PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, JJ., 

and Stephenson and Lacy∗, S.JJ. 

ARCHITECTURAL STONE, LLC, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 061797 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 September 14, 2007 

WOLCOTT CENTER, LLC, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Jerome James, Judge 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether a district court's 

ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to 

Code § 8.01-428 is an appealable order under Code § 16.1-106. 

I 

 On October 20, 2005, the General District Court of the City 

of Norfolk, in an unlawful detainer action, granted a default 

judgment in favor of plaintiffs Wolcott Center, LLC, and Lana 

Wolcott (collectively, Wolcott) and against defendants 

Architectural Stone, LLC, and Tim Watson (collectively, 

Architectural Stone). The judgment included a writ of 

possession of the subject property pursuant to Code § 8.01-128 

and monetary damages. 

 On April 5, 2006, Architectural Stone filed in the general 

district court a motion to set aside the default judgment under 

Code § 8.01-428. On April 14, 2006, the general district court 

 ∗

 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 

August 16, 2007. 
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denied the motion to set aside the default judgment. 

Thereafter, Architectural Stone filed a timely appeal to the 

Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk.

 Wolcott moved the circuit court to dismiss the appeal, 

arguing that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear 

the appeal because the general district court's ruling was not 

an appealable order. The circuit court granted Wolcott's motion 

to dismiss, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the 

general district court's ruling on the motion to set aside the 

default judgment did not dispose of the merits of the unlawful 

detainer action.

II 

 The statutory law governing civil appeals to circuit courts 

from courts not of record is set forth in Code § 16.1-106, which 

states, in relevant part, the following: 

 From any order entered or judgment rendered in a 

court not of record in a civil case in which the 

matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty 

dollars, exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees 

contracted for in the instrument, and costs, . . . 

there shall be an appeal of right, if taken within ten 

days after such order or judgment, to a court of 

record. 

 We interpreted Code § 16.1-106 in Ragan v. Woodcroft 

Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 497 S.E.2d 740 (1998), upon 

facts similar to those in the present case. In Ragan, a 

landlord brought an unlawful detainer action in a general 
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district court and obtained a judgment granting him possession 

of the subject property. The tenant did not appeal the judgment 

to the circuit court. Instead, the tenant filed a motion for a 

new trial, which the district court denied. Id. at 324-25, 497 

S.E.2d at 741. 

 The tenant then appealed the denial of the motion for a new 

trial to the circuit court. The circuit court assumed, without 

deciding, that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but 

denied the motion for a new trial on the merits. Id. at 325, 

497 S.E.2d at 741. 

 On appeal, we said that the phrase, "any order," in Code 

§ 16.1-106 granted appellate jurisdiction to the circuit court 

only over final orders and that "[a] final order or judgment is 

one that disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all 

relief contemplated." Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743. We held 

that the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial 

was not a final order or judgment because it did not dispose of 

the merits of the unlawful detainer action. Rather, "the final 

judgment in the unlawful detainer proceeding was the judgment 

awarding [the landlord] possession of the leased premises." Id. 

 Architectural Stone seeks to distinguish the present case 

from Ragan. First, it contends that the phrase, "any order 

entered," in Code § 16.1-106 includes the ruling by the general 

district court to deny the motion to set aside the default 
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judgment. That ruling, according to Architectural Stone, was an 

appealable order from that court to the circuit court. This 

same claim was made by the tenant in Ragan, and we rejected such 

a broad interpretation of the statute. We said that "this 

language provides for an appeal only from final orders or 

judgments" and that "[a] final order or judgment is one that 

disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all relief 

contemplated." Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743. 

 Second, Architectural Stone contends that an appeal of a 

ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Code 

§ 8.01-428 is distinct from an appeal of a ruling on a motion 

for a new trial under Code § 16.1-97.1. Code § 8.01-428(A) 

provides, in part, the following: 

 Upon motion of the plaintiff or judgment debtor 

and after reasonable notice to the opposite party, his 

attorney of record or other agent, the court may set 

aside a judgment by default or a decree pro confesso 

upon the following grounds: (i) fraud on the court 

[or] (ii) a void judgment. 

Architectural Stone asserts that the issues of fraud on the 

court and void judgments are "independent and distinct from the 

underlying issues in the unlawful detainer action." Continuing, 

Architectural Stone says that "[i]t is for this reason that a 

General District Court's ruling pursuant to a Code § 8.01-428 

[m]otion must be considered an appealable [o]rder." We do not 

agree. Only final orders and judgments are appealable, and we 
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reiterate that a final order in the present case is one that 

disposes of the merits of the unlawful detainer action. 

III 

 In the present case, the general district court's denial of 

the motion to set aside the default judgment was not an order or 

judgment that disposed of the merits of the unlawful detainer 

action. Rather, the order that disposed of the merits of the 

unlawful detainer action was the default judgment entered on 

October 20, 2005, and that judgment was not appealed. 

 We hold, therefore, that the general district court's 

ruling to deny the motion to set aside the default judgment is 

not a final, appealable order or judgment. Accordingly, we will 

affirm the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of 

Architectural Stone's appeal from the general district court. 

Affirmed.