3249215 (14654.8)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, as next friends of ) 

JANE DOE 2, a minor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No.: 

v. )

) Plaintiff Demands Trial by Jury 

US HEALTHVEST, LLC., a Delaware Limited ) 

Liability Company and 2014 HEALTH, LLC, a ) 

Delaware Limited Liability Company, doing ) 

business as CHICAGO BEHAVIORAL ) 

HOSPITAL, )

)

Defendant. ) 

MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER THE PSEUDONYMS OF

JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE 2

Jane Doe and John Doe, as the next of friends of Plaintiff Jane Doe 2, a minor, by their 

attorneys, Jennifer M. Sender and Andrés J. Gallegos of Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., move this 

Court for leave to file the Complaint under the pseudonyms of Jane Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe 

2, respectively. In support of said motion, Plaintiff states as follows: 

1. A copy of the proposed Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. With leave of

court, the Plaintiff will file under seal the Complaint using the Does’ proper names. 

2. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive and monetary compensation

against defendant for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794, et seq.; and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Section

1557”), 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Plaintiffs allege that the defendant violated these federal anti20-cv-5043

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discrimination statutes by refusing to admit Plaintiff, Jane Doe 2, to its psychiatric hospital based 

solely on her disability.

3. As alleged in the proposed Complaint, Jane Doe 2 is a minor. Jane Doe and John 

Doe are the parents of Jane Doe 2.

4. As more fully described in the proposed Complaint, the events surrounding the 

requested admission of Jane Doe 2 to defendant’s facility, were very traumatic and sensitive in 

nature, namely, Jane Doe 2 was experiencing a psychiatric crisis, including anxiety and delusions, 

and was expressing thoughts of suicide, and a hospital emergency department’s psychiatry crisis 

intervention team was seeking immediate placement of her in mental and behavioral health facility 

for treatment. 

5. A district court has the discretion to allow parties to proceed under fictitious names. 

K.F.P. v. Dane County, 110 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997). “To proceed anonymously, a party must 

demonstrate ‘exceptional circumstances’ that outweigh both the public policy in favor of identified 

parties and the prejudice to the opposing party that would result from anonymity.” Village of 

Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016). “[P]articularly vulnerable parties” such as “children 

[or] rape victims” may be better positioned to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Id. (quoting 

Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997)). “The 

presumption that parties’ identities are public information, and the possible prejudice to the 

opposing party from concealment, can be rebutted by a showing that the harm to the [party 

requesting anonymity]...exceeds the likely harm from concealment.” Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 

F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). 

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6. Here, exceptional circumstances exist to warrant the use of fictitious names for the

protection of a child. Moreover, given the sensitive medical nature of the circumstances that led to 

this litigation, as fully set forth in the proposed Complaint, the privacy of the minor Plaintiff 

exceeds any likely harm from concealment of her identity. Finally, anonymity of Plaintiff’s parents 

is necessary to ensure the anonymity of the minor Plaintiff, as her name could easily be discerned 

by the disclosure of her parents’ names. 

WHEREFORE, Jane Doe and John Doe, as the next of friends of Plaintiff Jane Doe 2, a 

minor, request that this Honorable Court allow them leave to file the Complaint under the 

pseudonyms of Jane Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe 2, respectively. 

Jane Doe and John Doe, as next of friends of Plaintiff Jane 

Doe 2, a minor. 

/s/ Jennifer M. Sender 

____________________________ 

One of Their Attorneys 

Jennifer M. Sender (ARDC No. 6207774) 

Andrés J. Gallegos (ARDC No. 6212168) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

ROBBINS, SALOMON & PATT, LTD.

180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3300 

Chicago, Illinois 60601 

(312) 782-9000 - Telephone 

(312) 782-6690 - Facsimile

jsender@rsplaw.com 

agallegos@rsplaw.com

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EXHIBIT A

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3249208 (14654.8)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, as next friends of ) 

JANE DOE 2, a minor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No.: 

v. )

) Plaintiff Demands Trial by Jury 

US HEALTHVEST, LLC., a Delaware Limited ) 

Liability Company and 2014 HEALTH, LLC, a ) 

Delaware Limited Liability Company, doing ) 

business as CHICAGO BEHAVIORAL ) 

HOSPITAL, )

)

Defendants. ) 

COMPLAINT

Jane Doe and John Doe, as next friends of Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 (“Plaintiff,” and sometimes 

“Jane Doe 2”), a minor, by their attorneys, Jennifer M. Sender and Andrés J. Gallegos of Robbins, 

Salomon & Patt, Ltd., for their Complaint against Defendants US HealthVest, LLC (“US 

HealthVest”) a Delaware Limited Liability Company and 2014 Health, LLC (“2014 Health” and 

together with US HealthVest are sometimes referred to herein a “Defendants”), a Delaware 

Limited Liability Company, doing business as Chicago Behavioral Hospital (“Chicago Behavioral 

Hospital” and sometimes referred to herein as “Hospital”), state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. In July 2019, Jane Doe 2 experienced a mental health crisis and was taken to

Highland Park Hospital’s emergency department. There, the hospital’s crisis intervention team 

determined Jane Doe 2 required immediate hospitalization to receive intensive, multidisciplinary 

mental health treatment as she was a serious threat of harm to herself. Admission was sought at

20-cv-5043

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Chicago Behavioral Hospital, a hospital with an adolescent mental health program. However, the

Hospital denied admission to Jane Doe 2 solely on the basis that she uses a wheelchair. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the 

Plaintiffs’ claims alleged herein arise under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 

504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 

Act (“Section 1557”), 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Injunctive relief is authorized by Rule 65 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

3. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All of the events 

or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred here in this district.

THE PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 is 15-years old and has been living with the effects of cerebral 

palsy since birth. Jane Doe 2 is a person with a disability within the meaning of all applicable 

statutes. Jane Doe 2 resides in Northbrook, Illinois with her parents and siblings.

5. US HealthVest is a behavioral healthcare company providing individualized 

behavior health services to patients of all ages, including inpatient, residential and day hospital 

services at seven psychiatric hospitals in Chicago, Atlanta, and Seattle markets. US HealthVest 

owns 2014 Health, and Chicago Behavioral is one of its behavioral health facilities.

6. 2014 Health operates Chicago Behavioral, a mental health facility that provides 

specialized mental health and substance abuse treatments offering specialized inpatient programs 

and outpatient services to address symptoms of mental illness. Among its inpatient services are 

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programs designed for adolescents, adults, and senior adults. Chicago Behavioral treats depression, 

with a special emphasis on teen depression, suicide, bipolar disorders, substance abuse, among 

other disorders. Chicago Behavioral is located in Des Plaines, Illinois.

7. Chicago Behavioral receives federal financial assistance in the form of Medicare 

and Medicaid reimbursement and is a participating provider in one or more Medicaid managed 

care plans. Accordingly, the Hospital is a recipient of federal financial assistance within the 

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and is a covered entity under Section 1557.

EXPERIENCES OF PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 2

8. Jane Doe 2 has a history of anxiety and depression, which has and will likely from 

time to time require intervention or treatment on an inpatient or outpatient basis. The Hospital is 

approximately 10.5 miles from Jane Doe 2’s residence. Upon the Hospital’s compliance with its 

federal nondiscrimination mandates, she intends to return to Hospital.

9. As a result of Jane Doe 2’s cerebral palsy, she requires the use of a power 

wheelchair for mobility, although she can ambulate with a walker, approximately 100 yards, and 

using forearm crutches, approximately 70 feet. She can operate her wheelchair independently. Jane 

Doe 2 can stand and bear weight with assistance for balance, for approximately 3-5 minutes. She 

can independently feed herself, requiring assistance only for cutting meat. She can wash her face 

and hands, brush her teeth, and bathe herself in a wheelchair accessible bathroom with assistance 

in setting up supplies and in transferring to and from her wheelchair and shower chair or tub. She 

can independently transfer to and from her wheelchair and toilet in a wheelchair accessible 

bathroom. However, since last summer because of increased depression she became incontinent. 

Jane Doe 2 can transfer herself to and from her wheelchair and a bed in a wheelchair accessible 

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bedroom. If her clothes are within reach, she can also dress and undress herself. Jane Doe 2 can 

speak and hear.

10. In July 2019, while attending summer camp for children with disabilities in Grand 

Rapids, Michigan, Jane Doe 2 was having episodes of significant anxiety, confusion, and delusion, 

and expressing thoughts of suicide. On July 25, 2019, she was rushed by ambulance to a hospital

in Grand Rapids. She remained there for five nights. The hospital tried without success to place

her into a mental and behavioral health hospital in the area. As a result, Jane Doe 2 was discharged, 

on July 30, 2019, to her mom, Jane Doe. The outpatient psychiatrist advised that Jane Doe 2 should 

go to the emergency department of Highland Park Hospital (“HPH”) to expedite psychiatric 

admission locally, which she did that same day.

11. HPH’s psychiatry crisis intervention team evaluated Jane Doe 2 in its emergency 

department. They diagnosed her as having depression with psychosis. The crisis intervention team 

concluded Jane Doe 2 required immediate hospitalization as she met the criteria for hospitalization 

due to the inability to care for herself.

12. HPH could not admit Jane Doe 2 to its mental and behavioral health unit and, 

therefore, its psychiatry crisis intervention team members attempted to secure Jane Doe 2’s 

admission in a mental and behavioral health facility. Chicago Behavioral was one of the facilities

HBH contacted on July 30, 2019. On that date, a crisis intervention team member initially 

contacted the Hospital and faxed a referral packet for its consideration. At approximately 11:49 

p.m., an HPH social worker received a call from the Hospital, and a Hospital employee stated,

“due to medical acuity, we have to deflect at this time.” Jane Doe 2, a teen diagnosed with 

worsening depression, anxiety including excessive worry, and psychosis, including delusions and 

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hallucinations, was denied mental health care at the Hospital, which specializes in teen depression,

solely on the basis of her disability.

13. Upon learning that she was denied admission to Hospital, for the very reason that 

was at the core of her depression – her wheelchair - Jane Doe 2 felt hopeless, angry, and 

discouraged. She had already felt a sense of isolation in her daily routine due to her disability and 

this deflection enforced her already existing feelings of depression and despair. 

14. As a direct and proximate cause of the Hospital’s refusal to admitJane Doe 2 caused 

her to suffer great mental anguish, frustration, stress, humiliation, and she was otherwise injured 

and damaged.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 12131

15. Plaintiff incorporates here by reference paragraphs 1 through 14, as if fully set forth 

herein. 

16. Plaintiff’s claims in Count I arise under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12189 (the “ADA”), and its implementing regulations under Title III, applicable 

to public accommodations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101 – 36.608, which provide in pertinent part as 

follows:

A. No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and 

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 

12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201.

B. It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual on the basis of a disability or 

disabilities of such individual, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other 

arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual to participate in or 

benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (1)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 

36.202(a).

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C. It shall be discriminatory to fail to make reasonable modifications in policies, 

practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such 

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to 

individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such 

modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) 

(2)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a).

D. A public accommodation shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen 

out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals 

with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be 

necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 

or accommodations being offered. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 

36.301(a).

E. A public accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are 

necessary for safe operation. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and 

not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with 

disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b).

F. A public accommodation shall remove architectural barriers in existing facilities, 

including communication barriers that are structural in nature, where such removal 

is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable, and able to be carried out without 

much difficulty or expense. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a).

G. The term “public accommodation,” as used in the statute, includes hospitals. 42 

U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.

17. As a behavioral health hospital, Hospital is a public accommodation and subject to 

the requirements of Title III of the ADA.

18. Jane Doe 2 did not seek admission to Hospital for medical care associated with her 

cerebral palsy. Moreover, Jane Doe 2 does not seek to expand the scope of Hospital’s existing 

teens behavioral health services or challenge its substance; she only wants to obtain its benefits as 

other patients who do not utilize wheelchairs do. Hospital has a legal obligation to modify its 

policies practices and procedures to allow for the admission of otherwise qualified patients who 

utilize mobility devices, like Jane Doe 2, and to provide the required assistance with her activities 

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of daily living, as doing so will not result in a fundamental alteration to the nature of its behavioral 

health services. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a).

19. Hospital has a legal obligation to not make a generalized assessment with respect 

to the safety threat that Jane Does 2’s use of her power wheelchair may pose. 28 C.F.R. § 

36.301(b).

20. The acts and omissions of Hospital violated and continue to violate the ADA and 

its implementing regulations in one or more or all the following manners, as Defendants have

discriminated against Plaintiff by:

A. Denying her the opportunity for the full and equal enjoyment of Defendants’

services and facilities on the basis of her physical disability.

B. Denying her the opportunity to participate in or benefit from Defendants’ services 

and facilities on the basis of her physical disability.

C. Utilizing admission criteria that screens her out from fully and equally enjoying its 

services and facilities.

D. Denying her the opportunity to participate in or benefit from Defendants’ services 

and Facilities based upon a general assessment of a perceived safety risk by her 

utilization of a wheelchair.

E. Failing to make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures, 

which are necessary to afford Defendants’ services and facilities to her where such 

modifications would not fundamentally alter the nature of its services.

F. Failing to remove architectural barriers where such removal is readily achievable 

to permit her to access its facilities the purposes of utilizing its services.

G. Otherwise having discriminated against Jane Doe 2 because of her disability.

21. Defendants’ conduct constitutes ongoing and continuing violations of the ADA. 

Unless restrained from doing so, Defendants will continue to violate the ADA. This conduct, 

unless enjoined, will continue to inflict injuries on Jane Doe 2, for which she has no adequate 

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remedy at law. Therefore, pursuant to section 308 of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12188), Plaintiff is 

entitled to injunctive relief.

22. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

12205.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Jane Doe 2 prays for the following relief:

A. An order enjoining Defendants from discriminating against the Plaintiff, requiring 

Defendants to (i) adopt and implement an inpatient admissions policy that does not 

screen out patients with physical disabilities; (ii) make available qualified staff to 

assist Plaintiff with her activities of daily living, as needed; (iii) provide its 

appropriate employees training on the foregoing admissions policy; (iv) provide its 

appropriate employees with disability cultural competency training; and (vi) 

remove existing architectural barriers where readily achievable;

B. A declaration that Defendants in denying Plaintiff access to its facilities and 

services discriminates against the Plaintiff and that Defendants fails to have a 

nondiscriminatory admission policy as required by law;

C. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and

D. Such other relief as the Court deems just.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973,

29 U.S.C. § 704

23. Plaintiff incorporates here by reference paragraphs 1 through 15, as if fully set forth 

herein. 

24. At all relevant times herein, Defendants received federal financial assistance in the 

form of reimbursement from the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. As a result, Defendants

are subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of Section 504, as herein described.

25. At all times relevant, there was in full force and effect a statute known as the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et sequitur, and its implementing regulations, 45 

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C.F.R. § 84.4(a). The Section 504 implementing regulation provides that "[n]o qualified 

handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap be excluded from participation in, be denied 

the benefits of or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which

receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance." 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a). The regulation further

provides:

A. A recipient, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, ... on the basis of 

handicap: (ii) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate 

in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service that is not equal to that afforded others

... 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(ii). 

B. A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize 

criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified 

handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap ... 45 C.F.R. § 

84.4(b)(4). 

C. In providing health, welfare or other social services or benefits, a recipient may not 

on the basis of handicap: ... (2) Afford a qualified handicapped person an 

opportunity to receive benefits or services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped persons. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a)(2). 

D. A definition for “handicapped person” as any person who: “(i) has a physical or 

mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) 

has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(l)(i)-(iii). 

E. A definition for “qualified handicapped person,” with respect to the provision of 

health, welfare and social services, as a person “who meets the essential eligibility 

requirements for the receipt of such services.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4). 

F. A recipient shall operate its program or activity so that when each part is viewed in 

its entirety, it is readily accessible to handicapped persons... 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a).

26. Jane Doe 2 is a qualified person with a disability who met the essential eligibility 

requirements for receipt of Hospital’s behavioral health services as she suffered from depression

and anxiety. Further, HPH’s psychiatry crisis intervention team determined psychiatric inpatient 

admission was required. The services she sought were directly within Hospital’s scope of services 

offered. But for her physical disability, Hospital would have accepted Jane Doe 2 as a patient.

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27. Through the acts and omissions alleged herein, Hospital has, solely on the basis of 

Plaintiff’s disability, denied Plaintiff access to its services and facilities, excluded Plaintiff from 

participating in its services, denied Plaintiff the benefit of its services and subjected Plaintiff to 

discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794. et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 

all of which have resulted in injury to Plaintiff. See, Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 

U.S. 610 (1986)(Section 504 does entitle handicapped individuals to ‘meaningful access’ to 

medical services).

28. Hospital’s discriminatory refusal to accept Jane Doe 2 as a patient, on the basis of 

her physical disability, was intentional and done with deliberate indifference as to Jane Doe 2’s 

federally protected civil and legal rights.

29. Hospital’s acts and omissions alleged herein violated Section 504 and its 

implementing regulations and discriminated against Plaintiff by:

A. Denying her meaningful access to its mental health services.

B. Denying her the opportunity for the full and equal enjoyment of its services 

and facilities owned, operated, and/or contracted for use by Defendants.

C. Denying her the opportunity to participate in or benefit from its services and 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.

D. Acting intentionally and with deliberate indifference by denying Plaintiff 

access to its services and facilities.

E. Defendants has otherwise discriminated against the Plaintiff.

30. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2), states that the 

“remedies, procedures and that the rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [being 

42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et sequitur] shall be available” for violations of section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act. By law, such remedies include compensatory monetary damages. Barnes v. 

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).

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31. As a proximate result of Defendants’ violations of Section 504, Defendants have

inflicted injury and damages upon the Plaintiff, including loss of a civil right, mental anguish, 

humiliation and mental pain and suffering.

32. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to section 

505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Jane Doe 2 prays for the following relief:

A. An order enjoining Defendants from discriminating against the Plaintiff, requiring 

Defendants to (i) adopt and implement a legally compliant admissions policy, 

practices and procedures; (ii) make available qualified staff to assist Plaintiff with 

her activities of daily living, as needed; (iii) provide its appropriate employees 

training on its aforementioned admissions policy; (iv) provide its appropriate 

employees disability cultural competency training; and (v) remove existing 

architectural barriers where readily achievable;

B. A declaration that Defendants in denying access to its facilities and services 

discriminates against the Plaintiff and that Defendants fails to have an admission 

policy as required by law;

C. An award of compensatory monetary damages;

D. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and

E. Such other relief as the Court deems just.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1557 OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 18116

33. Plaintiff incorporates here by reference paragraphs 1 through 15, as if fully set forth 

herein. 

34. Since March 2010, there was in full force and effect a statute known as the Patient 

Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable Care Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 18001, et seq., Pub.L. 

111-148. Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 

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color, national origin, sex, age, or disability in certain health programs and activities. 42 U.S.C. § 

18116. Section 1557’s implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 92.1 – 92.203, effective as of July 

18, 2016, apply to health programs or activities administered by recipients of Federal financial 

assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services.

35. Hospital is a participating provider in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and as 

a result, thereof, it is a covered entity under Section 1557.

36. The implementing regulations of Section 1557 prohibit discrimination of an 

individual on the basis of disability, inter alia, and prohibit an individual from being excluded 

from participation in, denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any 

health program or activity. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.101(a)(1). 

37. Those regulations, in pertinent part, require covered entities to comply with the 

accessibility standards for buildings and facilities set forth in the 1991 Standards or the 2010 

Standards. 45 C.F.R. § 92.203(a)&(b). The “1991 Standards” means the 1991 ADA Standards for 

Accessible Design, published at appendix A to 28 CFR part 36 on July 26, 1991, and republished 

as appendix D to 28 CFR part 36 on September 15, 2010. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.4. The “2010 

Standards” means the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, as defined at 28 CFR 35.104.

See Id.

38. Those regulations also require covered entities to make reasonable modifications 

to its policies, practices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to avoid 

discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the covered entity can demonstrate that making the 

modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the health program or activity. 45 C.F.R. § 

92.105.

39. Hospital’s discriminatory refusal to accept Jane Doe 2 as a patient on the basis of 

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her physical disability was intentional and done with deliberate indifference as to Jane Doe 2’s 

federally protected civil and legal rights.

40. Hospital’s acts and omissions alleged herein violated Section 1557 and its 

implementing regulations and discriminated against Plaintiff by:

A. Denying her meaningful access to its mental health services.

B. Denying her the opportunity for the full and equal enjoyment of its health 

program or activity.

C. Denying her the opportunity to participate in or benefit from its services and 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.

D. Acting intentionally and with deliberate indifference by denying Plaintiff 

access to its services and facilities.

E. Failing to make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or 

procedures, which are necessary to afford Defendants’ services and 

facilities to her where such modifications would not fundamentally alter the 

nature of its services.

F. Failing to remove architectural barriers where such removal is readily 

achievable to permit her to access its facilities the purposes of utilizing its 

services.

G. Defendants has otherwise discriminated against the Plaintiff.

41. Section 1557’s implementing regulations provide that the enforcement mechanisms 

available for and provided under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, inter alia, shall be available for purposes of Section 1557 as implemented by 

this part, and “compensatory damages for violations of Section 1557 are available in appropriate 

administrative and judicial actions brought under this rule.” See 45 C.F.R. § 92.301.

42. Defendants’ conduct constitutes ongoing and continued violations of Section 1557. 

Unless restrained from doing so, Defendants will continue to violate Section 1557. This conduct, 

unless enjoined, will inflict injuries on Plaintiff for which she will have no adequate remedy at 

law.

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43. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2), states that the 

“remedies, procedures and that the rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [being 

42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et sequitur] shall be available” for violations of section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act. By law, such remedies include compensatory monetary damages. Barnes v. 

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).

44. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff suffered the loss of a 

civil right and she suffered great mental anguish; and she will continue so to suffer for a long time 

in the future; and Plaintiff was otherwise injured and damaged.

45. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to section 

505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Jane Doe 2 prays for the following relief:

A. An order enjoining Defendants from discriminating against the Plaintiff, requiring 

Defendants to (i) adopt and implement a legally compliant admissions policy, 

practices and procedures; (ii) make available qualified staff to assist Plaintiff with 

her activities of daily living, as needed; (iii) provide its appropriate employees 

training on its aforementioned admissions policy; (iv) provide its appropriate 

employees disability cultural competency training; and (v) remove existing 

architectural barriers where readily achievable;

B. A declaration that Defendants in denying access to its facilities and services 

discriminates against the Plaintiff and that Defendants fails to have an admission 

policy as required by law;

C. An award of compensatory monetary damages;

D. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and

E. Such other relief as the Court deems just.

Case: 1:20-cv-05043 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/27/20 Page 18 of 19 PageID #:18
15

Jane Doe and John Doe, as next friends of Plaintiff Jane Doe 

2, a minor.

/s/ Jennifer M. Sender

____________________________

One of Her Attorneys

 

Jennifer M. Sender (ARDC No. 6207774)

Andrés J. Gallegos (ARDC No. 6212168)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

ROBBINS, SALOMON & PATT, LTD.

180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3300

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 782-9000 - Telephone

(312) 782-6690 - Facsimile

jsender@rsplaw.com

agallegos@rsplaw.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-05043 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/27/20 Page 19 of 19 PageID #:19