#29712-a-SPM

2022 S.D. 58

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

TRISTIN LARSON, Defendant and Appellant.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE BOBBI J. RANK

Judge

* * * *

BRAD A. SCHREIBER

Pierre, South Dakota Attorney for defendant

and appellant.

MARK VARGO

Attorney General

PAUL S. SWEDLUND

Solicitor General

Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff

and appellee.

* * * *

ARGUED

APRIL 26, 2022

OPINION FILED 10/05/22
#29712

-1-

MYREN, Justice

[¶1.] Tristin Larson was indicted for aggravated battery of an infant and 

alternative counts of second-degree murder or first-degree manslaughter for the 

death of Easton Felix (Easton). The circuit court denied Larson’s motion to 

suppress statements he made to law enforcement and his motion for judgment of 

acquittal. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder and aggravated battery 

of an infant. Larson appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] Larson and Elizabeth Felix (Felix) were in a romantic relationship for 

nearly a year. Felix had a two-year-old son, Easton. Larson, Felix, and Easton 

lived in a house with Larson’s mother, Melissa Marmo, in Pierre, South Dakota. On 

April 16, 2020, Larson watched Easton while Felix was at work. Larson got mad at 

Easton because he was not listening to him. Larson pushed Easton on the forehead, 

which caused him to fall to the floor and hit his head.1 Easton began crying and 

stood up but fell a second time. After his second fall, Easton began to convulse.

[¶3.] Larson called Felix, told her he pushed Easton and explained that 

Easton was not getting up. Felix told Larson to call the police, but he told her he 

did not want to do that. Felix and Larson remained on the phone during the 20 

minutes it took Felix to walk home. Larson told her he pushed Easton because 

1. As the only witness of the incident, Larson’s depiction of what happened 

necessarily provides the initial impression of what occurred. The State’s 

theory of the case was that Larson’s conduct was significantly more 

aggressive than a simple push. The State attempted to prove its theory of the 

case through Larson’s own description as well as expert testimony that the 

injuries were inconsistent with a mere push.
#29712

-2-

Easton was not listening and that she should not call the police because he did not 

want to get into trouble. Larson also told her to blame their dog if anyone asked 

what happened. When she arrived at the house, Easton was lying on the couch, and 

Larson was pacing back and forth. Larson resisted Felix’s requests to call 911 but 

agreed to call his mother. Marmo arrived promptly and took Easton to the hospital.

[¶4.] Law enforcement talked with Larson, Felix, and Marmo at the 

hospital. Larson and Felix said Easton was knocked off the bed by the dog. 

Because of bleeding in his brain, Easton was flown to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for 

further care.

[¶5.] On April 17, 2020, Felix talked with Kirsten Persson, a physician’s 

assistant from Child’s Voice in Sioux Falls, and told her that she had previously lied 

and that Larson pushed Easton. Felix spoke with law enforcement on the same 

day, and she placed a recorded call to Larson. During this call, Larson denied 

pushing Easton. During a second recorded call the next day, Larson admitted 

pushing Easton.

[¶6.] Easton passed away on April 18, 2020. That same day, Larson went to 

the Pierre Police Department for an interview with law enforcement. At the 

beginning of the interview, Detective Dusty Pelle read Larson his rights:

Pelle: You have the continuing right to remain silent and 

stop questioning at any time. Anything you say 

can be used as evidence against you. You have the 

continuing right to consult with and have the 

presence of an attorney. If you cannot afford an 

attorney, an attorney would be appointed for you. 

Do you understand these rights?

Larson: Yes.

Pelle: K. Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to 

me at this time?
#29712

-3-

Larson: Um, yeah.

[¶7.] During his interview with Detective Pelle, Larson admitted that he 

lied about the dog knocking Easton off the bed and that he pushed Easton on the 

head, causing him to fall to the floor. Larson explained that he told Easton to get 

into the shower, but Easton did not follow his directions. Larson described his 

response as follows:

He just wouldn’t turn around, so I finally got mad and I said 

well get, get the fuck away from me and I pushed him. And I 

like, I like shoved his head and he flew back and [hit] his head 

on the ground pretty hard and then he started to like get up, he 

started crying and started to get up and then his legs like went 

out from under him and he fell back and hit his head again[.]

Later in the interview, Larson explained:

I was just getting overwhelmed I fuck—I don’t know why I 

pushed him, I didn’t mean to kill him, I didn’t know I was gonna 

kill him, just pushing him you know what I—I mean yeah, I 

shoved him kind of hard, but people fall all the time.

Ultimately, Larson acknowledged: “Like I knew I did it on, I, I, after I did it, I knew 

I did it too hard on accident.” Once the interview concluded, Detective Pelle 

arrested Larson for first-degree manslaughter.

[¶8.] A Hughes County grand jury indicted Larson for a count of seconddegree murder, alternative counts of first-degree manslaughter under SDCL 22-16-

15(1) and (2),2 and a count of aggravated battery of an infant under SDCL 22-18-

1.4.3

2. SDCL 22-16-15(1)-(2):

Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if perpetrated:

(continued . . .)
#29712

-4-

[¶9.] Larson filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during his 

interview with Pierre law enforcement on April 18, 2020. Larson argued that he 

was so emotionally distraught that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not legally 

valid. The State asserted that Larson was not in custody at the time of the 

interrogation but argued that even if there was a custodial interrogation, Larson 

voluntarily waived his rights because he understood his rights and agreed to 

answer questions.

[¶10.] Detective Pelle was the only witness that testified at the evidentiary 

hearing on Larson’s motion to suppress. He testified that the interview lasted 

approximately 40 to 45 minutes, with a break where he talked to Larson’s mother. 

He noted that he read Larson his Miranda rights, and Larson agreed to waive 

them. Detective Pelle testified that Larson was not placed in restraints during the 

interview and had no difficulty understanding his questions. Detective Pelle stated 

that he did not tell Larson he was free to leave and admitted that he probably 

________________________

(. . . continued)

(1) Without any design to effect death, including an 

unborn child, while engaged in the commission of any 

felony other than as provided in § 22-16-4(2);

(2) Without any design to effect death, including an 

unborn child, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and 

unusual manner[.]

3. SDCL 22-18-1.4:

Any person who intentionally or recklessly causes serious bodily 

injury to an infant, less than three years old, by causing any 

intracranial or intraocular bleeding, or swelling of or damage to 

the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the 

infant’s head to impact with an object or surface is guilty of 

aggravated battery of an infant.
#29712

-5-

would not have been allowed to leave. Detective Pelle arrested Larson at the end of 

the interview.

[¶11.] Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Larson was subjected to a 

custodial interrogation4 but had been advised of all the required Miranda warnings. 

The circuit court determined that Larson had voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The circuit court determined that Larson’s 

emotional state during the interview “did not affect his ability to understand his 

rights, the waiver of his rights, or [Detective Pelle’s] questions.” The circuit court 

concluded that Larson “had no problem responding to [Detective Pelle] regarding 

the understanding and waiver of his rights and clearly expressed his desire to waive 

his rights and speak to [Detective Pelle].”

[¶12.] Next, the circuit court addressed the issue of whether Larson’s 

statements were voluntary. The circuit court stated that there was “no undue 

pressure or conduct” exerted by Detective Pelle during the interview and that the 

interview was conducted “in a calm and respectful manner.” The circuit court 

determined that “Larson was emotional at times during the interview and seemed 

to sleep when [Detective Pelle] stepped out to talk to his mother, [but] there is no 

indication that these matters eradicated his capacity to resist pressure.” The circuit 

court specified that Larson was “focused and able to quickly and completely respond 

to [Detective Pelle’s] questions throughout the interview.” The circuit court denied 

the motion to suppress.

4. The circuit court’s conclusion that Larson was subject to a “custodial 

interrogation” was not disputed by the State on appeal.
#29712

-6-

[¶13.] On the first day of the jury trial, Felix testified that Larson told her to 

blame their dog for what happened to Easton because he did not want to go to jail. 

She acknowledged that she did not call 911 immediately when she heard about 

Easton’s injuries because she was worried about what Larson would do to her or 

Easton. She also admitted lying to law enforcement at the hospital and going along 

with the dog story. However, she testified that she later told Kirsten Persson that 

Larson pushed Easton.

[¶14.] Dr. Gokhan Olgun, a pediatric intensivist from Sanford Children’s 

Hospital in Sioux Falls, testified about Easton’s various injuries. Easton scored the 

lowest possible score on the Glasgow Coma Scale, a tool used to understand the 

alertness or responsiveness of a patient. Easton had increased intracranial 

pressure caused by diffused tissue swelling, brain swelling, and edema. Dr. Olgun 

stated that Easton suffered a significant neurological injury and did not respond to 

physical stimuli, and an electroencephalogram showed no electrical activity in his 

brain. He also noted that Easton was not breathing independently and was on a 

ventilator. Dr. Olgun testified that Easton’s heart stopped beating at 2:25 p.m. on 

April 18, 2020.

[¶15.] Dr. Jaime Liudahl, an emergency room physician, testified about 

Easton’s condition when he first arrived at the Avera St. Mary’s Hospital in Pierre. 

He stated that Easton showed decreased responsiveness, and his pupils were 

unequal, indicating a brain injury. Dr. Liudahl said Easton was experiencing 

decorticate posturing (involuntary flexing of muscles that looks like seizure activity) 

caused by a brain injury or brain irritation. Dr. Liudahl testified that Easton 
#29712

-7-

suffered from bradycardia caused by increased intracranial pressure from bleeding 

in his brain. Bradycardia is when the heart slows below the normal range. A 

computed tomography (CT) scan of Easton’s head revealed that he had an 

intraventricular subdural hemorrhage, a bilateral frontal subdural hemorrhage, 

and a likely subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Liudahl explained that accelerationdeceleration forces cause these types of hemorrhages where the head hits something 

with abrupt force.

[¶16.] Dr. Barry Monfore, a diagnostic radiologist from Avera St. Mary’s 

Hospital, interpreted Easton’s CT scan. Dr. Monfore testified that Easton’s CT scan 

showed he had a bifrontal subdural hemorrhage, interhemispheric hemorrhage, and 

subarachnoid hemorrhage. His opinion was that these injuries were consistent with 

non-accidental trauma caused by acceleration-deceleration forces such as violent 

shaking or blunt force trauma to the head.

[¶17.] Detective Pelle testified about his interview with Larson. The 

interview video was admitted into evidence and published to the jury during his 

testimony. On cross-examination, Detective Pelle testified that Larson was 

emotional during the interview and that Larson told him that he did not mean to 

cause Easton’s death. Detective Pelle stated that he believed what Larson told him 

was the truth. On redirect, Detective Pelle clarified that Larson said the push to 

Easton was intentional.

[¶18.] Dr. Geoffrey Tufty, a pediatric ophthalmologist in Sioux Falls, 

conducted an eye examination on Easton. He testified that Easton’s eyes had 

intraretinal hemorrhages in all four quadrants of the retina extending to the ora 
#29712

-8-

serrata (the edge of the retina). He stated injuries related to household falls or 

accidental falls are usually located around the optic nerve or into the orbit of the 

eye, not in the ora serrata. Dr. Tufty opined that the force that would cause 

Easton’s injuries was a rapid acceleration-deceleration mechanism, and the events 

that would cause such a force would be a blow to the head or a head blow to a hard 

surface. He further asserted that Easton’s injuries were a marker for abusive head 

trauma.

[¶19.] In addition to speaking with Felix about the circumstances leading up 

to Easton’s injuries, Kirsten Persson also examined Easton due to concerns of 

physical abuse. She testified that Easton was in a coma and on mechanical 

ventilation during her evaluation. She testified that Easton had pinpoint bruising 

on both of his ears, bruising on his right arm, bruising and a lesion on his right leg, 

a bruise on his left calf muscle, a bruise on his left jaw near his chin, and a linear 

bruise on his left buttock. She also reviewed the results of his CT scan. Her opinion 

was that Easton’s injuries were from physical abuse that could be specified as 

abusive head trauma. Further, she asserted that an intentional push done in anger 

is not accidental.

[¶20.] Dr. Kenneth Snell, the coroner for Minnehaha and Lincoln Counties 

and a forensic pathologist, performed Easton’s autopsy on April 20, 2020. He 

testified that his examination revealed subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging. 

His opinion was that the strike upon Easton’s head, and the subsequent fall onto 

the floor, represented a rapid acceleration-deceleration injury. This caused 

shearing forces between Easton’s brain vessels and skull, resulting in 
#29712

-9-

hemorrhaging. Dr. Snell also testified about Easton’s multiple retinal hemorrhages 

and stated these injuries were associated with a rapid acceleration-deceleration 

type of injury. It was his opinion that Easton’s cause of death was traumatic brain 

injury due to assault, and the manner of death was homicide.

[¶21.] After the State rested, Larson made a motion for judgment of 

acquittal. He requested acquittal on the second-degree murder charge, arguing that 

the State failed to present sufficient evidence of an act imminently dangerous to 

others or of a depraved mind. He acknowledged that there was evidence that 

Larson pushed Easton but argued there was no evidence that the push was 

intended to harm Easton. Larson requested acquittal on the first-degree 

manslaughter charge and contended that the State did not provide sufficient 

evidence that Larson committed a felony, a reckless act, or an act in the heat of 

passion. He argued that the evidence showed an accident with unintended 

consequences. Lastly, Larson argued that there was insufficient evidence for 

aggravated battery because there was no evidence that he committed a reckless act. 

The circuit court denied the motion for acquittal.

[¶22.] On the third day of trial, the defense first called Sarah Big Eagle. She 

testified that she knew both Larson and Felix her whole life and never saw Larson 

discipline or be inappropriate with Easton. Dr. Brad Randall, a forensic 

pathologist, testified that he disagreed with Dr. Snell’s determination that the 

cause of death was homicide. In his view, where the actor’s intent was unclear, the 

cause of death on the death certificate should be listed as undetermined, meaning it 

could be an accident or a homicide.
#29712

-10-

[¶23.] After both parties rested, Larson renewed his motion for judgment of 

acquittal, and the circuit court denied the motion. The jury found Larson guilty of 

second-degree murder and aggravated battery of an infant. Larson admitted the 

allegations in the part II information. The circuit court sentenced Larson to life 

imprisonment for second-degree murder and 55 years for aggravated battery of an 

infant. The sentences were concurrent. Larson appeals.

Analysis and Decision

1. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Larson’s 

motion to suppress his statements made to law 

enforcement at the April 18 interview.

[¶24.] Larson argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress his statements made to law enforcement at the April 18 interview. He 

states that he was mentally and emotionally distraught, causing him to be unable 

to understand his Miranda rights or to voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly 

waive them. Larson contends that his “Um, yeah” answer is not a clear and 

unequivocal waiver of his rights. Further, he argues that his confession was not 

voluntary due to his emotional state during the interview. He asserts that the 

findings of fact entered by the circuit court are inconsistent with the circuit court’s 

conclusions. Instead, he believes that the circuit court’s findings force the 

conclusion that Larson did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his 

statements to the police were not voluntary.

[¶25.] “We review ‘the denial of a motion to suppress based on the alleged 

violation of a constitutionally protected right as a question of law by applying the de 

novo standard of review.’” State v. Willingham, 2019 S.D. 55, ¶ 21, 933 N.W.2d 619, 
#29712

-11-

625 (quoting State v. Rolfe, 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 706, 709). “[W]e review 

de novo a [circuit] court’s ruling on the question whether a defendant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights.” Id. ¶ 22, 933 N.W.2d at 625 

(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Tuttle, 2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 6, 650 N.W.2d 20, 

25). “The burden is on the State to prove the defendant’s admissions were 

voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

Miranda Waiver

[¶26.] “A waiver [of Miranda rights] need not be explicit, but ‘[t]o prove a 

valid waiver, the State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s 

rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were 

being waived and of the consequences of waiving them.’” State v. Two Hearts, 2019 

S.D. 17, ¶ 21, 925 N.W.2d 503, 512 (second alteration in original) (quoting Tuttle, 

2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 9, 650 N.W.2d at 26). “The State must prove the validity of the 

waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

[¶27.] “A court examines the totality of the circumstances when considering 

whether a valid waiver has taken place, such as ‘a defendant’s age, experience, 

intelligence, and background, including familiarity with the criminal justice system, 

as well as physical and mental condition.’” Id. ¶ 22, 925 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting 

State v. Lewandowski, 2019 S.D. 2, ¶ 21, 921 N.W.2d 915, 921). “A waiver may be 

inferred from the defendant’s understanding of the rights coupled with ‘a course of 

conduct reflecting a desire to give up those rights.’” Id. (quoting State v. Diaz, 2014 

S.D. 27, ¶ 47, 847 N.W.2d 144, 160).
#29712

-12-

[¶28.] Larson argues that his emotional state during the interview prevented 

him from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights. 

This Court has addressed whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived their Miranda rights in the context of psychological pressure, 

intoxication, impaired mental state, sleep deprivation, lack of understanding of 

English, and being a juvenile. See, e.g., Lewandowski, 2019 S.D. 2, ¶¶ 25–26, 921 

N.W.2d at 921–22 (defendant argued he was mentally impaired because he was 

intoxicated and had mental health issues); Two Hearts, 2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 25, 925 

N.W.2d at 513 (defendant argued he experienced drug withdrawals and 

psychological pressures); Diaz, 2014 S.D. 27, ¶ 23, 847 N.W.2d at 154 (defendant 

was a juvenile); State v. Ralios, 2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 23, 783 N.W.2d 647, 654 (defendant 

argued he was not proficient in English and was sleep deprived). Moreover, this 

Court has recognized that the defendant’s mental state is one of the circumstances 

considered when determining whether a defendant has waived their Miranda 

rights. Two Hearts, 2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 22, 925 N.W.2d at 512.

[¶29.] At the beginning of the interview, Larson’s head was down on the table 

in his arms when Detective Pelle read him his rights and asked him whether he 

understood his rights. Larson responded by saying, “Yes.” When Detective Pelle 

asked Larson if he wished to waive his rights and speak to him, Larson lifted his 

head, looked at Detective Pelle, and stated, “Um, yeah.” After this answer, Larson 

told the detective in detail what happened on April 16, 2020. Larson’s reactions and 

responses during the interview do not support his argument that his emotional 

condition prevented him from understanding his rights and waiving them. His 
#29712

-13-

conduct shows that he was not confused or unable to decide to waive his Miranda 

rights. Instead, his response of “Um, yeah,” and raising his head off the table to 

look at Detective Pelle show that he understood the questions and knew he was 

waiving his Miranda rights. See Massachusetts v. McNulty, 937 N.E.2d 16, 35 

(Mass. 2010) (stating that being “emotional[ly] upset alone does not render a waiver 

of [Miranda] rights or the voluntariness of the statement itself invalid where there 

is no evidence that the defendant was acting irrationally [during the 

interrogation].” (third alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Auclair, 828 

N.E.2d 471, 478 (Mass. 2005))).

[¶30.] In Ralios, the defendant argued that his “yeah” response was 

“meaningless conversation filler.” 2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 31, 783 N.W.2d at 656. This 

Court disagreed and determined that the defendant’s “yeah” response “was an 

affirmative and unequivocal positive response” to waive his Miranda rights. Id. 

¶ 34, 783 N.W.2d at 657. Like the defendant in Ralios, Larson said, “Um, yeah” 

when asked whether he wanted to waive his rights and talk to the detective. He 

then answered all of the detective’s questions until the detective concluded the 

interview. “A Miranda waiver may be inferred from the defendant’s understanding 

of the rights coupled with a course of conduct reflecting a desire to give up those 

rights.” Lewandowski, 2019 S.D. 2, ¶ 21, 921 N.W.2d at 921 (quoting Tuttle, 2002 

S.D. 94, ¶ 16, 650 N.W.2d at 29). Larson was fully engaged during the interview 

and provided detailed answers to Detective Pelle’s questions regarding Easton’s 

incident. This type of conduct is indicative of a “course of conduct reflecting” 

Larson’s desire to waive his Miranda rights. See Diaz, 2014 S.D. 27, ¶ 49, 847 
#29712

-14-

N.W.2d at 161 (concluding that answering questions reflected the defendant’s desire 

to waive Miranda rights); Ralios, 2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 34, 783 N.W.2d at 658 

(“Defendant’s willingness to answer questions about the potential charges against 

him showed a course of conduct reflecting a desire to give up his Miranda rights 

. . . .”); State v. Rhines, 1996 S.D. 55, ¶ 36, 548 N.W.2d 415, 429 (noting that the 

defendant’s “articulate and detailed” answers to questions was conduct showing a 

valid waiver).

[¶31.] The totality of the circumstances surrounding Larson’s interview 

supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Larson’s waiver was intelligent, 

knowing, and voluntary.

Voluntariness of Confession

[¶32.] “[T]he validity of a Miranda waiver of rights and the voluntariness of 

an admission are separate but parallel inquiries.” State v. Strozier, 2013 S.D. 53, 

¶ 21, 834 N.W.2d 857, 864 (citation omitted). Whether a confession was voluntary 

is a legal question and reviewed de novo. Tuttle, 2002 S.D. 94, ¶ 20, 650 N.W.2d at 

30.

[¶33.] “Once suspects in custody are properly advised of, and agree to waive, 

their Miranda rights, they may be freely questioned as long as interrogators do not 

obtain a confession through coercion.” Strozier, 2013 S.D. 53, ¶ 21, 834 N.W.2d at 

864 (citation omitted). “The voluntariness of a confession depends on the absence of 

police overreaching. Confessions are not deemed voluntary if, in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, law enforcement officers have overborne the defendant’s will.” 

Id. (citation omitted).
#29712

-15-

Two factual inquiries are relevant.

The factual inquiry centers on (1) the conduct of law 

enforcement officials in creating pressure and (2) the suspect’s 

capacity to resist that pressure. On the latter factor, we 

examine such concerns as the defendant’s age; level of education 

and intelligence; the presence or absence of any advice to the 

defendant on constitutional rights; the length of detention; the 

repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of 

psychological pressure or physical punishment, such as 

deprivation of food or sleep; and the defendant’s prior experience 

with law enforcement officers and the courts. Finally, deception 

or misrepresentation by the officer receiving the statement may 

also be factors for the trial court to consider; however, the police 

may use some psychological tactics in interrogating a suspect.

Id. (citation omitted).

[¶34.] Larson argues that his admissions to law enforcement were not 

voluntary because he was emotionally impaired during questioning. Larson does 

not challenge the circuit court’s findings but contends that the findings support his 

position that his emotional state impaired his ability to give a voluntary confession.

[¶35.] The circuit court found that Larson was 21 years old at the time of the 

interview and had previous “significant exposure” to the criminal justice system. 

Detective Pelle told Larson the purpose of the interview, and Larson agreed to 

participate. The circuit court found that Larson was placed in an interview room 

but was not handcuffed. Detective Pelle wore his service weapon and never 

informed Larson that he was free to leave. Detective Pelle read Larson all of his 

Miranda rights from a pre-printed card. As the circuit court noted, Larson was 

“very emotional and remorseful” at several points during the interview. Still, 

Detective Pelle would wait for Larson to compose himself before continuing his 

questioning. The circuit court found that Detective Pelle asked questions in a calm 
#29712

-16-

and sometimes sympathetic manner. In response to these questions, “Larson was 

fully engaged with [Detective Pelle] and clearly understood [Detective Pelle’s] 

questions.” The circuit court found that “Larson was able to give detailed responses 

and demonstrations” about what happened to Easton. The total time of the 

interview was one hour but included in that hour was a 30-minute break without 

questioning.

[¶36.] Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded: “there was no 

undue pressure or conduct by [Detective Pelle].” Also, the circuit court concluded 

that Larson’s emotional state at times during the interview did not “eradicate[] his 

capacity to resist pressure.”

[¶37.] Our de novo review also reveals that Larson was able to respond and 

give detailed answers to Detective Pelle’s questions despite being emotional. There 

is no indication that Larson’s periodically heightened emotional state impacted his 

“ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess.” See State v. 

Morato, 2000 S.D. 149, ¶ 12, 619 N.W.2d 655, 660 (“A defendant’s will is overborne, 

making a statement involuntary, when interrogation tactics and statements are so 

manipulative or coercive as to deprive a defendant of the ‘ability to make an 

unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess.’” (citation omitted)); see also State v. 

Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 717 (S.D. 1990) (“Mere emotionalism does not necessarily 

invalidate a confession.”). When Larson became emotional, Detective Pelle waited 

until Larson collected himself before continuing the interview. There is no evidence 

from the record or video that Larson misunderstood the questions he answered.
#29712

-17-

[¶38.] Considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine that the 

circuit court did not err in concluding that Larson’s interview statements were 

voluntary. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of Larson’s motion to suppress.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Larson’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal and whether the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.

[¶39.] This Court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. State 

v. Armstrong, 2020 S.D. 6, ¶ 12, 939 N.W.2d 9, 12. “In measuring the sufficiency of 

the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Frias, 2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 21, 959 

N.W.2d 62, 68 (quoting State v. Brim, 2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6, 789 N.W.2d 80, 83). “[T]he 

jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “In determining the 

sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass 

on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Bausch, 

2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 33, 889 N.W.2d 404, 413).

Second-Degree Murder

[¶40.] Larson argues that the State failed to present evidence that his actions 

were “imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind.” He asserts 

that although he intended to push Easton, he did not intend the push to cause 

injury or death. Larson claims on appeal, as he did to the jury, that Easton’s death 

resulted from an accidental consequence of the push. Larson contends the evidence 
#29712

-18-

was insufficient to establish he acted with a depraved mind because the one push 

resulted in unforeseen and unintended injuries.

[¶41.] SDCL 22-16-7 defines second-degree murder as “perpetrated by any 

act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard 

for human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any 

particular person, including an unborn child.”

[¶42.] Second-degree murder is a general-intent crime requiring the State to 

prove the defendant “had the intent to do the physical act or recklessly committed 

‘the physical act which the crime requires[.]’” Kleinsasser v. Weber, 2016 S.D. 16, 

¶ 24, 924 N.W.2d 455, 464, as modified (Apr. 18, 2016) (citation omitted). “[T]he 

State must prove that the defendant’s conduct established that he was acting with a 

depraved mind.” State v. Little Long, 2021 S.D. 38, ¶ 69, 962 N.W.2d 237, 259. 

“Depraved mind” is a “mens rea requirement involv[ing] less culpability than the 

element of premeditation required for first-degree murder.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“If a person is able to act with a lack of regard for the life of another, then that 

person can be convicted of second degree murder.” Frias, 2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 23, 959 

N.W.2d at 68 (quoting State v. Laible, 1999 S.D. 58, ¶ 13, 594 N.W.2d 328, 332). 

“[W]hether conduct is imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved 

mind regardless of human life is to be determined from the conduct itself and the 

circumstances of its commission.” Id. ¶ 23, 959 N.W.2d at 69 (citation omitted).

[¶43.] Perhaps the most compelling evidence presented to the jury was 

Larson’s explanation during his videotaped interview with Detective Pelle and the 

medical testimony documenting the severe injuries Easton sustained as a result of 
#29712

-19-

Larson’s actions. During that interview, Larson described and demonstrated how 

he “pushed” Easton. Larson stated, that after Easton would not go into the shower,

I finally got mad and I said well get, get the fuck away from me 

and I pushed him. And I like, I like shoved his head and he flew 

back and [hit] his head on the ground pretty hard and then he 

started to like get up, he started crying and started to get up 

and then his legs like went out from under him and he fell back 

and hit his head again[.]

Larson further stated,

I was just gettin[g] overwhelmed I fuck . . . I don’t know why I 

pushed him, I didn’t mean to kill him, I didn’t know I was gonna 

kill him, just pushing him you know what I . . . I mean yeah, I 

shoved him kind of hard, but people fall all the time.

He told Detective Pelle, “Like I knew I did it on, I, I, after I did it, I knew I did it too 

hard on accident.”

[¶44.] Dr. Liudahl testified that Easton’s injuries included bradycardia, 

decorticate posturing, an intraventricular subdural hemorrhage, bilateral frontal 

subdural hemorrhage, and a likely subarachnoid hemorrhage. He explained that 

Easton’s hemorrhages were caused by his head abruptly hitting something. Dr. 

Monfore also testified that Easton suffered from a bifrontal subdural hemorrhage, 

interhemispheric hemorrhage, and subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Monfore opined 

that Easton’s injuries resulted from non-accidental trauma caused by either violent 

shaking or blunt force trauma to Easton’s head. Dr. Tufty testified that Easton’s 

eyes had intraretinal hemorrhages extending to the ora serrata. Dr. Tufty stated 

that these injuries are not typically seen with accidental falls and are associated 

with shaking or a blow to the head. Kirsten Persson testified about the bruises 

found on Easton’s ears, right arm, left leg, left jaw, and buttock. She opined that 
#29712

-20-

Easton’s injuries were from physical abuse and abusive head trauma. Dr. Snell 

testified about the subdural, subarachnoid, and retinal hemorrhaging he found on 

Easton during his post-mortem examination. He opined that these injuries 

constituted a traumatic brain injury caused by the rapid acceleration-deceleration 

event of the strike upon Easton’s head and his subsequent fall to the floor.

[¶45.] The jury rejected Larson’s theory that his push to Easton’s head 

resulted in an accidental death and found him guilty of second-degree murder. 

Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Larson had a “depraved 

mind” when he pushed or shoved Easton to the ground with such force as to cause 

the significant head injuries that led to Easton’s death. See State v. Falkenberg, 

2021 S.D. 59, ¶ 36, 965 N.W.2d 580, 591 (“[A] blow to [the victim]’s face, with force 

sufficient to cause a ‘fighter’s fracture’ on [defendant]’s right hand, evinces an 

indifference to human life and the depravity necessary to support a second-degree 

murder charge.”); State v. Harruff, 2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 42, 939 N.W.2d 20, 31 

(Defendant’s “admission that he struck [the victim] in the chest with the force of a 

mule kick evinces a lack of regard for her life” that was sufficient, in combination 

with the other facts of the case, to support a second-degree murder conviction); 

State v. Miller, 2014 S.D. 49, ¶ 29, 851 N.W.2d 703, 709 (noting that testimony from 

physicians that the victim’s “injuries were from shaking, or blows, and were nonaccidental in nature” was sufficient evidence for second-degree murder).

[¶46.] “No guilty verdict will be set aside if the evidence, including 

circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, sustains a 

reasonable theory of guilt.” State v. Shaw, 2005 S.D. 105, ¶ 19, 705 N.W.2d 620, 
#29712

-21-

626 (quoting State v. Buchholz, 1999 S.D. 110, ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d 899, 905). When 

the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of second-degree murder beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Aggravated Battery of an Infant

[¶47.] Larson also contends there was insufficient evidence to establish the 

elements of aggravated battery of an infant. The State asserted that Larson was 

“reckless” because he pushed Easton with sufficient force to cause him to fall and 

hit his head on the ground with such force that he suffered injuries to his brain that 

caused his death. Jury instruction No. 36 defined “recklessly” as “a conscious and 

unjustifiable disregard of a substantial risk that one’s conduct may cause a certain 

result or may be of a certain nature.” Further, the circuit court instructed the jury 

that “[a] person is reckless with respect to circumstances when the person 

consciously and unjustifiably disregards a substantial risk that such circumstances 

may exist.”

[¶48.] Larson insists that the incident involving Easton was an accident and 

that the evidence does not show a substantial risk that Easton would fall, causing 

him injury. Larson notes that the room where the incident occurred was carpeted 

with no dangerous objects on the floor or in the vicinity.

[¶49.] During his interview with Detective Pelle, however, Larson admitted 

that he was mad and pushed Easton hard enough to cause him to fall and strike his 

head on the floor with sufficient force to make an audible noise. He said he knew 

right away that he had pushed him too hard.
#29712

-22-

[¶50.] As previously noted, the State presented testimony about Easton’s 

significant injuries, including bifrontal subdural, interhemispheric, subarachnoid, 

and intraretinal hemorrhaging. These injuries were fatal for Easton. Furthermore, 

several witnesses testified that Easton’s injuries were not accidental and were 

associated with child abuse. Dr. Snell opined that the manner of Easton’s death 

was homicide due to traumatic brain injury. The jury heard Larson’s theory of the 

case that Easton’s death was an accident and rejected it. In determining the 

sufficiency of the evidence, it is not this Court’s task to resolve conflicting evidence 

or weigh the evidence. Frias, 2021 S.D. 26, ¶ 21, 959 N.W.2d at 68. Here, there is 

sufficient evidence that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 

aggravated battery of an infant. Specifically, that Larson’s actions were at least 

reckless.

[¶51.] Based on our review of the record, the evidence is sufficient to support 

the conviction of aggravated battery of an infant. The circuit court did not err by 

denying Larson’s motions for judgment of acquittal.

Conclusion

[¶52.] The circuit court did not err in denying Larson’s motion to suppress his 

statement to law enforcement or his motions for judgment of acquittal. There was 

sufficient evidence to support the convictions for second-degree murder and 

aggravated battery of an infant. The convictions are affirmed.

[¶53.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN and DEVANEY, Justices, concur.

[¶54.] SALTER, Justice, concurs specially.
#29712

-23-

SALTER, Justice (concurring specially).

[¶55.] I join the Court’s opinion, but I write specially to question whether a 

separate voluntariness inquiry for Larson’s statements is truly necessary, given the 

fact that his arguments challenging the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver and 

his confession are identical.

[¶56.] The United States Supreme Court has observed that “one virtue of 

Miranda [is] the fact that the giving of the warnings obviates the need for a case-bycase inquiry into the actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused.” 

California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696 

(1981). But this is not to say “that compliance with Miranda conclusively 

establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent confession” in all instances. Berkemer 

v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 n.20, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 

(1984). Still, “cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a 

self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law 

enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” Id.; see also 

Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 444, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 

(2000).

[¶57.] This is not that type of rare case. Larson’s challenge to the 

voluntariness of his statements is unaccompanied by a claim that they were 

actually compelled and is otherwise indistinguishable from his argument that his 

mental state prevented a valid Miranda waiver. Therefore, having determined that 

this waiver was “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary[,]” I believe it is not necessary 

to undertake the same voluntariness analysis with regard to his confession.