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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SUZANNE P.*

(AC 43859)

Suarez, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted on a plea of guilty of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs as a second offender,

the defendant appealed to this court following the trial court’s denial

of her motion to modify a condition of her probation. As part of the

plea agreement, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to each of two

unrelated charges against the defendant, for breach of the peace in the

second degree and criminal trespass in the first degree. The breach of

the peace charge arose from an incident between the defendant and

her boyfriend, L, and the criminal trespass charge arose from an incident

in which the defendant trespassed on the property of her former husband, R, and their two children. As part of the defendant’s sentence,

the court imposed a special condition of probation, in which it ordered

that the defendant have no contact with the ‘‘domestic violence complainants.’’ After the commencement of her probationary period, the

defendant filed a motion, requesting that the no contact condition be

modified to delete the phrase ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ and to

replace it with language that specifically referenced only L and R. After

a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed

to this court. Held:

1. The trial court’s determination that the special condition prohibited the

defendant from having any contact with her children was not improper:

although the trial court’s oral pronouncement that the defendant have

no contact with the ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ was ambiguous,

its clarification that the phrase was meant to include the defendant’s

children was not manifestly unreasonable, because, even though criminal trespass is not a domestic violence crime, it was clear that the court

intended the phrase ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ to include those

affected by the defendant’s criminal trespass in addition to the victim

of the breach of the peace, L, and, although the children were not direct

complainants in the criminal trespass charge, the terms ‘‘complainant’’

and ‘‘victim’’ may be used interchangeably in criminal proceedings, the

defendant did not challenge the fact that R, who was also the victim of

criminal trespass, was included in the no contact order, and, if the trial

court had intended the order to apply only to L, it would have used the

singular term ‘‘complainant’’ instead of the plural term ‘‘complainants’’;

moreover, the issue of no contact with the children was before the

court at the defendant’s sentencing hearing, as, during that hearing, R

specifically requested that the defendant be prohibited from contacting

him and the children and defense counsel argued that, if a no contact

order were to be imposed, it should not apply to the children.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motion for modification:

a. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that her

right to procedural due process was violated because she was not provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the

no contact condition, the defendant having failed to establish a violation

of a constitutional right under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233): the trial

court was not required to canvass the defendant regarding the special

condition of probation under the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-19)

because the condition was not a direct consequence of the plea; moreover, at the sentencing hearing, R specifically and repeatedly requested

that the defendant have no contact with him and the children and the

defendant was provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the

issue; furthermore, the defendant did not move to withdraw her plea

even though she was aware, prior to the imposition of the sentence, that

a special condition of probation prohibiting contact with the children

was before the trial court.

b. The defendant’s constitutional right to substantive due process was

not violated because the special condition of probation did not violate
her fundamental right to parent her children, as the condition did not

reach further than was necessary to protect the children’s safety: the

no contact condition furthered a valid objective of probation because it

sought to protect the safety of the children as members of the public;

moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s taking

into consideration the emotional and mental health safety of the defendant’s children when fashioning its special conditions of probation was

an appropriate extension of State v. Ortiz (83 Conn. App. 142), in which

a no contact order was imposed to protect the physical safety of the

defendant’s children, as there was ample indication in the record of

emotional harm, and the no contact order focused on the emotional

well-being of the children.

Argued May 19—officially released November 9, 2021

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime

of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence

of intoxicating liquor or drugs and with the infraction of

failure to display lights while operating a motor vehicle,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Hartford, geographical area number fourteen, where

the defendant was presented to the court, Baio, J., on

a plea of guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs as a second

offender; judgment of guilty in accordance with the

plea; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as

to the infraction of failure to display lights; subsequently, the court, Baio, J., denied the defendant’s

motion to modify a special condition of her probation,

and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Daniel J. Krisch, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Kevin M. Black, Jr., former certified legal intern, with

whom were Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s

attorney, and, on the brief, Sharmese A. Walcott, state’s

attorney, and Mark Brodsky, former senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Suzanne P., appeals

from the judgment of the trial court denying her

amended motion to modify a special condition of her

probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the

court improperly (1) determined that the special condition prohibited her from having any contact with her

children, and (2) denied her amended motion for modification despite the fact that the special condition prohibiting contact with her children violates her right to due

process. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant. On July 6, 2018, the defendant pleaded guilty to

operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence

of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General

Statutes § 14-227a as a second offender. As part of the

plea agreement, the defendant also admitted to having

violated the terms of her probation. Her pleas were part

of a global resolution in which the following charges

were nolled: breach of the peace in the second degree

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-107 and failure to display lights while operating

a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-

96a (a). The breach of the peace charge arose from an

incident involving the defendant and her boyfriend, L.

The criminal trespass charge involved an incident in

which the defendant, after having been warned not to

trespass at the residence of her former husband, R,

and their two children, left on the front porch of that

residence a gift bag containing photographs and a note

indicating that she would like to see their children.

After canvassing the defendant, the court found that

the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and

accepted the plea. The state recommended two years

of incarceration, execution suspended after one year,

with three years of probation. The state urged the court

to order as a special condition of probation that the

defendant have no contact with L. The court ordered

a presentence investigation report (PSI), continued the

matter for sentencing and noted that the defendant had

the right to argue for a lesser sentence.

At the August 31, 2018 sentencing hearing, the issue

of no contact with the defendant’s children was raised.

When invited to provide a victim statement to the court,

R stated, ‘‘[W]ith a long history of [the defendant’s]

insobriety, my children and I would just like a no contact.’’1 The defendant noted her struggles with sobriety

and expressed her desire not to force herself on her

children. She explained, ‘‘Clearly alcohol has destroyed

and taken away a lot of good things in my life. . . . I

am a chronic relapser . . . . I just can’t lose anymore.

The worst of all of it is the time with my children.’’

The court noted the defendant’s history of unsuccessful

attempts at sobriety and the loss of contact with her
children. The court sentenced the defendant to two

years of incarceration, execution suspended after one

year, and three years of probation. One of the special

conditions of probation ordered by the court was that

the defendant have ‘‘no contact with the domestic violence complainants.’’2 The court further stated that,

after the defendant had completed four months of probation, she may file a motion to modify and ‘‘show that

there has been justification to address the issue of no

contact . . . .’’3

Before the defendant began probation, she filed a

motion to modify the no contact condition as to L, with

whom she planned to reside following her release. At

a January 18, 2019 hearing, the court denied the motion

and clarified that the no contact order prohibited contact with L and the defendant’s family.

The defendant’s probationary period began on May

13, 2019. The relevant written special condition of her

probation provided that she have ‘‘[n]o contact with

victim(s)/complainant(s) [L], [R] or [the] victim’s/complainant’s family.’’ The defendant filed a motion, dated

July 29, 2019, for clarification and modification of the

no contact special condition, in which she requested

the court to clarify that the no contact condition of her

probation did not apply to her children. In the motion,

the defendant argued that R had prevented her from

having visitation with her children as a result of the no

contact special condition, despite the fact that, pursuant

to a divorce settlement, the defendant and R shared

joint legal custody of the children, aged thirteen and

sixteen, who reside with R. The court denied the motion

without prejudice because R, who had made it ‘‘abundantly clear that he did not want contact for himself

or his children,’’ was not provided notice of the hearing.

The defendant then filed an ‘‘amended motion to modify

condition of probation,’’ dated November 13, 2019, in

which she sought to ‘‘modify the ‘no contact’ condition

of [her] probation by specifically deleting the condition

of ‘no contact with the domestic violence complainants’

and substitute [it] with ‘no contact with [L] and the

defendant’s ex-husband [R], with the exception that

[she] be permitted to have communication with [R] for

the specific purposes of discussing the educational,

financial, and health related needs of her minor children.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) In her motion, the defendant contended that prohibiting her from contacting

her children while on probation conflicted with the

court’s oral pronouncement of her sentence and violated her constitutional right to due process.

At the November 15, 2019 hearing on the defendant’s

amended motion to modify, defense counsel stated that

the defendant is ‘‘minimally . . . seeking clarification

. . . .’’ Counsel representing R and his children stated

that they did not want contact with the defendant at

this time and elaborated that the children ‘‘have suffered
deep wounds because of their mother’s behavior and

. . . they are going through recovery just as their

mother is going through recovery . . . .’’ R requested

that the court ‘‘uphold the no contact for myself and

my children at this time.’’ The court stated that, because

the therapist of the older child ‘‘is here, essentially, in

a representative role for those children, I will allow a

brief comment . . . .’’ The therapist stated that the

child was seeking stability and is not interested in having visitation with the defendant and that it was not in

the best interest of the child to force her to have contact

with the defendant. The court stated that ‘‘there’s a

family court matter going on. Clearly there are going

to be issues happening over there. . . . If the parties

come back and say that there’s no opposition to modification, the court will hear the motion.’’ The court concluded that the no contact special condition pertained

to the children and noted that, ‘‘[i]f we were here today

with the domestic violence victim and/or counsel on

their behalf saying that there was no opposition and

that they wanted contact, the court’s order would be

very different.’’ At the conclusion of the hearing, the

court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

On November 19, 2020, the court issued an articulation of its denial of the defendant’s amended motion

to modify in response to a motion for articulation filed

by the defendant.4 Additional facts will be set forth as

necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

determined that the special condition prohibited her

from having any contact with her children. She argues

that the court’s oral pronouncement, made at the time of

sentencing, that she have ‘‘no contact with the domestic

violence complainants,’’ is unambiguous and conflicts

with the written memorialization of that special condition, which provides that the defendant have ‘‘[n]o contact with victim(s)/complainant(s) [L], [R] or [the] victim’s/complainant’s family.’’ We are not persuaded that

the court’s determination was improper.

We note, preliminarily, that the court’s oral pronouncement of the special condition controls and not

the written memorialization of the oral pronouncement.

‘‘[B]ecause the sentence in a criminal case generally is

imposed orally in open court . . . the written order or

judgment memorializing that sentence, including any

portion pertaining to probation, must conform to the

court’s oral pronouncement.’’ (Citation omitted.) State

v. Denya, 294 Conn. 516, 529, 986 A.2d 260 (2010). ‘‘Consequently, as a general matter, any discrepancy between

the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written

order or judgment will be resolved in favor of the court’s

oral pronouncement.’’ Id., 531.

Whether the defendant’s criminal trespass is an act
of family violence under General Statutes § 46b-38a is

not the issue presented to us in this appeal. The court

apparently considered the trespass to be a domestic

violence crime, but the issue in this appeal is whether

the court used the term ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ to include the children.5 The court’s use of the

plural term ‘‘complainants’’ indicates that it intended

to include more persons than L in the order. It, however,

is ambiguous as to whether the term ‘‘complainants’’

includes, in addition to L, only R or R and the children.

In light of this ambiguity, we next consider whether the

court properly determined that the no contact condition

applied to the defendant’s children.

‘‘In order to determine whether the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment or impermissibly modified or altered the substantive terms of the

judgment, we must first construe the trial court’s judgment. It is well established that the construction of a

judgment presents a question of law over which we

exercise plenary review. . . . In construing a trial

court’s judgment, [t]he determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may

involve the circumstances surrounding the making of

the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which

is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.

. . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . In addition . . . because

the trial judge who issues the order that is the subject

of subsequent clarification is familiar with the entire

record and, of course, with the order itself, that judge

is in the best position to clarify any ambiguity in the

order. For that reason, substantial deference is

accorded to a court’s interpretation of its own order.

. . . Accordingly, we will not disturb a trial court’s

clarification of an ambiguity in its own order unless

the court’s interpretation of that order is manifestly

unreasonable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bauer v. Bauer, 308 Conn. 124, 131–32,

60 A.3d 950 (2013).

‘‘[T]he purpose of a clarification is to take a prior

statement, decision or order and make it easier to

understand. Motions for clarification, therefore, may be

appropriate where there is an ambiguous term in a

judgment or decision . . . but, not where the movant’s

request would cause a substantive change in the

existing decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Light v. Grimes, 136 Conn. App. 161, 169, 43 A.3d 808,

cert. denied, 305 Conn. 926, 47 A.3d 885 (2012).

At the November 15, 2019 hearing on the defendant’s

amended motion to modify, the court clarified that ‘‘the

transcript was clear, that the hearing was clear, and

that the sentence was clear that the no contact [condition] with the domestic violence victims and conditions

imposed included no contact with the children.’’ In its
articulation of the denial of the defendant’s amended

motion to modify, the court stated: ‘‘At the time of

sentencing, the defendant’s ex-husband, [R], expressed

. . . that he and his children wanted no contact with

the defendant . . . and not[ed] that they can no longer

handle the defendant’s ongoing alcohol abuse. The

defendant herself acknowledged her issues and that

she would not force herself on her children. The court

considered the effect on those closest to the defendant

of her history of alcohol abuse and noncompliance with

court orders.’’

The defendant disagrees with the court’s clarification

that the defendant’s children are included within the

phrase ‘‘domestic violence complainants.’’ She argues

that R was the sole complainant in the criminal trespass

case and, furthermore, that criminal trespass is not a

domestic violence crime. In criminal proceedings,

‘‘complainant’’ is often used in place of ‘‘victim.’’ See,

e.g., State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 369–70 and n.7,

897 A.2d 569 (2006). The interchangeable use of these

terms does not render the court’s clarification manifestly unreasonable simply because the children did not

directly complain of the criminal trespass but did so

indirectly through R. We are also not persuaded by the

defendant’s argument that the children are not included

as ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ because criminal

trespass is not a domestic violence crime. If so, then

R would be eliminated from the no contact order, and

the defendant does not challenge on appeal that the

special condition applied to R. It is clear that the court

intended the phrase ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’

to include those affected by the criminal trespass in

addition to the victim/complainant of the breach of the

peace, L. Finally, had the court intended the phrase to

apply to L only, then it would have used the singular

rather than the plural form of ‘‘complainants.’’6

Moreover, the issue of no contact with the children

was before the court at the sentencing hearing.

Although the state’s recommendation at the sentencing

hearing that the defendant have no contact with the

‘‘domestic violence victims’’ was unclear, the state, after

making that recommendation, directed the court’s

attention to R, who had requested to be heard. R, who

was a direct victim of the criminal trespass charge,

stated that ‘‘my family and I are done with her not being

sober,’’ and requested ‘‘no contact with myself and my

children and no drive-bys by my house and my street.

. . . [M]y children and I are done looking behind our

shoulder.’’ Although the driving while intoxicated

charge to which the defendant pleaded guilty did not

involve the children, the criminal trespass charge,

which involved the children, was part of the global plea

agreement. Further demonstrating that the issue was

before the court at the sentencing hearing, defense

counsel argued that the no contact order should not

apply to the children.
In light of the issues raised at the sentencing hearing,

we conclude that the court’s November 15, 2019 clarification that the phrase ‘‘domestic violence complainants’’ includes the defendant’s children is not manifestly

unreasonable.7 See Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 308 Conn.

131–32 (‘‘ ‘we will not disturb a trial court’s clarification

of an ambiguity . . . unless the court’s interpretation

. . . is manifestly unreasonable’ ’’). Accordingly, we

defer to the court’s clarification of the no contact special condition of the defendant’s probation.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

denied her amended motion to modify because the special condition prohibiting contact with her children violates her rights to (1) procedural due process and (2)

substantive due process. We address each claim in turn.

We first set forth the following general principles.

‘‘Probation is the product of statute. . . . Statutes

authorizing probation, while setting parameters for

doing so, have been very often construed to give the

court broad discretion in imposing conditions. . . .

[General Statutes §] 53a-30 (c) authorizes a court to

modify the terms of probation for good cause. . . . It

is well settled that the denial of a motion to modify

probation will be upheld so long as the trial court did

not abuse its discretion. . . . On appeal, a defendant

bears a heavy burden because every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness

of the court’s ruling. . . . The mere fact that the denial

of a motion to modify probation leaves a defendant

facing . . . strict conditions is not an abuse of discretion. Rather, [r]eversal is required only where an abuse

of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to

have been done.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Baldwin, 183 Conn. App. 167,

174–75, 191 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 922, 194

A.3d 288 (2018). Section 53a-30 (c) provides in relevant

part that, ‘‘[a]t any time during the period of probation

or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good

cause shown, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions, whether originally imposed by the court under

this section or otherwise . . . .’’

A

The defendant argues that she ‘‘did not have notice

that the [special no contact] condition would bar her

from contacting her children for three years.’’ She contends that the court failed to canvass her as to the

no contact special condition of her probation prior to

accepting her guilty plea.8 The defendant did not raise

these specific arguments in her amended motion to

modify or at argument on that motion and seeks review

to prevail pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,

567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Under Golding, ‘‘a
defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error

not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the

alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional

magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;

(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in

original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 239–

40, as modified by In re Yasiel R., supra, 781. The record

is adequate for review and the claim, which alleges a

violation of a fundamental right, namely, the right to

family integrity, is of constitutional magnitude. See

State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 162–63, 848 A.2d

1246, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915, 853 A.2d 530 (2004).

Accordingly, we review the claim under the third prong

of Golding to determine whether the alleged constitutional violation exists.9

There is no requirement that a trial court canvass a

defendant regarding the consequences of her plea that

are not direct consequences, which include the items

listed in Practice Book § 39-19.10 See State v. Faraday,

268 Conn. 174, 201–202, 842 A.2d 567 (2004) (Practice

Book § 39-19 defines scope of constitutional mandate

that defendant be advised of all direct consequences

of plea). The no contact special condition of probation,

which is not listed in § 39-19, is not a direct consequence

of the plea. In the unusual circumstances of the present

case, however, another set of procedural safeguards is

implicated. ‘‘[A] parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children . . . . Therefore, a parent

may not be deprived of his or her fundamental liberty

interest without being afforded procedural due process.

See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34,

96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Garvey v. Valencis,

177 Conn. App. 578, 593 n.5, 173 A.3d 51 (2017). ‘‘[F]or

more than a century the central meaning of procedural

due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are

to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order

that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.

. . . It is equally fundamental that the right to notice

and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Merkel v. Hill, 189 Conn.

App. 779, 786, 207 A.3d 1115 (2019). ‘‘The due process

clause demands that an individual be afforded adequate

notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard when

the government deprives her of a protected liberty interest. . . . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation

demands.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Garvey v. Valencis, supra,
593.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates

that the defendant had notice that the issue of no contact with her children was before the court and had

an opportunity to be heard. To provide context to the

court’s oral ruling, we note that, at the plea hearing,

the court had informed the defendant that ‘‘we’ll delay

the sentencing subject to coming back here to see what

the PSI demonstrates and hear[ing] arguments on sentencing.’’ One such argument at the sentencing hearing

was made by R, a victim of the criminal trespass charge.

Practice Book § 43-10 (2) provides that ‘‘[t]he judicial

authority shall allow the victim and any other person

directly harmed by the commission of the crime a reasonable opportunity to make, orally or in writing, a

statement with regard to the sentence to be imposed.’’

In his statement regarding the sentence to be imposed,

R specifically and repeatedly requested that the defendant have no contact with him and the children.

After R made these requests at the sentencing hearing, the defendant was provided with a meaningful

opportunity to address the issue. The defendant

addressed the issue of contact with her children and

stated that she realizes that her daughter ‘‘is very upset

about this and I’m not going to push myself on them

. . . .’’ Defense counsel was provided the opportunity

to discuss the no contact condition prior to sentencing.

He stated that the defendant wants to ‘‘live a healthy

lifestyle . . . free from drinking where she can serve

as a proper parent to her children,’’ and ‘‘resume . . .

healthy relationships with her family . . . .’’ He specifically requested that ‘‘the court impose a no contact

order except as to the children through a third, mutually

agreed party for obvious reasons that relate to my client’s sincere desire that as soon as she is alcohol free,

she has some chance of resuming a proper relationship

with her children.’’

Accordingly, the defendant was aware prior to the

imposition of the sentence that the possibility of a special condition of probation prohibiting contact with her

children was before the court, and defense counsel had

a meaningful opportunity to argue that the no contact

special condition should not include the defendant’s

children. Despite this opportunity, the defendant did

not move to withdraw her plea or otherwise challenge

the validity of her plea. For the foregoing reasons, we

conclude that the defendant’s right to notice and an

opportunity to be heard was not violated. As a result,

the defendant’s claim fails under the third prong of

Golding because the defendant failed to establish a

violation of a constitutional right.

B

The defendant next argues that her right to substantive due process was violated when the court denied
her amended motion to modify because the no contact

special condition prohibiting her ‘‘from contacting her

children for three years violates her ‘fundamental liberty interest’ as a parent.’’11 We are not persuaded.

‘‘The standard of review for the denial of a motion

to modify probation is well established. . . . Section

53a-30 (c) authorizes a court to modify the terms of

probation for good cause. . . . It is well settled that the

denial of a motion to modify probation will be upheld

so long as the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

. . . On appeal, a defendant bears a heavy burden

because every reasonable presumption should be given

in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . .

The mere fact that the denial of a motion to modify

probation leaves a defendant facing a lengthy probationary period with strict conditions is not an abuse of

discretion. Rather, [r]eversal is required only where

an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice

appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Njoku, 202 Conn. App. 491, 496–97,

246 A.3d 33 (2021). ‘‘In view of the nature and goals of

probation, however, and because any number of probationary conditions or combinations thereof are likely

to be suitable in any particular case, the trial court has

an exceptional degree of flexibility in determining [the]

terms [of probation] . . . and we therefore review

those terms for abuse of discretion only.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Imperiale, 337 Conn. 694, 707, 255 A.3d 825 (2021).

‘‘When sentencing a defendant to probation, a trial

court has broad discretion to impose conditions. . . .

Nevertheless, this discretion is not unlimited, as statutory and constitutional constraints must be observed.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) State v. Graham,

33 Conn. App. 432, 447, 636 A.2d 852, cert. denied,

229 Conn. 906, 640 A.2d 117 (1994). ‘‘[I]n determining

whether a condition of probation impinges unduly [on] a

constitutional right [in any particular case], a reviewing

court should evaluate the condition to ensure that it is

reasonably related to the purposes of [probation]. . . .

Consideration of three factors is required to determine

whether [such] a reasonable relationship exists: (1) the

purposes sought to be served by [the] probation[ary]

[condition]; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights

enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to

probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law

enforcement.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Imperiale, supra, 337 Conn.

708; see also State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 167–73, 540

A.2d 679 (1988) (court did not abuse its discretion in

modifying terms of probation under § 53a-30 to include

urinalysis testing, which defendant claimed was unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his fourth

and fourteenth amendment rights under federal constitution).
One valid objective of probation is ‘‘ ‘to preserve the

public’s safety.’ ’’ State v. Ortiz, supra, 83 Conn. App.

164. We conclude that the no contact condition of the

defendant’s probation furthers that objective because

it protects her children as members of the public. See

id., 166 (protecting defendant’s children as members of

public serves goal of probation). In the present case,

the court stated in its articulation that ‘‘the condition

of no contact was warranted and proper based on the

danger the defendant posed to those close to her as a

consequence of her criminal history, multiple convictions for operating under the influence, her long-standing substance abuse and history of noncompliance with

conditions of probation, including those related to substance abuse treatment.’’

Although no evidentiary hearing was conducted

regarding the effect of the defendant’s attempt to contact the children by leaving a gift and note on R’s front

porch after having been warned not to trespass, there

were detailed comments from R regarding the effect

that the defendant’s history of insobriety and prior

unwanted attempts at contact had on the children.

‘‘[D]ue process does not require that information considered by the trial judge prior to sentencing meet the

same high procedural standard as evidence introduced

at trial. Rather, judges may consider a wide variety of

information. . . . [T]he trial court may consider

responsible unsworn or out-of-court information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person’s life and circumstance. . . . It is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing judge

may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,

and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information

he may consider or the source from which it may come.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz,

supra, 83 Conn. App. 165.

The defendant claims that the condition unconstitutionally infringes on her right to parent her children.

The condition of probation restricts parental rights and,

thus, interferes with the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Therefore, we apply an additional layer

of scrutiny to this restriction. ‘‘[C]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are

among associational rights [the United States Supreme

Court] has ranked as of basic importance in our society

. . . rights sheltered by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment

against the [s]tate’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard,

or disrespect. . . . A prohibition on contact with one’s

children affects the defendant’s associational rights.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 165–66. Even when a court is warranted in severely

restricting the defendant’s contact with her children in

furtherance of the goal of probation to protect them as

members of the public, ‘‘that restriction should not

reach further than is reasonably necessary for the pres-
ervation of the children’s safety.’’ Id., 166.

In Ortiz, the defendant was convicted, inter alia, of

kidnapping and assaulting the victim, with whom the

defendant had three children. Id., 144–45. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor told the court that the

victim had provided detailed accounts of the defendant’s abuse of the children, including an incident in

which he put a sock and tape over the mouth of his

one year old child to stop the baby from crying and

another occasion on which he allegedly shook another

baby, which resulted in brain damage. Id., 164–65. The

defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty

years of incarceration, execution suspended after

twenty years, and five years of probation with one of

the conditions of probation being that he have no contact with his three children until they reach eighteen

years of age. Id., 144, 161. The defendant claimed on

appeal that the condition of no contact with his children

was illegal. Id., 161. This court concluded that, ‘‘[i]n

light of the information the court had before it at sentencing, the court was warranted in its concern of not

just protecting the victim, but also her offspring. However, the defendant also attacks the breadth of the

order, which proscribes all contact with his children.

. . . A strict application of the court’s order appears

to prohibit the defendant from sending even a birthday

card to his children. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how

such mail contact could jeopardize their safety. We

conclude that a blanket prohibition of all such contact

with the children is violative of the defendant’s constitutional rights.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)

Id., 165–66. Accordingly, this court reversed the order

only insofar as the no contact provision prohibited mail

contact. Id., 166.

In the present case, the defendant argues that there

was no indication that her misconduct had harmed her

children. She contends that her children were not in

the car with her when she was driving under the influence and that the criminal trespass charge simply

involves her having left a gift bag on R’s porch. The

charges and the harm stemmed from the defendant’s

actions in leaving a note for the children on R’s porch,

after having been warned not to trespass. Ortiz requires

that a condition prohibiting contact with a defendant’s

children be reasonably necessary for the preservation

of the children’s ‘‘safety’’ but does not indicate whether

that is restricted only to physical safety. Id.

We are persuaded that the trial court’s taking into

consideration the emotional and mental health safety

of the children when fashioning its special conditions

of probation is, under the circumstances of the present

case, an appropriate extension of Ortiz. In the present

case, it is undisputed that the defendant’s criminal conduct, which victimized her children, arose out of and

was intertwined with her alcohol abuse. It was reason-
able for the court, in imposing its special conditions of

probation, to take measures to protect the children from

the defendant’s intoxicated behavior. Moreover, it was

reasonable for the court to infer that intoxicated behavior could cause emotional injury to the children even

if did not occur in the children’s presence. The notion

that the defendant be able to resume contact with her

children once she is capable of having a healthy relationship with her family was raised by the defendant herself

as well as by her counsel at the sentencing hearing.

The defendant, appearing to recognize the harm caused

to her children, stated that she was ‘‘sick of disappointing everybody including myself,’’ and that she did not

want to ‘‘push’’ herself on her children or ‘‘bombard’’

them. Her counsel, also appearing to recognize the role

that alcohol abuse had played in damaging the emotional bond between the defendant and her children,

stated that it is ‘‘my client’s sincere desire that as soon

as she is alcohol free, she has some chance of resuming

a proper relationship with her children.’’ The court

crafted a special condition of probation that took into

account the defendant’s desire not to ‘‘bombard’’ the

children and to have the chance to resume a healthy

relationship with her children.

Moreover, there is ample indication in the record of

emotional harm. At the sentencing hearing, R stated

that he and the children are ‘‘done’’ with the defendant

‘‘not being sober . . . .’’ At the hearing on the defendant’s amended motion to modify, counsel for R and

the children stated that the children had suffered ‘‘deep

wounds’’ and are ‘‘going through recovery . . . .’’ R

further explained at that hearing that the last visit the

children had with the defendant was in December, 2014,

that the children did not want contact with the defendant and that they ‘‘feel [as] though . . . they can’t

really go to places such as the mall or to the center

with their friends because they don’t want to be looking

behind their shoulder.’’ In its articulation, the court

noted that R had expressed both directly and through

a letter that the children ‘‘can no longer handle the

defendant’s ongoing alcohol abuse.’’ The therapist of

the older child stated that ‘‘this is an ongoing issue

. . . [the child] is at this point not interested in having

visitation.’’ These circumstances are significantly distinguishable from the circumstances of Ortiz. In Ortiz, the

condition prohibiting all contact with the defendant’s

children until they reach the age of eighteen violated his

constitutional rights because there was no information

before the court that mail contact would jeopardize the

safety of the children. State v. Ortiz, supra, 83 Conn.

App. 166. In the present case, based on the information

before the court, the no contact order reasonably

focused on the emotional well-being of the children.

Because the special condition does not reach further

than reasonably necessary to protect the children’s

safety; see id., 163–66; the defendant’s constitutional
right to parent was not violated. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion for modification.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of domestic violence, we decline to identify the defendant, the

victims, or others through whom the victims’ identity may be ascertained.

See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 L requested that the protective order be removed, which request the

state opposed.

2 Special conditions of probation are conditions aside from the standard

conditions of probation that apply to all probationers. See, e.g., State v.

Johnson, 75 Conn. App. 643, 646 n.3, 817 A.2d 708 (2003).

3 Although the court expressly stated at the sentencing proceeding that

the defendant could move to modify the special condition upon a showing

of a justification for doing so, the defendant’s amended motion to modify

alleged no such justification.

4 The defendant filed a motion for articulation on July 17, 2020, seeking

an articulation from the trial court of its reasons for denying her amended

motion to modify. Following the court’s denial of the motion for articulation,

the defendant filed in this court a motion for review of the denial of her

motion for articulation. This court granted the defendant’s motion for review

but denied the relief requested therein and further ordered, sua sponte, that

the court ‘‘articulate whether it considered the defendant’s claim, raised in

her November 13, 2019 ‘amended motion to modify condition of probation’

that the no contact order with her children resulted in the termination of

her parental rights for three years without due process, in violation of both

the Connecticut and United States constitutions, and, if so, to state the factual

and legal basis for its decision concerning this claim.’’ In its articulation,

the court explained the basis for its imposition of a no contact order as to

the children, which included the defendant’s multiple violations of protective

orders, failure to comply with probation requirements and the protection

of those closest to the defendant.

5 At the August 21, 2019 hearing on the defendant’s July 29, 2019 motion

for clarification and modification, the court stated that the fact that the

criminal trespass charge involving R was part of a global agreement in which

that charge was nolled ‘‘doesn’t diminish [R’s] right to be considered as a

domestic violence victim.’’

6 Moreover, at the August 21, 2019 hearing on the defendant’s July 29,

2019 motion for clarification and modification, the court referred to R as a

domestic violence victim and stated that ‘‘it was expressly noted on the

record and the state’s attorney noted the docket number in which [R] was

a domestic violence victim,’’ which was the docket number for the criminal

trespass charge.

7 We reject the defendant’s alternative argument that ‘‘the court’s refusal

to modify the written conditions of probation to conform to its actual

sentence is plain error.’’ The defendant cannot prevail under this doctrine

unless she ‘‘demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so

harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest

injustice.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Jackson, 178 Conn. App. 16, 20, 173 A.3d 974 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn.

998, 176 A.3d 557 (2018). Because we conclude that the court’s clarification

was not manifestly unreasonable, the defendant has not demonstrated any

error, much less plain error.

8 The defendant also argues that she ‘‘lacked fair warning that the state

could revoke her probation for noncriminal activity.’’ See, e.g., State v.

Boseman, 87 Conn. App. 9, 17, 863 A.2d 704 (2004) (‘‘Where noncriminal

activity forms the basis for the revocation of probation, due process requires

specific knowledge that the behavior involved is proscribed. [W]here the

proscribed acts are not criminal, due process mandates that the [probationer]

cannot be subject[ed] to a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he

is given prior fair warning.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.

denied, 272 Conn. 923, 867 A.2d 838 (2005). Because the defendant’s probation has not been revoked, the requirement of fair warning of the conditions

of probation prior to a revocation of probation has no application here.

9 There has been no challenge on appeal to the trial court’s jurisdiction

to entertain the procedural due process claim raised by the defendant. We,
however, note that ‘‘once a defendant’s sentence is executed, the trial court

lacks jurisdiction to entertain any claims regarding the validity of that plea

in the absence of a statute or rule of practice to the contrary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Monge, 165 Conn. App. 36, 42, 138 A.3d

450, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924, 138 A.3d 284 (2016). Section 53a-30 (c),

which grants a trial court postsentencing jurisdiction to modify or enlarge

conditions of probation for ‘‘good cause,’’ is one such exception. We further

note that the trial court, which has broad discretion in administering probation, would have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s unpreserved due

process claim, and, therefore, we consider the claim. See State v. Obas, 320

Conn. 426, 431, 440–48, 130 A.3d 252 (2016) (reviewing state’s claim that

defendant was precluded from seeking exemption from sex offender registration, which he had raised in motion to modify probation, because he had

entered into plea agreement with state); State v. Crouch, 105 Conn. App.

693, 694, 939 A.2d 632 (2008) (reviewing claim that trial court improperly

added condition of probation in violation of terms of plea agreement and

in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to due process); State v.

Thorp, 57 Conn. App. 112, 114, 747 A.2d 537 (reviewing claim that trial

court improperly imposed more restrictive conditions of probation without

permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea when it granted state’s § 53a30 (c) motion to modify), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 913, 754 A.2d 162 (2000).

10 Practice Book § 39-19 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority shall not accept

the plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining

that he or she fully understands: (1) The nature of the charge to which the

plea is offered; (2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any; (3) The fact

that the statute for the particular offense does not permit the sentence to

be suspended; (4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge, including,

if there are several charges, the maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences and including, when applicable, the fact that a different or

additional punishment may be authorized by reason of a previous conviction;

and (5) The fact that he or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist

in that plea if it has already been made, and the fact that he or she has the

right to be tried by a jury or a judge and that at that trial the defendant has

the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses against him or her, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate

himself or herself.’’

11 This substantive due process claim concerns the ongoing conditions of

supervision of the defendant while she is on probation. The trial court

has jurisdiction to entertain such a claim in the context of a motion for

modification pursuant to § 53a-30 (c), which encompasses the ongoing supervision of the probationer. See State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 170, 540 A.2d

679 (1988).