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COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TEXAS CUSTOM POOLS, INC., F/K/A

RIVERBEND POOLS, INC.,

 Appellant,

v.

ALLAN CLAYTON and MIRIAM

CLAYTON,

 Appellees.

§

§

§

§

§

 § 

No. 08-07-00197-CV

Appeal from the

393rd Judicial District Court

of Denton County, Texas 

(TC# 2000-60215-393)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a joint motion to dismiss this appeal in accordance with

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a). The parties represent that they have reached an agreement to settle and

compromise all claims and causes of action in the underlying case, and request that this Court

vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal.

An intermediate court of appeals is authorized to vacate a trial court’s judgment and

dismiss the underlying case. See TEX.R.APP.P. 43.2(e). Further, Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 42.1 permits an appellate court to dispose of an appeal pursuant to a settlement

agreement. TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(2). We may render judgment effectuating the parties’

settlement agreement, set aside the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court

for rendition of judgment in accordance with the agreement, or abate the appeal and permit the

trial court to conduct proceedings to effectuate the agreement. TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(2). While

we are authorized to vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the underlying case, we are not
authorized to both vacate the judgment and dismiss the appeal.

Therefore, having considered the motion and the action requested by the parties, we will

GRANT the motion in part and vacate the trial court’s judgment dated March 19, 2007, without

consideration of the merits and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in

accordance with the settlement agreement. With regard to the parties’ request that we dismiss

the appeal, the motion is denied. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, costs will be taxed

against the party incurring the same. See TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(d). We direct the Clerk of the Court

to issue the mandate of the Court immediately.

August 31, 2010

DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Chief Justice

Before Chew, C.J., McClure, and Rivera, JJ.

-2-
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 393 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                        March 26, 1998.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 3246) to assist small businesses and labor organizations in defending 
themselves against Government bureaucracy; to ensure that employees entitled to 
reinstatement get their jobs back quickly; to protect the right of employers to 
have a hearing to present their case in certain representation cases; and to 
prevent the use of the National Labor Relations Act for the purpose of 
disrupting or inflicting economic harm on employers. The first reading of the 
bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and 
shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Education and the Workforce. After 
general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute 
rule. The bill shall be considered as read. No amendment shall be in order 
except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
resolution. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the 
report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be 
subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. The Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any 
amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes the minimum time for electronic voting 
on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote without 
intervening business, provided that the minimum time for electronic voting on 
the first in any series of questions shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of 
consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the 
bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous 
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or 
without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-1981

RUGYA MOHAMED MUKHTAR, Petitioner,
versus JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A79-477-319) Submitted: May 28, 2004 Decided: June 17, 2004 Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James A. Roberts, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES A. ROBERTS, Falls Church, Virginia, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Mary Jane Candaux, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rugya Mohamed Mukhtar, a native and citizen of Sudan, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In her petition for review, Mukhtar raises challenges to the immigration judge’s determination that she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. Specifically, she challenges the immigration judge’s finding that she lacked credibility. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence [s]he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Mukhtar fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that she seeks. Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of Mukhtar’s request for withholding of removal. The standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than that for granting asylum. Chen v. INS , 195 F.3d 198, 205 (4th Cir. 1999). To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate “a clear probability of persecution.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480- 3 - U.S. 421, 430 (1987). Because Mukhtar fails to show that she is eligible for asylum, she cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. Mukhtar also claims that the Board erred in affirming the decision of the immigration judge without opinion, after review by a single Board member, in accordance with the procedure set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2003). To the extent that Mukhtar claims that this procedure violated her rights under the Due Process Clause, we find that this claim is squarely foreclosed by our recent decision in Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft , 362 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2004). We further find that summary affirmance was appropriate in this case under the factors set forth in § 1003.1(e)(4). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### William F. Near v. Peter Lowe, Samuel J. P. Smead and Charles Rayner, adm’r for John Rayner.

*Partner's right to accounting*— When *barrred.*

*A.*partner’s right to an accounting is not barred in six years where the-partnership articles are under seal and contain covenants. No claim, under such articles would be barred in that time unless raised in an. action of assumpsit.

The statute of limitations, if it runs at all against a partner’s right to an' accounting, is barred by dealings in 0e shape of a showing of balances.

Where partnership articles provided that the partnership should expire by limitation, but the business was allowed to run on until a later date when a new firm was formed, leaving out one of the original' partners, and bringing in another, it was *held*that the partner who. was dropped had a right to an accounting from the members of the: new firm.

Appeal from Ingham.

Submitted October 18.

Decided October 31.

Bill for accounting. Complainant appeals.

BeversecL.

*J. O. Shields*and *M. V. Montgomery*for complainant..

*Ohatterton ds Moynes*for defendants.

Campbell, J.

Complainant filed his bill for an accounting concerning a partnership of which he, defendant Lowe,, and John Bayner were members, which was to expire bj limitation in May, 1871. .The business in fact ran on until July 31, 1871, when a new firm was formed which introduced defendant Smead, and left out complainant. He-claims that he has ’had no account of the business, and also' that he should share in the new business.

The testimony indicates that there has been no accounting, although it is claimed he received money in full of his proportion. Possibly he did, but he was entitled to know how matters stood, and there is testimony indicating that ho-*483did not receive credit in full for what was due him. This i can only be cleared up by an account showing the whole state of affairs.

It was held by the court below that the right to an account was barred in six years, as decided in *Jenny v. Perkins*17 Mich. 28. That case held that the legal analogy would properly apply in case there were no equities to the contrary* As the articles of partnership were under seal and contained; covenants the legal bar of six years could only arise in am action of *assumpsit. Christy v. Farlin*ante, p. 319. In | other actions it would require ten years. Moreover there were dealings within six years, in the shape of an alleged-showing of balances, which .would cut off the bar, had it. otherwise existed. ■ i

As the circuit court did not pass upon any other questíomi we shall not attempt to determine the merits beyond ordering an accounting. Until that is taken we do not think it. clear that defendant Smead should be discharged. It may be that the new firm has dealt in such a way as to involve it in the account. *We*have no means of knowing how this is,. and when the final decree is granted full justice can be. done to all parties.

The decree must be reversed with costs, and the cause? remanded for an accounting.

The other Justices concurred.
EXHIBIT 31.2
**CERTIFICATION**
I, G. Peter D’Aloia, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of American StandardCompanies Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;
(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter inthe case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and
1

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.
Date: July 29, 2004     By: /s/ G. Peter D’Aloia     G. Peter D’Aloia   Sr. Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
2
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

GENE AUSTIN,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-50082

D.C. No. 5:07-cr-00146-SGL-1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen G. Larson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 5, 2010

Pasadena, California

Before: B. FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Gene Austin appeals his conviction for assaulting a United States Bureau of

Prisons officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). Austin argues that the

trial court erred because it failed to provide the jury with a sufficiently precise

instruction that the jury must agree on the particular conduct that violated the

FILED

FEB 19 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

statute. We disagree. Even assuming that Austin was entitled to a “specific

unanimity” instruction, see, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991);

United States v. Gavin, 959 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1992), the district court

instructed the jury that they must agree on the “particular act that amounted to

assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering” with the

officer. This instruction was adequate.

 AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 23.1





            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the  Registration  Statement on
Form S-8 (No.  333-123943) of SmartPros Ltd. and Subsidiary  (the  "Company") of
our report dated February 28, 2008, relating to the financial  statements of the
Company included in the Company's Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended
December 31, 2007.











// Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP
--------------------------------
Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP

Melville, New York
March 24, 2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. 

# United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–———— No. 01 - 5376 September Term, 2002 00cv02560 Filed On: February 4, 2003

T ULARE C OUNTY, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v. G EORGE W. B USH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS P RESIDENT OF THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA, ET AL., APPELLEES N ATURAL R ESOURCES D EFENSE C OUNCIL, ET AL., I NTERVENORS

–———— BEFORE : Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Edwards, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge O R D E R Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a vote, it is2 ORDERED that the petition be denied.* Per Curiam FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk BY: Deputy Clerk * A separate statement of the panel is attached.1 Statement of the Panel PER CURIAM: Contrary to Tulare County’s argument, the court examined the complaint against a no more rigorous standard of pleading than that of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for example, of Count III of the complaint because it contained no factual allegations that any part of the Monument lacked scientific or historical value. The allegation that Sequoia groves comprise only six percent of the Monument might well have been sufficient if the President had identified only Sequoia groves for protection, but he did not; the Proclamation covered natural resources present throughout the Monument area. It was therefore incumbent upon Tulare County to allege that some part of the Monument did not, in fact, contain natural resources that the President sought to protect. That, and nothing more, is what led the court to conclude that the complaint did not identify improperly designated lands ‘‘with sufficient particularity.’’
#### B. Groom *v.*T. B. Oldham & Ellison and J. Barnes White & Co.

Trial — Findings of Court — Effect.

"Where the issues in two cases do not come within equitable jurisdiction, an agreement to transfer the cases to a court of equity amounts to an agreement to submit the law and facts of the case . to the judge without a jury, and the finding of the judge has the force and effect of a verdict.

Action — Consolidation—Evidence.

The consolidation of several causes, of action authorizes the court to consider all the testimony that is competent in either case.

*481APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY 'CIRCUIT COURT.

February 19, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The only reason why the two ordinary actions against the appellant were transferred to equity was that Barnes White and Company were prosecuting an equity suit against Oldham to subject his ■claims against Groom to the payment' of a debt due to them. Old-ham, upon the record, relinquished the benefit of his claims to Barnes White *&*Company, and his assignee in bankruptcy also disclaimed ■any interest in them.

The effect'of this was to substitute Barnes White & Co. to the •rights of Oldham- and to leave their controversy with Groom without even the shadow of an equitable issue. As a matter of law in so far as the litigation with Groom is concerned, there never was .a question or issue raised which would give a court of equity the slightest pretext for assuming jurisdiction of the litigation. In view •of these facts the agreement to transfer the two actions to equity was in effect an agreement to submit the law and facts of the two ■ordinary actions to the decision of the judge without the intervention of a jury, and his finding must be treated as the verdict of a jury.

The evidence as to the contracts between Groom and Gillispie & Oldham for the purchase of the horses is conflicting, and the judgment of the special judge can not be regarded as palpably against the weight of it.

We conceive that it was not erroneous to consider the last deposition given by Oldham'; he was no longer a party to the record and had no interest in the controversy.

It was not erroneous to consider the testimony of the deceased witness, Taylor, as set out in the bill of exceptions heretofore made up in one of these actions. *O’Brien v. Commonwealth,*6 Bush 563. The contract of sale of the three horses was essentially one and ■the same. The testimony of Taylor necessarily applied to the certain transaction. He was cross-examined by Groom. The two •causes had long been treated by all the litigants as one and the same, and the judgment of the special chancellor recites that the ■three actions of *Oldham v. Groom, Oldham & Gillispie v. Groom,*and *Barnes White & Co. v. Oldham, etc.,*were consolidated and by *482consent heard together. This recital must be taken as true. The consolidation of the three causes authorized the court to consider all the testimony that was competent in either.

*Apperson &*Reid, *for appellant.*

Holt, *for appellee.*

For these reasons the judgment must be *affirmed.*
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Sheri Bernstein

Appellate case number: 01-14-00821-CV

Trial court case number: 2014-30979

Trial court: 311th District Court of Harris County

The Court requests a response to Relator’s motion for emergency relief filed October 8, 

2014. The response, if any, is due October 13, 2014.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

X Acting individually 

Date: October 8, 2014
STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

COREY PATRICK ROBINSON,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-3493

_____________________________/

Opinion filed April 6, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

James O. Shelfer, Judge.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, BILBREY, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
EXHIBIT 32.2

      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Patriot  Scientific  Corporation (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period ended  August 31, 2005,  as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission  and to which this  Certification  is an
exhibit  (the  "Report"),   the  undersigned   officer  of  Patriot   Scientific
Corporation does hereby certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


Date: October 24, 2005                         /s/ Thomas J. Sweeney
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Thomas J. Sweeney
                                               Chief Financial Officer


                                       32