1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSETTE S., )

 )

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) No. 20-cv-4602

v. ) 

 ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

 )

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Josette S. (“Claimant”) brings a motion for summary judgment to reverse the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for 

disability insurance benefits (“DIBs”). The Commissioner brings a cross-motion for summary 

judgment seeking to uphold the decision to deny benefits. The parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). This Court has 

jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). For the reasons described herein, 

Claimant’s motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner, (Dckt. #26), is granted and the 

Commissioner’s motion to uphold the decision to deny benefits, (Dckt. #29), is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 On April 22, 2018, Claimant (then forty-six years old) filed an application for DIBs 

alleging disability dating back to March 12, 2012, due to limitations stemming from multiple 

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 - Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the Court 

refers to Claimant only by her first name and the first initial of her last name. Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Kilolo Kijakazi has also been substituted as the named defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). 

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sclerosis (“MS”). (Administrative Record (“R.”) 198). Claimant’s application was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 15). Claimant filed a timely request for a hearing, which 

was held on May 2, 2019, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Victoria A. Ferrer. (R. 30-

71). Claimant appeared with counsel and offered testimony at the hearing. A vocational expert 

also offered testimony. On July 3, 2019, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Claimant’s 

application for benefits. (R. 12-29). Claimant filed a timely request for review with the Appeals 

Council. The Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review on June 4, 2020, (R. 1-6), 

leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. This action followed. 

B. The Social Security Administration Standard to Recover Benefits

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that she is disabled, 

meaning she cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as “the kind of work usually done for pay or 

profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1572(b). 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) applies a five-step analysis to disability 

claims. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

At step two, the SSA determines whether the claimant has one or more medically determinable 

physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1521. An impairment “must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. In other words, a physical 

or mental impairment “must be established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable 

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medical source.” Id.; Shirley R. v. Saul, 1:18-cv-00429-JVB, 2019 WL 5418118, at *2 (N.D.Ind. 

Oct. 22, 2019). If the claimant establishes that she has one or more physical or mental 

impairments, the SSA then determines whether the impairment(s) standing alone, or in 

combination, are severe and meet the twelve-month duration requirement noted above. 20 

C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

At step three, the SSA compares the impairment or combination of impairments found at 

step two to a list of impairments identified in the regulations (“the listings”). The specific 

criteria that must be met to satisfy a listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairments meet or “medically equal” a 

listing, she is considered disabled and no further analysis is required. If the listing is not met, the 

analysis proceeds. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Before turning to the fourth step, the SSA must assess the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”), or her capacity to work in light of the identified impairments. Then, at step 

four, the SSA determines whether the claimant is able to engage in any of her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, she is not disabled. Id. If the 

claimant cannot undertake her past work, the SSA proceeds to step five to determine whether a 

substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age, education, 

and work experience. If such jobs exist, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

C. The Evidence Presented to the ALJ 

Claimant seeks disability benefits due to limitations stemming from MS. (R. 198). She 

alleges a disability onset date of March 12, 2012. (R. 15). She presented the following relevant 

evidence in support of her claim: 

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1. Evidence from Claimant’s Medical Records 

Claimant was diagnosed with MS on December 21, 2011. (R. 262). At that time, she 

“presented with slurred speech, gait instability, numbness in both legs knees down, and in her 

hands,” as well as “trouble with dexterity.” (Id.). Prior to her diagnosis, Claimant worked as a 

branch manager for Chase bank, but she went on disability shortly after her diagnosis. (R. 263). 

Claimant has “relapsing-remitting” MS, (R. 269), meaning that she has “flare-ups” or 

exacerbations of the disease, between which she has “periods of recovery, or remissions.”2

 

On December 22, 2011, Claimant told her treating neurologist, Paul Bertrand, DO, that 

the numbness in her right arm had decreased significantly, as had the numbness in her feet. (R. 

308). On December 29, 2011, Dr. Bertrand noted that Claimant was “doing somewhat better 

with her speech and with her right pronator drift.” (R. 307). An MRI of Claimant’s brain 

showed “some enhancing lesion” and “some un-enhancing lesion in the spinal cord.” (Id.). 

On February 23, 2012, Claimant was doing well, and an examination was “essentially 

unremarkable.” (R. 306). On April 16, 2012, Claimant complained of fatigue, leg pain, and 

“heaviness” in her legs. (R. 303). Still, her examination was “entirely within normal limits,” 

except for abnormal visual responses. (Id.). Claimant was again doing “relatively well” on July 

17, 2012, and presented with normal gait, motor, sensation, and reflexes. (R. 302). On January 

17, 2013, Dr. Bertrand again noted that Claimant was doing “relatively well regarding her MS” 

and was looking for employment. (R. 298). 

Claimant experienced an exacerbation of her MS in December 2013, marked by slurred 

speech and difficulty walking. (R. 262). By July 25, 2013, Claimant was again doing “fairly 

2

 Johns Hopkins Medicine, Relapsing-Remitting Multiple Sclerosis (Last Visited Feb. 16, 2023) 

https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/multiple-sclerosis-ms/relapsingremitting-multiple-sclerosis. 

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well,” aside from complaints of intermittent weakness in her arms, neck pain, and fatigue. (R. 

297). On February 24, 2014, and May 22, 2014, Dr. Bertrand reported that Claimant was doing 

well and had normal examination results. (R. 288-89). 

Claimant began treating with neurologist Malathi Rao, D.O., on October 14, 2015. At 

her initial visit, Claimant reported that she had not experienced a flare-up since December 2014. 

(R. 262). Claimant was tolerating her medication well, despite flu like symptoms, injection site 

reactions, increased “symptoms of urinary incontinence,” and trouble concentrating. (Id.). 

Claimant’s residual symptoms were described as “gait imbalance, weakness with walking 

upstairs, [and] numbness and throbbing at the bottom of her feet,” (Id.), but she presented with 

normal gait, speech, concentration, and attention, (R. 264), as well as normal strength and normal 

sensory reactions. (R. 265). In March 2016, Claimant again reported increasing numbness, 

tingling, and difficulty walking with burning in both feet. (R. 276). By December 7, 2016, 

however, she was doing well aside from getting fatigued earlier than usual. (R. 278). Her 

physical examination was normal. (R. 280). 

Claimant next experienced a MS flare-up on September 25, 2017. (R. 282). Her 

symptoms included “feeling drunk,” loss of balance, numbness in her hands and legs, and 

numbness and tingling in her face. (R. 332). She was prescribed a prednisone taper and steroids, 

which made her feel “somewhat better but not normal.” (Id.). On October 18, 2017, and 

December 20, 2017, Claimant presented with hand weakness, mildly dysarthric/slurred speech, 

and a slow and slightly wide-based gait. (R. 335, 546). Her gait continued to deteriorate, and 

she eventually had to use a wheelchair. (R. 594). 

On December 13, 2017, an updated MRI showed “multiple new lesions, some with 

residual enhancement.” (R. 445, 547). On December 20, 2017, Matthew McCoyd, M.D., 

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examined Claimant, concluded that her worsening MRI “represents treatment failure,” and 

recommended that she switch therapies. (R. 547). He noted that Claimant was “at high risk for 

future clinical and radiographic relapses, and worsening disability from MS,” and prescribed new 

medications. (Id.). 

Claimant’s date last insured was December 31, 2017. (R. 17). On June 26, 2018, she 

reported “feeling great” and “back to normal” following the new treatments. (R. 583). She had 

started walking again and was slowly increasing her distance. (Id.). In November and December 

of 2018, updated MRIs showed stable findings without evidence of new lesions. (R. 595, 606). 

On December 5, 2018, Claimant reported “feeling well,” and Dr. McCoyd observed that her gait, 

coordination, and strength were back to normal. (R. 594). 

2. Evidence from State Agency Consultants 

State agency consultant Calixto Aquino, M.D., reviewed Claimant’s file on May 29, 

2018. He found Claimant had the severe impairments of multiple sclerosis, visual disturbances, 

and neurocognitive disorders. (R. 77). However, he noted that “[t]he claim is insufficient in 

evidence from a physical standpoint,” (R. 76), and assessed no RFC restrictions, (R. 79). When 

assessing Claimant’s subjective complaints, Dr. Aquino acknowledged that Claimant “does have 

severe [medically determinable impairments] present, however, based upon the evidence in file 

the limitations imposed would not prevent [Claimant] from being able to perform [substantial 

gainful activity].” (R. 79). State agency consultant James Hinchen, M.D., reviewed Claimant’s 

file at the reconsideration level on October 9, 2018, and affirmed Dr. Aquino’s findings. (R. 86). 

State agency psychological consultant David Voss, Ph.D., reviewed Claimant’s file on 

May 25, 2018. He noted that although Claimant alleged cognitive and memory issues, there was 

“insufficient information and no [mental status evaluation] to assess the severity of [Claimant’s] 

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mental limitations prior to the [date last insured].” (R. 78). Dr. Voss assessed no mental RFC 

restrictions. State agency psychological consultant Joseph Mehr, Ph.D., reviewed Claimant’s file 

at the reconsideration level on October 1, 2018, and affirmed Dr. Voss’s findings. (R. 88). 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ applied the five-step inquiry required by the Act in reaching her decision to 

deny Claimant’s request for benefits. At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity between her alleged onset date of March 12, 2012, and her date last 

insured of December 31, 2017. (R. 17). At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant suffers 

from the severe impairment of multiple sclerosis. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ concluded that 

Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically 

equal one of the SSA’s listed impairments, including 11.09 (multiple sclerosis). (Id.). 

 Before turning to step four, the ALJ determined that Claimant has the RFC to perform 

sedentary work with the following limitations: 

Lifting and/or carrying up to ten pounds; standing and/or walking for two hours in 

an eight-hour workday; sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally 

climbing ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; never climbing 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently handle and finger with the right-dominant 

hand; no work at high exposed places; avoid work with hazardous machinery with 

external moving, mechanical parts; avoid work with sharp objects. [Claimant] is 

unable to meet the demands of fast-paced, high-production work, but is able to meet 

the demands of production rate pace in a shift. 

(R. 18). Based on this conclusion, the ALJ determined at step four that Claimant was capable of 

performing her past relevant work as a banking manager/financial institution manager. (R. 

23). Alternatively, the ALJ found that other jobs existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Claimant could perform given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, 

including the representative occupations of call out operator, address clerk, and document 

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preparer. (R. 24). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled from her alleged 

onset date through her date last insured. (R. 25). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A claimant who is found to be “not disabled” may challenge the Commissioner’s final 

decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. 

§405(g), which provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). “Substantial 

evidence is not a high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021), quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Commissioner’s decision must also be based on the proper legal criteria and be 

free from legal error. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); Steele v. Barnhart, 

290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). 

A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ’s judgment by 

reweighing the facts, resolving conflicts, deciding credibility questions, making independent 

symptom evaluations, or otherwise substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 

McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th 

Cir. 2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an “accurate and logical 

bridge” from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to “assess the validity of the agency’s 

ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether a claimant is 

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disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ’s opinion is adequately explained and supported 

by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The Court finds that the ALJ made two related errors that require reversal in this case. 

First, she failed to properly explain her decision to discount the findings of state agency 

consultants Drs. Aquino and Voss. Second, she failed to explain her finding that – despite the 

consultants’ findings to the contrary – various RFC restrictions were supported by the medical 

record. These shortcomings leave the Court unable to meaningfully review the ALJ’s findings 

and, therefore, require that the case be remanded for further proceedings.3

 See Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1994) (indicating that an ALJ must explain his analysis of 

the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful review). 

A. The ALJ’s assessment of the state agency consultants’ findings was illogical 

and lacked evidentiary support. 

The only medical professionals to assess Claimant’s physical RFC were state agency 

consultants Drs. Aquino and Voss, who reviewed Claimant’s file on May 29, 2018, and October 

9, 2018, respectively. Both doctors found that Claimant had the medically determinable 

impairment of MS, and that it was severe. (R. 77, 87); see also (R. 79, 89) (noting Claimant 

“does have severe [medically determinable impairments] present”). Even so, they further found 

that the evidence in the record was insufficient “from a physical standpoint” to determine how 

3

 Although Claimant does not explicitly raise these shortcomings, courts can sua sponte address issues in 

social security cases that a party has not raised. See, e.g., Kristin S. v. Saul, No. 19 C 1485, 2020 WL 

4586115, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2020) (citing cases); Mangan v. Colvin, No. 12 C 7203, 2014 WL 

4267496, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 28, 2014) (citing cases). Furthermore, in light of the Court’s decision to 

remand, it need not address Claimant’s remaining arguments related to the ALJ’s step four and step five 

findings. See DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Because we determine that the 

ALJ did not properly evaluate DeCamp’s limitations . . . we do not address DeCamp's other arguments.”). 

The Court’s decision in this regard is not a comment on the merits of Claimant’s other arguments, which 

she is free to assert on remand. 

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Claimant’s MS would restrict her activities. (R. 76, 86). Accordingly, they assessed no physical 

RFC restrictions and concluded that Claimant was “not disabled.” (R. 79, 89). 

 The ALJ described the consultants’ findings – and explained the weight she afforded 

them – as follows: 

[T]he state agency medical consultant(s) opined the claimant did not have a severe 

medically determinable impairment present prior to the date last insured of 

December 31, 2017. . . . However, records received after the DDS evaluations show 

that the claimant has MS and that she did have a significant flare in 2017 with some 

limitations. However, within several months the symptoms improved. Thus, the 

undersigned finds the DDS consultants’ opinions are not supported by and not 

consistent with the medical evidence of record in its entirety as there is evidence of 

a severe impairment, to wit, multiple sclerosis. 

(R. 22) (emphasis added). In making this assessment, the ALJ committed several reversible 

errors. First, she mistakenly asserts that the consultants found that Claimant did not have a 

severe medically determinable impairment when, in fact, both doctors repeatedly described 

Claimant’s MS as severe. (R. 77, 79, 87, 89). “An ALJ’s reasoning is flawed where it rests on a 

mischaracterization of the evidence.” Lourdes C. v. Kijakazi, No. 19-cv-04543, 2022 WL 

595310, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 25, 2022) (citing cases); see also Adela I. v. Kijakazi, No. 19-cv3590, 2021 WL 6049972, at *8 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 21, 2021) (“[I]f the ALJ repeatedly 

mischaracterizes or minimizes the medical evidence on which a plaintiff’s claim depends, how 

can he properly identify what work-related limitations stem from her impairments?”). 

Second, the ALJ never acknowledged the consultants’ actual findings, which was that 

there was insufficient evidence to determine Claimant’s RFC. Had she done so, she might have 

realized that she had insufficient evidence with which to assess Claimant’s case, as discussed in 

section III(B), infra. 

 Third, the ALJ’s assessment reveals a clear misunderstanding regarding what evidence 

was submitted following the consultants’ reviews. (R. 22) (“[R]ecords received after the DDS 

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evaluations show that the claimant has MS and that she did have a significant flare in 2017 with 

some limitations. However, within several months the symptoms improved.”). Contrary to the 

ALJ’s assertion, Drs. Aquino and Voss evaluated nearly all of the medical files from within 

Claimant’s disability period. (R. 73-74; 83-84). This included records documenting Claimant’s 

MS diagnosis, her September 2017 flare-up, and the December 13, 2017 MRI documenting new 

lesions. (R. 76-77; 86-87) (list of evidence in the record at the time of the consultants’ reviews). 

In fact, the only evidence that the consultants did not have access to was evidence 

documenting Claimant’s dramatic improvement in 2018. (R. 583) (June 26, 2018 note indicating 

that Claimant was feeling “great” and “back to normal”); (R. 594) (December 5, 2018 note 

comparing Claimant’s “essentially normal” gait at present to her previously slow and wide-based 

gait that required her to use a wheelchair). Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding – that the consultants’ 

opinions were unsupported by the record because the evidence submitted post-state agency 

review showed that Claimant’s condition was worse than the consultants believed – is contrary 

to the record. This shortcoming requires reversal, as ALJs are required to build a logical bridge 

from the evidence to their conclusions. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009); see 

also Mack v. Berryhill, 16-cv-11578, 2018 WL 3533270, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 23, 2018) (“While 

the ALJ was not required to adopt the state agency psychologist’s opinion in its entirely, he was 

required to build a ‘logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.’”). 

B. The ALJ impermissibly played doctor in assessing Claimant’s RFC in the 

absence of any medical opinions regarding her limitations. 

The Court further finds that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s RFC findings, 

as the record lacked any medical opinions regarding Claimant’s functional capabilities. Murphy 

v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We . . . reverse an ALJ’s determination only 

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where it is not supported by substantial evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”) (citation omitted). 

State agency medical consultants “are highly qualified physicians . . . who are experts in 

the evaluation of the medical issues in disability claims under the Act.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 

374180, at *2. In this case, as noted above, the consultants concluded that there was insufficient 

evidence in the record to assess Claimant’s functional capabilities. (R. 76, 86). In light of this 

finding, it is unclear how the ALJ – a non-medical professional – was able to deduce Claimant’s 

functional limitations from a record nearly identical to that which the consultants deemed 

insufficient. 

The state agency consultants’ findings in this case suggest there was “insufficient 

[evidence] to determine whether [Claimant] was disabled,” which would generally trigger the 

ALJ’s duty to seek additional evidence. Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 1994). “To 

remedy a lack of sufficient evidence – including a lack of medical opinions – the regulations 

encourage ALJs to recontact a claimant’s medical sources, request additional existing evidence, 

ask the claimant to undergo a consultative examination at the Agency’s expense, and/or ask the 

claimant or others for more information.” Shellie C. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-01791-MJD-SEB, 

2022 WL 3152052, at *2-3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 8, 2022); see also Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 741 

(7th Cir. 2011) (“If the ALJ found this evidence insufficient, it was her responsibility to 

recognize the need for additional medical evaluations.”). 

Instead of pursuing any of those options here, however, the ALJ chose to rely on her own 

interpretation of the medical evidence to determine Claimant’s RFC. This constitutes reversible 

error, as it is well established that ALJs “must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and 

make their own independent medical findings.” Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 

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1996); see also Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (“ALJs are required to rely on 

expert opinions instead of determining the significance of particular medical findings 

themselves.”); Tobias B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2959, 2022 WL 4356857, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 

20, 2022) (“Without any medical opinions in the record – whether from a state agency consultant 

or treating physician – it is unclear what the ALJ relied on in determining Claimant’s RFC, aside 

from her own interpretation of medical evidence, which is an impermissible source.”). 

Furthermore, even if the ALJ had been qualified to interpret the medical evidence in the 

record to create functional restrictions, she failed to explain – as she was required to do – what 

evidence supported her various conclusions. See, e.g., Briscoe ex rel. Taylor, 425 F.3d at 351 

(noting that the ALJ’s failure to explain how he arrived at his conclusions was “sufficient to 

warrant reversal of the ALJ’s decision.”). For example, and as Claimant argues, the ALJ failed 

to explain her finding that Claimant is capable of frequent – as opposed to unlimited or 

occasional – handling and fingering. Claimant often reported numbness and weakness in both 

hands and no physician opined that Claimant could handle and finger objects on a frequent basis. 

(R. 43, 46-47, 262, 332, 567). The ALJ’s other RFC findings – that Claimant can lift ten pounds, 

sit for six hours per eight-hour day, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and occasionally 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl – are similarly untethered to any record evidence. 

On remand, the ALJ must cite evidence supporting her various RFC conclusions in order 

to build the requisite “accurate and logical bridge.” See Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 

774-75 (7th Cir. 2022) (remand required where “[t]he ALJ did not explain how Jarnutowski 

could lift and carry up to 50 pounds and frequently lift or carry objects weighing up to 25 

pounds”); Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding reversible error 

when ALJ determined that claimant could stand for two hours when no physician opined as 

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much and the ALJ cited no evidence to support this conclusion); Adams v. Saul, 412 F.Supp.3d 

1024, 1028 (E.D.Wis. 2019) (finding the ALJ failed to provide the logical bridge from the 

evidence to his conclusion where he “failed to explain, with specific citations, how the evidence 

supports a limitation of frequent handling” and failed to explain “why handling is limited to 

frequent rather than occasional”). If such evidence does not exist – as the consultants’ opinions 

suggest – the ALJ must seek additional medical evidence to determine what limitations are 

caused by Claimant’s MS. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Claimant’s motion to reverse or remand the final decision of 

the Commissioner, (Dckt. #26), is granted and the Commissioner’s motion for summary 

judgment, (Dckt. #29), is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

ENTERED: March 13, 2023 

 

 

 ______________________ 

 Jeffrey I. Cummings 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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