alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001026516
<NAME> CAPSTAR BROADCASTING PARTNERS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         216,374
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   57,494
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,688
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               275,476
<PP&E>                                         148,245
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,623
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,596,695
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          120,234
<BONDS>                                        377,127
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          104,545
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,796
<OTHER-SE>                                     755,302
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,596,695
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,075
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   47,128
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                30,489
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   632
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              17,768
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (31,622)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (4,962)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (26,660)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (26,660)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>
#### GRINSTEAD *v.*THE STATE.

No. 6880.

December 14, 1928.

*I. H. Corbitt, J. Wade Johnson,*and *U. T. Shcwpe,*for plaintiff in error.

*George M. Napier, attorney-general, M. H. Boyer, solicitor-general, T. B. Gress, assistant attorney-general,*and *L. C. Underwood,*contra.

Gilbert, J.

Grinstead was convicted of murder. The exception is to a judgment refusing to grant a new trial. The motion was upon the general grounds, and on alleged newly discovered evidence tending to show that two of the jurors trying the case were disqualified by reason of prejudice and bias. Counter-affidavits introduced by the State completely contradicted the contention so made. The evidence authorized the jury to find that the accused, prior to the homicide for which he was tried in the present case, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; that he was sent by the prison authorities to the State Farm at MiHedgeville, but in about 30 or 60 days after he was placed at the State Farm he was brought back to the county jail of Montgomery County by a guard who stated that “Grin-stead had a furlough to come and see about some business;” that he was kept in jail one night, and was taken by the guard the next morning to his (defendant’s) home, whence he escaped and remained at large for about a year, when Homer Stuckey, a county policeman, with three others assisting him, went to the home of Grinstead to arrest him as an escaped convict; that, as arranged, the party upon arrival divided, two going around the right side of Grinstead’s house and two around the other side; that just as Stuckey appeared in sight in rear of the house, Grinstead, who was standing in the yard, with gun in shooting position, fired, discharging a load of buckshot into the body of Stuckey, who died instantly; that Grinstead endeavored to escape, but was apprehended. The evidence also warranted a finding that neither Stuckey nor the deputy by his side had any weapon drawn at the time of the fatal shooting; that Stuckey’s pistol, after his death, *537was taken from its holster by his side; that the other deputies were on the other side of the house; that after Stuckey was killed several shots were fired at Grinstead, but all miscarried. Grin-stead introduced no evidence, but in his statement contended that he fired blindly, at no one particularly, as he retreated from, those firing at him; that he did not know Stuckey, and did not know that they were officers “when they came up;” and that had he known they were officers he could have been two or three hundred yards away by the time they reached the house.

The verdict is supported by evidence. The grounds of the motion for a new trial, in view of the counter-showing, do not show error. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 25, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-581

Lower Tribunal No. 20-9538

________________

Edward F. Heil, Jr.,

Appellant,

vs.

Fisher Island Community Association, Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Carlos Guzman, Judge.

Mark Rutecki & Associates, P.A., and Mark C. Rutecki (Celebration); 

Rutecki & Associates, P.A. and Heather A. Rutecki, for appellant.

Law Offices of Geoffrey B. Marks, and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellee 

Oceanside at Fisher Island Condominium Association, Inc.; and 

PeytonBolin, PL, and Mauri Peyton (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee Fisher 

Island Community Association, Inc.

Before LOGUE, SCALES and HENDON, JJ. 
2

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Fla. Dep't of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 

1110 (Fla. 2021) (“To the extent the decision to enter a temporary injunction 

involves an exercise of discretion, we defer to the trial court unless it has 

abused its discretion.”); Briceño v. Bryden Invs., Ltd., 973 So. 2d 614, 616 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“A trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny a 

temporary injunction and an appellate court will not interfere with the 

exercise of such discretion unless the party challenging the grant or denial 

clearly shows an abuse of that discretion.”) (quoting Perry & Co. v. First Sec. 

Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 654 So. 2d 671, 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Patricia G. Kriss, Chief Financial Officer of Entropin, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(a) the Quarterly Report on Form
10-QSB of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and



(b) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated: November 12, 2004



|    |  |                        
|--- |  | -----------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Patricia G. Kriss  
|    |  | Patricia G. Kriss      
|    |  | Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to Entropin, Inc. and will be retained by Entropin, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request.
EXHIBIT 31.1

                   Certification of Principal Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, v. Ivan CONSTANT, Appellant.

No. 04-1025.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Dec. 13, 2004.

Decided Dec. 30, 2004.

Eric B. Henson, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.

David L. McColgin, Defender Association of Philadelphia Federal Court Division, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Before NYGAARD, ROSENN, and BECKER, Circuit Judges.

*226OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Arguing that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, Appellant Ivan Constant challenges his conviction under that statute. As we have previously considered and rejected an identical claim, *see United States v. Singletary,*268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), we affirm his conviction.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                           DEVON ENERGY CORPORATION                 Exhibit 11
                       Computation of Earnings Per Share


                                                                               
                                                             Three Months Ended March 31,
                                                                   1997           1996

PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE

Computation for Statement of Operations
<S>                                                            <C>              <C>
Net earnings per statement of operations                       $25,225,546      5,553,926

Weighted average common shares outstanding                      32,141,295     22,112,489

Primary earnings per share                                           $0.78           0.25

Additional Primary Computation (A)
Net earnings per statement of operations                       $25,225,546      5,553,926

Adjustment to weighted average common shares outstanding:
      Weighted average as shown above in primary computation    32,141,295     22,112,489
      Add dilutive effect of outstanding stock options
            (as determined using the treasury stock method)        358,398        135,253

      Weighted average common shares outstanding, as adjusted   32,499,693     22,247,742

Net earnings per common share, as adjusted                           $0.78           0.25

FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE (A)

Net earnings per statement of operations                       $25,225,546      5,553,926

Increase in net earnings from assumed conversion
      of Trust Convertible Preferred Securities
      (net of tax effect)                                        1,506,488              -

Net earnings, as adjusted                                      $26,732,034      5,553,926

Weighted average common shares outstanding as shown
      in primary computation above                              32,141,295     22,112,489

Add fully dilutive effect of outstanding stock options
      (as determined using the treasury stock method)              358,398        147,146

Add weighted average of additional shares issued
      from assumed conversion of Trust Convertible
      Preferred Securities                                       4,901,507              -

Weighted average common shares outstanding, as adjusted         37,401,200     22,259,635

Fully diluted earnings per common share                              $0.71           0.25



(A) The additional primary computations for both periods, and the fully diluted
    computations for the 1996 period, are submitted in accordance with
    Regulation S-K item 601(b)(11) although not required by footnote 2 to
    paragraph 14 of APB Opinion No. 15 because they result in dilution of less
    than 3%.

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
9892.

#### Galion Iron Works Company *v.*Marion County.

Wade, C. J.

1. By article 7, section 7, paragraph 1, of the constitution of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6563) it is declared that no county or municipal corporation shall incur any new debt, except for -a temporary loan or loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed one fifth of one per cent, of the assessed value of taxable property therein, without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters thereof, at an election for that purpose,- to be held as may be prescribed by law.

*58Decided November 12, 1918.

Complaint; from Marion superior court—Judge Howard. April 24, 1918.

The alleged debt was for culvert pipe used on roads.

*W. D.*Crawford, for plaintiff. *G. P. Munro,*for defendant.

2. The petition in this case shows that the contract under which the account in controversy arose was entered into by the County of Marion and a private corporation on April 27, 1911, and by the terms of the agreement the debt was to become due and payable on March 27, 1912. The debt which it was thus sought to create is inhibited by the provisions of the constitution referred to above. *Renfroe v. Atlanta,*140 *Ga.*81 (78 S. E. 449, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173) ; *City Council of Dawson v. Dawson Waterworks Co.,*106 *Ga.*696, 711 (32 S. E. 907). Payment being by the terms of the agreement deferred for a period of eleven months and it being made to mature after the end of the then-current fiscal year, and' it not being alleged that any special provision for the payment of such indebtedness had been piade at the time of the attempted creation of the debt, the petition was subject to the demurrer based upon that ground, and therefore the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer- and dismissing the petition. *Gaines*v. *Dyer,*128 *Ga.*586 (7) (58 S. E. 175); *Town of Wadley v. Lancaster,*124 *Ga.*354 (52 S. E. 335); *Butts County*v. *Jackson Banking Co.,*129 *Ga.*801 (60 S. E. 149, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, 121 Am. St. R. 244) ; *McCord v. Jackson,*135 *Ga.*176 (69 S. E. 23) ; *Renfroe*v. *Atlanta,*supra; *Town of Whigham*v. *Gulf Refining Co.,*20 *Ga. App.*427 (93 S. E. 238).

3. The attempt to create a debt being null and void', an allegation to the effect that the county commissioners ratified the claim by giving subsequent orders was wholly insufficient to make the demand legal. The claim being illegal, a subsequent ratification could not make it legal. *Dorsett v. Garrard,*85 *Ga.*734 (3) (11 S. E. 708). “What a municipal corporation was without power to do its officers could not make lawful by ratification.” *Toum of Wadley*v. *Lancaster,*supra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins and Luke, JJ., concur.*
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 8049** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. GEORGE P. SMITH , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:00

- cr - 00343

- JRS

- 1 )

Submitted : February 26, 2013 Decided: March 1, 2013

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judg es.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. George P. Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Erik Sean Siebert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: George P. Smith appeals the district court ’ s order denying his motion to reconsider the district court’s previous order denying Smith’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. United States v. Smith , No. 3:00

- cr - 00343

- JRS

- 1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2012) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NUMBER 13-10-00696-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

ESTATE OF AGNES W. MEELER, DECEASED

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

of Victoria County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

This appeal was abated by this Court on April 28, 2011, to allow the parties the 

opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations. This cause is now before the Court on 

appellant=s motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the parties have reached a 

settlement agreement. Appellant requests that this Court dismiss the appeal. 

Accordingly, this case is hereby REINSTATED.

The Court, having considered the documents on file and appellant=s motion to 

dismiss the appeal without prejudice, is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. 
2

See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a). Appellant=s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is 

hereby DISMISSED. Costs will be taxed against appellant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(d) 

("Absent agreement of the parties, the court will tax costs against the appellant."). 

Having dismissed the appeal at appellant=s request, no motion for rehearing will be 

entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

31st day of August, 2011.
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 77027-6-1 ) Respondent, )

) v. ) ) CHAD DAVID SMITH, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: June 11,2018

) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PER CURIAM. Chad Smith challenges the judgment and sentence imposed following his guilty plea to first degree theft. His court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that there is no basis for a good faith argument on review. Pursuant to State v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184,470 P.2d 188 (1970),and Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738,87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.2d 493(1967),the motion to withdraw must: (1)be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. (2)A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and (3)time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses;(4)the court—not counsel—then proceeds,after a full examination of all the proceedings,to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d at 185 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). This procedure has been followed. Smith's counsel on appeal filed a brief with the motion to withdraw. Smith was served with a copy ofthe brief and informed of his right to file a statement of additional groundsfor review. Smith did notfile a supplemental brief.

### No.77027-6-1/2

The material facts are accurately setforth in counsel's brief in support ofthe motion to withdraw. The court has reviewed the briefs filed in this court and has independently reviewed the entire record. The court specifically considered the following potential issues raised by counsel:

Did the trial courterr in ordering restitution? The issues raised by counsel are wholly frivolous. The motion to withdraw is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

_

2 FOR THE COURT: 

### 1/ / fa-nm, 4.c

4.- -------. '1 C 

# I V / ot Q 1 i

e.,.........
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift Energy
Manged Pension Assets Partnership 1988-A,  Ltd.'s balance sheet and statement of
operations  contained in its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended  September 30, 1997
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         63,318
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  16,514
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               79,832
<PP&E>                                         4,178,549
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,760,509)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 497,872
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3,088
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     494,784
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   497,872
<SALES>                                        111,121
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               112,400
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  47,971<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                37,493
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            37,493
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   37,493
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<FN>
<F1>Includes  lease  operating  expenses,  production  taxes  and  depreciation,
depletion and  amortization  expense.  Excludes general and  administrative  and
interest expense.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER and PRINCIPAL
       FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
          OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of the Everest Fund, L.P.
(the "Partnership"), for the quarter ended September 30, 2013,
as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter Lamoureux, President
of Everest Asset Management, Inc., the general partner of
the Everest Fund, L.P. (the "Fund"), hereby certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Fund.




      By:  /s/ Peter Lamoureux
         ----------------------
      Name: 	Peter Lamoureux
      Title: 	Director, President and
      		Treasurer

      November 14, 2013


		E-3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

KELLY B. DONAHUE,

Petitioner

v.

PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 77 WM 2023

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of February, 2024, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Application for an Immediate Hearing is DENIED. 

The “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief” is DENIED to the extent 

it seeks extraordinary relief and DISMISSED to the extent it seeks mandamus relief.