### No. 14489 

### IN

### THE SUPREME COUKI' 

### OF 

### THE 

### STATE OF PKNTANA 

### 1979



### INRE THEM7muAGE 

### OF JACrnAMAE 

### -SCPJ, PetitionerandAppellant,

Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal 

### frm: District 

### Court of theNinth Judicial District, Honorable

### R. D. Whillips, Judgepresiding. Counsel of Record: ForAppellant: Gale 

### R. Gustafson, Conrad, Mntana For Respondent: David H. Nelson, Brady, bbntana

Sut=anittedonbriefs: 

### February 28, 1979 Decided: 

## lRAR L 

## 1379 Filed: 

### @O;r 

### 7 

### - - $cfjQMr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Appellant Jacinta Mae Jermunson filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against Dennis Carter Jermunson on February 2, 1978, after approximately four years of 

### marriage. On March 6, 1978, she filed an amended petition, and thematter was heard the same day by the Honorable Ronald D. McPhillips. The parties agreed to the entering of a decree of dissolution reserving with the court rulings on the question of property and support for petitioner. On March 24, 1978, the districtjudge entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree. Determination of the property rights were reserved until a later date. The property settlement was decreed by the District Court on July 

### 14, 1978. From these findings of fact, conclusions of 

### law, and decree petitioner appeals. Two issues arepresented on appeal: 1. Did the District Court err in

### its distribution of marital property? 2. Did the District Court 

### err infailing toprovide maintenance for a period sufficient toenable petitioner to obtain appropriate education or training? The parties 

### weremarried on February 8, 1974. Atthe 

### timeof themarriage petitioner had not finished high school. She did not attend school during the marriage, although schooling was available toher. She had no marketable skills orvocational training and no outside income other than a job she has held. Petitioner desires to obtain vocational training tobecome 

### a nurse. Respondent 

### is a high school graduate and has had training inthe military as

### a diesel mechanic. Atthe presenttime he farms some 80 

### acres of land which was given tohim by his father. He 

### is employed by his father as a farmer and 

### is capable of doing outside carpentry, backhoe work and general repair work. The parties had an adjusted gross income in 1977 of $14,601.59. During theirmarriage the parties lived ina mobile home located inBrady, Montana. This mobile home 

### was purchased for $8,900 foruse as the marital home. Payments



### weremade on themobile home during the course of the marriage. During themarriage, the parties paid for 

### a 1972 Thunderbird automobile which had previously been purchased by the husband and his father and alsohad paid for a 1974 Jeep pickup. They acquired personal property inthe course of their marriage and approximately 70 percent of this property

was taken by respondent when the marriage failed. Prior to the marriage, as noted, respondent had acquired 80 acres of land from his father, a 1968 Ford truck, tool box, motorcycle, snow mobile, 

### a Willy's C-J Jeep, a dishwasher, and a dryer. Petitioner contributed to the assets of the family by her homemaking, aiding her husband's work 

### at

### times, and contributing some of her small income to the marriage. Directing our attention to the firstissue, 

### we find no
error in the trial court's distribution of themarital property. Both parties were young when married. Petitioner



### was not out of high school and did not possess any property other than wedding gifts. Respondent, fiveyears older than petitioner, had acquired some property and had been given property by his father. In four years of marriage, the parties acquired 

### littleproperty other than personal 

### itemswhich 

### were divided by the trialjudge atthe 

### timeof the dissolution. Due toindebtedness on the part of the couple, property was acquired and sold. Atthe 

### timeof the dissolution, the court estimated that the parties 

### were indebt in

excess of $20,000. This figurewas inerror, however, and the total debt amount, according to the transcript, was approximately $11,000. The court required respondent to

assume that debt, sopetitioner 

### is leftfree of any debts that accumulated during themarriage. Since the adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Actwhich became effective inMontana on January 

### 1, 1976, this Court has had numerous cases which control the distribution of marital property according tothe Act. See Vivian

v. Vivian (1978), Mont. 

## , 583 P.2d 1072, 35 St.Rep. 1359; In

### re Marriage of Reilly (1978), Mont. 

## , 577 P.2d 840, 35 St.Rep. 451; and In

### re Marriage of Johnsrud (1977) Mont. 

## , 572 P.2d 902, 34 St.Rep. 1417. The trial court did not abuse 

### its discretion and followed the statutes and 

### case law inMontana. We find no 

### meritto this firstissue. As to the second issue, whether ornot the trialcourt abused 

### its discretion inawarding petitioner $1,500 atthe 

### time of the dissolution, 

### we find no abuse of discretion. The trial court found, and properly so, that the parties had acquired no net worth during the course of theirmarriage. Petitioner claims she isnot receiving her just due from the marriage inthe amount of $1,500 and that the amount is insufficient. Petitioner should recognize, however, that under section 36-103, R.C.M. 1947, now section 40-2-102 MCA, she has a joint and mutual obligation topay for the neces

### sities of themarriage. The DistrictCourt required respon-dent to assume alldebts, freeing petitioner of these obligations which approximate $5,500 (her one-half of an $11,000 indebtedness). The District Court considered allthe facts and determined neither party atfault. We find no error inthe DistrictCourt's award of $1,500 topetitioner. In not awarding maintenance topetitioner under section 48-322, R.C.M. 1947, now section 40-4-203 MCA, again the trialcourt 

### isrequired tobalance the needs of the parties. Here the court found that the parties 

### were both capable of working and that no maintenance was required. This Court inPorter v. Porter (1970), 155Mont. 451, 457, 473 P.2d 538, held that: 

# ".



# . . a reviewing court 

### is never justified in substituting 

### its discretion for that of the trial court. In determining whether the trial court abused 

### itsdiscretion, the question 

### is not whether the reviewing court agrees with the trial court, but, rather, did the trial court inthe exercise of 

### its discretion 

### act arbitrarily without the 

### employment of conscientious judgment orexceed the bounds of reason, inview of allthe circumstances, ignoring recognized principles resulting in substantial injustice.

### " Here the District Court did not actarbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason. The judgment atthe District Court 

### is affirmed. !

We concur: