Affirm and Opinion Filed September 29, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00918-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.I.J., S.M.J., S.D.J. II, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-07514

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel

Opinion by Justice Molberg

Pro se Father appeals the trial court’s final decree of divorce making Mother 

sole managing conservator of children S.I.J., S.M.J., and S.D.J. Because we find 

Father’s complaints meritless, we affirm in this memorandum opinion. 

Background

We will discuss the proceedings in the trial court and the evidence presented 

at trial to the extent necessary to resolve Father’s appellate issues. Father filed an 

original petition for divorce from Mother on May 21, 2020. The couple had three 

boys, S.D.J., S.M.J., and S.I.J., aged eight, four, and three respectively. In her 

counterpetition, Mother alleged, among other things, that S.M.J. and S.I.J. had 
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mental or physical disabilities and required substantial care and personal 

supervision.

On October 20, 2020, the trial court entered temporary orders under which 

Father and Mother were temporary joint managing conservators. Among other 

things, Father and Mother were prohibited from consuming alcohol or a controlled 

substance within eight hours before or during the period of possession of or access 

to the children. 

On February 22, 2021, the trial court conducted a bench trial over Zoom. 

During Father’s testimony, his counsel repeatedly asked him to answer the questions 

being asked and to refrain from speaking unless he was answering questions. After 

a short break, counsel for Mother stated, “Judge, before we continue, my client has 

some very strong concerns that Mr. Jackson might be intoxicated right now. And 

before we continue, I just want to go on the record and make sure that -- that he does 

have the capacity to continue to answer questions and participate in this hearing?” 

Counsel for Father responded: 

Judge, first I’d like to say “thank you” to the Court and Mr. Aldinger 

for allowing us a quick break there. Mr. Jackson, I think, is under a lot 

of stress, complicated by the situation with his family and his young 

boys, the divorce trial. I asked him if he’s under any type of substance 

medication, any prescriptions, any substance at all that would inhibit 

his ability to testify? And he said, no, Judge. So I just -- Mr. Jackson is 

more of a situation of stress and pressure of the situation.

Father then told the court he could proceed with the trial. When his testimony 

resumed, it was interrupted again when it appeared Father was speaking with 
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someone in his room; he told the court, “I’m sorry, Judge. That was somewhere else, 

but done and done. Umm, yeah. I had to take care of -- someone wanted to sneak in 

the phone. Yeah, we can’t do that. Not even.” The court inquired of Father’s 

counsel: “Are you sure, Mr. Kelly, that your client is okay to testify because his 

demeanor is quite bizarre?” Mother’s counsel stated: 

Judge, under the circumstances, I’d rather us get him on the record. But 

if Mr. Kelly asks for additional courtesy, then that's fine. I’ll grant him 

that. I just want to get to the bottom of this because, again, my client 

has very strong concerns that he is intoxicated either with alcohol or 

some drug into his system. And she has very real concerns about it. 

And if not, with the capacity to participate today, I think we need to 

reset this, out of fairness of the parties and Mr. Kelly, as well. With 

that on the record, if he needs five minutes to confer with his client, 

again, I’ll leave it up to the judge’s discretion. I’m not gonna be 

opposed.

After a five-minute break, Father’s counsel stated: 

I did speak with my client. I believe that my client is not under any 

illegal or substances -- illegal substance and/or alcohol today that would 

impair him. As fair [sic] as clear impairment, I believe is lack of sleep, 

stress. Maybe that combination. He said he’s been taking some 

Tylenol. I’m not sure if it's an adverse reaction to the non-prescription 

pain relief. Something has caused this gentleman not to be himself 

today. It’s somewhat obvious. His demeanor is not -- I don’t want to 

say “acceptable.” It wasn’t normal today. We’re asking for a brief 

recess to allow Mr. Jackson to take care of whatever conditions that’s 

caused him to not be able to testify here today and have a quick reset? 

Counsel for Mother reiterated Mother’s belief that Father was intoxicated due 

to “either alcohol or the addition of some type of drug added to the alcohol,” and she 

“ask[ed] the court to go ahead and order [Father] to appear this morning for a drug 

and alcohol test on hair and urine.” Among other things, counsel for Father 
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responded, “if they want to do a drug test for illegal substances, that would be fine,” 

and that a urine test would be fine. 

The trial court allowed Mother to make a trial amendment to plead that she 

now sought to be sole managing conservator, and the court required Father submit 

to drug testing that morning. The court also indicated it would restrict Father’s 

possession and access until trial concluded. 

On February 26, 2021, Mother filed her first amended counterpetition for 

divorce. Among other things, the counterpetition stated that Father “may pose, or 

poses, a significant risk of harm to the physical safety and emotional well-being and 

development of the children the subject of this suit[,]” and requested Mother be 

appointed sole managing conservator of the children. Mother requested, among 

other things, that Father be required to complete a substance abuse evaluation and 

complete any plan recommended by the evaluator; obtain an alcohol monitoring 

device or be subject to random drug and alcohol testing; be supervised during any 

periods of visitation until he completed a treatment plan recommended following 

substance abuse evaluation; and “complete all education and training related to the 

care of [S.M.J.] and [S.I.J.].”

Father’s hair and urine drug test results from the first day of trial were filed in 

the record on March 9, 2021. They reflected positive results for ethyl glucuronide

(ETG) and ethyl sulfate (ETS). 
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Trial continued on April 5, 2021. Mother called Chris Deal to testify. Deal

performed alcohol and drug testing on Father following the first day of trial. He 

stated Father’s urinalysis test was positive for ETG, at a level of greater than 80,000 

ng/ml, and for ETS, greater than 20,000 ng/ml. Deal said the hair test could reflect 

alcohol consumption over the past 90 days, and the urine test could reflect 

consumption over the past 80 hours.

Father testified his gross income was $39,000 annually. He said S.D.J. was 

ten, S.M.J. was four, and S.I.J. was three. When counsel asked him whether one of 

the children was “closer to six,” Father answered, “no.” Father stated S.M.J. and 

S.I.J. had been diagnosed with neuronal ceroid lipidosis, which he described as a 

degenerative brain disease that, in practical terms, meant the two children could not 

walk or speak. S.M.J. required a feeding tube “a lot of the time,” and neither child

could lift his arms. Both children required wheelchairs to be moved. S.M.J. and 

S.I.J. had four nurses, paid for by Medicaid, who, over a twelve-hour period each 

day, gave the children basic care, muscle movement care, and helped them learn as 

much as they could. 

Father said he did not receive communication from Mother about the two 

boys. He also tried to receive information from the boys’ doctors but “met resistance 

there” as well. Father said Mother left the marital residence in August 2019. Before 

then, Father said he slept with the boys so he could monitor their seizures, changed 

diapers, cooked, cleaned, and other “normal stuff.” After the COVID-19 pandemic 
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began, Father said he no longer took them to the doctor as much because doctors’ 

offices allowed just one parent during visits. Father wanted the court to allow him 

access to the children’s medical records and to require Mother to inform him about 

any new changes if Father did not learn about them from the doctor. He also wanted 

to be informed about doctor’s appointments and medications the children were 

taking. Father said that sometimes the nurses were sent home when it was Father’s 

turn to take the children, despite the fact that the nurses still had time scheduled with 

the children. Father wanted the court to require access to the nurses like Mother had. 

Father said he had a good relationship with S.D.J. Father coached S.D.J.’s 

baseball and soccer teams, taught him how to cook, and played video games with 

him. 

Father also discussed what happened the morning of the first day of trial. He 

said he was tired and stressed and “had a few drinks to help [him] sleep,” but that 

since then, he had “been doing what’s necessary to handle all those issues.” He had 

been seeing a specialist to help him deal with the stress, alienation, and feelings of 

anxiety. He also participated in the BACtrack program1following the incident, said 

he had stopped consuming alcohol, and was willing to continue being monitored by 

BACtrack. 

 

1 BACtrack is service in which the participant utilizes a breathalyzer device to measure his blood 

alcohol content level. 
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Father testified he owned the marital home, and he wanted to keep living 

there. He wanted to buy Mother out of the equity of the home, which, he said, was 

worth around $196,000. The other major assets included the cars and Mother’s 

retirement account. Father was seeking half of the funds in Mother’s retirement 

account, and he believed they should keep their own vehicles. 

On cross-examination, Father denied he was an alcoholic and denied having 

any problems with alcohol—he said he could stop anytime he liked. But he said he 

would not agree to a permanent alcohol injunction “because that means never.” 

Father admitted he had been arrested for DWI twice. On April 14, 2019, he was 

arrested for DWI and unlawful carrying of a weapon. He invoked his Fifth 

Amendment rights when questioned about whether he had consumed alcohol or 

possessed a weapon on that date. Father said he was also arrested for DWI on August 

24, 2019. When asked whether he would agree to continue BACtrack testing for 

one year, he said he would agree to it for thirty days but he did not agree that Mother 

should have access to the BACtrack testing results. 

Father stated he was ordered to complete education and training regarding the 

care of his sons, and he said he had not done the training because, he said, “it doesn’t 

exist.” 

Mother testified about an incident of family violence in December 2019. She 

said she took the children over to Father’s house; he expressed his frustration that 

she was “not doing [her] part to mend some things in the relationship,” and she went 
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into the garage to “allow things to kind of cool off.” Father told her she needed to 

take the children and leave, and after she put the children in the car, she saw that 

Father was drinking wine. Father noticed that Mother saw what he had been drinking 

and stated, “Yes, I have been drinking.” She said he took the bottle and “shoved it 

into [her] face very hard.” Mother testified this hurt, and when she picked up her 

phone to record the incident, Father grabbed her phone and she was unable to get it 

back. He took it and threw it into a neighboring yard. Mother said she filed a report 

with the police about the incident. 

Father, on redirect examination, denied Mother’s version of the event 

happened. He said Mother “two-hand shoved” him and was taunting him to fight 

her, so he took her phone and threw it over the fence to get her to leave. 

Mother also said prior to this incident there had been incidents of family 

violence during the marriage. She said in July 2018, on an occasion when Father 

had been drinking, following an argument, Father choked her and then “tried to toss 

[her] and slam [her] in the garage on the floor.” She said Father could not slam her 

because she had tightly wrapped her legs around him. When they were back inside, 

Father slammed Mother down onto the floor, and her head missed the stone fireplace 

by a couple of inches. Mother left the house so the situation could cool off. 

Father denied this assault ever took place. He stated he never struck Mother 

that day. 
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Mother also discussed an incident that occurred in the summer of 2016 when 

Mother told Father he could not drive their vehicle to his brother’s house because, 

she said, Father was drunk. Father took the car keys anyway and got in the vehicle

while Mother, who was holding S.M.J. and pregnant with S.I.J., stood behind the 

vehicle, telling Father not to move it. As Father turned on the vehicle, Mother 

opened the trunk, and Father backed into her causing her to “fl[y] into the back of 

the trunk” as the top of the vehicle hit the garage. Father screamed at Mother that 

she had “broken the car” and he exited and slammed Mother onto the ground while 

she was still holding S.M.J. Mother said at one point she was able to put S.M.J. in 

his car seat, get in the vehicle herself, and lock it. She stated Father, who was 

“foaming at the mouth,” returned with a pocketknife and slammed the car window. 

This went on for about ten minutes before Father went inside again. Mother heard

things breaking inside the house before there was a sustained calm, at which point 

she took her son and went inside and found Father “passed out on the couch.” 

Father denied this event as told by Mother happened. He said he was trying 

to back out of the garage, and he was not drunk. Mother ran behind the vehicle, and 

he got frustrated with her because she was pregnant and holding S.M.J. Father said 

he did not push Mother, and she did not fall. 

Mother said Father had a history of alcohol abuse during the marriage. She 

said he did not have control when it came to alcohol. She said he had been arrested 

for driving while intoxicated twice. The first arrest was on April 14, 2019. She 
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became aware of the arrest because she had to take his blood pressure medication to 

him at the DeSoto jail. Mother said they later discussed the incident and she said he 

felt he drank enough on the occasion to be stopped by police. Mother was concerned 

about Father possessing a handgun while drinking because he could “los[e] control.” 

She became aware of Father’s second DWI arrest when she had to remove their 

vehicle from the impound. Father later told her he had fallen asleep at a stop sign 

and was detained by the police as a result; he admitted to her he had been drinking 

earlier in the day. 

Mother said she did not think Father had ever engaged in any kind of in- or 

outpatient alcohol treatment, and she believed he would benefit from such treatment. 

Mother said she had difficulty during the marriage getting ahold of Father to 

discuss caring for the children. Father would not respond to text messages or answer 

phone calls. She said Father had his own online portal where he could access the 

children’s health information.

Mother wanted sole managing conservatorship because she believed it was in 

the best interest of the children for someone to be able to make decisions “right then 

and there, without having to wait a week or two weeks to hear from” Father. Further, 

she said, the “alcohol usage [was] extremely concerning” to her, particularly given 

that S.M.J. and S.I.J. had seizures throughout the day. She questioned whether 

someone who was drunk or hung over could know whether something was going on 
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with either of the boys. Mother was also concerned about Father’s anger 

management problems which he had never acknowledged. 

Mother wanted Father to have access to the children but “with some 

accountability,” so she wanted Father to have a “step program,” where step one was 

supervised visits for ninety days. Mother did not think ninety days of alcohol testing 

was adequate because she did not believe Father could resolve his problem in ninety 

days. She also did not believe Father’s mother would be an appropriate supervisor 

because she did not think his mother could hold him accountable. Mother wanted 

real-time access to testing results from BACtrack so she could ensure the children’s 

safety was the top priority. Mother said the next step would be restricted access 

where he does not have overnight stays for a period, to periods including overnight 

access, at least for S.D.J. Then, if he completed a period of clean tests, he could 

move onto “something else.” Mother believed it was in the children’s best interest 

that BACtrack testing continue through all of these periods of possession for

accountability. 

On April 5, 2021, the trial court issued a memorandum ruling that stated, 

among other things:

The Court finds that during the Initial Zoom Trial on February 22, 2021, 

the Court found that [Father] had extremely bizarre behavior during the 

trial, and the Court had a suspicion that he was under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs. The Court finds that it had to take a number of breaks 

so that Attorney Patrick Kelly could try to regroup his client . . . . The 

Court finally stopped the Trial and Ordered that [Father] go to Nation 

Drug screening in order to submit a hair and urine sample. The Court 
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finds that the drug and alcohol results that returned on March 9, 2021 

were extremely high for ethyl glucuronide. The Court finds that 

[Father] was intoxicated and under the influence of alcohol during the 

February 22, 2021 Trial. The Court finds that [Father] currently has two 

DWIs currently pending in Dallas County. The Court finds that [Father] 

believes he does not have a problem with alcohol. The Court finds that

[Father] states that he goes to a Dr. Stephenson weekly for alcoholism. 

The Court finds that since the February 22, 2021 Trial, [Father] has 

been using a [BACtrack] Alcohol Monitoring Device. The Court finds 

that [Father] states that he should not be prohibited from ever drinking 

alcohol.

The trial court entered a final decree of divorce on September 22, 2021. As 

pertinent here, the court appointed Mother sole managing conservator and Father 

possessory conservator. Father’s possession of S.I.J. and S.M.J. was limited to two 

hours every other Saturday, supervised at Faith and Liberty Place. Father was 

ordered to admit himself to an inpatient alcohol treatment program and complete the 

program before he could have any unsupervised access to the children. Father was 

ordered to obtain and use the services of BACtrack to be tested daily for alcohol use, 

which he could discontinue after receiving twelve months of no positive test results.

Father was ordered to “complete all training involving the care of the children on or 

before August 31, 2021.” The trial court enjoined Father and Mother from 

consuming alcohol or any controlled substance for which they did not have 

prescriptions. 

Father’s counsel withdrew on October 19, 2021, and Father proceeds pro se 

in this appeal. 

Discussion
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In his second issue, Father argues the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. He raises multiple points, contending Mother’s counter petition and 

amended counter petition did not allege domestic violence in the marriage, there was 

no evidence to support Mother’s requests, and the trial court erred by ordering Father 

“to follow medical instruction based on a medical diagnosis that had not been 

determined by medical experts.” Father asks this Court to vacate all orders in the 

final decree of divorce “due to the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction” relating 

to inpatient treatment, BAC monitoring, hair and urine testing, and seeing Dr. 

Stephenson for alcohol dependence treatment. 

We reject Father’s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over this divorce proceeding. Trial courts have the power to and broad 

discretion in determining the custody of children “as an incident to the granting of a 

divorce.” See Page v. Sherrill, 415 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1967). The Texarkana 

Court of Appeals recently articulated a trial court’s power to condition a parent’s 

possession or access: 

When a trial court appoints a parent possessory conservator, it can 

conclude that unrestricted possession would endanger the physical or 

emotional welfare of the child, but that restricted possession or access 

would not. A court can fashion a possession order that remedies the 

danger to the child’s welfare by placing restrictions and conditions on 

possession or access. Indeed, if the trial court appoints a possessory 

conservator, it may grant, deny, restrict, or limit the possessory 

conservator’s possession of or access to the child.
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In re Marriage of Patel & Parrish, 643 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2022, no pet.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The trial court has 

discretion to impose restrictions or limitations on a parent’s right to possession of or 

access to a child as long as they do not exceed those required to protect the best 

interest of the child. Gerges v. Gerges, 601 S.W.3d 46, 64 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2020, no pet.). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to make the 

orders it did here relating to Father’s possession of or access to the children. 

We also must reject Father’s complaint about Mother’s pleadings. As we 

stated recently:

Our procedural rules require pleadings to provide fair notice of the 

claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can prepare a 

defense. A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of 

the facts upon which the pleader bases her claim. Under this standard, 

courts assess whether an opposing party can ascertain from the pleading 

the nature of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence 

that might be relevant.

J.G. v. Jones, 660 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. denied) (internal 

citations omitted). In her original counterpetition, Mother sought for herself and 

Father to be appointed joint managing conservators. As noted above, after Father’s 

above-described conduct on the first day of trial, the court granted Mother’s request 

to amend her counterpetition to seek appointment as sole managing conservator and 

supervised access for Father. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 66; Hampden Corp. v. Remark, 

Inc., 331 S.W.3d 489, 497–98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (“[U]nder rule 

of civil procedure 66, a trial court is required to freely grant a request to amend 
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pleadings during trial unless the opposing party presents evidence the amendment 

would prejudice that party in maintaining an action or defense on the merits.”). 

Father made no objection to Mother’s proposed trial amendment. Mother did so 

amend her pleading and stated in her amended counterpetition that Father “may 

pose, or poses, a significant risk of harm to the physical safety and emotional wellbeing and development of the children the subject of this suit.” Applying our fair 

notice pleading standard, we conclude Mother, when she amended her 

counterpetition, sufficiently raised the issue of Father’s alleged alcohol abuse, its 

impact upon the physical safety of the children, and related issues, including the 

issue of domestic violence. Accordingly, we reject Father’s contention and overrule 

his second issue. 

In his third issue, Father argues the trial court ordered him to complete “doctor 

required training without evidence of courses, certificates, or training 

specifications.” He further argues no evidence warranted the restriction of his 

possession and access to his children, and there were “no reports against [him] of 

neglect, abuse, endangerment, or any other behavior to support court ordered 

supervised visitation.” Relatedly, in his eighth issue, Father argues the trial court 

erred when it found Father committed acts of family violence because no credible 

evidence supported the allegations. And in his fourth issue, Father argues the trial 

court’s order that he admit himself to an inpatient alcohol treatment program and 

successfully complete the program before he had any unsupervised access to the 
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children was not supported by the evidence. Father requests the final decree of 

divorce be modified to incorporate the possession and access schedule previously 

established in the temporary orders.

We review the trial court’s decisions on custody, control, possession, and 

visitation matters for an abuse of discretion. Newell v. Newell, 349 S.W.3d 717, 720 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). In our review of a child custody ruling, 

“legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant 

factors in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id.; In re M.P.B., 

257 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). In determining whether 

the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether (1) the court had sufficient 

information upon which to exercise its discretion and whether (2) it erred in its 

application of that discretion. Newell, 349 S.W.3d at 720–21. Regarding the first 

question, the traditional sufficiency review comes into play; with regard to the 

second, “we determine, based on the elicited evidence, whether the trial court made 

a reasonable decision.” In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2010, no pet.). An abuse of discretion does not occur if some evidence of a 

substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. In re 

B.J.W.S., No. 14-08-01154-CV, 2010 WL 4396291, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). When an order, as here, affects the 

conservatorship and possession of a child, the child’s best interests are the primary 

consideration. In re K.J.B., No. 07-21-00235-CV, 2022 WL 2173203, at *1 (Tex. 
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App.—Amarillo June 16, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 

153.002).

The record before us contains evidence showing that S.M.J. and S.I.J. had 

complex medical needs requiring specialized, around-the-clock care, and that Father 

had not completed training the court previously ordered regarding the care of the 

children. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

ordering Father to complete training regarding the care of the children. Further, 

evidence reflects Father had a significant problem with alcohol abuse and had 

committed acts of domestic violence. Evidence showed Father had committed three 

acts of family violence against Mother, all of which involved Father consuming 

alcohol, and one of which involved and directly endangered S.M.J. Evidence 

showed Father had been arrested for DWI twice and had to delay trial in this case 

due to alcohol consumption. More broadly, Mother testified Father had a history of 

alcohol abuse during their marriage and that he did not “have control” when 

drinking. Yet Father denied he had a problem with alcohol, testifying he had no 

problems with alcohol. Given this, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering Father to undergo training regarding the medical care of the 

children, finding Father committed acts of family violence, requiring inpatient 

alcohol treatment, or requiring supervision for his periods of access to the children.

Further, in light of all of the above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in restricting Father’s possession of and access to the children. 
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In his ninth issue, Father argues the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s 

fees to Mother because no evidence supported such an award. Section 6.708 of the 

family code provides that, “[i]n a suit for dissolution of a marriage, the court may 

award reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.708(c). To 

support a request for such an award,

testimony should be given regarding the hours spent on the case, the 

nature of preparation, complexity of the case, experience of the 

attorney, and the prevailing hourly rates. The trial court does not need 

to hear evidence on each factor but can look at the entire record, the 

evidence presented on reasonableness, the amount in controversy, the 

common knowledge of the participants as lawyers and judges, and the 

relative success of the parties.

In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, 

no pet.) (cleaned up). The trial court has broad discretion in awarding an amount of 

attorney’s fees. Id. at 386. 

In her answer and in her counterpetition for divorce, Mother requested 

attorney’s fees to “effect an equitable division of the estate of the parties and as a 

part of the division, and for services rendered in connection with conservatorship 

and support of the children[.]” Mother’s counsel testified at trial, the trial court 

admitted his billing statement into evidence, and Father stipulated to Mother’s 

counsel’s qualifications. Counsel stated his hourly rate was $350/hour and his 

assistant’s rate was $150; opposing counsel stipulated these were reasonable rates. 

Mother’s counsel stated the fee total was $11,629.34 through the end of January. He 

stated these fees were reasonable and necessary. He also sought $2,450 in additional 
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fees for time spent in trial. In questioning whether attorney’s fees were warranted 

here, Father’s counsel cross-examined Mother’s counsel about whether this was a 

standard divorce case, and Mother’s counsel stated they had to file numerous

pleadings, Father’s alcohol use posed a safety issue for the children, and there “were 

very serious allegations in this case.” We conclude Mother’s counsel’s testimony 

provided a reasonable basis for the award of attorney’s fees, and we conclude the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $7,500 in fees. See In re Marriage 

of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d at 386–87. 

In his fifth issue, Father complains about various orders and filings, arguing 

they are “misleading, misidentified, or missing.” He complains that a February 24, 

2021 order suspending his possession and access to the children is mislabeled as 

“non-signed”; Mother’s May 6, 2021 motion to clarify memorandum ruling is 

missing from the record; a January 27, 2022 order appointing receiver is “not in the 

official e-file system”; a March 26, 2022 settlement statement was “falsely labeled”; 

and a March 31, 2022 receiver’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc “is not in the 

records of the case.” 

We conclude Father has failed to present anything here for our review. While 

we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we nevertheless hold pro se 

litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with 

applicable laws and rules of procedure. Washington v. Bank of New York, 362 

S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). To present an issue to this 
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Court, a party’s brief must contain, among other things, “a concise, 

nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record references, 

and a clear and concise argument for the contention made with appropriate citations 

to authorities and the record.” Id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Though “we do not 

require rigid adherence regarding the form of a brief, we examine briefs closely for 

compliance with rules that govern the content of appellate briefs.” Hammonds v. 

Dallas Cty., No. 05-18-01433-CV, 2020 WL 948383, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 

27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, it 

waives the issue on appeal. Devine v. Dallas Cty., 130 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).

Because Father fails to make a clear argument for his contentions here made 

with appropriate citation to pertinent authorities, we conclude he has failed to present 

anything for our review in his fifth issue. See, e.g., Gioffredi v. Retreat at Riverstone, 

No. 01-21-00627-CV, 2022 WL 17981570, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2

 

 

2 We note the procedure for supplementing the clerk’s record may be found at TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c). 

See Mayfield v. N. Vill. Green I Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., No. 01-12-00748-CV, 2014 WL 2538554, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“On her discovery that the clerk’s 

record did not contain the documents she deemed necessary for this appeal, [the appellant] could have 

directed the trial court clerk, by letter, to prepare and file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the 

documents.”).
–21–

In his sixth issue, Father argues the division of property in the final decree of 

divorce is canceled by another provision in the decree. The decree states, in pertinent 

part: 

It is ordered and decreed that Petitioner, [Father], is awarded the 

following as his sole and separate property, and Respondent, [Mother], 

is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property:

P-l. The following real property on the condition precedent he refinance 

the note payable and mortgage on the martial residence by July l, 2021 

subject to the terms of refinancing set forth in this Decree, including 

but not limited to any escrow funds, prepaid insurance, utility deposits, 

keys, house plans, home security access and code, garage door opener, 

warranties and service contracts, and title and closing documents: . . . 

COMMONLY KNOWN AS [ . . . ] DESOTO DRIVE, DESOTO, 

TEXAS 75115.

Father argues the first paragraph divesting Mother of all right to the properties listed 

cancels out the next paragraph conditioning the award of the marital residence to 

Father. Father cites one authority to support his argument: § 9.007(a) of the family 

code, which provides that “[a] court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the 

division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or annulment[,]” and

further states that “[a]n order to enforce the division is limited to an order to assist 

in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order and may not alter or change the 

substantive division of property.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.007(a).

We reject Father’s argument. The final decree here clearly conditioned the 

award of the marital residence on Father’s refinancing the property pursuant to the 

terms of the decree. This conditional award was “the division of property made or 
–22–

approved in the decree of divorce or annulment,” so it is nonsensical to suggest the 

decree itself amended or modified that division of property in violation of § 9.007. 

See TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.007(a). Father’s sixth issue is overruled. 

Father argues in his first issue the trial court erred and violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by ordering him to submit to drug and alcohol screening. And in 

his seventh issue, Father contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by 

enjoining his use of alcohol.3 However, Father did not present these constitutional 

complaints to the trial court, and he has accordingly failed to preserve these 

complaints for our review. See TEX.R. APP. P. 33.1; Ricks v. Ricks, 169 S.W.3d 523, 

526 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (complaint that divorce decree failed to 

comply with family code was not preserved for appellate review when complaint 

was never presented to trial court); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 632 

n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (when appellant failed to assert 

constitutional claim before the trial court, she did not preserve the claim for appeal). 

Father’s first and seventh issues are overruled. 

In his final issue, Father contends the trial court erred in appointing the 

receiver for the marital residence, Shelly White, and he raises an assortment of 

 

3 Although the family code does not speak to permanent injunctions, courts routinely incorporate them 

in final orders in family law cases, and there is no bar to incorporating language of injunction into a divorce 

decree. See Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Where the family 

code discusses injunctive relief, it generally dispenses with the traditional requirements for a permanent 

injunction. Id.; In re B.J.W.S., No. 14-08-01154-CV, 2010 WL 4396291, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). “There can be no question that courts routinely grant permanent 

injunctions consistent with the best interests of the child.” In re B.J.W.S., 2010 WL 4396291, at *9. 
–23–

complaints relating to the receiver. The trial court, in its April 5, 2021 memorandum 

ruling, ordered Father to “keep the marital residence . . . on the condition that he 

refinance the home by July 1, 2021 and [Mother] is paid 50% of the net equity.” The 

court ordered that, should Father fail to refinance the home by July 1, 2021, “the 

house is ordered as sold and the court appoints Shelly White [ ] as the realtor to sell 

the house at a price that she determines based on the market.” If the house was 

ordered sold, the net proceeds were to be divided fifty-fifty. The final decree signed 

several months later reiterated these orders. After Father failed to refinance or sell 

the home pursuant to the court’s orders, Mother filed an emergency motion to 

appoint a receiver, and a hearing on the motion was conducted on September 22, 

2021. The emergency motion and any reporter’s record of the hearing are not in the 

record before us. On October 7, 2021, Mother again moved for the appointment of 

a receiver, stating that Father had failed to refinance the mortgage and was refusing 

to sell the residence with Shelly White. On October 19, 2021, Father filed a motion 

in opposition to the appointment of the receiver. Among other things, Father argued 

no grounds existed for the appointment of a receiver and that the proposed 

receivership was inequitable. On December 8, 2021, the trial court extended the 

time for Father to refinance the marital residence until January 21, 2022, and ordered 

that Father did “not have the authority to unilaterally sell the residence to any third 

party without the agreement of [Mother].” The court also appointed Shelly White 

as receiver, effective February 1, 2022, to sell the house at the highest attainable 
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price and divide the proceeds pursuant to the final decree of divorce if Father failed 

to refinance the home within the extended timeframe. 

Section 7.001 of the family code “grants a trial court broad authority to divide 

marital property in a manner it deems just and right upon the dissolution of 

marriage.” Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 

pet. denied); TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001 (“In a decree of divorce or annulment, the 

court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court 

deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children 

of the marriage.”). The family code further provides that, “[w]hile a marriage is 

pending and on the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion after notice and 

hearing, the court may render an appropriate order . . . appointing a receiver for the 

preservation and protection of the property of the parties.” Id. § 6.502. The trial 

court may appoint a receiver if it deems the appointment to be necessary and 

equitable in order to preserve and protect one or both parties. In re C.F.M., 360 

S.W.3d 654, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Section 6.502 gives the trial 

court “the broadest form of discretion” when granting section 6.502 orders. Id. We 

review a trial court’s order appointing a receiver for an abuse of discretion. Shultz 

v. Shultz, No. 05-18-00876-CV, 2019 WL 2511245, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 

18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the hearing concerning 

the motion to appoint the receiver. “[W]hen we are confronted with an incomplete 
–25–

record, we presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact.”

Travelers Indem. Co. of Rhode Island v. Starkey, 157 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Without a complete record, we must overrule Father’s 

challenge to the trial court’s appointment of the receiver. See In re A.W.L., No. 05-

16-00916-CV, 2018 WL 446421, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 17, 2018, no pet.) 

(mem. op.); see also Blue Window Capital, LLC v. City of Dallas, No. 05-22-00042-

CV, 2022 WL 9765467, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. 

op.). Furthermore, Father cites no pertinent authorities to support his other 

complaints about the receiver; accordingly, we conclude these claims are waived. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

210918f.p05

/Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE
–26–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF S.I.J., 

S.M.J., S.D.J. II, CHILDREN 

No. 05-21-00918-CV 

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-07514.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Miskel participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 29th day of September, 2023.