Filed 9/30/20 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALBERTO GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B300393

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA068135)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Charles S. Lee,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________
2

Alberto Gonzalez, who was convicted of second degree 

murder after a 2003 jury trial, appeals from an order denying his 

petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.

1 In 

his form petition, he asserted he was convicted of felony murder 

or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, 

and he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes 

to sections 188 and 189, which became effective January 1, 2019. 

He contends he made a prima facie showing below that he is 

entitled to relief, and the trial court erred in summarily denying 

his petition without appointing counsel to represent him and 

without issuing an order to show cause and holding an 

evidentiary hearing. He also challenges, on hearsay grounds, the 

trial court’s reliance on the appellate opinion from his direct 

appeal in determining he is not entitled to relief under section 

1170.95. We reject Gonzalez’s contentions of error and affirm the 

order denying his petition for resentencing, as the record of his 

conviction and the trial court’s file establish he was convicted of 

murder as a direct aider and abettor, a theory of murder that is 

still viable after the amendment of sections 188 and 189.

BACKGROUND

In July 2003, an information charged Gonzalez and his 

codefendant, Gustavo Reyes, with one count of murder (§ 187, 

subd. (a)) and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187, 

subd. (a)), committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in 

association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). 

The information also alleged that codefendant Reyes personally 

and intentionally discharged a handgun, and that a principal 

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

personally and intentionally discharged a handgun, in the 

commission of both offenses. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).)

At the jury trial in December 2003, the prosecution 

presented evidence that the charged offenses involved a drive-by 

shooting, committed by gang members (Gonzalez and Reyes) 

against rival gang members. Under the prosecution’s theory, 

Gonzalez was the driver and codefendant Reyes was the shooter, 

who fired several shots out the window of a van at a group of 

men, killing one. (People v. Reyes & Gonzalez (Mar. 3, 2005, 

B174355) [nonpub. opn.], pp. 3-5 (Gonzalez).)2

The trial court instructed the jury on theories of murder 

liability applicable to the actual killer (i.e., the shooter, Reyes) 

and the direct aider and abettor of the murder (i.e., the driver, 

Gonzalez). In particular, the court instructed the jury with 

CALJIC No. 3.01 (Aiding and Abetting--Defined), CALJIC No. 

8.10 (Murder--Defined [Penal Code § 187]), CALJIC No. 8.11 

(“Malice Aforethought”--Defined), CALJIC No. 8.20 (Deliberate 

and Premeditated Murder), and CALJIC No. 8.31 (Second Degree 

Murder--Killing Resulting From Unlawful Act Dangerous to 

Life). The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder 

liability and expressly declined to instruct the jury on aiding and 

abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine

(CALJIC No. 3.02), denying the prosecution’s request for CALJIC 

2 The cited opinion is from Gonzalez’s direct appeal from his 

judgment of conviction. As explained more fully below, a court 

may consider the record of the conviction, including the opinion 

from the direct appeal, in evaluating a petition under section 

1170.95 and determining the theory of liability under which the 

petitioner was convicted of murder. (See People v. Lewis (2020) 

43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1138, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, 

S260598 (Lewis).)
4

No. 3.02 on the ground the instruction was not “indicated in this 

instance.”3

The jury found Gonzalez guilty of second degree murder 

and attempted murder and found true the gang and principal 

firearm use enhancement allegations, as to both offenses. On 

March 25, 2004, the trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 72 years to 

life in state prison: 15 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years 

to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, 

subdivision (d); and the middle term of seven years for the 

attempted murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm 

enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). (Gonzalez, supra, B174355, 

p. 2.)4

Gonzalez appealed, and this court affirmed his judgment of 

conviction. In that direct appeal, among other contentions not 

relevant here, Gonzalez contended insufficient evidence 

supported the finding he aided and abetted Reyes in committing 

the murder and attempted murder. (Gonzalez, supra, B174355, 

p. 3.) This court rejected Gonzalez’s contention, concluding 

substantial evidence established a rational trier of fact could find 

3 We granted the Attorney General’s request for judicial 

notice of: (1) the above-referenced jury instructions given at 

Gonzalez and Reyes’s trial; (2) the portion of the reporter’s 

transcript from the trial where the court denied the prosecution’s 

request that CALJIC No. 3.02 be given to the jury; and (3) the 

opinion from Gonzalez and Reyes’s direct appeal from the 

judgment of conviction.

4 The jury also found Reyes guilty of second degree murder 

and attempted murder and found true the gang and personal 

firearm use enhancement allegations, as to both offenses. 

(Gonzalez, supra, B174355, p. 2.)
5

beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez aided and abetted the 

murder and attempted murder. (Id. at pp. 14, 15-16.) 

On April 15, 2019, Gonzalez, representing himself, filed a 

form petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, a statute 

which permits a person convicted of felony murder or murder 

under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the 

court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be 

resentenced, if the person could not be convicted of murder today 

in light of amendments to sections 188 and 189. Senate Bill No. 

1437, which added section 1170.95 and amended sections 188 and 

189, was enacted in 2018 “to amend the felony murder rule and 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 

kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 

1015, § 1(f), p. 6674; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).)

In his form petition, Gonzalez checked boxes stating, in 

pertinent part, that he was convicted of second degree murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or under 

the second degree felony murder doctrine and he could not now 

be convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 and 

189, effective January 1, 2019. Gonzalez did not check the box 

requesting the trial court appoint counsel to represent him in 

connection with his petition. 

On June 28, 2019, the trial court issued a minute order, 

denying Gonzalez’s petition for resentencing without appointing 

counsel for him or holding a hearing. In the minute order, the 

court noted that at Gonzalez’s trial, the jury was instructed that 

Gonzalez could be found guilty of murder as a direct aider and 
6

abettor. The trial court also quoted the portion of the opinion 

from Gonzalez’s direct appeal where this court rejected 

Gonzalez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the finding that he aided and abetted Reyes in committing the 

murder and attempted murder. For these reasons, the court 

concluded Gonzalez did not qualify for resentencing under section 

1170.95.5

DISCUSSION

Gonzalez contends he made a prima facie showing that he 

is entitled to relief under section 1170.95, and the trial court 

erred in summarily denying his petition for resentencing without 

issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary 

hearing. As part of this contention, he argues the trial court 

relied on inadmissible hearsay in this court’s opinion from his 

direct appeal in determining he is not entitled to relief under 

section 1170.95. He also contends the trial court erred in denying 

his petition without appointing counsel to represent him.

5 The trial court summarized the evidence presented at

Gonzalez’s trial, based on this court’s appellate opinion from the 

direct appeal, and also found Gonzalez was not entitled to relief 

under section 1170.95 because he “was a major participant in the 

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 

life” within the meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(3), a 

statutory provision added by Senate Bill No. 1437. It is not clear 

what “felony” the trial court was referring to here, as section 189, 

subdivision (e)(3) relates to the underlying felony in a felony 

murder, a theory of liability the prosecution did not advance at 

trial, based on the record of conviction and the trial court’s file, 

including the jury instructions given and this court’s opinion in 

the direct appeal.
7

I. Section 1170.95’s Requirements

Under section 1170.95, subdivision (a), “A person convicted 

of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory may file a petition with the court that 

sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder 

conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining 

counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A 

complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the 

petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory 

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of 

first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted 

a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be 

convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The 

petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder 

because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 

1, 2019.” 

In amending section 188, Senate Bill No. 1437 added the 

following provision: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of 

Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a 

crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be 

imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a 

crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) To prove 

liability for murder as a direct aider and abettor—a theory that is 

still viable after Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendment of section 

188—the prosecution must show the defendant acted with 

knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and with the 

intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating commission of 

the offense. (See People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117-

1118.)
8

Senate Bill No. 1437 also added subdivision (e) to section 

189 (the statute that codified the felony murder rule), providing: 

“A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a 

felony listed in subdivision (a)[6]in which a death occurs is liable 

for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The 

person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the 

actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, 

counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted 

the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. 

[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying 

felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as 

described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); 

Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Section 189, subdivision (e)(3) is not 

relevant to our analysis—notwithstanding the trial court’s 

citation to this statutory provision—as the record of Gonzalez’s 

conviction establishes he was not convicted of felony murder.7

6 Subdivision (a) of section 189 provides: “All murder that 

is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, a 

weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of ammunition 

designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in 

wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing, or that is committed in the perpetration of, 

or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, 

burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act 

punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former 

Section 288a, or murder that is perpetrated by means of 

discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at 

another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict 

death, is murder of the first degree.”

7 Accordingly, Gonzalez’s assertion he is entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on his petition at which he may present 

evidence that he was not a major participant in the underlying 
9

Subdivision (b) of section 1170.95 sets forth the filing and 

service requirements of a petition for resentencing and states 

that the petition must include the following: (1) a declaration by 

the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief under the 

statute; (2) the superior court case number and year of conviction; 

and (3) an indication as to whether the petitioner requests 

appointment of counsel. There is no dispute as to Gonzalez’s 

compliance’s with subdivision (b). As set forth above, Gonzalez 

indicated he did not request appointment of counsel in connection 

with his petition by declining to check the box requesting the 

trial court appoint counsel to represent him.

A trial court that receives a petition for resentencing under 

section 1170.95 must follow these steps: “The court shall review 

the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima 

facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of 

this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court 

shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor 

shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the 

petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 

days after the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines 

shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima 

facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall 

issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)

At the evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause “to 

determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden 

of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the 

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life misses 

the mark. This was never prosecuted as a felony murder case. 

Thus, Gonzalez was not convicted of felony murder.
10

prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior 

conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to 

the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be 

resentenced on the remaining charges. The prosecutor and the 

petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or 

additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1170.95, 

subd. (d)(3).)

II. Gonzalez Did Not Make a Prima Facie Showing That 

He Is Entitled to Relief Under Section 1170.95

Gonzalez asserts that in his form petition for resentencing 

he “pleaded facts that, if true, entitle him to relief” within the 

meaning of section 1170.95, subdivision (c), triggering his 

entitlement to the evidentiary hearing described in subdivision 

(d). He argues that the trial court’s review of his prima facie 

showing under subdivision (c) begins and ends with consideration 

of his form petition because, in his words, “subdivision (c), unlike 

subdivision (d), does not authorize resentencing courts to review 

the record of conviction in determining whether to issue an order 

to show cause.” He acknowledges, however, that several divisions 

of this appellate district, including ours, have published decisions 

that disagree with his interpretation of subdivision (c), concluding 

that a trial court may consider the record of conviction in 

evaluating the petitioner’s prima facie showing. (See, e.g., Lewis, 

supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, review granted; People v. 

Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 323, review granted Mar. 18, 

2020, S260493 (Verdugo); People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 

Cal.App.5th 54, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410.)

In Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, review granted, this 

division explained: “Allowing the trial court to consider its file 

and the record of conviction is . . . sound policy. As a respected 
11

commentator has explained: ‘It would be a gross misuse of 

judicial resources to require the issuance of an order to show 

cause or even appointment of counsel based solely on the 

allegations of the petition, which frequently are erroneous, when 

even a cursory review of the court file would show as a matter of

law that the petitioner is not eligible for relief. For example,

if the petition contains sufficient summary allegations that

would entitle the petitioner to relief, but a review of the court

file shows the petitioner was convicted of murder without

instruction or argument based on the felony murder rule or

[the natural and probable consequences doctrine], . . . it would

be entirely appropriate to summarily deny the petition based

on petitioner’s failure to establish even a prima facie basis

of eligibility for resentencing.’ (Couzens et al., Sentencing

Cal. Crimes [The Rutter Group 2019] ¶ 23:51(H)(1), pp. 23–150 to 

23–151.) We agree with this view and, accordingly, conclude that 

the court did not err by considering our opinion in defendant’s

direct appeal in evaluating his petition.” (Id. at p. 1138.) We will 

adhere to Lewis, pending guidance from our Supreme Court.

The jury instructions given at Gonzalez’s trial, which are 

part of the trial court’s file in this case, demonstrate Gonzalez 

was prosecuted and convicted under a direct aider and abettor 

theory of murder liability. (See CALJIC Nos. 3.01 [Aiding and 

Abetting--Defined], 8.10 [Murder--Defined (Penal Code § 187)], 

8.11 [“Malice Aforethought”--Defined], 8.20 [Deliberate and 

Premeditated Murder] & 8.31 [Second Degree Murder--Killing 

Resulting From Unlawful Act Dangerous to Life].) The trial 

court did not instruct the jury on felony murder and expressly 

declined to instruct on aiding and abetting under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02). 
12

The opinion from Gonzalez’s direct appeal, which is part of 

the record of conviction, also demonstrates Gonzalez was 

convicted as a direct aider and abettor of the murder. In the 

opinion, this court rejected Gonzalez’s contention there was 

insufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that he aided 

and abetted Reyes in committing the murder and attempted 

murder, specifically addressing the state of the evidence 

regarding Gonzalez’s knowledge of Reyes’s plan to shoot the 

victim. (Gonzalez, supra, B174355, pp. 3, 14, 15-16.) By raising 

this contention in his direct appeal, Gonzalez acknowledged the 

jury found him guilty of murder as a direct aider and abettor and 

not under some other theory of liability (i.e., felony murder or 

murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine). 

Gonzalez’s objection, on hearsay grounds, to consideration of the 

appellate opinion in this manner is without merit. The opinion is 

relied on for a nonhearsay purpose—to determine under what 

theory Gonzalez was convicted of murder. (See People v. Woodell

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 460 [“The admissibility of an appellate 

opinion used for this nonhearsay purpose does not turn on 

whether each factual statement in that opinion comes within an 

exception to the hearsay rule but on whether the opinion logically 

shows what the original trial court found was the basis of the 

conviction”].)8

8 Gonzalez challenges, on hearsay grounds, the trial court’s 

summary of the evidence presented at trial, taken from this 

court’s opinion, to support the trial court’s finding that he “was a 

major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life” within the meaning of section 

189, subdivision (e)(3). As explained above, section 189, 

subdivision (e)(3) is not relevant to our analysis because section 

189 is the statute that codified the felony murder rule, and the 
13

Because the trial court’s file and the record of conviction 

demonstrate Gonzalez is not entitled to relief under section 

1170.95 as a matter of law because he was convicted of murder as 

a direct aider and abettor, the trial court did not err in denying 

his petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show 

cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.

III. Gonzalez Was Not Entitled to Appointment of 

Counsel

As set forth above, section 1170.95, subdivision (c) provides: 

“The court shall review the petition and determine if the 

petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner 

falls within the provisions of this section. If the petitioner has 

requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent 

the petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response 

within 60 days of service of the petition and the petitioner may 

file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor 

response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good 

cause. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or 

she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show 

cause.”

In Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, review granted, this 

division concluded “the trial court’s duty to appoint counsel 

[under section 1170.95, subdivision (c)] does not arise unless and 

until the court makes the threshold determination that petitioner 

‘falls within the provisions’ of the statute.” (Id. at p. 1140.) 

trial court’s file and the record of conviction demonstrate 

Gonzalez was not convicted of felony murder. Accordingly, we 

need not address Gonzalez’s argument that the trial court 

impermissibly relied on hearsay in this court’s opinion in making 

a finding that is inapplicable to this case.
14

Where a petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing that 

section 1170.95 applies to the murder conviction, the petitioner is 

not entitled to the appointment of counsel. (Lewis, at p. 1140; 

accord, Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 323, review granted 

[“the relevant statutory language, viewed in context, makes plain 

the Legislature’s intent to permit the sentencing court, before 

counsel must be appointed, to examine readily available portions 

of the record of conviction to determine whether a prima facie 

showing has been made that the petitioner falls within the 

provisions of section 1170.95”].)

Even if Gonzalez had requested the appointment of counsel 

in his petition for resentencing—which he did not—we would 

conclude he was not entitled to such appointment because he 

failed to make a prima facie showing that section 1170.95 applied 

to his murder conviction, as discussed above.

The First District Court of Appeal, disagreeing with Lewis

and Verdugo, recently held “a petitioner is entitled to counsel 

upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition for relief [within 

the meaning of section 1170.95, subdivision (b)] that requests 

counsel be appointed.” (People v. Cooper (Sept. 1, 2020, A156880) 

____ Cal.App.5th ____ [2020 WL 5175210, 10].) We respectfully 

disagree with Cooper’s holding, which cannot be harmonized with 

a plain reading of the statute. If a facially sufficient petition 

within the meaning of subdivision (b) gives rise to a requirement 

for appointment of counsel, subdivision (b) would so state. 

Instead, the Legislature placed the appointment of counsel 

requirement in subdivision (c), as the next step after the trial 

court’s review of the petition to determine if the petitioner has 

made a prima facie showing that petitioner falls within the 

provisions of section 1170.95. We will adhere to Lewis, pending 
15

guidance from our Supreme Court. But even if we were to apply 

Cooper’s holding to the facts of this case, we would not reverse 

the order denying Gonzalez’s petition on the ground the trial 

court did not appoint counsel to represent him because Gonzalez 

did not request the appointment of counsel in his petition.

Gonzalez argues, regardless of whether he requested 

counsel below under subdivision (c) of section 1170.95, he had a 

constitutional right to the appointment of counsel, which was 

triggered at the time he filed his petition for resentencing, 

because it was a “ ‘critical stage[]’ of the criminal process.” A 

critical stage, at which a defendant has a state and federal 

constitutional right to be represented by counsel, “can be 

understood as those events or proceedings in which the accused is 

brought in confrontation with the state, where potential 

substantial prejudice to the accused’s rights inheres in the 

confrontation, and where counsel’s assistance can help to avoid 

prejudice.” (Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court

(2019) 6 Cal.5th 998, 1004-1005.) 

The stage at which the trial court denied Gonzalez’s 

petition for resentencing does not constitute a critical stage of the 

criminal process, as defined in case law and set forth above. 

There was no confrontation with the state; indeed, the 

prosecution was not even involved at the stage the trial court 

denied the petition. Nor was there the potential for substantial 

prejudice to Gonzalez’s rights. The trial court determined 

Gonzalez was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Thus, our 

review on appeal is de novo. (In re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

948, 960 [questions of law are reviewed de novo].) In any case, he 

was not prejudiced. Gonzalez is represented by appointed 

counsel on appeal, and he has had a full opportunity to present, 
16

through counsel, whatever arguments he believes he was unable 

to assert below when he was unrepresented.

Moreover, because the retroactive relief provided by section 

1170.95 represents an act of lenity by the Legislature, a 

petitioner has no constitutional right to representation by counsel 

during the proceedings. (Cf. People v. Anthony (2019) 32 

Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [no right to jury trial in proceedings 

under Senate Bill No. 1437 because its retroactive relief is “an act 

of lenity that does not implicate defendants’ Sixth Amendment 

rights”], citing People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1063-1064; 

Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 555 [prisoners have 

no constitutional right to counsel “when mounting collateral 

attacks upon their convictions”].)

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in 

summarily denying Gonzalez’s petition for resentencing under 

section 1170.95 without appointing counsel to represent him and 

without issuing an order to show cause and holding an 

evidentiary hearing.

DISPOSITION

The June 28, 2019 order denying Gonzalez’s petition for 

resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.