[Cite as State v. Riggleman, 2016-Ohio-5179.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDILLON R. RIGGLEMAN 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 16-CA-9 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

15CR727 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 29, 2016 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

 

BRYAN MOORE ANDREW T. SANDERSON 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Burkett & Sanderson, Inc. 

20 South Second Street 73 North Sixth Street 

Newark, OH 43055 Newark, OH 43055 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 2 

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Dillon R. Riggleman [“Riggleman”] appeals his conviction and 

sentence after a negotiated guilty plea in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} The statement of the facts provided by the prosecuting attorney, and 

presented during the change of plea hearing is as follows, 

As to both counts on February 23rd, 2015, Newark Police Department 

officers were summoned to the Speedway Gas Station on East Main Street 

in Newark, Ohio. A cashier called after observing a male passed out in a 

truck at a pump in the middle of the night. Officers found the defendant, 

Dillon R. Riggleman, alone in the vehicle, sleeping with a smoking pipe in 

one hand and a lighter in the other. They aroused him and although 

exceptionally disoriented at the time and place, he was able to state that he 

had been using Methamphetamine. The pipe was tested and found to be 

positive for Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. All of 

this occurring in Licking County, Ohio. 

T. at 9-10. Riggleman agreed with these facts. T. at 10. See, also Bill of Particulars, 

filed Dec. 4, 2015. 

{¶3} On January 20, 2016, Riggleman pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated 

Possession of Drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The trial judge sentenced Riggleman 

to 6 months in prison and 30 days in jail on each respective count, those sentences 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 3 

running concurrent. Riggleman was credited with days of jail credit towards that 

sentence. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶4} Riggleman raises one assignment of error, 

{¶5} “I. THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.” 

Law and Analysis 

{¶6} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis. 

The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's 

essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced 

by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 

L.Ed.2d 180(1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 

674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373(1989). 

{¶7} In order to warrant a finding that trial counsel was ineffective, the petitioner 

must meet both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland and Bradley. 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251(2009). 

{¶8} Recently, the United States Supreme Court discussed the prejudice prong 

of the Strickland test, 

 With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 4 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct. 

2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of 

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. 

Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 

(2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape 

rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so 

the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive 

post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the 

right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689–690, 104 

S.Ct. 2052. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s 

representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the 

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the 

record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 

judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence.” Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell 

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 

(1993). The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 

incompetence under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it 

deviated from best practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., 

at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 5 

Harrington v. Richter, __U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 770, 777-778, 178 L.Ed.2d 624(2011). 

{¶9} Riggleman contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 

not offer mitigating evidence during the change of plea and sentencing hearing. 

{¶10} “Failure to present mitigating evidence * * * does not in itself constitute proof 

of ineffective assistance[.]” State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 157, 524 N.E.2d 476, 

480(1988). Accord Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-796, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 

638(1987); State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 138, 1999-Ohio-258, 707 N.E.2d 476; 

State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47(1997). 

{¶11} In the case at bar, the trial court stated it had considered the purposes and 

principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. T. at 16. During the colloquy, Riggleman 

informed the court that he has felonies pending in another county. T. at 16; 20. 

{¶12} In Burger v. Kemp, the Court observed, 

 We have decided that “strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690–691, 104 S.Ct., at 2066. Applying this 

standard, we agree with the courts below that counsel’s decision not to 

mount an all-out investigation into petitioner’s background in search of 

mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional 

judgment. It appears that he did interview all potential witnesses who had 

been called to his attention and that there was a reasonable basis for his 

strategic decision that an explanation of petitioner’s history would not have 

minimized the risk of the death penalty. Having made this judgment, he 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 6 

reasonably determined that he need not undertake further investigation to 

locate witnesses who would make statements about Burger’s past. 

483 U.S. at 794-795; 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638. 

{¶13} In the case at bar, there has been no showing in the record of this case that 

any mitigating evidence was in existence or that there were witnesses available whose 

testimony would have assisted the defense. Nothing in the record demonstrates that 

more mitigation material, if any existed, would have resulted in a lesser sentence. The 

failure to prove either prong is fatal. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 2000–

Ohio–448, 721 N.E.2d 52. Further, at the sentencing hearing and again in the sentencing 

entry, the trial court expressly indicated it considered all sentencing factors as required 

by law. 

{¶14} Riggleman has not established that “in light of all the circumstances, the 

identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. He 

“has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a 

breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel’s assistance.” 

Strickland, at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Accord, Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 

795-796, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638. 

{¶15} Riggleman’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 7 

{¶16} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, J., 

Farmer, P.J., and 

Hoffman, J., concur