UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

ANDY HOANG,

Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DC-844E-20-0727-I-1

DATE: July 26, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Andy Hoang, Raleigh, North Carolina, pro se.

Jo Bell, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has filed a petition for review 

of the initial decision, which reversed its denial of the appellant’s application for 

disability retirement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) 

and awarded him benefits. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of 

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute 

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the 

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial 

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of 

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and 

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to

find that the appellant met criterion (1) for determining eligibility for disability 

retirement benefits under FERS, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Effective August 27, 2018, the appellant was terminated from his position

as a CG-11 Risk Examiner with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(FDIC) for unacceptable performance. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 26. 

On February 7, 2019, he applied for FERS disability retirement benefits. Id.

at 37-50. In his statement of disability, the appellant asserted that he suffered 

“from multiple medical disabilities” including, but not limited to, post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD), severe anxiety, major depressive disorder with suicidal 

ideations, chronic fatigue syndrome, chronic hepatitis B, noted brain lesions,

concentration deficits, and meningioma. Id. at 43. The appellant asserted that 

these medical conditions prevented him from “performing the highly demanding 

job of a Risk Examiner.” Id. He further alleged that his medical conditions

“debilitate[] [him] and make[] [him] non-functional” and various methods of 

treatment were ineffective. Id. OPM issued an initial decision denying the 
3

appellant’s application for FERS disability retirement benefits after finding that

he did not meet all the criteria for disability retirement, and the appellant 

requested reconsideration. Id. at 12-21. He submitted additional documentation, 

but OPM issued a reconsideration decision sustaining its initial decision. Id.

at 5-9.

¶3 The appellant filed an appeal with the Board challenging OPM’s final 

decision and requesting a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 4. Following a telephonic 

hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing OPM’s 

reconsideration decision and ordering it to grant the appellant’s application for 

disability retirement. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 9-10. The 

administrative judge determined that the appellant established that he became 

disabled while employed at FDIC. ID at 4-6. The administrative judge also

found that the appellant’s medical conditions prevented him from being in 

attendance at work and impacted his ability to perform the duties of his position. 

ID at 6-8. The administrative judge then found that the appellant established that 

his disabling medical condition was expected to continue for at least 1 year from 

the date the application for disability retirement was filed. ID at 8-9. The 

administrative judge further found that accommodation of the appellant is 

unreasonable and that he did not decline an offer of reassignment to a vacant 

position. ID at 9.

¶4 OPM has filed a petition for review to which the appellant has responded. 

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶5 In an appeal from an OPM decision on a voluntary disability retirement 

application, the appellant bears the burden of proof by preponderant evidence. 

Christopherson v. Office of Personnel Management, 119 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 6 

(2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To be eligible for a disability retirement 

annuity under FERS, an appellant must establish the following elements: (1) he 
4

completed at least 18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in 

a position subject to FERS, he became disabled because of a medical condition, 

resulting in a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or, if there is no 

such deficiency, the disabling medical condition is incompatible with either 

useful and efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the disabling 

condition is expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date that the 

application for disability retirement benefits was filed; (4) accommodation of the 

disabling medical condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) he 

did not decline a reasonable offer of reassignment to a vacant position. 

Christopherson, 119 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 6; 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a).

¶6 As to criterion (1) for establishing entitlement to a FERS disability 

retirement annuity, the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s 

testimony that he began Federal service with the FDIC in 2012 before resigning 

in 2017; however, the administrative judge made no explicit finding as to whether

the appellant had 18 months of creditable civilian service. ID at 5. Therefore, we 

do so here. The appellant’s individual retirement record supports his testimony 

that he had 5 years of creditable civilian service between August 2012 and 

September 2017. IAF, Tab 10 at 51. Thus, we find the appellant has proven he 

had the requisite creditable service. Regarding criteria (4) and (5), the 

administrative judge determined that accommodation of the appellant’s disabling 

medical condition in his position was unreasonable and that the appellant did not 

decline an offer of reassignment to a vacant position. ID at 9. Moreover, OPM 

concedes on review that the appellant established criteria (1), (4), and (5) for 

establishing entitlement to FERS disability retirement benefits. PFR File, Tab 1 

at 6.

¶7 Rather, OPM challenges the administrative judge’s findings that the 

appellant established criteria (2) and (3) by preponderant evidence. Id. at 7-9. 

The administrative judge found that the appellant “established that he became 

disabled due to PTSD, Depression, and Hepatitis B while employed at FDIC,” 
5

that his medical conditions prevented him from performing the duties of his 

position, and that his medical condition was expected to continue for at least 

1 year after he filed his disability retirement application. ID at 4-9. As set forth 

below, we agree with the administrative judge’s findings.

The appellant met criterion (2) because he proved by preponderant evidence that 

his medical condition resulted in a deficiency in performance.

¶8 OPM appears to argue that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant 

evidence that his medical conditions caused a service deficiency as to his 

attendance. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. However, that is not the only way to establish

the second criterion for establishing entitlement to disability retirement unde r

FERS. An appellant may meet the statutory requirement that he “be unable, 

because of disease or injury, to render useful and efficient service in the 

employee’s position” by showing that the medical condition caused a deficiency 

in performance, attendance, or conduct, as evidenced by the effect of his medical 

condition on his ability to perform specific work requirements, or that his medical 

condition prevented him from being regular in attendance or caused him to act 

inappropriately. Christopherson, 119 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 6 (2013). The 

administrative judge determined that the appellant met this requirement because 

“his PTSD and depression prevented him from being in attendance at work and 

prevented him from performing the duties of his position.” ID at 6. As set forth 

below, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s medical

conditions resulted in a deficiency in his performance as a Risk Examiner. 

¶9 The appellant’s position required him to perform complex, detail-oriented 

tasks, as noted by the administrative judge, including writing comments for 

reports, conducting examinations as part of a team, and communicating with bank 

management during the examinations. ID at 6-7. The appellant explained that, in 

April 2018, he began experiencing symptoms associated with his PTSD, including 

panic attacks, nightmares, paranoia, suicidal ideations, and anxiety which 

impacted his ability to perform his duties. IAF, Tab 19, Hearing Recording (HR) 
6

(testimony of the appellant). He further asserted that he is still being treated for 

his PTSD and depression at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Id. The 

administrative judge found the appellant’s testimony credible and supported by 

the evidence in the record. ID at 6. It is well established that subjective 

evidence, i.e., testimony or written statements regarding symptoms that is 

submitted by the applicant, “may be entitled to great weight on the matter of 

disability, especially where such evidence is uncontradicted by the record.” 

Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 23 (2012) 

(quoting Chavez v. Office of Personnel Management, 6 M.S.P.R. 404, 422 

(1981)).

¶10 The objective medical evidence shows the appellant has been under the care 

of several medical professionals for various medical conditions, including PTSD 

and depression, and corroborates his claim that he could not perform his duties as 

a Risk Examiner due to his medical conditions. IAF, Tab 10 at 59-73; HR 

(testimony of the appellant). N.L., a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, treated the 

appellant for PTSD and depression from September 2018 to February 2020. HR

(testimony of N.L.). She testified that he presented with “very severe symptoms”

on his initial depression screener including, inter alia, impaired focus and

concentration, fatigue, daily suicidal thoughts, nightmares from his time in the 

Army, paranoia, and panic attacks. Id. She also found that he was not 

employable the entire time he was under her care due to the severity of his 

symptoms. Id. In addition, as noted by the administrative judge, the appellant 

submitted a November 6, 2018 letter by N.L. stating that that “[e]ven with intense 

psychotherapy and medication therapy [the appellant] will likely experience 

mental health symptoms that will impede on his cognitive ability for many years.” 

ID at 7; IAF, Tab 10 at 59. The administrative judge also considered a 

February 25, 2019 letter from D.L., a Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner, who 

continues to treat the appellant for PTSD and depression after he started treatment 

in December 2018. ID at 7; IAF, Tab 10 at 73. In the letter, D.L. asserted that 
7

“[the appellant’s] anxiety and depression were having a significant, negative 

impact on his daily function, sleep, drive, motivation and memory. He was 

struggling to engage in routine tasks and activities with planning and 

organization, which was creating basic problems for him regarding completion of 

tasks.” IAF, Tab 10 at 73. D.L. further stated in his February 2019 letter that 

“[the appellant’s] symptoms began to show some improvement in early January, 

but he continued to struggle with maintaining regular and purposeful routines. 

With ongoing treatment his symptoms have slowly begin to improve.” Id.

¶11 OPM argues on review that the administrative judge improperly weighed 

the objective medical evidence cited above. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. Specifically, 

OPM alleges that N.L.’s November 6, 2018 letter is contradictory to D.L.’s 

February 25, 2019 letter and that the administrative judge erred in assigning more 

probative weight to N.L.’s letter. Id. at 7-8. We disagree. In reaching his

conclusion, the administrative judge properly weighed the medical evidence. ID 

at 4-8; see Brown v. Department of the Interior, 121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 11 (2014) 

(recognizing that, in assessing the probative weight of medical opinions, the 

Board considers whether the opinion was based on a medical examination and 

provided a reasoned explanation for its findings as distinct from mere conclusory 

assertions, the qualifications of the expert rendering the opinion, and the extent 

and duration of the expert’s familiarity with the treatment of the appellant), 

overruled on other grounds by Haas v. Department of Homeland Security , 

2022 MSPB 36. Although D.L.’s letter indicates that the appellant’s symptoms 

have slowly improved, it is not incongruous with the testimony or medical 

opinion of N.L. Contrary to OPM’s assertion, D.L.’s letter is not inconsistent 

with N.L.’s testimony and statements because, as set forth above, D.L. explains 

that the appellant’s PTSD and depression negatively impacted his ability to 

function. IAF, Tab 10 at 73. The administrative judge considered and cited the 

medical evidence provided by both providers in finding that the appellant’s 

disability impacted his ability to work. ID at 7. He also found the objective 
8

medical evidence was consistent with the subjective medical evidence and the 

testimony before him; therefore, we are not persuaded by OPM’s challenge to the 

administrative judge’s consideration of the relevant medical evidence.2 See 

Henderson, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 19 (explaining that the Board considers all 

pertinent evidence in determining an appellant’s entitlement to disability 

retirement).

¶12 In addition, the appellant’s supervisor indicated on his written statement in 

connection with the appellant’s application for disability retirement that “[the 

appellant] was terminated from FDIC employment due to unacceptable job 

performance.” IAF, Tab 10 at 49-50. The appellant also testified that he was 

placed on a performance improvement plan shortly before his termination because 

his leadership at FDIC found “[his] work was not focused, [he] don’t [sic] have 

any concentration, [his] work was all over the place, [his] write up was all over 

the place.” IAF, Tab 10 at 26-28; HR (testimony of the appellant). These 

contentions are supported by the appellant’s letter of termination which states in 

relevant part that he has “been provided frequent feedback and counseling on

[his] performance and work products, . . . issued multiple [d]evelopmental 

[f]eedback [f]orms which detailed [his] unacceptable work and provided 

suggestions for improvement. Despite this feedback and counseling, [his]

performance has not improved.” IAF, Tab 10 at 26. Viewing this evidence along 

 

2

In determining that the appellant established entitlement to disability retirement

benefits, the administrative judge considered that the VA rated the appellant 100% 

disabled and found that he is entitled to “individual unemployability” because he is 

“unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of 

service-connected disabilities.” ID at 5; IAF, Tab 12 at 14. While the award of VA

disability benefits does not necessarily mandate that an applicant be granted a FERS 

disability retirement annuity, the Board must consider an award of such benefits when 

determining whether an appellant qualifies for a disability annuity under FERS. 

Sachs v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶¶ 10–12 (2005). Here, the 

medical evidence in the record corroborates the conclusion of the VA; therefore, we 

find the administrative judge appropriately considered the VA’s disability rating and 

benefits determination.
9

with the appellant’s objective medical evidence, the appellant’s testimony that his 

medical conditions prevented from performing his job duties is of considerable 

evidentiary value. See Newkirk v. Office of Personnel Management, 101 M.S.P.R. 

667, ¶ 16 (2006). Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that he proved by 

preponderant evidence that his medical conditions prevented him from 

performing the duties of the Risk Examiner position. ID at 7-8.

The administrative judge properly found the appellant’s disabling medical 

condition is expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date he filed his

application for disability retirement.

¶13 The administrative judge also found that his disabling medical condition 

lasted for more than 1 year after he filed his disability retirement application in 

February 2019, based partly on N.L.’s testimony that the appellant was 

unemployable in any capacity until February 2020. ID at 8; HR (testimony of 

N.L.). OPM argues that the medical opinion of N.L. establishes the appellant’s 

symptoms were reportedly improving; therefore, his medical condition did not 

last for 1 year after he submitted his disability application. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. 

We disagree. As noted above, the medical evidence consistently indicates that 

the appellant’s PTSD and depression impaired his cognitive ability and impacted 

his ability to function, precluding him from performing his duties as assigned. ID 

at 4, 7; IAF, Tab 10 at 59-67, 72-73. Moreover, both objective and subjective 

medical evidence indicate that the appellant suffered from PTSD and depression 

and was still receiving treatment for his medical conditions until at least February 

2020. IAF, Tab 10 at 59-67, 72-73; HR (testimony of the appellant and N.L.). 

We have considered OPM’s arguments on review concerning the administrative 

judge’s weighing of the evidence, but, as explained above, we discern no reason 

to reweigh the evidence or substitute our assessment of the record evidence for 

that of the administrative judge. As such, we agree with the administrative judge

that the appellant met his burden by preponderant evidence that his condition was 

expected to last 1 year after he filed his disability retirement application.
10

¶14 After considering all evidence in the record, we agree with the 

administrative judge’s finding that the appellant established entitlement to 

disability retirement under FERS. Accordingly, we conclude that OPM has 

provided no basis for disturbing the initial decision.

ORDER

¶15 We ORDER OPM to approve the appellant’s application for disability 

retirement. OPM must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of 

this Order.

¶16 We also ORDER OPM to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it 

believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken 

to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant to provide all necessary 

information OPM requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, 

if not notified, should ask OPM about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

¶17 No later than 30 days after OPM tells the appellant it has fully carried out 

the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the 

office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that 

OPM did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain 

specific reasons why the appellant believes OPM has not fully carried out the 

Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications 

with OPM. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of 

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The 

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If 

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees 
11

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. 

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued 

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS3

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

 

3

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 
13

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be 

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any 

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 
14

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.4 The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

 

4

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
15

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

/s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board