UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

EDWARD SCHMIDL, 

 Defendant. 

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No. 20 CR 382 

Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE CRIME VICTIM’S 

MOTION FOR AN AMENDED RESTITUTION ORDER 

Movants, Steven J. Morton & Associates, Ltd. and Valley Forge Insurance 

Company, through The Peacock Law Group, submits this reply brief in support of 

their motion for an amended restitution order. Movants requested a court order 

providing for three things: (1) adding Valley Forge Insurance (the victim’s insurance 

company) as a secondary restitution payee; (2) adding $5,000 out-of-pocket expenses 

to the restitution loss amount; and (3) adding $29,402.05 in prejudgment interest to 

the restitution loss amount. The government’s response concedes request number 

one. Movants are withdrawing their request number two that seeks to add $5,000 to 

the restitution. Thus, there is no dispute that the restitution order should be revised 

to include Valley Forge for $25,000 and Morton & Associates award reduced 

accordingly to $146,708. That leaves request number three, seeking prejudgment 

interest, as the only contested issue. However, the government’s response fails to 

demonstrate it has constitutional standing to contest Morton & Associates’ request, 

so the court should give the government’s objections no weight. Movants will 
2 

nonetheless address the government’s objections, which lack merit. As there is no 

other objection, the court should grant its prejudgment interest request. 

Background 

Motion Movants sought three forms of relief. Adding Valley Forge as a 

restitution payee (Motion ¶¶ 12-13); adding an addition loss of $5,000 for accounting 

expenses incurred by Morton and reimbursed by Valley Forge (Motion ¶¶ 14-15); and 

adding $29,402.05 in prejudgment interest. Motion ¶¶ 16-21. 

Hearing At the November 15, 2023, hearing, the government adamantly 

opposed the motion, and the court ordered a briefing schedule. At the hearing, the 

government questioned whether defendant Schmidl received proper notice of the 

motion, despite Movants filing proofs of service for notice that they sent Schmidl for 

the original hearing date (10/25/23, Dkt. 61) and an amended notice for the 

rescheduled hearing date (11/15/23, Dkt. 67). Prior to the November 15, 2023, 

hearing, Schmidl had filed no objection to the motion to amend and since then has 

filed no objection. The government’s response brief (Dkt. 69) does not challenge 

notice. At the November hearing, the government also challenged the request for 

interest. The government explained to the court that due to Schmidl’s poor economic 

circumstances, at sentencing the court waived Schmidl’s “interest” liability. The 

implication was that the court had already considered the “interest” issue at 

sentencing and had resolved Movants’ prejudgment interest request. However, the 

interest the court waived at sentencing was Schmidl’s liability for post-judgment 

interest as authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). Dkt. 46, J&C, p. 7 of 8. Not 
3 

surprisingly, the government’s response brief abandons its “res judicata” challenge to 

interest. Finally, at the hearing the government argued that the existing, flawed 

restitution order was somehow the responsibility of Morton & Associates. Again, the 

government’s response brief abandons this position. 

Response and the remaining contested issue. 

As to issue one, the government’s response states that it does not oppose the 

request “to substitute the insurer for $25,000 of the loss [i.e., $171,708] with the law 

firm’s amount reduced accordingly [i.e., to $146,708].” Response, p. 3. 

As to issue two, Movants are withdrawing the request with the proviso that the 

amended restitution order should reflect that the restitution owed Morton & 

Associates is $146,708 and the amount owed to Valley Forge is $25,000 (and not a 

$141,708/$30,000 split as explained in the following paragraph). Movants withdraw 

the request not for any reason raised in the government’s response but based on 

information about which Movants only recently learned. Stewart Dec. ¶¶ 3, 6. 

The government, Morton & Associates, and Valley Forge exchanged emails in 

August 2020, agreeing that the restitution presented to the court should be $176,708 

split $146,708 to Morton & Associates and $30,000 to Valley Forge. Motion ¶¶ 3-4 

and Ex. A. Despite that agreement, which the government’s response brief neither 

mentions nor acknowledges breaching, in December 2020, the government submitted 

to US Probation a statement that the restitution losses were a total of $171,708 split 

$141,708 to Morton & Associates and $30,000 to Valley Forge. Stewart Dec. ¶ 3. US 

Probation adopted these numbers, but apparently a clerical error occurring between 
4 

the Office of US Probation and the Clerk of Court prevented those numbers from 

being entered into the court’s order of judgment and conviction. Id. at ¶ 6. 

The request to increase the restitution by $5,000 was based on Movants’ 

assumption that the government honored the parties’ agreement, submitted loss 

amounts to the court consistent with that agreement, and an oversight resulted in 

the agreed amounts not being included in the final order. That assumption proved 

wrong as it is clear now that the government erroneously presented the loss total as 

$171,708, not $176,708. Stewart Dec. ¶ 3. Nonetheless, Valley Forge paid Morton & 

Associates $30,000, $25,000 toward the embezzlement loss of $171,708, included in 

the restitution order, and $5,000 toward accounting fees that are not included in the 

restitution order. It is undisputed that the restitution award should be revised to 

include Valley Forge for $25,000 and Morton’s award reduced to $146,708. 

As to issue three, the government’s response glosses over its own lack of 

constitutional standing to oppose the interest request. That said, the government 

concedes as it must that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Morton & Associates 

request under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) but disputes that the claim for prejudgment 

interest is “within the scope of § 3664(d)(5).” Response, p. 6. The government claims 

that Morton’s prejudgment interest request does not meet the “good cause” standard 

under § 3664(d)(5). Response, p. 8. The government further speculates that the court 

would not have awarded prejudgment interest had the request been presented at 

sentencing. Id. Finally, the government questions the proof of loss for interest and 

questions the rate of prejudgment interest Morton & Associates requested. Id. at 9. 
5 

Discussion 

The government lacks standing to contest the request to add prejudgment 

interest to the restitution award. Nonetheless, the government’s arguments are 

without merit. Morton has presented a valid claim to amend the restitution order. 

A. The government lacks standing to contest the motion to amend. 

“[S]tanding is a constitutionally required component of a federal court’s 

jurisdiction.” United States v. Bronke, No. 01-cr-532, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162943, 

at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2022). In Bronke, the district court declined to grant relief to 

the government in a case like this, a post-judgment proceeding involving the amount 

of restitution. Among other things the court questioned whether the government had 

demonstrated standing to contest the restitution liability issues. 

The Constitution grants federal courts the power to adjudicate disputes and 

that authority requires that “a case embody a genuine, live dispute between adverse 

parties, thereby preventing the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.” 

Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020). “The doctrine of standing implements 

this requirement by insisting that a litigant ‘prove that he has suffered a concrete 

and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and is 

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Adams, 141 S. Ct. at 498. 

“[T]o have standing, adverse parties must have ‘a direct stake in the outcome 

. . . [rather than being] concerned bystanders.’” Bronke at *17 (quoting Diamond v. 

Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1986)). Here, the 

government’s statement of its “Interests” in this dispute fails to demonstrate that any 
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injury will befall the government should the court grant the motion to include 

prejudgment interest. Response, p. 2. Should the court grant the motion to amend, 

the prejudgment interest liability falls alone on the defendant, Edward Schmidl, who 

filed no objection. The government will not be liable for the interest. The 

government’s statement of “Interests” in this matter proves only that it is a 

“concerned bystander” but lacks any stake in the outcome of the motion to amend. 

In its response, the government claims standing because it has a statutory 

burden to prove loss amounts. Response, p. 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)). However, 

§ 3664(e) is a sentencing provision that allocates the burdens of proof between the 

parties to a criminal case, the government and the defendant. Section 3664(e) says 

nothing about post-sentencing restitution matters like the one now before the court 

that is raised under § 3664(d)(5). Section 3664(d)(5) explicitly allows the “victim” to 

petition the court post-judgment without designating who shall file such petition, the 

victim (pro se), the victim’s personal attorney, or the government. Obviously, it is the 

party who files the petition that carries the burden of proof under § 3664(d)(5), and 

in this case that is the victim’s personal attorney, not the government. The 

government further suggests that when the victim, not the government, makes a 

request under § 3664(d)(5), the government “has a duty to protect the judgment” and 

“has a duty of condor to the court. ” Response, p. 2. However, the government does 

not point to what statute makes the United States duty bound to intervene in a 

dispute in which it has nothing at stake and the government does not say against 
7 

what harm it is supposedly “protecting the judgment.” As such, the government fails 

to demonstrate it has standing to oppose the interest request. 

A similar circumstance was addressed in United States v. Ray, 337 F.R.D. 561, 

564 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) gives a crime victim independent 

authority to move to quash a criminal defendant’s subpoena seeking personal or 

confidential information about a victim and requires the defendant to move for the 

court to issue such a subpoena with notice to the affected victim. In Ray, despite the 

fact that some of the victims were given notice and did not object to the issuance of a 

subpoena for the victim’s medical records, the government moved to quash the 

subpoenas and premised its right to do so on the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3771(a)(8), arguing under that under the CVRA it was duty bound to protect the 

victims’ right to “dignity and privacy.” Ray held that the government lacked standing 

to quash the subpoenas because the defendant provided notice to the victims and the 

victims did not ask for the targeted records to be kept confidential. 337 F.R.D. 561, 

571. Ray emphasized that the rule itself requires notice to be given to the victim, “’so 

that the victim can move to quash or modify the subpoena.’” Id. at 570 (quoting Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 17(c) with emphasis in original). Ray acknowledged the government’s 

duties under the CVRA, but the government would have standing only if “the victim 

herself wants the government to assert it [her rights under Rule 17(c)].” Id. at 571. 

The same logic applies to this case. Section 3664(d)(5) explicitly allows “the 

victim. . . to petition the court for an amended restitution order.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(d)(5) (emphasis supplied). If Morton & Associates had asked the government 
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for assistance, obviously the government would have standing to assert the victim’s

claim, but that is not the case. Moreover, § 3664(d)(5) assigns the government no role 

should a victim, pro se or through a private attorney, independently petition for relief. 

Cf. Ray, 337 F.R.D. at 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (Rule 17 does not give the government a 

role to play in quashing or modifying a subpoena when a victim declines to do so). 

The burden was on the government to establish its standing. Bronke at *17 

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The government failed to 

establish standing. Thus, its objections are merely those of an “interested bystander” 

and should be given no weight. Nonetheless, the objections are meritless.

B. The issue of standing aside, the government’s objections lack merit.

The government does not dispute that the court has statutory jurisdiction to 

consider Morton & Associates’ request for prejudgment interest under § 3664(d)(5), 

but disputes Morton’s contention that the prejudgment interest claim meets the “good 

cause” standard under § 3664(d)(5). Response, p. 8. The government further 

speculates that the court would not have awarded prejudgment interest had the 

request been presented at sentencing. Id. Finally, the government questions the 

proof of loss for prejudgment interest and the rate of prejudgment interest Morton & 

Associates requested. Id. at 9. 

1. Good cause 

As set forth in the motion and supporting affidavit, for its “good cause” showing 

Morton & Associates contends that it completely relied up the government’s attorneys 

as to what was and was not a compensable restitution loss, the government never 
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advised him that prejudgment interest is a compensable loss, and that the failure of 

the government’s attorney to include prejudgment interest was clear error under the 

CVRA and MVRA. Motion ¶¶ 17-20 and Morton Aff. ¶¶ 3-7. Rather than addressing 

the issue head on, the government mischaracterizes Morton’s good cause argument 

as one alleging that a victim obtaining post-judgment legal advice that shows the 

government committed legal error is good cause. Response, p. 8. That is not what 

Morton argues; rather, Morton argues that the government’s failure to properly 

counsel a victim as to compensable losses demonstrates good cause. The government 

argues that “the United States does not have an obligation to inform victims about 

possible legal arguments they might want to make with respect to restitution.” 

Id. at 10. This is astonishing considering the government’s acknowledgment that it 

has the statutory burden to prove restitution loss (Id. at 2), and that in doing so the 

government is obligated to vindicate a victim’s right under the CVRA to “full and 

timely restitution.” Motion ¶ 20. The government certainly has an obligation to 

inform victims about legal arguments that provides the victim with “full restitution,” 

which under Shepard “includes prejudgment interest.” 269 F.3d at 886. 

2. District Court’s discretion to award at sentencing 

Every circuit court to have considered the question, including the Seventh, 

agrees that prejudgment interest is a necessary and compensable element of loss for 
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criminal restitution purposes.3 

The government argues that at sentencing the award of prejudgment interest 

was merely discretionary, suggesting this court would not have awarded it. 

Response, p. 8. This is erroneous. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that 

regardless of whether restitution is discretionary or mandatory, once the district 

court makes a determination that the defendant is liable for restitution, the MVRA 

“mandates that the court order ‘full’ restitution.’” United States v. Day, 418 F.3d 746, 

756 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). Thus, proven, compensable losses are not 

something the district court has discretion to not include in a restitution order. 

Obviously, the court retains the discretion to determine whether the circumstances 

call for the award of interest, but the government’s brief does not contest that the 

circumstances of this case warranted a prejudgment interest award. And the 

government presented no evidence that Morton & Associates, a law firm, would not 

3 United States v. Corey, 77 F. App'x 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 

Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 321 (3d 

Cir. 2011); United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 

Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 983 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 

552 (7th Cir. 1993) (under VWPA); United States v. Shepard, 269 F.3d 884, 886 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (under MVRA); United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1059 (9th Cir. 

2004) abrogated on other grounds by Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 201 L. 

Ed. 2d 1 (2018); United States v. Patty, 992 F.2d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir. 1993); and 

United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1247 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) (observing but not 

holding that “restitution may include prejudgment interest”).

 
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have put the stolen funds to productive use absent Schmidl’s embezzlement. See, e.g., 

United States v. Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2011) (burden is on opponent of 

prejudgment interest to show the victim would not have made productive use of the 

stolen funds). 

 The award of prejudgment interest in this case—a proven, compensable 

loss—would not have been “discretionary” as the government argues but a necessary 

result under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act. 

3. Rate of interest & proof of loss 

The government claims that even if the court were to grant the request for 

prejudgment interest, Morton & Associates submitted the wrong rate of interest (i.e., 

5 percent, Illinois’s statutory prejudgment interest rate for plaintiffs/victims whose 

money was converted). Response, p. 9. The government claims the rate should be 

what the stolen funds “would have earned” but for the theft; the government strongly 

implies that the victim must prove that rate by also proving that the stolen funds 

were held in an interest-bearing account and proving what interest rate the funds 

would earn in that account. Id. (citing United States v. Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699 (2d 

Cir. 2011) & United States v. Edwards, 19 F. Supp. 3d 366, 376 (D. Mass. 2014)). The 

government misconstrues the authorities. 

The leading case on the issue of prejudgment interest liability and the one 

misconstrued by the government is United States v. Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 

2011). Qurashi “hold[s] that the MVRA allows a sentencing court to award 

prejudgment interest in a criminal restitution order to ensure compensation ‘in the 
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full amount of each victim’s losses.’” Id. at 704 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)). A 

secondary issue in that case was based on the defendant’s objection that the victim 

did not prove that the source of the stolen funds was “specific investment accounts 

whose gains and losses between the date of the fraud and the date of the sentencing 

could be tracked.” Id. at 702. 

Qurashi rejected the rule suggested by defendant’s argument, which would 

place a burden on victims to prove how they would have used the stolen funds—with, 

for example, proof that the funds would have been in an interest-bearing account 

earning “x” interest rate. Qurashi said the defendant’s argument assumed victims 

“store their reserves [of money] under mattresses for safekeeping” so victims must 

prove otherwise. Id. at 703. However, “the MVRA does not impose such a 

requirement.” Id. Qurashi held that the better rule was that the burden of proof was 

on the party opposing prejudgment interest; thus, Qurashi held that “in the absence 

of evidence that [the victims] would not have put the stolen money to productive use,” 

it would uphold the district court’s award of prejudgment interest. Qurashi, 634 F.3d

at 705 (emphasis supplied). 

As far as Movants’ research shows, no court has held that prejudgment interest 

is awardable to only those proving the funds would have earned interest. The 

government misconstrues the case it cites for this proposition, United States v. 

Shepard, 269 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2001). Certainly, the government asserts, and as 

Shepard indicated, prejudgment interest is due under the MVRA because the stolen 

funds “came from an interest-bearing account.” Id. at 886. However, the holding of 
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the case is not that interest is only awardable under the MVRA with proof of an 

interest-bearing account. The better interpretation of Shepard is that the fact that 

funds were stolen from an interest-bearing account negates the argument that the 

victim “would not have put the money at issue to productive use.” Qurashi, 634 F.3d 

at 705. 

The government also misconstrues Qurashi when it claims that case is 

authority for prescribing a certain rate of interest. Response, p. 9 (stating that the 

correct rate under Qurashi is the “interest rate the money would have earned” had 

the theft not occurred). In Qurashi, the restitution order “included prejudgment 

interest at a rate of 4 percent.” 634 F.3d at 701. While challenging the award of 

prejudgment interest, the Qurashi defendant did not “challenge the rate.” Id. at 702. 

Thus, as the rate of interest was not at issue, the case could set no precedent 

concerning the proper rate of prejudgment interest under the MVRA. 

The Seventh Circuit has not ruled on the correct rate a district court should 

use in MVRA cases for calculating prejudgment interest and our research has not 

found any fixed rule in other circuits or districts. In a different legal context, the 

Seventh Circuit held that prejudgment interest should be computed at the rate the 

defendant would have had to pay for unsecured credit. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco 

Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1311-35 (7th Cir. 1992). The current interest rate for 

unsecured debt is in a range with a low point of 5.91 percent and an average overall 
14 

rate of 20.68 percent.4 Alternatively, the court may want to consider the postjudgment interest rate applicable to federal criminal judgments, which in Schmidl’s 

case would be 4.53 percent.5

The rate suggested by Morton & Associates is the state prejudgment interest 

rate of 5 percent. Motion to Amend ¶ 8. This rate is the most appropriate as it is the 

rate Illinois law sets for prejudgment interest in the kind of circumstances presented 

in this case (theft). Id. Moreover, both victim and defendant are citizens of Illinois 

and so it is not unfair to determine the appropriate rate by looking to state law. The 

two alternatives—unsecured loan rate (5.91 percent) or federal post-judgment 

interest rate (4.53 percent)—yield a comparable result and demonstrate the fairness 

of using the Illinois prejudgment rate. 

C. Adding prejudgment interested is merited by statute and the facts. 

The circumstances warranting the award of interest are met in this case. It is 

clear that Morton & Associates, a law firm, would have otherwise put the funds 

4 The publication “Business Insider” tracks the rates for personal loans and 

the rates are found at the Business Insider’s Website. “Average Personal Loan 

Interest Rates,” Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/personalfinance/average-personal-loan-interest-rates (last visited, Jan. 3, 2024). 

5 Section 3612(f) of Title 18 provides rate of interest for a federal criminal 

judgment, which fluctuates according to a designated Treasury Department 

instrument. Id. A table of the rates for 2023 is found here: 

https://www.casb.uscourts.gov/post-judgment-interest-rates-2023. The rate for the 

week ending 4/7/23 is 4.53%. The applicable rate is derived from the judgment date, 

3/29/23, and the instructions set forth in as set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3612(f)(1) & (2). 
15 

embezzled by Schmidl to “productive use.” Qurashi, 634 F.3d at 704 (approving 

prejudgment interest on money obtained by fraud from an insurance company despite 

no evidence that funds would otherwise have been kept in an interest-bearing account 

because a business is presumed to put money to productive use). Morton & Associates 

has shown “good cause” as demonstrated by its complete reliance on the government; 

Morton’s communication problems with the government that were caused by the 

government; the government’s failure to seek prejudgment interest; and Morton & 

Associates’ diligent action to seek relief as soon as it discovered its additional loss. 

Moreover, no party with standing has contested Schmidl’s request under § 3664(d)(5) 

for an award of prejudgment interest. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth in the motion for an amended restitution order and 

in the foregoing brief, Movants request that this court enter an order amending the 

restitution order. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

STEVEN J. MORTON & ASSOCIATES 

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY 

THE PEACOCK LAW GROUP 

By: s/ Joseph A. Stewart 

 JOSEPH A. STEWART 

Principal Attorney 

161 North Clark Street, Suite 1600 

Chicago, Illinois 60601 

(312) 741-1070 

joseph.stewart@thepeacocklawgroup.com 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

EDWARD SCHMIDL, 

 Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 20 CR 382 

Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman 

DECLARATION

Joseph A. Stewart declares under oath that: 

1. I am the attorney representing Steven J. Morton & Associates, Ltd., the 

named victim in the referenced case to whom the court awarded restitution, and 

Valley Forge Insurance Company, who covered a portion of Morton’s losses. I submit 

this declaration in support of the motion for an amended restitution order and the 

facts set forth are based on information personally known to me. 

2. Attached to our motion is a 2020 email exchange between the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office, Morton & Associates and Valley Forge Insurance Company. Valley 

Forge insured Morton & Associates for the type of loss occasioned by defendant 

Schmidl’s fraud. Valley Forge paid Morton $25,000 against the $171,708 

embezzlement loss plus an additional $5,000 for the expense of accounting services 

Morton & Associates incurred to determine the exact amount Schmidl embezzled. 

Motion, ¶ 3 and Ex. A. Thus, the loss total should have been $176,708 with $146,708 

apportioned to Morton and $30,000 apportioned to Valley Forge. However, the order 

of judgment and conviction sets the restitution at $171,708 payable solely to Morton 

& Associates. 

3. On or about December 9, 2020, the U.S. Probation Office sent the court 

a Supplement to the PSR that deals with loss amounts (which includes a letter from 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office to U.S. Probation). Ex. 1. The U.S. Attorney’s Office 

communicated to U.S. Probation that the restitution loss amount was $171,708 with 
2 

$141,708 apportioned to Morton and $30,000 apportioned to Valley Forge. Id. This 

in turn was what U.S. Probation communicated to the court via the 2020 Supplement 

to the PSR. Id. The U.S. Attorney’s Office communicated the wrong total restitution 

amount ($171,708 rather than $176,708) and the wrong apportioned amounts, 

amounts that were not what the parties had agreed to in their 2020 email exchange. 

4. In August 2023, I observed some of these errors and requested that the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office file a corrective motion, but that office declined to do so. 

5. Thereafter, I filed a motion to amend the judgment order. I then 

requested that the U.S. Attorney take a position on the motion. Alternatively, I 

sought an agreed briefing schedule should we not be able to agree on what seemed 

like an obvious fix (the pre-judgment-interest issue to the side) to amend the 

restitution order. We were unable to agree on any of it. 

6. It was only after filing the motion to amend in October 2023 that I 

obtained a copy of the December 2020 Supplement to the PSR (noted above in ¶ 3). 

Then, in late November 2023, I had an exchange of emails with U.S. Probation 

(Meredith Clifton). I asked why the order of judgment and conviction reflected 

$171,708 payable solely to Morton & Associates despite what is set forth in the 2020 

Supplement to the PSR. Ms. Clifton related her assessment that a clerical error in 

her office resulted in the correct figures not being updated in a program called “Rest 

Assured.” 

7. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct 

other than when stated on information and belief. 

 Signed January 5, 2024 /s/ Joseph A. Stewart 
Exhibit 1