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Filed 12/9/15 P. v. Bell CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC DEON BELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

C076038

(Super. Ct. No. 13F05277)

Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5),1

defendant pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). A 

jury found true one prior strike and three prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced 

defendant to the upper term of three years, doubled, plus three years consecutive for the 

three prior prison terms, for a total of nine years in prison. 

 

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to Penal Code.
2

On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to 

suppress the evidence found in his car, because the search arose from an unlawfully 

prolonged detention. Disagreeing, we shall affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Evidence from the Suppression Hearing

At the suppression hearing, Sacramento Police Department Officer Andy Hall 

testified as the sole witness. On August 16, 2013, around 7:00 p.m., Hall saw a white van 

make a left turn without signaling. In a marked patrol car, Hall followed defendant as he 

made two more left turns without signaling and failed to yield at a stop sign.2 Hall turned 

on his patrol car’s emergency lights to stop the van. Defendant stopped and began to 

back up toward the patrol car in an apparent attempt to park. When the van came close to 

Hall’s car, Hall yelled at defendant to stop him from hitting the patrol car. Based on what 

he had observed of defendant’s driving, Hall believed defendant might be driving under 

the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hall contacted defendant and asked him for a valid 

license; defendant gave him an identification card instead. Defendant appeared 

“extremely nervous during the contact,” and “seemed like he was forcing laughter.”

As Hall returned to the patrol car, at “some point between the time [he] got it and 

the time [he] ran the [records] check,” Hall realized the identification card was not a 

driver’s license. He then ran a records check, which included checking for warrants and 

criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history results revealed at least five prior felony 

convictions in Sacramento County. His most recent conviction was for an assault on a 

peace officer and felony resisting, for which he had received a prison sentence of over 

eight years. 

 

2

 See Vehicle Code sections 22107 (failure to signal before changing lanes) and 22450

(requiring a stop at the limit line). Defendant does not challenge the validity of the initial 

traffic stop or the order to exit the car. 
3

After seeing the priors, Hall wanted to ensure defendant was “in a safer position” 

by placing him in the backseat of the patrol car before checking into his license status. 

He came back to the van and asked defendant to step out of the car and for consent to pat 

him down for weapons. Defendant consented. Hall did not find any weapons on

defendant. He was not arrested or handcuffed. Hall then asked defendant if there was 

anything illegal in the van. Defendant responded he had marijuana in the van and had a 

(medical) recommendation, but “it wasn’t on him at the time.” Defendant added that he 

did not want Hall to search the van. Hall placed defendant in the patrol car, still not 

handcuffed, and searched the van, finding a loaded .44 magnum handgun. Hall testified 

that he felt he had probable cause to search the van when he did, given defendant’s 

admission to having marijuana as well as his driving in a manner that suggested he was 

under the influence. 

Ruling

The trial court found the initial traffic stop was valid based upon several traffic

violations witnessed by Hall; defendant presented no arguments challenging the validity 

of the traffic stop. The court summarized Hall’s testimony and found Hall’s safety 

concerns were reasonable after he learned about defendant’s extensive criminal history, 

which included a prison sentence for assaulting a peace officer and felony resisting. The 

court opined safety concerns also justified Hall’s request for defendant to step out of his 

car and found the pat down consensual. 

Finding Hall’s testimony credible, the court commented that Hall intended to 

verify defendant’s driver’s license status after he secured defendant in the patrol car. 

However, defendant’s admission that there was marijuana in the van furnished probable 

cause to search it. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant claims the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress 

evidence, arguing that the initial valid traffic stop was “unlawfully” prolonged through an 
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“irrelevant” criminal history check, pat down, and questioning preceding the illegal car 

search. He asserts the unlawful detention was the poisonous tree that bore tainted fruit--

the inculpatory statement indicating there was marijuana in the car and the subsequent 

discovery of the loaded handgun. 

I

Standard of Review

When ruling on a section 1538.5 motion to suppress, the trial court “must find the 

historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine 

whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s 

resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The 

ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and 

fact that is subject to independent review.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 

505.) “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the 

record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express or 

implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 900, 969.)

II

The Detention and Pat-down Search

Defendant concedes that his initial detention was valid and that Hall was 

authorized to order him to step out of the car. Defendant first contends his detention was 

“unlawfully” prolonged because Hall took actions unrelated to the traffic stop by 

conducting a criminal history check absent any reasonable basis indicating defendant was 

involved in criminal activity. Defendant argues Hall was restricted to only issuing a 

traffic citation and promptly releasing him after the completion of his traffic-related 

investigation, and Hall’s additional investigation extended the detention beyond what was 

necessary and lawful. 
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We note at the outset that defendant, although arguing that his initial detention was 

unlawfully prolonged, does not provide in his briefing any indication of the duration of 

the stop prior to Hall’s search of the van. Nor does the record shed any light on this 

question. We are left without any evidence as to how long each component of the stop 

actually lasted, and how much, if any, additional time was added to the stop due to Hall’s 

various investigatory decisions.

There is no defined maximum permissible time limit for a stop. We assess the 

reasonableness of each detention in light of its particular circumstances. (Williams v. 

Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 358 (Williams); People v. Russell (2000) 

81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102).) Circumstances that develop or are discovered during a stop 

may create reasonable suspicion sufficient to support prolonging the detention. (Russell, 

at p. 102.) “[T]he question is whether the police diligently pursued a means of 

investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (Ibid.)

A warrant check is “permissible as long as [it does] not prolong the stop beyond 

the time it would otherwise take.” (People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) 

The reason for this rule “is to preclude officers from imposing a general crime 

investigation upon the detained traffic offender that is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to 

completion of the officer’s traffic citation duties unless the officer has an independent 

reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed unrelated offenses.” (Williams, supra, 

168 Cal.App.3d at p. 358; Brown, at pp. 498-499.) “The government interest in 

apprehending individuals with outstanding arrest warrants outweighs the minimal 

inconvenience to that already lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his or 

her traffic violation.” (Brown, at p. 498.) 

Here, during the initial stop and prior to the records check, Hall learned defendant 

had not provided him with a valid driver’s license. Then, in continuing the identification 

process by running a records check, Hall accessed defendant’s record of multiple felony 

convictions and alarming history of conduct toward law enforcement, resulting in 
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significant prison time. Defendant had already shown signs of intoxication and extreme 

nervousness, and had almost backed his van into the patrol car. In deciding to secure 

defendant and make sure he was not armed, Hall was entitled to prolong the detention 

even if it was to investigate matters unrelated to the initial traffic stop as long as the 

duration of the stop was not unreasonably or unduly extended. (People v. Gallardo 

(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238-239.) Contrary to defendant’s assertion, an unlawful

detention results only when it is unduly or unreasonably prolonged, not merely when it is 

briefly prolonged due to an emerging unrelated circumstance.

Here, as we have noted, there is no evidence that the results of the records check 

were not obtained within a reasonable time, and no evidence that those results were not 

obtained within the time a license check would have taken if performed in the first 

instance. Thus, the decision to run a records check first when defendant failed to produce 

a valid license did not unduly extend the detention beyond what was necessary to 

continue the traffic investigation while ensuring officer safety. The results of the records 

check certainly justified extending the stop for a consensual pat-down search and a 

follow-up question as to whether there was anything illegal in the van. The affirmative 

answer thereto resulted in probable cause for the search of the van.

Although defendant argues in passing that the pat-down search was not justified, 

we disagree. As we have explained, the results of the records check gave Hall ample 

justification to pat defendant down for weapons whether or not defendant consented, 

which the trial court found he did, in fact, do.3 Hall was also justified in telling defendant 

to take a seat within the patrol car for officer safety while completing his traffic-related 

 

3

 Under Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889], an officer may conduct a 

reasonable search of a nonarrestee for weapons for the officer’s protection if the officer 

has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. (Id. at pp. 

26-27 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 908-909]; People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 249.)
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investigation. When defendant volunteered that he did not want his van searched, Hall 

asked him one question which resulted in defendant’s admission to possessing drugs

within the van.

Defendant does not argue that defendant’s admission did not provide probable 

cause to search the van, but instead argues cursorily that the search and the gun found as 

a result were “the fruit of the unlawfully prolonged detention” and “should have been 

suppressed.” However, we have found no merit in defendant’s claims of error in the first 

instance. Thus, there is no poisonous tree to bear tainted fruit. Defendant’s final claim 

fails.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /s/

Duarte, J.

We concur:

 /s/

Robie, Acting P. J.

 /s/

Mauro, J.