IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION

AVANZALIA SOLAR, S.L. and )

AVANZALIA PANAMA, S.A. )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) Case No.: 20-cv-05035

)

GOLDWIND USA, INC., d/b/a )

GOLDWIND AMERICAS, )

)

Defendant. )

DEFENDANT GOLDWIND’S REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT

OF ITS MOTION FOR BILL OF COSTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ Response to Goldwind’s Bill of Costs sidesteps the law and certain facts in 

endeavoring to avoid imposition of costs by this Court. One blatant example underscores the 

credibility gaps in Plaintiffs’ submission. Plaintiffs assert that Goldwind cannot recover costs of 

depositions Goldwind noticed and took (as opposed to those which it had to defend) claiming 

that those costs have not been shown to be reasonable and necessary. As the only “example” of 

why those depositions were supposedly not reasonable and necessary, Plaintiffs cite to the 

deposition of Ronald Jimenez, noting that Mr. Jimenez was not listed in Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 

disclosures. But this statement was disingenuous because as Plaintiffs well know, Mr. Jimenez 

was specifically named by them in their answers to interrogatories as a person with knowledge 

of key issues in this case. But even more telling, every deposition taken by Goldwind was either 

a person identified in Plaintiffs’ own Rule 26 disclosures and/or their interrogatory answers or

was one of Plaintiffs’ named experts. Plaintiffs’ assertion that Goldwind should not be awarded 

costs in connection with the depositions it took is without merit. 

Plaintiffs also make misleading arguments with regards to the other costs at issue. For 

example, Plaintiffs challenge various costs for Spanish language translations, interpreters and 

transcripts on grounds that Goldwind’s two counsel of record were not Spanish speakers. But

Plaintiffs know full well from their own depositions that Goldwind’s team included experts, 

employees and a lawyer who were Spanish speakers. In fact, it was Plaintiffs who insisted on 

Spanish language transcription and transcripts; the idea that costs related to such a demanded 

procedure are not recoverable lacks merit. 

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Moreover, as set forth in detail below, Plaintiffs have ignored and/or failed to respond to 

law which supports Goldwind’s requests for costs, including, inter alia, the law which has 

emerged since the Covid-19 pandemic recognizing that videotaped and remote depositions which 

use online technology were reasonable and necessary during the pandemic. Goldwind should be 

awarded its costs as set forth in its Bill of Costs. 

I I . ARGUMENT

A. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, there is nothing about the “discovery 

timeline” which would bar Goldwind’s recovery of costs in connection with 

service of subpoenas, including Letters Rogatory.

Pursuant to Section 1920(1), a prevailing party is entitled to recovery of costs for clerk 

and marshal fees, a category which involves, inter alia, costs associated with 

the service of subpoenas, and includes costs incurred for service of Letters Rogatory by the U.S.

State Department. (See, ECF 183, Goldwind’s Memorandum in Support of its Bill of Costs

“Opening Memorandum” at P. 5 citing, Barthco Int'l, Inc. v. DIJFO do Brasil, Ltda., 2014 WL 

12861825, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 

12861826 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2014).) Goldwind thus seeks recovery of $13,650 it incurred in 

obtaining service though the State Department of Letters Rogatory on multiple entities who were 

located in Panama and whom Plaintiffs claimed were its potential customers and a potential 

lender. In arguing that they should be able to avoid paying those costs, Plaintiffs note that the 

case law cited by Goldwind which upholds the recovery of such costs is not from this circuit and 

thus that this Court is not required to follow its holding. However, Plaintiffs do not argue that the

cited law (Barthco) was wrongly decided nor contend that its reasoning was in any way flawed.

Instead of asserting that there is any reason why the costs of State Department service of

Letters Rogatory should not, as a general matter, be assessed under Section 1920(1), Plaintiffs

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argue that this Court should not permit recovery of those costs in this particular case “in light of

the discovery timeline.” Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that Goldwind should be barred from

recovery of any1costs in connection with the Letters Rogatory because Goldwind did not arrange

to have those Letters Rogatory served until August 2021 when discovery was near an end.

Plaintiffs maintain that seeking documents from their foreign witnesses and entities at that time

was not “reasonable and necessary” because it risked “late receipt” of discovery responses and

point out that the response did not come until December 2022, after the summary judgment

motion was briefed. (See, Plaintiffs’ Response at P. 3.) But as set forth in the motion requesting

the issuance of Letters Rogatory, Goldwind stated that their purpose was to “secure testimony 

for use at trial.” (See, ECF 51, Plaintiff’s Motion to Issue Letters Rogatory.) Plaintiffs also fail to 

mention that, although they complain that Goldwind “sat on its hands” with respect to its motions 

for the issuance of Letters Rogatory, Plaintiffs’ own requests for the issuance of such Letters 

Rogatory were made on the same day as one of Goldwind’s motions (and less than two weeks 

before Goldwind’s second such motion). (ECF 46.) 

The reasonableness and necessity of discovery is judged based at the time when the 

discovery is issued. See, e.g., Nwoke v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 2021 WL 3483434, at *2 (7th 

Cir. Aug. 9, 2021.) At the time that Goldwind requested the issuance of the Letters Rogatory to 

the entities in Panama, it could reasonably have expected that a response would be made by the 

time of trial. At that point, discovery was ongoing and no date for summary judgment, let alone 

trial, had been set. There was nothing about the discovery timeline that would have indicated that 

the documents would not be received in time for trial. Plaintiffs do not claim to the contrary.

1

In addition to the amount paid the State Department for the Letters to be served in Panama, Goldwind also paid 

$359.50 to the Clerk of the Court for the necessary apostille for the Letters to be served in Spain. 

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Plaintiffs also question why the Letters Rogatory that were sent to Panama were

“reasonable and necessary” in any event, complaining that Goldwind did not adequately explain

the necessity. But based on Goldwind’s Motion to Issue Letters Rogatory as well as the Letters

Rogatory themselves, Plaintiffs are certainly aware that the Letters Rogatory were directed to

entities who were identified by Plaintiffs as i) customers whose relationship with Plaintiffs

Goldwind purportedly “intentionally interfered” and ii) a bank involved in discussions relating to 

the financing of the solar plant project at the center of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. (See, ECF. No. 51.) And

as noted in the motion to issue the Letters Rogatory, the documents sought were relevant to the 

issue of: i) whether Goldwind was responsible for any alleged “delay” in Plaintiffs connection to 

the substation and building its solar plant, thus purportedly interfering with Plaintiffs’ ability to 

enter into contracts to provide electricity; ii) whether Plaintiffs had issues with financing unrelated 

to Goldwind; or iii) Goldwind’s contact (or lack thereof) with any of the parties to whom the Letters 

Rogatory are directed. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not and cannot make any argument as to why this 

discovery was not reasonable and necessary. Pursuant to Section 1961(1), Goldwind is entitled to 

the recovery of the entire $14,172 it seeks for costs in connection with the service of the Letters 

Rogatory and for the service of a subpoena by a private process server2.

B. Goldwind is entitled to its costs incurred in taking depositions and obtaining

transcripts. 

Goldwind sought a total of $128,564.09 for recovery of “fees of the court reporter.”

Plaintiffs do not challenge $17,379.15 of this amount but claim that Goldwind is not entitled to the 

rest, arguing that Goldwind cannot obtain recovery of costs in connection with i) depositions 

Goldwind took, ii) indexes, iii) depositions taken in Spanish, or iv) actions taken due to the Covid2 The private process server was used to obtain the deposition of Brian Blakely, an employee of the Inter-American 

Bank. Mr. Blakely was specifically identified as a potential witness for Plaintiffs. (See, Opening Memorandum at 

Blonder Declaration ¶2 and its accompanying exhibit B-2.)

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19 pandemic. But as detailed below, Plaintiffs’ arguments ignore both the law and the 

circumstances that existed when the depositions were taken, including the pandemic. 

1. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs of the depositions of Plaintiffs’

experts and the individuals identified in Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 Disclosures or 

interrogatory Responses.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that a party may recover costs of deposition transcripts which were 

reasonably necessary under 28 U.S.C. §1920(2). But Plaintiffs insist that Goldwind has not met 

its burden to show that the depositions noticed by Goldwind were reasonable and necessary and 

thus they maintain that Goldwind cannot recover for the costs of transcripts. As detailed below, 

this argument is nonsensical: the depositions of all of the witnesses noticed by Goldwind were 

necessary because, as Plaintiffs know, of the eleven witnesses deposed by Goldwind:

• Three (3) were Plaintiffs’ own identified expert witnesses (Hoyos, Rose, and 

Klienrichert);

• Four (4) were identified in Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 Disclosures as individuals who 

Plaintiffs intended to potentially use to support their claims. (Lorente, Galdon, 

Pernas3, and Espino); and

• Four (4) were identified in Plaintiffs’ interrogatory answers as parties with 

knowledge of and material involvement with key matters. (Jimenez, Ruiz, 

Blakely and Furones).

Plaintiffs have not, and could not, make any credible argument as to why it was not 

reasonable and necessary to take any of these depositions. They do not even try to claim that the 

depositions of experts or the deposition of a party identified on a Rule 26 disclosure was not 

reasonable and necessary as a matter of law. As their only “example” of Goldwind’s supposed 

inability to establish reasonableness and necessity, Plaintiffs point to the deposition of Ronald 

Jimenez, noting that he was not listed on Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 disclosures and insist that they were 

3 Lorente, Galdon, and Pernas were also deposed after being named as Avanzalia’s representatives for 30(b)(6) 

depositions. 

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“surprised by Goldwind’s insistence on deposing Mr. Jimenez, as Mr. Jimenez was not an 

employee of Avanzalia until months after Goldwind sold the El Coco substation.” (Plaintiffs’ 

Response to Bill of Costs at P. 5, f.n. 3.) This argument is disingenuous.

As Plaintiffs are fully aware, while Mr. Jimenez was not disclosed pursuant to Rule 26, he 

was explicitly identified by Plaintiffs as a person with involvement in and knowledge of the 

key issues in this case. Indeed, in their Response to Goldwind’s interrogatories, Plaintiffs 

identified Mr. Jimenez as someone with “material4involvement in Plaintiffs’ Solar Project” with 

respect to their “connection to the substation.” (See attached Exh. A. at Interrogatory No. 16, 

emphasis supplied.) And connection of Plaintiffs’ substation was a central issue in the case. During 

the litigation, Plaintiffs contended that once Goldwind was no longer the owner of the substation 

they were able to easily connect to the electrical grid and asserted that this fact “proved” wrongdoing 

by Goldwind. (See, e.g. Avanzalia 30(b) (6) Deposition at Pp. 139-140, Exhibit B, hereto) Plaintiffs

were the ones who identified Mr. Jimenez as having material information regarding the key issue of 

interconnection. The idea that his deposition, was not reasonable or necessary is meritless. 

The same is true of the other deponents taken by Goldwind who were not either experts or 

part of Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 Disclosures: Mr. Ruiz, Mr. Blakely and Mr. Furones. Mr. Ruiz was 

identified multiple times in Plaintiffs’ interrogatory Responses as a person with material 

involvement in, and knowledge of, inter alia, i) Goldwind’s purported “delaying Plaintiffs’ ability 

to access UEP1’s substation,” ii) Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain licenses, an Access Contract, and a 

Supervision Contract for the substation, iii) Plaintiffs’ communication with the Panamanian 

Regulators, and iv) Plaintiffs’ capability and plans to schedule and design and construct the 

4 Plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories explicitly stated that the identified individuals were not ones with only 

“minimal or temporary” involvement and that Plaintiff was limiting those identified to individuals with “material”

involvement.

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physical connection to the Solar Plant. (See, Exh. A., Interrogatory Responses at 4, 7, 8, and 12.) 

Such identification obviously made Mr. Ruiz’s deposition “reasonable and necessary.” Mr. 

Blakely was also identified in multiple interrogatory answers as a person with knowledge of key 

issues in the case including, inter alia, Plaintiffs’ development and financing of the substation at 

issue. (Id. at Responses 12 and 16.) The deposition of Mr. Furones was also “reasonable and 

necessary” because, as Plaintiffs know, he was the representative of Fistera, a company which 

Plaintiffs identified as the entity which made an offer to purchase the Solar Project and which offer 

was, Plaintiffs claimed, allegedly derailed by Goldwind. (Id. at Responses 2, 14). Plaintiffs have 

not even attempted to explain why the costs for these witnesses were not “reasonable and 

necessary.

Goldwind is entitled to recover its costs in connection with all of the depositions it took, as 

well as those it defended.

2. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs of the deposition indexes.

Plaintiffs assert that Goldwind should not recover the costs charged for pages of the 

deposition transcripts that contain word indexes and cite a more than decade old case which did 

not allow recovery for word indexes “because they were obtained only for the convenience of 

counsel.” (See, Plaintiffs’ Response Pp 2-3, citing Thayer v. Chiczewski, 07 CV 1290, 2010 WL 

3087447, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2010).) However, Plaintiffs do not claim that the transcripts could 

have been obtained without the word indexes. And recent case law has recognized that word 

indexes are now “are customarily included in transcripts” and not a separate optional charge 

incurred by a party for its convenience. See, Vaughn v. Eichorn, 4:19-CV-01201-JAR, 2021 WL 

6091096, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2021) (allowing recovery an index when as was true here, there 

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was no charge for the index separately.) The Seventh Circuit has recently approved the imposition 

of the cost of a transcript index. Escamilla v. United States, 62 F.4th 367 (7th Cir. 2023).

3. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs in connection with Spanish deposition 

transcripts.

As explained in Goldwind’s Opening Memorandum, based on a protocol demanded by 

Plaintiffs, when depositions in this case were taken of Spanish speakers there were two court 

reporters present (one transcribed the Spanish, the other transcribed the translated English) and 

transcripts were generated in both English and Spanish. (See, Opening Memorandum at P. 6 and 

attached Exh. B, Blonder Dec. at ¶5.) In their Response, Plaintiffs do not contest the fact that they 

were responsible for the presence of the Spanish court reporter. Nor do they dispute that they chose 

to have transcripts created both in English and Spanish. But despite that fact that Plaintiffs created 

these costs, they insist that costs of a Spanish court reporter and transcripts (which were 

unquestionably incurred by Goldwind) were somehow not “reasonable and necessary.” In support 

of this assertion, Plaintiffs point to the fact that Goldwind’s two counsel of record were not Spanish 

speakers. But, as Plaintiffs know from the depositions they attended, Goldwind’s litigation team 

included many Spanish speakers, including an attorney, Goldwind employees and experts. These 

team members were certainly available for review of Spanish language transcripts and Goldwind 

could certainly turn to any Spanish speaking consultant or vendor before trial to review any issues 

surrounding translation---but it would need the transcript to do so. This issue was likely to arise 

given Plaintiffs counsel’s repeated and heated objections to the translations performed by the 

professional translator. (Plaintiffs’ Response does not deny that such objections occurred.

Moreover, Goldwind’s Spanish speaking witnesses were entitled to review a copy of the 

transcript, which was generated and in Plaintiffs’ possession, and could be used against them at 

trial. Plaintiffs also claim that the Spanish language costs of Mr. Buitrago’ deposition were not 

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“reasonable and necessary” because Mr. Buitrago speaks English. This claim is without merit. As 

Mr. Buitrago testified, while he does speak English, he is most comfortable in his native Spanish 

and was certainly entitled to be deposed in that language. (See, Exh. C, Buitrago Deposition at P. 

95.) The bottom line is that Plaintiffs were the ones to demand that there be a Spanish language 

court reporter and obtained the resulting transcripts for themselves. Under these circumstances, 

Plaintiffs have no basis for complaining about Goldwind’s recovery of the costs it necessarily 

incurred as a result. 

4. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs in connection with Realtime Services.

As set forth in Goldwind’s Memorandum in support of its Bill of Costs, courts today 

routinely permit recovery of Realtime service when, as here, there were depositions that were taken 

in a foreign language. (See, Opening Memorandum at P. 8, citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.

Techtronic Indus. Co., Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 3d 977, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff'd in part, vacated in

part, rev'd in part sub nom. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341 

(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Realtime costs recoverable, given the necessity to ensure accurate and precise 

recording of testimony); See also, Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corp. Ltd., 1:17-

CV-01973, 2021 WL 3489813, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2021), appeal dismissed, 21-2635, 2022 

WL 671458 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022) (Allowing recovery of Realtime charges when depositions 

taken in a foreign language or when issues were of a technical nature.) Plaintiffs give a cursory 

objection to the recovery of fees for the English language Realtime service, but do not even bother 

to address the case law above or explain why this Court should not follow it.

Plaintiffs do object to the costs of the Spanish language service by raising once again, the 

point that Goldwind’s counsel of record were not Spanish speakers. But as noted above, an attorney 

on Goldwind’s team did speak Spanish and sat in on a deposition (and was available on an ‘on 

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call’ basis for others). Plaintiffs had access to this feed and were able to use it as part of their 

numerous objections to translation. Under those circumstances, Goldwind’s order of the Realtime 

feed in Spanish was “reasonable and necessary” and Goldwind should be entitled to recover all of 

its Realtime costs. 

5. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs in connection with rough drafts.

As explained in Goldwind’s Memorandum in Support of its Bill of Costs, Goldwind is 

entitled to recover the rough transcript costs because of the compressed discovery schedule. (See, 

Opening Memorandum at P. 9.) Plaintiffs do not question that costs of rough transcripts are 

recoverable when a discovery is compressed and concede that Goldwind is entitled to $4,822.15 

for rough transcripts. Yet, Plaintiffs insist that in a few instances cases (representing $1,333.85 in 

costs) discovery was not sufficiently compressed to require a rough transcript. (See, Response p. 

6.) However, this argument is without merit based on the fact that deposition dates were still in 

flux and the critical nature of some of the depositions. 

For example, one of the depositions Plaintiffs point to is the deposition of Enrique Lorente

(which, Plaintiffs neglected to tell this Court, was a 30(b)(6) deposition). Mr. Lorente’s 30(b)(6) 

deposition occurred on September 9, 2019. There were several depositions taken in the following 

month- Saad Qais, Chris Wittwer, and Jorge Buitrago- and, in general, the parties were planning a 

compressed and intensive discovery schedule. Goldwind needed to quickly review Mr. Lorente’s 

assertions which were being made on behalf of Plaintiffs in order to fully prepare to defend the

depositions and all relevant discovery. It was thus reasonable for Goldwind to order Mr. Lorente’s 

rough draft transcript. The cost of Mr. Lorente’s rough draft ($735) is more than half the total 

rough draft costs to which Plaintiffs object. Goldwind should be awarded all of its costs in 

connection with the rough drafts or at a minimum, $5,557.15.

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6. Goldwind is entitled to recover the costs in connection with videotaped depositions.

As discussed at length in Goldwind’s Memorandum, because the Covid-19 pandemic 

wreaked havoc on the world in 2020, courts have recognized the need for videotaped depositions 

to preserve testimony in light of the uncertainty of being able to produce witnesses at trial. Courts 

have thus routinely (in these very non-routine times) permitted full recovery of the costs of 

videotaping depositions. Goldwind cited numerous cases which support their right to recover the 

cost of the videotaped depositions which were taken in the Fall of 2021 through the Spring of 

2022. See, Opening Memorandum at Pp. 10-11, Yates v. City of Chicago, 18 C 2613, 2021 WL 

6063862, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Yates v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 58 F.4th 

907 (7th Cir. 2023); Bell v. Am. Int'l Indus.,2022 WL 4095903, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2022);

Said v Mayo, 2022 WL 598210; Walsh v. Bowers, 2021 WL 6755018, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 18, 

2021), report and recommendation adopted as modified, CV 18-00155 SOM-WRP, 2022 WL 

355126 (D. Haw. Feb. 7, 2022.)

Plaintiffs fail to address or even acknowledge this case law, citing only one pre-pandemic 

case which did not permit recovery of videotaped depositions in addition to the costs of transcripts. 

Plaintiffs instead argues that the Goldwind’s recovery of videotaping costs should be denied in the 

absence of proof as to the “restrictions that existed at the time the depositions were scheduled or 

conducted.” (Response at P. 6, emphasis supplied) But this argument blatantly ignores the logic 

behind the caselaw which is firmly rooted in the future uncertainty caused by the pandemic. See, 

Yates *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2021) (videotaping was reasonable and necessary “because these 

depositions were conducted in the midst of the pandemic, there is no telling whether theses witness 

would be available at trial.”); Bell, at *5; Said 2022 WL 598210 (“hedging against witness 

unavailability because of illness, travel restrictions, or other impediments during this period of 

heightened uncertainty [during the Pandemic] seems especially prudent and supports the 

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conclusion that Defendants “necessarily obtained” video recordings of ...depositions.”); Walsh v.

Bowers, 2021 WL 6755018, at *4 (“the Court accepts Defendants’ explanation that video 

depositions were particularly necessary for use in this case based on when the 

depositions were taken—in the midst of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic where the ultimate 

format of the trial and witness presentation remained uncertain.”). 

In a statement that defies the realities, Plaintiffs gripe that “Goldwind made no inquiry as 

to whether Avanzalia’s party witnesses would be able to travel for any potential trial.” (Response 

P. 6.) But of course, Plaintiffs could have no control over a government’s future lockdowns or 

restrictions on international travelers. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not deny that there were travel 

restrictions affecting Spain at various times during the pandemic. Plaintiffs’ argument on this score 

is without logic. So too is their assertion that numerous individuals should have been considered 

to be within the subpoena power of the court because they happened to be employees of a party at 

the time of their deposition. Trial was likely at least a year or more away when the depositions 

occurred. Obviously, no employee is subject to indentured servitude; there was no way of knowing 

whether those employees would remain under the control of a party. Given the fact that most of 

the witnesses deposed by Goldwind resided overseas, it could not rely on the subpoena power of 

this Court. And, as noted, neither the parties, nor even this Court, could control government 

restrictions on travel. 

During the pandemic era, it was “reasonable and necessary” to obtain both transcripts and 

videotaped depositions and courts today thus allow for both costs to be recovered under Section 

1921. See, Cnty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., 14 C 2280, 2023 WL 2283251, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 

27, 2023) (permitting recovery of both transcript and videotaping costs based on uncertainty

created by the pandemic); Black v. Wrigley, 17 C 101, 2020 WL 4437677, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 

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3, 2020), aff'd, 997 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2021) (“reasonable for party to request both printed 

transcripts and a recording of a deposition where the deponent was outside the subpoena power of 

the Court and therefore could not have been compelled to testify at trial.”); See also, Said v. Mayo, 

Id, citing , Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. C19-00351-RSM, 2021 WL 211536, 

at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2021) (collecting cases); Jacam Chem. Co. 2013, LLC v. Shepard, 

1:19-CV-093, 2023 WL 1992602, at *2 (D.N.D. Feb. 14, 2023) (noting pandemic issues and 

holding that “video depositions are often necessary for trial while transcripts are necessary to 

support or defend against motions.”) Goldwind should be awarded all of its costs incurred for 

videotaped depositions5. 

7. Goldwind is entitled to recovery of the court reporter’s overtime charges.

As discussed in Goldwind’s Opening Memorandum, overtime costs are recoverable under 

Section 1920. Those costs were necessitated largely by the fact that the depositions were taken in 

a foreign language in overseas time zones. Yates v. City of Chicago, 18 C 2613, 2021 WL 6063862, 

at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Yates v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 58 F.4th 907 (7th 

Cir. 2023.) Plaintiffs do not challenge this law but assert that Goldwind should not be entitled to 

any overtime charges despite pointing only to what they claim was a lack of necessity with respect 

to less than 1.5 percent of those changes ($262) of the total $22,186 of charges incurred. Thus, at 

a minimum Goldwind is entitled to recovery of $21,924.00 for overtime charges pursuant to 

5 On page 7 of their Response, Plaintiffs assert that three witnesses were deposed supposedly “for reasons unrelated 

to the claims at stake in this case” and refer to the depositions of the individuals deposed regarding purportedly missing 

data (Noble, March, and Dzyacky). But Plaintiffs were the ones who took and videotaped these depositions, and a 

hearing could most certainly have been ordered by this Court regarding these issues. For this reason alone, Goldwind’s 

obtaining the videotaped versions was “reasonable and necessary.” Cooper v. City of Chicago, 16 C 3519, 2018 WL 

3970141, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) (“party would be ill-advised not to obtain a copy of a video deposition if it 

knows that its opponent possessed video tapes of the same.”) Moreover, Plaintiffs were attempting to use those 

depositions in their efforts to obtain sanctions including an adverse inference at trial. 

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Section 1920.

6

8. Goldwind is entitled to the recovery of the costs charged by the court 

reporter for technical and administrative costs in connection with remote

depositions.

As set forth in Goldwind’s Memorandum, courts regularly permit recovery of technical

and administrative costs associated with depositions that were conducted remotely over Zoom or 

other equivalent electronic means during the pandemic. As the cases cited uniformly hold, those

costs sought were considered a “necessity not a convenience” during the pandemic and thus are 

recoverable under Section 1921. (See, Memorandum at Pp. 13-14, citing DeBoever v. Mellon

Investments Corp., 2022 WL 16963803, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2022)); See also, Versfelt v.

Sanza Food Serv., LLC, 20-61423-CIV, 2022 WL 2441314, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2022), report

and recommendation adopted, 20-61423-CIV, 2022 WL 2439092 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2022); Yates

v. City of Chicago, 18 C 2613, 2021 WL 6063862, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2021), aff'd sub

nom. Yates v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 58 F.4th 907 (7th Cir. 2023); Africano v. Atrium Med.

Corp., 17-CV-7238, 2022 WL 1989450, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2022; Bohner v. Union Pac. R.R.

Co., 2022 WL 970872, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2022.) However, once again, Plaintiffs shut their 

eyes to this law and fail to even discuss it. 

Instead, Plaintiffs complain that Goldwind has not provided sufficient explanation, even 

though its counsel provided a declaration stating that the charges related to administrative and 

technical costs charged by the court reporter in order to provide video conferencing deposition 

services, including technology for the sharing of exhibits. (See, ECF 183-2, Blonder Dec.) 

6 Plaintiffs only other real complaint about overtime charges is with respect to the supposedly “identical charges” for 

certain witnesses, referring only to charges of $56.25 for both Enrique Lorente and Ramon Pernas. But as the 

referenced invoice indicates, a total $112 overtime charge was accessed by the court reporter to both their depositions 

and thus Goldwind split the charges between them. (See ECF 182-2 at P. 60.) There is no reason why Goldwind should 

not be entitled to recovery of this small cost. 

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Plaintiffs do not provide this Court with any evidence that these charges were not as represented, 

nor do they claim that Goldwind could have conducted a remote deposition without incurring these 

charges. Under the law cited above, which developed during the pandemic, Goldwind is thus 

entitled to recovery of all of its costs incurred in connection with remote depositions.7

9. Goldwind is entitled to the recovery of the costs of oral i

interpretation.

As set forth in Goldwind’s Opening Memorandum, it is entitled to recovery of the costs of 

oral interpreters who translated depositions taken in Spanish. (Opening Memorandum at P.17)

Plaintiffs object and insist that there should be no recovery of any amount for interpretation 

because the court reporting service categorized these charge as “Translation and Interpretation” 

and costs for document translation (as opposed to oral interpretation) are not recoverable. 

(Response Pp. 11-12.) However, Goldwind’s counsel attested in his Declaration that all of the $19, 

744,25 sought pursuant to Section 1920(6), were for oral interpreters—not document translation. 

(ECF. 183-2 at ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence to the contrary. Goldwind is 

entitled to recovery of the entire amount sought for oral interpretation. Gutierrez v. P.A.L., Ltd., 

2012 WL 2993896, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2012) (“28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) provides that the 

compensation of interpreters may be taxed as costs where services were reasonably necessary.”)

7 Once again ignoring the reality of the world, Plaintiffs suggest that individuals within this Court’s subpoena power

or who were under the control of a party should have been required to be deposed in person. Doing so would have 

increased the risk of illness at the height of the Omicron surge. In any event, it should be noted that the remote 

depositions saved Plaintiffs from having to either incur travel costs or pay travel costs for Goldwind’s expert witnesses.

See, Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017(“Collectively, 28 U.S.C. §§

1821 and 1920(3) authorize the award of costs to reimburse witnesses for their reasonable travel and lodging 

expenses...” and “courts in this District have routinely awarded costs for expert witnesses' travel expenses.”) Given 

that Plaintiffs deposed five of Goldwind’s experts, none of whom were located in Chicago, and two of whom were 

located in Panama, these expenses -which Plaintiffs avoided by the use of remote depositions- would likely have been 

substantial. 

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Plaintiffs’ objections, which are not based on any assertion that the oral interpretation were

unnecessary, are meritless.

C. Goldwind is entitled to recovery of the small portion of the vast cost of 

document translation it incurred pursuant to Section 1920(6).

Goldwind has not sought most of the costs that it incurred in translating the large number 

of Spanish language documents in this case. As explained in Goldwind’s Memorandum, it seeks 

recovery for only a tiny subset of those costs and does so pursuant to Section 1920(4) (“Subsection 

4”) and cited case law in support of such recovery. (See, Opening Memorandum at P. 15, citing, 

BookIT OY v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2019 WL 13156690, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2019) citing,

Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012).) Rather than discuss this case law 

involving Subsection 4, Plaintiffs cite to inapposite law involving Subsection 6 of Section 1920. 

While Plaintiffs also assert that Goldwind did not provide sufficient explanation of the 

documents involved, Goldwind’s Memorandum made clear that the documents translated involved 

i) the expert report of Goldwind’s Panamanian law expert and ii) the translated documents that 

were actually submitted to this Court in Goldwind’s summary judgment papers. (Opening 

Memorandum at Pp. 14-17.) Other than to cite to the irrelevant law with respect to Subsection 6, 

Plaintiffs do not even discuss the expert report. However, Plaintiffs claim they could not discern 

what the summary judgment documents involved and thus that recovery of those costs are barred.

This assertion is belied by the face of the summary judgment motion and its supporting 

documentation. The summary judgment motion contained just eight documents translated at 

Goldwind’s expense. Half of those were identified by their Bates number on the translation 

service’s invoice. (See, ECF. 182-3 at P. 89.) The remaining four were the only other Goldwind 

translated documents submitted to this court (they were part of Exhibit 4 of Goldwind’s 56.1 

Statement and were identified by file number by the translation service.) (Id. at P. 90.) As a quick 

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review of those four documents demonstrates, all involved filings with, or orders of, the 

Panamanian Regulator which were critical to Goldwind’s argument for the application of 

preclusive effect to that regulator’s orders8. Goldwind is entitled to the costs of translation of this 

limited set of documents pursuant to Section 1920(4). 

D. This Court should not stay a decision or enforcement of a ruling on the Bill of 

Costs.

Finally, Plaintiffs have requested that this Court stay a decision on Goldwind’s Bill of 

Costs, or in the alternative, enforcement of the award of the costs. This Court should deny those 

requests. A stay of an award of costs is not provided by rule or by statute and “courts in this district 

which have been faced with such requests have denied such stays on the grounds that they are not 

provided by statute and would serve no useful purpose.” Hovde v. ISLA Dev. LLC, 18-CV-7323, 

2021 WL 7161195, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2021, citing Sembos v. Philips Components, 2003 

WL 22533579, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2003.)

In the Hovde case the court recognized that some courts have stayed payment of costs 

pending appeal, but noted that “a district court is under no obligation to stay a bill of costs pending 

appeal.” Id. And the court noted that in many where courts did so the “judgment holders did not 

object to the stay.” Id. As other courts which have refused to stay enforcement of a judgment for 

costs have noted, “A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial 

review and a court must consider multiple factors in determining whether to enter a stay including 

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; 

(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay 

8 File 6 was “2016-03-09 ASEP Grants AVZ's Request to Resolve the Dispute”; File 14 is a sub-exhibit of Ex. 4. It is 

titled “2017-06-18 Avanzalia's Appeal Against the June 5, 2017 Order”; File 15 was “2017-07-12 UEP Objections 

and Comments to UEPI’s Appeal”; and File 19 was “2017-10-03 UPEI Brief Extending the Objections to AVZ's 

Studies.” All were bookmarked in Goldwind’s 56.1 statement, ECF. 130. 

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will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public 

interest lies. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Rogers Behavioral Health, 2022 WL 

5117712, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 4, 2022) See also, Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 13 C 3432, 

2015 WL 2260723, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2015) (refusing stay of enforcement of costs when a 

plaintiff “has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal or presented sufficient 

justification to warrant any delay in the enforcement of the award of costs.”) Plaintiffs have not 

even made an effort to discuss any of the relevant factors. Their request for a stay of either decision 

or enforcement should be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Local Rule 54.1 and this Court’s entry of Judgment in its favor, 

Goldwind requests recovery of the amounts of costs set forth in its Bill of Costs and supported by 

this Reply. 

Dated: March 28, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

GOLDWIND USA, INC., d/b/a

GOLDWIND AMERICAS,

By: /s/Josh M. Leavitt

 One of Its Attorneys

Steven P. Blonder (#6215773)

Josh M. Leavitt (#6191417)

MUCH SHELIST, P.C.

191 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 1800

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 521-2000

sblonder@muchlaw.com

jleavitt@muchlaw.com

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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

Josh M. Leavitt, an attorney, certifies that on March 28, 2023 the foregoing Defendant 

Goldwind’s Reply in Further Support of its Motion for Bill of Costs was electronically filed with 

the Clerk of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division by using the 

CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following recipients:

W. Gordon Dobie 

Ricardo E. Ugarte 

Kelly E. Mannion 

Michael E. Lill 

Winston & Strawn, LLP

35 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

wdobie@winston.com

rugarte@winston.com

kmannion@winston.com

mlill@winston.com

/s/ Josh M. Leavitt

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