IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN THE MATTER OF S.L.M., a Youth 

IN THE MATTER OF S.T., a Youth 

Appeals From: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, - . ., '.A ,. - t b,( ;(A The Honorable Thomas A. OIson, Judge presiding. ?\"-PCM,= GG ' $4 3 t-. 01 mo~~~

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IN THE MATTER OF J.L.C., a Youth ( No. 96-220 --. 

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Appeal From: District Court of the TweIfth Gcf, 

In and for the County of Hill, 

The Honorable Job Warner, Judge presiding. 

IN THE MATTER OF J.A.T., a Youth No. 96-546 

IN THE MATTER OF L.D., a Youth No. 96-547 

Appeals From: District Court of the Thirteenth JudiciaI District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G, Ban, Judge presiding, 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Daniel P. BuckIey (argued); Berg, Lilly, AndrioIo & TolIefsen, Bozeman, Montana (96-576) 

D.E. Pomery (argued), Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana (96-337) 

John Keith, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana (96-220) 

Roberta A. Drew, YeIlowstone County Defender's Office, Billings, Montana (96-546 and -547) 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin (argued), Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Argued: November 6, 1997 

Submitted: November 14, 1997 

. Decided: December 30, 1997 
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The appellants in these five appeals challenge the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution 

Act, §§ 41-5-1601 through -1607, MCA, (EJPA) as being unconstitutional under the equal 

protection, due process and double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Montana 

constitutions, as well as under Article 11, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution. Although 

there are some factual differences in how each prosecution evolved as well as differences in 

the conclusions reached by the various District Courts, the constitutional issues presented 

encompass each of the appeals. Accordingly, we consolidate these appeals for purposes of 

an opinion. Since we determine that the EJPA violates Article 11, Section 4 (equal 

protection) of the Montana Constitution and Article 11, Section 15 (rights of minors) of the 

Montana Constitution, we need not address the double jeopardy and due process challenges. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF EACH APPEAL 

I. In the Matter of S.L.M.. Cause No. 96-576. Gallatin County: 

The Youth S.L.M. was charged with perjury and the criminal sale of dangerous drugs, 

both punishable as felonies if committed by an adult. The State alleged that S.M. sold $150 

worth of marijuana to an undercover agent. At the time of the offense, S.M. was under the 

age of 18 years. The State requested extended jurisdiction under the EJPA. The District 

Court held a hearing and granted extended jurisdiction over the charge of criminal sale of 

dangerous drugs, but did not extend jurisdiction over the charge of pe jury, an offense which 

2 
is not enumerated for extended jurisdiction under the EJPA. At the disposition hearing, the 

Youth argued that the EJPA violates the equal protection, double jeopardy, and due process 

guarantees of the Montana and United States constitutions. The District Court rejected the 

Youth's contentions and committed him to the Department of Corrections until he reaches 

the age of 19. The District Court then entered and stayed a Sentence and Judgment of 10 

years on the charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs. The Youth filed a motion for 

correction of sentence or reconsideration. That motion was denied, and the Youth appealed 

to this Court. 

11. In the Matter of J.L.C.. Cause No. 96-220. Hill County: 

The Youth J.L.C. was charged with negligent homicide as the result of a car accident 

in which J.L.C. was driving a vehicle while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. The 

vehicle rolled, and one of the two passengers died from injuries received. J.L.C. was 17 

years of age at the time of the incident. At the request of the county attorney, the District 

Court granted extended jurisdiction over the charge of negligent homicide. The Youth pled 

guilty to negligent homicide, and the court, by way of a juvenile disposition, placed the 

Youth on formal probation until he reaches the age of 21. In addition, under the EJPA, the 

court imposed an adult sentence committing the Youth to the Department of Corrections for 

a period of 5 years, suspended. The Youth filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
111. In the Matter of S.T.. Cause No. 96-337. Gallatin County: 

S.T. was charged in Youth Court with eight offenses, including two burglaries. He 

admitted to having committed each of the offenses. The State filed a motion to have the case 

designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution. S.T. challenged the EJPA as unconstitutional under the double jeopardy clause, the due process clause and Article 11, Section 15 of 

the Montana Constitution. The District Court rejected the constitutional challenges and 

imposed a juvenile disposition (chemical dependency treatment, random urinalysis and 

restitution) under 5 41-5-523, MCA, of the Youth Court Act as well as an adult sentence 

under 5 46-1 8-201, MCA (ten years to the Department of Corrections, stayed). 

Based upon a report of probation violations, the State subsequently filed a request 

with the court to impose the adult portion of the sentence. S.T. was arrested pursuant to a 

bench warrant. After initially denying the violations, S.T. admitted the violations of 

probation. The court then imposed the sentence of 10 years with the Department of 

Corrections, suspended 5 years, and imposed conditions for the suspended portion of the 

sentence. S.T. was credited with 91 days of incarceration served under the juvenile 

disposition. 

IV. In the Matter of J.A.T.. Cause No. 96-546. Yellowstone County and 

In the Matter of L.D.. Cause No. 96-547, Yellowstone County: 

J.A.T. was charged in Youth Court with assault with a dangerous weapon and 

misdemeanor theft. The State requested extended jurisdiction for the charge of assault, 
J.A.T. admitted the allegations in the petition and proceeded to challenge the constitutionality 

of the EJPA. The court ordered J.A.T. committed to the Department of Corrections until the 

age of 19. The court stayed the commitment on condition that J.A.T. continue to reside with 

his grandfather and attend school. The court held the adult portion of the sentence in 

abeyance pending a ruling on the Youth's motion challenging the constitutionality of the 

EJPA. 

Subsequently, the State filed a petition charging the Youth with possessing drug 

paraphernalia and, on that basis, sought to revoke the prior suspension of commitment. J.A.T 

admitted the allegations, and the court placed him on probation for one year. 

In a separate matter, in November of 1995, the State charged L.D. with being a 

delinquent youth for committing deliberate homicide. The State later amended its petition 

to charge negligent homicide as an alternate charge. L.D. admitted to the charge of negligent 

homicide, but challenged the constitutionality of the EJPA. The court declared L.D. a 

delinquent youth and committed him to the Department of Corrections until age 19. The 

court took the issue of whether to designate the case as one for extended jurisdiction under 

advisement. 

On July 19, 1996, the court issued a consolidated order in both L.D. and J.A.T. 

declaring thc EJPA unconstitutional on double jeopardy, due process and equal protection 

grounds. The State appeals from that decision. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. Does the EJPA violate the equal protection clauses of the United States 

Constitution andor the Montana Constitution? 

2. Does the EJPA violate the provisions of Article 11, Section 15 of the Montana 

Constitution? 

3. Does the EJPA violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States 

Constitution and/or the Montana Constitution? 

4. Does the EJPA violate the due process clauses of the United States Constitution 

and/or the Montana Constitution? 

DISCUSSION 

I. Overview of the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act 

In 1995, the legislature substantially revised the Montana Youth Court Act, including 

amending the Declaration of Purpose to effectuate the following purpose: 

to prevent and reduce youth delinquency through immediate, consistent, 

enforceable, and avoidable consequences of youths' actions and to establish 

a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention, competency 

development, community protection, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as 

ordered by the youth court[.] 

Section 41-5-102(2), MCA (1995). 

As part of the broad 1995 revision of the Youth Court Act, the EJPA was enacted. 

The EJPA is now codified at Title 41, Chapter 5, Part 16, MCA. Although the youths herein 
were all sentenced under the EJPA as it was enacted in 1995, the 1997 legislature amended 

the EJPA to provide for more procedural due process in revocation of stay proceedings. 

ij 41-5-1605, MCA. If the State were to initiate revocation of stay proceedings against any 

of the appellants, the 1997 amendments would inure to their benefit. However, for purposes 

of our equal protection analysis, the sentencing provisions of the Act remain the same in that 

they still provide for imposition of an adult sentence in addition to a juvenile disposition. 

Accordingly, we will refer to the Act as amended and codified at Title 45, Chapter 5, Part 16, 

MCA. 

A youth court case may be designated an "extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution" 

when the offender is at least 14 years of age, the county attorney requests that the case be 

designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution, a hearing is held, and the youth 

court designates the case as such. Section 41-5-1602, MCA. If, after a hearing, the county 

attorney has shown by clear and convincing evidence that designating the case an extended 

jurisdiction prosecution serves the public safety, the youth court may so designate. Section 

41-5-1603(3), MCA. 

A case may also fall under the EJPA if the youth is alleged to have committed one or 

more of the offenses listed under ij 41-5-206, MCA, and the county attorney designates the 

case as an extended jurisdiction prosecution. Section 41-5-1602(1)(b), MCA. The casc may 

also fall under the EJPA if the youth was at least 12 years of age, allegedly committed an 

offense which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable as a felony, and allegedly used 
a firearm in the commission of the offense. Section 41-5-1602(I)(b), MCA. Additionally, 

the case may be designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution if, after a hearing on the 

motion to transfer the case for prosecution in district court under 3 41-5-206, MCA, the 

youth court designates the case an extended jurisdiction prosecution. Section 41-5- 

1602(l)(c), MCA. 

After the case is designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution, the case proceeds 

to an adjudicatory hearing as provided in $ 41-5-1502, MCA. If the youth admits to 

committing, or is adjudicated to have committed, an offense which would be a felony if 

committed by an adult, the youth court must impose one or more of the juvenile dispositions 

under $ 41-5-1512, MCA, and any sentence which could be imposed on an adult offender 

of the same offense. The statute expressly provides that execution of the sentence imposed 

"must be stayed on the condition that the youth not violate the provisions of the disposition 

order and not commit a new offense." Section 41-5-1604(1)(b), MCA. 

If the court is subsequently informed that any condition of the disposition has been 

violated, or if it is alleged that the youth has committed a new offense, the court may, without 

notice, order the youth be taken into custody. Section 41-5-1605(1), MCA. The district 

court must then notify the youth, in writing, of the reasons alleged for revocation of the stay. 

Section 41-5-1605(1), MCA. 

If the youth challenges the reasons for the revocation, the court must hold a hearing 

at which the youth is entitled to notice, an opportunity to be heard, right to counsel, and the 
right to cross-examine witnesses. Section 41-5- l605(2), MCA. If, after the hearing, the 

court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions of the stay have been 

violated or that the youth has committed a new offense, the court shall provide a written 

statement of the reasons for the revocation and shall: 1) continue the stay and place the 

youth on probation; 2) impose one or more dispositions under $5 4 1-5- 1 5 12 or - 15 13, MCA, 

if the youth is under age 18; or 3) subject to $5 4 1 -5-206(6) and (7), MCA, order execution 

of the sentence imposed under 5 41-5-1 6O4(l)(b), MCA. Section 41 -5- l6OS(2)(b), MCA, 

Upon revocation and disposition, the youth court shall transfer the case to the district 

court. Section 4 1-5- l605(3), MCA. Upon transfer, the offender's extended jurisdiction 

juvenile status is terminated, and the youth court jurisdiction is terminated, Section 41-5- 

1605(3), MCA. Ongoing supervision of the offender is with the Department of Corrections 

rather than with the youth court's juvenile probation services. Section 4 1-5- 1605(3), MCA. 

11. Standine 

The State contends that certain of the youths lack standing to challenge the 

constitutionality of the EJPA. The youths contend that the EJPA violates equal protection 

by subjecting them to a Ionger period of incarceration than that permitted for an adult 

offender, The State points out, however, that the aduIt portion of the sentence is only 

tiggered if the youth violates the terms of his juvenile disposition and the stay of the adult 

sentence is revoked. Those youths who have not had the stay revoked have not been 
adversely affected by imposition of an adult sentence and thus, the State contends, lack 

standing. 

We conclude that the youths, each of whom have been sentenced under the EJPA, 

have standing to challenge its provisions. We recently addressed the question of standing 

in Gryczan v. State (Mont. 1997), 942 P.2d 112, 54 St.Rep. 699. We reiterated the criteria 

for determining standing: 1) the complaining party must clearly allege past, present or 

threatened injury to a property or civil right; and 2) the alkged injury must be distinguishable 

fiorn the injury to the public generally, but need not be exclusive to the compIaining party. 

Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 117. Gryczan involved a constitutional challenge by six homosexuals 

(the respondents) to the statutory prohibition on deviate sexual conduct, &g 5 45-5-505, 

MCA. The State contended that because the statute had never been enforced against 

consenting adults, there was no "threatened injury" and, thus, no standing. Fryczan, 942 

P.2d at 116. 

This Court, despite the fact that the respondents had not been arrested or prosecuted, 

held that they were precisely the individuak the statute was designed to impact. Gyczan, 

942 P.2d at 119, Furthermore, we noted that nothing prevented a county attorney from 

exercising his or her discretion and choosing to prosecute. Since the legislature had not 

disavowed the statute, we concluded that the respondents "suffer a legitimate and realistic 

fear of criminal prosecution along with other psychological harms. Respondents are 

precisely the individuals against whom the statute is intended to operate. This is sufficient 
to give Respondents standing to challenge the constitutionafity of the statute." Gryczan, 942 

P.2d at 120. 

The threat of injury to the youths herein is even more apparent than that to the 

respondents in Gryczan. There is no question but that the youths are among the individuals 

against whom the EJPA is directed. Further, the youths have not only been prosecuted, but 

have also been sentenced under the EJPA. Although the adult sentences of some of the 

youths may be presently stayed on the condition that they comply with their juvenile 

dispositions, they suffer a "legitimate and realistic" fear that the adult sentence will be 

imposed should they violate the disposition. We conclude that the youths, regardless of 

whether their stays have been lifted, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 

EJPA on equal protection grounds. 

111. Does the EJPA violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution 

andlor the Montana Constitution and the rights of minors under Article 11, Section 15 of the 

Montana Constitution? 

Resolution of this issue involves a question of constitutional law. Accordingly, we 

review to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. State v. 

Schnittgen (19961,277 Mont. 291,295,922 P.2d 500, 503. 

Equal protection challenges to legislation are reviewed under one of three different 

levels of scrutiny. When the legislation in question infringes upon a fundamental right or 

discriminates against a suspect class, we employ the most stringent standard, strict scrutiny. 
"Strict scrutiny has been limited to those instances when either a fundamental right has been 

infringed or a suspect classification has been established. Strict scrutiny requires the 

government to show a compelling state interest for its action." Davis v. Union Pacific 

Railroad Co. (Mont. 1997), 937 P.2d 27, 3 1, 54 %.Rep. 328, 331. 

If the right in question has its origin in the Montana Constitution, but is not found in 

the Declaration of Rights, we employ a middle-tier scrutiny. Butte Community Union v. 

Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426,434,712 P.2d 1309, 1313. Middle-tier scrutiny requires the 

State to demonstrate that its classification is reasonable and that its interest in the 

classification is greater than that of the individual's interest in the right infringed. Lewis, 712 

P.2d at 13 14. 

If the right in question is not hndamental and does not warrant middle-tier scrutiny, 

we review under a rational basis test. This test requires the government to show that the 

objective of the statute is legitimate and bears a rational relationship to the classification used 

by the legislature. Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (1987), 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 895. 

In addressing an equal protection challenge, we first identify the classes involved and 

determine whether they are similarly situated. The two classes involved in the present 

appeals are: 1) juveniles who are sentenced as adults under the EJPA; and 2) adults who are 

sentenced for committing the same offense as the juveniles. Since both classes are composed 

of persons who have committed the same act and who are sentenced "as adults," the classes 

are similarly situated for equal protection purposes. 
We next determine whether a suspect classification is involved. A suspect class is one 

"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposchl unequal 

treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 

extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent 

School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 41 1 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16,40. 

A classification between juvenile and adult offenders is a distinction based upon age. We 

have followed the United States Supreme Court in holding that a sentencing distinction based 

upon age is not a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny. Matter of Wood (1989), 236 

Mont. 118, 125, 768 P.2d 1370, 1375. 

We then defme the nature of the individual interest affected; is it a fundamental right 

triggering a strict scrutiny analysis? The youths argue that imposition of an adult sentence 

in addition to a juvenile disposition is an infringement upon their physical liberty and that 

physical liberty is a fimdamental right. This question was answered in Matter of C.H. 

(1984), 210 Mont. 184,683 P.2d 93 1. C.H. contended that placing a truant status offender 

in an institution for a 45-day predispositional evaluation was an infringement upon the 

fundamental right of physical liberty, a right which must be protected absent a compelling 

state interest. Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 938. She also contended that 3 41-5-103(12), 

MCA, is unconstitutional in that it authorizes the youth court to reclassify a youth in need 

of supervision who has violated a court order as a delinquent youth. Matter of C.H., 683 
P.2d at 938. She contended that this classification violated equal protection guarantees by 

allowing the court to treat youths in the same class, i.e., youthful conternnors, differently. 

While physical liberty is not specifically guaranteed under either the United States 

Constitution or the Montana Constitution, we noted in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940, that 

the concept of "liberty" is very much a part of our state constitution. The preamble to the 

Montana Constitution states in part: "We the people of Montana . . . desiring. . . to secure 

the blessings of liberty . . . do ordain and establish this constitution." Further, Article 11, 

Section 3 states in part: "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They 

include . . . the rights of. . . enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . ." Article 11, 

Section 17, the due process clause, states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 

property without due process of law." 

In Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940, we concluded: "Reading the preamble and these 

sections of our constitution together, we hold that under the Montana Constitution physical 

liberty is a fundamental right, without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would 

have little meaning." We then analyzed the interplay between the guarantee of equal 

protection and Article 11, Section 15's guarantee to minors of all the fundamental rights of 

Article I1 unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such 

persons. We held that "a juvenile's right to physical liberty must bc balanced against her 

right to be supervised, cared for and rehabilitated." Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941. 
We determined that two compelling state interests justified classifying a youth as a 

delinquent youth or a youth in need of supervision, depending upon the circumstances. The 

two compelling state purposes were: 1) to rehabilitate youthful offenders by providing for 

their care, protection and wholesome mental development before they become adult 

criminals; and 2) to substitute a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation and remove 

the element of retribution from the punishment of a youth who has violated the law. mr 

of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941. "The youth court's statutory authority to classify contempt of court, 

depending upon the circumstances of the case, permits the court to fashion an appropriate, 

individual rehabilitation plan for each youthful contemn[o]r." Matterof 683 P.2d at 

941. 

In the present appeals, the EJPA's imposition of an adult sentence in addition to a 

juvenile disposition infringes on the juvenile's physical liberty, which is a fundamental right. 

As in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941, we must therefore apply a strict scrutiny analysis and 

determine whether there is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify such an 

infringement and whether such an infringement is consistent with the mandates of Article 11, 

Section 15 of the Montana Constitution. 

Article 11, Section 15 provides: 

Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall 

include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless 

specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protections of such persons. 
This section must be read in conjunction with the guarantee of equal protection found in 

Article 11, Section 4. The report of the Bill of Rights Committee of the Constitutional 

Convention indicates that one of the primary purposes of Article 11, Section 15 was to 

remedy the fact that minors had not been accorded full recognition under the equal protection 

clause of the United States Constitution. The Bill of Rights Committee's Comments are as 

follows: 

The committee took this action in recognition of the fact that young people 

have not been held to possess basic civil rights. Although it has been held that 

they are "persons" under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

the Supreme Court has not ruled in their favor under the equal protection 

clause of that same amendment. What this means is that persons under the age 

of majority have been accorded certain specific rights which are felt to be a 

part of due process. However, the broad outline of the kinds of rights young 

people possess does not yet exist. This is the crux of the committee proposal: 

to recognize that persons under the age of majority have the same protections 

from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do adults. In such cases where 

the protection of the special status of minors demands it, exceptions can be 

made on clear showing that such protection is being enhanced. 

Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. I1 at 635-36. 

Clearly under Article 11, Section 15, minors are afforded full recognition under the 

equal protection clause and enjoy all the fundamental rights of an adult under Article 11. 

Furthermore, if the legislature seeks to carve exceptions to this guarantee, it must not only 

show a compelling state interest but must also show that the exception is designed to enhance 

the rights of minors. 

In Matter of C.H,, 683 P.2d at 941, we held that the state had a compelling interest in 

removing the element of retribution and instead rehabilitating youths before they became 
adult offenders. At the time Matter was decided, the stated purpose of the Youth 

Court Act was "to remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of 

retribution and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, and, in 

appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the youth court." Section 41-5-102(2), MCA 

(1983). However, the purposes of the Youth Court Act have since been considerably 

broadened. As of the 1995 amendments, the Declaration of Purpose now states the following 

goals: 

[T]o prevent and reduce youth delinquency through an immediate, consistent, 

enforceable, and avoidable consequences of youths' actions and to establish a 

program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention, competency 

development, communityprotection, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as 

ordered by the youth court[.] 

Section 41-5-102(2), MCA (1995) (emphasis added). 

As compared to the pre-1995 Declaration of Purpose, the Act now espouses much 

more preventative, if not punitive, goals; that is, the Act now seeks to prevent delinquency 

through imposition of enforceable and immediate consequences and to establish programs 

of detention and community protection. The State asserts that the EJPA was designed by the 

legislature to address the rising tide of juvenile criminal conduct in Montana and dispel the 

notion held by some juveniles that their criminal conduct holds no consequences for them. 

The EJPA, as noted by the State, gives the courts "a bigger stick to help keep kids in line--to 

let them know their crimes are serious and this is their last chance to cooperate." Obviously, 

it is no longer accurate to reason, as we did in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941, that Youth 
Court Act infringements upon a juvenile's physical liberty are legitimate nieans of enhancing 

their protection. Indeed, in requiring the court to impose an adult sentence in addition to the 

juvenile disposition, the EJPA goes beyond mere rehabilitation and injects the specter of 

retribution. Our holding in Matter of C.H. is thus distinguishable on that basis. 

All juveniles subject to the EJPA are at risk of serving an adult sentence in addition 

to their juvenile disposition. Thus, the EJPA, on its face, violates the equal protection clause 

of Article 11, Section 10 by treating EJPA offenders more harshly than their adult 

counterparts. The EJPA aIso violates Article 11, Section 15 by reducing, rather than 

enhancing, a juvenile's rights as compared to an adult's. The State, relying solely on its 

contention that age is not a suspect classification, does not address the fundamental right 

analysis and has not suggested any compelling state interest to justify the EJPA's 

infringement on the fundamental right of physical liberty. While the State has a clear interest 

in deterring serious juvenile crime and while it can, within the limits of equal protection, 

further this interest by increasing the sanctions imposed upon juveniles, it has no compelling 

state interest in treating them as adults and restricting their physical liberty beyond the 

restrictions which are imposed upon an adult for the same offense. 

As an example, one of the appeals before us, Matter of J.L.C., Cause No. 96-220, Hill 

County, involves a 17-year-old youth who pled guilty to one count of negligent homicide, 

a violation of $45-5-104, MCA. Pursuant to the EJPA, J.L.C. received a juvenile disposition 

committing him to formal probation until age 21 plus an adult sentence of 5 years with the 
Department of Corrections, suspended on the condition that he comply with the probation 

until age 21. Thus, while the "adult" portion of his sentence is only 5 years, the total 

sentence with both juvenile and adult aspects combined could equal 9 years, nearly twice as 

long as the 5-year adult sentence under similar circun~stances. Clearly, although the law 

purports to treat J.L.C. as an "adult," he is treated differently than an adult and in such a 

manner that his rights are lessened rather than enhanced, as mandated by Article 11, Section 

15. Thus, the EJPA, both on its face and as applied to J.L.C., violates equal protection under 

Article 11, Section 4 and a minor's rights to enhanced protection under Article 11, Section 15 

of the Montana Constitution. 

In addition to Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 931, discussed above, we have twice 

addressed equal protection challenges to the different treatment of offenders based upon age. 

As the following analysis indicates, we find both of these decisions distinguishable. 

A. Our Decision in Matter of Wood: 

In Matter of Wood (1989), 236 Mont. 118,768 P.2d 1370, we addressed an equal 

protection challenge by a 16-year-old youth to the process whereby jurisdiction over his 

homicide case was mandatorily transferred from youth court to district court. The Youth 

Court Act, 4 41-5-206(l)(a)(i), MCA, provided that a youth aged 12 years or older who had 

committed deliberate homicide or mitigated deliberate homicide may be transferred, after a 

hearing, to district court. Wood contended that, as a 16-year-old, he was entitled to the same 

due process (i.e., a hearing) as a younger person and that 4 41-5-206(3), MCA, denied equal 
protection when it provided that youths I6 years or older who have allegedly committed 

deliberate homicide must be transferred to district court, without any requirement of a 

hearing. Matter of Wood, 768 P.2d at 1372. We held that procedural due process is not a 

hndamental right nor is age a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny. Matter of Wood, 768 

P.2d at 1375. We applied the rational basis test and concluded that treatment as a juvenile 

is not an inherent right, that the legislature may restrict or qualify that right, and that the 

legislative classification based upon age and gravity of the offense was rationally related to 

the legitimate state objective of detening homicides committed by teenagers and protecting 

society from these violent offenders. Matter of Wood, 768 P.2d at 1376. 

Matterof 768 P.2d at 1370, is distinguishable from the case sub judice. Matter 

of Wood involves the right to procedural due process, which we held is not a hndamental 

right. In this case, the appellants are challenging the actual loss of physical liberty, in 

addition to challenging the process by which sentence is imposed. As we stated earlier, 

physical liberty is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. Also, Matter of Wood, 768 

P.2d at 1374-76, involved the transfer statute, $41-5-206, MCA, and an alleged right to be 

treated as a juvenile. The present appeals involve the EJPA, which while purporting to treat 

juveniles as adults in fact treats them more harshly than adults under similar circumstances. 

Our decision in Matter of Wood is thus not controlling of the issues presented herein. 
B. Our Decision in Matter of C.S.: 

We addressed an equal protection challenge to the disparate application of sentencing 

laws to minors as compared to adults in Matter of C.S. (1984), 210 Mont. 144, 687 P.2d 57. 

At the age of 15, C.S. was adjudged a delinquent youth for having committed the offense of 

violation of privacy in communication, a misdemeanor as provided in 5 45-8-2 13, MCA. 

Matter of C.S., 687 P:2d at 58. At the dispositional hearing, C.S. was committed to the 

Department of Institutions until age 21, unless the Department deemed an earlier release 

appropriate. Thus, the maximum amount of time C.S. could have spent in the custody of the 

Department was six years. Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 58. This was considerably longer 

than the six-month maximum to which an adult could be sentenced for committing the same 

offense. For that reason, C.S. argued that her term of commitment vioIated the equal 

protection clause. Matter of C.S., 687 P,2d at 58. We concluded that adults and minors are 

not similarly situated with respect to Montana's sentencing laws for three reasons. Matter 

of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59. 

The three reasons propounded were: 1) a juvenile commitment is different from a 

criminal conviction because, given the stated policy of the Youth Court Act in 1984, a 

juvenile commitment is strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution; 2) in contrast to an adult, 

the liberty interests of a minor are subject to reasonable regulation by the State under the 

doctrine of parens patriae; and 3) other jurisdictions have employed the parens patriae 

doctrine under similar youth court acts. Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59. 
Our decision in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 57, predates the adoption of the EJPA. 

After review of the EJPA and the revised Youth Court Act, we conclude that the three 

distinctions drawn in Matter of C.S. between minors and adults do not apply in the context 

of these acts. As stated above in our discussion of Matter of C.H., given the new breadth of 

purpose of the Youth Court Act and the adult sentencing provisions of the EJPA, it is no 

longer accurate to state, as we did in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59, that a Youth Court 

disposition is "strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution." Our holding in Matter of C.S. is 

thus distinguishable on that basis. 

Furthermore, where the offender is sanctioned with an "adult" sentence, as under the 

EJF'A, we cannot rely on the doctrine ofparenspatriae to distinguish between the treatment 

of juveniles and adults. Parens patriae traditionally refers to the role of the State as 

sovereign or guardian of persons who are under a legal disability, such as juveniles--"the 

principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as 

minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 

11 14 (6th ed. 1990). Where, as under the EJPA, the offender is no longer sentenced solely 

as a juvenile, but as an adult as well, the doctrine's paternalistic rationale no longer applies. 

Finally, the doctrine ofparens patriae must be applied consistently with Article 11, 

Section 15 of the Montana Constitution which provides: "The rights of persons under 18 

years of age shall include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article 

unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons." 
(Emphasis added.) In light of this clear constitutional guarantee, a juvenile enjoys all the 

rights and privileges of an adult unless the law at issue affords more, not less, protection to 

the juvenile. Our decision in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 57, did not address the provisions 

of Article 11, Section 15 and does not conflict with our conclusion that infringement of an 

EJPA offender's liberty for a longer period of time than an adult under like circumstances 

does not enhance the juvenile's rights. 

CONCLUSION 

Under the framework of the EJPA, a juvenile receives a juvenile disposition plus an 

adult sentence. If the juvenile violates the terms of the juvenile disposition, it is possible for 

the youth to serve a longer term of detention or imprisonment than an adult who has 

committed the same offense. The State has not shown a compelling interest to be advanced 

by this unequal treatment of similarly situated persons, nor has it shown that the EJPA 

provides juveniles with increased, rather than decreased, protection under the law. 

Therefore, we hold that the EJPA violates Article 11, Section 4 (equal protection) and Article 

11, Section 15 (rights of minors). 

Although the Youth Court Act, including the EJPA, is subject to a severability clause, 

our holding that the EJPA violates Article 11, Sections 4 and 15 of the Montana Constitution 

goes to the heart of the EPA. That is, thc EJPA's imposition of an adult scntcncc in addition 

to the juvenile disposition is necessary to the integrity of the EJPA and was the inducement 

to its enactment. Accordingly, the remaining provisions of the EJPA cannot be saved 
through application of the severability clause. & Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely (1981), 

193 Mont. 378, 399,632 P.2d 300, 3 11. 

Although our equal protection analysis differs considerably from that of the Thirteenth 

Judicial District Court in Matter of L.D. and Matter of J.A.T., that court nonetheless reached 

the right result. We affirm district court decisions which are correct regardless of the court's 

reasoning in reaching the decision. Clark v. Eagle Systems, Inc. (1996), 279 Mont. 279,927 

P.2d 995. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision that the EJPA is 

unconstitutional. The Hill County Matter of J.L.C., the Gallatin County Matter of S.L.M. 

and the Gallatin County Matter of S.T. are remanded to those District Courts for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We concur: A 

Justices 

24 
Justice Teny N. Trieweiler specially concurring. 

I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act, 

found at $9 41-5-1 101 to -1 105, MCA (1995), is unconstitutional. However, I conclude that 

it violates the prohibition against double jeopardy found at Article 11, Section 25, of the 

Montana Constitution, by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. Therefore, 

I would not reach the issue of whether it violates the youths' constitutional right to equal 

protection pursuant to Article 11, Sections 4 and 15, of the Montana Constitution. 

Section 41-5-1 104, MCA (1995), clearly provides for multiple punishments for the 

same offense. That section specifies that: 

If a youth in an extended jurisdiction prosecution pleads guilty to or is 

found guilty of an offense described in 41-5-1 102(1)(b), the court shall: 

(a) Impose one or more juvenile dispositions under 41-5-523; and 

(b) Impose an adult criminal sentence, the execution of which must 

be stayed on the condition that the youth not violate the provisions of the 

disposition order and not commit a new offense. If the youth violates the 

conditions of the stay or commits a new offense, the adult criminal sentence 

must be executed as provided in 41-5-1 105. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Section 41-5-1 104(a), MCA (1995), provides for imposition of those punishments 

established by the Youth Court Act. Subsection (b) provides for the concurrent imposition 

of an adult sentence which, although stayed, can be enforced at a later date. 

The State contends that pursuant to our decision in State v. Zabawa (1996), 279 Mont. 

307, 928 P.2d 151, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Hunter 

(1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 S. Ct. 673,74 L. Ed. 2d 535, cumulative punishments for a single 
offense do not violate the double jeopardy clauses of either the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, or Article 11, Section 25, of the Montana Constitution. While that 

may be the interpretation attached to the Federal Constitution by the United States Supreme 

Court, I would not follow that reasoning when applying our own constitutional prohibition 

against double jeopardy for the reasons stated in Justice Leaphart's dissent to the Zabawa 

decision. 

As this Court noted in State v. Johnson (1986), 22 1 Mont. 503, 5 13, 719 P.2d 1248, 

1254, "states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater protections than the 

Supreme Court of the United States has recognized in its interpretations of the federal 

counterparts to state constitutions." Furthermore, as stated by Justice Leaphart in his dissent 

to this Court's Zabawa decision: 

I would decline to adopt the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 

the "multiple punishment" element of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Missouri 

v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535. Instead, I 

interpret the double jeopardy clause of Article 11, Section 25 of the Montana 

Constitution, as providing substantive protection against multiple punishments 

irrespective of any legislative enactments. 

. . . [W]e do a grave disservice to the framers of the Montana 

Constitution when we hold that a constitutional provision means nothing more 

than what the legislative branch intends it to mean. Constitutional guarantees 

are not mere vessels to be left empty or filled at the whim of the legislative 

branch. Rather, they have intrinsic meaning which is independent of any 

legislative intent. Contrary to this Court's characterization of the issue, the 

question is not whether Article 11, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution 

provides "greater protection" from double punishment than does the Fifth 

Amendment, the question is whether it provides any protection independently 

of what the legislature chooses to provide. 
. . . The double jeopardy clause in Article 11, Section 25, limits the 

power of all branches of government, including the legislature. Whether the 

legislature intends multiple punishments or not, as a matter of state 

constitutional law, such cumulative punishment is proscribed under the double 

jeopardy clause. 

Zabawa, 279 Mont. at 323-26, 928 P.2d at 161-63 (Leaphart, J., dissenting). 

We have previously recognized that the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, and that Montana's 

corresponding right provides the same protection. See State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 

90,910 P.2d 247,250. The Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act clearly provides multiple 

punishments for the same offense. It defies all principles of a constitutional system of 

government to suggest that the Legislature defines it own constitutional parameters. 

Therefore, based on the reasoning in the dissent to Zabawa, I would conclude that the 

Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act violates the prohibition against double jeopardy in the 

Montana Constitution and is unenforceable. 

For these reasons, I concur with the result of the majority opinion, but express no view 

regarding the reasoning for the majority opinion.