Filed 7/2/20 (unmodified opn. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE

,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA

,

Defendant and Appella nt

. B2 97213 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA051184 )

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT*
It is ordered that the opinion filed June 10, 2020 be modified as

follows:

On page 4 , the foll owing language is a dded after the last sentence

of footnote 1 , ending with “additional contention.” : “ If, on remand, the
juvenile court transfers the case to criminal court, appellant will be able
to reassert this contention on appeal from the reinstateme nt of his

sentence. ”
The modification does not change the judgment.

_________________________________________________________ *MANELLA, P.J. WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.Filed 6/10/20 (unmodified opinion) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATIO N

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA,

Defendant and Appellant. B297213 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. N o. TA051184)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
X avier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,2

Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plain tiff and Respondent.

________________

______________________

INTRODUCTION In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old, and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Appel lant later successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence in light of an intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court. The trial court held a resentencing hearing and again imposed the LWOP term. On appeal, we re versed the new
sentence and remanded f or another resentencing in light of yet another intervening decision by the Supreme C ourt. At the second resentencing, the trial court again imposed the
LWOP sentence. In the interim, the electorate passed Propositi on 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabili tation Act of 2016.” Among other things, Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. ( People v. Superior Court ( Lara ) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 ( Lara ).) “Instead , they must commence the action in juv enile court. If the prosecution wishes to try the juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct .

. . a ‘transfer hearing’ to determine whether the matter should remain in3

juvenile court or be transferred to a dult court. Only if the juvenile cour t transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” ( Ibid .) The California Supreme Court has held that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to cases not yet final at the time i t was enacted. ( Lara, supra, at 304.) In this appeal, appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 because his judgment is not yet final. Respondent asserts that appellant is not
entitled to the benefit of the new law’s retr oactive application for two reasons. First, respondent argues that appellant’s judgment of conviction became final long before Proposition 57’s enactment, and his subsequent habeas and resentencing proceedings did not reopen its finality for purposes of t hat measure. Second, respondent conte nds that our Supreme Court’s holding in Lara concerning Proposition 57’s retroactive application does not apply to appellant
because he is now too old to benefit from rehabilitation as a juvenile. Because appellant’s original sentence was vacated and
his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57’s primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender’s sentence, we conclude that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on appellant as an ad ult, absent a transfer hearing. Regar dless of his current age, appellant fits within our Supreme Court’s holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse appellant’s sentence4

and reman d for appellant to receive a transfer hearing in the juvenile court. 1

BACKGROUND
In 1998, appellant was charged with first degree murder with special

- circumstance allegations and conspiracy
to commit murder. He committed the offenses that same year, whe n he was 16 years old

. He was tried a s an adult, following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be dealt with under juvenile court law. The following year, a jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the court imposed the then

- mandatory

sent ence of LWOP. On appeal, this court r eversed one of the special

- circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for review in 2001, and he did not petition for a writ of
certiorari. In 2014, appell ant filed a petition for a writ of hab eas corpus, seeking resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465, which held that mandatory LWOP sentences for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment’ s prohibition on cruel

1 App ellant also challenges his LWOP senten ce as unauthorized under Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (b)(4)

, which affords juveniles sentenced to an LWOP term an opportunity to parole after incarceration for 25 years. In light of our conditional reversal o f his sentence, we need not address th is additional contention.5

and unusual pun ishments. The trial court agreed appellant was entitled to resentencing, vacated appellant’s sentence, and following a resentencing hearing, again imposed the
LWOP term. While appellant’s appeal from his resentencin g was pending, the United States Supre me Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 718], which among other things, clarified its holding in
Miller v. Alabama . Because the trial court had exercised its resentencing discretion wit hout the guidance of Montgomery

,

we re versed and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 661, 674.) In 2019, on remand from this court, the trial court held a second resentencing hearing and onc e again sentenced appellant to LWOP. Appellant timely appealed. He contends that in light of Proposition 57, enacted after our opinion on appeal from his first resentencing, he is entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.

DISCUSSION
A. Governin g Principles

1. Proposition 57

At the tim e appellant was charged in 1998, “‘a child could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial
determination . . . that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’” ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 30 5.) Absent such a determination, “‘an y individual less than 186

years of age who violate[d] the criminal law [came] within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court

. . . . ’” ( Ibid. ) “Amendments to [the Welfare and Institutions Code] in 1999
and 2000 .

. . changed this historical rule. Under t he changes, in specified circumstances, prosecutors were permitted, and sometimes required, to file charges against a juvenile directly in criminal court, where the juvenile would be treated as an adult.” ( Lara

, supra , at 305.) In November 2016, voters pa ssed Proposition 57, again changing the procedure for charging juveniles. ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 303, 305.) According to the text of this measure, it was intended to “[s]top the revolving door of crime by emphasi zing rehabilitation, especially for ju veniles” and to “[r]equire a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court

. . . . ” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141, (2016 Voter Guide).) The voters mandated that
Pro position 57’s provisions be “broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, at § 5, p. 145.) “‘Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the
Welfare and Institutions Code so as to elim inate direct filing by prosecutors. C ertain categories of minors .

. . can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sop histication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be7

rehabilitated.’” 2 ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 305.) “Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” ( Id. at 303.)
W hile Proposition 57’s transfer hearing is similar in some respects to the fitness hearing conducted prior to the 1999 and 2000 amendments, there are key differences. Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or older who were accused of certain offenses, including murder, were subject

to a r ebuttable presumption that they were unfit for juvenile court treatment. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) No such presumption applies in transfer hearings under Proposition 57, and the People have the burden to sh ow that the juvenile should be treated as an adult. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a); Castillero

, supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at 398; J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 715.) In addition, in fitness hearings under prior law, a juvenile

cour t could retain jurisdiction over a juv enile age 16 or older accused of certain offenses, including murder, only if it found the individual suitable for juvenile court treatment under each of five criteria. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (c ) [cou rt must find juvenile suitable “under each and every one of the above criteria”].) In a transfer hearing under current law, the court must consider those five

2 Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.) further amended the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code ( People v. Castillero (2019) 33 Cal.A pp.5th 393, 399 ( Castillero )), but tho se changes are not relevant to this appeal.8

criteria, but has broad discretion in applying them , and need not find that all five support juv enile court treatment. (See
Welf. & I nst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3) [“the court shall consider the criteria specified”]; Castillero

, supra , at 398 [court has broad discretion to apply these statutory criteria].) 3 One Court of Appeal to consider the effect of Proposition 57 concluded that its primary benefit to juvenile defendants is in potentially affording them the dispositions rendered in juvenile court, rather than the generally much
more severe criminal sentences in adult court. 4 ( People v.

3 The five statutory criteria are: (1) “[ t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” which may include consideration of such factors as “the minor’s age , maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior,

. . . and the effect of the minor’s family and c ommunity environment and childhood tra uma on the minor’s criminal sophistication”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile c ourt to rehabilitate the minor” ; and (5) “ [t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.”

4 “‘There is no “sentence,” per se, in juvenile court. Rather, a judge can impose a wide variety of reh abilitation alternatives after conducting a “dispositional hearing,” which is equivalent to a sentencing hearing in a criminal court. [Citations.] In the more serious cases, a juvenile court can “commit” a minor to j uvenile hall or to the Division of Juv enile Justice (DJJ) .

. . . DJJ ( Fn. continued on the next page .)9

Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569, 612, ( Cervan tes ) disapproved on another ground in Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at
314

- 315.) Indeed, the court noted that “adult criminal sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being ‘tried in adult court.’” ( Cervantes

, supra , at 61 2.) Despite its conclusion that Propo sition 57 did not apply retroactively (a holding disapproved by Lara , as discussed below), Cervantes held that the purposes and features of Proposition 57 mandated that on remand for resentencing, a juvenile
offender c ould not be “‘sentenced in adult court ’” without a prior transfer hearing. ( Cervantes

, supra , at 612.)

2. Retroactive Application of Ameliorative
Statutes
Whether a statute operates retroactively or only prospectively is a matter of legislative intent. ( People v.
Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319.) In In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 ( Estrada ), our Supreme Court concluded that statutory amendments mitigating punishment for an offense applied retroactively to a petitioner who at the time of enactment, ha d committed the offense but had not ye t been

commitments can range from one year or less for nonserious offenses, and up to seven years for the most serious offenses, including murder. [Citation.] A minor committed to DJJ must

ge nerally be discharged no later than 23 years of age. [Citation.]’” ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 306

- 307.) Under certain circumstances, that discharge may be further delayed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1780, 1782.)10

convicted and sentenced. ( Id. at 742

- 743, 748.) The c ourt reasoned that when the Legislature makes an ameliorative change to criminal law, it must have determined the former law was too severe. ( Id. at 744

- 74 5.) As a result, absent
indications o f a contrary intent, “[i]t is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the

new statute

. . . should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” ( Id. at 745.) According t o the

c ourt, an ameliorative criminal statute may be constitutionally applied to acts committed before its passage, “provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” ( Ibid. ) Thus, under Estrada , absent indications of the legislati ve body’s contrary intent, courts pres ume it intended an ameliorative statute to apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments. (See ibid. ) Applying this rule in Lara , our Supreme Court concluded that Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative change to the criminal law. ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal .5th at 309.) Finding no contrary indications, it further concluded the voters intended Proposition 57 “‘to extend as broadly as possible.’” ( Lara

, supra , at 309

. ) Accordingly, the court held Proposition 57 applied retroactively to “all juveniles charge d directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the
time it was enacted.” 5 ( Lara

, at 304.) As discussed further

5 While Lara expressly addressed juveniles c harged directly in adult court, courts have held that its ruling extends equally to individuals who, like appellant, received a fitness hearing under the former law’s standards. ( Castillero

, supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at ( Fn. continued on the next page .)11

below, if, at a retroactive transfer hearing, the juvenile court
finds a defendant would have been fit for juvenile court
treatment, the defendant’s sentence must be reversed, and the juvenile court must then treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. ( Lara

, at 310, 313.)

3. Final Judgments

Under Estrada

, “[t]he key date [for retroactivity

pu rposes] is the date of final judgment.” ( Estrada

, supra , 63 Cal.2d at 744

. ) A retroactive ameliorative statute applies in a given case if it “becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes fin al .

. . .” ( Ibid. ) The c ourt did no t specify when a judgment becomes “final” for retroactivity purposes.
Several months before Estrada , however, the California Supreme Court discussed the finality of a judgment in In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 ( Spencer ). In ruling on a habeas petit ion raising federal constitutional challenges, the Spencer court noted the United States Supreme Court had defined the point of finality as “‘where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal ex hausted, and the time for petition for certiorari .

. . elapsed

. . . . ”’ ( Id. at 405, quoting Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622, fn. 5.) Finality therefore denoted

399; People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App .5th 316, 324

- 325 ( Garcia ).)12

“that point at which the courts can no longer provide a remedy to a defendant on direct review.” ( Spencer

, supra , at
405

. ) Our Supreme Court has since applied this definition of finality to the Estrada retroactivity rule, stating that an amendatory statute applies in “‘any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the superven ing legislation, has not yet
reached f

inal disposition in the highest court authorized to review it.’” ( People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 ( Rossi ), quoting Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230; accord, People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 3 06 [for purposes of
Estrada rule, “‘a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed’” (quoting People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5)].) This rule of finality is ea sy to apply in a typical case,
where a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced, the judgment is affirmed on appeal, a petition for review in the California Supreme Court is either denied or never filed, and a petition for certiorari in the United Sta tes Supreme Court
is likewise denied o r never filed. But questions have arisen as to how this rule applies in different procedural settings.
In People v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 96 ( Jackson ), a capital defendant’s judgment of death became final when he failed to seek certiorari. ( Id. at 9 7, 98.) In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the California Supreme Court
reversed his death sentence and remanded for a penalty retrial. ( Id. at 97.) The defendant was again sentenced to death, and in the auto matic appeal, sought to raise both13

gui lt

- phase and penalty

- phase claims based on Escobedo v. State of Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 ( Escobedo ), decided after his original judgment became final but before his penalty retrial. ( Jackson

, supra , at 98

- 99.) Be cause Escobedo applied retroactively o nly to judgments not yet final at the time it was decided ( In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372)

, our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s attempt to challenge his convictions based on that decision, noting that
it had reversed only the defendant’s deat h sentence: “ The scope of this retrial is a matter of state procedure under which the original judgment on the issue of guilt remains final during the retrial of the penalty issue and during all appellate proceedings reviewing the trial court’s decision o n that issue.” ( Jackson

, at 99; accord, People v. Kemp (1974) 10 Cal.3d 611, 614 (

Kemp ) [applying Jackson to preclude capital defendant’s Escobedo

- based challenge to his final judgment on guilt fo llowing penalty retri al].) 6 At the same

6 Our Su preme Court recently observed that “[i]n criminal actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘“sentence”’ are generally considered ‘synonymous’ [citation], and there is no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a sentence [citation]. ” ( People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5t h 40, 46 ( McKenzie ).) Jackson ’s distinction between the “judgment on the issue of guilt” and the “penalty” for purposes of finality appears to depart from that rule. ( Jackson

, supra , 67 Cal.2d at 99.) As we are awar e of no non

- capital case applying Jack son ’s rule, it is conceivable this distinction stems from the unique nature of capital trials, which are subject to bifurcated guilt and penalty phases. (See Phillips v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 1030, 1033, fn. 1 [describing Kemp and Jackson as hol ding “that a conviction under California’s ( Fn. continued on the next page .)14

time, however, the court agreed that the defendant could rely on Escobedo to challenge his new sentence , notwithstanding that his “conviction was final” before that case was decided. ( Jackson

, supra , at 100.)
Jackson therefore establ ished that a collateral proceeding may reopen the finality of a sentence for retroactivity purposes, even while the conviction remains
final. While Jackson involved the retroactivity of constitutional law, rather than an ameliorative statute, it applied t he same definition of finality later a pplied in Rossi

. (See Jackson

, supra , 67 Cal.2d at 98 [“A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct review are exhausted”], citing, inter alia, Spencer

, supra , 63 Cal.2d at 405.)

B. Analysis
Appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing
unde r Proposition 57, asserting its provisions apply retroactively to him. He maintains we should therefore conditionally reverse his judgment and refer the matter to the juvenile court. Appellant argues his judgment is not yet final because we reversed his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in 2016, and he is now appealing from

bifurcated process for adjudicating death penalty cases is a final judgment”].) Yet the interest in retaining the finality of convictions despite ongoing sentencing proceedin gs applies in other contexts as well. Because we conclude that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to appellant’s resentencing, we need not decide whether Jackson applies to non

- capital cases.15

that resentencing. Respondent counters that appellant’s judgment became final in 2001, when he originally exhausted direct appeal p rocedures. Respondent contends
the re opening of appellant’s sentencing following his successful habeas petition had no effect on the finality of his “judgment of conviction,” and therefore does not entitle him to the benefit of Proposition 57’s retroactiv e application. We begin with the sim ple observation that a ppellant’s sentence is not final: the superior court vacated his original sentence and resentenced him, we then reversed his new sentence and remanded for another resentencing, and appellant has taken this direct appeal from his seco nd resentencing. Because appellant’s sentence is still pending on direct appeal, his judgment is not final under our Supreme Court’s definition of finality for retroactivity purposes. (See Jackson

, supra , 67 Cal.2d a t 100 ; McKenzie

, supra , 9 Cal.5th at 4 6; Rossi

, supra , 18 Cal.3d at 304.) Respondent does not suggest that appellant’s sentence is entirely immune to challenges based on retroactive changes to the law. Instead, citing the Jackson / Kemp rule, respondent con tends that appellant’s judgment remain s final as to his conviction and all other matters not encompassed by his resentencing, including “pretrial proceedings under Proposition 57,” such that he may not benefit from that measure’s retroactive operation. We disagree. Assuming the rule establish ed in these capital cases applies in other contexts, it would not preclude appellant’s claim based on Proposition 57 because that measure affects16

his sentencing , independent of its potential effect on his
convictions. As the Cervantes court observed , a ju venile disposition is far more advantageous to the defendant than a criminal sentence for the same offense: indeed, “adult criminal sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being
‘tried in adult court

. . . . ’” ( Cer vant e s , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Based on the purposes underlying Proposition 57 and the substantially more severe consequences of sentencing in adult court for many juvenile felons, the court in Cervantes concluded that a juvenile felon may not be “‘sentenced in
adult court’” without a prior transfer hearing. ( Cervantes

, supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Thus, even before its ruling that Proposition 57 was not retroactive was disapproved in Lara, the Cervantes court recognized that a defendant may

not be resentenced on remand without a pr ior transfer hearing. ( Cervantes

, supra , at 612.) Lara left undisturbed
Cervantes ’s conclusion about Proposition 57’s application to sentencing.
In Lara itself, the c ourt stated that “[o]nly if the juvenile court tra nsfers the matter to adult court can t he juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 303.) Relying on this language, the court in People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 ( Ramirez )
held that on a limited remand for rese ntencing, “the trial

court was require d to consider the effect of Proposition 57 and issue any related orders,” thereby rejecting the People’s contention that the defendant’s request for a transfer17

hearing exceeded the scope of a limited remand. The
Ramir ez court explained that although it ha d remanded the defendants’ case for resentencing in light of intervening precedent, “the trial court had jurisdiction to consider any and all factors that would affect sentencing,” including Proposition 57. ( Ramirez

, supra , at 64

. ) Because Proposition 5 7’s primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender’s sentence, independent of the convictions, we conclude it applies retroactively to appellant’s nonfinal sentence and requires that he receive a
transfer hearin g. 7 (See Lara , s upra , 4 Cal.5th at 30 3;
Ramirez

, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at 64; Cervantes , s upra , 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Any resulting effect on appellant’s convictions would be a mere byproduct of his required treatment as a juvenile, should the juvenile court decide that
he would have been f

it for such treatment. (See Lara

, supra , at 306 [“‘there are no “conviction[s]” in juvenile court’”]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203 [“An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a con viction of a crime for any purpose”].) A juvenile court’s decision in a retroactive transfer hearing to treat the defendant as a juvenile does not disturb the jury’s findings; rather, the court
must treat the defendant’s convictions as juvenile

7 For similar reasons, we reject respondent’s contention th at appellant’s claim should be denied because it falls outside the scope of our prior limited remand for resentencing. (See Ramirez

, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at 64.)18

adjudicati ons and impose an appropriate disposit ion. (See Lara, supra , at 309

- 310, 313; see also id. at 309

- 310 [“‘Nothing is to be gained by having a “jurisdictional hearing,” or effectively a second trial, in the juvenile court’”].) And we see no reason why juve nile court treatment should open the j ury’s adjudications to challenge under new rules to which they would not otherwise be subject. Respondent argues that Lara ’s conclusion about Proposition 57’s retroactivity nevertheless does not apply to appellant beca use “ Lara considered the specific circ umstance of a defendant who had been charged but not sentenced.” Respondent maintains it is unlikely the voters intended the provisions of Proposition 57 to apply to those, like appellant,
far removed from their teena ge years and for whom treatment as a j uvenile would likely result in release from custody. These assertions, however, are at odds with our Supreme Court’s determination of the electorate’s intent

-- that Proposition 57 should apply retroactively to “all j uveniles charged directly in adult cou rt whose judgment was not yet final at the time it was enacted.” ( Lara, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 304.) It is not for us to say, at this time, whether appellant should be treated as a juvenile offender

-- only that our Sup reme Court’s pronouncement that Propos ition 57 should apply “as broadly as possible” encompasses appellant, regardless of his current age. ( Lara, supra , at 308; s ee Ramirez

, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at 60

- 61 [affirming referral for transfer hearing for defen dant who was 28 years old];
Garcia

, su

pra , 30 Cal.App.5th at 321, 330 [ordering transfer19

hearing for defendant who was over 40 years old].) Moreover, we see no reason why the juvenile court cannot adapt Proposition 57’s criteria to assess whether a person like appellant, who committed a crime as a minor but is now an adult, should or should not have been tried as an adult. (See Lara

, supra , at 313 [courts can implement retroactive transfer hearings “without undue difficulty,” and the potential complexity in providing such hearings “is no reas on to deny [them] ”].) Our conclusion that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to appellant’s sentence is consistent with our Supreme Court’s determination in Lara that the voters intended Proposition 57 “‘to extend as broadly as possible’” ( Lara

, supra , 4 Cal.5th at 309), i.e., “to every case to which it constitutionally could apply” ( Estrada

, supra , 63 Cal.2d at 745). Respondent offers no basis for concluding that this ameliorative amendment may not be applied cons titutionally to appellant’s sentence. Accordingly, we conclude appellant is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing under Proposition 57.20 DISPOSITION
In Lara , the c ourt approved the remedy one Court of Appeal had ordered for a juvenile defendant who had been
convicted and sentenced witho ut having received a transfer hearing. (See Lara

, supra , 4 Cal. 5th at 310, 313.) We afford appellant a similar remedy. Appellant’s sentence is conditionally reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court wit h directions to refer
the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing, to
determine if it would have transferred the case to adult criminal court had it originally been filed in juvenile court in
accordance with current law. If the juvenile court det ermines it would not have
transferred appellant to criminal court under current law, it shall treat appellant’s convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. If the juvenile court determines it would have transferred appella nt to adult criminal court, it shall t ransfer the case to criminal court, which shall then reinstate appellant’s sentence.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.