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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LORENZO ADAMS

(AC 36701)

Beach, Sheldon and Harper, Js.

Argued December 7, 2015—officially released March 22, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, geographical area numberthree,Roraback, J.)

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Walker, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky

III, state’s attorney, and Colleen P. Zingaro, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The defendant, Lorenzo Adams, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a

trial to the court, of attempt to commit larceny in the

sixth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-491

and 53a-125b2 and breach of peace in the second degree

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181.3 On appeal,

the defendant claims that the state adduced insufficient

evidence to sustain his conviction of both crimes

beyond a reasonable doubt.4 We affirm the judgment

of the trial court with respect to the breach of peace

charge, but we reverse the judgment with respect to

the attempted larceny charge.

The following facts are relevant to the defendant’s

claims on appeal. On the evening of September 23, 2006,

Sergeant Vincent LaJoie and Officer Jose Pastrana of

the Danbury Police Department responded to a report

of a larceny in progress at the Marshalls department

store in Danbury. They were informed that the suspect

was trying to flee and that the suspect physically

engaged Marshalls’ security personnel. LaJoie arrived

first and spoke with Joseph Fernandes and Christine

Nates—two loss prevention officers for Marshalls—

who described the suspect. Pastrana arrived shortly

thereafter while LaJoie still was conferring with Fernandes and Nates. LaJoie then transmitted the suspect’s

description to dispatch and proceeded to search for

the suspect in the shopping plaza parking lot. Pastrana

proceeded to the loss prevention office with Nates and

Fernandes, who showed him a DVD containing surveillance footage of the suspect’s activity in the store.

LaJoie found a person matching the suspect’s description outside of a nearby Staples store. He noticed that

this person was perspiring and breathing heavily. LaJoie

accosted the individual and informed dispatch that he

believed he had the suspect. Pastrana had viewed about

half of the surveillance footage when he was informed

that LaJoie had apprehended a suspect. He transported

Fernandes and Nates to LaJoie’s location, where they

identified the defendant as the suspect. The defendant

subsequently was taken into custody and transported

to the police station.

The state originally charged the defendant with

breach of peace in the second degree, robbery in the

third degree, and attempt to commit larceny in the

fourth degree. The defendant filed motions for a bill of

particulars and for a statement of essential facts in

August, 2012 and December, 2013. By a substitute long

form information dated January 9, 2014, the state

charged the defendant with robbery in the third degree,

attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree, and

breach of peace in the second degree. With respect to

the attempted larceny charge, the state alleged that the

defendant committed a crime when he ‘‘attempted to
take a jacket from the Marshall[s] store . . . .’’

The case was tried before the court on February 4,

2014. The state offered the surveillance footage of the

defendant in the store into evidence. The court was

shown the recorded footage5 during Pastrana’s direct

examination, which he narrated from the witness stand.

Specifically, Pastrana testified as follows. The footage

began with the defendant in the men’s department of

Marshalls without any shopping bags or other items in

his hands. The defendant looked through a rack of suits,

removed one from the rack, and carried it off to a corner

of the store. Later, the defendant took a pair of shoes

to the same corner of the store. Even later, the cameras

show the defendant placing items in a bag in the same

corner of the store. Pastrana specifically describes the

bag as ‘‘[a] plastic bag filled with some items.’’ The

defendant then gathered a large, full bag and walked

to the store exit without paying for anything. As he

reached the exit, he was approached by Fernandes and

Nates, who attempted to stop him from leaving the

store. The defendant struggled physically with them

for a few moments before exiting the store. The loss

prevention officers stated to Pastrana that they were

shoved by the defendant as he attempted to escape.

The defendant dropped the bag he was carrying before

he left the store. Neither Fernandes nor Nates testified

at trial.

After the trial concluded, the court articulated its

decision from the bench. The court found the testimony

of both police officers to be credible, and found the

defendant guilty of both breach of peace in the second

degree and attempt to commit larceny in the sixth

degree.6 With respect to breach of peace, the court

made the following remarks: ‘‘I am going to find [the

defendant] guilty of breach of peace in the second

degree because the court’s review of the evidence at

the time he was exiting the store, the videotape, demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a

scuffle which can clearly be characterized as tumultuous behavior in a public place.’’ With respect to

attempted larceny, the court commented that ‘‘the evidence, [the defendant] being in the Marshalls store and

going to the point of exit with a bag filled with things

that were not in his possession when he entered the

store, or which he was not carrying as he entered the

store, leads the court to find the defendant guilty of

attempted larceny in the sixth degree because the court

finds that the state has proven beyond a reasonable

doubt that he attempted to take possession of goods

or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by Marshalls

with the intent of converting the same to his use without

paying the purchase price for those goods.’’ The defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of three

months and six months on the attempted larceny and

breach of peace charges, respectively. This appeal

followed.
In this appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence

admitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree

and breach of peace in the second degree. The state

objects, arguing that it presented ample evidence from

which the court could find the defendant guilty of both

crimes. For reasons we now discuss, we affirm the

judgment with respect to the breach of peace charge

and reverse the judgment with respect to the attempted

larceny charge.

We begin with the standard of review. ‘‘The standard

of review [applicable to] a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two part test. First,

we construe the evidence in the light most favorable

to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether

upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably

could have concluded that the cumulative force of the

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crenshaw,

313 Conn. 69, 93, 95 A.3d 1113 (2014). ‘‘While the [trier

of fact] must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of

the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred

facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and

logical for the [trier of fact] to conclude that a basic

fact or an inferred fact is true, the [trier of fact] is

permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider

it in combination with other proven facts in determining

whetherthe cumulative effect of all the evidence proves

the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime

charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephen J. R., 309 Conn.

586, 593–94, 72 A.3d 379 (2013).

I

We address first whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of attempt

to commit larceny in the sixth degree. The defendant

argues that the state produced no evidence to prove

that the items that were in the bag he carried to the

store exit belonged to Marshalls. He also argues that

the state failed to submit evidence to prove that he

committed attempted larceny in the manner described

in the long form information, namely, by attempting to

steal a jacket belonging to Marshalls. The state argues

that the attempted larceny conviction was supported

by ample evidence. The state contends that the footage

showing the defendant selecting items from various

racks, gathering them in one corner of the store, and

then returning to that area for several minutes before

leaving with a full bag not previously depicted in the

footage, permitted the court to conclude that the defendant had attempted to take merchandise belonging to

Marshalls. The state notes that there is no dispute that
the defendant is the person depicted in the surveillance

footage. Further, the state argues that the defendant’s

unexplained flight from the store when approached by

Fernandes and Nates supports an inference that the

defendant was conscious of his guilt.

The following legal principles guide our analysis of

this issue. ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth

degree when he commits larceny as defined in section

53a-119 and the value of the property or service is five

hundred dollars or less.’’ General Statutes § 53a-125b

(a). ‘‘A person commits larceny when, with intent to

deprive another of property or to appropriate the same

to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains

or withholds such property from an owner. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-119. Subsection (9) of § 53a-119 provides that shoplifting is a means to commit larceny.

Section 53a-119 (9) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of

shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any

goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for

sale by any store or other mercantile establishment

with the intention of converting the same to his own use,

without paying the purchase price thereof. A person

intentionally concealing unpurchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises

of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have

so concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without paying the

purchase price thereof.’’ See also State v. Saez, 115

Conn. App. 295, 302, 972 A.2d 277 (‘‘for a conviction of

larceny by shoplifting, the state must prove that the

property taken by the defendant was goods, wares or

merchandise exposed for sale within the store’’), cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009).

With these principles in mind, we conclude that the

court improperly found that the state adduced sufficient

evidence to support a conviction of attempt to commit

larceny in the sixth degree. In particular, we conclude

that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant attempted to intentionally deprive

Marshalls of its property that it exposed for sale within

the store. See id. To begin with, we reject the court’s

conclusion that the surveillance footage showed the

defendant ‘‘going to the point of exit with a bag filled

with things that were not in his possession when he

entered the store, or which he was not carrying as he

entered the store . . . .’’ On the contrary, the footage

does not show the defendant entering the store at all;

it begins with him in the men’s section browsing suits.

There is no evidence that the defendant entered Marshalls with or without a bag, empty or full. Additionally,

there is no evidence in the record to support the court’s

conclusion that the ‘‘bag filled with things’’ that the

defendant carried to the store’s exit were things that

belonged to Marshalls. Pastrana testified that Fernandes and Nates had told him that the defendant was
‘‘taking items or picking out items, and then taking them

to a certain corner of the store, and then piling them

up.’’ He also testified that the surveillance footage

showed the defendant ‘‘put stuff in the bag,’’ and later

that he could see ‘‘[a] plastic bag filled with some items’’

in the defendant’s hands. Although this testimony is

consistent with the surveillance footage, there is no

testimony or footage to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the items belonging to Marshalls that

the defendant gathered in the corner of the store were

the same items that he placed into a plastic bag and

attempted to walk out with. No one testified, for example, that after Fernandes and Nates recovered the bag

from the defendant, they verified that the items they

discovered within the bag belonged to Marshalls. Furthermore, the surveillance camera’s view of the area

where the defendant gathered items is obstructed by

racks of clothing and a large sign suspended from the

ceiling. Thus, because the defendant’s activity in the

isolated corner of the store was mostly invisible to

the cameras, the state’s claim that the defendant was

placing goods belonging to Marshalls in the bag is, in

our view, pure speculation.

The state acknowledges that it was necessary to

prove that the items in the bag belonged to Marshalls,

but argues that it did. Specifically, the state contends

that the court reasonably could have determined that

the items belonged to Marshalls because Pastrana testified that Fernandes and Nates told him the value of the

items in the bag—approximately $979.7 The state relies

on State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 9 A.3d 446

(2011), in support of this position. The defendant in

Jennings was charged with larceny in the third degree

and conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree.

Id., 803. He was observed with two other individuals

in a Wal-Mart store standing near a shopping cart that

contained a clear plastic tote. Id., 804. All three individuals were observed collecting and concealing DVDs from

the store within that tote. Id. They removed the DVDs

from the tote and placed them inside a suitcase. Id. The

defendant’s coconspirators placed the suitcase in the

shopping cart and left the cart near the exit. Id. The

defendant then pushed the cart toward the exit and

was apprehended. Id. After the defendant was arrested,

a store employee scanned the DVDs and printed a

receipt that indicated that the value of the DVDs was

$1822.72. Id., 805. After a jury trial, the defendant was

convicted of larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. Id.

On appeal, the defendant claimed that the state had

failed to prove that the value of the DVDs exceeded

$1000, an essential element of larceny in the third

degree.8

Id., 806. Specifically, the defendant argued that

the only evidence of value offered at trial was given

by the responding police officer, who testified, after

refreshing his recollection with his police report, that
the value of the DVDs exceeded $1000. Id., 807–808.

Neither the store’s receipt nor the DVDs were exhibits

at trial. Id., 807. This court disagreed, reasoning that the

officer’s testimony, ‘‘absent objection by the defendant,

was sufficient proof that the total value of the 101 DVDs

exceeded $1000.’’ Id.

We disagree that Jennings is instructive to our analysis. The claim in Jennings was that the state failed to

present sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential element of value, not the essential element of ownership of the item, which is at issue

in the present case. See id., 806; see also State v. Lokting, 128 Conn. App. 234, 239–40, 16 A.3d 793 (‘‘larceny

in the sixth degree consists of two essential elements:

[1] the intentional deprivation of an owner’s property

through the wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding

of such property; see General Statutes § 53a-119; and

[2] the value of the property is [$500] or less’’ [emphasis

added]), cert. denied, 301 Conn. 926, 22 A.3d 1277

(2011); State v. Saez, supra, 115 Conn. App. 302 (‘‘for

a conviction of larceny by shoplifting, the state must

prove that the property taken by the defendant was

goods, wares or merchandise exposed for sale within

the store’’). In Jennings, the police and store loss prevention officers were able to see the defendant and

his coconspirators take specific items belonging to the

store, place them in a clear tote, transfer them into a

suitcase, and then begin to take them from the store.

Id., 804–805. Thus, there was never any issue concerning

the store’s ownership of the DVDs in that case.

Here, however, there is no evidence that the items

that the defendant tried to exit Marshalls with belonged

to the store. The surveillance footage does not capture

the defendant placing specific, identifiable store merchandise into the bag before making off with it, and

there was no evidence before the trial court that the

contents of the bag that the defendant abandoned

belonged to Marshalls. It is entirely conceivable that

the defendant entered Marshalls with the bag, and that

the bag contained items from somewhere else. To the

extent that the state argues that evidence of value may,

by itself, establish that the items belonged to Marshalls,

we reject that position as well. For all we know, Fernandes and Nates guessed the value that they reported to

Pastrana. We have no evidence to substantiate how they

concluded that the items valued $979. In the absence of

some evidence, we conclude that the court could not

infer ownership from value without speculating. Therefore, the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt an essential element of § 53a-125b and, consequently, the defendant’s conviction of attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree cannot stand.

II

The defendant next claims that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his conviction of breach of peace
in the second degree. We disagree.

‘‘A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the

second degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a

risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in

violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public

place . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1). ‘‘Pursuant to § 53a-181, the state must prove that (1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or

threatening behavior, (2) this conduct occurred in a

public place and (3) the defendant acted with the intent

to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or that

he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Ragin,

106 Conn. App. 445, 451, 942 A.2d 489, cert. denied, 287

Conn. 905, 950 A.2d 1282 (2008).

The defendant does not dispute that the conduct

occurred in a public place, but challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the act and intent

elements of the crime. First, the defendant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s

finding that the surveillance footage ‘‘demonstrated

beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a scuffle

which can clearly be characterized as tumultuous

behavior in a public place.’’ The defendant contends

that the footage is merely a series of digital snapshots

that do not show continuous action, and, therefore, that

it is impossible to determine that his actions constituted

fighting or violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior.

‘‘Our Supreme Court, in order to ascertain the meaning of § 53a-181 (a) (1), looked to the construction given

by this court in State v. Lo Sacco, 12 Conn. App. 481,

490, 531 A.2d 184, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 814, 533 A.2d

568 (1987), to identical language contained in General

Statutes § 53a-181a (a) (1), the public disturbance statute. See State v. Szymkiewicz, [237 Conn. 613, 618, 678

A.2d 473 (1996)]. In State v. Lo Sacco, supra, this court

stated that ‘ ‘‘[t]hreatening’’ is defined as a ‘‘promise

[of] punishment’’ or, ‘‘to give signs of the approach of

(something evil or unpleasant).’’ [Webster, Third New

International Dictionary.] When, [however] two or more

words are grouped together, it is possible to ascertain

the meaning of a particular word by reference to its

relationship with other associated words and phrases

under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. . . . Placed

within the context of the other words in the statute,

the word ‘‘threatening’’ takes on a more ominous tone.

The statute proscribes ‘‘engaging in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.’’ In State v.

Duhan, [38 Conn. Supp. 665, 668, 460 A.2d 496 (1982),

rev’d on other grounds, 194 Conn. 347, 481 A.2d 48

(1984)], the Appellate Session of the Superior Court

defined ‘‘tumultuous’’ as ‘‘riotous’’ and ‘‘turbulent.’’

Fighting, by its plain meaning, involves physical force.

. . . [T]he language of subdivision (1) of General Statutes § 53a-181a (a) . . . evinces a legislative intent to
proscribe conduct which actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence.’ ’’ In re

Jeremy M., 100 Conn. App. 436, 450–51, 918 A.2d 944,

cert. denied, 282 Conn. 927, 926 A.2d 666 (2007).

The court’s conclusion that the defendant engaged in

fighting or violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior

was supported by sufficient evidence. Although the surveillance footage does not depict uninterrupted action,

it clearly depicts a continuous altercation in increments

of nearly one image per second. The surveillance footage shows Fernandes and Nates confront the defendant

and attempt to block his exit from the store. Their arms

and bodies move about as the defendant tries to force

his way out the door. In addition, Pastrana testified

that Fernandes and Nates told him that the defendant

shoved them to get out. This testimony was admitted

into evidence without objection at trial.

The defendant also claims that the evidence was

insufficient to establish that he intended to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. ‘‘[T]he predominant

intent [in a breach of peace charge] is to cause what a

reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards would consider a disturbance to or

impediment of a lawful activity, a deep feeling of vexation or provocation, or a feeling of anxiety prompted

by threatened danger or harm.’’ State v. Wolff, 237 Conn.

633, 670, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996). Construing the evidence

in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction,

as we must, we conclude that the surveillance footage

shows Fernandes and Nates intercept the defendant as

he tried to leave. The defendant clearly attempts to

get around them on both sides before he successfully

escapes. Fernandes and Nates were attempting to prevent what they perceived as a theft in the course of their

employment—a lawful activity which was disturbed by

the defendant’s conduct. The cumulative force of this

evidence is that the defendant used physical force,

namely, a shove, with the intent to impede a lawful

activity. Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the court’s judgment with respect to

the breach of peace conviction.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

defendant’s conviction of attempt to commit larceny in

the sixth degree and the case is remanded with direction

to render a judgment of acquittal on that charge; the

judgment is affirmed with respect to his conviction of

breach of peace in the second degree.

In this opinion, SHELDON, J., concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of an attempt

to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for

commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which

would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes

them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the

circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a

substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-125b (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny
in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119

and the value of the property or service is five hundred dollars or less.’’

3 General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to

cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk

thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or

threatening behavior in a public place . . . .’’

4 The defendant also claimed that his constitutional right to present a

defense was violated, but abandoned this claim at oral argument before

this court.

5 The surveillance footage was produced by a closed circuit television

system which records a series of still pictures approximately every second.

6 The court found the defendant not guilty of robbery in the third degree.

7 Pastrana’s testimony on the subject of the value of the goods recovered

from the defendant is as follows:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And do you know what merchandise the defendant

was trying to take from the store at that time?

‘‘[Officer Pastrana]: To my best recollection, I cannot tell you the actual

items. I know the total amount that they gave me, that they ran up. The

total was approximately $979 and change.’’

8 General Statutes § 53a-124, defining larceny in the third degree, was

amended in 2009 to increase the minimum value of the property involved

to $2000. Public Acts 2009, No. 09-138, § 3.