FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 28, 2010

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-10117

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D. C. Docket No. 05-00131-CR-ORL-28JGG

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

C. KEITH LAMONDA,

JESSE W. LAMONDA,

JOHN L. MAYNARD,

Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(June 28, 2010)

Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT and ROTH,* Circuit Judges.

*Honorable Jane R. Roth, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by

designation.
PER CURIAM:

Appellants Keith LaMonda, Jesse LaMonda, and John Maynard were

convicted of defrauding and conspiring to defraud investors and life insurance

companies. No reversible error has been shown, so we will affirm their

convictions and sentences.

Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume their familiarity with

the underlying facts. Defendants operated a company that sold viatical settlements,

which are financial instruments created by the inter vivos conveyance of a life

insurance death benefit. During the seven-month trial, the Government presented

evidence that defendants (1) knowingly procured life insurance policies acquired

by fraud for the purpose of selling viatical settlements, (2) lied to investors who

purchased fraud-tainted viatical settlements, (3) secretly misappropriated investor

funds for personal use, and (4) conspired to conceal taxable income from the sale

of viatical settlements.

Defendants, asserting eleven issues for appeal, claim the District Court

committed reversible error. We disagree. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

52(a) precludes conviction reversal based on “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or

variance that does not affect substantial rights.” “[R]eviewing courts must apply

Rule 52(a)’s harmless-error analysis and must disregard errors that are harmless

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (internal

quotations omitted). The harmless-error rule assures criminal defendants a fair

trial, not a perfect one. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681

(1986).

During the course of every long trial, imperfections are bound to arise

because exigencies of live litigation require instantaneous rulings on matters of

which defendants complain (e.g., admissibility of evidence, scope of crossexamination). Defendants, however, have not shown any error committed by the

District Court, which handled this complex criminal matter admirably. The alleged

trial imperfections, even had they amounted to error (and they do not), were

harmless as to the outcome beyond a reasonable doubt.

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AFFIRMED.

We have considered and rejected each argument raised by defendants on appeal. To ensure

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completeness of the record, those arguments and their proponents are as follows: (1) the District

Court erred when it denied defendants’ suppression motions (Keith LaMonda), (2) the District

Court erred by restricting defense counsel from objecting during the Government’s rebuttal

closing argument (Keith LaMonda), (3) the District Court erred when it admitted testimony of

Maynard’s disbarment (Keith LaMonda), (4) the District Court erred by unfairly limiting

defendants’ cross-examination of Government witnesses and defendants’ presentation of their

case (Jesse LaMonda), (5) the evidence was insufficient to support Jesse LaMonda’s conviction

(Jesse LaMonda), (6) the Government unfairly criminalized conduct involving merely bad

business judgment (Jesse LaMonda), (7) the District Court improperly admitted evidence of civil

and regulatory violations (Jesse LaMonda), (8) the District Court erred in denying defense

requests for jury instructions, (9) the evidence was insufficient to support Maynard’s conviction

on Count Thirteen (John Maynard), (10) the evidence was insufficient to support Maynard’s

conviction on Count Fourteen (John Maynard), and (11) Maynard’s sentence was unreasonable

because the District Court failed to account for sentencing disparities among co-defendants

(John Maynard).

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