United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-1383

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Robert Deonte Coffey, originally named Robert Coffey

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

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Submitted: January 13, 2020

Filed: May 29, 2020

[Unpublished] 

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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Robert Deonte Coffey pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent 

to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Although the 
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Sentencing Guidelines recommended a total sentence between 66 and 72 months in 

prison, the district court1 chose 96 months instead. We affirm. 

The district court’s main reason for varying upward was that Coffey had also 

engaged in child sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), which was charged in the 

superseding indictment but later dismissed when he pleaded guilty. Had Coffey not

been a pimp for a 14-year-old runaway, the court said, it “probably would not” have 

varied upward. 

For two reasons, Coffey objects to the upward variance. The first is 

procedural. In Coffey’s view, the district court did not explain its reasoning well 

enough. Before varying upward, in addition to the sex trafficking, the court 

discussed Coffey’s criminal and disciplinary history, the seriousness of his offenses, 

the need for deterrence, and his background. Only then, after considering the 

recommended range, did it vary upward to 96 months. It did not have to say more. 

See United States v. Olson, 716 F.3d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 2013) (“As long as the 

sentencing court referenced ‘some of the considerations contained in § 3553(a), we 

are ordinarily satisfied.’” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1111 

(8th Cir. 2008))).

The other objection is substantive. Coffey thinks that his 96-month sentence 

is just plain unreasonable, especially because his view is that the district court should 

never have considered his sex-trafficking activities in the first place. The problem 

with this argument, however, is that we have long allowed district courts to consider 

“prior criminal conduct [at sentencing], whether or not related to the offense of 

conviction.” United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2010). 

His fallback argument is less categorical, but no more persuasive. Even if the court 

could consider the sex trafficking, he says, it should have placed less weight on it. 

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Arkansas. 
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The flaw in this more modest argument, however, is that the court had “wide 

latitude” to weigh his other illegal behavior in whatever way it saw fit, even when

imposing a “significant upward variance.” United States v. Abrica-Sanchez, 808 

F.3d 330, 335 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

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