MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2014 ME 44

Docket: Pen-13-374

Submitted

 On Briefs: February 27, 2014

Decided: March 18, 2014

Panel: ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

SHARON CASSIDY

v. 

CITY OF BANGOR et al.

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Sharon Cassidy appeals from the Superior Court’s (Penobscot, 

Anderson, J.) order accepting findings issued by the Bangor Planning Board 

nunc pro tunc and granting Cassidy forty days to consider the findings and file an 

amended brief in support of her 80B appeal. We dismiss Cassidy’s appeal as 

interlocutory.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] In 2012, Harvey Sprague submitted an application to the Board seeking 

approval to open and operate a quarry on Union Street in Bangor’s Rural 

Residence and Agricultural District. The Board considered Sprague’s application 

during its March 6, 2012, meeting, at which several residents of Bangor, including 

Cassidy, spoke in opposition to the proposed quarry. At the conclusion of the 
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meeting, the Board approved Sprague’s application by a 7-0 vote and notified 

Sprague of its decision by letter the next day.

[¶3] On April 3, Cassidy filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the 

Board’s decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. In her complaint, she listed the 

Board’s failure to make findings of fact as one of the grounds for her appeal. In 

response, the Board approved and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law to 

accompany its May 8 approval letter. On July 11, the court issued an order on 

Cassidy’s complaint, accepting the findings of the Board retroactively and granting 

Cassidy forty days to consider the findings and file an amended brief. Cassidy 

filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶4] The final-judgment rule prevents us from considering an interlocutory 

appeal unless the appeal falls within an exception. See Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 

ME 13, ¶ 5, 912 A.2d 1255. There are three exceptions to the final judgment rule: 

the judicial economy exception, the collateral order exception, and the death knell 

exception. Id. ¶¶ 5-8. None, however, apply to the interlocutory appeal of the 

procedural order in this case. See Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 6, 30 A.3d 816.

[¶5] The judicial economy exception allows appellate review of an 

interlocutory order if resolution of the appeal would establish a final disposition of 

the entire litigation and “the interests of justice require that an immediate review be 
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undertaken.” Bruesewitz, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 6, 912 A.2d 1255. Here, addressing the 

merits of Cassidy’s appeal would have the opposite effect—if we remand the case 

to the Board, as Cassidy suggests, duplicate litigation will certainly result and a 

final disposition will be delayed.

[¶6] The collateral order exception allows the appeal of an interlocutory 

order “where (1) that order involves a claim separable from and collateral to the 

gravamen of the lawsuit; (2) it presents a major and unsettled question of law; and 

(3) there would be irreparable loss of the rights claimed in absence of immediate 

review.” Id. ¶ 7 (quotation marks omitted). Only the second factor could arguably 

apply here. The order does not involve a claim that is separable and collateral to 

the gravamen of the lawsuit, and Cassidy will lose nothing by pursuing a final 

judgment and litigating the merits of the accepted findings.

[¶7] Similarly, the death knell exception does not apply because Cassidy 

has not demonstrated that a “substantial right” will be lost if review is delayed until 

final judgment. Id. ¶ 8. To the contrary, if the relief Cassidy requests is granted, a 

disposition on the merits of her case will be substantially delayed.

[¶8] Because Cassidy’s appeal does not fall within any of the exceptions to 

the final judgment rule, it must be dismissed.

The entry is:

Appeal dismissed as interlocutory.
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On the briefs:

Roy T. Pierce, Esq., Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, 

Portland, for appellant Sharon Cassidy

Paul S. Nicklas, Esq., Asst. City Solicitor, City of Bangor, 

Bangor, for appellee City of Bangor

Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq., Law Office of Hunter J. Tzovarras, 

Bangor, for appellee Harvey Sprague

Penobscot County Superior Court docket number AP-2012-5

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY