Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SCOTT L. BARNHART GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Keffer Barnhart LLP Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

CYNTHIA A. PLOUGHE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RYAN SCHONABAUM, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 82A04-1302-CR-44

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Carl A. Heldt, Judge

Cause No. 82C01-0002-CF-158

September 18, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
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Ryan Schonabaum appeals the fifty-year sentence imposed for two convictions of 

Class A felony child molesting.1 He asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider significant mitigators supported by the record and his sentence is inappropriate in 

light of his character and offense. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Between September and December of 1999, twenty-six-year-old Schonabaum 

performed oral sex on K.R. and C.R., both of whom were under the age of fourteen. He pled 

guilty to two counts of Class A felony child molesting pursuant to an agreement that 

provided his sentences would be served concurrently. The court accepted his plea and 

entered the convictions. After the sentencing hearing, the court found no mitigating factors, 

but found the following aggravators:

[D]efendant has a history of criminal activity. Specifically he has a felony 

conviction for Child Molesting . . . and the Court finds great significance that 

he was just released from probation September 1999, the same month that he 

committed the instant offense. The Court also believes that any sort of a 

reduced sentence in this case would depreciate the seriousness of the crime and 

the . . . and he’s obviously in need of a long period of incarceration, primarily 

to protect other children from him.

(Tr. at 18.) Based thereon, the court entered two fifty-year sentences and ordered them 

served concurrently.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

1. Abuse of Discretion

When the trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory range, we review for an 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
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abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g

875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We may reverse a decision that is “clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1985)).

Our review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing includes an 

examination of its reasons for imposing the sentence. Id. “This necessarily requires a 

statement of facts, in some detail, which are peculiar to the particular defendant and the 

crime . . . [and] such facts must have support in the record.” Id. The trial court is not 

required to find mitigating factors or give them the same weight the defendant does. Flickner 

v. State, 908 N.E.2d 270, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). However, a court abuses its discretion if 

it does not consider significant mitigators “clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Once aggravators and mitigators have been 

identified, the trial court has no obligation to weigh those factors. Id.

Schonabaum first asserts the court should have found his guilty plea a mitigator. “An 

allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the 

defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is not only supported by the record but 

also that the mitigating evidence is significant.” Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. A “guilty 

plea may not be significantly mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant’s 

acceptance of responsibility, or when the defendant receives a significant benefit in return for 

the plea.” Id. 
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Schonabaum’s guilty plea provided his sentences would be served concurrently, which 

reduced his possible sentence from one hundred years to fifty years. Schonabaum admitted 

the crimes in a taped statement given after he waived his rights. He suggested to the officer 

preparing the presentence investigation report that his eight-year-old victim had some 

responsibility for her molestation because she was “coming on to him.” (App. Vol. II at 20.) 

Under these circumstances, as Schonabaum’s plea was pragmatic and brought him a great 

benefit, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to mention the plea 

as a mitigator. See Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221 (concluding court did not abuse its 

discretion by omitting reference to a plea when evidence against defendant was 

“overwhelming” and defendant received the benefit of dismissed charges and a reduced 

sentence). 

Next, Schonabaum alleges the court “erred when it failed to recognize [his] difficult 

childhood and prior experience as a molestation victim as significant mitigating factors.” 

(Br. of Appellant at 5.) He asserts he should be seen as “less culpable” because “he was 

around the age of the victims in this case when he was molested himself.” (Id.) We note 

Schonabaum did not testify at trial or submit any documentary evidence to support these 

allegations. Rather, the only reference to them in the record is in the unsworn statements he 

gave for the presentence investigation report. (App. Vol. II at 23, 27.) We are inclined to 

agree with the State, which asserts Schonabaum’s molestation as a child, rather than being a 

mitigator, means he was “in a position to understand intimately the harm that child molesting 

causes victims.” (Br. of Appellee at 6.) Nevertheless, as our Indiana Supreme Court has 
5

“held that evidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight,” 

Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013), we cannot hold the trial abused its 

discretion by overlooking this proposed mitigator. 

2. Inappropriateness

We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender. Williams v. State, 891 N.E. 2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 

(citing Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found 

by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. Roney v. State, 872 

N.E.2d 192, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The appellant bears the burden of 

demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 

2006).

When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point 

to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. The advisory 

sentence for a Class A felony is thirty years, with a range of twenty to fifty years. Ind. Code § 

35-50-2-4. Schonabaum was sentenced to fifty years for each conviction; however his plea 

agreement’s requirement that the sentences be ordered served concurrently reduced his 

possible sentence from one hundred years to fifty years. Schonabaum’s offenses involved 

two different girls, one eight years old and one seven years old. 

When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s 

criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The 

significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character varies based on the 
6

gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id.

Schonabaum’s criminal history included convictions in 1995 of one count of Class C felony 

child molesting and one count of Class D felony child molesting. Schonabaum was released 

from four years of probation for those convictions on September 1, 1999, which is the same 

month he began committing the molestations underlying the charges herein. According to 

the presentence investigation report, Schonabaum claimed he began fondling the eight-year 

old because she “was coming on to him,” (App. Vol. II at 20), by “leaning against him while 

he was showing her how to run a program on his computer.” (Id.) Based on his criminal 

history, his commission of these crimes immediately upon completing probation, and his 

suggestion an eight-year-old girl wanted to engage in sexual activity with him, we cannot say 

his fifty-year sentence is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Schonabaum, nor is his 

sentence inappropriate based on his character and the nature of the offense. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.