IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE: Julie Covelli ) Case No. 

 ) 

) 

Plaintiff ) COMPLAINT 

 ) 

 ) 

v. ) July Demand Requested

 ) 

ZenResolve )

4720 E. Cotton Gin Loop ) 

 Phoenix, AZ 85040 ) 

 ) 

Defendant )

______________________________________________________________________ 

Now comes Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys, and, for his Complaint alleges as 

follows:

 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, 1337, 

1367; and 15 U.S.C. section 1692(d). 

2. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this 

claim occurred in this District. 

PARTIES 

3. Plaintiff, Julie Covelli (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) incurred an obligation to pay 

money, the primary purpose of which was for personal, family, or 

household uses (the “Debt”).

4. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Illinois. 

5. Defendant, ZenResolve. is an Arizona business entity with an address of 

4720 E. Cotton Gin Loop, Suite 135, Phoenix, AZ 85040 operating as a 

collection agency, and is a “debt collector” as the term is defined by 15 

U.S.C. Section 1692a(6). 

6. Unless otherwise stated herein, the term “Defendant” shall refer to

ZenResolve. 

7. Defendant uses instruments of interstate commerce for its principal 

Case: 1:20-cv-04338 Document #: 1 Filed: 07/23/20 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:1
purpose of business, which is the collection of debts. 

ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS 

8. Defendant has been attempting to collect on a high interest Internet loan 

allegedly owed by Plaintiff to Target Finance LLC. 

9. The loan was made via Internet to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in Illinois, 

where she resided. 

10. The Debt arose from services provided by the Creditor which were 

primarily for family, personal or household purposes and which meets the 

definition of a “debt” under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(a)(5)

11. The Debt was purchased, assigned or transferred to Defendant for 

collection, or Defendant was employed by the Creditor to collect to Debt. 

12. Specifically, this debt was purchased by the Defendant when Plaintiff was 

in default of his mortgage, making Defendant a Debt Collector under 11 

U.S.C. Section 1692a(6). 

13. The Defendant attempted to collect the Debt and, as such, engaged in 

“communications” as defined in 15 U.S.C. Section 1692a(2).

14. Defendant sent (and Plaintiff eventually received) this attached initial 

communication in collection of the debt on November 1, 2019. See 

Exhibit 

15. Such a communication, as described in Exhibit, represents or implied a 

valid and legally enforceable debt. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 

F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014). 

16. Target never had a license from the Illinois Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation or a state or federal banking or credit union 

charter, entitling it to make loans to Illinois residents at more than 9% 

interest. 

17. Defendant ZenResolve, LLC engages in a practice of attempting to collect 

high-interest loans (greatly in excess of 9%) obtained by Illinois residents 

in Illinois over the Internet from unlicensed lenders, including Target. 

18. The lenders sought out Illinois residents for such loans. 

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19. The lender was never licensed to make loans by the Illinois Department 

Financial and Professional Regulation. 

20. The lender did not have a bank or credit union charter that would 

authorize it to lend to Illinois residents at over 9%. 

21. The loan was made by the lender at an annual percentage rate exceeding 

the 9% which a non-bank lender which does not have a license from the 

Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation may charge 

for a loan made to an Illinois resident. 

22. Illinois law permits four types of non-real-estate secured consumer loans 

at over 9%: payday loans, installment payday loans, regular consumer 

installment loans, and small consumer loans. All four types require a 

license from the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional 

Regulation or a bank or credit union charter. 

23. A payday loan is a loan with an APR exceeding 36% and a term that does 

not exceed 120 days, including any transaction conducted via any medium 

whatsoever, including, but not limited to, paper, facsimile, Internet, or 

telephone, in which the lender receives a check, an authorization to a 

debit a consumer’s bank account, or a wage assignment or other interest 

in a consumer’s wages. 815 ILCS 122/1-10. Any lender that offers or 

makes a payday loan to a consumer in Illinois must do so in compliance 

with the Payday Loan Reform Act. 815 ILCS 122/1-15. 

24. An “installment payday loan” is a loan over 36% with a term of 112 to 180 

days made to a consumer in Illinois via any medium whatsoever, 

including, but not limited to, paper, facsimile, Internet, or telephone, in 

which the lender receives a check, an authorization to debit a consumer’s 

bank account, or a wage assignment or other interest in a consumer’s 

wages. 815 ILCS 122/2-5©. It must also be made in compliance with the 

Payday Loan Reform Act. 

25. The Payday Loan Reform Act imposes a rate cap (just over 400%) and 

numerous other limitations, such as limits on the amount of loans, limits on 

the number of loans, and the limits on the percentage of a consumer’s 

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income that the payments consume. 

26. The Payday Loan Reform Act also makes it unlawful (815 ILCS 122/4-5) 

for either a licensee or an unlicensed person or entity making payday 

loans: 

a. To use any device or agreement that would have the effect of charging 

or collecting more fees or charges than allowed by this Act, including, 

but not limited to, entering into a different type of transaction with the 

consumer. 

b. Charging for, or attempting to collect, attorney’s fees, court costs, or 

arbitration costs incurred in connection with the collection of a payday 

loan. 

c. Making a loan in violation of this Act. 

27. The Consumer Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/1 et seq.) regulates 

consumer loans to Illinois residents not covered by the Payday Loan 

Reform Act in a principal amount not exceeding $40,000. It authorizes 

two types of loans: 

a. Installment loans, on which rates are limited to 36% (205 ILCS 

670/15); 

b. Small consumer loans, for amounts up to $4,000 and terms in excess 

of 180 days, on which 99% and an acquisition fee may be charged for 

the term of the loan and 18% thereafter until paid (205 ILCS 670/15(b), 

205 ILCS 670/17.2, 205 ILCS 670/15(f)(7)). There are again 

restrictions based on the consumer’s income and other matters. 

28. Consumer loans which are not made by a licensed lender, bank or credit 

union are limited to 9%. 

29. Any loans to Illinois residents which meet the statutory definitions and are 

made by an unlicensed persons are void and unenforceable and 

felonious: 

a. The Consumer Installment Loan Act provides: at 205 ILCS 670/20(d), 

that if any person does not have a license issued under this Act makes 

a loan pursuant to this Act to an Illinois consumer, then the loan shall 

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be null and void and the person who made the loan shall have no right 

to collect, receive, or retain any principal, interest, or charges related to 

the loan.”

b. The Payday Loan Reform Act provides, at 815 ILCS 122/4-10(h), that 

“if a lender who does not have a license issued under this Act makes a 

loan pursuant to this Act to an Illinois consumer, then the loan shall be 

null and void and the lender who made the laon shall have no right to 

collect, receive, or retain any principal, interest or charges related to 

the loan.”

30. The loan made by Target described in this case was more than 20% 

interest. Indeed, on information and belief it was made at more than 

100%. 

31. Consumers may not waive the protection of these Illinois laws by contract. 

The Payday Loan Reform Act provides (815 ILCS 122/4-40) that there 

shall be no waiver of any provision of this Act. Contracts made in violation 

of licensing requirements intended to protect the public, or in violation of 

criminal laws imposing substantial penalties, are void. Chatham Foot 

Specialists, P.C. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 366, 380, 837 

N.E.2d 48 (2005). Neither choice of law clauses or other contractual 

devices can be used to avoid invalidation of loans made at criminally 

usurious rates. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp.3d 130, 

149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 

32. By demanding payment and collecting on this debt, Defendant 

represented or implied that the debt it was attempting to collect was 

enforceable. 

33. Even the most cursory inquiry into the legality of collecting high-interest 

loans made to Illinois residents over the Internet would have disclosed that 

it was violating the law. 

VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA-15 U.S.C. SECTION 1692, et seq.

34. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this 

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Complaint as though fully stated herein. 

35. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f by attempting to collect 

on a debt with usurious interest. 

36. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e by representing to the 

Plaintiff that loans-declared “null and void” by Illinois law-were outstanding 

balances, and offering settlements of such purported obligations, 

Defendant engaged in materially deceptive and misleading 

communications. Defendant also failed to disclose material facts 

necessary to make the statements made not misleading, all in violations of 

1692e. 

37. Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of Defendants’ violations.

JURY DEMAND 

38. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 39, Plaintiff demands the following relief: 

a. Judgment against Defendant, awarding the Plaintiff actual damages. 

b. Judgment against each of the Defendant, awarding the Plaintiff 

Statutory damages 

c. Judgment against Defendant, awarding the Plaintiff recovery of the 

costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees;

d. Judgment against Defendant, awarding the Plaintiff punitive damages 

in such amount as is found appropriate; and 

e. Any other legal and/or equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate. 

Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ John Carlin__________________

 John P. Carlin #6277222

 Suburban Legal Group, PC

 1305 Remington Rd., Ste. C

 Schaumburg, IL 60173

 jcarlin@suburbanlegalgroup.com

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

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