1

Filed 3/5/14 Nash v. Vincent CA1/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

JAMES NASH et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v. 

MARLEU VINCENT et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 A133271 

 (San Francisco County 

 Super. Ct. No. CGC10500027) 

INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiffs James Nash and Diane Lambert-Nash appeal from an order of the San 

Francisco Superior Court granting a motion to quash service of summons for lack of 

personal jurisdiction on defendants Marleu Vincent and Pauline Arbot,1 residents of 

Montreal, Canada. Defendants appeared specially to contest jurisdiction over them in 

plaintiffs’ action for injuries suffered when plaintiff James Nash fell two stories after a 

balcony railing on defendants’ home collapsed while plaintiffs were visiting. We shall 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs and defendants have been friends for many years. Defendants are 

Canadian citizens, who live in Montreal, Province of Quebec, Canada. They have friends 

who live in California, with whom they correspond by e-mail. Otherwise, they have no 

 1

 Pauline Arbot is also known as Pauline Arbour. 
2

regular contact in this state. Plaintiffs moved to California in 1977 and have lived in San 

Francisco for nearly 35 years. Lambert-Nash and Arbot maintained telephone and e-mail 

communications on a regular basis (at least monthly for about the past 10 years). At 

defendants’ invitation, plaintiffs visited them numerous times at defendants’ Canadian 

property. 

 In September 2008, on one of the Nashes’ visits to defendants’ Quebec home, 

plaintiff James Nash was severely injured when he fell to the ground from a balcony. 

Plaintiffs alleged on information and belief that the fall was caused by rotted wood. 

When he leaned against the railing, it gave way, causing him to fall to the ground below. 

 On May 20, 2010, plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against defendants in 

San Francisco Superior Court, alleging defendants’ Canadian home was negligently built 

and maintained.2

 Plaintiff Lambert-Nash also alleged a cause of action for loss of 

consortium arising from her husband’s injuries and for emotional distress she suffered as 

a result of witnessing her husband’s fall. The complaint sought both compensatory and 

punitive damages. 

 Jurisdiction is alleged in the complaint based upon allegations that defendants 

“consented to jurisdiction in the California Superior Court . . .” and that they “have 

regular and systematic contacts with the State of California.” The complaint does not 

allege what those contacts might be. 

 On June 13, 2011, defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint, as 

well as other documents. 

 On July 12, 2011, defendants specially appeared and filed their motion to quash 

service of summons and complaint. They asserted that service was improper under the 

Hague Service Convention; that defendants did not consent to the California court’s 

jurisdiction; and that defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with 

California to establish general jurisdiction. 

 2

 Plaintiffs also included as a defendant, ACS Recovery Systems (ACS), which 

they maintain was a collection service retained by plaintiffs’ health insurer. ACS was not 

a party to the motion to quash below and is not a party to this appeal. 
3

 Plaintiffs opposed the motion to quash. They asserted that “in an abundance of 

caution” they were “having the Summons and Complaint re-served by an expert in Hague 

Convention Service” and expected proper service would be completed before hearing on 

the motion to quash, which they argued would moot any original defects in service. (On 

July 26, 2011, two weeks before the motion to quash hearing, plaintiffs apparently served 

defendants with the documents required by the Hague Service Convention.) Plaintiffs 

did not reassert their allegation that defendants had consented to jurisdiction. Rather, 

they principally relied upon “specific” jurisdiction, asserting that when minimum 

contacts are analyzed under that concept, out-of-state defendants’ contacts with the forum 

need not be “continuous and systematic” where defendants purposefully established 

contacts in California and where plaintiffs’ cause of action arose out of or was related to 

the defendants’ contacts with California. Plaintiffs maintained such was the case here, 

based upon the defendants’ “extensive and expansive communications with [p]laintiffs in 

California, including a standing invitation” to visit defendants’ property in Canada, as 

plaintiffs had done many times before, and which was the place where James Nash was 

injured. Plaintiffs also asserted the relative burdens on defendants of litigating in San 

Francisco would be minimal, but the burdens on plaintiffs of litigating in Canada would 

be extreme. 

 Vincent and Lambert-Nash filed declarations more specifically addressing the 

question of personal jurisdiction and defendants’ motion to quash. There is nothing in 

the declarations indicating that defendants ever consented, either verbally or in writing, to 

the jurisdiction of the California courts and their declaration flatly denies defendants 

consented to jurisdiction It is undisputed that aside from telephone and e-mail 

correspondence to keep in touch with friends who reside in California, defendants have 

no regular contact with the state. 

 In her declaration, plaintiff Lambert-Nash states she and defendant Arbot 

maintained telephone and e-mail communications on a regular bases (at least monthly) 

over the last 10 years; that plaintiffs were at defendants’ property at defendants’ 

invitation and have a standing invitation to visit; that they have not visited defendants 
4

since the accident, due to plaintiffs’ serious health issues; that plaintiffs and defendants 

have ongoing communications; and that plaintiffs seek only compensation from 

defendants’ insurer, not from defendants personally. Lambert-Nash also states that, not 

long after the injury, James Nash was flown back to San Francisco, “where he has 

undergone extraordinary medical treatment, much of which continues.” His “ability to 

ambulate is still severely compromised.” She describes the treatment Nash has received 

and will continue to receive and states that such treatment “has involved as many as 

twenty, separate healthcare providers with different functions.” She further states that 

Nash is in need of “continuous medical treatment and follow-up appointments for the 

foreseeable future and that it would create substantial hardship for us to have to travel to 

Canada for extended litigation while [he] is undergoing this necessary treatment which 

needs to be ongoing and integrated.” She also states plaintiffs cannot afford the financial 

expense of travel to Canada to litigate the case and that they would be severely burdened 

by their health limitations, including her own health issues. Finally, she also states that as 

Nash’s pre-injury employment was in the Bay Area, all evidence relating to his sizeable 

earnings loss is in the Bay Area. 

 Following a hearing, the court granted defendants’ motion to quash on the ground 

that “[p]laintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving sufficient minimum contacts with 

the State of California to subject [defendants’] to the Court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, 

[p]laintiffs presented no evidence of [defendants’] alleged contractual consent to the 

Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, when serving [defendants], (Canadian citizens residing in 

Montreal, Quebec), [p]laintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of the [Hague 

Service Convention].” 

 Notice of entry of the court’s order was filed on September 1, 2011, and this 

timely appeal followed. 
5

DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to quash 

service of summons. 

A. Standard of Review 

 “When a defendant moves to quash service of summons for lack of specific 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. Once the plaintiff meets this 

initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction 

would be unreasonable. When the evidence is not in conflict, whether jurisdiction exists 

is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. (Snowney v. Harrah’s 

Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney).)” (Roman v. Liberty 

University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 677-680 (Roman).) 

B. The law—“minimum contacts” 

 California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the 

Constitutions of the United States and California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “Because 

California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process 

requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the 

same. [Citations.]” (Dole Food Company, Inc. v. Watts (2002) 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 

(Dole).) “Federal constitutional due process requirements dictate that a foreign defendant 

must have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that maintenance of suit against 

the foreign defendant in the forum state would not offend ‘ “traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice.” [Citations.]’ (Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 

326 U.S. 310, 316 [(International Shoe)].) If a defendant has sufficient contacts with the 

forum state, it may be subject to suit there on all claims, wherever they arose (general 

jurisdiction). If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not sufficient to support 

general jurisdiction, the defendant may nonetheless be subject to special jurisdiction, 

which depends on an assessment of the ‘ “relationship among the defendant, the forum, 

and the litigation.” ’ (Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 
6

414-415; see also Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 

445-448 (Vons).)” (Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 677-678.) 

 “ ‘When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the 

“ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” [Citation.] A court 

may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) “the 

defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits” (Vons, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 446); (2) “the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] 

defendant’s contacts with the forum’ ” [citations]; and (3) “ ‘the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and substantial justice” ’ ” (Vons, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 447, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-

473 [(Burger King)].)’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062; accord, 

Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) 

 “Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum 

contacts with a forum, ‘he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable’ in order to defeat personal 

jurisdiction [Citation.]” (Dole, supra, 303 F.3d at p. 1114, citing Burger King, supra, 

471 U.S. at p. 477.)3

 Although plaintiffs argue that defendants maintained regular, extensive contacts 

with them for decades, they do not appear to assert the court erred in finding against them 

on either the “consent” or “general jurisdiction” grounds. Rather, they argue they made a 

prima facie case of defendants’ minimum contacts with California sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements for asserting “specific jurisdiction” over defendants. Plaintiffs also assert 

 3

 In determining “reasonableness” courts must consider factors including, the 

extent of defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum; the burden on defendant in 

defending in the forum; the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s 

state; the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the most efficient judicial 

resolution of the controversy; the importance of the forum to plaintiff’s interest in 

convenient and effective relief; and the existence of an alternative forum. (See CE 

Distribution, LLC. v. New Sensor Corp. (9th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1107, 1112; Schwarzer 

et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2013) 

¶ 3:142.) 
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more broadly that the exercise by California of personal jurisdiction over defendants in 

this case “comports with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” We therefore focus on the 

“specific jurisdiction” formulation of the minimum contacts analysis. 

C. “Specific jurisdiction” 

 In asserting that they made a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs 

rely on their history of e-mail and other contacts with defendants, the open invitation 

extended by defendants to visit defendants’ Ontario property, and that plaintiffs’ injuries 

occurred as a result of such a visit. 

 In addition, plaintiffs point to numerous factors that they urge demonstrate 

California’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case is “reasonable” and comports with due 

process standards of “fair play and substantial justice.” (International Shoe, supra, 

326 U.S. at p. 316.) Among the “fairness” and “reasonableness” factors plaintiffs proffer, 

are their assertion that the case is “essentially only about damages” and thus, virtually all 

of the evidence (including health care providers, evidence of James Nash’s economic 

damages and the plaintiffs, themselves) is located in California; the economic and 

physical burden on plaintiffs to travel to Canada to litigate, especially given their health 

issues; and the numerous differences plaintiffs assert exist between Canadian and 

California law with respect to the right to jury trial, the collateral source rule, insurer 

“bad faith” jurisprudence, and the length of time in taking the case to trial, among other 

things, that plaintiffs maintain result in “massive legal disadvantages” to plaintiffs in a 

case where economic damages to date may approach policy limits. 

 However, these additional factors relating to the “reasonableness requirement”—

the requirement of “fair play and substantial justice”—are not part of the initial 

“minimum contacts” analysis. Rather, they are part of the considerations at play only 

after plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing at least “minimum contacts,” should 

defendants maintain that despite such “minimum contacts,” the presence of other 

considerations would render jurisdiction “unreasonable.” (Dole, supra, 303 F.3d at 

p. 1114; see Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476 [“Having determined that defendants 

did establish minimum contacts with California, we finally must consider whether the 
8

assertion of specific jurisdiction is fair. [Citation.] In this connection, a court ‘must 

consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s 

interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination “the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the 

shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 

policies.” ’ [Citations.]”]; see Schwarzer et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil 

Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶¶ 3:116.5, 3:141 [if plaintiff establishes both that the 

out-of-state defendant purposefully directed its activities toward residents of the forum 

and that plaintiff’s cause of action “arises out of” or “results from” the defendant’s 

forum-related contacts, defendant must come forward with a “compelling case” that the 

exercise of jurisdiction would be “unreasonable” to defeat jurisdiction, such that the 

assertion of jurisdiction in the forum state in the particular case would not “comport with 

fair play and substantial justice”].) 

 Defendants’ only contacts with California at evidence in this case are the regular 

telephone and e-mail communications between defendants and plaintiffs (“at least 

monthly”) over many years and, arguably, that plaintiffs have a “standing invitation to 

visit defendants in Canada” and were at the property at defendants’ invitation. We are 

not persuaded that by such casual phone and e-mail contacts defendants “purposefully 

availed” themselves of forum benefits. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447.) Nor are we 

persuaded that any of the plaintiffs’ causes of action is “related to” or “arises out of” 

these contacts with California. (Ibid.) 

In order to establish minimum contacts under the “specific jurisdiction” 

formulation, “the nonresident defendant must have purposefully directed its activities at 

forum residents, or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law. 

[Citations.]” (Schwarzer et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before 

Trial, supra, ¶ 3:117, citing Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 253-254; Kulko v. 

Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 94.) This requirement “assures that a nonresident 

will be aware that it is subject to suit in the forum state. It can then protect against the 
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costs of litigating there by purchasing insurance; or, if the costs and risks are too great, by 

severing its connections with the forum state. [Citation.]” (Id. at ¶ 3:118, citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297.) Unlike business 

contacts or commercial relationships where purposeful availment results in concrete 

benefits or invocation of the protections of the forum law such that the nonresident will 

be aware that it may be subject to suit in the forum state, the type of personal 

communications at evidence in the instant case would not put defendants on notice that 

they might be haled into court in California for injuries suffered by the visiting friends in 

their Canadian home.

Nor can we conclude here that the plaintiffs’ causes of action are sufficiently 

“related to” or “arise out of” defendants’ contacts with the forum. (Vons, supra, 

14 Cal.4th at p. 447.) Although the tests are related, the Supreme Court has not yet 

decided what constitutes sufficient “relatedness” for specific jurisdiction. (Schwarzer et 

al., Cal Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 3:136.) However, 

California has rejected the “but for” test, which would substantially expand the scope of 

limited jurisdiction, in favor of a “substantial connection” test, holding “that the 

relatedness requirement is satisfied if ‘there is a substantial nexus or connection between 

the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 

35 Cal.4th at p. 1068; accord, Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 680.) 

In Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 670, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 

court that a university’s contacts with California were insufficient to establish personal 

jurisdiction. In that case, a student who had been recruited to play football at Liberty 

University in Virginia was allegedly assaulted by his roommate before falling and 

suffering brain injuries. Plaintiff contended the university had purposely availed itself of 

the privilege of conducting business in California. The appellate court rejected that 

contention, stating: “[T]he only conduct plaintiff has established was that Liberty’s 

recruiting coordinator visited plaintiff in California to recruit him to play football for 

Liberty, and thereafter, Liberty mailed plaintiff a scholarship agreement and amended 
10

scholarship agreement that plaintiff executed in California. That conduct does not 

establish ‘purposeful availment.’” (Id. at p. 680.) 

In examining the second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction—the relatedness 

requirement—the Roman court observed that the California Supreme Court in Snowney, 

supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 1062, had rejected a “but for test” and other tests and “had 

adopted ‘ “a substantial connection” test and held that the relatedness requirement is 

satisfied if “there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum 

activities and the plaintiff’s claim.” [Citation.]’ ” (Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 679-680.) The Court of Appeal found the controversy was “unrelated to and does not 

arise from Liberty’s contacts with California. Plaintiff’s claims are for personal injuries 

based on alleged activities that took place entirely within Virginia.” (Id. at p. 680.) 

That is even more true in this case, where there was no evidence defendants ever 

traveled to California, no contract between the parties was involved, and the relationship 

between the casual and personal e-mail and phone contacts here were even more 

attenuated than that between the University that recruited the student to play football in 

Virginia and defendants here, who extended an “open invitation” to plaintiffs to visit. 

Any doubt on this score would be put to rest by Walter v. Superior Court (1986) 

178 Cal.App.3d 677. In that case, the appellate court overturned the trial court’s refusal 

to grant a motion to quash service of summons in a breach of contract action brought by a 

California woman against a New Jersey resident. The lawsuit maintained that the New 

Jersey resident, in a series of telephone calls, had induced the plaintiff to leave her job 

and apartment in California to become his companion and confidante by promising that 

he would support her for the rest of her life, provide her with medical insurance, pay her 

a large sum of money and buy her a car. (Id. at p. 679.) The trial court found the 

plaintiff had established the defendant’s “minimum contacts” with California in that the 

defendant’s conduct had caused or resulted in substantial economic effect in California, 

little or none in New Jersey, that the “[d]efendant contacted plaintiff not infrequently or 

even occasionally, but innumerable times over a period of months, making telephone 

calls from New Jersey to plaintiff in California,” and that the defendant sent money from 
11

New Jersey to plaintiff in California. Consequently, the trial court found the defendant 

had “ ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at a resident of the forum, and hence ha[d] 

‘fair warning’ that California would seek to assert jurisdiction over such a claim. 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 680.) The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds that the New 

Jersey resident did no business in California and never traveled here, that the contract 

alleged was not to be performed in California, and that if breached, the contract breach 

occurred in New Jersey, not California.4 Although the plaintiff invoked jurisdiction on 

the basis that defendant’s act had “caused an effect” in this state, the appellate court 

observed that, “an act ‘having an effect’ in the forum state is not necessarily synonymous 

with an act which ‘affects’ a California resident. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 680-681.) In a 

statement directly relevant to this case, the appellate court concluded: “[The defendant] 

had no connection with California whatsoever, other than his telephone calls to plaintiff, 

and he certainly could not have anticipated being ‘haled into Court’ here should the 

agreed-to arrangement prove unsatisfactory.” (Id. at p. 681.) “The fact that [the 

defendant] called [the plaintiff] in California ‘innumerable times over a period of months’ 

is likewise insufficient to establish our court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident. 

[Citations.] The fact that real party gave up her job and apartment ‘in California’ is 

irrelevant; it is [the defendant’s] activity, and not that of [the plaintiff], which is the key 

element in the determination of jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 682.) Finally, the 

Court of Appeal acknowledged it was “not unmindful of the fact that plaintiff asserts she 

cannot afford to maintain a lawsuit in New Jersey while [defendant], she claims, is 

 4

 The appellate court also distinguished other cases in which the “effects” test was 

found to provide sufficient basis for jurisdiction, such as Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 

783—a libel action involving the publication of a story containing libelous statements 

concerning the California activities of a California resident, read by thousands of 

individuals in this state, where the focal point of the story and the harm suffered were in 

California. “Such is not the case here. . . . This is a private dispute between two 

individuals which neither the general population of California nor the California courts 

have any particular interest (aside from providing a forum for plaintiff, a California 

resident.)” (Walter v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.) 
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wealthy and can afford to defend the present action in California. We sympathize with 

plaintiff but cannot resolve a constitutional issue based upon sympathy for a litigant.” 

(Id. at p. 682.) 

Similarly, in Inselberg v. Inselberg (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 484, telephone calls 

between Michigan defendants and the plaintiff’s daughter in California, that could have 

played some role in inducing the daughter to leave her father and return to the defendants 

in Michigan, were held insufficient to support jurisdiction over defendants in California, 

even where the defendants were alleged to have furnished the cost of transportation to the 

daughter to help her to leave. (Id. at pp. 489-490.) 

Defendants argue that minimum contacts may be created by the non-resident’s use 

of e-mail or telephone, citing Hall v. LaRonde (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1342 (Hall). 

There, LaRonde, a New York resident, was alleged to have breached a contract for sale of 

licenses for the use of a computer software application. All business between Hall (the 

California plaintiff) and LaRonde was conducted via electronic mail and telephone. In 

finding sufficient minimum contacts to allow the assertion of personal jurisdiction in 

California, the appellate court observed: “LaRonde’s contacts with California consisted 

of more than simply purchasing a software module from Hall. LaRonde worked with 

Hall to integrate the module into LaRonde’s software package. Even after the initial 

adaptation was finished, LaRonde continued to work with Hall to modify the module for 

new and existing software. In addition, the contract contemplated that LaRonde would 

make continuing royalty payments to Hall. Thus, LaRonde created a ‘ “continuing 

obligation[]” ’ between himself and a resident of California. (Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 475-476.) [¶] LaRonde’s contacts with California were 

more than ‘ “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated.” ’ [Citation.] . . . LaRonde 

purposefully derived a benefit from the interstate activities. [Citation.] It is fair to 

require that he account in California for the consequences that arise from such activities.” 

[Citation.]” (Hall, supra, at p. 1347.) 

Hall is clearly distinguishable as involving business activities in which electronic 

communications played a key role in the parties’ 
13

 conduct of business and in carrying out their respective obligations under the 

contract between them, such that the court could conclude that the defendant “purposely 

derived a benefit from interstate activities.” (Hall, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) 

Jamshid-Negad v. Kessler (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1704, relied upon by plaintiffs, 

is also clearly distinguishable. There, the plaintiffs alleged that the nonresident 

defendants’ son, who was attending a campus of the University of California, attempted 

to break into their apartment, while intoxicated. (Id. at p. 1707.) The appellate court held 

that “in light of the Legislature’s intent to protect California citizens from the willful 

misconduct of minors by specifically regulating parental supervision, that nonresident 

parents who send their minor child to obtain an education at a public institution cause a 

sufficient effect in California to enable its courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction 

over them.” (Id. at pp. 1706-1707.) The court invoked the “effects” test described as 

follows: “ ‘[W]e conclude it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the 

defendant intentionally causing “effects in the state by an omission or act done 

elsewhere” whenever (a) the effects are of a nature “that the State treats as exceptional 

and subjects to special regulation,” or (b) the defendant has, in connection with his 

causing such effects in the forum state, invoked “the benefits and protections of its 

laws.” ’ (Quattrone v. Superior Court (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 296, 306.)” (JamshidNegad v. Kessler, at p. 1708.) Neither condition applies to the facts of the instant case. 

On the evidence presented here, we must conclude that plaintiffs have failed to 

meet their burden of showing facts justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

defendants. Because plaintiffs have not shown defendants had the “minimum contacts” 

with California required to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, we do not 

examine whether defendants nevertheless could show that jurisdiction was 

“unreasonable.”5 Nor do we address the question of proper service of process under the 

Hague Convention. 

 5

 We hereby deny plaintiffs’ pending request for judicial notice filed June 19, 

2013, relating the current status of plaintiffs’ action against defendants in Montreal and 

counsel’s estimate of the earliest possible trial date. 
14

DISPOSITION 

 The order quashing service of summons is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their 

costs on appeal. 
15

 _________________________ 

 Kline, P.J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Haerle, J. 

_________________________ 

Richman, J.