United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 13-1215

MANUEL ORDONEZ-QUINO,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Torruella, Howard, and Thompson,

Circuit Judges.

Nancy J. Kelly, John Willshire Carrera, and Harvard

Immigration & Refugee Clinic, on brief for Petitioner.

Dara S. Smith, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Division, and David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Office of

Immigration Litigation, on brief for Respondent.

July 23, 2014
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Manuel Ordonez-Quino

seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision

affirming an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of his requests for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United

Nations Convention Against Torture. Among other things, he says

the BIA's and IJ's determinations that he did not demonstrate past

persecution on account of a protected ground were not supported by

substantial evidence. Because we agree, we grant his petition and

remand for further proceedings.

I. Facts

We take the facts primarily from Ordonez-Quino's

affidavit and testimony before the IJ, who found him credible,

supplementing with some history for context. See Ayala v. Holder,

683 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 2012).

Ordonez-Quino was born in Zacualpa, Department of Quiché,

Guatemala, on December 4, 1974. He is an indigenous Mayan Quiché. 

His native language is Quiché; he speaks very little Spanish.

Ordonez-Quino grew up during the most violent period of

the brutal civil war that ravaged Guatemala from 1962 through 1996. 

In his affidavit and testimony, he related haunting childhood

memories of the Guatemalan military's attacks on his family and

their community. He said the Guatemalan government singled them

out for persecution because of their indigenous race and ethnicity,

their real and imputed political opinions, and their membership in

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various social groups. During the attacks, he said, the military

"shot at us, bombed us, destroyed our homes[,] and killed our

people. I witnesse[d] many terrible things."

In 1980, during one such attack, a military helicopter

dropped a bomb next to Ordonez-Quino and his father. Ordonez-Quino

was only five or six years old. His father was trying to carry him

to safety in the surrounding mountains when the nearby explosion

knocked Ordonez-Quino to the ground. His father scooped him back

up and ran into hiding, but the damage was done. Either as a

result of the explosion or the fall, Ordonez-Quino suffered a

severe illness, experiencing high fevers and extreme headaches for

days. Because soldiers controlled the area, his parents could not

seek medical attention and instead applied traditional remedies. 

Due to his injuries, Ordonez-Quino ultimately became almost

completely deaf in both ears. 

From that time forward, Ordonez-Quino's hearing loss

affected him deeply. Because he could not hear, he lost his

ability to speak clearly. It was difficult for him to communicate

and develop relationships. He struggled to learn at the same pace

as his peers. He was more vulnerable to violence because he could

not hear the onset of military raids.

In the years that followed, soldiers continued to

victimize Ordonez-Quino's community. At some point, his family's

home and lands were destroyed. To survive, they went to work at a

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farm on the coast of Guatemala. They all "worked very hard and

lived very hard lives," but Ordonez-Quino suffered more because he

could not understand Spanish or hear what his supervisors yelled at

him. He says he "live[d] in constant anxiety and fear." 

Some time later, Ordonez-Quino went to work in the

textile mills in Guatemala City, where he was often mistreated

because he could not hear or understand Spanish. During this

period, his parents helped him arrange a marriage to a Quiché woman

from his hometown. They later had a daughter together.

While he was in Guatemala City, Ordonez-Quino reports

that he was repeatedly targeted by racist gangs because of his

Quiché ethnicity. Again, his inability to hear or to understand

Spanish put him in greater danger because he could not hear the

gangs' threats or detect their approach.

Ordonez-Quino left Guatemala City after a violent gang

attack in 2005, when gang members "started beating [him] as if they

were going to kill [him]." While fleeing the gang, he ran into a

barbed wire fence, causing permanent scars to his head and arm.

Fearing that he might not be able to escape if he were

attacked again, Ordonez-Quino returned briefly to his hometown

where he hid in his family's home. He came to the United States

soon after because his family warned him it was not safe to stay in

Guatemala. Today, his family tells him not to return to Guatemala

due to ongoing violence against the Mayan Quiché community.

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II. Administrative Proceedings

Ordonez-Quino entered the United States through Mexico

without inspection in July 2005. He made his way to Providence,

Rhode Island to live with family members, and he found work at the

Michael Bianco factory in New Bedford, Massachusetts.

On March 6, 2007, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement raided the factory and detained Ordonez-Quino, along

with over 300 other workers. The next day, the government issued

a Notice to Appear, charging Ordonez-Quino with removability under

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien who had entered the United

States without inspection or parole.1

On October 4, 2010, Ordonez-Quino appeared before an IJ

in Boston, Massachusetts, seeking (1) asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158; (2) withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3); and (3) protection under the Convention Against

Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-18. Ordonez-Quino had

great difficulty testifying because he could not hear his

1

 Ordonez-Quino was taken first to Fort Devens, Massachusetts,

and then transferred to a detention facility in El Paso, Texas. On

March 22, 2007, he appeared before an IJ in El Paso without

counsel, without a Quiché translator, and without hearing

assistance. The IJ ordered him removed in short order. OrdonezQuino subsequently obtained counsel and appealed the IJ's decision,

arguing he had not received a full and fair hearing, in violation

of his due process rights. Both Ordonez-Quino and the Department

of Homeland Security moved to remand his case to the IJ, and the

BIA acquiesced. He later applied for and was granted a change of

venue to Boston, Massachusetts.

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attorney's or the IJ's questions well, despite the assistance of a

hearing aid.2

In addition to his testimony and personal affidavit,

Ordonez-Quino submitted the following materials to the IJ: the

testimony and affidavit of a doctor verifying Ordonez-Quino's

hearing impairment and noting his improvement with a hearing aid;

the report of Guatemala's Commission for Historical Clarification

("Historical Clarification Report" or the "Report"), which, inter

alia, found that the Guatemalan military committed acts of genocide

against indigenous Guatemalans in several regions — including

Ordonez-Quino's hometown of Zacualpa — during the Guatemalan Civil

War;3 decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and

Ninth Circuits addressing asylum claims brought by indigenous

2 Ordonez-Quino obtained one hearing aid in the United States

prior to appearing before the IJ. He could not afford a second

one, but he says he hopes to get another if he is permitted to stay

in the United States.

3

 Comm'n of Historical Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report

of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and

Recommendations, Conclusions, ¶¶ 38-41 (1999), available at

http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf ("Historical

Clarification Report" or the "Report"). The Commission was established through

the June 1994 Oslo Accord "to clarify with objectivity, equity[,] and

impartiality, the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with

the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people,"

during the civil war. Id. at Prologue, 11.

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Guatemalans;4 several documents describing ongoing discrimination

against Mayans in Guatemala; numerous reports and articles issued

by the U.S. State Department and prominent human rights

organizations detailing the history of violence and recent human

rights violations against Mayans in Guatemala; and several

documents about gang violence in Guatemala.

After the hearing, the IJ denied Ordonez-Quino's requests

for relief and ordered him removed. Though the IJ found

Ordonez-Quino's testimony credible and excused his failure to seek

4 Those cases were: Perez Calmo v. Mukasey, 267 F. App'x 640

(9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (remanding IJ's denial of asylum

because (1) petitioner's failure to show persecution was directed

specifically at her did not necessarily preclude finding of past

persecution, and (2) substantial evidence did not support IJ's

finding of no nexus between soldiers' invasion of petitioner's

village and a protected ground); Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496

F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding IJ's denial of asylum and

withholding of removal because (1) IJ's adverse credibility

findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) IJ

failed to consider harm petitioners and family suffered from

perspective of small children); Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d

146 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (remanding IJ's denial of asylum

because IJ failed (1) to take entire record into account and (2) to

consider harm petitioner suffered cumulatively and from perspective

of small child); and Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 81 F. App'x 673 (9th

Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (remanding IJ's denial of asylum and

withholding of removal because IJ failed to consider whether

violence was committed against petitioner by actors the government

was unwilling or unable to control).

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asylum before the one-year filing deadline,5

 the IJ concluded that

Ordonez-Quino did not qualify for asylum because he had not

demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of a protected ground.

As for past persecution, the IJ found that the Guatemalan

military attacked Ordonez-Quino's community during the war because

they thought there were guerrillas within or nearby, not because

the community was Mayan Quiché. While the IJ acknowledged that

racism may have informed the military's beliefs about the

community, he said racism itself was not the reason for bombing in

or near the villages, and "[t]he purpose of the bombing was not to

destroy the Mayan Quich[é] community." The IJ further found no

evidence that Ordonez-Quino was later accosted by gangs because of

his Mayan Quiché identity. Accordingly, the IJ held that OrdonezQuino had not established the required nexus between the past harm

he suffered and a protected ground.

As for fear of future persecution, while the IJ

acknowledged that the Mayan Quiché population continues to suffer

pervasive discrimination in Guatemala, he found that their present

mistreatment does not rise to the level of persecution. Moreover,

5

 The IJ excused Ordonez-Quino's failure to apply for asylum

before the one-year mark because Ordonez-Quino's "hearing loss with

the resultant inability to communicate, as well as the possibility

of some neurological damage resulting from his inability to hear

and to learn . . . constitute[d] exceptional circumstances relating

to the delay in his having filed his application for asylum." The

government has not challenged this decision.

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though Ordonez-Quino might fear further violence, the IJ said he

had not shown he would be targeted by gangs or others in the future

on account of a protected ground. In fact, family members who

share his protected traits are living in Guatemala safely.

Accordingly, the IJ held that Ordonez-Quino was not

eligible for asylum. He likewise found that Ordonez-Quino was not

eligible for relief under the more stringent "clear probability of

persecution" standard for withholding of removal, or for protection

under the Convention Against Torture.

Ordonez-Quino appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA. He

challenged the IJ's finding of no nexus between the past harm he

suffered and a protected ground, and he argued he was eligible for

asylum based both on past persecution and a well-founded fear of

future persecution. He also expressly requested a discretionary

grant of humanitarian asylum based on the severity of the past

persecution he had experienced and the serious harm he would suffer

if returned to Guatemala, in case the BIA found that changed

circumstances in Guatemala undercut the reasonableness of his fear

of future persecution.

On January 10, 2013, the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision

in a brief opinion. First, the BIA agreed that Ordonez-Quino had

not established a sufficient link between the past harms he

suffered and a protected ground to qualify for asylum. Second, it

found that the harms Ordonez-Quino said he experienced in the past

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did not amount to persecution. Third, the BIA said that even if

Ordonez-Quino had established past persecution on account of a

protected ground, changed country conditions would have rebutted

his claim to a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Finally, the BIA found that Ordonez-Quino had waived any

claim to humanitarian asylum by not specifically raising it before

the IJ. It went on to say that even if Ordonez-Quino had not

waived this claim, Ordonez-Quino was not eligible for humanitarian

asylum because he had not established past persecution. In a

footnote, the BIA added: 

Even if [Ordonez-Quino] had shown that his

injuries during the civil war were on account

of a protected ground sufficient to establish

past persecution, [Ordonez-Quino's] case would

not warrant humanitarian asylum based on the

special considerations discussed in Matter of

Chen, [20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18-19 (BIA 1989)].

This timely appeal followed.

III. Discussion

Before us, Ordonez-Quino contends that the BIA's and IJ's

determinations that he did not establish past persecution on

account of his race, ethnicity, and/or imputed political opinion

were unsupported by substantial evidence. He further argues that

the BIA committed legal error by treating humanitarian asylum as a

form of relief that an applicant must request independent of a

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past-persecution-based asylum claim in order to preserve it.6

 We

address each of his arguments in turn.

A. Standard of Review

We usually review decisions of the BIA, not the IJ. 

Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2013). But where, as

here, "'the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses

some of the bases for the IJ's decision, we have authority to

review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.'" Romilus v.

Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Chen v. Ashcroft,

376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004)); see id. ("[W]here the BIA's

decision adopts portions of the IJ's opinion, we review those

portions of the IJ's opinion that the BIA has adopted."); see also

Jianli Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2012) ("[W]here,

as here, the BIA adopts portions of the IJ's findings while adding

its own gloss, we review both the IJ's and the BIA's decisions as

a unit."); Cabas v. Holder, 695 F.3d 169, 173 (1st Cir. 2012)

("Because the BIA adopted in part the IJ's decision . . . but also

6 Ordonez-Quino also says the BIA erred as a matter of law by

not recognizing imputed political opinion as a basis for asylum. 

If that is indeed what the BIA has done here, we agree it would be

error. See Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[A]n

imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly

attributed, may constitute a reason for political persecution

within the meaning of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act."

(internal quotation marks omitted)). But because we find the IJ

and BIA erred by not finding Ordonez-Quino eligible for asylum

based on the grounds of race and ethnicity, we need not deal with

this argument. We likewise need not discuss Ordonez-Quino's

arguments that the BIA and IJ erred by denying his requests for

withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture relief.

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provided additional analysis, we review both decisions.").

We review the BIA's and IJ's interpretations of law de

novo, "subject to appropriate principles of administrative

deference." Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2010). 

We review their findings of fact — including whether persecution

occurred on account of a protected ground — "under the familiar and

deferential substantial evidence standard." Ivanov, 736 F.3d at

11. We will respect their findings so long as they are "'supported

by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole.'" Larios, 608 F.3d at 107 (quoting I.N.S.

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). "However, 'our

deference is not unlimited,'" and we must reject the BIA's and IJ's

findings if "'we cannot conscientiously find that the evidence

supporting them is substantial, when viewed in the light that the

record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence

opposed to [their] view[s].'" Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11 (quoting

Kartasheva v. Holder, 582 F.3d 96, 105 (1st Cir. 2009)) (internal

brackets omitted); see also Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110,

119 (1st Cir. 2004). We will reverse if the record would compel a

reasonable fact-finder to reach a contrary conclusion. Vasili v.

Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Chhay v. Mukasey,

540 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008)).

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B. Asylum

To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must show he is

unwilling or unable to return to his home country "because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see id.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11. Proof of past

persecution creates a presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11. 

The government may rebut this presumption by demonstrating, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that "[t]here has been a fundamental

change in circumstances such that the [petitioner] no longer has a

well-founded fear of persecution," or that the petitioner "could

avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of [his]

country of nationality . . . and under all the circumstances, it

would be reasonable to expect [him] to do so." 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B).

1. Past Persecution

Persecution is a fluid term, not defined by statute. 

Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11 (quoting Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494

F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 2007)). We know it requires that "the sum

of [a petitioner's] experiences . . . add up to more than ordinary

harassment, mistreatment, or suffering." Lopez de Hincapie, 494

F.3d at 217. It "normally involves 'severe mistreatment at the

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hands of [a petitioner's] own government,'" or "'non-governmental

actors . . . in league with . . . or . . . not controllable by the

government.'" Ayala v. Holder, 683 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2012)

(quoting Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)). But

within these broad parameters, courts usually assess whether harm

rises to the level of persecution on a case-by-case basis. Sok v.

Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Aguilar-Solis v.

I.N.S., 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999)).

For purposes of asylum, a petitioner must demonstrate

that the harm he experienced occurred "on account of" a statutorily

protected ground. Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 12. After passage of the

REAL ID Act of 2005, this means a protected ground must be at least

"'one central reason' for the mistreatment," and it must not be

"'incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another

reason for harm.'"7 Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2008) (quoting In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA

2007)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). A petitioner need not

provide direct proof of motive, but he must put forth "some

evidence on the subject due to its importance in the statutory

scheme." Singh, 543 F.3d at 5 (citing Babani v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d

20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2007)).

7

 The REAL ID Act of 2005 applies to all applications that,

like Ordonez-Quino's, were filed on or after May 11, 2005. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158 note (effective date of 2005 amendment); Moreno v.

Holder, 749 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2014).

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a. Nexus to a Protected Ground

Ordonez-Quino says the IJ's determination that he did not

establish the requisite nexus between the harms he suffered and his

Mayan Quiché race and ethnicity was not supported by substantial

evidence. We agree. In reaching this conclusion, it appears that

the IJ — and the BIA following suit — ignored or unreasonably

interpreted crucial documentary evidence linking Ordonez-Quino's

experiences to his protected Mayan Quiché identity.

With respect to the attack that caused Ordonez-Quino to

lose his hearing, the IJ said: 

The bombing which occurred in 1980 and during

the period of the civil war cannot be found to

be precipitated by the Guatemalan army bombing

the Mayan Quich[é] population. Rather, the

bombing attacks were taking place in or near

these communities because it was believed that

there were guerrillas in or near these

communities. 

To the extent that a certain racism existed at

that time, it still was not a basis for

bombing in or near the Mayan Quich[é]

villages. Rather, the racism was the basis,

however founded or unfounded, of the

Guatemalan military believing that the Mayan

Quich[é] community was sympathetic to the

guerrilla cause and were harboring guerrillas.

I find based on the documentary evidence that

although [Ordonez-Quino] was injured and

suffered hearing loss because of the bombing

raids that the bombing raids were not directed

at the Mayan Quich[é] community per se, but,

rather, they were on account of the civil war

which was going on at the time and on the

basis of the Guatemalan army seeking to ferret

out and destroy the guerrilla enemies. The

purpose of the bombing was not to destroy the

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Mayan Quich[é] community.

The IJ further found "that the tragic damage to [Ordonez-Quino's]

ears as a result of the bombing during the civil war in 1980 [was]

as a result of the civil war and general conditions of strife and

violence which existed in Guatemala at the time."

The BIA agreed with the IJ's take, reiterating his

finding that "all Mayans were targeted because of their suspected

support of the guer[r]illas," and saying Ordonez-Quino "ha[d] not

shown that he was targeted based on ethnicity rather than being a

victim of violence incident to the civil war."

However, the Historical Clarification Report, as well as

other documentary evidence Ordonez-Quino submitted, tells a

different story. According to the Report, racism was an underlying

cause of the Guatemalan Civil War and "a basic explanatory factor

for the indiscriminate nature and particular brutality with which

military operations were carried out against hundreds of Mayan

communities." Historical Clarification Report, Conclusions, ¶¶ 12,

33. "[D]uring the bloodiest years of the confrontation," "Mayan

communities . . . became a military objective." Id. at Conclusions,

¶ 62. Eighty-three percent of the war's identified victims were

Mayan. Id. at Conclusions, ¶ 1.

Though the army did, as the IJ reported, associate Mayan

communities with guerrilla-supporters, "in the majority of cases,

the identification of Mayan communities with the insurgency was

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intentionally exaggerated by the State, which, based on traditional

racist prejudices, used this identification to eliminate any

present or future possibilities of the people providing help for,

or joining, an insurgent project." Id. at Conclusions, ¶ 31.

The consequence of this manipulation . . . was

massive and indiscriminate aggression directed

against communities independent of their

actual involvement in the guerrilla movement

and with a clear indifference to their status

as a non-combatant civilian population. The

massacres, scorched earth operations, forced

disappearances and executions of Mayan

authorities, leaders[,] and spiritual guides,

were not only an attempt to destroy the social

base of the guerrillas, but above all, to

destroy the cultural values that ensured

cohesion and collective action in Mayan

communities.

Id. at Conclusions, ¶ 32. Furthermore, the army's inflated

perception of Mayans as guerrilla allies "contributed to increasing

and aggravating the human rights violations perpetrated against

them, demonstrating an aggressive racist component of extreme

cruelty that led to the extermination en masse[] of defen[s]eless

Mayan communities purportedly linked to guerrillas — including

children, women[,] and the elderly." Id. at Conclusions, ¶ 85. 

Considering these repeated "destructive acts, directed

systematically against groups of the Mayan population," including

"against minors who could not possibly have been military targets,"

the Historical Clarification Report found that "the only common

denominator" among victims was membership in a Mayan ethnic group,

and the Guatemalan military's acts were committed "with intent to

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destroy" these groups, "in whole or in part." Id. at Conclusions,

¶ 111. The Report ultimately concluded that the Guatemalan State

had "committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people" in

four regions, including Ordonez-Quino's hometown of Zacualpa,

between 1981 and 1983.8 Id. at Conclusions, ¶¶ 110, 122.

Thus, while the IJ correctly noted that Mayan communities

like Ordonez-Quino's were targeted during the civil war in part

because of their real or imagined connection to guerrilla forces,

the documentary evidence does not support his finding that the

purpose of such attacks "was not to destroy the Mayan . . .

community." In fact, that was precisely the military's aim, as

explicitly found by Guatemala's own Historical Clarification

Commission, and consistent with numerous documentary sources in the

8 The Report adopted the United Nations' definition of

genocide as:

[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic[],

racial[,] or religious group, . . . : 

a) Killing members of the group; 

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of

the group; 

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of

life calculated to bring about its physical

destruction in whole or in part; 

d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group; 

e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to

another group.

Historical Clarification Report, Conclusions, ¶ 109 (citing U.N.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, art. 2, approved Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered

into force Jan. 12, 1951)).

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record. Furthermore, the evidence does not support the IJ's

conclusion that the attacks on Ordonez-Quino's village were merely

"a result of the civil war and general conditions of strife and

violence which existed in Guatemala at the time." Rather, the

evidence shows that Ordonez-Quino's community and others were

intentionally targeted by government forces during the war because

of their Mayan identity. Cf. Arevalo-Giron v. Holder, 667 F.3d 79,

82-83 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding agency's determination that

Guatemalan petitioner's father was "a random casualty of the civil

war" was supported by substantial evidence where petitioner did not

allege father was a member of the army, the guerrillas, or the

civil patrol — or a targeted racial or ethnic group).

We do not require an asylum applicant to demonstrate that

he was singled out only due to his protected trait; rather, he must

show that such characteristic was "one central reason" for his

abuse. Singh, 543 F.3d at 5; see Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 14-15

(applying pre-REAL ID Act standard). Rarely will an applicant know

the "exact motivation" of his persecutors — especially when he was

victimized as a young child — and, "'of course, persecutors may

often have more than one motivation.'" See Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 15

(alteration omitted) (quoting Sompotan v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 63, 69

(1st Cir. 2008)). Ordonez-Quino has amply shown that his Mayan

Quiché identity was "at least one central reason" why he and his

community were targeted by the Guatemalan army, and he need show no

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more than that. Thus, we find that the IJ's conclusion, echoed by

the BIA, that Ordonez-Quino did not demonstrate an adequate nexus

between the harms he experienced during the civil war and a

protected ground is not supported by substantial evidence "'when

viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes,

including the body of evidence opposed to the [IJ's] view.'"9

Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11 (quoting Kartasheva, 582 F.3d at 105). 

Consequently, it must be vacated.10

b. Degree of Harm

Because the IJ found that Ordonez-Quino had not met the

nexus requirement, he did not decide whether the harms OrdonezQuino experienced as a Mayan Quiché in Guatemala rose to the level

of past persecution. The BIA, on the other hand, proceeded to find

that, in addition to lacking the requisite nexus, Ordonez-Quino's

"account of being discriminated against due to his ethnicity [did]

not amount to past persecution." "Moreover," the BIA said, "the

isolated nature of both the civil war-related bombing and the

respondent's incident with a gang does not support a claim of

asylum." We hold that this finding also was not supported by

9 This is not the first time that an IJ has ignored the

Historical Clarification Report's findings at his or her peril. 

See Jorge-Tzoc, 435 F.3d at 149-50 (finding, inter alia, that IJ

erred when she failed to take into account Report's findings).

10 We do not disturb the IJ's finding that Ordonez-Quino did

not establish a nexus between the 2005 gang attack and his Mayan

Quiché identity. However, on remand the agency may wish to

reconsider this determination after digging deeper in the record.

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substantial evidence in the record.

As a refresher, to constitute persecution, "the sum of [a

petitioner's] experiences must add up to more than ordinary

harassment, mistreatment, or suffering." Lopez de Hincapie, 494

F.3d at 217; see Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir.

2005) ("[P]ast persecution requires that the totality of a

petitioner's experiences add up to more than mere discomfiture,

unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment."). The abuse must

also "have reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness, as well

as some regularity and frequency." Ivanov, 736 F.3d at 11 (quoting

Rebenko v. Holder, 693 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2012)) (internal

quotation mark omitted). But within these broad guideposts, we

usually assess whether a particular petitioner was persecuted on a

case-by-case basis. See Sok, 526 F.3d at 53 (quoting AguilarSolis, 168 F.3d at 570).

As several of our sister circuits have recognized, "age

can be a critical factor" in determining whether a petitioner's

experiences cross this threshold. Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307,

314 (7th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496

F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007); Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d

146, 150 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Where the events that form

the basis of a past persecution claim were perceived when the

petitioner was a child, the fact-finder must "look at the events

from [the child's] perspective, [and] measure the degree of [his]

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injuries by their impact on [a child] of [his] age[]." HernandezOrtiz, 496 F.3d at 1046. The "'harm a child fears or has suffered

. . . may be relatively less than that of an adult and still

qualify as persecution.'" Liu, 380 F.3d at 314 (quoting Jeff

Weiss, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidelines for Children's Asylum

Claims, 1998 WL 34032561, at *14 (Dec. 10, 1998)). Moreover, harm

to a child's family or community — upon whom the child depends —

may contribute to a finding of persecution against the child

himself. See Jorge-Tzoc, 435 F.3d at 150; see also HernandezOrtiz, 496 F.3d at 1045-46.

Ordonez-Quino's past persecution claim is primarily based

on harms he experienced as a Mayan Quiché child growing up during

the Guatemalan Civil War. Those harms include numerous attacks by

Guatemalan soldiers on his village — one of which left him almost

completely deaf and stunted his development — as well as the

ongoing deprivation, relocations, and discrimination he and his

family faced over the years.11

The BIA appears to have committed two errors in assessing

Ordonez-Quino's past persecution claim. First, rather than

considering the harms Ordonez-Quino experienced cumulatively, the

BIA considered only two of the incidents Ordonez-Quino described:

11 Later, Ordonez-Quino says he was threatened and beaten by

gangs as an adult in Guatemala City, but we will not consider these

incidents because we have not disturbed the IJ's and BIA's findings

that these incidents were not linked to a protected ground.

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the 1980 bombing that resulted in his hearing loss, and the 2005

gang attack that precipitated Ordonez-Quino's departure from

Guatemala. By describing the bombing as an "isolated" incident,

the BIA implicitly rejected (without explanation) Ordonez-Quino's

description of the plural "attacks" waged against his village

during the civil war and the trauma he and his family suffered as

a result, thereby again ignoring crucial evidence in the record.

Second and relatedly, there is no indication that the BIA

considered the harms Ordonez-Quino suffered throughout this period

from his perspective as a child, or that it took the harms his

family suffered into account. Ordonez-Quino was very young at the

time of the attacks on his village. He remembers "being extremely

frightened" and "witness[ing] many terrible things" as soldiers

shot at, bombed, and killed members of his community. At age five

or six, he was horrifically injured in a bombing attack that

resulted in a lengthy, severe illness and permanent, near-total

hearing loss. He says that "not being able to hear was . . .

terrifying." This injury altered the course of Ordonez-Quino's

life dramatically — he lost the ability to speak clearly, had

difficulty learning, and became more vulnerable to violence. His

family, upon whom he was totally dependent, suffered greatly during

the attacks as well and eventually was forced to relocate for

survival. This combination of circumstances — bombing attacks,

permanent injury, the loss of a home, the razing of lands, and

-23-
internal displacement lasting years — could certainly support a

finding of past persecution for an adult. Such a string of events

even more strongly supports a finding of past persecution for a

small child, whose formative years were spent in terror and pain. 

Because the BIA failed to address the harms Ordonez-Quino

and his family experienced cumulatively and from the perspective of

a child, its determination is not supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Thus, we must vacate the BIA's determination that

the harms Ordonez-Quino and his family suffered did not rise to the

level of past persecution. See Jorge-Tzoc, 435 F.3d at 150.

On remand, bearing these principles in mind, the agency

must determine whether the harms Ordonez-Quino suffered in

Guatemala on account of his Mayan identity meet the standard of

past persecution, viewed in the aggregate and from the perspective

of a child of Ordonez-Quino's age when these events occurred. We

further note that though the agency's review may properly account

for both the cumulative nature of these events and Ordonez-Quino's

youth, correction of either error could prove a sufficient basis

for a finding of past persecution on remand.

2. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution

After finding that Ordonez-Quino had not demonstrated

past persecution on account of a protected ground, the IJ went on

to find that Ordonez-Quino also failed to establish a well-founded

fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. For

-24-
this conclusion, he relied on the ongoing presence of OrdonezQuino's family members — who share his protected traits — in their

village. He further said that any gang violence Ordonez-Quino

feared in the future would not be because of his protected

characteristics, "but rather only in furtherance of [the gang's]

reprehensible criminality."

On remand, if the agency determines that the harm

Ordonez-Quino suffered as a Mayan Quiché child in Guatemala rose to

the level of past persecution, a different analysis will be

required. As we set out above, past persecution creates a

presumption of future persecution, which the government can rebut

by demonstrating that there has been a fundamental change of circumstances in

Guatemala such that the applicant's fear can no longer be considered wellfounded.12 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). To overcome the presumption, the

government must show that "'changes in country conditions . . . have negated

the particular applicant's well-founded fear of persecution,'"

taking his individual situation into account. Hernandez-Barrera v.

Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 9, 24 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Fergiste v.

I.N.S., 138 F.3d 14, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1998)).

Unlike the IJ, after finding that Ordonez-Quino had not

demonstrated past persecution on account of a protected ground, the

12 The government can also rebut the presumption by showing

Ordonez-Quino could avoid persecution by moving to another part of

Guatemala and it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 

-25-
BIA proceeded to hold that even if Ordonez-Quino had shown past

persecution, changed country conditions would have rebutted his

claim to a well-founded fear of future persecution. For support,

the BIA cited this court's decision in Palma-Mazariegos v.

Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2005). That case treated the

distinct issue of whether a Guatemalan petitioner had a reasonable

fear of future harm based on his refusal to join the guerrilla

forces. Id. at 33. The court there noted that evidence showed the

guerrillas had been integrated into the government after the civil

war and no longer engaged in militant activities. Id. at 35-36. 

As a result, the court found that the record supported the BIA's

finding of changed conditions sufficient to rebut that petitioner's

asserted fear of future harm. Id. at 37.

Ordonez-Quino, on the other hand, says he has a wellfounded fear of future persecution based on his Mayan Quiché race

and ethnicity. He provides significant documentation of ongoing

systemic racism and human rights violations against the Mayan

Quiché community. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, 2009 Human

Rights Reports: Guatemala §§ 5-6 (2010) (noting, inter alia,

threats to and murders of indigenous leaders; pervasive

discrimination against indigenous community; and land dispute where

police evicted roughly 80 indigenous community members from their

homes, burned their homes, and destroyed their crops); Guatemalan

Human Rights Comm'n, Guatemala Human Rights Review, January-

-26-
September 2007 7 (2007) (describing violent evictions of indigenous

families from native lands at hands of police officers and military

personnel).

The BIA's quick dismissal of Ordonez-Quino's fear-offuture-persecution claim with a conclusory statement and an

inapposite case citation, without any reference to the voluminous

record, is not a finding supported by substantial evidence. See

Gailius v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) ("In order for

this court to conduct a proper substantial evidence review of the

BIA's decision, the [BIA's] opinion must state with sufficient

particularity and clarity the reasons for denial of asylum."

(internal quotation marks omitted)). The BIA appears not to have

made any attempt to assay the evidence of current conditions in

Guatemala for Ordonez-Quino specifically, and thereby failed to

undertake the type of particularized analysis that our standards

demand. See Hernandez-Barrera, 373 F.3d at 25.

Accordingly, if the agency now finds that Ordonez-Quino

has in fact demonstrated past persecution, it will need to

determine whether the government has rebutted Ordonez-Quino's

corollary presumption of a well-founded fear considering the

evidence put forth in this record and his individual situation.

3. Humanitarian Asylum

Furthermore, if the agency finds both that Ordonez-Quino

has established past persecution and that the government has

-27-
rebutted his fear of future persecution, Ordonez-Quino may

nevertheless be able to obtain discretionary asylum relief based on

past persecution alone under the "humanitarian exception." See

Guerrero v. Holder, 667 F.3d 74, 79 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). This exception permits a

decisionmaker to grant an asylum applicant's request for relief "in

the absence of [a] well-founded fear of future persecution" if:

(A) The applicant has demonstrated

compelling reasons for being unwilling

or unable to return to the country

arising out of the severity of the past

persecution; or

(B) The applicant has established that

there is a reasonable possibility that

he or she may suffer other serious harm

upon removal to that country.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B); see also Matter of Chen, 20

I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989).

To qualify for humanitarian asylum based on the severity

of past persecution, an applicant must prove that he or she

experienced "extraordinary suffering" in the past. Zarouite v.

Gonzales, 424 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2005). In other words, "an

[applicant] must show past persecution so severe that repatriation

would be inhumane." Tokarska v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.

1992) (per curiam) (quoting Baka v. I.N.S., 963 F.2d 1376, 1379

(10th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[T]he

paradigm case is one in which so much abuse has been directed

-28-
against the victim that the suffering is projected into the future

and that a return of the applicant to the place where the harm was

inflicted would magnify the prior suffering.").

A showing of severe harm and the long-lasting effects of

such harm, such as an ongoing or permanent disability, may support

a discretionary grant of humanitarian asylum. See Jalloh v.

Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the

agency requires a showing of both "'severe harm and the longlasting effects of that harm'" to obtain humanitarian asylum

(quoting In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (BIA 1998)));

Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 801 (9th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing female genital mutilation as "a particularly severe

form of past persecution because of its many continuing effects");

Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 18; cf. Gebru v. I.N.S., 173

F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming

denial of humanitarian asylum where petitioner "presented no

evidence demonstrating that she suffers from physical and

psychological disabilities like those shown in Matter of Chen"). 

For example, in Matter of Chen, the first BIA decision invoking

humanitarian asylum, the BIA relied in part on the applicant's

continuing physical disability — he had to wear a hearing aid due

to injuries sustained when rocks were thrown at his head at a young

age, was "always anxious and fearful, and [was] often suicidal" —

in deciding to exercise discretion in the applicant's favor. 20 I.

-29-
& N. Dec. at 20-21. 

Ordonez-Quino first specifically requested humanitarian

asylum before the BIA, claiming eligibility based both on the

severity of harm underlying his past persecution and the serious

harm he would suffer if removed to Guatemala. In response, the BIA

said Ordonez-Quino had waived his claim to humanitarian asylum

because he had not explicitly raised it before the IJ. 

Alternatively, the BIA said that even if Ordonez-Quino had not

waived his claim, he was not eligible for humanitarian asylum

because he had not established past persecution on account of a

protected ground. Even further, the BIA said, if Ordonez-Quino had

made the requisite showing of past persecution and nexus, he still

would not qualify for humanitarian asylum based on the

considerations discussed in Matter of Chen.

Before us, Ordonez-Quino challenges each of these

conclusions. The government, on the other hand, says we lack

jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of humanitarian asylum. In

the alternative, it contends the BIA did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to grant humanitarian asylum to Ordonez-Quino. It

further advises that we need not address the BIA's waiver

determination because we can uphold the BIA's decision on either of

these two bases.

Because we are remanding Ordonez-Quino's case to

determine whether he established past persecution on account of a

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protected ground, we need not comment on the BIA's ultimate

conclusions regarding his eligibility for humanitarian asylum. 

However, for the sake of clarity on remand, we make a few points.

First, we easily reject the government's jurisdictional

argument. This court has, on numerous occasions, exercised its

power to review agency decisions regarding applicants' requests for

humanitarian asylum based on past persecution alone. See, e.g.,

Precetaj, 649 F.3d at 77-78; Waweru v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 199, 205

(1st Cir. 2006); Zarouite, 424 F.3d at 64; Tokarska, 978 F.2d at 1-

2. The government's citation to Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 57-

58 (1st Cir. 2005) — which dealt with an unrelated statute granting

the Attorney General discretion to "parole into the United States

temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a

case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant

public benefit any alien applying for admission into the United

States," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) — does not convince us that we

lack power to review the agency's humanitarian asylum

determinations.

Second, contrary to the BIA's assertion, Ordonez-Quino

did not waive his claim to humanitarian asylum by not explicitly

requesting it from the IJ apart from his overall past-persecutionbased asylum claim. As the government explains, what we refer to

as "humanitarian asylum" is not a separate form of relief created

by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Rather, it is a

-31-
discretionary form of relief that may be granted to certain asylum

seekers.13 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B). Neither the

BIA nor the government has cited any case — and we have found none

— requiring an asylum seeker to request humanitarian asylum

independent of other past-persecution-based asylum relief before

the IJ in order to preserve his claim to humanitarian asylum before

the BIA.14 The lone case the BIA cites in support of waiver —

Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA 2007) — does

not deal with humanitarian asylum. Rather, in that case, the BIA

rejected an applicant's attempt to argue an entirely new basis for

asylum for the first time on appeal, saying he was "eligible for

asylum as a result of his mother's death . . . from an alleged

forced sterilization procedure," when he had previously sought

asylum based only on his religion. Id. Here, on the other hand,

Ordonez-Quino has consistently asserted eligibility for asylum

based on the past harm he experienced in Guatemala on account of

his race and ethnicity.

13 By way of illustration, we note, as did Ordonez-Quino, that

there is no separate space in the asylum application, Form I-589,

for an applicant to make a claim for "humanitarian asylum," as

opposed to "regular" asylum.

14 We have, however, found cases requiring an asylum applicant

to request humanitarian asylum at the agency level — i.e., before

the BIA or IJ — prior to asking this court to review the agency's

denial of such relief. See, e.g., Zarouite, 424 F.3d at 64;

Velásquez v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2003), abrogated

on other grounds by Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir.

2005). But that's a different matter.

-32-
Finally, while we make no comment on the merits of

Ordonez-Quino's humanitarian asylum claim, we note that the BIA's

conclusory statement that his case "would not warrant humanitarian

asylum based on the special considerations discussed in Matter of

Chen," even if he had shown his injuries amounted to past

persecution on account of a protected ground — without any

discussion of the severity of the harms Ordonez-Quino suffered —

would not withstand substantial evidence review. See Gailius, 147

F.3d at 46 (explaining that the BIA must state with sufficient

particularity and clarity its reasons for denial of asylum for this

court to conduct a proper substantial evidence review). 

Accordingly, if the agency finds upon remand that Ordonez-Quino has

established past persecution but that the presumption of a wellfounded fear of future persecution is rebutted, it must also

determine whether the persecution Ordonez-Quino experienced — as

well as the ongoing harm he suffers today due to his hearing

disability and developmental difficulties, and any harm he might

suffer upon returning to Guatemala — warrant a grant of

humanitarian asylum.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the BIA affirming

the IJ's decision is vacated and the matter is remanded for

proceedings consistent with this decision.

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