alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 2.3
 STOCK PURCHASE AND
SALE AGREEMENT
 Agreement ML&CO. BHC MLBT
 Share
Capital
 Acquisition
  Acquisition of Interests.
 Encumbrance
 Purchase Price
 Closing Date
 Representations and Warranties of ML&CO.
 Capitalization




---



##### 



Ownership of Share Capital
 Solvency
 Mutual Representations and Warranties of ML&CO. and BHC
 Organization; Powers.
 Authorization; Enforceability.
   Governmental Approvals; No Conflicts
   Representations and Warranties of MLBT
 Organization; Powers.
 Authorization; Enforceability.
  2




---



##### 



Governmental Approvals; No Conflicts
   Certain Covenants
 Tax Matters
  Further Assurances
 Miscellaneous
 Counterparts
 Governing Law
 Expenses
 Successors and Assigns
 Headings; Definitions
 3




---



##### 



Amendments and Waivers
 Entire Agreement
 [SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]
 4




---



##### 



MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC.By:
    /s/ Mark D. LinszName:
    Mark D. LinszTitle:
    Treasurer BANA HOLDING CORPORATIONBy:
    /s/ Joe L. PriceName:
    Joe L. PriceTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer MERRILL LYNCH BANK & TRUST CO., FSBBy:
    Lawrence P. WashingtonName:
    Lawrence P. WashingtonTitle:
    Chairman & Chief Executive Officer 5
```

                    NOTICE REGARDING ARTHUR ANDERSEN CONSENT

Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"),
provides that if any part of a registration statement at the time such part
becomes effective contains an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring a security pursuant to
such registration statement (unless it is proved that at the time of such
acquisition such person knew of such untruth or omission) may sue, among others,
every accountant who has consented to be named as having prepared or certified
any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any
report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement,
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report or
valuation which purports to have been prepared or certified by the accountant.

This Form 10-K is incorporated by reference into the following Registration
Statements on Form S-8 of MAXXAM Inc. (the "Company"): No. 33-54479 and
33-101903 (collectively, the "Registration Statements").

The Company on April 30, 2002, decided to no longer engage Arthur Andersen LLP
("Andersen") as its independent auditor and appointed Deloitte & Touche LLP to
replace Andersen. The Company has been unable to obtain Andersen's written
consent to the incorporation by reference into the Registration Statements of
its audit report with respect to the Company's financial statements as of
December 31, 2001 and 2000 and for the years then ended. Rule 437a under the
Securities Act permits the Company to file this Form 10-K without a written
consent from Andersen in this situation. As a result, it is unlikely that
you would be able to sustain a claim against Andersen under Section 11(a) of the
Securities Act for any purchases of securities under the Registration Statements
made on or after the date of this Form 10-K. To the extent provided in Section
11(b)(3)(C) of the Securities Act, however, other persons who are liable under
Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, including the Company's officers and
directors, may still rely on Andersen's original audit reports as being made by
an expert for purposes of establishing a due diligence defense under Section
11(b) of the Securities Act.
```
#### Demeras Van Buskirk v. Thomas H. Harrod, county drain com’r, and John M. Trask, clerk.

*County ditch*— Notice *as to prelvminm'ies.*

Notice of the time and place of the appointment by the judge of probate of commissioners to determine upon the location of a county ditch is essential to the validity of the proceedings.

Certiorari to bring up proceedings for the location and construction of a county diteh.

Submitted April 14.

Decided April 25.

*John II. Kimball*for plaintiff in certiorari.

Marston, J.

No notice was given of the time and place for the appointment of commissioners by the probate court, and as repeatedly held this was fatal.

The proceedings must be quashed and held for naught.

The other Justices concurred.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ )

BAHIG F. BISHAY

, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Case No. 2 4

- cv

- 2086 (APM)

TREVOR N. MCFADDEN

, et al

., )

in his individual capacity, )

U.S. District Court Judge, )

)

Defendant s

. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Bahig F. Bishay filed this action against Defendant U.S. District Court Judge

Trevor N. McFadden and 14 judges of the D.C. Circuit. Compl., ECF No. 1. The crux of the

C omplaint is that Judge McFadden wrongfully dismissed a case that Plaintiff filed against various

federal officials and others, Bi shay v. Harris , 21

- cv

- 1831 (TNM)

. See generally i d. In the

dismissed action, Judge McFadden entered an order enjoining Plaintiff from further filings in

federal court absent satisfying various conditions, including seeking leave of court to file a new

action. See Bishay v. Harris (Bishay I) , 668 F. Supp. 3d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2023). The D.C. Circuit

upheld the injunction. See Bishay v. Harris , No. 23

- 5019, 2023 WL 6784306, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct.

6, 2023). In filing this action, Plaintiff has not satisfied any of the pre

- conditions to suit set forth

in Judge Mc Fadden’s injunction. Bishay I , 668 F. Supp. 3d at 14. For that reason, this case is

dismissed.

The case also must be dismissed for the independent reason that judicial officers are

immune from suit for their judicial acts. See Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor , 567 F.3d 672, 682

(D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff only has alleged conduct performed in Defendants’ judicial capacities

.Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint and this

action with prejudice. Plaintiff’s various other motions, ECF Nos. 4, 5, and 7, are denied as moot.

A separate final order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: July 30 , 2024 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Court Judge
10253.

#### Mills *v.*The State.

Stephens, J.

1. “Presence and participation in the act of killing a human being is not evidence of consent and concurrence in the perpetration of the act, by a defendant charged with aiding and abetting in the killing, unless he had a felonious design or participated in the felonious design of the person killing.

*(а)*“If the person charged with murder in the first degree commit the assault on the deceased with a deadly weapon, but his intention to assault him with a deadly weapon was unknown to the person charged in the same indictment as principal in the second degree, and he intended to participate in an assault and battery only, and in no design to kill, he is guilty of manslaughter only.

(б) “If a person charged in an indictment as principal in the second degree is connected with the act of killing, but is not connected with the intention to kill, and does not know that the person killing intended to use a deadly weapon in making an assault, he is guilty of manslaughter.” *Brown*v. *State,*28 *Ga.*200 (4-6); 1 Chitty’s Criminal Law, 258.

2. The evidence, while conflicting, authorized the inference that the defendant participated in the act of killing committed by the actual perpetrator of the homicide, but did not participate in the latter’s intent to kill. The verdict of voluntary manslaughter was therefore authorized by the evidence.

3. The conviction in this case being for voluntary manslaughter only, it was not harmful to the accused for the trial judge to refuse to charge, as requested, that “Even if one was present at the commission of a crime and mentally approved or consented to same, yet if that consent was unknown to the person committing the crime, the one so mentally approving could not be held guilty as a principal.” The defendant having been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the jury must necessarily have found that he was not guilty of consent and approval, and the failure to charge as requested, even if it could be considered as error, was harmless. *Land*v. *State,*11 *Ga. App.*761 (2) (76 S. E. 78).

*69Decided July 16, 1919.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Montgomery superior court— Judge Graham. November 16, 1918.

*A. 0. Saffold, JUschol Graham,*for plaintiff: in error.

*W. A. Wooten, solicitor-general,*contra.

4. The other request to charge was fully covered by the general charge.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., eoneur.*
<PAGE>   1



                                                                     EXHIBIT 11


                           MONARCH DENTAL CORPORATION
                       COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE
                  (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                         THREE MONTHS ENDED            SIX MONTHS ENDED
                                                                               JUNE 30,                     JUNE 30,
                                                                     -------------------------     -------------------------
                                                                        1998           1997           1998            1997
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
<S>                                                                  <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>       
PRIMARY:
Net income                                                           $    1,352     $      325     $    2,456     $      558
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
Weighted average common shares outstanding                               10,324          3,281         10,280          3,249
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
Net income per share                                                 $     0.13     $     0.10     $     0.24     $     0.17
                                                                     ==========     ==========     ==========     ==========

FULLY DILUTED:
Net income                                                           $    1,352     $      325     $    2,456     $      558
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding:
   Weighted average common shares outstanding                            10,324          3,281         10,280          3,249
   Weighted average common equivalent shares outstanding                    142          3,463            117          3,344
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
Weighted average common and common equivalent
   shares outstanding                                                    10,466          6,744         10,397          6,593
                                                                     ----------     ----------     ----------     ----------
Net income per share                                                 $     0.13     $     0.05     $     0.24     $     0.08
                                                                     ==========     ==========     ==========     ==========

</TABLE>
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4035

To amend section 402 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide a 2-year extension of supplemental 

security income in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 for refugees, asylees, 

and certain other humanitarian immigrants. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 25, 2004

Mr. CARDIN (for himself, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ENGLISH, and 

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut) introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To amend section 402 of the Personal Responsibility and 

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide 

a 2-year extension of supplemental security income in 

fiscal years 2005 through 2007 for refugees, asylees, 

and certain other humanitarian immigrants.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘SSI Extension for El5 derly and Disabled Refugees Act’’. 
2

•HR 4035 IH 

1 SEC. 2. SSI EXTENSION FOR HUMANITARIAN IMMIGRANTS. 

2 Section 402(a)(2) of the Personal Responsibility and 

3 Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 

4 1612(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the fol5 lowing: 

6 ‘‘(M) TWO-YEAR SSI EXTENSION THROUGH

7 FISCAL YEAR 2007.—

8 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—With respect to 

9 eligibility for benefits for the specified Fed10 eral program described in paragraph 

11 (3)(A), the 7-year period described in sub12 paragraph (A) shall be deemed to be a 9-

13 year period during fiscal years 2005 

14 through 2007. 

15 ‘‘(ii) ALIENS WHOSE BENEFITS

16 CEASED IN PRIOR FISCAL YEARS.—

17 ‘‘(I) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on 

18 the date of the enactment of the SSI 

19 Extension for Elderly and Disabled 

20 Refugees Act, any qualified alien ren21 dered ineligible for the specified Fed22 eral program described in paragraph 

23 (3)(A) during fiscal years prior to fis24 cal year 2005 solely by reason of the 

25 termination of the 7-year period de26 scribed in subparagraph (A) shall be 
3

•HR 4035 IH 

1 eligible for such program for an addi2 tional 2-year period in accordance 

3 with this subparagraph, if such alien 

4 meets all other eligibility factors 

5 under title XVI of the Social Security 

6 Act. 

7 ‘‘(II) PAYMENT OF BENEFITS.—

8 Benefits paid under subparagraph (I) 

9 shall be paid prospectively over the 

10 duration of the qualified alien’s re11 newed eligibility.’’.

Æ
#### James A. Wisner v. Peter J. Wirth.

*Bankruptcy*— Authentication *of assignment.*

An instrument purporting to be a copy of an assignment in bankruptcy from the register to the assignee, purporting to be certified by the register, but not certified by the clerk, and not otherwise identified by acknowledgment or record, is not evidence under § 14 of the Bankrupt Law without further proof.

Error to Isabella.

. Submitted Apr. 19.

Decided Apr. 25.

Ejectment. Plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

*H. H. Hoyt*for appellant.

*JBrown <& leaton*for appellee.

Campbell, J.

Wisner sued Wirth in ejectment, and based his title on certain alleged bankruptcy proceedings. The court below held that he had not made such proof of title as would be legally sufficient.

Among other copies of documents he produced what seems from the bill of exceptions to have been a record copy of the statutory assignment from the register in bankruptcy to the assignee in bankruptcy. By section 14 of the Bankrupt Law as then in force the title of the bankrupt’s estate is to pass to the assignee by virtue of an assignment *292from the judge or register “by an instrument under his hand.” Bankrupt Law, § 14 The same section provides-that “ a copy duly certified by the clerk of the court, under' the seal thereof, of the assignment made by the judge or' register as the case may be, to him as assignee, shall be conclusive evidence,” etc. This is the only provision made by that statute for proving the assignment by a copy. Our statutes make no provision on the subject. The record of" such an instrument without acknowledgment or other verification could not avail to create evidence of title. The-original does not appear to have been produced, and the statute does not declare- such original without the clerk’s-certificate as proving itself. The signature of the judge or' register alone could have no such effect unless by statute. There is nothing in the record showing any sufficient proof’ of the assignee’s rights, and therefore we need not consider the other questions as to what if any proof is necessary further under the bankrupt laws to put defendant on- hisdefence.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Cooley and Mmrston, J"J. concurred.
Order entered July 11, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00113-CR

DAVION VAN QUINN SCOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F20-75064-R

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s July 8, 2022 motion for an extension of time 

to file his brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant’s brief due by 

August 10, 2022.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 26, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 70535]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28030]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


Office of the Secretary; Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response; Statement of Organization, Functions, and 
Delegations of Authority

    Part A, Office of the Secretary, Statement of Organization, 
Functions, and Delegations of Authority of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) is being amended at Chapter AN, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), as last 
amended at 78 FR 25277 April 30, 2013. This organizational change is to 
realign the Medical Reserve Corps from the HHS Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Health to ASPR under the Office of Emergency Management 
and is consistent with authorities established under Sections 1703, 
2811(c)(2)(D), and 2813 of the Public Health Service Act, as modified 
by the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 
2013 (Pub. L. 113-5). The change is as follows.
    I. Under Part A, Chapter AN, Section AN.00, Mission, add 
``Authority over and responsibility for the Medical Reserve Corps.''
    II. Delegations of Authority. All delegations and redelegations of 
authority made to officials and employees of affected organizational 
components will continue in them or their successors pending further 
redelegation, provided they are consistent with this reorganization.
    This reorganization is effective on the date of publication in the 
Federal Register.

    Dated: November 19, 2014.
Sylvia M. Burwell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-28030 Filed 11-25-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4150-28-P
#### Flora B. Hazen v. Town Board of Akron.

*Removed of school district moderator.*

The Primary School law does not authorize the township board to remove the moderator for hiring her husband to teach the district school and agreeing to pay him more than is necessary to secure a better teachex2. Act 164 of 1881 ch. xiii, § 8.

Certiorari to town board.

Submitted April 12.

Proceedings quashed April 19.

*Blade c& Quvnm,*for plaintiff in *certiorari.*

Marston, J.

The statute relating to primary schools gives to the township board power to remove from office upon satisfactory proof, any district officer who shall have illegally used or disposed of any of the public moneys •entrusted to his charge, or who shall persistently and without sufficient cause, refuse or neglect to discharge any of the duties of his office. Act No. 164, Laws 1881, ch. 13, § 8.

Mrs. Hazen was holding and exercising the duties of the •office of moderator, and the board undertook to remove her *189upon a written complaint, charging — yirsi, that she was not duly elected; and secondly, that she was guilty of a gross-violation of duty in hiring her husband to teach the school and in agreeing to pay him more wages than was requisite to have obtained a good or .better teacher.

It is sufficient to say, that the statute does not authorize-a removal on any such charges, and even if it did, the evidence introduced did not tend to support the charges made..

The proceedings therefore must be quashed .with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
----

----

----

----

----

----

----

|   | MET-PRO      CORPORATION             |
|--------|--------------------------------------|
|   |                                 |   |
|   |                                 |   |
|   | By:                                  | /s/ Raymond J. De Hont |
|   |                                 |   |
|   | Title:                               | President and Chief Executive      Officer |
|   |                                 |   |
|   | Date:  April      10, 2008 |

----

| Name                            | Title                                                             | Percentage |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Raymond      J. De Hont         | Chief      Executive Officer and President                        | 34.42%     |
| Gary      J. Morgan             | Chief      Financial Officer and Senior Vice President of Finance | 29.73%     |
| Paul      A. Tetley             | Executive      Vice President                                     | 9.46%      |
| Lewis      E. Osterhoudt        | Vice      President/General Manager                               | 1.37%      |
| Gregory      C. Kimmer          | Vice      President/General Manager                               | .80%       |
| Thomas      V. Edwards          | Technical      Director                                           | .62%       |
| Vincent      J. Verdone         | Vice      President/General Manager                               | 0%         |
| Clark      R. Griffith          | General      Manager                                              | 0%         |
| Robin      L. Schroeder         | Director      of Information Technology                           | 0%         |
| Gennaro      A. D’Alterio | General      Manager                                              | 0%         |
| Thomas      F. Walker           | General      Manager                                              | 0%         |

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-1409

ABDUL AZIZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-97-1769-A)

Submitted: July 26, 2001 Decided: July 31, 2001

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Abdul Aziz, Appellant Pro Se. Jeffrey Eden Weinstein, ECKERT,

SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Abdul Aziz appeals the district court’s denial of a post judgment motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district

court originally dismissed the action as untimely filed, and this

court affirmed. Aziz v. Orbital Sciences Corp., No. 98-1281, 1998

WL 736469 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 1998) (unpublished).

We review denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d

861, 869 (4th Cir. 1999). Having reviewed the district court’s

order denying the motion, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the requested relief. Therefore, we deny

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED