[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13043

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL I. ROIG,

by and through its Personal Representative Gail Olivera, 

KYLE ROIG, 

an individual, 

SAM ROIG, 

an individual, 

GAIL OLIVERA, 

an individual, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 

a business entity, 

THOMAS O'MALLEY, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13043

an individual,

ROMAINE SEGUIN, 

an individual, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60811-AMC

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gail Olivera, individually and on behalf of the estate of Samuel Roig, and Roig’s children, Kyle and Sam, appeal the denial of 

their motion to vacate the final judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), 

against their complaint of employment discrimination and tortious 

conduct under Florida law. We affirm.

In 2018, the Roigs, citizens of Florida, sued United Parcel 

Service, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in 

Georgia, and Thomas O’Malley, a Florida citizen, in a Florida 

court. United and O’Malley removed the case to the district court, 

28 U.S.C. § 1332, and argued that the Roigs fraudulently joined

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22-13043 Opinion of the Court 3

O’Malley to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The Roigs voluntarily dismissed their complaint without prejudice. Seven months later, the 

Roigs unsuccessfully tried to amend their original complaint in 

state court by adding United manager Juan Vicente as a defendant, 

but the state court struck the complaint. 

In 2020, the Roigs filed a second lawsuit in state court against 

United and O’Malley and added United employee Romaine Seguin

as a non-diverse defendant. The defendants removed the second 

lawsuit to the district court and argued that the Roigs fraudulently 

joined defendants O’Malley and Seguin to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The Roigs moved to remand. 

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

that the district court deny the motion to remand because O’Malley and Seguin were fraudulently joined as defendants. The district

court adopted the report and recommendation over the Roigs’ objections and denied their motion to remand. Because the denial of 

a motion to remand is not an appealable final order, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we dismissed the Roigs’ appeal from that order for lack of 

jurisdiction.

The Roigs moved the district court to enter a “consent final 

judgment” to create an appealable final order so they could challenge the denial of their motion to remand. The district court 

warned the Roigs that, under Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324 

(11th Cir. 1999), they would not be able to appeal the denial of their 

motion to remand after requesting a consent judgment. The Roigs 

and United later submitted a joint proposed judgment for dismissal 

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with prejudice. The district court entered the proposed judgment 

as requested. We dismissed the Roigs’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction 

because they lacked standing to appeal the final judgment they requested. Roig v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 21-11915, at *1 (11th 

Cir. Sept. 1, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Est. of Roig by & Through 

Oliveira v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 142 S. Ct. 2679 (2022).

Seven months later, the Roigs filed a “motion for relief from 

final judgment and to remand to state court,” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(4). They argued that the district court lacked an arguable basis for subject-matter jurisdiction because their complaint stated 

valid claims against O’Malley and Seguin. The district court denied 

the Roigs’ motion.

We review the denial of a motion under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) de novo. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 

(11th Cir. 2001). Rule 60(b)(4) allows a party to seek relief from a 

final judgment that “is void,” but only in the “rare instance where 

a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice 

or the opportunity to be heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 

Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270–71 (2010). So “courts considering Rule 

60(b)(4) motions that assert a judgment is void because of a jurisdictional defect generally have reserved relief only for the exceptional case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked even 

an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.” Id. at 271.

The Roigs argue that the final judgment is premised on a 

“jurisdictional error” by the district court in denying their motion 

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to remand, but they fail to explain how the district court lacked an 

“arguable basis” for exercising jurisdiction. See id. We have held 

district courts must “ignore the presence of [a] non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand” if a plaintiff has named a 

non-diverse defendant solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011). This

inquiry enforces a jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the erroneous application of which will not render a resulting judgment 

void. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270; Oakes v. Horizon Fin., S.A., 259 F.3d 

1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is well-settled that a mere error in 

the exercise of jurisdiction does not support relief under Rule 

60(b)(4).”). Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) requires a total want of jurisdiction; only a clear usurpation of power renders a judgment void. 

See Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319–20 (citing United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661–62 (1st Cir. 1990)). Because the district 

court had at least an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction, the Roigs 

failed to establish the “rare instance” in which “exceptional” relief 

is warranted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71; 

Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319–20.

We AFFIRM the denial of the Roigs’ motion for relief from 

the final judgment and DENY their motion to vacate as moot.

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