Copyright	©	2016,	Oracle	and/or	its	affiliates.	All	rights	reserved.

The	Internet	of	Infrastructure	Threats

IoT,	DDoS,	and	Future	Internet	Architecture

Andrew	Sullivan

NIST	IoT	Cybersecurity	Colloquium

Thanks	to	my	colleagues	Chris	Baker	and	Marshall	Everson
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Who	Am	I	&	Why	Should	You	Believe	Me?

•Working	on	Internet	Infrastructure	since	2001

–Especially	DNS

•At	Oracle	Dyn	since	2012

•Internet	Architecture	Board	from	2013	to	2017

–Chair	from	2015-2017

•Primary	concern:	resilience	and	scalability	of	Internet

My	views	are	not	necessarily	those	of	the	Oracle	Corporation.

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IDEAL

•Mostly	distributed

•Resilience	through	operational	

diversity

•Mostly	small	operations	for	

specific	purposes

•Many,	many	operators

ACTUAL

•Highly	concentrated	

•Resilience	through	operational	

scale

•Distributed	operations	by	a	few	

large	players	&	common	

protocols

•A	few	huge	operators,	and	a	long	

tail	of	tiny	ones

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The	Internet’s	Distributed	Architecture
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An	Example:	Oracle	Dyn	Anycast Network

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Reminder:	DDoS	Has	Flavours

Something 

bad from 

spoofed address 

(smurf attack, 

DNS query for big 

record, ping of 

death, etc.)
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IoT:	A	New	Botnet	Environment!
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Reminder:	Bots	and	Botnets

● Bot:	An	autonomous	program	on	a	network	(especially	the	Internet)	

that	can	interact	with	computer	systems	or	users.

● Botnet:	A network	of	private	computers	infected	with	(usually)	

malicious	software	and	controlled	as	a	group (usually) without	the	

owners’ knowledge.

● Bot herder: An	individual	who	controls	and	maintains	a	botnet	by	

installing	botnet	software	in	numerous	machines,	putting	these	

machines	into	his	or	her	control.
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• Espionage

• Chaos

• Includes	cyber-war,	

terrorism,	&c.

• Money

Why?
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“Keep	Up	With	Patches”	Not	Enough

We	will	run	out	of	time	before	They	run	out	of	compromises

•Fingerprinted	a	sample	of	3,000	IPs	(of	~4.1	million	unique	A	record	IPs	

in	dynamic	DNS	data).

–10%	of	the	devices	in	the	sample	are	affected

–Use	case	that	encourages	owners	to	open	them	to	the	Internet.

•Example:	IP	Cameras

–Use	case	of	many	devices	promotes	bandwidth	and	computing	power

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Use	case	that	encourages	

owners	to	open	them	to	

the	Internet.

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This	is	what	

we	wanted!
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1. Incentives	for	security	are	backwards:	

Usability	is	harder

2. Pressure	to	ship	==	ship	soon,	secure	

later

3. More	devices	than	people

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All	About	Incentives
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End-to-end	Need	Not	Mean	Network	Endpoint

•End-to-end	model	is	often	interpreted	to	mean	“network	endpoint”

•Better	understood	as	end	of	functional	communication

–Need	not	be	at	endmost	point

–Application	perspective	needed

•We	forgot	that	many	networks	are	nevertheless	“Internet	sites”

–No	network	manager	!=	not	a	network

•Create	the	incentives	for	safe	operation

–S.1691	a	good	move	in	this	way

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Some	Will	Be	Keen	To	See	Outright	Regulation

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The	roots	of	the	unsafe	vehicle	problem	are	so	

entrenched	that	the	situation	can	be	improved	only	by	

the	forging	of	new	instruments	of	citizen	action.	

–Ralph	Nader
1414

Time	we	don’t	have

Treaties	Take	

Time
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What	Is	To	Be	Done?

•Continue	to	pursue	incentives	for	vendors

•Build	(your)	infrastructure	with	multiple	providers

•Promote	and	develop	good	tools	for	unmanaged	networks

–Internet	Engineering	Task	Force	HOMENET,	&c.

•Understand	control	points

–Building	everything	with	controls	back	in	the	cloud	means	service	failure	if	you	

can’t	reach	the	cloud

–The	Internet’s	design	is	more	resilient,	so	buy	systems	that	work	that	way

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Thank	you!