alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________________

Nos. 95-40954 & 95-40995 Summary Calendar

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN WESLEY CLUBB and HELEN RUTH CLUBB,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (1:95-CR-83-1 & 1:95-CR-83-2)

_________________________________________________________________ July 30, 1996

Before DAVIS, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John Wesley and Helen Ruth Clubb appeal the denial of their

motions to dismiss an indictment charging them with conspiracy to

possess, and possession with the intent to distribute, marijuana,

contending that the civil forfeitures of currency, pursuant to 21- 2 -

U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), and real property, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(7), bar their criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The currency forfeited under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) was

forfeited summarily in an administrative proceeding after the

Clubbs fai led to file a claim. Because only property that is

unclaimed or unowned may be so forfeited, our court has held that,

by definition, su mmary forfeiture proceedings neither place an

individual in jeopardy nor constitute punishment. S ee United

States v. Arreola-Ramos
, 60 F .3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1995). The

Clubbs’ contention that their petition for restoration of the

currency, filed after the conclusion of the forfeiture proceeding,

comprised an appearance in the forfeiture proceeding, is

unavailing. S ee Uni ted States v. Morgan , 84 F.3d 765, 768 (5th

Cir. 1996) (a “petition for remission or mitiga tion does not

contest the administrative forfeiture because it does not trigger

judicial forfeiture proceedings nor make the petitioner a party to

any proceeding which can result in punishment for double jeopardy

purposes”).

The contentions regarding the forfeiture of r e al estate,

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), are foreclosed by the Supreme

Court’s very recent decision in United States v. Ursery , ___ U.S.

___,

___ S. Ct. ___, 1996 WL 340815, *14-*16 (1996) (applying twostage analysis, and concluding that in re m civil forfeiture- 3 -

pursuant to § 881(a)(7) was neither “punishment” nor criminal for

purposes of the Double Je opardy Clause, because (1) Congress

intended forfeitures under § 881 to be civil, and (2) there was

little evidence, much less the “clearest proof”, that forfeiture

proceedings under § 881(a)(7) “are so punitive in form and effect

as to ren der them criminal despite Congress’ intent to the

contrary”).

AFFIRMED
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.
JONATHAN ROGER OCHOA , Petitioner

. No. 1 CA

- CR 19

- 0 291 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400CR201200498 The Honorable Brandon S. Kinsey , Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Yuma County Attorney’s Office , Yuma By Jon R. Smith Counsel for Respondent
Law Offices of Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson By Harriette P. Levitt Counsel for Petitioner FILED 3-26-2020STATE v. OCHOA Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B R O W N , Judge:
¶1 Petitioner Jonathan Roger Ochoa seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- con viction relief, filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is petitioner’s first petition. ¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court ’ s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner ’ s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review). ¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.
¶4 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review and deny relief.
2nd Cybersecurity Framework Workshop

Outbrief and 

Discussion of Next Steps

May 31, 2013
Framework Development Process

2

Engage the 

Framework 

Stakeholders

Collect, 

Categorize, 

and Post RFI 

Responses

Analyze RFI 

Responses

Select 

Framework 

Components

Prepare and 

Publish 

Preliminary 

Framework

NIST Issues RFI – February 26, 2013

1st Framework Workshop – April 03, 2013

Completed – April 08, 2013

Identify Common Practices/Themes – May 15, 2013

2nd Framework Workshop at CMU – May 29-31, 2013

Draft Initial Framework – June 2013

3rd Framework Workshop at UC 

 San Diego– July 2013

4th Framework Workshop – September 2013

Publish Preliminary Framework – October 2013

Ongoing 

Engagement:

Open public comment 

and review is 

encouraged and 

promoted throughout 

the process
Workshop Goals

• Further discussion of RFI inputs, current business/operational 

practices

• Refine and augment data set to be used in Initial Draft of Framework

• Shape the Properties and Characteristics of the Initial Draft 

Framework

The open and public review and comment process is directed by the 

President in the EO, AND is the right way to approach this 

development.

3
What We Heard

The Framework should have the properties and characteristics:

• Not conflict with existing regulatory requirements

• Must have context for multiple audiences and relate to business 

drivers

• Modular approach to allow for differences in business

• Refer to existing frameworks, standards, guidelines, and practices

4
Initial Workshop Conclusions

• Connection between Business / Mission Management and Cyber 

Risk Management is vital 

• Framework must support business decisions

• Cyber Risk Management – identify existing standards, guidelines, 

and common practices to support decisions in the following areas:

• Understand

• Prevent

• Detect

• Respond

• Recover

• Improve

5
Sampling of Workshop Themes

• Risk management accountability and responsibility needs to be 

clearly defined

• More work required to identify the unique privacy and civil liberties 

needs for critical infrastructures

• Different types of dependencies must be addressed: technology, 

business partner, and process

• There is a need to have cybersecurity trained workforce

• Modular model viewed as beneficial to identify and prioritize areas 

for potential investment, scales for wide range of enterprise sizes

• Foundational cybersecurity practices continues to be an identified 

gap

6
Next Steps

In June 2013, we will post on the Framework website 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cyberframework.cfm:

• A summary of this Workshop

• An illustrative outline of the Framework

7
Stay Engaged

Please send us your notes, continued observations, and further 

suggestions at cyberframework@nist.gov; 

Look again at the Analysis and Responses at 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cyberframework.cfm;

Review and Comment on the Next Set Deliverables to be posted in 

June 2013;

3rd Cybersecurity Framework Workshop

July 10-12 at the University of California San Diego

8
Thank you Carnegie Mellon 

University for hosting the 

2nd Cybersecurity Framework 

Workshop

9
#### Willis Warner *v.*C. W. Hutchinson.

Costs — Scope of Allowance.

A party held to have no right to complain that costs. were not allowed him up to the time of the release of mortgage.

Pleading — Filing.

Papers held to he regarded as having been filed.

Sales — Evidence.

The evidence 'held not to show delivery of a certain amount of lumber.

APPEAL PROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 17, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Appellant has no right to complain that costs were not allowed him up to the time of the release by Ecklar of his mortgage. At the time he was sued he owed on the mill and other property sold to him by Hutchinson a much larger amount than was due on the mortgage. No fraud was practiced on him1 in the sale; he knew of the existence of the mortgage, and relied upon Hutchinson to remove it, and there is nothing in this record tending to show that Hutchinson so failed to keep his agreement to do so, as to damage or endanger appellant.

*223
      *J. T. McClintock, for appellant.*

*J. Q. Ward, for appellee.*

It is also evident that the reply lodged with the papers of the suit was regarded and treated by both parties as filed. Otherwise appellant would not have taken the numerous depositions to sustain his counterclaim. Under the proof this counterclaim was properly disallowed.

Appellant fails to establish the delivery to Hutchinson of $200 or $240 worth of lumber after the measurement by Dill. The evidence of his own interests is unsatisfactory and entitled to but little consideration, and the proof as to hisi absence in Grant County at the time it is pretended this lumber was delivered, connected with the testimony of the parties having the mill at the same time, shows that it is almost impossible that any such delivery would have been made.

The testimony fully sustains the judgment of the court below. It is therefore *affirmed.*
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JANUARY 18, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-15765

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket Nos. 02-02117-CV-T-30-TGW & 00-00097-CR-T-3

ALEJANDRO TAMAYOS-RAMOS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(January 18, 2007)

Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Tamayos-Ramos, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
2

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus petition. On

appeal, Tamayos-Ramos makes several arguments regarding why his plea was not

knowing and voluntary or is not enforceable, including primarily that the

government breached the agreement. However, Tamayos-Ramos presents no

argument regarding the issue raised by this Court’s certificate of appealability

(“COA”). Specifically, Tamayos-Ramos never discusses whether the district court

erred in denying his § 2255 motion to vacate because the claims raised were barred

by the collateral attack waiver contained in his plea agreement. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), governs this appeal because TamayosRamos filed his petition after the effective date of the AEDPA. Under the

AEDPA, appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the COA. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253; Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Additionally, Tamayos-Ramos is a pro se litigant and is thus entitled to a lenient

interpretation of his arguments on appeal. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).

Careful review of Tamayos-Ramos’s appellate brief reveals that he has not

addressed the issue on which the COA was granted, namely, whether the district

court erred in denying his § 2255 motion to vacate because the claims raised were
3

barred by the collateral attack waiver contained in his plea agreement. Instead,

Tamayos-Ramos argues the merits of one of his underlying claims: that the

government breached the plea agreement. Even construing Tamayos-Ramos’s

brief liberally, there is no indication that he presents any arguments regarding the

issue on appeal. Therefore, Tamayos-Ramos has abandoned the issue on which we

granted the COA. See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992)

(concluding that an appellant abandons an issue not addressed on appeal). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Tamayos-Ramos’s § 2255

petition. 

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 10, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-30671 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LINDA FAYE HAWKINS SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 02-CR-30044-2

-------------------- Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Linda Faye Hawkins Smith appeals the sentence imposed by the district court after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base. She argues that under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the district court erred in holding her responsible for a larger amount of cocaine base for relevant conduct purposes than the amount alleged in the indictment and found by the jury in her first trial. She acknowledges that this argument is foreclosedNo. 03-30671 -2- by United States v. Doggett , 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000), but she states that she is raising it to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. Apprendi does not invalidate a sentencing court’s factual findings concerning drug quantity for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines in cases where those findings cause a defendant’s guideline range to shift within the statutory range. Doggett , 230 F.3d at 266; United States v. Randle , 304 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 1748 (2003). Smith also argues that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, she cannot be held responsible for a drug quantity greater than the amount found by the jury in the first trial. Double jeopardy did not bar retrial in this case because Smith’s first conviction was reversed due to a due process violation, and not due to insufficient evidence. See Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1978); Shute v. State of Texas , 117 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1997).

AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinionshould not * be publishe d and is not precedent except under the limited circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 09- 60617 Su m m ar y Cal endar
SH ER M AN Q U I N TI N SLAD D EN , a l s o kno w n a s She r m an Q
. Sl ad de n, P et i t i on er

v. ERI C H
. H OLD ER, J R. , U. S. ATTORN EY GE N ERA L , Res po nde nt
Pet i t i o n f

o rRev i e w o f

a n Ord e ro f

t he B o a r do f Im m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls B IAN o. A 043 581 798
B ef ore R E AV L E Y , JO L L Y , an d O W E N , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R IA M: * S h erm an Q u i n t i n Sladden , a na t iv e a n d c i t i zen of T ri n i da d an d T obag o, p e tit io n s th is co u r t to r e v ie w th e d e c is io n o f th e B o a r do f Im m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls af f i rm i ng t he i m m i gr at i o n j udg e ’ s (I J) f i nalo r de ro f

de po r t at i o n a nd de t e r m i nat i o n t hatSl ad de n was i ne l i gibl e f o r c anc e l l at i o n o f

r e m o va lpur s uant t o 8 U
. S
. C
. § 1229 b( a) becau se he h ad com m i t t ed an aggrava t ed fel on y. Sl ad den contend s t h at hi s N ew Y ork S t ate conv i ct i on fora t t em pted cri m i n alpossess i on of a contr ol l ed s u b sta n ce sh ou l d n otbe t reat ed as an aggrav ated fel on y u n der United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D May 13, 2010 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 09-60617 Document: 00511109997 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/13/2010N o. 09- 60617

2 federall aw . H e al so asser t s t h at hi s du e process ri gh ts w e re v i ol ated becau se th e IJ i ssu e d a w r itten de ci sion the da y a ft er h i s h ea ri n g th a t w a s con traryto t he dec i si on t hatt he I J s t at ed o r al l y att he hear i ng. S u f f i ci en tevi den ce w as subm i t t ed t h at S l ad den ’ s s t ate c on vi ct i on w as f or a ttem p tedpo sse ssion of a con troll ed su b stan ce w i th th e i n ten t t o se l li t. T h e IJ
corr ect l y determ i n ed th a t this convi ct i on const i t u t ed an aggrav ated fel on y f or im m ig r a tio n la w p u r p o s e s . S ee 8 U. S
. C. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) (U) ;Ja cob v. Hol d er , 335 F . A p p ’ x3 7 0 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 9 ); Hu sban dv. Mu ka sey , 28 6 F
. A p p ’ x 1 3 0 , 13 3 ( 5 th C i r. 200 8) (h ol di n g “ [ a] n att em pt i s t h e equ ivalent of t h e u n derl yi n g of

fen se f or pu rposes of

t h e aggrav ated fel on y d e term i n ati on ” )
. Th eref ore, w e l ack ju r is d ic tio n to re v ie w th e fin a l o r d e ro f r e m o v a l. S ee8 U .S .C
. § 1 2 5 2 (a )(2)(C ). Sl ad de n ha s no ts ho w n a ny pr ej udi c e f r o m t he al l e ge d vi o l at i o n o f hi s due p r o c e s s rig h ts
. S ee B ol vi t o v. Mu ka sey , 5 2 7 F .3 d4 2 8 , 4 3 8 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 8 ). T h e p e tit io n fo rre v ie w is D E N IE D
. Case: 09-60617 Document: 00511109997 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/13/2010
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

GROVERSELLERS 

ATTORNCYGENLRAL 
Seaorablo Barbart C, Xllm, pa@ g 

aIt ahla ala8 thoxv 1‘ 8 ro8ia‘aol~ sovoa 

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Oae Rua&e& Thoul sortioa 4 of 3un8ta Bill 319 paolitosll 

rat8 88lba trio 8~ of Qe thoated tbowana ($1 g 0,000) 

Dollrrr for l aoh tLoa1 par of t& blonnlue for 

ohild relhre ronlooO rdl rlw 8.8‘ 8ald.r 

'(1.1 Can t&n Ltata Dopartunt of F'rrblio ':olfar8 oon8true tb wotioa of sanat8 Bill 311, rovidbn( to? tbo mat:tUtiOa 3ivi8iQa t0 Man t i at 

th8 l rptiltw l otlbarlm4 u&w d‘ bill 08x1 k 

pala out ot trio balmerr OS bead h tha '3hilbrm'a 

ABDiataaoo’~~ nthor than out of tba oarruit 

8ppmpmtian r0r tkt0 armieu bh~h r0r tbr old 

z 2 r 

l II) Uhlldron Dlrl8iw of t!m Daprrmont 

le Tufuo? 

r(8.) C8n tha Oorrptrollor ~08 ~8180 tha 

mount l 

to bo osf 

r o g r la to 6 for Um fiutltutlo8 Dlil~lam 

out d tb okluro8“ *“laa‘Boo ?tAM 

la ‘Mord‘Da dab Bedla 4 l f suM a ë Bill 3ls 

bohra tranaforr* Uto balanom to the Dmnw81 

Rovonoo ma? 
t 

. . 

.I 

/ ,_; 

our 00ort8 hero unlforaly hold that tb .latanalon 

ot t ha I.ogla~raro 81 to 8 &r 18 to ba marain& pr:iourihy 

ry import ot tha lraguae n88dt 

(C. A.), lB9 2, '7, 701. Thea *bra a 

st1lgwm8, It mill ba mforoed rooordkg& it8 8orda. Amlarron v. Fe&d& 138 Tax. bob, 161 L. ‘2. 

. 

se0101 Bill 519 300ti08 4, ‘peolfl#11~ ruthozlra‘ 

rith4r88818 rm ah8 chdrw8 ~88ia8~0 mid or *w 8~11 

. . . rp oprl8#6 horoln or othervdw provld04~ kioro trad- 

?‘r to cc @omnlRemaw htad. 

hmorinc: your qu*rtlons: xc l8 our opinloa ttnt 

the l x p o a di8ah0m0a a ur e ua4rr 3o a aBtill o Do . Slv sh o uld 

bo pal4 0lra of the belancn aa $8~6 la the Whll&aa*r ~**Ls* 

l aa YwW. mrtbr tat thr Co8gtroll8r rhsuld m8t 88id8 

the 88ount l p ro~rl.alaU for the Stata xn8tituaioa 31+;81on 

OUt Or' UN Ch E &#O'a AsS~S~~MJ# BAIta mr0~8 trSMfWTiJI& thr 

mlaaeor to the omorrl Fi~,reaae hind. 

Tours wry truly 

David ,untob 

A“l‘t‘nt 

,
**EXHIBIT      32.1**

**Certification      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,                and |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of                Registrant. |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                              |                                            |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                         | /s/ Liu              Zhong              Yi |
|   | Name:              Liu Zhong Yi                   |
|   | Title:              Chief Executive Officer  |

----
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Texas Windstorm Insu r ance Association v. Randy Jones

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 6

- 00 38 5

- CV

Trial court case number: 84 1 6 6

- CV

Trial court: 2 3 9th District Court of Brazoria County, Texas

Texas Windstorm Insurance Association ha s filed a petition for permissive appeal. The

petition is GRANTED

.

Texas Windstorm Insurance Association is deemed to have filed a notice of appeal as of

the date of this order. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(b), 28.3(k). A separate notice of appeal need not

be filed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 28.3(k). This appeal is governed by the rules for accelerated

appeals. See id.

The Clerk of this Court is inst ructed to file a copy of this order with the trial court clerk.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd

Date: June 2 , 2016