148976981.2 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

NICHOLAS MARQUEZ, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GOOGLE LLC, 

Defendant. 

No. ____________________________ 

Honorable _______________________ 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453, defendant Google LLC (“Google”) 

hereby gives notice of removal of this action from the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois to 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 

By filing this notice, Google does not concede any allegation, assertion, claim, or demand 

for relief in the Complaint of plaintiff Nicholas Marquez (“Marquez”), or that any damages exist. 

Google expressly denies that it has violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 

740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. (“BIPA”), affirmatively states that it intends to defend this matter 

vigorously, and reserves all defenses and objections to the allegations, assertions, claims, 

demands for relief, and supposed damages set forth in the Complaint. 

I. THE STATE COURT ACTION 

On March 23, 2020, Marquez, on behalf of himself and allegedly similarly situated 

individuals, commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois under the 

caption Nicholas Marquez v. Google LLC, Case No. 20CH500. See Ex. A (Complaint). Counsel 

for Google accepted service of the Complaint on June 30, 2020, and the parties thereafter agreed 

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that Google should have until August 28, 2020 to answer or otherwise respond to Marquez’s 

Complaint. See Ex. B (agreed order). 

Marquez filed a motion for class certification along with the Complaint. See Ex. C. That 

motion was generally entered and continued. See Ex. B. No other substantive action has been 

taken in the Circuit Court. 

Marquez seeks relief based on Google’s alleged violations of BIPA. In particular, 

Marquez alleges that Google “systematically and automatically collected, captured, or otherwise 

obtained” the “‘biometric identifiers’” and “‘biometric information’” of Marquez and the 

putative class members and that Google “does not publicly provide a retention schedule or 

guidelines for permanently destroying the ‘biometric identifiers’ and ‘biometric information’” of 

Marquez and the putative class members, in violation of BIPA. Ex. A ¶¶ 51-53. 

Marquez brings this action as a class action, seeking to represent an alleged class of “[a]ll 

Google Photos users located in Illinois for whom Google created and stored a face template after 

May 28, 2015.” Id. ¶ 41. He specifically alleges that there are “millions of persons” who are 

members of the proposed class and that “joinder [would be] impractical.” Id. ¶ 42. 

On behalf of himself and each putative class member, Marquez seeks: “statutory damages 

to [Marquez and each putative class member] of $1,000.00 pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1) for 

each violation of BIPA committed negligently, and $5,000.00 pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) for 

each violation of BIPA committed intentionally or recklessly”; a judicial declaration that 

“Google’s actions . . . violate the BIPA”; “injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to 

protect the interests of [Marquez and each putative class member], including, inter alia, an order 

requiring Google to collect, store, and use biometric identifiers or biometric information in 

compliance with the BIPA”; “reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 

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BIPA”; “pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable”; and “such other and further 

relief as equity and justice may require.” Id. at 20 (“Prayer For Relief”). 

II. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL 

A. This Action Is Removable under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 

 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

This action is removable under § 1441 because this Court has original jurisdiction under the 

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1453(b) (procedure for removing class actions). 

 Under CAFA, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any putative class 

action in which (1) the aggregate number of members in the proposed class is 100 or more; 

(2) the matter in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs”; and (3) the parties are minimally diverse—that is, “any member of a class of plaintiffs is 

a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(C); see also 

Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (requirements for CAFA 

jurisdiction). Because all of those requirements are met here, and because Google has met all 

other applicable requirements, this action is removable under CAFA. 

1. This is a putative class action in which the aggregate number of proposed 

class members is alleged to be 100 or more. 

 This is a putative class action under CAFA, which defines “class action” as “any civil 

action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule 

of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a 

class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). Marquez brings this action under Section 2-801 of the 

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, see Ex. A ¶ 41, which allows “for the maintenance of a class 

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action” when the alleged “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; 

“[t]here are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate 

over any questions affecting only individual members”; “[t]he representative parties will fairly 

and adequately protect the interest of the class”; and “[t]he class action is an appropriate method 

for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” 735 ILCS 5/2-801(1)-(4). The 

requirements for class certification under Section 2-801 parallel those of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23. Compare 735 ILCS 5/2-801 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 

Marquez proposes to represent a class of similarly situated individuals who, like him, 

allegedly used Google Photos. More specifically, Marquez seeks to represent a class defined as 

“[a]ll Google Photos users located in Illinois for whom Google created and stored a face 

template after May 28, 2015.” Ex. A ¶ 41. Marquez alleges that there are “millions of persons” 

who are members of that putative class. Id. ¶ 42; see also id. ¶ 9 (same). Accordingly, while 

Google does not concede that Marquez’s proposed class is certifiable, lawful, or otherwise 

proper, and while Google expressly reserves the right to raise all arguments and defenses to 

Marquez’s allegations, including Marquez’s class certification allegations, the alleged class, as 

defined by the allegations of Marquez’s Complaint, includes well over 100 people. CAFA’s first 

requirement is therefore satisfied. 

2. The amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 

 CAFA requires courts to aggregate the claims of putative class members “to determine 

whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest 

and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). A court must “determine whether it has jurisdiction by 

adding up the value of the claim of each person who falls within the . . . proposed class and 

determine whether the resulting sum exceeds $5 million.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 

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568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013). The amount in controversy “concerns what the plaintiff is 

claiming . . . , not whether plaintiff is likely to win or be awarded everything he seeks.” Brill v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 

 Marquez does not allege a specific amount in controversy. As a result, Google need only 

make “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” 

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 

 Here, it is clear that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5,000,000 threshold for 

removal purposes. BIPA provides for “liquidated damages of $5,000” “for each violation” that is 

committed “intentionally or recklessly.” 740 ILCS 14/20, 14/20(2). Marquez expressly alleges 

that Google “recklessly or intentionally violated each of BIPA’s requirements,” Ex. A ¶ 54, and 

he therefore seeks an award of $5,000 in statutory damages for each of Google’s alleged 

violations of BIPA, see id. at 20. Further, Marquez seeks the maximum amount of statutory 

damages on behalf of himself and each member of the putative class, which Marquez alleges to 

be “millions” of people, i.e., at least 2,000,000 people. Id. ¶ 42. Thus, based on Marquez’s 

request for statutory damages alone, the amount in controversy alleged in the Complaint easily 

exceeds $5,000,000. CAFA’s second requirement is therefore satisfied. See Appert v. Morgan 

Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Morgan Stanley has provided 

a good-faith estimate that plausibly explains how the stakes exceed $5 million. That is 

sufficient.”); Blomberg v. Serv. Corp. Int’l., 639 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Once the 

proponent of federal jurisdiction has explained plausibly how the stakes exceed $5,000,000 . . . 

the case belongs in federal court unless it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover that 

much.”). 

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3. The parties are minimally diverse. 

 Marquez alleges that he is a “resident and citizen” of Illinois. Ex. A ¶ 7. Marquez further 

alleges that Google is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California, see id. ¶ 8, and 

that Google is therefore a citizen of those states, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Thus, “any member 

of [the class] of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d)(2)(A), and CAFA’s third and final requirement is satisfied.

4. None of CAFA’s exceptions bar removal.

This action does not fall within the exceptions to removal jurisdiction under CAFA. 

Section 1332(d)(4) requires a federal court to decline jurisdiction over a class action when, 

among other things, “greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in 

the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” and at least one 

defendant whose “alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the 

proposed class . . . is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(4)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (similarly excluding cases where “two thirds 

or more of” the class members and “the primary defendants . . . are citizens of the State in which 

the action was originally filed”). Section 1332(d)(4) does not apply here because Google is not a 

citizen of Illinois, where the action was originally filed. Likewise, the discretionary exemptions 

in Section 1332(d)(3) apply only where “the primary defendants are citizens of the State in 

which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3); see also Roppo, 869 F.3d at 585 

(local controversy and discretionary CAFA exceptions do not apply when primary defendant is 

not citizen of state in which action was filed). 

 Sections 1332(d)(9) and 1453(d) exempt certain securities and corporate-governance 

cases from CAFA’s broad jurisdictional grant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(9), 1453(d). They are 

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inapplicable here because Marquez’s claims do not arise under the Securities Act of 1933 or the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and do not involve state-centric corporate governance issues. 

B. Venue and Intra-District Assignment Are Proper 

 The Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division is the proper venue and intra-district 

assignment for this action upon removal because this “district and division embrac[e]” the 

Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, where the Complaint was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

C. Google Has Satisfied All Other Requirements 

 Google timely filed this Notice of Removal. Google was served by agreement on June 30, 

2020. See Ex. B. Google subsequently filed and served this Notice of Removal within 30 days of 

said service, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

 Further, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), Google has filed with this Notice of 

Removal true and correct copies of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Google in the 

state-court action. See Ex. A-C. A true and correct copy of the state court docket is attached as 

Exhibit D. 

 Finally, Google will promptly serve on Marquez and file with the Circuit Court a “Notice 

of Removal to Federal Court.” Google will also file with this Court a “Certificate of Service of 

Notice to Adverse Party of Removal to Federal Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 5(d). 

III. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND DEFENSES 

Google expressly reserves all of its defenses and rights, and none of the foregoing shall 

be construed as in any way conceding the truth of any of Marquez’s allegations or waiving any 

of Google’s defenses. Google also reserves its right to amend or supplement this Notice of 

Removal. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Google respectfully requests that this Court exercise 

jurisdiction over this action and enter orders and grant relief as may be necessary to secure 

removal and to prevent further proceedings in this matter in the Circuit Court of Will County, 

Illinois. Google further requests whatever other relief the Court deems appropriate. 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Kathleen A. Stetsko 

Kathleen A. Stetsko 

PERKINS COIE LLP 

131 S. Dearborn Street # 1700 

Telephone: 312.324.8400 

Fax: 312.324.9400 

Email: KStetsko@perkinscoie.com 

Susan Fahringer 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

Ryan Spear 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

Nicola C. Menaldo 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

PERKINS COIE LLP 

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 

Seattle, WA 98101-3099 

Telephone: 206.359.8000 

Fax: 206.359.9000 

Email: SFahringer@perkinscoie.com 

Email: RSpear@perkinscoie.com 

Email: NMenaldo@perkinscoie.com 

Sunita Bali 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

PERKINS COIE LLP 

505 Howard St. 

Suite 100 

San Francisco, CA 94015-3204 

Telephone: 415.344.7000 

Fax: 206.359.9000 

Email: SBali@perkinscoie.com 

Attorneys for defendant Google LLC. 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Kathleen A. Stetsko, certify that on July 28, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will 

send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record. 

On this date I further caused to be served on each of the attorneys identified below, via 

the delivery methods indicated below, a copy of the foregoing document: 

David C. Nelson 

Nelson & Nelson, Attorneys at Law, P.C. 

420 N. High Street 

PO Box Y 

Belleville IL 62222 

Tel: (618) 277-4000 

Email: dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com 

Frank S. Hedin 

David W. Hall 

HEDIN HALL LLP 

1395 Brickell Avenue, Ste 1140 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Tel: (305) 357-2107 

E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com 

E-mail: dhall@hedinhall.com 

Joseph I. Marchese 

Philip L. Fraietta 

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 

888 Seventh A venue 

New York, NY 10019 

Tel: (646) 837-7150 

E-Mail: jmarchese@bursor.com 

E-Mail: pfraietta@bursor.com 

Attorneys for plaintiff Nicholas Marquez 

 X Via the Clerk’s eFiling Application 

___ Via U.S. Mail, 1st Class 

___ Via Overnight Delivery 

___ Via Facsimile 

 X Via Email 

___ Other: ___________________ 

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

By: /s/ Kathleen A. Stetsko

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