Present: All the Justices 

LARRY MASSIE, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 971835 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 June 5, 1998 

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 

OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 

Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we decide whether the tolling 

provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), which allows a 

plaintiff to recommence a cause of action within six months 

of the date of an order of nonsuit or within the original 

period of limitation, whichever is longer, applies to a 

limitation period fixed by contract rather than by statute. 

Because we conclude that the tolling provision applies only 

to a statute of limitations, we will affirm the judgment of 

the circuit court. 

I. 

 The pertinent facts are not disputed. Larry Massie 

and Sondra Massie (the Massies), as employees of the 

Russell County School System, are subscribers to a group 

health and hospitalization insurance contract (the 

Contract) issued by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia 

(Blue Cross). Sondra underwent oral surgery on May 10, 
1989. Following the surgery, Blue Cross paid only a 

portion of Sondra’s medical bills. 

 On February 12, 1991, the Massies filed a warrant in 

debt in the General District Court of Russell County 

against Blue Cross seeking recovery of the remaining amount 

allegedly owed on Sondra’s medical bills. Upon application 

by Blue Cross, the action was removed to the circuit court. 

On February 21, 1992, the circuit court granted the 

Massies’ motion for a nonsuit and dismissed the action 

without prejudice. 

 The Massies recommenced their action by filing a 

motion for judgment on August 14, 1992 in the circuit 

court. In response, Blue Cross filed a special plea in bar 

arguing that the twelve-month limitation period contained 

in the Contract bars the action. That contractual 

provision provides the following regarding the period of 

limitations: 

I. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

No action at law or suit in equity may be brought 

against the Plan more than twelve (12) months after 

the date on which the cause of action accrued with 

respect to any matter relating to: 

• this Contract; 

• the Plan’s performance under this Contract; or 

2
• any statement made by employees, officers, or 

directors of the Plan concerning the Contract or the 

benefits available to a Member.1

 After considering the parties’ respective arguments 

and memoranda, the circuit court held that the twelve-month 

contractual limitation bars the instant action. In a 

letter opinion, the court stated the following reasons for 

its decision: 

The parties to this suit have agreed that no action at 

law may be brought against [Blue Cross] more than 12 

months after the date on which the cause of action 

accrued with respect to any matter relating to the 

contract between them. For this Court to superimpose 

upon that very plain statement of the parties’ 

agreement, the statutory exemption in cases of nonsuit 

would be to eviscerate the contractual provision. 

Moreover, Virginia Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), by its own 

terms, operates only to toll the applicable statute of 

limitations and not to [toll] limitation periods 

established by contract. 

On June 4, 1997, the court issued an order sustaining 

Blue Cross’ special plea in bar and dismissing the present 

action with prejudice. The Massies appeal. 

II. 

 In Virginia, parties to a contract may agree that any 

action to enforce the contract must be filed within a 

shorter period of time than that established by an 

otherwise applicable statute of limitations. Board of 

 1

 The Contract defines “Plan” as Blue Cross and 

“Member” as “the Subscriber, and if Family Coverage is in 

force, the Subscriber’s Dependents . . . .” 

3
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Sampson, 235 Va. 516, 520, 

369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1988). A contractual period of 

limitations must not be unreasonably short, id., and in an 

insurance contract, the period of limitations cannot be 

“less than one year after the loss occurs or the cause of 

action accrues.” Code § 38.2-314. 

 The Massies do not challenge the validity of the 

twelve-month limitation period in the Contract.2 Nor do 

they assert that they filed the present action within the 

twelve-month period after their cause of action accrued. 

Rather, the Massies contend that they timely filed the 

present action because they recommenced their suit within 

six months after entry of the nonsuit order on February 21, 

1992. They assert that, even though they are bound by the 

twelve-month limitation period in the Contract, they are 

entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision in Code 

§ 8.01-229(E)(3). In other words, the Massies argue that 

the filing of the first suit in general district court 

tolled the twelve-month contractual limitation period, and 

that, following the nonsuit of the first action, they had 

six months within which to refile their action. 

 2

 If the Contract did not contain a period of 

limitations, the five-year statute of limitations for 

written contracts under Code § 8.01-246(2) would be 

applicable. 

4
 The Massies premise their argument on the current 

version of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3). This section states the 

following: 

 If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit 

as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of 

limitations with respect to such action shall be 

tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited 

action, and the plaintiff may recommence his 

action within six months from the date of the 

order entered by the court, or within the 

original period of limitation, or within the 

limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, 

whichever period is longer. This tolling 

provision shall apply irrespective of whether the 

action is originally filed in a federal or a 

state court and recommenced in any other court, 

and shall apply to all actions irrespective of 

whether they arise under common law or statute. 

The Massies specifically argue that the last phrase, “shall 

apply to all actions irrespective of whether they arise 

under common law or statute,” means that the six-month 

tolling provision applies to all cases that are nonsuited, 

including the present one. However, Blue Cross argues that 

the prior version of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), which is 

identical to the current version except that it does not 

contain the last phrase, governs the disposition of this 

case because the Massies’ cause of action accrued before 

the 1991 amendment adding that phrase went into effect. 

 We do not need to decide which version of Code § 8.01-

229(E)(3) applies in this case because the operative 

language, “the statute of limitations with respect to such 

5
action shall be tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited 

action,” has not changed. (Emphasis added). The plain 

meaning of this phrase is that, after a voluntary nonsuit, 

the statute of limitations, not a contractual period of 

limitations, is tolled, and the plaintiff may recommence 

the suit within six months or within the original period of 

limitations, whichever is longer. “[W]hen a statute is 

clear and unambiguous, a court must accept its plain 

meaning and not resort to rules of construction or 

extrinsic evidence.” Wall v. Fairfax County School Bd., 

252 Va. 156, 159, 475 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1996). Thus, we 

conclude that Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) does not apply to a 

contractual period of limitations and that the instant 

action is, therefore, time-barred. See Riddlesbarger v. 

Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 391 (1868); Chichester v. 

New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 51 A. 545, 547 (Conn. 1902); 

Davenport v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.2d 134, 135 (Ga. 

Ct. App. 1948); Lewis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 369 

(Mass. 1902); Howard Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 18 A. 614, 615 

(Pa. 1889). 

Our decisions in Ward v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 253 Va. 

232, 482 S.E.2d 795 (1997), and Clark v. Butler Aviation—

Washington Nat’l, Inc., 238 Va. 506, 385 S.E.2d 847, 

(1989), cited by the Massies, do not compel a different 

6
result. While both of those cases involved the tolling 

provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), neither case dealt with 

a contractual period of limitations. Thus, those decisions 

have no relevance to the present case. 

 Finally, the Contract itself did not include a 

provision tolling the twelve-month limitation period after 

a nonsuit or incorporate the six-month tolling provision 

contained in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3). “A court must give 

effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the 

language of their contract, and the rights of the parties 

must be determined accordingly.” Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 

800, 805, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980). By agreeing to a 

period of limitations different from the statutory period, 

the parties chose to exclude the operation of the statute 

of limitations and, in doing so, also excluded its 

exceptions.3

 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court. 

Affirmed.

 3

 Neither party advanced any argument regarding the 

applicability of the general tolling provision of Code 

§ 8.01-229(E)(1) to the present case, and hence we express 

no opinion on the matter. 

7