alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### J. W. Hale, etc., *v.*J. C. Vanarsdale, etc.

Taxation — Lien—Execution of Sheriff’s Bond.

A lien created by the execution of a sheriff of the bond prescribed by R. S., ch. 83, art. 9, § 3, applies only to the revenue and public dues for which the sheriff is 'bound directly to the commonwealth.

Taxation — Lien—Revenue Bond.

The revenues collected by a sheriff are protected by a bond executed pursuant to R. Stat., ch. 26, art. 2, § 3, 'and the county does not have a lien on the estate of the sheriff for their security.

Taxation — Right of County Court to Revenues Collected.

The rights of' a county court as to revenues collected are like those of the county creditors, and are no greater or more comprehensive.

Taxation — Lien of County Levy.

The lien of the state for taxes assessed does not extend to counties in favor of the county levy.

Taxation — Sureties of County Auditor — Lien.

The quietus of the county auditor, which relates only to the revenues and public dues: of the state, extinguishes- the lien, and leaves the sheriff’s real estate as free from incumbrance as though no bond had been given.

APPEAL, PROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT.

December 3, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The lien created by the execution by the sheriff of the bond prescribed by Sec. 3, Article 9, Chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes, applies only to the revenue and public dues, for which the sheriff is bound directly to the commonwealth. The entire chapter is devoted to the revenues and public dues to be annually collected for the payment of the expenses and debts of the state.

The county levy or revenues is secured by the bond executed pursuant to Sec. 3, Article 2, Chapter 26, of Revised Statutes. The statute does not give to the county a lien upon the real estate *of*the sheriff. The right of the county to sue on the bond is provided for *193by Sec. 6 of said article and chapter. Like remedies are given to the various county courts to compel the sheriffs to settle their accounts and pay over money in their hands belonging to the counties as are given to county creditors. To these creditors the sheriff and his sureties, their heirs, devisees and personal representatives, are jointly and severally liable. Against them such creditors may have judgments in *personam,*but the statute gives them; no lien upon any part of the estate of the sheriff.

*Bush, Kyle & Poston, for appellants.*

*J. B. & P. B. Thompson, James,- for appellees. ■*

The rights of the county courts are like those of the county creditors and not greater or more comprehensive.

The language of the statute providing for the lien in favor of the commonwealth does not authorize the conclusion that it was intended that counties should also have a similar lien.

The quietus of the auditor which relates only to the revenues and public dues of the state, extinguishes the lien, and leaves the sheriff’s realty as free from encumbrance as though no bond had ever been given. The demurrer to appellants’ petition was properly sustained.

Judgment *affirmed.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-7538

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ROBERT T. BENNAFIELD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-00-57) Submitted: January 28, 2005 Decided: February 11, 2005 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert T. Bennafield, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Edward Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert T. Bennafield seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bennafield has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 8



SUBSIDIARIES
OF VUANCE LTD. AS OF APRIL 30, 2012





|Name
        of Subsidiary |  | Jurisdiction
        of Organization |  | Percent
        Owned |  
|-------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------ |  | --------------------- | -
|                           |  |                                      |  |                       |  
|Vuance Inc.                |  | United States                        |  | 100                   | %
|Vuance RFID Inc.*          |  | United States                        |  | 100                   | %
|S.B.C. Aviation Ltd.       |  | Israel                               |  | 100                   | %
|SuperCom Slovakia A.S.     |  | Slovakia                             |  | 66                    | %
|PureRFid Inc.              |  | United States                        |  | 100                   | %







* Vuance RFID Inc. has an Israeli wholly-owned subsidiary, Vuance
RFID Ltd.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer of GFI Group Inc.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of GFI Group Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James A. Peers, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to the 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|Date: March 31, 2005                                    |  | 
|------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|                                                        |  | 
|/s/JAMES A. PEERSJames A. Peers
Chief Financial Officer |  | 

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit
32.1
  CERTIFICATION
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the quarterly report of Patriot Scientific Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended February 29, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and to which this Certification is
an exhibit (the “Report”), the undersigned officer of the Company does hereby
certify, pursuant to Rule 13a–14(b) or Rule 15d–14(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of
the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:
  (1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 (2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date:
April 9, 2008
   /s/
      Frederick C.
      GoernerFrederick C.
      GoernerChief Executive
      Officer
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00384-CR

STEPHEN MELVIN BONDS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 78th District Court

of Wichita County (61,080-B)

April 1, 2021

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was error in the trial court’s judgment. The judgment is modified to accurately reflect 

an enhanced first-degree-felony offense. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed as modified.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Dana Womack

 Justice Dana Womack
#### Lewis Meyers *v.*Fred Forstman, &c.

Adverse Possession — Entry Under Void Patent — Extent of Possession.

Where a party claiming land by adverse possession claims to have entered under a patent which, is absolutely void, the patent can not have any force except to show the extent of possession claimed under it.

Adverse Possession — When 'Limitations Begin to Run.

Although a party’s entry on land may have been tortious and wrongful from the beginning, yet if he entered under a deed, regularly put on record' and continued to asisert ownership thereunder, the Statute of Limitations began to run from the date of such entry.

APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT. '

December 12, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The testimony in this case sufficiently establishes the fact that these appellants and those under whom they claim, had for more than twenty years next preceding the institution, of their suit, been in *95the actual adverse possession of that portion of the fifty-five-acre tract of land to which they were adjudged title.

*E. H. Smith, for appellant.*

It may be conceded that the patent to Bishop was void, as it doubtless was, and yet the law of this case is not thereby affected. Hartman entered under his deed from Bishop, and’ held and claimed to the extent of its boundaries, which included the land in contest. The calls of the deed indicate the extent of his possession, and that possession has only been disturbed in so far as the enclosure around the Baxter improvement encroaches upon it. The possession of those claiming-title through Bishop is not analagous to cases in which two legal and valid patents conflict. In such cases it is well settled that the prior patentee can only acquire possession of the land covered by both to the extent that he may actually enclose them.

But as Bishop’s patent,' in so far as it conflicts with- that issued t0' Walin, is absolutely void, it conferred upon himi no right of entry, and can cut no figure other than to indicate the extent of the possession claimed under it. If it be true, as insisted upon by appellants, that the possession of those- under whom appellees claim was tortuous and wrongful from the beginning, still, as Hartman entered under a' deed regularly put to record, and continued to assert claim of ownership to the lands embraced by such deed, the statute of limitation must be regarded as having began to run against appellant and -his vendors fromi the date of such entry. There may have been breaks in, the possession shortly after Hartman’s purchase, but for at least twenty years before this suit was instituted it is shown to have been continuous. The amended answer of appellant -was not such a pleading as required a reply. It contained only matters of defense, and the fact that appellant chose to ask relief against appellees did not make it incumbent upon them: to reply to it. We perceive no- error in the action, of the court below.

■ Judgment *affirmed.*

-, *for appellees.*
#### R. R. Jones *v.*S. E. Jones, Assignee, etc.

Bills and Notes — Position of Name on Bill.

With tbe evidence equipoised tbe fact that Holbrook is tbe payee and bis name is just where it would be on the bill, first endorser, becomes important and must assert an influence in determining tbe liability of tbe parties.

*550APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

June 23, 1871.

*Bodley & Simrall, Barrett & Robert, for appellant.*

*Harrison, fir appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

The evidence in this case is conflicting and but for one controlling fact it would be difficult to conclude on which side the preponderance was; the fact alluded to is the position of the name of Holbrook on the bill.

It is true the witnesses differ in their statements as to when it was placed there. Holbrook says it was some thirty days after the bill was made and delivered to him; that he placed his name on it to enable Dean to present it to the bank and receive payment, and he is to some extent corroborated by Cur-ran and others.

While Caldwell and Tuck state positively that Holbrook endorsed it before they did, Caldwell endorsing for Phelps, Caldwell & Co., and they are to some extent corroborated by Phelps. With the evidence thus equipoised the fact that Holbrook is the payee, and his name is just where it would be on the bill, first endorser, becomes important and must assert an influence in determining the liability o fthe parties. And in connection with that fact, we think the weight of the evidence sustains the conclusion of the court below, which, however, we would feel bound to sustain without that fact on the conflict which exists.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
NO. 07-01-00360-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL C

	NOVEMBER 5, 2001

	______________________________

ANDY POSEY,

			Appellant

	v.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

			Appellee

	FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 44,010-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING

	______________________________

	ORDER ON APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

Before QUINN, REAVIS, and JOHNSON, JJ.

	Andy Posey, appellant, has moved to withdraw his notice of appeal and dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 42.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2) and dismiss the appeal.  Having dismissed the appeal at appellant’s personal request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

								Brian Quinn 

           	                            				    Justice

Do not publish.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**TIME AMERICA, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Time America, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Thomas S. Bednarik, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Craig J. Smith, Vice President - Finance and Administration and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 
| By:    | /s/ Thomas S. Bednarik                                                  |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Thomas S. Bednarik                                                      |
|   | President and Chief Executive Officer                                   |
|   | November 14, 2005                                                       |
|   |                                                                    |
| By:    | /s/ Craig J. Smith                                                      |   |
|   | Craig J. Smith                                                          |
|   | Vice President - Finance and Administration and Chief Financial Officer |
|   | November 14, 2005                                                       |

 

----
Exhibit 32.2



                                 CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, the undersigned  officer of Golden American
Life Insurance  Company (the "Company")  hereby certifies that, to the officer's
knowledge,  the  Company's  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
September  30, 2003 (the  "Report")  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
Section 13(a) or 15(d),  as applicable,  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934
and that  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.




November 12, 2003          By  /s/ Keith Gubbay
-----------------              -------------------------------------------------
      (Date)                   Keith Gubbay
                               President
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_______________ ___ _ NO. 09
- 13
- 00 059
- CR

_______________ ___ _ RODNEY DWAYNE CLEVELAND , Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________________________________________ _ On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 94049

_________________________________________________________________ _ ORDER Appellant Rodney Dwayne Cleveland filed a motion for rehearing of our opinion of March 6, 2013

. The opinion dismissed Cleveland ’ s appeal because the trial court entered a certification of Cleveland’s right to appeal , certif ying that this is a plea

- bargain case and that Cleveland has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The Court requested a response from the State. In its response, the State indicates that Cleveland’s appeal involved revocation of community2 supervision, which is not a ple a bargain case, and the State also explains that “there is no indication that the defendant waived his right of appeal.” Upon reviewing the newly

- filed clerk’s record, we agree with the State. For these reasons, we grant Cleveland’s motion for rehearing, set aside our opinion of March 6, 2013, and reinstate Cleveland’s appeal. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 614

- 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (An appellate court has the ability to examine a certi fication for defectiveness.); Waters v. State , 124 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, p et. ref’d ) (Recitations in a certification of the right to appeal must be true and supported by the record.). The reporter’s
record is due June 3 , 201 3. ORDER ENTERED MAY 2, 2013.
PER CURIAM

Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ABC Corporation., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

The Partnerships and Unincorporated 

Associations Identified on Schedule “A” 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 1:23-cv-03301 

 Judge Honorable Thomas M. Durkin 

 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 

NOW COMES He Cheng, attorney of record for Defendants GYROOR US, urbanmax, 

GaodeshangUS, Gyroor, FENGCHI-US, HGSM, Gyroshoes (collectively “Defendants”), and for 

his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, states as follows: 

1. He Cheng is no longer associated with Glacier Law LLP. 

2. The remaining counsel from Glacier Law LLP will continue to represent the 

Defendants in these proceedings. 

3. The withdrawal will neither prejudice Defendants nor delay the proceedings. 

WHEREFORE, He Cheng respectfully requests that this Court grant his motion to 

withdraw as counsel for Defendants. 

Date: 10/11/2023 

Respectfully Submitted: 

/s/ He Cheng 

He Cheng 

Attorneys for Defendants

 

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 672 Filed: 10/11/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:17329
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this October 11, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing 

file with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and service was perfected on all counsel 

of record and interested parties through this system, which will deliver a true and correct copy of 

the foregoing documents via CM/ECF. 

Date: 10/11/2023 

 

/s/ He Cheng 

He Cheng

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 672 Filed: 10/11/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:17330
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MITCHELL SNOW, 

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 

Respondent

______________________

2023-1196

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-22-0107-I-1.

______________________

O R D E R

The petitioner having failed to file an appendix 

required by Federal Circuit Rule 30(a) within the time 

permitted by the rules, it is 

ORDERED that the petition for review be, and the 

same hereby is, DISMISSED, for failure to prosecute in 

accordance with the rules. 

FOR THE COURT

May 11, 2023

Date /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner 

Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: May 11, 2023

Case: 23-1196 Document: 12 Page: 1 Filed: 05/11/2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

ROGELIO LAGUNES-DIAZ, 

Defendant BelowAppellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Plaintiff BelowAppellee. 

§ 

§ No. 296, 2014 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware, 

§ in and for Sussex County 

§ Cr. ID 1208001348 

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: September 25, 2014 

 Decided: September 30, 2014 

Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 

O R D E R

This 30th day of September 2014, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) On June 2, 2014, the Court received appellant’s notice of appeal from 

a Superior Court sentencing order entered on July 3, 2013. The Clerk issued a 

notice pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) directing appellant to show cause 

why the appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to file his appeal within the 

30 day limitations period.1

 

(2) Appellant filed a response to the notice to show cause on September 

25, 2014. He contends that he cannot read and does speak English and, therefore, 

 

1Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(ii). 
-2-

has been unable to find anyone to assist him until recently. He asserts that the 

lawyer who represented him in the Superior Court did not help him and was only 

interested in having him plead guilty. 

(3) Time is a jurisdictional requirement.2

 A notice of appeal must be 

received by the Office of the Clerk of this Court within the applicable time period 

in order to be effective.3 An appellant’s pro se status does not excuse a failure to 

comply strictly with the jurisdictional requirements of Supreme Court Rule 6.4 

Appellant’s lack of language proficiency is insufficient to warrant the equitable 

tolling of the time to file an appeal.5 Unless the appellant can demonstrate that the 

failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to court-related personnel, his 

appeal cannot be considered.6

(4) There is nothing to reflect that appellant’s failure to timely appeal is 

attributable to court personnel. Consequently, this case does not fall within the 

exception to the general rule that mandates the timely filing of a notice of appeal. 

Thus, the Court concludes that the within appeal must be dismissed. 

 

2Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989). 

3Del. Supr. Ct. R. 10(a). 

4

Smith v. State, 47 A.3d 481, 486-87 (Del. 2012). 

5 Quintero v. State, 945A.2d 1168 (Table), 2008 WL697599 (Del.Mar. 17, 2008). 

6

Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979). 
-3-

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 

29(b), that the within appeal is DISMISSED. 

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely

Justice