alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### General Services Administration

          - [Notice CPL-2014-03; Docket No. 2014-0002; Sequence 36]

# AGENCY:

General Services Administration.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting cancellation.

# SUMMARY:

                        The GSA Labor-Management Relations Council (GLMRC) previously announced in its November 14, 2014                         **Federal Register**                         notice that it planned to hold a meeting Tuesday, December 2, 2014 and Wednesday, December 3, 2014. That meeting is being cancelled. A new notice will be posted in the                         **Federal Register**                         announcing the date and time when rescheduled.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Ms. Temple L. Wilson, GLMRC Designated Federal Officer (DFO) at the General Services Administration, OHRM, 1800 F Street NW., Washington, DC 20405; phone at 202-969-7110, or email at                         *gmlrc@gsa.gov.*

Dated: November 24, 2014.

Temple L. Wilson,

GSA Labor-Management Relations Council, Designated Federal Officer.

[FR Doc. 2014-28117 Filed 11-26-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-34-P
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22

- 7124

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,
Plaintiff

- Appellee
,

v.

WAYNE EARL JENKINS
,
Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Catherine C. Blake, Senio r District Judge. ( 1:17

- cr

- 00106

- CCB

- 4 )

Submitted : February 16, 2023 Decided: February 22, 2023

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RUSHING , Circuit Judge , and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Wayne Earl Jenkins , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-7124 Doc: 13 Filed: 02/22/2023 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM:
Wayne Earl Jenkins seeks to ap peal the district court’s order denying his “Motion
to Reopen and for Reconsideration of Restitution.” But n o such order exists because the
district court has yet to resolve Jenkins’ motion. The last action that the district court took

on the motion was ordering a Government response. To the extent that Jenkins might seek
to appeal that order, it is not appealable. See United States v. Doe , 962 F.3d 139, 143 (4th
Cir. 2020) ( “[W]e have jurisdiction only over final orders and certain interlocutory and

co llateral orders”) . Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 22-7124 Doc: 13 Filed: 02/22/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0477 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOHN HILL,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including July 1 4 , 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 7 2023

06/07/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0477
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 408 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 450
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 408

                          [Report No. 108-240]

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 14, 2003

                                Received

                            December 9, 2003

    Read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
                               Resources

                             March 9, 2004

              Reported by Mr. Domenici, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To provide for expansion of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPANSION OF SLEEPING BEAR DUNES NATIONAL LAKESHORE.

    (a) In General.--When title to the land described in subsection (b) 
has vested in the United States in fee simple, the boundary of Sleeping 
Bear Dunes National Lakeshore is revised to include such land in that 
park.
    (b) Land Described.--The land referred to in subsection (a) 
consists of approximately 104.45 acres of unimproved lands generally 
depicted on National Park Service map number 634/80078, entitled 
``Bayberry Mills, Inc. Crystal River, MI Proposed Expansion Unit to 
Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore''. The Secretary of the Interior 
shall keep such map on file and available for public inspection in the 
appropriate offices of the National Park Service.
    (c) Purchase of Lands Authorized.--The Secretary of the Interior 
may acquire the land described in subsection (b), only by purchase from 
a willing seller.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON ACQUISITION BY EXCHANGE OR CONVEYANCE.

    The Secretary of the Interior may not acquire any of the land 
described in subsection (b) of section 1 through any exchange or 
conveyance of lands that are within the boundary of the Sleeping Bear 
Dunes National Lakeshore as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

                                                       Calendar No. 450

108th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 408

                          [Report No. 108-240]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

  To provide for expansion of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             March 9, 2004

                       Reported without amendment
```
## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 22

- 00383

- CV

C OMMISSIONERS C OURT OF W ISE C OUNTY , T EXAS ; AND D ANNY W HITE , C OUNTY C OMMISSIONER , P RECINCT O NE , W ISE C OUNTY , T EXAS
, Appellant s

V

.

K ATHERINE M ASTROPIERO
, Appellee §

§

§

§

§ O n Appeal from the 271st District Court

of Wise County ( CV18

- 06

- 475 )

April 20, 2023

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and h ol ds that there

was error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this court ’ s opinion

.

It is further ordered that ap pell ee Ka therine Mastropiero shall bear the costs of

this appeal, for which let execution issue.SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Dana Woma c k Justice Dana Womack
#### Thos. C. Johnson *v.*Commonwealth.

Clerks of Courts — Action Against — Defense.

In an action by the state against the clerk of the county court for money collected as taxes, it is no defense to the action that a suit is pending between defendant and the trustees of the jury fund to whom the money collected is payable, and that the state should wait until the termination of such suit.

APPEAL, FROM! WOLFE CIRCUIT COURT.

February 12, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge P'eteRS :

Appellant, as clerk of the Wolfe County Court, owed the commonwealth for taxes, etc., collected the sum of $88.55, which by law it was his duty to pay over to the trustee of the jury fund; and upon his failure to do so a rule was awarded against him and in answer to that rule insists that the commonwealth shall wait until he and Cox, the trustee, shall. litigate a long and perplexing controversy arising on a contract on the part of Cox to construct a house, and on the part of appellant to pay at future periods.

The mere statement of the proposition would seem to carry its own refutation. As between private individuals, if appellant owed a debt to a man for whom Cox was the agent, with authority to collect, it could scarcely be contended that when Cox as agent was *450endeavoring to collect the money, that appellant could set off a demand he had against Cox individually against the debt of his principal, much less could he do so against a debt of the sovereign.

*W. L. Hurst, for appellant.*

*Rodman, G. W. Cox, for appellee.*

The commonwealth pays all legal demands due from it when properly presented promptly, and to enable it to do so all its agents and collecting officers must act with like promptness.

Cox was its officer for a specified purpose, and with limited powers, with no authority to compound, transfer, or change the liability of its officers. The money in the hands of appellant belonged to the commonwealth, not to Cox, and having the legal right to it, the proceeding was properly in its name. And without its assent to any agreement made between appellant and Cox it could not be bound. And such assent is not alleged in the answer. The demurrer was therefore properly sustained to the answer and the judgment must be *affirmed.*.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                             119
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,309
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (86)
<INVENTORY>                                      8,793
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                13,975
<PP&E>                                          10,589
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (904)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  26,758
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,908
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            44
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,020
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    26,758
<SALES>                                         11,916
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,978
<CGS>                                            9,313
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,560
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (50)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    13
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 232
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (90)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (90)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   (214)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (304)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000837894
<NAME>                        Enex Oil & Gas Income Program III - Series 8, L.P.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   mar-31-1997
<CASH>                                         20521
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  39752
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               62630
<PP&E>                                         2523596
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2338397
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 247829
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          81925
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     165904
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   247829
<SALES>                                        77255
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               77255
<CGS>                                          39276
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  48282
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               6565
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   22408
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
#### Ralph G. HOLDERNESS and Shirley J. Holderness, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 77-1683.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 1, 1980.

Decided March 3, 1980.

Joseph Levin, Dice, Sweeny, Sullivan & Feikens, Detroit, Mich., for petitioners-appellants.

M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jonathan S. Cohen, Gilbert E. Andrews, John A. Dudeck, Tax Div., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Stuart E. Seigel, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D. C., for respondent-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs-appellants Holderness, who are husband and wife, appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court affirming the Commissioner’s disallowance of deductions for travel and entertainment expenses and losses incurred in the operation of a horse farm. They contend that they did provide adequate substantiation for the business character of the expense items and that the Commissioner should have allowed deduction of losses for the five horse ranch operation on the 140 acre farm which they used for home.

Our review of this record does not convince us that we can appropriately hold that the adverse findings of fact of Tax Court *402Judge Tannenwald can be set aside as clearly erroneous. The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Tax Court’s opinion, reported at P-H Memo T.C., par. 77,005 (1977).
| $118,734,816.35 |   |                                     Dated:     | June      28, 2001 |
|-----------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
|            |   |                                     Effective: | June      28, 2001 |

|   | 1. | A      payment of interest only on the date hereof representing interest from and      including such date to and including July 7, 2001;  and |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Consecutive      monthly payments of principal and interest, as set forth on Schedule A,      beginning on the First Amortization Payment Date, set forth on Schedule A,      up to and including the payment date immediately before the Final Payment      Date set forth on Schedule A, each of such payments to be applied (a) to      the payment of interest computed at the Applicable Rate; and (b) the      balance applied toward the reduction of the principal  sum. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----

----

----

----

|   | BORROWER:                                 |
|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|   |                                      |
|   | LAKEPOINTE      ASSETS LLC,               |
|   | a      Delaware limited liability company |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |
|   | By:                                       | /s/      J. Richard Rosenberg |
|   |                                      | J.      Richard Rosenberg |
|   |                                      | Vice      President and Chief Financial Officer |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |
|   |                                      |   |

----
#### John G. Marshall *v.*Henry Benge, etc.

Contracts — Construction—Understanding of Parties.

Ordinarily courts will not hear oral evidence as to what parties understood to he the meaning of a written contract, but will look alone to the language used to ascertain the meaning.

*340Contracts — Construction—Meaning of Words.

Where it is clearly and unmistakably shown that both parties to a contract attached to a word or expression used a meaning different from that ordinarily applied to it, and that to refuse to allow such understanding to control would be to enforce a contract which they did not intend to make, oral evidence is admissible to show what the understanding of the parties was as to the contract.

APPEAL, FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT.

January 17, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Appellees’ first instruction is irreconcilable with the only instruction given at appellant’s instance, and is erroneous and misleading. The writing must be regarded as containing the contract actually made and finally consummated by the parties.

The contract as therein expressed must be taken as the true one, notwithstanding any other different agreement or understanding between the parties before the paper was signed. There is no sufficient allegation of mistake or fraud in reducing the contract to writing, and it must be enforced as written.

Appellees’ second instruction is also liable to objection. Ordinarily courts will not hear oral evidence as to what the parties understood to be the meaning of their written contract, but will look alone to the language used, to ascertain that meaning.

If it can be clearly and unmistakably shown that both parties attached tó a word or expression used a meaning different from that ordinarily and generally applied to* it, and that to refuse to allow their understanding to control would be to enforce between them a contract they neither intended to make nor supposed they had made. The general rule heretofore stated may be relaxed. But in this case, as the application of this exceptional rule of practice will essentially change the legal effect of the contract of leasing as written, this second instruction should have been so framed as not to have withdrawn from- the consideration of the jury the testimony conducing to prove that, although Marshall may not have regarded Benge as liable to pay rent accruing thereafter in case the hotel building should be destroyed by fire, he nevertheless expected and intended that he should be bound to him in the same manner and to the same extent that he was bound to his lessor.

*341
      *Burnarn, Chenault, for appellant.*

*Breck,*Turner, *Smith, for appellees.*

We are of opinion that the second instruction is calculated to have . this effect.

The numerous, instructions asked for by appellant and refused by the court ought not to have been given. His first instruction, which was given, correctly states the law of his case.

For the reasons indicated the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial consistent with the principles' herein set out.
Input to the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity 

Building a Trusted Computing Foundation
�

Executive Summary: 

By now, the commission has concluded that solution to our cyber security 

challenges are simply not more firewalls, more security software, more cyber

intelligence and more training. While these capabilities certainly have their place

in the cyber security solution space, they will not stop sophisticated nation-state

and cyber criminals intent on penetrating our critical infrastructure, not to mention

our economic base. 

As the government learned decades ago (1983 to be exact), the only real 

defense that nation-state and cyber criminal hackers respect and can raise the

bar enough to deter their machinations is a sufficiently secure computer system. 

The government has learned (and keeps on learning) that a truly secure computer

is one in which the system has been designed and developed with a trusted

computing foundation. This is truly what it means to “bake security in,” vice “bolt 

security on.” 

In 1983, the government (with the help of industry) established the

requirements for building “provably” secure and trusted systems and industry 

(e.g., Sun, Digital Equipment Corporation) built systems that were largely resistant

to contemporary hacking techniques like the, now famous, buffer overflow.

To truly get to the heart of our cyber security crises and introduce meaningful

technical solutions, it is imperative that the commission recommend a government

championed research and development effort (in partnership with academia and

industry) to establish technical principles and criteria that enable greater security

and trust in our computer networks, operating systems and applications.

This paper addresses this challenge and proposes a way forward for the

government to make a true leap forward in finally raising the bar on sophisticated

hackers, who currently have the upper-hand on our cyber defenders. The 

approach is truly a “back to the future story” and offers solutions to make the cyber

security crises a cyber security nuisance. 

Robert Bigman

Rybbigs@GMail.com 

1
�