UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT 

TECHNOLOGY CO.; and UNICORN 

GLOBAL, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND 

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A”,

Defendants.

No. 20 C 4806

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On October 6, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for an order to show 

cause, finding that the remaining defendants—Gyroor and those allegedly affiliated 

with it—had sold products in violation of the preliminary injunction. See R. 444. The 

Court also ordered the Gyroor Defendants to pay Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees 

and costs. See id. Over the following four months, the parties communicated about 

the appropriate amount but could not reach agreement. See R. 504-4. Plaintiffs have 

filed this motion seeking $119,209.59 in fees and costs. See R. 503. Plaintiffs’ motion 

is granted in that they are awarded a total of $89,051.60 in fees and costs.

Legal Standard

Due to its “superior understanding of the litigation,” the Court has 

considerable “discretion in determining the amount of a fee award.” Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The Court must “‘provide a reasonably specific 

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explanation for all aspects of a fee determination,’” but its explanation “need not be 

lengthy.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 651 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010)); see also Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 

826, 838 (2011) (district courts may engage in “rough justice” in apportioning fees).

“The party seeking an award of fees” has the burden to “submit evidence supporting 

the hours worked and rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The Court may reduce 

the hours calculation “[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate.” Id.

Analysis

Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ fee and cost request with the following 

arguments: (1) the number of hours expended is unreasonable; (2) some work should 

have been performed by non-lawyers at lower rates; (3) the hourly rates are 

unreasonable; (4) Plaintiffs’ expenses for samples of the infringing products and 

expert consultation are not reasonable; and (5) Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover 

fees for filing this motion for fees.

I. Number of Hours

During the four months between the Court’s order granting the motion to show 

cause and the filing of this motion, the parties communicated about the appropriate 

amount of fees and costs. Plaintiffs made an initial demand, and then modified that 

demand in response to Defendants’ objections at least three times. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ modification of their demand constitutes 

“reasonable ground to believe that Plaintiffs’ documentation of hours is inconsistent 

and inaccurate.” R. 509 at 4. But the only modification with which Defendants take 

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issue specifically is the decrease in the number of hours for which Plaintiffs’ seek 

compensation. This is not an indication that Plaintiffs’ record of hours worked is 

inaccurate. Rather, the change in Plaintiffs’ demand indicates a willingness to 

compromise, which should be part of any good faith negotiation.

The only specific inaccuracy Defendants found in Plaintiffs’ submission is 

Plaintiffs’ mistaken inclusion in the records submitted in support of this motion of a 

bill for “draft declaration in support of the motion to default,” which is unrelated to 

the motion to show cause. Defendants argue that this mistake is sufficient to 

undermine Plaintiffs’ entire fee request. But Defendants also concede that Plaintiffs 

admitted this billing line item was included in error, and its removal is part of the 

reason the number of hours for which Plaintiffs seek compensation on this motion is 

less than previously demanded. Again, this good faith correction is not reason to 

believe Plaintiffs’ current demand is unreasonable.

Defendants third objection has more merit. Defendants point out that many of 

Plaintiffs’ billing entries do not mention the motion to show cause or “Gyroor” or any 

defendant in particular. The majority of Plaintiffs’ entries include such a notation, 

which raises the possibility that the more ambiguous entries are not related to this 

motion. Plaintiffs contend that they are able to identify the relevant entries by the 

dates and their general knowledge of their attorneys’ activities during the time period 

preceding the filing of the motion to show cause. But Plaintiffs also concede that their 

block billing method necessarily entails billing for work that applies to this case as a 

whole, and not necessarily specifically to the show cause motion. 

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Under these circumstances, the Court finds it unreasonable to award fees for 

billing entries that do not specifically mention the show cause motion or “Gyroor.” 

For this reason, the Court counted the entries that are sufficiently specific in an effort

to determine the compensable hours:

Attorney/

Paralegal & 

Rate

Kelly

$865/hour

Yuan

$650/hour

Nandi

$695/hour

Abdelaziz

$610/hour

Wickersham

$350/hour

Alam

$350/hour TOTAL

Corrected 

Hours

6.9 104.1 25 19.3 4.2 1 160.5

Corrected 

Hours 

x Rate

$5,968.50 $67,665.00 $17,375.00 $11,773.00 $1,470.00 $350 $104,601.50

Requested 

Hours

19 75.1 18.1 20.3 4.2 3.3 140

Requested 

Fees

$16,435.00 $48,815.00 $12,579.50 $12,383.00 $1,470.00 $1,155.00 $92,837.50

Surprisingly, the total corrected fees based on the corrected hours, i.e., the total based 

on billing entries that specifically mention the show cause motion or “Gyroor,” are 

$104,601.50, which is greater than the total amount of fees for which Plaintiffs seek 

compensation, $92,837.50.1 Additionally, Plaintiffs seek far more compensation for 

attorney Kelly than the bills support, while they seek far less for attorneys Yuan and 

Nandi.

As it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that the hours they billed are 

reasonable and appropriate, the Court will cap the number of hours to be awarded,

for each attorney or paralegal (subject to Defendants’ further objections addressed 

1 Plaintiffs also seek fees for bringing this fee petition, but the Court addresses that 

issue separately below.

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below), at the lesser number of hours supported by either the billing records or 

Plaintiffs’ request. For example, for attorney Kelly’s work, the maximum number of 

hours to be compensated is the 6.9 hours supported by the billing records. But for 

attorney Yuan’s work, the maximum number of hours to be compensated is the 75.1 

hours Plaintiffs seek, rather than the higher 104.1 hours supported by the records. 

Even though the records support the greater amount of 104.1 hours, the Court cannot 

ignore Plaintiffs’ representation that 75.1 is the appropriate amount. Following this 

principal for each of Plaintiffs’ six attorneys and paralegals yields the following 

maximum number of compensable hours and fees:

Attorney/

Paralegal

Kelly

$865/hour

Yuan

$650/hour

Nandi

$695/hour

Abdelaziz

$610/hour

Wickersham

$350/hour

Alam

$350/hour

TOTAL

Compensable 

Hours

6.9 75.1 18.1 19.3 4.1 1 124.6

Compensable 

Amounts

$5,968.50 $48,815.00 $12,579.50 $11,773.00 $1,470.00 $350 $80,956.00

II. Non-Lawyer Work

Defendants object further that Plaintiffs should not be awarded fees for the 

time attorney Yuan spent capturing screen shots of their internet storefronts. 

Defendants argue that this is work that could be accomplished by a paralegal at a 

lower hourly rate.

Plaintiffs argue that that billing entries for “screen captures do not reflect 

merely clicking ‘print to PDF,’” but “reflect Mr. Yuan’s substantial work trying to 

track down various Gyroor-affiliated stores and alter egos, analyzing which product 

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offered were covered by the preliminary injunction, and obtaining evidence of that 

non-compliance to us in Plaintiffs’ motion.” R. 512 at 3-4. 

As with the lack of specificity in Plaintiffs’ billing entries just discussed, Yuan’s 

description of his work as merely “screen captures” leaves Plaintiffs vulnerable to 

Defendants’ argument. However, the Court’s knowledge of the case and Yuan’s work 

is more extensive that the billing entries alone. Yuan submitted affidavits on the 

motion to show cause that demonstrate the extent of the work he did to prepare the 

motion, and which confirm the description of his work that Plaintiffs provide here. 

Because of the affidavits he submitted on the motion to show cause, the Court is 

aware that Yuan spent significant time examining and analyzing Defendants’ 

internet stores and products in a substantive manner. Based on these affidavits and 

the sworn representations of Plaintiffs’ counsel on this motion for fees, the Court will 

accept that Yuan’s billing notation of “screen captures” reflected work that required 

the skill of an attorney. The Court will not reduce the compensable hours for Yuan’s 

work on this basis.

III. Hourly Rates

Defendants object that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to establish 

that their hourly rates are reasonable, because they support the reasonableness of 

the rates with only a “self-serving affidavit.” See R. 509 (citing Spegon v. Cath. Bishop

of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 556 (7th Cir. 1999)). Defendants’ citation to Seventh Circuit 

authority for this argument is accurate as far as it goes. But the Seventh Circuit 

found an attorney affidavit insufficient when the attorney never actually billed 

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clients for the rates sought. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Seventh Circuit 

has held that an attorney’s affidavit attesting to their hourly rates is sufficient to 

establish the reasonableness of those rates when the attorney actually billed their 

client at those rates. See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 556 (“since Rossiello has no fee-paying 

clients, he has no ‘actual’ billing rate that can be presumed to be his market rate”). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel attests that they billed the hours they seek and has 

submitted billing invoices for those hours. The Court ordered unredacted copies of 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s invoices for in camera review and confirmed that counsel billed 

at the rates stated in counsel’s affidavit. Along with the unredacted invoices, counsel 

filed an additional affidavit stating that Plaintiffs have actually paid fees well in 

excess of the fee amounts sought on this motion.

Defendants could have rebutted the reasonableness with evidence that the 

rates are excessive. But Defendants have offered no such evidence. Therefore, the 

Court finds the rates are reasonable.

IV. Expenses

In addition to their fee request, Plaintiffs’ seek reimbursement for the $959.09 

they spent to buy Defendants’ products to examine them, and for the $6,413.00 paid 

to “a design patent expert to confirm that each of the identified infringing products 

were in fact a reproduction [of Plaintiff’s products covered by the preliminary 

injunction],” R. 503 at 3. While both of these expenses are relevant to the subject 

matter of the motion to show cause, the Court finds that Plaintiffs would have 

incurred these expenses during the course of the case even if they never had reason 

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to file the motion to show cause. Plaintiffs will ultimately have to prove the facts the 

Court found on a preliminary basis in entering the injunction. Examination of 

Defendants’ products and consultation with an expert will be necessary to make that 

proof for the same reasons Plaintiffs determined they were necessary to file the 

motion to show cause. Because these expenses are relevant to the case as a whole, 

and not particular to the motion to show cause, the Court will not award them here.

V. Fees on Fees

Plaintiffs also seek fees for the preparation of this fee petition. “The relevant 

inquiry with respect to this determination is whether the hours claimed to have been

expended on the fee request bear a rational relation to the number of hours spent

litigating the merits.” Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). 

One guidepost in this regard is that a “ratio of fifteen minutes worked on the fee 

petition for every hour worked on the merits [is] excessive.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 554.

Here, Plaintiffs seek $19,000 for filing this motion for fees. Notably, the 

amount had not been billed to Plaintiffs at the time they filed this motion for fees. It 

was an estimate by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Without concrete evidence of the time counsel 

spent on this motion for fees, the Court will award ten percent of the costs of the 

motion to show cause, or $8,095.60, which would amount to about twelve and a half 

hours of work at a rate of $650 per hour. This is in line with other awards for work 

on fee petitions. See Batt, 241 F.3d 894-95 (citing awards of 2 hours and 1.6 hours); 

see also Barnes v. Aryzta, LLC, 2019 WL 277716, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2019) (14.4 

hours).

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Conclusion

Therefore, Plaintiffs are awarded a total of $89,051.60 in fees and costs.

ENTERED:

______________________________

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: April 26, 2022

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