United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-2599MN

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Ramon Gavilan-Cuate, *

*

Appellee, *

* 

v. * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court

Chuck Yetter, Jail Administrator, * for the District of

Washington County Jail; Curtis Aljets, * Minnesota.

District Director, Immigration and *

Naturalization Service, *

*

Appellants. *

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 Submitted: October 17, 2001

 Filed: January 9, 2002

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Before BOWMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals from an order of the District Court for the District

of Minnesota granting Ramon Gavilan-Cuate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

to determine whether his conviction of conspiracy to transport and harbor illegal

aliens is an “aggravated felony” as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(N), 1324 (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii). The government argues that

this Court should reverse the District Court’s decision to grant the petition because
1

The BIA relied on Matter of Ruiz-Romero, Int. Dec. 3376 (BIA 1999) (finding

that a conviction of transporting an illegal alien within the United States is an

aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N)). Appendix of Appellant 221. 

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this issue was presented and decided by this Court when it dismissed Gavilan-Cuate’s

direct appeal in 1999. We agree with the government’s argument and reverse the

decision of the District Court.

I.

In April 1998, Gavilan-Cuate pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport and

harbor illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324 (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii).

Following his conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service served GavilanCuate with a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge, stating that he was

subject to removal from the United States as an alien convicted of an “aggravated

felony.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1101(a)(43)(N) (defining an

aggravated felony as “an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section

1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling)”). The immigration judge found

Gavilan-Cuate “removable as charged and ordered him removed to Mexico.” Brief

for Appellant 9. Gavilan-Cuate appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

Before the BIA, Gavilan-Cuate’s sole argument was that his crime of conviction did

not constitute an aggravated felony. The basis for his argument was that he was

involved only in transporting and harboring aliens once they were within the United

States, rather than actually smuggling aliens across the border. The BIA dismissed

his appeal and determined that Gavilan-Cuate was convicted of an aggravated felony,

making him subject to removal.1

 In November 1999, Gavilan-Cuate filed a petition with this Court asking us to

review the Final Order of Removal issued by the BIA. The government responded by

arguing that this Court should dismiss Gavilan-Cuate’s appeal because we lacked
2

This statute states, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court

shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is

removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section

1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any offense covered

by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title . . ..” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). GavilanCuate v. INS, No. 99-4045 (8th Cir. January 24, 2000) (order dismissing appeal).

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jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against aliens convicted of aggravated

felonies. However, the government conceded that this Court did have the jurisdiction

to determine “the preliminary jurisdictional fact of whether petitioner’s crime for

which he was convicted and upon which he was ordered removed constitute[d] an

aggravated felony.” Appendix for Appellant 305. See Hall v. INS, 167 F.3d 852, 855

(4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a court may determine “whether the petitioner is an alien,

and whether he has been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses”). We

determined that Gavilan-Cuate had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was

removable. Therefore, we dismissed Gavilan-Cuate’s appeal because we lacked

jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against aliens convicted of certain

criminal offenses, including aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).2

The instant appeal arises from Gavilan-Cuate’s petition for habeas corpus in the

District Court to answer the same question raised in our Court, whether GavilanCuate’s conviction for conspiracy to transport and harbor illegal aliens was an

aggravated felony. The District Court granted the petition and determined that

Gavilan-Cuate’s conviction was not an aggravated felony. Gavilan-Cuate v. Yetter,

94 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2000). The government appeals this ruling. Because

we dismissed Gavilan-Cuate’s direct appeal on the basis that he had committed an

aggravated felony and was subject to removal, we reverse the District Court’s

decision.
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II.

In this case, our prior decision is conclusive. Though a jurisdictional

determination is not usually binding on future proceedings, it is binding as to issues

that are addressed by the Court in determining the jurisdictional question. In 1999,

Gavilan-Cuate appealed the finding that his crime of conviction was an aggravated

felony as described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) to this Court. Though the

government argued that we lacked jurisdiction to hear Gavilan-Cuate’s appeal, we did

have jurisdiction to determine preliminary jurisdictional facts, such as whether

Gavilan-Cuate’s crime constituted an aggravated felony making him removable. We

dismissed Gavilan-Cuate’s appeal because we lacked jurisdiction to review final

orders of removal against aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Because our

dismissal was premised on the fact that Gavilan-Cuate was convicted of an aggravated

felony, that decision is binding on this proceeding.

Accordingly, the District Court’s decision is reversed, and the cause remanded

with directions to dismiss the petition.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.