*This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Citation of unpublished orders and judgments is not favored. Nevertheless, an unpublished decision may be cited if it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion and it would assist the court in its disposition. A copy of the decision must be attached to the brief or other document in which it is cited, or, if cited in oral argument, provided to the court and all other parties.

- 1 - UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 2/29/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

______ DIANE D. PARRETT, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 95-3146 ) (D.C. No. 93-CV-1308) RAYTHEON COMPANY, BEECH AIRCRAFT ) (Dist. of Kansa s) CORPORATION, UNITED BEECHCRAFT, ) INC., BEECH HOLDINGS, INC., RALPH ) DELONG and DAVE LAMBERTZ, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )

______ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

______ Before BRORBY, BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

______

Diane D. Parrett (Parrett) appeals from the distric t court’s Memorandum and Order of March 10, 1995: granting a motion in limine to Raytheon Company and its subsidiaries Beech Airc raft1 When reviewing a motion for summary judgment we rev iew

the facts in the light most favorable to the non-mo ving party. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1410, 1412 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993). - 2 - Corporation, United Beechcraft, Inc., and Beech Hol dings, Inc., Dave Lambertz, and Ralph DeLong (collectively “appe llees”); granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on her age discrimination, sexual discrimination, sexual haras sment/hostile work environment and retaliation claims; and dismis sing without prejudice her state law claim of breach of impliedcontract.

Facts 1 United Beechcraft, Inc. (Beechcraft), owns and oper ates an aircraft fixed base operation at Wichita’s Mid-Cont inent Airport. From October, 1988, to September 15, 1992, Beechcra ft operated three facilities in Wichita: Beechcraft-South, Beec hcraft-Central,
and Beechcraft-North. Parrett was hired at Beechcraft-South as a receptionist/merchandise purchasing manager on Augu st 11, 1975. Parrett left Beechcraft in December, 1977, but was rehired in June, 1981. In 1985, her job title was changed, at her r equest, to customer service representative. On April 22, 1989, Parrett wrote a lengthy letter t o Thomas Phillips, CEO of Raytheon Company, complaining abou t communications problems, management practices and policies, disrep air of the- 3 -

facility, treatment of customers, and treatment of employees in general by Line Manager Ralph DeLong (DeLong). (Ap pellant’s Appendix at 94-98). Parrett was contacted by Ron L ance (Lance), Manager of Administration and Personnel for Beech H oldings, Inc., in early June, 1989, and informed that her concerns were being
addressed. On October 10, 1990, Parrett prepared a 17-page “In cident Report” entitled Diane Parrett vs. United Beechcraf t. The first portion of the report complained that there was no customer service representative supervisor position to which custome r service representatives could aspire. The report proceededto complain about the “sexist, bigoted,” “dictator,” behavior o f DeLong and the new Assistant Line Manager, Bob Wattson, who was a “willing assistant” to DeLong. (Appellant’s Appendix at 104 ). Specifically, Parrett’s report stated that, interalia : (1) on some unspecified date, DeLong told another female e mployee at Beechcraft-South, that “we should be made to wear ‘ hot pants’ to go out and park planes like the girls in Salina do;” ( 2) in 1984, DeLong purchased uniforms for the three women cust omer service representatives at Beechcraft-South, including Parr ett, and that he stayed in the room and watched while her bust, wais t, hips, and inseam were measured by the man from the uniform company, although the blinds were drawn to prevent the line technicia ns outside from observing; (3) in speaking with her, DeLong once re ferred to- 4 -

another female employee by stating, “That dumb broa d, she can’t even go the restroom without asking me;” (4) in spe aking to another employee regarding Parrett, DeLong said, “She’s as stupid as a whore on South Broadway;” (5) sometime in 1982 she called in sick, Wattson then called her at home and told her that i f she performed her part in a local play that evening she would be fired; (6) in January, 1989, she called in sick with pneumonia an d Wattson patronizingly said, “Well, I guess we’ll just have to chalk it up to the wimp factor;” (7) in December, 1989, Wattson“just blew up and lost his cool” yelling at Parrett while discuss ing complaints made about her not performing tasks fast enough; an d (8) on several occasions, Wattson accused her of errors she had ne ver made and when she did make a $0.10 error he shoved it in herface and said,
“Gotcha.” Id . at 104-08. In March, 1991, Parrett delivered a copy of her Inc ident Report to Nita Long, head of the EEO Department at Beechcraft in Wichita. On November 22, 1991, Brian Mitchell (Mitchell), a personnel representative for Beech Holdings, Inc., met with P arrett after receiving a telephone call from her. At that time, Parrett gave Mitchell a copy of her Incident Report. After thei r meeting, Parrett wrote an update to her Incident Report whic h she sent to Mitchell. The 4-page update contained complaints r anging from the operation of Beechcraft-South to the style of furni ture in the- 5 -

office. (Appellant’s Appendix at 117-120). Mitchell wrote Parrett on December 11, 1991, statin g that management would investigate the issues raised by h er in order to achieve a “proper resolution.” He indicated he wou ld contact her at a later date and provided a telephone number forher to contact him in the interim. In early 1992, the supervisory structure at Beechcr aft-South changed. Dave Simons, the Operations Manager, was reassigned to another facility and replaced, on an interim basis, by Mike Bomstad (Bomstad). Shortly thereafter, Bomstad directed De Long to reduce Parrett’s work week to Tuesday through Thursday eff ective February 23, 1992. In making this decision, Bomstad relied on a misunderstanding that Parrett frequently asked for Monday’s and Friday’s off to work at the bed and breakfast she r an out of her home. Parrett immediately complained to Mitchell t hat she had not repeatedly asked for Monday’s and Friday’s off to w ork at her bed and breakfast and that she did not want a three-daywork week. Within ten days Parrett was reinstated to a full fi ve-day schedule. In March, 1992, Bomstad was replaced by Alden Lange (Lange). In addition, Eric Larson (Larson) replaced Wattson as Assistant Line Manager and Parrett’s immediate supervisor. About this time, Parrett heard that Diane Pruitt wa s leaving her position doing fuel farm accounting. Parrett s ent her resume to Dave Lambertz (Lambertz), Business Manager in Wi chita. Lambertz- 6 -

informed her that he was looking for someone with a n accounting degree. In July, 1992, Lambertz and Lange intervie wed and hired Anna Isenhour (Isenhour) for the accounting positio n. Until that time, Isenhour had been a customer service representative/receptionist at Beechcraft-South. A lthough Isenhour did not have an accounting degree, she had experien ce in operations management of aviation fixed based operations, expe rience and training in accounting, and had taken a number of c ollege courses in both accounting and computing. On September 15, 1992, Beechcraft combined the oper ations of its north and south facilities, closing Beechcraft- South. As a result, Parrett’s customer service representative p osition at Beechcraft-South was eliminated and she was transfe rred to a receptionist position at Beechcraft-Central. Conni e Thomas, who had held the receptionist position at Beechcraft-Ce ntral, moved into the position of sales secretary working direct ly for Ken
Shultz. In November, 1992, Beechcraft experienced a furtherreductionin-force in which Parrett’s receptionist position a t BeechcraftCentral was eliminated. Lambertz determined that P arrett lacked the experience to perform any of the available posi tions and notified her of her layoff on November 13, 1992. I n a meeting with Lambertz and Wes Bishop, Parrett opted to list her status as “terminated” rather than “layoff” in order to recei ve her 401K plan- 7 -

benefits immediately. On January 26, 1993, Parrett filed a sworn written complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the Equ al Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After an attempt at an administrative resolution failed, the EEOC issued h er a right to sue letter on July 15, 1993. On August 20, 1993, Parrett initiated this action a gainst appellees alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et
seq .; violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 4 2 U.S.C. § 1981(a); age discrimination; and breach of implied contract of employment. In addition, Parrett alleged that appe llees withheld and altered material evidence relating to her age d iscrimination claim. On August 18, 1994, appellees filed a Motion in Lim ine to exclude from the trial any reference to or testimon y regarding Parrett’s allegation that appellees tampered with a n October 8, 1993, memorandum from Lambertz to Lange. On Decemb er 27, 1994, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on al l of Parrett’s claims. On March 10, 1995, the district court granted appel lees’ motion in limine; granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Parrett’s discrimination and retaliation claims; an d dismissed her state law claim for breach of implied contract with out prejudice. On April 13, 1995, the district court denied Parret t’s motion for2 Parrett does not contest the district court’s dismi ssal

without prejudice of her state law claim of breach of contract. Therefore, this issue is abandoned. SeeCrow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis , ___ F.3d ___,___ n.5 (10th Cir. 1995). - 8 - reconsideration.

Issues On appeal, Parrett contends that the district court erred in (1) granting appellees’ motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to her allegation of document tampering, a nd (2) in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on her claims of age discrimination, sexual discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliatio n. 2

Discussion
I. Parrett contends that the district court erred in g ranting appellees’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of her allegation of document tampering. Parrett alleges that appell ees altered an October 8, 1992, memorandum from Lambertz to Lange which was highly relevant to her age discrimination claim. Parrett claims that on the original memorandum birth dates had been handwr itten in the margin next to five employees’ names, including her s, which were not there when appellees’ returned the memorandum after borrowing it.- 9 -

The evidentiary rulings of the district court are r eviewed for an abuse of discretion. Faulkner v. Super Valu Sto res, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1419, 1433 (10th Cir. 1993). Under this defer ential standard of review, a district court will be reversed only i f we have a firm and definite belief that the district court made a clear error in judgment. Id . (citing Gilbert v. Cosco Inc. , 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993)). After careful review of the record, we conclude tha t the district court did not abuse its discretion in excl uding any reference to the alleged alteration of the October 8, 1992, memorandum. The author of the memorandum, Lambertz , testified that he did not put any dates on the memorandum and he h ad never seen any dates on the memorandum. (Defendants/Appellees ’ Supplemental Appendix, Vol. II at 331-333). In addition, the di strict court found that: the report of Parrett’s forensic docume nt examiner failed to identify any evidence of document tamperi ng and, in fact, concluded that the copy provided to Parrett was a c opy of the same document used in a suit prior to the tampering alle gations which had never been removed from the possession of Parre tt’s counsel; Lambertz testified that “an internal Beech memo was generated from Wes Bishop to Ron Lance on November 5, 1992, which identified various individuals for recommended layoffs, and al so listed the date of hire (rather than birth) for each employee; ” the November 5, 1992, document could easily have been mistaken for the- 10 -

allegedly altered document; and the only person to have actually seen a document with both employees’ names and date s on it only inferred that the dates were birth dates and could not remember the particular dates in question. (Appellant’s Appendi x at 27-32). Therefore, the district court concluded that “[s]et against the minimal probative value of [Parrett’s] evidence is the direct statement of the [appellees] that there has been nomanipulation and the clear prejudice arising from the assertion of a deliberate falsification of evidence.” Id . at 30. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees’ motion in limine.

II. Parrett contends that the district court erred in g ranting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on her discr imination claims. The district court granted summary judgmen t dismissing Parrett’s sexual discrimination, sexual harassment/ hostile work environment, and age discrimination claims as untimely and granted summary judgment on her retaliation claim on the gr ounds that there was a “complete lack of any evidence suggesting tha t the acts complained of were caused by Parrett’s participatio n in protected activity.” (Appellant’s Appendix at 42). This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo . “We apply the same legal standard used by the district court under Fed.- 11 -

R. Civ. P. 56(c) and examine the record to determin e if any genuine issue of material fact was in dispute; if not, we d etermine if the substantive law was correctly applied.” Applied Ge netics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc. , 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if the plea dings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admiss ions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving p arty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing AppliedGenetics , 912 F.2d at 1241). When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving/opposing party. W olf , 50 F.3d at 796. The opposing party, however, must identify su fficient evidence to require submission of the case to a jur y. Jones v. Unisys Corp , 54 F.3d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1995). We affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment if the record contains any basis to do so. Swoboda v. Dubach , 992 F.2d 286, 291 (10th Cir. 1993).

A. Title VII Claims Parrett contends that the district court erred in g ranting summary judgment to appellees on the grounds that h er Title VII sexual discrimination and sexual harassment/hostile work3 The 300 day limitation applies in those states that

have statutorily prohibited sexual discrimination. Otherwise the limit is 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

4 The timely filing of a discriminatory charge may al so be equitably tolled where a plaintiff has been “act ively deceived” causing her filing to be untimely. Purri ngton v. University of Utah , 996 F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 1993); Martinez v. Orr , 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984). However, this argument was not raised in the district court and, therefore, cannot be considered on appeal. - 12 - environment claims were untimely. In Kansas, a plaintiff must file Title VII discrimi nation charges within 300 days after the alleged discrimin atory act occurred. 342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Parrett filed her complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission on January 26, 1993. Thus, her claim is timely only with respect to discrimina tory acts which occurred after April 1, 1992. All of the specific acts of discrimination and of ahostile work environment complained of by Parrett occurred while Wattson was Assistant Line Manager under DeLong. However, Larson replaced Wattson as Assistant Line Manager on March 16, 1992 . Therefore, Parrett’s Title VII claims were untimely and in ord er for her untimely Title VII claims to survive, she must prov e that a continuing violation existed. 4 To invoke the continuing violation exception to the Title VII charge-filing deadlines, Parrett must show either ( 1) a series of related acts taken against a single individual, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or (2) t he maintenance- 13 -

of a company-wide policy of discrimination both bef ore and during the limitations period which evidences a pervasive, institutionalized “system” of discrimination. Pur rington v. University of Utah , 996 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1993); Bruno
v. Western Elec. Co. , 829 F.2d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 1987). While Parrett asserts that she has continually beensubjected to sexual discrimination and a hostile work environment, she does not point to any specific incidents of discriminati on or harassment which occurred afterApril 1, 1992. The only mention of continuing discrimination and harassment after April 1, 1992, is found in her affidavit submitted in response to appellees’ motio n for summary judgment, wherein she asserted that: 33. During the short time Eric Larson took over as Assistant Line Manager, which was only approximatel y six months, he made conditions more tolerable, but he d id not have the power to correct the ongoing discriminator y policies. This did not change the workplace enviro nment, it did not give me an opportunity for equal advance ment, nor keep me from being subject to sexual innuendos all around me, or anything else. The basic work “environment” did not change, although Eric’s manag ement style made it more enjoyable. Female Customer Serv ice Reps were still subject to sexually oriented commen ts from customers on an ongoing basis, such as “she must have PMS”, “darling”, “sweetie” or “cupcake”. (Appellant’s Appendix at 67) (emphasis added). Parrett’s only continuing complaint is that her dis criminatory work environment has not changed because she is sti ll subject to sexually oriented jokes and innuendos from customer s . However, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq ., protects an employee from- 14 -

unlawful employment practices of the employer . Section 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides: (a) Employer practices It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a n employer -- ( 1 ) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an y individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because ofsuch individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or nationa l origin; or ( 2 ) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his sta tus as an employee, because of such individual’s race, col or, religion, sex, or national origin.

Taking Parrett’s affidavit in the light most favora ble to her, there are no allegations of discriminatory acts whi ch occurred after April 1, 1992, which rise to the level of a v iolation of her civil rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In addition, the district court found that Parrett’ s assertions in her affidavit of February 14, 1995, w ere an attempt to create a “sham issue” because they egregiously c ontradicted her earlier deposition testimony. (Appellant’s Appendi x at ). We
agree. In her deposition on November 16, 1993, Parrett tes tified in response to direct questions by counsel that:

A. After Eric took over there was a very noticeable improvement in everything. Everyone res ponded to him. He was fair and treated everyone as equals

. * * *- 15 - Q. What do you claim, if anything, was the hostile work environment directed to you during your workin g shift when Eric Larson was your immediate superviso r? A. When Eric took over, things were a lot better. There were not the comments made to us. There were not the differences in treatment. He immediately gave me a key to access the cabinets where the supplies were kept. He immediately went back to talking to me about ord ering merchandise and being willing to delegate some auth ority and let you take a part in taking care of day-to-da y operations, whereas Bob [Wattson] had kept all of t hat to himself and would not let me have any control over anything, even if it was my own work area. He woul d not release that. Q. Do you claim there was any hostile work environment because of your sex while Eric Larson w as your immediate supervisor on or after March of 1992 ? A. As far as from a management standpoint, the way he treated me, no. There was always some underlyin g thing with linemen, but not as far as with Eric. H e was very fair. Q. In reference to the work area that Eric Larson had responsibility over, what do you claim, if anyt hing, was the hostile work environment directed toward yo u because of your sex? A. He improved that a lot. I really just right now could not recollect anything. If anything, he improved situations a lot with the treatment becaus e of the women that were there. (Defendants’/Appellees’ Supplemental Appendix, Vol. VI at 1321 & 1334). Parrett has failed to produce any evidence of a con tinuing violation. She has not alleged any specific incide nts of discrimination which occurred within the limitation s period to substantiate a continuing violation based on a seri es of related acts nor has she adduced any evidence of a pervasiv e company-wide5 The 300 day limitation applies in those states that

have statutorily prohibited sexual discrimination. Otherwise the limit is 180 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). - 16 - policy of discrimination. Hence, we hold that the district court properly granted appellees summary judgment on Parr ett’s Title VII discrimination claims.

B. Age Discrimination Parrett contends that the district court erred in d ismissing her age discrimination claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq ., as untimely. The district court considered Parrett’s age discrim ination claim together with her Title VII discrimination claims a nd found that they were all untimely because they were not filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. (Appellant’s Appendix at 42). Similar to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the A DEA requires that a plaintiff file age discrimination c harges within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occur red. 529 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). Therefore, because Parrett filed her complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission on January 26, 1 993, her age discrimination claim is timely only with respect todiscriminatory acts which occurred after April 1, 1992. Parrett based her age discrimination claim on three incidents: (1) in June, 1981, Lambertz and Lange hired the you nger Isenhour over her for the fuel farm accounting position; (2) in November,- 17 -

1992, her seniority should have “bumped” her into I senhour’s fuel farm accounting position instead of being terminate d when her receptionist position was eliminated; and (3) in De cember, 1992, she was not rehired after Dee Zogelman resigned herposition as a customer service representative just six weeks afte r Parrett’s termination. Since all of these events occurred af ter April 1, 1992, Parrett’s age discrimination claims were time ly. However, we must now consider whether a genuine issue of materi al facts exists which would prevent summary judgment. ADEA plaintiffs may establish discrimination indire ctly through the three-part framework set out in McDonne ll Douglas Corp.
v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr. , 941 F.2d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discri mination. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination that requires a defendant t o come forward with evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea son for the challenged action. MacDonald , 941 F.2d at 1119. If the defendant offers evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory r eason for its employment decision, “the presumption of discrimina tion established by the prima facie showing simply drops out of the picture.” Ingels v. Thiokol Corp , 42 F.3d 616, 621 (10th Cir. 1994). The- 18 -

plaintiff must then offer evidence that age was a d etermining factor in the challenged decision by either showingthat the defendant’s proffered reasons were really a pretext for age discrimination or by producing direct evidence of a ge discrimination. Jones , 54 F.3d at 630. At the summary judgment stage, if the plaintiff produces both a prima facie case and evidence supporting a finding that “defendant’s all eged nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decisi ons are pretexual, the case should go to the factfinder.” Ingels , 42 F.3d at 622. We must first determine whether Parrett es tablished a prima facie case on any one of her claims. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that she was (1) within t he protected age group; (2) doing satisfactory work or qualified forthe position; (3) discharged or adversely affected by the employe r’s decision; and (4) replaced by a younger person. Jones , 54 F.3d at 630. “In reduction in force cases, because a plaintiff is no t always replaced with another employee, we modified the McD onnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme so that a plaintiff may demo nstrate the fourth element by producing ‘evidence, circumstanti al or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude t hat the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision a t issue.’” Id

. (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co. , 853 F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir. 1988)). The fourth element may also be shown by- 19 -

circumstantial evidence that a plaintiff was treate d less favorably than younger employees. Rea v. Martin Marietta Cor p. , 29 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir. 1994). Parrett alleges that she was discriminated against based on her age when Isenhour, who is much younger than Par rett, was given the fuel farm accounting position and when Isenhourwas retained in that position during the reduction in force. In es tablishing a prima facie case, it is clear that Parrett was in t he protected age group, over 40; adversely affected by the decision ; and replaced by a younger person, Isenhour, who was in her earlytwenties. Of critical importance to her claims is whether she wa s qualified for the fuel farm accounting position. SeeKenworthy v. Conoco, Inc. , 979 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1992) (in failure topromote case, plaintiff could make a prima facie showing through credible evidence that she was qualified for the position sh e sought, even if that evidence was disputed by her employer). The most credible evidence of Parrett’s qualificati ons for the fuel farm accounting position is found in her resume which she voluntarily sent to Lambertz as an application for that position. The fuel farm accounting position required, interalia , personal computing skills; knowledge and use of Lotus 1-2-3 and Dbase; and accounting and general ledger experience and skills . Although Parrett’s resume lists an extensive array of skills and experiences, it is devoid of any personal computingskills,6 In our independent review of the record, we discove red

that Parrett took one college class in financial ac counting in which she received a grade of “C.” This alone is i nsufficient to qualify her for the fuel farm accounting position. - 20 - knowledge or use of Lotus 1-2-3 or Dbase and lackin g in accounting experience. 6(Appellant’s Appendix at 121-123). Without these primary skills and experiences, Parrett is not qual ified for the fuel farm accounting position. Finally, Parrett claims that she was discriminated against when she was not rehired/recalled and a younger woman was transferred from the warranty department into the c ustomer service representative position vacated by Dee Zogleman sixweeks after Parrett was terminated. At the time Parrett was no tified her receptionist position was being eliminated, she was given the choice to list her status as “terminated” or “layof f.” If she chose “layoff” she was subject to recall, but had t o wait a minimum of six months to receive her 401K plan benefits. H owever, if she chose “terminated” she would receive her 401K plan benefits immediately. For personal reasons, Parrett chose t o list her status as “terminated” in order to receive her bene fits sooner. Therefore at the time the customer service represen tative position became vacant, Parrett was not subject to recall. She could apply for any positions that came available like any othe r member of the public. However, Beechcraft was under no obligatio n to call and offer her the job.- 21 -

Accordingly, Parrett has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Hence, the district co urt properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees.

C. Retaliation Claim Parrett contends that the district court erred in g ranting appellees’ summary judgment motion with respect to her retaliation claims. The district court found that summary judgment was appropriate as to Parrett’s retaliation claims bec ause of a “complete lack of any evidence suggesting that the acts complained of were caused by Parrett’s participation in protec ted activity.” (Appellant’s Appendix at 42). Parrett asserts that appellees retaliated against h er for writing her April 22, 1989, letter to Phillips, forsubmitting her Incident Report and the update in 1991 to Mitchell, and for filing this Title VII action with the EEOC and KHRC. Parr ett claims that in retaliation for her actions Appellees: cut her s chedule to a three-day work week; never gave her the opportunityto interview for other positions during the reduction in force, although her seniority should have permitted her the opportunityto remain with the company; and did not bring her back to work sixweeks after she was terminated when Dee Zogelman resigned her posit ion. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation a pl aintiff must show that (1) she was engaged in a protected o pposition to- 22 -

Title VII discrimination or participated in a Title VII proceeding; (2) she was disadvantaged by an action of her emplo yer subsequent to or contemporaneously with such opposition or par ticipation; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protec ted activity and the adverse employment action. Daniel v. Loveridge , 32 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994); Burrus v. United Tel. Co. ofKan., Inc. , 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert . denied , 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). “The causal connection may be demonstrated by evide nce of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliat ory motive, such as protected conduct followed by adverse action.” Burrus , 683 F.2d at 343. The district court found that Parrett’s letter of April 22, 1989, was not the product of protected conduct beca use it failed to raise any issues of gender or age discrimination; t herefore it could not serve as the basis for a claim of retalia tion. (Appellant’s Appendix at 42 n.2). We agree. Altho ugh Parrett’s April 22, 1989, letter raises many issues, it fails to allege any discriminatory actions which would amount to a viol ation of Title VII. In addition, Parrett’s filing of her complain t with the EEOC and the KHRC cannot be the basis of a retaliation c laim, inasmuch as these filings were made well after Parrett’s emp loyment with appellees had been terminated. Parrett’s only allegations of Title VII discriminat ion are found in her Incident Report which she distributed in March and- 23 -

November of 1991. The only adverse job action chro nologically proximate to Parrett’s publication of her Incident Report was the temporary reduction in her work week to Tuesday thr ough Thursday which occurred in February, 1992. However, it is u ncontroverted that this reduction was caused by Bomstad’s mistake n belief that she wished to have Monday’s and Friday’s off and th at he did not know of her Incident Report before instituting her new schedule. In addition, Parrett was returned to her normal fiv e-day work week within ten days. We have previously held that a “p laintiff must show that the individual that took adverse action a gainst [her] knew of [her] protected activity.” Williams v. Ric e , 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we agree with t he district court that this brief adverse job action cannot ser ve as a basis for a claim of retaliation. With respect to Parrett’s remaining claims that she was retaliated against because appellees failed to give her the opportunity to interview for available jobs during the reduction in force and that appellees failed to recall her six w eeks after she was terminated, the district court found “a complet e lack of any evidence suggesting that the acts complained of wer e caused by Parrett’s participation in protected activity, here , by submitting the incident report and its update in late 1991.” (Appellant’s Appendix at 42). After careful review of the recor d, we hold that Parrett failed to demonstrate a causal connection b etween her- 24 -

protected activity and adverse action by the appell ees. Summary judgment on Parrett’s retaliation claims was proper

. AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court: James E. Barrett, Senior United States Circuit Judge