### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Sp ec ia l S es sio n Ju ne 19, 200 6
SED LEY AL LEY v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 85-05085-87 W. Ot is Higgs, Jr., Jud ge

No. W2006-01179-C CA-R 3-P D - F iled Jun e 22, 2006

I n 1985, the Petitioner, Sedley Alley , was convicted of ag g ravated rape, ki dnapping , and first de g ree murder

. Fo r t h e capital c rime of f irst deg ree murder, the jury imposed the sentenc e of de ath. Petitioner Alley ’s execution was sche duled for May 17, 2006; however , on May 16, 20 0 6 , the Governor, upon rec ommendation of t he Tennessee Boa rd of Probation and Parole, g rante d a fifte enday reprieve to allow the Petitioner the opportunity to petition the trial court for D NA testi ng of “those a dditional items t hat wer e not included in his 2004 petition.” On May 19, 2006, Petitioner Alley filed a pe tition t o compel testing of evide nce unde r the Post-Conviction DNA Ana ly sis Act of 2001. The p o st-conviction court denied the pe tition on M ay 31, 2006. Our supre me court, on J une 2, 2006, re schedule d Petitioner Alley ’s ex ecution for J une 28, 2006. See State v . Sedley Alley , No. M1991-00019-SC-DPE-DD (Tenn., at Nashville, June 2, 2006) ( order). The Petitioner soug ht and was g rante d expedited r eview by this Court. Upon review of the re cord and the re sponses by bo th p art ie s, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D A VI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I LLI A M S and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Ba rry C. Scheck, Vanessa Potkin, and Colin S targ er, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, and Paul R. B ottei and K e l l e y J

. H e n r y, N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , S e d l e y A l l e y. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gen e r al a n d Rep o r ter ; M ic hael E. Moor e, Solicitor Gene ral; and Jennifer L . Smit h, Associate D eputy Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

On J uly 11, 1985, nineteen- y ear -old Marine L ance Corporal Suzanne Collins’ life was terminated after being beate n, rape d, and im paled with a thi rty -one- inch long tree branc h. Se e Sta te v. Alley , 776 S.W .2d 506, 508 (Tenn. 1989) , cert. de nied , 483 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 758 (1990). The Petitioner, Sedley

Alley , who was a lmost t h i rty y ear s old at the time, was ar rested a fter pr oviding a “le ng thy

statement of his ac tiviti es that re sulted in the death of Suzanne Collins to officer s of the Nava l I nvestig ating Service on t h e morning of 12 July1985.” Id . A Shelby Countyjury

found Petitioner Alley

g uiltyof the kidnapping , ag g ravated rape , and preme ditated first deg ree murder of the vi ctim. The jury

found two ag g ravating c ircumstance s, i.e. , the mur de r w a s e sp e c ia lly he ino us , atroc ious, or crue l and the murde r wa s comm i t t ed d u ri n g a kidnapping and ra pe, and se ntence d Petitioner Alley

to death. See Alley , 776 S.W .2d at 508. “He was sentenc ed to 40 y ear s on eac h of th e o th e r o f f e n s e s , a ll s e n te n c e s c o n s e c u ti v e

. ” Id . at 508. For the two re maining c onvictions, the trial court imposed c onsecutive f orty -y ear sentenc es. I

d. Petitioner Alley ’s convictions and sentenc es we re a ffirme d on direc t appea l. Id.

Th is c a s e h a s b e e n t h e s u b j e c to f e xt e n s i v e ap p e l l a t e r e v i e w

. T h e P e t i t i o n e r s o u g h tp o s tconviction re lief, which w as denie d. See Al ley v . S tate , 958 S.W .2d 138, 140 (Tenn. Crim. App.) , perm. to appeal de nied , ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . O n a ppe a l, this Cou rt

re ve rs e d th e low e r c ou rt ’s de nia l, order ed the r ecusa l of t he trial judge , and remanded the case for a new he aring

. See Al ley v . S tate , 882 S.W .2d 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Upon rema nd, Petitioner Alley was a g ain denied r elief. Alley , 958 S.W .2d at 140. On appeal, thi s Court affirme d the lower court' s denial of post-c onviction relief

. Id

. I n 1998, Petitioner filed a pe tition for writ of habe as cor pus in the United States District Court for the Western D istrict o f Tennessee. T he district court summarily dismiss ed the pe tition. See Al ley v . B e ll , 1 0 1 F

. S u p p

. 2 d 5 8 8 ( W

. D

. T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e S i xth C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A pp e a ls aff irmed the lowe r court's dismissal. Se e Al ley v . B e ll , 307 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. de nied , 540 U.S. 839, 124 S. C t. 99 (2003), reh’g de nied , 540 U.S. 1086, 124 S. Ct. 952 (2003). The rea fter, the State of Te nnessee filed a moti on in the Tennessee Supreme C ourt reque sting the se tting of an e xe c u ti o n d a te

. O n Ja n u ar y 1 6 , 2 0 0 4 , th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t g r a n te d th e St a te ' s mo ti o n, setting the execution date for J une 3, 2004. See State v . Sedley Alley , No. M1991-00019-SC-DPEDD (Te nn. J an. 16, 2004) ( order).

On M ay 4, 2004, Petitioner Alley unsucce ssfully

soug ht post-conviction DNA analy sis in the Sh e lb y Co u n ty Cr imin al Court. Se e Se dle

y Al ley v . S tate , No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, May 26, 2004), perm. to appeal de nied , ( Te nn . O c t. 4, 2004), cert. de nied , 544 U.S. 950, 125 S. Ct. 1695 (2005). This Court af firmed the lowe r court’s denial. Id. Petitioner’s J une 3, 2004, execution date was stay ed by order of the fede ral district court
a s a re su lt o f the Pe tit ion e r’ s f ili ng a mot ionun de r R ule 60 (b ) o f the Federa l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e. T h e motion was re jected and, on Marc h 29, 2006, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court
resc heduled Petitioner Alley ’s execution for May 17, 2006. Se e ge ne ra lly Se dle y Al ley v
. Ri c k

y Be ll, Nos. 05-6876, 06-5552, 2006 WL 1279050 (6th Cir. May

9, 2006), reh’g en banc de nied , (May 15,-3-

2006) (de ny ing ha

beas c laim as successive habeas petiti on). One week later, the Petitioner filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Wester n Di s t ri ct of Te nnessee reque sting injunctive relief

in the form of acc ess to certain evidenc e introduce d in his criminal trial for purpose s of DNAtesting at his own ex pense. The district court dismissed Alley ’s 42 U.S.C. §1983 action for failing to state a claim upon which re lief could be g rante d. See A lley v. Key , – F. Supp. 2d –, 2006 WL 1302213 (W.D. Tenn. 2006). The Six th Circuit affirme d the district court’s dismissal, adding that there is no ge nera l constituti onal rig ht to post-conviction DNA testing

. See Se dley Alleyv. W illiam R. Key , No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364 (6th Cir. May

14, 2006), reh’g en ba n c d enied , (May 16, 2006).
On April 11, 2006, thirty -six day s prior to his scheduled e x ecution, the P et i t i o n er br oug ht a cla im under 42 U.S.C. §1983 c halleng ing T ennesse e’s letha l injection protocol. On May 11, 2006, the fe dera l district c ourt issued an order stay ing the Petitioner’s execution. T his order w as vac ated b ythe Six th Circuit on May 12, 2006. Sedley Alley v . George Litt le, No. 06-5650, 2 0 0 6 WL 1313365, (6th Cir. May

12, 2006), reh’g e n banc denie d , (May 16, 2006). The Petitioner then soug ht
a stay of e xec uti on fro m th e Uni ted St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt a ndpe tit ion e d f

or a writ o f c e rt ior ari , seeking revie w of the Six th Circuit Court of Appeals’ dec isions in t he thre e fe dera l case s of Sedley Alley v

. George Litt le, Sedley Alley v . W illiam R. Key , and Se dle

y Al ley v . R ic k

y Be ll . Ce rt ior ari is
curr ently pending befor e this nation’s hig hest court.
On May 16, 2006, the Governor of Tenne ssee g rante d a fifte en-day reprieve of

the execution of the Pe tit ion e r’ s sen te nc e to pe rm it Pet iti on e r A lle y to r e turn to state c ou rt

a ndse e k p e rm iss ionto perf orm a DN A ana ly sis of certain items al l ege d l y not included in a pre vious petition for DNA analy sis filed by

Petitioner Alley

in 2004.

I. P e ti ti one rAl le y’ s R e que st

On May 19, 2006, Petitioner Alley fi l ed , p u rsuant to Tennessee Code A nnotated sec tions 40 -3 0- 30 4 a nd 40 -3 0- 30 5, a pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n DN A a na ly sis in the She lb yCount y Criminal Court. I n the peti t i o n , Petitioner Alley reque sted testing of

numerous items omitted fr o mh i s fi rs tp et i t i o n u n d ert h e A ct , i n cl u d i n g: (1) skin cells/sweat fro m t h e [ m en’s r ed] underwe ar that were found next to t he vic tim ’s bo dy

a ndbe lie ve d to ha ve be e n w orn b y the a ssailant;
(2) blood o r s k in cells on a stick used to violate the victim, including the pa per in which the stick wa s wrappe d; and
(3 ) ma te ri a l f

ro m un de rn e a th the fi ng e rn a ils of the vic tim

. Th e Pe titio ner a sse rt e d th a t “ the se ite ms, ” “ in a dd iti onto the sw abs fr om the vic tim po ssi bly containing semen, c ould be subjecte d to STR DNA test i n g t o conclusively prove ( or disprove)-4-

Mr . A lle y ’s inn oc e nc e .” He a lso re qu e ste d D NA te sti ng on “ blo od a nd a ha ir fo un d o n a ndin h is
c ar that w e re dir e c tly

lin ke d to th e vi c tim

a t tria l us ing primi tiv e AB O t e sti ng a ndmic ro sc op ic hair a naly sis.”
Petitioner Alley

claims that DNA te sting of the se items h as the potential of identifying the re a l pe rp e tr a tor

of the c ri me . Sp e c if

ic a lly , P etiti on e r A lle y

a sse rt e d th a t “ re du nd a nt r e su lts ” (DNAtests results that establish t h e s ame ge netic prof ile on a number

of probative items of evidenc e) c an esta

blish the true per

p et ra t o r o f t he crime and exclude him as the pe rpetrator. Whil e he a sserted t h at testing of the af oreme ntioned items would most clearly exonerate him, he fu rthe r arg ue d that te sti ng of a dd iti on a l ite ms sh ou ld be su bje c te d to e xami natio n a s thes e it e ms could contain a dditional evidence and cr eate additional redundant results. These items include:
(1 ) Sle e ve le ss j e rs e y

ty pe sh irt; (2 ) On e wh ite tub e so c k b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; (3 ) On e pa ir

of jog g ing sh orts b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; (4) The victim’s bra ; (5 ) Th e vic tim ’s wh ite c ott on pa nti e s; (6 ) B lue e xer c ise be lt b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; (7 ) L e ft jog g ing sh oe be lon g ing to the vic tim ; (8 ) Rig ht j og g ing sh oe be lon g ing to the vic tim ; (9 ) Sty ro fo a m drinking c up s; (10) Bloodstained g rass c ollected f rom bene ath the victim’s vag inal are a; and (1 1) B e e r b ott le s. Petitioner Alley

maintains that testing of thes e i t em s could very

well establish a DN A match to the victim’s boy friend, Joh n Bo ru p

. P et itioner asserts that Mr. Bor up admitted to being with the victim on the night of he r murder , Mr. Bo ru p m ore c losely matches the description of the abduc tor, and Mr. B orup drove a dar k, wood-pa neled Dodg e Aspe n st at i o n wag on. Furthermore , Petitioner Alley asserts that DNA testing results could be e ntere d into CODI S or a state D N A d a ta

b a s e a n d “ s c o r e a ‘ h it ’ to a c o n v ic te d o f f e n d e r , th u s n o t o n ly e x onera ting Mr. All ey , b u t also identify ing the actua l assailant.” In this reg ard, Petitioner Alley maintains that he has “the rig ht to d o DN A t es t ing of the crime scene evidenc e to prove third party g uilt, whether that comes a

bout by linking DNAfrom the c rime sce ne evide nce to a convicted of

fende r in the CODI S database or direc tly to Mr. Bor

up.”

Pe tit ion e r Al le y fu rthe r c on te nd s that, in ma kin g the de te rm inatio n of wh e the r he w ould ha ve be e n p ro se c ute d inlig ht o f e xcu lpatory DN A r e su lts , th e re vie wi ng c ou rt is n ot l imi te d to the evidenc e introduce d at t ri al , b u t is required to c onsider all of the evidenc e, including fac tual alle g a ti o n s d e v e lo p e d b y

th e Pe ti ti o n e r

p o s t- ju d g me n t. I n th is r e g ar d , th e Pe ti ti o n e r c o n te n d s th at t h e c o u rt m u s tco n s i d ert h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) Evidence that the medica l ex am i n er h ad dete rmined that the victim had died betwee n 1:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., co ntrary to the State’s theory

at trial that the vic tim ha d d ie d at 11 :30 p. m.;-5-

(2) Petitioner Alley

had no motive to kill th e v i ct i m , while her boy friend, John Bor up, did;
(3) An expert, Dr. Richa rd L eo, has de ter mined that the Petitioner’s conf ession is unreliable a nd not true;
(4) The victim’s boy friend, John Borup, f it t h e d es cripti on of the a bductor a s 5’8”; medium build; short, dark brow n hair; dar k complexion; and no fa cial hair ; (5) J ohn Bor

up drove a

dark- colore d Dodg e Aspe n station wag on; (6) T h e ti re tra cks and shoe prints from the abduc tion scene a re not fr om the Petitioner’s station wag on or fr om his shoes; and
(7) Hairs a nd fing erprints fo u n d o n i tems near the victim’s body

do not belong to Petiti oner A lley

. The State of T ennesse e filed a response in o pposition t o Petitioner Alley ’s re quest for D N A t e s t i n g , a s s e r t i n g t h a t“ t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a s r a i s e d n o a d d i t i o n a l ar g u m e n t s t h a t w o u l d j u s t i f y a differ en t j u d i ci al ruling than the one pr eviously rende red by

the trial court and af

firmed by the Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appe als in 2004.”

II. P os t- Co nvi c ti on C our t’ s R uling

On M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t e n te r e d it s o r d e r d e n y in g p o s t- conviction DNA testing . The c ourt determined that “the pe titioner has fa iled to meet the statutory
r e q u ir e me n ts w h ic h w o u ldman d a te D N A A n a ly s is a s o u tl in e d inT e n n

. Code A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 [0 ]- 304 and has no t convinced this court that discretionary analy sis should be gr anted unde r the Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3[0] -305.” Thepost-conviction court continued:

Wi th r e g ar d to r e q u ir e me n ts o f T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 [0 ]- 3 0 4 , th e c o urt finds t h at petitioner has f

ailed to demonstrate that a re asonable probability exis ts that . . . he wou l d n o t h ave been pr osecute d or convic ted if exculpatory results had be en ob ta ine d t hro ug h D NAa na ly sis of there qu e ste d s a mpl e s; h a s f a ile d to demonstrate that so m e of the samples soug ht arestill in exi stence and/or a re in a condit i o n t h at is suitable for testing ; and petitioner ha s failed to demonstrate that the pu rp o s e o f t h e p e t i t i o n i s t o d e t e r m i n e a c t u a l i n n o c e n c e a n d n o t m e r e l yto d e lay th e e xe c u ti o n o f h is s e n te n c e

. See T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-30- 304(1), ( 2) and (4) . Thus, testing is not mandate d in this case.-6- Ad dit ion a lly , th is c ou rt

fi nd s th a t th e pet it ione r h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te that a r e a s o n ab le p r o b ab il ity

e xis ts th a t an a ly s is o f

s a ide v id e n c e w il l p roduce DNA r esults which would have rende red the petitioner’s ve rdict or se ntence more favor able if t h e re s u lts had been a vailable at the proce eding leading to the judgme nt of conviction. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -30 5. Th us , th is c ou rt is not inclined to order te sting unde r the discr etionary portion of the Ac t. . . .

After entry of the post-c onviction court’s ruling but before a n o t i ce of appe al document was filed by

the Petitioner, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court g rante d t h e S t ate of Tennesse e’s motion to rescheduled the execution date. In this reg ard, the T en n es s ee S upreme Court ordere d that the Petitioner’s execution date be re set for June 28, 2006. I n light of the imminent ex ecution date, Petitioner Alley

expeditious ly

filed a notice of appeal o n J u n e 7 , 2 006. On J une 8, 2006, the Petitioner filed with t his Court a mot ion to expedite the appeal and to also seek or al ar g ument in this m atter. The Petitioner’s motions were g rante d by order enter ed June 9, 2006.

III. Th e Ac t

The Post-Conviction D NA Ana ly sis Act of 2001 provides that a per son convicted of
certain enumer ated c rimes, including first d egr ee m u rder , may , at any time , file a pe tition reque sting for ensic DN A ana ly sis of any eviden ce , whi ch may

contain a biolog ical spec imen, (1) in the possession or control of the prosec ution, law enfor ceme nt, laboratory , or court, and (2) that is rela te d to th e in v e s ti g a ti o n o r p r o s e c u ti o n th a t r e s u lt e d in th e ju d g me n t o f c o n v ic ti o n . T.C.A. § 4 0- 30 -3 03 . T he Ac t pr ov ide s n o s ta tut ory tim e lim it andg ive s p e tit ion e rs th e op po rtun ity to reque st analy sis at “any

time, ” wh ether or not such a r equest wa s made at trial. Gr iff in v . S tate , 18 2 S. W.3 d 7 95 , 7 99 (Tenn. 20 06 ). A p os t- c on vic tio n c ou rt is o bli g a te d to or de r D NAa na ly sis wh e n th e pe tit ion e r h a s me t e a c h o f the fo llo wi ng fo ur c on dit ion s: (1) A re asonable proba b ilityexis ts that the petitioner would not have be en prosec uted or c onvicted if e x culpatory re s ults had been obta ined throug h DNA
a na ly sis ; (2 ) Th e evi den c e is s til l in e xiste nc e a ndin s uc h c on dit ionthat D NAa na ly sis may be conduc ted;
( 3 ) The e v id e n c e w a s n e v e r p r e v io u s ly s u b je c te d to D N A a n a ly s is o r w a s not subjected to the analy sis that is now requeste d which could r esolve a n issue not resolved by

previous ana ly sis; and
(4) The a

pplication for a naly sis is m ade f or the purpose of demonstrating innocenc e and not to u n reasonably delay the execution of sentenc e or administration of justice.-7-

T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 30 4; se e als o Gr iff in , 1 82 S.W. 3d a t 79 8. Ad dit ion a lly , if DN A ana ly sis wo uld have pr odu ce d a m ore f avora ble ver dict or sentenc e if the r esults had bee n available at the p r o c e e d in g s le a d in g u p to th e c o n v ic ti o n o r s e n te n c e , th e n th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u rt mayorder DN A ana ly si s wh e n th e pe tit ion e r m e e ts the sa me c on dit ion s. T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 30 5; se e als o Gr iff in , 182 S.W .3d at 798. I n either instance, some phy sical evidenc e must be available and in a proper condition to enable a

DNA a naly sis. T.C.A. § 40-30-304(2).

“‘I f the state c ontests the prese nce of any qualifying c rit er i a an d i t is appare nt that eac h prer equisite ca nnot be established, the [post-conviction] court has the authority to dism iss the petition.’” Ma rc us Nix on v . S tate , No. W2005-02158 -C CA-R3-WM, 2006 W L 851764, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Apr. 3, 2006) (q u o t i n g W ill iam D. Bu

for d v . S tate , No. M2002- 021 8 0 -C CA-R3-PC, 2003 W L 1937110, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 24, 2003) , perm. to appeal de nied, (Tenn. 2003) ). That is, a pe titioner’s fa i l u re to mee t any of the qualify ing criteria is fatal to the ac tion. W ill iam D. Bu

for d , 2003 WL 1937110, at *6. Moreove r, the Ac t do e s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly pr ov ide fo r a

he ari ng a s to th e qu a lif y ing c ri te ri a

a nd , infa c t, authorizes a hea

rin g o nly afte r DNAanaly sis produces a favor able r esult. See T.C.A. § 40-30- 312.

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt is a ff or de d c on sid e ra

ble dis c re tio n inde te rm ini ng whe ther to g rant a petitioner re lief under

the Act, and the scope of appe llate re v i ew i s l i m i t ed. See Se dley Al ley v . S tate , No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1 1 9 6 0 9 5 , at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, May

26, 2004), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn. O ct

. 4, 2004), cert. de nied , 5 44 U. S. 9 5 0 , 1 2 5 S

. C t

. 1 6 9 5 (2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g J ac k J ay Sh utt le v . S tate , N o. E2 00 3- 00 13 1- CCA -R 3- PC, 2 0 0 4 WL 1 9 9 8 2 6 , a t * 4 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. , a t Kn o xv il le , F e b

. 3 , 2 004), p erm. to appeal denied , (T e nn . O c t. 4 , 2 00 4) ( c itatio n o mit te d) ). I n ma kin g its de c isi on , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt mus t consider a ll the available e vidence , including the ev i d en ce pr esente d at trial and any stipulations of fact m ad e by

either pa rty

. Id. The lowe r court may also consider

the opinions of this Court
a ndthe Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt on dir e c t app e a l of

thepe tit ion e r’ s c on vi ctions or theapp e a ls of the pe titioner’s prior post-c onviction or habe as cor pus actions. Id. Onapp e llate re vie w, thi s Court will not reverse unless the judg ment of the lowe r court is not supported by substantial evidenc e. Id. (c i t i n g W ill ie Tom En sl ey v. Stat e , N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 6 0 9

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 3 WL 1868647, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 11, 2003) ).

IV . P os t- Co nvi c ti on C our t’ s P ar ti ali ty and B ias

Petitioner Alley

asserts, in his pursuit of post-convic tion DNA ana ly sis, that he was den ied a fai r h e ari ng be fo re a n impa rt ia l a ndun bia se d tribu na l. T hu s, he c on te nd s th a t th is matter should be r emande d for a hearing be fore an impartial judg e. In support of his claim, the Petitioner asser t s (1 ) t h e post-convic tion court irrationally ref used to rec og nize the power of DN A t e sti ng to p ro ve thi rd -p arty g uil t a ndthe e xcu lpatory im pact o f D NAData ba se I d e n ti f ic a ti o n ; ( 2 ) th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t d e n ie d th e Pe ti ti o n e r a n e v id e n ti ar y

h e ar in g , the reby-8-

cate g o r ic a ll y

p r o h ib it in g th e p r e s e n tati o n a n d c o n s id e r a ti o n o f e v id e n c e ; ( 3 ) th e p o s t- c o n v ic tion court re fused to per

mit the Petit ioner to make an o ff er of proof; (4) the post-conviction court prejudg ed the c ase a s ev i d en ce d b y the court’s ruling from the be nch af ter a brief r ece ss; and (5) the post-conviction court eng age d i n i n appropriate ex pa rte communications with the Assistant Di stric t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l.

A fa ir t ri al i n a fa ir tribunal is a basic r equire ment of due pr ocess. The principles of impartiality , disinterest ed n es s , and fairness ar e fundamental conc epts in our jurisprudenc e. See State v. Bondurant , 4 S

. W

. 3 d 6 6 2 , 6 6 8 (T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Lynn , 924 S.W .2d 892, 89 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ). Artic le I , Se c tio n 1 7 o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut io n andthe F ou rt e e nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion gua rante e all litigants a hea

ring befor e an impartial decision-make r. In re Came ron , 1 26 Te nn . 6 14 , 65 8, 15 1 S. W. 6 4, 76 (1 91 2) ; se e als o Tumey v

. Oh io , 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. C t

. 4 3 7 , 444 (1927) ( “Eve ry proce dure w hich would offe r a po ssi ble te mpt a tio n to the a ve ra g e ma n a s a jud g e to f

or g e t th e burd e n o f p ro of re qu ir e d to convict the de fendant, or which mig ht lead him not to hol d t h e b al ance nice, c lear , and true betwee n the state a nd the ac cused de nies the latter due proce ss of law.” ). Article VI , S ec tion 11 of the Te nnessee Constit ution states that judge s cannot pa rticipate in c as es in which they might have e ven the slig htest interest. Ne e ly v . S tate , 63 Tenn. 174, 182 (1874) . A similar restriction
app e ars in s e c tio n 1 7- 2- 10 1( 1) , Tenn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d. Th e pu rp os e of the se pr ov isi on s is to guard a g ainst the prejudg ment of a litig ant’s rig hts and to avoid situations in which the lit ig a nts mig ht b e lie ve that th e c ou rt re a c he d a

pr e jud ic e d c on c lus io n because of int e re st, parti al i t y , o r favor. Chumbley v . People’ s Bank & Trust C o., 165 Tenn. 655, 659, 57 S.W.2d 787, 788 (1933)

. A trial bef ore a biased or pr ejudice d judgeis a denial of due proce ss. W ilson v. W ilson , 987 S.W .2d 555, 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Wit h respe ct to the P et i t i o n er’s alleg ations that the post-conviction court “pre judge d” the matter a nd eng ag ed in improper ex pa rte communica t i ons with the Assistant District Attorney Ge ne ra l, w e c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s a l l e g a t i o n s ar e j u s tt h a t–a l l e g a t i o n s

. T h e r e c o r d f a i ls to support these alleg ations, and this Court is not p er m i t t ed t o eng ag e in spec ulation. Moreover , while the re cord doe s re fl ec t t h at the post-convic tion court ref used to permit him to present the te st im on y of a n e xpe rt , w e are un able to c on c lud e that th is a c tio n in dic a te d b ia s b y the po stconviction court as the Post-Conviction DN A An al y sis Act does not contemplate an evide ntiary hearing until af

ter DNA testing produce s results favor able to the pe titioner. T.C.A. § 40-30-312. Ne ith e r d oe s th e Ac t ma nd a te that the tr ia l cou rt g rant a pe tit ion e r p e rm iss ionto t ake de po sit ion s. Rather, a ny

such ac tio n i s wi t h i n the trial court’s discretion. See T.C.A. § 40-30-311 ( court may enter orders as m ay b e appropriate) . Acc ording ly , this Court cannot ag ree with the Petitioner’s
assertion that the post-conviction court wa s partial and bia sed. This claim is without merit.O n J u n e 12, 2006, P et i t i on er A l l ey fi l ed wi t h t h e Sh el by Coun t y Cr i mi n al Cour t Cl er k a n a men ded n ot i ce of 1

a p p e a l d o c u m e n t ch a llen g ing the p o st-co n v ic tio n c o u rt’s J u n e 8 , 2 0 0 6 , o rd e r.
-9- V. Evidence Rej ect ed by this Cou rt in the 2004 P etition

I n support of his claim that the pre sumed exc u l p at o ry re sults of DNA testing would have resulted in the Petitioner not being prosec uted o r co n victed, the Petitioner urg ed conside ration of “additional exculpatory

evidence such a s the time-of-de ath re velations when c onsidering the
re a so na ble pr ob abil ity

pr on g .” As pr e vio us ly

a sse rt e d inhis 20 04 pe tit ion , Pe tit ion e r A lle y a g a in asks the courts of this state to disreg ard c ert ai n t ri al ev i dence as unre liable. The lowe r court sp e c if ic a lly de te rm ine d th a t “ no thi ng in th e c a se la w e ith e r s ug g e sts or re qu ir e s th e c ou rt

to
a c c e p t o r e n te r tain ext r a n e o u s in f o r mati o n o r

n e w ly p r o p o u n d e d th e o r ie s b y e ith e r s id e

. ” We ag ree

.
I n the P et itioner’s 2004 petition, he urg ed the c ourt to disreg ard c erta in evidence as unreliable and to consider newly discovere d evidenc e that discre d i t ed ev i dence used to convict the P etitione r , in c lu d in g : ( 1 ) h is c o n f e s s io n , ( 2 ) d o c u me n ts f

r o m D r

. B e ll r e v e a li n g th e v ic ti m’ s time of death was later

than orig inally

thought, ( 3 ) t h e d es cr i p tion of the perpe trator doe s not match the Petitioner’s de scription, (4) the de scription of the ve hicle pro v i ded by the witnesses does not match that of the Petitioner’s vehicle , (5) tire trac k s at the abduc tion scene do not matc h the Petitioner’s vehic le, (6) f inge rprints on a be er bottle re cover ed nea r the victim ’s body

are not identical to the Petitioner’s, a nd (7 ) shoe prints at the abduction sce ne do not match the shoe s he
was we aring on the nig ht in q u es t i o n

. This reque st was unsucc essful. See Se dle y Al ley v . S tate , No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at * 3. Addi t i o nally , the Petitioner challeng es the post-c onviction court’s June 8, 2006, order, ba rring th e P et i t i o n er f

rom including as part of t h e ap pellate r ecor d the af fidavits of investig ator April Higue ra. The post-c onviction 1 court de termined that the material c ontained in t h e af fi d av its were not r eleva nt to the issues involved in the court’s de termination.

I n th e pr e se nt p e tit ion , t he P etiti on e r, a g a in, a sk s th is C ou rt to d isc re dit

or ig no rec e rt a in evidence introduce d at trial and to c onsider new ly discovere d evidenc e tending to exculpate the Petitioner, that is, the same evide nce a rg ued in the 2004 petition. The Post-C o n v i ct i on DNA An a ly sis Ac t do e s n ot r e qu ir e no r p e rm it the lo wer cou rt to r e -e va luate the c re dib ili ty or va lid ity of the e vidence sub m i t t ed at trial. Nor doe s the Act pe rmit the court to consider new e vidence , aside for DNA test re sults, supporting a diff ere n t t h eo rythan the one r elied upon by the petitioner. The Post-Conviction DNA An al y s i s Act is not the proper vehicle to se ek re view of evidenc e other

than re sults available fr om D NA t es t i n g of biolog ical spec imens rec overe d during the cour se of the inve stigation or prosec ution of th e petitioner. Se e ge ne ra lly T.C.A. § 40-30- 30 2

. O th e r a v e n u e s e xis t f o r c o n s id e r a ti o n o f n e w ly d is c o v e r e d e v id e n c e in b o th th e s tate and fe de ra l c ou rt s.-10- VI . Thi r d- P ar ty Evi de nc e and D NA Da ta bas e
The Petitioner ar g ues that he is enti t l ed to have the r esults of the DNAtesting c ompare d to a third-party

person a nd the re sults checke d ag ainst known violators in a public DNAdataba se. I n support of his arg ument, the Petitioner relies primarily upon the United States Supreme Court decision in H

o lm e s v
. S o u th Carolina , 547 U.S. ---, 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006). In Holmes , the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court a ff ir me d a lon g lin e of

c a se s h old ing that ne ith e r s ta tut e s n or state evide n t i ar y

rules can irrationally

restric t a def

endant f rom exculpating himself throug h proof that a third party

is guilty

. Holmes , 547 U.S. at --, 126 S. Ct. at 1729. I n this r ega rd , the Petitioner
asserts that the “no third party g uilt” ru l e im posed by

the post-conviction court is irrational and
un c on sti tut ion a l. H e arg ue s th a t:

it is i nconce ivable that the sa me male DN A profile c ould be on the murde r wea pon, th e re d u nderw ear , and the victim’s clothing . No sing le per son who was not involve d i n t h e cr ime could have his DNA on all of these items. Mr. Alley ha s si mply

re qu e ste d th a t th e c ou rt

c on sid e r the po ssi bil ity

that r e du nd a nt r e su lts
c ou ld p oin t to the sa me thi rdpa rty , a ndals o the po ssi bil ity that th is thir d p arty c ou ld b e ide nti fi e d th ro ug h u se of DN A d a ta

ba se s.

He c o ntends that to deny him third-party

comparison defeats the purpose of the DNA Ac t in that “the Ac t was passe d specific ally not only to exonerate the innoc en t , b u t al s o to identify actua l pe r p e tr a to r s o f o f

f e n s e s w h o , w ith o u t D N A te s ti n g , ar e r o a mi n g f r e e ” ( c it in g L e g is lati ve Tape #3
on S B 7 9 6 : S e n a t e Ju d i c i ar y ( M a y 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( S e n a t o r

C o h e n ) )

. P e t i t i o n e r

A l l e y f u r t h e r a s s e r ts tha t he is n o t a s k i n g t h a t D N A t e s t i n g b e p e r f o r m e d o n a n y t h i r d p ar t y

. R a t h e r , h e s e e k s on lyto test crime- scene evidenc e that may contain the DN A of the pe rpetrator. Fi nally , Petitioner Alley contends that the Stat e o f T en nessee , by enac ting the Post-Conviction DNA Ana ly sis Act, has “c re ated a

liberty interest for

convicted de fendants to secure rele ase f rom prison by

means of DN A t e sti ng .” Th us , h e arg ue s th a t “ the c ou rt s c a nn ot r e stric t a n in ma te ’s statut ory ri g ht t o va c a te his c on vic tio n, mu ch less pr ov e his a c tua l in no c e nc e , b y ir ratio na lly a ndun fair ly preve nting him from using DNA testing to prove third party g uilt.”
First, Petitioner’s re liance on Ho lm e s is misplace d. The holding in Ho lm e s wa s li mit e d to the rig ht of a c riminal defe ndant to prese nt a complete de fense at trial. Thus, we would be constraine d to ext end the Ho lm e s rule to post-convic tion DNA proc eeding s and dec line to do so. As fu rthe r s up po rt

fo r h is ent it lem ent to h a ve DN A t e st r e su lts pr oc e sse d th ro ug h a DN A d a ta bank in orde r to sear ch for serial pe rpetrator matche s , P etitioner Alley relies upon this Court’s opinion in Sta te v . Jo hn ny Mo ffi tt , No. W2001-00781-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 818247, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, A pr. 19, 2002), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn. Oct

. 21, 2002). The appea l in Mo

ffi tt prese nted a c ertified que stion of law re s u l ting f rom the def

endant’ s g uiltyplea to second de g ree murder. Id. “The prec ise question [before the Court] is whether the defe ndant is entitled to a d i s m i s s al d ue to the loss of [evidence by the State].” Sta te v . J

oh nn y Mo ffi tt , No. W2001-00781-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 W L 8 1 8 2 4 7 , at *2. This Court held that the fa ct that
e v i d e n c e w a s l o s td i d n o tw arr a n td i s mis sa l pe r se
. Id . at *5. Rather this Court held than a n instruction to the jury

would “havebeen mor e than suff icient t o resolve the issue.” Id. The-11-

Petitioner arg ues that the holding in Mo ffi tt is app lic able he re “ in the c on te xt of th e reason able probability

analy sis . . . [ and] if the State wer e to re fuse to put the male D NA prof ile . . . in the C OD I S databa se, under Mo ffi tt , th e trie r o f f

a c t mu s t a s s u me th a t th e r e s u lt s

. . . w o u ld ‘ h it’ on a serial of fende r.” A g ain, the issue in Mo ffi tt fo c us e d u po n th e re me dy fo r “ los t” e vid e nc e wi thi n the c on te xt of a jury

tr ia l. A c c or din g ly , w e re je c t th e Pe tit ion e r’ s a

rg ume nt that Mo

ffi tt ’s holding should be extended to determinations of “ rea son ab le proba bility ” under

the Post-Conviction DN A A na ly sis Ac t.

I n Alley I, thi s Co urt he ld that th e “ pu rp os e of the P os t- Co nv ict ion D NAAn a ly sis Ac t is to establish th e in n o c e n c e o f th e p e ti ti o n e r a n d n o t to c r e a te c o n je c tu r e o r s p e c u lati o n th a t th e ac t may have possibly

been pe rpetrated by

a phanto m defe ndant.” Alley , 2004 WL 1196095, at *9. The Ac t’s rea ch is limit ed to the performance o f DNA analy sis which compar es the pe titioner’s DN A to sample s tak e n fr om bio log ic a l spe c ime ns g a the re d at th e tim e of the of fe ns e . T he statut e does not authorize t h e trial court to order the victim to subm it new DNA samples y ear s after the offe nse, nor d o e s th e s tatu te o p e n th e d o o r to a n y o th e r c o mp ar is o n s th e p e ti ti o n e r may e n v is io n. Ea rl D av id C ra wfo rd

v . S tate , No. E2002-02334- CCA-R3-PC, 2003 W L 2178 2 3 2 8 , at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Aug . 4, 2003), perm. t o a p p eal denied , ( Te nn . D e c . 2 2, 20 03 ). Th is Court rej ec t s any

implied testing of third pa rty individuals or the need to “ run” D NA testing results throug h a DNAdataba se for “hits.” I ndeed, other st ates ha ve re jected r equests to compar e DNA pr ofiles with state and national DNA data bases a s “a d d [ i n g] y et another lay er of speculation.” Se e Com mo nwe alt h v. Smi th , 889 A.2d 582, 586, n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). Nor
c a n th is C ou rt

e nd or se the Pe ti ti on er’s arg ume nt that T e nn e sse e c re a te d a “ lib e rty int e re st” in
us ing DN A t e sti ng to p ro ve thi rdpa rty g uil t. S inc e state s h a ve no ob lig a tio n to pr ov ide for po stconviction re lief of a ny

form, including DNA testing , see Pe nnsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S

. 5 51, 557, 107 S. Ct

. 1990, 1994 (1987), there is no inhere nt rig ht to a certain type or me thod of testing wh e n s e e kin g su c h r e lie f. An y lib ert y int e re st that e xists , th e re fo re , mu st b e on e c re a te d b y state law. And, while the re may be a liberty

interest in testi n g b i o l o gi ca l samples for D NA cr eate d by
enac tment of statutory

provisions, such rig ht to acce ss potentially exculpator y ev i d ence does not
rema in unconditional. Se e ge ne ra lly Kenneth Lynn Moore v. Bi l l L o ck yer , N o. C04 -1 95 2 M HP, 2005 WL 2334350 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005). A ny in t er est cre ated by

enac tment of the Ac t
cre ated a limit ed intere st of a def

endant in es t ab l i s h i n g his/her innocenc e and did not cr eate an i n t e r e s ti n e s t ab l i s h i n g t h e g u i l to f a s p e c u l a t i v e a n d u n k n o w n t h i r d p ar t y.

Th e Peti ti one r c on c e de s th a t “ sh ou ld the sa mpl e s yie ld r e su lts wh ic h c a nn ot b e lin ke d to either the defe ndant or the vic tim then the evidence would demonstrate that he did not rape and kill the victim, but that someone e lse did.” This conc ession neg ates the need or re quirement under the Act, at this juncture, f or data base comparison or third-pa rty comparison. The re sults of DNA testing m u s t s t and alone and do not enc ompass a spec ulative nationwide se arc h for the possibili ty

of a third pa

rty perpe trator. Thus, the D NA ana ly si s i s l i mited to showing that the bio log ic a l sp e c ime n d id n ot b e lon g to e ith e r the Pe tition e r o r thevic tim

.-12- VI I. Hou se v. Be ll

As additional authority , Petitioner Alley relies upon the U n i t ed S tates Supreme Court’ s rec ent dec ision in Ho us e v . B e ll , 5 47 U. S. – , – S. Ct . – (J un e 12 , 20 06 ), in su pp ort of his
e nti tle me nt t o D NAte sti ng . Sp eci fi cal ly , th e Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t Ho us e is significant for two propositions: (1) Ho us e confirms Te nnessee law that the de termination whethe r a pe titioner meets the standa

rds of the D NA Ac t re q u i res a consideration of all available evidenc e, including that evidenc e uncove red a fter the entry of the judgm en t of convic tion; and (2) compa ring the fac ts that led to the g ranting of re lief in Ho us e with the fac ts before this Court c onfirms that the Petitioner is entitled to release of the e vidence apply ing the “re asonable p ro b ability ” standa rd. Petitioner A ll e y a s s e r ts th a t “ [e ]v a lu a ti n g a ll th e e v id e n c e , A ll e y ’ s c a s e f o r in n o c e n c e b a s e d on the pr e su me d e xcu lpatory DN A e vid e nc e is marke dly stronger than House’s .” (e mph a sis in orig inal).

Petitioner Alley

confuse s the limit ed scope of the proc eeding s prese ntly bef o re t h i s Court with a Herrara c la im o f actual in no c e nc e . T he reis n o auth ority pe rm itt ing a

re vie wi ng c ou rt

to consider e vidence which wa s not admitted at trial. See Ra y mo nd Ro ge r J on e s v . S tate , No. E2003-00580-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 2821300, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi l l e, Dec. 3, 2004), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. Ma r. 21, 2005) ( “The re a

re no Te nnessee appellate court de c isi on s h old ing that a

po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

ma y c on sid e r e vid e nc e that w a s e xclu de d at tria l in making this determination[.] ”). Mor eover , without eng ag ing in a l en g thy discussion comparing the fa c tua l e vid e nc e in the tw o c a se s, thi s Co urt fi nd s th e de ta ils of thetw o c a se s f

a c tua lly dis tin g uis ha

ble . T he pu rp os e of

the Pos t- Con vic tio n D NAAn a ly sis Ac t is lim ite d. I t is no t a vehicle f or ra ising c laims of “ac tual innocenc e,” but r ather may , in certain instances, e nable a n

“ a c tua l in no c e nc e ” c la im t o b e raise d infu tur e pr oc e e din g s.

VI II. Evi de nc e of P e ti ti one r ’s G uilt

I n this Court’s 2004 review of the Petitioner’s first peti t i o n fo r DNAanaly sis, the follow i ng summarization of facts wa s included as a dopted from the T ennesse e Supreme Court’s de c isi on on dir e c t app e a l:

The victim was Suzanne Marie Collins, age 1 9, a lanc e cor poral in the U.S. Marine Corps stationed at the Milli ng to n Na v al Ba se, while she w as p u r s u i n g c o u r s e s i n a v i o n i c s

. S h e w a s d e s c r i b e d b y h e r r o o m m a t e a s a

f r i e n d l y, happy , outgoing pers o n , al wa y s rea dy to help others with their proble ms. I n the M ar i n es , s h e w as , “o n t h e h o n o r d es k ”, wh i ch re q u i re d t h e a c h i ev em en to f h i gh standards, a cade mically and otherwise and that, “y ou be a r eal motivated, squaredaway Marine.”-13- At approx imately

10:00 p.m. on 11 J uly

1985 she left he r bar

rac ks dressed in phy sical training g ear , a re d Marine T -shirt, red Ma rine shorts, white soc ks and te nn is s ho e s a ndwe nt j og g ing on the B a se , n orth o f N a vy Roa d. He r room mate indicated that the vic tim h ad been too busy that day to work out at the g y m, which
wa s c los e d at th a t ti me of nig ht. He r b od y

wa s f ou ndth e nex t mo rni ng in O rg ill Park, which a djoins the Naval B ase, north of Navy Road.

Def endant wa s not in t h e m i l itary servicebut was married to a military person a nd they

lived on the Nava l Ba se. He was e mploy ed by a Mi llington h ea t i n g and air conditioning c ompany . He wa s almost 30 y ear s old, had two children, born of an e arlier marria g e, living in Ke ntuck y , an d h ad a history of alcohol and substan ce a buse. Afte r appr opriate Miranda warnings de fendant waived the prese nce of

an attorne y

and g ave a

leng thy statem en t o f h is activities that resulted in the death of Suz anne Colli ns to of fice rs of the Na v al I n v es t igating Se rv ic e on the mornin g of 12 July 19 85 . T he state me nt w a s ta pe re c or de d w ith defe ndant' s permission. A narr ative ac count of th e relevant e vents of that eve ning
a s h e re la te d th e m to the Na va l of fi c e rs fo llo ws

.

About 7 : 0 0 p

. m . on 11 J uly 1985, his wife lef

t with two women to go to a Tupperw are party . Def

endant ha d been drinking be er be fore they left and by app ro x i mately

9:00 p.m. he had consume d an additional six -pac k and a f ifth of wi n e. At that ti me he dr ove his 1972 Merc ury station wag on, with a Kentuc ky license ta g to the Mini Mart an d purcha sed anothe r six -pac k. He wa s depre ssed, lonely and unhappy

. He had no friends “of his ow n” here

. He missed his two children, his mother and fathe r, all Ke ntucky residents. He was torn between g oin g to K e ntuc ky , s ta y ing wh e rehe wa s, or drivi ng the c ar i nto a

wa ll t o kill him se lf . H e dr ov e to the no rth s id e of the B a se , p ark e d o n a lot ne ar the g olf
course and starte d running toward N avyL ake. H e ran past a g irl jogg ing and before h e go t t o t h e lake he stopped, she c aug ht up with him and they had a brief
conver sation. He did not know her name and had neve r see n her be fore . They tu r n e d ar o u n d a n d jo g g e d b a c k to h is c ar

. H e s to p p e d th e r e o u t o f b r e a th , a n d she continued on towar d the g ate at Navy Road. He started dri v i n g d o wn t he roa d toward that gate in spit e o f hi s appar ent re cog nition that he was drunk and
wea ving f rom side to side on the roa dway . Parenthe tically , the asphalt road in that vi c i n i t y h a s n arr o w l a n e s , n o c u r b , t h e g r a s s c o v e r e d s h o u l d e r s a n d n e ar b y t e rr a in
are ap p ro x imately

level with the roa dway . He he ard a thump and rea liz ed he ha d struck the g irl jogg er. Q uoting f rom his statement, “she rolled around and
scre amed a co u p le of times and I ran ove r and g rabbe d her and told her I was g oing to take h er to the hospital. I helped he r into the ca

r and w e starte d towards. . . .”-14- On the way

to the hos p i t al def

endant sa id that she ca lled him names such as a dr unken basta

rd and thre atene d t o get h i m i n trouble and he tried to ca lm her down, without succe ss. When he rea ched the traff ic light on Na vy

Road nea

r the 7/1 1 s tor e he turne d le ft

a nda g a in we nt t o th e no rth p art of the B a se in the vic ini ty of the lake . He de scribed in c onsiderabl e detail the s u b s eq u ent eve nts, that included hitting he r a f

ew times, holding her dow n on the g round, an d s t i ck i n g a scr e w d r iv e r in th e s id e o f h e r h e a d , u n d e r c ir c u ms tan c e s ap p ar e n tl y c a lc u late d by de fe nd a nt t o a

pp e a r t o b e a c c ide ntal

. Al l of

the se a c tio ns we rebe c aus e sh e wo uld not list en to his pleas not to turn him in.

He insisted that he did not have sex wi t h h er at any time, nor did he eve n try at any time. He insiste d t h at h e was scare d of the trouble she was thre atening him w ith and was drunk and could not think clearly . After sticking the
scre wdriver

in her he ad and he r collapse , he dec ided t o m ak e it appea r that she had bee n rape d. He took off her c lothes, and dra g g ed h er b y t h e feet over ne ar a tree . There he broke off a tree limb, ins erte d it i n h er v agina and “pushed it in.” H e t h e n r a n t o t h e c ar

a n d d r o v e a w a y.

The State c alled numer ous witnesses who obser v ed s ome of the
mov e me nts of

de fe nd a nt andvic tim

that ni g ht.

A N a va l of

fi c e r dri vin g no rth to wa

rdthe lake on the B a se pa sse d tw o ma le Ma ri ne s jo g g ing no rth, a ndla te r s a w a fe ma le Ma

ri ne in red T- sh irt a ndre d s ho rt s a lso jog g ing no rth. Af

te r p a ssi ng the lon e Ma

ri ne he sa w a

wh ite mal e ne ar an o ld station wag on with wood paneli n g t h at was parked on an empty lot near the buffa lo pens. The two Ma rines testified that a s they jogg ed north a

fema le Marine
wa s jo g g ing so utha ndsh ortly thereafter the y

e nc ou nte re d a

statio n w a g on wi th wood g rain pa neling also g oing south that swe rved ove r into the north lane towards them. The car continued on southward and when they we re sever al hu nd re d y ard s f

urthe r n orth the y

he arda fe ma le vo ic e scr eam ing in d ist re ss, “Don' t touch me”, “ L eave me alone.” They immediately

turned a round and r an south in the direction of the sc ream. I t was too dark to se e any acti v i t y v ery

far ahea d and bef

ore the y rea che d the sce ne they

saw the station wa g on drive off tow ardthe ma in g ate

. At that ti me the y we reabo ut 1 00 y ard s a way a ndwe reable to observ e t h at t h e st ation wag on was off the roa d in the g rass, ne ar the fenc e, on the left or wrong side for a vehicle g oing south. Suspecting a kidnapping they continued on to the g ate a nd g ave a full report of what the y h ad wi t n es sed. They
acc ompanied mi l i t ary

security personne l on a tour of the r esidential ar eas of the Ba se looking for the station wag on, without success. How ever , afte r they returne d to the ir barr acks, they wer e summoned to the security office s wh er e t hey identified the station wag on. Def endant ha d been stoppe d an d broug ht in for questioning a s had his wi fe

. T h ei r re sponses had a llay ed any suspicion that-15-

d ef e n d a n t h ad b ee n co n n ec t ed wi t h a k i d n ap p i n g an d t h eywe re al l o we d t o go home. All of these e vents occ urre d befor e appr ox imatel y1:00 a.m., 12 J uly 1985. The victim' s body

was found shortly

befor e 6:00 a.m. on that date and def endant was promptly

arr ested by

the military

police.

After completing the statement, de fendant voluntarily acc ompanied office rs over

the route he h ad take n the nig ht beforeand to the location of the murder and acc urate ly

identified various things, including the tree wher e he ha d left the bo d y an d wh er e it was found by others and f

rom which the limb he used had bee n broken.

T he patholog ist, Dr. J ames B ell, testified that the ca use of de ath was mul tip le inj urie s. He a lso ide nti fi e d sev eral sp e c if ic inj urie s, e a c h o f w hic h c ou ld have be en fatal. T h e v i ct i m had bruises a nd abra sions over her entire body , front and bac k. He testified that the injuries to the skull could have be en inflicted by the rounde d end of de fendant's sc rew driver that was fo u n d near the sce ne, but not by the pointed end. He identified the tre e branch that wa s inserted into the victim's body . I t measure d 31 inches in leng th and had be en inserte d into the body more than o n c e , to a

d e p tho f tw e n ty in c h e s , c au s in g s e v e r e in te r n a l i n ju r ie s a nd hemor rh agi n g . The pathologist was of the opinion that the victim was alive whe n t h e t re e l i m b wa s i n s er t ed i n t o h erb o d y

. T h er e w er e a l s o b ru i s es o n t h e v i ct i m 's neck c onsistent with st rang ulation.

Alley , 776 S.W .2d at 508-10 (f ootnote omitted).

Additionally , t his Court noted the following f acts in its 2004 review of the Petitioner’s
re qu e st f or DN A ana ly sis :

At trial, Petitioner Alley relied upon an insanity defe nse. Alley, 776 S.W .2d at 510. Alley prese nted t h e t es t i mony of two psy cholog ists who diag nosed the Petitioner as suffe ri n g from a multiple per sonality disorder. Id. Ho we ve r, ne ith e r d oc tor c ou ld v e ri fy

wh e th er an alte rn a te pe rs on a lit y wa s in
co n t rol at the time of the of fense

. Id. T h e St a te ' s p s y c h o lo g is t a ls o e xa mi n ed the Pe tit ion e r a nd de te rm ine d that ps y c ho log ic a l te sts a dmi nis te re d to the Pe tit ion e r i n May 1986 sug g est ed t h at he wa s exagg erating or malinge ring

. Id. at 510-511. The State' s psy cholog ist further noted that Petiti oner had n o h i story of mental health tre atment prior t o t he murde r and that it was “improbable that a condition of insanity

had take n c o n tr o l o f

h is a c ti o n s o n th e e v e n in g o f th e mu r d er.” Id. at 51 1. I n s um, the S tat e' s p sy c ho log ist , w hil e dia g no sin g a bo rd e rl ine pe rs on a lit y disorder w ith a chronic history of drug and alc ohol abus e, fo u n d no evidenc e of multipl e per sonality

disorder or

psy chosis. Id.-16- Dr. Cra ig L ahre n, an expert in hair analy sis, and Paulette S[ utton] , an expert in forensic se rolog y , also t es t ified at the Petitioner' s trial. Dr. L ahre n examined a hair c ollected f rom inside the victim's shoe. Dr

. L ahren determined this hair to be a “ Cauca sian pubic hair. ” He s t at ed that “[t]here wa s nothing
unus ual or unique a

bout the item, and the sample w as too limit ed to ac tually do a fa i r c o m p ar i s o n wi t h t h e- wi t h t h e k n o wn p u b i c h ai r. ” A h ai r f o u n d o n t h e v i ct i m 's waistband wa s examined and determined to be a “m edium -brown Caucasia n body hair, proba

bly from the a

rm or the l eg. ” Ag ain, there was not “e noug h consistent microscopic c hara cteristic s ” to “do a succe ssful comparison on those.” Two strands o f h a ir c o ll e c te d f r o m th e v ic ti m' s s o c k s w e r e id e n ti f ie d a s b e in g f

rom an Afric an-A merican. Dr. L ahre n testified that the pre s en ce o f these hairs on the victim's socks w ould be consistent with the vict i m walking around in he r “soc k fee t.” Four

hairs found on the victim's shirt we re “l ight- brown Cauc asian he ad hair. The y ra n ge fr o m two to seven inche s in leng th. . . .” These hairs we re determined to bel o n g t o t h e victim . Finally , hair found on the driver' s side of the Petitioner' s 19 7 2 Merc ury station wag on “appe are d to be the same as [the victim's] head ha ir.”

Paulette S[ utton] examined blood spe cimens found at the crime sc ene. Bl o o d wa s fo u n d o n t h e d ri v er 's s i d e d o o r a n d n ea r t h e h ea d l i gh to f t h e P et i t i o n er 's vehicle. T he blood found on the driver' s side door re veale d AB O type blood, the
sa me ty pe as the vic tim . T he stain w a s f ou ndto b e c on sis te nt w ithblo od y ha ir having been sw iped ac ross the surfa ce j u st above the door handle g oing do wn wa rdtow ardthe ro a d. Paule tte S[utt on ] al so e xami ne d a blood y na pkin found on the floor

board of Petitioner' s car . Sh e wa s not able to determine the specie s orig in for the sa mple. Simi larly , there was blood on a screw driver f ound at th e s c e n e , b u t S[ u tt o n ] c o u ld n o t id e n ti f y th e s o u r c e

. T h e r e w a s no blood or
s em i n al s t ai n s f

o u n d o n t h e v i ct i m 's cl o t h i n g. Bl o o d wa s fo u n d o n t h e P et i t i o n er 's shorts, but a blood type could not be de termined.

Se dle y Al ley v . S tate , No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at **6-7.

IX . TheSt at ut or y C r it e r ia

A. Existenc e of Evide nce

I n r e sp on se to P e tit ion e r A lle y ’s re qu e st f or DNA analy sis , th e State a sse rt e d th a t c e rt a in
e vid e nc e re qu e ste d by the Pe tit ion e r is e ith e r no lon g e r in e xiste nc e or ha s been sev erely contaminated to the point that the r el i ability of any testing w ould be hig hly suspect. TheT he A ssi st an t D i s t r i ct At t orn ey G ene r al mai nt ai ned t hat a “ broken f i ng er nai l of

t he vi ct i m” nev er was 2

r ecove r ed and, t hu s , does not ex i s t for t es t i ng

. H e f ur t her mai nt ai ned t hat , i f a f i ng er nai l was r ecove r ed, t hat ev i dence woul d hav e been i n t he cus t od y of t he U ni ver s i t y o f

T enn es s ee. Accordi ng l y , i f a f i ng er nai l ex i s t ed, i t woul d hav e been d est royed wit h t he o t her bi o l o gi cal evi d ence. A revi ew of t he reco rds reveal t hat a “ m i d f i ngernai l ” was r eceived b y t he U ni vers i t y o f T e n n e sse e L a b o rat o ry f rom t he “ m o rgue. ” W hi l e i t i s unkno wn whether t hi s i s t he f i ngernai l t hat t he P eti t i o ne r see ks t o hav e a nal y zed, i t i s cl ear t hat t hi s ev i dence al ong w i t h v agi nal s wabs , bl oo d s amp l es , an d ot her sp e c im e n s w e re in the p o sse ssio n o f t h e U n ive rs ity o f T e n n e sse e L a b o ra to ry.
-17- Assistant District Attorney Gene ral stated that, in 1990, an evidenc e storag e fr eezer at the Univers ity o f T e n n e s s e e ma lf u n c ti o n e d , r e s u lt in g in th e d e s tr u c ti o n o f c e r tain e v id e n c e. He reported that the University of Tenne ssee was the custodian of the biologica l sampl es o b t ained from the autopsy , clothing, and the Petitioner’s vehic le. B ased u p o n t h e stateme nts by the As sis ta nt D ist

ri c t A tt orney

Ge ne ra l, the low e r c ou rt fo un d th a t “ c e rt a in i te ms a reno t st ill in
e xiste nc e or

are no t su ita

ble fo r t e sti ng ; th us, peti tio ne r f a ils to m e e t th e statut ory re qu ir e me nts wi th re g ardto tho se ite ms. ” Spe c if ic a lly , th e low e r c ou rt

fo un d th e fo llo wi ng ite ms n o lo ng e r i n e xiste nc e fo r D NAte sti ng or in a c on dit ionsuit abl e for DNA te sti ng : ( 1) blo oda ndha ir fo un d in the Petitioner’s vehic le; (2) br oken fing ernai l o b t ai ned fr om the victim; (3) sa mples taken fr om 2 the victim and the Petitioner; and (4) swabs taken from the victim’s body

. The lowe r court found that th e re ma ini ng ite ms u po n w hic h te sti ng wa s so ug ht w e rein p os se ssi on of the She lby

Cou nty Criminal Court C lerk.

Collateral to his reque st for DNAanaly sis, the Petiti o n er s o u gh t permission to take d ep o s i t i o n s t o i d en t i fyt h e c u rr en tl o ca t i o n o f e v i d en ce wh i ch m ayb e s u b j ec tt o DN A t es t i n g. The State re sponded, in part, that Petitioner’s c ounsel admitted, in 2004, befor e a f eder al district court that “ their investig ation reve aled that the U T evidence did not ex ist any more a nd that the only evidenc e lef

t for testing was in the c ustody of the Criminal Court Clerk, Will iam Key .” The lower c ourt denied the motion, finding that nothing in the Post-Convi ction DNA Ana ly sis Act mandated a

court to permit depositi ons. We ag ree . No provision in the DNA Ac t mandates that the tr ia l c ou rt

pe rm it d e po sit ion s. Whil e Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 30 -3 11 pe rmits a trial court to “ma

ke such othe r orde rs as may be appr opri at e, ” t his provision is di scre tionary , not mandatory . Thus, we f ind no error

in the post-conviction court’s denial o f the Petitioner’s moti o n to take depositions. The re cord supports the lower c ourt’s finding s as to the nonex i s t en ce o f c er t ai n i t em s fo r t es t i n g. W e f i n d n o v i ab l e r ea s o n t o d i s agr ee wi t h t h i s fi n d i n g. Th e pe tit ionpr oc e e ds onthe fo llo wi ng ite ms:

1. Men’s re d underw ear ; 2. Stick and paper

in which stick was wr apped; 3. Sle e ve le ss j e rs e y

ty pe sh irt; 4. On e wh ite tub e so c k b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; 5. On e pa ir

of jog g ing sh orts b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; 6. The victim’s bra ; 7. Th e vic tim ’s wh ite c ott on pa nti e s;-18- 8. B lue e xer c ise be lt b e lon g ing to the vic tim ; 9. L e ft jog g ing sh oe be lon g ing to the vic tim ; 10

. Rig ht j og g ing sh oe be lon g ing to the vic tim ; 11

. Sty ro fo a m drinking c up s; 12. Bloodstained g rass c ollected f rom bene ath the victim’s vag inal are a; and 13

. B e e r b ott le s. T h e s e i t e m s a r e a l l e g e d t o b e i n t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e C r i m i n a l C o u r tC l e rk f o r S h e l b y C o u n t y.

B. Evidenc e Prev iously Subjected to DNA testing

The post-conviction court found that “under prong three of the statute, the evidence soug ht by the petitioner for

testing ha s never

bee n s u bjected to DN A ana ly sis. Thus, this court fi nd s p ro ng thr e e of

the statut e is m e t.” No re a so n e xists to d isp ute the low e r c ou rt ’s ru lin g a s to t h i s p ro n g.

C. R e as on ab le Pr ob ab ili ty of D iff

e re nt R e su lt

Th e Pos t- Con vic tio n D NAAn a ly sis Ac t w a s c re a te d b e c aus e of thepo ssi bil ity

that a person ha s been w rong fully convicted or

sentenc ed. J

ac k J ay Sh utt le v . S tate , 2004 WL 199826, at *5 (c i t at i o n o m i t ted). In this reg ard, the post-conviction court is to assume that the “‘DN A
a n a ly s is w il l r e v e a l e xc u lp a to r y r e s u lt s in th e c o u r t’ s d e te r mi n a ti o n a s to w h e th e r to order DNA testing.’ ” Id

. (q u o t i n g Ri c k y Fl am ing o B ro wn, Sr. v . S tate , N o. M2 00 2- 02 42 7- CCA -R 3- PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEX I S 528, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 13, 2003), perm. t o a p p ea l denied, ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 3 ) )

. T h e P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s , r e l y i n g u p o n p r i o r d e c i s i o n s o f

t h is Court, se e ge ne ra lly J

ac k J ay Sh utt le , 2004 WL

199826, at *1, that the dete rmination of whethe r a par ticular c ase me ets the re asonable proba b ilitystandard is not base d on the type of e vidence that was used to obtain the c onviction, nor on the streng th of the State’s c ase. That is, neither a vic tim ’s ide nti fi c a tio n o f a pe rp e tr a tor

no r a de fe nd a nt’ s p re tr ia l c on fe ssi on ma y fo rm th e so le ba sis fo r d e nying DN A t e sti ng . Rathe r, he c on te nd s, wh a t is de c isi ve un de r the re a so na ble pr ob abil ity

stand ardis the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e so ug ht t o be tes te d o r, in o the r w or ds , the sig nificanc e that excul p at o ry DN A test results would have in the c ase. ThePetitioner str e nu ou sly

a sse rt s th a t th e re su lts of te sti ng ne e d n ot o nly

be con si de re d in div idu a lly , b ut a lso collectively , in order to obtain what the Petitioner ref ers to as “ redundant results.”

I n Alley I , t hi s Court st a te d th a t “ [a] ‘ re a so na ble pr ob abil ity ’ o f a

dif fe re nt r e su lt e xists when the evidenc e at issue, in this case potentially favor able DNA results, u n d ermines confide nce in the o utcome of the prosec ution.” SedleyAlley , 2 00 4 WL 11 96 09 5, a t *9 ; se e als o State v. W

orkman , 1 1 1 S. W. 3 d 1 0 , 1 8 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 2 0 0 2 )

. T h is Co u r t r e c o g n iz e d tha t-19-

“[t] he purpose of the Post-Conviction DNA Analy sis Act is to establish the innocenc e of the petitioner and not to cr ea t e co n j ec t u re or

speculation that the act may have possibly

been perpe trated by

a phantom def

endant.” Sedley Alley , 2004 WL 1196095, at *9. I f the a l l ega tion of the pe titioner’s innocence is re cent and the evidenc e supports the pe titioner as the off ender , a prior conf

ession may

be enoug h to deny

DNA testing

. Id .; see al so J e sse Ha dd

ox v . S tate , No. M2003-00514-CCA-R3-P C , 2004 WL 2544668, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 10, 2004). The c onvicted def endant r equesting post-conviction DNA analy sis is not provided a presumption o f innocenc e, and the revie wing court ne ed not ig nore the proof supporting the conviction.

The post-c onviction court conc luded that the Petitioner has f ai l ed to demonstrate a
rea sonable proba

bilitythat he would not have been pr osecute d or convic ted if exculpatory DNA evidenc e had be en obtained f rom any of the re quested items or a ny combination of the re quested ite ms. I n r e vie wi ng the po st- c on vi cti on c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion , w e , a s d id the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt , re vie w the e xistin g e vid e nc e a lon g wi th “ po te nti ally fa vo ra ble ” DN A r e su lts . A s st a te d inthi s Court’s 2004 opinion, a summary of the e x isting evide nce ide ntify ing Petiti o n er Al l ey as the pe rp e tr a tor

is a s f oll ow s:

1. Petitioner Al l eyg ave a leng thy and detailed confe ssion, including
acc ompany ing l aw enfor ceme nt officials to the sce ne, whe re he identified the loc a tio n w he re the bo dy

wa s fou nd and thetr e e fr om w hic h h e ob ta ine d th e limb used to pene trate the victim. I ntere stingly , Petitioner Alley never contested the validity of his fac tually detailed c onfession until May 2004, nearly

twenty y ear s afte r the dat e of his confession and thirty day s befor e his schedule d execution date.

2. Three witnesses desc ribed the ve hicle lo ca t ed i n the ar ea of the abduc tion as a late mode l gr een or

brown F ord or Me rcury

station wag on with wood-pane ling and Ke ntucky

tag s. T h e vehic le was de scribed a s having a loud muffler . Two Marines later identified the P etitioner’s vehicle as being the vehicle at the scene of the abduc tion. The Petitioner’s vehicle wa s a d ark gr een 1972 Me rcury station wag on with wood paneling and a K entucky license plate.

3. Th e P e tit ion e r i nf

orme d la w e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs that he str

uc k th e vic tim on the side of the he ad with a sc rew driver. Ascr ew d ri v er wa s found nea r the crime sc ene. T he me d i ca l examiner described a c ontusion to t he victim’s hea d as being consistent with the injury inflicted by

the blunt end of a

scre wdriver

.-20-

4. Th e Pe tit ion e r i nf

orme d la w e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs that he str

uc k th e vi ctim with the front drive r’s side of his v eh i cl e. B lood was found on the he adlig hts on the front driver’s side of

his vehicle.

5. Th e Pe tit ion e r t oldhis wi fe , Ly nn e Al le y , “ Ye s, I killed the g a l a t . . . O rg ill Park.”

6. Thirty -one a

rea s of stain i n g o n the Petitioner’s blue-je an shorts worn the night of the crime tested positive for blood. The shorts app ea red to have bee n fre shly launder ed.

7. A bloody head hair found on the front driver’ s side do o r o f P et itioner Al le y ’s c ar b e lon g e d to the vic tim

.

8. B loo d o n th e drive r’ s si de do or of Pe tit ion e r A lle y ’s c ar w a s o f the sa me AB O b loo d ty

pe a s th e vic tim

.

9. Petitioner Alley

defe nded on the g round of insanity , specific ally , that he suffe red f rom multipl e per sonality disorder. This theory

rema ined consistent at tr ia l, o n d ir e c t app e a l, andin h is p os t- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s.

10. The victim was qua rtere d with other mil i t ary personne l in a marine barr acks, and her body

was found in a

public park.

11. The jury

was informed that numerous ha irs wer e found on the victim’s clothing and at the crime scene . The jury was fu rt h er i n formed that some of the hairs b el o n ged to the victim, some to neither the victim nor the Petitioner, and
so me we reins uf

fi c ie nt t o p e rm it m ic ro sc op ic c omp ari so n a na ly sis

.

12. The State’s the ory at trial did not involve sexual i n t ercourse, but rather, a n act of sex u al m u t i l ati on with a thirty -one- inch tree limb being inserted into the victim’s vag ina. This theory was c onsistent with the Petit ioner’s sta t em en t to law
e nf or c e me nt.-21- Redund ant DNA Test R esults

Whil e the Pe tit ion e r p la c e s g re a t e mph a sis up on “ re du nd a nt D NAre su lts ,” thi s Co urt is
un pe rs ua de d th a t hi s “ re du nd a nt r e su lts ” a na ly sis dif fe rs fr om an in divid ua l de te rm inatio n a s to the “f avora ble” nature of eac h item’s DNA testing results. I n essenc e, the c rux of the Petiti oner’ s reque st for consider ation of “r edundant” test results is that the absenc e of the Petiti o n er’s DNA from these samples, or a ny combi nation there of, establishes his innoce nce of the murder . We are not persuade d by

this arg ument. As stated pre viously , the Post-Convictio n DNA Ana ly sis Act does not envision DNA testing of third-pa rty ind i v i d uals nor does it conte mplate a ne w investigation for a spe culative pha ntom defendant. T h i s C o urt is not inclined to disreg ard the
overw helming e vidence ag ainst the Pe t i t i o n er and, at this late date , embra ce an entirely new theory of the c rime. Even a ssuming that DNAtesting of the numerous items re quested by the Pe tit ion e r w ou ld g e ne rate re su lts ind ic a tin g a n a bs e nc e of the Pe tit ion e r’ s DN A fr om the se ite ms, this would not, wit h cons i d er at ion of the plethora of cr edible evide nce a g ainst the Petitioner, establish his innocence of the murde r or c onvince this Court t hat he would ha ve bee n neither prosec uted nor c onvicted if this DNA e vidence had bee n reve aled to the jury

.
(1) Vic tim ’s Jogging Sh oes

Pe tit ion e r A lle y

se e ks DN A t e sti ng on the jog g ing sh oes bel on g ing to the vic tim reg arding what appe ars to be bloodstains and a lso on a hair. The record re veals that the shoe s wer e pr ev i o usly

tested for

the pre sence of blood. Paulette Sutton testified at the Petitioner’s trial that the t es t fo r blood on the shoes showed a presumptive neg ative. Petitioner Alley now c on te nd s th a t hi s e xpe rt

ha s id e nti fi e d wh at hebe lie ve s “ ma y ” be blo odon thesh oe . T he po stc on vic tio n c ou rt

c on c lud e d th at th e Pe tit ion e r h a d f a ile d to de mon str a te that su c h e vid e nc e e xists for testing . Moreove r, the post-c onviction court found: Even if the pe titioner could demonstrate throug h testing that there is blood on the shoe and the blood does not belo n g t o h i m , there is no reasona ble proba bilitythat
su c h a re su lt wo uld ha ve pr e c lud e d pr os e c uti on or c on vic tio n. Th e bl oo d i s l ikel y from the victim. Even if t h e p eti tioner, we re to find the blood wa s from an unknown male source, this information is of little use. . . . Furthermore , . . . the victim lived and worke d in a publi c p l ace. The blood on he r shoe c ould have
come fr om any one that she r outinely came in contact with or f rom the roa dside wher e she f

reque ntly ran.

As to the hair sa mple, any DNA testing of the ha ir sample with re su l t s not matching the Pe tit ion e r o r

t h e v i c t i mw o u l d m e r e l y e s t ab l i s h t h a tt h e v i c t i mc a m e i n c o n t a c tw i t h a t h i r d p ar ty
a t so me po int

in t ime . T he vic tim

liv e d inc ommun a l mi lit ary qu art e rs . It is con ceiva

ble that a thi rd p art y ’s ha ir

a tta c he d to he r s ho e s inhe r e ve ry day ro uti ne . M or e ov e r, theha ir , e ve n if proven to be long to a

third party , does not neg ate the r emaining evidenc e, i n cludi ng the Petitioner’s fac tually

specific confe ssion, which strong ly identifies th e P eti tioner as the-22-

perpe trator. More over, Paule tte Sutton previou s ly examined both the victim’s left and rig ht shoes. She determined that the spots on the shoes did not test positive f or blood. The P etitioner has fa iled to establish the prese nce of a biolog ical spec imen for DN A testing

.
(2) M en’s Red Underwear

The P et i tioner conte nds that DNA testing should be conduc ted on a pair of re d underw ear found at the c rime sce ne. Tria l testimon y es t ab lished that there w as no blood or seme n found on the un de rw e ar. No ne the le ss, the Pe tit ion e r m a int a ins that th e un de rw e ar c a n b e te ste d fo r ski n cells or other

habitual wea

rer DNA to identify

the per son who wore the under we ar . The Petitioner further

asserts that the State’s theory at t ri al was that the red unde rwe ar, f ound near the victim’s body , belong ed to the per petrator.

Whil e the e vid e nc e a t tria l su g g e ste d th at th e re d u nd e rw e ar d id n ot belo ng to the vic tim due to the siz e differ ence , no proof was introduced establishing that the red underw earb el o ng ed to the perpe trator. Thus, while the State arg ued in clos i n g ar g ument that the re d underw ear b el o n ged to the per

petrator, arg ument is not proof. I n determining the sig nificanc e of exculpatory

results of DNAtesting on the red unde rwe ar, the post-conviction court noted:

[T] his court must consider the pr oof fr om the whole tria l an d h o w t his piece of evidenc e fits bef

ore de termining whether testing should be a ll o wed. This court g iv e s c o n s id e r ab le w e ig h t t o th e p o te n ti a l e f f e c t o n th e ju r y

th a t e xc u lp a to ry results might ha ve with re g ard to this p ar ticular piec e of e vidence . Howeve r, g ive n th e ov e rw he lmi ng e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt andthe fa c t t hat the St a te
never specific ally

tied the under wea

r to the def

endant at trial, this court finds petitioner has f

ailed to show thereis a reasonable pr obability that exculpatory
re s u l t s wo uld have led the State to foreg o prosec ution and/or resulted in pe titioner not being convicted.

We ag ree . No evidenc e identifies the r ed u n d erwear as belong ing to the Petitioner. The Pe tit ion e r’ s con fes sio n f

a ils to m ake a ny

re fe re nc e to the Pe tit ion e r’ s c lothin g . In f a c t, the on ly mention of any clothing belong ing to the P etitioner on the ni g ht of the murde r ar e the Petitioner’s blue

- je a n s h o r ts , w h ic h te s te d p o s it iv e f o r h u man b lo o d

. M o r e o v e r , it ap p e ar s f

r o m th e r ecor d that th is e vid e nc e ha s b e e n inthe c us tody of the She lby

Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt Cle rk

fo r the pa st twenty -plus y ear s. Ag ain, the issue of c ontamination must be considere d in view of the numerous individuals who have come into contac t with the underwe ar. A ccor dingly , even shoul d DN A t esting reve al the pre sence of DNAbelong ing to a third party , as alleg ed by the P e t i t i o n e r , t h e r e i s a s tr o n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s D N A w i l l n o t b e l o n g t o t h e p e r p e t r a t o r

. F i n a l l y, even should the Pet i t i o n er b e able to esta blish that DNA testing w ould only reve al the DNAof-23-

the ac tual “we are r” of

the re d underw ear , this evidence falls s hort of exculpating the Petitioner as the per petrator in light of his conf ession and the e y ewitness identification of the Petitioner’s ca r.

(3) Vic tim ’s Red Mar ine Corps T-Sh irt and Bra

Pe tit ion e r A lle y

c on te nd s th a t th e vict im ’s t- sh irt a ndbr a re ve a l a stain o n th e le ft

br e a st
are a consistent with saliva, seme n, o r m u co u s that could be teste d for DN A. The Petitioner further contends that the t-shirt possibly contains a bloodstain on the back a s well as per spiration. Reg arding the stains on the front of the s h i rt an d o n t h e bra cup, the Petitioner a sserts that stains
are saliva fr om the perpe trator biti ng the vi ctim’s brea st as t he autopsy report reve aled c ontusions to the br e a st a

re a . A s n ote d b y

the po st- c on vic tio n co urt, thi s evi de nc e wa s exam ine d b y Paule tte Sut tonwh o d e te rm ine d th a t no bl oo d, sem en, or othe r b od ily fl uid s w e repr e se nt o n th e br a ortshirt. The post-convic tion court furthe r found:

[T] his court finds petitioner’s a s s er t ion that stains are pr esent on [the] vi ctim’s shirt with biological worth highly suspect, esp ecially

in light of the f

act that the shirt has bee n in the evidenc e room with other items for nearly twenty y ear s. . . .

I nitially , this court notes t h at t h ere is no way to demonstrate that the purported stai n is associated w ith the crime. It could have just as e asily predated the c ri me ; a ndc ou ld a lso be of so me natur e other th an b iol og ic a l mate ri a l. Howeve r, . . . this court will assume that th er e are biolog ical materials on the victim’s shirt that do not b el o n g t o the def endant. It appea

rs from pe titioner’s arg ument that he cla ims the stains are sa liva from the pe rp et ra t or biting the vic tim ’s br e a st. Ho we ve r, a ssu min g e ven that th e stains areof the mus t
e xcu lpatory

natur e – i. e . s a liv a

no t be lon g ing to the p e tit ion e r, g ive n th e pr oo f i n thi s c a s e , th is c o u r t f

in d s th e r e is n o t a

r e a s o n ab le p r o b ab il ity

th a t th e d e f

e n d a nt would not have be en prose cuted or convicted. T he pe t itioner has continued to try to impl i cate the victim’s boy friend; howe ver, any such stain could have been le ft during a consensua l se x ual encounte r. More over, g iven the fa ct that the def endant g ave a leng thy confe ssion , a d et ai l ed wa lk throug h of the c rime sce ne, and continued to admit his guilt to his wife eve n afte r he w as in jail, it is not likely that this information would have pre vented pe titioner’s prosec ution or conviction.

Reg arding exculpatory

results on testing of

the victim’s bra, the court stated:

[T] he co urt ag ain notes that such e vidence could have been le ft throug h a
consensua l sex ual ac t. Given this fact and, gi v en t he evide nce a g ainst the defe ndant[,] the court ag ain finds that eve n if the spec i m en we re sufficient for testing and still in good e noug h condition to test and such tests excluded petitioner-24-

as the sourc e of the specimen, a rea sonable proba

bilitywould n o t ex i s t t h at s uch a result would have prec luded prosec ution and/or conviction.

A re view of the rec o rd from the Petitioner’s dire ct appe al re veals that the Petitioner denied a ny

phy sical conta ct wi th the victim’s brea st. Additionally , the Petitioner denied any sexual int erc ourse or

contac t with the victim, other than the ac t of sexual mut ilation. As stated by the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt , it is m or e lik e ly

than n ot that th e c on tu si on s o n th e vic tim ’s br e a st
wer e the result of a c onsensual sexual encounte r. Additionally , as noted by the State, there is no evidenc e indicating whether the t-s h i rt and bra

wer e fr eshly

launder ed bef

ore the victim’s
mur de r. As su c h, it i s p os sib le that a ny stain o n th e t- sh irt a ndbr a pr e date s th e c ri me . M e re ly detec ting DN A from a nother individual on the victim’s clothing , in the absenc e o f any evidenc e as to h o w an d wh en that DNA was de posited, would not ex culpate the Petitioner by pointing to a d i ff erent assailant. As the Petitioner de nied any contac t with the victim’s breast, this Court would be constrained to conclude that DNA testing on the bra and t-shirt excluding the Petitioner and the victim wo u l d h ave resulted in the Petitioner not being prosec uted or c onvicted of the crime.

(4) Vic tim ’s Underwear

Pe tit ioner Al ley c on te nd s th a t th e c ro tc h a re a of the vic tim ’s pa nti e s is staine d w ith biologica l material that c an be te sted for DNA. The post-c onviction court prope rly noted that the
un de rw e ar h a d p re vio us ly be e n te ste d b y

Paule tte Sut tonwh o d e te rm ine d th a t the un derw ear did not contain semen or

blood. The post -convic tion court de termined that “ if [S utton’s] conclusions
wer e incor

rec t and eve n if subsequent tes t i n g re veale d the petitioner wa s not the source of any biologica l material, ther e is not a re asonable probability that such re s u l t s would have preclude d h is p r o s e c u ti o n o r c o n v ic ti o n

. ” I n th is r e g ar d , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t n o te d th a t “ th e stains could be bodily

fluids from the victim or they could be f

luids fr o m a p revious consensual sexual act.” Moreove r, since the State’s t h eo ry wa s one of se x ual mutilation and not penile penetr ation
a ndbe c aus e the Pe tit ion e r d e nie s p e nil e pe ne tr a tio n o f thevic tim , w e a g re e wi th th e po stconviction court’s finding that “i t i s unlikely that the fa ct that testing [of the victim’s underwe ar] excluding the petitioner as the source of any biologica l material on the victi m ’s u nderw ear , would have a

signific ant impact on the jury .”

(5 ) O ne Whi teTube Soc k Be lon gin g t o t he Vi c ti m

Petitioner A ll e y n e xt s e e k s D N A te s ti n g o n h a ir s f o u n d o n th e v ic ti m’ s s o c k a s w e ll as testing on w hat appe ars to be a bloodstain on the sock. Fir st, we note that the Petitioner reque sted DNA te sting of a h ai r found on t he sock in his 2004 petition. This request wa s denied. Moreove r, Paulette Sutton ex amined the soc k p ri o r to the Petitioner’s trial and c oncluded that no blood or semen wa s fo u n d o n t he sock. Thepost-conviction court declined DN A testing on the-25-

so c k, fi nd ing that, i n add iti on to the se fa c t, D NAte sti ng wa s n ot w arr a nte d “ du e to the pu bli c nature of the victim’s living arr ang ement even assuming results excluding the defe ndant w ere found.” The post-conviction court further found that “if the re a

re n ew h airs on the socks that
wer e not found by

Sutton or L ah [ re ] n , i t is just as li kely they wer e deposited the re by court personne l sometime over the last twe nty y ear s.”

Th e re c or d s up po rt s th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing . T he vic tim wa s q ua rt e re d in public acc ommodations and it is co n ceiva ble that stains and hair s collecte d on the victim’s socks du e to the natur e of

he r l ivi ng arran gemen ts. Th e Pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te that a
rea sonable proba

bilityexis ts that he would not have b ee n p ro s ec uted or c onvicted if the soc ks
r e v e a l e d t h e D N A o f

a t h i r d p ar t y.

(6) Vic tim ’s Jogging Sh orts

Petitioner Alley

also contends that the vic t i m’s jogg ing shorts found at the crime scene contain a p o s s i b l e b loodstain. Ag ain, Paulette Sutton testified at the Petitioner’s trial that the sh orts d id n ot c on ta in any blo odor se me n s ta in. Th e po st- c onvi cti on cou rt f ou ndthat, i f a

stain did exi st, “the stain could belong to the victim; but eve n excluding the victim, this court finds the defe ndant does not mee t the st atutory require ments. L ike the alleg ed stain on the shirt, this court finds the stain on the sh o rts could have predated the crimes and could be the re sult of consensual sexual activity . Thus, even if there is such a spec imen and testi ng reve als it is consistent with a
source other than the defe nd an t , t h i s court finds ther e is not a re asonable probability that prosec ution and/or conviction would have occur red in this case .”

There is no indication in the recor d, other than the bare alleg ation of t h e P et i t i oner, that the stain would reve al the pre sence of semen or blood. I n fac t, Paulette Sut t o n t es t i fi ed to t he contra ry . Moreove r, since the re is no evide nce r eg arding the pre -crime condition and history of the victim’s shorts, D NA testing r esults excluding the Petitioner’s DN A from the shorts, in li g ht of the ove rwhe lming proof to the co n t rary , do not cre ate a rea sonable proba

bilitythat the Petitioner would not have be en prose cuted or convicted.

(7 ) B lue Exe r c iseBe lt

Petitioner Alley

also seeks D NA testing on t he victim’s blue exerc ise belt found at the crime sc ene. T he Petitioner conte n d s that the exercise be lt contains biologica l specimens and hairs that ar e suitable for

DNA testing . Whil e it is unclear whether the exercise bel t contains any biologica l evidence other than hairs, the post-convi ct i o n court noted that it is likely that the biologica l material on the e x erc ise belt is “sweat, or nasal se cre tions o r s o m e o ther biolog ical
s p e c im e n b e lo n g in g to th e v ic ti m. ” T h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t a s s u me d , h o w e v e r , that the-26-

biological m at er i al is “not from either the def endant or the victim.” The post-c onviction court continued:

[S ]i nce t h i s court is unclea r what exact “biologic al” mate rial the pe titioner portends is on the belt, the c ourt finds a re asonable probability does no t exi st that the e xclu sio n o f b othde fe nd a nt andvic tim a s d e po sit or s o f the su bs tances wo uld pr e c lu d e th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s p r o s e c u ti o n o r c o n v ic ti o n

. I f

th e mate r ia l i s s w e a t or
ev en nasa l secre tions, it is possibl e the victim loaned the belt to others to use for exercise a nd any

number of pe ople could have d ep o s ited biologica l material on the belt. Addi t i o n al l y , as pre viouslymentioned[,] the victim was the re sident of a public barr acks and could have contac ted the materials there.

The post-c onviction court further noted that the Petitioner previously soug ht DNA testing on hairs found on the exercise be lt which was de nied. Se e Se dle y Al ley v . S tate , No. W2004- 01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at *10. I n affi rm i ng the lower court’s prior denial of DNA testing on hairs found on the exercise be lt, this Court noted that, “eve n if proven to belong to a third-par t y , d o es n ot neg ate the r emaining evidenc e which strong ly identifies the Petitioner as the pe rpetrator.” Id. The fa ct that g enetic material be lon gi n g t o a t h ird party could be f

ound
on the vic tim ’s e xerc is e bel t do es no t le a d th is C ou rt to the c on c lus ionthat th e Pe tit ion e r w ou ld not have be en prose cuted or would not have be en convic ted of the c rime.

(8 ) T hr e e St yr ofoa mCup s

Petitioner Alley

maintains that he should be per m i t t ed t o conduct DN A testing on three Styrofoa m cu p s fo und near the victim’s body . The post-c onviction court made the following fi nd ing s: [ T ] h i s co urt notes that testimony from the tria l court indicate d that the cups we re sent to a lab to be tested for the pr esenc e of bodily fluids and none we re f

ound.

. . . Pe tit ion er ha s g ive n th e c ou rt no re a so n to do ub t th a t th e c up s e ith e r c on ta in bio log ic a l mate ri a l or

a ny su c h s a mpl e s a

reins uf fi c ie nt f or testing . N e ve rthe le ss, even i f t es t s could be pe rformed and suc h tests excluded the defe ndant as the
source of the specimen, g iven the over whelming proof in this case , the court finds there is n o t a re asonable probability that the petitioner would not have been prosec uted or c onvicted. In addition to the incri minating e vidence alre ady mentioned by

this court, of additional sig nificanc e is the fa ct that the victim’s blo oda ndha ir were fo un d o n th e de fe nd a nt’ s c a r, blo odwa s f

ou ndon his clothing, and a napk i n fo u n d at the sce ne re sembled one f ound in the defe ndant’s
car

.-27-

Th is C ou rt

c on c lud e s th a t th e po st -co nv ic tio n c ou rt ha s n ot a

bu se d it s d isc re tio n in finding that the P et i t i o n er did not establish a “re asonable probability ” that the State would not have soug ht prosecutio n or that he w ould not have bee n convicted if DNA testing on the three Styrofoa m cups failed to r evea l the prese nce of his DNA. The vic tim’s body was fo u nd in a public place . I t is highly likely that other pe rsons had visited the ar ea an d deposited the Sty ro fo a m c up s. Th e Pe tit ion e r’ s c on fe ssi on fails to i nc lud e a ny re fe re nc e to S ty

ro fo a m c up s.

(9) Bee r Bottle s

At the Pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l, un op e ne d, fu ll bo ttl e s of be e r we re ide nti fi e d. Fing e rp ri nts coll ec t ed from the beer bottles did not match those of the Petitioner or the victim. The Petitioner
c on te nd s th a t te sti ng sh ou ld b e pe rm itt e d to te st the bo ttl e s f or tr a c e s o f D NA . T he po stc on vic tio n c ou rt

ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

This reque st completely

fails to meet the f

irst prong o f t h e st atute. In rea litythe be e r b ott le s w e re no t f

ou ndc los e to the bo dy . T hi s cou rt re a lize s th a t “ ne ar” is a relative term; but the t rial t ransc ript reve als that the bee r bottles wer e ac tually “not in the particula

r ar ea of the sce ne.” .

. . T h e b o t t les wer e found in a n are a rese mbling a p i cnic a

rea and we re loc ated both in and out of the trashcan. . . . Further testimony

reve aled that the bottles wer e found approximately 1⁄2 to 3/4 of a
m i l e a w a y f

r o mt h e b o d y.

The bottles and t h e b o d y wer e found in a

public are a. Clearly , even if the bottles showed the pre sence of DNAfrom som eone othe r than the de fendant or victim, give n the over whelming pr oo f o f the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t, a s o utl ine d inthi s o rd e r, thi s fact would n ot l e a d to a re a so na ble probability

that the def

endant would not have been pr osecute d or convic ted.

Th e re c ord supp orts the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionon the se re qu e ste d it e ms. I t is highly p ro b ab l e t h at t he bee r bottles found in a public a rea “four -tenths of a

mile from the entra nce of

th e r o a d w a y

w h e r e th e r o a d f

o rk s ” c o mp ar e dto th e lo c a ti o n o f th e v ic ti m’ s b ody “one- half mile fr om the entra nce of the roa dway

on the south road” contained the DNA of neither the Petitioner nor the victim. The f act that g enetic material be longing to a third party could be found on these be er bottles would not have resulted in t h e Petitioner not being prosec uted or convicted of

the crime.

(1 0) Blo ods ta ine d G r as s C oll e c te d fro mBe ne at h t he Vi c ti m ’s Body

Pe tit ion e r A lle y

c on te nd s th a t he sh ou ld b e pe rm itt e d to te st g ra ss re c ov e re d fr om b e ne a th the vic tim ’s va g ina l are a wh ic h may

c on ta in b od ily

fl uid s. At

thePe tit ion e r’ s tria l, P aule tte-28-

Sutton t es t i fi ed t h at “five individual bag s of dirt and g rass” wer e submitted for a naly sis. She
e xami ne d th e c on te nts of a ll o f the ba g s, e xce pt o ne , e xpla ini ng that on e ba g “ a c tua lly ha d mo ld on the outside of the ba g , and I didn’ t ev en o p en i t for f urther analy sis. I t just wouldn’t have been a n y g o o d

. ” Su tt o n c o n ti n u e d th a t “ [t ]h r e e o f th e b a g s , I c o u ld n o t s e e a n y b lo o d s tains on the g rass, a nd on one, ther e wa s blood present.” Ba sed upon Sutton’s te s t i mony , one bag of
e vid e nc e is u na va ila

ble fo r t e sti ng . Si nc e the se sa mpl e s w e rein the c us tod y of Ms. S ut ton , it

is possible that these samples a re no longe r in exist ence . Notwithstanding, a s the lower c ourt presumed that some of these sa mples were still available for testing , we, too, will so presume.

Ag ain, the Petitioner has ne ver a lleg ed that he se x ually penetrated the vic tim to t he de g re e wh ic h w ou ld h a ve re su lte d inhis de po sit ing seme n at th e sc e ne of the c ri me . It is mos t lik e ly that the blo odide nti fi e d o n th e g ra ss s a mpl e s b e lon g s to the vic tim a s it wa s f ou ndbe ne a th her va g inal are a. Howe ver, e ven should the samples c ontain DN A evidenc e belong ing to ne ither the Pe tit ion e r n or

the vic tim , w e wo uldbe c on str a ined t o con clu de that su c h e vid e nc e wo uld have pr eclude d the Petitioner’s prose cution or convic tion.

(11) Tre e Lim b and P aper in w hich L im b w as Wrapped

Pe tit ion e r A lle y

seeks te sti ng on thetr e e limb u se d to ra pe , b ru ta lize , a ndkil l th e vic tim
a ndthe pa

pe r i n w hic h th e li mb was wr app e d. Al tho ug h th e Pe tition e r p re vio us ly so ug ht p os tconviction DNA te sting on a hair found on the t re e li mb, he has a ltered his re quest in the prese nt petition to test for blo od and fluids found on the tre e limb as well as f or skin cells/sweat of the assailant. At the Petitioner ’s t ri al , the medica l examiner testified that “blood evide nce or red materia l e vidence ” was prese nt on the external aspec t of the tree limb that was pr otruding betwee n the vi ct i m ’s l egs . Fr om the medical e x aminer’ s testimony , it was more likely than not that, due to t h e fa ct that the tree limb had been inserted, withdraw n, and re inserted at least twice, the blood on the limb was that of the victim. The post-c onvictio n co u rt m ad e t h e following fi nd ing s: [The Assistant District Attorney Gene ral] expl ains that the tree limb . . . was stored in an evidence “bin” in custody of the Criminal Court Clerk. [The A s s is tan t D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l] s tate d th a t th e tr e e li mb h a s b e e n inth is [b in ], unseale d, open to the public and t h e elements for twenty y ear s. The branch
apparen tl y is s tor e d a lon g wi th o the r e vid e nc e in this c a se . D e sp ite de fe ns e counsel’s a

rg uments that such contamination has n o eff ect on the pote ntial DNA that may be re c ov e re d f

ro m the limb, thi s c ou rt

fi nd s th a t a ny

su c h r e su lts wo uld be hig hly suspect g iven the conditions that e vidence has been in f or twenty y ear s. .

. .

. . . .-29-

. . . This court finds petitioner’ s arg ument t h at t h e b lood can now be tested af ter twenty y ear s of exposure to the eleme nts and the proposi t i o n that even if it were
su ita ble fo r t e sti ng , th e blo odmig ht b e lon g to s ome on e oth e r tha n th e vic tim preposter ous. Wi th reg ard to the stain the pe ti t i o n er contends “ might” be semen, a s th e State e xpla ine d th e limb h a s b e e n lo os e a nde x po sed fo r n e arl y tw e nty y ear s; thus, it is just as li kely the purporte d semen stain is ac tually some other
s u b s tan c e

. F in a ll y , c e r tain ly , th e c o n tami n a ti o n o f th e e v id e n c e w o u ld a f f e c t an
e xam iner ’s abil ity

to g e t a n a c c ur a te pr of

ile fr om s kinc e lls take n f ro m th e limb, if any such material even still exi sts on the limb.

As to the proposition that a rea sonable probab i l ity exis ts that such evidenc e, if it excluded the def en d ant, would have resulted in either the State not
se e kin g pr os e c uti on or p e tit ion e r n ot b e ing c on vic te d, thi s c ou rt fi nd s th a t, w ith
re g ardto the skin c e lls a ndha ir , g ive n th e fa c t th a t th e li mb w a s ta ke n f ro m a public p ark, this arg ument is without m erit. More over, g iven the medica l
e xami ne r’ s te sti mon y

re g ard ing the blo ode vid e nce o n the l imb , th is c ou rt fi nd s it unlikely the State would have forg one prose cution or t h e j u rynot convicted ha d DNA testing excluded defe ndant as the blood sourc e. F inally , arg uably had semen not belong ing to the de fendant been found on the limb, the question become s a m o re d i ff

i cu lt one. Howeve r, since the State’s theory was not one of pe nil e pe ne tr a tio n a ndsin c e the defe nd a nt c la ims he didno t pe ne tr a te the vic tim with his penis such a result would not ne cessa rily have prec luded pro s ec u t i o n nor re su lte d ina c qu itt a l. It is lik e ly that ha d th e vic tim

ha d c on se ns ua l se x tha t so me semen from the consensua l a ct might have been transfe rre d to th e l i m b u p on insertion. Thus, this court finds that g iven the bre adth of incriminatin g p ro o f at trial, eve n this result would not meet the first prong of the statute.

Th is Cou rt c a nn ot dis a g re e wi th the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion

. I t is more l ike ly than not than any

blood on the tree limb belongs to the victim. Moreover, as to DN A testing on th e blo od , s kinc e lls , o r any oth e r b iol og ic a l sp e c ime n o n th e limb, we wo uldbe c on str a ine d to conclude that the pre sen ce of DNA be longing to neither the Petitioner nor the victim would have result ed i n the State not pursuing prosec ution or the jury not convicting the Petitioner. Our conclusion is based upon te stimonyevincing contamination of the limb

. I n ad d i t i on to the uncontested a ssertion of the State tha t t h e l i m b has bee n “unsea led” in an “ evidenc e bin” in the custody of the Criminal Court Clerk, the trial re cord indica t es t hat numerous third pe rsons have handled the limb. I ndeed, the rec ord of the direct a ppeal r efle cts that, at the Petitioner’s tria l, the limb w a s p a sse d f

ro m th e pr os e c uto r t o D r. B e ll f or ide nti fi c a tio n. Un do ub te dly , th ir d p arty DNA e x ists on the lim b. The D NA Act does not require f urther inve stigation into t he identity of third party

DNA. Ac cording ly , even if testing wo u l d establish the pre sence of DNAof a third party and not the DNAof the Petitioner, with the conside ration of the over wh el m i n g proof a nd with th e c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e c o n tami n a ti o n o f

th e li mb s in c e th e c r im e , w e c a n n o t c o n c lu d e th at-30-

the State w o u ld h a v e f

o r e g o n e p r o s e c u ti o n o f th e Pe ti ti o n e r o r th a t th e Pe ti ti o n e r w o u ld n o t ha ve been c onvicted.

D. Motivation of Bringing Petition

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de te rm ine d that Pe tit ion e r Al le y faile d to me e t the c ri te ri a un de r su bs e c tio n (4 ) of Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d se c tio ns 40 -3 0- 30 4 a nd 40 -3 0- 30 5. Th e se provisions provide that the petition for DN A ana l y s i s m u s t be broug ht for the pur pose of demonstrating innocenc e and not to unre asonably delay the execution o f s en t en ce or a dmi nis tr a tio n o f j us tic e . T .C. A. §§ 40 -3 0- 30 4( 4) , - 30 5( 4) . A s t o th is c ri te ri on , th e po stconviction court remar

ked:

This court has se rious questions reg arding the motivations of the petitioner fo r r a isi ng thi s is su e a t th is t ime . T he pe tit ion e r s ou g ht t o pre se nt muc h o f the se c la ims hour s b e fo re his e xec uti on a ndha s p re vio us ly ha d th e op po rtun ity

to lit igate a port ionof

his re qu e st b e fo rethi s c ou rt , ina 20 04 Pe tit ion e r f

or Pos tConviction DNA Analy sis. A P et i t i o n which wa s also filed close to the time of his pending execution. Whi le i t i s clear fr om the Statutes constituti ng the Act and the c a se la w ana ly zing the Ac t th a t a pe tit ionfo r p os t- con vi ction D NAa na ly sis may be broug ht at any

time, the samples soug ht for testing by this petiti oner ha ve be e n a va ila

ble sin c e be fo re thetria l. M uc h o f the do c ume ntation su pp ortin g the ir
re qu e st was availab le a t tria l. T hr ou g ho ut t he dir e c t app e a l a ndthe po stc on vic tio n o f this c a se , p e tit ioner has a sse rt e d th a t he c omm itt e d th e a lle g e d a c ts, but was not sane at the time of thei r co m m i s s i o n

. Thus, the timing of pe titioner’s
a lle g a tio ns is h ig hly

su sp e c t.

. . . This co u rt d o es not believe pe titioner seeks re lief under the Act f

or the pu rp os e of

de mon str a tin g a c tua l in nocence. Rathe r this c ou rt i[s] f ir mly
c on vin c e d th a t th e mot ivatio ns of pe tit ion e r a

requ ite dif

fe re nt. I t is c le ar t o th is
co u r t th a t p e ti ti o n e r

s e e k s to d e lay

h is e xe c u ti o n w ith th is la s t m in u te s u c c e s sive pe tit ionfo r P os t Co nv ic tio n D NAAn a ly sis

.

Th e low e r c ou rt ’s fi nd ing on thi s is su e is s up po rt e d b y su bs ta nti a l e vid e nc e a s it e xi sts in the proc e d u r a l h is to r y o f th is c a s e

. Wh il e it is tr u e th a t th e Pe ti ti o n e r is n o w r e p r e s e n te d by differ ent counse l than in 2004, we cannot fi n d p re s en t counsel blame less for not filing a more tim e ly pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n D NAa na ly sis . Ind e e d, un de r directio n o f c ur re nt c ou ns e l, Pe ti ti o n e r A ll e y s o u g h t in M ar c h 2 0 0 6 a c c e s s to th is s a me e v id e n c e f r o m th e f e d e r a l c o u r ts f

or DN A t e sti ng . T he Pe tit io ner fai ls to of fe r an e xpla natio n a s to wh y no a tte mpt

wa s ma de in s ta te court to test these a dditional items. Notwit hstanding , even the reque st made i n fe d era l court wa s made shortly

befor e the Petitioner’s sc hed u l ed M ay 2006 execution. Finally , we note that theW hi l e t he P ost

- C onvi ct i on D N A Anal y s i s Act does not s t at ut ori l y prohi bi t a defendan t f r om f i l i ng un l i mi t ed 3

success i ve p et i t i o ns reque st i ng D N A t est i ng, nei t her can t hi s C o urt co nd o ne such pi ecem eal l i t i gat i o n ai m ed at de l ayi ng the e x e c u tio n o f a se n te n c e

. S e e g e n e ra lly H i l l v
. M cDonough , – U

. S. –, – S. C t

. –, 2006 W L 1584710, a t * 6 ( Ju n e 12, 2 0 0 6 ). In d e e d , t h e U n ited S ta te s D istric t C o u rt re c e n tly d ism isse d the P e tit io n e r’s § 1 9 8 3 a c tio n c h a llen g ing the S ta te ’s le tha l i n je c tio n p ro to c o l o n the b a sis tha t t h e P e tit io n e r h a d un d u ly d e la ye d the fi ling o f t h a t ac tio n

. See Sedl ey A l l ey
v . G e o rg e L itt le , N o

. 3:06

- 0 3 4 0 (M

. D

. T enn. , Jun. 14 , 20 0 6 ).
-31- Post-Convi ction DNA Ana ly sis Act was e n ac t ed in 2001. The Petitioner’s convic tions and sentenc es we re a ff

i rm ed b y our supre me court in 1989. This C ourt must ponder why DNA testing w as not reque sted until 2004, shortlybefor e the Petitioner’s s ch ed u l ed ex ecution, whe n the evidenc e soug ht to be tested existed prior to the Petit i o n er ’s trial and such r elief ha d been
a va ila ble to h im s inc e 20 01

. Whe n a re qu e st t o th e fe de ra l c ou rt a nda la st- min ute a tte mpt

to 3 delay execution was made to the Governor of this State, this Court can only conclude that such eff orts leading to the filing of the petition that is presently befor e this Court wer e m ade f or the purpose of

delaying the execution of the sentenc e.

CO NC LU SION

Upon our re view of the rec ord bef o re u s , i n cl uding the Petitioner’s motion for DNA testing, the State’s re sponse and pr evious opinions of t h is Court and our supreme court in the dir e c t app e a l a ndpo st -con vi ction p ro c e e din g s, we c on c lud e that th e re c or d s up po rt s th e po stc on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s th a t th e Pe tit ione r f a ile d to e sta

bli sh that ( 1) a

re a so na ble probability

exis ts t h at t h e P etitioner would not have been pr osecute d or convic ted if exculpatory results had be en obtained thr oug h DNA a naly s i s ; an d (2) a rea sonable proba bilityexis ts that analy sis of the evidenc e will produce DNA r esults which would have rende red the Petitioner’s
ve rd ic t or se nte nc e mor e fa vo ra

ble if the resul ts had been av a ila ble a t th e pr oc e e din g s le a din g to the judg ment of convic tion. See T. C.A . § § 4 0- 30 -3 04 (1 ), -3 05 (1 ). Acco rdi ngly , th e po stc on vic tio n c ou rt

did no t e rr by de nying the Pe tit ion e r’ s r e qu e st f or DN A ana ly sis

.
The judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAV ID G. H AYE S , J UDGE-32-