IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MARK M.,1

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of 

Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 05063 

Magistrate Judge Beth W. Jantz 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Mark M.’s application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons 

that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 17, Pl.’s Mot.] is granted. The 

Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22, Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the 

Court refers to Plaintiff by his first name and the first initial of his last name. 

2

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her 

predecessor.

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BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural History 

On October 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB and SSI, alleging disability since July 

2, 2016 due to a deteriorating hip, lower back spasms, depression, anxiety, obesity, and sleep 

apnea. [Dkt. 16-1, R. at 103.] Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and again upon 

reconsideration. [R. 113, 131.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”), which was held on December 18, 2019. [R. 42.] Plaintiff personally appeared and 

testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. [R. 42.] Vocational expert (“VE”) Julie 

L. Bose and medical expert Sai R. Nimmagadda, M.D., also testified. [R. 42, 75, 79.] On January 

31, 2020, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him not disabled under the Social 

Security Act. [R. 35.] The Social Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. 

II. The ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim in accordance with the Social Security Administration’s 

five-step sequential evaluation process. [R. 16-17.] The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of July 2, 2016 through his 

date last insured of December 31, 2019. [R. 17.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 

had the following severe impairments: C3-5 spondylosis and L5-S2 severe narrowing of the thecal 

sac (degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine), obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, 

and osteoarthritis of the right hip. [R. 17-22.] The ALJ concluded at step three that his 

impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal one of the Social Security 

Administration’s listings of impairments (a “Listing”). [R. 22-23.] Before step four, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary 

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work except that he could push and pull occasionally, could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, 

and could not be exposed to environment conditions of vibration, wetness, unprotected heights, 

and dangerous moving machinery. [R. 23-34.] The ALJ further indicated that Plaintiff could 

climb ramps and stairs occasionally, as well as balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl 

occasionally. [R. 23-34.] At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to 

perform his past relevant work as a mail carrier and a purchasing manager/production manager. 

[R. 34.] At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under the Social 

Security Act. [R. 34-35.] 

DISCUSSION 

I. Judicial Review 

 Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine disability 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry, asking 

whether: (1) the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for 

which she claims disability; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant 

retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

“A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five.” Briscoe 

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ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005). “The claimant bears the burden of 

proof at steps one through four, after which at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner.” 

Id. 

Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether it adequately 

discusses the issues and is based upon substantial evidence and the proper legal criteria. Villano 

v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 

S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). “To determine whether substantial evidence 

exists, the court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for 

the ALJ’s by reweighing the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the 

credibility of witnesses.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). While this 

review is deferential, “it is not intended to be a rubber-stamp” on the ALJ’s decision. Stephens v. 

Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court will reverse the ALJ’s finding “if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or if it is the result of an error of law.” Id., at 327. 

 The ALJ also has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record, and to “build an 

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful 

judicial review of the administrative findings.” Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837; see also Jarnutowski 

v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022). Although the ALJ is not required to mention every 

piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ’s analysis “must provide some glimpse into the reasoning 

behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001); 

accord Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ “must explain [the ALJ’s] 

analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” 

Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 351). 

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II. Analysis 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1) failing to accommodate 

Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations; and (2) improperly evaluating Plaintiff’s exertional 

limitations; and (3) improperly evaluating opinion evidence. After reviewing the record and the 

briefs submitted by the parties, this Court concludes that the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s 

mental RFC. Because this failure alone warrants remand, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s 

additional arguments. 

 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations in crafting the RFC. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion 

of Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Ailsa K. Nielsen and, as a result, concluded that Plaintiff 

had only mild limitations in two areas of mental functioning and no limitations in two other areas. 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to incorporate the mild limitations he credited into the 

RFC. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred by neither incorporating into the RFC 

Plaintiff’s mild limitations in concentration, persistence and pace and adapting or managing 

himself, nor explaining why those mild limitations produced no functional restrictions that needed 

to be included in the RFC. This error requires remand. 

The ALJ’s sole discussion of Plaintiff’s mental limitations came at step two, where the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were non-severe impairments. In so doing, the 

ALJ evaluated the opinions of Dr. Nielsen and two agency consultants. [R. 20-21.] Dr. Nielsen 

opined in September 2018 that Plaintiff had many likely work-preclusive limitations, including, 

among others, limitations in the following areas that would preclude performance for 20% of an 

eight-hour workday: remembering locations and work-like procedures; understanding and 

remembering detailed instruction; maintaining attention and concentration to perform simple 

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tasks; performing activities within a schedule, maintaining attendance, and being punctual and 

within customary tolerances; and completing a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and performing at a consistent pace without 

an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. [R. 1450-54.] Dr. Nielsen’s narrative 

assessment noted that Plaintiff “endorsed” the foregoing “factors that preclude performance for 

20% of a work day.” [R. 1450.] The ALJ found Dr. Nielsen’s opinion was “not persuasive” 

because it was based largely on Plaintiff’s reporting of his own limitations; it was not supported 

by an explanation, as Dr. Neilsen’s opinion mostly listed symptoms and subjective complaints and 

noted that Plaintiff is participating in therapy; and because it was inconsistent with examination 

findings and the claimant’s own statements throughout the record, including his statement that he 

could follow instructions very well. [R. 21.] 

Instead, the ALJ credited the opinions of the two agency consultants who found that 

Plaintiff had mild limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace and adapting or managing 

himself, but no limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information and interacting 

with others. [R. 19-20.] The agency consultants explained that Plaintiff noted “pain-related 

concentration difficulties,” but did not note “limitations resulting from other mental impairments,” 

and the consultants concluded that assessment was “consistent with the medical evidence in the 

file.” [R. 109, 125.] The ALJ adopted the consultants’ findings of mild limitations in 

concentration, persistence, and pace and adapting and managing oneself, noting in his CPP 

discussion that Plaintiff’s pain “may not be easily separable as there is some overlap between the 

mental symptoms with ongoing physical complaints.” [R. 20.] 

At the end of the ALJ’s step two discussion of Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ 

expressly noted: 

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The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual functional 

capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 

2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental residual functional 

capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process 

requires a more detailed assessment. The following residual functional capacity 

assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the 

“paragraph B” mental functional analysis. 

[R. 21.] Notwithstanding the ALJ’s statement that his step two discussion was “not a residual 

functional capacity assessment,” the ALJ did not revisit Plaintiff’s mental limitations throughout 

the rest of his opinion. 

The Court need not determine whether the ALJ adequately evaluated the foregoing opinion 

evidence because even if the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Nielsen’s opinions, the ALJ still failed 

to properly account for the mild CPP and adaptation limitations that he credited from the agency 

consultants. It is axiomatic that “both the hypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment must incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by the medical record.” 

Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014). This is true even if mental impairments “are 

non-severe and the limitations that they impose on the claimant’s capabilities are minor.” Thomas 

G. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-5860, 2022 WL 4234967, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2022) (collecting 

cases). Time and time again, courts in this District have remanded ALJ opinions identifying nonsevere mental impairments at step two that disappear without explanation when it comes time to 

craft the RFC before step four. See e.g., Thomas G., 2022 WL 4234967, at 5 (Cummings, J.); 

Kathy A. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2387, 2022 WL 2758001, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2022) 

(Cummings, J.); Anthony W. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 C 6209, 2022 WL 1062334, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 

8, 2022) (Harjani, J.); Judy D. v. Saul, No. 17 C 8994, 2019 WL 3805592, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 

13, 2019) (Schenkier, J.); Iora P. v. Berryhill, No. 18 C 3640, 2019 WL 1112272, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

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Mar. 11, 2019) (Rowland, J.); Hearan v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 0542, 2018 WL 3352657, at *3 (N.D. 

Ill. July 9, 2018) (Gilbert, J.). 

The ALJ here did exactly what this line of cases indicates is impermissible: the ALJ 

determined at step two that Plaintiff had non-severe mental impairments including mild CPP and 

adaptation limitations, but the ALJ failed to discuss or even mention Plaintiff’s mild mental 

limitations in crafting the RFC. The arguments the Commissioner offers to stave off remand are 

unavailing. First, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ was entitled to rely on the opinions of 

the agency consultants, who did not identify any specific functional restrictions beyond noting that 

Plaintiff had mild CPP and adaptation limitations. But neither the ALJ nor the agency consultants 

ever noted or explained that Plaintiff had no concrete functional restrictions arising from his mild 

mental limitations; they simply noted that Plaintiff had mild CPP and adaptation limitations, and 

that the former involved pain-related concentration difficulties. [R. 20-21, 109, 125.] That the 

agency consultants did not translate mild limitations into concrete restrictions does not mean that 

the consultants opined that there were in fact no such restrictions, nor did the ALJ make any such 

express finding.3

More fundamentally, the Commissioner can’t rely on the ALJ’s step two discussion to 

justify the RFC because the ALJ expressly stated that his step two discussion was not an RFC 

assessment. The ALJ noted that his step two analysis was “not a residual functional capacity 

assessment” and indicated that “[t]he mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 

4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment.” [R. 21.] It is 

3

 The Commissioner also suggests that the ALJ relied on Dr. Nimmagadda’s discussion of 

Plaintiff’s pain allegations in accounting for Plaintiff’s mental limitations, but the ALJ never 

mentioned Plaintiff’s mental impairments in discussing Dr. Nimmagadda’s opinions (or in crafting 

the RFC more broadly), nor did Dr. Nimmagadda specifically address Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations. [R. 23-31; 80-97.] 

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true, as the Commissioner points out, that ALJ opinions must be read holistically, and the failure 

to repeat an analysis from step two or three when crafting the RFC before step four is typically not 

a proper basis for remand. See Zellweger v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1251, 1252 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[The 

sequential process is not so rigidly compartmentalized, and nothing in the Chenery doctrine 

prohibits a reviewing court from reading an ALJ's decision holistically.”). But in this instance, 

where the ALJ expressly noted that his step two analysis did not constitute an RFC assessment, 

and that an RFC assessment required a more detailed analysis, “the Court will not overreach and 

ignore the ALJ’s own words in an effort to read the opinion as a whole.” Anthony W., 2022 WL 

1062334, at *3; see also David K. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-1743, 2022 WL 2757695, at *5 (N.D. 

Ill. July 14, 2022) (same). “If the ALJ intended to incorporate restrictions caused by Claimant’s 

mild mental limitations into the RFC, []he was obligated to explain how []he did so.” Viviana R. 

v. Kijakazi, No. 19-CV-07419, 2022 WL 3354840, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2022). The ALJ’s 

opinion contains no such explanation, notwithstanding the ALJ’s promise of one. 

The ALJ’s step two analysis does include the conclusory, apparently boilerplate statement 

that “[t]he following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the 

undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” [R. 21.] Court after court 

has rejected this language as insufficient to properly account for mild mental limitations without a 

more thorough discussion when crafting the RFC, finding the language confusing or ambiguous: 

It is unclear what the ALJ meant by saying that the RFC “reflects” his Step 2 

findings concerning [claimant]’s mental limitations. He could have intended this to 

mean that the RFC was designed to incorporate the mild impairments identified at 

Step 2, even though they were not specifically mentioned in the RFC. He could also 

have meant that he considered the Step 2 limitations as part of the RFC analysis but 

found them to be too mild to warrant additional non-exertional restrictions. 

David K., 2022 WL 2757695, at *5 (citing Muzzarelli v. Astrue, No. 10 C 7570, 2011 WL 5873793, 

at *23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2011)). The ALJ was obligated to explain either how the RFC 

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“incorporate[d] restrictions caused by Claimant’s mild mental limitations,” or, alternatively, why 

“the ALJ believed that the mild mental limitations did not merit a non-exertional limitation in the 

RFC.” Viviana R., 2022 WL 3354840, at *5. The ALJ did neither. 

 The Commissioner suggests that it is incorrect to say that an ALJ must always include 

mental restrictions for non-severe impairments, but this response attacks a straw man. “Even if a 

mild limitation finding at step two does not necessarily equate to any RFC limitation, the ALJ must 

still affirmatively evaluate the effect such mild limitations have on the claimant’s RFC.” Kathy 

A., 2022 WL 2758001, at *4 (cleaned up). It is the ALJ’s failure to conduct such an evaluation—

and not the ALJ’s failure to find any limitations—that requires remand. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues that because the jobs identified by the vocational expert 

in this case all involved unskilled work, it doesn’t matter that the ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff’s 

mild mental limitations in crafting the RFC. It is true that this type of error is particularly egregious 

when an ALJ finds that a Plaintiff can perform skilled work. See, e.g., Anthony W., 2022 WL 

1062334, at *4 (“The ALJ’s error in the present case is particularly problematic because the VE 

found that Anthony could perform his previous work as an automobile salesperson and a household 

appliance salesperson; jobs that The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)lists as skilled and 

semi-skilled employment.”); Iora P. v. Berryhill, No. 18 C 3640, 2019 WL 1112272, at *4 (N.D. 

Ill. Mar. 11, 2019) (“This error is particularly problematic here, as the VE found that the ALJ’s 

RFC would permit Plaintiff to perform her past skilled position as a senior financial advisor.”). 

But courts have repeatedly remanded in indistinguishable circumstances, noting that “[e]ven a 

claimant’s ability to perform unskilled work may be impacted or precluded by difficulties with 

memory and concentration.” Kathy A., 2022 WL 2758001, at *4; see also Thomas G., 2022 WL 

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4234967, at *4; Viviana R. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3354840, at *4. The Court cannot say that the 

ALJ’s error was harmless.4

“On remand, the ALJ must either incorporate into the RFC non-exertional limitations that 

account for Claimant’s mild limitations in [adapting or managing himself] and his mild limitations 

in concentration, persistence, and pace, or explain why such limitations are unnecessary.” Kathy 

A., 2022 WL 2758001, at *5. Because the ALJ’s failure to adequately account for Plaintiff’s 

mental limitations in the RFC requires remand, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining 

arguments. The Administration should not, however, construe the Court’s silence on the 

remaining issues as an indication that the ALJ’s initial adjudication was appropriate or not with 

respect to those issues. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [17] is granted. The 

Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

SO ORDERED. 

Date: 12/27/2022 

BETH W. JANTZ 

United States Magistrate Judge 

4

 The Commissioner’s suggestion that any error is irrelevant because the VE identified unskilled 

jobs that Plaintiff could perform is also at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s repeated rejection of 

“the notion that a hypothetical confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks and limited 

interactions with others adequately captures temperamental deficiencies and limitations in 

concentration, persistence, and pace.” DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The Commissioner cites Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2021) in support of her 

argument, but Pavlicek held only that the ability to perform simple, repetitive work is not 

inherently inconsistent with moderate CPP limitations; the Court did not hold that limitations to 

unskilled or simple and repetitive work always account for moderate (or mild) CPP limitations. 

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