MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 5 Docket: Ken

- 19

- 262 Argued : December	5 ,	2019 Decided : January 9 ,	2020 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , and HUMPHREY, JJ.

A DOPTION BY	STEFAN S

.
JABAR,	J. [¶1] The	father	of two	children appeals	from	judgment s of	the	Kennebec County	 Probate	 Court	 ( E. Mitchell,	 J. )	 terminating	 his	 parental	 rights	 in anticipation	of	adoption s pursuant	to	18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 204(b)	(2018);	22	M.R.S. §	4055(1)(A)(2),	(B)(2)(a),	and	(B)(2)(b)(i i )	(2018). 1 He	argues	on	appeal	that the	record	contains	insufficient	evidence	to	support	the	court’s findings that	he is	an	unfit	parent	and	that	termination of	his	parental	rights	is	in	his	children’s best	interests. See 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 204(b)	(2018);	22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2). He	also	contends	that	the	court	erred	as	a	matter	of	law	by	reaching	these	two

1 The	Maine Probate	Code was	recently	repealed	and	recodified. P.L.	201 7 ,	ch.	402.		This	matter was	fully	litigated	prior	to	the	effective	date	of the	recodified	Probate	Code.		Therefore,	all Probate Code citations	in	this	opinion	are	to	the repealed 2018	version ,	codified	in	Title	18

- A	of	the	Maine Revised	Statutes

. The	relevant	text	is substantively unchanged	in	the	new	codification. See P.L.	201 7 , ch.	402, § A

- 2 (codified	at	18

- C	M.R.S.	§§	9

- 103,	9

- 204,	9

- 302	(2019));	P.L.	2019,	ch.	417,	§	A

- 103 (establishing	effective	date	of	September	1,	2019).2 findings	in	an	improper	sequence,	 and	by	 failing	 to consider	 open	adoption s that	would	have	left	his	parental	rights	intact. We	affirm	the	judgments.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] On	 July	30,	 2018,	 the	mother	and	 stepfather	 of the	children filed petitions to adopt the	children the	Kennebec	County	Probate	Court, seeking	to establish	 the	stepfather	as	 the	children’s	legal	 father	pursuant	 to	18

- A	M.R.S. § 9

- 103	 (2018). Soon	 thereafter,	 the	mother	 filed	 petition s to	 terminate	 the father’s	parental	rights	pursuant	to	18

- A	M.R.S.	§ 9

- 204	(2018) ,	thereby	freeing the	ch ildren	for	adoption	by	the	stepfather

. The	father	was	duly	served	with notice	of	the	petitions	to	terminate	his	parental	rights, to	which	he registered his	objection. The	court	held	a	one

- day	hearing	on	the	matter	on	May 22,	2019

. On	 June	 10,	 2019,	 the court	 entered	 judgments	 terminating	 the	 father’s parental	rights	with	regard	to the	children. The	father did	not	file	a	motion	for further	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 conclusions	 of	 law ,	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 52, or	 any	 other post
- trial	 motion. The	 father timely	 appealed	 from	 both	 orders.	 	 M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). [¶ 3 ] The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	court’s	explicit	findings	and the	trial	record. See Guardianship	of	Ard , 2017	ME	12,	¶	1 5 ,	154	A.3d	609	( “In the	absence	of	a	motion	for	findings	of	f act,	see	M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(a),	we	assume3 that	the	court	found	all	of	the	facts	needed	to	support	its	decision	if	those	facts are	supported	by	competent	evidence .” (quotation	marks	omitted) )

. The	older child was	 born	 in	 2006	 and	 is	 developmentally	 disabled. He	 attends	 public school,	 where	 he	 receives	 intensive	 special	 education	 services	 as	 part	 of	 an Individual ized Education	P rogram (IEP). The	younger	child was	born	in	2009 and	also	has	been	diagnosed with genetic	and	behavioral	disorders. He attends a	 public	 school	 where	 his	 education	 is	 directed	 by	 an	 IEP	 and	 he	 receives

one - on - one	 supervision	 at	 all	 times	 during	 the	 school	 day. He exhibits aggressive	behaviors	and	is	sometimes	violent. [¶ 4 ] The	mother	and	father	divorced	in	2012,	and a parental	rights	and responsibilities	 order	 was	 issued	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 divorce,	 awarding primary	residence	to	the	mother	and contact rights	to	the	father. In	practice, the	 amount	 of	 time	 that	 each	 child	 spent	 with the	 father varied	 over	 time. Begi nning	in 201 5 ,	 the	 father’s contact with	 the	 children	 declined	 gradually. The	 father	 has	 not	 seen	 the	 children	 since	 July	 2016 ,	 and	 has	 had	 no communication	with	the	children	since	May	2018

. This	lack	of	contact	is	at	least partially	 the	 result	 of	 the	 mo ther’s	 conduct

— the	 court	 found	 that	 she “wrongfully	made	it	difficult	for [the	father]	to	contact	her

. ” Since	at	least	201 5 , the	 children have	 resided	 primarily	 with	 the	 mother	 and	 stepfather.	 	 The4 stepfather	is	consistently	involved	in	caring	for	the	children	and	interacts	on	a daily	basis	with	their	educational	and	medical	providers. [¶ 5 ] The	two	orders	issued	by	the	court	are	mirror	images	of	one	another except	 for	 the	 relevant	 child’s	 name.	 	 T he	 court	made	 the	 following	 findings with	regard	to	both	children: [T]he	 termination	 of	 the	 parental	 rights	 of	 [the	 father]	 thereby freeing	the	child	for	adoption	by	[the	stepfather]	would	be	in	the child’s	 best	interests. This	 Court	 also	 specifically	 fi nds	 that	 [the father’s]	 failure	 to	 make	 any	 attempt	 to	 establish	 a	 family relationship	with	 the	 child,	 or	 contribute	in	 any	way	 to ward the child’s	financial	support,	constitutes	clear	and	convincing	evidence that	[ the	father ]	has	been	unwilling	or	unable	t o	take	responsibility for	the	child	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	child’s needs. [¶ 6 ] The	court also	found	that “[ t he	father]	has	not	taken	the	necessary steps	in	a	reasonable	time	frame	to	care	for	his	son	with	highly	special	needs wel l	known	 to	him.		He	has	been	absent	 from	his	life	 for over two	years	and owes	over	$30,000	in	child	support.” Although the	court	noted	that the	mother had	wrongfully	made	it	difficult	for the	father to	contact	her	or	the	children, the court	 found that the father “made	no	effort	 to	legally	enforce	his	 rights	or	 to contact	 [the	 child’s]	 medical	 providers	 or	 his	 school.”	 	 The	 medical	 and educational	professionals	who	worked	with the	children “had	never	met [the father] .” The	 court	 stated	 that	 b oth	 children “ will	 need	 special	 care	 and5 attention	for	the	rest	of [their	lives] , ” and	that the	father “ has	done	nothing	to assist	 with	 this	 challenge	 and	 did	 not	 demonstrate	 a	 valid	 reason	 for	 his absence.”
II.		DISCUSSION
A. Legal	Standard [¶ 7 ] “When	 a	 private	 individ ual	 invokes	 court	 action	 to	 terminate parental	 rights	 .	 .	 .	 the	 court	 engages	 in	 state	 action	 that	 implicates	 the constitutionally	protected	liberty	interest	a	parent	has	in	parenting	his	or	her child	free	from	state	interference.” Adoption	of	Isabelle	T. , 2017	ME	220,	¶	3, 175	A.3d	639 .		These	protections	are	not	absolute. Id. ¶¶	5

- 6.		 “A	 state	may interfere	with	a	 parent ’ s	 fundamental	 right	 to	parent	 a	child	when	 the	court makes	a	finding,	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence,	that	the	parent	is	unfit	and
t he	child ’ s	best	interest	will	be	served	by	state	intervention	to	avoid	harm	to the	child.” Id .	¶ 6

. [¶ 8 ] Petitions	 for	 private	 adoptions	 in	 Maine	 Probate	 Courts	 are governed	 by	 the Adoption	 Act, 18

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 9

- 101	 to	 9

- 315	 (2018) .	 	 The Adoption	 Act	incorporates	 by	 reference 22	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4050

- 4059	 (2018), the statutory	 framework	 governing	 termination	 in	 child	 protection	 proceedings.
18

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 9

- 204(b)	 (2018 ).	 	 In	 Title	 18

- A	 adoption	 proceedings,6 “termination	of	parental	rights occurs	prior	to	the	adoption	in	order	to	enable the	child	.	.	.	to	be	legally	available	for	adoption.” 2 Adoption	of	Isabelle	T., 2017 ME	 220,	 ¶	 9,	 175	 A.3d	 639.	 	 In	 determining	 whether	 to	 terminate	 parental rights,	 the	 court	 engages	 in	 a	 two

- step	 analysi s,	 first	 making	 a	 finding	 of parental	unfitness	using	the	factors	outlined	in 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b), and	only	then	determining	whether	termination	is	in	the	best	interests	of	the child , 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)( 2 ) (a)

. Se e Adoption	of	Shayleigh	S .,	20 18	ME	165, ¶	17,	198	A.3d	791

. [¶ 9 ] A	court’s	finding	of	unfitness	must	be	grounded	in	one	or	more	of the	following	findings: ( i )	 The	 parent	 is	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 protect	 the	 child	 from jeopardy and	these	circumstances	are	unlikely	to	change	within a time	that	is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	child ’ s	needs; ( ii )	The	parent	has	been	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility for	the	child	within	a	time	that	is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the child ’ s	needs; [ or ] ( iii )	The child	has	been	abando ned;

.	.	.	. 22	M.R.S.	§	4055	(1)(B)(2)(b).

2 The	Probate	Court,	according	to	statute,	cannot	grant	an	adoption	petition	absent	the	consent	of each	of	the	adoptee’s	living	parents. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 302( a ) (2) (2018).		Such	consent	is	not	required, however,	from	a	parent	whose	“rights	have	been	terminat ed	according	under	Title	22,	chapter	1071, subchapter VI .”		18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 302( b )( 2 ). Thus,	termination	of	a	nonconsenting	parent’s	parental rights	is	often	a	prerequisite	to	adoption	under	Title	18

- A.		Such	is	the	case	here. See	infra Part	II(D)

.7 [¶1 0 ] We	review factual	findings	regarding	whether	termination	is	in	the best	interest	 of	a	child	 for	clear	error. Adoption	 of	 Isabelle	T., 2017	ME	220, ¶ 30,	175	A.3d	639.		A	finding	of	parental	unfitness	i s	also	reviewed	for	clear error,	and we will	find	such	an	error	“only	if	there	is	no	competent	evidence	in the	record	to	support	it;	if	the	fact

- finder	clearly	misapprehended	the	meaning of	the	evidence;	or	if	the	finding	is	so	contrary	to	the	credible	evi dence	that	it does	not	represent	the	truth	of	the	case.” Id

. “ When	the	burden	of	proof	at	trial is	 clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 our	 review	 is	 to	 determine	 whether	 the fact

- finder	could	 reasonably	have	been	 persuaded	 that	 the	 required	 findings
were	 prov ed	 to	be	highly	 probable. ” Adoption	 of	Shayleigh	S .,	2018	ME	165, ¶ 1 4 ,	198	A.3d 791 .		The	court’s	“ultimate	decision	to	terminate	parental	rights” is	reviewed	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion. Adoption	 of	 Isabelle	T., 2017	ME	220, ¶ 30,	175	A.3d	639

. B. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence [¶1 1 ] The	father	challenges	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	underpinning the	trial	court’s	finding s that h e	was	unfit	and	that	termination	would	be	in	the children’s	best	interests

. Contrary	 to	his	contentions,	 the	 record	evid ence	is such	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 “could	 reasonably	 have	 been	 persuaded	 that	 the required	findings	were	proved	to	be	highly	probable. ” Id

. ¶	33

. The	court	did8 not	err	in	reaching	its	findings,	nor	did	it	abuse	its	discretion	in	its	decision	to
terminate the	father’s	parental	rights. Adoption	of	Shayleigh	S .,	2018	ME	165, ¶ 1 4 ,	198	A.3d 791 ; Adoption	of	Isabelle	T., 2017	ME	220,	¶	30,	175	A.3d	639.
1. Finding	of	Unfitness [¶1 2 ] Record	evidence	demonstrates	that the father’s	efforts	to	maintain contact	with	his	two	children	have	been	sporadic	and	ineffective.		Prior	to	2016, he	 had	 regular	 contact	 with	 the	 children	 and	 took	 advantage	 of	 his contact rights.	 	 After	 March	 2016,	 he	 had	 virtually	 no	 in

- person	 contact	 with the children	and	any	phone	contact	was	short	and	intermittent.		After	June	2018, he	had	no	direct	contact	with	the	children.		His	efforts	to	maintain	contact	were limited	to	contacting	the	mother.		What	little	indirect	contact	did	occur	was	a product	of	th e	efforts	of	the	paternal	grandparents. The father	moved	to	Florida in	December	2016 , to	seek	employment	and	work	on	his	sobriety , staying	for nearly	two	years

. [¶1 3 ] The mother	 imposed roadblocks	 to	 the	 father	 contacting	 the children, severely curtailing	 the	 father’s	 contact	 after	 he	 was	 arrested	 in March 2016. She	also	moved	to	a	new	address	in	October	2017,	and	changed her	 phone	 number	 in	 June	 2018. The	 trial	 court acknowledged	 the wrongfulness	 of this conduct and	 took	 it into	 consideration in	 its	 orders.9 However,	the	father’s	record	of	minimal	contact	with	the	children	predated	the imposition	of	these	roadblocks. By	mid

- 2015,	his contact with	the	children	had declined	to,	at	most, one	overnight	visit	per	weekend

. Further, after	the	mother cut	off	his contact ,	t he father did	not	attempt	to	enforce	his	rights	through	the judicial	 system	 or	 otherwise	 try	 to	 pursue	 contact.	 	 He	 did	 not	 contact	 the maternal	 grandparents,	 the	 children’s	 schools or medical	 providers,	 or	 the stepfather. [¶1 4 ] The	 court	 found	 that	 both	 children	 will	 need	 special	 care	 and attention	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 their	 lives,	 and	 the	 record	 demonstrates	 that	 their disabilities	 render	 change,	 uncertainty,	 and	 transition	 extremely	 difficult	 for both	children .		The	trial	court	reasonably	could	have	been	persuaded	that	it	was highly	probable the	father was	either	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility for the	children in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	their	needs.
2. Finding	Regarding	the	Children’s Best	Interest [¶1 5 ] The	significant	special	needs	of the	children are	also	relevant	 to the	court’s	second	core	finding

— that	termination	of	the	father’s	parental	rights would	be	in	 the children’s	best	interests .		22	M.R.S.	§	4055( 1 )( B )( 2 )( a )

. The best	in terest	factors	considered	in	a	Title	18

- A	proceeding	are	the	same	as	those in	a	Title	22	proceeding:10 In	considering	the	children ’ s	best	interests,	the	court	is	required	to consider	the	needs	of	the	children,	including	the	children ’ s	age,	the children ’ s	at tachments	to	relevant	persons,	periods	of	attachments and	separation,	the	children ’ s	ability	to	integrate	into	a	substitute placement	 or	 back	 into	 their	 parent ’ s	 home	 and	 the	 children ’ s physical	and	emotional	needs. Also	r elevant	to	the	best	interests det ermination	is	 the	harm	 the	children	may	suffer	if	 the	parent ’ s rights	 are	 not	 terminated,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 children ’ s	 need	 for permanence	and	stability. Adoption	 of	 Isabelle	 T., 2017	 ME	 220,	 ¶	 49,	 175	 A.3d	 639	 (quotation	 marks omitted)	(alterations	omitted). [¶1 6 ] The	trial	court	considered	the	needs	of	each	child,	their	respective ages	and	relationships	with	their	parents	and	step

- father,	the	time	spent	with the	parties,	and their	ability	to	integrate	into	the	mother	and	stepfather’s	home. The	record	evidence	shows	that	both	children,	and the	younger	child especially, require	consistency,	routine,	and	predictability	in	order to function well in	the home	and	in	school

. Strong coordination among the	caregivers,	educators,	and medical	providers is necessary	in	order	 for	 the	children	 to	coexist	with	 their family	members	and	peers,	and	to	progress	toward	their	social	and	educational goals.	 	 The	 evidence	 shows	 that	 the	 father	 has	 n ot	 contributed	 to	 those coordinated	efforts,	but	 that the	stepfather has.		The	evidence	 further	shows that	sporadic	contact	with	the	father	interferes	with	the	children’s	routine	and progress.		With	regard	to the	younger	child ,	changes	to	routine	correlate with11 increased	aggressive	behaviors.		In	light	of	the	evidence	presented	at	trial,	the trial court	 could	 reasonably	 have	 been	 persuaded	 that	 the	 required	 findings were	proved	to	be	highly	probable,	and	thus	did	not	clearly	err	in	determining
termination	t o	be	in	the	best	interest	of	each	child. [¶1 7 ] Because	the	trial	court	did	not	clearly	err	in	its	determinations	that the	 father	 has	 been	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 two children	 within	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 their needs	 and	 that termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	each	child,	the trial court	did	not	abuse its	discretion	in	terminating	the	father’s	parental	rights.
C. The	Court’s	Sequence	of	Findings [¶1 8 ] The	father	next	argues	that	the	trial	court	erred	as	a	ma tter	of	law by	first	determining	that	termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	each	child	and then	finding	that	he	has	been	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the children	within	a	time	that	is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	their	needs.		The fat her	 raises	 this	 challenge	 for	 the	 first	 time	 on	 appeal. See supra Part	 I. Therefore,	we	review	for	obvious	error. In	re	Joshua	B .,	2001	ME	115,	¶ 9

- 10 , 776	A.2d 1240 ; see Alexander, Maine	Appellate	Practice ,	§ 402(a)	at	310	(5th ed.	 2018); see	 also MP Assocs.	 v.	 Liberty ,	 2001	 ME	 22,	 ¶	 18,	 771	 A.2d	 1040

.12 Obvi ous	error	is	that	which	deprives	a	party	of	a	fair	trial	or	otherwise	treats	a party	unjustly. See Shayleigh	S .,	2018	ME	165,	¶	18,	198	A.3d	791. [¶1 9 ] Title 22	 §	4055(1)(B)(2) lists	 two	 findings	as	prerequisites	 to	a termination	of	parental	rights: f irst,	that	termination	is	in	the	best	interest	of the	child; and s econd,	that	the	parent	has	demonstrated	unfitness	in	one	of four
ways. 22 M.R.S. §	4055(1)(B)(2)

. Notwithstanding the	order	in	which	 these two	 findings	are	laid	out	in	 the	statute, the	constitution	requires that	“a	 trial court	 must	 find	 parental	 unfitness	 before	 it	 proceeds	 to	 consider	 the	 best interest	of	the	children.” Adoption	of	Shayleigh	S .,	2018	ME	165,	¶	17, 198	A.3d
791 ; see	 also Adoption	 of	 Hali	 D .,	 2009	 ME	 70,	 ¶¶	 4

- 5,	 974	 A.2d	 916 ; In	 re Michelle	W., 2001	ME	123,	¶	11,	777	A.2d	283

. [¶ 20 ] In	both	of	the	trial	court’s	judgments,	it	first	stated	that	it	found termination	to	be	in	the	child’s	best	interests.		Then,	in	a	separate	sentence,	the trial court	 found	 that	 the	 father	 “has	 been	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 take responsibility	for	the	child	i n	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	child’s needs.”		However,	the	language	of	the trial court’s	order	does	not	necessarily suggest	that it made	a	finding	as	to	the	children’s	best	interests	before	reaching the	 question	 of	 fitness ;	 the record	 demonst rates	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 clearly understood	that	the	two	findings	were	distinct	and	that	a	finding	as	to	fitness13 must	be	reached	before	it	could	proceed	to	a	best	interest	analysis. At	trial,	the court	stated,	“[Y]ou	don’t	even	get	[to]	the	best	interes t	of	the	child	standards until	you	deal	with	the	termination	standard.” [¶ 2 1] The	trial	court’s	order	and	the	record	evidence	do	not	support	a conclusion	 that the	 father was	 denied	 a	 fair	 trial	 or	 subjected	 to	 a	 serious injustice.	 	 The trial court	 made	 a ll	 required	 findings,	 correctly	 applying	 the standard	of clear	and	convincing evidence to	both	the	best	interest	prong	and the	 fitness	 prong.	 	 The trial court	 understood	 that	 these	 findings	 were independent	 of	 one	 another	 and	 a	 finding	 as	 to	 one	 should	 not inform	 the finding	 as	 to	 the	 other.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 mistake	 made	 by	 the	 trial	 court	 in arranging	its	findings	within	the	termination	orders	was	not	obvious	error. Cf. In	re	Michelle	W., 2001	ME	123,	¶ ¶ 8, 11, 777	A.2d	283; In	re	Joshua	B .,	2001	ME 115,	¶ 8,	776	A.2d	1240.
D. Necessity	of	Termination [¶ 22 ] Finally, the	father argues	that	the	trial	court	erred	in	concluding that his parental	rights	needed	to	be	terminated	in	order	for the	stepfather to adopt	the	children.		Instead, the	father argues,	the trial court	could	have	granted the	adoption	petition	without	terminating	his	rights,	leaving	the	children	with14 three	 legal	 parents.	 	 This	 argument	 reflects	 a	 misunderstanding	 of Title 18

- A adoption	proceedings	and	is not	persuasive

. [¶ 23 ] The	Probate	Cou rt	is	a	court	of	limited	jurisdiction. Marin	v.	Marin , 2002	ME	88, ¶	9, 797	A.2d	1265 .		The	Adoption	Act	grants	the	Probate	Court jurisdiction	over	adoption	petitions.		18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 103(1)(a)	(2018); see	also In	re	Melanie	S ., 1998	ME	132,	¶	8, 712 A.2d	1036

. Before	the	court	may	grant a	petition	for	adoption,	however,	written	consent	is	required	from	each	of	the adoptee’s	 living	 parents,	 unless	 an	 exception	 is	 satisfied. 18

- A M.R.S. §§ 9

- 302( a )( 2 ), ( b )	 (2018). A	 parent’s	 consent	 is	 not	 required	 i f	 his	 or	 her parental	 rights	 have	 been	 terminated	 pursuant	 to	 22	 M.R.S.	 §§ 4050

- 4059 (2018). 3 Limited	by	its	statutory	mandate,	the	Probate	Court	is	left	with	two choices	in	 the	 face	of	a	nonconsenting	parent: deny	 the	petition	 for	adoption because	the	pe titioner	has	failed	to	prove	that	the	nonconsenting	parent	is	unfit or,	if	 the	petitioner	has	established	 that	 the	parent	is	unfit	and	 that	adoption would	 be	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest, terminate	 the	 nonconsenting	 parent’s parental	 rights,	 thereby	 obviat ing	 the	 need	 for the	 parent’s consent. See Adoption	 of	 Isabelle	 T., 2017	 ME	 220,	 ¶	 12,	 175	 A.3d	 639	 (noting	 that	 the

3 T he	Title	22	termination	procedures	are	incorporated	by	reference	in 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 204, which authorizes	the	Probate	Court	to	terminate	parental	rights	in	conjunction	with	an	adoption	petition.15 Adoption	Act	does	not	authorize	rehabilitation	or	reunification	efforts	prior	to or	 instead	 of	 termination	 of	 parental	 rights). We review	 a	 trial	 court’s determination	of	its	own	authority	de	novo. Bonner	v.	Emerson ,	2014	ME	135, ¶	9,	105	A.3d	1023. [¶ 24 ] Here,	the	father	was	a	living	parent	of	both	prospective	adoptees and,	as	such,	the	trial	court	could	not	grant	either	petitio n	without	his	consent , which	the	father	did	not	provide

. 18

- A	M.R.S.	§	9

- 302( a )( 2 ). The	m other	filed petitions	to	terminate	the	father’s	parental	rights, and	the	trial	court	granted those	petitions

. Only	after	the	court	determined	that	the	father’s	cons ent	was not	 legally	 necessary

— because	 his	 rights	 had	 been	 terminated

— could	 it proceed	to	consider	the	adoption	petitions. [¶ 25 ]		The	trial	court	did	not	have	the	authority	to	pursue	the	third	option described	 by	 the	 father : an	 open	 adoption	 granted	 with	 h is	 parental	 rights intact	 but	 without	 his	 written	 consent. Although	 the	 Maine	 Parentage	 Act contemplates	 more	 than	 two	 parents,	 the	 Adoption	 Code	 does	 not.	 	 Title
18

- C M.R.S.	§9

- 308 states that	the	effect	of	an	adoption	is	to	“divest[]	the	parent and	 chil d	 of	 all	legal	 rights,	 privileges,	 immunities,	 duties	 and	 obligations	 to each	other	as	parent	and	child,	except	an	adoptee	inherits	from	the	adoptee’s former parents	 if	 provided	 in	 the	 adoption	 decree.” 18

- C	 M.R.S.	 §	 9

- 308(6)16 (2019)	 (emphasis	 added). The	 Code	 contains	 no	 provision	 for	 parents	 who wish	 to	 “consent”	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 their	 children	 by	 someone	 else,	 unless those	consents	are	accompanied	by	voluntary	termination	of	parental	rights. [¶ 26 ] The	 trial	court	did	not	err	in	 failing	 to	consi der	an	adoption	not authorized	by	law. The	entry	is: Judgment s affirmed.

Caleb	 J.	 Gannon,	 Esq.,	 and	 John	 E.	 Baldacci, Jr., Esq. (orally) ,	 Lipman	 &	 Katz, Augusta,	for	appellant father Maryellen	Sullivan,	Esq.,	and	Joe	Lewis,	Esq. (orally) ,	Port	City	Legal,	Portland, for	appellees mother	and	stepfather

Kennebec	County	Probate	Court	docket	numbers	A2018

- 4689	and	A2018

- 4690 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY