In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2480 

PILAR SANDOVAL REYNOSO, 

Petitioner, 

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent. 

____________________ 

Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A200-779-379

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 28, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2024 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. The Department of Homeland Security served Pilar Sandoval Reynoso with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for unlawfully residing in the United States. 

Sandoval applied for cancellation of removal, which an Immigration Judge denied. The IJ concluded that Sandoval did not 

establish ten years’ continuous physical presence, or show 
2 No. 23-2480 

that his qualifying relative children would suffer exceptional 

and extremely unusual hardship. Sandoval also did not merit 

a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration 

Appeals affirmed the IJ’s denial, including the discretionary 

finding. 

Sandoval petitions for our review. We lack jurisdiction to 

review the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1). And we lack jurisdiction to consider the Board’s 

review of the IJ’s decision. We therefore dismiss Sandoval’s 

petition, and we need not review his remaining claims.

I.

A. Application for Cancellation of Removal

In May 2012, DHS served Sandoval with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear, filed it with the United States Department of 

Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review, and began 

removal proceedings against him. The Notice alleged that 

Sandoval was not a United States citizen or national; was a 

Mexican native and citizen; arrived in this country at an unknown location on an unknown date; and entered the U.S. 

without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by 

an immigration officer. The Notice charged Sandoval with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present 

in the United States without admission or parole after inspection. 

The Notice did not specify the date and time of the first 

hearing. The immigration court later scheduled the first hearing for May 29, 2012. Sandoval attended this hearing with 

counsel. The IJ did not accept arguments or filings at that
No. 23-2480 3

hearing and subsequently scheduled a new one on July 30, 

2013. 

Sandoval attended that hearing and was represented by 

new counsel. Without objecting to the Notice, Sandoval admitted to its allegations and conceded removability as 

charged. He also voiced his intention to apply for cancellation 

of removal for non-permanent residents. He claimed prima 

facie eligibility for cancellation of removal and asserted that 

he last entered this country in October 1999, had four U.S. citizen children, and possessed no disqualifying convictions. 

The IJ asked whether Sandoval had ever left the U.S. He answered that he left on September 6, 2003, after accepting a voluntary return. He then reentered this country one month 

later. The IJ asked Sandoval about his return to Mexico in September 2003, and he answered that Border Patrol agents “took 

[him] back September 15 or September 18 of 2003.” At the 

hearing the IJ questioned whether Sandoval was returned to 

Mexico in a manner that broke continuous physical presence 

and requested evidence from both parties on the issue. DHS 

submitted four Forms I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien. Sandoval submitted those same four forms, in addition to employment information and tax returns. These 

forms showed four voluntary returns to Mexico, one in 1999 

and three in September 2003. At a later hearing, the IJ accepted 

into evidence without objection all documents the parties presented. 

In December 2020, Sandoval updated his application for 

cancellation of removal with supporting documentation. In a 

pre-hearing statement, he claimed he could establish ten years 

of continuous presence in the U.S., and he met all statutory 

eligibility requirements. Additionally, he argued he merited a 
4 No. 23-2480 

favorable exercise of discretion. After receiving evidence, the 

IJ set a merits hearing. Sandoval testified that he started working in this country in 1999, began paying taxes in 2000, and 

bought a home in 2005. He also explained he obtained a 

driver’s license in 2004 and again in 2012—after receiving two 

infractions for driving without a license. 

Sandoval then testified about his family. He said he was 

married, and he and his wife were from San Juan Xoconusco 

in Mexico, where their families still lived. His four children 

were all born in the U.S. and are thus American citizens. He 

explained one of his children had dyslexia and received free 

special education services in public school. On this point, 

Sandoval submitted articles by the U.S. Department of State, 

including one that said schools offering special education programs in Mexico “may not be reliable in some instances.” 

Sandoval said his child only had one year of high school left 

and she would not receive further assistance from U.S. 

schools after graduation. He also explained that another child 

had asthma. Sandoval stated that if he was returned to Mexico, his wife and children would go with him. 

Sandoval also testified about his numerous illegal entries 

into the U.S. and returns to Mexico. In July 1999, a couple 

weeks after he unlawfully entered this country, immigration 

enforcement authorities sent him back to Mexico. Sandoval illegally reentered the U.S. in October 1999. Then, on September 6, 2003, he was charged with driving under the influence 

of alcohol. The police called immigration authorities, who 

told Sandoval he “had to return to Mexico because [he was] 

undocumented.” According to one of the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien forms, the immigration officer explained to Sandoval that he had the option of voluntary return 
No. 23-2480 5

or the issuance of a Notice to Appear and the possibility of an 

order of removal. But “Sandoval did not want to risk getting 

formally deported and decided to return voluntarily in order 

to try to obtain a visitor’s permit.” So, Sandoval voluntarily 

returned to Mexico on September 12, 2003. He testified that 

Border Patrol agents told him he could “fight [his] case from 

here” or “get a permit to come back from Mexico.” He “chose 

to go back to Mexico” with the intention of re-entering the 

U.S. illegally to be with his family. 

Immediately after his return to Mexico, Sandoval began 

attempting to illegally re-enter this country. During two attempts, on September 20 and 28, 2003, he encountered immigration officials at the border. Again, he chose to voluntarily 

return to Mexico rather than stay in immigration detention 

and wait for a hearing. When immigration authorities provided him the same option as before “to fight [his] case” or 

“sign and go back,” he “signed and went back.” Near the end 

of September 2003, Sandoval illegally re-entered the U.S. After accepting all the testimony and evidence, including the 

record of Sandoval’s illegal reentries, the IJ considered Sandoval’s objection and the relevant law to make his decision. 

B. IJ and Board Decisions

An IJ must determine whether an applicant seeking cancellation of removal has established (A) 10 years’ continuous 

physical presence, (B) good moral character during that time, 

(C) the absence of a disqualifying conviction, and (D) “that 

removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship to the [applicant’s] spouse, parent, or child, who is 

a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The applicant 

also bears the burden of proving that he merits relief in the 
6 No. 23-2480 

exercise of discretion. See id.; Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 

246 (2010). 

On February 9, 2021, the IJ denied Sandoval’s application 

for cancellation of removal and his alternative application for 

voluntary departure. He ordered Sandoval removed to Mexico. The IJ found that Sandoval had not established ten years’ 

continuous physical presence, and he had not shown that his 

children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship. Importantly, he did not merit a favorable exercise 

of discretion. 

On the discretionary point, the IJ relied on Sandoval’s 

“history of criminal and civil infractions in Wisconsin and his 

history of repeatedly violating the immigration laws by entering the United States illegally.” The IJ referenced Sandoval’s 

two citations for driving without a license and noted that 

Sandoval’s 2003 arrest and plea to a DUI was “serious” and 

“put other members of the community at risk.” The IJ found 

“[t]he most serious negative factor” was Sandoval’s repeated 

violations of federal immigration laws. The IJ counted at least 

five unlawful entries between July 1999 and October 2003. The 

IJ also observed that Sandoval chose voluntary return over the 

opportunity to appear before an IJ because he “thought it 

would be easier to illegally re-enter the United States, and he 

apparently lied to the immigration officer when he said he 

would ‘try to obtain a visitor’s permit.’” 

The IJ considered the positive equities, including Sandoval’s four U.S. citizen children and the hardships they would 

experience if they accompanied Sandoval back to Mexico. The 

IJ also noted Sandoval’s history of paying taxes, engaging in 

steady work, and the absence of recent arrests. But the IJ determined that Sandoval’s DUI and “many illegal entries, 
No. 23-2480 7

especially given the circumstances of his September 2003 

return to Mexico,” outweighed the “significant” positive factors. So, exercising his discretion, the IJ denied Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal. 

Sandoval appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board. The 

Board affirmed and declined to remand, explaining in part 

that the IJ “properly denied the respondent’s application for 

cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.” Sandoval 

petitions for our review.

II. 

When a petitioner challenges an unfavorable ruling on a 

cancellation of removal application, judicial review is limited 

to legal and constitutional claims. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 338–39 

(2022) (explaining that § 1252(a)(2)(D) “preserves review of 

constitutional claims and questions of law,” but “judicial review of factfinding is unavailable.”); Perez-Fuentes v. Lynch, 

842 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief in immigration 

proceedings, including cancellation of removal. ... But, ... we 

retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law raised in a petition for review.”). An IJ’s factual 

findings and ultimate exercise of discretion are not reviewable. See Patel, 596 U.S. at 338–39. The court has “interpreted 

the phrase ‘questions of law’ in [section 1252(a)(2)](D) narrowly, holding that legal questions are present only when the 

Board misinterprets a statute, regulation, constitutional provision, or its own precedent, applies the wrong legal standard, or fails to exercise its discretion at all.” Martinez-Baez v. 

Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
8 No. 23-2480 

Sandoval argues that this court has jurisdiction to review 

the IJ’s discretionary denial of his application for cancellation 

of removal. Pointing to Kucana, he claims this case involves 

regulations that may be reviewed. 558 U.S. at 246–48 (explaining that courts’ jurisdictional stripping over discretionary decisions applies only to statutes). But Sandoval is incorrect. The 

requirements necessary for nonpermanent residents to receive cancellation of removal are codified in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1). As this case directly involves a statute, Sandoval incorrectly relies on Kucana. 

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1): 

The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and 

adjust []the status of an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible 

or deportable from the United States if the alien— 

(A) has been physically present in the United 

States for a continuous period of not less 

than 10 years immediately preceding the 

date of such application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 

1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to paragraph 

(5); and 

(D) establishes that removal would result in 

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship 

to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is 

a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
No. 23-2480 9

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D) (emphasis added). 

As explained in Kucana, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) dictates that 

courts cannot review a judgment granting relief under 

§ 1229b. 558 U.S. at 246 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)

(§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “places within the no-judicial-review category ‘any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255.’”)). Recently, in 

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), the Court clarified 

that only a portion of § 1229b is considered a “grant” of relief, 

thereby stripping courts of jurisdiction. The Court explained

that even “if the IJ decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal at step one” by establishing factors (A)–(D), 

“his step-two discretionary determination on whether or not 

to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is not 

reviewable as a question of law.” Id. at 225 n.4; see also Lopez 

v. Garland, 105 F.4th 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2024) (explaining that 

Congress reserved the IJ’s discretionary decision for the Executive Branch (citing Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 n.4)). 

In other words, we can review an IJ’s decision about

whether a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation in very limited circumstances. But we cannot review an IJ’s additional 

discretionary decision to grant such cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal of

... an alien who is inadmissible or deportable ... .”) (emphasis 

added). That decision is a question of law unreviewable 

within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(D). So, the IJ’s 

discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal cannot be reviewed. 

As for the Board’s decision, this court generally lacks jurisdiction to review such a decision on a motion to reopen or 

reconsider if the court “lack[s] jurisdiction over the 
10 No. 23-2480 

underlying order.” Cruz-Mayaho v. Holder, 698 F.3d 574, 577 

(7th Cir. 2012) (citing Martinez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 

679, 683 (7th Cir. 2006). Sandoval may not seek review of the 

ultimate discretionary determination by framing the issue as 

a challenge to the Board’s refusal to remand proceedings.

III. 

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). And we lack jurisdiction 

over the Board’s review of that decision. As the IJ’s discretionary decision controls the outcome of Sandoval’s application, 

we need not consider his remaining claims about continuous 

physical presence and exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship. 

We DISMISS in part Sandoval’s petition for review for lack 

of jurisdiction, and we DENY the remainder of his petition.