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<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">December 3, 2007</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Dear NIST,</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">We would like 
  to introduce a new Voting Technology called "Retro-control". This 
  is the first method which combines full transparency with complete anonymity 
  guaranteed and prevents from selling and buying one's votes.</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Below is an overview 
  of the method, while details could be found in a patent description, patent 
  application # PCT /RU2007 /000500. (see<br>
  http://www.retro-control.narod.ru/eng/html/solution.html). </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Provided, there 
  is an electronic voting system we propose to equip it with a printing device 
  and adjust the software so that the screen before one casts<br>
  a vote shows his/her unique identity code which is on the screen until the voter 
  finishes his/her voting session. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">After that the 
  screen shows the list of nominees for the voter to choose from and vote for. 
  </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">The printing device 
  then prints out a document for the voter that we call "voter certificate" 
  or simply "certificate". The differences between a ballot paper and 
  a certificate are outlines below:</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">a) A voter keeps 
  a certificate with himself/herself instead of casting it into a ballot box.</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">b) To the right 
  from nominee names printing devise inserts the identity codes of various voters 
  into each line of the certificate but not into the only one. The line which 
  is corresponding to the voter choice is inserted with a code visible on the 
  screen. The rest of lines are inserted with different codes of the real voters 
  who took their votes earlier. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">For example, if 
  a voter is coded 2201 with his/her vote for the Republican Party, his/her certificate 
  would look as follows (in case a voter is unique within a ballot district):</font></p>
<blockquote> 
  <p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Democratic Party 
    0112<br>
    Republican Party 2201<br>
    Socialistic Party 0943<br>
    Green Party 1118</font></p>
</blockquote>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Numbers 0112, 
  0943 and 1118 are codes of unknown voters who voted for democratic, socialistic 
  and green party accordingly. Once the voter is given the<br>
  certificate, he/she ascertains that his/her code 2201, which has been shown 
  on screen, is the same as that in the second line of the certificate standing 
  for Republican Party. After that the code disappears from the screen and a voter 
  leaves the ballot station with certificate.</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">It is then proposed 
  to publish the returns in codes like in above example so that a voter using 
  his/her certificate could control both his/her vote and those of other unknown 
  voters whose codes are shown in the certificates. Each discrepancy should be 
  document supported, corrected and, perhaps, repaid for to the voter that found 
  a discrepancy. Showing the certificate with discrepancies to any authority, 
  a voter does not disclose his/her vote, because one can not prove that the identity 
  code in the line with discrepancy belongs to him/her. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">In this way, a 
  voter has a document to be able to question the returns, if the data in his/her 
  certificate are not completely the same as in officially published code returns. 
  Moreover, one can not sell and buy votes using this kind of certificate. It 
  is impossible to define with this document the choice of the voter, because 
  only original recipient knows his/her identity code, therefore, the seller cannot 
  prove that he/she voted as required by the buyer, thus, making no sense in the 
  deal. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Our method is 
  an opportunity to control one's own vote for those who did not take a vote. 
  For this purpose we propose to publish the list of voters who has taken their 
  votes with so arrangement by address that it guarantees anonymity for voters 
  who has taken and has not taken theirs votes. If the quantity of the voters 
  in one apartment is nil, or it is equal to the quantity of the voters so the 
  information on this address can not be published separately. It can demonstrate 
  the choice of voters who took the vote or who didn't take. This address should 
  be combined in the list with neighbor apartment. If the combined sum after two 
  apartments is equal neither to nil nor the total quantity of the voters it can't 
  be defined who personally took the vote and who didn't. There can be many combinations 
  of addresses. It can be the quantity of the voters within the story or within 
  the entire house or few houses. It is easier for the neighbors to exchange the 
  information and check the authenticity of the address list of the voter quantity. 
  </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Because the total 
  quantity of the voters must be equal to the quantity of the voters in the list 
  of code returns then it's enough to make sure after returns publication. Nobody 
  can accuse in falsification of the factious votes neither election committee 
  nor electronic system designers. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">If there is no 
  centralized electronic system of the voting we propose to create simplex electronic 
  system of the local scale when using "Retro-Control".<br>
  It consists of usual computers with printing devise. It is desirable to combine 
  the computers in the Local Network but it is enough to use the diskette for 
  the computer exchange. To follow the principle of secret ballot the monitor 
  of the computer should be covered with pyramid-shaped housing. There is an<br>
  eyehole on the top of the pyramid and it is the voter who may see the screen 
  picture. The voter can make a choice with the help of the electronic pointing<br>
  devise for example the mouse. The rest procedure doesn't differ from the one 
  described above. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">For the voting 
  at home and at the remote locations it is advisable to use portable computers 
  instead of ballot box. The screen of such computer also should be hidden from 
  the extraneous eyes with curtains for example. If there is a portable printing 
  devise so the certificate is printed automatically. If there is no devise the 
  certificate should be filled in by the present member of the election committee 
  manually. In this case the voter should memorize his/her code and press the 
  button. After it the code should be erased and one can see the image of his/her 
  certificate with the lines filled in. Then the screen can be seen and all codes 
  are written down in the certificate manually. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">If there is no 
  possibility to use the computers at polling place (it is a very rare situation 
  nowadays) we propose to use so called voting counter. It is the isolate cabin 
  with the cashier one of the members of the committee inside. The voting counter 
  is equipped with the observation eyehole. It is only the voter who can see from 
  outside the process of voting inside. Instead of the computer mouse the choice 
  is made with the pointing devise for example the fescue available outside the 
  voting counter. The cashier acts as a computer algorism. He defines the code 
  of the voter at random; cumulates code returns; fills in the certificates manually 
  and gives this paper thru the extending window. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">The results of 
  the voting can be published at the Internet and be sent thru mobile telecommunication 
  system, by means of sms short message service. But<br>
  it is easy for the voter to get the lists of code returns and addresses of the 
  voters from the election district by regular mail as a newspaper. Besides, local 
  press contains the election returns tables of each district; the regional press 
  the election returns tables of all districts; central press the election return 
  tables of all region (province). So it is easy to check if the returns in tables 
  were counted wrong. Thus, each voter can buy three newspapers (local, central 
  and regional) after the election to make sure if:</font></p>
<blockquote> 
  <p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">1) the district 
    returns were included correctly into central ones;<br>
    2) the central returns were included correctly into regional ones;<br>
    3) the regional returns were included correctly into general returns. </font></p>
</blockquote>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">So each voter 
  can control every stage of elections. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">As a conclusion 
  let's get back to the advantages of our method.</font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">1. As we proved 
  before the system of poll is getting more transparent but the anonymity provides 
  the freedom of choice and the secret ballot principle. It is advantage of the 
  method. If the voters control the election returns the possibility of sporadic 
  errors in counting and malicious falsification of the results are expelled. 
  Whatever small the break between winners and loser of the elections within the 
  new system people may not worry because the loser party has to find honest the 
  victory in even one vote or to prove the opposite. <br>
  2. Besides the practical aspects there are moral and personal ones. The right 
  and possibility to control your own vote is the development of the civil rights 
  and freedoms. It brings the moral value to each citizen which must be developed. 
  </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">3. Public affair 
  and social significant advantages of the "Retro-control" system come 
  from the situation when it is impossible to accuse without adducing any proof 
  or just to suspect somebody in falsification of the election returns. It follows 
  that the legitimacy and authority of the person or party elected are getting 
  higher and the social concord is becoming stronger. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">4. The party or 
  a person elected thru the "Retro-control" method will be granted the 
  prestige on the international arena and the whole country will<br>
  be accepted as an advanced country with the democratic elections system. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">5. Nowadays many 
  designers of the electronic elections system have to make their inventions more 
  transparent for control. Sometimes they have to provide the primary codes of 
  the software. Because when one relies on the honesty of the designers the scholars 
  believe that the possibility of coup d'etat exists. However the more transparent 
  the system is the more possible this system can be exposed to the unauthorized 
  break-in. The "Retro-control" method solves this problem drastically. 
  When the voters can control their votes there is no need to control the electronic 
  system organization. The protection from the outer break-in is the prerogative 
  of the system designers and they will get the right and responsibility to protect 
  the system anywise and to blackout its organization. </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">6. The proposed 
  system of the view thru the eyehole gives the possibility to the watchers to 
  control even the fingers movements of the voter. So the sharp voter can't make 
  a picture of his/her choice on the cell phone camera to sell his vote then. 
  </font></p>
<p><font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"><br>
  With best regards, <br>
  the designer of the "Retro-control" method<br>
  Zulin A.M.<br>
  Ul. Soyuza Respublik 17-15 <br>
  Barnaul, Russia, 656038</font></p>
<p> <font size="-1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"><br>
  </font></p>

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