alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Emanuel Nugent v. Frank W. Foster and Wilder D. Stevens.

*Gift*— Evidence

“Where a man, who had been taking care of his mother, took away a broken stove and replaced it with a new one, saying to a third person that he wanted to have a good one there for his mother, it was-*held*that the statement, by itself, was insufficient evidence of a gift to her.

Error to Kent.

Submitted Oct. 12.

Decided Oct 31.

Trover. The case was tried by a justice of the peace’ without a jury and in the absence of any showing by defendants was decided in plaintiff’s favor. On appeal', there was testimony tending to show that Daniel Nugent had been working certain premises of which his mother, Mrs. Nugent, had a life-lease, and that he supported her ^ that he afterwards gave his brother Emanuel a certificate of the sale to him of all his personal property, and left the place, the understanding being that Emanuel was to occupy it; that sometime befoi’e, and while he was still on the place, he had bought a certain stove with money furnished him by Emanuel; and that some time after Daniel had gone away, dames, another brother sold the same stove to Wilder D. Stevens by his mother’s authority. Sarah Doyle, a granddaughter of Mrs. Nugent who had lived witli her from time to time, testified that a former stove which had been in use for several years had fallen down and was broken in the mother’s absence, and that Dan said he would bring it away or change it, — change it or buy a new one, — she didn’t remember which; he was to get a new one before grandma would come home; he said his intention was to exchange the stove and have a new one there when grandma came home, and she (the witness) told him he might patch up the old stove as he was going to stay there but a short time, and make it do; and he said he wanted to have a good stove *435there for grandma. She farther testified that he went away with the old stove and came back with another, and that she asked him if he had changed the stove and he said he could not change it but he got another. The justice’s judgment was affirmed. Defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

*ITughes, O'Brien & Smiley*for appellant

*Taggart c& Wolcott*for appellee.

Marston J.

This was an action of trover brought to recover the value of a cook-stove which the plaintiff claimed to have purchased from his brother, Daniel Nugent, and which the defendants claim to have acquired under a sale-from the mother of Daniel, to whom it is claimed the latter gave the stove.

We are of opinion that the case was very fairly submitted to the jury, and that the court was correct in saying that the conversation between Daniel and Sarah Doyle, standing alone, would not be sufficient evidence to show a gift of the stove by Daniel to his mother. We do not think it necessary in this case to examine the charge in detail for the purpose of pointing out the correctness of the same.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
10081.

#### Sikes *v.*Payton.

Luke, J.

1. Where the actual consideration of an unconditional promise to pay is not integrated in the instrument, its only recital as to consideration being the general phrase “for value received,” the general rule, that the real consideration is ordinarily a proper subject-matter of inquiry where the controversy is between the original parties, does not authorize the promisor, unless fraud, accident, or mistake exist, to plead that his unconditional obligation to pay was conditional upon the happening of contingencies; and such a plea, being fatally defective, was properly stricken on motion. *Hirsch*v. *Oliver,*91 *Ga.*554, 560 (18 S. E. 354); *Dinkler*v. *Baer,*92 *Ga.*432 (3) (17 S. E. 953) ; *Byrd*
      *722v. *Marietta Fertilizer Co.,*127 *Ga.*30 (56 S. E. 86) ; *Pryor v. Ludden,*134 *Ga.*288 (67 S. E. 654, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 267); *Daniels v. Smith,*144 *Ga.*561 (87 S. E. 774) ; *Rheney*v. *Anderson,*22 *Ga. App.*417 (96 S. E. 217); *Planters Bank v. Brown,*22*Ga. App. 495*(96 S. E. 328).

Decided May 13, 1919.

Appeal; from Tift superior court—Judge Eve. August 8, 1918.

*James H. Price,*for plaintiff in ertor.

*Fulwood & Hargett,*contra.

2. The ruling stated in the case of *Gibbs v. Fourth National Bank,*17 *Ga. App.*388 (87 S. E. 155), is abstractly correct, but is-not altogether applicable to the facts there 'stated; and in so far as- that case- conflicts with the ruling here made, it is overruled. -

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Jenkins, J.,concur.*
EXHIBIT 32

                 STRATFORD AMERICAN CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES


          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Stratford  American  Corporation and
Subsidiaries  ("the Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30,
2004 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof
(the "Report"),  we, Mel L. Shultz, President and Director of the Company, David
H. Eaton, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of the Company,  and
Daniel E. Matthews, Controller, Secretary and Treasurer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Mel L. Shultz
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mel L. Shultz, President and Director
November 15, 2004



/s/ David H. Eaton
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
David H. Eaton, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board
November 15, 2004



/s/ Daniel E. Matthews
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel E. Matthews, Controller, Secretary and Treasurer
November 15, 2004
#### THE STATE ex rel. WILSON, Collector, v. JOPLIN NATIONAL BANK, Appellant.

In Banc,

March 23, 1904.

TAXATION: Assessment Against Bank. The judgment in this case, which was for personal taxes assessed against a national hank, and not against its stockholders, is reversed on the authority *of*State ex rel. v. Bank, 180 Mo. 717.

Appeal'from Jasper Circuit Court. — *Eon. Jos. D.*Perkins, Judge.

Reversed.

ROBINSON, C. J.

Like the case of State ex rel. Wilson v. First National Bank of Carterville, 180 Mo. 717, this action was begun by the same plaintiff, as collector, to recover of this defendant, the Joplin National Bank, certain personal taxes, aggregating the sum of $3,212.26, with interest and penalties added, alleged to be due to the State and county for the years 1897 and 1901, assessed and levied against defendant on account of its shares of stock duly listed by defendant’s chief officer, and delivered to the assessor for taxation.

*5At the trial, before the circuit court, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and the case is brought here on defendant’s appeal. The questions involved in this case, as also the facts upon which it was determined, are in all essential particulars the same as in the case of the State ex rel. Wilson v. First National Bank of Carterville, supra. Upon the authority of that case,, and for the reasons given therein, the judgment rendered in this case should be reversed, and it is so ordered.

*Marshall, Gantt, Burgess, Valliant*and *Fox, JJ.,*concur; *Brace, J.,*dissents.
<PAGE>   1
                                   EXHIBIT 21

                         Subsidiaries of the Registrant

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                        STATE OR OTHER JURISDICTION OF           NAMES UNDER WHICH
SUBSIDIARY                              INCORPORATION OR ORGANIZATION         SUBSIDIARY DOES BUSINESS
----------                              ------------------------------        ------------------------
<S>                                             <C>                               <C>
Bingo Press & Specialty Limited                 Ontario, Canada                   Bazaar & Novelty

Video King Gaming Systems, Inc.                     Colorado                         Video King

Stuart Entertainment, G.A. de C.V.                   Mexico

Stuart Entertainment, Ltd.                             UK

S.E. International, Inc.                              Iowa
</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.2
 
 Agreement August 1, 2010 Jason Stroisch Executive Synergetics USA, Inc. Company
  Board
     Standard Compensation Due




---



##### 



Cause 2 provided however
 Change in Control
   2




---



##### 



Code
 Disability Disabled
 Exchange Act
 Involuntary Termination Status
Changes
 Person
 Term Term
 3




---



##### 



Termination of Employment
    4




---



##### 



No Mitigation
    Excess Parachute Payments
   5




---



##### 



Funding
 Assignment
 Notices
 To the Company:
    
    Synergetics USA, Inc.
3845 Corporate Centre Drive
OFallon, Missouri 63368
Attn:Chairman of the BoardTo Executive:
    
    Jason Stroisch
1760 Discovery Drive
Wentzville, MO 63385
  Provisions Severable
 Entire Agreement
 Not an Employment Agreement
 6




---



##### 



Amendments and Modifications
 Governing Law
   SYNERGETICS USA, INC.By:
    /s/ Robert H. DickName:
    Robert H. DickTitle:
    Chairman of the Board of DirectorsEXECUTIVE/s/ Jason StroischName:
    Jason Stroisch 7
Exhibit 32.2

      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Patriot Scientific Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended November 30, 2005, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and to which this Certification is an
exhibit (the "Report"), the undersigned officer of Patriot Scientific
Corporation does hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: January 23, 2006


                                        /s/ Thomas J. Sweeney
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Thomas J. Sweeney
                                        Chief Financial Officer
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2018

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 18 -00657- CR

BRODERICK RECHARD STOKES , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1384655

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Broderick Rechard Stokes pleaded guilty to burglary of a vehicle with intent to commit theft with two or more previous convictions

. Appellant and the State agreed appellant’s punishment would not exceed two years’ imprisonment

. O n May 2, 2013, the trial court sentenced appellant i n accordance with the terms of
his agreement with the State. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 24 , 2018

. We lack jurisdiction over this appea l for two reasons: the notice of appeal was not filed timely, and this is a plea bargain case with no appealable matters a nd2

appellant has not been granted permission to appeal.
First, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after sentence is imposed when the defendant has not filed a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements
of Rule 26 .2 is essential to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. Under those circumstances it can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. Id. Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed more than five years after sentence was imposed. Therefore, the appeal was not timely perfected, and we lack jurisdiction.
Second, in a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may appeal only matters raised by a written , pretrial motion or with the trial court’s permission. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
Appellant’s pun ishment do es not exceed the agreed length of confinement.
The rec ord does not contain any appealable pretrial rulings , and the trial court did not grant appellant permission to appeal.
Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby

. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
10877.

#### David *v.*The State.

Decided November 5, 1919.

Indictment for manufacture of intoxicating liquor; from Harris superior court—Judge Howard. July 26, 1919.

The instructions complained of in the motion for a new trial were as follows: “The burden is on the defendant to establish to the satisfaction of the jury that the alibi is true. If he does, he should be acquitted on this testimony alone. It is not necessary that he establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jurors are not "atisfied that an alibi has been established, you should not disregard any testimony introduced to support it, but you should consider this testimony alohg with the other testimony in the ease and the defendant’s statement, in arriving at a verdict in the case, *370and determine whether the defendant is guilty of any charge beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether he is not guilty, as contended by him.” It was contended that “said charge is confusing and misleading,” and it “places a burden on the defendant that the law does not impose upon him,—that is of establishing his alibi beyond a reasonable doubt.”

*369Luke, J.

1. The charge of the court upon the defense of alibi is not subject to the criticism urged against it. It was understandable, not confusing, and correctly charged upon this particular defense. See *Smith*v. *State,*3 *Ga. App.*803 (61 S. E. 737).

2. The evidence for the State, if believed by the jury, demanded the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge. This court can not set a verdict aside where the jury who sees and hears the witnesses give credit to one version rather than the other. The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, G. J., and Bloodicorth, J., eoneur.*

*370
      *George C.*Palmer, for plaintiff in error.

*C. F. McLaughlin, solicitor-general,*contra.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000837028
<NAME> TDX CORP.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         513,590
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  291,841
<ALLOWANCES>                                   158,000
<INVENTORY>                                    329,425
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,028,148
<PP&E>                                         973,057
<DEPRECIATION>                                 587,276
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,635,574
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,535,142
<BONDS>                                         89,753
<COMMON>                                        73,345
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     934,434
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,635,574
<SALES>                                      1,487,319
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,487,319
<CGS>                                          920,694
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,718,330
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,009
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (228,036)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,441
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (231,477)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Wendell T. BELL, Claimant-Appellant, v. Anthony J. PRINCIPI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7098.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Oct. 20, 2004.

ORDER

Pursuant to the Court’s letter dated September 23, 2004,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

This appeal is dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3942 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.3942

                       One Hundred Eighth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
           the twentieth day of January, two thousand and four

                                 An Act

 
To redesignate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 7 Commercial Boulevard in Middletown, Rhode Island, as the ``Rhode 
                 Island Veterans Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 7 
Commercial Boulevard in Middletown, Rhode Island, is hereby 
redesignated as the ``Rhode Island Veterans Post Office Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Rhode Island Veterans Post 
Office Building''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                                  CERTIFICATION


                    In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form
              10-Q/A (the "Report") of Lindsay Manufacturing Co. (the "Company")
              for the quarter ended May 31, 2003, I, Richard W. Parod, Chief
              Executive officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18
              U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
              Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

                    (1)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of
                           section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
                           of 1934; and

                    (2)    the information contained in the Report fairly
                           presents, in all material respects, the financial
                           condition and results of operations of the Company.

                      /s/ RICHARD W. PAROD
                      -------------------------------
                      President and Chief Executive Officer
                      Richard W. Parod

                      October 10, 2003

                    A signed original of this written statement required by
              Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained
              by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
              Commission or its staff upon request.








                                       24
Rev. 0127201

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

219 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE OF ATTORNEY ADDRESS OR NAME

1. Complete this form and e-file it, using the Notice of Change of Address event, in each

case that you list below.

2. Update your contact information in CM/ECF. Click HERE for update instructions.

Name

Firm

Street Address

City/State/Zip Code

Phone Number 

Email address

ARDC (Illinois State Bar members, only)

If you have previously filed an appearance with this court using a different name, enter that name. 

List all active cases in which you currently have an appearance on file.

Case Number Case Title Assigned Judge

_______________________________

Signature of Attorney 

2/8/2021

Date

Chief of Staff v. Hisox

Case: 1:20-cv-03169 Document #: 54 Filed: 02/08/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:950
1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please

2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 

3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated

4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does

5 not include the filing date. 

6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

7 SAL REY SALCIDO,

8 Petitioner-Appellee,

9 v. NO. 29,577

10 MARCELLA BACA-DORY,

11 formerly MARCELLA JOHNSON,

12 Respondent-Appellant.

13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY

14 Jane Shuler Gray, District Judge

15 Marek & Francis, P.A.

16 Jay Lynn Francis

17 Carlsbad, NM

18 for Appellee

19 Marcella Baca-Dory

20 Rio Rancho, NM

21 Pro Se Appellant

22 MEMORANDUM OPINION

23 WECHSLER, Judge.
2

1 Summary reversal in part and remand were proposed for the reasons stated in

2 the notice of proposed disposition. No memorandum opposing summary reversal in

3 part and remand has been filed, and the time for doing so has expired.

4 Reversed and remanded.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 _______________________________

7 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 

8 WE CONCUR:

9 _______________________________

10 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge

11 _______________________________

12 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge