IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNNY C. BORIZOV (M-38390), )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 20 CV 4754

v. )

) Judge Marvin E. Aspen

CHARLES TRUITT, Warden, )

Stateville Correctional Center, )

)

Respondent.

1 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:

Before us is Johnny C. Borizov’s pro se amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition and decline to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

Borizov is currently incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois, in 

the custody of the warden of that facility, Respondent Charles Truitt. In May 2013, a jury in the 

Circuit Court of DuPage County convicted Borizov of three counts of first-degree murder and one 

count of solicitation of murder. The State’s theory was that Borizov was legally accountable for 

the actions of Jacob Nodarse, who admitted that he fatally shot Jeffrey and Lori Kramer and their 

son, Michael Kramer, who were the immediate family of Angela Kramer, Borizov’s ex-fiancée.

 

1 We have substituted the name of the current warden at Stateville Correctional Center, as 

required by Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 

Courts. 

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A. Trial and Conviction

The following description of the trial evidence and history of the case is taken directly from 

the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision on Borizov’s direct appeal. See People v. Borizov, 2015 IL 

App (2d) 130736-U. These facts are presumptively correct on habeas review, see Hartsfield v. 

Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307, 309 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020), and Borizov has not rebutted this presumption. 

Jeffrey Kramer, Lori Kramer, and their son, Michael Kramer, were shot and 

killed in their Darien home at approximately 3 a.m. on March 2, 2010. Jeffrey and 

Lori’s daughter, Angela Kramer, was in the home at the time of the killings. Police 

arrested Jacob Nodarse in Florida two days later. Nodarse admitted killing the 

Kramers, but maintained that he had committed the crimes to protect himself and 

his family. He explained to investigators that he was expected to give testimony in 

a custody dispute between defendant and Angela involving their infant son. He 

further explained that Angela was threatening to expose members of defendant’s 

criminal organization in an attempt to gain leverage against defendant in the 

custody dispute. Nodarse said defendant convinced him that he and his family 

would be harmed unless he killed the Kramers. Nodarse later pleaded guilty but 

mentally ill to the murder of Jeffrey Kramer. The State agreed to dismiss the 

murder charges involving Lori and Michael in exchange for Nodarse’s testimony 

against defendant. The following testimony and evidence was introduced during 

defendant’s jury trial.

Defendant and the Kramer Family

Angela testified that she began dating defendant during fall 2007. 

Defendant had been friends with her previous boyfriend, Steve Hetman, who had 

recently died in a motorcycle accident. Defendant was not employed, but he 

frequently went out at night, claiming he “had vending machines to go collect 

money from.” On Halloween 2007, defendant and Angela went to a casino. 

Defendant looked at a surveillance camera while the two were alone and said he 

had to make sure that he was being recorded because he had “people out there doing 

stuff” for him.

Defendant and Angela became engaged in April 2008. Angela became 

pregnant shortly thereafter. She moved into a Countryside home with defendant in 

January 2009. Their son, Nicholas, was born in February 2009. Tensions arose 

between defendant and the Kramer family during Angela’s pregnancy. On one 

occasion, defendant would not allow Lori to attend a doctor visit where Angela and 

defendant were scheduled to learn the gender of their unborn child.

Lori’s mother, Joyce Tamarrino, testified that Lori described an argument 

she had with defendant in March 2009. Lori said defendant told her, “I hate you, 

bitch. You’ll never see your grandson again. I hope you die.” Lori responded by 

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calling defendant a sociopath. Joyce observed defendant on subsequent occasions 

stating that he hated Jeffrey and Lori and he hoped they would die.

In April 2009, defendant became angry because Jeffrey was towing a nonworking car from defendant’s Countryside home. Although Jeffrey had given the 

car to Angela, defendant took offense because he had spent money on the car. 

Angela testified that defendant shoved Jeffrey, pulled a switchblade, and said, “I 

am going to fucking kill you. I fucking hate you.” The police arrived shortly 

thereafter and restrained defendant. No arrests were made.

In May 2009, Joyce held a party to celebrate Nicholas’s three-month 

birthday. Angela testified that defendant insisted on going to the party and would 

not let her go alone. At one point, defendant saw Lori holding Nicholas and became 

upset. Defendant grabbed Nicholas, forcefully placed him in his baby carrier, and 

left the party. As defendant was leaving, he struggled over the baby carrier with 

Lori and Joyce, both of whom sustained bruises during the incident. The police 

were called to the party, but made no arrests.

Jacob Nodarse

Although he had never seen a psychologist or psychiatrist during his youth, 

Nodarse testified that he had been depressed since the fifth grade. He explained 

that his parents were strict Jehovah’s Witnesses. As a child, Nodarse was not 

allowed to be involved in extracurricular activities due to the bad influences from 

people of other faiths. His parents would throw away many of his possessions, such 

as CD’s and DVD’s. This led to friction between Nodarse and his parents, and “an 

abusive and hostile environment.” He testified that his parents would beat him, 

which led him to begin cutting himself with a knife. He began smoking marijuana 

and drinking alcohol during his junior year in high school. He moved away from 

home during his senior year of high school, and his parents and younger sister 

subsequently moved to Fort Myers, Florida.

In fall 2005 Nodarse was working as a technician at a BMW dealership and 

taking classes at a community college. He moved into an apartment with his 

friends, Joe Jereb and Jake Guziec. Nodarse described the apartment as a “party 

house,” with at least 20 people present on any given night. Nodarse began smoking 

marijuana “almost every day” and drinking alcohol “probably five out of seven 

days a week.” He was prescribed Vicodin after suffering a bacterial infection and 

mononucleosis in 2007. After he recovered, he began purchasing Vicodin illegally, 

which had a “snowball effect” progressing to stronger medications. He began using 

Percocet, Oxycontin, methadone, hydromorphone, and eventually, heroin. At first, 

the drugs alleviated his severe depression and anxiety; they were “almost a magical 

solution.”

Nodarse began seeing a psychiatrist for depression in late summer 2009.

He had recently learned that his younger sister had been raped. Two of his close 

friends had recently died. His girlfriend of two years, Samantha Mercado, 

described Nodarse as being smart, but testified that she thought he was depressed 

and he needed help. In fall 2009, Nodarse walked in on Mercado having sex with 

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Jereb. It became common knowledge among Nodarse’s friends that Jereb had slept 

with Mercado. Nodarse nevertheless continued living in the apartment.

Nodarse and Defendant

Nodarse met defendant in early summer 2009. He soon began purchasing 

drugs from defendant, including Vicodin, Oxycontin, and heroin. By fall 2009, 

Nodarse had become friends with defendant and frequently accompanied him to 

bars and restaurants. Defendant said he was part of a criminal organization and had 

connections to powerful criminals. He claimed his organization received payouts 

from casinos and committed crimes such as extortion and murder, in addition to 

dealing drugs. He said that members of the organization had to commit a murder 

before they could be initiated.

Nodarse testified that defendant introduced him to men named Mitch, Tony, 

Dino, and Frank, each of whom defendant claimed were part of his organization. 

Defendant described Mitch as his “right-hand man.” Tony handled defendant’s 

distribution of narcotics. Dino ran his own crew and had a similar rank as 

defendant. Frank was an older man who had a high rank and a lot of authority. 

Defendant made it clear that Nodarse was never to discuss any aspect of the 

criminal organization with any of these men.

Defendant also told Nodarse of people who had “put in a fair amount of 

work” for the organization, meaning that they had killed several people. These 

included men named John and Vito, as well as a bouncer at a bar named “Capri,” 

where high-ranking members of the organization frequently met. These 

discussions always took place while defendant and Nodarse were alone in a car.

Soon after they met, Nodarse and defendant realized that they shared a 

mutual acquaintance: Michael Kramer. Michael was one of the regular attendees 

at the apartment that Nodarse shared with Jereb and Guziec. Nodarse had known 

Michael for approximately four years, describing him as a good friend. When 

defendant realized that Nodarse and Michael were friends, defendant explained to 

Nodarse that he was dating Angela and he did not get along with Michael. Nodarse 

was instructed not to tell Michael of his friendship with defendant. Michael 

eventually became suspicious regarding Nodarse’s source of drugs and asked him 

whether he knew defendant. Nodarse lied and said he did not.

Thanksgiving 2009

The State presented extensive evidence and testimony that defendant and 

Michael had a heated argument the night before Thanksgiving 2009. Nodarse 

testified that he and Michael were drinking at Nodarse’s apartment late Wednesday 

night and into Thursday morning. At one point, Nodarse confessed that he knew 

defendant and apologized for previously claiming otherwise. Michael went on a 

profanity-laced rant and claimed that defendant had abused Angela.

Defendant called Nodarse’s phone later that night. Michael asked Nodarse 

who was calling and threatened to fight him if he did not hand over the phone. 

Nodarse gave the phone to Michael, who then cursed at defendant, threatened to 

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shoot him in the head, and stated that he was going to help Angela raise Nicholas. 

Before ending the conversation, Michael told defendant, “[a]nd feel free to come 

over here. I’m going to kill your ass.” Nodarse subsequently spoke with defendant 

on the phone, describing him as being “irate.” Defendant told Nodarse that he was 

armed and speeding toward Nodarse’s apartment, adding that he was going to kill 

Michael. Nodarse estimated that he heard Michael and defendant both threaten to 

kill each other about 30 times that night.

Angela testified that she was at the Countryside home alone with Nicholas 

on the night before Thanksgiving 2009. She said Nicholas was “very sick” with a 

“103, 104 fever.” Defendant was out and Angela did not know where he was. She 

was awakened early Thursday morning by a phone call from Michael, describing 

him as “upset” and “angry.” Defendant called Angela between 5 and 10 minutes 

later. He told Angela that he was “heading to where Michael is right now” and 

“[Michael] better watch it.” At around 5:00 a.m., defendant arrived at the 

Countryside home with Nodarse. Defendant instructed Nodarse to tell Angela 

about Michael’s threats.

Nodarse testified that he was kicked out of his apartment with Jereb and 

Guziec after the Thanksgiving incident. Defendant arranged for Nodarse to rent a 

Countryside apartment from his uncle, Greg Georgevich. Defendant said that 

Georgevich knew of his illegal activities, but told Nodarse not to discuss the topic 

with him. Nodarse’s roommate at the Countryside apartment was Graham Morenz, 

a fellow employee at the BMW dealership.

Defendant and Angela Separate

Tensions escalated between defendant and Angela during December 2009 

and January 2010. Angela testified that defendant would not allow her to take 

Nicholas to the Kramer family’s Darien home on Christmas day. Angela and 

defendant argued through the next day, as Angela threatened to move out of the 

Countryside home if defendant could not start getting along with her family. 

Defendant said he did not care if Angela left, but he was keeping Nicholas, adding 

that Angela would be seeing her family “in body bags.” The two eventually reached 

an informal agreement to split custody of Nicholas, and Angela moved into the 

Kramer family’s Darien home.

Angela continued to live in the Darien home during the following weeks, 

despite defendant’s repeated requests that she [] move back to the Countryside 

home. On December 31, 2009, she and Lori met with attorney Anique Drouin for 

an initial consultation regarding legal custody of Nicholas. Angela was scheduled 

to pick Nicholas up from the Countryside home on January 13, 2010. The night 

before, defendant had called Angela and threatened to throw her things to the street 

if she did not move back to the Countryside home. Angela arrived at the 

Countryside home the next day to find many of her belongings outside in the 

driveway. She said defendant was being loud and profane, and he continued to 

throw her belongings out of the house. Angela began recording a video of the 

incident on her cell phone. The video was admitted and played for the jury. After 

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leaving the Countryside home, Angela went directly to Drouin’s office to file for 

sole legal custody of Nicholas.

On January 14, 2010, Lori Kramer spoke with Evelyn Hanley, the facilities 

manager at her place of employment. Hanley testified that Lori said Angela was 

involved in a custody dispute, and Lori was concerned for her safety because 

defendant knew where she sat at work and he “might come pay her a visit at the 

office.” She said defendant had “been combative, and he would make her family 

miserable in the child custody process.” Lori sent Hanley an email that same day 

detailing her concerns, with a picture of defendant attached. The email stated that 

defendant had made threats toward the Kramer family and requested that defendant 

not be allowed past security. Hanley forwarded the email to the company’s security 

department. A copy of the email was admitted into evidence.

Evidence of Accountability and Solicitation

Nodarse testified that defendant began cultivating the motive for the killings 

as his relationship with Angela deteriorated. Defendant told Nodarse that Angela 

had given the police information about several of his criminal associates and their 

illegal activities. The members of defendant’s organization were upset because 

Angela knew more than she was supposed to have known. They believed Angela 

acquired this information from Nodarse because of Nodarse’s friendship with 

Michael. In addition, defendant explained that his associates had been questioning 

Nodarse’s involvement with the criminal organization. Defendant had taken the 

liberty of vouching for Nodarse’s initiation, meaning the members of the 

organization believed that Nodarse had committed a murder.

Defendant also claimed he had an “informant” who had been spending time 

at Nodarse’s old apartment. According to the informant, Michael had been 

discussing his desire to kill Nodarse to prevent him from testifying during Angela’s 

custody proceeding, as Nodarse would be a “key witness” regarding the 

Thanksgiving incident.

These conversations escalated through February 2010, as defendant claimed 

the members of his criminal organization were increasingly upset with Michael and 

Angela. Defendant supported his claim that Michael and Angela were giving the 

police information by showing Nodarse some papers relating to the custody dispute. 

Nodarse testified that the papers had an official heading and contained a list with 

several names. Nodarse recognized his name, as well as several of defendant’s 

criminal associates. Defendant said Michael and Angela had already helped the 

police find drugs in a vehicle belonging to his associate, John. As a result, John’s 

children were taken into foster care. Defendant had been ordered to either kill 

Angela and Michael himself, or have Nodarse do the job. Defendant explained, 

however, that he would not be able to get away with the murders because the 

custody dispute gave him an obvious motive.

Defendant said his criminal associates were also threatening to harm 

Nodarse’s family if Angela and Michael were not killed. Defendant had a printout 

from Nodarse’s sister’s Facebook page. He said John had sent him the printout and 

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commented that Nodarse’s sister was “very pretty” and “he would be interested in 

her.” Defendant knew that Nodarse’s sister had previously been raped.

Defendant also repeatedly mentioned the threats from Michael, eventually 

claiming that Michael had gathered enough money to hire someone to kill Nodarse. 

On February 20, defendant called Nodarse and told him Michael had arranged to 

kill him that night. Nodarse armed himself with knives and spent the night waiting 

in his kitchen with the lights off and the blinds drawn. Defendant warned Nodarse 

that he would be killed if he went to the police, adding that he would find out 

because he had connections with several police officers.

On February 22, at defendant’s urging, Nodarse purchased a handgun for 

his own protection. He picked up the handgun and some magazines on February 

25, following a three-day waiting period. He quit his job at the BMW dealership 

that same day, telling co-workers that people were trying to kill him. He told 

defendant that he was going to Florida, where his family lived, so he could protect 

them. Defendant told Nodarse that this would be useless; John was a professional 

that would inevitably find Nodarse’s family and rape his sister. Defendant said the 

only other option was to kill Michael and Angela.

Nodarse testified that defendant helped devise the plan to kill the Kramers. 

On the night of February 25, defendant took Nodarse to the back yard of the 

Kramers’ Darien home. Defendant described the layout of the Kramer house. He 

told Nodarse to kick in a door or break a window to get into the house. Once 

Nodarse was in, he would be committed: he was to kill Angela, Michael, Jeffrey, 

and Lori, making sure to shoot each of them in the head. Defendant told Nodarse 

to check the rooms upstairs and make sure that no one was hiding in the closets.

He told Nodarse to wear latex gloves underneath a second pair of gloves, along 

with a mask and three layers of clothing. He gave Nodarse a pair of over-sized 

shoes that belonged to his associate [Dino] Dion, which Dion had left in defendant’s 

car. He told Nodarse to stuff tissue paper in the end of the shoes and wear them 

while he was in the Kramer home.

Nodarse would tell people that he was leaving for Florida on Sunday, 

February 28, at which point he would suspend all contact with defendant. He would 

delete all of his text messages and render his phone untraceable. He would stay 

somewhere in the area, unnoticed, until early Tuesday morning, March 2. He would 

kill the Kramers at precisely 3 a.m. Defendant would be in a bar with surveillance 

cameras while Nodarse was killing the Kramers. Defendant’s associate, John, 

would be killing the social worker who had taken his children. At 4 a.m., defendant 

would kill the Kramers’ cousins, who were gang-affiliated, to prevent them from 

striking back in retaliation. Nodarse would drive directly to Florida after killing 

the Kramers.

Nodarse could not sleep during the following days because he was paranoid 

and afraid. He wrote a suicide note to his family, which was admitted into evidence. 

He gave defendant a list of phone numbers for people whom defendant promised 

to protect in case anyone sought revenge. He went out to a bar with defendant on 

the evening of February 27. Defendant pulled him aside at one point during the 

night and told him that everything was “still on as planned.”

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March 2, 2010

Nodarse testified that he began taking a large amount of drugs on March 1. 

By the early hours of March 2, he had taken 10 Vicodin pills, 2 Adderall pills, 

Klonopin, and sleeping medication. He became disoriented and felt as though he 

was dreaming. As he left his apartment, dressed according to defendant’s 

instructions, he could not distinguish between reality and a dream. He mistakenly 

drove to his old apartment before proceeding to the Kramer house. Just before 3 

a.m., he approached the house with his loaded gun and a hammer. He had visions 

of his sister being injured and he could hear her screaming. He testified, “it came 

in my mind that this is something I had to do to save my family. And I gathered up 

as much courage as I could and I broke the window.”

As he entered the house, Nodarse first saw Michael on the couch watching 

television. He fired a stray shot at Michael, who ran into the kitchen. Nodarse 

turned to his right, saw Jeffrey, and shot him in the torso. He noticed Lori coming 

down the stairs and he shot her in the torso as well. Nodarse walked to Jeffrey and 

Lori and shot them each in the head, just as defendant had instructed. He then 

looked for Michael and found him holding a steak knife in the kitchen. He fired a 

shot into Michael’s torso, and then shot him in the head. Nodarse checked upstairs 

for Angela, but he could not find her; he did not check the bedroom closets. He 

quickly left the Kramer home and went to his car, which he had left running.

Nodarse was driving south through Indiana when the sun started to rise. He 

became very nervous and started having flashbacks. He pulled over and vomited 

on the side of the road, still uncertain as to whether he had been dreaming. He 

realized that he had committed the murders after determining that he had spent 

rounds of ammunition. He drove to a restaurant in Terre Haute, Indiana, and parked 

near a dumpster. He put his handgun, ammunition, mask, shoes, gloves, and outer 

layers of clothing in a black garbage bag. He placed the bag into the dumpster and 

proceeded driving southbound toward Florida.

While in Georgia, Nodarse called 911 because he believed undercover 

police cars were harassing him. A recording of that conversation was admitted into 

evidence and played for the jury. Nodarse also attempted calling defendant, but 

defendant did not answer. He was able to contact Guziec, who testified that 

Nodarse was “freaking out,” and he thought “almost all the vehicles around him 

were cops.” Guziec told Nodarse that something had happened, explaining that 

Michael and his parents might not be alive. Nodarse paused and responded that he 

and Guziec might not get another chance to talk. Nodarse also mentioned that he 

had written a letter for his sister and he was going to Florida to protect her. Guziec 

called the police after Nodarse hung up.

Aftermath

Nodarse made contact with his parents, who met him in Tampa Bay and 

drove him to Fort Myers. He fell asleep along the way. He woke up to the sound 

of a U.S. Marshal tapping his gun on the car window. Nodarse was taken into 

custody and interviewed twice on March 4. He was then flown back to Chicago 

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and interviewed at the Darien police station on March 6. The videos of these 

interviews were admitted and played for the jury as prior consistent statements. 

While there were minor discrepancies between Nodarse’s statements during the 

interviews and his trial testimony, he was generally consistent in his representations 

that defendant led him to believe he and his family members were in danger. He 

was also consistent in his statements that defendant was instrumental in devising 

the plan to kill the Kramers.

Defendant called 911 just before 7 a.m., on March 2, and asked to speak 

with a police officer. Willow Springs police officer Bobby Sims met with 

defendant. Sims testified that defendant said he did not feel safe because he 

recognized the Kramers’ home on televised news reports and he feared his son’s 

mother was dead. Defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to the Darien police 

station. On the way, defendant said he had been at a casino during the previous 

night and he had nothing to do with the murders. At trial, the State admitted 

surveillance videos showing that defendant was at a Joliet casino with his brother, 

Boris, from approximately 10:30 p.m. to 3:45 a.m. At approximately 3:26 a.m., 

defendant went out for a cigarette break and had a conversation with Guilia Wuttke, 

who testified that defendant appeared nervous and repeatedly checked his phone.

Defendant was later arrested and placed in a holding cell next to Nodarse. 

The two had several conversations on March 5 and 6. Recordings of those 

conversations were admitted and played for the jury. Defendant repeatedly asked 

Nodarse if he had spoken with police. He also asked if Nodarse wore gloves and 

disposed of the gun, claiming his lawyer told him the police had recovered finger 

prints and a gun.

Nodarse’s Mental State

Clinical psychologist Dr. John Murray testified as an expert witness for the 

State. He conducted 10 interviews with Nodarse, in addition to reviewing 

Nodarse’s interviews with law enforcement. He found Nodarse to be credible, 

stating that Nodarse’s story was consistent with what he had said during the 

interviews in the days following the murders. Dr. Murray estimated Nodarse’s 

intelligence to be “at least average, probably higher.” He opined that Nodarse was 

fit to stand trial with medication, and that, although Nodarse was experiencing 

symptoms of a mental illness at the time of the murders, those symptoms were not 

so severe that Nodarse was not responsible for his actions. He diagnosed Nodarse 

with bi-polar disorder, a severe mood disorder, which was linked to major 

depressive episodes that he had experienced during his life.

Du Page County jail staff psychiatrist Dr. James Corcoran testified on 

behalf of defendant. He had interviewed Nodarse 48 times. On April 30, 2010, 

Nodarse told Dr. Corcoran that he sometimes heard voices. Dr. Corcoran had 

interpreted this as a possible auditory hallucination, and he was concerned at the 

time that Nodarse might be developing some psychotic symptoms. Dr. Corcoran 

admitted on cross-examination that he did not document the incident as an auditory 

hallucination, due largely to the possibility that Nodarse could have been suffering 

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residual symptoms from his prior substance abuse. Dr. Corcoran never diagnosed 

Nodarse as being psychotic.

Forensic psychiatrist Dr. Mark Mills also testified on behalf of defendant. 

In his opinion, Nodarse was intermittently psychotic in and around the time of the 

killings. This meant Nodarse “was manifesting significant symptoms of 

hallucinations, of delusions, of lack of contact with reality, of problems with 

thinking.” Although Dr. Mills never interviewed Nodarse, he came to his 

conclusion by studying Nodarse’s videotaped interviews with investigators, the 

audiotapes of Nodarse and defendant in the holding cells, and reports from several 

psychologists who had interviewed Nodarse. Dr. Mills did not think Nodarse had 

a broad period of psychosis until the weeks leading up to the killings.

Verdict

The jury found defendant guilty of the first-degree murders of Jeffrey 

Kramer, Lori Kramer, and Michael Kramer, as well as solicitation of the murder of 

Angela Kramer. 

2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 4-53 (subheadings italicized and subheading labels omitted). 

B. Post-Trial Motion and Direct Appeal

Borizov filed a motion for a new trial in which he raised 31 claims of error. (Mot. New 

Tr., St. Ct. R., Ex. G (Dkt. No. 74-7), at 9-16.)2 The trial court denied the motion and sentenced 

Borizov to three consecutive terms of natural life in prison for the murders and a consecutive 30-

year sentence for soliciting Angela’s murder. See People v. Borizov (Borizov II), 2019 IL App 

(2d) 170004, ¶ 3. 

Borizov then filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court. In that appeal, Borizov’s 

sole contention was that he was deprived of a fair trial due to a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial 

misconduct, namely, introducing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence for the purpose of showing 

the jury that he was a bad person, as well as making numerous “objectionable comments” during 

closing and rebuttal arguments. (Direct Appeal Br., St. Ct. R., Ex. B (Dkt. No. 74-2), at 23-47.) 

2 We have utilized the ECF pagination for the citations to Borizov’s motion for a new trial 

and brief on direct appeal, the orders on the postconviction petition and postconviction petition for 

leave to appeal, and the trial transcript. 

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On November 12, 2015, the Illinois Appellate Court issued an opinion affirming Borizov’s 

conviction. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U. The court held that several of the evidentiary issues 

were not properly preserved, and as to the preserved ones, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in allowing the evidence. Id. ¶¶ 58-74. The court also held that although the prosecution made 

four improper comments in its closing argument, they did not amount to a pervasive pattern of 

misconduct or constitute a material factor in Borizov’s convictions. Id. ¶¶ 76-124.

Borizov renewed his claims in a Petition for Leave to Appeal (“PLA”), which the Illinois 

Supreme Court summarily denied on March 30, 2016. (Direct Appeal PLA & Denial Order, St. 

Ct. R., Ex. F (Dkt. No. 74-6).) 

C. Postconviction Proceedings

In October 2016, Borizov filed a pro se postconviction petition in which he stated that he 

had raised 31 issues in his motion for a new trial, “many of which were significant,” and appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to “raise issues that were objected to at trial[] and filed in the 

Motion for New Trial.” (Postconviction Pet., St. Ct. R., Ex. G (Dkt. No. 74-7), at 2.) Borizov did 

not elaborate. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that Borizov’s claim was “nonspecific, bald and conclusory” and he had failed to specify how he had been prejudiced by any 

alleged error of appellate counsel. (Order on Postconviction Pet., id. at 24-28.) 

Borizov, through counsel, appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for 

postconviction relief. At this level, he asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

argue that one of the jurors suffered from an implied bias. (Postconviction Appeal Br., St. Ct. R., 

Ex. H (Dkt. No. 74-8).) The Illinois Appellate Court issued an opinion affirming the dismissal. 

Borizov II, 2019 IL App (2d) 170004. Borizov then filed a PLA to the Supreme Court of Illinois, 

reiterating the ineffective assistance claim relating to juror bias. (Postconviction PLA, St. Ct. R., 

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Ex. L (Dkt. No. 74-12).) The Illinois Supreme Court summarily denied the PLA on March 25, 

2020. (Order on Postconviction PLA, id. at 24.) 

D. Federal Habeas Petition

In August 2020, Borizov filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition, asserting claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror bias. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

After we denied Borizov’s subsequent motions to stay the proceeding and for reconsideration of 

that denial, we granted Borizov’s motion for leave to file an amended habeas petition to add new 

claims based on a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the prosecution’s 

alleged use of perjured testimony. (Order, Dkt. No. 48.) At that time, we also stayed the 

proceeding so that Borizov could exhaust the two new claims before the Illinois courts by filing a 

successive postconviction petition. (Id.) 

Borizov sought assistance from an attorney, who, after investigating the viability of filing 

a successive postconviction petition in state court, informed Respondent’s counsel that he had 

completed his investigation and would not be seeking leave to file such a petition. (See Dkt. Nos. 

54, 68.) Thereafter, in December 2022, we lifted the stay and directed Respondent to answer the 

amended petition. Respondent filed an answer. (Dkt. No. 73.) Borizov was given the opportunity 

to file a reply to the answer and several extensions of time in which to do so. He has not filed a 

reply, nor did he request an extension of the most recent deadline, which was November 28, 2023, 

(Dkt. No. 85), so we proceed to a ruling on the amended petition. 

DISCUSSION

In his amended § 2254 petition, Borizov lists five grounds for relief:

1. The prosecutor engaged in a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, 

specifically in (a) improper closing arguments and (b) the introduction of improper

and prejudicial character evidence for the purpose of depicting Borizov as a “bad 

person.”

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2. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise all issues that were 

presented in Borizov’s motion for a new trial, including the claim of juror bias.

3. Juror #189 suffered from implied bias.

4. The prosecutor withheld evidence about the State’s key witness (Nodarse)

in violation of Brady.

5. The prosecutor used Nodarse’s perjured testimony to convict Borizov.

(Am. Pet. (Dkt. No. 43), at 5-6(A).) For clarity, we will follow Respondent’s lead in referring to 

the portion of Claim 2 that alleges ineffective assistance with regard to juror bias as Claim 2(a) 

and the portion of Claim 2 that alleges ineffective assistance with regard to the 30 other issues 

presented in Borizov’s motion for a new trial as Claim 2(b).

Respondent contends that Borizov’s claims are procedurally defaulted, meritless, and/or 

barred. (Answer at 23-46.) By failing to reply, Borizov waived any counterarguments. See Webb 

v. Frawley, 906 F.3d 569, 581 (7th Cir. 2018); Alcaraz v. Pfister, No. 19 C 1734, 2020 WL 

4904566, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020). But since Borizov is proceeding pro se, we fully 

address each of his claims below. 

A. Claims 2, 3, 4, 5, and Portions of Claim 1(b) Are Procedurally Defaulted

The doctrine of procedural default bars Claims 2, 3, 4, 5, and portions of Claim 1(b). A 

petitioner may procedurally default a claim in two ways. The first is by failing to fairly present a 

claim for “one complete round” of state court review—in other words, to the state trial court, the 

Illinois Appellate Court, and the Illinois Supreme Court, either on direct review or in 

postconviction proceedings. Mata v. Baker, 74 F.4th 480, 488 (7th Cir. 2023); McGhee v. Watson, 

900 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2018). A claim is fairly presented when the state court was supplied 

with the operative facts and controlling law and thus “sufficiently alerted to the federal 

constitutional nature of the issue to permit it to resolve that issue on a federal basis.” McDowell 

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v. Lemke, 737 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2013). The second way a claim is procedurally defaulted is 

when the state court relied on an independent and adequate state procedural rule to reject the claim. 

Lee-Kendrick v. Eckstein, 38 F.4th 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2022). 

1. Claims Not Asserted Through One Complete Round of State-Court Review

(Claims 2(b), 3, 4, and 5)

Claim 3, juror bias, was not presented at each level of the state-court system. Borizov did 

not raise it at all on direct appeal, and he did not fairly present it to the trial court that heard his 

postconviction petition in the first instance. Rather, in that petition he raised only a generalized 

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to argue unspecified issues among 

the 31 raised in the post-trial motion, and he did not mention the juror-bias issue at all. Therefore, 

Claim 3 is barred as procedurally defaulted. See Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384-86 (7th 

Cir. 2016). 

Claim 2(b), in which Borizov alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing 

to raise issues in his post-trial motion other than juror bias, is likewise procedurally defaulted

because it was not presented in Borizov’s postconviction appeal brief or ensuing PLA. 

Alternatively, procedural default bars review of Claim 2 in its entirety, including the portion of the 

claim that alleges ineffective assistance with regard to juror bias. Even with the liberal 

construction given to pro se pleadings, McDowell, 737 F.3d at 482, Borizov’s postconviction 

petition failed to give the state trial court a meaningful opportunity to pass upon the substance of 

any claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Borizov merely argued that his motion for a new 

trial had “raised 31 points, many of which were significant,” and that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to “raise issues that were objected to at trial, and filed in the Motion for New 

Trial.” (Postconviction Pet. at 2.) He cited no facts or legal principles and did not specify which 

points in the motion for a new trial were “significant.” To meet his burden of fairly presenting this 

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claim to the state trial court, Borizov had to do more than assert ineffective assistance in such a 

broad and conclusory manner. See McGhee, 900 F.3d at 854 (petitioner’s faulting appellate 

counsel for failing to raise unspecified issues was inadequate to present an ineffective-assistance 

claim to the state appellate court); Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2017)

(ineffective-assistance claim was not fairly presented to the state supreme court where petition

contained only “vague and sparse references” to the claim and no supporting argument).

Claims 4 and 5, for violation of Brady and the use of perjured testimony, are procedurally 

defaulted for failure to raise them before the Illinois state courts at any point. Borizov did not

present these claims on direct appeal or in his state postconviction proceedings. He concedes as 

much in his amended petition. (Am. Pet. at 6 (“The two amended claims: (1) Brady violation; and 

(2) use of perjury[,] have not been presented or exhausted in the state court, as Petitioner only 

recently obtained evidence to support [the] claims.”).) And after we stayed this action to allow 

Borizov to exhaust Claims 4 and 5 before the Illinois courts by pursuing a successive

postconviction petition, in the end he did not seek leave to file such a petition. Because Claims 4 

and 5 were not exhausted in state court, they are procedurally defaulted. See Perruquet v. Briley, 

390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the habeas petitioner has failed to fairly present to the 

state courts the claim on which he seeks relief in federal court and the opportunity to raise that 

claim in state court has passed, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted that claim.”); Alcaraz, 

2020 WL 4904566, at *4 (holding that a Brady claim was procedurally defaulted when the 

petitioner admitted that he did not raise the issue in state court and ultimately failed to file a 

successive state-court petition or an explanation as to why he failed to do so). 

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2. Claims Rejected on an Independent and Adequate State-Law Ground 

(Claim 2(a) and Portions of Claim 1(b))

In Claim 2(a), Borizov contends that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for not 

raising the juror-bias claim. Borizov raised this claim before the Illinois Appellate Court, which 

rejected it on the ground that it did not comply with the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 

ILCS 5/122-2, which requires a petition to “clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner’s 

constitutional rights were violated.” Borizov II, 2019 IL App (2d) 170004, ¶ 20. Rather, Borizov 

had “placed the burden on the trial court to parse through all the claims listed in the motion for a 

new trial, without specifying which claims counsel should have raised.” Id. Borizov’s failure to 

satisfy Illinois’s procedural requirements for obtaining relief on a postconviction claim was an 

independent and adequate state-law ground that precludes federal habeas review of the claim. See

Turner v. Mueller, No. 16 C 10237, 2019 WL 3716930, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2019) (collecting 

cases) (claim was procedurally defaulted due to state court’s reliance on the independent and

adequate ground that petitioner had failed to go beyond conclusory, unsupported statements). 

In Claim 1(b), Borizov contends, as he did on direct appeal, that the prosecution engaged 

in misconduct by introducing “improper and very prejudicial evidence to depict” him as a “bad 

person.” (Am. Pet. at 5.) Borizov raised five evidentiary challenges before the Illinois Appellate 

Court. (Direct Appeal Br. at 34-43.) The court rejected two of them—challenges to the 

prosecution’s introduction of evidence regarding (1) Borizov and Angela’s son, Nicholas, having 

been ill with a high fever on the night before Thanksgiving 2009, and (2) Borizov’s cell phone 

having contained contacts for police officers—on the ground that they were not properly preserved 

and therefore forfeited because there were no objections at trial. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 

72-73. The court further concluded that the two evidentiary issues were not reviewable under 

either prong of the plain-error analysis. Id. ¶ 74. The application of forfeiture and the 

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determination that plain error did not excuse it is an independent and adequate state-law ground of 

decision, so the portions of Claim 1(b) pertaining to Nicholas’s illness and phone-contacts 

evidence are procedurally defaulted, and habeas relief is thus barred. See Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 

627 F.3d 586, 591-93 (7th Cir. 2010); Madden v. Melvin, No. 17 C 724, 2017 WL 11516829, at 

*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2017). 

3. Exceptions to Procedural Default Do Not Apply

A habeas petitioner can overcome procedural default by showing either (1) cause for the 

default coupled with resulting prejudice, or (2) that federal relief is needed to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hicks, 871 F.3d at 531; Tabb v. Christianson, 855 F.3d 757, 

765 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). But Borizov 

presents no argument that he can satisfy either exception. Therefore, he forfeits the argument, and 

there is no basis to excuse his procedural default.3

 See Hicks, 871 F.3d at 765. 

In Claims 4 and 5, Borizov does cite (without explanation) and submit brief handwritten 

statements that are labeled as the declarations of two fellow inmates at Stateville. (Am. Pet. at 6-

6A & Exs. A & B.) The statements contain extremely vague hearsay to the effect that Nodarse 

told these inmates some time in 2019 that he “lied on” Borizov. (Id., Exs. A & B.) To the extent 

that Borizov may be relying on these exhibits in an attempt to overcome the procedural default of 

Claims 4 and 5 through the “miscarriage of justice” exception, he misses the mark. The exception 

applies to the “extremely rare” case where a petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which 

he is imprisoned, and it requires a presentation of new reliable evidence tending to support such 

an argument that was not presented at trial. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321-27 (1995) (stating 

3 Given our determinations that Claims 2(a) and 3 are procedurally defaulted and there is 

no basis to excuse the default, we need not reach Respondent’s argument in the alternative that 

they are barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). (Answer at 43-46.)

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that a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in light of the new evidence); Dixon v. Williams, 93 F.4th 394, 2024 WL 687251, 

at *5-6 (7th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024). For one thing, the statements Borizov submits do not remotely 

suggest that the prosecution withheld Brady material or suborned perjury. Furthermore, they are 

neither compelling nor reliable and consequently fail to approach the stringent Schlup standard or 

merit an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Carlos v. Williams, No. 14 C 1263, 2015 WL 5009354, at

*10 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2015) (in assessing reliability, “identity matters”; testimony from new 

witnesses with no evident motive to lie stands in contrast to testimony from “inmates, suspects, or 

friends . . . of the accused”); United States ex rel. Brisbon v. Fry, No. 000, 2004 WL 1244123, at 

*5 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2004) (inmate affidavits submitted in connection with the “miscarriage of 

justice” exception “are not uncommon and experience has shown that they are to be treated with a 

fair degree of skepticism”).

B. The Remaining Portions of Claim 1(b) Are Meritless 

As we observed above, Borizov asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

introducing certain evidence for the purpose of depicting Borizov as a bad person. On Borizov’s 

direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court considered the merits of the three evidentiary challenges 

in Claim 1(b) that are not defaulted. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act bars federal habeas relief for claims 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” Shirley v. Tegels, 61 F.4th 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)). “This deferential standard reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against 

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error 

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correction through appeal.” Id. (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Thus, habeas relief is 

precluded unless a petitioner demonstrates that the state court’s ruling was “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 

(2011)). A federal court cannot issue a habeas writ that rests on a belief that a state court 

misunderstood or misapplied state law. Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1098 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing, 

inter alia, Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192 n.5 (2009)). 

The three non-defaulted portions of Claim 1(b) are challenges to the prosecution’s 

introduction of evidence regarding (1) the death of Angela’s former boyfriend, Steve Hetman; (2) 

a hearsay statement made by Georgevich, Borizov’s uncle, to one of Nodarse’s coworkers; and (3) 

Borizov’s affiliation with the Latin Kings gang. As to Hetman, the prosecution had commented 

during opening statements that Borizov had “asked out his dead best friend’s girlfriend” within “a 

few months” of Hetman’s death. (Trial Tr., St. Ct. R., Ex. A (Dkt. No. 74-1), at 108.) Later, the 

prosecution briefly questioned Angela about Hetman’s death and the ensuing start of Angela and 

Borizov’s relationship, and defense counsel objected. (Id. at 250-51.) The trial court allowed the 

evidence “[j]ust for the time line of events.” (Id. at 251-52.) Hetman’s death was not mentioned 

by other witnesses or during closing arguments. While the appellate court agreed with Borizov 

that the State could have established a timeline of events without discussing the timing of Hetman’s 

death, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence because the 

relationship between Angela and Borizov was at the center of the case and there had been no 

objection to Angela’s testimony that Hetman was her former boyfriend. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-

U, ¶ 62. The court concluded that it was therefore not unreasonable for the trial court to allow 

evidence regarding the timing of Hetman’s death insofar as it pertained to the beginning of Angela 

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and Borizov’s relationship, especially considering that the trial court limited the likelihood that the 

probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Borizov

by warning the prosecution not to emphasize the timing, and the prosecution heeded that 

admonition. Id. 

The next challenge was to the prosecution’s introduction of testimony about an out-ofcourt statement made by Georgevich. There was evidence that after Thanksgiving 2009, Borizov 

helped Nodarse rent an apartment from Georgevich. Nodarse shared the apartment with Graham 

Morenz, a coworker at the car dealership. On direct examination, the prosecution asked Morenz 

if he had had any conversations with Georgevich after the Kramers were killed. The trial court 

sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection but on redirect permitted Morenz to answer the same 

question after overruling defense counsel’s objection that it was beyond the scope of crossexamination. (Trial Tr. at 1812, 1825-36.) Morenz answered that Georgevich told him “not to let 

the police search the apartment without a search warrant.” (Id. at 1836.) Borizov argued on appeal 

that the statement was hearsay, irrelevant, and prejudicial, serving only to show the jury that his 

family was hiding something. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶ 64. The appellate court agreed that 

the statement was hearsay4 but determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

allowing it. Id. ¶¶ 65-66. Defense counsel had opened the door to the statement by asking Morenz 

questions on cross-examination to establish that Georgevich was not doing favors for Borizov, and 

the prosecution on redirect was attempting to counter the defense’s implication that Borizov was 

not the “master” of Nodarse; under those circumstances, the court explained, the trial court’s ruling 

was not “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Id. ¶ 66. 

4 On this point, we respectfully disagree with the state court; a command is not hearsay 

because it is not an assertion of fact. See, e.g., Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 662 (7th 

Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, our conclusion in this respect does not assist Borizov. 

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Borizov also challenged the prosecution’s introduction of evidence that Borizov had 

obtained drugs from the Latin Kings street gang. Nodarse testified that he purchased his drugs 

from an individual named Henry Prucha before he began purchasing them from Borizov and that 

he had met Borizov for the first time at Prucha’s house. Prucha had testified earlier before a grand 

jury that the Latin Kings were Borizov’s primary source of drugs. The trial court permitted Prucha 

to testify that Borizov’s source was a street gang but ruled that Prucha could not specifically 

mention the Latin Kings. Later, on cross-examination of Borizov’s psychiatric expert, Dr. Mark 

Mills, however, the prosecution sought to discredit Mills’s opinion that Nodarse was intermittently 

psychotic and hallucinating at the relevant time by confronting him with Prucha’s grand jury 

testimony, in order to show that Nodarse did not misperceive Borizov’s representations that he 

was involved with the Latin Kings. After defense counsel objected on the ground that the court 

had previously barred the reference, the trial court observed that defense counsel earlier had agreed 

to play videotaped interviews of Nodarse that contained a number of references to the Latin Kings. 

(Trial Tr. at 3208-10.) Those videos were played prior to Dr. Mills’s testimony, so evidence about 

the Latin Kings had already been presented to the jury. The trial court overruled the objection on 

the ground that Prucha’s grand jury testimony that the Latin Kings were a source of Borizov’s 

drugs was relevant to Nodarse’s claim that Borizov had told him about his criminal involvement,

and there were conflicting expert opinions about the credibility of Nodarse’s testimony on the topic 

of his communications with Borizov. (Id. at 3210-13.) On appeal, Borizov argued that the 

prosecution’s questions were an attempt to “back door” evidence that was previously excluded. 

The appellate court disagreed, explaining that Prucha’s testimony supported Nodarse’s claim that 

he was convinced of Borizov’s criminal stature, and because the jury had previously heard 

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Nodarse’s multiple references to the Latin Kings, the probative value of Prucha’s testimony 

outweighed the danger of any unfair prejudice to Borizov. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 69-70. 

As to each of Borizov’s three non-defaulted evidentiary challenges, the Illinois Appellate 

Court held that under Illinois law, the evidence was not erroneously introduced by the prosecution 

or admitted by the trial court. Id. ¶¶ 58-70 (citing Ill. R. Evid. 401, 403, & 801(c) and People v. 

Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 89 (2001) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to evidentiary rulings). 

Respondent contends that Borizov “cannot challenge” these determinations because the rulings 

turned on state law, (Answer at 43), but that is incorrect. It is true that in the context of a habeas 

petition we do not review the rulings as a matter of state law, but, as the Seventh Circuit has 

explained, we can consider a state court’s evidentiary rulings when they implicate a federal

constitutional question. Fieldman v. Brannon, 969 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2020). It is nonetheless 

rare for a “[r]un-of-the-mill” error of state law to “provide a basis for federal habeas relief” because 

a petitioner must show that the state court rendered its merits decision “in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); see also 

Ruhl, 743 F.3d at 1098 (“In essence, Ruhl asks us to overturn the Illinois Appellate Court’s 

determination that the statements were admissible under Illinois law. As a general rule, this is not 

something we can do. Only in very rare cases where the state court’s resolution of the evidentiary 

dispute was clearly unreasonable or otherwise implicates federal constitutional rights has this court 

granted habeas relief on state law evidentiary questions.”) (citations omitted). 

Borizov invokes his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in Claim 1, but he does not 

develop any argument whatsoever as to how the state court’s evidentiary rulings were contrary to 

or involved an unreasonable application of federal law pertaining to those rights or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence, nor does he cite any law in support of this claim. 

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Therefore, Borizov falls well short of demonstrating that the state court’s thorough analysis of the 

evidentiary issues was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103; see also Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2018) (habeas relief is 

appropriate solely in “those relatively uncommon cases in which state courts veer well outside the 

channels of reasonable decision-making about federal constitutional claims”). Very little trial time 

was spent on the challenged evidence, all of which was peripheral to the central facts of the case, 

and nothing in the record suggests that its introduction and admission resulted in a violation of due 

process or any of Borizov’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas relief 

on Claim 1(b). 

C. Claim 1(a) Is Meritless

In Claim 1(a), Borizov asserts that several statements made by the prosecution in closing 

argument deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On direct appeal, the 

Illinois Appellate Court discussed the prosecution’s remarks in detail and held that although four 

of them were improper, they did not play a material role in Borizov’s convictions because the 

evidence was not closely balanced, and they did not create a pervasive pattern of misconduct that 

resulted in unfair prejudice. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 76-124. 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), provides the clearly established federal law 

for Borizov’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

5

 See Evans v. Jones, 996 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 

2021). “Under Darden, a prosecutor’s improper statements deprive a criminal defendant of his 

5 Although the Illinois Appellate Court did not cite Darden, the court correctly articulated 

its standards when considering Borizov’s claim that the prosecution’s comments deprived him of 

a fair trial. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶ 78. It then applied the standards by first evaluating

whether the prosecution’s comments were improper, concluding that four of them were, and 

proceeding to examine whether Borizov was prejudiced as a result. Id. ¶¶ 82-124. 

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right to a fair trial if the remarks ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181); see also Bell v. Hepp, 

70 F.4th 385, 390 (7th Cir. 2023). A defendant seeking relief under Darden embarks on an “uphill 

battle,” for improper statements during closing arguments “rarely constitute reversible error.” 

Evans, 996 F.3d at 775 (quoting United States v. Klemis, 859 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 2017)). The 

Darden standard is “highly generalized” and its application “can demand a substantial element of 

judgment,” so state courts have significant leeway in applying it. Id.; Bell, 70 F.4th at 390. 

Nevertheless, even within the federal habeas framework, deference does not imply abandonment 

or abdication of judicial review. Evans, 966 F.3d at 775.

The first step in applying Darden is analyzing the comments under scrutiny to determine 

whether they were improper. Id. Borizov’s challenges fall into three categories, which he labeled 

in his direct appeal as (1) comments ridiculing defense counsel; (2) comments disparaging 

Borizov; and (3) misstatements of law. (Direct Appeal Br. at 23-34.) Respondent contends that 

the state court’s rejection of all but four of Borizov’s challenges was reasonable. We agree for the 

reasons discussed below. 

1. The Illinois Appellate Court Reasonably Concluded that Most of the 

Prosecution’s Comments Were Not Improper

a. Comments Critical of the Defense

Borizov argued that it was improper for the prosecution to characterize the defense’s theory 

as “laughable,” “ludicrous,” a “joke,” and something that “should be thrown in a giant dumpster.” 

(Trial Tr. at 3571, 3578, 3579, 3593.) The prosecution further stated that defense counsel was 

trying to “trick,” fool[],” and “distract” the jury with “strateg[ies]” and “tactic[s].” (Id. at 3572, 

3574, 3583, 3590, 3591.) Toward the end of the rebuttal closing, the prosecution remarked, “They 

want you to believe Jake Nodarse . . . is hallucinating about only Johnny Borizov. How gullible 

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do they think you are? Do they think you are a zero on a gullibility scale?” (Id. at 3599.) The 

prosecution also declared that Borizov “thinks he is going to outsmart us all. The law is not dumb. 

And neither are you.” (Id. at 3611.) Borizov asserted on appeal that it was outside the bounds of 

proper argument to mock the defense and tell the jury that defense counsel was employing 

deception and relying on the jurors’ being gullible or dumb. (Direct Appeal Br. at 28-31.) 

The Illinois Appellate Court found that there was error only as to the comment about the 

jurors’ “gullibility scale.” 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 87-89. A prosecutor may not argue 

that defense counsel is attempting to dupe jurors; such comments tend to improperly shift the focus 

away from the actual evidence in a case. Id. ¶ 87. The “gullibility scale” comment, said the court, 

did not pertain to the evidence presented or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it; rather, 

the comment served no purpose but to draw the jury’s attention away from the actual issues in the 

case and prejudice them against the defense.6

 Id. ¶ 89. But there was no error as to the remainder 

of the remarks in the first category since they were made not to disparage defense counsel but to 

criticize the defense’s theory of the case, and it is permissible for a prosecutor to challenge the 

credibility and persuasiveness of a defense theory. Id. ¶ 85 (citing cases). 

The court’s conclusions were appropriate. Aside from the “gullibility scale” comment, the 

prosecution’s statements about defense counsel’s arguments were harsh but not improper. Rather 

than disparaging defense counsel personally, they targeted the defense’s theory of the case. A 

prosecutor is permitted to criticize defense counsel’s tactics and attack defense theories. Tijerina 

v. Lashbrook, No. 14 C 343, 2017 WL 1319669, at *5-6 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017); United 

States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 254 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Washington, 417 F.3d 780, 

6 The court also observed that the remark was incorrectly phrased; if a juror was considered 

a “zero on the gullibility scale,” they would not be gullible at all. Id. ¶ 89. 

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786-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no misconduct where the prosecutor characterized defense 

counsel’s arguments as “made up,” “absolutely false,” “ridiculous,” and “ludicrous,” reasoning 

that while the remarks “pushed the bounds of zealous advocacy,” they were “largely focused on 

the lameness of the defense rather than defense counsel personally”). 

b. Comments Critical of Borizov

The second category of comments comprises those that Borizov claims were made for the 

sole purpose of disparaging him. First, the prosecution said that Borizov has an “evil heart.” (Trial 

Tr. at 3420.) Second, the prosecution argued that Borizov “hated” Angela and referred to a 

bartender’s testimony that in February 2010, Borizov was at a bar with other women and made

derogatory statements about Angela, including “fuck that bitch.” (Id. at 2302, 3421, 3575.) Third, 

the prosecution portrayed Borizov as a bad father by commenting that he did not want Angela to 

go to a meeting to apply for “aid for children,” and he was “out” on nights when he had custody 

of Nicholas, including when he went to the casino on the night of the killings. (Id. at 3439-40, 

3445, 3470.) Fourth, the prosecution stated that “if [Borizov] didn’t [solicit and assist Nodarse in 

committing the crimes], he is not guilty of anything, and he walks out the door and he can go fight 

some more for custody of Nicholas,” thereby improperly suggesting that the jury should convict 

Borizov to protect Nicholas from him. (Id. at 3572.)

The Illinois Appellate Court concluded that most of the prosecution’s remarks about 

Borizov constituted error, reasoning that the “evil heart” remark referred to Borizov himself, not 

his plan, and it is improper to call a defendant “evil”; the comment regarding Borizov’s opposition 

to Angela’s attending the aid meeting pertained to excluded evidence (which the State conceded); 

and the statement in rebuttal about the future custody of Nicholas was irrelevant and should have 

been met with an instruction to the jury to disregard it. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 91-101. 

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The court held that it was not error, however, for the prosecution to assert that Borizov 

hated Angela because it was reasonable to infer from the evidence, including Borizov’s own 

statements about her, that he felt that way. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶ 96. Furthermore, since 

defense counsel had stated in his opening statement that Borizov was a “great father” who “loved 

and still loves Angela Kramer to this day,” (Trial Tr. at 172), the prosecution did not err in 

commenting on Borizov’s conversation at the bar or the fact that he was not at home on certain 

nights when he had custody of Nicholas. Id. These conclusions were not unreasonable. The 

prosecution’s assertion that Borizov “hated” Angela was a fair inference from the evidence, which 

included the bartender’s testimony concerning Borizov’s visit to the bar with other women and 

derogatory statements about Angela. Inferences drawn from the evidence are “fair game for 

closing argument.” London v. Clements, 600 F. App’x 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2015); Duncan v. 

Atchison, No. 12 C 10362, 2014 WL 4062737, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (a prosecutor may 

characterize evidence in a way that does not benefit the defendant). In addition, the comment, as 

well as the comments about Borizov having been out on nights when he had custody of Nicholas, 

including the night of the murders, was permissible as a direct response to defense counsel’s 

assertions about Borizov. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Harrington, No. 14 C 4118, 2017 WL 4699241, 

at *14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2017) (prosecution’s statements in closing argument are not improper 

when responsive to defense remarks).

c. Comments on the Law

The third category of challenged remarks consists of three statements the prosecution made 

during rebuttal closing argument, which Borizov says are misstatements of law. The first instance 

related to Nodarse’s testimony that he may have kicked in the door to Angela’s bedroom on the 

night of the murders. Angela had previously testified that she did not recall her door having been 

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kicked. Defense counsel presented a theory in closing argument that in fact the door was not 

kicked in, and Nodarse had never gone upstairs to “go after” Angela, because his real motive on 

the night of the killings was to kill Michael. (Trial Tr. at 3535-37.) In rebuttal, the prosecution 

pointed out that during extensive cross-examination of an investigator who was at the crime scene 

on March 2, 2010, defense counsel did not inquire about whether Angela’s door had been kicked 

in. (Trial Tr. at 3586-87.) This remark, Borizov argued, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 

by focusing on potentially exculpatory evidence that defense counsel had failed to elicit. (Direct 

Appeal Br. at 27-28.) 

The Illinois Appellate Court held that the prosecution’s remark was not error; defense 

counsel had provoked the response by asserting in closing argument that a lack of evidence 

regarding Angela’s door supported the defense’s theory of the case. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U,

¶¶ 103-04. This determination was reasonable. By arguing in closing that Nodarse was an 

unreliable witness and that he had never gone upstairs at the Kramers’ home based on the lack of 

physical evidence that Angela’s door had been kicked in, defense counsel had invited the 

prosecution’s observation in rebuttal that defense counsel never cross-examined the detective 

about whether such evidence was found. Under those circumstances, the prosecution’s comment 

was permissible and did not shift the burden of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 

243, 255 (7th Cir. 1995) (where the defense theory rests on the unreliability of the government’s 

witness and there are witnesses other than defendant who can provide evidence to support the 

defense theory, a prosecutor may imply that the failure of the defense to present available evidence 

in opposition to the government’s witness (other than the defendant’s testimony) supports a 

conclusion that the government’s witness is reliable); United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308, 1314 

(7th Cir. 1993) (commenting on a defendant’s failure to ask particular questions of a witness does 

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not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof unless it taxes the exercise of the defendant’s 

right not to testify). 

The second purported misstatement of law pertained to the jury instruction on accomplicewitness testimony, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal No. 3.17, which states that the 

testimony of a witness who says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant 

is subject to suspicion and should be considered with caution and examined in light of the other 

evidence. After stating that the instruction “makes sense” and the jury “should follow it,” the 

prosecution told the jury: 

We don’t have two guys that are arrested at the same time. Or they don’t have to 

be arrested at the same time. But it’s not that kind of case. And go ahead and 

analyze what [Nodarse] says. It’s too late now. You have already analyzed it 

beyond belief. You have heard him for three days testifying, and you have seen 

hours and hours of video. So, you already accomplished that goal. 

(Trial Tr. at 3587-88.) Borizov contended that this statement was essentially an invitation to 

disregard the instruction due to the length of time Nodarse spent on the stand as well as an 

inaccurate suggestion that it was too late for the jury to critically assess Nodarse’s testimony at a 

point in the trial when it was not permitted to have begun evaluating the evidence. (Direct Appeal 

Br. at 26-27.) 

The appellate court found that the prosecution’s comment about the accomplice-witness 

instruction, while “undoubtedly careless,” was not improper because it did not amount to a 

direction to disregard the instruction and any possible error was cured by the jury’s having received 

the proper instruction. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶ 107. This determination was reasonable. 

The prosecution’s remarks were somewhat disjointed and difficult to follow in the first place, and 

a close examination when read in context indicates that it did not reach the level of an improper 

invitation to disregard the instruction. The prosecution prefaced the remarks by stating twice that 

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the jury should follow the instruction, so the gist was simply that Nodarse’s testimony held up 

under suspicion. Even if the remarks sent a mixed message about the accomplice-witness 

instruction, it was cured by the trial court having subsequently provided the instruction to the jury. 

See, e.g., Clark v. Lashbrook, 906 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To the extent that any prejudice 

arose due to the ambiguous nature of the [prosecutor’s] statement, the clear jury instructions cured 

it.”); Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555, 566 (7th Cir. 2005). 

In the third challenged statement, the prosecution told the jury at the close of its rebuttal 

argument: “If you follow the law like you promised and you follow the evidence which you heard, 

there is only one choice that you have. And that is to find this defendant guilty of everything he 

is charged with.” (Trial Tr. at 3612.) Borizov argued that this statement was an improper 

admonition to the jury that they would not be living up to their oath should they return a verdict of

not guilty. (Direct Appeal Br. at 25-26.) 

Although the court found that the prosecution’s assertion that the jury could only render 

one appropriate verdict in accordance with its promise “flew dangerously close to the line of 

impropriety,” it did not find error in the remarks. 2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶¶ 108-10. The 

court explained that since defense counsel reminded the jury on several occasions during closing 

argument that it had promised to hold the State to its burden of proof, counsel had opened the door 

to the prosecution’s lone reference to the jury’s promise. Id. ¶ 110. This analysis was not 

unreasonable. While the prosecution’s commentary was ham-handed because it risked implying 

that the jury’s oath compelled it to convict Borizov, it came on the heels of defense counsel’s use 

of the refrain “you promised” in her closing argument to the jury. (Trial Tr. at 3568, 3570.) And, 

as Respondent points out, the prosecution’s comment did not amount to a statement that the jury 

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would not be doing its job if it acquitted Borizov. The prosecution called for a verdict premised 

on the evidence, which is proper. 

2. The Illinois Appellate Court Reasonably Concluded that the Prosecution’s 

Improper Comments Did Not Deprive Borizov of His Right to a Fair Trial

Under Darden, only if a prosecutor’s statements were improper must we decide whether 

they “so infected the trial with unfairness” to have denied Borizov his due process right to a fair 

trial. See Evans, 996 F.3d at 775. A prosecutor’s remarks are measured within the context of the 

trial as a whole to determine whether there was prejudicial error. Carter v. Ryker, No. 10 C 3783, 

2011 WL 589687, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2011). 

As discussed above, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the prosecution made four 

errors during closing argument: the “gullibility scale” comment, the suggestion that Nicholas’s 

future custody was a factor the jury should consider, and the statements that Borizov had an “evil 

heart” and did not want Angela to go to the “aid for children” meeting. 2015 IL App (2d) 1307360-

U, ¶ 112. Thus, we must decide whether those improper comments deprived Borizov of a fair 

trial. See Evans, 996 F.3d at 778. Several factors guide our inquiry: whether the prosecution 

misstated evidence; whether the remarks implicated Borizov’s specific rights; whether the defense 

invited the comments; the trial court’s instructions; Borizov’s opportunity to rebut the improper 

remarks; and the weight of the evidence against Borizov. See id. at 778-79 (citing Darden, 477 

U.S. at 181). The weight of the evidence is most important, but the factors are not applied rigidly, 

and we use them only as a guide to decide whether there was fundamental unfairness that “infected 

the bottom line.” Id. at 779 (quoting Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 903 (7th Cir. 2001)).

When considering whether the improper remarks were a material factor in Borizov’s 

convictions, the state court first set out the elements of the charged crimes:

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Defendant does not dispute that Nodarse committed the first-degree murders of 

Michael, Jeffrey, and Lori. . . . [T]he State’s theory was that defendant was 

accountable for these crimes. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of 

another when, “either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the 

intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, 

or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 

720 ILCS 5/5–2(c) (West 2010). The State also charged defendant with the 

solicitation of Angela’s murder. A person commits the offense of solicitation of 

murder when, with the intent that the offense of first-degree murder be committed, 

he or she “commands, encourages, or requests another to commit that offense.” 720 

ILCS 5/8–1(b) (West 2010). The jury was instructed accordingly regarding each 

of the charged crimes.

2015 IL App (2d) 130736-U, ¶ 113. The court then reviewed the evidence, which centered on 

Nodarse’s testimony that Borizov convinced him of the need to kill the Kramers, in part because 

of claimed threats from members of his criminal organization; helped Nodarse devise the plan to 

kill them; and told him precisely when and how to carry out the plan. Id. ¶¶ 114-15. The court 

acknowledged that Nodarse’s story presented “obvious cause for skepticism” but observed that he 

consistently recounted the same story when he was interviewed three times in the days following 

the murders, and the interviews occurred before he agreed to testify against Borizov in exchange 

for dismissal of two of the murder charges. Id. ¶ 116. 

The court also discussed the extensive evidence corroborating various aspects of Nodarse’s 

story. Angela had testified that she was at a casino with Borizov in 2007 when he told her that he 

needed to be captured on surveillance video because he had “people out there doing stuff” for him. 

Id. ¶ 117. Nodarse later testified that Borizov told him to kill the Kramers at precisely 3:00 a.m. 

on March 2 because Borizov intended to be somewhere with surveillance cameras that could verify 

his alibi. Id. Borizov was indeed captured on surveillance video at a casino at the time Nodarse 

killed the Kramers. Id. A witness testified that she spoke with Borizov while the two smoked 

cigarettes around 3:30 a.m. and that he appeared nervous and repeatedly checked his phone. Id. 

There was also testimony from other witnesses corroborating Nodarse’s belief that Borizov was 

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dangerous and involved with powerful criminals as well as his belief that he was going to be killed 

on the night of February 20, 2010. Id. ¶¶ 118-19. Furthermore, there was evidence that Nodarse 

had written a lengthy suicide note to his family before the killings, in which he stated that although 

he had done “nothing” to the people he believed were threatening him, “they wanted to kill me 

and all of you” and that he had considered informing the police, but that option would have 

endangered his family because the people who posed a threat “know cops that are bad and help 

them find people!” Id. ¶ 120. 

The jury also heard evidence that Nodarse and Borizov communicated very frequently until 

two days before the killings, the point at which Nodarse said Borizov had instructed him to stop 

calling and texting him. Id. ¶ 121. Between January 17 and February 27, 2010, Borizov called 

Nodarse 179 times, and Nodarse called Borizov 171 times, with at least one call each day. They 

also texted each other 80 times between February 6 and February 27, with at least one text each 

day. But on February 28 and March 1, neither called or texted the other. On the day of the murders, 

Nodarse called Borizov six times, but Borizov did not answer and did not call Nodarse. Id. 

Finally, the jury heard audiotapes in which Borizov had made several statements to 

Nodarse while the two men were in holding cells at the Darien police station after the murders. Id.

¶ 122. Borizov told Nodarse that they were likely being recorded, but nonetheless asked him, 

“Gloves on out there?” Id. Nodarse replied, “Gloves for like winter football.” Id. Borizov 

responded, “Then why are these people telling me you left prints out there?” Id. Later, Borizov 

asked Nodarse where he had left his gun and whether he had directed police to the gun. Id. 

In light of all this evidence, the Illinois Appellate Court disagreed with Borizov’s 

contention that this was a closely balanced case. Id. ¶ 124. It also concluded that while the 

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prosecution’s four improper comments were “disturb[ing],” it did not believe that they constituted 

a pervasive pattern of misconduct that resulted in unfair prejudice to Borizov. Id. 

We agree with Respondent that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably concluded that 

Borizov was not prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the prosecution’s four improper comments 

in closing argument. It is true that defense counsel did not invite the comments and Borizov did 

not have the opportunity to rebut those regarding custody of Nicholas and the gullibility scale

because they were made during the rebuttal closing. But the remarks were fleeting, and Borizov 

did have the opportunity to rebut the “evil heart” comment and the remark that he did not want 

Angela to attend the children’s-aid meeting. Furthermore, the remaining Darden factors do not 

support Borizov’s claim. While the comment about the meeting referred to excluded evidence, 

the comments did not involve misstatements of the evidence, and they do not appear to have 

implicated any of Borizov’s specific constitutional rights. Additionally, the record reflects that the 

trial court instructed the jury that it was to determine the facts only from the evidence in the case 

and apply the law to the facts to decide the case; the evidence consisted only of the testimony of 

the witnesses and the exhibits that the court had received; opening and closing statements are not 

evidence; and it should disregard any statement or argument the attorneys made that was not based 

on the evidence. (Trial Tr. at 3618-20.) Most importantly, the evidence weighed strongly against 

Borizov. As outlined above, the State presented substantial evidence that Borizov was legally 

responsible for Nodarse’s conduct, including evidence that corroborated Nodarse’s account of 

events. “Strong evidence of guilt eliminates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor’s remarks 

unfairly prejudiced the jury’s deliberations.” Lieberman v. Washington, 128 F.3d 1085, 1098 (7th 

Cir. 1997) (brackets omitted). Viewing Borizov’s trial as a whole and considering the Darden

factors, we hold that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably found that the prosecution’s four 

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isolated improper comments did not deprive Borizov of a fair trial. Accordingly, no federal habeas 

relief is warranted on Claim 1(a). 

For the reasons stated above, we deny habeas relief on all of Borizov’s claims. 

D. Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 

requires us to “issue or deny a certificate of appealability” when we enter “a final order adverse to 

the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may issue only if the petitioner has made “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In deciding 

whether a certificate of appealability should issue, “the only question is whether the applicant has 

shown that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional 

claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (internal punctuation and citation 

omitted). Because Borizov has failed to make such a showing, we decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we deny Johnny Borizov’s amended § 2254 petition [43] and 

decline to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is directed to substitute as 

Respondent Charles Truitt, Warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and alter the case caption to 

Borizov v. Truitt. Civil case terminated.

____________________________________

Marvin E. Aspen

United States District Judge

Date: March 28, 2024

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