United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30335

Summary Calendar

____________

J. Cory Cordova

Plaintiff, 

Christine M. Mire, 

Appellant, 

versus

University Hospital & Clinics, Incorporated; 

Lafayette General Medical Center, Incorporated; 

Lafayette General Health System, Incorporated, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:19-CV-1027

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge: 

This is the third appeal from a sanctions order entered under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The Appellant for this appeal is the Plaintiff’s 

attorney. The district court entered sanctions against the Appellant for 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 31, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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presenting frivolous arguments regarding the Defendants’ potential liability 

as the Plaintiff’s purported employer. We AFFIRM. 

In this court, the Defendants filed a motion for damages, attorney fees, 

and costs. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 That motion is GRANTED, and we REMAND to calculate damages.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We detailed the factual and procedural background of the case the last 

time it was before us. See Cordova v. La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. 

of Supervisors, No. 22-30548, 2023 WL 2967893, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) 

(“Cordova II”). We repeat only some of this history.

This case arose from Dr. J. Cory Cordova’s non-renewal from a 

medical residency program run by Louisiana State University at the Lafayette 

General Hospital. Following his departure from the program, Cordova filed 

suit in state court in March 2019 against Louisiana State University, the 

program director Dr. Karen Curry, the department head Dr. Nicholas Sells, 

and the director of graduate medical education Kristi Anderson (collectively, 

“LSU Defendants”). Cordova also sued University Hospital & Clinics, Inc., 

Lafayette General Medical Center, Inc., and Lafayette General Health 

System, Inc. (collectively, “Lafayette General Defendants”), who operated 

the hospital where Cordova was a resident. Additional defendants included 

Cordova’s former counsel, Christopher Johnston, and the Gachassin Law 

Firm, who previously represented Cordova in state court.

Cordova alleged that the LSU and Lafayette General Defendants 

violated his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions by 

their non-renewal of his residency, committed a breach of contract, and 

sabotaged his efforts to apply to other residency programs. He brought his 

constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cordova contended that 

Johnston and the Gachassin Law Firm were liable under state malpractice 

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law for failing to disclose a purported conflict of interest through their prior 

representation of the Lafayette General Defendants. Cordova was 

represented by Appellant, Christine M. Mire, and five attorneys from the 

Bezou Law Firm when he brought these claims.

In August 2019, the LSU Defendants validly removed the case to 

federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Cordova’s claims raised 

questions of federal law. The district court dismissed some of the claims 

without prejudice. The LSU Defendants and Lafayette General Defendants 

then moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims.

In December 2020, the district court granted those summary 

judgment motions and amended its prior order to dismiss those claims with 

prejudice because of Cordova’s failure to amend his pleadings. With respect 

to the Lafayette General Defendants, the district court held Cordova failed 

to allege any state action or any direct act or omission that would make them 

liable under Section 1983. The district court held Cordova’s breach of 

contract claims failed because none of the Lafayette General Defendants 

were in a contractual relation with him.

The LSU and Lafayette General Defendants next moved for entry of 

final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The LSU 

Defendants also filed a motion for costs and attorney fees. Five days after the 

district court ruled against him on summary judgment, Cordova moved to 

remand the case to state court, arguing that the district court’s dismissal of 

his Section 1983 claims meant that his complaint never raised a federal 

question and thus left the district court without jurisdiction. At this point, 

the five attorneys from the Bezou Law Firm withdrew as counsel for 

Cordova, leaving only Mire. The district court referred the parties’ motions 

to a magistrate judge, who recommended the court remand Cordova’s only 

remaining claims, which were for legal malpractice claims against Johnston 

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and the Gachassin Law Firm. The district court adopted the magistrate 

judge’s report and recommendation, remanded the malpractice claims, and 

certified its rulings as final by judgment dated March 24, 2021. On April 14, 

2021, the district court issued an order denying the LSU Defendants’ motion 

for attorney fees but granting costs in the amount of $1,068.60.

On April 27, 2021, Cordova appealed both orders. Because Cordova’s 

notice of appeal of the March 24 order was filed 34 days after its entry, we 

held that his appeal was untimely and that we lacked jurisdiction to review 

the district court’s dismissal on the merits. See Cordova v. La. State Univ. 

Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 21-30239, 2022 WL 1102480, at 

*2 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2022) (“Cordova I”). We also rejected Cordova’s 

challenge to the district court’s order awarding costs to the LSU Defendants 

because “he [did] not even attempt to press, let alone substantiate, his 

argument that the district court erred in taxing costs against him.” Id. at *1. 

Finally, we denied Cordova’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion 

for relief from judgment because he did not file such a motion in district court 

and failed to raise the issue in briefing before us. Id. at *2.

In July 2022, Cordova filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the district 

court’s prior judgments, arguing the Defendants “engaged in fraud and/or 

misrepresentations” in the court’s prior proceedings. Cordova also 

contended the Lafayette General Defendants conceded that they were 

Cordova’s employers in a new state action Cordova filed after our May 2022 

mandate. Cordova further alleged the Bezou Law Firm failed to disclose a 

purported conflict of interest because counsel for the Lafayette General 

Defendants was representing the Bezou Law Firm and its attorneys in an 

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unrelated disciplinary proceeding.1 The Defendants opposed Cordova’s 

motion and filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1)–(3) and 

28 U.S.C. § 1927.

In August 2022, the district court denied Cordova’s Rule 60(b) 

motion as untimely, finding Cordova’s allegations of misrepresentation or 

fraud and “new evidence” relating to Cordova’s employment status barred 

by Rule 60(b)’s one-year limitation period. The district court further 

determined that Cordova’s claims regarding the Bezou Law Firm were 

untimely under Rule 60(b)(6) because they were not brought within a 

“reasonable time.” Nonetheless, the district court also addressed the merits 

of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion. The district court explained that even if 

Cordova could show that the Lafayette General Defendants were his true 

employers and that they were contracting parties or joint actors with the LSU 

Defendants, neither showing would change the court’s prior rulings. 

Regardless of who Cordova’s employer was, the court held there was no 

breach of contract or denial of due process in the non-renewal of Cordova’s 

residency. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the LSU 

Defendants “due to plaintiff’s unreasonable attempts at continuing this 

litigation.”

Cordova timely appealed the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) 

motion and the award of attorney fees to the LSU Defendants. Cordova II, 

2023 WL 2967893, at *1. We affirmed and remanded the case for the district 

court to calculate sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. 

See id. at *1–3. We also denied Cordova’s motions to disqualify counsel and 

for sanctions, damages, attorney fees, and costs. Id. at *2–3. We issued our 

_____________________

1 The same conflict of interest claim was first raised in briefing before us in 2021. 

See Cordova I, 2022 WL 1102480, at *2; Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *2. Cordova did 

not bring the issue to the district court’s attention until July 2022.

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mandate in May 2023 and the district court awarded Defendants $50,664.74 

in frivolous appeal costs.

In February 2023, while Cordova’s appeal was pending, the district 

court granted the Lafayette General Defendants’ Rule 11(b) motion for 

sanctions but declined to issue sanctions under Section 1927. Similar to its 

denial of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion, the district court again rejected 

Cordova’s attempt to relitigate the issue of who his employer was. As it 

stated previously, “the court clearly found no merit to the breach of contract 

claims” even if the Lafayette General Defendants were Cordova’s 

employers. Thus, because the evidence Cordova and Mire persistently 

attempted to introduce and litigate would not affect the district court’s 

decision on the merits, “the futility of any arguments relating to the Lafayette 

General [D]efendants’ status as employer reflects counsel’s bad faith in 

attempting to make an issue of it.” Although the court declined to sanction 

Mire over her arguments regarding the Bezou Law Firm’s potential conflict 

of interest and the timeliness of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion, it found her 

“meritless arguments” on the Lafayette General Defendants’ employer 

status to be “so unfounded as to amount to violations of Rule 11(b)(1)–(3).” 

The district court therefore sanctioned Mire, but not Cordova, “to deter any 

more frivolous arguments or filings.”

Following the submission of the Lafayette General Defendants’ bill of 

costs, the court awarded $29,100.00 in attorney fees and $529.70 in costs. 

Mire timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs for 

abuse of discretion. See Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 779 (5th Cir. 

2022). “A district court abuses its discretion if it (1) relies on clearly 

erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or (3) 

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misapplies the law to the facts.” Id. (quoting Fessler v. Porcelana Corona de 

Mex., S.A. de C.V., 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022)). Mire argues that we 

should apply de novo review because the district court’s Rule 11 sanctions 

violate her First Amendment rights. Because we hold that this case does not 

implicate First Amendment rights and Mire’s arguments to the contrary are 

frivolous, our decision would be the same even under de novo review. Abuse 

of discretion is therefore all that is necessary.

I. The district court’s imposition of sanctions

Rule 11 requires attorneys certify that their papers are not filed “for 

any improper purpose” and any “claims, defenses, and other legal 

contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). In doing so, attorneys certify that they “have 

conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed 

with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed 

for any improper purpose.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 

393 (1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An attorney’s conduct is 

judged under an objective standard of reasonableness governed by the 

“snapshot” rule, which focuses on the “the instant the attorney affixes his 

signature to the document.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 

F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 

Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1992)). “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is 

to deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . . streamline the 

administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 

at 393.

Much of Mire’s brief attempts to relitigate the issues of Cordova’s 

employment status and a potential conflict of interest. We previously 

explained why Mire’s arguments cannot succeed in a Rule 60(b) motion to 

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vacate. See Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *1–2. Under the law of the case 

doctrine, “an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined 

either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court on a 

subsequent appeal.” Gene & Gene, LLC v. BioPay, LLC, 624 F.3d 698, 702 

(5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fuhrman v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 

2006)). Mire does not argue that any of the exceptions to this doctrine apply,

and she therefore forfeits any argument to the contrary. See id. (explaining 

the exceptions); Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).

In fact, Mire appears to recognize the merits of the issues she attempts 

to relitigate are irrelevant to this appeal. She acknowledges the district court 

did not impose sanctions for pressing arguments relating to a potential 

conflict of interest or for filing Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion late. Instead, 

Mire was sanctioned for continuing to argue Cordova’s actual employer was 

the Lafayette General Defendants after the district court repeatedly 

explained why that possibility would not change the outcome of the case. 

The district court repeatedly stated that even if the Lafayette General 

Defendants employed Cordova, either solely or as joint actors with the LSU 

Defendants, or entered into agreements with Cordova directly, Cordova’s 

underlying claims still lacked merit. Sanctions were therefore imposed on 

Mire for continuing to press arguments that had clearly been rejected. 

Mire asserts “this appeal was filed because the district court 

overlooked the ample and unrefuted evidence . . . that the Lafayette General 

Defendants do have potential liability as employer for Dr. Cordova in this 

case.” None of this evidence, however, demonstrates the Lafayette General 

Defendants’ potential liability because the district court found there was 

nothing for them to be liable for. The time to challenge these conclusions has 

long passed.

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The imposition of sanctions is the only matter properly before us. 

Mire asserts the district court abused its discretion for three reasons: 

(1) Mire presented a novel argument regarding the employment relationship 

between Cordova and the Lafayette General Defendants and therefore 

sanctioning her would violate the First Amendment; (2) Mire’s sanctions

impose a “chilling effect” on future attorneys to report attorney misconduct; 

and (3) the district court was without jurisdiction to impose sanctions or 

accept “new evidence” as to the employment relationship between Cordova 

and the Lafayette General Defendants. These arguments are frivolous.

We begin with the First Amendment.2 Mire argues attorneys have a 

First Amendment right to make nonfrivolous arguments to the court and her 

arguments that the Lafayette General Defendants were Cordova’s true 

employer were not frivolous. Instead, the district court described them as 

“novel.” We agree the First Amendment covers novel, nonfrivolous 

arguments, but many frivolous arguments are also novel.

3 We expect, indeed 

hope, that a large number of frivolous arguments are new, i.e., have never 

been made before. We realize a “misapplication of Rule 11 can chill counsel’s 

_____________________

2 Mire’s First Amendment arguments are likely forfeited because she did not press

them below. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397. Mire argues to the contrary by identifying a single 

paragraph in her memorandum in opposition to sanctions. This paragraph, however, states 

general propositions about the proper role of an attorney in our judicial system. Although 

this paragraph may imply certain First Amendment arguments, “to be preserved, an 

argument must be pressed, and not merely intimated.” Stanford v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 450, 

462 n.18 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, in the interest of finally putting 

this matter to rest, we address Mire’s First Amendment arguments. 

3 See Anderson v. Williams, No. 95-10055, 1995 WL 295914, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 

1995) (unpublished) (presenting the novel yet frivolous argument that printing a name and 

trademark on postage is a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney 

Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions for pursuing a “novel” yet 

unsupported proposition); Anderson v. Steers, Sullivan, McNamar & Rogers, 998 F.2d 495, 

596 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting as frivolous an argument that presented a “novel” question); 

In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x 226, 229 (1st Cir. 2019) (same).

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‘enthusiasm and stifle the creativity of litigants in pursing novel factual or 

legal theories,’ contrary to the intent of its framers.” Snow Ingredients, 833 

F.3d at 529 (quoting CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 989 F.2d 791, 

794 (5th Cir. 1993)). Even so, we agree with a prior panel’s conclusion that 

“there is no First Amendment exception to a Rule 11 violation.” Fuller v. 

Donahoo, No. 93-1447, 1994 WL 486931, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1994) 

(unpublished); King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1151 n.17 (10th Cir. 2018). 

This is because, in judicial proceedings, “whatever right to ‘free speech’ an 

attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or 

other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to 

preserve a claim for appeal.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 

(1991). This serves Rule 11’s primary purpose of deterring baseless filings 

and streamlining the administration of justice. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393.

Despite Mire’s contentions, the First Amendment is not a bar to the 

sanctions imposed in this case. Mire was not sanctioned because her novel 

arguments were frivolous, but because it was frivolous to continue to make 

the rejected novel arguments. As the district court stated, “I ruled on the 

merits in the initial summary judgment. On the 12(b)(6) I re-addressed them. 

I addressed them again in my ruling on the Rule 60B motion. I don’t change 

my position on that.” The court on three separate occasions ruled that the 

underlying claims were meritless, regardless of who employed Cordova.

Therefore, continuing to argue who was Cordova’s actual employer would 

not change that.

Accordingly, it was unreasonable for Mire to continue to press an 

issue that the district court had already decided. See Snow Ingredients, 833 

F.3d at 528. Such conduct is indeed sanctionable “either because [it was]

made for an improper purpose regardless of its merits or because . . . even [if] 

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made in good faith, [it was] legally indefensible.” Id. (emphasis added).4 It 

was therefore not a subjective belief that Mire’s new “statutory employer” 

theory was frivolous that led to sanctions. Instead, it was the objective view 

that it was improper for Mire to continue to attempt to relitigate an issue 

thrice rejected. See id.

Mire’s second argument is that the court’s imposition of sanctions 

“will result in a chilling effect on the duty of lawyers to report 

judicial/attorney misconduct.” We are puzzled as to how this helps Mire’s 

position, as she insists in her reply brief she was not sanctioned for raising the 

issue of a potential conflict of interest. Whether aimed at reporting a 

potential conflict of interest or at her multiple other claims of professional 

and criminal misconduct, her argument lacks merit because she was not 

sanctioned for raising these issues. Because she fails to address the basis for 

the district court’s decision to impose sanctions, we need not entertain this 

argument further. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 

F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to discuss legal issues that do not 

address the grounds for the district court’s decision).

Mire’s third argument is that the district court was without 

jurisdiction when it imposed sanctions because her appeal of the court’s Rule 

60(b) decision was pending. “As a general rule the effective filing of a notice 

of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the district court to the court of appeals 

with respect to all matters involved in the appeal.” Thomas v. Capital Sec. 

_____________________

4 The Lafayette General Defendants argue that Mire continues to press the issue 

of Cordova’s employer as a tactic to delay an unfavorable res judicata ruling in state court. 

Mire all but admitted to this in the Rule 60(b) motion by stating “[i]t is the pending 

exception of res judicata in state court that leaves Dr. Cordova with no choice but to file the 

foregoing motion.” Although we do not decide whether Mire’s motive was improper, her 

persistence in litigating an issue that does not change the merits lends credence to the 

Lafayette General Defendants’ claim.

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Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, an “exception is 

that . . . the district court retains jurisdiction to entertain and resolve a 

motion requesting attorney’s fees or sanctions. The basis for this exception 

is that attorney’s fees/sanctions are matters collateral to the merits of the 

action.” Id. Mire fails to address this longstanding precedent, despite the 

Lafayette General Defendants raising it in their brief. Mire “is 

unquestionably obligated to recognize contrary authority.” Johnson v. 

Lumpkin, 76 F.4th 1037, 1038 (5th Cir. 2023). The district court had 

jurisdiction to impose sanctions.

Mire also argues the court improperly accepted new evidence during 

the sanctions hearing, which “encompassed issues that were pending on 

appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide.” She contends 

the district court’s use of this evidence to find she acted in bad faith violated

due process and the “snapshot rule” that evaluates an attorney’s actions at 

the time they were taken. The new evidence was Cordova’s 2017 and 2018 

W-2 forms, which purportedly showed that Cordova was not paid by any of 

the Lafayette General Defendants while a resident. Mire argues it was error 

to consider this evidence because the Lafayette General Defendants “did not 

lay the proper foundation to establish” that Mire possessed or knew about 

these documents at the time she filed the untimely Rule 60(b) motion.

Mire’s argument mischaracterizes the scope of the “snapshot” rule 

and how it relates to the reasonableness of attorneys’ conduct. When 

evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s factual inquiry under Rule 11, 

courts assess various factors, including “the time available to the signer for 

investigation . . . [and] the feasibility of a prefiling investigation.” Smith, 960 

F.2d at 444. Mire has been representing Cordova in this matter since at least 

2018. Mire filed the untimely Rule 60(b) motion in July 2022. Thus, at least 

three or four years had elapsed from the time the W-2s came into existence 

and could easily have been obtained by Mire and/or Cordova at the time Mire 

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filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Under the “snapshot” rule, Mire had ample 

time to investigate the identity of Cordova’s true employer, including to

review relevant documents such as W-2s and paystubs, before signing the 

Rule 60(b) motion. See id. The Lafayette General Defendants were not 

required to lay a foundation to establish that Mire possessed or knew about 

these documents when she filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Instead, it was 

Mire’s lack of inquiry, as evidenced by the W-2s and other record evidence, 

that made her conduct objectively unreasonable.5

 This was well within the 

district court’s discretion to consider.

The district court did not err in its sanction order.

II. The Lafayette General Defendants’ Appellate Rule 38 motion

The Lafayette General Defendants have moved for damages under 

Appellate Rule 38. Rule 38 provides that “[i]f a court of appeals determines 

that an appeal is frivolous, it may . . . award just damages and single or double 

costs to the appellee.” Fed. R. App. P. 38.

Almost a year ago, we wrote that “Cordova has repeatedly refused to 

heed the district court’s warnings about ‘unreasonable attempts at 

continuing this litigation’ with an untimely and also meritless Rule 60(b) 

motion.” Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *3. That appeal was frivolous. 

Id. Despite our warning, frivolous arguments to the district court continued. 

In its Rule 11 order, the district court again warned that Cordova “may 

expose himself to liability if he continues to seek justifications to reopen this 

suit.” The district court further warned both Cordova and Mire that 

although it refrained from sanctioning them under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “the 

_____________________

5 Even if the district court erred in considering the W-2s specifically, the district 

court also considered other documentation in Cordova’s LSU residency file, on the record 

since the summary judgment stage, that demonstrate Mire’s lack of reasonable inquiry.

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standard might be met with further abusive litigation tactics.” It awarded 

attorney fees and costs in the hope that this would “deter any more frivolous 

arguments and filings.”

Unfortunately, the Rule 11 sanctions did not deter yet another 

frivolous appeal. 

We GRANT the Lafayette General Defendants’ Rule 38 motion. As 

before, “[w]e believe the district court is in the best position to set an 

appropriate sanction.” Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *3. Therefore, we 

REMAND for the district court to determine the appropriate sanctions, 

attorney fees, and costs for this appeal. 

AFFIRMED, MOTION GRANTED, and case REMANDED.

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