IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ROSA M. A., )

) No. 20 C 4862

Plaintiff, )

) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

v. )

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rosa M. A. appeals the Acting Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Social 

Security benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court reverses the Acting Commissioner’s 

decision. 

Background

On February 28, 2017 and June 9, 2017, plaintiff filed applications for benefits, which were

denied initially, on reconsideration, and after a hearing. (R. 219, 233, 264-65, 269-82.) On January 

24, 2019, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. (R. 290-92.) 

The ALJ held another hearing, after which he again denied plaintiff’s applications. (R. 25-44.) 

The Appeals Council denied review (R. 1-12), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of 

the Acting Commissioner reviewable by this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Villano v. 

Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

Discussion

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by 

“[s]ubstantial evidence,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

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adequate to support a conclusion.’” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (quoting Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, 

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 

1154 (2019).

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The regulations 

prescribe a five-part sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920. The Acting Commissioner must consider whether: (1) the claimant has 

performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which she claims disability; (2) 

the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the residual functional 

capacity to perform her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 

881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886. If that burden is met, at step 

five, the burden shifts to the Acting Commissioner to establish that the claimant is capable of 

performing work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2).

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged disability onset date of October 1, 2015. (R. 27.) At step two, the ALJ determined 

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that plaintiff has the severe impairments of major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, obesity,

status-post tear of the talofibular ligament, and varicose veins. (R. 28.) At step three, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or 

medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id. at 36.) At step four, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff cannot perform any past relevant work but has the RFC to perform light work 

with certain exceptions. (R. 39-42.) At step five, the ALJ found that jobs exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, and thus she is not disabled. (R. 43-

44.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to obtain a valid waiver of representation. “A claimant 

has a statutory right to counsel at a disability hearing.” Binion v. Shalala, 13 F.3d 243, 245 (7th 

Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 406; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1700.) However, a claimant may waive that 

right if she has been “properly informed of [it].” Id. To obtain a valid waiver of counsel, the ALJ 

must explain to the pro se claimant: “(1) the manner in which an attorney can aid in the 

proceedings, (2) the possibility of free counsel or a contingency arrangement, and (3) the limitation 

on attorney fees to 25 percent of past due benefits and required court approval of the fees.” Id.

The record shows that the ALJ provided the required explanations to plaintiff before she 

signed the waiver of representation form. (See R. 58-72.) It also shows that plaintiff waived 

representation because she did not want to delay the hearing. (R. 72-73.) Plaintiff argues that her 

desire to avoid delay renders her waiver invalid (ECF 22 at 9), but she offers no authority for that 

proposition. Because the ALJ complied with the requirements of Binion, the Court holds that 

plaintiff’s waiver was valid.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ breached his duty to develop the record. An ALJ 

fulfills this duty if “[he] probes the [pro se] claimant for possible disabilities and uncovers all of 

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the relevant evidence.” Binion, 13 F.3d at 245. An ALJ breaches this duty if there is an omission 

from the record that prejudices the claimant. Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2009).

“‘Mere conjecture or speculation that additional evidence might have been obtained in the case is 

insufficient to warrant a remand.’” Id. (quoting Binion, 13 F.3d at 246). “Instead a claimant must 

set forth specific, relevant facts—such as medical evidence—that the ALJ did not consider.” Id.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s failure to obtain an opinion from the advanced practice nurse 

who treated her was a prejudicial omission. The Court disagrees. “[T]he record is complete as a 

matter of law when it contains adequate information for the ALJ to render a disability decision, 

regardless of whether the treating doctor has weighed in.” Charles F. v. Saul, No. 18 C 618, 2019 

WL 3776656, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2019). Such is the case here, as the record contains

numerous medical records, the reports of two consultative examinations, and four medical 

opinions regarding plaintiff’s functional capacity. The Court concludes that the record contains 

sufficient evidence for the ALJ to determine whether plaintiff is disabled.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed her symptom allegations without 

any supporting analysis. The ALJ was required to evaluate plaintiff’s symptoms in light of “all of 

the available evidence” and “determine the extent to which [plaintiff’s] alleged functional 

limitations . . . [could] reasonably be accepted as consistent with the . . . evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1529(a), 416.929 Among the factors relevant to this evaluation are: plaintiff’s daily 

activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain or other symptoms; 

precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any 

medication she takes or has taken to alleviate . . . pain or other symptoms; treatment, other than 

medication, she receives or has received for relief of symptoms; measures she uses or has used to 

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relieve her pain or other symptoms; and any other factors concerning [her] functional limitations 

and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(2).

The ALJ noted plaintiff’s claims that depression, thrombophlebitis,1 and anemia limited 

her ability to work because they caused her to have headaches, insomnia, and fatigue, and impaired 

her ability to concentrate. (R. 29.) Thereafter, the ALJ summarized the records of medical 

treatment plaintiff received from February 2016 through December 2018, ending each summary 

paragraph with this statement: “I find the consistency of the claimant’s statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms to be slightly consistent.” (See R. 30-33.) 

The ALJ did not, however, identify the symptoms to which each medical record related or explain 

how each record supported or refuted those symptom allegations. Because there is no “logical 

bridge” between the evidence and the ALJ’s rejection of plaintiff’s symptoms, we cannot uphold 

the ALJ’s symptom evaluation. See Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Here,

the ALJ did not provide a reason for omitting from her analysis the objective medical evidence in 

the record supporting Minnick’s subjective complaints. Without a logical bridge between the 

evidence and the ALJ’s conclusion, we lack a sufficient basis upon which to uphold the ALJ’s 

determination of Minnick’s credibility.”).

1

“Thrombophlebitis . . . is an inflammatory process that causes a blood clot to form and block one or more veins, 

usually in [the] legs.” www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/thrombophlebitis/systems-causes/syc-20354607 (last 

visited Aug. 16, 2022).

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court reverses the Acting Commissioner’s decision, 

denies the Acting Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [25], and in accordance with the 

fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), remands this case for further proceedings consistent with 

this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: August 16, 2022

M. David Weisman

United States Magistrate Judge

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