UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JASON V.,

1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security,

2

Defendant.

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Case No. 1:20-CV-04992

Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

MEMDORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jason V. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for 

disability insurance benefits. Jason, through counsel, moves for summary judgment seeking reversal 

of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. The Commissioner responded with a motion 

for summary judgment in support of affirming the ALJ’s decision. For the following reasons, the 

Court denies Jason’s motion [35], grants the Commissioner’s motion [43], and affirms the ruling of 

the ALJ.

Background

Jason filed an application for benefits on January 19, 2016, alleging a disability onset date of 

January 2, 2011. His application was denied initially on April 28, 2016, and denied upon

reconsideration on July 22, 2016. Jason then requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on 

January 18, 2018. On April 4, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Jason’s application. The 

1 Northern District of Illinois Internal Operating Procedure 22 prohibits listing the full name of the Social 

Security applicant in an opinion. Therefore, the Court refers to the plaintiff by his first name and the first initial 

of his last name, or only by his first name. 2 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. She is automatically 

substituted as the named defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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Appeals Council then declined review, leaving the ALJ’s April 2018 decision as the Commissioner’s

final decision reviewable by this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Judicial Standard of Review

Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in 

reaching her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Surprise v. Saul, 968 F.3d 658, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation 

omitted). An ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence but must “build a logical bridge from 

evidence to conclusion.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

“Even if the court agrees with the ultimate result, the case must be remanded if the ALJ fails in his 

or her obligation to build that logical bridge.” Sheila W. v. Saul, 395 F. Supp. 3d 974, 978 (N.D. Ill. 

2019) (Cole, J.) (citation omitted). Though a federal court’s review of an ALJ’s decision is 

deferential, and courts do not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for that of the ALJ, 

the ALJ’s decision will be remanded if it lacks sufficient evidentiary support, an adequate discussion 

of the issues, or is undermined by legal error. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th 

Cir. 2003). But federal courts do not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for that of 

the ALJ. Poole v. Kijakazi, 28 F.4th 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2022).

Disability Determination Standard

A person is disabled under the Social Security Act if he is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security 

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Administration has set forth a five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether an individual 

is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a); 416.920(a). The evaluation considers whether the claimant

(1) has engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims disability; (2) has 

a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) has an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) can perform his past relevant work; and (5) is capable of 

performing any work in the national economy. Id.

ALJ’s Disability Determination

The ALJ analyzed Jason’s claim in accordance with the Social Security Administration’s fivestep sequential evaluation process. The ALJ found at step one that Jason had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since January 2, 2015. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Jason had the 

severe impairment of anxiety disorder (“GAD”).

3

 At step three, the ALJ determined that Jason did 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity 

of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. However, the ALJ found that

Jason’s impairment caused moderate limitations in (1) understanding, remembering, or applying 

information; (2) interacting with others; and (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The 

ALJ also found that Jason had a mild limitation in adapting or managing himself.

The ALJ then determined that Jason had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: 

“[Jason] can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and make simple work-related 

3 The ALJ also noted that: (1) Jason has hypertension, which the ALJ found to be non-severe; and (2) Jason 

has alleged non-medically determinable impairments including major depressive disorder, IBS, lumbar and 

cervical spine herniations, tinnitus, and angina. (Dkt. 27-1, at 47–48.)

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decisions.” (Dkt. 27-1, at 49.) The ALJ additionally found that Jason “can tolerate occasional 

changes in a routine work setting, occasional interactions with supervisors and co-workers, and no 

interaction with the general public.” (Id., at 48.) The ALJ went on to summarize Jason’s allegations 

and found that his “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 

alleged symptoms, but that [Jason’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

in the record for reasons explained in this decision.” (Id., at 51.) The ALJ noted that Jason had 

several hospital visits and medication checks where Jason was “feeling ok” and his “anxiety was 

stable.” (Id., at 50–51.) The ALJ said that, despite Jason’s multiple visits to Mercy Hospital for 

anxiety-related complaints, the records show his mental status examinations during these visits 

“were largely normal.” (Id., at 51.) 

The ALJ also considered a two-page letter detailing some of Jason’s treatment and 

medication history provided by Lorene Cameron, a Qualified Mental Health Professional at The 

Link and Option Center, Inc. (Id., at 711.). However, the ALJ did not give Cameron’s decision any 

controlling weight because the ALJ did not find Cameron to be an acceptable medical source.

4 (Id.

at 51.) The ALJ further remarked that Cameron’s statement lacked an opinion on Jason’s ability to 

perform and engage in work-related activities, but decided to consider Cameron’s statement as a

summary of the history of Jason’s treatment and diagnoses. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ considered the 

findings made by state-agency medical physicians who reviewed the medical record and opined that 

4 The ALJ did not provide more reasoning as to why Cameron was not an acceptable medical source in this 

section of her decision. But, as discussed below, the Social Security Regulations determine who is considered 

an “acceptable medical source.” 

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Jason’s claims of disability were not supported by the record. (Id.) The ALJ found these opinions to 

be generally consistent with evidence of record. (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Jason was unable to perform his past relevant work as a 

boilermaker. (Id., at 52.) At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the Vocational Expert 

(“VE”) who said that an individual with Jason’s restrictions could perform work as a cleaner, a 

packager, and a machine feeder. Based on the VE’s testimony and considering Jason’s age,

education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs in significant numbers 

in the national economy that Jason can perform, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under 

the Social Security Act. (Id.)

Analysis

Jason contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that: (1) Jason’s only severe impairment was 

GAD when he has been diagnosed with other impairments; (2) he did not have a sufficiently severe 

impairment or combination of impairments to meet the requirements outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1; and (3) he had the RFC to perform a full range of work with certain limitations.

Severe Impairments

The ALJ did not err by concluding that Jason did not have the severe impairments of 

posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), major depressive disorder (“MDD”), hypertension, irritable 

bowel syndrome (“IBS”), lumbar and cervical spine herniations, tinnitus, and angina. Jason provides 

little to no evidence from a medically acceptable source to establish those diagnoses as medically 

determinable impairments. The ALJ’s holding is grounded in substantial evidence and the ALJ 

made a logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion. 

To show that he has a severe impairment, a plaintiff must show that he suffers from a 

medically determinable condition that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic 

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work activities and that the condition is expected to persist for at least twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1508; 404.1520(c). Jason contends that the ALJ failed to properly analyze his impairment 

from PTSD or MDD, despite having a diagnosis for each disorder. Jason’s argument is 

unconvincing. In support of his motion, he blanketly cites to 47 pages of the record, which he 

contends is “overwhelming evidence” that he suffered from PTSD and MDD, in addition to GAD. 

(Dkt. 36, at 9.) This does not address the ALJ’s reasoning for her finding—that no evidence from 

an acceptable medical source evidenced the existence of a medically determinable impairment from 

PTSD or MDD. (See Dkt. 27-1, at 48.) In reply, Jason contends that the ALJ ignored pages of his 

medical records (Dkt. 27-1, at 610–681), and therefore committed reversable error. The ALJ, 

however, did consider these records in coming to her conclusion. (Dkt. 27-1, at 51.) Furthermore, 

the records mention as part of his medical history that Jason came to the medical center with 

diagnoses of PTSD and MDD. (Id., at 678.) But the notes later indicate that he does not meet the 

criteria for PTSD. (Id., at 660.) Either way, these notes do not equate to the “medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” necessary to establish a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.921; see also Horr v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 16, 20 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding ALJ’s decision to 

give little weight to a report that contained only symptoms and diagnoses rather than “a statement 

that reflects a judgment about the nature and the severity of the impairment” and the claimant’s 

limitations). The Court therefore finds no error in the ALJ’s determination at step two. 

Jason also argues that the ALJ erred in finding his hypertension was non-severe. He asserts 

that his emergency hospital visit records show the uncontrollable, and therefore severe, nature of his 

hypertension. (Dkt. 27-1, at 481, 509, 527 (showing multiple hospital visits in which Jason 

complained of hypertension).) The ALJ, however, relied on notes from those same hospital visits, 

which state that Jason’s hypertension was asymptomatic. (Id., at 47; 481; 509; 527.) Therefore, the 

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condition could not affect Jason’s ability to do basic work activities and the ALJ’s conclusion is 

substantially supported by the evidence. 

Jason also contends that the ALJ should have found that his IBS, lumbar and cervical spine 

herniations, tinnitus, and angina were medically determinable impairments. Jason devotes one 

conclusory sentence to this cause in his motion, arguing that the ALJ ignored the “medical evidence 

related to” these diagnoses. (Dkt. 36, at 9.) He fails to explain what evidence presented at hearing 

showed that these conditions meaningfully restricted his ability to work. See, e.g., Perez v. Astrue, 881 

F. Supp. 2d 916, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Cole, J.) (“A diagnos[i]s, or symptom for that matter, does not 

automatically translate to a limitation or impairment and simply listing them proves nothing.”). 

Thus, the Court does not disagree with the ALJ’s conclusion that Jason failed to provide “credible 

evidence that these conditions are the result of any anatomical abnormality that is demonstrable by 

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” (Dkt. 27-1, at 48.)

Finally, at the end of his motion for summary judgment, Jason contends that the Appeals 

Council improperly declined to review his submission of new evidence that had not been presented 

to the ALJ. “The Social Security Administration regulations require that [the Appeals Council] 

evaluate ‘new and material evidence’ in determining whether a case qualifies for review.” Farrell v. 

Astrue, 692 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2012). Jason argues that the evidence bolsters his claim that he is 

severely impaired in the areas of PTSD, MDD, and IBS. (Dkt. 36, at 15.) Specifically, he presented 

portions of 2012 deposition testimony by Dr. Anne Costakis and 2006 to 2011 medical records from 

Mercy Medical and the University of Chicago Medicine. The Appeals Council declined to consider 

the deposition testimony, finding that it was “not material” or “relevant to [Jason’s] claim for 

disability.” (Dkt. 27-1, at 26.) Likewise, the medical records were not considered because the 

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evidence did “not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision.” 

(Id.)

While Jason argues that this evidence would have been “highly relevant” to his disability 

claim, he makes no argument that the evidence was either new or material. Records are new if “they 

were ‘not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding.’” 

Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 725 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1296 (7th 

Cir. 1997)). The records Jason seeks to be reviewed are from 2006 to 2012, far before the January 

18, 2018 hearing or the March 30, 2018 issuance of the ALJ’s decision. Jason submits no argument 

as to why these records could not have been presented during the administrative proceeding. As a 

result, the Court does not remand for consideration of these records. 

Listed Impairments

Next, Jason argues that the ALJ erred by finding that his severe impairment due to GAD (or 

a combination of the other impairments he believes are severe) did not meet the criteria of one of 

the Listed Impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If a claimant shows that his severe 

impairment is among, or medically equivalent to, the Listed Impairments, he has demonstrated his 

impairment is presumptively disabling for the purpose of Step 3 of the analysis. See Jeske v. Saul, 955 

F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2020). The ALJ analyzed only whether GAD met the criteria under Listing 

12.06 because she did not find the other conditions severe at step two. The Commissioner argues 

that Jason’s brief neglects to discuss whether he met the criteria in Paragraph A of Listing 12.06, 

thus dooming his motion. (Dkt. 44, at 6.) But the ALJ likewise did not discuss Paragraph A in her 

decision, apparently assuming that Jason had met the criteria for purposes of the order. Because the 

Court upholds the ALJ’s ruling that Jason does not meet the Paragraph B or C criteria, the Court 

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need not assess whether Jason meets the Paragraph A criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 

12.06 (claimant must satisfy the requirements of Paragraphs A and B or Paragraphs A and C). 

The ALJ based her conclusions on the Listing criteria in part on the state-agency medical 

physicians’ findings. (See Dkt. 27-1, at 48.) Those physicians concluded that Jason did not meet or 

equal a Listing, which the ALJ found was supported by and consistent with the overall medical 

record. “An ALJ may rely on a reviewing physician’s assessment [of whether a claimant’s 

impairments meet a presumptive disability listing] unless later evidence containing new, significant 

medical diagnoses ‘changed the picture so much’ that it reasonably could have changed the 

reviewing physician’s opinion.” Massaglia v. Saul, 805 F. App’x 406, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because Jason does not argue that later 

evidence “changed the picture,” the ALJ properly relied on the state-agency consultants’ findings. 

Jason nonetheless argues that the ALJ improperly found that he did not meet the Paragraph 

B criteria. Under Paragraph B, a mental impairment must result in at least one extreme or two 

marked limitations in: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing themselves. The ALJ 

concluded that Jason did not have one extreme or two marked limitations in these areas and 

therefore was not presumptively disabled. “When evaluating whether an impairment is 

presumptively disabled under a listing, the ALJ ‘must discuss the listing by name and offer more 

than a perfunctory analysis of the listing.’” Jeske, 955 F.3d at 588 (quoting Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 

F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

First, Jason contends that he had more than a moderate limitation with respect to 

understanding, remembering, or applying information as well as concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace. (Dkt. 36, at 10.) Jason maintains that the ALJ wholly ignored reports of Jason’s 

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short attention span and difficulty keeping track of bills. (Dkt. 27-1, at 404–405.) As to 

understanding, remembering, or applying information, the ALJ cited Jason’s function report and 

other medical evidence, which included Jason’s self-reporting of his ability to remember, understand, 

and carry out instructions. (Id., at 48.) She then weighed this with the evidence that Jason did not 

need reminders to take medication and could handle his finances. (Id.) The ALJ based her decision 

on Jason’s limitation for concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace in part on his presentation at 

the hearing. Jason was focused, fully engaged, and responded to questions, in contrast to his selfreports that he had difficulties concentrating and maintaining his attention. (Id. at 49.) This 

reasoning, in consideration with the ALJ’s reliance on the reviewing physicians’ assessment, is much 

more than a “perfunctory analysis” of the listing. See Jeske, 955 F.3d at 588. Accordingly, the ALJ 

did not err in ruling that Jason has a moderate limitation in these areas. 

The ALJ’s conclusion that Jason possesses a moderate limitation in interacting with others 

was similarly proper. The ALJ relied on Jason’s self-reported evidence that he did not often spend 

time with others or participate in many social functions. (Dkt. 27-1, at 48.) The record also showed 

that Jason’s treatment providers observed that he had no difficulties in getting along with staff or 

other individuals in treatment, and that he was cooperative and demonstrated a fair mood. (Id.) In 

weighing this evidence, the ALJ properly found only a moderate limitation in interacting with others. 

Jason argues that this conclusion contradicts the ALJ’s finding that Jason “should have no 

interactions with the public.” (Dkt. 27-1, at 49.) The ALJ’s holding about Jason’s non-exertional 

limitations is not at odds with this conclusion. The limitation applied only to interactions with the 

public—the ALJ concluded that other interactions (such as with supervisors and coworkers) are 

permissible. Therefore, the ALJ’s finding was based on substantial evidence and not in error. 

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Next, Jason argues that the ALJ erred in finding a mild limitation in adapting and managing 

oneself because the ALJ improperly weighed the factors of Jason’s personal care and put too much 

weight on Jason’s appearance during the hearing. (Dkt. 36, at 11.) The ALJ concluded that Jason 

did not report significant issues in performing personal care, but Jason maintains that the record 

shows that he cared little for what he wore and did not shave often. (Dkt. 27-1, at 404–05.) 

Contrary to Jason’s argument, these same records show that he practiced other good hygiene habits, 

such as regular bathing and getting haircuts. In addition, the ALJ also relied on Jason’s mental 

health records—which showed that he had good hygiene and was appropriately dressed during 

visits—and his appearance at the hearing. (Id., at 49.) In sum, the ALJ’s conclusion that Jason did 

not have one extreme or two marked limitations under the Paragraph B criteria was appropriately 

supported by substantial evidence and there was a logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s 

conclusion. 

In the alternative, Jason argues that the ALJ erroneously held that he did not meet the 

Paragraph C criteria, which requires that the claimant have a “serious and persistent” mental 

disorder shown by a medically documented history of the disorder for at least two years and 

evidence of (1) “[m]edical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly 

structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental 

disorder”; and (2) the “minimal capacity to adapt to changes in your environment or to demands 

that are not already part of your daily life.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.06. Said otherwise, 

“the Paragraph C criteria address the situation where symptoms are not necessarily currently 

extreme but are ‘serious and persistent,’ and ‘could worsen if the person had to significantly change 

their daily routine.’” Robert S. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-02235-MG-RLY, 2021 WL 5979361, at *6 

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(S.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2021) (quoting Carl D. v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-47-JVB, 2021 WL 363599, at *2 

(N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2021)). 

It is true that the ALJ’s decision as to the Paragraph C criteria is brief, concluding only that 

“the record fails to document the existence of” the criteria. (Dkt. 27-1, at 49.) But the ALJ’s 

discussion under subsection five substantiates her decision. See Zellweger v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1251, 1254 

(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2020)) (“[N]othing [ ] prohibits a 

reviewing court from reviewing an ALJ’s step-three determination in light of elaboration and 

analysis appearing elsewhere in the decision.”). In that section, the ALJ confirms that she relied 

upon the findings by the state-agency physicians who concluded that Jason did not meet the 

Paragraph C criteria or otherwise meet or equal a Listing. (Dkt. 27-1, at 51, 165, 191.) Again, Jason 

does not argue that another medical professional contradicted these opinions. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 

F.3d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Because no other physician contradicted the [state-agency 

physicians’] two opinions, the ALJ did not err in accepting them.”); see also Massaglia, 805 F. App’x at 

409–10 (“Opinions of state-agency consultants may constitute substantial evidence on the issue of 

whether a claimant’s impairments meet a presumptive disability listing.”). Thus, the ALJ properly 

relied on state-agency physicians’ opinions.

Jason argues that he satisfies the Paragraph C criteria because he started and continued 

treatment for his GAD in 2011 and Cameron’s letter indicates that he had continuing treatment 

through 2016. (Dkt. 36, at 11–12.) His argument fails to address the necessary component of 

“marginal adjustment.” Jason does not argue that his “symptom[s] arose from changes in [his] 

environment or new demands, as paragraph C requires.” Aida U. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-5669, 2022 

WL 4109717, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2022) (Cummings, J.). Because Jason does not show that he 

would otherwise meet the Paragraph C criteria, the Court will not reverse the ALJ’s decision. 

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Sosinksi v. Saul, 811 F. App’x 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven if the ALJ does not offer such an 

analysis, we do not reverse if the claimant fails to show that he meets the criteria for that listing[.]”). 

Residual Functional Capacity

Because the ALJ found that Jason was not presumptively disabled under the Listings, the 

ALJ assessed Jason’s RFC and found that he had the RFC to perform a full range of work, with 

some limitations, as described above. Jason argues that this conclusion does not logically follow 

from the evidence in the record. First, Jason maintains that the ALJ discounted his testimony about 

the difficulties he experienced as a result of his GAD, PTSD, and MDD. But the ALJ discredited 

his testimony because she found it at odds with the medical evidence. The Court cannot overturn 

the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong.” Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 

(7th Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s observations of Jason at trial in conjunction with the discrepancies 

between his testimony and the medical record are sufficient to support her decision to discredit 

Jason’s statements about his GAD symptoms. Id. (upholding ALJ’s credibility determination in light 

of the ALJ’s observations of the claimant at hearing and claimant’s testimony contradicting the 

record). 

Jason next contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment failed to credit statements made by his

family members. (Dkt. 36, at 10.) Jason asserts that his family member’s statement about the effects 

of Jason’s other conditions, including IBS and angina, was not considered. (Dkt. 27-1, at 445–51.) 

But the record indicates that Jason’s attorney filled out the statement. The family member’s name 

and contact information appear only in the section requesting the “name of someone (other than 

your doctors) we can contact who knows about your medical conditions...” (Id., at 445.) Jason’s 

nephew also provided a statement about Jason’s deteriorating condition and stated that Jason has 

trouble concentrating, completing tasks, and understanding. (Id., at 429–36.) The ALJ’s opinion 

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does not specifically discuss whether or how much weight she gave to the nephew’s statement. 

Jason contends that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the nephew’s statement was error, but neglects to 

cite any legal authority for the proposition. To the contrary, “an ALJ need not mention every piece 

of evidence, so long as he builds a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Denton v. 

Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Because the ALJ grounded her opinion in the reputable 

medical evidence, there was no error. 

The ALJ correctly concluded that Lorene Cameron was not an acceptable medical source 

whose opinion should be entitled to controlling weight. Cameron was not a licensed psychologist or 

other acceptable source per the governing regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). Even still, the ALJ 

did consider the statement and concluded that it did not provide opinions on Jason’s ability to 

perform and engage in work-related activities. (Dkt. 27-1, at 51.) Jason additionally argues that the 

ALJ ignored his dependence on Valium, which made him drowsy and could affect his ability to 

work. (Dkt. 36, at 13.) But the record shows that the ALJ was aware of and considered his Valium 

use in her opinion. (Dkt. 27-1, at 50–51.) 

Ability to Perform Work 

Jason asserts that the ALJ relied on the flawed opinion of the VE to conclude that Jason can 

perform a broad range of jobs. (Dkt. 36, at 11–15.) During the hearing, the ALJ questioned the VE

regarding work in the national economy under a set of hypothetical circumstances. Jason contends 

that the ALJ failed to ask the VE to specifically consider Jason’s moderate limitations in 

understanding, remembering, and applying information; interaction with others; and maintaining 

concentration, persistence, and pace. The hypothetical posted to the VE “must incorporate all of 

the claimant’s limitations supported by the medical record, including even moderate limitations in 

concentration, persistence, or pace.” Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). 

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But “[a]s a matter of form, the ALJ need not put the questions to the VE in specific terms—there is 

no magic words requirement.” Id. The question must simply ensure that the VE understands the

claimant’s limitations in order to narrow the answer to include those jobs the claimant could 

perform. Id.

The ALJ’s hypothetical appropriately captured Jason’s limitations that were supported by the 

record. The question included that the hypothetical individual could “understand, remember, and 

carry out simple instructions and make simple work-related decisions,” thereby taking into account 

Jason’s moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying information. (Dkt. 27-1, 

at 75 (emphasis added).) Likewise, the ALJ captured Jason’s limitations with interacting with others 

and concentration, persistence, or pace by narrowing the question to apply to an individual who 

“can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting,” and “can tolerate occasional interactions 

with supervisors and coworkers [but not] interaction[s] with the pub[l]ic.” (Id., at 75–76.) Further, 

because Jason has not explained what work restrictions would address his limitations, any alleged 

error is harmless. See Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2019).

The ALJ’s question about off-task time also did not create reversible error. Although Jason 

mentions the off-task time question in his motion, he addresses the issue in earnest for the first time 

in reply. (Compare Dkt. 36, at 15 with Dkt. 48, at 3–4.) Jason contends that the ALJ erred when she 

asked the VE about the amount of off-task time and absences generally tolerated in the workplace 

but did not incorporate the VE’s opinion into her ruling. In support, Jason cites cases in which an

ALJ asked the VE about whether work exists in the national economy for someone who is off-task 

twenty percent of the time and failed to discuss the limitation in their opinion. See Jacob D. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-0554, 2021 WL 3674610, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2021) (Cox, J.); Kukec v. 

Berryhill, No. 16 cv 9805, 2017 WL 5191872, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2017) (Cox, J.). In Jacob D. v. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04992 Document #: 51 Filed: 08/17/23 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:871
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Kijakazi, the judge found reversible error because the question suggested that the ALJ made

unspoken conclusions about the claimant’s potential off-task time. Jacob D., 2021 WL 3674610, at 

*4 (“It appears the ALJ had reason to believe Plaintiff might be off task at least 20% of the time, or

there would be no reason to have posed this hypothetical to the VE.”). This case is distinguishable. 

Jason does not argue or put forward evidence that he required a certain amount of off-task time or 

absences related to his GAD. In fact, the record shows that Jason was not significantly limited in his 

ability to “complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically 

based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of 

rest periods.” (Dkt. 27-1, at 167, 194.) Therefore, though “the ALJ’s questions were unnecessary 

and create some confusion, they do not rise to the level of reversible error.” Kurtti v. Berryhill, No.

18-CV-873, 2019 WL 977886, at *5–6 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2019); see also Victoria R. v. Kijakazi, No.

20-cv-04444, 2022 WL 3543231, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2022) (Cummings, J.) (“[B]ecause

Claimant did not have any medically documented limitation specifying an amount of time she would 

be off task, the ALJ did not err by failing to discuss the [VE’s] response to the hypothetical 

concerning off-task time when formulating Claimant’s RFC.”). 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 

grants the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The Court affirms the ALJ’s decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/17/2023

Entered: _____________________________ 

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Court Judge 

Case: 1:20-cv-04992 Document #: 51 Filed: 08/17/23 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:872