alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH, )

) Case No. 20-cv-5068

Plaintiff, ) 

)

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

v. )

)

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, )

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, )

PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED )

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED )

ON SCHEDULE A HERETO, )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff EMOJI COMPANY 

GmbH hereby dismisses with prejudice all causes of action in the complaint against the following 

Defendants identified in Schedule A. Each party shall bear its own attorney’s fees and costs.

No. Defendant 

60 Huxince

156 mizoelec

157 SPARIK ENJOY

199 Locotech

215 KeithV

271 Nothing but quality

The respective Defendants have not filed an answer to the complaint or a motion for summary 

judgment in this matter. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is 

appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 9, 2020 By: s/Michael A. Hierl _ 

Michael A. Hierl (Bar No. 3128021)

William B. Kalbac (Bar No. 6301771)

Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.

Three First National Plaza

70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 580-0100 Telephone

mhierl@hsplegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 40 Filed: 11/09/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:2879
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 

Voluntary Dismissal was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court and served on all counsel of 

record and interested parties via the CM/ECF system on November 9, 2020.

s/Michael A. Hierl

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 40 Filed: 11/09/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:2880
fourth £dition as adopted by the 87th National 

Conference on Weights & Measures 2002 

NISI 

National Institute of 

Standards and Technology 

Technology Administration 

U.S. Deportment of Commerce 

NIST 

Handbook 133 

January 2003
#### John C. Adams *v.*John B. Martin, Etc.

Evidence — Statements No Part of Res Gestae — Impeachment.

The statements of McPherson in the presence of Smith are not evidence against appellee, they were made after the payment of the money to Adams and were not a part of the res gestae. Smith’s testimony is important only in so far as it impairs McPherson’s credibility by showing that his sworn statements are inconsistent with others made by him out of court.

APPEAL PROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 27, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

McPherson swears in his deposition, not only that it was his intention to pay off the note sued on, when he paid Martin the $5,000.00, and that it was his understanding that said note was satisfied out of that payment, but that it paid the note of $600 and that he (I) w1as to have the note. Adams said he had neglected to bring the note with him.

If these statements are to be credited, the questions of law as to the proper application of the judgment need not be considered as it is clear the parties themselves made the application.

The reasons assigned by McPherson why he understood that the $1,500 payment satisfied the note, viz.: “that the money apid covered the note and all the items of the account which had been re*7leased” is not inconsistent with, nor does it destroy the force of his testimony on this, point because he states further that the store account was properly left out for. future adjudication.

*Dulaney, for appellant*

*Hines & Porter, for appellees.*

The statements, of McPherson, in the presence of Smith are not evidence against appellee; they were made after the payment of the money to Adams, and were not a part of the res gestae.

Smith’s testimony is important only in so far as it impairs McPherson’s credibility by showing that his sworn statements are inconsistent with others made by him out of court.

As the foundation for impeaching McPherson in this manner had not been laid, and as no opportunity had been given him to explain the conversation spoken of by Smith, the testimony of the latter on this point ought not to be regarded as competent for any of the purposes of this litigation.

The petition of Martin contains nothing which precludes him from relying on the specific application of the $1,500 payment to the satisfaction of certain named debts owing by McPherson to Adams.

Judgment affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-1705

DARYL ANTHONY GREEN,

Debtor - Appellant,

v.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT; PRINCE GEORGE’S 

COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,

Creditors - Appellees,

and

TIMOTHY P. BRANIGAN,

Trustee - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. (8:21-cv-02441-PJM)

Submitted: April 20, 2023 Decided: April 24, 2023

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daryl Anthony Green, Appellant Pro Se. Karen Hess Rohrbaugh, Assistant Attorney 

General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, 

Maryland; Timothy P. Branigan, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY P. BRANIGAN, Laurel, 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1705 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2023 Pg: 1 of 3
2

Maryland for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1705 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2023 Pg: 2 of 3
3

PER CURIAM:

Daryl Anthony Green appeals the district court’s orders: (1) dismissing his appeal 

from the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, and 

(2) imposing a prefiling injunction against him. With respect to the dismissal order, we 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error and no abuse of discretion. See Fed. 

R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(2); In re SPR Corp., 45 F.3d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Serra 

Builders, Inc., 970 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir. 1992). We also find no abuse of discretion 

by the district court in imposing monetary sanctions and a prefiling injunction upon finding 

that Green engaged in abusive, repetitive, and vexatious bankruptcy filings. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s order. Green v. Prince George’s Cnty. Ofc. of Child Support, 

No. 8:21-cv-02441-PJM (D. Md. June 16, 2022).

We deny Green’s motions: for an extension of time to file transcripts and to amend 

his informal brief; to address his appeals from the dismissal of two other bankruptcy court 

actions; for judicial notice, to strike the sanctions order, and for leave to file federal 

litigation; and for a stay pending appeal and a preliminary injunction. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1705 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2023 Pg: 3 of 3
#### G. M. Adams, etc., *v.*Harrison Cockerill.

Replevin — Signing Blank Bond' — Presumption.

Where one signs a blank replevin bond, it will be presumed that the execution debtor or tbe sheriff bad authority from the person so signing to fill the blanks, unless such authority is revoked before the blanks have been filled.

APPEAL FROM OWSLEY CIRCUIT COURT.

February 13, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The appellee’s grounds for relief in this action are in the nature of a plea of *non est factum*to the replevin bond which was- at the time of the institution of the suit about to be enforced by execution. Although this is a proceeding in equity the parties seem voluntarily to have submitted the questions of fact to a jury, and the chancellor based his judgment perpetuating the injunction upon the verdict returned.

The instructions given are more favorable to appellants than they should have been. It does not matter whether the execution debtors did or not practice a fraud upon Cockerill when he procured his signature to the blank replevin bond.

The essential question is, Did the sheriff have the right to fill up the bond at the time he did so? •

The signing of the blank bond imposed no liability upon Cock-erill. It was then incomplete and would be made to answer no purpose until filled up. It is to be presumed that the execution debtor Daniels, or the sheriff had authority from Cockerill to fill blanks, and had .either of them done so whilst this authority continued he would have been concluded by its exercise. Daniels, however, without filling the blanks, delivered the paper to the sheriff. The latter called Cockerill’s attention to the amount due on the execution, *460and immediately the presumed authority to fill up the blanks was revoked.

*James, for appellaAits.*

*Rodman, for appellee.*

Cockerill had executed no bond, and was not liable for the judgment against Daniels at the time of his conversation with the sheriff, and he that day expressly revoked the authority that that officer had to render him' liable therefor by filling up and accepting the bond which had previously been signed in blank.

The sheriff states that when he did fill the blanks, he acted for his own protection, and not under authority from- Cockerill.

The newly discovered testimony relates only to. the alleged fraud practiced by Daniel upon the appellee, and would not have been pertinent to the issue if it had been produced on the trial. Besides this, the affidavit of Hogg shows that he was agent for appellants in the preparation of the cause and that he knew on the 1st of April what Daniels would swear. This was nearly a month before the trial.

The motion for a new trial was properly overruled.

Judgment *affirmed.*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0155

IN THE MATTER OF:

C.L.,

A Youth.

GRANT

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until June 19, 2020 to prepare, 

file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief. 

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

May 19 2020

05/19/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0155
| Exhibit 99.4 **Citigroup Commercial Mortgage 2004-C1****Aggregate Statement of Principal and Interest Distributions to****Certificateholders****for January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004****Ending Principal****Class****Principal****Interest****Balance**Residual 0.00 0.06 0.00 A-1 5,027,946.39 1,118,463.78 64,929,053.61 A-2 0.00 3,772,796.82 161,062,000.00 A-3 0.00 5,708,744.40 217,418,000.00 A-4 0.00 14,888,632.45 553,662,000.00 B 0.00 834,675.78 31,039,000.00 C 0.00 357,706.67 13,302,000.00 D 0.00 715,440.23 26,605,000.00 E 0.00 357,706.67 13,302,000.00 F 0.00 397,451.85 14,780,000.00 G 0.00 317,961.48 11,824,000.00 H 0.00 516,687.40 19,214,000.00 J 0.00 155,216.28 5,913,000.00 K 0.00 155,190.00 5,912,000.00 L 0.00 155,190.00 5,912,000.00 M 0.00 155,190.00 5,912,000.00 N 0.00 77,595.00 2,956,000.00 P 0.00 116,392.50 4,434,000.00 PM 365,348.74 68,271.71 2,956,865.26 Q 0.00 504,388.44 19,214,797.00 X 0.00 1,435,429.49 1,177,390,850.61 Y-I 0.00 0.00 0.00 Y-II 0.00 0.00 0.00 Y-III 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4063

To authorize States, in the event of inadequate Federal funding under part 

B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, to waive certain 

requirements of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 30, 2004

Mr. BALLANCE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL

To authorize States, in the event of inadequate Federal funding under part B of the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Act, to waive certain requirements of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and 

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No School Left Behind 

5 Act of 2004’’. 
2

•HR 4063 IH 

1 SEC. 2. FULL FUNDING OF PART B OF THE INDIVIDUALS 

2 WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT. 

3 (a) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—Subject to subsection (c), 

4 section 1116(b) of the Elementary and Secondary Edu5 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6316(b)) (relating to the 

6 identification of schools for school improvement, corrective 

7 action, or restructuring) shall not apply in a State if—

8 (1) for any fiscal year the Federal Government 

9 appropriates for the purpose of carrying out part B 

10 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

11 (20 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.) an amount that is less than 

12 the amount determined under subsection (b); and 

13 (2) the State chooses to waive the application of 

14 such section 1116(b). 

15 (b) AMOUNT.—The amount referred to in subsection 

16 (a)(1) is the product of—

17 (1) the number of children with disabilities in 

18 all States who are receiving special education and re19 lated services—

20 (A) aged 3 through 5 if the State is eligi21 ble for a grant under section 619; and 

22 (B) aged 6 through 21; and 

23 (2) 40 percent of the average per-pupil expendi24 ture in public elementary and secondary schools in 

25 the United States. 
3

•HR 4063 IH 

1 (c) LIMITATION.—For any fiscal year described in 

2 subsection (a)(1), a State may waive the application of 

3 section 1116(b) of the Elementary and Secondary Edu4 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6316(b)) for not more than 

5 3 consecutive school years, beginning with the school year 

6 that commences during the fiscal year involved. 

7 (d) CONTINUED FUNDING.—A State’s decision under 

8 this section to waive the provisions of section 1116(b) of 

9 the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 

10 U.S.C. 6316(b)) shall not affect the State’s eligibility for, 

11 or receipt of, funds under such Act. 

12 (e) STATE.—For purposes of this section, the term 

13 ‘‘State’’ has the meaning given to that term in section 

14 9101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 

15 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).

Æ
----

----

| Name of Subsidiary                     |   | Jurisdiction of Organization |   | Percent Owned |
|----------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------|--------|---------------|
|                                   |   |                         |   |          |
| Vuance, Inc. (formerly SuperCom, Inc.) |   | United States                |   | 100%          |
| SuperCom Asia Pacific Limited          |   | Hong Kong                    |   | 100%          |
| Vuance – RFID Inc.*              |   | United States                |   | 100%          |
| S.B.C. Aviation Ltd.                   |   | Israel                       |   | 100%          |
| SuperCom Slovakia A.S.                 |   | Slovakia                     |   |   66%    |
| PureRFid, Inc.                         |   | United States                |   | 100%          |

----

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,768,258
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             3,040,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  2,643,401
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                     28,891,259
<ALLOWANCE>                                    418,425
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              38,238,230
<DEPOSITS>                                  33,522,344
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            235,614
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       512,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,968,272
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              38,238,230
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              1,617,459
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               62,296
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               141,342
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             1,821,097
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             795,622
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        1,025,475
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  225,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                920,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,963
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       5,963
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,963
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                     4.1
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               195,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,575
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              418,425
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           418,425
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 1

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 666-1 Filed: 09/06/23 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:16739
(12) United States Design Patent (10) Patent No.: 

USOOD73.9906S 

US D739,906S 

Chen (45) Date of Patent: Sep. 29, 2015 

(54) TWO-WHEELED VEHICLE D552,201 S * 10/2007 Kwak .......................... D21,765 

D567,883 S * 4/2008 Ota .............................. D21,421 

D572,332 S * 7/2008 Sramek et al. ............... D21,765 (71) Applicant: Shane Chen, Camas, WA (US) D607,525 S * 1/2010 Marciano ..................... D21,769 

(72) Inventor: Shane Chen, Camas, WA (US) * cited by examiner 

(**) Term: 14 Years Primary Examiner — Cynthia M Chin 

(22) Filed: Mar 12, 2013 The ornamental design for a two-wheeled vehicle, as shown 

and described. 

(51) LOC (10) Cl. ................................................ 21-02 

(52) U.S. Cl. DESCRIPTION 

USPC ......................................................... D21A760 

(58) Field of Classification Search FIG. 1 is a top view of the two-wheeled vehicle. 

USPC ........ D21/419, 421, 423,426, 760, 765, 766, FIG. 2 is a front elevation view of the vehicle of FIG. 1; the 

D21/769, 771, 776, 803: D12/1; 280/7.14, rear elevation views being identical thereto. 

280/11.14, 11.16, 11.19, 11.115, 11.226, FIG. 3 is a bottom view of the vehicle of FIG. 1. 

280/11.233, 11.25, 11.27, 11.28, 14.21, FIG. 4 is a perspective view of the vehicle of FIG. 1; and, 

280/87.01, 87.021, 87.03, 87.041, 87.042, FIG. 5 is a side view of the vehicle of FIG. 1; the opposite side 

280/809,811: 180/180, 181 view being identical thereto. 

See application file for complete search history. The broken lines represent functional components which are 

provided for context and do not form a part of the claimed 

(56) References Cited design. In FIGS. 1-4, the single broken line in the middle of 

the vehicle represents a joint whereby the right and left halves 

U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS of the vehicle may twist relative to each other as part of the 

D437.377 S * 2/2001 Fisher .......................... D21765 vehicle's function. 

D465,003 S * 10/2002 Ohrvallet al. ... D21,763 

D535,714 S * 1/2007 Cheng et al. ................. D21,763 1 Claim, 3 Drawing Sheets 

e rat a 

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 666-1 Filed: 09/06/23 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:16740
U.S. Patent Sep. 29, 2015 Sheet 1 of 3 US D739,906S 

 

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 666-1 Filed: 09/06/23 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:16741
U.S. Patent Sep. 29, 2015 Sheet 2 of 3 US D739,906S 

Fig. 3 

 

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 666-1 Filed: 09/06/23 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:16742
U.S. Patent Sep. 29, 2015 Sheet 3 of 3 US D739,906S 

Fig. 3 

 

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 666-1 Filed: 09/06/23 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:16743
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

ABC Corporation I, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:20−cv−04806

Honorable Steven C.

Seeger

The Partnership and Unincorporated Associations

Identified on Schedule "A"

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, September 22, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Steven C. Seeger: Plaintiffs' ex parte motion

for entry of a temporary restraining order (Dckt. No. [17]) is granted in part. Order to

follow. Plaintiffs' motion for electronic service under Rule 4(f)(3) (Dckt. No. [22]) is

granted. Plaintiffs' motion to seal (Dckt. No. [33]) is granted. Plaintiffs' other motion to

seal (Dckt. No. [39]) is hereby granted. Plaintiffs make a rather weak showing of the need

to file documents under seal. The notion is that Defendants could undercut a temporary

restraining order by creating a new Amazon Standard Identification Number ("ASIN")

and selling the same infringing products under the new ASIN. Plaintiffs never explain

why filing the complaint and related documents would prevent that outcome. Isn't there a

risk that Defendants could do that anyway? Plaintiffs do not address the point, even

though this Court raised it several weeks ago. (Dckt. No. [36]) Still, given the risk of

harm, the Court reluctantly will allow Plaintiffs to file the documents under seal for the

time being. Plaintiffs' third motion to seal (Dckt. No. [40]) is hereby granted. Again, the

Court does so reluctantly. Plaintiffs repeated the generic justification for filing under seal

(Dckt. No. [40]), even though this Court expressly found that justification lacking last

month. (Dckt. No. [28]) By October 6, 2020, Plaintiffs shall file a statement that explains,

with specificity, exactly how filing the documents under seal protected harm to Plaintiffs

in this particular case. Mailed notice(jjr, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 41 Filed: 09/22/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:2539
For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 41 Filed: 09/22/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:2540