UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES T.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

 ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

 SOCIAL SECURITY,

1

Defendant.

No. 20 CV 4990

Magistrate Judge McShain

ORDER

Plaintiff James T. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review 

of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision denying his application for 

benefits. For the following reasons, the Court reverses the SSA’s decision, denies the 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment [32],2 and 

remands this case to the agency for further administrative proceedings.

Background

A. Procedural Background

In 2013, plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security 

income; both applications alleged a disability onset date of April 1, 2013. [18-1] 105. 

The claims were rejected initially and on reconsideration. [Id.]. Plaintiff requested a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which proceeded on August 26, 

2016. [Id.]. The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and denied his applications, 

and the Appeals Council denied review in October 2017. [Id.] 1-6. Plaintiff appealed 

to this Court, and on October 18, 2016, the Court remanded for further proceedings. 

1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security, is substituted as the defendant in this case in place of the former Commissioner of 

Social Security, Andrew Saul.

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers 

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except for citations to the 

administrative record [18, 24], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner of 

each page.

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[18-2] 858-59. In accordance with an order from the Appeals Council, the ALJ held 

two additional hearings on plaintiff’s applications in November 2019 and April 2020. 

[Id.] 769-810; [24-1] 1798-1833. On April 27, 2020, the ALJ issued a written decision 

again finding that plaintiff was not disabled. [18-2] 742-60. Plaintiff appealed again 

to this Court, and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3

B. The ALJ’s Decision

In her April 2020 decision on remand from this Court, the ALJ reviewed 

plaintiff’s disability claim in accordance with the SSA’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. At step one of her decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not 

engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged onset date. [18-2] 745.4

At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

osteoarthritis of the elbows, degenerative joint disease/osteoarthritis of the right 

hand and knee, carpel tunnel syndrome, bipolar affective disorder, major depressive 

disorder, and polysubstance use disorder. [Id.] 745, 751. At step three, the ALJ ruled 

that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. [Id.] 751-53. Before turning to 

step four, the ALJ determined that, if plaintiff “stopped the substance use,” he would 

have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform less than a full range of 

medium work with certain physical and mental restrictions. [Id.] 753-58. Relevant to 

plaintiff’s appeal, the ALJ found that plaintiff “retains the capacity to understand, 

remember, concentrate, persist, and perform simple routine work in [a] low-stress 

environment, defined as[ ] having simple work-related decisions and routine changes 

in work environment.” [Id.] 753. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff can “attend for 

2 hours at a time for simple tasks, but would require a break for 15 minutes, which 

could be accommodated by routine breaks and lunch.” [Id.]. Finally, the ALJ found 

that plaintiff should be free from fast-paced work, but would be able to meet daily 

quotas. [Id.]. At step four, the ALJ held that plaintiff could not perform his past 

relevant work as a cook. [Id.] 758. At step five, the ALJ found that a significant 

number of jobs existed in the national economy that plaintiff could perform: laundry 

worker (33,000 jobs), industrial cleaner (92,000 jobs), and laborer (45,000 jobs). [Id.] 

758-59. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled. [Id.] 759.

3 The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate 

Judge. [11].

4 Because plaintiff suffered from a substance-use disorder, the ALJ analyzed plaintiff’s 

disability claim in two different ways: one in which the ALJ assumed that plaintiff’s 

substance abuse would continue, see [18-2] 745-51, and one in which the ALJ assumed that 

plaintiff would halt his substance abuse, see [id.] 751-59. Because plaintiff does not challenge 

the former component of the ALJ’s decision (where the ALJ found that plaintiff would be 

disabled if his substance abuse did not abate), the Court discusses only the latter component 

of the ALJ’s decision, which was unfavorable to plaintiff.

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Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a sequential 

five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is unemployed; (2) whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any listed impairments; (4) whether the claimant is 

unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to 

perform any other available work in light of her age, education, and work experience. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a). “An affirmative answer leads either to 

the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A 

negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a 

determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 

(7th Cir. 2000). 

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially to determine if it is 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “not a 

high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019)). But the standard 

“is not entirely uncritical. Where the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary 

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be 

remanded.” Brett D. v. Saul, No. 19 C 8352, 2021 WL 2660753, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 

29, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded 

because (1) the ALJ did not include a limitation to 1-2 step unskilled tasks in the 

hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert (VE) or the RFC determination; 

(2) the ALJ violated the law of the case doctrine and did not adequately account for 

plaintiff’s limitations in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace; (3) 

substantial evidence did not support the manipulative limitations in the RFC 

determination; and (4) the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis was patently 

erroneous. See [20] 4-16. For the following reasons, the Court agrees that the ALJ 

erred by failing to either include the 1-2 step unskilled task limitation in the RFC 

determination or explain why she declined to do so.5

5 Because this issue is dispositive, the Court does not address plaintiff’s other grounds for 

reversal.

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A. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Explain Why She Did Not Include 

a 1-2 Step Unskilled Task Limitation in the RFC Determination.

“A disability claimant’s RFC describes the maximum she can do in a work 

setting despite her mental and physical limitations.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 

807 (7th Cir. 2014). “An ALJ must evaluate all relevant evidence when determining 

an applicant’s RFC[.]” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). “Although 

an ALJ need not mention every snippet of evidence in the record, the ALJ must 

connect the evidence to the conclusion; in so doing, he may not ignore entire lines of 

contrary evidence.” Id. at 592.

In this case, state agency psychological consultant Tyrone Hollerauer assessed 

plaintiff’s mental RFC at the reconsideration level. See [18-1] 96-97. Among other 

things, Dr. Hollerauer opined that plaintiff was “limited to 1-2 step unskilled tasks.” 

[Id.] 97. After summarizing the contents of Dr. Hollerauer’s assessment in her written 

decision, the ALJ gave that assessment “moderate weight”:

Moderate weight is given to the [sic] Dr. Hollerauer’s assessment, as the 

objective medical evidence support[s] the degree of limitation as noted. 

He identified the claimant’s difficulty concentrating at time[s] and a 

psychiatric consultative examination report that showed concentration 

deficits. The record also reflects the claimant’s mental impairments are 

complicated by his history of polysubstance drug abuse. However, he 

showed improvement with drug use cessation and medication 

compliance. Further, Dr. Hollerauer based his opinion on a thorough 

review of the record, and the contemporaneous treatment notes from the 

claimant’s treatment provider, routinely identifying unremarkable 

mental status exams, and that the claimant has only required 

intermittent conservative care during the relevant time period. While 

Dr. Hollerauer’s opinion is consistent with the record at the time the 

opinion was rendered, the undersigned considered additional evidence 

at the hearing level as well as claimant testimony that supports the 

current mental limitations noted in the decision without substance 

abuse.

[18-2] 756-57.

Despite giving moderate weight to Dr. Hollerauer’s assessment, the ALJ did 

not include the 1-2 step unskilled task limitation in the RFC determination or explain 

why she did not do so. See [18-2] 753. Nor did the ALJ include this limitation in any 

of the hypothetical questions she posed to the VE. See [24-1] 1826-28. Instead, the 

ALJ purported to account for plaintiff’s mental limitations by restricting him to

performing simple work in a low-stress environment that entailed only “simple workrelated decisions and routine changes in the work environment.” [18-2] 753.

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The Court concludes that the ALJ erred by failing to either adopt Dr. 

Hollerauer’s 1-2 step unskilled tasks limitation or explain why she declined to do so. 

An ALJ “must explain [her] analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity 

to permit meaningful appellate review.” Moira L. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 C 2687, 2022 

WL 846469, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). When

evaluating opinion evidence, the ALJ “is not required to credit every part of a medical 

opinion just because he credits one part.” Stephens v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-3117, 2016 

WL 1271050, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016), aff’d, 671 F. App’x 390 (7th Cir. 2016). 

But the ALJ was “required to–and did not–explain why [s]he adopted some of [Dr. 

Hollerauer’s] findings and rejected others.” Diaz v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 11149, 2017 

WL 4163959, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017) (remanding for new RFC determination 

where ALJ gave “some weight” to state agency psychologists’ opinions but did not 

explain why RFC omitted their recommendation that plaintiff was limited to 1-2 step 

tasks); accord Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 8, 2023) (remanding where ALJ “did not provide any explanation concerning her 

apparent rejection of the one-to-two step task limitation, and thus obviously did not 

provide the requisite explanation and logical bridge”); Mildred B. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 

CV 3532, 2022 WL 1746849, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2022) (remanding where ALJ 

gave considerable weight to opinion of state agency consultant who opined that 

plaintiff was limited to 1-2 step tasks but did not include that limitation in RFC 

determination and failed to explain why she did not adopt that limitation); Ghada G. 

v. Kijakazi, No. 19 C 6306, 2022 WL 580782, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2022) (“[I]t is 

generally alright when an ALJ draws her hypothetical/residual functional capacity 

finding directly from the opinions of the state agency reviewing doctors. But the ALJ 

didn’t do that here. She rejected the limitation to ‘simple 1-2 step tasks’ and didn’t 

explain why. That has to be addressed on remand as well.”) (internal citations 

omitted); Martinez v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 9240, 2018 WL 2984829, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 

14, 2018) (remanding where ALJ gave great weight to agency consultants’ opinions 

that plaintiff was limited to 1-2 step tasks, but “did not include a one- to two-step 

task limitation in his ultimate RFC determination or in his hypothetical questions 

posed to the VE” and instead “limited Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks”).

The ALJ’s error was a critical one because the 1-2 step unskilled task 

limitation identified by Dr. Hollerauer is more restrictive than the limitation to 

simple work that the ALJ included in the RFC determination. Cases from the 

Northern District of Illinois “have repeatedly interpreted the restriction [to 1-2 step 

tasks] to limit a claimant to Level 1 Reasoning jobs,” as defined by the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (DOT). Kevin W. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-6557, 2023 WL 35178, at 

*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2023); see also Deborah B., 2022 WL 1292249, at *4 (“the 

limitation to one-to-two step tasks is more restrictive than just the limitation to 

simple work found by the ALJ”). In contrast, “a restriction to ‘simple work’ could 

include jobs with a Reasoning Level of 2 or higher.” Kevin W., 2023 WL 35178, at *4. 

Notably, each of the jobs that the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform was a 

Reasoning Level 2 or 3 job. See DOT 361.684-018 Spotter I, 1991 WL 672984 (laundry 

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worker jobs are Reasoning Level 3 positions); DOT 381.687-018 Cleaner, Industrial, 

1991 WL 673258 (industrial cleaner jobs are Reasoning Level 2 positions); DOT 

922.687-058 Laborer, Stores (laborer jobs are Reasoning Level 2 positions). Had the 

ALJ limited plaintiff to 1-2 step unskilled tasks, as Dr. Hollerauer had opined, this 

work would have been precluded, and (on the present record at least), plaintiff would 

have been found disabled.

The Acting Commissioner’s arguments to the contrary are meritless. 

First, the Acting Commissioner contends that plaintiff’s “entire argument is 

premised on the mistaken believe [sic] that the ALJ ‘effectively adopted’ Dr. 

Hollerauer’s opinion.” [33] 4. The Acting Commissioner emphasizes that the ALJ only 

gave moderate weight to the opinion and noted that “additional evidence received at 

the hearing level reflected different limitations from those assessed by Dr. 

Hollerauer.” [Id.]. But plaintiff is not arguing that the ALJ had to adopt every 

component of Dr. Hollerauer’s opinion simply because she gave the opinion moderate 

weight. Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ needed to explain why, having given 

moderate weight to Hollerauer’s assessment of his mental capabilities, she did not 

include an important part of that assessment: the restriction to 1-2 step unskilled 

tasks. And while the Acting Commissioner suggests that the ALJ did not adopt this 

limitation because of the “additional evidence received at the hearing level,” the ALJ 

did not specify what evidence she was referring to or explain why (or whether) it 

caused her to reject the 1-2 step unskilled tasks limitation. See Angelica R. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-50369, 2023 WL 1971647, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2023) (“Merely 

mentioning the one-to-two-step task limitation was not the same as fully addressing 

and analyzing the PC’s opinions.”); Mack v. Berryhill, No. 16 CV 11578, 2018 WL 

3533270, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 23, 2018) (by “cho[osing] to discard portions of [state 

agency psychologist’s opinion] in his RFC without any discussion of how the evidence 

supports his ultimate conclusions . . . the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge from the 

evidence to his conclusion that Claimant should not be limited to one to two step 

tasks”). 

Second, the Acting Commissioner contends that plaintiff failed “to establish 

that a one- to two-step limitation should have been included in the RFC assessment 

in the first place.” [33] 4. Incredibly, the Acting Commissioner faults plaintiff for 

“cherry-pick[ing]” evidence that is consistent with Dr. Hollerauer’s opinion–such as 

“pieces of his own testimony and mental exam findings generally”–before dismissing 

plaintiff’s effort to corroborate Dr. Hollerauer’s assessment as “lay speculation.” [Id.] 

4-5. Contrary to the Acting Commissioner’s position, plaintiff more than met his 

burden to introduce evidence that supported his disability claim: the agency’s own 

psychological consultant opined that plaintiff could not perform more than 1-2 step 

unskilled tasks. The error here was the ALJ’s failure to articulate, however 

minimally, any basis for excluding that limitation in the RFC determination. 

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Third, the Acting Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s error was harmless 

because plaintiff “fail[ed] to establish that the jobs identified by the ALJ . . . were 

incapable of being performed by an individual limited to the performance of one- to 

two-step tasks.” [33] 5. The Acting Commissioner contends that plaintiff’s argument, 

which depends on the Reasoning Level classifications in the DOT, is nothing but “lay 

speculation.” [Id.]. The Acting Commissioner does not explain why it takes an expert 

to determine the Reasoning Level associated with a particular job listing in the DOT, 

nor does she engage with any of the many, many cases from the Northern District of 

Illinois explaining why a limitation to 1-2 step tasks precludes jobs with a Reasoning 

Level greater than Level 1. And while the Acting Commissioner relies on Surprise v. 

Saul, 968 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that “there is no apparent 

conflict between a simple task limitation and level 3 reasoning,” this argument begs 

the critical question raised in plaintiff’s appeal: did the ALJ properly account for 

plaintiff’s mental limitations by restricting him to simple work, or should the ALJ

have gone further and limited him to performing 1-2 step unskilled tasks? The ALJ’s 

failure to address that question requires a remand.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s request to reverse the SSA’s decision 

and remand this case to the agency [27] is granted, and the Acting Commissioner’s 

motion for summary judgment [32] is denied. The decision of the SSA is reversed, 

and, in accordance with the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order.

_____________________________________

HEATHER K. McSHAIN

United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: December 1, 2023

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