J-S86030-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: A.T.P.

APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1074 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 17, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 32A-2016 O.C.

IN RE: E.J.P.P.

APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1075 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 17, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 31A-2016 O.C.

IN RE: T.M.J.P.

APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1076 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 17, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 29A-2016 O.C.
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IN RE: L.R.P.

APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1077 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 17, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 30A-2016 O.C.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2016

A.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decree entered June 17, 2016, 

terminating his parental rights to his children, T.M.J.P., born in September 

2013; L.R.P., born in May 2012; A.T.P., born in September 2010; and 

E.P.P.,1 born in May 2015 (collectively, the “Children”), under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).2 We affirm.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 E.P.P. is also referred to as E.J. throughout this appeal.

2 The trial court also held an evidentiary hearing on CYS’s petition for 

involuntary termination of the parental rights of the Children’s mother. In 

the same decree entered June 17, 2016, the trial court terminated the 

parental rights of Mother. In its opinion entered on June 17, 2016, the trial 

court makes clear that the termination of both parents’ rights was under 

section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), and not subsection (a)(1). See Trial 

Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 6-7. On July 1, 2016, Mother filed separate 

appeals from the decree, assigned Docket. Nos. 980, 981, 982, and 983 

WDA 2016. This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals on July 28 2016. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court accurately and aptly set forth the factual background of 

this appeal as follows:

CYS personnel entered the . . . home on October 31, 

2014 to investigate a report that the oldest child, [A.T.P.], 

had sustained a suspicious orbital fracture whose origins 

the [parents] could not explain. They also found the home 

to be cluttered and dirty, with dishes stacked in the sink 

and visible mold. They took emergency custody of 

[Children] at that time and placed them with [foster 

parents]. Adjudicated dependent at a subsequent shelter 

hearing, they have been with the [foster parents] ever 

since.

As they completed an initial assessment, CYS personnel 

also discovered that [A.T.P.] was suffering from scabies 

and that [L.R.P.] had not received all of the medication his 

doctor had prescribed following his tonsillectomy. In 

addition, Mother and Father regularly missed the children’s 

medical appointments and had failed to address [A.T.P.’s] 

vision problem, for which he received corrective eye 

surgery after being placed with the [foster parents]. 

Though [T.M.J.P.] also evidenced vision problems and was 

born with a hole in her heart, moreover, the [parents] had 

failed to address either condition, while [L.R.P.], though 

not exhibiting any identifiable medical problems, was 

underweight and malnourished.

In addition to presenting with an array of medical 

needs, the children suffered from severe physical delays 

that Mother and Father failed to adequately address. At 

four years of age, [A.T.P.’s] speech was limited to a few 

isolated words that were difficult to understand, while 

[L.R.P.] and [T.M.J.P.] only made noises, some of which 

included identifiable vowel and consonant sounds. In 

addition, [A.T.P.’s] motor skills were underdeveloped and 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Because of the timing of the filing of Mother’s and Father’s appeals, a 

different panel of this Court will address Mother’s appeals in a separate 

Memorandum. 
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his gait unsteady, and [T.M.J.P.], at eleven months old, 

could not crawl, roll over, or even sit up on her own.

Mother and Father’s neglect, it seems, stemmed from a 

lack of parental capacity, not necessarily a lack of concern. 

They did not understand their children’s needs or basic 

parenting principles. As a result, they neglected to provide 

the mental, physical, and emotional stimulation that was 

essential to their children’s development. 

It is impossible for one to remedy an unrecognized 

problem, though, and the Court questions whether Mother 

and Father even recognized their children’s deficiencies. 

As Mother testified, it was Dr. Fatula who suggested in 

2011 that she contact Amazing Kids to initiate services 

that would address [A.T.P.’s] delays and Early Headstart 

that contacted her and offered additional services. It was 

not that Mother or Father observed and appreciated their 

son’s deficits and took steps to address them. That is not 

to discount their willingness to follow up and accept help, 

which they did, but to clarify that their decision to contact 

Amazing Kids was not unprompted.

By the time CYS took custody of [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and 

[T.M.J.P.], Amazing Kids was also providing services for 

the younger children, speech therapy and special 

instruction for [L.R.P.] and occupational therapy and 

special instruction for [T.M.J.P.]. Visits occurred weekly 

and lasted approximately one hour, meaning that Amazing 

Kids had therapists in the home for five or six hours per 

week. Ranging from skeptical to accepting and 

cooperative, Mother and Father complied with that regimen 

such that in-home services, which also incorporated limited 

parenting training, went uninterrupted from the time they 

started in 2011 until the children were placed with the 

[foster parents] in 2014. Upon Mother's request, CYS 

continued using Amazing Kids’ services to facilitate a level 

of continuity for the children, and under the same service 

providers’ tutelage, the children have made greater strides 

in the [foster parents’] home than they did in Mother and 

Father’s home.

Unlike [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.], E.J. never lived 

with the [parents]; he has been with the [foster parents] 

since he was born and has consistently received 
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appropriate care his entire life. Consequently, his physical, 

emotional, and mental skills have developed at a normal 

rate. He is appropriately verbal for his age and has 

adequate muscle control . . . , is alert and responsive to 

outside stimuli, and appears to be emotionally healthy.

While some of [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.’s] 

developmental issues may be intractable, the [foster 

parents] have also made every effort to meet their 

individual needs. [A.T.P.], for instance, has undergone 

corrective surgery for his eye condition and is now wearing 

leg braces, while [T.M.J.P.] is being monitored for possible 

eye surgery and will be receiving her own leg braces this 

month.1 In light of the children’s therapeutic progress, 

moreover, the Court can only assume that the [foster 

parents] are actively working to help them improve their 

motor, verbal, and other skills rather than just allowing the 

therapists access and being satisfied with the few hours of 

services the children receive from third-party providers.

1

 Mother and Father have participated in securing 

medical appointments for their children, but only to a 

very limited extent.

Since losing custody of their children, Mother and 

Father have undergone a substantial amount of parenting 

training. They began with an unspecified number of 

classes with a local pastor and, when CYS caseworker 

determined that they needed more intensive, hands–on 

program, began Community Action’s “Nurturing Parenting 

Program.” They participated in that program for a total of 

three hundred days and were taught a variety of skills, 

some of which they were able to implement during 

supervised visits with their children. Their progress, 

however, has been slow, limited, and of questionable 

permanence. Community Action’s court summaries, 

submitted as Exhibit 1, are exemplary in that regard.

In reports drafted September 17, 2015 and March 18, 

2016, respectively, Susie Reed and Lisa Doty proffered 

positive and optimistic evaluations of Mother and Father’s 

parenting achievements. They also reported both parents’ 

scores from their respective administrations of “AdultAdolescent Parenting Inventory,” the results of which 

belied the women’s subjective evaluations and indicated 
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that Mother and Father still had moderate to severe 

parenting deficits. After three hundred days in the 

program, for instance, Father scored only two out of ten 

and Mother one out of ten in the “Developing Empathy” 

category, while both managed only a three out of ten for 

“Appropriate Discipline” and one out of ten for 

“Empowering Children.” The highest score either of them 

achieved in any category was six out of ten, which was still 

two points shy of the established goal. Of serious concern, 

moreover, was that some of Mother and Father’s scores 

actually declined between testing dates. Those objective 

scores, divorced from the biases of the evaluators who 

were personally invested and wanted to see Mother and

Father succeed, tended to confirm the caseworkers’ and 

Dr. Ryen’s observations about the [parents’] capacity to 

implement the parenting skills they had been taught and 

appropriately care for [Children].

Op. of the Court, filed June 17, 2016, at 1-4 (“Trial Court Op.”).

On April 11, 2016, Jefferson County Children and Youth Services 

(“CYS” or the “Agency”) filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights with regard to each of the Children. On June 8, 2016, the 

trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At the hearing, CYS presented 

the testimony of Casey Lopez, the Children’s caseworker, and Allen Ryen, 

Ph.D., a licensed psychologist specializing in children and families. Father 

presented the testimony of Laura M. Hertel, the owner of Amazing Kids, 

L.L.C., an early intervention provider agency contracted by Jefferson County, 

as an expert in early intervention. N.T., 6/8/16, at 76-78. Ms. Hertel 

testified that she is familiar with the family in this matter, as she provided 

services to A.T.P., beginning in March of 2011, speech therapy for L.R.P., 

and special instruction for T.M.J.P. Id. at 78-79. Father then presented the 
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testimony of Susan M. Reed, who holds a bachelor’s degree in crisis and 

trauma counseling and Christian counseling, and is working on her master’s 

degree. Id. at 98. Ms. Reed also holds a certificate in parenting from 

Family Developmental Resources, and worked with the Nurturing Parent 

program. Id. She worked with Mother and Father on nurturing their 

parenting every week between June 2015 and January 2016, sometimes as 

often as three times a week. Id. at 98-99. Father testified on his own 

behalf, as did Mother. 

On June 17, 2016, the trial court entered its decree involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 

(5), (8), and (b). 

In its opinion accompanying its decree, the trial court stated the 

following:

The Court would emphasize that it does not question 

that Mother and Father love their children and have 

demonstrated their commitment to being reunited as a 

family. They attended every one of the sixty-eight, twoand-a-half hour visits CYS offered them in 2015 and have 

maintained that pattern thus far in 2016. Mother likewise 

took advantage of the five visits she was afforded in 2014. 

Both have also complied with the agency’s mental health 

requirements; Father participated in an evaluation from 

which no follow-up treatment was recommended, and 

Mother continues to receive mental health services 

consonant with her provider’s recommendations. In 

addition, Mother and Father have recently acquired a 

suitable residence.2 More than a year-and-a-half after 

having [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.] removed from 

their home, though, they are still unable or unwilling to 

keep up with their children’s medical needs, which was one 

of CYS’s primary concerns in the first place and, given the 
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children’s known conditions, is also a serious concern for 

the Court. They also have not yet advanced beyond 

supervised visits in a home-like environment and have 

failed to demonstrate that they are ready to assume 

greater responsibility.

2

Insofar as that only occurred on May 31, 2016 and 

is a month-to-month lease, however, it is far from 

certain that their housing situation will become 

stable in the near future.

Once again, it is not that Mother and Father are 

unwilling to develop acceptable parenting skills; it is that 

they are unable to do so within any reasonable timeframe. 

Their children were removed from their care approximately 

nineteen months ago, and despite their consistent efforts 

and access to relevant service providers, Mother and 

Father have made only modest improvements in their 

parenting skills and are nowhere near ready to parent four 

children on a full-time basis. Given what little progress 

they have made in the last nineteen months, in fact, the 

Court wonders whether they would ever be ready for that. 

Contributing to the Court’s uncertainty was the [Parents’] 

own testimony. Prompted by their attorneys, they agreed 

that they would need continuing services as they 

transitioned to being a family of six and indicated that they 

would solicit help if they needed it. They demonstrated no 

awareness, however, that taking complete responsibility 

for raising four children was vastly different than 

implementing learned parenting skills for a few hours in a 

home-like environment. It was telling, moreover, that 

Father saw no irony in asserting that he could support four 

children while also explaining how he had quit his job in 

favor of increased social security income and that Mother 

deemed herself ready to assume the challenges of 

parenting four children when she could not even accept 

being challenged by a person whose goal was to help her 

become a better mother and preserve her family.

Testifying about her tenure with Family Preservation, a 

service provider that seeks to improve parenting and 

family functioning, Mother affirmed that she had 

cooperated with its program until the end. She quit, she 

said, because she was being pushed. “And I’m not 

someone who likes to get pushed,” she defiantly 
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announced. Her attorney attempted to rehabilitate her 

with a series of leading questions about her willingness to 

cooperate with the same provider in the future. In light of 

her initial, spontaneous averments, however, her 

subsequent assurances were unconvincing. She had 

already informed the Court that she was unwilling to be 

confronted and challenged. While content to comply with 

services when the providers were friendly and 

encouraging, she rebelled when she deemed their 

demands to be unreasonable and “pushy.” Parenthood, 

though, is full of confrontation and challenges, and Mother 

is apparently not equipped to handle them.

The [foster parents], on the other hand, are well 

equipped to handle the challenges of raising four children, 

three of whom have special needs. They have proven as 

much in the last year-and–a half. They have loved the 

children, attended to their medical and therapeutic needs, 

and in every other way acted as concerned and supportive 

parents, and [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], [T.M.J.P.], and E.J. have 

responded accordingly. As evidenced by their delight at 

being reunited and going home with [foster mother] at the 

end of visits with Mother and Father, each implicitly 

recognizes the love and stability these foster parents have 

provided, and each has flourished under their supervision.

Conversely, three of the children show little or no 

attachment to their biological parents. E.J. has never 

known them as his primary caretakers, and their 

interactions with him during visits have been too 

superficial to foster a bond, while [A.T.P.] and [T.M.J.P.] 

generally prefer playing by themselves even when Mother 

and Father are present. [L.R.P.] is the exception, as he 

demonstrates a stronger connection with Mother. His 

affection for [foster mother] is equally strong, though, 

which is why he, like his siblings, is happy to be reunited 

with her after visits. All of the children, while they may 

indeed enjoy certain structured activities with Mother and 

Father, implicitly recognize the [foster parents] as their 

source of love and support. Mother and Father, they 

silently communicate, are merely peripheral figures in their 

lives.

Trial Court Op. at 4-6 (footnote in original).
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On July 15, 2016, Father timely filed notices of appeal, along with 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.3 This Court, sua sponte, consolidated Father’s appeals on August 9, 

2016. 

On appeal, Father raises the following issues:

Whether the Trial Court committed an error in determining 

the Father lacked parental capacity, and could not remedy 

this incapacity under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)).

Whether the Trial Court committed an error in determining 

the conditions that led to the children’s removal continue 

to exist and cannot be remedied within a reasonable time 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511[(a)](5).

Whether the Trial Court committed an error in determining 

the conditions that led to the children’s removal continue 

to exist and cannot be remedied under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511[(a)](8).

Whether the Trial Court committed an error and/or abuse 

of discretion in finding that the termination of Father’s 

parental rights was in the best interest of the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.

Father’s Br., at 3-4.4

____________________________________________

3 On July 20, 2016, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) incorporating the finding of facts and conclusions of law 

set forth in its June 17, 2016 opinion.

4 As it appears that the fourth issue in Father’s concise statement and 

brief challenges section 2511(b) determination, and, as he discusses section 

2511(b) in his fourth issue, we will consider his challenge to section 2511(b) 

preserved for our review. See Father’s Brief, at 4, 14-17. Cf. Krebs v. 

United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of 

a petition for termination of parental rights. As in 

dependency cases, our standard of review requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by 

the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 

(Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275, 

284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not 

result merely because the reviewing court might have 

reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel 

Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 

455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 

Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate 

courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the 

child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge 

to second guess the trial court and impose its own 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the 

Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal).

 
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credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions 

are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 

165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We will focus on section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
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essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied, “are not limited to affirmative misconduct[;][t]o the contrary, 

those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform 
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parental duties.” In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal 

citations omitted).

Father argues that the trial court erred in finding that CYS presented 

sufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental rights under 

section 2511(a)(2) because he has demonstrated visible progress in 

attaining varied parental skills and in remedying his parental deficits. See

Father’s Br., at 7. Father states that although Dr. Ryen testified that, “in a 

real life unsupervised parenting situation, it is not clear that these parents 

would be able to consistently apply the skills they may have learned. . . ,” he 

left open the possibility of unsupervised visitation between Father and the 

Children. Id. (citing CYS Exhibit 4, at 5. 

Father also relies on the testimony of Ms. Reed and Ms. Hertel to 

support his argument that he has the ability to remedy the causes and 

conditions of his parental incapacity. Father alleges that the record does not 

support the trial court’s determination that the testimony of Ms. Reed and 

Ms. Hertel lacked credibility, and that we should “disturb” the trial court’s 

credibility determination. Father’s Br., at 8, n.1. Father contends that the 

trial court improperly supported its determination with the testimony of the 

CYS caseworker, Ms. Lopez, which was based on her attendance at only two 

supervised visits between the parents and the Children between January and 

June of 2016. See id. at 9; N.T., 6/8/16, at 26. 
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Father argues that the present case is distinguishable from In re 

Adoption of: M.E.P., supra. In In re Adoption of: M.E.P., the mother of 

the child was mentally challenged, and, even with assistance, did not learn 

proper parenting skills while the child was in foster care for eighteen 

months. The mother depended upon her own mother, the child’s 

grandmother, and refused to leave her parents’ home or to obtain individual 

counseling. The mother made remedial measures after the filing of the 

termination petition, but her remedial measures were insufficient to show 

that she wished to learn parenting techniques. The mother also showed 

little interest in achieving her family service plan goals. Thus, the trial court 

terminated her parental rights under several subsections of section 2511, 

including (a)(2). Regarding section 2511(b), the trial court found that the 

mother lived in a place that would be dangerous to the child. The trial court 

also found that there was no parent-child bond, although the mother loved 

the child, and that the foster parents provided the child with a stable living 

environment, and intended to adopt him. We affirmed.

While Father admits that Ms. Hertel and Ms. Reed realistically see the 

need for in-home services and a parenting “refresher” following 

reunification, he states that there was not any suggestion that 24-hour 

parenting assistance was necessary. Father’s Br., at 9. Father states that 

he has become an active participant in the Children’s medical and 

developmental care. Father asserts that, given his progress in achieving
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adequate parenting skills, through his consistent investment in overcoming 

his parenting deficits, CYS has failed to sustain its burden. Thus, Father 

claims that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating his parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2).

In its opinion, the trial court stated as follows:

To the extent it is not implicit from the above findings, the 

Court would specify that it did not find Ms. Hertel and Ms. 

Reed to be credible in their assessments of Mother and 

Father’s parenting skills and family interactions. Unlike Dr. 

Ryen and the caseworker, they did not have dedicated 

training in psychology or child development or experience 

assessing familial needs from the parents’ and the 

children’s perspectives. Their roles were instead to be 

helpers and advocates for the clients they served, and it 

was apparent from their testimony that their predisposed 

bias was to emphasize areas of improvement while 

overlooking or discounting those that were problematic. 

Given the obvious deficits in both parents and children as 

of October 31, 2014, moreover, it is nearly impossible to 

otherwise understand why Ms. Hertel and her staff did not 

deem conditions at the [family] home to be of particular 

concern. They did not, though, and that fact alone makes 

Ms. Hertel’s observations and opinions suspect.

Trial Court Op. at 6.

In analyzing section 2511(a)(2), the trial court found as follows:

Termination is warranted pursuant to subsection (a)(2), 

however, as Mother and Father plainly lack parental 

capacity, and their history clearly indicates that they are 

unable to remedy that situation within a reasonable period 

of time, if ever.3

3 Under subsection (a)(2), a parent’s repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to 

parent is cause for termination where it has left the 

child without essential parental care, control, or 
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subsistence and is not likely to be remedied by the 

parent.

As the Court has already detailed, Mother and Father 

displayed severe parenting deficits that, as of October 31, 

2014, had left their children without proper medical care 

and produced substantial and perhaps irreversible 

developmental delays in [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.] and [T.M.J.P.]. 

Such was the case even though service providers had been 

in the home since 2011. Basic parenting classes, 

parenting help through Amazing Kids and Family 

Preservation, three hundred days in the “Nurturing 

Parenting Program,” and ongoing mental health services 

for Mother were only moderately successful in improving 

their parenting skills.

Nineteen months after losing custody of their children, 

Mother and Father were still far from being ready to 

assume the responsibility of raising four children, three of 

whom had been identified as having special needs. Yes 

they were able to attend to certain basic physical needs, 

like changing diapers and preparing meals, and had made 

progress - Mother more than Father - in the way they 

interacted with their children. They had only gotten that 

far after extended and intensive parenting training, 

though, and, while testifying on June 8, 2016, evidenced a 

disconcerting lack of awareness about their persisting 

parental deficits and the skills and fortitude necessary to 

raise four children. Whether additional parenting training 

and mental health services could remedy those issues is 

questionable and, at the very least, would be an extensive 

process that would leave the children in CYS’s custody for 

an unacceptable length of time. Pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), 

however, [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], [T.M.J.P.], and [E.P.P.] do not 

have to continue waiting indefinitely to see whether Mother 

and Father can acquire the capacity to appropriately care 

for them and meet their unique medical and 

developmental needs on a full-time basis and with only 

limited help from social service providers. Pursuant to § 

2511(a)(2), Mother and Father’s rights may be terminated 

so that the [foster parents] may adopt the siblings and 

guarantee them a permanent home.

Trial Court Op., 6/17/16, at 7-8 (footnote in original).
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As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s findings and credibility determinations, we find no abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion in finding that Father’s parental rights should be 

terminated under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 

817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). 

Next, Father argues that CYS failed to satisfy its burden of proof under 

section 2511(b). He contends that, although the Children undeniably have 

special needs, he would continue to exert efforts to address those needs

during a reunification process. Father states that, after only two supervised 

visits and, based on an eight-month-old bonding assessment, Ms. Lopez 

testified that termination was in the best interests of the Children. Father 

challenges Ms. Lopez’s assessment with the testimony of Ms. Reed and 

Mother that there is a positive interaction between Father and L.R.P. Father 

emphasizes that the trial court found that he and Mother love the Children, 

and have demonstrated their commitment to being reunited as a family. 

See Father’s Br., at 15-16 (citing N.T., 6/8/16, at 16). He does not 

challenge the trial court’s finding that the Children have done well in foster 

care, and that the foster parents have satisfactorily met the Children’s 

medical and developmental needs. Father expresses concern, however, that 

the trial court placed no weight on the fact that A.T.P. broke his femur while 

in the foster care placement, and he contends that the trial court should 
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have weighted this fact more heavily.5 Given the evidence of record in this 

matter, we do not agree with Father that the trial court failed to afford this 

incident any weight. 

We have explained that while the focus in terminating parental rights 

under section 2511(a) is on the parent, under section 2511(b) it is on the 

child. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) 

(en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs 

and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to

include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 

2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs 

and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 

A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

When evaluating a parental bond,

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Lopez testified, on cross-examination by Father’s counsel, that 

A.T.P. had broken his femur while playing with his sibling while in foster 

care. N.T., 6/8/16, at 25. Ms. Lopez also testified that Father was very 

concerned after A.T.P.’s injury, and appropriately followed up by sending 

A.T.P. a greeting card. Id.
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the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social 

workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. 

Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 

bonding evaluation. 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations 

omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it 

part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where direct 

observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 

A.2d 753, 762 (Pa.Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this 

analysis: 

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is 

not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s 

feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, 

the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics 

as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect 

and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage 

and completely disavow a parent . . . . Nor are we of the 

opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] 

and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a 

parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The 

psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in 

terms of the development of the child and [his or her] 

mental and emotional health than the coincidence of 

biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs 

of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 446 A.2d at 763-764 (affirming the 

involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights, despite the existence 
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of some bond, where placement with the mother would be contrary to the 

child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother would be fairly 

attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost constantly, for 

four years).

In fact, our Supreme Court has observed that the mere existence of a 

bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the 

denial of a termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of 

children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive 

parent.” See In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 

A.2d at 535)). The Supreme Court instructed, “[t]he continued attachment 

to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and 

neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are 

harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id. (quoting In 

re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 410, 418 (Pa.Super. 

2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)).

We have explained that “[a] parent’s own feelings of love and affection 

for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 

994 A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his . . . child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill his . . . parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 
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2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the 

well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the 

hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.”)).

Regarding section 2511(b), the trial court found as follows:

Pursuant to subsection (b), the Court must give primary 

consideration to the children’s developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare, and that analysis clearly 

favors termination. While in Mother and Father’s care, 

[A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.] suffered from severe 

neglect. Whether through lack of understanding or lack of 

concern, both parents failed to provide the physical, 

mental, and emotional stimuli essential to their children’s 

proper development. As a result, they experienced 

profound developmental delays and never established 

primary bonds with either parent. Consequently, it was no 

more meaningful for them to see Mother and Father at 

CenClear or CYS’s offices than it was to see Dr. Ryen or 

their service providers.

Conversely, the [foster parents] have gained a place of 

importance in the children’s hearts, and it is thus [foster 

mother] they are happy to see and go home with when 

parental visits are over. As detailed above, moreover, it is 

the [foster parents] who have attended to the children’s 

physical, mental, emotional, and medical needs since they 

were removed from their birth parents’ home, and it is 

because of them and their willingness to attend to the 

children’s special needs that they have made the progress 

they have.

E.J. is additional evidence, and perhaps the most 

convincing of all, that termination is in the children’s best 

interests. Having been placed with the [foster parents] as 

a newborn, he was never exposed to the social and 

cultural deprivation his siblings experienced and thus has 
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not suffered from the attendant developmental delays. 

Rather, he is developing normally in every respect – a fact 

that is directly attributable to his not having been exposed 

to Mother and Father’s neglectful parenting habits.

Because CYS has proven clearly and convincingly that 

termination is appropriate under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) and that it will best meet 

the children’s needs pursuant to subsection (b), therefore, 

the Court will enter a decree terminating the parental 

rights of Mother and Father with respect to both [sic] 

children.

Trial Court Op., 6/17/16, at 8-9. 

After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record 

supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to find 

no bond exists such that the Children would suffer permanent emotional 

harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated. This Court finds no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to the 

Children pursuant to section 2511(b). We, therefore, affirm the decree 

terminating Father’s parental rights with regard to the Children under 

section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/2016