1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FAITH H., )

 )

 Plaintiff, ) No. 1:20-cv-04311

 )

v. ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings

 )

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

 )

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Faith H. (“Claimant”) moves to reverse or remand the final decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for disability insurance benefits 

(“DIBs”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The Commissioner filed a response 

seeking to uphold the decision to deny benefits. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of 

a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). This Court has jurisdiction to 

hear this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons herein, 

Claimant’s motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner, (Dckt. #18), is denied and the 

Commissioner’s motion to uphold the decision to deny benefits, (Dckt. #23), is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 In June 2017, Claimant (then forty-four years old) filed applications for SSI and DIBs, 

alleging disability dating back to June 26, 2017, due to limitations from major depression, 

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 - Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the Court 

refers to plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last name. Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted as the named defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:565
2 

anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Administrative Record (“R.”) 267). Her 

claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 16). Claimant filed a timely request for 

a hearing, which was held on April 3, 2019, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Janice 

Bruning. (R. 45-67). On June 26, 2019, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Claimant’s 

application for benefits. (R. 13-31). The Appeals Council denied review on May 27, 2020, (R. 

1-7), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. This action followed. 

B. The Social Security Administration Standard to Recover Benefits

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that she is disabled, 

meaning she cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve] 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as “the kind of work usually 

done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1572(b). 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) applies a five-step analysis to disability 

claims. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

At step two, the SSA determines whether a claimant has one or more medically determinable 

physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1521. An impairment “must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. In other words, a physical 

or mental impairment “must be established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable 

medical source.” Id.; Shirley R. v. Saul, 1:18-cv-00429-JVB, 2019 WL 5418118, at *2 (N.D.Ind. 

Oct. 22, 2019). If a claimant establishes that she has one or more physical or mental 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:566
3 

impairments, the SSA then determines whether the impairment(s) standing alone, or in 

combination, are severe and meet the twelve-month duration requirement noted above. 20 

C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

At step three, the SSA compares the impairment or combination of impairments found at 

step two to a list of impairments identified in the regulations (“the listings”). The specific 

criteria that must be met to satisfy a listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairments meet or “medically equal” a 

listing, she is considered disabled, and no further analysis is required. If the listing is not met, 

the analysis proceeds. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Before turning to the fourth step, the SSA must assess a claimant’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”), or her capacity to work in light of the identified impairments. Then, at step 

four, the SSA determines whether the claimant is able to engage in any of her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, she is not disabled. Id. If the 

claimant cannot undertake her past work, the SSA proceeds to step five to determine whether a 

substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age, education, 

and work experience. If such jobs exist, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

C. The Evidence Presented to the ALJ 

 Again, Claimant seeks benefits due to limitations from major depression, anxiety, and 

PTSD. (R. 267). Her alleged onset date is June 26, 2017, and her date last insured is December 

31, 2023. (R. 15). The record contains the following relevant evidence that bears on her claim: 

 1. Evidence from Claimant’s Medical Records 

 Claimant has a history of psychosis, mood instability, and anxiety. (R. 298-99). She has 

been diagnosed with “major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate,” (R. 347), and began 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:567
4 

receiving mental health treatment from the DuPage County Health Department, (“DCHD”) on 

September 15, 2015. (R. 305). When she began treating with DCHD, Claimant reported feeling 

overwhelmed, helpless, and numb. (R. 304). She became frustrated easily and was always tired. 

(Id.). She also demonstrated paranoia regarding her estranged family. (Id.). She told providers 

that in the past, her mood, paranoid thoughts, and isolative behavior had resulted in her 

becoming homeless. (R. 304). Claimant has four children, but she does not have custody over 

them and has not seen them in more than seven years. (R. 360). 

 At an October 28, 2016 appointment, it was noted that Claimant had attained housing 

through PADS, a subsidized supportive housing program, and was working full-time at a store 

called Savers. (Id.). Claimant stated that her medications were helping her focus and function. 

(Id.). Her Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score at the time was a 57, indicating 

moderate symptoms or “moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.”2

 (R. 

301). On May 2, 2017, Claimant told DCHD providers that she had lost her full-time job at 

Savers and began working part-time at TJ Maxx, which she enjoyed. (R. 340). Although she 

was anxious about the change, Claimant said that she had been “able to cope and work through 

her anxiety.” (Id.). She reported good sleep, appetite, and concentration. (Id.). 

 Claimant subsequently left TJ Maxx and began working part-time at Goodwill. On 

August 1, 2017, Claimant noted that her “life [was] much better since she changed her job to 

Goodwill as her anxiety there [was] much less and [she liked] the environment.” (R. 345). 

Claimant presented as fully oriented with a coherent and logical thought process, intact 

judgment, attention, and concentration, and partial insight, however she also reported sleeping 

2

 The GAF score is a numeric scale from 0 through 100 used to assess severity of symptoms and 

functional level. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 

text revision 2000). Although the American Psychiatric Association recently discontinued use of the GAF 

score, it was still in use during Claimant’s relevant examinations. See id., at 16 (5th ed. 2013). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:568
5 

too much, decreased interest in activities, poor concentration, low energy, and low motivation. 

(R. 345-46). She felt that she had to “force herself” to do things like go to church. (Id.). It was 

noted that ongoing treatment was necessary to “prevent decompensation in illness.” (R. 348). 

 On August 17, 2017, Claimant reported “feeling better” and enjoying activities. (R. 350). 

She stated that she had enough energy to do her job and that her concentration was “okay.” (Id.). 

Despite these reports and a normal mental status exam, Claimant’s GAF score had declined to 

38, indicating “some impairment in reality testing or communication” or “major impairment in 

several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.”3 (R. 351). 

Later that month, Claimant reported to a crisis center due to suicidal ideations. (R. 355). She 

remained in the center for three days and the doctors adjusted her prescriptions. (Id.). On 

August 24, 2017, Claimant reported feeling better, with no suicidal ideations, clearer thinking, 

good sleep and appetite, and no mania or psychosis. (Id.). Although she reported feeling 

overwhelmed and anxious at work, she was performing well. (Id.). She was fully oriented with 

no memory impairments or delusions, intact judgment, and a normal affect. (R. 356). 

 On October 3, 2017, Claimant was “still down,” but no longer anxious. (R. 360). Her 

mental status evaluation was normal, but her GAF remained a 38. (R. 361). Two weeks later, 

she reported restlessness and difficulty concentrating. (R. 365). Even so, she felt that part-time 

work “suited her” much better than full-time work, which she said aggravated her depression. 

(Id.). Claimant was engaging in leisure and community activities, maintaining meaningful 

relationships, and managing her emotions. (Id.). She could perform household tasks, cook, 

maintain personal hygiene, and administer her own medications. (R. 366). Claimant presented 

as fully oriented with normal attention, concentration, long and short-term memory, judgment, 

3 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. text revision 

2000).

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:569
6 

thought process, and fund of knowledge. (R. 372). She was pleasant and cooperative. (R. 374). 

Although Claimant reported experiencing some paranoia, anxiety, and increased crying, her GAF 

score had risen back to a 57. (R. 372-74). 

 On November 28, 2017, Claimant reported ongoing symptoms of depression, but no 

excessive worry or panic. (R. 384). She was performing well at work and had a normal mental 

status evaluation. (R. 384-85). Although she was experiencing delusional thoughts regarding 

her family, her GAF remained a 57. (R. 385-86). 

 In February 2018, Claimant told providers that she was benefiting from regular exercise 

and attending church. (R. 406). On March 20, 2018, she reported feeling “really good.” (R. 

418). She was enjoying activities, staying on a routine, socializing, performing well at work, and 

sleeping well. (Id.). She did not feel sad or overwhelmed. (Id.). On July 24, 2018, Claimant 

noted that it was easier to get out of bed in the mornings and that she was not feeling depressed 

or anxious. (R. 462). She had lost fifteen pounds and was performing well at work. (Id.). On 

November 6, 2018, Claimant again reported that she was performing well at work and her 

medications were “working well.” (R. 468). She also noted that she had stopped attending 

therapy because it made her “too emotional.” (Id.). 

 On August 2, 2018, Claimant’s treating provider indicated that Claimant “has difficulty 

managing full time work.” (R. 451). She noted that Claimant struggles with thoughts and mood 

when her “workload increases or becomes too fast paced” and improves with “limited work 

hours.” (R. 453). On January 10, 2019, Claimant reported increased anxiety. (R. 474). She 

stated that she was performing well at work but had called in sick twice. (Id.). She denied 

persistent sadness or hopelessness. (Id.). On February 7, 2019, Claimant stated that she had no 

energy or motivation and had missed a few days of work due to depression. (R. 426). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 6 of 23 PageID #:570
7 

 3. Evidence from State Agency Consultants 

State agency psychological consultant M. W. DiFonso, Psy.D., reviewed Claimant’s file 

on October 17, 2017. She found that Claimant had a mild limitation in understanding, 

remembering, or applying information; a moderate limitation in interacting with others; a 

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or 

managing herself. (R. 72). Dr. DiFonso also indicated that evidence did not establish the 

presence of the “paragraph C” criteria. (Id.). Referencing Claimant’s treatment notes, she found 

Claimant’s “cognitive and attentional skills” were intact and sufficient for simple, one-to twostep as well as multiple-step tasks. (R. 75). Claimant’s ability to carry out detailed tasks was 

moderately limited by her depression, as were her interpersonal skills. (Id.). Dr. DiFonso 

concluded that Claimant was capable of multiple-step productive activity with modified social 

demand and, therefore, was not disabled. (R. 75, 77). State agency psychological consultant 

Tyrone Hollerauer, Psy.D., reviewed Claimant’s file on February 23, 2018, and reached the same 

findings as Dr. DiFonso. (R. 96-101). 

 4. Evidence from Claimant’s Case Manager 

Katie Arellano is a case manager who works with Claimant as part of the PADS housing 

program. Ms. Arellano completed a report on Claimant’s behalf on August 27, 2018. She 

opined that Claimant’s illness markedly restricted her activities of daily living because it caused 

her to “feel tired [and have] slower reaction times, trouble concentrating.” (R. 424). According 

to Ms. Arellano, Claimant’s impairment markedly restricted her socialization because she 

“isolates herself when feeling depressed.” (Id.). It also markedly impacted her ability to sustain 

concentration and attention, frequently resulting in failure to complete tasks (although she noted 

that Claimant completed tasks when not doing so “puts her at risk of losing housing, etc.”). (R. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 7 of 23 PageID #:571
8 

425). Ms. Arellano described the PADS housing where Claimant lives as a highly supportive 

and protective setting. (Id.). Outside of this setting, she theorized that Claimant “would have 

more financial barriers, which would create a more stressful environment,” thereby exacerbating 

Claimant’s depression, and increasing her suicidal ideations. (Id.). Ms. Arellano concluded that 

Claimant was not able to function in a competitive work setting on a full-time basis. (Id.). 

 Ms. Arellano also testified on Claimant’s behalf at the hearing. She noted that it took 

Claimant longer than most people to complete an assessment, which she suggested was due to 

Claimant’s limited ability to concentrate. (R. 64-65). She also testified that Claimant regularly 

missed scheduled meetings due to fatigue and depression. (R. 65-66). Ms. Arellano noted that 

Claimant “isolates a lot” and “has no engagement with friendships.” (R. 66). 

 5. Evidence from Claimant 

 Claimant has a bachelor’s degree in education. (R. 296). At the time of her hearing, she 

was working twenty hours per week at Goodwill. (R. 50). Claimant testified that she becomes 

“almost incapacitated” if she works two days in a row because her “symptoms of depression 

flare up.” (R. 51). She also stated that when she worked full-time, her depression worsened, and 

she required additional medication. (Id.). Claimant sleeps until about 10 or 11 a.m. on days that 

she does not work. (Id.). She can perform household chores, enjoys reading, drives regularly 

and is learning sign language. (R. 52-53). She does not have any friends, but she has an 

emotional support dog, which she feeds and takes outside. (R. 55). 

 According to Claimant’s records from Goodwill, she was tardy seven times and absent 

three times over a twelve-month period. (R. 32). Between August 2017 and May 2019, 

Claimant called in sick at least eleven times. (R. 33-44). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:572
9 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ applied the five-step inquiry required by the Act in reaching her decision to 

deny Claimant’s request for benefits. At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 26, 2017. (R. 18). At step two, 

the ALJ determined that Claimant suffered from the severe impairments of anxiety disorder and 

depression. (R. 19). 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Claimant did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the Commissioner’s listed 

impairments. (Id.). In support of this finding, the ALJ assessed the so-called “paragraph B 

criteria” and found that Claimant’s impairments caused a mild limitation in understanding, 

remembering, or applying information; a moderate limitation in interacting with others; a 

moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in 

adapting or managing herself. (R. 19-21). The ALJ further concluded that the evidence failed to 

establish the presence of the “paragraph C” criteria, finding Claimant did not live in a highly 

structured setting and did not have minimal capacity to adapt to changes in her environment or 

demands that are not already a part of her daily life. (R. 21-22). 

Before turning to step four, the ALJ determined that Claimant had the RFC to perform a 

full range of work at all exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations: 

“[C]laimant can understand, remember, and carry out no more than simple routine tasks 

performing the same tasks day in and day out with no public contact and no more than 

occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors.” (R. 22). Based on this finding, the ALJ 

determined at step four that Claimant was not capable of performing her past relevant work as a 

school teacher. (R. 26). Even so, at step five, the ALJ concluded that a sufficient number of jobs 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 9 of 23 PageID #:573
10 

existed in the national economy that Claimant could perform given her age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, including the representative positions of cleaner, laundry worker, and 

assembler. (R. 26-27). As such, the ALJ found that Claimant was not under a disability at any 

time from June 26, 2017, through the date of her decision. (R. 27). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A claimant who is found to be “not disabled” may challenge the Commissioner’s final 

decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. 

§405(g), which provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). “Substantial 

evidence is not a high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021), quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Commissioner’s decision must also be based on the proper legal criteria and be 

free from legal error. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); Steele v. Barnhart, 

290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). 

A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ’s judgment by 

reweighing the facts, resolving conflicts, deciding credibility questions, making independent 

symptom evaluations, or otherwise substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 

McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th 

Cir. 2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an “accurate and logical 

bridge” from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to “assess the validity of the agency’s 

ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 10 of 23 PageID #:574
11 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant 

is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ’s opinion is adequately explained and 

supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Claimant raises four arguments in support of remand, asserting that: (1) the ALJ failed to 

properly account for the so-called “paragraph C” criteria in the RFC assessment; (2) the RFC 

restrictions do not adequately account for her mental limitations; (3) the ALJ’s assessment of her 

subjective complaints was patently wrong; and (4) the ALJ improperly discredited the opinions 

of her case manager and mental health provider. Respectfully, the Court disagrees on all counts. 

A. The ALJ properly considered the paragraph C criteria when assessing 

Claimant’s RFC. 

Under paragraph C, a claimant who alleges that her mental impairment meets a listing 

must show the impairment is “serious and persistent,” as demonstrated by “a medically 

documented history of the disorder over a period of at least [two] years,” and evidence of both: 

(1) [m]edical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly 

structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of 

your mental disorder . . .; and 

(2) [m]arginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to changes 

in your environment or to demands that are not already part of your daily life . . . . 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (emphasis in original). Here, the ALJ found the evidence did 

not establish that Claimant: (1) had been receiving ongoing consistent therapy or support that 

diminished the symptoms and signs of her mental impairments; (2) lived in a highly structured 

setting; or (3) had minimal capacity to adapt to changes in her environment or demands that are 

not already a part of her daily life. (R. 21-22). Although Claimant now contests these findings – 

arguing that she lives in a structured setting and has minimal capacity to adapt to changes or new 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 11 of 23 PageID #:575
12 

demands – she does not argue that she met or equaled a listing. (Dckt. #18 at 11). Instead, she 

alleges that, as a result of these step-three errors, the ALJ “failed to account for the impact of 

[Claimant’s] protective living environment on her ability to function as well as she does.” (Dckt. 

#18 at 12). 

Claimant’s step three argument fails for three reasons. First, the Court finds no evidence 

to suggest that it was the “highly structured” nature of Claimant’s subsidized apartment that – in 

and of itself – diminished her symptoms. To begin, the ALJ asked during the hearing whether it 

was Claimant’s homelessness – rather than her mental health – that qualified her for the 

apartment in the first place, and Claimant’s counsel confirmed that it was the former, which 

supports the ALJ’s finding in this regard. (R. 22, 50). And, while Claimant argues that she “must 

live in such a setting because she is unable to function independently,” (Dckt. #18 at 11),4

 the 

only evidence she cites does not support this proposition. Instead, the record reveals that her 

case manager, Ms. Arellano, was concerned that the financial consequences of losing the 

subsidized apartment would adversely impact Claimant’s mental health. Specifically, Ms. 

Arellano indicated that if Claimant lost the apartment, she “would have more financial barriers 

which would create a more stressful environment” and this stress would trigger her depression 

and lead to suicidal ideation. (R. 425). This suggests that it was the financial stability offered by 

the subsidized apartment – rather than its structured nature – that kept Claimant’s symptoms at 

bay. In any case, Claimant cites no medical evidence indicating that she required a structured 

living arrangement because of her mental impairments. 

Second, even if the record indicated that Claimant required the structured nature of her 

housing program for purposes of her mental health, it is unclear what additional RFC 

4 In particular, Claimant suggests that her case manager found that if she were “forced to function 

outs[ide] this setting she would be more stressed with increased suicidal ideation.” (Dckt. #18 at 11). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 12 of 23 PageID #:576
13 

accommodations should have been included to account for such a limitation. Claimant’s failure 

to explain how her alleged need for structured housing affects her capacity to work dooms her 

paragraph C argument. Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2019) (remand not 

warranted where claimant fails to identify what work restrictions might address her limitations); 

Saunders v. Saul, 777 Fed.Appx. 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding RFC where claimant 

suggested no “better way to capture the idea behind [alleged limitations] and apply those 

problems to job requirements”); Lemerande v. Berryhill, No. 17-C-190, 2018 WL 1061462, at *7 

(E.D.Wis. Feb. 26, 2018) (without evidence from a medical source or the claimant as to how a 

certain impairment will limit functional capacity, courts will not fault the ALJ for “failing to 

create limitations of [her] own”). 

Finally, Claimant argues that “she has minimal capacity to adapt to changes or new 

demands.” (Dckt. #18 at 11). The Court notes that the ALJ acknowledged the evidence 

Claimant cites in support of this marginal adjustment argument – namely, her own reports that 

she benefits from part-time work and a treatment note from her mental health provider indicating 

the same – in the RFC assessment and found it to be unpersuasive. (See R. 24-25). As the 

Seventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed, “claimants cannot simply point to evidence the ALJ 

considered and rejected and ask this court to infer greater limitations from it. Instead, they must 

engage with the ALJ’s analysis and show why it was either illogical or unsupported.” Dzafic v. 

Kijakazi, __ Fed.Appx. __, 2023 WL 2536340, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 2023). As in Dzafic, 

Claimant here “does neither,” and her argument on this point does not support reversal. Id. 

In sum: because Claimant cannot show that (1) her mental impairment meets the 

paragraph C criteria; or (2) that the ALJ failed to adequately consider limitations related to the 

paragraph C criteria in the RFC assessment, the Court finds no reversible error here. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 13 of 23 PageID #:577
14 

 B. The ALJ properly accounted for Claimant’s mental limitations in the RFC. 

The ALJ found that Claimant has moderate limitations in both interacting with others and 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (R. 20-21). To accommodate these limitations, 

the ALJ provided the following restrictions: “[C]laimant can understand, remember, and carry 

out no more than simple routine tasks performing the same tasks day in and day out with no 

public contact and no more than occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors.” (R. 

22). For a variety of reasons, Claimant now argues that these restrictions are insufficient to 

account for her specific deficits. (Dckt. #18 at 7). 

 An ALJ’s RFC findings are intended to capture “the most [a claimant] can still do despite 

[her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a)(1); see also Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 720 (7th 

Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 24, 2014) (“Residual functional capacity is the 

extent to which a person can still work despite having health problems.”). Claimant is right to 

note that, when assessing mental RFCs, the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly rejected the notion 

that a hypothetical . . . confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks and limited interactions 

with others adequately captures temperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration, 

persistence, and pace.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2014); see also DeCamp 

v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2019); Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(citing cases). But the analysis does not end there. “[A]n ALJ has some latitude with the exact 

wording of an RFC as long as it conveys in some way the restrictions necessary to address a 

claimant’s limitations.” Recha v. Saul, 843 Fed.Appx. 1, 4 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit has “let stand an ALJ’s hypothetical omitting the terms 

‘concentration, persistence and pace’ when it was manifest that the ALJ’s alternative phrasing 

specifically excluded those tasks that someone with the claimant’s limitations would be unable to 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 14 of 23 PageID #:578
15 

perform.” Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). In 

other words, the same restrictions outlined here may suffice, so long as they clearly account for 

the Claimant’s specific limitations. In particular, the Seventh Circuit has found that an RFC is 

adequately tailored to a claimant’s individualized needs in cases where the ALJ relied on the 

opinions of medical experts who explicitly found that such limitations would suffice. See 

Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2021) (ALJ’s reliance on state agency consultants’ 

opinions to account for limitation in maintaining CPP was permissible); Delong v. Saul, 844 

Fed.Appx. 894, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (same); Recha, 843 Fed.Appx. at 4 (same); Burmester v. 

Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 2019) (same). 

Here, state agency consultants Drs. DiFonso and Hollerauer found that despite 

Claimant’s moderate CPP limitations, her “cognitive and attentional skills [were] intact and 

adequate for simple one-two step tasks as well as multiple step tasks.” (R. 75, 100). The ALJ 

found these opinions to be “persuasive,” (R. 24), and it was reasonable for the ALJ to rely on 

these opinions – the only medical opinions in the record regarding Claimant’s functional 

capacity – when crafting Claimant’s RFC. Morrison v. Saul, 806 Fed.Appx. 469, 474 (7th Cir. 

2020) (relying on the opinion of a medical expert is a “permissible way of ‘translating’ medical 

evidence into work-related restrictions.”); Carla G. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 C 5945, 2022 WL 

345075, at *8 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 4, 2022) (noting that a restriction will generally be found sufficient 

“where the ALJ draws it from the narrative assessment of a doctor”). Indeed, the ALJ went 

further by adding a limitation that Claimant should perform the same tasks day in and day out “in 

consideration of her complaints with concentration so she would not have to learn to do new 

tasks on a regular basis.” (R. 24). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 15 of 23 PageID #:579
16 

Claimant insists that additional restrictions were necessary, arguing that she is unable to 

work more than twenty hours per week or two consecutive days. (Dckt. #18 at 10). “But even if 

the record could support such limitations, there is nothing that compels them.” Delong, 844 

Fed.Appx. at 900 (finding the ALJ did not need to limit claimant to additional breaks and a 

certain amount of off-task time when no medical professional found that such limitations were 

necessary). The ALJ addressed Claimant’s complaints regarding full-time work in the RFC and 

found the evidence she cited in support of a limitation to part-time work was not persuasive. 

(See R. 24-25; Section III(A), supra). Accordingly, Claimant’s mental limitations argument – 

which is essentially a list of her subjective complaints – amounts only to an invitation to reweigh 

the evidence in her favor, which the Court cannot do. See Karr, 989 F.3d at 513; Ivair M. v. 

Berryhill, No. 18 C 3884, 2019 WL 2085139, at *4 (N.D.Ill. May 13, 2019) (“Instead of point to 

any specific errors in the RFC, Plaintiff recites his diagnosis, treatment, and complaints. But this 

does not establish work-related limitations or show that the ALJ should have included additional 

limitations in the RFC.”).5

 

C. The ALJ’s assessment of Claimant’s subjective complaints was not patently 

wrong. 

It is well settled that any challenge to the ALJ’s symptom evaluation faces a high hurdle, 

as the Court will not overturn the ALJ’s credibility finding unless it is “patently wrong,” 

meaning it lacks any explanation or support in the record. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413-14. Despite 

5

 While Claimant also appears to take issue with the ALJ’s assessment of her ability to interact with 

others, (Dckt. #18 at 8), she does not contest the ALJ’s finding that she had a moderate limitation in this 

area, nor does she suggest that the ALJ’s restriction to “no public contact and no more than occasional 

contact with coworkers and supervisors” was insufficient to account for this limitation. Because it is 

unclear what aspect of the ALJ’s “interacting with others” assessment with which Claimant takes issue, 

any argument related to this portion of the ALJ’s analysis is waived. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 

F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not 

preserve a claim.”). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 16 of 23 PageID #:580
17 

this deferential standard, Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in two ways when assessing her 

subjective complaints. She accuses the ALJ of: (1) failing to mention records documenting 

exacerbations in Claimant’s symptoms; and (2) giving too much weight to Claimant’s ability to 

work part-time and further misconstruing evidence related to her part-time work. These 

arguments are largely undeveloped by the Claimant. Even so, the Court will address each point 

to the extent it is possible to do so based upon her briefing. 

1. The ALJ did not “cherry pick” evidence regarding Claimant’s 

depression symptoms when discounting her subjective complaints. 

Although an ALJ “is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony 

presented,” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009), she may not “cherry pick” pieces 

of evidence that support a conclusion of disability while ignoring related evidence that 

undermines that conclusion. Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, 

Claimant takes particular issue with the ALJ’s finding that an August 2017 downturn in 

Claimant’s mental health – during which Claimant’s GAF score dropped to 38 and suicidal 

ideations led to a three-day stay in a crisis center – was “only temporary,” as evidenced by 

records documenting her continued improvement in the following years. (R. 24). 

Claimant suggests that, in reaching this finding, the ALJ neglected to mention six 

treatment notes reflecting “exacerbations” of Claimant’s depression symptoms. (Dckt. #18 at 

12). Per the Court’s review, however, the treatment notes that Claimant accuses the ALJ of 

ignoring do not show an exacerbation of symptoms. At worst, they show that Claimant’s 

symptoms were ongoing. But mostly, they show improvement. (R. 360) (October 3, 2017 note 

that while Claimant’s mood was “still down,” a “black cloud” had been lifted and she was no 

longer anxious); (R. 365) (October 17, 2017 note that while “some days” were still a struggle for 

Claimant, she was managing her symptoms on medication and things “were better”); (R. 384) 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 17 of 23 PageID #:581
18 

(November 28, 2017 note indicating that while Claimant continued to struggle with an “overall 

sense of depression,” she reported no excessive worry or panic, fair sleep and appetite, 

performing well at work, no mania, no delusions, and no suicidal ideations); (R. 468) (Claimant 

still depressed, but better); (R. 474) (January 10, 2019 note indicating that while Claimant’s 

mood had been “more anxious,” she was performing well at work and reported no persistent 

sadness or hopelessness, no mania or psychosis, and no thoughts of self-harm).6 Importantly, 

Claimant’s GAF score remained a 57 – indicating only moderate symptoms – from October 2017 

through the most recent record provided from January 2019. (R. 476-77). 

Because the evidence cited by Claimant largely supports – rather than contradicts – the 

ALJ’s finding that her mental health limitations were not “marked” following the August 2017 

downturn, Claimant’s argument that the ALJ committed impermissible cherry-picking when 

discounting her complaints is unsupported and unpersuasive. 

2. The ALJ did not commit reversible error when assessing evidence 

related to Claimant’s part-time work. 

Claimant next contends that the ALJ improperly considered her part-time employment at 

Goodwill in at least two respects. First, Claimant argues that the ALJ “falsely asserted that the 

evidence does not support that full-time work would not be possible, given that part-time work is 

6

 Claimant’s argument appears to be largely rooted in a misreading of the DCPH treatment notes. In 

particular, she neglects to note that several paragraphs are repeated, verbatim, in many treatment notes, 

apparently to provide context and background regarding Claimant’s condition. In the “History of Present 

Illness” section of the notes, for example, the first paragraph describes Claimant’s condition generally and 

remains mostly unchanged at every appointment. (R. 330, 335, 340, 355, 360, 378, 384). The second 

paragraph discusses Claimant’s symptoms at the time of her appointment. Accordingly, Claimant’s 

reliance on the first paragraph to describe her condition on October 3, 2017, is misplaced. (Dckt. #18 at 

14) (citing R. 360). Claimant similarly relies on two other treatment notes that – when read in context – 

are clearly meant to provide background regarding her condition rather than describe her current state. 

See (R. 365) (section cited by Claimant describes reasons she initially sought or was referred for mental 

health treatment; (R. 416) (section cited by Claimant describes the “problem” that prompted her to seek 

treatment and it is repeated in other treatment notes). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 18 of 23 PageID #:582
19 

so beneficial.” (Dckt. #18 at 12) (citing R. 24). However, while Claimant is correct to note that 

the Seventh Circuit has “cautioned ALJs not to draw conclusions about a claimant’s ability to 

work full time based on part-time employment,” Lanigan v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 558, 565 (7th 

Cir. 2017) (citing cases), the Court finds that the ALJ made no such inference here. Instead, she 

cited Claimant’s statement that “she was benefitting from working part-time” as evidence that 

her condition had improved since her August 2017 episode. (R. 24). This was a logical 

inference, which is all that is required of the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence. The ALJ further 

found that the record suggests that Claimant decreased her hours at Goodwill on the 

recommendation of her social security attorney in order to bolster her disability case. (R. 24).7

 The Court also notes that this case is distinguishable from Lanigan, relied on by 

Claimant. Unlike in Lanigan, the record does not reflect that Claimant was receiving any 

accommodations from her employer that the ALJ failed to mention. See Lanigan, 865 F.3d at 

565. Furthermore, while the claimant in Lanigan had been on the job for only six weeks – “far 

too short a time to infer anything about his prospects of maintaining even part-time 

employment,” id. – Claimant had been working at Goodwill for more than two years at the time 

of her hearing. Claimant’s demonstrated ability to independently manage her work schedule, 

interact with co-workers and customers, and perform her job duties is undeniably relevant to her 

application and the ALJ was permitted to consider it within the proper context. See Berger v. 

Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the diminished number of hours per week 

7 On July 12, 2017, Claimant’s case manager noted that Claimant had reduced her hours at Goodwill 

(from 22 hours to 20 hours per week) “as advised by social security attorney.” (R. 403). Claimant asserts 

that the ALJ took the case manager’s statement “out of context” because “there is no indication as to why 

[Claimant’s] representative may have recommended this.” (Dckt. #18 at 14). The Court disagrees. It is 

logical to presume that this attorney (who specializes in social security disability (R. 403)) was providing 

this advice on the belief that it was advantageous for Claimant’s social security disability case. 

Conversely, there is no rational basis to believe that the attorney directed Claimant to reduce her hours to 

exactly part-time (20 hours) from 22 hours for any health-related reason. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 19 of 23 PageID #:583
20 

indicated that [the claimant] was not at his best, the fact that he could perform some work cuts 

against his claim that he was totally disabled.”); Brenda C. v. Saul, 1:20-cv-00215-SEB-MPB, 

2021 WL 606738, at *5 (S.D.Ind. Jan. 27, 2021) (“The ALJ did not equate Brenda C.’s ability to 

work at McDonalds for a year with the ability to work on a full-time basis, but concluded that 

this work history was not consistent with her allegations of limitations. There was no patent 

error.”). 

 The Court acknowledges that the ALJ’s reasoning is not completely airtight. For 

example, the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s reports of fatigue and her request for a day off 

between shifts were “inconsistent with her recent report in the record that she was performing 

well at work and getting fair sleep,” (R. 24), is unpersuasive. It is entirely possible that Claimant 

could have asked not to work consecutive days while still performing well at her part-time job. 

It is also possible that Claimant could get an adequate amount of sleep and still feel tired. See 

Martin v. Astrue, No. 09-1998 (RHK/JJG), 2010 WL 2787437, at *2 (D.Minn. June 7, 2010) 

(noting that depressed claimant “suffered from fatigue, despite sleeping ten to twelve hours a 

night and napping daily.”). Nonetheless, “[n]ot all of the ALJ’s reasons must be valid as long as 

enough of them are.” Halsell v. Astrue, 357 Fed.Appx. 717, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Considering the valid reasons the ALJ relied upon to support her assessment of Claimant’s 

subjective symptoms – namely, Claimant’s non-severe mental health symptomology and her 

activities of daily living – the Court is convinced that the ALJ would reach the same result on 

remand. See McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 890 (affirming the ALJ’s credibility determination even 

though only one of the three reasons the ALJ offered was valid); Kittelson v. Astrue, 362 

Fed.Appx. 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ’s adverse credibility finding was not perfect. But 

it was also not ‘patently wrong.’”). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 20 of 23 PageID #:584
21 

D. The ALJ properly assessed the findings of Claimant’s mental health provider 

and case manager. 

Finally, Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly discredited statements made by one of 

her mental health providers, Michaela Egert, and her case manager, Ms. Arellano. Again, the 

Court disagrees. 

On August 7, 2018, Ms. Egert, a licensed Mental Health Provider, noted that Claimant 

“struggles with thoughts and mood, when workload increases or becomes too fast paced,” and 

improves “with limited work hours.” (R. 453). The ALJ credited the portion of the statement 

regarding workload and pace to the extent that she limited Claimant “to simple routine tasks 

performing the same tasks day in and day out,” (R. 25), but discounted it to the extent that it 

implied that limited work hours were necessary, noting “there was no explanation given as to 

why the claimant cannot do full-time work.” (R. 25). 

The Court need not assess the adequacy of the ALJ’s reasoning in this regard. Although 

Ms. Egert noted that Claimant’s symptoms had improved with limited work hours, she did not

opine that Claimant could not undertake full-time work – a finding that would have contradicted 

the ALJ’s assessment. Similarly, Ms. Egert’s statement that Claimant “struggled” with increased 

work, is not the same as an opinion that Claimant could not maintain a full-time work schedule. 

Accordingly, whether or not the ALJ properly assessed this single treatment note is irrelevant as 

the note does not contradict the ALJ’s findings. McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 892 (courts “will not 

remand a case to the ALJ for further specification where [they] are convinced that the ALJ will 

reach the same result”). 

Claimant’s case manager, Ms. Arellano, completed a report on her behalf on August 27, 

2018. In it, she opined that Claimant’s depression markedly restricted her activities of daily 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 21 of 23 PageID #:585
22 

living, socialization, and ability to sustain concentration and attention. (R. 424-25). She further 

indicated that Claimant would not be able to function in a competitive work setting on a full-time 

basis. (R. 425). When asked at the hearing whether Claimant has difficulty with activities such 

as following through on doctor’s appointments, maintaining cleanliness in her unit, and 

accessing community support, Ms. Arellano testified that Claimant is “usually very tired,” and 

sometimes presents as “disheveled.” (R. 63-64). 

The ALJ partially credited Ms. Arellano’s statements, restricting Claimant’s interactions 

with others in reliance on Ms. Arellano’s suggestion that Claimant had problems with 

socialization. (R. 25). As for Ms. Arellano’s findings of marked limitations, the ALJ discounted 

these as inconsistent with the record, which shows that Claimant “is able to live on her own, to 

get to and from work on her own, and to handle funds.” (R. 25). She further found Ms. 

Arellano’s testimony that Claimant presented as “disheveled” to be inconsistent with her own 

case notes and the case notes of others, which generally indicated that Claimant was “wellgroomed.” (Id.). Finally, the ALJ noted that Ms. Arellano’s assessment lacked medical support 

and that Claimant’s daily activities – such as her ability to maintain her work schedule, work 

with customers, run errands, go to the library, and go to church – were inconsistent with the 

extreme limitations described by her case manager. 

Claimant briefly argues that this assessment relied on “improper inferences” and “false 

equivalencies,” but she fails to point to any. (Dckt. #18 at 16). For example, the Court disagrees 

with Claimant’s assertion that the ALJ’s comparison of Ms. Arellano’s testimony regarding 

Claimant’s “disheveled” appearance, (R. 64), with her case notes indicating that Claimant was 

“well-groomed,” (R. 390-94), constitutes a “false equivalency.” These two observations are, 

indeed, at odds with each other and the ALJ was permitted to say so. Fair v. Saul, 853 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 22 of 23 PageID #:586
23 

Fed.Appx. 17, 21 (7th Cir. 2021) (ALJ properly discounted treating physician’s opinion where 

his “own records did not support his conclusions.”). 

Furthermore, the ALJ did not improperly rely on Claimant’s ability to work part-time to 

discount Ms. Arellano’s findings, as Claimant asserts. Rather than equating the capacity to work 

part-time with the capacity to work full-time, the ALJ reasoned that Claimant’s ability to present 

professionally, maintain a work schedule, and interact with customers was inconsistent with the 

extreme limitations described by Ms. Arellano. (R. 25). This is not an unreasonable conclusion. 

As noted above, the ALJ was permitted to consider Claimant’s ability to work part-time when 

assessing the extent of her limitations. And Claimant herself admits that her functional 

limitations “may indeed be considered moderate,” rather than marked. (Dckt. #18 at 9). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ built the requisite logical bridge from the evidence to 

her decision not to fully credit Ms. Arellano’s statement. That is all that is required. Rice v. 

Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting an ALJ must only “minimally articulate his 

or her justification for rejecting or accepting specific evidence of a disability”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #18), is 

denied and the Commissioner’s motion to uphold the decision to deny benefits, (Dckt. #23), is 

granted. The decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 

ENTERED: March 17, 2023 

 

 ______________________ 

 Jeffrey I. Cummings 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Case: 1:20-cv-04311 Document #: 27 Filed: 03/17/23 Page 23 of 23 PageID #:587