# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 18, 2014 *

Decided August 20, 2014

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 12

‐ 3267

MICHAEL D. ALLISON,

Plaintiff–Appellant

,

v.

CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, ILLINOIS,

et al.,

Defendants–Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District

of Illinois.

No. 09

‐ 703

‐ GPM

G. Patrick Murphy,

Judge

.

O R D E R NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C).No. 12

‐ 3267 Page 2

This appeal culminates a nearly decade

‐ long litigation saga. In 2003 and again in

2005, Michael Allison’s vintage Buicks were towed from his driveway in Bridgeport,

Illinois. In 2005 Allison sued the city, several city officials, and a tow

‐ truck operator for

unreasonably seizing his cars in violation of the Fourth Amendment and depriving him

of property without a hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. On the eve of trial, he voluntarily dismissed that suit, but in 2009 he filed a

substantively identical lawsuit. During the two suits, Allison repeatedly fired his

counsel, including shortly before the second suit’s scheduled trial date. Allison sought a

continuance, but the court ordered the trial to go forward with Allison proceeding pro

se, and the jury eventually ruled against him. On appeal Allison argues that the

defendants committed “fraud on the court” during discovery and that the court should

have granted him a continuance. These arguments are meritless, so we affirm.

The amended complaint in the 2009 suit mirrored the operative complaint in

Allison’s earlier suit. The new case proceeded to discovery and the parties clashed: Both

sides objected to many discovery requests and filed motions to compel and for

sanctions. In late 2010 Allison rehired attorney Richard Fedder (whom he had fired in

the earlier proceeding), and Fedder successfully moved to extend the discovery

deadline and to submit additional interrogatories and requests for production; Allison,

however, fired him again a month later. The parties continued to wrangle over

discovery

‐ related issues, and in mid

‐ 2011, Allison again rehired Fedder, who convinced

the court to reopen discovery and allow the amendment of the complaint to add a civil

RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c). Between December 2011 and September

2012, the court postponed the trial eight times, usually at Fedder’s request.

Despite Fedder’s successes on his behalf, Allison sought additional relief through

his own pro se motions. For example he twice attempted to file a self

‐ styled “motion to

continue trial and for equitable relief,” accusing defendants’ counsel of committing

“fraud upon the court” by requesting to inspect his Buicks, by failing to respond in a

satisfactory manner to his discovery requests, and by filing a motion for sanctions. But

because Allison was already represented by an attorney, the district court struck these

motions. See United States v. Gwiazdzinski

, 141 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1998).

Dissatisfied with the district court’s decision not to consider his pro se motions,

Allison again fired Fedder less than three weeks before trial. The court warned that the

trial would take place as scheduled; if Allison stood by his decision to discharge Fedder,

then Allison would have to represent himself at trial. On the day of trial, Allison

confirmed that he was discharging Fedder and submitted pro se motions accusing theNo. 12

‐ 3267 Page 3

defendants of committing fraud, asserting that the magistrate judge who had ruled on

discovery motions was biased, and asking for a continuance. The court denied the

motions. It also dismissed the civil RICO claim as barred by the statute of limitations.

After the case proceeded to trial, and Allison struggled to present his case on his

own, he asked the court if he could bring Fedder—who remained in the courtroom and

assisted Allison with procedural matters during trial—“back into the case to conduct

this jury trial.” The court denied that request, explaining that Allison had fired and then

rehired his counsel “three times before, but it will not happen again. Now, you are on

your own.” Allison continued to testify but did not offer evidence regarding several

defendants, so after he rested his case, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to

those defendants. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 50(a). The remaining defendants put on their case,

and the jury ruled in their favor.

On appeal Allison primarily argues that the district court made incorrect

discovery rulings because the defendants and their lawyers committed “fraud on the

court.” We reject this argument for multiple reasons. First, Allison points to no evidence

in the record supporting his contention that the defendants engaged in “fraud,” and we

can find none. Allison’s unhappiness about the defendants’ aggressive discovery tactics

does not support a conclusion that they lied to the court. (For a similar reason, we reject

Allison’s cursory argument that the four

‐ year statute of limitations for civil RICO,

s ee Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley

‐ Duff & Assocs., Inc.

, 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987), should

have been equitably tolled. Allison points to no evidence supporting his argument that

the defendants “fraudulently concealed” facts about this claim.) Second, the court did

not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings, and in fact its generous extension of the

discovery deadline and reopening of discovery enabled Allison to obtain some of the

information he sought. See Stevo v. Frasor

, 662 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 2011) (no abuse of

discretion in closing discovery after district court had extended discovery period for 15

months). Third, Allison has not explained how he was seriously prejudiced by his

inability to obtain the rest of the information he had requested. See Jones v. City of

Elkhart, Ind.

, 737 F.3d 1107, 1116 (7th Cir. 2013).

Allison also argues that the district court erred by denying his request for a

continuance on the date of trial. We disagree. “We are particularly reluctant to find an

abuse of discretion where

. . . a court denies a continuance to a [party] who decides to

proceed pro se but then complains of not being prepared for trial.” United States v.

Volpentesta

, 727 F.3d 666, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2013). The court’s decision to hold the trial as

scheduled was not an abuse of discretion, given that the original complaint had beenNo. 12

‐ 3267 Page 4

filed almost seven years earlier, the court had previously granted many continuances,

and the court had explained to Allison (almost three weeks before trial) exactly what

would happen if he persisted in firing his attorney again. See United States v. Egwaoje

,

335 F.3d 579, 583–84, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of continuance where

defendant decided to proceed pro se on day of trial); Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate,

Inc.

, 694 F.2d 1081, 1085–86, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of continuance

where plaintiffs’ lawyer withdrew on day of trial; case had been pending for three years

and the district court permissibly concluded that “no further delay could be tolerated”).

Allison also argues that the court improperly denied his mid

‐ trial request for

Fedder to return to the case, but this decision was within the court’s broad discretion to

“efficiently and fairly manage trial proceedings,” Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc.

, 368 F.3d

709, 719 (7th Cir. 2004). Mere hours after granting Allison’s request to discharge Fedder

and proceed pro se, the court was not required to allow Allison to change his mind

again. See United States v. Tolliver

, 937 F.2d 1183, 1187–88 (7th Cir. 1991).

We have considered Allison’s remaining arguments—which are mostly

“generalized assertion[s] of error”—and conclude that none has merit. Anderson v.

Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001); see F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a)(8).

AFFIRMED.