NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MARCUS TALIAFERO WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0137 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2021-108279-001

The Honorable Kevin B. Wein, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

Brown and Little, PLC, Chandler

By Matthew O. Brown

Counsel for Appellant

Marcos Taliafero Williams, San Luis

Appellant

FILED 09-03-2024
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Marcus Taliafero Williams appeals his conviction and 

sentence for second-degree murder. Williams’ counsel filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, he 

found no arguable questions of law. Counsel asks us to search the record 

for reversible error. Williams filed a supplemental brief, which this Court 

has considered. After reviewing the record, we affirm Williams’ conviction 

and sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

conviction and resolve all reasonable inferences against Williams. See State 

v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 In February 2021, John,

1 an elderly man, was walking through

the parking lot of a shopping mall on Bethany Home Road in Phoenix, 

Arizona. At some point, Williams drove up, got out of his car, and began 

yelling at John. Without any provocation from John, Williams punched him 

in the face. John fell backward and hit his head on the ground. Williams 

stood over John in a fighting stance before getting back in his car and 

speeding away.

¶4 A witness called 9-1-1 and ran to help John, who was lying on 

the ground. The witness told dispatch that he saw the last two numbers of 

Williams’ license plate, 6-7, and described the car as a late model Nissan 

Altima with faded metallic paint. A second witness, who also called 9-1-1, 

followed Williams east on Bethany Home Road. The witness lost Williams 

after he turned south on Central Avenue. The witness described Williams’ 

car as a Nissan with metallic paint and damage to the front passenger’s side.

Both witnesses described Williams as a black man with a “pudgy” or heavy 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the victim’s privacy.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

3

build. A third witness only heard a shout, a “thump,” and then saw 

Williams speed away. She said that Williams’ car looked like a 2000 Nissan 

Altima with damaged or faded metallic paint.

¶5 Police officers responded to the 9-1-1 calls and saw a late 

model Nissan Altima travelling south on Central Avenue. They saw that 

the car had damage to the front passenger’s side, “discolored or damaged” 

metallic paint, and the license plate had the last two numbers 6-7. The 

officers followed the car to a restaurant’s parking lot, where they observed 

Williams and a female passenger get out of the car. Williams’ appearance

fit the general descriptions provided by witnesses. The officers detained 

Williams briefly in the parking lot and brought one of the witnesses to 

identify him. The witness told officers, “I didn’t see facial features of the 

person because I was at a distance, but I knew based on make and model of 

vehicle, color of vehicle, the body type, age, size of the person and the 

clothing that they were wearing, that everything that I saw matched what I 

remembered.”

¶6 Meanwhile, paramedics responded to the mall’s parking lot, 

observed that John had difficulty standing and answering questions, and

transported him to the hospital. Doctors discovered that John suffered a 

severe brain injury and required emergency surgery. They could not 

control the bleeding in John’s brain and he died at the hospital. A medical 

examiner conducting the autopsy saw that John had bruises on his face and 

jaw, orbital fractures, and fractures to the back of his skull. The medical 

examiner concluded that John died of complications due to blunt force head 

trauma and ruled his death a homicide.

¶7 After John passed away, officers detained and interviewed

Williams. During the interview, he appeared animated and argumentative.

Williams admitted to driving a 2001 Nissan Altima, with his ex-girlfriend 

as the sole passenger, on the day of the offense. Williams stated that he had 

“probably” driven through the mall’s parking lot. He said that people were 

harassing him during that time period, and he wanted them to leave him 

alone, but he denied assaulting anyone. Officers also spoke with Williams’

ex-girlfriend who admitted that they were in the mall’s parking lot on the 

day of the offense. Although she did not recall Williams getting into an 

altercation, she had fallen asleep in the backseat and woke up as they were 

turning south on Central Avenue. Williams told her that officers were 

following them, even though the officers never engaged their sirens or 

emergency lights.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 Officers gathered video surveillance from businesses in and 

near the mall. Although the surveillance did not capture the moment of the 

offense, it showed Williams’ car and John walking through the parking lot.

Cellular data also placed Williams and his ex-girlfriend near the mall at the

time of the offense. The State charged Williams with one count of seconddegree murder, a class 1 felony. See A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3) (second-degree 

murder).

¶9 Before trial, the superior court denied Williams’ motion to 

remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause. Williams 

petitioned for special action review, this Court accepted jurisdiction, and 

denied relief. Williams also moved to suppress statements he made when 

officers first contacted him in the restaurant’s parking lot, arguing that they

were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court

conducted a suppression hearing and granted the motion in part, 

suppressing any statements Williams made “in response to questions from 

law enforcement between the time he was placed inside the police vehicle 

and when he was read the Miranda advisement.” The State did not 

introduce these statements at trial. The court also precluded any mention

of Williams’ drug use at the time of the offense.

¶10 At trial, the State presented eyewitness testimony, expert 

testimony, video surveillance, autopsy and crime scene photos, and a 

redacted recording of Williams’ interview. After the State’s case-in-chief, 

the superior court denied Williams’ motion for judgment of acquittal under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 20(a)(1), finding the State 

presented sufficient evidence for the jury to render a verdict. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 20(a)(1). Williams elected not to testify on his own behalf. Upon 

the State’s request, the court instructed the jury on the lesser-included 

offense of manslaughter. The jury, however, found Williams guilty of the 

greater offense of second-degree murder. Williams stipulated to four of the 

aggravating factors alleged by the State.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

5

¶11 The superior court conducted the sentencing hearing in 

compliance with Williams’ constitutional rights and Rule 26. The court 

sentenced Williams to the slightly aggravated term of 19 years’ 

imprisonment with 759 days of presentence incarceration credit,

2 and 

imposed the standard fees and assessments. See A.R.S. § 13-710(A)

(sentencing range for second-degree murder). The court also issued a 

lifetime no-contact injunction, prohibiting Williams from contacting John’s 

next of kin. See A.R.S. § 13-719(A)(1) (allowing lifetime injunctions for 

dangerous offenses). Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 We review the entire record for reversible error. State v. 

Thompson, 229 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 3 (App. 2012). Counsel for Williams has 

advised this Court that after a diligent search of the entire record, counsel

has found no arguable question of law. 

¶13 In Williams’ supplemental brief, he first argues that the 

superior court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

Specifically, he claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

“directly identifying” him as the perpetrator. We review this issue de novo, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s 

verdict. See State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, 20, ¶ 72 (2015). In making this 

determination, the relevant inquiry is whether “any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

Sufficient evidence may exist even where conflicting evidence is presented, 

State v. Flowers, 110 Ariz. 566, 567 (1974), and may be circumstantial or 

direct, State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 7 (App. 2005).

2 The superior court awarded one more day of presentence 

incarceration credit than was warranted, but absent a cross-appeal by the 

State, we lack the jurisdiction to correct an illegally lenient sentence. See 

State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 281–83, 286 (1990).
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

6

¶14 To convict a person of second-degree murder, as relevant 

here, the State must prove that “without premeditation,” and “[u]nder 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the person 

recklessly engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby 

causes the death of another person.” A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3). Through video 

surveillance, eyewitness testimony, and officer testimony, the State placed 

Williams at the crime scene and presented sufficient evidence that he hit

John in the face. Expert witness testimony, supported by an autopsy report 

and photos, proved that John had been hit in the face, he fell backward and 

hit the back of his head, and the impact fractured his skull. This injury 

caused bleeding in John’s brain and resulted in his death. Although the 

State did not present video surveillance showing the exact moment of the 

offense and eyewitnesses did not see Williams’ distinct facial features, the 

evidence, even if circumstantial, established that Williams perpetrated the

assault that caused John’s death. See Pena, 209 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 7. Sufficient 

evidence supports Williams’ conviction, and the superior court did not err 

in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

¶15 Next, Williams argues that numerous instances of 

prosecutorial error, both separately and cumulatively, deprived him of the 

right to a fair trial and due process. See In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458, 470, ¶ 

47 (2020) (distinguishing between prosecutorial error and misconduct). He 

claims that, throughout trial, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the 

State’s witnesses, misrepresented the evidence, elicited precluded 

testimony, expressed his personal opinion, and lied about his ability to 

redact exhibits. To warrant reversal, the alleged prosecutorial error must

have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26

(1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]uch conduct is 

not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant 

impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which 

the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool v. Superior Ct.

In & For Pima Cnty., 139 Ariz. 98, 108 (1984).

¶16 We have reviewed the entirety of the prosecutor’s opening 

and closing remarks, as well as his examination of witnesses, and find 

nothing in the record rising to the level of prosecutorial error. The 

prosecutor did not engage in intentional vouching by placing the prestige 

of the government behind the State’s witnesses, he did not provide personal 

assurances of their credibility, and he did not present precluded or 

misleading evidence. See State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 276–77 (1994); Pool, 

139 Ariz. at 108. The prosecutor properly used opening remarks “to apprise 

the jury of what the party expects to prove and prepare the jurors’ minds 
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

7

for the evidence which is to be heard,” State v. Prewitt, 104 Ariz. 326, 333 

(1969), and closing argument to “summarize the evidence, make submittals 

to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, 

and suggest ultimate conclusions,” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 602 (1993).

All within the permissible range of conduct. Although the parties litigated 

the extent of redacting particular exhibits, namely body-worn camera 

footage, the State ultimately redacted the footage and Williams stipulated 

to its admission. Moreover, the superior court instructed the jury that 

statements by counsel do not constitute evidence, and they should not

consider or speculate on redacted portions of the exhibits. We presume the 

jury followed the court’s instructions. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, 

¶ 68 (2006) (citing State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 127 (1994)). The alleged 

instances of prosecutorial error, taken separately or cumulatively, did not

result in an unfair trial or denial of due process. See Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79, 

¶ 26.

¶17 Finally, Williams argues he received ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel. Such claims may not be raised on direct appeal. State ex 

rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 415, ¶ 20 (2007). Instead, they must be 

presented to the superior court in a post-conviction relief proceeding under 

Rule 32.1. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a) (grounds for post-conviction relief 

for ineffective assistance of counsel). We need not address such a claim 

here.

¶18 All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, counsel 

represented Williams at all critical stages of the proceedings. The superior 

court properly instructed the twelve-person jury on the elements of the 

charged offense, the elements of the lesser-included offense, the State’s 

burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and all other applicable 

laws. The record contains substantial evidence supporting the jury’s 

verdict and no-contact order. The court sentenced Williams within the 

statutory limits and imposed the appropriate fees and assessments. We 

decline to order briefing and affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence.

¶19 Upon the filing of this decision, Williams’ counsel shall 

inform him of the status of the appeal and of his future options. Counsel 

has no further obligations unless, upon review, he finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Williams shall 

have 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a 

pro per motion for reconsideration or a petition for review.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

8

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’ conviction and 

sentence.