alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

| (1) | The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                               |                                  |                      |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                               | STUDIO ONE MEDIA, INC.                |
|                               |                                  |                      |
| Date:  February 14, 2011 | By:                         | /s/  Preston J. Shea |
|                               | Preston J. Shea                       |
|                               | President and Chief Executive Officer |

|                               |                                                 |                          |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                               | STUDIO ONE MEDIA, INC.                               |
|                               |                                                 |                          |
| Date:  February 14, 2011 | By:                                        | /s/  Kenneth R. Pinckard |
|                               | Kenneth R. Pinckard                                  |
|                               | Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer |
OSAC Affiliates 

November 2023 

AFFILIATES 

Michael Coble 

Debra Glidewell 

Simone Gittelson 

Ann Marie Gross 

Nathalie Hicks Champod 

Brian Higgins 

Mary Jones Dukes 

Melissa LaVigne 

Bruce McCord 

Amy McGuckian 

Steven Myers 

Jennifer Naugle 

 Craig Nolde 

Sean Oliver 

Beth Ordeman 

Amber Rasmussen 

Andrea Roth 

Margaret Sanger 

Jessica Skillman 

Steven Weitz 

Susan Welti 

Christian Westring 

Jonathan Whitaker
#### LOOS v. DUTRO

No. 107P97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 615

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 23 July 1997.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A21E0010. JASMINE LEIGH DOURESSEAUX v. AARON CHRISTIAN

THOMAS.

Applicant Jasmine Leigh Douresseaux has filed an emergency motion

requesting the stay of the trial court’s order holding her in civil and criminal contempt

for failing to comply with a prior child custody order. Douresseaux asserts that,

because she properly filed a notice of appeal of the contempt order and applied for

supersedeas, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed on a contempt hearing, which

according to the record before us is set for September 17, 2020.

Generally, “a supersedeas suspends all further proceedings in the suit in which

the judgment superseded is rendered. . . . Under this rule, the supersedeas, during its

pendency, prevents any steps to enforce or carry into effect the judgment.” (Citation

and punctuation omitted.) Simmons v. Harms, 287 Ga. 176, 181 (3) (a) (695 SE2d 38)

(2010). OCGA § 5-6-13 (a) provides that “[a] judge of any trial court or tribunal

having the power to adjudge and punish for contempt shall grant to any person

convicted of or adjudged to be in contempt of court a supersedeas upon application

and compliance with the provisions of law as to appeal and certiorari, where the

person also submits, within the time prescribed by law, written notice that he intends

to seek review of the conviction or adjudication of contempt. It shall not be in the

discretion of any trial court judge to grant or refuse a supersedeas in cases of

contempt.”

It appears from the record before us that Douresseaux timely filed a notice of

appeal from the trial court’s contempt order and properly applied for supersedeas

under OCGA § 5-6-13 (a). Accordingly, Douresseaux’s motion is herebyGRANTED,

September 16, 2020
and the trial court’s enforcement of the contempt order is STAYED until the

resolution of Douresseaux’s appeal thereof.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/16/2020
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

 

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

 

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350, the undersigned officer of ING Life Insurance and Annuity Company (the “Company”)hereby certifies that, to the officer’s knowledge, the Company’s QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 or 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatthe information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 

 
| November 5, 2010                            | By: /s/ | Catherine H.  Smith                     |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------|
|        (Date) |         | Catherine H. Smith

President |

 

----
U.S. District Court for the Northern District Of Illinois

Attorney Appearance Form

Case Title: Case Number: 

An appearance is hereby filed by the undersigned as attorney for:

Attorney name (type or print): 

Firm: 

Street address: 

City/State/Zip: 

Bar ID Number: Telephone Number: 

 Yes No

 Yes No

 Yes No

 Yes No

(See item 3 in instructions)

Email Address:

Are you acting as lead counsel in this case?

Are you acting as local counsel in this case?

Are you a member of the court’s trial bar?

If this case reaches trial, will you act as the trial attorney? 

If this is a criminal case, check your status. Retained Counsel

Appointed Counsel 

If appointed counsel, are you 

a 

 Federal Defender

 CJA Panel Attorney

______________________________________________________________________

In order to appear before this Court an attorney must either be a member in good standing of this Court’s 

general bar or be granted leave to appear pro hac vice as provided for by local rules 83.12 through 83.14. 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Under 28 U.S.C.§1746, this 

statement under perjury has the same force and effect as a sworn statement made under oath.

Executed on 

Attorney signature: S/

(Use electronic signature if the appearance form is filed electronically.)

Revised 8/1/2015

Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 19 Filed: 08/31/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:246
#### John C. Heinze *v.*Commonwealth.

Intoxicating Liquors — indictment—Tipplinghouse.

' An indictment for keeping a tipplinghouse is not defective for failure to state the month in which the offense was committed, when it must have been committed, if at'all, within the prescribed time.

I ntoxi cati n g Li quors — Li cense — Bond.

Under § 1, Act February 17, 1866, Myer’s Supp. 762, requiring a coffee-house keeper to execute a bond before he can sell intoxicating liquor to any one, a license to sell liquor confers no authority to sell liquor without execution of such bond.

APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 14, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

In the case of *Commonwealth v. Harvey,*16 B. Monroe, 1, this court held that a presentment which merely charges the defendant with having kept a tippling house is good under the revised statutes; nor is the presentment in this case defective in failing to state the months in which the offense was. committed. It was found by the grand jury on the 8th of March, 1872; and the offense as charged must have been committed if at all between the 1st of January, 1872, and the day the presentment was found. Consequently, it must necessarily have been within the time prescribed.

By Sec. 1 of an act approved 17th February, 1866, Myers Supp., page 762, it is provided that before any coffee house keeper shall presume hereafter to sell any spirituous or vinous liquors, to any person whatever, he shall execute a bond with one or more good sureties in the penalty of $500, conditioned, etc.

Without executing the bond as required, a license confers no authority to sell liquor on a keeper of a coffee house; the law requires him to execute the prescribed, bond at the time and at each time he obtains license to keep a coffee house and it was admitted on the trial that from the 12th day of July, 1871, to the 13th of May, 1872, he had no bond except one he executed on the 6th of Feb*206ruary, 1871, and having sold liquor by the retail within the periods named, without having executed the requisite bond, he subjected himself to the penalty of keeping a tippling house.

*T. O. Goalder, for appellant.*

*Rodman, for appellee.*
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00657-CR

BRODERICK RECHARD STOKES, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 185th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1384655 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant Broderick Rechard Stokes pleaded guilty to burglary of a vehicle 

with intent to commit theft with two or more previous convictions. Appellant and 

the State agreed appellant’s punishment would not exceed two years’ imprisonment. 

On May 2, 2013, the trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the terms of 

his agreement with the State. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2018. 

We lack jurisdiction over this appeal for two reasons: the notice of appeal was

not filed timely, and this is a plea bargain case with no appealable matters and 
2

appellant has not been granted permission to appeal. 

First, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after 

sentence is imposed when the defendant has not filed a motion for new trial. See

Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements 

of Rule 26.2 is essential to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction. Slaton v. State, 

981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a 

court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. 

Under those circumstances it can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. Id.

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed more than five years after sentence was 

imposed. Therefore, the appeal was not timely perfected, and we lack jurisdiction. 

Second, in a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was 

guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment 

recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may 

appeal only matters raised by a written, pretrial motion or with the trial court’s 

permission. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).

Appellant’s punishment does not exceed the agreed length of confinement. 

The record does not contain any appealable pretrial rulings, and the trial court did 

not grant appellant permission to appeal.

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Exhibit 32.1

 

Mechanical Technology Incorporated

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Mechanical Technology Incorporated (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peng K. Lim, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (18 U.S.C. Sections 1350(a) and (b)), that, to my knowledge:
NO. 12-09-00010-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

§ APPEAL FROM THE 145TH

IN THE INTEREST OF

J.H., A CHILD § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

§ NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed, as to Appellant J.H. only, because J.H. failed, after notice,

to file a docketing statement. The judgment was signed on December 8, 2008, and J.H. filed a notice

of appeal on December 22, 2008.

J.H.’s docketing statement in this case was due to have been filed at the time the appeal was

perfected, i.e., December 22, 2008. See TEX. R. APP. P. 32.1. On January 9, 2009, this court

requested J.H. to file her docketing statement within ten days if she had not already filed it. 

When J.H. failed to file the docketing statement, on April 8, 2009, this court issued a second

notice advising her that the docketing statement was past due and giving her until April 20, 2009 to

comply with rule 32.1. The notice further provided that failure to comply with this second notice

would result in the appeal being presented for dismissal in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 42.3. The deadline established by this second notice has expired, and J.H. has not

responded. Accordingly, this appeal, as to J.H. only, is dismissed. See TEX.R.APP. P. 42.3(c). The

appeal, as to R.H., remains on this court’s docket. 

Opinion delivered April 28, 2009.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
Exhibit 31.2CERTIFICATIONSI, Pamela G. Boone, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Synergetics USA, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b) [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions contained in SEC Release34-47986];(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: June 13, 2006              /s/ Pamela G. Boone   Pamela G. Boone   Executive Vice President, Chief FinancialOfficer, Treasurer and Secretary
##### 



Exhibit 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Standard Companies
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, G. Peter DAloia, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to
§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that (1) the Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.

/s/ G. Peter DAloia
G. Peter DAloia
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

May 1, 2003

A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certification is
accompanying the Form 10-Q solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18,
United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a
separate disclosure document.
#### MULLIS v. SECHREST

No. 283A97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 91

Petition by defendant (Sechrest) for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 and Appellate Rule 16(b) as to issues in addition to those presented as the basis for the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals allowed 23 July 1997.
H. R. 421

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the seventh day of January, two thousand and three

An Act

To reauthorize the United States Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution,

and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Environmental Policy and Conflict

Resolution Advancement Act of 2003’’.

SEC. 2. ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FUND.

Section 13 of the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence

in National Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act

of 1992 (20 U.S.C. 5609) is amended by striking subsection (b)

and inserting the following:

‘‘(b) ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FUND.—There is

authorized to be appropriated to the Environmental Dispute Resolution Fund established by section 10 $4,000,000 for each of fiscal

years 2004 through 2008, of which—

‘‘(1) $3,000,000 shall be used to pay operations costs

(including not more than $1,000 for official reception and representation expenses); and

‘‘(2) $1,000,000 shall be used for grants or other appropriate

arrangements to pay the costs of services provided in a neutral

manner relating to, and to support the participation of nonFederal entities (such as State and local governments, tribal

governments, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals)
H. R. 421—2

in, environmental conflict resolution proceedings involving Federal agencies.’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
**EXHIBIT 15.1**August 7, 2003Vornado Operating Company888 Seventh AvenueNew York, NY  We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial information of Vornado Operating Company and subsidiaries for the periods ended June 30, 2003 and 2002, as indicated in our report dated August 7, 2003; because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-68458 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-77143 on Form S-8.We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLPParsippany, NJ
WAIVER TO NOTE PURCHASE AGREEMENT


	This Waiver (the "Waiver") to the Note Purchase Agreement is 
issued as of December 31, 1996, to Maui Land & Pineapple Company, 
Inc. ("Company") by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
("John Hancock").

	WHEREAS, Company and John Hancock are parties to that 
certain Note Purchase Agreement dated as of September 9, 1993 as 
amended by that certain First Amendment to Note Purchase 
Agreement dated as of March 30, 1994 and that certain Second 
Amendment to Note Purchase Agreement dated as of November 13, 
1995 (collectively the "Note Purchase Agreement:); and

	WHEREAS, John Hancock transferred a portion of the 9.43% 
Promissory Notes of the Company to JHMAC Trust 1996, which 
transferred said portion to Bankers Trust Company as collateral 
agent (John Hancock and Bankers Trust Company are collectively 
the "Purchaser"); and 

	WHEREAS, the Company has requested that Section 7.4 
Dividends, Distributions, etc., be waived with respect to the 
dividend of five cents ($0.5) per share aggregating eighty-nine 
thousand eight hundred fifty seven dollars ($89,857) declared on 
November 1, 1996 and paid on December 20, 1996 (the "Dividend"); 
and

	WHEREAS, Purchasers are willing to waive the provisions of 
Section 7.4 of the Note Purchase Agreement with respect to the 
Dividend.

	NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual conditions 
and agreements set forth in this Waiver, the Company and 
Purchasers hereby agree as follows:

	Purchasers waive Section 7.4 of the Note Purchase Agreement 
with respect to the Dividend.

	Except as specifically set forth above, all of the terms and 
conditions of the Note Purchase Agreement are hereby ratified and 
confirmed and remain in full force and effect.  Except as set 
forth herein, the execution, delivery and effectiveness of this 
Waiver shall not operate as a waiver of any right, power or 
remedy of Purchasers under the Note Purchase Agreement or any of 
the Notes.

	No fee or other consideration of any type is being paid by 
Company or any of its subsidiaries to the any other person in 
connection with this Waiver.

	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned executed this Waiver as 
of the date first set forth above.


							JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE 
							INSURANCE COMPANY

							By: __/S/ D. DANA DONOVAN___
							Title  Sr. Investment Officer

			
							BARNETT & CO.



							By: _/S/ RICHARD MCCORMICK    
							Title:  ASSISTANT TREASURER

											
							MAUI LAND & PINEAPPLE 
							COMPANY, INC.

							By: _/S/ PAUL J. MEYER_______	
							Title: EVP-Finance