[Cite as State ex rel. Bennett v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. , 2021-Ohio-3119.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. JAMEKA BENNETT, et al. Plaintiffs-Appellants

v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS Defendant-Appellee : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case Nos. 28981 28982 28983 28984

Trial Court Case Nos. 2018-CV-5436 2018-CV-5437 2018-CV-5438 2018-CV-5439 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court )

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 10th day of September, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . JULIUS L. CARTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0084170, 130 West Second Stree t, Suite 1622, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants BRODI J. CONOVER, Atty. Reg. No. 0092082 & ALEXANDER L. EWING, Atty. Reg. No. 0083934, 3300 Great American Tower, 301 East Fourth Street, Cin cinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee

. . . . . . . . . . . . .-2-

HALL, J. {¶ 1} The appellants, four former supervisors with Dayton Public Scho ols, appeal from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of th e appellee Board of Education on their complaints for declaratory judgment and a wr it of mandamus reinstating their employment following a reduction in force inv olving the school district. {¶ 2} The appellants advance two assignments of error. First, they ch allenge the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Dayton Public Schools Board of Education. Second, they contend the trial court erred in its su mmary judgment ruling by failing to address “all the claims of all the parties.” {¶ 3} The appellants are Jameka Bennett, Erica Dowell-Evans, Richard Knight, and the administrator of the estate of Mychelle Brown. 1 In May 2016, they signed new two-year contracts to continue their employment in the position of “Transportation Supervisor II” in the school district’s transportation departme nt, which included the district’s yellow school buses. Although the appellants’ duties differed, they all were involved with supervising the district’s school bus drivers. Sh ortly after the appellants signed their new contracts, the Board of Education hired a new superintendent, Rhonda Corr. Due to long-term declining enrollment and a corresponding loss of funding, Corr recommended streamlining operations within the school district and reducing or eliminating positions through reorganization and consolidation. Ultimately, approximately 20 administrators were recommended to have their contracts susp ended as part of a

1 After this appeal was filed, one of the appellants, Mychelle B rown, passed away. Following a suggestion of death, we substituted Maria L. Shinn, Administrator of Brown’s estate, as a party in Brown’s place. For purposes of our analys is herein, references to the “appellants” still mean Bennett, Dowell-Evans, Knight, and Brow n.-3- district-wide reduction in force (RIF). Included in that number were the four appellants. {¶ 4} At the time of the proposed RIF, the transportation department was in undisputed disarray. Problems included chronic understaffing of bus drivers, aging buses, and poor route design. The school district was inundated with c alls from parents complaining about their children being picked up late or not at all. The appellants frequently were forced to abandon their supervisory roles to su bstitute for absent bus drivers. Part of Corr’s original strategy was to outsource supe rvision of the transportation department to a third-party vendor. The Board of Education reje cted outsourcing and settled on district-wide reorganization that included a RIF. {¶ 5} In late October 2016, the appellants were informed of the plan to abolish their positions and to suspend their contracts. They received notice that the Board of Education intended to vote on the recommended RIF at its November 17, 201 6 meeting. Thereafter, the school district issued revised letters to the appellants on November 8, 2016, advising them that the vote would occur on either that same day, Novembe r 8, 2016, or on November 17, 2016. There is a dispute about whether this letter was hand-delivered to the appellants or mailed to them. In any event, the Board voted on November 8, 2016, to abolish the appellants’ positions effective November 18, 2016. {¶ 6} As part of Superintendent Corr’s restructuring plan, Associate Superintendent Sheila Burton created the Transportation and Fle et Services Department. Unlike the former transportation department, which included jus t yellow school buses, this new department covered all district-owned vehicles. Burton also placed a dedicated call center in the new department. In addition, she brought training , compliance, and evaluation programs into the Transportation and Fleet Services Department. After the-4- reorganization, the school district posted vacancy announcement s in late December 2016 for the newly created positions of Associate Director of Transp ortation and Fleet Services. The job description differed from the job description for the o ld Transportation Supervisor II position. As described in the posting, the new positions inc luded more responsibilities and came with a higher salary. Although the appellants had “rec all” rights for two years following the RIF, the school district did not notify them. Ins tead, the school district initially hired three other people to fill the new positions. Shortly the reafter, the district added a fourth person to fill a fourth position. The people hired into the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions included bus driver s who had been under the supervision of the appellants, a dispatcher, and a mechanic. {¶ 7} In November 2018, the appellants filed separate complaints agai nst the Board of Education, alleging both that their contracts improper ly had been suspended and that they should have been recalled into the newly created positions. They sought declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus restoring them to t heir prior positions and ordering them to be given new contracts in the position of Asso ciate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services. The four cases were consolid ated below. Following extensive discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judg ment. In an April 21, 2020 ruling, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of th e Board of Education in

each case. It reasoned as follows: In this case, the parties appear to agree that the Plaintiffs w ere “other administrators” as defined by R.C. 3319.02. Further, it is undi sputed that R.C. 3317.171 gives the Board the authority to adopt an adminis trative personnel suspension policy. However, because the Board has ado pted-5- such a policy, no administrator employment contract may be susp ended except pursuant to the policy. The parties’ disagreement relate s to whether the Board complied with the RIF Policy in suspending the Plaint iffs’

contracts. Plaintiffs argue that the Associ ate Director position is essen tially the same as the Transportation Supervisor II position, and thus the RIF policy required the Board to notify Plaintiffs via mail about the vaca nt job positions before offering the positions to anyone else. On the other hand , the Board argues that it was only required to mail Plaintiffs about vacan t positions for which they are qualified, and that the Associate Director posit ions had an expanded role with added responsibility, and therefore it follo wed its policy and the law in suspending Plaintiffs’ contracts. Upon cross referencing the job descriptions provided by the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the essential duties of an Ass ociate Director substantially differed from the essential duties of Transportat ion Supervisor II. Under the latter position, the list of duties consisted of nearly half a page and mostly involved the management, direction, and supervision of bus drivers. Conversely, the list of essential duties for Associate Director is nearly two pages long and clearly illustrates a position with a n expanded role with more responsibilities. For instance, in addition to t he management and supervision of bus drivers, the Associate Director was resp onsible for supervising the operation efficiency of all District vehicles a nd not just the yellow school buses. They had authority to purchase, maintain a nd dispose-6- of the District’s motor fleet. They also were responsible for w orking with the Director in developing policies, rules and regulations within t he department. Finally, the Court notes that the salary listed in the last adm inistrator contract for each Plaintiff amounted to $52,987, while the star ting salary for Associate Director is $65,825. The Plaintiffs argue that the Associate Director position only appears different from the Transportation Supervisor II position becaus e the Transportation Supervisor II position had evolved over time. Ho wever, the only evidence to support this assertion is Plaintiffs’ affidavi t testimony. Also, the Plaintiffs point out that shortly after they were disciplin ed for misuse of District vehicles, the Transportation Supervisor II position wa s abolished. In other words, it appears Plaintiffs are arguing that the Board u sed the RIF as an excuse to terminate their employment. However, the Court fin ds that Plaintiffs’ discipline history has no significance on the outco me of this case. Even if this Court were to assume arguendo that the Board was j ust looking for a convenient excuse to discharge Plaintiffs, the law allows the Board to suspend administrator contracts so long as it is done pursuant to the RIF Policy. The Board apparently did not believe Plaintiffs were qu alified for the more advanced role of Associate Director, so they did not notif y Plaintiffs about the positions. The RIF Policy only requires the Board to notify Plaintiffs about job vacancies for which they are qualified. Th erefore, the Court concludes that the Board complied with the RIF Policy in suspending

Plaintiffs’ contracts.-7- (April 21, 2020 Decision, Order, and Entry at 5-6.) {¶ 8} In their first assignment of error, the appellants challenge th e trial court’s entry of summary judgment against them. The appellants correctl y note that they held written “administrator” contracts pursuant to R.C. 3319.02, whi ch covers non-licensed supervisors and management-level employees. Another provision, R.C. 3319.171, authorizes a school board to adopt its own policies for the sus pension of administrator contracts as part of a RIF. If such a policy is adopted, it mus t include the following: (1) One or more reasons that a board may consider for suspendin g any contract of employment entered into under section 3319.02 of th e Revised Code. A reason for such suspension may include the financial co nditions of

the school district or educational service center. (2) Procedures for determining the order of suspension of contr acts within the employment service areas affected; (3) Provisions requiring a right of restoration for employees w hose contracts of employment are suspended under the policy if and when any po sitions become vacant or are created for which any of them are or becom e qualified. R.C. 3319.171(B)(1), (2), and (3). {¶ 9} Consistent with R.C. 3319.171, the Board of Education adopted a policy in 2009 governing the suspension of administrator contracts. The p olicy, which was entitled “Reduction in Professional Staff Workforce,” authorized the sus pension of administrator contracts for reasons including decreased enrollment of student s, financial considerations, and organizational restructuring. It also provi ded procedures for-8- determining the order of suspension. Finally, it provided as fo llows with regard to R.C. 3119.171(B)(3)’s requirement that affected employees have a rig ht of restoration: When any positions become vacant or are created for which profe ssional staff are or become qualified, the following provisions will be followed to restore professional staff. 1. The Human Resources Department will maintain a list of emplo yees whose contracts are suspended under this policy. When an employ ee’s contract is suspended, the employee’s name and current mailing address shall appear on such list and shall remain on such list for a period of up to two years from the last day of work, except for when the employee is restored to work during the two-year period, as fur ther explained below. 2. All vacant and approved position job postings will be mailed to employees whose names appear on the above-described list. 3. Employees placed on the list are solely responsible to maint ain a current mailing address at all times with the Human Resources office an d are solely responsible to make sure their current mailing address a ppears

on the above-described list. 4. Once the professional staff member returns to work in any po sition with the Board, the employee’s name will be permanently removed from the list. Thus, no further job posting mailings will be sent to suc h employee. And, the Board obligations to restore the professional staff me mber under this policy will end upon the date the employee returns b ack to-9- work for the Board. 5. At the expiration of two years, if the employee is still not restored to work with the Board in any position, the employee’s name will be rem oved from such list and the right to restoration under this policy w ill end. 6. The same factors used to determine reductions and reassignme nt of staff will be considered in determining who will be awarded vac ant or created positions for which an employee holding a suspended con tract is qualified. (Defendant-Respondent’s February 11, 2020 Summary Judgment Moti on at Exh. A.) {¶ 10} Here the appellants do not dispute the Board of Education’s rig ht to implement a RIF. They argue, however, that no RIF occurred with regard to their positions in the transportation department because those positions were n ot abolished. But even assuming that a true RIF occurred, the appellants further argue that they had a right to be recalled into any position for which they were qualified. Th e appellants assert that the school district improperly failed to create a recall list, to n otify them of the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions, and to recall them into those positions. Although the job description for the new positions d iffered from the old Transportation Supervisor II job description, the appellants co ntend their old job description was outdated and that their actual responsibilities had evolved and expanded. The appellants further contend that they presented evidence est ablishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were qualified for the new positions. Therefore, they argue that the Board of Education was not entitled to summary j udgment on the basis that they were unqualified for the new jobs.-10- {¶ 11} Under Civ.R. 56, a trial court may enter summary judgment for t he moving party “if there are no genuine issues of material fact remainin g to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonabl e minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” (Citat ion omitted.) Smith v. Five

Rivers MetroParks , 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760, 732 N.E.2d 422 (2d Dist. 1999). “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means that we apply the same standards as the trial court.” (Citations omitted.) GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co ., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, 873 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). {¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we find a genuine issue o f material fact as to whether the appellants’ positions were eliminated th rough a RIF involving the transportation department. There is no dispute that Dayton City Schools was experiencing declining enrollment and a corresponding loss of funding. Large ly for these reasons, a

recommendation was made that the Board of Education restructure and downsize the school district’s administrative workforce, including but not l imited to the transportation department. 2 (Corr depo. at 40-41.) Under the Board’s policy, declining enr ollment, loss of funding, and restructuring constitute valid reasons for a RI F. {¶ 13} With regard to the transportation department, however, the reco rd fails to establish that the declining enrollment and loss of funding adv ersely affected the school district’s transportation of students. In her deposition, Assoc iate Superintendent Burton

2 Prior to adopting a RIF plan, school district leaders had disc ussed abolishing the entire transportation department and outsourcing transportation to a t hird-party vendor. (Corr depo. at 43.) But that idea “never got any traction” because th e Board of Education opposed it. ( Id .)-11- explained: “Even though we’re losing students in [Dayton Public Schools], it doesn’t mean we’re losing them for transportation, because we transport stud ents who are non-DPS students. * * * [E]ven though you leave our district, you go to a charter, we still transport you.” (Burton depo. at 23.) We note too that the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions paid significantly more than the o ld Transportation Director II positions. We see no cost savings given that the Board of Ed ucation quickly replaced the four appellants after the RIF by hiring four new people to fill the higher-paid Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. {¶ 14} A RIF in the transportation de partment still might have been pe rmissible as part of the broader restructuring plan within Dayton City Schoo ls. Here, however, the school district employed the four appellants in the position of Transportation Supervisor II prior to the RIF. Within months after the RIF, the Board of Education had filled four new Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positio ns. The Board argues that a RIF occurred because the new positions involved expanded resp onsibilities as part of the district-wide restructuring. This might be true if the new and expanded duties of the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positio ns were taken from some other employee who was terminated in the RIF. In such a case, t he restructuring would

result in a demonstrable reduction in force. {¶ 15} In the proceedings below, however, the appellants disputed whet her their old Transportation Supervisor II positions had been abolished o r even revised. The appellants separately averred, among other things, that they ha d reviewed the position description and vacancy announcement for the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services position. They also averred that the duties desc ribed in the vacancy-12- announcement appeared to be the same duties they were performin g, or had performed, prior to their termination. They further averred that they prev iously had supervised three people hired into the new position and could perform all of the duties identified by those new employees. (Bennett, Dowell-Evans, Brown, and Knight Affida vits accompanying Plaintiffs-Relators’ March 23, 2020 Response Opposing Defendant -Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) {¶ 16} Based on the appellants’ affidavits, a trier of fact reasonably could find that the school district did not abolish their positions in the RIF and subsequently create revised positions. Rather, according to the appellants, the sch ool district renamed their old Transportation Supervisor II positions and created a new jo b description for the position of Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Serv ices that reflected what they already had been doing. If the four appellants’ affidavits are credited, then the Board of Education simply suspended their administrator contracts, pu rportedly as part of the district-wide RIF, and promptly hired four new people to perfor m the same duties the appellants had been performing. {¶ 17} The record also contains testimony from which a trier of fact r easonably could infer that the Board of Education had a motive for replac ing the appellants with new employees who performed essentially the same job. Board of Educ ation member Sheila Taylor expressed her belief that the transportation supervisors were included in the RIF “because the department was in such disarray.” (Taylor depo. at 50.) She attributed the decision to eliminate the appellants’ positions to “all the cha os that was going on in that department” and a need “to change the atmosphere[.]” ( Id . at 26.) Board of Education member John McManus described the transportation department bef ore the RIF as-13- “beyond dysfunctional” and “an embarrassment.” (McManus depo. a t 21.) He acknowledged having “discussions amongst the Board Members abou t getting rid of the transportation supervision because of all the issues that were going on[.]” ( Id . at 37-38.) McManus recalled understanding that departments that lost super visors, including the transportation department, “would have a replacement” and “new supervisors would come in” so that “the ordinary course of business could be main tained.” ( Id . at 38.) With regard to the transportation department in particular, McManus stated that it “could not get any worse” than it was when the four appellants were employ ed. ( Id . at 40.) He added that “[l]osing the leadership that was in transportation was no t going to negatively [a]ffect transportation because it was in such a state of mismanagement. ” ( Id .) For that reason,

McManus “didn’t shed a tear” when he saw the names on the RIF l ist. ( Id . at 49.) Based on our review of the entire record, and construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellants, we believe a trier of fact reasonably could find that the district-wide RIF was used to rid the transportation department of them. The reco rd supports a reasonable inference that the appellants’ inclusion in the RIF was a matte r of housecleaning rather than reducing headcount. {¶ 18} Finally, we note our inability to identify any other Dayton Cit y Schools administrator whose employment was terminated as a result of th e restructuring that purportedly resulted in the new Associate Director of Transport ation and Fleet Services position being given additional responsibilities. In other word s, even if the newly created position did involve some added responsibilities, it does not a ppear that those responsibilities were taken from another employee who was elimi nated by the RIF. {¶ 19} For all of the foregoing reasons, a trier of fact reasonably co uld conclude-14- that no true reduction in force occurred as far as the appellan ts were concerned. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appell ants, we find a genuine

issue of material fact on that issue. {¶ 20} Even assuming, arguendo, that a true RIF did occur in the trans portation department, we also find a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the appellants had restoration or “recall” rights to the new Associate Directo r of Transportation and Fleet Services jobs. Associate Superintendent Sheila Burton testified that she assumed responsibility for the revised transportation department after the RIF and played a role in developing the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fle et Services positions. (Burton depo. at 25, 29.) She determined that these new positio ns “would have to have some different job responsibilities.” ( Id . at 30.) In particular, the new positions included supervision of all district-owned vehicles, not just school bus es. Burton also added attendance at the 18-month training course to learn “what it to ok to be a transportation director” and to know “how to manage and lead individuals.” ( Id . at 31.) Burton explained that for the most part the newly hired individuals were able to perform the tasks assigned to them when hired. The additional training was to teach them h ow to do each other’s jobs in case that became necessary. ( Id . at 49-53.) Finally, Burton mentioned dividing various job responsibilities between the new associate director s based on their skills and strengths. ( Id . at 31-33, 49-53.) {¶ 21} Executive Director of Human Resources Judith Spulock testified that recall rights existed only “if the same exact position” was reestablis hed. (Spurlock depo. at 37.) In Spurlock’s opinion, the appellants were not entitled to be r ecalled because the Transportation Supervisor II positions from which they had been “RIFed” were not-15- reestablished. ( Id . at 37-38.) Spurlock believed that employees impacted by the R IF had no right to be recalled into non-identical positions even if th ey were qualified. ( Id . at 38.) In her opinion, employees who lost their jobs through the RIF h ad no right even to be notified of job openings unless the open position was the exact same one from which they had been removed. ( Id . at 46.) {¶ 22} Andrae Hicks, who served under S purlock in human resources, tes tified that he worked on preparing job postings in the two-year period foll owing the RIF, and he never heard anything about any of the postings being sent to em ployees who had lost their jobs in the downsizing. ( Hicks depo. at 91-92.) Spurlock herself admitted that the job posting for the new Associate Director of Transportation and Fl eet Services positions was not sent to the appellants. (Spurlock depo. 103-104.) Despite h er position as the head of the department responsible for the new job postings and the rec all list, Spurlock admitted not even knowing whether the appellants were qualified for the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. ( Id . at 48-49.) {¶ 23} Board of Education member John McManus also remembered being to ld “that the job descriptions and the duties of the [Associate Dir ector of Transportation and Fleet Services] job were going to be different because of a res tructuring; and, therefore, right to recall was not applicable.” (McManus depo. at 58-59.) On the other hand, Board of Education member Sheila Taylor believed that the appellants at least would have the opportunity to apply for the newly-created positions along with anyone else who was interested. (Taylor depo. at 28-36.) Taylor expressed her opini on that the appellants had recall rights because they were not fired for cause. Instead, t he entire transportation department “was being looked at” as part of the RIF restructuri ng. ( Id . at 76.)-16- {¶ 24} Based on the record before us, a trier of fact reasonably could find that the appellants were not even considered for the new Associate Direc tor of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. As set forth above, the record co ntains evidence that they were not informed of the new positions, human resources head Sp urlock testified that the appellants were not entitled to be recalled because their old p ositions were not identical to the new ones, and Spurlock did not even know whether the app ellants were qualified for the new positions. Construed most strongly in the appellant s’ favor, this evidence suggests that the appellants were not considered as candidates for the new positions. {¶ 25} Under R.C. 3319.171(B)(3), however, the Dayton City Schools’ RI F policy was obligated to include “[p]rovisions requiring a right of res toration for employees whose contracts of employment are suspended under the policy if and w hen any positions become vacant or are created for which any of them are or become qualified.” R.C. 3319.171(B)(1), (2), and (3). Contrary to the view of Spurlock and other school-district representatives, the appellants’ recall rights were required by statute to extend to any available positions for which they were or became qualified. In accordance with th is requirement, the Dayton City Schools’ RIF recall policy states that it applies “[w]hen any positions become vacant or are created for which professional s taff are or become qualified[.]” It further provides that “[a]ll vacant and approv ed position job postings will be mailed to employees whose names appear” on the recall list. It also addresses employees being “restored to work” within two years “in any position.” (D efendant-Respondent’s February 11, 2010 Summary Judgment Motion at Exh. A.) We note t oo that a Dayton Public Schools information packet advised that administrative s taff who lost their jobs through the RIF were entitled to apply for any posted position for which the affected-17- administrators believed they were qualified. (Plaintiffs-Relato rs March 23, 2020 Response Opposing Summary Judgment at Exh. 26.) Consequently, t he appellants’ recall rights turn on whether they were qualified for the new A ssociate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions, not on whether the new positions were identical to the old Transportation Supervisor II positions. {¶ 26} On appeal, the Board of Education suggests that the appellants were not recalled into the new positions because they were unqualified. In its appellate brief, however, the Board cites no deposition testimony or other evide nce from anyone stating that the appellants in fact were not qualified. It its April 21 , 2020 summary-judgment ruling the trial court stated that “[t]he Board apparently did not bel ieve Plaintiffs were qualified for the more advanced role of Associate Director, so they did n ot notify Plaintiffs about the positions.” We conclude there is at least a genuine issue o f material fact in regard to whether the appellants were qualified. As we have explained, th e record supports a finding that the appellants were not recalled—or even considere d for recall—because the new positions were not identical to their old positions. This i s essentially what human resources head Spurlock said when she admitted not knowing whet her appellants were qualified for the new jobs and explained that they had no recal l rights, regardless of their qualifications, because such rights existed only “if the same e xact position” was reestablished. (Spurlock depo. at 37, 48-49.) {¶ 27} Based on the language of R.C. 3319.171(B)(3) and the Board of Education’s RIF recall policy, the critical issue is whether th e appellants were qualified to fill the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Service s positions. The trial court’s ruling compared the position description for Transportation Sup ervisor II and Associate-18- Director of Transportation and Fleet Services and concluded tha t the latter position involved an “expanded role with more responsibilities” and high er pay. Based on the differences in the two positions on paper, the trial court appe ars to have found that the appellants were not qualified for the new jobs as a matter of l aw. In reaching this conclusion, it did not consider the appellants’ argument that t he Transportation Supervisor II positions had evolved over t ime and included responsibilitie s greater than those mentioned in their job description. The trial court stated that the only evidence supporting the appellants’ claim that their jobs had evolved over time was their own affidavits. {¶ 28} Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the appell ants, we believe a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether t hey were qualified for the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positio ns. Notably, the appellants filed their own detailed affidavits in the proceedings below ad dressing their experience and qualifications for the new positions. Appellant Bennett’s a ffidavit states in part: 7. I was capable of successfully performing all the duties of m y position when my contract was suspended in 2016. 8. I was capable of replacing the other Transportation Supervis or II positions whenever one of my co-workers was unavailable in 2016.

* * * 15. I was notified in the Reduction in Force meeting that all v acancy

announcements would be mailed to m y mailing address whenever a new position was posted for applicants. 16. I never received any mailing of vacancy announcements from the Dayton Public Schools following my termination on November 18, 2016.-19- 17. I never received any recall notices and was never contacted by Dayton Public Schools regarding my recall rights. 18. I have reviewed the position description of Associate Direc tor of Transportation and Fleet Services that was posted by Dayton Pub lic

Schools on or about December of 2016. 19 The duties described in the vacancy announcement for Associa te Director of Transportation and Fleet Services position appear t o be the same duties that I was performing, or had performed, prior to m y termination on November 18, 2016. 20. Dayton Public Schools never contacted me about the Associat e Director of Transportation and Fleet Services position by recalling me o r letting me know of the Vacancy Announcement. 21. I was a supervisor for Torr once Jackson, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea Ludd prior to my termination on November 18, 2016. 22. Torronce Jackson, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea Ludd were al l promoted to the position of Associate Director of Transportatio n and Fleet Services during the period when I had recall rights.

* * * 27. I was capable of receiving new training when my employment with Dayton Public Schools was terminated on November 18, 2016, and I had already supervised fleet vehicles

. 28. I have reviewed the deposition transcript of Torronce Jacks on, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea Ludd and can perform all the duties they ha ve-20- described for their positions. 29. I supervised the garage and all the mechanics during my tim e as a Transportation Supervisor, prior to the RIF, and the Transporta tion Department did all the maintenance on the fleet vehicles unless it was a repair that required me to get an outside company to do the rep air. 30. I was responsible for the registration and licensure of all the fleet vehicles, prior to the RIF, and the Transportation Department h as always been responsible for the fleet vehicles since I was initially p romoted to Transportation Supervisor II. 31. I have received training through the State of Ohio intended for transportation supervisors and covering many different areas of transportation. My certificates from this training were turned in to the district. 32. The tier bells are set at the beginning of the school year and approved by the Board of Education. 33. The Transportation Department had a call center that was pa rt of the department beginning in approximately the 2014-2015 school year , which was supervised by Transportation Supervisor Mychelle Brown. The call

center was later moved to the central office downtown. 34. The Transportation Department had a PBX Operator that answe red calls when there was no call center at the facility, and she wo uld route those calls to the Director, Supervisors, or dispatcher. 35. I was responsible for training and compliance for all drive rs within the district. We have always had training and compliance requiremen ts for the-21- State of Ohio.

36. I am an On Board Instructor and I trained Terrence Jackson to be an

On Board Instructor for the district. 37. I was contracted [sic] by Transportation Director Michael R osenberger, after the RIF, and he requested that I assist him in doing the T-Reports required by the State of Ohio.

( Bennett Affidavit accompanying Plaintiffs-Relators’ March 23, 2 020 Response Opposing Defendant-Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) {¶ 29} Appellants Dowell-Evans, Brown, and Knight provided similar aff idavits. As mentioned above, they averred that they had reviewed the positi on description and vacancy announcement for the Associate Director of Transportati on and Fleet Services position. They also averred that the duties described in the va cancy announcement appeared to be the same duties they were performing, or had per formed, prior to their termination. They further averred that they had supervised Torr once Jackson, Terrence Jackson, and Andrea Ludd, who were hired at various times to fi ll vacant Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions, and co uld perform all of the duties identified by the Jackson brothers and Ludd as part of the new positions. Although the trial court discounted these affidavits, apparently on the basi s that they were self-serving, we find them sufficiently detailed and specific to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the appellants’ qualification for the new jobs. If th e appellants testified at trial consistent with their affidavits, a trier of fact reasonably co uld conclude that they were qualified to fill the position of Associate Director of Transpo rtation of Fleet Services. {¶ 30} We note too that the appellants’ affidavits are not the only ev idence-22- supporting their claims. James Wallace served as Transportation Director and supervised the appellants for several years until shortly before the RIF, when Mike Rosenberger assumed the director’s position. In his deposition, Wallace tes tified that appellant Brown primarily was responsible for supervising dispatchers, appellan t Evans supervised the “routers” and paraprofessionals, appellant Knight supervised tr ansportation for parochial and charter schools, and appellant Bennett supervised training and the mechanics. (Wallace depo. at 60.) According to Wallace, each of the four a ppellants knew the full “day-to-day operations” of the Transportation Department. They were capable of filling in for each other and filling in for him. ( Id . at 60-61.) Wallace also reviewed the position description for the newly created Associate Director of Transpo rtation and Fleet Services positions. He opined that the appellants were capable of perfor ming all of the listed duties. ( Id . at 86-87.) While serving as Transportation Director, Wallace also had supervised brothers Terrance and Torronce Jackson as well as Andrea Ludd, all of whom had been school bus drivers. ( Id . at 88-89.) After the RIF, they were hired to fill vacant Asso ciate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positions. Wallac e was unaware of any specialized knowledge they possessed related to those positions . ( Id . at 89.) {¶ 31} When discussing one aspect of his own Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services responsibilities, Terrance Ja ckson stated that “anybody could do it.” (Terrance Jackson depo. at 24.) When ask ed what he had learned about performing the Associate Director of Transportation and F leet Services job after being given it, Terrance Jackson responded that he “could go on forever.” ( Id. at 27.) When Terrance’s brother Torronce Jackson got his Associate Dire ctor of Transportation and Fleet Services job, he had little prior management experien ce. (Torronce Jackson-23- depo. at 12.) Torronce Jackson testified that managing the enti re fleet of school-district vehicles was not significantly different than managing just the yellow school buses. ( Id . at 23-25.) He explained that the only real difference was the yell ow school buses requiring

more work because they had to be inspected. ( Id .) He believed that someone who could supervise school buses (i.e., the appellants) could supervise f leet vehicles. ( Id .) {¶ 32} Finally, according to Superintendent Corr, applicants hired to fill the Associate Director of Transportation and Fleet Services positio ns were all sent to an 18- month training course “to know what it took to be a transportat ion director.” (Corr depo. 31-32.) She also sent them to leadership training “so they knew how to manage and lead individuals[.]” ( Id .) In her deposition, Associate Superintendent Burton clarified that newly hired associate directors largely were able to perform the resp onsibilities assigned to them when hired. The additional training was to enable them to perform one another’s jobs. (Burton depo. at 49-53.) According to former Transportati on Director Wallace, however, the four appellants already knew how to perform each o ther’s jobs. And the appellants’ affidavits support a finding that the new jobs func tionally were the same as their old jobs. Construed most strongly in the appellants’ favo r, the evidence suggests that the appellants were qualified for the new positions. We fi nd a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. The first assignment of error is s ustained insofar as the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the Board of Educa tion. 3

3 The appellants also seem to suggest that the trial court shoul d have entered summary judgment in their favor on their complaints for declaratory jud gment and a writ of mandamus. In the conclusion of their brief, they appear to ask us to remand with instructions for the trial court to issue the requested writ. W e note, however, that the appellants’ assignment of error is limited to the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education. Therefore, we express no opini on as to whether the appellants should have been granted summary judgment. In findin g genuine issues of-24- {¶ 33} In their second assignment of error, the appellants contend the trial court erred in “failing to address all the claims and all the parties when deciding Summary Judgment.” Although the appellants’ brief fails to argue this i ssue, we previously resolved it in a March 5, 2021 Decision and Entry. In rejecting an argum ent that no final appealable order existed, we held that the trial court did fully resolve a ll claims involving all parties when it entered summary judgment in favor of the only defendant and against all of the plaintiffs on all of their claims. Based on the reasoning set f orth in our March 5, 2021 Decision and Entry, the second assignment of error is overruled

. {¶ 34} Having sustained the appellants’ first assignment of error, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in each case in favor o f the Board of Education and remand the cases for further proceedings.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

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Julius L. Carter Brodi J. Conover Alexander L. Ewing Hon. Gregory F. Singer

material fact, we mean only that the record does not support th e entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Board of Education, which is the only issue raised by the first assignment of error.