The Honorable Lynn Adelman, District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1397

PAUL KIORKIS,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A046 101 699.

ARGUED OCTOBER 19, 2010—DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2011

Before CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and

ADELMAN, District Judge.



CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. In 2007, the Department of

Homeland Security placed Paul Kiorkis, a Lebanese

citizen who had been legally residing in the United States
2 No. 10-1397

for over a decade, into removal proceedings due to his

prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

Kiorkis conceded that he was removable, but filed an

application seeking asylum and other forms of relief. An

immigration court denied his request for asylum after

conducting a full merits hearing, finding that Kiorkis

had failed to establish that he had a well-established

fear of future persecution on the basis of a statutorilyprotected ground. Kiorkis appealed the immigration

court’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA). A one-member panel of the Board denied Kiorkis’s

appeal and affirmed the immigration court’s analysis in

its entirety. Kiorkis filed an appeal with this court,

alleging that the immigration court and the Board failed

to consider all of his future persecution claims. We

affirm the decisions below.

I. Background

Paul Kiorkis is an Assyrian Christian who was born in

Beirut, Lebanon in 1984. Twelve years later, Kiorkis—along

with his father, mother and four siblings—obtained an

immigrant visa and entered the United States as lawful

permanent residents. After moving to the United States,

the Kiorkis family settled in the greater Chicago area

and, except for a few members who have relocated to

Michigan, remain in Illinois to this day. Over the past

14 years, all of the Kiorkis family members, except the

appellant, have succeeded in obtaining full U.S. citizenship.

After immigrating to the United States, Kiorkis

remained a lawful permanent resident in good standing
No. 10-1397 3

with the law for several years. Eventually, however,

Kiorkis ran afoul of the law. In 2003, he pleaded guilty

to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance

and was sentenced to two years of probation, which it

appears he completed without incident. This conviction

came back to haunt Kiorkis in 2007 when he applied

for naturalization. When reviewing Kiorkis’s application, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discovered his prior conviction and used it as grounds for

denying his application. DHS also instituted removal

proceedings against Kiorkis at this time, seeking to

remove him from the United States pursuant to section

237(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA). 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(B)(I) (providing for the

removal of aliens who have been convicted for violating

controlled substance laws).

In March 2008, Kiorkis appeared for his initial hearing

before the immigration court and was granted an extension so that he could obtain representation. In

August 2008, Kiorkis failed to appear at the second

hearing and the court ordered him in absentia removed.

The court rescinded its order upon Kiorkis’s timely

filing of a motion to reopen and continued the hearing

to January 2009. At this hearing, Kiorkis conceded that

he was removable.

In February 2009, Kiorkis submitted an application

for asylum, withholding of removal and protection

under the Convention Against Torture. In his asylum

application, Kiorkis stated that certain aspects of his

identity made him a likely target of future persecution
4 No. 10-1397

at the hands of Hezbollah and the Lebanese government.

In April 2009, Immigration Judge Ipema presided over

a merits hearing concerning his application. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ipema denied all of

Kiorkis’s requests and ordered his removal to Lebanon.

In May 2009, Kiorkis appealed Judge Ipema’s order to

the BIA. Two months later the BIA determined that the

transcript from Kiorkis’s hearing contained too many

indiscernible notations to permit appellate review and

remanded the case for further consideration. In September 2009, Immigration Judge Kessler presided over a

second merits hearing regarding Kiorkis’s claims. At

the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Kessler granted

Kiorkis’s request for voluntary departure, but denied

all of Kiorkis’s other requests for relief.

Kiorkis filed a timely appeal from Judge Kessler’s

decision with the BIA. In January 2010, after receiving

briefing from both parties, the BIA affirmed the decision

below and dismissed the appeal. Kiorkis asks this court

to review the BIA’s decision, alleging that both the BIA

and Judge Kessler erred in denying his requests for relief.

II. Discussion

Because the BIA dismissed Kiorkis’s appeal in a singlemember opinion that agreed with the immigration

judge’s analysis, the immigration judge’s opinion “as

supplemented by the Board’s opinion becomes the basis

of review.” Raghunathan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 378 (7th

Cir. 2010). Before analyzing the merits of each of
No. 10-1397 5

Kiorkis’s claims, however, we must first consider the

extent to which we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Kiorkis has conceded that he is removable from the

United States due to his commission of a drug-related

criminal offense. When an individual is removable

on such grounds, section 1252(a)(2)(C) of the INA

severely curtails our ability to review the decisions of

the immigration court and the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)

(stating that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review

any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain

criminal offenses); see also Aguilar-Mejia v. Holder, 616

F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2010). While we are prohibited

completely from questioning the factual determinations

made by either body, a subsequent provision of the

INA states that we retain the authority to review the

agency’s determinations for legal errors. 8 U.S.C. § 1252

(a)(2)(D) (stating that courts retain jurisdiction to hear

appeals raising “constitutional claims or questions of

law”); see also Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir.

2009); Li Fang Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618, 620 (7th

Cir. 2008). We review the legal determinations of the

immigration court and the BIA de novo, with deference

to the agency if the issue involves an ambiguous section

of the INA or an interpretation of agency regulations.

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997).

On appeal, Kiorkis alleges that the immigration court

and the BIA erred in three distinct ways: (1) they failed

to acknowledge his Hezbollah-related fear of future
6 No. 10-1397

persecution claims; (2) they ignored his fear of future

persecution claims that were not related to his religion;

and (3) they applied the wrong evidentiary standard

when determining that he had not shown a likelihood

of future persecution.

A. Kiorkis’s Hezbollah-related Claims

Kiorkis’s first argument on appeal contends that

Judge Kessler and the BIA considered only whether

Kiorkis had a well-founded fear of future persecution

at the hands of the Lebanese government and failed to

address his claims concerning persecution at the hands

of Hezbollah. He also argues that section 1252(a)(2)(C)

of the INA does not limit our ability to review the decisions below for these errors as they constitute legal,

rather than factual, errors.

In prior cases where our jurisdiction has been restricted by section 1252(a)(2)(C), we have acknowledged

“that the line between legal questions—which we can

review—and discretionary factual determinations—which

we cannot—is occasionally difficult to draw.” Khan v.

Filip, 554 F.3d at 688. It is clear that we are not

prevented from reviewing “an argument that necessarily

implicates a claim of legal error, such as an allegation

that the BIA failed to exercise discretion at all by completely ignoring an argument.” Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540

F.3d 528, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Mansour v. INS,

230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that agencies

are required to respond to the arguments that they are
No. 10-1397 7

presented with). However, it is also clear that we are

prohibited from reviewing “factual determinations or

the manner in which the agency weighed the various

factors that inform the exercise of discretion” or from

hearing claims that merely allege that the immigration

court “failed to apply the law.” Aguilar-Mejia, 616 F.3d

at 703; Khan, 554 F.3d at 689. Insofar as Kiorkis is

alleging that the immigration court and the BIA completely failed to consider his Hezbollah-related claims

(as opposed to claiming that these bodies exercised their

discretion, but did so improperly), we find that the

jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA are not

applicable and that it is proper for us to review the decisions below.

After reviewing Judge Kessler’s and the BIA’s decisions, we find that Kiorkis’s allegations concerning his

Hezbollah-related claims are not supported by the record. The BIA and the immigration courts are entitled

to a presumption of regularity concerning their resolution of claims and applicants appealing from their decisions bear the burden of establishing that an error occurred. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 33-34 (7th Cir.

1992). Further, while we have remanded immigration

cases “because an absence of analysis left us uncertain

that a claim had been fully understood,” we have also

recognized that it is impossible for immigration courts

to “write an exegesis on every contention an applicant

raises.” Dobrota v. INS, 195 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1999).

At the end of the merits hearing, Judge Kessler noted

evidence submitted by the parties discussing “ongoing

sectarian violence and other problems in Lebanon,”
8 No. 10-1397

The immigration court’s decision to address these claims 1

jointly is particularly understandable given that Kiorkis indicated in both his brief and his testimony that Hezbollah has

infiltrated the Lebanese government and effectively controls

many of its decisions.

including a United Nations report indicating that Lebanon’s government generally respects religious freedom

and a U.S. State Department report discussing the

dangers posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon. She also discussed Kiorkis’s history with and present fears of

Hezbollah. It is true that Judge Kessler did not explicitly distinguish between Kiorkis’s claims concerning Hezbollah and those involving the Lebanese

government when finding that Kiorkis had not demonstrated a well-established fear of future persecution;

however, this failure does not constitute reversible error. The record establishes that Judge Kessler under- 1

stood Kiorkis’s Hezbollah-related claim, that she considered the evidence before her and that she found it was

insufficient to support granting Kiorkis’s request for

asylum. Hence, it is clear that the immigration court did

not commit a legal error by ignoring Kiorkis’s claim.

B. Kiorkis’s Non-Religious Future Persecution Claims

Kiorkis also argues that the decisions below should be

reversed because Judge Kessler and the BIA failed to

consider three of the four statutorily-protected grounds

that he identified as providing a basis for his fear of

persecution claims. More specifically, Kiorkis alleges that
No. 10-1397 9

the immigration court and the BIA did not consider

whether his status as an Assyrian, a Westernized/Americanized individual and a member of a family with a

history of opposing Hezbollah supported a finding that

he possesses a well-founded fear of future persecution.

He contends that these omissions constitute legal errors

and, hence, that they can properly be reviewed by this

court.

Because Kiorkis’s second argument, like his first,

alleges that the immigration court and the BIA completely

ignored his claims, section 1252(a)(2)(C) of the INA

does not bar us from reviewing the decisions below.

Iglesias, 540 F.3d at 530-31. While we cannot question

the validity of Judge Kessler’s or the BIA’s factual determinations or the weight that they attributed to the parties’ evidence, a complete failure to consider

Kiorkis’s arguments constitutes grounds for reversal.

Id.; Khan, 554 F.3d at 689.

Our review of the opinions issued by Judge Kessler

and the BIA leaves us convinced that Kiorkis’s fear

of future persecution claims were not ignored. We begin

by noting that Kiorkis’s claim concerning his Assyrian

identity was not raised below and, as such, is not

properly before this court. In the brief that he submitted

to Judge Kessler prior to his merits hearing, Kiorkis

stated that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his Christianity, family membership,

political views and American identity. When Kiorkis

appealed Judge Kessler’s ruling to the BIA, he stated

that he feared persecution on three grounds—“(1) as a

Christian, (2) as one who is pro-Americanized and pro-
10 No. 10-1397

Western, and (3) as a member of a family who was persecuted by Hezbollah in the past.” Because Kiorkis

did not assert that his ethnicity provided an independent basis for finding a fear of future persecution

until filing his briefs with this court, the immigration

court and the BIA did not err by not addressing this

claim. See Mekhitav v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.

2009).

Given the novelty of Kiorkis’s ethnicity-based claim and

his concession that the immigration court and the BIA

considered his Christianity-based claim, we are left to

decide whether these bodies gave sufficient consideration to his Americanized/pro-Western identity and

family membership claims. When delivering her opinion,

Judge Kessler discussed Kiorkis’s contentions that his

American point of view and other distinctly Western

characteristics would put him at risk for future persecution, noting that one of his primary claims for relief

was “related to the fact that he ha[d] been effectively

Americanized.” Judge Kessler also stated that Kiorkis

had testified that he was “afraid of Hezbollah because

of his uncle fighting against them, and his father being

shot” and that he feared “being tortured by Hezbollah

because his family has fought against them.” After acknowledging these claims and reviewing the evidence

that the parties had submitted, she held that,

[a]lthough [Kiorkis] certainly has some concerns

and although the well-founded fear standard is a low

standard, I cannot conclude . . . that it has been demonstrated that there is . . . [a] ten percent chance or so

that he himself would suffer harm that rises to the
No. 10-1397 11

level of persecution, or that any such harm he fears

would be on account of his membership in a particular

social group.

(emphasis added). Given all of this, it is clear that the

immigration court considered Kiorkis’s fear of future

persecution claims based upon his Americanized/proWestern and family group identities, but found them

unconvincing and entered a judgment that dismissed

both claims.

We caution, however, that our holding should not

be interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of the

immigration court’s decision. Although we recognize

practical limitations, Judge Kessler might have discussed each of Kiorkis’s claims in greater depth and

elaborated on the reasons why she was rejecting each

claim. Section 1252(a)(2)(C)’s limitation of our jurisdiction, however, implies some restriction on the severity

of our critique of how Kiorkis’s social group claims

were handled. To the extent such a critique requires

reviewing the factual determinations of the immigration

court, section 1252(a)(2)(c) restricts its scope.

C. Evidentiary Standard

Kiorkis’s final argument alleges that the immigration

court and the BIA applied an incorrect evidentiary standard when deciding whether to grant his asylum application. He argues that the judgments entered by both

adjudicative bodies should be reversed because they did

not weigh the totality of his circumstances, failed to

consider all of his future persecution claims in the
12 No. 10-1397

We have jurisdiction over these issues as an appellant’s 2

allegation that a court applied the incorrect legal standard

falls squarely within the “questions of law” exception to

section 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdictional restrictions. Joseph v.

Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 829 (7th Cir. 2009).

2-28-11

context of one another and improperly focused on a

single piece of evidence.

Kiorkis’s argument concerning the evidentiary

standards applied by the immigration court is not supported by the record. Kiorkis has failed to identify

2

any part of Judge Kessler’s opinion that indicates that

she did not weigh the totality of Kiorkis’s circumstances

or that she considered his claims in isolation when deciding whether she should grant his request for asylum.

While Kiorkis suggests that the immigration court’s

heavy emphasis on his Christianity-based claims allow

us to infer that the court made these errors, doing so

would conflict with both this circuit’s practice and a

plain language reading of Judge Kessler’s opinion. RhoaZamora, 971 F.2d at 33-34.

III. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above, the ruling of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.