i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 85 5- CV E v a OR TIZ , Appellant
v . COLUMBUS INSURANCE AG ENCY ,

Appellee Fr om the 38th J udicial District Court, Medina County , Texas

Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 07 -0 7- 18 51 3- CV Honora ble Mickey

R. Pennington, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J uly 30, 2008 AFF I RMED Ap pe lla nt E va Or tiz c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of he r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t la ws uit
a g a ins t Co lum

bu s Ins ur anc e Ag e nc y

fo r w ant o f pros e c uti on , a nd its de nia l of

he r m oti on

to
re ins ta te . F ind ingno e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND Or tiz f ile d s uit a g a ins t Col umb us I ns ur anc e Ag e nc y in B e xar County , Te xas, a lle g ing a c a us e of ac tion for bre ach of

contra ct. Columbus answere d the suit and filed a motion to transfe r venue .04

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 2- The trial c ourt g rante d Columbus’s mot ion and orde red the suit transfer red to Medina

County on J une 26, 2007. The rea fter, on Septe mber 4, 2007, a trial judge in Medina Count y dismiss ed Or tiz ’s suit without prejudice for lac k of prose cution beca use the c ourt cost associated with the transf er ha d not been pa id by

Ortiz. Ortiz filed a verifie d motion to reinstate claiming that her f ailure to pa

y the
c os t of tr ans fe r w a s n ot i nte nti on a l or the re su lt o f c on sc iou s ind if fe re nc e , bu t c ou ld b e re a so na bly explained. Specifica lly , the motion state d , “[ Or t i z ] did not make the pay ment as notice of

the pay ment due for

transfe rringthe ca se wa s not rece ived by [Ortiz ] or her counse l of rec ord.” Columbus oppos ed Or

tiz ’s motion to reinstate and include d in its written response a cer tified copy of a July 12, 2007 letter from the Medina County District Clerk addr essed to Or tiz ’s attorne y which notified Or

tiz that a fi l i n g fe e of $207 for the transf

er of the ca se wa s due and ow ing, a nd neede d to be paid within 3 0 d ay s i n o rder to avoid the ca se beingdismiss ed on the c ourt’s own motion. On October 3, 2007, the trial court hear d Ortiz’s motion to reinstate a nd denied it by

written order . Both pa

rties submitted proposed finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law for the c ourt’s consideration. The trial cour t entere d the finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of l aw s u b m i t t ed by Col umb us on

Oc tob e r 2 4, 20 07 . O rt iz no w a pp e a ls. D I S CUS S I ON I n two issues, Ortiz arg ues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in dis missing her case for wa

nt of prose cution and fa iling to re instate her la wsuit. A t rial cour

t may dismiss a suit for wa

nt of prosec ution based upon Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 165a or beca use the cour

t possesses inhere nt power to dismiss when a

plaintiff fa ils to prosecute his or he r ca se with due dilig ence . T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 65 a ; Vi lla rre al v . Sa n An ton io T ru c k & Eq uip ., 994 S.W .2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999). The de cision to dismi ss a ca se for

want of prosec ution rests wit hin the s ound discretion of the trial court. Sta te
v. R otello, 6 7 1 S. W. 2 d 5 0 7 , 5 0 8

- 0 9 ( T e x. 1 9 8 4 )
. We r e v ie w an o r d e r o f d is mi s s a l f o r wa nt of04

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 3- prosec ution and an order overr uling a motion to reinstate under a clea r abuse of discre tion standard. MacG regor v. Ric h, 941 S.W .2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion if it i s sh ow n, wi th r e sp e c t to the re so lut ion of fa c tua l di sp ute s, that th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld r e a so na

bly have rea ched only one dec ision. W alker v . Pack

er, 827 S.W .2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). Wit h respe ct to determinations of leg al principles, the “ trial court has no ‘discre tion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the fa cts. Thus, a clear failure by the t rial court to analy ze or apply

the law
corr ectly will constitut e an a

buse of discr etion . . . .” Id. Ortiz maintains the trial co u rt abused its discre tion when it denied her reque st for rein s ta te me nt beca

use she pr ovided a “ rea sonable e x planation” f or her untimely pay ment of the c ourt
c o s tan d b e c a u s e s h e e s t a

b l i s h e d a t o t a l i t y o f f

a c t o r s i n d i c a t i n g d

u e d i l i g e n c e o n h e r p art
. G e n e r a l l y, whether a par ty has p ro s ec u t ed a ca se with rea sonable dilig ence is a fac tual deter mination. MacG regor, 941 S.W .2d at 76. No sing le fa ctor is deter minative; instead, the trial cour t may consider the suit’s history , including the leng th of t ime the s uit has been pending , the extent and ty pe of ac tivity

in the suit, and the movant’s explanation for the de lay
. Ch r is ti a n v . Ch r istian, 985 S.W .2d 513, 514-15 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Her e, Ortiz ’s case was dismiss ed for want of prosec ution for failure to pay the cost assoc iated with transfe rringthe ca se t o Medina Count y . On appeal, Ortiz acknowle dg es she wa s awa re of the J une 27, 2007 order transfe rring her suit a nd assessing costs of cour t ag ainst her. She a

rg ues in her br ie f, ho we ve r, that th e June 27 , 2 00 7 o rd e r d id n ot i nd ic a te an a mou nt o we d to the c ourt , a

tim e in wh ic h to su

bmit pay men t, or whe re the pa

y me nt s ho uld

be se nt. She fu

rt he r a rgue s h e r f

a ilure to timely pay the Medina County

court c osts was due to either mistake or ac cident on the pa rt o f the United States Postal S er v i ce , as neither she nor he r attorne y

ever rec eived the July

12, 200704

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 4- corr espondenc e notifying he r of the c ourt’s intent to dismis s for non-pay ment. I n addition, she states she exercised due dilige nce by tender ing pa

y ment of the $207 c ost with her motion to reinstate. She maintains this ex planation meets he r burde n for r einst at em en t b ec ause it is rea sonable a nd “not contra dicted or disprove n by [C olumbus] .” T EX . R. C IV . P. 165a(3) ( “The court shall reinstate the
case upon finding afte r a he aring that the failure of the party or his attorney was not intentional or the re sult of conscious indi ffe renc e but was due to an accident or mistake or t hat t he fa ilure has be en otherwise r easona

bly explained.”). We b e gin our a na ly sis by fi rs t no tin g that, c on tr ary to O rt iz’ s a sse rt ion

that he r m oti on

to
re ins ta te wa s “ no t c on tr a dic te d o r d isp rov en” by Col umb us , th e re c or d r e ve a ls C olumbu s d id challeng e Or

tiz ’s explanation f

or delay ed pay

ment. At the time of the hear ing, the trial court ha d two
wr itt e n p le a din g s b e fo re it— Or tiz’ s ver if ie d mo tio n to re ins ta te and Col umb us ’s wr itt e n r e sp on se in oppositi on. Wit hin that response, Columbus attache d sever al exhibi ts, inc luding a cer tified copy
o f t h e J u l y 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 l e t t e r

f r o m t h e M e d i n a C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C l e r k a d dr e s s e d

t o R u s s e l l A m s b e r

r y, attorney of re cord f

or Ortiz, notify ing A msberry that the filing fee for tra

nsfer of the c ase w as $207 and that the f

ee ne eded to be paid within thirty day s to a void dismissal of the case on the cour t’s own motion. C olumbus’s response f urther a sserted that Ortiz’s counsel did rec eive the J u ly 12, 2007 notice letter

beca use it was prope rly

addre ssed and plac ed in the United States mail, a nd beca use the letter wa s never

returne d to the district clerk. F urthermor e, co n t ra ry t o Ortiz’s assertion that Columbus di d not disprove its ex planation for delay , Ortiz as t he movant, not Columbus, bear s the burden of proof to esta

blish the gr ound for r ei n s t at em en t under Rule 165a
. Kenley v . Quintana Petroleum Corp., 93 1 S. W.2 d 3 18 , 3 21 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n Ant on io 199 6, wr it de nie d) . Af te r a c a se ha s b e e n d ism iss e d f

or wa nt of pr os e c uti on , “[t]he pa rt y re qu e sti ng re ins ta te me nt ha s th e burd e n to04

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 5- bring forth a r ecor d establishing that reinstateme nt was required. .
. An af fidavit or other

competent evidenc e is requir ed to af firmatively

show that no notice wa s rec eived.” Id. (interna l ci t ati ons omitted). T u r n i n g t o t h e r e c o r d b e f

o r e u s , a s p o i n t e d o u t b y C o l u mb u s , O rt i z h a s n o t p r ov ide d th is court with a r eporte r’s re cord of the hea ring on h er m o t i o n t o reinstate. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 34.1 (“The appellate rec ord consists of t h e cl er k ’s re cord a nd, if nec essar

y to the appea l, the repor

ter’s
rec ord.”) . Not ev er y ap p ea l , howeve r, re quires a r eporte r’s re cord; a repor ter’s r ecor d is not
n ec es s ary i f “ o n l y ar gu m en t s b y

co u n s el ar e p re s en t edi no p en co urt.” M ic h iana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v . Holten, 168 S.W .3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005). Wit hout a re porter’ s rec ord, it is unclear whether the Octobe r 3, 2007 hea

ring on Ortiz’s moti on to r einstate was evidentiar y or nonevide ntiary . The tr ia l c ourt ’s Oc tob e r 3, 20 07 or de r s ta te s th a t th e c ourt c on sid e re d “ the ple a din g s, evidenc e, and
argume nts of

c ouns e l” in d e nyingthe mot ion to r e ins ta te . H ow e ver, in br ie fi ngbe fo re thi s c ourt , neither pa

rty argues that any

evidenc e wa s prese nted to the trial judg e duringthe hea ring on the motion to reinstate, and, in fa ct, one of the t ri al co u rt ’s conclusions of lawis that, “Plaintiff prese nted no evidenc e at the he aringin support of Pla in ti f f ’ s gr o unds to reinstate.” (empha sis added). Ab se nt a c le ar i nd ic a tio n th a t th e Oc tob e r 3 , 2 00 7 hear in g wa s an e vid e nti ary he ari ng , w e wi ll pr e su me that it wa s non e vid e nti ary and that th e tr ia l c ourt

c on sid e re d o nly

the e vid e nc e fi le d w ith the cler k. Id. at 783. Since the Oc tober 3, 2007 hear ing is pr esumed to be nonevidentiar y , Ortiz has not waived e rror

by her f ailure to pre sent this court with a re porter’ s rec ord. Cf. id. (complaining party must present re cord to e stablish harmful er ror f rom evidentiar

y hear ing)
. B e c a us e we ha

ve no re porter’ s rec ord of the he aring , howeve r, we mus t i n d ulge ever y
rea sonable presumption in f avor of the finding s and judg ment of the trial c ourt. W rig ht v . W rig ht,04

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 6- 69 9 S. W.2 d 6 20 , 6 22 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 85 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) . F ro m th e re c or d b e fo re us , we a re a ble to asce rtain that althoug h Ortiz de nied within her ver ified motion for re instatement that sh e ha d r e c e ive d th e July

12 , 2 00 7 n oti c e le tte r, the tr ia l cou rt e nte re d sev e ra l fin din g s of f a c t a g a ins t Or tiz’ s ass e rt ion
. I n fa c t, af

te r the he ari ng , the tr ia l cou rt e nte re d a

tot a l of thi rt y -o ne fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, including that, “[p] laintiff’s counse l does not di s p u t e t h at the addr ess [used in the J uly 12, 2007 letter] is his corr ect address,” the J uly 12, 2007 letter wa s “prope rly addre ssed, stamped a

nd mailed,” “wa s not returne d t o t h e Medina County District Clerk undeliver ed,” a nd “wa s duly

rec eived by plaintiff’s counse l.” Under our Rules of Civil Procedur e, “[ s]ervice by mail shall be complete upon deposit of the pape r, enc losed in a postpaid, properly addre ssed wra pper, in a post office or off

icial depository

under the car e and custody of the United States Postal Service .” See T EX . R. C IV . P. 21a. Fur thermore , Rule 21a sets up a pre sumption t hat notice pr operly mailed was duly

rec eived. Clif

f v. Huggins, 724 S.W .2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987). “This pre sumption m ay be rebutted by

an off er of proof of nonrec eipt. I n the absence of evidenc e to the contrary , the pre sumption has the force of a rule of la w.” Id. Her e, the only offe r of proof wa s the following verifie d statement, “[Ortiz] did not
ma k e th e p ay me n t a s n o ti c e o f

th e p ay me n t d u e f o r tr an s f e r r in g th e c a s e w a s n o t r e c e iv e d b y [O rti z] or her counsel of r ecor d.” Cf. id. at 779 (both par ty and attorne y

provided swor

n testimony that they had not re ceive d notice of tria l setting). When view ed in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s finding s, as we must, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discre tion when it rejec ted Ortiz’s offe r of pr oof of nonr ece ipt. Additionally , the trial cour t entere d sever al conc lusions of law, including that Ortiz “fa iled to prosec ute [ her] case with due dil ige nce,” “pre sented no evidenc e at the hea ring in support of plaintiff’s g rounds t o reinstate,” and “f ailed to meet plaintiff’ s burden of proof to have this c ase r einstated.” Ag ain, indulgingever y rea sonable pre sumption i n favor of the04

- 07

- 00 85 5- CV

- 7- fi nd ing s and

jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l cou rt , we ho ld t

he tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in dismiss ing a

nd ref using to re instate Ortiz’s lawsuit ag ainst Columbus . The j u d gm en t of the trial court is af firmed. Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice