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#### Talmadge, commissioner, *v.*McRae; *et vice versa.*

Nos. 6764, 6770.

December 13, 1928.

Rehearing denied January 23, 1929.

See *Talmadge v.*Cordell, ante.

Atkinson, J.

The decision in this case is controlled by the decision in the companion ease of *Talmadge*v. *Cordell,*ante.

*Judgment affirmed on the maim Mil of exceptions, and affirmed in part and reversed in part on the eross-Mll.*

*All the Justices concur.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7093

ELDON GUY BELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES B. HUNT, JR., Governor; FRANKLIN FREEMAN, Secretary of Corrections; TALMADGE L.

BARNETT, Superintendent of Eastern Correctional Institution; CHARLES EURGIA LAND, Doctor;

DOCTOR BALOCH, Medical Director; GENEVA BERRY,

R.N.; MRS. LAPINSKI, R.N., Nurse,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District

Judge. (CA-94-860-5-CT-H)

Submitted: November 21, 1996 Decided: December 4, 1996

Before HALL, WILKINS, HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eldon Guy Bell, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion accepting the magistrate judge's

recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

on the reasoning of the district court. Bell v. Hunt, No. CA-94-

860-5-CT-H (E.D.N.C. June 6, 1996). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Martin Flannigan *v.*Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Appeal — Reversal—Sufficiency of Evidence.

The Court of Appeals has no power to reverse a judgment upon a conviction for a felony on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence.

APPEAL FROM MeCRAOKEN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 10, 1873.

*T. H. Burke, for appellant.*

*Attorney General, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

This court has no power to reverse a judgment upon a conviction for a felony because it is against the evidence. There are no instructions in the record and, the indictment being good, the judgment must stand.

Judgment *affirmed.*
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## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-1597

___________ Charlotte Klingler; Charles Wehner; * Sheila Brashear, * * Appellants, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Western Director, Department of Revenue, * District of Missouri. State of Missouri, * * [PUBLISHED] Appellee. * * __________________ * * United States of America, * * Amicus Curiae. *

___________ Submitted: December 10, 2001 Filed: February 27, 2002

___________ Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. After Charlotte Klingler and others filed suit against the director of the Department of Revenue of the state of Missouri, claiming that the fee charged for-2- placards that allow use of accessible parking violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), see42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, the defendant moved to dismiss the case based on eleventh amendment immunity. The district court granted the motion and the plaintiffs appealed. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

In Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), the Supreme Court held that eleventh amendment immunity was not available to state officials in suits seeking prospective injunctive relief for violations of federal law. See also Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 664, 667-68 (1974). In Randolph v. Rodgers , 253 F.3d 342, 347-48 (8th Cir. 2001), which we decided after the district court entered its judgment in this case, we held this principle applicable to non-employment claims based on Title II of the ADA. We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs here may seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young . We believe, however, that Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (1999) bars the plaintiffs' claim for monetary damages. We therefore reverse the district court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, but affirm its dismissal of the claim for damages, and we remand to the court for further proceedings. A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### J. M. Hawkins *v.*T. L. Lee, etc.

Bailment — Gratuitous Bailee.

Tbe owner of a steamer, in .transporting freight free of charge, a package containing plaintiff’s money, was held to act as a gratuitous bailee only and was not liable for its loss, unless the loss resulted from the negligence of the owner of the steamer or his agents or servants.

Appeal — Reversal—Judgment in Criminal Case.

A judgment of a court in a criminal law action stands on the same footing as the verdict of a jury, and' will not be 'disturbed unless palpably against the weight of the evidence.

APPEAL PROM McCRACKEN COURT OP COMMON PLEAS.

December 24, 1872.

*Hawns & Allen, for appellant.*

*Q. Q. Quigley, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The testimony; shows that no. charge was made and no- compensation expected for the transportation of the package containing plaintiff’s money from Paducah' to its destination on the Tennessee river.

As to such package, the owners of the steamer were not acting in the capacity of common carriers, but as mere accommodation bailees. They are not liable for its lossi unless it resulted from the neglect of themselves, their agents or their servants.

Whether or not it was so lost, was a question which the parties voluntarily submitted to the court for adjudication. The judgment of the court in a common law action stands on the same footing with the verdict of a jury. We are not prepared to decide that the judgment in this case was palpably against the weight of the evidence.

It must therefore be *affirmed.*
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Exhibit 99




The May Department Stores Company
611 Olive Street
St. Louis, MO 63101-1799

April 5, 2002



Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street N.W.
Washington, DC  20549

Ladies and Gentlemen:


Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen) has represented to The May Department Stores
Company, a Delaware corporation, that its audit was subject to Andersen's
quality control system for the U.S. accounting and auditing practice to provide
reasonable assurance that the engagement was conducted in compliance with
professional standards and that there was appropriate continuity of Andersen
personnel working on the audit and availability of national office
consultation. Availability of personnel at foreign affiliates of Andersen is
not relevant to this audit.



Sincerely,




/s/ Thomas D. Fingleton
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL CONWAY,

 Plaintiff, 

 v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

 Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case Number: 1:20-cv-04966

Judge Sara L. Ellis

Magistrate Judge Beth W. Jantz

ORDER AND ENTRY 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FOR LEAVE TO FILE PLAINTIFF’S REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN 

DOCUMENTS, RECORDINGS, AND DATA

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Reply in support 

of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel The Production Of Certain Documents, Recordings, And Data, dated 

November 25, 2022 (Dkt. #139), and to strike from the Docket, as inadvertently filed, his Reply to 

said Motion, together with exhibits, entered on the docket as Doc. No 166 in this case.

For good cause, the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff Conway is granted leave to file his 

Reply. The Clerk is ordered to enter on the docket, Plaintiff’s Reply to Dkt. No. 139, attached as Exhibit 1 

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave, and to strike from the docket Plaintiff’s inadvertently filed Reply, together 

with exhibits, entered on the docket as Dkt. No. 166 in this case.

SO ORDERED. 

________________________________

THE HONORABLE BETH W. JANTZ

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case: 1:20-cv-04966 Document #: 167-2 Filed: 03/12/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:2339
No. CR-15-398

DAMIEN FORD

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered January 7, 2016

PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 

TIME, MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT, 

AND MOTION TO HOLD IN AVAIL

[MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,

NO. 46CR-12-438]

HONORABLE KIRK DOUGLAS 

JOHNSON, JUDGE

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS MOOT.

PER CURIAM 

 In 2013, appellant Damien Ford was found guilty by a Miller County jury of firstdegree battery, second-degree battery, and aggravated assault for the beating death of his 

live-in girlfriend’s twenty-three-month-old son. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 

624 months’ imprisonment. On October 29, 2014, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Ford v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 576. The mandate issued on November 18, 2015. 

 On January 23, 2015, Ford filed in the trial court a verified, untimely pro se petition 

for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2015), 

arguing eleven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief on 

the untimely petition, and an appeal was lodged. 

Now before us is Ford’s motion for extension of time, motion for transcript, and 

motion to hold in avail. Because it is clear from the record that Ford could not prevail on 

appeal, we dismiss the appeal, and the motions are therefore moot. An appeal from an order 

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.

Cite as 2016 Ark. 3
that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it 

is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Williams v. State, 2014 Ark. 70 (per curiam). 

Under Rule 37.2(c)(ii), if an appeal was taken of the judgment of conviction, a 

petition claiming relief under Rule 37.1 must be filed in the trial court within sixty days of 

the date the mandate is issued by the appellate court. The mandate in Ford’s direct appeal 

was issued on November 18, 2015, meaning a postconviction petition pursuant to the Rule 

must have been filed by January 19, 2015.1

 As the trial court correctly noted, Ford’s January 

23, 2015 petition was untimely. Because it is clear from the record that Ford could not 

prevail on appeal, we dismiss the appeal, and the motions are therefore moot.

 Appeal dismissed; motions moot. 

 WYNNE, J., not participating. 

1The actual date for Ford to file his Rule 37 petition would have been January 17, 

2015, but that date fell on a Saturday; therefore, the last day to file his Rule 37 petition 

would have been the following business day, Monday, January 19, 2015. Ark. R. App. P.–

Crim. 17 (2015). 

Cite as 2016 Ark. 3
Order entered March 6, 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 20 - 00277 - CR No. 05 - 20 - 002 85 - CR No. 05 - 20 - 002 86 - CR UMAIR AHMAE KHAN, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A ppellee On Appeal from the 199th Judi cial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 199 - 80965 - 2018 , 199 - 8 1674 - 2018 & 199 - 83132 - 2018 O RDER Umair Ahmae Khan timely filed his notice s of appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(a)(1). We ORDER the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant is entitled to court

- appo inted counsel in t h ese appeal s . If the trial court finds that appella nt is entitled to court

- appointed counsel, we ORDER the trial court to appoint an atto rney to rep resent appellant in the appeal s . If the trial courtfinds that appellant is not en titled to court

- appointed counsel, the trial court shall

determine whether app ellant will retain counsel to represent him in the appeal s and, if so, the name, State Bar numbe r, and contact informatio n for retained counsel. We ORDER the trial court to transm it a reco rd of the hearing, includ ing findings of fact, any orders, and any su pporting documentation, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. We DIRECT t he Cl erk to s en d copies o f this order to the Honorable Angela Tucker , Presiding Judg e, 19 9 th Judicial District Court; Lynne Finley , Collin County District Clerk ; LaTresta Ginyard , offici al court reporter , 19 9 th Judicial District Court ; and the Collin Count y District Attorney ’ s Office

. W e ABATE the appeal s to allow the trial court to comply with the ord er. The appeal s will be reinstated t hirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7983

WARREN CHASE, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MARYLAND DIVISION OF CORRECTION (DOC); ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:09-cv-00955-CCB)

Submitted: January 14, 2010 Decided: January 22, 2010

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Warren Chase, Appellant Pro Se. Edward John Kelley, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Warren Chase seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude Chase has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED