IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT 

TECHNOLOGY CO. and UNICORN 

GLOBAL, INC., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CHEAPAANZEE, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 20-cv-4806 

Judge Steven C. Seeger 

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole 

FILED UNDER SEAL 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE MOTION FOR 

ENTRY OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, INCLUDING A TEMPORARY 

INJUNCTION, A TEMPORARY ASSET RESTRAINT, AND EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

Adam Kelly 

Doug Masters 

Arthur Yuan 

321 North Clark Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60654 

(312) 464-3100 

Christopher G. Binns 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

345 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10154 

(212) 407-4000 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................3

I. PLAINTIFFS’ BUSINESS, HOVERBOARD PRODUCTS, AND 

DESIGN PATENTS ................................................................................................3

II. DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES ........................................................5

III. DEFENDANTS HAVE CAUSED AND WILL CONTINUE TO 

CAUSE PLAINTIFFS IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT AN EX 

PARTE TRO .............................................................................................................6

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7

I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE SATISFIED GROUNDS FOR AN EX PARTE 

TRO..........................................................................................................................8

A. Plaintiffs Will Likely Succeed on the Merits of Design Patent 

Infringement .................................................................................................9

B. Plaintiffs Have No Adequate Remedy at Law to Compensate for 

Defendants’ Infringing Activities, and Has Suffered and Will 

Continue to Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of a TRO ................10

C. The Balance of Equities Favors Granting Plaintiffs an Ex Parte

TRO............................................................................................................12

D. An Ex Parte TRO Will Serve Public Interest ............................................13

II. THE EQUITABLE RELIEF SOUGHT IS APPROPRIATE ................................14

A. An Ex Parte TRO Enjoining Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct is 

Appropriate ................................................................................................14

B. Restraining Defendants’ Assets to Prevent Fraudulent Transfer 

of Assets is Appropriate .............................................................................15

C. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Expedited Discovery...........................................16

III. A MINIMAL BOND SHOULD SECURE THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

................................................................................................................................16

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 

971 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................9, 12 

Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Ltd., 

No. 12-CV-0053, 2012 WL 760692 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2012) ..................................................11 

Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 

256 F. App’x 707 (5th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................15 

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 

735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................11 

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 

809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................13, 14 

Bell & Howell Doc. Mgmt Products Co. v. Altek Systems, 

132 F.3d 701 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................10 

Bushnell, Inc. v. Brunton Co., 

673 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Kan. 2009) ......................................................................................12 

Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 

664 F.3d 922 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................................8, 12, 13

Christian Dior Couture, S.A. v. Lei Liu, et al., 

No. 15-CV-6324, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158225 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) ...........................8 

Cobraco Manufacturing Co. v. Valley View Specialties Co., 

No. 90-CV-0284, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10958 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1990) .............................13 

Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Jasso, 

927 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ............................................................................................7 

Competitive Edge, Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 

763 F. Supp. 2d 997 (N.D. Ill 2010) ..........................................................................................9 

Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’n, 

No. 13-CV-2167, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47248 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2013) ............................12 

Deckers Outdoor Corporation v. The Partnerships, et al., 

No. 15-CV-3249 (N.D. Ill. April 4, 2015) (unpublished) ........................................................17 

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Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 

543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................10

Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 

420 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................9 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc., v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 

415 U.S. 423 (1974) ...................................................................................................................8 

Lorillard Tobacco Co v. Montrose Wholesale Candies, 

No. 03-CV-4844, 2005 WL 3115892 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2005) ...............................................16 

Nat’l Presto Indus. Inc. v. Dazey Corp., 

18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1990) .......................................................................................14 

Nike Inc. v. Fujian Bestwinn Industry Co., Ltd., 

166 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Nev. 2016) ................................................................................12, 15 

Otter Prods. v. Anke Group Indus. Ltd., 

13-CV-00029, 2013 WL 5910882 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2013).................................................12, 13 

Park v. O-Sung & Co., 

No. 97-CV-0924, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10967 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1997) .............................10 

PCT Int’l Inc. v. Holland Elecs. LLC, 

No. 12-CV-01797, 2015 WL 5210628 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 4373941 

(Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2016) .........................................................................................................11 

Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 

300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................10 

Railway Co. v. Terminal Railroad Assoc. of St. Louis, 

35 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................11 

Rathmann Grp. v. Tanenbaum, 

889 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................16 

Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 

659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................11 

Scholle Corp. v. Rapak LLC, 

35 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2014) .......................................................................................15

Tuf-Tite, Inc. v. Fed. Package Networks, Inc., 

No. 14-CV-2060, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163352 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ........................................15 

Ty, Inc. v. The Jones Group, Inc., 

237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................................8, 9, 12 

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Vance v. Rumsfeld, 

No. 06-CV-06964, 2007 WL 4557812 (N.D. Ill Dec. 21, 2007) .............................................16 

Statutes 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ..............................................................................................................................8 

28 U.S.C. § 1338 ..............................................................................................................................8 

28 U.S.C. § 1391 ..............................................................................................................................8 

35 U.S.C. § 1 ....................................................................................................................................8 

35 U.S.C. § 171 ..........................................................................................................................9, 13 

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ...........................................................................................................................9 

35 U.S.C. § 282 ......................................................................................................................1, 9, 13 

35 U.S.C. § 283 ..............................................................................................................................14 

35 U.S.C. § 289 ..............................................................................................................................15 

Other Authorities 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)..................................................................................................................16 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) ........................................................................................................................7 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) ......................................................................................................................16 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ......................................................................................................................16 

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Plaintiffs Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology Co. (“Chic”) and Unicorn Global, Inc. 

(“Unicorn”) submit this Memorandum of Law in support of its ex parte Motion for entry of a 

Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), including a temporary injunction, a temporary asset 

restraint, and expedited discovery against Defendants. 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs are playing a virtual game of Whack-A-Mole. But unlike the arcade version of 

Whack-A-Mole where the player possesses one hammer to use against ten known moles for only 

30 seconds, this virtual version includes anonymous moles or Defendants who pop up with one 

identity to sell infringing products, and then after being whacked, will reemerge with a different 

identity and continue their infringement until another whack. The Plaintiffs cannot possibly 

possess enough hammers to stop this unfortunate cycle and ask this Court to turn off this game. 

Plaintiff Chic owns U.S. Design Patent Nos. D737,723 (“the ’D723 patent”), D738,256 

(“the ’D256 patent”), D785,112 (“the ’D112 patent”), and D784,195 (“the ’D195 patent”) 

(collectively, “Patents-in-Suit” or “Plaintiffs’ Designs”). Chic utilizes the Patents-in-Suit when 

designing, manufacturing, and selling its hoverboards under the SISIGAD and FLYING-ANT 

name brands (“Plaintiffs’ Products”). Plaintiff Unicorn is the exclusive U.S. distributor of 

Plaintiffs’ Products. Defendants are foreign-based entities who operate anonymous online ecommerce stores (“Defendant Internet Stores”) and sell unauthorized products that infringe the 

Patents-in-Suit (“Infringing Products”). 

This Court should grant an ex parte TRO for several reasons. First, the Patents-in-Suit are 

presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282, and as explained below, Plaintiffs have submitted 

substantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of design patent infringement and thus have 

demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the merits. Second, Defendants’ infringing 

conduct is causing the Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. Such conduct is eroding Plaintiffs’ 

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control of their patents rights, damaging their reputation and goodwill, diminishing their market 

share, and causing customer confusion. Simply put, monetary damages will be inadequate to 

compensate Plaintiffs for Defendants’ infringement. 

Third, the equities weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have invested millions of dollars 

to develop novel designs and secure design patent protection. Yet the Defendants are unlawfully 

taking advantage of that investment to Plaintiffs’ detriment. By comparison, Defendants are 

entitled to little consideration as willful infringers and whatever harm may befall upon them under 

an ex parte TRO would be the result of their own infringement. And an ex parte TRO will serve 

the public by furthering the long-held public policy of favoring the protection of patent rights. 

Plus, an ex parte TRO will provide incentive for other inventors and innovators to continue 

developing new products without fear of the inability to enforce their patents. 

Fourth, the requested scope of ex parte relief is appropriate. Because Defendants operate 

anonymously in order to evade enforcement actions and will often transfer assets outside of this 

Court’s reach, an order restraining Defendants’ assets is warranted. Unless Defendants’ assets are 

frozen, Plaintiffs will be unable to properly account for or receive a monetary award. Additionally, 

to further Plaintiffs’ request for relief of a proper accounting, Plaintiffs should be awarded 

expedited discovery in order to ascertain Defendants’ banking and payment systems. Absent 

expedited discovery, freezing Defendants’ assets will do little to make Plaintiffs whole when 

enforcing their lawfully issued patents. 

Accordingly, in order to turn off this virtual game of Whack-A-Mole, this Court should 

issue an ex parte TRO to enjoin Defendants from infringing the Patents-in-Suit and grant the 

additionally requested equitable relief. 

 

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STATEMENT OF FACTS 

I. PLAINTIFFS’ BUSINESS, HOVERBOARD PRODUCTS, AND DESIGN 

PATENTS 

Chic is a high-tech company that manufactures and licenses hoverboard products for sale 

in the United States. Chic is supported by Zhejiang University Ministry of Education Computer 

Aided Product Innovation Design Engineering Center, the Zhejiang University International 

Design, and Zhejiang Key Laboratory of Service Robot. See Declaration of Jaiwei Ying, dated 

August 14, 2020 (“Ying Declaration”) ¶ 2. Chic is located in the Liangzhu University Science and 

Technology Park, Yuhang District, Hangzhou, China. See id. ¶ 3. Chic is ranked as a Top 100 

Most Technologically Advanced Enterprises and a Top Ten Industrial Design Center in Zhejiang 

Province. See id. Chic-designed hoverboard products are highly successful within the United 

States, and have been featured in Justin Bieber music videos and in NBA contests. See id. ¶ 4. 

Chic has invested heavily in its hoverboard technology. Specifically, Chic has spent 

several million dollars in research and development of hoverboard products. See id. ¶ 4. 

Intellectual property protection is vital to the success of Chic’s business operations. Chic has been 

assigned approximately 400 granted patents for its hoverboard technologies and designs in various 

countries such as China, the United States, the European Union, and Canada. See id. ¶ 5. The 

Patents-in-Suit claim and illustrate ornamental features of hoverboards. See id. ¶ 6. 

The ’D723 patent and the ’D256 patent are entitled “Self-Balancing Vehicle,” and were 

issued on September 1, 2015 and September 8, 2015, respectively. See id. ¶¶ 7-8. The ’D195 

patent and the ’D112 patent are entitled “Human-Machine Interaction Vehicle,” and were issued 

on April 18, 2017 and April 25, 2017, respectively. See id. ¶¶ 9-10. Jiawei Ying is the named 

inventor of the Patents-in-Suit, and he has assigned all rights, title, and interest to the patents to 

Chic. See id. ¶ 6. Chic has licensed certain rights to the Patents-in-Suit to Unicorn, including the 

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right to enforce. See id. ¶ 7-10; see also Declaration of Jinyuan Lei, dated August 14, 2020, (“Lei 

Declaration”), ¶ 5. Plaintiffs utilize the Patents-in-Suit when designing, manufacturing, and selling 

Plaintiffs’ Products. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 21. 

The Patents-in-Suit have revolutionized hoverboard ornamental design that features a 

central support platform. See Ying Decl. ¶ 11. Specifically, the ’D723 patent and the ’D256 patent 

have defined the fundamental ornamental configurations of the hoverboard product class. See id. 

The ’D112 patent features a soft edge between the central support platform and the fenders, and 

the ’D195 patent features a sharper edge. Both designs have streamline shapes that appeal to 

United States customers. See id. The ’D112 patent features a soft edge between the central support 

platform and the fenders, and the ’D195 patent features a sharper edge. See id.

Chic’s investment in the Patents-in-Suit, among its other patents, have made Chic a global 

leader in the hoverboard industry. Sales of Chic-designed or licensed hoverboard products have 

exceeded over about 50 million dollars in the past few years. Unicorn sells, through affiliates and 

licenses, various hoverboard models under the FLYING-ANT brand name, among others, which 

are licensed from Chic. See Lei Decl. ¶ 4. For example, Unicorn sold at least approximately 

100,000 units on Amazon.com in 2019 for an average sales price of $110.00 per unit, generating 

approximately $11 million in 2019. See id. ¶ 6. Based on these figures, Plaintiffs have projected 

a 20% growth per year over the next two years. See id. Also Plaintiffs’ Products have earned high 

reviews and industry praise. For example, the FLYING-ANT Hoverboard, and the Hoverboard 

for Kids & Adults have maintained a 4.3 out of 5 review with at least 369 reviews at the time of 

this motion. See id. ¶ 4. 

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Although Plaintiffs’ Products have been successful, that success has been substantially 

hindered by other unauthorized sellers who have copied Plaintiffs’ Designs, including but not 

limited to the Defendants in this case. 

II. DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES 

Although the Defendants lack a license to the Patents-in-Suit, see Ying Decl. ¶ 13, each 

are making, using, offering for sale, selling, and/or importing into the United States for subsequent 

sale or use the Infringing Products. See Lei Decl. ¶ 6-7. Defendants offer to sell and/or sell the 

Infringing Products to residents of the United States, including Illinois residents, through 

Defendant Internet Stores. See id. ¶ 12, Ex. 5. Although Plaintiffs sold approximately 100,00 

hoverboards in 2019, infringers such as Defendants sold a far greater number of units—units that 

unlawfully featured Plaintiffs’ Designs. See id. ¶ 8. For example, in the first six months of 2020, 

infringers shipped more than 100,000 “hoverboard” or “self-balancing vehicle” units that feature 

Plaintiffs’ Designs, severely impacting Plaintiffs’ 20% growth projections. See id. Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct has effectively forced the Plaintiffs to compete against its own (unauthorized) 

patented designs. 

Defendants actively conceal their identities and use multiple fictitious names and addresses 

to register and operate their network of Defendant Internet Stores. See id. ¶ 10. Defendants 

regularly create new online marketplace accounts on various platforms (e.g., Amazon.com, 

eBay.com, Walmart.com, etc.) under unknown fictitious names and addresses. See id. ¶ 11. These 

tactics are commonly used by Defendants to conceal their identities and the full scope and 

interworking of their operation, so as to avoid being shut down. See id. 

Despite operating under multiple fictitious names, there are similarities among the 

Defendant Internet Stores. Specifically, Defendant Internet Stores maintain similar accepted 

payment methods, check-out methods, metadata, illegitimate search engine optimization tactics, 

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lack of contact information, identically or similarly priced items and volume sales discounts, the 

same incorrect grammar and misspellings, and similar hosting services. See id. ¶ 14. 

To evade enforcement efforts Defendants will often register new online accounts under 

new seller aliases once they receive notice of a lawsuit. See id. ¶ 11. Infringers such as Defendants 

will also typically ship products in small quantities via international mail to minimize detection by 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. See id. ¶ 7. They further operate multiple credit card 

merchant accounts and PayPal accounts behind layers of payment gateways in order to continue 

operation in spite of enforcement efforts. See id. ¶ 15. Defendants often maintain offshore bank 

accounts and regularly transfer funds from their PayPal accounts (or other financial accounts) to 

off-shore bank accounts outside this Court’s jurisdiction. See id. 

III. DEFENDANTS HAVE CAUSED AND WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE 

PLAINTIFFS IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT AN EX PARTE TRO 

Because of the unique and imminent nature of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs 

have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm without an injunction from this Court. 

Defendants’ unlawful conduct prevents Plaintiffs from exercising control of its rights to patented 

designs and fully exploiting these designs and associated proprietary technologies. See Lei Decl. 

¶¶ 16 and 18. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has also damaged Plaintiffs reputation and goodwill. 

See id. Furthermore, Defendants’ conduct has damaged Plaintiffs’ consumer brand confidence, 

which can result in a loss of future sales and market share. See id. 

Additionally, Defendants’ unlawful conduct is causing a loss of pricing power, thereby 

diminishing Plaintiffs’ investment in the Patents-in-Suit by forcing Unicorn to engage in a pricing 

war against infringers who are impermissibly utilizing Plaintiffs’ Designs in the Infringing 

Products. See id. ¶ 17. Defendants have flooded the marketplace with inferior products that tarnish 

Plaintiffs’ goodwill and causes confusion amongst consumers, damaging consumer confidence in 

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Plaintiffs’ Designs. See id. Defendants’ inferior products are manufactured with faulty parts and 

endanger consumer, exposing the entire hoverboard industry to the risk of collapsing due to safety 

issues. See id. 

Monetary damages will not adequately compensate Plaintiffs for Defendants ongoing 

infringement. See id. ¶ 16. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately calculate the damage 

caused by Defendants’ conduct, because Plaintiffs have lost control over its rights in patented 

designs, experienced a diminished reputation and goodwill, loss pricing power, diminished market 

share, and Plaintiffs inability to exploit its patented designs. See id. The extent of harm to 

Plaintiffs’ reputation and goodwill and possible diversion of customers because of a loss in brand 

confidence is unquantifiable. See id. ¶ 17. Such loss of quality control and the damage cause to 

Plaintiffs’ reputation is neither calculable nor precisely compensable. 

Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm and will continue to do so absent a TRO from this 

Court enjoining Defendants from further unlawful conduct. 

ARGUMENT 

This Court is empowered to issue an ex parte TRO where immediate and irreparable injury, 

loss, or damages will result to the movant before the adverse party may be heard in opposition. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Here Defendants’ willfully infringing conduct is causing and will 

continue to cause irreparable harm to Plaintiffs and thus an ex parte TRO is warranted. 

Absent the requested TRO, Defendants will likely register new e-commerce stores under 

new aliases, and move any assets to off-shore bank accounts outside the jurisdiction of this Court, 

see Ying Decl. ¶ 15, trapping Plaintiffs in a virtual Whack-A-Mole. Courts have recognized that 

civil actions against foreign, online infringers present special challenges that justify proceeding on 

an ex parte basis. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Jasso, 927 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 

1996) (observing that “proceedings against those who deliberately traffic in infringing 

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merchandise are often useless if notice is given to the infringers”). An ex parte order preserves 

the status quo and prevents irreparable harm. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc., v. Brotherhood of 

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 

An ex parte TRO is appropriate where, like the case here, the necessary subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction requirements are satisfied. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claims in this action under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a)-

(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This Court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants directly target business activities toward 

consumers in the United States, including Illinois, through Defendant Internet Stores. Specifically, 

Defendants are soliciting Illinois residents by operating one or more e-commerce stores through 

which Illinois residents can purchase products featuring the Patents-in-Suit. See, e.g., Christian 

Dior Couture, S.A. v. Lei Liu, et al., No. 15-CV-6324, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158225, at *6 (N.D. 

Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) (finding personal jurisdiction was proper over defendant offering to sell alleged 

infringing product to United States residents, including Illinois, despite no actual sale); Declaration 

of Arthur Tan-Chi Yuan, dated August 18, 2020 (“Yuan Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-4. And the Defendants are 

committing tortious acts in Illinois, are engaging in interstate commerce, and have wrongfully 

caused Plaintiffs substantial injury in this state. 

I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE SATISFIED GROUNDS FOR AN EX PARTE TRO 

To obtain a temporary restraining order Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits; (2) that no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3) that it will suffer 

irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. See Ty, Inc. v. The Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 

891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001); Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). Once these three conditions are satisfied, this Court should then consider the harm that the 

Defendants will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing such harm against the irreparable 

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harm the Plaintiffs will suffer if relief is denied. Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 895. Finally, the Court 

should consider the potential effect on the public interest (non-parties) in denying or granting the 

TRO. Id. Weighing all of these factors and “sitting as would a chancellor in equity,” this Court 

should decide whether to grant the TRO. Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 

F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992)). 

A. Plaintiffs Will Likely Succeed on the Merits of Design Patent Infringement 

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their patent infringement claim. The Patent 

Act provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 

invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during 

the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). To determine whether a 

violation of § 271(a) has occurred, this Court should (1) “construe the asserted claim[s]” and then 

(2) “determine whether the accused product [] contains each limitation of the properly construed 

claims, either literally or by a substantial equivalent.” Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 

420 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005). All issued U.S. patents are afforded a statutory 

presumption of validity including the Patents-in-Suit. See 35. U.S.C. §§ 171, 282. 

Chic is the lawful owner of the Patents-in-Suit and Unicorn is the lawful assignee. See

Ying Decl. ¶ 7-10; Lei Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs have submitted extensive evidence that Defendants 

make, use, offer for sale, sell, and/or import into the United States for subsequent sale or use 

products that directly and/or indirectly infringe the ornamental designs embodied in the Patentsin-Suit. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2, Schedule A, Exhibit 1; see also Yuan Decl. ¶¶ 2-4. The evidentiary 

record shows that an ordinary observer would be deceived into thinking that the Infringing 

Products would the same as Plaintiffs’ Products. Ying Decl. ¶ 17 (explaining that Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct “will continue to cause consumer confusion, which weakens [Plaintiffs’] brand 

recognition and reputation”); see also Competitive Edge, Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 997, 

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1011 (N.D. Ill 2010) (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). Defendants possess no license to the Patents-in-Suit and are not authorized retailers of 

Plaintiffs’ Products. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of design patent infringement 

for the Patents-in-Suit, and thus have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 

B. Plaintiffs Have No Adequate Remedy at Law to Compensate for Defendants’ 

Infringing Activities, and Has Suffered and Will Continue to Suffer 

Irreparable Harm in the Absence of a TRO 

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and will continue to be irreparably harmed 

absent a TRO. Because the Plaintiffs possess valid patents and have established patent 

infringement, this Court may presume irreparable harm. See Bell & Howell Doc. Mgmt Products 

Co. v. Altek Systems, 132 F.3d 701, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In matters involving patent rights, 

irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear showing has been made of patent validity and 

infringement.”). “Harm is irreparable if it cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final 

judgment after trial.” Park v. O-Sung & Co., No. 97-CV-0924, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10967, at 

*11-12 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1997). 

Even beyond the presumption, Plaintiffs have presented overwhelming evidence of 

irreparable harm. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer the loss of their exclusive 

patent rights, loss of market share that Plaintiffs may never be able to recover, immeasurable 

damage to Plaintiffs’ goodwill and reputation as the creator and authorized provider of the 

Plaintiffs’ Products. See Lei Decl. ¶¶ 16-18. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately calculate 

damages from Plaintiffs’ loss control over its design patent rights, loss of pricing power, 

diminished market share, and inability to exploit their patented designs. See id. The extent of 

harm to Plaintiffs’ reputation and goodwill and possible diversion of customers due to a loss in 

brand confidence is unquantifiable. See id. Such collective harms are irreparable. See Promatek 

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Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that damage to goodwill 

was irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy at law exists); see also Railway Co. v. 

Terminal Railroad Assoc. of St. Louis, 35 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[S]howing injury to 

goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money 

damages.”). 

A causal nexus exists between Defendants’ infringement and the irreparable harm Plaintiffs 

are suffering. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

Defendants’ infringing use of Plaintiffs’ Designs in the Infringing Products is a substantial, if not 

the exclusive, reason for consumer demand of the Infringing Products. See, e.g., Lei Decl. ¶ 8 

(explaining that within the first six months of 2020, Defendants have sold 40% more hoverboard 

units than Plaintiffs sold in the entirety of 2019); see also PCT Int’l Inc. v. Holland Elecs. LLC, 

No. 12-CV-01797, 2015 WL 5210628, at *23-24 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 4373941 

(Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2016) (“The Federal Circuit has explained that when the products at issue are 

“relatively simple” with a small number of features, the causal nexus requirement is easier to 

satisfy because the infringing feature has a large impact on demand for the products”). 

A monetary judgment will be difficult to collect here because Defendants are foreign 

entities who hide their true identities, further justifying the requested injunctive relief. See Robert 

Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that collection of 

monetary damages would be difficult because defendants were foreign corporations). In similar 

cases involving foreign infringers other district courts have found that money damages were 

insufficient. See, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Ltd., No. 12-CV-0053, 2012 WL 760692, at 

*5 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2012) (“[A] finding of irreparable harm was not clearly erroneous because it 

also found that since AE Tech is a foreign corporation, money damages would be insufficient.”); 

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Otter Prods. v. Anke Group Indus. Ltd., 13-CV-00029, 2013 WL 5910882, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 

2013) (“[B]ecause Anke has no presence in the United States, it may be difficult or impossible for 

Otterbox to enforce a monetary judgement against Anke”); Bushnell, Inc. v. Brunton Co., 673 

F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1263 (D. Kan. 2009) (granting preliminary injunction; “the prospect of 

collecting money damages from a foreign defendant with few to no assets in the United States tips 

in favor of a finding of irreparable harm”); Nike Inc. v. Fujian Bestwinn Industry Co., Ltd., 166 

F. Supp. 3d, 1177, 1179 (D. Nev. 2016) (“[B]ecause Bestwinn has no presence in the United States, 

it may be difficult or impossible for NIKE to recover a money judgement against Bestwinn.”). 

Because Plaintiffs are afforded a presumption of irreparable harm, have presented 

substantial evidence of the same, and face substantial difficulties of recovering any monetary 

judgment from these foreign Defendants, an ex parte TRO is appropriate. See Celsis, 664 F.3d at 

930 (holding that “[p]rice erosion, loss of goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business 

opportunities” constitute irreparable harm). 

C. The Balance of Equities Favors Granting Plaintiffs an Ex Parte TRO 

The Plaintiffs have demonstrated (1) a prima facie case of design patent infringement, (2) 

irreparable harm, and (3) a causal nexus between the Defendants’ infringement and Plaintiffs’ 

irreparable harm. Now this Court should weigh the equitable considerations of the parties’ 

competing interests. See Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 895; see also Abbott Labs, 971 F.2d at 6, 11. When 

weighing the equities, this Court should apply “a sliding scale approach: the more likely the 

plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he 

is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor.” Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. P’ships & 

Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 13-CV-2167, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47248, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 

2013) (quoting Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of America 

Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008)). Properly weighed, the equities favor entering a TRO. 

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Beginning with the Plaintiffs, the Patents-in-Suit are valid and infringed, see supra, Section 

I(A), and the Plaintiffs will likely succeed on the merits. See 35. U.S.C. §§ 171, 282. Plaintiffs 

also have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, see supra, Section I(B), and are 

unlikely able to recover monetary damages by virtue of Defendants’ status as foreign entities. See 

Otter Prods., 2013 WL 5910882, at *2 (holding that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury 

through the loss of control of intellectual property rights, loss of consumer goodwill, and ability to 

exploit trademark and design patents). Absent a TRO, Plaintiffs will be unable to justify the 

millions of dollars invested to develop the Patents-in-Suit, and will continued to experience the 

Defendants taking advantage of such investments to Plaintiffs’ detriment. Therefore, before even 

assessing the Defendants’ equities, if there are any, the sliding scale favors Plaintiffs. 

But the Defendants possess scant equity in their favor because as willful infringers, this 

Court should afford little equitable consideration due to any harm caused by a TRO. Such harm 

would be self-inflicted. Defendants willfully chose to walk an infringing path and courts have 

refused to assign “harm” to defendants who assume such a risk. See Celsis, 664 F.3d at 931 (“[T]he 

preliminary record suggests that [the defendant’s] losses were the result of its own calculated risk 

in selling a product with knowledge of [the plaintiff’s] patent.”). 

Accordingly, the equities heavily favor Plaintiffs. 

D. An Ex Parte TRO Will Serve Public Interest 

This Court should also consider the public interest, which when considered here, the public 

interest will be served by an ex parte TRO. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). Public policy favors protection of rights secured by valid patents. See Cobraco 

Manufacturing Co. v. Valley View Specialties Co., No. 90-CV-0284, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

10958, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1990). “[T]he public interest nearly always weighs in favor of 

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protecting property rights in the absence of countervailing factors, especially when the patentee 

practices his invention.” Apple Inc., 809 F. 3d at 647. 

Issuing an ex parte TRO will provide incentives for inventors and innovators to continue 

to develop new products and patenting inventions without fear of the inability to enforce the 

patents and stop infringers. Additionally, the public will not be harmed, as there are other 

hoverboard products on the market that do not infringe on the Patents-in-Suit, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 

Products. See Nat’l Presto Indus. Inc. v. Dazey Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 

(ruling that if an injunction makes the defendant’s products unavailable, the public has other 

products to purchase, including the plaintiff’s products); see also Apple Inc., 809 F.3d at 647 (“This 

is not a case where the public would be deprived of Samsung’s products. Apple does not seek to 

enjoin the sale of lifesaving drugs, but to prevent Samsung from profiting from the unauthorized 

use of infringing features in its cellphones and tablets.”). 

Accordingly, the public interest favors granting an ex parte TRO. 

II. THE EQUITABLE RELIEF SOUGHT IS APPROPRIATE 

The Patent Act authorizes courts to issue injunctive relief “in accordance with the 

principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the 

court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283. This Court has the power to not only stop the foreign 

Defendants’ infringing activities, but also award additional reasonable relief to ensure their 

compliance with this Court. 

A. An Ex Parte TRO Enjoining Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct is Appropriate 

When considering the current global economy where infringers can operate anonymously 

over the internet, Plaintiffs’ request for an ex parte TRO is appropriate. Plaintiffs have submitted 

substantial evidence that Defendants are making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing 

Infringing Products into the United States. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2, Schedule A, Exhibit 1. Thus, 

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enjoining Defendants from further unlawful conduct is warranted. Such relief is necessary to stop 

the ongoing harm to Plaintiffs’ control over their rights to Plaintiffs’ Designs, its reputation and 

goodwill, and the harm to unknowing consumers who purchase the Infringing Products—ones that 

fail to meet the quality standards associated with Plaintiffs’ Products. An ex parte TRO is 

warranted because Plaintiffs are unaware of the true identities or locations of the Defendants, as 

well as other Defendant Internet Stores selling Infringing Products. Courts have repeatedly 

authorized immediate injunctive relief in similar cases involving the sale of infringing products. 

See, e.g., Tuf-Tite, Inc. v. Fed. Package Networks, Inc., No. 14-CV-2060, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

163352, at *29 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Scholle Corp. v. Rapak LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 

2014); Nike, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1178-79. 

B. Restraining Defendants’ Assets to Prevent Fraudulent Transfer of Assets is 

Appropriate 

This Court has the inherent equitable authority to issue prejudgment asset restraints. See 

Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 256 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, an ex 

parte restraint of Defendants’ assets is needed to ensure an equitable accounting of Defendants’ 

profits and sales of Infringing Products. As stated previously, Defendants use anonymous seller 

aliases to evade detection and transfer assets to financial institutions outside of this Court’s 

jurisdiction upon notice of a lawsuit. See Lei Decl. ¶ 11. And Defendants will hold most of their 

assets outside of the United States making it easy to hide or dispose of assets. An ex parte restraint 

should account for these circumstances and ensure Defendants’ compliance. 

Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover “the extent of [Defendants’] total profit.” See 35 

U.S.C. § 289. In order to ascertain such profits Plaintiffs seek an accounting and payment from 

Defendants of all profits realized by Defendants from Defendants’ unlawful conduct. See Am. 

Compl. ¶ 17. This Court has awarded that same relief and froze assets to preserve the potential 

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profits. See Lorillard Tobacco Co v. Montrose Wholesale Candies, No. 03-CV-4844, 2005 WL 

3115892, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2005) (holding that because plaintiffs requested relief was 

equitable—disgorgement of profits—the court froze defendant’s assets). 

Unless Defendants’ assets are frozen, Defendants will likely hide or move their ill-gotten 

gains to offshore bank accounts. Accordingly, a reasonable asset restraint to facilitate a proper 

accounting and monetary award from Defendants is warranted. 

C. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Expedited Discovery 

Expedited discovery is necessary to discover Defendants’ banking and payment system 

accounts. Defendants may be using third-party payment processors such as PayPal to maintain 

anonymity by interposing a third-party between the unknowing consumer and Defendants. Courts 

have broad power to permit discovery in order to reveal the identification of unknown defendants. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and 65(d)(2)(C); see also Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-06964, 2007 

WL 4557812, at *6 (N.D. Ill Dec. 21, 2007) (“[F]ederal courts have the power to order, at their 

discretion, the discovery of facts necessary to ascertain their competency to entertain the merits.”). 

The expedited discovery requested here is limited to include only what is essential to prevent 

further irreparable harm. Discovery of these financial accounts is necessary to both freeze the 

accounts and to ensure compliance with this Court. But without the requested expedited discovery, 

an asset restraint and seizure will have little effect. Accordingly, expedited discovery is warranted. 

III. A MINIMAL BOND SHOULD SECURE THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 

A minimal bond of no more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) is sufficient to support the 

issuance of an ex parte TRO. Requiring a security upon issuance of a TRO is within the sound 

discretion of this Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); see also Rathmann Grp. v. Tanenbaum, 889 

F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs have submitted substantial evidence demonstrating 

Defendants’ blatant infringement and thus a minimal bond is sufficient. See, e.g., Deckers Outdoor 

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Corporation v. The Partnerships, et al., No. 15-CV-3249 (N.D. Ill. April 4, 2015) (unpublished) 

(establishing $10,000 bond for a TRO enjoining foreign infringers).

CONCLUSION 

The Plaintiffs have provided substantial evidence to demonstrate the necessary 

requirements for this Court to grant the requested ex parte TRO. Absent such relief Defendants 

will continue infringing the Patents-in-Suit and causing irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, in 

contravention of the public’s interest in enforcing valid design patents. Accordingly, this Court 

should enter an ex parte TRO and shut off the Defendants’ virtual game of Whack-A-Mole. 

Date: August 18, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

By: /s/ Adam Kelly 

Adam Kelly 

Doug Masters 

Arthur Yuan 

321 North Clark Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60654 

Tel.: (312) 464-3100 

Fax: (312) 464-3111 

Email: akelly@loeb.com 

Email: dmasters@loeb.com

Email: ayaun@loeb.com

Christopher Binns (admitted pro hac vice) 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

345 Park Avenue 

New York, New York 10154 

Tel.: (212) 407-4000 

Fax: (212) 407-4990 

Email: cbinns@loeb.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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