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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SELENE DANIELLE ARRIAGA,

 

 Plaintiff,

 

 v.

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook 

County, Illinois; THE NORTHEAST 

REGIONAL COMMUTER 

RAILROAD CORPORATION d/b/a 

METRA; COOK COUNTY, 

ILLINOIS; MARIE RANGEL, 

JOSEPH PEREZ; PAUL RIGGIO; 

DAVID CAMMACK; THEODORE 

STAJURA; and TIMOTHY 

O’DONNELL 

 Defendants.

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 No. 20 C 4498

 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Selene Arriaga brings suit against Defendants Northeast Regional 

Commuter Railroad Corporation (“Metra”), Cook County, Illinois, and seven other 

named Defendants for revealing her transgender status and failing to curb the 

discrimination and harassment that resulted from this disclosure. Arriaga alleges

violations of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and equal 

protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for disclosure of medical information and 

failure to supervise and protect. She further alleges violations under state law for 

discrimination on the basis of gender, Illinois Civil Rights Act, 740 ILCS 23//5(a), and 

indemnification. Before the Court are Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss 

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Dkts. 53, 60) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Arriaga’s First Amended 

Complaint (Dkt. 47) and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). Selene Arriaga is a maleto-female transgender individual who has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria 

(DSM-V). (Id. at ¶¶ 17; 19). In order to treat this condition, she underwent a series of 

medical interventions, including hormone therapy and gender confirmation 

surgeries. (Id. at ¶¶ 18; 20). While she was undergoing this treatment, she secured a 

job as a police officer at Defendant Metra and enrolled in the Cook County Sheriff’s 

Police Academy (“Police Academy”). (Id. at ¶ 15). At the time, she was “living in 

stealth,” that is, living as a transitioning person without disclosing that fact publicly. 

(Id. at ¶ 21). At all times leading up to the instant action, Arriaga sought to keep her 

transgender identity and associated medical treatments private. (Id. at ¶¶ 23; 29).

Around the time of her entry into the Police Academy, Defendants disclosed 

her identity as a transgender woman to Police Academy administrators and staff, her 

superiors and co-workers, and police chiefs in municipal departments. (Id. at ¶¶ 25; 

31-2; 34). Defendants Perez and Riggio are the Metra Police Chief and Deputy Chief, 

respectively (collectively, along with Defendant Metra, the “Metra Defendants”). (Id.

at ¶¶ 7-8). Defendants Rangel, Cammack, Stajura, and O’Donnell hold various 

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supervisory roles at the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and Police Academy (collectively, 

along with Defendants Cook County and Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, the 

“Cook County Defendants”). (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6; 9-12). Recruits who went through the 

Academy with Arriaga also disseminated information about her gender identity 

among themselves and to another Metra police officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-6; 38-9; 40). 

Arriaga was not aware of the full extent of these disclosures until she received a 

subpoena from an attorney in July 2020, which advised that Defendants had “outed” 

her to a much larger group of people than she had been aware. (Id. at ¶ 26).

The divulgence of Arriaga’s status as a transgender woman effectively revealed 

her history of procedures and her psychiatric condition. (Id. at ¶¶ 22; 24). As a natal 

male, her feminine voice and appearance could only be achieved through gender 

confirmation surgery and hormone treatments. (Id. at ¶ 22). Moreover, these 

procedures are only available to persons who suffer from gender dysphoria. (Id. at ¶¶ 

22; 24). Arriaga therefore claims that the Defendants’ disclosures were tantamount 

to revealing her confidential medical history. (Id.)

As a result of these disclosures, Arriaga sustained discrimination and 

harassment by fellow recruits during her tenure at the Police Academy, including 

jokes, taunting, and inquiries about her procedures and protected status, both inperson and over group chat. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). For instance, her colleagues distributed

a years-old photographic image of her as a male prior to her transition, which they 

obtained by culling her brother’s Facebook page. (Id. at ¶ 41). A fellow recruit also 

referred to her by a transphobic slur. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). These incidents caused her 

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significant psychological distress in addition to her pre-existing dysphoric condition. 

(Id. at ¶ 28).

Arriaga reported this offensive conduct to Defendants, who took no remedial 

action regarding the illegitimate disclosure of her medical information or the genderbased harassment she sustained. (Id. at ¶¶ 25; 46-49; 53). The Cook County 

Defendants in fact concealed the fact that none of the offending parties had been 

disciplined, allowing Arriaga to believe that her complaint of a hostile work 

environment had met with redress, though this was not the case. (Id. at ¶ 50). Arriaga 

claims that these failures perpetuated the ongoing and continuous practice of private 

medical information dissemination and harassment. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-49). She continued 

to be mistreated on account of her gender until she graduated from the Academy on 

August 27, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 27).

On February 22, 2021 Arriaga amended her original filing with the instant 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), claiming that Defendants violated her 14th

Amendment substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by disclosing her 

private medical information via her transgender status (Count I) as well as failing to 

supervise Academy personnel and to protect her from harassment and discrimination 

(Count II). Arriaga also brings claims under state law for violations of the Illinois 

Civil Rights Act, 740 ILCS 23/5(a) (Count III) and indemnification (Count IV). 

LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court 

must construe the complaint “in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept 

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well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.” 

Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016). The complaint must contain 

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual 

allegations,” but the short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice 

of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter that when “accepted as true . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims (Counts I-II)

Arriaga’s § 1983 claims originate in Defendants’ disclosure of her transgender 

status and attendant medical history in violation of her substantive due process right 

to medical privacy (Count I) and their failure to supervise CCSO personnel and 

protect Arriaga from discrimination and harassment in violation of her substantive 

due process rights (Count II). Counts I and II are brought against all Defendants. 

Defendants Metra, Dart, Perez, and Riggio assert that the claims against them 

should be dismissed on various grounds.

To bring a municipal claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an official 

government policy, custom, or practice is not merely causal but the “moving force 

behind [a] deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 

829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 

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692 (1978). “[U]nconstitutional policies or customs take three forms: (1) an express 

policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread 

practice, that, although unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it 

constitutes a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that a person 

with final policymaking authority caused the injury.” Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 

356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Arriaga alleges that Metra Police Chief Perez and Cook County Police 

Academy Director Rangel are final policymakers for Metra and Cook County, 

respectively, under state law. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 47, 53). See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). She claims that their failure to establish a policy enforcing 

CCSO employees’ obligation to refrain from divulging recruit medical information 

and to supervise and protect animated her deprivation of constitutional rights. (Dkt. 

47 at ¶¶ 47-8). To demonstrate liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

policymaker was “deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious consequences” 

of the harmful policy, custom, or practice—that is, that a reasonable policy-maker 

would conclude that a deprivation of a federally protected right would result. Gable 

v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002). Arriaga contends that Defendants 

did or should have known that the ensuing discrimination would result from the 

absence of a policy to forestall it. (Id. at ¶74).

Defendants maintain that Arriaga’s Monell claims fail as a matter of law on 

three grounds. First, they argue that Defendants Perez and Rangel are not official 

policymaking authorities for the Academy, so Arriaga cannot sustain § 1983 claims 

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against Metra or Cook County1 on the third prong of the Chortek test. Second, they 

submit that she points not to an express policy but to a lack of policy, which does not 

trigger Monell liability. Third, they argue that her claim must be viewed as a singleincident theory of Monell liability, which applies narrowly to an injury that is “a 

highly predictable consequence” of an alleged policy, which category excludes the 

conduct she describes. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011).

A. Policymaking Authority and Personal Involvement

Defendants’ motion rests on the premise that Perez and Rangel are not final 

policymaking authorities for the Police Academy under state law. This Court 

dismissed the claims against Perez and Rangel in the previous iteration of Arriaga’s 

complaint because she did not allege sufficient involvement on their parts in crafting 

Metra and Cook County policy and cited to extrinsic evidence and the Railroad Police 

Act, rather than the governing Regional Transportation Act, to infer that 

policymaking authority was vested in Metra Defendants. Arriaga remedies this 

deficiency in the instant complaint in reference to Perez, though not in reference to 

Rangel.

Defendant Perez argues that final policymaking authority rests in the hands 

of Metra’s Executive Director under the Regional Transportation Authority Act, 70 

ILCS 3615, et seq. However, as both the plaintiff and Defendants note, the RTA 

permits the delegation of policymaking authority. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

1 Because Dart is sued in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, Arriaga’s claims 

against him are treated as claims against Cook County, Illinois, and are, thus, subject to the 

requirements of Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Guzman v. 

Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2007).

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U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). In the instant Complaint, Arriaga cites sufficient evidence 

to support the position that such authority was delegated to Perez, including revising 

police policies and procedures and making employment decisions without meaningful 

oversight. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 53-4.) The instant Complaint also clarifies the relevance of 

the Railroad Police Act, 610 ILCS 80/2, which vests Metra’s Police Department with 

the authority to establish internal controls and policies addressing allegations of 

misconduct on the part of police personnel. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-5). Accordingly, Arriaga 

sufficiently pleads that Perez had final policymaking authority as to the issue at 

hand.

Perez also argues that Arriaga fails to allege sufficient personal involvement 

on his part in her allegation of constitutional misconduct in Count II. A § 1983 claim 

must be predicated on personal involvement by the defendant, not vicarious liability, 

and give sufficient notice of the claim against him and the precise conduct that 

occasioned it. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As noted in this 

Court’s prior opinion, Arriaga has surmounted the threshold of plausibility in her 

allegation that Defendant Perez disclosed her medical information in satisfaction of 

Count I. Arriaga’s medical information was (1) private (2) disclosed without 

permission or a significant motivating government interest and (3) tantamount to a 

medical disclosure, given her feminine presentation. Accordingly, such disclosures 

constituted a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Denius v. 

Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000).

However, this Court dismissed Arriaga’s failure to supervise and protect claim 

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against Perez in her initial Complaint as conclusory and formulaic. The instant 

Complaint and Reply to Defendants’ motion remedy this deficiency by detailing how 

Perez failed to instate a policy to prevent his subordinate, Defendant Riggio, from 

discussing Arriaga’s transgender identity with Police Academy officials or sanction 

Riggio once he had done so, exhibiting a deliberate indifference to the known risks of 

this conduct. (Dkt. 47 at ¶ 76; Dkt. 63 at 5-6). Counts I and II are therefore sustained 

as to Metra, Perez, and Riggio. 

Arriaga, however, fails to plead sufficient facts to impute policymaking 

authority to Defendant Rangel. She refers to Rangel as “final decision making 

authority for Cook County Sheriff’s Office Police Academy,” (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 48-9, 65), 

but does not provide any factual detail to gird this contested claim. As in her original 

Complaint, Arriaga suggests that that Rangel’s policymaking authority should be 

inferred from her position as Director of the Police Academy. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 4-5). 

However, mere title or position is insufficient to establish policymaking authority.

Arriaga must allege facts indicating that by virtue of her position Rangel has the 

“authority to adopt rules for the conduct of government” which “is final in the special 

sense that there is no higher authority.” Auriemma v. Rice, 957 4. Gernetzke v. 

Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001). She fails to do so. 

Counts I and II are therefore dismissed as to Cook County.

B. Policy Omissions

Defendant Dart argues that only an express, affirmative policy triggers Monell 

liability and that Arriaga’s claim fails because it is predicated on the absence of a 

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policy. While a policy omission does not necessarily reflect a decision to act 

unconstitutionally, Monell liability may still attach under certain circumstances, 

though more evidence than a single incident is required to establish “what the 

omission means.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005). When a 

municipality is on notice of a pattern of unconstitutional practices, it may be held 

liable on the theory that the “decision not to train certain employees about their legal 

duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights” is tantamount to an official policy of condoning 

constitutional violations. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Arriaga’s 

complaint to Defendant Dart, to which he exhibited not only deliberate indifference 

in his failure to respond but also bad faith in his attempt to conceal his 

unresponsiveness, put the municipality on notice of the violations of her due process 

rights. 

Dart further argues that Arriaga alleges a single-incident theory of liability, 

which undermines her policy omission claim. However, the facts Arriaga alleges do 

not comprise a single incident but continual harassment sufficient to establish an 

empirical pattern of conduct. She alleges being repeatedly outed as a post-operative 

transgender individual, taunted on account of her transgender status, and called a 

transphobic slur over a sustained period of several weeks. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 25, 27, 36). 

Arriaga therefore need not rely on a single-incident theory of Monell liability as she 

alleges multiple incidents throughout the course of her tenure at the Police Academy.

Defendant Dart further argues that the harassment Arriaga endured is not a 

“highly predictable consequence” of the failure to have preventative policies. To the 

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contrary, recent data indicates that over half of transgender persons experience 

workplace discrimination2 and the frequency of such discrimination has been highly 

publicized in recent years, as Plaintiff points out. It therefore stands to reason that, 

regardless of Arriaga’s status as the first transgender recruit, it is plausible to allege 

that Defendant Dart should have been on notice of the prevalence of transgender 

discrimination and established policies to forestall such conduct or, at the very least, 

to respond to the conduct she reported. Counts I and II are therefore sustained as to 

Defendant Dart.

II. State Law Claims (Counts III-IV)

A. Illinois Civil Rights Act Violation

In Count III, Arriaga alleges a violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act 

(“ICRA”), 740 ILCS 23/5(a) against Defendant Dart and Metra Defendants. The 

ICRA provides that “No unit of State, county, or local government in Illinois shall: (1) 

exclude a person from participation in, deny a person the benefits of, or subject a 

person to discrimination under any program or activity on the grounds of that 

person’s . . . gender or (2) utilize criteria or methods of administration that have the 

effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their . . . gender.” 740 

ILCS 23/5(a). Arriaga does not allege that she was excluded from participation in the 

Academy or denied a benefit of the Academy, but that she was subjected to 

2 JAIME GRANT ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 

TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011) (indicating that ninety percent of transgender survey respondents 

reported employment discrimination on the basis of their gender identity). See also, Shanna Kattari 

et al., Policing Gender Through Housing and Employment Discrimination: Comparison of 

Discrimination Experiences of Transgender and Cisgender LGBTQ Individuals, J. Soc’y Soc. Work &

Rsch. 7, 3 (Fall 2016). https://doi.org/10.1086/686920 (indicating that fifty percent of transgender 

participants reported workplace discrimination).

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discrimination on account of her transgender identity. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 85-86).

Defendants argue that Arriaga fails to state a claim under the ICRA because 

she neglects to plead exclusion, privation of benefits, or sufficient factual detail of

discrimination by Defendant Dart and Metra Defendants. This argument fails on two 

grounds. First, Arriaga need not allege violations of the exclusion or privation 

provisions of the ICRA to state a claim, since she alleges that she was “subject to 

discrimination.” 740 ILCS 23/5(a)(1). Second, Arriaga does plead facts in her 

Complaint that implicate the Defendants in discrimination against her, drawing a 

line of causation between their disclosures and the gender-based harassment she 

details therein. (Id. at ¶¶ 85-86.) A Complaint need only “allege[] injuries from the 

discriminatory effects of defendant’s actions.” See, e.g., Leslie v. Bd. of Educ., 379 F. 

Supp. 2d 952, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (emphasis added).

Defendants also argue that Arriaga’s claim fails because she does not offer

sufficient evidence of personal animus on the part of Defendant Dart or Metra 

Defendants. However, discriminatory intent is not a necessary element of 

discrimination under the ICRA. McFadden v. Board of Educ. for Illinois School Dist.,

984 F.Supp.2d 882 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The Defendants employed “methods of 

administration that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination,” since 

their failure to address recruit misconduct plausibly had such effects, even if the 

named Defendants did not themselves engage in harassment. 740 ILCS 23/5(a)(2). 

The state law is modeled on the federal Title VI, which accommodates claims for 

discrimination by third parties when Defendants with an obligation to respond to 

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such conduct exhibit deliberate indifference, as Defendants allegedly did to Arriaga’s 

complaints. Weiler v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 86 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (explaining 

that Illinois courts look to cases involving violations of federal civil rights statutes to 

guide its interpretation of the ICRA). Her description of a hostile work environment, 

if accepted as true, therefore “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

under the ICRA. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570)).

B. Indemnification

Because Arriaga’s ICRA claim and federal claims under § 1983 survive against 

some of the individual Defendants, Arriaga’s indemnification claim against 

Defendants Metra and Cook County survives (Count IV).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part 

and denied in part. Counts I and II are dismissed as to Defendant Dart but otherwise 

survive. Counts III and IV survive.

____________________________________

Virginia M. Kendall

United States District Judge

Date: October 23, 2021

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