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National Construction Safety Team

Advisory Committee (NCST AC) Meeting Summary

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Gaithersburg, Maryland 

May 3, 2016

Advisory Committee Members: 

Jeremy Isenberg, Chair Stanford University

Paul A. Croce FM Global (retired) 

Susan L. Cutter University of South Carolina 

James Harris JM Harris and Company

Anne S. Kiremidjian Stanford University 

James R. Quiter Arup

Sarah A. Rice The Preview Group, Inc. 

NIST Representatives, Guests, and Contractor Support: 

Kent Rochford Associate Director for Laboratory Programs, 

NIST

Howard Harary Director, Engineering Laboratory, Designated 

Federal Officer, NIST

Long Phan Group Leader, Structures Group, Engineering 

Laboratory, NIST

Marc Levitan Acting Director, National Windstorm Impact 

Reduction Program (NWIRP), Engineering 

Laboratory, NIST

Erica Kuligowski Leader, WUI Fire Group, Engineering Laboratory, 

NIST

Jason Averill Chief, Materials and Structural Systems Division, 

Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Terri McAllister Group Leader, Community Resilience Group, 

Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Nelson Bryner Acting Chief, Fire Research Division, Engineering 

Laboratory, NIST

Dave Jorgensen, Research Meteorologist and Chief, National 

Severe Storms Laboratory/R&D Division, NOAA

Ben Davis Management and Program Analyst, Community 

Resilience Group, Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Melissa Banner Administrative Assistant, Community Resilience

Group, Engineering Laboratory, NIST 

Judith Mitrani-Reiser Assistant Professor, Department of Civil 

Engineering, Johns Hopkins University

Melissa Faletra Wind Engineer, Applied Research Associates

Mat Heyman Consultant, Applied Research Associates
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Summary of Discussions 

I. Opening Remarks 

Dr. Jeremy Isenberg, Chair of the Committee, opened the meeting at 9:00 a.m. and 

welcomed the NCST Advisory Committee members and the NIST representatives to the 

meeting. 

He thanked NIST for its responses to the Committee’s 2015 report that would be 

shared during the meeting. Isenberg noted that for several recommendations there 

was no response, as NIST noted that those recommendations were outside the 

Committee’s scope. He stated that it was important to not have any confusion about 

this issue and he looked forward to clarification.

Dr. Kent Rochford thanked the Committee for its time, noting that federal advisory 

committees are important to NIST as it conducts its work. NIST values and depends 

upon the advice and counsel of advisory committees, carefully reviews reports, and 

take recommendations and observations seriously. These recommendations are an 

important part of NIST’s decision process. Rochford noted that the Committee 

would be hearing about related efforts; while these activities are outside the direct 

scope of the NCST Act, they enhance the members’ understanding of the agency’s 

NCST work. Rochford stated that he looks forward to feedback, observations, and 

advice the Committee would offer.

II. NIST Responses to NCST Advisory Committee’s 2015 Report

Overall NIST Response and Committee’s Scope

Dr. Howard Harary thanked the Committee for preparing its 2015 report, most

importantly, recommendations regarding the NCST. He clarified the Committee’s 

scope, noting that the Advisory Committee was created specifically to provide 

recommendations to NIST regarding the NCST Act’s implementation. Harary said 

that previous recommendations have been very helpful to NIST in:

• conducting investigations; 

• presenting its findings and recommendations; 

• tracking implementation of those recommendations; and 

• exploring how those findings and recommendations can have expanded 

impact on the safety of structures. 

Although the Committee’s scope is defined by its charter, the Committee’s members 

also share their observations on other matters, which NIST values. He stated that 

NIST welcomes any comments from members, but cautioned that if they do not 

relate directly to NCST matters and are offered as consensus recommendations, they 

legally fall outside the scope of the Committee’s charter. At the same time, NIST does 

not wish to discourage members’ discussions or observations; he said that it is not a 

matter of whether a topic gets discussed at a meeting -- but rather, whether it shows 

up in a report as a Committee recommendation. 
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Isenberg thanked Harary for clarifying this, and suggested that the Committee’s 

report could be organized into two parts: a set of recommendations and a set of

observations. He also suggested that a memo to the Director of NIST could be 

generated that would provide additional information beyond what was in the report 

to Congress. A brief discussion followed about the Committee’s scope in which 

members sought additional clarification about specific issues being within or 

outside their charge. That included NIST’s work on the disaster data repository, 

which will include both NCST and non-NCST work. 

Specific NIST Responses to Advisory Committee Recommendations and 

Committee Discussion

Harary provided NIST’s responses to the Committee’s 2015 recommendations as 

follows. Additional detail was provided in charts and by several subsequent 

speakers.

1. Fire investigations

The Committee commented on several aspects of NIST’s fire investigations that are 

not part of any NCST-related work at this time. The Committee would be updated on 

NIST’s fire research activities and the National Fire Research Laboratory (NFRL)

during presentations and the NFRL tour later in the day.

2) Community Resilience Center of Excellence (CoE)

• NIST agreed with the Committee’s recommendations about the potential 

usefulness of tools and methods for NIST’s future NCST disaster and failure 

investigations that result from the CoE’s research.

• NIST is placing a high priority on integrating CoE research tools and data into 

its own investigations as these tools becomes available, and that future NCST 

disaster and failure investigations will benefit from that work.

• NIST staff, including the acting director of the Disaster and Failure Studies 

Program, Long Phan, is actively collaborating with the CoE on community 

models, data architecture and management, and field studies research. 

3) Implementation of Recommendations from the Joplin Tornado Report.

• NIST appreciates the Committee’s recognition of the traction gained among 

standards and code organizations regarding recommendations from the

Joplin investigation.

• NIST has been working with code developers, state and local officials, and 

other federal agencies (such as FEMA and NOAA) to follow up on all of NIST’s 

proposed improvements for tornado protection and resilience.

• Among the most significant accomplishments are the first approved building 

code changes resulting from the investigation, slated for publication in ICC's 

2018 International Building Code (IBC) and 2018 International Existing 
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Building Code (IEBC). These will help to protect schools and their associated 

high-occupancy buildings from violent tornadoes. 

The NIST Joplin team would brief the Committee in detail during the day, covering 

implementation of recommendations as well as ongoing related research.

4) Disaster Data Repository

The Committee would be updated about NIST’s latest work with the disaster data 

repository during the meeting. 

5) Possible Expansion for Deployment of NCST Teams

• NIST has considered expanding its criteria for NCST deployment to address 

issues related to resilience in addition to reducing risk. Such a change would 

extend the types and numbers of disasters that NIST might investigate under 

NCST authorities. 

• A primary consideration is the limited resources available within the 

Disaster and Failure Studies program and the Engineering Laboratory.

• With the variety of current commitments and uncertainties about future 

budgets, NIST was not currently in a position to modify the criteria. But NIST 

appreciates the recommendation, understands its value, and will continue to 

consider modifications, especially if additional resources are available.

III. Update on Implementation of Joplin Investigation 

Recommendations and Discussion 

Dr. Long Phan reviewed NIST’s 16 recommendations calling for:

• Nationally accepted standards for tornado–resistant design and design 

methodologies.

• Uniform national guidelines that enable communities to create safe and 

effective public sheltering strategies, tornado shelter standard for existing 

buildings, and installation of tornado shelters in new and existing buildings.

• National codes and standards and uniform guidance for clear, consistent, 

recognizable, and accurate emergency communications and joint plans by 

emergency managers, the NWS, and the media to make sure that accurate 

and consistent emergency alert and warning information is communicated in 

a timely manner.

• Research, technologies and strategies to advance tornado wind 

measurements, strengthen emergency communications, increase warning 

time, derive more accurate tornado hazard maps and improve public 

response.

Several of the recommendations were being addressed by other organizations that 

had agreed to serve in a lead role.
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Recommendation #3 called for tornado hazard maps to be developed for use in the 

engineering design of buildings and infrastructure. The maps will consider spatially 

based estimates of the tornado hazard instead of point–based estimates. Key points 

included:

• Existing tornado hazard maps do not account for biases and increased risk of 

strike on large spatial systems. 

• NIST had contracted with ARA to develop Tornado Hazard Maps for Building 

Design, and is 1.5 years into a four-year effort.

• Progress to date included: 

1. Reviewed the state-of-knowledge on tornado climatology, biases in 

tornado databases, and tornado risk assessment.

2. Conducted data analysis and sensitivity studies of factors affecting 

tornado data to inform tornado hazard maps development plan.

3. Quantified tornado risk metrics for pilot municipality (Joplin) and 

sensitivity analysis to guide prioritization of maps development.

4. Held stakeholder workshop to update key private sector, academic, 

and governmental stakeholders on progress of the tornado hazard 

maps development effort (September 2015).

The Committee discussion included questions, observations, and recommendations:

• A suggestion was made that a milestone-based indicator would be helpful, in 

addition to information about how far into the project NIST was in terms of 

time that has passed. Phan responded that this would be possible. 

• Whether tornado hazard maps could be developed with spatially based 

estimates of the tornado hazard rather than today’s point-based estimates

that rely on damage to structures. NIST had hosted a workshop in September

2015 to ensure that the methodology for developing the new tornado map is 

understood and supported by the community, so that at the end of four years, 

the mapping approach would be acceptable to everyone. 

• NIST anticipates updating these maps over time. NIST considers its new 

tornado hazard map would be V1.0, similar to the way that tsunami 

mappings are managed.

Progress in Developing Tornado Hazard Maps

• Melissa Faletra, Wind Engineer with Applied Research Associates (ARA), 

provided additional details about the tornado hazard maps project and 

offered an overview of the tornado hazard modeling process. She pointed out 

one of the first task involves review and compilation of tornado data, which 

come from different sources and databases, and database cleansing to 

correct errors and biases in the databases due to differences over time with 

data collection methods and procedures as well as data entry and database 

management and administration. She emphasized that it was important to 

capture in modeling that a particular tornado (e.g., EF-4) is not at that 

constant force throughout its full path. Faletra also presented ARA’s effort in
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modeling of wood frame walls’ performance in tornado as a way to validate 

tornado wind speeds. She summarized the NIST/ARA’s tornado hazard maps 

development effort by stating that tornado hazard analysis is a complicated, 

iterative process with many components, but NIST and ARA are making 

steady progress.

The Committee discussion included questions, observations, and recommendations

about:

• Has work so far given an indication of whether the maps we have been using 

are too low for this hazard? Faletra stated that the work done to date 

indicates that the risk of tornado strike for a particular building shown by the

current maps is lower than it should be.

• How building density is accounted for in these maps.

• Whether the use of satellite imaging had been considered in constructing 

maps; for example, damage to vegetation could be helpful in identifying

length and width of the tornado, and to infer wind speeds. Phan noted that 

an ASCE Standard on Tornado Wind Speed Estimation was being developed

so that in the future, tornado databases could include that additional 

information. Committee member Kiremidjian noted that new tools could be 

developed to extract data from existing images, and that the effort would not 

be very costly.

• How the technology ultimately would find its way into the IBC, and what that 

was going to look like. Would these approaches be embedded in software in 

the same way that seismic hazard assessments are conducted? If so, who is 

going to have access to and know how to best use that software? How would

it be used by urban planners and building officials, and structural engineers?

Phan said that the plan was to incorporate new technological approaches

into ASCE 7, for example, and that the map would be digitally based. Details 

about how it would be made public were being worked through with the 

appropriate ASCE committee, with the final format envisioned as software.

• The usefulness of USGS’s seismic hazard mapping that is available online; a 

suggestion was made that NIST should look at the USGS website as an analog 

to see how such a tool can be offered to the broader community.

• The selection of structure types in databases and their validity. 

• Whether NIST was making any efforts to develop the right kinds of 

instruments to better measure wind velocities from tornadoes. Committee

member Kiremidjian stated that “We shouldn’t just be getting wind speeds 

by reverse engineering via structural damage,” and suggested that cameras 

or small sensors could be used to get wind speeds/directions that could help 

to improve measurements of wind velocities due to tornadoes. Members 

were informed by Levitan that NIST is working with ASCE standard 

committee on improving wind speed measurements from radar and in situ, 

and that NST was funding some related work, including on new technology 

approaches. It was noted that NOAA is working on other technologies; they 

are the lead for recommendation #1.
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Update on Joplin-Related Standards, Codes, and Guidance Development 

Marc Levitan provided the Committee with an update on standards, codes, and 

guidance development work as a result of the Joplin Tornado investigation 

recommendations. These included:

Existing Standards 

• ASCE/SEI 7-22, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Structures

• ICC 500-2019, Standard for Design and Construction of Storm Shelters 

New Standards

• ASCE/SEI Standard for Estimation of Wind Speeds in Tornadoes.

• NFPA 1616, Standard for Mass Evacuation and Sheltering.

Building Codes

• 2018 International Building Code (IBC).

• 2018 International Existing Building Code (IEBC).

Guidelines

• FEMA P-431, Tornado Protection: Selection Refuge Areas in Buildings.

• FEMA P-320, Taking Shelter from the Storm: Building a Safe Room for Your 

Home or Small Business, 4th ed. (December 2014).

• FEMA P-361, Safe Rooms for Tornadoes and Hurricanes: Guidance for 

Community and Residential Safe Rooms, 3rd ed. (March 2015).

• ICC 500-2014 Commentary on the Standard for Design and Construction of 

Storm Shelters (January 2016).

The final three guidelines listed above represent completed work.

Levitan noted that national model building codes, standards, and practices seek to 

achieve life safety for the hazards considered in design. He said that a paradigm shift 

was needed to include tornadoes in design practice, which are not currently 

considered, except for structures in nuclear power plants, storm shelters, and safe 

rooms. The Joplin investigation report called for nationally accepted performancebased standards for tornado-resistant design of buildings and infrastructure to be 

developed in model codes and adopted in local regulations to ensure the resilience 

of communities to tornado hazards (R5). 

The progress of work by NIST and others in tornado design incorporation into 

standards and codes included a reference to the work on new tornado hazard maps 

(R3), new tornado wind load design methods (R6), and development of new damage 

indicators (DIs) for the EF tornado intensity scale to better distinguish between the 

most intense tornado events (R4). It also included a recommendation (R2) that 

information gathered and generated from tornado events (such as Joplin) should be 

stored in publicly available and easily accessible.

Levitan also reported that ASCE had approved a new standard committee called 

Wind Speed Estimation in Tornadoes. Co-chaired by NWS and NIST, it has 93 

members, mainly meteorologists, wind engineers, and structural engineers. The 
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scope of the new standard includes wind speed estimation by EF scale, radar and insitu measurements, forensic engineering, tree fall patterns, and remote sensing.

The committee’s scope also includes requirements for data and metadata, and is

intended for adoption by the National Weather Service (NWS). Current NWS 

requirements do not allow for inclusion of actual wind speeds.

Better guidance for existing Damage Indicators (DIs) are being developed to provide 

more consistent wind speed estimates (e.g., a large building where half of the 

building is damaged badly and the remainder of the building suffers little, if any, 

damage). That work also encompassed the development of new engineering-based 

DIs (e.g., Jersey barriers, where wind tunnel tests were determining the speeds 

required for overturning).

A key limitation is that the EF Scale is damage based, and a tornado has to hit 

something in order to get an estimated wind speed. Recent mobile radar 

measurements indicate much stronger winds than those estimated by damage, so 

under-reporting appears to be a major problem.

National guidelines are being developed to enable communities to create safe and 

effective public sheltering strategies (R8). The guidelines should address planning 

for siting, designing, installing, and operating public tornado shelters within the 

community. NIST has worked closely with FEMA on guidance (e.g., multiple “Safe 

Room” publications), leading development of the ICC 500 standard commentary, 

and working with NFPA on its proposed 1616 annex (now out for balloting).

Recommendation (R7) has two parts: (a) a tornado shelter standard specific for 

existing buildings be developed and referenced in model building codes and (b) 

tornado shelters be installed in new and existing multi–family residential buildings, 

mercantile buildings, schools and buildings with assembly occupancies located in 

tornado hazard areas. Code changes approved for the 2018 IBC and IEBC were 

developed in coordination with the Building Code Advisory Committee (BCAC) and 

FEMA and expand requirements for incorporation of ICC 500 storm shelters at both 

new and existing schools.

Less successful efforts to date include those seeking to implement recommendation 

(R11) that aggregate used as surfacing for roof coverings and aggregate, gravel, or 

stone used as ballast be prohibited on buildings of any height located in a tornado–

prone region. Changes were proposed for the 2018 IBC; they were not successful in 

recent balloting, but NIST is revising the code change proposal.

For recommendation (R9) (that uniform guidelines be developed and implemented 

nationwide for conducting assessment of tornado risk to buildings and designating 

best available tornado refuge areas as an interim measure within buildings until 

permanent measures fully consistent with Recommendations 5 and 7 are 

implemented), NIST is working with FEMA to update FEMA P-431. The current 

version deals almost exclusively with schools; the revised version will have a new, 
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engineering–based selection methodology that will cover a broader array of 

building occupancies and types and incorporate quantitative as well as qualitative 

factors. 

Committee members asked about:

• Plans to expand shelter code-related implementation beyond schools. 

Levitan confirmed plans to do that, but also noted that those are more 

complicated and likely will engender greater resistance. Consequently, NIST 

had decided on a phased approach. He offered that there will be more 

shelters constructed, more products developed to bring the cost down, and 

more designers and developers familiar with these issues, and that these 

developments likely would improve the prospects for code adoption. 

• How new construction was being handled versus renovated buildings in 

proposals to improve various codes.

• The economic impact of no longer using aggregate roofs, and whether it was 

feasible to use the same kind of rooftop to encapsulate the pebbles and keep 

them from blowing away—rather than replacing them. NIST staff noted that 

aggregate surfaced roofs are becoming less and less common and now 

represent only a small percentage of market share. Economic impacts would 

be large for those involving with aggregate roofs, but that there now were 

many alternatives to those systems. After further discussion, NIST said that it 

could bring in its Applied Economic Office to help assess the situation, if the 

agency is not successful during the next code considerations. Committee 

members’ ideas about this topic were welcomed.

Emergency Communications

Erica Kuligowski described work to develop guidance for community-wide public 

alerts in emergencies. She noted that this was an outgrowth of a NIST Joplin 

investigation report recommendation calling for the development of codes, 

standards, and guidance for emergency communications and a joint plan by 

emergency managers, the media, and the NWS for consistent alerts.

There is a two-year project to develop guidance for communities for public alerts 

via outdoor siren (warning) systems and social media (including mobile alerts). The 

guidance will 1) focus on alerting strategies for relevant hazard and threat scenarios 

in communities in the U.S. and 2) provide technical foundation for NFPA 1616 on 

alerting requirements. 

After reviewing the multiple elements of a community-wide emergency 

communication system, Kuligowski stressed the highly collaborative nature of the 

ongoing work, with NFPA as the designated lead for implementing the Joplin report 

recommendation. This work is organized into two distinct, but related areas:

1) NFPA 1616 Technical Committee, with Annex K on Emergency 

Communication: Public Alerts and Warnings and Annex L on Social Media 

Planning.
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2) Fire Protection Research Foundation (FPRF), with a Project Panel consisting 

of the Department of Homeland Security (S&T), NOAA/National Weather 

Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Local (and State) emergency 

management and response community, siren/alarm manufacturers, the 

research community (including social dimensions of disasters), and the NFPA 

1616 Chair.

NIST has previously collaborated with FPRF and NFPA in related work. 

The Joplin investigation identified confusion about what the siren signals meant,

and that communities used the sirens in various ways. The project is looking at 

current siren technologies, limitations, and capabilities in alerting. It also is 

examining how people respond to alerting sounds and patterns – and is reviewing

methods that leading communities have adopted to standardize siren systems. In 

the second year, a guidance document will address standard alerting strategies and 

point to effective usage of mobile devices and social media tools.

Progress to date includes the review of siren policies for several regional 

organizations around the country. Joplin has taken the lead and is working with 

other communities in Southwest Missouri. Next steps include literature reviews of 

how people respond to alerting sounds and patterns, collection of additional siren 

policies developed by communities, and a workshop to be held in the summer of 

2016. 

Committee members asked several questions, including whether it was feasible to 

use or develop technology that would trigger a signal to the building’s alarm system 

to enhance alert and warning messages. Kuligowski said that she would follow up 

with alarm manufacturers on the FPRF Panel.

NOAA Grid-Based Threat Communication: Forecasting a Continuum of 

Environmental Threats (FACETS)

Dave Jorgensen of NOAA reviewed progress in implementing Joplin report 

recommendation (R16) that calls for technology to be developed to provide tornado 

threat information to emergency managers, policy officials, and the media on a 

spatially resolved real–time basis to supplement the currently deployed official 

binary warn/no warn system. NOAA has the lead for this recommendation.

Jorgensen pointed to issues with the current tornado warning system, especially 

noting that warning polygons:

• Are messy and inherently “binary” (on/off; in/out)—leading forecasters to 

make warning areas conservatively large, 

• Have huge false alarm rate, and 

• Reflect a 1950s Teletype-era paradigm based on air raid sirens.

He told the Committee that “we can do so much better now with new technologies”

and believes that warning times can increase from12 minutes to 45 minutes.
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Jorgensen briefed members on NOAA’s National Severe Storms Lab (NSSL) work to 

explore and develop a new grid-based threat communication paradigm, called 

Forecasting a Continuum of Environmental Threats (FACETS). This is a new, allhazard watch/warning paradigm (grid-based, probabilistic threats) redesigned with 

social/behavioral science. It is a multi-year exploration/development effort. To date, 

the work team has completed a first iteration of probabilistic hazard grids and tools

and has run limited tests with NWS forecasters via a Hazardous Weather test bed in 

Norman, OK. Twelve years of NWS radar data has been analyzed in preparation for 

statistical based methods for warnings.

The benefit of FACETS is that it would provide a fully-integrated continuum of 

weather threat information; a reduction in size of “warned” areas (avoiding 

overwarning); considerable new opportunities for America’s weather industry; and 

offer more useful, actionable, and recipient-specific information (e.g., hospitals may 

be more sensitive to threats that other occupancies). These advances would help to 

meet the NWS goal of a Weather-Ready Nation. Considerable work remains to be 

done, he noted. 

Members followed up Jorgensen’s presentation by noting:

• There were varying timelines today for alerts/warnings for different kinds of 

hazards (e.g., seismic warnings) and that there were clear implications for 

protecting building occupants. For example, seismic warnings offered only 

limited help (e.g., time for hospitals to stop surgeries, people to get under 

desks).

• Tsunami warnings are a reasonable comparison of tornado warnings. 

IV. National Fire Research Laboratory Tour

Committee members toured the National Fire Research Laboratory (NFRL) at NIST, 

a new facility that could be used in future NCST investigations as well as other 

disaster-related investigations and research. Matt Bundy, NFRL Director for Fire 

Research, described types of work at the facilities and their relationship to the NCST 

investigations of the World Trade Center buildings collapses and fires as well as the 

Rhode Island nightclub fire and other disaster investigations. He reviewed NFRL 

expansion design objectives and operating principles and processes.

Members asked about commissioning tests for fire and pollution control

equipment), facility capabilities, expected types of structures to be tested, and the 

capacities and limitations of the facilities (e.g. dimensions, multi-story, starting fires 

at various locations).

V. Disaster and Failure Studies Update

Jason Averill reviewed the criteria for NCST investigations that evaluate the need for 

an investigation and considers many factors. He followed with a review of the 

disasters that had taken place since the last Advisory Committee meeting in March 

2015 and how each scored using those criteria. NIST chose not to deploy to any of 
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the nine recent disasters, although the agency is still monitoring the April Kyushu, 

Japan, earthquakes.

Members asked a series of questions about the criteria and how each disaster was 

rated. That included the effect of limited resources. Averill advised that if the agency 

deployed NCST, NIST would need to adjust its other work to reflect the increased 

resource and workload demands. In this decision making process, the knowledge 

that might be gained through an NCST investigation and the potential impact on 

standards and codes would have to be weighed against other ongoing work. 

Members were reminded that NIST’s goal in undertaking an investigation under the 

NCST authority is not to do a forensic analysis. There was an extended discussion 

about resource availability and decision making about NCST deployment.

Especially in light of a spectacular New Year’s Eve fire in Dubai, Averill said that 

NIST needed to look carefully at the standards being used to address fires and make 

sure that we are not overlooking fires where building exteriors were involved. He 

also noted that recent Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) fires did not score high 

enough to be investigated, but there is a lot of background detail about WUI fires 

that is just starting to emerge.

Disaster Data Repository Updates

Averill advised the committee that recent additions to the Disaster Data Repository 

cover data from the Chile 2010 Maule and the 1985 Valparaiso earthquakes; this 

information is now available for public access. The Joplin and Moore Tornadoes 

Data Repository will be available for public access in summer 2016.

Referring to the Committee’s past interest in the potential for expanding data 

contributors beyond NIST, Averill told members that NIST hopes that the data 

repository eventually becomes an integral tool for field studies. He said that NIST is

moving towards a place where it can begin to think about and accept data from nonNIST sources, as the agency and community get more experience with the database 

under its belt. Averill noted that there are a variety of questions that must be 

addressed regarding any special access that would be required to enable those 

additions, and he stated that NIST must first ensure that the database is fully 

functional. He noted that NIST would not want to start working with outside 

contributors and then need to “change the rules” about the database. One member 

asked specifically about several potential data contributors; Averill requested that 

information about them be provided to NIST, noting that eventually, the agency

would want to pilot with non-NIST contributors.

Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning (CoE)

Noting that integrating social and economic aspects of communities’ built 

environment with engineering aspects is one of the exciting areas of community 

resilience, Averill explained the role of the Center for Risk-Based Community 

Resilience Planning, a NIST Center of Excellence (CoE). It is important that the

resilience focus is on recovery; that necessitates longitudinal studies to measure and 
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track the function of the community over time. He provided updates on the CoE’s 

progress since its establishment in 2015, and noted that the CoE was expected to 

contribute tools that would assist in future disaster investigations – just as the 

results of those investigations would be factored into the Center’s research by 

“hindcasting.” For instance, CoE researchers could take data from the Joplin 

investigation as input conditions, and then test and validate the computational 

models being developed in the CoE. This was another example of the benefit and 

impact of the Joplin study. 

Members posed questions about the inclusiveness of resilience metrics for 

transportation and communications, potential overlap between CoE field studies 

and NCST studies, and relationship of the CoE work with other resilience efforts 

such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities. Averill responded by 

noting that multiple physical infrastructure systems were being addressed by the 

CoE, that there was no statutory prohibition on having the CoE investigate a failure 

that NIST also was investigating – although coordination would be key in those 

cases and objectives of these studies would be different, and that there have been 

significant communications with other organizations, including working with

Rockefeller’s Chief Resilience Officers as part of these officials’ training sessions.

VI. Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Fires

Nelson Bryner reported on NIST’s investigations of two major WUI fires in Amarillo, 

TX (2011) and Waldo Canyon, CO (2012) – neither of which were conducted under 

the NCST Act. 

He noted that the Amarillo fire was the first opportunity to analyze information 

from an electronic data collection system for equipment. There is not much 

information to be gathered from destroyed structures, so investigators cannot learn 

much about fire spread or the impact on nearby structures. But damaged (rather 

than destroyed) structures allow investigators to begin to identify vulnerabilities 

and the response of structures to fires. For instance, are decks, fences, or attics

playing a significant role in fire spread? 

Extensive data was collected after the Waldo Canyon Fire: over 200 technical 

discussions with first responders and 4,500 distinct fire observations and/or 

defensive actions for ~8 hours of incident. After the first hour, structures were 

being ignited from structure-to-structure rather than from wildland ignitions

Bryner emphasized that WUI fires require rapid response, explaining the difference 

between responses for urban, WUI, and wildfire responses – with WUI fires being 

closer to urban. He told the committee that “We’ve been fighting WUI more like 

wildfires,” and that these investigations show that there is no time for staging 

firefighters and apparatus. Bryner said that communities need to have pre-plans for 

WUI fires, just as they have pre-plans for structural fires.
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Members asked several questions about radio communications, and were told that 

there were issues coordinating with multiple jurisdictions’ equipment. 

VII. Reauthorization of the National Windstorm Impact Reduction Program 

(NWIRP)

Marc Levitan reviewed NWIRP’s mission, history and agency roles, with NIST having 

lead agency responsibilities, plus carrying out R&D to improve model building 

codes, voluntary standards, and practices for design, construction, and retrofit of 

buildings, structures, and lifelines. He reinforced that FEMA and NIST are mandated

to work together on standards and codes. There is a separate advisory committee 

for windstorm impact reduction. That committee is charged with offering

assessments and recommendations on: 1) trends and developments in the natural, 

engineering, and social sciences and practices of windstorm impact mitigation, 2)

the priorities of the Program’s Strategic Plan, 3) the Program’s coordination, 4) the 

effectiveness of the Program in meeting its purposes, and 5) any revisions to the 

Program which may be necessary. Windstorm investigations are authorized under 

NWIRP.

Members had questions about how NWIRP investigations related to the NCST 

investigations and the potential for a lack of adequate coordination; NIST would be 

fully aware of any planned investigations. They also asked about whether NIST 

could conduct an NCST investigation and borrow investigators from other agencies 

that they would pay for; NIST staff cited NCST Act requirements that at least one 

member of each team be from outside NIST. They noted that the external Joplin 

investigator was from NOAA (Dave Jorgensen) and that agency had paid his costs. 

Levitan added that if another agency owning a facility were damaged, NIST would 

have a coordination mechanism in place to play a role in an assessment.

A member asked for a definition of “windstorm” and whether there is a crossover 

with NCST. NIST staff responded that there was no definition in the statute, but that 

one of the advantages of NIST having the NWIRP lead is that these programs all 

report to the NIST Engineering Laboratory Director.

VIII. Committee Discussions

Asks of the NCST Advisory Committee

Howard Harary posed several questions to the Committee:

• Can the Committee recommend criteria for deployment teams to various 

hazard events (EQ, hurricane, wildfire, etc.) to ensure the right expertise is 

available to collect necessary data and make assessments? 

• Can the Committee advise NIST on best practices for standardizing the type 

and format of data collected during deployment for various hazard events? 
15

He also asked the Committee to review the Engineering Laboratory’s First Level 

Hazard Review for field deployments, and respond with best practices for 

improving field safety. Harary noted that the Committee could address these 

requests in small groups, and would need to meet in a full Committee setting in 

order to reach a consensus.

Committee members indicated that they were interested in following up. 

Members had several questions and initial observations regarding recommending 

criteria for deployment teams:

• What are the difficulties in getting people on the team now, and are there 

gaps in expertise? Does NIST see areas where investigations could “grow”

and where they could make a greater impact?

• What authority does NIST have with respect to working with other agencies 

to bring in expertise that we don’t have within house? NIST staff responded 

that there are no limitations on NIST’s authority in this regard; if it is

supportive of an investigation’s goals, NIST can find a way to partner with 

other agencies. The agency has more than 20 MOUs with agencies and 

private companies in case NIST encounters them during its investigation to 

avoid roadblocks. 

• Can the process be improved by studying past investigations before NCST 

was in place? Reviewing about a dozen investigations might be appropriate 

in terms of assessing scope and expertise. The Committee requested a very 

high-level listing of the principal investigators of prior investigations which 

of the type that NIST would evaluate seriously for NCST investigations if 

those incidents were to occur in the future.

NCSTAC Preparation of Annual Report to Congress

Committee members reviewed the day’s discussions and issues, including the NIST 

requests made of them, and agreed on an approach for responding and for 

preparing the annual report to Congress. 

The Committee adjourned at 5:00 pm.