* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30776 Summary Calendar

THERON CARR Plaintiff - Appellant v. MURPHY OIL USA INC Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:06-CV-1794
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-Appellant Theron Carr alleged claims of race discriminationunder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Louisiana law against DefendantAppellee Murphy Oil USA, Inc. Carr says that he was terminated from his employment with Murphy because he is African-American. The district court granted summary judgment to Murphy, holding that Carr had not made out a prima faciecase for discrimination. Carr now appeals. We affirm the judgment United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D February 12, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo.

2 of the district court because Carr has not shown that there is a disputed fact issue as to whether he was qualified for the position he held with Murphy. 1. We review the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment de novo
. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co. , 486 F.3d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 56(c). 2. To establish a prima faciecase ofdiscrimination on the basis ofrace or national original under TitleVII, Carr must showthat hewas: (1)
a member ofa protected class; (2) qualified for the position held; (3) subject toan adverse employment action; and (4) treated differently from others similarly situated. A barca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 2005). Because the standards governing Carr’s discrimination claim under Louisiana law are substantively similar to those governing his Title VII claim, the outcome ofCarr’s claimswill be the same under the federal and state statutes. McCoy
v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007). We therefore analyze the issues only under Title VII. 3. The district court held that Carr had not shown a material fact issue
as to whether he was qualified for thejob of Platform Operator, an essenti al element of Carr’s prima facie case under Title VII. We agree with this conclusion. After his hiring, as part of Murphy’s training program for newemployees Carr was required to complete classroom training and on-the-job training. After completing his classroom training, Carr was fired after he failed to show sufficient progress during his on-the-job training period. During this period, trainees are given written tests and walkthrough tests. After fourNo.

3 weeks of training, Carr had only passed one of the tests, with the minimum passing score of80% achieved on his second attempt, and he had failed four other tests. On one test, he received a 32%. Murphy says and Carr admits that the knowledge tested on these exams is essential for the Platform Operator position. In addition to failing these tests, there is e vidence that multiple supervisors thought Carr was having trouble grasping the knowledge necessary to perform his job. Carr says that no other trainee has been fired from Murphy for failing tests during the on-the-job training period. But he has not produced any evidence showing that trainees in the same po sition as Carr, with as many or as low failing scores, were not terminated. Furthermore, he has not presented any credible evidence showing that he was qual ified for the Platform Operator position. AFFIRMED.