In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 04-3731

LINDA T. and GENE A., as parents of,

and on behalf of their minor son,

WILLIAM A.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

RICE LAKE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 03 C 628—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 3, 2005—DECIDED AUGUST 2, 2005

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and KANNE and SYKES,

Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In this case we review the denial

of a claim for attorneys’ fees under the Individuals With

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400

et seq. The district court denied the claim because although

Linda T. and Gene A., parents of William A., prevailed in

part in a state administrative agency hearing challenging
2 No. 04-3731

certain aspects of William’s educational program, their

success on the merits was de minimis. We affirm.

I. Background

William A. is an autistic child who attends the Rice Lake

Area School District (“the District”) in Barron County,

Wisconsin. From age three to six he attended the District’s

early childhood program located in Red Cedar Hall, a

facility that offers a functional-based, prevocational curriculum to disabled students. William attended kindergarten at Tainter Elementary School, and for the first grade he

was placed half-day at Red Cedar Hall and half-day at

Tainter Elementary. From the second through the fifth

grades, William attended Tainter Elementary full-time.

William’s intellectual and social development are significantly delayed. According to the District, in August 2003,

when William was twelve years old and preparing to enter

sixth grade, his reading and math skills were between the

mid-first to mid-second grade level. The District determined

that William’s expressive language and communication

abilities were approximately at the level of a 2-to-2-1⁄2-yearold, and that in terms of daily living skills such as personal

hygiene, dressing, and eating, he functioned at the age of a

3.3-year-old child. William is cheerful and compliant but

seldom initiates verbal exchanges and takes cues from

peers inconsistently. William was sometimes disruptive in

class and was removed from his fifth-grade regular classroom on some occasions.

On April 30, 2003, the District convened an Individualized

Education Program (“IEP”) meeting to determine William’s

continuing eligibility for special education, develop an IEP,

and determine his placement for the 2003-2004 school year.

William’s parents participated in the IEP team meeting.

The parents and the District had come to very different

views about the appropriate placement for William. The
No. 04-3731 3

District believed that William would receive little or no educational benefit from being placed full-time at Rice Lake

Middle School because the regular sixth-grade curriculum

is too complex and fast-paced for him. Although the special

education teachers at the Middle School acknowledged that

William could work on some of his objectives and goals

within a regular classroom, they pointed out that none of

William’s own objectives and goals are part of the regular

sixth-grade curriculum. 

The IEP that was developed for William offered placement

half-day at Red Cedar Hall and half-day at the Middle

School. The description of the special education program in

the IEP is the same for both locations and indicates that

William will receive “an individually designed program for

Autism serviced through the Cognitive Disabilities

Program.” Under the IEP, William will receive “special education 100% of the time” and “will participate with nondisabled peers whenever appropriate.” The IEP also provides that “on-going autism training will be offered for the

staff that work with” William, including participation in

autism workshops and training, the amount and frequency

of which were to be determined “as opportunities arise and

are deemed appropriate.”

William’s parents were dissatisfied with the IEP and

requested a due process hearing before the Wisconsin

Division of Hearings and Appeals. They challenged the IEP

on three grounds. First, they argued that William’s placement half-days at Red Cedar Hall denied him the right to

receive a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment as guaranteed by the “mainstreaming” provision contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Linda

T. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137

(W.D. Wis. 2004). William’s parents sought an order placing

William at the Middle School full-time. Second, the parents

contended that William’s IEP did not contain sufficient

particulars about the instructional training services to be
4 No. 04-3731

provided to the staff. The parents asserted that rather than

simply state that such services be provided “as needed,” the

IEP should specify the amount and frequency of instructional training services that would be provided. Third, the

parents requested that the District retain an independent

consultant to train staff on how to implement William’s

IEP. Id.

After a three-day hearing and the filing of posthearing

briefs, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision on the merits of the parents’ claim. That decision is the

focus of this attorneys’ fees dispute. The ALJ concluded that

William “would not receive a satisfactory education in the

regular education classroom setting at the Middle School

during the morning” because the regular education class is

substantively unrelated to the goals and objectives of his

IEP. Id. at 1138. Accordingly, the ALJ held that placing

William at Red Cedar Hall for half of the school day was

acceptable. Id. The ALJ also concluded, however, that the

IEP did not identify with sufficient particularity the

available and appropriate opportunities for William to

interact with nondisabled peers during his half days at the

Middle School, instead stating only that he would participate with nondisabled peers “whenever appropriate.” Id. at

1138-39. The ALJ found this lack of specificity to be inconsistent with the “mainstreaming” standard and ordered the

IEP team to reconvene “to determine what mainstreaming

opportunities are appropriate for [William] and to revise the

IEP and placement offer to include such opportunities to

the maximum extent appropriate.” Id. at 1139.

With respect to the staff training issue, the ALJ also

found the language in William’s IEP too vague and directed

the IEP team to revise the IEP “so that it clearly states the

amount and frequency of autism training that will be provided to the staff who work with [William].” Id. Finally, the

ALJ rejected the parents’ request that the district be

ordered to hire an independent consultant to train

William’s teachers. Id.
No. 04-3731 5

William’s parents then filed the present action in the

district court seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B) as the prevailing party in the agency proceeding. The parties did not contest the conclusions reached

by the ALJ. The only issues before the court were whether

William’s parents “prevailed” in the legal sense in the

agency proceeding, and if so, what amount, if any, would

constitute a reasonable fee award. Id. at 1140.

The district court held that although the parents did not

prevail on the issues of William’s placement and the retention of an independent consultant, they were entitled to

prevailing party status to the extent that the ALJ ordered

the IEP revised to provide greater specificity regarding staff

training. Id. at 1142. But the court held that the plaintiffs’

success before the ALJ was de minimis because the issue of

greater specificity in the IEP was merely a “secondary

concern” and the ALJ’s decision did not require the District

to provide William with any new or additional services. Id.

at 1143-44. The court thus declined to award attorneys’

fees, citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992), which

holds that a plaintiff who formally but only nominally

prevails may be denied recovery of attorneys’ fees. William’s

parents appealed.

II. Discussion

The IDEA contains a fee-shifting provision that permits

an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party: “In any

action or proceeding brought under this section, the court,

in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as

part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability

who is the prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

IDEA’s fee-shifting provision allows an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees to the party who prevails in an administrative proceeding as well as an action in court. T.D. v.

LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 479 (2003). The
6 No. 04-3731

parties do not disagree about the district court’s determination that the parents prevailed at the due process

hearing on the issue of greater specificity in William’s IEP

regarding teacher training. The only dispute on appeal is

whether, having determined that the parents had prevailing party status, the district court erred in denying them

attorneys’ fees because their success on the merits was

de minimis. 

A party “prevails” for purposes of federal fee-shifting

statutes when he or she obtains “actual relief on the merits”

of a claim that “materially alters the legal relationship

between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior

in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar, 506

U.S. at 111-12. However, the Supreme Court in Farrar held

that “[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally

‘prevails’ . . . should receive no attorney’s fees at all.” Id. at

115 (citation omitted); Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George

L., 102 F.3d 895, 907 (7th Cir. 1996). The prevailing party

inquiry “does not turn on the magnitude of relief obtained,”

but the size of the fee award does. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114.

The Supreme Court has said that “the most critical factor”

in determining the reasonableness of a fee award “is the

degree of success obtained.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 436 (1983). Therefore, “the degree of the plaintiff’s

success in relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a

factor critical to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibility for a fee award at all.” Tex. State

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,

790 (1989). The reasonable fee award for a prevailing

plaintiff who obtains only a “Pyrrhic victory” is zero. Farrar,

506 U.S. at 117 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 

We review the district court’s determination whether to

grant attorneys’ fees under the IDEA deferentially, reversing only upon finding an abuse of discretion. George L., 102

F.3d at 907 (citing Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 987

(7th Cir. 1988) and Max M. v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No.
No. 04-3731 7

203, 859 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)). “An abuse of

discretion is found only when reasonable persons could not

take the view espoused by the district court.” Id. Here, as

we have noted, the district court declined to award attorneys’ fees because the degree to which William’s parents

succeeded at the due process hearing was so slight that it

did not support the recovery of any attorneys’ fees.

The district court analogized the facts of this case to those

in George L., and we find the analogy sound. In George

L.,the parents of a disabled child convinced a hearing officer

that the school district failed to provide their child with a

free appropriate public education but did not prevail on

their claim that the private school into which they had

unilaterally placed him was the least restrictive environment for his education. George L., 102 F.3d at 906-07. The

hearing officer ordered specific changes to the child’s IEP,

including particular amounts of individualized instruction,

but declined to authorize placement at the private school

and ordered only interim reimbursement of the parents’

private school costs until the new IEP was implemented. Id.

We affirmed the district court’s denial of a fee award, noting

that under Farrar, “when a plaintiff’s success is simply

technical or de minimis, no fees may be awarded, even if

the plaintiff has succeeded on an issue in the litigation and

may thus be technically a ‘prevailing party.’ ” Id. at 907.

Although the parents in George L. won changes in their

child’s educational program, they lost their primary claim

regarding his placement in the private school. Accordingly,

we concluded that the district court did not “abuse[ ] its

discretion in finding such achievement de minimis in the

context of the Parents’ broader goals in this case.” Id. at

908.

Similarly, in this case, William’s parents succeeded only

on their claim that William’s IEP required greater specificity in certain discrete areas; they lost on the placement

issue, which was most important in the context of the administrative proceeding as a whole. As the district court
8 No. 04-3731

1 Effective July 1, 2005, this subsection now reads: “Attorneys’

fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the IEP Team

unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative

proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for

a medication described in subsection (e) of this section.” See

Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2715 (2004).

noted, the ALJ did not require the provision of any additional or different services to William; by requiring greater

specificity in the IEP, the ALJ was simply ordering the

District to complete an evaluation it had already begun.

Linda T., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoned determination that

this degree of success is de minimis and insufficient to

support an award of attorneys’ fees. 

The plaintiffs argue that the district court’s analysis was

deficient because the court failed to take into account a

1997 amendment to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D), which, they

contend, creates a presumption in favor of an award of

attorneys’ fees under the circumstances of this case. In 1997

Congress amended the fee-shifting statute as part of a

broad overhaul of the IDEA. See Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111

Stat. 37 (1997). Among other changes, the following limitation was added to the fee-shifting provision:

Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded relating to any

meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or

judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a

mediation described in subsection (e) of this section that

is conducted prior to the filing of a complaint under

subsection (b)(6) or (k) of this section.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).1

The parents argue that this new language creates a

“presumptive eligibility” for attorneys’ fees in cases where,

as here, a new IEP meeting is ordered as a result of an ad-
No. 04-3731 9

ministrative proceeding. The amendment cannot reasonably

be read in this way. We note first that the amendment

pertains to claims for attorneys’ fees associated with IEP

meetings; the claim currently before the court is one for fees

associated with the proceeding before the ALJ, not fees

associated with the new IEP the ALJ ordered.

As for the substance of the argument, the 1997 amendment is plainly a limitation on awards of attorneys’ fees: it

prohibits recovery of fees associated with IEP meetings

unless the meeting is convened by order of a court or

administrative agency. This language does not create a

“presumptive eligibility” to an award of attorneys’ fees by

inverse implication; it removes discretion from the court

over a certain category of fees but does not compel the exercise of the court’s discretion in favor of the category of fees

included in the prohibition’s “unless” clause. The court’s

general discretion to award attorneys’ fees remains governed by § 1415(i)(3)(B), which requires the court to determine prevailing party status and what amount of fees, if

any, is reasonable under the circumstances. The 1997

amendment prohibits the court from including in any fee

award a certain type of attorneys’ fees; it does not purport

to alter the basic statutory framework for determining

whether a fee award is appropriate in the first instance.

We have previously held that the 1997 amendments prohibiting recovery of attorneys’ fees in certain circumstances

do not “indicate a Congressional intent about anything

related to the ‘prevailing party’ requirement” in the IDEA

fee-shifting provision. T.D., 349 F.3d at 476. Rejecting as

“quite strained” an argument similar to that advanced here,

we concluded in T.D. that the new fee-limiting provisions

“do not inform anything about the meaning of the term

‘prevailing party’ in the IDEA because they are relevant

only after a plaintiff has been deemed a ‘prevailing party.’”

Id. In the same vein, we conclude here that the fee-limiting

provision in § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) constrains the exercise of the
10 No. 04-3731

court’s discretion over the size of a fee award under

§ 1415(i)(3)(B) to the extent that it excludes fees incurred in

connection with IEP meetings except under certain limited

circumstances; the limiting provision does not create a

presumptive entitlement to fees where the exception to the

exclusion applies.

This interpretation of the statute is reinforced by a House

Report—cited by William’s parents and an amicus— which

accompanied the draft legislation:

The Committee believes that the IEP process should be

devoted to determining the needs of the child and planning for the child’s education with parents and school

personnel. To that end, the bill specifically excludes the

payment of attorneys’ fees for attorney participation in

IEP meetings, unless such meetings are convened as a

result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action.

 . . . .

Questions have been raised regarding the relationship

between the extent of success of the parents and the

amount of attorneys’ fees a court may award. In addressing this question, the Committee believes the

amount of any award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing

party under part B shall be determined in accordance

with the law established by the Supreme Court in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and its

progeny. 

As we stated in the 1986 report accompanying the legislation that added the attorneys’ fees provisions: “It is

the committee’s intent that the terms ‘prevailing party’

and ‘reasonable’ be construed consistent with the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 440 (1983).”

H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, at 105-06 (1997), reprinted in 1997

U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 103. When the Supreme Court held in

Farrar that de minimis success on the merits will not sup-
No. 04-3731 11

port an award of attorneys’ fees, it relied explicitly on

Hensley. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114. If “the most critical

factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is

the degree of success obtained,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, it

follows that there is a certain point below which the plaintiffs’ success will support no award at all. Nothing in the

1997 fee-limiting amendments to the IDEA affects this

principle, derived from Farrar and Hensley.

The district court reasonably concluded that although

William’s parents achieved something of legal significance

at the due process hearing, their victory was de minimis

and did not justify an award of fees. This was not an abuse

of discretion. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
12 No. 04-3731

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-2-05