IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

N O. 2014-KA-01505-COA

MARLON LITTLE APPELLANT

v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/02/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: W . DANIEL HINCHCLIFF NICKITA SHANTA BANKS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN JASON L. DAVIS BARBARA W AKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ALEXANDER C. MARTIN NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF ARMED ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS; AND CONVICTED OF FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS, W ITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL - 11/22/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Marlon Little appeals his convictions f or arm ed robbery a nd f

elon in possession o f

af

irearm

. At trial, the only substantive evidence presented by the State was the victim ’s

ey ewitness testim ony

. Little argues t hat the v ictim ’s initial descripti o n o f t h e assailant to police was so inconsistent w ith Little’s actual phy sical a t tributes that the verdict was against

the weight of the e vidence, requiring reversal. W e agree and reverse and rem and f or a new
trial.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW ¶2. On October 31, 2 0 13, nurse practitioner Danny Ellis was robbed a t gunpoint shortly

af ter closing his Port Gibson of f ice f o r the day

. Ellis t estif

ied that t he robber jum

ped h im

f rom behind and wrestled h im to the ground. Ellis hit t he attacker in the side of t he head with his laptop. The robber p u t his knee in Ellis’s chest and held a pistol to his f ace, dem anding

h is wallet. The m a n was wearing a hoodie w ith the string pulled t ight across h is c h i n

. T h e

upper portion of the hoodie obscured a portion o f the attacker’s f a ce. Ellis had never seen the

m an bef ore. Af ter the m a n took Ellis’s w allet and lef t, Ellis walked to the police station and reported the robber y t o Port Gibson’s chief of police, Calvin Jackson. Initially , Ellis

described the m an who attacked him as a clean-shaven, stocky Af rican Am erican m ale in his

m id-to-late twenties. ¶3. The police received a tip f rom a n inf

orm ant identif

y ing Little as a suspect. Based on
this tip, J ackson, who was f am i liar with Lit t l e, put together a seven-photo lineup on
Novem ber 4, 2013, to show to Ellis. Ellis identif i ed the m an in the f

ourth photo, Little, as the

m an who had r obbed h i m

. Ellis testif ied that he recognized Little in p art because the attacker

had pronounced nasolabial f olds. Littl e w a s the only p erson in the photo l ineup with

2pronounced nasolabial f olds. L i t t l e is f

orty y ears old, t all and thin, with gold teeth, and

norm ally wears a goatee. The police did not conduct any investigation other than presenting Ellis with the photo lineup. The gun and the wallet were never recovered. ¶4. Little w as indicted in April 2014. 1 The trial w as held less than a m o nth later on May
13, 2014. The m orning of t rial, t he cou r t denied a previously f iled def ense m otion f

or a
continuance requesting m o re t im e to f ind Little’s alibi w itness. A subpoena f or the witness

was issued the day bef

ore t rial. Little’s attorne y a l s o a rgued in the m otion to continue that

her contact with her client had been lim ited due to his being com m itted to a transitional hom e by his parole of

f icer, and that m ore tim e was needed to prepare a def e n se. ¶5. Police Chief Jackson testif ied f or the Stat e , r e c o u n t i n g t h e c o u rse of the police investigation. Ellis testif

i ed f or t he State, identif

y ing Little as the person w ho had robbed h im

at gunpoint. The def

ense did not call any witnesses. Several witnesses the de f e n s e h a d

intended to call either did not show or could not be f o und in tim e f

or trial. ¶6. Little’s m otion f

or a new trial was denied. He appeals.

DISCUSSION ¶7. The sole argum ent Little m akes on direct appeal is t hat the evidence a gainst him w as

so m inim al and contradictory t h a t h i s c onviction was against the weight of the e vidence, requiring reversal. 2 “W hen reviewing a denia l o f a motion f o r a new trial based on an

1 In Jan u a ry

2 0 1 4 , th e g ran d j u ry

in itially n o -b illed th e ch arg es.

2 T h e b rief f

iled b y L ittle’s atto rn ey n o tes th at sev eral arg u m en ts, su ch as in ef f ectiv e assistan ce o f co u n sel, w o u ld b e b est p reserv ed f o r p o stco n v ictio n -relief rev iew i n th e ev en t th at L ittle’s co n v i ctio n w e re af f irm e d o n d irect ap p eal. L i t t l e f i l ed a su p p l em e n tal p ro se b rief raisin g m

u l t i p le issu es (in clu d in g an alib i d ef en s e ), all o f w h ich w o u ld n o t b e
3objection to the w eight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary

to the o verwhelm ing weight of t he evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State , 895 So. 2d 8 36, 844 (¶18) (Miss. 2005). The Court

sits as a “thirteenth juror,” and if it “disagrees with t h e jury ’s resolution of the conf licting

testim o ny ,” the proper rem edy is t o grant a new t rial. Id

. “[ T]he evidence should be weighed in the light m o st f

avorable to the verdict.” I d

. ¶8. The testim ony of an uncorroborated witness can b e s uf f icient to sustain a conviction. Renfro v

. State , 1 1 8 So. 3d 560, 565 (¶22) (Miss. 2013); Pritchett v. State , 134 So. 3d 857,

860-61 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (f inding t he preponderance o f the evidence did not weigh heavily a gainst the jury ’s verdict where the victim im m ediately recognized the def endant in

a photographic lineup and had a ccurately described the def endant’s appearance to a detective prior to b eing shown the lineup). However, the reliability of a n e y ewitness identif ication is

lessene d when the d e scription i nitially given to police is inconsistent with the subsequent lineup identif

ication of a def endant. See W

illiams v. State , 98 So. 3d 468, 472 (¶16) (Miss.

Ct. A pp. 2012) (the f

actors used to determ ine reliability o f a lineup identif ication include the

accuracy of a witness’s prior description of the crim inal). ¶9. In Bush , a v ictim i n i t i a l l y t o l d p o l i c e that the m asked m an who had robbed the

convenience store she worked at h ad a slit above his lef t ey e and that he m ight have a gold

tooth. Bush , 895 So. 2d. at 841 ( ¶8). She l ater identif i ed the def

e ndant, Bush, as the robber,

even though Bush did not have a scratch or scar above his lef t ey e and did not have a gold

ap p ro p r iate f

o r rev iew o n d irect ap p eal.
4tooth. Id

. The Mississippi Suprem e Court s t a t e d t h a t “[ w]ere this conf licting evidence the only substantive proof the State presented to t h e j u r y , perhaps Bush’s argum ent f or a new
trial would have m erit.” Id

. at 845 (¶19). However, a d d i tional evidence against Bush

included the ey e witness testim ony of a coconspirator, a p urported unre c orded conf ession

Bush m a de to police, and a security video consistent with the version of events told by the

victim , the coconspirator, and Bush in his purported conf ession. Id

. ¶10. Sim ilar to the testif y ing victim in B ush , the victim here gave a n i nitial d escription o f

the assailant that was inconsistent with the def endant’s actual phy sical attributes, including age and build. But unlike in Bush , the State here presented no substantive proof to support
Little’s guilt other than the victim ’s testim ony identif y ing Little as th e a s sailant. W e have

here the e xact situation t he Mississippi Suprem e Court i dentif ied a s potentially m eritorious

in Bush

. ¶11. We f

i n d , o n t h e f

a c t s of this case, that the w e i ght of the evidence preponderates heavily against the v e r d ict where the sole substantive proof presented a t trial was the

testim o ny of the victim identif y ing the def

endant, a nd the v ictim ’s initial description of the

attacker to t h e p o l i ce was inconsistent with that identif ication. W e theref

ore reverse and

rem and f or a new trial.

CONCLUSION ¶12. Because the only s ubstantive proof presented at trial of Little’s guilt was the victim ’s

identif ication of Little, and that identif ication was inconsistent with the initial d escr i p t i o n given to police, w e f

ind that t he verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that a new

5trial is warranted. W e theref o r e reverse and rem and. ¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRC U I T C O U R T OF CLAIBORNE COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND T H I S C A S E I S R E M A N D E D F O R F U R T H E R PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT W ITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO CLAIBORNE COUNTY.
LEE, C .J., IRVING, P .J., BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, J J
. , CONCUR. GRIFFIS, P .J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
GRIFFIS, P.J., DISSENTING: ¶14. The m ajor i t y , s i t t i n g a s a “thirteenth juror,” has determ ined that an ey ewitness’s

testim o ny is not suf

f icient evidence to s ustain the jury ’s verdict t o c onvict Little. The

decision t o rem and could present a unique dilem m a f o r the trial j udge. Suppose t hat on

rem and, just bef

ore a n e w trial is held, the prosecutor and the def ense attorney m eet with the

trial judge and say : “Your Honor, we have the exact sam e evidence to of f er at t his trial as the

last. Based on the Court of Appeals’ ruling, i f the sam e e vidence r esults in a guilty verdict,

y ou will be obligated to grant a new trial.” They w o uld be right. This case could be retried

until a jury acquits the def e ndant. Thus, I am puzzled b y the m ajority ’s decision to rem and

the case f or a new trial. ¶15. N e vertheless, I d isagree with the m ajority ’s decision t o reverse Little’s convic t i o n

. First, I address the standard of review. Second, I address m y analy s i s. ¶16. I d i s agree with using t he “thirteenth juror” rationale in the s tandard o f review. I n Hughes v

. State , 43 So. 3 d 5 26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), I joined J u dge Larry Roberts’s specially concurring opin i o n. Judge Roberts, who w as a very experienced circuit judge,

addressed his concern with “the of ten-used characterization of an appellate court’s role when

6r e v i e w ing the w eight o f the evidence

— nam ely our self -assigned role o f the ‘thirteen t h juror.’ It is a m oniker I could not disagree w ith m ore.” Id. at 530 (¶16) (Roberts, J., specially concurring). Judge Roberts reasoned:

M y review of this state’s jurisprudence on the m a t ter shows that the f irs t appearance of “thirteenth juror” us e d by a Mississippi appellate court in the context of

an appellate court’s role in a review of the weight of the evidence
was in McQueen v. State , 4 2 3 S o

. 2 d 800 (Miss. 1982). In McQueen , the Mississippi S uprem e Court quoted a l e n g t h y p assage f r om Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31 ( 1982), in which the United States Suprem e Court discussed the procedural consequences a n d d i ffe r e n c e s b e t

w e e n r e v e r s i n g a c o nviction based upon insuf

f iciency o f the evidence and the weight of the evidence. McQueen , 423 So. 2d at 803-04 (quoting Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 41-45). In so d o i n g , t h e Suprem e Court stated that “a reversal based upon the weight of the e vidence, unlike a reversal based on insuf f i cient evidence, does not m e an that acquittal
was the only proper v e r d i c t

. Instead, the appellate court s its a s a ‘thirteenth juror’ a nd disagrees w ith the j ury ’s resolution of the conf licting testim ony .” Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42. Post McQueen , the phrase w as bounced around in the opinions of the suprem e court, and later, this C ourt, bef ore ultim ately settling
as a f avorable description of an appellate court’s r ole. B ut the Suprem e Court never used the phrase “thirteenth juror” again.

Nine y ears af

ter McQueen w as handed d own, the suprem e court again used the phrase. However, this tim e it was m uch l ess f avorable and tended to disagree with Tibbs

. The suprem e court stated: “The appellate court’s role is to see t hat there is a f

a ir t rial g iven to both sides. W e are not r esult oriented. The suprem e court will not be the thirteenth juror.” W alker v. Graham , 582 So. 2d 431, 4 33 (Miss. 1991). This sentim ent was continued over the next sev e r a l y e ars as “thirteenth juror” was singularly used in a numb e r o f d issents in a negative connotation d escribing the r ole the dissenting a uthor believed the m ajority was incorrectly f

illing. S ee Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1 532, Order of Moose, Inc. , 641 So. 2d 1 1 86, 1 1 9 3 (Miss. 1 994) (McRae, J., dissenting); Lloyd W o od Constr. Co., Inc. v. Little , 623 So. 2d 968, 974 (Miss. 1993) (McRae, J., dissenting); Stonecipher v. Kornhaus , 623 So. 2d 955, 9 67-68 ( Miss. 1993) (McRae, J., dissenting); New Hampshire Ins. C o. v. Sid Smith & Assocs., Inc. , 610 So. 2d 3 4 0, 348 ( M iss. 1992) ( McRae, J., dissenting); S tate Highway Comm'n of Miss. v. Hyman , 5 9 2 S o

. 2 d 9 52, 958 (Miss. 1991) (McRae, J., dissenting).
Then, in Allen v. State , 7 4 9 S o

. 2d 1152, 1159 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999),

7this Court, reciting the standard o f review utilized w hen reviewing a denial of

a m otion f

o r a new trial, stated that: “It has been said that on a m otion f or new trial the trial court sits as a thirteenth juror. The m otion, however, is addressed to the discretion of t he trial court.” This language and standard, i m ply i ng t hat the trial c ourt i s the t heoretical “thirteenth j uror,” w as e c h o e d tim e and tim e again.

This all led us t o the current use o f t h e t e r m a s f i r st penned in Bush v

. State , 895 So. 2d 8 3 6 (Miss. 2005). There the suprem e c ourt quoted Amiker v. D rugs For Less, Inc. , 7 9 6 So. 2 d 942 (Miss. 2000) and stated: “On a m otion f or a new trial t he court sits as a t hirteenth juror. T he m otion, however, is addressed to t he discretion of the court, which s h ould be exercised w ith caution, and the p o w e r to grant a new trial should be invoked o nly in exceptional cases in which the e vidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Bush , 895 So. 2d at 844 (¶18). This passage was interpreted f or the proposition that “when the trial court (and subsequently the appellate court) reviews a verdict that is alleged t o be a gainst the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence, this presents
a dist i nctive situation which necessitates the court sitting as a “ thirteenth juror.” Id. at 844 n.2. The Bush court, labeling itself as a “thirteenth juror,” then resolved the issue of whether Kany nne Ja mo l Bush’s conviction was supported b y the weight of t he evidence by beginning its c o n c l u s i o n with “sitting as a l im i ted ‘thir t e e nth juror’ i n this case.” Id. at (¶19). B ut A miker sim ply does not m andate or otherwise suggest that it is proper f or an appellate court to sit, review t he evidence, and m a k e a judgm ent c all of credibility and other m atters germ a ne to the role of a juror.

In A miker , the central issue was whether a successor jud g e c o u l d vacate his predecessor’s order granting a new trial. Amiker, 796 S o. 2d at 946 (¶8). In arriving at the conclusion, the suprem e court in Amiker s tated:

It has l ong been recognized that t he tri a l j u dge is in the best position to v i e w t h e trial. “The trial judge who hears the witnesses l ive, obser v e s t h e i r d em eanor and in general sm ells the sm oke of the battle is by his v ery position f a r better equipped to m ake f indings of

f act which will have the reliability that we need and desire.” Gavin v

. State , 473 So. 2 d 952, 955 (Miss. 1985). Using a cold, printed record o f a case, if that, a successor judge sits in an inf

erior position to t he judge who presided over the trial of the case.

Id. at 947 (¶16). Further, it was identif ied that:

8If we allowed a successor judge t o change a decision granting a new trial, we woul d i n v est p ower in one in no better position than this Court t o do what this C ourt does not do. T h i s C o u rt justif iably r e f u ses to review grants of a new trial based in part
on the s uperior p osition of the t rial court to decide such m a tters. Dorr v. W atson , 28 Miss. 383, 395 (1854) (“The granting [ of ] a new trial rests in a grea t me a s u r e upon the sound discretion of the court below, to be exercised under all the circum stances of the case with ref

erence to settled legal rules as w ell as the justice
o f t h e particular c ase. If a new t rial be ref used, a strong case m u st be shown to authorize the appellate court to say t hat it was error; and so, if it b e granted, it m u st be m anif

est t hat it was im properly g ranted.”). S

e e a lso R ayner v. Lindsey , 243 M iss. 824 , 832-33, 138 So. 2d 902, 905-06 (1962). Surely , a successor trial judge is in no better position than this Court.

Id. at 948 (¶21). I do n o t f ind these pronouncem ents can f orm t he basis f

or the establishm ent o f an appellate court as a “thirteenth juror” when reviewing the denials of m otions f

or a new trial as s urm ised i n Bush and utilized in the litany of cases f ollowing it (including cases f rom this Court—som e e v en authored by
m y self ). In f act, Amiker suc c e ssf

ully p leads the case f

or the alternative and only reestablishes that it is the trial court alone that can f ill the role of “thirteenth juror.”

The role o f an appellate court when reviewing the denial o f a m otion f or a new trial is, sim

ply stated, to determ ine whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. Sheffield v. State , 749 So. 2d 123, 127 (¶16) (Miss. 1 999). This is so f or the exact reasons expounded in Amiker

. I t is the trial j udge who s its and observes the e vidence and w itnesses’ dem eanor t hroughout the trial; w ho hears the witnesses’ testim o nies; and w ho, ultim ately , is t he closest thing a trial has to a “thirteenth juror.” That t itle and point of view ar e s im ply inappropriate f

or an appellate court arm ed only with “a cold, printed record of a case.”
My last point goes t o the r ealistic ram if ications of a reversal by an appellate court of a t rial court’s denial of a m o tion f or a new trial. As touched upon in Justice W hite’s dissent in Tibbs , given an a p pellate co u r t ’s reversal on the weight of the evidence, “the def e ndant h a s a lready dem onstrated t hat a conviction based on the State’s case, as so f ar developed, i s ‘against t he w eight of the evidence.’” Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 50 (W hite, J ., dissenting). Theref ore, the State and trial court are put in a precarious situation on rem and. Assum ing the State c hooses to prosecute again, with no b etter or worse e vid e n c e a t its

9d isposal, a nd the def e nse does not m ake any substantive changes i n i t s presentation of evidence or trial strategy , and the sam e result o ccurs, by the “rule of the c ase,” t he trial c ourt is all but r equired to grant a second new trial. If not, whe n t h e def

e ndant appeals his conviction arguing that the weight of the evidence is not s uf

f icient and, of course, cites the reversal of his previous conviction as authority , an appellate court w ould sim ilarly have no choice but to reverse and rem and once m ore or be guilty of intellectual dishonesty

. The m ajority in Tibbs argues otherwise stating in response to Justice W hite’s dissent that: Although reversal of a f i r s t conviction b ased o n sharply conf licting testim ony m ay serve the interests o f justice, reversal of a second conviction based o n t h e sam e evidence m ay not. W hile the i nterests of justice m ay r equire an a p p e l l ate court to sit once as a thirteenth juror, that standard does not com pel the court to repeat the role.

Tibbs , 4 57 U.S. at 43 n .18. However, in m y opinion, this line of r easoning does nothing m ore than m uddle and dilute the standard of re view that an appellate court m

ust apply

. If there h a v e been no substantive changes f rom one trial to t he next and the sam e outcom e is r eached by a s e c o n d j ury , a f ailure on an appellate court’s part to, once again, rem and the case f or a new trial can be viewed a s n o t h ing m ore than arbitrary and capricious. Quite clearly , all other things equal, if the weight of the e vidence would not support
a f inding of g uilt a f

ter the f irst conviction, the sam e evidence, w hen presented during subsequent trials, m ust s t ill be deem ed inadequate to support a conviction. C ontrary to the statem ent quoted f rom Tibbs above, our role as an appellate court does not change.

Theref ore, I r espectf

ully suggest to the m e m

bers of our a

ppellate j udiciary t hat
we are not, and can never be, the hy pothetical “thirteenth juror.” The c losest judicial en t i t y identif

iable as a possible “ thirteenth juror” m u st b e the trial judge. W hen we review a claim on appeal that the v e r d i ct is contrary to the weigh t o f t he evidence, we sim ply determ ine based u

pon the cold record whether the trial judge abused his discretion. Nothing m o re, nothing less. Hughes , 43 So. 3d at 530-33 (¶¶17-25) (Roberts, J., specially concurring). ¶17. If these are the correct c riteria to review a m otion f or a new trial, we should ask why

the “thirteenth j uror” analy sis is n ot also part of the standard of r eview in c ivil cases. F or

1 0exam

ple, i n W hite v. Y ellow Freight System, Inc. , 9 05 So. 2 d 5 06, 5 10-11 (¶7) (Miss. 2004),

the suprem e court considered a m otion f or a new trial and did not include a “thirteenth juror”

discussion:

A m otion f

or a new trial f

alls within a lower standard of review than d oes t hat of a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict or a directed v e r d i ct. [ Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey , 878 So. 2d 31, 55 (Miss. 2004)]. R u le 59 of the Mississippi R

ules of Civi l P r ocedure authorizes t he trial judge t o s et aside a jur y v e r d ict as t o any or all parts of the issues tried and to g rant a new trial whenever

. . . j u stice requires. M.R.C.P. 59 cm t. The grant or denial of a m otion f o r a new trial is a m atter within t he trial court’s s o u n d d i s cretion. G r e e n v

. Grant , 641 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Miss. 1994). A new trial m ay be granted in a num

ber o f circum stances, such as when the verdict is against the substantial or o verwhelm ing weight of the e vide n c e

. Shields v. Easterling , 6 76 S o

. 2 d 293, 2 98 (Miss. 1996); see also URCCC 10.05(2)[ .] On a ppeal, this Court m ay reverse the grantin g o f a new trial only when the t rial court h as abused its discretion. Green , 641 So. 2d a t 1207. The existence of t rial court discre t i on, as a m atter of law and logic, necessarily im plies that there are at least two dif

f ering actions, n e i t h e r o f which if taken by the trial judge will result in reversal. Shields , 676 So. 2d at 298. I n r e v i e w i n g the trial court’s decision, an appellate court mu s t consider t he c r edible evidence in the light
m os t f a v o r a b le to the non-m oving party a nd g enerally take the credible evidence supporting the c l a i ms or def e nses of the non-m o ving party as t rue. Gre en , 641 So. 2d a t 1207. W hen the evidence is so viewed, this Court will
reverse only when, upon review of t he entire record, we are lef t wi t h a f irm and def inite conviction that the v e r d i ct, if allowed to stand, would work a m iscarriage of

justice. Id. at 1207-08. ¶18. Wh e n we review this case on an abuse-of -discretion s t a n d a r d , I f i n d t h a t t h e

e y e witness’s testim ony w as suf f icient. I do not f

ind the v erdict to be so c o ntrary to th e
overwhelm ing w eight of the evidence that to al l o w i t to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice. B ush , 8 95 So. 2d at 844 (¶18). I would af f irm Little’s conviction.
For these reasons, I dissent.
FAIR AND WILSON, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION

.

1 1