UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4026

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DOMINIQUE RASHEED WELDON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, 

Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00287-H-1)

Submitted: August 6, 2013 Decided: August 23, 2013

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Yvonne Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dominique Rasheed Weldon appeals the twenty-four-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. Finding 

no error, we affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation 

of supervised release if the “sentence is within the applicable 

statutory range . . . and is not plainly unreasonable.” United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir 2006). “When 

reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, 

we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Such a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court 

considered both the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the 

Sentencing Guidelines and any pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper 

basis for the sentence. Id. Where, as here, the sentence 

departs from the Chapter 7 policy statement range, the court 

must make “explicit the reasons for its departure.” See United 

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). If the 

sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm because “a sentence 

that is not unreasonable also is not plainly unreasonable.” 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. 
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None of Weldon’s challenges to the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence has merit. First, he complains 

that the district court identified the need “to promote respect 

for the law” as one of several reasons for imposing the selected 

sentence. Weldon correctly states that this § 3553(a)(2)(A) 

factor is not among the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) that a court may consider prior to imposing a 

revocation sentence. However, consideration of an omitted 

§ 3553(a) factor does not render a revocation sentence plainly 

unreasonable, especially where, as here, the district court 

primarily relied on permitted factors in selecting the sentence. 

See United States v. Black, 289 F. App’x 613, 614-15 (4th Cir. 

2008); United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 

2007). 

Weldon also argues that the court gave an insufficient 

explanation for the twenty-four-month sentence, which is well 

above the recommended Chapter 7 policy statement range of sixtwelve months. The record reflects that the court cited as 

reasons for the selected sentence Weldon’s extensive criminal 

history beginning at age sixteen, his gang affiliation, his poor 

work record, and his having failed multiple drug tests 

administered over a short period of time. We conclude that this 

explanation was sufficient.
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Finally, Weldon contends that the district court did 

not consider placing him in a substance abuse treatment program 

in lieu of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006). 

While the record is silent as to whether the court considered 

this alternative to incarceration, we note that, in the absence 

of evidence to the contrary, the district court is presumed to 

have properly recognized and exercised its discretion under 

§ 3583(d). United States v. Hammonds, 370 F.3d 1032, 1038-39

(10th Cir. 2004). We find nothing in the record that would 

rebut this presumption.

Because Weldon’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable, 

we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before us and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED