United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-1014

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jamon Lonzel Winfrey, also known as Jamon Lonzell Winfrey

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

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Submitted: December 13, 2021

Filed: January 31, 2022

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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Jamon Winfrey pleaded guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm offense in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced under the

Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because his multiple prior felony convictions

included three predicate serious drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). One of

the ACCA predicates was a 1990 state court felony conviction when Winfrey was

fifteen years old. At sentencing, Winfrey objected that an ACCA enhancement based
on this juvenile offense would violate the Eighth Amendment as construed in Miller

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The district court1 overruled the objection,

concluding it was foreclosed by Eighth Circuit precedent. Varying downward, the

court sentenced Winfrey to 135 months’ imprisonment followed by a 21-month

consecutive sentence for committing this offense while on supervised release for a

prior offense. Winfrey appeals the sentence, arguing the district court erred in

rejecting his Eighth Amendment contention. We review this claim of constitutional

sentencing error de novo. See United States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1349 (2017). Agreeing Winfrey’s contention is

foreclosed by controlling Eighth Circuit precedents, we affirm. 

In a series of cases governing juvenile criminal sentencing, the Supreme Court

established that the concept of proportionality central to the Eighth Amendment

requires recognition that “because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less

deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68

(2010). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the Court held that the

Eighth Amendment “forbid[s] imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were

under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” In Graham, 560 U.S. at 82,

the Court held that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole

sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” In Miller, the Court

held “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of

their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual

punishments.’” 567 U.S. at 465.

Roper, Graham, and Miller reviewed sentences initially imposed on juvenile

offenders. Winfrey argues that using his juvenile offense to apply an ACCA

enhancement to the sentence imposed for his adult felon-in-possession offense is “the

1The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

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functional equivalent of a mandatory no parole sentence” and therefore is

unconstitutional under Miller. In United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir.

2009), we rejected the contention that an ACCA enhancement based on crimes

committed as a juvenile was unconstitutional under Roper, concluding that “Roper

does not deal specifically -- or even tangentially -- with sentence enhancement.” In

United States v. Sykes, we reaffirmed our decision in Jones and held that “[n]either

Roper nor Graham prohibit sentence enhancement based on convictions incurred as

a juvenile.” 809 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other

grounds, 137 S. Ct. 124 (2016).2

Acknowledging these adverse precedents, Winfrey argues that we should not

view Jones as binding on our panel because it was decided prior to Miller. True

enough, but Miller simply applied the reasoning of Roper and Graham to an

additional type of juvenile sentence -- mandatory life without parole. Miller did

nothing to cast in doubt our prior determination that cases imposing Eighth

Amendment limitations on initial juvenile sentences do not control recidivist

sentencing enhancements for adult offenders. When a recidivist enhancement such

as the ACCA is applied in sentencing an adult offender like Winfrey, “100% of the

punishment is for the offense of conviction,” with the enhancement serving as a

“stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated

offense because it is a repetitive one.” United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386

(2008) (cleaned up). Therefore, not surprisingly, we have upheld the use of juvenile

offenses in imposing recidivist sentencing enhancements since the Supreme Court

decided Miller, both in Sykes, 809 F.3d at 439-40, and in Emmert, 825 F.3d at 910

(18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) enhancement). See also Wright v. United States, 902 F.3d

868, 872 n.5 (8th Cir. 2018).

2On remand, we vacated our prior decision because the state law burglary

convictions at issue were no longer ACCA predicates, but we did not reconsider our

interpretation of Roper and Graham. See United States v. Sykes, 727 F. App’x 908,

909 (8th Cir. 2018).

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Here, Winfrey’s ACCA-enhanced sentence punishes him for a crime he

committed when he was 45 years old. The reasoning underlying Roper, Graham, and

Miller -- that juveniles offenders have reduced culpability and greater capacity for

rehabilitation -- cannot excuse Winfrey’s actions. “Unlike defendants who receive

severe penalties for juvenile offenses and are thus denied a chance to demonstrate

growth and maturity, ACCA recidivists have been given an opportunity to

demonstrate rehabilitation, but have elected to continue a course of illegal conduct.” 

United States v. Orona, 724 F.3d 1297, 1308 (10th Cir.) (cleaned up), cert. denied

571 U.S. 1034 (2013); accord United States v. Hunter, 735 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir.

2013), cert. denied 572 U.S. 1074 (2014). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We deny Winfrey’s pro se

motion and renewed motion for appointment of new appellate counsel. 

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