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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

GENARO GALINDO, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20-cv-03409

)

v. ) Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., ) Magistrate Judge Valdez

)

Defendants. )

LIMITED CONSENT TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO

Defendant City of Chicago, by its attorney, Edward N. Siskel, Corporation Counsel,

hereby stipulates to the following:

1. On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging that Defendants violated his Constitutional rights. [ECF 24]. Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint brings the following claims: Count I – fourth amendment unreasonable seizure; Count 

II – conspiracy; Count III - fourth amendment unlawful detention; Count IV – a Monell claim 

against Defendant City. Id.

2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights as a result of various policies, practices, and customs of the City. [ECF 24] In 

other words, Plaintiff has brought a Monell claim against the City. See Monell v. Department of 

Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff seeks a judgment against the 

City for damages caused by the alleged violation of his rights under the Constitution.

3. Even if the constitutional rights of Plaintiff were violated as alleged, the City

specifically denies any such constitutional violation was caused by a person with “final

policymaking authority,” denies the City has any “policies, customs, or practices” that cause

Exhibit A

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constitutional deprivations, denies it has any widespread deficient or unconstitutional practice that

is “so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,” denies 

it has the requisite degree of culpability therefrom, and denies that any alleged “policy, custom, or 

practice” of the City directly caused the alleged violations that would give rise to liability under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

4. Without admitting the Monell allegations in the Complaint, the City will consent to 

entry of judgment against it for compensatory damages and, to the extent allowed by the court,

reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, if the finder of fact in this case finds that

Individual Defendants are liable for a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights as alleged in the 

Complaint. The terms of this Consent also will apply if Individual Defendants are found liable to 

Plaintiff on a motion for summary judgment, or found liable to Plaintiff pursuant to any other court 

procedure not involving a finder of fact that determines, based on the merits of this case, that 

Individual Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for a violation of his constitutional rights as alleged in 

the pending Complaint.

5. With respect to Individual Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity, the City

will consent to entry of judgment against it for compensatory damages and, to the extent allowed

by the Court, reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, if the finder of fact determines 

that Individual Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights as alleged in the Complaint, 

even if Individual Defendants are further found to be not liable to Plaintiff because they are entitled 

to qualified immunity.

6. For this purpose and in this case only, the City waives its right under Monell not to 

be found liable for damages pursuant to Section 1983 without proof that the City by its “policy, 

custom, or practice,” and with the requisite degree of culpability, caused the alleged constitutional 

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violation. As stated herein, if liability for a constitutional violation regarding Plaintiff is found 

against Individual Defendants, the City agrees to accept liability against it for compensatory 

damages and, to the extent allowed by the Court, reasonable attorney fees, based solely on that 

alleged constitutional violation, and not upon any alleged “policy, custom, or practice.” The 

Consent to Entry of Judgment will not apply to liability based on a settlement to which the City is 

not a party, or a non-court procedure, such as arbitration or mediation, unless the City agrees to be 

bound by such proceedings.

7. The City does not waive any defense it may have to the claims in this case except

as specifically stated above. The City also retains the right to move to alter or amend any judgment, 

move for judgment as a matter of law reversing such judgment, appeal, or seek any other post-trial 

relief from such judgment based on any grounds not inconsistent with this Consent.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kyle A. Rockershousen

Kyle A. Rockershousen

Iris Chavira

Raoul Mowatt

City of Chicago - Department of Law

Federal Civil Rights Litigation Division

30 N. LaSalle, Suite 900

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 744-0742

Kyle.Rockershousen@CityofChicago.org

Attorneys for Defendant City of Chicago

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