IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT 

TECHNOLOGY CO. and UNICORN 

GLOBAL, INC., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND 

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 20-cv-4806 

Judge Thomas M. Durkin 

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole 

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR 

ALTERNATIVELY TO VACATE THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

By its plain terms, the preliminary injunction applies to Fengchi-US and Urbanmax 

(“Affiliated Defendants”), both of which had sufficient notice under Rule 65(a). The preliminary 

injunction bars infringement by those acting in active concert and participation with named 

defendants. Substantial evidence demonstrates that Affiliated Defendants are effectively alter egos 

of Gyroor-US and other defendants which were named in the injunction issued in November 2020 

and modified the next month (“PI” refers to the modified injunction). Urbanmax even describes 

itself as a “Gyroor Sister Brand.” All available evidence indicates that Affiliated Defendants were 

aware of these proceedings and the initial preliminary injunction weeks before the Court entered 

the modified PI. Despite the close relationship with named defendants and notice of the PI, 

Affiliated Defendants sold infringing products that the PI barred Gyroor-US from selling. Thus, 

Affiliated Defendants were properly subjected to the PI’s restraints. Now, four months later, they 

raise procedural challenges to their enjoinment. These claims are both tardy and groundless. 

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Affiliated Defendants’ motion seems to be the next step in a litigation strategy of endless 

motion practice, with virtually no discovery.1

 Plaintiffs had suspected that such a strategy operated 

in parallel to continued infringement in violation of the PI, but only in the past days have Plaintiffs 

obtained evidence sufficient to justify the extreme measure of moving the Court for relief. In 

short, Plaintiffs have reason to believe that the Gyroor-affiliated defendants have been selling in 

violation of the PI and have been moving assets, potentially to render themselves judgment proof. 

Combined with the excessive motion practice, this approach would serve to increase the costs of 

litigation while reducing the collectible portion of any judgment. Plaintiffs thus intend to move 

for an order to show cause prior to the scheduled completion of briefing on the current motion, 

after Plaintiffs formally raise the issues to defense counsel. 

In light of the conduct to date, even if the Court deems notice to have been insufficient, the 

Court should not vacate the PI on the basis of a procedural issue. Instead, the Court should keep 

the current PI in place while setting a briefing schedule and hearing on a renewed motion for 

preliminary injunction, thereby dispelling any doubt regarding notice. 

 

1

 The tactics leading to this motion are telling. On May 24, defense counsel started announcing 

that various defendants would be moving to vacate. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 12. Defense counsel 

announced the same as to a different defendant on May 25. Id. ¶ 13. On June 3, in the midst of 

scheduling discussions on separate issues, defense counsel announced motions to vacate as to five 

more defendants, including Urbanmax and Fengchi-US. Id. ¶ 14. On June 4, defense counsel 

proposed two weeks for a response to this five-defendant motion, and Plaintiffs suggested three 

weeks on June 7. Id. On June 14, defense counsel announced the filing of a motion to vacate as 

to eight additional defendants. Id. ¶ 15. In response, Plaintiffs suggested 30 days “[g]iven the 

multiplicity of defendants,” because defense counsel had announced such motions on behalf of 

thirteen differently-situated defendants. Id. A summary of a subsequent meet and confer confirms 

that the proposed 30 days was for a “Briefing Schedule for Tomoloo’s Rule 65 Motion to Vacate 

the PI.” Id. ¶ 16. But Affiliated Defendants then represented that Plaintiffs requested 30 days to 

respond to this two-defendant motion. Dkt. 297. Plaintiffs did not object to the entered briefing 

schedule because two weeks is appropriate for a response to this two-defendant filing. See Dkt. 

302. 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

(a) Entry of the Preliminary Injunction 

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on November 20, 2020. Dkt. 105. 

Immediately after, Plaintiffs filed a notice of motion. Dkt. 110. After a hearing—at which counsel 

for since-dismissed defendants appeared—this Court entered the preliminary injunction order on 

November 24, 2020. Dkt. 113. Under this Court’s order, Plaintiffs published that order on a public 

website dedicated to the proceedings of this case.2

 On December 4, 2020, Stephen Vegh contacted 

Plaintiffs’ counsel, holding himself out as counsel for Gyroor. Cf. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs 

provided Mr. Vegh with various filings, including the original notice of motion, motion for 

preliminary injunction, preliminary injunction order, and operative complaint (with redacted 

defendant lists). Id. In response to questions subsequently raised by third-party eBay, Inc., the 

Court entered a modified PI Order on December 23, 2020. Dkt. 147. Plaintiffs updated the 

dedicated website with the modified PI Order the next day. That modified PI is the operative PI. 

Consistent with Rule 65(d)(2)(B)&(C), the PI bound the named defendants “as well as their 

affiliates, officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, confederates, and all persons acting for, 

with, by, through, under or in active concert with them.” Dkt. 147, ¶ 1. The PI order does not 

require any additional process for the PI to apply to such additional parties. 

(b) Enjoinment of Affiliated Defendants Fengchi-US and Urbanmax 

Affiliated Defendants Fengchi-US and Urbanmax were not named in the defendant list that 

was operative at the time the PI was entered because Plaintiffs discovered these storefronts in 

January 2021. Plaintiffs believe, based on substantial evidence, that these entities were either 

 

2 Docket: 20-cv-4806, US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Loeb & Loeb LLP, 

available at https://www.loeb.com/en/general/20-cv-4806. 

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affiliates or alter egos of Gyroor-US (a named defendant), or acting in active concert or 

participation with a named defendant. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 4. Affiliated Defendants claim that their 

“accounts and assets were restrained” on February 12, 2021. Dkt. 297 at 3. On February 17, 2021, 

Amazon confirmed that Affiliated Defendants’ stores had been frozen. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 5. But 

Plaintiffs had received such notice a day earlier, from opposing counsel. 

Throughout January and February, Plaintiffs’ counsel had been corresponding with 

Danielle McKinley and Mr. Vegh, then-counsel for Gyroor-US and other defendants in this case. 

Dkt. 152–53. On February 16—before Amazon even confirmed the freeze—Ms. McKinley 

contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel to ask whether certain “storefronts” were involved in the case, 

including Fengchi-US and Urbanmax. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 6. At that point, Plaintiffs had never 

mentioned these storefronts to Ms. McKinley or Mr. Vegh. Over the subsequent month, Plaintiffs’ 

counsel would have sporadic discussions with Mr. Vegh and Ms. McKinley regarding these 

storefronts generally, including the basis on which each were enjoined. See, e.g., Id. ¶ 7. 

(c) Subsequent Contact with Urbanmax and Fengchi-US 

On April 27, attorneys from the Glacier Law Firm formally replaced Mr. Vegh and Ms. 

McKinley as counsel for Gyroor-US. See Dkt. 209–10 & 214–15. On May 4, the Glacier Law 

Firm filed an appearance on behalf of Urbanmax on May 4 and later filed an appearance on behalf 

of Fengchi-US on June 18. Dkts. 225, 299. 

At the May 10, 2021 status hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiffs and Urbanmax to meet 

and confer regarding a potential motion to dismiss. Dkt. 233. Following this meeting, Plaintiffs 

sent Urbanmax a proposed joint status report stating: 

3. Counsel for Urbanmax has represented to Plaintiffs’ counsel that Urbanmax is 

not actually related to or affiliated with Gyroor-US in any way, and Urbanmax is 

not acting in concert or participation with Gyroor-US or a related or affiliated 

entity. Plaintiffs have requested an affidavit from Urbanmax attesting to these facts. 

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4. In the event Plaintiffs receive such an affidavit, Plaintiffs will: (1) promptly 

request that Amazon remove any restraint on Urbanmax’s assets; (2) no longer seek 

to include Urbanmax in the proposed Amended Schedule A; and (3) remove 

Urbanmax from the proposed Amended Schedule A at the time of formally filing 

it, if the pending motion to amend Schedule A is granted. These steps will end 

Urbanmax’s connection with this case and Plaintiffs will not seek to add Urbanmax 

to this case in the future. Because Plaintiffs have agreed to these steps, no motion 

practice with regards to Urbanmax is necessary at this time. 

Dkt. 237. On May 13, Urbanmax signed off on the proposed report and agreed to provide the 

requested affidavit “this evening.” Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 8. 

But Urbanmax never sent an affidavit to Plaintiffs. Instead, nearly two weeks later on May 

25, Urbanmax filed an affidavit directly with the Court that was materially different from what the 

parties had agreed. See Dkt. 265. The affidavit was filed between two other 3 AM filings by the 

Glacier Law firm. Later that day, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Urbanmax’s counsel and stated that, 

contrary to what was agreed upon in the joint status report, the affidavit did not address: 1) being 

“related or affiliated” to Gyroor-US in any way; 2) “acting in concert or participation with GyroorUS”; and 3) interactions or affiliations with entities that are related or affiliated with Gyroor-US. 

Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 9. Instead, the affidavit narrowly focused on Urbanmax’s affiliation with a 

specific Gyroor-US Amazon store and its specific corporate owner. Id. Plaintiffs again requested 

a resubmission of an affidavit to address these discrepancies. But Urbanmax responded that it was 

“not interested in resubmitting an affidavit at this point. Urbanmax will appeal the preliminary 

injunction order and seek damage accordingly.” Id. ¶ 10. Urbanmax’s counsel appended “subject 

to FRE 408” to the top of this email. Id. So instead of accepting voluntary dismissal and 

unfreezing of assets, Urbanmax elected to remain as a defendant. 

 As to Defendant Fengchi-US, Glacier Law notified Plaintiffs’ counsel for the first time on 

June 3, 2021, that it will be representing Fengchi-US and requested a meet and confer on a motion 

to vacate the PI Order. Id. ¶ 11. Apparently Mr. Vegh and Ms. McKinley were no longer 

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representing Fengchi-US. Plaintiffs responded that they “are willing to offer Fengchi-US the same 

deal we offered Urbanmax and Gaodeshang”—referring to the deal to drop Urbanmax and release 

its assets upon receipt of an affidavit attesting that it was not related to or acting in concert with 

Gyroor-US and its affiliates. Id. But like Urbanmax, Fengchi-US refused to provide the requested

affidavit and elected to remain a defendant, with its assets frozen. 

Both Affiliated Defendants have declined to submit affidavits attesting that they are not 

affiliated or acting in concert with Gyroor-US. Instead, Affiliated Defendants chose to wait 

months after they were enjoined—and after Gyroor-US made several unsuccessful attempts to 

dismiss this case and the PI Order3—to bring this motion. 

(d) Service 

On May 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion to Amend Schedule A to add the defendants 

whom Plaintiffs had identified as being related to named defendants and whose assets Amazon 

had previously frozen. See Dkt. 227, ¶ 2. Glacier Law, on behalf of Gyroor-US, filed an opposition 

to this motion that neither expressly denied the relationship of Affiliated Defendants to GyroorUS, nor actually opposed the motion. See Dkt. 241. The Court granted the motion on May 24, 

formally adding Affiliated Defendants to the case. Dkt. 253. After Glacier Law refused to accept 

 

3

 Since appearing in the case nine weeks ago, the Glacier Law firm has filed on behalf of various 

defendants, inter alia: a 12(b)(6) motion on behalf of Gyroor-US that was denied as being a 

successive and thus impermissible (Dkt. 217, 226); a motion on behalf of Gyroor-US for leave to 

refile the successive 12(b)(6) motion, which was also denied (Dkt. 231, 238); a Rule 20/21 motion 

including a motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, on behalf of Gyroor-US, which was denied 

(Dkt. 211, 284); a notice of appeal on behalf of defendant Gaodeshang, who appeared in this case 

the day it filed the notice of appeal, and a response to a Seventh Circuit order to show cause as to 

why the appeal should not be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction (Dkt. 256, Case No. 21-1964 

Dkt. 3). Since filing the current motion, Glacier Law has also filed a notice of appeal of the 

dismissal of the Rule 20/21 motion/motion to vacate. Dkt. 298. 

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service on behalf of Affiliated Defendants—on whose behalf Glacier Law had already appeared—

Plaintiffs served Affiliated Defendants directly under this Court’s order. Dkt. 310. 

II. ARGUMENT 

 The Affiliated Defendants’ position here is questionable. This is not a situation where 

Plaintiffs have attempted to bind truly independent, formally distinct entities within the large 

corporate tree of Unilever, for example. The situation is completely opposite. In fact it is 

unclear if any corporate distinctions even exist between the defendants before the Court, or if 

they are just regularly disregarded. Regardless, the defendants are effectively agents or alter 

egos of one another. As such they are bound by the PI, consistent with the Federal Rules and 

Seventh Circuit law. And the facts here demonstrate that Affiliated Defendants received 

adequate notice well before their assets were restrained. 

(a) The PI Already Binds the Affiliated Defendants Because of Their Close 

Connection to Gyroor-US. 

The PI binds named defendants “as well as their affiliates, officers, agents, servants, 

employees, attorneys, confederates, and all persons acting for, with, by, through, under or in active 

concert with them.” Dkt. 147, ¶ 1. Plaintiffs requested that Amazon restrain Affiliated Defendants 

assets because Plaintiffs believed, based on substantial evidence, that Affiliated Defendants were 

related to Gyroor-US and thus covered by the PI. Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 4. Subsequently discovered 

facts of the case have confirmed that belief as true: 

• Gyroor-US’s counsel knew of the asset freeze on Affiliated Defendants even before

Plaintiffs’ counsel knew. Such rapid knowledge could only be possible if Affiliated 

Defendants were on alert to the litigation and had an extremely close, seamless connection 

with Gyroor-US (or a different named defendant). 

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• Urbanmax was given the opportunity to be free of the PI and this litigation more than seven 

weeks ago, if only it would swear that it did not meet the criteria for being bound by the 

PI. Instead of doing so, Urbanmax: 

o Waited nearly two weeks after it represented it would provide the affidavit to 

actually provide any affidavit. 

o Filed an affidavit directly with the Court, rather than sending it to Plaintiffs. 

o Filed the affidavit as the middle of a trio of late night filings, where it would be 

least conspicuous. 

o Filed a narrow affidavit, instead of one that Urbanmax had agreed to provide (and 

represented to the Court in a joint status report that it would provide). The agreedupon, unfiled affidavit would have made the broad averments necessary to establish 

that Urbanmax had no connection to named defendants in this case. 

o Refused to submit the agreed-upon affidavit, once Plaintiffs identified the material 

discrepancies between Urbanmax’s filed affidavit and the one it agreed to submit. 

o Appended a “FRE 408” disclaimer to the top of its refusal to provide the requested 

affidavit, thereby suggesting that Urbanmax knew the refusal to provide the agreedupon affidavit was effectively an admission that Urbanmax could not do so, i.e. an 

admission that Urbanmax was in fact connected to named defendants.4

 

• Fengchi-US was given the opportunity to be free of the PI and this litigation a month ago, 

if only it would swear that it did not meet the criteria for being bound by the PI. Instead of 

 

4

 Rule 408 renders inadmissible for certain purposes (1) compromise offers; and (2) “conduct or a 

statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim” (emphasis added). 

Urbanmax’s refusal to discuss an affidavit it has agreed in a court filing to provide is not a 

compromise offer nor in any way a statement about the claims in this case. 

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doing so, Fengchi-US filed an appearance and has proven to be another channel for GyroorUS’s endless-motion litigation strategy. 

• Plaintiffs recently discovered a Facebook page for an entity called “Urbanmax Gyroor” 

that advertises Gyroor products and includes the description “Gyroor Sister Brand: 

Urbanmax.” Abdelaziz Decl. ¶ 4. 

By Defendants’ own acknowledgement, “A preliminary injunction can be enforced against a third 

party only upon a court’s authorization.” Dkt. 297, p. 2. This requirement was satisfied when the 

Court issued the PI Order authorizing the restraint of “Defendants, their affiliates, officers, agents, 

servants, employees, attorneys, confederates, and all persons acting for, with, by, through, under 

or in active concert with them.” Dkt. 147, ¶ 1. 

(b) Plaintiffs Did Not Need to Seek Leave to Formally Enjoin Affiliated 

Defendants. 

Affiliated Defendants cite a handful of cases to argue that only the Court could apply the 

PI to affiliated entities. There are three issues with these citations. First, the Court already did so, 

by expressly applying the PI to affiliates. Second, Affiliated Defendants repeatedly add emphasis 

to case quotations but fail to acknowledge that counsel, rather than the Court, made these 

emphases, thereby materially altering their meanings. Third, almost none of these cases even apply 

to entities enjoined under Rule 65(d)(2)(B)&(C). See Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 564 

(7th Cir. 2010) (attempt to bind websites which the Seventh Circuit held were not in active concert 

and participation); United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794–95 (7th Cir. 1998) (personal 

jurisdiction case relating to protective order under 21 U.S.C. § 853, applied to defendant’s wife);

Nat'l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of the United States Under the Hereditary Guardianship, 

Inc. v. Nat'l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of the United States, Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 840–41 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (“complicated,” decades-long case addressing privity issues); Pow! Entm’t, LLC v. 

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Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Co., Partnerships, and Uninc. Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A 

Hereto, No. 20 CV 1324, 2020 WL 5076715, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154861 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 

2020) (attempt to permanently bind third-party institutions like Amazon and eBay, through default 

judgment against defendants unrelated to such institutions). 

One cited case does address entities enjoined under Rule 65(d)(2)(B)&(C). See Lake Shore 

Asset Mgmt. v. CFTC, 511 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2007).5 Unlike the current case, that case involved 

a permanent injunction against U.S. enterprises that were unquestionably legally distinct from the 

named defendants. In fact, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the regulated nature of the defendants: 

“Lake Shore transacts its business in the United States. It voluntarily registered with the CFTC 

and joined the NFA.” Id. at 765–66. Further, and most critically, the enjoined defendants in Lake 

Shore were required to take affirmative acts, rather than simply ceasing certain activities. The 

Court observed that Rule 65(d) allows binding third-parties, but it does not allow a “litigant’s 

affiliates [to be] named in an injunction.” 511 F.3d at 766. The Court drew the distinction by 

stating that an injunction “may not impose obligations directly on other members of the corporate 

group. . . . . [A] district court must not direct Lake Shore to do things that only some other member 

of the group, not named a defendant, could perform.” Id. at 767. 

Although distinguishable, both Seventh Circuit cases contain guidance applicable here. 

The Lake Shore court rejected any notion that affiliated entities are unbound by a preliminary 

injunction and instead stated: “Of course, other members of the Lake Shore Group of Companies 

act at their peril if they disregard the commands of the injunction, for, if the district court ultimately 

 

5

 Aside from a passing reference to cases being quoted by the primary cited cases, the only other 

case Affiliated Defendants cite is an out-of-circuit, unpublished district court case. See BMW of 

N. Am., LLC v. Issa, Case No. 2:19-cv-220, 2020 WL 1325278, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49004 (D. 

Utah Mar. 20, 2020). Despite Affiliated Defendants’ citation to it, this case squarely supports

Plaintiffs by holding that entities covered by Rule 65(d)(2) were properly bound. 

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determines that they are in concert with Lake Shore, then they will be in contempt of court.” Id. 

As such, when an affiliated entity takes affirmative acts in contravention of an injunction (rather 

than merely refusing to take affirmative acts in compliance with one), it should be held in 

contempt, not relieved of the burden of compliance. And read in conjunction with Blockowciz, the 

import is clear: the mere issuance of an injunction constitutes sufficient notice to bar affiliated 

entities from taking acts in contravention of the injunction. See Blockowicz, 630 F.3d at 568 

(holding that pre-injunction conduct does not trigger Rule 65(d), because the purpose of the rule 

“is to prevent defendants from rendering injunctions void by carrying out prohibited acts through 

third parties who were not parties to the original proceeding”). 

(c) Rule 65(a)’s Applies a Pragmatic and Discretionary Notice Standard. 

Rule 65(a) does not specify what constitutes adequate notice. See People ex rel. Hartigan 

v. Peters, 871 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1989). Some courts have stated that notice should apprise 

a defendant of the hearing and provide adequate time to prepare a defense. Id. But this is not a 

strict requirement, and “the question of what constitutes sufficient notice [is left] primarily to the 

district court's discretion.” Id.6 In assessing whether notice was proper, courts look to the totality 

of the circumstances to determine whether notice was reasonably calculated “under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” Id., quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). One circumstance courts “consider in evaluating the sufficiency of 

 

6

 In a case similar to this one, a Gyroor-related entity named Runchenyun—which had previously 

been a defendant here—filed a motion to vacate that the Court granted, via minute entry. See 20-

cv-5905, Dkt. 105. The facts here are materially different as to Affiliated Defendants, and 

Plaintiffs believe that Peters is inconsistent with the Court’s rationale in that manner. 

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notice is whether the alleged inadequacies in the notice prejudiced the appellant.” 871 F.3d at 

1340. Most notably, Rule 65 does not mandate that notice come directly from the movant. 

Paragraph 7 of the PI reflects a similar reading of Rule 65, declaring that “[t]he combination 

of providing notice via electronic publication and e-mail, along with any notice that the Defendants 

receive from payment processors, shall constitute notice reasonably calculated under all 

circumstances to apprise Defendants of the pendency of this action and afford them the opportunity 

to present their objections.” Dkt. 147, ¶ 7. The totality of circumstances demonstrates that notice 

was sufficient under Rule 65(a) and Paragraph 7 of the PI. 

(d) Affiliated Defendants Had Actual Notice of the Preliminary Injunction 

No Later Than December 4, 2020, Weeks Before the Operative PI Was Entered. 

Affiliated Defendants received at least three forms of notice: (1) the initial preliminary 

injunction order, moving papers, and notice of motion provided to Gyroor-US on December 6, 

2020; (2) the electronic publication of the initial and modified injunctions on the dedicated 

website; and (3) the notice Amazon provided when restraining their assets. In considering the 

totality of the circumstances—as the Court should—these forms of notice were reasonably 

calculated to provide Affiliated Defendants with adequate notice of the relief sought. 

“[N]otice to an attorney is notice to the client and knowledge of an attorney is imputed to 

the client, notwithstanding whether the attorney has actually communicated such knowledge to the 

client.” Lloyd's Syndicate 3624 (Hiscox) v. Clow, No. 19 C 6405, 2020 WL 4194213, 2020 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 128161, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2020) (citations and quotations omitted); see also

Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962); Fleming v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., No. 93-1092, 

1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26536, at *5 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (“In this Circuit an attorney’s conduct 

is imputed to the client in any context.”). Therefore, and because of their seamless ties to earliernamed defendants, Affiliated Defendants were aware of the initial preliminary injunction and the 

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overall proceedings no later than December 4, when counsel for Gyroor-US contacted Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. They thus were aware then that affiliates and those acting in concert or participation with 

Gyroor-US were also bound. If Affiliated Defendants objected to the scope of the injunction, they 

could have done so then, long before Plaintiffs discovered their infringement and restrained their 

assets. 

The critical question regarding notice is whether it “apprise[d] interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford[ed] them an opportunity to present their objections.” Peters,

871 F.2d at 1340. What Affiliated Defendants fail to say is telling: 

• Affiliated Defendants never deny an affiliation with Gyroor-US and the other defendants. 

• Affiliated Defendants never state that they would have objected to the PI at the time it was 

entered. 

• Affiliated Defendants never state that they were prejudiced by any alleged lack of notice. 

• Affiliated Defendants never explain why they waited to raise any objection to the 

Preliminary Injunction until four months after their assets were restrained. 

*** 

Defendants’ unreasonable delay, continuation of seriatim motion practice, and refusal to 

address substantive issues cast doubt on Affiliated Defendants’ motion and their claimed lack of 

notice. When issuing its most written recent order, the Court stated: 

This piecemeal motion practice smacks of intentional delay rather than a sincere 

attempt to bring this case to resolution. While there is no express time limit on 

making a motion under Rules 20 and 21, the Court has the responsibility to manage 

the case so it proceeds efficiently and the discretion to decide how that should be 

accomplished. Gyroor’s failure to address joinder in its initial motion to dismiss, 

and its decision to file multiple serial motions, has unnecessarily delayed and 

complicated this case. That conduct counsels in favor of denying the motion 

Dkt. 284 pp. 1–2. The Court concluded: 

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[T]he Court is skeptical of Gyroor’s contention that it received insufficient notice 

because the Court has given permission for electronic service, making notice 

relatively straightforward, and Gyroor has participated in the case for several 

months without raising this issue. Gyroor contends that it was prejudiced by late 

notice because it was not given “an opportunity to defend itself.” R. 281 at 1. 

Gyroor has filed four motions in this case and appeared at four hearings. See R. 

207; R. 226; R. 233; R. 276. Gyroor has had ample opportunity to “defend itself.” 

Id. at 3. These statements remain highly relevant to the current motion. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court should clarify that the PI does apply to Affiliated Defendants. Further, because 

Affiliated Defendants were apprised of these proceedings through counsel well in advance of their 

assets being restrained, the Court should deny the motion to vacate. Affiliated Defendants have 

failed to demonstrate any prejudice due to the allegedly deficient notice, and their decision to wait 

months before raising the notice issue proves that no prejudice existed. 

If the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ position on the merits, Plaintiffs respectfully request 

that the Court leave the PI in place and set a briefing and hearing schedule on a new preliminary 

injunction, thereby resolving any alleged notice issues. 

 

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Date: July 2, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

 /s/ Adam Kelly 

Adam Kelly 

Doug Masters 

Arthur Yuan 

Neil Nandi 

321 North Clark Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60654 

Tel.: 312-464-3100 

Email: akelly@loeb.com 

Email: dmasters@loeb.com

Email: ayuan@loeb.com 

Email: nnandi@loeb.com 

Marwa Abdelaziz (admitted pro hac vice) 

LOEB & LOEB LLP 

345 Park Avenue 

New York, New York 10154 

Tel.: (212) 407-4000 

Email: mabdelaziz@loeb.com 

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