IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE K.,1)

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 20 C 4887

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act

(“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I), 423, five years ago in February of 2017. (Administrative Record (R.)

191-200).2 She claimed that she had been disabled since September 23, 2016, due to back surgery,

lower back pain, and varicose veins. (R. 193, 250). Over the next three and a half years, plaintiff’s

application was denied at every level of administrative review: initial, reconsideration,

administrative law judge (ALJ), and appeals council. It is the ALJ’s decision that is before the court

for review. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.955; 404.981. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on

August 20, 2020. The parties consented to my jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) on

October 6, 2020. [Dkt. #7]. Plaintiff asks the court to reverse and remand the Commissioner’s

1 Northern District of Illinois Internal Operating Procedure 22 prohibits listing the full name of the

Social Security applicant in an Opinion. Therefore, the plaintiff shall be listed using only their first name and

the first initial of their last name.

2 For some reason, plaintiff filed repeated applications for benefits on February 27, 2017; March 20,

2017; and April 13, 2017. (R. 191-200, 228-34). But the ALJ considered her application to have been filed

February 23, 2017. (R. 15). That’s somewhat significant as the regulatory framework changed in certain

respects for applications filed after March 27, 2017. Wright v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2715, 2021 WL 3832347,

at *6 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021); Deloney v. Saul, 840 Fed.Appx. 1, 4 (7th Cir. 2020); .

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decision, while the Commissioner seeks an order affirming the decision.

I.

A.

Plaintiff was born on June 14, 1965, making her 54 years old when the ALJ found her not

disabled. (R. 12-36, 193). At her hearing, plaintiff testified that, on “an average bad day” she woke

up with back pain or whole body pain. More often than not, she spent her days lying down with a

pillow between her knees. (R. 42). She could sit 8 to 10 minutes before she had to change position,

stand for 4 to 5, and walk about 50 yards. (R. 42-43, 45). She had four different levels of pain

medication she took: a muscle relaxer, an anti-inflammatory, Tramadol, and Norco. (R. 44). She

also got injections which would give her up to three weeks of relief. (R. 49). Plaintiff traced her

problems to her last back surgery in 2016. (R. 45). On a good day she could get out of bed and sit,

but had to elevate her feet due to her history of blood clots and varicose vein surgery. (R. 47). Even

after her back surgery she tried to go back to work, She tried commercial cleaning and house

cleaning, but after each time, it took her days to recover. (R. 50-51). She tried driving for Uber. 

(R. 50-51). But she just couldn’t manage due to her pain. (R. 51). 

The medical record in this case is large, about 1400 pages long. (R. 354-1745). As such,

the court will dispense with a lengthy summary of the medical evidence, and focus on that evidence

that is significant in terms of the parties’ positions. But, suffice it to say, that plaintiff has a lot of

back trouble and she has gone through a lot in a quest to alleviate it. She has had multiple back

surgeries, including a laminectomy and fusion at L5-S1 in 2009 (R.850-851); a lumbar fusion 

and laminectomy in 2014 (R. 849); and a surgical procedure in October of 2016 which included

revision of the prior laminectomy at L4-L5, a new laminectomy at levels L3-L4, an L4-L5 

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posterior spinal fusion, and a L4-S1 posterior spinal instrumentation. (R.440). She has also had

numerous injections to relieve her pain. (R.1216, 1223, 1231, 1236, 1244). And, she has taken,

and continues to take, a veritable pharmacy full of pain medications, from muscle relaxers up to

narcotics like Norco and OxyCodone. (R.279, 291, 1385, 1389). 

B.

After an administrative hearing at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified, along

with a vocational expert, the ALJ determined the plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease; status post spinal fusion; fibromyalgia; degenerative joint disease of the

right knee (R. 17). The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s gastroesophageal reflux disease, high

cholesterol, high blood pressure, varicose veins, asthma, and anxiety were not severe. (R. 18-21). 

Next, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except she could

occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She

could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl and frequently balance. During

this period, she should have avoided unprotected heights and moving mechanical

parts. The claimant should have been allowed to change/alternate positions every

hour for 1-2 minutes while remaining at the workstation and having no change in the

work process.

(R. 21). The ALJ then reviewed plaintiff’s allegations and activities. She then found that the

plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms; however, the [plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence

in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (R. 23). The ALJ said the plaintiff’s

statements were “inconsistent because the record documents no persistent limitations in gait or

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station as a result of the claimant’s back and knee impairments” and following her back surgeries,

“injections were generally effective at relieving the claimant’s pain.” (R. 23). The ALJ then

determined that plaintiff did not have impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments in the Listing of Impairments, 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ specifically considered the requirements for the

Listings 1.02 and 1.04. (R. 22). 

Next, the ALJ summarized the medical evidence. (R. 23-26). She also reviewed the medical

opinions, affording little weight to the reviewing physicians who found plaintiff could do light work,

finding that the medical evidence supported a limitation to sedentary work. (R. 27). The ALJ gave

great weight to the opinions of the reviewing doctors who found plaintiff had no severe mental

impairment. (R. 27). She rejected the opinions from plaintiff’s treating doctors as inconsistent with

the treatment records that documented improvement with injections and plaintiff’s ability to work

part-time cleaning houses. (R. 27-28). The ALJ explained that his residual functional capacity

finding was supported by “the medical treatment notes that reveal no neurological deficits and a

fairly normal gait,” the absence of indications that she was “unable to sit straight or require an

assistive device to ambulate,” and the fact that epidural injections provided significant relief. (R.

28).

The ALJ then found that plaintiff was able to perform her past work as a legal secretary,

based on the testimony from the vocational expert. (R. 28). Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff

not disabled and not entitled to benefits under the Act. (R. 29).

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II.

If the ALJ’s decision is supported by “substantial evidence,” the court on judicial review

must uphold that decision even if the court might have decided the case differently in the first

instance. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). To determine whether substantial

evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole, Biestek v. Berryhill, – U.S. –, –, 139 S. Ct.

1148, 1154 (2019), but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by reweighing the

evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses. 

Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to

whether a claimant is entitled to benefits,” the court must defer to the Commissioner's resolution of

that conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997); Schloesser v. Berryhill, 870 F.3d

712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017).

The substantial evidence standard is a low hurdle to negotiate. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154;

Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). If reasonable minds could differ, the court must

defer to the ALJ's weighing of the evidence. Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2020). But,

in the Seventh Circuit, the ALJ also has an obligation to build what is called an “accurate and logical

bridge” between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the

administrative findings. Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015); O'Connor–Spinner v.

Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). The court has to be able to trace the path of the ALJ's

reasoning from evidence to conclusion. Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2015);

Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if the court agrees with the ultimate result,

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the case must be remanded if the ALJ fails in his or her obligation to build the required “logical

bridge.” As Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996) put it: “we cannot uphold a decision

by an administrative agency, any more than we can uphold a decision by a district court, if, while

there is enough evidence in the record to support the decision, the reasons given by the trier of fact

do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Of course, this is

a subjective standard, and the very subjectivity of the requirement makes it difficult for ALJs hoping

to write decisions that stand up to judicial scrutiny when challenged. One reviewer might see an

expanse of rushing water that can only be traversed by an engineering marvel like the Mackinac

bridge. Another might see a shallow creek they can hop across on a rock or two. But, in any event,

the “logical bridge” requirement is “lax.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008); Berger

v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008). “If a sketchy opinion assures us that the ALJ

considered the important evidence, and the opinion enables us to trace the path of the ALJ's

reasoning, the ALJ has done enough.” Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1985).3

III.

A.

The plaintiff lodges three arguments against the ALJ’s decision. First, she contends that the

ALJ’s determination that her impairments did not meet or equal Listings 1.02 and 1.04 was

erroneous. Next, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinions from

her treating physicians. Finally, the plaintiff claims the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

3The “logical bridge” requirementmade itsfirst appearance in Social Security cases in Judge Posner's

opinion in Sarchet. However, its phrasing traces its lineage to Judge Spottswood Robinson's opinion in the

non-Social Security case of Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where Judge Robinson said:

“ ‘Administrative determinations must have a basis in law’ and their force depends heavily on the validity

of the reasoning in the logical bridge between statute and regulation.” 408 F.2d at 167.

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determination was erroneous. 

B.

First, the plaintiff complains that the ALJ did not provide an adequate analysis of why her

condition did not meet or equal Listing 1.02 (covering major dysfunction of a weight-bearing joint)

or Listing 1.04 (covering disorders of the spine). The plaintiff submits that the ALJ offered no

analysis of his Listing 1.02 finding, and little analysis of his Listing 1.04 finding. The plaintiff relies

on the Seventh Circuit’s admonition in Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2015), that a

“perfunctory analysis . . . [is] inadequate to dismiss an impairment as not meeting or equaling a

Listing.” 775 F.3d at 935 (emphasis supplied). But, here, as always, “general propositions do not

decide concrete cases.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)(Holmes J., dissenting). See

also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 29 (2003); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir.

1995)(“Courts do not decide abstract principles of law but rather concrete cases and controversies.”). 

But, the ALJ went far enough here.

Listing 1.02 provides:

1.02 Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause): Characterized by gross

anatomical deformity (e.g., subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis,

instability) and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or

other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate medically

acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the

affected joint(s). With:

A. Involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e., hip, knee, or

ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b; or

B. Involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity (i.e., shoulder,

elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform fine and gross movements

effectively, as defined in 1.00B2c.

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Listing 1.04 requires a disorder of the spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root or spinal cord,

and one of the following:

A. Nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain,

limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss accompanied by sensory or reflex loss,

and if involving the lower back, a positive straight-leg raising test in the sitting and

supine positions; or

B. Spinal arachnoiditis, confirmed by an operative note or pathology report of tissue

biopsy, or by appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by severe

burning or painful dysesthesia, result in need for changes in position or posture more

than once every two hours; or

C. Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in psuedoclaudication, established by finding on

appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by chronic nonradicular pain

and weakness, resulting in an inability to ambulate effectively.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 1.04.

The ALJ discussed these listings as follows:

While the claimant does have lumbar spinal stenosis, there is no documentation that

this is documented by chronic nonradicular pain and weakness resulting in an

inability to ambulate effectively. The claimant’s most recent physical exam in

January 2019 reveals that the claimant had normal coordination, gait, and balance,

not consistent with a finding that the claimant’s lumbar disc degeneration meets

Listing 1.04C. Similarly, while there is also impingement of the ventral thecal sac

at L3 -L4, the record does not . . . document positive straight leg raising both sitting

and supine as required by listing 1.04A. (Ex. B28F/34). 

(R. 21). 

So, the ALJ covered Listing 1.02(A) and Listing 1.04(C) by noting an absence of evidence

that plaintiff was unable to ambulate effectively. The regulations describe the condition as the

inability to “sustain[ ] a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out

activities of daily living,” such as walking a block over rough or uneven surfaces, using public

transportation, shopping, banking, and climbing a few steps with the use of a hand rail. 20 C.F.R.

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pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, 1.00B2b(2). See also Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 867–68 (7th Cir.

2012). While the plaintiff may be correct that there are instances in the record where she exhibited

an antalgic gait, there were also many more instances where it was not. The ALJ noted some of

them: May 25, 2017(R. 23, 1198 (Her gait was [just] slightly antalgic . . . .); June 10, 2017 (R. 24,

930-34 (During the physical examination, she could get on and off the exam table without support,

walk greater than 50 feet without support with an antalgic gait, and perform heel toe

walk));September 19, 2018 (R. 25, 1390 (The musculoskeletal examination was normal and there

were no abnormalities in gait, coordination, or balance)); January 18, 2019 (R. 22,1384 (Her gait,

coordination, and balance were normal)). See Zellweger v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (7th Cir.

2021)(a reviewing court may look at the ALJ's more thorough discussion of the evidence elsewhere

in the decision to find support for his Step 3 findings); Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir.

2020). 

So, in reality, plaintiff’s argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which the court

is not permitted to do. As the court put it in Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021), “[e]ven

if reasonable minds could differ on the weight the ALJ gave to the medical evidence, we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ's by reweighing the evidence.” Accord Zoch v. Saul, 981

F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2020); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). But, even if it

could, the needle would point away from plaintiff being unable to ambulate effectively. Here are

examples from the record: January 26, 2017 (R. 795(slightly antalgic gait)); August 31, 2016: (R.

989 (normal gait)); October 20, 2017 (R. 1431(normal coordination, gait, and balance)); January 15,

2018: (R. 1425 (no tenderness, full range of motion and strength, normal coordination, gait, and

balance)); April 25, 2018: R. 1420 (tenderness in back, normal coordination, gait, and balance));

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April 4. 2018: (R. 1398 (no joint or muscle pain, normal range of motion, normal gait, normal

strength)); June 13, 2018: (R. 1394 (normal range of motion, normal gait, normal strength));

September 19, 2018: (R. 1389-90 (normal range of motion, normal gait, normal strength)); March

11, 2019: (R.1345 (can ambulate normally and sustain a reasonable pace walking for daily activity);

February 13, 2019: (R. 1408-09 (no back or neck pain, but joint and muscle pain; normal range of

motion, normal gait, normal strength)).

As for 1.04(A) and 1.04(B), the plaintiff concedes that the record contains no positive

straight leg raisings test in both the sitting and supine positions, and that the record contains no

operative note or pathology report of tissue biopsy confirming spinal arachnoiditis. [Dkt. #23, at 6]. 

As such, the ALJ’s discussion of whether the plaintiff’s impairment met a listed impairment was

adequate.

B. 

The plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinions of her treating

physicians, Drs. Badescu and Patel. A “treating physician's” medical opinion “is entitled to

controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record.” Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016). If the ALJ

decides not to give the opinion controlling weight, he is to weigh it by applying the factors set forth

in § 404.1527(c). As a general rule, an “ALJ should explicitly consider the details of the treatment

relationship and provide reasons for the weight given to [treating physicians’] opinions.” Yurt v.

Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)); see also Karr v. Saul,

989 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2021); Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (“If an ALJ

does not give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight, the regulations require the ALJ to

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consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the

physician's specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and support-ability of the

physician's opinion.”). Here, the ALJ did not go through the factors, but a court will still not

overturn an ALJ’s decision as long as the court is assured that the ALJ analyzed the treating

physician's medical opinion within the multifactor framework. Wright v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2715,

2021 WL 3832347, at *6 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021). That’s not the case here.

Dr. Patel thought that plaintiff was limited to less than sedentary work and that she could lift

less than 10 pounds occasionally and frequently. He thought she could not stand/walk on a long-term

basis and could only do so in 30-minute increments, could never bend or tolerate vibration, and

needed to change position every hour to lessen pain. The doctor did allow that plaintiff was able

to sustain a reasonable walking pace to carry out activities of daily living and ambulate without an

assistive device. But, the ALJ rejected the doctor’s opinion for the sole reason that it purportedly 

was not consistent with “treatment records that document improvement with injections”citing – in

not particularly helpful fashion, see, e.g., Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014)(the

court will not “scour the record for supportive evidence.”) – a block of 40 pages of treatment notes. 

(R. 27, citing Ex. B22F). 

With all deference, a review of the notes does not sustain this conclusion. The treatment

notes, in session after session, detail plaintiff experiencing back pain, joint stiffness, limb pain, leg

numbness, and muscle spasm. Yes, there are entries indicating that the most recent injection

provided relief, but such relief was not always complete, and it never lasted:

August 30, 2017: low back pain, joint stiffness, limb pain, numbness (R. 1208)

September 5, 2017: moderately intense upper back pain, radiates to right leg, right

thigh numbness (R. 1212-13)

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September 18, 2017: moderate upper and lower back pain, last injection provided

100% relief initially, but only 50% after two weeks (R. 1215)

December 11, 2017: moderate low back pain, joint stiffness, limb pain (R. 1218)

December 13, 2017: same, pain unresponsive for four weeks without relief (R. 1222)

July 3, 2018: pain for 3 months; moderate, with stiffness, spasm, radiculopathy, right

leg numbness (R. 1225)

August 15, 2018: moderately intense low back pain with stiffness and muscle spasm. 

(R. 1234). 90% decrease in pain immediately after injection. (R. 1237).

November 7, 2018: moderately intense low back pain with stiffness and muscle

spasm; last injection provided 80% relief for two months (R. 1242). 90% relief

immediately after injection. (R. 1245)

December 20, 2018: moderately intense pain with stiffness and muscle spasm. Noted

that plaintiff had greater than 80% relief for 6 weeks in the past. (R. 1247)

February 21, 2019: moderately intense pain, with stiffness, spasm, radiculopathy,

right leg numbness and weakness; four weeks unresponsive (R. 1229) 50% decrease

in pain (R. 1232)

Intermittent relief from severe pain here and there does not undermine Dr. Patel’s opinion

that plaintiff was limited to less than sedentary work. Dr. Patel cannot be on call to inject the

plaintiff each time the relief waned, and plaintiff’s pain became unresponsive. As such, Dr. Patel’s

opinion was consistent with his examination results and his notes, and the rule is inapplicable that

an ALJ may decline to give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight when the opinion is

inconsistent with the physician's treatment notes. Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir.

2021). 

Similarly, the ALJ afforded little weight to the treating source statement from Dr. Vlad

Badescu, because the ALJ concluded that it was almost identical to Dr. Patel’s statement. The ALJ

further explained that, to the extent Dr. Badescu felt plaintiff was limited to less than sedentary

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work, his opinion was inconsistent with the record for the same reason as Dr. Patel’s was: relief from

injections. (R. 28). But, again, the record of relief, sometimes partial, from time to time, following

injections does not undermine the doctor’s opinion as to plaintiff’s limitations generally. Full-time

work, eight hours a day, five days a week, week after week, can’t be scheduled to coincide with

relief from a plaintiff’s most recent injection. Accordingly, the case has to be remanded, and the

ALJ needs to provide more detail for discarding the two opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians,

which, significantly, are consistent with one another. 

The ALJ also added the observation that the doctor’s opinion was not supported by the

claimant’s ability to work part time cleaning houses. (R. 23). But, time and again, the Seventh

Circuit has cautioned ALJs not to draw conclusions about a plaintiff’s ability to work full time based

on part-time employment. Lanigan v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2017). See Jelinek v.

Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 812 (7thCir. 2011)(explaining that a claimant's “brief, part-time employment”

did not support the conclusion “that she was able to work a full-time job, week in and week out,

given her limitations”). The ALJ didn’t do that here, exactly; instead, she used the plaintiff’s parttime cleaning work to undermine the opinions of her doctors that she was limited to less than

sedentary work. But, the ALJ completely ignored the most significant aspect of plaintiff’s attempts

to work: it triggered all her pain and it took her days to recover. (R. 51). An ALJ cannot ignore that

a plaintiff performs daily activities with significant limitations, with help, or with breaks to rest. See

Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 2021)(“. . . the ALJ overlooked, or at least did not

acknowledge and engage with, the limitations with those tasks that [plaintiff] included . . . [such as]

her need for frequent breaks, and her dependence on her children for daily living activities

(including shopping, personal hygiene, and caring for pets”); Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 562 (7th

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Cir.2009)(“The ALJ here ignored [claimant's] numerous qualifications regarding her daily

activities....”); see also Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2016); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d

631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the plaintiff testified that the house-cleaning she did was for

people she knew and who knew of her limitations. This appears to fall into the category of what the

Seventh Circuit has called the “altruistic employer.” See Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 760 (7th

Cir. 2013). In any case, it’s an exceedingly flimsy – and insufficient – reason to discard medical

opinions; and this case must be remanded.

One further observation is in order. The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s “medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however,

the [plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for

the reasons explained in this decision.” The ALJ focused on the fact that plaintiff did not always

limp, and, again, that injections provided intermittent relief from pain. (R. 25). While neither of

those factors necessarily support a rejection of plaintiff’s allegations of pain, it is somewhat

troubling that the ALJ ignored not only the plaintiff’s excellent work history, but her subsequent

failed attempts to work despite her severe impairments and pain. As the court stressed in Loveless

v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016), “‘a claimant with a good work record is entitled to

substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work because of a disability.’” See also Hill v.

Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir.2015). Moreover, plaintiff’s quest for relief through multiple

surgeries, multiple injections, and various levels of medication, including strong narcotics, tends to

support her allegations. See e.g., Plessinger v. Berryhill, 900 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir.

2018)(criticizing the ALJ for failure to address fact that plaintiff’s allegations of pain were

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consistent with the strong prescription pain medication he was taking); Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d

702, 709 (7th Cir. 2013)(narcotic pain relievers, submission to steroid injections, and undergoing

major surgery all serve to bolster the credibility of plaintiff’s allegations); Carradine v. Barnhart,

360 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004)(finding doctor’s prescription for strong pain medications

corroborated claimant’s credibility regarding pain). While the ALJ need not address these points in

every case and they are not necessarily dispositive, here, the ALJ’s failure to do so, combined with

her focus on intermittent relief provided by injections, calls into question her assessment of

plaintiff’s allegations and the conclusion she reached. 

CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #22] is granted,

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #26] is denied, and this case is remanded to the

Commissioner.

ENTERED: 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DATE: 4/19/22

15

Case: 1:20-cv-04887 Document #: 32 Filed: 04/19/22 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:1866