2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-26-2007

O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-3288

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*

The Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, United States Circuit

Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

1

 PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 05-3288

____________

PATRICK J. O’CONNOR; MARIE M. O’CONNOR;

 Appellants,

 

 v.

 SANDY LANE HOTEL CO., LTD.

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 04-cv-02436)

District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner

Argued June 16, 2006

Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and REAVLEY,*

 Circuit

Judges.

____________

(Filed: July 26, 2007)

James Mundy (Argued)

Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross & Mundy

1845 Walnut Street, Suite 2000

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellant
1

We recount only those facts relied on by the O’Connors to

support their claim of specific jurisdiction. In their brief, the

O’Connors also argued that Sandy Lane is subject to general

jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, and in the alternative they sought to

2

Paul A. Lisovicz (Argued)

Coughlin Duffy

350 Mount Kemble Ave.

P.O. Box 1917

Morristown, NJ 07962

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

While receiving a massage treatment at a Barbados hotel,

appellant Patrick J. O’Connor slipped, fell, and injured his

shoulder. He and the hotel had arranged for that massage by

telephone after the hotel mailed a spa brochure to his Pennsylvania

home. Mr. O’Connor and his wife Marie brought negligence

claims against the hotel, and the District Court dismissed for want

of personal jurisdiction. In this appeal, we conclude that the

District Court had specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the

O’Connors’ claims. As a result, we will reverse and remand. 

I. 

Appellee Sandy Lane Hotel Company is a Barbados

corporation. Its sole business is the operation of the Sandy Lane

Hotel in St. James, Barbados. The hotel considers itself “the

premier address in the Caribbean,” and its features include 45 holes

of championship golf, a state-of-the-art spa, and a setting

“overlooking a gorgeous crescent of beach on Barbados’ western

coast.” Appendix (“App.”) 259, 276. 

Patrick and Marie O’Connor reside in Pennsylvania. They

first heard about Sandy Lane while planning a vacation.1

 Friends
transfer the case to the Southern District of New York. See Pl.

Brief 1-2. To that end, they discussed, inter alia, five business

trips to Philadelphia by Sandy Lane employees, the mailing of

newsletters to approximately 800 Pennsylvania addresses, and

Sandy Lane’s relationships with public relations and marketing

firms in New York City. See Pl. Brief 6-8, 21-23. At oral

argument, however, the O’Connors’ attorney stated they were

abandoning their other arguments and relying exclusively on their

claim of specific jurisdiction. 

3

and travel agents said good things about the resort, so the couple

booked a week’s stay through the American Express travel agency.

The O’Connors left for Barbados in late February 2002 and

returned to Pennsylvania in early March. Upon their return, Sandy

Lane started mailing seasonal newsletters to the O’Connors’ home.

These newsletters kept the O’Connors up to date on new amenities

and other changes at Sandy Lane. See, e.g., App. 304 (“[O]ur wine

waiters have been in France this summer participating in the harvest

and improving their wine knowledge to better serve you.”). 

In early 2003, the O’Connors decided to make a return trip.

They booked a five-night stay at Sandy Lane through a travel

agency. Sandy Lane then mailed the O’Connors a brochure

highlighting the many treatments available at the on-site spa. The

brochure advised the couple to schedule spa treatments in advance

of their trip. The O’Connors perused the brochure and liked what

they saw. They decided to purchase various treatments, and the

scheduling process involved a series of phone calls both to and

from Sandy Lane. In the end, Sandy Lane agreed to provide spa

treatments at specific dates and times, and the O’Connors agreed to

pay a set price.

The O’Connors arrived in Barbados shortly thereafter, and,

on February 26, Mr. O’Connor was due for one of his massages.

He went to the spa at the appointed time, and the staff began to

“rejuvenate” his “mind, body, and spirit.” App. 281, 325. As part

of that process, a Sandy Lane employee instructed Mr. O’Connor

to step into the shower and wash up. Unfortunately, Mr.

O’Connor’s feet were still slick with massage oils, and there were

no mats on the shower’s wet floor. As he stepped into the shower,
4

Mr. O’Connor slipped, fell, and tore his rotator cuff. 

Mr. and Mrs. O’Connor brought negligence claims against

the hotel in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County.

Sandy Lane removed the case to the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the District Court

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The O’Connors appeal.

II. 

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction because

the O’Connors are citizens of Pennsylvania, Sandy Lane is a

Barbados corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441; Nat’l S.S. Co. v. Tugman,

106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291, and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Pinker v. Roche

Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Once challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing personal jurisdiction. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG,

270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, since the District

Court did “not hold an evidentiary hearing . . ., the plaintiff[s] need

only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the

plaintiff[s] [are] entitled to have [their] allegations taken as true and

all factual disputes drawn in [their] favor.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc.

v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), a District Court

typically exercises personal jurisdiction according to the law of the

state where it sits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Because this

case comes to us from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, we apply the Pennsylvania longarm statute. It provides for jurisdiction “based on the most

minimum contact with th[e] Commonwealth allowed under the

Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §

5322(b); see Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960

F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, in determining

whether personal jurisdiction exists, we ask whether, under the Due

Process Clause, the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with

. . . [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
2

A slightly refined version of this test applies to intentional

tort claims. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); IMO Indus.,

Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998). Because the

O’Connors’ claims sound only in negligence, we use the standard

formulation of the test here. 

5

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal

quotation omitted). 

III.

The two types of personal jurisdiction are general

jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n.9 (1984). The

O’Connors conceded at oral argument that Sandy Lane lacks the

“continuous and systematic” Pennsylvania contacts needed to

support general jurisdiction, so we consider only the specific

variety here. 

The inquiry as to whether specific jurisdiction exists has

three parts. First, the defendant must have “purposefully directed

[its] activities” at the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471

U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quotation marks omitted). Second, the

litigation must “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those

activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Grimes v. Vitalink

Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994). And third, if

the prior two requirements are met, a court may consider whether

the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise “comport[s] with ‘fair play

and substantial justice.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).2

A.

At the threshold, the defendant must have “purposefully

avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Physical

entrance is not required. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Grand

Entm’t Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d

Cir. 1993) (“Mail and telephone communications sent by the
3

We note that our usual practice is to assess specific

jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis. See, e.g., Remick v.

Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001). However, “it may

not be necessary to do so” for certain factually overlapping claims.

Id. In this case, Mr. O’Connor brings a negligence claim, while

Mrs. O’Connor alleges loss of consortium. Mrs. O’Connor’s lossof-consortium claim is “purely derivative” of her husband’s

negligence claim. Nigra v. Walsh, 797 A.2d 353, 355 n.1 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2002); see also Scattaregia v. Wu, 495 A.2d 552, 554

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“The consortium plaintiff has suffered no

direct injury. His right to recover is derived, both in a literal and

legal sense, from the injury suffered by his spouse.”) (quotations

and alterations omitted). Because the two claims “together . . .

represent the total, compensable damages—direct and

indirect—suffered as a result of the principal plaintiff’s injury,”

Scattaregia, 495 A.2d at 553, we need not analyze them separately.

 

6

defendant into the forum may count toward the minimum contacts

that support jurisdiction.”). But what is necessary is a deliberate

targeting of the forum. Thus, the “unilateral activity of those who

claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant” is

insufficient. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. And contacts with a

state’s citizens that take place outside the state are not purposeful

contacts with the state itself. See Gehling v. St. George’s Sch. of

Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1985). 

Some of the contacts alleged by the O’Connors do not meet

this standard.3

 First, the O’Connors claim they heard about the

hotel from friends and travel agents in Pennsylvania. Sandy Lane,

however, was not a party to these conversations, and they have no

bearing on our jurisdictional inquiry. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.

Second, the O’Connors rely on their 2002 trip to Sandy Lane. This

too lacks jurisdictional significance. Contact with vacationing

Pennsylvanians is no substitute for contact with Pennsylvania. See

Gehling, 773 F.2d at 542-43. A Philadelphia vendor may sell a lot

of cheesesteaks to German tourists, but that does not mean he has

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting

activities within Germany. 
4

The Court granted certiorari on the question in Carnival

Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), but ultimately

decided the case on other grounds. Id. at 589.

5

Some courts have opined that the test’s disjunctive

phrasing—“arise out of or relate to”—itself implies a “flexib[le]”

and “relax[ed]” standard. See, e.g., Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d

1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). But the

Supreme Court has cautioned against attaching any significance to

its use of the disjunctive. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10

(“We do not address . . . whether the terms ‘arising out of’ and

‘related to’ describe different connections . . . . Nor do we reach

the question whether, if the two types of relationship differ, a

forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where the

cause of action ‘relates to,’ but does not ‘arise out of,’ the

defendant’s contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an

7

Nonetheless, Sandy Lane’s other claim-specific contacts do

amount to purposeful availment. After the O’Connors’ initial stay,

Sandy Lane continued to cultivate the relationship by mailing

seasonal newsletters to their Pennsylvania home. And after the

O’Connors booked their 2003 trip, Sandy Lane mailed them a

brochure and traded phone calls with them for the purpose of

forming an agreement to render spa services. Through these acts,

Sandy Lane deliberately reached into Pennsylvania to target two of

its citizens. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; Grand Entm’t, 988 F.2d

at 482. Thus, if the O’Connors’ allegations are true, then they

establish purposeful contact with Pennsylvania. See Miller Yacht,

384 F.3d at 97. 

B.

1.

Identifying some purposeful contact with the forum is but

the first step in the specific-jurisdiction analysis. The plaintiffs’

claims must also “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those

contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1559.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet explained the scope

of this requirement.4

 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.5 State
assertion of specific jurisdiction.”). 

6

See Mark M. Maloney, Note, Specific Jurisdiction and the

“Arise from or Relate to” Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?,

50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1265, 1283 (1993) (“[T]he substantive

relevance test and the proximate cause test are essentially the

same.”); see also Davis v. Baylor Univ., 976 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1998) (same); Shell Compania Argentina de Petroleo, S.A. v.

Reef Exploration, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 830, 837 n.5 (Tex. Ct. App.

2002) (same).

8

and lower federal courts have stepped in to fill the void, but their

decisions lack any consensus. See generally Miller Yacht, 384 F.3d

at 102-05 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part) (“The courts of appeals

have adopted divergent interpretations of ‘arise out of or relate to’

as that phrase relates to specific jurisdiction analysis.”). 

Three approaches predominate. The most restrictive

standard is the “proximate cause” or “substantive relevance” test.

Courts have articulated this test in a variety of ways. Some hold the

defendant’s contacts must be the “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s

injury “(i.e., the defendant’s in-state conduct [must] g[i]ve birth to

the cause of action).” See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.

v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (quotation marks

omitted). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Helicopteros, similarly

described it as a requirement that “the cause of action . . . formally

‘arise out of’ the [defendant’s] contacts.” See Helicopteros, 466

U.S. at 426-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But stated most simply,

this test examines whether any of the defendant’s contacts with the

forum are relevant to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. See Lea

Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State

Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 82-83.6 The Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit employs this standard in most cases,

but it “allow[s] a slight loosening . . . when circumstances dictate.”

See Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir.

1996). Other courts apply a purer, more rigid version. See, e.g.,

State ex rel. La Manuf. Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v.

Wells, 657 P.2d 207, 211 (Or. 1982) (requiring the defendant’s

contacts to have “relevance to the substance of th[e] claim for
7

See also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759

F.Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (endorsing a test that looks to

whether “the acts of the defendant within the forum state represent

the factual predicates upon which the cause of action are to be

based”) (quotation marks omitted); Simpson v. Quality Oil Co.,

Inc., 723 F.Supp. 382, 388-89 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (“[T]he defendant’s

contacts with the forum must be substantively related to the cause

of action in order to confer specific jurisdiction over the

defendant.”); Kingsley & Keith (Canada) Ltd. v. Mercer Int’l

Corp., 456 A.2d 1333, 1338 (Pa. 1983) (Nix, J., in support of

reversal, judgment affirmed by an equally divided court) (“[T]he

acts of the nonresident defendant within the forum state [must]

represent the factual predicates upon which a cause of action are to

be based.”). 

8

See also Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909

(6th Cir. 1988) (applying a “made possible by” standard); Deluxe

Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir.

1984) (applying a “lies in the wake of” test); Prejean v. Sonatrach,

Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In a case like this,

the contractual contact is a ‘but for’ causative factor for the tort

since it brought the parties within tortious ‘striking distance’ of

each other.”); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 552-55

(Mass. 1994) (interpreting the Massachusetts long-arm statute to

adopt a but-for test and holding that the statute is constitutional). 

9

relief”).7

A second, more relaxed test requires only “but-for”

causation. As the name indicates, this standard is satisfied when

the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen in the absence of the

defendant’s contacts. See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897

F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds 499 U.S.

585 (1991).8

 In Shute, for example, two Washingtonians booked

a Carnival cruise through a travel agent, and during the cruise one

of them “slipped on a deck mat.” See id. at 379. Carnival provided

brochures to travel agencies in Washington, and it also held

seminars for Washington travel agents. Id. These contacts satisfied

the but-for test because, “[i]n the absence of Carnival’s activity, the

Shutes would not have taken the cruise, and Mrs. Shute’s injury
9

Sandy Lane argues that our decision in Scheidt v. Young,

389 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), controls the analysis here.

To the contrary, Scheidt did not discuss relatedness. In Scheidt, a

Pennsylvania hotel placed an advertisement in the New York Daily

News. A New Jerseyan read the advertisement, called the hotel to

book a room, and then telegraphed a deposit. During the New

Jerseyan’s stay, she suffered an injury. We held that placing an

10

would not have occurred.” Id. at 386.

 A third standard looks for a “substantial connection” or

“discernible relationship.” Unlike the but-for test, causation is of

no special importance. The critical question is whether the tie

between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is close

enough to make jurisdiction fair and reasonable. See Shoppers

Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335-36 (D.C. 2000);

see also Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1998); Vons

Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1096-97 (Cal. 1996);

Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 603-04 (Conn. 1995).

Because courts that follow this approach consider the totality of the

circumstances, there appears to be no rigid distinction between

general and specific jurisdiction. See Chew, 143 F.3d at 29; see

also Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 336 (holding that the court’s

“discernible relationship” requirement relaxes in light of “extensive

and repeated advertising . . . in the Washington Post”). Instead, the

two categories sit at “opposite ends of [a] sliding scale.” See

William M. Richman, Review Essay: Part I—Casad’s Jurisdiction

in Civil Actions, Part II—A Sliding Scale to Supplement the

Distinction between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 Cal. L.

Rev. 1328, 1340-1346 (1984). The degree of relatedness required

in a given case is inversely proportional to the overall “intensity of

[the defendant’s] forum contacts.” See Vons, 926 P.2d at 1096-97.

2. 

This Court has never adopted a definitive approach to the

relatedness requirement.9

 Over the years, we have applied the
advertisement in an out-of-state newspaper that happens to

circulate in New Jersey is not “purposeful[] avail[ment] of the

privilege of conducting activities within” the state. Id. at 60. As

a result, we had no occasion to address the scope of the relatedness

requirement. 

11

requirement many times, but our cases have avoided “categorical

determinations.” See, e.g., Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1224-25.

Nonetheless, in contract cases we have effectively required

substantive relevance. See Gen. Elec. Co., 270 F.3d at 150 (“In

contract cases, courts should inquire whether the defendant’s

contacts with the forum were instrumental in either the formation

of the contract or its breach.”). As for tort claims, in Miller Yacht

Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2004), a divided panel

stated that “a defendant’s contacts with a forum need not have been

the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries in a tort case.” Id. at

99. The majority noted that this conclusion “beg[ged] the question

of what level of relationship is necessary under the ‘arise out of or

relate to’ requirement,” but it declined to adopt a specific test. Id.

at 99-100. It stated that courts should “approach[] each case

individually and take[] a realistic approach.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted).

We agree, of course, that courts must decide each case

individually, and Miller Yacht’s rejection of the proximate cause

test binds this panel. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d

595, 610-11 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, the Supreme Court’s

personal jurisdiction cases have repeatedly warned against the use

of “mechanical or quantitative” tests. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at

319; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)

(“[F]ew answers will be written in black and white. The greys are

dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.”)

(quotation marks omitted). In light of this instruction, we think it

appropriate to continue this Court’s established practice and refrain

from adopting a bright-line test. See Miller Yacht, 384 F.3d at 99-

100.

That is not to say, however, that our relatedness inquiry

should be completely devoid of standards. The Due Process Clause

is supposed to bring “a degree of predictability to the legal system.”
10Indeed, even a leading academic proponent of the slidingscale test perceives some tension between that approach and

Supreme Court precedent. See William M. Richman,

Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 599, 615

(1993) (“Jurisdiction should exist in cases like Helicopteros; the

general/specific distinction should not eliminate the possibility of

amenability in cases that fall between the two paradigms. To

encompass all the proper cases, the dichotomy should be

supplemented with a sliding scale.”); see also Eugene F. Scoles, et

al., Conflict of Laws 306 (4th ed. 2004) (“Whatever the merits of

[a sliding scale], it is clear that a fairly sharp dichotomy between

[general and specific jurisdiction] still expresses the view of the

Supreme Court.”). 

12

See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

297 (1980). It should allow out-of-state residents to “structure their

primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that

conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” Id. The more

flexible our approach, the less certain its application; and when the

only rule is that each case is different, then in no case can the result

safely be predicted. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law

of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989). Thus, while our

precedents foreclose the application of a single, mechanical test, it

is altogether appropriate for us to provide further guidance on this

Court’s approach to the relatedness requirement.

At the outset, then, we must state that the “sliding scale,”

“substantial connection,” and “discernible relationship” tests are

not the law in this circuit. By any name, these “hybrid” approaches

allow courts to vary the scope of the relatedness requirement

according to the “quantity and quality” of the defendant’s contacts.

See Richman, supra, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 1345; see also Chew, 143

F.3d at 29; Vons, 926 P.2d at 1096-97; Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 335-

36. General and specific jurisdiction merge, and the result is a

freewheeling totality-of-the-circumstances test. See Chew, 143

F.3d at 29. Our cases, however, have always treated general and

specific jurisdiction as analytically distinct categories, not two

points on a sliding scale. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16;

Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001).10 If the

defendant “maintain[s] continuous and substantial forum
11As Professor Twitchell puts it, simply combine “a little

purposefulness, a little relatedness, a little convenience and some

state interest,” and—voilá!—“fair jurisdiction, even if the case falls

outside the contours of specific and general jurisdiction as they

have been defined by courts and commentators.” Id.

13

affiliations,” then general jurisdiction exists. See Dollar Sav. Bank

v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1984). If the

defendant’s contacts fall short of that standard, then at least one

contact must give rise or relate to the plaintiff’s claim. See Grimes,

17 F.3d at 1559. These categories constitute “two distinct

theories,” and our cases recognize the importance of separate

analysis. See Remick, 238 F.3d at 255; Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1559.

We are not inclined to alter this approach, nor will we

supplement it with a sliding scale. When courts confine general

and specific jurisdiction to their separate spheres, potential

defendants can anticipate and control their jurisdictional exposure.

See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. As long as out-of-state residents

refrain from continuous and substantial forum contacts, they can

conduct their affairs “confident that transactions in one context will

not come back to haunt them unexpectedly in another.” See RAR,

Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (7th Cir. 1997).

Under a “hybrid” approach, by contrast, all factors come together

in “a sort of jurisdictional stew.” See Mary Twitchell, Burnham

and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 Rutgers L.J.

659, 666 (1991).11 Unbounded judicial intuition replaces structured

analysis, and its application from case to case necessarily defies

prediction. Cf. EEOC v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 975

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (“Every case, after all,

has its circumstances, and every chancellor’s foot a different

length.”). A standard so formless has no place in our relatedness

inquiry. 

Unlike the hybrid approaches, the but-for test at least makes

an attempt to preserve the distinction between general and specific

jurisdiction. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 385. But-for causation does

not shift with the strength of the defendant’s contacts, nor does it

slide along a continuum. Rather, it draws a bright line separating

the related from the unrelated. See William L. Prosser, The Law of
12See also Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra, at 236 (“[T]he

consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an

event go back to the discovery of America and beyond. ‘The fatal

trespass done by Eve was cause of all our woe.’”). 

14

Torts 237 (4th ed. 1971) (“Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what

has in fact occurred.”). More importantly, by ensuring the

existence of some minimal link between contacts and claims, butfor causation provides a useful starting point for the relatedness

inquiry. 

But although the analysis may begin with but-for causation,

it cannot end there. The animating principle behind the relatedness

requirement is the notion of a tacit quid pro quo that makes

litigation in the forum reasonably foreseeable. See Burger King,

471 U.S. at 475-76. Out-of-state residents who “exercise[] the

privilege of conducting activities within a state . . . enjoy[] the

benefits and protection of” the state’s laws; in exchange, they must

submit to jurisdiction over claims that arise from or relate to those

activities. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; Burger King, 471 U.S.

at 475-76. But-for causation cannot be the sole measure of

relatedness because it is vastly overinclusive in its calculation of a

defendant’s reciprocal obligations. The problem is that it “has . . .

no limiting principle; it literally embraces every event that

hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain.” See Nowak

v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996).12 If butfor causation sufficed, then defendants’ jurisdictional obligations

would bear no meaningful relationship to the scope of the “benefits

and protection” received from the forum. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

at 319. As a result, the relatedness inquiry cannot stop at but-for

causation. 

Indeed, even courts that embrace the but-for test recognize

its overinclusiveness. See, e.g., Shute, 897 F.2d at 385. These

courts fall back on the third step of the analysis—whether

jurisdiction is otherwise fair and reasonable—to protect against the

but-for test’s causative excesses. See id. But-for causation,

however, may have more holes than the third step can plug. Once

the plaintiff proves minimum contacts, the court may consider

whether the defendant has “present[ed] a compelling case that the
15

presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unreasonable.” See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (emphasis

added); see also Richman, supra, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. at 634 (“[T]he

contacts step is by far the more important; the fairness inquiry plays

a subsidiary role.”). Moreover, even if the third step is up to the

task, courts cannot elide relatedness simply because the

jurisdictional inquiry has a third component. See Burger King, 471

U.S. at 476-77; Miller Yacht, 384 F.3d at 96-97. Relatedness is an

independent constitutional mandate, and some but-for causes do not

relate to their effects in a jurisdictionally significant way. 

We thus hold that specific jurisdiction requires a closer and

more direct causal connection than that provided by the but-for test.

As we stated in Miller Yacht, there is no “specific rule” susceptible

to mechanical application in every case. See 384 F.3d at 100. But

in the course of this necessarily fact-sensitive inquiry, the analysis

should hew closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific

jurisdiction rests. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76. With each

purposeful contact by an out-of-state resident, the forum state’s

laws will extend certain benefits and impose certain obligations.

See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Specific jurisdiction is the cost of

enjoying the benefits. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor

Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In return for the[] benefits

and protections [of a state’s laws,] a defendant must—as a quid pro

quo—submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum.”)

(quotations marks omitted); Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984 (7th

Cir. 1986) (“Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents of a state is a

quid for a quo that consists of the state’s extending protection or

other services to the nonresident.”). The relatedness requirement’s

function is to maintain balance in this reciprocal exchange. In order

to do so, it must keep the jurisdictional exposure that results from

a contact closely tailored to that contact’s accompanying

substantive obligations. The causal connection can be somewhat

looser than the tort concept of proximate causation, see Miller

Yacht, 384 F.3d at 99-100, but it must nonetheless be intimate

enough to keep the quid pro quo proportional and personal

jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.

3.

Applying these principles to this case, we first note that
13We cite Pennsylvania authorities only to illustrate the link

between the contractual obligation that arose in Pennsylvania and

the tort duty that arose in Barbados. We express no opinion on

choice of law. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481-82 (“[C]hoice-oflaw analysis . . . is distinct from minimum-contacts jurisdictional

analysis.”) (emphasis removed).

16

Sandy Lane’s Pennsylvania contacts are a but-for cause of Mr.

O’Connor’s injury. Mr. O’Connor’s affidavit claims that he

decided to purchase spa treatments “as a result” of Sandy Lane’s

solicitation. App. 281. We accept that statement as true because

the District Court held no evidentiary hearing. See Miller Yacht,

384 F.3d at 97. Thus, but for the mailing of the brochure, Mr.

O’Connor never would have purchased a massage, and he would

not have suffered a massage-related injury. 

The link is also much closer than mere but-for causation.

Pennsylvania law allows individuals and businesses to make and

enforce binding agreements. Sandy Lane availed itself of that

opportunity, and, through its mailings and phone calls to

Pennsylvania, it formed a contract for spa services. The hotel

acquired certain rights under that contract, and with those rights

came accompanying obligations. Like all services contracts, the

spa agreement contained an implied promise that Sandy Lane

would “exercise due care in performing the services required.” See

Richard A. Lord, 23 Williston on Contracts § 63.25, at 525-26 (4th

ed. 2002). In the case before us, the O’Connors contend that Sandy

Lane failed to do exactly that. As such, their claims directly and

closely relate to a continuing contractual obligation that arose in

Pennsylvania. 

 True enough, the O’Connors’ claims sound in tort, not

contract. They claim that Sandy Lane breached a social duty that

existed independent of and in addition to the hotel’s contractual

obligations. See St. Clair v. B&L Paving Co., 411 A.2d 525, 526

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (“Those who undertake an activity pursuant

to a contract have both a self-imposed contractual duty and a social

duty imposed by the law to act without negligence.”).13 Our

relatedness analysis, however, requires neither proximate causation

nor substantive relevance. See Miller Yacht, 384 F.3d at 99-100.
17

It is enough that a meaningful link exists between a legal obligation

that arose in the forum and the substance of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The O’Connors claim Sandy Lane breached a duty that is identical

to a contractual duty assumed by the hotel in Pennsylvania. So

intimate a link justifies the exercise of specific jurisdiction as a quid

pro quo for Sandy Lane’s enjoyment of the right to form binding

contracts in Pennsylvania. We therefore hold that the O’Connors’

claims “arise out of or relate to” Sandy Lane’s Pennsylvania

contacts.

C.

Having determined that minimum contacts exist, we next

consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would otherwise

comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The existence of

minimum contacts makes jurisdiction presumptively constitutional,

and the defendant “must present a compelling case that the presence

of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unreasonable.” See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; see also

Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 207

(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that if minimum contacts are present, then

jurisdiction will be unreasonable only in “rare cases”); Grand

Entm’t Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 483 (3d

Cir. 1993) (“The burden on a defendant who wishes to show an

absence of fairness or lack of substantial justice is heavy.”).

The Supreme Court has identified several factors that courts

should consider when balancing jurisdictional reasonableness.

Among them are “the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s

interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in

obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate [and

international] judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

efficient resolution of controversies,” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477

(quotation marks omitted), and “[t]he procedural and substantive

interests of other nations.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior

Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 115 (1987).

Several of these factors weigh in favor of litigating this

dispute in Barbados. First, the burden on the defendant is a

“primary concern” in any case, see World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292,
18

and it is all the more significant here due to “[t]he unique burdens

placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal

system.” See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. Sandy Lane’s representatives

will have to travel 2,000 miles to litigate in Pennsylvania, and the

company must also familiarize itself with a foreign legal system.

Second, the efficiency factor also tips toward Sandy Lane. See

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Most of the witnesses are in

Barbados, the evidence is there, and it is not at all clear that

Pennsylvania law will apply to the merits. See Griffith v. United

Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 805-06 (Pa. 1964) (holding that under

Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules courts should apply the law “of

the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the

particular litigation”). Third, Barbados has a considerable

“substantive interest” in determining the rights and liabilities of its

own domestic corporations. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. All told,

these factors tend to show that litigating this dispute in Barbados

might well be a reasonable and efficient outcome. 

Sandy Lane, though, has a much higher hill to climb.

Because it has minimum contacts with Pennsylvania under the first

two steps of our analysis, it must make a “compelling case” that

litigation in Pennsylvania would be unreasonable and unfair. See

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. As the Supreme Court has stated,

“[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the

interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction

will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”

See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. Indeed, Asahi is the only Supreme

Court case ever to present so compelling a situation, and it involved

a suit in California between parties from Japan and Taiwan. See id.

Unlike California’s “slight” interest in that case, id., Pennsylvania

has a “manifest interest in providing effective means of redress”

when a foreign corporation reaches into the state and solicits its

citizens. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223

(1957). Furthermore, requiring the O’Connors to litigate in

Barbados would saddle them with a burden at least equal to Sandy

Lane’s burden in Pennsylvania. 

In light of these countervailing interests, we conclude that

this is not one of those “rare” and “compelling” cases where

jurisdiction would be unreasonable despite the presence of

minimum contacts. The burdens on Sandy Lane are substantial, but
14Sandy Lane also moved to dismiss under the doctrine of

forum non conveniens. We express no opinion on that motion and

leave it for the District Court to consider in the first instance. Cf.

Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 150

(1st Cir. 1995) (”The doctrines of personal jurisdiction and forum

non conveniens share certain similarities, but they embody distinct

concepts and should not casually be conflated.”). 

19

they do not entirely dwarf the interests of the O’Connors and the

forum state. Pennsylvania may not be the best forum—it may not

even be a convenient one.14 But when minimum contacts exist, due

process demands no more than a reasonable forum. Sandy Lane

has failed to present a compelling case of unreasonableness, so we

hold that jurisdiction in Pennsylvania “comport[s] with fair play

and substantial justice.” See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.

 IV. 

In sum, the O’Connors have alleged facts that, if true,

establish personal jurisdiction over Sandy Lane in Pennsylvania.

Sandy Lane purposefully directed its activities at Pennsylvania, the

O’Connors’ claims arise from or relate to those activities, and no

other factors render jurisdiction in Pennsylvania unfair or

unreasonable. The District Court therefore had specific jurisdiction

to adjudicate the O’Connors’ claims. We will reverse its judgment

and remand the case for further proceedings.