Filed 10/9/14 P. v. Ramirez CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
GILBERT RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant. B253587
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA089929)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Suzette Clover, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *2 Defendant and appellant Gilbert Ramire z appeals from his co nviction, following a no contest plea, on one count of felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). We affirm. On July 12, 2013, defendant was charge d by information w ith three counts: possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Sa f. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1), felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and possession of amm unition (Pen. Code, § 30305, s ubd. (a)(1); count 3). It was also specially alleged, as to all counts, defendant had suffered five prior qualifying strikes within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law and had served five prior prison terms. The information was subsequently amended by interlineati on to add one count (count 4) for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). Defendant moved to suppress evidence reco vered at the time of his arrest. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) Los Angele s County Deputy Sheriffs Jona than Elizarraraz and Scott Chapman, the arresting deputies, testified at the evidentiary hear ing to the following facts. Shortly after 1:00 in the morning on May 31, 2013, the deputies were on patrol in a marked vehicle. They were making a routin e check at the Palms Motel in the City of
Rosemead because it is known for a hi gh level of narcotics activity. Defendant was standing with a female at the motel’s check-in window. Deputy Chapman believed defendant matched the gene ral description of a suspect wanted for making criminal threats from a week or so be fore in the same general area. Defendant was about 30 feet from the patrol car and Deputy Chapman, while still seated in the driver seat, asked defendant hi s name and if he had any iden tification. Defendant said something inaudible but then denied having any identification. Deputy Chapman asked defendant if they could speak with him a nd he walked over to their patrol car. Deputy Elizarraraz got out of the car and went up to defendant and asked
defendant if he could search him. Defendant said “Go ahead . I don’t have anything.”3 Defendant then conceded he had a “small” kni fe with him. Deputy Elizarraraz performed a brief patdown search and found an 8-inch folding knife in the pocket of defendant’s shorts. Deputy Elizarraraz was “startled” by the size of the knife, because defendant had called it small, and because it was in the “f ixed” or open position, pointing upward. Deputy Elizarraraz secu red the knife and detain ed defendant. Deputy Chapman placed defe ndant in the back of th e patrol car. He asked defendant his name and ran it through the mob ile digital computer. As a result of that preliminary check, Deputy Chapman believed defe ndant was on parole. It appears that
fact was later found to be untrue. Th e deputies proceeded to conduct a weapons investigation. The deputies spoke with defendant’s female companion. She told them they had arrived at the motel in the white pickup tr uck parked nearby. Deputy Chapman walked over to the truck and saw, through the open window, a hypodermic needle lying on the
driver’s side floorboard. The needle had a brown residue in it and was lying on a black bandana. The deputies search ed the vehicle and found a loaded .22-caliber handgun under the bandana and three small balloons, of what was later determined to be heroin, in
the bed of the truck. Defendant did not call any witnesses. After entertaining argument, the court
denied defendant’s moti on to suppress. Thereafter, on the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached. De fendant agreed to enter a plea of no contest to counts 2 and 4 and to admit one prior strike. The requ isite admonitions were stated on the record and defendant waived his rights to a jury trial. The court found defendant made a knowing and voluntary decision to waive his ri ghts and enter into the plea agreement, and found a factual basis supported the plea. Counts 1 and 3 and the remaining special allegations were dismissed.4 The court sentenced defendant to the low term of 16 months, doubled due to the strike, on each of counts 2 and 4, with the terms to run concurrently. Defendant was awarded 378 days of custody credits, and ordered to pay va rious fines and fees.
The record discloses no effo rt by defendant to secure a certificate of probable cause, and no certificate is contained in the record. Thus, the only issues cognizable by this appeal are search and seizure issues, a nd issues arising from postplea proceedings to determine the degree of the crimes and penalties to be imposed. ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74-75.) Defendant file d a timely notice of appeal raising only the
issue of the denial of his motion to suppress in accordance with Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m) and Panizzon

. We appointed appellate counsel to repres ent defendant. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 ( Wende ) in which no issues were
raised. The brief included a declaration from counsel that he revi ewed the record and sent a letter to defendant explaining his ev aluation of the record. Counsel further
declared he advised defe ndant of his right, under Wende , to submit a supplemental brief within 30 days. On May 5, 2014, defendant submitted a one-page handwritten letter brief. Defendant did not identify any specific claim of error, but only requested his current appellate counsel be relieved and that new appellate counsel be appointed. Defendant requested his current counsel be replaced because of counsel’s opinion there are no arguable appellate issues. Simply because appointed counsel submitted a Wende brief
does not mean defendant is entitled to new co unsel. Defendant ha s not shown any basis
for an order substitutin g new counsel.
As for the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court is vested with broad discretion in judging witness credibilit y, weighing the evidence and drawing the reasonable inferences therefrom. “ ‘ “On app eal, all presumptions favor the exercise of that power. . . .” [Ctiati ons.]’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537; see also People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924 [discussing standard of5 review for ruling on a motion to suppress].) The record amply support s the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. The deputies ha d a reasonable basis for asking defendant a few simple questions to determine his iden tity based on Deputy Chapman’s belief he fit the general description of a suspect from an incident the previous week. Defendant consented to a patdown search. There are no facts showing the officers acted aggressively, in a coercive manner or othe rwise unduly prolonged the initial detention
such as to vitiate the voluntariness of defend ant’s consent. A large knife was recovered from defendant’s pocket, and th e deputies saw, in plain vi ew, evidence of drugs in defendant’s parked vehicle whic h justified the search of the vehicle. We do not believe Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, referenced in defendant’s letter brief, supports a
different outcome on defendant’s motion. To the extent defendant’s letter suggests appointed counsel failed to co mpetently represent him by refu sing to raise the denial of the motion as an appellate is sue, we are not persuaded.
We have examined the entire record and ar e satisfied that appo inted counsel fully complied with his responsibilities in assessing whether or not any colorable appellate
issues exist. We conclude there are no arguable appellate issues. ( People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; Wende , supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.)
DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

We concur:
RUBIN, Acting P. J.

FLIER, J.