NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

JERICE HUNTER, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0499 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-008323-001 

The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Adele Ponce

Counsel for Appellee 

De Brigida Law Offices, PLLC, Glendale

By Ronald M. De Brigida, Jr.

Counsel for Appellant

James E. Rogers College of Law Clinical Programs, Tucson

By Vanessa Buch

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Innocence Project Inc.

FILED 9-21-2017
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

2 

William Farr & Gallagher, New York, NY

By James C. Dugan, Pro Hac Vice

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Innocence Project Inc.

Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Tucson

By David J. Euchner

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Law Office of Julia Cassels, Tempe

By Julia B. Cassels

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell

joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Jerice Hunter appeals her convictions and sentences for child 

abuse and first-degree murder. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 At 5:21 p.m. on October 11, 2011, Hunter called 9-1-1 to report 

the disappearance of her five-year-old daughter, the victim. Within 

minutes, a nearby patrol officer arrived at Hunter’s apartment complex and 

encountered an upset and “teary” Hunter standing out front. Hunter 

explained that she ran an errand at approximately 4:10 p.m. and left the 

victim and her other young children in the charge of her then 13-year-old 

daughter, T.H. By the time Hunter returned home less than an hour later, 

the victim was missing. 

¶3 Over the next several hours, numerous officers responded to 

the report of a missing child. Initially, the officers canvassed the apartment 

complex, knocking door-to-door. They then contacted all residences within 

a one-mile radius by telephone, uploaded the victim’s information onto a 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

3 

national missing child database, contacted the press, requested an air unit 

to assist with a search, and investigated several possible victim sightings. 

Despite these efforts, the officers were unable to locate the victim.

¶4 On October 14, 2011, Child Protective Services (“CPS”)1 took 

Hunter’s other children into State custody. A few weeks later, T.H.’s foster 

mother provided the police with a letter that T.H. had written to her 

grandmother. Based on the contents of the letter, a detective interviewed 

T.H. on November 18, 2011. Following that interview, officers executed a 

search warrant on Hunter’s apartment and discovered “pour patterns” 

inside her bedroom closet consistent with “someone [having] wiped the 

wall with chemicals.” Officers then seized the closet’s carpet. 

¶5 Five days later, Hunter’s neighbor, S.A., contacted a police 

detective. She reported that she drove Hunter to an apartment complex 

across town on October 4, 2011, because Hunter had ostensibly wanted to 

sell some clothes to a friend. When they arrived at the apartment complex, 

Hunter unloaded a large duffel bag that she had placed in S.A.’s trunk. To 

S.A.’s surprise, Hunter then put on plastic gloves and placed the bag inside 

a dumpster, explaining that her friend would later retrieve it.

¶6 After speaking with S.A., the detective had the dumpster 

from the apartment complex impounded. Later that day, two members of 

Maricopa County’s Canine Search and Rescue Unit, each of whom worked 

with a certified cadaver dog trained to find decaying human remains, 

reported to the police station to perform checks on various items. Both dogs 

alerted on S.A.’s trunk, the carpet seized from Hunter’s bedroom closet, and 

the dumpster impounded from the apartment complex. The State 

subsequently charged Hunter with one count of child abuse and one count 

of first-degree felony murder of her five-year-old daughter. The State also 

alleged five aggravating circumstances against Hunter. The State also 

alleged that Hunter had four historical prior felony convictions.

¶7 At Hunter’s 2015 trial, several of Hunter’s cousins testified 

that she had relocated to California shortly after giving birth to the victim 

and had left the victim in the care of relatives. Four and one-half years later, 

Hunter returned to Arizona and demanded custody of the victim, though 

she had no housing and was living at a shelter. Hunter’s cousins initially 

 

1 In 2014, the Arizona Legislature eliminated CPS and in its place 

created the Department of Child Safety. See S.B. 1001, 51st Leg., 2d Spec. 

Sess., ch. 1, § 20 (2014). To maintain consistency with the trial court record, 

we will refer to the parties as they existed at the time. 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

4 

refused to relinquish custody of the victim, and did so only after Hunter 

called the police. When the cousins subsequently saw the victim at family 

gatherings, they became concerned that she was being physically abused 

and notified CPS.

¶8 The victim’s kindergarten teacher testified that Hunter called 

her on September 21, 2011, and inquired whether the victim was bothering 

classmates or failing to complete her work in class. The teacher assured 

Hunter that the victim was well-behaved and hard-working at school, but

Hunter complained that the victim was defiant, aggressive, and 

uncooperative at home. The attendance clerk from the victim’s school 

testified that the victim last attended class on the next day, September 22, 

2011. When the clerk spoke with Hunter regarding the victim’s absences, 

Hunter reported that the victim had ringworm and pinkeye and would be 

kept home until she recovered. 

¶9 The custodian of records at a pediatric clinic testified that the 

victim was a registered patient, but that none of the clinic’s health care 

providers ever treated her. Hunter had scheduled appointments for both 

the victim and one of her sisters on October 11, 2011. But on the day of the 

appointments, Hunter called the clinic to cancel or reschedule only the 

victim’s sister’s appointment. Neither Hunter nor the victim appeared for 

the victim’s appointment, however, and the clinic logged the victim’s 

appointment as a “no-show.”

¶10 The victim’s oldest sibling, T.H., testified that in the weeks 

leading up to the victim’s disappearance, Hunter had repeatedly become 

angry with the victim and “spanked” her out of the other children’s view. 

After the last “spanking” incident, the victim never emerged from Hunter’s 

bedroom. During the days that followed, T.H. snuck into Hunter’s bedroom 

to check on the victim while Hunter was out of the apartment. She noticed 

that the victim had bruises “everywhere,” clumps of missing hair, and dark 

matter oozing from her eyes. On the first visit, T.H. offered the victim food 

and water and helped her to the bathroom, because the victim was unable 

to walk independently. By the third and final visit, the victim was barely

moving and no longer talking. The last time T.H. saw the victim was 

approximately a week before Hunter reported her missing. T.H. explained 

that Hunterinitially instructed the children to tell anyone who inquired that 

the victim was home sick, and on October 11, 2011, she ordered the children 

to report that the victim was missing. 

¶11 One of Hunter’s neighbors testified that the last time she saw 

the victim was in September 2011, when the victim returned home from 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

5 

school with other children who rode the bus. She explained that after she 

informed the police that she had not seen the victim with the other school 

children for weeks, Hunter told her she was “the devil.” 

¶12 A woman who met Hunter while they were both living at a 

shelter testified that she stayed at Hunter’s apartment for several days in 

April 2011 and saw Hunter behave very “aggressively” with the victim. 

Most notably, Hunter “whipp[ed]” the victim because she dropped some 

playdough on the floor. When the woman attempted to intercede, upset by 

the severity of the punishment inflicted on the victim, Hunter warned her 

not to interfere. Reluctant to intervene any further, the woman immediately 

left the apartment, leaving behind all her belongings, including two large 

duffel bags. 

¶13 One of Hunter’s cousins testified that he had visited Hunter 

at approximately 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 2011. During his brief visit, he 

noted that her apartment smelled strongly of bleach. When he left, Hunter 

asked him to drop off her daughter, whom he had never met, at a school 

bus stop. Although Hunter introduced the young girl as the victim, the 

cousin later saw the victim’s photograph on the news and immediately 

realized that she was not the little girl whom he had driven to the bus stop. 

¶14 Several criminalists testified about tests they had conducted 

on the carpet seized from Hunter’s bedroom, the lining of S.A.’s trunk, and 

the dumpster impounded from the apartment complex. A stain of the 

victim’s blood, measuring approximately 11 inches in length and 8 inches 

in width, was found on the closet carpet. A small blood stain was also found 

on S.A.’s trunk liner, but the blood was neither the victim’s nor any of her 

relatives’. Police found no blood or other trace evidence inside the 

dumpster.

¶15 A police detective testified that investigators obtained footage 

from the transfer station that handled the trash collected from the seized 

dumpster on October 4, 2011. The video showed that a full, dark 

“canvas-style bag” was picked up that day. Based on the footage, 

investigators searched the receiving landfill for 96 days, but were unable to 

locate the bag or the victim’s body. 

¶16 After the State rested and the trial court denied Mother’s

motion for judgment of acquittal, Hunter called two witnesses who told 

police that they saw a child resembling the victim the day of her reported 

disappearance. The first witness, V.Y., acknowledged that he “probably” 

reported seeing the victim on October 11, 2011, but testified that he could 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

6 

not be sure which of Hunter’s daughters he saw that day. The second 

witness, C.G., confirmed that she saw a little girl who looked like the victim 

that afternoon.

¶17 After a 24-day trial, the jury found Hunter guilty of both 

counts. The jury also found four aggravating circumstances. The trial court 

found that Hunter had four historical prior felony convictions and 

sentenced her to an aggravated term of 20 years’ imprisonment on the count 

of child abuse and a term of natural life on the count of first-degree felony 

murder. Hunter timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

1. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

¶18 Hunter contends that the trial court improperly denied her 

motion for judgment of acquittal.2 Given the State’s failure to recover the 

victim’s body and its substantial reliance on circumstantial evidence, she

argues that no reasonable jury could have found her guilty. We review de 

novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. 

West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562–63 ¶¶ 15, 19 (2011). “[T]he relevant question is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 562–63 ¶¶ 16, 19. 

Sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury can convict may be direct 

or circumstantial. Id. A judgment of acquittal is appropriate only when no

substantial evidence supports the conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). 

¶19 As relevant here, a person commits child abuse by 

intentionally or knowingly (1) causing a child to suffer a physical injury or 

(2) placing a child in a situation in which the child’s health is endangered, 

 

2 The Innocence Project, Wrongful Conviction Clinic at the University 

of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law and Arizona Attorneys for 

Criminal Justice have filed amici curiae briefs with this Court. We have 

denied the State’s motion to strike the briefs of amici curiae. However, we 

consider only the portions of those briefs that comply with Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 31.25, and address only the arguments that the parties 

have raised. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 16(a) (“Amicus curiae is not a party to 

the appeal, and must be independent of any party to the appeal.”); Cave 

Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 4 n.2 ¶ 7 (2013) (holding that 

amici curiae are not permitted to create, extend, or enlarge issues beyond 

those raised by the parties).
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

7 

if the circumstances are likely to produce death or serious physical injury. 

A.R.S. § 13–3623(A)(1). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13–1105(A)(2), a person 

commits first-degree felony murder by committing child abuse, and in the 

course of that offense, causing the death of any person. 

¶20 Here, the State presented evidence that Hunter severely 

injured the victim then confined her to a bedroom closet without food, 

water, or medical care. T.H. testified that Hunter had physically disciplined 

the victim outside the other children’s view, and that the victim had never 

emerged from Hunter’s bedroom thereafter. When T.H. surreptitiously 

checked on the victim after Hunter left the apartment, she saw that the

victim’s small body was bruised “everywhere,” clumps of her hair were 

missing, and her eyes were oozing a dark substance. T.H. helped the victim 

to the bathroom because she could not walk unassisted, then returned her 

to the confines of Hunter’s closet. Within days of sustaining the injuries at 

the hand of her mother, the victim could no longer speak and could barely

move. T.H. never saw her again. Investigators who later examined Hunter’s

closet found the carpet stained with the victim’s blood and found pour 

patterns suggesting that the closet walls had been cleaned with chemicals. 

¶21 In addition, the State presented evidence that Hunter had

disposed of the victim’s body. S.A. testified that Hunter had asked for a ride 

to a friend’s apartment under the pretense of selling clothes, but that 

instead, Hunter had placed a large duffel bag purportedly containing the 

clothing inside a dumpster, offering the nonsensical explanation that her 

friend would later retrieve it. Investigators obtained video of the trash from 

the dumpster and confirmed that a large duffel bag was picked up on the 

day in question.

¶22 Given these facts, sufficient evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could find that Hunter intentionally and knowingly 

physically injured the victim and then placed her in a situation endangering 

her health, namely, confining her to a closet without medical treatment, 

food, and water. A reasonable jury could further find that the conditions of 

the victim’s confinement ultimately resulted in her death. Therefore, the 

trial court did not err by denying Hunter’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal.3

 

3 Contrary to her argument, no expert medical opinion testimony was 

necessary to prove that Hunter’s failure to treat the victim’s injuries 

endangered the victim’s health. The record reflects that the victim could no 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

8 

2. Alleged Preclusion of Third-Party Culpability Evidence 

¶23 Hunter asserts that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings 

prevented her from fully presenting her defense that “someone else was 

responsible for her daughter’s disappearance.” Specifically, she contends 

that the court improperly excluded evidence identifying a member of her

extended family who allegedly threatened a defense witness. 

¶24 During a mid-trial hearing, the court questioned whether 

defense counsel had intended to argue that one of Hunter’s relatives 

abducted the victim. Referencing prospective defense witness C.G., defense 

counsel explained that she would present evidence that the victim had been

abducted, but disclaimed any intent to identify the perpetrator as a family 

member or any other particular person. 

¶25 Later at trial, while cross-examining a detective who spoke

with C.G. the evening of the reported disappearance, defense counsel

elicited testimony that C.G. had provided police with information 

regarding a suspect car. Defense counsel then questioned whether C.G. 

subsequently reported to police that she had been threatened. The 

prosecutor objected to the question on grounds of relevance and argued

that any evidence regarding the identity of the person who had allegedly 

threatened C.G. was inadmissible hearsay because “somebody else told 

[C.G.] the person was [F.T.]” In response, defense counsel argued that the

detective’s failure to follow-up on C.G.’s reported threat demonstrated that 

the police did not investigate other leads in the case. The trial court 

implicitly overruled the objection and allowed defense counsel to question 

whether the detective conducted any investigation into C.G.’s reported 

threat. After the detective acknowledged that C.G. had provided the name 

of the person who had allegedly threatened her, defense counsel asked 

whether the detective had addressed C.G.’s claim when he spoke with F.T. 

The detective admitted that he had never discussed C.G.’s allegation with 

F.T., though he spoke to F.T. after C.G. reported the threat.

 

longer speak or move by the time that T.H. had last visited her, 

demonstrating that the victim’s health was seriously compromised and her 

life in jeopardy. Likewise, notwithstanding Hunter’s claims, the State did 

not need to prove that the victim lost a fatal quantity of blood while 

confined in the closet. To prove child abuse and felony murder pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 13–3623(A)(1) and –1105(A)(2), the State had to show only that the 

victim was seriously injured and then confined to a closet for several days 

without food, water, or medical care. 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

9 

¶26 Before defense counsel later called C.G. to testify, the court

revisited the State’s claim that any evidence regarding the identity of the 

woman who had allegedly threatened C.G. was irrelevant and inadmissible 

hearsay. Defense counsel reasserted that the evidence was relevant to 

demonstrate that the police “did not look at anyone but” Hunter. The court 

noted that defense counsel had already elicited testimony from the 

detective to support the argument that the police did not investigate the 

report and had failed to explore all leads in the case. After hearing from the 

parties, the court determined that any evidence regarding the identity of 

the person who threatened C.G. was irrelevant. In response to the court’s 

ruling, defense counsel agreed that the name of the individual was not 

relevant and expressly disclaimed any intent to argue that F.T. abducted 

the victim. The court then instructed defense counsel that she could elicit 

the nature of the “threat,” but not the name of the individual who allegedly 

made the threat. 

¶27 C.G. then testified that she was outside her apartment the 

afternoon of October 11, 2011, and saw a young, crying girl who appeared 

to be by herself. When C.G. offered to help the girl return home, she ran 

away. As the girl ran down the street, a dark car approached her. Quite 

suddenly, a door swung open and a black woman emerged, grabbed the 

girl’s arm, and pulled her into the car. The events unfolded in a matter of 

seconds, and given the child’s failure to scream or otherwise resist, C.G. 

was uncertain whether she had witnessed an abduction. As soon as she 

heard the victim was reported missing, however, C.G. approached officers 

canvassing the neighborhood and relayed what she had witnessed. A few 

days later, a black woman, unknown to C.G., banged on C.G.’s apartment 

door. When C.G. answered the door, the woman addressed C.G. in a 

“threatening” voice and “demanded” that C.G. revise her story and “tell 

the police that it was a white woman that took the child, not a black 

woman.” Though frightened, C.G. told the woman that she knew what she 

saw and would not lie. After the woman left, C.G. contacted the police, 

reported that she had been threatened, and named the individual who had 

threated her. When asked by both defense counsel and the prosecutor how 

she had provided the name of the unfamiliar woman, C.G. explained that 

her neighbor “knew the family” and identified the woman to her.

¶28 During closing arguments, defense counsel told the jury that 

the police had failed to conduct a thorough investigation of all leads in the 

case: 

Even when [C.G.] said that she was being threatened, that 

seemed odd and strange and something that needs to be 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

10 

looked into. It was absolutely ignored. [C.G.] called the 

detectives. Told them she had been threatened. She gave the 

name of the person that had threatened her. She said that it 

didn’t matter what they said to her. She was not going to 

change what she saw because she knows she saw what she 

saw. Nobody is going to make her change her mind. She gave 

the name and the detectives told you they did nothing with it.

They did talk to [F.T.] four months later, but they never 

talked to her about threatening [C.G.]. They never talked to 

her about [C.G.] at all.

¶29 At that point, the prosecutor objected, and the trial court 

ordered that the portion of defense counsel’s argument pertaining to F.T. 

be stricken. The court then instructed defense counsel to “rephrase,” and 

defense counsel argued:

Let’s be clear, you know from [C.G.’s] testimony that she gave 

information to [the detective] about being threatened. It 

scared her. It bothered her. She didn’t like it. She needed 

someone to know. She needed the detectives to know. And 

she told [the detective], and she gave him a name. And you 

heard from [the detective] that later when he talked to [F.T.], 

he never brought up [C.G.’s] name. He never asked her 

anything about [C.G.]. Never tried to verify to make any 

connection. It was ignored, and that’s the point. It’s all about 

the information, that officers felt didn’t fit into their theory 

that [Hunter] is guilty, so they’re going to ignore it.

It really does beg the question, though, why anyone 

would be threatening [C.G.] if she didn’t see [the victim] that 

way. If she saw some other little girl, why in the world would 

anyone need to threaten her? 

On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s argument by 

reminding the jury that F.T. was “the defendant’s beloved father’s 

girlfriend,” not “somebody associated elsewhere.”

¶30 We generally review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility 

of third-party culpability evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Prion, 

203 Ariz. 157, 161 ¶ 21 (2002). But because Hunter did not seek to introduce 

the name of the woman who threatened C.G. as evidence of third-party 

culpability at trial, and twice disclaimed any intent to do so, we review this
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

11 

claim for only fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Henderson, 210 

Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19 (2005). 

¶31 The normal restrictions on hearsay apply to third-party 

culpability evidence. State v. Machado, 224 Ariz. 343, 358 ¶ 40 (App. 2010), 

abrogated on other grounds as recognized in State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 

26 n.4 ¶ 13 (App. 2012). In general, an out-of-court statement offered to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 

802. 

¶32 Here, Hunter sought to prove the identity of the woman who 

allegedly threatened C.G. through C.G.’s out-of-court statements to police 

and in-court testimony. Because C.G. did not know the woman and could 

provide the woman’s name only by recounting her neighbor’s identifying 

statement, the evidence was plainly hearsay. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c). 

Therefore, the trial court did not err, much less fundamentally err, by 

excluding the evidence. See State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 387 ¶ 7 (2015) 

(“We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for 

any reason.”). 

¶33 Moreover, even if the trial court improperly precluded the 

evidence, Hunter sustained no prejudice. The record reflects that Hunter 

had an unhindered opportunity to present evidence that C.G. saw a black 

woman pull a young girl who resembled the victim into a car. This evidence 

allowed Hunter to argue that someone else caused the victim’s 

disappearance. In addition, Hunter elicited testimony that: (1) a woman had 

threatened C.G. and had demanded that she alter her statement to police

and (2) police officers had failed to investigate the reported threat. This 

evidence permitted Hunter to argue that the police investigation focused 

solely on her, to the exclusion of other possible leads.

¶34 To the extent that the identity of the woman who had 

allegedly threatened C.G. was possibly relevant, the record reflects that 

defense counsel had repeatedly placed the information before the jury. 

First, when questioning the detective who had interviewed C.G., defense 

counsel asked whether he had spoken with F.T. regarding C.G.’s claim that 

she had been intimidated. Second, defense counsel asserted during closing 

argument that the detective had failed to “make the connection” between 

F.T. and the threat when he subsequently questioned F.T. If any doubt

regarding the identity of the woman persisted, the State removed it by 

adopting defense counsel’s framing of the issue and arguing that, unlike 

other family members, F.T. was not at odds with Hunter and therefore that 

any suggestion that she may be culpable was misleading. Thus, Hunter 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

12 

identified the woman who allegedly threatened C.G., albeit indirectly. 

Because she was therefore able to fully present her defense that someone 

else caused the victim’s disappearance and that the police failed to 

adequately investigate that lead, Hunter sustained no prejudice from the 

trial court’s ruling preventing her from directly eliciting the name of the 

woman who allegedly threatened C.G. 

3. Admission of Cadaver Dog Evidence

¶35 Hunter contends that the trial court improperly admitted 

“dog sniff” evidence. She argues that the court abdicated its gatekeeping 

function by failing to apply Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 

U.S. 579 (1993), and Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 702. She also 

challenges the court’s findings that the evidence was reliable and relevant 

and that its probative value outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. 

¶36 Before trial, Hunter moved to preclude any cadaver dog 

evidence pursuant to Daubert and Rules 401, 402, 403, and 702. At an 

evidentiary hearing held on the motion, D.H. testified that his pure-bred 

Golden Retriever, Casey, became a certified cadaver dog in November 2006 

and recertified annually through 2012. As a cadaver dog, Casey was trained 

to detect decaying human biological material. To train Casey, D.H. used 

teeth, knee bone, blood, and placenta from living persons, as well as “grave 

dirt from a soak site.” Throughout his testimony, D.H. reiterated that all

decaying human tissue produces “the enzymes” that a cadaver dog is 

trained to detect, and that a cadaver dog therefore does not distinguish 

between material separated from a living person and the remains of a 

deceased one. 

¶37 In November 2011, D.H. and Casey assisted the police with 

the identification of cadaver material related to this case. When D.H. and 

Casey reported to an open yard at the police station, Casey immediately 

walked to the corner of the yard and alerted on an “air handling system” 

connected to an evidence room that may have contained “cadaver 

material.” D.H. then redirected Casey to two cars, one a decoy car and the 

other a subject car. The trunk lid of each car was held slightly ajar, and 

Casey alerted on the subject car, which was S.A.’s car. D.H. then led Casey 

to a loading dock where a decoy dumpster and a subject dumpster were 

located. Initially, Casey alerted on some unrelated biohazard containers 

holding human biological material, but D.H. then redirected her and she

alerted on the subject dumpster, which was impounded from the apartment 

complex where Hunter deposited the canvas bag. Finally, D.H. and Casey 

entered the police station and Casey sniffed two decoy carpets and a subject 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

13 

carpet. Casey alerted on the subject carpet, which was seized from Hunter’s

closet. D.H. admitted that he had never previously tested whether Casey 

could detect the scent of cadaver material when the decaying matter had 

been removed more than a month before and stated that he did not know 

how long a scent could remain inside an enclosed container. He also 

acknowledged that he had assisted in setting up the car and carpet tests, 

and was therefore aware which items were suspect. 

¶38 B.S. testified that her pure-bred Labrador Retriever, Brogan, 

became a certified cadaver dog in 2007 and recertified annually since that 

time. Like Casey, Brogan initially alerted on the air unit in the police yard

and the biohazard containers by the loading dock, but he then alerted on 

the subject trunk, dumpster, and carpet. B.S. also testified that Brogan 

cannot distinguish between decaying material that has been separated from 

a living person and the remains of a deceased one. Akin to D.H., B.S. further

testified that she has never tested how long a cadaver scent can be detected 

after decaying material has been removed. Unlike D.H., B.S. had no 

knowledge which car, carpet, or dumpster were suspect during the tests.

¶39 After D.H. and B.S. testified, defense counsel argued that the 

cadaver dog evidence was irrelevant because the dogs, admittedly, could 

not distinguish between the decaying matter of a living person and a 

deceased individual. Accordingly, the dogs would have alerted on the 

carpet and trunk liner, which contained blood stains, whether a deceased 

person was ever present. Because ascertaining what human biological 

material, if any, may have been deposited in the dumpster between October 

4, 2011, and its seizure on November 23, 2011, was impossible, defense 

counsel argued that no basis existed to conclude that the dogs alerted on 

the scent of a deceased person with respect to any of the items. 

¶40 After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court 

entered a detailed ruling denying Hunter’s motion. The court found that 

the canine handlers’ testimonies did not constitute “scientific testimony” 

for Daubert purposes because the handlers were “not testifying about any 

scientific technique, theory or methodology.” Instead, they were discussing 

“an investigative technique,” sharing “their personal observations,” and 

explaining “their interpretation” of the dogs’ actions “based on their 

training and experience.” Nonetheless, the court analyzed the canine 

handlers proffered testimony “within the framework of Evidence Rule 702” 

and found: 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

14 

1. [D.H.] and [B.S] have specialized knowledge that will help the jury 

understand the evidence. Their testimonies regarding the human 

remains searches are relevant.

2. Casey is a pure bred Golden Retriever, a breed of dogs known for 

tracking scent. Casey has been trained and has been certified and 

re-certified in tracking decaying human remains scents. Casey has 

been certified since 2005 until she retired in 2013. Casey did not fail 

a recertification until 2013. The Court finds that Casey’s training and 

certification programs are adequate. 

3. Brogan is a pure bred Labrador Retriever. Brogan has been trained 

and has been certified and re-certified in tracking decaying human 

remains scents. Brogan has been certified since 2007, and he has 

never failed a re-certification. The Court finds that Brogan’s training 

and certification programs are adequate. 

4. Casey alerted on the trunk area of the vehicle at issue, rather than 

the decoy vehicle. Casey also alerted on the dumpster at issue, rather 

than the decoy dumpster. She also alerted on carpeting from the 

apartment rather than the decoy carpeting. Independent of Casey, 

Brogan also alerted on the trunk area of the vehicle at issue, rather 

than the decoy vehicle, the dumpster at issue, rather than the 

alternate dumpster, and the carpeting from the apartment rather 

than the decoy carpeting.

5. Based on their training and experience, and the fact that Brogan was 

able to verify Casey’s results and vice versa in this case, the Court 

finds that there are sufficient reasons to trust Brogan and Casey’s 

alerts, and the results are sufficiently reliable.

6. The dogs are trained and certified to detect the scent of decaying 

human remains. The dogs are not trained or certified to: (1) 

differentiate whether the decaying human remains scent is from 

bone or blood or other types of tissues; (2) differentiate whether the 

decaying scent was from a live person’s biological material or a dead 

person’s biological material; and (3) determine how long the scent 

can linger in an area with the scent. However, these factors do not 

affect the reliability of the dogs’ performances. The Court finds that 

these factors go towards the weight of the evidence, not its 

admissibility.
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

15 

7. The Court finds that the probative value of [D.H.] and [B.S]’s 

testimonies regarding the human remains searches is not 

substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.

¶41 We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 594 ¶ 13 (2014).

In doing so, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to its 

proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial 

effect.” State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329, 333 ¶ 5 (App. 2015). 

¶42 The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 

702, which was amended in 2012 to reflect “the principles set forth in 

Daubert.” State ex. Rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 297 ¶ 17 (App. 

2014). The rule allows a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education to testify in the form of an opinion 

or otherwise if such testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or determine a fact in issue[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a). 

¶43 In evaluating whether expert opinion will assist the trier of 

fact, the trial court serves as a gatekeeper, “with the aim of ensuring such 

testimony is reliable and helpful[.]” State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 9 ¶ 12 (2016) 

(quoting Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. (2012)). Notwithstanding the trial court’s 

gatekeeping role, the rule does not “supplant traditional jury 

determinations of credibility and the weight to be afforded otherwise 

admissible testimony,” nor is it intended to “preclude the testimony of 

experience-based experts.” Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. (2012); see also Sandretto 

v. Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 234 Ariz. 351, 357 ¶ 14 (App. 2014) (citing 

the advisory committee note to Federal Rule 702: “Nothing in this 

amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone—or experience in 

conjunction with other knowledge skill, training, or education—may not 

provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony.”). Accordingly, 

“[c]ross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 

instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 

means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. 

(2012). Finally, when Rule 702 is implicated, the proponent of the expert 

testimony bears the burden of establishing its admissibility by a 

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 229 ¶ 9 

(2015). 

¶44 Contrary to Hunter’s argument, the record reflects that the 

trial court fulfilled its gatekeeping role. Although the court found that the 

“dog sniff” evidence was not a testable scientific technique under Daubert, 

it nonetheless properly applied Rule 702, which embodies the Daubert
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

16 

principles and concluded that the evidence satisfied the threshold 

standards for relevance and reliability. 

¶45 The record supports the trial court’s findings. At the 

evidentiary hearing, D.H. and B.S. testified regarding their and their dogs’ 

training to obtain certification as canine-handler teams. D.H. and B.S. also 

testified regarding their previous experience working with the police to 

locate cadaver material, described their search methods, discussed their 

techniques for directing their canines, and explained how they interpret 

their dogs’ behaviors. In addition, the State presented evidence that both 

canine-handler teams passed the applicable training and certification 

programs and maintained their certifications through the relevant time 

periods. Moreover, specific to this case, both dogs independently alerted on 

the suspect items—not the decoy items—demonstrating their ability to 

distinguish between cadaver material and other scents. As the trial court 

found, the dogs essentially verified each other’s findings, and their 

consistent results, along with the evidence regarding the dogs and their

corresponding handlers’ training and experience, satisfied Rule 702’s

reliability threshold. 

¶46 Nonetheless, Hunter correctly notes that neither canine

(1) had typically used line-ups in actual, non-training searches, (2) had ever 

demonstrated an ability to detect cadaver material at a location/on an item 

more than fifty days after the cadaver material had been removed, and 

(3) could distinguish between decaying human material deposited from a 

living person and that from a deceased individual. As the trial court found, 

however, these limitations on the canines’ training and abilities affected the 

weight afforded to the “dog sniff” evidence, not its admissibility. See State 

v. Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, 186 ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (“If an expert meets the liberal 

minimum qualifications, her level of expertise goes to credibility and 

weight, not admissibility.”); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. (explaining that 

the amendment did not disturb “traditional jury determinations of 

credibility and the weight to be afforded” testimony). 

¶47 Similarly, the jury could consider limitations in D.H.’s 

testimony in deciding the dog sniff evidence’s weight—but those 

limitations did not themselves bar the evidence’s admissibility. See id.; see 

also Bernstein, 237 Ariz. at 230 ¶ 18 (explaining that “in close cases, the trial 

court should” admit expert testimony and “allow the jury to exercise its 

fact-finding function, for it is the jury’s exclusive province to assess the 

weight and credibility of evidence”). These limitations included (1) that the 

locations for the car and dumpster test sites were contaminated with scents 

from unrelated decaying human biological material, (2) D.H.’s knowledge 
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

17 

that some items were suspect and the corresponding possibility that he may 

have intentionally or unwittingly led his canine to alert on those items, and 

(3) D.H.’s contradictory trial testimony that his dog never made a false alert. 

¶48 Hunter also argues that the dog sniff evidence was 

inadmissible under Rules 401 and 403. Specifically, she argues that the dog 

sniff evidence relating to the trunk liner and carpet was irrelevant because 

the dogs would have alerted to the mere presence of blood on those items, 

and therefore their alerts did not demonstrate that a dead body had ever 

been present. She also argues that the experts’4 use of the word “cadaver” 

was “misleading and unduly prejudicial.”

¶49 Relevant evidence is admissible unless it is otherwise 

precluded by the federal or state constitution, an applicable statute, or rule. 

Ariz. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a 

fact of consequence in determining the action “more or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401. But even relevant 

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Ariz. R. Evid. 403. 

¶50 Applying these principles here, evidence that both canines 

alerted on the suspect carpet, trunk liner, and dumpster tended to prove 

that the deceased victim had been present in those spaces. That is, the 

evidence rendered the State’s theory that Hunter had killed the victim in 

her bedroom, transported the victim’s body in S.A.’s trunk, and disposed 

of the victim’s body in an apartment dumpster more probable than it would 

have been without the evidence. Although Hunter correctly notes this

evidence did not prove the victim was deceased, and the canines’ alerts can 

be otherwise explained, the evidence did provide some proof. With respect 

to Hunter’s claim of unfair prejudice through the experts’ use of the term 

“cadaver” at trial, the record reflects that both canine-handlers repeatedly 

explained that their use of the term “cadaver” referred to any decaying 

human biological material, whether its source was alive or dead. Therefore, 

although the term may otherwise refer to a dead body, the undisputed 

evidence at trial clarified the meaning of the term with respect to “cadaver 

dogs.” Because the term’s meaning was clear, its use did not suggest the 

jury should decide the case on an improper basis, and was therefore not 

unfairly prejudicial. See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545 (1997) (“Unfair 

prejudice results if the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision 

 

4 Although Hunter refers to the “State’s” use of the term “cadaver,” 

she raises this claim as part of her challenge to the admission of the “dog 

sniff” evidence, and we therefore review the argument within that context.
STATE v. HUNTER

Decision of the Court

18 

on an improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy or horror.”). Accordingly, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting D.H. and B.S.’s 

expert opinion testimony.

CONCLUSION

¶51 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hunter’s convictions and 

sentences.