NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

O. L., AKA, Jane Doe, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF ORANGE; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55258 

D.C. No. 

8:20-cv-00322-JWH-GJS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 19, 2024

**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Jane Doe1, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s summary judgment 

in Doe’s action challenging the conditions at the Women’s County Jail in Orange 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 The district court allowed appellant to proceed under a pseudonym in this case.

FILED

JUL 19 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

County, California, where Doe was housed as a pretrial detainee. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mendiola-Martinez v. 

Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s claims 

challenging the conditions of her confinement because none were an 

unconstitutional punishment. See, e.g., Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 

(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that, to constitute punishment, the governmental action 

must cause harm or disability that either significantly exceeds or is independent of 

the inherent discomforts of confinement); see also Gordon v. County of Orange, 

888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth objective deliberate 

indifference standard for Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement 

claims brought by pretrial detainees).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s claims 

challenging strip and cell searches because none of the searches was unreasonable. 

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-59 (1979) (setting forth balancing test for 

determining whether a search is reasonable in the prison context); Michenfelder v. 

Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s retaliation 

claim because Doe failed to establish that the allegedly retaliatory cell search did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. See, e.g., Rhodes v. 
3 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that elements of First 

Amendment retaliation claim in prison context include establishing that alleged 

adverse action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s claim that

defendant County of Orange failed to train and to supervise its employees because 

Doe failed to establish any underlying unconstitutional violation. See Jackson v. 

City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality 

nor a supervisor. . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or 

constitutional violation has occurred.”, (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 

U.S. 796, 799 (1986))).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s claims 

under the California Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 2, 7 and 13, which failed for the 

same reasons as her analogous federal claims.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s state law 

tort claims. Doe’s claim for negligent supervision fails because she did not 

establish that some of the defendants were negligent in training and in supervising

other defendants. See Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 203 P.3d 1127, 1132 

(Cal. 2009) (explaining that to establish negligence under California state law, 

plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages); Delfino v. Agilent 

Technologies, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 397 (Ct. App. 2006) (setting forth 
4 

elements of claim for negligent supervision and retention). Doe’s claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress also fails, because none of the conduct at 

issue was extreme or outrageous. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gen. Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 

184, 188 (Ct. App. 1982) (setting forth elements of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim).

Doe’s claim that the defendants violated California Penal Code § 4030 fails 

because the strip search restrictions in the statute do not apply to detainees like 

Doe, who are placed in the jail’s general population. Cal. Penal Code § 4030(e).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying in part Doe’s 

motion to compel discovery. Doe was provided with some discovery, and has not 

established that she was actually and substantially prejudiced by the decision. See, 

e.g., Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating standard of 

review and explaining that a “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed 

except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and 

substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted)). 

The County Defendants’ motion to strike portions of the opening brief 

(Docket Entry No. 27) is granted. The Clerk shall strike the Opening Brief 

Appendix (Docket Entry No. 5 at 78-81).

AFFIRMED.