SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0652-22 

MICHAEL LEONARDI, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

STATE POLICE RETIREMENT 

SYSTEM, 

 Respondent-Respondent. 

___________________________ 

Argued March 5, 2024 – Decided May 6, 2024 

Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli. 

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the State 

Police Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, 

SPRS No. xx4987.

Lauren Patricia Sandy argued the cause for appellant 

(The Law Offices of Lauren Sandy, LLC, attorneys; 

Lauren Patricia Sandy, of counsel and on the briefs). 

Jakai T. Jackson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney 

General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Jakai T. Jackson, on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0652-22

PER CURIAM 

Petitioner Michael Leonardi appeals from a final agency decision by the 

Board of Trustees (Board), of the State Police Retirement System, finding he 

was not entitled to an accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits under 

N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(a). We affirm. 

We glean the relevant facts and procedural history from the record. 

Leonardi was employed as a police officer in Washington Township from 2001 

to 2004. In September 2004, he was hired by the New Jersey State Police 

(NJSP). Leonardi completed police academy training both to become a police 

officer and a trooper. At the academy, he was taught basic lifesaving measures, 

including CPR. 

With the NJSP, Leonardi was a road trooper and assigned to various 

locations and assignments, as a Trooper I, II and III. In 2014, he became a 

detective. During his time with NJSP, Leonardi "responded to numerous—close 

to 500 or more—auto accidents, with roughly thirty to thirty-five of them 

[involving] fatal[ities]." 

Leonardi explained when responding to an accident, officers usually 

arrived before medical services, so he typically would render emergency aid 

until medical services arrived. Thereafter, he would continue to administer CPR 
3 A-0652-22

if medical services requested. It was common for medical services to ask for 

police assistance. 

On the morning of May 17, 2018, Leonardi was at the Netcong Station. 

At the same time, along Route 80 in Mount Olive, a school bus with forty-four 

passengers was involved in an accident with a dump truck. Reports came in 

over the radio regarding "a severe school-bus accident with numerous injuries 

and possible fatalities." 

Leonardi immediately drove to the scene. He stated the scene of the 

accident: 

was horrific—the force of the impact of the dump truck 

hitting the bus ripped the bus off its axle, and there were 

children who had been ejected from the bus on the 

ground in the median of the highway and other children 

suspended upside down from their seatbelts inside the 

overturned bus frame. 

Leonardi "heard children crying and screaming for their parents, and 

observed children and teachers with severed limbs, broken bones, bleeding, and 

other injuries." Troopers carried two unconscious female children to an 

ambulance. An emergency medical technician (EMT) attended to one of the 

children who "coded," but ultimately survived. 

Leonardi assessed the other child, M.V. He was told "she had a faint 

pulse." The child was lifeless, with severe injuries and head trauma. Despite 
4 A-0652-22

her severe injuries, Leonardi provided chest compressions to M.V. "After ten 

to fifteen minutes of chest compressions, the EMT advised Leonardi to stop, but 

[he] continued for several more minutes." The EMT advised Leonardi that M.V. 

was dead and requested that he "black tag" her. 

Leonardi then assisted in moving another child to an ambulance for 

transport to a hospital. He reassessed the scene, which included "bloody and 

injured children all over the place. Every child was screaming for help and for 

their parents." 

Leonardi also "helped a trooper stabilize another child, who appeared to 

have internal injuries and broken limbs, and placed her on a backboard and into 

an ambulance." Further, "[he] attempted to comfort another child who . . . 

reach[ed] out and call[ed] to him." Leonardi bandaged the child's significantly 

bleeding head and sat him on the median guardrail until the child could be 

transported to the hospital. 

Next, Leonardi returned to the ambulance and remained with M.V. Since 

the area was a crime scene, M.V. could not be left alone, and "as a father," 

Leonardi did not want to leave her. M.V.'s age and identity were disclosed to 

Leonardi, and he learned that the children in the bus were fifth and sixth grade 

students. 
5 A-0652-22

In the ambulance, Leonardi "broke down" and advised others "he would 

be the one assigned to remain with M.V." He "prayed and apologized to her for 

not being able to save her." Leonardi stayed with M.V. for approximately three 

hours. During that time, he thought of her family and learned that M.V.'s twin 

sister was on another bus. Occasionally he opened the ambulance door, "to get 

air and a bottle of water." But because Leonardi had a daughter the same age as 

M.V., "[h]e became extremely protective of M.V." 

Once "the NJSP Crime Scene Investigation North Unit arrived, [Leonardi] 

assisted another trooper in removing [M.V.] from the ambulance and 

photographing her injuries." "Leonardi remained with M.V. until the medical 

examiner arrived and removed her from the scene." 

Thereafter, Leonardi "went to [an] area by the dump truck where [a 

teacher]'s body was located. Leonardi assisted a Crime Scene trooper in

photographing" the teacher's body. 

Then, "Leonardi just stood on the median and did not know what to do. 

His thoughts were racing, and he became almost numb to his surroundings." Not 

remembering where he parked his vehicle, Leonardi was driven back the to the 

Netcong Station. At the station he "washed as much blood off his hands and 

body as he could and helped detectives with the investigation." He stared at his 
6 A-0652-22

computer screen and recognized "there was nothing else for him to do." He 

decided to go home and was driven back to the accident scene to retrieve his 

vehicle, "which he had not realized he left." 

After arriving home, Leonardi remained outside in his vehicle for 

approximately an hour, "trying to process the scene and incident." Once inside 

he "took a shower to wash off the remaining blood." He could not watch 

television because coverage of the accident was on every channel. He 

experienced flashbacks of everything that occurred, had difficulty falling asleep, 

and kept envisioning M.V.'s lifeless body. 

Following the accident, Leonardi applied for ADR benefits. By letter of 

September 25, 2019, the Board advised Leonardi it had "determined that [he 

wa]s totally and permanently disabled from his job duties due to his 

psychological condition." However, because the "incident was not undesigned 

and unexpected and [since] Leonardi's disability was not the direct result of the 

incident but was instead associated with a pre-existing condition," the Board 

denied his application. 

Leonardi appealed from the Board's determination. The Board approved 

Leonardi's request for a hearing and transmitted the matter to the Office of 

Administrative Law. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held hearings on 
7 A-0652-22

January 26 and February 16, 2021. On May 27, 2022, the ALJ issued an eightyfour-page opinion, concluding the event was not "undesigned or unexpected." 

She explained: 

law-enforcement officers are expected to encounter 

incidents such as "serious bodily injury to or the death 

of a juvenile." Thus, while the bus accident was 

unequivocally horrific, Leonardi responded to a 

catastrophic accident where he had to render aid and 

document a crime scene. While certainly there were

several factors that made Leonardi's experience 

particularly traumatic, including the condition of the 

victims and his extensive interactions with M.V., who 

was his daughter's age, I [conclude] that the event was 

not undesigned and unexpected. 

In addition, the ALJ found Leonardi did "not prove[] that the disability 

[wa]s not the result of a pre-existing disease aggravated or accelerated by the

work." She explained: 

There [wa]s no dispute that an incident involving

serious bodily injury or death to a child is particularly 

traumatic and horrific . . . . Even absent any prior 

psychological or psychiatric history, severe [posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)] might result, but

given Leonardi's psychiatric and psychological history, 

including the prior references to PTSD, depression, and 

alcohol abuse, whether or not Leonardi's disability 

[wa]s the result of a pre-existing disease aggravated or

accelerated by work effort cannot be determined from 

the record, especially in view of, but not limited to, the

following: testimony that Leonardi's disability was an

exacerbation or aggravation of pre-existing PTSD and 

alcohol-abuse disorder; . . . testimony that Leonardi's
8 A-0652-22

PTSD [wa]s cumulative; that it cannot be conclusively 

established when [Leonardi was] treated . . . or for 

what; and that none of [Leonardi]'s expert witnesses 

had reviewed any prior medical records. 

Accordingly, the ALJ was "constrained to [conclude] that the application 

for [ADR] benefits should be denied," and the Board's determination denying 

Leonardi's application for ADR benefits should be affirmed. 

Thereafter, at its July 26, 2022 meeting, the Board considered: the ALJ's 

decision; all exhibits; Leonardi's exceptions; the Deputy Attorney General's 

(DAG) exceptions; and statements made by Leonardi and the DAG. The Board 

then adopted the ALJ's decision affirming its denial of the application. 

In August 2022, Leonardi requested reconsideration of the Board's denial 

of his application. He argued the ALJ erred in "finding that the May 17, 2018

incident was not undesigned and unexpected" and by "not correctly apply[ing] 

the legal standard regarding causation." Three days later, Leonardi 
9 A-0652-22

supplemented his request for reconsideration, pursuant to an amendment to

N.J.S.A. 53:5A-101 and N.J.S.A. 53:5a-10.2.2 

In September 2022, the Board "affirmed the finding that the May 17, 2018 

incident was not undesigned and unexpected." The Board also found "[b]ecause 

. . . Leonardi's application . . . was not denied solely on the basis of direct result," 

1

 N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, in part, was amended effective July 29, 2022, to provide: 

A member with a pre[-]existing and asymptomatic 

condition that is rendered symptomatic as a direct result 

of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of

the performance of the member’s regular or assigned 

duties may be eligible for an accidental disability 

retirement allowance, provided that the traumatic event 

is caused by a circumstance external to the member and 

is the substantial contributing cause of the member’s

permanent and total disability. 

2

 N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, in part, was amended effective July 29, 2022, to provide: 

A member with a pre[-]existing and asymptomatic 

condition that is rendered symptomatic as a direct result 

of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of

the performance of the member’s regular or assigned 

duties may be eligible for an accidental disability 

retirement allowance, provided that the traumatic event 

is caused by a circumstance external to the member and 

is the substantial contributing cause of the member’s

permanent and total disability. 
10 A-0652-22

reconsideration of his application should be denied under N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10 and 

-10.2. 

On appeal, Leonardi argues the Board erred in denying his application 

because: (1) the accident was "undesigned and unexpected"; (2) his PTSD was 

not pre-existing; and (3) he qualified for ADR benefits in accord with new 

legislation. We disagree. 

We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our

analysis. "Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. 

of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). "We recognize that agencies have 'expertise 

and superior knowledge . . . in their specialized fields.'" Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., 

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (quoting In re License 

Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006)). Therefore, we will not "substitute 

[our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a 

different result." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re

Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). 

For those reasons, we "ordinarily should not disturb an administrative 

agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the 

agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
11 A-0652-22

unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence" in 

the record as a whole. In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate 

of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). "The burden of demonstrating that the 

agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person 

challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-

44 (App. Div. 2006) (citations omitted). 

"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency's 

interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing." Thompson 

v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 449 N.J. Super. 478, 483

(App. Div. 2017) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. 

Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007)). "Such deference has been specifically extended 

to state agencies that administer pension statutes because a state agency brings 

experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating 

a legislative enactment within its field of expertise." Id. at 483-84 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). However, we are "in no way bound by

the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal 

issue." Id. at 484 (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J. at 196). We "apply de novo 

review to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law." Ibid. (quoting 

Russo, 206 N.J. at 27). 
12 A-0652-22

The State Police Retirement System provides for an ADR allowance. 

N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(a). To qualify, the member must demonstrate he or she "is 

permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring 

during and as a result of the performance of his [or her] regular or assigned 

duties." Ibid. 

In Patterson, the New Jersey Supreme Court developed the standard for 

qualifying for ADR benefits when a member's claim is grounded on "a

permanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor, without any physical 

impact." Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 33 (2008). 

The Court "mandate[d] a two-step analysis in cases in which a member 

claims permanent mental incapacity as a result of an exclusively psychological 

trauma." Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 426

(2018). In step one, the court determines whether the disability "result[ed] from 

direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves 

actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the 

physical integrity of the member or another person." Patterson, 194 N.J. at 34. 

Second, the "traumatic event posited as the basis for an [ADR] pension [must] 

not [be] inconsequential but . . . objectively capable of causing a reasonable 

person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury." Ibid.
13 A-0652-22

 "If the event meets the Patterson test, the court then applies the Richardson 

factors to the member's application." Mount, 233, N.J. at 426 (quoting Russo, 

206 N.J. at 32-33). "That is important because it underscores that not every 

person who experiences a Patterson-type horrific event will automatically 

qualify for a mental-mental accidental disability benefit." Russo, 206 N.J. at 32. 

Under Richardson, to receive ADR benefits, a claimant must prove: 

1. that he is permanently and totally disabled; 

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is: 

a. identifiable as to time and place, 

b. undesigned and unexpected, and 

c. caused by a circumstance external to the 

member (not the result of pre-existing 

disease that is aggravated or accelerated by 

the work); 

3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a 

result of the member's regular or assigned duties; 

4. that the disability was not the result of the member's 

willful negligence; and 

5. that the member is mentally or physically 

incapacitated from performing his usual or any other 

duty.

[Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212-13.] 
14 A-0652-22

Here, our focus is on Richardson's requirement the "tragic event" was 

"undesigned and unexpected." 

Satisfaction of the "undesigned and unexpected" factor requires an event 

"extraordinary or unusual in common experience" and not "[i]njury by ordinary 

work effort." Richardson, 192 N.J. at 201 (citation omitted). "The polestar of

the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of [the member's] job, an

unexpected happening . . . occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and 

total disability of the member." Id. at 214. 

As the Court noted in Russo, a member "who experiences a horrific event 

which falls within his [or her] job description and for which he [or she] has been 

trained will be unlikely to pass the 'undesigned and unexpected' test." Russo, 

206 N.J. at 33. "Thus, for example, an [EMT] who comes upon a terrible 

accident involving life-threatening injuries or death, will have experienced a 

Patterson-type horrific event, but will not satisfy Richardson's 'undesigned and 

unexpected' standard because that is exactly what his training has prepared him 

for." Ibid. 

Nonetheless, 

Russo should not be construed to mean that the inquiry 

regarding whether an event is "undesigned and 

unexpected" is resolved merely by reviewing the

member's job description and the scope of his or her 
15 A-0652-22

training. In a given case, those considerations may 

weigh strongly for or against an award of accidental 

disability benefits. To properly apply the Richardson 

standard, however, the Board and a reviewing court 

must carefully consider not only the member's job 

responsibilities and training, but all aspects of the event 

itself. No single factor governs the analysis. 

[Mount, 233 N.J. at 427.] 

Therefore, in Mount, the Court considered the officer: 

confronted a catastrophic accident at close range. He 

initially viewed a victim's arm hanging from the 

vehicle's window. Bystanders approached the vehicle 

demanding that [the officer] rescue the occupants. 

With no firefighting equipment except a small fire 

extinguisher, [the officer] faced the imminent threat of 

an explosion. Within moments, the car burst into 

flames. As [the officer] learned minutes later, the 

explosion "melted" the young victims' bodies into the 

interior of the vehicle. 

[Ibid.] 

The Court concluded the event was "undesigned or unexpected" despite 

"[b]y virtue of his job description, training, and prior experience, [the officer] 

could anticipate being called to accidents that were serious or even fatal. As his 

job description suggest[ed], in some circumstances [the officer] would be 

expected to remove victims from a damaged vehicle pending the arrival of 

medical personnel." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427.
16 A-0652-22

Nonetheless, the Court held the "tragic event" was "undesigned and 

unexpected" because the officer "was not trained to combat, unassisted, an 

explosion of such magnitude experienced at such a close range. With no 

firefighting equipment or protective gear, [the officer] was helpless in the face 

of a terrible tragedy." Id. at 427-28.

In Russo, the Court held Richardson was "plainly satisfied" when: 

a newly-minted police officer, with no psychiatric 

history, completely untrained and unequipped for 

firefighting, was ordered into a burning building and, 

with his fellow officers, bravely rescued three of the 

four occupants. The intensity of the fire terrified and 

disoriented [the officer], singed his uniform, and sent 

him to the hospital overnight for smoke inhalation. One 

person in the house, who cried out for help to [the

officer] and his fellow officers, could not be reached 

because of the fire's ferocity and perished. Thereafter, 

the victim's family heaped scorn on [the officer] and 

blamed him for their relative's death. It was as a result 

of the fire and the confluence of events it generated, 

including the death of the victim and the relatives' 

accusations, that [the officer] was rendered 

permanently mentally disabled. 

[Russo, 206 N.J. at 34 (emphasis added).] 

Under other circumstances the Court has held a "tragic event" was not 

"undesigned and unexpected." In Mount, the Court also considered the ADR 

benefits application of a hostage negotiator who claimed permanent disability 

"when a lengthy hostage negotiation ended with the shooting death of the 
17 A-0652-22

hostage-taker, as [the hostage-taker and negotiator] spoke by cellphone." 

Mount, 233 N.J. at 408. The Court concluded the negotiator "directly and 

personally experienced a terrifying or horror[-]inducing event," satisfying 

Patterson. Id. at 429. However, the Court concluded the shooting was not 

"undesigned and unexpected" because of the direct "sequence of events that led 

to [the] death." Id. at 431. The Court considered: (1) the negotiator's training 

and knowledge of police tactics; (2) that "it was readily apparent . . . a violent 

encounter could occur"; (3) the hostage-taker told the negotiator "the situation 

would end with the [hostage-taker's] death"; and (4) the hostage-taker's 

"statements and conduct portended a violent confrontation with police." Id. at 

430. In other words, there was nothing "undesigned or unexpected" about the 

"tragic event." 

We apply these well-established principles to the matter here, and affirm. 

We are satisfied the ALJ's decision that the event was not "undesigned and 

unexpected," and the Board's subsequent adoption of that decision, were based 

on "sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). 

While in no respect minimizing the horrific event, the evidence failed to 

establish the event was "undesigned or unexpected." 
18 A-0652-22

Here, Leonardi was alerted to "a severe school-bus related accident with 

numerous injuries." As he had done countless other times, Leonardi responded 

to the accident that included injuries and fatalities. Utilizing his training and 

experience, he assessed the scene; tended to the injured; assisted with crime 

scene photographs; and, because it was a crime scene, stayed with the body of a 

deceased child for hours. In short, because Leonardi was trained and 

experienced through his employment to assist accident victims, the school bus 

accident was not "undesigned or unexpected." 

We commend Leonardi for his professionalism and compassion in caring 

for multiple accident victims, and are sympathetic to his mental condition, but 

under the circumstances presented before us, we have no basis to disturb the 

Board's determination that he did not satisfy the "undesigned and unexpected" 

requirement of Richardson. 

To the extent we have not addressed Leonardi's remaining arguments, it 

is because either our disposition makes it unnecessary, or because they lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.