MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	55

Docket: Cum-19-282

Argued: March	3,	2020

Decided: May	5,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	and	CONNORS, JJ.*

20	THAMES	STREET	LLC	et	al.

v.

OCEAN	STATE	JOB	LOT	OF	MAINE	2017,	LLC

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1]		The	issue	presented	in	 this	appeal	is	whether	 the	court	hearing	a	

commercial	 forcible	 entry	 and	 detainer	 action	 has	 jurisdiction	 to	 award	

lease-based	attorney	fees.		Ocean	State	Job	Lot	of	Maine	2017,	LLC,	appeals	from	

a	judgment	of	the	Superior	Court	(Cumberland	County,	Warren,	J.)	in	which	the	

court	vacated	an award	of	attorney	fees	to	Ocean	State entered	by	the	District	

Court	in	the	Business	and	Consumer	Docket	(Mulhern,	J.).	 The	Superior	Court	

concluded that	 the	District	Court	lacked	subject	matter	jurisdiction	 to	award

lease-based attorney	fees	upon finding	for	Ocean	State	on	a	commercial	forcible	

 *		Although	Chief Justice	Saufley participated	in	the	appeal,	she resigned before	this	opinion	was	

certified.
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entry	and	detainer	action	brought	by	20 Thames	Street	LLC	and	122	PTIP	LLC	

(collectively,	20 Thames).	 We	affirm	the	Superior	Court’s	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 In	 August	 2017,	Ocean	 State	 rented	 a	 commercial	 retail	 space	in	

Falmouth	from	Louis	Vinios,	trustee	of	Falmouth	Realty	Associates.		20 Thames	

subsequently	purchased	the	property	from	Vinios	and	assumed	the	lease	with	

Ocean	State.		Less	than	two	months	later,	20	Thames	filed	in	the	District	Court	

(Portland)	 its	 complaint	 for	 forcible	 entry	 and	 detainer,	 alleging that Ocean	

State breached	the terms of	the	lease and	20	Thames	was	entitled	to	possession.	

The	 matter	 was	 transferred	 to	 the	 Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket.	 	After	 a	

three-day	 trial,	 the	 court	 (Mulhern,	 J.)	 found	 in	 favor	 of Ocean	 State,

determining	that	it	had	not	violated	the	lease.		Upon	Ocean State’s petition,	and	

after	receiving affidavits from	the	parties,	the	court	awarded	Ocean	State	costs	

and	$206,076	in	attorney	fees	based	on the	following	lease	provision:

In	 the	event	either	party	hereto	initiates	litigation	 to	enforce	 the	

terms	and	provisions	of	this	Lease,	the	non-prevailing	party	in	such	

action	 shall	 reimburse	 the	 prevailing	 party	 for	 its	 reasonable	

attorney’s	fees,	filing	fees,	and	court	costs.
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[¶3]		20	Thames	appealed	to	the	Superior	Court.		See	14	M.R.S.	§	6008(1)	

(2018).1		That	court (Warren,	J.)	affirmed	the	judgment	for	Ocean	State	on	the	

complaint	and	the	award	of	costs, but vacated	the attorney fee	award	because	

it	 concluded	 that	 the	District	 Court	lacked	 jurisdiction	to	 award lease-based

attorney	fees.

[¶4]	 	 Ocean	 State	 timely	 appealed,	 challenging	 the	 Superior	 Court’s	

decision	 vacating	 the	 award	 of	 attorney	 fees.	 	 See	 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 1851	 (2018);	

M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II.	 DISCUSSION

[¶5]	 	 Title	 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 6017	 (2018) governs	 the	 forcible	 entry	 and	

detainer	process	 for	commercial	leases.		The	question	is	whether	 the	statute	

confers	on	the	District	Court the	authority to award	lease-based	attorney	fees.	

This	question	relating	 to	 the	scope	of	the	District	Court’s	jurisdiction	may	be	

raised	at	any	time	in	the	proceedings,	whether	by	a	party	or	by	the	court.		See	

Jensen	v.	Jensen,	2015	ME	105,	¶	11,	121	A.3d	809;	Warren	v.	Waterville	Urban	

Renewal	Auth.,	290	A.2d	362,	365	(Me.	1972).		Thus,	we	will	not	disregard	the	

issue	as	unpreserved	or	waived.

 1		20	Thames	also	appealed	to	us,	but	we	dismissed	its appeal	for	lack	of	jurisdiction.
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[¶6]	 Ordinarily, “litigants	bear	their	own	attorney	fees	in	the	absence	of	

statutory	authority	or	a	contractual	provision.”		Soley	v.	Karll,	2004	ME	89,	¶	10,	

853	A.2d	755.	 In	the	context	of	a	forcible	entry	and	detainer	action,	claims	for	

breach	 of	 contract	 may	 not	 be	 asserted unless	 authorized	 by	 the	 statute.		

M.R. Civ.	P.	80D(g)	(“Forcible	entry	and	detainer	actions	shall	not	be	joined	with	

any	other	action,	nor	shall	a	defendant	in	such	action	file	any	counterclaim.”);	

see	also	Bureau	v.	Gendron,	2001	ME	157,	¶	9,	783	A.2d	643.		Such	additional	

claims	 are	 disallowed	 because	 “[t]he	 judicial	 power	 in	 a	 forcible	 entry	 and	

detainer	 action—a	 summary	 proceeding	 to	 determine	 who	 has	 a	 right	 to	

immediate	possession	of	real	property	to	the	exclusion	of	another—is	purely	

statutory	in	origin.”		Rubin	v.	Josephson,	478	A.2d	665,	667	(Me.	1984); see	also	

Tozier	v.	Tozier,	437	A.2d	645,	647	(Me.	1981).		Because	contractual	attorney	

fees	are	not	available	in	a	forcible	entry	and	detainer	action absent	statutory	

authorization,	the	question	is	whether	the statute	here	provides	authority	for	

the	District	Court	to	award	those lease-based	fees.2

 2		Title	14	M.R.S § 6017 (2018) does	not	supply	a	basis	for	the	award	of	statutory attorney	fees.		

Cf. 14 M.R.S.	§§ 6004-A(2),	6010,	6014(3) (2018)	(allowing	an	award	of	attorney	fees	in	a	residential	

forcible	entry	and	detainer	matter	to	a	party whose	opponent fails	 to	make	a	good-faith	effort	 to	

mediate;	 to	 a	 tenant	 from	 a	 perpetrator	 of	 domestic	 violence,	 sexual	 assault,	 or	 stalking;	 or	 to	 a	

landlord	if	an	action	alleging	an	illegal	eviction	was	not	brought	in	good	faith	and	was	frivolous	or	

intended	only	to	harass).
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[¶7]		Ocean	State	argues	that	the	attorney	fees	are	statutorily	authorized	

either	(A) as	“arrears”	that	may	be	awarded	pursuant	to	14	M.R.S.	§	6017(6), or	

(B)	 as	 an	 “offsetting	 claim[]” that	 may	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 District	 Court

pursuant	to	14 M.R.S.	§ 6017(2)(A).

[¶8]		In	examining	the	statute de	novo,	Thornton	Acad.	v.	Reg’l	Sch.	Unit	

21,	2019	ME	115,	¶	5,	212	A.3d	340,	we	construe	its	terms	“to	give	effect	to	the	

Legislature’s	 intent	 in	 enacting	 the	 statute,”	 Packgen,	 Inc.	 v.	 Bernstein,	 Shur,	

Sawyer	 & Nelson,	 P.A.,	 2019	 ME	 90,	 ¶	 20,	 209	 A.3d	 116	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).		We	interpret	the	statute	in	the	context	of	the	entire	statutory	scheme,

see	id. ¶	21,	and give	 the	 statute’s	words	 “their	plain,	common,	and	 ordinary	

meaning,	 such	 as	 people	 of	 common intelligence	 would	 usually	 ascribe	 to	

them,”	 Thornton	 Acad.,	 2019	 ME	 115,	 ¶	 5,	 212	 A.3d	 340	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).	 	 In	 doing	 so,	we	will	 “avoid[] results	 that	 are	 absurd,	inconsistent,	

unreasonable,	or	illogical.”		Packgen,	2019	ME	90,	¶	21,	209	A.3d	116	(quotation	

marks	omitted).		Only	if	the	statute	is	“susceptible	of	different	meanings”	and	

therefore ambiguous,	id. (quotation	marks	omitted),	will	we	look	 to	extrinsic	

indicia	 of	 legislative	 intent, such	 as	 the	 legislative	 history	 of	 the	 statute, to	

ascertain	the	Legislature’s	intent	in	enacting	the	statute,	see id.; see	also	In	re	

Child	of	Nicholas	P.,	2019	ME	152,	¶	32,	218	A.3d 247.
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A. Arrears

[¶9]		“The	District	Court	has	jurisdiction	to	hear,	decide	and	award	rent	

and	arrears allegedly	 owing, regardless	 of	 the	amount.”		14	M.R.S.	§	6017(6)

(emphasis	added).		Ocean	State	contends	that	the	separation	of	the	terms	“rent”	

and	 “arrears”	 means	 that	 “arrears”	 can	 include sums	 owed	 by	 a	 party	 apart	

from	rent,	including	attorney	 fees.		This	interpretation	is	not	consistent	with	

the	 plain	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 “arrears,”	 however,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	 “[a]n	

unpaid,	 overdue	 debt	 or	 unfulfilled	 obligation.” Arrears,	 American	 Heritage	

Dictionary	of	the	English	Language	(5th	ed.	2016);	see	also	Arrear,	Black’s	Law	

Dictionary	 (11th	 ed.	 2019)	 (defining	 an	 “arrear”	 as	 “[a]n	 unpaid	 or	 overdue	

debt”).	 	 Here,	 20	 Thames	 was	 not	 behind	 in	 its	 payment	 of	 Ocean	 State’s	

attorney	fees before	any	attorney	fees	were	awarded.		To	interpret	the	statute	

to	include	attorney	fees incurred	in	the	litigation	as “arrears allegedly	owing”	

would	 be	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 the	 term.	 	 14	 M.R.S.	

§ 6017(6).

B. Offsetting	Claims

[¶10]	 	 The	 commercial	 forcible	 entry	 and	 detainer	 statute	 further	

provides	 that, “[i]n	 addition	to	 deciding	 the	 right	 of	 possession,	 the	 District	

Court	shall	also	decide	the	amount	of	rent	owed,	if	disputed.		In	establishing	the	
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amount	of	rent	owed,	 the	District	Court	may	consider	offsetting	claims to	 the	

extent	appropriate.”		Id. §	6017(2)(A)	(emphasis	added).		Ocean	State	contends	

that	a claim	 for	attorney	 fees	under	a lease	is	an	“offsetting	claim” when	 the	

tenant	prevails.

[¶11]	 	 “Offset”	 is	 defined	 as	 “to	 balance,	 complement,	 counteract,	

compensate	for,	etc.” Offset,	Webster’s	New	World	College	Dictionary	(5th	ed.	

2016);	see	also	Offset,	Black’s	Law	Dictionary	(defining	“offset”	as	“[t]o	balance	

or	calculate	against;	to	compensate	for”).		If	the	tenant	prevails	and	no	rent	or	

arrears	are	owed,	there	is	nothing	to “offset.”

[¶12]	 	 In	 sum,	 the	 forcible	 entry	 and	 detainer	 action	 is	 a	 summary	

proceeding,	 narrowly	 defined	 by	 statute and	 constrained	 by	 rules	 of	 court.		

Section	6017	authorizes	only	a	narrow	category	of	claims	outside	possession	to	

be	pursued	in	the	action.	 Under	the	plain	language	of	section	6017,	a	contract	

claim	for	attorney	fees not	incurred	until	and	through	the	litigation	does	not	fall	

into	this	category.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.
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Seth	W.	Brewster,	Esq. (orally),	Ryan	P.	Dumais,	Esq.,	and	Micah	A.	Smart,	Esq.,	

Eaton	Peabody,	Portland,	for	appellant	Ocean	State	Job	Lot	of	Maine	2017,	LLC

Eben	 M.	 Albert,	 Esq.,	 Glenn	 Israel,	 Esq. (orally), and	 David	 A.	 Soley,	 Esq.,	

Bernstein	Shur,	Portland,	for	appellees	20	Thames	Street	LLC	and	122	PTIP	LLC

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2018-47

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY