FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEBBLE BEACH COMPANY, a 

California General Partnership, No. 04-15577

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.  v. CV-03-04550-PJH

MICHAEL CADDY, an individual, OPINION

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 5, 2006—San Francisco, California

Filed July 12, 2006

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Stephen S. Trott

and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Trott

7667
COUNSEL

Stephen M. Trattner, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffappellant. 

Mikal J. Condon, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Oakland,

California, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge: 

Pebble Beach Company (“Pebble Beach”), a golf course

resort in California, appeals the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of its complaint against Michael Caddy (“Caddy”), a

small-business owner located in southern England. In addition, Pebble Beach seeks review of an order denying its

request for an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

Because Caddy did not expressly aim his conduct at California or the United States, we hold that the district court determined correctly that it lacked personal jurisdiction. Given the

nature of the claims and the facts of this case, we conclude

also that the district court properly exercised its discretion by

denying Pebble Beach’s motion to conduct additional jurisdictional discovery. Thus, we affirm. 

I

Pebble Beach is a well-known golf course and resort

located in Monterey County, California. The golf resort has

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7671
used “Pebble Beach” as its trade name for 50 years. Pebble

Beach contends that the trade name has acquired secondary

meaning in the United States and the United Kingdom. Pebble

Beach operates a website located at www.pebblebeach.com.

Caddy, a dual citizen of the United States and the United

Kingdom occupies and runs a three-room bed and breakfast,

restaurant, and bar located in southern England. Caddy’s business operation is located on a cliff overlooking the pebbly

beaches of England’s south shore, in a town called Barton-onSea. The name of Caddy’s operation is “Pebble Beach,”

which, given its location, is no surprise. Caddy advertises his

services, which do not include a golf course, at his website,

www.pebblebeach-uk.com. Caddy’s website includes general

information about the accommodations he provides, including

lodging rates in pounds sterling, a menu, and a wine list. The

website is not interactive. Visitors to the website who have

questions about Caddy’s services may fill out an on-line

inquiry form. However, the website does not have a reservation system, nor does it allow potential guests to book rooms

or pay for services on-line. 

Except for a brief time when Caddy worked at a restaurant

in Carmel, California, his domicile has been in the United

Kingdom. 

On October 8, 2003, Pebble Beach sued Caddy under the

Lanham Act and the California Business and Professions

Code for intentional infringement and dilution of its “Pebble

Beach” mark. Caddy moved to dismiss the complaint for lack

of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. On March 1, 2004, the district court granted Caddy’s

motion on personal jurisdiction grounds, without addressing

the insufficiency of service of process issue. The district court

denied also Pebble Beach’s request for additional discovery.

Pebble Beach timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

7672 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
II

We review de novo the district court’s determination that

it does not have personal jurisdiction over Caddy. See

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800

(9th Cir. 2004). We review a district court’s decision to grant

or deny discovery on jurisdictional facts for abuse of discretion. Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The arguments are straight forward. Caddy contends that

the district court may not assert personal jurisdiction over

him, and, consequently, that the complaint against him was

properly dismissed. Pebble Beach argues in return that Caddy

is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California, or,

alternatively, in any forum in the United States, because he

has expressly aimed tortious conduct at California and the

United States.1 Pebble Beach asserts that it may look to the

entire United States as a litigation forum pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) if Caddy’s contacts with California are insufficient to warrant jurisdiction. As explained

more thoroughly below, Rule 4(k)(2) may, in limited circumstances, be a basis for establishing jurisdiction where “the

United States serves as the relevant forum for a minimum

contacts analysis.” Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002).

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating

that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See Harris

1Caddy’s contacts with California or the United States are not continuous or substantial enough to establish general jurisdiction. See Glencore

Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114,

1125 (9th Cir. 2002) Thus, we consider only the question of whether

Caddy’s contacts are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. 

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7673
Rutsky & Co. Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Bell & Clement Ltd., 328 F.3d

1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003). However, this demonstration

requires that the plaintiff “make only a prima facie showing

of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.”

Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

citations omitted). Moreover, for the purpose of this demonstration, the court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the

plaintiff, here, Pebble Beach. Id.

[1] The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a

defendant is proper if it is permitted by a long-arm statute and

if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due

process. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat. Bank of Coops., 103

F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, both the California longarm statute and Rule 4(k)(2)—what is often referred to as the

federal long-arm statute—require compliance with due process requirements. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1129 (California long-arm statute); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 922 (applying

Rule 4(k)(2) as a federal long-arm statute). Consequently,

under both arguments presented by Pebble Beach, resolution

turns on due process.

[2] For due process to be satisfied, a defendant, if not present in the forum, must have “minimum contacts” with the

forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction “does not

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).

[3] In this circuit, we employ the following three-part test

to analyze whether a party’s “minimum contacts” meet the

Supreme Court’s directive. This “minimum contacts” test is

satisfied when,

(1) the defendant has performed some act or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the privileges

of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim

arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum7674 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction

is reasonable. 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d

1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). “If any of the three requirements

is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the

defendant of due process of law.” Omeluk v. Langsten Slip &

Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the

“minimum contacts” test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802

(internal citations omitted). Here, Pebble Beach’s arguments

fail under the first prong. Accordingly, we need not address

whether the claim arose out of or resulted from Caddy’s

forum-related activities or whether an exercise of jurisdiction

is reasonable per the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77

(1985). 

Under the first prong of the “minimum contacts” test, Pebble Beach has the burden of establishing that Caddy “has performed some act or consummated some transaction within the

forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum.” Bancroft, 223

F.3d at 416. We have refined this to mean whether Caddy has

either (1) “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, or (2) “purposefully directed” his activities toward the forum. Schwarzenegger, 374

F.3d at 802. Although we sometimes use the phrase “purposeful availment” to include both purposeful availment and direction, “availment and direction are, in fact, two distinct

concepts.” Id.

[4] Thus, in order to satisfy the first prong of the “minimum

contacts” test, Pebble Beach must establish either that Caddy

(1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting

activities in California, or the United States as a whole, or (2)

that he purposefully directed its activities toward one of those

two forums. Id.

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7675
1. Purposeful Availment

[5] Pebble Beach fails to identify any conduct by Caddy

that took place in California or in the United States that adequately supports the availment concept. Evidence of availment is typically action taking place in the forum that invokes

the benefits and protections of the laws in the forum. Id. at

803. Evidence of direction generally consists of action taking

place outside the forum that is directed at the forum. Id. (suggesting evidence of purposeful direction includes activities

such as distribution and advertising). All of Caddy’s action

identified by Pebble Beach is action taking place outside the

forum. Thus, if anything, it is the type of evidence that supports a purposeful direction analysis. Accordingly, we reject

Pebble Beach’s assertion that Caddy has availed himself of

the jurisdiction of the district court under both concepts and

proceed only to determine whether Caddy has purposefully

directed his action toward one of two applicable forums.

2. Purposeful Direction: California

[6] In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that a foreign act that is both aimed at and has effect in the forum satisfies the first prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis. 465

U.S. 783 (1984). We have commonly referred to this holding

as the “Calder effects test.” See, e.g., Bancroft, 223 F.3d at

1087. To satisfy this test the defendant “must have (1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at

the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is

suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. at 1088 (citing Panavision Int’l

v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)). However,

referring to the Calder test as an “effects” test can be misleading. For this reason, we have warned courts not to focus too

narrowly on the test’s third prong—the effects prong—

holding that “something more” is needed in addition to a mere

foreseeable effect. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Specifically

we have stated,

7676 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
Subsequent cases have struggled somewhat with

Calder’s import, recognizing that the case cannot

stand for the broad proposition that a foreign act

with foreseeable effects in the forum state will

always give rise to specific jurisdiction. We have

said that there must be “something more” . . . . We

now conclude that “something more” is what the

Supreme Court described as “express aiming” at the

forum state. 

Id. Thus, the determinative question here is whether Caddy’s

actions were “something more”—precisely, whether his conduct was expressly aimed at California or alternatively the

United States.

[7] We conclude that Caddy’s actions were not expressly

aimed at California. The only acts identified by Pebble Beach

as being directed at California are the website and the use of

the name “Pebble Beach” in the domain name. These acts

were not aimed at California and, regardless of foreseeable

effect, are insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

In support of its contention that Caddy has expressly aimed

conduct at California, Pebble Beach identifies a list of cases

where we have found that a defendant’s actions have been

expressly aimed at the forum state sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant. Pebble Beach asserts that these

cases show that Caddy’s website and domain name, coupled

by his knowledge of the golf resort as a result of his working

in California, are sufficient to satisfy the express aiming standard that it is required to meet. We disagree. If anything, these

cases establish that “something more”—the express aiming

requirement—has not been met by Pebble Beach. 

In Panavision, the defendant, a cybersquatter, registered the

plaintiff’s trademark as part of a domain name. 141 F.3d at

1318-19. The use of the domain name by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from registering its own domain name and

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7677
was part of a plan to obtain money from the plaintiff in

exchange for the rights to the domain name. Id. The court

found personal jurisdiction, not merely because of the domain

name use, but because the plan was expressly aimed at the

plaintiff: 

[The Defendant] did considerably more than simply

register Panavision’s trademarks as his domain

names on the Internet. He registered those names as

part of a scheme to obtain money from Panavision.

Pursuant to that scheme, he demanded $13,000 from

Panavision to release the domain names to it. His

acts were aimed at Panavision in California, and

caused it to suffer injury there.

Id. at 1318. 

Here, Caddy has hatched no such plan directed at Pebble

Beach. He is not a cybersquatter trying to obtain money from

Pebble Beach. His operation is legitimate and his website

relates directly to that end. 

In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves, similar to

Panavision, the defendant’s alleged plan to defraud the insurance company involved direct interaction with the forum

state. 912 F.2d 1062 (1990). We held that the action at issue

satisfied Calder’s “effects test” because the defendant sent a

letter to the forum state addressed to the plaintiff, thereby

defrauding a forum state entity. Id. at 1065. 

In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., a dispute over the domain name www.masters.org was triggered

by a letter sent by Augusta that required Bancroft & Masters,

a computer corporation in California, to sue or lose the

domain name. 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). We stated that

the “expressly aiming” standard was satisfied when “individualized targeting was present.” Id. at 1088. We reasoned that

specific jurisdiction was proper and that the expressly aiming

7678 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
requirement was satisfied because the letter sent by Augusta

constituted “individualized targeting.” Id.

The defendant in both Bancroft and Metropolitan Life did

“something more” than commit a “foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.” Id. at 1087. In both cases this

“individualized targeting” was correspondence that was a

clear attempt to force the plaintiff to act. Here, Caddy

engaged in no “individualized targeting.” There is no letter

written by Caddy forcing Pebble Beach to act. The only substantial action is a domain name and non-interactive informative web site along with the extraneous fact that Caddy had

worked, at some point in his past, in California. This does not

constitute “individualized targeting.” Indeed, to hold otherwise would be contrary to what we have suggested in earlier

case law. 

[8] In Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d

1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000), we cited Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that when a “website advertiser [does] nothing other

than register a domain name and post an essentially passive

website” and nothing else is done “to encourage residents of

the forum state,” there is no personal jurisdiction. Similarly,

in Panavision we stated, “We agree that simply registering

someone else’s trademark as a domain name and posting a

web site on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party

domiciled in one state to jurisdiction in another.” 141 F.3d at

1322. Why? Because “the objectionable webpage simply was

not aimed intentionally at the [forum state] knowing that harm

was likely to be caused there,” and “[u]nder the effects doctrine, ‘something more’ was required to indicate that the

defendant purposefully directed its activity in a substantial

way to the forum state.” Rio Properties, 130 F.3d at 120 (citing Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 418, 420) (internal quotation

marks omitted).2

2

In Rio Properties it was shown that the defendant did more than put

up a passive website. Id. at 1021. Indeed, the defendant was actively comPEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7679
[9] These cases establish two salient points. First, there can

be no doubt that we still require “something more” than just

a foreseeable effect to conclude that personal jurisdiction is

proper. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Second, an internet

domain name and passive website alone are not “something

more,” and, therefore, alone are not enough to subject a party

to jurisdiction. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1020; Panavision,

141 F.3d at 1322. 

In contrast to those cases where jurisdiction was proper

because “something more” existed, the circumstances here are

more analogous to Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.

374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004). In Schwarzenegger, we determined that personal jurisdiction based solely on a noninteractive print advertisement would be improper. Id. at 807.

In Schwarzenegger, the former movie star and current California governor, brought an action in California alleging that

an Ohio car dealership used impermissibly his “Terminator”

image in a newspaper advertisement in Akron, Ohio. Id. at

800. The federal district court in California dismissed the

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Applying the

Calder “effects test,” we affirmed, concluding that even

though the advertisement might lead to eventual harm in California this “foreseeable effect” was not enough because the

advertisement was expressly aimed at Ohio rather than California. Id. at 807. We concluded that, without “something

more” than possible effect, there was simply no individualized targeting of California, or the type of wrongful conduct,

that could be construed as being directed at the forum state.

Id. We held that Schwarzenegger had not established jurisdiction over the car dealership.

[10] Pebble Beach, like Schwarzenegger, relies almost

exclusively on the possible foreseeable effects. Like Schwarpeting with the plaintiff by targeting Nevada consumers with radio and

print media. Id. Accordingly, in Rio Properties there was no doubt that

action was expressly directed at Nevada and that jurisdiction was proper.

7680 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
zenegger, Pebble Beach’s arguments depend on the possible

effects of a non-interactive advertisement—here, Caddy’s

passive website. Notably absent in both circumstances is

action that can be construed as being expressly aimed at California. The fact that Caddy once lived in California and therefore has knowledge of the Pebble Beach golf resort goes to

the foreseeable effect prong of the “effects test” and is not an

independent act that can be interpreted as being expressly

aimed at California. Consistent with the dicta of Cybersell,

Panavision, and Rio Properties, we reject also any contention

that a passive website constitutes expressed aiming. Thus,

today, we extend the holding of Schwarzenegger to the situations described in Panavision and Rio Properties, where the

sole basis for asserting jurisdiction is a non-interactive passive

website. As with the print advertisement in Schwarzenegger,

the fact that Caddy’s website is not directed at California is

controlling.

3. Purposeful Direction: United States

Even if Pebble Beach is unable to show purposeful direction as to California, Pebble Beach can still establish jurisdiction if Caddy purposefully directed his action at the United

States. This ability to look to the aggregate contacts of a

defendant with the United States as a whole instead of a particular state forum is a product of Rule 4(k)(2).3

See Glencore

Crain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284

F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Rule 4(k)(2) is commonly referred to as the federal long-arm statute. Id.

3Rule 4(k)(2) provides in whole, 

If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution

and laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a

waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising

under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the

courts of general jurisdiction of any state. 

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7681
The exercise of Rule 4(k)(2) as a federal long-arm statute

requires the plaintiff to prove three factors. Id. First, the claim

against the defendant must arise under federal law. Id. Second, the defendant must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction. Third, the

federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport

with due process. Id. Here, the first factor is satisfied because

Pebble Beach’s claims arises under the Lanham Act. And, as

established above, the second factor is satisfied as Caddy is

not subject to personal jurisdiction of California, or any state

court. 

[11] That leaves the third factor—due process. The due

process analysis is identical to the one discussed above when

the forum was California, except here the relevant forum is

the entire United States. And, as with the foregoing analysis,

our resolution here depends on whether Caddy’s actions were

purposefully directed at the United States. Pebble Beach contends that the “purposeful direction” requirement is satisfied

under the Calder “effects test” because Caddy’s operation is

expressly aimed at the United States. Pebble Beach makes

four arguments. 

First, Pebble Beach claims that because Caddy selected a

“.com” domain name it shows that the United States was his

“primary” market and that he is directly advertising his services to the United States. Second, Pebble Beach asserts that

his selection of the name “Pebble Beach” shows the United

States is his primary target because “Pebble Beach” is a

famous United States trademark. Third, Pebble Beach asserts

that Caddy’s intent to advertise to the United States is bolstered by the fact that Caddy’s facilities are located in a resort

town that caters to foreigners, particularly Americans. Finally,

Pebble Beach asserts that a majority of Caddy’s business in

the past has been with Americans. 

[12] As before, Pebble Beach’s arguments focus too much

on the effects prong and not enough on the “something more”

7682 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
requirement. First, following the rationale articulated in

Cybersell, Rio Properties, and Panavision, we conclude that

the selection of a particular domain name is insufficient by

itself to confer jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,

even under Rule 4(k)(2), where the forum is the United States.

The fact that the name “Pebble Beach” is a famous mark

known world-wide is of little practical consequence when

deciding whether action is directed at a particular forum via

the world wide web. Also of minimal importance is Caddy’s

selection of a “.com” domain name instead of a more specific

United Kingdom or European Union domain. To suggest that

“.com” is an indicator of express aiming at the United States

is even weaker than the counter assertion that having “U.K.”

in the domain name, which is the case here, is indicative that

Caddy was only targeting his services to the United Kingdom.

Neither provides much more than a slight indication of where

a website may be located and does not establish to whom the

website is directed. Accordingly, we reject these arguments.

[13] This leaves Pebble Beach’s arguments that because

Caddy’s business is located in an area frequented by Americans, and because he occasionally services Americans, jurisdiction is proper. These arguments fail for the same reasons;

they go to effects rather than express aiming. Pebble Beach’s

arguments do have intuitive appeal—they suggest a real effect

on Americans. However, as reiterated throughout this opinion,

showing “effect” satisfies only the third prong of the Calder

test—it is not the “something more” that is required. In Bancroft, we stated that foreseeable effects alone are not sufficient to exercise jurisdiction, that “something more” is

required and that “ ‘something more’ is what the Supreme

Court described as ‘express aiming’ at the forum state.” 223

F.3d at 1087 (internal citations omitted). The “something

more” additional requirement is important simply because the

effects cited may not have been caused by the defendant’s

actions of which the plaintiff complains. Here, although

Caddy may serve vacationing Americans, there is not a scintilla of evidence indicating that this patronage is related to

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7683
either Caddy’s choice of a domain name or the posting of a

passive website. Accordingly, we find no action on the part of

Caddy expressly directed at the United States and conclude

that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over Caddy would

offend due process.

B. Jurisdictional Discovery

[14] The district court properly exercised its discretion by

refusing to grant a continuance to allow Pebble Beach to conduct additional jurisdictional discovery. “[W]here a plaintiff’s

claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated

and based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials

made by the defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery . . . .” Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d

555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121

F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D. N.C. 1988)). Here, we have rejected

Pebble Beach’s assertion of personal jurisdiction based on

Caddy’s chosen domain name and website. As a matter of

law, we have concluded that a passive website and domain

name are an insufficient basis for asserting personal jurisdiction. Caddy’s website is passive, and, therefore, additional

discovery on this issue would not be helpful. Furthermore, the

record was sufficiently developed for the district court to rule

on all remaining issues pertaining to jurisdiction. As a result,

there was no need for the district court to grant additional

time for discovery.

III

Caddy did not expressly aim his conduct at California or

the United States and therefore is not subject to the personal

jurisdiction of the district court. A passive website and

domain name alone do not satisfy the Calder effects test and

there is no other action expressly aimed at California or the

7684 PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY
United States that would justify personal jurisdiction. Also,

the district court exercised properly its discretion by denying

additional jurisdictional discovery. 

AFFIRMED.

PEBBLE BEACH v. CADDY 7685