Docket No. 83595–Agenda 8–September 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

								JESSICA WOOTERS, Appellee.

Opinion filed NOvembovember 18, 1999.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the judgment of the court:

	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Marion County

convicted defendant, Jessica Wooters, of murdering her infant son.

720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(2) (West 1996). Section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of

the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 1998)) prescribes mandatory life imprisonment for any

person 17 years or older convicted of murdering a child less than

12 years old, provided the offender is not sentenced to death.

	The State did not seek the death penalty for defendant, and the

circuit court refused to sentence defendant to a life term in prison.

The circuit court ruled that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) violates

article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §11), because section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) prevents the

sentencing court from assessing any evidence that would mitigate

against a term of natural life in prison. The court subsequently

sentenced defendant to 25 years’ imprisonment. The State appealed

directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We agree with the

legislature’s determination that the murder of a child under age 12

by an individual age 17 or older (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 1998)) warrants life imprisonment. However, we affirm the

25-year sentence imposed by the circuit court on the sole basis that

section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) violates the single subject clause of the

Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8.

BACKGROUND

	In 1996, the State of Illinois charged defendant Jessica

Wooters by information with first degree murder. 720 ILCS

5/9–1(a)(2) (West 1996). The State alleged that defendant, who

was then 20 years old, struck her 19-day-old son in the head,

“knowing the act created a strong probability of death or great

bodily harm, thereby causing [his] death.”

	 Before trial, defendant twice moved the circuit court to declare section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of

Corrections unconstitutional. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West

1998). In pertinent part, section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) states:

			“(A) Except as otherwise provided in the statute

defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a

felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court

under this Section, according to the following limitations:

				(1) for first degree murder,

* * *

					(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a

term of natural life imprisonment when the death

penalty is not imposed if the defendant,

* * *

						(ii) is a person who, at the time of the

commission of the murder, had attained the age of

17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an

individual under 12 years of age; or, irrespective

of the defendant’s age at the time of the

commission of the offense, is found guilty of

murdering more than one victim[.]” 730 ILCS

5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998).

	Defendant argued that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii): violated the

eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,

amend. VIII); transgressed the constitutionally mandated

separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary (Ill.

Const. 1970, art. II, §1); and denied defendant due process and

equal protection of the laws (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, §2). In addition, defendant maintained that

section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) violated article I, section 11, of the

Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. Article I, section

11, provides that penalties must be established “according to the

seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the

offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.

According to defendant, the mandatory life sentence in section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) was a “disproportionate” penalty that ignored

the directive set forth in article I, section 11, to establish penalties with the aim of returning an offender to the community at large.

Defendant’s motions were denied.

	Following a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty as

charged. The court also allowed defendant leave to file additional

authority concerning the constitutionality of section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii).

	 At a subsequent hearing, the circuit court ruled that the life

sentence prescribed by section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) violated article I,

section 11. The court opined that the General Assembly enacted

section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) without regard to the “objective of

restoring the offender to useful citizenship,” since a mandatory life

sentence deprives an offender of any chance to rejoin society. The

court found no evidence in the legislative history that the General

Assembly contemplated the rehabilitative potential of an offender

sentenced pursuant to section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii). Also, the statute

interfered with the judiciary’s obligation, when sentencing a

criminal defendant, to consider mitigating evidence and the

defendant’s rehabilitative potential. The court concluded that

sentencing the defendant in this case to life imprisonment “strikes

[the court] as inherently unfair.” Finding section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

unconstitutional, the court conducted a sentencing hearing and

sentenced defendant to 25 years’ imprisonment.

	The State filed the instant appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

	The court reviews de novo a lower court order declaring a statute unconstitutional. Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1996).

ANALYSIS

A. Whether Section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) Violates Article I, Section

11, of the Illinois Constitution

 	Before this court, the State argues that the enactment of section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) lies well within the General Assembly’s

authority to define criminal conduct and to prescribe suitable

punishment for that conduct. Defendant counters that by mandating a life prison sentence for adult murderers of children

under 12 years of age, the legislature violated its obligation to set

penalties “with the objective of restoring the offender to useful

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.

	We begin our analysis with the presumption that all legislative

enactments are constitutional.  People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 244 (1995); see also People v. Wages, 261 Ill. App. 3d 576, 588 (1994). Defendant bears the burden of overcoming that

presumption. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 244.

	 In People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201 (1984), and People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235 (1995), this court held that mandatory life imprisonment can be harmonized with article I, section 11. In

Taylor, the circuit court ordered defendants Andre and Dorothy Taylor to serve life sentences after the defendants’ convictions for

the murder of two individuals. The murders occurred during an

armed robbery executed by the defendants. The circuit court

sentenced the defendants pursuant to the version of section 5–8–1

then in existence, which required life imprisonment for anyone

guilty of murdering more than one victim. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.

38, par. 1005–8–1(a)(1)(c).

	The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute usurped

the trial judge’s responsibility to weigh mitigating evidence and any

evidence of rehabilitative potential when sentencing a defendant.

According to the appellate court, the trial court’s obligation to

consider these matters arose both from the prescriptions of article

I, section 11, and from the separation of powers clause, embodied

in article II, section 1, of the state constitution. Ill. Const. 1970,

art. II, §1.

	This court reversed the appellate court and reinstated

defendants’ life sentences. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 210-11. Preliminarily, the Taylor court noted that the power to define criminal conduct and to determine the appropriate punishment for

that conduct rests with the legislature. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 205; see also People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 259 (1994); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67, 79 (1980); Wages, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 588. Moreover, although the dictates of article I,

section 11, apply to the judiciary, they apply with equal force to the legislature, albeit with a different effect.1 Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 205- 06.

	As this court explained in People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 205- 06:

		“Section 11 is directed to the legislature in its function of

declaring what conduct is criminal and the penalties for the

conduct. It is directed to the judiciary in that it requires

courts not to abuse discretion in imposing sentences within

the framework set by the legislature. [Citations.]”

	The Taylor court observed that article I, section 11, bound the General Assembly to the twin objectives of “restoring an offender

to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the

seriousness of the offense.” Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Critically, however, the Taylor court also held that “there is no indication that the possibility of rehabilitating an offender was to be given greater

weight and consideration than the seriousness of the offense in

determining a proper penalty.” Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206.

	The court concluded that, in enacting section 5–8–1, the

legislature fulfilled its duty to consider an offender’s rehabilitative

potential. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Where, as in Taylor, no set of mitigating circumstances could suggest a more lenient sentence, life

imprisonment is consonant with the constitution. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206.

	Similarly, in People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235 (1995), the trial court imposed a life sentence on the defendant Paul Dunigan,

following the defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault.

The defendant’s conviction in Dunigan, plus the defendant’s previous two convictions for felony offenses, rendered defendant

a “habitual criminal” under Illinois law, and thus subject to a

mandatory life sentence in prison. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.

33B–1.

	 The defendant argued that, among other things, article I,

section 11, was necessarily abridged by the habitual criminal

statute’s requirement of a life sentence. Nonetheless, the Dunigan court affirmed the legislature’s authority to “determine the nature

and extent of criminal sentences.” Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 244. Additionally, this court found that the General Assembly

“obviously” considered both the seriousness of the conduct and the

offender’s rehabilitative potential when enacting the habitual

offender statute. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 246. Under that law, a defendant qualifies for a life prison sentence only after defendant

has been convicted of a felony on two prior occasions.

		“[D]efendants are given the opportunity, when sentenced

for their first two serious felony offenses, to present

mitigating evidence and to demonstrate their rehabilitative

potential. The [Habitual Criminal] Act may be invoked

only after a defendant has twice demonstrated that

conviction and imprisonment do not deter him from a life

of crime.” Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 246.

	In the instant appeal, defendant attempts to distinguish

Dunigan and Taylor by noting that, in each of those cases, the defendants’ repeated criminal acts justified sentences that

precluded reintegration into the general population. In Taylor, defendant argues, the defendants committed multiple murders. In Dunigan, the defendant was twice convicted of a felony before the events in Dunigan occurred. Defendant concludes that the innate recidivism displayed by the defendants in Dunigan and Taylor cannot be attributed to a first-time murderer like the defendant in

this case. Therefore, the General Assembly lacked any basis to

assume an offender subject to section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) could not

be restored to useful citizenship.

	We find defendant’s argument unpersuasive. The two murders

committed by the defendants in Taylor occurred virtually simultaneously (Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 204), so that the Taylor defendants received life sentences for a single, murderous episode,

no more indicative of habitual criminal conduct than the events of

the case at bar. Further, the frequency of criminal conduct cannot

be the only factor that determines whether an offender is capable

of rehabilitation. The constitution directs the General Assembly to consider the “seriousness,” or nature, of the offense. Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §11. Accordingly, it is just as fitting for the General

Assembly to craft penalties based on the nature of the crime

committed as it is to rely on the defendant’s criminal history.

	The nature of the crime punished pursuant to section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) is, in the words of one legislator, “especially

heinous.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 21,

1995, at 153 (statements of Representative Winkel). By definition,

the crime involves an individual not only capable of murder, but

also capable of taking the life of the most vulnerable members of

our society. Therefore, the General Assembly could conclude that

no mitigating evidence would justify a sentence less severe than life

imprisonment for an offender guilty of this crime.

	Further, this state has traditionally exhibited an acute interest

in the well-being of minors. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d 245, 254 (1998); see also American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central

Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (1996) (“the welfare and protection of minors has always been considered one of the

State’s most fundamental interests”); see also People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1992); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill. 2d 419, 437 (1977). To impose life-time imprisonment on an adult

convicted of murdering a child is commensurate with the state’s

dedication to protecting children. This special concern for the

safety of minors supports the General Assembly’s determination

that no mitigating evidence could justify returning an adult offender

to society after murdering a young child. See Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 254 (section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) does not violate article I, section 11: “The legislature validly could have made the same

determination in regard to a single murder of a young child as was

made in regard to a repeat murderer [in Taylor]”).

	We turn last to the circuit court’s conclusion that the General

Assembly never attempted to ensure that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

would be constitutionally compatible with article I, section 11. The

circuit court grounded its finding on the absence of any debate

concerning article I, section 11, in the legislative history of section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii). Silence in the legislative record is not

dispositive of the General Assembly’s intent. As noted previously, we must assume that the legislature meant to fulfill its

constitutional obligations. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 244. Without more, mere silence by the General Assembly regarding the

rehabilitative potential of adults who kill minors fails to overcome

the presumptive validity of the legislation.

	 The General Assembly enacted section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

following this court’s decisions in Taylor and Dunigan. “Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be

presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the

prevailing case law.” Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 262. Therefore, we hold that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) complies with article I, section

11, of the Illinois Constitution, and suffers from no constitutional

infirmity.

B. Whether Section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) Violates Article IV,

Section 8, of the Illinois Constitution

	On appeal, defendant suggests for the first time that section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) also violates the “single subject” rule found in

article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,

art. IV, §8). The State concedes that, although defendant neglected

to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional

dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant’s

argument. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1989).

	Section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) became law as 1 of 10 sections

contained in Public Act 89–203 (Pub. Act No. 89–203 (eff. July

21, 1995)). Defendant maintains that the various sections of Public

Act 89–203 lack a logical and natural relationship to any single

subject, and thus Public Act 89–203 transgresses the single subject

rule. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8. The State’s response is three-

pronged: first, that the 10 sections of Public Act 89–203 relate to

a single subject and, therefore, no constitutional breach has

occurred; second, that there is no violation of the single subject

rule because Public Act 89–203 adheres to the principles animating

the single subject provision; and third, that the “codification” rule

bars application of the single subject clause in this case.

	Article IV, section 8, provides in relevant part:

			“Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be

confined to one subject.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8.

	In 1934, this court articulated the basic test that which guides

our interpretation of the single subject rule:

		“The term ‘subject,’ in a constitutional provision of this

character, is given a comprehensive meaning. It may be as

broad as the legislature chooses to make it so that a single

act may include all matters which have a logical or natural

connection. Provisions of an act which relate, directly or

indirectly, to its general subject, do not render the act

vulnerable to the objection that it embraces more than one

subject. Since an act may contain all matters germane to

its general subject, it may include the means reasonably

necessary or appropriate to the accomplishment of its

purpose.” People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Board of County Commissioners, 355 Ill. 244, 247 (1934).

	The court held further that the single subject clause of the

constitution places no limit on the comprehensiveness of the

subject matter encompassed by legislation, and that only statutory

provisions “that can by no fair intendment be considered as having

any legitimate relation to each other” will breach the single subject

rule. City of Chicago, 355 Ill. 244; see also Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, No. 85366, slip op. at 8 (July 1, 1999); People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997); People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (1971); People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 607-08 (1953).

	In the case at bar, the legislature entitled Public Act 89–203,

“An Act in relation to crime” (Pub. Act No. 89–203 (eff. July 21,

1995)), and indeed, several sections of the Act do relate to our

criminal code. For example, included in Public Act 89–203 is an

amendment to section 32–10 of the Criminal Code of 1961 which

expanded the circumstances under which a person charged with a

felony while on bail must appear in court for bail to be reset. 720

ILCS 5/32–10 (West 1996). Public Act 89–203 also amended

section 11–6 of the Criminal Code to include a definition of

“solicits” for the crime of indecent solicitation of a child. 720 ILCS

5/11–6 (West 1996). The amended section 11–6.5 of the Criminal Code added a definition of “arranges” to the statute outlawing

indecent solicitation of an adult. 720 ILCS 5/11–6.5(c) (West

1996).

	Two sections of Public Act 89–203 amended the Unified Code

of Corrections by adding provisions requiring the payment of

restitution following conviction in certain domestic battery cases

(730 ILCS 5/5–5–6, 5–6–3.1 (West 1996)) and by adding section

5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii), the subject of the instant appeal. The enactment

also amended section 6–208.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code to alter

the conditions under which an individual convicted of driving while

intoxicated could receive a temporary driving permit. 625 ILCS

5/6–208.1 (West 1996). Public Act 89–203 added terms of

imprisonment as punishment for persons arrested for driving under

the influence while accompanied by an individual under the age of

16. 625 ILCS 5/11–501 (West 1996). In Public Act 89–203, the

General Assembly also added section 5–1120 to the Counties

Code, thereby empowering counties to establish and fund programs

to reduce, prevent or control juvenile delinquency. 55 ILCS

5/5–1120 (West 1996). Each of these amendments may logically

be said to be related to crime, the subject of the Act.

	One section, however, is unrelated to crime. Public Act

89–203 amended sections 15–1508 and 15–1701 of the Illinois

Mortgage Foreclosure Law, which is codified in Code of Civil

Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/15–1508, 15–1701 (West 1996). The

amendment to section 15–1508 allows residents of foreclosed

property to be removed from the premises only if the residents are

personally named in the relevant complaint or petition. The

amendment to section 15–1701 guarantees adequate notice of a

change of ownership for individuals in possession of real estate, but

who were not parties to foreclosure proceedings on that property.

	We agree that the passages amending the Criminal Code bear

a logical and natural connection to the single subject of “crime.”

Inasmuch as the punishments set forth in the amended sections of

the Code of Corrections and the Vehicle Code arise from the

commission of crimes, the State can plausibly argue that these

sections are also sufficiently related to the subject of “crime.”

Juvenile delinquency is a recognized root of crime. The amended

section of the Counties Code enabling county governments to establish programs designed to prevent or diminish juvenile

delinquency also passes constitutional muster as part of the “crime”

bill embodied in Public Act 89–203.

	 By contrast, the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure

cannot be harmonized with the other provisions of Public Act

89–203. Amendments to sections 15–1508 and 15–1701 of the

civil procedure code are distinctly noncriminal in nature, in that

they change the means by which renters and other nonowners of

real property are notified of a foreclosure. Legislative history

incorporated into the State’s brief indicates that the Legal

Assistance Foundation of Chicago and members of the banking

industry agreed to these amendments to correct “abuses”

surrounding mortgage foreclosures. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate

Proceedings, April 20, 1995, at 40 (statements by Senator

Fitzgerald).

	 While we are mindful of our obligation to construe the single

subject classification “broadly,” we find nothing in Public Act

89–203 to suggest even a tenuous connection between sections

15–1508 and 15–1701 and the topic of “crime,” let alone a “natural

and logical” connection. Absent a natural, logical connection of all

provisions of Public Act 89–203 to a single subject, the enactment

is unconstitutional as violative of article IV, section 8. Arangold, slip op. at 8, 10.

	The State relies on Rembert v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995), in support of its argument that Public Act 89–203 complies

with the Illinois Constitution. The State’s reliance is misplaced. In Rembert, tenants of mortgaged premises foreclosed pursuant to the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15–1102 et seq. (West 1996)) sued to enjoin the Cook County sheriff’s department

from enforcing orders of possession and eviction notices in which

tenants were not individually identified. The Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals never reached the due process claims raised by the

tenants; instead, the court remanded the matter to the district court

to determine whether amendments to sections 15–1508 and

15–1701 of the Foreclosure Law rendered the controversy moot. Rembert, 62 F.3d at 942-43.

	 The State maintains that the practices of the sheriff’s office

described in Rembert prompted the General Assembly to amend the Foreclosure Law to include the present versions of sections

15–1508 and 15–1701. The State further contends that the sheriff’s

participation in evicting residents from foreclosed property

connects sections 15–1508 and 15–1701 to the remaining sections

of Public Act 89–203. The State may be correct that the Rembert litigation caused the Foreclosure Law to be amended. Regardless,

the mere fact that the sheriff enforces orders of possession and

notices of eviction does not transform sections 15–1508 and

15–1701 into legislation concerning “crime.” Sections 15–1508

and 15–1701 bear no relation to the subject of crime: they relate

only to procedures to be employed following the foreclosure of a

mortgage. We conclude that, contrary to the State’s interpretation

of Rembert, the Rembert decision in fact demonstrates that the impetus to enact sections 15–1508 and 15–1701 flows from

concerns unrelated to crime.

	We note that, in Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d 245, our appellate court relied on Rembert to conclude that all sections of Public Act 89–203, including sections 15–1508 and 15–1701, related to “law

enforcement” and therefore did not violate the single subject rule. Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 253. The Wheeler court quoted a footnote in Rembert describing the sheriff as “ ‘an integral part of the State machinery that allows purchasers of mortgaged real

estate to take possession of that real estate.’ ” Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 253, quoting Rembert, 62 F.3d at 941 n.1. Continuing, the Wheeler court reasoned that “considering the focus this legislation [sections 15–1508 and 15–1701] place[ ] on the sheriff

and his deputies, who are law enforcement officers, in regard to the

services of notices and writs of possession only on properly

designated parties to the foreclosure proceeding, we conclude this

portion of Public Act 89–203 has ‘a natural and logical connection’

to the rest of the act.” Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 253-54.

	Initially, we disagree that the legislature passed Public Act

89–203 as a “law enforcement”-related bill. The text of the

legislation describes itself as related to “crime.” Moreover,

Representative Winkel, sponsor of the bill, described Public Act

89–203 as a “good, tough-on-crime-bill.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem.,

House Proceedings, May 21, 1995, at 164 (statements of

Representative Winkel).

	Additionally, Wheeler quoted Rembert out of context. The Rembert court only intended to rebut the sheriff’s suggestion that the case was moot because “he is not responsible for the content

of the order of possession.” Rembert, 62 F.3d at 941 n.1. The court of appeals dismissed the sheriff’s argument as “scapegoating”

and ruled that the sheriff’s “integral” role in the machinery of

foreclosure forced him to bear responsibility for procedures used

to evict residents of foreclosed property. Rembert, 62 F.3d at 941 n.1. Rembert neither directly nor indirectly indicated a link between the sheriff’s office and the subjects of law enforcement or crime.

	The State further argues that the amendments to the civil

procedure code are related to “law enforcement” because sheriffs

must serve and enforce eviction notices (citing 725 ILCS 5/107–16

(West 1996); 735 ILCS 5/2–202, 15–1107, 15–1502(c)(2) (West

1996)) in potentially violent settings. Again, we find no basis in the

legislative record to conclude that the General Assembly drafted

Public Act 89–203 as a law enforcement bill. The General

Assembly unequivocally indicated that “crime” formed the core of

Public Act 89–203’s subject matter.

	Assuming arguendo that Public Act 89–203 pertained to “law enforcement,” the bill would still violate the single subject rule.

Reduced to their essence, the amendments to sections 15–1508 and

15–1701 were drafted to correct procedural due process violations

caused by a lack of specificity in orders of possession and eviction

notices. See Rembert, 62 F.3d at 941; Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d 245. The fact that the sheriff’s office may compose and serve

eviction notices is, at best, incidental to the notice provisions

altered by the amendments. We hold that sections 15–1508 and

15–1701, as embodied in Public Act 89–203, are unrelated to the

subjects of “law enforcement” and “crime.”

	We find the present appeal analogous to our recent decision

in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). In Reedy, a bill originally drafted only to amend the insanity defense statute was gutted and

replaced with Public Act 89–404, which contained 10 different

provisions. Public Act 89–404 embraced subjects as diverse as the

burden of proof borne by a defendant asserting the insanity defense

(720 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 1996)) and procedures required for the perfection and satisfaction of hospital liens (770 ILCS 35/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)). The State asserted that the diverse subjects that comprised Public Act 89–404 related to “ ‘governmental

matters which are the responsibility of the various county State’s

Attorneys.’ ” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12.

	This court found that Public Act 89–404 violated the single

subject rule. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12. We reasoned that, at a minimum, Public Act 89–404 encompassed two distinct subjects,

the criminal justice system and hospital liens, and that “even the

most liberal attempt to reconcile these *** subjects [was]

unavailing.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12. Though the State suggested that the separate sections of Public Act 89–404 were all related to

“governmental matters,” the category itself was so broad as to

“strain[] credulity.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12. While the subject uniting the provisions of an enactment may be broad and

comprehensive, it cannot be so vast as to eviscerate the very

meaning of the term “subject.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 9. A “subject” with imperceptible boundaries “render[s] the single subject clause

of our constitution meaningless.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12.

	In the matter before this court, we are unable to discern a

single subject that could unite all sections of Public Act 89–203. As

stated previously, the obvious intent of the amendments to rules

governing notice of foreclosures is to ensure adequate notice to

persons who were not parties to the foreclosure proceedings but

might be affected by the results of those proceedings as occupants

of the subject property. See Wheeler, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 253. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 20, 1995, at 40

(statements of Senator Fitzgerald). Those amendments say nothing

about law enforcement officers, crime, or the potential of violence.

To attempt to link these sections of Public Act 89–203 to “crime”

or “law enforcement” simply “strains credulity.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12.

	Nonetheless, the State urges the court to find Public Act

89–203 constitutional because the enactment allegedly comports

with the purpose animating the single subject clause. The drafters

of the constitution included the single subject rule to prevent “log-

rolling,” or the practice of bundling unpopular legislation with

more palatable bills, so that the well-received bills would carry the

unpopular ones to passage. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 514-15 (1997); Geja’s Café v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 257-58 (1992); Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193, 201-02 (1974).

		“ ‘The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects

diverse in their nature, and having no necessary

connection, with a view to combine in their favor the

advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several

measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own

merits, [is] one both corruptive of the legislator and

dangerous to the State.’ ” Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d at 202, quoting People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494-95 (1865).

Further, the single subject rule promotes an orderly legislative

process. The task of receiving and debating a bill is simplified if the

contents of the bill embrace only one subject. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15.

	According to the State, each chamber of the General Assembly

separately “considered” each of the provisions of Public Act

89–203. The State implies that none of the provisions of Public Act

89–203 had to “piggy back” on another provision to win approval,

and that none of the concerns underpinning the single subject rule

apply to the enactment of this legislation.

	 The State’s assertions are somewhat misleading. Legislative

records from the House of Representatives illustrate that the

different sections of Public Act 89–203 received separate majority

votes in the Senate, but not in the House. The House sponsor of

Public Act 89–203 preceded his description of the Public Act’s

contents, then known as Senate Bill 838, with this statement:

“Senate Bill 838 actually contains several Bills that have been

rolled into it by amendment.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House

Proceedings, May 21, 1995, at 145 (statements of Representative

Winkel).2 Debate concerning several provisions of Senate Bill 838 ensued. Critically, though, when the House voted to pass Senate Bill 838, it voted only as to the collective legislation, and not as to

the individual amendments contained in the bill. 89th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, May 21, 1995, at 164-65.

	Contrary to the State’s reading of the legislative history, we

interpret it as an example of the very evil the single subject rule is

intended to prevent. The House received the legislation as a single

package, and thus, we cannot conclude that the representatives

cast their votes in favor of each section of the bill. We cannot

concur that Public Act 89–203 complied with the purpose of the

single subject clause.

	Moreover, this court rejected a similar argument raised by the

State in Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 15-16. There, the State requested that the court apply a harmless error standard to the court’s

construction of Public Act 89–404, which this court held violated

the single subject rule. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 15. The State suggested that, because each of the individual sections of Public

Act 89–404 “possessed the necessary support for individual

passage, the purpose of the single subject rule prohibiting ‘log

rolling’ of unpopular measures was not implicated.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 15.

	The court responded in part:

			“The State’s argument simply lacks merit. The State

ignores the previously emphasized purpose of the single

subject rule that promotes orderly and informed legislative

debate and enactment. Since the crux of single subject rule

analysis concerns the interrelatedness of an act’s

provisions, the harm in passing discordant bills in one act

without informed debate is obvious.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 15-16.

	Finally, the State urges the court to adopt the “codification”

principle. Pursuant to this rule, the codification of a bill cures any

constitutional infirmity in the title or subject matter of the bill. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990). This court has recently and unequivocally rejected the codification rule. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 13-14. We find no need to consider that argument

further.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated above, we hold that Public Act 89–203

violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IV, §8), and therefore, we affirm the judgment of

the circuit court.

Affirmed.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:

	I agree that this court must affirm the circuit court'’s ruling that

section 5--–8--–1(qa)(1)(Fc)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corr4ections *((730

ILCS 5/5--–8--–1(a)(1)(cv)(11ii) (West 1998) is unconstitutional. I reach

this conclusion because the statute was enacted in violation of the

single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.  I, like the other six members of this court, agree that the

circuit court’s finding that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified

Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998))

is unconstitutional must be affirmed on the basis that the section

violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IV, §8. I, therefore, fully

join in section B of the “Analysis” section in the opinion authored

by Justice McMorrow. See slip op. at 8-16. However, I do not join

in section A of the   “Analysis” (see slip op. at 3-8), and I express no

opinion as to the issues discussed therein.

	JUSTICES BILANDIC, HEIPLE and RATHJE join in this

special concurrence.

	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also specially concurring:

	I agree with Justice McMorrow’s conclusion that Public Act

89–203 was passed in violation of the single-subject clause of the

Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8.  Because the

court today strikes down this Act under the single subject clause,

it is entirely inappropriate for the court to render an opinion on the

constitutionality of section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code

of Corrections under article I, section 11 of the Illinois

Constitution of 1970. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. I agree with

Justices Rathje and Bilandic and Chief Justice Freeman that a

majority of this court today expresses no opinion as to the issues

discussed in section A of Justice McMorrow’s opinion. Section A

of that opinion has failed to gain the approval of a majority of the

court and therefore does not constitute the law of Illinois.

	JUSTICE RATHJE joins in this special concurrence.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, also specially concurring:

	I, like the other six members of this court, agree that the

circuit court’s finding that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified

Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998))

is unconstitutional must be affirmed on the basis that the section

violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IV, §8. I, therefore, fully join in section B of the

“Analysis” section in the opinion authored by Justice McMorrow.

See slip op. at 8-16. However, I do not join in section A of 

“Analysis” (see slip op. at 3-8), and I express no opinion as to the issues discussed therein.

	JUSTICES BILANDIC and RATHJE join in this special

concurrence.

	JUSTICE RATHJE, also specially concurring:

	Like Chief Justice Freeman and Justices Bilandic and Heiple,

I join in only part B of Justice McMorrow’s decision. When an act

is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio; the state of the law is as if the act had never been passed. See People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990); see also People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). Thus, once we determine that the public act

creating the statute is invalid in its entirety, we have nothing more

to review. Addressing the constitutionality of the statute before

addressing the single subject violation in no way changes this

simple truth. Justice McMorrow’s substantive ruling is that Public Act 89–203 was passed in violation of the single subject clause; the

remainder of the opinion is dicta and without any legal effect.

	Having said that, I must point out that today this court sets a

dangerous precedent. For reasons never explained and wholly

unknown to me, this court has elected to release as the court’s

“judgment” a position that garners only three votes, when four

members of this court share an opposing viewpoint. I, Chief Justice

Freeman, and Justices Bilandic and Heiple believe that Public Act

89–203 violates the single subject clause and that the court’s

analysis should end there. Nevertheless, four members of the court

voted to endorse Justice McMorrow’s approach, undoubtedly as

a means of assuring the legislature that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 1998)) is constitutionally valid. Until today, this court has

“decline[d] to engage in speculative analysis or to render an

advisory opinion *** where, as in the instant case, such analysis or

opinion is not necessary for the disposition of the cause.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 470 (McMorrow, J., writing). Apparently, the rules have changed. 

	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also specially concurring:

	I agree with Justice McMorrow’s conclusion that Public Act

89–203 was passed in violation of the single-subject clause of the

Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8.  Because the

court today strikes down this Act under the single subject clause,

it is entirely inappropriate for the court to render an opinion on the

constitutionality of section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code

of Corrections under article I, section 11 of the Illinois

Constitution of 1970. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. I agree with

Justices Rathje and Bilandic and Chief Justice Freeman that a

majority of this court today expresses no opinion as to the issues

discussed in section A of Justice McMorrow’s opinion. Section A

of that opinion has failed to gain the approval of a majority of the

court and therefore does not constitute the law of Illinois.

	JUSTICE RATHJE joins in this special concurrence.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, also specially concurring:

	I, like the other six members of this court, agree that the

circuit court’s finding that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified

Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998))

is unconstitutional must be affirmed on the basis that the section

violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IV, §8. I, therefore, fully join in section B of the

“Analysis” section in the opinion authored by Justice McMorrow.

See slip op. at 8-16. However, I do not join in section A of 

“Analysis” (see slip op. at 3-8), and I express no opinion as to the

issues discussed therein.

	JUSTICES BILANDIC and RATHJE join in this special

concurrence.

	JUSTICE RATHJE, also specially concurring:

	Like Chief Justice Freeman and Justices Bilandic and Heiple,

I join in only part B of Justice McMorrow’s decision. When an act

is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio; the state of the law is as if the act had never been passed. See People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990); see also People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). Thus, once we determine that the public act

creating the statute is invalid in its entirety, we have nothing more

to review. Addressing the constitutionality of the statute before

addressing the single subject violation in no way changes this

simple truth. Justice McMorrow’s substantive ruling is that Public Act 89–203 was passed in violation of the single subject clause; the

remainder of the opinion is dicta and without any legal effect.

	Having said that, I must point out that today this court sets a

dangerous precedent. For reasons never explained and wholly

unknown to me, this court has elected to release as the court’s

“judgment” a position that garners only three votes, when four

members of this court share an opposing viewpoint. I, Chief Justice

Freeman, and Justices Bilandic and Heiple believe that Public Act

89–203 violates the single subject clause and that the court’s

analysis should end there. Nevertheless, four members of the court

voted to endorse Justice McMorrow’s approach, undoubtedly as

a means of assuring the legislature that section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 1998)) is constitutionally valid. Until today, this court has

“decline[d] to engage in speculative analysis or to render an

advisory opinion *** where, as in the instant case, such analysis or

opinion is not necessary for the disposition of the cause.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 470 (McMorrow, J., writing). Apparently, the rules have changed. 

	JUSTICRE E HEIPLE joins in this special concurrence.