NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 12-1556

___________

ADMINISTRATOR-BENEFITS FOR THE EXXON MOBIL SAVINGS PLAN

v.

RONALD WILLIAMS; PATRICIA BENJAMIN; DOLDRIA BENJAMIN; 

DANIEL WILLIAMS; ESPRIT AGNES; IRIS WILLIAMS; JOSEPH BENJAMIN, SR.

(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00072)

PATRICIA BENJAMIN

v.

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; EXXON MOBIL SAVINGS PLAN; 

EXXON MOBIL BENEFITS COMMITTEE

(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00102)

PATRICIA BENJAMIN

v.

ESSO STANDARD OIL MEDICAL INSURANCE

AIG LIFE INSURANCE CO.-MCS; 

ESSO STANDARD OIL COMPANY (PUERTO RICO)

(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00118)
2

PATRICIA BENJAMIN

v.

ESSO STANDARD OIL COMPANY (PUERTO RICO)

(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00119)

PATRICIA BENJAMIN

v. 

ESSO VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC.; 

AIG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO

(D. V.I. No. 3-10-cv-00074)

 Patricia Benjamin,

Appellant

On Appeal from the District Court 

of the Virgin Islands – Appellate Division

(District Court Nos.: 3-09-cv-00072; 3-09-cv-00102; 3-09-cv-00118; 

3-09-cv-00119 and 3-10-cv-00074)

District Judge: Juan R. Sanchez

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on May 13, 2014

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 23, 2014)

O P I N I O N 
3

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

Patricia Benjamin appeals from an order dismissing her four consolidated lawsuits 

against ExxonMobil entities for failure to prosecute. Benjamin had filed the lawsuits on 

behalf of then-minor Ronald Williams, to secure employee death benefits from 

ExxonMobil following the death of his father, Fitzroy Williams. During the pendency of 

the lawsuits, Ronald Williams reached the age of majority, and Patricia Benjamin was 

dismissed as a named party. Benjamin now objects to her dismissal as a party, and 

contests the order dismissing the consolidated lawsuits. For the reasons set forth below, 

we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Benjamin as a party and dismiss the remainder 

of her appeal for lack of standing. 

I. Background

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the facts 

necessary to the disposition of this appeal. Fitzroy Williams (“Fitzroy”) died in 1994 

while employed by Esso Virgin Islands, Inc., an ExxonMobil affiliate. Appellant Patricia 

Benjamin, acting as guardian of Fitztroy’s then-minor son Ronald Williams, filed four

lawsuits against various ExxonMobil entities (“ExxonMobil”) seeking to obtain 

employee benefits allegedly owed to Ronald Williams as Fitzroy’s beneficiary. The 

District Court of the Virgin Islands then consolidated Benjamin’s lawsuits (the 

“consolidated actions”). 

Faced with the possibility of multiple rival claims from Fitzroy’s living family 

members, Administrator-Benefits for the ExxonMobil Savings Plan (“Administrator-
4

Benefits”) filed an interpleader action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands (the 

“interpleader action”). The purpose of the interpleader action was to determine Fitzroy’s 

beneficiary and avoid multiple judgments against ExxonMobil for the same set of 

benefits. Benjamin unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the interpleader action for lack of 

jurisdiction, but did not file an answer to the interpleader action. 

A. Trial of the Interpleader Action

The interpleader action was tried on December 6, 2010 but neither Patricia 

Benjamin nor Ronald Williams attended. Following the bench trial, on April 6, 2011, the 

District Court ruled that Ronald Williams was Fitzroy Williams’ sole beneficiary and 

therefore was entitled to $47,156.92 in benefits. (Suppl. App. 267b-272b.) In an order 

accompanying its opinion, the District Court instructed any other potential beneficiary to 

file notice within 30 days if they wished to contest the District Court’s beneficiary 

determination. (Id. at 273b.) No such notice was filed.

Administrator-Benefits deposited Ronald Williams’ award in the District Court’s 

registry. To our knowledge, Ronald Williams has not yet claimed the $47,156.92 but 

remains entitled to do so. 

B. Order Removing Benjamin as Named Plaintiff

Simultaneous to the disposition of the interpleader action, the District Court 

removed Benjamin as a named plaintiff. ExxonMobil first filed a notice objecting to 

Benjamin’s continued status as a named plaintiff in the consolidated actions on 

November 22, 2010. (Suppl. App. 260b-265b.) ExxonMobil alleged that Benjamin’s 

guardianship of Ronald Williams had terminated because Ronald Williams had turned 18, 
5

the age of majority in the Virgin Islands. Benjamin did not file any opposition to this 

notice. The District Court granted ExxonMobil’s objection, and dismissed Benjamin as 

plaintiff on April 6, 2011. (Id. at 275b-76b.) In doing so, the District Court held that 

Ronald turned 18 on February 26, 2009, and at that time became an emancipated adult. 

The District Court ordered that Ronald Williams file a motion to be substituted as the

named plaintiff in the consolidated actions by June 6, 2011. He failed to do so. 

C. Dismissal of the Consolidated Actions

ExxonMobil then moved to dismiss the consolidated actions under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute, on January 13, 2012. (Suppl. App. 277b284b.) The District Court granted the motion with prejudice in an order dated January 

31, 2012. The District Court noted that Ronald Williams’ personal participation in the 

consolidated actions had been “nonexistent” and that the Court had been unable to 

contact him despite several attempts. (Id. at 284b-287b.) The dismissal of the 

consolidated actions did not affect Ronald Williams’ right to the $47,156.92 awarded to 

him in the interpleader action. (Id. at 286b.)

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, it is unclear what relief Benjamin seeks from this Court given 

that Ronald Williams remains entitled to collect the $47,156.92 awarded to him. 

Nevertheless, Benjamin makes several challenges to the District Court’s rulings.

A. Whether Benjamin was Properly Dismissed as a Party 

We will first address Benjamin’s argument that she should not have been 

dismissed as a named plaintiff in the consolidated actions. On April 6, 2012, The District 
6

Court dismissed Benjamin as a named plaintiff because Ronald Williams was no longer a 

minor, terminating her guardianship. The Court then provided time for Ronald Williams 

to be substituted as the real party in interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

17(a). (Suppl. App. 275b-276b.) We review the District Court’s order for abuse of 

discretion. ICON Grp., Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 829 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 

1987).

Without explanation, Benjamin urges that Appellees were judicially estopped from 

asserting that Benjamin was not the proper plaintiff in the consolidated actions. 

(Appellant Br. at 53.) In fact, Benjamin makes no argument as to why she remains 

authorized to act on behalf of Ronald Williams. Instead, Benjamin categorically states 

that she “represents the beneficiary based upon guardianship” 1 without citing any

supporting authority. (Id. at 54.) 

Under Virgin Islands law, a “guardianship of a minor terminates upon the minor’s 

. . . emancipation or attainment of majority or as ordered by the court.” 15 V.I.C. 

§ 5-210(a). 2The age of majority in the Virgin Islands is 18. 16 V.I.C. § 261. The 

 

1

Though neither party addresses it in the briefs, it appears as though the order appointing 

Benjamin as Ronald Williams’ guardian may arguably have entitled Benjamin to remain 

his guardian until he reached the age of 21. See Benjamin v. AIG Ins. Co. of P.R., No. 

2010-0025, 2012 WL 1353527, *2 (V.I. 2012) (citing In re R. W., Super. Ct. Fam. No. 

G19/2002, slip op. at 2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002)). We do not know whether this is 

the reason for Benjamin’s belief that she remained Ronald Williams’ guardian 

notwithstanding her dismissal. However, we need not decide whether Benjamin was 

entitled to remain Ronald Williams’ guardian until he turned 21 because Ronald Williams 

turned 21 on February 26, 2012 and the issue is therefore moot. 

2

The statute governing the term of a guardianship was current at the time that the District 

Court entered its order on April 6, 2011 (the “April 6, 2011 Order”), but was repealed as 

of August 22, 2012. The April 6, 2011 Order inadvertently cites to § 5-209(a).
7

District Court found that Ronald Williams turned 18 on February 26, 2009. As a result, 

the District Court held that Benjamin was no longer authorized to act upon Ronald 

Williams’ behalf. Benjamin presented no argument to the contrary. Pursuant to Rule 

17(a), the District Court dismissed Benjamin as plaintiff, and gave Ronald Williams 60 

days to file a motion to be substituted as the real party in interest. The District Court 

correctly applied Rule 17(a) and Virgin Islands law, and did not abuse its discretion. We 

therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Patricia Benjamin as plaintiff in the 

consolidated actions. 

B. Standing on Appeal

Having held that Benjamin was properly dismissed as a party, we are now 

presented with the question of whether she has standing to pursue the remainder of her 

appeal. Though Appellee does not raise lack of standing as an argument in its brief, this 

Court is “required to raise issues of standing sua sponte” when they arise. Addiction 

Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005). 

In general, only parties of record in the District Court have standing to pursue an 

appeal. Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir.

1995). However, a nonparty may have standing if particular requirements discussed in 

Caplan are met. A nonparty may pursue an appeal if “(1) the nonparty had a stake in the 

outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the record; (2) the nonparty has 

participated in the proceedings before the district court; and (3) the equities favor the 

appeal.” Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir.

1999). 
8

Because we hold that Benjamin was properly dismissed as a party, she must fulfill 

the nonparty standing requirements in order to pursue this appeal. Cf. Neilson v. ColgatePalmolive, 199 F.3d 642, 650 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that generally only one person may 

act in a representative capacity on a minor’s behalf). Though Benjamin satisfies the 

second nonparty standing requirement by virtue of her participation in the proceedings in 

the District Court, she does not satisfy the first or third requirements, and therefore lacks 

standing to pursue her appeal. 

The first requirement is not satisfied because Benjamin does not have a stake in 

the outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the record. At no time did 

Benjamin have a personal stake in the lawsuits she filed; she acted on behalf of Ronald 

Williams who is now capable of representing his own interests.3 

The third requirement is not satisfied because the equities do not favor Benjamin’s 

appeal. Benjamin filed the consolidated actions to obtain Fitzroy Williams’ employee 

benefits from ExxonMobil on behalf of Ronald Williams. She achieved this result when 

the District Court determined that Ronald Williams was Fitzroy Williams’ sole 

beneficiary and granted him certain benefits. Though Ronald Williams has thus far 

neglected to collect his award, the dismissal of the consolidated actions does not affect 

his ability to do so. Benjamin therefore does not satisfy the nonparty standing

requirements and lacks standing to pursue this appeal. 

III. Conclusion

 

3 Moreover, we cannot discern any benefit Ronald Williams would glean from this 

appeal, as he remains entitled to collect $47,156.92 as a result of the District Court’s 

rulings.
9

We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Benjamin as a party. Because 

Benjamin does not satisfy the requirements for nonparty standing on appeal, we therefore 

dismiss the remainder of Benjamin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.