United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1145, -1161 

INNOGENETICS, N.V., 

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant, 

v. 

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

. 

John S. Skilton, Heller Ehrman LLP, of Madison, Wisconsin, argued for plaintiffcross appellant. With him on the brief were Christopher G. Hanewicz, David L.

Anstaett, and Randy J. Kozel; and Shannon M. Bloodworth, of Washington, DC. Of 

counsel on the brief was Colin G. Sandercock, Proskauer Rose LLP, of Washington, 

DC. Of counsel was Sarah C. Walkenhorst. 

Adrian M. Pruetz, Pruetz Law Group LLP, of Manhattan Beach, California, 

argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Erica J. Pruetz. Of counsel 

on the brief was Scott B. Kidman, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges LLP, of 

Los Angeles, California. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 

Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2007-1145, -1161 

INNOGENETICS, N.V., 

 Plaintiff-Cross Appellant, 

v. 

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in 

case no. 05-CV-0575, Judge Barbara B. Crabb. 

____________________________ 

DECIDED: January 17, 2008 

____________________________ 

Before BRYSON, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and MOORE, 

Circuit Judge. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) appeals on a multitude of grounds the judgment 

entered against it by the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Wisconsin for infringement of Innogenetics, N.V.’s (Innogenetics) U.S. Patent No. 

5,846,704 (the ’704 patent). We reverse and remand for a new trial the district court’s 

judgment as a matter of law that claim 1 of the ’704 patent was not anticipated by U.S. 

Patent No. 5,580,718 (the Resnick patent). We also vacate the permanent injunction 

granted against Abbott. As for the whole host of other issues that Abbott raises on 
appeal, we find no reversible error and affirm the lower court’s judgment in those 

respects. Innogenetics cross-appeals the district court’s judgment as a matter of law 

that Abbott’s infringement was not willful. Under the standards recently articulated in In 

re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), we also affirm 

that aspect of the lower court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

The technology in this case pertains to diagnostic tools that not only detect but 

also classify hepatitis C virus (HCV) genotypes in a biological sample, which facilitates 

tailoring the treatment of patients with different genotypes. The ’704 patent claims a 

method of genotyping HCV based on distinct genetic sequences that can be found in 

the 5 prime untranslated region (5’ UTR) of the HCV genome. This method teaches 

specifically hybridizing probes, or short strands of nucleic acids, to a target sequence in 

the 5’ UTR via complementary base pairing principles, and then detecting the formation 

of any complexes formed between the probes and the nucleic acids of the 5’ UTR. 

Abbott’s genotyping assay kits, like the method claimed in the ’704 patent, also 

involve specifically hybridizing probes to the nucleic acids of the HCV’s 5’ UTR. The 

kits then detect the successful formation of any specifically hybridized complexes using 

the process of Realtime polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Through this process, dye 

molecules attached to Abbott’s probes are released and observable as fluorescent 

signals after polymerase enzymes destroy the hybridized probe-target complexes. 

Innogenetics sued Abbott, asserting that Abbott’s genotyping assay kits infringe 

claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ’704 patent. Claim 1, the only independent claim on appeal, 

reads in its entirety as follows: 

2007-1145, -1161 2
A method of genotyping HCV present in a biological sample comprising 

hybridizing nucleic acids in a biological sample with at least one probe and 

detecting a complex as formed with said probe and said nucleic acids of 

HCV, using a probe that specifically hybridizes to the domain extending 

from the nucleotides at positions -291 to -66 of the 5’ untranslated region 

of the HCV. 

’704 col.113 ll.1-7. 

Abbott moved for summary judgment, asserting that its kits were not infringing, 

that the ’704 patent was invalid, and that the ’704 patent had been procured by 

inequitable conduct. In its order denying Abbott’s motions, the district court construed 

the claim limitation “detecting a complex as formed” to mean “detecting a complex that 

is or has been formed.” The district court also construed the limitation in the preamble, 

“method of genotyping,” to mean “[a] method that distinguishes among types and/or 

subtypes of hepatitis C virus (HCV) and classifies the HCV into a genotype or subtype.” 

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Abbott’s motion and 

granted Innogenetics’ motion, concluding that Abbott had failed to adduce sufficient 

evidence to require a trial on the issue of inequitable conduct. Furthermore, the district 

court deemed Abbott’s inequitable conduct claim “exceptional” and awarded attorney’s 

fees to Innogenetics. 

At the final pre-trial conference, the district court granted Innogenetics’ motion in 

limine and excluded testimony on obviousness by Abbott’s witness, Dr. Patterson. 

However, the written order commemorating the conference rulings inaccurately stated 

that defendant was precluded from entering any evidence of obviousness at trial. 

Aware of the mistake, Abbott nonetheless never moved for correction or reconsideration 

of the written order, noting only that it wished to preserve an objection on the issue. 

Additionally, the district court precluded the following evidence related to anticipation: 

2007-1145, -1161 3
1) U.S. Patent No. 6,071,693 (the Cha patent) on the grounds that Abbott did not 

disclose the patent as an anticipating prior art reference until the last day of discovery 

and 2) any testimony beyond the actual words and content of the Cha PCT application 

from Dr. Cha, the inventor of the Cha patent and the Cha PCT application, on the 

grounds that he had not been tendered as an expert witness and that an expert report 

had not been submitted. 

Because Abbott conceded that its entire noninfringement argument had been 

predicated on a construction of the claims that the court had not adopted, the district 

court entered judgment as a matter of law of literal infringement against Abbott for literal 

infringement of claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ’704 patent. The case then proceeded to a 

bifurcated jury trial with only Abbott’s affirmative defense of anticipation tried during the 

liability phase. At trial, Abbott presented the international patent application for the 

invention claimed in the Cha patent and the testimony of its expert, Dr. Bruce Patterson, 

that the Resnick patent anticipated claim 1 of the ’704 patent. However, before the 

case went to the jury, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law of no 

anticipation by the Resnick patent based on its determination that Dr. Patterson’s 

testimony “rested on an inaccurate understanding of the construction of the limitation 

‘genotyping.’” The jury concluded that claim 1 of the ’704 patent was not anticipated.1 

During the damages phase of trial, the jury awarded $7 million in damages to 

Innogenetics and found Abbott’s infringement to be willful. 

Post-trial, the district court denied Abbott’s motion for a new trial on infringement 

and invalidity and for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on damages. However, 

 1

 The jury did not decide the validity of claims 2 and 3, as they were 

dependent on claim 1. 

2007-1145, -1161 4
the district court did grant Abbott’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that 

infringement was not willful. The district court also granted Innogenetics’ motion for a 

permanent injunction. 

On appeal, Abbott challenges a myriad of issues, including the district court’s 

claim construction, summary judgment of literal infringement, evidentiary exclusions as 

to Abbott’s obviousness and anticipation defenses, judgment as a matter of law that the 

Resnick patent did not anticipate claim 1 of the ’704 patent, summary judgment of no 

inequitable conduct, award of attorney’s fees to Innogenetics for Abbott’s counterclaim 

of inequitable conduct due to its exceptionality, and grant of a permanent injunction. On 

cross-appeal, Innogenetics challenges the district court’s judgment as a matter of law 

overturning the jury verdict of willful infringement. We address each of these issues in 

turn. 

ANALYSIS 

 I. INFRINGEMENT 

A. Claim Construction 

We begin our inquiry with the district court’s claim construction, which we review 

de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 

banc). Abbott takes umbrage with the district court’s construction of the two-letter word 

“as” from the claim limitation “detecting a complex as formed with said probe and said 

nucleic acids of HCV.” According to Abbott, the word “as” limits the claims at issue to 

detecting hybridized complexes in a contemporaneous manner. Hence, Abbott asserts 

that its products are not encompassed by the ’704 patent because they detect the 

formation of a hybridized complex through the observation of fluorescence emitted after 

2007-1145, -1161 5
the complex has been destroyed, and not the actual complex itself. We conclude that 

the claim language makes no such distinction. Abbott’s proposed construction unduly 

limits the claims of the ’704 patent by divorcing the word “as” from its full context, “as 

formed with said probe and said nucleic acids of HCV.” The district court properly 

construed the claim limitation as detecting the formation of probe-target complexes, 

regardless of whether the method of detecting requires destroying the probe-target 

complex itself. 

In determining the meaning of a disputed claim limitation, we look primarily to the 

intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language, the written description, and 

the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 

(en banc). Words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” 

as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 1312-13. Claims are read in 

view of the specification, which is the single best guide to the meaning of disputed 

terms. Id. at 1315. “In examining the specification for proper context, however, this 

court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the claims.” 

CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing

Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

A plain reading of the claim limitation suggests that it does just what it says—it 

detects the formation of a complex between a probe and nucleic acids of the HCV. 

Nowhere does the claim language suggest that it only detects the complex itself. 

Indeed, in an expert report submitted by Innogenetics, Dr. William Reznikoff, a 

molecular genetics expert, opined that, in the context of the entire patent and its 

prosecution history, one ordinarily skilled in the art would understand claim 1 to include 

2007-1145, -1161 6
detecting any complexes that have been formed. Abbott provides no expert opinions on 

how a person ordinarily skilled in the art would have a different understanding of the 

claim limitation. Nor does Abbott ever contest the credibility of Dr. Reznikoff’s 

understanding. 

While we may not be in as able a position as the district court to ferret out the 

credibility of an expert, Dr. Reznikoff’s reading is supported by the intrinsic evidence. 

The specification of the ’704 patent explicitly states that the detection of hybrids “may be 

determined by means of colorimetric, fluorescent, radiometric detection or any other 

method comprised in the state of the art.” ’704 Patent col.6 ll.36-43 (emphasis added). 

Abbott contends that the written description constricts the claim limitation to a method of 

contemporaneous detection because the described embodiments all feature detection 

of an actual complex. However, as is well established, an applicant is not required to 

describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his 

invention. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 

1985). Given the sparse but broad statements in the specification about how the 

claimed invention detects hybridized complexes, see ’704 Patent col.6 ll.36-43, col.20 

ll.16-28, col.20 ll.41-42, Abbott’s reading of the process of detection improperly narrows 

the claim language. 

Lastly, relying on various dictionaries, Abbott argues that the word “as” is 

correctly defined as “at the same time that: while.” Abbott’s reliance on a single 

dictionary definition without explanation—especially where “as” has multiple 

meanings—commits the very error of construction that we warned against in Phillips. 

See 415 F.3d at 1321 (“The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such 

2007-1145, -1161 7
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than 

on the meaning of claim limitations within the context of the patent.”). In context, the 

use of the word “as” is merely syntactical, linking the word “complex” to a description of 

its composition. See Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.mw.com/dictionary/as (last visited Jan. 16, 2008) (defining “as” to mean “when considered 

in a specified form or relation—usually used before a preposition or a participle,” as 

illustrated by the phrase, “my opinion as distinguished from his”). 

As the district court pointed out, there is little meaningful distinction between a 

method of detecting the hybridized complex itself and a method of detecting the 

hybridized complex through fluorescence emitted immediately after it is destroyed. 

What is detected is still a complex “formed with said probe and said nucleic acids of 

HCV.” We uphold the district court’s claim construction because it is consistent with our 

understanding of the claim limitation at issue. 

B. Judgment as a Matter of Law of Literal Infringement 

We affirm the JMOL entered against Abbott for literal infringement of claims 1, 2, 

and 3 of the ’704 patent because it has not properly raised any plausible arguments on 

appeal. Given that the district court did not adopt Abbott’s proposed claim construction, 

the sole defense against literal infringement asserted by Abbott was that Realtime PCR, 

the method of detection used in its assay kits, was not known to the ordinary artisan at 

the time of the filing of the ’704 patent application. However, the district court deemed 

this issue forfeited because Abbott “did not raise this issue before trial when it could 

have been given thorough consideration. Instead it raised the issue for the first time at 

9:30 p.m. on the night before the start of trial and did so simply by submitting a 

2007-1145, -1161 8
proposed jury instruction, rather than by bringing the matter directly to the attention of 

the court and opposing counsel.” 

We review procedural issues not unique to patent law under regional circuit law. 

Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., 403 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Absent extraordinary 

circumstances, the Seventh Circuit has stated that it rarely reaches forfeited arguments 

in civil litigation. Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 

1005 (7th Cir. 2003). Abbott’s belief that “there was no need to raise [its argument] prior 

to the court adopting a claim construction not proposed by either party” falls well short of 

extraordinary. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that Abbott had been 

fully heard on the issue of literal infringement and that there was no legally sufficient 

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Abbott on that issue. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 50. 

It should be noted that, forfeiture aside, Abbott’s argument lacks merit. 

Essentially, Abbott argues that a patent can never be literally infringed by embodiments 

that did not exist at the time of filing. Our case law allows for after-arising technology to 

be captured within the literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough. See

SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(finding that the claim limitation “regularly received television signal” is broad enough to 

encompass digital signals even though no televisions that could receive digital signals 

existed as of the filing date). 

Additionally, Abbott itself has put forth evidence that Realtime PCR did in fact 

exist by the time the inventors filed their PCT application in 1992, and by the time they 

applied for the ’704 patent in 1994. In his expert report, Abbott’s witness, Dr. Bruce 

2007-1145, -1161 9
Patterson, stated that “Realtime PCR using 5’ to 3’ exonuclease activity was pioneered 

around 1991 . . . .” Abbott does not dispute this evidence. We have no reason to 

disturb the district court’s grant of JMOL as to literal infringement. 

II. INVALIDITY 

Abbott challenges the district court’s denial of its motion for a new trial on the 

issue of invalidity on a number of evidentiary exclusions. Regional circuit law governs 

our review of motions for a new trial. EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor 

Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under Seventh Circuit law, the district 

court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Naeem 

v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2006). A new trial may be granted 

where “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages are excessive, or 

if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted). Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wollenburg v. 

Comtech Mfg. Co., 201 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 

A. Obviousness 

Abbott contends that it was clear error for the district court to preclude Abbott’s 

obviousness defense. During the discovery period, the district court granted 

Innogenetics’ motion to strike Dr. Patterson’s supplemental expert report because it 

violated the court’s earlier order on the filing of such supplemental reports. Abbott does 

not contest that ruling. This left Abbott with only Dr. Patterson’s original expert report 

for his planned testimony on obviousness. The district court determined that the report 

was insufficient to support a jury finding of obviousness and thus failed the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). Therefore, at the final pretrial conference, it 

2007-1145, -1161 10
granted Innogenetics’ motion in limine, and excluded Dr. Patterson from testifying about 

obviousness at trial. 

However, the written order commemorating the conference rulings inaccurately 

stated that defendant was precluded from entering any evidence of obviousness at trial. 

Aware of the mistake, Abbott nonetheless never moved for correction or reconsideration 

of the written order. Instead, it advised plaintiff’s counsel in writing that it would not be 

contesting the written ruling and would put in no evidence of obviousness. Abbott 

confirmed this decision on the first day of trial, noting only that it wished to preserve an 

objection on the issue. Post-trial, the district court denied Abbott’s Rule 50(b) motion for 

a new trial on obviousness because Abbott, despite its knowledge from the very 

beginning that the written order was inaccurate, was only then seeking correction by 

way of overturning the jury’s unfavorable verdict against it. Abbott now appeals the 

district court’s denial of its motion for a new trial on obviousness on the grounds that Dr. 

Patterson’s testimony on the issue was excluded and that, furthermore, no other 

evidence on the issue was allowed. Because the district court’s rulings were not an 

abuse of discretion, we leave the jury verdict intact. 

1. Dr. Patterson’s testimony

The district court did not err in finding that Dr. Patterson’s report on the alleged 

obviousness of the asserted claims of the ’704 patent was deficient for purposes of 

disclosure under Rule 26. For each of the claims that he analyzes for obviousness, Dr. 

Patterson merely lists a number of prior art references and then concludes with the 

stock phrase “to one skilled in the art it would have been obvious to perform the 

2007-1145, -1161 11
genotyping method in [claims 1-9 & 12-13] of the ’704 patent.”2

 “[T]here must be some 

articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 

obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. 

Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (“To facilitate review, this analysis should be 

made explicit.”) (citing Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). Nowhere does Dr. Patterson state how 

or why a person ordinarily skilled in the art would have found the claims of the ’704 

patent obvious in light of some combination of those particular references. As the 

district court found: “It is not credible to think that a lay jury could examine the Cha 

application, the Resnick ’718 patent that defendant cited as prior art or any of the other 

references and determine on its own whether there were differences among them and 

the ’704 patent.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C, slip op. at 14 

(W.D. Wis. Jan. 3, 2007). Such vague testimony would not have been helpful to a lay 

jury in avoiding the pitfalls of hindsight that belie a determination of obviousness. See

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (discussing the “importance of 

guarding against hindsight . . . and resist[ing] the temptation to read into the prior art the 

teachings of the invention in issue” when considering the obviousness of a patent). 

 2

 Abbott argues on appeal that Dr. Patterson “also opined that the Cha PCT 

application standing alone rendered the ’704 patent obvious.” For support, Abbott cites 

to a portion of Dr. Patterson’s report, Section VIII-A, which discusses in some detail the 

Cha PCT application. However, this section of the report focuses exclusively on 

anticipation. Even if we expand our consideration to the entire expert report, Dr. 

Patterson never once opines that the claims of the ’704 patent are rendered obvious by 

the Cha PCT application alone. To the extent that Dr. Patterson does opine on 

obviousness, in each instance in which he references the Cha PCT application, it is 

always in combination with other references. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Patterson from testifying at trial that 

the Cha PCT application alone renders the ’704 patent claims obvious. 

2007-1145, -1161 12
On appeal, Abbott argues in a single sentence, without any explanation, that the 

district court erred in concluding that Dr. Patterson did not offer any evidence of a 

“motivation to combine” the various prior art references that he opined rendered the 

claims of the ’704 patent obvious. To be sure, Dr. Patterson suggested that one of skill 

in the art was motivated to find a method capable of genotyping because at least one 

prior art reference had disclosed that “different genotypes of HCV respond differently to 

interferon therapy.” The district court was nevertheless correct that knowledge of a 

problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine 

particular references to reach the particular claimed method. Innogenetics, slip op. at 

14 (“A generalized motivation to develop a method is not the kind of motivation required 

by the patent laws.”). We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion 

when it precluded Dr. Patterson’s vague and conclusory obviousness testimony which 

did not offer any motivation for one skilled in the art to combine the particular references 

he cites in order to practice the claimed method.3 

Abbott also argues that there is no requirement that an expert opine on 

motivation to combine references, and that motivation can be established by other 

witnesses or the prior art. Abbott is correct that an expert is not the only source for 

 3

 We are mindful that in KSR, the Supreme Court made clear that a finding 

of teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine is not a “rigid rule that limits the 

obviousness inquiry.” 127 S. Ct. at 1741. This, however, does not alter the district 

court’s pre-KSR conclusion in this case or our affirmance thereof. There was a 

complete absence of any proof that one skilled in the art would find the particular 

claimed method obvious based upon Dr. Patterson’s list of prior art references or the 

knowledge generally available to those of ordinary skill in the art for any reason. We 

must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the 

claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be 

combined to produce the claimed invention. Although Abbott cites KSR, it does not 

argue on appeal that a different result would be reached in this case under KSR. 

2007-1145, -1161 13
evidence that it would be obvious for one skilled in the art to combine references to 

reach the claimed method. But, as the district court held, “some kind of motivation must 

be shown from some source, so that the jury can understand why a person of ordinary 

skill would have thought of either combining two or more references or modifying one to 

achieve the patented method.” Id. at 13. However, as we discuss in the next section, 

Abbott was precluded from offering any other evidence of obviousness, due to Abbott’s 

own failure to notify the district court of its error in its preclusion order, and this 

determination was not an abuse of discretion. 

2. Preclusion of all evidence of obviousness

Even in the face of the inaccurate preclusion order, we conclude that the district 

court’s denial of a new trial on the issue of obviousness was well within its discretion. In 

the Seventh Circuit, a new trial is granted “only when the record shows that the jury’s 

verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out 

to be overturned or shocks our conscience.” Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 

1995) (internal quotations omitted). This is hardly a case that cries out to be overturned 

or shocks our conscience. In its opening brief, Abbott’s only support for its argument 

that it had suffered prejudice from not being able to present other witnesses on 

obviousness is the bald statement that some of its other non-expert witnesses “could 

have” established invalidity under § 103. Speculation is not sufficient to demonstrate 

prejudice. The district court found, and our review of the record does not show 

otherwise, that Abbott “[said] nothing about what these witnesses would have had to 

say about obviousness” in specific. Innogenetics, slip op. at 16 (“Without such 

information, I cannot determine whether defendant was prejudiced by not being 

2007-1145, -1161 14
permitted to adduce evidence on obviousness.”). Without having provided any 

satisfactory explanation as to why it waited until the conclusion of trial to alert the court 

to the inaccurate order, Abbott will have to bear the cost of being precluded from 

presenting any evidence of obviousness at trial. For the above reasons, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion denying Abbott a new trial on the issue of 

obviousness. 

B. Anticipation 

1. Dr. Cha’s testimony

For purposes of showing that the claims of the ’704 patent were anticipated by 

prior art and thus invalid, Abbott sought to introduce at trial the testimony of Dr. Tai-An 

Cha, the inventor and author of three prior art references, including the Cha PCT 

application, which was before the jury. The district court confined Dr. Cha’s testimony 

to the actual words and content of the Cha PCT application because an expert report 

was required even though Abbott had only disclosed Dr. Cha as “a fact witness and, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A), as an expert who had not been specially 

retained.” The district court concluded that, given Dr. Cha’s role as the inventor behind 

the application, the mere fact that he was not receiving compensation for his scientific 

testimony did not exempt Abbott from furnishing an expert report. Without information 

about the proposed content of Dr. Cha’s de facto expert testimony, Innogenetics would 

not have been able to prepare an adequate deposition or cross-examination. 

On appeal, Abbott contends that “[t]here is no requirement that a retained expert, 

rather than the prior art’s author, provide [an explanation of how the ordinary artisan 

would have understood a reference’s disclosures.]” Abbott entirely fails to address the 

2007-1145, -1161 15
district court’s reason for restricting Dr. Cha’s testimony—that witnesses who will be 

giving scientific testimony are not exempt from the report requirements of Rule 

26(a)(2)(B), even when they are not compensated for their work. In sum, the district 

court concluded that Abbott should have provided an expert report to Innogenetics for 

Dr. Cha’s specialized testimony. The Seventh Circuit has expressly left open the 

question of whether experts not specially retained but providing scientific testimony 

must comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B), see Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 

758 n.3 (7th Cir. 2004), and we need not reach this issue since Abbott has not 

challenged this determination. 

The district court also concluded that Dr. Cha’s testimony should be limited 

because any information he might have to offer beyond the words of the Cha PCT 

application would be irrelevant to the issue before the jury of “whether the Cha [PCT] 

application was sufficient in itself to have informed a person of ordinary skill in the art in 

1992 how to distinguish among HCV genotypes by using probes in the 5’ UTR.” As the 

inventor behind the Cha PCT application, Dr. Cha could have added information that 

might not have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art just from reading 

the application, such as the conditions he used for his experiments or explanations for 

anomalous results. Again, Abbott fails to address the district court’s reasoning or 

discuss how Dr. Cha’s testimony would inform the jury of how the ordinary artisan would 

understand the disclosures of the Cha PCT application. Therefore, we affirm the district 

court’s evidentiary ruling because it was not an abuse of its discretion. 

2. The Cha patent

2007-1145, -1161 16
 Abbott did not disclose the Cha patent as an anticipatory prior art reference 

under 35 U.S.C. § 282 until the last day of discovery, after the time for depositions had 

passed. Abbott had not discussed the Cha patent in an expert report, identified it during 

discovery in response to Innogenetics’ interrogatories on anticipation, or mentioned it in 

the final pretrial conference. Abbott did not refer to the Cha patent again until the eve of 

trial, when Abbott sought to amend the district court’s jury instructions to include the 

Cha patent in the jury instructions specific to anticipation. Finding that the belated 

introduction of the Cha patent as an anticipatory prior art reference was prejudicial to 

Innogenetics, the district court excluded the Cha patent from consideration on the issue 

of anticipation. 

 Although Abbott technically complied with the requirements of § 282, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Cha patent from trial. Abbott’s 

disclosure of the Cha patent as an anticipatory prior art reference on the very last day of 

discovery meant Innogenetics was stripped of any meaningful opportunity to prepare an 

adequate cross-examination of the reference. See ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 

534, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of § 282, like that of the Federal Rules, is to 

prevent unfair and prejudicial surprise, not to facilitate last-minute production of 

evidence.”). That Innogenetics had an expert analyze the Cha patent in the context of 

inequitable conduct does not mean, as Abbott would have us believe, that Abbott’s late 

disclosure did not prejudice Innogenetics on the issue of validity under § 102. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the Cha patent.4

 4

 This case aptly demonstrates the pitfalls of playing fast and loose with 

rules of discovery. Conclusory expert reports, eleventh hour disclosures, and attempts 

to proffer expert testimony without compliance with Rule 26 violate both the rules and 

2007-1145, -1161 17
3. JMOL of no anticipation by the Resnick patent

Abbott argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting JMOL of no 

anticipation of claim 1 of the ’704 patent by the Resnick patent and in denying its motion 

for a new trial on the same basis.5

 The district court’s grant of JMOL was predicated on 

its determination that Dr. Patterson’s testimony with regard to anticipation by the 

Resnick patent “rested on an inaccurate understanding of the construction of the term 

‘genotyping.’” Innogenetics, slip op. at 29. 

This determination by the district court, that Dr. Patterson’s testimony was tainted 

by an inaccurate understanding of the claim term genotyping, is clearly erroneous. At 

trial, Dr. Patterson testified on behalf of Abbott that the Resnick patent anticipated claim 

1 of the ’704 patent. Specifically, he stated that the Resnick patent disclosed probes 

that “distinguish” between two groups of hepatitis C isolates—“one containing hepatitis 

C 1 . . . [and] the non-1 types of hepatitis C.” Opposing counsel objected, arguing that 

Dr. Patterson’s use of the word “distinguish” at trial was inappropriate because his 

expert report submitted under Rule 26 defined a “method of genotyping” as “the process 

of detecting and classifying the different strains of the virus as manifested by nucleotide 

sequence variation in a certain region of the virus genome. In other words, genotyping 

 

principles of discovery, and the obligations lawyers have to the court. Exclusion and 

forfeiture are appropriate consequences to avoid repeated occurrences of such 

manipulation of the litigation process.

5

 Abbott additionally seeks to overturn the district court’s judgment as a 

matter of law of no anticipation by the Resnick patent of claim 2 of the ’704 patent. 

However, Abbott never presented this argument at trial or even during discovery. We 

will not decide an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Taubenfeld v. AON Corp., 

415 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 833 

F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1987)) (“On numerous occasions we have held that if a 

party fails to press an argument before the district court, he waives the right to present 

that argument on appeal.”). 

2007-1145, -1161 18
detects and classifies the various genotypes of a virus, such as, in the case of HCV, 

HCV-1, HCV-2, HCV-3, HCV-4, HCV-5, and HCV-6.” Docket. No. 33 (Patterson Expert 

Rep. 4). 

The dispute over whether Dr. Patterson based his testimony on the district 

court’s claim construction seems to turn upon his use of the words “detect” and 

“classify” and the district court’s use of the words “distinguish” and “classify” in its 

construction of a “method of genotyping” as “[a] method that distinguishes among types 

and/or subtypes of hepatitis C virus (HCV) and classifies the HCV into a genotype or 

subtype.” Despite the difference in semantics, we discern no difference in meaning 

between the definition of genotyping used by Dr. Patterson and the one adopted by the 

district court. 

The ’704 patent, by its own terms, differs from the prior art in its ability not just to 

detect the presence of HCV, but more importantly, to identify the types and/or subtypes 

of HCV that exist in a sample. The specification of the ’704 patent states: 

Several patent applications have addressed the problem of detecting the 

presence of HCV . . . . Furthermore, the 5’ UR of HCV isolates has been 

proven to be a good candidate for designing probes and primers for 

general HCV detection . . . . However, none of these patent applications 

presents a method of identifying the type and/or subtype of HCV present 

in the sample to be analyzed. . . . Consequently, the aim of the present 

invention is to provide a method for the rapid and indisputable 

determination of the presence of one or several genotypes of HCV present 

in a biological sample and indisputably classifying the determined 

isolate(s). 

’704 Patent col.2 ll.7-43 (emphasis added). As disclosed, the method of genotyping in 

the ’704 patent requires more than simply determining whether HCV is present (i.e., 

detecting HCV) in a sample. It requires detecting HCV, and then distinguishing among 

one or more of the types and/or subtypes of HCV and being able to classify the types 

2007-1145, -1161 19
and/or subtypes found. Certainly, one of the preferred embodiments of the ’704 patent 

is capable of distinguishing among all six presently known types of HCV using multiple 

probes. ’704 Patent col.10 ll.5-10. 

To the extent, however, that Innogenetics argues that a “method of genotyping” 

requires identifying both the presence and the absence of types in a sample and 

thereby distinguishing among all six types of HCV, it is in error. (Oral Arg. Tr. 28:03-

28:33, Oct. 1, 2007) (“[I]t’s the ability to exclude . . . it’s the ability to say I know what I 

have and I know what I don’t have . . . you may or may not be able to say that you don’t 

have something else that is in the contaminated sample . . . you might be able to say I 

got type A and type B, but you can’t say a negative, that I don’t have type 1-C or type 1-

D . . . .”). Claim 1 is not so narrow as to require a method capable of identifying every 

possible genotype of HCV present and absent in a sample. In fact, claim 1 states that 

the claimed “method of genotyping” may be performed with “at least one probe.” This 

contemplates infringement by a method that uses a single probe to detect and classify 

the presence of a single type of HCV. A single probe would not be capable of 

identifying what genotypes are present along with what genotypes are not present in a 

sample (a single probe could not distinguish and classify all six types). In short, the 

“method of genotyping” in claim 1 covers a method capable of detecting and classifying 

at least one particular type of HCV without necessarily identifying the absence of all 

other types. This is the only definition consistent with the language of the claim itself 

and is supported by the written description. 

In this respect, Dr. Patterson’s expert report and trial testimony are both 

consistent with the construction of “method of genotyping.” In his expert report, Dr. 

2007-1145, -1161 20
Patterson stated that the Resnick patent is capable of “detecting and classifying types of 

HCV.” Docket No. 33 (Patterson Expert Rep. 19). At trial, contradicting the testimony 

of Innogenetics’ witnesses, he testified that the Resnick patent “distinguish[es]” between 

two groups of HCV, type 1 HCV and all other types of HCV. (Trial Tr. vol. 3, 23:19-24:4, 

Aug. 29, 2006). Dr. Patterson’s reading of the Resnick patent was that it disclosed a 

method capable of identifying whether a sample contained HCV type 1 as opposed to 

another type of HCV. If true, this would meet the “method of genotyping” limitation of 

claim 1.6 Dr. Patterson’s failure to use the district court’s exact words does not change 

the substance of his testimony or render it inapplicable. 

We therefore find improper the district court’s preclusion of Dr. Patterson’s 

testimony on the basis that he was using a different definition of “method of genotyping.” 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s entry of JMOL and remand for a new trial on 

the issue of whether the Resnick patent anticipated claim 1 of the ’704 patent consistent 

with this opinion. 

III. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 

We review summary judgment decisions de novo, reapplying the standard used 

by the district court. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., 

389 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 

2007). Under that standard, summary judgment must be granted when, drawing all 

 6

 Innogenetics may have other arguments or contradictory evidence with 

regard to whether the Resnick patent anticipates. We decide only that, in light of the 

proper construction of a “method of genotyping,” it was an abuse of discretion for the 

district court to preclude Dr. Patterson’s testimony on the Resnick patent and to grant 

JMOL. What a prior art reference discloses is, of course, a question of fact, and if there 

are disputes over material facts, whether the Resnick patent anticipates claim 1 of the 

’704 patent should be resolved at trial by the fact finder. 

2007-1145, -1161 21
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

“[I]nequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, 

failure to disclose material information, or submission of false material information, 

coupled with an intent to deceive.” Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 

1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 

(Fed. Cir. 1995)). Materiality is defined by what a reasonable examiner would have 

considered important in deciding whether to allow a patent application. Digital Control, 

Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Both intent and 

materiality are questions of fact, and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. 

v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 

 Abbott contends that Innogenetics’ representation to the PTO of the relevance of 

the Cha PCT application during the prosecution of the ’704 patent amounts to 

inequitable conduct. Prior to applying for the ’704 patent (’568 application), the 

inventors of the claimed method of genotyping filed for a patent (EP ’342 application) in 

the European Patent Office (EPO). The EP ’342 application was prosecuted under a 

“problem solution” framework common in European practice in which a piece of art 

(whether relevant or not) is termed the “closest prior art.” The prosecuting attorney 

identified the Cha PCT application as the closest prior art, but argued that none of the 

submitted references taught or disclosed the method claimed in the EP ’342 application. 

Under its standards of patentability, the EPO determined that certain claims in the EP 

2007-1145, -1161 22
’342 application were not novel in light of the Cha PCT application. Thus, claims were 

amended with a disclaimer that they were “amended to disclaim the teaching of [the 

Cha PCT application.]” The prosecution history of the ’704 patent indisputably shows 

that Innogenetics submitted as prior art references to the PTO both the Cha PCT 

application itself and an international search report that clearly marked the Cha PCT 

application as problematic for the EPO. However, Innogenetics’ patent attorney, in his 

accompanying prior art statement submitted to the PTO, stated that “the references do 

not relate to the invention and, therefore, further discussion of the same is not 

necessary.” In direct contrast to the statement made to the PTO, Innogenetics’ 

prosecuting attorney admitted that he did not actually examine the prior art identified, 

and that his statement that “the references do not relate to the invention” was the same 

boilerplate language he used in other prior art statements. 

The district court correctly concluded that Innogenetics’ behavior before the PTO 

did not constitute a material omission or misrepresentation. Innogenetics’ 

representation of the Cha PCT application amounted to mere attorney argument and 

our precedent has made clear that an applicant is free to advocate its interpretation of 

its claims and the teachings of prior art. See Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 

224 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Cases involving affidavits or declarations are 

held to a higher standard. See, e.g., eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, LLC, 480 F.3d 

1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that false statements made by patentees in 

sworn declarations or affidavits, as opposed to attorney argument, are “inherently 

material”). Given that the Cha PCT application had been submitted for the patent 

2007-1145, -1161 23
examiner to examine herself, she was free to accept or reject the patentee’s arguments 

distinguishing its invention from the prior art. 

Abbott has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact as to the 

materiality of Innogenetics’ representation and therefore we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment of no inequitable conduct. We also affirm the district court’s 

award of attorney’s fees based upon its finding that the claim of inequitable conduct was 

exceptional. We see no clear error in this determination. 

IV. PERMANENT INJUNCTION 

We review the district court’s decision to grant the permanent injunction for 

abuse of discretion. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

We may find an abuse of discretion on a showing “that the court made a clear error of 

judgment in weighing relevant factors or exercised its discretion based upon an error of 

law or clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. An injunction does not necessarily follow 

a determination that a patent has been infringed. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 

126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). Rather, whether an injunction is warranted in a patent 

case is to be determined, as in other cases, according to the well established four part 

test. Id. at 1839. 

Abbott contends that the district court clearly erred in its finding that Innogenetics 

had been irreparably harmed and was not adequately remedied by the $7 million award 

of damages for Abbott’s infringement. It argues that, because the jury included a 

market entry fee of $5.8 million in its calculation of damages, Innogenetics has been 

fully compensated for both Abbott’s past infringement and possible future sales of its 

accused products. 

2007-1145, -1161 24
At the damages phase of trial, the jury was instructed to calculate a reasonable 

royalty for Abbott’s infringement of the ’704 patent starting from “just before the 

infringement began (in June 2003).” Docket No. 359 (Jury Instructions 3). Nowhere did 

the jury instructions state the reasonable royalty would be limited to a period from the 

start of infringement to the date of judgment. In fact, the jury was told that a reasonable 

royalty could “include both an up-front payment and an ongoing royalty payment.” 

Docket No. 359 (Jury Instructions 1) (emphasis added). 

Innogenetics conceded at oral argument that the final amount of damages 

awarded by the jury included both a market entry fee of $5.8 million and an ongoing 

royalty payment amount of $1.2 million. The jury’s damage award exactly tracked 

damages proposed by Innogenetics’ expert, John Jarosz, at trial—$7 million, which 

included an upfront payment that equated to approximately $5.8 million and a running 

royalty of 5 to 10 Euros per test on the 190,000 tests Abbott had sold up to that point. 

Docket No. 340 (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 9:15-10:8, Sept. 5, 2006). Contrary to Innogenetics’ 

contentions, the jury verdict of $7 million was not a royalty for Abbott’s past infringement 

only.7 The record is replete with references to the market entry fee as an amount paid 

in anticipation of Abbott’s long-term license to sell its products. For example, Mr. 

Jarosz, testified that the hypothetical negotiation upon which he was basing his 

proposed amount of damages was not capped by the date of the jury award, but would 

 7

 It is hard to believe that a hypothetical negotiation between Innogenetics 

and Abbott would result in a royalty of $7 million that included a market entry fee of $5.8 

million to sell licensed products for a three year period only, Abbott’s total revenue 

during the period of infringement was just $13 million. State Contr. & Eng'g Corp. v. 

Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[A]n actual infringer's profit 

margin can be relevant to the determination of a royalty rate in a hypothetical 

negotiation.") (citing Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 

1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

2007-1145, -1161 25
have involved looking at “what, over a longer term, would be a sensible license.” 

Docket No. 340 (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 18:21-22, Sept. 5, 2006.) Having used Innogenetics’ 

licensing agreement with Roche as a template for his calculations for this case, Mr. 

Jarosz also testified that one of the reasons Roche entered a deal for an upfront market 

entry fee of $6 million plus a running royalty is that “the long run is what drove its 

licensing perspective.” Docket No. 340 (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 18:22-19:2, Sept. 5, 2006). See

also Docket No. 223 (Jarosz Video Dep. 115:12-116:25, July 27, 2006) (explaining that 

the damage award contemplates an upfront fee, the calculation of which is based upon 

projected sales until 2019, and a running royalty); Docket No. 229 (Jarosz Expert Rep. 

34-35) (explaining that his $5.8 million market entry fee was based upon “projected 

sales of its HCV genotyping tests through 2019”).

The reasonable royalties awarded to Innogenetics include an upfront entry fee 

that contemplates or is based upon future sales by Abbott in a long term market. When 

a patentee requests and receives such compensation, it cannot be heard to complain 

that it will be irreparably harmed by future sales. Moreover, this factor greatly outweighs 

the other eBay factors in this case. As a result, the district court’s grant of an injunction 

prohibiting future sales of Abbott’s genotyping assay kits was an abuse of discretion and 

must be vacated.8 While the market entry fee was based upon the projection that 

 8

 In its order granting the permanent injunction, the district court stated that 

“[i]t would denigrate the value of plaintiff’s patent rights to allow defendant to continue to 

sell plaintiff’s invention as its own in exchange for the same fee it would have paid 

without a lawsuit.” Injunctive relief ought not to act as a form of “extra damages” to 

compensate for litigation costs. See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 

1549 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (remarking that injunctions may not be punitive in any case). Cf.

Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that awarding 

“kickers” on top of a reasonable royalty to compensate for heavy litigation costs or 

expenses is abuse of discretion). If litigation costs were a factor, injunctive relief would 

2007-1145, -1161 26
Abbott could sell its product through 2019, even Abbott acknowledges that such future 

sales would be subject to the running royalty, a compulsory license. We remand to the 

district court to delineate the terms of the compulsory license, such as conditioning the 

future sales of the infringing products on payment of the running royalty, the 5-10 Euros 

per genotyping assay kit.9 

V. JMOL of No Willful Infringement 

Finally, we turn to Innogenetics’ cross-appeal challenging the district court’s grant 

of JMOL, overturning the jury’s verdict of willful infringement. Under the standard 

recently articulated in In re Seagate Tech., LLC, “proof of willful infringement permitting 

enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.” 497 F.3d at 

1371. “[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 

constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Id. “[T]he patentee must also demonstrate 

that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the 

infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been 

known to the accused infringer.” Id. Our review of the record does not indicate how 

Abbott’s development and sale of its genotyping products were at risk of an objectively 

high likelihood of infringement. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s grant of JMOL 

of no willful infringement. 

CONCLUSION 

 

be warranted in every litigated patent case. Cf. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (noting that 

permanent injunctions are not to be granted as a matter of course in patent litigation). 

9

 An injunction delineating the terms of the compulsory license would permit 

the court to retain jurisdiction to ensure the terms of the compulsory license are 

complied with.

2007-1145, -1161 27
2007-1145, -1161 28

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Wisconsin is affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and vacated-inpart. The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART; REVERSED-IN-PART; VACATED-IN-PART; and REMANDED

COSTS 

No costs.