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1 3. Community Disaster Resilience for the Built Environment

2 3.1. Community Level Disaster Resilience

3 Communities come in varying sizes and with varying cultures; and they all face a wide range of 

4 opportunities, challenges, and hazards. A community can be defined in many ways, from a single 

5 neighborhood to a nation. For purposes of this framework, a community is defined as ―people who live, 

6 work, learn, and/or play together under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, such as a town, city or 

7 county.‖

8 Community disaster resilience is best addressed by plans based on the available social services, supported

9 at the neighborhood level, organized around a well-orchestrated community effort, and functional 

10 physical infrastructure. As described in Chapter 2, community disaster resilience planning should begin 

11 by defining the needs of the community’s citizens, which are supported by a community’s social 

12 institutions, prior to hazard events and during recovery. Those needs provide the basis for establishing 

13 performance goals for the built environment. The built environment is an essential part of community 

14 disaster resilience. A strong foundation provides the building clusters (buildings of similar function) and 

15 infrastructure systems needed by the people, businesses and government to restore the neighborhoods, 

16 care for vulnerable populations, and restore the community’s economy. Chapter 2 defines how the social 

17 institutions are linked to and rely on building clusters and infrastructure systems during the recovery. To 

18 understand what is needed from the building clusters and infrastructure systems during recovery, desired 

19 performance levels (functionality) and associated restoration times need to be defined for each with the 

20 expectation that temporary measures will be provided in the interim. Those definitions, which become the 

21 metrics for resilience, are compared to the existing conditions to define gaps that represent opportunities 

22 for improvement. 

23 Every community is different and will approach development of a community resilience plan from a 

24 different perspective, tolerance for risk, expectation of services to be provided, and planning process. The 

25 vitality and usability of the plan depends of its unique adaptation to its community. The plan development 

26 and iimplementation will require a broad base of support. 

27 3.1.1. Community Disaster Resilience for the Built Environment

28 The term ―resilience‖ means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions, and withstand 

29 and recover rapidly from disruptions. As related to the built environment, resilience means the ability of 

30 identified buildings and infrastructure systems to return to full occupancy and function, as soon as they 

31 are needed, to support a well-planned and expedited recovery. After identifying the social services to be 

32 provided and the necessary building clusters and infrastructure systems, the next step is to identify how 

33 soon each is required after a hazard event occurs. Timing will depend on both the type and intensity of the

34 event, the age and composition of the community, and available assistance from neighboring 

35 communities, regions, and state.

36 Achieving and maintaining community resilience is an ongoing effort that involves planning and will 

37 benefit from mitigation before the hazard event, followed by emergency response, restoration and long38 term reconstruction after the event. This framework defines a process for developing a community plan 

39 that will inform actions before, during, and after an expected hazard event occurs. 

40 As outlined in Chapter 1, a variety of efforts were initiated in the past 15 years related to community 

41 resilience. Beginning in 2007, the San Francisco Planning and Research Association (SPUR) pioneered 

42 this style of resilience planning. Their work’s, focus was at the community level, specifically considering

43 what San Francisco needed from policies and programs to become a Disaster Resilient City 

44 (www.spur.org). SPUR’s work produced multiple policy papers and recommendations covering broad 

45 issues of disaster resilience. Their policy recommendations focused on what is needed before the disaster, 

46 for disaster response, and after the disaster (see Table 3-1). 
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47 The Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission led a planning effort in 2012 to 2013 that 

48 followed the SPUR concepts and defined actions from Oregon communities needed to survive and 

49 rebound from a magnitude 9.0 Cascadia earthquake and tsunami 

50 (http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/osspac/docs). The plan determined the impacts of the earthquake 

51 statewide, defined acceptable time frames to restore functions needed to accelerate statewide recovery, 

52 and recommended changes in practices and policies, that if implemented over the next 50 years, the plans

53 will allow Oregon to reach desired resilience targets.

54 Communities benefit from determining the levels of disaster resilience required for their physical 

55 infrastructure. This is best done for several levels of each prevalent hazard. Accordingly, each individual 

56 building or system will derive its resilience goals and performance levels from those defined by the 

57 community for its cluster and function. 

58 Table 3-1: The SPUR Plan for San Francisco (SPUR 2009).

SPUR’s Resilient City Initiative

Before the 

Disaster

Our Before the Disaster work has focused on key questions related to disaster planning. What do we need to be 

doing now to make sure that our built environment can recover quickly from a major earthquake? Which existing 

buildings need to be retrofitted, and to what standard of performance? How do we encourage better performance 

from new buildings? How do we strengthen our infrastructure so that our buildings are serviceable after an 

earthquake? SPUR addresses these and other questions in four Before the Disaster papers published in the 

February 2009 edition of the Urbanist.

Disaster 

Response

Disaster Response focuses on activities during the days and weeks following a catastrophic event, including 

damage assessment, ensuring the safety of responders, communications and control, evacuation, public health and 

safety and restoration of vital systems. SPUR has recently completed a paper on the culture of preparedness, 

which focuses on disaster planning and preparedness in San Francisco’s neighborhoods.

After the 

Disaster

Our After the Disaster task force is asking several key questions: After a catastrophe, are we prepared to rebuild 

our city to a state even better than it was before? What plans and systems of governance does San Francisco need 

if it is to be effectively positioned to rebuild? What lessons can be learned from recovery experiences in lower 

Manhattan, New Orleans, Haiti, Chile, China, and beyond? This task force will be working to complete major 

papers on long-term recovery, covering the topics of transportation, governance, planning, and housing.

59 3.1.2. Contributing Factors to Resilience

60 Just as the prevalent hazards are different across the country, so are the communities with respect to their

61 age, composition, capabilities, and values. The initial process of developing a community disaster 

62 resilience plan requires an estimation of how quickly a community needs to recover from each prevalent 

63 hazard to maintain its population, workforce, and economic viability given its current built environment 

64 and planned development. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that New Orleans was not resilient for flood 

65 events because of the impact of flood damage on housing of the workforce. Other communities may be

66 resilient for all but extreme events, because of their location, inherently resilient government, ability to 

67 meet social needs, and redundancy in their built environment. The impact of the 1994 Northridge 

68 earthquake on the cities in the San Fernando Valley was a good example of inherent resilience. Decades 

69 of good building codes prevented all but a few casualties, yielded a rapidly repairable physical 

70 infrastructure, and the availability of housing just outside the damage zone, which allowed the workforce 

71 to return quickly.

72 From among the many metrics that give communities their distinguishing characteristics, the following 

73 discussion illustrates how they may inform development of a resilience plan. Our discussion is organized 

74 around Social Systems, Political Systems, Economic Systems and the Built and Natural Environment. 

75 Each characteristic needs to be considered by community resilience planners as they seek to identify their 

76 strengths and adapt ideas from other communities. 

77 Social Systems

78  Attitudes. Communities that have experienced a disaster learn from the experience. If the resulting 

79 recovery effort is orderly and successful, they may develop a sense of contentment with their status 
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80 quo, even if the experience was based on a moderate event. If the resulting recovery was challenging, 

81 drawn out and less than successful in the short term, they may move more aggressively toward a 

82 resilient state in the reconstruction process. A window of opportunity opens for 1 to 2 years, during 

83 which people are interested in resilience activities and making big changes to their planning processes 

84 and codes. Communities that have not experienced a damaging hazard event are unlikely to be 

85 proactive and develop disaster resilience plans.

86  Age of the Community. Age brings mature and sophisticated social institutions, efficient and 

87 informed governance, historically significant landmarks, deep-rooted cultural values, and more. It 

88 also brings an aging physical infrastructure that contributes to resilience gaps. With more and larger 

89 gaps comes the challenging task of determining priorities for closing the gaps in an orderly manner.

90  Social Vulnerability and Inequity. Not all people use and/or have access to a community’s buildings 

91 and infrastructure systems in the same ways. These systems typically reflect the people who created 

92 them, and may not address the needs of everyone likely to be affected in a hazard event (or on a day93 to-day basis) such as the elderly, people living in poverty, racial and ethnic minority groups, people 

94 with disabilities, and those suffering from chronic and/or mental illness. Others that may not be 

95 adequately represented are renters, students, single-parent families, small business owners, culturally

96 diverse groups, and historic neighborhoods. Moreover, hazard events tend to create settings in which 

97 populations on the margins of vulnerability become vulnerable, increasing the number of people in 

98 this category.

99 Built and Natural Environment

100  Natural Capital. Each community has a unique location, topology and green infrastructure that 

101 contribute to its culture, vitality, and vulnerability to hazards. For example, a dense tree canopy 

102 increases the vulnerability to severe weather; hills and mountains contribute to landslide 

103 vulnerability; flat ground or locations near rivers, lakes, or other bodies of water may be susceptible 

104 to flooding and liquefaction vulnerability. Community resilience planning must take these features

105 into account in assessments and mitigation plans.

106  Codes, Standards, Administration, and Enforcement. Local building codes and enforcement are key 

107 tools for building physical infrastructure that performs as anticipated and for retrofitting at opportune 

108 times. To achieve resilience, local codes may need to be more stringent than national model 

109 standards. A community’s history with adoption, administration, and enforcement of codes will 

110 significantly influence the degree of inherent resilience present in the physical infrastructure. There 

111 must be a commitment to funding these activities for the resilience plan to be effective.

112  Architecture and Construction – Not all buildings and systems are built alike. Vulnerability to 

113 damage depends on the construction materials and their combustibility, structural and non-structural

114 systems, quality of construction, size and shape of the building or systems, codes and practices in 

115 place during construction, and the building’s current condition. The hundreds of permutations of

116 architecture and construction styles vary by community and impact the communities’ resilience. For 

117 example, in San Francisco, the multi-family apartment buildings of the 1920s and 1930s are a unique

118 construction style particularly vulnerable to moderate and larger earthquakes. The over 6,000 

119 buildings represent a significant amount of housing that will be uninhabitable after a moderate or 

120 large seismic event and will create a demand for interim housing that cannot be provided within the 

121 city limits. As a result, one of San Francisco’s first resilience programs is a mandatory program to 

122 retrofit these buildings to a shelter-in-place level. 

123 Economic Systems

124  Economic Drivers. The financial health of a community depends largely on the availability of jobs 

125 and a strong set of economic drivers. The vulnerability of the economy to a hazard event depends on 

126 the transportability of its industries. Knowledge-based industries can relocate if the workforce or 

127 needed physical infrastructure is not quickly restored; research and development industries are more 
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128 rooted, because of the related laboratory and test facilities; manufacturing is deeply rooted and hard to 

129 move; most tourism is permanent and only needs to be restored. The restoration times and priorities 

130 built into a community’s disaster resilience plan need to recognize the mobility of the key industries

131 that support their economy.

132  Financial Conditions. Communities are typically faced with broad-ranging financial demands for 

133 expanded governance and new programs aimed at addressing deficient conditions. Each program

134 requires staff support and funds to achieve the desired outcome. Disaster resilience, which is one of 

135 many community needs, requires financial support for emergency responders, planners, and building 

136 officials, and funds to develop and implement disaster resilience plans. The speed of recovery 

137 depends on those plans and the ability to implement them under recovery conditions.

138  Resources. Ongoing efforts to encourage development and achieve sustainability through energy 

139 efficiency and alternate energy generation have created a variety of new funding mechanisms. 

140 Community-backed bonds, locally-crafted loan programs, taxes, and FEMA mitigation grants are 

141 being used to finance mitigation projects. Tax incentives can also be enacted as a means to underwrite 

142 activities that are needed for community resilience. A lack of immediate funding should not overly 

143 influence the content of the disaster resilience plan. The plan should point to the need for new funding 

144 solutions. 

145 Political Systems

146  Priorities for Emerging Public Policies. Communities face multiple opportunities that bring new 

147 public policies and priorities. A transparent and holistic community disaster resilience plan, with 

148 informed recovery plans and prioritized mitigation options, offers the opportunity for a community to 

149 balance the cost and benefit of becoming more resilient with other competing opportunities and 

150 demands.

151  Governance Structure. While resilience planning begins at the neighborhood level, the process and 

152 structure needed to build up to a community-level resilience plan will depend on the community 

153 governance structure. For a community that is an incorporated city, the plan will be self-contained 

154 and represent the needs of multiple neighborhoods served by the city departments and agencies. If the 

155 community is an unincorporated portion of a county, the plan will benefit from the capabilities of 

156 multiple neighborhoods and the interaction, interdependence, and mutual assistance inherent in the 

157 other communities that form the unincorporated areas of the county. In both cases, communities will 

158 need to look outside their jurisdictions to understand and plan for their dependence on others in their 

159 region.

160  Hazard Mitigation Planning. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 specifically addresses mitigation 

161 planning and requires state and local governments to prepare multi-hazard mitigation plans as a 

162 precondition for receiving FEMA mitigation project grants. Many communities have produced such 

163 plans and update them every 5 years. This Community Disaster Resilience Framework can 

164 significantly inform the Community Capabilities, Risk Assessment, and Mitigation Strategy included 

165 in the FEMA Mitigation Plan. An existing Mitigation Plan can provide much of the planning 

166 information needed for identifying assets, resources, and stakeholders. Hazard Mitigation Plans are 

167 not regulatory, and if these plans are to have a measured impact to promote resilience activities, they 

168 should be formally adopted into compliance with the community’s land use, zoning, and building 

169 code regulations (APA 2010).

170 3.1.3. Acceptable Risks

171 Acceptable risk can be defined ―as the level of human and/or material injury or loss.... that is considered 

172 to be tolerable by a society or authorities in view of the social, political, and economic cost-benefit 

173 analysis‖ (Businessdictionary.com, 2015). Risk is often defined and interpreted differently by engineers, 

174 laypeople, community leaders, and other stakeholders, based on their level of understanding and 

175 expectations. Risks to the built environment are affected by land use planning, possible hazard events, 

176 adoption and enforcement of codes and standards, and maintenance and operation of physical 
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177 infrastructure. Risk levels currently embodied in the built environment can be inferred from the national 

178 model building codes, standards, and guidelines. The consensus process of codes and standards provides

179 the best mechanism for defining minimum levels of acceptable risk for the built environment. The risks in 

180 the codes and standards account for hazard levels, performance of various types of construction, and the 

181 consequences of damage or failure. Standards and guideline writers bring their personal experiences to 

182 the development process. They normalize the experience for application to other vulnerable regions via 

183 various metrics and formulations, and develop guidance for designing to an equivalent acceptable level. 

184 Codes, standards, and guidelines also provide minimum design criteria for many natural hazards and 

185 building and infrastructure performance.

186 Each community’s current land use policies and construction standards are an inherent measure of the risk 

187 they have accepted with regard to the built environment. This decision is often influenced by other factors 

188 such as costs, politics, and desire for growth. For this reason, construction practices and the degree of 

189 compliance with current national standards varies dramatically across the nation. It is common for local 

190 jurisdictions to amend the national standard and eliminate provisions they deem unnecessary. The lack of 

191 personal experience with a damaging hazard event and the lack of understanding about the level of 

192 damage expected when a significant hazard event occurs often lead to misconceptions of a community’s 

193 vulnerability. Communities should recognize their vulnerabilities based on national experience, not just 

194 local events, by adopting and enforcing the current national land use policies (e.g., flood zones) and 

195 model codes. The cost of compliance for new construction is minor compared to future savings.

196 The resilience planning process needs to consider the performance expectations eimbedded in adopted

197 design codes as an indicator for the community’s existing physical infrastructure, as outlined in Chapters 

198 5 through 9. Since the performance expectation is focused at the community level, the plan does not insist 

199 that all buildings meet the same performance level. Instead, selected building clusters and infrastructure 

200 systems with specific functions for community recover should meet the needed performance. A 

201 community’s decisions for damage levels and required functionality in the built environment defines their 

202 level of acceptable risk. 

203 3.1.4. Implementing Community Resilience Planning

204 A community resilience plan should be developed through a collaborative arrangement between the Chief 

205 Executive’s office (e.g., Mayor), community departments and key stakeholders, including representatives 

206 of the community’s social institutions (e.g., community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

207 business/industry groups, health care, education, etc.), representatives of the physical infrastructure 

208 systems, and interested community members. Because of the holistic nature of the plan and the need to be 

209 fully supported during implementation, a public-private partnership is the best mechanism to develop the 

210 resilience plan. Guidance related to building a planning team is well documented in the FEMA Local 

211 Mitigation Planning Handbook. FEMA suggest beginning with existing community organizations or 

212 committees and involving all agencies and organizations involved in hazard response and mitigation 

213 planning.

214 The Community Resilience Planning Team will vary in size and breadth depending on the community. 

215 The following organizations that include elected officials, Departments, Businesses and Service 

216 Professionals and volunteer organizations, are examples those that should be considered for inclusion in 

217 the team depending on the size and makeup of the community.

218 Elected Officials

219  The Office of the Chief Executive (e.g., Mayor) provides leadership, encourages collaboration 

220 between departments, and serves as the link to the stakeholders in organizing, compiling, and vetting 

221 the plan throughout the community. The office also serves as the point of contact for interactions with 

222 neighboring communities within the region and the State. A Chief Resilience Officer or other leader

223 within the office should lead the effort.
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224  City Council or Board of Supervisors represents the diversity of community opinion, adopts the 

225 needed plans, and enacts legislation for needed mandatory mitigation efforts.

226 Departments

227  The Department of Building and Safety identifies appropriate codes and standards for adoption;

228 provides plan check and inspection services as needed, to assure proper construction; provides post 

229 event inspection services aimed at restoring functionality, as soon as possible. The department should 

230 also develop and maintain a GIS-based mapping database of all community physical infrastructure, 

231 and social institutions and their relationship to the physical infrastructure.

232  The Department of Public Works is responsible for publicly owned buildings, roads, and

233 infrastructure, and identifies emergency response and recovery routes.

234  Fire Departments/Districts are responsible for codes and enforcement of construction standards 

235 related to fire safety and brings expertise related to urban fires, wild fires, and fire following hazard 

236 events.

237  Parks and Recreation identifies open spaces available for emergency or interim use for housing and 

238 other neighborhood functions.

239  The Public Utilities Commission is responsible for overseeing publicly owned utility systems and 

240 assists in developing recovery goals.

241  The Planning Department identifies pre-event land use and mitigation opportunities and post-event 

242 recovery opportunities that will improve the city’s layout and reduce vulnerabilities through repair 

243 and reconstruction projects and future development.

244  The Emergency Management Department identifies what is needed from the physical infrastructure 

245 to streamline response and recovery of the social structure of the community, including defining a set 

246 of standardized hashtags to facilitate community-wide information transfer

247 Business and Service Professionals

248  Chambers of Commerce, Community Business Districts, Building Owners, and Managers provide 

249 the business perspective on resilience planning and recovery in terms of their needs for workforce, 

250 buildings, utilities, and other infrastructure systems, as well as how their needs should influence the 

251 performance levels selected.

252  Service and Utility Providers hold the keys to rapid recovery of functionality and should work 

253 together to understand the community needs and priorities for recovery, as well as the 

254 interdependencies they share.

255  Architects and Engineers help determine the design and performance capabilities for the physical 

256 infrastructure and assist in the development of suitable standards and guidelines. They can help 

257 establish desired performance goals and the actual performance anticipated for the existing built 

258 environment.

259 Volunteer Organizations

260  Nongovernment Organizations (NGO) consist of any non-profit, voluntary citizens' groups that are

261 organized on a local, national or international level and is task-oriented. NGOs perform a variety of 

262 service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to Governments, advocate and monitor 

263 policies and encourage political participation through provision of information. Within the 

264 Community Service social institution (See Chapter 2), NGOs provide support to other social 

265 institutions, especially those that provide services to vulnerable and at-risk populations

266  National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADS) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, 

267 membership-based organization that helps to build resiliency in communities nationwide. It serves as 

268 the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle —

269 preparation, response, recovery and mitigation — to help disaster survivors and their communities.
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270  Community Service Organizations (CSOs) are volunteer, membership based groups that provide 

271 service to the community’s social institutions and will have a role in the post-disaster environment.

272 Implementing a resilience plan for the built environment is a long-term effort that requires constant 

273 attention, monitoring, and evolution. Because of the cost and the need to transform the governance

274 systems, real estate, and construction cultures, it can easily take up to 50 years or more to fully 

275 implement. Once the resilience performance goals for buildings and systems are adopted, all new 

276 construction can be built in compliance at very little additional cost. Studies, such as FEMA 313 (1998),

277 show that the increased costs range from 0 to 5 %. Unfortunately, this alone will only have a long-term 

278 impact, since the vast majority of buildings and systems will not conform until replaced or retrofitted.

279 Retrofitting existing facilities to achieve new performance goals are generally considered to be cost 

280 prohibitive. However, the resilience plan allows resilience gaps related to clusters of buildings or 

281 infrastructure systems to be judged in terms of relative importance to the community, mitigated as 

282 appropriate, and can provide short-term interim, post recovery strategies.

283 3.2. Pathway to Community Resilience

284 Figure 3-1 shows a flow chart of the Community Resilience Planning process. First steps include 

285 establishing the core resilience planning team, determining social assets and identifying key social needs 

286 for community recovery, and determining physical infrastructure assets and natural resources that support 

287 these key social needs. With this community information, the community resilience plan is developed 

288 with the following steps: 1) establish community-level performance goals, 2) determine anticipated 

289 performance of infrastructure clusters; 3) complete the performance matrix, and 4) identify and prioritize 

290 gaps between the desired and anticipated performance for the clusters and each hazard. Once the gaps are 

291 prioritized, the community can develop strategies to mitigate damage and improve recovery of functions 

292 across the community. This path is compatible with the FEMA Mitigation Plan (FEMA 2013), which 

293 many communities are using. However, the plan to community resilience goes a step farther to envision 

294 and plan for recovery of functionality across the community.

295 When a hazard occurs, each building and infrastructure system should protect the occupants from serious 

296 injury or death. This goal can be achieved by adopting and enforcing current building codes. In addition 

297 to safety, communities need to determine how soon their buildings and infrastructure systems will need to 

298 be functional to support community recovery. The desired recovery times will depend on the needs of the 

299 social institutions, the size of the area affected during the hazard event, and the anticipated level of 

300 disruption in terms of affected area (e.g., local vs. widespread) and loss of functionality. The outcome of 

301 planning is summarized in a Summary Resilience Matrix, as defined in Section 3.2.5.

302 Given this set of performance goals organized around hazards, physical infrastructure system clusters, and 

303 anticipated levels of disruption, communities can develop and implement a resilience plan and strategies 

304 to improve the anticipated performance. Anticipated performance measures include safety, functionality, 

305 and recovery times. Comparing the performance of the existing built environment to the performance 

306 goals identifies opportunities for mitigation or other plans, such as relocation either before or after a 

307 hazard event. 
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a. Core Activities for Developing a 

Resilient Community

b. Flow Chart for Developing a Community Resilience 

Plan

308 Figure 3-1: Flow Chart for Developing Resilience Plan

309 3.2.1. Identify Clusters of Buildings and Infrastructure Systems

310 Clusters of buildings and supporting infrastructure systems that support social needs and emergency 

311 response efforts after a hazard event need to be identified. The cluster ensures that all supporting systems 

312 are functional so that the buildings and infrastructure systems can operate as intended. Chapters 5 through 

313 9 provide specific guidance on how to define the clusters of facilities and support systems needed for each 

314 phase of recovery, short term, intermediate, and long term. Table 3-2 lists the buildings that are likely 

315 needed during each recovery phase within a cluster. Refer to Chapter 4 for guidance on considering the 

316 interdependencies between physical infrastructure systems. 
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317 Table 3-2: Buildings and Facilities in Clusters by Recovery Phase

Recovery Phase Buildings in Clusters

1. Short Term Critical Facilities 

1. Hospitals and Essential healthcare facilities

2. Police and Fire Stations

3. Emergency Operations Centers

4. Disaster Debris and Recycling Centers

Emergency Housing 

1. Public Shelters

2. Residential Shelter-in-Place 

3. Food Distribution Centers

4. Nursing Homes, Transitional Housing

5. Animal Shelters

6. Faith and Community-Based Organizations

7. Emergency Shelter for Emergency Response and Recovery Workers

8. Gas Stations (location known by community)

9. Banking Facilities (location known by community)

2. Intermediate Housing/Neighborhoods/Business

1. Essential City Services Facilities

2. Schools

3. Medical Provider Offices

4. Neighborhood Retail Stores

5. Local Businesses 

6. Daycare Centers 

7. Houses of Worship, Meditation, and Exercise

8. Buildings or Space for Social Services (e.g., Child Services) and Prosecution Activities

9. Temporary Spaces for Worship

10. Temporary Space for Morgue

11. Temporary Spaces for Bath Houses

12. Temporary Spaces for Markets

13. Temporary Spaces for Banks

14. Temporary Spaces for Pharmacies

15. Local Grocery Stores (location known by community)

3. Long Term Community Recovery 

1. Residential Housing 

2. Commercial and Industrial Businesses

3. Non-Emergency City Services

4. Resilient Landscape Repair, Redesign, Reconstruction, and Repairs to Domestic Environment

318 3.2.2. Hazard Events

319 This framework is based on resilience planning for three levels of a hazard events that are referred to as 

320 routine, expected, and extreme. The definition of each level depends on the characterization of the hazard

321 and a community’s tolerance for damage or loss of function. 

322 Communities should select the prevailing hazards that may damage physical infrastructure, which may 

323 include:

324  Wind – storms, hurricane, tornadoes

325  Earthquake – ground shaking, faulting, landslides, liquefaction

326  Inundation – riverine flooding, coastal flooding, tsunami

327  Fire – urban/building, wildfire, and fire following a hazard event

328  Snow or Rain – freeze or thaw

329  Human-caused – blast, vehicular impact, toxic environmental contamination as a result of industrial 

330 or other accidents as well as due to clean-up/disposal methods after a hazard event

331
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332 3.2.2.1. Hazard Levels for Resilience Planning 

333 For each hazard selected, communities should determine the three levels of hazard intensity or magnitude

334 for use in the framework. Each should be defined in the same terms that are used for design.

335  Routine – Hazard level is below the expected (design) level and occurs more frequently. Buildings 

336 and infrastructure systems should remain fully functional and not experience any significant damage 

337 that would disrupt the flow of normal living.

338  Expected – Design hazard level, where the design level is based on codes, may be greater than the 

339 minimum required by codes, or may be set for the building or infrastructure system based on other 

340 criteria. Buildings and systems should remain functional at a level sufficient to support the response 

341 and recovery of the community. This level is based on the design level normally used for buildings. 

342  Extreme – Hazard level is above the expected (design) level and may be referred to as the maximum

343 considered occurrence based on the historic record and changes anticipated due to climate change. 

344 However, this hazard level should not need to be the largest possible hazard level that can be 

345 envisioned, but rather one that the community wants to be able to recover from, though it will take 

346 longer than for an expected hazard event. Critical facilities and infrastructure systems should remain 

347 functional at this level. Other building and infrastructure systems should perform at a level that 

348 protects the occupants and allows them to egress without assistance. In addition, emergency response 

349 plans should be based on scenarios that represent this hazard level.

350 As an example, Table 3-3 contains the definitions that SPUR used for the three levels of seismic hazard 

351 they recommended for San Francisco resilience planning. 

352 Table 3-3: Sample Hazard definition for earthquakes developed by SPUR for San Francisco

Routine

Earthquakes that are likely to occur routinely. Routine earthquakes are defined as having a 70% probability of 

occurring in 50 years. In general, earthquakes of this size will have magnitudes equal to 5.0 – 5.5, should not 

cause any noticeable damage, and should only serve as a reminder of the inevitable. San Francisco’s 

Department of Building Inspection (DBI) uses this earthquake level in their Administrative Bulletin AB 083 for 

purposes of defining the ―service level‖ performance of tall buildings.

Expected

An earthquake that can reasonably be expected to occur once during the useful life of a structure or system.

It is defined as having a 10% probability of occurrence in 50 years. San Francisco’s Community Action Plan 

for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) assumed that a magnitude 7.2 earthquake located on the peninsula segment of the 

San Andreas Fault would produce this level of shaking in most of the city.

Extreme 

(Maximum 

Considered 

Earthquake)

The extreme earthquake that can reasonably be expected to occur on a nearby fault. It is defined as having a 

2% probability of occurrence in 50 years. The CAPSS defined magnitude 7.9 earthquake located on the 

peninsula segment of the San Andreas Fault would produce this level of shaking in most of the city.

353 The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 7-10 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings 

354 and Other Structures defines minimum hazard levels for design nationwide. Table 3-4 presents suggested 

355 design hazard levels for buildings and facilities based on ASCE 7-10. Communities may define the size of 

356 a hazard they wish to consider for each level, based on the table or based on other available information.

357 It is important that hazard levels are selected and characterized in a manner that can be used by design 

358 professionals in design and retrofit of facilities. 
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359 Table 3-4: Design Loads for Buildings and Facilities (ASCE 7-10)

Hazard Routine Expected Extreme

Ground Snow 50 year 300 to 500 year1 TBD

Rain 2 2 2

Wind – Extratropical 50 year 700 year 3,000 year3

Wind – Hurricane 50 to 100 year 700 year 3,000 year3

Wind – Tornado 3 3 3

Earthquake4

50 year 500 year 2,500 year

Tsunami 50 year 500 year 2,500 year 

Flood 100 year 100 to 500 year TBD

Fire – Wildfire 4 4 4

Fire –Urban/Manmade 4 4 4

Blast / Terrorism 5 5 5

1

For the northeast, 1.6 (the LRFD factor on snow load) times the 50-year ground snow load is equivalent to the 300 to 500 year 

snow load. 

2 Rain is designed by rainfall intensity of inches per hour or mm/h, as specified by the local code. 

3 Tornado and tsunami loads are not addressed in ASCE 7-10. Tornadoes are presently classified by the EF scale. Tsunami loads 

are based on a proposal for ASCE 7-16.

4 Hazards to be determined in conjunction with design professionals based on deterministic scenarios. 

5 Hazards to be determined based on deterministic scenarios. Reference UFC 03-020-01 for examples of deterministic scenarios.

360 3.2.2.2. Hazard Intensity

361 The impact of hazards depends on more than just size and frequency. The impact also depends on the size 

362 of the area affected, the extent of civilization in the affected area, the impact of the damage, and the 

363 community’s ability to respond. The size of the affected area depends on the particular hazard, as does the 

364 geographic distribution of the intensity. A wildfire in the wilderness areas of the California Sierra Nevada 

365 Mountains, where there is little population, can burn many square miles of forest with little disruption. On 

366 the other hand, the 1992 Oakland Hills firestorm covered only 1520 acres, but killed 11, destroyed nearly 

367 4,000 homes and apartments, and caused $1.5 billion in damage. The affected area was relatively small 

368 compared to other wildfires; but the disruption to the affected population and built environment was 

369 severe. 

370 For purposes of this framework, the terms affected area and anticipated disruption level are defined in 

371 terms of the Community and the impacts of a hazard event at the present time. 
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372 Table 3-5: Affected Area and Anticipated Disruption Level

Category Definition

Affected area

Localized Damage and lost functionality is contained within an isolated area of the community. While the 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may open, it is able to organize needed actions within a few days

and allow the community to return to normal operations and manages recovery. Economic impacts are 

localized

Community Significant damage and loss of functionality is contained within the community, such that assistance is 

available from neighboring areas that were not affected. The EOC opens, directs the response and turns 

recovery over to usual processes once the City governance structure takes over. Economic impacts extend 

to the region or state.

Regional Significant damage occurs beyond community boundaries. Area needing emergency response and 

recovery assistance covers multiple communities in a region, each activating their respective EOCs and 

seeking assistance in response and recovery from outside the region. Economic impacts may extend 

national and globally.

Anticipated Disruption Level

Minor All required response and recovery assistance is handled within the normal operating procedures of the 

affected community agencies, departments, and local businesses with little to no disruption to the normal 

flow of living. Critical facilities and emergency housing are functional and community infrastructure

systems are functional with local minor damage.

Moderate Community EOC activates and all response and recovery assistance is orchestrated locally, primarily using 

local resources. Critical facilities and emergency housing are functional and community infrastructure

systems are partially functional.

Severe Response and recovery efforts are beyond the authority and capability of local communities that are 

affected and outside coordination is needed to meet the needs of the multiple jurisdictions affected. 

Professional services and physical resources are needed from outside of the region. Critical facilities and 

emergency housing have moderate damage but can be occupied with repairs, community infrastructure 

systems are not functional for most needs.

373 3.2.3. Community Performance Goals

374 Performance goals for buildings, building clusters and infrastructure systems are a combination of 

375 performance levels during the hazard event and recovery times. Standard definitions for performance 

376 levels that cover safety and functionality assure uniform development of community plans and the codes, 

377 guidelines, manuals of practice, and analytical tools that support them. Recovery times are needed to 

378 identify the extent of temporary facilities and systems that will be needed, as well as for prioritizing repair 

379 and reconstruction that recognizes local, regional, and possibly national and international implications of 

380 damage due to a hazard event. For instance, if a production plant in a community is the national supplier 

381 for a particular good, the impact of damage to the plant extends well beyond the community.

382 3.2.3.1. Performance Levels for Buildings

383 To assure that a community framework is compatible with codes and standards, and other guidance 

384 documents for physical infrastructure, common definitions of performance are needed for facilities and 

385 infrastructure systems. Setting performance goals for both safety and functionality informs plans for new 

386 construction and any needed retrofitting of existing buildings and infrastructure systems. For new 

387 construction, such performance goals help improve a community’s resilience over time. For existing 

388 construction, performance goals help identify clusters of buildings and infrastructure systems that may 

389 benefit retrofitting or other measures to provide the needed performance. Table 3-6 provides standard 

390 definitions for building performance levels that are used for seismic performance of buildings, but are 

391 adopted here for general application to performance for all hazards.

392
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393 Table 3-6: Performance Definitions for Buildings

Category Performance Standard

A. Safe and operational These are facilities that suffer only minor damage and have the ability to function without 

interruption. Essential facilities such as hospitals and emergency operations centers need to have this

level of function.

B. Safe and usable 

during repair

These are facilities that experience moderate damage to their finishes, contents and support systems. 

They will receive green tags when inspected and will be safe to occupy after the hazard event. This 

level of performance is suitable for shelter-in-place residential buildings, neighborhood businesses 

and services, and other businesses or services deemed important to community recovery.

C. Safe and not usable These facilities meet the minimum safety goals, but a significant number will remain closed until 

they are repaired. These facilities will receive yellow tags. This performance may be suitable for 

some of the facilities that support the community’s economy. Demand for business and market 

factors will determine when they should be repaired or replaced.

D. Unsafe – partial or 

complete collapse

These facilities are dangerous because the extent of damage may lead to casualties.

394 3.2.3.2. Performance Recovery Levels for Building Clusters and Infrastructure Systems

395 Performance levels for building clusters and infrastructure systems are defined in terms of the time 

396 needed to restore the cluster or system to full functionality. Recovery times will vary with the hazard 

397 under consideration. Early in the planning process, generalized time frames such as days, weeks, and 

398 months are sufficient. Disaster response and recovery traditionally is organized around sequential 

399 recovery stages or phases. Recovery phases are defined in a variety of ways by deferent programs, but 

400 generally have common goals. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Disaster Response 

401 Plan defines them as short, intermediate and long term as shown in Figure 3-2 with a series of activities 

402 defined in each. While each begins early in the recovery time frame, the bulk of effort follows sequential

403 stages.

404

405 Figure 3-2: National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDEF) Recovery Continuum (NDRF 2014)

406 The three recovery phases use the terms in the NDRF and are defined in Table 3-7. While discrete time 

407 frames are designated, it is recognized and expected that there will be considerable overlap in their 

408 imitation and completion, and each recovery phase could conceivably start shortly after the hazard event.

409 The time frames shown are suggestions related to expected hazard events and may not be applicable for 

410 all plans.

411 Table 3-7: Recover Phases 

Phase Name Time Frame Condition of the built environment

I Short Term 0 to 3 days Initial emergency response and staging for recovery

II Intermediate 1 to 12 weeks Housing restored and ongoing social needs met

III Long Term 4 to 36+ months Reconstruction in support of economic recovery

412 For Buildings in Clusters. While individual buildings are assigned performance levels that reflect their 

413 role in the community, as noted above, the performance of a cluster with multiple buildings depends on 

414 how many of the buildings are restored and functioning. For purposes of planning, it is helpful to set 

415 goals for three levels of cluster recovery for the percentage of buildings recovered. 
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416 Table 3-8: Building Performance Recovery Levels

Category Performance Level

30% Restored Minimum number needed to initiate the activities assigned to the cluster

60% Resorted Minimum number needed to initiate usual operations

90% Restored Minimum number needed to declare cluster is operating at normal capacity

417 For Infrastructure Systems. The recovery of infrastructure systems needs to be measured in terms of its 

418 ability to restore service as a percentage of full capacity. While the components of the system are

419 measured and rated in terms of the performance levels defined above, the overall performance of the 

420 system needs a system-wide categorization based on restoration of service.

421 Table 3-9: Infrastructure Performance Recovery Levels

Category Performance Level

I Resume 90% service within days and 100% within weeks

II Resume 90% service within weeks and 100% within months

III Resume 90% service within months and 100% within years

422 3.2.4. Anticipated Performance of the Physical Infrastructure Clusters

423 The majority of buildings and infrastructure systems in service today have been designed to serve their 

424 intended functions on a daily basis under the normal environmental conditions. Buildings and other 

425 structures are also designed to provide occupant safety during an expected (design) level hazard event, but 

426 they may not continue to be functional. The design of buildings and physical infrastructure systems are 

427 provided by experienced architects and engineers following their community codes and standards of 

428 practice. The codes and standards of practice are continually evolving due to changing technology, 

429 changing needs, and to address observed performance issues during hazard events. Current design 

430 practices related to predicting performance for the expected or extreme hazard event are uneven, and may 

431 be based on expert judgment or past experience of other communities. The technologies needed to 

432 estimate the anticipated performance of existing buildings and infrastructure systems are constantly being 

433 improved. Technologies related to building evaluation for seismic conditions is maturing and is in its 

434 third generation. On the other hand, methods are just emerging for estimating infrastructure system 

435 performance and restoration times. Chapters 5 through 9 provide guidance on how to estimate the 

436 performance of existing buildings and infrastructure systems.

437 Architects and engineers generally design or evaluate buildings and infrastructure systems one building or 

438 system at a time without considering community-level functions or dependencies on other systems. Under 

439 a community resilience plan, each design should be compatible with the goals of the community 

440 resilience plan. 

441 While it would be ideal to retrofit or replace all buildings and systems that do not meet the community 

442 resilience goals, it is neither necessary nor practical. As a starting point, a community should focus on 

443 having a critical mass of buildings and infrastructure systems to support short term recovery 

444 The next step is to evaluate each of its designated clusters of buildings and infrastructure systems and 

445 estimate its anticipated recovery time for its current condition for each level of the hazard. This 

446 information, when compared to the performance goals previously set, defines the gaps that need to be 

447 addressed.

448 3.2.5. Summary Resilience Matrix

449 A matrix-based presentation of the many facets of a community resilience plan has been developed for 

450 use with this framework. It includes a Detailed Resilience Matrix for buildings and infrastructure systems.

451 Example detailed matrices for the fictional community Centerville, USA are developed and shown in 

452 each of the infrastructure system chapters that follow and they include the recovery times for each 
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453 recovery phase and estimated levels defined in Table 3-7 for each of the three hazard levels. The detailed 

454 example matrices for Centerville, USA are summarized in three Resilience Matrices, as shown in Table 

455 3-10 through Table 3-12, to provide an overview of the desired and anticipated recovery goals estimated 

456 for the built environment. For purposes of providing a general overview, the summary matrix only shows 

457 the 90% restoration time needed for all elements within each phase for each infrastructure system.
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458 Table 3-10: Example Summary Resilience Matrix for a Routine Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Routine Event Localized 60% Restored

Disruption Level Minor 90% Restored

(3) X Current

459

Functional Category: Cluster

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Routine Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 2 -- Intermediate Phase 3 – Long-Term

Days Days Days Wks Wks Wks Mos Mos Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

460 Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard being considered

Specify level – Routine, Expected, Extreme

Specify the size of the area affected – localized, community, regional

Specify severity of disruption – minor, moderate, severe

2 30% 60% 90% Restoration times relate to number of elements restored within the cluster

3 X Estimated 90% restoration time for current conditions based on design standards and current inventory
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461 Table 3-11: Example Summary Resilience Matrix for an Expected Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Expected Event Community 60% Restored

Disruption Level Moderate 90% Restored

(3) X Current

462

Functional Category: Cluster

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Expected Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 1 – Short-Term

Days Days Days Wks Wks Wks Mos Mos Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

463 Footnotes: See Table 3-10, page 16
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464 Table 3-12: Example Summary Resilience Matrix for an Extreme Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Extreme Event Regional 60% Restored

Disruption Level Severe 90% Restored

(3) X Current

465

Functional Category: Cluster

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Extreme Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 1 – Short-Term

Days Days Days Wks Wks Wks Mos Mos Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-36 36+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90%

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90%

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Waste Water 90% X

Communication 90% X

466 Footnotes: See Table 3-10, page 16

467
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468 3.3. Mitigation and Recovery Strategies

469 Community disaster resilience planning provides a comprehensive picture of the gaps between desired 

470 and anticipated performance of the physical infrastructure to support recovery for the hazards and hazard 

471 levels considered. This information provides communities with the opportunity to develop short term 

472 plans for covering the most urgent gaps with emergency/interim facilities and supporting infrastructure 

473 systems as well as a comprehensive community-level basis for long term strategies that will eventually 

474 close the gaps.

475 Mitigation to derive long term solutions before the event costs money, but reduces demands during 

476 recovery and can speed up the overall recovery process. Streamlining recovery processes can also reduce 

477 the need for mitigation. 

478 Mitigating the gaps can be addressed in a number of ways, from altering the expectations to relying on 

479 more external assistance, to adding redundancies, to retrofit and/or reconstruction programs that add 

480 robustness. For some hazards, such as flooding, the threat can be redirected.

481 Mitigation also provides the opportunity to build-back better. When a hazard event occurs, there is 

482 significant pressure to quickly restore the built environment to its pre-event condition. With advanced 

483 planning, reconstruction can be done to a ―new normal‖ that includes addressing the needs of the social 

484 institutions and also improving sustainability, and resilience.

485 Cost is always an issue with regard to funding mitigation activities. While the initial planning is 

486 comprehensive and requires the interaction of a large number of people, it is the first and most cost effect 

487 step in the process, carrying out the needed retrofits before the hazard event occurs has significant long 

488 term benefits. A study of grants awarded by FEMA indicates ―a dollar spent on disaster mitigation saves 

489 society an average of $4.‖ (MMC 2005) It is noteworthy that this study is being revisited as the benefit 

490 for investment is presumed to have increased dramatically since the study was last completed.

491 Unfortunately, most communities wait until after a hazard event occurs before they become serious about 

492 mitigation planning. This is not the most appropriate time to implement criteria to achieve a more resilient 

493 community. At this point the stressors on the community are overwhelming. Communities need to 

494 implement criteria for enhanced resiliency prior to any hazard event to achieve effective change and to 

495 achieve an acceptable level of community continuity should a hazard event occur. Fortunately, the FEMA 

496 requirements for mitigation planning are an incentive to initiate the process and this NIST Disaster 

497 Resilience Framework yield actionable information that can be implemented in the long term.

498 Once the plan is in place, a number of non-construction activities can be done at low cost for significant 

499 long-term benefit. There is also a series of construction related activities that can significantly improve 

500 community resilience in the long term.

501 3.3.1. Non-Construction Strategies

502 Implementing a community’s disaster resilience plan related to the physical infrastructure should begin 

503 with evaluating and validating the following activities or initiating them as needed. Each is a low-cost 

504 activity that is best done as an extensions to existing programs. 

505 1. Organize and maintain a resilience office lead by a Chief Resilience Officer that collaborates with and 

506 learns from the Rockefeller 100 Resilience Cities program. Orchestrate community engagement 

507 through this office and solicit buy-in.

508 2. Incorporate the resilience plan in the Community Safety Element of the General Plan.

509 3. Incorporate the resilience plan in the communities FEMA Mitigation Plan

510 4. Adopting the latest national model building codes and standards for the physical infrastructure. 

511 5. Insist on the development of codes and standards that are compatible with resilience planning and set 

512 transparent performance goals. 
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513 6. Adopt appropriate land use planning regulations that manage the green infrastructure, limit urban 

514 sprawl, and set design standards for construction in high hazard zones such as flood plains, coastal 

515 areas, areas susceptible to liquefaction, etc.

516 7. Assure the effectiveness of the building department in enforcing current codes and standards during 

517 permitting and construction inspection to assure that the latest processes are being followed.

518 8. Develop processes and guidelines to be deployed for post-event assessments and repairs.

519 9. Collaborate with adjacent communities to promote common understanding and opportunities for 

520 mutual aid during response and recovery.

521 10. Elevate the level of inter-system communication between the infrastructure community’s providers 

522 and incorporating the interdependencies in their response and recovery plans. 

523 11. Lobby for State and Federal owned and leased properties to be built and upgraded to resilient 

524 standards.

525 12. Develop and implement education and awareness programs for all stakeholders in the community to 

526 enhance understanding, preparedness, and opportunities for mitigation. 

527 3.3.2. Construction-Related Strategies

528 1. Using the tools provided in Chapter 10, prioritize gaps identified between the desired and anticipated

529 performance of infrastructure clusters, as summarized in the Resilience Matrix for the prevailing 

530 hazards. 

531 2. Identify and implement opportunities for natural systems protection including sediment and erosion 

532 control, stream corridor restoration, forest management, conservation easements, and wetland 

533 restoration and preservation. 

534 3. For each built environment gap, identify the guidelines and standards used to assess deficiencies in 

535 individual public and private buildings and infrastructure systems. Define the gap in a transparent and 

536 publicly available method and announce the result. This will trigger voluntary actions on the part of 

537 building owners and infrastructure system operators. 

538 4. Include retrofitting of public buildings to achieve the resilience goals in the capital planning process 

539 and make it a part of the prioritization process. 

540 5. Develop incentives to encourage new construction be built to the resilient standards and for deficient 

541 existing construction to be retrofitted as needed. 

542 6. Support national efforts to improve code-based design standards that match the resilience metrics 

543 defined in this framework.

544 7. Identify building and infrastructure system clusters that need to be retrofitted under mandatory 

545 programs and implement the retrofitting through local ordinances. Develop and announce viable 

546 funding opportunities and include some level of public funding.

547 3.4. REFERENCES

548 APA (2014). Planning for Post Disaster Recovery: Next Generation. American Planning Association, 

549 Washington, D.C.

550 FEMA (1998). FEMA 313 – Promoting the Adoption and Enforcement of Seismic Building Codes: A 

551 Guideline for State Earthquake and Mitigation Managers. Washington, DC. 

552 FEMA (2013). Local Mitigation Planning Handbook, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

553 Washington DC, March.

554 MMC (2005). Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings from 

555 Mitigation Activities. Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences, 

556 Washington DC.

557 NDRF (2013). National Disaster Recovery Framework. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

558 Washington DC.
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559 NRC (2006). Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding the Human Dimensions. Committee on 

560 Disaster Research in the Social Sciences. National Research Council, Washington DC.

561 NRC (2012). Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. National Research Council, The National 

562 Academies Press, Washington D.C. www.map.edu. 

563 OSSPAC (2013). The Oregon Resilience Plan: Reducing Risk and Improving Recovery for the Next 

564 Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami. Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission Salem, 

565 OR.

566 SPUR (2009). The Resilient City: What San Francisco Needs from its Seismic Mitigation Policies, San 

567 Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association. San Francisco, CA.