Si xth Di vi si on Decem ber 10, 2010

No. 1-08- 3092 THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, v. FR EDERIC K STEW

AR T, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Ap pe al fr o m th e C i rc ui t Cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty 07 CR 13027 Honorable Jo se ph G. Ka zmie r sk i, Jud ge P re siding JU STI CEMc BR

ID E de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Fo llowing a ju ry t rial, d efenda nt , Fr ede rick St ewa rt , w as fo und g uilty o f arso n and aggravated arson and the t rial cour t sentenced him

to concurre nt ter ms of s ix and ni ne y ears’ impr iso nme nt , r es pe ct ive ly. O n a pp ea l, de fen da nt co nt en ds t ha t ( 1) t he St at e fa iled t o pr o ve him gui l ty of ar son an d agg ra v ate d a rs on b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t; (2 ) the tr

i al cou rt a b us ed i ts discre ti on b y ad m i tti n g th e dea th certif i ca te of W i l l i e Jon es

i n to ev i den ce ; (3 ) the c our

t f ai l ed to properl y qu esti on th e p rospe cti

v e j ur orspu

rsua n t to Su pr em e C our t Ru l e 4 31 (b ) (O f

f i ci al Re por ts A dvan ce Sheet No. 8 ( A

pri l 11 , 20 07 ), R . 43 1(b ), e f

f . M ay 1, 2 00 7) ; an

d ( 4) th e c our

t ab us ed i ts discre ti on b y f ai l i n g to i n str uc t th e j ur

y on th e l es se r-i n cl uded of f ense of cri m i n al da mag e to property . Jur y select ion in t his case bega n on Au gus t 20, 200 8. The t rial co ur t initially made t he followi ng statemen

ts to the ven

ire.

“Un de r th e l aw , th e def

en da nt i s p res um ed to be i nn ocent of1-08-3092

2 t he ch ar ge s a ga inst him. T his p r es ump t io n r ema ins w it h him t hro ugho ut ever y sta ge o f the t rial and dur ing deliber at ions o n t he verdict and i s not o vercome unless from al l the evi dence in the case yo u a r e c o nvin ce d b eyo nd a r ea so na ble do ub t t ha t t he de fen da nt is gu ilt y. The St at e has t he bur den o f pro ving t he gu ilt o f the de f en da nt b ey ond a re as ona bl e doubt an

d th i s b urden rem ai ns on th e S tate th rough out th e c as e. The def

en da n t i s n ot re qui re d to pres en t any evi den ce on his own beha l f .” The trial court then questioned t he f irst panel of

pro spective j uro rs: “Oka y. Do all of you unde rst and a nd ac cep t t he fo llowing fun da men t al p r inc iple s o f o ur leg al s yst em: Tha t a pe rso n acc use d o f a cr ime is pres umed t o be innoce nt of t he cha rg es a gainst him, tha t t hat pr esu mpt ion st ays wit h t he de fen da nt t hr o ug ho ut t he t r ial a nd is no t o ve r co me u nle ss fr o m all the evi dence y ou belie ve that the State pro ved h is guil t bey ond a
r ea so na ble do ub t ; t ha t t he de fen da nt do es no t ha ve t o pr o ve his in nocence;that t he def

endan t do es not have to present any evi dence
o n his o wn be ha lf. Do all o f yo u u nd er st an d t ho se pr inc iple s a pp ly t o t his ca se , ev er ybo dy? An ybody ha ve an y probl em with a ny of those prin

ci ple s, let1-08-3092

3 me kn ow, pleas e.” Defens e co unse l then q ues t ioned t he first pane l, st at ing, “N ow , t he judg e exp lained t o yo u t hat t he De f ense h as n o b urden

i n th i s c as e. If

Mr . Ste wa rt d ec i de d n

ot to te sti f y , w h i ch i s h i s r i gh t, would you consider that in y our verdict?” One potential j uro r respo nded “perhaps” to defense
coun sel ’squestion

and stated

that i t woul d “ depe

nd[ ] on the

Judg e’s i nstructi on.” Th

e tri al court responded, “I wi

ll in struct you in tha

t regard, t hat if

the defe ndan t chooses not t o t estif

y, that f act
m us t not b e c ons i de red

by you i n a ny wa y i n a rri vi ng at y our v erd i ct.” Th e s am

e p oten ti al j uror stated, “ then i t won’ t be c onsi

dered by me.” De f

en se c ouns el

then ask ed th e prosp ecti

ve j urors i n di v i du al l y wh eth er th ey wou l d c on si der d ef en da n t’s de cisi on n ot to te sti

f y i n ar ri v i n g a t a ver dict . All of t he pr os pec t ive juro rs r esp ond ed t hat t hey wo uld no t , e xcep t for one juro r w ho responded “possi

bl y” and an ot her who responded, “I’m not cert ai

n y et, but I wo uld h

ave to hear the c i rcum stan ces of the si tuati on f i rst.” The trial court proceeded to question the se cond panel of prospective

jurors as to whether they understoo d and accepted t he f ollowi ng princi ples: “That a pe rso n acc use d o f a cr ime is pres umed t o be inn o ce nt o f t he ch ar ge s a ga ins t him, t ha t t ha t pr es umpt io n s t ays with the defendan

t t hrougho ut t he trial an

d is n ot overco me un

less fr o m all t he ev ide nc e yo u b elie ve t ha t t he St at e p r o ve d h is g uilt b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t; th at th e def en da n t doe s n ot h av e to pr ove his innoce nce; t hat t he de fendant do es no t have t o p re sent
an y evi den ce on his own beha l f .”1-08-3092

4

Defens e counsel posed the following question to the second panel of prospect iv e jurors: “I know the judge asked you a quest ion si mi larl y al ong t hese l

in es, bu t i f Mr . Stewa

rt doe s n ot take the wi tne ss sta nd , wou l d a ny of you hol d that agai

ns t hi m , b y a show of ha nds a bou t hi m not testify in g? No sh ow of h ands.” The trial court then questioned t he third panel of prospec tive j uro rs: “Do all of you unde rst and a nd ac cep t t he fo llowing fun da men t al p r inc iple s o f o ur leg al s yst em: Tha t a pe rso n acc use d o f a cr ime is pres umed t o be innoce nt of t he cha rg es a gainst him, tha t t hat pr esu mpt ion st ays wit h t he de fen da nt t hr o ug ho ut t he t r ial a nd is no t o ve r co me u nle ss fr o m all the evi dence y ou belie ve that the State pro ved h is guil t bey ond a
r ea so na ble do ub t ; t ha t t he de fen da nt do es no t ha ve t o pr o ve his in nocence;that t he def

endan t do es not have to present any evi dence
o n his o wn b eha lf. Do all o f yo u u nd er st an d t ho se pr inc iple s a pp ly t o t his
cas e?” Defe nse couns el

asked each

prospective j uror indi

vi dually whether he

or she would consi

der defen dant’s decisi on not t o t estif y i n arri vi ng at a verdi

ct. All of the j urors responded that t hey would not.1-08-3092

5

T he fo llo win g e vid en ce wa s p r es en t ed at de fen da nt ’s t r ial. Chicag o p olice o ffi

cer Er in Murp hy tes t ifi

ed t hat on J une 8 , 2 007 , she was on p at ro l in a
ma rked police car wi

th her partner, Off

ic er Tim ot hy Tantil lo. At approxi

ma tely 4:20 a.m., Of

fi cer Mu r ph y wa s p at r o lling t he ar ea o f 53 r d S t r ee t an d P r inc et o n Av en ue in Ch ica go , I llino is, wh ich is a residentia

l a rea with a num ber of ab andoned b

uil din gs and v acant lot s. Off

ic er Murphy

was patro ll in g north on Princ eton when sh e l ooked t hrough an al

le y to Sout h Shi

el ds and obs erved a
ma n, whom she i dentif ie d as def endan t, holdi ng a red gas ca

n an d standi ng on the f

irst-f loor back po rc h of a vaca nt building loc at ed a t 540 5 S ou t h Shields. The officer , w ho w as famili ar wit h t he
ar ea, t est ifi

ed t hat Shields w as o ne bloc k t o t he we st of P rincet on, t hat an alley ran be t wee n t he two s tree ts, a nd tha t pe ople s ti l l

l i ve d i n th e a rea . Of f i cer Murphy

wa s a bl e to s eethe

bu i l di ng on Shi elds b eca use there were onl y vacan t lots b etween h

er an d def endan t. A s O f f i cer M ur ph y drov e th rough th e a l l ey towa rd th e b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 40 5 S outh Shiel ds, she n

ot ic ed that defen

dant was weari

ng l atex gl oves and that the gas can ’s spout was sti ck i n g ou t. W h en Of f i cer M ur ph y pa ss ed de f en da n t, he f l ed on f oot a cross

se v eral v ac an t l ots to ward Prin

ceton. Off

ic er Murphy

followed i

n he r squad car and sa

w defe ndan t t hrow the gas
can a nd t he black shirt he wa s we ar ing t o t he gr ou nd. Defend ant ult imately hop ped a fence and
ran i nto the b acky

ard of 5345 Pri nc eton, wh

ere h e was place d i nto custody b

y Of f i cer Ta nti l l o. Defe ndan t was stil l we arin g the la tex glove s at the tim

e, and Of fi cer Murphy

was presen

t when Detec tiv e Be l l rem oved them f rom h i m . Off ic er Murphy

then retriev

ed the gas can

and sh irt that defen

dant had discarded. Off

ic er Murphy saw that the back porch

def endan t had be en stan di ng on wason f i re an d cal l ed th e f i re1-08-3092

6

de pa r t men t . Sh e d es cr ibe d t he fire as “hu ge ” a nd t es t ified t ha t t he en t ire ba ck po r ch wa s “u p in flames” and t hat all of t he windo ws o n t he bac k o f the hou se w er e “bus t ing o ut .” Officer M ur phy described the weather at that t im e as “very win dy” an d test if ied that the wind was bl

owing “so str ong” to th e n orth th at i t h ad b l own th e f i reacros s th

e a l l ey to a h ous e l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh Prin ceton, which

caught on fi

re. Off ic er Murphy

al so test if

ie d that t he sh

irt she recovered sm

elle d of gasolin e and that def

endan t also sm elle d of gasolin

e when he was taken

in to custody. On
cross-exam

in ation, Of fi cer Murphy

testifi ed that she wi

tnessed h er partner search def

endan t when he wa s plac ed int o c ust od y and t hat she d id no t see her par t ner re co ver matc hes, a light er , o r a ny other i tem f rom d ef endan t that coul

d be use d to start a f

i re. Ry an Ri vera, a f ire m arshal for the ci ty of Ch ic ago, was quali

fi ed as an e xpert in the area of fire inves t igat ions. Rivera was called t o t he sc ene a nd lear ned t hat t her e had been a heavy
am ount o f f ire i n rear of the se cond fl

oor of the bui

ldi ng l ocated at 5405 Sout h Shi el ds and that t he fire ha d sp re ad t o t he r oo f of ano t her oc cup ied building. He e xamined t he inte rio r a nd exterior of the b

uil din g at 5405 So uth Shiel ds and determ in ed that the fi

re started o n the secondfloo r land ing o f the po rc h. H e o bser ved t hat at t he r ear of t he ho use , t he st airs lea ding t o t he
sec ond -floo r land ing wer e go ne. He w ent t hro ugh t he inte rio r o f the hou se t o t he r ear of t he
se con d f l oor wh ere the f i re s tarte d a nd obs erv ed tha t the re wasno f

l oori ng on th e s ec ond f l oor l an di ng . Be ca us e h e h ad be en tol d that there

wa s a he av y am oun t of f i re, he l ooke d f or so mething , su ch as a mat t re ss o r a so fa, t hat wo uld have cau sed t hat amou nt of fire. He fo und no
such ob j ect, wh i ch i ndi cated th at the f i re wa s as si sted b

y a f l am mab l e l i qui d. Moreover, the

f i re had burned even

ly across t he wood en f

looring, which i

t do es not no rmal

ly do, and this al

so1-08-3092

7

in dic ated that t he f

ire was assi sted by

a fl am ma ble liqui d. Riv era al so smel

le d gasoli ne at the rear of the se cond

f l oor of the

bui l di ng a nd d eterm i ne d tha t the f i re had b een

caus ed b y cri m i na l action. Bas ed up on h

i s ex peri ence a nd e xa m i na tion of the sc ene, Ri

vera con cl uded that the f i re wa s c au se d by

the “ ope n f l am e i gn i ti on of the f l am mab l e l i qui d vap ors of

an i gn i tab l e l i qui d”on the second-f

loor lan din g of the bui

ldi ng. Ri vera also explai

ned that the fi

re “f le w across” the alle

y and b urned a hol

e i n the roof of the other bui ldi ng. Based upon h

is experience an

d the fact t hat the wi nd was b lowi

ng at approxim

ately 27 mi le s per hour at the time of the fi re, Riv era concl uded that it was “ab solutel

y” “a possi bi li ty” that the i

ni tial fi re spread to t he seconda

ry struct ure. On
cr os s-e xaminatio n, R ivera t est ifi ed t hat t her e wa s evide nce o f squa t t er s livi ng in t he building l ocated a t 5405 South

Shi elds. Officer S t even B ryan t est ifi ed t hat at app ro ximately 4: 30 a .m. on J une 8 , 2 007 , he
res pon de d to a cal l of a f oot chas e i

n th e a rea of the 530 0 b l ock

of South Pri nc eton . Up on arriv in g there, he observe d a l arge num ber of people i

n thei r yards i n the area an

d was f la gged dow n b y a w om an wh o sc re am ed , “ m y h ous e is on

f i re .”That h

ous e w as l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh Pri nc eton. Of

f i cer B ry an obse rve d tha t the wi nd was b l owi

ng e m bers thr ough th e al l ey toward 5354 S outh Pri

nc eton an d tha t the roof of that hous e was

on f i re. He noti f i ed dispa tch of the f i re and s ubse que nt ly l

ear ned t hat t her e wa s ano t her fire in a building t hat was loca t ed w ithin t he bl ock. Detective K

evi n Bel l of the bomb and arson squa

d responded to an arson in vestigation at 540 5 Sou th S hi el ds . He retr i eved the red ga s c an an d the shi rt de f en da nt h ad be en we ari ng f rom Officer M ur phy and t oo k a p air o f late x glo ves t hat wer e st ill on d efenda nt ’s hand s. T he de t ect ive1-08-3092

8

testifi ed that defen

dant’s sh irt and the l

iqui d in side the red can b ot h sm

elle d of gasolin

e. A spout
was also scr ewe d int o t he o pening o f the gas oline ca n. T he de t ect ive te st ifi ed t hat t he building loca t ed a t 540 5 S ou t h Shields w as a bando ned a nd t he fo llowing exc hange t hen t oo k plac e at t he
co nclusio n of D et ect ive Bell’s dire ct examinat ion:

“Q. An d how did y

ou set o ut t o determin

e who the owner of the pro pert y is? A. Best way we do it is to chec k t he Count y Assessor ’s taxpay er database. Q. When you ch ecked the database, di

d you learn i

n f act that the owne r of th e proper ty - - MS. SI LVA [ defens e co unse l]: O bject ion. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [Ass ista nt St at e’s At t or ney:] Did you learn w ho t he
owner o f the proper ty was? A. Yes. MS . SIL VA [de f ense cou ns el ]: Obj ec ti on. Fou

nd ati on THE COURT : That answer will stand, yes. MR. HOLLA

ND [Assi stant Stat e’s A

tt orney]: No f

urther questions.” Gr ego ry Slo an t est ifi

ed t hat on J une 8 , 2 007 , he lived in and wa s t he ca re t ake r o f the bui ldi ng l ocated at 5354 Sout h Pri

nceton. The bui

ldi ng was a m

ultifam il y dwelli ng that had1-08-3092

9

tenants on both f

loors. Sloan was

sl eepi ng i n Ch ic ago Heigh

ts in the early morni ng of J une 8, 200 7, when he re ceived a t elepho ne ca ll i nfor ming him

t hat so mething had ha ppe ned t o t he building loc at ed a t 535 4 S ou t h Pr incet on. When he a rr ived t her e, he o bser ved t hat t he r oo f of t he building was bur nt . S loan a lso t est ifi ed t hat pr ior t o J une o f 200 7, he had see n defend ant in the nei ghborhood “a coupl e of tim es” whe n he brought kids b

y the candy store t hat Sloan operated
o ut o f t he ho us e a t 53 54 So ut h P r inc et o n. Slo an als o t es t ified t ha t “a n o lde rgu y” u se d t o live in the h ouse l ocated a t 5405 South

Shi elds b ut that n o one l i ve d i n that hous e at the

tim e of the f i re. The State t hen

rested its case. The tri al

court deni

ed defe ndan t’s motion f

or a directed
ver dict , a nd t he de fense t hen r est ed w itho ut pr ese nt ing any evidenc e. Fo llowing clo sing
ar gument s, t he t rial co ur t instr uct ed t he jur y that defend ant was pr esu med t o be innoce nt of t he charges aga

in st hi m a nd that the presum

ption rem ai ned wi th defen dant throughout trial

and was not o vercome

unless f rom al l the e vi dence the j ury was

convi nced b ey ond a reasonabl

e doubt that defend ant was guilt y. The co ur t also instr uct ed t he jur y that t he St at e has t he bur den o f pro ving de fen da nt ’s gu ilt be yo nd a r ea so na ble do ub t , t ha t de fen da nt wa s no t r eq uir ed t o pr o ve his innoce nce, and “t he fact t hat t he de fendant did no t t est ify must not be co nsider ed by you in any way in arriv in g at your verdict.” The j ury f ound defen

dant guil ty of aggrav

ated arson and arson. The trial court sentence d defen dant to co ncurrent terms of ni ne an d si x y ears’ i mprisonm ent. This appeal fol lowed. Defe ndan t contends that t he State did n ot prove hi

m gui lty of aggravated arson b ey

ond a
re aso nable do ubt . H e initially claim s t hat t he evide nce p re sent ed a t t rial failed t o e st ablish tha t he

“ kn owi n gl y ” dam ag ed th e b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh

Pri n ceton , a s req

ui re d b y th e statu te1-08-3092

10

def i ni ng th e of f en se of aggra va ted ars on. Defe ndan t asserts that t hi s clai

m s hould b e reviewed de novo be ca us e n ei the r th e f ac ts n or the credibil

ity of the wi tnesses are i

n di spute. See People

v. Smith , 191 Il

l . 2d 408 (2000 ). Ho weve r, defend ant is challenging t he infere nces t hat can be dr awn fr om t he evide nce, and therefore his contention is a chal le nge to the suff

ic ie ncy of the evi

dence prese

nted at tr ia

l. See People v. Hinton , No . 3- 08
- 05 83 , slip o p. at 2- 3 ( Ju ne 22 , 20 10 ) ( r eje ct ing t he de fen da nt ’s cla im that t he court should rev

ie w de novo hi s argum

ent that he di d not have n ot ic e or knowledge of a

n or der of p ro t ect ion and finding tha t t he de fendant ’s cha llenge wa s t o t he su ffi ciency o f the
evi den ce b eca use he wascontes

tin g the i nf eren ces that coul d be drawn f rom th at evi den ce). Wh en revi ewi ng a chal l enge to the s

uf f i ciency of the ev i den ce, the rel ev an t questi on i s wh ethe r, aft er vie win g t he ev ide nc e in a lig ht mo st fav o r ab le t o t he St at e, an y ra t io na l t r ier o f fac t co uld ha ve f ound th e es sen tia l elem en ts of th e cri me b ey ond a reas onab l e doubt. People v. Cunningham , 2 12 I ll. 2d 2 74, 278 (2 004 ). The t rier of fac t is res po nsible for asse ssing t he
cr edibility of t he wit nesse s, w eighing t he t est imony, and dr awing r eas ona ble inferenc es fro m the
evi den ce. People

v. Ortiz, 196 Il

l . 2d 236 , 259 (2 001). U

nde r thi s stan dard, a revi ewi ng c ourt resol ve s al l reas onab l e i

nf eren ces i n f avor of the State. People v. Collins , 106 Ill . 2d 237, 261 ( 19 85 )
. A c r iminal c o nvic t io n w ill no t be se t as ide o n app ea l un les s t he ev ide nc e is so impr o ba ble
or uns ati sf

actory that i t creates a rea sona bl e doubt as to the de f

endan t's g uil t. People v. Cox , 195 Ill . 2d 378 , 387 (2 001). Defend ant was char ged wit h co mmi t t ing t he o ffense o f agg ra vat ed a rso n “in that he, in the
cou rs e of com m i tti ng ars on, kn owi ngl y da mag ed pa rti al l y or total l y an y bu i l di ng or s tructure

of1-08-3092

11

Gre gory Sloan e, l oca ted at 5 354 S. P ri nc eton , i n C hi cago, I l l i noi s, a nd [de f en da nt] knew or reasonabl y s hould h ave kn own that one or more persons were present therein .” The aggravated
ar son sta tute prov i de s, i

n re l ev an t pa rt:

“ A pers on c om

m i ts aggr avate d a rs on w he n i n th e c ours e of
co mmit t ing ar so n he o rsh e k no win gl y da mag es , pa r t iall y o rt o t ally,
an y bu i l di ng or s tructure , i

nc l udi ng an y ad j ac en t bu i l di ng or structur e, *** and (1) he kn ows or r easonabl

y s hould kn ow that
one or m ore pers ons a

re pre sen t therei n ** *.” 72 0 ILC S 5/20 -1.1 (We st 2006 ). The element s o f agg ra vat ed a rso n, includ ing t he element of k now ledge , ne ed no t be pr ove n by di rect ev i den ce a nd i nstead m ay be i nf erred f rom th e su rround i ng f acts a nd c i rcum stan ces . People v. Burre tt , 216 I ll . App. 3d 18 5, 190 ( 1991). Section 4-5 o f the Crim in al Code of 1961pro vides: “A p er so n kn o ws , o r a ct s k no wing ly or wit h kn o wle dg e o f: (a) Th e n atu reor a tten da n t ci rc um sta n ce s of h i s c on duct, de sc r ibe d b y t he st at ut e d efin ing t he o ffen se , wh en he is c o nsc io us ly aware that hi s conduct is

of such nature or t hat such ci

rcumstances exist . Kno wledg e o f a mat er ial fact includ es a war enes s o f the sub stan tia l proba bi l i ty th at such f act ex i sts. (b ) Th e res ul t of h i s c on duct, de scri

b ed b y th e statu te de fining t he o ffen se , wh en he is c o nsc io us ly aw ar e t ha t t ha t r es ult is practi cal l y certai n to be caus ed b y his con duct.” 7 20 IL CS 5/4 -51-08-3092

12 (We st 2006 ). Defe ndan t clai ms that t he State fai

le d to prove that by s etting f ire to the buildi

ng l ocated at 540 5 S ou t h Shields, defend ant was “co nscio usly awa re t hat it w as p ra ct ically cer t ain” t hat t he bu ilding lo ca t ed at 53 54 So ut h P r inc et o n w o uld be da mag ed
. De fen da nt as se r t s t ha t it wa s hig hly unl ike ly that t he f ire woul d spread f rom one bui

ldi ng to t he other giv

en the distance an

d open space be tween the two st ructures. We dis agree. In t his case , t he fact s and circu msta nces sur ro unding defend ant ’s co nduc t sup po rt t he in feren ce that defen

dant acted with the m

ental state necessary

to be conv

icted of aggravated
arson . The

re ca n b e no di spute th

at a natural

cons eque nc e of f i re i s tha t it ten ds to spre ad. Def endan t al so doesnot di spute th

at he started th

e f i re at 540 5 South Sh

i elds a nd th at the f i re then spre ad to the roof

of the buil di

ng l ocated a t 5354 South

Pri nc eton. Howe

ver, the re cord doe s n ot s uppor t de f en da n t’s as se rti on th at i t wa s “ h i gh l y un l i ke l y ” th at th e f i reat 5 40 5 S outh Shi elds woul d spr ead to a n earb y bui l di ng. Th e rec ord establ i shes that def endan t started th e f

i re at 540 5 S ou t h Shields by igniting a flammable subst ance , t he us e o f which cr eat ed a “huge ” and

“he av y am oun t of f i re. ” M oreov

er, de f en da nt i gn i ted tha t f i re on the outdoor , se con

d-f l oor landing o f the building, w hich was made o ut of w oo d and which wa s o bser ved by Officer Mur phy t o be “up in flame s. ” M o st impo r t an t ly, t he win d w as blo win g a t 27 miles pe rho ur ne ar t he t ime
o f t he fir e a nd Of

fic er Mu r ph y de sc r ibe d t he we at he rat t ha t t ime a s “ ve ry win dy. ” A dd it io na lly, the area i mm edi ately surroundin

g 5405 Sout h Shi

el ds was resi

dentia l a nd com prise d of bui

ldi ngs and vacant lot s. Giv

en the weather condi

tions at the tim

e, a jury could rational

ly concl ude that defen dant’s acti ons of usi

ng a f la mm abl e substance to igni

te a fi re on an outdoo r woo den1-08-3092

13

structure attached to the b

uil di ng a t 5405 South

Shi elds m ade i t a practic al

certai nty that the f i re would spr ead to a n earb y bui l di ng. Fu r t he r , a ma p o f t he ar ea int r o du ce d in t o ev ide nc e s ho ws t ha t 53 54 So ut h P r inc et o n is al most di rectly north of 5405 Sout h Shi

el ds and Of

fi cer Murphy

testifi ed that when sh

e arriv ed at t he sc ene, t he wind w as blo wing “so st ro ng” t o t he no rt h. D efenda nt ack now ledge s t hat t he bui ldi ng l ocated at 5354 Sout h Pri

nceton i s no m

ore t han 300 feet f

rom the bui

ldi ng l ocated at 54 05 So ut h S hie lds
. T he map o f t he ar ea sho ws t ha t t he sp ac e b et we en t he t wo st ruc t ur es is compri sed of an

alle y a nd pri ma ril y v acant lot s. Defe

ndan t clai ms that t hi s “great am

ount o f open space” made i t “h i ghl y unl i kel y ” tha t the f i re woul d spr ead b etween the two structure s. Howe ver, we be lieve tha t a r at ional jur y cou ld re ach t he o ppo site co nclusio n and find t hat given t he wind cond i tions, i.e. , th e s

pe ed an d di recti on of the wi nd , th e “gre at a

moun t of open s pa ce ” a nd l ac k of ot her structures between the two buil din gs i ncreased the l

ike li hood t hat the fi

re defen dant set at 5405 Sout h Shi

el ds would spread to the bui ldi ng at 5354 Sout h Pri

nceton. In f

act, Fire Mars

hal Rivera t est ifi

ed t hat t he fire “abs olu t ely” co uld have spr ead bet wee n t he t wo st ru ct ur es a nd Off ic ers Murphy

and Bry an each observed the wi

nd bl owing e mb ers or fi

re through the all

ey t ow ar d 53 54 S ou t h Pr incet on. Unde r t hese circu msta nces , a ra t ional t rier of fac t co uld have fou nd t hat defend ant kno wingly set fire t o t he building lo cat ed a t 535 4 S ou t h Pr incet on. Defend ant next claims tha t t he St at e failed t o p ro ve beyo nd a r eas ona ble do ubt t hat t he b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 40 5 S outh

Sh i el dswa s “ad

j ac en t” to t h e b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh Prin ceton. Defenda

nt asserts that the legislative hi story beh

in d an am endm ent to t he aggravated
arson statute, wh

i ch adde d the

phr ase “i nc l udi ng a ny adj acent b

uil di ng,” establ i shes that the term1-08-3092

1 “A dja cent” i s comm

only defi ned as “ ly in g near, close, or contiguous, nei ghbori ng.” W eb ste r’ s U n ab ridg ed Di cti on ar y 28 (2 d e d. 1 99 8) . Al

th oug h th e S tate wa s n ot re qui re d to prove that 5354 So uth Prin ceton was adj acent to 5405 So uth Shiel ds, the evi dence prese

nted at trial cl ea rl y estab l i sh ed th at th e two b ui l di n gsweread

j ac en t. 14 “ ad j ac en t,”as us ed i n th e statu te, mea n s “ad j oi n i n g.” The two b ui

l di n gsare n ot ad j ac en t, defend ant ar gue s, be cau se t hey are almost 300 feet apa rt , t hey are sep ar at ed by five city lo t s, a nd t hey do not shar e a c ommo n bor der . T he St at e r esp ond s t hat it w as no t re quir ed t o p ro ve t hat t he two b ui l di ng s w ere ad j ac en t be ca us e adj ac en

t i s n ot a n ec es sa ry el em en t of the of f ense of ag gr av ate d a rs on an d b ec au se de f en da n t wa s n ot ch ar ge d w i th da mag i n g a n ad j ac en t b ui l di n g b ut,
ra t her , he was char ged wit h kno wingly damaging t he building lo cat ed a t 535 4 S ou t h Pr incet on. Ini tia l l y , def endan t ci tes n o authori ty i n s upport of his cl ai m that “ adj acent” is a n

ece ssa ry element of t he o ffense o f agg ra vat ed a rso n. A p oint ra ised o n app eal t hat is not sup po rt ed by citation to relevan

t aut hority i s waiv

ed under Supr eme Court Rule 341(h)( 7) (210 Ill . 2d R. 341(h )(7)). People v. Ward , 215 Ill . 2d 317, 332 (2005). Moreover, t he State did n ot charge defend ant wit h damag ing an “ad jacent ” building bu t , r at her , w ith k now ingly damaging t he bui ldi ng l ocated at 5354 Sout h Pri

nceton. Therefore, the State was not r equi red to prove that 5354 So uth Princeto n was adj acent t o 5405 Sout h Shields. 1 As discussed above, the Stat e proved b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t th at def en da n t kn owi n gl y da mag ed th e b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh Pri nc eton . There f

ore, wecon

cl ude tha t the State prov ed de f en da nt g ui l ty of ag gra va ted ars on bey ond a reas onab l e doubt. Defe ndan t next contends that the Stat e fai le d to prove hi

m gui lty of arson be

yond a
re aso nable do ubt . T he r elevant st at ut e pr ovid es t hat “[a] per so n co mmi t s ar so n when, by means1-08-3092

15

of f i reor e x pl osi v e, h e k n owi n gl y : (a ) [d ]a mag es an y re al prope rty , or a n y pers on al prope rty ha vi ng a va l ue of $150 or m

ore, of a nothe r wi thout hi s consen t.” 720 IL CS 5/2 0-1 (W

est 200 6). In t his case , t he St at e cha rg ed d efenda nt wit h ar so n “in that he, by means o f fi re or explo sion, kn o win gl y da mag ed an y r ea l p r o pe r t y, t o wit , 54 05 S o ut h S hie ld s, Ch ica go , Co o k C o un t y, Ill i noi s, the property of W i l l i e Jon es wi thout the c onse

nt of Wi ll i e Jon es.” Defendan t assert s that t he Stat e fai led to pr ove the “of another” element of arson because t he ev ide nc e p r es en t ed at t r ial d id n o t es t ab lish t ha t Willie J o ne s o ran yo ne els e h ad an int er es t in the propert y l

ocated at 5405 Sout h Shi el ds. Defe

ndan t again cl ai ms that our review should be de
novo beca use his claim i

nvolves only t he de t er minatio n of w het her t he unc ont est ed fac t s met t he St at e’s bu rd en o f pro of. Ho weve r, we w ill re view de fendant ’s ar gument as a challenge t o t he
su f f i ci en cy of the ev i de nc e b ec au se

de f en da nt i s c onte sti ng the i nf ere nc estha t ca n b e d raw n f rom the evi dence prese

nted at tr ia

l. See Hinton , sli

p op. at 3. The arson statute pro vi

des that “[p]ropert y ‘ of another’ m eans a b uil din g or o ther propert y, wh

ether real or personal , in

whi ch a person other than the of fen der has an in terest which the off ender has no authority to defea t o r im pai r, even though the of

fen der may al so have an i ntere st i n the buil di

ng or property .” 720ILCS 5/20-1 (We st 2006 ). The “of another” requirem ent of the arson statute is i nterpreted broadly . See People v. Smith , 258 Ill . App. 3d 633, 638 -39(19 94)(“ Ill i

noi s c as e l aw has rec ogn

ize d a br oad , li be ral de f i ni ti on of own ers hi p of pr op er t y”). While i

t is not nece ssar y to pr ove t he ident ity o f the ow ner or po sses so r o f the pr emises, t he pr oo f must est ablish tha t t he pr op er t y is one in which so meone ot her t han t he def endan t has an i ntere st wh

i ch the def endan t has no au thori ty to i m pai r. People v. Raw ls , 57 I ll.1-08-3092

16

Ap p. 3d 70 2, 705 ( 1978)
. We co nc lud e t ha t t he St at e fa iled t o pr o ve t his e leme nt o f t he o ffen se be yo nd a r ea so na ble do ub t . T he St at e a lleg ed in t he ind ict men t t ha t Willie J o ne s w as t he pe r so n w ho ha d a n int er es t in th e b ui l di n g a t 54 05 Sou

th Sh i el ds . H owev er , the p ri

mar y ev i den ce of f ered b y th e S tate to establ is h thi s elem

ent was Jones’ death certif ic ate, which

li sts hi s address as 5405 South Shi el ds on the dat e of hi s death, Sep tember 22, 2006. At most, t hi s established that Jo nes had an i nterest in the p ro per t y eight mo nt hs befo re t he fire a nd it did no t est ablish tha t Jo nes ha d an int er est in the propert y a

t t he tim e of the arson. Moreover, the eigh t-month peri od is si

mpl y too long, wi

thout more, to permit a reasonab le in feren ce that any

in terest Jo nes h

ad i n the b uil din g continue d after hi s death until the ti

me of the f ire. The onl

y e vi dence rel ating to that eight-m

onth period was testi m ony that the bui l di ng was v aca nt an d tha t squatters

had be en see n i ns i de of i t. However, t his evidenc e do es no t est ablish tha t Jo nes o r a nyone e lse had an inte re st in the p ro per t y dur ing t hat t ime or at t he t ime of t he fire. The only o t her evidenc e in the re co rd is Sloa ne’s t est imony t hat “an o lder guy” u sed t o live in t he ho use at 540 5 S ou t h Shield bu t t hat nobo dy lived in the house a t t he time of the fire. Even assuming that t his was a reference t o Jo nes, Sloane’s testim ony i s onl y c onsi stent with the death ce rtif ic ate and i

t do es not add any

greater pro of that Jone s had an

i ntere st i n the proper

ty a t the ti me of the a rson . The St at e claims t hat altho ugh J one s wa s de cea sed pr ior t o t he da t e o f the ar so n, t he de at h c er t ifica t e s up po r t s t he infe r en ce t ha t Jo ne s’ es t at e o wn ed t he pr o pe r t y at t he t ime defen dant set fi re to it or that it was the propert y of the Stat e. See 755 ILCS 20/1 (West 2008) (“If any person di es owni

ng an y real or personal estate without any le gacy , and leavi

ng no known1-08-3092

17

he irs o rr ep r es en t at ive s c ap ab le o f inhe r it ing t he sa me * ** , su ch r ea l an d p er so na l es t at e s ha ll eschea t as provided i

n the Probate Act of 1975 ***"). However, the Stat e’s theory of the case, as refl ected in the in dictment, was that Jones was the person who had an

in terest in the property at th e ti me of th e f i re . C on siste

n t wi th th i s th eor y , the S tate

argu ed i n cl osi n g th at th e dea th certif ic ate establi

shed that Jones l

iv ed at 5405 Sout h Shi

el ds “at one poin

t in h is li fe” a nd that because no one was l

iv in g in the bui ldi ng at the tim

e of the f ire, def endan t “dam aged the real pr op er t y of Will

ie Jo nes. ” T he jur y was also instr uct ed t hat t he St at e had t o p ro ve t hat defend ant knowin gly dam aged the real

propert y of

Wi ll ie Jones. The State did n

ot off er any evi dence at trial to su ppor t the the ory tha t Jon es ’ e sta te ow ne d the p rope

rty at the ti me def en da nt s et f i re to i t or that it was the property of the State. For exam ple , no evidence was

presented establ

is hi ng what type of i nterest Jones had i

n the property and theref

ore t here i s no bas is

in the record t o conclude tha t Jon esha d a n ow ne rs hi p or oth er ty peof i nte res t tha t coul d have g one

to hi s e sta te or esc heat ed t o t he St at e. In a ddit ion, it ap pea rs t hat t he St at e had informat ion as t o w ho o wned t he bui ldi ng, as ev ide nced b y D etective Bel

l’ s testim ony tha t he used the county assessor’s taxpay er database to determin

e the owner of the property. However, after the trial court sustain

ed an obje ction on he arsay

grounds when

the Stat e attempted to elic it the na me of the property owner fro m Det ect ive Bell, t he St at e t her eaft er cho se no t t o e licit any evidenc e as t o w ho lived in o r w ho
o wn ed t he bu ilding at t he t ime o f t he fire
. I n t he ab se nc e o f su ch ev ide nc e, t he r ec o r d is i ns uf f i cien t to permi t the i nf eren ce that the Sta

te sugg ests. The State also clai

ms that t he testim

ony e stablis

hi ng that the bui

ldi ng was v acant was suf f i ci en t b y i tse l f to prov e th

at s om eon e oth er th an de f en da n t h ad an i n terest i n th e p rop er

ty1-08-3092

18

b ec au se “ l ogi ca l l y a v ac an t b ui l di n g b el ongsto ei th er th e S tate or s om e oth er i n di v i du al or en ti ty that has not clai

me d the in

terest. ” The State further cl ai ms that t he death certi fi

cate establis

hes tha t de f en da nt wasnot th

e p rev i ousown er of the prop erty an d that, w he n th es e p i ec esof evidence are considered to gether, they establish that so meone other t han def endant had an i

nterest in the propert y a

t t he tim e of the f ire. We ca nnot co nclude t hat evidenc e indicat ing t hat defend ant did no t have a n inter est in the propert y i s suf fi ci ent to meet the Stat e’s b urden of provi

ng be yond a reasonabl

e doubt that
so meone ot her t han de fendant had a n inter est in the p ro per t y. The St at e do es no t cite t o a ny authority h

oldi ng that its b

urden of proof on thi s elem ent was sati sf

ie d by evi dence i ndicatin g that th e def en da n t di d n ot h av e a n i n terest i n th e p rop er

ty . M ore ov er , a l

th oug h i t i s n ot n ec es sa

ry to prove the iden

tity of the owner or po ssessor of the property, i n each case ci ted by the parties t her e wa s so me evidenc e indicat ing t hat a pe rso n or ent ity had a n inter est in the p ro per t y at t he tim e of the a rson that the def endan t had no ri ght to i m pai r. See, e.g. , People v. Gaither , 10 3 I ll. Ap p. 2d 47 , 55 (19 68) (n

am ed pe rson testi f i ed th at she leas ed an

apartm en t in the b uil di ng) ; People v. Tisley , 20 Ill . App. 3d 145, 148 (1974) (eviden ce showed that a contract purchaser had an inter est in the building); People v. R oss , 4 1 I ll. 2d 4 45, 450 (1 968 ) ( re co rd sho wed t hat bank had r eceived a co urt or der of po ssessio n of t he pr emises thr ou gh for eclosu re) ; Smith , 25 8 I ll. App. 3d at 637-39 (witnesse s testif ie d to the nam

es of the co-owners of the prem is es and other wi tnes ses testi f i ed that they

were l ess ees of a partm en ts i n the buil di

ng a t the ti me of the f i re); Raw ls , 5 7 I ll. App. 3d a t 703 -0 4 ( wit ness t est ifi ed t hat she lived in an ap ar t ment in t he building and that the ap art ment was damaged by the fire). T he type o f evi dence t hat sat isf

ied the St ate ’s1-08-3092

19

burden of proo f i n these cases i s l acki

ng i n thi s case an

d we concl

ude that the evidence contai ned in the r eco rd is insufficient t o p ro ve t hat so meone ot her t han de fendant had a n inter est in the property at the ti me of the f i re. While the t rier of fac t , in t his case t he jur y, wa s re spo nsible for weighing t he evide nce a nd drawin g reasonabl

e i nf erences f rom that evidence, i

ts determi nation i s not conclus iv

e. People v. Smith , 185 I ll . 2d 532, 542 (199 9). Rat her, we wil l reverse a convi

ction where the evidence is so unr eas onab l e, i

m proba bl e, or un sati sf

actory as to cre ate a re ason

ab l e doubt of de f

endan t’s gu i l t. Smith , 1 85 I ll. 2d a t 542 . I n t his case , fo r t he r eas ons discu ssed abo ve, we c onc lude t hat t he evi dence was

in suf fi ci ent to pr ove defe

ndan t guil ty of arson b ey

ond a reasonabl

e doubt and we t her efo re re ver se t hat co nvictio n. In a rel ate d a rgum en t, d ef en da n t cl ai m s th at th e tr i al cou rt erre d b y ad m i tti n g th e dea th cert if icate o f Wi

ll ie Jones into evidence. H owe ver, t his cl aim relates o nly

to defendant’s
conv i cti on f or arson and we n eed n ot consi der i t gi ven that we h

av e rev erse d tha t conv i cti on. De f en da n t n ex t con ten dsth at h e w as den i ed a f ai r tri al b ec au se th e tr i al cou rt f ai l ed to question the prospectiv

e j urors o n thei

r understandi

ng an d acceptance of the l

egal prin ci ple s ou t lined in People v. Zehr , 1 03 I ll. 2d 4 72 ( 198 4) , a nd se t for t h in Sup re me Co ur t Rule 4 31( b) (O ffi cial Rep or t s Adva nce S heet No . 8 (Ap ril 11, 200 7) , R . 4 31( b), eff. Ma y 1, 2 007 ). We
re view de fendant ’s co nt ent ion de novo . See People v. Tlatenchi , 391 Ill . App. 3d 705, 721 (2009) (a tr ia

l c ourt ’s com

pli ance wi th suprem e court r ule s i s revi

ewed de novo ). In Zehr , 10 3 Il

l . 2d at 4 76- 78, our s

upr em e c ourt h el d a tri al cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on durin g voir dire by refusing t he de fense c ou nsel's r equ est t o a sk q ues t ions a bou t t he St at e's1-08-3092

20

bur den of proof, de f

endan t's ri ght n ot to testi f

y , and the presum pti on of i nn ocence. Th

e court re as on ed th at “es se

n ti al to th e q ual i f i ca ti on of j urorsi n a cri m i n al ca se i s th at th ey kn ow th at a de fend ant is p re su med inno ce nt , t hat he is no t re qu ire d t o o ffer any e vide nce in his o wn b eha lf, that he m ust be proved guilty

bey ond a reasonabl

e doubt, and that his

fai lure to testify

in hi s own beh al f can not be hel d agai nst hi m.” Zehr , 103 Ill . 2d at 477. In 19 97 , the s

up re me c our

t am en de d R ul e 4 31 to en

su recom pl i an ce wi th th e req ui re men ts o f Zehr
. 17 7 I ll. 2 d R
. 43 1, Co mmit t ee Co mment s, at lxxix. Fo llo win g t ha t ame nd men t , Ru le 431(b) provided:

“

If requested by the defendant , the court shal l ask each pote nti al j uror , i nd i vi dua l l y or i n a grou p, w he the r th at j uror unde rst ands and a cce pt s t he fo llowing p rinciples: (1 ) t hat t he def endan t is presum ed i nn ocen t of the charge( s) ag ai

nst hi m or her; (2 ) t hat befo re a de fendant can be co nvicte d t he St at e must pr ove t he de fendant guilt y beyond a re aso nable do ubt ; (3 ) t hat t he defen dant is not required to o ff

er any evi dence on h

is or her own be ha lf; a nd ( 4) t ha t t he de fen da nt ’s failu r e t o t es t ify ca nno t be he ld ag ain st him o rhe r ; ho we ve r , no inq uir y o f a p r o sp ec t ive jur o rsha ll be made into t he de fendant ’s failure t o t est ify when t he de fendant objects. The court’s method of i nqui ry s hal l provi de each juror an op po rt unit y to re spo nd t o s pec ifi c qu est ions c onc er ning t he1-08-3092

21 princi ples set out in

this section.” (Emphasis added.) 1 77 Ill . 2d R. 431(b). On Marc h 21 , 2007, th

e su prem e court am

ended R ule 431 (b) b

y rem ovi ng th e ph rase , “If request ed by

the defendant.” The amended versi on now read s: “The c ou rt shall ask e ach p ot ent ial juro r, individually or in a gr ou p, whet her t hat juro r u nder st ands and a cce pt s t he fo llowing pr inciples: ( 1) t hat t he de fendant is pre sumed innoce nt of t he char ge( s) a gainst him or he r; ( 2) t hat befo re a de fendant can be convi cted the Stat e m

ust prove the defen

dant guil ty be yond a
re aso nable do ubt ; (3 ) t hat t he de fendant is not re quir ed t o o ffer any evidenc e o n his or her ow n behalf; and ( 4) t hat t he de fendant 's failure t o t est ify

canno t be held a gainst him or he r; ho weve r, no inquiry o f a pr os pec t ive juro r sha ll be made into t he de fendant 's f ai l ur e to te sti

f y wh en th e def en da n t ob j ects. ” O f

f i ci al Re por ts Advance Sh

eet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff . May 1, 2007. The am ended v ersi on of Rule 431(b) now i mposes a sua sp onte

duty on th e tri al cou rt to ques ti on the potential

jurors as to whether they understand an

d accept the Zehr

prin ci ple s. Such question i ng i s n o lon ger de pen den t upon a reque st by

def en se c ouns el
. People v. Yarbor , 38 3 I ll. Ap p. 3d 67 6, 682 ( 2008)
. De fen da nt cla ims t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t faile d t o co mply w it h t he ame nd ed ve r sio n o f Ru le 431(b) becaus e i

t did not question the prospectiv e j urors as to their un

derstandi ng an d acceptance1-08-3092

22

of t he pr inciple tha t defend ant ’s de cision no t t o t est ify canno t be held a gainst him. Defend ant asse rt s t hat pr ejudice may be pre sumed fro m the t rial co ur t ’s failure t o c omp ly with Rule 4 31( b) and that, as such, the error requires automatic reversal . The State do es not dispute that the trial
cou rt fai led to quest ion the pr ospe ctive juror s about this principl e, and we agree that the co urt ’s f ai l ur e to d o so wa s e

rror . Th e S tate argu es , howev er , that def en da n t’s cl ai m i s s ub j ect to f orfe i ture b eca use he did not raise a

n ob j ection at trial

or in cl ude the i ssue i

n h i s posttrial

motion
. See People v. Enoch , 1 22 I ll. 2d 1 76, 186 (1 988 ) ( failure t o r aise o bject ion at t rial and include t he obje ction i

n a posttrial

motion resul

ts in wai ver of that i ssue on appeal ). Defen dant responds that the rule of

forfe iture sh

ould be relax ed becaus e “i

t is the [trial

] judge’ s conduct that is at i ssue” and t hat re quir ing defens e co unse l to objec t t o t he t rial co ur t ’s no nco mpliance wit h Rule 4 31( b)
wo ul d b e in co ns ist en t wit h t he pu r po se o f t he ame nd men t t o Ru le 4 31 ( b)
. Alt er na t ive ly, def endan t argues that h i s cl ai m shoul d be

revi ewed f or pl ai n error be caus e the

tria l court’s f ail ure to compl y w ith R ule 431(b) depriv

ed hi m of hi s “ri ght to a fai

r trial bef ore a pro perly

selected jury.” Our sup re me co ur t re cent ly decided t his issue in People v. Thompson , No. 109033 (O ct obe r 2 1, 201 0) . I n t hat cas e, t he t rial co ur t violat ed t he cu rr ent ver sion o f Rule 43 1( b) because it did not question the prospective jurors as to whether they understood and accepted t ha t de fen da nt wa s no t r eq uir ed t o pr o du ce an y evid en ce o n his o wn be ha lf. Ad dit io na lly, w hile the c ourt aske d the

prospe cti ve j urors i f they und erstood the

presum pti on of i nn ocence, the court did not ask whethe

r they acc epted th

at pri nc i ple. Th e c ourt th

en consi de red whether a

vi ol ati on of Rul e 4 31(

b)wa s a stru ctu ral err or1-08-3092

23

r eq uir ing au t o mat ic r ev er sa l. I t no t ed t ha t au t o mat ic r ev er sa l is r eq uir ed o nly wh en an er r o ris dee med “st ru ct ur al,” and t hat t he Su pr eme Co ur t has r eco gnized an er ro r a s st ru ct ur al only in a l i m i ted cl ass of c ase s. Thompson , sli

p op. at 7-8, citin

g People v. Glasper, 234 Ill . 2d 173, 197- 98 ( 200 9) . T he co ur t also not ed it s pr eviou s o bser vat ions in Glasper th at a trial cou rt’ s f ai l ur e to com pl y wi th the prior vers i on of

Rul e 431 (b) d

i d not i nv olv e a f und am en tal ri ght or a constitutional

prot ection b

ut, rat her, i

nvol ved a v iolation of the s

upreme c ourt ’s rules that was sub j ect to harm

l ess error rev i ew. Thompson , sli

p op. at 8, citi

ng Glasper , 2 34 I ll. 2d a t 193 . T he
co ur t held t hat while tr ial befor e a biase d jur y is str uct ur al err or subjec t t o a ut omat ic reve rsa l, t he “f ai lure to compl

y w ith R ule 431(b) does not necessari ly resul t in a biased j ury” or “ren der a trial fun dam entally unf ai r or unreliabl

e i n determi ni ng gui lt or in nocence.” Thompson , sl i p op. at 9. It pointed out t hat there was no evi dence that the def

endan t in that case was tried b efore a bi ased jury, t hat t he t rial co ur t did ad dr ess s ome o f the Rule 4 31( b) r equ irement s in voir dire , and that the j ury wasadm oni shed an

d i nstructed on

Rul e 431 (b) pri

nc i ples. Thompson , sl

i p. op at 9. Acco rd ingly, the co ur t held t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s violat ion o f Rule 43 1( b) d id no t fall within the category of structural

errors a nd th us di d not req ui re autom ati c rev ersa l
. Thompson , sli

p op. at 9- 10. The defend ant in Thompson ac kn owl edge d that h

i s c l ai m wa s f orf ei ted be ca us e h e di d n ot obje ct to the trial

court ’s f ai lure to compl

y w ith R ule 431(b) or incl

ude the i ssue i

n hi s postt rial motion. He as

ked the court t o relax the rul e of f orfei ture because the trial

judge ’s conduct was at i ssue an d be caus e of

the i m practi cal i ty of a party obj ecti ng to a tri al j udge ’squestions. Thompson , sli

p op. at 10. Referri

ng to t hi s prin

ci ple as the “ Sprinkl edoctr in e,” the court noted1-08-3092

24

that i t al l owed the f

ail ure to pres erve an

error to be excuse d “ onl

y i n extraordi

na ry ci rcumstances,” such

as “wh en a j udge m

akes i nappropriate rem

arks to a jury or relie s upon socia l
comm entary i nstead of ev

ide nce i n i mposi ng a death se

ntence.” Thompson , sl

i p op. at 10. Th

ere was no c omp elling reas on t o r elax t he fo rfeit ur e r ule in Thompson , ho we ve r , be ca us e a “simp le obje ction would h

ave al lowed the trial

court to correct the error dur in g voir dire ” and there was “no indica t ion t hat t he t rial co ur t wo uld have igno re d an o bject ion t o t he Ru le 431 (b) questioni ng.” Thompson , sli

p op. at 11. T he de fen da nt als o cla imed t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ’s vio lat io n o f Ru le 4 31 ( b) wa s r ev iew ab le und er the sec ond pr

ong of plai n-e rror revi ew b eca

use i t in f ri nge d on h i s ri ght to an i m partial j ury and t hus a ffect ed t he fairne ss o f his tr ial and cha llenged t he inte gr ity o f the judicial pr oc ess. The court equated the second prong of plai n-error review wi

th structur al

error and recognized that

“ [a] f i nd i ng tha t the de f en da nt wastri ed

by a b i as ed j ury woul d ** * s ati sf

y the se con d pr ong of pla in -error review.” Thompson , sli p op. at 12. The court found, however, that t he def endan t had faile d t o mee t his b ur de n o f es t ab lishin g t ha t t he jur y in his ca se wa s bia se d a nd st at ed t ha t it co uld
no t “p r es ume t he jur y wa s bia se d s imply be ca us e t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in c o nd uc t ing t he Ru le 431(b) questioni

ng.” Thompson , s l i

p op . a t 12 . Th e c our t th en re i terate d th at th e f ai l ur e to co nduc t Rule 4 31( b) q ues t ioning d oe s no t nece ssar ily re sult in a biased jury and not ed t hat t he prospective j urors receive d some of the Rul e 431(b) questioni ng an d that t he veni

re had be en adm onis hed an d in structed o n Rul

e 431(b) prin

ci ple s. For these reasons, the court co ncl uded that the seco nd pro ng of plain -err or review did not pro vide a basi s for excusing t he defendant’s procedu ral def aul t. Thompson , sli

p op. at 13.1-08-3092

25

Applying t he ho lding in Thompson to the pr esent ca se, we c onclude t hat t he tr ial cou rt ’s fai lure to comply wi

th Rule 431 (b) do es not requ ire aut omatic rever sal and that defendant’s pr o ce du r al d efa ult may no t be ex cu se d u nd er t he pla in- er r o rdo ct r ine
. T he r e is no dis pu t e in t his
cas e tha t the tri al court f ail ed to com

pl y wi th Ru l e 431 (b) w

hen i t di d not que sti on the

j urors ab o ut t he ir u nd er st an din g a nd ac ce pt an ce o f t he pr inc iple t ha t de fen da nt ’s failu r e t o t es t ify co uld not be held a gainst him. Ho weve r, it ca nnot be as sumed t hat defend ant was pr ejudice d by t he
erro r and there is no evidence in the reco rd indi

cating that defendant’s jury was biased agains

t hi m. See Thompson , sli

p op. at 9. Instead, while the trial court did n

ot question the j urors about def endan t’s de ci sion n

ot to testi f

y , the re cord sh

ows tha t def en se c ouns el

question ed al l the j urors ab o ut t he ir u nd er st an din g a nd ac ce pt an ce o f t his p r inc iple
. T he t r ial c o ur t als o st at ed t he pr inc iple in the presence of the venire and i nstruct ed the jury on i

t pr ior to deli

berations. Under t hese ci rc um sta n ce s, we con cl ude th at th e tr i al cou rt’ s f ai l ur e to c om

pl y wi th Ru l e 4 31 (b ) w as

n ot a structura l error requ

i ri ng a utoma tic reversa l
. We al so concl

ude that def

endan t’s pr ocedura l def aul t can not be relax ed i n th i s ca se. Al though defen

dant cl ai ms that forfei

ture should b e rela

xed b ecause i

t is the “ judge ’s conduct that is a t iss ue , ” d efe nd an t co uld ha ve r ais ed an o bje ct io n t o t he t r ial c o ur t ’s no nc o mplia nc e w it h Rule 431 (b) in the t rial co ur t , t her eby allowing t he co ur t t o c ur e t he er ro r. The re is not hing in the record t o suggest t hat the court wo uld h ave i gnored defen

dant’s request and, to the contrar y, we presum e the tria l court woul

d ha ve corrected

i ts error gi ven the m andatory na ture of Rul e 431 (b). See Thompson , sli

p op. at 10-11. Finally , w e co nclude t hat defend ant ’s pr oc edu ra l default canno t be exc use d und er t he1-08-3092

26

sec ond pr ong of the p l ai n-e rror doctri

ne . The plai n-e rror doctri

ne by pas ses norm al f orfe i ture pri nc i plesan d “ al l owsa re vi ew i ng cou rt to consi

der un pre serv ed err or wh en (1) a c l ea r or o bvio us er r o ro cc ur r ed an d t he ev ide nc e is so clo se ly bala nc ed t ha t t he er r o ralo ne t hr ea t en s t o t ip the scales of j ustice agai

nst the def

endan t, regardless of the s eriousn ess of the error, or ( 2) a cle ar or obvio us e rr or oc cur re d and t hat er ro r is so ser iou s t hat it affec t ed t he fairne ss o f the de f en da nt’ s tri al an d c ha l l en ge d the i nte gri ty of the j udi ci al proc es s, r

eg ard l es s of the cl osene ss of the evi dence.” People v. Piatkow ski , 225 Ill . 2d 551, 565 (2007), ci ting People v. Herron , 215 Ill . 2d 167 , 186-8 7 (200 5). In both i nstanc es, the b

urden of p ersuasi

on rem ai ns on the def endan t. Herron , 215 Il

l . 2d at 18 7. Defend ant claims tha t t his issue s hou ld be r eviewe d und er t he se co nd pr ong of t he plainerror do ctrine an

d that t he trial

court ’s error requires reversal because it was of such m agni tude that it denied hi

m a trial bef ore a fai r and i mpa rtial jury. We di sagree. We can not presume that de fen da nt ’s jur y wa s bia se d a ga inst him so lely be ca us e o f t he t r ial c o ur t ’s er r o ran d it is defend ant ’s bur den t o e st ablish tha t t he er ro r a ffect ed t he fairne ss o f the defend ant ’s t rial and chal le nged the i ntegrity of the j udic ia

l process. See Thompson , sli p op. at 12. Defen

dant has fai le d to me et this b

urden bec ause he h

as off ered no expl

anati on as to how his jury was biased agai nst hi m gi ven that defens e counsel

questioned the prospectiv e j urors about the prin

ci ple that t he t rial co ur t omit t ed, t hat t he t rial co ur t st at ed t he pr inciple in the p re senc e o f all pro spe ct ive j urors , a n d th at th e c our t ad moni sh ed an d adv i se d th e j ur y on Ru l e 4 31 (b ) p ri

n ci pl es pri or to i ts delib erations. Unde

r these ci rcumstances, we can

not say that the trial

court ’s error was so serious that i t af f ected th e f ai rne ss of def endan t’s trial and ch al l enged the i

nteg ri ty of the j udicial

proces s.1-08-3092

27

See Thompson , sl

i p op. at 1 3. A

cc ordi ngl y , th e tri al cou rt’ s error d

oesnot r i se to the l evel of pla in e rr o ran d w e fin d t ha t de fen da nt ha s fo r feit ed his c laim o n app ea l. Defend ant ’s final cont ent ion is t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d by not instr uct ing t he jur y on t he off ense of crim in al dam age to pro perty. The record shows that defen se counsel

asked the trial
cour t t o instruct the jury on the off ense of crim

in al dam age to pro pert y, whi

ch i t claim ed was a l es se r-i n cl uded of f ense of ar son an d agg ra v ate d a rs on . Th e tr i al cou rt d en i ed de f en da n t’s re qu est, st at ing t ha t ba se d u po n t he ev ide nc e p r es en t ed at t r ial, t he jur y co uld no t r at io na lly ac qu it def endan t of ag grav

ated arson a

nd f i nd h i m gui l ty of cri m i na l dam age to property. A l thou gh a d ef en da nt g en era l l y may not b e c onv

i cte d of an of f ense f or wh i ch he has n ot been charged, i

n som e i nstances a defe ndan t may be en titled to an i

nstruction on an

unch arged l ess er-i nc l uded off en se. People v. Phillips , 383 Ill . App. 3d 521, 540 (2008). A less er-in cl uded offense is one whi

ch “[i]s establi shed by

pro of of the same or less than al l of the f acts o r a less culpa ble menta l sta t e ( or bot h), t han t hat which is re quir ed t o e st ablish the co mmi ssio n of t he of f ense ch arge d.” 72 0 I LC S 5 /2 -9 (a) (W

est 20 06 ). C our

ts u se a two-s tep“ ch

argi n g i n str um en t” app ro ach t o d et er mine whet her t he o ffense is a less er -includ ed o ffense and whet her t he de fendant i s en titl ed to an i nstructi on on th

at off en se. People v. Kolton , 21 9 I l l . 2d 35 3, 3 60 (2 00 6) . F i

rs t, cou rts l ook a t the al l eg ati ons i n th e c ha rgi ng i ns trum en t to dete rm i ne whether th

e des cri ption of the g reater of f en se c ontai

ns a “ broad f ounda tion ” or “m ai n outl i ne ” of the l ess er of f en se. Kolton , 21 9 I ll. 2 d a t 36 1. Ho we ve r , t he ide nt ifica t io n o f a le ss er - inc lud ed o ffen se do es no t au t o mat ica lly
en titl e the def endan t to have the j ury i nstructed on

that of f en se. Phillips , 383 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 540. Once a l esser-i ncl uded off ense i s identif ie d, a court mus

t exam in e the evi dence prese

nted at tr ia

l1-08-3092

28

to determ i ne wh ethe r the e vi den ce ra tion al l y supp orts a con

vi cti on f or the l ess er-i nc l uded off en se. Kolton , 21 9 Ill. 2d at 361 ; People v. Medina , 221 Ill . 2d 394, 405 (2006) (explai ni ng that “[a] defen dant is entitled to a lesser-i

ncl uded off ense i nstruction onl

y i f the ev ide nce at trial

is such that a jur y cou ld ra t ionally fi

nd t he de fendant guilt y of t he lesse r o ffense, yet a cqu it him of t he greater”). We init ially no t e t ha t de fen da nt ’s ar gu men t o n t his is su e is co nfine d s o lely t o his
con vi cti on f or ag gra va ted ars on, an d there f ore a ny cl ai m wi th res pe ct to h i s c onv i cti on f or ar son is wai ved. See Bui , 381 Ill . App. 3d at 421-22. Mo reover, the Stat e concedes, an d we agree, that under the chargi

ng i nstrume nt approach, crim

in al dam age to pro perty i s a lesser-i ncl uded off ense of aggravated arson. See People v. Parsons , 284 Ill . App. 3d at 1058-59. As noted, defendan t was charged with co mm itting the offen

se of aggravated ar son “i

n that he, in the course of c omm i ttin g ars on, kn

owi ngl y dam aged partial l y or totall y an y bui l di ng or structure of

Gregory Slo an e, lo ca t ed at 53 54 S. Pr inc et o n, in Ch ica go , I llino is, an d [ de fen da nt ] kn ew o rr ea so na bly sh oul d h av e k n own th at on e or morepers on s were p re se n t th erei n .”The cri

m i n al da mag e to property sta tute prov i de s i

n re l ev an t pa rt: “(1) A person c omm

its an il le gal act when h

e: (a) kn owi ngl y da mag esan y prop erty of
another wi

thout hi s consen t; or (b) re ckles sly by

means o f fi

re or explo sive dam ages property of a nothe r; or (c) kn owi ngl y sta rts a f i re on the l an d of1-08-3092

29 another without hi s consen t.” 720 ILCS 5/21-1(1) (We st 2006 ). A person acts reckl

essl y w hen he “ consciously

dis regards a substantial

and un jus tif ia ble ris k that circumstances exis

t o r that a result wil

l f ollow * * * and such di sregard co nstitutes a gr oss dev i ati on f rom th e stan dard of care whi ch a rea sona bl e pers on woul

d exercise i

n the si tuati on.” 720 IL CS 5/4 -6 (West 200 6). Ha vi ng con cl ude d that c ri

m i na l da mag e to p rope

rty i s a l es ser-i nc l ude d of f ense of ag gr av at ed ar so n, o ur ne xt st ep is t o de t er mine w he t he rt he ev ide nc e p r es en t ed at t r ial w o uld rati ona l l y pe rm i t the j ury to ac qui t the de f en da nt of ag gra va ted ars on a nd to f i nd hi m gui l ty of crim in al dam age to pro perty. Def

endan t clai ms that t he j ury coul

d have rational

ly concl uded that he did not kn

owi ngl y set f i re to the b

uil di ng l ocated a t 5354 South

Pri nc eton an d theref ore acqu i tted hi m of a ggrav ated arson a

nd i nstead f ound th at his actions we

re reckless

and theref

ore co nvicte d him of cr imi

nal damag e t o p ro per t y. De fendant re lies upo n People v. Bradley , 25 6 I ll. App. 3d 5 14 ( 199 3) , t o s upp or t his co nt ent ion. In Bradley , t he de fendant was char ged wit h agg ra vat ed a rso n base d o n evidenc e t hat she set fire t o he r bo yfriend's mat t re ss. The defend ant initially indicat ed t hat she ha d bee n smok ing
and m ay ha ve dropped a ci garette a nd i gni ted the mattress . Under f

urthe r ques tion i ng, h owever, th e def en da n t ad m i tted th at sh e del

i b erate l y set h er b oyf rien d' s m attres s on f i rewi th h er ci ga re tte li ghter because s

he was a ngry with h im . On appeal , the defen

dant chal le nged h er aggravated
ar so n co nvictio n and c laimed tha t t he t rial co ur t er re d by not instr uct ing t he jur y on t he l ess er-i nc l uded off en se of cri m i na l dam age to property. Bradley , 2 56 I ll. App. 3d a t 515 -1 6. The1-08-3092

30

appella te court agreed and h

el d: “In the pres ent case, def

endan t ini tial ly off ered *** an expl anati on of how the f

ire m igh t have b een caus ed. She stated that she m ay have dropped and not ret riev ed a ligh ted cigarette during a struggle wi

th [her boy

fri end]. Thi s statemen

t, although subse quently

recanted by

defen dant, could hav

e supported a determi nation b y the jury that defenda

nt acted reckless ly

rather than kno wingly and de liberat ely. De fendant 's initial st at ement as t o t he
ca us e of th e f i reen ti tl ed h er to an i n str uc ti on on cri m i n al da mag e to property . We

hol d tha t the tri al court erred

i n f i ndi ng th at there
was no e vidence of r eck lessnes s and in refus ing t o g ive the in struction on crim

in al dam age to pro perty.” Bradley , 256 Ill . App. 3d at 516. Th e Sta te, on the othe r han d, c l ai m s th at the p res en

t ca se i s s i m i l ar to Phillips , 38 3 I ll. App. 3d at 531-32, in wh ic h the def endan t was convicted of aggravated arson on evi dence showi ng th at he i gni ted a pi ece of c ardb oard i

n a garb age c an

that he pl ace d ne ar the

resi den ce. In a vi deotaped st atemen

t, t he def endan t t old the poli

ce that he placed the garbage c an three f eet aw ay fr o m t he r es ide nc e b ec au se it wa s le ss win dy int ha t lo ca t io n a nd be ca us e h e b elie ve d “ ‘it wouldn’ t catch

an y thi ng’ ” on f i re. Phillips , 3 83 I ll. App. 3d a t 532 . H e also claimed in the st at ement t hat he did no t intend t o s et t he r eside nce o n fire and t hat t he r esu lting fire t o t he resi den ce was an acc i den t. Phillips , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 532. On appeal , the defen dant argued1-08-3092

31

that his counsel was i nef fecti ve f or faili ng to request an instruction on the off ense of crim in al damag e t o p ro per t y, ar guing t hat t her e wa s evide nce indica t ing t hat his act ions w er e r eck less and that he was

there f ore en titl ed to the i nstructi on. Phillips , 38 3 I l l . A pp . 3d at 5 43 . Th

e a pp el l ate co ur t disag re ed, not ing t hat unlike t he de fendant in Bradley , w hos e st at ement t hat she
acc ident ally dro ppe d a lit cigar et t e evide nced a lack of int ent ional and deliber at e co nduc t , t he defen dant’s acti ons i

n that case i

ndicated that he start ed the fi re knowin

gly and del ib erately , thus “n egatin g any contention that the fi

re was caused b

y m ere reckle ssne ss.” Phillips , 383 Ill . App. 3d a t 543 . T he co ur t furt her not ed t hat in all of the acc ou nt s o f the fire de fendant pr ovid ed, he consistently

admi tt ed to deli

berately s tart in g the fi re in the garbage can, whi ch he positioned cl

ose to the res i den

ce. Phillips , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 543. The court al so noted t hat the State pr esented evidenc e t hat defend ant act ually sta rt ed t he fire by igniting g aso line on t he r ear wall of t he
re sidenc e, which wa s clear ly a deliberat e and kno wing ac t . T he co ur t co nclude d t hat even if t he jur y belie ve d t he de fen da nt ’s co nfe ss io n a bo ut ign it ing t he fire in t he t r as h c an , t he r e w as no ba sis upon wh i ch i t coul d have ra

ti ona l l y ac qui tted h i m of ag gra va ted ars on a nd con vi cte d h i m of crim in al dam age to pro perty bec ause there was n o evi dence that def

endan t acted recklessl

y w hen he adm i tted to del i

beratel y starti ng th e f i re. Phillips , 383 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 543-44. We ag re e wit h t he St at e and find tha t , similar t o t he de fendant ’s ac t ions in Phillips , al l of de f en da n t’s acti on s i n th i s c as e ev i den ce

de l i b erate an d k n owi n g c on duct. There is n

o dispute t hat defend ant deliber at ely set fire t o t he building lo cat ed a t 540 5 S ou t h Shields by igniting gasoli ne on that bui

ldi ng’s second-f loor lan din g on a ni ght that was describ ed as “v ery wi ndy .” As discussed ab ove, by

doing s o defenda

nt knowin

gly set fi re to the bui

ldi ng l ocated at 53541-08-3092

32

Sou th Pri n ceton . Th

ere w as n o ev i den ce pr es en ted i n di ca ti n g th at th e f i reac ci den tal l y spre ad to that buil din g, and the f

ire m arshal testifi ed that given the wi

nd condi tions on the n

igh t o f the f ire, it w as “abs olu t ely” “a po ssibili t y” tha t t he initial fire sp re ad t o t he se co ndar y str uct ur e. Unlike t he fact s in Bradley , t her e is no evidenc e in the pr ese nt cas e t hat defend ant acc ident ally caused t he f i re or tha t hi s actions we

re an y thi ng b ut del i berate an d kn owi ng. A ccordi ngl y , we f i nd th at there was no bas is

upon whi ch the j ury coul

d have rational

ly acqui tt ed hi m of aggravated arson but found h im guil ty of cri mi nal dam age to pro perty. Theref

ore, defendan

t was not entitled to an i nstructi on on th

e less er-i nc l uded off en se. Moreo ver, even i f def

endant was entitled to an instruct ion on the lesser-i ncl uded offense of c riminal damage t o p ro per t y, t he failure t o g ive suc h an inst ru ct ion d id no t pr ejudice defend ant in li ght of the overwhel

mi ng ev ide nce regardi

ng the greater off

ense of aggravated arson. See Parsons , 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1060- 61 (findi ng that the evidence supp or ting the d efendant’s
con vi cti on f or th e grea

ter of f ense of ag gra va ted ars on wasso strong that the def en da nt wasnot pr ej udi ce d b

y an y f ai l ur e to i n str uc t th e j ur

y on th e l es se r-i n cl uded of f ense of cri m i n al da mag e to pro per ty); People v. McClellan , 232 Ill . App. 3d 990 (1992) (fai lure to instruct jury on l

esser offense re quir es r ever sal o nly i f the defend ant was so pr ejudice d by suc h failure so as t o a ffect t he outcome of the v erdi

ct). In thi s case, def

endan t was observed standi

ng on the rear porch of 5405 South Shiel ds wearin g la tex glove s and h

oldi ng a red gasol

in e can. Def

endan t fled from

the police when

he saw them a nd di scarded the gasolin

e can an d the shi rt he was weari

ng wh il e bei ng pursued. Af

ter defend ant fled, t he po lice obs er ved t hat t her e wa s a “hu ge” fire at 540 5 S ou t h Shields a nd t hat t he1-08-3092

33

back porch wh

ere defe ndan t had been

standi ng was “ up in fl am es.” The poli

ce testif ie d that defend ant smelled o f gaso line when he w as t ake n into cus t od y and t hat t he shirt defend ant discarded as well

as the cont ents of the red g asoli ne can also smel

led of gasoli

ne. The house where de f en da nt s tarte d the f

i re, 540 5 Sou

th S hi el ds , wa s l oca ted i n a res i denti al are a m ade u p of
vacan t lots, abandoned structures, and bui ldi ngs i n wh ic h peopl e liv

ed. Off ic er Murphy

descri bed t he we at her at t he t ime defenda nt ignite d t he fire a s “ver y windy” and s he t est ifi ed t hat t he wind
wa s b l owi n g s tron gl y to th e n orth . Th e rec ord re v ea l s th at th e b ui l di n g l oca ted at 5 35 4 S outh Prin ceton, a mul

tif am il y dwelli ng, i s al most di rectly to the north of 5405 South Shiel ds. The two bu i l di ng s a re l es s th an one ci ty bl ock ap art a nd the are a b etw een th

e tw o i s c om

prise d pr i mari l y of
vaca nt lot s. E mbers fr om t he fire a t 540 5 S ou t h Shields w er e blow n acr os s t he alley and ult imately set fire t o t he r oo f of 53 54 S ou t h Pr incet on. The ar so n invest igat or co nclude d t hat t he fi re at 5405 So uth Shiel ds was cause d by the “open i

gni tion of the f

la mm abl e liqui d vapors of an ign itabl e liqui d” on the bui

ldi ng’s second f loor and he testi fi

ed that the fi

re “f le w across” the alle

y an d ig nit ed a h o le in t he r o o f o f t he bu ilding at 53 54 So ut h P r inc et o n. I n lig ht o f t his overwhel mi ng ev ide nce of de fen

dant’s gui lt, we concl

ude that defen

dant suf fered n o prejudice from the trial court ’s decisi on not t o ins truct the jury

on the le sser-i

ncl uded off ense of crim in al da mag e t o pr o pe r t y. Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e vac at e de fendant ’s co nvictio n and s ent ence for ar so n. T he judgm ent of the circuit cour t o f Cook Co unty i s aff irm ed in all ot her respects. A f f i rm ed i n pa rt a n d vac ate d i

n pa rt. CAHILL, J., co ncurs.1-08-3092

34

PRESIDING JUSTICE GARCIA, speci ally concurrin

g: I ag r ee wit h t he majo r it y t ha t t he r e is "n o ba sis up o n w hic h t he jur y co uld ha ve r at io na lly
ac qui tted [the def en da n t] of ag gr av ate d a rs on b ut f oun d h i m gui l ty of cri m i n al da mag e to property ." Sl

i p op . a t 32 . I d o n ot ag re e, h owev er , that to a

rri v e a t th at c on cl

us i on we n ee d to
engage i n a l ess er-i nc l uded off en se a na l y si s. Spe ci f

i cal l y , I di sa gr ee wi th th e m aj ori ty' s state men t, ai de d by the State 's con ce ss i on, tha

t cri m i na l da mag e to p rope

rty i s a l es ser i nc l ude d of f ense of aggravated arson under the f acts of thi s case. Sl

ip op. at 28. The t wo offense s, c riminal damage t o p ro per t y and ag gr avat ed a rso n, a re sep ar at ed by t he inter mediat e ( so t o s pea k) offense of a rso n, w ith w hich the defend ant was also char ged . T he defen dant nonethel

ess i nsists that his

le sser-i ncl uded contention does not apply to the charged offense of a rso n. Lit t le wo nder , a s de monst ra t ed by t he major ity, t he evide nce is o ver whelming th at th e def en da n t pu r po se ly set f i re to an a ba ndon ed b uil di ng. Th e def endan t's c onten tion be f ore us a ppe ar s t o be t hat t he t rier of fac t co uld have fou nd his pu rp os eful act s as t o o ne building t o be
merel y reckl ess as to the occupi ed b uil di ng to wh i ch the f i re spread. The re is no a ut hor ity t hat sup po rt s t he de fendant 's claim tha t his pur po seful st at e o f mi nd i n s tarti ng a f i re b y pour i ng ga sol i ne on th e b ac k por

ch of an ab an doned bu i l di ng ca n c ha ng e to a reckl ess state of m i nd b ase d on strong wi

nds bl owi ng a t the ti me. On l y one f i re wa s se t; tha t fi re wasset pur

posel y . I a m n ot pe rsuade d th

at u n der the f acts o f th i s c as e cri

m i n al da mag e to propert y i s a lesser-i

ncl uded off ense of aggravated arson. See People v . Mil le r , No. 107878 (Se ptem b er 23 , 20 10 ) (" l es se

r-i n cl uded of f ense [i s] an of f ense estab l i sh ed b y proof of l es se r f acts *** t han the charged offen se") , citing 720 ILCS 5/2-09 ( West 2004). The clai med l esser "facts"1-08-3092

35

in this case, that the defen

dant acted only

reckle ssl y i n settin g a fi re that spread to an occupi ed building o r t hat he sho uld no t be sa ddled wit h kno wing t he building wa s o ccu pied, co uld no t be fo un d t o be "fa ct s" by t he jury.