[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Castner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4950.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -4950
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLEE , v . C ASTNER , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Castner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4950.] Criminal law—Sentencing—Community control—R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)—An offender’s violations of substantive community-control rehabilitative requirements aimed at addressing th e offender’s misconduct are not technical violations of community control—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. (No. 2019-1221—Submitted June 17, 2020— Decided October 21, 2020 .)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 2018 CA 0127, 2019-Ohio-2979.

_______________________ D E W INE , J. {¶ 1} David Castner was ordered to com plete a drug-treatment program as a condition of his community-c ontrol sanction. Soon after ente ring the program, he was kicked out for using the facility’s computers to talk to young girls online.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Because he had failed to complet e drug treatment and another co urt-ordered program, the trial court terminated his community control and s entenced him to a 12-month prison term. {¶ 2} An Ohio statute author izes a trial court to impose a prison ter m as a penalty for community-control violations but limits the amount of prison time that the court may impose for a “technical violation” to 90 days. R .C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i). Castner asks this court to hold that any violation that does not constitute a felony is a “technical violation” subject to the s entencing cap. We recently rejected that interpretation in State v. Nelson , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020- Ohio-3690, __ N.E.3d __. There, we explained that, generally, violations of administrative requirements facilitating community-control supe rvision are technical violations, whereas vio lations of substantive rehabil itative requirements
aimed at addressi ng the offender’s misconduct are not. Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 3} Today, we apply the Nelson framework and concl ude that Castner’s
violations were not technical in nature. That means that the t rial court was authorized to impose a prison term in excess of the statutory c ap for technical violations, so we affirm the judgment below. Castner fails to complete drug treatment {¶ 4} Castner pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs, a fifthdegree felony. The Richland County Common Pleas Court sentence d Castner to two years of community control a nd advised him that if he viola ted the terms of his community control, he would receive a 12-month prison sentence. The court further imposed a number of cond itions directed at addressing C astner’s substance abuse, including a requirement t hat he complete a residential t reatment program offered by the Volunteers of America (“VOA”). Castner’s drug o ffense had come on the heels of his release from prison for crimes involving hi s sexual abuse of a young girl. Consequently, the trial court also ordered Castner to participate in Richland County’s Re-Entry Court—a program designed to reduce r ecidivism ratesJanuary Term, 2020

3 by providing services, supervision, and support to recently rel eased prisoners as they transition back into society. See Richland County Common Pleas Courts, http://richlandcour tsoh.us/robinson.php (accessed Oct. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E8YB-YQZZ ]. {¶ 5} Just three weeks into his community-control sentence, the VOA kicked Castner out of its program. During his short stint at t he VOA, Castner made multiple requests to be moved to mental-health facilities due t o his alleged
homicidal and suicidal ideations and told a staff member that h e was “not mentally ready to handle the bullshit at the VOA.” The VOA reported tha t Castner was a “continuous disruption” to the ope rations and programming at th e facility. {¶ 6} Castner’s probation officer filed a complaint, alleging that Ca stner had violated the condition of his community control requiring h im to complete the VOA treatment program. Castner admitted to the violation. The probation officer
recommended that the court send Ca stner to a different resident ial treatment program run by an organization called Alvis House, which in his view was better suited to respond to Castner’s needs. The trial court continue d Castner on community control with the new condition that he complete the A lvis House program. Castner entered the facility the following day. {¶ 7} After barely two weeks at Alvis House, program staff discovered that Castner had been using the facility’s computers to contact youn g girls. Castner had set up a “Hello Kitty” themed e-mail account based on the popul ar children’s
cartoon character. He told a staff member that he had created the account and posted pictures of himself online in an effort “to get females to talk to him.” Castner had reached out to a number of young girls over the Internet an d had begun talking to a 13-year-old girl on the phone. Because his actions had vi olated the facility’s policies on computer and phone use , Alvis House discharged him from the program. And for failing to complete either of the treatment p rograms offered to him, Castner was also terminat ed from the Re-Entry Court.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 8} Castner’s probation officer filed a second complaint, alleging that Castner had violated the conditions of his community control or dering him to complete the Alvis House and Re-E ntry Court programs. Castner again admitted to the alleged violations. At the hearing on the violations, C astner asked the court to give him another chance at Alvis House, assuming the program would allow him to return. His probation offi cer recommended that the court te rminate Castner’s community-control sanction and im pose the suspended 12-month pr ison sentence. The trial court continued the matter to consider its options. {¶ 9} When the parties reconvened a few weeks later, the trial court
concluded that Castner had burne d through all his available tre atment options and that his behavior on community control demonstrated that he con tinued to pose a risk to the public. The court th erefore imposed the 12-month p rison term. {¶ 10} Castner appealed his prison sentence to the Fifth District Cour t of Appeals, arguing that his failure to complete the Alvis House a nd Re-Entry Court programs were “technical” viola tions and thus his sentence coul d not exceed the 90-day sentencing cap contained in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i). U nder that provision, if an offender has been placed on community control for committ ing a fifth-degree felony, the trial court’s ability to impose a prison sentence u pon the offender for violating the terms of his comm unity control is subject to two limitations:

If the prison term is imposed for any technical violation of the conditions of a community control sanction imposed for a fe lony of the fifth degree or for any violation of law committed while under a community control sanction imposed for such a felony that consists of a new criminal offense and that is not a felony, th e prison term shall not exceed ninety days.

Id.January Term, 2020

5 {¶ 11} The Fifth District affirmed Cast ner’s sentence. It concluded t hat the
terminations from the Alvis Hous e and Re-Entry Court programs w ere violations
of substantive rehabilitative c onditions, rather than mere tech nical violations, and therefore the trial court was within its authority to impose th e full 12-month prison sentence. 2019-Ohio-2979, ¶ 21. {¶ 12} We accepted Castner’s appeal and now affirm.
Castner’s violations were not technical violations {¶ 13} This appeal turns on the meaning of the term “technical violati on” in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c), which is not defined in the statute. Relying on this court’s
discussion of “technical violations” in State ex rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult Parole
Auth. , 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 609 N.E.2d 546 (1993), Castner asserts tha t “technical
violations” are violations t hat do not constitute a new felony. {¶ 14} We recently rejected that argument in Nelson , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3690, __ N.E.3d __. There, we concluded that the Taylor decision did not at all address the meaning of “technical violation” under t he statutory scheme
at issue here. Nelson at ¶ 25. And we determined that the plain meaning of the term “technical” pertains to something that is “immaterial,” id. at ¶ 18, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1463 (6th Ed.1990), or “[i]nvolved in detail or in form rather than in a principle or in substance,” id. , quoting Lynton, Ballentine’s Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus 661 (1995). Applying the common understanding of the term in the community-control cont ext, we concluded that an off ender commits a
“technical violation” if the c ondition violated is “akin to ‘an administrative requirement facilitating communi ty control supervision.’ ” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting
State v. Davis , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-11-156, 2018-Ohio-2672, ¶ 18. B ut we explained that when a viola tion “concerns a condition of com munity control that was ‘specifically tailored to address’ matters related to the defendant’s
misconduct or if it can be deemed a ‘substantive rehabilitative requirement whichS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 addressed a significant factor contributing to’ the defendant’s misconduct,” the
violation does not amount t o a technical violation. Id ., quoting Davis at ¶ 17-18. {¶ 15} Additionally, we observed that the statute limits the trial cou rt’s discretion when imposing a pris on sentence for a less serious “ technical violation” but it gives the court greater discretion in sentencing an offe nder for violating a more serious community-control vi olation, even if the violation did not rise to the
level of a crime. Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, we concluded that a trial court should “engage in a practical assessment of the case before it” by considering “the nature of the community-control condition at issue and the manner in which it was violated, as well as any other relevant circumstances in the case.” Id. at ¶ 26. We emphasized that when evaluating whether a violation is technical, no singl e factor is
determinative. Id. {¶ 16} Applying our analysis in Nelson to the facts of this case, it is evident
that Castner’s violations were not technical in nature. The co nditions imposed by the court mandating that Castner complete the Alvis House and R e-Entry Court programs were plainly substantive rehabilitative requirements t hat were specifically tailored to address Castner’s drug use and were ai med at reducing his
likelihood of recidivism. Indeed , substance-abuse treatment wa s the central focus of Castner’s community-control sanction. When he failed to com plete the VOA treatment program, the trial court worked with him by placing h im in a program better suited to his needs, givin g him another opportunity to r eceive treatment. And the trial court warned him that if he failed to complete treatm ent a second time, prison would likely follow. {¶ 17} Moreover, the circumstances sur rounding Castner’s termination from the Alvis House program belie his claim that his failure t o complete the program was a technical violation. Castner had been at the fac ility a mere two weeks before the staff realized that he had been disobeying the program’s rules regarding computer and phone use so that he could communicate w ith youngJanuary Term, 2020

7 girls—behavior that, given his history, might well have led to criminal conduct had
it continued undetected. Castner’s termination from the Alvis House program was
the direct result of his own s ubstantial misconduct, which occu rred almost immediately upon his arrival at t he facility and without his ha ving made a serious attempt to engage in the required treatment.
Conclusion {¶ 18} By failing to complete treatment through the Alvis House progra m and by being unsuccessfully termin ated from the Re-Entry Court, Castner violated two substantive rehabilitative conditions of his community cont rol that were specifically tailored to address his criminal drug use. And th e circumstances surrounding the violations were such that they cannot be deemed merely technical in nature. Thus, the sentencing cap in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i ) does not apply, and
the trial court had the discretion to sentence Castner to a 12- month prison term. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Fifth Distr ict Court of Ap peals. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , and F ISCHER , JJ., concur.
S TEWART , J., concurs, with an opinion.
D ONNELLY , J., dissents, with an opinion.

_________________ S TEWART , J., concurring. {¶ 19} Although I joined the dissenting opinion in State v. Nelson , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3690, __ N.E.3d __, and I continue to concl ude that a nonfelony violation of community control is a technical violation of a person’s community-control conditions, star e decisis compels me to join the majority’s decision today because the law on the issue before us was affir matively established by a majority of this court in Nelson

. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis , 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 43 (“The doctrine of stare decisis is designed to provide continui ty and predictability in our leg al system”).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 _________________ D ONNELLY , J., dissenting. {¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent. As I explained in my dissenting opini on in
State v. Nelson , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3690, __ N.E.3d __, the term “technical violation” in the field of criminal law is commonly understood to be a violation of a community-control (or parole or probation) term that is not itself a criminal offense, id. at ¶ 36 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) . Further, construing the te rm “technical violation” according to its commonly understood mean ing gives effect to the legislative intent underlying R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c), bec ause one of the main purposes behind the statutory pr ovision was “lowering incarcera tion costs to Ohio taxpayers by reducing the number of low-level offenders in the state prison system.” Id. at ¶ 40 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). {¶ 21} The General Assembly is free to define the term “technical violation” in any way it pleases relating to R.C. 2929.15(B)(1) (c), and it is free to
establish a definition that is different from the commonly unde rstood meaning of the term. But until it does so, we should heed the clear inten t of the language that is currently in place. We should not allow our blind reverence for judicial discretion to attenuate the meaning of the term “technical violation” to t he point that the meaning of “technical” lies en tirely in the eye of the beholder

. . {¶ 22} Although appellant David Castne r’s violation of his communitycontrol sanction was substantial, in my view, it constituted a “technical violation” as the term is used in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c). And although the trial court was circumspect in reaching its judgment imposing a 12-month prison term upon Castner following his violati on, the court was nonetheless limi ted by R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) to imposing a 90-day term of imprisonment. Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the judg ment of the Fifth District Co urt of Appeals.

_________________January Term, 2020

9 Gary D. Bishop, Richland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Josep h C. Snyder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Darin Avery, for appellant.

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