IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

JOSEPH JEROME GRIGGS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 18-CR-168 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

No. W2023-00100-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Joseph Jerome Griggs, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated rape conviction, for 

which he is serving a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We 

affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined.

J. Colin Rosser, Somerville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joseph Jerome Griggs.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Mark E. Davidson, District Attorney General; Joe Van Dyke, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Petitioner was convicted of the aggravated rape of his thirteen-year-old cousin. 

Immediately after the rape and while the Petitioner was still in the room, the victim sent a 

text message to a friend, who called the police. The Petitioner confessed in a pretrial 

statement. 

The victim testified at the trial about the rape, and the Defendant testified that no 

rape occurred. The State offered forensic evidence which corroborated the victim’s 

account. On appeal, the Defendant argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient because 

it did not establish that he, and not one of the other people in the room at the time of the 

rape, committed the offense, and (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. This 

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court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Joseph Jerome Griggs, No. 

W2020-01686-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 4760366 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2021).

The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, which was amended after the 

appointment of post-conviction counsel. At the post-conviction hearing, the attorney who 

acted as co-counsel in the Petitioner’s conviction proceedings testified that he and trial 

counsel spoke to the Petitioner “constantly.” Co-counsel said he and counsel “begged” the 

Petitioner to accept one of the two plea offers, the first being for ten years and the second 

for nine years, based upon the strength of the State’s evidence and the favorability of the 

offers. Co-counsel noted that the State’s evidence included the Petitioner’s pretrial 

statement, in which the Petitioner confessed nineteen times, and medical evidence which 

corroborated the confessions. Co-counsel said that, at the Petitioner’s request for his family 

members be included in the discussions, counsel and co-counsel included the family “to 

explain to him that he should take these offers.” Co-counsel said he was aware that the 

Petitioner wanted Dr. Lisa Piercey to testify. Other evidence showed that Dr. Piercey was 

the medical director of the Child Advocacy Center. Co-counsel said that nothing in Dr. 

Piercey’s report “regarding the rape of a girl” was favorable to the defense and that he saw 

no reason to call Dr. Piercey as a defense witness. Co-counsel said he had “no clue” why 

the Petitioner thought Dr. Piercey would be a favorable defense witness.

Co-counsel did not recall whether he requested a court-ordered mental evaluation 

of the Petitioner. Co-counsel said he and trial counsel never had issues communicating 

with the Petitioner, whom co-counsel described as “lucid” and lacking any apparent mental 

health issues. Co-counsel did not recall any concerns about the indictment based upon the 

victim’s age of thirteen at the time of the offense, despite the fact that one mode of 

committing aggravated rape involved raping a child under the age of thirteen. Co-counsel 

agreed that another mode of committing aggravated rape involved a rape in which the 

victim suffered bodily injury and that the indictment also alleged bodily injury to the 

victim. Co-counsel agreed that the plea negotiations had been based upon aggravated rape 

involving bodily injury to the victim.

Trial counsel testified that she and co-counsel conveyed various plea offers to the 

Petitioner “[m]ultiple times.” She thought the first offer was for twelve years, that a later 

offer was for nine years, and that a third offer for eight years was discussed but not offered 

in writing. She said the plea offers had been for a guilty plea to the lesser-included offense 

of rape. She said she and co-counsel thoroughly reviewed the plea offers with the Petitioner 

and explained the Petitioner’s exposure if he went to trial.

Trial counsel testified that no rape kit was obtained from the victim. Counsel said 

Dr. Piercey’s report stated that no rape kit was needed based upon the physical evidence. 

Counsel said that she was familiar with Dr. Piercey from other rape cases and described 

Dr. Piercey as “known throughout the state . . . as an expert” and “definitely not defense 
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friendly.” Counsel said she viewed the prosecutor’s having taken Dr. Piercey off the 

State’s witness list as “a plus for” the defense.

Trial counsel testified that the only issue she and co-counsel had with the Petitioner 

was that the Petitioner would not be honest with them until they confronted him with the 

State’s evidence. Counsel said the Petitioner insisted that the victim was not going to 

cooperate with the State and that he had not said in his pretrial statement that he had sex 

with the victim. Counsel said she and her investigator reviewed the video recording of the 

statement, in which the Petitioner stated repeatedly that he had consensual sex with the 

victim. Counsel said that all of the victim’s statements were consistent and that because 

the Petitioner would not accept the evidence against him, she arranged with the jail for the 

Petitioner to view the video recording of his statement. Counsel said that based upon her 

experience, “there’s a difference between somebody having mental health issues and just 

being in denial about what they’re accused of.” She said that the Petitioner was articulate, 

that he was able to read and write letters, and that they discussed his letters. She said the 

Petitioner believed, based upon a dream, that “God was going to set him free.” She said 

that after the Petitioner went to prison, she began receiving letters from him in different 

handwriting than his previous letters. She said that at this point, the Petitioner began stating 

that she should have called Dr. Piercey as a witness and that he wanted the video recording. 

When asked about the discrepancy between the indictment charging the Petitioner 

with a crime against a person under age thirteen and the victim’s actual age of thirteen, trial 

counsel testified that when she noticed the issue, she raised it. She said she advised the 

Petitioner that “a jury wasn’t going to be too concerned about [the victim’s] age” because 

the victim was his first cousin, whose age he would know. She agreed that she and the 

prosecutor had discussed the case in terms of aggravated rape based upon injury to the 

victim, rather than the victim’s age. She said she advised the Petitioner that the forensic 

evidence and the Petitioner’s confession were compelling proof for the State. She said that 

the Petitioner “nailed his own coffin shut” with the confession and that she advised him 

she “didn’t have any magic” to overcome the State’s “overwhelming” proof. She said she 

and co-counsel told the Petitioner that they would do their best for him at a trial but that, if 

convicted, he could expect to spend fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. Documents 

reflecting written plea offers for ten and nine years and a letter from co-counsel to the 

Petitioner memorializing a verbal eight-year offer were received as exhibits.

Counsel testified that she never discerned a need for a psychological evaluation of 

the Petitioner. She described him as typical of accused sex offenders she had represented, 

in that he did not want to accept his guilt and wanted to manipulate the facts and his 

attorneys. Counsel noted that a person might have mental health issues but nevertheless 

be competent for trial.
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The Petitioner testified that his attorneys told him that the plea offers were extended 

because he committed a rape but no rape kit was conducted to determine if “it was 

aggravated rape or even rape.” He said he did not understand how he could be charged 

with rape without a rape kit. He said his attorneys “[s]omewhat” and “sometimes” 

explained the terms of the plea offers and his options. He said they met with him two or 

three times between their appointment as his counsel and his trial.

The Petitioner testified that his attorneys should have sought a mental evaluation 

because he had a learning disability. He said he was unable to read and write. When asked 

if he had been given a “diagnosis,” he responded that he had been “in resource” in his 

school years.

The Petitioner testified that he did not see Dr. Piercey’s “letter” until he had been in 

prison for a year. He said that based upon the letter, he should have been charged with no 

greater offense than “sexual assault.” He said Dr. Piercey would have been a favorable 

defense witness. Dr. Piercey’s report was received as an exhibit. In pertinent part, the 

report provided the following in the assessment section: “Child sexual abuse. The finding 

of no acute trauma or residua of trauma is to be expected, given the child’s description of 

the event, length of time since the episode, and her post-pubertal status.” The report stated 

that the examination occurred on April 9, 2018 and that the reported rape occurred on 

approximately March 20, 2018.

The Petitioner testified that he did not accept the eight-year offer because he was 

not guilty. When asked how many times he had admitted in his pretrial statement that he 

had sex with the victim, he said he “was stumbling over [his] words” because he was angry 

and upset.

Trial counsel was recalled and testified that she had not heard until the Petitioner’s 

hearing testimony that the Petitioner was illiterate. She said he sent her several letters from 

jail. She said he sent letters in different handwriting from prison. She said the Petitioner 

signed the letters sent from prison. She said that even if the Petitioner had not written the 

letters, he was familiar with their contents when she discussed them with him. She said 

she and co-counsel verbally communicated the eight-year offer to the Petitioner on the 

Sunday before the trial.

The Petitioner was recalled and testified that two other inmates wrote the letters the 

Petitioner sent to counsel. He said he signed them. 

In its order denying relief, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed 

to establish his claims by clear and convincing evidence, The court found that the 

Petitioner failed to show that trial counsel and co-counsel performed deficiently and that 

the Petitioner suffered prejudice from counsel and co-counsel’s alleged deficiencies. 
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Specifically, the court found that counsel and co-counsel “met with petitioner and 

discussed the case, including possible defenses and negotiated plea opportunities” and that 

counsel and co-counsel “presented a reasonable defense for the petitioner but a jury did not 

accept the defense.” This appeal followed.

The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief for his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Post-conviction relief is available “when the 

conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any right 

guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” 

T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2018). A petitioner has the burden of proving his factual allegations 

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f) (2018). A post-conviction court’s 

findings of fact are binding on appeal, and this court must defer to them “unless the 

evidence in the record preponderates against those findings.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 

572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); see Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A postconviction court’s application of law to its factual findings is subject to a de novo standard 

of review without a presumption of correctness. Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 457-58. 

To establish a post-conviction claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner has the burden of proving that (1) counsel’s 

performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 

364, 368-72 (1993). The Tennessee Supreme Court has applied the Strickland standard to 

an accused’s right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. See 

State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580. “[F]ailure to prove 

either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective 

assistance claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). To establish the 

performance prong, a petitioner must show that “the advice given, or the services rendered 

. . . are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” 

Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The 

post-conviction court must determine if these acts or omissions, viewed in light of all of 

the circumstances, fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A petitioner “is not entitled to the benefit of hindsight, may 

not second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy by his counsel, and cannot criticize a 

sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision.” Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1994); see Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tenn. 2008). This deference, 

however, only applies “if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.” 

Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). To establish the prejudice 

prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 
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466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id.

In his brief, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying 

relief based upon claims that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to: meet 

with him and thoroughly explain the plea offers and his potential sentencing exposure if he 

went to trial, request a mental evaluation, address an error in the indictment, and call Dr. 

Piercey as a defense witness. Counsel and co-counsel testified that they met with the 

Petitioner several times and exhaustively discussed the plea offers and his trial exposure. 

The Petitioner testified to minimal contact with his attorneys. The Petitioner testified that 

he thought he should have received a mental evaluation based upon his history of a learning 

disability, and both counsel and co-counsel testified that the Petitioner was able to 

communicate with them and that they did not have any reason to believe a mental 

evaluation was appropriate. Counsel testified that the Petitioner simply refused to accept 

the reality of the situation in which he found himself. The Petitioner testified that his 

attorneys failed to challenge the indictment as defective because it alleged that the victim 

was under age thirteen, despite her being older. Co-counsel testified that the indictment 

also alleged that the victim suffered bodily injury during the course of the rape, another 

mode of committing aggravated rape. The Petitioner testified that his attorneys failed to 

call Dr. Piercey as a defense witness. Co-counsel testified that Dr. Piercey’s report did not 

contain information favorable to the defense, and counsel said Dr. Piercey was well-known 

as not being defense-oriented. Dr. Piercey’s report noted a lack of physical findings, as 

would be expected due to the passage of time between the rape and the victim’s 

examination. Notably, the Petitioner did not call Dr. Piercey as a witness at the postconviction hearing. 

The post-conviction court credited the State’s evidence over that offered by the 

Petitioner, and the court found that the Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving his 

claims by clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner’s argument essentially invites this 

court to reweigh the evidence. We must defer to the post-conviction court’s findings of 

fact “unless the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings.” Henley, 960 

S.W.2d at 578; see Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456-57. Upon review, we conclude that the 

evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. Further, we 

conclude that the court correctly applied the law to its factual findings. See Fields, 40 

S.W.3d at 457-58. 

The Petitioner is not entitled to relief. In consideration of the foregoing and the 

record as a whole, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

 _____________________________________

 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE