NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

KEVIN LEE FRANCOIS, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0378 

FILED 5-3-2018 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2010-006046-001 DT 

The Honorable Alfred M. Fenzel, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson

Counsel for Appellee 

Ballecer & Segal LLP, Phoenix

By Natalee E. Segal 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell

joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge: 

¶1 Kevin Lee Francois appeals his convictions and sentences for 

burglary in the second degree, kidnapping, aggravated assault, sexual 

abuse, and multiple counts of sexual assault. Francois argues the superior

court erred by denying his motion to appoint substitute trial counsel and 

precluding defense witnesses. Francois also argues the court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress DNA evidence. Finally, Francois raises a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Early in the morning of August 22, 2003, the female victim 

awoke in her bed with a man on top of her covering her face with a pillow.

The man violently physically and sexually assaulted the woman before 

fleeing. The victim woke up her roommate, who called 9-1-1. 

¶3 The victim did not see the perpetrator and could not 

otherwise identify him, although she “thought maybe [she] recognized the 

voice.” A male DNA profile from “dried oral secretions” located on the

victim’s breast did not match any possible suspects or the profiles stored in 

a national law enforcement DNA database (“CODIS”). Fingerprints at the 

crime scene that were not the victim’s also did not match prints in a law 

enforcement database. The investigation went cold.

¶4 Seven years after the assault, Francois was arrested in 

California after a police officer observed him attempting to break into a 

residence, and pursuant to California law Francois provided a DNA sample

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Francois. State v. 

Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404, n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 

Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

3 

for testing. Francois’s DNA profile was then added to CODIS, and 

thereafter, the Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office learned of a “hit” on the 

DNA sample collected from the victim’s breast. Arizona law enforcement 

officers determined that the hit was related to Francois’s DNA profile, and 

they, with the assistance of a California peace officer, obtained a warrant to 

collect a sample of Francois’s saliva and blood. The officers travelled to 

California and procured the samples, and subsequent testing revealed a 

“match” between Francois’s DNA and the DNA found on the victim’s 

breast. 

¶5 The State charged Francois with one count each of burglary in 

the second degree, a Class 3 felony; kidnapping, a Class 2 felony; 

aggravated assault, a Class 6 felony; sexual abuse, a Class 5 felony; and 

eight counts of sexual assault, Class 2 felonies. The jury found Francois 

guilty as charged and determined the State proved three aggravating 

factors regarding all counts except the burglary charge, which the jury 

found two aggravating circumstances. The court imposed aggravated 

consecutive prison sentences totaling 137.75 years. Francois timely

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing to 

Substitute New Counsel and by Allowing Hybrid Representation.

¶6 Almost five years after the indictment, and one month before 

trial was scheduled to begin, Francois requested appointment of substitute 

counsel. The superior court denied the request, noting it had allowed 

Francois to personally file motions and responses, thus Francois “had de 

facto hybrid representation.” The court subsequently accepted Francois’s 

waiver of counsel and permitted him to proceed pro se at trial with counsel 

serving in an advisory capacity.2 Eventually, Francois asked that advisory 

counsel assume full representation of his defense.

 

2 In another criminal matter involving a similar sexual assault 

committed against a different victim, Maricopa County Superior Court 

Cause Number CR2010-006261, Francois waived counsel in 2011. The court 

dismissed that case without prejudice after Francois’s conviction in the 

instant matter. 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

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4 

¶7 Francois argues the court erred by permitting hybrid 

representation. Francois does not direct us to any objection raised to the 

superior court regarding his hybrid representation. Instead, the record 

shows that he participated in his defense by filing numerous detailed pro se

motions, and participating in pretrial hearings. Further, Francois provides 

no authority to support his summary assertion that this case “required 

representation.” Arizona does not prohibit hybrid representation and the 

superior court has discretion to allow it. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 325 

(1994). On this record, and absent authority that would prohibit hybrid 

representation under the circumstances presented in this case, we do not 

find reversible error. 

¶8 Francois also argues the superior court erred by denying his 

request for new counsel because Francois and counsel had an irreconcilable 

conflict. Francois contends he and counsel failed to communicate, and they 

disagreed over trial strategy.

¶9 A superior court ruling regarding a request for substitute 

counsel “will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. 

Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶ 27 (2005). The Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel does not guarantee a defendant a “meaningful relationship” with 

his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 

186, ¶ 28. Rather, courts must balance a defendant’s right to counsel

“against the public interest in judicial economy, efficiency, and fairness.” 

Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 187, ¶ 31. In ruling on a substitution of counsel 

request, the court considers factors including “whether an irreconcilable 

conflict exists . . . whether new counsel would be confronted with the same 

conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time 

period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity 

of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.” Id. (quoting 

State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 486–87 (1987)). To demonstrate irreconcilable 

conflict, “the defendant must present evidence of a ‘severe and pervasive 

conflict with the attorney or evidence that he had such minimal contact with 

the attorney that meaningful communication was not possible.’” State v. 

Hernandez, 232 Ariz. 313, 318, ¶ 15 (2013). 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

5 

¶10 At the time Francois requested substitute counsel, defense 

counsel informed the court he could effectively3 represent Francois, stating: 

[W]e haven’t had too many issues and we’ve been able to 

communicate and we’ve talked at length about his cases and 

what not. So I don’t feel like there’s any animosity towards 

us. But at the same time too I understand where he’s coming 

from. If he wants just more of my time than I’m able to give 

him in general, I just think that that’s a reality that I can’t take 

away from—I have other cases. . . . I know that Mr. Francois 

and I have a difference of opinion in terms of how many 

witness interviews need to be done.

Francois responded: 

Well, I’d just like the Court to know that I don’t doubt

[defense counsel’s] effectiveness or his abilities or skills in the 

courtroom and I know that between [the prosecutor] and 

yourself and [defense counsel] you guys have a professional

relationship and he does handle himself with decorum in the 

court and can litigate cases. . . . But there is a difference in 

opinion on who should be interviewed and what should take 

place. . . . The communication, we do have a good 

relationship. I respect [defense counsel]. 

¶11 As the foregoing comments illustrate, Francois and counsel

did not have a fractured relationship or a breakdown in communication. At 

most, they disagreed over “who should be interviewed and what should 

take place.” A difference in proposed trial strategy does not rise to the level 

of a fractured relationship necessitating appointment of a different lawyer. 

Hernandez, 232 Ariz. at 318, ¶ 15. The record shows the court considered

that Francois would experience the same frustration with new counsel 

regarding counsel’s inability to spend all his or her time on Francois’s case, 

the trial had been repeatedly continued, doing so again would 

inconvenience witnesses, and current counsel was prepared to adequately 

represent Francois. See id. at 321, ¶¶ 33–34 (describing factors the court 

should consider when evaluating whether appointment of new counsel is 

 

3 Francois stated his reason for wanting to proceed pro se was 

“ineffective assistance of counsel.” To the extent Francois raises an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in this direct appeal, we do not 

address it. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002). 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

6 

necessary when a defendant has “something less than irreconcilable 

conflict” with current counsel). The record supports the superior court’s 

denial of Francois’s Motion for New Counsel and the decision to allow 

Francois to proceed pro se. See State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 358, 360, ¶¶ 10, 

25 (2009) (“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing 

waiver of counsel is a question of fact . . . based substantially on the trial 

judge’s observation of the defendant’s appearance and actions.”). 

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Francois’s 

request for substitute counsel. 

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Precluding 

Francois’s Alibi Witnesses as a Discovery Sanction for Late 

Disclosure.

¶12 Four days before trial was scheduled to begin, Francois filed 

a pro se “current witness list,” disclosing names of individuals who were 

purportedly with him on the date of the sexual assault. The State, noting 

Francois did not previously disclose an alibi defense, moved to preclude 

such a defense at trial. The court granted the motion. 

¶13 Francois does not argue that he timely disclosed his 

supplemental witness list. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(b)(1), (d)(1) (requiring 

a defendant within 40 days after arraignment or within 10 days after the 

prosecutor’s disclosure pursuant to Rule 15.1(b), whichever occurs first, to

provide a written notice to the prosecutor specifying all defenses, including 

alibi, as to which the defendant intends to introduce evidence at trial).

Instead, without citing authority to support his arguments, he contends

preclusion was too drastic a remedy for his discovery violation, and the 

court should have continued the trial to permit the State “to conduct their 

due diligence as to the defense witnesses.” Francois further argues the State 

was not prejudiced by his late disclosure because he timely disclosed a 

third-party defense. We review the court’s decision to exclude evidence due 

to untimely disclosure for abuse of discretion. State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 

579, 586 (1997). 

¶14 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2(c)(1) provides that a 

defendant must timely disclose the names, addresses, and written or 

recorded statements of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(c)(1). “[T]he underlying principal of Rule 15 is 

adequate notification to the opposition of one’s case-in-chief in return for 

reciprocal discovery so that undue delay and surprise may be avoided at 

trial by both sides.” State v. Stewart, 139 Ariz. 50, 59 (1984). Where a 

defendant fails to disclose a witness in a timely fashion, preclusion may be
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

7 

appropriate. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7(c)(1); State v. Thompson, 190 Ariz. 555, 558 

(App. 1997). 

¶15 If a court determines that a sanction is proper for a discovery 

violation, the court must consider whether a less stringent sanction would 

suffice before it precludes the evidence. State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, 58, ¶ 37 

(App. 2002). Further, before precluding evidence as a sanction for a

discovery violation, the court must consider “the significance of the 

information not timely disclosed, the violation’s impact on the overall 

administration of the case, the sanction’s impact on the party and the 

victim, and the stage of the proceedings when the party ultimately made 

the disclosure.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7(c). 

¶16 The superior court did not abuse its discretion by excluding

Francois’s alibi witnesses. The record reflects the court considered the Rule 

15.7 factors and specifically found that “the prejudice to the State is too 

great” to allow Francois to pursue a new alibi defense on the eve of trial. 

The record supports the court’s finding. Additionally, the court concluded, 

and we agree, that the previously disclosed third-party defense did not 

provide notice to the State that Francois would raise an alibi defense. A 

defendant claiming that a third party committed the crimes in question

does not necessarily imply that the defendant was not present at the crime 

scene. Furthermore, the difference in preparation and investigation which 

would be performed by the State based on an alibi defense, versus that of a 

third-party defense, is significant. As the State argued during the hearing 

on their motion to preclude, an alibi defense requires time in order to 

subpoena financial records, travel and phone records, and interview

witnesses to ascertain the truth of their statements regarding both their 

location, and the defendant’s, at the time the crime was committed.

¶17 Absent authority to the contrary, we will not conclude that a 

timely noticed third-party defense also notifies the State that a defendant 

may raise an alibi defense. Therefore, the superior court could reasonably 

conclude that precluding Francois’s alibi witnesses was a proper remedy 

for his untimely disclosure. See State v. Ramos, 239 Ariz. 501, 505, ¶ 12 (App. 

2016) (concluding preclusion of disclosed alibi witness was appropriate 

remedy for untimely disclosure, despite significance of witness to 

defendant and lack of defense counsel’s bad faith, because late disclosure 

introduced a new defense theory and “caused a significant disadvantage to 

the state.”).
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

8 

C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing to 

Suppress the DNA Evidence.

¶18 Francois moved pretrial to suppress the DNA evidence, 

arguing his California arrest was unlawful and the arresting officer

conspired with others to establish probable cause in his California 

attempted burglary case. As a result, Francois argued the warrantless 

seizure of his DNA violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The superior

court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

¶19 Francois contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing

to determine whether his California arrest was “lawful” and the ensuing 

warrantless seizure was constitutional. He further summarily asserts that 

he “had the right to confront the state’s witnesses . . . [and] the court 

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Francois to prove his arrest 

and seizure was unlawful.” We review the court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary 

issue, but we review constitutional and legal issues de novo. See State v. Gay, 

214 Ariz. 214, 217, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). More specifically, we review the court’s 

decision to deny a motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.9(e) (“[T]he court 

may set a motion for argument or hearing.”) (emphasis added); State v. 

Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 407, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). 

¶20 The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making 

unreasonable searches and seizures, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and

the exclusionary rule generally prevents the introduction of evidence seized 

in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, State v. Hackman, 189 

Ariz. 505, 508 (App. 1997). Subject to some exceptions, a warrantless search 

is per se unreasonable. State v. Branham, 191 Ariz. 94, 95 (App. 1997). As 

pertinent here, if probable cause exists to support an arrest,4 the United 

States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Fourth 

Amendment is violated by a law that authorizes the warrantless seizure of 

a suspect’s DNA. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449–50 (2013). 

¶21 The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 

suppression motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court

 

4 “To make a warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable 

cause to believe both that a crime has been committed and that the person 

to be arrested committed the crime.” State v. Keener, 206 Ariz. 29, 32, ¶ 15 

(App. 2003). 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

9 

considered the arresting officer’s sworn testimony given at the probable 

cause and suppression hearings in the California case. Based on that 

testimony, the superior court concluded, as did the California court that 

addressed the same arguments Francois raised in support of his 

suppression motion, that the arrest in California was supported by probable 

cause. Although the superior court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, 

it did consider materials Francois submitted to support his argument that 

the California officers conspired against him, and the court determined 

those materials did not indicate a conspiracy as Francois alleged. While a 

hearing would have allowed the court to assess the credibility of the officer 

involved, and would have avoided relying on the previous hearing in 

California, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the superior 

court to deny a suppression hearing. The court acted within its discretion 

by implicitly determining Francois failed to present a prima facie

suppression issue requiring an evidentiary hearing on the motion to 

suppress. See State v. Nilsen, 134 Ariz. 433, 435–36 (App. 1982) (“The trial 

judge did not err in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing. . . . The record 

shows that he patiently and carefully reviewed the appellants’ offers of 

proof and arguments. . . . No further hearing was necessary or desirable.”), 

aff'd as modified, 134 Ariz. 431 (1983); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b)(2)(A) 

(requiring a defendant to allege specific circumstances and establish a prima 

facie case supporting suppression of evidence before the State has the

burden of proving lawfulness of seizure).5

¶22 To the extent Francois argues the superior court erred by

denying his suppression motion because the California statute requiring 

arrested persons to provide a DNA sample is unconstitutional, we 

summarily reject the argument. The record reflects that, although Francois 

initially raised this issue before trial, he abandoned it after the United States 

Supreme Court issued its decision in King. See King, 569 U.S. at 449 (2013) 

(collecting and analyzing a suspect’s DNA pursuant to Maryland’s DNA 

Collection Act is a legitimate booking procedure following an arrest 

supported by probable cause and does not violate the Fourth Amendment).

In addition, the California Supreme Court has since found their statute to 

be constitutional. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 2018). 

¶23 Regarding Francois’s assertion that the court’s failure to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing violated his confrontation rights, we do not 

 

5 Because Francois failed to establish a prima facie case, we reject his 

implication that the State had the burden to prove the seizure of his DNA 

complied with the Fourth Amendment.
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

10 

address it because Francois fails to present a developed argument 

supported by authority and has thereby waived the issue. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7)(A) (“An appellant’s opening brief must set forth . . . 

appellant’s contentions with supporting reasons for each contention, and 

with citations of legal authorities . . . on which the appellant relies.”); State 

v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452, ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (“In Arizona, opening briefs 

must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth 

an appellant’s position on the issues raised.”) (quoting State v. Carver, 160 

Ariz. 167, 175 (1989)); State v. Sanchez, 200 Ariz. 163, 166, ¶ 8 (App. 2001) 

(issue waived because defendant failed to develop argument in his brief).

D. The State Did Not Engage in Prosecutorial Misconduct. 

¶24 During closing arguments, defense counsel repeatedly 

challenged the DNA evidence, saying it “sucks” and referring to the 

evidence as “bogus.” During the State’s rebuttal argument, the following 

transpired:

[PROSECUTOR]: So ask yourself this: You heard evidence in 

this case from multiple sources that all of the forensic 

evidence in this case, the bedding, all of the DNA had all been 

released to the defense for independent testing. You heard 

from [the DNA unit criminalist] that he released evidence 

from the lab. He coordinated directly with another lab to 

release the evidence to them for independent testing for the

defense. 

Now, if this is such—if DNA sucks and it’s bogus, what on 

earth are they doing asking for this evidence to be released for 

independent testing?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I am going to object as improper 

burden shifting. I think it is improper argument, judge, for the 

record.

THE COURT: I don’t believe it is burden shifting but I think 

you should move on.

¶25 Francois argues the foregoing rebuttal argument constituted

improper vouching for DNA testing. We review for fundamental error 

because Francois did not object at trial on this basis. See State v. Lopez, 217 

Ariz. 433, 434–35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (an objection on a ground other than the 

one asserted to the appellate court does not preserve the issue for appeal).

Thus, Francois bears the burden to establish that error occurred, that the 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

11 

error was fundamental, and that the error resulted in prejudice. State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 20 (2005). That is, Francois must show that 

“(1) misconduct exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the 

misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying 

[Francois] a fair trial.’” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 (2007)

(quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), 210 Ariz. 327, 340, ¶ 45 (2005)).

¶26 To determine whether the prosecutor’s argument was 

improper, we consider whether he called the jury’s attention to matters it

should not consider. State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 224, ¶ 128 (2006), abrogated 

on other grounds by State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 267, ¶¶ 13–14 

(2017). Improper prosecutorial vouching consists of two types: “(1) where 

the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness; (2) 

where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury 

supports the witness’s testimony.” State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 423 (1989). 

The first type of vouching consists of personal assurances of a witness’s

truthfulness. State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 277 (1994). The second type 

involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by 

reference to material outside the record. Id. Francois argues that the 

challenged argument “inferred that Francois had retested the bedding and 

shirt inferring they contained DNA evidence, something never testified to 

by any witness. Piggybacking on this inference, the state argued that 

government’s result [sic] was confirmed by none other than Francois’s own 

handpicked lab.” Thus, Francois contends the prosecutor engaged in the 

second type of vouching.

¶27 The prosecutor did not refer to matters outside the record to 

support the State’s argument. The evidence established that Francois 

requested independent DNA testing of the bedding from the crime scene

and the saliva sample collected from the victim’s body. To rebut Francois’s 

argument that the DNA evidence and test results presented by the State 

were unreliable, the prosecutor could, therefore, properly refer to the 

defense’s request for independent DNA testing. See State ex rel. McDougall 

v. Corcoran, 153 Ariz. 157, 160 (1987) (“It strikes us as elemental fairness to 

allow the State to comment upon the defense’s failure to adduce potentially 

exculpatory evidence to which defendant had access when defendant is 

attacking the accuracy of the State’s evidence.”); State v. Martinez, 130 Ariz. 

80, 82–83 (App. 1981) (no misconduct where prosecutor commented at trial 

about defendant’s failure to present evidence on how a stolen speaker cover 

got into his car trunk when the prosecutor made those statements as a 

rebuttal to the defendant’s argument that the speaker cover had been found 

and not stolen); see also State v. Kerekes, 138 Ariz. 235, 239 (App. 1983) 

(because purported misconduct occurred during the State’s rebuttal 
STATE v. FRANCOIS

Decision of the Court

12 

argument, this court views the challenged statement in the context of 

defendant’s closing argument). Furthermore, even though the prosecutor 

did not comment on Francois’s failure to provide the results of an 

independent DNA test, such an additional inference would also not be 

considered vouching. See McDougall, 153 Ariz. at 160 (prosecutor was 

permitted to comment on defendant’s failure to produce evidence 

concerning an independent breath test when defendant challenged the 

accuracy of the State’s test results). While we recognize the fine distinction 

between commenting on a defendant’s failure to present evidence and 

commenting on evidence outside the record, we hold no vouching occurred

in this case. See id. (“Such comment is permitted by the well-recognized

principle that the nonproduction of evidence may give rise to the inference 

that it would have been adverse to the party who could have produced it.”).

¶28 Finally, even if we were to hold the prosecutor’s comments in 

closing to constitute vouching, the error would not be fundamental. See 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 20. The DNA evidence presented at trial 

showed a match between Francois’s DNA profile and that of the saliva 

found on the victim’s breast following the assault, and the victim testified 

that she recognized Francois’s voice during trial as the same one she heard 

during the assault. 

CONCLUSION

¶29 Francois’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.