Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, Agee, and 

Goodwyn, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 

DAVID DUTY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 071542 SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 June 6, 2008 

MARGARET J. DUTY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 

Michael L. Moore, Judge 

 This litigation was commenced when Margaret J. Duty filed in 

the trial court a bill of complaint against David Duty, praying 

for a determination of the rightful owner of a parcel of land in 

Russell County containing 0.521 acres.1 In a final order, the 

trial court determined that Margaret Duty was the lawful owner of 

the property. We awarded David Duty this appeal. 

 The case was heard upon an “Agreed Written Statement of 

Facts,” which shows that Margaret Duty received a deed to the 

0.521-acre tract from W. B. Gray and America Virginia Gray 

dated May 16, 1973. The deed recited a consideration of 

$1,000.00 and was recorded September 13, 1973. The deed 

described the property as follows: 

BEGINNING at a point in the middle of Little Cedar Creek, 

corner to Maggie Duty lands; thence leaving said Creek, and 

with the line of Maggie Duty, in a northwesterly direction 

101 feet to the center of Secondary Rt. 658; thence with the 

center of said road as it meanders in a southwesterly 

direction approximately 514 feet to a point where said 

secondary road intersects with U.S. Route 19; thence with the 

northern boundary line of U.S. Route 19 in an easterly 

 1

 Although the parties bear the same surname, the record does 

not disclose the nature of their relationship, if any. 
direction to the center of said Little Cedar Creek; thence 

with the center of said Creek as it meanders in a 

northeasterly direction to the BEGINNING corner, containing 

0.521 acres, more or less. 

 The deed contained no recitation concerning derivation of 

title. Attorneys in a law firm in which the daughter of Margaret 

Duty was a paralegal conducted a search of the Russell County land 

records and were unable to determine the source of title to the 

Grays, Margaret Duty’s grantors. 

 To establish the source of David Duty’s title, his counsel 

introduced an exhibit entitled “David Wayne Duty Chain of Title,” 

beginning with a deed dated November 30, 1938, and recorded 

December 1, 1938, from W. H. Fogleman, single, to Grace Garrett 

conveying, in consideration of the sum of $50.00, a one-acre tract 

of land described as follows: 

 BEGINNING at a planted stone a corner to the lands of 

Arthur McReynolds and the School House lot, thence in a 

northeastern direction with said Arthur McReynolds’ line to 

the new State highway leading from Lebanon to Hansonville; 

thence along the southwestern side of said new State Highway 

to a stake at the new bridge across Little Cedar Creek, 

thence a straight line in a southwestern direction to the old 

State highway leading from Lebanon to Hansonville, thence in 

a northwestern direction along the north eastern side of said 

old State highway to a water gate across said creek, and a 

corner to the school house lot, thence in a north eastern 

direction with said school house lot line to the south 

eastern corner of the same; thence in a north western 

direction and with said school house lot line to the point of 

beginning, and containing one (1) acre, more or less, but is 

sold by the boundary and not by the acre. 

This deed, like Margaret Duty’s deed from the Grays, did not 

recite any derivation of title. 

2
 The next deed in David Duty’s “Chain of Title” is dated 

February 4, 1975, and recorded February 5, 1975, some seventeen 

months after recordation of Margaret Duty’s deed from the Grays. 

In the 1975 deed, Grace Litton, widow, formerly Grace Garrett,2 in 

consideration of the sum of $500.00, conveyed a 0.521-acre parcel 

to Bonnie Lou Gibson. The deed described the parcel with the same 

description that was used in the deed conveying the 0.521 parcel 

from the Grays to Margaret Duty but did not recite any derivation 

of title. 

 The final entry in David Duty’s “Chain of Title” was a deed 

to him from Bonnie Lou Gibson dated October 4, 2004, and recorded 

the same date, conveying a 0.521-acre tract of land in 

consideration of “the love and affection which the party of the 

first part has for the party of the second part.” The deed used 

the same description for the 0.521-acre parcel as was used in the 

deeds from the Grays to Margaret Duty and from Grace Litton to 

Bonnie Lou Gibson and recited that it was “the same property 

conveyed unto Bonnie Lou Gibson . . . by deed dated February 4, 

1975, which said deed is of record in the Russell County Circuit 

Court Clerk’s Office.” 

 2

 A list of heirs of W. H. Fogleman, deceased, was attached to 

David Duty’s “Chain of Title” showing Gracie Garrett Litton as 

Fogleman’s niece. 

3
 After entry of the final order finding Margaret Duty to be 

the lawful owner of the property at issue, David Duty filed a 

motion to vacate the order. The trial court denied the motion. 

 On appeal, David Duty argues that the trial court erred in 

finding that Margaret Duty was the valid titleholder of the land 

in dispute. Citing Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 23 S.E. 233 

(1895), David Duty maintains that because the Grays’ deed to 

Margaret Duty did not identify their source of title, they held no 

title and could not convey any title to her. 

 David Duty argues further that, under Code § 55-105, “[a] 

purchaser shall not . . . be affected by the record of a deed or 

contract made by a person under whom his title is not derived.” 

In this case, David Duty concludes, his predecessor-in-title, 

Bonnie Lou Gibson, was a bona fide purchaser for value without 

notice and her title to the 0.521-acre tract was unaffected by the 

Gray-to-Margaret Duty deed because it was not in Bonnie Lou 

Gibson’s chain of title. 

 The trial court, however, made a finding to which David Duty 

has not assigned error. The court found David Duty had 

acknowledged he knew “in the 1980s” that Margaret Duty had a deed 

to the property, such knowledge coming, of course, prior to the 

recording in 2004 of David Duty’s deed to the property. 

Generally, “a purchaser with notice from a purchaser without 

notice takes a good title.” Guss v. Sydney Realty Corp., 204 Va. 

4
65, 72, 129 S.E.2d 43, 49 (1963) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But, for this rule to apply, a purchaser with notice 

from a purchaser without notice must be a purchaser for value. 

See Richardson v. AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Corp., 267 Va. 43, 

51, 592 S.E.2d 65, 70 (2004) (citing Guss, 204 Va. at 72, 129 

S.E.2d at 49). Here, David Duty’s notice of Margaret Duty’s deed, 

coupled with the fact he is not a purchaser for value, having 

acquired his deed as a gift, refutes his entitlement to stand in 

the shoes of Bonnie Lou Gibson, his purported predecessor-in-title 

and purchaser-for-value without notice. See Richardson, 267 Va. 

at 52, 592 S.E.2d at 70. 

 A further difficulty with David Duty’s argument was pointed 

out by the trial court in its final order. After setting out the 

description of the 0.521-acre tract, the court held “[t]here was 

insufficient evidence to establish the source of the above 

described land to either [Margaret Duty’s] deed or the predecessor 

in title to [David Duty’s] deed.” To establish the source of 

title to Bonnie Lou Gibson, David Duty’s predecessor-in-title, 

David Duty relies on the 1938 deed from W. H. Fogleman to Grace 

Garrett, which, like the 1973 Gray-to-Margaret Duty deed, did not 

identify the grantor’s source of title. 

 Finally, the trial court found that David Duty had not 

established that the property described in the 1975 deed from 

Grace Litton to Bonnie Lou Gibson was the same property described 

5
in the 1938 deed from W. H. Fogleman to Grace Garrett, later Grace 

Litton. The trial court found further that David Duty had not 

provided any proof that the land referenced in the 1938 deed had 

been partitioned into separate plots, nor had he provided any 

explanation of the disparity in the size of the parcels described 

in the 1938 and 1975 deeds. 

 David Duty argues that the trial court placed the burden of 

proof on the wrong party; it was not his duty to establish the 

fact that the property described in the 1938 and 1975 deeds was 

identical or that the land described in the 1938 deed had not been 

partitioned; it was Margaret Duty’s burden to prove these matters. 

 We cannot find that the trial court made any ruling on the 

burden of proof issue or that David Duty objected to the ruling if 

it was made. Be that as it may, David Duty introduced the 1938 

deed into evidence; in doing so, he vouched for its contents and 

its authenticity; and he cannot complain that it may have been 

used to the benefit of his adversary. See Seaboard Airline Ry. v. 

Chamblin, 108 Va. 42, 50, 60 S.E. 727, 730 (1908). 

 In any event, David Duty states he argued in the trial court 

that the property described in the two deeds was identical because 

he showed that both deeds referred to the same natural and 

artificial monuments, i.e., “Little Cedar Creek” and “new State 

Highway” or “U.S. Route 19.” However, the trial court’s response 

to David Duty’s argument was a finding that “some of the landmarks 

6
referenced in the 1938 deed and all subsequent deeds were the same 

because the land described in the 19[38] deed was located on 

opposite sides of what is referred to as ‘Little Cedar Creek’[] to 

the subject property thus sharing some landmarks.” (Emphasis 

added.) David Duty does not even mention this finding, let alone 

challenge it, and it stands as an undisputed holding that the 

property described in the 1975 deed from Grace Litton to Bonnie 

Lou Gibson was different property from the property described in 

the 1938 deed from W. H. Fogleman to Grace Garrett, later Grace 

Litton.3

 Ultimately, the trial court expressed the view that Code 

§ 55-96(A)(1) makes Virginia a “race notice” state. Accordingly, 

in its final order, after holding that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish the source of title of the disputed 

parcel to either Margaret Duty’s deed or the predecessor-in-title 

 

3

 In the trial court, counsel for David Duty introduced an 

exhibit which he represented during oral argument before this 

Court as being “a plat to the property” that refers to natural and 

artificial monuments, i.e., “Little Cedar Creek” and “new State 

Highway (U.S. Route 19),” that were also referred to in the 

several deeds in issue. However, the plat, which is undated and 

uncertified, does not show a 0.521-acre parcel or a one-acre 

parcel but a tract of 0.31 acre without any indication of its 

owner. The plat does show Little Cedar Creek bordering one side 

of the 0.31-acre tract but there is no “new State Highway (U.S. 

Route 19)” shown anywhere on the plat. When questioned about the 

discrepancies during oral argument, David Duty’s counsel stated he 

could not “explain anything about that plat, it was just a plat.” 

We cannot explain it either and have not given it any 

consideration. 

7
8

to David Duty’s deed, the trial court held that, because Margaret 

Duty “was the first to record her deed with the Clerk’s Office of 

the Circuit Court of Russell County,” she “is the valid title 

holder of the above described land in dispute by nature of the 

priority of her deed and shall have clear and free title from 

Defendant, David Duty.” 

 Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Affirmed.