alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          18,616
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,947
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (438)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                50,415
<PP&E>                                          69,940
<DEPRECIATION>                                  44,883
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 199,539
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           44,907
<BONDS>                                        191,078
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           27,538
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                    (52,763)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   199,539
<SALES>                                        134,806
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               134,806
<CGS>                                          106,730
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  106,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                35,682
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,922
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (17,659)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       245
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (17,904)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (2,816)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (20,720)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Power ConversionCorporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 28,2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Rodger B. Dowdell, Jr., Chairman, President and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)            The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)            The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/ Rodger B. Dowdell, Jr.                       |   |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                             |
| Rodger B. Dowdell, Jr.                           |
| Chairman, President and  Chief Executive Officer |
|                                             |
| May 7, 2004                                      |

 

The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of aseparate disclosure document.

 

----
#### William East *v.*Eliz. Canady, etc.

Witnesses — Inconsistent Statements.

Where a witness’ statements are not consistent, but he is not impeached, or directly contradicted, his evidence can not properly be disregarded.

APPEAL PROM WAYN'E 'CIRCUIT COURT.

January 14, 1873.

*Van*Winkle, *for appellant.*

*James, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Martin Silvees was a competent witness in favor of the widow and children of John Silvees, deceased. He had no interest with them in their defense, but was rather interested in compelling them to pay his debt, and as the proceeding against him was upon a return of *nulla boncn*he was liable for costs, whether it resulted in the discovery and subjection of any of his estate to the payment of his debt or not.

His statements are not altogether consistent, but as he is neither impeached nor1 directly contradicted, his evidence could hardly have been properly disregarded.

Even if it be true that he voluntarily and without consideration remitted to appellees two hundred dollars of the purchase price originally agreed to be paid for the land, we do> not well see how appellant can complain on that account.

By the sale of what he claimed to- be Martin Stevens’ equity of redemption in a tract of land, he, by his own bid, satisfied his execution in full. This was done on the 3d day of January, 1865.

The deed to these appellees was made fifteen days afterwards, when appellant had no apparent claim against Martin Silvees. Having elected to take Martin Silvees’ title to' this land, in satisfaction of his debt, these appellees had the legal right to make any arrangement with the latter they could to perfect this title, and it can scarcely be inferred that by releasing a portion of the purchase money, as matters then stood, the parties intended to practice fraud on appellant. His petition.as to appellees was properly dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4037 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  2d Session

                               H. R. 4037

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 475 Kell Farm Drive in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the ``Richard G. 
             Wilson Processing and Distribution Facility''.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4037

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 475 Kell Farm Drive in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the ``Richard G. 
             Wilson Processing and Distribution Facility''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 475 
Kell Farm Drive in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Richard G. Wilson Processing and Distribution 
Facility''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Richard G. Wilson Processing 
and Distribution Facility''.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 20, 2004.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Jno. H. Jesse *v.*S. E. Jones

Bills and Notes — Action—Pleading—Demurrer.

Where a note plainly imports a personal obligation of the maker, a petition against the maker in his official capacity as guardian is demurrable at the instance -of the guardian’s sureties.

APPEAiL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT. '

January 8, 1873.

*Porter, Wallace, for appellant.*

*D. L. Thornton, W. Ttvrner, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin:

The note for $106.85 exhibited by the appellee, as evidence of his debt, appears to have been taken in satisfaction of the accounts for taxation, and according to repeated decisions of this court, plainly imparts the personal obligation, of A. H. Bohannan, the fact of his being guardian being shown only as matter of identity and description. It is not alleged that the acceptance of this note was induced by fraud or mistake. The action should, therefore, have been treated as against A. H. Bohannan and his sureties on his bond, as guardian, for the individual debt of A. H. Bohannan. The demurrer of the sureties to the petition should, therefore, have been sustained, independently of the question whether, in any case, an action can be maintained directly on the bond of a guardian for an ordinary liability incurred by the guardian, as such for and on behalf of the wards.

It results that the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the petition, and also in instructing the jury, and passing an instruction inconsistently with the views we have stated, is deemed erroneous.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16

- 0996 Filed May 17, 2017

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JANIE JO DRAKER - FALCON AND ESTEBAN FALCON Upon the Petition of JANIE JO DRAKER - FALCON , n / k / a JANIE JO DRAKER - RANDALL , Petitioner

- Appell ee , And Concerning ESTEBAN FALCON , Respondent

- Appell ant

.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, George L. Stigler , Judge.

The husband appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment. AFFIRMED.

John J. Sullivan of Sullivan Law Office, P.C. , Oelwein , for appellant. Gary F. McClintock of McClintock Law Office , Independence , for appell ee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.2

POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Janie Draker

- Falcon (now known as Janie Draker

- Randall) filed a petition for dissolution on December 30, 2010. H er husband, Estaban Falcon, was personally served on Jan uary 6, 2011. He did not file a response . Janie then sent Estaban a notice of her intent to file an application for default judgment in
J anuary and February. The court entered a default judgment on April 12. Estaban file d a motion to set aside the default judgment on May 3,
2016

— more than five years after it was entered. In his motion, Estaban
maintained he had never received Janie’s notice s of intent to file for default judgment or a copy of the judgment itself. He cla imed this constituted “good cause” to set aside the judgment . After a hearing on the moti on, the district court denied Estaban’s motion , finding it was untimely.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977 provides: On motion and for good cause shown, and upon such terms as the court prescribes, but not ex parte, the court may set aside a default or the judgment thereon, for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty. Such motion must be filed promptly after the discovery of the grounds thereof, but not more than 60 days after entry of the judgment . Its filing shall not affect the finality of the judgment or impair its operation. (Emphasis added.) While Estaban claims there is good cause to set aside the judgment, he has not r ecited

— and we have not found

— any authority providing an exception to the sixty

- day limit found in rule 1.977. Thus, even if we believed Estaban’s claims that he was unaware of the default judgment until April 2016 when his wages were first garnished, we c annot say the district court erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
#### Walter C. Whitaker *v.*E. M. Gault.

Parties — Necessary Parties.

In a suit on a traverse bond, it was held that it was not necessary that all the obligors be made parties. .

Principal and Surety — Traverse Bond.

A surety on a traverse bond was held liable because the traverse was not prosecuted with effect.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON ’CIRCUIT COURT.

March 14, 1873.

*562
      *John C. Walker, for appellant.*

*Bodley & Swnrcdl, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

■ It is too late now to inquire whether the traverse of the finding of the jury in the forcible entry and detainer cáse of *Grnlt v. Price*should have been prosecuted to the .county court instead of the Court of Common Pleas. The judgment of the latter court was affirmed on appeal by this court, and that judgment is now conclusive as to the validity of the bond sued on. It was not necessary that all the obligors to the bond should have been sued. Appellee had the right to sue all or any of them.

The answer presented no legal ground of defense, and the judgment upon the facts as to damages sustained seems to be for the proper amount.

It is therefore affirmed. In response to petition for rehearing, we would say, that the record shows that the traverse bond was not taken by the Common Pleas Courts, but by Matlock, the justice, who was the proper person to take it. The condition of the bond is that Price and Whitaker would pay to Gault all damages he might sustain by reason and in consequence of the traverse if it should not be prosecuted with effect. It was not prosecuted with effect, hence Whitaker, the surety, is liable.

Petition overruled.
#### Lelan C. Haynes *v.*Karen Sue Haynes.

[No. 2-675A157.

Filed November 26,1975.]

*Richard W. Reed,*of Muncie, for appellant.

*Thomas L. Raisor,*of Muncie, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

— The appellee previously filed in this . cause her Motion to Dismiss or Affirm which alleged various defects in . the record, of the proceedings and the appellant’s brief. Thereafter the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss,. ordered the Motion to Affirm held in abeyance and ordered the appellant to rebrief, said amended brief to be prepared in accordance with Rule AP. 8.3, and to be filed within 20 days, failing which, the motion to affirm.would be sustained. .

The appellant has now filed his amended brief. Again, the amended brief fails to comply with the rule, more particularly, AP. 8.3 (A) (7) pertaining to argument.

*56This appeal is from a judgment modifying a prior order for child support. The appellant argues generally that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss directed to the petition to modify, that the court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for a finding for respondent at the close of petitioner’s evidence, and that the court erred in its judgment of modification in that the amount of the recovery was excessive. We emphasize that the argument is general. The several portions of the argument are mere argumentative assertions of error. Appellant has not supplied us with any reasons in support of his contentions and the only authority he cites is a portion of IC 1971, 31-1-11.5-17. There is no specific, cogent argument with citations of authority together with a showing of how the arguments and authorities are applicable to the facts of this case, all as required by Rule AP. 8.3 (A) (7) ,1

We again point out that after the appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm was filed we permitted appellant to file an amended brief, and specifically directed that it be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Rule AP 8.3. Appellant thus had a second chance to prepare a brief which would conform to the rule after the deficiencies of his first brief were pointed out to him.

Since the appellant has presented no argument which supports his allegations of error, he has therefore waived those claimed errors and nothing is preserved for review. Accordingly, the appellee’s Motion to Affirm, heretofore ordered held in abeyance, is now granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Note. — Reported at 337 N.E.2d 580.

1

. *Citizens National Bank of Grant County*v. *Harvey*(1975), Ind. App., 334 N.E.2d 719. *Bell*v. *State*(1975); 165 Ind. App. 56, 330 N.E.2d 752. *Rabb v. Miller*(1974), 161 Ind. App. 471, 316 N.E.2d 458, *Williams*v. *State*(1973), 260 Ind. 543, 297 N.E. 805,
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE COMPANY DOES NOT FILE A CLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET, THEREFORE THESE NOT
PROVIDED.  5-02 (9), 5-02 (21)
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           5,826
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,966
<ALLOWANCES>                                       280
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         655,394
<DEPRECIATION>                                  92,762
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 586,049
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        199,598
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           237
<OTHER-SE>                                     367,756
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   586,049
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                54,880
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   21,752
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,900
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   119
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,227
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,882
<INCOME-TAX>                                       181
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,701
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,701
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.48
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Perry L. COLTER, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-6983.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 22, 2004.

Decided: Dec. 6, 2004.

*235Perry L. Colter, Appellant pro se.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Perry L. Colter, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion to vacate judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), which Colter attempted to bring under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a

§ 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Colter has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Colter’s notice of appeal and informal brief on appeal as an application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. *See United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*540 U.S. 995, 124 S.Ct. 496, 157 L.Ed.2d 395 (2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact finder would have found the movant guilty. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), 2255 (2000). Colter’s claim does not satisfy either of these conditions. Therefore, we decline to authorize Colter to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *236the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
IV

House Calendar No. 276

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 588

[Report No. 105–805]

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4761) to require the United

States Trade Representative to take certain actions in response to the

failure of the European Union to comply with the rulings of the World

Trade Organization.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 9, 1998

Mr. DREIER, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution;

which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4761) to require

the United States Trade Representative to take certain

actions in response to the failure of the European Union

to comply with the rulings of the World Trade Organization.

1 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution

2 it shall be in order without intervention of any point of

3 order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 4761) to

4 require the United States Trade Representative to take

5 certain actions in response to the failure of the European
2

HRES 588 RH

1 Union to comply with the rulings of the World Trade Or2 ganization. The bill shall be considered as read for amend3 ment. The previous question shall be considered as ordered

4 on the bill to final passage without intervening motion ex5 cept: (1) one hour of debate on the bill equally divided

6 and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority

7 member of the Committee on Ways and Means; and (2)

8 one motion to recommit.

House Calendar No. 276

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 588

[Report No. 105–805]

RESOLUTION

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4761)

rulings of the World Trade Organization.failure of the European Union to comply with thetive to take certain actions in response to theto require the United States Trade RepresentaOCTOBER 9, 1998

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
EXHIBIT 32.1NOVELLUS SYSTEMS, INC.CERTIFICATIONIn connection with the periodic report of Novellus Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q forthe period ended April 1, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”),I, Richard S. Hill, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 ofthe United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for theperiods indicated.This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, “filed” with the Securities and ExchangeCommission.       Dated: May 11, 2006 By: /s/ Richard S. Hill Richard S. Hill      Chairman of the Board of Directors