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1 8. Communication and Information Systems

2 8.1. Introduction

3 PPD-21 identifies “energy and communications systems as uniquely critical due to the enabling functions 

4 they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.” These two infrastructure systems are highly

5 interdependent. Communication and information systems, the focus of this chapter, are increasingly 

6 critical parts of our daily lives. For example, the banking system relies on the Internet for financial 

7 transactions, documents are transferred via Internet between businesses, and e-mail is a primary means of 

8 communication. When Internet is not available, commerce is directly affected and economic output is 

9 reduced.

10 Communication and information systems have seen incredible development and use over the past 20-30 

11 years. In terms of system types, functionality, and speed, some of the most notable changes of 

12 communication and information systems over the past few decades are:

13  Moving from a society that relies on fixed line (i.e., landline) telephones as the primary means of 

14 two-way voice communication to one that relies heavily on mobile devices (e.g., cell phones) and 

15 Internet (Voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP) for voice communication, text messages, and e-mail. 

16 Many now have abandoned traditional landlines in favor of mobile phones and VoIP.

17  Moving from a society where large personal computers were used to communicate via e-mail and 

18 access information via the Internet to a society where smaller mobile devices, such as laptops and cell 

19 phones, are used for the same purpose

20  More and more people now use laptops, smart phones, and tablets to read news on the Internet and

21 watch movies and television shows, instead of using traditional methods such as television

22  More recently, businesses have begun to use social networking sites for collaboration, marketing, 

23 recruiting, etc.

24 As in many other developed countries, most people in the United States take these services for granted 

25 until they are unavailable. Unfortunately, communication and information systems are often lost in the 

26 wake of natural disasters—a time when they are needed most for:

27  Relaying emergency and safety information to the public

28  Coordinating recovery plans among first responders and community leaders

29  Communication between family members and loved ones to check on each other’s safety

30  Communication between civilians and emergency responders

31 When addressing resilience, communities must also think about the longer term and improving 

32 performance of the built environment in the next hazard event. Intermediate and long-term 

33 communications and information infrastructure needs of communities include:

34  The ability to communicate with employers, schools, and other aspects of individuals’ daily lives

35  Re-establishing operations of small businesses, banks, etc., via Internet and telecommunications so 

36 they can serve their clients

37  Restoration, retrofits, and improvements to infrastructure components so it will not fail in the same 

38 way in future events (i.e., implement changes to make infrastructure more resilient).

39 To address resilience of communication and information infrastructure, service providers should work 

40 with other stakeholders in the community to establish performance goals for their infrastructure. Example 

41 performance goals for the fictional town of Centerville, USA are provided in this chapter to illustrate the 

42 process of setting performance goals, evaluating the state of existing communication and information 

43 infrastructure systems, identifying weak links in the infrastructure network, and prioritizing upgrades to 

44 improve resilience of the network. The example performance goals tables are for a generic hazard, but can 
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45 be developed by a community/service provider for any type and magnitude of hazard in rural or urban 

46 communities.

47 The goal of this chapter is to provide guidance for the reader that can be used to understand the potential 

48 forms of damage to infrastructure and develop plans to improve communication and information 

49 infrastructure resilience. Damage observed in past events and success stories are used to show that service 

50 providers have many opportunities to become more resilient. Guidance for planning of logistics and 

51 personnel are outside the scope of this chapter. Communities and service providers have their own 

52 challenges and solutions to accomplish their goals. 

53 8.1.1. Social Needs and System Performance Goals

54 As discussed in Chapter 2, the social needs of the community drive performance goals that are to be 

55 defined by each community and its stakeholders. Social needs of the community include those of citizens, 

56 businesses (both small/local and large/multi-national), industry, and government. Each community should 

57 define its performance goals in terms of the time it takes for its critical infrastructure to be restored 

58 following a hazard event for three levels of event: routine, expected, and extreme, as defined in Chapter 3.

59 The community has short (0-3 days), intermediate (1-12 weeks), and long-term (4-36+ months) recovery 

60 needs. Specific to communications, communities traditionally think about recovery in terms of emergency 

61 response and management goals, which include communication between:

62  Citizens and emergency responders

63  Family members and loved ones to check on each other’s safety

64  Government and the public (e.g., providing emergency and safety information to the public)

65  First responders

66  Government agencies

67 However, as discussed in the introductory section, communities must think about their long-term social 

68 needs when addressing resilience. The community’s intermediate goal is to recover so people and 

69 businesses can return to their daily routine. To do this, people need to be able to communicate with their 

70 employers, their children’s schools, and other members of the community. Businesses need to have 

71 Internet and telephone service to communicate with their clients and suppliers. In the long term, 

72 communities should strive to go beyond simply recovering by prioritizing and making improvements to 

73 parts of the communications infrastructure that failed in the disaster.

74 8.1.2. Availability, Reliability, and Resilience

75 Availability and reliability are terms often used by industry when referring to communications networks. 

76 Availability refers to the percentage of time a communications system is accessible for use. The best 

77 telecommunications networks have 99.999 percent availability, which is referred to as “five 9’s 

78 availability” (CPNI 2006). This indicates a telecommunications network would be unavailable for only 

79 approximately five minutes/year.

80 Reliability is the probability of successfully performing an intended function for a given time period 

81 (Department of the Army 2007). Therefore, though reliability and availability are related, they are not the 

82 same. A telecommunications network, for example, may have a high availability with multiple short 

83 downtimes or failure during a year. This would mean the reliability is reduced due to incremental 

84 disruptions (i.e., failures) in service. Reliability will always be less than availability.

85 Whether the type of communications system is wireline or wireless telephone, or Internet, service 

86 providers market their reliability to potential customers. Service providers think about the 

87 communications system itself in terms of the services they provide to the end user rather than the 

88 infrastructure (i.e., built environment) that supports the service. 
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89 Resilience is closely related to availability and reliability. Like availability and reliability, resilience 

90 includes the ability to limit and withstand disruptions/downtime. However, resilience also involves 

91 preparing for and adapting to changing conditions to mitigate impacts of future events so disruptions 

92 occur less frequently, and, when they do occur, there is a plan to recover quickly. Resilience is also the 

93 ability to recover from a disaster event such that the infrastructure is rebuilt to a higher standard. 

94 Consequently, by enhancing the resilience of communications infrastructure, availability (amount of 

95 downtime) and reliability (frequency of downtime) can be improved. Note that availability will never 

96 reach 100 percent because maintenance, which requires downtime, will always be needed.

97 Capacity. Resilience of communications infrastructure is dependent on the network’s capacity. As is often 

98 seen during and immediately after disaster events, there is an increase in demand of the communication 

99 and information systems (Jrad et al. 2005 and 2006). Section 8.1 points out that, during and immediately 

100 after a disaster event, the system is used extensively for communication between family and loved ones, 

101 communication with vulnerable populations (e.g., ill or elderly), civilians and first responders, and

102 customers and service providers when outages occur. 

103 Unfortunately, the capacity of a system is not immediately increased for disasters and so cellular phones, 

104 for example, may not appear to immediately function properly due to high volume use. This is especially 

105 true in densely populated areas, such as New York City, or around emergency shelter or evacuation areas. 

106 The latter is an especially important consideration, because some facilities used as emergency shelter and 

107 evacuation centers are not designed with that intent. 

108 For example, the Superdome in New Orleans, LA was used as emergency shelter during Hurricane 

109 Katrina. Although this was an exceptionally large facility used for sporting and entertainment events, 

110 these facilities can be overwhelmed prior to, during, and after disaster events because of the influx of 

111 civilians seeking shelter. This results in increased demand on the wireless/cellular network. 

112 With the expansion of technology and the massive growth of cellular phone use, the wireless 

113 telecommunications network around emergency shelter facilities will become more stressed in disaster 

114 events until augmented by additional capacity.

115 Jrad et al. (2005) found that for an overall telecommunications infrastructure network to be most resilient, 

116 an approximately equal user base for wireline and wireless communications was best. The study found 

117 that if one network is significantly greater than the other and the larger one experiences a disruption, 

118 increased demand will switch to the smaller network and lead to overload. As a simple example, if 

119 landline demand is 1,000,000 users, cellular network demand is 500,000 users, and the landline network 

120 experiences a disruption in a disaster event, some landline demand will transfer to the cellular network 

121 (Jrad et al. 2005). The increased demand would then stress the wireless network and likely result in 

122 perceived service disruptions due to overloading of the network when many calls cannot be completed.

123 Historically, network connectivity (e.g., reliability or availability) has been a primary concern for 

124 communications. However, because of the increased multiuse functionality of mobile communications 

125 devices (e.g., cellular phones and iPads), communications network resilience also needs to consider the 

126 type of data being used, and hence capacity of the network. 

127 Capacity will become an even greater challenge for communications service providers in the wake of 

128 future hazard events. Additional capacity is needed to support service for non-traditional functionality of 

129 mobile devices such as sending photographs, watching movies on the Internet, etc. Furthermore, some 9-

130 1-1 centers have the ability to receive photo submissions, which may require more capacity than a phone 

131 call. On the other hand, if 9-1-1 call centers can receive text messages, this may also be useful because 

132 text messages take up a very small amount of data (i.e., less capacity) and can persist until they get into 

133 the network and delivered. 
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134 8.1.3. Interdependencies

135 Chapter 4 provides details of the interdependencies of all critical infrastructure systems in a community. 

136 The built environment within communities is continually becoming more complex and different systems

137 are becoming more dependent on one another to provide services. Specific to the communications and 

138 information system, the following interdependencies must be considered:

139 Power/Energy. The communication and information system is highly dependent on the power/energy 

140 system. For current high technology and data services, the end user needs external power for 

141 telecommunications, Internet, and cable. Loss of external power means loss of 

142 communication/information services, except for cellular phones which will likely be able to function until 

143 their battery is diminished in the absence of standby power. For use beyond the life of the battery, the cell 

144 phone must be charged using an external power source. Furthermore, distribution of communications and 

145 power service is often collocated (e.g., wires traveling along utility poles). Failure of these systems can 

146 happen simultaneously due to tree fall severing both types of lines. In the wake of a disaster event where 

147 external power is lost, communications infrastructure needs continuous standby power to ensure 

148 continued functionality.

149 External power is also critical for cooling critical equipment inside buildings. Air conditioning systems, 

150 which keep critical equipment from overheating, are not typically connected to standby power. Therefore, 

151 although critical communication equipment may continue to function when a power outage occurs, it may 

152 become overheated and shutdown (Kwasinski 2009).

153 Conversely, emergency repair crews for power utilities need to be able to communicate so they can 

154 prioritize and repair their network efficiently. The power provider controls the rights of the utility poles; 

155 therefore, the design, construction, routing, and maintenance of telecommunication lines are dependent on 

156 the requirements and regulations of the power utility provider.

157 Transportation. A common problem after disaster events is that roadways and other parts of the 

158 transportation system needed in recovery of infrastructure become impassible. Specifically, tree fall and 

159 other debris resulting from high wind events (e.g., hurricanes and tornadoes), storm surge/flooding, and 

160 ice storms prevent emergency crews from reaching the areas where they need to repair damaged 

161 communications infrastructure. Moreover, standby generators cannot be refueled because roads are 

162 impassible. Transportation repair crews, including those for traffic signals, need to be able to 

163 communicate to ensure their system is fixed. Traffic signals and transportation hubs also rely on 

164 communications systems. Traffic signals use communication systems for timing and synchronization of 

165 green lights to ensure smooth flow of traffic and transportation hubs use communications system to 

166 communicate schedules for inbound/outbound passenger traffic. 

167 Building/Facilities. Buildings and facilities need their communications and information systems to 

168 function properly. Buildings used for business and industry communicate with clients, suppliers, and each 

169 other via telephone and e-mail. Residential buildings need these services to communicate with employers, 

170 loved ones, banks, and services. Currently, money is transferred between businesses, bills are paid to 

171 services/businesses and personal banking is completed online or, less commonly, by telephone. 

172 Individuals inside buildings in the immediate aftermath of sudden, unexpected events (e.g., blast events) 

173 also need the communications network to learn what is happening.

174 In large urban centers, service providers often have cell towers on top of buildings. If these buildings fail, 

175 an interruption in service may occur due to the loss of the cell tower.

176 Water and Wastewater. Water and wastewater utilities rely on communications amongst operations staff 

177 and emergency workers in the recovery phase. If the communications network, including the cellular 
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178 network, is down for an extended period of time following a disaster event, the recovery process can take 

179 longer since there will be limited coordination in the efforts.

180 Similar to power/energy, water is needed for cooling systems in buildings that house critical equipment 

181 for the communications and information systems. Furthermore, water and wastewater systems are needed 

182 in buildings that house critical equipment for technicians.

183 Security. Security is an important consideration, particularly in the immediate (emergency) recovery after 

184 a disaster event. Service providers will not endanger employees. In cases where power and 

185 communications systems fail, security becomes an issue because small groups of citizens may use it as an 

186 opportunity for looting and violence. Communication and information service providers must be able to 

187 work with security to control the situation and begin the recovery process in a timely manner.

188 8.2. Critical Communication and Information Infrastructure

189 This section discusses some of the critical components in the communication and information system 

190 infrastructure, their potential vulnerabilities, and strategies used in the past to successfully mitigate 

191 failures. Figure 8-1 presents components of a telecommunications system.

192

193 Figure 8-1. Components of the Communications System (City of New York, 2013)

194 8.2.1. Landline Telephone Systems

195 Most newer, high technology communication systems are heavily dependent on the performance of the 

196 electric power system. Consequently, these newer communication systems are dependent on the 

197 distribution of external power to end users, which often is interrupted during and after a disaster. Hence, 

198 reliable standby power is critical to the continued functionality of the end user’s telecommunications. 
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199 Conventional analog landlines (i.e., not digital telephones) operate on a separate electric supply that may 

200 be impacted by the event, but service providers often use their own standby power to minimize disruption

201 at end user locations. Hence, landline telephones are generally a more resilient option for telephone 

202 communication if commercial power loss is the only impact from a disaster event. 

203 The American Lifelines Alliance (ALA 2006) recommends that landline systems should be retained or 

204 reinstated for standby service to reduce vulnerability. However, failure of utility poles or trees onto wires 

205 can result in lines for power, cable, and telecommunications being cut, resulting in loss of service.

206 8.2.1.1. Central Offices

207 Central Offices, also known as telephone exchanges, are buildings that house equipment used to direct 

208 and process telephone calls and data. Maintaining the functionality of these facilities is critical to the 

209 timely recovery from an event. These facilities are designed as occupancy Category III (in some cases IV) 

210 buildings in ASCE 7 and, consequently, are expected to be fully functional after an expected event.

211 The primary resiliency concerns for Central Offices are:

212  Performance of the structure

213  Redundancy of Central Offices/nodes within network

214  Placement/protection of critical equipment

215  Threat to/from interdependent services

216 Performance of the Structure. The design of Central Offices is extremely important for continued service 

217 of the telecommunications system. These buildings are to be designed as an Occupancy Category III 

218 building per ASCE 7, and consequently the design of equipment and standby power must be consistent 

219 with that of the building design. 

220 Depending on the location of the community, the design considers different types and magnitudes of 

221 disasters. For example, the design of Central Offices in California may be mainly concerned with 

222 earthquake loading, whereas Central Offices on the east coast may be concerned mainly with hurricane 

223 force winds and/or flooding (especially if it is located in the floodplain as are many Central Offices in 

224 coastal communities). In place of providing redundancy of Central Offices, these structures should be 

225 designed to resist more severe environmental loads. In cases where Central Offices are located in older 

226 buildings that were built to codes and standards that are less stringent than current day standards, it is 

227 important to bring these buildings up to modern standards or harden the sections of the building 

228 containing critical telecommunications equipment to achieve the desired performance level.

229 Partial failure of a Central Office can result in the loss of switches and other critical equipment, which 

230 results in damage to the communications infrastructure network and loss of functionality. On September 

231 11, 2001 (9/11), four switches were lost in the Verizon Central Office located at 140 West Street (Jrad et 

232 al. 2006). 

233 Complete collapse of a Central Office or other building containing a node/exchange in the network would 

234 result in loss of all switches and critical equipment. On 9/11, two switches were lost in the World Trade 

235 Center Buildings that collapsed (Jrad et al 2006). Though these were not Central Offices, the loss of the 

236 nodes could not be recovered. The loss of an entire Central Office would bring the service provider’s 

237 network to a halt, particularly if no redundancy or backup/restoration capability was built into the network 

238 of Central Offices.

239 Since communities are ultimately responsible for updating, enforcing, and making amendments to 

240 building codes, it is important that the most up-to-date building codes be used in the design of new 

241 buildings that are used as a part of the communication network. In cases where existing buildings house 

242 Central Offices, these buildings should be evaluated and hardened as needed to ensure the critical 

243 equipment within the structure is protected.
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244 Redundancy of Central Offices. 

245 As learned after the 9/11 terrorist 

246 attacks on the World Trade 

247 Centers in New York City, 

248 redundancy of Central Offices is 

249 vital to continued service in the 

250 wake of a disaster. On September 

251 11, almost all of Lower 

252 Manhattan (i.e., the community 

253 most immediately impacted by 

254 the disaster) lost the ability to 

255 communicate because World 

256 Trade Center Building 7 

257 collapsed directly onto Verizon’s 

258 Central Office at 140 West Street, 

259 seen in Figure 8-2 (Lower Manhattan Telecommunications Users’ Working Group, 2002). At the time, 

260 Verizon did not offer Central Office redundancy as part of its standard service. Furthermore, customers of 

261 other service providers that leased Verizon’s space lost service as well since they did not provide 

262 redundancy either. 

263 Verizon made a significant effort to restore their services rapidly after the attacks and have since 

264 improved their system to use multiple Central Offices for additional reliability. AT&T also endured

265 problems as they had two transport nodes located in World Trade Tower 2, which collapsed and was 

266 restored in Jersey City, NJ with mobilized recovery equipment. Overall, almost $2 billion was spent on 

267 rebuilding and upgrading Lower Manhattan’s telecom infrastructure after 9-11 (Lower Manhattan 

268 Telecommunications Users’ Working Group, 2002). 

269 Although this was an extremely expensive venture, it is an example that shows building a telecom system 

270 with redundancy can eliminate expensive upgrading/repair costs after a disaster event. However, this 

271 magnitude of expense is likely not necessary for many other communities.

272 Placement/Protection of Critical Equipment. Although construction of the building is important,

273 placement and protection of equipment is also an essential consideration if functionality is to be 

274 maintained. For example, any electrical or standby power equipment, such as generators, should be placed 

275 above the extreme (as defined in Chapter 3) 

276 flood level scenario. They should also be 

277 located such that it is not susceptible to other 

278 environmental loads such as wind. Flooding 

279 produced by Hurricane Sandy exposed 

280 weaknesses in the location of standby power 

281 (e.g., generators). Generators and other 

282 electrical equipment that were placed in 

283 basements failed due to flooding (FEMA 

284 2013).

285 In recent events where in-situ standby power 

286 systems did not meet the desired level of 

287 performance and failed, portable standby 

288 power was brought in to help bring facilities 

289 back online until power was restored or on290 site standby generators were restored. For 

291 example, Figure 8-3 shows a portable standby generator power unit used in place of basement standby 

Figure 8-2. Damage to Verizon Building on September 11, 2001 

(FEMA 2002)

Figure 8-3. Large Standby Portable Power Unit Used 

when Basement Generators Failed (FEMA 2013)
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292 generators that failed due to flooding of Verizon’s Central Office at 104 Broad Street in Manhattan, NY 

293 after Hurricane Sandy (FEMA 2013).

294 After 9/11, the Verizon Central Office at 140 West Street (i.e., the one impacted by the collapse of WTC 

295 7) was hardened to prevent loss of service in a disaster event (City of New York, 2013). Between 9/11 

296 and Hurricane Sandy, the 140 West Street Central Office:

297  Raised their standby power generators and electrical switchgear to higher elevations

298  Used newer copper infrastructure (i.e., encased the copper wires in plastic casing)

299  Provided pumps to protect against flooding

300 The City of New York (2013) compared the performance of this Central Office to the one at 104 Broad 

301 Street (also affected by Sandy) that had not been hardened. The 104 Broad Street Central Office 

302 positioned its standby power generators and electrical switchgear below grade (i.e., in a basement) and 

303 had old copper infrastructure in lead casing (City of New York 2013). While the 140 West Street Central 

304 Office (i.e., the hardened Central Office) was operational within 24 hours, the 104 Broad Street Central 

305 Office was not operational for 11 days. 

306 The success story of the 140 West Street Central Office during and after Hurricane Sandy illustrates that 

307 making relatively simple changes in location of equipment can significantly improve 

308 infrastructure/equipment performance following a disaster event. This example shows careful planning of 

309 critical equipment location and protection is essential to achieving the performance goal of continued 

310 service in the wake of a disaster event.

311 An alternative to raising all critical equipment is to protect it so

312 water does not enter the Central Office during a flood event.

313 Sandbags are often used in North America to protect buildings or 

314 openings of buildings from flooding. However, these sandbag 

315 barriers are not always effective. After the 9.0 magnitude 

316 earthquake and tsunami in the Great Tohoku, Japan Region in 

317 2011, Kwasinksi (2011) observed that watertight doors performed 

318 well in areas that experienced significant damage and prevented 

319 flooding of critical electronic equipment in Central Offices. 

320 Watertight doors, such as that shown in Figure 8-4, can be used in 

321 the United States to prevent water from entering a Central Office 

322 due to inland (riverine) or coastal (storm surge, tsunami) flooding.

323 Note that other openings, such as windows, may also be vulnerable 

324 to flooding and need to be sealed effectively so other failures in 

325 the building envelope do not occur (Kwasinski 2011). 

326 Placement and protection of critical equipment should be 

327 considered for all types of natural disasters a community may 

328 experience. As illustrated by the Hurricane Sandy example, 

329 different hazard types warrant different considerations. Equipment stability must be considered for 

330 earthquakes. Figure 8-5 shows an example of failure inside a telecommunications Central Office in the 

331 1985 Mexico City Earthquake (OSSPAC 2013). The building itself did not collapse, but light fixtures and 

332 equipment failed. Critical equipment in earthquake prone regions should be designed and mounted such 

333 that shaking will not lead to equipment failure. 

Figure 8-4. Watertight Door Used 

on Central Office in Kamaishi, 

Japan (Kwasinski 2011)
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334 As indicated in Chapter 3 and presented in Table 8-1

335 through Table 8-3 (see Section 8.3), the desired 

336 performance of the communications system in the 

337 routine, expected, and extreme event (as defined in 

338 Chapter 3) is little or no interruption of service. 

339 These Central Office buildings are considered Risk 

340 Category III buildings in ASCE 7 and, consequently, 

341 should be designed to remain functional through the 

342 1/100 year flood elevation + 1 ft, or the design343 based elevation (whichever is higher), the 1,700 year 

344 wind event (based on ASCE 7-10), and the 0.2 

345 percent earthquake. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, 

346 the desired performance with respect to flooding 

347 was not achieved. 

348 Although these facilities are less vulnerable to wind than flood, in the case of routine, expected, and 

349 extreme events it is critical that the building envelope performs as intended since failure of the building 

350 envelope can allow significant amounts of water to enter the building and damage components. 

351 Historically, few building envelopes actually meet anticipated performance levels.

352 Threat to/from Interdependent Services. As discussed in Section 8.1.3 and Chapter 4, interdependencies 

353 play a big role in the overall performance of communications infrastructure. Central Offices rely on 

354 external power for critical equipment and electrical switchgear. The transportation system is needed for 

355 workers to maintain and monitor the functionality of equipment. Functioning water is needed for 

356 technicians to enter a building, meaning that if water the water system is not functional, repairs cannot be 

357 made to critical equipment. 

358 Electric power is the most obvious and important dependency of the communication and information 

359 system. For Central Offices, external electric power is needed to ensure the air conditioning system is 

360 functional so it can serve as a cooling system for critical electrical equipment. Although critical 

361 equipment is typically connected to backup batteries and/or standby generators, air conditioning systems 

362 are not connected to these standby systems. When there is a loss of electric power, critical 

363 telecommunications equipment can overheat and shut down as a result (Kwasinski 2009). 

364 Intra-dependencies with the rest of the communications infrastructure network must be considered. A 

365 Central Office serves as a switching node in the network and if its functionality is lost, stress is put on the 

366 network because the links (distribution system) are not connected as intended.

367 8.2.1.2. Transmission and Distribution 

368 While the Central Offices of the telecommunications systems play a key role in the functionality of the 

369 system, the transmission and distribution system must also be maintained and protected adequately for 

370 continued service. There are several components that must be considered for continued functionality:

371  First/last mile transmission

372  Type of cable (copper wires, coaxial cables, fiber optic cables)

373  Overhead vs. Underground Wires

374  Distributed Loop Carrier Remote Terminals (DLC RTs) 

375  Cable Television (CATV) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

376 First/Last Mile Transmission. The “first/last mile” is a term used in the communications industry that 

377 refers to the final leg of delivering services, via network cables, from a provider to a customer. The use of 

378 the term “last mile” implies the last leg of network cables delivering service to a customer, whereas “first 

Figure 8-5. Light Fixture and Equipment 

Failure inside Central Office in Mexico City 

1985 Earthquake (Alex Tang, OSSPAC 2013)
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379 mile” indicates the first leg of cables carrying data from the customer to the world (e.g., calling out or 

380 uploading data onto the Internet). Although the name implies it is one mile long, this is not always the 

381 case, especially in rural communities where it may be much longer (WV Broadband 2013). 

382 As learned from the 9/11 attacks, the first/last mile is a key to resilience for telecommunications and 

383 information infrastructure, especially for downtown business telecom networks. In urban settings, service 

384 providers typically connect Central Offices in a ring, which connects to the Internet backbone at several 

385 points (Lower Manhattan Telecommunications Users’ Working Group, 2002). Although the first/last mile 

386 is beyond this ring of Central Offices, the redundancy results in a resilient method that improves the 

387 likelihood that service providers will achieve their systems performance goal of continual service. Path 

388 diversity is built into the infrastructure system often using nodes that connect to the network backbone. 

389 However, as learned during workshops used to inform this framework, part of the last mile typically does 

390 not connect to the network backbone and, thus, is vulnerable to single-point failures. Furthermore, the 

391 location of the node failure also impacts service. If the failed node is between a Central Office and the 

392 buildings/facilities it services (i.e., first/last mile) the first/last mile customers will be of service. 

393 There is likely to be less redundancy in the telecommunication and information network cable systems in 

394 rural communities. Historically, rural and remote communities have not used these services as frequently 

395 or relied as heavily on them as urban communities. This has been the case because: 

396  In the past, technology to send large amounts of data over a long distance had not been available

397  The cost for service providers to expand into remote communities may be too high and have a low 

398 benefit-cost ratio

399 As a result of the lack of redundancy in rural and remote communities, a failure of one node in the service 

400 cables (single point of failure) may be all that is necessary for an outage to occur. Therefore, it may not be 

401 practical, currently, for rural and remote communities to expect the same performance goals as urban 

402 communities. As communications technology continues to grow and change, the level of redundancy (or 

403 path diversity) in communications infrastructure delivering services to rural/remote communities is likely 

404 to increase. In the case where the reason for loss of telecommunication services in the loss of external 

405 power rather than failure of the communications system itself, restoration of services may be quicker for 

406 rural communities. As learned in stakeholder workshops held to inform this framework, it was observed 

407 in Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy that power can be easier to restore in rural areas because in densely 

408 populated areas, components tend to be packed in tightly and other systems need to be repaired first 

409 before getting to the power supply system.

410 Copper Wires. Copper wires work by transmitting signals through electric pulses and carry the low power 

411 needed to operate a traditional landline telephone. The telephone company (i.e., service provider) that 

412 owns the wire provides the power rather than an electric company. Therefore, the use of traditional analog 

413 (i.e., plain old telephone service or POTS) landlines that use copper wire lessens the interdependency on 

414 external power (ALA 2006). As a result, in a natural hazard event resulting in loss of external power, 

415 communication may still be possible through the use of analog landlines (though this is not guaranteed).

416 Although copper wires perform well in many cases, they are being replaced by fiber optic cables because 

417 copper wires cannot support the large amount of data required for television and high-speed Internet, 

which has become the consumer expectation in the 21st 418 century (Lower Manhattan Telecommunications 

419 Users’ Working Group 2002).

420 Some service providers are interested in retiring their copper wires. Keeping both fiber optic and copper 

421 wires in service makes maintenance expensive for service providers and, hence, for customers (FTTH 

422 Council 2013). Copper wire is an aging infrastructure that becomes increasingly expensive to maintain. 

423 Verizon reported its operating expenses have been reduced by approximately 70 percent when it installed 

424 its FiOS (fiber optic) network and retired its copper plant in Central Offices (FTTH Council 2013). 
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425 Despite the advantages of traditional copper wire, there are also well-documented problems. As seen 

426 during and after Hurricane Sandy, copper wire is susceptible to salt water flooding. Once these metal 

427 wires are exposed to salt water, they fail (City of New York 2013). One solution to this problem is to 

428 ensure the copper wire is encased in a plastic or another non-saltwater-sensitive material. Furthermore, 

429 copper wires are older and generally no longer installed. 

430 Coaxial Cables. Coaxial cable is a more modern material and commonly used for transmission. It offers 

431 more resistance to water and is, therefore, not as susceptible to flood damage as copper wires. After 

432 Hurricane Sandy, these coaxial wires generally performed well with failures typically associated with loss 

433 of power to the electrical equipment to which they were connected (City of New York 2013). Coaxial 

434 cable has been and continues to be primarily used for cable television and Internet services. However, 

435 coaxial cables are being replaced by fiber optic cable since fiber optics can carry all types of services.

436 Fiber Optic Cables. Fiber optic cables are more resistant to water damage than either coaxial cable or 

437 copper wire (City of New York 2013). Fiber optic cables are now commonly used to bundle home 

438 services (television, high-speed Internet, and telephone) into one system, and provide ultra-high speed 

439 Internet. The use of fiber optic cables allows for transmission of large amounts of data on a single fiber. 

440 These cables are fully water resistant (City of New York 2013). Unfortunately, these services rely more 

441 heavily on power provided by a power utility instead of the communications provider itself for the end 

442 user. Consequently, during and after a natural hazard event where power is frequently interrupted, 

443 landline communications using fiber optic cables are lost in the absence of end user standby power 

444 equipment (ALA 2006). In fact, some communities turn off the power prior to the arrival of hurricane 

445 force winds for safety purposes. This prevents “live” electric lines from falling on roads, homes, etc., but 

446 it also eliminates the external power source for telecommunications of the end user. Some service 

447 providers provide in-home battery backup for cable and telephone. 

448 Overhead vs. Underground Wires. Distribution wire can be strung overhead using utility poles, or run 

449 underground. There are advantages and disadvantages for both options. 

450 Overhead wire failures are relatively easily located and repaired in the wake of a natural hazard event. 

451 However, their exposure makes them especially susceptible to high wind (e.g., hurricanes and tornadoes) 

452 and ice hazards. In high wind events, overhead wires 

453 may fail due to the failure of poles by the direct 

454 action of wind acting on poles and cables, or trees

455 falling onto the cables. Figure 8-6 shows an example 

456 of a failed cable television (CATV) line due to the 

457 direct action of wind during Hurricane Katrina.

458 Widespread failure of the aboveground system in 

459 high winds and ice storms is common and often 

460 associated with the effects of tree blow-down and 

461 falling branches. This is difficult to mitigate without 

462 removing trees. Some improvement in performance 

463 can be achieved with continued trimming of 

464 branches, to reduce both the likelihood of branches falling on lines and wind-induced forces acting upon 

465 the trees, which reduces the blow-down probability. The electric utility that owns the poles performs the 

466 tree trimming. Chapter 7 discusses challenges associated with tree removal and trimming.

467 Ice storms can also result in failure of aboveground communication infrastructure. For example, in 

468 January 2009, Kentucky experienced an ice storm in which long distance telephone lines failed due to 

469 loss of power and icing on poles, lines, and towers (Kentucky Public Service Commission 2009). Similar 

470 to wind hazards, accumulation of ice seen in Kentucky, paired with snow and high winds, led to tree 

471 falling onto overhead telephone and power lines. However, unlike power lines, telecommunication lines 

Figure 8-6. Failure of CATV cable due to the 

direct action of wind (Kwasinski 2006)
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472 that have limbs hanging on them or fall to the ground will continue to function unless severed (Kentucky 

473 Public Service Commission 2009). Since long distance telecommunications depend on power from 

474 another source (i.e., power providers), communication with those outside the local community was lost 

475 during the storm. Following the 2009 Kentucky ice storm, many communities became isolated and were 

476 unable to communicate their situation and emergency needs to regional or state disaster response officials 

477 (Kentucky Public Service Commission 2009). However, as learned in workshops held to inform this 

478 framework, long distance communications do have standby power capability. 

479 Emergency response and restoration of the 

480 telecommunications infrastructure after a hazard

481 event is an important consideration for which the 

482 challenges vary by hazard. In the cases of high wind 

483 and ice/snow events, tree fall on roads (Figure 8-7) 

484 slows down emergency repair crews from restoring 

485 power and overhead telecommunications. Ice storms 

486 have their own unique challenges in the recovery 

487 process. In addition to debris (e.g., trees) on roads, 

488 emergency restoration crews can be slowed down by 

489 ice-covered roads, and soft terrain (e.g., mud) in 

490 rural areas. Emergency restoration crews also face 

491 the difficulty of working for long periods of time in 

492 cold and windy conditions associated with these 

493 events. Communities should consider the conditions 

494 under which emergency restoration crews must 

495 work in establishing realistic performance goals of telecommunications infrastructure.

496 Although installation of underground wires eliminates the concern of impacts from wind, ice, and tree 

497 fall, underground wires may be more susceptible to flood if not properly protected, or earthquake damage 

498 and liquefaction. 

499 Communities in parts of the United States have debated converting their overhead wires to underground 

500 wires to eliminate the impacts from wind, ice, and tree fall. However, converting overhead to 

501 underground wires is both challenging and expensive (City of Urbana Public Works Department 2001). 

502 The main challenges/issues associated with converting from overhead to underground wires noted in the 

503 City of Urbana’s Public Works Department Report (2001) are:

504  Shorter design life of the underground system

505  Lack of maintenance and repair accessibility of the underground facilities

506  Aboveground hardware issues

507  Converting all customers’ wiring to accommodate underground in place of aboveground services

508 Service providers, like electric utility providers, would pass the cost associated with converting from 

509 overhead to underground wires to their customers (City of Urbana Public Works Department 2001). As 

510 discussed in Chapter 7 (Energy Systems), electric utility companies have tree trimming programs (and 

511 budgets) to reduce the risk of tree branches falling and damaging their distribution lines. The power utility 

512 is also reimbursed by telecommunications service providers since their services also benefit from the tree 

513 trimming program. The cost associated with maintaining a dedicated tree trimming program is 

514 significantly less than converting from overhead to underground wires because converting to an unground 

515 network involves many expensive efforts, including removing the existing system, lost cost resulting from 

516 not using the existing system for its design life, underground installation costs, and rewiring each building 

517 to accommodate underground utilities (City of Urbana Public Works Department 2001). Since 

Figure 8-7. Trees Fallen Across Roads Due to

Ice Storm in Kentucky Slowed Down Recovery 

Efforts (Kentucky Public Service Commission 

2009)
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518 telecommunications service providers and electric power utilities share infrastructure, they should work 

519 together to decide what is best for their distribution system.

520 Loop Digital Carrier Remote Terminals. Loop Digital Carrier Remote Terminals (DLC RTs) are nodes 

521 in the landline and Internet network that allow service to be distributed beyond the range for a given 

522 Central Office or exchange. Historically, copper wires provide service from a Central Office to a 

523 customer within approximately 4 kilometers of that Central Office (Kwasinski et al. 2006). The use of 

524 fiber optic cables and curbside DLC RTs can extend this range of service to approximately 10 km 

525 (Kwasinski et al. 2006). Therefore, DLC RTs provide a possible solution for service providers to reach 

526 customers further from their existing Central Offices or exchanges without having to invest in the 

527 construction of additional Central Offices. However, these nodes will not always allow sufficient capacity 

528 to replace the demand of a Central Office or node. Therefore, the service provider should consider how 

529 many customers it needs to serve (i.e., demand) with the node and if that number will grow (e.g., due to 

530 expansion of developments in area) or shrink (e.g., customers leave and do not come back as was the case 

531 after Hurricane Katrina).

532 DLC RTs can be used to rapidly replace smaller Central Offices or nodes as was done after Hurricane 

533 Katrina when less capacity than before the event was needed (Kwasinski 2011). This can help limit 

534 downtime of the network, but appropriate planning is needed to ensure the DLC RTs do not fail after the 

535 next hazard event. Perhaps the two most important things for service providers to consider when 

536 implementing DLC RTs are construction to limit vulnerability to hazards and standby power, which is a 

537 crucial consideration for any communications infrastructure.

538 A key lesson learned for DLC RTs from Hurricane 

539 Katrina was that nodes should be elevated in storm 

540 surge areas so they are not impacted in future hazard

541 events (Kwasinski 2011). The former BellSouth in 

542 New Orleans implemented this practice in New 

543 Orleans and the surrounding region after Hurricane 

544 Katrina. Figure 8-8 shows a DLC RT elevated on a 

545 platform. The building in the background of the

546 figure was a small Central Office in which all 

547 equipment was damaged during Hurricane Katrina, 

548 but never replaced (Kwasinski 2011). When the next 

549 set of storms (i.e., Hurricanes Gustav and Ike) passed 

550 through the region in 2008, many of the DLC RTs 

551 were not physically damaged due to storm surge.

552 Like cell towers, DLC RTs, need standby power to 

553 function when external power is disrupted as often 

554 occurs in a hazard event (see Section 8.2.3.1). Standby power generators can either be installed 

555 permanently, or deployed after a disruption in service. There are challenges associated with both options. 

556 Waiting until after an event to deploy standby generators can be difficult because: 

557  It can require significant labor support and logistics to mobilize a large number of standby generators

558  Fuel-operated standby generators require refueling during extended outages, which can be 

559 problematic due to access to fuel

560  Transportation routes to reach nodes may be impassible due to debris

561 In contrast, permanent generators can be expensive to install and maintain for a large number of sites, and 

562 require periodic testing to ensure they will function when needed. Furthermore, permanent generators 

563 should also be placed such that they are less vulnerable to the hazards that face the community (e.g., 

Figure 8-8. Elevated DLC RT with Natural Gas 

Standby Generator Installed After Hurricane 

Katrina (Kwasinski 2011)
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564 raised above anticipated storm surge levels). The installation of permanent standby generators (and 

565 raising the DLC RTs) after Hurricane Katrina (see Figure 8-8), helped reduce the amount of 

566 telecommunications outages during the 2008 Hurricanes (Gustav and Ike) that struck the same region

567 (Kwasinski 2011).

568 As discussed in other chapters of this document (e.g., Chapter 7), there are several energy options for 

569 standby generators. The most common is liquid fuel. Fuel is generally widely available, but may not be 

570 immediately after a disaster event which may make refueling challenging if outage times of external 

571 power extend for a long period of time. Permanent natural gas standby generators have also been used in 

572 the past. Natural gas standby generators performed well during Hurricane Gustav (Kwasinski 2011). 

573 However, natural gas generators are not the best option in general because natural gas distribution lines 

574 are often shut down prior to an anticipated hazard event to prevent fire and explosions. As a result, natural 

575 gas may not be the best option for standby power at critical nodes in the communications network. 

576 Cable Television (CATV)

577 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).

578 Many people receive landline 

579 telephone, Internet, and cable 

580 television through the same service 

581 provider. These services are bundled 

582 and distributed to the customers in a 

583 similar manner to the typical landline

584 using coaxial cable. UPS systems are 

585 used to inject power into the coaxial 

586 cable so CATV service can be 

587 delivered to customers (Kwasinski et 

588 al. 2006). UPS systems are placed on 

589 a pedestal on the ground or on a utility 

590 pole. Kwasinski (2011) documented 

591 several of the challenges associated 

592 with this infrastructure, including the 

593 placement of UPS’ on the ground or 

594 on utility poles, and providing adequate standby power. Like all of other critical equipment discussed in 

595 this chapter, it is important to place UPS systems such that their vulnerability to hazards is minimized.

596 Figure 8-9 (left) shows two UPS systems after Hurricane Katrina: one that was mounted on a pedestal at 

597 ground level was destroyed due to storm surge, and another that was mounted to a utility pole was not 

598 damaged. However, Figure 8-9 (right) also shows that placing UPS systems too high on utility poles can 

599 interfere with regular maintenance (Kwasinksi 2011). As previously mentioned, providing adequate 

600 standby power is a challenge, particularly for a pole-mounted UPS, because the additional load on a 

601 utility pole to provide sufficient standby power may be more than the pole can withstand. 

602 8.2.2. Internet Systems

603 The Internet has become the most used source of communication over the past couple of decades. It is 

604 continually used for e-mail, online shopping, receiving/reading the news, telephony, and increasingly for 

605 use of social networking. Businesses rely heavily on the Internet for communication, sending and 

606 receiving documents, video conferencing, e-mail, and working with other team members using online 

607 collaboration tools. The Internet is heavily used by financial institutions for transferring funds, buying 

608 and selling stocks, etc. Connectivity is becoming more important in the healthcare industry as it moves 

609 towards electronic medical records. 

Figure 8-9. Placement of UPS Systems is an Important 

Consideration for Resilience and Periodic Maintenance

(Kwasinski 2009)
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610 High-speed Internet is often tied in with telephone and cable by service providers through coaxial or fiber 

611 optic wires. The Internet depends on the electric power system, and loss of power at any point along the 

612 chain from source to user prevents data reception. As a result, Internet dependency on the electric power 

613 system makes it vulnerable to the performance of the power system in a natural hazard event. A concern 

614 for Internet systems, as is the case for landlines, is single points of failure (i.e., an individual source of 

615 service where there is no alternative/redundancy). 

616 8.2.2.1. Internet Exchange Points (IXP) 

617 Internet Exchange Points are buildings that allow service providers to connect directly to each other. This 

618 is advantageous because it helps improve quality of service and reduce transmission costs. The 

619 development of IXPs has played a major role in advancing development of the Internet ecosystem across 

620 North America, Europe, and Asia (Kende and Hurpy, 2012). IXPs now stretch into several countries in 

621 Africa and continue to expand the reach of the Internet. IXPs facilitate local, regional, and international 

622 connectivity.

623 IXPs provide a way for members, including Internet Service Providers (ISPs), backbone providers, and 

624 content providers to connect their networks and exchange traffic directly (Kende and Hurpy 2012). 

625 Similar to Central Offices for landlines, this results in IXPs being a potential single point of failure. 

626 The buildings housing the IXPs would be expected to meet the ASCE 7 requirements for critical 

627 buildings (Occupancy Category IV) and, consequently, would be expected to perform with no 

628 interruption of service for the “expected” event, or hazard level. The facilities would be expected to have 

629 sufficient standby power to function until external power to the facility is brought back online. 

630 Location of Critical Equipment in IXPs. Another similarity to telecommunications Central Offices is 

631 that the location and protection of critical equipment is important. Critical equipment should be protected 

632 by placing it in locations where it will not be susceptible to expected hazards in the community. For 

633 example, inevitably some buildings are in floodplains because many large urban centers are centered 

634 around large bodies of water or on the coast. The owner, engineers, maintenance, and technical staff must 

635 all be aware of potential hazards that could impact the equipment within the structure. As should be done 

636 for telecommunications Central Offices, the following considerations should be taken into consideration 

637 for the critical equipment of IXPs:

638  Electrical and emergency equipment should be located above the elevation of an “extreme” flood, 

639 which is to be defined by the community (see Chapter 3). Alternatively, tools such as Sea, Lake, and 

640 Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) maps could be used to define the minimum elevation for 

641 electrical and critical equipment.

642  Rooms housing critical equipment should be designed to resist extreme loads for the community, 

643 whether it is earthquake, high wind, blast, other hazards, or a combination of hazards. Remember that 

644 fire is often a secondary hazard that results from other hazard events. 

645  Where possible, redundancy and standby power for critical equipment should be provided.

646 All too often, communities see the same problems and damage in the wake of a natural hazard event (e.g., 

647 loss of power, loss of roof cover and wall cladding leading to rain infiltration in high wind events). 

648 Fortunately, many problems can be mitigated by sufficient planning and risk assessment (as previously 

649 discussed in the comparison of two telecommunications Central Offices in New York City after Hurricane 

650 Sandy). Careful placement and protection of critical equipment can help achieve performance goals of the 

651 Internet’s critical equipment. For example, in flood prone regions, critical equipment should be placed 

652 above the extreme flood level for the area. In earthquake regions, critical equipment should be designed 

653 and mounted such that shaking from earthquake events does not cause failure.
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654 8.2.2.2. Internet Backbone

655 The Internet Backbone refers to the cables that connect the “network-of-networks.” The Internet is a 

656 system of nodes connected by paths/links. These paths run all over the United States and the rest of the 

657 world. As a result, many of the same challenges identified for the landline cables for fiber optic cables 

658 exist for Internet, namely that it requires power to function. The heavy reliance on power impacts the 

659 performance and recovery goals of Internet service for service providers and their customers.

660 Path Diversity. Path diversity refers to the ability of information to travel along different paths to get to 

661 its destination should there be a failure in its originally intended path (i.e., path diversity is synonymous

662 with redundancy). The more diversity that exists, the more reliable the system.

663 8.2.3. Cellular/Mobile Systems

664 The cellular telephone system has most of the same vulnerabilities as the landline system, including the 

665 local exchange offices, collocation hotels, and cable head facilities. Other possible failure points unique to 

666 the cellular network include the cell site (tower and power) and backhaul switches at Central Offices. 

667 Figure 8-1 (page 5) shows how the cellular phone network fits within the telecommunication network. At 

668 the base of a cell tower is switchgear (also known as Cell Site Electronics) and standby power. Damage of 

669 switchgear at the base of the tower prevents switching to standby power when commercial power fails.

670 8.2.3.1. Cell Towers

671 Virtually all natural hazards including earthquake, high wind, ice and flood affect the ability of an 

672 individual cell tower to function through loss of external power or failure of cell phone towers 

673 themselves.

674 Loss of External Power. Large scale loss of external power occurs relatively frequently in hurricanes 

675 (mainly due to high wind and flooding), large thunderstorm events (such as those associated with 

676 derechos and tornadoes), ice storms, and earthquakes. Some cell towers are equipped with batteries 

677 designed to provide four to eight hours of standby power after loss of external power (City of New York 

678 2013). In the past, the FCC has attempted to mandate a minimum of eight hours of battery standby power, 

679 but the requirement was removed by the courts. However, adequate standby power should be provided for 

680 cell towers, particularly in areas that serve critical facilities. The functionality of the tower can be 

681 extended through use of permanent or portable diesel generators. Portable generators were used in New 

682 York following Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The installation of permanent diesel generators has been 

683 resisted by the providers due to the high cost and practicality (City of New York 2013).

684 Recalling that buildings and systems should remain fully functional during and after a routine event 

685 (Chapter 3), all cellular towers and attached equipment should remain operational. There is an expectation 

686 that the 9-1-1 emergency call system will remain functional during and after the event. Considering the 

687 poor performance of the electric grid experienced during recent hurricanes (which produced wind speeds 

688 less than the nominal 50 to 100-year values as specified in ASCE 7 [93, 95, 02 and 05]), external power is 

689 unlikely to remain functional during the expected, or even routine (as defined in Chapter 3) event. 

690 Consequently, adequate standby power is critical to ensure functionality. Recent experience with 

691 hurricanes and other disaster events suggest the standby power needs to last longer than the typical 

692 current practice of four to eight hours (City of New York 2013).

693 In flood prone areas, the standby power needs to be located, at a minimum, above the 100-year flood level 

694 to ensure functionality after the event. Similarly, the equipment must be resistant to the 50-year 

695 earthquake load.

696 The use of permanently located diesel electric standby power poses significant difficulties due to the 

697 initial and ongoing required maintenance costs. Diesel generators are often (though not always) loud and 

698 may generate complaints from nearby residents. In the case of events such as hurricanes and major ice 
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699 storms where advanced warning is available, portable generators can be staged and deployed after the 

700 storm. However, for widespread hazard events, such as hurricanes and ice storms, the need often exceeds 

701 the ability to deploy all of the portable generators needed. When they are deployed, the portable 

702 generators usually require refueling about once per day so continued access is important. Permanent 

703 generators also require refueling, but the frequency is variable due to the different capacities of permanent 

704 generators. In events where there is little to no warning, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, staging of 

705 portable generators cannot be completed ahead of time. However, for localized events that are 

706 unpredictable and short duration (e.g., tornadoes, tsunamis), portable generators may be the best approach 

707 for quick recovery of the system’s functionality. 

708 In highly urbanized areas, such as New York City, cell towers are frequently located on top of buildings, 

709 preventing the placement of permanent diesel standby generators and making it difficult to supply power 

710 from portable generators because of impeded access. 

711 Improvements in battery technology and the use of hydrogen fuel cell technologies may alleviate some of 

712 the standby power issues. Furthermore, newer cellular phone technologies require less power, potentially 

713 leading to longer battery life. Standby battery technology is a key consideration in establishing the 

714 performance goals of cellular phones in the wake of a hazard event.

715 Failure of Cell Phone Towers. Collapse of cell phone towers due to earthquake, high winds, or flooding 

716 should not be expected to occur when subject to a natural hazard event of magnitude less than or equal to 

717 the expected event. This was not the case in Hurricane Katrina (2005) where cell phone towers were 

718 reported to have failed (DHS, 2006), although many failed after being impacted by flood-borne debris 

719 (e.g., large boats, etc.), whose momentum was likely well beyond a typical design flood impact. After an 

720 event, failed towers can be replaced by temporary portable towers. Similarly, the January 2009 Kentucky 

721 ice storm had cell phone tower failures due to the combination of ice accumulation and winds over 40 

722 mph (Kentucky Public Service Commission 2009).

723 Cell towers may be designed to either ASCE Category II or ASCE Category III occupancy requirements. 

724 The latter is used when the towers are used to support essential emergency equipment or located at a 

725 central emergency hub. Consequently, in the case of wind and flood, the towers and equipment located at 

726 the base of the tower should perform without any damage during both routine and expected events 

727 (Chapter 3). 

728 More commonly, cell towers are designed to meet the criteria of TIA/EIT-222-G. Prior to the 2006 

729 version of this standard (which is based on the ASCE 7 loading criteria), it used Allowable Stress Design 

730 (ASD) rather than Load and Resistance Factor Design, wind loads used fastest mile wind speeds rather 3-

731 second gust, and seismic provisions were not provided. The ice provisions differ from version to version, 

732 but no major differences in methodology have been noted. Therefore, cell towers designed to meet the 

733 criteria of TIA/EIT-222-G should perform well in an expected wind, ice, or earthquake event. However, 

734 older cell towers that have not been retrofitted/upgraded to meet the 2006 version of TIA/EIT-222-G may 

735 not perform as well. Specifically, cell towers in earthquake-prone regions may have been designed and 

736 built without guidance on the loading, which may have resulted in either over- or under-designed cell 

737 towers in these regions.

738 Backhaul Facilities. Backhaul facilities serve a purpose similar to that of the Central Offices and 

739 consequently should meet the same performance goals, including proper design of the standby power 

740 system.

741 8.3. Performance Goals

742 Although the goal of communities, infrastructure owners, and businesses is to have continued operation at 

743 all times, 100 percent functionality is not always feasible in the wake of a hazard event given the current 

744 state of infrastructure in the United States. Depending on the magnitude and type of event, the levels of 
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745 damage and functionality will vary. Most importantly, performance goals of the communications 

746 infrastructure will vary from community to community based upon its needs and should be defined by the 

747 community and its stakeholders. As discussed in Section 8.2, there are many examples of service 

748 providers and other infrastructure owners who have successfully made changes to their infrastructure 

749 system such that their downtime has been shortened or even eliminated after a hazard event. 

750 This section provides examples of performance goals for the fictional town of Centerville, USA.

751 Communication infrastructure stakeholders and communities can use performance goals tables to assess 

752 their infrastructure and take steps in improving their resilience to hazard events. Note that performance 

753 goals are specified in terms of recovery time. However, mitigation techniques, including improving 

754 design and code/standard enforcement, play significant roles in accomplishing performance goals.

755 Therefore, both mitigation strategies and recovery plans can be used to achieve performance goals.

756 Before establishing performance goals, it is imperative to understand who the owners, regulatory bodies,

757 and stakeholders of the communications infrastructure are and how they operate. All groups should be 

758 involved in establishing performance goals and working together to narrow gaps in resilience. 

759 Infrastructure Owners, Regulatory Bodies, and Stakeholders. Ownership and regulation of 

760 communication and information infrastructure systems adds a layer of complexity for resilience. 

761 Governments typically do not own communication infrastructure other than in their own facilities. 

762 However, Federal, State, and Local government agencies are involved in the regulation of 

763 communications infrastructure. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has an advisory

764 committee called the Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) that 

765 promotes best practices, although there are limited requirements for compliance with the practices. 

766 However, best practices are often implemented by service providers (despite not being standards) because 

767 they help mitigate risks, which is a good idea in a competitive industry. 

768 The FCC has authority over wireless, long-distance telephone, and Internet services, whereas state 

769 agencies have authority over local landlines and agencies at all levels have regulatory authority over cable 

770 (City of New York 2013). Within these three levels of government, there may be multiple agencies 

771 involved in overseeing infrastructure. State and local Departments of Transportation (DOTs) control 

772 access to roadway rights-of-way for construction. The local Department of Buildings (DOB) regulates the 

773 placement of electrical equipment, standby power, and fuel storage at critical telecommunications 

774 facilities as specified in their local Building Codes (City of New York 2013).

775 Service providers own communications infrastructure. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was 

776 established to promote competition in the communications industry (FCC 2011), which would result in 

777 lower prices for customers. This has resulted in a growing number of industry players who share 

778 infrastructure to offer options for their services to customers more efficiently. Service providers can 

779 sometimes share infrastructure to provide their services. However, their infrastructure cannot always be 

780 shared because different providers use different technology that is not compatible. 

781 Telecommunication and Cable/Internet Service Providers, such as AT&T and Verizon, often share 

782 infrastructure with providers in the energy industry. For example, utility poles for overhead wires 

783 typically serve to transport electric energy, telecommunications, and cable. It is, therefore, essential that 

784 key members from these service providers are involved in establishing, or agreeing to, the performance 

785 goals for the communications infrastructure. Improved performance of their infrastructure, much like the 

786 power industry, will result in improved service in the wake of a hazard event. Moreover, improvements 

787 made to achieve performance goals may result in better performance on a day-to-day basis. A service 

788 provider may benefit from excellent performance following a hazard event because customers frustrated 

789 with their own service may look for other options that are more reliable. Service providers may also 

790 experience different damage levels for the same quality infrastructure due to poor fortune, which can 

791 provide an inaccurate perception that it is not as reliable as another service provider. However, this may 
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792 not always be true because some service providers share infrastructure and thus, failures may occur due to 

793 interdependencies. Moreover, in a competitive cost-driven industry, the cost to make a system more 

794 resilient, which is passed down to customers, may result in losing business. Therefore, including service 

795 providers in the group of stakeholders is key because their industry is quite complex.

796 After the AT&T divestiture of 1984, the end user became responsible for the voice and data cabling on its 

797 premises (Anixter Inc. 2013). Therefore, building owners are responsible for communications 

798 infrastructure within their facilities. As a result, standards have been developed by the American National 

799 Standards Institute/Telecommunications Industry Association (ANSI/TIA) for different types of premises, 

800 including:

801  Commercial buildings (e.g., office and university campus buildings)

802  Residential buildings (e.g., single and multi-unit homes)

803  Industrial buildings (e.g., factories and testing laboratories)

804  Healthcare facilities (e.g., hospitals)

805 Communications infrastructure has owners and stakeholders from multiple industries that must be 

806 included in establishing the performance goals and improving resilience of system components. For 

807 resilience of the distribution communication systems, service provider representatives, including designer 

808 professionals (engineers and architects for buildings owned by service providers such as Central 

809 Offices/data centers), planners, utility operators, and financial decision makers (i.e., financial analysts) for 

810 power service providers must be included in the process. Owners of buildings that are leased by service 

811 providers to house critical equipment and nodes in their system are important stakeholders. Additionally, 

812 representatives of end users from different industries should be included to establish performance goals 

813 and improve resilience of communications system transfer from provider to building owner. Specifically, 

814 transfer of telecommunications and Internet to a building is often through a single point of failure. Those 

815 involved in building design, such as planners, architects, engineers, and owners need to be aware of 

816 potential opportunities to increase redundancy and resiliency. 

817 Performance Goals. Performance goals in this document are defined in terms of how quickly the 

818 infrastructure’s functionality can be recovered after a hazard event. Minimizing downtime can be 

819 achieved during the design process and/or recovery plans. Example tables of performance goals for 

820 communications infrastructure, similar to the format presented in the Oregon Resilience Plan (OSSPAC 

821 2013), are presented in Table 8-1 through Table 8-3. These tables of performance goals are examples for

822 routine, expected, and extreme events, respectively. Note that these performance goals were developed 

823 based on wind events using current ASCE (ASCE 7-10) design criteria, performance seen in past high 

824 wind events, and engineering judgment. Thus, these goals can be adjusted by users as necessary for their 

825 community to meet its social needs, consider their state of infrastructure, and the type and magnitude of 

826 hazard. For example, an earthquake-prone region may have different performance goals because the 

827 design philosophy is for life safety as opposed to wind design which focuses on serviceability. 

828 The performance goals tables (Table 8-1 to Table 8-3) are intended as a guide that communities/owners 

829 can use to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the resilience of their communications systems 

830 infrastructure. As previously discussed, the performance goals may vary from community-to-community 

831 based upon its social needs. Communities/owners and stakeholders should use the table as a tool to assess 

832 what their performance goals should be based on their local social needs. Tables similar to that of Table 

833 8-1 to Table 8-3 can be developed for any community (urban or rural), any type of hazard event, and for 

834 the various levels of hazards (routine, expected and extreme) defined in Chapter 3 of the framework. 

835 Representatives of the stakeholders in a given community should participate in establishing the 

836 performance goals and evaluating the current state of the systems. The City of San Francisco provides an 

837 excellent example of what bringing stakeholders together can accomplish. San Francisco has developed a 
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838 lifelines council (The Lifelines Council of the City and County of San Francisco 2014), which unites

839 different stakeholders to get input regarding the current state of infrastructure and how improvements can 

840 be made in practice. The lifelines council performs studies and provides recommendations as to where 

841 enhancements in infrastructure resilience and coordination are needed (The Lifelines Council of the City 

842 and County of San Francisco 2014). Their work has led to additional redundancy being implemented into 

843 the network in the Bay Area. 

844 Granularity of Performance Goals. Table 8-1and Table 8-3 present examples of performance goals for 

845 different components of the communications infrastructure when subjected to each hazard level. The list 

846 of components for this example is not intended to be exhaustive. These lists vary by community based on 

847 its size and social needs. In terms of granularity of the performance goals table, the communications 

848 infrastructure system is broken down into three categories (see Table 8-2): 1) Core and Central Offices, 2) 

849 Distribution Nodes, and 3) Last Mile. 

850 The Core and Central Offices could be split into two different functional categories by nationwide service 

851 providers. The Core refers to the backbone of service provider’s network that includes facilities that store 

852 customer data and information. For larger service providers, these facilities may be geo-redundant and run 

853 in tandem so one widespread event, such as a hurricane or earthquake, cannot disrupt the entire network. 

854 Central Offices, discussed throughout this chapter, are regional nodes whose failure would result in 

855 widespread service disruptions. For this example of performance goals, the Core and Central Offices are 

856 treated as one functional category because the performance goals for Centerville, USA are the same (i.e., 

857 no failure of Central Offices or Core facilities).

858 Distribution nodes include the next tier in the communications network that collect and distribute 

859 communications at a more local (e.g., neighborhood) level. For Centerville, USA, this includes cell 

860 towers. For other communities, this may include DLC RTs and other local hubs/nodes.

861 The last mile refers to distribution of services to the customers. For landline, Internet, and cable, this is 

862 impacted by the performance of the distribution wires in a given hazard event. Wireless technology, such 

863 as cellular phones, operates using signals rather than physical infrastructure for distribution. Therefore, 

864 the last mile distribution is not needed. Although the system’s components (e.g., underground cables, 

865 overhead cables, etc.) are not specifically included in the performance goals, they must be considered to 

866 achieve the performance goals specified by the community or service provider. 

867 Developing Performance Goals Tables. The community/owners should work to establish their own 

868 performance goals. In the example tables (Table 8-1 to Table 8-3), performance goals are established for 

869 three levels of functionality. The orange shaded boxes indicate the desired time to reach 30 percent

870 functionality of the component. Yellow indicates the time frame in which 60 percent operability is desired 

871 and green indicates greater than 90 percent operability. A goal is not set for 100 percent operability in this 

872 example because it may take significantly longer to reach this target and may not be necessary for 

873 communities to return to their normal daily lives. The performance of many of the components in the 

874 communication network, such as towers and buildings housing equipment are expected to perform 

875 according to their design criteria. Recent history, however, suggests this is frequently not the case.

876 The affected area of a given hazard can also be specified, which is often dependent on the type of hazard. 

877 For example, earthquake and hurricanes typically have large affected areas, whereas tornadoes and 

878 tsunamis have relatively small affected areas. The affected area is important for a community to consider 

879 because it will impact how much of the infrastructure may be damaged, which in turn will impact the 

880 duration of the recovery process. The disruption level based on the current state of the communications 

881 infrastructure system as a whole should be specified as usual, moderate or severe. 

882 An “X” is placed in the each row of Table 8-1 through Table 8-3 as an example of how a community can 

883 indicate anticipated performance and recovery of the infrastructure in their evaluation. As seen in the 
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884 tables, the hypothetical “X” indicates there is a significant gap between what is desired and what reality is 

885 for all of the components. This is a resilience gap. If the community decides that improving the resilience 

886 of their Central Offices is a top priority after its evaluation of their infrastructure, the next step would be 

887 to determine how to reduce this resilience gap. For Central Offices and their equipment, there are a 

888 number of solutions that can help narrow the gap in resilience, including hardening the building to resist 

889 extreme loads and protecting equipment from hazards such as flooding by elevating electrical equipment 

890 and emergency equipment above extreme flooding levels. 

891 These lessons have been learned through past disasters, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricanes

892 Sandy and Katrina, etc. Section 8.6.1discusses potential methods to evaluate the anticipated performance 

893 of existing communications infrastructure. Sections 8.6.2 and 8.6.3 provide mitigation and recovery 

894 strategies that can be used to achieve the performance goals set by the community or service provider. 

895 The strategies in these sections also recognize it will take communities/owners time and money to invest 

896 in solutions, and provides possible long and short term solutions.

897 Emergency Responder Communication Systems. The performance goals include distribution 

898 infrastructure to critical facilities such as hospitals, fire and police stations, and emergency operation 

899 centers. However, the example performance goals for communication infrastructure do not include

900 communication systems between emergency responders (fire/police/paramedics), which have their own 

901 communications networks and devices. Community emergency response providers should ensure their 

902 networks and devices remain functional in the immediate aftermath of a disaster event (i.e., there should 

903 not be any downtime of emergency responder communication networks). After a disaster event, 

904 functionality of critical services communication networks is essential to coordinating response to people 

905 who are injured, and fire or other hazard suppression.

906 
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907 Table 8-1. Example Communications Performance Goals for Routine Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Routine Event Localized 60% Restored

Disruption Level Minor 90% Restored

(3) X Current

908

Functional Category: Cluster

(4) 

Support 

Needed

(5) 

Target 

Goal

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Routine Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 2 -- Intermediate Phase 3 – Long-Term

Days Wks Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Nodes/Exchange/Switching Points A

Central offices 90% X

Buildings containing exchanges 90% X

Internet Exchange Point (IXP) 90% X

Towers A

Free standing cell phone towers 90% X

Towers mounted on buildings 90% X

Distribution lines to ...

Critical Facilities 1

Hospitals 90% X

Police and fire stations 90% X

Emergency operation center 90% X

Emergency Housing 1

Residences 90% X

Emergency responder housing 90% X

Public shelters 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods 2

Essential city service facilities 60% 90% X

Schools 60% 90% X

Medical provider offices 60% 90% X

Retail 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 3

Residences 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail 60% 90% X

Offices and work places 60% 90% X

Non-emergency city services 60% 90% X

Businesses 60% 90% X

909 Notes: These performance goals are based on an expected wind event (using current ASCE design criteria) and performance seen in past high 

910 wind events.

911 Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard being considered

Specify level -- Routine, Expected, Extreme

Specify the size of the area affected - localized, community, regional

Specify severity of disruption - minor, moderate, severe

2 30% 60% 90% Restoration times relate to number of elements of each cluster

3 X Estimated restoration time for current conditions based on design standards and current inventory

Relates to each cluster or category and represents the level of restoration of service to that cluster or category

Listing for each category should represent the full range for the related clusters

Category recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

"X" represents the recovery time anticipated to achieve a 90% recovery level for the current conditions

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R Regional

S State

MS Multi-state

C Civil Corporate Citizenship 

5 Indicate minimum performance category for all new construction. 

See Section 3.2.6
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912 Table 8-2. Example Communications Performance Goals for Expected Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Routine Event Localized 60% Restored

Disruption Level Moderate 90% Restored

(3) X Current

913

Functional Category: Cluster

(4) 

Support 

Needed

(5) 

Target 

Goal

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Expected Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 2 –

Intermediate Phase 3 – Long-Term

Days Wks Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-36 36+

Nodes/Exchange/Switching Points A

Central Offices 90% X

Buildings containing exchanges 90% X

Internet Exchange Point (IXP) 90% X

Towers A

Free standing cell phone towers 90% X

Towers mounted on buildings 90% X

Distribution lines to ...

Critical Facilities 1

Hospitals 90% X

Police and fire stations 90% X

Emergency Operation Center 90% X

Emergency Housing 1

Residences 60% 90% X

Emergency responder housing 60% 90% X

Public Shelters 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods 2

Essential city service facilities 30% 90% X

Schools 30% 90% X

Medical provider offices 30% 90% X

Retail 30% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 3

Residences 30% 90% X

Neighborhood retail 30% 90% X

Offices and work places 30% 90% X

Non-emergency city services 30% 90% X

Businesses 30% 90% X

914 Footnotes: See Table 8-1, page 22.
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915 Table 8-3. Example Communications Performance Goals for Extreme Event in Centerville, USA

Disturbance Restoration times

(1) Hazard Any (2) 30% Restored

Affected Area for Extreme Event Regional 60% Restored

Disruption Level Severe 90% Restored

(3) X Current

916

Functional Category: Cluster

(4) 

Support 

Needed

(5) 

Target 

Goal

Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed

Extreme Hazard Level

Phase 1 – Short-Term Phase 2 -- Intermediate Phase 3 – Long-Term

Days Wks Mos

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-36 36+

Nodes/Exchange/Switching Points A

Central Offices 90% X

Buildings containing exchanges 90% X

Internet Exchange Point (IXP) 90% X

Towers A

Free standing cell phone towers 90% X

Towers mounted on buildings 90% X

Distribution lines to ...

Critical Facilities 1

Hospitals 90% X

Police and fire stations 90% X

Emergency operation center 90% X

Emergency Housing 1

Residences 30% 90% X

Emergency responder housing 30% 90% X

Public shelters 30% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods 2

Essential city service facilities 30% 60% 90% X

Schools 30% 60% 90% X

Medical provider offices 30% 60% 90% X

Retail 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 3

Residences 30% 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail 30% 60% 90% X

Offices and work places 30% 60% 90% X

Non-emergency city services 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses 30% 60% 90% X

917 Footnotes: See Table 8-1, page 22.
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918 8.4. Regulatory Environment

919 There are multiple regulatory bodies at the various levels of government (Federal, State, and Local) that 

920 have authority over communications infrastructure. There is no one regulatory body that oversees all 

921 communication infrastructure and is responsible for enforcement of the various standards and codes. The 

922 rapidly evolving technologies over the past 30 years have led to changes in regulatory jurisdiction, which 

923 adds complexity to the regulatory environment. This section discusses regulatory bodies of 

924 communications infrastructure at the Federal, State, and Local levels.

925 8.4.1. Federal 

926 The regulatory body of communication services and, thus, infrastructure is the FCC. The FCC is a 

927 government agency that regulates interstate and international communications of telephone, cable, radio,

928 and other forms of communication. It has jurisdiction over wireless, long-distance telephone, and the 

929 Internet (including VoIP). 

930 As previously discussed, the FCC has an advisory group called the Communications Security, Reliability, 

931 and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) that promotes best practices. The council performs studies, 

932 including after disaster events (e.g., Hurricane Katrina), and recommends ways to improve disaster 

933 preparedness, network reliability, and communications among first responders (Victory et. al 2006). The 

934 recommended best practices are not required to be adopted and enforced since they are not standards. 

935 However, as learned in the stakeholder workshops held to inform this framework, industry considers best 

936 practices voluntary good things to do under appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, implementing best 

937 practices allows service providers to remain competitive in business.

938 8.4.2. State

939 State government agencies have authority over local landline telephone service. Most commonly, the 

940 agency responsible for overseeing communications infrastructure at the State level is known as the Public 

941 Service Commission (PSC). However, other State agencies have jurisdiction over telecommunications 

942 infrastructure as well. A prime example is the State DOT. The State DOT has jurisdiction over the right943 of-way and, therefore, oversees construction of roads/highways where utility poles and wires are built. 

944 Utility poles and wires are commonly placed within the right-of-way of roads, whether it is aboveground 

945 or underground. The DOT has the ability to permit or deny planned paths of the utilities. 

946 8.4.3. Local

947 Local government has jurisdiction over communication infrastructure through a number of agencies. The 

948 Department of Buildings (DOB), or equivalent, is responsible for enforcing the local Building Code. 

949 Therefore, the DOB regulates the placement of electrical equipment, standby power, and fuel storage at 

950 critical telecommunications facilities such as Central Offices (City of New York 2013). 

951 Large cities, such as New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Seattle have their own DOT (City of 

952 New York 2013). These local DOTs oversee road construction and the associated right-of-way for 

953 utilities (including communications infrastructure). Many smaller municipalities have an Office of 

954 Transportation Planning, which serves a similar function.

955 8.4.4. Overlapping Jurisdiction

956 Due to the complex bundling packages that service providers now offer customers, a number of 

957 regulatory bodies have jurisdiction over the various services provided in said bundle. For example, a 

958 bundled telephone, Internet and cable package functions under the jurisdiction of both Local (cable) and 

959 Federal (Internet and VoIP) agencies (City of New York 2013). Furthermore, changing from traditional 

960 landlines to VoIP shifts a customer’s services from being regulated by State agencies to Federal agencies. 

961 As technology continues to evolve, jurisdiction over services may continue to shift from one level of 
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962 government to another. Following the current trend of more and more services becoming Internet based, 

963 the shift of services may continue to move toward being under Federal agency regulations.

964 8.5. Standards and Codes

965 Codes and Standards are used by the communication and information industry to establish the minimum 

966 acceptable criteria for design and construction. The codes and standards shown in Table 8-4 were mainly 

967 developed by the American National Standards Institute/Telecommunications Industry Association 

968 (ANSI/TIA). This organization has developed many standards that are adopted at the state and local 

969 government levels as well as by individual organizations. In fact, many of the standards presented in 

970 Table 8-4 are referenced and adopted by universities, such as East Tennessee State University (ETSU 

971 2014), in their communication and information systems design guidelines. Individual end users, such as a 

972 university campus or hospital, and levels of government may have additional standards/guidelines.

973 Table 8-4. Summary of Communication and Information Codes and Standards

Code/Standard Description 

ANSI/TIA-222-G Structural Standards 

for Antennae Supporting Structures and 

Antennas

Specifies the loading and strength requirements for antennas and their supporting 

structures (e.g., towers). The 2006 edition of the standard has significant changes 

from its previous editions including: changing from ASD to LRFD; change of wind 

loading to better match ASCE-7 (i.e., switch from use of fastest-mile to 3-second 

gust wind speeds); updating of ice provisions; and addition of seismic provisions 

(Erichsen 2014)

ANSI/TIA-568-C.0 Generic 

Telecommunications Cabling for 

Customer Premises

Used for planning and installation of a structured cabling system for all types of 

customer premises. This standard provides requirements in addition to those for 

specific types of premises (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ANSI/TIA-568-C.1 Commercial Building 

Telecommunications Cabling Standard

Used for planning and installation of a structured cabling system of commercial 

buildings (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ANSI/TIA-569-C Commercial Building 

Standard for Telecommunication 

Pathways and Spaces

Standard recognizes that buildings have a long life cycle and must be designed to 

support the changing telecommunications systems and media. Standardized 

pathways, space design and construction practices to support telecommunications 

media and equipment inside buildings (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ANSI/TIA-570-B Residential 

Telecommunications Cabling Standard

Standard specifies cabling infrastructure for distribution of telecommunications 

services in single or multi-tenant dwellings. Cabling for audio, security, and home 

are included in this standard (Hubbell Premise Wiring, Inc. 2014)

ANSI/TIA-606-B Administration 

Standard for Commercial 

Telecommunications Infrastructure

Provides guidelines for proper labeling and administration of telecommunications 

infrastructure (Anexter Inc. 2013).

ANSI/TIA-942-A Telecommunications 

Infrastructure Standard for Data Centers

Provides requirements specific to data centers. Data centers may be an entire 

building or a portion of a building (Hubbell Premise Wiring, Inc. 2014)

ANSI/TIA-1005 Telecommunications 

Infrastructure for Industrial Premises

Provides the minimum requirements and guidance for cabling infrastructure inside 

of and between industrial buildings (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ANSI/TIA-1019 Standard for Installation, 

Alteration & Maintenance of Antenna 

Supporting Structures and Antennas

Provides requirements for loading of structures under construction related to 

antenna supporting structures and the antennas themselves (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ANSI/TIA-1179 Healthcare Facility 

Telecommunications Infrastructure 

Standard

Provides minimum requirements and guidance for planning and installation of a 

structured cabling system for healthcare facilities and buildings. This standard also 

provides performance and technical criteria for different cabling system 

configurations (Anexter Inc. 2013)

ASCE 7-10 Minimum Design Loads for 

Buildings and Other Structures

Provides minimum loading criteria for buildings housing critical communications 

equipment. Also provides loading criteria for towers.

IEEE National Electrical Safety Code 

(NESC)

United States Standard providing requirements for safe installation, operation and 

maintenance of electrical power, standby power and telecommunication systems 

(both overhead and underground wiring). 
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974 8.5.1. New Construction

975 The standards listed in Table 8-4 are used in new construction for various parts of the communications 

976 infrastructure system. As discussed in Section 8.2.1.1, new Central Offices are designed using ASCE 7-10 

977 Occupancy Category III buildings. Consequently, the design of equipment and standby power for Central 

978 Offices must be consistent with that of the building design. As discussed in Chapter 5 (Buildings), 

979 buildings (e.g., Central Offices) must be designed in accordance with ASCE loading criteria for the 

980 applicable hazards of the community, which may include flooding, snow/ice, earthquakes, and wind. 

981 Wind loading criteria used by ASCE 7-10 has been developed using hurricane and extratropical winds. 

982 Other natural loads that can cause significant damage such as wildfire, tsunami, and tornadoes are not 

983 explicitly considered in ASCE 7-10. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, fire protection standards are 

984 available and are used to mitigate potential building fire damage. 

985 The ANSI/TIA-222-G standard is used for the design of new cell towers. This version of the standards, 

986 released in 2006, included the biggest set of changes since the standard’s inception (TIA 2014). Some 

987 major changes include:

988 1. Using limits states design rather than allowable stress design

989 2. Changing the design wind speeds from fastest-mile to 3-second gust, as is done for ASCE 7, and 

990 using the wind maps from ASCE 7

991 3. Earthquake loading is addressed for the first time in the ANSI/TIA-222 standard (Wahba 2003)

992 Note that wind, ice, and storm surge are the predominant concerns for towers. However, earthquake 

993 loading was added so it would be considered in highly seismic regions (Wahba 2003).

994 Communication system distribution lines are subject to the design criteria in the National Electric Safety 

995 Code (NESC). As discussed in Chapter 7, Rule 250 contains the environmental hazard loading on the 

996 communication and electric power lines as well as their supporting structures (e.g., utility poles). 

997 Specifically, these criteria address combined ice and wind loading, which are provided in Rule 250B for 

998 three districts of the United States defined as: 1) Heavy; 2) Medium; and 3) Light. Rule 250C addresses 

999 “extreme” wind loading and Rule 250D provides design criteria for “extreme” ice with concurrent wind.

1000 Use of the term “extreme” by NESC does not correspond to that used in this document. Rather, use of 

1001 “extreme” by the current version of NESC-2012 indicates the use of the ASCE 7-05 maps for the 50 year 

1002 return period, which, if used with the appropriate ASCE 7-05 load and resistance factors, corresponds to 

1003 an expected event as defined in Chapter 3 of this document. However, the NESC “extreme” loads only 

1004 apply to structures (in this case distribution lines) at least 60 feet above ground. Since most 

1005 communication distribution lines in the last mile are below this height (i.e., 60 feet), the lines would be 

1006 designed for Rule 250B, which has lower loading requirements than Rules 250C and D.

1007 For communication distribution wires, the designer could use either the NESC or ASCE 7. Malmedal and 

1008 Sen (2003) showed ASCE 7 loading of codes in the past have been more conservative than those of 

1009 NESC, particularly for ice loading. Using ASCE 7 will provide a more conservative design, but a higher 

1010 cost that is not desirable to utilities/service providers. When considering resilience, a more conservative 

1011 design should be considered, particularly for communication distribution lines in the last-mile to critical 

1012 facilities. 

1013 In the communications industry, codes and standards provide the baseline loading and design for 

1014 infrastructure. However, the industry heavily relies on the development and implementation of best 

1015 practices, rather than regulations, to improve their infrastructure resilience. The FCC’s CSRIC provides 

1016 an excellent example of a body that develops and publishes best practices for various network types 

1017 (Internet/data, wireless and landline telephone) and industry roles, including service providers, network 

1018 operators, equipment suppliers, property managers, and government (CSRIC 2014). Service providers 

1019 often adapt these and/or develop their own best practices to help improve the infrastructure of which their 
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1020 business relies. The best practices developed by the CSRIC cover a wide array of topics ranging from 

1021 training and awareness to cyber security and network operations. For the purposes of this document, only 

1022 a handful of the best practices developed by the CSRIC (see Table 8-5) that relate to physical 

1023 communications infrastructure are listed. 

1024 As shown in Table 8-5, the best practices list many suggestions discussed in this chapter, including:

1025  Adequate standby power for critical equipment and cell towers

1026  Backup strategies for cooling critical equipment in Central Offices

1027  Limiting exposure of distribution lines and critical equipment to hazards (important for standby 

1028 equipment too)

1029  Minimizing single points of failure in Central Offices, and distribution network

1030 The best practices (CSRIC 2014) have an emphasis on ensuring adequate power supply because the 

1031 communications system is dependent on power systems to function. Innovative technologies and 

1032 strategies for maintaining external power infrastructure continue to be developed and are discussed in 

1033 Chapter 7.
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1034 Table 8-5. Best Practices for Communications Infrastructure

Best Practice Description (CSRIC 2014) Applicable Infrastructure

Network Operators, Service Providers, Equipment Suppliers, and Property Managers should ensure the inclusion of fire stair returns in their 

physical security designs. Further, they should ensure there are no fire tower or stair re-entries into areas of critical infrastructure, where 

permitted by code.

Central Offices, nodes, critical 

equipment

Network Operators and Service Providers should prepare for HVAC or cabinet fan failures by ensuring conventional fans are available to cool 

heat-sensitive equipment, as appropriate.

Critical equipment 

Network Operators and Service Providers should consult National Fire Prevention Association Standards (e.g., NFPA 75 and 76) for guidance 

in the design of fire suppression systems. When zoning regulations require sprinkler systems, an exemption should be sought for the use of 

non-destructive systems.

Central Offices, nodes, critical 

equipment

Network Operators should provide back-up power (e.g., some combination of batteries, generator, fuel cells) at cell sites and remote equipment 

locations, consistent with the site specific constraints, criticality of the site, expected load, and reliability of primary power.

Cell sites and DLC RTs

Network Operators and Property Managers should consider alternative measures for cooling network equipment facilities (e.g., powering 

HVAC on generator, deploying mobile HVAC units) in the event of a power outage.

Central Offices, nodes, critical 

equipment

Network Operators, Service Providers, and Property Managers together with the Power Company and other tenants in the location, should 

verify that aerial power lines are not in conflict with hazards that could produce a loss of service during high winds or icy conditions.

Distribution lines

Back-up Power: Network Operators, Service Providers, Equipment Suppliers, and Property Managers should ensure all critical infrastructure 

facilities, including security equipment, devices, and appliances protecting it are supported by backup power systems (e.g., batteries, 

generators, fuel cells).

Central Offices, nodes, critical 

equipment

Network Operators, Service Providers, and Property Managers should consider placing all power and network equipment in a location to 

increase reliability in case of disaster (e.g., floods, broken water mains, fuel spillage). In storm surge areas, consider placing all power related 

equipment above the highest predicted or recorded storm surge levels.

Central Offices, nodes, Cell 

sites, DLC RTs, critical 

equipment

Network Operators, Service Providers, Equipment Suppliers, Property Managers, and Public Safety should design standby systems (e.g., 

power) to withstand harsh environmental conditions.

Critical equipment

Network Operators, Service Providers, Public Safety, and Property Managers, when feasible, should provide multiple cable entry points at 

critical facilities (e.g., copper or fiber conduit) avoiding single points of failure (SPOF).

Distribution lines

Service Providers, Network Operators, Public Safety, and Property Managers should ensure availability of emergency/backup power (e.g., 

batteries, generators, fuel cells) to maintain critical communications services during times of commercial power failures, including natural and 

manmade occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/black outs, terrorism). Emergency/Backup power generators should be 

located onsite, when appropriate.

Critical equipment

Network Operators and Service Providers should minimize single points of failure (SPOF) in paths linking network elements deemed critical 

to the operations of a network (with this design, two or more simultaneous failures or errors need to occur at the same time to cause a service 

interruption).

Distribution

Back-Up Power Fuel Supply: Network Operators, Service Providers, and Property Managers should consider use of fixed alternate fuel

generators (e.g., natural gas) connected to public utility supplies to reduce the strain on refueling.

Central Offices/nodes, cell sites, 

DLC RTs, critical equipment. 

Network Operators and Public Safety should identify primary and alternate transportation (e.g., air, rail, highway, boat) for emergency mobile 

units and other equipment and personnel.

Cell sites, DLC RTs, critical 

equipment
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1035 8.5.1.1. Implied or Stated Performance Levels for Expected Hazard Levels

1036 As discussed in Chapter 5, the performance level for an expected hazard event depends on the type of 

1037 hazard and the design philosophy used for the hazard. 

1038 For wind, buildings and other structures are designed for serviceability. That is, in the expected wind 

1039 event, such as a hurricane, the expectation is neither the building’s structure nor envelope will fail. The 

1040 ability of the building envelope to perform well (i.e., stay intact) is imperative for high wind events, 

1041 because they are typically associated with heavy rainfall events (e.g., thunderstorms, hurricanes, 

1042 tornadoes). Therefore, even if the building frame were to perform well, but the envelope failed, rain 

1043 infiltration could damage the contents, critical equipment, and induce enough water related damage such 

1044 that the building would have to be replaced anyway. The expectation is that a Central Office would not 

1045 have any significant damage for the expected wind event, and would be fully operational within 24 hours. 

1046 The 24 hours of downtime should only be required for a high wind event to allow for time to bring 

1047 standby generators online if needed and ensure all switches and critical electrical equipment are not 

1048 damaged.

1049 Similarly, for an expected flood, a Central Office should not fail. There is likely to be some damage to the 

1050 building and its contents at lower elevations, particularly the basement. However, if the critical electrical 

1051 and switchgear equipment and standby power are located well above the inundation levels, the Central 

1052 Office would be expected to be fully operational within 24 hours of the event.

1053 For earthquakes, buildings are designed for life safety. Therefore, for Central Offices in highly seismic 

1054 regions, some damage to the building is likely for the expected earthquake. As a result, it is likely that 

1055 there will be some loss of functionality of a Central Office following the expected earthquake event. If the 

1056 critical equipment and switchgear were designed and mounted, downtime would be expected to be limited 

1057 (less than one week). However, if the critical equipment and switchgear were not mounted to resist 

1058 ground accelerations, it could be weeks before the Central Office is fully functional again.

1059 For cell towers, the primary hazard that is considered for design in ANSI/TIA-222 is wind. However, ice 

1060 and earthquake are also considered. ANSI/TIA-222 provides three classes of tower structures (Wahba 

1061 2003):

1062  Category I Structures: Used for structures where a delay in recovering services would be acceptable. 

1063 Ice and earthquake are not considered for these structures, and wind speeds for a 25-year return 

1064 period using the ASCE 7-02/7-05 methodology are used.

1065  Category II Structures: This is the standard category that represents hazard to human life and 

1066 property if failure occurs. The nominal 50-year return period wind, ice, and seismic loads are used.

1067  Category III Structures: Used for critical and emergency services. The nominal 100-year return 

1068 period loads.

1069 For the expected event, failures would only be anticipated for a small percentage of cell towers (e.g., less 

1070 than five percent). It is noted that, as discussed in the previous section, the loading in ANSI/TIA-222-G is 

1071 based on that of ASCE 7. 

1072 Communication distribution wires will likely experience some failures in the expected event, particularly 

1073 for wind and ice storms. As discussed in the previous section, most distribution lines in the last-mile are 

1074 below 60 feet above the ground and, hence, are not even designed to meet what Chapter 3 defines as the 

1075 expected event if Rule 250B in NESC is followed for design. For lines that are designed to meet the 

1076 NESC Rules 250C and 250D, it would be anticipated that only a small percentage of failure of the 

1077 overhead wire would fail in an expected ice or wind event. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter 

1078 and in Chapter 7, tree fall onto distribution lines causes many failures rather than the loading of the 
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1079 natural hazard itself. Therefore, service providers should work with the electric power utility to ensure 

1080 their tree-trimming programs are adequately maintained. 

1081 8.5.1.2. Recovery Levels

1082 As discussed in the previous section, Central Offices and cell towers should not have an extended 

1083 recovery time for the expected event. Given that the earthquake design philosophy is life safety (rather 

1084 than wind which is designed for serviceability), Central Offices may have some loss of functionality due 

1085 to damage to the building envelope and critical equipment if it is not designed and mounted to resist 

1086 adequate ground accelerations. 

1087 With respect to cell sites, wind, storm surge, and fire are the predominant hazards of concern for 

1088 designers. Ice and earthquake are also considered, though not to the same extent in design. Given that the 

1089 ANSI/TIA-222-G loads are based on ASCE 7 loading, it is anticipated that only a small percentage of cell 

1090 tower structures would fail during an expected event. Cell towers are configured such that there is an 

1091 overlap in service between towers so the signal can be handed off as the user moves from one area to 

1092 another without a disruption in service. Therefore, if one tower fails, other towers will pick up most of the 

1093 service since their service areas overlap. 

1094 For distribution lines, a key factor, more so than the standards, is location of the cables. For example, if 

1095 the distribution lines are underground for a high wind or ice event, failures and recovery time should be 

1096 limited. However, even if the distribution lines are underground it is possible for failure to occur due to 

1097 uprooting of trees. For flooding, if the distribution lines are not properly protected or there has been 

1098 degradation of the cable material, failures could occur. For earthquake, failures of underground 

1099 distribution lines could also occur due to liquefaction. As discussed in Section 8.2.1, although 

1100 underground lines may be less susceptible to damage, they are more difficult to access to repair and 

1101 failures could result in recovery times of weeks rather than days. However, for an expected event, some

1102 damage to the distribution lines would be expected. 

1103 If the distribution lines are overhead, high wind and ice events will result in failures, largely due to tree 

1104 fall or other debris impacts on the lines. The debris impacts on distribution lines is a factor that varies 

1105 locally due to the surroundings and tree trimming programs that are intended to limit these disruptions. 

1106 Although these lines are more likely to fail due to their direct exposure to high winds and ice, 

1107 recovery/repair time of the lines for an expected event would be expected to range from a few days to a 

1108 few weeks depending on the size of the area impacted, resources available, and accessibility to the 

1109 distribution lines via transportation routes. Note that this only accounts for repair of the communications 

1110 distribution lines itself. Another major consideration is the recovery of external power lines so the end 

1111 user is able to use their communications devices. Chapter 7 addresses the standards and codes, and their 

1112 implied performance levels for an expected event.

1113 8.5.2. Existing Construction

1114 Although the standards listed in Section 8.2 are used for new construction for communications 

1115 infrastructure, older versions of these codes and standards were used in the design of structures for the 

1116 existing infrastructure. 

1117 Central Offices designed and constructed within the past 20 years may have been designed to the criteria 

1118 ASCE 7-88 through 05. Prior to that, ANSI standards were used. There have been many changes in the 

1119 design loading criteria and methodology over the design life of existing Central Offices. For example, 

1120 ASCE 7-95 was the first time a 3-second gust was used for the reference wind speed rather than the 

1121 fastest mile for the wind loading criteria (Mehta 2010). Over the years, reference wind speeds (from the 

1122 wind speed contour maps) have changed, pressure coefficients have been adjusted, earthquake design 

1123 spectra, ground accelerations, and other requirements have changed. Overall, codes and standards have 

1124 been added to/changed based on lessons learned from past disaster events and resulting research findings.
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1125 As discussed in Section 8.5.1, ANSI/TIA-222-G is the current version of the standard used for cell towers 

1126 and antennas. However, prior to 2006, versions of the code include (TIA 2014):

1127  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-F established in 1996

1128  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-E established in 1991

1129  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-D established in 1987

1130  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-C established in 1976

1131  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-B established in 1972

1132  ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-A established in 1966

1133  ANSI/EIA-RS-222 established as the first standard for antenna supporting structures in 1959. 

1134 The 1996 standard, ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-F, was used during the largest growth and construction of towers 

1135 in the United States (TIA 2014). As noted in Section 8.5.1, earthquake was not considered in this version 

1136 of the standard, allowable stress design was used rather than limit states design, and reference wind 

1137 speeds used fastest mile rather than 3-second gust (Wahba 2003). Note that the use of fastest mile for the 

1138 reference wind speed is consistent with ASCE 7 prior to the 1995 version (of ASCE).

1139 Historically, communication distribution lines, like the new/future lines, have been designed to NESC 

1140 standards. The following lists some of the most significant changes to NESC rule 250 that have occurred 

1141 over the past couple of decades (IEEE 2015):

1142  Prior to 1997, NESC did not have what is now referred to as an “extreme” wind loading. Rule 250C 

1143 adapted the ASCE 7 wind maps after the wind speed changed from fastest mile to 3-second gust as is 

1144 used today.

1145  In 2002, Rule 250A4 was introduced to state that since electric and telecommunication wires and 

1146 their supporting structures are flexible, earthquakes are not expected to govern design.

1147  In 2007, Rule 250D was introduced for design of “extreme” ice from freezing rain combined with 

1148 wind.

1149 These changes and their timeframe indicate older distribution lines, if not updated to the most recent code, 

1150 may be more vulnerable to failures from wind and ice events than the current code. However, the NESC 

1151 adopting these new standards should help lead to improvements of overhead distribution line performance 

1152 in the future.

1153 8.5.2.1. Implied or Stated Performance Levels for Expected Hazard Levels

1154 Existing Central Offices designed to an older version of ASCE 7 or ANSI criteria should have similar 

1155 performance to those of new construction for an expected event. However, it is possible that these 

1156 structures may have varied performance depending on the design code’s loading criteria. Nonetheless, an 

1157 existing Central Office should have similar performance to that of a newly constructed Central Office (see 

1158 Section 8.5.1.1). 

1159 As discussed in the previous section, the ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-F 1996 standard was in effect when the 

1160 largest growth and construction of cell towers took place (TIA 2014). For wind and ice, the towers would 

1161 be expected to only have a small percentage of failures for the expected event as discussed in Section 

1162 8.5.1.1. However, earthquake loading was not included in any of the standards prior to ANSI/TIA-222-G 

1163 (Wahba 2003). Although earthquakes do not typically govern the design of cell towers, highly seismic 

1164 regions would be susceptible to failures if an expected earthquake occurred. For existing towers designed 

1165 to standards other than ANSI/TIA-222-G in highly seismic regions, the design should be checked to see if 

1166 earthquake loads govern and retrofits should be implemented if necessary. Existing towers that have 

1167 electronics added to them are updated to meet requirements of the most up to date code (ANSI/TIA-222-

1168 G). Note that despite no earthquake loading criteria in ANSI/TIA/EIA-222-F, and older versions of this 
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1169 standard, designers in highly seismic regions may have considered earthquake loading using other 

1170 standards, such as ASCE 7. However, this was not a requirement.

1171 As discussed in Section 8.5.1.2, some communication distribution lines are anticipated to fail during an 

1172 expected event. Given that “extreme” ice loading was not included in the NESC standard until 2007, 

1173 distribution lines adhering to prior codes may be particularly vulnerable to ice storms.

1174 8.5.2.2. Recovery Levels

1175 As discussed in the previous section and Section 8.5.1.2, Central Offices and cell towers should not 

1176 require a long time for full recovery after an expected event. However, given that older standards of 

1177 ANSI/TIA/EIA-222 did not include earthquake loading criteria, a large number of failures and, hence, 

1178 significant recovery time may be needed to repair or replace towers after an expected event in a highly 

1179 seismic region. To replace a large number of towers would take weeks, months, or even years depending 

1180 on the size of the impacted area. As discussed in Section 8.6.3, service providers have the ability to 

1181 provide cell on light trucks (COLTs) so essential wireless communications can be brought online quickly 

1182 after a hazard event in which the network experiences significant disruptions (AT&T 2014). However, the 

1183 COLTs are only intended for emergency situations. They are not intended to provide a permanent 

1184 solution. The best approach for cell tower owners in these earthquake prone regions is, therefore, to 

1185 ensure the cell towers can resist the earthquake loading criteria in the new ANSI/TIA standard.

1186 With respect to performance of distribution lines, performance and recovery time is largely dependent on 

1187 the placement of the cables (i.e., overhead versus underground) as discussed in Section 8.5.1.2. 

1188 8.6. Strategies for Implementing Community Resilience Plans

1189 Section 8.2 discusses critical components of communication and information infrastructure. The 

1190 discussion includes examples from different types of hazards to encourage the reader to think about the 

1191 different hazards that could impact the communication and information infrastructure in their community. 

1192 The number, types, and magnitudes of hazards that need to be considered will vary from community to 

1193 community. 

1194 Section 8.3 discusses the performance goals of the communication and information infrastructure strived 

1195 for by the community. Section 8.3 does provide example performance goals for the routine, expected, and 

1196 extreme event. However, the performance goals should be adjusted by the community based on its social 

1197 needs, which will vary by community.

1198 Sections 8.4 and 8.5 outline some regulatory levels and issues, and codes and standards the reader should 

1199 keep in mind when planning to make upgrades/changes to existing structures as well as building new 

1200 structures for their communications network. The objective of this section is use the information from 

1201 Sections 8.2 through 8.5 to provide guidance on how a community or service provider should work 

1202 through the process of assessing their communications infrastructure, defining strategies to make its 

1203 infrastructure more resilient, and narrowing the resilience gaps. 

1204 8.6.1. Available Guidance

1205 Recall that in the Section 8.3 discussion of setting performance goals of the communication and 

1206 information infrastructure, there was also an “X” in each row corresponding to an example of what a 

1207 community actually found its infrastructures’ performance to be given a level of hazard. The question 

1208 then becomes: How does the community/service provider determine where the “X” belongs for the 

1209 various types of infrastructure in our community?

1210 At this point, the community should have convened a collection (or panel) of stakeholders and decision 

1211 makers to approach the problem and establish the performance goals for each type and magnitude of 

1212 hazard. To assess the infrastructure, this panel should have the knowledge, or reach out to those in the 
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1213 community who have the knowledge to assess the state of the infrastructure. The panel of stakeholders 

1214 and decision makers will have to assess the infrastructures’ performance relative to the type and 

1215 magnitude of event that the community may face because different types of hazards will result in different 

1216 types of failure modes and, consequently, performance. In some communities, it may only be necessary to 

1217 make assessments for one hazard (such as earthquake in some non-coastal communities in California or 

1218 Oregon). In other communities, it may be appropriate to complete assessments of the performance for 

1219 multiple types of hazards such as high winds and storm surge in coastal communities in the Gulf and east 

1220 coast regions of the United States.

1221 There are three levels at which the infrastructure can be assessed:

1222 Tier 1. A high level assessment of the anticipated performance of the components of the communications

1223 infrastructure can be completed by those with knowledge and experience of how the components and 

1224 system will behave in a hazard event. For Central Offices, this may include civil and electrical 

1225 engineer/designers. For wires (both overhead and underground), and cell towers, this may include 

1226 engineers, utility operators, service providers, technical staff, etc. As a minimum, each community should 

1227 complete a high level (Tier 1) assessment of its infrastructure. The community can then decide whether 

1228 additional investment is warranted in completing a more detailed assessment. The SPUR Framework 

1229 (Poland 2009) took this high level approach in assessing their infrastructure for the City of San Francisco, 

1230 and is highly regarded as a good example for the work completed to date. 

1231 Tier 2. A more detailed assessment can be used, based on an inventory of typical features within the 

1232 communication infrastructure system, to develop generalized features for various components of the 

1233 infrastructure. To do this, the community would have to use or develop a model for their community to 

1234 assess the performance of common components of their infrastructure system for a specific type and 

1235 magnitude of event (i.e., model a scenario event and its resulting impacts). Alternatively, the community 

1236 could model a hazard event scenario to compute the loads (wind speeds/pressures, ground accelerations, 

1237 flood elevations) to be experienced in the community and use expert judgment to understand what the 

1238 performance of various components of the communications infrastructure would be as a result of the 

1239 loading. 

1240 A Tier 2 communication and information infrastructure assessment would include the impact on typical 

1241 components of the infrastructure system independent of the intra-dependencies. The Oregon Resilience 

1242 Plan (OSSPAC 2013) provides a good example of modeling a hazard event to assess the resulting impacts 

1243 of the current infrastructure. It used HAZUS-MH to model and determine the impacts of a Cascadia 

1244 earthquake on the different types of infrastructure and used the losses output by the HAZUS tool to back1245 calculate the current state of the infrastructure.

1246 Tier 3. For the most detailed level of analysis, a Tier 3 assessment would include all components in the 

1247 communications infrastructure system, intra-dependencies within the system, and interdependencies with 

1248 the other infrastructure systems. Fragilities could be developed for each component of the 

1249 communications infrastructure system. A Tier 3 assessment would use models/tools to determine both the 

1250 loading of infrastructure due to the hazard and the resulting performance, including intra- and 

1251 interdependencies. Currently, there are no publicly available tools that can be used to model the intra- and 

1252 interdependencies.

1253 8.6.2. Strategies for New/Future Construction

1254 For new and future construction, designers are encouraged to consider the performance goals and how to 

1255 best achieve those goals rather than designing to minimum code levels, which are sometimes just for life 

1256 safety (e.g., earthquake design). It is important to consider the communication and information 

1257 infrastructure as a whole because it is a network and failure in one part of the system impacts the rest of 

1258 the system (or at least the system connected directly to it). Therefore, if it is known that a critical 
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1259 component of the infrastructure system is going to be non-redundant (e.g., a lone Central Office, or a 

1260 single point of entry for telephone wires into a critical facility), the component should be designed to 

1261 achieve performance goals set for the extreme hazard. 

1262 Throughout this chapter, there are examples of success stories and failures of communications 

1263 infrastructure due to different types of hazards (wind, flood, earthquake, ice storms). Designers, planners,

1264 and decisions makers should think about these examples, as well as other relevant examples, when 

1265 planning for and constructing new communications and information infrastructure. There are several 

1266 construction and non-construction strategies that can be used to successfully improve the resilience of 

1267 communications infrastructure within a community. 

1268 Construction Strategies for New/Future Central Offices. With respect to Central Offices that are owned 

1269 by service providers, the service provider should require the building to be designed such that it can 

1270 withstand the appropriate type and magnitude of hazard events that may occur for the community. It is 

1271 imperative that all hazards the community may face are addressed because hazards result in different 

1272 failure modes. Designing for an extreme earthquake may not protect infrastructure from the expected 

1273 flood, or vice versa. However, as was discussed during the workshops held to inform this framework, not 

1274 all Central Offices or other nodes housing critical communications equipment are owned by service 

1275 providers. 

1276 Sections of buildings are often leased by service providers to store their equipment for exchanges or 

1277 nodes in the system. In this case, service providers typically have no influence over the design of the 

1278 building. But, if a building is in the design phase and the service provider is committed to using the space 

1279 of the building owner, the service provider could potentially work with the building owner and designers 

1280 to ensure their section of the building is designed such that their critical equipment is able to withstand the 

1281 appropriate loading. In a sense, the goal would be to “harden” the section of the building in the design 

1282 phase rather than retrofitting the section of the structure after a disaster, as is often done. Adding the 

1283 additional protection into the design of the building would likely cost more initially, and the building 

1284 owner would likely want the service provider to help address the additional cost. However, the service 

1285 provider would be able to compute a cost-to-benefit ratio of investment for paying for additional 

1286 protection of their critical equipment versus losing their equipment and having to replace it.

1287 Non-Construction Strategies for New/Future Central Offices. Although the design and construction of 

1288 buildings that house critical equipment for Central Offices, exchanges, and other nodes in the 

1289 communications network is an important consideration, non-construction strategies can also be extremely 

1290 effective. For example, service providers who own buildings for their Central Offices should place their 

1291 critical equipment such that it is not vulnerable to the hazards faced by the community. For example, 

1292 Central Offices vulnerable to flooding should not have critical electrical equipment or standby generators 

1293 in the basement. Rather, the critical electrical equipment and standby generators should be located well 

1294 above the extreme flood levels. As shown by the success story of the Verizon Central Office after 

1295 Hurricane Sandy described in Section 8.2.1, placing the critical equipment and standby generators above 

1296 the extreme flood level can significantly reduce the recovery time needed. Similarly, for Central Offices 

1297 in earthquake prone areas, service providers can mount their critical equipment to ensure it does not fail 

1298 due to the shaking of earthquakes. 

1299 Service providers planning to lease space from another building owner should be aware of the hazards 

1300 faced by the community and use that information in the decision making process. For instance, a service 

1301 provider would not want to rent space in the basement of a 20-story building to store electrical and critical 

1302 equipment for an exchange/node.

1303 Construction Strategies for New/Future Cell Towers. New/Future Cell Towers should be designed to the 

1304 latest TIA/EIT-222-G standard. As discussed in Section 8.2.3, the 2006 version of the TIA/EIT-222-G 

1305 standard was updated to reflect the design criteria in ASCE 7 for wind, ice, and earthquake loading. For 
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1306 wind and ice, if the towers are designed and constructed in accordance with the appropriate standards, 

1307 only a small percentage of cell towers would be anticipated to fail in an “expected” event. With respect to 

1308 earthquake, where the design philosophy is life safety, towers should be designed beyond the code 

1309 loading criteria. Since cell towers are becoming more numerous, they should be designed for the 

1310 “expected” event.

1311 Non-Construction Strategies for New/Future Cell Towers. Historically, the predominant cause of 

1312 outages of cell towers has been the loss of electrical power. As discussed in Section 8.2.3, the FCC’s

1313 attempt to mandate a minimum of eight hours of battery standby power to overcome this problem was 

1314 removed by the courts. However, service providers should provide adequate standby power to maintain 

1315 functionality following a hazard event.

1316 As is the case for standby generators in Central Offices, standby generators for cell towers must be placed 

1317 appropriately. Standby generators for cell towers in areas susceptible to flooding should be placed above 

1318 the “expected” flood level. Similarly, in earthquake regions, standby generators should be mounted such 

1319 that the ground accelerations do not cause failure on the standby generator. 

1320 Additional protection should be implemented for cell towers when appropriate and feasible. As discussed 

1321 in Section 8.2.3, during Hurricane Katrina debris impacts from boats in flood areas resulted in failure of 

1322 cell towers. Impacts from uprooted trees or branches during high wind events and tsunamis could also 

1323 result in failure of these towers. Therefore, the topography and surroundings (e.g., relative distance from 

1324 trees or harbors to cell towers) should be considered to ensure cell towers are protected from debris 

1325 impact.

1326 Strategies for New/Future Distribution Line to End User. As discussed in Section 8.2.1, there are 

1327 several different types of wires (copper, coaxial, and fiber optic) that carry services to the end user. Each 

1328 of the types of wires has advantages and disadvantages. More and more, service providers are installing 

1329 fiber optic wires to carry services to the customer. 

1330 There is ongoing debate regarding whether underground or overhead wires are the best way to distribute 

1331 services to the end user. For new/future distribution lines, several factors should be used to decide which 

1332 method of distribution of services is best. The factors should include:

1333  Building cluster to which the services are being distributed

1334  Potential hazards to which the community is susceptible

1335  Topography and surroundings of distribution lines

1336  Redundancy or path diversity of distribution lines

1337 The first three items can be considered together. The building cluster to which the services are being 

1338 delivered (1st bullet) is a key consideration. As seen in Section 8.3, performance goals for transmission of 

1339 communications services to critical facilities reflect a desire for less recovery time (i.e., better 

1340 performance) than the clusters for emergency housing, housing/neighborhoods, and community recovery. 

The hazards the community faces (2

nd 1341 bullet) can be used to determine how to best prevent interruption of 

1342 service distribution to the building (i.e., end user). For example, in regions that are susceptible to high 

winds events (i.e., 2

nd 1343 bullet), it may be appropriate to distribute communication services to critical 

1344 services (and other clusters) using underground wires rather than overhead wires. The use of overhead 

1345 wires would likely result in poorer performance in wind events because of failures due to wind loading or, 

more likely, debris (i.e., tree) impact (3

rd 1346 bullet).

Redundancy or path diversity (4th 1347 bullet) of communications distribution lines to end users is an important 

1348 consideration. As discussed in Section 8.2.1, building redundancy in the communications network is 

1349 essential to ensuring continuation of services after a hazard event. For example, single points of failure in 

1350 the last/first mile of distribution can be vulnerable to failure causing long term outages. Redundancy (i.e., 
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1351 path diversity) should be built into in the distribution network, especially the last/first mile, wherever 

1352 possible.

1353 8.6.3. Strategies for Existing Construction

1354 Similar to new/future communication and information infrastructure, there are several construction and 

1355 non-construction strategies that can be used to successfully improve the resilience of existing 

1356 communications infrastructure within a community. However, unlike new/future components of the 

1357 communications infrastructure system, existing components must be evaluated first to understand their 

1358 vulnerabilities, if they exist. If it is determined that a component is vulnerable to natural loads, strategies 

1359 should be used to improve its resilience. 

1360 Given that the communication and information infrastructure system is extremely large and much of the 

1361 existing infrastructure is owned by service providers or third party owners (e.g., building owners) with 

1362 competing needs for funding, it is not reasonable to expect that capital is available for service providers 

1363 (or third parties) to upgrade all infrastructure immediately. However, prioritization can address the most 

1364 critical issues early in the process and develop a strategy to address many concerns over a longer time 

1365 period. Moreover, by evaluating the inventory of existing infrastructure and identifying weaknesses, 

1366 service providers can use the data to implement strategies for new/future infrastructure construction so the 

1367 same weaknesses are not repeated.

1368 Construction Strategies for Existing Central Offices. Existing buildings owned by service providers and 

1369 used as Central Offices should be assessed to determine if the building itself and sections of the building 

1370 containing critical equipment and standby generators will be able to meet performance goals (see Section 

1371 8.3). As stated for the case of new/future construction, if the Central Office is a non-redundant node in the 

1372 service provider’s infrastructure network, the Central Office should be evaluated to ensure it can resist the 

1373 “extreme” level of hazard. However, if the Central Office is a node in a redundant infrastructure system, 

1374 and failure of the Central Office would not cause any long-term service interruptions, the Central Office 

1375 should be assessed to ensure it can withstand the loads for the “expected” event. 

1376 If the service provider finds that its Central Office will not be able to withstand the loading for the 

1377 appropriate level of hazard event, it should take steps to harden the building. Although this is likely to be 

1378 expensive, if the Central Office is critical to the service provider’s performance following a hazard event 

1379 in both the short and long term, a large investment may be necessary and within a reasonable cost-benefit 

1380 ratio. 

1381 For nodes, exchanges, or Central Offices located in leased (existing) buildings, the service provider does 

1382 not have control over retrofitting or hardening the building. However, the service provider could attempt 

1383 to work with the building owner to have the sections of the building housing critical equipment hardened. 

1384 Alternatively, there are also several non-construction strategies that could be used to protect the critical 

1385 equipment. 

1386 Non-Construction Strategies for Existing Central Offices. Critical equipment in Central Offices or in 

1387 other nodes/exchanges in the communications infrastructure network should be assessed to determine 

1388 whether it is likely to fail during hazard events faced by that community. Whether the building is owned 

1389 by the service provider or leased from a third party, relatively easy and inexpensive changes can be made 

1390 to protect the critical equipment.

1391 As was demonstrated by the example of the Manhattan Verizon Central Office at 140 West Street

1392 discussed in Section 8.2.1, non-construction strategies can be used to successfully improve performance 

1393 of critical equipment in hazard events. Recall that the 140 West Street Central Office was hardened after 

1394 9/11. What may have been the most successful change was elevating the standby generators and critical 

1395 equipment to higher elevations such that they would not fail in the case of flooding (City of New York 

1396 2013). Compared to another Central Office located at 104 Broad Street in New York City that had critical 
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1397 equipment and standby generators stored in the basement, the Verizon Central Office performed much 

1398 better. The 104 Broad Street had an outage of 11 days, whereas the Verizon Central Office was 

1399 operational within 24 hours. The 104 Broad Street did not meet the performance goals for the expected 

1400 event in Section 8.3. With the singular change of elevating critical equipment and standby generators, the 

1401 Verizon Central Office met the performance goals presented in Section 8.3. 

1402 Construction Strategies for Existing Cell Towers. Existing cell towers should be evaluated to determine 

1403 whether they can resist the loading from the “expected” event the community faces (wind speed/pressure, 

1404 earthquake ground accelerations, ice storms). Versions older than the 2006 ANSI/TIA-222-G did not 

1405 include earthquake design criteria. Therefore, design loads for existing cell towers, particularly in 

1406 earthquake-prone regions, should be assessed to understand the loading that the towers can withstand. It is 

1407 assumed that a designer in an earthquake-prone region would use loading based on other codes and 

1408 standards, but it is possible that the loading used in the original design may not be adequate. If it is found 

1409 after assessing the cell tower for earthquake loading that it was not designed to resist adequate loads, 

1410 retrofits such as the addition of vertical bracing can be constructed to ensure the loading can be resisted. 

1411 Similarly, since there have been changes in the wind and ice loading in ANSI/TIA-222-G to better match 

1412 the loading criteria in ASCE, cell towers should be assessed to ensure they will resist the appropriate 

1413 loads, and retrofitted if needed.

1414 Non-Construction Strategies for Existing Cell Towers. Existing cell tower sites should be assessed to 

1415 determine whether adequate standby power supply is available given the criticality of the site and whether 

1416 the standby generator and switchgear are protected against loading from the appropriate magnitude 

1417 (expected) of natural hazard. Although it may not be economically feasible to provide standby generators 

1418 for all cell towers immediately, a program can be developed to accomplish this over time. The immediate 

1419 surroundings of cell sites should be assessed to determine vulnerabilities to airborne and waterborne 

1420 debris. If the cell site is located such that it is vulnerable to tree fall or other debris in a high wind or flood 

1421 event, additional protection should be provided to protect the cell tower.

1422 Strategies for Existing Distribution Line to End User. For existing distribution lines to the end user, an 

1423 inventory of wires, including the type, age, and condition should be recorded. When wires are damaged or 

1424 have deteriorated due to age, they should be retired and/or replaced. 

1425 As discussed for new/future distribution lines, overhead versus underground wires is an ongoing debate in 

1426 the industry. Distribution lines, particularly to critical buildings, should be assessed to determine whether 

1427 overhead or underground wires are best for the communications infrastructure system. If a service 

1428 provider is considering switching from overhead wires to underground wires to avoid possible outages 

1429 due to ice storms or high wind events, a cost-benefit ratio should be computed as part of the assessment 

1430 and decision making process. If cost is much greater than projected benefits, the service provider may 

1431 want to consider other priorities in making their infrastructure more resilient. In fact, rather than 

1432 switching the distribution lines from overhead to underground wires, the service provider may find it 

1433 more economical to add redundancy (i.e., path diversity) to that part of the infrastructure network. Thus, 

1434 the service provider would not be reducing the risk to the existing overhead distribution wires, but 

1435 reducing the risk of service interruptions because it is not solely reliant on overhead distribution lines.

1436 Non-Construction Strategies for Critical Facilities/Users. As previously discussed, communications 

1437 network congestion is often seen during and immediately after a hazard event. The following programs 

1438 have been implemented to help critical users have priority when networks are congested due to a disaster 

1439 event (DHS 2015): 

1440  Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)

1441  Wireless Priority Service (WPS)

1442  Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)
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1443 GETS works through a series of enhancements to the landline network. It is intended to be used in the 

1444 immediate aftermath of disaster events to support national security and emergency preparedness/response. 

1445 Cell phones can also use the GETS network but they will not receive priority treatment until the call 

1446 reaches a landline. Rather, the WPS is used to prioritize cell phone calls of users who support national 

1447 security and emergency preparedness/recovery when the wireless network is congested or partially 

1448 damaged. WPS is supported by seven service providers: AT&T, C Spire, Cellcom, SouthernLINC, Sprint, 

1449 T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless (DHS 2015). The GETS and WPS programs are helpful in coordinating 

1450 recovery efforts in the wake of a disaster event. However, note that the main goal of these programs is to 

1451 provide priority service when there is congestion due to limited damage. If a significant amount of the 

1452 infrastructure fails, these services may not be available. 

1453 TSP is an FCC program that enables service providers to give service priority to users enrolled in the 

1454 program when they need additional lines or need service to be restored after a disruption (FCC 2015). 

1455 Unlike the GETS and WPS programs, the TSP program is available at all times, not just after disaster 

1456 events. For all of these programs, eligible entities include police departments, fire departments, 9-1-1 call 

1457 centers, emergency responders, and essential healthcare providers (e.g., hospitals). 

1458 Short-Term Solutions for Restoring Service. Service providers and other stakeholders (e.g., third party 

1459 building owners) responsible for infrastructure cannot make all infrastructure changes in the short term 

1460 due to limited resources, a competitive environment driven by costs, and competing needs. Therefore, as 

1461 part of their resilience assessment, service providers should prioritize their resilience needs. Service 

1462 providers should budget for necessary short-term changes (0-5 years), which may include relatively 

1463 inexpensive strategies such as placement and security of critical equipment and standby generators. For 

1464 the long term (5+ years), service providers should address more expensive resilience gaps that include 

1465 hardening of existing Central Offices and replacing overhead distribution lines with underground lines.

1466 Although not all resilience gaps can be addressed in the short term through investment in infrastructure, 

1467 service providers should use other strategies to address these gaps. Ensuring there is a recovery plan in 

1468 place so service to customers is not lost for an extended period of time helps minimize downtime. 

1469 AT&T’s Network Disaster Recovery (NDR) team provides an excellent example of using temporary 

1470 deployments to minimize service disruption. The AT&T NDR was established in 1992 to restore the 

1471 functionality of a Central Office or AT&T network element that was destroyed or in which functionality 

1472 was lost in a natural disaster (AT&T 2005). 

1473 The NDR team was deployed after several disaster events to minimize service disruption where the 

1474 downtime would have been long term, including after 9/11, the Colorado and California wildfires in 2012 

1475 and 2013, the 2013 Moore, OK tornado, 2011 Joplin, MO tornado, 2011 Alabama tornadoes, Hurricane 

1476 Ike in 2008, and 2007 ice storms in Oklahoma (AT&T 2014). The AT&T NDR team completes quarterly 

1477 exercises in various regions of the United States and around the world to ensure personnel are adequately 

1478 trained and prepared for the next hazard event (AT&T 2014). Training and field exercises for emergency 

1479 recovery crews are essential to helping reduce communications network disruptions and, hence, the 

1480 resilience gaps.

1481 After the May 22, 2011 Joplin tornado, the NDR team deployed a Cell on Light Truck (COLT) on May 

1482 23, 2011 to provide cellular service near the St. John’s Regional Medical Center within one day of the 

1483 tornado (AT&T 2014). The cell site serving the area was damaged by the tornado. Satellite COLTs can be 

1484 used to provide cellular communications in areas that have lost coverage due to damage to the 

1485 communication infrastructure system (AT&T 2014).

1486 Using satellite telephones can be an alternative for critical facilities or emergency responders in the 

1487 immediate aftermath of a hazard event. Satellite phones are almost the only type of electronic 

1488 communications system that will work when cell towers are damaged and Central Offices or 

1489 exchanges/nodes have failed (Stephan 2007). Unfortunately, satellite phones are used infrequently, 
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1490 especially with the continuing growth of cellular phones. In 1999, the State of Louisiana used Federal 

1491 funds to provide the state’s parishes with a satellite phone to use in the event of an emergency, but the 

1492 state stopped providing the funding to cover a monthly $65 access fee one year before Hurricane Katrina 

1493 occurred (Stephan 2009). As a result, only a handful of churches kept the satellite phones. However, even 

1494 for those parishes that did keep their satellite phones, they did little to alleviate the communications 

1495 problem because nobody else had them when Hurricane Katrina occurred. In general, people do not own 

1496 satellite telephones so this is not the best solution for an entire community. However, for critical facilities 

1497 and communications between emergency responders, satellite telephones may be a viable option to ensure 

1498 the ability to communicate is preserved.

1499 8.7. References

1500 Anixter Inc., (2013). Standards Reference Guide. Glenview, Illinois. 

1501 American Lifelines Alliance (2006). Power Systems, Water, Transportation and Communications Lifeline 

1502 Interdependencies – Draft Report. Washington, DC.

1503 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE 2010). ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings 

1504 and Other Structures, Second Edition. New York, New York.

1505 AT&T (2014). Viewed August 28, 2014. < http://www.corp.att.com/ndr/deployment1.html>.

1506 AT&T (2005). Best Practices: AT&T Network Continuity Overview. 

1507 The City of New York (2013). A Stronger, More Resilient New York. New York City, NY. 

1508 City of Urbana Public Works Department (2001). Overhead to Underground Utility Conversion.

1509 Urbanaa, Illinois.

1510 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI 2006). Telecommunications Resilience Good 

1511 Practice Guide Version 4. United Kingdom, March 2006.

1512 Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC 2014).

1513 <https://www.fcc.gov/nors/outage/bestpractice/BestPractice.cfm>. CSRIC Best Practices. Viewed 

1514 December 16, 2014.

1515 Department of the Army (2007). Reliability/Availability of Electrical & Mechanical Systems for 

1516 Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

1517 (C4ISR) Facilities. January 19, 2007. 

1518 Department of Homeland Security (DHS 2015). GETS/WPS Documents. <

1519 http://www.dhs.gov/publication/getswps-documents#> . Viewed January 13, 2015.

1520 East Tennessee State University Office of Information Technology (ETSU 2014). Telecommunications 

1521 Design and Installation Standards Policy.

1522 Erichsen, John R. Slideshow Presentation: ANSI/TIA-222-G Explained. Viewed July 5, 2014.

1523 Federal Communications Commission (FCC 2015). <Telecommunications Service Provider. 

1524 http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/telecommunications-service-priority> . Viewed January 13, 2015.

1525 Fiber-to-the-Home Council (FTTH Council 2013). Comments of the Fiber-to-the Home Council on 

1526 Request to Refresh Record and Amend the Commission’s Copper Retirement Rules. Washington, 

1527 DC.

1528 Hubbell Premise Wiring Inc. Structured Cabling Standards and Practices. Viewed July 5, 2014.

1529 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE 2015). History of the National Electrical Safety 

1530 Code ANSI C2. < http://standards.ieee.org/about/nesc/100/> . Viewed January 26, 2015. 
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1531 Jrad, Ahman et al. (2005). Wireless and Wireline Network Interactions in Disaster Scenarios. Military 

1532 Communications Conference. Washington, DC.

1533 Jrad, Ahman et al. (2006). Dynamic Changes in Subscriber Behavior and their Impact on the Telecom 

1534 Network in Cases of Emergency. Military Communications Conference. Washington, DC.

1535 Kende, Michael, and Hurpy, Charles (2012). Assessment of the Impact of Internet Exchange Points –

1536 Empirical Study of Kenya and Nigeria. Analysys Mason Limited. Washington, DC.

1537 Kentucky Public Service Commission (2009). The Kentucky Public Service Commission Report on the 

1538 September 2008 Wind Storm and the January 2009 Ice Storm. 

1539 Kwasinski, Alexis (2009). Telecom Power Planning for Natural Disasters: Technology Implications and 

1540 Alternatives to U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s “Katrina Order” in View of the 

Effects of 2008 Atlantic Hurricane Season. 31st 1541 International Telecommunications Energy 

1542 Conference (INTELEC).

1543 Kwasinski, Alexis (2011). Effect of Notable Natural Disasters from 2005 to 2011 on Telecommunications 

1544 Infrastructure: Lessons from on-site Damage Assessments. 2011 IEEE International 

1545 Telecommunications Energy Conference (INTELEC).

1546 Kwasinski, Alexis; Weaver, Wayne; Krein, Philip; and Chapman, Patrick (2006). Hurricane Katrina: 

1547 Damage Assessment of Power Infrastructure for Distribution, Telecommunication, and Backup.

1548 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Urbana-Champaign, IL.

1549 Lower Manhattan Telecommunications Users’ Working Group Findings and Recommendations (2002). 

Building a 21st 1550 Century Telecom Infrastructure. Ney York City, NY.

1551 Mehta, Kishor (2010). Wind Load History ANSI A58.1-1972 to ASCE 7-05. Structures Congress, 

1552 American Society of Civil Engineers.

1553 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC 2013). The Oregon Resilience Plan: 

1554 Reducing Risk and Improving Recovery for the Next Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami. Salem, 

1555 Oregon.

1556 The Lifelines Council of the City and County of San Francisco (2014). Lifelines Interdependency Study 

1557 Report I. San Francisco, California. 

1558 Federal Communications Commission (FCC 2011). <www.fcc.gov/telecom.html>. Viewed on July 5, 

1559 2014. Telecommunications Act of 1996. 

1560 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2002). World Trade Center Building Performance 

1561 Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations. New York, New 

1562 York.

1563 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013). Mitigation Assessment Team Report: Hurricane 

1564 Sandy in New Jersey and New York. Washington, DC.

1565 Malmedal, Keith; Sen, P.K. (2003). Structural Loading Calculations of Wood Transmission Structures. 

1566 IEEE Rural Electric Power Conference.

1567 Stephan, Karl D (2007). We’ve got to Talk: Emergency Communications and Engineering Ethics. IEEE 

1568 Technology and Society Magazine.

1569 Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA 2014). TR-14 Structural Standards for Communication 

1570 and Small Wind Turbine Support Structures. Viewed September 22, 2014.

1571 <http://www.tiaonline.org/all-standards/committees/tr-14>. 
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1572 Wahba, John et al. (2003). New Standards for Broadcast Structures ANSI/EIA/TIA-222-G.

1573 West Virginia Broadband (2013). Viewed July 5, 2014.

1574 <http://www.westvirginia.com/broadband/mediaroom/BroadbandGlossary.pdf>.

1575 The White House. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 

1576 February 5, 2013. Office of the Press Secretary. Washington, DC.

1577 Victory, Nancy et al. (2006). Report and Recommendations of the Interdependent Panel Reviewing the 

1578 Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks. Washington, DC.