IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ILIRIANA F.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 5026

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Iliriana F.’s claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 14] is 

granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s request for affirmance 

[Doc. No. 19] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since

June 24, 2017. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which

she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which 

was held on August 22, 2019. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the 

hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. 

An Albanian interpreter was also present at the hearing.

On November 7, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding

her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 24, 2017. At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); depression; coronary artery disease; asthma; and 

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obesity. The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in 

combination, do not meet or medically equal any listed impairments. 

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can occasionally 

balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; is precluded from work at unprotected 

heights or around hazardous machinery and can do no commercial driving; must 

avoid concentrated exposure to cold, heat, humidity, witness, pulmonary irritants, 

and vibration; is limited to simple routine tasks with only occasional interaction 

with the general public as part of routine job duties and only occasional interaction 

with coworkers and supervisors; is precluded from fast production such as assembly 

line or work where a machine sets the pace, but can perform work at a variable 

rate; can have no strict production or hourly requirements, but can do work with 

end of the day work goals; and is precluded from tandem tasks.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform her 

past relevant work as a sales clerk, customer service representative, or produce 

clerk. However, at step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that

she is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

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DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

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However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ failed to support her rejection of treating source opinions with 

substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s non-exertional 

deficits in the RFC assessment; and (3) the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff would be 

capable of performing work at the light exertional level is unsupported and 

unexplained.

In advancing her third argument, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ 

failed to properly account for her documented problems with fatigue. On the topic of 

Plaintiff’s fatigue, the ALJ noted that in May and October of 2017, February and 

March of 2018, and June of 2019, Plaintiff reported ongoing problems with fatigue

to her medical providers. (R. 22-26.) The ALJ further noted that in October 2017, 

Dr. Saha Narayan “opined that the claimant’s intercostal pain with some associated 

fatigue appeared to be noncardiac by the claimant’s description of symptoms.” (Id.

at 23.) The ALJ also noted that in June 2019, Dr. Enrique Saguil “referred the 

claimant for an MRI and physical therapy to address her complaints of fatigue, 

weakness, and muscle pain.” (Id. at 24.) Otherwise, the ALJ’s only analysis of 

Plaintiff’s fatigue is her following statement: “The claimant has complained of 

fatigue due to her physical and mental impairments. This has been considered in 

limiting her to light work with postural limitations.” (Id. at 26.) 

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The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s evaluation of her fatigue falls 

short of what is required. In light of Plaintiff’s documented issues with fatigue, the 

ALJ was required to fulsomely “discuss [the claimant’s] fatigue and how it might 

affect her job performance.” Holland v. Barnhart, No. 02 C 8398, 2003 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 15599, at *24-25 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2003). The ALJ did not do that. Merely 

acknowledging Plaintiff’s fatigue and then bluntly stating it is accommodated by a 

limitation to light work is insufficient. See Collins v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 3589, 2018 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114090, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2018) (“The ALJ states that the 

RFC accommodates Plaintiff’s fatigue and leg pain by limiting him to light work, 

but he does not explain how the demands of light work are consistent with 

Plaintiff’s demonstrated impairments, an error that requires remand.”) (citations 

omitted); Lopez v. Berryhill, 340 F. Supp. 3d 696, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“[T]he ALJ 

seemed to accept that Mr. Lopez suffered fatigue and sleepiness during the day 

because she said that her residual functional capacity finding was ‘sufficient to 

address claims of fatigue . . .’ One can only guess why that is.”). The ALJ’s failure to 

properly account for Plaintiff’s fatigue requires that this matter be remanded. See 

Allen v. Astrue, No. 06-CV-4660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109559, at *33-34 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 13, 2008) (“Despite these numerous references [to fatigue], it is unclear if, or to 

what extent, ALJ White considered Allen’s fatigue in concluding that he has the 

residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain specified limitations. 

On remand, the ALJ must discuss how Allen’s fatigue affects his ability to work.”) 

(citations omitted).

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Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that 

treating source opinions are properly evaluated and Plaintiff’s non-exertional 

limitations are properly assessed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 

14] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s request for 

affirmance [Doc. No. 19] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should be 

remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: March 1, 2022 ________________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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