NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0372n.06 No. 09-5377 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
JOH N A . K

IN G , D .O. ; JOH N A . K

IN G , LL C , Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , v. HOSPITAL CORP ORATION OF A MERICA, e t al. , Defendants-A

ppellees
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: KEITH , C OLE, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge. P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l an t s D r . J o h nA
. K i n g an d J o h nA
. K i n g , LLC
a pp e a l the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the ir mot ion fo r re lie f fr om jud g me nt un de r F e de ra l Rul e of Civ il Procedur e 60(b) . For

the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND King is an osteopathic phy sician who pra cticed in Putnam C ounty , West Virginia, f rom November

2002 until J une 2003. He initially was g rante d orthopedic a

nd spinal privileg es at Putnam Ge ne ra l H os pit a l, bu t hi s p ri vil e g e s late r w e re su sp e nd e d o n Jun e 5, 20 03 . In a dd iti on , h is application for

anesthe siology

privileg es at Putnam Gene ral wa s denied. During the past five y ear s, King has filed f our lawsuits relating to the de nial and re vocationNo. 09-5377

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- 2 - of h i s m e d i c a l p r i v i l e g e s . H e f i l e d t h e f i r s to nJun e 6 , 2 0 0 5 , i nt h e S o u t h e r nD i s t r i c to f

W e st Virg inia, see Kings v. T

eays Valley Health Servs., Inc. (“ King I ”), N o. 2:05-cv-00463. T he district court g rante d a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion filed by the defe ndants and dismissed the ca se with prejudice
. King filed a se cond suit on May 24, 2006, in the Southern District of West Virg inia, see King v. Teays Valley H

ealth Servs., I

nc. (“ King II ”), Case No. 2:06-cv-0408. King volu n t ar i l y d ismiss ed that action. King filed his third action on October 26, 2007, in the Middle District of Tenne ssee, see King v. Teays Valley

Health Serv

s., Inc. (“ King III ”), Case No. 3:07-cv- 01064. The de fenda nts filed a motion to dismiss , which is still pending
. King filed t his case —his fourth lawsuit—on Fe bruar y 29, 2008, in the Middle District of Tenne ssee, see King v. T eays Valley Health Servs., I nc. (“ King IV ”), Case No. 2:08-cv- 00018. The proc edura l history

of this case (

King IV ) is as follows. On Fe bruar y 29, 2008, King and J ohn A. King , L L C (collec tively , “Appe llants”) filed suit. On August 27, 2008, howeve r, the district court e ntere d an orde r to stay the ca se, pendingthe outcome of King ’s bankruptcy proce eding . Then,
on No ve mb e r

1 7 , 2 0 0 8 , A p p e l l an t ’ s c o u n s e l , R o b e rtB ar d , f i l e d a n o t i c e o f v o l u n t ar y d i s m i s s a l. Counsel also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of rec ord. The district c ourt subsequently lifted the stay in order to r

ule on the Appe llants’ motion to di smiss. The court f i rs t o b s er ved that the motion was si l en t as t o whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. N ext, t he cour t acknow ledg ed that King previously had take n a voluntary

dismiss al in King II

—a ca se that the c ourt
c on c lud e d c on ta ine d a

numbe r o f t

he same de fe nd ants and

the same c la ims . Re lyingon F e de ra l Ru le of Civil P roce dure 41( a)( 1)(B ), which conce rns voluntary dismiss als and states that “if the plaintiff previously

dismiss ed any

fede ral- or

state-c ourt action base d on or including the same c laim, a noticeNo. 09-5377

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- 3 - of dismissal operate s as an a djudication on the merits,” the c ourt dismissed King IV with prejudice
. (R. 37, Orde r.) On Dec ember

31, 2008, the Appellants filed a Motion for Relief fr om Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), a

rg uing that the district court’s orde r wa s void and that they wer e surpr ised by the dis mis sa l. T he Ap pe lla nts the n f ile d a n A me nd e d M oti on

fo r R e lie f f

ro m F ina l Judg me nt. The district cour

t de nied both motions, noting that neither motion addr essed Rule 41(a )(1) (B ), the court’s r easoning for dismiss ing the case with pr ejudice. On Fe bruar y 12, 2009, the Appellants tried ag ain, filing a Motion for Rehe aring , but the result was the same. The district co u rt denied the mot io n becau se App e lla

nts of fe re d n o g ro un ds fo r r e lie f t hat ha d n ot “ a lr e a dy

be e n e xha

us tiv e ly explored in the Court’s prior Orde r.” ( R. 48, Order .) Appellants timely

appea led. II. AN AL YSI S On appe al, App el l ants make two c laims to support their argument that the district court’s Rul e 60 (b ) r

uli ngsh ou ld b e re ve rs e d: ( 1) that th ey di d not a uth or ize the ir

a tto rn e y to v olu nta ri ly dismiss their ca se, and (2) that this ca se ( King IV ) and the previously

dismiss ed ca se (

King II ) ar e substantially differ ent. We conclude , howeve r, t hat Appellants have waived both ar g uments. See Thu rm an v . Yell ow F

re igh t Sy s. , 90 F .3 d 11 60 , 11 72 (6 th Cir
. 19 96 ) (“ I ssu e s that are no t sq ua re ly prese nted to the trial cour t are considere d waived a nd may not be ra ised on appe al.”)
. As a thre sh old

ma tte r, the pa

rt ie s d isp ute wh e the r t

he re la xed

pr o s e sta

nd ard a pp lie s to Appellants’ plea dings. See W agenkne cht v. United States , 533 F.3d 412, 415 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“When deter mining whe ther to dismiss a pr o s e complaint, th es e co m p laints are he ld to less stringentNo. 09-5377

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- 4 - standards tha

n formal plea dings dr afte d by lawy ers.”) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). On Fe bruar y 29, 2008, Appellants filed the c omplaint in this case pr o se, but shortly there afte r attorne y Robert B ard be g an filing paper s on their behalf. On J uly 24, 2008, the district court c oncluded that “[b] ased on the motion filed by [counsel] ” Appe llants wer e “no longe r pro se .” In addition, as the dis tr ic t c ourt

re c og nize d

i n i t s o r de r d e nyingAp pe lla

nts ’ R ule 60 (b ) m oti on

fo r r e lie f f

ro m ju dg me nt,

“ [Ap pe lla nts ] we re no t a c tin g p ro se a t any tim e be c a

us e the Court

ha d n ot g ra

nte d th e mot ion

to withdraw filed by [Bard].” (R. 42, Order, 2.) Be cause the district court re cord doe s not show that the withdraw al motion was g ra n t ed , we c onclude that Appe llants were not proce eding pro se a nd thus the relaxed s tandar d does not apply
. Even if, howeve r, we came to the oppos ite conclusion, the
re su lt w ou ld b e the same . As we e xpla in be low , App e lla nts ’ ple a din g s ar e so la c kin g that th e y c ou ld
no t me e t e ve n th e re la xed sta nd ard be c a us e “ pr o se pa

rt ie s mus t sti ll br ie f t

he iss ue s a dv anc e d w ith
some eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation.” Coleman v. Shone y’s, I nc. , 79 F. App’ x 155, 157 (6th Cir. 2003) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). Appellants first cla im that the fil ing of the motion for voluntary

dismiss al was una

uthorized. I n th e ir Mo tio n f

or Re lie f f ro m F ina l J ud gment before the dis tr ic t c ourt , th e y argue d th a t th e ir
c ouns e l si mul tane ou sly

wi thd re w a nd fi le d th e no ti c e of

dis mis sa l and

“ c ouns e l, m ay

or may no t, have a uthority to file for w ithdrawa l as counsel and at the same time move the court for a dismissal of the plaintiff’ s cause of ac tion.” (R. 38, Motion for Relief from J udg ment, 1.) Appellants we nt on to say that they were “s u rp ri s ed to lear

n” that the ba

nkruptcy trustee a bandoned the cause of action, but at no point did they asser t that the dismiss al motion was without their authorization or outside the scope of counse l’s authority . ( Id. at 2.) Now, on appea l, Appellants ar g ue that the f ilingNo. 09-5377

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- 5 - of the dis mis sa l w a s una

uth or ize d b e c a

us e c ouns e l fa ile d to no tif y Ap pe lla nts and fa ile d to ob ta in their conse nt. Thus, their argument that t he dismissal moti on was una uthorized has evolved, a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t c on sid e r t

he ir pr e se nt a rgume nt. Th a t th e iss ue wa s n ot r ais ed bef or e the dis tr ic t c ourt

is e sp e c ia lly

pr ob le ma tic be c a

us e Appellants’ a

rg ument that counsel did not have permission to file t he dis missal motion is not a pure question of law. Instead, the c laim require s the pane l to determine the f actua l circumstanc es surround i n g t he filing of the motion—information that is not in the recor d—and appe llate re view
o f a w a iv e d is s u e is n o t a p p r o p r iate w h e r e th e r e c o r d is in s u f f ic ie n tl y d e v e lo p e d
. Cf. B r ya n t v. Dollar Gen. Corp. , 538 F.3d 394, 400 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (per mitti ng consideration of issues not raised below whe n the issue is one of law , and “f urther de velopment of the re cord is unnec essar y ”) ( internal qu otatio n mark s omi tte d) ). To “ pr e se rv e the int e g ri ty of the a pp e llate str

uc tur e ,” we wi ll n ot p e rm it this “back- up theor[y ] [ to] be mounted for the first time” a

nd instead dee m the arg

ument waived. Estate of Thomas P. Quirk v. Comm ’r, 928 F.2d 751, 758 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A p p e l l a nt s ’ s e c on d a

rgume nt—

that King II andth is case are d if feren t— su ffers f

ro m th e sa me defe ct. I n their Amende d Motion for Relief, Appe llants conce ded that this ca s e and King II “include[] many of the same claims” and shar e “ma ny of the same defe ndants as we ll,” but then went on to claim that “[t] he plea dings ha ve sepa rate and distinct merit.” (R. 40 , Amended Motion for Relie f f r o m a F in a l Ju d g me n t, 1
. ) H o w th e c la im s ar e d is ti n c t, h o w e v e r , is n o t e xp lained. The district court there fore did not have befor e it the argument now ar ticulated on appe al. I nstead, the court ha d only a p as s i n g as s ertion t hat the two cla ims were not the sa me, and Appe llants’ “vagueNo. 09-5377

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- 6 - ref ere nce” to this arg ument “does not squar ely prese nt the argument presse d here on appea l.” Banks

v. Rock well I nt’l N. Am. Aircraft Operations , 855 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1988) (de clining to r eview
an ar g ument that was mentioned only in passing in plaintiff’ s opposition t o summary judgme nt). I nt h e f i n al a n a l y s i s , ev en t h e m o s tch ar i t ab l e r ea d i n g o f A p p el l an t s ’ d i s t ri ct co u rt fi l i n gs shows that t h ei r ar gu m ents on appea l were not properly raised be fore the district court a nd are the re fo re wa ive d. We t

he re fo re de c lin e to r e vie w the ir argume nts
. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.