NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS MONTGOMERY; BRENDA 

MONTGOMERY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

MICHAEL WEST; DOES, Nine Unknown 

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau Of 

Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, and 

Drug Enforcement Agency, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-15728 

D.C. No. 

3:21-cv-00128-ART-CSD 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Anne R. Traum, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 3, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,***

District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for 

the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 5 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Dennis and Brenda Montgomery appeal the district court’s dismissal of their 

claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 

U.S. 388 (1971), as barred by the statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal of a claim based on a statute of 

limitations. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We review a district 

court’s denial of equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion, except where relevant 

facts are undisputed, our review is de novo. Id. We affirm.

1. The district court correctly concluded that the statute of limitations barred 

the Montgomerys’ Bivens claim. While “federal law determines when a Bivens

claim accrues, the law of the forum state determines the statute of limitations for 

such a claim.” Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002). To 

determine the applicable Bivens statute of limitations, we look to the forum state’s 

personal injury statute of limitations. Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409–10 

(9th Cir. 1991). And the “claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to 

know of the injury.” W. Ctr. for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 

Here, the operative events occurred in March 2006 at the Montgomerys’

property in Nevada. Nevada’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years. 

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th 

Cir. 2014). The statute of limitations began accruing in March 2006 when the agents 
3 

raided the Montgomerys’ property, so the statute expired in March 2008. The 

Montgomerys filed this Bivens claim on March 11, 2021, so they missed the deadline 

by thirteen years. Thus, the district court properly deemed their claim time barred. 

2. The district court also properly held that equitable tolling does not apply 

to the Montgomerys’ claim. For equitable tolling to apply, a litigant must establish 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

The Montgomerys failed to establish either here.

The Montgomerys did not diligently pursue their rights because they 

inexplicably waited years before filing suit. “The doctrine [of equitable tolling] is 

not available to avoid the consequence of one’s own negligence and does not apply 

when a late filing is due to claimant’s failure to exercise due diligence in preserving 

his legal rights.” Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

The Montgomerys argue that the protective order in place, which required 

review of any pleadings by a United States attorney, operated as a “gag order.” But, 

as the district court correctly noted, that statement is “inaccurate.” The 

Montgomerys fail to show how the protective order or declaration by then-Director 

of National Intelligence John Negroponte invoking the state secrets privilege 

blocked them from filing this suit. The same protective order was in place in a 
4 

related civil litigation between Dennis Montgomery and his former eTreppid 

colleagues, and Montgomery litigated that case for several years. See Montgomery

v. eTreppid Techs., LLC., 3:06-cv-00056 (Aug. 29, 2007), ECF No. 253. Dennis 

Montgomery also encountered the same order in his 2017 suit against the FBI that 

partly relied on the same facts he alleged here. See Montgomery v. Comey, 300 F. 

Supp. 3d 158, 165, 173 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d as modified, 752 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 

2019) (per curiam). 

The Montgomerys do not explain how the protective order caused their years

long delay and only note that the related litigation was “complicated.” But that 

litigation settled in 2009—twelve years before they filed suit. See Montgomery v.

eTreppid Techs., LLC., 3:06-cv-00056 (D. Nev. Feb. 20, 2009), ECF No. 962. The

Montgomerys’ mistaken understanding of the order and its protocols prevents

equitable tolling here. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Equitable tolling is typically denied in cases where a litigant’s own mistake clearly 

contributed to his predicament.”); see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (rejecting equitable 

tolling when “petitioner waited years, without any valid justification, to assert [his] 

claims” because “[e]quity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross 

laches in the prosecution of rights” (quoting McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 

14, 19 (1874)).

The district court properly concluded that the Montgomerys were not entitled 
5 

to equitable tolling. 

AFFIRMED.