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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 12, 2015 

v No. 319307 

Wayne Circuit Court 

KCEE KINARD ODOM, LC No. 13-003337-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of third-degree fleeing and eluding, 

MCL 257.602a(3). Defendant was sentenced to two years’ probation and we affirm. 

 Defendant’s conviction arises from his failure to promptly stop the vehicle he was driving 

when Detroit Public Schools Police Department (DPSPD) officers attempted to perform a traffic 

stop. His sole argument on appeal is that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. Specifically, defendant argues that the police officers’ testimony was 

unreliable and there was a lack of evidence demonstrating that defendant was aware that the 

police were attempting to stop him or that he intended to flee from the police. We disagree.1

 In ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to 

support a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. A reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make 

credibility choices in support of the trier of fact’s verdict. [People v Strickland, 

293 Mich App 393, 399; 810 NW2d 660 (2011) (quotation marks and brackets 

omitted).] 

 The elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding are: 

 

1

 Whether a defendant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. 

People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). 
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(1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and performing his 

lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified as a law 

enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle, 

(3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have ordered 

the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware that he had been 

ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey the order by trying to 

flee from the officer or avoid being caught, which conduct could be evidenced by 

speeding up his vehicle or turning off the vehicle’s lights among other things, and 

(6) some portion of the violation must have taken place in an area where the speed 

limit was thirty-five miles an hour or less, or the defendant’s conduct must have 

resulted in an accident or collision, or the defendant must have been previously 

convicted of certain prior violations of the law as listed in MCL § 750.479a(3)(c); 

MSA 28.747(1)(3)(c). [People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599 NW2d 

527 (1999) (Grayer I).] 

To satisfy the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a defendant’s vehicle is not required 

to reach a certain speed or exceed the speed limit for a particular distance because “the statute 

itself does not limit fleeing and eluding to high-speed or long-distance chases.” Id. at 741, 745. 

 First, the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that 

Officers Tamika Lance and Donald Hughes were in uniform and performing their lawful duties 

in a car that was adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle. Lance testified that she was 

wearing her Detroit Public Schools Police Department (DPSPD) uniform, which consisted of 

jeans, a shirt with the word “police” on it, a badge around her neck, and a “duty belt.” See 

People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 719-720; 680 NW2d 477 (2004) (noting that the statute only 

requires the officer to “be in uniform” and does not contain any minimum requirements for the 

uniform). Both officers also testified that they were performing their lawful duties at the time of 

the incident because state-certified DPSPD officers are authorized to make arrests and perform 

traffic stops in the areas between DPS schools. Finally, the testimony of Lance, Hughes, and 

defendant referenced the vehicle’s overhead lights and markings, allowing a reasonable jury to 

find that the officers’ car was adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle. Although 

defendant’s mother testified that she did not notice any lights or markings, and defendant’s son 

testified that he did not see any lights when he looked back at the police car while he was riding 

in defendant’s vehicle, it is the jury’s responsibility to determine the weight and credibility of the 

witnesses’ testimony. People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). 

Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was 

sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the officers were lawfully performing their 

duties in uniform and in an adequately identified vehicle, satisfying the first element. 

 Second, the record clearly indicates, and defendant does not dispute, that he was driving a 

car at the time of the incident, satisfying the second element.

 Third, there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that an officer 

ordered defendant to stop with the use of his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights. Hughes 

and Lance testified that Hughes activated the overhead lights and siren immediately after 

defendant rolled through a red light and turned in front of their vehicle at an intersection. The 

DPSPD investigator testified that defendant acknowledged that the officers had activated the 
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emergency lights during an interview following his arrest. However, defendant testified that the 

officers did not activate the overhead lights until the vehicle reached the corner of his street and 

did not activate the siren until the officers turned the vehicle around and stopped the vehicle near 

his residence. Defendant’s son stated that he did not see any lights while he was riding in 

defendant’s vehicle and did not hear a siren until defendant’s vehicle reached the block of the 

residence. Despite the conflicting testimony as to the exact point at which the officers activated 

the overhead lights and siren, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that 

the officers ordered defendant to stop by using the vehicle’s overhead lights or siren at some 

point before defendant stopped the vehicle, satisfying the third element. 

 Fourth, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant was 

aware that the officers had ordered him to stop. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable 

inferences arising therefrom may provide sufficient evidence to establish the elements of a crime. 

Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 582. Lance and Hughes testified that there were no other vehicles 

between the DPSPD car and defendant’s car when Hughes activated the lights and siren and 

followed defendant to his residence. Lance stated that the DPSPD vehicle was approximately 

three car lengths away from defendant’s vehicle after Hughes activated the lights and siren. 

From this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant was close enough to the 

DPSPD vehicle to be aware that the officers were ordering him to stop, especially because no 

other vehicles were present. Moreover, there was testimony that defendant exceeded the speed 

limit and disregarded a “stop” at 6 Mile Road and Hoover Street despite the unhindered visibility 

and close proximity of the DPSPD vehicle after Hughes activated the lights and siren. Further, 

according to the DPSPD investigator, defendant acknowledged that he did not stop when the 

officers activated the overhead lights. Although defendant provided contrary testimony that the 

officers did not activate the lights until the officers reached the block of his residence and did not 

activate the siren until they turned around in front of his residence, determinations regarding the 

weight and credibility of witness testimony are reserved for the jury. Id. Accordingly, there was 

sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer that defendant was aware that the 

officers had ordered him to stop, satisfying the fourth element. 

 Fifth, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant refused to obey the 

order to stop by trying to flee from the police officers or otherwise avoid being caught. Grayer I, 

235 Mich App at 741. To satisfy this element, there must be a finding that defendant had the 

intent to flee or avoid capture, id. at 741-742, and we may consider circumstantial evidence in 

order to determine whether a defendant possessed such an intent, People v Grayer, 252 Mich 

App 349, 356; 651 NW2d 818 (2002) (Grayer II). Lance and Hughes testified that, based on the 

speed of the police vehicle, defendant exceeded the speed limit after Hughes activated the lights 

and siren and did not slow down as they pursued him with the lights and siren activated. Hughes 

testified that defendant disregarded a “stop” at 6 Mile Road and Hoover Street during the pursuit. 

Contrary to the officers’ testimony, defendant denied that he was fleeing and eluding the police 

because (1) he was not speeding when the officers followed him; (2) the officers did not activate 

the lights until they had reached defendant’s block and did not activate the siren until after the 

officers drove past his house; (3) he was unaware that he had any outstanding warrants against 

him or that he was driving without a valid license; and (4) he approached the officers after he 

exited the vehicle at his residence. However, even though defendant’s testimony was contrary to 

that of the officers, it was the jury’s role to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight afforded to the evidence. Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 582. Accordingly, there was 
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sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to support the 

jury’s finding that defendant intended to flee and elude the police, satisfying the fifth element. 

 Sixth, there was sufficient evidence that the violation took place in an area where the 

speed limit was 35 miles per hour or less. Lance and Hughes both testified that defendant’s 

vehicle traveled on residential roads where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour after they had 

turned on the overhead lights and siren, satisfying the sixth element. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro