United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted September 15, 2022*

Decided September 15, 2022 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge 

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1522 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSHUA NEUBERT, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:07-cr-00166-SEB-KPF 

Sarah Evans Barker, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Joshua Neubert, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his second motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In this motion, he argued that 

he had shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on (1) a change 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 22-1522 Page 2 

in the law under which he was sentenced and (2) his progress toward rehabilitation. We 

affirm. 

Neubert first moved for compassionate release in 2019—11 years into his 32-year 

sentence for brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He relied on an amendment to § 924(c) made by Congress in the 

First Step Act of 2018 that reduced the statutory mandatory sentences for some 

defendants with multiple § 924(c) convictions. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 Stat. 

5194, 5221–22 (2018). Under the amendment, he argued, he would not face the 25-year 

minimum if sentenced today. The court denied the motion because the amendment did 

not apply retroactively to defendants sentenced under an earlier version of § 924(c). 

In 2020, Neubert moved a second time for release, renewing his argument about 

the amendment to § 924(c) and arguing that his rehabilitative progress while in prison 

presents an extraordinary and compelling basis for relief. The district court denied this 

motion, stating (again) that the changes to § 924(c) were non-retroactive and that 

Congress has expressly precluded granting compassionate release on the basis of 

rehabilitation alone. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 

Neubert sought reconsideration, repeating many of his same challenges. The 

district court denied this request too. The court invoked our holding in United States v. 

Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021), that an argument about non-retroactive 

sentencing changes can never by itself establish an extraordinary and compelling reason 

for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). And without the change to § 924(c), Neubert was 

left only with his rehabilitation as an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief—an 

argument the court said it had already rejected. 

On appeal, Neubert argues that a later decision of the Supreme Court, Concepcion 

v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022), confirms that Thacker should not prevent a 

change in the law from qualifying as extraordinary and compelling. Concepcion held 

that “the First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or 

fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” Id. 

But we are reviewing the denial of a compassionate release motion under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), not a resentencing decision under the First Step Act. In Concepcion, the 

Court distinguished the two, noting that Congress—in the context of compassionate 

release—“imposed express statutory limitations” that cabin the exercise of judicial 

discretion. 142 S. Ct. at 2401. Our discretion remains confined by the limits set by 
No. 22-1522 Page 3 

Congress, and we decline to interpret § 3582(c)(1)(A) inconsistently with Congress’s 

decision to make its amendment to § 924(c) apply only prospectively. See United States v. 

Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2021). Similarly, nothing in Concepcion calls into 

question our decision in Thacker. As we recently stated, “[w]e take the Supreme Court at 

its word that Concepcion is about the matters that district judges may consider when 

they resentence defendants...[and not] the threshold question whether any given 

person has established an `extraordinary and compelling’ reason for release.” United 

States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022). In other words, Concepcion “does not alter 

[our] understanding” that the prospective amendments to § 924(c) are not an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Id. 

Relatedly, Neubert’s rehabilitative efforts alone are not a basis for release under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Peoples, 41 F.4th at 842; 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The district court did not 

abuse its discretion arriving at this conclusion. 

AFFIRMED