* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, we have determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 98-50255

Summary Calendar

_________________

ROGELIO F. LEDEZMA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(A-96-CV-811)

October 5, 1998

Before, EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rogelio F. Ledezma appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment affirming the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration’s determination that Ledezma is not entitled to

disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We reverse and remand.

When, as in this case, “appeal is taken from a district
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court’s summary judgment in favor of the [Commissioner], this

[c]ourt has held that . . . review is to be made independently of

the determinations of the district court, and without regard to

whether the district court acted correctly.” Cieutat v. Bowen, 824

F.2d 348, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, the focus of our inquiry

is on the propriety of the Commissioner’s findings. Our review of

the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to determining (1)

whether the proper legal standards were used to evaluate the

evidence; and (2) whether its decision is supported by substantial

evidence. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.

1990). We note that because the Appeals Council denied review of

the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, that decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of this

appeal.

Ledezma first avers that the ALJ erred in failing to refer to

Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1985) when it determined

the severity of Ledezma’s impairment. An ALJ must evaluate

disability claims by a five-step sequential process. See Muse v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991)(listing the steps); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1998). We have held that when an ALJ proceeds

past step two of this process, a court may infer a finding of a

severe impairment, and specific reference to Stone by the ALJ is

not required. See Reyes v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir.

1990)(stating that “[b]ecause the ALJ proceeded to the third step

in evaluating Reyes’ claim, we must infer that the ALJ found a

severe impairment”); Shipley v. Secretary of Health and Human
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Servs., 812 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1987)(“Satisfying the Stone

test of severity means only that claimant has passed the second

step of the inquiry mandated by the regulations.”). Here, the ALJ

proceeded beyond the second step, and therefore, we may infer a

finding of severe impairment. We find no error in the ALJ’s

failure to refer to Stone.

Ledezma also contends that the ALJ erred in applying 20 C.F.R.

pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 2, Rule 201.19 in denying him disability

insurance benefits. Rule 201.19 requires a finding of not disabled

for claimants who (1) are restricted to sedentary work, (2) are

between forty-five and forty-nine years old, (3) have skilled or

semi-skilled work experience, but lack transferable skills, and (4)

possess a limited or less education, but are at least literate and

able to communicate in English. See Rule 201.19. Ledezma argues

that Rule 201.19 does not apply because he could not communicate in

English, and because his past work experience was not semi-skilled.

The ALJ determined that Ledezma could not communicate in

English. This determination precludes the application of Rule

201.19. Thus, the ALJ’s application of 201.19 is not supported by

substantial evidence. See Cotto v. Chater, 1995 WL 577770, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1995)(noting that “since the evidence shows

that plaintiff speaks no English, this finding [of limited or less

education] is not supported by substantial evidence”). Because we

conclude that the ALJ should not have applied Rule 201.19, we need

not decide whether the ALJ erred in finding that Ledezma’s past

work experience was semi-skilled.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

affirming the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and the case is

REMANDED to the district court for remand to the Commissioner for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSE AND REMAND.