alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Marion Rayner v. John Rayner.

*Divorce*— Ill-treatment—Conduct *after fling MU.*

Ill-treatment soon after marriage, if followed, by a peaceable and on the-whole harmonious life for many years, can be given little weight in a suit for divorce for cruelty.

Expressions used by the defendant in divorce after the bill is filed are-not entitled to consideration.

Appeal from Gratiot.

Submitted Jan. 3-4.

Decided Jan. 10.

Bill for divorce: Defendant appeals.

Beversed.

*T. W. Whitney*for complainant.

*James*Paddock, *James K. Wright*and *Tarsney <&■ Weadock*for defendant.

Ill-treatment does not justify divorce unless it amounts to extreme cruelty: *Cooper v. Cooper*17 Mich. 205 ; violence done during a quarrel is not enough: *Soper v. Soper*29 Mich. 305 ; nor is a single act of cruelty; *Hassell v. Hassell*34 Am. 298; *Graecen v. Graecen*1 Green Ch. (N. J.) 459 ; nor occasional sallies of *601passion unless they threaten bodily harm : *Rhame v. Rhame*16 Am. Dec. 597 ; *Poor v. Poor*29 Am. 664; nor a single act of personal violence unless farther violence may be reasonably apprehended if cohabitation continues: *Cook v. Cook*3 Stockt. 195; divorce is not granted in Kentucky for ill-treatment unless it endangers the wife’s life: *Thornberry v. Thornberry*2 J. J. Marsh. 322.

Marston, J.

"While the evidence in this case does not show the defendant to have at all times acted in the most amiable way towards his wife, yet it is not of that clear and! satisfactory character that is considered requisite to enable a court to dissolve the marriage relation between the parties. What took place between the parties shortly after the marriage is so remote in point of time, in view of their peaceable and on the whole harmonious life1 for so many years afterwards, that we can give it but little prominence. Some of the expressions relied upon are to say the least ambiguous^ dependent upon the smTounding circumstances to give them tone and character, and thus show whether in jest or otherwise, while others were made after the bill was filed and are not entitled to consideration. The chargé of cruelty most strongly relied upon, we cannot safely say has not been magnified and made to appear in a worse light than a true narration would justify.

We must therefore in view of all the facts reverse the decree and dismiss the bill. The. complainant will be allowed the sum of $500 for support during the pendency of this case and for expenses therein.

The other Justices concurred.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________________

Nos. 95-40954 & 95-40995

Summary Calendar

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN WESLEY CLUBB and

HELEN RUTH CLUBB,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(1:95-CR-83-1 & 1:95-CR-83-2)

_________________________________________________________________

July 30, 1996

Before DAVIS, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Wesley and Helen Ruth Clubb appeal the denial of their

motions to dismiss an indictment charging them with conspiracy to

possess, and possession with the intent to distribute, marijuana,

contending that the civil forfeitures of currency, pursuant to 21
- 2 -

U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), and real property, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(7), bar their criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The currency forfeited under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) was

forfeited summarily in an administrative proceeding after the

Clubbs failed to file a claim. Because only property that is

unclaimed or unowned may be so forfeited, our court has held that,

by definition, summary forfeiture proceedings neither place an

individual in jeopardy nor constitute punishment. See United

States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1995). The

Clubbs’ contention that their petition for restoration of the

currency, filed after the conclusion of the forfeiture proceeding,

comprised an appearance in the forfeiture proceeding, is

unavailing. See United States v. Morgan, 84 F.3d 765, 768 (5th

Cir. 1996) (a “petition for remission or mitigation does not

contest the administrative forfeiture because it does not trigger

judicial forfeiture proceedings nor make the petitioner a party to

any proceeding which can result in punishment for double jeopardy

purposes”).

The contentions regarding the forfeiture of real estate,

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), are foreclosed by the Supreme

Court’s very recent decision in United States v. Ursery, ___ U.S.

___, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1996 WL 340815, *14-*16 (1996) (applying twostage analysis, and concluding that in rem civil forfeiture
- 3 -

pursuant to § 881(a)(7) was neither “punishment” nor criminal for

purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, because (1) Congress

intended forfeitures under § 881 to be civil, and (2) there was

little evidence, much less the “clearest proof”, that forfeiture

proceedings under § 881(a)(7) “are so punitive in form and effect

as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent to the

contrary”).

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT A

Townstone Financial, Inc. 

2014–2016 Applications by Property Address

2010 Census Data 

% African-American (Non-Hispanic)

Case: 1:20-cv-04176 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 07/15/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:19
#### WAH SUN LEW v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, Limited.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

May 31, 1951.

George J. Engelman, New York City (O. Raymond Basile, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Dow & Symmers, New York City, for defendant.

CONGER, District Judge.

Motion to transfer the above action from this District to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, pursuant to Title 28, § 1404 United States Code Annotated.

This motion should be granted. The plaintiff himself resides in San Francisco. The Steamship S.S. President Cleveland, on which plaintiff was employed at the time he became ill, is a vessel engaged exclusively in trans-Pacific voyages with its home port in San Francisco.

The doctor who treated plaintiff on board the S.S. President Cleveland is only availr able in San Francisco’.

The plaintiff was treated at a hospital in San Francisco.

Defendant is a. Delaware corporation with its head offices in 'California.

Plaintiff gives no valid reason for holding the trial in this jurisdiction, either does he claim that he -has any witnesses here. See Bounds v. Streckfus Steamers, Inc., D.C., 89 F.Supp. 242.

Submit order on notice.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00154- CV NO. 03-13-00155- CV
Carolyn Barnes, Appellan t

v. Velocit y Cre dit Union , Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NOS . 12- 1288 -C27 7 & 12- 0459 -T27 7, H ONO RAB LE K EN ANDERSON, JUDGE P RESIDING
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n trial court cause number 12-0459-T277, appellant Caroly n Ba rnes asser ted claims ag ainst defe ndants that included appellee Velocity Credit Uni o n . Velocity subsequently obtained
a summary judgme nt ag ainst Ba rnes, and the district court, on Velocity ’s motion, sever ed Ba rnes’ s claims a g a in s t V e lo c it

y into a separ ate cause number, 12-1288-C277, making the summary judgme nt final. Ba rnes fi l ed a notice of appea l ref ere ncing both cause numbers, which wer e dockete d as separ ate appea ls—03-13-00154-CV for the appea l from trial cou r t c a u s e n u mb e r 12-1288-C277, and 03-13-00155- CV for the a ppeal f rom trial cour

t cause number 12-0459- T277. I ndicating that trial court cause number 12-1288-C277 is the intended subject of her appea l, Ba

rnes has moved t hat we consolidate the two appellate cause s into 03 -1 3 -0 0 1 5 4 -C V (the appea l from 12-1288-C277) and dismiss appellate cause 03-13-00155- CV. Velocity ag ree s that only trial cour t cause number 12-1288-C277 is the subject of Ba rnes’ s appea l and does notobject to consolidation. We there fore g rant Ba rnes’ s motion and consolidate appellate cause number 03-13-00155- CV into cause number 03-13-00154- CV. The rec ord and all filings from c a u s e n umber 03-13-00155- CV are transfe rre d into cause number 03-13-00154- CV, and ca u s e n u mber 03-13- 00155-CV is dismis sed.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Rose 03-13-00154- CV Consolidated 03-13-00155- CV Dismissed Filed: May

17, 2013

2
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4114 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4114

To amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to exclude non-native migratory 
 bird species from the application of that Act, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 1, 2004

 Mr. Gilchrest (for himself, Mr. Saxton, and Mr. Kind) introduced the 
    following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to exclude non-native migratory 
 bird species from the application of that Act, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 
2004''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF NON-NATIVE SPECIES FROM APPLICATION OF CERTAIN 
              PROHIBITIONS UNDER MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT.

    Section 2 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703) is 
amended--
            (1) in the first sentence by striking ``That unless and 
        except as permitted'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In 
        General.--Unless and except as permitted''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) Limitation on Application to Introduced Species.--
            ``(1) In general.--This section applies only to migratory 
        bird species that are native to the United States and whose 
        occurrence in the United States is entirely the result of 
        natural biological or ecological conditions.
            ``(2) Treatment of introduced species.--For purposes of 
        paragraph (1)--
                    ``(A) a bird species shall not be treated as native 
                to the United States if it occurs in the United States 
                solely as a result of intentional or unintentional 
                human-assisted introduction; and
                    ``(B) a migratory bird species shall be treated as 
                native to the United States if--
                            ``(i) it was native to the United States 
                        and extant in 1918;
                            ``(ii) it was extirpated after 1918 
                        throughout its range in the United States; and
                            ``(iii) after such extirpation, it was 
                        reintroduced in the United States as a part of 
                        a program carried out by a Federal agency.''.
                                 <all>
```
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 225 (Friday, November 21, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69532-69533]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27617]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-83,015]


Fenner Precision, Inc., Including On-Site Leased Workers From 
Aerotek Buffalo, New York; Amended Certification Regarding Eligibility 
To Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance

    In accordance with Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended 
(``Act''), 19 U.S.C. 2273, the Department of Labor issued a 
Certification of Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance 
on November 5, 2013, applicable to workers of Fenner Precision, Inc., 
Buffalo, New York. The Department's notice of determination was 
published in the Federal Register on November 26, 2013 (78 FR 70581-
70583).
    At the request of state workforce office, the Department reviewed 
the certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers were 
engaged in activities related to the production of polyurethane CAST 
products.
    The company reports that workers leased from Aerotek were employed 
on-site at the Buffalo, New York location of Fenner Precision, Inc. The 
Department has determined that these workers were sufficiently under 
the control of the subject firm to be considered leased workers.
    Based on these findings, the Department is amending this 
certification to include workers leased from Aerotek working on-site at 
the Buffalo, New York location of Fenner Precision, Inc.
    The amended notice applicable to TA-W-83,015 is hereby issued as 
follows:

    All workers of Fenner Precision, Inc, including on-site leased 
workers from Aerotek, Buffalo, New York, who became totally or 
partially separated from employment on or after August 21, 2012 
through November 5, 2015, and all workers in the group threatened 
with total or partial separation from employment on the date of 
certification through two years from the date of certification, are 
eligible to apply for

[[Page 69533]]

adjustment assistance under Chapter 2 of Title II of the Trade Act 
of 1974, as amended.

Michael W. Jaffe,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2014-27617 Filed 11-20-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeal of

-- ) ) Family Entertainment Services, Inc. D/B/A IMC ) ) ASBCA No. 59161 Under Contract No. W9124E-12-D-0001 ) APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT:
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Mr. William Johnson President Raymond M. Saunders, Esq.

Army ChiefTrial Attorney CPT Evan C. Williams, JA

Trial Attorney ORDER OF DISMISSAL The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. Dated: 1 July 2014

Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 59161, Appeal ofFamily Entertainment Services, Inc. D/B/A IMC, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

JEFFREYD. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) v. ) Criminal Action No. 15-152-05 (RMC) ) BRIAN BRYANT (5), ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER On February 17, 2017, a jury found Def endant Brian Bryant guilt y of several charges, including conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. F ollowing the jury’s verdict, the Court heard argument concerning the detention of Brian Bryant a nd his codefendants pending sentencing. See Tr. of 2/17/17 Hearing (Tr.) [Dkt . 218]. The Court determined that Brian Bryant should be detained. Id . 12:19-13:6. Brian Bry ant now moves for release pending his sentencing, see Def.’s Mot. for Release Pendin g Sentencing (Mot.) [Dkt. 249], w hich the Government opposes, see Gov’t’s Opp’n [Dkt. 250]. Upon cons ideration of the parties’ m otions, the Court denies Brian Bryant’s motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (2012) provides that the Court shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offen se and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence . . . b e detained, unless the judicial o fficer finds by clear and convin cing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released . . . . To overcome the presumption that the Court “sha ll” detain defen dants pending sentencing, Mr. Bryant must provide “clear and c onvincing” evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community.To meet this burden, Brian Bryan t points to his strong ties to the local community, his history of complying with hi s prior terms of release, and h is information that a cooperating

witness does not believe Brian B ryant poses a threat to her. See Mot. at 1-2. This information does not rise to the level necessary to establish “clear and co nvincing evidence” that Mr. Bryant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community. Mr. B ryant’s ties to the community, and behavior while on supervised rel ease, were as true on February 17, 2017 as they are today. Mr. Bryant still faces a considerabl e prison sentence which serves as a strong incentive to flee. Further, as the Court ruled in F ebruary, “there is this concern also about the safety and situation of [the cooperating witness] wit h the potential for threats for a boiling up of anger now that the

verdicts have been reached a nd declared.” Tr. 12:22-25. That concern still exists, even if the cooperating witness does not cur rently feel threatened. In sho rt, Mr. Bryant’s arguments do not constitute sufficiently new or m aterial information to convince the Court to recons ider its earlier ruling, and the risks that existe d in February exist just as st rongly today. Accordingly, for the reas ons stated above, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant Brian Bryant’s Motion for Release from Custody Pending Sentencing [Dkt. 249] be DENIED

.

Date: October 19, 2017 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge
Mary Winters and Mila /s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 29, 2015

No. 04-15-00342-CV

VILLA DIJON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. and Implicity Management 

Company,

Appellants

v.

Mary WINTERS and Mila Cheatom,

Appellees

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015-CI-03926

Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On December 18, 2015, we referred this cause to mediation, set deadlines for mediation 

and a mediator’s written report, and suspended all other appellate deadlines until February 1, 

2016. On December 23, 2015, Appellees filed an unopposed motion to extend time to file 

Appellees’ brief until February 19, 2016. 

The appellate timetable was suspended; Appellees’ motion is MOOT. After the mediator 

submits a written report as ordered, this court will issue an order addressing the appellate 

timetable.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of December, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Case: 1:20-cv-05191 Document #: 33-5 Filed: 12/10/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:407
Case: 1:20-cv-05191 Document #: 33-5 Filed: 12/10/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:408
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4134 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to simplify the deduction 

for points paid with respect to home mortgages. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 2, 2004 

Mr. HOUGHTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to simplify 

the deduction for points paid with respect to home mortgages. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Home Mortgage Tax 

5 Simplification Act of 2004’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SIMPLIFICATION OF DEDUCTION FOR POINTS ON 

7 HOME MORTGAGE. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (g) of section 461 of 

9 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to prepaid 
2 

•HR 4134 IH 

1 interest) is amended by adding at the end the following 

2 new paragraph: 

3 ‘‘(3) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN

4 REFINANCINGS.— 

5 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—This subsection shall 

6 not apply to points paid in respect of indebted7 ness secured by such residence resulting from 

8 the refinancing of indebtedness meeting the re9 quirements of paragraph (2) or this paragraph. 

10 ‘‘(B) LIMITATION.—Subparagraph (A) 

11 shall apply only to the extent the amount of the 

12 indebtedness resulting from such refinancing 

13 does not exceed the sum of— 

14 ‘‘(i) the amount of the refinanced in15 debtedness, plus 

16 ‘‘(ii) the lesser of $10,000 or the 

17 points paid in respect of the indebtedness 

18 resulting from the refinancing to the ex19 tent that the indebtedness resulting from 

20 the refinancing does not exceed the refi21 nanced indebtedness.’’. 

22 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of 

23 paragraph (2) of section 461(g) of such Code is amended 

24 by inserting ‘‘based on business practice’’ after ‘‘Excep25 tion’’. 
3 

•HR 4134 IH 

1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

3 December 31, 2004. 

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6437

LARRY JEROME BROOKS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

M. N. BARKER, Individually and as a City

Police Officer,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Paul Trevor Sharp,

Magistrate Judge. (CA-94-80-6)

Submitted: July 10, 1997 Decided: July 23, 1997

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Jerome Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. Gusti Wiesenfeld Frankel,

Ursula Marie Henninger, WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellees.
* The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate

judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).

2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the magistrate judge's order denying relief

on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint.* We have reviewed the

record and the magistrate judge's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate

judge. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, No. CA-94-80-6 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 19, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED