UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

BRYCE D. DRAPER, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-3130 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CR-20035-JWL-JPO-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce the 

appeal waiver in Bryce D. Draper’s plea agreement. We grant the government’s 

motion and dismiss the appeal. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2016, Draper pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). His plea agreement included a broad appeal waiver, 

which indicated he “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal . . . any 

* This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law 

of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 9, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

matter in connection with this prosecution, his conviction, or the components of the 

sentence . . . , including the length and conditions of supervised release, as well as 

any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release.” Mot. to Enforce 

attach. B at 6. The district court sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment, 

followed by 3 years’ supervised release. In May 2017, Draper was released from 

prison based on time served and began his term of supervised release. 

In 2018, the district court determined that Draper violated several conditions 

of his supervised release. The court revoked his supervised release and sentenced 

him to 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by 1 year of supervised release. Draper 

appealed, and we affirmed. United States v. Draper, 768 F. App’x 828, 830 

(10th Cir. 2019). In 2020, after Draper completed his additional imprisonment, the 

district court found that he again violated conditions of his supervised release. The 

court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment, 

with no additional supervised release. Draper appeals both his revocation and the 

sentence imposed. 

DISCUSSION 

The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver in Draper’s plea 

agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 

(per curiam). Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within 

the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would 

result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. Draper, through counsel, challenges 
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only the first two factors, so we do not address the miscarriage-of-justice factor. See 

United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that this 

court need not address a Hahn factor that the defendant does not contest). 

A. Scope of the Waiver 

Draper first argues that his appeal from his second revocation of supervised 

release does not fall within the scope of his appeal waiver. We disagree. 

“When construing an appellate waiver, we apply well-established contract 

principles and examine the plain language of the agreement.” United States v. 

Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]e strictly construe the scope of the appellate waiver and interpret any 

ambiguities against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate 

rights.” Id. at 1151-52 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). 

“But we do not hesitate to hold a defendant to the terms of a lawful plea 

agreement.” United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Draper contends his waiver does not reach the present appeal because 

revocation of supervised release “is a separate post-conviction proceeding that 

provides a separate right of appeal.” Resp. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

But as we have recognized, “where a plea agreement includes more precise language 

describing the rights waived by the defendant,” a waiver can extend beyond a direct 

appeal from a conviction and can encompass post-conviction proceedings. United 

States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.9 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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Draper’s waiver included precise language and specified that he “waive[d] any 

right to appeal . . . any matter in connection with this prosecution, his conviction, or 

the components of the sentence . . . as well as any sentence imposed upon a 

revocation of supervised release.” Mot. to Enforce attach. B at 6 (emphasis added). 

We have recognized that a waiver with this exact language encompasses an appeal 

from the revocation of supervised release. See United States v. Porter, 905 F.3d 

1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2018) (observing that we have enforced a waiver in an appeal 

from the revocation of supervised release where the “waiver in [the] original plea 

agreement” specified the defendant “‘waive[d] any right to appeal . . . the sentence to 

be imposed herein, including the length and conditions of supervised release, as well 

as any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release’” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).1

 

By its plain terms and consistent with Lonjose and Porter, the appeal waiver in 

Draper’s plea agreement covers the appeal of a sentence following revocation of 

supervised release. Draper argues, however, that his second revocation of supervised 

release is too attenuated from his original judgment and the plea agreement 

containing the waiver. See Resp. at 5-7 (noting “[t]he July 2020 judgment is not the 

revocation of the supervised release imposed with the sentence for the 2016 

conviction,” and contending “the appeal waiver from the December 2016 agreement 

1

 We declined to enforce the waiver in Porter because the waiver did not 

include “specific language” to bar an appeal from the revocation of supervised 

release and the parties could have “include[d] sentences upon revocations within the 

scope of the waiver” if they had so desired. 905 F.3d at 1180. 
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does not cover this third-round sentencing proceeding”). But he cites no authority to 

support this proposition, and we are aware of none. 

Draper plainly waived his right to appeal “any sentence imposed upon a 

revocation of supervised release,” Mot. to Enforce attach. B at 6, not merely, as he 

alleges, the initial “imposition of supervised release” and “the revocation of that

supervised release,” Resp. at 7 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude that 

Draper’s appeal from his second revocation of supervised release falls within the 

scope of his appeal waiver. 

B. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver 

Draper also argues he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appeal 

rights. We disagree. 

For this Hahn factor, we look to the language of the plea agreement and the 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy to assess whether a waiver of 

appellate rights was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 

1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2014). “[E]ither the express language of the plea agreement, if 

sufficiently clear, detailed, and comprehensive, or the probing inquiry of a proper 

Rule 11 colloquy could be enough to conclude the waiver was knowing and 

voluntary. But the synergistic effect of both will often be conclusive.” United States 

v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 

The plea agreement, which Draper signed, explicitly states that he “knowingly 

and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal . . . any sentence imposed upon a 

revocation of supervised release.” Mot. to Enforce attach. B at 6. At the change-of-
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plea hearing, the prosecutor read verbatim that passage from the agreement, id.

attach. A at 15, and Draper and his counsel confirmed that was their “understanding 

of the plea agreement,” id. at 16. During the Rule 11 colloquy, Draper acknowledged 

that he had “gone over” the appeal waiver with his attorney and that he wanted the 

court to approve the waiver “as part of [his] plea agreement.” Id. at 18. He also 

acknowledged he “could be imprisoned for an additional term of imprisonment” if he 

“violate[d] the conditions of [his] supervised release, and it’s revoked or taken away 

from [him].” Id. at 9.2

 Finally, Draper indicated he understood that, subject to 

exceptions stated in the waiver, he was “giving up any right [he] might have to 

appeal anything having to do with [his] case.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 

Draper contends that if, as we concluded above, his appeal falls within the 

scope of his waiver, “[n]othing in the plea colloquy suggests he knew he might be 

waiving that scope of appeals.” Resp. at 7. He alleges that “[a]t most[,] the colloquy 

shows he was aware that he could be sentenced to supervised release[] and . . . was 

waiving the right to appeal the terms of that supervised release.” Id. (emphasis 

added). But the waiver, as stated in the plea agreement and confirmed during the 

colloquy, is not so limited. Instead, it clearly indicates Draper knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to appeal, among other things, “any sentence imposed 

upon a revocation of supervised release.” Mot. to Enforce attach. B at 6 (emphasis 

2

 At sentencing, Draper, through counsel, “concur[red] with [the prosecutor’s] 

request for the three years of supervised release.” Mot. to Enforce attach. C at 15. 
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added). We are not persuaded that his waiver as to “the future chain of supervised 

release and revocations” was “inadvertent[].” Resp. at 7.3

Accordingly, we conclude that Draper has failed to carry his burden of 

demonstrating that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appeal rights. 

CONCLUSION 

Draper’s appeal falls within the scope of his appeal waiver, and he knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his appellate rights. We therefore grant the government’s 

motion to enforce Draper’s appeal waiver and dismiss this appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Per Curiam 

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 To the extent Draper suggests his waiver was not knowing and voluntary 

because it subjected him to an unreviewable endless cycle of supervised release and 

revocations, we note that the “future chain” he describes, Resp. at 7, was at all times 

finite and governed by statute. See United States v. Hernandez, 655 F.3d 1193, 1198 

(10th Cir. 2011) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) “forecloses the possibility of 

endless cycles of prison and supervised release” and that even when a defendant has 

had multiple revocations of supervised release, the amount of supervised release a 

district court can impose in connection with any revocation is limited by § 3583(h) to 

“the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in 

the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was 

imposed upon revocation of supervised release” (emphasis omitted)); see also United 

States v. Collins, 859 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating “as to not only the 

first but also second and subsequent revocations, § 3583(e)(3) imposes a statutory 

maximum prison term based on the original criminal offense for which the defendant 

was convicted”).