RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2988-22 

B.A., JR.,1

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

B.G., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Submitted January 22, 2024 – Decided February 1, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino and Chase. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FV-12-2308-23.

Gomperts McDermott & Von Ellen, LLC, attorneys for 

appellant (Marisa Lepore Hovanec, of counsel and on

the brief). 

Respondent has not filed a brief. 

PER CURIAM 

1

 We use initials in this domestic violence case to protect the identities of the 

parties. R. 1:38-3(b)(12). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2988-22

Defendant B.G. ("appellant") seeks reversal of the Family Part's April 21, 

2022 decision granting a Final Restraining Order ("FRO") against her in favor 

of plaintiff B.A., Jr. ("respondent")2 pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic 

Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 (the "PDVA"). 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's finding that 

appellant committed a predicate act of domestic violence under the PDVA, 

"prong one" as required by the two-prong construct set forth in Silver v. Silver, 

387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). However, we remand this matter 

to the trial court to reconsider whether restraints are necessary under "prong 

two" of Silver, after a fuller evaluation of the factors listed within the statute. 

The following abbreviated background will suffice for purposes of this 

opinion. Appellant and respondent were formerly in a relationship and lived 

together for three years. The parties have three children together. 

Appellant asserted that she had previously obtained an FRO against 

respondent in 2018 that lasted until she voluntarily dismissed it during the 

COVID-19 pandemic. 

In April 2023, appellant filed a complaint against respondent alleging his 

2

 Because the parties litigated multiple cases against one another, in which they 

were sometimes the plaintiff and sometimes the defendant, we shall refer to them 

as "appellant" and "respondent" to minimize confusion. 
3 A-2988-22

commission of domestic violence against her in violation of the PDVA. At the 

time, the parties were living together. Appellant first obtained a temporary 

restraining order ("TRO") against respondent, and then obtained an FRO after a 

hearing on April 11, 2023. 

Appellant contends the April 11 FRO was granted to her as a result of 

respondent assaulting her "with such force that he chipped her tooth, ripped her 

clothing, and left bruises all over her body." Appellant further asserts that 

respondent was charged and arrested for simple assault because of that physical 

altercation. 

The April 11 FRO barred respondent from appellant's residence and place 

of employment, prohibited future acts of domestic violence, prohibited any 

communication with appellant, prohibited his possession of firearms or 

weapons, required him to "undergo domestic violence counseling, substance 

abuse evaluation and any treatment," provided for supervised parenting time 

through respondent's sister, and required a calculation of child support. 

At 11:25 a.m., minutes after the April 11 hearing concluded, respondent 

allegedly received a text message from appellant. The text message stated as 

follows: 
4 A-2988-22

I hope you and [name omitted]3 live a very happy life 

together. We hope it was worth losing your family and 

seeing your child daily. I guess beating your baby

mother up who did everything for you for a fat, ugly 

47-year-old was worth it. You literally ruined your life 

for another old white trash bag. Your poor daughters. 

Upon receiving that text message, respondent immediately filed a 

domestic violence complaint against appellant and obtained an TRO against her 

that same day. Respondent's complaint variously alleged that appellant: had 

contacted his family members in an attempt to misinform him of the Family Part 

court date, repeatedly reached out to family members to "speak ill" of him, 

reached out to coworkers and their spouses asking about him, and put a tracking 

device on his phone and vehicle. 

The Family Part conducted a hearing on respondent's application on April 

21, 2023. Both parties, who were self-represented, testified. No other witnesses 

were presented. 

The focus of the trial was the text message respondent received 

immediately after the previous April 11 FRO hearing. The trial court asked 

respondent how he knew the text came from appellant. In reply, respondent 

testified he knew she was the sender "[b]ecause [he] ha[d] her blocked on . . . 

3

 From the parties' testimony, the name appears to be that of respondent's new 

partner. 
5 A-2988-22

over forty-five different fake phone numbers." 

 Resuming his testimony, respondent testified the text made him feel 

"[s]ad. I mean, I felt like [appellant] was kicking me when I was down. She 

knew she won the case so for to say that to me is like what more—like I'm not 

bothering her . . . . I'll walk away gladly, but to kick me while I'm down." 

When the trial court asked respondent if he was "afraid of [appellant][,]" 

he testified, "Yes, for the simple fact that she always gets one over on me." 

Respondent continued, "I mean, I just got a job, and now I can't even take it 

because I'm here in court. And like she's complaining about support, but I can't 

work because I'm in jail.4 So, when is it going to stop?" Pressed for more 

information, respondent testified, "It's like she comes in and . . . she doesn't 

care." 

Respondent then attempted to elaborate on his narrative of appellant 

allegedly having access to his passwords and taking over his email and social 

media accounts, speaking to coworkers and tracking his car. However, he was 

unable to provide any corroborating evidence of such conduct to the trial court. 

4

 This reference appears to relate to the assault charge that appellant previously 

filed against respondent. 
6 A-2988-22

Consequently, the trial court dismissed those allegations and focused solely on 

the April 11 text message. 

The trial court confirmed with respondent that the parties "had a 

significant history of domestic violence" and "there's been complaints filed by 

you, filed by [appellant]," and that the parties "were [in court] on April 11th." 

When asked by the court at the April 21 hearing why he wanted a 

restraining order against appellant, respondent testified: 

 Just so we can stop—I don't want to bother her, I 

really don't . . . I don't want her bothering me and my 

family when I'm trying to get my life together as well. 

That's all I want. I don't want no—I don't wish her any 

bad ill will. I just don't want her—I don't want her to 

keep bothering me the way she's been doing. I don't 

bother her. I don't call family, friends, nobody. I just 

want the same respect. 

The trial court then addressed respondent's text message allegation with 

appellant. She testified: 

I didn't send a text message. [Respondent] has a history 

of retaliating. We had . . . an FRO back in 2018. He 

tried to also do the same thing when we went for our 

final restraining order in 2018. I had a FRO for 

harassment on him. He did the same thing in court, a 

couple minutes right after our court date went and filed 

a TRO on me back then. The TRO was thrown out . . . . 

This is the same. 
7 A-2988-22

The trial court asked appellant "[w]ho would send a message right after 

you left [the courtroom]." Appellant responded she thought respondent had sent 

the text himself, noting that he did not "want[] [her] to do well in life." She 

claimed his allegation against her about the text message was a form of 

retaliation. She also claimed that respondent had previously impersonated her 

in an email to her mother. On inquiry by the court, appellant denied ever using 

a different phone number to contact respondent. 

Upon considering the parties' competing narratives, the court concluded 

that respondent had met his burden of establishing a predicate act of domestic 

violence. The court also concluded that respondent had shown his need for 

restraints. 

In its oral decision, the court noted that the testimony of appellant at the 

previous April 11 FRO hearing was consistent with the tenor of the post-hearing 

text message. The court also noted the "timing of the text message at 11:25 a.m. 

was literally within minutes" after the end of the prior FRO hearing, which added 

to respondent's credibility. 

Additionally, the trial court found that appellant "lack[ed] credibility" in 

her denial that she had sent the text message. In this regard, the court noted 

respondent's testimony that "his [cell phone] number was blocked and the only 
8 A-2988-22

way [the text message] could have come through is using some application to 

provide a random phone number." 

After finding plaintiff credible and defendant incredible concerning the 

relevant events, the court discussed whether the text message comprised 

harassment. Placing that that question into context, the court observed "these 

parties have a significant history of harassment and that this case is a continuum 

of their tumultuous relationship." 

The court found that the text message constituted "a communication . . . 

likely to cause annoyance or alarm" and thereby satisfied the definition of 

harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. The court noted the timing of the text 

transmission—immediately after the April 11 FRO hearing—was "essentially 

poking the bear . . . and really taunting [respondent] about what had happened." 

The court found the message "would be unique" to appellant as the source of the 

harassing communication. 

Turning to the second prong of the analysis, the court observed that "the 

appropriate thing to do to keep the peace between the parties is to issue restraints 

on both sides." In that spirit of reciprocity, the court directed that appellant 

"should be restrained from contacting [respondent] to keep the peace, given the 

significant history of domestic violence." The trial court therefore granted the 
9 A-2988-22

FRO in respondent's favor. 

Now represented by counsel, appellant seeks to overturn the FRO. She 

essentially argues that: (1) the proofs were inadequate to establish she 

committed a predicate act of harassment by sending the post-hearing text 

message; and (2) there was insufficient need for restraints shown. Respondent 

has not filed an opposing brief. 

We evaluate these two core contentions under well-established standards 

of review. The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial court to make 

certain findings, pursuant to a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 

125-27. Initially, the court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, 

by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate 

acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. The trial court 

should make this determination "in light of the previous history of violence 

between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 402 (1998)). 

Secondly, the court must determine "whether a restraining order is necessary, 

upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to - 

29(a)(6),5 to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further 

5

 As recited in the PDVA, the six factors are: 
10 A-2988-22

abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)'s provision that "[i]n 

proceedings in which complaints for restraining orders have been filed, the court 

shall grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse"); see also J.D. v. 

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011). 

We evaluate a family judge's findings on these two prongs with a 

considerable degree of deference. The Family Part's findings are binding on 

appeal, "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 

154 N.J. at 411-12. "[This court] defer[s] to the credibility determinations made 

by the trial court because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the 

witnesses, and hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a 

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 

(1) [t]he previous history of domestic violence between 

the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment, and physical abuse; (2) [t]he existence of 

immediate danger to person or property; (3) [t]he 

financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; 

(4) [t]he best interests of the victim and any child; (5) 

[i]n determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim's safety; and (6) [t]he existence 

of a verifiable order of protection from another 

jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(a)(6).] 
11 A-2988-22

N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412); see also S.D. v. M.J.R., 

415 N.J. Super. 417, 429-30 (App. Div. 2010). 

This court also bears in mind the expertise of Family Part judges, who 

routinely hear many domestic violence cases. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. We will 

not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless 

[we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent 

with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the 

interests of justice." S.D., 415 N.J. Super. at 429 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 

412). However, we review de novo a trial judge's legal conclusions. C.C. v. 

J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 429 (App. Div. 2020). 

Applying these principles, we have no hesitation in affirming the trial 

judge's finding that respondent met the first prong of Silver and proved the 

predicate act of harassment. We defer to the court's finding that respondent's 

testimony was more credible than that of appellant with respect to the source of 

the text message and the surrounding events. As the court reasonably noted, the 

tenor and timing of the message was consistent with an attempt to alarm or 

seriously annoy respondent, who had just lost the previous FRO case with 
12 A-2988-22

appellant minutes earlier in the courtroom.6 The conduct suffices to be deemed 

harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Moreover, the trial judge had a proverbial 

"feel" for the parties' ongoing disputes. 

That said, we part company with the trial court's stated rationale under the 

second prong concerning the necessity of restraints against appellant. The court 

did not address the six factors germane to necessity, which are set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6). The court instead adopted a generic approach 

of reciprocity, concluding that it would help "keep the peace" if both parties 

were restrained. We appreciate the court's perception that each of the two parties 

has been attempting, back and forth, to prevail over the other party—in and out 

of the courthouse. Nonetheless, the court's existing discussion of the second 

prong is insufficient, as is, to adjudicate the second prong of Silver. 

Consequently, we remand this matter to the trial court7 to reconsider and 

amplify its analysis under the second prong of Silver. The court shall have the 

discretion to reopen the hearing and adduce additional testimony if it finds it 

6

 We note the dissonance between appellant obtaining restraints against 

respondent communicating with her and, as the court found, appellant promptly 

initiating a communication to respondent. 

7

 If the FRO judge has since retired, a different Family Part judge shall conduct 

the remand, and shall be furnished with the transcripts of the previous 

proceedings. 
13 A-2988-22

beneficial to do so. In the meantime, the restraints ordered in the FRO remain 

in place, pending the trial court's remand determination. Based on the remand 

proceeding, the court has the prerogative to reaffirm or vacate its ruling. After 

that, either aggrieved party may pursue a new appeal. 

All other arguments raised on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.