Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

TRACY HESTER, 

Appellant, 

v. 

AURORA LANDAU; SHOWBOAT 

SHOW CLUB ANCHORAGE, LLC; 

TERRY MAURICE STAHLMAN; 

and ESTATE OF JAMES GOARD; 

Appellees. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-15809 

Superior Court No. 3AN-11-06873 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7254 – June 29, 2018 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge. 

Appearances: Michael A. Stepovich, Stepovich & Vacura 

Law Office, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Kenneth W. Legacki, 

Anchorage, for Appellee Landau. No appearance by 

Appellees Showboat Show Club Anchorage, LLC; Terry 

Maurice Stahlman; or Estate of James Goard. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, 

and Carney, Justices. 

CARNEY, Justice.
 

WINFREE, Justice, concurring.
 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A woman sued her former employer for unpaid compensation, naming the 

company and both of its owners as defendants. One of the owners died while the suit 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

was pending, and the former employee substituted the owner’s estate in the proceedings. 

Judgment was eventually entered in favor of the former employee. A year later the 

deceased owner’s widow moved for relief from the judgment as the sole beneficiary of 

his estate, arguing that neither her husband nor the estate had been properly served with 

notice of the suit. The former employee responded that service had been proper and that, 

in any case, the widow did not have authority to file a motion on behalf of the estate. 

The court denied the motion on the ground that the widow had not shown good cause for 

relief from the judgment. We affirm on the alternate ground that the widow did not have 

authority to act on the estate’s behalf. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Aurora Landau was a dancer at the Showboat Show Club in Anchorage. 

In April 2011 she filed a complaint in superior court against Showboat Show Club 

Anchorage, LLC, seeking to recover unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and 

impermissible deductions from her earnings. Her suit also named the LLC’s two 

members and managers, Terry Stahlman and James Goard. Stahlman, also the LLC’s 

registered agent, was personally served a summons and complaint for all three 

defendants at his Anchorage residence, which was listed in the LLC’s state licensing 

reports as the entity’s principal office and both Stahlman’s and Goard’s member address. 

It appears undisputed that Goard actually lived in Fairbanks. Yet Landau’s 

efforts to serve Goard consisted of unsuccessfully sending the summons and complaint 

by certified mail to Stahlman’s Anchorage residence and then serving Goard’s copies of 

the summons and complaint on Stahlman at the same residence. 

Stahlman responded to the summons and complaint stating that he had 

settled the claim, but Landau later advised the court that no payment had been made and 

the settlement had failed. Landau then moved for entry of default against Goard and the 

LLC. When Landau sought Goard’s default, Landau’s attorney asserted in his affidavit 

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that service on Goard had been accomplished by leaving the summons and complaint 

with Stahlman, “a person of reasonable age and discretion at the address of record 

pursuant to the Corporations Section, State of Alaska, for service on James Goard,” and 

attaching the return of service to his affidavit. The attached return of service for Goard 

said that the summons and complaint were left with Stahlman at his Anchorage 

residence, which was described as “the defendant[’s] usual place of residence.” A 

deputy clerk entered their default in February 2012. In April the LLC appeared before 

the court through counsel, and shortly thereafter the court set aside the default with 

respect to it. The default remained in effect as to Goard. 

Goard died in April 2012. His widow, Tracy Hester, is evidently his 

estate’s sole beneficiary. Robert Nesbitt sought appointment as the estate’s personal 

representative in September but was not appointed by the probate court until April 2013. 

On August 21 the court held a trial setting conference for Landau’s claims 

against the LLC, Stahlman, and Goard. The court noted that Goard was dead and reentered default against the LLC because it no longer was represented by counsel. In a 

later colloquy between the court and Landau’s attorney, the court noted that once notice 

of a party’s death is on the record, the court must dismiss claims against the decedent 

unless there is a party substitution within 90days.1 Landau’s attorney acknowledged that 

1 Alaska Civil Rule 25(a) provides: 

If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
 

court may order substitution of the proper parties. The
 

motion for substitution may be made . . . by any party, and
 

shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon
 

persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
 

service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is
 

made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon
 

the record . . . , the action shall be dismissed as to the
 

(continued...) 

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he “may have to bring in the estate.” 

Trial began on December 19 and was then continued to a later date. On 

December 31 — more than 90 days after the August 21 hearing, after the first day of trial 

had concluded, and while Nesbitt’s petition for appointment was pending in probate 

court — Landau moved to substitute the Estate of James Goard as a defendant in Goard’s 

place. The court granted the substitution the following month, even though an estate had 

not yet been opened.2 Landau then notified the putative estate that she had an interest.3 

Trial concluded June 18, 2013. In July the court found Stahlman, Goard’s 

estate, and the LLC jointly and severally liable for Landau’s damages. Landau was 

awarded atotal of$74,383.23 indamages, prejudgment interest, penalties, andattorney’s 

fees and costs. She then notified the Goard estate by filing a copy of the judgment in the 

probate proceeding. 

In November 2014, a year after the estate was notified, Hester moved for 

relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) “as sole beneficiary of the Estate of 

James Goard.” She argued that neither Goard, his estate, nor herself as sole beneficiary 

1	 (...continued)
 

deceased party.
 

But cf. Estate of Lampert ex rel. Thurston v. Estate of Lampert ex rel. Stauffer, 896 P.2d 

214, 217-18 (Alaska 1985) (holding court did not err by enlarging time for substitution 

after death of party). 

2 We have previously made clear that a party may not sue a decedent without 

first obtaining appointment of a personal representative to give the court personal 

jurisdiction. Hamilton v. Blackman, 915 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Alaska 1996). 

Rule 25(a)’s substitution process appears to similarly contemplate that there actually be 

an estate opened and a personal representative named who would substitute for the 

deceased party. 

3 See AS13.16.070 (providing for filing demand for noticeagainstunopened 

estate). 

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had ever been properly served with the complaint. She further argued that Landau had 

moved to substitute the estate after the deadline set by Civil Rule 25(a). Throughout the 

motion Hester asserted her status as “sole beneficiary of the Estate” as the basis for her 

action. 

Landau responded that all relevant persons, including Hester, had been 

properly served and that Hester had not shown good cause to vacate the default 

judgment. She also noted that Hester was not the estate’s personal representative and 

argued that she therefore lacked standing to object to the substitution of the estate or to 

the default judgment. Hester’s reply repeated her arguments that Goard had not been 

properly served and argued that Hester had interest-injury standing because, as the sole 

beneficiary, her financial interest in the case was identical to that of the estate. 

The superior court denied Hester’s motion in December 2014, stating that 

the defendants had been properly served and that both Goard and Hester “were aware of 

the litigation and the default.” The court found that Hester had not shown good cause 

to vacate the judgment because she had not shown that the outcome of the suit might be 

different if relief were granted. The court did not address the dispute over Hester’s 

standing to act for the estate. 

Hesterappealed, arguing that neither Goard nor his estatehadbeenproperly 

served with notice of the litigation and that the default judgment entered against the 

estate should be vacated. We ordered supplemental briefing on Hester’s standing to seek 

relief from judgment on behalf of the estate. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Statutory interpretation is a question of law to which we apply our 

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independent judgment.4 

IV. DISCUSSION 

We have not previously addressed whether the sole beneficiary of an estate 

who is not its personal representative has legal authority to appear in court on behalf of 

the estate. We conclude that Alaska’s probate code gives that authority only to the 

estate’s personal representative. We therefore affirm the superior court’s order denying 

Hester’s motion for relief from judgment on the alternate ground that Hester did not have 

the authority to file the motion.5 

“Weinterpretstatutes‘accordingtoreason,practicality,and common sense, 

taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the 

drafters.’ ”6 Statutory interpretation begins with the text’s plain meaning,7 but we also 

consider legislative history, even when the text “is facially unambiguous.”8 Because 

Alaska adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) “in its entirety” in 1972,9 the UPC’s 

4 Statev. Ketchikan GatewayBorough,366P.3d86,90 (Alaska2016) (citing 

State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014)). 

5 Brandner v. Pease, 361 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2015) (“We may affirm the 

superior court on any basis supported by the record, even if that basis was not considered 

by the court below or advanced by any party.” (quoting Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065, 

1070 (Alaska 2008))). 

6 Colemanv.McCullough, 290 P.3d413,414(Alaska2012) (quoting Thoeni 

v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249, 1258 (Alaska 2007)). 

7 Ward v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98 (Alaska 2012). 

8 Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) 

(quoting State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 762 

(Alaska 2012)). 

9 In re Estate of Bavilla, 343 P.3d 905, 909 (Alaska 2015) (citing Jaworski 

(continued...) 

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commentary is “instructive in interpreting the Alaska probate statutes.”10 

Alaska probate law defines and establishes various roles for people 

connected to a decedent or an estate. One role is that of an “interested person,” which 

“includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and other persons 

having property rights in or claims against” the estate.11 Hester is an interested person 

with respect to the Goard estate because she is a beneficiary of the estate. Landau is also 

an interested person because she has a claim against the Goard estate. Interested persons 

have specific rights under Alaska law. For example, they have the right to seek informal 

probate of a will,12 to receive notice of hearings and other actions of the court,13 and to 

demand that a personal representative give bond.14 

Personal representatives play a key role in administering and distributing 

the estate.15 They are “under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in 

accordance with the terms of” the will16 and “have statutory powers enabling them to 

collect, protect, sell, distribute and otherwise handle all steps in administration without 

9 (...continued) 

v. Estates of Horwath ex rel. Streets, 277 P.3d 753, 759 (Alaska 2012)). 

10 In re Estate of Baker, 386 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Alaska 2016) (citing In re 

Estate of Maldonado, 117 P.3d 720, 728 (Alaska 2005)). 

11 AS 13.06.050(26). 

12 See AS 13.16.090(a)(3), (d). 

13 See AS 13.06.110; AS 13.16.620. 

14 See AS 13.16.265. 

15 See AS 13.16.015; AS 13.16.245-.440. 

16 AS 13.16.350(a). 

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further order of the [c]ourt.”17 Personal representatives are authorized to take a number 

of different types of actions in “acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested 

persons.”18 One of these is the authority to “prosecute or defend claims[] or proceedings 

. . . for the protection of the estate.”19 Another provision gives the personal 

representative “the same standing to sue and be sued . . . as the decedent had immediately 

before death.”20 Although neither provision explicitly states that this grant of authority 

is exclusive or that no other person may take such actions on behalf of the estate, the 

only person to whomthey delegate authority is the personal representative. Neither these 

provisions nor any other part of the probate code grants such authority to anyone else. 

A provision of a related statute bolsters this reading. Part of Alaska’s Code 

of Civil Procedure deals with “Survival and Wrongful Death Actions.”21 Alaska 

Statute 09.55.570 specifies that “[a]ll causes of action by one person against another . . . 

survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal 

representatives of the latter.”22 The legislative record of Alaska’s adoption of the UPC 

indicates that AS 09.55.570 was offered as an amendment to the UPC bill23 and was 

17 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III, general cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969), 

http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/upc_scan_1969.pdf. 

18 AS 13.16.410. 

19 AS 13.16.410(22). 

20 AS 13.16.350(c). 

21 AS 09.55.570-.585. 

22 AS 09.55.570. 

23 1972 House Journal 937, 940. 

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subsequently adopted.24 Both the version adopted in 1972 and the current statute specify 

that it is the personal representative who is authorized to proceed in actions relating to 

the death of the person whose estate they represent.25 When considered together with the 

grant of standing to sue and be sued in AS 13.16.350(c), this provision confirms that the 

legislaturespecifically intended thepersonal representativeto bethelegalactor on behalf 

of an estate. 

The probate code’s provisions concerning the appointment and removal of 

a personal representative also support this view. They establish requirements for a 

person to be appointed as personal representative and, critically, to exercise the powers 

of the office. In order “to acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of 

a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be appointed by order of the court 

or registrar, qualify, and be issued letters.”26 The personal representative may also be 

required to file a bond.27 The personal representative’s duties and powers “commence 

upon appointment,” although they also “relate back in time” to prior acts by the 

appointed person.28 The personal representative has the power to ratify actions taken on 

behalf of the estate by others prior to the representative’s appointment, but this ability 

does not extend to actions taken by others after appointment of a personal 

24 See Ch. 78, § 4, SLA 1972. The statute was amended slightly in 1973 to 

its present form. See Ch 56, § 34, SLA 1973. 

25 Compare AS 09.55.570 with Ch. 78, § 4, SLA 1972. 

26 AS 13.16.015 (with exception regarding Foreign Personal Representatives 

in AS 13.21 not applicable here). 

27 See AS 13.16.255. 

28 AS 13.16.340. 

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representative.29 

The probate code takes care to ensure that there is no lapse in the estate’s 

representation once a personal representative is appointed. Under AS 13.16.290(c), a 

personal representative may resign the position after giving notice, but the resignation 

is not effective until a successor has been appointed and the estate’s assets have been 

turned over to the successor. A personal representative’s appointment ultimately 

terminates when probate is over.30 The code’s careful prevention of a gap in 

representation of the estate would not be necessary if a beneficiary could simply step in 

to perform the representative’s duties or exercise the representative’s authority.31 

The probate code provides other remedies to interested persons short of 

authorizing them to act as an estate’s legal representative. First, AS 13.16.275(a) allows 

any interested person to petition the probate court for an order “to secure proper 

performance of the personal representative’s duty.” Second, AS 13.16.295(a) permits 

an interested person to “petition for removal of a personal representative for cause at any 

time.” And if an interested person is unable to prevent a personal representative’s breach 

29 Id. (relating to the “[t]ime of accrual of duties and powers” of the personal 

representative); see UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 17, § 3-701 cmt. (“The sentence 

concerning ratification is designed to eliminate technical questions that might arise 

concerning the validity of acts done by others prior to appointment.” (emphasis added)). 

30 See AS13.16.290(a)-(b) (providing thattermination ofappointment occurs 

through an order closing the estate or one year after the filing of a closing statement). 

31 As Landau notes, a personal representative has a fiduciary duty to the 

estate; interested parties do not. See AS 13.16.350(a) (“A personal representative is a 

fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees . . . . A personal 

representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate . . . as expeditiously and 

efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.”). In cases with more than 

one interested person, allowing a single interested person to act on behalf of the entire 

estate could lead to serious conflicts of interest. 

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of fiduciary duty by one of these methods, that person may sue the personal 

representative for the damage or loss under AS 13.16.395. 

Alaska probate law thus establishes a comprehensive scheme for the 

representation of an estate in legal matters.32 This scheme relies on the personal 

representative to act on the estate’s behalf and does not allow others to exercise those 

powers. Because Hester was not the estate’s personal representative, she did not have 

the authority to act on its behalf.33 Whatever defects may have existed in the original 

service of Goard or the later substitution of his estate, Hester did not have the legal right 

to move for relief from judgment on the estate’s behalf. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The order of the superior court is AFFIRMED on the alternate ground that 

Hester did not have the legal authority to bring the motion for relief from judgment. 

32 Cf. Sinka v. N. Commercial Co., 491 P.2d 116, 118 (Alaska 1971) (holding 

that the Uniform Commercial Code provides “a comprehensive scheme for recovery of 

damages” for certain types of injuries). 

33 Because we do not address or resolve the merits of the motion for relief 

from judgment, our opinion does not foreclose the estate, as the party with the proper 

legal authority, from bringing a similar motion in the superior court. 

Hester also argued in her supplemental briefing that she is a real party in 

interest pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 17(a) and thus has the authority to bring the 

motion for relief from judgment. Rule 17(a) is inapplicable to Hester’s motion for relief 

from judgment because Hester is not prosecuting an action in the name of a real party 

in interest as required by the text of the civil rule. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 17(a). 

Accordingly, given the rule’s inapplicability to the facts of this case, we do not further 

address this argument. 

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WINFREE, Justice, concurring. 

I agree with today’s decision. I write separately to highlight what I believe 

to be serious service of process questions that will remain unanswered in light of that 

decision. 

Effective service of a summons and complaint on a competent individual 

requires: (1) actual personal service; (2) leaving the papers at the person’s dwelling 

house or usual place of abode with another person of suitable age and discretion then 

residing there; (3) delivering the papers to an agent authorized by appointment or law to 

receive them; or (4) completed signed delivery by registered or certified mail with return 

receipt.1 If service cannot be made through these methods, a party may apply to the court 

for alternative service methods.2 

James Goard apparently lived in Fairbanks. AuroraLandau’sinitial service 

efforts for Goard consisted of unsuccessfully sending the summons and complaint by 

certified mail to Terry Stahlman’s Anchorage residence and then delivering Goard’s 

copies of the summons and complaint to Stahlman at that same residence. But Landau 

had not applied to the court for permission to serve Goard at Stahlman’s residence. 

When Landau sought Goard’s default, Landau’s attorney asserted in his 

affidavit that service on Goard had been accomplished by leaving the summons and 

complaint with Stahlman, “a person of reasonable age and discretion at the address of 

record pursuant to the Corporations Section, State of Alaska, for service on James 

Goard,” attaching the return of service to his affidavit. It is unclear exactly what 

Landau’s attorney meant by address of record with the Corporations Section for 

“service” on Goard, but it is clear that the address was the one listed for Goard with the 

1 Alaska R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (h). 

2 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 4(e). 

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Corporations Section for purposes of his relationship to Showboat Show Club 

Anchorage LLC. The attached return of service for Goard said that the summons and 

complaint were left with Stahlman at his Anchorage residence, which was described as 

“the defendant[’]s usual place of residence.” The return of service as to Goard was false; 

Stahlman’s Anchorage residence was not Goard’s usual place of residence, it was 

Goard’s LLC-related address. 

This raises questions that will remain unanswered by this court in light of 

today’s decision that Goard’s widow lacked standing to bring an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) 

motion on Goard’s estate’s behalf. Alaska Civil Rule 4(d)(1) permits individual service 

by leaving papers at a person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode. Could Landau 

effectively ignore that provision by instead unilaterally choosing to leave service papers 

at an address Goard had listed with the state for LLC purposes, even though it apparently 

was not Goard’s dwelling house or usual place of abode? When an individual member 

of an LLC, a partner in a partnership, or a shareholder in a corporation has an address 

listed with the state on a required filing, is that address — as a matter of law, 

notwithstanding Rule 4(d)(1) and without regard to Rule 4(e) — an effective service 

address for the individual with respect to a lawsuit arising from the entity’s operations? 

The superior court apparently answered “yes” to one or both of those 

questions. Today’s decision leaves the superior court’s answer(s) unreviewed. 

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