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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

MICHAEL HORTON, 

 Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 13, 2017 

v No. 330347 

Wayne Circuit Court 

MCLAREN PERFORMANCE 

TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and LINAMAR USA, 

INC., 

LC No. 15-010998-AW 

 Defendants/Cross-Appellees, 

and 

CITY OF LIVONIA, 

 Defendant. 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and GLEICHER and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff, Michael Horton cross-appeals1

 by right the trial court’s order denying his 

request for a writ of mandamus against defendant City of Livonia (Livonia) and dismissing his 

breach of contract claims against defendants McLaren Performance Technologies, Inc., 

(McLaren) and Linamar USA, Inc. (Linamar). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 In March 2010, McLaren proposed to rezone a portion of property located at 32233 Eight 

Mile Road in Livonia to build new structures. Horton, who lived adjacent to the property, was 

one of the property owners who submitted letters of protest to Livonia. At a meeting of 

Livonia’s Planning Commission, McLaren outlined its plans for the property to the attending 

 

1

 The initial appeal in this case was dismissed on stipulation of the parties. Michael Horton v 

McLaren Performance Technologies Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

March 18, 2016 (Docket No. 330347). 
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property owners. According to Horton’s complaint, he entered into a contract with McLaren and 

Linamar after the meeting. Horton promised to withdraw his formal protest in exchange for 

McLaren and Linamar’s promises “(1) to construct a flat parking lot of not more than 60 parking 

spaces, (2) to build a retention pond, (3) to build its manufacturing facility and parking lot in 

substantial conformity with the plans that were presented to the City of Livonia in April 2010 

and (4) to not seek further expansion on the property.” Subsequently, McLaren sent a letter to 

the Livonia City Council on April 21, 2010, stating a number of voluntary conditions that it 

agreed to incorporate into its rezoning petition. Livonia approved rezoning in April 2010. 

 On August 20, 2015, Horton filed his complaint in this action, in part alleging that 

McLaren and Linamar breached their contract by building a more extensive parking lot and 

failing to incorporate the landscaping they had agreed to. Horton requested that the trial court 

issue a writ of mandamus against Livonia and issue an injunction to halt construction. 

 At the November 12, 2015 hearing, the trial court heard arguments related to Horton’s 

writ of mandamus and the preliminary injunction; Horton’s alleged contract with McLaren and 

Linamar was only mentioned in passing, when McLaren and Linamar alleged that Horton’s 

complaint for breach of contract referred to the voluntary conditions that they had incorporated 

into their zoning conditions with Livonia instead of a separate contract. Following the hearing, 

the trial court issued an injunction until McLaren obtained rezoning of the property in 

accordance with proper procedures, but the trial court sua sponte dismissed Horton’s claim for 

breach of contract on the basis that Horton could not enforce the voluntary conditions between 

McLaren, Linamar, and Livonia. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

 We review de novo questions of standing. Barclae v Zarb, 300 Mich App 455, 467; 834 

NW2d 100 (2013). We also review de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). MCR 2.116(I)(1) 

provides that “[i]f the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if 

the affidavits or other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall 

render judgment without delay.” However, the trial court may not contravene a party’s due 

process rights when granting summary disposition under this provision. Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 

286 Mich App 483, 489; 781 NW2d 853 (2009). 

III. STANDING 

 Horton contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his breach of contract claims 

against McLaren and Linamar. We agree. 

 At a minimum, due process requires that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be 

heard regarding its claims. Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 235; 848 NW2d 380 

(2014). 

 In his complaint, Horton alleged that he had entered into a contract in April 2010 with 

McLaren and Linamar regarding the conditions under which he would withdraw his objection to 

rezoning. Horton also alleged that McLaren and Linamar violated those conditions. It is clear 

from the record that the trial court mistakenly conflated Horton’s alleged independent contract 
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with McLaren and Linamar’s voluntary conditions attached to their zoning petition. Horton was 

not seeking to enforce the voluntary conditions that McLaren and Linamar agreed to with 

Livonia. As a result, Horton was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the 

existence of the alleged contract between himself, McLaren, and Linamar. 

 McLaren and Linamar argue that this Court should affirm the trial court’s dismissal 

because any contract was oral and cannot meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. 

However, because of the procedural posture of this case, there is no factual record regarding the 

existence or nonexistence of a written contract, or, if the contract was oral, whether the statute of 

frauds would bar it on its terms. We lack the necessary facts to affirm on this basis. See People 

v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007) (discussing the 

circumstances under which this Court may decide unpreserved issues). 

 We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition on Horton’s 

breach of contract claims against McLaren and Linamar. Because this is the only issue Horton 

raises on appeal, we do not disturb the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Horton’s 

claims against Livonia. We approve the parties’ stipulation dismissing the City of Livonia from 

this proceeding. 

 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra