alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
10462.

#### Bramblett *v.*The State.

Decided June 13, 1919.

Conviction of assault with intent to murder; from Murray superior court—Judge Tarver. March 8, 1919.

*II. II. Anderson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Joseph M. Lang, solicitor-general, R. Noel Steed,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

The special grounds of the motion for a new trial are void of merit. There is ample evidence to support the verdict. Where no error of law is committed and “there is any evidence, however slight, to support a verdict which has been approved by the trial judge, this court is absolutely without authority to control the judgment of the trial court.” *Toole v. Jones,*19 *Ga. App.*24 (90 S. E. 732) ; *Bradham*v. *State,*21 *Ga. App.*519 (94 S. E. 618), and cases cited.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-12-0001121 02-JUN-2017 01:35 PM SCWC-12-0001121

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ʻ I

STATE OF HAWAI ʻ I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. RAYMOND S. DAVIS, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-12-0001121; CASE NO. 1DTA-12-01623)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.) Upon consideration of Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Raymond S. Davis’s motion for reconsideration, filed on May 25, 2017, the papers in support thereof, and the records and files herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, June 2, 2017.
/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 7, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00470-CR

LORENZA ANDRE SAM, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court 

Fort Bend County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 10-DCR-055360A 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant was convicted of capital murder in 2013. We affirmed his 

conviction in 2016. Sam v. State, No. 14-13-00840-CR, 2016 WL 6134445 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2016, pet. ref’d). 

On April 9, 2018, appellant, acting pro se, filed a document entitled, “Notice 

of Appeal and Request for Certificate of Appealability.” The words “In the Fifth 

Court Circuit Court of Appeals, New Orleans, Louisiana” are typed at the top of the 

document. The document is addressed to “Clerk of Court; Lyle Cayce.” According 
2

to the website for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, that court’s clerk 

is Lyle W. Cayce. The document contains a certificate of service in which appellant 

declares he mailed the document to “Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Clerk of Court 

Lyle Cayce, 600 Maestri P., New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-3408” and that “an exact 

carbon-copy has been courtesy delivered by same to” this court. 

The Fort Bend County District Clerk assigned this appeal to us on June 8, 

2018. Since that time, the clerk’s record has been filed, and the trial court appointed 

counsel to represent appellant. 

This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. We have already affirmed his 

conviction on direct appeal. Further, it appears appellant did not intend to pursue his 

appeal in this court; rather, he was notifying this court of his intent to challenge our 

decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

On July 18, 2018, we notified appellant and his newly-appointed counsel, 

Kristen Jernigan, that we would dismiss the appeal unless any party demonstrated, 

by July 30, 2018, meritorious grounds for retaining the appeal. No response has been 

filed.

The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell 

Do Not Publish—Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

          - [Docket No. BOEM-2014-0078; MMAA104000]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice of Availability of a Second Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and Notice of Public Hearings; Correction.

# SUMMARY:

                        On November 7, 2014, BOEM published a notice in the                         **Federal Register**                         (79 FR 66401). BOEM is changing the venue for one of the public hearing dates. This notice makes that change.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Public Hearings: Pursuant to the regulations implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA, BOEM will hold public hearings on the Second Draft SEIS. The hearing scheduled on December 1, 2014, previously announced to occur at the Loussac Library Complex, will be held at a different location. The hearing will instead take place at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, 109 W. International Airport Road, Anchorage, Alaska.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael Routhier, Program Analysis Officer and Project Manager, BOEM, Alaska OCS Region, 3801 Centerpoint Drive, Suite 500, Anchorage, Alaska 99503-5823 or by telephone at (907) 334-5200.

Dated: November 17, 2014.

Walter D. Cruickshank,

Acting Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

[FR Doc. 2014-28003 Filed 11-25-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-MR-P
T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N NO. 03-10-00279- CV In re F aron Ray Truelove ORI GINAL P ROCEEDI NG F ROM B ELL COUNTY M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N The pe tition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P . 52.8(a) .

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop Filed: May

27, 2010
Exhibit
      32.1




CERTIFICATION
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
      TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
      connection with the quarterly report of Patriot Scientific Corporation (the
      “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended August 31, 2006, as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission and to which this Certification is an
      exhibit (the “Report”), the undersigned officer of Patriot Scientific
      Corporation does hereby certify, pursuant to Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities
      and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title
      18
      of the United States Code 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
      October 23, 2006


/s/
              David H. PohlDavid
              H. Pohl*Chief
                Executive Officer*
EXHIBIT 12





GE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE HOLDINGS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES





COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES


(Dollar amounts in millions)


Nine Months Ended September 28, 2002


(Unaudited)





Ratio of Earnings to Fixed ChargesNet earnings

$
683Provision for income taxes


300Minority interest


3Cumulative effect of accounting changes


380Earnings before income taxes, minority interest and cumulative effect of change in accounting principle


1,366Fixed charges:Interest expense


104Interest portion of net rentals


22Total fixed charges


126Less interest capitalized, net of amortization


2Earnings before income taxes, minority interest and cumulative effect of change in accounting principle, plus fixed
charges

$
1,490Ratio of earnings to fixed charges


11.9





For purposes of computing the ratios, fixed charges consist of
interest on all indebtedness and one-third of rentals, which management believes is a reasonable approximation of the interest factor of such rentals.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.6


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

           We consent to the inclusion in this registration statement on Form
S-1 (File No. 333-48819, Amendment No. 5) of our report dated February 3, 1997,
on our audit of the consolidated financial statements of Midcontinent
Broadcasting Co. of Wisconsin, Inc. We also consent to the reference to our firm
under the caption "Experts".



                                            COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
May 22, 1998
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH, )

) Case No. 20-cv-5068

Plaintiff, ) 

)

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

v. )

)

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, )

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, )

PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED )

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED )

ON SCHEDULE A HERETO, )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff EMOJI COMPANY 

GmbH hereby dismisses with prejudice all causes of action in the complaint against the following 

Defendants identified in Schedule A. Each party shall bear its own attorney’s fees and costs.

No. Defendant 

61 hygjkyw

64 IPBULIKE

92 kuluko

121 Idear

129 ltgyth

141 one by two

169 Jinyou Youren

172 Meet Futher

174 ho home life

214 JFK BORN

221 nmxbcvjhfjsg

234 Horizon-T

252 liuyanlin

274 osdikjghrhyse

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 42 Filed: 11/17/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:2883
The respective Defendants have not filed an answer to the complaint or a motion for summary 

judgment in this matter. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is 

appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 17, 2020 By: s/Michael A. Hierl _ 

Michael A. Hierl (Bar No. 3128021)

William B. Kalbac (Bar No. 6301771)

Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.

Three First National Plaza

70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 580-0100 Telephone

mhierl@hsplegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 42 Filed: 11/17/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2884
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 

Voluntary Dismissal was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court and served on all counsel of 

record and interested parties via the CM/ECF system on November 17, 2020.

s/Michael A. Hierl

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 42 Filed: 11/17/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:2885
9798.

#### CARSWELL *v.*GREEN.

Decided February 11, 1919.

There is'no evidence to support the finding and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

Complaint; from city court of Macon—Judge Guerry. April 25, 1918.

*J. M. Hancock,*for plaintiff in error. *S. W. Hatcher,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

Trammell was indebted to the defendant, Cars-well, for supplies,, and to the plaintiff, Green, Lor rent, and the plaintiff’s petition alleged that Carswell purchased from Trammell produce raised on the plaintiff’s land, to wit, fodder worth $11.75, *397hay $3.50, one bale of cotton worth $69 and one bale worth $61, cottonseed $11; total $156.25; and that Carswell knew at the time of purchasing that the rent had not been paid, that Trammell had no other property, and that the only way the plaintiff had of collecting hi^ rent was by enforcing his lien'as landlord against the property purchased, which was removed beyond his reach by the defendant and converted to the defendant’s own use. The defendant’s plea denied every allegation of the petition. The judge passed upon the case without the intervention of a jury, and rendered a. finding and judgment for the plaintiff for $90. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and the movant excepted. The record does not show that a demurrer to the petition was filed. The special grounds of the motion for a new trial were but amplifications of the general grounds; so we have for determination the one question of whether the judgment should be reversed on the general grounds.

There is no evidence to show that the “property was removed out of the reach of petitioner by defendant,” except it be some of the fodder, mor is there any evidence to .show that the defendant ever bought from the plaintiff’s tenant any of the produce named above, except some of the fodder ($3 worth), the whole of which is alleged in the petition to be worth $11.75, and yet $90 is the •amount of the finding and judgment. The greatest amount shown by the testimony to have been received by the defendant from Trammell was $97.50, and this was in cash and not in the value of produce purchased. Deducting from this sum $32.50, which the undisputed evidence shows was paid to Carswell from the sale of a cow, .it appears that the total cash received by Carswell from the tenant was $65, which might have been the proceeds from produce sold to others. However, as stated above, the evidence fails to show that this amount resulted from produce sold by Trammell to Carswell. Even granting that all this came from the sale-of produce raised on the plaintiff’s farm, and. that all of it was purchased by Carswell from Trammell (which is not true, according to the evidence in the record);and adding thereto the alleged value Of the fodder, $11.75, the total amount would be only $76.75. The record clearly shows that there is no proof to support the finding and judgment, and the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
#### Benjamin Jones & Wife *v.*Isaac Cunningham, etc.

Husband and Wife — Judgment—Levy Under.

In an action against a husband -and wife for debts incurred by the wife prior to their marriage, judgment may be rendered against them, but as- to- the ¡husband, the judgment -should only be levied upon the property which ¡had come, or might ¡have come to him through the marriage.

APPEAL PROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT.

December 8, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin :

It seems tha-t the judgment is only final so far as it directs the payment of Parker’s debt. As to that, it appearing that Mrs. Jones was properly chargeable with- enough to pay it, for indebtedness incurred before her marriage with her husband, Jones, it was proper to render judgment against them, but as to the husband, the judgment should only have been to be levied upon- property which had come, or might come, to him- by the marriage, instead of the ordinary personal judgment which was given against him- as well as his wife. *Beaumont v. Miller,*1 Metcalf, *70; Fultz v. Fox, 9*B. Monroe 499.

This case differs from- those of *Agner and Wife v. Williams,*1 Bush 4, and *Curd v. Dodds, 6*Bush 681, in the essential fact that the liability of the wife, Mrs. Jones, existed at the time of her marriage, and was not merely a claim arising thereafter against her separately or in conjunction with her husband.

*57
      *Eginton, for appellants.*

*J. Simpson, for appellees.*

Wherefore, for the error indicated in rendering the judgment against Benjamin Jones, it is reversed, and the cause remanded for a judgment not inconsistent with this opinion.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Phillips 66 Company

Appellate case number: 01-16-00108-CV

Trial court case number: 2014-20601

Trial court: 133rd District Court of Harris County

Relator Phillips 66 Company has filed a petition for writ of mandamus directed at the 

trial court’s order granting a motion to compel discovery filed by the Real Parties in Interest. 

Phillips 66 has also filed an Opposed Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay, asking us 

to stay the trial court’s order pending resolution of the mandamus petition. The motion is 

granted; we stay the trial court’s order compelling discovery pending further order of this Court. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10.

The Court requests a response to the petition from the Real Parties in Interest. The 

response shall be filed within 15 days of the date of this order. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Rebeca Huddle

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 16, 2016
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
CONDENSED  CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE  SHEET AT  SEPTEMBER  30,  1999 AND THE RELATED
CONDENSED  CONSOLIDATED  STATEMENTS  OF  OPERATIONS  AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE NINE
MONTHS  ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30, 1999 OF  STRATFORD  AMERICAN  CORPORATION  AND ITS
SUBSIDIARIES  AND IS QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH  FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       2,029,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   54,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,032,000
<PP&E>                                         616,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                  83,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,655,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          180,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           64,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,855,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,655,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               177,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               596,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (467,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (467,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                (13,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (480,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.08)


</TABLE>
#### Frank B. Spear and John W. Spear v. Marquette, Houghton *&*Ontonagon Railroad Company.

*Damage ly sparJcsfrom beomotim.*

Persons who have authorized the use of a locomotive ontheir premises, and have known of its use and acquiesced in it, have no right of action for damage done to their property by fire set by sparks from such locomotive.

Error to Marquette.

Submitted Oct. 4.

Decided Oct. 18.

Case. Plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

*W. H. Maynard*and *Dan H. Ball*for appellants.

*W. P. Mealy*for appellee.

Campbell, J.

This case comes up on a re-trial of the same issues referred to in a former decision of this court, reported in 44 Mich. 170. The damage sued for was for a loss by the burning of a warehouse and some hay in and near it, from fire set by sparks from a locomotive.

"We do not discover any material difference between the present record and the former one, so far as the rules of responsibility are concerned. The track on which the locomotive ran is on plaintiffs’ premises and built for the convenience of such business as was done with them individu*247ally or as warehousemen. The only right the railroad company had was through a contract with plaintiffs. It appears that locomotives were not generally, if ever, used to bring cars on to the dock, as they were usually run down an inclined track. Cars to be taken to the road from the dock were drawn by locomotives.

The locomotives used were for reasons owing to the arrangements on the dock, required to be small ones, and the locomotive named the “ Birchrod ” was the one generally used, and it was this one which caused the injury. The plaintiffs knew of its use and there is nothing to indicate on this record that they did not approve it. Engines were not sent unless there were cars to be drawn off, and usually plaintiffs sent for them.

"Without dwelling on the facts which, as already stated, do not seem to us £o introduce any new element into the cause, we think, as we held before, that the use of this engine was with the knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiffs on their own premises, and that they cannot complain of what they have authorized.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 99(b)


                                  CERTIFICATION

         In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (the
"Report") of Lindsay Manufacturing Co. (the "Company") for the quarter ended
February 28, 2003, I, Bruce C. Karsk, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

         /s/ BRUCE C. KARSK
         -------------------------------
         Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
         Bruce C. Karsk

         April 14, 2003

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.












                                       23
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4071

To extend the time within which claims may be filed under the September 

11th Victim Compensation Fund. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 30, 2004

Mr. MCHUGH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL

To extend the time within which claims may be filed under 

the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING CLAIMS 

4 UNDER SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSA5 TION FUND. 

6 Section 405(a)(3) of the September 11th Victim 

7 Compensation Fund of 2001 (49 U.S.C. 40101 note) is 

8 amended by striking ‘‘2’’ and inserting ‘‘3’’.

Æ