitutes a 

seizure of the person for Fourth Amendment 

purposes.'" "In order to justify an 

investigatory stop of a vehicle, the officer 

must have some reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants 

are involved in, or have recently been 

involved in, some form of criminal activity." 

 "To determine whether an officer has 

articulated a reasonable basis to suspect 

criminal activity, a court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances, including the 

officer's knowledge, training, and 

experience." "'[A] trained law enforcement 
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officer may [be able to] identify criminal 

behavior which would appear innocent to an 

untrained observer.'" 

Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237-38, 498 S.E.2d 422, 

424 (1998) (citations omitted). 

 The evidence proved that on the morning of the incident the 

officer was a lieutenant on uniformed patrol and was the shift 

supervisor. When the officer testified concerning events he 

observed, he illustrated his testimony by using the videotape he 

made while observing those events. His testimony was more than 

sufficient to prove that he observed "erratic driving behavior." 

See Neal, 27 Va. App. at 239 n.3, 498 S.E.2d at 425 n.3. 

Indeed, the officer testified that Edwards' vehicle crossed the 

center line several times and made an improper turn. 

 The trial judge observed the videotape and came to the same 

conclusion, finding that Edwards "crossed the centerline a couple 

of times." Under those circumstances, "a brief detention for 

[an] investigative purpose is justified where an officer has 

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 

'criminal activity may be afoot.'" Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 

Va. App. 440, 444, 425 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1992) (citation omitted). 

Because the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 

Edwards was driving improperly, see May v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. 

App. 348, 353-54, 349 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1986), the trial judge did 

not err in denying the motion to suppress. 

 II. 
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 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Edwards sought to 

introduce the testimony of two expert witnesses to comment upon 

the events shown on the videotape. One proposed witness, a 

former state trooper, would have testified that when he observed 

the videotape, he saw Edwards commit no traffic infractions. The 

other witness, a defensive driving coordinator, would have rated 

Edwards' driving performance on the videotape. The trial judge 

excluded the proffered testimony. Edwards contends that "the 

trial [judge] err[ed] in refusing to permit testimony from [her] 

witnesses who would have testified as to the measurements of the 

road, the obstructions adjacent to the road which would justify 

defensive-driving measures, the number of vehicles that routinely 

touch the centerline at various locations, and their opinions 

that [Edwards], whose driving was captured by video, neither 

drove erratically nor committed any traffic infractions." 

 The principle is well established in Virginia that "where 

the facts and circumstances shown in evidence are such that men 

of ordinary intelligence are capable of comprehending them, 

forming an intelligent opinion about them, and drawing their own 

conclusions therefrom, the opinion of an expert founded upon such 

facts is inadmissible." Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 904, 

108 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1959). 

 The trial judge had the opportunity to view the videotape 

and did so while the officer testified. Based on the officer's 

testimony and the events depicted on the videotape, the trial 
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judge drew his own conclusions regarding appellant's driving on 

the night in question and whether the officer had a reasonable 

articulable suspicion that Edwards was driving improperly. The 

proffered expert testimony would have invaded the province of the 

trial judge as the trier of fact. See Schooler v. Commonwealth, 

14 Va. App. 418, 422, 417 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1992). Accordingly, 

we hold that the trial judge did not err in excluding the expert 

testimony. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment. 

 Affirmed.