[Cite as State ex rel. Bennett v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-3119.]

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. JAMEKA 

BENNETT, et al. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants 

v. 

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 

DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

Defendant-Appellee

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Appellate Case Nos. 28981 

 28982 

 28983 

 28984 

Trial Court Case Nos. 2018-CV-5436 

 2018-CV-5437 

 2018-CV-5438 

 2018-CV-5439 

(Civil Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court)

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 10th day of September, 2021. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

JULIUS L. CARTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0084170, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1622, 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 

 

BRODI J. CONOVER, Atty. Reg. No. 0092082 & ALEXANDER L. EWING, Atty. Reg. No. 

0083934, 3300 Great American Tower, 301 East Fourth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 

 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 

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HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} The appellants, four former supervisors with Dayton Public Schools, appeal 

from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the appellee Board of 

Education on their complaints for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus 

reinstating their employment following a reduction in force involving the school district. 

{¶ 2} The appellants advance two assignments of error. First, they challenge the 

trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Dayton Public Schools Board of 

Education. Second, they contend the trial court erred in its summary judgment ruling by 

failing to address “all the claims of all the parties.” 

{¶ 3} The appellants are Jameka Bennett, Erica Dowell-Evans, Richard Knight, 

and the administrator of the estate of Mychelle Brown.1 In May 2016, they signed new 

two-year contracts to continue their employment in the position of “Transportation 

Supervisor II” in the school district’s transportation department, which included the 

district’s yellow school buses. Although the appellants’ duties differed, they all were 

involved with supervising the district’s school bus drivers. Shortly after the appellants 

signed their new contracts, the Board of Education hired a new superintendent, Rhonda 

Corr. Due to long-term declining enrollment and a corresponding loss of funding, Corr 

recommended streamlining operations within the school district and reducing or 

eliminating positions through reorganization and consolidation. Ultimately, approximately 

20 administrators were recommended to have their contracts suspended as part of a 

1 After this appeal was filed, one of the appellants, Mychelle Brown, passed away. 

Following a suggestion of death, we substituted Maria L. Shinn, Administrator of Brown’s 

estate, as a party in Brown’s place. For purposes of our analysis herein, references to the 

“appellants” still mean Bennett, Dowell-Evans, Knight, and Brown. 
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district-wide reduction in force (RIF). Included in that number were the four appellants. 

{¶ 4} At the time of the proposed RIF, the transportation department was in 

undisputed disarray. Problems included chronic understaffing of bus drivers, aging buses, 

and poor route design. The school district was inundated with calls from parents 

complaining about their children being picked up late or not at all. The appellants 

frequently were forced to abandon their supervisory roles to substitute for absent bus 

drivers. Part of Corr’s original strategy was to outsource supervision of the transportation 

department to a third-party vendor. The Board of Education rejected outsourcing and 

settled on district-wide reorganization that included a RIF. 

{¶ 5} In late October 2016, the appellants were informed of the plan to abolish their 

positions and to suspend their contracts. They received notice that the Board of Education 

intended to vote on the recommended RIF at its November 17, 2016 meeting. Thereafter, 

the school district issued revised letters to the appellants on November 8, 2016, advising 

them that the vote would occur on either that same day, November 8, 2016, or on 

November 17, 2016. There is a dispute about whether this letter was hand-delivered to 

the appellants or mailed to them. In any event, the Board voted on November 8, 2016, to 

abolish the appellants’ positions effective November 18, 2016. 

{¶ 6} As part of Superintendent Corr’s restructuring plan, Associate 

Superintendent Sheila Burton created the Transportation and Fleet Services Department. 

Unlike the former transportation department, which included just yellow school buses, this 

new department covered all district-owned vehicles. Burton also placed a dedicated call 

center in the new department. In addition, she brought training, compliance, and 

evaluation programs into the Transportation and Fleet Services Department. After the 
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reorganization, the school district posted vacancy announcements in late December 2016 

for the newly created positions of Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services. 

The job description differed from the job description for the old Transportation Supervisor 

II position. As described in the posting, the new positions included more responsibilities 

and came with a higher salary. Although the appellants had “recall” rights for two years 

following the RIF, the school district did not notify them. Instead, the school district initially 

hired three other people to fill the new positions. Shortly thereafter, the district added a 

fourth person to fill a fourth position. The people hired into the new Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services positions included bus drivers who had been under the 

supervision of the appellants, a dispatcher, and a mechanic. 

{¶ 7} In November 2018, the appellants filed separate complaints against the 

Board of Education, alleging both that their contracts improperly had been suspended 

and that they should have been recalled into the newly created positions. They sought 

declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus restoring them to their prior positions and 

ordering them to be given new contracts in the position of Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services. The four cases were consolidated below. Following 

extensive discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judgment. In an April 21, 2020 

ruling, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education in 

each case. It reasoned as follows: 

In this case, the parties appear to agree that the Plaintiffs were “other 

administrators” as defined by R.C. 3319.02. Further, it is undisputed that 

R.C. 3317.171 gives the Board the authority to adopt an administrative 

personnel suspension policy. However, because the Board has adopted 
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such a policy, no administrator employment contract may be suspended 

except pursuant to the policy. The parties’ disagreement relates to whether 

the Board complied with the RIF Policy in suspending the Plaintiffs’ 

contracts. 

 Plaintiffs argue that the Associate Director position is essentially the 

same as the Transportation Supervisor II position, and thus the RIF policy 

required the Board to notify Plaintiffs via mail about the vacant job positions 

before offering the positions to anyone else. On the other hand, the Board 

argues that it was only required to mail Plaintiffs about vacant positions for 

which they are qualified, and that the Associate Director positions had an 

expanded role with added responsibility, and therefore it followed its policy 

and the law in suspending Plaintiffs’ contracts. 

 Upon cross referencing the job descriptions provided by the 

Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the essential duties of an Associate Director 

substantially differed from the essential duties of Transportation Supervisor 

II. Under the latter position, the list of duties consisted of nearly half a page 

and mostly involved the management, direction, and supervision of bus 

drivers. Conversely, the list of essential duties for Associate Director is 

nearly two pages long and clearly illustrates a position with an expanded 

role with more responsibilities. For instance, in addition to the management 

and supervision of bus drivers, the Associate Director was responsible for 

supervising the operation efficiency of all District vehicles and not just the 

yellow school buses. They had authority to purchase, maintain and dispose 
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of the District’s motor fleet. They also were responsible for working with the 

Director in developing policies, rules and regulations within the department. 

Finally, the Court notes that the salary listed in the last administrator 

contract for each Plaintiff amounted to $52,987, while the starting salary for 

Associate Director is $65,825. 

 The Plaintiffs argue that the Associate Director position only appears 

different from the Transportation Supervisor II position because the 

Transportation Supervisor II position had evolved over time. However, the 

only evidence to support this assertion is Plaintiffs’ affidavit testimony. Also, 

the Plaintiffs point out that shortly after they were disciplined for misuse of 

District vehicles, the Transportation Supervisor II position was abolished. In 

other words, it appears Plaintiffs are arguing that the Board used the RIF as 

an excuse to terminate their employment. However, the Court finds that 

Plaintiffs’ discipline history has no significance on the outcome of this case. 

Even if this Court were to assume arguendo that the Board was just looking 

for a convenient excuse to discharge Plaintiffs, the law allows the Board to 

suspend administrator contracts so long as it is done pursuant to the RIF 

Policy. The Board apparently did not believe Plaintiffs were qualified for the 

more advanced role of Associate Director, so they did not notify Plaintiffs 

about the positions. The RIF Policy only requires the Board to notify 

Plaintiffs about job vacancies for which they are qualified. Therefore, the 

Court concludes that the Board complied with the RIF Policy in suspending 

Plaintiffs’ contracts. 
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(April 21, 2020 Decision, Order, and Entry at 5-6.) 

{¶ 8} In their first assignment of error, the appellants challenge the trial court’s 

entry of summary judgment against them. The appellants correctly note that they held 

written “administrator” contracts pursuant to R.C. 3319.02, which covers non-licensed 

supervisors and management-level employees. Another provision, R.C. 3319.171, 

authorizes a school board to adopt its own policies for the suspension of administrator 

contracts as part of a RIF. If such a policy is adopted, it must include the following: 

(1) One or more reasons that a board may consider for suspending any 

contract of employment entered into under section 3319.02 of the Revised 

Code. A reason for such suspension may include the financial conditions of 

the school district or educational service center. 

(2) Procedures for determining the order of suspension of contracts within 

the employment service areas affected; 

(3) Provisions requiring a right of restoration for employees whose contracts 

of employment are suspended under the policy if and when any positions 

become vacant or are created for which any of them are or become 

qualified. 

R.C. 3319.171(B)(1), (2), and (3). 

{¶ 9} Consistent with R.C. 3319.171, the Board of Education adopted a policy in 

2009 governing the suspension of administrator contracts. The policy, which was entitled 

“Reduction in Professional Staff Workforce,” authorized the suspension of administrator 

contracts for reasons including decreased enrollment of students, financial 

considerations, and organizational restructuring. It also provided procedures for 
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determining the order of suspension. Finally, it provided as follows with regard to R.C. 

3119.171(B)(3)’s requirement that affected employees have a right of restoration: 

When any positions become vacant or are created for which professional 

staff are or become qualified, the following provisions will be followed to 

restore professional staff. 

1. The Human Resources Department will maintain a list of employees 

whose contracts are suspended under this policy. When an employee’s 

contract is suspended, the employee’s name and current mailing 

address shall appear on such list and shall remain on such list for a 

period of up to two years from the last day of work, except for when the 

employee is restored to work during the two-year period, as further 

explained below. 

2. All vacant and approved position job postings will be mailed to 

employees whose names appear on the above-described list. 

3. Employees placed on the list are solely responsible to maintain a current 

mailing address at all times with the Human Resources office and are 

solely responsible to make sure their current mailing address appears 

on the above-described list. 

4. Once the professional staff member returns to work in any position with 

the Board, the employee’s name will be permanently removed from the 

list. Thus, no further job posting mailings will be sent to such employee. 

And, the Board obligations to restore the professional staff member 

under this policy will end upon the date the employee returns back to 
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work for the Board. 

5. At the expiration of two years, if the employee is still not restored to work 

with the Board in any position, the employee’s name will be removed 

from such list and the right to restoration under this policy will end. 

6. The same factors used to determine reductions and reassignment of 

staff will be considered in determining who will be awarded vacant or 

created positions for which an employee holding a suspended contract 

is qualified. 

(Defendant-Respondent’s February 11, 2020 Summary Judgment Motion at Exh. A.) 

{¶ 10} Here the appellants do not dispute the Board of Education’s right to 

implement a RIF. They argue, however, that no RIF occurred with regard to their positions 

in the transportation department because those positions were not abolished. But even 

assuming that a true RIF occurred, the appellants further argue that they had a right to 

be recalled into any position for which they were qualified. The appellants assert that the 

school district improperly failed to create a recall list, to notify them of the new Associate 

Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions, and to recall them into those 

positions. Although the job description for the new positions differed from the old 

Transportation Supervisor II job description, the appellants contend their old job 

description was outdated and that their actual responsibilities had evolved and expanded. 

The appellants further contend that they presented evidence establishing a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether they were qualified for the new positions. Therefore, they 

argue that the Board of Education was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis 

that they were unqualified for the new jobs. 
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{¶ 11} Under Civ.R. 56, a trial court may enter summary judgment for the moving 

party “if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only 

one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to 

have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” (Citation omitted.) Smith v. Five 

Rivers MetroParks, 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760, 732 N.E.2d 422 (2d Dist. 1999). “We

review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means that we apply the same 

standards as the trial court.” (Citations omitted.) GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio 

App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, 873 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we find a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether the appellants’ positions were eliminated through a RIF involving the 

transportation department. There is no dispute that Dayton City Schools was experiencing 

declining enrollment and a corresponding loss of funding. Largely for these reasons, a 

recommendation was made that the Board of Education restructure and downsize the 

school district’s administrative workforce, including but not limited to the transportation 

department.2 (Corr depo. at 40-41.) Under the Board’s policy, declining enrollment, loss 

of funding, and restructuring constitute valid reasons for a RIF. 

{¶ 13} With regard to the transportation department, however, the record fails to 

establish that the declining enrollment and loss of funding adversely affected the school 

district’s transportation of students. In her deposition, Associate Superintendent Burton 

2 Prior to adopting a RIF plan, school district leaders had discussed abolishing the entire 

transportation department and outsourcing transportation to a third-party vendor. (Corr 

depo. at 43.) But that idea “never got any traction” because the Board of Education 

opposed it. (Id.) 
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explained: “Even though we’re losing students in [Dayton Public Schools], it doesn’t mean 

we’re losing them for transportation, because we transport students who are non-DPS 

students. * * * [E]ven though you leave our district, you go to a charter, we still transport 

you.” (Burton depo. at 23.) We note too that the new Associate Director of Transportation 

and Fleet Services positions paid significantly more than the old Transportation Director 

II positions. We see no cost savings given that the Board of Education quickly replaced 

the four appellants after the RIF by hiring four new people to fill the higher-paid Associate 

Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. 

{¶ 14} A RIF in the transportation department still might have been permissible as 

part of the broader restructuring plan within Dayton City Schools. Here, however, the 

school district employed the four appellants in the position of Transportation Supervisor 

II prior to the RIF. Within months after the RIF, the Board of Education had filled four new 

Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. The Board argues that 

a RIF occurred because the new positions involved expanded responsibilities as part of 

the district-wide restructuring. This might be true if the new and expanded duties of the 

Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions were taken from some 

other employee who was terminated in the RIF. In such a case, the restructuring would 

result in a demonstrable reduction in force. 

{¶ 15} In the proceedings below, however, the appellants disputed whether their 

old Transportation Supervisor II positions had been abolished or even revised. The 

appellants separately averred, among other things, that they had reviewed the position 

description and vacancy announcement for the Associate Director of Transportation and 

Fleet Services position. They also averred that the duties described in the vacancy 
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announcement appeared to be the same duties they were performing, or had performed, 

prior to their termination. They further averred that they previously had supervised three 

people hired into the new position and could perform all of the duties identified by those 

new employees. (Bennett, Dowell-Evans, Brown, and Knight Affidavits accompanying 

Plaintiffs-Relators’ March 23, 2020 Response Opposing Defendant-Respondent’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment.) 

{¶ 16} Based on the appellants’ affidavits, a trier of fact reasonably could find that 

the school district did not abolish their positions in the RIF and subsequently create 

revised positions. Rather, according to the appellants, the school district renamed their 

old Transportation Supervisor II positions and created a new job description for the 

position of Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services that reflected what 

they already had been doing. If the four appellants’ affidavits are credited, then the Board 

of Education simply suspended their administrator contracts, purportedly as part of the 

district-wide RIF, and promptly hired four new people to perform the same duties the 

appellants had been performing. 

{¶ 17} The record also contains testimony from which a trier of fact reasonably 

could infer that the Board of Education had a motive for replacing the appellants with new 

employees who performed essentially the same job. Board of Education member Sheila 

Taylor expressed her belief that the transportation supervisors were included in the RIF 

“because the department was in such disarray.” (Taylor depo. at 50.) She attributed the 

decision to eliminate the appellants’ positions to “all the chaos that was going on in that 

department” and a need “to change the atmosphere[.]” (Id. at 26.) Board of Education 

member John McManus described the transportation department before the RIF as 
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“beyond dysfunctional” and “an embarrassment.” (McManus depo. at 21.) He 

acknowledged having “discussions amongst the Board Members about getting rid of the 

transportation supervision because of all the issues that were going on[.]” (Id. at 37-38.) 

McManus recalled understanding that departments that lost supervisors, including the 

transportation department, “would have a replacement” and “new supervisors would 

come in” so that “the ordinary course of business could be maintained.” (Id. at 38.) With 

regard to the transportation department in particular, McManus stated that it “could not 

get any worse” than it was when the four appellants were employed. (Id. at 40.) He added 

that “[l]osing the leadership that was in transportation was not going to negatively [a]ffect 

transportation because it was in such a state of mismanagement.” (Id.) For that reason, 

McManus “didn’t shed a tear” when he saw the names on the RIF list. (Id. at 49.) Based 

on our review of the entire record, and construing the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the appellants, we believe a trier of fact reasonably could find that the district-wide RIF 

was used to rid the transportation department of them. The record supports a reasonable 

inference that the appellants’ inclusion in the RIF was a matter of housecleaning rather 

than reducing headcount. 

{¶ 18} Finally, we note our inability to identify any other Dayton City Schools 

administrator whose employment was terminated as a result of the restructuring that 

purportedly resulted in the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services 

position being given additional responsibilities. In other words, even if the newly created 

position did involve some added responsibilities, it does not appear that those 

responsibilities were taken from another employee who was eliminated by the RIF. 

{¶ 19} For all of the foregoing reasons, a trier of fact reasonably could conclude 
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that no true reduction in force occurred as far as the appellants were concerned. 

Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellants, we find a genuine 

issue of material fact on that issue. 

{¶ 20} Even assuming, arguendo, that a true RIF did occur in the transportation 

department, we also find a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the appellants 

had restoration or “recall” rights to the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet 

Services jobs. Associate Superintendent Sheila Burton testified that she assumed 

responsibility for the revised transportation department after the RIF and played a role in 

developing the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. 

(Burton depo. at 25, 29.) She determined that these new positions “would have to have 

some different job responsibilities.” (Id. at 30.) In particular, the new positions included 

supervision of all district-owned vehicles, not just school buses. Burton also added 

attendance at the 18-month training course to learn “what it took to be a transportation 

director” and to know “how to manage and lead individuals.” (Id. at 31.) Burton explained 

that for the most part the newly hired individuals were able to perform the tasks assigned 

to them when hired. The additional training was to teach them how to do each other’s 

jobs in case that became necessary. (Id. at 49-53.) Finally, Burton mentioned dividing 

various job responsibilities between the new associate directors based on their skills and 

strengths. (Id. at 31-33, 49-53.) 

{¶ 21} Executive Director of Human Resources Judith Spulock testified that recall 

rights existed only “if the same exact position” was reestablished. (Spurlock depo. at 37.) 

In Spurlock’s opinion, the appellants were not entitled to be recalled because the 

Transportation Supervisor II positions from which they had been “RIFed” were not 
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reestablished. (Id. at 37-38.) Spurlock believed that employees impacted by the RIF had 

no right to be recalled into non-identical positions even if they were qualified. (Id. at 38.) 

In her opinion, employees who lost their jobs through the RIF had no right even to be 

notified of job openings unless the open position was the exact same one from which they 

had been removed. (Id. at 46.) 

{¶ 22} Andrae Hicks, who served under Spurlock in human resources, testified that 

he worked on preparing job postings in the two-year period following the RIF, and he 

never heard anything about any of the postings being sent to employees who had lost 

their jobs in the downsizing. (Hicks depo. at 91-92.) Spurlock herself admitted that the job 

posting for the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions was 

not sent to the appellants. (Spurlock depo. 103-104.) Despite her position as the head of 

the department responsible for the new job postings and the recall list, Spurlock admitted 

not even knowing whether the appellants were qualified for the Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services positions. (Id. at 48-49.) 

{¶ 23} Board of Education member John McManus also remembered being told 

“that the job descriptions and the duties of the [Associate Director of Transportation and 

Fleet Services] job were going to be different because of a restructuring; and, therefore, 

right to recall was not applicable.” (McManus depo. at 58-59.) On the other hand, Board 

of Education member Sheila Taylor believed that the appellants at least would have the 

opportunity to apply for the newly-created positions along with anyone else who was 

interested. (Taylor depo. at 28-36.) Taylor expressed her opinion that the appellants had 

recall rights because they were not fired for cause. Instead, the entire transportation 

department “was being looked at” as part of the RIF restructuring. (Id. at 76.) 
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{¶ 24} Based on the record before us, a trier of fact reasonably could find that the 

appellants were not even considered for the new Associate Director of Transportation 

and Fleet Services positions. As set forth above, the record contains evidence that they 

were not informed of the new positions, human resources head Spurlock testified that the 

appellants were not entitled to be recalled because their old positions were not identical 

to the new ones, and Spurlock did not even know whether the appellants were qualified 

for the new positions. Construed most strongly in the appellants’ favor, this evidence 

suggests that the appellants were not considered as candidates for the new positions. 

{¶ 25} Under R.C. 3319.171(B)(3), however, the Dayton City Schools’ RIF policy 

was obligated to include “[p]rovisions requiring a right of restoration for employees whose 

contracts of employment are suspended under the policy if and when any positions 

become vacant or are created for which any of them are or become qualified.” R.C. 

3319.171(B)(1), (2), and (3). Contrary to the view of Spurlock and other school-district 

representatives, the appellants’ recall rights were required by statute to extend to any 

available positions for which they were or became qualified. In accordance with this 

requirement, the Dayton City Schools’ RIF recall policy states that it applies “[w]hen any 

positions become vacant or are created for which professional staff are or become 

qualified[.]” It further provides that “[a]ll vacant and approved position job postings will be 

mailed to employees whose names appear” on the recall list. It also addresses employees 

being “restored to work” within two years “in any position.” (Defendant-Respondent’s 

February 11, 2010 Summary Judgment Motion at Exh. A.) We note too that a Dayton 

Public Schools information packet advised that administrative staff who lost their jobs 

through the RIF were entitled to apply for any posted position for which the affected 
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administrators believed they were qualified. (Plaintiffs-Relators March 23, 2020 

Response Opposing Summary Judgment at Exh. 26.) Consequently, the appellants’ 

recall rights turn on whether they were qualified for the new Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services positions, not on whether the new positions were 

identical to the old Transportation Supervisor II positions. 

{¶ 26} On appeal, the Board of Education suggests that the appellants were not 

recalled into the new positions because they were unqualified. In its appellate brief, 

however, the Board cites no deposition testimony or other evidence from anyone stating 

that the appellants in fact were not qualified. It its April 21, 2020 summary-judgment ruling 

the trial court stated that “[t]he Board apparently did not believe Plaintiffs were qualified 

for the more advanced role of Associate Director, so they did not notify Plaintiffs about 

the positions.” We conclude there is at least a genuine issue of material fact in regard to 

whether the appellants were qualified. As we have explained, the record supports a 

finding that the appellants were not recalled—or even considered for recall—because the 

new positions were not identical to their old positions. This is essentially what human 

resources head Spurlock said when she admitted not knowing whether appellants were 

qualified for the new jobs and explained that they had no recall rights, regardless of their 

qualifications, because such rights existed only “if the same exact position” was 

reestablished. (Spurlock depo. at 37, 48-49.) 

{¶ 27} Based on the language of R.C. 3319.171(B)(3) and the Board of 

Education’s RIF recall policy, the critical issue is whether the appellants were qualified to 

fill the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. The trial court’s 

ruling compared the position description for Transportation Supervisor II and Associate 
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Director of Transportation and Fleet Services and concluded that the latter position 

involved an “expanded role with more responsibilities” and higher pay. Based on the 

differences in the two positions on paper, the trial court appears to have found that the 

appellants were not qualified for the new jobs as a matter of law. In reaching this 

conclusion, it did not consider the appellants’ argument that the Transportation Supervisor 

II positions had evolved over time and included responsibilities greater than those 

mentioned in their job description. The trial court stated that the only evidence supporting 

the appellants’ claim that their jobs had evolved over time was their own affidavits. 

{¶ 28} Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellants, we 

believe a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether they were qualified for the 

Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. Notably, the appellants 

filed their own detailed affidavits in the proceedings below addressing their experience 

and qualifications for the new positions. Appellant Bennett’s affidavit states in part: 

7. I was capable of successfully performing all the duties of my position 

when my contract was suspended in 2016. 

8. I was capable of replacing the other Transportation Supervisor II positions 

whenever one of my co-workers was unavailable in 2016. 

 * * * 

15. I was notified in the Reduction in Force meeting that all vacancy 

announcements would be mailed to my mailing address whenever a new 

position was posted for applicants. 

16. I never received any mailing of vacancy announcements from the 

Dayton Public Schools following my termination on November 18, 2016. 
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17. I never received any recall notices and was never contacted by Dayton 

Public Schools regarding my recall rights. 

18. I have reviewed the position description of Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services that was posted by Dayton Public 

Schools on or about December of 2016. 

19 The duties described in the vacancy announcement for Associate 

Director of Transportation and Fleet Services position appear to be the 

same duties that I was performing, or had performed, prior to my termination 

on November 18, 2016. 

20. Dayton Public Schools never contacted me about the Associate Director 

of Transportation and Fleet Services position by recalling me or letting me 

know of the Vacancy Announcement. 

21. I was a supervisor for Torronce Jackson, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea 

Ludd prior to my termination on November 18, 2016. 

22. Torronce Jackson, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea Ludd were all 

promoted to the position of Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet 

Services during the period when I had recall rights. 

 * * * 

27. I was capable of receiving new training when my employment with 

Dayton Public Schools was terminated on November 18, 2016, and I had 

already supervised fleet vehicles. 

28. I have reviewed the deposition transcript of Torronce Jackson, Terrence 

Jackson, and Andrea Ludd and can perform all the duties they have 
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described for their positions. 

29. I supervised the garage and all the mechanics during my time as a 

Transportation Supervisor, prior to the RIF, and the Transportation 

Department did all the maintenance on the fleet vehicles unless it was a 

repair that required me to get an outside company to do the repair. 

30. I was responsible for the registration and licensure of all the fleet 

vehicles, prior to the RIF, and the Transportation Department has always 

been responsible for the fleet vehicles since I was initially promoted to 

Transportation Supervisor II. 

31. I have received training through the State of Ohio intended for 

transportation supervisors and covering many different areas of

transportation. My certificates from this training were turned in to the district. 

32. The tier bells are set at the beginning of the school year and approved 

by the Board of Education. 

33. The Transportation Department had a call center that was part of the 

department beginning in approximately the 2014-2015 school year, which 

was supervised by Transportation Supervisor Mychelle Brown. The call 

center was later moved to the central office downtown. 

34. The Transportation Department had a PBX Operator that answered 

calls when there was no call center at the facility, and she would route those 

calls to the Director, Supervisors, or dispatcher. 

35. I was responsible for training and compliance for all drivers within the 

district. We have always had training and compliance requirements for the 
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State of Ohio. 

36. I am an On Board Instructor and I trained Terrence Jackson to be an 

On Board Instructor for the district. 

37. I was contracted [sic] by Transportation Director Michael Rosenberger, 

after the RIF, and he requested that I assist him in doing the T-Reports 

required by the State of Ohio. 

(Bennett Affidavit accompanying Plaintiffs-Relators’ March 23, 2020 Response Opposing 

Defendant-Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) 

{¶ 29} Appellants Dowell-Evans, Brown, and Knight provided similar affidavits. As 

mentioned above, they averred that they had reviewed the position description and 

vacancy announcement for the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services 

position. They also averred that the duties described in the vacancy announcement 

appeared to be the same duties they were performing, or had performed, prior to their 

termination. They further averred that they had supervised Torronce Jackson, Terrence 

Jackson, and Andrea Ludd, who were hired at various times to fill vacant Associate 

Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions, and could perform all of the duties 

identified by the Jackson brothers and Ludd as part of the new positions. Although the 

trial court discounted these affidavits, apparently on the basis that they were self-serving, 

we find them sufficiently detailed and specific to establish a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the appellants’ qualification for the new jobs. If the appellants testified at trial 

consistent with their affidavits, a trier of fact reasonably could conclude that they were 

qualified to fill the position of Associate Director of Transportation of Fleet Services. 

{¶ 30} We note too that the appellants’ affidavits are not the only evidence 
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supporting their claims. James Wallace served as Transportation Director and supervised 

the appellants for several years until shortly before the RIF, when Mike Rosenberger 

assumed the director’s position. In his deposition, Wallace testified that appellant Brown 

primarily was responsible for supervising dispatchers, appellant Evans supervised the 

“routers” and paraprofessionals, appellant Knight supervised transportation for parochial 

and charter schools, and appellant Bennett supervised training and the mechanics. 

(Wallace depo. at 60.) According to Wallace, each of the four appellants knew the full 

“day-to-day operations” of the Transportation Department. They were capable of filling in 

for each other and filling in for him. (Id. at 60-61.) Wallace also reviewed the position 

description for the newly created Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services 

positions. He opined that the appellants were capable of performing all of the listed duties. 

(Id. at 86-87.) While serving as Transportation Director, Wallace also had supervised 

brothers Terrance and Torronce Jackson as well as Andrea Ludd, all of whom had been 

school bus drivers. (Id. at 88-89.) After the RIF, they were hired to fill vacant Associate 

Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. Wallace was unaware of any 

specialized knowledge they possessed related to those positions. (Id. at 89.) 

{¶ 31} When discussing one aspect of his own Associate Director of 

Transportation and Fleet Services responsibilities, Terrance Jackson stated that 

“anybody could do it.” (Terrance Jackson depo. at 24.) When asked what he had learned 

about performing the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services job after

being given it, Terrance Jackson responded that he “could go on forever.” (Id. at 27.) 

When Terrance’s brother Torronce Jackson got his Associate Director of Transportation 

and Fleet Services job, he had little prior management experience. (Torronce Jackson 
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depo. at 12.) Torronce Jackson testified that managing the entire fleet of school-district 

vehicles was not significantly different than managing just the yellow school buses. (Id. at 

23-25.) He explained that the only real difference was the yellow school buses requiring 

more work because they had to be inspected. (Id.) He believed that someone who could 

supervise school buses (i.e., the appellants) could supervise fleet vehicles. (Id.) 

{¶ 32} Finally, according to Superintendent Corr, applicants hired to fill the 

Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions were all sent to an 18-

month training course “to know what it took to be a transportation director.” (Corr depo. 

31-32.) She also sent them to leadership training “so they knew how to manage and lead 

individuals[.]” (Id.) In her deposition, Associate Superintendent Burton clarified that newly 

hired associate directors largely were able to perform the responsibilities assigned to 

them when hired. The additional training was to enable them to perform one another’s 

jobs. (Burton depo. at 49-53.) According to former Transportation Director Wallace, 

however, the four appellants already knew how to perform each other’s jobs. And the 

appellants’ affidavits support a finding that the new jobs functionally were the same as 

their old jobs. Construed most strongly in the appellants’ favor, the evidence suggests 

that the appellants were qualified for the new positions. We find a genuine issue of 

material fact on that issue. The first assignment of error is sustained insofar as the trial 

court erred in entering summary judgment for the Board of Education.3 

3 The appellants also seem to suggest that the trial court should have entered summary 

judgment in their favor on their complaints for declaratory judgment and a writ of 

mandamus. In the conclusion of their brief, they appear to ask us to remand with 

instructions for the trial court to issue the requested writ. We note, however, that the 

appellants’ assignment of error is limited to the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in 

favor of the Board of Education. Therefore, we express no opinion as to whether the 

appellants should have been granted summary judgment. In finding genuine issues of 
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{¶ 33} In their second assignment of error, the appellants contend the trial court 

erred in “failing to address all the claims and all the parties when deciding Summary 

Judgment.” Although the appellants’ brief fails to argue this issue, we previously resolved 

it in a March 5, 2021 Decision and Entry. In rejecting an argument that no final appealable 

order existed, we held that the trial court did fully resolve all claims involving all parties 

when it entered summary judgment in favor of the only defendant and against all of the 

plaintiffs on all of their claims. Based on the reasoning set forth in our March 5, 2021 

Decision and Entry, the second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 34} Having sustained the appellants’ first assignment of error, we reverse the 

trial court’s entry of summary judgment in each case in favor of the Board of Education 

and remand the cases for further proceedings. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TUCKER, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Julius L. Carter 

Brodi J. Conover 

Alexander L. Ewing 

Hon. Gregory F. Singer 

material fact, we mean only that the record does not support the entry of judgment as a 

matter of law in favor of the Board of Education, which is the only issue raised by the first 

assignment of error.