NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SUMMYR K., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.K., A.K., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0061

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD30701

The Honorable Alison Bachus, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kathryn E. Harris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn L. Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 8-28-2018
SUMMYR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Summyr K. (“Mother”) challenges the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to twins A.K. and A.K., born in February

2016, on the basis of Mother’s substance abuse, the children’s out-of-home 

placement for over six months, and a finding that it is in the children’s best 

interests. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a 

dependency petition as to Mother’s child, A.M., due to Mother’s alleged 

substance abuse.1 One year later, the twins were added to the dependency 

petition. DCS alleged that Mother had a current and long history of abusing 

drugs—including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and prescription 

medications—had failed to participate in drug testing, and that her 

substance abuse impaired her ability to provide proper care for the twins. 

The twins were found dependent as to Mother in early July 2016, and the 

court adopted a family reunification case plan.

¶3 Mother participated in services through Lifewell Behavioral 

Wellness through July 2016. But after Lifewell recommended that Mother 

enter its residential inpatient program, she declined and discharged herself

on July 14.

¶4 On August 4, Mother checked into Patina Wellness Center

(“Patina”). Mother resided at Patina for only eight days before she was

discharged for failing to abide by Patina’s rules, using drugs off-site, 

attempting to bring drugs on-site, and minimizing her negative behaviors.

¶5 On August 16, 2016, while on probation for a narcotics charge

and resisting arrest, Mother stabbed her boyfriend and was arrested for 

 

1 A.M. requested and was appointed a permanent guardian, was 

dismissed as a party to the severance motion, and is not a party to this 

appeal.
SUMMYR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

aggravated assault and disorderly conduct. Mother pleaded guilty to 

misconduct involving a weapon. Mother was incarcerated from August 

2016 until December 2017.

¶6 Meanwhile, given Mother’s lack of progress, DCS moved to 

change the case plan to severance and adoption in February 2017, and later 

moved to terminate her rights to the twins on the six-month out-of-home 

placement and substance-abuse grounds. Upon her release from prison, 

DCS provided Mother with referrals for drug testing, substance-abuse 

treatment, and a case-aide. The court held a contested severance hearing 

on January 2, 2018, and took DSC’s motion to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to the twins under advisement. On February 13, 2018, the court 

granted the motion, terminating Mother’s parental rights to the twins on 

both grounds and also finding termination was in their best interests.

¶7 Mother timely appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence for both statutory grounds and best interests. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235, 

12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother claims the court’s order terminating her parental 

rights on both the six-month out-of-home placement ground and the 

substance abuse ground is not supported by reasonable evidence.

¶9 The superior court may terminate parental rights if DCS 

proves a § 8-533(B) statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence, 

Michael J. v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000), and that 

termination is in the children’s best interests by a preponderance of the 

evidence, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). We do not 

reweigh evidence on appeal and will affirm the superior court’s factual 

findings if supported by reasonable evidence in the record. Dominique M. 

v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97, ¶ 6 (App. 2016).

I. Substance Abuse Ground

¶10 The court may terminate a parent’s rights under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(3) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence “the parent is unable 

to discharge [their] parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs [or] controlled substances . . . and there 

are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a 

prolonged indeterminate period.” In addressing termination pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the court may consider any admissible evidence, 
SUMMYR K. v. DCS, et al.

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including evidence of the length and frequency of the substance abuse, 

substances abused, behaviors associated with the abuse, prior efforts to 

maintain sobriety, and prior relapses, in determining whether reasonable 

grounds exist to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged period. 

See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 20 (App. 2016).

¶11 Mother asserts the superior court abused its discretion by 

severing her parental rights on this ground. But reasonable evidence 

supports the court’s order. Mother testified that before her incarceration, 

she participated in family reunification, sought counseling at Lifewell, and 

participated in drug testing, indicating she was taking steps to remedy her 

substance-abuse problem. However, Mother admitted she tested 

inconsistently, and a June 2016 status report indicated Mother refused to 

test on multiple occasions because she had recently unlawfully ingested 

medications. Additionally, Mother’s landlord reported her using 

methamphetamine and cocaine, and a June 2016 hair sample tested positive 

for amphetamine, methamphetamine, morphine, heroin, and opiates. 

Lifewell records indicate Mother used heroin or morphine, and 

methamphetamines, three to six times per week. Despite this evidence, 

Mother believed that her drug use did not endanger the twins because she 

waited roughly three days after each use before breastfeeding. In July 2016, 

Lifewell assessed Mother as a high risk due to her refusal to abstain from 

mind-altering substances, noting that it appeared Mother was only seeking 

treatment to avoid consequences and to appease others. Lifewell 

recommended that Mother enter its residential inpatient program, but she 

declined.

¶12 Although Mother completed previous treatment programs, 

she repeatedly relapsed, including after the twins were born, and agrees 

she has a long history of substance abuse. Lifewell records show Mother 

has trouble maintaining sobriety despite nearly a year-and-a-half of 

working with counselors. Mother claims she is currently sober, but the 

superior court properly could balance temporary abstinence against a 

significant history of abuse and inability to abstain. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). Mother also 

participated in services while in prison, and stated her desire to continue to 

participate in services to maintain sobriety, but she has relapsed in the past 

when not incarcerated. See id. (discussing evidence of a parent’s inability

to rise above their addiction in a “non-custodial and unstructured setting”). 

Before her arrest, Mother’s progress with Lifewell was described as “slow” 

and then “regression.” During her short stay at the Patina in August 2016, 

Mother told the clinicians that she “just like[s] to get high,” blamed DCS 
SUMMYR K. v. DCS, et al.

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and others for her troubles, and continued to abuse drugs despite being in 

a treatment facility.

¶13 Regarding the impact Mother’s substance abuse had and 

would have on her ability to parent the twins, Mother relapsed and 

repeatedly used drugs after the twins were born, and DCS reports indicated 

she left the twins with others so she could use drugs. Mother was in and 

out of treatment facilities, was incarcerated, and had a previous charge for 

narcotics possession. See id. at 377-78, ¶ 19 (noting that A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)

does not require a finding that the parent be unable to discharge any

parental responsibilities, but that the drug use prevents the parent from 

discharging the collective “parental responsibilities”). Although Mother 

was currently sober, she testified at the severance hearing that if she were 

an objective viewer she would want to see more stability to see that she 

“was going through with the services and that [her sobriety] could be 

prolonged.”

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, termination pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(3) is supported.

¶15 Although termination of Mother’s rights was also based on 

the six-month out-of-home placement ground, because we affirm on 

grounds of substance abuse, we need not evaluate whether reasonable 

evidence supported the court’s order on other grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

II. Best Interests

¶16 Mother also claims termination is not in the twins’ best 

interests. When considering the children’s best interests, the court must 

balance the unfit parent’s diluted interest in parenting against the 

independent interests of the children in a safe and stable home life. Kent K., 

210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35. The party seeking severance has the burden to show, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the children’s 

best interests based on consideration of the possible benefits of 

reunification, the benefits of termination, and the potential continued harm 

to the children if the parental relationship continues. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)

(“[I]n considering any of the following [statutory] grounds, the court shall 

also consider the best interests of the child[ren].”); Dominique M., 240 Ariz. 

at 98, ¶¶ 8, 12 (discussing a totality of the circumstances, consideration 

regarding affirmative benefits of termination, the removal of a detriment to 

the children if the parent-child relationship is not severed, and the existence 

of a bonded relationship between the biological parent and child).
SUMMYR K. v. DCS, et al.

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¶17 Here, the court considered Mother’s substantial and lengthy 

history of substance abuse, evidence of Mother’s inability to achieve 

permanent sobriety before her incarceration, and evidence that Mother was 

incarcerated for misconduct involving a weapon and disorderly conduct

while on probation for previous charges. The evidence supports a finding

that termination would remove a detriment if the parent-child relationship 

continued. Additionally, DCS personnel testified the children were in an 

adoptive placement that was meeting their needs. This evidence further 

supports the court’s finding that termination was in the twins’ best 

interests.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm the superior court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.