[Cite as State v. Gamble, 2023-Ohio-843.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 22AP-584

(C.P.C. No. 15CR-566)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Cameron S. Gamble :

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 16, 2023

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Darren M. Burgess, for appellee. 

On brief: Cameron S. Gamble, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Cameron S. Gamble, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to vacate post-release control. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In July 2015, Gamble pleaded guilty to having a weapon while under 

disability, a violation of 2923.13 and a third-degree felony. The next month, the trial court 

sentenced Gamble to three years of community control with intensive supervision. The 

trial court notified Gamble, at the sentencing hearing and in writing, what could happen if 

he violated the terms of community control, including the imposition of a three-year prison 

sentence. In January 2017, the trial court revoked community control and sentenced 
No. 22AP-584 2

Gamble to a three-year prison term. The trial court’s revocation entry notified Gamble 

that he “may receive a period of post-release control of up to 3 years and, if [he] violates 

post-release control [his] sentence will be extended administratively in accordance with 

State law.” (Jan. 25, 2017 Entry at 2.) Gamble did not appeal from either judgment.

{¶ 3} In June 2022, Gamble filed a motion to vacate post-release control, which the 

trial court denied. He timely appeals from that denial. 

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 4} Gamble presents the following sole assignment of error for our review:

The trial court failed to incorporate RC 2967.28 into my journal 

entry, and or to state that “The adult parole authority will 

administer Post release control pursuant to RC 2967.28 upon 

my release, and that the violation of the conditions of prc will 

subject the offender to the consequences set forth and that 

statue”. To validly impose Post release control. And I am not 

the aggrieve party for res judica to apply.

(Sic passim.)

III. Discussion

{¶ 5} Considering the substance of the trial court judgment from which Gamble

has appealed, we construe his sole assignment of error as generally alleging the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to vacate post-release control. This assignment of error lacks 

merit.

{¶ 6} Gamble’s postconviction motion was barred by res judicata. “[A]ny issue that 

could have been raised on direct appeal and was not is res judicata and not subject to review 

in subsequent proceedings.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 16, 

citing State v. Hutton, 100 Ohio St.3d 176, 2003-Ohio-5607, ¶ 37. The res judicata doctrine 

does not, however, preclude a collateral challenge to a void judgment. State v. Harper, 160 

Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 18. But, Gamble did not collaterally challenge a void

judgment.

{¶ 7} In Harper, the Supreme Court of Ohio “reevaluate[d] the basic premise of 

[its] void-sentence jurisprudence” and clarified this unsettled area of law with this guiding 

principle: “A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” Id. at ¶ 34, 42. See State v. 
No. 22AP-584 3

Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 27 (noting that the above-quoted 

principle in Harper is not limited to cases involving the imposition of post-release control). 

“ ‘[A] common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.’ ” Harper at

¶ 25, quoting Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, ¶ 8. And, “[i]n a criminal 

matter, the court acquires jurisdiction over a person by lawfully issued process, followed by 

the arrest and arraignment of the accused and his plea to the charge.” Henderson at ¶ 36, 

citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481 (1927). Thus, when the sentencing court has 

jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors “render the sentence voidable, not void, and the 

sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.” Harper at ¶ 42. 

{¶ 8} Here, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case and 

personal jurisdiction over Gamble. This is a felony case, process was lawfully issued,

Gamble was arrested and arraigned, and he entered a plea. Consequently, any sentencing 

error committed by the trial court relating to post-release control would have made the 

judgment voidable, not void. Id. at ¶ 43. Accordingly, Gamble could have raised this issue

in a direct appeal but he did not and, therefore, his motion to vacate is barred by res 

judicata.

{¶ 9} Because the trial court did not err in denying Gamble’s motion to vacate, we 

overrule his sole assignment of error.

IV. Disposition

{¶ 10} Having overruled Gamble’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

MENTEL and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.