# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 15 , 20 20 *

Decided October 15
, 2020

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM
, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER
, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

Nos. 19

- 2559 & 19

- 2560

JASON OLRICH, Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

KENOSHA COUNTY, et al.
, Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 18

- cv

- 1981

- pp & 18

- cv

- 1982

- pp
Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge

.
O R D E R
Jason Olrich filed two suits in 2018 alleging that Kenosha City and County officials violated his Fourth , Fifth , and Fourteenth Amendment rights during arrests in 2007 and 2012. The district court dismissed both suits , concluding that his claims were either time

- barred or l egally insufficient. Olrich appeal s each ruling, and in light of the ir similarities, we have consol idate d his appeals for decision

. Because t he Fourth and

* Appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide these cases without oral argument because the appellant’s brief and record adequa tely present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P

. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No s . 19

- 2559 & 19

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Fourteenth Amendment claims accrued outside of the applicable limitations period , and because no incriminating statement s were allegedly used against him within the limitations period , we affirm both judgments.

Olrich’s suits allege that during two encounters state officials coerc ed him into giving false statements

. The first encounter occurred in 20 0 7

. Olrich alleges that deputy she riffs from Kenosha arrested him on drug charges , denied his requests for a phone and a lawyer , forced him to “contract” to be a confidential informant , and w hen Olrich later refused to inform, he was arrested and again denied an attorney. The second
encounter occurre d in May 2012 . Two Kenosha police officers arrested Olrich for selling marijuana , denied his requests for an attorney , and physical ly coerce d him to sign a confession , w hich led to charges that were quickly dropped

. Then f our years later, in 2016 , when Olrich was prosecuted for a n unrelated crim e , a prosecutor sought to admit information about the 2007 and 2012 arrests. This was the first time Olrich saw reports about his earlier encounter s and believes t hat they contain information that i s false

.
Th ese suit s , filed i n December 2018 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , came more than 11 years after the first encounter and 6 years after the second

. In the first suit, he sue s the sheriff’s deputies who arrested him in 2007 ; in the second he sue s an officer who arrested him in 2012

. B ecause Olrich is now in prison, t he district court screen ed both complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A . It concluded that Olrich ’ s claims about unlawful
arrests and abuse during the interrogations in 2007 and May 2012 were , when he sued in December 2018, untimely under Wisconsin’s six

- year statute of limitations

. Regarding Olrich’s remaining claim that a violation of the Fifth Amendment accrued in 2016 , the district court ruled that his complaint did not state sufficient facts. The complaint, for example, did not identify the information obtained from his old arrests or allege whether the prosecutor was allowed to use any of that information. Olrich moved to reconsider the rulings , re

- arguing the accrual dates on his claims and invoking the “ discovery ” rule and the continuing

- violation s doctrine. T he court denied the motions . It reasoned that Olr i ch knew about his alleged injuries by May 2012, and any discovery of evidence in 2016 did not prevent him from filing his complaints

sooner. On appeal, Olrich maintains that his claims are timely. Although failure to bring a claim within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, district courts may nonetheless dismiss a case under § 1915 A as untimely when the complaint alleges facts that reveal that the claims are time

- barred. Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199 , 215 (2007). Under § 1983 , federal courts borrow the limitations period from the personal

- injury laws of theNo s . 19

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forum state, here, Wisconsin

. Malone v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 266, 279 (1985)). A t the time of the events alleg ed in Olrich’s complaints
, th is period was six years from the date that the claims

acc ru ed

. W IS

. S TAT . § 983.35 ( 1979 )

. F ederal law dictates when the claim s accrue d

. Huber v. Anderson , 909 F.3d 201, 207 (7th Cir. 2018).

We first address the claims in bot h suits under the Fourth Amendment (for unlawful arrest) and Fourteenth Amendment (for abuse during detention)

. Olrich filed the suits i n December 2018, so to be timely these claims must have accrued no earlier than December 2012. C laims of u nlawful arrest accrue either when the detention end s , see Manuel v. City of Jolie t , 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) , or when detention converts to one authorized by valid legal process (like arraignment) , Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 389

– 90 ( 2007 )

. Olrich’s arrests in 2007 and May 2012 allegedly occurred and ended more than six years before December 201 8 , rendering them untimely

. Th e same is true of Olrich ’s claims that officers violated the Fourt eent h Amendment by physically abusing him during his detentions in 2007 and May 2012

. Any ex cessive force during a detention “is immediately actionable , ” Evans v. Poskon , 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010) , so these claim s too accrued more than six years before December 201 8

. The district court therefore correctly dismissed these claims.

Olrich replies t hat his claims are not time

- barred by virtue of the discovery rule and the continuing

- violation s doctrine , but he is incorrect

. The discovery rule applies when a plaintiff doe s not learn of an injury and who caused it until after its occurrence. United States v. Norwood , 602 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Kubrick , 444 U.S. 111 (1979)). Olrich , however, was present at his arrests and detention. N othing pr evented him from appreciating any alleged violations that occurred. Olrich admits as much by alleging that , shortly after his arrests, he put the m behind him when he could
not find an attorney to help him sue . Likewise, the continuing

- violations doctrine

a pplies only to claim s necessarily compris ed of a string of connected wrongful act s that, though beginning outside the limitations period , ends within the period ( like hostile work environment claims )

. Nat ’ l R.R. Passenger Corp. v . Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 115

– 17 (2002)

. Each constitutional violation Olrich alleges , however, constitutes its own singular, discrete event and ended outside of the limitations period

. That brings us to Olrich ’s claims under the Fifth Amendment. He argues that when the officers i n 2007 and 2012 refused his requests for counsel and questioned him anyway , they v iolat ed his Fifth Amendment right against self

- incrimination. A Fifth Amendment claim based on a denial of counsel during an interrogation accrue s only ifNo s . 19

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and when any inculp atory statements obtained without counsel are used against the plaintiff in a criminal case. See Johnson v. Winstead , 900 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2018). Olrich co ntends that this occurred in 2016 when , during a tri a l on unrelated charges , a prosecutor attempted to offer into evidence information about h is 2007 and 2012 arrests. This criminal trial took place in 2016 , so Olrich concludes that his Fifth Amendment claim s would be timely in 2018

.
Even if th ese claim s w ere timely, the district court still rightly dismissed them because Olrich do es not adequately allege a violation. H e alleges only that he was notifi ed in 2016 that the prosecution moved to admit information about the 2007 and 2012 arrests. As the district court observed, t his allegation is insufficient because Olrich does not state that the prosecution sought to use incriminating statements that he made after he requested counsel , or even that the prosecutor’s motion was granted

. Give n these omissions, we cannot plausibly infer a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

W e have considered whether Olrich should receive an opportunity to amend his complaint to rectify these omissions, but conclude that an amendment is unnecessary. When a compl aint fails to state a claim, the plaintiff ordinarily should receive at least one opportunity to amend it, unless an amend ment would be futile. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind

. , 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015). This

norm is even more acute when the district court exercises its authority to dismiss a claim sua sponte. Luevano v. Wal

- Mart Stores, Inc. , 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013)

. In dismissing the Fifth Amendment claim s , however, the district court told Olrich about these omissions . Yet despite the court’s advice about his claims ’ defects , Olrich did not assert , either during his motion s for reconsideration in the district court or to us on appeal, that he c an cure these shortcoming s

. Because he has not given us any reason to believe that an amendment might be worthwhile , it is not necessary to allow for one.

AFFIRMED