J-S63028-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

CARLOS ALBERTO ACOSTA, JR.

Appellee No. 785 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order May 2, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000461-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2014

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered on May 2, 2014, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County, which granted the 

suppression motion of Appellee, Carlos Alberto Acosta, Jr.1 

The disposition of this appeal turns on whether state troopers 

conducted a lawful traffic stop. The stop led to the recovery of heroin from 

Acosta. How the troopers recovered the heroin is not pertinent here. We 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This appeal is permissible as the Commonwealth has certified in good faith 

that the order submitted for our review substantially handicaps the 

prosecution and the appeal is not intended for delay purposes. See 

Pa.R.A.P., Rule 311(d); Commonwealth v. Dugger, 486 A.2d 382 (Pa. 

1985).
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are solely concerned with the stop. If the stop was unlawful, as the 

suppression court found, the troopers illegally seized Acosta and we must 

affirm the suppression court’s decision to suppress the evidence. If the stop 

was lawful, as the Commonwealth maintains, we must reverse the 

suppression court and remand. We conclude that the suppression court 

erred and, accordingly, reverse the suppression order. 

The parties are familiar with the underlying factual and procedural 

history of this case so we set forth only the facts and procedural history 

relevant to our determination.

Trooper Kenneth Riggle and his partner were on patrol when at 

approximately 1:00 AM he observed a vehicle, the driver of which was later 

identified as Acosta, traveling south on State Route 150. The vehicle then 

began to turn onto Pennsylvania Avenue. The vehicle’s turn onto 

Pennsylvania Avenue caught Trooper Riggle’s attention. As he explained at 

the suppression hearing:

The vehicle, when it made it’s [sic] left turn onto Pennsylvania 

Avenue, to me, it took a wide turn; and it was headed toward –

there’s a business there, Curt’s Smokin’ Ribs. It looked as 

though the vehicle was going to drive into the grass area. The 

vehicle slowed down almost to a stop, corrected, and then 

turned sharp left to get onto Pennsylvania Avenue.

N.T., Suppression Hearing, 4/28/14, at 6. The sharp turn was necessary 

because if the vehicle stayed straight it would have ended up in the grass. 

Trooper Riggle “suspected it could have been a DUI” given the fact that the 

vehicle looked like it was “going to drive off the roadway” coupled with the 
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“wide turn.” Id., at 9-10. Trooper Riggle activated his cruiser’s overhead 

lights and pulled the vehicle over. As Acosta pulled over, he failed to use his 

turn signal. 

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Riggle cited the suspected driving 

under the influence and failure to use a turn signal as the reasons for the 

traffic stop. See id., at 9. Focusing solely on the failure to use the traffic 

signal, the suppression court ruled that the stop was illegal, as “Trooper 

Riggle did not observe any other violations of the vehicle code....” 

Suppression Court Opinion, 5/2/14, at 3. The suppression court reasoned 

that the traffic signal violation could not serve as the basis for the stop as 

Trooper Riggle was already in the process of initiating the stop when that 

violation occurred. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 4/28/14, at 24. This 

reasoning is sound. But the trooper testified that he pulled Acosta over for 

two reasons—the other being that he suspected the driver of being under 

the influence. Oddly, the suppression court does not reference, at all, the 

trooper’s testimony that he suspected that Acosta was driving under the 

influence. Finding no vehicle code violation to justify the stop, the 

suppression court granted the suppression motion, suppressing “any and all 

evidence seized, observed and/or obtained by the Commonwealth after the 

stop of Defendant’s vehicle....” Order, 5/2/14. This timely appeal followed. 

Our standard and scope of review of the grant of a suppression motion 

is as follows.
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We begin by noting that where a motion to suppress has been 

filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is 

admissible. In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our 

task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported 

by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as 

here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of 

the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the 

defendant's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the 

prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole 

remains uncontradicted.

Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings of the 

suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error 

in the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.

Commonwealth v. Burgos, 64 A.3d 641, 647 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

As noted, Trooper Riggle conducted a traffic stop as he suspected 

Acosta was driving under the influence. “[B]ecause of the severe 

consequences of drunken driving in terms of roadway deaths, injuries, and 

property damage, ... the government has a compelling interest in detecting 

intoxicated drivers and removing them from the roads before they cause 

injury.” Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 124-125 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (citation omitted). This is why the legislature provided for the 

standard of “reasonable suspicion” rather than the heightened standard of 

“probable cause” in Section 6308(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code as the 

threshold for conducting a lawful traffic stop. See id., at 125. See also 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“A 

police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has 
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reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle code has taken place, for 

the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the provisions of 

the code.”) (emphasis omitted). 

The standard for establishing reasonable suspicion is as follows. 

[T]he officer must articulate specific observations which, in 

conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those 

observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his 

experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person 

he stopped was involved in that activity. The question of 

whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time [the officer 

conducted the stop] must be answered by examining the totality 

of the circumstances to determine whether the officer who 

initiated the stop had a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the individual stopped. Therefore, the fundamental 

inquiry of a reviewing court must be an objective one, namely, 

whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

[stop] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 

action taken was appropriate.

Basinger, 982 A.2d at 125 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; 

some brackets added). 

Here, Trooper Riggle articulated specific observations, which led him to 

conclude that the driver of the vehicle may have been involved in criminal 

activity, namely driving under the influence in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3802. He possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop. 

As a trooper for twenty-one years, with a familiarity of observing 

people driving under the influence, Trooper Riggle testified that Acosta’s 

erratic driving, set forth in detail above, led him to suspect impaired driving. 

“[E]rratic driving provides a sufficient, reasonable basis to support an 
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investigatory stop.” Commonwealth v. Hamme, 583 A.2d 1245, 1247 

(Pa. Super. 1990) (citation omitted). 

The suppression court’s legal conclusion that Trooper Riggle failed to 

possess reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop is erroneous. 

Accordingly, we reverse the order.

Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2014