UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SOUTH CAPITOL BRIDGEBUILDERS,

a joint venture composed of Archer 

Western Construction, LLC and Granite 

Construction Company,

Plaintiff,

No. 20-CV-3894

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

LEXINGTON INSURANCE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

South Capitol Bridgebuilders (“South Capitol”) brings this breach of contract 

action alleging that Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) denied Plaintiff’s 

insurance claim improperly and in bad faith. Lexington filed a motion to transfer this 

action to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a), (Dkt. 16), requested leave to submit additional documents in 

support of the motion to transfer. (Dkt. 25). The motion for leave to submit additional 

documents is granted. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motions to transfer 

jurisdiction is also granted.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, South Capitol, is a joint venture comprised of two partners, 

Archer Western Construction, LLC and Granite Construction Company.1 Archer 

 

1 All facts referenced in this Order are from the Complaint and the exhibits thereto unless otherwise 

specified.

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Western’s members are all citizens of Illinois, making the LLC itself an Illinois 

citizen.

2 Granite Construction is a corporation and a California citizen. South Capitol 

was convened for the purpose of contracting with the city of Washington DC to 

demolish and reconstruct the Frederick Douglass Memorial Bridge, and it maintains 

an office in the District of Columbia for that purpose. (Dkt. 17, Ex. 4). South Capitol’s 

corporate headquarters is in Chicago, however.

Lexington, the Defendant, is a Delaware insurance company with its primary 

offices in Massachusetts. It issued South Capitol a policy covering the Frederick 

Douglass Memorial Bridge project. That insurance policy was negotiated by South 

Capitol representatives in Chicago and a copy of the contract was delivered to the 

Plaintiff there. The policy covers “loss of or damage to” insured property including 

“all costs rendered necessary by defects of material workmanship, design, plan, 

specification and should damage [. . .] occur to any portion of the Insured Property.”

(Dkt. 1, ¶ 16–19).

South Capitol began reconstruction of the Frederick Douglass Memorial 

Bridge in 2017. It poured concrete into molds to support steel arches in 2019. When 

the molds were removed, however, the concrete had pockets of air. The air pockets 

undermined the structural integrity of the concrete supports, which need to be 

replaced before construction can continue.

South Capitol filed a claim with Lexington, seeking coverage of the costs 

associated with repairing and rebuilding the concrete structures. Lexington’s New 

 

2 The Archer Western employee who filed the insurance claim, Jack Slattery, resides in Florida.

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York-based claim administrator worked with a New York adjusting firm, Charles 

Taylor Adjusting, and DeSimone Consulting Engineers, a New York engineering 

firm, (Dkt. 17, Ex. 1 at 4; Ex. 3), to investigate the claim and determine the cause and 

magnitude of South Capitol’s losses. The engineers and adjusters interviewed South 

Capitol employees on site in the District of Columbia. (Dkt. 17, 4). DeSimone 

determined that the pockets of air in the concrete structures formed when the 

concrete was poured, likely because the workmen on site failed to adequately vibrate 

the concrete immediately after it was poured into the mold. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 39)

On April 9, 2020, Lexington denied the claim. Its denial letter stated that “the 

mere existence of a defect in components [. . .] does not render such components 

‘damaged’” and that “[i]n order to sustain direct physical loss or damage, insured 

property must be in an initially satisfactory state and then changed by some external 

event into an unsatisfactory state.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. 3 at 5). South Capitol filed suit in the 

Northern District of Illinois.

ANALYSIS

Lexington requests that the Court transfer the case pursuant to § 1404(a)

which provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 

where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Transferring a case is 

appropriate when “(1) venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) venue is proper 

in the transferee district; (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and 

witnesses; and (4) the transfer will serve the interests of justice.” Nalco Co. v. Envtl. 

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Mgmt., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). The 

party moving for transfer has the burden of establishing that their proposed forum is 

clearly more convenient. See Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219–20 

(7th Cir. 1986). “District courts have broad discretion to grant or deny” such a motion. 

Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989); see also

Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th 

Cir. 2010). 

The parties agree that venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois and 

in the District of Columbia. (Dkt. 17, 5; Dkt. 23, 4). The Court now considers whether 

transfer would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses, and whether it would 

serve the interest of justice. These considerations are often referred to as the “private 

interest factors” and the “public interest factors.” See, e.g., Karp v. Silver Arch Cap. 

Partners, LLC, No. 20 CV 0139, 2021 WL 492872, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2021).

A. Private Interest Factors

When considering the convenience of the parties and witnesses, courts take 

into account factors such as (1) “the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum;” (2) “the relative 

ease of access to sources of proof;” (3) access to witness and witness attendance at 

proceedings in light of “the availability of compulsory process” and “the costs of 

obtaining the attendance of witnesses;” (4) “the situs of material events;” and (5) “the 

convenience of the parties.” Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, 

Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. 

Co., No. 13 CV 2207, 2014 WL 1018115, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014). While these 

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factors are useful, § 1404(a) “permits a flexible and individualized analysis and 

affords district courts the opportunity to look beyond a narrow or rigid set of 

considerations in their determinations.” Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978 

(citing Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)).

1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

South Capitol chose the Northern District of Illinois both because that is the 

headquarters of one of its two affiliates, Archer Western Construction, and because 

that affiliate negotiated the insurance contract in Chicago. This factor weighs in favor 

of denying the motion to transfer. However, there is some dispute as to how much 

weight the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be given. Compare Dunn v. Soo Line R. 

Co., 864 F. Supp. 64, 65 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“plaintiff's choice in selecting forum is 

entitled to substantial weight”) with Black & Decker Corp. v. Vermont Am. Corp., 915 

F. Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“a plaintiff's choice of forum must be given some 

weight”). Moreover, “the weight given to plaintiff's choice of forum is lessened if the 

chosen forum has relatively weak connections with the operative facts giving rise to 

the claim.” Von Holdt v. Husky Injection Molding Sys., Ltd., 887 F. Supp. 185, 188 

(N.D. Ill. 1995); see also Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 973 

F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[W]hen the events giving rise to the cause of action 

took place elsewhere, the weight granted to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum is 

diminished significantly.”). The events giving rise to this action took place in the 

District of Columbia, so the importance of this factor is diminished.

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2. Access to Sources of Proof

The parties disagree about the nature of the action and therefore disagree 

about what the “sources of proof” will be if this case proceeds. Lexington argues that 

the case will turn on facts related to that basis of its decision to deny coverage and 

will involve the activity at the site of the construction (e.g., whether the concrete 

supports were functional and integrated into the rest of the bridge before they were 

damaged, or whether they were defective from the start.) (Dkt. 1, Ex. 3 at 4). South 

Capitol argues that the only issue is one of contract interpretation. Assuming South 

Capitol is correct, this factor still does not weigh heavily in favor of keeping the case 

in the Northern District of Illinois. The contract can be accessed anywhere. If, 

however, Lexington is correct and the interpretation of the contract depends on facts 

related to the construction of the bridge, this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer

to the District of Columbia.

3. Attendance of Witnesses

Courts have noted that “[t]he convenience of witnesses is often viewed as the 

most important factor” in the private interest evaluation. See, e.g. Westchester Fire, 

No. 13 C 2207, 2014 WL 1018115, at *6 (citing Tingstol Co. v. Rainbow Sales, Inc., 18 

F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1998) and Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 

(N.D. Ill.1989)).

Based on the initial disclosures produced by each party, only one potential 

witness, Archer Western attorney Grant Peoples, lives in Illinois. (Dkt. 26, Exs. 1–3).

The majority are construction professionals who were interviewed by Lexington’s 

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agents in the course of their investigation and are located in the District of Columbia, 

including Eric Hayes, project manager for Plaintiff. Lexington’s claim administrator 

and adjuster are located in New York and Texas. This factor counsels in favor of 

transfer.

4. Situs of Material Events.

The parties disagree about where the material events in this case took place. 

In terms of strict contract construction, the policy was negotiated by South Capitol 

employees in Chicago. However, the property covered by the policy is located in 

Washington DC and the events that are determinative of whether the property 

sustained “direct physical loss or damage” meaning whether it was “initially [in] 

satisfactory state and [was] then changed by some external event into an 

unsatisfactory state” took place in Washington DC.

In cases where an insurance company seeks a declaratory judgment asserting 

it has no duty to defend a policy holder, courts often consider the situs to be “the 

forum where the insurance policy has been solicited, negotiated, delivered, and 

executed.” See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Topsail Sportswear, Inc., No. 10 C 1507, 

2010 WL 2757556, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2010) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co. v. Brother Int’l Corp., No. 05 CV 5484, 2006 WL 1543275, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 

2006)); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Equity Serv., No. 9 CV 7091, 2010 WL 2541978, 

at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2010). In these actions, however, courts were considering the 

forum where the contract was negotiated and the forum where the underlying action

(which the insurer is being asked to defend) was filed, which was not necessarily the 

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location where the insured property or entity was located. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,

No. 10 CV 1507, 2010 WL 2757556, at *2; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 05 CV

5484, 2006 WL 1543275, at *3; Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 9 CV 7091, 2010 WL 

2541978, at *9. Based on the claim denial letter attached to the Complaint, Lexington 

determined the repairs were not covered because the concrete structures were not 

properly functioning components of the bridge before they became defective. 

Analyzing this determination may require factfinding that goes beyond the four 

corners of the insurance contract. For purposes of change of venue analysis, this is a 

neutral factor.

5. Convenience of the Parties

The Northern District of Illinois is presumably the more convenient venue for

South Capitol, since the partnership maintains its primary office in this district. 

Neither South Capitol nor Lexington has given the Court reason to believe that the 

District of Columbia would be a similarly convenient venue, since neither party has 

a primary office there (although South Capitol has a secondary office in the District 

of Columbia). This factor weighs in favor of denying the motion to transfer.

Overall, the private interest factors weigh slightly in favor of granting

Lexington’s motion to transfer this case to the District of Columbia.

B. Public Interest Factors

Next, the Court considers public interest factors such as (1) relative “docket 

congestion and likely speed to trial;” (2) “each court’s relative familiarity with the 

relevant law;” (3) “the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each 

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locale;”; and (4) “the relationship of each community to the controversy.” Research 

Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010)

(citations omitted); see also Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLC, 

240 F. Supp. 3d 848, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2016). These public interest factors “may be 

determinative, warranting transfer or its denial even where the convenience of the 

parties and witnesses points toward the opposite result.” Id.

1. Docket Congestion

In 2020, 394 civil cases were filed per judge in the Northern District of Illinois, 

while only 249 were filed per judge in the District of Columbia. (Dkt. 17, Ex. 5). 

During that timeframe each Illinois judge had an average of 712 cases pending, while 

District of Columbia judges had an average of 356. Id. Because of these disparities,

on average cases in the Northern District of Illinois are resolved 11.2 months after 

filing, while cases in the District of Columbia are resolved after only 5.3 months. Id. 

This factor weighs in favor of transfer to the District of Columbia.

2. Familiarity with the Relevant Law

“In a diversity action it is [. . .] considered advantageous to have federal judges 

try a case who are familiar with the applicable state law.” Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron 

Works, 796 F.2d 217, 221 (7th Cir. 1986). The parties disagree about which forum’s 

law will be applied to this case, so before weighing this factor the Court must 

determine what the applicable law is likely to be.

A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice of law rules of the state 

in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–

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97 (1941). If a case is transferred from one federal district court to another pursuant 

to § 1404, the transferee court applies the transferor court’s choice of law rules, so 

whether or not this case is transferred, Illinois choice of law rules will apply. See 

Coffey, 796 F.2d at 221.

When adjudicating insurance coverage disputes, “Illinois courts employ a ‘most 

significant contacts’ test to determine the governing substantive law for the contract.” 

Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 2000). This test 

considers the several factors including “the location of the subject matter, the place 

of delivery of the contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the place of 

the last act to give rise to a valid contract, the place of performance, or other place 

bearing a rational relationship to the general contract.” Id. (citing Lapham-Hickey 

Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, (1995)). However, “[w]hile all 

these factors must be considered in the choice of law analysis, the location of the 

insured risk is given special emphasis.” Jupiter Aluminum Corp., 225 F.3d at 873

(emphasis added) (citing Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. 

of Ill., 268 Ill. App. 3d 655 (1994) and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 193 

(1971) for this proposition and holding that Indiana law applied to an insurance 

contract protecting property located in Indiana, despite the fact that both the 

insurance broker and the policy holder were Illinois corporations, and that the

insurance contract was negotiated and signed in Illinois).

Here, the subject matter of the insurance contract is located in the District of 

Columbia, the contract was delivered in Illinois, the insured and the insurer are 

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domiciled in California, Illinois, Delaware and Massachusetts, the place of the last 

act to give rise to a valid contract is Illinois, and the places bearing a rational 

relationship to the contract are the District of Columbia and Illinois. However, 

because the location of the insured risk is given special emphasis, the contract law of 

the District of Columbia may apply. For purposes of the change of venue analysis, 

this public interest factor is neutral. 

3. Local Interest and Relationship of the Community to the Controversy

The Court considers the third and fourth public interest factors together. South 

Capitol argues, without citing any case law, that Illinois has the greatest local 

interest in this dispute, because its partners are citizens of Illinois and California, 

and it is “based” in Illinois. It argues that the District of Columbia has no interest in 

this case because it is not a party to this case. This is unpersuasive. The District of 

Columbia is not just the location of the insured property, it is also the eventual owner

of the insured property: the bridge. If South Capitol is unable to recover the cost of 

reconstructing the bridge from Lexington it may delay completion of the bridge or 

increase the cost of construction. See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Dimucci Dev. Corp. of 

Ponce Inlet, Inc., No. 14 CV 7234, 2015 WL 1137648, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2015) 

(granting motion to transfer to Florida and noting that “Florida also has a strong 

interest in the interpretation of insurance coverage over construction of residential 

buildings within its state.”). This factor weighs strongly in favor of transfer.

The public interest factors weigh in favor of transferring the case to the District 

of Columbia.

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CONCLUSION

Lexington’s motion to transfer (Dkt. 16) is granted. The Clerk is directed to 

transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

forthwith. Defendant’s motion for leave to submit additional documents (Dkt. 25) is 

granted. Civil case terminated.

Dated: April 15, 2021

E N T E R:

MARY M. ROWLAND

United States District Judge

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