alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### E. T. Williams *v.*J. M. Williams.

Divorce — Cruel Treatment — Evidence.

The evidence was held not to show that the wife was entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment.

APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT.

January 24, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

' The cruel and inhuman treatment complained of by the wife consists in occasional quarrels between herself and husband, with reference to the children of each', by former marriage, and in relation to their property. They had lived together as husband and wife for fourteen years and notwithstanding the statement of the children and the relatives of the parties, who seem to have become enlisted on the one side or the other of the controversy, we are inclined to believe that they lived happily enough together until by reason of their declining years they each became peevish and fretful, and as the result of a hasty and inconsiderate conclusion resolved to separate from each other without any good or sufficient cause.

Occasional trouble, no doubt, now and then existed in a family like theirs, with children whose claims to parental affection were not always recognized by the stepfather or the stepmother. We have no doubt but what the appellee told his wife to leave, when temporarily excited by the conduct of some of the children whom' he supposed had been subjecting him to ridicule. He seems, however, to have repented of this rash act and very soon made overtures and duties as a husband and the wife should at once have accepted his proffered terms and ended their troubles. The character of these parties, connected with their past history whilst together as husband and wife, is convincing that the husband entertained no suspicion to his wife for a settlement of all their domestic troubles, that gave evidence of the fact that he was not unmindful of his obligations as to the purity and virtue of his wife, and the statement of Leavill, who seems to have been a very willing witness, was prompted more by reason of his hostility to the appellee, than by his recollection *392of what really passed between him and his old uncle, who seems, according to the witness’s statement to have reposed in him the utmost confidence when detailing the cause of his domestic trouble. There is nothing in the record to prevent these parties from spending their remaining years happily together and the chancellor with this view dismissed the petition, and we must affirm the judgment. The appellee, the husband, must pay all the costs, including the costs of the wife, both in this court and the court below.

*Kennedy, for appellant.*

*Petrie, for appellee.*
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4098 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4098

                   For the relief of Zhuljeta Zhegra.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 31, 2004

  Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                   For the relief of Zhuljeta Zhegra.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR ZHULJETA ZHEGRA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of section 
201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Zhuljeta Zhegra shall be 
eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status 
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon 
filing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under section 
204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful permanent 
resident.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Zhuljeta Zhegra enters the United 
States before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), she 
shall be considered to have entered and remained lawfully and shall, if 
otherwise eligible, be eligible for adjustment of status under section 
245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the application for issuance of an 
immigrant visa or the application for adjustment of status is filed 
with appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Zhuljeta Zhegra, the Secretary 
of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the 
current or next following fiscal year, the total number of immigrant 
visas that are made available to natives of the country of the alien's 
birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act or, 
if applicable, the total number of immigrant visas that are made 
available to natives of the country of the alien's birth under section 
202(e) of such Act.
    (e) Denial of Preferential Immigration Treatment for Certain 
Relatives.--The natural parents, brothers, and sisters of Zhuljeta 
Zhegra shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any 
right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### E. W. Len *v.*John Henson, etc.

Landlord and Tenant — Transfer of Lease.

Where one who was a conditional purchaser of land as tenant of the vendor, abandoned his attitude as a purchaser after cultivating the land one year, and sold his interest to another and put him in possession, the landlord had the right to treat the transaction as a transfer of the lease only.

APPEAL PROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 14, 1873.

*B. G. Willis, H. Taylor, for appellants.*

*Doniphan, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

As we construe the contract of March 29, 1862, Black was conditionally a purchaser of the land, as the tenant of Len, depending on the payment or non-payment of the stipulated price in tobacco, annually. It appears that Black, after cultivating the land one year and making some improvements, elected to abandon the attitude of a purchaser, and sought to dispose of his alternate rights, under the contract, and upon the failure of Len to pay him for his improvements he sold to Henson for $30 and put him in possession. Len seem's to have treated this transaction, as he had a right to do, as a transfer of the lease, which began and took effect upon the election o'f Black that he would not hold the land as a purchaser.

There is not, we think, any such evidence of an adverse holding of the land by Henson as to entitle him1 to the benefit of the statute of limitation, as applying, before the expiration of the lease, which was less than two years, six months before the institution of this action.

It results that, in our opinion, upon the fact proved on the trial, the court erred in adjudging the inquisition found' in the country to be true.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial and proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
**Exhibit 13.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 20-F of Inmarsat Group Limited (the “Company”) forthe annual period ended December 31, 2005 (the “Periodic Report”), I, Andrew Sukawaty, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge the Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Periodic Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

 

Date: April 28, 2006
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<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.3
 
                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ENGINEER
 
     As an independent engineering consultant, I hereby consent to the use of my
reports and data extracted therefrom (and all references to me and my Firm)
included in or made a part of this Registration Statement on Form S-4 relating
to the registration of 10 1/4% Notes due 2006 of Costilla Energy, Inc. to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about April 17, 1998.
 
                                            W. SCOTT EPLEY, P.E.
 
Midland, Texas
April 17, 1998
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Chicago & Vicinity Laborers' District Council

Pension Fund, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:20−cv−04888

Honorable Beth W.

Jantz

Illinois Paving Company

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, August 17, 2021:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Beth W. Jantz: Pursuant to the parties'

agreed stipulation to dismiss [32], all claims in this action are dismissed with prejudice,

subject to the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, with each side bearing its own

attorneys' fees and costs. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice. (as, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04888 Document #: 33 Filed: 08/17/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:78
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4028

To prohibit the award of a Federal contract unless the contractor agrees 

to offer their employees certain health insurance benefits. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 24, 2004

Mr. WYNN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Government Reform 

A BILL

To prohibit the award of a Federal contract unless the contractor agrees to offer their employees certain health 

insurance benefits.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON GIVING ADVANTAGE IN PUB4 LIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION TO ENTITIES 

5 PROVIDING LESS HEALTH INSURANCE BENE6 FITS THAN BENEFITS PROVIDED TO FED7 ERAL EMPLOYEES 

8 In the case of any public-private competition held 

9 under Office of Management and Budget Circular A–76 

10 or any other outsourcing policy for the conversion of an 
2

•HR 4028 IH 

1 activity or function performed by Federal employees, no 

2 advantage shall be given to an offeror for a proposal to 

3 save costs for the Federal Government by either—

4 (1) failing to offer employer-sponsored health 

5 insurance benefits to workers to be employed under 

6 the contract for the performance of such activity or 

7 function; or 

8 (2) offering employer-sponsored health insur9 ance benefits to such workers that are less than the 

10 benefits provided for Federal employees under chap11 ter 89 of title 5, United States Code.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4288

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PAUL RICHARD CHATMAN, a/k/a Paul Richard Chapman,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00170-CCE-1)

Submitted: November 16, 2017 Decided: November 22, 2017

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andrew L. Farris, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Paul Richard Chatman appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his 

term of supervised release and sentencing him to seven months’ imprisonment with no 

additional term of supervised release. Chatman’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds

for appeal but questioning whether Chatman’s revocation sentence is reasonable. 

Chatman was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done 

so. During the pendency of this appeal, Chatman was released from incarceration.

We may address sua sponte whether an issue on appeal presents “a live case or 

controversy . . . since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the 

courts.” Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2017). Because 

Chatman has already served his term of imprisonment and the district court did not 

impose any additional term of supervised release, there is no longer a live controversy 

regarding the revocation sentence. Therefore, counsel’s challenge to the district court’s 

decision to impose the seven-month prison term is moot. See United States v. Hardy, 545 

F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2008).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have 

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot the appeal of 

Chatman’s sentence and affirm the remainder of the revocation judgment. We deny 

counsel’s motion to withdraw at this stage in the proceedings. This court requires that 

counsel inform Chatman, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Chatman requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 
3

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may renew his motion. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Chatman.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JAN 6 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RICKY WRISTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 97-3284

v. D. Kansas

KARL FRIEDEL, Sedgwick County

District Court Judge; WILBUR D.

GEEDINGS, attorney; GLENN E.

SMITH, JR., in their individual and

official capacities,

Defendants - Appellees.

(D.C. No. 97-CV-3291) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, MCKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Ricky A. Wriston filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against a party who had filed a tort suit against him in state court, that

party’s attorney, and the judge who had entered judgment against Wriston in that

action. The district court summarily dismissed the civil rights action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the complaint failed to state a claim for relief

and was frivolous and malicious. 

Essentially, Wriston argues, without factual support, that because the

Kansas statute of limitations barred the state tort action, the three defendants

knowingly conspired under color of state law to violate his constitutional rights

by causing a judgment to enter against him and by garnishing his prison funds to

satisfy the judgment. On appeal, Wriston also argues that the summary dismissal

is evidence of the district court judge’s bias and prejudice against prisoner

litigants. We agree with the district court that the action fails to state a claim and

that it is frivolous. The action is founded on “clearly baseless” factual

contentions and is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” See Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779

(10th Cir. 1997). In addition, Wriston’s action is subject to dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) as it seeks compensatory and punitive damages against

a state court judge.
-3-

Accordingly, we AFFIRM. Because this appeal is frivolous and fails to

state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), it constitutes an

“occasion” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge
#### B. F. Shepperd, etc., *v.*Wm. Bowling.

Interest — Money Payable on Demand.

Where money is payable on demand, interest runs only irom the date of the demand.

APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT;

December 7, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor;

The evidence in- the case shows that the claim1 of three hundred dollars was allowed the appellee by the county court; this claim was included in the list of the county creditors and delivered to the sheriff. It was then the duty of the sheriff to collect the money and pay it over on demand. It also appears that the sheriff had collected or could have collected by the use of ordinary diligence enough of the county levy to satisfy the claims of the creditors. The defense set up in regard to the military claims and the advice of the appellee, with regard to them, can not be made available under the pleadings and proof so as to preclude the appellee from his right to recover. There is no sufficient denial of the demand by the answer, but if there was, the proof shows that the parties live in the sarnie town; and that in 1866 a written demand was made of the appellant, Shepperd, for the money. This we deem sufficient. This money, however, was payable on demand only, and no interest began to run on the claim until a demand was made. It was, therefore, erroneous to instruct the jury to give interest from October, 1863. It was proper to give the 10 per cent, upon the principal and interest, but this interest (6 per cent.) should have been calculated from the date of the demand and then ten per cent, on the aggregate amount. Sec. 5 of the Act of 1864, Myers Supplement, has reference only to the claims due the county and not to the claims of creditors. The payments made by the sheriff were properly applied to the previous allowance made the appellee. The instruction- given at the instance of appellees can not embrace the law of the case, except as to the question of interest. The court properly refused the instruction asked for by the defendant, and at *198any rate the instruction given for the appellee presented the whole law of the case except as stated. The judgment of the court below is reversed and cause remanded with directions to. award the appellant a new trial and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

N *I. Filson, Ireland, for appellants.*

*Dulind, for appellee.*
Exhibit 13.10



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 20-F of Inmarsat Global Limited (the Company) for
the annual period ended 31 December 2006 (the Periodic Report), I, Rick Medlock, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge the Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



By:

/s/     RICK
MEDLOCKRick Medlock Chief Financial Officer




Date: 29 April 2008
Rev. 11/29/2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Illinois

219 South Dearborn Street

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Thomas G. Bruton 312-435-5670

Clerk

Date: Case Number:

Case Title: Judge:

DOCUMENT REMOVED DUE TO REASON(S) CHECKED BELOW

 Document entered in error. 

 Document withdrawn or removed per court order of 

 Incorrect document linked. 

 Other:

 Removed per IOP30(b).

Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk

By: /s/

Deputy Clerk

07/30/2020

USA v. al-Shahman

1:20-cr-00362

Jorge L. Alonso

✔

Roberto Cornejo

Case: 1:20-cr-00362 Document #: 6 Filed: 07/29/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:20