If this opinion indicates tha t it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.



### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant, UNPUBLISHED January 24, 2019

v No. 341836

Genesee Circuit Court

DERRELL ANDRE RICHARDSON, LC No. 17

- 042113

- FH

Defendant

- Appellee.

Before: L ETICA

, P .J., and C AVANAGH and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court ’ s order dismissing charges of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227

, felon in possession of a firearm , MCL 750.224f , felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), and two counts of possession of a firearm during

the commiss ion of a felony , MCL 750.227b

, after the circuit court granted defendant’s motion to

suppress e vidence found during a traffic stop. We reverse and remand for further proceedings

.

I. FACTS

This case arises from a July 17, 2017 traffic stop near the in tersection of Mason and

Ge nesee Streets in Flint. Defendant was driving eastbound on Genesee Street, approaching the

intersection. At the same time, two Michigan State Police troopers were trav eling northbound on Mason Street in their fully

- marked police car . Both the traffic stop and the incident preceding it were recorded on the police car’s d ashboard camera.

The troopers slowed down to avoid a collision with defendant because they believed that he was app roaching the stop sign too fast and would drive through it. Yet defendant managed to

come to a full stop after partially passing the stop sign on Genesee Street

, but before entering

Mason Street. At that point, t he back third of defendant’s car was behi nd the stop sign and it sat

in the space on Genesee Street connecting the sidewalk that runs parallel to Mason Street. After stopping, def endant turned right onto Mason Street.- 2

- The officers subsequently pulled defendant over for failing to stop at a stop sign, MCL 257.649, failure to use a turn signal, MCL 257.648, and impeding traffic, MCL 257.676b. During the course of the traffic stop , the officers found a gun and ammunition, which led to the

criminal charge s

. D efendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic sto p. He argued the stop was unjustified because the troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that

his actions were unlawful.

At the evidentiary hearing, Sergeant Jeff Juneac, who was driving the police car

, testified

that he observed defendant , who was traveling 15 to 20 mph, drive “past the stop sign, past the crosswalk, right up into” the intersectio n

. Sergeant Juneac explained that he “slowed right down thinking he [defendant] was coming right through the intersection.” Thereafter, d efendant made a right

- hand turn and Sergeant Juneac testified that he did not observe defendant’s turn signal on.

Se rgeant Juneac turned the patrol car around, activated its lights, and stopped defendant’s car

. In

later review of the dashboard video , Sergeant Juneac believed defendant’s turn signal came on as defendant was making the right tur n. Sergeant Juneac clarified that, after review of the dashboard video, he believed that defendant “was starting a turn and I saw a blinker I believe. It wasn’t prior to the turn that I saw [it].” The three infractions Sergeant Juneac observed were failure to stop at the stop sign, impeding traffic, and failure to use a turn signal.

Trooper Craig Winnie, who was the passenger in the police car , testified that he too saw defendant’s car approaching the stop sign “at a high rate of speed” and that it passed the stop sign before coming to an abrupt stop. After defendant’s car made its turn southbound

, Sergeant

Juneac t urned the ir patrol car around to follow it. Trooper Winnie did not obs erve whether

defendant’s car had its turn signal activated because he was “on the comp uter getting ready to punch in the license plate.” Trooper Winnie observed defendant stop beyond the stop sign, “blocking the sidewalks, so impeding pedestrian traffic.” On cross

- examination, Trooper Winnie admitted that it was possible defendant’s turn signal was on prior to his turning southbound. He also admitted that there were no pedestrians in the area at the time that defendant stopped beyond the stop sign so no pedestrian traffic was, in fact, impeded. Contrary to Sergeant Juneac, Trooper Winnie testified that defendant did not impede them because they were travelling in a

different direction.

After being detained in th e police car, defendant asked if he could inquire about why he was stopped. Trooper Winnie responded: “Yup, ‘cuz you almost ran a stop sign. You were impeding traffic.”

Following the witness testimony, defense counsel argued that defendant completely stopped at the stop sign in a location that did not impede eithe r pedestrian or vehicular traffic and that his turn signal ha d been activated. The prosecution argued that as long as the troopers had a reasonable suspicion of a violation based on their observations

— whether or not they were

mistaken

— the traffic stop should be upheld. Defense counsel referred the court to the das hboard video and argued that it was clear that defendant came to a complete stop, that his car did not- 3

- impede the va n 1 that was tr avelling southbound, and that defendant had his turn signal on. Even so, the troopers stopped him.

Th e trial court noted that Sergeant Juneac testified that he believed defendant’s blinker was not on before he made the traffic stop but admitted that

, after he saw the video, he began to question himself as to whether defendant’s turn signal was on. The court stated that it w ould watch the video but noted that the video was go ing to have to show that Sergeant Juneac was not telling the truth. In reviewing the video, the court initially opined: “I can’t tell from the video if there was a blinker being used or i f that was sunli ght reflecting off the grill.” A fter repeatedly watching the vid eo , including with the aid of a magnifying glass, the court stated that it would review the video again later and make its decision.

The court subsequently entered an opinion, holding that “ [a] close view of the video

shows defendant’s right turn signal was blinking ” and “[t]he officer was not mistaken about the blinker, because he testified he saw the signal as defendant was turning.” Further, there was “no showing that defendant was impedi ng traffic” and defendant did, in fact, come “ to a complete

stop .” The court concluded: “ It appears the troopers jumped to the wrong conclusion before they saw the blinker and acted too quickly. The totality of the circumstances of the stop reveals

that [the] troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was engaged in illegal

conduct.” Accordingly, the court suppressed the evidence after determining the traffic stop was

invalid

. The court later entered an order dismissing the charges again st defendant arising from the suppressed evidence. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

T he prosecution argues that the trial court erred when it suppressed the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. We agree.

We review the trial court’s factual f indings for clear error and its interpretation of the law

de novo. People v Dunbar , 499 Mich 60, 66; 879 NW 2d 229 (2016) ; People v Williams , 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made.” People v Roberts , 292 Mich App 492, 502; 808 NW2d 290 (2011) ( quotation

marks an d citation omitted).

Detaining a motor vehicle constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. See People v Dillon , 296 Mich App 506, 508 ; 822 NW2d 611 (2012). To effectuate a valid traffic
stop, “ a police officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of law. ” People v Hyde , 285 Mich App 428, 436; 775 NW2d 833 (2009) ( quotation marks and citation omitted). S ee also People v Yeoman

, 218 Mich App 406, 410; 554 NW2d 577 (1996). The determination w hether police ha d a

“ reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must be made on a case

- by

- case basis, evaluated under the

1 Counsel omitted mention of the police vehicle, which the trooper s lowed and stopped in anticipation of defendant driving through the stop sign.- 4

- totality of the circumstances, and based on common sense. ” Dillon , 296 Mich App at 508. If a driver violates a portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC) , MCL 257.1 et seq

., in a manner constituting a civil infraction, the officer may stop and detain the vehicle. Dunbar , 499 Mich at 66; MCL 257.742(1).

M CL 257.649(8) instructs a driver where to stop his vehicle at a stop sign. In pertinent part, it reads:

Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, the driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop b efore entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection , or if there is not a crosswalk shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; or if there is not a crosswalk or a clearly marked stop line, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway whe re the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 257.10 defines a crosswalk, describing it as:

(a) That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of

the lateral lines of the side walks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs from the edges of the traversable highway.

(b) Any portion of a highway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or oth er markings on the surface.

MCL 257.10(a) makes plain that, when a sidewalk is present at an intersection, the lateral lines that connect both parts of the sidewalk become a crosswalk. Such an intersection does not need to be indicated by any sort of markings to qualify as a crosswalk. The presence of the marking requirement as a separate way to identify a crosswalk in MCL 257.10(b) shows that no markings are required for an area to be consider ed a cros swalk under MCL 257.10(a). Sebring v City of Berkley , 247 Mich App 666, 678

- 679; 637 NW2d 552 (2001).

By using the word “crosswalk” in MCL 257.649(8) and defining it in MCL 257.10(a), the Legislature directed a driver approaching a stop sign t o stop before the point where the sidewalk

meets the road. See also People v McIntosh

, 23 Mich App 412, 417; 178 NW2d 809 (1970) (“ ‘Where an applicable statute or ordinance designates specifically where the stop should be made, it is, of course controlli ng.’ ”), quoting 3 ALR3d 180, 215

. If a driver stops after the point

where the s idewalk meets the road then he encroache s on the area “within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway” that create a crosswalk u nder MCL 257.10(a), and violat es MCL 257.649(8).

Here , the dash camera video clearly shows a sidewalk running parallel to Mason Street as well as defendant ’s failure to stop his car until it occupied the space between the sidewalks. Even though there a re no markings on Genesee Street to note the presence of a crosswalk, a

crosswalk nevertheless exists under MCL 257.10(a) , occupying the space on Genesee Street that- 5

- connects the two sidewalks. See Sebring , 247 Mich App at 678

- 679

. Because d e fendant did not stop his car before reaching this area

, he violated MCL 257.649(8).

The testimony of both troopers and the audio on the dash cam video indicate s that the
troopers stopped defend ant for failing to properly stop at a stop sign. By focusing on the fact that defendant eventually stopped, the trial court legally erred in concluding the troopers had no valid reason to stop defendant. This error led the circuit court to further err by suppressing the evidence found during the traffic st op and subsequently dismissing all charges against

defendant. 2

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

2 Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull over defendant for violating MCL 257.649(8), discussion of whether they had reasonable suspicion to stop him for other violations

is moot. See People v Richmond , 486 Mich 29, 34; 782 N W2d 187 (2010) (noting that an appellate court will generally “not reach moot questions or declare principles or rules of law that have no practical legal effect in the case before it”) (quotation marks and citation omitted) ; People v Kavanaugh

, 320 Mich A pp 293, 299; 907 NW2d 845 (2017) (“[W] hen there is probable cause to believe that a driver has violated a traffic law, it is constitutional to briefly detain the driver for purposes of addressing th e violation even if the officer’ s subjective intent

for st opping the car is based on other factors. ”).