IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

International Union of Operating Engineers, )

Local 150, AFL-CIO )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-cv-03836

)

Roland Machinery Company, ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 (“Local 150”) filed a 

complaint against Defendant Roland Machinery Company (“RMC”) to compel arbitration pursuant 

to their collective bargaining agreement. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment [23, 

25]. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted and Defendant’s motion is denied.

Background

Local 150 is a labor organization acting as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain 

employees of RMC, an employer that sells, leases, and repairs heavy equipment in Illinois, Indiana,

and Missouri. Since 1976, the parties have entered into a number of bargaining agreements, the 

most recent of which went into effect on January 1, 2018. Section 6 of the current collective 

bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) details the grievance and arbitration provisions, defining

“‘grievance’ [as] any claim or dispute involving an interpretation or application of the agreement by 

an employee, or an Employer, or the Union, that one of the other of the aforesaid persons or 

organization is violating or has violated this Agreement.” (Dkt. 27 at ¶ 5). If the parties cannot 

resolve the grievance, “it shall be submitted to a neutral arbitrator.” (Id.).

On March 9, 2020, Local 150 submitted a grievance to RMC (the “Grievance”) alleging that 

the company violated the CBA by requiring employees to use their accrued vacation time for sick 

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leave. No provision of the CBA explicitly permits RMC to force the use of accrued vacation time 

for sick days, nor does the CBA specifically address personal or sick leave. Only Section 16 of the 

CBA addresses restrictions on the use of vacation time as it prohibits RMC from compelling 

employees to use vacation leave during a seasonal layoff. (Dkt. 27 at ¶ 8). The CBA additionally

contains a Management Rights clause, in which RMC retains the “right to make reasonable rules and 

regulations concerning the conduct of the business and the employees, providing the same are not 

contrary to the terms of this Agreement.” (Dkt. 27 at ¶ 12). On May 31, 2020, RMC refused to 

process the Grievance and submit the dispute to arbitration. 

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine 

dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 

2510, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When considering cross motions for summary judgment, the court 

must “construe all facts and inferences therefrom in favor of the party against whom the motion 

under consideration is made.” Markel Ins. Co. v. Rau, 954 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Discussion

Initially, the Court declines to consider RMC’s argument that Local 150’s Grievance is 

untimely, barring arbitration. Questions of procedural arbitrability, such as the “applicability of a 

time limit rule[,] [are] matter[s] presumptively for the arbitrator, not for the judge.” Howsam v. Dean 

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d. 491 (2002). 

The parties’ cross motions for summary judgment therefore hinge on whether the CBA 

reflects an agreement to submit the sick leave dispute to arbitration. The duty to arbitrate is a matter 

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of contract and “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 

agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co, 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S. Ct. 

1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). The initial question of substantive arbitrability—that is, whether the 

CBA creates a duty to arbitrate a particular grievance—lies with the Court. AT&T Tech., Inc. v. 

Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649, 105 S. Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1996) (citing Warrior & 

Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582–83). In assessing arbitrability, the Court may not rule on the merits of the 

underlying claims. Id. at 649. For this reason, the Court declines to consider the parties’ arguments 

as to whether RMC established a past practice concerning the sick leave policy.

When a CBA contains a broad arbitration clause, as is true here, a presumption of 

arbitrability arises. AT&T Tech., Inc., 475 U.S. at 650. A party may rebut the presumption if the 

agreement expressly excludes the grieved issue from arbitration. If no express exclusion exists, 

“only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.” 

Karl Schmidt Unisia, Inc. v. UAW Local 2357, 628 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Warrior & Gulf, 

363 U.S. at 585).

To overcome the presumption of arbitrability, RMC primarily argues that the CBA does not 

expressly include an agreement to arbitrate the sick leave issue. This argument is without merit as it 

incorrectly inverses the applicable standard. See id. at 912 (“Mere failure to address a type of dispute 

is not necessarily an express exclusion of that type.”). RMC also contends that because the CBA 

restricts RMC from compelling employees to use vacation time during seasonal layoffs, the omission 

of a similar restriction for sick leave expressly excludes the issue from arbitration. The Seventh 

Circuit rejected this reasoning in Karl Schmidt Unisia, Inc., concluding that the rule of construction 

inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is irrelevant to the question of express exclusion. Id. at 913. 

Finally, RMC maintains that the CBA’s Management Rights clause expressly excludes from 

arbitration those “reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of the business and the 

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employees, providing the same are not contrary to the terms of [the CBA].” This argument is 

identical to the issue in Warrior & Gulf, in which the Supreme Court created the express exclusion 

requirement. 363 U.S. at 583–84. The Court held that a vague Management Functions clause, 

similar to the clause at issue, did not exclude from arbitration those issues which were “strictly a 

function of management” unless otherwise expressly excluded from arbitration by the parties’

agreement. Id. The CBA’s Management Rights clause is therefore insufficient to evidence express 

exclusion of the sick leave issue for which Local 150 filed its Grievance. 

Because the arbitration clause is quite broad and the exclusion clause is vague, RMC’s only 

saving grace is to put forth “the most forceful evidence” that the parties did not intend to submit 

the issue to arbitration. Id. at 585. RMC propounds no such evidence. Therefore, the undisputed 

facts do not rebut the presumption of arbitrability. Local 150’s motion for summary judgment is 

granted and RMC’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [25] is GRANTED 

and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [23] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 11/15/2021

Entered: _____________________________

 SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

 United States District Judge

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