REVISED March 15, 2013

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-51067

ANDRICKA STEWART,

Plaintiff – Appellant 

v.

WACO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant – Appellee 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Andricka Stewart appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of her civil-rights action against Defendant-Appellee Waco

Independent School District (the “District”). She seeks review only of her claim

under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Because Stewart

states a claim under one theory of liability, we REVERSE and REMAND for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 14, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 11-51067

1 The District disputes whether the incidents qualify as sexual abuse under Texas law.

2

I. Facts and Procedural History

Because this appeal arises from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we

presume the truthfulness of well-pled allegations. See, e.g., Davis ex rel.

LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). This court

reviews such cases de novo, construing facts “in the light most favorable to the

non-movant.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316

(5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Dismissal [is] appropriate if [the plaintiff]

fail[s] to allege facts supporting a plausible claim or fail[s] to raise her right to

relief above a speculative level.” Id. (citation omitted).

As alleged in her first amended complaint: Stewart “suffers from mental

retardation, speech impairment, and hearing impairment” and qualifies as a

person with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Rehabilitation Act. During the relevant time period, Stewart attended A.J.

Moore Academy, then a District high school, as a special-education student.

After an incidentinvolving sexual contact between Stewart and another student

in November 2005, the District modified Stewart’s Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”) to provide that she be separated from male students and

remain under close supervision while at school.

Nonetheless, the complaint alleges that Stewart was involved in three

other instances of sexual conduct, which she characterizes as “sexual abuse,”

over the next two years.1In February 2006, a male student sexually abused

Stewart in a school restroom. The District concluded that Stewart “was at least

somewhat complicit” in the incident and suspended her for three days. In

August 2006, school personnel allowed Stewart to go to the restroom unattended,

and she was again sexually abused by a male classmate. Finally, in October

2007, a male student “exposed himself” to Stewart. The District suspended her
No. 11-51067

2 Stewart generically alleges that she “has a history of being harassed by other students

due to her disability, including intimidation by other students, physical assaults, being beat

up, and having other kids call her names.” She contends that her grandmother put District

officials on notice of these incidents, to no avail.

3 Stewart’s filed her complaint almost three years from the final instance of alleged

sexual abuse to file suit. The District pled limitations as an affirmative defense in its answer,

but it has not raised the issue here, and we express no opinion on it.

4 Stewart’s complaint and the progression of the case at the district court level focused

on § 1983 claims premised on substantive due process violations under state-created-danger

and special-relationship theories. We note that the district court’s dismissal of those claims

is supported by our subsequent opinion in Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington County School

District ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854-66 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Stewart does not challenge

this portion of the district court’s judgment.

3

again. In none of these instances, according to Stewart, did the District take any

steps to further modify her IEP or to prevent future abuse.2

Stewart sued the District in state court, and the District removed on

federal-question grounds.3 Relevant here, Stewart brings a claim under the

Rehabilitation Act for the District’s alleged “gross mismanagement” of her IEP

and failure to reasonably accommodate her disabilities. She asserts that the

suspensions meted out after the second and fourth incidents deprived her of

educational benefits.

The district court dismissed Stewart’s action in its entirety, concluding

that her claims under § 504, the ADA, and Title IX failed because they

attempted to hold the district liable for “the actions of a private actor.”4 Stewart

filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied in a single-page

order. She timely appealed.

On appeal, Stewart borrows from Title IX case law and contends that she

can state a claim under § 504 for the District’s deliberate indifference to

disability-related student-on-student sexual assault, in addition to “gross

mismanagement” of her IEP. She also characterizes her claim as one based on

the District’s “fail[ure] to provide her with the necessary accommodations to

prevent repeated sexual abuse by her peers” and “plac[ing] her in a dangerous
No. 11-51067

5 Stewart also suggests that the District violated § 504 by virtue of the suspensions.

By itself, though, discipline of a special-needs student is not a violation of § 504. The law is

clear that a school district may discipline a special-education student like any other

student—even with removal from her normal educational environment—so long as the

predicate incident is not a “manifestation” of the student’s disability. See, e.g., S-1 v.

Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346-49 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig

v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988)); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir.

1986) (“When a child’s misbehavior does not result from his handicapping condition, there is

simply no justification for exempting him from the rules, including those regarding expulsion,

applicable to other children.”); see also Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Sci., 669 F.3d 454,

465 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A school, if informed that a student has a disability with behavioral

manifestations, may be obligated to make accommodations to help the student avoid engaging

in misconduct. But, the law does not require the school to ignore misconduct that has occurred

because the student subsequently asserts it was the result of a disability.”). Stewart fails to

plead that she was disciplined for conduct attributable to manifestations of her disabilities or

to describe how her disabilities manifest themselves in the educational environment.

4

environment by failing to adhere to its own prescribed accommodations intended

to protect her.”5

The District responds with three general arguments. It first contends that

Stewart pleads no facts connecting the alleged sexual abuse solely to her

disability. The District next argues that it was not deliberately indifferent

because it investigated the alleged incidents and took action that it deemed

appropriate under the circumstances. This argument notes that Stewart failed

to directly allege that her disabilities contributed to the conduct underlying the

two suspensions. Finally, the District asserts that Stewart fails to state a claim

thatthe District acted in bad faith or with “gross misjudgment.” In the District’s

opinion, Stewart has essentially packaged a dispute over its legitimate

disciplinary and educational decisions as a civil-rights action.

II. Guiding Principles

Section 504 provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a

disability in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected

to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This court has reviewed § 504 claims under
No. 11-51067

5

the standard applicable to claims arising under the ADA. See, e.g., D.A. ex rel.

Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing,

inter alia, Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005) (en

banc)). “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, [a

plaintiff] must demonstrate: (1) that she is a qualified individual within the

meaning of the ADA; (2) that she was excluded from participation in, or was

denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which [the school district]

is responsible; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination is because of her

disability.” Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 F. App’x 287, 292 (5th Cir.

2012) (unpublished) (citing Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669,

671-72 (5th Cir. 2004)). “The only material difference between the two

provisions lies in their respective causation requirements.” Bennett-Nelson v.

La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section

504 prohibits discrimination “solely by reason” of a disability, whereas the ADA

applies even if discrimination is not “‘the sole reason’ for the exclusion or denial

of benefits.” Id. (citation omitted).

Because § 504 and the ADA focus on discrimination, students with

disabilities may use them to supplement avenues of recovery available under the

Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.

See D.A., 629 F.3d at 453 (citing Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d

1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983)). “[T]o establish a claim for disability discrimination,

in [the] educational context, ‘something more than a mere failure to provide the

“free appropriate education” required by [the] [IDEA] must be shown.’” Id. at

454 (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982)) (last

alteration in original). A plaintiff instead must “‘allege that a school district has

refused to provide reasonable accommodations for the handicapped plaintiff to

receive the full benefits of the school program.’” Id. (quoting Marvin H., 714

F.2d at 1356). This may be shown by “facts creating an inference of professional
No. 11-51067

6 The Eighth Circuit has briefly considered a § 504 claim apparently brought under a

Title IX theory of liability under a bad-faith and gross-misjudgment analysis. See Bradley v.

Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2002).

6

bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Id. at 455. Allegations that educational

authorities “‘exercised professional judgment,’” even mistakenly, do not suffice

unless they “‘depart grossly from accepted standards among educational

professionals.’” Id. at 454-55 (quoting Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171); cf.

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (“[T]he decision, if made by a

professional, is presumptively valid . . . .”).

III. Stewart Fails to Plead Student-on-Student Harassment

Stewart does not appeal the dismissal of her Title IX claim. She instead

argues that she may state a § 504 claim under a theory of liability analogous to

that applied to student-on-student sexual harassment claims under Title IX,

given the two statute’s similar operative language. See Brown v. Sibley, 650

F.2d 760, 767 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (noting similarities). The Sixth Circuit has

deployed that approach in education-related § 504 cases. See, e.g., S.S. v. E. Ky.

Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 453-56 (6th Cir. 2008). Such analysis appears consonant

with a bad-faith and gross-misjudgment standard,6 and also comports with the

high standard applied in the context of a state actor’s liability for constitutional

claims based on third-party harms. See, e.g., Covington, 675 F.3d 849.

We need not decide the viability of such a cause of action here. Even if

Stewart’s Title IX-like theory of disability discrimination is actionable, she fails

to plead facts sufficient to state such a claim. Plaintiffs may premise a Title IX

claim against a school district based on student-on-student sexual harassment

where the district“acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment

in its programs or activities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633; see also id. at 641 (noting

that this “hold[s] the [state actor] liable for its own decision to remain idle in the

face of known student-on-student harassment in its schools”).
No. 11-51067

7 We may ascertain the unreasonableness of a school district’s actions from the

pleadings. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (“This is not a mere ‘reasonableness’ standard, as the

dissent assumes. In an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss,

for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a response as not ‘clearly

unreasonable’ as a matter of law.” (internal citation omitted)).

8 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650-51 (using, as an example of qualifying misconduct,

deliberate indifference to “overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources,” such as “a

case in which male students physically threaten their female peers every day, successfully

preventing the female students from using a particular school resource”); id. at 652-53

(requiring that the “behavior be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the

7

The standard applied to such claims, however, is exceedingly high.

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet” in and of itself.

Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). It

“generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of similar

violations.’” Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). A discrimination claim based on student-on-student

harassment requires even more: the “action will lie only for harassment that is

so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s

access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. That

is, a school district’s “response to the harassment or lack thereof [must be]

clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances,” id. at 648, such that

the district’s actions subjects the victim to further discrimination. Id. at 649; see

also Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding

that Davis requires plaintiffs to “allege that the Title IX recipient’s deliberate

indifference to the initial discrimination subjected the plaintiff to further

discrimination,” an element not present in pleading deliberate indifference in

municipal-liability cases). 

Stewart’s complaint falls short of this stringent standard.7 We assume

without deciding that the abuse here qualifies as severe, pervasive, and

objectively offensive behavior that effectively excluded Stewart from equal access

to educational opportunities.8 The complaint’s largely cursory allegations,
No. 11-51067

victim equal access to an educational program or activity” and be “played out on a ‘wide-spread

level’ among students”).

9 Stewart mentions the two in-school suspensions, but these were only wrongful if they

were based on conduct attributable to manifestations of her disabilities. She instead asserts

that the suspensions were inappropriate because “she was only a freshman and was mentally

retarded.” Compl. ¶ 15. This says only that Stewart was young and that she had a disability,

facts insufficient without more to permit the inference that the District was clearly

unreasonable in disciplining her.

8

however, provide little information on the “‘constellation of surrounding

circumstances, expectations, and relationships’” necessary to determine whether

the District’s responses were “clearly unreasonable” under the circumstances.

The complaint fails to address the harassers’ identities and relationship

to Stewart,the punishments meted outto the harassers,the nature ofthe abuse,

the names and responsibilities of District personnel with knowledge of the

harassment, the time-delay between the abuse and the District’s response, the

extent of Stewart’s harm and exclusion from educational opportunities,9the

specific reasons why the District’s responses were obviously inadequate, or the

manner in which such responses likely made Stewart susceptible to further

discrimination. Courts have found these factors, among others, relevant in the

context of student-on-student harassment under Title IX. See, e.g., Davis, 526

U.S. at 651-53; Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 364-65 (6th

Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 282 (Oct. 1. 2012); Rost v. Steamboat Springs

RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1122-24 (10th Cir. 2008); Porto v. Town of

Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 73-76 (1st Cir. 2007); Williams, 477 F.3d at 1295-99;

Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 2003);

Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817,

823-25 (7th Cir. 2003); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259-

63 (6th Cir. 2000); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238,

1247-49 (10th Cir. 1999).
No. 11-51067

10 The reasonableness of the District’s response may depend, for example, on whether

Stewart was abused by the same student or whether the harassers understood the “severity

and offensiveness of their actions,” Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823, which they might not if they

were students with certain types of disabilities.

9

The paucity of Stewart’s complaint, moreover, contrasts to the detailed

allegations made in other cases decided at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See

Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-35; Williams, 477 F.3d at 1288-91; Murrell, 186 F.3d at

1243-44 (student with disabilities). Stewart pleads four instances of abuse, to

which the District responded initially by implementing IEP modifications and

on two occasions by determining that Stewart was “complicit” in the misconduct

and suspending her. We know little about the District’s response to the third

incident. Stewart complains that the District failed to modify her IEP and to

eliminate future harassment, but she gives no explanation as to what actions

were taken, even as she omits any suggestion that the District did nothing. In

the absence of allegations relevantto atleast some ofthe factors listed above, we

are asked to infer that the District’s responses were clearly unreasonable

because it disciplined Stewart and the abuse did not end after the first three

incidents.10

But,“the factthat measures designed to stop harassment prove later to be

ineffective does not establish that the steps taken were clearly unreasonable in

light of the circumstances known by [the district] at the time.” Porto, 488 F.3d

at 74; see also Hawkins, 322 F.3d at 1287 (“[W]hether the [school] Board’s

actions were clearly unreasonable must be measured by what was known.”).

Davis specifically counsels against requiring that districts must “purg[e] their

schools of actionable peer harassment or that administrators must engage in

particular disciplinary action[s]”in order to avoid being deliberately indifferent.

526 U.S. at 648. Indeed, school districts have no obligation to accede to

“particular remedial demands,” and “courts should refrain from second-guessing

the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Id.; see also Gabrielle
No. 11-51067

10

M., 315 F.3d at 824-25. Yet, that is essentially what Stewart asks us to do, even

while many facts crucial to her claim remain within her knowledge, but unpled.

See Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 824-25 (“All that [the plaintiff] denies is the

remedial effect of these steps, claiming that . . . [the harasser] continued to

bother her. . . . . [The plaintiff] misunderstands the law.”).

Even so, the complaint as it stands allows us to conclude that this is not

a case where the school district responded “by merely investigating and

absolutely nothing more.” Vance, 231 F.3d at 260, 261-62 (affirming jury verdict

for student on Title IX peer-harassment claim where the school district

responded to years of repeated, escalating, and serious incidents of sexual

harassment by merely “talking” to the harassers); see also Williams, 477 F.3d at

1296-97 (reasoning that rape victim sufficiently pled deliberate indifference

where the university waited eight months to hold a disciplinary hearing and

eleven months to implement “corrective actions,” despite identifying the rapists

as other students within days of the incident and having actual knowledge that

the victim would not return to school so long as the rapists remained on

campus); Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247-49 (concluding that a high school student

capable of functioning at only a first-grade level sufficiently pled deliberate

indifference under Title IX by alleging that she was subjected to a month-long

pattern of severe sexual assault, that specific school personnel had actual

knowledge of the incidents but refused to discipline the harasser or inform the

student’s mother, and that the principal retaliated against the mother’s

complaints by suspending the disabled student, despite the student having

suffered psychological harm requiring her hospitalization and assignment to

home-bound services).

Accordingly, although the District’s responses may leave something to be

desired, the complaint provides insufficient facts to plausibly state that the

District’s responses were so clearly unreasonable as to rise to the level of
No. 11-51067

11 As we discuss below, ineffectiveness or inadequacy is highly relevant to the grossmisjudgment inquiry.

11

deliberate indifference to actionable student-on-student harassment under

Davis. Compare Porto, 488 F.3d at 74 (ruling that school district was not

deliberately indifferent because remedial efforts to keep the victim and harasser

separated occasionally proved ineffective; school district’s failure to assign an

aide to accompany victim to the bathroom “suggest[ed] only that [the district]

may have been negligent”), with Doe ex rel. A.N. v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 200

F. App’x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (affirming jury verdict against

school district in part because the jury reasonably could have concluded thatthe

district was deliberately indifferent in waiting five weeks to take “concrete

action” against student rapists who continued to harass the victim on a daily

basis).

We believe this conclusion hews more faithfully to deliberate-indifference

principles than the “inadequate” or “ineffective” response standard suggested in

Vance, 231 F.3d at 261 (“Where a school district has actual knowledge that its

efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods

to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known

circumstances.”). The ineffectiveness of a school district’s actions may serve as

a factor tending to show deliberate indifference under certain circumstances.11

In light of Davis’s teaching, however, it cannot end the inquiry, even at the

pleading stage. See Porto, 488 F.3d at 74 (“The test for whether a school should

be liable . . . for student-on-student harassment is not one of effectiveness by

hindsight.”). It also matters that the deliberate-indifference principles at play

in a Title IX mode of analysis derive directly from those well-established in the

§ 1983 context. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91

(1998). Indeed, Vance acknowledges this doctrinal lineage and cites precedent

holding that deliberate indifference requires knowledge of and an unreasonable
No. 11-51067

12

response to “‘a substantial risk of serious harm.’” 231 F.3d at 260 (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994)).

Stewart pleads no facts showing that the District knew its responses to

each incident created an obvious and substantial risk of recurring abuse, and

municipal-liability precedent precludes equating negligence with deliberate

indifference. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.7 (1989)

(distinguishing “gross negligence” from “deliberate indifference”); Thompson v.

Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[D]eliberate indifference

cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response

to a substantial risk of serious harm.” (citation omitted)); Varnado v. Lynaugh,

920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (deliberate indifference not shown by “‘[m]ere

negligence, neglect or . . . malpractice’”(citation omitted)). Accordingly, Stewart

does not state a § 504 claim for deliberate indifference to student-on-student

harassment.

IV. Stewart’s Claim for Gross Misjudgment Survives

Stewart may nonetheless state a § 504 claim based on the District’s

alleged refusal to make reasonable accommodations for her disabilities. Given

the dearth of case law directly addressing this issue, we explain in detail below

some considerations relevant to such claims.

A. Gross Misjudgment and Reasonable Accommodations

We begin by clarifying that bad faith or gross misjudgment are just

alternative ways to plead the refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, an

ambiguity potentially left open by our precedent in this area. See D.A., 629 F.3d

at 454-55 (noting this circuit’s “long-established rule” requiring a plaintiff to

show that a district “‘refused to provide reasonable accommodations,’” but also

considering whether the plaintiff showed bad faith or gross misjudgment

(citation omitted)); Marvin H., 714F.2d at 1356 & n.13 (rejecting plaintiff’s § 504

claim because the case did “not involve a refusal to provide services[,] but rather
No. 11-51067

12 See Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding, in a case

presenting extreme allegations of misconduct, that plaintiff stated § 504 claims where she

alleged a school district refused to provide her with “the home instruction necessitated by her

disability” and to “evaluate [her] and to place her appropriately according to her evaluation”);

Smith ex rel. Townsend v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting

§ 504 claim in part because nothing suggested that the district “had the chance to formulate

[an IEP] and failed to do so” (citation omitted)); see also M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.

721, 326 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2003) (M.P. I) (“One could therefore find that the District

acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment on the basis of its failure to return M.P.’s

mother’s repeated phone calls regarding the safety of her son, the school administrators’

proposals to either drastically alter M.P.’s school day or send him to an alternative school for

behaviorally troubled students, and the District’s assurance that it could cover the costs of

M.P.’s transportation to the Northfield School District, and rescission of that offer once M.P.

had enrolled in Northfield.”); cf. Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir.

1998) (affirming dismissal of a § 504 claim that alleged nothing more than a “failure to timely

assess and diagnose”).

13

a disagreement over the correctness of the services provided”). In this view, it

is immaterial whether the District explicitly refused to make reasonable

accommodations; professionally unjustifiable conduct suffices.

A contrary interpretation would limit § 504 claims only to where a school

district literally refuses to make an accommodation. Although such cases are

clear violations of § 504,12 situations may arise where a district’s course of action

goes strongly against the grain of accepted standards of educational practice in

ways that have nothing to do with affirmatively refusing a reasonable

accommodation. For example, a district may exercise gross misjudgment in

departing from an accommodation shown to be effective for a particular student

in favor of a practice that achieves far less favorable outcomes, but nonetheless

persists in the latter approach without adequate justification. Cf. Patterson v.

Hudson AreaSchs., 551F.3d 438, 448 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]tis undisputed that

[the district] was fully aware that use of the resource room in eighth grade

impacted the amount of harassment that [the student] suffered and

discontinuing the resource room in ninth grade correlated with a return to high

levels of harassment. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that [the district] knew
No. 11-51067

14

how to combat the harassment . . . and simply chose not to implement that

known method of success.”). 

Notably, a plaintiff also may plead gross misjudgment by alleging that a

school district knew of his disabilities but failed to investigate disability-based

discrimination and harassment complaints or to “take appropriate and effective

remedial measures once notice of [the] harassment was provided to school

authorities.” M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 868 (8th

Cir. 2006) (M.P. II). In sum, a school district refuses reasonable accommodations

under § 504 when it fails to exercise professional judgment in response to

changing circumstances or new information, even if the district has already

provided an accommodation based on an initial exercise of such judgment.

B. Distinguishing Gross Misjudgment from Deliberate Indifference

As the above discussion suggests,the gross-misjudgment inquiry borrows

from deliberate-indifference doctrine. We emphasize, however, that the two

theories are distinct. Deliberate indifference applies here only with respect to

the District’s alleged liability for student-on-student harassment under a Title

IX-like theory of disability discrimination. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. On

the other hand, “gross misjudgment”—a species of heightened

negligence—applies to the District’s refusalto make reasonable accommodations

by further modifying Stewart’s IEP, a claim traditionally cognizable in some

fashion via the IDEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. See Sellers ex rel.

Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a grossmisjudgment standard applies where “plaintiffs allege a [§] 504 violation in the

education context on the basis of negligence” (citing Monahan, 687 F.2d at
No. 11-51067

13 See also Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. A.L., 194 F. App’x 173, 182 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006)

(unpublished) (“[A] failure to provide an appropriate IEP under the IDEA would not, in and

of itself, establish discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, absent some evidence of ‘bad

faith or gross misjudgment’ on the part of the school authorities.” (citations omitted)); Shirey

ex rel. Kyger v. City of Alexandria Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1143, *4-5 (4th Cir. 2000) (table)

(unpublished) (same); Jeremy H. ex rel. Hunter v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278-79

(3d Cir. 1996) (discussing interplay of IDEA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act); cf. K.R. ex rel. Riley

v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 373 F. App’x 204, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (construing, in

jury charge context, a claim that the school district failed to “‘take[] more or different measures

to protect [the student] from the alleged student-on-student harassment’” to sufficiently

explain the concept of “reasonable accommodation”).

14 The dissenting opinion contends that gross-misjudgment sets an unacceptably low

bar for § 504 liability, but that is an issue over which this panel has no control given D.A.’s

prior endorsement of Monahan. Our precedents, in any case, explain the difference between

gross negligence—from which gross misjudgment derives—and deliberate indifference.

“Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, ‘gross negligence’ and ‘deliberate

indifference’ involve different degrees of certainty, on the part of an actor, that negative

consequences will result from his act or omission. Whereas the former is a ‘heightened degree

of negligence,’ the latter is a ‘lesser form of intent.’” Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d

443, 453 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citation omitted).

15

1170)).13 We adopted the gross-misjudgment approach in D.A., 629 F.3d at 454-

55.14

Thus, although the inquiries have much in common, whether the District’s

actions were “clearly unreasonable” with respect to peer-occasioned disability

harassment remains analytically separate from whether it acted with gross

misjudgment as measured by professional standards of educational practice.

Compare Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-53 (Title IX liability for student-on-student

sexual harassment obtains only when the harassment “is so severe, pervasive,

and objectively offensive thatit can be said to deprive the victims of access to the

educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”), with D.A., 629

F.3d at 454-55 (The “‘exercise[ of] professional judgment’” is sufficient unless it

“‘depart[s] grossly from accepted standards among educational professionals.”’

(citation omitted)). Maintaining the distinction between these two separate

claims comports with the Supreme Court’s observation in Davis that the

relationship between the harasser and the victim to some degree controls a
No. 11-51067

15 February and August 2006, and October 2007.

16

school district’s liability for the harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (“The

relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent

to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX’s guarantee of equal

access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or

activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to satisfy these

requirements than is teacher-student harassment.”).

C. Stewart’s Gross-Misjudgment Claim

Returning to this dispute, the District insists that Stewart’s complaint

itself shows that the three additional incidents of sexual abuse do not state a

gross-misjudgment claim. The District observes that § 504 does not “creat[e]

‘general tort liability for educational malpractice,’” D.A., 629 F.3d at 454, and

notes that the three additional incidents occurred over a time period spanning

eighteen months.15 The District also relies on the fact that it investigated the

alleged incidents, contending that its responses prove that it was not

deliberately indifferent. These arguments urge an impermissibly cramped view

of the District’s obligations under § 504.

We have likened the effort to provide reasonable accommodations to an

exercise in “bilateral cooperation.” Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671F.2d 141,

145 (5th Cir. 1982) (Title VII context). The “obligation to engage in the

interactive process extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation and

continues when the [plaintiff] asks for a different accommodation or where the

[defendant] is aware that the initial accommodation is failing and further

accommodation is needed.” Humphrey v. Mem. Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128,

1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

Thus, however appropriate the District’s initial response, it had an

ongoing responsibility to calibrate Stewart’s IEP to effectively address the
No. 11-51067

16 There is much we do not know at this juncture. As counsel observed at oral

argument, it is unclear from the complaint whether the three additional incidents may be

attributed to isolated and unrelated events or to a more widespread practice of disregarding

Stewart’s IEP. The closer the facts are to the latter, the more likely it is that the District

exercised gross misjudgment in managing Stewart’s IEP.

17 Ittherefore makes no difference to this claim whether Stewart explicitly pled that she

was suspended for conduct that could be characterized as a manifestation of her disabilities,

such as hypersexuality or a unique susceptibility to sexual abuse. Thus, the district’s

argument that Stewart does not allege that the sexual abuse was “solely” caused by her

disability misses the mark. Stewart’s gross misjudgment claim can survive at this early stage

if it plausibly alleges that the District’s gross mismanagement of her IEP—not the sexual

abuse it allegedly allowed—was solely related to her disablity.

17

behaviors itintended to prevent by keeping her separated from males and under

close supervision. Under § 504, it is not enough that the District might have

discharged its duty under a deliberate-indifference standard by taking

remedial—but inadequate—action. See M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.

721, 326 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2003) (M.P. I) (Deliberate indifference “is

irrelevant if it can be shown that the District acted in bad faith or with gross

misjudgment.”). At this early stage, we conclude that even if the District

provided Stewart with reasonable accommodations when it initially modified her

IEP, the three subsequent instances of alleged sexual abuse could plausibly

support a finding that the modifications were actionably ineffective.16

Thus, on the record as it currently stands without the benefit of further

discovery, we conclude that Stewart plausibly states a claim that the District

committed gross misjudgment in failing to implement an alternative approach

once her IEP modifications’ shortcomings became apparent. She alleges that she

was sexually abused on campus on three separate occasions after the District

initially modified her IEP. Regardless of what role Stewart allegedly played in

facilitating this misconduct, her IEP was designed to prevent such encounters,

and Stewart can plausibly argue at this stage that its effective implementation

would have obviated any need for discipline.17 The complaint also contains

allegations that the District knew of specific aspects of the alleged abuse that
No. 11-51067

18

could have given rise to further modifications. For example, the first two

additional instances both involved Stewart’s use of the restroom and effectively

occurred only three months apart, assuming an intervening three-month

summer break, supporting a plausible argument that the District could have

modified Stewart’s IEP to prohibit her from going to the restroom unattended.

It is plausible that failing to further modify an IEP in such circumstances

grossly departs from standard educational practice.

We caution that this opinion should not be read to make school districts

insurers of the safety of special-needs students. We emphasize that courts

generally should give deference to the judgments of educational professionals in

the operation of their schools. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. This opinion

neither alters that default rule nor lowers the high standards plaintiffs must

satisfy to impose liability against school districts. Isolated mistakes made by

harried teachers and random bad acts committed by students and other thirdparties generally will not support gross-misjudgment claims. At this stage in the

case, we cannot say definitively that this case involves only the latter.

Just as a pattern of constitutional violations increases the likelihood that

a state actor has been deliberately indifferent, a district’s continued use of

ineffective or inadequate methods when confronted with multiple instances of

a specific type of misconduct becomes less defensible over time. At some point,

the failure to act appropriately becomes “‘such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the

person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.’”

Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323). Given the

repeated and specific instances of sexual misconduct here, whether and at what

point the District crossed that line is a question better reevaluated after

discovery. For pleading purposes, Stewart’s gross-misjudgment theory raises

more than a speculative claim for relief.
No. 11-51067

18 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (“The term ‘related services’ means transportation, and

such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including . . . psychological

services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, . . .

counseling services,including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and

medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation

purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special

education . . . .”).

19

V. Stewart Need Not Have Exhausted Administrative Remedies

Before concluding, we address the dissenting opinion’s

contention—unaddressed by either party’s briefs—that Stewart’s claims

necessarily fail because she did not exhaust them through the IDEA’s

administrative scheme. The dissenting opinion correctly observes that plaintiffs

must administratively exhaust certain non-IDEA claims so long as they “seek[]

relief that is also available under” the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Similarly, we

agree that merely demanding monetary damages—which are unavailable under

the IDEA—does not automatically remove a claim from the IDEA’s ambit. See,

e.g., Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(noting that the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all

hold that a plaintiff cannot avoid IDEA exhaustion simply by seeking damages),

cert. denied,132 S. Ct. 1540 (Feb. 21, 2012); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478,

483-86 (2d Cir. 2002) (drawing same conclusion from, inter alia, Fourth and

Eighth Circuit case law). The IDEA makes “available” myriad remedies through

its “related services” provision—many fairly characterized as

compensatory—that go beyond day-to-day learning accommodations.18 See

Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiffs therefore generally cannotinsulate claims for monetary damages from

administrative review by “artful pleading” if the damages would be used to

obtain the same compensatory or other services “also available under”the IDEA.

See Payne, 653 F.3d at 875 (describing three situations in which administrative

exhaustion applies); cf. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991 (construing “‘relief available’
No. 11-51067

19 Specifically, the District observed: “Clearly, Plaintiff has not pled for any relief that

is available for any alleged IDEA violation.”

20 We previously have cautioned against raising affirmative defenses sua sponte. See

Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 116 F.3d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 1997) (res judicata context); cf. Carbe v.

Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing, in PLRA context, that exhaustion is

an affirmative defense that “is waived if not asserted,” unless the complaint facially shows the

plaintiff failed to exhaust (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007))). Stewart pled that she

is exempt from administrative exhaustion on futility grounds. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,

327 (1988).

21 The Supreme Court recently has attempted to “bring some discipline to the use” of

the term “jurisdictional.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202

(2011). That precedent suggests that we should be especially cautious in addressing whether

the IDEA-exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional one; we should do so only after careful

analysis. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010) (“Our recent cases

evince a marked desire to curtail such ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can

miss the ‘critical difference[s]’ between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional

limitations on causes of action.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Union Pac. R.R.

Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S.

Ct. 584, 596 (2009) (“Recognizing thattheword‘jurisdiction’has been used by courts, including

this Court, to convey ‘many, too many, meanings,’ we have cautioned, in recent decisions,

against profligate use of the term.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

90 (1998))).

20

to mean relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person

complains, not necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers”).

Ultimately, we disagree with the dissenting opinion for two reasons. As

an initial matter, the District arguably forfeited administrative-exhaustion

arguments. It failed to raise the issue on appeal or in its motion-to-dismiss

briefing before the district court. Indeed, although the District pled IDEA

exhaustion as an affirmative defense, it expressly disclaimed Stewart’s eligibility

for IDEA relief in its first motion to dismiss.19 Despite this, the dissenting

opinion addresses administrative exhaustion sua sponte.

20 The only basis for

doing so would have to be an implicit conclusion—unstated and

unexamined—that the IDEA considers the issue jurisdictional.21 Our sister

circuits, however, are split on that very issue. Compare Payne, 653 F.3d at 870-

71 (joining the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in holding that IDEA exhaustion
No. 11-51067

22 The Gardner court nonetheless doubted that exhaustion is jurisdictional given the

existence of judicial exceptions like futility and inadequacy, 958 F.2d at 112, a view that is

consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. See Union Pacific, 130 S. Ct. at 596

(“Subject-matter jurisdiction properly comprehended, we emphasize[], refers to a tribunal’s

‘power to hear a case,’ a matter that ‘can never be forfeited or waived.’” (quoting Arbaugh v.

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (emphasis added)).

23 There is no basis for the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that Congress intended the

IDEA to largely supplant the protections otherwise afforded to plaintiffs under § 504. See

Dissenting Op. at 3 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984)). Indeed, Congress

specifically—and swiftly—repudiatedSmith’s contrary interpretation. See, e.g., A.W. v. Jersey

City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 796 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Congress enacted § 1415(l) of the

IDEA[] to countermand Smith and make clear that actions can be maintained under the

Constitution or under federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities

notwithstanding the fact that the IDEA also protects these rights.” (emphasis added)).

24 Stewart pled futility; as with the exhaustion argument in general, the parties have

not addressed the issue. We discuss the issue here because we cannot exercise “hypothetical

jurisdiction.” See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-02. If IDEA exhaustion is jurisdictional, as the

dissenting opinion implicitly suggests, then we must conclusively establish the basis for our

jurisdiction. That necessarily requires us to analyze whether Stewart needed to first

administratively exhaust her § 504 claim before presenting it to the district court.

21

is not jurisdictional) and Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991 (The “failure to exhaust

administrative remedies does not deprive a court of jurisdiction; lack of

exhaustion usually is waivable, as lack of jurisdiction is not.” (collecting

Supreme Court precedent)), with Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514

F.3d 240, 245 (2d. Cir. 2008) (construing exhaustion as jurisdictional). We have

declined to take sides in this debate, and we do so again today. See M.L. v.

Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 451 F. App’x 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished);

Gardner v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1992).22

We need not decide whether exhaustion in general in this area is

jurisdictional because Stewart would avoid dismissal even ifthe IDEA obligated

us to consider exhaustion sua sponte as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Although

the IDEA contemplates the channeling of some § 504 claims through

administrative review,23 see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), Stewart’s claim is not such a

claim according to her complaint.24 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 874 (observing that
No. 11-51067

25 As the en banc Ninth Circuit cautioned in Payne, we must be careful at this stage to

avoid using exhaustion as a license to speculate about whether plaintiffs like Stewart intend

to use a damage award on something conceivably available under the IDEA. See 653 F.3d at

877 (“Particularly in contexts where courts are expected to draw inferences in favor of

plaintiffs, we do not think itis appropriate to make what are essentially merits determinations

in the context of evaluating the need for exhaustion. Nothing in the IDEA protects a school

from non-IDEA liability simply because it was making a good-faith attempt to educate its

22

IDEA exhaustion applies “only to the extent that the relief actually sought by

the plaintiff could have been provided by the IDEA”); id. at 877 (“[W]e do not

think, especially in the context of motions to dismiss or summary judgment

motions, that it is proper for courts to assume that money damages will be

directed toward forms of relief that would be available under the IDEA”).

As pled, Stewart’s § 504 claim seeks monetary damages to hold the District

accountable for exercising gross misjudgment in managing Stewart’s IEP, a form

of disability discrimination that allegedly caused her to suffer repeated instances

of sexual abuse. She specifically seeks damages for past “physical pain,”

“medical expenses,” and “physical impairment,” as well as past and future

“mental anguish” and “mental health expenses.” It may be that the IDEA

provides or could have provided some of the relief demanded in Stewart’s

complaint. But we cannot conclude on this record that Stewart actually seeks

compensatory or prospective forms of educational relief or related services “also

available under” the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), that “may be required to assist

[her so that she can] benefit from special education,” Id. § 1401(26)(A). See

Payne, 653 F.3d at 875 (“[W]hether a plaintiff could have sought relief available

under the IDEA is irrelevant—what matters is whether the plaintiff actually

sought relief available under the IDEA. In other words, when determining

whether the IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust, courts should start by looking

at a complaint’s prayer for relief and determine whether the relief sought is also

available under the IDEA. If it is not, then it is likely that § 1415(l) does not

require exhaustion in that case.”).25
No. 11-51067

disabled students. If the school’s conduct constituted a violation of laws other than the IDEA,

a plaintiff is entitled to hold the school responsible under those other laws.”). It is unnecessary

here for us to determine whether the Payne analysis should be fully adopted by our circuit. We

simply cite it to show that exhaustion is not necessary under either of the tests commonly

utilized.

23

These conclusions comport with those from other circuits that have

recognized the inadequacy of IDEA remedies in analogous circumstances, even

some that consider exhaustion jurisdictional. See M.P. II, 439 F.3d at 868

(excusing failure to exhaust in gross-misjudgment case because § 504 claim was

“wholly unrelated to the IEP process”; plaintiff alleged that the school district

“failed to provide him with accommodations in the educational environment;

failed to investigate allegations of disability discrimination,

student-against-student harassment, [and] hostile education environment . . . ;

and failed to take appropriate and effective remedial measures”); Polera, 288

F.3d at 489-90 (suggesting that administrative exhaustion is futile where a

“school has failed to implement services that were specified or otherwise clearly

stated in an IEP”); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1275

(10th Cir. 2000) (Cases “that have required plaintiffs who seek damages to

exhaust their IDEA administrative remedies have done so where the plaintiffs’

alleged injuries were educational in nature and therefore presumptively

redressable through the IDEA’s administrative procedures.” (collecting cases));

Covington v. Knox Cnty. Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding

that exhaustion was futile where plaintiff had graduated, his injuries and the

conditions giving rise to them occurred in the past, and the IDEA afforded no

real relief); Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.

1999) (allegations of past physical and psychological abuse and injury could not

be remedied through the IDEA, as such injuries “typically are remedied through
No. 11-51067

26 See also McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“The nature of [the plaintiff’s] claim is not educational; no change to his IEP could remedy,

even in part, the damage done to [his] body. By adding [a claim that could provide damages]

to his complaint, [the plaintiff] only seeks to recover for the arguably outrageous actions of

[school personnel].”); Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 n.11 (2d Cir. 1992)

(referencing legislative history explaining that IDEA exhaustion is particularly inappropriate

where a school district fails to abide by a student’s IEP (citations omitted)); cf. Frazier v.

Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 57-64 (1st Cir. 2002) (concluding that exhaustion applied

to plaintiff’s claim for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on school district’s

alleged failure to provide a free appropriate public education).

27 The dissenting opinion puts undue reliance on cases where a school district allegedly

violated the IDEA for improperly implementing an IEP. See Dissenting Op. at 1 n.1. The

plaintiffs in Bobby R., for example, brought a claim under only the IDEA and alleged that the

school district failed to provide a free appropriate public education by crafting and negligently

implementing inadequate IEPs. See Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 343-45

(5th Cir. 2000). The Bobby R. plaintiffs sought IEP modifications and reimbursement for

private-placement expenses, relief clearly available under the IDEA. Id.

Cases like Bobby R. provide scant guidance here. It did not concern exhaustion. Nor

did it involve a § 504 claim, and this circuit had not yet adopted the gross-misjudgment

standard. If it had, however, IDEA exhaustion “is not intended to temporarily shield school

officials from all liability for conductthat violates constitutional and statutory rights that exist

independent of the IDEA and entitles a plaintiffto relief different from what is available under

24

an award of monetary damages”), overruled in part on other grounds by Payne,

653 F.3d at 867.26

In short, Stewart’s gross-misjudgment theory of liability—premised on

sexual abuse fostered by the district’s alleged disability discrimination—does not

appear to seek damages “as a substitute for relief under the IDEA.” Payne, 653

F.3d at 877. “Under these narrow circumstances, . . . the IDEA’s administrative

remedies, oriented as they are to providing prospective educational benefits,

[cannot] possibly begin to assuage . . . severe physical, and completely noneducational, injuries.” Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274. Accordingly, we conclude that,

at this pleading stage, Stewart need not have exhausted her § 504 claim under

the IDEA before presenting it to the district court. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 871

(“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not

subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could

conceivably have been redressed by the IDEA.”).27
No. 11-51067

the IDEA.” Payne, 653 F.3d at 876. A school district may simultaneously be liable for both

violations of the IDEA and other remedial statutes. See id. at 881 (“The dissent would hold

that if [an IDEA remedy] could correct a student’s injuries, then exhaustion is required even

if the injuries were caused by a non-IDEA violation for which federal law authorizes remedies

apart from the IDEA. . . . The dissent’s approach would effectively refashion § 1415(l) from a

provision designed to facilitate the coexistence of the IDEA with other forms of relief into one

designed to preempt all cases involving the mistreatment of disabled students by a school. We

do not think that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was intended to penalize disabled

students for their disability. This is not what § 1415(l) says, and we think it is not what

Congress intended.”).

25

Conclusion

Because Stewart plausibly states that the District acted with gross

misjudgment in failing to further modify her IEP, we REVERSE the district

court’s dismissal of Stewart’s § 504 claim and REMAND for proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Because Stewart appealed only the dismissal of

that claim, we do not address the district court’s rulings as to her other claims.

Although the case may go forward to the extentindicated, we note thatthe

pleading is not a model of detail. Thus, the district court remains free to order

that Stewart replead in conformity with the guidance provided in this opinion

to state at least those facts that are within her control. In line with Payne’s

“relief-centered” approach to exhaustion, moreover, the district court may

reevaluate as the case proceeds whether each of Stewart’s damage claims

actually seeks IDEA relief. See 653 F.3d at 882. The burden for showing that

exhaustion applies, however, falls to the District. See, e.g., id. at 884 (Callahan,

J., concurring).
No. 11-51067

1 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1), 1401(26)(a), 1412, 1414, 1415; see also Houston Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a school district violates

26

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

This is a suit for money damages against a school district for failing to

modify or properly enforce Ms. Stewart’s IEP to protect her from sexual contact

with fellow students. In reversing the district court’s dismissal, the panel

majority permits Ms. Stewart to use § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to enforce

her IEP though she never exhausted her administrative remedies under the

IDEA. The majority then misapplies § 504 to create tort liability for money

damages against the school district. I respectfully dissent. 

I.

Drawing upon a notion of “bilateral cooperation” from Title VII, the

majority concludes that § 504 imposed on the school district “an ongoing

responsibility to calibrate Stewart’s IEP to effectively address the behaviors

intended to be prevented by keeping her separated from males and under close

supervision.” The majority reverses the dismissal below because Stewart’s

complaint — which devotes itself to chronicling the shortcomings of her IEP —

“plausibly states that the [school] [d]istrict acted with gross misjudgment.” It

reaches this holding “regardless of what role Stewart allegedly played in

facilitating th[e] misconduct,” because “effective implementation [of Stewart’s

IEP] would have obviated any need for discipline.” 

Yet for all the majority’s focus on Stewart’s IEP, it fails to recognize that

the IEP is a creature, not of § 504, but of the IDEA, a quite distinct federal

statute. True enough, the IDEA imposes an obligation on the school district to

provide an appropriate education that entails furnishing those “related services”

necessary to that end —here, amending and enforcing Ms. Stewart’s IEP to keep

her separated from her male classmates.1 The IDEA contains its own detailed
No. 11-51067

the IDEA where it “fail[s] to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP.”);

Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 484 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding

that “a material failure to implement an IEP . . . violates the IDEA.”); Van Duyn ex rel. Van

Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “a material failure

to implement an IEP violates the IDEA.”); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027

n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “fail[ure] to implement an essential element of [an] IEP that

was necessary for the child to receive an educational benefit” violates the IDEA).

2 Cf. Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,

368 (1985) (“In several places, the [IDEA] emphasizes the participation of the parents in

developing the child’s educational program and assessing its effectiveness.”); Klein Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Hoven, 690 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The IDEA requires that school districts

allow parents to play a significant role in the development of IEPs for each child with a

disability. . . [and] also requires states to establish procedures to resolve IEP-related disputes

between parents and school districts.”).

3 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 

4 See, e.g., Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting a § 504 claim

predicated on the school district’s alleged “general[] fail[ure] to implement [the plaintiff’s]

Plan,” observing that the claim “relate[s] unmistakably to the evaluation and educational

placement of [the plaintiff] . . . and to the provision of a free appropriate education”). 

27

remedial scheme —an “interactive process” between parents and school districts

whose absence the majority bemoans.2 This process is enabled by congressional

insistence that a disabled student exhaust her remedies before resorting to the

courts, at least where she “seek[s] relief that is also available under” the IDEA.3

Here, neither the complaint nor the amended complaint suggests that Ms.

Stewart’s parents or guardians ever contacted the school district about any of

the alleged instances of sexual abuse, much less the district’s responses to them.

Ms. Stewart nevertheless attempts to avoid exhaustion by requesting money

damages. But at the heart of Ms. Stewart’s lawsuit is a dispute over the content

and implementation of her IEP, a matter that clearly falls within the purview

of the IDEA and is capable of resolution through its administrative processes.4

Stewart’s allegations leave little doubt on this point:

• [Paragraph 15:] In February 2006, even though [Stewart’s] IEP dictated

that she was to be kept separate from male classmates and was to be closely

supervised, she was again sexually abused by another student, this time

in the bathroom. Again, Waco ISD officials were aware of the incident but
No. 11-51067

28

her IEP was unmodified and no additional steps were taken to protect

[Stewart] from further sexual abuse. 

• [Paragraph 16:] In August 2006, with [Stewart’s] IEP still mandating that

she be kept separate from male classmates and be closely supervised, she

was permitted to go to the bathroom unattended. . . . Unfortunately and

unsurprisingly,[Stewart] was sexually abused in the bathroom by [a] male

classmate. Waco ISD officials were again aware of this incident and again

did not make any changes to [Stewart’s] IEP or take any steps to ensure

that she would not be sexually abused in the future. 

• [Paragraph 17:] In October 2007, with [Stewart’s] IEP still mandating that

she be kept separate from male classmates and be closely supervised, she

was again sexually abused by a male classmate who exposed himself to

her. Again . . . school officials suspended [Stewart] from school, depriving

her of an educational benefit. 

• [Paragraph 21:] There is nothing indicating any efforts by Waco ISD to

properly train and supervise Waco ISD staff in the effective implementation

of [Stewart’s] IEP. As a result, staff members repeatedly failed to follow the

requirements of [Stewart’s] IEP. 

• [Paragraph 22:] Despite the determinations by school officials that

[Stewart] was complicit in some of these instances of sexual abuse, there

is nothing indicating that any sort of sexual education was contemplated

by her ARD Committee and her IEP did not dictate any sort of education

for [Stewart] in the inappropriateness of sexual contact at school.

• [Paragraph 26:] [Stewart] asserts that Waco ISD has violated [her] rights

pursuantto [§504 of the] Rehabilitation Act. Defendant’s practices and/or

proposed actions, set out in detail above, have, together and separately,

contributed to violating her rights under [§504].

• [Paragraph 27:] In addition and in the alternative, the failure of the school

district to keep [Stewart] safe from a known harm while on campus

constitutes a gross mismanagement of her educational plan and also a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act thereby.

• [Paragraph 28:] Furthermore, the failure to train or supervise Waco ISD

staff to ensure that [Stewart’s] IEP was properly carried out constitutes a
No. 11-51067

5 See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996)

(Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting the argument that a suit for money damages is automatically

exempt from the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, reasoning that “‘relief available’ . . . mean[s]

relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains, not necessarily

relief of the kind the person prefers.”). 

6 See Rose, 214 F.3d at 210–11. 

7 Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993.

8 Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989).

29

gross mismanagement of her education plan and a violation of the

Rehabilitation Act thereby. 

In such circumstances, the mere fact that Ms. Stewart prefers a monetary

remedy does not exempt her from the statute’s exhaustion requirement.5 For the

same reason, Ms. Stewart’s perfunctory allegation that exhaustion would be

“futile” is unpersuasive.6

That we cannot know with certainty what Stewart’s timely recourse to her

IDEA remedies would have produced is inherent in the requirement of

exhaustion. Perhaps those remedies would have avoided all that has followed,

or perhaps they would have ultimately fallen short. But “parents cannot know

that without asking, any more than we can.”7 The cardinal function of

exhaustion is to “enable the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its

expertise to the problem, to exercise its discretion, and to correct its own

mistakes.”8 Other than in exceptional circumstances that clearly fall outside of

the purview of the IDEA, we ought not allow litigants to short-circuit this

inherently discretionary process with their own predictions as to what results
No. 11-51067

9 Cf. e.g., Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

dispositive question generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be

redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies. . . . Where the

IDEA’s ability to remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be required in order

to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate the alleged

problem.”). 

10 Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993. 

11 Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148–49 (5th Cir. 2010)

(Haynes, J.) (“[I]t is well established . . . that the court of appeals ‘may affirm a district court’s

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on any grounds raised below and supported by the record.’”). 

30

it might have produced.9 Here, the allegations in Stewart’s complaint leave me

convinced “that at least in principle[,] relief is available under the IDEA.”10

The majority passes over the threshold question of exhaustion because the

school district “failed to raise the issue on appeal or in its motion-to-dismiss

briefing before the district court.” But we are reviewing the judgment of the

district court and can affirm its dismissal on any ground raised below and

supported by the pleadings.11 Here, Stewart pleaded exception to exhaustion.

The district’s answer not only denied those pleadings but asserted Stewart’s

failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. The exhaustion issue was

indisputably presented to the district court. We not only have the authority to

affirm on that basis, but the duty, as the district court’s judgment is plainly

sound, albeit for reasons it did not reach. 

The majority also suggests that exhaustion does not apply because Stewart

seeks damages for past physical harms, not “prospective forms of educational

relief or related services.” To the extent any injury suffered by Stewart as a

result of the school district’s alleged mismanagement of her IEP — physical or

otherwise — cannot now be redressed through the IDEA’s administrative

processes, this result is itself the consequence of Stewart’s failure to timely

exhaust. To hold that a disabled student can avoid exhaustion simply by waiting
No. 11-51067

12 Cf. Polera v. Board of Educ. of the Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478

(2d Cir. 2002) (“We . . . consider itincongruous that [the plaintiff] waited years before pursuing

any remedy, yet now claims that the remedy available to her at the time — the [IDEA’s]

administrative process — would have been too slow.”). 

13 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011–12 (1984). Smith is merely one manifestation

of the principle that “a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”

Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976) (holding that “[t]he balance,

completeness, and structural integrity” of Title VII evidence that Congress intended it to

provide the exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment); see also

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973) (holding that challenges to the fact or scope

of imprisonment must be brought under the habeas statute, not § 1983, as the former is the

“more specific act.”). 

31

to bring her damages claim until administrative remedies are no longer useful

would gut the exhaustion requirement of all meaning.12

Congress has elected to channel disputes over the difficulties encountered

in mainstreaming disabled children first to the school house, bringing parent

and teacher to the conference table. The congressional judgment is that the

overwhelming majority of disputes will be resolved in the process. If the effort

fails to achieve the desired result, parents can resort to the courts. At that

juncture, there is less reason to look forward, and more reason to look backward

and allocate responsibility for a failure. 

II. 

Exhaustion aside, the majority is obligated to read § 504 in harmony with

the IDEA and abide the statutes’ differences. As the Supreme Court recognized

in Smith v. Robinson, “Congress did not intend a handicapped child to be able

to circumvent [the IDEA’s] requirements or supplement [its] remedies . . . by

resort to the general antidiscrimination provision of § 504.”13 This means that

when an IEP is in place, its shortcomings must find their answer within the

detailed remedial scheme under the IDEA unless those shortcomings are

somehow of a meaningfully distinct character. That distinction inheres in the

language of § 504 as read by the Supreme Court and this Circuit — it is
No. 11-51067

14 Davis, 442 U.S. at 412–13; D.A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 454 (5th

Cir. 2010)(“Further constraining the viability of claims under the disability non-discrimination

laws is this courts long-established rule that[] a cause of action is stated under § 504 when it

is alleged that a school district has refused to provide reasonable accommodations.”).

15 See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982).

16 See D.A., 629 F.3d at 454 (“[We] used the term ‘refusal’ because the statute requires

intentional discrimination against a student on the basis of his disability. This is consistent

with [Monahan].”).

17 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (noting that to

merit an award of damages under Title IX, the school’s response “must amount to deliberate

indifference to discrimination”); see also S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky Univ., 532 F.3d 445 (6th Cir.

2008) (evaluating a § 504 claim predicated on disability-based peer-on-peer harassment under

the “deliberate indifference” standard). 

32

triggered by a “refusal” by the school district to grant a disabled student’s

request for a reasonable accommodation.14

Several courts have gone a step further, substituting “gross misjudgment

or bad faith” for refusal.15 But that was to address the reality that a literal

insistence upon a request for accommodation could frustrate the core purpose of

§ 504 — to prevent discrimination against persons with disabilities.16 It was not

to expand the statute’s reach. Accepting this judicial effort, if the

congressionally stated liability of § 504 is not to be expanded to reach negligent

conduct, then at the least, the words substituted for “refusal” must do no more

than capture non-literal refusals. “Bad faith” appears to be fit for this surrogate

task, with its draw upon intentionality. “Gross misjudgment” less so. And

potentially devastatingly less so. It appears to be not a surrogate for refusal, but

“a species of heightened negligence.” Yet as the majority correctly suggests, the

level of culpability actionable under § 504 should be “consonant with” the

“deliberate indifference” we require under the virtually identical discrimination

prohibition of Title IX.17 As we observed in Brown v.Sibley,“[t]he overwhelming

similarity of these . . . passages is no accident. Congress expressly modeled the
No. 11-51067

18 650 F.2d 760, 768 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1297 (1974), reprinted at 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390–91). 

19 Stewart’s bald allegations of “sexual abuse” fail the federal pleading standard. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (“To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations

on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of

respondent’s allegations . . . that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”). 

33

discrimination prohibition contained in section 504 after the prohibitory

language contained in . . . Title IX.”18

Here, the majority observes, Ms. Stewart’s amended complaint alleges

that the school district responded to the first incident of misconduct by

modifying Stewart’s IEP and the second and fourth by investigating the

respective incidents and suspending her. Thus, the majority concludes,

“although the District’s responses may leave something to be desired, the

complaint provides insufficient facts to plausibly state that the District's

responses were so clearly unreasonable as to rise to the level of deliberate

indifference.” But the majority continues on, drawing an inference of “bad faith

or gross misjudgment” from the school district’s alleged mismanagement of

Stewart’s IEP — now relying on “the three subsequent instances of alleged

sexual abuse.” This, notwithstanding the fact that Stewart’s “cursory” amended

complaint, filed with time for discovery, is bereft of detail,

fail[ing] to address the harassers’ identities and relationship to

Stewart, the punishments meted out to the harassers, the nature of

the abuse, the names and responsibilities of District personnel with

knowledge of the harassment, the time-delay between the abuse and

the District’s response, the extent of Stewart’s harm and exclusion

from educational opportunities, the specific reasons why the

District’s responses were obviously inadequate, or the manner in

which such responses likely made Stewart susceptible to further

discrimination. 

With all respect, the majority has in its application of controlling standards

created tort liability for money damages, allowing Stewart to proceed on

pleadings that, at best, state a plausible claim for oversight or negligence.19 It
No. 11-51067

20 Ms. Stewart’s amended complaint departs from her state-court complaint in another

noteworthy regard. Whereas the amended complaint suggests that school officials took no

action to protect Stewart from peer-on-peer sexual contact in school bathrooms, the original

complaint representedthatMs. Stewart’s “special education teacher reports thatthe schooldid

make some attempt to address this problem by permitting [Ms. Stewart]to go to the bathroom

after a tardy bell, while the restroom and hall were supposedly clear of any other students.”).

34

signifies that Ms. Stewart in her original complaint characterized the school

district’s failure to abide her IEP as “actionable negligence,” a characterization

carefully omitted from the amended complaint.20

III.

Today, the majority allows parents unhappy with an IEP to bypass the

comprehensive remedial scheme of the IDEA and sue under § 504 for money

damages. It then misapplies § 504 to impose on schools a tort-like duty not to

mismanage a disabled student’s IEP. This unfortunate consequence defies

precedent. I would hold that Ms. Stewart’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under the IDEA bars her from seeking money damages under § 504.

Alternatively, I would hold that bad faith, gross misjudgment, and deliberate

indifference all rest upon substantially identical levels of culpability — levels

that approximate the discriminatory animus § 504 was intended to capture. On

either wing, the district court’s dismissal ought be affirmed.