Dear EAC/TGDC members, my best wishes for a prosperous New Year to you and to all 

who are working for the wellbeing of America, and hoping that the holidays have 

refreshed your spirits for the promising months ahead. I have, good news: NOBODY has 

been able to prove, nor has there been anybody who could articulate how, when, where or 

in what circumstances the “One Smart Card per Voter” fails to provide any one of the 

following functionalities, as they provide the highest level of security and transparency to 

the electoral process. 

• Allow voters to verify their entire ballot after Election Day 

• Allow voters to cast a vote at the precinct or outside the precinct 

• Allow an absentee voter to cast a vote while being observed, and yet in total 

confidentiality 

• Allow overseas voters to cast votes by phone in total confidentiality 

• Allow ballots to keep their votes secret until tally time 

• Allow ballots to stand up for a correct tally of the votes entrusted to them 

• Allow all political parties to oversee the entire process with step by step audit trails 

• Allow the Court to remove from the ballot box a ballot that was cast by an impugned 

voter without revealing the vote 

Therefore it is safe to assume that not only are these functions desirable but that they are 

also attainable using currently available hardware. In light of this, I don’t doubt the 

inclusion of these functionalities, features and procedures in the Voluntary Voting 

Guidelines document that is under your responsibility. 

I believe that the electoral industry is prepared to readily modify/upgrade their products 

to comply with those guidelines. To this effect, I’d like to provide a brief description of 

what, in my opinion, are basic guidelines. 

1) A transparent electoral administration needs to be responsible for the overall 

creation, control, and supervision of the elections. This entity, hereafter called 

G3, shall equally consist of representatives from three (3) equally important 

groups (the government Board of Elections and the two leading political parties) 

and shall be controlling the process at each of the precincts throughout the 

country. 
2) The security of the electoral process shall be protected by the use of secret codes, 

random numbers and encrypted files. 1) No less than two types of voter’s 

personal codes, the Voter’s Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) and the 

Voter’s Personal Voting Codes (PVC), shall be created and stored in secure 

computers by each voter. Voter’s codes shall be used to guarantee the legitimacy 

and confidentiality of the vote. 2) G3 codes shall be created and stored in secure 

computers by each individual G3 representative. G3 codes shall be used to 

guarantee the security, legitimacy and confidentiality of each vote. 3) A random 

number shall be generated after voting to become the Voter’s Verification 

Numbers (VVN). The VVN shall protect the identity of the voter while allowing 

them to verify their ballot after Election Day. 4) A VVN-PIN-encrypted file, for 

the purpose of publishing it in the Internet after the votes are tallied, shall be 

created after the ballot is cast. Each VVN-PIN-decrypted file shall reveal only the 

ballots’ questions with the corresponding PVC’s as selected by the voter. 

3) The G3 shall ensure full transparency of the electoral process by verifying, 

authorizing, and controlling a) the listing of the voters of each precinct, b) the 

issuing of ballots of each precinct c) the tallying of ballots of each precinct, d) the 

publishing of results (precinct, county, state and country level) on their respective 

websites, e) the publishing of all electoral software application’s source-code 

and/or the algorithms and/or the encryption techniques used on the EAC/NIST 

website, f) the publishing of all election related information, guidelines, and 

procedures (including how and where the voter’s and G3 codes are securely 

stored) on the EAC/NIST website, g) and the publishing of all voter’s encrypted 

ballots on each individual G3 precinct’s websites to allow voters to verify their 

votes after Election Day. 

4) People with disabilities shall have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges 

to access and use PIN and PVCs to cast his/hers votes. 

5) The electoral system, shall guarantee the same level of security, legitimacy, 

secrecy and transparency achieved at typical precincts to all voters who cast their 
votes outside of the precinct (whether overseas or disabled); regardless of the 

means utilized to deliver their vote (USPS, existing telecommunication network 

or Internet). 

6) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have means to convince all precinct G3 

members, at any time, that the votes were cast by a legitimate voter. 

7) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have means to keep the cast votes secret 

at all times, except for tallying. 

8) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have secret means designed specifically 

for tallying the votes only when all precinct G3 members agree to count them. 

9) Ballots shall incorporate a mean to track the number of times the voter’s 

selections have been revealed. 

10) The Justice system shall have a mean to remove ballots that were cast by 

impugned voters, without compromising the secrecy of the vote. 

EAC/TGDC members, the world sees America as the beacon for democracy; in your 

hands is the historic responsibility to gather, analyze and adopt the measures that can 

make that light shine brighter. 

Respectfully submitted on January 4, 2005 by, 

Fernando Morales 

2231 Wakerobin Ln. 

Reston Va 20191 

703-476-9878 

http://www.sballot.com/

cc: EAC Commissioners 

 EAC Juliet Thompson, General Counsel 

 David M. Thomas & Christopher A. Lopez of Representative Tom Davis’ office 

 Bob Dix & Ursula Wojciechowski of Representative Adam H. Putnam’s office 

 Matthew Petersen of Representative Robert Ney’s office 

 Paul Vinovich Staff Director Committee on House Administration