alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1447

ELIZABETH A. REEVES,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 versus

ST. MARY’S COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; BOARD OF

APPEALS FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY, MARYLAND;

DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ZONING FOR ST.

MARY’S COUNTY, MARYLAND; HEALTH DEPARTMENT;

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH; SUSAN

MCNEAL; HOWARD THOMPSON; SPENCER SCRIBER;

TERRY MILLER; MARGARET ABRAHAM; LAWRENCE E.

ROWLAND; JON B. GRIMM; DANIEL H. RALEY;

SHELBY P. GUAZZO; J. THOMAS MATTINGLY, JR.;

JOSEPH ANDERSON; JULIE RANDALL,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-02-2449-8)

Submitted: October 29, 2004 Decided: November 24, 2004

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elizabeth A. Reeves, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel Karp, ALLEN,

KARPINSKI, BRYANT & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
- 2 -

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

Elizabeth A. Reeves’ civil suit was dismissed by final

order filed on June 13, 2003, and entered three days later on

June 16. In her “Motion for Reconsideration and Recusal of Judge

Williams,” filed on August 15, 2003, Reeves alleged that she did

not timely receive notice of the court’s final order and that she

wished to appeal. In her untimely notice of appeal, Reeves again

alleged that she did not timely receive notice that her action had

been dismissed. We construe Reeves’ statement in her “Motion for

Reconsideration” as a motion to reopen the time to note an appeal

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). See Sanders v. United States, 113

F.3d 184, 187-88 (11th Cir. 1997); Ogden v. San Juan County, 32

F.3d 452, 454 (10th Cir. 1994). 

Rule 4(a)(6) permits a district court to reopen the

appeal period if: (a) the motion is filed within 180 days after the

judgment or order is entered or within seven days after the moving

party receives notice of the entry, whichever is earlier; (b) the

court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the

entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not

receive the notice from the district court or any party within

twenty-one days after entry; and (c) the court finds that no party

would be prejudiced. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

Here, it is unclear whether Reeves has met the

requirements of the Rule. Accordingly, we remand the case to the
- 4 -

district court for it to determine whether Reeves can satisfy the

requirements of Rule 4(a)(6). We express no opinion as to whether

Reeves has met the requirements of the Rule. The record, as

supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further

review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

REMANDED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cr−00585

Honorable Maria Valdez

Jacob Mathley

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, September 24, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: At the telephonic request of

Defendant's counsel, the Court grants an extension to 9/25/20 by 9:00 a.m. to file a written

response under seal. Mailed notice (lp, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cr-00585 Document #: 17 Filed: 09/24/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:46
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 

)
 

AHRAF SALIM ABDESSALAM, )
 

)
 

Petitioner, )
 

)
 Civil Action No. 06-1761 (ESH) 

v. ) 

) 

BARACK H. OBAMA et al. ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

)
 

2. Does 

not, why not? 

ORDER 

Two weeks before the next hearing, the government is to file answers to the following 

questions and provide the requested documents. 

1.	 How many detainees did identify as having fought at Tora Bora? Of 

those, how many were Libyan? Provide their detainee numbers. 

have a detainee number and, if 

3.	 What information, ifany, did provide regarding __ 

and . Provide any documents containing this information. 

4.	 Does the government have any pictures ofpetitioner at or after his capture? Ifso,
 

produce them.
 

5.	 Did_admit to having fought at Tora Bora? If so, provide the interview
 

containing this admission.
 

A conference call will be held on March 13,2009, at 2:15 P.M. to discuss further scheduling. 

SO ORDERED. 
-- --------

/s/

ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

United States District Judge 

DATE: March 6, 2009
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Elmer Keith TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. 04-1885.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 2004.

Decided Dec. 8, 2004.

*488Michael Mills Hobart, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elmer Keith Taylor, Fort Dodge, IA, pro se.

Before RILEY, MCMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Elmer Keith Taylor (Taylor) pled guilty to being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, and the district court1 sentenced him in accordance with the parties’ stipulation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) to 420 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. On appeal, Taylor challenges the district court’s order finding him competent to stand trial, and we affirm.

“Due process requires that a defendant be competent to plead guilty.” *Hunter v. Bowersox,*172 F.3d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1999). The test for determining competency to plead guilty or proceed to trial is “whether a criminal defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” *Drope v. Missouri,*420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (quoting *Dusky v. United States,*362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam)).

Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no clear error in the district court’s competency ruling. *See United States v. Cook,*356 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir.2004) (standard of review). Notwithstanding one psychologist’s view that Taylor was incompetent, the court’s ruling was supported by the report and testimony of a staff psychologist at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, where Taylor was evaluated for about a month. The staff psychologist found Taylor had no mental disorder that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense. *See United States v. Tucker,*243 F.3d 499, 506 (8th Cir.2001) (when there are two permissible views of evidence, factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous). The court’s ruling was also supported by Taylor’s demeanor at the competency hearings, when Taylor raised questions about his constitutionally guaranteed trial rights and about his counsel’s performance, and at the change-of-plea hearing, when Taylor assured the court that he understood the proceedings and felt better emotionally than he had in the past. *See Vogt v. United States,*88 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir.1996) (in considering defendant’s mental competency to stand trial, attention should be paid to any evidence of defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor before trial court, available medical evaluations, and whether counsel questioned defendant’s competency before court).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
H. R. 4037

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the twentieth day of January, two thousand and four

An Act

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 475 Kell

Farm Drive in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the ‘‘Richard G. Wilson Processing

and Distribution Facility’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

The facility of the United States Postal Service located at

475 Kell Farm Drive in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, shall be known

and designated as the ‘‘Richard G. Wilson Processing and Distribution Facility’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,

or other record of the United States to the facility referred to

in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Richard

G. Wilson Processing and Distribution Facility’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Exhibit 31.1



Certifications



I, J.A. Cardwell, Sr., certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Petro Distributing, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.



|                      
|----------------------
|Date: March 29, 2005  
|/s/ J.A. Cardwell, Sr.
|(J.A. Cardwell, Sr.)  
|President and Director
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

John Doe

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:20−cv−04518

Honorable John

J. Tharp Jr.

The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability

Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated

Associations Identified on Schedule A Hereto, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, December 7, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr:The unopposed motion by

defendant UUMM for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead [47] is granted.

The moving defendant's response to the amended complaint is due by 12/18/2020. Mailed

notice(air, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04518 Document #: 48 Filed: 12/07/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:2057
#### Charles West et al. v. B. E. Wheeler.

*Promissory note*— Judge *disqualified by interest as indorsee.*

Suit upon a promissory note cannot be brought before a justice of the peace to whom it has been indorsed for collection, as he thereby becomes the plaintiff’s agent therefor

Error to Hillsdale.

Submitted Oct. 19.

Decided Oct. 31.

Assumpsit. Defendant brings error.

Reversed.

*J. L. O’Medley*and *O. A. Stacy*for appellant.

A juror cannot sit in a case in which he is interested : *Peninsular Ry. Co. v. Howard*20 Mich. 18; *Stockwell v. White Lake*22 Mich. 341; *Mich. Air Line Ry. v. Barnes*44 Mich. 222*People v. Montcalm Circ. Judge*41 Mich. 550; an indorsement for collection carries the legal title to the collecting agent *(Boyd v. Corbitt*37 Mich. 52) in trust: *Moore v. Hall*48 Mich. 143.

*Millard, Weaver do Wearer*for appellee.

The indorsement of a note for collection merely creates an agency and does not vest any interest or legal title in the indorsee: *Manhattan Co. v. Reynolds*2 Hill 140 ; *Wood v. Tyson*13 La. Ann. 104; *Smith v. McManus*7 Yerg. 477; *Dugan v. United States*3 Wheat. 172; *Dollfus v. Frosch*1 Den. 367 ; *Barker v. Prentiss*6 Mass. 430; *Bank of Utica v. Smith*18 Johns. 230; Story Prom. Notes (5th ed.), § 120 *a.*

Graves, C. J.

Yolney Reynolds, a justice of the peace,, gave judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor against the defendant on a promissory note and the circuit court affirmed the judgment on certiorari and the defendant brought error.

*506The case was in substance this: The plaintiffs held what purported to be a promissory note made by the defendant and payable to their order and they caused it to be left with the justice for collection under their indorsement made in these terms: *“Pay Volney Reynolds, J. P., or order, for collection*and the justice began the suit before himself on ' the note. The plaintiffs by a person acting as their attorney declared on the note and the defendant pleaded the general issue, but subsequently objected that the justice had no jurisdiction because of his being indorsee. The justice overruled the point and proceeded with the cause.

A trial followed and without any change in the indorsement or in its legal significance the justice gave judgment on the note in favor of the plaintiffs as before mentioned. The good faith of the justice is not doubted. But the question is whether he was qualified to go on against the objection raised and render judgment on the note.

My brethren are of opinion that it was the legal import of the facts that the justice was the plaintiffs’ agent for the -collection of the note and so continued *(M’Minn v. Richtmyer*3 Hill 236), and that being their legal agent therein he could not at the same time and in relation to the same matter act also as justice of the peace; that the characters were not compatible.

The result is that both judgments below must be reversed with the costs of all the courts.

The other Justices concurred.
Case: 1:20-cr-00474 Document #: 2 Filed: 08/07/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:19
Monday, October 5, 2020 at 14:52:44 Eastern Daylight Time 

Subject: Dra$ NISTIR 8312, dated August 2020, “Four Principles of Explainable ArEficial Intelligence” 

Date: Friday, October 2, 2020 at 1:31:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time 

From: Jeff Brennan 

To: NIST Explainable AI 

AEachments: image001.png, image002.png, image003.png 

Subj: Draft NISTIR 8312, dated August 2020, “Four Principles of Explainable Artificial 

Intelligence” 

In response to the “Call for Patent Claims,” Vettd, Inc., wishes to disclose the existence of a pending

patent application (U.S. 2020/0285971) with claims relating to the draft publication. Vettd provides

assurance that a license to any essential patent claim(s) of this pending application will be made

available to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance or 

requirements in the Information Technology Laboratory draft publication under reasonable terms and

conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. Further, Vettd will include in any

documents transferring ownership of patents subject to this assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure

that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee, and that the transferee will

similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with the goal of binding each

successor-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in any relevant transfer

documents. 

Please let me know if you have any questions or need anything further at this point. On behalf of Vettd, Inc., 

JEFF BRENNAN 

General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer at Vettd 

m: @vettdhq 

t: /vettd 

Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1 / 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of InVivo Therapeutics Holdings Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Frank M. Reynolds, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



|                      |  |                                                                       
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: March 24, 2011 |  | /s/ Frank M. Reynolds                                                 
|                      |  | Frank M. Reynolds, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 25, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70223-70224]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27627]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

[OPIC-162; OMB-3420-0019]


Submission for OMB Review-Comments Request

AGENCY: Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35), agencies are required to publish a Notice in the Federal 
Register notifying the public that the agency is renewing an 
information collection for OMB review and approval and requests public 
review and comment on the submission. Comments are being solicited on 
the need for the information; the accuracy of the

[[Page 70224]]

Agency's burden estimate; the quality, practical utility, and clarity 
of the information to be collected; and ways to minimize reporting the 
burden, including automated collected techniques and uses of other 
forms of technology.

DATES: Comments must be received within 60 calendar-days of publication 
of this Notice.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the subject form may be obtained from the Agency 
submitting officer.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OPIC Agency Submitting Officer: Essie 
Bryant, Records Manager, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 1100 
New York Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20527; (202) 336-8563.

Summary Form Under Review

    Type of Request: Renewal of an information collection without 
change.
    Title: Self-Monitoring Questionnaire.
    Form Number: OPIC-162.
    Frequency of Use: One per investor per project per year.
    Type of Respondents: Business or other institution (except farms); 
individuals.
    Standard Industrial Classification Codes: All.
    Description of Affected Public: U.S. companies or citizens 
investing overseas.
    Reporting Hours: 1,860 (4 hours per form).
    Number of Responses: 465 per year.
    Federal Cost: $47,356.
    Authority for Information Collection: Sections 231, 231A, 239(d), 
and 240A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
    Abstract (Needs and Uses): The Self Monitoring Questionnaire is the 
principal document used by OPIC to monitor the developmental effects of 
OPIC's investment projects, monitor the economic effects on the U.S. 
economy, and collect information on compliance with environmental and 
labor policies.

    Dated: November 17, 2014.
Nichole Cadiente,
Administrative Counsel, Department of Legal Affairs.
[FR Doc. 2014-27627 Filed 11-24-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3195-01-M