alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Trustees of the Chicago Painters and Decorators

Pension Fund, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−04922

Honorable Sharon Johnson

Coleman

First Look Design, Inc.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, January 20, 2021:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman: Telephone status

hearing held on 1/20/2021. Counsel for plaintiff reports that the parties have reached a

settlement. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), this case is

dismissed without prejudice for 6 months. If no motion to reinstate is filed by 7/19/2021,

the dismissal shall automatically convert to one with dismissal with no further action by

the Court. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice. (ym, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04922 Document #: 16 Filed: 01/20/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:38
9515.

#### Bass & Company *v.*Vinson *et al.*

Luke, J.

The vendors of certain personal ' property took from the vendees a promissory note, secured in the same 'instrument by a mortgage on the property sold, in which it was stated that the note was given “for purchase-money of one sorrel mare mule four years old, and one black mare mule seven years old, title only guaranteed,” and the vendors instituted a proceeding to foreclose the mortgage for the amount of the *394note, to which the vendees interposed an affidavit of illegality containing the following plea (after stating the consideration of the mortgage and the purchase-price of each of the animals) : “Affiants say that at the time the sorrel horse-mule was delivered to them the said mule was sick, and affiant Dan Vinson called plaintiffs’ attention to the fact, and was informed by plaintiffs that the mule was not sick and would be all right in a few days. Acting on said statement, affiant Dan Vinson took said mule hack to his farm. The said mule grew worse, and in two or three days he returned the mule to plaintiffs, with the complaint that he was sick and that he could not use him. Affiants say that the *plaintiffs accepted said mule, ■ tools possession of him, and in a fewr days he died in their possession*(italics ours). Affiants say, therefore, that they are not liable for the purchase-money of said mule, or any part thereof; that there has been a total failure of consideration in so far as the value-of said mule is concerned.” *Held:*The affidavit of illegality was not subject to general demurrer attacking it for legal insufficiency. The plea was a good plea of recission, and- the fact that the pleader denominated it as a plea of failure of consideration does not defeat the plea or its effect. See Civil Code (1910) § 5635; *Bates*v. *First National Bank,*111 *Ga.*756 (36 S. E. 949) ; *Daniel*v. *Burson,*16 *Ga. App.*39 (84 S. E. 490). The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the plea.

Decided February 11, 1919.

Affidavit of illegality; from Baldwin- superior court—Judge Park. December 39J1917.

Application for certiorari to review this decision was denied by the Supreme Court.

*Sibley & Sibley,*for plaintiffs,.cited:

*Holt*v. *Clary,*146 *Ga.*46; *Lufburrow*v. *Henderson,*30 *Ga.*483; *Bullard*v. *Brewer,*118 *Ga.*918; *Schofield-Burkett Construction Co.*v. *Rich,*16 *Ga. App.*331; Civil. Code (1910), § 4339; *Crenshaw*v. *Jackson,*6 *Ga.*609; *Arnold*v. *Carter,*135 *Ga.*319.

*Allen & Pottle,*for defendant, cited:

Civil Code, § 5635, and cases cited in the decision; *Holt v. Clary,*supra (distinguished).

2. The issue presented was one of fact, and for no reason assigned did' the court err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Jenhins, J., concur.*
COURT OF APPEALS FOIl THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Cecilia Marie Ryan and Attorney Suzanne Schwab-Radcliffe

Appellate case number: 01-12-01022-CV

Trial court case number: 12FD1843

Trial court: County, Court at Law No 3 of Galveston County

On December 14, 2012, relator, Cecelia Ryan, filed what is effectively an agreed motion to stay

trial, currently set to begin on December 19, 2012. Relator’s emergency motion is granted. The

December 19, 2012 setting for the trial of the underlying case is stayed. The stay is effective

until this mandamus proceeding is finally decided. See TEX. R. APp. P. 52.10(b).

It ~s so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/Laura C. Higley

[] Acting individually [] Acting for the Court

Date: December 17, 2012
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 CERTIFICATE OF
PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER Each of the undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity as an officer of CRT
Properties, Inc. (the Company) that he has reviewed this quarterly report
and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the quarterly report of the
Company on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2004 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, that the quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
report not misleading, and that the information contained in such report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at
the end of such period and the results of operations and cash flows of the
Company for such period. Dated: August 4, 2004
    /s/ Thomas J. CrockerThomas J. CrockerChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
CRT Properties, Inc. Dated: August 4, 2004
    /s/ Steven A. AbneySteven A. AbneyVice President, Finance and
Chief Accounting Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
CRT Properties, Inc.
No. 16,084.

#### Dick et al. v. Mullins et al.

*Practice.*— Motion *to Dismiss Appeal.*— Notice *to Appellants.*— Supi-eme *Court Hule.*— Under Rule 14 of the Supreme Court, a motion to dismiss an appeal because of the alleged insufficiency of the notice of appeal, will be overruled if the appellants have not been given notice of the motion.

Bill of *Exceptions.*— How *Phiidence Made Part of.*— Stenographer’s Beport— A bill of exceptions incorporating the evidence is always essential, as the evidence must come to the appellate tribunal under the sanction of the trial judge. Evidence can not be brought into a bill of exceptions by reference to a stenographer's report,- but the'report itself may be incorporated.

From the Pulaski Circuit Court.

*W. Spangler*and *J. M. Spangler,*for appellants.

*B. Borders*and *F. L. Dukes,*for appellees.

Elliott, J.

Notice of the appeal was served upon the appellees, and the service is proved by the acknowledgment of their attorney. They have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because of the alleged insufficiency of the notice of appeal, but they have not given the appellants notice of the *366motion. The rules of the court require notice of such motions, and there must be a compliance with those rules. Rule XIV* The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled, with instructions to the clerk to tax the costs of the motion against the appellees.

Filed May 25, 1891.

The questions argued by the appellants’ counsel require an examination of the evidence, and that is not before us. The stenographer’s report of the evidence does not, and can not, make the evidence a part of the record. The recital of the record is this : *“*And the defendants filed and presented a bill of exceptions, No. 1 being the stenographer’s long-hand report of the evidence, taken upon the trial of this cause.” The report is appended to the record, and is preceded by the certificate of the clerk. It is entirely clear that evidence can not be brought into the record in the mode here adopted. *Clark*v. *State, ex rel.,*125 Ind. 1, and cases cited; *Fiscus*v. *Turner,*125 Ind. 46; *Ohio, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *Voight,*122 Ind. 288; *Doyal*v. *Landes,*119 Ind. 479; *Wagoner*v. *Wilson,*108 Ind. 210.

A bill of exceptions incorporating the evidence is always essential, as the evidence must come to the appellate tribunal under the sanction of the trial judge. Thei’e is no necessity for copying the stenographer’s report, but the report must be embodied in the bill of exceptions before the judge signs it. Evidence can not be brought into a bill by reference to a stenographer’s report, but the report itself may be incorporated. *Patterson*v. *Churchman,*122 Ind. 379.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from SEC Form
10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               7
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      175
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          3
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   195
<PP&E>                                            5435
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (3820)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    1874
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              467
<BONDS>                                           1098
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          1945
<OTHER-SE>                                       (104)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      1874
<SALES>                                            797
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   789
<CGS>                                              476
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      476
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    84
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  72
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    157
<INCOME-TAX>                                        57
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                100
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       100
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .95
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .95
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM COMPX
INTERNATIONAL INC.'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS
ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001049606
<NAME>                        COMPX INTERNATIONAL INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         12,784
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  33,396
<ALLOWANCES>                                   793
<INVENTORY>                                    35,993
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               84,901
<PP&E>                                         115,495
<DEPRECIATION>                                 28,620
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 219,754
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          27,427
<BONDS>                                        31,101
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       161
<OTHER-SE>                                     155,470
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   219,754
<SALES>                                        131,203
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               131,203
<CGS>                                          95,139
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  95,139
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               153
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,071
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                21,450
<INCOME-TAX>                                   7,827
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            13,626
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   13,626
<EPS-BASIC>                                    .84
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .84



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Richard Cohen, the Chief Financial Officer of Baseline Oil & Gas Corp. (the
"Company") do hereby certify under the standards set forth and solely for the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated: March 30, 2006                                    /s/ Richard Cohen
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Richard Cohen
                                                         Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of SmartPros Ltd. (the Company) on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the date hereof (the Report), I, Allen S.
Greene, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A
signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon
request.

|                         | 
|------------------------ | 
|/s/ Allen S.
 Greene     | 
|                         | 
|Allen S.
 Greene         | 
|Chief
 Executive Officer | 
|                         | 
|March 23,
 2009          | 

---
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3920

To allow Congress to reverse the judgments of the United States Supreme 

Court. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2004

Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky (for himself, Mr. DEMINT, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. 

POMBO, Mr. COBLE, Mr. COLLINS, Mr. GOODE, Mr. PITTS, Mr. FRANKS

of Arizona, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. DOOLITTLE, and Mr. KINGSTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be 

subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 

of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL

To allow Congress to reverse the judgments of the United 

States Supreme Court.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Congressional Ac5 countability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004’’. 
2

•HR 3920 IH 

1 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVERSAL OF SUPREME COURT 

2 JUDGMENTS. 

3 The Congress may, if two thirds of each House agree, 

4 reverse a judgment of the United States Supreme Court—

5 (1) if that judgment is handed down after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act; and 

7 (2) to the extent that judgment concerns the 

8 constitutionality of an Act of Congress. 

9 SEC. 3. PROCEDURE. 

10 The procedure for reversing a judgment under section 

11 2 shall be, as near as may be and consistent with the au12 thority of each House of Congress to adopt its own rules 

13 of proceeding, the same as that used for considering 

14 whether or not to override a veto of legislation by the 

15 President. 

16 SEC. 4. BASIS FOR ENACTMENT. 

17 This Act is enacted pursuant to the power of Con18 gress under article III, section 2, of the Constitution of 

19 the United States.

Æ
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

The Directors 

Inmarsat Group Limited 

99 City Road 

London EC1Y 1AX 

United Kingdom 

 

The Directors 

Inmarsat Finance plc 

99 City Road 

London EC1Y 1AX 

United Kingdom 

 

26 March 2009 

 

Dear Sirs: 

 

**CONSENT TO REFERENCE WATSON WYATT LIMITED IN INMARSAT GROUP LIMITED AND INMARSAT FINANCEPLC 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 20-F**

 

We hereby consent toyour reference to our name in your 2008 annual report on Form 20-F in connection with the disclosure of pensions and post-retirement medical information (collectively, the “**Pensions Disclosure**”) therein. In giving such consent, wedo not thereby admit that we come within the category of person whose consent is required under Section 7 or Section 11 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “**Securities Act**”), or the rules and regulationsadopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “**SEC**”) thereunder, nor do we admit that we are experts with respect to any part of such Form 20-F within the meaning of the term “experts” as used in theSecurities Act or the SEC’s rules and regulations adopted thereunder. Although we understand you used our report to draft the Pensions Disclosure, you are solely responsible for the scope and substance of the Pensions Disclosure. 

 

Sincerely
**Exhibit
      15.2**





**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**





We
      consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Experts” and to the use
      of our auditors’ report dated March 22, 2007 on the financial statements of
      SuperCom Asia Pacific Limited for the year ended December 31, 2006 in the Annual
      Report (Form 20-F with file no. 000-50790) of Vuance Ltd for the year ended
      December 31, 2007 filed with the United States Securities and Exchange
      Commission.







**BDO
      McCabe Lo Limited**


Certified
      Public Accountants





26
      June
      2008
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 30, 2020

ON RECONSIDERATION EN BANC

NO. 03-19-00294-CV

The City of Austin, Texas, Appellant

v.

Sayeed Anam, Individually and as Independent Administrator of The Estate of Zachary 

Anam and Cara Anam, Individually, Appellee

APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN, BAKER, TRIANA,

KELLY AND SMITH

REVERSED AND RENDERED -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE TRIANA, JOINED BY JUSTICE SMITH; 

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

This is an appeal from the probate court’s order denying the City of Austin’s plea to the 

jurisdiction signed on April 12, 2019. Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, and having 

reviewed the motion, the record, and the parties’ arguments, we grant the motion for 

reconsideration en banc. The Court therefore withdraws its opinion and judgment from July 30, 

2020. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was 

reversible error in the probate court’s order. Therefore, the Court reverses the probate court’s 

order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and renders judgment dismissing the Anams’
claims against the City. Appellee shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and

in the court below.
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 98-2143

ARNOLD W. VINICK,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on March 8, 2000, is

amended as follows:

Page 20, line 9: Add a new footnote number “8” after the

period ending the sentence: “Responsibility during one period

does not equate to responsibility in all periods.” 

The text for the new footnote 8 is as follows: “We do not

mean to suggest that in all § 6672 cases a district court is

precluded from considering evidence from outside the quarters in

question. For example, behavior in one quarter, depending on

the circumstances, could cast light on one's status as a

responsible person in other quarters. Because one's function

and status can change between quarters, however, it would be

erroneous based solely on evidence from one quarter

automatically to conclude that a person is responsible in

another quarter.”
Alter the subsequent footnotes' numbering accordingly.
#### GRASTY v. GRASTY

No. 223P97

Case below: 125 N.C.App.736

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 5 June 1997.