IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2013-CA-02134-COA MAEGAN WHITE A/K/A MEAGAN WHITE A/K/A MAEGAN LEE WHITE APPELLANT

v. CHRISTOPHER WHITE A/K/A CHRISTOPHER LEE WHITE APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/12/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DOROTHY W INSTON COLOM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W E BSTER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ROBBIE E. W ILLIS JAMES P. VANCE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CARRIE A. JOURDAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN AW ARDED TO APPELLEE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/16/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., ROBERTS AND JAMES, JJ. ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The W ebster County Chancery Court gra n t e d M a egan Lee W h ite (“Maegan”) and Christopher L ee W hite (“C.L.”) a n irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce. The parties subm itted

a ll c hild-related issues to t he court, including child custody and v isitation. The c o u r t awarded C.L. sole custody of their two m inor c hildren and gave Maegan visitation rights. Maegan tim ely

appealed. Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Maegan and C.L. m arried on July 1, 2006, in Starkville, M i s s i s s i p p i

. Their son,Garrett, was born o n January 13, 2 007. The couple’s daughter, Harley , was born Decem ber 26, 2007. Maegan f

iled f or d ivorce on February 2 1, 2012, on the grounds o f habitual cruel and inhum an t re a t me n t , or in the alternative, i rreconcilable d if f erences. She a l so sought
perm anent custody of Garrett a nd Harley

. C .L. f iled his answer and a counter-com plaint f or divorce on May 9, 2012, c iting adultery , h a b i t u a l cruel and inhum an treatm ent, or in the alternative, irrec o n c i l a

b l e d i ffe r e n c e s. He also sought p erm anent custody of t he two children.
A tem p orary order was entered on June 4, 2012, g ranting Maegan tem porary custody of the children and awarding C.L. visitation every other weekend. ¶3. On or a b o u t S e p t e mb e r 1 1 , 2 0 1 2 , M aegan f iled a m o tion t o suspend visitation, alleging that C.L. had inappropriately touched Harley

. As a result, t he chancellor suspended C.L.’s visitation a nd appointed a g u a r d i a n ad litem (GAL) to investigate. Once the GAL f i led her report, C .L. f

iled a m o tion to reinstate visitation on October 12, 2 0 1 2

. O n Novem ber 20, 2 012, t he c hancellor reinstated C.L.’s v isitation but ordered that all visits be supervised by the W ebster County Departm ent of Hum an Services. In April 2013, the court reinstated C.L.’s f

ull visitation rights. T hereaf ter, on April 2, 2013, the parties consented, in writing, to a divorce on the ground o f irreconcilable d if f erences, subm itting the f

ollowing issues to the court: c hild custody and v isitation, child support , children’s health insurance and health-related bills, children’s school and extracurricular expenses, claim ing the c h ildren on tax returns, all other child-related m atters, division of personal property , and taxes. A trial was held June 18-19, 2013. ¶4. At trial, the f

ollowing f

acts were presented: Maegan is twenty -eight y ears old and has

2been a registered nurse since 2007. She earned h er nursing d egree whil e ma r r ied to C.L.

Maegan has worked w ith f i ve dif f erent com panies i n various capacities since beginning her

career. C.L. is f

orty y ears old and owns a body shop next door to the m arital hom e. Until the separation, Maegan, C.L., and their two children lived together in W ebster County

. C.L. worked at his b o dy shop f o r the entirety of the m arriage, while Maegan had to travel f rom W e bster County in order to atte nd school and later f or work. W h ile both parties were at school o r work, Maegan’s f am ily m em

bers of ten helped watch the children until May 2008, when both children began attending day care. W hile C.L.’s j ob was consistently near the hom e a nd provided “norm a l” working hours, Maegan’s c a reer as a nurse som e tim es required her to work night shif

ts a nd required signif

i cant t ravel. During this ti m e, parenting duties were equal, although som e tim es aided by Maegan’s f

am ily m em

bers. ¶5. Wh e n t h e parties s eparated in June 2011, Maegan mo v e d w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n t o Oktibbeha County , which was near to her m o ther and her job a t Mississippi Hom e Care in Starkville. Initially , C.L. and Maegan split equal tim e with t he children, rotating every two day s a s well as three-day

weekends. In August 2011, Maegan enrolled Garrett and Harley in p reschool in Louisville, which was approxim ately f if teen m inutes f

r o m t h e ir hom e in Sturgis. The children adjusted well to their new school, and Harley began speech therapy

. In February 2012, M a egan m o v e d , along w ith t he children, to Caledonia. Here, Maegan enrolled the children i n a pre-kindergarten program a t Caledonia Elem entary

. In J u ne 2012, the court awarded Maegan tem porary f u ll custody and gave C.L. visitation rights f or every other weekend and the m onth of July 2012.

3¶6. In August 2012, Maegan f iled an em ergency m otion with the c ourt, alleging that C.L. had inappropriately touched Harley

. Maegan t estif ied a t trial that in A ugust 2012, when the children returned af

t er a visit with C.L., Maegan d iscovered blood in Harley ’s underwear and

an abscess on her upper t h i g h

. Two weeks later, Harley had a “f it” when she had to return
to C.L.’s, including b e com ing phy sically ill, scream ing, and cry i n g . S oon af ter, Harley allegedly disclosed to Maegan that C.L. had inappropriately touched her. Af ter Maegan f

iled her em ergency m o tion presenting these allegations, the court revoked C.L.’s visitation rights and an i nvestigation com m enced. Harley w as interviewed by police, by the Lowndes County Departm ent of Hum an Services, and the court-appointed GAL. T h e G A L ’ s r eport later stated that Harley h ad t old the GAL that her m other told her she could a v oid returning to C.L.’s if she told people h e had touched her private parts. Maegan denied this at t rial. The allegations against C.L. were f

o und to be unsubstantiated, and his visitation rights were restored. ¶7. In Decem

ber 2012, Maegan resigned f rom her job and m oved f

rom Caledonia back
to Sturgis. She b egan a new job at Rolling Hills, a healthcare f acility in Starkville, and the children were enrolled at the L ouisville Public Schools. R oughly two m onths af ter beginning

e mp l oy m e nt with Rolling Hills, Maegan began working at Diam ond G rove in Louisvil l e . Two weeks af

ter being hired, Maegan was term inated. She testif ied at trial it was because her drug screen tested positive f or Adderall, and although she h ad a p rescription, the f acility said they could not take a risk of having an em ploy ee with a ccess to am

p hetam ines at their f acility , where m a ny p a tients had the sam e ty pe o f me d i cine. At the tim e of trial, Maegan had s ecured em

p loy m ent as a hom e health nurse in Louisville. Maegan t es t if ied that the

4children, r egardless of where they were living or where their m other worked, had a schedule

that they adhered to. I f she was e ver “on call,” there were alway s f riends or f

am ily m em

bers nearby who would be able to tem porarily care f or the children. ¶8. Additionally , Maegan t e s t i f i e d generally t hat she and the children a ttended church regularly , and that s he did not consum e alcohol regularly or abuse drugs. Sh e d e n i e d that
any one who cared f

or her children drank to excess or had any problem s w ith alcohol. She also denied dating a ny one during her m arriage and denied having sexual relationships with
any one in f

ront of her children. Maegan claim ed that both prior to and af ter the separation, C.L. neglected Harley

. She testif i ed that he o f

ten took Garrett hunting and f ishing, but lef

t Harley at hom e. Even when both children were hom e, he had little to do with Ha r l e y . Maegan’s m other and grandm other both testif ied sim ilarly about C.L.’s involvem ent with Harley

. Both wom en also testif i ed about Maegan’s p arenting skills and t heir willingness to help care f

or the children whenever needed. ¶9. Additional witnesses were called to testif y a bout Maegan, including Tary n Shurden,

a f r iend and coworker. Shurden’s testim ony called into question the veracity of Maegan’s
statem ents that s he d id not drink or date during or af ter the separation. Shurden testif ied that she h ad seen Maegan drink alcohol socially and said i t would be untrue f or som eone to say she never drank. Shurden also testif ied that she did not believe Maegan to have a problem with alcohol; however, Maegan h a d conf ided concerns about her own m other’s drinking. Finally , Shurden testif

ied that she knew of two prior relationships Maegan had both during the m arriage a nd af

ter t he separation. Jim m y Owens, the hum a n-resources d irector at

5Diam ond Grove, w here M aegan worked f or a very brief tim e, also testif ied. Owens denied Maegan’s account o f her tim e at Diam ond Grove. He stated that af ter Maegan’s drug screen

cam e back positive f

o r am phetam ines, he tried to g et in t o u c h with her about providing a valid prescription. She was u nable or unwilling to do so and never contacted him again. She was ultim ately

term inated f

or absenteeism

. ¶10. C.L

. ’ s t e s t i m o n y o b v i o u sly dif f ered in m any respects f

rom Maegan’s. H e testif

ied that he h ad lived in the m a rital hom e prior to t he m arriage, and he still lived there p ost-separation.
H i s business h ad been continuously located less than a m i le a w a y f rom his hom e, and h e worked there generally f

rom 8 a.m . to 5 p.m . , Monday throu gh Friday

. C.L. stated that he had owned this business since 1999, and because he w as the boss, he had f l exibility to com e and go as needed. C.L. adm itted, like Maegan, that they shared parenting responsib ilities while m arried, b ut d enied t h a t s h e did the b ulk of the work and that he neglected Harley

. C.L. did n ot deny that Maegan, as an of f s h o ot of her career a s a nurse, w as prim arily responsible and m ore knowledgeable a bout the children’s heath needs. C.L. testif ied that he had a wonderf

ul r e lationship with both children, and he showed n o f avoritism to Garrett because he w as a boy

. C.L. adm i tted he t o ok G arrett hunting and f ishing m ore of

ten than Harley , b ut only because Garrett was a boy and was older. C.L. noted that b oth children had

som e conf usion over the separation at f irst, but that e ven despite the allegations m ade against him , he still had a healthy relationship with both children. ¶11. C.L. testif

ied that he planned to stay in his current hom e f o r t h e f o r e s e e able f

uture. He said that both children would be able to be enrolled in W ebster County schools, should

6h e b e given custody , and they c ould rem ain there until they graduated f r om h igh schoo l

. Despite the problem s b etween him and Maegan, C .L. said he would be m o re than happy to have Maegan involved in the children’s s chool lif e and e xtracurricular activities. Contrary to Maegan’s testim ony , C.L. denied ref u sing to participate in H arley ’s speech therapy . He testif i ed that he did not r e a l l y know that she was in speech t herapy , and he did not believe it was necessary

. However, he did notice a m a rked im provem ent in her speech and would

c o n tinue to assist in therapy as n eeded. C.L. acknowledged that his f a m ily was not as involved with the c hildren a s Maegan’s was, but he appreciated the help her f a m ily was able to provide. ¶12. C.L. testif

ied that he was, at the tim e o f t rial, in a relationship w ith a wom an nam ed
J e n n if er Sm ith. He said that he som etim es spent t he n ight with Jennif er when h e d i d n o t have visitation with his children, but that Jennif er had n ever stay ed at his hom e when Garrett and Harley were there. Sm ith testif ied sim i larly

. C .L. testif

ied that he d id not want to push his children into his new relationship with Sm ith, and he f elt it was im

portant f or them not
to s ee him stay w ith Sm ith because he was still m arried to their m other. C.L. t estif ied about the im portance of

m orals and stability

f or his children, both of

which he believed he could provide. ¶13. The f

inal witness t estim o n y came f r o m t h e G A L , w ho had already subm itted her report to the court. In her report and her testim ony , the GAL recom m ended t hat custody be given to C.L., based of

f the stability he could provide to the children. She did not note any specif ic detrim ental ef

f ects on Garrett and Hartley f rom t he m ultiple m oves they had endured

7since the separation, but she did b elieve that switching schools could b e dif f i cult f or children. She m entioned t hat her o pinion of C.L.’s stability a nd truthf ulness h ad strengthened during the trial. H owever, the GAL’s opinion of Maegan’s truthf ulness som ewhat declined during her i nvestigation and the trial. Specif i cally , the G AL testif

ied that s h e believed the

m olestation allegations w ere created by Maegan to f urther her cause f

or f ull c u s t ody

. Her report was adm itted as an exhibit. In her f i nal recom m endation, the GAL noted: The Court is c onf

ronted with the dilem m a in which t wo loving, capable parents bot h w a n t c u stody of their m inor children. The f ather of f ers m ore stability t o the children.

. . . Maegan, on the other h and, has not exhibited m uch stability

. . . . I believe it i s in the best interest of the children to stay in one area and develop a hom e com m u nity , which seem s to have already been established in Mathiston. Maegan a n d C

. L

. both have great parenting skills.

. . . G arrett and Harley would b e in good hands with either parent. However, I believe that the [ f ]ather of f ers t he m ost stability to t he children and it would be in their best interest if their phy sical custody was placed with him

. ¶14. The chancellor ultim ately agreed with the GAL. In h er order, the chancellor weighed the Albright f

actors, keeping i n mi n d t h e polestar consideration of the best interest of the children. She f

ound f our f a ctors to be in C.L.’s f

avor; o ne i n Maegan’s f

avor; two in neither parent’s f avor; and f

our to be in both p arents’ f avor. 1 T he court also noted that it questioned Maegan’s credibility , as she was untruthf ul about dating other people and t he term ination of h e r j o b at Diam ond Grove. The chancellor was unable to ignore the f a l se a llegations o f

m olestation m ade against C.L., n o ting that Harley told the GAL that M aegan told h er to say her f ather had touched her. Finally , the chancellor noted t hat all of these circum stances—the

1 In h er o p in io n , th e ch an cello r d id n o t a d d r ess th e p ref eren c es o f th e ch ild ren , f in d in g th em

to b e in ap p licab l e. N eith er p arty ch allen g es th i s f

in d i n g . 8Albright f

actors, the credibility o f the witnesses, and the GAL’s report—led her to f ind that C.L. should be awarded custody of Garrett and Harley

. ¶15. Maegan tim ely

appealed and raised two issues:
I. Wh e t h e r t he c hancellor i s required to consider the p ropriety of joint custody in an irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce where neither p arty requests joint custody

. II. W hether the chancellor e rred in her application of the Albright f actors. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶16. “[ T ]he standard of review in child[ -]custody cases i s quite lim ited. A chancellor m u st be m anif estly wrong [ or] clearly erroneous, or apply an e r roneous legal standard in order f or [ the a ppellate court] to reverse.” J ohnson v. Gray , 8 59 So. 2d 1006, 1012 (¶31) (Miss. 2003) (citing Mabus v. M

abus , 847 so 2d 815, 818 (¶8) (Miss. 2003)). W e def er to a chancellor' s f indings of f

act; h owev e r , h e r conclusions a bout the law are reviewed de novo. Irving v. Irving , 67 So. 3d 776, 778 (¶11) (Miss. 2011). ¶17. A d d i t i o n a l l y , our polestar consideration in c hild-custody cases m ust b e t h e b e s t interest of the child. Hall v. Hall , 134 So. 3d 822, 825 (¶8) (Miss. C t. App. 2014). “So long

as t here is substantial evidence i n the record that, if f ound c redible by the chancellor, would provide support f

or the chancellor’s d ecis i o n , this Court m ay not intercede sim ply to substitute our collective o pinion f o r that of the chancellor.” Hammers v. Hammers , 890 So. 2d 944, 9 50 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Bower v. Bower , 758 So. 2d 405, 412 (¶33) (Miss. 2000)). ANALYSIS

9I. Joint-Custody Requirem ent

¶18. Maegan argues that the chancellor f ailed t o consider joint custody at all in her decison
to grant C.L. custody of Garrett a nd Harley , and this f ailure is “m anif

estly wrong, c learly
erroneous, and

. . . based on a n erroneous legal standard.” Maegan c i t es C rider v. Crider , 904 S o . 2 d 1 4 2 ( M iss. 2005), and Clark v. C lark , 126 So. 3d 1 22 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), arguing that these cases require a chancellor to consider joi n t c u s t ody , even when neither party has a sked the court to consider joint custody

. Maegan argues t hat because she and C.L. both applied t o t h e court f or a determ ination of custody issues, the Mississippi Suprem e Court’s i nterpretation of the phrase “upon application o f both parties” in Crider requires the
court to c o nsider whether joint custody is in the best interest of t he children. W e cannot
agree. ¶19. M a e g a n ’ s interpretation of both Clark and Crider i s f a ulty

. In Cla r k , t h i s C o u r t reversed and rem anded a chancellor’s decision to award s o le phy sical custody to the m other, requiring the c ourt to consider the propriety of joint custody on rem a nd. B oth p arents had requested sol e p h y s i cal custody of their child and subm itted t he issue t o the court f or determ ination. A f

ter hearing testim ony of the parties, the chancellor had noted: “ [ In these] kinds of cases . . . i t’s hard

. . . to give the c h ild to one or the o ther because every t hing here would support that.

. . . [

H] o w can you choose o ne over the o ther, but [ this court] has to. ” Clark , 126 So. 3d at 124-25 (¶10). In reversing the c hance r y c o u r t ’s judgm ent, this Court noted, “Based on our reading of the transcript, it appears that the chancery court m ay have concluded

. . . that i t was required to o rder custody t o one p arent regardless o f whether joint

1 0phy sical custody was in the best interest of [ the c hild].” I d. a t 125 (¶12). Noting our concern that the chancery court had incorrectly conclu d e d i t was n ot authorized to consider joint custody , as n either party had requested it, we reversed a n d r e m a n ded f or f urther consideration. ¶20. Sim ilarly , i n Crider , parents in an irreconcilable-dif f erences d ivorce each requested

so l e c u s t o d y of their c hild. T h e parents subm itted the i ssue of custody to t he court f or determ ination. Af

ter considering testim ony presented and conducting an Albright analy sis, the chancellor f

ound that, even though neither parent requested joint custody , it was in the child’s best interest. Thus, she awarded joint custody to the p arents f or a two-y ear period. The m other appealed, noting that Mississippi Code Annotated s ection 93-5-24(2) ( R e v . 2 0 1 3 ) 2 prohibited a chancellor f rom awarding joint custody unless specif ically requested by the parties. This Court a greed and reversed the chancellor’s judgm ent, prom pting the f

ather
to petition f

or certiorari with the suprem e court. Af ter a thorough analy sis of the statute and its m eaning, the suprem e court stated:
It is l ogical and r easonable that “application of both parties” exists when both pa r t i e s consent to allowing the court to determ ine custody

. The f act that the parties request that the court determ i ne which p arent is to receive “prim ary custody ” does not alter thi s. The parties are allowing the court to determ ine what f o r m o f custody is in the best interest of the child. If j oint custody is determ ined to b e in the best interest of t he child using court-specif ied f actors, i.e., the Albright f

actors, the parties should not be able to prohibit this by the wording of

the consent. Crider , 904 So. 2 d at 147 (¶12). The suprem e court f urther noted that the chancellor is in the

2 S ectio n 9 3 -5 -2 4 (2 ) read s: “Jo in t cu sto d y m ay b e aw ard e d w h e re irreco n ci l a b le d if f eren ces is th e g ro u n d f

o r d iv o rce, i n th e d iscretio n o f th e co u rt, u p o n ap p licatio n o f b o th p aren ts.” 1 1best position to evaluate the “ credibility , s incerity , capabilities and intentions of the parties,”

and that it is “incum

bent upo n a c h a n c e l lor not to award joint custody ” unless in the best interest of the child. Id. a t ( ¶ 1 3 )

. T h e c ourt ultim ately held that “when parties consent in writing to the court’s d e t e r m i n a t ion of custody , they are c o nsenting and agreeing to that determ ination and this m eets t he statut o r y d i r e c tive of ‘joint application’ in [ section] 93

- 5

- 2 4 ( 2 ) .” Id. a t 148 (¶15). Finally , the court af f irm ed the c hancellor’s j udgm ent and noted t hat a “chancellor may award joint custody in a n [ irreconcilable-dif f erences] divorce, when the parties r equest t he c ourt to determ ine cu s t o d y . ” Id. a t 148-49 (¶17) (em phasis added). ¶21. Maegan incorrectly i n t e r p r e t s b o t h C l a r k a n d C rider to require a c hancellor to consider joint custody when f aced with an irreconc i l a

b l e - d i ffe r e n c e s divorce. The chancellor “is bound to consider the child’s best interest above all e lse.” Riley v. Doerner , 677 So. 2d 740, 744 ( Miss. 1996). In both Clark and C rider , the c hancellors f

ound joint custody to be in t he child’s best interest. In Clark , the chancellor incorrectly awarded sole custody to one parent despite t he f

inding that joint custody w as the child’s b e s t i n t erest; in Crider , the chancellor a w a rded joint custody because that was in the c hild’s b est interest, and the
suprem e court af

f irm ed that award. Crider and its progeny allow—not require—a chancellor
to award joint custody w h en in the best interest of the child. In the present case, the chancellor f

ound that it was in Garrett and Harley ’s best int e r e s t t o g ive custody to C.L. Though the chancellor’s or d e r ma kes no m ention o f joint custody , he is not r equired to do

so. The c h ancellor’s prim ary duty is to consider the best interests of the children and m ake

1 2a d eterm i nation of custody based on that concern. There is no evidence that the chancellor

d i sregarded the children’s b est interests when determ ining c ustody

. Th e c h a n c e l l o r ’ s c u s t o d

y award to C.L. was not error.
II. Albright Analy s is ¶22. The polestar c onsideration in child-custody cases is the b e s t i n t e r e s t of the child.
A l b r i g h t v
. Albright , 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). The A lbright f actors are as f ollows: (1) age, health, a nd sex of the child; ( 2) a determ i nation of the parent who had the continuity of care prior to the s e paration; (3) w hich parent h as the b est parenting skills and

w h ich parent has t he willingness and capacity to provide prim ary child ca r e ; ( 4 ) t h e

em ploy m ent of the parent a nd responsibilities of that em ploy m ent; (5) the p hy si c a l and

m ental health and age of the parents; (6) the em otional ties of parent and child; (7) the m oral f itness of the parents; (8) the h om e, school, and com m unity record of t h e child; (9) the pref erence of the child at the age s uf f icient to express a pref

erence by law; (10) the stability of t he hom e environm ent and em ploy m ent of e a ch p arent; and (11) other f actors relevant to the parent-child relationship. Id. ¶23. “In order to determ i ne whether or not the chancellor was ma n i f e s t l y wrong, clearly

erroneous or a

bused h is discretion in apply ing the Albright f a c tors, w e review the evidence and testim ony presented at trial under each f actor to ensure his ruling was supported by the record.” Hollon v. Hollon , 784 So. 2d 943, 947 (¶13) (Miss. 2001). However, analy sis under Albright is “not a m athem atical equation.” Hall , 1 34 S o. 3d at 827 ( ¶19) (citing L ee v. Lee , 798 So. 2 d 12 8 4 , 1288 (¶15) (Miss. 2001)). Additionally , “all the [ Albright ] f

actors are

1 3im

p ortant, but t he chancellor h a s the ultima t e d i s c r e t ion to weigh the evidence the way he

sees f i t.” Johnson , 859 So. 2d a t 1013-14 (¶36). “So long as there is substantial evi d ence in the re c o r d t h a t , if f

ound credible b y the chancellor, would provide support f or the chancellor’s decision, this C ourt m ay not intercede sim ply to substitute our c o l l e c tive opinion f or that of the chancellor.” Hammers , 890 So. 2d at 9 50 ( ¶14) (citing Bower , 758 So. 2d at 41 2 (¶33)). T he Court m ust def er to the chancellor’s f

indings under Albright if they are supported by s ubstantial e vidence and cannot r eweigh the im portance of the e v idence. Hall , 134 So. 3d at 8 28 ( ¶21) (citing Carter v. Carter , 7 35 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). ¶24. Maegan alleges that t he chancellor’s f i ndings under Albright were clearly erroneous “because s u

b s t a n t i a l , c r e dible evidence supported a lternative f indings that would f

avor either Maegan or both parents[ .]” Of t he eleven f a c tors the chancellor considered, Maegan claim s the chancellor erred i n her analy sis of nine f actors. The chancellor f

ound that f

our f actors f avored C.L.; one f

actor f avored Maegan; f

our f actors f a v ored both parents; and two f actors f avored neither p arent. Af t er thoroughly reviewing the record, including the parties’ brief s, 3

3 C .L .’s b rief to th e C o u r

t b arely ad d resses th e A lb rig h t f a cto rs o r M aeg an ’s claim s, o t h e r th a n to assert th at th e ch an cello r’s f in d in g s o f f

act sh o u ld b e g iv en d ef

eren ce. T h e en tirety o f C .L .’s arg u m en t in su p p o rt o f th e ch an cello r’s f

i n d i n g s scarcely co v ers a p ag e. In h er rep ly b rief

, M a eg an u rg es t h e C o u r

t to h o ld th at C .L

. h as w aiv ed h i s arg u m en t as to th e m erits o f th e case b ecau se h e f ailed to co m

p letely b rief h is a rg u m en t an d cited o n ly b asic p rin c ip les o f law

. We d eclin e to d o so ; m o reo v e r, in N

. E

. v. L .H

. , th is C o u rt n o ted t h at “w h e n m atters o n ap p e al t o u ch th e w elf are o f a m in o r ch ild , th en reg ard less o f w h eth er a p arty f iled a b rief

, [ w e] w i ll ‘reach th e m erits o f th e issu es in [ t h e ] ap p eal.’” N .E

. v. L .H

. , 7 6 1 S o . 2 d 9 5 6 , 9 6 2 (¶1 4 ) (M i ss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) (q u o tin g A llred v. A llred , 7 3 5 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 4 (¶9 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 1 9 9 9 )). T h o u g h h is arg u m en t is b rief , C .L

. d id f

ile a r esp o n siv e b rief an d d id cite su p p o rt f

o r h is f actu a l arg u m en t. A lth o u g h w e g en erally d esire p arties’ b rief s to p ro v id e an in -d ep t h , y et co n c ise, an aly sis, C .L .’s b rief d o es n o t am o u n t to a w aiv er. 1 4the trial transcript, and other d ocum ents, we cannot say the c hancellor’s decision to award

custody to C.L. was m anif

estly wrong or clearly

erroneous. A. The Age, Health, and Sex of the Child ¶25. Maegan c laim s that the chancellor erred in her f i ndin g t h a t “ t he age o f the children f avors neither parent” b ecause the chancellor f ailed to analy

ze or e xplain that f

inding. She points to this Court’s holdin g i n F u l k v
. Fulk , 827 S o. 2d 736 (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2002), to support her argum ent t h a t the chancellor’s brief statem ent o n the age of t he children is insuf f icient. In Fulk , t his Court reversed and rem anded a chancellor’s award of custody to the f a ther. T he chancellor in that case issued a bench ruling and did not consider all of the Albright f actors. Additionally , all of the f actors she did e xam ine w ere in the f ather’s f avor, and the chancellor o f

f ered no exp l a n a t i o n a s t o how she arrived at her conclusions. W e

rem anded f

or her f ailure to discuss and consider each f actor. Id. at 740 (¶13). ¶26. The present case signif icantly dif f ers f rom Fulk

. In the present case, the chancellor did discuss each of the A lbright f actors. The chancellor provided som e e xplanation f or each f actor with the e xception of the a ge of the children. The chancellor f ound that the children’s
ages f avored n either parent, and she provided no discussion about her f inding. However, this

F u rth erm o re, th e cases M aeg a n cites to in su p p o r t o f h er req u est b o th in v o lv ed th e a p p ella n t’s f

ailu r e to p ro v i d e a

u th o rity in su p p o rt o f h is arg u m en ts. S ee Jefferso n v. S ta te , 1 3 8 S o . 3 d 2 6 3 , 2 6 5 (¶8 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 1 4 ); T a ylo r v. K en n ed y , 9 1 4 S o . 2 d 1 2 6 0 , 1 2 6 2 (¶¶3

- 4 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 5 )

. A d d itio n ally , th o u g h C .L .’s b rief o n ly b rief ly d iscu sses th e appl i c a t i on of t he Al br i ght f acto rs, th e b u lk o f h is b rief is d ed icated to t h e arg u m en t th at M aeg an w aiv ed an y erro r b y n o t f ilin g a p o st-trial m o tio n t o th e c h a n cello r. C

. L

. cites M i ssissip p i R u le o f C iv il P ro ced u re 5 9 (e) to su p p o r t h i s arg u m en t. R u le 5 9 is in ap p l icab l e h ere. T h e ch an cello r’s j u d g m en t is f

in al an d ap p ealab le; th ere is n o req u irem en t f o r p o st-j u d g m e n t m o tio n s. 1 5one instance alone is not suf f icient t o rul e that the chancellor’s analy sis w as m anif estly

erroneous. In Fulk , the chancellor did not d iscuss s everal f actors at all, and the f

actors she did discuss were s upported by no explanation or rationale. It was necessary f or this C ourt
to reverse and rem and in Fulk as w e could not review t he chancellor’s analy sis where it did
not exist. Here, the chancellor has provided analy sis. I t is true tha t s o me f actors received

m ore analy sis than others, but som e f actors required m ore discussion. ¶27. However, Maegan claim s that the age f actor required a discussion of t he tender-y e ars doctrine. She argues that the doct r i n e , t hough weakened, still gives a presum p tion that a

m other is generally better suited to raise a y o ung c hild. 4 At the tim e of trial, Garrett was six and Harley was f

i ve. The suprem e court h as ruled that “a child is no longer o f t ender y ears when t hat child can be e qually care d f o r by persons o ther than the m other.” Mercier v. Mercier , 717 So. 2 d 304, 307 ( ¶15) (Miss. 1998). W hile the tender-y ears doctrine was once of ten determ inative of custody issues, i t is now o nly a presum ption and one of several f

actors
to b e considered. Id. S uf f icient evidence was produced a t trial to show that bo t h p a r e n t s

were equally capable of caring f or both children. W e cannot s ay that the chancellor’s f inding regarding age or her f

ailure to address the tender-age doctrine was m anif e stly erroneous. ¶28. Maegan does n ot dispute the chancellor’s f indings that Garrett’s sex f avored C.L. and Harley ’ s sex f

a vored Ma e g a n . She does dispute, however, that Garrett’s health weighs in C.L.’s f avor. Much evidence was pres e n t e d a t t rial regarding Maegan’s career as a nurse, Harley ’ s m edical issues, a n d G a r r e tt’s allergies. Both parents testif ied and were cross4 S o b ieske v. P resla r , 7 5 5 S o . 2 d 4 1 0 , 4 1 3 (¶1 0 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 0 ). 1 6exam ined on these i ssues. Though C.L. testif ied that during t he m arriage, M aegan took care of the m ajority

of the children’s healthcare due to her career, he testif ied he was f

ully able
to care f or their health needs alone. He was questioned regarding Harley ’ s dog bite and the
treatm ent it received. He w as also questioned regarding Garrett’s al l e r g y t o peanuts. The chancellor is i n the best p o s i t i o n to h ear testim ony a nd weigh its credibility

. W e will not disturb t he c hancellor’s f

indings where there is suf f i cient evidence to support her f indings. Hall , 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
B. Continuity of Care ¶29. Maegan claim s the chancellor’s f inding that continuity

of c a re f avored both parents

was erroneous. In h er o pinion, the chancellor noted that Maegan was t he prim ary caretaker
p r i or to the separation but that C.L. was the sole caretaker of the children w h e n M a e g a n worked nights. Maegan d oes n ot dispute that C.L. h as been c o ntinually involved in the care of t he children. Maegan claim s that even post-separation, she was the prim ary caretaker, as she took the children to school, got them ready f or school, and bathed t hem

— even when C.L. had them on school nights. However, C.L. disputed Maegan’s testim ony regarding her role

as sole caretaker. He t estif ied that t h e p arenting duties w ere split f airly evenly preseparation. He denied that the children were ever unclean or dirty when he returned them to Maegan’s care. W e f

ind no m anif

est error with the c hancellor’s f i n d i n g s. W e will not disturb her f

indings where suf

f icient evidence exists in support of those f indings. Id. C. Parenting Skills ¶30. Maegan does n ot dispute the chancellor’s f inding that the parenting skills f avor h er.

1 7However, she does c laim this f actor should be given m o re weight t han any other. She of f ers

no support f

or this theory

. W e decline to af f ord the parenting-skills f

actor m ore weight than other Albright f

actors. D. Willingness and Capacity to Provide Prim ary Care ¶31. The chancellor f

ound that both parents were willing and able to provide prim ary care f or Garrett and Harley

. Maegan argues that the chancellor erred because she is more capable and w illing than C.L. Maegan’s argum ent seem s t o hinge on her dedication to t he children’s healthcare and her dedication to have the children enrolled in preschool program s and educational day c are. However, C.L. testif ied that thos e t h i ngs were im portant to him as well. According to his testim ony , his objection to the children’s enrollm ent at a preschool

was not because he objected to preschool; he objected to m oving the children around f rom school to school. A gain, we decline to substitute our judgm ent and weighing o f the evidence f or the chancellor’s. Hall , 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
E. Em ploy m ent of Each Parent and the Responsibilities of that Em ploy m ent ¶32. The chancellor f

o un d t h a t M a e g a n ’ s e mp l o y me nt required her to rely on f am ily

m em bers and f riends to care f

o r the children, whereas C.L.’s j ob is m ore f lexible, u ltim ately f avoring him

. Both p a rents and s everal witnesses testif i ed a bout Maegan’s reliance upon her

m other, grandm other, and f r iends to h elp watch the children a n d e v e n pick t hem up f rom school. C.L. testif

ied that, should he be given custody , the children’s s chool would be less than a m ile f

rom h is hom e and place of business. He p lanned to k eep his job and his hom e
at least l ong e nough f

or bot h t o g r a d u a t e high school. On the other hand, Maegan’s

1 8em

ploy m ent had been unsteady s i nce graduating f r om nursing school. She had held several jobs, in s everal l ocations, since the separation. A f ew of those jobs also involved extensive travel and the need to be “on call” and available at a m om ent’s n otice—even in t he m iddle of the night. Maegan claim s the chancellor’s f inding this f

actor in C

. L

. ’ s f

avor was error when t his f

actor f avors b oth parties. However, we f ind no error. W e will no t d i s t u r b t h e chancellor’s f

indings where there is suf f icient evidence to support them

. Hall , 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
F. Phy sical and Mental Health of Each Parent ¶33. Neither party

disputes the f

inding that this f

actor f avored both parents. G. Em otional Ties Betw een Parent and Child ¶34. The c hancellor f

ound that this fa c t o r fa v o r e d n e i t h er parent, stating specif

ically : “Both parents have strong em otional ties with the children. However, not surprisingly , Garrett is closer to [ C.L.] and Harley is closer to [ Maegan].” Maegan does not dispute that statem ent but instead argues that the chancellor should have f ound this f

actor t o f a vor b o t h p a r e n ts. She cit e s Lee , 798 So. 2d 1284, to support her assertion that, “ [ u ]nless there is som e clear advantage to f

avoring one p a rent over the other, the f act that one child is closer to one parent does not preclude a f

inding that each parent had a strong and binding e m otional tie with both children.” There is nothing i n Lee to directly support this t heory ; however, sim ply because the chancellor is not p recluded f rom m aking a certain f

inding does not m e an s he is required
to m ake that f

inding. W e f

i nd no error with the chancellor’s f indings.
H. Moral Fitness of Each Parent

1 9¶35. Maegan a rgues that the chanc e l l o r e r red in f inding this f

actor to slightly f

a vor C.L. Testim ony w a s p r e s e n ted that Maegan engaged i n at least two extram a rital relationships during her m arriage and had engaged in a f ew relationships post-separation. Maegan denies these to be “relationships,” and say s that they would be isolated inc idents, should they be
true. C .L. did adm it to a r e l a t i o n ship af t er the separation, however. The chancellor noted that C.L. did not spend the night with his partner when he h a d custody of the children, whereas testim ony suggested that Maegan had enterta i n e d overnight guests w hile the children were present. ¶36. Maegan correctly asserts that m arital f ault should not be used as a sanction in custody

c a s e s . A l b r ight , 437 So. 2d at 1005. H owever, adultery i s a f actor to be considered i n evaluating m oral f

itness, though not g iven “undue w eight.” Blakely v. Blakely , 88 So. 3d 798, 804-05 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). There is no evidence that Maegan was apportioned
any “f ault” as a r e s u l t o f h er alleged relationships. There is also no evidence that the chancellor g a v e M a e g a n ’s alleged adultery a n y undue weight. W e will not d isturb the chancellor’s f

indings, as she is in the b est position to give weight t o the evidence presented to her. Hall , 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
I. Hom e, School, and Com m unity R ecord of the Children ¶37. The chancellor f

ound this f

actor to f avor C.L. She noted that though the children had attended several schools, they did not h ave a t rue “school record.” She also p ointed out that the children had been “uprooted” and m oved to a dif f erent school in the m iddle o f the y ear. She f urther noted the f

act that w hile in the Lowndes County School S y stem , G arrett had

2 0eleven unexcused absences and six unexcused tardies. Additionally , the c hancellor noted

that Maegan had to rely on others to pick up the c hildren while she worked. C onversely , if the children were with C.L., they would b e at the sam e school probably f or the rest of their school-aged lives, and they would be m uch nearer their schools, m a king i t e a s i e r o n the children to arrive on tim e and not have to wake so early

. ¶38. Maegan argues that the chancellor erred b y s t a ting that the children had no school record. This is of no consequence. Maegan’s argum ent against that statem ent centers on her adm irable insistence pre- and p ost-separation that t h e c h i l dren attend s c hools. No one disputes M aegan’s dedication t o her children’ s education. The f act that the chancellor correctly or incorrectly stated the children had no school record does not r ef lect a reversible

error on t he chancellor’s part. She suf f iciently noted other evidence t o support her f inding. ¶39. Maegan f

urther disputes the chancellor’ s f i n d i n g s t h a t i t w o u l d be easier on the children to attend school if they lived with C.L. S he claim s the chancellor’s f indings were unsubstantiated and thus were error. She argues that t h e c hildren rose early f o r school because t hey liked to get there early f or breakf ast and to socialize. She also a r gues that her

m other took the children to and f rom school b ecause her m other worked there, not because Maegan was unable to d o i t. However, the c h ancellor’s f indings also noted that Garrett had had an excessive num

ber of tardies and a

bsences f rom at least one of

his schools. It is not unreasonable f

or the chancellor to presum e t ha t the tardies stem m ed f rom the distance Maegan had to t ravel to ge t t h e children ready f or s chool; by giving c ustody to C.L., who lived m e re m inutes f

rom the school, it would benef it the children.

2 1J. Stability of Hom e Environm e n t and Em ploy m ent of Each Parent

¶40. The chancellor f

ound this f

actor to f avor C .L., noting t hat Maegan “has m oved with the children several tim es since t h e s e p a r ation. In addition, s he changed em ploy m ent f or various r easons at least three tim es since the separation.” Maegan a rgues that the chancellor did not provide suf

f icient rationale and explanation f or her f inding that C.L. has proven he

can provide a stable hom e and h a s s t a b le e m ploy m ent. She a lso claim s that she presented

reasons f or h er m oves and changes in e m ploy m ent at trial, and these reasons were a lway s f or the benef it of her c hild r e n . A dditionally , Maegan states that, at the tim e of trial, she had stable and reliable em

ploy m ent, and the cha n c e l lor should not have given so m uch weight to her past em

p loy m ent. ¶41. Maegan a rgues that the chancellor’s statem ent that C.L.’s hom e and em ploy m ent is stable is “conclusory ” and u n supported, but evidence presented at trial clearly supports such

a c onclusion. C.L. has had the sam e em ploy m e nt s ince bef

ore they m a rried; Maegan has had several dif

f erent jobs since the separation. Though M a e g a n a r gues passionately that her

m oves and changes in em p l oy m ent were a ll f

or t he benef

it of the c hild r e n , which no one denies, i t does not change the f act that her em

ploy m ent and hom e have not been as stable as C.L.’s. Thus, suf

f icient evidence existed f

or the chancellor to m ake her f i nding.
K. Other Factors Relevant to the Parent-Child Relationship ¶42. In considering other relevant f actors, t he chancellor noted an incident w here Maegan adm itted to leaving the children unattended in her car while she applied f or a job. Though Maegan prot ests that she was watching the car the entire tim e and the air conditioner was

2 2running, the c h i l dren were f rightened enough to c all 911 w hile locked in the c ar. The chancellor also s tated that s he “can not [ sic] overlook the f alse allegations m ade by [ Maegan] regarding [ C.L.] inappropriat e l y t o u c h i n g H a r l ey .” The chancellor stated that she questioned Maegan’s credibility , noting that s he had doubts about Maegan’s testim ony regarding other relationships a nd her em

ploy m e nt with Diam o nd G rove. F inally , the chancellor noted that the GAL f

ound that giving C.L. custody would be in the best interests of the children. ¶43. Maegan does n ot dispute that leaving the children in the c ar was p oor judgm ent, but she argues that t he chancellor should have f actored C.L.’s poor j udgm ent in the Albright analy sis as well. Maegan also argues t hat because the chancellor m ade no f inding that the allegations against C.L. were knowingly f alse, she should have considered t he totality of the circum stances surrounding t he allega t i o n s . Maegan f urther claim s that the chancellor had f ound the allegations to be a “dead point” because the court ordered that no one other than the GAL be allowed to discuss t hem

. Thus, M aegan alleges, the c hancellor’s r eliance on the GAL’s statem ents regarding the allegations i s reversible error. She presents no support f or this theory , and we decline to af f ord it any m erit.
L. Sum m ary of Albright Analy sis ¶44. Based on the testim ony presented at trial and t he GAL’s report, the c h a n c e l l or was

c onvinced that it would be in Garrett and Harley ’s best interest to be placed in C.L. ’ s custody

. Af

ter a thorough review of the r e c ord, we f i nd t he c hancellor’s decision supported by substantial evidence. Maegan’s contention t hat the chancellor erred in her Albright analy sis is without m erit.

2 3CONCLUSION

¶45. Maegan’s claim that the chancellor e r red by n ot considering joint custody is without

m erit. Sim ilarly , M aegan’s assertion that the chancellor’s Albright a n aly sis was f lawed also lacks m erit. Substantial evidence existed to s upport the chancellor’s determ inations, and we cannot say

her decision was m anif

estly wrong or clearly

erroneous. W e theref

ore af f irm

. ¶46. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF WEBSTER COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE AS S E S S E D TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AN D G R I F FIS, P.JJ., BARNES, I SHEE, CARLTON, M A X W E L L AND F AIR, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN P ART A N D DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

2 4