UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES WILSON, Plaintiff,

 v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE DISTRICT 508, 

Defendants. 

 No. 20 C 4604

 Judge Thomas M. Durkin 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Wilson alleged that his supervisor and employer, the City Colleges of 

Chicago, discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race and age.1 The 

Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Wilson’s claims except 

his retaliation claim under Title VII, which the City Colleges never moved to dismiss. 

The City Colleges now seek summary judgment on that claim. That motion is granted. 

Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for 

opposing an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To prevail 

on a Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in an 

activity protected by the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 

(3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Lewis 

v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018). 

1 The City Colleges of Chicago is the more common name of defendant Board of 

Trustees of Community College District 508. 

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Wilson began working as a maintenance engineer for the City Colleges in 2015. 

He alleges he made many complaints about the circumstances of his employment to 

his supervisors and the Human Resources Department at the City Colleges. But he 

does not allege that any of those earlier complaints concerned discrimination 

prohibited by Title VII. Rather, the complaints generally concerned his assignments 

and work conditions. Because Title VII protects only complaints about 

“discrimination based on a protected characteristic,” Wilson’s complaints about his 

job conditions are not protected by Title VII. See Miller v. Chicago Transit Auth., 20 

F.4th 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Merely complaining in general terms of 

discrimination or harassment, without indicating a connection to a protected class or 

providing facts sufficient to create that inference, is insufficient.”). 

Wilson alleges that he made what the Court assumes was a verbal complaint 

to the City Colleges EEO Officer in May 2019. But it was not until November 19, 2019

that Wilson filed a grievance with the City Colleges alleging racial discrimination. 

Four days later, he submitted a complaint to the EEO Office alleging discrimination.

The Court assumes that this grievance and complaint is activity protected by Title 

VII.

Having produced evidence that he engaged in a protected activity, Wilson must 

also demonstrate that he suffered an adverse action as a result of that protected 

activity. For an adverse action to be actionable as retaliation under Title VII, it must 

have occurred after the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, or else it is impossible 

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to demonstrate causation. In this case, that means that only actions taken against 

Wilson after his May or November 2019 complaint can be actionable. 

The primary problem with Wilson’s claims is that he does not explain when

many of the alleged adverse actions occurred. This is true for the following alleged 

adverse actions: 

“subjected him to intimidating, humiliating, and 

derogatory statements,” see R. 76 at 2 (no date); 

“performing dangerous activities without proper 

equipment,” see R. 76 at 2 (no date); 

“took away from [Wilson] the job that he was hired to 

do, making [Wilson] no longer responsible solely for 

Washburne but for all five . . . buildings,” see R. 76 at 5 

(no date); 

“giving [Wilson] additional work to do,” see R. 33 ¶ 19 

(no date); 

Wilson’s supervisor “threatened to terminate him,” see

R. 76 at 3 (no date); 

Wilson’s “locker was broken into, and his items disposed 

of,” R. 76 at 3 (no date), R. 76 at 5 (no date); 

Wilson was disciplined “for not signing the diary or 

logbook,” see R. 76 at 4 (no date), R. 76 at 7 (no date), R. 

76 at 15 (no date); and, 

Wilson’s supervisor disciplined him because Wilson 

“observed and took pictures of [the supervisor] and an 

unknown unauthorized person in the boiler room 

making adjustments to the equipment which generated 

a warning code on [Wilson’s] phone,” see R. 76 at 8 (no 

date). 

The dates of these alleged incidents are not included in Wilson’s complaint, R. 33; 

brief, R. 76; or statements of material facts, R. 77, R. 78, R. 91. The Court is not 

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required to search the record further. See United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607 

F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t was not the district court’s job to sift through the 

record and make [the plaintiff’s] case for him.”). Without dates, a reasonable jury 

could not find that these adverse actions were caused by Wilson’s complaint of racial 

discrimination. 

One of Wilson’s allegations of an adverse action occurred prior to his complaint 

about discrimination in May or November 2019. He admits that he was denied access 

to the Engineers’ jeep to get around campus prior to February 2019. See R. 77 ¶ 42. 

Because this action occurred prior to Wilson’s EEO complaint, it cannot have been 

caused by his EEO complaint, and therefore cannot have been retaliatory. 

Wilson also identifies dates for the following incidents that occurred after his 

complaint of racial discrimination, whether it occurred in May or November 2019. 

They are the following: 

“[B]etween 2019 and 2020,” Wilson’s supervisor told 

him “he was suspended for one day and that he 

shouldn’t come to work the following day,” but the 

Human Resources Department told Wilson that the 

supervisor “had no authority to issue a suspension, and 

that Plaintiff should ignore the suspension and come to 

work the following day,” see R. 76 at 14-15; 

In December 2019, Wilson was required to relocate to a 

different building on the campus where Wilson admits 

“all of the other Engineers had workspace and lockers.” 

See R. 77 ¶ 27. Wilson claims that this action “denied 

him appropriate workspace,” see R. 76 at 2; and took 

away Wilson’s “dedicated and assigned workspace” and 

“dedicated computer, and . . . phone line,” see R. 76 at 4 

(no date); 

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In December 2019, Wilson’s supervisor changed 

Wilson’s shift. Wilson filed a grievance and was 

awarded a more favorable shift the next month, see R. 

76 at 8-9;

On January 10, 2020, [Wilson’s] supervisor “issued a 

disciplinary write-up against [Wilson] for failing to 

properly paint [a] wall. Wilson complained to [Human 

Resources], who indicated the matter was not 

appropriate for a write-up, rather the wall simply 

needed to be repainted, see R. 76 at 9; and, 

Wilson alleges that on February 25, 2021, his 

supervisor disciplined him for: (i) supposedly making a 

false statement; (ii) loafing or not performing work 

during periods of time; (iii) failing to maintain 

equipment properly, and (iv) breaching two specific 

work rules, see R. 76 at 3-4, 13. 

For these allegations, the problem is not timing, but the materiality of the 

allegations. “For Title VII retaliation purposes, a materially adverse action need not 

be one that affects the terms and conditions of employment, but it must be one that 

a reasonable employee would find to be materially adverse such that the employee 

would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867-

68. “Material” means “significant” and not “trivial.” Id. In other words, the Supreme 

Court has explained, Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the 

American workplace.” Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 

(2006). It is insufficient to allege or demonstrate an unwanted or unexpected negative 

experience at work. Rather, the retaliatory act must cause some “injury or harm.” See

Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67; see also Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856–57 (an employer’s 

unfulfilled “threats of unspecified disciplinary action” did not constitute adverse 

actions). 

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Here, all but one of Wilson’s allegations concern either unfulfilled threats or 

unspecified workplace disputes. Wilson alleges that his supervisor wished to suspend 

him, yet admits that the City Colleges Human Resource Department prevented this 

from happening. Wilson alleges that his supervisor gave him a less favorable shift, 

yet that decision was soon reversed. Wilson claims that his supervisor wrote him up 

for inadequately painting a wall, but Human Resources again stepped in to prevent 

the discipline. And Wilson vaguely alleges that his supervisor disciplined him for: (i)

supposedly making a false statement; (ii) loafing or not performing work during 

periods of time; (iii) failing to maintain equipment properly, and (iv) breaching two 

specific work rules. Wilson’s vague allegation of “discipline” is insufficient evidence 

for a reasonable jury to find that Wilson was subject to an adverse action. Moreover, 

discipline for failing to meet reasonable job-related expectations is not actionable. 

Wilson has not presented any evidence that he did not engage in these activities of 

which he was accused. Indeed, he has presented no specific evidence about these 

alleged incidents at all. Without such evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that 

he was subject to retaliation in violation of Title VII. See Johnson v. Advocate Health 

and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018) (To defeat summary 

judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and 

come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). 

Under certain circumstances, the decision to relocate an employee’s 

workstation could arguably be material. But here Wilson admits that this action was 

taken to make his working conditions equal to that of his fellow engineers. And 

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Wilson does not allege or present evidence that the relocation of his workstation had 

a materially negative effect on his working conditions. Without such evidence, a 

reasonable jury could not find that a reasonable employee would be dissuaded from 

engaging in the protected activity, and thus the relocation of Wilson’s workstation 

cannot be retaliatory. 

Conclusion 

 Therefore, the City Colleges’ motion for summary judgment [70] is granted. 

ENTERED: 

 ______________________________ Honorable Thomas M. Durkin 

United States District Judge 

Dated: May 16, 2024

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