alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Middlefield Banc Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Thomas G. Caldwell, President, and Donald L. Stacy, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|                                      |  |  |                                            | 
|------------------------------------- |  |  | ------------------------------------------ | 
|By: /s/ Thomas G. Caldwell            |  |  | By: /s/ Donald L. Stacy                    | 
|Thomas G. Caldwell                    |  |  | Donald L. Stacy                            | 
|President and Chief Executive Officer |  |  | Principal Financial and Accounting Officer | 



December 13, 2013



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Middlefield Banc Corp. and will be retained by Middlefield Banc Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4163 

To provide for a greater number of members on certain combined Farm 

Service Agency county committees. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 2, 2004 

Mr. SHUSTER (for himself and Mr. HOLDEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To provide for a greater number of members on certain 

combined Farm Service Agency county committees. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INCREASED MEMBERSHIP OF CERTAIN COM4 BINED FARM SERVICE AGENCY COUNTY COM5 MITTEES. 

6 Section 8(b)(5)(B) of the Soil Conservation and Do7 mestic Allotment Act (16 U.S.C. 590h(b)(5)(B)) is 

8 amended by adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(vi) MEMBERSHIP OF COMBINED

10 FARM SERVICE AGENCY COUNTY COMMIT-
2 

•HR 4163 IH 

1 TEES.—Notwithstanding the numerical 

2 limitations of clause (ii), a county com3 mittee that results from the combination 

4 or consolidation of county, area, or local 

5 committees representing 3 or more coun6 ties shall consist of not fewer than 3 nor 

7 more than the applicable number of mem8 bers who meet the requirements of clause 

9 (ii). For purposes of the preceding sen10 tence, the applicable number is the sum of 

11 1 and twice the number of counties rep12 resented by the members of the com13 mittee.’’. 

Æ
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00119-CV

SENRICK WILKERSON,

Appellant

v.

HUNTSVILLE INSTITUTIONAL PAROLE OFFICE,

Appellee

From the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1527660

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Senrick Wilkerson appeals the trial court’s judgment of dismissal rendered against 

him on February 29, 2016. By letter dated June 20, 2016, the Clerk of this Court notified 

Wilkerson that the appeal was subject to dismissal because the original filing fee of 

$205.00 had not been paid and warned Wilkerson that the Court would dismiss the 

appeal unless, within 10 days from the date of the letter, Wilkerson paid the filing fee or 
Wilkerson v. Huntsville Institutional Parole Office Page 2

obtained indigent status for the purposes of appeal. Ten days have passed, and 

Wilkerson has not responded. 

This appeal is dismissed. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed July 20, 2016

[CV06]
<PAGE>
 
EXHIBIT 11

                STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS

<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                                                      Six Months           Year Ended December 31,  
                                                                    Ended June 30,   ------------------------------------
                                                                        1997            1996        1995        1994
                                                                    --------------   ----------  ----------  ------------
<S>                                                                 <C>             <C>          <C>         <C> 
Primary                                                             
------- 

Weighted average Premier common shares outstanding during
 the period                                                           7,910,903       7,971,439   7,906,511    7,000,025 

Common shares issuable in connection with assumed
 exercise of options under the treasury stock method                    151,356         119,930      76,149       41,638 
                                                                     ----------      ----------  ----------   ---------- 
Total                                                                 8,062,259       8,091,369   7,982,660    7,041,663 
                                                                     ==========      ==========  ==========   ========== 
Net income less preferred dividends                                  $4,088,000      $5,493,739  $4,547,944   $1,790,999 
                                                                     ----------      ----------  ----------   ---------- 
Per share earnings                                                         0.51            0.68        0.57         0.25 
                                                                     ==========      ==========  ==========   ========== 
</TABLE>
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-1517

_____________________________

ELIJAH PASSMORE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Francis J. Allman, Jr., Judge.

June 13, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and RAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Elijah Passmore, pro se, Appellant.
2

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

GLUE WILKINS, : No. 74 MM 2019 

Petitioner 

v. 

HONORABLE JOSEPH C. 

MADENSPACHER, SENIOR JUDGE, 

SPECIALLY ASSIGNED, 

Respondent 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 2019, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Amended King's Bench Matter is DENIED. The 

Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the judge's name from the caption.
IV

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 79

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to discourage frivolous

ethics complaints.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 26, 1997

Mr. BURTON of Indiana submitted the following resolution; which was referred

to the Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to

discourage frivolous ethics complaints.

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. FRIVOLOUS ETHICS COMPLAINTS.

3 (a) Clause 4(e)(2) of rule X is amended by adding

4 at the end the following:

5 ‘‘(G)(i) At any time, the committee may, by an af6 firmative vote of a majority of its total membership, deter7 mine that a complaint filed against a member is frivolous

8 and baseless.

9 ‘‘(ii) The committee may make such a determination

10 if it deems that the complaint filed against a member has
2

•HRES 79 IH

1 no basis in fact, the alleged violation is of such a minor

2 and technical nature that it does not reflect discredit upon

3 the House or its Members, the complaint was filed for

4 purely partisan reasons and not out of concern for main5 taining the ethical standards of the House, or the com6 plaint is part of a pattern of abuse and misuse of the Com7 mittee on Standards of Official Conduct.

8 ‘‘(iii) In the case of any complaint deemed frivolous

9 and baseless, the committee shall determine the costs of

10 its inquiry and report such costs to the Committee on

11 House Oversight, the Clerk of the House, and the public.

12 ‘‘(iv) If a complaint deemed frivolous and baseless by

13 the committee is filed by a Member of Congress, that

14 member’s ‘Member’s Representational Account’ (MRA),

15 shall be charged for the costs of the committee’s inquiry.

16 If such complaint is filed by more than one member, each

17 member’s MRA shall be charged proportionately.

18 ‘‘(v) At its discretion, and by a vote of a majority

19 of its total membership, the committee may rule that a

20 member or members who have filed a frivolous and base21 less complaint may repay the costs of the inquiry over a

22 period of greater than 1 year.
3

•HRES 79 IH

1 ‘‘(vi) Alternatively, the committee may, by an affirm2 ative vote of a majority of its total membership, rec3 ommend to the House that the Member or Members re4 sponsible for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint be

5 fined an appropriate amount.’’.

Æ
#### J. V. SATTERFIELD, Appellant, v. Joseph CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, Appellees.

No. 79-1487.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 15, 1980.

Decided Jan. 30, 1980.

Sam Boyce, Newport, Ark., for appellant.

Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., W. H. Dillahunty, U. S. Atty., and Samuel A. Perroni, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., and Paula Mastropiere-Billingsley, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept, of Health, Education & Welfare, Dallas, Tex., for appellee.

*1289Before ROSS and HENLEY, Circuit Judges, and PORTER, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Donald J. Porter, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

J. V. Satterfield appeals from a decision of the district court granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, thereby affirming the Secretary’s decision to deny Satterfield disability insurance benefits. The denial was predicated on the Secretary’s determination that appellant was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

We have carefully examined the briefs and the record, and we affirm on the basis of the district court’s opinion. *Satterfield v. Mathews,*483 F.Supp. 20 (E.D.Ark.1979). Substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s determinations. Its denial of disability benefits was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of its discretion.

Affirmed.
9916.

#### Mizell Live Stock Company *v.*Sutton.

Decided January 15, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Nashville—Judge Christian. June 8, 1918.

*H. L. Jackson, W. D. Buie,*for plaintiff.

*H. L. Quincey, J. D. Lovett,*for defendant.

Luke, J.

1. Where a purchaser of a promissory note has actual notice that it was given for the purchase of stock in an incorporated company, ' sold by an agent, traveling salesman, or promoter, such notice is just as effective to put the purchaser of the note on notice that he.is taking it subject to the equities existing between the original parties thereto as if the consideration of the note had been expressed in the face of the note. See Acts 1912, p. 153; Park’s Code § 4294 (b) ; *Heard*v. *Nat. Bank,*143 *Ga.*48 (84 S. E. 129).

2. The charge of the court, when read as a whole, is not subject to the criticisms urged; the evidence authorized the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge. For none of the reasons assigned did the court err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Jenkins, J., concur.*
#### E. L. Foulks *v.*John P. Ritter, etc.

Chattel Mortgages — Foreclosure—Necessary Party.

In a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage, one who sold the property to satisfy a debt owing by the mortgagor is not a necessary party.

APPEAL PROM -CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT.

December 19, 1872.

*Peland, Phelps & Son, for appellant.*

*McPherson, Champlin, Ritter, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The evidence presented in this record does not justify the conclusion that appellant was induced to- give to Spencer authority to execute the mortgage to L. B. Ritter, by reason of any opinion given him as to its legal effect by said mortgagee in person, or by agent or attorney. It does not appear that said Ritter ever spoke to appellant on the subject, and it seems that at the time J. P. Rit-ter advised him as to its effect, he was acting for Spencer, and gave the opinion at the instance of appellant himself.

We would be inclined to doubt whether or not the written authority empowered Spencer to mortgage the planing mill and other-property claimed by appellant, but he sets up in his petition and answer that it was intended to confer that power, and the paper executed to him by J. P. Ritter, as agent for L. B. Ritter, exonerating him from, personal liability, in terms ratifies and approves the mortgage then written, which mortgage embraced this property.

Appellant was not a necessary party to the proceeding to enforce' the mortgage. He did not, as matter of law, own the planing mill, etc. He held the title thereto to secure the debt owed him by Spencer, and as indemnity on account of his suretyships for him. When he gave Spencer authority to. mortgage the property to L. B. Rit-ter, he released all claim to- it, except as between himself and his debtor.

He failed to show that he was damaged by the sale made by the commissioner, or that any fraud had been practiced on him by the mortgagee.

It is no ground of complaint that, the mortgage of J. P. Ritter on the individual interest of Abell was enforced, inasmuch as it is clear that the entire property will not satisfy L. B. Ritter’s claim, i and pay firm debts contracted after Spencer became a partner.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### G. M. Perry *v.*B. D. Lacy.

Execution — Return, Validity.

Where the return to an execution shows that the land, in question was sold in front of the courthouse door, and the proof shows that the courthouse had been destroyed by fire, and that ithe sale was made in front of a hotel which was being used as a .courthouse, there is no such irregularity in the return as to render the isale void.

APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT.

December 7, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

There is no such irregularity in the sale of the land in controversy under the executions in favor of Lacy as would authorize this court to adjudge the act void. The return of the executions by the sheriff shows that it was sold' in front of the court house door. It appears from the proof that the court house was destroyed by fire; that the courts of the county were afterwards held in a hotel in the town. This hotel was for the time being the court house of the county and was used as such and a sale in front of it was in compliance with the law. The amendment made by the sheriff of his return on the execution was proper.

There is no reason for distributing the judgment of the court below. Judgment affirmed.
#### Nickerson, Appellant, *v.*Nickerson et al., Appellees.

(No. 2028

Decided February 18, 1949.)

*Mr. Gus Byttner,*for appellant.

*Messrs. Landis, Ferguson, Bieser & Greer*and *Mr. Irvin G. Delscamp,*for appellees.

By the Court.

This cause is submitted on motion of defendant Margaret Nickerson, appellee herein, to dismiss the appeal or affirm the judgment on the ground that no bill of exceptions, assignments of error or brief had been filed by plaintiff, appellant herein.

Notice of intention to appeal on questions of law was filed on October 27, 1948. The failure to file a bill of exceptions within the time prescribed by law does not necessarily require the dismissal of the ap*517peal. If the errors complained of appear on the face ■of the record a bill of exceptions would not be required. There being no assignments of error, the court can not determine whether a bill of exceptions is required. 'The motion will be overruled on that ground.

The filing of assignments of error and brief is controlled by Rule VII which requires the appellant to file the same within 50 days after filing notice of appeal. No good cause has been shown for failure to file assignments of error and brief within the required time.

This court has consistently held that the failure of the appellant to file assignments of error and brief within the time required by Rule VTI is ground for dismissal of the appeal. *Anderson*v. *Indus. Comm.,*135 Ohio St., 77, 19 N. E. (2d), 509; *Peck*v. *County Commrs.,*28 Ohio Law Abs., 702; *Seifer*v. *Indus. Comm.,*29 Ohio Law Abs., 52; *Brown, Gdn.,*v. *Brown,*35 Ohio Law Abs., 527, 42 N. E. (2d), 456; *State, ex rel. Merrill, v. Moore,*52 Ohio Law Abs., 301, 82 N. E. (2d), 765.

The motion to dismiss the appeal on the latter ground is sustained.

*Motion sustained.*

Miller, P. J., Hornbeck and Wiseman, JJ., concur.
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 390

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CR-14-789

MARCUS HARRIS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered June 17, 2015

APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-2010-10-1]

HONORABLE BERLIN C. JONES,

JUDGE

SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM

ORDERED

M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge

Marcus Harris appeals from the revocation of his previously ordered probation. 

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-

3(k), appellant’s attorney has filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, stating that there is no

merit to the appeal. The motion is accompanied by an abstract and addendum of the

proceedings below and a brief in which counsel asserts that there is nothing in the record that

would support an appeal. The clerk of this court mailed copies of counsel’s motion and brief

to each of appellant’s last three known addresses, notifying him of his right to file a pro se

statement of points for reversal within thirty days. Each time, the package was returned “not

deliverable” or “unclaimed.” Appellant has filed no statement.

Because the addendum is incomplete, we must first order that it be supplemented

before we can decide the case. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8) requires that an
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 390

appellant’s brief contain an addendum that includes true and legible photocopies of nontranscript documents in the record that are essential for the appellate court to confirm its

jurisdiction, to understand the case, and to decide the issues on appeal. For obvious reasons,

the rule specifically requires that the addendum contain the judgment from which the appeal

is taken. Here, however, appellant’s addendum does not include the judgment and sentencing

order appealed from. Under these circumstances, we direct counsel for appellant to file within

seven days a supplemental addendum correcting this omission. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-

2(b)(4). We strongly encourage counsel, prior to filing the supplement, to review our rules

as well as the abstract and addendum to ensure that no additional deficiencies are present.

After the supplement is filed, the case will be resubmitted for decision.

Supplemental addendum ordered.

HARRISON and GLOVER, JJ., agree.

Gary W. Potts, for appellant.

No response.

2
EXHIBIT 1 

FILED UNDER SEAL

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 19-1 Filed: 08/18/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:1513
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10161.

#### Pierce *v.*Felts, executor.

Decided April 22, 1919.

Complaint; from Warren superior court—Hawes Cloud, judge pro hac vice. October 11, 1918.

*H. W. Arant,*for plaintiff in error.

*M. L. Felts, E. T. Shurley, E. P. Davis,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

There being in the bill of exceptions no exception to any final judgment, but only an exception to the judgment striking the defendant’s pleas, the bill of exceptions must be dismissed. This is true even though the record shows that the ease was finally terminated by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. *McCranie*v. *Shipp,*10 *Ga. App.*544 (73 S. E. 701).

*Writ of error dismissed.*

*Bloodworth and Stephens, JJ., concur.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-591

In Re: PAMELA SUE ERVIN,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(CA-97-1145-6, CA-97-1199-6)

Submitted: November 19, 1998 Decided: December 1, 1998

Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Pamela Sue Ervin, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Pamela Sue Ervin filed a petition for a writ of mandamus apparently seeking to have this court order the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to enforce

default judgments that Ervin obtained in that court. However, the

district court subsequently vacated the default judgments pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Ervin’s appeal in the underlying case was

dismissed by this court for want of prosecution.

Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary

circumstances. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,

402 (1976). Mandamus relief is only available when there are no

other means by which the relief sought could be granted, see In re

Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987), and may not be used as a

substitute for appeal. See In re Catawba Indian Tribe, 973 F.2d

1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992). The party seeking mandamus relief

carries the heavy burden of showing that she has “no other adequate

means to attain the relief [s]he desires” and that her entitlement

to such relief is “clear and indisputable.” Allied Chem. Corp. v.

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). Ervin has not made such a

showing. Accordingly, we deny Ervin’s petition. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument wold

not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED