* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30776

Summary Calendar

THERON CARR

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MURPHY OIL USA INC

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 2:06-CV-1794

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Theron Carr alleged claims of race discrimination

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Louisiana law against DefendantAppellee Murphy Oil USA, Inc. Carr says that he was terminated from his

employment with Murphy because he is African-American. The district court

granted summary judgment to Murphy, holding that Carr had not made out a

prima facie case for discrimination. Carr now appeals. We affirm the judgment

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 12, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No.

2

of the district court because Carr has not shown that there is a disputed fact

issue as to whether he was qualified for the position he held with Murphy.

1. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Texas Indus., Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 486 F.3d 844, 846 (5th

Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows

“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(c). 

2. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race

or national original under Title VII, Carr must show that he was: (1)

a member of a protected class; (2) qualified for the position held; (3)

subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)treated differently

from others similarly situated. Abarca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404

F.3d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 2005). Because the standards governing

Carr’s discrimination claim under Louisiana law are substantively

similar to those governing his Title VII claim, the outcome of Carr’s

claims will be the same under the federal and state statutes. McCoy

v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007). We

therefore analyze the issues only under Title VII. 

3. The district court held that Carr had not shown a material factissue

as to whether he was qualified for the job of Platform Operator, an

essential element of Carr’s prima facie case under Title VII. We

agree with this conclusion. After his hiring, as part of Murphy’s

training program for new employees Carr was required to complete

classroom training and on-the-job training. After completing his

classroom training, Carr was fired after he failed to show sufficient

progress during his on-the-job training period. During this period,

trainees are given written tests and walkthrough tests. After four
No.

3

weeks of training, Carr had only passed one of the tests, with the

minimum passing score of 80% achieved on his second attempt, and

he had failed four other tests. On one test, he received a 32%.

Murphy says and Carr admits that the knowledge tested on these

exams is essential for the Platform Operator position. In addition

to failing these tests, there is evidence that multiple supervisors

thought Carr was having trouble grasping the knowledge necessary

to perform his job. 

Carr says that no other trainee has been fired from Murphy

for failing tests during the on-the-job training period. But he has

not produced any evidence showing that trainees in the same

position as Carr, with as many or as low failing scores, were not

terminated. Furthermore, he has not presented any credible

evidence showing that he was qualified for the Platform Operator

position.

AFFIRMED.