IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

AVANZALIA SOLAR, S.L. and ) 

AVANZALIA PANAMA, S.A., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 20 C 5035 

 ) 

GOLDWIND USA, INC., d/b/a ) 

GOLDWIND AMERICAS, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Avanzalia Solar, S.L. and Avanzalia Panama, S.A. (Avanzalia) sued Goldwind 

USA, Inc. (Goldwind) for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and 

tortious interference with contract. In brief, Avanzalia alleged that it was unable to sell 

electricity from its Panamanian solar energy project because Goldwind refused to allow 

it to connect to Panama's national electric grid via a substation that Goldwind owned. 

The Court granted summary judgment for Goldwind on all claims. Under Federal Rule 

of Procedure 54(d), Goldwind has petitioned the Court for costs totaling $182,661.56. 

Avanzalia objects to nearly all of Goldwind's requested costs. For the reasons below, 

the Court upholds some of Avanzalia's objections to Goldwind's bill of costs and 

overrules the others. 

Discussion 

A prevailing party generally is entitled to recover costs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). 

The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 "defines the term 'costs' as used in 

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Rule 54(d)." Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 565 (2012). "[A] 

particular expense must fall into one of the categories of costs statutorily authorized for 

reimbursement." Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000). In 

addition, "[a]ny party seeking an award of costs carries the burden of showing that the 

requested costs were necessarily incurred and reasonable." Trs. of Chi. Plastering Inst. 

Pension Tr. v. Cork Plastering Co., 570 F.3d 890, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). 

A. Costs claimed under section 1920(1) 

Goldwind seeks to recover $14,172 under section 1920(1), which permits courts 

to award costs for "fees of the clerk and marshal." Specifically, Goldwind seeks (1) 

$162.50 in fees paid to private process servers, (2) $13,650 in fees paid to the U.S. 

State Department for the service of letters rogatory on six Panamanian entities; and (3) 

$359.50 in fees paid to the Clerk in connection with the preparation of the letters 

rogatory. 

1. Private process server fees 

Goldwind seeks $162.50 in fees paid to private process servers. The Seventh 

Circuit has held that section 1920(1) "permit[s] recovery of expenses that do not exceed 

what the marshal would have charged, for the tasks marshals are authorized to 

perform" under 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a). Collins v. Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 

1996). This includes "service costs that do not exceed the marshal's fees, no matter 

who actually effected service." Id. Avanzalia does not object to Goldwind's request for 

$162.50 private process server fees. The Court therefore taxes these costs to 

Avanzalia. 

 

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2. U.S. State Department fees 

 Goldwind seeks $13,650 in fees that it paid to the State Department for the 

service of letters rogatory on six Panamanian entities that were outside the subpoena 

power of the Court. A letter rogatory is "a formal request from a court in which an action 

is pending, to a foreign court to perform some judicial act" such as "the serving of a 

summon, subpoena, or other legal notice." 22 C.F.R. § 92.54. Goldwind argues that 

the fees are akin to permissible private process server fees and therefore are 

recoverable under section 1920(1). But unlike private service of process, the 

transmission of letters rogatory to foreign judicial authorities is not a "task[ ] marshals 

are authorized to perform." Collins, 96 F.3d at 1060. As a matter of international law, 

letters rogatory must be "transmitted via the diplomatic channel" or via other methods 

established by treaty. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Crim. Resource Man. § 275 (2020). The 

requested expenses were therefore neither paid to "the clerk [or] marshal," 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1920(1), nor paid to a third party for functions that those officials were "authorized to 

perform." Collins, 96 F.3d at 1060. Moreover, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 

courts should not "cast[ ] aside the ordinary meaning of the various items enumerated in 

the costs statute." Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 573. Because there is no basis in section 

1920(1) for taxing the State Department fees as costs, the Court denies Goldwind's 

request. 

3. Clerk of Court fee 

Goldwind also seeks $359.50 in fees it paid to the Clerk of Court to obtain the 

letters rogatory that it sent to the State Department for processing. Avanzalia does not 

dispute that this sum is taxable under section 1920(1) as a "fee[ ] of the clerk." Rather, 

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it argues that Goldwind's letters rogatory were not reasonable and necessary to the 

litigation. To support its argument, Avanzalia emphasizes that Goldwind did not file its 

motion for letters rogatory until August 9, 2021, which was the scheduled deadline for 

initiating foreign discovery requests. Avanzalia argues that Goldwind's supposed lack of 

diligence in securing the letters shows that Goldwind did not consider them to be 

reasonable and necessary to the litigation. But Avanzalia fails to mention that it, too, 

waited until the August 9 deadline to move for its own letters rogatory. The Court 

overrules Avanzalia's argument that the timing of Goldwind's motion precludes the 

reasonableness of its expenses. The bottom line is that the motion was timely even if it 

was filed at the deadline. Avanzalia otherwise does not dispute Goldwind's explanation 

that the six Panamanian entities were necessary discovery targets because Avanzalia 

had named them as entities relevant to its theory of damages. The Court therefore 

taxes to Avanzalia the $359.50 paid to the Clerk. 

B. Costs claimed under section 1920(2) 

 Goldwind requests $128,564.09 under section 1920(2), which permits courts to 

award costs for "[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily 

obtained for use in the case." Goldwind seeks to recover numerous deposition-related 

expenses, including (1) final transcripts, (2) court reporter appearance fees, (3) court 

reporter overtime fees, (4) rough transcripts, (5) video recordings of depositions, (6) 

Realtime feeds, and (7) fees associated with conducting remote depositions via 

videoconferencing software. Avanzalia does not dispute that section 1920(2) authorizes 

recovery of these costs. Rather, it argues that some of the claimed expenses were not 

reasonable or necessary for various reasons. 

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 1. Final transcripts 

 Goldwind requests $32,987.30 in costs for final transcripts of depositions. 

Avanzalia raises several objections. First, although Avanzalia concedes that Goldwind 

is entitled to costs for the English-language transcripts of depositions noticed by 

Avanzalia, it objects to the costs associated with the index pages of those transcripts. 

Second, it objects to all transcript costs incurred for depositions that Goldwind itself 

noticed. Third, Avanzalia objects to all costs related to final Spanish-language 

transcripts. 

 a. Indexes 

 Avanzalia concedes that it owes Goldwind $9,964.50 for final English-language 

transcripts of depositions that Avanzalia noticed. But it argues that it should not be 

responsible for an additional $614.60 in per-page charges for the index pages 

appended to these transcripts. See Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 1-3. The Seventh Circuit has held 

that district courts have discretion to award costs under section 1920(2) for deposition 

transcript indexes. See Escamilla v. United States, 62 F.4th 367, 376 (7th Cir. 2023) 

("In some circumstances, word indices can be essential to understanding the content of 

a deposition transcript. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its 

discretion in including the index pages with the transcript costs."). But the prevailing 

party still must show that the indexes were reasonable and necessary rather than a 

matter of convenience. Cf. Little, 514 F.3d at 702 (stating that "courts may not tax the 

costs of transcripts . . . provided merely for convenience of the requesting attorney").

 Goldwind argues that indexes are commonly included with deposition transcripts 

today. It offers no explanation, however, for why they were reasonable and necessary 

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in this case. At best, it argues that Avanzalia "do[es] not claim that the transcripts could 

have been obtained without the word indexes." Def.'s Reply at 7. But it is Goldwind's 

burden to show that its costs were reasonable and necessary, not Avanzalia's. See Trs. 

of Chi. Plastering Inst. Pension Tr., 570 F.3d at 906. The Court declines to award 

Goldwind the contested $614.60 for the index pages; Avanzalia is therefore taxed 

$9,964.50 for the final transcripts of the English-language depositions that it noticed.1

 b. Depositions noticed by Goldwind 

In a single sentence, Avanzalia argues that it should not be responsible for the 

transcript costs for any deposition noticed by Goldwind because "Goldwind failed to 

meet its burden to show that such deposition testimony was reasonable and necessary 

for Goldwind's use in the litigation." Pl.'s Resp. at 4. The Court rejects this 

underdeveloped argument. "The proper inquiry is whether the deposition was 

reasonably necessary to the case at the time it was taken." Cengr v. Fusibond Piping 

Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 455 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Goldwind 

asserts that it deposed only Avanzalia's expert witnesses, individuals Avanzalia 

identified in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures as potentially supporting its claims, Avanzalia's 

corporate representatives under Rule 30(b)(6), and individuals Avanzalia identified as 

having material knowledge or involvement in key matters. Absent any countervailing 

1

 Avanzalia's index objection presumably could also apply to the other transcript costs at 

issue in this case, such as the English-language transcripts of depositions noticed by 

Goldwind and the Spanish-language transcripts. But Avanzalia has raised this objection 

and calculated the associated costs only for the final English-language transcripts of 

depositions that it noticed. See Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 1-3. The Court therefore deducts only 

the $614.60 in index charges that Avanzalia has identified in its objections. 

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evidence (which Avanzalia does not provide), this is sufficient to show that the 

depositions were reasonably necessary at the time they were taken. 

 Avanzalia advances a more specific argument with respect to Goldwind's 

decision to depose Ronald Jimenez, an Avanzalia employee. It claims that this 

deposition was unreasonable because Avanzalia did not hire Jimenez until six months 

after Goldwind sold the substation at the root of the parties' dispute. Goldwind counters 

that in response to an interrogatory, Avanzalia identified Jimenez as a person with 

material involvement in the subject matter of the case. Def.'s Reply at 6. Specifically, 

Avanzalia stated that Jimenez was an "employee . . . with material involvement in [its] 

Solar Project," with respect to the "substation connection." Def's Reply, Ex. A at 24. In 

addition, Avanzalia's theory of liability in this case relied in part on events occurring after 

Goldwind sold the substation. See, e.g., Def.'s Reply, Ex. B at 2 (Avanzalia 

representative testifying during deposition that "as soon as Goldwind left the project . . . 

the project was finished in a few months"); Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. to Summ. J. at 24 

(supporting its argument that it "had a reasonable expectation of selling [its] electricity 

on the open spot market once connected to the national grid" by pointing to the fact that 

it has "actually been selling electricity on the open market since they connected their 

solar plant in January 2021"). The fact that Jimenez began working for Avanzalia after 

Goldwind sold the substation therefore does not foreclose the possibility that he had 

material information about subsequent developments relevant to Avanzalia's claims. 

Because Goldwind has shown that the depositions it noticed were reasonable and 

necessary to the litigation and Avanzalia otherwise does not oppose the final transcript 

costs, the Court overrules Avanzalia's objection. 

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 c. Spanish transcripts 

 Goldwind seeks to recover $11,601.70 in costs for the Spanish-language 

transcripts of certain depositions. According to Goldwind, two court reporters attended 

these depositions. "One court reporter recorded everything said in English, including 

the words spoken by the oral interpreters; the other recorded everything said in 

Spanish." Def.'s Bill of Costs at 6. Avanzalia briefly argues that Goldwind is not entitled 

to any costs for final transcripts in Spanish because "[n]either of Goldwind's counsel of 

record . . . speak or read Spanish." Pl.'s Resp. at 5. But Goldwind stated in its bill of 

costs that the bilingual reporting protocol "was established by Plaintiffs' counsel," and 

Avanzalia does not dispute that assertion. Avanzalia thus cannot claim now that those 

costs were not reasonable and necessary. In addition, Goldwind says it had Spanishspeaking lawyers on its team in addition to its non-Spanish-speaking counsel of record, 

even if they did not actively attend the depositions. The Court overrules Avanzalia's 

objection to the Spanish-language transcript expenses. 

 Avanzalia also objects to costs related to the Spanish-language deposition of 

Jorge Buitrago. It contends that Buitrago speaks English and that any costs associated 

with taking his deposition in Spanish thus were not reasonable and necessary. But it 

was Buitrago, not Goldwind, who chose to be deposed in Spanish; Avanzalia's attorney 

complied with that choice and switched to asking questions in Spanish. Regardless of 

Buitrago's alleged English-language skills, the deposition ultimately proceeded in 

Spanish. Goldwind has sufficiently shown that the associated transcript costs were 

reasonable and necessary. 

 

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 2. Court reporter appearance fees 

Goldwind seeks $10,617.50 in court reporter appearance fees. Costs related to 

court reporter attendance at a deposition are taxable. Escamilla, 62 F.4th at 375. 

Avanzalia objects to these costs in their entirety. It repeats the same objections 

regarding the necessity of Goldwind's depositions and the necessity of bilingual court 

reporting that it advanced with respect to Goldwind's claimed costs for the final 

transcripts. As previously discussed, the Court overrules those arguments. The only 

remaining issue is whether the maximum rate for court reporter appearance fees set by 

N.D. Ill. Local Rule 54.1 applies to court reporters transcribing in Spanish. 

 Under Local Rule 54.1, "[c]ourt reporter appearance fees may be awarded in 

addition to the per page limit [for transcripts], but the fees shall not exceed the published 

rates on the Court website unless another rate was previously provided by order of 

court." The published rates for the Northern District of Illinois are $110 per half day and 

$220 per full day. Goldwind argues that these limits do not apply to Spanish-language 

court reporters. It therefore seeks to fully recover the Spanish-language court reporter 

appearance fees, which ranged from $1200 to $1575 per day. 

 The published rates do not indicate any basis for differentiating based on 

language or any other special circumstance. Local Rule 54.1 provides a safety valve by 

permitting parties to seek court approval of a different rate. However, the Rule specifies 

that parties must do so before seeking costs, not after: "fees shall not exceed the 

published rates on the Court website unless another rate was previously provided by 

order of court." Because the parties did not seek a court-ordered rate adjustment for 

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the Spanish-language reporter, the Court concludes that Goldwind can recover costs for 

the Spanish-language court reporter appearance fees only up to the maximum amount. 

 Based on the chart of deposition expenses submitted by Goldwind, the Court 

finds that a Spanish-language court reporter was present for six full days and that 

therefore Goldwind is entitled to $1,320 in costs. See Def.'s Bill of Costs, Ex. B-3. 

3. Court reporter overtime 

Goldwind seeks $12,312.50 in court reporter overtime costs. It asserts that "[t]he 

parties agreed that the depositions of certain witnesses would be conducted at times 

that would incur overtime charges because of the start times of depositions, the length 

of time the deposition took (because of translation) and/or the fact that the witness was 

residing in a foreign country in a foreign time zone." Def.'s Bill of Costs at 13. 

Avanzalia does not dispute that Goldwind is entitled to overtime costs as a general 

matter, but it contests the necessity of overtime costs for the depositions of three 

witnesses: Virgil Rose ($112), Arturo Hoyos ($75), and Ivan Furones ($75). Avanzalia 

contends these depositions took place during standard hours and that Goldwind was 

responsible for any excess time. Goldwind does not provide a substantive reply to 

Avanzalia's assertions. Therefore, the Court sustains Avanzalia's objections to the 

$262 in overtime costs for these three witnesses and awards Goldwind $12,050.50 in 

overtime costs. 

4. Rough transcripts 

 Goldwind seeks to recover $6,156.17 for rough drafts of deposition transcripts. 

Avanzalia does not dispute that $4,822.15 of these claimed expenses were reasonable 

and necessary due to the parties' compressed deposition schedule. But Avanzalia 

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objects to $1,222.27 of the rough draft costs in instances where it argues that the 

deposition schedule was not fast-paced enough to require Goldwind to order a rough 

draft. Avanzalia also argues that it should not be responsible for $111.75 for rough 

transcripts that it says were "unrelated" to the litigation. 

 Regarding the first objection, Goldwind fails to adequately respond to Avanzalia's 

argument. Avanzalia specifically objected to the rough drafts obtained for David 

Halligan, Enrique Lorente, and Andres Alva. Goldwind's reply explains only its need "to 

quickly review Mr. Lorente's assertions"—made in his capacity as Avanzalia's corporate 

representative—to prepare for several depositions scheduled soon after. Def.'s Reply 

at 19. The Court finds on this basis that it was reasonable and necessary for Goldwind 

to obtain a rough transcript of Lorente's deposition. But because Goldwind's reply is 

silent as to Halligan and Alva, it has not justified the $254.37 and $232.90 fees for the 

rough transcripts of those depositions, respectively. 

 Regarding the second objection, Avanzalia noticed the three depositions at 

issue. The Court therefore rejects its unexplained assertion that these depositions were 

"unrelated" to the litigation. Avanzalia does not object on any other grounds to 

Goldwind's stated need for rough drafts of these transcripts. Goldwind therefore is 

entitled to recover the disputed $111.75. In sum, the Court taxes Avanzalia with 

$5,668.90 in rough transcript costs. 

5. Videorecorded depositions 

Goldwind seeks $34,570 for video recordings of depositions. The Seventh 

Circuit has held that the "costs for video-recorded depositions" are taxable under 

section 1920(2). Little, 514 F.3d at 701. "A prevailing party can recover costs for both a 

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video-recording and a transcript of the same deposition, provided that the party can 

show both are necessary and reasonable in the context of the case." Trading Techs. 

Intern., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 962, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Little, 514 

F.3d at 702); Oleksy v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 06 C 1245, 2016 WL 7217725, at *6 (N.D. 

Ill. Dec. 12, 2016). Avanzalia argues that Goldwind has failed to show that its video 

costs were reasonable and necessary. 

 Goldwind asserts, and Avanzalia does not dispute, that "none of the witnesses 

whose videotaped depositions were taken by Goldwind were within the subpoena power 

of the court." Def.'s Bill of Costs at 11. Because witnesses outside of the Court's 

subpoena power cannot be compelled to testify at trial, "it was accordingly reasonable 

to request both printed transcripts and video recordings of their depositions." Cascades 

Comput. Innovation, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11 C 4574, 2016 WL 612792, at 

*4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016) (Kennelly, J.). In addition, discovery took place during the 

COVID-19 pandemic when many proceedings, including the depositions in this case, 

could not be conducted in person. Goldwind's decision to obtain video recordings of 

some depositions was reasonable given the risks that illness or travel restrictions might 

have made witnesses unavailable for trial. See, e.g., Yates v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 

2613, 2021 WL 6063862, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2021) ("[B]ecause these depositions 

were conducted in the midst of the pandemic, there is no telling whether these[ ] 

witness[es] would be available at trial.").

 Avanzalia argues that the fact that the witnesses were employees of Avanzalia or 

Goldwind mitigated the risk that witnesses would be unavailable for trial. Although that 

arguably lowered the probability that they would decline to appear in court, it does 

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nothing to minimize the risk of pandemic-related complications or other events that 

might render a witness unavailable. 

 Goldwind also obtained video copies of three depositions in which Avanzalia 

initiated the videorecording. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable and 

necessary for Goldwind to obtain the same recordings as its opponent. See Oleksy, 

2016 WL 7217725, at *7 (finding that the prevailing party's cost for obtaining video "was 

not unreasonable" because the opposing party initiated the deposition and video 

recording); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 838, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2015) ("It 

would be unfair to allow Plaintiffs access to video recordings of transcripts for possible 

use at trial and to deny [the defendant] the right to obtain those same video tapes (and, 

of course, to tax the Plaintiffs for them upon prevailing)."). The Court concludes that the 

$34,570 that Goldwind paid to obtain video recordings of depositions was reasonable 

and necessary and taxes these costs to Avanzalia. 

6. Realtime feeds 

Goldwind seeks $17,850.62 in fees for Realtime transcript feeds in English and 

Spanish during various depositions. Avanzalia does not dispute that Realtime feeds are 

taxable as "transcripts" under section 1920(2).2 Goldwind asserts that the Realtime 

feeds were reasonable and necessary because they were "demanded by Plaintiffs 

and/or were necessitated by the fact that the depositions were taken in Spanish and 

there were frequent lengthy interpretation services which resulted in repeated objections 

2

 Avanzalia also does not object to the Realtime costs (or any other transcript costs, 

aside from the court reporter appearance fees) as exceeding the limitations set by N.D. 

Ill. Local Rule 54.1. The Court therefore does not consider that argument. 

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by Plaintiffs' counsel during the depositions concerning translation." Def.'s Bill of Costs 

at 32. Avanzalia argues that the Realtime services were not reasonable or necessary, 

particularly because Goldwind's counsel conducting the depositions did not speak 

Spanish. 

 Avanzalia does not dispute that it insisted upon Realtime services at depositions. 

To the extent that Avanzalia now argues that the services it required were not 

reasonable or necessary, the Court overrules that proposition. The Court agrees, 

however, that Goldwind has not sufficiently explained why it needed Realtime feeds in 

English or Spanish at depositions for which Avanzalia did not insist upon these services. 

Goldwind's assertion that a Spanish-speaking attorney from its team sat in on "a" 

deposition is insufficient to show that Realtime services were reasonably necessary in 

every instance. Def.'s Reply at 9. The Court concludes that Goldwind should not 

recover costs for Realtime services that were not demanded by Avanzalia. Neither 

party, however, specifies which Realtime feeds were provided at Avanzalia's insistence. 

Goldwind's counsel asserts in an affidavit supporting the bill of costs that Avanzalia 

"requested Realtime feeds for most of the depositions taken in this matter" but does not 

provide further detail. Def.'s Bill of Costs, Ex. B ¶ 6. Because Avanzalia has not 

disputed that it demanded Realtime feeds at "most" depositions, the Court awards 

Goldwind $8,925.31, which represents 50% of its requested costs for Realtime feeds. 

7. Remote deposition services 

 Goldwind seeks to recover $14,070 in "costs associated with the display of 

exhibits and other costs in connection with the technology for conducting a remote 

electronic deposition." Def.'s Bill of Costs at 13. As previously discussed, the Court 

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recognizes that the COVID-19 pandemic required the parties to conduct remote 

depositions. But Goldwind has provided almost no explanation as to what the various 

charges in this category represent and why each was reasonably necessary to 

conducting a remote deposition. The supporting invoices, which list charges for vague 

line items such as "Advanced Technology Services/Connectivity," "Exhibits," and 

"Veritext Virtual Services," fall short of explaining what services were provided and why 

these services were important to carrying out the remote depositions. Because 

Goldwind has not carried its burden, the Court declines to award Goldwind the 

requested $14,070 in costs. 

C. Costs claimed under section 1920(4) 

Goldwind seeks $20,180.72 under section 1920(4), which permits courts to 

award costs for "[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 

materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." Specifically, 

Goldwind seeks to recover (1) $3,761 in electronic copying fees associated with ediscovery, (2) $144.25 in photocopying expenses, and (3) $16,274.55 in document 

translation expenses. 

1. Electronic copies 

Goldwind requests $3,761.92 in "costs associated with electronic copying in 

connection with [its] productions of documents to Plaintiffs." Def.'s Bill of Costs at 14. 

The law is unsettled as to which electronic processes are the equivalent of "making 

copies" under section 1920(4). See Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Commc'ns Corp. Ltd., 

No. 17 C 1973, 2021 WL 3489813, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2021) ("The Seventh Circuit 

has not comprehensively addressed the extent to which e-discovery costs may be taxed 

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against a non-prevailing party under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)."). Although the Seventh 

Circuit has said that "costs for converting data into a readable format in response to [a] 

discovery request" are taxable under section 1920(4), it "has not subsequently 

determined whether § 1920(4) allows for recovery of other services involved in 

processing [electronically stored information]." Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver 

Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 893, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 

F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009), abrogated in part on other grounds by Hughes v. Nw. 

Univ., 142 S. Ct. 737 (2022)). But Goldwind characterizes its requested costs as 

associated only with "electronic copying," and Avanzalia does not dispute that 

characterization or object to the amount requested by Goldwind. Therefore, the Court 

taxes Avanzalia in the amount of $3,761.92. 

 2. Photocopies 

Avanzalia argues that Goldwind has not carried its burden of showing the 

$144.25 in photocopying costs were reasonable and necessary. The Court concludes 

that Goldwind has sufficiently explained that the requested photocopying costs were for 

(1) Avanzalia's requested copy of Goldwind's expert report on Panamanian law, (2) 

copies of documents submitted to the State Department, and (3) copies of documents 

submitted to the Court in connection with Goldwind's motion for summary judgment. 

The Court finds that these relatively minor copying expenditures were reasonable and 

necessary. See Motorola Sols., Inc., 2021 WL 3489813, at *11 ("A prevailing party may 

recover photocopying costs for documents provided to the court or the other parties, but 

not for those made for its own convenience." (quoting Merix Pharm. Corp. v. Clinical 

Supplies Mgmt., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 927, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2015))). 

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 3. Document translation 

Goldwind asserts that it is entitled to recover $16,274.55 in document translation 

fees. The Supreme Court has held that document translation is not taxable under 

section 1920(6)—which authorizes "compensation of interpreters"—because the 

"ordinary meaning of the word 'interpreter' is a person who translates orally from one 

language to another" rather than a person who translates the written word. Taniguchi, 

566 U.S. at 562. Goldwind nevertheless contends that document translation expenses 

are authorized under section 1920(4) if copies of the translated documents were 

necessary to the litigation. This roundabout interpretation is incompatible with the text 

of the statute and the Supreme Court's warning against "stretch[ing] the ordinary 

meaning of the cost items Congress authorized in § 1920." Id. at 573. Goldwind cites 

to two district court decisions authorizing translation costs under section 1920(4), but 

both decisions rely on a Fifth Circuit case from 1983, decades before the Supreme 

Court decided Taniguchi. See BookIt OY v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 17 C 02577, 2019 

WL 13156690, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2019) (citing Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 713 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1983)); DSS Tech. Mgmt. Inc. v. 

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co., Ltd., No. 14 C 0199, 2016 WL 5942316, at *6 (E.D. 

Tex. Oct. 13, 2016) (same). That authority thus does little to bolster Goldwind's 

argument. Because document translation costs are not authorized by section 1920(4) 

or 1920(6), the Court denies Goldwind's request for these expenses. 

 

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D. Costs claimed under section 1920(6) 

Goldwind seeks $19,744.75 under section 1920(6), which permits courts to 

award costs for "compensation of interpreters." Goldwind asserts that it is entitled to 

recover the fees it paid for English-Spanish and Spanish-English oral interpretation at 

various depositions. As discussed, oral interpretation is a taxable cost under section 

1920(6). See Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 562. But Avanzalia argues that Goldwind cannot 

recover any of its oral interpretation expenses because the invoices Goldwind submitted 

from each deposition list a charge for "Translation & Interpretation." Because document 

translation is not a taxable cost, Avanzalia argues that Goldwind cannot recover any of 

its interpretation expenses. Pl.'s Resp. at 12. 

 Although the invoices are poorly labeled, Goldwind's counsel has attested that 

the entirety of the amount charged was for oral interpretation at depositions. This is 

supported by the fact that each invoice is marked as associated with the "Proceeding 

Type: Depositions" and is itemized by the name of the witness deposed. See, e.g., 

Def.'s Bill of Costs at 73 (Ex. B-3). Apart from the "Translation & Interpretation" label, 

Avanzalia has not pointed to any evidence that the court reporter service that issued the 

invoices performed document translation services that were rolled into the charge 

included on the deposition invoices. In sum, the Court concludes that Goldwind has 

provided sufficient evidence that it spent $19,744.75 on oral interpretation, not 

document translation. Avanzalia otherwise does not dispute that these interpretation 

fees were reasonable and necessary. The Court therefore taxes these costs to 

Avanzalia. 

 

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E. Summary of awarded costs 

To summarize, the Court taxes the following costs to Avanzalia: 

$162.50 for private service of process 

$359.50 for the Clerk of Court fee 

$9,964.50 for final English-language transcripts of depositions Avanzalia noticed 

$10,806.50 for final English-language transcripts of depositions Goldwind noticed 

$11,601.70 for final Spanish-language transcripts 

$2,592.50 for English-language court reporter appearance fees 

$1,320 for Spanish-language court reporter appearance fees 

$12,050.50 for court reporter overtime fees 

$5,668.90 for rough transcripts 

$34,570 for video recordings 

$8,925.31 for Realtime feeds 

$3,761.92 for electronic copying 

$144.25 for photocopies 

$19,744.75 for oral interpretation. 

 This totals $121,672.83 in costs. 

F. Stay 

 Avanzalia has moved for a stay of the enforcement of any award of costs 

pending its appeal of the Court's order granting summary judgment to Goldwind. 

Goldwind opposes the motion. "A district court is under no obligation to stay a bill of 

costs pending appeal." Hovde v. ISLA Dev. LLC, No. 18 C 7323, 2021 WL 7161195, at 

*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2021). Apart from the fact that the Court's judgment may be 

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reversed—which is a possibility almost any time a party appeals—Avanzalia provides 

no explanation for why a stay might be warranted. The Court denies the motion. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court approves Goldwind's bill of costs [dkt. 183] 

in part and awards Goldwind $121,672.83 in costs. The Court denies Avanzalia's 

motion for a stay [dkt. 188]. 

 ________________________________ 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: September 7, 2023 

Case: 1:20-cv-05035 Document #: 193 Filed: 09/07/23 Page 20 of 20 PageID #:11573