Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Daniel G. Foote

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of K.P.G. (Minor 

Child), a Child in Need of 

Services,

K.P. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

April 9, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1709-JC-2053

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Danielle Gaughan, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1703-JC-891

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018 Page 2 of 13

Case Summary

[1] K.P. (“Mother”) appeals a trial court order adjudicating her son, K.P.G., a 

child in need of services (“CHINS”). She asserts that the trial court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over her and K.P.G. and raises several other issues, all of 

which amount to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

trial court’s CHINS determination. Finding that she waived her jurisdiction 

challenge and that the evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS 

determination, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 14, 2017, acting on a report of child neglect, Marion County 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”)1sent family case manager (“FCM”) 

Olivia Payne to the local bus station. There, Payne encountered Mother and 

eighteen-month-old K.P.G., who reportedly had been in the bus station all day 

without food. Payne attempted to speak to Mother, who was largely 

noncommunicative. She learned that Mother and K.P.G. (New Jersey 

residents) had been traveling from Iowa back to New Jersey, had missed their 

connecting bus, and had been in the Indianapolis bus station for nearly eighteen 

 

1

 Mother has filed a motion to strike certain portions of DCS’s brief as outside the record. See Appellee’s Br.

at 15 (paragraph 2 line 2, and footnotes 6 and 7). DCS filed an objection, pointing out that Mother had 

included the challenged information (affidavit and medical report) in her appendix and affirmed the accuracy 

of the appendix. We grant Mother’s motion to strike, noting that the information was not part of the trial 

court record, and order that the information be stricken not only from DCS’s brief but also from Mother’s 

appendix. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 56-61 (affidavit and accompanying medical report). That said, we 

note that our order to strike the information has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of this appeal. 
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hours. During the hour or so that Payne was with them, K.P.G. cried virtually 

the entire time, appeared unclean and tired, and looked like he did not feel well. 

Payne also noticed that each time K.P.G. tried to lean on Mother, Mother 

pushed him away. When Payne picked up K.P.G. to console him, he seemed 

feverish and was “breathing rapidly” and “really hard.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. After 

observing a hospital band on his wrist, Payne took him to a local children’s 

hospital, where he was evaluated and admitted. Mother said that a doctor in 

New Jersey had told her that K.P.G. had a heart murmur and that if a certain 

area did not close on its own, he would need surgery. She later testified that 

she did not want the New Jersey doctor performing surgery “cause I don’t like 

surgery.” Id. at 58.

[3] Shortly after K.P.G. was removed and hospitalized, Mother was admitted to 

the secured mental health unit at a different Indianapolis hospital. She reported 

that she suffered from mental illness, was trying to wean herself from her 

medication, and had not taken any medication for two months. She told FCM 

Carol Davis that she was from New Jersey and had been living with relatives 

there.

[4] On March 16, 2017, DCS filed a petition seeking to have K.P.G. adjudicated a 

CHINS. The trial court gave wardship of K.P.G. to DCS and ordered his 

placement in foster care (after hospitalization). Mother did not appear for the 

initial detention hearing, and the court ordered that she not have visitation with 

K.P.G. until she appeared in court. A week later, she appeared for the 

continued initial hearing, and pauper counsel entered an appearance on her 
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behalf. The next day, DCS amended the petition to include K.P.G.’s putative 

father. DCS sought an expedited interstate compact placement with New 

Jersey, which the trial court granted but which ultimately was not accepted by

New Jersey. 

[5] K.P.G. remained hospitalized, and on June 6, 2017, DCS sought and was 

granted permission for K.P.G. to undergo surgery to repair his heart defect. 

That same day, Mother filed a memorandum of law, unaccompanied by a 

motion, alleging that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mother 

and K.P.G. On June 16, 2017, DCS filed an objection to Mother’s 

memorandum, claiming that it was not properly filed, that Mother had 

appeared in person and by counsel, and that the trial court had found probable 

cause for the CHINS proceedings in March. The trial court never ruled on 

Mother’s memorandum. Following the factfinding hearing on July 11, 2017, 

the trial court issued an order accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon adjudicating K.P.G. a CHINS. One month later, the court held a 

dispositional hearing and issued a dispositional and parental participation

order, for K.P.G. to remain in foster care and Mother to participate in services. 

Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 
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Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – Mother failed to properly contest the issue of 

personal jurisdiction and therefore has waived it for 

consideration on appeal.

[6] Mother claims that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and 

K.P.G. because they are New Jersey residents who were present in Indiana 

merely because of a layover during a bus trip. “Personal jurisdiction refers to a 

court’s power to impose judgment on a particular defendant.” Boyer v. Smith, 

42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). A challenge to personal jurisdiction is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 508. 

[7] Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(2) permits a party to raise lack of personal jurisdiction 

as a defense. “A party can waive lack of personal jurisdiction and submit 

himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not 

contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 

1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Trial Rule 12(B) provides a mechanism for raising 

defenses such as a lack of jurisdiction or insufficient service of process by 

requiring that the defenses or objections be asserted in the responsive pleading 

(where one is required) or by motion. The rule further states,

A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 

pleading if a further pleading is permitted or within twenty [20] 

days after service of the prior pleading if none is required. If a 

pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is 

not required to serve a responsive pleading, any of the defenses in 

section (B)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (8) is waived to the extent 

constitutionally permissible unless made in a motion within 
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twenty [20] days after service of the prior pleading. No defense 

or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 

defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.

[8] Here, Mother was not required to file a responsive pleading to the CHINS 

petition. As such, she had twenty days from the date of service of the petition 

to file a motion challenging personal jurisdiction. The chronological case 

summary shows the following: on March 16, 2017, DCS filed the CHINS 

petition; on March 24, 2017, Mother appeared before the trial court; on March 

27, 2017, counsel entered an appearance on Mother’s behalf; on March 28, 

2017, DCS amended the CHINS position to include K.P.G.’s putative father; 

and on June 6, 2017, Mother submitted a memorandum (without an 

accompanying motion) raising for the first time the defense of lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Claiming that minimum contacts were lacking, Mother stressed in 

her memorandum that she and K.P.G. were just passing through Indiana and 

had never paid taxes, received government benefits, attended school, or resided 

in Indiana. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 79. Eighty-two days elapsed between

the filing of the CHINS petition and Mother’s submission of her memorandum 

first addressing the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. More than seventy

days elapsed from Mother’s appearance in person and by counsel to the time of 

her personal jurisdiction memorandum and from the date of DCS’s amended 

petition and Mother’s memorandum. Simply put, Mother submitted herself to 

the trial court’s jurisdiction by appearing in court and failing to contest personal 

jurisdiction at that time or within the time limitations found in Trial Rule 12(B). 
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As a result, she may not contest the issue on appeal. See Heartland Res., 903 

N.E.2d at 1007. 

Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS 

determination.

[9] Mother raises several arguments that essentially are challenges to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the CHINS determination. When reviewing the 

sufficiency of evidence, we give due regard to the trial court’s ability to assess 

the credibility of witnesses. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial 

court’s decision. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). Where the 

trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We 

consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the 

findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s findings 

and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous and a review of the record 

leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. “Findings are 

clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support them 

either directly or by inference.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 

1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted). “A judgment is clearly 

erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard.” Id. at 1002.

[10] In a CHINS proceeding, DCS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance 

of the evidence that a child meets the statutory definition of a CHINS. In re 
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N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). To meet its burden of establishing 

CHINS status, DCS must prove that the child is under age eighteen, 

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply 

the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the 

coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. 

[11] Although the acts or omissions of one or both parents can cause a condition 

that creates the need for court intervention, the CHINS designation focuses on 

the condition of the children rather than on an act or omission of the parent(s). 

N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. In other words, despite a “certain implication of 

parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a 

CHINS adjudication is simply that – a determination that a child is in need of 

services.” Id. (citations omitted). 

[12] Mother maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that K.P.G. has been 

seriously impaired or endangered due to any inability, refusal, or neglect on her 

part to provide him with necessities or adequate supervision absent the court’s 

coercive intervention. She does not specifically challenge any of the court’s 

findings, and as such, we simply determine whether the unchallenged findings 
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are sufficient to support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 

N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 

[13] The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact include the following:2

4. Mother and K.P.G. came to the attention of DCS in March of 

2017 when DCS was called to investigate a report of Mother and 

K.P.G. being in the Indianapolis Greyhound Bus Station for 

approximately 18 hours after Mother had missed a bus to return 

back to New Jersey where her family, including her mother, 

lives. K.P.G. was wearing a hospital band and it was reported 

that he had not eaten all day and that Mother was not responsive 

to his needs.

5. When the DCS assessment worker arrived at the Greyhound 

bus station, she observed K.P.G. to be crying the whole first hour 

that she was there and Mother never tended to him. K.P.G.

would lean up against Mother and Mother would bump him 

away with her arm. Additionally, K.P.G. felt warm to the touch, 

was breathing rapidly and was wearing a hospital band.

6. The police were called as well as DCS and Mother was taken 

to the secured mental health unit at Methodist Hospital and held 

for 72 hours. K.P.G. was taken to Riley Hospital because he 

appeared lethargic, was breathing rapidly and was wearing a 

hospital band. 

7. When Mother was released from Methodist she contact[ed]

DCS. DCS offered to refer mental health services but Mother 

declined. Mother stated that she “was grown and did not need 

help.” DCS offered to refer home based case management to

assist Mother with housing, transportation and to facilitate the 

 

2

 The findings refer to K.P.G. by his first name. We refer to him by his initials.
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treatment of mental health needs but Mother declined that 

service as well. 

8. K.P.G. has a heart condition and had heart surgery on June 

23, 2017 and K.P.G. is currently hospitalized.

9. At the time of the incident in the Greyhound Bus Station, 

Mother was aware that K.P.G. had a heart condition. 

10. By her own admission, Mother has “had mental illness for a 

while” and “is trying to wean” herself off of the medicine. 

11. Mother has not stayed in recent contact with DCS and DCS 

is not aware of where Mother is living.

12. Mother has not seen K.P.G. since before his surgery on June 

23, 2017. 

13. Throughout the trial Mother was very agitated, snorting at

times, laughing, shaking her head and muttering to herself while 

others testified. Mother’s testimony was difficult to follow as 

Mother rambled and went off on tangents. Mother frequently 

muttered, “desperate, how desperate” shaking her head. On one 

occasion Mother randomly stated to the DCS attorney who was 

questioning her, “You got kids, I got kids. You got feelings, I got

feelings.”

l4. The child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent to supply the child with necessary 

food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision. 

By her own admission, Mother has mental health issues and is 

not consistent with treatment and has been “weaning” herself off 

of the medication. Mother was observed in the Greyhound Bus 

Station to be non-responsive to K.P.G.’s needs. Mother had 

been in the bus station for quite some time and K.P.G. did not 

appear well. Mother was observed in the courtroom today to be 
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agitated and talking to herself. Mother’s responses to questions 

were rambling and non-responsive. Though there was no stated 

mental health diagnosis, Mother’s behavior in Court during trial 

indicate[s] mental health issues that impair her ability to care for 

K.P.G., especially because of his young age and medical needs. 

15. The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the 

child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted 

without the coercive intervention of the Court. Mother needs 

mental health treatment so that she can appropriately care for her 

child and Mother lacks the insight into her mental health issues 

to seek treatment without the coercive intervention of the Court.

K.P.G. has serious medical needs and the coercive intervention 

of the Court is necessary to ensure that K.P.G. receives the 

appropriate treatment.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 102-04.

[14] Mother claims that the trial court’s findings fail to support its conclusion that 

K.P.G. was endangered by her inability or unwillingness to provide him with 

care and treatment absent its coercive intervention. Emphasizing that she and 

K.P.G. were merely passing through Indiana, she relies heavily on our decision 

in M.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 964 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012). There, we reversed a CHINS determination for three young 

children whose mother brought them to Indiana to look up relatives after smoke 

damage from a fire in their building had temporarily displaced them from their 

Maryland apartment. Id. at 245. There, we emphasized the unusual 

circumstances, which included not only the fire in an adjacent apartment but 

also a blizzard that resulted in their predawn arrival in Indiana, and the father’s 

emergency trip to Texas to tend to his sick mother. Id. at 245-46. Both parents 
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were employed and had a savings account, and the mother had brought cash for 

food and lodging in Indiana. Id. She asked a police officer to take her and the 

children to an inexpensive motel, but the officer took them to a shelter instead. 

Id. at 246. The evidence simply did not support the trial court’s finding that the 

mother had relocated to Indiana without a plan for housing and that she was 

unwilling or unable to provide the children with stable housing. 

[15] We find M.K. distinguishable. While both cases involved mothers and children 

who are not Indiana residents, the trial court’s findings in M.K. emphasized a 

perceived housing deficiency as its basis for the CHINS adjudication, where the 

evidence showed that the mother in fact had cash and a plan for lodging, and 

that she had simply fallen prey to a “series of unfortunate and unforeseen 

events.” Id. In contrast, here, the trial court based its decision on K.P.G.’s 

serious health problems and Mother’s mental illness, both of which were 

unfortunate but not unforeseen. Mother knew that K.P.G. had a serious heart 

defect that would likely require surgery, yet she admitted that she had not 

consented to surgery in New Jersey because she did not like surgery. FCM 

Payne’s astute and prompt response to K.P.G.’s labored breathing at the bus 

station resulted in his hospitalization, treatment, and eventual surgery. As for 

Mother’s mental illness, she admitted that she was trying to wean herself from 

her prescribed medication and that she had not taken it for the two months 

preceding the CHINS proceedings. In short, her untreated mental illness left 

her unable to make critical decisions concerning K.P.G.’s care and treatment. 

FCM Payne’s potentially lifesaving intervention underscores Mother’s need for 
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the programs and services ordered by the CHINS court. Based on the 

foregoing, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS 

determination. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.