Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Zurek v. Petersen, 2015 IL App (1st) 150508

Appellate Court 

Caption

KEN ZUREK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. RANDALL K. PETERSEN, 

TOMMY THOMSON, in His Capacity as Village Clerk of the Village 

of Franklin Park, Illinois, and DAVID ORR, in His Capacity as 

County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, Respondents-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-15-0508

Filed May 22, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-COEL-029; 

the Hon. Margarita Kulys-Hoffman, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Ken Zurek, of Franklin Park, appellant pro se.

Joseph Cainkar, of Louis F. Cainkar, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee 

Randall K. Petersen.

Matthew M. Welch and P. Joseph Montana, both of Montana & Welch 

LLC, of Palos Heights, for appellee Tommy Thomson.

Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Palmer and Justice Gordon concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner Ken Zurek and Vicki Vanderhei and Chris Litwin filed nomination papers with 

the Village of Franklin Park, Cook County, Illinois, in order to appear as candidates for the 

office of village trustee on ballots printed for the consolidated election occurring on April 7, 

2015. Respondent Randall K. Petersen filed an objector’s petition contending that none of the 

voter petition sheets filed in support of the three candidates met the requirement in section 

10-4 of the Election Code that each sheet include a sworn statement from the circulator of the 

petition specifying the date or dates on which the sheet was circulated. 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 

2012). The candidates then tried to persuade the Franklin Park Municipal Officers Electoral 

Board (electoral board or board) that it was sufficient for each circulator to have sworn “that 

all of the signatures on this sheet were signed within the statutory time period for petition 

circulation.” The electoral board rejected this argument and ruled unanimously that the 

nomination papers were invalid. The candidates sought review in the circuit court of Cook 

County, which affirmed the board, and then candidate Zurek sought further review by this 

court. Due to the short period of time between his appeal to this court and the scheduled 

election on April 7, 2015, we granted Zurek’s motion to expedite the appeal, we accelerated 

the usual briefing schedule, and, after considering the parties’ briefs and the record compiled 

for our review, we issued a short order on April 1, 2015, affirming the board’s decision. This 

opinion provides our reasons for that affirmance. 

¶ 2 Before addressing the arguments for reversal, we have considered the fact that Zurek, a 

pro se individual, seeks relief on behalf of himself and the two other candidates. We find that 

it is not appropriate for us to grant any relief to candidates Vanderhei and Litwin. The notice 

of appeal and amended notice of appeal associated with this case were submitted by 

“Petitioner-Appellant Ken Zurek, pro se” and were signed only by Zurek on his own behalf. 

A notice of appeal (or in this case, a notice and an amended notice) must contain the 

signature of each appellant or his or her attorney. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(4) (eff. May 30, 2008). 

Candidates Vanderhei and Litwin did not sign Zurek’s notice or amended notice of appeal 

and they did not file a separate notice of appeal. Zurek is not a licensed attorney and no 

attorney signed Zurek’s notice or amended notice on behalf of the two other candidates. 

Accordingly, this appeal was taken by Zurek only on Zurek’s behalf only. The board’s 

decision as to the candidacies of Vanderhei and Litwin is not before us and will not be 

affected by our decision. Coleman v. Akpakpan, 402 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824, 932 N.E.2d 184, 

186 (2010) (when a notice of appeal named only the wife and contained only the wife’s 

signature, then it was an appeal taken by only the wife and not by the wife and husband); 

People v. Krueger, 146 Ill. App. 3d 530, 533, 495 N.E.2d 993, 996 (1986) (when a notice of 

appeal named two appellants but was signed by only one of them, it was an appeal taken by 

only the one who signed); US Bank, National Ass’n v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶ 3 

n.1, 10 N.E.3d 339 (when a notice of appeal named one of four defendants and was signed by 

an attorney only on behalf of that one defendant, then it was an appeal as to only that one 

defendant). 

¶ 3 We now turn to the substantive issues. Where an administrative board’s decision has been 

reviewed by the circuit court, the appellate court reviews the decision of the electoral board, 

instead of the decision of the court. Pascente v. County Officers Electoral Board, 373 Ill. 

App. 3d 871, 873, 869 N.E.2d 802, 804 (2007); Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal 
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Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (2008). When the 

dispute is over the interpretation of a statute, as it is in this case, then the question is purely 

one of law and our standard of review is de novo. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210, 886 N.E.2d at 

1018. 

¶ 4 Shortly after receiving notice of the objector’s petition, candidates Zurek, Vanderhei, and 

Litwin filed with the electoral board a motion to strike and dismiss the objector’s petition. 

Although the electoral board was not persuaded by any of the arguments for dismissal, Zurek 

repeats them on appeal. Accordingly, we will set out and address each argument in turn. 

¶ 5 The candidates first argued to the electoral board that Tommy Thomson, Franklin Park’s 

village clerk, filed the objector’s petition without first receiving the original and two copies 

as required by section 10-8 of the Election Code. Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) 

(amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012)). This was the full extent of the argument. The 

candidates did not specify what occurred when the petition was presented for filing. Section 

10-8 states in relevant part, “Any legal voter of the political subdivision or district in which 

the candidate or public question is to be voted on, *** having objections to any certificate of 

nomination or nomination papers or petitions filed, shall file an objector’s petition together 

with 2 copies thereof ***. Objection petitions that do not include 2 copies thereof, shall not 

be accepted.” Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012)). 

In their reply brief, the candidates attached an affidavit from Zurek which included the 

statement, “That based on my experience with the Village Clerk’s office it has been their 

practice to issue a time stamped receipt to the person filing an objector petition indicating the 

number of copies of the objector’s petition filed and to keep said copy for their records.”

¶ 6 The electoral board convened public hearings on January 12, 2015, January 25, 2015, 

February 2, 2015, February 9, 2015, and February 12, 2015, regarding the objector’s petition 

and the candidates’ motion to dismiss. In its subsequent decision, the electoral board 

remarked that the candidates failed to provide and had not even asked to introduce written 

proof or testimony supporting their allegation that Village Clerk Thomson accepted less than 

two copies of the objector’s petition at the time of filing. The electoral board pointed out that 

the candidates were not taking issue with the receipt issued by “Franklin Park Clerks Office” 

clearly showing the timely filing date and time. Continuing, the board noted that it is the duty 

of the village clerk to accept an objector’s petition and that section 10-8 of the Election Code 

does not require that a municipal clerk or other local election official issue a receipt which 

specifies the number of additional copies that were tendered with the original petition for 

filing. Section 10-8 only requires that the “local election official shall note the day and hour 

upon which such objector’s petition is filed.” Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 

10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012)). Thus, in this case, the objector was under no obligation to 

plead, prove, or produce a receipt identifying the number of copies that were filed. 

¶ 7 Zurek now contends that the objector’s compliance with section 10-8’s mandatory 

language (“shall file”) cannot be presumed and that because the record lacks any evidence of 

the objector’s compliance, the objection was waived. Puss N Boots, Inc. v. Mayor’s License 

Comm’n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 984, 986-87, 597 N.E.2d 650, 652-53 (1992) (stating that the use 

of “shall” generally indicates a legislative intent to make a provision or a law mandatory). 

Zurek relies on Thomas, in which the court held that an objector’s “fail[ure] to object to the 

sufficiency of *** nomination papers in the manner prescribed by statute [results in waiver of 

the objection].” Thomas v. Powell, 289 Ill. App. 3d 143, 147, 681 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1997). 
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Zurek contends this means that when the objector to Zurek’s candidacy did not affirmatively 

show the objector’s compliance with section 10-8, then the objection should have been 

dismissed. Zurek cites other authority, but Thomas is the only case he cites for the 

proposition that it was the objector’s burden at the hearing to produce evidence of 

compliance and that the board incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the candidates to 

prove their contention that the objector submitted less than two copies of his petition to the 

village clerk. 

¶ 8 We do not find Zurek’s argument persuasive. According to section 10-8, an objection 

petition cannot be filed unless a sufficient number of copies accompany the original petition. 

Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012)) (“Objection 

petitions that do not include 2 copies thereof, shall not be accepted.”). Therefore, the only 

reasonable inference created by the filing of this petition is that the objector tendered a 

sufficient number of copies at the time. 

¶ 9 This reasonable inference is bolstered by the fact that after accepting and filing the 

documents, the election official is required to take certain actions. The election official is 

required by section 10-8 to send the original objection petition to the electoral board and one 

of the copies to the candidate. Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 

(West 2012)). Thus, pursuant to statute, the original and one copy are distributed straight 

away. Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012) (“not later 

than 12:00 noon on the second business day after receipt of the petition, [the election official 

shall] transmit *** the original objector’s petition to the chairman of the proper electoral 

board *** and shall transmit a copy *** to the candidate whose certificate of nomination or 

nomination papers are objected to”)). The election official is required by section 10-15 to 

subsequently certify either the names of candidates entitled to appear on the election ballot or 

to certify that an objection is or objections are pending. 10 ILCS 5/10-15 (West 2012) (“each 

local election official *** shall *** direct the election authority to place upon the official 

ballot for such election the names of such candidates”; however, “candidates whose petitions 

have been held invalid by the appropriate electoral board *** shall not be so certified”). 

Thus, the election official does more than simply file stamp and distribute objection papers. 

The third set of documents filed by the objector is presumably for the election official’s own 

record keeping and files, so that the official can keep track of the status of any objection 

proceedings and certify the appropriate information for the ballot. 10 ILCS 5/10-15(7) (West 

2012) (“Where a candidate’s nominating papers or petitions have been objected to and the 

decision of the electoral board *** is either unknown or known to be in judicial review, the 

words ‘OBJECTION PENDING’ shall be placed under the title of the office being sought by 

the candidate and next to the name of the candidate.”).

¶ 10 The reasonable inference that three sets were tendered and accepted in this instance was 

not overcome by any authority cited by Zurek. He fails to cite any statute or case law that 

requires the municipal election official to issue or the objector to obtain a receipt which 

specifies the number of copies that were accepted by the official for filing. Instead, Zurek’s 

self-serving affidavit vaguely refers to his “experience” on an unspecified date in an 

unspecified type of proceeding with some sort of objection petition. Zurek’s affidavit was not 

legal authority and it added nothing to these proceedings. 

¶ 11 Another defect in Zurek’s argument is that he failed to set out any facts in his motion to 

dismiss or his affidavit which would overcome the reasonable inference here of statutory 
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compliance and, therefore, shift the burden of proof of statutory compliance to the objector. 

Zurek did not, for instance, present the sworn statement of someone who observed the filing. 

Zurek did not specify the number of copies that were presented for filing. Zurek did not 

identify the specific village employee who accepted the documents and instead assumed 

Village Clerk Thomson himself accepted the papers. Factual statements regarding the 

presentation, acceptance, and filing of the objector’s petition are what could overcome or at 

least call into doubt the reasonable inference that was created by the acceptance and filing of 

this petition. 

¶ 12 Zurek’s reliance on Thomas is misplaced. Thomas, 289 Ill. App. 3d 143, 681 N.E.2d 145. 

That case indicates that facts established by the record shall not be overcome by mere 

assertions of a party or an assumption by the court–which is a principle that is not helpful to 

Zurek’s appeal. In Thomas, the date that was file stamped by the county clerk’s office on an 

objector’s petition showed that the objection was late. Thomas, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 146-47, 

681 N.E.2d at 147. The objector contended that his petition was not late and had been timely 

filed in a different office which did not make note of the filing before the petition was 

transmitted to the county clerk’s office, where it was file stamped after the deadline. Thomas, 

289 Ill. App. 3d at 147, 681 N.E.2d at 147. However, the court determined that it had to limit 

its analysis to the evidence of record rather than rely on a contrary argument. Thomas, 289 

Ill. App. 3d at 147, 681 N.E.2d at 147. That holding does not suggest that Zurek’s bare 

assertion that the objector filed less than two copies, unsupported by any facts regarding the 

filing of the objector’s petition, warranted the dismissal of that petition.

¶ 13 Since Zurek has failed to provide any authority or facts in his favor, we reject his primary 

argument for reversal of the electoral board’s decision.

¶ 14 The candidates also argued to the board that the objector’s petition was defective and 

should be dismissed because it did not name as a party the new political party, “Progress 

Through Lower Taxes Party.” The nomination petition sheets at issue here included the 

following title and introduction: 

“PETITION FOR NOMINATION

VILLAGE TRUSTEES–NEW POLITICAL PARTY 

 We, the undersigned, being duly qualified electors and registered voters in the 

Village of Franklin Park in the County of Cook and the State of Illinois do declare 

that it is our intention to form a new political party in the political division aforesaid, 

to be known and designated as the PROGRESS THROUGH LOWER TAXES 

PARTY, and do hereby petition that the following named persons shall be candidates 

for the offices hereinafter specified, to be voted upon at the Consolidated Election to 

be held on April 7, 2015. 

A COMPLETE SLATE IS HEREBY PRESENTED 

[Chris Litwin, village trustee, four-year term, *** Sunset Lane, Franklin Park; Vicki 

Vanderhei, village trustee, four-year term, *** Herrick Avenue, Franklin Park; Ken 

Zurek, village trustee, four-year term, *** George Street, Franklin Park].”

¶ 15 The candidates argued to the electoral board that the political party was a necessary and 

indispensible party to the objection proceedings and that its omission from the petition 

warranted its dismissal. The electoral board did not find this argument persuasive and neither 

do we. 
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¶ 16 We reject this argument because the political party does not exist and has never existed as 

a legal entity such that it could be made a party to an action either as a respondent or 

petitioner or assert any rights in this election proceeding. New political parties are created by 

a nomination petition as set out in section 10-2 of the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 

2012); People ex rel. Voters for Progress Party v. Wilk, 118 Ill. App. 2d 386, 390, 254 N.E.2d 

834, 836 (1969) (“A group of persons who desire to form a new political party and to have 

their candidates placed upon the ballot proceed by petition under section 10-2 of the Election 

Code ***.”). Section 10-8 of the Election Code states that “nomination papers, *** being 

filed as required by this Code, and being in apparent conformity with the provisions of this 

Act, shall be deemed to be valid unless objection thereto is duly made in writing within 5 

business days after the last day for filing the *** nomination papers.” (Emphasis added.) 

Pub. Act 98-691 (eff. July 1, 2014) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012)). Timely 

objection was made in this instance; thus, the validity of the nomination petitions was put 

into question and the electoral board subsequently sustained the objection in its entirety. 

Therefore, the nomination petitions were not valid and they did not create a new political 

party. People ex rel. Vigilant Party v. Village of Dolton, 118 Ill. App. 2d 392, 396, 254 N.E.2d 

832, 834 (1969) (where nominating petitions for full slate of candidates under the name of a 

new political party were stricken, this political party did not exist). Zurek cites two cases in 

which new political parties were named as parties, Green Party v. Henrichs, 355 Ill. App. 3d 

445, 822 N.E.2d 910 (2005), and Lyons MVP Party v. Lyons, Illinois, Municipal Officers 

Electoral Board, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 945 N.E.2d 1175 (2011). However, neither opinion 

addresses the appropriateness of naming a political party and neither court held that a 

political party is an indispensible party in an election proceeding. 

¶ 17 Our next consideration is whether the wording of the petition circulators’ affidavits 

complied with the Election Code. The objector’s petition to the nomination papers centered 

on allegations that the petition circulators’ affidavits were entirely ineffective because it was 

impossible to determine from the face of the petition sheets when each individual sheet was 

circulated. The objector contended the statement that was provided could not be properly 

tested or relied upon to uphold the integrity of the electoral process. 

¶ 18 The parties’ arguments require us to apply section 10-4 of the Election Code. 10 ILCS 

5/10-4 (West 2012). When applying a statute, a court’s primary objective is to ascertain and 

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 

441, 837 N.E.2d 16, 21 (2005). The best indication of legislative intent is the language used 

in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Gillespie Community Unit 

School District No. 7 v. Wight & Co., 2014 IL 115330, ¶ 31, 4 N.E.3d 37. Statutory language 

that is clear and unambiguous will be applied as it was written, without resort to other 

principles of statutory construction. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 

1054 (1997). A court will not depart from plain statutory language by reading in exceptions, 

limitations, or conditions that were not expressed by the legislature. Metropolitan Life 

Insurance Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 114234, ¶ 18, 990 N.E.2d 1144. Words and phrases will not 

be considered in isolation, but will be viewed in context with other relevant provisions of the 

statute. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 

1252 (2003). Furthermore, each word, clause and sentence of a statute will be given a 

reasonable construction, if possible, and will not be rendered superfluous. Prazen v. Shoop, 

2013 IL 115035, ¶ 21, 998 N.E.2d 1. 
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¶ 19 Section 10-4 of the Election Code states in relevant part: 

“No signature shall be valid or be counted in considering the validity or sufficiency of 

such petition [for nomination] unless the requirements of this Section are complied 

with. At the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be added a circulator’s 

statement, *** certifying that the signatures on that sheet of the petition were signed 

in his or her presence; certifying that the signatures are genuine; and either (1) 

indicating the dates on which that sheet was circulated, or (2) indicating the first and 

last dates on which the sheet was circulated, or (3) certifying that none of the 

signatures on the sheet were signed more than 90 days preceding the last day for the 

filing of the petition; and certifying that to the best of his knowledge and belief the 

persons so signing were at the time of signing the petition duly registered voters *** 

and certifying that their respective residences are correctly stated therein. Such 

statement shall be sworn to before some officer authorized to administer oaths in this 

State. No petition sheet shall be circulated more than 90 days preceding the last day 

provided in Section 10-6 for the filing of such petition.” 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2012). 

¶ 20 Thus, in short, section 10-4 of the Election Code requires each circulator to provide a 

factual statement under oath attesting to the timing of the circulation of each petition. 10 

ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2012). However, instead of setting out one of the three factual statements 

mandated by section 10-4, the nomination papers at issue include the legal conclusion “that 

all of the signatures on this sheet were signed within the statutory time period for petition 

circulation.” The only date that appears on each of the 45 petition sheets that was submitted 

is the date on which the sheet was notarized. 

¶ 21 We do not consider the circulators’ statement “that all of the signatures on this sheet were 

signed within the statutory time period for petition circulation” to be what was required by 

the plainly worded statute. Stating a legal conclusion instead of certain facts does not 

accomplish the purpose of including an affidavit. The obvious purpose of all election laws is 

to ensure honest and fair elections. Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21, 66, 561 N.E.2d 585, 

605 (1990). The purpose of requiring the circulator’s sworn statement is to subject that 

person to a possible perjury prosecution. Sakonyi v. Lindsey, 261 Ill. App. 3d 821, 826, 634 

N.E.2d 444, 447 (1994). Thus, the requirement of a circulator’s affidavit is considered “a 

meaningful and realistic method of eliminating fraudulent signatures and protecting the 

integrity of the political process.” Sakonyi, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 826, 634 N.E.2d at 447; 

Shipley v. Stephenson County Electoral Board, 130 Ill. App. 3d 900, 906-07, 474 N.E.2d 905, 

910 (1985). However, if the circulator’s statement is a legal conclusion rather than a factual 

statement identifying a specific date, a range of two specific dates, or a window of no more 

than 90 days before the filing of the petition, then it would be impossible to effectively 

question the circulator about when he or she obtained the voters’ signatures. The purpose of 

the affidavit is defeated by the conclusory statement. 

¶ 22 Zurek contends that all that was intended by section 10-4 was only the possibility of 

prosecution for perjury, not a conviction for perjury. This is effectively a concession that the 

conclusory statement shields the circulator from questioning. Since the questioning cannot 

lead to a conviction, it is unlikely that criminal charges would even be filed. Zurek’s 

interpretation undermines the purpose of the statute. 

¶ 23 Zurek points to his more recent affidavit, written on January 10, 2015, and filed in 

response to the objector’s petition, in which Zurek swore that he personally printed all the 
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circulator’s petition sheets, and that 42 of them were printed on November 28, 2014, while 

the other 3 were printed on December 8, 2014. Even this after prepared affidavit fails to track 

the statutory language regarding the specific date or range of dates. Furthermore, there is no 

provision in the statute for one campaign organizer to file a single, blanket affidavit in lieu of 

the plainly worded requirement that certain factual statements appear at the bottom of each 

petition sheet and be attested to by the individual who circulated that sheet. 

¶ 24 Zurek proposes that compliance with section 10-4 can be less than exact, that substantial 

and not strict compliance will suffice, and that the content of the affidavit at issue met that 

lesser standard. He provides little reasoning to support this position, other than to protest that 

excluding his name from the ballot has “undoubtedly result[ed] in absurdity, inconvenience, 

and injustice and allow[ed] the objector to hijack the consolidated election for Franklin Park 

Village Trustee and disenfranchise the candidates’ voters.”

¶ 25 Statutes are deemed mandatory if the intent of the legislature directs a certain 

consequence from noncompliance with the statute. Pullen, 138 Ill. 2d 21, 561 N.E.2d 585. In 

this instance, the legislature dictated a certain consequence for noncompliance with section 

10-4: “No signature shall be valid or be counted in considering the validity or sufficiency of 

such petition [for nomination] unless the requirements of this Section are complied with.” 10 

ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2012). We find this to be a clear statement from the legislature that 

literal, strict compliance is required. 

¶ 26 Zurek next argues that section 10-4 is unconstitutionally vague. 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 

2012). Zurek did not present this argument to the electoral board and it is not appropriate for 

him to raise new arguments during review of the board’s decision. Cook County Board of 

Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 395 Ill. App. 3d 776, 786, 918 N.E.2d 1174, 1182 

(2009) (arguments or objections that are not made during the course of the administrative 

hearing process but instead are raised for the first time on review are deemed waived). We 

find the new argument has been waived. 

¶ 27 We conclude that because the wording of the circulators’ affidavits was defective, section 

10-4 of the Election Code mandated that all of the voters’ signatures and all of the petition 

sheets be deemed invalid. The objection to the petition sheets was correct and the board acted 

properly when it sustained the objection in its entirety and held that Zurek’s name would not 

appear on the ballot. 

¶ 28 Zurek’s final argument is that if we conclude his name was erroneously left off the ballot, 

we should void the results of the election that occurred on April 7, 2015, and order that a 

special election take place which includes Zurek as a candidate for village trustee. We have 

rejected all of Zurek’s arguments for reversal and we do not find the April ballot to have 

been in error without the inclusion of Zurek’s name. No special election is warranted.

¶ 29 Given that none of Zurek’s arguments have been convincing, we affirm the decisions of 

the board and the circuit court. 

¶ 30 Affirmed.