DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JAKELIN EDMONDSON,

Appellant,

v.

TRI-COUNTY ELECTRICAL SERVICES, INC.,

Appellee.

No. 4D23-231

[April 19, 2023]

Appeal from the County Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John Hurley, Judge; L.T. Case No. CONO20-002337.

Michael Garcia of Michael Garcia, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Patrick Giunta of Patrick Giunta, P.A., Pompano Beach, for appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Jakelin Edmondson (“Homeowner”) seeks review of a trial 

court order that granted Appellee Tri-County Electrical Services, Inc.’s 

(“Contractor”) motion to increase a cash security bond pursuant to section 

713.24(3), Florida Statutes (2020). Homeowner contends that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to increase a cash security bond after the entry 

of final judgment. We agree with Homeowner and thus reverse and 

remand the order at issue.1

Background

In the underlying suit, Contractor filed a lien enforcement proceeding 

against Homeowner alleging that Contractor had been underpaid for 

electrical work which it performed on Homeowner’s property. Contractor 

was seeking to foreclose on a claim of lien for $6,780.00 against 

Homeowner’s property. 

1 Because no judicial labor remains pending in the trial court, we treat 

Homeowner’s “petition for writ of certiorari” as an appeal of a final order. See 

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
2

After Contractor filed suit, Homeowner transferred the claim of lien to 

a cash security bond for $9,339.45, pursuant to section 713.24(1), Florida 

Statutes (2022). A month later, Contractor moved to increase the cash 

security under section 713.24(3), Florida Statutes (2022). The trial court 

deferred ruling on that motion. 

Thereafter, the case proceeded to a bench trial on the merits, and the 

trial court entered a final judgment, finding in Contractor’s favor on all 

issues. In its final judgment, the trial court reserved jurisdiction over 

attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. Homeowner did not seek appellate 

review of the final judgment.

Subsequently, Contractor moved for attorney’s fees and, within the 

motion’s “wherefore” clause, requested an increased cash bond. 

Contractor also filed a renewed motion to increase the cash security,

noting that the trial court had deferred ruling on its earlier pre-trial 

motion.

The trial court entered an “Agreed Final Judgment” awarding 

Contractor pre-judgment interest, attorney’s and expert fees, and costs, 

and directing the clerk of the court to close the case. That final judgment 

did not address Contractor’s motion to increase the bond. Nor did the final 

judgment reserve jurisdiction over any matters. No appeal or collateral 

motion followed. 

More than a month later, after the time for filing a motion for rehearing 

had passed, the trial court held a hearing and granted Contractor’s motion 

to increase the cash bond. This timely appeal followed. 

Analysis

Homeowner argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant 

Contractor’s motion to increase the cash bond, because final judgment 

had been entered prior to granting the motion. 

It is well settled that after the time for a motion for rehearing has 

passed, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over a final judgment. 

See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 263 So. 3d 134, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2018); see also Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 

1, 3 (Fla. 1970) (“Except as provided by Rules 1.530 and 1.540, Florida 

Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has no authority to alter, modify 

or vacate an order or judgment.”). Here, while the trial court reserved 

jurisdiction in its initial final judgment to award fees and costs, the 

subsequent “Agreed Amended Final Judgment” resolved those issues and 
3

failed to reserve jurisdiction for any purpose. Contractor did not file a 

timely motion for rehearing, which would have been the time to raise the

bond increase issue.

Nonetheless, where a rule of civil procedure or statute allows for postjudgment relief, the trial court’s jurisdiction will be reinstated. See Kippy 

Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193, 199 (Fla. 1965) (“[A] trial court has no 

authority to modify, amend or vacate a final order, except in the manner 

and within the time provided by rule or statute . . . .”).

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 allows a party to seek relief from 

a final judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly 

discovered evidence, or fraud. Contractor did not file a rule 1.540 motion 

here. Additionally, while this Court looks at the substance of filings over 

form, the motion to increase the bond did not challenge the final order on 

one of the accepted bases in the rule. See Concept, L.C. v. Gesten, 662 So.

2d 970, 973 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 

The trial court here relied on section 713.24 as the basis for its 

jurisdiction to increase the security bond. Section 713.24(3) permits a 

motion to increase a bond in a “pending” action to enforce a lien:

Any party having an interest in such security or the property 

from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any 

number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit 

court of the county where such security is deposited, or file a 

motion in a pending action to enforce a lien, for an order to 

require additional security, reduction of security, change or 

substitution of sureties, payment of discharge thereof, or any 

other matter affecting said security.

§ 713.24(3), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphasis added). 

The action here was not “pending” under section 713.24(3). “The 

general rule is that an action remains pending in the trial court until after 

a final judgment and such time as an appeal is taken or time for an appeal 

expires.” Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). By 

the time the trial court had ruled on the motion to increase the bond, the 

time for an appeal had passed. Therefore, because the matter was no 

longer pending, the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion.

Conclusion
4

The trial court was without jurisdiction to grant Contractor’s motion to 

increase the bond. We accordingly reverse and remand this matter to the 

trial court for the purpose of vacating its order granting Contractor’s 

motion to increase the bond. 

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

GROSS, CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.