See T EX . A D M IN . C ODE , Title 30, Chapter 111. 1 T EX . W A T ER C ODE §§7.177(a) (5), ( b) and 7.187( 1)(B ), (2) (C). 2 T EX . C O N ST ., Art. I I , §1. 3 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 0912 - 08

TH E ST A TE O F T EX A S

v . M I C H A E L JO SE P H R H I N E , A ppel l ee ON APP ELLEE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE S ECON D CO URT O F AP PEALS

DENTO N CO UNTY
K ELL ER , P. J. , f

i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h M E YE RS , H ERVEY , and H OL C OM B , JJ . , j oi ne d.

We gr anted r eview to de termi n e whe ther the pe nal offe nse with which a ppellee w as char g ed—violation of outdoor burningregulations for whic h a criminal pena lty is attache d under 1 th e W at er C o d e

— v i o l at es t h e s ep ar at i o n -o f- p o we rs p ro v i s i o no f t h e T ex as C o nstitut ion. I n support 2 3RHINE CONCURRENC E – 2

See Court’s op., pa ssi m . 4 Id. at 3. 5 of his g round for

revie w, appe llee ar g ues that the court of appea ls e ng ag ed in an improper “ lockstep” analy sis with federa l decisional law tha t was based on a Te x as Supreme Court c ase that made the same mistake. I n a wide-rang ing discussion, he quotes from J ames Madison a nd Thomas J eff

erson, trac es the development of the doctrine of separ ation of power s from John L ocke to the Continental Congr ess, ex amines t he his torical developments surrounding the framing of the constitutions of the United States, Virg inia, Kentucky , and Te x as, and e valuates the jurisprudenc e of Te x as and othe r states. Fr om this di scussion, appellee argues that Madison and Jeffe rson had r ival conce ptions of the doctrine of sepa

ration of powers. He contends that Madison’s m ore liberal, “balance of powe r”

a pp ro a c h u lti ma te ly pr e va ile d with re sp e c t to the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on , w hic h h a s n o e xpre ss separ ation-of- power s provision, but that J eff erson’ s formalist, s t ri ct s epar ation approa ch has preva iled in ma

ny states, including Texas, that adopted an e x press sepa ration-of -powe rs provision modeled af

ter the one J eff

erson f ormulated. Appe llee ar g ues that the strict s ep ar at i o n approa ch pr oh ibi ts the L e g isl a tur e fr om d e le g a tin g to an ex ecut ive a g e nc y the a bil ity to e na c t r

ule s th a t f

ix elements of c riminal offe ns es. He argues alter natively that, under e ither a r estrictive or liberal approa ch, the leg islative deleg ation fails to pr ovide sufficie nt guidance to the administrative ag ency on what ty

pes of outdoor bur

ning ma y be prohibited. Thoug h the Court spends a g reat deal of time setting forth var ious statutory provisions and administrative re g ulations, it addresse s in only the m ost cursor

y fashion appellee’ s argument for a 4

more restric tive approa ch to the doctr ine of sepa ration of powe rs, citing a fe w ca ses and sa y ing that his c la im o f s tr ic t in te rp re ta tio n ig no re s p re c e de nt f ro m th is C ourt

and the Te xas S up re me Court

. 5RHINE CONCURRENC E – 3

Sim s v . S tat e , 99 S.W .3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 6 Ha le yv . S tat e , 173 S.W .3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 7 Pe na v . S

tat e , 191 S.W .3d 133, 136, 136-37 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 8 Appellee claims that the issue was ra ised bec ause he objected at trial to the State’s relianc e 9 on fede ral de cisional authority and the tria l court sugg ested that feder al authority was “ persua sive” and “not man d a to r

y o nu s . ” Id o n o t a d dr e s s th is c o n te n ti o nb e c a u s e , b e lo w , Ia c c e p t h is le g al argument that he had no oblig ation to preser ve er ror. We ha ve stated that “[a]s a g ener al proposition, r eviewing courts oug ht to mention a party ’s

numbe r o ne argume nt a

nd e xpla in w hy

it d oe s n ot h a ve the pe rs ua siv e fo rc e that th e pa rt y thi nk s it does.” Especia lly considering the quality of the brie fing in this case, and the potentially far -re aching 6 conseque nces of

our dec ision, it is essential to addre ss a ppellee’ s principal contentions. Since the Court do e s n ot d o s o, Ish a ll. A. P rese rvation of E rror But first I addre ss a prese rvation-of -er ror argument advanc ed by the Texas Commi ssion on En vir o n m e n t a l Q u a l i t y

( “ T C E Q ” ) i ni t s a m i c u s b r i e f

. T h o u g h t h e ar g u m e n ti s r a i s e d f o r t h e f ir st time on discretionar

y revie w, “pr eser

vation of er

ror is a sy stemic requir ement that must be re viewed by the cour ts of appea ls reg ardle ss of whethe r the issue is ra ised by the par ties,” and so inquiry

even at this late stag e may

be appr opriate. Moreove r, we have “ rec og nized the desirability of avoiding 7 the adjudication of const itutional is sues when at all possible,” and g reat car e should be take n espec ially when r esolution of the constitutional issue “threa tens to overturn t h e ac ts of another branc h of g overnme nt.” 8 TCEQ contends that a

ppellee ha s forfe ited his rig ht to urg e his restric tive interpre tation of the do c tr ine of

se pa ratio n o f p ow e rs be c a

us e he did

no t rai se it b e fo re the tr ia l c ourt and be c a us e 9RHINE CONCURRENC E – 4

TCE Q doe s not dis pu te that app e lle e ra ise d the iss ue be fo re the c ourt of a pp e a ls b ut c la ims 10 that th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls c or

re c tly re fu se d to a dd

re ss the iss ue be c a

us e he ha d f

a ile d to ra ise it at tr ia l. Se e Pe na v . S

tat e , 2 85 S.W. 3d

45 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 09 )( by fa ili ngto ra ise it at tr ia l, 11 defe ndant forf

eited clai m t h at the Texas Constit ution’s Due Course of L aw c lause provide d more protec tion tha n Du e P roce ss under the f eder al constitution with respect to the de struction of potentially

exculpatory

evidenc e). Ha ile yv . S tat e , 87 S.W .3d 118, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 12 Rh od es v . S tat e , 24 0 S.W. 3d 88 2, 88 6 n. 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Vo los e n v . S tat e , 227 13 S.W .3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). U.S. Const., Arts. I , §1, I I , §1, I I I , §1. 14 the court of appea ls did not a ddress it. I t is true that, by relying sole ly

upon fede ral c onstitut ional 10 authority at trial, an appealing

party can f orfe it a claim t hat t he Tex as Constitut ion provides more expan sive protec tions. But a ppellee w on at trial, so the appe llate cour t could aff

irm on a leg al 11 theory not pr esente d to the trial court. And bec ause a ppellee did not eve n have to f ile a brie f in the 12 court of a ppeals, the failure of t he court of appe als to addre ss his lega l contentions does not prec lude us from doing so. 13 B. Separation of P owers 1. Is the Texas Const

itut ional Provisi on More Restrictive? The United States Constitution contains n o ex press sepa ration-of -powe rs provision. Separation of powers is implied throug h the fe der al co nstitut ion’s structure , dividing g overnme nt into three bra

nches, a nd throug h vesting into each br anch its par ticular powe r, leg islative, executive, or judicial, as the case may be. Wit h respe ct t o leg islative power , the United States Constitut ion 14 provides that “[a]ll legislative Power s here in gr anted sha ll be vested in a Cong ress of the UnitedRHINE CONCURRENC E – 5

Id. , Art. I , §1. 15 T EX . C O N ST ., Art. I I , §1. 16 J im Ross i, Institutional Design and the L ingering Legacy of Antifede ralist Separati on of 17 Powers Ideals in the States , 52 V AND . L. R EV . 1 16 7, 11 90 -9 1 ( 19 99 ). F ive state s h a ve a “ g e ne ra l” separ ation-of- power s provision, and the remaining te n states have no express separ ation-of- power s provision. Id. at 1191.

Fletche r v. Office of the Attorney Gene ral ex rel. Stumbo , 1 6 3 S

. W

. 3 d 8 5 2 , 8 6 1 ( K

y. 18 2005)(quoting Madison, Speech on the Floor of t he House of Repre sentatives, June 22, 1789, in 1 Annals of Cong ress 581). States.” 15 By contras t, the Texas Consti tution contains the following e x press sepa ration-of -powe rs pr ov isi on : The powe rs of the G overnme n t o f t h e State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct depart m en t s , ea ch of w hich shall be c onfided to a se parate body of mag istracy , to wit: Those which are L eg islative to one; those which ar e Executive to another, a

nd those which are J udicial t o another ; and no per son, or collec tion of pe rs on s, be ing of on e of the se de pa rtme nts , sh a ll e xer c ise any po wer prop e rl y attache d to either of the others, except in the instances he rein e x pressly permitted. 16 This has bee n identified as a “strict” separ ation-of- power s provision, a nd thirty -five states have such a provision. Al l other thing s being equal, this text ual diffe renc e betwe en the United States a nd 17 Texas constituti ons sugges t s t h at Tex as would more a g g ressively enfor ce se paration of powers betwee n its gove rnmental bra nches tha n would the fe dera l gove rnment. That conc lusion is but tressed by historical deve lopments surrounding the framing of the United States and Te x as constitutions. Madison is gene rally cre dited as the principal a uthor of the United States Constit ution, and he did indicate that the principle of se paration of powers w as of the utmost i mportance : “I f there is a principle in our Constit ution, indee d in a ny fre e Constituti on more

sacr ed than a

nother, it is that whi ch s ep ar at es t he leg islative, executive and judicial powe rs.” 18RHINE CONCURRENC E – 6

The F eder alist Papers (Sig net Classic edition 2003, ed. by Clint on Rossit er) , No. 47, p. 19 299 (empha sis in original).

Id. , No. 48 at p. 310. 20 Id. at p. 305. 21 No te s o n th e State of Vi rg ini a (S e le c te d Wr iti ngs J e ff

e rs on 19 79 , e d. by

Ha rv e y C. 22 Mans fi e ld, Jr.) , Q ue ry

XI I I : Constit ution , p. 30. Id. 23 Neve rtheless, his a

rg uments in de fense of the Constit ution in the Fe dera list P aper s indicate that he

was more conce rned with chec ks and balances be tween the various bra nches tha n with maintaining strict separ ation. I t was Madison’s viewthat the principle be hind the doctrine of separ ation of power s was violated only

when “ the who le power of one depar tment is exercised by

the same ha

nds which possess the who le powe r o f another depa rtment.” He f

urther c ontended that “ a mer e 19 demar cation on par chment of the constitutional limits of the sever al depar tments is not a sufficient g uard a g ainst” the ty

rannic al conce ntration of power . Rather, the thr ee br anche s must be “so far 20

connec ted and blende d as to g ive to eac h a constitutional control over the others.” 21 J eff ers o n , to o , w a s c o n c e r

n e d w it h c h e c k s an d

b a la n c e s , b u t h e a ls o w an te d a s tr ong statement conce rning the separ ation of power s. I n his N otes on the State of Virg inia he said that “the power s of g overnme nt should be so divided and balanc ed among severa l bodies of mag istracy , as that no one could tra

nscend their leg al limits , without being e ffe ctually chec ked and r estraine d by the others.” J eff

erson be lieved that the “ leg islative, executive and judiciar y depar tment should be 22 separ ate a nd distinct, so that no person should exercise the pow ers of more than one of them at the

s a m e t i m e ” a n d a “ b ar

r i e r ” s h o u l d b e “ p r o v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e s e s e v e r a l p o w e r s . ” M o s ti mp o rt a n t l y, 23 J eff erson’ s proposed c onstitut ion f or Virg inia, contained in a n appendix to his Notes, included a nRHINE CONCURRENC E – 7

Notes on the State of Virg inia (Peng uin Classics 1999, ed. by Fr ank Shuffe lton), para g raph 24 i m m ed i at el y

p re ce d i n g h ea d i n g en t i t l ed“I. Legi s l at u re , ” p

. 2 1 8 , p ro v i d i n g: The powe rs of g overnme nt shall be divided into three distinct depa rtments, eac h of them to b e confide d to a sepa rate body of mag istracy ; to wit: t hose which a re leg islative to one, those whic h are judiciary to another, a

nd those which a

re e x ecutive to a no the r. No pe rs on , or c oll e c tio n of pe rs on s, be ingof on e of the se de pa

rtme nts , shall exerci s e any

power proper ly belong ing to e ither of the othe rs, except in the instances he reina fter e x pressly permitted. Fletche r , 1 63 S.W. 3d

a t 86 1; State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d 707, 712 n.7 25 (L a. 1994).

Fletche r , 163 S.W .3d at 861. T h e Ke n tucky court a cknowledg ed that this acc ount was 26 first related in an 1898 Ke ntucky opinion by

J udg e Du Relle with no citation to a uthority

. Id. at 861 n.3. Plau t v . S

pe nd thr ift Fa rm , 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995)(e mphasis in origina l). 27 express separ ation-of- power s clause that is almost i dentical to the one fo u n d i n t he Te x as Constit ution. The hig h courts in Kentuc ky and L ouisiana have rec og nized J eff erson a s the author 24 of their similarly -worde d separ ation-of- power s provisions. Acc ording to a n acc ount g iven by

the 25 Supreme Court of Ke ntucky , J eff erson told J ohn Br eckinr idge and Georg e Nicholas “that there was a dang er in the f

eder al constitu t i o n b ec au s e the clause de fining the power s of the depa rtments of g overnme nt was not sufficie ntly g uarde d, and that the first thing to be pr ovided for by the Kentuc ky

c on sti tut ion

sh ou ld b e to c on fi ne the jud ic iary to i ts p owers, and th e le g isl a tiv e and e xec uti ve to theirs.” 26 I n some contexts, the Supreme Court has re cog ni z ed a vig orous role f or the doc trine of separ ation of powe rs: “[T] he doctr ine of sepa ration of powe rs is a str uc tural s afe gu ar d . . . a prophylactic de vice, e stablishing hig h walls and c lear distinctions becaus e low wa lls and vag ue dis tin c tio ns wi ll n ot b e jud ic ia lly de fe ns ibl e in t

he he a t of int e rb ra nc h c on fl ic t.” As re c e ntl y a s la st 27RHINE CONCURRENC E – 8

Mede llin v. Texas , 128 S. Ct . 1346, 1367-72 (2008)

. 28 Fletche r , 163 S.W .3d at 861 (c iting ca ses). 29 Board of Trust ees v . Attorney Ge neral , 132 S.W .3d 770, 782, 784 (Ky . 2003) 30 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan , 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 31 See Tex as Boll W

eev il Eradication Found. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W .2d 454, 467 (Tex. 1997); 32 see also Barco Be verageCorp. v. Indiana Alcoholic Be verageComm’n , 595 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. 1992). B. H. v . S

tat e , 645 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 1994)

. 33 Barco Be verageCorp. , 595 N.E.2d at 254. 34 y e ar , th e Su

p r e me Co u rt i n v a li d a te d

a Pr e s id e n t’ s a c ti o na s in tr u d in g u p o nCo n g r e s s ’ s e x clusive authority to make law. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has rema rked, “The Uni t ed S t ates 28 Supreme Court has c onsistently allay ed Jeffer son’s purporte d fea rs.” 29 B ut w ithre sp e c t to the le g isl a tiv e de le g a tio n of po we r t o e xec uti ve a g e nc ie s, the same Kentucky court c hara ct er i z ed the Supreme Court’s enfor ceme nt of separ ation of powe rs as “toothless” and “ fee ble.” Thou gh t he Supreme Court has deve loped a nonde leg ation doctrine, 30 31 it ha s found a deleg ation of authority to a n administrative ag ency to violate separ ation of powe rs on

on ly th ree occ a sio ns , a ll o f w hic h w e re duri ngthe Ne w D e a l e ra . Th a t w a s w he n th e “ c ourt

32 packing ” contr oversy

occur red, a fter w hich the Supreme Court declined to overturn any more administrative leg islation. “[T] he notion that the Constitut ion narrow ly confine s the power

of 33 Con g re ss t o d e le g a te a

uth or ity to ad min istra tiv e a g e nc ie s, wh ic h wa s b ri e fl y in v ogue in t

he 19 30 s, has bee n virtually

abandone d by

the Court for a ll practica l purposes

. ” The Supreme Court of 34 Florida has ca lled the fe dera l app ro ac h to the nondeleg ation doctrine a “nondoctr ine,” sa

y ing thatRHINE CONCURRENC E – 9

B.H. , 645 So. 2d at 992 n.3. 35 Id. a t 99 0- 92 ; Bloeme r v. Turner , 28 1 Ky

. 83 2, 83 8, 13 7 S.W. 2d 38 7, 39 0 ( 19 39 ); Bo ar d 36 of Trust ees , 1 32 S.W. 3d

a t 78 1- 82 ; Al e

x an de r v . S

tat e , 441 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss. 1983). Se e als o State ex re l. King v. Morton , 9 55 So. 2d 10 12 , 1 02 0 n. 10 (Ala. 20 06 )( ob se rv ingthat so me commentators have sug g ested that textual diverg ence re n d er s fede ral a uthority “not per tinent to a discussion of the re quirements of a state constitution”). But see Da vi d v. Vesta Co. , 45 N.J . 301, 32 3- 24 , 2 12 A. 2d

34 5, 35 7 (19 65 )( “ B ut a str ic t inte rp re ta tio n of the pr inc ipl e , rig idl y c la ssi fy inga ll g overnme ntal action as leg islative, executive, or judi cial wa s never intended by

Montesquieu . . . by the fo un din g fathe rs of

our f e de ra l sy ste m, o r b y

the dr a ft e rs of

our S ta te Con sti tut ion s” ); Bo re ali v. Ax elrod , 71 N.Y.2d 1, 10 n.1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 n.1 (Ct .App.1987)(line of case s based upon Panama Refining

has rig htfully

fallen into disrepute ). 739 S.W .2d 246, 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 37 See Zedne r v. United States , 547 U.S. 489 (2006). 38 Se e als o A rm ad

ill o B ail Bo nd s v . S tat e , 802 S.W .2d 237, 239-241 (Tex. Cr i m . App. 39 19 90 )( se pa

ratio n- of -p ow e rs vio la tio n for le g isl a tur e to re qu ir e a de lay of e ntr y of jud g me nt i n b a il the Sup re me Court

ha s e sse nti a lly

a bd ic a te d a

ny re sp on sib ili ty

to a c t in the ma tte r. Du e to

35 differ ence s in the tex t of state and f eder al constitutions and the history of fede ral jurisprudenc e, at least some state c ourts have e x pressly decla red that fede ral a

utho rity is not persuasive in this are a of the law

. 36 I n a conte x t other th an l egi slative deleg ation, this Court has enforc ed the doc trine of separ ation of powe rs more a g g ressi v ely than the United States Supreme Court has. I n Meshe ll v. Sta te , we he ld the Texas Speedy Trial Ac t uncon s t i t u tional beca use the time limits i mposed on criminal prose cutions were an unlawf ul encr oachme nt on the exclusive d iscretion of the prosec utor–a membe r of the judicia l branch

. By contra st, the fede ral Spee dy Trial Ac t remains 37 vital. T h er e ar e s ev eral aspec ts to the doctrine of se paration of powers. I f Texas and fe dera l 38 j u r i s p r u d e n c e d i f

f e r i no n e a s p e c t , t h e c h an c e s ar e g o o d t h a t t h e y d i f f e r i n o t h e r a s p e c t s a s w e l l

. If Texas de fends more vigor ously the dividing line betwee n the leg islative and judicial bra nches, then

39RHINE CONCURRENC E – 10

bond forf eiture pr ocee dings)

. Ire c og nize that th e pr os e c uto r i s p art of the e xec uti ve br anc h in

the fe de ra l sy ste m. Appellee also cites the Te x as constitutional convention debates of 1845 to show that the 40 Texas frame rs wer e conc erne d about the princ iple of sepa ration of powers in discussing whether the Secre tary of State should b e an el ec ted or a ppointed office and whe ther to g ive the Gove rnor the rig ht to veto l egi s l at i o n . Havingalre ady acc epted the pr oposition t hat the Te x as Constitut ion enfor ces a

stricter doc trine of se paration of powers than the Unit ed States Constitut ion, Ineed not consider w hether

these de bates indirec tly

lend furthe r support to that proposition. 92 Tex. Crim . 501, 244 S.W . 822 (1922). 41 87 Tex. Crim . 476, 223 S.W . 227 (1920). 42 it w ou ld l ike ly

a lso de fe nd

mor e vig or ou sly

the lin e be tw e e n th e le g isl a tiv e and e xec uti ve br anc he s. Be cause defe nse of the nonde leg ation li n e b et we en the legislative a nd executive bra

nches in the fe de ra l sy ste m is a lmo st n on e xiste nt, it s tand s to re a so n th a t de fe ns e of that li ne in t

he Te xas s ta te sy ste m w ou ld b e mor e ro bu st. 40

2. Are Crim inal Sanctions Categorically Prohibit ed? Ibe g in w itha

pp e lle e ’s c on te nti on

that th e L e g isl a ture can nev er d e le g a te the po we r t o f ix elements of a criminal offe nse. Appellee cites two Texas case s, Ex parte Hum phrey and Ex

pa rte 41 Lesli e , fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that “ the a

uth or ity to d e fi ne c ri mes, and

to f ix pun ish me nts fo r t

ho se 42

cr i mes, is vested exclusively in the L eg islature.” B ut both decisions rec og nized the ability of the L e g isl a tur e to atta c h c ri min a l pe na lti e s to the vio la tio n o f a re g ula tio n und e r t

he pr op e r c on dit ion s: J udicial sanction has often been g iven to the exercise of the powe r t o , b y l aw, presc ribe the pun i s h m ent for the violation of the regulations of a boar d or commission, upon the theory that, observingproper

limit ations, s u ch an act is not ob no xious to t

he pr inc ipl e den y ingto t he L e g isl a tur e the po we r t o d e le g a te its authority

. * * * The powe r to make la

ws is placed by the people throug h the C onstitut ion upon theRHINE CONCURRENC E – 11

Lesli e , 8 7 T e x. Cr im. a t 47 8- 79 , 2 23 S.W. a t 22 6- 28 ; se e als o Humphrey , 9 2 T e x. 43 Cr im. a t 50 5, 24 4 S. W. at 82 4 ( qu oti ngfi rs t tw o p ara g ra ph s f ro m Le sli e above)

. 74 Tex. Crim . 232, 168 S.W . 522 (1914). 44 Id. at 234, 168 S.W. at 523. 45 146 Tex. Crim . 430, 176 S.W .2d 177 (1943). 46 L eg is latu r e . T h e r ig h ts o f in d iv id u a ls ar e g u ar d e d b y r e s tr ic ti o n s to u c h in g the enac tment and publication of law s, and the privileg e is aff orded of p rese nting by peti ti o no r

a p p e ar an c e b e f

o r e th e le g is lati v e c o mm itte e s o p p o s it io nto p r oposed e na c tme nts a ff

e c tin g the pr op e rt

y or the lib e rt y of the c iti zen . A com pl ete d law , if pe na l in its e ff e c t, m us t de fi ne the a c t or

omi ssi on de no un c e d a s c ri min al to so me d e g r e e o f c e rt a i n t y. * * * I n confe rringupon an instrument o f gover nment, such as the live stoc k sanitary c omm iss ion , th e po we r t o ma ke ru le s, the no no bs e rv anc e of wh ic h c onst itu te s a criminal off

ense, it is deeme d nece ssary that the L eg islature def

ine the power and place limit ations upon the authority to promulg ate rules, to the end that they may not be lac king in the e ssential elements of a law denounc ing a

n offe nse. 43 Moreove r, ea

rly Texas case law conta ins ex amp l es o f t his Court upholdi ng laws that criminally punish the vi olation of an administrative reg ulation. I n Sm ith v . S tat e , the def

endant wa s prosec uted for dr iving c attle ac ross a qua rantine l i n e. W e h eld that the L eg islature did not

44 unconstitutionally deleg ate lawmaking authority to the L ive S tock S anitary Commi ssion; rather, the Com mi s s io n w a s a c ti n g “ u n d e r s p e c if ic c o mm an d o f th e L e g is latu r e in e s ta b li s h in g th o s e lines wh e ne ve r t

he y de e me d it wa s nec e ssa

ry to do so to pro te c t the liv e sto c k of thi s sta te fr om s ple ne tic feve r, or infec tious or conta g ious diseases.” I n W ill iam s v . S

tat e , the def

endant wa s convicted of 45 g ro wi ngc ott on

in a n a re a de sig nate d b y the Pin k B oll wo rm Com mis sio n a s a

re g ulate d zo ne a nd

in violation of regulat i ons promulga ted by the Commiss ioner on Ag riculture. We held that the 46 L e g i s l a tu r e d i d

n o ti mp r o p e r l y d e l e g a t e i t s a u t h o r i t y:RHINE CONCURRENC E – 12

Id. at 438, 176 S.W.2d at 183. 47 Emphasis in appellee ’s brief

. 48 Fl e tc he r v . Co mm on we alt h

. 49 Askew v . Cross K

ey W aterways , 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979)

. 50 Sn od gras s v . S tat e , 150 S.W . 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912). 51 Th e g e ne ra lly

a c c e pte d r

ule g ov e rn ingsu c h matte rs no w a pp e ars to b e that a leg islative body

may , afte r dec laring policy and fix ing a primary standard, c onfer upon executive or a dm i n i s t ra t i v e off icer s the power

to fill up the details, by presc ribing rules and r eg ulations to promote the purpose a nd spirit of the leg islation and to ca rry it into effec t. I n such ca ses the ac tion of the L eg islature in g iving suc h rules and r eg ulations the forc e of la ws does not violate the c onstitut ional inhibiti on ag ainst deleg ating the leg islative function. 47 I n revie wing the jurisprudenc e of othe r states, a ppellee c omments that he “has discovere d no decisional law , in either these States [wit h a strict separ ation-of- power s provision] or in those others that ha ve le ss sp e c if

ic pr ov isi on s, in w hic h a

State le g isl a tur e ha s b e e n c on sti tut ion a lly pe rm itt e d to deleg ate to a state ag ency the legis l at i v e au t h ority

to define thee le me nts of a c rim ina l of fe ns e .” 48 He c on te nd s, ho we ve r, that de c isi on a l la w f ro m ot he r s ta te s is ins tr

uc tiv e , an d he dis c us se s a c a se from Ke ntucky , a ca se fr om Florida, and a T ex as ca s e t hat re lies upon authority from Indiana, 49 50 Missouri, and Alabama

. His discussion of these cas es re v eals that they are rele vant only

to the 51 extent that they advocate, in ge nera l, a re strictive appr oach to se paration of powers—a proposition that Ihave a lrea dy

acc epted. But, in fa ct, many

states have addre ssed t h e d el eg ation question with respec t to criminal offe nses, and the weig ht of authority is ag ainst appellee ’s contention that the f ix ing of elements of criminal off

enses c an neve r be de leg ated. Case s from cour ts o f l as t resor

t in eight state s have holdings a

nd contain languag e that mig ht sugg est that criminal offenses are simply off limits whenRHINE CONCURRENC E – 13

B.H. , 6 45 So. 2d

a t 99 2- 93 (e sc a

pe fr om d e te nti on

fa c ili ty le ve l 6 o r a

bo ve ); Sundberg v. 52 Sta te , 2 34 Ga

. 48 2, 48 4, 21 6 S.E .2 d 3 32 , 3 33 (1 97 5) (c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e s a c t) ; Ho we ll v . S

tat e , 238 G a . 9 5 , 9 5

- 9 6 , 2 3 0 S

. E

. 2 d 8 5 3 , 8 5 3

- 5 4 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ( D e p t

. o f N a t

. R e s f

i r e ar m r e g u l a t i o n ) ; B l o em erv. Turner , 28 1 Ky

. 83 2, 84 0, 13 7 S.W. 2d 38 7, 39 2 ( 19 39 )( do g fo od re g ulatio n) ; State v. Broom , 439 So. 2d 35 7, 36 9 ( L a . 1 98 3) (o p. on re he ari ng )( e xplos ive s r e g ulatio n) ; State v. Rac cagno , 530 S.W .2d 69 9, 70 2- 03 (M o. 19 75 )( tax sta mp r e g ulatio n) ; State v. Gallion , 572 P.2d 683, 688-90 (Utah 19 77 )( c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s a c t) ; S

ta tev . G r in stead , 157 W. Va. 1001, 1012-13, 206 S.E.2d 912, 92 0 ( 19 74 )( same ); State v. Grimshaw , 49 Wy o. 192, 210, 53 P.2d 13, 19 (1935)( transporting g oods without a permit).

Av ata r Dev. Co rp . v . S

tat e , 7 23 So. 2d

19 9, 20 3- 04 (F la . 1 99 8) (f a ilu re to c omp ly

wi th 53 en v i ro n m en t al p er m i tco n d i t i o n )( d i s t i n gu i s h i n g B.H. ); All Pro Paint & Body Shop ,639 So.2d at 713- 1 4 (h az ar d o u s wa s t e) (d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Broom ); State v. Thompson , 627 S.W .2d 298, 302-03 (Mo. 1982)(c ontrolled substance s act)( distinguishing R a cc a g no ); Fo un d. for In de p. Liv ing v . Ca be llHu nti ng ton Bo ar

d o f H e alt h , 214 W. Va. 818, 829-31, 591 S.E.2d 744, 755-57 (2003) (cle an indoor ai r r egu l at i o n s )( d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Grinstead ). Ho we ll , 238 Ga. at 9 5 , 2 3 0 S

. E .2d at 853 (re g ulations could be made basis of cr iminal 54 prosec ution if the enabling statute “limited the power to promulg ate rules

. . . in harmony with what the As se mbl y ha s a lr e a dy de c lare d to b e a c ri me ” ); Bloeme r , 281 Ky . at 840, 137 S.W.2d at 391-92 (d isc us sin g a de qu a c y

of statut or y sta nd ard s) ; Gallion , 572 P.2d at 687 (deleg ation was to attorne y g ener al, a spe cific pe rson within t h e ex ecutive de partment, sepa ration-of -powe rs provision was dir e c te d a t a

“ pe rs on ” and

did no t a pp ly to a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc ie s) ; Grimshaw , 49 Wy o. at 210-11, 53 P.2d at 19 (no fix ed st andar d wher e orde r or de cision of ag ency could be ove rturned on r eview) ; b u t s e e W

y o m in g Co a li ti o n v . W

y o m in g G a m e &F

is h Com m’n , 8 7 5 P.2d 729, 732 (Wy o. 1 9 9 4 )( co n s t ru i n g Grimshaw in dicta to mean that “a n ag ency may not define a

standard of

conduct pursuant to which a

n individual might be adjudg ed a c riminal”). E xp a r teM

cCurley , 390 So. 2d

25 , 2 6- 29 (1 98 0) (c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e s a c t) ; State v. 55 W illiams , 1 19 Ar iz. 5 95 , 5 98 -9 9, 58 3 P. 2d 25 1, 25 4- 55 (1 97 8) (f

oo d s tamps ); Cur

ry v . S tat e , 279 Ar k. 15 3, 15 8- 60 , 6 49 S.W. 2d 83 3, 83 6- 37 (1 98 3) (c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e s a c t) ; Pe op le v . Lo wri e , 761 P.2 d 77 8, 78 0- 84 (C olo . 1 98 8) (s e x ac ts i n li qu or e sta bli sh me nt) ; State v. Kellogg , 98 I daho 541, 542- 45 , 5 68 P.2 d 5 14 , 5 15 -1 8 ( 19 77 )( c on tr oll e d s u b s t a n c e s a c t) ; State v. Turmon , 417 Mich. 638, 643-53, it comes to deleg ating authority to an administrative ag ency . But late r ca ses in four of those states 52 have he ld that such a rea ding is too broad and that deleg ation is permissible if ce rtain conditions are
met. A re ading of the opinions in the rema ining f our states sug g ests that there may also be ba ses 53 for disting uishing or limiting their holdings. And a number of ot her state s have uphe ld leg islative 54 de le g a tio ns that in vo lve e le me nts of c ri min a l of

fe ns e s. S om e of th e se de le g a tio ns oc c ur re d in 55RHINE CONCURRENC E – 14

340 N.W.2d 620, 623-27 (1983)( same, but a lso discussing prior ca se involving c riminal penalties attach e d to v io lati o no f

o p e ns e a s o nd e c la

r a ti o n s r e g ar d in g b ir d s , f is h , an d f u r - b e ar in g an im a ls ); State v. Cutright , 193 Neb. 303, 304-07, 226 N.W.2d 771, 773- 74 (1975)( swimming in a re stricted are a)( but disti ng uishing between a leg islative definition of the cr ime that incorporates a re g ulation and a statut e that si mpl y

c ri min a lize s th e vio la tio n o f a re g ulatio n) ; State v. Switzer , 22 Ohio St. 2d 47 , 5 1- 53 , 2 57 N. E. 2d

90 8, 91 1- 12 (1 97 0)( po sse ssi on of un de rs ize d f

ish ); Sta te v . P e loq uin , 427 A. 2d 13 27 , 1 32 9- 31 (R .I . 1 98 1) (c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e s a c t) ; Sta te v . M

os c he ll , 2004 SD 35, P13-25, 677 N.W.2d 551, 558-60 (2004)(hunting , taking , and tra nsportation of wild animals)(c riticizi ng Broom ). Se e Mc Cur le

yv . S tat e , 390 So. 2d 15, 16 (A l a. C ri m . App. 1980)(punishment imposed 56 wa s fou r y e a rs in pe nit e nti ary pr ob a te d to twe lve mon ths in j a il) ; Kellogg , 98 I daho at 542, 568 P.2d a t 515 (o ff

e ns e punis ha

ble by up to thr e e y e ars of imp ri so nme nt) ; Turmon , 471 Mich. at 653, 340 N.W.2d at 627 (controlled substances act cre ates felonies, no mea ningf ul differ ence from dele g ation perspe ctive betwe en fe lonies and misdemeanor s).

Cur ry , 2 79 Ar

k. a t 15 9, 64 9 S. W.2 d at 83 7; Turmon , 417 Mich. at 648 n.4, 340 N.W.2d 57 at 625 n.4. See thi s o pin ion

fo otn ote 2 ( c ri min a l pe na lti e s) ; T EX . W A T ER C ODE §7.102 (civil pena lty). 58 connec tion with a st ate’ s controlled substanc es ac t, which ca rried f elony penalties, and cour

ts have 56 obs er v ed t h at permitting de leg ation in that context i s the “majority view” of those jurisdictions addre ssing the issue. 57 Appellee ’s arg ument also runs up ag ainst a practica l consideration. The re g ulation at issue has bot h civil and criminal penalties. The penalties themselves are statutory

. I s an administrative 58 rule a ny less “leg islative” if it car ries only a civil pena lty rathe r than a criminal one? The c riminal
nature of the penalty makes a diffe renc e for many constitutional provisions t hat direc tly protec t the citizen from the g overnme nt: due proce ss a nd the rig ht to a jury

trial, for e x ample. B ut separation of powe rs is conce rned w ith the gove rnment’s re lationship with i tself rather than with citiz ens who

may be po te nti a l r

ule -b re a ke rs . 3. Wha t is the

sc op eof the Te xa s Co nsti

tutiona l prov ision?RHINE CONCURRENC E – 15

1 4 3 U. S

. 6 4 9 , 6 9 4 (1 8 9 2 )( qu o t i n g Locke’ s Appeal , 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873))

. 59 W illiams, 14 6 T e x. Cr im. a t 43 8, 17 6 S. W.2 d at 18 3; Monroe v . Harco, Inc

. , 762 So. 2d 60 82 8, 83 1 ( Al a . 2 00 0) ; State v. Arizona Mines Supply Co. , 107 Ariz. 199, 205, 484 P

. 2 d 6 1 9, 625 (1 97 1) ; Swa nb e rg

v . Ta rt , 30 0 Ar

k. 30 4, 31 1, 77 8 S. W.2 d 9 31 , 9 34 (1 98 9) ; Kugler v. Y ocum , 69 Ca l. 2d 37 1, 37 6, 44 5 P. 2d

30 3, 30 6 ( 19 68 ); People v . Gallegos , 6 44 P.2 d 920 , 929 (C olo . 1 98 2) ; Kellems v . B ro wn , 163 Conn. 47 8, 50 0, 31 3 A .2 d 5 3, 64 -6 5 ( 19 72 ); Avatar Dev . Corp. , 723 So. 2d at 204; Te lfo rd v . G ain esv ill e , 2 08 Ga . 5 6, 63 , 6 5 S. E. 2d 24 6, 25 1 ( 19 51 ); Kellogg , 98 I d ah o at 543, 568 P.2 d at 51 6; People e

x r el

. A d a mo w s ki v. Chicago Land Clearance Com. , 14 I ll. 2d 74, 80, 150 N. E. 2d 79 2, 79 6 ( 19 58 ); Sta nto n v . S mi th , 429 N. E. 2d 22 4, 22 8 ( I nd . 1 98 1) ; AF SCM E/ Io wa C ou nc il 61 v . S tat e , 4 84 N. W.2 d 3 90 , 3 94 (I ow a 19 92 ); State ex re l. H

a w ks v. Topeka , 176 Kan. 240, 246 27 0 P.2 d 27 0, 27 6 ( 19 54 ); Fletche r , 1 63 S.W. 3d a t 86 2; All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d at 71 1; Kov ac k

v . Li c e ns ing

Bo ar d, W ate rv ill e , 157 Me. 411, 418 , 1 7 3 A. 2 d 554, 558 (1961); Not tin gh am Vi lla

ge , I nc . v . B alt im or e Cou nty , 266 Md. 339, 351, 292 A.2d 680, 686 (1972); Taylor v. Smithkline Be echam Corp. , 4 68 Mic h. 1, 9 n .7 , 6 58 N.W .2 d 12 7, 13 2 n .7 (2 00 3) ; Hassler v. En gb e rg , 2 33 Minn. 48 7, 51 5, 48 N. W.2 d 3 43 , 3 60 (1 95 1) ; Cla rk v . S tat e , 381 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (M iss . 1 98 0) ; Thompson , 627 S.W .2d at 303; Sta te v . S tar k , 100 Mont. 365, 371, 52 P.2d 890, 893 (1 93 5) ; Searle v . Y

ensen , 1 18 Ne b. 83 5, 84 2- 43 , 2 26 N. W. 4 64 , 4 67 (1 92 9) ; Vi lla nu e v a v . S tat e , 117 Ne v. 66 4, 66 8, 27 P.3 d 4 43 , 4 46 (2 00 1) ; Litt le Fe rry v . B e rg e n Co un ty

Se we r A uth or ity , 9 N.J . 536, 54 3, 89 A. 2d

18 , 2 3 ( 19 52 ); Sta te exre l. S tat e Pa rk & Re c re ati on Com m’n v . Ne w M e x ic o S tat e Auth. , 7 6 N .M . 1 , 1 0, 41 1 P. 2d 98 4, 99 1 ( 19 66 ); Peac ock v. County of Scotland , 262 N.C. 199, 203- 04 , 136 S.E .2 d 612 , 615 (1 96 4) ; North Dakota Council of Sch. Adm’rs v. Sinner , 458 N.W.2d 280, 28 6 ( 19 90 ); Switzer , 2 2 O hio St. 2d a t 52 -5 3, 25 7 N .E .2 d at 91 2; Burger v. Gorden , 380 P.2d 687, 69 0 ( Ok la . 1 96 3) ; Sa v ag e v . M ar tin , 161 Or e . 6 60 , 6 97 , 9 1 P. 2d 27 3, 28 8 ( 19 39 ); Te rry

v . P ra tt , 258 I n Fi e ld v . Clar

k , a late nineteenth- centur y case , the United States Supreme Court quoted a Pe nn sylva

nia de c i s i o n f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e e n a law t hat pr op e rl y

c on fe rs a dmi nis tr a tiv e a

uth or ity

an d o n e t h a ti mp r o p e r l y d e l e g a t e s l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y: Th e le g islatu re cann ot d e le g a te its po we r t o ma ke a law; bu t it

c an ma ke a law t o deleg ate a power to deter

mine some fac t or st ate of things upon which the law makes or int e nd s to make , its ow n a c tio n de pe nd

. To de ny thi s w ou ld b e to s top the wh e e ls of g ov e rnme nt. Th e re are many thi ng s u po n w hic h w ise and

us e fu l le g isl a tio n mu st depend w hich ca

nnot be known t o t h e law-making power , and, must, theref ore, be a subjec t of inquiry

and dete rmination outside of the halls of leg islation. 59 T h i s C o u rt an d

t h e v as tm aj o ri t y

o f o t h er s t at e c o u rt s o f l as tre s o rt h av e q u o t edfr o m t h i s p as s age with approva l (including the hig h courts in Flor ida and Ke ntucky , upon which appe llee re lies most). 60RHINE CONCURRENC E – 16

S.C. 17 7, 18 4, 18 7 S. E. 2d 88 4, 88 7 ( 19 72 ); John Morre ll & Co. v. Amer i ca n R y. Ex press Co. , 45 S.D

. 39 9, 40 4, 18 7 N .W. 72 4, 72 5 ( 19 22 ); Ga mb le v . S tat e , 206 Tenn. 376, 387, 333 S.W .2d 816, 82 1 ( 19 60 ); State Highway Bd. v. Gates , 110 Vt . 67, 77 , 1 A. 2d 82 5, 82 9 ( 19 38 ); Stuart’s Ex’rs v. Bo ar d o f Si nk ing Fu nd Com m’ rs , 1 23 Va . 2 24, 2 29 , 9 6 S. E. 23 9, 24 1 ( 19 18 ); Diversified Inv

. Pa rtn e rsh ip v . De

p’ t of So c . & He alt

h S e rv s. , 113 Wn. 2d 19 , 25, 77 5 P. 2d 94 7, 95 0 ( 19 89 ); Cowan v. County Comm’n , 161 W. Va . 106 , 110 -1 1, 24 0 S.E. 2d 67 5, 67 8 ( 19 77 ); State v. W akee n , 2 63 Wis. 40 1, 40 9, 57 N. W.2 d 3 64 , 3 68 (1 95 3) ; Grimshaw , 49 Wy o. at 205, 53 P.2d at 17. Ros si at 1191-1201. 61 Id. at 1196-97. 62 Id. at 1198-1200. 63 Id. at 1196-97. 64 Be y ond ag ree ment on this passag e, ther e ar e var ious approac hes and nua nces in the state s with respec t to the issue of nondeleg ation. One sc holar ha s g rouped the states into three br oad nondeleg ation cate g ories: wea k, moderate, and strong

. Notably , in the “strong ” nond el ega t ion 61
cate g ory , he has inc luded Texas, Florida , Arizona, I llinois , Kentucky , Massac husetts, Montana, Ne br a sk a , N e va da , N e w H a mps h i r e , N e w M e xi c o , N e w

Y o r k , O h i o , O k l a

h o m a , Pe nn sylva

nia , So uth Da ko ta , South Car oli na , Vir g ini a , an d We st V ir g ini a . L ou isi ana , th e state oth e r t ha n K e ntu c ky

to 62

re c og nize the Jef

fe rs on ian or ig in of

its “ str ic t” se pa

ra tio n- of -p ow e rs pr ov isi on , is c a te g or ize d a s a “moder ate” nondeleg ation state. New York, Ohio, and P ennsylvania have no express separ ation- 63 of-powe rs clause , New H ampshire a nd South Dakota have a “g ener al” pr ovision, and the rema ining states in the “strong ” categ ory , like Texas, have a “strict” provision expressly requiringsepar ation of the bra nches of g overnme nt. Wh e th e r

th e cha rac terization of how strong ly various states e nforc e 64 the no nd e le g a tio n d oc tr ine wa s c or re c t w he n ma de or

re ma ins c or

re c t to da y is a dif fi c ult ma tte r t o

asce rtain without close fa miliarity with the jurisprudenc e of e very state in t h e co u n t ry . But a n examination of the case s can r evea l some common threads that are rele vant to our inquiry

.RHINE CONCURRENC E – 17

See W illiams , 14 6 Te x. Cr im. a t 43 8, 17 6 S. W.2 d at 18 3; W ald e n v. Ha rt , 243 Ark. 650, 65 65 2, 42 0 S. W.2 d 8 68 , 8 70 (1 96 7) ; Barco Be verageCorp. , 5 95 N. E. 2d a t 25 3- 54 ; S

tat e e x re l. T om as ic v . W

y an do tteCou nty , 2 64 Ka n. 29 3, 30 3- 04 , 9 55 P.2 d 1 13 6, 11 48 (1 99 8) ; B o a rd of Trustees , 1 32 S.W. 3d

a t 78 2; Lewis v. State Dept. of Human Serv

. , 433 A.2d 743, 747-4 8 (M e. 19 81 ); Turmon , 4 17 Mic h. a t 64 4- 45 , 3 40 N. W.2 d at 62 3- 24 ; Sta te v . M ath is , 315 Mont. 378, 382, 68 P.3 d 7 56 , 7 60 (2 00 3) ; C o b b v . S t a t e C a n v a s s ing Bo ar d , 1 40 N.M. 77, 89, 140 P.3d 498, 510 (2 00 6) ; Mo sc he ll , 200 4 SD at P15- 16 , 677 N. W.2 d at 55 8- 59 ; Found. for Indep. Living , 214 W. Va at 830, 591 S.E.2d at 756. Arizona M

ines Supply Co. , 107 Ar iz. at 20 5, 48 4 P. 2d a t 62 5 ( po llu tio n s tand ard s) ; Cur ry , 66 27 9 Ar k. a t 15 9- 60 , 64 9 S.W. 2d a t 83 7 ( c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e s a c t) ; People v. Holmes , 959 P.2d 406, 41 2 (C olo

. 19 98 )( c on tr a

ba nd a t a de te nti on fa c ili ty ); Avatar Dev . Corp. , 723 So. 2d at 207 (pollution c on tr ol a nd pr e ve nti on ); Kellogg , 98 I daho at 543- 44, 568 P.2d at 516-17 (contr olled substances a ct); T om as ic , 2 6 4 K an . a t 3 0 5 , 9 5 5 P. 2 d a t 1 1 4 8

- 4 9 ( c o n s o li d a ti o no f c it y an d c o u n ty o p e r a ti o n s ); Ashland Transf

er Co

. v. S t a t e T

ax Comm’n ., 247 Ky . 144, 160-61, 56 S.W.2d 691, 698 (1 93 2) (c omm e rc ia l tra ff

ic on pu bli c hig hw ay s) ; All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d at 716-17 (h a zar do us wa ste ); Le wis , 43 3 A. 2d a t 74 8- 49 (s ub surf a c e se wa g e dis po sa l sy ste ms) ; Pe loq uin , 427 A.2d at 1330-31 ( controlled substanc es ac t).

Avatar Dev . Corp. , 723 So. 2d at 207. 67 This Court and courts in other state s have w idely upheld the dele g ation o f authority to an administrative ag ency s o long a s the L eg islature ena cts proper standards to guide administrative discretion. When the subject matter to be regulated is complex, courts have a llowed the standa rds 65 to be more g ener al in order to affor d suffic i en t flexibi lity to the ag ency

and to take a dvantag e of

e xpe rt ise

. En vir on me nta l r e g ul ati on in p art ic ula r h a s b e e n c ha

ra c te ri zed a s a c omp le x fie ld i n 66

w h ic h a la r g e a mo u n t o f

a d mi n is tr a ti v e d is c r e ti o nis n e c e s s ar y . T h e Su

p r e me Co u rt o f

F lor ida

e xpla ine d: Clearly , environmenta l protection re quires hig hly technica l, s cientific, reg ulatory sc he me s to ens ur e pr op e r co mpl ianc e wi th le g isl a tiv e po lic y . It w ou ld b e dif fi c ult , if not impo s s ible, to require the L eg islature to ena ct such rule s, regulations and proce dures c apable of addr es s i n g the my riad of pr oblems and situations that may arise implicatingpollution control and preve ntion. 67 Neve rthele s s , co u rt s have a lso recog nized that standards should not be so vague as to c onferRHINE CONCURRENC E – 18

W alden , 2 43 Ar

k. a t 65 4, 42 0 S. E. 2d

a t 87 0; Mo sc he ll , 2004 SD at P.17, 677 N.W.2d at 68 559. Lowr ie , 7 61 P.2 d at 78 2; Cobb , 140 N.M. at 89, 140 P.3d at 510.

69 Lowr ie , 7 61 P.2 d at 78 2; B.H. , 645 So. 2d at 994. 70 B.H. , 6 45 So. 2d

a t 99 4; Ma thi

s , 31 5 M on t. at 38 3, 68 P.3 d at 76 0; Cobb , 140 N.M. at 89, 71 140 P.3d at 510. Ma thi s , 315 Mo nt. a t 38 3, 68 P.3 d at 76 0; see also W alden , 243 Ark. at 654, 420 S.E.2d 72 a t 87 0 ( “ un re g ulate d” or

“ un de fi ne d” ); Mo sc he ll , 2004 SD at P.17, 677 N.W.2d at 559 (same). Cottrell v. Ci ty and County of Denv er , 6 36 P.2 d 7 03 , 7 09 (C olo . 1 98 1) ; Al l Pr o Pa int & 73 Body Shop , 6 39 So. 2d

a t 71 3; Turmon , 4 17 Mic h. a t 64 8, 65 0, 34 0 N .W. 2d a t 62 5, 62 6; Opinion of Justices , 3 68 Ma ss. 83 1, 83 7, 33 3 N .E .2 d 3 88 , 3 93 (1 97 5) ; Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 10, 517 N.E .2d a t 13 54 ; Pe loq uin , 42 7 A .2 d at 13 31 ; W yoming Coalition v. W

yoming Game& Fish Comm’n. , 875 P.2d 729, 733-34 (Wy o. 1994). Colorado a llows for the possibility that a dele g ation may be prope r even if standards and safe g uards c an be f ound only at the administrative leve l, Cot tre ll , 636 P.2d at 709-10, but such a thing has not be en sug g ested in a ny other jurisdiction (as fa r as I am awa re) , and Ne w M ex i co has spec ifically stated that an a g ency ’s “se lf-imposed re straints can in no wa y serve to supply what has be en omitted.” Cobb , 140 N.M. at 89, 140 P.3d at 510. See above f

ootnote. 74 discretion that is absolute, unbridled, open-e nded, arbitra ry , or uncontrolled. 68 69 70 71 72 I n addition, a number of

courts have held that proce dural safe g uards must ac company broad standards to e nsure that the a g ency action conf

orms to those standards. The re quired proc edura l 73 safe g uards ty

pically include a pr e-ad o p t ion public hear ing a nd post-adoption judicial revie w. 74 P ro ce d u ra l safeguards e nsure that the a dminist rative a g ency rea lly is doing the w ill of the L eg islature: The pr e-a doption public hearingensure s that th e ad m i n i strative ag ency takes the l egi s l at i v e standa

rds into acc ount, eng ag ing in f actua l determinations that re late to the leg islative standards r ather

than simply d i ct at i n g policy , and judicial re view ensur es that the a dminist rativeRHINE CONCURRENC E – 19

Se e Cot tre ll , 636 P.2d at 709 (safe g uards e nsure “ that administrative action will be rational 75 and consistent in the first instance and that subsequent judi cial review of that action is ava ilable and wi ll b e e ffec tiv e ” ); All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d at 713 (proce dural saf eg uards requ ir e me n t “ e n s u r e s th e a g e n c y e xe r c is e s th a t d is c r e ti o n in a c c o r d an c e w it h th e p o lic y

and standards pr escr ibed in the ena bling statute” ). See Avatar Dev . Corp. , 7 2 3 S o . 2 d a t2 0 2 (q u o t i n g Askew , 372 So. 2d at 918-19) 76 (d e le g a tio n inva lid

wh e n “ ne ith e r t

he a g e nc y

no r t he c ourt s c an d e te rm ine wh e th er th e a g e nc y is c arr y ing ou t the int e nt of

the le g isl a tur e ” ); All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d at 712 (a dequac y of standar ds “pre vents judicial revie w from becoming mere ly an exercise at larg e by providing the courts with some mea sure a g ainst which to judg e the of ficial a ction that has bee n challeng ed”)

. Bloeme r , 281 Ky . at 84 0, 13 7 S. W.2 d at 39 1; Ma thi s , 315 Mont. at 385, 68 P.3d at 761; 77 Bo re ali , 71 N.Y.2d at 11, 517 N.E .2d at 1355.

Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm ’n v. M ississi ppi Power & Light Co. , 593 So. 2d 997, 999 78 (M iss . 1 99 1) ; se e als o D av id , 45 N.J

. at 324, 212 A.2d at 357 (w arningag ainst use of sepa ration-of

power s doctrine with “peda ntic rig or” that would make “the modern a dminist rative a g ency . . . an impossibi lity

in our law” ). Kellogg , 98 I daho at 544, 568 P.2d at 517. 79 Tom as ic , 2 64 Ka

n. at 30 5, 95 5 P. 2d

at 11 48 ; All Pro Paint & Body Shop , 639 So. 2d at 80 71 6; Opinion of Justices , 368 Mass. at 834-35, 333 N.E .2d at 392.

Lon g v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 285, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 81 ag ency ’s rules a

nd other a ctions actua lly confor m to the l egi s lative standar ds. Of c ourse, f or 75 safe g uards to have mea n i ng , the leg islative standards must be suff iciently specific to allow the ag ency and the c ourts to determine w hether the ag ency

is carr y ing out the intent of

the leg islature. 76 Thoug h the l i n e of de marc ation betwee n a prope r and a n improper de leg ation may not be easy to discern, the bra

nches should be kept as separate as possible while takinginto account the 77 prac tical nec essities of life. The fa ct that the L eg islature could have bee n more spec ific does not 78

nece ssarily

invalidate a de leg ation, howeve r, and leg islative standards c an be implied fr om an 79 express statuto ry

purpose, consistent with the principle that we will employ a nar rowing 80 construction to sa

ve the constitutionality

of a statute if

it is amenable to such a

construction. The

81RHINE CONCURRENC E – 20

Board of Trust ees , 132 S.W .3d at 784. 82 372 So. 2d at 914. 83 Id. at 914-15. 84 Id. 85 Id. at 919. 86 Supreme Court of Ke ntucky has explained that one important purpose of the nonde leg ation branc h of the se pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs do c tr ine is to en sure that the L e g isl a tur e take s th e po lit ic a l he a t f or its

e na c tme nts rathe r t

ha n s hif tin g bla me to a n une le c te d b ur e a

uc ra t. 82 Application of these principles may be found in a number of c ases, a nd Idiscuss a fe w of the sig nif ic ant d e c isi on s h e re . I

be g in w ithc a se s th a t ha

ve fo un d a de le g atio n to be un c on sti tut ion a l. I n Askew v. Cross Key W

aterways , the Supreme Court of Florida addre ssed the constitutionality of the Flor ida Environmental L and and Water Manag ement Ac t. That statute empowe red “ the 83 Division of State Planning to re commend ar eas of critica l state concern to the Governor and cabinet actingas the Administration Commis sion” and e mpower this Administration Comm ission to act on those rec ommendations. An ar ea c ould be desig nated a s “of c rit i ca l state conc ern” if it had 84 signific ant impact upon “envir onmental, historical, natura l, or arc haeolog ical resour ces of reg ional or statewide importance ,” wa s signific antly aff ecte d by or had a signific ant ef

fec t upon “an e x isting or propose d major public fa cility or other a rea of major public investment,” or wa s a “pr oposed ar ea of ma jor de ve lop me nt po te nti a l,” inc lud ing “ a pr op os e d sit e of a ne w c omm un ity .” Th is s c he me

85 violated sepa

ration of powe rs bec ause it conf err ed u p o n the Administrative Commiss ion “the fu nd a me nta l le g isl a tiv e ta sk of de te rm ini ng wh ic h g e og ra ph ic are a s and

re so ur c e s are in t

he g re a te st need of protec tion.” T h e s t at u t e tre ated “ alike, as f ung ible g oods, disparate cate g ories of 86RHINE CONCURRENC E – 21

Id. 87 71 N.Y.2d at 7, 517 N.E .2d at 1352. 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Id. at 9, 517 N.E.2d at 1353 (ellipsis in original). 93 environmenta l, historical, natura l, and ar chae ologic al re source s of re g ional or statewide importance

and a ll o f F lor ida ’s manif

old re so ur c e s w ith in t

ho se va st c a te g or ie s, ” so tha t a re vie wi ngc ourt

c ou ld not possibly

“asc erta in w h e th e r

th e p r io r it ie s r e c o gn iz ed by the Administration Comm ission comport with the intent of the leg islature.” 87 I n Boreali v. Ax elrod , t h e New Y ork Court of Appe als addre ssed the constitutionality of regulations on the indoor s m o k i n g of tobac co. The Public Hea lth Council promulgated 88 “re g ulations prohibiting smoking in a wide var iety

of indoor ar eas that are open t o t he public, including sc hools, hospitals, auditoriums , food marke ts, stores, banks, taxicabs and limousines.” 89 The rule s required resta urants with seating c apac ities of g reater than f ifty people to provide nonsmoking are as, and employ ers wer e require d to pr ovide smoke-f ree work a

rea s for nonsmoking employ ees. Some are as we re e x empt from the r eg ulations, including re staurants with seating

90

c a pa c iti e s o f l e ss t

ha n f if ty , c on ve nti on s, tr a de sh ow s, and ba rs . A wa ive r of the re g ulatio ns c ou ld 91 be ob ta ine d f

ro m th e Com mis sio ne r

“ u p o n a s ho wi ngof

fi na nc ia l ha rd sh ip. ” Th e c la ime d a

uth or ity 92 for these regulations was a statute that authorized the Public He alth Council to “deal with any matter

a ff e c tin g the

. . . p ub lic he a lth .” Th e Ne w Y or k c ourt de c lin e d to say

that th e br oa d e na

bli ngstatut e 93RHINE CONCURRENC E – 22

Id. 94 Id. at 11-12, 517 N.E.2d a t 1355. 95 Id. at 13, 517 N.E.2d at 1356. 96 Id.

. 97 Id. at 14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356. 98 87 Tex. Crim . at 477-78, 223 S.W. at 227. 99 Id. 100 was itself a

n unconstitutional deleg ation of leg islative authority , but the court c oncluded that the

a g e nc y “ str e tc he d th a t st a tut e be y on d it s c on sti tutio na lly va lid re a c h w he n it

us e d th e statut e a s a basis for dr afting a code embodying its own a ssessment of what public policy oug ht to be.” 94 The c ourt g ave f

our re asons for its conc lusion: First, the c ourt observe d that, while “a cting to further the laudable g oal of protec ting nonsmoker s from the ha rmful ef fec ts of ‘passive smoking ,’ the ag ency

in rea lity “construc ted a r eg ulatory scheme laden w i th exceptions based solely upon economic a

nd social conc erns.” Second, the a g en cy wrote on a

“cle an slate,” cre ating “a 95 compre hensive set of rule s without the benefit of le g islative g uidance .” Third, the ag ency “ac ted 96 in an ar ea in whic h the L eg islature had repe atedly tried – and failed – to rea ch agr eeme nt in the fa ce of substantial public debate and vig orous lobby ing by a var iety of intere sted fac tions.” Finally , no 97 specia l expertise or technica l competenc e in the fie ld of hea lth was involved in the deve lopment of the anti -s mok ingre g ulatio ns . 98 I n Ex pa rteLesli e , we addre ssed the constitutionalit y of a statute a

uthorizi ng administrative action with re spect to livestock. The defe ndant was prose cuted f or fa iling to dip cattle that we re 99 in a quar antine zone. T h e re l evant statute made it a cr iminal offense to fail to dip livestock “at 1 00RHINE CONCURRENC E – 23

Id. at 479, 223 S.W. at 228. 101 Id. 102 Se e Sm ith , 74 Tex. Crim . at 234, 168 S.W. at 523. 103 Lesli e , 87 Tex. Crim . at 479-82, 223 S.W. at 228-29. 104 645 So. 2d at 994. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 such t ime and in such m anner as di rec ted i n writing by the l ive s tock s anitary commission.” On 101 Marc h 2 7 , th e c omm iss ion or de re d the de fe nd ant to dip his c a ttl e on Ma rc h 2 9 be tw e e n 7 :00 a .m. th th

and 1:0 0 p .m. Th ou g h the L e g isl a tur e ’s c le a r pur po se wa s to pr ote c t li ve sto c k f ro m di se a se s, 102 103 the st a tute in qu e s ti o n im p o s e d an a f

f ir mati v e d u ty o n li v e s to c k o w n e r s to c o mp ly w ith a n ins pe c tor ’s or de r w ith ou t pr ov idi ngany g uid anc e c on c e rn ingthe “ date s o r i nte rv a ls wh e n cattl e sh a ll be dipped” or the amount of notice that an ow ner should have to bring his cattle into compliance

. 104 Another e x ample of a case in w hich the leg islative policy was pe rhaps c lear

but the statutory standards w ere not is the Florida de cision in B. H. v . S tat e . I n that c a se , a statut e c re a te d th e c ri me of “ e s c a p e fr om a ny se c ur e de te nti on

fa c ili ty or any re sid e nti a l c omm itm e nt f a c ili ty of re str ic tiv e ne ss le ve l V Ior

a bo ve .” Th e De pa

rtme nt of He a lth and Re ha bil itativ e Se rv ic e s wa s g ive n th e a uth or ity 105 to define r estrictivene ss levels “in terms of br oad ca t ego ries base d on ‘the risk a nd needs of

the ind ivi du a l c hil d, ’ of wh ic h the re c an be no mor e tha n eig ht, ” wi th no oth e r m e anin g fu l li mit a tio ns . 106 The De partment c reated four r isk levels, numbere d 2, 4, 6, and 8. T h e Florida Supreme Court 107 ob se rv e d th a t th e De pa

rtme nt co uld have jus t a s e a sil y c re a te d r isk

le ve ls n umb e re d 1 thr ou g h 4 —in which ca se no fac ility would fall within the definition of the off ense—or risk levels numbere d 10,RHINE CONCURRENC E – 24

Id. 108 Id. 109 Se e Sm ith , 7 4 T ex . Cr im. a t 23 3- 34 , 1 68 S.W. a t 52 2- 23 ; W illiams , 146 Tex. Crim . at 110 433-39, 176 S.W.2d at 179-83.

See M cCurley , 3 90 So. 2d

a t 26 -2 9; Cur

ry , 279 Ark. at 155-60, 649 S.W .2d at 835-37; 111 Kellogg , 9 8 I da

ho a t 54 2- 44 , 5 68 P.2 d at 51 5- 17 ; Turmon , 417 Mich. at 643-53, 340 N.W.2d at 623- 27 ; Thompson , 6 27 S.W. 2d a t 30 0- 03 ; Pe loq uin , 427 A.2d at 1328-31. 20 , 3 0, and

40 —in wh ic h c a se a ll f

a c ili tie s w ou ld f

a ll within the de fi nit ion of the of fe ns e . Thus ,

108 the ena bling statute f

ailed to ar ticulate rea sonably definite standards, instead confe rringunlimit ed and ar bitrary discretion. 109 Iturn now to some ca ses that have upheld a deleg ation as constitutional. I ref er a g ain to our decisions in Sm ith and W

illiams , respe ctively involving transportation of cattle acr oss a quar antine line and the g rowing of cotton in a quar antine zone. The le g islative policy of pre venting the sprea d of disease to livestock or cotton was clea r, the need f

or expertise and the ability to addre ss conditions

on the g ro un d w a s e vid e nt, and the a uth or ity to d e sig nate zon e s bas ed on the thr e a t of dis e a se infestation was r easona

bly specific

. 110 A n umb e r o f j ur isd ic tio ns have up hel d th e de le g a tio n o f a uth or ity to a n a dmi nis tr a tor

to desig nate a

particula r drug as a controlled subst ance , and prose cute possession of that substance a s

a c ri me . I n mo st o f t

he se c a se s th e statut e c on ta ine d a lis t of the fo llo wi nge ig ht s tand ard s: 111 (1 ) T he a c tua l or

re la tiv e po te nti a l f

or a bu se ; (2 ) T he sc ie nti fi c e vid e nc e of its ph arm a c olo g ic a l e ff

e c t, i f k no wn ; (3 ) T he state of

c ur re nt s c ie nti fi c kn ow le dg e re g ard ingthe su bs tanc e ; (4 ) T he his tor

y and c ur re nt p a tte rn

of a bu se ;RHINE CONCURRENC E – 25

See M cCurley , 390 So. 2d

a t 26 ; Cur

ry , 27 9 Ar k. a t 15 8- 59 , 64 9 S.W. 2d a t 83 6; Turmon , 112 41 7 M ic h. a t 64 6, 34 0 N .W. 2d at 62 4; Thompson , 6 27 S.W. 2d a t 30 1 n .5 ; Pe loq uin , 427 A.2d at 1331 n.7. Turmon , 417 Mich. at 648, 340 N.W.2d at 625.

113 Pe loq uin , 427 A.2d at 1331. 114 Avatar Dev . Corp. , 7 23 So. 2d a t 20 1 ( fu ll n a me of

a g e nc y pr ov ide d in

br a c ke ts i n 115 place of “de partment” ). (5 ) T he sc op e , d

ur a tio n a nd sig nif ic anc e of a bu se ; (6 ) T he ri sk

to t he pu bli c he a lth ; (7) The potential of the substanc e to produc e psy chic or phy siologica l depende nce liability ; and (8) Whether

the substance is an immediate pre curso r o f a substanc e alr eady controlled unde r this chapter

. 112 Th e Mic hig a n c ourt

r e f e r r e d t o m a n d a t o r y r ule makin g pr oc e dure s a s f ur the r i ns ur inga g a ins t po ssi ble abuse of deleg ated powe r while the Rhode I slan d co u rt p o i nted to the ava ilability of judicial 113 revie w. 114 Th e Sup re me Court

of F lor ida a dd

re sse d the c on sti tut ion a lity of a po llu tio n c on tr ol s ta tut e that made it a criminal offe nse for a person “[t] o fail t o obtain any permit requir ed by

this chapter or by rul e o r r e g u lati o n , o r to v io late o r f a il to c o mp ly w it

h an y r u le , r e g u lati o n , o r d e r , p e r mi t, or

c e rt if ic a tio n a do pte d o r is su ed by the [De pa

rtme nt o f E nv ir on me nta l Pr ote c tio n] pu rs ua nt t o it s lawful a uthority .” I n a purpose section, the leg islation articulated that “ pollution of the air and

115

wate rs of thi s st a te c on sti tut e s a me na c e to pu bli c he a lth and we lf

are ,” no te d v ari ou s h arm fu l e ff e c ts,

and de c lare d a pub lic po lic y to pr ote c t and imp ro ve the qu a lity of a ir and wate r a nd to p ro te c t a g a ins tRHINE CONCURRENC E – 26

Id. at 206. 116 Id. at 206 n.8 117 Id. at 207. 118 Found. for Indep. Living , 214 W. Va. at 825-26, 830, 591 S.E.2d at 751-52, 756. 119 the ha rm fu l e f

f e c t s o f p o l l u t i o n . T h e s t a tu t e a l s o c o n t a i n e d c r i t e r i a r e qu i r i n g t h e d e p art m e n tto 116 consider a

number of f

actor s, including the eff

ects of a n activity o n people, wildlife, na vigation, erosion, fishing, re cre ation, and historical a nd arc haeolog ical re source s, whether the ac tivity

was temporar y or per manent, and the relative value of the functions beingperf

ormed by are as af fec ted by the ac tivity

. Thoug h the prosecution at i ssue involved the violation of a pe rmit condition, the

117

c ourt mor e br oa dly

ind ic a te d th a t the L e g isl a tur e la c ke d a bil ity and e xpe rt ise to e na c t “ ru le s,

re g ulatio ns , a

nd pro cedu res ” c a

pa ble of a dd re ssi ngthe “ the my

ri a d p ro ble ms a

nd sit uatio ns ” implicating pollution control, and that the provision of “c riminal sanctions for the willful violation of administrative rule s and re g ulations is of lit tle conseque nce w here it is t he L eg islature, and not the administrative body , that has dec lare d such ac t s u nlawful ba sed upon express leg islative policy .” 118 The fina l case Iaddre ss is in contrast to the New Y ork decision reg ardingthe re g ulation of smoking. I n West Virg inia, the L eg islature articulated in a purpose provision that it wished to have

“ a c iti zenry fr e e fr om the us e of tob a c c o. ” I n li g ht o f t his art ic ulate d p ur

po se , a su ff ic ie nt b a sis 119 for a dopting anti-smoking reg ulations car rying criminal penalties ex isted under a statute per mitti ng

an a g e nc y to “ a do pt a

nd pr omu lg a te and fr om time to time a me nd ru le s c on sis te nt w ithstate pu bli c health laws and the rules of the W est Virg inia state depa rtment of hea lth and human re source s, that

are nece ssary

and prope r for

the protection of the g ener al hea lth of the servic e ar ea a nd theRHINE CONCURRENC E – 27

Id. 120 Se e Gu zm an v . S tat e , Gu zman v. State , 95 5 S.W. 2d 85 , 89 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Ma nz i 121 v . S tat e , 88 S.W .3d 240, 242-44 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002). T EX . W A T ER C ODE , §7.177(a) (5). 122 preve ntion of the introduction, propag ation and spre ad of disea se.” 120 Fr om this di scussion, I conclude that a dele g ation of authority to an administrative ag ency is constituti onally

permissible under the separ ation-of- power s provision of the Texas Constit ution if t h e f o ll o w in g f

o u r c o n d it io n s ar e me t: ( 1 ) th e d e le g a ti o n c an , a t le a s t b y im p lication, be

c ha ra c te ri zed a s th e de le g a tio n of autho ri ty to ma ke a fa c tua l det e rm ina tio n r e le va

nt t o th e purp os e of the statut e , r a ther

tha n s imp ly a po lic y de c isi on , ( 2) the statut e c on ta ins sta nd ard s, e xpre ssl y provided or impli ed fr om an express statutory purpose, that a

re suf ficiently specific to give g uidance to the ag ency and to t he cour ts as to what ty

pes of r ules or other

actions ar e and a

re not pe rmissible, (3) pr e-a doption procedur al safe g uards e x ist to ensure that the a g ency has the opportunity

to consider whether the rule or

other a ction confor

ms to the l eg islative standards, a nd (4) post-a doption judicial revie w is available to ensure that the ag ency rule or othe r ac tion does i n fa ct comply with the leg islative standards. An ag ency ’s action under this four -prong ed approa ch is essentially an implied fac t determination. As is usual with f act deter minations, de fer ence should be ac corde d on judicial revie w to the ag ency ’s action. I now turn to the application of those conditions to the case at bar

. 121 4. Does the outdoor bur nin g delegation com ply with the Te xa s Se pa ra tio n- of

-p owe rs p ro v ision? The L eg islature has pr ovided that a c riminal offe nse occ urs if a pe rson “intentionally or knowing ly

with respec t to t h e p erson’s conduct, violates . . . a rule a dopted under

Chapter 382, Hea lth and Safety

Code.” Appellee was prose cuted f or a r ule adopted unde r §382.018, authori zing 122RHINE CONCURRENC E – 28

T EX . H EA L TH & S AF ETY C ODE , §382.018(a)

. 123 Id. , §382.018(b)- (d). 124 Id. , §382.002(a)

. 125 Id. , §382.017(a)

. 126 Id. , §382.011(a) (3). 127 a dmi nis tr a tiv e ru le s th a t “ c on tr ol o r p ro hib it the ou tdo or bu rning of wa ste and

c omb us tib le

ma te ri a l.” Th e statut e re qu ir e s T CEQ to p e rm it o utd oo r burn ing of wa ste that “ c on sis ts of tr e e s, 123 br us h, g ra ss , lea ves , bra

nc h tr imm ing s, or

oth e r p lant g ro wth” wh e n it is b ur ne d und e r c e rt a in

c on dit ion s. Se c tio n 3 82 .0 18 do e s no t spe c if ic a lly me nti on oth e r t y pe s o f m a te ri a l, b ut s ome 124 provisions within C hapter 382 are instructive. F ir st, the L e g isl a tur e e xpre ssl y art ic ulate d th e purp os e of Cha pte r 3 82 : Th e po lic y

of thi s st a te and

the purp os e of

thi s c ha pte r a re to sa fe g ua

rd the state ’s a ir re so ur c e s f

ro m po llu tio n b y

c on tr oll ingor

a batin g a ir po llu tio n a

nd e mis sio ns of

a ir contaminants, consistent with the protec tion of public health, gen eral welfa re, a nd phy sical property , including the esthetic enjoy ment of air r esourc es by

the public and t h e m a i n t e n an c e o f

a d e qu a t e v i s i b i l i t y. 125 I n it s r u le ma k in g s e c ti o n , Ch a

p te r 3 8 2 r e f

e r s to a d o p ti n g a r

u le “ c o n s is te n t w it

h th e policy

and purposes of this chapte r.” Second, the L eg islature provided that TCEQ shall have the power and 126 duty to “control the qua lity

of the state’ s air.” T h i rd, t he L eg islature provide d the following 127 expli cit standards f

or dete rmining w hether

to adopt a rule under Chapte r 382: Th e te rm s and

pr ov isi on s o f a

ru le a do pte d b y th e com mis sio n ma y dif fe re nti a te a m o n g p art i c u l ar

c o n d i t i o n s , p art i c u l ar

s o u r c e s , an d

p art i c u l ar ar e a s o f

t h e s t a t e . In adopting a rule , the commission sha ll recog nize that the quantity or cha rac teristic of air c ontaminants or the duration of their pre sence in the atmos phere may cause a nee d for a ir control in one a

rea of the state but not in othe r are as. I n this connection, the commission shall consider:RHINE CONCURRENC E – 29

Id. , §382.017(e)

. 128 (1) the f

actor s found by it to be proper a nd just, including existi ng phy sical conditions, topog raphy , population, a nd preva iling wind direc tion a nd velocity ; a

nd (2) the f act that a rule and the deg ree s of conf ormanc e with the rule that may be pr op e r f

or an e sse nti a lly

re sid e nti a l are a

of the state may

no t be pr op e r fo r a

hig hly develope d industrial are a or a relatively unpopulated ar ea. 128 The de leg ation of au t h o rity here can, a

t least by implication, be char acte rized as the deleg ation of authority

to make a fac tual deter

mination rele vant t o the purpose of the statute, rather than simply

a policy decision. The L eg islature has tasked TCEQ with de termining how to safe g uard the qualit y of our air. What practice s threate n air qua lity is a fac tual deter

mination. I n deter

mining that a pra ctice should be prohibited, TCEQ impliedly d etermines that the prac tice thre atens the quality of our a ir. I n deter

mining that a prac tice should be regulated, TCEQ impliedly deter mines
t h a tt h e r e g u l a t i o no f

t h a tp r a c t i c e i s n e e d e d

t o s a f e g u ar d a i r qu a l i t y. T h e s t a tu t o r

y s c h e m e a l s o p r o v i d e s s t an d ar d s . T C E Q m u s t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e qu a n t i t y, char acte ristic, and duration of air contaminants in deter mining whether there is a nee d for a ir control in one ar ea of

the state but not other a rea s. I f appr opriate, the ag ency must consider phy sical

c on dit ion s, top og ra

ph y , p op ulatio n, a nd

pr e va ili ngwi nd

dir e c tio n and ve loc ity , and the a g e nc y mus t

c on sid e r t he dif fe re nc e be tw e e n r e sid e nti a l are a s, hig hly de ve lop e d ind us tr ia l are a s, and

re la tiv e ly unpopulated are as. I n addition, the purpose statement tasks TCEQ with pr otecting p u b l i c h ealth, g ener al welf

are , p h y s ical prope rty , the esthetic e njoy ment of air r esourc es by

the public, and the

m a i n t e n an c e o f

a d e qu a t e v i s i b i l i t y. There fore , a rule under the statutory scheme must promote air quality and be tailored to the fac ts of a p arti c u la

r g e o g r a p h y , o r if it is a s tate w id e r u le , th e n th e a c ti v it

y th a t is p r o h ib ite d orRHINE CONCURRENC E – 30

See id. , §382.017(d). 129 Id. , §382.017(a) -(c ). 130 T EX . G OVT . C ODE §2001.023. 131 Id. , §2001.024. 132 Id. , §2001.029. 133 Id. , §2001.038. 134 regulated must be the kind that da mag es the quality

of the a ir eve ry

wher e in the State of Te x as, fr om the larg est city

to the remotest rur al location. The s tatuto r

y s c h e me a ls o c o n ta in s p r e - a d o p ti o n s a f e g u ar d s th a t g iv e th e a g ency the opportunity

to consider infor

mation provided throug h public comment, either throug h Chapter 382 or throug h the Administrative Procedur e Act (APA). I f the Chapter 382 proce dure is followe d, 129

a pu bli c he ari ngmus t be he ld b e fo re a ru le is a do pte d; no tic e of the date , tim e , p la c e , a nd purp os e of t he hearing for a statewide rule m ust be publi shed t wenty day s befor e the he aringin at least three newspa pers whose combined cir culation, in TCEQ’s judg ment, will give r easonable circ ulation thr ou g ho ut t

he State ; and

a ny pe rson may app ear

a t th e he ari ngand

be he ard

. I f t

he APA 130 proce dure is followe d, the ag ency must give thirty day s notice of the he aringby publication in the Texas Reg ister, the notice must satisfy cer tain require ments which include matters relating to the 131

c on te nt o f t

he pr op os e d r

ule , a nd th e ag e nc y

mus t a ff or d in te re ste d p e rs on s th e op po rt un ity to 132 comment on the propose d rule. 133 J udicial re view is also available. I t is possi ble that a TCEQ r ule re lating to outdoor bur ning could be challeng ed in a decla ratory judgme nt a ction under the APA. But re g ardle ss of whethe r 134 that is the case , when a

violation of the rule ha s resul ted in a cr iminal conviction, the propriety ofRHINE CONCURRENC E – 31

TCE Q h a s sp e c if

ic a lly a uth or ize d b urn ingus e d “ so le ly fo r r e c re a tio na l or

c e re mon ia l, 135 purposes or in the nonco m m er cial preparation of food, or used e x clusively for the pur

pose of supply ing w armth duringcold weather.” T EX . A D M IN . C ODE §111.207.

See id. , §111.219(7). 136 the rule c an be review ed on appe al. Thoug h defe rential, such r eview c an neve rtheless be

m ea n i n gfu l

. Fo r e x am p l e, ap p el l ee ar gu es t h at T C E Q c o u l d en ac ta ru l e b an n i n g ci gar et t e s m o k i n g. But a statewide a

nti-smoking rule would clea rly violate the leg islative standards be cause such

c on du c t doe s not, e ve n und e r the mos t def e re nti a l re vie w, po se a thr e a t to the qu a lity of the a ir in a ll portions of the state. I conclude that the L eg islature did not unconstitutionally deleg ate its power 135 in enac ting the outdoor

burning statute. Th e re ma ini ng qu e sti on

is w he the r T CEQ a c te d w ith in t he L e g isl a tur e ’s g ra

nt o f a uth or ity in p a ssi nga

ru le that pr oh ibi te d b ur

nin g of the ite ms i n q

ue sti on . T he ru le in q

ue sti on se e ms t o

136 be a r easona

ble one de signe d to pr o t ec t the quality of the a ir in any

portion of the state. Con se qu e ntl y , I

wo uld de ny a pp e lle e ’s c ha lle ng e and

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. Ic on c ur in t he c ourt ’s jud g me nt. Filed: September

23, 2009 Publis h