UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

GEORGE M. LECCO, a/k/a Porgy,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:05-cr-00107-1)

Submitted: June 20, 2011 Decided: July 13, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia; Amy L. Austin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United 

States Attorney, E. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

George Lecco appeals his conviction, following a jury 

trial, of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006); one count of use of a 

firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006); two counts of possessing a firearm as 

a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); 

four counts of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); one count of murder with a firearm 

during a cocaine conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A), (j) (2006); one count of witness tampering by 

killing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (2006); one 

count of witness retaliation by killing, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B) (2006); and one count of conspiracy to 

destroy and conceal evidence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(k) (2006). Lecco’s convictions arose from his cocaine 

distribution and hiring of Patricia Burton and Valeri Friend to 

murder Carla Collins in retaliation for her telling police that 

Lecco continued to deal cocaine and carry firearms after 

agreeing to assist police in their drug investigation. 

On appeal, Lecco argues that (1) the district court 

erred in admitting statements Burton or Friend made to Collins 

during the murder implicating Lecco; (2) the district court 

erred in excluding evidence that Lecco was a “fixer” in the 
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community; (3) the district court erred in excluding statements 

made to police to show police misconduct during the 

investigation; and (4) the Government violated Lecco’s Fifth 

Amendment rights by presenting perjured testimony at trial. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s 

rulings on the admissibility of evidence. United States v. 

Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011). A statement is not 

hearsay if it is offered against the defendant and is a 

statement of a co-conspirator of the defendant made “during the 

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2)(E). For a statement to be admissible under Rule 

801(d)(2)(E), the government must show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed of which the defendant 

was a member; and (2) the co-conspirator’s statement was made in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 

901, 905 (4th Cir. 1996). A co-conspirator’s statement is made 

“in furtherance of” a conspiracy “if it was intended to promote 

the conspiracy’s objectives, whether or not it actually has that 

effect.” United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 

1994). We broadly construe the “in furtherance” requirement, 

such that “even casual relationships to the conspiracy suffice 

to satisfy the exception.” United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 

254, 262 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding the admission of a co-
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conspirator’s explanation, in a drug conspiracy, that he had 

obtained drugs through a robbery); see also United States v. 

Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 292 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding the 

admission of a co-conspirator’s threat to kill a government 

informant because he had “snitched” on the leader of the 

conspiracy).

Lecco contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting Burton and Friend’s explanation to 

Collins that they were killing her at Lecco’s request. We 

disagree. The district court correctly held that the 

explanation was in furtherance of the conspiracy because it 

effectively furthered the retaliatory goal of the conspiracy. 

Further, the explanation was intended to remind the coconspirators of the penalty for failing to carry out the 

conspiracy’s goals, and it was not unduly prejudicial.

Lecco next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it excluded evidence of his helpfulness. Rule 

404(a), Fed. R. Evid., deems inadmissible evidence of a person’s 

character “for the purpose of proving action in conformity 

therewith,” excepting “evidence of a pertinent trait of 

character offered by an accused.” Proof of such a trait may be 

made by reputation or opinion testimony in all cases, and if the 

trait is an essential element of the charge, claim, or defense, 

specific instances of conduct also may be admitted. Fed. R. 
5

Evid. 405; see also United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 

1164 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Unless evidence of character is an 

essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof of 

character is limited to general good character (reputation as a 

good person and law abiding citizen).”).

Here, Lecco sought to introduce evidence that he had 

helped people in his community on several occasions in an 

attempt to show that he only helped his friends bury Collins 

after the murder. Evidence of character, however, is not an 

essential element of any of the charges that were brought 

against Lecco, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1), (j) 

1512(a)(1)(C), (k), 1513(a)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 

nor did he raise a defense with a character element. Moreover, 

as the district court held, Lecco’s status as a “fixer” is not a 

pertinent character trait, as the fact that he helped members of 

the community in noncriminal matters did not make it more likely 

that he would bury a body after a murder for which he was not 

otherwise culpable. 

Lecco’s third claim is also without merit. Lecco 

challenges the district court’s exclusion of a witness’s false 

statements to police. At trial, Lecco argued that those 

statements were similar enough to another witness’s concededly 

false statements to suggest police misconduct during the 

investigation. The district court excluded them, finding that 
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they were hearsay, “at best,” and that they were otherwise 

irrelevant and immaterial.

Although we agree with Lecco that the proffered 

evidence was not hearsay, as it was not offered for the truth of 

the matter asserted, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), we hold that it was 

within the district court’s discretion to exclude the evidence 

as irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. 

“[R]elevance typically presents a low barrier to admissibility.” 

United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2003). 

Thus, to be relevant, “evidence need only be ‘worth 

consideration by the jury,’ or have a ‘plus value.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 998 (4th Cir. 

1997)). However, relevancy must be determined “in relation to 

the charges and claims being tried, rather than in the context 

of defenses which might have been raised but were not.” United 

States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2005).

Prior to his attempted introduction of the false 

statements, Lecco did not argue police misconduct as a defense; 

rather, his theory was that the murder was the result of an outof-control cocaine binge with which he was not involved. 

Because police manipulation did not tend to prove Lecco’s claim 
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that the witnesses lied to police to protect themselves, we hold 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding the statements as irrelevant.

Finally, Lecco claims that the Government denied him 

due process when it called Friend, but not Burton, to testify. 

Essentially, Lecco argues that Friend’s testimony was so 

“diametrically opposed” to Burton’s that the Government 

knowingly presented perjured testimony by calling only Friend. 

The government “may not knowingly use false evidence, including 

false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction.” Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). In order to establish a due 

process violation, a claimant must show “the falsity and 

materiality of the testimony and the prosecutor’s knowledge of 

its falsity.” Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602, 614 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Perjured testimony is material “if there is any reasonable 

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 

judgment of the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lecco has not shown that the Government deprived him 

of due process by calling Friend to testify rather than Burton 

because he has not shown that the Government knew of any falsity 

in Friend’s testimony or that the testimony was material. Lecco 

falsely characterizes the Government’s assertion at Burton’s 

sentencing hearing that Burton “was the first to come forward 

with at least the closest true story of what happened to 
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Collins,” and he has not established that Friend and Burton’s 

slightly differing accounts of the murder could have affected 

the judgment of the jury.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED