2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-21-2011

Janet Evans v. NY & NJ Port Authority

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-3829

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Recommended Citation

"Janet Evans v. NY & NJ Port Authority" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 830.

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-3829

_____________

JANET L. EVANS; ROBERT A. COPLIN; 

ANNETTE BARRY-SMITH; ROCHELLE JOYNER; 

RONALD SMITH; BONNIE L. FORD; 

NEIL SKELTON; JUDITH A. SAMUEL

v.

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 

its employees, agents, and/or servants

Janet L. Evans; Robert A. Coplin, Appellants

_____________

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 2-06-cv-03239

District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

_____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 11, 2011

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 21, 2011)

_____________________

OPINION

_____________________
2

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Janet Evans and Robert A. Coplin appeal from an order of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted the motion for 

summary judgment filed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.1

Evans and Coplin sued their employer, the Port Authority, asserting several 

causes of action alleging that the Port Authority had discriminated against them on 

the basis of race in failing to promote them.

 For 

the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.

2

 The Port Authority succeeded in 

moving for the dismissal of several claims. After the close of discovery, the Port 

Authority filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims of race 

discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Evans, and of racial 

discrimination under § 1983 by Coplin. The District Court appropriately applied 

the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.3

 1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the Notice of Appeal specifically states 

that the appeal is from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we decline to 

review any of the earlier rulings in this case. See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 

F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that “[i]f an appeal is taken only from a specified 

judgment, the court does not acquire jurisdiction to review other judgments not specified 

or ‘fairly inferred’ by the Notice”). 

 The Court concluded that 

2

 Evans and Coplin are two of seven plaintiffs from the District Court proceeding. The 

other five chose not to participate in this appeal. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to 

the facts bearing on the contentions of error raised by Evans and Coplin. 

3

 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). This 

framework, as the District Court properly noted, also applies to claims of racial 
3

neither Evans nor Coplin had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination. 

In addition, the Court determined that the Port Authority had proffered legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reasons for its failure to promote Evans and Coplin and that 

neither had shown that these reasons were pretextual. 

On appeal, Evans and Coplin contend that the District Court erred in 

granting summary judgment because it made credibility determinations. Our 

review of a court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Doe v. C.A.R.S. 

Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).

Evans contends that the District Court erred in determining that she failed to 

demonstrate, as part of her prima facie case, that she was qualified for the position 

of Director of Government and Community Affairs. In her view, the Court erred

because it made its own judgment as to her qualifications. The Court explained, 

however, that Evans failed to provide any evidence regarding the experience, 

knowledge, and skills required for the position. Nothing in our review provides a 

basis for concluding otherwise. Furthermore, Evans has not directed us to any

evidence of record that refutes the District Court’s determination. Because Evans 

failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or 

§ 1983, we conclude that the District Court did not err by granting the Port 

 

discrimination asserted under § 1983. Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 

1997).
4

Authority’s motion for summary judgment.

The District Court also determined that Coplin failed to demonstrate the 

prima facie element that he was qualified for the position of Labor Relations 

Specialist. This was error, as Coplin demonstrated that he was among the eleven 

individuals interviewed for the position. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and 

Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (reiterating that a plaintiff meets his

burden of adducing a prima facie case by showing that he “was sufficiently 

qualified to be among those persons from whom a selection, to some extent 

discretionary, would be made”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The District Court did not err, however, in concluding that Coplin failed to 

show that the Port Authority’s proffered reason for not promoting him was 

pretextual. The Court noted, and the record confirms, that the Port Authority 

explained that Coplin had not been selected for the position because he had

received the next-to-lowest rating of the eleven candidates who were interviewed. 

The Port Authority pointed out that it had awarded the position to a Caucasian 

female who had attained the second-highest score during the interview process.

Coplin does not challenge these facts. Instead, he asserts that the District Court

employed the wrong standard. But as we explained above, supra n. 3, the Court 

applied the proper standard to his § 1983 claim. 

Evans and Coplin also assert that the District Court erred because it failed to 
5

apply a mixed motive analysis. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 

(2003). We disagree. A mixed motive case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that 

race was a motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 

101. In the absence of a prima facie case of discrimination, or a showing that an 

employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions were 

either a post-hoc fabrication or a pretext, there is no inference of discrimination. 

See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993). Without an 

inference that a protected factor played a part in an employer’s action, there is no 

basis for a district court to apply a mixed motive analysis. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.