FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LEON CURTIS ECKFORD, AKA 

Porky, AKA Spank, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50167 

D.C. No. 

8:16-cr-00054-

CJC-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 13, 2023

Pasadena, California

Filed August 15, 2023

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges, 

and Eric N. Vitaliano,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

* The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2 USA V. ECKFORD

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

Affirming Leon Eckford’s conviction and sentence, the 

panel held that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a 

crime of violence that properly served as a predicate for 

Eckford’s conviction and mandatory minimum sentence for 

the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Under the “elements clause” of § 924(c), the phrase 

“crime of violence” is defined as “an offense that is a felony 

and . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” The phrase “physical force” means 

violent force, or force capable of causing physical pain or 

injury to another person. The panel applied the “categorical 

approach,” asking whether the federal felony at issue always 

requires the government to prove the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of force.

The panel held that under United States v. Dominguez, 

48 F.4th 1040 (9th Cir. 2022) (Dominguez II), completed 

Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of 

§ 924(c). The panel concluded that Dominguez II was not 

clearly irreconcilable with, and thus overruled by, United 

States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery is not a crime of violence). First, Taylor was 

not intervening higher authority because it was decided 

before Dominguez II. In Dominguez II, this court, on 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
USA V. ECKFORD 3 

remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light 

of Taylor, partially reinstated United States v. Dominguez, 

954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020) (Dominguez I) (holding that 

both completed Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery are categorically crimes of violence), and again 

held that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of 

violence. Second, the panel concluded that, even if it were 

not bound by Dominguez II, it would still find that 

Dominguez I’s analysis of completed Hobbs Act robbery, 

which cited the “realistic probability” test from Gonzales v. 

Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), was not clearly 

irreconcilable with Taylor. 

The panel held that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act 

robbery also satisfies the elements clause of § 924(c) 

because, for purposes of criminal culpability, the law does 

not distinguish between principals and aiders and abettors. 

COUNSEL

Kristi A. Hughes (argued), Law Office of Kristi A. Hughes, 

Cardiff, California, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Suria M. Bahadue (argued), Assistant United States 

Attorney; Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Criminal Appeals Section Chief; E. Martin Estrada, United 

States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Los 

Angeles, California; Scott D. Tenley, Zweiback Fiset & 

Zalduendo LLP, Los Angeles, California; for PlaintiffAppellee.
4 USA V. ECKFORD

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Leon Eckford pleaded guilty to aiding and 

abetting the robbery of two jewelry stores in violation of the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). For his crimes, he was 

sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, including a mandatory 

minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a “crime 

of violence.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). On appeal, Eckford argues 

that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of 

violence and therefore cannot serve as a predicate for his 

§ 924(c) conviction and mandatory minimum sentence. We 

disagree and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, 

Leon Eckford participated in two jewelry store robberies. 

The first robbery was straightforward. Two of Eckford’s coconspirators entered a jewelry store and used a 

sledgehammer and an ax to smash open display cases. 

Eckford then swooped in to help his co-conspirators retrieve 

Rolex watches from the broken cases. Their haul was 14 

watches, altogether worth over $200,000.

Eckford’s second robbery raised the stakes. Upon 

entering a jewelry store, one of Eckford’s co-conspirators 

used a handgun to strike a security guard. The coconspirator then pointed his gun at the security guard, 

ordered him to the ground, and took the handgun that the 

guard carried in his holster. The co-conspirator pointed both 

his and the security guard’s handguns at the store employees. 

One of the participants in the robbery ordered the employees 
USA V. ECKFORD 5

to lie down on the floor. In the midst of the commotion, 

Eckford and three compatriots hacked at display cases with 

axes and sledgehammers. The group grabbed 133 Rolex 

watches—valued at over $2 million—and fled.

In April 2016, Eckford was arrested in his home. In a 

post-arrest interview, Eckford admitted that he participated 

in both robberies.

B. Procedural History

Eckford was indicted on five counts: one count of 

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a); two counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act 

robbery, id.; one count of aiding and abetting the use of a 

firearm during a crime of violence, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); 

and one count of being a felon knowingly in possession of 

ammunition, id. § 922(g)(1). Eckford pleaded guilty to the 

first four counts. The felon in possession charge was 

dismissed on the government’s motion.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated a 

sentencing guideline range of 63 to 78 months for Eckford’s 

three Hobbs Act robbery counts. Because a conviction for 

“brandish[ing]” a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of 

violence” requires a mandatory consecutive seven-year 

sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), the district court 

bumped its guideline calculation up to 147 to 162 months. 

In light of a number of mitigating factors, including 

Eckford’s traumatic upbringing, his contrition for his crimes, 

and exemplary behavior in prison, the district court varied 

downward from the guidelines and issued a sentence of 11 

years (132 months). As permitted by his plea agreement, 

Eckford filed a timely appeal of his sentence.
6 USA V. ECKFORD

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s final sentence pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(a). Normally, we review de novo the district 

court’s determination of whether a conviction is a crime of 

violence. United States v. Begay, 33 F.4th 1081, 1087 (9th 

Cir. 2022) (en banc). However, “where a defendant makes 

an argument for the first time on appeal that was not the basis 

of an objection in the trial court, we review for plain error.” 

Id. (citing United States v. Cuevas-Lopez, 934 F.3d 1056, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2019)).

The government argues that plain error review applies 

here because Eckford failed to argue before the district court 

that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime 

of violence. Eckford asserts that he adequately preserved the 

issue through comments at his change of plea and sentencing 

hearings. 

We need not resolve this dispute because we have 

discretion to review this question de novo. “[W]e are not 

limited to [plain error] review when we are presented with 

[1] a question that is purely one of law and [2] where the 

opposing party will suffer no prejudice as a result of the 

failure to raise the issue in the trial court.” United States v. 

McAdory, 935 F.3d 838, 841–42 (9th Cir. 2019) (third and 

fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted). Whether 

Eckford’s conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act 

robbery is a crime of violence is a purely legal question. See 

United States v. Perez, 932 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2019). 

The government has failed to explain how it would be 

prejudiced by de novo review, and it has fully briefed the 

issues. See McAdory, 935 F.3d at 842 (finding the 

government would not be prejudiced by de novo review 

when the government had been given “a full opportunity to 
USA V. ECKFORD 7

present its views”). We will, therefore, review Eckford’s 

claims de novo.

III. DISCUSSION

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), “any person who, during and 

in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a 

firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses 

a firearm” shall receive a mandatory sentence of “not less 

than 5 years.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). “[I]f the firearm is 

brandished,” the mandatory minimum sentence is seven 

years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Eckford’s conviction under 

§ 924(c) is based on the district court’s conclusion that 

aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime 

of violence.” If this conclusion is erroneous—if aiding and 

abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence—then 

we must reverse Eckford’s § 924(c) conviction.

Under a provision of § 924(c) known as the 

“elements clause,” the phrase “crime of violence” is defined 

as “an offense that is a felony and . . . has as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A). As used in the elements clause, “the phrase 

‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable 

of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).

“To determine whether a federal felony may serve as a 

predicate for a conviction and sentence under the elements 

clause . . . we must apply a ‘categorical approach.’” United 

States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2020 (2022). The 

categorical approach ignores the facts surrounding the 

particular defendant’s conviction. Id. Instead, “[t]he only 

relevant question is whether the federal felony at issue 

always requires the government to prove—beyond a 
8 USA V. ECKFORD

reasonable doubt, as an element of its case—the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of force.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

Eckford raises two issues. First, he argues that Hobbs 

Act robbery is not a crime of violence for purposes of 

§ 924(c). Second, he claims that even if Hobbs Act robbery 

is a crime of violence, aiding and abetting such robbery is 

not.

A. Hobbs Act Robbery as a Crime of Violence

We will first address Eckford’s argument that completed 

Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. This question 

has a history in our court. In United States v. Mendez, we 

held that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. 992 F.2d 

1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993). However, our conclusion in that 

case was not based on the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), 

but rather the so-called “residual clause” of § 924(c)(3)(B). 

Id. at 1491–92; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (“‘[C]rime of 

violence’ means an offense that is a felony and . . . by its 

nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 

the person or property of another may be used in the course 

of committing the offense.”). At the time we decided 

Mendez, the residual clause provided an alternative mode of 

evaluating whether an offense is a crime of violence. In 

2019, the Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause of 

§ 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, 

unenforceable. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 

(2019).

Without the residual clause, the only way to define a 

crime of violence under § 924(c) is through the elements 

clause. We took up the question of whether Hobbs Act 

robbery constitutes a crime of violence under the elements 

clause in United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th 
USA V. ECKFORD 9

Cir. 2020) (“Dominguez I”), vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2857 

(2022). There, we reasoned that even the “least serious way” 

to commit Hobbs Act robbery, “placing a victim in fear of 

bodily injury,” satisfied the elements clause “because it 

‘requires at least an implicit threat to use . . . violent physical 

force.’” Id. at 1260 (quoting United States v. Gutierrez, 876 

F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017)). We thus concluded, 

joining all other circuits, that “Hobbs Act robbery . . . is 

categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause.” 

Id. We also determined that the same was true of the 

defendant’s convictions for attempted Hobbs Act robbery. 

Id. at 1261–62. We affirmed the defendant’s § 924(c) 

convictions for both Hobbs Act robbery and attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery.

Last year, in United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court 

held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of 

violence. 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2020–21 (2022). In light of

Taylor, the Court vacated and remanded our decision in 

Dominguez I. Dominguez v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2857 

(2022). On remand, we issued a brief amended order in 

which we reversed the defendant’s § 924(c) conviction 

based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery. United States v. 

Dominguez, 48 F.4th 1040 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Dominguez II”); 

see Dominguez I, 954 F.3d at 1261–62. But we upheld the 

defendant’s § 924(c) conviction based on completed Hobbs 

Act robbery, incorporating the reasoning we had provided in 

Dominguez I. Dominguez II, 48 F.4th 1040; see Dominguez 

I, 954 F.3d at 1260–61.

Dominguez II should resolve this case. But Eckford 

claims that even Dominguez II’s partial reinstatement of 

Dominguez I is clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. 

“Generally, a panel opinion is binding on subsequent panels 

unless and until overruled by an en banc decision of this 
10 USA V. ECKFORD

circuit.” United States v. Easterday, 564 F.3d 1004, 1010 

(9th Cir. 2009). There is a narrow exception on which 

Eckford relies: “en banc review is not required to overturn a 

case where ‘intervening Supreme Court authority is clearly 

irreconcilable with our prior circuit authority.’” Id. at 1010–

11 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 

2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Sanchez v. 

Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021)). “[T]he ‘clearly 

irreconcilable’ requirement ‘is a high standard’” that 

demands more than mere “tension between the intervening 

higher authority and prior circuit precedent.” Fed. Trade 

Comm’n v. Consumer Def., LLC, 926 F.3d 1208, 1213 

(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. 

LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2013)). “[I]f we can 

apply our precedent consistently with that of the higher 

authority, we must do so.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 

533 (9th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Consumer Def., 926 F.3d at 1213).

According to Eckford, Hobbs Act robbery cannot be, 

categorically, a crime of violence because it encompasses 

threats of future injury to intangible economic interests, like 

public goodwill or reputation. Such threats, Eckford claims, 

would not satisfy the elements clause because they do not 

necessarily entail the use of “physical force.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). We addressed this 

concern in Dominguez I. We reasoned that we need not 

analyze whether threats to injure “intangible economic 

interests” require a threat of physical force because the 

defendant had “fail[ed] to point to any realistic scenario in 

which a robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by placing 

his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic 

interest.” 954 F.3d at 1260. Our reasoning referred to a test 

from Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), in 
USA V. ECKFORD 11

which the Court rejected the use of imaginative hypothetical 

scenarios. There, the Court held that a state statute is not 

broader than its generic federal equivalent unless there is “a 

realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the 

State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the 

generic definition of a crime.” Id. at 193. Relying on this 

test, we rejected the “intangible economic interests” 

argument because we found there was no realistic 

probability that the government would bring a Hobbs Act 

robbery case based on such a theory. Dominguez I, 954 F.3d 

at 1260.

Eckford claims the “realistic probability” test is 

incompatible with Taylor. Recall that Taylor dealt with 

attempted Hobbs Act robbery, not completed Hobbs Act 

robbery. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2020. In order to prove an 

attempt, the government had to show that the defendant 

“completed a ‘substantial step’” to achieving the goal. Id. 

But the government admitted that a “substantial step” “need 

not be violent.” Id. (quoting Brief for United States 22). In 

other words, to prove attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the 

government was “not require[d] . . . to prove that the 

defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use 

force against another person or his property.” Id. 

In Taylor, the United States pointed to Duenas-Alvarez

as evidence that the defendant bears the burden of showing 

“how his crime of conviction is normally committed or 

usually prosecuted.” Id. at 2024. The Court rejected the 

application of Duenas-Alvarez in Taylor’s case, for two 

reasons. First, the Court observed that in Duenas-Alvarez, 

the Court was engaged in a different version of the 

categorical approach. In Duenas-Alvarez, the Court was 

comparing generic federal law to state law, and the state 

courts are the final arbiters of the meaning of the state
12 USA V. ECKFORD

statute. So the Court employed the “realistic probability” 

test to measure how a state was likely to apply its statute; the 

test placed the burden on the defendant to show that a 

creative application of the state statute was a “realistic 

probability” and not just a “theoretical possibility.” DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. In Taylor, however, the Court had 

no such federalism concerns because it was comparing one 

federal statute to another federal statute. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 

at 2025. Second, the Court pointed out that in DuenasAlvarez the state and federal law clearly overlapped; the 

question was whether “state courts also ‘appl[ied] [their law] 

in [a] special (nongeneric) manner.’” Id. (quoting DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. at 193) (first and third alterations in 

original). In Taylor, there was no need to inquire how a state 

might enforce its own law; it was a matter for the federal 

courts to compare the elements of attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery with the § 924(c) requirements and determine how 

the two statutes should be read. The Court concluded that 

an attempt did not require the government to prove the use, 

attempt use or threatened use of force. Id.

Taylor’s concerns are not at play in this case. First, 

Taylor is not “intervening higher authority.” Miller, 335 

F.3d at 893 (emphasis added). The precedent that binds us 

is not Dominguez I; it is Dominguez II. Dominguez II was 

published after the Supreme Court vacated Dominguez I in 

light of Taylor. By reinstating the completed Hobbs Act 

robbery analysis of Dominguez I, the panel in Dominguez II

necessarily affirmed that analysis as consistent with Taylor. 

It is not our place to second-guess this holding.

Second, even if we were not bound by Dominguez II, we 

would still find that Dominguez I’s citation to the realistic 

probability test does not render its analysis of completed 

Hobbs Act robbery clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. 
USA V. ECKFORD 13

Taylor did not overrule Duenas-Alvarez; it merely held that 

the realistic probability test was not implicated because the 

Court was comparing two federal statutes. Taylor, 142 S. 

Ct. at 2024; see also Alfred v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1025, 1043 

(9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (recognizing 

that Taylor “interpret[ed] the ‘realistic probability’ 

requirement narrowly”). In Dominguez I, we cited DuenasAlvarez to emphasize that there was no “realistic scenario in 

which a robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by placing 

his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic 

interest.” Dominguez I, 954 F.3d at 1260. More 

importantly, that was not the end of our analysis. We also 

pointed to the Fourth Circuit, which had

observe[d] that both Section 924(c) and 

Hobbs Act robbery reference the use of force 

or threatened use of force against “property” 

generally, without further defining the term 

“property.” . . . And neither provision draws 

any distinction between tangible and 

intangible property. Thus, we do not discern 

any basis in the text of either statutory 

provision for creating a distinction between 

threats of injury to tangible and intangible 

property for the purposes of defining a crime 

of violence.

DominguezI, 954 F.3d at 1261 (second alteration in original) 

(quoting United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir.

2019)). We “agree[d] with and adopt[ed] this reasoning.” 

Id. In other words, if “property” encompasses intangible 

property in the Hobbs Act, then so does “property” in 

§ 924(c); conversely, if the Hobbs Act does not extend to 

intangible property, then neither does § 924(c). There is no 
14 USA V. ECKFORD

daylight between the use of the term “property” in the two 

statutes. See Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 

1812 (2019) (“This Court does not lightly assume that 

Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same 

term in the same or related statutes.”). 

We recognize that Eckford’s argument goes one step 

beyond what we discussed in Dominguez I. His point is not 

just that Hobbs Act robbery may involve injury to intangible

property. Rather, his point is that a threat to injure 

intangible property does not entail the physical force that the 

elements clause demands. Although this argument has some 

appeal, it is not a natural reading of the text. The First Circuit 

addressed a similar claim in United States v. García-Ortiz, 

904 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2018). García-Ortiz argued that “a 

person can commit Hobbs Act robbery by threatening to 

‘devalue some intangible economic interest like a stock 

holding or control right.’” Id. at 107. The First Circuit 

pointed out that the hypothetical “sounds to us like Hobbs 

Act extortion,” which is punished in a separate section. Id. 

(emphasis in original); see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). The 

court was 

unpersuaded that a threat to devalue an 

intangible economic interest constitutes the 

type of “injury” described in the Hobbs Act’s 

robbery provision. . . . Hobbs Act robbery, 

even when based upon a threat of injury to 

property, requires a threat of the kind of force 

described in Johnson[], that is, “violent force 
USA V. ECKFORD 15

. . . capable of causing physical pain or 

injury.”

Id. at 107 (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140). We agree with 

the First Circuit’s analysis. The broad form of intangible 

injury that Eckford describes is a far cry from the physical 

harm evoked by the terms “force,” “violence,” and “fear of 

injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b). Eckford’s reading of the 

statute would “ascrib[e] to one word a meaning so broad that 

it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving 

unintended breadth to [the Hobbs Act].” Yates v. United 

States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (quoting Gustafson v. 

Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). In short, even if we 

thought Taylor enabled us to reconsider our analysis in 

Dominguez I, we would still reach the same result: Hobbs 

Act robbery is a crime of violence. See Mathis, 932 F.3d at 

266 (fear of injury “necessarily involves the threat to use 

physical force” (internal quotation marks, citation, and 

alteration omitted)).

B. Aiding and Abetting Hobbs Act Robbery as a Crime of 

Violence

In the alternative, Eckford argues that even if Hobbs Act 

robbery satisfies the elements clause, aiding and abetting 

Hobbs Act robbery does not. Eckford argues that a 

defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting Hobbs 

Act robbery for being complicit in another person’s use of 

force without using or threatening to use force himself, and 

that such complicity cannot satisfy the elements clause.

Eckford’s argument misunderstands the nature of aiding 

and abetting liability. At common law, aiding and abetting 

was considered a separate offense from the crime committed 

by the principal actor. Over time, “every jurisdiction—all 
16 USA V. ECKFORD

States and the Federal Government— . . .‘expressly 

abrogated the distinction’ among principals and aiders and 

abettors.” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 189 (quoting 2 W. 

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(e) (2d ed. 2003)). 

As a consequence, aiding and abetting liability is “not a 

separate offense.” United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 

820 (9th Cir. 2005). We no longer distinguish between 

principals and aiders and abettors; principals and 

accomplices “are equally culpable and may be convicted of 

the same offense.” Alfred, 64 F.4th at 1034 (plurality 

opinion); see 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an 

offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces or procures its commission, is 

punishable as a principal.”); Rosemond v. United States, 572 

U.S. 65, 72–73 (2014). Eckford would have us return to the 

era when we treated principals and accomplices as guilty of 

different crimes. We have long moved past such distinctions 

for purposes of determining criminal culpability, although 

the terminology may be useful for other reasons. See Alfred, 

64 F.4th at 1034 (plurality opinion) (pointing out that 

although principals and accomplices “are equally culpable 

and may be convicted of the same offense,” the 

“metaphysical line between the two” may play a role in 

sentencing). An accomplice is guilty of committing the 

crime “even if that aid relates to only one (or some) of a 

crime’s phases or elements.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 73; see 

id. at 74 (“A strategy of ‘you take that element, I’ll take this 

one’ would free neither party from liability.”).

This rule applies to convictions under § 924(c). We have 

“repeatedly upheld § 924(c) convictions based on 

accomplice liability.” United States v. Henry, 984 F.3d 

1343, 1356 (9th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases). That means 

that “aiding and abetting a crime of violence . . . is also a 
USA V. ECKFORD 17

crime of violence.” Young v. United States, 22 F.4th 1115, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2022); see Amaya v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 

984–86 (9th Cir. 2021) (declining to consider aiding and 

abetting liability in its elements clause inquiry); United 

States v. Door, 917 F.3d 1146, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(same). We have reasoned that consideration of accomplice 

liability is not necessary for an elements clause inquiry 

because that inquiry looks only for the presence (or absence) 

of a single element. See Amaya, 15 F.4th at 984–86; Door, 

917 F.3d at 1152–53. Thus, even though accomplice 

liability presents an alternative means of committing an 

offense, that alternative means of commission does not 

affect whether the predicate offense “has as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another.” 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

In sum, nothing in this analysis is “clearly 

irreconcilable” with Taylor. Taylor dealt with an inchoate 

crime, an attempt, and does not undermine our precedent on 

aiding and abetting liability. “[T]here are fundamental 

differences between attempting to commit a crime, and 

aiding and abetting its commission . . . .” Garcia, 400 F.3d 

at 819. Chief among these differences is that “[i]n an attempt 

case there is no crime apart from the attempt, which is the 

crime itself,” whereas “aiding and abetting is a different 

means of committing a single crime, not a separate offense 

itself.” Id. at 819–20. Put differently, proving the elements 

of an attempted crime falls short of proving those of the 

completed crime, whereas a conviction for aiding and 

abetting requires proof of all the elements of the completed 

crime plus proof of an additional element: that the defendant 

intended to facilitate the commission of the crime. See id. at 

819. One who aids and abets the commission of a violent 
18 USA V. ECKFORD

offense has been convicted of the same elements as one who 

was convicted as a principal; the same is not true of one who 

attempts to commit a violent offense. Accordingly, we 

conclude that our precedent is not clearly irreconcilable with 

Taylor.

IV. CONCLUSION

We have previously held that Hobbs Act robbery is a 

crime of violence, Dominguez II, 48 F.4th 1040, and that 

aiding and abetting a crime of violence is also a crime of 

violence, Young, 22 F.4th at 1123. That precedent has not 

been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.