National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress

National Institute of Standards and Technology

2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS 

OF THE 

NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY 

TEAM ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

DECEMBER 2003

National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress

National Institute of Standards and Technology

1

2003 Annual Report to Congress of the 

National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

1.0 Executive Summary

Pursuant to Public Law 107-231Section 11(b)-Annual Report, the National Construction 

Safety Team Advisory Committee (the Committee) presents it 2003 Report on the 

implementation of the National Construction Safety Team Act (the Act) by the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 

The Committee was established and met three times during 2003, during which it 

reviewed progress on the two on-going investigations involving the 2001 World Trade 

Center building collapses following a terrorist attack and the Station nightclub fire in 

February in which 100 persons were killed. In addition, the Committee received and 

took under advisement, recommendations and comments from the public. 

The Committee made many comments and suggestions on the investigations and 

concluded that both investigations were valuable with realistic and achievable goals. 

That said, the Committee is concerned that several key issues have to be addressed if 

the long-term implementation of the Act is to be successful. Recommendations 

addressing these key issues are: 

 Creation of a National Construction Safety Team Office within the Building and Fire 

Research Laboratory of NIST with permanent staff and initial funding of $2,000,000. 

 Establishment of a Safety Team Investigation reserve fund of $2,000,000 to be used 

at the discretion of the Director of NIST to fund investigations when warranted. 

 Establishment of a program to familiarize local and State investigating authorities of 

the Act. 

 A research program investigating the factors affecting human decision making and 

evacuation behavior during emergencies in buildings. 

The Committee made other specific recommendations to NIST on the investigations. 

Most of these recommendations were accepted or resolved. Other items intended to 

further achieve the goals of the Act were identified for future consideration. 
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2.0 Background

2.1 Committee Responsibilities and Membership 

On October 1, 2002, the National Construction Team Safety Act (Public Law 107-203) 

became effective. This Act charged the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST), a part of the Department of Commerce (DOC), to form investigative teams 

(herein after called ‘Safety Teams’) “...after events causing a failure of a building or 

buildings that has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed a significant potential 

for substantial loss of life”. 

The legislation also required NIST to establish an advisory committee “...to advise the 

Director in carrying out this Act and to review the procedures developed under section 

2(c)(1) and the reports issued under section 8.” On November 5, 2002, DOC approved 

the Charter for the formation and operation of the ‘National Construction Safety Team 

Advisory Committee’ (NCSTAC) (Attachment I). In consultation with other Federal 

Agencies and private sector interests, NIST selected members for service on the 

NCSTAC. Attachment II lists the Committee members and their professional affiliations 

and backgrounds. 

The Act also required the NCSTAC to report through the Director to Congress; 

specifically to the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and to the 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate. The Committee’s 

charge is to evaluate and assess Safety Team activities and the implementation of 

Safety Team recommendations and to recommend other actions that will improve the 

operation and effectiveness of Safety Teams in carrying out their responsibilities. This 

report has been prepared to fulfill this requirement. 

2.2 Summary of Committee Meetings 

2.2.1 The NCSTAC met three times during the year, on April 29-30, August 26-27 and 

December 2-3, 2003 at NIST facilities in Gaithersburg, MD. The Committee received 

and took under advisement public comments at all three meetings. Detailed minutes of 

the three meetings and the public comments are posted on the NIST Web Site. 

Recommendations made by NCSTAC members concerned current Safety Team 

investigations, the various projects supporting these investigations and the proposed 

Final Interim Rule outlining the procedures governing implementation of the Act. The 

NCSTAC’s recommendations to NIST and NIST’s responses are summarized in 

Attachment III. 
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2.2.2 Brief Summaries of the Three Meetings 

2.2.2.1 April 2003 Meeting

2.2.2.1.1 Briefings: NIST staff prepared and presented a detailed review of the 

investigation and research and development plans for both the World Trade 

Center and Station Nightclub Safety Team on-going investigations. NIST staff 

also covered the procedures Federal advisory committees must follow. Finally, 

the Committee reviewed interactions between NIST and other Federal 

government investigative bodies (e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

(ATF), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), etc.). NIST staff also reported on 

investigator training received and the status of agreements outlining procedures 

and accountabilities where two or more Federal agencies might be investigating 

the same incident. 

2.2.2.1.2 Other Agenda Items: The NCSTAC expressed concerns about the 

various administrative requirements NIST must follow in any investigation that 

could impede or significantly slow down a Safety Team investigation. The 

Committee made several recommendations (discussed in Section 4.1 below and 

Attachment III) for NIST’s evaluation directed at obtaining relief from many of 

these requirements, thereby minimizing administrative delays and allowing 

investigations to move ahead in as timely and effective manner as possible. 

2.2.2.1.3 Public Comments Received: The NCSTAC received comments from 

Ms. Monica Gabrielle on behalf of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, Mr. Robert 

Polk on behalf of the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) and 

Ms. Colleen Delaney, who has residences in both New York and Rhode Island. 

Commenters expressed their personal or organizational support for the Act and 

NIST’s role in implementing it. They also expressed concern over current 

building codes and the issue of code enforcement in the United States. 

2.2.2.2 August 2003 Meeting

2.2.2.2.1 Briefings: The NCSTAC received detailed technical briefings on the 

progress of the on-going investigations. A considerable number of comments 

and recommendations were made concerning the two investigations regarding 

additional testing, interview criteria and underlying assumptions concerning 

modeling of building performance and fire dynamics. 

2.2.2.2.2 Other Agenda Items: The NCSTAC further reviewed the various 

procedures that a Federal advisory committee must follow. The NCSTAC also 

reviewed the procurement practices NIST followed in selecting individual outside 

experts and other laboratories for both investigations. The Committee had no 

recommendations regarding the selection criteria or the competencies of the 
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selected contractors. The NCSTAC reviewed two specific recommendations 

made during the Public Comment period from Ms. Monica Gabriel of the 

Skyscraper Safety Campaign. One recommendation was that the NCSTAC hold 

its December 2003 meeting in the New York City area. The other was that 

NCSTAC record all future meetings (see below). The NCSTAC initially adopted 

both recommendations. After further review of the costs and logistics involved, 

NCSTAC meetings will continue to be held at NIST headquarters. Beginning 

with the December 2003 meeting, NCSTAC meetings will be recorded. 

2.2.2.2.3 Public Comments Received: The NCSTAC received five public 

comments during the meeting and subsequently received an e-mail, which the 

NCSTAC has included in the public record. The commenters were Dr. Robyn 

Gershon of the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University and the 

Principal Investigator of the World Trade Center Evacuation Study; Ms. Gabrielle 

of the Skyscraper Safety Committee; Mr. John Biechman, Vice President of 

Government Affairs for the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA); Mr. Jake 

Pauls, a building safety consultant and; Mr. Frank Lombardi, Chief Engineer of 

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 

Comments were informative and supportive of the Act and NIST’s investigations, 

but two commenters expressed concern over the delay in obtaining information 

and NIST not taking advantage of using existing information from various 

sources both within and outside the United States. 

Mr. Sherman Rattner’s post-meeting e-mail to the NCSTAC shared his belief that 

the unique and innovative design of the World Trade Center Towers were critical 

to the building’s ability to withstand the impact of the aircraft and the subsequent 

fires allowing thousands of individuals to egress the building and survive. 

2.2.2.3 December 2003 Meeting

2.2.2.3.1 Briefings: The NCSTAC received detailed technical briefings on the 

results of various projects from both investigations. The NCSTAC noted that the 

various project status were generally in line with the original project plans. NIST 

staff reported that they had now obtained all essential information needed to 

complete the World Trade Center investigation. The original completion date of 

September 30, 2004 for issuing a draft investigation report was reasonable. 

While several individual suggestions were offered on specific aspects of an 

investigation or individual experiments or tests, no major recommendations 

regarding the direction or content of the various programs were made. 

2.2.2.3.2 Other Agenda Items: The NCSTAC reviewed the Interim Final Rule 

detailing procedures for implementation of the Act as published in the 

November 28, 2003 Federal Register and commented as a Committee 

suggesting several revisions. NIST staff described plans to improve NIST’s 

interaction at the State and local level involving incidents with criminal 
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investigations. Several comments were made regarding the need to address 

incidents with civil litigation, as well. 

The NCSTAC was briefed on the results of a press conference held in 

Providence, RI a few days before the NCSTAC meeting on the Station nightclub 

fire. NIST staff asked the public to contact them with any information they might 

have on the incident and reported several contacts had been made following the 

press conference. Finally, the NCSTAC reviewed the problem of ‘communityscale fires’, a relatively new phenomenon where close spacing of houses and 

other structures can cause fires to rapidly spread from building to building similar 

to historic city conflagrations or Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) fires. The 

NCSTAC concluded that community-scale fires were possible candidates for 

Safety Team investigations. 

2.2.2.3.3 Public Comments Received: Retired New York Battalion Chief Arthur 

Sheuerman and L. Ray Scott, Battalion Chief of Prince William County in Virginia 

addressed the Committee during the meeting. The NCSTAC also accepted 

written comments from Mr. Donald Bliss, Executive Director of the National 

Infrastructure Institute’s Center for Infrastructure Expertise. Comments included 

a recommendation NIST review the findings of a British investigative study of the 

World Trade Center tower collapses, the growing hazards associated with closely 

spaced housing and other structures and the need for NIST to work closely with 

organizations having similar objectives to NIST’s charge under the Act.

2.3 NCSTAC Comments On Implementation of the Act and Investigations

Following signing of the legislation, NIST moved quickly to form the advisory committee 

as required within the Act. Candidate NCSTAC members were promptly appointed. 

The NCSTAC’ s membership technical expertise is multi-disciplined, coming from the 

structural, fire and behavioral sciences. Members also have a variety of business, 

engineering and academic backgrounds. The NCSTAC had full access to all staff 

members as it began its review of on-going projects. Communications between the 

NCSTAC and NIST management and staff have been open and candid. 

By the time of NCSTAC’s formation, NIST had already initiated two major investigations 

– the World Trade Center investigation and the Station Nightclub fire in West Warwick, 

RI. Two other multi-death incidents also occurred during 2003. Over 20 persons died 

in a crowd crush incident in Chicago, IL while exiting a second story nightclub. After 

careful consideration, NIST elected not to form a Safety Team for this incident. 

The other incident also occurred in Chicago in October and involved a fire in an 

unsprinklered, multi-story county office building in which six county employees died. 

NIST staff conducted an on-site reconnaissance of this incident. Subsequently, NIST 

decided not to launch a Safety Team investigation of the incident. As discussed in 

paragraph 2.4, both decisions were influenced by the limited availability of personnel 
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who could be released from current Safety Team investigations, especially the 

investigation of the World Trade Center collapses. 

2.4 Criteria for Establishing Safety Team Investigations, Prioritization and 

Allocation of Resources to Specific Investigations 

A recurring issue in establishing Safety Teams is the availability of sufficient technical 

staff to conduct an on-site investigation and perform any subsequent research or testing 

needed to understand performance of a building or structure during an incident. The 

scale and complexity of the current World Trade Center disaster has strained NIST’s 

existing resources. Limited resources may continue to affect NIST’s ability to fully 

implement the Act even when the World Trade Center investigation is completed. For 

example, the NCSTAC notes that in both 2002 and 2003, there were no major natural 

catastrophes such as an earthquake or hurricane or any other national emergency such 

as a terrorist incident. Safety Team investigations of future building failures will provide 

valuable knowledge in building design, emergency egress and crisis response and 

minimize the consequences of such disasters. Adequate funding, that is stable from 

year-to-year, is needed to conduct Safety Team investigations and prevent overtaxing 

NIST resources and assuring successful implementation of the Act. 

Recognizing scarcity of resources, the NCSTAC worked with NIST staff to establish 

methodology to help decide whether to form a Safety Team to investigate a specific 

event. This methodology should help NIST properly allocate resources for future 

events. 

2.5 Dissemination and Technical Assistance Program 

An important aspect of NIST’s implementation of the Act is the Dissemination and 

Technical Assistance Program (DTAP). DTAP’s objectives are to provide input to the 

development of Codes and Standards as well as to the field of building and safety 

sciences. The NCSTAC has reviewed the implementation of DTAP for the World Trade 

Center investigation. NIST conducted four major press briefings since the beginning of 

the investigation (including one held prior to the passage of the Safety Team legislation 

in which the proposed investigation process was presented to the public for comment). 

Subsequently, NIST engaged the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) to assist 

in transferring information to the Codes and Standards bodies as well as to the 

architectural and engineering communities. At the present time, the NCSTAC has no 

specific comments or recommendations regarding DTAP. 

2.6 Comments on Improving the Implementation and Objectives of the Act 

During these first nine months of working as a committee, start-up operational issues 

associated with members becoming familiar with both the ongoing investigations and 

individual NIST staff were resolved. The current investigations appear to be on target. 
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NIST investigation teams have been very responsive to NCSTAC suggestions and 

recommendations. This experience, although limited, has provided a base for planning 

future NCST investigations. Additional issues that were identified and discussed with 

NIST staff were: 

2.6.1 Identification and Selection of Future Investigations. – NIST published the Interim 

Final Rule addressing criteria for launching an investigation in the Federal Register on 

November 28, 2003. This Rule incorporated many NCSTAC recommendations for 

initiating a Safety Team investigation. The NCSTAC also recommended that NIST 

develop a roster of non-NIST staff that would be available on very short notice to assist 

in reconnoitering a building failure site and determining if a full Safety Team 

investigation should follow. 

2.6.2 Cooperation with First Responders and State and Local Authorities Investigating a 

Building Failure Site. – Cooperation between NIST, first responders, and State and local 

authorities is critical to a successful investigation. NIST is working with various Federal 

Agencies to establish ongoing working relationships. When State and Local 

investigators are involved, clarification of responsibilities is more complex. If there is no 

criminal investigation, Safety Team investigations have priority over other investigations. 

Where there are criminal investigations, they take priority over an NCST investigation. 

The NCSTAC believes State and local investigating authorities will require much greater 

familiarization with the Act if future potential conflicts are to be avoided. 

2.6.3 Human and Financial Resources to Perform Investigations as Provided in the Act. 

– The World Trade Center investigation was funded prior to the passage of the Act. 

These funds are being used as directed by the Act. The Rhode Island fire investigation 

is relatively small by comparison so its funding has been provided by NIST. Other 

investigation opportunities have not been undertaken because of the lack of sufficient 

resources. The NCSTAC believes that for either more numerous investigations or 

investigations larger than the Rhode Island fire, NIST will not have sufficient human or 

financial resources to start a Safety Team investigation. Section 4.4 provides a 

recommendation to help resolve this problem. 

2.6.4 Acquiring Information When Individual Rights Conflict With the Authority Provided 

in the Act. – The Act defers investigation priority where the Attorney General has 

determined there is the possibility of criminal activity, provides guidance on the authority 

and responsibilities among Federal agencies and stresses the need for cooperation 

among other investigation authorities. It is silent with respect to individuals and their 

attorneys who are engaged in collecting evidence for use in civil litigation. The NCSTAC 

is currently reviewing this issue with the NIST staff to determine if a recommendation for 

modification of the Act is appropriate. 
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3.0 Current Safety Team Investigations

3.1 World Trade Center Investigation

3.1.1 World Trade Center Investigation Objectives: The World Trade Center 

investigation objectives are to investigate the building construction, the materials used 

and the conditions that contributed to the World Trade Center disaster. The four major 

objectives are to: 

 Determine why and how World Trade Center 1 and World Trade Center 2 collapsed 

following the initial impacts of the aircraft and why and how World Trade Center 7 

collapsed; 

 Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or low depending on location, 

including all technical aspects of fire protection, occupancy behavior, evacuation, 

and emergency response; 

 Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, 

operation, and maintenance of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7; and 

 Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current building and fire codes, 

standards, and practices that warrant revision. 

 

The investigation is one element of the overall World Trade Center response plan that 

includes the investigation, an associated research & development program and a 

dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP). The overall NIST response 

and the investigation plan started before the legislation was passed and the NCSTAC 

was established. 

The World Trade Center investigation was funded on September 9, 2002 through the 

transfer of $16 million from FEMA under Public Law 107-206. An additional $3.4 million 

was redirected internally by NIST in FY2002 for research and pre-planning of the World 

Trade Center investigation. In FY2003, $3 million for research and DTAP support was 

appropriated by Congress in FY2003. For FY2004, $4 million has been requested, 

again for research and DTAP support. 

3.1.2 World Trade Center Projects: Eight major projects form the World Trade Center 

investigation effort. They are: 

 Project #1: Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and Practices 

 Project #2: Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis 

 Project #3: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel 

 Project #4: Investigation of Active Fire Protection Systems 

 Project #5: Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability Environment 

 Project #6: Structural Fire Response and Collapse Analysis 

 Project #7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications 

 Project #8: Fire Service Technologies and Guidelines 
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The investigation program currently has a delivery date of a draft report in September 

2004. 

The status of each project was updated at the NCSTAC meetings of August 26-27 and 

December 2-3, 2003. Sixteen contracts were issued by November 1, 2003. The 

current status of each of the eight major project areas is detailed in the minutes and 

presentations from the December 2-3, 2003 NCSTAC meeting. 

3.1.3 NCSTAC Comments on the World Trade Center Investigation and Associated 

Projects: The major challenges facing the investigation and comments and 

recommendations from the NCSTAC are summarized below: 

3.1.3.1 Through most of 2003, significant gaps existed in the data collection related 

to almost all of the project areas. During this period, while NIST pursued missing 

data, they relied on other reliable sources to provide the data necessary to continue 

the investigation. The amount of voluntarily offered documentation and information 

was impressive. By November, NIST had received all of the data essential to 

completing the investigation of the World Trade Center disaster. 

3.1.3.2 Timely receipt of information and physical evidence was important to this 

investigation and that will be true for any Safety Team investigation. For future 

investigations, NIST must plan to immediately deploy an authorized Safety Team to 

an incident site to directly gather information and physical evidence. This is 

particularly important with respect to obtaining eyewitness and emergency 

responder interview data. 

3.1.3.3 Many of the calculations and predictions necessary for successful completion 

of the World Trade Center project are state-of-the-art methods using best-available 

technology. As with all leading edge technologies, there is substantial technical risk 

and no guarantee the investigation will succeed in all of its technical objectives. Of 

particular concern in the World Trade Center investigation is the detailed fire 

environment and related fire induced structural response predictions. The NCSTAC 

believes that NIST has mitigated this risk through a variety of innovative approaches 

throughout its investigative plan. 

3.1.3.4 The scheduled delivery date of the draft report is September 2004. The 

NCSTAC believes this target date is reasonable and achievable. Several important 

contracts were issued in the last quarter of 2003, raising the possibility that 

unforeseen technical and data collection problems could delay completing the final 

report. The NCSTAC advised NIST that technical quality and completeness of an 

investigation and any associated projects is the highest priority outcome. While all 

efforts should be made to meet the September 2004 delivery date, there should be 

no compromise in quality should unforeseen technical problems arise. 
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3.1.3.5 In summary, given the unique and challenging nature of this investigation 

and the relative lack of infrastructure available at NIST for investigations of this 

scale, the NCSTAC believes that the World Trade Center investigation and 

associated programs are technically well founded and are currently on track to meet 

its stated objectives. 

3.2 Station Nightclub Fire

3.2.1 Station Nightclub Fire Investigation and Objectives: The investigation was 

initiated after a site survey by a NIST reconnaissance team on February 22, 2003 with a 

report to the NIST Director on February 25. 2003. This report resulted in the 

establishment of a Safety Team investigation on February 27, 2003. 

The Station fire resulted in 100 fatalities. The rapid spread of fire and smoke 

necessitated a Safety Team investigation to determine how this rapid fire development 

may have overwhelmed any fire safety features of the building and possibly affected 

occupant egress. Depending upon the investigation’s findings, the potential exists to 

mitigate similar future building failures with changes in building practices, standards, 

codes and regulations. 

3.2.2 Factors Affecting the Investigation: The NIST Safety Team investigation has been 

conducted independent of a criminal investigation being conducted by the Rhode Island 

Attorney General’s Office. In accordance with the provisions of the Act, Safety Team 

investigations must relinquish investigating priority to the appropriate law enforcement 

authorities. Thus, much of the physical evidence needed to conclude the Safety Team 

investigation is in the custody of the State Attorney General. On December 9, 2003, the 

Rhode Island grand jury handed down 100 indictments of involuntary manslaughter with 

criminal negligence, to each of the building co-owners and to the manager of the band. 

The seriousness of the charges makes it likely that this evidence will not be available in 

the immediate future. In addition to the criminal proceedings, approximately 717 items 

are in an evidence repository storage building pending current civil litigation. 

3.2.3 Station Nightclub Projects: The tasks and projects included in this investigation 

are: 

 Establishment of Initial Conditions 

 Materials and Contents Identification (ceiling, wall, and foam soundproofing 

samples)

 Cone Calorimeter, Panel Corner and Ignition Experiments 

 Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability Environment 

 Determination of Occupant Behavior and Egress 

 Building and Fire Codes Identification for Revision 

 Impact of Sprinklers on Survivability 
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Future projects include comparative experiments with actual samples of materials from 

the evidence storage repository when legally available; documentation of emergency 

response (in cooperation with assistance from the United States Fire Administration and 

local and State agencies); and recommendations to Code organizations for 

improvements not only in fire codes but also preventing crowd crush incidents like the 

Station fire and the crush in the Chicago night club in February. 
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4.0 NCSTAC Recommendations

4.1 NIST Implementation of the NCST Act

The NCSTAC commends NIST on the speed with which it has undertaken the two 

active investigations as well as their efforts to keep the public advised of its progress 

and plans through press conferences and the NIST web site. Notwithstanding this 

admirable start, several issues have arisen during the implementation that the NCSTAC 

believes should be addressed. 

4.1.1 Timeliness: Forensic investigations are extremely dependent on the timeliness of 

on-site, first-hand examination of the physical evidence and access to eyewitnesses. 

This response can be improved. 

4.1.1.1 Develop procedures for deciding if a Safety Team Investigation is needed 

when an event occurs so investigators can leave immediately to reconnoiter the 

failure site and begin examination of physical evidence and eyewitnesses. 

4.1.1.2 Review and seek relief from those Federal regulations and procedures (e.g., 

the Paperwork Reduction Act, etc.) that could impact the rapid deployment of Safety 

Teams to a site or impede access to information needed to complete a thorough and 

timely Safety Team investigation. 

4.1.1.3 Develop ‘first call’ investigating teams who are prepared on a moments 

notice to visit the site of an incident within the 48 hours required by the Act, and 

following reconnoitering the site, report to the Director as soon as possible on the 

advisability of a Safety Team investigation. Consider retaining individuals as 

members of the reconnaissance team who know local authorities to improve 

immediate access to an investigation site. 

4.1.1.4 Cooperation With Local Authorities: The Act is clear that when the Attorney 

General determines a criminal act may be involved in a building failure, the criminal 

investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency takes priority over a Safety 

Team investigation. The Act is also clear that Safety Teams are expected to work 

cooperatively with local authorities, other Federal agencies and other research 

organizations in conducting an investigation. Some of these investigators may take 

possession of evidence needed to complete the Safety Team investigation. The 

NCSTAC believes improved access to information held by local authorities is critical 

to Safety Team investigations. In both the World Trade Center and the Station 

Nightclub fire, greater familiarization by local authorities with NIST’s Safety Team 

responsibilities might have accelerated the release of information. Because the Act 

is new, many local authorities may not know of the Safety Team initiative and the 

assistance available to them from NIST. 

4.1.1.4.1 Institute a program designed to educate local authorities on the Act and 

NIST’s role in investigations so that these authorities will look to NIST for positive 
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assistance in conducting and investigation by working with and through them, 

rather than independently. 

4.1.1.4.2 Where delays occur in gathering information, collecting physical 

evidence or gaining access to eyewitnesses, NIST should use the power provided 

by the Act to subpoena documents to hold public meetings to solicit testimony in 

order to facilitate and improve future investigations. 

4.2 WTC Investigation and Research Programs

Recommendations and suggestions made by the NCSTAC during the year were 

adopted and implemented by NIST. Additional recommendations are not required at 

this time.

4.3 Station Nightclub Fire and Research Programs 

4.3.1 The Station Nightclub fire investigation is being affected by the lack of access to 

certain key pieces of information. Although this was mitigated to some degree by the 

large amount of information available in the press and through media video tapes, the 

investigation would benefit from having access to both the physical evidence being held 

by law enforcement authorities and individual attorneys. Being able to interview 

survivors of the fire would aid the investigation. The Station Nightclub fire and the 

incident at a Chicago nightclub a few days earlier clearly indicates that the factors 

affecting crowd egress during emergencies are not well understood. Therefore, the 

NCSTAC recommends that: 

4.3.1.1 NIST and the Department of Commerce study and advise how NCST 

investigators can carry out their work with State, Local and Federal agencies in 

the context of a criminal investigation to gain access to critical data. 

4.3.1.2 A research project be initiated to study evacuation decision-making and 

human behavior during major building emergencies, including the phenomenon 

of crowd crush as seen in the Chicago nightclub and the Station Nightclub 

incidents. 

4.4 Objectives of the Act and Program Funding 

In order to achieve the objectives of this Act, the damaged building must be visited 

immediately after the damaging event. From these observations and in consultation 

with appropriate knowledgeable individuals, the Director of NIST will be able to make a 

decision on its selection for investigation under this Act. The initiation of the NCST 

Investigation must begin as soon as practical after its selection in order to obtain and 

protect the damage data. 
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4.4.1. Section 15 of the Act authorizes the use of NIST funds otherwise authorized by 

law to carry out this Act. This should provide sufficient funds for the immediate postevent observation, but will not provide sufficient funds to perform the Investigation to 

achieve the objectives of this Act. Nor is there sufficient time for the Director of NIST, 

through the Department of Commerce, to request a special appropriation for the 

selected Investigation. Annual funds should be made available to the Director of NIST 

to cover one year of investigations. This would provide time to request a supplemental 

appropriation to fund the Investigation. On that basis the following recommendation is 

made: 

4.4.1.1 Establish a National Construction Safety Team Office within the Building and 

Fire Research Laboratory at NIST with annual funding in the amount of $2,000,000 

and an additional $2,000,000 reserve fund appropriated for use by the Director of 

NIST to initiate major investigations of building failures in a timely manner as 

required by the Act. This investigation reserve fund should be maintained year-toyear so that investigations can begin promptly and not have to await final budget or 

appropriation approvals. 
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5.0 Individual NCSTAC Member Comments and Recommendations

One NCSTAC member requested that several comments be included in this report for 

information. The NCSTAC will address these comments and recommendations at a 

future meeting. 

5.1 Professor Corbett: 

5.1.1. Since it is apparent that investigative priority was relinquished to the Rhode 

Island Attorney General's Office in the case of the Station nightclub fire, I think it is 

appropriate to include the documentation from the Attorney General that notified the 

Director to give investigative priority to Rhode Island authorities. This 

documentation will give Congress a more complete picture of this complex legal 

issue. 

5.1.2 NIST needs to take an aggressive, investigative stance with regard to 

information acquisition. NIST investigators should not only solicit documents, but 

physically visit and interview individuals who possess information about the building 

in question. In addition, NIST should dispatch investigators to visit repositories of 

information such as court archives that could provide important data. 

5.1.3 While the Interim Final Rule for the "Procedures for Implementation of the 

NCST Act" has been established, it is critical that NIST quickly develop a set of 

detailed protocols for conducting the investigation itself. While the Interim Final Rule 

speaks about investigations, it lacks detail. A comprehensive procedures manual is 

called for. 

For example, the Final Interim Rule speaks of collecting and analyzing physical 

evidence but provides no specifics on how this is to be accomplished. A procedures 

manual would detail the specific test or analysis technique that should be used for a 

particular type of evidence. 

Investigation procedure manuals of the National Transportation Safety Board and 

the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board would provide good 

guidance in the preparation of an NCST Procedures Manual. In addition, national 

guidelines such as the National Fire Protection Association's Guide for Fire and 

Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921) are also useful. 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

16

ATTACHMENT I 

CHARTER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 

NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

 

ESTABLISHMENT:

In accordance with the requirements of Section11 of the National Construction Safety 

Team Act (P. L. 107-231), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Secretary of Commerce 

hereby establishes the National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee, 

hereinafter referred to as the Committee, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act, 5 USC App. 2. 

OBJECTIVES AND DUTIES:

The Committee will act in the public interest to: 

1. Advise the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

hereinafter referred to as the NIST, on carrying out the Act by: 

a. Providing advice on the functions of National Construction Safety Teams, 

hereinafter referred to as Teams, as described in section 2(b)(2) of the Act. 

b. Providing advice on the composition of Teams under section 3 of the Act. 

c. Providing advice on the exercise of authorities enumerated in sections 4 and 5 of 

the Act. 

d. Providing such other advice as necessary to enable the Director to carry out the 

Act. 

2. Review and provide advice on the procedures developed under section 2(c)(1) of the 

Act. 

3. Review and provide advice on the reports issued under section 8 of the Act. 

4. Function solely as an advisory body, in accordance with the provisions of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act. 

MEMBERS AND CHAIRPERSON:

1. The Director of NIST shall appoint the members of the Committee, and they will be 

selected on a clear, standardized basis, in accordance with applicable Department 

of Commerce guidance. Members shall be selected on the basis of established 

records of distinguished service in their professional community and their knowledge 

of issues affecting the National Construction Safety Teams. Members shall serve as 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

17

Special Government Employees. Members serve at the discretion of the NIST 

Director. 

2. Members shall reflect the wide diversity of technical disciplines and competencies 

involved in the National Construction Safety Teams investigations. Members will be 

drawn from industry and other communities having an interest in the National 

Construction Safety Teams investigations, such as, but not limited to, universities, 

state and local government bodies, non-profit research institutions, and other 

Federal agencies and laboratories. 

3. The Committee shall consist of not fewer than 5 nor more than 10 members. The 

term of office of each member of the Committee shall be three years, except that 

vacancy appointments shall be for the remainder of the unexpired term of the 

vacancy and that the initial members shall have staggered terms such that the 

committee will have approximately 1/3 new or reappointed members each year. 

Members who are not able to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of the Committee 

will have their membership terminated. 

4. Any person who has completed two consecutive full terms of service on the 

Committee shall be ineligible for appointment for a third term during the one year 

period following the expiration of the second term. 

5. The Director of NIST shall appoint the Chair from among the members of the 

Committee. The Chair’s tenure shall be at the discretion of the Director of NIST. 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS:

1. The Committee shall report to the Director of NIST. 

2. The Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) within NIST will provide staff 

support for the Committee. 

3. The Committee shall meet at least once per year at the call of the Chair. Additional 

meetings may be called whenever one-third or more of the members so request it in 

writing or whenever the Chair or the NIST Director requests a meeting. 

4. Members of the Committee shall not be compensated for their services, but will, 

upon request, be allowed travel and per diem expenses in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

5701 et seq., while attending meetings of the Committee or subcommittees thereof, 

or while otherwise performing duties at the request of the Chair, while away from 

their homes or regular places of business. 

5. The Committee shall provide an annual report through the Director of BFRL and the 

Director of NIST, to the Secretary of Commerce for submission to the Committee on 

Science of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

18

Science, and Transportation of the Senate, to be due at a date to be agreed upon by 

the Committee and the Director of NIST. Such report will provide an evaluation of 

National Construction Safety Team activities, along with recommendations to 

improve the operation and effectiveness of National Construction Safety Teams; and 

an assessment of the implementation of the recommendations of the National 

Construction Safety Teams and of the Committee. In addition, the Committee may 

provide reports at strategic stages of an investigation, at its discretion or at the 

request of the Director of NIST, through the Director of the BFRL and the Director of 

NIST, to the Secretary of Commerce, to be due on dates to be agreed upon by the 

Committee and the Director of NIST. 

6. The Committee may establish subcommittees subject to the provisions of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Department of Commerce Committee 

Management Handbook. Subcommittee members shall be selected from the parent 

committee. 

7. The annual cost of operating the Committee is estimated at $ 250,000, which 

includes 0.5 work years of staff support. 

8. The Committee shall not act in the absence of a quorum, which shall consist of a 

simple majority of the members of the Committee not having a conflict of interest in 

the matter being considered by the Committee, except that, if the number of 

members on the Committee is even, half will suffice. 

9. NIST will report to the Committee actions taken in response to recommendations by 

the Committee. 

DURATION:

While the duration of the Committee is continuing, the Charter shall be renewed every 

two years from the date of filing. 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

19

ATTACHMENT II 

National Construction Safety Team 

Advisory Committee - 2003

John M. Barsom 

President, Barsom Consulting, Ltd. 

Pittsburgh, PA. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 

John L. Bryan, Professor Emeritus and 

Consultant, Fire Protection and Life Safety 

University of Maryland, 

Frederick, MD. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2004 

David S. Collins, President 

The Preview Group, Inc. 

Cincinnati, OH 

Term Expires: March 31, 2004 

Glenn P. Corbett, Professor 

Public Management-Fire Science, 

John Jay College of Criminal Justice 

New York, NY. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 

Philip J. DiNenno, President 

Hughes Associates, Inc. 

Baltimore, MD. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 

Paul M. Fitzgerald, Chair 

Executive Vice President (retired) 

FM Global, Johnston, RI. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 

Robert D. Hanson, Professor Emeritus 

University of Michigan 

Walnut Creek, CA. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2006 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

20

Charles Thornton, Chairman and Principal 

Thornton-Tomasetti, Inc. 

New York, NY 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 

Kathleen J. Tierney, Professor 

Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, and 

Director, Disaster Research Center 

University of Delaware 

Newark, DE. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2004 

Forman A. Williams, Professor 

Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering and 

Director, Center for Energy Research 

University of California at San Diego 

San Diego, CA. 

Term Expires: March 31, 2005 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

21

ATTACHMENT III 

Summary of NCST Advisory Committee Recommendations 

Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

Formal Recommendations 

NCST Advisory Committee meetings 

should be recorded on audiotape and 

archived. 

Accepted Ongoing. Will be arranged for 

December and subsequent 

meetings. 

S. Cauffman 

The next Advisory Committee meeting 

should be an open meeting held in New 

York City on December 2 and 3, 2003 

Not 

Accepted 

Complete. Discussions held with 

Chair of AC and decision was 

made to hold meeting at NIST due 

to additional cost of meeting in 

NYC 

J. Hill 

NIST and DOC should study and present 

to the Advisory Committee at the next 

meeting how the investigators can carry 

out their work with state, local, and federal 

agencies in the context of a criminal 

investigation to gain access to critical data. 

Accepted Complete. Added to agenda for 

December meeting. 

M. Rubin/ 

C. Burkhardt 

Urban-wildland interface (as a possible 

condition for deployment of a team) should 

be presented by NIST at the next meeting. 

Accepted Complete. Added to agenda for 

December meeting. 

W. Grosshandler 

The WTC project leaders should identify 

the necessary input that they need in order 

to accomplish their objectives, and if it 

comes from another project, make sure that 

the appropriate project leader is aware of 

the need and provides the necessary data. 

Accepted Ongoing. A series of meetings 

between the projects are being held 

that involve all affected projects to 

ensure that data needs are 

identified and filled. 

S. Sunder 

NIST should be onsite at the E119 test 

facilities during specimen preparations and 

testing. 

Accepted Ongoing. NIST is visiting both 

UL facilities to witness fabrication 

of assemblies and testing. 

J. Gross 

The closest representation of as-built 

conditions should be tested in the E119 

tests, including primer paint, ensuring that 

the properties of the steel being tested 

match the steel that was in the buildings as 

closely as possible. 

Accepted Ongoing. NIST is attempting to 

use steel that most closely matches 

the steel in the buildings as well as 

primer paint and the like. 

J. Gross 

Consider whether an additional E119 test is 

needed using lower strength steel (A-36 or 

close substitute if unavailable) and 

different fireproofing thicknesses that 

could have been present in the buildings 

based on the specifications 

Accepted Completed. A fourth test is being 

added to NIST plans 

J. Gross 

Interviews done in support of Project 7 for 

the WTC investigation should be recorded 

on audiotape and transcribed. 

Partially 

Accepted 

Ongoing. Interviews will be taped 

if the interviewee agrees. 

Transcripts will not be made as 

part of the investigation. 

J. Averill 

For future investigations, there should be 

pre-approved instruments for use in initial 

interviews and fact-gathering at the scene. 

Accepted Ongoing. J. Hill 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

22

Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

A research project should be initiated to 

study the phenomena of crowd crush, such 

as occurred at the Chicago and Rhode 

Island nightclubs. 

Accepted Ongoing. Contract awarded to 

Arup Fire to do literature search (in 

connection with RI investigation). 

Research plan awaiting Arup 

report in spring '04. 

W. Grosshandler 

Recommend Advisory Committee 

members be assigned as leaders for 

drafting sections of the Annual Report to 

Congress. 

Accepted Ongoing. Advisory committee 

members are working on specific 

sections of the report as assigned 

by the Chair of the Committee. 

Paul Fitzgerald 

Informal Recommendations 

The links to the NCST Advisory 

Committee web page and email address 

should be more easily found on the NIST 

home page and advertised more often to 

the public. 

Accepted Ongoing. The links have been 

made more prominent on the 

website and the email address is 

being provided to the media during 

press events 

M. Heyman/ 

M. Newman 

NIST should check with other agencies, 

such as the National Transportation Safety 

Board, who have experience with 

investigations running concurrently with 

criminal investigations. 

Accepted Ongoing. C. Burkhardt agreed to 

follow-up on recommendation. 

C. Burkhardt 

Suggestion was made to revise the trigger 

criteria for an NCST investigation by 

deleting the statement regarding terrorists. 

Accepted Completed. Wording changed. J. Hill 

WTC investigation data that is missing 

should be prioritized as to what is most 

important to the investigation. Be aware of 

information overload issues. 

Accepted Completed. S. Sunder 

A “plan B” should be developed for 

information that is essential to the WTC 

investigation and may not be made 

available. 

Accepted Completed. None of the missing 

information is considered essential. 

NIST believes that this information 

could be very important to the 

investigation and should be made 

available to it. 

S. Sunder 

Experimental risk should be considered in 

planning for the WTC investigation. The 

potential is there for surprise results from 

the experiments. 

Accepted Completed. The need to plan for 

such risks has been communicated 

to all Project Leaders. 

S. Sunder 

Analytic risks are complicated on the WTC 

investigation by the use of external and 

internal sources, which presents a 

significant communication issue. There 

should be frequent and strong interaction 

among the project team members. 

Accepted Ongoing. Communications 

between Project Leaders and 

external experts have been 

emphasized and are being 

supplemented by a number of 

multi-project meetings. 

S. Sunder 

WTC investigation requirements should be 

reviewed and streamlined as much as 

possible if the original timeframe is to be 

met. 

Accepted Ongoing. Requirements are being 

actively managed to maintain focus 

on the most important aspects of 

each project. 

S. Sunder 
The National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

2003 Report to Congress 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

23

Recommendation 

NIST 

Response Status 

Responsible 

Party 

The Project 3 contractor is trying to 

characterize all of the pieces of steel from 

the WTC buildings. It may be advisable to 

concentrate on the pieces from the impact 

zones and combining this information with 

information from the photo enhancement 

work. 

Accepted Ongoing. WJE is focusing on the 

pieces from the impact zones. 

F. Gayle 

The behavior of the steel in the WTC 

buildings will depend greatly on its 

geometry. Triaxial stresses should be 

considered as a possible failure mode. 

Accepted Ongoing. NIST is now working 

with ARA to ensure that triaxial 

stresses are appropriately 

considered in the impact analysis, 

and will do so with the contractor 

in the collapse analysis. 

F. Gayle 

The weld metal should be characterized. Accepted Ongoing. Weld metal was already 

being characterized. 

F. Gayle 

Furnaces should be checked to ensure that 

they are in top condition prior to the E119 

tests. 

Accepted Ongoing, NIST will be checking 

furnace conditions during visits to 

UL facilities to view test assembly 

fabrication. 

J. Gross 

There will be differences in the 

manufacturing and assembly of the 17-ft 

and 35-ft E119 test sections. The 

differences should be minimized, and the 

differences between the two should be 

known. 

Accepted Ongoing. NIST is working to 

minimize differences between the 

17 ft and 35 ft. specimens and to 

understand the consequences 

where differences exist. 

J. Gross 

The Australian Steel Institute should be 

contacted for additional information on 

E119 like testing of steel. 

Accepted Ongoing. Will be following up 

with Australian Steel Institute to 

see if they have any information on 

steel testing that is relevant to the 

investigation. 

J. Gross 

Information from FDNY and the 

McKinsey & Company report is needed to 

validate the data being collected in the 

interview process. An alternate plan 

should be developed in case such 

information does not become available. 

Accepted Ongoing. The FDNY and 

McKinsey & Company data is 

considered very important and 

NIST believes that it should be 

made available to the investigation, 

but it is not considered essential 

information. 

J.R. Lawson 

The database of information from the 

interviews should be structured with keys 

for time and space to allow the analysts to 

attempt to resolve inconsistencies (e.g., 

who was where, when). 

Accepted Completed. The Project 7 team 

has included this activity in its 

plans. 

J.R. Lawson/J. 

Averill 

Information is starting to be generated by 

the Columbia University study. This 

information should be used to augment the 

information being collected by NIST. 

Accepted Ongoing. NIST has been 

cooperating with Columbia 

University in its study and will 

continue to do so. 

J. Averill 

The draft survey instrument should be 

provided to the Committee members. 

Accepted Completed. The draft survey 

instrument was sent to the 

members on October 10, 2003. 

J. Averill