TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-21-00512-CV

Melvin Rivas Gonzalez, Appellant

v. 

Dynamic Motors, Inc., Appellee

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-GN-19-000940, THE HONORABLE MADELEINE CONNOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Melvin Rivas Gonzalez (Gonzalez) appeals the trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment in favor of Dynamic Motors, Inc. (Dynamic Motors). In his sole issue 

on appeal, Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because 

Dynamic Motors failed to prove its affirmative defense that workers’ compensation was the 

exclusive remedy for his injury. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gonzalez filed suit against Dynamic Motors and MFish, LLC (MFish), for injuries 

he sustained at work after falling 20 feet from a garage roof onto a concrete floor. Dynamic Motors 

is a local used car dealership and service garage in Austin. On January 20, 2018, Dynamic Motors 

hired Gonzalez as a car detailer and porter. As a car detailer, his job duties included cleaning the 

cars’ exteriors, interiors, and motors. 
2

On March 20, 2018, Gonzalez was performing his usual job duties when the garage 

service manager asked him to help with some repairs on the garage roof. Gonzalez agreed to help. 

Shortly after getting on the roof, Gonzalez stepped through a skylight and fell 20 feet to the 

concrete floor below. He suffered two broken ankles requiring surgery and physical therapy, 

leading him to suffer permanent mobility issues. Shortly after his injury, Dynamic Motors 

submitted a claim for workers’ compensation insurance on Gonzalez’s behalf. Gonzalez received 

periodic payments until August 5, 2019, when his doctor determined he achieved maximum 

medical improvement (MMI).

On February 20, 2019, Gonzalez filed suit alleging Dynamic Motors and MFish

were negligent in failing to provide fall protection devices to Gonzalez, failing to train him how to 

recognize and prevent falls, and failing to warn him about the location and weight-bearing capacity 

of the roof’s skylight.1 Dynamic Motors pleaded the exclusive remedy doctrine as an affirmative 

defense, claiming that Gonzalez was precluded from filing a common law negligence suit against 

Dynamic Motors because he had already filed, and received benefits from, a workers’ 

compensation claim. Dynamic Motors filed a traditional summary judgment on its affirmative 

defense, arguing that Gonzalez’s exclusive remedy had already been satisfied in the form of 

workers’ compensation benefits. In support, it attached evidence including Gonzalez’s 

employment documents, the relevant workers’ compensation claim, a written statement from a coemployee, excerpts from Gonzalez’s deposition, and various written discovery responses. 

Gonzalez also moved for summary judgment in a combined traditional and no-evidence motion, 

claiming, among other things, that there was no evidence that he was an employee at the time of 

1 MFish is the limited liability company that allegedly owns the property on which 

Dynamic Motors is located.
3

the accident because he was not acting in furtherance of Dynamic Motors’ business. The trial 

court denied Gonzalez’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and granted Dynamic Motors’ 

traditional motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment, dismissing Gonzalez’s suit 

against Dynamic Motors in its entirety. 2 This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. See 

FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). We must take as 

true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve 

any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 

215 (Tex. 2002). When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial 

court grants one motion and denies the other, the appellate court considers the summary judgment 

evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if the reviewing court

determines that the trial court erred, renders the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. 

See FM Props. Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 872. When the trial court does not specify the grounds 

relied upon in granting the motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court must affirm if any 

of the summary judgment grounds are meritorious. Id.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is whether the exclusive remedy doctrine bars Gonzalez’s 

negligence claims against Dynamic Motors. The Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) provides 

2 The motion for summary judgment at issue was filed on behalf of Dynamic Motors only. 

The trial court entered final judgment in the suit against Dynamic Motors as to be appealable. 

MFish did not move for summary judgment and Gonzalez’s claims against MFish continued in the 

trial court.
4

remedies for the prompt payment of medical expenses and lost wages for covered employees who 

sustain work-related injuries, without the injured employee having to prove liability under a 

common-law tort theory. TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex. 2016) 

(citing HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. 2009)). In exchange for the guarantee of 

benefits, the Act prohibits an injured employee from seeking common law remedies from his 

employer. See Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a) (exclusive remedy doctrine) (“Recovery of workers’ 

compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation 

insurance coverage . . . against the employer [] for the [] work-related injury sustained by 

the employee.”).

The exclusive remedy doctrine is an affirmative defense that requires the defendant 

to prove two elements: (1) the employee sustained a work-related injury; and (2) the employer 

was covered by workers’ compensation insurance.3 See id. On appeal, Gonzalez does not 

challenge whether Dynamic Motors carried workers’ compensation insurance that was in effect at 

the time of the injury or that Dynamic Motors filed a claim on Gonzalez’s behalf shortly after the 

injury. Accordingly, only the first element of the defense is at issue—specifically whether 

Gonzalez was acting as an “employee” under the Act when he sustained his injury.

3 Some exceptions apply to the defense, including claims against the employer for 

intentional torts and claims against third parties. See id. § 417.001(a); see also Varela v. American 

Petrofina Co. of Tex., Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983) (providing that employee may seek 

recovery from third party whose negligence contributed to injury); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 

689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985) (“The [Act] is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries 

with the exception of intentional injury.”); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996) 

(holding injured employee may recover workers’ compensation benefits in addition to seeking 

liability against co-worker for intentional tort).
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Whether Gonzalez was an “employee” under the Act

The Texas Labor Code defines an employee as “each person in the service of 

another under a contract of hire, whether express or implied, or oral or written.” Tex. Lab. Code 

§ 401.012(a). Section 401.012(c), however, provides exceptions to the “employee” definition, 

including “a person whose employment is not in the usual course and scope of the employer’s 

business.” Id. § 401.012(c)(2).

Gonzalez contends that, because roof repairs are not part of Dynamic Motors’ 

business and because Gonzalez was engaging in such an activity when he was injured, he was not 

engaged in the usual course and scope of Dynamic Motors’ business and was therefore not an 

“employee” at the time of the injury-causing event. Accordingly, he argues, his injury is 

non-compensable under the Act. Because he claims it is non-compensable under the Act, he would

not barred from pursuing a common law claim of negligence against Dynamic Motors. See id.

§ 408.001. He also argues that Section 401.012(b)(1) (temporary direction exception) does not 

apply because Gonzalez was not “directed” by his employer to perform roof repairs.

Dynamic Motors counters that Gonzalez’s receipt of workers’ compensation 

payments, in and of itself, establishes that the injury was compensable under the Act and therefore 

Gonzalez was an employee at the time of the injury. We need not resolve this question, however, 

because the summary judgment evidence conclusively established Dynamic Motors’ entitlement 

to summary judgment on the ground that Gonzalez was employed in the usual course and scope 

of Dynamic Motors’ business at the time of the incident. See Tex. Lab. Code § 401.012(c)(2);

FM Props. Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 872 (“When a trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment does not specify the grounds relied upon, the reviewing court must affirm summary 

judgment if any of the summary judgment grounds are meritorious.”).
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Course and scope of business

Gonzalez hinges his argument on the premise that roof repairs are not inclusive of 

Dynamic Motors’ business model and therefore he was not employed in Dynamic Motors’ usual 

course and scope of business at the time he was performing them.

In his deposition, Gonzalez stated he believed he was hired only as a car detailer 

and did not perform any other duties for Dynamic Motors. Even viewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to Gonzalez, we conclude that this testimony was insufficient to raise a fact issue 

as to whether he was employed in the usual course and scope of Dynamic Motors’ business at the 

time of the injury. The evidence is undisputed that at the time of the injury, Gonzalez was working 

his regular shift while earning an hourly rate on his employer’s premises. First, the record shows 

that when Gonzalez was hired in January 2018, his written job duties included: “car detailing, lot 

maintenance, taking trash out, detailing vehicles, removing property from vehicles, storing 

detailing equipment, [and] other duties as assigned.” Secondly, Jonathan Fish, vice president of 

Dynamic Motors, provided deposition testimony describing Gonzalez as “a porter/helping 

hand . . . if you know, we needed someone to mow the lawn or, in this case, fix small leaks in the 

roof . . . we would ask for volunteers to help out with that . . . the porter’s position is kind of a 

helping hand around the entire lot.” All of these job duties further the business of a used car 

dealership. Based on the language of Section 401.012(c)(2), the dispositive inquiry is only whether 

Gonzalez’s employment—not assigned task or miscellaneous activity—was in the usual course 

and scope of the employer’s business. Gonzalez has not provided, nor have we found, any 

authority that provides a task-by-task approach to the classification of “employee” under Section 

401.012(c)(2). See Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 138 (Tex. 2018)

(refusing to evaluate employee status in vicarious liability case on task-by-task basis). 
7

Accordingly, because the undisputed evidence shows that Gonzalez was hired by Dynamic Motors 

to perform job duties consistent with those required in a used car dealership, the trial court did not 

err in determining Gonzalez was employed in the usual course and scope of Dynamic Motors’ 

business at the time of the injury.

Because Dynamic Motors conclusively proved that Gonzalez was an employee who 

suffered a work-related injury and that he received workers’ compensation benefits, Gonzalez’s 

suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Tex. 

Lab. Code § 408.001. The trial court did not err in granting Dynamic Motors’ motion for summary 

judgment based on that affirmative defense.4

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

__________________________________________

Edward Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: October 19, 2023

4 Because the evidence conclusively established that Gonzalez’s employment was in the 

course and scope of Dynamic Motors’ business at the time he was injured, we do not address his 

arguments concerning the temporary direction exception under Section 401.012(b)(1). See

FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000) (providing reviewing 

court must affirm trial court’s judgment if any summary judgment grounds are meritorious).