alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE BODY OF THE ACCOMPANYING FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          23,289
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   73,049
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,238
<INVENTORY>                                     69,938
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               173,601
<PP&E>                                         239,863
<DEPRECIATION>                                  60,870
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 423,357
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           82,771
<BONDS>                                        256,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        63,676
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,369
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   423,357
<SALES>                                        147,803
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               147,803
<CGS>                                          124,761
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  137,823
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (118)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,577
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,521
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,084
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,437
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,437
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 226 (Monday, November 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 69832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27779]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[B-83-2014]


Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) 7--Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; Notification 
of Proposed Production Activity; IPR Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Pharmaceutical Products); Can[oacute]vanas, Puerto Rico

    The Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, grantee of FTZ 7, 
submitted a notification of proposed production activity to the FTZ 
Board on behalf of IPR Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPR), located within FTZ 
7, in Can[oacute]vanas, Puerto Rico. The notification conforming to the 
requirements of the regulations of the FTZ Board (15 CFR 400.22) was 
received on November 3, 2014.
    IPR already has authority to produce certain pharmaceutical 
products, including Crestor[supreg] tablets, a treatment to lower 
cholesterol. The current request would add microcrystalline cellulose 
(input) to the scope of authority. Pursuant to 15 CFR 400.14(b), FTZ 
activity would be limited to the specific foreign-status components and 
specific finished products described in the submitted notification (as 
described below) and subsequently authorized by the FTZ Board.
    Production under FTZ procedures could exempt IPR from customs duty 
payments on the microcrystalline cellulose used in export production. 
On its domestic sales, IPR would be able to choose the duty rates 
during customs entry procedures that apply to its finished 
Crestor[supreg] and other pharmaceutical products (duty free) for the 
foreign-status input, microcrystalline cellulose (duty rate, 5.2%). 
Customs duties also could possibly be deferred or reduced on foreign 
status production equipment.
    Public comment is invited from interested parties. Submissions 
shall be addressed to the FTZ Board's Executive Secretary at the 
address below. The closing period for their receipt is January 5, 2015.
    A copy of the notification will be available for public inspection 
at the Office of the Executive Secretary, Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 
Room 21013, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20230-0002, and in the ``Reading Room'' section of the 
FTZ Board's Web site, which is accessible via www.trade.gov/ftz.
    For further information, contact Diane Finver at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b2f6dbd3dcd79cf4dbdcc4d7c0f2c6c0d3d6d79cd5ddc4"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="094d6068676c274f60677f6c7b497d7b686d6c276e667f">[email protected]</span></a> or (202) 482-1367.

    Dated: November 17, 2014.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-27779 Filed 11-21-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### W. H. Sandford *v.*R. D. Kemper.

Forcible Entry and Detainer — Possession Without Claim of Right.

The mere fact of possession of land without the claim of right will ■not make the entry of the tenant a forcible entry.

Forcible Entry and Detainer — Right to Retake Possession.

An owner of land may -take possession of premises where he has been dispossessed by a mere trespasser who sets up no claim to the land. '

APPEAL PROM OWEN’ CIRCUIT COURT.

January 21, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The mere fact of possession by Sandford, without claim of right, would not make the entry of Kemper a forcible -entry within the legal meaning of that term. A person may repossess himself of his own premises when dispossessed by a mere trespasser, who sets up no claim in himself. The third instruction asked for by appellant does not recognize this distinction and was therefore properly refused.

*376
      *Drone, for appellant.*

*Craddock, for appellee.*

The fourth instruction gives the law on this subject correctly and fully. The modification to the seventh instruction did change its meaning, and without it the instruction would have been misleading.

The evidence authorized the fourth instruction given for appellee. Kemper and Sandford were both on the premises when Burk abandoned his possession. Both of them took steps at that time to secure the possession, but neither of them became actually possessed. The one received the key to the house and put up the bars. The other repaired the fence by putting up a few rails. Both of them left shortly after Burk, and if either had possession after leaving, it was constructive and not actual. If Burk had forfeited his lease by transferring it without Kemper’s consent, there was no- one in the actual possession to whom he could give the notice required in such cases by the statute. He found the premises vacant when he subsequently entered, and if by reason of Burk’s unauthorized sale his right to the possession had ended, h-is entry was not a forcible entry. Perceiving no error in the proceeding prejudicial to appellant, the judgment of the circuit court is *affirmed.*
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4216

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a refundable credit 

of $500 to public safety volunteers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 22, 2004

Mr. VITTER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 

a refundable credit of $500 to public safety volunteers.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Volunteer First Re5 sponders Tax Relief Act of 2004’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REFUNDABLE CREDIT FOR PUBLIC SAFETY VOLUN7 TEERS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart C of part IV of sub9 chapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
2

•HR 4216 IH 

1 1986 (relating to refundable credits) is amended by insert2 ing after section 35 the following new section: 

3 ‘‘SEC. 35A. PUBLIC SAFETY VOLUNTEERS. 

4 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT.—In the case of an eli5 gible public safety volunteer, there shall be allowed as a 

6 credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the tax7 able year an amount equal to $500. 

8 ‘‘(b) ELIGIBLE PUBLIC SAFETY VOLUNTEER.—For 

9 purposes of this section, the term ‘eligible public safety 

10 volunteer’ means an individual who is a volunteer for more 

11 than half of the taxable year with a public safety organiza12 tion, including any organization of firefighters, emergency 

13 medical personnel, or other first responders to emer14 gencies.’’.

15 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

16 (1) Paragraph (2) of section 1324(b) of title 

17 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘or 

18 35A’’ after ‘‘section 35’’. 

19 (2) The table of sections for subpart C of part 

20 IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of such Code is 

21 amended by inserting after the item relating to sec22 tion 35 the following new item:

‘‘Sec. 35A. Public safety volunteers.’’.
3

•HR 4216 IH 

1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

3 December 31, 2004.

Æ
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

DEMETRIUS JOHNSON )

) Case No. 20 CV 4156

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Heather K. McShain

REYNALDO GUEVARA, et al. )

)

Defendants. ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on, August 15, 2024 at 1:45 p.m., we shall appear before 

the Honorable Judge Sara L. Ellis or any judge sitting in her stead, in Courtroom 1403 at the 

Dirksen Building, 219 S. Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois and shall present Defendant City of 

Chicago’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages copies of which is hereby attached 

and served upon you.

DATE: August 9, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Eileen E. Rosen 

Special Assistant Corporation Counsel for 

Defendant City of Chicago

Eileen E. Rosen 

Austin G. Rahe 

Catherine M. Barber 

Theresa B. Carney 

Lauren M. Ferrise

ROCK FUSCO & CONNELLY, LLC 

333 West Wacker Drive, 19th Fl.

Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 494-1000 

erosen@rfclaw.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-04156 Document #: 365 Filed: 08/09/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:52550
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−03758

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

Long Leaf Trading Group, Inc., et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, December 28, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin: Motion hearing held on

12/28/2020 regarding motion to quash [48]. For the reasons sated on the record, the

motion to quash [48] is denied without prejudice. Mailed notice. (ecw, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 52 Filed: 12/28/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:363
No. 01-15-00210-CV

IN THE

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

FRANCISCO CALLEJA-AHEDO

Appellant

V.

COMPASS BANK

Appellee

On Appeal from the 55th District Court 

Harris County, Texas. 

Trial Cause No. 2014-22168

AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION

OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Appellant Francisco Calleja-Ahedo and files this agreed motion for 

extension of time to file his Appellant’s Reply Brief and would show:

Appellant’s Reply Brief is due on November 12, 2015. Mr. O’Connor is presently 

restricted in his work and other activities and cannot complete the brief by November 12, 2015 

due to ongoing health issues. See Doctor’s letter attached hereto. In addition, Appellant’s 

ACCEPTED

01-15-00210-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

11/2/2015 11:04:12 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 11/2/2015 11:04:12 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
attorney has had to postpone trials and arbitrations, which are now reset for later in November

and require substantial time and effort. Appellant’s attorney is unable to complete Appellant’s

Brief under such circumstances, which requires dealing with numerous issues and record review.

WHERFORE, Appellant requests a thirty (30) day extension, until December 12, 2015, to

file Appellant’s Reply Brief. 

Respectfully Submitted,

O’CONNOR, CRAIG, GOULD & EVANS

By: /s/ Michael C. O’Connor_____

Michael C. O’Connor

State Bar No. 15187000

2825 Wilcrest Dr., Suite 261

Houston, TX 77042

713-266-3311

713-953-7513 (fax)

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

The undersigned certifies that he has conferenced by e-mail with Pat Huttenbach,

attorney for Appellee, who has agreed to this Motion.

 By: /s/ Michael C. O’Connor_____

Michael C. O’Connor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been

forwarded to all counsel of record by electronic service in accordance with Rule 21a on this 2

nd

day of November, 2015.

 By: /s/ Michael C. O’Connor_____

Michael C. O’Connor
#### NYE v. ROGERS

No. 203A97

Case below: 125 N.C.App. 743

Motion by plaintiffs (Nye et al) to dismiss appeal allowed 23 July 1997.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         141,309
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  121,582
<ALLOWANCES>                                    89,979
<INVENTORY>                                     37,376
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               219,414
<PP&E>                                          97,251
<DEPRECIATION>                               (780,521)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,002,924
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          379,920
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,585
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,383,071
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,002,924
<SALES>                                        290,434
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               290,434
<CGS>                                           30,209
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  208,556
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               834,227
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (782,559)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (782,559)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (782,559)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-3073EA

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

Mark Allen Johnson, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: December 10, 1997

Filed: December 17, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Mark Allen Johnson appeals the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the

district court on revocation of Johnson's supervised release. We conclude that an

extended discussion on our part is not warranted because Johnson's arguments are

foreclosed by this court's recent opinion in United States v. Thornell, No. 97-1534,

1997 WL693050, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 1997). We thus affirm Johnson's sentence.

See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
10225.

#### Williams *v.*The State.

Decided March 7, 1919.

Broyles, P. J.

1. The fact that a juror is related within' the prohibited degree to a ^witness for the State in a criminal prosecution does not render him incompetent to serve as a juror upon the trial of the case. *Athinson*v. *State,*112 *Ga.*411 (37 S. E. 747) ; *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*v. *Mead,*22 *Ga. App.*70 (95 S. E. 476); 16 R. C. L. 259, § 77.

'(a) The contention of the accused, as set forth in his motion for a new' trial, was that the witness who was related to one of the jurors was the “prosecuting witness,” and-“to all intents and purposes was in fact the prosecutor in said case.” Even if this contention were supported by the affidavits submitted, and even if the proof of this contention were sufficient in law to establish the disqualification of the juror, yet, as the evidence submitted by the movant 'was met by a counter-showing by the State, the judge was the trior of this issue, and it does not appear that he abused his discretion in resolving it in favor of the State.

2. The verdict was authorized by the evidence, and the court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodicorth and Stephens, JJ., concur.*

*519Accusation, of misdemeanor; from city court of Blackshéar— Judge Mitchell. October 26, 1918.

*James R. Thomas, W. W. Bennett,*for plaintiff in error..

*S. F. Memory, solicitor,*contra.
2016 UT App 148

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF D.D.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

J.D.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20160385-CA

Filed July 14, 2016

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Price Department

The Honorable Mary L. Manley

No. 1126964

Thomas D. Sitterud, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L. ROTH, and 

KATE A. TOOMEY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Appellant J.D. (Father) appeals the adjudication order, 

entered on May 27, 2016, which concluded that D.D. was an 

abused and neglected child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court.

¶2 The sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred 

by not allowing Father an opportunity to testify after he arrived

the end of the trial and as the court was announcing its decision. 
In re D.D.

20160385-CA 2 2016 UT App 148

The trial transcript demonstrates that neither Father nor his 

counsel requested that he be allowed to testify or otherwise 

address the court after Father’s belated arrival at the 

adjudication hearing. It is undisputed that Father had notice of 

the adjudication hearing, that he was represented by counsel at 

the hearing, and that this counsel cross-examined the State’s 

witness. Father argues before this court that because the juvenile 

court had stated earlier in the hearing that Father could 

participate if he arrived and because the court had not entered 

an order, the court erred by not “allowing [Father] an 

opportunity to present testimony.”

¶3 The argument lacks merit. After obtaining permission to 

once more check to see if Father had arrived at the courthouse, 

Father’s counsel stated, “So not having the chance for him to 

testify, I’ll make a closing based on the evidence that was 

presented today.” The juvenile court then made findings on the 

remaining issues disputed by Father and announced its decision. 

Father’s counsel then stated, “[I]f I could just for the record 

reflect that [Father] is here, he . . . showed up when the Court 

did announce and came through the door.” However, counsel 

did not request that Father then be allowed to testify. Noting 

that Father arrived “41 minutes late,” the court stated, “You can 

talk to your lawyer about what took place today, the hearing 

was set for 10:00, you had notice and you had counsel, so we 

continued.” Under the circumstances, Father has not 

demonstrated that he was denied an opportunity to participate 

in the adjudication hearing or that he made any timely request to 

testify in order to preserve the issue he seeks to raise on appeal.

¶4 Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60663 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus REAL PROPERTY AND RESIDENCE AT 1118 WOODLEA STREET, ETC., YAZOO CITY, MISSISSIPPI, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: ALL IMPROVEMENTS, STRUCTURES, BUILDINGS, FIXTURES, FURNISHINGS, GOODS, WARES, APPLIANCES, JEWELRY, GOLD, SILVER ARTIFACTS, IMPLEMENTS, MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND PROPERTY OF EVERY DESCRIPTION; APPURTENANCES SITUATED THEREON AND ALL CONTENTS THEREIN, Defendant, EDWARD HANSERD, Claimant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 5:90-CV-22 B

- - - - - - - - - - June 17, 1998 Before DAVIS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Edward Hanserd (#14178-039), a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate or set asideNo. 97-60663 -2- its default judgment of forfeiture under Rules 55(c) and 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hanserd contends that he was the true owner of the forfeited property and that he was never notified of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. This court reviews “a district court’s refusal to set aside an entry of default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) or to set aside a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) under an abuse of discretion standard.” CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc. , 979 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1992). There is no basis for concluding that the Government knew that the address to which notice was mailed was not likely to result in Hanserd receiving actual notice of the forfeiture. No abuse of discretion has been shown. The district court’s order is
AFFIRMED.