COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Fe lton and Senior Judge Willis

DIANNA ROWAN FEATHERSTONE MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2151-03-3 PER CURIAM MAY 25, 2004 DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE Charles J. Strauss, Judge (Larry Gott, on brief), for appellant. (W. Clarke Whitfield, Jr., Interim City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. No brief for the Guardian ad litem for the infant child.
Dianna Rowan Featherstone appeals a decision of the trial court te rminating her parental rights to her son (the child) pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Appellant contends the evidence failed to clearly and convincing ly establish that sh e was unable or unw illing to remedy the conditions which caused pl acement of the child wi th the Danville Division of Social Services (DSS). Appellant also contends th at DSS failed to offer reasonable and appropriate efforts to assist her in ending the cond itions. Upon reviewin g the record and brie fs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is wi thout merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisi on of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). So viewed, the evidence established that in 2000, DSS received a complaint alleging that appellant left her two daughters home alone and had intercourse in front of them. The two girls were removed from the home while appellant was pr egnant with the child. Pursuant to a March 2000 protective order, appellant was ordered to take substance abuse classes. In April 2000, appellant was having problems with the Housing Authority, and Kelly Bail ey, a social worker, transported appellant to the Housing Authority to obtain a new apartment. DSS also purchased food for appellant in April 2000. The child was born on May 23, 2000, and Bailey took diapers and clothing to the hospital for him. In J une 2000, DSS provided money for appellant’s two older daughters to attend the Salvation Army summer camp. Appellant was also having a problem paying her utilities, and DSS set up a paym ent arrangement with the utility department. In July 2000, DSS requested help from the Salvation Army and Goodwill for a baby bed, baby clothes and other household items. In October 2000, appellant completed the parenting classes as required by the protective order of March 2000. In December 2000, DSS purchased items for appellant’s two older daughters, and in Janua ry 2001, DSS purchased diapers, Pedialyte and medications for the child. From March 2000 through April 2001, eight substance abuse tests were offered to appellant. Appellant refused three tests, but took five tests. A ppellant tested positive for cocaine on two of the tests, she tested negative on one test and the results were inconclusive on two tests. The first positive test result was on January 3, 2001, and the second positive test occurred on March 2, 2001. The positive drug tests violated the protective order of March 2000.- 3 - On April 5, 2001, DSS received a complaint fr om an apartment manager that the child was left alone in an apartment. DSS investigat ed the complaint and classified it as a level one physical neglect/high risk. On May 3, 2001, DSS r eceived a complaint that the child was being left unsupervised and had burned his arm. It was also reported that the child had gotten outside his residence on several occasions and gotten his h ead stuck in the porch railings. It was also reported that appellant had been seen physically dragging the child across the yard and cursing him. DSS investigated these complaints and cl assified them as level two physical neglect/high risk. As a result of these complaints, a social worker helped appellant obtain a reissued Social Security card, file for disability, and enroll w ith WIC. The social worker also transported appellant to the Health Department and helped he r enroll in substance abuse classes, which were again ordered by the court. DSS began the process for a preliminary removal of the child, but on September 4, 2001, he was removed on an emergency basis due to appe llant’s arrest for criminal charges. The only person left to care for the child was appellant’ s husband, a convicted sex offender. When asked by the social worker why she would allow her husband to be alone with the child, appellant stated she “just didn’t think a nything of it.” Appellant knew he r husband for one month prior to marrying him in August 2001. The child was seventeen months old when he came into foster care. He had severe temper tantrums, would bite himself, and kick an d attempt to bite other persons trying to control him. After several evaluations, the child was diagnosed with autism, spectrum disorder and delays of speech and language development. Si nce being in foster care, the child has made improvements in his speech and language. At the start of the child’s speech and language therapy, he could only speak two words together. At the time of the termination hearing on June- 4 - 10, 2003, the child could speak in four to five word sentences and could ca rry on a conversation. The child’s behavior had also improved. Appellant was incarcerated in a diversion cen ter and was scheduled for release in January 2003. On September 22, 2002, the court held a foster care hearing in which DSS asked the court to approve the goal of returning the child to hom e. The court did not approve the plan and soon after the hearing, appellant absconded from the di version center, which re sulted in a revocation of a previously suspended sentence. Deborah Fitzgerald, a fo ster care worker, testified she ha d concerns with appellant’s ability to take care of the child due to her past impuls iveness and lack of good judgment. Fitzgerald testified she had exhausted all options of placing the child with a relative. A ppellant told Fitzgerald that her mother lives “somewhere in Texas,” and ap pellant never provided Fitzgerald with names of other relatives. DSS has never been ab le to identify the child’s father.
ANALYSIS Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof, by cl ear and convincing evidence that (a) the termination is in the best interests of the chil d, (b) “reasonable and appropriate” services have been offered to help the parent “remedy substa ntially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, ” and, (c) despite those se rvices, the parent has failed, “without good cause,” to remedy those cond itions “within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed twelve months from the date th e child was placed in foster care.” Because “‘[r]easonable and appropriate’ e fforts can only be judged with refe rence to the circumstances of a particular case,” Ferguson v. St afford Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992), we have held that th e trial judge “must determine wh at constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the f acts before the court.” Id. at 338-39, 417 S.E.2d at 4 (citation omitted). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be- 5 - disturbed on appeal, unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). Appellant argues that DSS failed to provide r easonable and appropriate services to assist her. The record reveals, however, that DSS offe red her extensive opportuniti es and services with housing, utilities, medical supplies, social se rvices, substance abus e counseling, parenting classes, clothing and other household items. At the conclusion of the h earing, the trial judge found: [T]he State has had to assist you, they’ve offered you programs, they’ve offered you money, they’v e offered you clothes, they’ve offered you baby supplies, they’ve taken care of your utilities for you, they’ve done all these things to try to get you to the point where you can do what you need to do as a parent, and you haven’t done it. And the child has suffered as a result of it. Based upon the circumstances of this case, the tr ial judge did not err in determining that DSS provided reasonable and appropria te services to appellant. Appellant also argues the evidence was not clear and convincing that she was unwilling or unable to remedy the conditions leading to the placement of the child in foster care. Again, we do not agree. Despite the efforts of DSS, ap pellant neglected the children, tested positive for cocaine, was arrested, and absconded from the dive rsion center. Appellant was still incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. Upon entry into foster care, the child was diagnosed with autism, spectrum disorder and delays of speech and language development. The child also had severe temper tantrums. Since being in foster care, the child has made im provements in his speech and language and his behavior has also improved. “It is clearly not in the best intere sts of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Ka ywood v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).- 6 - The record supports the tria l court’s finding that DSS pr esented clear and convincing evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and establishing that the termination of appellant’s residual parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.