alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11031.

#### Evans *v.*The State.

Decided January 27, 1920.

Indictment for assault witb intent to murder; from Gordon superior court—Judge Tarver. September 27, 1919.

*Starr & Paschall, M. B. Eubanks,*for plaintiff in error.

*Joseph M. Lang, solicitor-general,*contra.

Luke, J.

1. “Where the court gives in charge to the jury the principles of law with respect to the right of a'slayer to kill in order to prevent the commission of a felony, the failure to define the term' ‘felony,’ as used in such charge, in the absence of a request to give such definition, is not error requiring a new trial.” See *Faison*v. *State,*13 *Ga. App.*180 (3) (79 S. E. 39), and cit.; *Smith*v. *State,*23 *Ga. App.*541 (4) (99 S. E. 142).

2. The charge of the court wasjfull and fair and stated the contentions of the parties clearly, and, if the defendant desired more specific instructions upon the issues raised by his statement, he should have made a timely written request therefor. The evidence authorized the verdict, and it was not error, for any reason assigned, to overrule the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, G. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cr−00400

Honorable Martha M. Pacold

Wendall Kemp

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, April 7, 2021:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Martha M. Pacold: as to Wendell Kemp:

Defendant's motion to modify conditions of release from home incarceration to a nightly

curfew [37] is granted without objection. (rao, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cr-00400 Document #: 38 Filed: 04/07/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:81
10268.

#### McCRACKIN *et al. v.*THE STATE.

Decided September 19, 1919.

Indictment for murder; from Colquitt superior court—Judge Thomas. November 30, 1918.

*'James Humphreys, B. B. Oox,*for plaintiff in error.

*C. B. Hay, solicitor-general,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

1. The accused was trjed for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Under the facts of the case, as shown by the record, a new trial is demanded because the court erred in charging the jury on voluntary manslaughter. See *Coleman*v. *State,*121 *Ga.*594 (49 S. E. 716); R*obinson*v. *State,*109 *Ga.*506 (34 S. E. 1017).

2. As the case is to be .tried again, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other assignments of error.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Stephens, J., concurs. Broyles, P. J. dissents.*

Broyues, P. J.,

dissenting. In my opinion the law of voluntary manslaughter was involved in this ease. Some of the evidence for the State showed a voluntary and unlawful homicide. Other evidence for the State showed that the homicide was committed with malice. The evidence for the State, as a whole, established a ease of murder. Parts of the defendants’ statements merely showed that the killing was without malice, either express or implied. Other parts of the statements showed' that the killing was justifiable. The statements, as a whole, showed a case of justifiable homicide. The jury, in a criminal case, however, can believe a part, or parts, of the defendant’s statement and reject other parts. *196They can also believe a part of the statement”'in preference to the sworn testimony of the State, and reject that part of the State’s evidence which is in conflict with that part of the statement. So, in this case, the jury were authorized to believe that part of the State’s evidence which showed that the killing was voluntary and unlawful, and to reject that part which showed malice, and which was in conflict with those portions of the defendants’ statements' which showed no malice. They also had the power to accept as true those portions of the defendants’ statements which showed that the killing was done without malice, and to reject those portions of the defendants’ statements which showed that the killing was done without malice, and to reject those portions of the statements which showed justifiable homicide. It follows that the jury were authorized, by so combining portions of the State’s evidence and portions of the defendants’ statements, in finding that the homicide was voluntary and unlawful, but without any malice, either express or implied—and every such homicide is voluntary manslaughter. The statements of the defendants showed that an actual unprovoked assault, with a deadly weapon, was made upon them by the deceased immediately preceding the killing. This was sufficient to authorize an inference by the jury ’that the unprovoked assault upon the defendants by the deceased had so suddenly aroused their passion that the killing was the result thereof, and that there was no deliberation or malice upon their part. The court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury upon the law of voluntary manslaughter.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

KALEB L. BASEY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30196 

D.C. No. 4:14-cr-00028-RRB-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2022**

Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. 

Kaleb L. Basey appeals pro se from the district court’s orders granting his 

motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and 

denying reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Basey’s 

request for oral argument is denied. 

FILED

JUL 21 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-30196 

As an initial matter, we reject Basey’s assertions that the district court’s 

order granting relief was an injunction or “coerced settlement.” The record reflects 

that the district court properly granted Basey’s motion for return of property after 

the government filed a notice of non-opposition conceding that it had no legitimate 

reason to retain the property at issue. See United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 

1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A district court has both the jurisdiction and the 

duty to return the contested property once the government’s need for it has ended.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Basey’s motions for reconsideration after ordering the 

government to return Basey’s items and delete copies in its possession. See United 

States v. Tapia-Marquez, 361 F.3d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating standard of 

review). Contrary to Basey’s contentions, the district court was not required to 

treat the government’s notice of non-opposition as a motion to dismiss, and neither 

the district court nor this court need reach Basey’s claim that the property at issue 

was illegally seized. See Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1369 (“[W]hen the property in 

question is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes . . . the legality of the search 

and seizure is no longer an issue.”). Finally, no hearing on the motion was 

required. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).

In light of this disposition, we do not reach the government’s remaining 

arguments.
3 21-30196 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Basey’s motion for reassignment to a different district judge is denied as 

moot.

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of China Broadband, Inc. (f/k/a Alpha
      Nutra, Inc.) (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended June 30,
      2007
      as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
      "Report"), I, Marc Urbach, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      China Broadband, Inc. (f/k/a Alpha Nutra, Inc.) and will be retained by China
      Broadband, Inc. (f/k/a Alpha Nutra, Inc.) and furnished to the Securities and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





August
                19, 2008
            By:
            */s/ Marc
                Urbach*Name:
                Marc Urbach
              Title: 
                President (Principal Executive
                Officer)
#### Nick PORTACCI, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. MORAN TOWING AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

No. 79-2147

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 9, 1980.

F. L. Benckenstein, Beaumont, Tex., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Weller, Wheelus & Green, Michael R. McGown, Beaumont, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before HILL, GARZA and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.

*

 Fed.R.App.Proc. 34(a), 5th Cir. Local R. 18.

PER CURIAM:

The tug SHEILA MORAN collided with the F/V MISS JERLENE, injuring the latter and plaintiff Portacci. Portacci brought suit in admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976), for damages sustained. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the vessels’ “mutual fault” had caused the collision; Portacci’s recoverable damages accordingly were reduced by 50%. This result satisfied neither party, both of whom appeal.

The district court made unusually specific findings of fact. The SHEILA MORAN failed, *inter alia,*to sound a warning signal or to have proper running lights. The MISS JERLENE failed, *inter alia,*to have a working radio or to keep a proper lookout. The vessels’ operative omissions combined jointly to cause the collision. The *294record supports these findings, which we affirm. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

We have difficulty, however, with the district court’s equal apportionment of damages. Under *United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,*421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975), this disposition was proper only if “the parties [were] equally at fault” or if “it [was] not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.” *Id.*at 411, 95 S.Ct. at 1716. Here, the district court found only that the vessels were “mutually at fault.” R. 136. Standing alone, this finding can not sustain the judgment. “Mutual fault” certainly does not imply equal fault; the former describes 10%-90% just as accurately as it does 50%-50%. *Cf. California v. Italian Motorship Ilice,*534 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Mutual Fault-Equal Contribution Rule” requires that “when there is a mutual fault . the damages must be equally allocated regardless of the degrees of comparative fault”). Nor does the district court’s order anywhere state that specific apportionment is not practicable in this case. Although the judge made some comments to this effect toward the end of trial, Tr. 626-27, it is the final order and judgment which we review.

The cause is REMANDED so that the district court can apportion damages in accordance with *Reliable Transfer, supra,*making appropriate findings of fact. In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 3736

_____________________________
K

ATHERINE A MAN , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , D EPARTMENT O F R EVENUE , C HILD S UPPORT P ROGRAM a nd D EBORAH H OLZER , Appellee s

.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order rendered by the Department of Revenue

.

May 3, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
M AKAR , O STERHAUS , and B ILBREY , JJ., concur

.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Katherine Aman
, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein
, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee s.
10315.

#### Barrett *v.*Allen.

Decided June 13, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Monroe—Judge Anderson presiding. January 7, 1919.

The suit was on an, account for 15% months board, and for expense of moving the defendant, laundry, etc. The defendant was the mother of the plaintiff’s wife. He and his wife and daughter testified that when the defendant came to their home to board she agreed to pay whatever her board was worth, and. said that she would not go there if not allowed! to pay board. No amount was agreed upon. It was testified that she boarded at the plaintiff’s house 15% months, and that $20 a month, as charged in the account, was a reasonable charge for her board, and was the usual charge in the town in which they lived; that the plaintiff moved her to his house with his own teams and money, and the amount charged for this was reasonable. The defendant testified that she did not agree to pay any board, but did pay her daughter, the plaintiff’s wife, $5 a month, and “that is all it is worth;” that she “did not agree to pay any more;” and that when she went to live with them she carried enough provisions and canned goods to last her two years. There was a credit of $65 cash on the account sued on, and the plaintiff testified that the defendant paid or gave this amount to his wife. The defendant-and others testified that during a part of the period mentioned she did not stay at the plaintiff’s house, but stayed with other children. The verdict was for the defendant.

*R. L. & H. C. Cox,*for plaintiff.

*O. Roberts,*for defendant.

'Bkoyles, P. J.

1. Under tlie facts of the case the following charge was error: “The plaintiff can not recover in this case for services and board, unless it is shown that there was an agreement by which the defendant was to pay for them when she went to live with her son-in-law, Barrett [the plaintiff]. The law is that services rendered and board furnished by one near relative to another are presumed to be gratuitous, and the burden in such case is upon the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was a contract between the parties by which such services and board were to be paid for by the party.” *Murrell*v. *Studstill,*104 *Ga.*604, 606 (30 S. E. 750) ; *Wall*v. *Wall,*15 *Ga. App.*156 (82 S. E. 791), and cases there cited.

2. As there must be a new trial of the case on account of the error in the charge of the court, the question whether the verdict is supported by evidence is not passed upon.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Bloodworth and Stephens, JJ., concur.*
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-7022

ANGELO B. HAM, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. OFFICER CAIN, SMU, Business Office, Lee Correctional Institution; L. MILLER, Grievance Coordinator, Lee Correctional Institution, Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. David C. Norton, District Judge. (6:08-cv-01764-DCN)

Submitted: October 21, 2008 Decided: October 28, 2008

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Angelo B. Ham, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: Angelo B. Ham appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge

recommended that relief be denied and advised Ham that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Ham failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Ham has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny Ham’s motion for appointment of counsel and affirm the judgment

of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

23 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
10526.

#### Campbell *v.*The State.

Decided July 23, 1919.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Walton superior court— Judge Cobb. December 13, 1918.

*Rogers & Knox, On-in Roberts,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. 0. Dean, solicitor-general,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

The verdict was amply authorized by the evidence and no ground of the motion for a new trial shows cause for a reversal of the judgment below.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodioorth and Stephens, JJ., concur.*
fflniteb ~tates !lBepartment of ((ommerce 

Jlational 3Jnstitute of ~tanbarbs anb \[ecbnologp 

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For: 

Los Angeles County 

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international system of units (SI), documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented measurement procedures, successfully 

completed training and proficiency tests, documented calibration intervals, submitted a quality management system, and 

demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate. 

The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State 

Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2005. 

2019 Scope 

Mass Echelon Ill Volume Transfer, II 

25 kg to 1 mg 5 gal 

5000 lb to 1000 lb 

so lb to 1 lb fJ*«.du~ 

8 oz to 0.03125 oz Douglas A. Olson, Chief 

NIST Office ofWeights and Measures 

Effective Dates: 2019-01-01 to 2020-02-01 

(Rev.: March 2013)
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 99.1

i2 TECHNOLOGIES                                                          [LOGO]
================================================================================
                                                                   PRESS RELEASE

i2 TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERTRANS LOGISTICS SOLUTIONS FINALIZE MERGER


IRVING, TX
May 5, 1998

i2 Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: ITWO), the leading provider of supply chain
optimization and decision support solutions, announced that it finalized its
merger with InterTrans Logistics Solutions, the market leading provider of
software designed to manage both the daily operations and the tactical and
strategic planning aspects of transportation and logistics activities across the
supply chain, which was first announced on March 24, 1998. Under the terms of
the agreement, i2 will issue up to 1.66 million shares of its common stock for 
all the outstanding shares and stock options of InterTrans in a transaction
accounted for as a pooling of interests. InterTrans, headquartered in Markham,
Ontario, will continue to operate as an independent business unit.

ABOUT i2 TECHNOLOGIES:
Founded in 1988, i2 Technologies' planning, optimization and decision support
solutions are in use across a variety of industries, including consumer goods,
automotive, metals, high tech and electronics. i2 Technologies' RHYTHM family of
solutions provides complete supply chain management from sourcing and
manufacturing to distribution, logistics and transportation planning. i2 is
headquartered in Irving, TX, and with the addition of InterTrans has
approximately 1,400 employees and maintains offices worldwide. The Company was
ranked first in the software category on Forbes ASAP's 1998 list of "The ASAP
Top 100 Dynamic Companies." i2 also was recognized as a "Technology of the Year"
in Industry Week's Fifth Annual Technology & Innovation Awards. For additional
information, visit i2 on the web at http://www.i2.com.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
CONTACT:
<S>                                          <C>
Angela Schwecke                              Brent Anderson
Public Relations, i2 Technologies            Investor Relations, i2 Technologies
214-860-6000                                 214-860-6000
angela_schwecke@i2.com                       brent_anderson@i2.com
</TABLE>
                                       ###
PR-251