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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PHILIP FRIEND (AC 36097)
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Pellegrino, Js. Argued March 4—officially released August 18, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, B. Fischer, J.)
PaulF. Enzinna, prohacvice, withwhomwasDylan P. Kletter, for the appellant (defendant).
Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were MichaelDearington, state’s attorney, and Brian K. Sibley, Sr., and Maxine Wilensky, seniorassistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee (state).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Philip Friend, appealsfromthejudgmentofconviction, renderedafter
a jury trial, of twelve counts of larceny of varying degrees: three counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-122 (a) (2), two counts of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-123 (a) (2), and seven counts oflarceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a124 (a) (2).1 These charges arose out ofhis relationship with Standard Beef Company (SBC) between August, 2007 and February, 2008. On appeal, the defendant claimsthat: (1) the evidence was insufficientto support his conviction of larceny on all counts; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s statements made during the state’s closing argument; and (3) he
was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial when the state ‘‘failed to bring him to trial until four and a half years after his arrest

. . . .’’ We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, which thejury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On August 2, 2007, the defendant signed an agreement to become a consultant to SBC in New Haven. SBC was owned solely by Henry Bawarsky and
was in the business ofpurchasing meat products from wholesale suppliers and then reselling them to its customers. Underthe terms ofthe agreement, the ‘‘specific services’’ that were to be provided by the defendant to SBCwouldhavetobemutuallyagreedonbytheparties. The defendant would provide his services to SBC as
an independent contractor and would be ineligible to receive ‘‘anyadditional compensation oremployeebenefits that would otherwise accrue to him if he were an employee

. . . .’’ The agreement further provided that the defendantwouldbe reimbursedforhis documented out-of-pocket expenses. In consideration for his services, the defendant would receive 25 percent ofSBC’s netprofitsestimatedweekly.2Inaddition, the defendant
was to ‘‘receive an option to purchase, together with Richard Greenfield, all of the outstanding shares’’ of SBC to be exercised by December 31, 2007.3 The agreement specifically provided that ‘‘[a]ll moneys to be paid by [SBC] to third parties’’ had to be approved in writing by Bawarsky and either the defendant or Greenfield, which could be evidenced by ‘‘a check signed by both such parties.’’4 Finally, the agreement provided that its terms ‘‘may not be altered, modified
or extended except in writing signed by both parties.’’
Prior to the defendant’s becoming a consultant to SBC, the company employed approximately twenty people. It was managed primarily by Bawarsky, senior vice president William Dober, and senior accountant/ comptrollerFredAuger. Paperdocumentswerecreatedto keep track ofthe inventory and finances.5 The blank company checks were stored in a safe. Only employees in aposition oftrust had the combination to access the safe.6 Prior to any checks being sent out, Auger would match the printed checks with the corresponding invoices and submit them to Dober forverification and signature. Likewise, Dober, who had a corporate credit card, provided Auger with itemized receipts to explain andjustify the charges on the account. Although Auger could issue checks, he was not authorizedto signthem. Overall, Bawarsky, Dober, and Auger actively were engaged in the running of SBC and remained informed of its day-to-day operations and financial situation.
InAugust, 2007, SBCwasinapoorfinancialsituation; it didnothave enoughfundstopayits suppliers ontime and frequently risked overdrafting its bank account. Nevertheless, SBC remained an attractive acquisition target because it owned approximately a 15 percent stake in New Haven Food Terminal—areal estate asset worth ‘‘millions of dollars.’’
Once the defendanthad assumedhis role as aconsultant to SBC in August, 2007, he immediately began implementingchangesinthewaythecompanyhadbeen operating. The old computer software was enhanced by a modern one, providing more timely and accurate information to the sales personnel.7 The data from the
newsystem, whichbecamefullyoperationalinOctober, 2007, fed directly into Greenfield’s office in New York,
sohe couldremotelymonitorandaccess SBC accounts. In addition to the new software, Greenfield provided SBC with barcode scanners and label printers to improve efficiency. Greenfield also provided SBC with
an $800,000 line ofguaranteed trade credit to help ease the company’s financial burden.8 As a result of these changes, SBC’s finances significantlyimproved; the frequency and amounts of the bank account overdrafts diminished, profit margins improved, and the annual loss of $400,000 began to decrease.
Atthetime ofthese changes, Bawarskywasseenwith the defendant and introduced him to the company’s personnel as someone who would help turn the business around and become the eventual owner of SBC. On August 6, 2007, Bawarsky, who was seventy-nine years old, suffered a broken leg, was hospitalized for
more than a month and was unable to participate in the running of SBC. Even after he was able to return towork, Bawarskywouldcomeinonlyforseveralhours three or four times a week. Following Bawarsky’s injury, the defendant increased his role in the day-to-day operations of SBC. On September24, 2007, he firedAugerand assumedthe company’saccountant/comptrollerduties, becomingan employee in addition to his consultantposition. Having assumedAuger’sposition, the defendantgained control
over the SBC checkbook, and Dober no longer hadcontrol over some checks that were being sent out. On November 27, 2007, the parties signed an amendment to the original agreement extending the option to purchase SBC to February 28, 2008. Despite the extension, the sale of SBC did not occur. In February, 2008, David Bawarsky, Henry Bawarsky’s son, took control ofthe companyandforcedthe defendant out, removing him from the property with the help of the New Haven police.
A criminal investigation ensued, and the defendant
was charged with thirteen counts of larceny.9 The jury found the defendant guilty on twelve counts, and the court sentencedhimto twelve years incarceration, execution suspended after sixyears, with five years probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.
I

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
We begin with the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiencyofthe evidenceto supporthislarcenyconviction
on twelve counts. ‘‘A defendant who asserts an insufficiency ofthe evidence claim bears an arduous burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statev. Rodriguez, 146 Conn. App. 99, 110, 75 A.3d 798, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 948, 80 A.3d 906 (2013). ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support a criminal conviction
weapplyatwo-parttest. First, weconstruetheevidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . ‘‘Wenotethatthejurymustfindeveryelementproven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permittedto considerthe factproven andmay consider itincombinationwithotherprovenfactsindetermining whetherthe cumulative effectofallthe evidenceproves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . ‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.

. . . It is not one fact

. . . but the cumulative impact of
a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.

. . . In evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept
as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence.

. . . The [jury] may drawwhatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence [that] it deems to be reasonable and logical.

. . . ‘‘[Inaddition], [a]swehave oftennoted, proofbeyond
a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt

. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal.

. . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is areasonableview ofthe evidence thatwould support
a reasonable hypothesis ofinnocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Papandrea, 302 Conn. 340, 348–49, 26 A.3d 75 (2011).
As to the law governing the crime oflarceny in Connecticut, ‘‘[a] person commitslarcenywhen, withintent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the
same to himselfor a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner.’’10 General Statutes § 53a-119. Our ‘‘courts have interpretedthe essential elements oflarcenyas (1) thewrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lackofconsent ofthe owner.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev.Flowers, 69 Conn. App. 57, 69, 797 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 929, 798A.2d972 (2002). ‘‘Becauselarcenyisaspecificintent crime, the state must show that the defendant acted withthe subjective desire orknowledge thathis actions constituted stealing.

. . . One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believing that

. . . he has a right to take it, is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief, since in such case the felonious intent is lacking.

. . . The general rule applies

. . . to one who takes it with the honest belief that he has the right to do so under
a contract

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Papandrea, supra, 302 Conn. 350. With these principles in mind, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we determine that thejury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each conviction.
A
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of three counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of § 53a-122 (a) (2).11 We address each in turn.
1
Count One–Webster Bank DebtThe following additional facts are relevant to this claim. Priortobecomingaconsultantto SBC, the defendantwas the principal ofRidgefield Farms, LLC (Ridgefield Farms), a wholesale beef seller that had been a supplier to SBC. Ridgefield Farms had an outstanding debt to Webster Bank in the amount of $88,158.66. The defendant was personally responsible for settling the debt by November 16, 2007.12 On November 9, 14, and 16, 2007, the defendant handwrote three SBC checks payable to ‘‘Webster’’ adding up to the amount of the outstanding debt.13 Checks dated November 9 and November 16 were signed by the defendant only. The November 14 checkhadtwo signatures; the defendant’s and a signature resembling Dober’s. Dober testified, however, that the second signature was not his.
At trial, the defendant argued that SBC owed Ridgefield Farms ‘‘[a] significant amount of money’’ for past deliveries ofbeef. To support his argument, the defendant introduced two internal SBC documents. The first document reflected that, as of May, 2007, SBC owed Ridgefield Farms $26,830.32. Dober testified that he recalled the debt being at ‘‘$27,000 and change’’ in the
summer of 2007. The second document reflected an outstanding debtas $50,339.49 inJuly, 2007. Inaddition, the defendant presented the testimony of Attorney DavidPite, whorepresentedthe defendantinhisnegotiations with Webster Bank regarding the settlement of the outstanding loan. Pite testified that in the fall of 2007, SBC owed Ridgefield Farms ‘‘in excess of $100,000.’’ Pite explained that he knew the extent of the debtbecause, atthat time, he also was representing SBC in two legal matters concerning the company’s outstanding debts and, therefore, he ‘‘had to know who
was owed what.’’
On appeal, the defendant claims that the state ‘‘offered no evidence that [SBC] did not authorize these checks, but instead asked thejury to infer the absence ofconsentbecause [SBC] hadno connection with Webster Bank, and [the defendant] used the [SBC] money to pay off a debt he personally guaranteed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Such inference, the defendantcontends, ‘‘isnotsupportedbytheevidence.’’Additionally, the defendant argues that the state failed to offer sufficient evidence to show that he had the intent to deprive SBC of its property. Specifically, the defendant argues that he acted under a good faith beliefthat SBC owed a substantial amount ofmoneyto Ridgefield Farms and that he, as the owner of Ridgefield Farms,
was entitled to satisfy his personal debt to Webster Bank using SBC funds. We are not persuaded.
We first note that ‘‘direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available.

. . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct

. . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom.’’ (Internal quota-tionmarks omitted.) Statev. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 657, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010).
We further note that in State v. Papandrea, supra, 302 Conn. 340, our Supreme Court has considered the questionofwhetherthedefendant’sintenttostealcould reasonably have been inferred under a set of circumstances similar to this case. The similarities between the cases warrant a brief discussion of the Papandrea decision.
The defendant in Papandrea worked as an accountant and chief financial officer for Homecare Management Strategies, Inc. (Homecare), a provider of financial services to home health care agencies. Id., 342. At the same time, the defendant was a majority shareholder of White Oak Systems, LLC (White Oak),
a software company that provided its services to Homecare. Id.
In a period from February, 2004 to February, 2005, the defendant issued a number of Homecare company checks payable to various art dealers. Id., 344. Once these transactions were revealed to the Homecare owner, the defendant’s employment was terminated, and he was subsequently charged with stealing corporate funds to purchase artwork for his personal use. Id., 344–46.
At trial, the defendant argued that he was entitled to
use the funds because ‘‘Homecare owed him money as White Oak’s principal shareholder at the time he had issuedthe checks.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 345. Despite this defense theory, thejury convicted the defendant of nine counts of larceny in the first degree, and this court affirmed thejudgment on direct appeal. Id., 345–46. Thereafter, our Supreme Court grantedthe defendant’spetitionforcertificationlimited to the issue of the sufficiency of evidence in the case. Id., 342. Affirming this court’s decision, our Supreme Court concluded that the state had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Specifically, the courtheldthatthejuryreasonably couldhave found that the defendant acted with intent to steal because (1) byvirtue ofhis professional education and work experience he ‘‘knew that a debt to White Oak
wasdifferentfromadebttohimpersonally’’; id., 351; (2) he transferred the ‘‘funds directly into his own pocket, rather than, for instance, transferring them to White Oak or sharing them with’’ another principal at White Oak; id., 353; (3) the relevant ‘‘entries in the Homecare checkregistercontainnothingtoindicatethatthetransactions involved artwork, thatthepayees were art dealers, orthat the ultimate beneficiary ofeach transaction
was the defendant or, for that matter, White Oak’’; id., 356; (4) the defendantdidnotbegin ‘‘makingillicitwithdrawals’’ until he had become ‘‘the sole Homecareemployeedealingonadailybasiswithchecksandbookkeeping’’ and the provision of the financial reports to management; id., 355; and (5) Homecare had no prior history ofissuing company checks ‘‘to an individual for personal use

. . . .’’ Id., 354.
Likewise inthe present case, thejuryheard sufficient evidence reasonably to conclude that the defendant acted with a specific intent to deprive SBC ofproperty. At trial, the jury heard evidence that the defendant’s initial role at SBC was that of ‘‘an advisor and consultant.’’ In addition, having terminated Auger in September, 2007, the defendant became the company’s accountant/comptroller, assuming oversight and control of SBC’s finances. On the basis of this evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant, as anexecutive officerofthe company, must have known that SBC’s debt to Ridgefield Farms was distinct from a debt to him personally. Having reached that conclusion, the jury then reasonably could have inferred that the defendant was not acting under the good faith belief that SBC owed the funds to him personally. Additionally, the jury could have concluded that, at the time he wrote out the checks, the defendant was not acting in good faith because he did not follow the required SBC procedure of having two signatures on the company’schecks, hehandwrotethe checksinstead ofissuing them on the company’s newly installed computer software, he simply named Webster Bank as the payee without any explanation ofthe underlying nature ofthe transaction, and he transferred funds directly to Webster Bank instead of paying Ridgefield Farms first and then paying off the debt.14 Moreover, the jury reasonablycouldhave concludedthat SBC’s debtto Ridgefield Farms was not large enough to explain the payment of$88,158.66. While it is true that Pite testified that SBC’s debt to Ridgefield Farms was in excess of $100,000, the jury also heard Dober testify that he remembered the debt being approximately $27,000. It is axiomatic thatthejury, asthe final arbiter ofcredibilityofanywitness,wasfreetodisbelievePiteandinstead credit Dober’s recollection of the amount of the debt and, thus, conclude that SBC did not owe Ridgefield Farmsthe amount claimedbythe defendant.15 SeeState

v.Robinson, 125 Conn. App. 484, 489, 8A.3d 1120 (2010) (‘‘[o]n appeal, we cannot revisit the jury’s decision to believe the witnesses’’), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 911, 12 A.3d 1006 (2011). Moreover, because no evidence at trial established that SBC owed Ridgefield Farms any funds at the time the payments hadbeen made, thejury
was free to conclude that SBC did not owe any money to Ridgefield Farms. Likewise, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had not been authorized to issue checksto WebsterBankbySBC orits ownerBawarsky,and that he was aware of that. The consulting agreement, which the defendantpersonally had signed, expressly provided that all funds paid to third parties required apriorwritten authorization by Bawarsky and eitherthe defendantorGreenfield. Inaddition, the company’s check signing procedure was amended in August, 2007, explicitly to require two signatures on all SBC checks. The defendant had signed that document too, acknowledging his familiarity with the new policy. Furthermore, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the checks themselves indicated lack of consent by SBC; two ofthe three checks bore only the defendant’s signature, and thejury could have credited Dober’s testimony that the third check, while bearing
a second signature similar to his, in fact had not been signedbyhim. Significantly, the defendant didnotissue the checks until after he had assumed control of the company’s checkbook having terminated Auger. Finally, thejury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant lacked authorization and was trying to avoid detection by handwriting the checks used in the old computer system instead of issuing checks on the
new system, which could be accessed and monitored remotely by Greenfield—the man who personally had extended and guaranteed the $800,000 trade credit to SBC.16
2

Count Three–Berger Legal, LLC
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. During the negotiations of the consulting agreementanditsamendment,thedefendantwasrepresented by Attorney Jennifer Rose of Berger Legal, LLC (Berger Legal). In turn, SBC was represented by its
own counsel, Attorney Geoffrey Hecht. Subsequently, BergerLegal sentthe defendantthree separate invoices foritsservicesonAugust31, 2007, for$8170.22; September 30, 2007, for $809.10; and October 31, 2007, for $1193.50. The defendant paid the invoices in full with three separate SBC checks issued using the old computersystem. Each checkappearedto havebeensigned by the defendant and Dober. At trial, however, Dober testified that the signature on the check for $1193.50

was not his and that he was not able to confirm that the signature on the check for $8170.22 was his.17
On appeal, the defendant claims that the state ‘‘offered no evidence from which the jury could infer that [SBC’s] payment of [BergerLegal’s] fees was unauthorized.’’ We disagree.
In his brief, the defendant concedes that there was evidence at trial establishing Berger Legal as a third party. Under the terms ofthe consulting agreement, all SBCpaymentstothirdpartiesrequiredwrittenapproval ofboth Bawarsky and the defendant or Greenfield. The checks to Berger Legal did not have Bawarsky’s signa-ture on them. Thus, the jury reasonably could have inferredthatthe lack ofBawarsky’s signature indicated that such payments had not been authorized. In addition, the jury could have found that the defendant had chosen to issue the checks on the old system to avoid detection by Greenfield, who testified that he did not expectthe defendanttopayanypersonalexpenseswith SBC funds. As in the first count, the defendant did not issue these SBC checks until after he had assumed the control overthe SBC checkbook. Furthermore, thejury also could have inferred that the payments to Berger Legal had not been authorized on the basis of Dober’s inability to confirm the authenticity ofhis signature on two ofthe checks. Finally, thejury, relying on its common sense, could reasonably have inferred that an agreement as to legal fees necessarilywould have been reflectedinthe consultingagreement. SeeStatev.Lavigne, 121 Conn. App. 190, 196, 995A.2d94 (2010) (‘‘[triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), aff’d, 307Conn. 592, 57A.3d332 (2012). Thisinferenceis supported by the trial testimony regarding Bawarsky’s involvement in the drafting of the agreement, the specific provision concerning the third party payments, and SBC’s acute shortage of available funds.
3
Count Four–Peaceable Sales, LLC
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. On April 7, 2006, the defendant and his wife registered a limited liability company–Peaceable Sales, LLC (Peaceable Sales)–with the State of Connecticut. During his tenure at SBC, the defendant issued ten SBC checksto Peaceable Salestotaling $76,159.95. Although most of the checks were accompanied by a Peaceable Sales invoice, three checks had no corresponding invoices. Five of the checks were issued on the old computer system, and three were handwritten. Four of the checks had been signed by the defendant alone, and five more had a second signature that resembled Dober’s. Dober, however, testified that four out of the five checksthathadtwo signatureshadnotbeensigned byhim.18 Similarly, Dober’s sister, Marcy Gollinger, also
was unable to identify her brother’s signature on all five checks.
At trial, Dober testified that he had no recollection of SBC doing business with Peaceable Sales, and that he had never seen an invoice from that company. In addition, Gollinger testified that she did not remember writing an SBC check to Peaceable Sales prior to August, 2007. Likewise, Ilka Cintron testified that she had not heard of Peaceable Sales prior to the defendant’s arrival at SBC.
To counter the testimony and evidence presented by the state, the defendant introduced several documentsthat, accordingto him, provedthatthe checks hadbeen issued to satisfy SBC’s outstanding debt to Peaceable Sales for real deliveries of meat products. Specifically, the defendant presented the jury with a series of invoices reflecting a purchase of thirty-seven boxes of tenderloins by SBC from Peaceable Sales that laterpurportedlywere soldto West Connmeat companynetting SBC a profit of $6770.62.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the state ‘‘produced not ashred ofevidence to support its theorythat any transaction between [SBC] and Peaceable Sales
was a sham

. . . .’’ On the contrary, the defendant argues, the evidence presented at trial ‘‘showed that [SBC] bought real beef from Peaceable Sales, which it later sold for a profit.’’ We are not persuaded by these arguments. As we have stated previously, the jury heard testimony that a total of ten SBC checks had been issued to Peaceable Sales. The first four checks, totaling $1855.26, were issued in September, 2007, using the old computer system. The following two checks, totaling $25,263.05, wereissuedinOctoberandearlyNovember, 2007, using the new computer system. Thereafter, however, in November, 2007, and early January, 2008, the defendant handwrote two old system checks totaling $23,250.65. LaterinJanuary, 2008, the defendant issued
a check for $10,432.91 using the new computer system again, followed by another handwritten check for $15,358.08 used in the old system. At trial, Gollinger testified that by October, 2007, the
newcomputersystemwasfullyoperational. Shefurther testified that, once the new system had been installed, all ofthe existing accounts were transferredto the new systemandSBC ‘‘startedpayableson [the] newsystem.’’ The only exceptions, according to Gollinger, were the invoices and bills issued prior to October, 2007.
On the basis of her testimony, the jury reasonably couldhave concludedthatthispatternofthealternating
use ofthe old and the new computer systems well after the October changeover was an indication that at least
some of the purported transactions between SBC and Peaceable Sales were fictitious, and that the defendant used the old system in November, 2007, and January, 2008, in an apparent attempt to hide the true nature of those payments. The jury could have found further supportforits conclusion inthe factthatthe November and January checks issued under the old system had been handwritten and had only the defendant’s signature. Moreover, the jury could have credited the testimony of Dober and Gollinger, neither of whom were able to verify the authenticity of Dober’s signature on the checks at issue, and reasonably have concluded that the checks had been issued without following the procedure required by the consulting agreement and the SBC policy requiring two signatures.In his brief, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial ‘‘showed that [SBC] made a profit on the items it purchased from Peaceable Sales.’’ We note that the evidence the defendant cites to may explain one transaction, but not all. Furthermore, even if the jury were to credit everytransactionbetween SBC and Peaceable Sales that had an accompanying invoice as legitimate, it, nevertheless, would have been left with two unexplained checks, permitting the jury reasonably to conclude that they were illegitimate because they were written by hand in January, 2008, and signed by the defendant alone. We further note that the combined value of these two checks equals $25,465.72, which exceeds the $10,000 threshold of § 53a-122 (a) (2).19
The defendant further contends that the state’s arguments attrial, that Peaceable Sales was a ‘‘phony’’ company‘‘run outof[the defendant’s] house, supposedlyby [his] wife, andthat its bills to [SBC] were not legitimate bills,’’ were not supported by the evidence and could have caused ‘‘the jury to speculate, or even suspect, that the company engaged in sham transactions.’’ We
are not persuaded by this argument. It is well settled that because jurors are ‘‘well equippedto analyze the evidence,’’ ourappellate courts will not negate a verdict ‘‘on the chance

. . . that the jury convicted on a ground that was not supported by adequate evidence when there existed alternative grounds for which the evidence was sufficient.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539–40, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994) (en banc). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that in this case, as in Chapman, the jurors ‘‘were in a position to be able to evaluate the testimony presented and to
assess whether the charged theory was supported by the evidence.’’ Id., 540.
B
The defendantnext claimsthatthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of two counts of larceny in the second degree in violation of § 53a-123 (a) (2).20 We address each in turn.
1
Count Five–Washington Mutual Credit Card
Additional facts pertaining to this count are as follows. During his tenure at SBC, the defendant had a personal credit card issued by the Washington Mutual Bank. From September, 2007, through January, 2008, the defendant made multiple purchases with the card, which, by the end of December, 2007, amounted to $7966.24. The credit card statements, introducedbythe state at trial, reflected that, inter alia, the defendant made purchases at 121 Restaurantin North Salem, New York ($161.19); Vista Wine & Spirits in South Salem, New York ($68.80); Bed Bath & Beyond in Danbury($231.97); Studentcity.com ($1497); Galleria D’Arte in Ridgefield ($330.94); Circuit City in Danbury ($58.29); Urban Outfitters in New Haven ($398.64); Ridgefield Pet, Inc. ($5.29); and Johnston & Murphy’s in Marlton, New Jersey ($1003.50). The defendant also used the card to take out a cash advance of $1567.99, and incurred both a finance/cash advance charge of $47.04 and late fees in the amount of $78, all included in the totaloutstandingamountbythe endofDecember, 2007.
On December 17, 2007, the defendant wrote an oldsystem check payable to the order of ‘‘Washington Mutual’’ in the amount of $5500. The check was handwritten and signed only by the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant argues that, in orderto find him guilty on this count, the jury had to ‘‘make two separate and necessary’’ inferences: (1) thejury had to infer that SBC ‘‘did not authorize payment of charges that were not [SBC’s] business expenses’’; and (2) the jury had ‘‘to infer, from the descriptions ofthe charges contained in the billing statements, that charges paid with [SBC] funds were, in fact, [the defendant’s] personalexpenses, ratherthan [SBC’s] businessexpenses.’’ Neitherofthese inferences, accordingtothe defendant, is supported by the evidence. We disagree.
To support his first argument, the defendant points to paragraph six of the consulting agreement, which provides that the ‘‘[c]onsultant shall be reimbursed for out-of-pockettravelandroom, boardandentertainment expenses incurred during the term hereof; provided [c]onsultant submits documentation verifying said expenses.’’ Althoughitistruethatthe consultingagreementdoes not specifically limit the reimbursement to business expenses only, thejury reasonably could have inferred that, as a consultant who was hired to bring in new businessandhelpturnaroundthe companyinthemidst ofa deep financial crisis, the defendant would be reimbursed for only verified legitimate business expenses. Furthermore, an additional indication that SBC intendedtoreimbursethe defendantforlegitimatebusiness expenses is found in paragraph one of the consulting agreement, which provides, inter alia, that the ‘‘[c]onsultant shall serve as advisor and consultant to [SBC] in connection with [SBC’s] business activities.’’ (Emphasisadded.)Thus, thejuryreasonablycouldhave concluded that the defendant was hired to improve SBC’s business fortunes and that he would have been reimbursed only for expenses incurred in the pursuit of that goal.
The defendant next argues that, ‘‘even if the jury could infer lack of authorization from the fact that a charge was not for a business expense of [SBC], the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to infer that any charge paid with [the check] was not, in fact, abusiness expense of [SBC].’’ Specifically, the defendant argues that the state ‘‘put on no evidence to show what
was purchased in any credit card transaction, or even any evidence with regard to what was sold at any of the merchants involved.’’
The problem with the defendant’s argument is that it presumes that the jury reasonably could have found that the expenses were personal only through direct evidence. His argument, however, ignores the substantial circumstantial evidence before the jury at trial. In particular, thejury reasonably could have inferred that the expenses were personal in nature because the defendant used the old system checks atthe time when the new system was fully operational and all ofthe new accountsweretobeprocessedthroughthenewsystem, the check had been signed only by the defendant in clear violation ofthe SBC check signing policy and the consulting agreement, he issued the checks after he had assumed control of the corporate checkbook, and there were no invoices in SBC’s records explaining the nature of the charges. That inference in turn would have then allowed thejury reasonably to conclude that purchases made at Urban Outfitters, Ridgefield Pet, Inc., GalleriaDArte,VistaWine&Spirits, andStudentcity.com, as well as the cash advance, cash advance fee, late fees, and other purchases were not business related, despite the fact that no witness had testified about the nature ofthe purchases made with the credit card. See State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 245, 627 A.2d 877 (1993) (‘‘[t]hereis, infact, norule oflawthatforbids the resting ofone inference upon facts whose determination is the result ofother inferences’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
2
Count Six–American Express Credit Card 000
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. During the defendant’s tenure at SBC, his wife, Jamie Friend, and Peaceable Sales held an American Express credit card account ending in 000. FromAugust 8, 2007, through August 28, 2007, the defendant made multiple purchases with the card amounting to $1134.12. The credit card statement forthatperiod, introduced bythe state at trial, reflected that the defendant had made purchases at Izumi Japanese Restaurant in Danbury ($99.15); Barcelona in Fairfield ($247.23); Bing’s Car Service in Hopewell Junction, New York ($165); Koo Restaurant in Ridgefield ($108.10); Spring House Hotel
on Block Island, Rhode Island ($195.80); Metro-North ($23); andseveralgasolinepurchasesmadeinNewYork and Connecticut ($295.84). Bythe next statement cycle ending on September 28, 2007, the account had accrued $3605.93 in new purchases, a late payment fee, and afinance charge, bringing the total balance on the account to $4740.05. Thedefendantsubmittedacopyofthemonthlystatementto SBC with certain charges having handwritten notations purportedly explaining theirnature. Charges submitted forpayment included ‘‘peripherals’’ at Verizon Wireless in Brookfield ($116.57); ‘‘computers’’ at Best Buy in West Hartford ($1262.92); transportation to New York City and back with Mincpac, Inc., ($296); a company dinner at Brazis Restaurant in New Haven ($41.88); several entertainment charges ($366.80); Microsoft Tech Support ($59); and multiple ‘‘fuel’’ purchases ($436.28).
On September 21, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $483.84. The check was issued using the old computer system and had only the defendant’s signature. On September 26, 2007, the defendant issued another SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of$483.84. The check also was issued on the old system, but it had two signatures; the defendant’s and a signature resembling Dober’s. On October 23, 2007, the defendant issued a third SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $2675.04. The check was issued on the
new system and also had two signatures. At trial, however, Dober testified that neither ofthe two signatures
was his. Bythenextmonthlystatement, endingonOctober28, 2007, theaccounthadaccrued$288.15innewpurchases and fees, bringing the total outstanding balance to $1385.48. The newpurchases included afinance charge ($57.19); a purchase at Temple Grill in New Haven ($103.50); Vanger Garage in NewYork, NewYork ($26); and several fuel purchases ($101.46).
On November 19, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $1385.48. The check was issued on the
new system and signed only by the defendant. By the monthly statement ending on November 28, 2007, the account had accrued $2128.96 in new purchases and fees. The defendant submitted a copy of the monthly statement to SBC with certain charges having beenblacked out. The remaining charges reflect that the defendant made purchases at Verizon Wireless ($552.05); Microsoft Support ($524.94); Ridgefield Office Supply in Ridgefield ($106.35); Arman Garage in New York, New York ($48); multiple fuel purchases ($339.49); and a finance charge ($31.83). At the bottom of the invoice, the defendant handwrote instructions, directing Gollinger to pay the entire balance and then deduct $526.30 from his paycheck.
On December 7, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $2128.96. The check was issued using the new system and signed only by the defendant.On appeal, the defendant renews the argument we addressed in part I B 1 of this opinion, arguing that the state neither presented evidence that SBC had not authorized the payment nor proved that the charges
were in fact personal rather than business expenses. We disagree.
Aswe concludedinpartIB 1 ofthis opinion, the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to infer that SBC had not agreed to compensate the defendantforhispersonal expenses. Furthermore, having reviewedthe evidence inthe case, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to allowthejury reasonably to infer that the purchases made with the credit card were not legitimate business expenses. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons. The jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendanthadno SBC authorizationto issuethe checks and was trying to avoid detection because three ofthe five checks used had only one signature in violation of the companypolicyandthe consultingagreement. Such
an inference is further supported by Dober’s testimony at trial that he did not sign the remaining two checks. Moreover, the jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant’s notations on the statements as illegitimate on the basis of a simple comparison between the history ofthe charges and corresponding payments made by the defendant. The evidence clearly shows that as of August 28, 2007, the account had a balance of $1134.12. The defendant issued two SBC checks, presumablyto pay forbusiness expenses, against these charges foratotal of$967.68, leaving anunpaidbalance of$166.44.21 The September 28, 2007 statement reflects that the defendant had made new charges totaling $3605.93. Out of that total, his notations identified $2675.04 as supposedly legitimate business expenses, and the defendant issued an SBC check for the correspondingamount, leavinganunpaidbalance of$1097.33. At that point, the only reasonable inference that could have been made is that the defendant had paid for all legitimate business expenses up to date, and the remaining balance, therefore, represented personal expenses ineligible for compensation. The October 28, 2007 statement reflects that the defendant had made $288.15 in new charges, compelling a reasonable inference that no more than the total of the new charges in the October statement can potentially qualify as a business expense. The evidence, however, clearly showsthatthe defendantissuedacompanychecktotaling $1385.48—the exact sum of the new charges reflected in the October statement and previously unpaid balance.22 On the basis ofthis comparison, and the inference that the defendant was trying to avoid detection by issuing three checks with one signature and two checks with suspect signatures of Dober, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defen-dant’sinvoiceswerenotcredibleandrejectedthedefendant’s theory of defense.
C
The defendantnext claimsthatthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of seven counts of larceny in the third degree in violation of § 53a-124 (a) (2).23
1

Count Eight-–Pite Law Office, LLC
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. As
wepreviouslystatedinpartIA 1, duringthe defendant’s tenure at SBC, David Pite had been the defendant’s counsel in his negotiations over the Ridgefield Farms’ outstandingdebtto WebsterBank. OnOctober30, 2007, Pite Law Office, LLC (law office) sent a $1050 invoice to SBC for ‘‘legal services rendered from June 1, 2007, through October 31, 2007.’’24 The specific charges were detailed as ‘‘[t]elephone conferences with Attorney Gfellerandherassociateregarding [SBC] checks,pleadings, court notices and collection settlement negotiations for doubtful accounts. Review ofagreements and business restructuring.’’ On November 19, 2007, the defendant issued the law office an SBC check for the fullamount. The checkwasissuedonthenewcomputer system and had only the defendant’s signature.
On December 1, 2007, the law office sent a $962.50 invoice to SBC for ‘‘legal services rendered from November 1, 2007, throughNovember30, 2007,’’ regarding the SBC ‘‘[a]cquisition.’’25 The invoice detailed the charges as ‘‘[a]dditional telephone conferences with Attorney Rose regarding [SBC] real estate holdings and Food Terminal Market structure. Drafted release as requested and correspondence to Bank Counsel.’’ On December 12, 2007, the defendantpaidthe invoice with
an SBC check signed by the defendant only.
OnJanuary8, 2008, the defendant, purportedlyacting
on behalf of SBC, signed a retainer agreement with the law office to ‘‘represent [SBC] in the following matters: general corporate matters and litigation; including Vande Rose Foods, LLC and Edart Trucking disputes.’’ The agreement called for an initial retainerfee of$2500 to be paid by SBC to the law office. On January 11, 2008, the defendant issued an SBC check in the amount of$2500. The check was issued on the new system and had the defendant’s signature only.
At trial, when asked to explain the nature of the charges in the December 1, 2007 invoice, Pite testified that the charges reflected the work he had done ‘‘in connection with the Vande Rose litigation

. . . .’’ Pite further testified that he started working on the Vande Rose matter ‘‘in the fall,’’ 2007, and that Vande Rose ‘‘just didn’t sue [SBC] until January of 2008.’’ As to the October 30, 2007 invoice, Pite admitted that AttorneyGfeller, whose name appeared in the invoice, was, at the time, an attorney for Webster Bank. In addition, when asked as to why the retainer agreement had not been signed by SBC president and owner Bawarsky, Pite explained that the defendant asked him ‘‘to do it and said that he was authorized to sign’’ the retainer
onbehalfofthe company. Ultimately, Pite testifiedthat he billed SBC for his services because he ‘‘must have done work [for SBC].’’ He added, however, that ‘‘because [he] felt bad having to bill it,’’ he ‘‘courtesied’’ SBC some of his time in the invoices.
ThestatepresentedtestimonyofHechtwhohadbeen representing SBC and Bawarskypersonally at the time. Hecht testified that Pite had been authorized to represent SBC in the Vande Rose dispute in January, 2008, ‘‘on the condition that [the defendant] was going to pay Mr. Pite’s legal fees.’’ Hecht specifically testified that he had informed Pite of this condition during a telephone call he had made on January 18, 2008, and in an e-mail he had sent to Pite following the telephone call. The e-mail, which was entered at trial as a full exhibit, stated, inter alia, the following: ‘‘This will confirm our telephone conversation earlier today regarding the suit in Federal Court by Vande Rose against [SBC] and [the defendant]. You have confirmed that [the defendant] has hired you to appear on behalf of both defendants. You also indicated that you believe that Vande Rose will be withdrawing the counts directed against [the defendant] personally. I represent Henry Bawarsky, sole stockholder of [SBC]. He has no objection to you appearing on behalf of [SBC], with the understanding that [the defendant] is responsible for your fees.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In his testimony, Pite disputed Hecht’s recollection of the terms of the agreement. He acknowledged that he had received the e-mail from Hecht, but testified that, once he had realized that the terms in the e-mail had been stated inaccurately, he called Hecht and informed him ofthe inaccuracy. To support Pite’s testimony, the defense produced a copy of Hecht’s e-mail, bearing Pite’s handwritten note purportedly made during a phone call Pite had made following the receipt of the e-mail, correcting Hecht’s understanding of the terms of the agreement.26
In his brief, the defendant argues that, even if all of the evidence presentedbythe state were to be credited by the jury, it was nevertheless insufficient to sustain his conviction onthis count. Specifically, the defendant argues that the state ‘‘was required to prove not only that [SBC] paid Attorney Pite, but that any such payments were for work for which [SBC] had not agreed to pay.’’ We are not persuaded. First, thejury reasonably could have concluded that it was the defendant who was responsible for paying Pite’s legal fees accrued in connection with the VandeRose litigation. At trial, Hecht testified that that was hisunderstandingofthe agreement. Thejury, ofcourse,
was free to credit his testimony over Pite’s testimony to the contrary. Thus, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the retainer fee of $2500 as well as the December 1, 2007 invoice for $962.50 that Pite had identifiedattrialashavingbeenpreparedin connection with Vande Rose matter had not been authorized by SBC. Second, even if the jury were to determine that Pite had been retained by SBC in January, 2008, making it responsible for paying his fees, the jury reasonably could have concluded that charges from prior to that time were not legitimate. Furthermore, as is the case in other counts, the checks were signed by the defendantonlydespitethe clauseintheconsultingagreement explicitlyrequiringawrittenauthorizationbyBawarsky before any funds could be paid out to a third party. Additionally, Pite had not been formally retained to provide legal services to SBC until January, 2008; by thattime, however, Pite hadbilled SBC ontwo separate occasions. From that evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Bawarsky had not authorized the payments ofthe two invoices, and that Pite had not been retained by SBC to provide legal services at the time, despite his testimony that he ‘‘must have done work [for SBC].’’ The jury also reasonably could have inferred that the post hoc creation of the January retainer agreement had been done by the defendant in
an attempt to legitimize his previous payments to Pite. Moreover, the jury reasonably could have questioned thelikelihoodofPiterepresentingSBC inacomplicated ‘‘litigation of a large bill’’ concerning a ‘‘great amount of money,’’ for approximately five months without any formal agreement. This inference is furthered strengthened by the fact that Bawarsky had an attorney who had been representing his interests at the time. Finally, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the services SBC had been billed for in the October 30, 2007 invoice had not been performed for its benefit, but rather for that of the defendant personally. The invoice clearlystatesthatthe chargesstemfromconferences with an attorney from Webster Bank ‘‘regarding [SBC] checks, pleadings, court notices and collection settlement negotiations for doubtful accounts. Review ofagreements andbusiness restructuring.’’ Attrial, Pite testified that he had represented the defendant in the negotiations with the Webster Bank that resulted in the signing of the forbearance agreement on October 22, 2007. Thejury also heard testimony that the defendant had paid his debt to Webster Bank with SBC checks. In addition, the forbearance agreement specified that Webster Bank had ‘‘commenced a collection action’’ against the defendant. On the basis of that evidence, thejuryreasonablycouldhave inferredthatthe charges in the October 30, 2007 invoice reflected legal servicesthathadbeenperformedforthe defendantpersonally.27
2
Count Nine–U.S. Bank Ridgefield Farms Credit Card
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. Ridgefield Farms held acredit card issuedbyU.S. Bank from prior to 2005. At trial, the representative of the bank, John Shaw, testified that approximately in September, 2007, the bank suspended the credit card account because no payments had been made for at least ninety days preceding the suspension. Shaw further testified that the unpaid balance on the account equaled $3721. On November 19, 2007, the defendant issued an old system SBC check payable to the order of U.S. Bank in the amount of $3721. The check was handwritten and signed only by the defendant.
In his brief, the defendant renews the argument we addressed in part I A 1 of this opinion, arguing that the state did not ‘‘put on any evidence suggesting that [SBC’s] payments did not result in a corresponding reduction of [SBC’s] debt to Ridgefield Farms.’’ Once again, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument. As we concluded in part I A 1 of this opinion, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant acted without SBC’s consent by issuing a handwritten company check with only his signature. In addition, on the basis of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the jury also reasonably could have determined that SBC’s debt to Ridgefield Farms did not reach the extent claimed by the defendant or that it did not exist at all.
3
Count Ten–U.S. Bank Visa Credit Card
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. During his tenure at SBC, the defendant held a personal credit card issued by the U.S. Bank. From August 4, 2007, through September 5, 2007, the defendant made multiple purchases with the card, which amounted to
a total of $5331.85. The credit card statement for that period, introduced by the state at trial, reflected that the defendant made purchases at American Airlines ($298.60); Massage Envy Country ($49); Millilo Farms in Ridgefield ($39.63); Impark in New York, New York ($33); Express in White Plains, New York ($61.81); The GapinWhitePlains, NewYork ($82.06); Bloomingdale’s inWhite Plains, NewYork ($33.24); NordstrominWhite Plains, New York ($98.69); Barney’s in White Plains, NewYork($56.61); Fandango.com($33); Manisses/1661 Inn on BlockIsland, Rhode Island ($836.20); Caraluzzi’s in Wilton ($94.99); Hi Speed Ferry, Rhode Island ($67.50); Ridgefield Liquor Shop in Ridgefield ($43.98); Dead Eye Dicks on BlockIsland, Rhode Island ($95.92); Stop & Shop in Ridgefield ($49.73); Aldo’s Moped, Inc.on Block Island, Rhode Island ($66); The Moped Man
on Block Island, Rhode Island ($69.85); Trader Joe’s in Danbury ($110.67); Verizon Wireless ($1059.87); Bed Bath & Beyond in Danbury ($211.98); The Sports Authority in Danbury ($195.96); The Ridgefield Supply in Ridgefield ($54.02); Shell Oil in Cross River, New York ($88.70); Macy’s in Danbury ($580.31); Luc’s Caf e  ́ Restaurant in Ridgefield ($112.28); Kohl’s in Ridgefield ($42); ProgressiveInsurance ($500); andComcastCable ($266.25). During the same period, the defendant also incurred a finance interest charge of $219.67.
On September 7, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘Visa’’ in the amount of $2849.25. The check was issued using the old computer system, the corresponding credit card account number
was handwritten in, and the check had only the defendant’s signature.
On appeal, the defendant renews the argument we addressed in part I B 1 of this opinion, arguing that the state neither presented evidence that SBC had not authorized the payment nor proved that the charges
were in fact personal rather than business expenses. We disagree.
Aswe concludedinpartIB 1 ofthis opinion, the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to infer that SBC had not agreed to compensate the defendant forhis personal expenses. Similarly, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence, in the form ofthe credit card statement, forthejury, using its common sense and experiences, reasonably to infer that the charges were personal. Moreover, thejury reasonably could have concluded that, by not adhering to the SBC policy requiring two signatures and the terms of the consulting agreement, the defendant had attempted to avoid detection because the purchases
were not legitimate business expenses. 4
Count Eleven–Exxon Credit Card
Additional facts pertaining to this count are as follows. The defendant’swife held an ExxonMobile credit card issued by the Citi Bank. During the defendant’s tenure at SBC, the card was being used continuously to makepurchases at80 Bedford Roadin Katonah, New York ($748.42); 2507 Albany Avenue in West Hartford ($939.93); 31 Danbury Road in Ridgefield ($150.02); 200 Sargent Drive in New Haven ($94.89); Route 35 & Bouton Road in South Salem, NewYork ($138.24); 30 South KinderkamackRoadinMontvale, NewJersey ($105.61); 680 East Main Street in Mount Kisco, NewYork ($5.14); 192 North Bedford Road in Mount Kisco, New York ($20.01); 681 Piermont Road in Closter, New Jersey ($69.30); and 209 Route 3 East in Secaucus, New Jersey ($40.13). During that period, the defendant issued four SBCchecks payable to the order of ‘‘Exxon Mobil.’’28 The first check was issued on October 11, 2007, using the old computer system. The check was in the amount of $253.90 and was signed by the defendant only. The second check was issued on October 18, 2007, using the new system. That check was in the amount of $475.51 and had the defendant’s signature and a signature resembling Dober’s. At trial, however, Dober did not recognize the signature as his. The third check was issued on November 19, 2007, also using the new system. It was in the amount of $326.54 and signed only by the defendant. The last payment was made by an old system check issued on December 24, 2007. It was handwritten in the amount of $730 and had only the defendant’s signature.
At trial, the state presented testimony ofJudith Ledoux, the bursar of the University of Hartford. Ledoux testified that in the fall of 2007, the defendant’s sons
were registered as students atthe university. According to Ledoux, one of the sons had an automobile. She further testified that the files of the defendant’s sons contained several off-campus addresses, including 18 Temple Street in Hartford, and Closter, New Jersey.29 When asked whether she considered AlbanyAvenue as being close to the university’s campus, Ledouxtestified that she did.
In addition to the testimony of Ledoux, the state introduced testimony of Mel Cartoceti, an investigator for the state. Cartoceti testified that, according to his measurements, the distance between 2507 Albany Avenue in West Hartford and 18 Temple Street in Hartford
was 4.31 miles. He also testified that the distance between 18 Temple Street in Hartford and the University of Hartford was 3.09 miles. Finally, Cintron, who worked in the same office as the defendant at SBC, testified that, between September, 2007, andJanuary, 2008, shehadseenthe defendant at SBC in New Haven everywork day. Similarly, Greenfield testified that, as he understood it, the defendant had been at the SBC office ‘‘on a daily basis.’’
On appeal, the defendant argues that the state ‘‘offered no evidence with regard to what was purchased, by whom, or for what purpose.’’ ‘‘Absent such evidence,’’ he argues, ‘‘the inference the [state] asked the jury to draw—i.e., that these charges represented personal purchases by [the defendant,] rather than [SBC] expenses—amounts to rank speculation, and is impermissible.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We disagree. First, the jury reasonably could have inferred that a creditcardthathadbeenissuedtothe defendant’swife, in fact, had been used by his wife and possibly other family members rather than by SBC employees. That inference is supported by the testimony ofLedoux and Cartoceti attrialthat, atthe time, in additionto residingin Closter, New Jersey, the defendant’s sons attended college and resided in a close proximity to 2507 Albany Avenue in West Hartford.30 Furthermore, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s sons had been using the card on the basis of the regularity withwhichthe chargesat2507AlbanyAvenuehadbeen made. The credit card statements introduced at trial clearlyshowthat during the periodfrom October, 2007, through December, 2007, the card hadbeenused atthis location twenty-three times. Similarly, thejury reasonably could have inferred that the twenty-four charges at 80 Bedford Road in Katonah, New York, also had not been made by the defendant, but rather someone else. Inmakingthisinference, thejurycouldhave relied
on its common experience and knowledge of the fact thatKatonah, NewYork, doesnotliebetweenthe defendant’sresidenceinRidgefieldandthe SBC officeinNew Havenwhere, accordingtothetestimonyofCintronand Greenfield, he appeared every work day. Second, having made this inference, the jury then reasonablycouldhave concludedthatthe chargesmade by persons who had not been employed by SBC could not have been legitimate business expenses of SBC. In addition, thejuryreasonablycouldhave concludedthat the purchases had been made for personal expenses
onthe basis ofthe evidence showingthatthe defendant clearly violated the consulting agreement and the companypolicyregardingtwo signaturesonall SBC checks, and that he handwrote old system checks long after the new system had become fully operational.
In his brief, the defendant argues that, even if some of these charges were incurred at a gas station near the homes of the defendant’s sons, the state ‘‘offered

no evidence that

. . . they were incurred for the sons’ personaluse, andwerenot [SBC] expenses.’’Tosupport his argument, the defendant points to evidence at trial showingthathissonsoccasionallyhadperformedsome work at SBC in New Haven. Of course, the jury was freetorejectthenotionthatSBChadchosentocompensate the defendant’s sons for their work by paying the credit card account issued in their mother’s name as implausible. In addition, the defendant lacked the necessary authority to make such payments under the terms of the consulting agreement. 5
Count Twelve–BMW Leasing Account
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. During the defendant’s tenure at SBC, his wife leased a BMW automobile from BMW Financial Services with a monthly payment of $539.51.
On November 30, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘BMW Financial Services.’’Thecheckwasintheamountof$1356andsigned onlybythe defendant. The defendant submitted to Gol-linger a handwritten invoice that purported to list the mileage that he had driven for business purposes in September, October, and November, 2007. On the bottom of the invoice, the defendant wrote that he had travelled 2825 miles and then multiplied that mileage by $0.48 for a total of $1356. The invoice also included
a handwritten notation, directing to ‘‘[m]ake check directly to BMW.’’
At trial, Gollinger testified that, in the process of creating an internal SBC account number to generate
a company check on the new system, she entered the
name of the defendant’s wife as the leaseholder. According to Gollinger, when the defendant learned of that, ‘‘he gotveryupsetwithme because Iputhername
on that actual account, so I took it off.’’ Thereafter, onJanuary 15, 2008, the defendantissued
a second SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘BMW Financial Services.’’ That check was in the amount of $394.56 and was signed only by the defendant. The defendant submitted a calendar page for December, 2007, withmultiplehandwrittenentriespurportedlylisting the mileage he had travelled for business purposes during that month. According to the defendant’s handwrittennotation, hehadtravelled822 milesforbusiness during that month for a total of $394.56.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the state failed to present evidence that he ‘‘did not, in fact, use his wife’s car to drive the number of miles he claimed for business purposes. Instead, the [s]tate asked the jury to infer, from the fact that the car was leased in his wife’s name, that [the defendant] was stealing [SBC’s] money to pay for his wife’s car, rather than seeking ‘reimburs[ment] for out of pocket

. . . travel expenses,’ pursuant to the [consulting agreement]. Absent any evidence to support it, any such inference
was not only contrary to all the evidence, but pure speculation, and not permissible.’’ We are not persuaded. First, asisthe casewithothercounts, thejuryreasonably could have inferred that the payments to BMW Leasing were unauthorized by SBC because the companychecks, althoughissuedonthenewsystem, lacked the required second signature in clear violation of the company policy and the terms of the consulting agreement regarding third party payments. In addition, thejury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had been trying to avoid detection on the basis of Gollinger’s testimony that the defendant became ‘‘very upset’’ and insisted that she remove any reference to his wife’s name from the SBC computer system. Furthermore, thejury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s invoices didnot conformto the requirementoftheconsultingagreementforreimbursablebusiness expenses to be accompanied by ‘‘documentation verifying said expenses.’’ (Emphasis added.) Theinvoices are handwritten, provide scant details and, on their own, offer no verification for the claims made therein. Second, the invoices submitted by the defendant reflect that, between September and December, 2007, he had travelled 3647 miles for business purposes. At trial, however, both Cintron and Greenfield testified that the defendant appeared in the office on a daily basis. See State v. Pearl, 28 Conn. App. 521, 528–30, 613A.2d304 (1992) (findingthatdiscrepanciesbetween witnesses’ observations and claims ofovertime submitted for payment supported reasonable inference that defendant did not work hours claimed).
6
Count Thirteen–Greater Huron Development Corporation/Keane & Beane, P.C.
Additional facts pertaining to this count are as follows. Prior to his tenure at SBC, the defendant, both personally and as one of the owners of Ridgefield Farms, had been Involved in a legal dispute brought by the Greater Huron Development Corporation (GHDC) in the United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York. In that matter, the defendant was represented by Attorney David Glasser ofthe law firm Keane & Beane, P.C.
On August 10, 2007, the defendant entered a court approved settlement, resolving the dispute. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendant was to begin making monthly payments to GHDC in the amount of $1392.04. On September 10, 2007, the defendant issued
an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘GHDC’’ in the amount of$1392.04. The checkwas issuedusingthe old computersystemandwas signed onlybythe defendant.
On December 10, 2007, Keane & Beane, P.C., sent an invoice to the defendant in the amount of $35,000. On January 1, 2008, the defendant issued a company check payable to the order of ‘‘Keane & Beane, P.C.’’ in the amount of $1000. The check had only the defendant’s signature.
In his brief, the defendant renews the argument we addressed in part I A 1 ofthis opinion, arguing that the state did not present evidence proving that SBC funds hadnotbeenusedto satisfythe SBC’s outstanding debt to Ridgefield Farms. Without suchproof, he argues, the conviction on this count cannot stand. We disagree.
As we stated in part I A 1 of this opinion, the jury
was free to disbelieve the defendant’s theoryofdefense and conclude that SBC owed no money to Ridgefield Farms. In addition, in this count, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant’s clear violation of the company’s policy requiring two signatures
on all checks as well as his violation of the terms of the consulting agreement was indicative of his intentto embezzle SBC funds to satisfy his personal debts.
7
Count Two–American Express Credit Card 009
Additional facts pertaining to this count follow. During his tenure at SBC, the defendant held an individual credit card account with American Express. The statement ending on August 8, 2007, reflects that the defendant made purchases at Wal-Mart in West Haven ($697.20); Maguire’s Bayfront Restaurant in Ocean Beach, New York ($512.88); Gotomypc.com ($269.40); Fancy Food Show in New York City, New York ($120); made multiple fuel purchases ($456.97); paid a parking lot fee in New York City, New York ($19); and several E-ZPass charges ($245). The statement ending on September 9, 2007, reflects that the defendant made purchases at Tiger Direct.com ($2595.55); and a service charge with OnStar ($17.97).
On September 21, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in theamountof$2828. Thecheckwasissuedusingtheold computersystemandwas signed onlybythe defendant.
For the next statement cycle ending on October 8, 2007, the defendant submitted a copy of his monthly statement with the following charges claimed as business expenses: OnStar service charge ($20.09); ‘‘computers/printers’’ at Tiger Direct.com ($339.98); ‘‘file cabinets’’ at Wal-Mart ($240.92); La Quinta Inn in New Haven ($110.88); and several fuel purchases ($135.14).
On October 19, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to American Express in the amount of $847.01. The check was issued using the new computer system and it was signed by the defendant and Dober.
Forthe statement cycle ending on November 8, 2007, the defendant submitted a copy of his monthly statement with the following charges claimed as business expenses: Park Avenue Garage in New York City, New York ($33.13); Machine Shop in New York ($169); OnStar service charge ($20.09); Route 7 Grill in Great Barrington, Massachusetts ($1238.82); andmultiplefuel purchases ($192.52).
On November 30, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $2486.43. The check was issued using the new system and was signed only by the defendant.
The statement cycle ending on December 8, 2007, reflectsthatthedefendantmadepurchasesatTailgators RestaurantinDerby ($46.58); Croton Creek Steakhouse in CrotonFalls, NewYork ($170.14); Romeo and Cesare in New Haven ($160); Morton’s ofHartford in Hartford ($310.60); Joseph’s Steakhouse in Bridgeport ($349.47); Cru Restaurant in New York City, New York ($327.44); Credit Alert membership fee ($119.99); Northwest Airlines ‘‘Passenger

. . . Friend/Jamie’’ ($71.25); North-west Airlines ‘‘Passenger

. . . Friend/Phili[p]’’ ($71.25); Amtrak ‘‘Passenger

. . . Stone/Richard’’ ($437); American Airlines ($1588.70); OnStar service fee ($20.09); E-ZPass ($155);VerizonWireless ($564.96); L.L.Bean Direct ($269.45); Rio Suites in Las Vegas, Nevada ($422.19); PayPal ($25); a finance charge ($350.55); and multiple fuel purchases ($267.66).
On December 21, 2007, the defendant issued an SBC check payable to the order of ‘‘American Express’’ in the amount of $5157.64. The check was issued using the old system and was signed only by the defendant.
On this count, the defendant was charged with larceny in the first degree. The jury, however, acquitted him ofthat charge and oflarceny in the second degree, but found him guilty of larceny in the third degree.
The defendant renews the argument we addressed in part I B 1 of this opinion, arguing that the state neitherpresentedevidencethatSBC hadnotauthorized the payment nor proved that the charges were in fact personal rather than business expenses. We disagree.
As we concluded in part I B 1, there was sufficient evidence forthejury reasonably to inferthat the defendant was to be reimbursed by SBC for only verified legitimate business expenses. Moreover, the jury reasonably could have inferred the lack of authorization in this count from the fact that three ofthe four checks used by the defendant did not have a second signature explicitly required by the company policy and the consulting agreement. In addition, the jury could also find supportforthatinference inthe factthatthe December 21, 2007 old system check was handwritten months after the new system became fully operational when all ofthe new accounts were supposed to be processed through the new system. On the basis of this inference, the jury then reasonably could have concluded that the charges for the Credit Alert membership fee, Northwest Airlines ticket forthe defendant’s wife, apurchase at L.L.Bean Direct, andlodginginRio SuitesinLasVegas, Nevada, reflected in the December 9, 2007 statement, were unauthorized personal expenses.31 Furthermore, in the November 8, 2007 invoice the defendant claimed to have made business purchases totaling $1653.56. The corresponding SBC check, however, totaled $2486.43. On the basis of this evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the difference of $832.87 between the invoice and the company check represented an unauthorized personal expense. The jury could find further support for this inference in the fact that all business expenses from the previous monthly cycle purportedly had been paid off in full by the defendant, negating any need to make an additional payment in November.
II
PROSECUTORIAL IMPROPRIETYThe defendant next claims that he was deprived of
a fair trial by the prosecutor’s statements made during the state’s closingargument. Specifically, the defendant argues that the prosecutor, without any evidentiary basis, argued in his rebuttal that Bawarsky realized the defendant had been stealing from SBC and asked for his son’s help to stop the theft. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. During the closing arguments, defense counsel tried to portray David Bawarsky as someone who had been trying to prevent the defendant from becoming the new owner of SBC because he wanted to preserve his own interests in the company. In furtherance of that theory, defense counsel argued to thejury that the defendant ‘‘was causedto be ejectedfromthe company in lateJanuary, he was causedto be ejected and aname surfaced that had never surfaced in the negotiations or any legal document at all and that name as you now know is David Bawarsky, the son of Henry who had been thrown out of the company twenty years earlier

. . . .’’ Duringthe rebuttalargument, the state addressedthe defense’s theory, and the following colloquy ensued. ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You heard argument about David Bawarsky coming in, he’s been thrown out in the 80’s,

nowsometwentyyearslaterhe comesback, well David Bawarsky was Henry’s son. And isn’t it okay for a father to ask his sonfor help? ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge, there’s no testimonythatMr. Bawarskydid, thatHenryBawarskydid. ‘‘The Court: That’s true. I will strike that. There’s no evidence of that in this trial. ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: But David pulls up and outs [the defendant]. Ifyou had an employee that was stealing from you would you keep him there? ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge, I was precluded from arguing that Mr. Bawarsky was the victim,
so how can [the prosecutor] now target that

. . . [the defendant] was stealing from David Bawarsky.

. . . ‘‘The Court: I’m going to allow it, it’s argument. It’s appropriate argument.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In addition, when arguing as to count four, the prosecutor stated the following: ‘‘Does it make much sense for [SBC] to be paying a commission to a consultant andthento his company, andthentothe third company that was involved which is West Conn. Does that really make sense? Does it make logical business sense? Not if you know about it, but if you don’t know because the only person who does know is the person writing the checks, you don’t find out about it until later, then when you do you shut it down.’’32 (Emphasis added.)
We begin our discussion by setting forth relevantlegal principles governing the claims of prosecutorial impropriety. ‘‘In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engageinatwo step analyticalprocess.

. . . The two steps are separate and distinct.

. . . We first examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred.

. . . Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether it deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.

. . . In other words, an improprietyis an impropriety, regardless ofits ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, 151 Conn. App. 687, 693, 95 A.3d 1208, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 926, 101 A.3d 272 (2014).
To determine ‘‘whether any improper conduct by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth inState v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)], with due considerationofwhetherthatmisconductwas objected to at trial.

. . . These factors include: the extent to whichthe [impropriety] wasinvitedbydefense conduct
or argument

. . . the severity ofthe [impropriety]

. . . the frequency of the [impropriety]

. . . the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case

. . . the strength of the curative measures adopted

. . . and the strength of the state’s case.

. . . ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improperremarksbytheprosecutordeprivedthedefendant ofhis constitutional right to afairtrial, the burden is on the defendant to show, not only that the remarks
were improper, but also that, considered in the light of thewholetrial, theimproprietieswere so egregiousthat they amounted to a denial of due process.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 561–63, 34 A.3d 370 (2012). Furthermore, ‘‘prosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occurinthe course ofclosing arguments.

. . . In determining whether such [an impropriety] has occurred, the reviewing court must give due deference to the fact that [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument.

. . . Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence andthe reasonable inferences to be drawntherefrom.

. . . ‘‘Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury’s attention from the facts of the case. [The prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people ofthe [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent.. . . By reason of his office, he usually exercises great influence [on] jurors. His conduct and language in the trial ofcases in which human life or liberty [is] at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he represents the public interest, which demands novictim and asks [for]
no conviction through the aid ofpassion, prejudice, or resentment. Ifthe accused [is] guilty, he should [nonetheless] be convicted only after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established rules whichthe laws prescribe. [Although] the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters which the jury ha[s] no right to consider.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, 151 Conn. App. 693–94. Withtheseprinciplesinmind, we nowturntothe defendant’s claim.
On appeal, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]hese assertions are simply, and undeniably, false—there was no evidence whatsoever that Henry Bawarsky ever believed that [the defendant] had stolen anything.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Furthermore, he continues, these ‘‘false statements made by the [prosecutor] in closing here were severe and went to ‘the very heart of the case’—i.e., whether Henry Bawarsky consented to the expenditures at issue.’’ We are not persuaded. Havingreviewedtherecord,weconcludethatnoneof thecommentsmadebythestateinitsclosingarguments
was improper. The first comment made by the state— ‘‘[a]ndisn’titokayforafathertoaskhissonforhelp?’’— clearlyhadbeen made in response to defense counsel’s closing argument. See State v. Kendall, 123 Conn. App. 625, 643–44, 2A.3d990 (findingitproperforprosecutor, followingdefendant’s closingargument, tohighlightdifferencebetweenstate’sversionanddefendant’sversion of facts and inferences properly drawn from those facts), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902, 10 A.3d 521 (2010). Similarly, the second comment—‘‘[i]f you had an employee that was stealing from you would you keep him there?’’—also had been made in response to the defense’s alternative theory that David Bawarsky was trying to protect his own interests in SBC. In addition, this comment can be fairly inferred from the facts in the record. David Bawarsky did take control of the company in 2008 and forced the defendant out with the help of the New Haven police. See State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 320, 664A.2d 743 (1995) (‘‘[c]ounsel may comment upon facts properly in evidence and upon reasonable inferences to be drawn fromthem’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]).
As to the final comment—‘‘you don’t find out about it until later, then when you do you shut it down’’—it too was not improper. At trial the state’s theory of thecase had been that the defendant had the control of the company checkbook andused itto payhispersonal debts. Thus it was proper for the prosecutor to comment that once the defendant’s dealings had been discovered, he was forced out or ‘‘shut down.’’ See id.
We conclude that the state’s comments were not improper and, accordingly, need not consider whether any claimed impropriety deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. See State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 76 n.19, 43 A.3d 629 (2012).
III

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL Finally, the defendant claims that his ‘‘convictions should be vacated, because his right to a speedy trial
was violated.’’ Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘he was denied his right to a speedy trial when the [s]tate failed to bring him to trial until four and a half years after his arrest

. . . .’’ Having reviewed the record in the case, we conclude that the defendant failed to preserve his constitutional claim at trial and, thus, can only prevail on his claim if he satisfies the test established by our Supreme Court inState v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).33
The following additionalfacts andproceduralhistory
are relevantto this claim. OnAugust 26, 2013, following his convictions at trial, the defendant filed a motion for ‘‘judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, or for a new trial.’’Thecourtdeniedthedefendant’smotion. OnApril 4, 2014, the court issued a written articulation of its denial of the defendant’s motion. The articulation sets forth the factual background as follows: The defendant ‘‘was arrested by warrant on December 18, 2008. Bond
was set on the warrant in the amount of$350,000. [The defendant] postedthe bond and was released from custody. His first court appearance was on January 5, 2009

. . . . ‘‘On February 10, 2009, he appeared and entered not guilty pleas on all pending charges and elected to be triedbyajury. AttorneyNorm Pattis entered an appearance on behalf of [the defendant] on January 5, 2009, and was his counsel until June 10, 2013.

. . . ‘‘On December 30, 2009, [defense counsel] filed a motion for a speedy trial. The case was assigned for jury selection on January 7, 2010. Subsequently, the statutoryperiod for commencing [the defendant’s] trial
was tolled due to [defense counsel’s] involvement in another trial.

. . . [The defendant’s] case was then assigned for jury selection on February 22, 2010.’’
OnMarch 15, 2010, however, the defendantwithdrew hismotionforaspeedytrial. ThetranscriptoftheMarch 15, 2010 hearing reveals the following colloquy: ‘‘The Court: All right. Let me just indicate this is amatter that was on the trial list. A motion for speedy trial was filed by counsel. It had been—the running of the statutehadbeentolledtothis datebecause [defense counsel] was on trial for a good bit of that period and
we set it down for today and what’s happening today?

* * * ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I would like to withdraw that motion, Judge. I’ve had discussions with the state and there was a supervisedpre-trial last week. We are withdrawing our speedy trial motion after discussions with the state. In exchange the state is agreeing not to proceed on the thirty-two counts of forgery against [the defendant], but has reserved the right to proceed evidentially as to those facts on the notice of uncharged misconduct. We have reserved the right to oppose that at the time of trial, but the current—the case going forward would involve simply a one count claim of larceny in the first degree. ‘‘And the reason that the parties reached this agreementwithcourtsupervisionisthatthe—the entity that claims to be a victim, of course we dispute that it’s a victim of anything other than the delusion of an interlope probe, butthe entitythat claims to be avictim went into bankruptcy and its records became the property of a trustee. The entity is now out ofbusiness and fifty-eight boxes of items that both sides need to look atnoware reposednearthe Foxboro StadiuminMassachusetts and we’re just going to need some time for that, Judge. ‘‘So in—you know, clearlywe know chaos benefitted the defendant here, but the state wants the opportunity to look at those records and on the theory that it will A, do so and B, do the right thing, it’s persuaded we’re right and potentially drop this case, we thought it was in [the defendant’s] interest to withdraw the speedy trial motion. ‘‘The Court: All right. And then assuming that’s done with good faith in that you wouldn’t be—I mean, you have the right to tomorrow file a speedy trial again. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: There’s no gamesmanship going
on here. ‘‘The Court: All right. So the understanding is ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Well, I can’t say that, I’m always playing a game, but I mean I don’t have any—I don’t have any intent [to] reclaim it. ‘‘The Court: I’m hoping this is a one-time—an exception to the usual. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yeah. ‘‘The Court: And let me just ask you this, and the understanding is to give the state the opportunity to review the fifty-eight boxes and materials?‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Correct and we’re going to look at it as well, Judge.’’ Following the March 15 hearing, the case was docketed six dates in 2011 and two dates in 2012. Finally, the jury selection commenced on April 26, 2013. The defendant did not file another motion for a speedy trial
orindicatetothe court‘‘thathe requestedjuryselection to commence in 2011 or 2012’’ by motion or correspondence. The issue reemerged in his August 26, 2013 motion to dismiss.
We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim by setting forth the governing legal principles. ‘‘Both the United States constitution and the constitution of Connecticut guarantee every criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const., amend. VI; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8. This guaranteeprotects againstunreasonable delaybetweenformal accusation andtrial [that wouldthreaten] toproduce morethan one sortofharm, including oppressivepretrial incarceration, anxietyand
concern of the accused, and the possibility that the [accused’s] defensewillbeimpairedbydimmingmemories and loss ofexculpatory evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 609–10, 758 A.2d 327 (2000).
In Connecticut, ‘‘General Statutes § 54-82m34 codifies
a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and confers on thejudges ofthe Superior Court the authorityto make such rules as they deem necessaryto establish a procedure for implementing that right. Pursuant to that authority, the judges adopted Practice Book §§ 43-39 through 43-41.’’35 (Footnote added.) State v. Hampton, 66 Conn. App. 357, 366–67, 784 A.2d 444, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 901, 789 A.2d 992 (2001).
In his brief, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a dismissal ofhis case because ofthe ‘‘extreme delay and the severe prejudice [he] suffered as a result’’ of the delay. For the following reasons, we decline to review the defendant’s claim.
It is settled that ‘‘[p]ursuant to § 54-82m, the filing of a motion for a speedy trial by the defendant is a prerequisite to dismissal of the information.

. . . Therefore, before the defendant may move for dismissal, he must file amotion for aspeedytrial. Furthermore, [Practice Book § 43-41] provides: Failure of the defendant to file a motion to dismiss prior to the commencement oftrial shall constitute awaiver ofthe right to dismissal under these rules. Because a motion to dismiss is waived unless filed before the commencement of trial and a motion for a speedy trial must precede a motion for dismissal, logically a motion for a speedy trial must also be filed before the commencement of trial in order to be afforded a remedy under the rules.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 47Conn.App. 91, 98–99, 702A.2d906(1997),cert. denied, 243 Conn. 960, 705 A.2d 552 (1998).
The record in this case establishes that the only motion for a speedy trial that had been filed was voluntarily withdrawn by the defendant on March 15, 2010.36 Moreover, the record also indicates that the defendant failed to file his motion to dismiss before the commencement of trial as required by § 43-41. These facts lead us to conclude that, because he withdrew his speedy trial motion and did not file a timely motion to dismiss, ‘‘he is deemed to have waived his right to the statutory protection afforded by § 54-82m.’’ Id., 99; see alsoStatev. Hampton, 66 Conn. App. 357, 368, 784A.2d 444, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 901, 789 A.2d 992 (2001).
Becausethe defendantfailedtoinvoketheprotection of § 54-82m, his constitutional claim has not been preserved at trial and thus can only be afforded review under the Golding analysis. See State v. Rodriguez, supra, 47 Conn. App. 99. To obtain review ofan unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding, the defendant must present us with a record that is adequate for review and affirmatively demonstrate that his claim is indeed
a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. See Statev.Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 754–55, 91A.3d862 (2014). Having examined the record, we conclude, however, that it is not adequate for review.
In its articulation, the court found that the case ‘‘was docketed six dates in 2011 [and] two dates in 2012

. . . .’’ Critically, however, the record is silent on the issue ofwhich party had requested the aforementioned continuances, and the defendant failed to seek an articulation or rectification thereof. Without knowing who requestedthe continuancesandwhatrationalewasprovided as justification for these requests, our review of the defendant’s claim would amount to a speculation in which we decline to engage. The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant was acquitted of one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of § 53a-123 (a) (2), and found not guilty as charged on
one count of larceny in the first degree, but guilty of a lesser included offence of larceny in the third degree.

2 Under the terms ofthe agreement, the defendant’s pay would be reconciled on September 30 and December 31, 2007.

3 Richard Greenfield was, at the time, the defendant’s business partner in the planned acquisition of SBC. Greenfield signed an identical consultant agreement with SBC on August 3, 2007.

4 OnAugust 10, 2007, SBC alsoamendeditsbanksignaturepolicytorequire two signatures on company checks. The defendant’s signature appears on the form.

5 Even though some aspects ofthe company’s accounting were computerized, the software was described as ‘‘antiquated’’ at trial.

6 Testimonyattrialestablishedthatthe defendant,Auger, MarcyGollinger, Dober’s sister, who was in charge of SBC payroll and accounts payable, and Ilka Cintron, an office worker at SBC, had the combination to access the safe.

7 The new system used different SBC checks that were visually distinct from the checks used in the old system.
8 The line of credit eventually was increased to $1.4 million. Greenfield

was a personal guarantor of the trade credit.9 The defendant was also charged with thirty-three counts offorgery, but these charges were dropped by the state.
10 Additionally, § 53a-119 (1) provides that ‘‘[a] person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.’’

11 General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-122 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of larceny in the first degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and

. . . (2) the value ofthe property

. . . exceeds ten thousand dollars

. . . .’’

12 Thedatehadbeendeterminedbythetermsoftheforbearanceagreement reached between the defendant and Webster Bank. Upon repayment, Webster Bank agreed, inter alia, to withdraw its action against Ridgefield Farms and to release an attachment on the defendant’s home.

13 Initially, the defendant attempted to satisfy the debt by sending SBC checksthathadbeenissuedto the orderofRidgefield Farms. WebsterBank, however, refused to accept these checks as payment because it was not the named payee.
14 Attrial, the defendantpresented evidence that, priorto issuingthe three checks directly to Webster Bank, he attempted to endorse the SBC checks issued to Ridgefield Farms in favor of Webster Bank, which it refused to accept as being contrary to its policy. On appeal, the defendant cites to this evidence as proof that he acted in good faith and only resorted to issuing the SBC checks directly to Webster Bank after it would not accept his previousforms ofpayment. This argumentfailsto explainwhythe defendant did not attempt to satisfy his debt to Webster Bank in the most logical and reasonable way—by depositingthe checksto the Ridgefield Farms accounts first and then paying Webster Bank—but instead kept trying to satisfy his debt in a roundabout way. Thus, thejury reasonably could have discredited this evidence.

15 Similarly, the jury was free to discredit the two documents submitted by the defendant. We note, however, that even if the jury were to consider the documents as proof of the debt’s existence, almost $36,000 would still be left unexplained as the second document had the debt equal $50,339.49 by July, 2007. We further note that this difference is more than enough to meet the $10,000 threshold of § 53a-122 (a) (2).

16 See footnote 8 of this opinion.

17 Dober did confirm the authenticity of his signature on the check for $809.10.

18 We note that Dober was not asked to authenticate the signature on the fifth check by the state. We further note that the sixth check that had two signatures had been signed by someone other than Dober, and the state did not seek to verify the authenticity of that signature at trial.

19 In his brief, the defendant cites to State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 621, andStatev. Green, 261 Conn. 653, 804A.2d810 (2002), assupportinghisclaim that the state did not present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction

on count four. Both decisions stand for the well-established principle of Connecticutjurisprudencethatinsufficientevidence cannotsupportacriminal conviction. In Hedge, our Supreme Court held that in ‘‘the absence of any evidence that the defendant engaged in conduct reflecting an intent to sell drugs at

some location within the proscribed area, the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal’’ on that count. State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 661. In Green, the court held that evidence showing that (1) the defendant andhis companions atthe scene ofthe crime were friends, (2) the defendant may have had a dispute with the victim who was a member of a gang, and (3) the simultaneous drawing of the guns by the defendant and his companions in an apparent response to a cry out to ‘‘shoot the [expletive]’’

was ‘‘too weak a foundation upon which to base an inference of an agreement’’ to commit murder. State v. Green, supra, 261 Conn. 672–73. In his brief, however, the defendant provides limited analysis and does not explain how these particular cases offer support to his claim on appeal. The only conclusion that the defendant seemingly draws from both cases is that ‘‘the link between the facts proved with respect to count [four] and the inference the state asked thejury to draw was even more tenuous than the links the [court] found insufficient inHedge and Green.’’ Forthe reasons previously explained under this subsection, we disagree. The defendant also cites State v. Godfrey, 39 Conn. App. 1, 663 A.2d 1117 (1995), appeal dismissed, 236 Conn. 904, 670 A.2d 1305 (1996) (appeal dismissed as moot because of death of defendant), as supporting his claim of insufficient evidence. In light of the procedural history of the case, weconcludethatitsprecedentialvalue isquestionable and, therefore, wefollow

our Supreme Court’s well established precedent holding that on ‘‘appeal,

we do not ask whether there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence,’’ but rather ask ‘‘whetherthere is areasonable view ofthe evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Papandrea, supra, 302 Conn. 349.

20 General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-123 (a) provides, inter alia, that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of larceny in the second degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and

. . . (2) the value ofthe property

. . . exceeds five thousand dollars

. . . .’’

21 We note that the evidence does not include a detailed business expense invoice corresponding to the August 28, 2007 statement.
22 We also note that the record does not contain a detailed business expense invoice corresponding to the October 28, 2007 statement.
23 General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-124 (a) provides, inter alia, that ‘‘[a] person is guilty oflarceny in the third degree when he commits larceny,

as defined in section 53a-119, and

. . . (2) the value of the property

. . . exceeds one thousand dollars

. . . .’’

24 The invoice separated the charges into two categories: (1) six hours charged at $175 per hour; and (2) four hours at ‘‘no charge.’’

25 The invoice separated the charges into two categories: (1) five and onehalf hours charged at $175 per hour; and (2) two and one-half hours at ‘‘no charge.’’

26 Pite testified that the note read: ‘‘Call [Hecht] and told him erroneous, [SBC] only retained me. Told [the defendant] to get separate counsel.’’

27 Inhisbrief, the defendantarguesthatthe statefailedtopresentevidence ‘‘with regard to which of his services

. . . Pite charged for, and which he providedatno charge’’inhisOctober30, 2007invoice. Absentsuchevidence, he argues, the jury was left ‘‘to speculate whether [Pite] billed [SBC] for services which [SBC] did not agree to pay, or for services for which [SBC] did agree to pay.’’ We are not persuaded by this argument. On redirect, Pite explainedthe ‘‘no charge’’ entry onthe December 1, 2007 invoicebystating‘‘IgenerallywoulddothatwhenI’mchargingsomeone, you know, many hours for looking over stuffthat, you know, just as a courtesy,

so I believe it wasjust probably reviewing documents or reviewing invoices

or something that I felt, you know, even though it took time I gave him

a break.’’ The jury reasonably could have interpreted Pite’s explanation as simply meaning that it was his practice not to charge his clients for the full amount of time it had taken him to resolve a matter when he felt that it had taken him too long. This interpretation is further supported by Pite’s statement during cross examination that he ‘‘courtesied that time because [he] felt bad having to bill [SBC]

. . . .’’

28 Two checks were issued to the order of ‘‘Exxon Mobil,’’ one to the order of ‘‘Exxon Inc.,’’ and one to the order of ‘‘Exxon Processing Center.’’

29 At trial, Ledoux was specifically instructed only to name the town and the state for the second address.

30 We note that the sum of purchases made in West Hartford and Closter is sufficient to meet the $1000 threshold of § 53a-124 (a) (2).

31 We note that the sum of the purchases reflected in the December 9, 2007 statement equals $5376.77, which is larger than the amount of the December 21, 2007 check by $219.13. In his brief, the defendant argues that, because the amount billed in the statement exceeded the amount paid by the defendant, the state had to but ‘‘failed to prove that [SBC] funds were used to pay any particular charge or charges.’’ We reject the defendant’s argument. There was sufficient evidence to allow the jury reasonably to conclude that the sum ofunauthorizedpersonal purchases was greaterthan the gap between the statement balance and the check.

32 We note that the defendant failed to object to this comment. Nevertheless, the defendant’s claim may be reviewed. See State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572–73, 849 A.2d 626 (2004) (unpreserved claims ofprosecutorial improprietyreviewablewithout seekingreviewpursuanttoStatev. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 [1989]).

33 In State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘adefendant canprevail onaclaim ofconstitutional errornotpreserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequatetoreviewtheallegedclaimoferror; (2)theclaimisofconstitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of

a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failedto demonstrate harmlessness ofthe alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

34 General Statutes § 54–82mprovides: ‘‘In accordance withthe provisions of section 51–14, the judges ofthe Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution ofthis state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions ofsection 54–82c, the trial ofsuch defendant shall commence within eight months from the filing date ofthe information

or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is notbroughtto trial withinthe time limit setforth in subdivision (1) of this section and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant’s inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1) of this section.’’ Section 54-82m was amended by No. 07-217, § 194, of the Public Acts, which made technical changes to the statute that are not relevant to this appeal. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the current version of the statute.
35 Practice Book § 43-41 provides: ‘‘Ifthe defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable time limit set forth in Sections 43-39 and 43-40, and, absent good cause shown, a trial is not commenced within thirty days of the filing of a motion for speedy trial by the defendant at any time after suchtimelimithaspassed, theinformationshallbedismissedwithprejudice,

on motion of the defendant filed after the expiration of such thirty day period. For the purpose of this section, good cause consists of any one of the reasons for delay set forth in Section 43-40. When good cause for delay exists, the trial shall commence as soon as is reasonably possible. Failure of the defendant to file a motion to dismiss prior to the commencement of trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under these rules.’’

36 In his brief, the defendant argues that his withdrawal ofthe motion for

a speedy trial on March 15, 2010, did not constitute a ‘‘ prospective waiver of the right.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We are not sure what to make of the defendant’s argument. The record is clear that the withdrawal ofthe motion

was not intended to act as a prospective waiver; as the court specifically instructed the defendant that he had ‘‘the right to tomorrow file a speedy trial again.’’ Thus, the defendant and the state knew that his withdrawal did not constitute a prospective waiver, and that he could reassert his right to a speedy trial at any time thereafter. He simply did not do so in a timely manner.