70268 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 2014 / Notices 

Washington, DC 20591; Telephone (202) 

267–8442. 

Discussion: Pursuant to 14 CFR 

120.109(b), the FAA Administrator’s 

decision on whether to change the 

minimum annual random drug testing 

rate is based on the reported random 

drug test positive rate for the entire 

aviation industry. If the reported 

random drug test positive rate is less 

than 1.00%, the Administrator may 

continue the minimum random drug 

testing rate at 25%. In 2013, the random 

drug test positive rate was 0.485%. 

Therefore, the minimum random drug 

testing rate will remain at 25% for 

calendar year 2015. 

Similarly, 14 CFR 120.217(c), requires 

the decision on the minimum annual 

random alcohol testing rate to be based 

on the random alcohol test violation 

rate. If the violation rate remains less 

than 0.50%, the Administrator may 

continue the minimum random alcohol 

testing rate at 10%. In 2013, the random 

alcohol test violation rate was 0.091%. 

Therefore, the minimum random 

alcohol testing rate will remain at 10% 

for calendar year 2015. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: If you 

have questions about how the annual 

random testing percentage rates are 

determined please refer to the Code of 

Federal Regulations Title 14, section 

120.109(b) (for drug testing), and 

120.217(c) (for alcohol testing). 

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 

13, 2014. 

James R. Fraser, 

Federal Air Surgeon. 

[FR Doc. 2014–27829 Filed 11–24–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[Safety Advisory 2014–02] 

Roadway Worker Authority Limits— 

Importance of Clear Communication, 

Compliance With Applicable Rules and 

Procedures, and Ensuring That 

Appropriate Safety Redundancies Are 

in Place in the Event of 

Miscommunication or Error 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. 

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety 

Advisory 2014–02 to reemphasize the 

importance of clear communication and 

compliance with applicable rules and 

procedures regarding roadway worker 

authority limits on controlled track. 

FRA believes it is necessary to issue this 

advisory in light of the 

miscommunication or error involved in 

recent roadway worker incidents that 

occurred at locations that were either 

outside of authority limits or within 

authority limits that were no longer 

protected due to dispatcher error. This 

safety advisory recommends that 

railroads monitor their employees for 

compliance with existing applicable 

rules and procedures and that they also 

examine their train dispatching systems, 

rules, and procedures to ensure that 

appropriate safety redundancies are in 

place in the event of miscommunication 

or error. In addition, this safety advisory 

recommends that if a railroad 

determines that appropriate safety 

redundancies are not in place, the 

railroad should adopt electronic 

technology that would provide 

appropriate safety redundancies, and 

adopt certain interim safety measures 

and procedures at least until such 

technology is in place. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Kenneth Rusk, Staff Director, Track 

Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 

493–6236; or Anna Nassif Winkle, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 

493–6166. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

FRA is concerned about the 

infrequent, but repetitive incidents 

involving roadway workers being struck 

or nearly struck by trains that appear to 

be due to miscommunication or error 

regarding the roadway workers’ 

authority limits or location in relation to 

the authority limits. This safety advisory 

discusses six such incidents, three of 

which resulted in four employee 

fatalities. However, there have been 

other close-call incidents involving 

similar circumstances that did not result 

in fatalities but further highlight the 

need for this safety advisory. 

Information regarding some of the 

incidents discussed below is based on 

FRA’s preliminary findings and the 

respective railroad’s reporting to date. 

The probable causes and contributing 

factors, if any, have not yet been 

established for all of these incidents and 

nothing in this safety advisory is 

intended to attribute a cause to these 

incidents, or place responsibility for 

these incidents on the acts or omissions 

of any person or entity. 

The following is a summary of the 

circumstances involved in each of the 

incidents: 

In November 2013, a BNSF Railway 

Co. (BNSF) lead welder was killed when 

his welding truck collided with an 

eastbound freight train on a single main 

track at a location that was outside of 

his roadway work group’s limits of 

authority. It appears from FRA’s 

preliminary investigation that the twoman work group set on the track at a 

location outside of their authority limits 

after the workers disagreed regarding 

the extent of the authority limits and 

after not being able to quickly resolve 

the discrepancy because the screen 

displaying their authority was not 

visible at the time they set on the track. 

The foreman was apparently attempting 

to ‘‘wake up’’ the computer screen as 

the operator was setting their vehicle on 

and operating over the track, rather than 

remaining clear of the track until the 

discrepancy could be resolved, as 

required by the railroad’s good faith 

challenge procedures. 

In May 2013, a Metro-North 

Commuter Railroad Co. (Metro-North) 

track foreman was struck and killed by 

a passenger train in Danbury, 

Connecticut, after a student dispatcher 

prematurely removed the control signal 

blocking devices that had been 

established for the track foreman’s work 

group, and cleared the signal for the 

passenger train. Investigation by FRA 

and the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) determined that the 

student dispatcher assumed that the 

foreman no longer needed the main 

track after the dispatcher had lined the 

foreman-piloted locomotive crane into 

an out-of-service track. Several weeks 

prior to this incident, a very similar 

incident occurred on the same railroad. 

However, in that situation, the roadway 

worker detected the advancing train 

movement in sufficient time to move 

away from the track and avoid being 

struck by the train. 

In May 2013, a CSX Transportation, 

Inc. (CSX) hi-rail vehicle collided with 

a CSX train while traveling southward 

on the CSX Florence Division, Charlotte 

Subdivision. The hi-rail was operating 

under an EC–1 authority (a form of 

exclusive track occupancy), but was 

struck when it encountered the 

northbound CSX train at milepost (MP) 

340.52. This location was approximately 

one and one-quarter miles outside of the 

authority limits the track inspector 

operating the vehicle had requested and 

was granted (i.e., from MP 339.1 to MP 

339.3). FRA’s investigation also 

determined that in requesting authority 

from the dispatcher, the track inspector 

stated his location as MP 339.5, which 


wreier-aviles on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 2014 / Notices 70269 

1The incident that occurred in January 2007 in 

Woburn, Massachusetts, resulted in three NTSB 

Safety Recommendations to FRA, two of which are 

addressed, or partially addressed, in this safety 

advisory. Safety Recommendation R–08–05 

recommended that FRA ‘‘[a]dvise railroads of the 

need to examine their train dispatching systems and 

procedures to ensure that appropriate safety 

redundancies are in place for establishing 

protection and preventing undesired removal of 

protection for roadway workers receiving track 

occupancy authority,’’ and Safety Recommendation 

R–08–06 recommended that FRA ‘‘[r]equire 

redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for 

maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on 

the train dispatcher to provide signal protection.’’ 

Although this safety advisory adopts Safety 

Recommendation R–08–05 and recommends safety 

redundancies in general that would also seemingly 

address the recommendation in R–08–05, it does 

not recommend a position on shunting, as FRA has 

specifically invited comment on this issue from the 

railroad industry and other interested parties in a 

notice of proposed rulemaking on Railroad 

Workplace Safety; Roadway Worker Protection 

Miscellaneous Revisions (see 77 FR 50324, Aug. 20, 

2012), and that issue will be addressed in the final 

rule. 

was approximately two-tenths of a mile 

outside of the authority limits he 

requested; however, neither the 

dispatcher nor the operator caught that 

the initial point of entry was outside of 

the authority limits being requested 

during the radio transmission of the 

authority. In addition, when the track 

inspector completed his work, he had 

planned on exiting at the same point 

that he had entered the track, but 

decided that the highway traffic at the 

crossing at that location was too heavy 

to safely take off the hi-rail, so he 

continued south, thinking that he could 

exit the track at the crossing located at 

MP 340.88, but was struck in a curve 

before reaching that crossing. The track 

inspector received minor injuries from 

the head-on collision, and no train crew 

injuries were reported. 

In April 2013, a Metro-North roadway 

work group in a hi-rail truck mistakenly 

reported to the dispatcher that they 

were in the clear, south of an 

interlocking. However, FRA’s 

investigation determined that the truck 

was in fact still inside the limits of the 

interlocking. Minutes later, a commuter 

train struck and destroyed the vehicle. 

The occupants vacated the vehicle 

seconds before it was struck, and there 

were no injuries to the employees or the 

passengers. 

In March 2013, a Kansas City 

Southern Railway Co. (KCS) hi-rail 

vehicle operating northward on KCS’ 

Shreveport Subdivision collided with 

the side of a BNSF freight train that was 

operating on Union Pacific Railroad Co. 

track through a KCS interlocking at 

Texarkana, Texas. FRA’s investigation 

determined that the KCS section 

foreman that was operating the hi-rail 

vehicle had been looking for potential 

washouts after heavy rains, and 

indicated to FRA that he attempted to 

stop his hi-rail vehicle short of the 

interlocking after realizing his close 

proximity, but failed to do so due to wet 

rail conditions. The KCS hi-rail truck 

entered the limits of the interlocking 

(outside of his limits of authority) and 

collided with the 74th and 75th cars in 

the BNSF train that was operating on 

signal indication through the 

interlocking. The collision resulted in 

significant damage to the hi-rail vehicle, 

and minimal damage to the rolling 

stock. The section foreman was not 

injured. 

In January 2007, a Massachusetts Bay 

Commuter Railroad Co., LLC dispatcher 

prematurely lifted an exclusive track 

occupancy that was providing on-track 

safety for a roadway work group in 

Woburn, Massachusetts, and a 

commuter train struck and killed two 

roadway workers in the group and 

seriously injured two others. The track 

gang had a valid Form D, Line 4 (a form 

of exclusive track occupancy) with a 

main track out of service. Just prior to 

the incident, a hi-rail vehicle asked for 

and received permission from the 

roadway worker in charge (RWIC) of the 

authority limits to enter the out-ofservice area. When the hi-rail vehicle 

cleared the authority limits, the operator 

of the hi-rail broadcast this information 

via a radio communication. 

Investigation by FRA and the NTSB 

determined that the dispatcher lifted the 

blocking devices after having accepted 

that communication as the track gang 

foreman having cleared the limits, 

rather than the operator of the hi-rail 

vehicle having cleared the limits. FRA 

notes this incident in particular, since it 

gave rise to NTSB safety 

recommendations, as discussed in 

footnote 1. 

The above incidents represent the 

various types of errors that can occur by 

various employees in establishing, 

removing, or adhering to roadway 

worker authority limits, and highlight 

the importance of clear communication 

and the need for railroads to monitor 

their employees for compliance with 

existing applicable rules and 

procedures. In addition, the range of 

possible errors also highlights the need 

for railroads to examine their train 

dispatching systems, rules, and 

procedures to ensure that appropriate 

safety redundancies 1 are in place in the 

event that an employee fails to comply 

with such rules and procedures. 

FRA believes that the probability of 

the incidents described above occurring 

could be significantly reduced by 

installation of Positive Train Control 

(PTC). Until such time that PTC is 

implemented, and for locations where 

PTC is not required, FRA recommends 

that railroads adopt one or more 

electronic technologies that may serve 

to fill the technology gap. Examples of 

such technology already in use include 

the following systems: 

• Enhanced Employee Protection 

System—With this system, when an 

RWIC secures a track authority, he or 

she is provided a code via a beeper-like 

device that is not provided to the 

dispatcher issuing the authority. The 

system is designed so that the 

dispatcher cannot remove the blocking 

devices that are preventing the clearing 

of the absolute signal until the RWIC 

provides him or her with the issued 

code. Thus, the dispatcher cannot 

remove the associated on-track safety 

provided by the authority without the 

knowledge and agreement of the RWIC. 

This system is currently in use on a 

northeastern commuter railroad. 

• Hi-Rail Limits Compliance 

System—This system relies upon a 

global positioning system location 

transponder that is mounted in a hi-rail 

or roadway maintenance machine and 

linked to the dispatching office. When 

the vehicle or machine is operated 

within a mile of the authority limits, the 

operator will be alerted via a yellow 

warning light on the transponder. When 

the vehicle or machine is operated 

within one-half mile of the authority 

limits, the operator will be alerted via a 

yellow flashing light on the 

transponder. If the operator operates the 

vehicle or machine outside of his or her 

authority limits or sets on a main track 

for which he or she does not have 

authority, the operator will be alerted 

via a red warning light and the 

dispatcher is immediately notified as 

well, so that appropriate action can be 

taken. This system is currently in use on 

a number of subdivisions of a Class 1 

railroad. 

• Train Approach Warning System 

(TAWS)—For this system, an electronic 

alerter device is utilized at interlockings 

to detect an approaching train on any 

track and provide both visual and 

audible indicators to roadway workers 

via a personal beeper device on their 

person and at their bungalow, once the 

system is activated. This on-track safety 

system has been utilized under FRA 

waiver by a major Class 1 railroad at 

selected interlockings since 2001. 

Recommended Action 

In light of the miscommunication or 

error involved in roadway worker 

incidents that have occurred at locations 

that were either outside of the 

respective roadway workers’ authority 

limits or within authority limits that 


wreier-aviles on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
70270 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 2014 / Notices 

were no longer protected due to 

dispatcher error, FRA recommends that 

railroads take the following actions to 

promote the safety of roadway workers: 

1. Increase monitoring of their 

employees for compliance with existing 

applicable rules and procedures, 

particularly those involving the 

establishment, removal, or verification 

of track authority, and good faith 

challenges. 

2. Examine their train dispatching 

systems, rules, and procedures to ensure 

that appropriate safety redundancies are 

in place. 

3. If a railroad determines that 

appropriate safety redundancies are not 

in place, adopt electronic technology 

that would provide appropriate safety 

redundancies. At least until such 

technology is in place, and as an 

immediate first step to the adoption of 

such technology, railroads should— 

a. Stress the importance of 

dispatchers being advised of the work 

plans by the RWIC when securing track 

occupancy authority; 

b. Forbid student dispatchers by 

general order or bulletin from removing 

blocking devices until confirmation is 

received by the dispatcher providing 

supervision; and 

c. Require student dispatchers to 

secure confirmation from the 

supervising dispatcher prior to the 

removal of blocking devices. 

d. With regard to inadvertent and 

unauthorized hi-rail movement outside 

the limits of authority, instruct roadway 

workers that prior to passing any 

absolute signal, a roadway worker 

should verify the limits of his or her 

authority as follows: 

i. For roadway workers traveling with 

other occupants in a vehicle, verify the 

limits with another occupant within the 

vehicle by verbally reviewing the 

authority; 

ii. For roadway workers acting in the 

capacity of a lone worker (or otherwise 

traveling alone in a vehicle that is the 

first vehicle in the roadway work group 

to pass the absolute signal), announce 

over the radio the location and intent to 

pass the absolute signal; and 

iii. In either case, if the roadway 

worker or roadway work group is 

relying upon an electronic authority, 

and the electronic device displaying 

that authority malfunctions, the 

roadway worker must either secure a 

hard copy of the authority or vacate the 

track until he or she can verify the 

authority. 

FRA encourages railroads to take 

actions that are consistent with the 

preceding recommendations and to take 

other actions to help ensure the safety 

of the Nation’s railroad employees and 

the general public. FRA may modify this 

Safety Advisory 2014–02, issue 

additional safety advisories, or take 

other appropriate actions it deems 

necessary to ensure the highest level of 

safety on the Nation’s railroads, 

including pursuing other corrective 

measures under its rail safety authority. 

Robert C. Lauby, 

Associate Administrator for Safety and Chief 

Safety Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2014–27955 Filed 11–21–14; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Maritime Administration 

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Board 

of Visitors Notice of Meeting 

AGENCY: Maritime Administration, DOT. 

ACTION: Meeting notice. 

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act of 

1972 (5 U.S.C., Appendix, as amended), 

the Government in Sunshine Act of 

1976 (5 U.S.C. 552b, as amended) and 

41 CFR 102–3.150, The U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Maritime 

Administration (MARAD) announces 

that the following U.S. Merchant Marine 

Academy (‘‘Academy’’) Board of 

Visitors (BoV) meeting will take place: 

1. Date: December 8, 2014. 

2. Time: 1000. Members of the public 

wishing to attend the meeting will need 

to show photo identification in order to 

gain access to the meeting location. 

3. Location: The Crabtree Room of the 

Library on the Academy campus, Kings 

Point, New York. 

4. Purpose of the Meeting: The 

purpose of this meeting is to update 

BoV members on Academy issues, and 

for the BoV to review the progress of 

ongoing capital and maintenance 

improvements. 

5. Public Access to the Meeting: 

Pursuant to the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 552b and 41 

CFR 102–3.140 through 102–3.165) and 

the availability of space, this meeting is 

open to the public. Seating is on a firstcome basis. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The 

BoV’s Designated Federal Officer or 

Point of Contact is Brian Blower; 202 

366–2765; Brian.Blower@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Any 

member of the public is permitted to file 

a written statement with the Academy 

BoV. Written statements should be sent 

to the Designated Federal Officer at: 

Brian Blower; 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., 

W28–313, Washington, DC 20590 or via 

email at Brian.Blower@dot.gov. Please 

contact the Designated Federal Officer 

for information on submitting comments 

via fax. Written statements must be 

received no later than three working 

days prior to the next meeting in order 

to provide time for member 

consideration. By rule, no member of 

the public attending open meetings will 

be allowed to present questions from the 

floor or speak to any issue under 

consideration by the BoV. 

Authority: 46 U.S.C. 51312; 5 U.S.C. app. 

552b; 41 CFR parts 102–3.140 through 102– 

3.165. 

By Order of the Maritime Administrator. 

Dated: November 20, 2014. 

Thomas M. Hudson, 

Acting Secretary, Maritime Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2014–27963 Filed 11–24–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2014–0033] 

Reports, Forms, and Record Keeping 

Requirements; Agency Information 

Collection Activity Under OMB Review 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: In compliance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice 

announces that the Information 

Collection Request (ICR) abstracted 

below has been forwarded to the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and comments. The ICR 

describes the nature of the information 

collection and its expected burden. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before December 26, 

2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments to the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget, 725 17th Street NW., 

Washington, DC 20503, Attention 

NHTSA Desk Officer. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

additional information or access to 

background documents, contact Lisa 

Gavin, Office of Crash Avoidance 

Standards (NVS–121), U.S. Department 

of Transportation, National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration, West 

Building, W43–432, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

Email address: lisa.gavin@dot.gov. Ms. 


wreier-aviles on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES