NIST IR 8401 (DRAFT)

Satellite Ground Segment: Applying the Cybersecurity 

Framework to Assure Satellite Command and Control

Jim McCarthy/ NIST

Joe Brule/ MITRE

06/16/2022
NISTIR 8401 Scope

• NISTIR 8401: Ground Segment

• Terminals

• Mission Operation Centers

• Payload Operation Centers

• Separate NISTIRs for Other Segments

• User Segment (NISTIR 8323)

• Update underway

• Space Vehicle (Draft NISTIR 8270)

• Resolving Comments Now
Background: Ground Segment Profile

• SPD 5, Protecting American Space Systems from Cyber 

Threats: “... directs U.S. Government agencies to work with commercial 

companies consistent with the principles in the SPD to further define best practices, 

establish cybersecurity informed norms, and promote improved cybersecurity 

behaviors throughout the Nation’s industrial base for space systems”

• Space Systems Center (SSC) Statement of Work;

“... In addition, SSC is seeking diversity of perspective especially with regards 

to our civilian user communities and their requirements and needs.”

 CSF Profile development enabled SSC to gain commercial 

perspective

o How does industry address cybersecurity issues?

o What is the residual risk to Commercial Space? 

 The resulting CSF Profile will help the commercial satellite industry 

improve their cybersecurity posture

 Greater Sector Security Contributes to Hosted Payload Risk Analysis
NISTIR 8401 Development

• SSC Statement of Work: 

• Collaborate with NIST NCCOE

• SSC GPS office provided FFRDC support

• Develop a Cyber Security Framework (CSF) 

Profile for Satellite Ground Systems

• The Approach

• NIST Hosts Workshop/Engage Industry 

• Solicit Participation in a “Community Of 

Interest”
Facilitating Cybersecurity Discussions
Identify: 

Asset Management Category

Subcategory Applicability to the ground segment References

ID.AM-1: Physical 

devices and systems 

within the 

organization are 

inventoried.

Document and maintain an inventory of the 

components to include cloud-based

resources that reflect the current system. 

Consider incorporating a configuration 

management tool that documents the 

physical location of all physical 

components and verify with physical 

inspections. During physical inspections, 

identify equipment and its physical 

interfaces. 

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 

CM-8, CM-9 PM-5 

NIST SP 800-160 Rev. 

1 2.3

ID.AM-2: Software 

platforms and 

applications within 

the organization are 

inventoried.

Document and maintain an inventory of 

software components to include virtual 

machine images, such as license 

information, version numbers for 

applications, software and operating 

systems. System software inventory is 

reviewed and updated as defined by the 

organization.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 

CM-8, PM-5

NIST SP 800-204C

 

 

 

Content of a Sector Level Profile

Category 

Subcategory 

Subcategory ID 

CSF language 

Guidance on how to apply the 

subcategory to the space ground 

segment

Specific references to 

provide insight on 

applying controls to 

achieve the desired 

outcomes.

Function 
Leveraging Industry

• NIST Hosted Multiple Workshops

• CSF Overview

• Introduce Ground Segment Profile 

• Solicit Participation in a “Community Of 

Interest”

• ‘Chatham House Rules’

• Draft Sections and resolve comments

Date Session Purpose

24 JUN 2021 Workshop Introduce the CSF to industry

23 SEP 2021 COI Meeting Front Matter

7 OCT 2021 COI Meeting Identify Function

21 OCT 2021 COI Meeting Protect Function

4 NOV 2021 COI Meeting Detect Function

18 NOV 2021 COI Meeting Respond and Recover Functions

18 NOV 2021 Deep Dive Remote access and cloud

22 NOV 2021 Deep Dive Ground Infrastructure as a 

service

2 DEC 2021 COI Meeting End-to-End Review

Industry Actively Participated in the Creation of this Profile. 
Community of Interest

• ~ 130 Members representing over thirty organizations

• Satellite Vendors, Operators, Government, Academia, 

• Consultants, Private Individuals, Cloud Service Providers
Key Finding: Movement to Cloud

• Virtualization 

• Virtual Machines and Environments

• Flexible, facilitates testing, system administration, recovery

• Permissions based on RBAC (vice access to specific hardware) 

• Challenges/ Considerations

• May need to augment authentication/ authorization 

• Device authentication 

• Hypervisor considerations such as VM escape

• Smaller satellite operators are more likely to adopt cloud based providers

• Cloud is most suitable for commodity hardware/ software. 

• Critical Satellite bus commands are still done from a dedicated SOC

• Requires aggressive monitoring to verify that all activity is authorized and within 

the terms of pre-defined agreements 

• Zero Trust, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence 

• Considered futuristic

• Being monitored 

• Not ready to adopt in the immediate future
Key Finding: Increased Decoupling of Segments

• Federated Infrastructure

• Fewer Dedicated Operations Centers

• Ground site as a service

• Distributed Antenna fields (queued commands) 

• Distributed Mission and Satellite Operation Centers

• Isolation of flows done in parallel (vice double encryption within tunnels) 

• Less Reliance on Physical Protection Measures

• Less reliance on Air Gapping

• External data flows (ex. planning, collision avoidance etc.) inhibited by air gapping. 

• More focus authentication mechanisms
Key Findings: CSF Functions (One of three)

• Identify 

• Payload Command Centers, Mission Operation Centers, Ground sites may be 

independent organizations or provided as a third-party service.

• Identification of roles, responsibilities, terms of service must be identified and 

agreed upon in advance on a case-by-case basis.

• Data Separation, access and authorization are determined in advance on a 

case-by-case basis.

• Multiple Organizations may interface with the satellite platform resulting in 

very complex authentication/ authorization interfaces.

• Protect

• Space uses custom software and hardware

• Legacy systems are not always suitable for highly interconnected cyber-ecosystem. 

• Additional considerations warranted for niche components

• Vendor support (for specialized components) require remote access for 

maintenance.
Key Findings: CSF Functions (Two of three)

• Detect: 

• Severe SWaP constraints of space vehicle will impact Ground Segment’s 

detection requirements

• Incumbent on Ground Segment to consider third party stakeholder’s (such as 

hosted payload) requirements and constraints

• Standards-based solutions for data formatting, and transmission facilitates 

interoperability, integration and sharing.

• Attributes such as criticality, sensitivity, tolerance to false positives etc. will vary amongst 

stakeholders. The setting and review of thresholds need to be agreed upon on a case-bycase basis in advance.

• Detection attributes are influenced by the risk assessment

• Include the continuous monitoring of the RF environment 

• Detection information is shared with stakeholders or regional organizations to facilitate 

collaboration 
Key Findings: CSF Functions (Three of three)

• Respond/ Recover

• Situational awareness is key for appropriate and timely response and 

recover

• Exchange information with external stakeholders and providers in 

accordance with pre-arranged agreements and thresholds is paramount to 

respond and recover

• The investigation of RFI may involve and in some cases require notification of 

external agencies. 

Space operations use custom software and hardware that did not necessarily consider the environment of a highly interconnected cyber-ecosystem. This can be especially problem 
Way Forward

• Current Profiles

• Ground Segment (Draft NISTIR 8401)

• Public comment period open until; 06/21/2022 

• Please submit comments to; pnt-eo@list.nist.gov

• Final document expected Q4 FY2022

• User Segment (NISTIR 8323 Rev. 1 Draft Upcoming)

• Release for public comment; June 2022

• Final document expected Q1 FY2023

• Space Vehicle (Draft NISTIR 8270)

• Comment period closed; 04/08/2022

• Comment adjudication underway and final document TBD

• Possible Future Profiles

• Launch Profile

• Transfer Profile 

• IMINT Profile

• Satellite Internet Service Provider Profile
Thank you!

Profile Links

• NISTIR 8401 (Draft), Satellite Ground Segment: Applying the Cybersecurity Framework | CSRC

• NISTIR 8323, Foundational PNT Profile | CSRC

• NISTIR 8270 (Draft), Intro to Cybersecurity for Commercial Satellite Operations | CSRC

Contact Information 

• pnt-eo@list.nist.gov

• Joseph.Brule@nist.gov

• Suzanne.Lightman@nist.gov

• James.McCarthy@nist.gov

• Matthew.Scholl@nist.gov