IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 15, 2003

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROLANDO ROSAS CONTRERAS

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. 1-301-69 Donald P. Harris, Judge

No. M2002-01053-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 21, 2003

The Defendant, Rolando Rosas Contreras, was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape

and two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as

a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the three rape convictions, and he was sentenced

as a Range I standard offender to six years for each of the two convictions for aggravated assault.

The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of

twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is

insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by sentencing him to an effective

sentence of twenty-five years. We affirm the convictions and modify the sentence imposed by the

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed in Part;

Modified

DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T. WOODALL and

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

John H. Henderson, District Public Defender and Douglas P. Nanney, Assistant Public Defender,

Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rolando Rosas Contreras.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney General;

Ron Davis, District Attorney General; and Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for

the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape, each a Class A

felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, each a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing,

he was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the aggravated rape

convictions. He was also sentenced as a Range I standard offender to six years for each of the

aggravated assault convictions. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, resulting
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in an effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this

appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support

his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve an effective sentence of twentyfive years.

The proof offered by the State established that on February 14, 2001, at about five o’clock

in the morning, Adrianna Terrazas, a middle school student, was awakened by the sound of someone

coming through her bedroom door in her family’s apartment. The intruder told her to “go back to

sleep and to not scream.” The person was holding a knife, and he pointed it at Adrianna. Adrianna

testified that she was “scared” because she was afraid the man would “try to kill [her].” Adrianna

identified the Defendant as the man who came into her room holding the knife. 

Gloria Terrazas, the eleven year old younger sister of Adrianna, testified that she shared a

bedroom with Adrianna. On the morning of February 14, she woke up when she heard people

talking in her room. She said that a man was telling Adrianna “not to scream.” The man was

holding a knife, and Gloria thought the man was going to “hurt [them]” and “cut [them].” Both

Adrianna and Gloria testified that when the intruder left their room he went to the room of their older

sister, Maria.

Maria Terrazas, the older sister of Adrianna and Gloria, testified that she was awakened by

the sound of a man talking to her friend, who was sleeping in Maria’s room. The man told her friend

that “he had gotten in the wrong house” and was going to leave. He told Maria’s friend to go back

to sleep. Maria’s friend attempted to use her cell phone, and the intruder said that if she did not put

the phone down, “he might do something to her baby.” Maria was able to see that the man was

holding a small knife. The man told Maria to lie down, and he was “waving the knife around in his

hand.” Maria lay on the bed, and the man lay down next to her. He instructed her to remove her

shirt and her pants. Maria testified that at first she refused, but the man got angry and told her that

if she did not comply, “he’d cut [her].” The man then told her in Spanish to get on top of him and

place his penis inside her vagina. Maria refused. At this point, the man, still holding the knife, stood

next to the bed and demanded that Maria perform oral sex on him, which Maria did for a few

seconds. The man then made her lie down on the bed, and he got on top of her. Maria testified that

he touched her cheek with his knife. He then used his knife to cut her underwear off; then he

penetrated her vagina with his penis. This lasted less than a minute. The man then got up and

knocked several items off Maria’s night stand. As Maria was putting her pants on, the man turned

on the light, and Maria saw his face for two or three seconds. Maria testified that she had seen him

before at the Hispanic grocery store that her parents owned. She identified the Defendant as the man

who came into her room on the morning of February 14, 2001.

Maria testified that after the Defendant left her room, he took her into the kitchen. He began

groping her, and he bent her over the kitchen table and tried to have anal sex with her. However, he

was unsuccessful. The Defendant ordered Maria to get on her knees and perform oral sex on him

again, which she did. Maria testified that the Defendant still had the knife while they were in the

kitchen. As he was leaving the apartment, the Defendant told Maria that if she told anyone what he
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had done, “he would kill [her] or somebody in [her] family.” When he left, Maria called the police

on her friend’s cell phone. Maria was taken to the hospital in an ambulance, and a rape kit was

performed on her. Then Maria went to the police department to make a composite picture of the man

who had raped her. Maria also made a photo identification of the Defendant.

Dr. Cindy Woodall testified that she treated Maria Terrazas on February 14, 2001. She

testified that Maria told her that she had been sexually assaulted in her room earlier that morning.

Maria told her that there had been vaginal and oral penetration, but she was unsure whether her

attacker had ejaculated. Maria told Dr. Woodall that during the assault, the intruder had held a knife

against her cheek. Dr. Woodall testified that she found no damage to Maria’s vagina. She did locate

dried semen on the entrance to Maria’s vagina. After Dr. Woodall performed the rape kit on Maria,

she gave it to Detective Becky Johnson. Dr. Woodall stated that, although she located semen around

Maria’s vagina, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation laboratory report stated that no semen was

present. Dr. Woodall explained that this could have occurred either because she failed to swab the

semen properly or the swab was dry. 

Detective Tommy Heithcock of theFranklin Police Department testified that on February 14,

2001, he went to the Bramblewood Apartments to investigate the sexual assault of Maria Terrazas.

He found a microwave oven outside the bathroom window of the apartment, and he located

footprints on top of it. The bathroom window was open, and he discovered similar footprints on the

tile floor in the bathroom. From this evidence, Detective Heithcock determined that the intruder had

entered the apartment through the bathroom window. However, he was unable to find any

fingerprints around the window or on any of the doorknobs. The detective did gather several items,

including the panties that had been cut off Maria, bed sheets, a blanket, a pillowcase, and a light bulb

from a lamp in Maria’s bedroom.

Detective Becky Johnson of the Franklin Police Department went to the emergency room on

February 14, 2001 and recovered the rape kit that had been administered to Maria Terrazas. She

testified that semen was detected on some of the evidence recovered from Maria’s bedroom, such

as the blanket and bedspread. However, the DNA matched Maria’s boyfriend. Detective Johnson

also testified that she assisted Maria in examining photographs at the police station. Maria picked

the Defendant out of the photo lineup and said, “That’s him.” When Ms. Johnson asked Maria how

certain she was on a scale of one to ten that it was the Defendant who raped her, Maria replied

“Ten.” Detective Johnson also showed a photo lineup to Adrianna Terrazas, who said that the man

in photograph number five, the Defendant, looked familiar. However, Adrianna was unable to say

for certain that the Defendant was the man who had been in her family’s apartment. 

Agent Elizabeth Reid of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, a forensic scientist

specializing in latent fingerprint analyzation, testified that she examined the light bulb that Detective

Heithcock had removed from the lamp in Maria Terrazas’ bedroom. She recovered a fingerprint

from the light bulb; then she compared that print with the fingerprints of the Defendant. She testified

that the print found on the light bulb matched the Defendant’s left thumb print. 
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The Defendant argues that the proof presented by the State at trial is insufficient to support

his three convictions for aggravated rape and two convictions for aggravated assault. Tennessee

Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that “[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by

the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the

trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Evidence is sufficient if, after reviewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000). In addition, because conviction

by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt, a

convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. See

McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); see also State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105-

06 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d

913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State “the strongest legitimate

view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn

therefrom.” Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914; see also Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 279. The court may not “reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence” in the record below. Evans, 838 S.W.2d at 191; see also Buggs,

995 S.W.2d at 105. Likewise, should the reviewing court find particular conflicts in the trial

testimony, the court must resolve them in favor of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. See

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and

value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact, not the appellate

courts. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,

623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

“Aggravated rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant . . .

accompanied by any of the following circumstances: (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish

the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a)(1).

“‘Sexual penetration’ means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other

intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body . . . into the genital or anal openings of the

victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101(a)(2) states that a person

commits assault who “[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent

bodily injury.” An aggravated assault is an assault in which a deadly weapon is used or displayed.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B).

In this case, the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s three convictions for

aggravated rape. Maria Terrazas testified that the Defendant told her to lie on her bed as he was

“waving the knife around in his hand.” When she did, he instructed her to remove her shirt and her

pants. She stated that when she hesitated, he became angry and threatened to cut her with the knife.

The Defendant removed his penis from his pants, told Maria to get on top of him and “put it inside

[her vagina].” Maria refused, and the Defendant then stood next to the bed and demanded that Maria

perform oral sex on him, which she did for about five seconds. The Defendant then had Maria lie
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back down on the bed, and he got on top of her. He touched the side of her face with the knife; then

he used the knife to cut off her underwear. At this point, the Defendant had vaginal intercourse with

Maria for about one minute. The Defendant got up and took Maria into the kitchen. There he began

groping her and unsuccessfully attempted to engage in anal intercourse with her. Then the Defendant

ordered her to perform oral sex on him again, which she did. Maria testified that the Defendant was

wielding the knife the entire time. The Defendant’s fingerprint was found inside the home where

the attack occurred. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the Defendant did commit three separate unlawful sexual penetrations of Maria Terrazas

by force while using a weapon.

Likewise, the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s two convictions for

aggravated assault. Both Adrianna Terrazas and Gloria Terrazas testified that the Defendant entered

their room armed with a knife. Both girls testified that the Defendant instructed them to not scream.

Both girls testified that they were afraid. Adrianna stated that she feared that the Defendant would

“try to kill [her],” and Gloria testified that she was afraid that the Defendant would “cut [them].”

Based upon this evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the

Defendant did cause both the girls to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury while he was displaying

a deadly weapon. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve an effective

sentence of twenty-five years. When an accused challenges the length, range, or manner of service

of a sentence, this Court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption

that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d).

This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court

considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823

S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

When conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this Court must consider: (a) the evidence,

if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; (c) the principles of

sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the

criminal conduct involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement

made by the defendant regarding sentencing; and (g) the potential or lack of potential for

rehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; State v. Brewer, 875

S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Thomas, 755 S.W.2d 838, 844 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1988).

If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, that the

court imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and proper weight to the

factors and principles set out under the sentencing law, and that the trial court’s findings of fact are

adequately supported by the record, then we may not modify the sentence even if we would have

preferred a different result. See State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 926-27 (Tenn. 1998); State v.

Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
1We note that the presentence report was not included in the appellate record.

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At the sentencing hearing in his case, the trial court heard testimony from Steven Adams, a

former cell mate of the Defendant in the county jail. Mr. Adams testified that while they were in jail

together, he and the Defendant had engaged in a conversation about the components of a successful

criminal prosecution. Mr. Adams testified that the Defendant told him that he had raped Maria

Terrazas. The Defendant told Mr. Adams how he used a knife while raping Maria. Mr. Adams

stated that the Defendant described where the Terrazas family lived and where Maria Terrazas

worked. The Defendant explained to Mr. Adams that the police had been unable to find any semen,

DNA evidence, or fingerprints at the crime scene. Ultimately, the Defendant asked Mr. Adams

whether he would be willing to hurt someone for money. The Defendant added that his family in

Mexico had approximately twenty thousand dollars. This caused Mr. Adams to be concerned about

the safety of Maria Terrazas. Sometime later at a church service, Mr. Adams approached the

Defendant and asked how things were going. The Defendant responded by asking Mr. Adams if he

had ever heard of MS Thirteen, which Mr. Adams recognized as the name of a Mexican gang. Then

the Defendant winked at Mr. Adams and said, “I’ve got the problem taken care of.” As a result of

these conversations with the Defendant, Mr. Adams wrote a letter to the district attorney general’s

office describing the things the Defendant was saying.

David Pratt, an officer with the Board of Probation and Parole, also testified at the sentencing

hearing. He stated that he prepared a presentence report in the Defendant’s case.1

 He testified that

the Defendant admitted to being in the United States illegally in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.

Furthermore, the Defendant admitted while on the stand at the sentencing hearing that he used

marijuana once while he was still residing in Mexico. However, the Defendant denied asking Steven

Adams to harm Maria Terrazas.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve

an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The trial judge found

as an enhancing factor that the Defendant had a history of criminal behavior in addition to that

necessary to establish the appropriate range. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2) (Supp. 2002).

In finding this enhancement factor, the court placed great weight on the testimony of Steven Adams,

and it placed little weight on the Defendant’s illegal residency in the United States and his smoking

marijuana while in Mexico. 

After thoroughly reviewing the testimony of Mr. Adams, we cannot conclude that his

testimony was sufficient to establish that the Defendant had a history of criminal behavior. Although

Mr. Adams testified that the Defendant asked him whether he would hurt someone in exchange for

money, the asking of this question does not constitute a crime. Likewise, the mentioning of twenty

thousand dollars in Mexico or of a gang does not constitute evidence of criminal behavior. Finally,

the Defendant saying that the problem is “taken care of,” while perhaps a cause for concern,

especially when coupled with statements regarding hurting people, money, and gangs, does not rise

to the level of criminal conduct. Therefore, it was error for the court to apply enhancement factor

(2) based on the testimony of Steven Adams. However, irrespective of the misapplication of
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enhancement factor (2) regarding the testimony of Mr. Adams, there was evidence presented at the

sentencing hearing that the Defendant was in the United States illegally and that he had used

marijuana in the past. These facts do properly establish enhancement factor (2). However, the trial

court gave these facts little weight, and these circumstances do not justify the trial court’s

enhancement of five years over the presumptive sentence, which, for a Range I offender convicted

of a class A felony, is the midpoint of the range, or twenty years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-

112(a)(1), 210(c). Based on our review of the record and the sentencing hearing, we have

determined that an enhancement of two years on each count of aggravated rape is appropriate.

The Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. We modify the sentence imposed by the trial

court from twenty-five years on each count of aggravated rape to twenty-two years on each count.

The sentence imposed for each of the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault shall remain

at six years, and all of the sentences shall run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-two

years.

___________________________________ 

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE