* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 8 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

EDITH DARLING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. McCURTAIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, also known as Board of County Commissioners of McCurtain County, Oklahoma,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-7019 (D.C. No. 96-CV-189-P) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff, Edith Darling, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, McCurtain County Board of Commissioners, in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, and th e dismissal of her pendent state claims. “We review the grant or denial of su mmary judgment de novo , applying the same legal standard used by the distri ct court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1490, 1493 (10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if “th ere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is ent itled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We construe the factual record and reasonable infer ences therefrom in the light most favorable to Ms. Darling, as the non movant. See Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Ass’n , 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 1996). Ms. Darling claims the deputy sheriff of McCurtain County forcibly entered her home without a warrant, forcibly seized her and pla ced her into involuntary protective custody in violation of her Fourth Amend ment and due process rights. Ms. Darling claims that the deputy did not comply w ith the requirements of Oklahoma’s emergency detention and protective custo dy statute, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 5-207, though she does not dispute thatthe deputy received prior authorization from a state district court judge to take her into protective custody. However, she does dispute defendant’s evidence thatshe was suicidal and-3-

intoxicated at the time she was taken into custody, and she claims that the deputy sheriff used excessive force when taking her into c ustody. These disputed issues are not material, however, because Ms. Darling has not presented evidence that defendant is liable for the deputy’s actions. See Lawmaster v. Ward , 125 F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A fact is ‘materia l’ only if it may affect the suit’s outcome.”). Municipal liability in § 1983 cases is limited to d eprivation of federally protected rights caused by action taken pursuant to official municipal policy.
See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” be hind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the m unicipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown , 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). As thoroughly discussed by the district court in it s order, Ms. Darling presented no facts demonstrating such a causal link between the alleged actions by the deputy sheriff and the Board of County Commissioner s. Her conclusory allegations that the deputy acted pursuant to an un constitutional, established county policy in taking her into protective custody , or that the county had an inadequate training program for sheriffs and their deputies regarding protective custody seizures are unsupported by any evidence an d, thus, are insufficient to-4-

defeat summary judgment. See White v. York Int’l Corp. , 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations will not d efeat properly supported motion for summary judgment). We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on Ms. Darling’s § 1983 claim, and we discern no abuse of discretionin its decision to dismiss her pendent state claims. The judgment of the United S tates District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED substantia lly for the reasons set forth in its order dated January 24, 1997.

Entered for the Court

James E. Barrett Senior Circuit Judge