No. 86-76 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

LINDA S. REICH, 

Petitioner, Counter-Appellant 

and Respondent, 

and 

KEITH A. REICH, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Robert Holmstrom, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Kinnard & Woodward; Vernon E. Woodward, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent : 

English & Lee; Bruce E. Lee, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: May 9, 1986 

Decided: June 20, 1986 

Filed: JUN 2 0 1986 

- - .- 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal of the property distribution in a 

dissolution of marriage entered by the Yellowstone County 

District Court. We affirm in part and remand in part. 

The issues raised by the husband are: 

(1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 

setting the value of certain corporate equipment at $40,000? 

(2) Did the District Court err by awarding a corporate 

asset to the wife as part of the property division? 

On cross appeal the wife raises these issues: 

(3) Did the District Court err by awarding the wife 

less than one-half of the marital estate after specifically 

finding a 50/50 division was appropriate? 

(4) Should husband be ordered to pay wife's attorney 

fees incurred on appeal? 

A hearing was held on the wife's petition for dissolution of marriage in October 1985. At the time of the hearing 

the parties had not agreed on the disposition of their marital property. The District Court entered its findings and 

conclusions, and after motion by the wife and a hearing, 

those findings and conclusions were amended. The decree of 

dissolution was entered in December 1985. The District Court 

held in its original order that an equal division of the 

marital estate was appropriate. In its amended order, the 

court found that the parties' net worth was $132,658.60. The 

court awarded the wife property with a total net value of 

$62,526.43. Among other property, the court awarded the 

husband his 100% interest in his business corporation, Reich 

Geophysical, Incorporated. 
I 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in setting 

the value of certain corporate equipment at $40,000? 

The husband challenges the District Court's finding 

that: "The Petitioner submitted evidence reflecting that the 

value of [certain logging equipment] was $40,000.00 . . .." 

He argues that there was no evidence that the the value of 

the logging equipment, which is owned by his business corporation, is $40,000. 

The husband testified that the logging equipment had a 

fair market value of between 30 and 40 percent of the original purchase price. His valuation of $28,350 was 35 percent 

of the original purchase price. The court received evidence 

that the equipment was carried on the corporate books at a 

value of $80,960.51. It further received into evidence a 

letter from Norwest Bank in which the value of the equipment 

was stated as $100,000. Also admitted into evidence was a 

certificate of insurance showing that the 1.ogging equipment 

was insured for $64,224. 

It is true that there was no testimony before the District Court that the value of the logging equipment was 

exactly $40,000. However, this Court has held that a district court is free to find a value for marital property 

within the range of the evidence submitted. In re Marriage 

of Staudt (Mont. 1985), 700 P.2d 175, 179, 42 St.Rep. 740, 

744. We will not set aside a district court's finding of 

fact unless the finding represents an abuse of discretion. 

Reese v. Reese (1979), 185 Mont. 52, 55, 604 P.2d 326, 328. 

We conclude that valuation of the logging equipment at 

$40,000 is supported by the evidence and is not an abuse of 

the District Court's discretion. 
I1 

Did the District Court err by awarding a corporate asset 

to the wife as part of the property division? 

The husband contends that award of the 1981 Ford pickup 

truck to the wife was error because title to the truck was in 

Reich Geophysical, Inc. In the husband's proposed findings, 

he suggested distributing the truck to the wife. He now 

cites Buxbaum v. Buxbaum (Mont. 1984), 692 P.2d 411, 41 

St.Rep. 2243, as authority that in a dissolution of marriage, 

a corporate asset should not be distributed to the wife who 

did not hold any shares in the corporation. Here the District Court recognized that the wife's automobile was not 

reliable and that the husband had a car furnished to him by 

the corporation and that the corporation also had a 1981 Ford 

pickup. The District Court then apparently concluded that 

because the husband was the sole shareholder of the corporation he was able to cause the asset to be transferred, and it 

awarded the Ford pickup to the wife. It is technically true 

that the District Court did not have the power to order the 

distribution of corporate property where the corporation 

itself was not a party to the marital dissolution. However, 

our review of the record demonstrates that the District Court 

carefully reviewed all of the assets of the parties, including all of the various assets owned by the corporation, which 

in turn was owned solely by the husband. We conclude that 

there was a proper factual basis for the distribution of the 

pickup to the wife. However, we also recognize that the 

husband is technically correct as a matter of law. 

We remand to the District Court with the following 

instructions: Within 30 days of the issuance of remittitur 

in this cause the husband shall file with the District Court 
his election to accept the distribution of the 1981 Ford 

pickup truck to the wife or in the alternative to accept a 

property substitution equal in value to the $7,500 assigned 

to the truck. Thereafter the District Court shall amend its 

property distribution to coincide with that election, if 

amendment is required. 

I11 

Did the District Court err by awarding the wife less 

than one-half the marital estate after specifically finding a 

50/50 division was appropriate? 

This issue is raised by the wife on cross appeal. She 

points out that in its original findings of fact and conclusions of law the court awarded her approximately one-half of 

the marital estate. The total net worth of the parties was 

set at $117,658.60 and the wife was awarded net assets valued 

at $58,776.43. The court's original findings and conclusions, however, were later amended to include in the marital 

estate the uncontested values of the 1981 Ford pickup and of 

a 1980 Datsun 280 ZX. Titles to both of these vehicles were 

held by the husband's business corporation but they were 

erroneously left out of calculation of the net worth of the 

corporation. The court amended its findings and conclusions 

to increase the parties' total net worth to $132,658.60. 

However, it increased the wife's award by only $3,750, so 

that the total assets awarded to her were $62,526.43. She 

argues that she is entitled to another $3,750 in net assets 

so that she receives half of the net marital estate. We 

recognize that in concluding that the estate should be divided 50/50, the District Court may not have concluded that a 

precise mathematical division was required. We do not wish 

to take the place of the District Court in making this 
decision. We therefore remand this issue to the District 

Court for further consideration and for an amendment to its 

property division, if it concludes that such an amendment is 

appropriate. 

IV 

Should husband be ordered to pay wife's attorney fees 

incurred on appeal? 

The wife argues that husband's appeal is not well taken 

and borders on being frivolous. She therefore requests that 

the court award her her attorney fees on appeal. The wife 

cites no authority in support of this request and we note 

that the parties were each ordered to pay their own attorney 

fees in the action before the District Court. Additionally, 

husband has made a valid legal argument in his second issue. 

We conclude that the husband should not be ordered to pay 

wife's attorney fees on appeal. 

Affirmed in part and remanded to the District Court for 

modifications as required by this Opinion. 

We Concur: