IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TRISTA C.,1)

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 20 C 4921

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§416(I), 423, 1381a, 1382c, over

three years ago in June of 2018. (Administrative Record (R.) 213-25). She claimed that she has

been disabled since January 1, 2017, due to spondylitis, sacroiliitis, rheumatoid arthritis, bursitis,

scoliosis, cretonne, degenerative disc disease, autoimmune disease, high blood pressure, and anxiety.

(R. 238). Over the next two years, plaintiff’s application was denied at every level of administrative

review: initial, reconsideration, administrative law judge (ALJ), and appeals council. It is the ALJ’s

decision that is before the court for review. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.955; 404.981. Plaintiff filed suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on August 21, 2020. The parties consented to my jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) on October 7, 2020. [Dkt. #7]. Plaintiff asks the court to reverse and remand

the Commissioner’s decision, while the Commissioner seeks an order affirming the decision.

1 Northern District of Illinois Internal Operating Procedure 22 prohibits listing the full name of the

Social Security applicant in an Opinion. Therefore, the plaintiff shall be listed using only their first name and

the first initial of their last name.

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I.

A.

Plaintiff was born on February 25, 1987, making her just 29 years old when she claimed she

became unable to work. (R. 213). She only made it through the tenth grade in school. (R. 40). She

worked “on and off” as a waitress from the time she was 18 years old, steadily from 2012 through

2017, and part -time the last couple of years. (R. 39. 231, 254-57). At just 5'5" tall, she weighed 260

pounds. She testified that she had lost 50 pounds to get to that weight, but was disappointed that it

had not helped her back pain. (R. 39-40). She used a back brace, a cane, a grabber to pick up things

and get dressed, and a rail in the shower. (R. 40).

Plaintiff said she was unable to drive because her feet get numb. (R. 41). She lived with her

daughter and a roommate. Her daughter and roommate did most of the housework, but plaintiff did

the laundry. (R. 44). She estimated that she had undergone 40 epidural steroid injections over the

years. (R. 41). They were hit and miss. Improvement was about 30-40% to where she could walk

for five days to a few weeks. (R. 53). 

She last drove a year and a half before the hearing; now her feet got numb so she was no

longer able to. (R. 42). Five days out of every week, she said couldn’t get out of bed. (R. 45). 

During the day on a typical day, she would be lying down only 2 or 3 hours. (R. 51-52). The rest

of the time she would be sitting or standing. (R. 51). She could sit for 5 minutes, stand for 15

minutes, and walk about a block with breaks along the way. (R. 47). She and her daughter got by

on food stamps and plaintiff’s friend letting them live at her place. (R. 55).

The record in this case is large and messy. The medical evidence covers about 1350 pages

(R. 319-1674) and, as is the custom, comes to court compiled in haphazard fashion. Medical files

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jump from 2011-2013 to 2017-2017 to 2017-2018 to 2016-2018 throughout the record. A fair

portion of those records are duplicates and triplicates. Neither party was able to make much sense

of it in their briefs, citing perhaps a couple dozen pages of it or so. What it distills down to is that

plaintiff does have a handful of impairments that give her a fair amount of pain in her back and legs,

for which she has consistently sought treatment, mostly without success, for several years. 

The plaintiff has a history of experiencing pain due to her two major ailments: rheumatoid

arthritis with ankylosing spondylosis and degenerative disc disease with disc bulging in her lumbar

spine. Doctors haven’t been much help, and as her pain has continued, they have prescribed her a

pharmacy’s worth of NSAIDs, muscle relaxers, and pain medications: acetaminophen,

cyclobenzaprine, diazepam, gabapentin, hydrocodone, ibuprofen, meloxicam, tizanidine, celebrex,

dilaudid. (R. 631-32, 641, 653, 679). And, they have given her repeated, almost regular, epidural

steroid injections; perhaps not 40 as plaintiff estimates, but if she is wrong, the record shows she is

not far wrong. Her treatment has been further complicated by the fact that she is allergic to many of

the medicines that would be prescribed for her rheumatoid arthritis: Enbrel, Humira, methotrexat,

Simponi. (R. 575, 606, 631, 668).

Plaintiff’s troubles appear to have begun in earnest back in 2015 when she was still working

as a waitress. She lost her rheumatologist due to insurance issues. (R. 947). So, upon a significant

flare-up, she had to go to the emergency room in tears with acute low back pain on December 26,

2015. (R. 946). She was given diazepam and was able to walk upon discharge. (R. 947). She

continued trying to work through 2016, but pain continued as well. (R. 953, 958). Surgery was not

an option at that point. (R. 955).

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On September 10, 2017, CT scan of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spines was normal. 

(R. 571-72, 576). Sensory and motor exam was normal. There was tenderness to palpation all

throughout the spine, however. (R. 576, 584). MRI on September 14, 2017, demonstrated

degenerative disc disease with diffuse disc bulging, mild central canal stenosis, and spondylosis. (R.

601, 608-09). Neurological and musculoskeletal exams revealed tenderness and limited range of

motion in the lumbar spine (R. 602, 607, 612).

Plaintiff saw her treating physician, Dr. Byjak, on September 19, 2017. He noted that an

MRI showed a bulging disc. Pain was improved by only 20%; standing was difficult. The doctor

said plaintiff could not work for 3 weeks. There was tenderness and limited range of motion in the

lumbar spine. (R. 692). On October 12, 2017, Dr. Byjak reported that an MRIshowed some disease

of the spine. There was tenderness along the spine and in the sacroiliac joints. Gait was normal and

there were no motor or sensory deficits. (R. 689-90). 

On December 12, 2017, plaintiff sought treatment for a significant increase in pain which

caused her to fall trying to walk. She was treated in the ER with morphine, valium, tylenol, and

motrin. (R. 1019). Strength and sensory exams were normal the next day, but there was tenderness

in the spine and in the SI joints. (R. 1020). A week later she had a bilateral SI joint injection. 

(R.1026). Plaintiff underwent a bilateral SI joint injection on December 21, 2017. (R. 644). 

By January 8-9, 2018, plaintiff reported this was 100% effective for her back pain, but that

she still had left hip and leg pain. (R. 655). Again, range of motion throughout the spine was limited. 

Strength was normal throughout, but reflexes were significantly reduced. Sacral sulcus tenderness,

bursa tenderness, and facet loading were all positive. Again, a number of tests were not performed

due to plaintiff’s significant pain, including straight leg raising. (R. 657). A week later, plaintiff was

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again seeking treatment for left hip pain which had become progressively worse. (R. 667). It was

exacerbated by walking, standing, bending and prolonged sitting. (R. 667). Physical exam was

unchanged. (R. 669-70). Pain continued and exam was unchanged again a couple of weeks later.

(R. 678). Medications were adjusted, with celebrex added and dilaudid replacing (R. 679).

On February 28, 2018, plaintiff was again seeking treatment for left hip pain radiating down

to her foot and low back pain. Little or nothing had changed. Norco replaced dilaudid and another

injection was scheduled. (R. 745-48). Plaintiff was back again on March 28, 2018. She reported

30% relief from the injection. (R. 772). In April, plaintiff’s condition was unchanged, but she tested

positive for THC and was told if she did again, her pain medications would be discontinued. (R.

787-88). Another injection was scheduled (R. 787, 841, 1047).That injection provided onlyminimal

relief. (R. 850-51). 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Byjak again on April 26, 2018. He reported abnormal gait, tenderness in

the spine, and swelling in both knees. (R. 686). The doctor felt plaintiff would need to see a

rheumatologist for her rheumatoid arthritis and ankylosing spondylitis. He thought further injections

might be helpful. (R. 687). Another one was given on May 9, 2018. (R. 1055).

Plaintiff reported continued and increased pain on May 30, 2018. (R. 850-51). Examination

was the same as the previous examinations: limited range of motion, reduced reflexes, normal

strength, and several tests not performed due to pain. (R. 853). Plaintiff had yet another injection

on June 14, 201 8. (R. 1059). But, more injections were in the offing for the plaintiff in July and

again in October 2018. (R. 854, 1465, 1493,1507). Relief ranged from none to 30% to 50% to

100%. (R. 1480). Pain continued through 2018. Exams in August, September, October showed 

limited range of motion, reduced reflexes, normal strength, positive tenderness testing, pain

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preventing a number of other tests. (R. 1476, 1478-80, 1489, 1491-92, 1523-24).

Report of an EMG done on November 21, 2018, was illegible as included in the record. (R.

1540-42). As a result, the ALJ presumed it had never been done, despite the fact that it as mentioned

in a doctor’s report from March 1, 2019. (R. 1552). The results were actually interpreted as an

“abnormal study” with “evidence of mild chronic low lumbar radiculopathy . . . most notable at

L4/L5.” [Dkt. #19-1]. 

Plaintiff also developed right foot pain toward the end of 2018. X-rays on November 1,

2018, revealed a small plantar calcaneal spur on her right foot. (R. 1646-47). An x-ray in February

2019 revealed degenerative disc disease in plaintiff’s thoracic spine. (R. 1654-55). 

On March 1, 2019, plaintiff was seeking treatment for continued back pain and radiating

symptoms again. She was noted to be walking with a limp. Range of motion in the spine was

limited. Strength was normal, but reflexes were reduced and sacral sulcus tenderness, bursa

tenderness, and facet loading were all positive. Straight leg raising was finally done and was positive

for radiculopathy in the left leg. (R. 1551). Plaintiff was given yet another epidural steroid injection

on March 5, 2019. (R. 1562-63). Plaintiff was still limping at examination on March 29, 2019. 

Examination was the same as it had been on March 1

st

, with limited range of motion and positive

straight leg raising. (R. 1574). Examination was again the same on April 29, 2019. (R. 1588).

In May 2019, it was time for another epidural steroid injection. (R. 1599). This one

provided 50% pain relief for about a week. (R. 1609). Examination on May 30, 2019, was much

the same; plaintiff continued to walk with a limp. (R. 1611). She was given another injection in

August. (R. 1636). 

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B.

After an administrative hearing at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified, along

with a vocational expert, the ALJ determined the plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

“ankylosing spondylitis; lumbar radiculopathy; sacroiliac joint dysfunction; trochanteric bursitis;

rheumatoid arthritis; and obesity”. (R. 17). The ALJ found that, while plaintiff had a number of

other impairments, including substance abuse, hypertension, and anxiety, they were not severe. (R.

18). The ALJ then found plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in the Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, focusing on Listing 1.02 (covering

dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (covering disorders of the spine), and 14.09(covering inflammatory

arthritis). (R. 19-20). 

The ALJ then determined that plaintiff could perform light work with the following

limitations: she could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she could occasionally stoop and

crouch; she could frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, and crawl; and she could never

work at unprotected heights or around movingmechanical parts. (R. 20). The ALJthen summarized

the plaintiff’s allegations and concluded that the plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the [plaintiff’s] statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in

this decision.” (R. 21). The ALJ then summarized the plaintiff’s treatment and medical evidence,

noting that the plaintiff’s treatment had been conservative – medication and injections – and that she

hadn’t always followed through with medical recommendations. (R. 21-24). The ALJ also

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determined that she made inconsistent statements to healthcare providers. (R. 24). 

Next, the ALJ, relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, found that plaintiff could

perform her past relevant work as a waitress (DOT #311.477-030, SVP 3, light exertion as generally

performed and medium as plaintiff performed it). (R. 25). The ALJ, again relying on the testimony

of the vocational expert, also found that there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers

in the national economy that plaintiff could perform: Mail Clerk, DOT 209.687-026, an unskilled

job (SVP 2), classified at the light exertion level per the DOT, and 10,500 jobs in the national

economy; Cleaner, DOT code 323.687-014, an unskilled job (SVP 2), classified at the light exertion

level per the DOT, and 532,000 jobs in the national economy; Cashier, DOT code 211.462-010, an

unskilled job (SVP 2), classified at the light exertion level per the DOT, and 880,000 jobs in the

national economy. (R. 26-27). Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and not entitled

to benefits under the Act. (R. 27-28).

II.

If the ALJ’s decision is supported by “substantial evidence,” the court on judicial review

must uphold that decision even if the court might have decided the case differently in the first

instance. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). To determine whether substantial

evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole, Biestek v. Berryhill, – U.S. –, –, 139 S. Ct.

1148, 1154 (2019), but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by reweighing the

evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses. 

Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to

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whether a claimant is entitled to benefits,” the court must defer to the Commissioner's resolution of

that conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). Accord Schloesser v. Berryhill, 870

F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017).

The substantial evidence standard is a low hurdle to negotiate. Biestek , 139 S. Ct. at 1154;

Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). If reasonable minds could differ, the court must 

defer to the ALJ's weighing of the evidence. Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2020). But,

in the Seventh Circuit, the ALJ also has an obligation to build what is called an “accurate and logical

bridge” between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the

administrative findings. Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015); O'Connor–Spinner v.

Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2010). The court has to be able to trace the path of the ALJ’s

reasoning from evidence to conclusion. Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2015);

Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if the court agrees with the ultimate result,

the case must be remanded if the ALJ fails in his or her obligation to build that logical bridge.

Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)(“. . . we cannot uphold a decision by an

administrative agency, any more than we can uphold a decision by a district court, if, while there is

enough evidence in the record to support the decision, the reasons given by the trier of fact do not

build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.”). Of course, this is

somewhat of a subjective standard: one reader’s Mackinac Bridge is another’s swaying rope. The

inherent elusiveness of the requirements makes it difficult for ALJs hoping to write acceptable

decisions that stand up to judicial scrutiny when challenged. But, at the same time, the Seventh

Circuit has also called this requirement “lax.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008);

Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008). “If a sketchy opinion assures us that the ALJ

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considered the important evidence, and the opinion enables us to trace the path of the ALJ's

reasoning, the ALJ has done enough.” Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1985); 

Mogg v. Barnhart, 199 F. App'x 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2006); Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315

F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). This, is at least how things stood until the Order by Judges Sykes,

Easterbrook and Scudder in Brumaugh v. Saul, 850 F. App’x 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2021) – which

seemed to cast doubt on the “logical bridge” requirement – at least as many had understood it. There,

the plaintiff argued that the ALJ failed to build a “logical bridge” from the evidence to his

determination that the plaintiff was capable of light work. The plaintiff contended that the ALJ

should have explained what changed after the first ALJ’s conclusion that she could only do sedentary

work, and since she did not, the “logical bridge” requirement had not been satisfied – and reversal

was therefore mandatory. The Court of Appeals, citingBiestek’s, 139 S.Ct. 1152 substantial evidence

requirement, unhesitatingly rejected this contention, saying: “[t]his argument rests on a faulty

premise: the ‘logical bridge’ language in our caselaw is descriptive but does not alter the applicable

substantial-evidence standard.” 850 F.App’x at 977 (Emphasis supplied).2 Apart from the fact that

an Order is an unorthodox device for casting doubt in a long-adhered to doctrine, five months after

Brumbaugh, the court in Wright v. Kijakazi, _Fed.Appx._, 2021 WL 3832347 (7th Cir. 2021) cited the

“logical bridge” language with seeming and unqualified approval. In any event, given the medical

evidence and the work the ALJ found the plaintiff could do, a sketchy opinion is not enough here.

And reversal is required even under a rigid interpretation of the logical bridge requirement.

2 Since the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 

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III.

A.

As it happens, this case has a “logical bridge” problem. It is often said that courts must apply

a common-sense approach to reviewing an ALJ’s decision. Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472, 478

(7th Cir. 2019); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809,

811 (7th Cir. 2000). Common sense undercuts the ALJ’s decision here. The record demonstrates

that plaintiff suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and degenerative disc disease in her lumbar and

thoracic spine. She has radiating pain down her left leg, which has been confirmed by straight leg

raising tests – when those tests have not been precluded by pain – and an EMG. She also developed

a spur in her right heel. All that is enough give one pause when an ALJ decides a person can be on

her feet all day, every day, carrying trays of food back and forth as a waitress. Then add the fact that

plaintiff is morbidly obese, with a BMIranging from 43 to 49. A person with a BMI of 30 is deemed

obese, and a person with a BMI of 40 is deemed extremely obese. “Policy Interpretation Ruling

Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Obesity,” Social SecurityRuling 02–1p. To paraphrase the Seventh

Circuit from a case in which the plaintiff had far fewer impairments and was carrying far less weight,

“[i]t is one thing to have a bad [back, left leg, and right foot]; it is another thing to have a bad [back,

left leg, and right foot] supporting a body mass index in excess of 40.” Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d

693, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.

2009)(“Additionally, . . . the ALJ must specifically address the effect of obesity on a claimant's

limitations because, for example, a person who is obese and arthritic may experience greater

limitations than a person who is only arthritic.”). From a common-sense perspective – or a “logical

bridge” perspective – the ALJ’s decision just doesn’t add up.

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An ALJ must account for the combined effects of all of a plaintiff’s impairments, including

those that are not themselves severe enough to support a disability claim. Spicher v. Berryhill, 898

F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2018); Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir.2003). There

is nothing in the ALJ’s opinion to assure a reviewing court that he considered the effects of all of

plaintiff’s impairments in combination. It is certainly not clear from the statement that plaintiff’s

impairments have been “accommodated by requiring that she never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, only occasionally stoop and crouch, frequentlyclimb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, and

crawl, and never work at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical parts.” (R. 25). How

does climbing stairs up to two-thirds of every day accommodate bulging discs and radiculopathy

down the left leg, a heel spur, rheumatoid arthritis and morbid obesity? It’s certainlynot self-evident

as it might arguably be if a person were found limited to sedentary work. But what the Seventh

Circuit said about the plaintiff in Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2014) doing sedentary

work – as opposed to waitressing – seems applicable here:

Remember that she's almost morbidly obese. This might make it difficult for her to

sit for long periods of time, as sedentary work normally requires. Presumably she

could get up from her work table from time to time, but that might be painful given

her obesity—the sheer weight she must lift—and her leg pain, which is aggravated

by standing, since standing requires her legs to support her great weight. We don't

want to play doctor ourselves; but the likely difficulties that morbidly obese persons

(and the plaintiff is almost morbidly obese) face even in doing sedentary work are

sufficiently obvious . . . .

Id. at 707. Certainly, the difficulties the plaintiff in this case would face on her feet waiting on

tables for eight hours every should be sufficiently obvious.

To support plaintiff’s capacity to return to her waitress job, in the main, the ALJ’s analysis

focused on the plaintiff’s course of treatment. For the ALJ, a medication regimen of strong narcotics,

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muscle relaxers, and anti-inflammatories, combined with dozens of epidural steroid injections was

conservative treatment, meaning that things were not as bad as plaintiff alleged. This type of

treatment might be termed “conservative” in the sense that it is not surgery, but nevertheless,

narcotics and injections tend to support allegations of pain rather than detract from them. See, e.g.,

Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 2016); Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir.

2013)(contrasting ‘conservative’ treatment like over-the-counter medication with ‘more aggressive’

treatment like prescription narcotics and steroid injections). Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751,

755 (7th Cir.2004) (physicians' prescription of strong pain medications substantiated claimant's pain

allegations). Moreover, the ALJ seemed to assume that surgery was somehow a recommended

option. But it would have done nothing for plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis and it may have been

inadvisable due to her morbid obesity. Indeed, at least at one point in the record, doctors said

surgery was not indicated. (R. 955). And, further treatment for plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis was

curtailed because of her allergies to many immuno-suppressant medications. (R. 575, 606, 631,

668). The ALJ did not explore any of this. See Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir.

2012)(ALJ must explore the reasons for lack of course of treatment, such as ineffectiveness, before

drawing a negative inference); Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir.2009); Craft v. Astrue,

539 F.3d 668, 679 (7th Cir.2008). 

The ALJ also called into question plaintiff’s veracity because she “made inconsistent

statements to medical providers”; meaning she told her treating physician that injections had

provided no relief, but told other providers that they had provided 30-50% relief. It’s not clear

where the ALJ got this from or what exactly to make of it. As the plaintiff testified – and as her

statements to providers throughout the record support – injections were “hit and miss” in terms of

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the degree of relief provided. Moreover, the records the ALJ cites do not indicate that plaintiff told

her physician they never provided any relief. In fact, those records indicate plaintiff reported

“moderate response” (R. 717, 727, 1673), as opposed to “not giv[ing] her any relief” as the ALJ

states. (R. 24).

The ALJ also got a couple of other things wrong in dismissing the plaintiff’s allegations. He

said plaintiff stopped seeing her treating physician after mid-2018, insinuating, again, that things

could not be as dire as plaintiff alleged. (R. 24). But, as the record shows, that’s not true. Plaintiff

continued to treat regularly with Dr. Byjak through 2019. (R. 1661-72). The ALJ also asserted that

plaintiff failed to follow through with a scheduled EMG toward the end of 2018. (R.23). Also, not

true. In fact, plaintiff did have the EMG in November 2018, which was positive for radiculopathy. 

(R. 1540-42). The ALJ may have missed it as the report in the disorganized administrative record

is illegible, but an examination report in March 2019 mentions that EMG having been done (R.

1552), so the ALJ should not have used plaintiff’s purported failure to follow through with her

doctor’s recommendation to attack her credibility.

Similarly, the ALJ also found plaintiff not credible because “despite the [plaintiff’s] hearing

testimony that she used a cane for balance and ambulation, the record is void of medical

documentation establishing the need for a hand-held assistive device . . . no medical provider

prescribed a cane, nor did they describe circumstances for which an assistive device was needed.” 

(R. 23). But, no prescription is required for a cane; a cane “can be bought by anyone who wants

[one].” Stahl v. Colvin, 632 F. App'x 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2015); Frazier v. Berryhill, 2019 WL

157911, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2019). The fact that no doctor may have prescribed a cane does not mean

plaintiff was lying about using it to walk and help with her balance. Doctors have repeatedly

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observed her to have a limp, diminished reflexes, limited range of motion, and radiculopathy

established by positive straight leg raising and, later, an EMG. With all that, it’s not surprising

plaintiff went out and got herself a cane, prescription or not. They are available, for example, at

Walgreens without any prescription.

So, in the end, this is a case where the “logical bridge” fails at several points. The court does

not know what these records look like when they are before the ALJ but, if it is similar to the

unorganized jumble they look like when they finally are filed in federal court, mistakes are

understandable. But where multiple mistakes form the basis for the ALJ’s assessment of a plaintiff’s

claim, and it strains credulity that a plaintiff can return to the work the ALJ thinks she can despite

multiple impairments that adversely affect her ability to be on her feet all day, every day, the case

has to be remanded for a more careful look. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’smotion for summaryjudgment [Dkt. #20]is granted,

and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #27] is denied.

.

ENTERED: 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DATE: 10/13/21

15

Case: 1:20-cv-04921 Document #: 31 Filed: 10/13/21 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:1796