alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

POLYBLANK DESIGNS LIMITED, 

Plaintiff,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED 

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A”,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:20-cv-04453

Judge Sara L. Ellis

Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Plaintiff hereby files this Notice of Voluntary 

Dismissal, without prejudice, as to the following Defendant(s) identified on Schedule A of the 

Complaint:

NO. DEFENDANT

123 GooHome Store

DATED: October 10, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keith A. Vogt

Keith A. Vogt (Bar No. 6207971)

Keith Vogt, Ltd.

111 West Jackson Boulevard, Suite 1700

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Telephone: 312-675-6079

E-mail: keith@vogtip.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

Case: 1:20-cv-04453 Document #: 30 Filed: 10/12/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:4018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document was electronically filed on October 10, 2020 with the Clerk of the Court using the 

CM/ECF system, which will automatically send an email notification of such filing to all registered 

attorneys of record.

/s/ Keith A. Vogt

Keith A. Vogt

Case: 1:20-cv-04453 Document #: 30 Filed: 10/12/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:4019
1 microbiology @ the speed of light

mibiC GmbH & Co. KG |||| Ostendstrasse 25| Haus 6 | 12459 Berlin |||| |||| 

Phone: +49 (0) 30 53041750 ||||||| ||| ||||||| |||| |||||||| || 

mibi-c.com ||||| fast viabilty detection |classification || bacteria|| yeast | fungi |

Fast Automated Raman spectroscopic

Detection and Identification of microbial

Contamination
2 microbiology @ the speed of light
3 microbiology @ the speed of light
4 microbiology @ the speed of light

Image analysis + Raman 

Number microbes Viability + species ID
5 microbiology @ the speed of light

Automated Enumeration •Metal foil with 0.4 μm pores RAMAN inactive 
6 microbiology @ the speed of light

Measurement: Image analysis + Fluorescence

Targeting + Raman

1. Scan filter with dark-field

100-5000 Images

2. Scan filter with Fluorescence mode 

(if necessary, in case of large amount 

of debris ) or as viability marker

3. Selection of potential microbes for 

Raman Spectroscopy

4. Verification of potential microbes 

by Raman Spectroscopy

5. Single cell technique, no amplification 

necessary, may be helpfull
7 microbiology @ the speed of light

Bildgeführte Spektroskopie

Slide 7

Raman Spectroscopy

Raman Signal of the microbes

for ID and verfication
8 microbiology @ the speed of light

Molecular Spectroscopy

I

cm-1
9 microbiology @ the speed of light
10 microbiology @ the speed of light
11 microbiology @ the speed of light
12 microbiology @ the speed of light

Detection & ID @ LOD 1000 in Cell Based Therapeutic

[1 mL 2 E6 Cells]

• USP <1071>

• EP 2.6.27

– LOD <100 CFU

– Sample Volume 0.1-10 ml

– Wide Range of

Microorganisms with low false

neg. and positive

– Easy, Aseptic, Validation 

possible

Result before Administration
13 microbiology @ the speed of light

Challenges | Solutions | Outlook

• Lysis of the Mamalian Cells creates a 

lot of debris

– Cell Concentration dependand!

• Enzymes are used to digest debris

• Debris is in the similar size as microbes

Efficient cleaning up and selective

staining is neccesary

LOD of <1000 was established

TTR: 3 h 3 h
14 microbiology @ the speed of light

GRAMRAYbenefits & advantages

Quick result less 

than 24 hours

Cost-effective for

large number of

samples

Additional 

Information by ID More safe product
VCAT Subcommittee Oct 15

POSSIBLE Recommendations

• Establish frequent “grand rounds” audits of individual laboratory 

rooms led by senior, trained NIST executive.

• Set firm target for reduction in each OSHA reportable statistic

• Distribute and discuss IRIS statistics with all-at-NIST by Director 

memo each reporting period. Leadership team to identify top 

priority IRIS issues and action plans to reduce occurrence. These 

will be a standing agenda item at each VCAT meeting. 

• Increase “transparency” on all safety metrics, including exact stage 

at which non-closed IRIS cases are stalled.

• Address ergonomic factors, a major contributor to reported 

injuries. Establish pilot program, e.g. with statistical and 

mathematical scientists to pilot ergonomic impact progress.
#### Johann Kuschell et al. v. Gregory J. Campau.

*Lease*— Chattel *mortgage security.*

A clause in a lease, stipulating toy way of securing the payment of rent, that “all goods, wares and merchandise, household furniture, fixtures or other property which are or shall toe placed in or on said premises by them, shall be liable, and this lease shall constitute a lien or mortgage on said property,” does not cover the dwelling house upon the premises.

General terms in a clause describing property encumbered thereby are limited to the class of property specified.

Error to "Wayne.

Submitted June 21.

Decided June 27.

Trespass. Defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

*Wittiam S. Thomas*and *Henry M. Oheever*for appellants.

A house erected on a leased lot is personal property: 1 Washb. R. P. 133; *Smith v. Benson*1 Hill 176; *Goodenow v. Allen*68 Me. 308; and where parties treat fixtures as personal property, the law will so consider them as between such parties: *Ford v. Cobb*20 N. Y. 344; *Tifft v. Horton*53 N. Y. 377; *Godard v. Gould*14 Barb. 662; *Shell v. Haywood*16 Penn. St. 523; *Hensley v. Brodie*16 Ark. 511; *Gooding v. Riley*50 N. H. 400; personalty is not merged in realty where there is no unity of title: *Adams v. Lee*31 Mich. 440 ; *Kerr v. Kingsbury*39 Mich. *35150; one who gives a chattel mortgage on fixtures is -estopped from denying that they are personalty: *Smith v. Waggoner*50 Wis. 155; *Denham v. Sankey*38 Ia. 269.

*Wilhmson, Post <& Wilkmson*for appellee.

Maeston, J.

Plaintiffs brought an action of trespass to recover damages for the taking and removing a part of their ■dwelling-house from off lands owned by them.

The defendant’s claim of right to remove the same was based upon a chattel mortgage clause in a lease of a certain .•other lot upon which this house then stood, to secure payment of the rent.

Giving this so-called mortgage full force and effect, still ¡the defendants had no right to this house thereunder, for .the very good reason that this house was not included ¡therein. The parties agreed that “all goods, wares and merchandise, household furniture, fixtures or other property which are or shall be placed in or on said premises by them, shall, be liable, and this lease shall constitute a lien or mortgage on said property,” etc.

The general terms herein used are restrained and limited ito the particular kinds of property mentioned immediately preceding. This is a well-settled rule of construction, .applicable alike to contracts and statutes, and is decisive of ihe present controversy.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
##### 



Exhibit 99.2 ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCEPrincipal Life Income Fundings Trust 2004-8 (the Trust) I, Nancy H. Forte, a duly elected and acting officer of Citibank, N.A. (Indenture Trustee),
do hereby certify on behalf of the Indenture Trustee, that: 1. I have reviewed and examined the performance by the Indenture Trustee of the application of
trust money collected by the Indenture Trustee pursuant to Section 5.02 and, if applicable, Section
6.06 of the Indenture pursuant to which the Trusts notes were issued during the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2004 (the Relevant Year); and 2. Based upon my review and examination described in 1 above, and except as provided in the
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm on Compliance, dated March 15, 2005,
prepared by the Ernst & Young LLP substantially in accordance with Section 4.05 of the Expense and
Indemnity Agreement, to the best of my knowledge, the application of trust money collected by the
Indenture Trustee pursuant to Section 5.02 and, if applicable, Section 6.06 of the Indenture was
performed in accordance with the terms of the Indenture throughout the Relevant Year. CITIBANK, N.A., as Indenture Trustee By:
    
    /s/ Nancy H. ForteName: Nancy H. ForteTitle: Assistant Vice PresidentDate:
    
    March 29, 2005
#### David Elston, plaintiff, *vs.*Andrew Schilling *et al.*defendants.

1. A judgment by default, at a general term, dismissing an appeal for not serving copies of the casé in due time, will be opened, where the appellant shows that the action, and all the proceedings therein, were wholly neglected ’ by his attorney and counsel, in consequence of his being rendered by his habits incompetent, to take charge of them. The language of Mullin, J. in *Sharp*v. *The Mayor, $c. of New York,*(31 *Barb.*585,) is applicable to such a case.

*1.*The court, at special term, is the proper tribunal to which to apply for relief, under such circumstances.

(Before Robertson, Ch. J. at special term,

March —, 1868.)

Motion to open a judgment taken by default.

*75
      *S. T. Birdsdle,*for motion and plaintiff.

*O. Q. Egan,*opposed.

Robertson, Ch. J.

This is a motion for leave to open a judgment, taken by default at the general term, affirming one at special term. The proceedings, which were on appeal, appear to have, been regularly taken, but the appeal was dismissed for not serving proper cases in due time. The ground of moving to vacate such judgment and to be let in to be heard on the appeal, is, that the whole proceedings and action were utterly neglected by the attorney and counsel for the plaintiff, who was rendered incompetent by his habits from taking charge of them. I think the language of Justice Mullin in *Sharp*v. *The Mayor of New York,*(31 *Barb.*585,) is applicable to such a case. It would certainly work great hardship if the representative of a party, by courtesy and fiction of law an officer of the court, could inflict on a client unbounded injury, and there was no redress but by the doubtful remedy of an action for negligence.

I do not regard the decision on a former motion against letting the plaintiff in to be heard, as *res judicata,*as the court had not then before it the incapacity of the plaintiff’s attorney and counsel to take charge of the action. Surely the court would have interfered if he had become imbecile or insane, and it should not the less interfere when his habits rendered him partially so. There is no doubt all the steps taken in the cause, as well as the indulgences granted by the defendants’ counsel would have raised a barrier to relief, if the plaintiff had been properly represented. As it was, he was entirely helpless.

As to the suggestion of the absence of exceptions to the referee’s report upon the amount of damages from the injunction, that cannot interfere with the right of the *76plaintiff to be properly represented and heard. Indeed, I do not understand how judgment in the action was entered upon such report. The court at general term can dispose of that, as well as any other question, on appeal, on hearing the argument. .

This court at special term is the proper tribunal to which to apply for relief. The motion must be granted, upon the terms -of the plaintiff' paying the costs of obtaining the judgment at general term, also those of the previous motion to be let in, and of the appeal from the order denying such motion, and $10 costs of the present motion; otherwise it must be denied, with $7 costs.
#### H. M. Chaney, etc., *v.*B. W. S. Lowe.

Insolvency — Preference of Creditor.

A sale of property by an insolvent son to 'his' father in -discharge of a debt owing the father was held to- be in fraud of other creditors of the son.

*458Appeal from Nicholas circuit court.

February 13, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The merits of this controversy must be determined upon the testimony of the father and son. ' The father is asserting a claim1 against his son amounting to near forty-three hundred dollars and upon his statement, if true, the pledge of the whisky as a security for this debt was made in 1869 and therefore six months had elapsed prior to the filing of Lowe’s petition, in which he seeks to bring the transaction between the father and son within the act of 1856.

Robert Chaney, however, swears that the whisky was only stored in the house of his father in 1869 and that there was no transaction between them in regard to it until August, 1870, when he sold it to his father in payment of the debt he owed him. The son was then in an insolvent condition and the father threatening to institute suit against him and to prevent this suit and for the purpose of discharging this debt and having the other creditors to suffer the sale was made.

The son making this statement has no other interest in the action than to have his debts paid and the result of the controversy can not in any manner affect his rights, as the proceeds of- the whisky must necessarily be applied as a partial payment upon his indebtedness. If the father’s statement is to be adopted he makes nearly the entire amount of his debt to the exclusion of the other creditors, whilst the son’s statement will give to each his pro rata portion of the proceeds of the sale of the property.

The petition of Lowe was filed oh the 9th of November, 1870. The sale to the appellant was made in August of the same year, except the twenty barrels of new whisky. Whether this new whisky was delivered early or later in- the spring of 1870 does not clearly appear. If sold or delivered after the 8th of May, 1870, the suit of Lowe was then instituted within six months from that date and the proceeds of the old and new whisky must be apportioned between the creditors or placed in the general fund for distribution.

No injustice is done their creditors by making them share equally in what Robert Chaney has to pay his debts, and his disinterested position towards all these parties leaves no doubt in our minds but what his statements with regard to these business transactions between himself and father are true.

*459
      *Thos. Kennedy, W. P. Ross, for appellant.*

*Phister, Hargis, for appellee.*

We perceive no reason for disturbing the judgment of the court below and the same is now *affirmed.*
----

Exhibit 32

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United StatesCode)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each ofthe undersigned officers of Newport Gold, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the"Company"), does hereby certify, [to such officer's knowledge], that:

The Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007(the"Form *10-KSB*") of the Company fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,and the information contained in the Form *10-KSB* fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

**
Dated: April 15, 2007/s/ Derek Bartlett
 
Derek Bartlett, Chief Executive Officer
 
 

 
Dated: April 15 2007/s/ John Arnold
 
John Arnold, Chief Financial Officer
A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

**
#### J. G. Arnold *v.*Williams and J. A. Coddin’s Admr.

Bills and Notes — Notice of Protest — When to Be Given.

The notary was under no obligation to mail the notices in this case, on the evening of the protest, but was bound to mail them on the following day. The first mail left at 6 o’clock A. M. It would have required more than ordinary diligence to have sent them by that mail but if it had been the only one leaving that day this diligence would have been required. By the mail at noon the notices reached their destination at 1 P. M. on that day.

APPEAL FROM KENTON CHANCERY COURT.

January 16, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

From the proof in this case we conclude that the notices of protest were mailed to appellants in time to. reach Covington at 1 p.. m. on the day after the dishonor of the bill.

In the case of *Dodge v. Bank of*Kentucky, 2 A. K. M. 610, this court laid down the doctrine in general terms that the notice when it goes by mail must go. by the first mail after the last day of grace is over. It is to be observed that in that case there were but three mails per week between the place of protest and the' residence or postoffice of the party sought to be charged. Hence it was important that there should be no delay in.- mailing the notice. In *Bank of Kentucky v. Eades,*1st Littel 277, it was held that where the parties to. the bill reside in the same village, notice given on the day after protest is sufficient, and we are not aware that the law has ever been construed differently in this State. The cases of *Smith v. Roach,*7 B. Monroe 17, and *Triplett v. Hunt,*3d Dana 126, accord with the principle, and require no greater diligence than that the notice of protest shall be mailed the day following the last day of grace.

The notary was under no obligation to mail the notices in this case on the evening of the protest, but was bound to mail them on the following day. The first mail left at 6 o’clock a. m. It would have required more than ordinary diligence to. have sent them by that mail but if it had been the only one leaving for Covington that day this diligence would have been required.

By the mail at noon the notices reached Covington at one o’clock p. m. and during business hours.

*6*Carlisle & Foot, for appellants.*

*Rankin, for appellee. 1*

Had'the bill been, protested in Covington, notices delivered at that hour would have been sufficient. We can see no reason why the fact that the protest was made in Cincinnati should require greater diligence on the part of the notary.

To carry the rule to> such an extent would he going further than this court has ever gone, and further than the general current of authority, will warrant.

Judgment affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3949 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3949

 To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to delegate to the Under Secretary of 
   Commerce for International Trade the functions relating to trade 
        adjustment assistance for firms, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 11, 2004

  Mr. Graves introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to delegate to the Under Secretary of 
   Commerce for International Trade the functions relating to trade 
        adjustment assistance for firms, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 
              FOR FIRMS.

    Section 256(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2346(b)) is 
amended by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2012''.

SEC. 2. DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO CARRY OUT THE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 
              FOR FIRMS PROGRAM.

    (a) Delegation.--Section 256 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
2346) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (a) through (c) as 
        subsections (b) through (d), respectively;
            (2) by inserting before subsection (b) (as redesignated) 
        the following:
    ``(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the Secretary shall 
delegate all functions of the Secretary under this chapter to the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade.''; and
            (3) in the heading, by striking ``to small business 
        administration''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The item relating to section 256 in the 
table of contents of the Trade Act of 1974 is amended to read as 
follows:

``Sec. 256. Delegation of functions; authorization of 
                            appropriations.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
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|   | [SIGNATURES      APPEAR ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES] |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|

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| By: |                                                                   /s/  J. Richard  Rosenberg |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |  [SIGNATURES      CONTINUE ON FOLLOWING PAGE] |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------|

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| By: |                                                                     /s/  Judith M.  Shewbridge |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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|   | B | Other      Properties |
|--------|---|-----------------------|

|   | D | Certificate      of Compliance and Release |
|--------|---|--------------------------------------------|

----

|   | (a) | (i) | if      any portion of the Debt described in Section 3.01(a)(i), (ii) and. (iii)      is not paid when due; |
|--------|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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Exhibit 4.7(b)

(FACE OF COMMON SECURITIES CERTIFICATE)

THIS CERTIFICATE IS NOT TRANSFERABLE

One Common Security

MELLON CAPITAL III

COMMON SECURITIES

This Common Security Certificate certifies that Mellon Financial Corporation (the Company) is the registered Holder of the Common Security set forth above. The Common Security represents a beneficial interest in the
assets of Mellon Capital III, a Delaware statutory trust (the Trust), having an initial liquidation amount of §50,000. The Common Security is not transferable. The designations, rights, privileges, restrictions, preferences
and other terms and provisions of the Common Security are set forth in, and this certificate is hereby issued and shall in all respects be subject to the terms and provisions of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement of the Trust, dated as of
September 19, 2006, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time (the Trust Agreement), including the designation of the terms of the Common Security as set forth therein. All capitalized terms used herein that are
defined in the Trust Agreement have the meanings set forth therein.

The Company agrees to treat the Debentures held by the Trust as
indebtedness for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

A copy of the Trust Agreement is available for inspection at the offices of the
Property Trustee.

Upon receipt of this certificate, the Holder is bound by the Trust Agreement and is entitled to the benefits thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trust acting through one of its Administrative Trustees has executed this Common Security Certificate.



MELLON CAPITAL III, acting through one of its Administrative TrusteesBy:

/s/Michael K. HugheyName:

Michael K. Hughey Administrative
Trustee


Date: September 19, 2006