IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ABC CORPORATION I and 

ABC CORPORATION II., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND 

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 20-cv-4806 

Judge Thomas M. Durkin 

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole 

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 

REGARDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2019) does not control because: (1) 

Matlin does not address Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which governs personal jurisdiction over a 

foreign defendant like Jiangyou-US; (2) Matlin did not address federal causes of action based on 

“offers to sell,” which is an act of patent infringement alleged here; and (3) Federal Circuit 

authority permits considering the jurisdictional contacts of the moving defendant’s alter egos. 

I. Rule 4(k)(2) Governs Personal Jurisdiction Here 

The parties initially briefed the wrong applicable law. Jiangyou-US’s opening brief 

never cited Federal Circuit authority. Dkt. 363. As such, although Plaintiffs cited some Federal 

Circuit authority, we focused primarily on cases interpreting the Illinois Long Arm Statute. Dkt. 

412. But those briefs may point the Court in the wrong direction, because Federal Circuit law 

applies to personal jurisdiction in patent infringement cases. See Coolsavings.com, Inc. v. 

IQ.Commerce Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1999), citing 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech 

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Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 1998).1

 The parties also did not address Rule 

4(k)(2), which is the essential rule controlling whether this Court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. See Genetic Veterinary Scis., Inc. v. LABOKLIN GmbH & 

Co. KG, 933 F.3d 1302, 1310–12 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign 

defendants under Rule 4(k)(2) in a patent action). 

The Federal Circuit has interpreted Rule 4(k)(2) as a “federal long-arm statute,” 

extending personal jurisdiction when the contacts with the forum state would not otherwise 

warrant it. See Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 

1285, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Rule 4(k)(2) personal jurisdiction is proper where “(1) the 

plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any 

state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due 

process.” Id. at 1293–94. For the third element, courts consider the defendant’s contacts with 

the entire United States in aggregate, not any one state. See Genetic Veterinary, 933 F.3d at 

1309. 

Here, the asserted § 271 patent infringement claims plainly satisfy the first element. See 

Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1294. As to the second element, Jiangyou-US has identified no state where 

it can be sued. See Dkt. 412, pp. 7–8; Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 

2012) (“[I]f the defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to 

 

1

 As Plaintiffs stated, although state court and regional circuit cases guide interpretation of the 

state long-arm statute, the Federal Circuit governs the overall question of personal jurisdiction. 

See PetEdge, Inc. v. Fortress Secure Sols., LLC, 144 F. Supp. 3d 249, 252–53 (D. Mass. 2015), 

citing Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

and Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., 149 F.3d 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The 

Illinois Long Arm Statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum reach allowed by the federal and 

state constitutions, and no court has identified material differences between the Illinois and federal 

constitutions on this issue. Matlin, 921 F.3d at 705. Therefore, the inquiry here is what scope of 

jurisdiction does the federal constitution permit, which is controlled by the Federal Circuit. 

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identify any other where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).”). 

To the contrary, Jiangyou-US purportedly resides in China. Dkt. 363-1, ¶ 4–5. As to the third 

element, this Court has access to Jiangyou-US’s sales in the U.S. of the T581 Hoverboard, which 

is one of the Accused Products here. See Dkt. 466, p. 2. Plus, as an Amazon.com seller, 

Jiangyou-US has expressly targeted U.S. consumers. See 20-cv-7082, Dkt. 50, pp. 5–6 (amicus 

brief discussing process for registering an Amazon store). Accordingly, given that Jiangyou-US 

has sufficient contacts with the U.S., personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) is appropriate here. 

II. The Matlin Cause of Action Materially Differs from the Cause of Action Here 

In addition to not addressing Rule 4(k)(2), Matlin did not address a cause of action based 

on offering an infringing product for sale, which Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded in their 

complaint. See 35 U.S.C. § 271; Dkt. 101, ¶¶ 42, 46, 50, 54. Matlin was a dispute regarding the 

payment of royalties. See 921 F.3d at 707 (“The defendants’ alleged objectionable conduct in 

this case—failing to pay Matlin and Waring royalties on the products—has little to do with 

Illinois.”). Thus, the cause of action only arose “upon [the] sale of the products.” Id. at 703. 

Here, by contrast, by offering the infringing products for sale in Illinois (an undisputed 

fact), Jiangyou-US violated federal patent law in Illinois regardless of whether Plaintiffs or any 

other consumer ever purchased an infringing product. See PetEdge, Inc. v. Fortress Secure Sols., 

LLC, 144 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Federal Circuit law remains unclear whether 

an alleged infringer even needs to sell a product in the forum to confer jurisdiction; mere offers 

for sale may be sufficient”). In PetEdge—in which the plaintiff’s employees had purchased the 

products on which the plaintiff based personal jurisdiction—the court distinguished 

“manipulative purchase” cases by noting that defendants who sell on Amazon “place their 

products into the national stream of commerce through online retailers.” 144 F. Supp. 3d at 256. 

And the defendant in that case did not refuse to fulfill orders from Massachusetts residents or 

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“otherwise attempt to avoid doing business in the state.” Id. at 257. The same is true here: 

Jiangyou-US availed itself of a website that directed offers to Illinois residents, and Plaintiffs’ 

purchase proves that Jiangyou-US did not refuse to do business with Illinois residents. 

III. Jiangyou-US’s Contacts Materially Differ from Those of the Matlin Defendant 

Jiangyou-US is clearly an alter ego of the other Gyroor Defendants. See Dkt. 444, p. 3 

(holding Defendants in contempt and noting that Defendants’ evidence “does not dispute that 

Gyroor-US is affiliated with the seven other defendants”). The Matlin statement which the Court 

quoted is part of the discussion of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 921 

F.3d at 707. The Federal Circuit’s analysis includes a similar prong: “whether [the] assertion of 

personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Nuance Commc’ns., Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 

626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The alter egos’ Illinois contacts render jurisdiction 

reasonable and fair here. See id. at 1232–33; Dkt. 412, pp. 7–8.

Plaintiffs now submit even more evidence demonstrating that Jiangyou-US is nothing 

more than an alter ego of the Gyroor Defendants. See Declaration of Arthur Yuan (“Yuan 

Decl.”). Notably, the named defendant “Gyroor” owns the trademark “Jiangyou” in China. 

Yuan Decl., ¶ 13. And the principals of the named defendant “Gyroor” even own the company 

named “Jiangyou” in China. Id., ¶¶ 17–18.2

 The totality of evidence proves that Jiangyou-US is 

so closely associated with the other defendants in this matter as to render it virtually the same. 

Because personal jurisdiction over those defendants is undisputed, exercising personal 

jurisdiction over Jiangyou-US based on its alter egos’ contacts is appropriate. 

 

2

 Jiangyou-US’s discovery responses have been sparse, preventing Plaintiffs from corroborating 

or refuting its jurisdictional declaration or discovering more about the intertwined relationships. 

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CONCLUSION

Matlin is distinguishable because it did not address the law and facts that control here. 

Instead, Rule 4(k)(2) and Federal Circuit authority controls. Plaintiffs have established more 

than a prima facie showing for why personal jurisdiction is proper over China-based Amazon 

seller Jiangyou-US. That noted, the contemptuous conduct to date raises concerns that 

dismissing Jiangyou-US will provide another outlet for the remaining defendants to engage in 

unchecked infringement and asset transfer. Therefore, Plaintiffs request that, if the Court 

dismisses Jiangyou-US from this action, it expressly notes that the remaining defendants may be 

held in contempt for Jiangyou-US’s conduct in violation of the preliminary injunction, as 

Jiangyou-US would be acting in active concert or participation with them. 

Date: October 29, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, 

 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

By: /s/ Neil G. Nandi 

Adam Kelly 

Arthur Yuan 

Neil Nandi 

321 North Clark Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60654 

Tel.: (312) 464-3100 

Fax: (312) 464-3111 

Email: akelly@loeb.com 

Email: ayuan@loeb.com 

Email: nnandi@loeb.com 

Marwa Abdelaziz (admitted pro hac vice) 

345 Park Avenue 

New York, New York 10154 

Tel.: (212) 407-4000 

Fax: (212) 407-4990 

Email: mabdelaziz@loeb.com 

 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

 

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