IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH R.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 4853

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) to Plaintiff Keith R. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the 

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons 

that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary remand [Doc. No. 21] is denied, and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 26] is granted.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is an individual who received SSI benefits as a child, having been 

found disabled by an ALJ in 2006 due to borderline intellectual functioning and 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. As required by law, Plaintiff’s eligibility for 

disability benefits was redetermined under the rules for determining disability in 

adults when Plaintiff attained age 18. On July 26, 2017, it was determined that 

Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of July 1, 2017. That determination was upheld 

upon reconsideration after a disability hearing held by a State agency Disability 

Hearing Officer. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing.

Two separate hearings before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) were 

held on January 17, 2019 and September 5, 2019. Plaintiff personally appeared and 

testified at the hearings. Impartial medical experts, vocational experts, and 

Plaintiff’s mother also appeared and testified at both hearings. Plaintiff waived 

representation for the January 17, 2019 hearing, but was represented by counsel at 

the September 5, 2019 hearing. In light of medical expert testimony at the January 

17, 2019 hearing, the ALJ had sent Plaintiff for a mental consultative evaluation. 

However, at the September 5, 2019 hearing, Plaintiff’s representative stated that 

they had not received any letter from Plaintiff’s doctor.

On October 1, 2019, the ALJ denied SSI benefits to Plaintiff, determining 

that Plaintiff was no longer disabled under the Social Security Act as of July 1, 

2017. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s 

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request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the 

Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits was analyzed in accordance with the fivestep sequential evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ first noted that Plaintiff attained age 18 on 

November 15, 2016, and that he had previously been found to be no longer disabled 

as of July 1, 2017, based on a redetermination of disability under the rules for 

adults who file new disability applications. At step two, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: obesity; schizoaffective disorder; and 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The ALJ concluded at step three 

that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically 

equal any listed impairments.

Before step four, the ALJ determined that, since July 1, 2017, Plaintiff 

retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the 

following additional limitations: can perform simple routine tasks requiring no more 

than short simple instructions and simple work-related decision-making with few 

workplace changes; can maintain occasional contact with the general public of a 

brief, superficial, and incidental nature and have occasional interaction with 

supervisors and co-workers; and can work in proximity to others, but with no 

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shared or tandem tasks. At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past 

relevant work.

At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, 

work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that, since July 1, 2017, Plaintiff can 

perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a 

finding that he is no longer disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

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precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

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Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

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1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ ignored certain impairments and reached an incomplete RFC 

assessment; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted a consultative examiner’s opinion 

and lacked an evidentiary basis for her assessment concerning the period from 

November 2017 onward; and (3) the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptoms. Each argument will be addressed below in turn.

A. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Impairments

As stated above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments of 

obesity, schizoaffective disorder, and ADHD. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ did 

not adequately address his diagnoses of borderline intellectual functioning, 

personality disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. According to Plaintiff, the 

ALJ did not properly consider whether those diagnoses constituted severe 

impairments. However, “[d]eciding whether impairments are severe at Step 2 is a 

threshold issue only; an ALJ must continue on to the remaining steps of the 

evaluation process as long as there exists even one severe impairment.” Arnett v. 

Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “any error 

at Step Two is harmless if the ALJ finds a claimant has any severe impairments 

and goes on to sufficiently address the aggregate effect of all the claimant’s severe 

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and non-severe impairments later in his analysis.” Dorothy B. v. Berryhill, No. 18 

CV 50017, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91276, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2019) (citations 

omitted). Here, despite not finding them to be severe impairments, the ALJ’s RFC 

analysis does in fact discuss Plaintiff’s diagnoses of borderline intellectual 

functioning, personality disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. (R. 21-23.)

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has explained that “having been diagnosed 

with . . . impairments does not mean they imposed particular restrictions on [a 

claimant’s] ability to work.” Weaver v. Berryhill, 746 F. App’x 574, 578-79 (7th Cir. 

2018) (citation omitted). Accordingly, it is a claimant’s “burden to establish not just 

the existence of the condition, but to provide evidence that they support specific 

limitations affecting her capacity to work.” Id. at 579 (citations omitted). Under 

this legal framework, Plaintiff’s broad assertion that Plaintiff’s “personality 

disorder results in greater limitations than the ALJ included in her RFC” is 

insufficient. (Pl.’s Memo. at 9.) Furthermore, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff 

“fails to identify any additional specific functional limitations caused by the 

diagnoses” and “does not attempt to argue how these diagnoses impacted him 

differently, if [at] all, than schizoaffective disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder.” (Def.’s Memo. at 3-4.) Though, for the first time in his reply brief, Plaintiff 

vaguely implies that the aforementioned diagnoses may impact Plaintiff’s asserted 

need for repeated instructions, Plaintiff does not specifically tie that limitation to 

his diagnoses. Ultimately, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s “reliance 

on diagnoses alone fails to show prejudicial error with either the ALJ’s step two or 

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RFC determinations.” (Id. at 4.) See Richards v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 26, 30 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (“But pointing to various diagnoses and complaints and saying that they 

might hinder [the claimant] is insufficient to establish the existence of a functional 

limitation.”) (citation omitted).

B. The ALJ’s Treatment of Dr. Karr’s Opinions

Plaintiff next maintains that the ALJ did not properly evaluate consultative 

examiner Dr. Jeffrey Karr’s findings that Plaintiff “had ‘marked’ restriction[s] in 

interacting appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers and in 

responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work 

setting.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 10.) In her decision, the ALJ assessed Dr. Karr’s opinions 

as follows:

After performing a mental consultative evaluation of the claimant in 

February 2019, Dr. Karr indicated he was uncertain as to the claimant’s 

functional ability as the claimant exhibited highly questionable effort 

during the consultative evaluation. Dr. Karr did indicate the claimant 

had marked limitation [in] interacting appropriately with others and 

responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a 

routine work setting due to his significant school suspension history as 

well as a legal history, and that he presented uncooperative. I give great

weight to the opinion of Dr. Karr that the claimant’s functional ability 

based on findings during this evaluation could not be properly 

determined due to highly questionable effort. I give less weight to the 

opinion of Dr. Karr that the claimant has marked limitation in social 

interaction, as the evidence of record only supports at most a moderate 

limitation with social interaction as also opined by Drs. Taylor and 

Cremerius.

(R. 23-24 (citation omitted).)

An ALJ “is required to consider a consultative examiner’s opinion and explain 

the weight given to such an opinion in his decision.” Lucio v. Barnhart, No. 03 C 

7078, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12207, at *38 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2004) (citation 

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omitted). However, “[a]n ALJ may discount the opinion of a consultative examiner . 

. . as long as he provides good reasons for doing so.” Johnny T. Saul, No. 17 C 8671, 

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3387, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2020) (citation omitted). 

Further, “[a]n ALJ can give less weight to a [consultative] doctor’s opinion if it is 

internally inconsistent or inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the 

record as long as she articulates her reasons for giving the opinion less weight.” 

Hall v. Astrue, 489 F. App’x 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Here, per 

the above-quoted passage, the ALJ explained the weight she gave to Dr. Karr’s

opinions and articulated good reasons for finding some of those opinions 

unpersuasive. Indeed, the ALJ elsewhere found persuasive the opinion of State 

agency consultant Dr. Russell Taylor’s opinion that Plaintiff had only moderate 

restrictions with interacting with others and could interact with others sufficiently 

in a work setting with reduced social demands. (R. 22-23.) The ALJ also found 

persuasive the opinion of State agency consultant Dr. Leslie Fyans’ opinion that 

Plaintiff had only mild restrictions with interacting with others. (Id. at 23.)

Additionally, the ALJ gave some weight to the opinion of impartial medical expert 

Dr. Michael Cremerius’ opinion that Plaintiff had moderate restrictions with 

interacting with others. (Id.) The ALJ was entitled to rely on the expertise of three

doctors in finding that Plaintiff had at most moderate restrictions with interacting 

with others. See Minnis v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 91 C 4399, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

5491, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 1992) (“[T]he testimony of the three doctors . . . 

constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.”). Accordingly, the 

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Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Karr’s 

opinions.3

Mixed in with his argument concerning Dr. Karr, Plaintiff asserts that the 

ALJ erred in rendering an RFC determination for the period of November 2017 

through the date of the decision because she did not rely on a medical opinion that 

addressed that period. However, as an initial matter, the necessity of medical 

opinions is a matter subject to the ALJ’s discretion. See Jesus P. v. Saul, No. 19 C 

2271, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105788, at *33 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2020) (“An ALJ’s 

retention of a medical expert is discretionary and ‘there is no requirement that 

ALJs contact all treating physicians for disability opinions.’”) (citations omitted). 

Further, the job of assessing a claimant’s work-related abilities lies solely with the 

ALJ, not a medical expert. See Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F. 3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(“[T]he determination of a claimant’s RFC is matter for the ALJ alone – not a 

treating or examining doctor – to decide.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Seventh 

Circuit has made clear that “[t]he claimant bears the burden of producing medical 

evidence that supports her claims of disability.” Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 

668 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) 

3 Plaintiff argues in passing that “if the ALJ believed that Dr. Karr was uncertain about 

any of his conclusions, that was not sufficient reason to reject them [and] the ALJ should 

have contacted Dr. Karr for clarification.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 11.) “But the ALJ was only 

required to recontact a medical source . . . if the evidence received is inadequate to 

determine whether the claimant is disabled.” Vincent A. v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 7136, 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80484, at *16 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2019) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). The Court agrees with Defendant that that was not the case here, where the ALJ 

relied on other evidence, including multiple medical opinions and routinely normal mental 

status examination findings.

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(“The claimant bears the burden of submitting medical evidence establishing her 

impairments and her residual functional capacity.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s 

argument concerning the lack of medical opinions must fail because Plaintiff 

himself did not offer the medical opinions he now claims were lacking. See Charles 

F. v. Saul, No. 18 C 618, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134940, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 

2019) (“[The claimant] contends that the treating doctor’s opinion would be 

‘valuable information’ to support his claim. Therefore, the burden was on [the 

claimant] to supply an opinion from Dr. Vermillion.”). For these reasons, the Court 

must reject Plaintiff’s argument concerning the ALJ’s RFC determination for the 

period after November 2017.

C. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms

For his final argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s assessment of his

reported symptoms was erroneous. Pertinent to Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, in 

her decision, the ALJ noted that: “[p]sychological evaluations in September and 

October 2017 noted the claimant was alert and cooperative with normal mood and 

affect along with normal attention span and concentration” (R. 21); “[i]n April 2018, 

. . . on psychiatric and mental status evaluation[s], he had all normal findings” (id.); 

“[o]n [a] mental status evaluation [in May 2018] he was oriented to time, place and 

person . . . [and] had normal fund of knowledge and had no depression, anxiety or 

agitation” (id.); “in June 2019 . . . [h]e had all normal findings on psychiatric and 

mental status evaluation[s]” (id. at 22); “in July 2019, he reported that his 

symptoms were better, he was sleeping better, he had no suicidal or homicidal 

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ideation, he denied hallucinations . . . [and] had all normal findings on psychiatric 

and mental status evaluation[s]” (id.); and “in August 2019 . . . he denied anxiety, 

behavioral problems, combative, compulsive behavior, depression, hyperactivity, 

inattentive[ness], obsessive behavior, paranoia, phobia, suicidal ideation and 

temper tantrums” (id.).

The ALJ concluded as follows regarding Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms:

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of his symptoms, they are inconsistent because medical 

records do not support his alleged impairments to the extent alleged 

with only routine and conservative treatment. In addition, Dr. Valette 

explained the inconsistencies in results at the various consultative 

examinations, which suggest the claimant was malingering. 

Furthermore, the limitations the claimant testified to having are 

inconsistent with records now at the hearing level and objective 

diagnostic tests and studies do not support his allegations. He had a 

FSIQ of 75 in school. Dr. Valette explained issues as to the validity of 

the IQ testing and the inconsistencies. The claimant’s activities of daily 

living suggest the claimant has greater ability. He was working for his 

Uncle in March and April 2019 at a body shop earning $70.00 a week.

(R. 25.)

This Court gives “the ALJ’s credibility finding special deference and will 

overturn it only if it is patently wrong.” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 

(7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[P]atently wrong . . . 

means that the decision lacks any explanation or support.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Under that standard, the Court 

finds that, per the ALJ’s explanation and support outlined above, the ALJ 

reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms were not fully 

corroborated. See Atkins v. Saul, 814 F. App’x 150, 155 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Here, the 

ALJ otherwise explained his conclusion adequately. He explained that the objective 

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medical evidence and Atkins’s daily activities did not corroborate his subjective 

symptoms.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Prill v. Kijakazi, No. 21-

1381, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1072, at *23 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022) (“Substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Prill’s account of her subjective 

symptoms was not consistent with her medical records.”); Ray v. Saul, 861 F. App’x 

102, 107 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Because the ALJ’s weighing of [claimant’s] reported 

symptoms in the context of the whole record is supported by substantial evidence, 

we find no reversible error on this front either.”); Schrank v. Saul, 843 F. App’x 786, 

789 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he ALJ’s credibility determination was not ‘patently wrong,’ 

because she found [claimant] not credible for several reasons that were adequately 

supported by the record.”) (citation omitted); cf. Lacher v. Saul, 830 F. App’x 476, 

478 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The ALJ’s rationale here was thin, but it was adequate to 

reflect her conclusion that the objective medical evidence and Lacher’s daily 

activities did not corroborate his subjective symptoms.”). Ultimately, Plaintiff has 

not shown that the ALJ’s evaluation of his alleged symptoms was “patently wrong,” 

as was Plaintiff’s burden. See Horr v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 16, 19–20 (7th Cir. 

2018).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not well 

taken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary remand [Doc. No. 21] is denied, 

and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 26] is 

granted.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: February 25, 2022 ________________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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