United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-50904

Summary Calendar

____________

Alexander Isaiah Perez, 

Petitioner—Appellant, 

versus

Sandra Hijar, Warden, FCI La Tuna, 

Respondent—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:22-CV-324

______________________________

Before Smith, Elrod, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Prison officials caught Alexander Perez, federal prisoner # 44217-013, 

using a third-party e-mail communication service that allowed users to mask 

the identities of their contacts. A prison disciplinary hearing was held, and 

the discipline hearing officer (“DHO”) concluded that Perez violated Prohibited Act Code 296. As a consequence, the DHO sanctioned Perez with 

the loss of 27 days of good-conduct time, 180 days of commissary privileges, 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 17, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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and 365 days of e-mail privileges. 

Perez filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, raising various challenges to 

the disciplinary proceeding, which the district court denied. Perez then filed 

a Rule 59(e) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district 

court likewise denied that motion. 

Perez now appeals, raising six arguments: (1) The district court erred 

in sua sponte denying the § 2241 petition because it relied on Rule 4 of the 

Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases in the United States District 

Courts; (2) the district court’s grant of Perez’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) demonstrates that it erred in denying the § 2241 petition;

(3) the disciplinary hearing violated Perez’s due process rights; (4) the district court erred in not analyzing the due process claim based on violations by 

the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) of its disciplinary regulations; (5) the BOP’s 

reading of e-mail into Code 296 violated the Administrative Procedures Act; 

and (6) the district court erred in denying the Rule 59(e) motion. 

A certificate of appealability is not needed because Perez is proceeding 

under § 2241. Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001). “In an 

appeal from the denial of habeas relief, this court reviews a district court’s 

findings of fact for clear error and issues of law de novo.” Id. This court 

“may affirm the district court’s denial of relief on any ground supported by 

the record.” Hunter v. Tamez, 622 F.3d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, Perez’s challenge to the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion is reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. Kapordelis v. Myers, 16 F.4th 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 2021). 

Perez’s Rule 4 argument is unpersuasive because Rule 1(b) of the rules 

governing § 2254 cases articulates that these rules may apply to other habeas

corpus petitions as well. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Perez’s argument regarding the granting of IFP status fails, as the IFP standard does not encompass a 

full inquiry into the merits. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 

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1983). Regarding Perez’s due process claim, the record reflects that all three 

factors articulated in Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974), were 

met, and there was the requisite level of evidence to support the disciplinary 

action, see Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 

(1985). 

Perez’s argument that the district court should have analyzed the due 

process claims in light of the BOP’s failure to follow its hearing regulations is 

without merit because a prison’s failure to follow its own policies or regulations does not violate due process where constitutional minima were otherwise satisfied. See Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009). We 

also discern no error in the district court’s determination that the inclusion 

of e-mail amounted to an interpretation of an existing rule, not a substantive 

rule change. Finally, the district court did not err when it denied Perez’s 

Rule 59(e) motion. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 

(5th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of the § 2241 petition and the

denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. 

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