*********************************************** 

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*********************************************** 
FATIMA K. DE ALMEIDA-KENNEDY v.

JAMES KENNEDY

(AC 43348)

Alvord, Elgo and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s pending

motions, which included a motion for modification of his alimony, child

support and visitation orders, two motions for contempt, a motion for

an order to prevent the plaintiff from filing additional motions without

leave of the court pursuant to Strobel v. Strobel (92 Conn. App. 662), a

motion to remove the guardian ad litem, and a motion to compel compliance with his discovery request, all for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement

Act (§ 46b-155 et seq.). Prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the

defendant relocated to Florida and the plaintiff and the parties’ children

relocated to Tennessee. The defendant returned to Connecticut after

approximately one year in Florida. While the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

was pending, the defendant filed an application for an emergency ex

parte order of custody, and the trial court entered an emergency order

awarding temporary custody to the defendant and also ordered a hearing

on the custody issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

ordered that all existing orders regarding the custody of the parties’

minor children be stayed until the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss was

resolved. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, for which the

plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of her arguments, as she was

unable to attend in person, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s

motions for a Strobel order, to remove the guardian ad litem, and to

compel, and one of his motions for contempt. The defendant appealed

to this court and then filed a motion to reargue with the trial court. The

trial court stayed consideration of the defendant’s motion for modification of his alimony, child support and visitation orders, which remained

pending, until the defendant’s motion to reargue was resolved. The

defendant then filed an amended appeal from the stay order. The trial

court issued a memorandum of decision on the defendant’s motion to

reargue in which it, inter alia, vacated the stay and ordered dismissal

of the custody proceedings, the defendant’s motion for modification,

and his second motion for contempt, and the defendant further amended

his appeal to challenge that ruling. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked

a proper basis on which to grant the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss: the

substance of the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, which recited details

of her relocation, in addition to other documentation that she provided in

connection with her motion to dismiss, including an individual education

plan for her son that was prepared by his school in Tennessee and an

electrical bill for a residence in Tennessee that listed the plaintiff as

the account holder, undermined the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff

did not introduce any admissible evidence as to her residence, the length

of time at her residence, the location of the children, or her financial

circumstances.

2. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court

abused its discretion in staying enforcement of the emergency ex parte

custody order: the claim was not properly before this court because

the defendant failed to file a motion for review of the stay order, which,

pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 66-6), was his sole remedy.

3. The trial court properly concluded that, pursuant to the applicable statute

(§ 46b-115l (a) (1)), it did not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction

over the defendant’s motions relating to custody of and visitation with

the minor children and, therefore, it properly granted the plaintiff’s

motion to dismiss those motions: jurisdiction under § 46b-115l (a) (1)

terminated in April, 2018, when the plaintiff and the minor children

relocated to Tennessee following the defendant’s relocation to Florida,
as neither the parties nor the minor children continued to reside in

Connecticut after that time; moreover, Connecticut did not reacquire

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when the defendant returned to reside

in the state, as § 46b-115l(a) (1) pertained only to continuing jurisdiction,

not interrupted or intermittent jurisdiction.

4. The trial court improperly dismissed certain of the defendant’s motions

unrelated to the issues of child custody or visitation: the trial court’s

dismissal order was predicated on its conclusion that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction under the act, however, the act only concerned issues

of custody or visitation and was not applicable to orders relating to

child support or other monetary obligations; accordingly, although the

defendant’s two motions for contempt, which concerned custody and

visitation with the minor children, and his motion for modification,

which sought to modify the existing visitation order, were properly

dismissed, the defendant’s motion to modify his alimony and child support orders, along with his motions for a Strobel order, to remove the

guardian ad litem, and to compel compliance with his discovery request,

were beyond the purview of the act, as they had no relation to the issues

of child custody or visitation, and, consequently, they were improperly

dismissed.

5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deferring consideration of the

defendant’s motion to modify his alimony, child support, and visitation

orders: the defendant’s motion to reargue, which asked the trial court

to reconsider and reverse its determination that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under the act, required the deferral of consideration of the

merits of his motion to modify until after the jurisdiction question was

fully resolved.

Argued January 7—officially released September 7, 2021

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Gould, J., rendered

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation

agreement; thereafter, the court, Egan, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s motions

for a Strobel order, to remove the guardian ad litem,

to compel, and for contempt and stayed the custody

proceeding that was instituted by the defendant’s application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, and

the defendant appealed to this court; subsequently, the

court, Stewart, J., issued a stay on the defendant’s

motion to modify, and the defendant amended his

appeal; thereafter, the court, Egan, J., granted the

defendant’s motion to reargue and amended its decision

relating to the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the custody proceedings and the defendant’s

motion to modify and for contempt, and the defendant

amended his appeal. Affirmed in part; reversed in part;

further proceedings.

James Kennedy, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

J. David Griffin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this contentious postdissolution marital

dispute,1

the defendant, James Kennedy,2 appeals from

the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to

dismiss filed by the plaintiff, Fatima K. De AlmeidaKennedy, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (act), which has been adopted by Connecticut and codified in General Statutes § 46b-115 et

seq. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1)

lacked a proper basis on which to grant the motion to

dismiss, (2) abused its discretion in staying enforcement of an ex parte custody order, (3) improperly concluded that it lacked continuing, exclusive jurisdiction

pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-115l (a) (1), (4)

improperly dismissed several motions unrelated to the

issue of child custody or visitation, and (5) abused its

discretion in staying consideration of his motion for

modification. We affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On August 2, 2010, the trial court

dissolved the parties’ marriage. The judgment of dissolution incorporated by reference a written separation

agreement, which provided, inter alia, that (1) the plaintiff was to have legal custody of the parties’ two minor

children, (2) the defendant was permitted supervised

visits, and (3) the defendant would pay weekly unallocated alimony and child support.3 On December 9, 2014,

that judgment was modified by agreement to provide

for, inter alia, a reduction to the defendant’s alimony

and child support obligations and joint legal custody

with primary physical custody remaining with the plaintiff.

On December 28, 2015, the defendant filed a motion

for modification requesting, among other things, a further reduction of his alimony and child support obligations. The court, Wenzel, J., declined that request, the

propriety of which this court affirmed on appeal. See

De Almeida-Kennedy v. Kennedy, 188 Conn. App. 670,

674–82, 205 A.3d 704, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 909, 210

A.3d 566 (2019). On March 10, 2016, the court, Adelman,

J., appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the minor

children.

On August 30, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for

contempt, on which the court, Wenzel, J., scheduled a

hearing for November 8, 2017. Prior to that hearing, the

defendant moved to Florida in October, 2017.

At the November 8, 2017 hearing on the motion for

contempt, the plaintiff’s counsel and the guardian ad

litem informed the court that the defendant, who was

not present at the hearing, had relocated to Florida

and had failed to attend a child support enforcement

proceeding in Connecticut one day earlier. The court
also heard testimony from the guardian ad litem in

support of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. In its

oral memorandum of decision, the court concluded that

the defendant was in wilful contempt of the separation

agreement and, accordingly, suspended the defendant’s

unsupervised visitation rights.4

It is undisputed that the

defendant has not seen the minor children in person

since that judgment was rendered.

In April, 2018, the plaintiff and the minor children

relocated to Tennessee. The defendant thereafter filed

a series of motions in April and May, 2018, including,

inter alia, a motion for modification in which he sought

to reduce his unallocated alimony and support obligations and to modify his visitation order.5 The defendant

also filed an application for an emergency ex parte

order of custody on May 8, 2018, which the court denied.

On November 7, 2018, the plaintiff, appearing at that

time in a self-represented capacity, filed a motion to

dismiss the defendant’s pending motions for lack of

jurisdiction under the act. In that motion, the plaintiff

asked the court to ‘‘terminate jurisdiction’’ for various

reasons, most notably the fact that she had resided in

Tennessee with the minor children for more than six

months.6 While that motion to dismiss was pending, the

defendant filed another application for an emergency

ex parte order of custody on November 27, 2018. That

same day, the court, Gould, J., entered an emergency

order awarding temporary custody to the defendant.

The court also ordered a hearing to be held on the

custody issue within fourteen days.

On December 11, 2018, the court held such a hearing

at which the plaintiff’s counsel, the defendant, and the

guardian ad litem were present. At that time, the guardian ad litem apprised the court that the defendant’s

November 27, 2018 application for an emergency ex

parte order of custody ‘‘contain[ed] misleading, incorrect, incomplete, as well as false statements.’’ At the

conclusion of that hearing, the court, Hon. Robert J.

Malone, judge trial referee, ordered all existing orders

regarding the custody of the minor children to be stayed

until the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction was resolved.

On May 1, 2019, the court held a hearing on the

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. The defendant appeared

at that hearing and was heard by the court. Although

the plaintiff was unable to travel to Connecticut for the

hearing, she submitted an affidavit in support of her

motion to dismiss.

In its August 29, 2019 memorandum of decision, the

court, Egan, J., stated in relevant part: ‘‘In support of

her motion [to dismiss], the plaintiff claims that she

and the parties’ minor children had lived in Franklin,

Tennessee for at least seven months as of November

7, 2018, when the ex parte application was filed. She
further claims that as of October, 2018, the defendant

had lived one year in Satellite Beach, Florida after leaving Connecticut. She claims the defendant returned to

Connecticut as of October 8, 2018; however, as of that

date, both parties had both been living out of . . . Connecticut for over six months and the defendant had

been living out of state for a full year.

‘‘The plaintiff further submits that she is the primary

emotional, physical and financial caregiver for the children, and they have continued to reside in Tennessee

since their move in [April, 2018]. The children [have

been] enrolled in Williamson County Schools in Tennessee since April 22, 2018. Individual Education Plans

. . . were established for them on May 7, 2018. All

other aspects of their care have been transferred to

Tennessee.

‘‘The plaintiff further argues that with respect to the

[Connecticut] child support order, on September 14,

2018, the Family Support Magistrate dismissed the child

support case because the order was enforced in Florida.

The plaintiff emphasized that while she is working in

Tennessee, she has modest means. Travel to Connecticut to address motions would require her to secure

childcare for the children at a steep cost to her, take

the children out of school to travel with her, or find

[someone to care for] them while she is away.7 She

does not have the means to afford an attorney.

‘‘The defendant testified that he resides in Connecticut. He returned in October, 2018, from Florida. He

argues that the plaintiff has gaps in her Tennessee residency and that she gave inconsistent dates of residency.

Further, she admits to travel out of state.

‘‘With respect to his relationship with the children,

the defendant argues that he tried to have access to

them, but he was unsuccessful due to the plaintiff’s

actions. The defendant testified that he has no information on the care and relationship of the children.

‘‘With respect to the ties of the minor children to

Connecticut, the defendant argues that he has family

here. The children have lifelong relationships here. They

were only pulled out of school in March, 2018. They

had medical providers in March, 2018. They would be

able to receive an education and medical treatment no

different than they would have in 2018. . . . At the

time of the [plaintiff’s November 7, 2018 motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction], the plaintiff and the minor

children had lived in Tennessee for seven months. The

defendant resided in Florida for over one year.’’ (Footnote added.)

The court continued: ‘‘Based upon the evidence introduced and the representations of the plaintiff’s counsel,

the court finds that all parties no longer lived in [Connecticut] at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss

on November 7, 2018.’’8 The court then concluded that
‘‘Connecticut does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’’ under § 46b-115l (a) (1).9

In addition, the court

expressly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the

present dispute pursuant to General Statutes § 46b115q, finding that ‘‘Connecticut is an inconvenient

forum’’ and that ‘‘Tennessee is a more appropriate

forum’’ to resolve the child custody dispute between

the parties.10 Accordingly, the court dismissed four of

the defendant’s pending motions.11 In addition, the court

ordered the custody proceeding that was instituted by

the defendant’s application for an emergency ex parte

order of custody to be ‘‘stayed upon the condition that

a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in

Tennessee.’’12

On September 3, 2019, the defendant filed an appeal

of the court’s August 29, 2019 judgment with this court.

He then filed a motion to reargue with the trial court.

At that time, the defendant’s April 4, 2018 motion for

modification of his alimony, child support, and visitation orders remained pending. On December 12, 2019,

the court, Stewart, J., stayed consideration of that

motion to modify until the defendant’s motion to reargue was resolved. On December 31, 2019, the defendant

filed an amended appeal from that stay order.

On July 9, 2020, the court issued its memorandum of

decision on the defendant’s motion to reargue. The

court first concluded it lacked both exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to § 46b-115l and initial child

custody jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes § 46b115k. In light of that determination, the court abandoned its earlier ruling, in which it had declined to

exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of an inconvenient

forum pursuant to § 46b-115q.13 As the court stated:

‘‘[T]he statutory requirements necessary for the court

to assume . . . jurisdiction over the custody issues

[have] not been established pursuant to . . . [§§] 46b115k and . . . 46b-115l. Therefore, based upon the

court’s further review of the record, the memorandum

of decision dated August 29, 2019, shall be amended to

vacate the stay on the basis of inconvenient forum.’’

The court also amended its prior ruling to order the

dismissal of ‘‘the custody proceedings.’’ In addition,

the court entered an order dismissing two additional

pending motions filed by the defendant—his April 4,

2018 motion for modification and his April 4, 2018

motion for contempt. On July 29, 2020, the defendant

further amended his appeal to challenge the trial court’s

July 9, 2020 ruling on his motion to reargue, and this

appeal followed.14

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court lacked

a proper basis on which to grant the motion to dismiss

filed by the plaintiff. More specifically, he claims that

the plaintiff ‘‘did not introduce any admissible evidence

as to her residence, the length of time at the residence,
the location of the children, nor [her] financial circumstances.’’ On our plenary review of the record before

us; see Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, 329

Conn. 515, 523, 187 A.3d 1154 (2018); GMAC Mortgage,

LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn. App. 165, 174, 73 A.3d 742

(2013); we disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim. On January 10, 2019, the plaintiff

filed a memorandum of law in support of her motion to

dismiss, which was accompanied by multiple exhibits,

including a copy of the individual educational program

for her minor son prepared by Williamson County

Schools in Franklin, Tennessee for the period beginning

May 7, 2018, and an electrical bill dated June 5, 2018,

that lists the plaintiff as the account holder for a ‘‘service

address’’ located in Franklin, Tennessee. In addition,

the plaintiff submitted an affidavit that recited certain

details regarding her relocation to Tennessee. At the

May 1, 2019 hearing on the motion to dismiss, the following colloquy occurred regarding that affidavit:

‘‘The Court: Well, under the Practice Book the motion

to dismiss requires the motion, a memorandum of law

and an affidavit may—may be submitted to, I think, fill

in the record—

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I—I did submit an—

‘‘The Court: —with the facts.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: —affidavit.

‘‘The Court: You did.’’15

At that time, the defendant did not dispute the existence of that affidavit. Moreover, in its August 29, 2019

memorandum of decision, the court specifically found

that the plaintiff had filed an affidavit in support of her

motion to dismiss.

In his subsequent motion to reargue, the defendant

nevertheless claimed that the plaintiff never ‘‘supplied

an affidavit’’ to the court. In addressing that claim, the

court stated in its July 9, 2020 memorandum of decision

on the motion to reargue that, during a December 4,

2019 hearing on that motion, the plaintiff’s counsel ‘‘represented that she filed the plaintiff’s sworn affidavit

dated May 1, 2019, on the day of the hearing.’’ The court

then noted that it was ‘‘unable to locate the sworn

affidavit. Counsel filed a second sworn affidavit from

the plaintiff on the day of the hearing on December 4,

2019, to replace the missing affidavit. Given the volume

of pleadings in the case and the potential of an administrative error, the court accepted counsel’s representation regarding filing, accepted the substitute sworn affidavit, and considers counsel’s statements [at the May

1, 2019 hearing] to be argument.’’16

In that affidavit, the plaintiff averred, inter alia, that

‘‘[o]n or around October, 2017, the defendant moved to

Florida’’; that ‘‘[i]n April, 2018, as a result of financial
hardship and to be closer to family, I relocated myself

and both minor children to Franklin, Tennessee’’; that

‘‘[a]t the time I relocated, the defendant still resided in

Florida’’; that ‘‘[t]he defendant currently owes more

than $107,000 in back child support, according to Connecticut Child Support Enforcement’’; that the minor

children ‘‘are enrolled in the Williamson County School

System in Franklin, Tennessee,’’ where they were ‘‘thriving academically and emotionally’’; that ‘‘[d]ue to financial hardship, I enrolled our family in public benefits’’;

that ‘‘[o]n or about March 20, 2019, Tennessee began a

child support action against the defendant’’; and that,

‘‘[a]s of May 1, 2019, I have continuously resided in

Tennessee, with our children, for more than one year.’’

The substance of that affidavit, along with other documentation provided in connection with the motion to

dismiss, undermines the defendant’s claim that the

plaintiff failed to produce ‘‘any admissible evidence as

to her residence, the length of time at the residence,

the location of the children, nor [her] financial circumstances.’’ We therefore reject that claim.

II

The defendant next contends that the court abused

its discretion in staying enforcement of the emergency

ex parte custody order. That claim is not properly

before us.17

As this court has explained, ‘‘[p]ursuant to Practice

Book § 61-14, [t]he sole remedy of any party desiring the

court to review an order concerning a stay of execution

shall be by motion for review under [Practice Book §]

66-6. . . . Issues regarding a stay of execution cannot

be raised on direct appeal. . . . Practice Book § 66-6

requires that [m]otions for review . . . be filed within

ten days from the issuance of notice of the order sought

to be reviewed. . . . If a party does not file a motion

for review, that party is precluded from challenging the

court’s stay order by means of a direct appeal. . . .

We therefore decline to review this claim because it has

been improperly presented for resolution on appeal.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Clark v. Clark, 150 Conn. App. 551, 575–76, 91 A.3d 944

(2014). Because the defendant failed to file a motion

for review of the stay order in question, we decline to

review his claim.

III

The defendant also claims that the court improperly

concluded that it did not have exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction pursuant to § 46b-115l (a) (1). We disagree.

‘‘At the outset, we note our well settled standard

of review for jurisdictional matters. A determination

regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must

decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically
correct and find support in the facts that appear in the

record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Igersheim

v. Bezrutczyk, 197 Conn. App. 412, 416, 231 A.3d

1276 (2020).

‘‘The purposes of the [act] are to avoid jurisdictional

competition and conflict with courts of other states in

matters of child custody; [to] promote cooperation with

the courts of other states; [to] discourage continuing

controversies over child custody; [to] deter abductions;

[to] avoid [relitigation] of custody decisions; and to

facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other

states. . . . The [act] addresses [interjurisdictional]

issues related to child custody and visitation. . . . The

[act] is the enabling legislation for the court’s jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parisi v.

Niblett, 199 Conn. App. 761, 770, 238 A.3d 740 (2020).

The salient provision of the act is codified in Connecticut in § 46b-115l (a) (1), which provides in relevant

part: ‘‘[A] court of this state which has made a child

custody determination pursuant to sections 46b-115k

to 46b-115m, inclusive, has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until . . . [a] court of

this state or a court of another state determines that

the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as

a parent do not presently reside in this state . . . .’’ In

the present case, the court found that the defendant

left Connecticut and relocated to Florida in October,

2017, while the plaintiff and the minor children relocated to Tennessee in April, 2018. The court further

found, and the defendant does not dispute, that he did

not return to Connecticut until the end of September,

2018. Thus, from April to September, 2018, neither the

plaintiff, the defendant, nor the minor children ‘‘presently reside[d] in this state,’’18 a prerequisite to exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under § 46b-115l (a) (1).

As the commentary to the act notes, ‘‘when the child,

the parents, and all persons acting as parents physically

leave the [s]tate to live elsewhere, the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases.’’ Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) § 202, comment (2),

9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 674 (2019); see also N.S. v. D.M., 21

Cal. App. 5th 1040, 1048, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67 (2018)

(‘‘[o]nce a state makes an initial child custody determination . . . it retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction

over custody matters until . . . all parties move outside the state’’ (citation omitted)); Wahlke v. Pierce, 392

S.W.3d 426, 431 (Ky. App. 2013) (‘‘the relocation of both

parents and the child out of this [c]ommonwealth before

commencement of the modification proceeding

divested the family court of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’’); Hogan v. Hogan, 308 Neb. 397, 403, 954

N.W.2d 868 (2021) (‘‘Nebraska no longer possessed

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. This is because when

the children and the parents have moved away from

the issuing state, the issuing state no longer meets the

jurisdictional prerequisites . . . .’’); Kar v. Kar, 132
Nev. 636, 639, 378 P.3d 1204 (2016) (‘‘[o]nce it determined that the child and the child’s parents no longer

resided in Nevada, the district court lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’’ (emphasis in original)); T.D. v.

M.H., 219 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2019) (‘‘a court

lacks exclusive, continuing jurisdiction if all parties

move out of the [c]ommonwealth’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The defendant nonetheless submits that the courts

of this state reacquired ‘‘exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’’ on his return to Connecticut in September, 2018.

He has provided no legal authority to support that novel

contention. By its plain language, § 46b-115l pertains to

the continuing jurisdiction of a Connecticut court, not

the interrupted or intermittent jurisdiction. The defendant’s claim also is contrary to the stated intent of the

drafters of the act, who explained: ‘‘The phrase ‘do not

presently reside’ is not used in the sense of a technical

domicile. The fact that the original determination [s]tate

still considers one parent a domiciliary does not prevent

it from losing exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after

the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents

have moved from the [s]tate.

* * *

Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is not reestablished if, after the child, the parents, and all persons

acting as parents leave the [s]tate, the [noncustodial]

parent returns.’’ (Emphasis added.) Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) § 202,

comment (2), supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 674–75; accord

In re M.R.F.-C., 158 N.E.3d 688, 695, 697 (Ohio App.

2020) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that it lacked

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when ‘‘Ohio was the

children’s ‘home state’ when the initial custody proceedings occurred . . . [but] was no longer the children’s

home state due to the family’s relocation to Michigan’’

and concluding that ‘‘[m]other did not satisfy Ohio’s

residency requirement when she attempted to reestablish residence in Ohio shortly before filing her motion’’);

cf. In re Marriage of Ruth, 32 Kan. App. 2d 416, 421–22,

83 P.3d 1248 (2004) (concluding that Kansas trial court

retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction despite fact

that mother and children moved to another state

because father ‘‘has continuously resided in Kansas

since the [parties’] divorce’’ (emphasis added)).

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial

court properly determined that it did not have exclusive,

continuing jurisdiction over the defendant’s November

27, 2018 motion for custody and his other motions

related to custody and visitation with the minor children.19 The court, therefore, properly granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss those motions.

IV

We next address the defendant’s claim that the court,
in ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and his

motion to reargue, improperly dismissed certain

motions unrelated to the issue of child custody or visitation. We agree.

The court’s dismissal order was predicated on its

conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the act. The act is ‘‘the enabling legislation for

the court’s jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Parisi v. Niblett, supra, 199 Conn. App. 770.

The act, however, is limited in scope—it concerns

issues of custody or visitation. Sections 46b-115k and

46b-115l, on which the court’s decision here was predicated, expressly grant the trial court jurisdiction over

‘‘child custody determination[s].’’20 Like the act, Connecticut law defines ‘‘ ‘[c]hild custody determination’ ’’

as ‘‘a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation

with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent,

temporary, initial and modification order. The term does

not include an order relating to child support or other

monetary obligation of an individual . . . .’’21

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-115a (3); see

also Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement

Act (1997) § 102 (3), supra, 9 U.L.A. (Pt. IA) 658.

The critical question, then, is whether the motions

dismissed by the court fall within the purview of

‘‘ ‘[c]hild custody determination[s],’ ’’ as defined by

§ 46b-115a (3). The two motions for contempt filed by

the defendant on April 4 and May 14, 2018, both concerned custody and visitation with the minor children

and, thus, properly were dismissed by the trial court.

The court likewise properly dismissed that portion of

the defendant’s April 4, 2018 motion for modification

that sought to modify the existing visitation order.

At the same time, the defendant’s April 4, 2018 motion

to modify the unallocated alimony and child support

order plainly is beyond the purview of the act, as that

order relates to the defendant’s monetary obligations.

See General Statutes § 46b-115a (3). As this court has

observed, a ‘‘motion for modification concerning child

support is not governed by the [act]. Financial orders,

such as child support, are not governed by the [act].’’

Parisi v. Niblett, supra, 199 Conn. App. 771 n.9. The

defendant’s May 3, 2018 motion for a Strobel order, his

May 3, 2018 motion to remove the guardian ad litem,

and his May 3, 2018 motion to compel compliance with

his discovery request also have no relation whatsoever

to the issue of child custody or visitation. For that

reason, the court improperly dismissed those motions

for lack of jurisdiction under the act.

V

As a final matter, the defendant claims that the court

abused its discretion in deferring consideration of his

April 4, 2018 motion to modify his alimony, child sup-
port, and visitation orders. We disagree.

As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction

is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the

court. . . . [A]s soon as the jurisdiction of the court

to decide an issue is called into question, all other action

in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made.’’ (Citations omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer,

218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). In the present

case, the court’s December 12, 2019 decision to defer

consideration of the defendant’s motion for modification expressly was predicated on the pendency of the

defendant’s motion to reargue, in which he asked the

court to reconsider and reverse its determination that

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the act. Given

those circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court

abused its discretion. To the contrary, the court properly deferred consideration of the merits of the defendant’s motion to modify until after the jurisdictional

question fully was resolved.

VI

In sum, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the defendant’s November 27, 2018 motion for

custody, his April 4, 2018 motion to modify the visitation

order, and his April 4 and May 14, 2018 motions for

contempt for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under

the act. We further conclude that, because they do not

relate to ‘‘ ‘[c]hild custody determination[s],’ ’’ as that

term is defined by the act, the court improperly dismissed the defendant’s April 4, 2018 motion to modify

his alimony and support obligations, his May 3, 2018

motion for a Strobel order, his May 3, 2018 motion to

remove the guardian ad litem, and his May 3, 2018

motion to compel compliance with his discovery

request. Because the substance of those motions is

beyond the purview of the act, the court improperly

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over those pleadings.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the defendant’s April 4, 2018 motion to modify the unallocated

alimony and child support order, his May 3, 2018 motion

for a Strobel order, his May 3, 2018 motion to remove

the guardian ad litem, and his May 3, 2018 motion to

compel compliance, and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law; the judgment is

affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 A review of the docket reveals approximately 350 postjudgment pleadings

by the parties since 2010.

2 The defendant is licensed to practice law in this state, as he indicated

on his appeal form.

3

‘‘[A]n unallocated order incorporates alimony and child support without

delineating specific amounts for each component . . . .’’ Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 539, 558, 46 A.3d 112 (2012).

4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he

court has had these parties before it on numerous occasions. Even in the
past four months, we’ve had repeated hearings, repeated motions and cross

motions, and it’s becoming increasingly clear to the court that there are

tremendous communication problems between the parties and that these

problems are increasingly . . . impacting the welfare of the children.

‘‘The factual basis set out in the motion for contempt is consistent with

all of the evidence that had been submitted to the court previously. It appears

to be supported by the investigation of our court-appointed guardian ad

litem, including her home visit with the children.

‘‘Normally, the court would be reluctant to proceed on a motion of this

kind in the absence of one of the parties. It does appear that [the defendant]

had notice and there is no evidence before the court to indicate that his

absence from the court today was anything other than entirely voluntary

and calculated.

‘‘I do note for the record that when he was last before the court and

pursuant to the agreement . . . [on September 21, 2017], I specifically indicated to [the defendant], as well as the plaintiff, that pending motions would

be heard at the future scheduled hearing date with regard to all other pending

motions. And this was about four weeks after the plaintiff had filed her

motion for contempt, which is the subject of today’s hearing. I believe that

the immediate best interests of the children require the court to address

the problems that increasingly plague this case and I’m not going to let [the

defendant] . . . continue what I find to be his significant misconduct

because he chooses not to be here.

‘‘So I do find based on the evidence that’s been presented to the court

that [the defendant] is in wilful contempt of the court’s judgment, which

includes the separation agreement as modified from time to time by the

court and the parties. And specifically, that he continues to disparage the

plaintiff to communicate with the children concerning matters that are

inappropriate, offensive and harmful to the children.

‘‘In light of that contempt, it’s the order of the court that on an interim

basis the court suspends the right of [the defendant] to visitation with either

child. Physical visitation will be allowed only with the specific consent of

the [plaintiff] or the guardian ad litem. Such visitation must be supervised

by a person or agency acceptable to the [guardian ad litem] or the actual

presence of the [plaintiff] if she agrees to do so.

‘‘Such visitation must take place within the state of Connecticut. Under

no circumstances may [the defendant] remove or travel with either child

outside the state of Connecticut or assist them in any way in leaving the

state of Connecticut. Should [the defendant] choose to seek modification

of this order he must appear here in the state of Connecticut at a properly

scheduled time and place.’’

5 The defendant also filed two motions for contempt on April 4 and May

14, 2018, a May 3, 2018 motion for a Strobel order; see Strobel v. Strobel,

92 Conn. App. 662, 886 A.2d 865 (2005); to preclude the plaintiff from filing

further postdissolution motions without leave of court, a May 3, 2018 motion

to remove the guardian ad litem, and a May 3, 2018 motion to compel

compliance with his discovery request.

6

In her motion to dismiss, the plaintiff averred that she and the minor

children had been living in Tennessee for the past seven months. She further

alleged that ‘‘[i]t would be an extreme financial burden on the plaintiff,

caring for her two children, to have her come to any and continuous court

hearings and depositions related to the repetitive already denied motions

filed by the defendant. . . . It is financially impossible and extremely

impractical to travel literally 1000 miles to Connecticut to start or continue

with the same court hearings litigated for over the past six years. . . . The

plaintiff has no financial means to secure childcare nor to travel nor to

afford an attorney and is in continuous growing debt, especially as a result

of the [nonpayment of alimony and child support by the defendant].

* * *

[T]he defendant filed these motions when he was living in the state of

Florida when both parties were [not] living [in] Connecticut. . . . The defendant was physically closer to Tennessee and the [minor] children prior to

his return to Connecticut after having been living for one full continuous

year in Florida.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

7 Although there is no indication that it was raised in the proceeding at

trial, we note that General Statutes § 46b-115t (d) provides: ‘‘The court may

order a party to pay for reasonable and necessary travel and expenses of

a party to the child custody proceeding or the child who is outside the state.’’

8 We agree with the defendant that the court’s initial finding was clearly

erroneous, as there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant
was not living in Connecticut when the plaintiff filed her motion to dismiss

on November 7, 2018. In its July 9, 2020 memorandum of decision on the

defendant’s motion to reargue, the court corrected that finding, stating that

‘‘[b]ased upon further review of the record . . . the defendant returned to

Connecticut at the end of September, 2018.’’

9 General Statutes § 46b-115l provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Except as

otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, a court of this state which has made

a child custody determination pursuant to sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m,

inclusive, has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:

(1) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the

child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently

reside in this state . . . .’’

10 General Statutes § 46b-115q (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] court

of this state which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child

custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time

if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances

and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. . . .’’

11 The motions that were dismissed were the defendant’s May 3, 2018

motion for a Strobel order, his May 3, 2018 motion to remove the guardian

ad litem, his May 3, 2018 motion to compel, and his May 14, 2018 motion

for contempt.

12 General Statutes § 46b-115q (c) provides: ‘‘If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is

a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that

a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated

state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and

proper.’’

13 A prerequisite for such action under General Statutes § 46b-115q is that

‘‘[a] court of this state . . . has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a

child custody determination . . . .’’

14 This court subsequently granted permission for the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issues related to the amended appeal. The defendant

filed his supplemental brief on September 9, 2020. The plaintiff did not file

a supplemental brief.

15 At that hearing, the plaintiff was represented by Attorney Stacey Cox

of the Victim Rights Center of Connecticut, Inc.

16 On appeal, the defendant has not challenged the propriety of the court’s

decision to accept that substitute affidavit.

17 In light of that conclusion, we do not consider the question of whether

the trial court, in the first instance, possessed temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-115n (a) to issue the November 27,

2018 ex parte order when the minor children indisputably were not present

in this state at that time.

18 That undisputed fact likely explains why the trial court denied the

defendant’s May 8, 2018 application for an emergency ex parte order of custody.

19 In its July 9, 2020 memorandum of decision on the defendant’s motion

to reargue, the court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to make an

initial child custody determination pursuant to § 46b-115k. The defendant has

raised no claim regarding the propriety of that determination in this appeal.

Moreover, we note that the court, in light of its conclusion that it lacked

both exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to § 46b-115l and initial

child custody jurisdiction pursuant to § 46b-115k, expressly abandoned its

earlier ruling under the forum non conveniens doctrine, as codified in § 46b115q, and vacated the stay issued in accordance therewith. As the court

stated: ‘‘[T]he statutory requirements necessary for the court to assume

continuing jurisdiction over the custody issues [have] not been established

pursuant to . . . [§§] 46b-115k and . . . 46b-115l. Therefore, based upon

the court’s further review of the record, the memorandum of decision dated

August 29, 2019, shall be amended to vacate the stay on the basis of inconvenient forum.’’ The defendant in this appeal has not challenged that ruling.

20 By its plain language, General Statutes § 46b-115k confers jurisdiction

on ‘‘a court of this state . . . to make an initial child custody determination

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-115l similarly delineates the parameters of

the ‘‘exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’’ of a Connecticut court when ‘‘a court

of this state . . . [previously] has made a child custody determination

. . . .’’

21 As one commentator remarked, ‘‘[b]y excluding proceedings involving

monetary obligations, the [act] continues the idea of divided jurisdiction in

matrimonial cases.’’ R. Spector, ‘‘International Child Custody Jurisdiction
and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,’’ 33 N.Y.U.

J. International L. & Pol. 251, 262 n.40 (2000); see also MJ v. CR, Docket No.

CAAP-17-0000696, 2021 WL 2679556, *6 (Haw. App. 2021) (noting ‘‘bifurcated

jurisdiction’’ over child custody and child support matters); Stevens v. Stevens, 682 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind. App. 1997) (‘‘[A] state may have jurisdiction

to enter a dissolution decree, but such does not necessarily confer jurisdiction to make a child custody determination. Rather, jurisdiction over custody

matters having an interstate dimension must be independently determined

by application of that state’s version of the [act]’’); DeWitt v. Lechuga, 393

S.W.3d 113, 118 (Mo. App. 2013) (analysis under act ‘‘may well result in

bifurcated adjudications, where one state adjudicates paternity and child

support and another state adjudicates custody and parenting time’’); In re

Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex. 2012) (‘‘Whether the Texas divorce action

was filed first is irrelevant in determining jurisdiction over custody matters,

as the two proceedings involve different inquiries. . . . [O]ne state may

have jurisdiction over custody even if the divorce is decided by another

state’s court.’’ (Citations omitted.)).