* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-21130

_____________________

GEORGE WEBSTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER

RETIREMENT PLAN; WILLIAM BIDWILL;

THOMAS CONDON; GENE UPSHAW;

TAYLOR SMITH; LEONARD TEEUWS;

JEFF VAN NOTE; EDDIE JONES; JAMES

KENSIL; DANIEL JIGGETTS; EDWARD

GARVEY; SARAH E. GUANT, formerly

known as Sarah E. Meizlik,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-3826)

_________________________________________________________________ September 22, 1997

Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

George Webster appeals the district court’s order dismissing

on summary judgment his claim that the Retirement Board arbitrarily

and capriciou sly denied him past and future retirement and2

disability benefits under the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan

(the “Plan”). Finding no abuse of discretion, the district court

affirmed the Retirement Board’s determination that Webster was

t otally disabled as a result of nonfootball related injuries and

that, under the Plan, participants are entitled to “football”

benefits only when the cause of total disability is such that, if

the football related injury did not exist, the participant would

not be totally disabled. We review de novo the district court’s

holding whether the Retirement Board a bused its discretion, but

will set aside fac tual findings underlying the district court’s

review of the Board’s determination only if clearly erroneous. S ee

Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 39 F.3d 594, 601 (5th Cir.

1994).

As the district court’s well-reasoned opinion properly

concludes, the Retirement Board did not abus e its discretion in

denying Webster football benefits . Webster’s medical records

contain ample evidence that he first became totally disabled as a

r esult of throat cancer, as well as other nonfootball related

injuries, and that they continued to plague him throughout the time

he sought football benefits under the Plan. Despite Webster’s

assertions to the contrary, the medical reports issued in 1992 and

1993 do not esta blish that he was totally disabled s olely as a

result of football related injuri es. Rather, the reports reveal3

that, while the effects of Webster’s football related injuries were

enough to leave him totally disabled, the disabling effects of his

nonfootball related injuries persisted. Thus, the Retirement Board

did not abuse its discretion in finding that the initial and

continuing cause of Webster’s total disability was unre lated to

football.

The district court also correctly determined that the

Retirement Board’s interpretation of the Plan did not constitute an

abuse of discretion. Under the Plan, Webster was entitled to

football benefits if his total di sability “result[ed] from a

football injury.” The Board interpreted this provision to permit

football benefits only if total disability would not exist but for

the presence of football related injuries. This interpretation is

entirely consistent with a fair and reasonable reading of the Plan

and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. S ee Pickrom v. Belger

Cartage Serv., Inc. , 57 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1995). As the

district court concluded, because substantial evidence indicated

that Webster’s nonfootball related injuries were totally disabling,

he was not entitled to football benefits under the Bo ard’s

reasonable interpretation of the Plan. Consequently, the judgment

of the district court is, for the reasons assigned by that court,

A F F I R M E D.