NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBIN BLADMIRO SANCHEZ

PI MENT A L,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General,

Respondent. No. 22

- 1905

Agency No.

A200

- 6 0 2

- 751

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2024 **

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges

.

Robin Bladmiro Sanchez Pimental (“Pimental”), a native of Guatemala,

p e t i t i o n s f

o r r e v i e w f

r o m t h e d e n i a l o f h i s m o t i o n t o r e o p e n i m m i g r a t i o n

p r o c e e d i n g s b a s e d o n a l l e g e d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l

. H e a l s o r e q u e s t e d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 8 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

t h a t t h e B o a r d o f I m m i g r a t i o n A p p e a l s ( “ B I A ” ) r e i s s u e i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n d u e t o

h i s c o u n s e l ’ s a l l e g e d e r r o r

. W e r e v i e w t h e d e n i a l o f a m o t i o n t o r e o p e n f o r a n

a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n

. See Cui v. Garland , 13 F.4th 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2 0 2 1 ) ; s e e a l s o

S i n g h v

. G o n z a l e

s

, 4 9 4 F

. 3 d 1 1 7 0

, 1 1 7 2 ( 9 th C i r

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( t r e a t i n g a r e q u e s t t o

r e i s s u e a s a m o t i o n t o r e o p e n )

. W e d e n y t h e p e t i t i o n

.

1. T h e B I A d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g P i m e n t a l ’ s m o ti o n t o

rei s s u e i t s p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n

. P i m e n t a l d i d n o t c o m p l y w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l

r e q u i r e m e n t s o f M

a t t e r o f L o z a d a

, 1 9 I

. & N

. D e c

. 6 3 7 ( B

. I

. A

. 1 9 8 8 )

. A s r e l e v a n t

h e r e

, u n d e r L o z a d

a

, “ ‘ f o r m e r c o u n s e l

, w h o s e integrity o r c o m p e t e n c e i s b e i n g

i m p u g n e d

, ’ ” m u s t b e n o t i f i e d o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s a n d g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y “ ‘ t o

p r e s e n t h i s v e r s i o n o f e v e n t s i f h e s o c h o o s e s [

. ] ’ ” R e y e s v

. A s h c r o

f t

, 3 5 8 F

. 3 d 5 9 2

,

5 9 9 ( 9 th C i r

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( q u o t i n g L o z a d a

, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639). Although we have

excused strict compliance with Lozada where fo rmer counsel’s error was “plain on

the face of the administrative record,” Escobar

- Grijalva v. I.N.S. , 206 F.3d 1331,

1335 (9th Cir.), amended , 213 F.3d 1221 (9 th Cir. 2000) , the record here falls short

of providing unequivocal evidence of ineffective assistance. See Rojas

- Garcia v.

Ashcroft , 339 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, whether the at torney erred

turns on the timing an d contents of a phone conversation not detailed in the record

and of which Pimental has an incomplete recollection. In addition, because

Pimental changed addresses while his first motion to reopen was pending, t h e3

r e c o r d d o e s n o t e x c l u d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s f o r m e r c o u n s e l mailed him

information about the BIA’s decision, but Piment a l failed to receive it through no

fault of the attorney’s. Had the attorney been notified of Pimental’s allegations and

given an opportunity to respond, the attorney may well have disputed Pimental’s

account.

Because we conclude that the BIA’s denial of the motion to reissue w as

supported by Pimental’s failure to comply with Lozada , we need not consider

whether he was prejudiced by the attorney’s alleged error.

2. W i t h respec t to Piment a l’s motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in determining that his t i m e a n d n u m b e r b a r r e d m o t i o n did not quali fy

for equitable tolling. Noncitizens generally may file one motion to reopen within

90 days of a final order of removal. S e e 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 9 a ( c ) ( 7 ) ( A )

, ( C ) ( i )

. The BIA

determined that equita ble tolling was not warranted because Pimental was or

should have been aware of its June 2020 decision denying his first motion to

reopen

, y e t d i d n o t f

i l e h i s s e c o n d m o t i o n until Apr il 2021. Even assuming, as

Pimental asserts, that he did not learn of the BIA’s decision until he was detained

by immigration authorities on November 2, 2020, and that the deadline should be

tolled until then , his second motion to reopen was still filed well outside the 90

- day

window. Pimen tal therefore did not act wit h the requisite due diligence to warrant

equitable tolling. See Iturribarria v. I.N.S. , 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003).4

PETITION DENIED.