alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a),

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Principal Financial Officer

I, Christopher R. Huber, certify that:

1. I have reviewed
this annual report on Form 10-K of NightHawk Radiology Holdings, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.
The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: March 5, 2007



/s/    CHRISTOPHER R.
HUBERChristopher R. HuberChief Financial Officer and Vice President of Operations (Principal Financial Officer)
#### McGehee *v.*Pope *et al.*

No. 6471.

January 15, 1929.

*Anderson, Rountree & Crenshaw*and *Granger Hansell,*for plaintiff in error.

*Howell, Heyman & Bolding,*contra.

Per Curiam.

Where a person, having a wife and daughter, makes a will disposing of all of his property, in which will both the wife and daughter are devisees, and afterwards executes a deed conveying to the wife certain real estate which constitutes the bulk of his property, which the daughter alleges is null and void because obtained by fraud ' and undue influence, and should for this reason be canceled, the daughter has such an interest, pending the probate of the will, as will entitle her to injunctive relief, restraining the grantee in the deed from disposing of the property thereby conveyed, and for cancellation of the deed, either as devisee if the will is set up or as heir at law if it is not set up. In *Murray*v. *McGuire,*129 *Ga.*269 (58 S. E. 841), and *Turner*v. *Holbrook,*145 *Ga.*603 (89 S. E. 700), the plaintiffs were proceeding solely in their capacity as heirs at law, and not in the alternative capacity of devisees or heirs at law.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atlcinson, J., who dissents.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE, L.M.K., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-50312.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 24, 1999.

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING

Before: CANBY, NOONAN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The opinion filed July 16, 1998, reported at 149 F.3d 1033, is amended as follows:

At 149 F.3d at 1035, right column, last full paragraph: Delete the final sentence of the paragraph (beginning • “Her prosecution would have ...”), and substitute the following sentence and footnote:

> Her prosecution would have followed even without her statement, *see id.*at 783 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting), and the admission of her statement did not materially affect the determination of delinquency.1

With the above amendment, the panel as constituted above, has voted to deny the petition for rehearing. Judge Kleinfeld has *1052voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing .en banc and Judges Canby and Noonan have so recommended.

The suggestion for en banc rehearing has been circulated to the full court, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for a rehearing en banc is rejected.

1

. In previous cases involving the Juvenile Delinquency Act we have stated that, even when no due process violation occurred, the test of harmlessness was whether the error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt,” thus applying a constitutional standard to nonconstitutional error. *Doe II,*862 F.2d at 779; *see also United States v. Baker,*10 F.3d 1374, 1395 (9th Cir.1993). In other cases that involve nonconstitu-tional error that is susceptible to harmless-error analysis, we have required only that it be "more probable than not” that the error did not materially affect the verdict. *See United States v. Rahm,*993 F.2d 1405, 1415 (9th Cir.1993). We need not resolve any tension between these two different standards for nonconstitutional error, because we find the error in this case to be harmless even by the more stringent constitutional test.
Reverse and Remand; Opinion Filed November 21, 2014.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-00923-CR

COREY THOMAS FREEMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401-80780-2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans

Opinion by Justice Evans

Corey Thomas Freeman was convicted of online solicitation of a minor under section 

33.021(b) of the Texas Penal Code. On September 10, 2013, we affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. See Freeman v. State, No. 05-12-00923-CR, 2013 WL 4805698 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Sept. 10, 2013, pet. granted). After we issued our opinion and judgment, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Ex Parte Lo holding that section 33.021(b) is facially 

unconstitutional. See Ex Parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The court then 

granted Freeman’s petition for review in this case, vacated our judgment, and remanded the 

cause for reconsideration in light of Lo. See Freeman v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (per curiam).

A law that has been declared facially unconstitutional is void from its inception and 

cannot provide a basis for any right or relief. See Ex Parte Chance, 439 S.W.3d 918, 918–19 
–2–

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (per curiam) (Cochran, J., concurring). For this reason, a person may 

always obtain relief from an indictment or conviction that was based on a penal statute that has 

been declared unconstitutional. Id. at 919. “No one can be convicted for a non-existent crime 

and no prior conviction based upon that unconstitutional statute is valid.” Id.

Freeman was convicted under a statute that has been declared facially unconstitutional. 

Because Freeman cannot lawfully be convicted for a crime that does not exist, we reverse the 

trial court’s judgment, remand the cause, and direct the trial court to dismiss the indictment.

 

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

120923RF.U05

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
–3–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

COREY THOMAS FREEMAN, Appellant

No. 05-12-00923-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401-80780-2011.

Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. 

Justices Lang and Myers participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED

and the cause REMANDED with instructions to enter an order dismissing the indictment.

Judgment entered this 21st day of November, 2014.
10516.

#### Martin *v.*The State.

Beoyles, P. J.

1. Complaint is *made*of the following excerpt from the charge of the court: “The State insists it has proven certain incriminating statements on the part of the defendant that connect him with the manufacture of this liquor. Look and see whether such statements were made, and, if made, whether they amount to incriminating admissions upon his part, and, if you find they do, you may take into consideration any incriminating admission made by the defendant, together with all other testimony in the case, to aid you in any way in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty, whether he is connected with the manufacture of liquor, as charged in the indictment.” *56Under the facts of the case and in the absence of a timely and appropriate written request, this excerpt was not erroneous because of failure to charge the law of confessions as set out in section 1031 of the Penal Code. *Walker v. State,*118 *Ga.*34 (44 S. E. 850); *Pierce*v. *State,*132 *Ga.*27 (61 S. E. 792); *Lindsay*v. *State,*138 *Ga.*818 (76 S. E. 369); *Riley*v. *State,*1 *Ga. App.*651 (57 S. E. 1031);*Rucker*v. *State,*2 *Ga. App.*140 (58 S. E. 295); *Porter*v. *State,*11 *Ga. App.*246 (74 S. E. 1099; *Weldon*v. *State,*21 *Ga. App.*330 (1c) (94 S. E. 326).

Decided June 27, 1919.

Indictment for manufacture of liquor; from Floyd superior court—Judge Wright. April *7,*1919.

*M. B. Mebane,*for plaintiff in error.

*G. II. Porter, solicitor-general,*contra.

2. There was testimony, other than that of accomplices, directly connecting the defendant witli the offense charged and authorizing his conviction. *.Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworih and Stephens, JJ., concur.*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIAN ZHENG,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 73305

Agency No. A205

- 187

- 548

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 14, 2020 * *

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Tian Zheng

, a native and citizen of China

, petitions pro se for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration

judge’s decision denying his application s for asylum

, withholding of removal

, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (“ CAT ”)

. We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for sub stantial evidence the agency’s factual findings.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 22 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 15

- 73305

Guo v. Sessions , 897 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018). We grant in part and deny

in part the petition for review, and we remand.

The record compels the conclusion that the cumulative harm Zheng suffered

in China rose to the level of persecution. See Guo , 897 F.3d at 1213

- 17 (finding

petitioner suffered past persecution because of his religious beliefs where he was

detained, beaten, forced to sign a document promising not to attend a home church,

and required to report to the police weekly ); see also Guo v. Ashcroft , 361 F.3d

1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004) (totality of the circumstances compelled finding of

persecution). Thus, we grant the petition for review as to Zheng ’s asylum and

withholding of removal claims, and remand to the agency for further proceedings

consistent with this disposition. See Guo , 897 F.3d at 1217; see also INS v.

Ventura , 537 U.S. 12, 16

- 18 (2002) (per curiam).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because

Zheng failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to China. See Aden v.

Holder , 589 F.3d 1040, 1 047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Guo , 897 F.3d at 1217

(insufficient likelihood of torture).

The government shall bear the costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED in part; DENIED in part;

REMANDED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of China Broadband, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marc Urbach, Principal
      Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      China Broadband, Inc. and will be retained by China Broadband, Inc. and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.




August
                19, 2008
            
            */s/ Marc
                Urbach*Marc
                Urbach*(President
                and Principal*
              *Executive
                Officer)*
**Exhibit32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Power ConversionCorporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 26,2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Donald M. Muir, Senior Vice President, Finance andAdministration, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                                              TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                              Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Donald M. Muir                                  |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                |
| Donald M. Muir                                      |
| Senior Vice President, Finance and  Administration, |
| and Chief Financial Officer                         |
|                                                |
| November 5, 2004                               |

 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of aseparate disclosure document.

 

1

----
10628.

#### Bailey *v.*Miller County.

Decided February 7, 1920.

Complaint; from Miller superior court—Judge Worrill. April 30, 1919.

*N. L. Stapleton,*for plaintiff. *P. D. Rich,*for defendant.

Stephens, J.

1. It is within the legitimate powers of a county to rent a farm for the purposes of maintaining and working paupers chargeable against the county, and to furnish live stock and food products necessary to maintain such farm and carry out such purposes. Civil Code (1910), § 542.

2. Where a county, in the exercise of such powers and for such purposes, and acting through the proper authorities, obtains possession of land, with crops growing thereon belonging to another, under a contract of purchase which is void for the reason that it is an attempt to create a debt beyond the constitutional power of the county, the county is nevertheless liable to the owner of the land for its rental value for the time during which the land was actually occupied and used by the county, and for the value of the crops thereon consumed for the maintenance of such farm and the live stock of the county necessary for the purposes above mentioned or other legitimate county purposes. *Butts County*v. *Jackson Banking Co.,*129 *Ga.*801, 807 (60 S. E. 149, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, 121 Am. St. R. 244); *Harris County*v. *Brady,*115 *Ga.*767 (1) (42 S. E. 71).

3. The petition shows, that, under a resolution of the board of county commissioners authorizing the purchase of a “farm for the paupers of said county and to furnish food products to the convidts of said county as well as the live stock used in building roads -in said county,” the County of Miller purchased from petitioner certain land-“to be used as a county farm,” and went into .possession of the same, placing thereon a caretaker and a large number of cattle and hogs which consumed the crops on the place which had belonged to the petitioner. A “county farm” purchased under a resolution authorizing its purchase for a legitimate county purpose is presumably purchased for such purpose; and the maintenance of the live stock by a county is presumably for a legitimate county purpose. The petition as amended set out a cause of action against the county, and the trial judge erred in sustaining the general demurrer thereto.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4300 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4300

     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
     Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to 
  participate in the Eastern Municipal Water District Recycled Water 
              System Pressurization and Expansion Project.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 6, 2004

   Mr. Issa (for himself, Mrs. Bono, and Mr. Calvert) introduced the 
    following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
     Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to 
  participate in the Eastern Municipal Water District Recycled Water 
              System Pressurization and Expansion Project.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Eastern Municipal Water District 
Recycled Water System Pressurization and Expansion Project''.

SEC. 2. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) In General.--The Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study 
and Facilities Act (Public Law 102-575, title XVI; 43 U.S.C. 390h et 
seq.) is amended by adding after section 1636 the following:

``SEC. 1635. EASTERN MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT RECYCLED WATER SYSTEM 
              PRESSURIZATION AND EXPANSION PROJECT, CALIFORNIA.

    ``(a) Authorization.--The Secretary, in cooperation with the 
Eastern Municipal Water District, California, may participate in the 
design, planning, and construction of permanent facilities needed to 
establish operational pressure zones that will be used to provide 
recycled water in the district.
    ``(b) Cost Sharing.--The Federal share of the cost of the project 
described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 25 percent of the total 
cost of the project.
    ``(c) Limitation.--Funds provided by the Secretary shall not be 
used for operation or maintenance of the project described in 
subsection (a).
    ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $12,000,000.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in section 2 of 
Public Law 102-575 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 1634 the following:

``Sec. 1635. Eastern Municipal Water District Recycled Water System 
                            Pressurization and Expansion Project, 
                            California.''.
                                 <all>
```
Opinion issued February 28, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00062-CR

———————————

VICTOR EARL KNIGHT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1594356

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Victor Earl Knight, pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony 

offense of aggravated robbery—deadly weapon, with an agreed punishment 

recommendation of eleven years’ confinement.

1

 In accordance with his plea bargain 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2), (b) (West 2011).
2

with the State, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at

eleven years’ confinement on December 19, 2018.

2

 The trial court certified that this

was a plea-bargained case and that appellant had no right of appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

In a plea-bargain case, a defendant may only appeal those matters that were 

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the trial court’s 

permission to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2006); TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the 

defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. TEX. R. APP.

P. 25.2(d); see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Here, the trial court’s certification stated that this was a plea-bargained case 

and that appellant had no right of appeal, and the trial court did not give its 

permission to appeal any matters. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); Dears, 154 

S.W.3d at 615. The clerk’s record, filed in this Court including the plea waiver, 

supports the trial court’s certification. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 615. Because 

appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss this appeal. See Chavez v. State, 

183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having 

 

2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (West 2011).
3

jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to 

appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, 

regardless of the basis for the appeal.”).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX.R. APP.

P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).