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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ERIC BLACKMAN

No. 20 CR 412 

Judge Robert W. Gettleman

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION PAPER AS TO SENTENCING FACTORS

On December 22, 2019, 13 individuals were shot in a mass shooting at a

residence on the south side of Chicago. Approximately 31 expended cartridge casings

were recovered from inside of the residence. Thirteen of those expended cartridge

cases came from a firearm that defendant ERIC BLACKMAN illegally straw

purchased for someone else.

The straw purchaser plays a significant role in the gun violence that has

continuously troubled the City of Chicago and threatened the public safety of its

residents. The straw purchaser has no criminal history. An individual who cannot

legally possess firearms or who does not want to be associated with a firearms sale

takes advantage of this fact and uses the straw purchaser to be the face of a firearm

transaction. Both the straw purchaser and the prohibited person deceive the firearms

dealer by concealing the identity of the true buyer of the firearm, which results in

frustrating law enforcement’s efforts to investigate serious crimes traced to that

purchased firearm. It is the straw purchaser who sets in motion a chain of events that

has the potential to endanger the community.
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Such was the case here when defendant straw-purchased the Smith and

Wesson 9 millimeter pistol that played such a significant role in the December 2019

shooting that injured so many people.

Defendant was charged with, and pled guilty to, straw-purchasing that Sith

and Wesson firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Defendant’s offense is a

serious one. In light of defendant’s specific history and characteristics and the

principles of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence at the high end of

the Guidelines range of 6 to 12 months is an appropriate and just sentence in this

case. Such a sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the goals

set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines and § 3553(a).

I. Factual Background1

On August 10, 2019, defendant purchased a 9 millimeter Smith and Wesson 

pistol from a licensed firearms dealer in Oak Forest, Illinois. In connection with the 

purchase of that pistol, defendant completed an ATF Form 4473. When defendant 

completed that form, he certified that he was the actual buyer of the Smith and 

Wesson pistol. At the time that defendant so certified, he, in fact, knew that he was 

not purchasing the gun for himself but was rather doing so on behalf of another 

person, namely Individual A. 

1 The information contained in this section is based on the complaint, R. 1, and the

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which contains the Government’s Version of the 

Offense (“GVO”). At sentencing, the district court may rely upon information contained in a 

PSR so long as the information is well-supported and appears reliable. See United States v. 

Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2004).
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On August 4, 2020, ATF agents interviewed defendant who admitted that he 

purchased the firearm for Individual A because Individual A was underage and could 

not purchase a gun himself.2 PSR ¶ 6; see GVO, Exh. A, ATF Report No. 7 at 1-2. 

Text messages between defendant and Individual A, which were recovered from 

defendant’s phone, show that defendant’s intent from the outset was to purchase a 

gun for another person and to lie on the ATF Form 4473 where he claimed to be the 

actual buyer of the firearm. During the text exchanges, defendant and Individual A 

discussed defendant’s purchase of the firearm for Individual A. PSR ¶ 6. Specifically, 

defendant told Individual A, “give me your cash, I’ll go buy you one [firearm] brand 

new.” R. 1 at 4. Individual A asked defendant if he could get “good ones [firearms]” 

for $400, and defendant responded, “guns is guns but yeah you can get some for $400.” 

On July 25, 2019, Individual A confirmed with defendant that he could still purchase 

the gun for Individual A [“I was still tryna buy that [firearm] [t]omorrow[.] [Y]ou still 

got me?” Defendant confirmed that he did [“Yeah I got you”]. Defendant and 

Individual A made plans to go to the gun store together, but Individual A told 

defendant, “if you wanted [to,] I could just give you the bread [money] and you can 

grab it [firearm from the gun store]. I know you know what’s good and what’s not 

anyway.” After defendant purchased this firearm, he gave it to Individual A. 

2 ATF agents previously interviewed defendant on January 28, 2020. See GVO, Exh. A at 

ATF Report No. 4 at 2-5. During that interview, defendant told agents that he left the Smith 

and Wesson firearm with Individual A at Individual A’s residence for safe-keeping. 

Defendant admitted in his August 4, 2020 interview with agents that he lied to them about 

what happened to the firearm after he purchased it. See GVO, Exh. A at ATF Report No. 7 

at 2. 
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Individual A then gave defendant $400. See GVO, Exh. A, ATF Report No. 7 at 2.

When agents asked defendant during the interview for his thoughts on providing 

Individual A with the firearm that defendant purchased, defendant responded, “I just 

figured what’s the worst that could happen?” Id.

Law enforcement recovered the firearm from Individual A on or about 

December 30, 2019. PSR ¶ 5; see GVO, Exh. B. According to police reports from that 

incident, Chicago Police Department officers observed Individual A walking with 

what appeared to be the handle of a gun sticking out from his right coat pocket. GVO, 

Exh. B. Officers attempted to stop Individual A when he began running down the 

sidewalk. Id. Officers apprehended Individual A and recovered from him the Smith 

and Wesson that defendant bought for him. Id. The firearm was loaded and had an 

obliterated serial number when officers recovered it from Individual A. Id. Individual 

A was subsequently charged with and convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a 

weapon. PSR ¶ 5. 

After law enforcement recovered the firearm from Individual A, they 

determined that it was a firearm that had been used in the December 22, 2019 mass 

shooting. See GVO, Exh. C. 

II. Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing Range 

As a matter of process, the Court must properly calculate the Guidelines range,

treat the Guidelines as advisory, consider the section 3553(a) factors, and adequately

explain the chosen sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007).
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A. Offense Level Calculation and Criminal History Calculation

The PSR agrees with the calculations set forth in the plea agreement. PSR ¶ 

55. In the plea agreement, the base offense level is 12 pursuant to Guideline § 

2K2.1(a)(7). PSR ¶ 11. After a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 

defendant’s total offense level is 10.3 PSR ¶¶ 18-19. 

Defendant has 0 criminal history points, placing him in criminal history 

category I. PSR ¶ 24.

B. Guidelines Range

When an adjusted offense level of 10 is considered with his placement in

Criminal History Category I, defendant’s advisory Guidelines range is 6 to 12 months’

imprisonment. PSR ¶ 54.

III. Application Of The Section 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

A sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range is reasonable and 

appropriate in this case because the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of such a 

sentence. In determining the sentence to impose, courts consider, among other 

factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

3 The PSR notes that defendant failed to return to the probation officer completed and signed 

financial forms and release forms as directed. PSR ¶¶ 9, 18, 51. The PSR also notes that 

defendant failed to respond to the probation officer’s follow-up attempt to obtain these forms. 

PSR ¶ 9. The PSR notes, however, that defendant’s admission to investigating agents and 

his timely guilty plea “outweigh” his failure to return the requisite forms to the probation 

officer. PSR ¶ 18. 
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characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).4

There are several § 3553(a) factors that support such a sentence for this 

defendant, including: (1) his history and personal characteristics, (2) the seriousness 

of the offense, (3) the need to provide just punishment for the offense and adequate 

deterrence, and (4) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant. The government’s proposed sentence adequately addresses these factors 

and appropriately provides a just sentence for this defendant.

A. History and Characteristics of the Defendant5

Defendant is 30 years old. PSR ¶ 35. Defendant has no prior criminal history.

PSR ¶¶ 22-24. Defendant reported to the probation officer that he was raised by his

single mother on the south side of Chicago, that his childhood was “great,” that his

mother gave him “anything he wanted,” and that while he did not speak with his

siblings on a frequent basis, he had a close relationship with them. PSR ¶¶ 30-31.

Defendant denied any gang affiliation. PSR ¶ 34. Defendant reported being in a longterm and stable relationship with his girlfriend and that he had no children. PSR ¶

4 Courts also must consider the need for the sentence to (A) reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to 

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D); see also e.g., United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 278 (7th Cir. 

2011). Section 3553(a) also requires the court to impose a sentence that is Asufficient, but not 

greater than necessary,@ to comply with the purposes of sentencing.

5 The PSR notes that the probation officer was unable to corroborate this information with 

defendant’s brother. PSR ¶ 29.
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32. Defendant reported an employment history to the probation officer, though the

officer was unable to verify certain of this self-reported employment because

defendant did return a signed release of information form.6. PSR ¶¶ 45-49. 

Unlike many of the defendants in this District, defendant does not have a

criminal history, and he had a solid upbringing. On the one hand, while the Court

can consider defendant’s lack of criminal history as a mitigating factor, the Court

should also weigh it as an aggravating factor for his lack of criminal history is what

allowed him to commit the straw-purchasing offense.

B. Seriousness of the Offense

The nature of defendant’s offense is undoubtedly serious. The Supreme Court

has explained the “twin goals” of section 922(a)(6) and identified the difficulties law

enforcement face during investigations of serious firearms crimes when strawpurchasers at the front end mask the identity of the firearm’s true purchaser:

[T]he statute establishes an elaborate system to verify a would-be gun

purchaser’s identity and check on his background. It also requires that

the information so gathered go into a dealer’s permanent records. The

twin goals of this comprehensive scheme are to keep guns out of the

hands of criminals and others who should not have them, and to assist

law enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes. And no part

of that scheme would work if the statute turned a blind eye to straw

purchases—if, in other words, the law addressed not the substance of a

transaction, but only empty formalities.

To see why, consider what happens in a typical straw purchase. A felon

or other person who cannot buy or own a gun still wants to obtain one.

(Or, alternatively, a person who could legally buy a firearm wants to

conceal his purchase, maybe so he can use the gun for criminal purposes

6 The government notes that during its investigation, it learned that defendant was employed 

at the food retailer referenced in paragraph 47 of the PSR.
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without fear that police officers will later trace it to him.) Accordingly,

the prospective buyer enlists an intermediary to help him accomplish

his illegal aim. Perhaps he conscripts a loyal friend or family member;

perhaps more often, he hires a stranger to purchase the gun for a price.

The actual purchaser might even accompany the straw to the gun shop,

instruct him which firearm to buy, give him the money to pay at the

counter, and take possession as they walk out the door.

***

And likewise, the statute’s record-keeping provisions would serve little

purpose if the records kept were of nominal rather than real buyers . . .

That information helps to fight serious crime. When police officers

retrieve a gun at a crime scene, they can trace it to the buyer and

consider him as a suspect. Too, the required records enable dealers to

identify certain suspicious purchasing trends, which they then must

report to federal authorities. But once again, those provisions can serve

their objective only if the records point to the person who took actual

control of the gun(s). Otherwise, the police will at most learn the identity

of an intermediary, who could not have been responsible for the gun's

use and might know next to nothing about the actual buyer.

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 181-83 (2014) (internal citations and

parantheticals omitted).

Here, defendant purchased the gun for Individual A and knowingly (falsely)

certified that the gun was for him when it was, in fact, for Individual A. By concealing

that Individual A was the actual buyer, defendant “prevented the dealer from

transacting with [Individual A] face-to-face, recording his name, age, and residence,

inspecting his photo ID, submitting his identifying information to the background

check system, and determining whether he was prohibited from receiving a firearm,”

id. at 188 (internal citations omitted), conduct that “thwarted application of

essentially all of the firearms law’s requirements,” id. at 188-89.
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The devastating impact of prohibited persons illegally possessing firearms on

a community cannot be overstated. Firearms and firearm-related violence have

plagued the City of Chicago for years.7 The City of Chicago has been inundated with

violence from the actions of individuals who illegally possess firearms and then use

those firearms to commit crimes. Those individuals present a clear and present

danger to the residents of the City of Chicago and undoubtedly pose a serious risk

and threat of violence to the community. The residents of the City of Chicago have

borne and continue to bear the brunt of the physical and emotional toll from that gun

violence. Violence in Chicago neighborhoods negatively impacts quality of life, and it

causes serious damage to those who live in daily fear of how that violence can impact

their families and neighborhoods.

Those who straw purchase firearms and deliver them into the hands of

individuals who are either unwilling or unable to purchase firearms within the

boundaries of the law are inextricably linked to the gun violence that follows the

transfer of those firearms. Straw purchasers contribute to the potential violence in

Chicago that could result from firearms ending up in the hands of those who should

not possess them.

This case is representative of the harmful ripple effect that straw-purchased

firearms can have. The Smith and Wesson firearm that defendant purchased for, and

transferred to, Individual A was purchased on August 10, 2019. It was used

7 See, e.g. https://abc7chicago.com/straw-purchases-fuel-chicago-gun-violence-drug-cartelmayhem/5690949/ (last visited on July 12, 2021). 
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approximately four months later in the December 22, 2019 mass shooting where 13

individuals were shot. See GVO, Exh. C. A little over one week later, Chicago police

officers recovered the firearm—loaded and with an obliterated serial number—from

Individual A after Individual A fled from police.

Defendant’s purchase of that Smith and Wesson set in motion a chain of events

which endangered the health, safety, and welfare of the community at large,

culminating in potentially deadly harm to Chicago residents and heightened danger

to police officers who were trying to keep the City of Chicago safe. A sentence at the

high end of the Guidelines range appropriately reflects the seriousness of defendant’s

offense and is a fair and just punishment when considering an application of the other

§ 3553(a) factors.

C. The Need for Defendant’s Sentence to Promote Respect for the

Law, Provide Just Punishment, Afford Adequate Deterrence,

and Protect the Public from Future Crimes by this Defendant

Defendant told ATF agents during his August 4, 2020 interview that he bought

the gun for Individual A because he “ain’t gotta worry about nothing with him” [later

explaining that he did not believe that Individual A would do anything bad with the

gun]. See GVO, Exh. A at ATF Report No 7 at 2. While defendant did not believe that

harmful consequences would follow the illegal purchase and transfer of that firearm

to Individual A, he was wrong. Defendant’s act of straw-purchasing the firearm for

Individual A was an intentional one, and it showed disrespect for the rules governing

firearms purchases and a disregard for the broader reasons those rules are in place.

As the Abramski Court concluded, “[we] can hardly think of a misrepresentation any
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more material to a [firearm] sale’s legality.” 573 U.S. at 189. The government’s

proposed sentence will help promote respect for the law, reinforce the underlying

purposes for imposing firearms regulations, and provide a just punishment for

defendant’s current crime.

The sentence imposed in this case must send a message to deter others inclined

to straw purchase firearms for money or other reasons and to force them to think

twice before doing so. As noted above, defendant’s actions are a case study in how

even one straw purchaser and one illegally purchased firearm can negatively impact

the Chicago community in a harmful way. See United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872,

874-75 (7th Cir. 2018) (allowing for consideration of “locality-specific factors,”

including the rise in Chicago’s gun violence). In addition to general deterrence,

defendant must specifically be deterred from committing future crimes. A sentence

at the high end of the Guidelines range is necessary to reflect the consequences that

flow from this type of crime, ensure that defendant does not continue his criminal

conduct, and send a message to others that an offense such as this is one that comes

with serious consequences.

IV. Supervised Release Conditions

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a sentencing court has discretion to impose

appropriate conditions of supervised release, to the extent that such

conditions (1) are reasonably related to factors identified in § 3553(a),

including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant; (2) involve no greater deprivation

of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in §

3553(a); and (3) are consistent with the policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission. Policies emphasized by the Sentencing
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Commission include deterrence rehabilitation, and protecting the

public.

United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), the Seventh 

Circuit held that sentencing courts must make an independent determination that 

each condition of supervised release imposed on a defendant is rationally and 

reasonably related to the offense conduct and characteristics, and to the sentencing 

purposes identified by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c) and 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D). 

Thompson, 777 F.3d at 374-76. 

Consistent with these principles, the government recommends that the Court 

impose a three-year period of supervised release. The government agrees with the 

probation officer that the mandatory, discretionary, and special conditions of 

supervised release recommended in the PSR are reasonable and appropriate to 

protect the public and the supervising probation officer, deter defendant from 

returning to criminal conduct and promote his respect for the law, and ensure that 

defendant receives the appropriate support for him to reintegrate into society. PSR 

at 12-17. 
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V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court

impose a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range and order a three-year

term of supervised release with the requested supervised release conditions

consistent with the goals of criminal punishment. 

Date: July 12, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,

JOHN R. LAUSCH, JR.

United States Attorney

By: /s/ Sheri L. Wong 

Sheri L. Wong

Assistant U.S. Attorney

219 South Dearborn Street, 5th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 697-4069