J-S77027-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

AARON ANDERSON A/K/A ANDRE HULL

Appellant No. 673 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013285-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. **

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014

Aaron Anderson appeals from his judgment of sentence. We affirm.

On February 4, 2014, Aaron Anderson entered a negotiated guilty plea 

to third degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime and prohibited 

offensive weapons1. The trial court sentenced him to 25-50 years’ 

imprisonment. On February 7, 2014, Anderson filed a timely post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On February 11, 2014, the trial court 

____________________________________________

** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502, 907, and 908, respectively.
J-S77027-14

- 2 -

denied Anderson’s motion2. Anderson filed a timely appeal, and both 

Anderson and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

The relevant facts are as follows: Anderson was charged with shooting 

Rahspe Athy three times with a sawed-off shotgun on July 26, 2012. N.T., 

2/4/14, p. 12 (guilty plea hearing transcript). The Philadelphia Medical 

Examiner’s Office pronounced Athy dead as a result of multiple gunshot 

wounds. Id. 

On February 4, 2014, Anderson executed a written guilty plea 

colloquy3in which he admitted to committing the crimes of third degree 

murder, possession of an instrument of crime, and possession of a 

prohibited offensive weapon. Guilty Plea Colloquy, Page 1 of 4, "THE 

CHARGES". Anderson also agreed in the colloquy: "The facts of the case 

have been read to be me. The crimes and elements of the crime(s) have 

been explained to me. I committed the crime(s), and that is why I am 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court’s order denying Anderson’s post-sentence motions was not 

in the certified record. On April 16, 2014, this Court entered a rule to show 

cause why this appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory due to the lack 

of an order denying Anderson’s post-sentence motions. In response, 

Anderson’s attorney filed a copy of the order with the trial court, which 

transmitted the order to this Court in a supplemental record. Therefore, we 

will not quash this appeal.

3 Anderson’s written guilty plea colloquy was not in the certified record, but 

the Commonwealth moved to add the written colloquy to the record under 

Pa.R.A.P. 1926. On October 27, 2014, this Court granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion. The trial court thereupon added the guilty plea 

colloquy to the record and transmitted it to this Court.
J-S77027-14

- 3 -

pleading guilty." Id., Page 3 of 4, "FACTS OF MY CASE AND ELEMENTS OF 

CRIME(S)." Lastly, Anderson agreed: "I cannot come back to court later and 

say that I was not guilty. Once I plead guilty, I can no longer complain that 

I was innocent and did not commit the crime." Id., Page 3 of 4, "GIVING UP 

DEFENSES". 

After signing the colloquy form, Anderson appeared before the court 

and entered a guilty plea to the aforementioned crimes. Anderson stated 

under oath that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol that 

would affect his ability to understand what he was doing. N.T., 2/4/14, pp. 

8-9. He agreed that (1) he was entering the agreement knowingly and of 

his own free will; (2) he had spoken to his attorney, his investigator and his 

family concerning the negotiations; (3) all of his questions had been 

answered; and (4) he was satisfied with his attorney. Id., pp. 9-10. 

Anderson listened to the Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts alleged 

against him and then entered guilty pleas to the aforementioned offenses. 

Id., pp. 12-13. The court determined that Anderson knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently entered into this guilty plea and accepted his plea. Id., p. 

14. The court then immediately imposed sentence. Id., pp. 22-23.

Three days after pleading guilty and receiving a lengthy sentence of 

imprisonment, Anderson moved to withdraw his guilty plea. His motion 

stated in relevant part: “[Anderson] has indicated through his mother that 

he is taking responsibility for someone else who is the actual shooter. 
J-S77027-14

- 4 -

[Anderson] prays the Honorable Court allow him to withdraw his plea and 

proffer to the Commonwealth the actual shooter. . .” Motion To Withdraw 

Guilty Plea, ¶¶ 2-3. The trial court denied this motion without a hearing.

Anderson raises a single issue in this appeal: “Whether The Court 

erred when it denied the Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

without a hearing on February 11, 2014 where he advised the court and the 

Commonwealth that he wanted to proffer as to whom the real shooter was?” 

Brief for Appellant, p. 5. 

A defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing 

must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice before 

withdrawal is justified. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 

383 (Pa.Super.2002). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it 

was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Id. 

The record demonstrates that it would not be manifestly unjust to 

disallow Anderson’s withdrawal of his guilty plea. Anderson made no claim 

in his post-sentence motion that he did not enter his plea knowingly, 

voluntarily or intelligently. He made no suggestion as to his innocence at his 

combined guilty plea and sentencing hearing, and it was only after 

sentencing that he claimed that he was innocent. A claim of innocence does 

not meet the heightened standard for post-sentence plea withdrawal. See 

Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Pa.Super.1994) ("A 

defendant's post-sentence recantation of guilt does not rise to the level of 
J-S77027-14

- 5 -

prejudice on the order of manifest injustice sufficient to require that he be 

permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty"). 

In effect, Anderson claims that he lied to the trial court when he 

admitted guilt in his written and oral plea colloquies. By pleading guilty, 

however, Anderson is bound by the statements he made in open court while 

under oath, and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea 

which contradict the statements he made during his plea colloquy. 

Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa.Super.1999). Having 

admitted during the guilty plea hearing that he shot the decedent, Anderson 

cannot now claim that someone else did the shooting.

Furthermore, the trial court did not have to hold a hearing before 

denying Anderson’s post-sentence motion. In Commonwealth v. Cappelli, 

489 A.2d 813 (Pa.Super.1985) (en banc), the appellant tendered a 

negotiated guilty plea and then filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, asserting that his plea was involuntary due to his “age, 

intelligence and standing.” We held that the trial court did not err by 

declining to hold a hearing: "[R]equir[ing] the court to conduct a hearing 

based upon a simple repudiation of all that was said at the guilty plea 

proceeding after sentencing, would depreciate the gravity which our 

procedures attach to guilty plea proceedings." Cappelli, 489 A.2d at 818. 

We also stated that it would be "an affront to the dignity of the [trial] court 
J-S77027-14

- 6 -

and orderly procedures to direct a hearing” on the "naked allegation" in the 

defendant’s motion. Id. 

Cappelli observed that while a hearing might be necessary in 

"borderline" cases, the court should not grant a hearing "every time a claim 

is made that a guilty plea was improperly induced." Id. at 819; see also

Commonwealth v. Harris, 406 A.2d 778, 779 (Pa. Super. 1979) (plea 

withdrawal petition alleging involuntary guilty plea properly denied without 

hearing, where defendant failed to assert any facts demonstrating 

involuntariness, and record of plea colloquy indicated colloquy was detailed 

and extensive). The present case is simply not a "borderline" case, given 

that Anderson’s post-sentence motion merely offered an unsupported 

assertion of innocence, and the written and oral guilty plea colloquies 

unequivocally establish that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

tendered his plea. Stork, supra, 737 A.2d at 791 ("a hearing is not 

necessary where Appellant's motion is supported by facts that are in direct 

variance with his unequivocal record responses at the time of plea").

For these reasons, we affirm the order denying Anderson’s postsentence motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-S77027-14

- 7 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2014