NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR ALFONSO MONZONCAMPOS, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70064 

Agency No. A087-764-491

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of an

Immigration Judge

Submitted March 8, 2022**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Hector Alfonso Monzon-Campos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, 

petitions for review of a decision of an immigration judge (IJ) upholding an asylum 

officer’s negative reasonable fear determination. We deny the petition for review.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 16 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 2 of 4

1. The proceedings before the IJ did not violate Monzon-Campos’s due 

process rights. Although non-citizens in reasonable fear proceedings are entitled to 

due process protections, they are not entitled to all of the same protections granted 

to persons not previously removed. Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 812 (9th 

Cir. 2018). The IJ conducts a de novo review of the asylum officer’s 

determination, and non-citizens are not entitled to present new evidence or 

testimony in the IJ hearing. Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195 

(9th Cir. 2021).

Monzon-Campos contends that the IJ failed to conduct a de novo review and 

to elicit sufficient testimony. However, at the outset of the hearing, the IJ stated 

that he would review the asylum officer’s decision and reverse it if he disagreed. 

Nothing in the record suggests that his review was not de novo. Moreover, the IJ 

questioned Monzon-Campos about the details of his prior testimony and allowed 

him to provide additional testimony. In these proceedings, Monzon-Campos was 

not entitled to more.

2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the harm 

Monzon-Campos feared was not related to a protected ground. A petitioner in a 

reasonable fear proceeding must show a “reasonable possibility” that he will be 

persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
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social group, or political opinion in the country of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 

8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).

Monzon-Campos testified that police and criminals repeatedly extorted him 

for money, sometimes by violent means. But he also testified that the perpetrators 

of that extortion targeted him purely because they “think I have money.” MonzonCampos cannot demonstrate the required nexus to a protected ground when 

substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that his fear of harm is based 

exclusively on a “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by 

theft.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s rejection of Monzon-Campos’s claim 

that the harm he feared was related to his political opinion. Although MonzonCampos responded “Yes” when the IJ asked whether he would be harmed due to 

his political opinion, he only made a conclusory allegation of “mistreatment and 

persecution[.]” The asylum officer’s written analysis concluded that MonzonCampos “has not established that others would be aware of . . . or that anyone 

would be inclined to harm him on account of those opinions[,]” which MonzonCampos “could not define” beyond his attendance at “one protest where the entire 

village participated” and his expressed opinion on a new president, which have 

only resulted in “a verbal argument.” When the IJ asked Monzon-Campos if he 
Page 4 of 4

had faced problems due to his political opinion, he said that these problems were 

“[j]ust arguments, words, nothing bigger.”

3. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that MonzonCampos did not qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture. To 

be entitled to CAT protection, a petitioner must establish that, if returned to his 

home country, he is more likely than not to face torture by or with the 

government’s acquiescence. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 831, 833 

(9th Cir. 2016). Although Monzon-Campos testified that the police repeatedly 

stopped him while driving and demanded money, nothing beyond speculation links 

the police or other government actors to the more violent extortion he suffered at 

the hands of criminals. Nor is there anything in his testimony to suggest that he 

would be singled out for torture on his return.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.