ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

People v. Stahl, 2013 IL App (5th) 110385

Appellate Court

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

TERRIS E. STAHL, Defendant-Appellee.

 District & No. Fifth District

Docket No. 5-11-0385

Filed February 19, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Defendant was rendered unfit to stand trial on charges of home invasion

and aggravated unlawful restraint arising from an incident in which he

invaded the residence of his former wife, since the brain injury he

suffered when he shot himself with one of his weapons rendered him

unable to recall any of the events surrounding the incident and there was

testimony that defendant could not understand the nature of the

proceedings against him or assist in his defense.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 09-CF-567; the

Hon. Jan V. Fiss, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Brendan F. Kelly, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino,

Stephen E. Norris, and Jennifer Camden, all of State’s Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. 

Justin A. Kuehn and Matthew P. Young, both of Kuehn Law Firm, of

Belleville, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Welch and Goldenhersh concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Terris E. Stahl, is unable to remember any of the events surrounding the

incidents leading to charges of home invasion and aggravated unlawful restraint due to brain

damage resulting from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. He was found unfit to stand trial.

After a subsequent fitness restoration hearing, the court again found that the defendant was

unfit to stand trial and that it was not reasonably probable that he could be fit within one

year. The State appeals, arguing that the defendant’s inability to recall events does not render

him unfit to stand trial. We affirm.

¶ 2 The events at issue occurred shortly after the defendant’s former wife, Erin Kruep, filed

for divorce. According to testimony presented at a discharge hearing after the initial finding

of unfitness, Kruep spent the evening of April 5, 2009, at her home with Chuck Smith (a

friend of both Kruep and the defendant), Alyssa Schmitt (Kruep’s 17-year-old babysitter),

and William Marshall (Schmitt’s boyfriend). At 1 in the morning, Kruep went to bed and

invited her three guests to stay overnight. Marshall left some time later, but Smith fell asleep

in Kruep’s guest room and Schmitt fell asleep on the living room sofa. Kruep and the

defendant had a four-year-old son, Owen, who was asleep in his bedroom when these events

took place.

¶ 3 At 4 in the morning, Kruep and Schmitt woke up when they heard glass break and

Kruep’s burglar alarm go off. The defendant pointed a gun at Schmitt and demanded to know

where Kruep was. He then found Kruep in her bedroom, pointed a gun at her, and threatened

to kill her. The defendant woke Smith by going to the guest room and pointing a second gun

in Smith’s face. With one gun pointed at Kruep and Schmitt and the other pointed at Smith,

the defendant told them that they were all “gonna die” that night. Kruep managed to call

9-1-1 on her cell phone and ask for help before the defendant knocked the phone from her

hand.

¶ 4 The defendant ordered Kruep, Schmitt, and Smith into the basement. He continued to

hold all three at gunpoint, with one gun in each hand. He told Kruep that if she would take

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him back, he would change. However, he then fired a shot into the wall and told her, “Now

you know I’m serious, bitch.”

¶ 5 Owen woke up and turned on the bathroom light. The defendant allowed Schmitt to go

upstairs to take care of him. While Schmitt was upstairs with Owen, she looked out the

window and saw a police officer outside who had arrived in response to Kruep’s 9-1-1 call.

Schmitt motioned to the officer through the window. She held her hand in the shape of a gun

and pointed to her head, then pointed down the hallway toward the basement door. The

officer returned to his squad car and called for backup. Schmitt took Owen and left the

house.

¶ 6 The defendant continued to point the guns at Kruep and Smith. He told Kruep that if he

could not have her, he would kill her. Later, the police tactical response force arrived at the

house. An officer attempted to talk to the defendant with a megaphone. The defendant

eventually decided that he would be willing to talk to a police officer he knew if that officer

was at the scene. He sent Smith upstairs to find out whether the officer was there. Some time

later, the defendant told Kruep that he did not want to go to jail. He told her what kind of

funeral he wanted and what he wanted her to tell their son about his death. He then told her

to leave. As Kruep was leaving, she heard a gunshot. She ran from the house and told the

officers that the defendant had shot himself.

¶ 7 The defendant was found lying facedown in a doorway on the main floor of Kruep’s

home. He was taken to the hospital. A trail of blood led from the defendant down the stairs

leading to the basement. Two guns were found in the basement, including a .22 that was

found in a pool of blood with its hammer cocked.

¶ 8 The defendant was arrested in May 2009 and charged with home invasion (720 ILCS

5/12-11(a)(1) (West 2008)) and aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1(a) (West

2008)). He was conditionally released to live with his parents because the county jail could

not meet his medical needs. He was indicted on both charges on June 12, 2009. On October

1, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for a hearing to determine his fitness to stand trial.

¶ 9 Prior to the initial fitness hearing, two psychologists provided opinions, Dr. Kenneth

Gilbert and Dr. John Rabun. Dr. Kenneth Gilbert initially evaluated the defendant in July

2009, after the defendant’s mother hired him to evaluate the defendant’s risk of suicide. Dr.

Gilbert provided a report in January 2010 based upon his July 2009 evaluation. He opined

that the defendant suffered two types of memory deficit as a result of the gunshot wound.

First, the defendant was unable to recall the events at issue or anything that happened in the

48 hours leading up to those events. Second, the defendant’s ability to form new short-term

memories was severely impaired. Dr. Gilbert explained that this short-term memory

impairment would make it impossible for the defendant “to track what happened in court

from one day to the next.”

¶ 10 Dr. Gilbert explained that the type of brain injury sustained by the defendant could lead

to memory loss because the “swelling and distortion of brain tissue” caused by the gunshot

interrupts the process of creating neurological connections that establish memories. Dr.

Gilbert opined that it was possible for the defendant’s short-term memory impairment to

improve, although he could not predict with any certaintywhetherthis would be the case. He

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opined, however, that there was “no probability” that the defendant would recover his

memories of the events at issue or the 48 hours leading up to them. He concluded that the

defendant could not understand the nature of the proceedings against him or assist in his own

defense.

¶ 11 Dr. John Rabun was retained by the State to perform an independent evaluation of the

defendant. He provided a report in April 2010. Dr. Rabun essentially agreed with Dr. Gilbert.

He found that the defendant had no memory of the day of the events charged as well as

“significant deficits in his capacity to learn and retain new information.” Dr. Rabun noted

that the defendant’s cognitive difficulties were significant enough that his father had been

appointed to act as his plenary legal guardian as a result. Dr. Rabun concluded that the

defendant was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and unable to

assist in his defense. He opined that all of the defendant’s memory impairments were

unlikely to improve.

¶ 12 In July 2010, the matter was called for a hearing. The parties stipulated that Dr. Gilbert

and Dr. Rabun would testify in accordance with the opinions expressed in their reports if

called to testify. In light of the fact that both psychologists believed that the defendant was

not fit to stand trial, the State stipulated to a finding of unfitness. The court held a discharge

hearing in November 2010. After hearing the testimony set out previously, the court found

the defendant “not guilty” and ordered him committed to Alton Mental Health Center. The

defendant was admitted to Alton on February 24, 2011.

¶ 13 On March 17, 2011, Alton staff filed a progress report with the court indicating that the

defendant was now fit to stand trial. See 725 ILCS 5/104-18(a)(2) (West 2010). The report

was signed by Dr. David Montani, a staff psychologist who was treating the defendant. Dr.

Montani stated that the defendant still was completely unable to recall the events at issue and

continued to have difficulty in forming new memories. He explained that the defendant had

been tested by Dr. Ronald Sellers to assess the extent of his memory deficit. Dr. Sellers’

testing revealed that the defendant was in the bottom percentile in his ability to recall new

information after 20 to 30 minutes. Dr. Montani nevertheless opined that the defendant was

fit to stand trial. He noted that the defendant was able to tell him the roles of the judge,

prosecutor, defense counsel, and jury in a trial. He also noted that the defendant was able to

discuss with him the proceedings at the November 2010 discharge hearing.

¶ 14 The court held a fitness restoration hearing on May 13, 2011. At the outset of the hearing,

defense counsel stated that “both parties would ask the court to take judicial notice of all the

prior reports.” He noted that this included the reports of Dr. Gilbert and Dr. Rabun from

2010, which had previously been admitted. The prosecutor stated, “That’s correct, Your

Honor.”

¶ 15 Dr. Montani testified for the State that the defendant had a basic understanding of the

charges against him and the possible penalties as well as the roles of courtroom personnel.

He further testified that when he discussed the November 2010 discharge hearing with the

defendant, the defendant was able to recall and discuss the evidence presented at that hearing.

The defendant was able to tell Dr. Montani about discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses

at the hearing and comment on the fact that no gunshot residue testing was conducted. Dr.

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Montani acknowledged that the defendant stillsuffered from significant short-term memory

impairment, but he believed that this would not prevent him from functioning in the context

of a trial if he were provided with note-taking materials and sufficient breaks during the

testimony to conferwith counsel. Dr. Montani also acknowledged that the defendant was still

completely unable to recall any of the events charged in the indictment. He testified that the

defendant was not likely to recover these memories through treatment.

¶ 16 Criminal defense attorney John O’Gara testified as an expert witness for the defendant.

He described how the defendant’s inability to remember the relevant events could impact his

ability to assist defense counsel. O’Gara explained that there was no way for the defendant

to tell his attorney his version of the events at issue or what his state of mind was at the time,

information that is critical to determining what defenses might be available. He further

testified that the defendant cannot meaningfully testify in his own defense because he cannot

remember the events at issue. Finally, O’Gara testified that the defendant cannot even

intelligently decide how to plead because he does not know whether he committed any of the

acts charged.

¶ 17 The court then heard arguments from the parties’ attorneys. The defendant argued that

the State was required to prove the defendant fit to stand trial by clear and convincing

evidence, while the State argued that it only needed to prove he was fit by a preponderance

of the evidence. The court asked both parties to submit proposed orders that addressed the

appropriate standard. The court then took the matter under advisement.

¶ 18 On May 24, 2011, the court entered an order finding that the defendant was unfit to stand

trial and was unlikely to become fit again. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the

court denied. The State then filed the instant appeal.

¶ 19 The State contends that the trial court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the

evidence because a defendant’s amnesia related to the events surrounding the charges against

him is not sufficient to support a finding of unfitness. We disagree.

¶ 20 A defendant is not fit to stand trial if he is unable to understand the purpose and nature

of the proceedings against him or if he is unable to assist counsel in his defense. People v.

Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d 310, 330, 836 N.E.2d 872, 889 (2005) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/104-10

(West 2000)). Once a bona fide doubt is raised as to the defendant’s fitness to stand trial, the

State must prove the defendant fit by a preponderance of the evidence. Clay, 361 Ill. App.

3d at 331, 836 N.E.2d at 889. In determining a defendant’s fitness, courts are to consider,

among other things, the “defendant’s ability to observe, recollect and relate occurrences,

especially those concerning the incidents alleged.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/104-

16(b)(2) (West 2010).On appeal from a court’s determination regarding a defendant’s fitness

to stand trial, we review to determine whether the court’s finding was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 836 N.E.2d at 889.

¶ 21 As previously noted, the defendant in this case suffers from two types of memory

impairment, both of which have some impact on his fitness to stand trial. However, there is

evidence that the defendant’s short-term memory improved somewhat, and Dr. Montani

opined that the defendant could overcome his difficulties with reasonable accommodations.

On appeal, the defendant focuses his arguments on his complete amnesia as to the events at

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issue in the indictment. For purposes of this appeal, we may assume that the defendant’s

short-term memory impairment can be accommodated adequately and focus our discussion

on whether his inability to recall the events at issue makes him unfit to stand trial. For the

reasons that follow, we conclude that it is.

¶ 22 In support of its position, the State cites People v. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d 629, 482

N.E.2d 104 (1985). There, the defendant was charged with arson and murder. Schwartz, 135

Ill. App. 3d at 631, 482 N.E.2d at 105-06. Like the defendant here, the defendant in Schwartz

suffered a self-inflicted gunshot wound and was unable to remember the events involved in

the charges against him. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 632, 482 N.E.2d at 106. At a hearing

to determine his fitness to stand trial, a psychiatrist testified that the defendant could not

recall the events of the day of the offenses but could understand the nature and purpose of

the proceedings and communicate with his attorney. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 632, 482

N.E.2d at 106. The court found the defendant fit to stand trial. The defendant continued to

assert the issue of his fitness throughout the trial without success. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d

at 632, 482 N.E.2d at 106.

¶ 23 The defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 635,

482 N.E.2d at 108. Both the defendant and the State presented extensive testimony about the

events in the weeks leading up to the offenses. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 633, 482 N.E.2d

at 107. This included the defendant’s own testimony. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 635, 482

N.E.2d at 108.

¶ 24 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding him fit to stand trial.

Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 636-37, 482 N.E.2d at 109. The Second District found that

although the defendant was unable to “cooperate in his defense concerning the amnesiac

period,” he was able to communicate with his attorney about trial decisions. Schwartz, 135

Ill. App. 3d at 638-39, 482 N.E.2d at 110-11. The court found that this was all our statute

contemplates in providing that a fit defendant is one who is able to assist in his own defense.

Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 639, 482 N.E.2d at 111.

¶ 25 In addition, the defendant there raised general due process concerns regarding the impact

of his memory loss on the fairness of his trial. More specifically, he argued that his memory

loss prevented him from offering his own testimony as to his state of mind at the time the

offenses took place. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 639, 482 N.E.2d at 111. In rejecting this

claim, the appellate court noted that the defendant was able to tell his attorney about the

events leading up to the arson and murder which supported his insanity defense. The

defendant was even able to testify about these events. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 482

N.E.2d at 111-12. The court found that under the “particular circumstances” before it, the

defendant was able to fully develop and present his insanity defense. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App.

3d at 640, 482 N.E.2d at 112.

¶ 26 We believe the Schwartz court ignored express statutory language applicable to fitness

hearings. As previously stated, the statute expressly provides that the court should consider

the defendant’s ability to recall the events involved in the charges against him and relate

those to defense counsel. Indeed, the statute emphasizes the defendant’s abilityto relate these

events. 725 ILCS 5/104-16(b)(2) (West 2010). We thus decline to follow Schwartz. See

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People v. Pruitt, 239 Ill. App. 3d 200, 209, 606 N.E.2d 866, 872 (1992) (noting that one

district of the appellate court is not required to follow the holding of another district of the

appellate court).

¶ 27 It is also important to note that, while the Schwartz court held that complete amnesia of

the events surrounding the charged behavior does not automatically support a finding of

unfitness, the court did not hold that a defendant who lacks anymemory of the events at issue

may never be found unfit on this basis alone. In that regard, the instant case is distinguishable

from Schwartz. In Schwartz, the defendant was able to provide his attorneywith information

about the events leading up to the charged incident that helped him present his insanity

defense. Here, the defendant is unable to recall anything that occurred in the 48 hours leading

up to the events at issue, and there is no indication that an insanity defense would be

appropriate or that the defendant can provide his attorneywith any information that will help

him to present any other defense.

¶ 28 The State argues, however, that concerns about a defendant’s ability to remember the

events at issue are more properly raised in an appeal aftertrial and framed in terms of general

due process concerns. In support of this argument, the State points to the procedural history

of Schwartz. There, as previously discussed, the defendant challenged his conviction on the

grounds both that he should not have been found fit to stand trial and that his inability to

remember events deprived him of a fair trial because he could not present all of the evidence

relevant to his insanitydefense. We have alreadyrejected the holding in Schwartz. Moreover,

we do not read the opinion to hold that a defendant suffering from amnesia must always go

through a trial and then challenge his conviction on general due process grounds instead of

challenging the court’s fitness determination. As we have already discussed, the applicable

statute expressly emphasizes the defendant’s ability to recall and relate to counsel the events

at issue in the charges against him. Here, the defendant has no such ability. To hold that this

issue is not a question of fitness would be at odds with the very purpose of our provisions

related to fitness to stand trial.

¶ 29 The State further argues that the defendant in fact can assist in his own defense because

he is able to review police reports and discuss witness testimony with his attorney. We are

not persuaded. The defendant here is unable to provide counsel with any information at all

concerning the events at issue. This is far more critical aid to a defense attorney than the

ability to read police reports and assess witness testimony. The defendant’s recollection of

the events at issue is information the attorney has no other means of obtaining. Thus, the fact

that the defendant may be able to discuss aspects of the trial with his attorney does not

override the fact that he is unable to provide his attorney with any information concerning

the crimes charged.

¶ 30 In addition, the State argues that the court erred in considering the reports of Dr. Gilbert

and Dr. Rabun because our fitness statute addresses a defendant’s current condition, and

those reports were based on evaluations of the defendant which took place more than a year

before the fitness restoration hearing. This argument correctly states the law. Schwartz, 135

Ill. App. 3d at 631, 482 N.E.2d at 105-06. However, the undisputed medical evidence

showed that while the defendant’s condition had improved in some respects, his inability to

recall the relevant events had not changed. We also note that the State acquiesced to the

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defendant’s request that the court take judicial notice of the reports and that Dr. Montani

considered them in rendering his opinion. We find no error.

¶ 31 Finally, the State argues that the court was not free to disregard Dr. Montani’s expert

opinion where there was no opinion to contradict it. Again, we disagree. As previously

discussed, all of the psychological evidence–including Dr. Montani’s testimony and

reports–indicated that the defendant had no memory of the events at issue and was unlikely

ever to recover his memory of what occurred. Dr. Montani’s conclusion that the defendant

was fit to stand trial was a legal conclusion, not a psychiatric opinion. The ultimate legal

conclusion as to the defendant’s fitness was an issue for the court to determine. People v.

Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 231, 673 N.E.2d 318, 331 (1996).

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order finding the defendant unfit to

stand trial.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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