2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-13-2013

Bruce Baldinger v. Tracey Cronin

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-1381

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Recommended Citation

"Bruce Baldinger v. Tracey Cronin" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 381.

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CLD-346 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-1381

___________

BRUCE E. BALDINGER

v.

TRACEY CRONIN; MATTEO PATISSO; 

THE NATIONAL FRAUD CONSTABLE; 

LIQUID BRICK, INC.; JOHN DOES 6-30

 Matteo Patisso,

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-07044)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect and

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

July 25, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 13, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________
2

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Matteo Patisso, one of four named defendants in the District 

Court, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing him from the case pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, denying his request to transfer the case 

to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, denying his 

motion for sanctions, and remanding the case to New Jersey state court. For the reasons 

that follow, we will dismiss the appeal in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction and

summarily affirm to the extent that we have jurisdiction.

This is actually the second action involving Patisso and Bruce Baldinger, the 

plaintiff in the District Court. Baldinger, an attorney, instituted the first case (which is 

not directly at issue here) in the District of New Jersey in 2010, alleging that Patisso and 

another individual had defamed him. Ultimately, the Court entered judgment in favor of 

Baldinger and awarded him over $1 million in damages.

Meanwhile, in May 2011, Baldinger, in response to different allegedly defamatory 

statements made by unknown individuals, filed a lawsuit in New Jersey state court 

against various “John Doe” defendants; in October 2012, after allegedly learning that 

Patisso had been the source of the statements, Baldinger amended the complaint to name 

him. Patisso then removed the case to the District of New Jersey. Baldinger, in turn, 

claimed that the removal was procedurally improper and asked the District Court to 

remand the case to state court. Soon thereafter, Baldinger also filed a motion under Rule 
3

41(a)(2) seeking an order voluntarily dismissing Patisso from the case. According to the 

motion, Baldinger had learned while trying to enforce his judgment in the previous case 

that Patisso was effectively judgment-proof, and Baldinger therefore saw no purpose in 

pursuing another action against him. Patisso, for his part, filed a flurry of motions in the 

District Court, including a request to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York 

and a motion for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Ultimately, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss Patisso, and then 

dismissed Patisso’s pending motions and remanded the remainder of the case to New 

Jersey state court. (None of the other defendants have entered appearances, so the 

viability of the case at this point is unclear.) Patisso then appealed to this Court.

Our jurisdiction over this appeal is limited. Most critically, we do not have 

jurisdiction over the District Court’s remand order. This Court’s jurisdiction over district 

court orders remanding removed cases to state court is constrained by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(d). Subject to an exception not applicable here, § 1447(d) provides that “[a]n 

order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on 

appeal or otherwise[.]” § 1447(d). The Supreme Court has stated that § 1447(d) “must 

be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified 

in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. 

Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). Section 1447(c) specifies two grounds for remand: 

(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) any other defect (provided that the defect is 
4

timely raised by the party seeking remand). See Cook v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431, 434-35

(3d Cir. 2003). Here, the District Court remanded the case for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, based on its analysis of the diversity rules. This type of “routine” 

jurisdictional determination falls squarely within the prohibition of appellate review 

under § 1447(d), and we will therefore not review this part of the District Court’s order. 

See Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 126–28 (3d Cir. 1998).

We do, however, have jurisdiction over the District Court’s order dismissing 

Patisso from the case pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). As an initial matter, because the 

dismissal order was “both logically precedent to, and separable from, the remand 

decision,” § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review. Carr v. Am. Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 

675 (3d Cir. 1994). Likewise, because the dismissal was without prejudice (rather than 

with prejudice, which would have been a complete victory for Patisso), it qualifies as an 

adverse judgment for Patisso. See Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1123 n.3 (10th Cir. 

2005) (collecting cases). 

With that said, however, we discern no error in the District Court’s order. The 

grant or denial of a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 is within the District 

Court’s sound discretion; the general rule is that such a motion should be granted 

liberally. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 863 (3d Cir. 1990). Here, 

there was no prejudice to Patisso — Baldinger filed his dismissal motion just months 

after naming Patisso, and before Patisso had even filed a responsive pleading. See id. 
5

Patisso argues that this ruling prejudiced him because it was rendered before he had the 

opportunity to file a counterclaim and build a case against Baldinger. However, even 

putting aside the fact that we see no reason why Patisso could not file his own action, an 

assertion about something Patisso might file in the future does not suffice to show that 

the District Court abused its discretion. See United States v. Prof’l Air Traffic 

Controllers Org., 449 F.2d 1299, 1300 (3d Cir. 1971).

Further, we conclude that the District Court properly determined that Patisso’s 

dismissal from the case mooted his request to transfer the action to the Eastern District of 

New York. A case is moot when “changes in circumstances that prevailed at the 

beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” 

Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 862 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, because 

Patisso was dismissed from the action, a venue ruling would not provide any meaningful 

relief to him. See generally CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 57 F.3d 395, 

402 (4th Cir. 1995).1

Finally, while we have jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s order denying 

Patisso’s request for counsel fees, see Stallworth v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit 

Auth., 105 F.3d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1997), his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 fails.2 We 

 

1

To the extent that Patisso asks us to transfer the matter to the Eastern District of New 

York, we deny his request.

2 While the District Court erred in concluding that its dismissal of Patisso mooted the 

attorney’s fees claim, see, e.g., Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 
6

review the District Court’s order for abuse of discretion; a court will grant fees where an 

attorney has “(1) multiplied proceedings; (2) in an unreasonable and vexatious manner; 

(3) thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in bad faith or by 

intentional misconduct.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent 

Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, Baldinger filed just a few documents in 

the District Court before voluntarily dismissing Patisso. Further, while this is the second 

case involving these parties, the cases concerned separate underlying facts. Thus, as the 

District Court held, Patisso is not entitled to relief under § 1927.

Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal in part and summarily affirm the District 

Court’s order in part. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Further, Patisso’s motion to 

transfer is denied. 

 

F.3d 1248, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004), we may affirm on any basis apparent in the record, see

CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 622 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013).