RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3881-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY BURKHALTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted April 19, 2018 –

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 

14-04-0437.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Lon Taylor, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, on the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Caitlyn Kelly, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress his statement 

to police pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Decided July 25, 2018
2 A-3881-16T1

defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of firstdegree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3),1 and one 

count of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-5(b), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his Miranda

motion. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement 

to an aggregate term of twenty-one years' imprisonment, with an 

eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the 

No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In addition, defendant 

was ordered to serve the special sentence of parole supervision 

for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, and comply with the requirements of 

Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.

On appeal, defendant raises the following single point for 

our consideration:

POINT I

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 

STATEMENT BY A SEMI-ILLITERATE AND 

HOSPITALIZED DEFENDANT, HANDCUFFED TO HIS BED 

AND NOT FEELING WELL AS A RESULT OF MULTIPLE 

GUNSHOT WOUNDS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 

SINCE HE WAS INCAPABLE OF VOLUNTARILY WAIVING 

HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS AND GIVING A STATEMENT TO 

POLICE.

Having considered defendant's contention in light of the record 

and the applicable legal standards, we affirm.

 

1 The charges pertained to two separate victims, K.M. and P.H.
3 A-3881-16T1

On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert C. Billmeier conducted a 

N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, at which Trenton Police Officer Nelson 

Cartagena and Mercer County Prosecutor's Office Detectives Anthony 

Petracca and Matthew Norton testified for the State. Cartagena 

and Petracca testified about defendant's December 11, 2012 

statement given while hospitalized for near-fatal gunshot wounds,

which was the subject of the Miranda hearing and this appeal. 

Norton testified about an earlier October 19, 2012 statement given 

at Trenton police headquarters.2 The judge also reviewed the 

December 11, 2012 recorded interview. 

Petracca was assigned to investigate separate cases involving 

defendant, who was both the suspect in three sexual assaults,

occurring on October 12, November 24, and November 27, 2012, and

the victim of a November 28, 2012 shooting. The October 12, 2012

sexual assault occurred in Trenton during a burglary at the home 

of the victim, K.M. K.M. selected the photograph of defendant's 

identical twin brother, Steven Burkhalter, out of a photo array 

and identified him as her assailant. However, Steven Burkhalter 

was incarcerated in Missouri at the time of the assault. 

 

2 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the admissibility of 

his October 19, 2012 statement.
4 A-3881-16T1

In a police interview conducted by Norton on October 19, 

2012, in connection with the October 12, 2012 sexual assault of 

K.M.,

3 defendant did not provide any incriminating statements, but

acknowledged that he was known by the street name "Twin." 

Thereafter, J.R., the victim of the November 24, 2012 sexual 

assault, identified her assailant by the nickname "Twin." 

Additionally, P.H., the victim of the November 27, 2012 sexual 

assault that occurred during a burglary of her Hamilton home,

identified defendant as her assailant from a photo lineup.

In the November 28, 2012 shooting, defendant was shot four 

times by two different assailants and suffered extensive internal 

injuries, requiring emergency surgery. Following the surgery, on 

December 4, 2012, Petracca went to interview defendant in his 

hospital room at Capital Health System. However, due to his 

medical condition and difficulty speaking with a suction tube 

inserted in his mouth, defendant was only able to give Petracca 

the street name of one of the shooters. 

 

3 The recorded interview was conducted after Norton advised 

defendant of his Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver of 

his rights. During the administration of the rights, because 

defendant advised Norton he could not read, Norton read the rights 

as well as the waiver to defendant. The ensuing colloquy between 

defendant and Norton also included Norton explaining in detail the 

meaning of the word "coercion" to defendant. 
5 A-3881-16T1

Petracca returned to the hospital to interview defendant on 

December 6 and December 10, 2012. Although defendant's medical 

condition was improving, Petracca refrained from interviewing 

defendant on either date after inquiring with the nurse about 

defendant's condition. Nevertheless, after Petracca left the 

hospital on December 10, 2012, another Trenton Police Detective 

charged defendant in a complaint-warrant with the sexual assault

of J.R. because defendant had expressed his intention to leave the 

hospital against medical advice.4 

Cartagena testified that on December 11, 2012, the day after 

defendant was charged, he was assigned to defendant's hospital 

room to guard him while he was in police custody. That day, 

Cartagena observed defendant for approximately eight hours, during 

which defendant watched television, talked, and otherwise behaved 

normally, despite being handcuffed to the bed. At defendant's 

request, Cartagena telephoned Petracca to advise him that 

defendant wished to speak with him. As a result, Petracca arrived 

at the hospital some time before 3:30 p.m. However, before 

speaking with defendant, Petracca talked with defendant's nurse 

to get an update on his medical condition, as he had in the past.

 

4 In its opinion, the trial court noted that a December 10, 2012 

progress note from defendant's hospital records indicated that 

defendant "had poor thought organization and detailed recall of 

events." 
6 A-3881-16T1

Petracca inquired whether the "influence of a 

medication . . . would affect [defendant's] ability to think [or] 

make decisions," and confirmed that he would not be interrupting 

any planned treatment for defendant. After receiving medical 

clearance, Petracca found defendant's overall condition 

"substantially" improved and noted "[h]e was no longer attached 

to devices to assist his breathing[,] [h]e was no longer draining 

saliva from his mouth," and "[h]e was also actually out of the 

bed . . . sitting in one of those hospital chairs." Over the next 

two hours, Petracca "continuous[ly]" recorded his interview with

defendant utilizing a "portable recorder that digitally records 

audio onto a hard drive," which he then "downloaded . . . to a 

CD."

Initially, the following exchange occurred between defendant 

and Petracca:

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: How are you 

doing? . . . You doing okay?

[DEFENDANT]: I'm getting better.

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: Good. You look a little 

better. . . . Do you know what's going on or 

what?

[DEFENDANT]: No. 

. . . 

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: . . . All right. Before 

we get started, I've got to go over a couple 
7 A-3881-16T1

things with you. And I know that you've 

probably been through this process before. 

But before we get started, how are you 

feeling?

[DEFENDANT]: Not good.

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: Not good? What's 

bothering you?

[DEFENDANT]: (Indiscernible).

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: Well, I'll talk to you 

about that, but I just want to make sure first 

before we start talking that your head is 

clear, that you understand what I'm saying, 

and that you're okay, because if you're not 

healthy[,] I don't want to be talking to you 

if you're not feeling well. So, are you all 

right?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: Okay. . . . I want to go 

over some stuff. You just need to listen. If 

you have any questions you can ask me, and 

then we'll work from there. All right. The 

first thing I've got to do with you is read 

you your rights [so that] before we talk you 

understand what they are. All right? Did you 

talk to you[r] mom today?

[DEFENDANT]: (Indiscernible).

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: Yeah. [S]he called me 

last night.

[DEFENDANT]: Am I going to jail?

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: I'm going to talk [about]

all of that. We'll talk about it. Let me 

just get through all this first. Do you read 

and write English?

[DEFENDANT]: I read a little bit.
8 A-3881-16T1

DETECTIVE PETRACCA: . . . All right. Then 

I'll read you everything so that you won't 

have to worry about it. 

Then, utilizing the Uniform Mercer County Rights and Waiver 

of Rights Forms, Petracca read aloud and reviewed with defendant 

his Miranda rights as well as the waiver of rights. After reading 

the waiver of rights form, Petracca explained to defendant,

This just basically states that you are 

willing to talk to me right now. Okay? I am 

not forcing you. I'm not pressuring you. I'm 

not holding something over your head saying 

you'd better talk to me or else. Okay? And 

actually, you had the officer that was here 

today call me earlier, is that correct? Okay. 

So, you can read that and sign there. And 

remember, . . . if you decide you don't want 

to talk to me at any point in time you can 

say, Detective, I don't want to talk to you 

anymore, and we'll be done. 

Defendant signed the forms, acknowledging his understanding of his 

rights and of his agreement to waive his rights and answer 

questions without a lawyer present. Defendant also acknowledged 

on the form that "no promises or threats" were made and that "no 

pressure or coercion of any kind" was used against him. 

Petracca also reviewed with defendant and read aloud the

"Arrest Warrant Notice Form," informing defendant that the day 

before, he had been charged with sexual assault, and bail in the 

amount of "$100,000 with no 10%" was imposed. Defendant questioned 

Petracca about the bail and specifically inquired whether there 
9 A-3881-16T1

was a ten percent option. Petracca responded there was "[n]o ten 

percent" option and explained that "a lot of people . . . use a 

bail bondsman" in order to pay a lower percentage, but confirmed 

that "[a]t some point, . . . [defendant] may have to go to jail 

if [he] can't post bail." 

Defendant expressed frustration at his inability to make a 

phone call while hospitalized to make arrangements to post bail. 

Petracca agreed to contact defendant's mother and advise her about 

the bail but refused "to break [the Trenton Police Department's] 

rules" by allowing defendant to speak to his mother directly.

5

Defendant also expressed concern about being incarcerated with the 

individuals responsible for shooting him, to which Petracca 

responded that if defendant "cooperate[d] with that investigation, 

for [his] safety," those individuals would be incarcerated "in a 

different jail." 

Next, Petracca requested defendant's consent to obtain a DNA 

sample for use in the investigation of the crimes for which 

defendant was a suspect. To that end, Petracca read defendant his 

rights in connection with providing his consent. Defendant 

voluntarily agreed to provide two buccal swabs, and after Petracca 

explained that the DNA evidence collected at the crime scenes 

 

5 Cartagena confirmed that defendant was not permitted to make 

phone calls or have visitors while he was in police custody.
10 A-3881-16T1

would incriminate him, defendant eventually made incriminating 

statements about each of the three sexual assaults and 

corresponding burglaries committed by himself and his associates.

At one point during the interview, when questioned about the 

identity of the persons responsible for his near fatal shooting, 

defendant stated, "I don't think I want to talk about that no 

more." However, the interview continued with defendant telling

Petracca his concerns about being identified as a "snitch," his 

fear for his safety and that of his family members, and his prior 

burglary convictions in Missouri, for which he had been 

incarcerated.

Following the hearing, on April 17, 2014, Judge Billmeier

issued a written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress 

his statement to Petracca. The judge found the testimony of all 

three witnesses credible, and described Cartagena's testimony as 

"straight forward" and non-evasive, Petracca's as "forthright," 

and Norton's as "worthy of belief." Next, the judge determined 

that all four of the Miranda factors were satisfied and concluded 

that "[d]efendant made a proper waiver of his Fifth Amendment 

rights, and provided a statement to Detective Petracca of his own 

volition." 

As to the first and second requirements, the judge found

"[d]efendant was properly advised of his rights by Detective 
11 A-3881-16T1

Petracca," and, although "he has difficulty reading," defendant 

reviewed and signed the forms after Petracca read them to him. 

Turning to the voluntariness of the waiver, guided by State v. 

Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), the judge concluded that

"[c]onsidering the totality of the facts and circumstances," 

defendant's waiver "was knowing, intelligent and voluntary" and 

was not "the product of coercion." The judge found support for 

his decision that "[d]efendant clearly understood what the 

detective was inquiring about" and "was not suffering any 

debilitating effects from the medications he was on, or the 

injuries he suffered" in "the level of discussion" between 

defendant and Petracca. 

In that regard, the judge recounted that defendant was twentythree-and-one-half years old at the time of the interview, and,

although he "did not complete high school and was of limited 

intelligence, he was able to have a two-hour conversation with 

Detective Petracca and asked very appropriate questions when the 

Detective went through his Miranda rights and waiver." The judge

also found the questioning "was not prolonged in nature and 

certainly did not involve any 'physical punishment or mental 

exhaustion,'" and defendant was "reminded by Detective Petracca 

in explaining his Miranda rights, [that] he could tell him he 

wanted to stop talking at any time." The judge found "further 
12 A-3881-16T1

evidence of [d]efendant's soundness of mind from [d]efendant's 

inquiry as to the DNA evidence the detective discussed." 

Regarding "advice as to constitutional rights," the judge 

recounted that "[d]efendant had been apprised of his Miranda rights 

and waiver by Detective Norton" two months "prior to the waiver 

at issue." According to the judge, "[d]efendant had properly 

waived his constitutional rights" at that time and, during 

questioning, had denied any involvement in the October 12, 2012 

sexual assault. In addition to the interaction with Norton, the 

judge found "[d]efendant was no neophyte to the criminal justice 

system." The judge detailed defendant's "extensive experience 

with the criminal justice system in the State of Missouri," where 

he had "pled guilty to . . . five burglaries, and spent time in 

state prison." 

The judge expressly rejected defendant's argument that "his 

hospitalization and poor health, his fear for his safety and the 

safety of his mother, his lack of education, his mental limitations 

and Detective Petracca's offer of DNA evidence existing," rendered 

his waiver the product of coercion. Likewise, the judge rejected 

defendant's assertion that "coercive techniques were used." The 

judge explained:

Although defendant was in the hospital, feared 

for his safety, and lacked certain educational 

skills, it is clear to this court [d]efendant 
13 A-3881-16T1

asked Detective Petracca to come visit him at 

the hospital in order to discuss the charges 

against him. Detective Petracca informed

[d]efendant if he no longer wanted to talk to 

the Detective at any time, he could stop. 

Detective Petracca was honest and forthcoming 

with [d]efendant when asked questions and made 

no attempt to trick, intimidate, force or 

confuse [d]efendant into making a statement. 

Further, this court does not find the 

[D]etective's offer to aid [d]efendant in 

finding a way to post bail was made in exchange 

for incriminating answers to the [D]etective's 

questions. On the contrary, this court finds 

Detective Petracca offered to speak to 

[d]efendant's mother and offered advice as to 

the services of a bail bondsman prior to any 

questioning or interrogation as to the sexual 

assaults. Therefore, this court finds the 

fourth factor of the Miranda analysis has been 

satisfied.

Finally, the judge emphatically rejected defendant's argument 

that "the admission of [d]efendant's statement [was] fundamentally 

unfair" because "[d]efendant believed Detective Petracca was at 

the hospital to discuss the matter in which [d]efendant was the 

victim, and not the sexual assaults [d]efendant was charged with." 

The judge determined that "a review of the record suggest[ed] just 

the opposite," because it was defendant who "invited Detective 

Petracca to the hospital to speak with him about the sexual assault 

charges pending against him." The judge elaborated:

Most notably, [d]efendant [told] 

Detective Petracca he [did] not want to talk 

about his assailant and [did] not end the 

conversation with the Detective when 

questioned about the sexual assaults. This 
14 A-3881-16T1

court finds it was [d]efendant who led the 

conversation in the direction of the sexual 

assaults[,] and as such, it is apparent to the 

court [d]efendant had every intention of 

discussing those charges with the Detective.

Additionally this court finds Detective 

Petracca was clear on his intention to 

question [d]efendant as to the sexual assault 

charges[,] as right from the very start of the 

interrogation, . . . the Detective informed 

[d]efendant of his charges. Additionally, the 

Detective informed [d]efendant, "[n]ow, I told 

you, you got a sex assault charge outta 

Trenton. They signed a complain[t] on you 

yesterday . . . ." It is clear [from] this 

exchange the Detective was not trying to hide 

his intention in going to the hospital to 

speak with [d]efendant.

 

The judge entered a memorializing order, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that "[a]n overall assessment of 

the uncontested facts that [defendant] was recovering from lifethreatening injuries, was handcuffed to his bed, did not feel 

well, was semi-literate, and suffered from learning and cognitive 

difficulties" showed that "the State could not prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that [defendant] voluntarily and intelligently 

waived his Miranda rights." Further, according to defendant, 

"[s]ince [his] physical and mental limitations undermined the 

voluntariness of the Miranda waiver, they inevitably undermined 

the voluntariness of his statement," and "[t]he trial court ignored 

the fact that the interrogation pertained to dual investigations." 

We disagree.
15 A-3881-16T1

When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress 

a defendant's statement, we must "engage in a 'searching and 

critical' review of the record." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 

543 (2015) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1187 (2016). We defer to 

the trial court's findings supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record, particularly when they are grounded in the 

judge's feel of the case and ability to assess the witnesses' 

demeanor and credibility. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 

(2009); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). 

This standard of review applies even where the motion court's 

"factfindings [are] based solely on video or documentary 

evidence," such as recordings of custodial interrogations by the 

police. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017). We will not 

reverse a motion court's findings of fact based on its review of 

a recording of a custodial interrogation unless the findings are 

clearly erroneous or mistaken. Id. at 380. However, we review 

issues of law de novo. Ibid.; State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 411 

(2012).

At a hearing challenging the admission of statements made 

during a custodial interrogation, "the State must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that a defendant's confession was voluntary and 

was not made because the defendant's will was overborne." State 
16 A-3881-16T1

v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005). The State must also prove 

"the defendant was advised of his rights and knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently waived them." State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 602 

n.3 (2011). Further, the determination of whether the State has 

satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a 

defendant's statement was voluntary requires "a court to assess 

'the totality of the circumstances, including both the 

characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the 

interrogation.'" Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383 (quoting State v. 

Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993)). 

We must determine "whether, under the totality of 

circumstances, the confession is 'the product of an essentially 

free and unconstrained choice by its maker' or whether 'his will 

has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination 

critically impaired.'" State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 271 

(App. Div. 2003) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 

225-26 (1973)). The "factors relevant to that analysis include 

'the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning 

constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the 

questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether 

physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved.'" Hreha, 

217 N.J. at 383 (quoting Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654). The court 

should also consider defendant's prior encounters with law 
17 A-3881-16T1

enforcement and the period of time that elapsed between the 

administration of Miranda warnings and the defendant's confession. 

Ibid.

Applying these principles and deferring to the judge's 

factual findings, which are amply supported by the record, we are 

satisfied that Judge Billmeier's denial of defendant's motion to 

suppress his statement was proper. Based on the judge's assessment 

of the totality of the circumstances, including the 

characteristics of defendant and the nature of the interrogation, 

the judge correctly determined that the State satisfied its burden 

of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was advised 

of his rights, knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his 

rights, and gave a voluntary statement. We reject defendant's 

contrary arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed in Judge Billmeier's well-reasoned written decision.

Affirmed.