J-S33031-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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MICHAEL AUSTIN,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 916 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000398-2004

 CP-22-CR 0003099-2004 

BEFORE: BENDER, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 07, 2017

Michael Austin (Appellant) appeals pro se1from the order entered on 

May 3, 2016, granting his motion to correct clerical errors. We dismiss this 

appeal as moot.

The motions court set forth the following procedural history.

[Appellant] was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, 

and simple assault on April 20, 2005. On June 15, 2005, 

[Appellant] was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, [10 

to 20] years of imprisonment for burglary, and [one to two] 

years of imprisonment for simple assault. The burglary and 

simple assault sentences were ordered to run consecutive to the 

life sentence. 

[Appellant] challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal, and the Superior Court filed a memorandum opinion on 

May 16, 2006, affirming [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence. 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s May 11, 2017 application for appointment of counsel is denied.
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[See Commonwealth v. Austin, 903 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. 

2006), appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1100 (Pa. 2006).] Years later, 

on April 4, 2016, [Appellant] filed a “motion to correct clerical 

errors.” [Appellant] claimed [the sentencing court] entered an 

oral judgment of sentence, not a written one, and asked to be 

provided with the sentencing order. [The motions court] granted 

[Appellant’s] motion on May 3, 2016, with instructions for the 

[c]lerk of [c]ourts to transmit to [Appellant] a certified copy of 

[the court’s] sentencing order from June 15, 2005.

On May 31, 2016, [Appellant] filed a “motion to compel 

disclosure of the court’s sentencing order.”[2] On the same date, 

[Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. 

Specifically, [Appellant] appealed from “the final judgment 

entered in this matter on the 3rd day of May, 2016[.]” On June 

9, 2016, after the notice of appeal had been filed, [the motions 

court] filed an order denying [Appellant’s] motion to compel.[3] 

Motions Court Opinion, 10/13/2016, at 1-2.4

 Appellant asks us to decide whether Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(a)(2) requires 

the clerk of courts of Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas to file a 

written judgment of sentence in the official record for Appellant’s criminal 

case. Appellant’s Brief at 4.

 

2

In his second motion, Appellant alleged that “the [c]lerk of [c]ourts only 

furnished [Appellant] with [his] guideline sentencing forms, a Department of 

Corrections 300-B form reflecting [his] sentence from June 15, 2005, and 

the [sentencing court’s] sentencing forms.” Motions Court Opinion, 

10/13/2016, at 2. Although his motion was not a model of clarity, it appears 

that Appellant sought a certified copy of his actual sentencing order, or in 

the alternative, a newly-created-judgment-of-sentence order he believed he 

needed to file an appeal. Motion to Compel, 5/31/2016, at 1. 

3 The motions court explained that the clerk already had provided Appellant 

with “[o]fficial sentencing information” from the docket, except the copy of 

the transcript from the sentencing hearing, which it then forwarded. Order, 

6/9/2016, at 1.

4 Both Appellant and the motions court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Initially, we note that Appellant’s notice of appeal references only the 

May 3, 2016 order granting his motion to correct clerical errors. In this 

motion, the relief requested by Appellant was for the motions court to “issue 

an order upon the clerks[’] office directing it to provide [Appellant] with a 

certified copy of [his s]entencing [o]rder.”5 Motion to Correct Clerical Errors, 

4/4/2016, at 1. The motions court granted the precise relief sought by 

Appellant. See Order, 5/3/2016, at 1 (“[T]his court grants Appellant’s pro 

se motion and hereby directs the clerk of courts to transmit to defendant a 

certified copy of the court's sentencing order of this docket on or about June 

15, 2005.”) (capitalization altered). On appeal, Appellant requests that we 

order the motions court to produce a certified copy of the sentencing order. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Because the motions court already granted 

Appellant’s request for a certified copy of the sentencing order, his appeal of 

 

5 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s motion constituted an 

untimely-filed petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In the motion, Appellant simply requested a certified 

copy of his sentencing order. PCRA review is limited to defendants who 

claim that they are wrongfully convicted and/or are serving an illegal 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Burkkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Appellant’s motion did not seek substantive relief regarding 

his conviction or sentence, and, therefore, it is not a petition under the 

PCRA. Although Appellant argues in his brief that he is being detained 

illegally because there is no evidence of a written judgment of sentence, he 

did not make this claim in his motion to correct clerical errors. If he had, his 

motion would have constituted a petition for habeas corpus, not a PCRA 

petition. See Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2014). 
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the May 3, 2016 order is moot.6,7,8 See Printed Image of York, Inc. v. 

Mifflin Press, Ltd., 133 A.3d 55, 59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue before a 

 

6 We also note that, because the motions court decided the motion in 

Appellant’s favor, Appellant is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of 

Pa.R.A.P. 501. See In re J.G., 984 A.2d 541, 546 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“A 

prevailing party is not ‘aggrieved’ and therefore, does not have standing to 

appeal an order that has been entered in his or her favor.”). Although the 

Commonwealth mentions in its brief that Appellant was a prevailing party, it 

did not argue specifically that Appellant lacked standing. Since standing is 

not jurisdictional, we cannot raise an issue of standing sua sponte. 

Commonwealth v. Allen, 107 A.3d 709, 711 (Pa. 2014).

7

 In addition to seeking an order compelling production of a certified copy of 

his sentencing order, Appellant also requests that this Court “arrest 

judgment” and direct the trial court to schedule a sentencing hearing. 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. This request is related to his averment on appeal 

that he is serving an illegal sentence imposed without a written sentencing 

order. Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, Appellant did not present this 

argument to the motions court, and, therefore, it is waived. Even if it were 

not waived, this argument would have no merit based upon other documents 

in the record reflecting Appellant’s sentence. See Joseph, 96 A.3d at 372 

(holding that the prisoner was not being detained illegally despite the 

absence of a sentencing order because the criminal docket and transcript of 

the sentencing hearing confirmed his sentence). 

 

8 Although Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from the June 9, 2016 

order denying his motion to compel, it is clear from Appellant’s concise 

statement and brief that the June 9, 2016 order is the order with which 

Appellant actually takes issue. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 5 (listing the 

text of the June 9, 2016 order as the order in question); id. at 6 (“The 

present appeal follows denial of Appellant’s motion to compel disclosure of 

the court’s sentencing order....”) (capitalization altered); id. at 10 (arguing 

that the motions court “has no legal standing to allow” the clerk to “refuse to 

adhere” to Pa.R.Crim.P. 114, which, according to Appellant, requires the 

clerk to draft and file a written judgment of sentence after the court signs 

it). 

 

 However, not only did Appellant fail to appeal the June 9, 2016 order, on 

the same day that he filed the motion to compel, and before the motions 

court ruled on the motion, he filed the instant notice of appeal, which 

divested the motions court of jurisdiction regarding Appellant’s request for a 
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court is moot ‘when a determination is sought on a matter which, when 

rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.’”) 

(citation omitted).

Appeal dismissed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2017

 

certified copy of his written judgment of sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) 

(prohibiting the trial court from proceeding “further in the matter” after an 

appeal is taken, except as otherwise prescribed). Because these exceptions 

do not apply here, the motions court lacked jurisdiction to enter the June 9, 

2016 order denying Appellant’s motion to compel, and the order is a nullity. 

See Bell v. Kater, 839 A.2d 356, 358 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that an 

order entered by trial court regarding the same matter after the matter was 

appealed was a legal nullity).