14-50 

Cheong v. Lynch

 BIA

 Straus, IJ 

 A077 933 350

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 13th 4 day of August, two thousand fifteen.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

8 Chief Judge,

9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

10 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 SIEW LENG CHEONG,

15 Petitioner, 

16

17 v. 14-50

18 NAC

19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL*,

21 Respondent.

22

23

24

25

26 ___________________________________________________________ 27 *Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney

28 General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former

29 Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

30

31
1 FOR PETITIONER: Jon E. Jessen, Stamford, Ct. 

2

3 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney

4 General; John S. Hogan, Senior

5 Litigation Counsel; Andrea N. Gevas,

6 Trial Attorney, Office of

7 Immigration Litigation, United

8 States Department of Justice,

9 Washington, D.C.

10

11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

12 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

13 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

14 is DENIED.

15 Siew Leng Cheong, a native and citizen of Malaysia,

16 seeks review of a December 16, 2013, decision of the BIA

17 affirming the July 1, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge

18 denying her applications for withholding of removal and

19 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re

20 Siew Leng Cheong, No. A077 933 350 (B.I.A. Dec. 16, 2013),

21 aff’g No. A077 933 350 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 1, 2013). 

22 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

23 facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.

24 Under the circumstances of this case, we have

25 considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the

26 sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237

27 (2d Cir. 2008). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), we

28 lack jurisdiction to review any final order of removal

2
1 against an alien who, like Cheong, is removable by reason of

2 having committed an aggravated felony unless the petition

3 raises constitutional claims or questions of law. See

4 Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2015); see

5 Santana v. Holder, 714 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013). 

6 With regard to withholding of removal, Cheong

7 challenges only the agency’s conclusion that the past harm

8 she endured did not rise to the level of persecution. Her

9 challenge raises a reviewable question of law. See Hui Lin

10 Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2012). 

11 The record supports the agency’s conclusion that, when

12 viewed either as isolated events or in the aggregate, Cheong

13 was not harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high

14 threshold of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of

15 Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006)(elaborating on the

16 meaning of persecution). Cheong testified that on

17 approximately three or four occasions in Malaysia, during

18 school, after school, or when she was on the bus, Muslim

19 boys touched her body with their hands. She was never

20 subjected to serious physical or mental harm to the degree

21 that her life or freedom was actively threatened, and the

22 three or four incidents, considered in the aggregate, do not

3
1 rise to the level of persecution. See id.; cf. Manzur v.

2 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir. 2007)

3 (“[A]ccumulation of harm from the individual incidents may

4 rise to the level necessary for persecution even though an

5 individual incident may not.”). 

6 Assuming jurisdiction to review Cheong’s CAT claim, 

7 see Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2004),

8 substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that she

9 did not establish that she would be more likely than not

10 tortured if removed. Cheong presented no evidence that

11 anyone sought to harm her specifically, and there is no

12 evidence of conduct that would rise to the level of torture. 

13 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17; Lecaj v. Holder, 616

14 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t

15 of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2005).

16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17 DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this

18 petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of

19 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule

20 34.1(b).

21 FOR THE COURT: 

22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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