IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JANINE F.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 5125

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Janine F.’s claim for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 17] is

denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 23] is 

granted. 

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability 

since June 17, 2005. Plaintiff’s claim was denied throughout the administrative 

stages, after which she appealed to this Court. The Court remanded the matter for 

further proceedings on February 8, 2012. Another administrative hearing was held, 

after which another unfavorable decision was issued. Plaintiff again appealed her 

claim to this Court, and the Court again remanded the case for further proceedings 

on May 27, 2016. Following the second remand, another hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on February 23, 2017. Plaintiff

personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. A 

vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. 

On March 13, 2017, the ALJ again denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, 

finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security 

Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving 

the ALJ’s March 13, 2017 decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, 

therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. 

Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

In the ALJ’s March 13, 2017 decision, Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in 

accordance with the five-step sequential evaluation process established under the 

Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that 

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Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her 

alleged onset date of June 17, 2005 through her date last insured of September 30, 

2008. At step two, the ALJ concluded that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff

had the following severe impairments: history of cellulitis; lower extremity edema; 

thoracic kyphosis; herniated and bulging discus of the thoracic and lumbar spine; 

and obesity. The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or 

in combination, did not meet or medically equal any listed impairments. 

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs; and no 

concentrated exposure to extreme heat. At step four, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff would be unable to perform her past relevant work as a CNA. However, at 

step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff

could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading 

to a finding that she was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

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has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

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evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

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a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ did not properly weigh the medical opinions; (2) the ALJ did 

not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective statements; and (3) the ALJ’s RFC 

determination is not based on substantial evidence. Each argument will be 

addressed below in turn.

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A. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions

In advancing her first argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in 

discounting the opinions of her “treating sources and a retrospective consultative 

opinion from a specialist . . . without providing a proper rationale for why the 

treating source and specialist opinions were not supported by the record.” (Pl.’s Br. 

at 1.) According to Plaintiff, “the ALJ failed to identify a proper evidentiary basis for 

rejecting those opinions.” (Id. at 8.) The first part of Plaintiff’s argument is directed 

to the ALJ’s consideration of the opinions of Dr. Elizabeth Ritz, her treating 

primary care physician, and Dr. Fazal Khan, who has treated Plaintiff for back 

pain.

Under the “treating physician rule,”3 an ALJ must give controlling weight to 

a treating physician’s opinion if the opinion is both “well-supported” and “not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c); see Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ must 

“offer good reasons for discounting” the opinion of a treating physician. Campbell v. 

Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Adrian Z. v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-4585, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129383, at *4 (N.D. 

Ill. Aug. 2, 2019) (“When an ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating 

3

 The Social Security Administration has modified the treating-physician rule to eliminate 

the “controlling weight” instruction. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (“We will not defer or give 

any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) ..., 

including those from your medical sources.”). However, the new regulations apply only to 

disability applications filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“For 

claims filed (see § 404.614) before March 27, 2017, the rules in this section apply.”).

Plaintiff’s application in this case was filed in 2005, and, therefore, the ALJ was required to 

apply the former treating physician rule.

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physician’s opinion, he must provide a sound explanation for the rejection.”) 

(citation omitted). Even if a treater’s opinion is not given controlling weight, an ALJ 

must still determine what value the assessment does merit. Scott, 647 F.3d at 740; 

Campbell, 627 F.3d at 308. 

In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged the opinions of Dr. Ritz, including her 

opinions that Plaintiff “was limited to sitting for 15-20 minutes and standing for 10-

15 minutes” and that Plaintiff would need “frequent rest breaks due to pain.” (R. 

684-85.) In discounting Dr. Ritz’s opinions, the ALJ reasoned as follows:

I do not assign Dr. Ritz’ opinions controlling or even great weight. I 

appreciate that Dr. Ritz is a treating doctor. However, she only 

specializes in internal medicine. Moreover, her opinions are based on 

the claimant's subjective complaints. Indeed, while Dr. Ritz stated that 

she had been treating the claimant for two years for back and right 

sciatic nerve pain, the first mention of back pain in Dr. Ritz’s records is 

in July 2006, which was accompanied by the claimant's report that she 

was filing for disability. The claimant only complained to Dr. Ritz a few

times about her alleged pain during the period at issue, and those 

complaints involved discussions of her disability claim. I note that 

during the September 2006 office visit on the date one of the letters was 

written, the claimant attributed the increased severity of her pain due 

to packing, painting, and performing other physical activities associated 

with moving, and not due to a chronic condition. More significant is Dr. 

Ritz's notation of the claimant's request that Dr. Ritz document the 

claimant's allegations in a letter, including the need to stop all activity 

several times throughout the day because the pain is so bad. Review of 

the letter confirms that Dr. Ritz did in fact include this information. I 

also find it probative that despite Dr. Ritz’s advisement of pain of such 

severity that it precludes work activity and impacts daily tasks, Dr. Ritz 

declined to prescribe any narcotic or prescription pain medication, 

opting instead to encourage the claimant to continue taking ibuprofen. 

I also find that Dr. Ritz’s own treatment notes, including on the dates 

she wrote these letters, do not reflect physical findings to support her 

opinions. These factors all amply support the conclusion that Dr. Ritz’s 

statements were based solely on the claimant’s subjective complaints, 

and not supported by any medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic 

findings. I note that while Dr. Ritz again advised in October 2008 of the 

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claimant's ability to work, she also expressly acknowledged that such an 

assessment was based on the claimant's subjective reports. Regarding 

Dr. Ritz's January 2009 opinion, I appreciate that this opinion was 

based in part on MRI findings. However, I am more persuaded by the 

examination findings, which consistently document normal neurological

functioning. I note that just a few months after the MRI, Dr. Schlagheck 

noted that the claimant had trigger point[s] in her back, but full range 

of motion of her lumbar spine, normal gait, and good strength. 

Accordingly, given these factors, I assign Dr. Ritz’s opinions minimal 

weight.

(Id. at 685 (citations omitted).)

The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. Khan. The ALJ noted that Dr. 

Khan had been seeing Plaintiff since 2011 for back pain and that he opined that 

Plaintiff could sit for five minutes, stand for five minutes, and walk zero blocks 

without rest or severe pain. (Id. at 686.) The ALJ further detailed Dr. Khan’s 

opinions, including his opinions that Plaintiff required an at will sit/stand option, 

multiple breaks, and needed a cane or assistive device. The ALJ noted Dr. Khan’s 

statement “that these limitations had been present since 2005, and . . . the claimant 

could not perform any job due to her need to change positions and side-effects of 

medication.” (Id.) The ALJ then assessed Dr. Khan’s opinions as follows:

I do not assign Dr. Khan's opinion controlling or even great weight. Dr. 

Khan did not treat or examine the claimant during the critical period at

issue. Moreover, it does not appear that he is a specialist, as he works 

in a family health center. His opinion is grossly inconsistent with the 

objective medical findings from the period at issue. In addition, there is 

no allegations of side-effects from medications related to her back during 

the critical period at issue. I note that Dr. Khan found the claimant could 

never bend/stoop, yet at the consultative examination, she was in fact 

able to bend over; other examinations document her full lumbar range 

of motion. For these reasons, I do not assign Dr. Khan's opinion any

significant weight.

(Id.)

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The Court finds that the ALJ provided the requisite sound explanations for 

discounting the opinions of Dr. Ritz and Dr. Khan. In sum, the ALJ discounted Dr. 

Ritz’s opinions because they were not within her specialty, were based on Plaintiff’s 

subjective reports, and were not supported by treatment notes. The ALJ discounted 

Dr. Khan’s opinions because he did not treat Plaintiff during the relevant 

timeframe and his opinions were not within his specialty and inconsistent with 

examination findings. Given this explicit and detailed reasoning, the Court 

concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision not to give Dr. 

Ritz’s and Dr. Khan’s opinions controlling weight. See Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 

F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An ALJ may discount a treating physician’s medical 

opinion if it is inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician, . . . or when 

the treating physician's opinion is internally inconsistent, . . . as long as he 

‘minimally articulate[s] his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of 

disability.’”) (citations omitted); Gale L-S v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 6874, 2023 WL 

2746003, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2023) (“An ALJ may discount a treating 

physician’s opinions based on the claimant’s subjective complaints.”) (citations 

omitted).

With respect to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Ritz’s opinions, Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ was “playing doctor” and relied on her “own unqualified lay opinion.” 

(Pl.’s Br. at 9.) The Court rejects that argument. The ALJ was not erroneously 

“playing doctor” by considering and weighing the evidence in relation to the various 

medical opinions. See Armstrong v. Barnhart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886-87 (N.D. Ill. 

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2003) (“Our review of the record indicates that the ALJ was not ‘playing doctor,’ but 

performing his duty to consider and weigh the evidence.”). Indeed, “comparing and 

weighing the different [medical] opinions differently based on whether they were 

supported by the medical record as a whole . . . is exactly what the ALJ is supposed

to do.” Roy R. v. Kijakazi, No. 10 CV 1687, 2022 WL 1185601, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 

21, 2022) (citations omitted). That is what the ALJ did here.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of Roger 

Miller, her treating chiropractor. In her decision, the ALJ noted the “statement 

dated December 29, 2005 [in which] Mr. Miller opined that it would be ‘very 

difficult’ for the claimant to ‘do any occupation’ due to her spinal conditions and 

acute exacerbations.’” (R. 685.) In rejecting Mr. Miller’s opinion in that regard, the 

ALJ reasoned that he was “not an acceptable medical source” and “he acknowledged 

that he was without knowledge of the claimant’s current status” at the time he 

rendered the opinion. (Id.) The ALJ further reasoned that Mr. Miller “did not 

examine the claimant during the period at issue” and “[e]ven his treatment notes 

prior to the period at issue do not support his assessments.” (Id.) The ALJ also 

reasoned that there was “no evidence that chiropractor Miller possesses the 

vocational expertise to conclude that the claimant does not have the ability to 

perform any occupation.” (Id.) The ALJ also considered Mr. Miller’s subsequent 

opinion that Plaintiff would “continue to have acute onsets of low back pain/sciatica 

due to possible lumbar disc herniation” and Plaintiff was “very restricted in her 

employment future.” (Id. at 686.) The ALJ similarly discounted that opinion 

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because Mr. Miller was not an acceptable medical source and “[h]is opinion is 

beyond his expertise [and] it is not supported by examination findings by actual 

doctors as well as the consistent normal neurological findings.” (Id.) The Court finds 

no error in the ALJ’s treatment of Mr. Miller’s opinions. The ALJ reasonably 

rejected the opinions, in sum, because Mr. Miller concededly was not an acceptable 

medical source and his opinions were not based on contemporaneous treatment, 

were not supported by treatment notes, and were inconsistent with other 

examination findings.

Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of a statement provided by 

Dr. George DePhillips, a non-treating consultant. The ALJ assessed Dr. DePhillips’ 

statement as follows:

The claimant's representative submitted a signed statement from 

neurologist, Dr. George DePhillips dated December 18, 2012 indicating 

that MRI studies were consistent with the claimant's subjective pain 

complaints and that in all probability the claimant would have

experienced such symptomatology since at least June 2005. However, 

the issue is not whether the condition exists, but instead whether the 

claimant's condition is disabling. Here, I find that it is not. While the 

claimant has a long history of back pain, even before the alleged

disability onset date, the claimant is not automatically disabled due to 

the findings of herniated disc. The overall record shows there has been 

minimal treatment and minimal examination findings during the period 

at issue.

(R. 686 (citations omitted).) Again, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment 

of Dr. DePhillips’ statement. The ALJ reasonably rejected Dr. DePhillps’ vague 

conclusion offered many years after the period in question because it was 

inconsistent with the treatment and examination findings that occurred during the 

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relevant timeframe. Accordingly, overall, the Court finds Plaintiff’s challenges to 

the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinion evidence unavailing.

B. The ALJ’s Subjective Symptom Assessment

For her second argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating 

her subjective symptoms. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “over-relied 

on Plaintiff’s daily activities without consideration for Plaintiff’s difficulty in 

performing those activities.” (Pl.’s Br. at 1.) In her decision, the ALJ detailed 

Plaintiff’s allegations that “her ability to work is limited due to cellulitis in her right 

leg; shifting disc in her back; and sciatica.” (R. 678.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s 

allegation “that her pain starts from her lower back and radiates down her right 

leg.” (Id. at 678-79.) The ALJ further noted Plaintiff’s reports that “her back pain 

has increased and makes it difficult for her to take care of her personal needs” and 

her testimony that “her back pain is constant” and “she is unable to sit or stand for 

longer than 15 minutes continuously; unable to lift more than ten pounds; and 

unable to bend at the waist.” (Id. 679.) However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s 

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] 

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

in the record.” (Id. at 681.)

In support of her determination that Plaintiff’s complaints were not fully 

corroborated, the ALJ explained that “the medical records do not support the 

severity of the claimant’s alleged symptoms to the extent alleged,” including 

because exam findings showed “[m]otor strength [of] 5/5 throughout” and “[s]he was 

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able to walk on her toes and heels, and tandem walk, squat, and stand on one leg.” 

(Id.) Along those lines, the ALJ noted that “physical examinations have essentially 

been within normal limits.” (Id. at 683.) The ALJ further explained that “the record 

reflects that on numerous occasions the claimant failed to even mention complaints 

of back pain, especially to her treating physician Dr. Ritz.” (Id. at 682.) Additionally, 

the ALJ reasoned that the medical “findings simply do not support the claimant’s 

allegations of 10/10 level pain, difficulty getting dressed, laying down most of the 

day, an inability to bend over, and daily use of a cane and/or walker.” (Id. at 683.)

This Court gives “the ALJ’s credibility finding special deference and will 

overturn it only if it is patently wrong.” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 

(7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[P]atently wrong . . . 

means that the decision lacks any explanation or support.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Under that standard, the Court 

finds that, per the ALJ’s explanation and support outlined above, the ALJ 

reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully corroborated. See 

Prill v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1381, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1072, at *23 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 

2022) (“Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Prill’s account 

of her subjective symptoms was not consistent with her medical records.”); Ray v. 

Saul, 861 F. App’x 102, 107 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Because the ALJ’s weighing of 

[claimant’s] reported symptoms in the context of the whole record is supported by 

substantial evidence, we find no reversible error on this front either.”); Schrank v. 

Saul, 843 F. App’x 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he ALJ’s credibility determination 

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was not ‘patently wrong,’ because she found [claimant] not credible for several 

reasons that were adequately supported by the record.”) (citation omitted); cf. 

Lacher v. Saul, 830 F. App’x 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The ALJ’s rationale here was 

thin, but it was adequate to reflect her conclusion that the objective medical 

evidence and Lacher’s daily activities did not corroborate his subjective 

symptoms.”). Indeed, Plaintiff herself concedes that the ALJ provided multiple 

reasons for discounting her subjective statements, including “because she was able 

to perform some activities of daily living, the record did not contain objective finds 

that the ALJ would have expected to find in the record, and because Plaintiff’s 

treatment did not occur with the frequency and in the manner the ALJ would have 

expected.” (Pl.’s Br. at 12.)

Concerning Plaintiff’s specific challenge concerning her activities, the ALJ 

provided the following analysis:

The record shows the claimant engaging in exertional activities, which 

are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of 

disabling symptoms and limitations. For example, the medical evidence 

of record further shows that on September 6, 2006, the claimant

reported “terrible back pain,” worsened by packing and painting in 

preparation for a move. She stated that she simply took Ibuprofen three 

or four times a day with some relief, and that she also needed frequent 

rest breaks to cope with the pain. Dr. Ritz noted that the claimant had 

“again” hurt her lower back while moving to a new house. In May 2008, 

the claimant reported that she might have been bitten while mowing the 

lawn.

(R. 681 (citations omitted).)

Plaintiff argues that an ALJ is required to “consider difficulties in how [] 

activities are performed or modified.” (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) Plaintiff’s contention in that 

regard is somewhat puzzling, given that the ALJ did explicitly recognize that 

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moving and painting allegedly exacerbated her pain. Plaintiff herself acknowledges 

that “[t]he ALJ stated that [Plaintiff] suffered pain in preparing to move to a new 

home, and again suffered pain after the move.” (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that “the 

ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s testimony that she needed to frequently shift 

positions and take rest breaks while performing activities.” (Id.) Again, that 

assertion is rebutted by the fact that the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff allegedly 

needed breaks to cope with the pain. In any event, the Court concludes that it was 

reasonable for the ALJ to determine that Plaintiff engaging in taxing activities such 

as packing and mowing the lawn tended to contradict Plaintiff’s allegations of 

disabling pain. Defendant is correct that “[t]he ALJ did not impermissibly equate 

these activities with an ability to work full time – instead, she cited these activities 

as evidence undercutting Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms.” (Def.’s 

Memo. at 8.)

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erroneously “discounted Plaintiff’s 

allegations because she did not frequently go to the doctor during the relevant time 

period” given Plaintiff’s explanation “that she could not always afford consistent 

medical treatment.” (Pl.’s Br. at 13.) In her decision, the ALJ “appreciate[d] that 

[Plaintiff] has limited funds for medical care” but noted that the record revealed 

“infrequent trips to the chiropractor and relatively rare treatment for the allegedly 

disabling symptoms.” (R. 682-83.) The Court agrees with Defendant that “[a]lthough 

Plaintiff purportedly had ‘limited funds for medical care,’ the ALJ was nonetheless 

justified in concluding that this fact alone did not sufficiently explain away the 

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dearth of treatment.” (Def.’s Memo. at 6.) And, ultimately, Plaintiff has not shown 

that the ALJ’s evaluation of her subjective symptoms was “patently wrong,” as was 

Plaintiff’s burden. See Horr v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 16, 19–20 (7th Cir. 2018). 

C. The ALJ’s RFC Determination

For her final arguments, Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ failed to account for 

Plaintiff’s need for additional rest periods while performing activity” and “further 

erred in failing to incorporate a proper sit/stand opinion in the RFC determination.” 

(Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.) As an initial matter, as discussed above, the ALJ did in fact 

consider Plaintiff’s allegation that she needed frequent rest breaks to cope with pain 

while engaging in activities. Additionally, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he ALJ 

alternately found that Plaintiff would be able to sustain work with a sit/stand 

opinion.” (Id. at 15.) In any event, as Defendant point out, “[n]either the two stateagency medical consultants nor the consultative examiner Dr. Budzesnki believed 

that Plaintiff required ‘additional rest periods’ or a ‘sit/stand’ option.” (Def.’s Memo. 

at 14.) The Court ultimately agrees with Defendant that “Plaintiff’s proposed 

limitations seem to find their only support in Plaintiff’s own claims, which the ALJ 

reasonably discredited, and the opinion of Dr. Khan – rendered long after her date 

last insured – which the ALJ reasonably gave limited weight.” (Id.) Accordingly, the 

Court finds Plaintiff’s final arguments unavailing. 

Case: 1:20-cv-05125 Document #: 30 Filed: 06/06/23 Page 17 of 18 PageID #:1414
18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not well 

taken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 17] is denied, 

and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 23] is 

granted. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: 

 

DATE: June 6, 2023 ________________________________ 

 HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:20-cv-05125 Document #: 30 Filed: 06/06/23 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:1415