* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 10, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

PETER ERLANDSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORTHGLENN MUNICIPAL

COURT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-1056

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00202-ZLW)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Peter Erlandson, pro se.

J. Andrew Nathan and Marni Nathan Kloster of Nathan, Bremer, Dumm & Myers,

P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
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BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

Peter Erlandson, appearing pro se, appeals the orders entered by the district

court dismissing his amended complaint and denying his motion to amend or alter

judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. Background.

In his amended complaint, Mr. Erlandson asserted that the district court had

jurisdiction over his case pursuant to “[t]he [United States] Constitution,” and he

characterized his action as a “Petition For A Constitutional Review.” R., Doc. 5

at 2,3. Mr. Erlandson further alleged that: (1) he was charged, tried, and

convicted of littering his own property in Municipal Court in the City of

Northglenn, State of Colorado; (2) on November 13, 2006, a judgment of

conviction was entered and a sentence was imposed for the littering charge; 

(3) his sentence was a fine of $235; and (4) an appeal bond has not been granted

and is not necessary as he is not in custody. Id. at 3-4. We note that, following

his conviction for littering in Northglenn Municipal Court, Mr. Erlandson

unsuccessfully appealed to a Colorado district court and the Colorado Supreme

Court. See Erlandson v. City of Northglenn, No. 07SC861, 2008 WL 131214

(Colo. Jan. 14, 2008) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).

In his amended complaint, Mr. Erlandson alleged that the Northglenn

Municipal Court, as well as the prosecutors involved in the municipal court
1 Based on the allegations in Mr. Erlandson’s amended complaint, we will

assume for purposes of this appeal that the littering charge was a criminal offense

and that the municipal court proceedings were criminal in nature.

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proceedings, violated a number of his constitutional rights.1 Specifically,

Mr. Erlandson alleged that the court and prosecutors: (1) engaged in selective

prosecution; (2) violated his rights to a defense, due process, and equal

protection; (3) violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by conducting a

warrantless search of his property; (4) “gave” a definition of the term “litter” that

was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; and (5) violated his right to use his

real property to store his personal property. R., Doc. 5 at 4-5. As relief for these

alleged constitutional violations, Mr. Erlandson requested that the district court

“overturn his conviction and rule that the prosecution did willfully and wantonly

violate his rights under the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 10.

The district court sua sponte dismissed Mr. Erlandson’s complaint,

concluding as follows:

To the extent Mr. Erlandson seeks to overturn his state court

conviction, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 504 (1973). Pursuant to § 2254(a), Mr. Erlandson must be in

custody in order to seek habeas corpus relief. “The custody

requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the

writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual

liberty.” Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).

As noted above, Mr. Erlandson alleges that his municipal court

conviction resulted only in a monetary fine. However, the imposition

of a fine, by itself, does not satisfy the custody requirement. See

Fields v. Oklahoma, 243 Fed. App’x 395, 397 (10th Cir. 2007)
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(collecting cases). Therefore, because Mr. Erlandson is not in

custody, the habeas corpus claims he raises seeking to overturn his

conviction must be dismissed. 

R., Doc. 7 at 2. 

Mr. Erlandson subsequently filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e) to alter or amend the district court’s judgment. In his motion,

Mr. Erlandson stated that he “did not ask for a writ of habeas corpus, but rather

for the court to uphold and defend [his] Constitutional rights.” Id., Doc. 11 at 1. 

He also reasserted the constitutional claims that were set forth in his amended

complaint, adding the following allegations:

The City of Northglenn Municipal Code is also clearly

unconstitutional in that it violates both the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments by its lack of standards and definitions and subsequent

arbitrary and capricious enforcement and selective prosecution. If

there are no standards, then everyone is guilty until proven innocent. 

This is a . . . violation of the presumption of innocence.

Id. at 3. Once again, Mr. Erlandson also asked the district court “to affirm [his]

Constitutional rights and reverse [his] conviction by the Northglenn Municipal

Court.” Id.

The district court denied Mr. Erlandson’s Rule 59(e) motion, reasoning as

follows:

Mr. Erlandson is challenging in this action a municipal court

conviction that resulted only in a monetary fine and he asks the Court

to reverse that conviction. The Court determined that Mr. Erlandson

was seeking habeas corpus relief and dismissed the action because

Mr. Erlandson is not in custody for the purposes of the habeas corpus

statute. Mr. Erlandson states in his motion to reconsider that he did
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not request a writ of habeas corpus, but he reiterates that the relief he

seeks is to have his municipal conviction overturned.

. . . The Court remains convinced that Mr. Erlandson’s sole

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 and that he does not satisfy the custody requirement of that

statute.

Id., Doc. 13 at 2. Mr. Erlandson then filed the instant appeal.

II. Analysis.

It is well established that “[t]he ‘in custody’ language of § 2254 is

jurisdictional and requires habeas petitioners to be ‘in custody’ under the

conviction or sentence under attack when they file the petition.” Broomes v.

Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004). Given the jurisdictional nature

of the “in custody” requirement, we will treat the district court’s dismissal of

Mr. Erlandson’s amended complaint as a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “We review the dismissal of a complaint

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. We may affirm the dismissal on

any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law,

even grounds not relied upon by the district court.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d

1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted).

We agree with the district court that “[t]he payment of restitution or a fine,

absent more, is not the sort of ‘significant restraint on liberty’ contemplated in the

‘custody’ requirement of the federal habeas statutes.” Obado v. New Jersey, 328

F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003); accord Fields v. Oklahoma, 243 F. App’x 395, 397
2 Because we are relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dispose of any

claims asserted by Mr. Erlandson under § 1983, we do not need to decide whether

the Supreme Court’s “favorable-termination requirement,” see Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), applies in cases such as this one where the party

seeking relief from a state-court conviction, through no fault of his own, does not

have a remedy available under the federal habeas statute. We note, however, that

there is currently a split among our sister circuits on this issue. See, e.g., Powers

v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 601-03 (6th Cir. 2007)

(discussing circuit split), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. April 16,

2008) (No. 07-1318).

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(10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Dremann v. Francis, 828 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir.

1987); Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 804-05 (1st Cir. 1984); Spring v. Caldwell,

692 F.2d 994, 996-97, 999 (5th Cir. 1982); Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483,

485 (11th Cir. 1982); Hanson v. Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Ill.,

591 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir.

1976). Thus, to the extent Mr. Erlandson is seeking habeas relief under § 2254,

the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over this action.

Further, while Mr. Erlandson’s amended complaint could be liberally

construed as asserting claims for declaratory and/or injunctive relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, he is jurisdictionally barred from seeking relief under § 1983 by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).2

 “The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases

brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before
3 “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases brought after the state

proceedings have ended.” Mann, 477 F.3d at 1146 (quotation omitted); see also

Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where state court appeals process has run

its full course). This requirement is satisfied here because Mr. Erlandson filed his

federal court action eight days after the Colorado Supreme Court denied his

petition for a writ of certiorari. See Erlandson v. City of Northglenn, No.

07SC861, 2008 WL 131214 (Colo. Jan. 14, 2008); R., Doc. 1 (motion for leave to

proceed before the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 filed on January 22,

2008); id., Doc. 3 (initial complaint filed on January 31, 2008).

4 We note, however, that a state-court judgment may be timely appealed

directly to the United States Supreme Court from the highest court of a state by

means of a petition for a writ of certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

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the district court proceedings commenced.”3 Mann, 477 F.3d at 1146 (quotations

omitted). Consequently, a complaint filed in a federal district court that seeks

review and reversal of a state-court judgment is properly dismissed under 

Rooker-Feldman.

4

 Id. at 1147. 

Although the decision was not published, we believe this court’s recent

decision in Meadows v. Okla. City Mun. Court, 247 F. App’x 116 (10th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished), correctly determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars

challenges to state-court municipal convictions such as the one at issue here. In

Meadows:

Mr. Meadows was convicted in Oklahoma City Municipal

Court of driving under the influence of alcohol in January 1999. 

Eight years later, in March 2007, he filed in the Western District of

Oklahoma what he labeled a “Motion for Leave to File Motion to

Vacate Judgment Out of Time,” asking the federal district court, in

substance, to vacate his 1999 state court conviction. Mr. Meadows

alleged that newly discovered evidence - the results of blood tests

showing no alcohol in his system - was illegally withheld at the time
-8-

of his trial. This evidence, he said, proved that he was innocent of

the crime charged. He alleged due process violations and asked that

he be allowed to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and that the

judgment and sentence be vacated.

The district court dismissed Mr. Meadow’s action. The court

reasoned that Mr. Meadow’s attempt to vacate his municipal court

conviction constituted “a collateral attack on, and/or an appeal of, the

final judgment arising from that conviction,” and that, as such, it was

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibiting federal suits

appealing state court judgments. 

Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).

While we found Mr. Meadows’s appeal of the dismissal of his lawsuit to be

untimely, we found that he had timely appealed the district court’s denial of his

motion to reconsider. Id. at 117-18. We therefore addressed the merits of the

district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling, concluding as follows:

[Mr. Meadows’s motion to reconsider] still seeks, in essence, to

overturn a conviction from the Oklahoma City Municipal Court

system. This amounts, as the district court found, to an appeal from,

or collateral attack on, the state court’s judgment, and it is not

allowed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bolden v. City of

Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The RookerFeldman doctrine prohibits federal suits that amount to appeals of

state-court judgments.”). Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional limit on

federal district and appellate courts, and it prohibits us from

reviewing state court decisions. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, 18B

Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4469.1 (“The general statutes that establish

original federal subject-matter jurisdiction in the district courts do

not extend to an ‘appeal’ from a state-court judgment.”).

Id. at 118.

We agree with the reasoning and result in Meadows. Accordingly, applying

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we conclude that the district court lacked 
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subject-matter jurisdiction over any challenges to Mr. Erlandson’s municipal

court conviction under § 1983. 

Finally, while it appears that Mr. Erlandson is attempting to challenge the

facial constitutionality of the City of Northglenn Municipal Code, his

constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment

and thus barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine unless they fall into one of two

categories. The first category consists of general constitutional challenges where

“the party does not request that the federal court upset a prior state-court

judgment applying [the contested] law against the party, and . . . the prior 

state-court judgment did not actually decide that the state law at issue was

facially unconstitutional.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476

(10th Cir. 2002) (citations, footnote, and emphasis omitted), overruled in part by

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005), and

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 465-66 (2006)); see also Mo’s Express, LLC v.

Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that general constitutional

challenges are beyond reach of Rooker-Feldman “when the relief sought . . .

would not reverse or ‘undo’ the state-court judgment”). The second category

consists of cases in which “a party may challenge state procedures for

enforcement of a judgment, where consideration of the underlying state-court

decision is not required.” Kenmen, 314 F.3d at 476.
5 The situation here is thus distinguishable from the situation in Mo’s

Express where: (1) the plaintiff asserted general constitutional challenges for the

purpose of obtaining prospective injunctive and declaratory relief; and (2) if

successful, the plaintiff’s claims would not have disrupted a state-court judgment.

See Mo’s Express, 441 F.3d at 1237-38.

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We hold that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider

Mr. Erlandson’s constitutional challenges to the City of Northglenn Municipal

Code. In his amended complaint, Mr. Erlandson specifically asked the district

court to “overturn” his municipal court conviction. See R., Doc. 5 at 10. 

Likewise, in his post-judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), he asked the

district court to “reverse” his conviction. Id., Doc. 11 at 3. As a result, he was

clearly seeking to “upset” or “undo” a prior state-court judgment,5

 and his general

constitutional challenges are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Further, even construing his claims liberally, Mr. Erlandson is not challenging

“state procedures for enforcement of a judgment.” Kenmen, 314 F.3d at 476.

Thus, his constitutional claims do not fall within the second category of cases that

we discussed in Kenmen. 

The district court’s order and related judgment dismissing this action for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are AFFIRMED. We GRANT Mr. Erlandson’s

motion for leave to proceed in this appeal in forma pauperis.