[Cite as Singer v. Adams, 2019-Ohio-2410.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Oscar L. Singer, Jr., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 18AP-833 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CV-1610)

Bret Adams, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 18, 2019 

 

On brief: Golden & Meizlish Co., LPA, Keith E. Golden, and 

Adam H. Karl for appellant. Argued: Adam H. Karl.

On brief: Bret Adams, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

PER CURIAM 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Bret Adams, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to a bench trial, in favor of plaintiff-appellee, 

Oscar L. Singer, Jr. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On February 14, 2017, Singer filed a complaint against Adams, as well as Bret 

Adams dba FMMF and FM2, LLC dba FMMF Fashion Music Festival1 (herein collectively 

referred to as "defendants"), alleging (1) breach of contract for failure to repay a $50,000 

loan Singer made to secure the performance of hip hop artist Ludacris at a music festival 

defendants were coordinating; (2) breach of contract for failure to pay plaintiff $6,000 for 

an Emergency Operations/Security Plan Singer provided for the music festival; (3) fraud; 

 

1 The caption of the complaint refers to "FMMF Fashion Music Festival," however the complaint itself refers 

to Fashion Meets Music Festival. See Compl. at ¶ 4. The court considers the entities to be one and the same 

and the terms will be used interchangeably. 
No. 18AP-833 2 

(4) unjust enrichment; (5) promissory estoppel; and (6) punitive damages. Defendants 

filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim2 alleged one count of abuse of process. 

The counterclaim in effect alleged that Singer had abused process by naming Adams 

individually as a defendant in the case because Singer had wired the $50,000 to a bank 

account belonging to defendant FM2, LLC. 

{¶ 3} Upon Singer's motion, on May 8, 2019, the court granted Singer default 

judgment as to liability only against defendant FM2, LLC. 

{¶ 4} On September 24, 2018, the court held a bench trial. In the final judgment 

entry, the court found that based on the evidence presented at trial, and weighing the 

credibility of the parties, an oral contract existed between Singer and Adams for repayment 

of the loan to secure the performance of Ludacris. The court specifically noted that the 

contract was not between Singer and FM2, LLC dba FMMF Fashion Meets Music Festival. 

Rather, the court found that Adams was personally liable for the loan amount of $50,000, 

plus prejudgment interest from June 4, 2015 at the statutory rate, plus postjudgment 

interest at the statutory rate, plus costs. The court further found that a contract existed 

between Singer and defendant FM2, LLC dba FMMF Fashion Music Festival for payment 

of services in the amount of $6,000 plus interest at the statutory rate. The court found no 

evidence to support the claims of fraud and punitive damages and determined that the 

claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel "no longer have merit" given the 

court's decision regarding the breach of contract claims. (Oct. 8, 2018 Jgmt. Entry at 2.) 

The court noted that the final judgment entry was a final appealable order and there was 

no just cause for delay. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 5} Adams, pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises the following 

assignment of error: 

The Trial Court's October 3, 2018 Judgment Entry is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence 

 

2 In its final judgment entry, the trial court did not address Adams' counterclaim. However, as noted in our 

decision, the judgment entry did state that it was a final appealable order and there is no just cause for delay. 

Furthermore, the court's determination that the contract for repayment of the loan was between Singer and 

Adams, not defendant FM2, LLC dba FMMF Fashion Music Festival, in effect determines the action and 

prevents a judgment in favor of Adams on his abuse of process counterclaim. R.C. 2505.02. 
No. 18AP-833 3 

and/or testimony did not support a finding that Mr. Adams was 

personally liable under an oral contract. 

III. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 6} Adams argues that there was no manifestation of mutual assent to establish 

that he was acting other than in a corporate capacity. In support of his argument, he states 

that Singer did not present evidence that amounted in effect to a written document, Singer 

failed to testify about the repayment terms or terms of breach and that Adams himself 

"testified that the discussions between himself, as a representative of FM2, LLC, and 

[Singer] were that repayment would occur from the proceeds of the festival." (Adams's brief 

at 6-7.) He argues that Singer was inconsistent in his testimony and was caught several 

times contradicting his answers to requests for admissions. Following these arguments at 

several points, Adams stated "(See Trial Transcript)" yet he did not specifically refer to what 

portions of the transcript, if any, supported his arguments. Id. As noted above, he also 

referred to Singer's answers to requests for admissions. 

{¶ 7} The record before us does not contain a transcript of the bench trial and does 

not contain answers to requests for admissions. Therefore, this court is unable to review 

Adams's assignment of error and must overrule the same. 

{¶ 8} " ' "The duty to provide a transcript for appellate review falls upon the 

appellant. This is because the appellant bears the burden of showing error by reference to 

matters in the record." ' " Lee v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 1oth Dist. No. 06AP625, 2006-Ohio-6658, ¶ 10, quoting Dailey v. R & J Commercial Contracting, Inc., 10th 

Dist. No. 01AP-1464, 2002-Ohio-4724, ¶ 20, quoting Fleisher v. Siffrin Residential Assoc., 

Inc., 7th Dist. No. 01-CA-169, 2002-Ohio-3002, ¶ 25, following Knapp v. Edwards 

Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). "Absent a transcript, this court must presume 

the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the trial court's decision." Lee at ¶ 10, 

citing Edwards v. Cardwell, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-430, 2005-Ohio-6758, ¶ 4-6; Dailey at 

¶ 20. " 'Where a party to an appeal fails to file portions of the transcript necessary for 

resolution of his assignments of error, the assignments will be overruled.' " Lee at ¶ 10, 

quoting Maloney v. Maloney, 34 Ohio App.3d 9 (11th Dist.1986), syllabus. Further, in 

reviewing a trial court's judgment following a bench trial, " 'an appellate court is "guided by 

the presumption" that the trial court's findings are correct.' " Lee at ¶ 11, quoting 

Broadstone v. Quillen, 162 Ohio App.3d 632, 2005-Ohio-4278, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing 
No. 18AP-833 4 

Patterson v. Patterson, 3d Dist. No. 17-04-07, 2005-Ohio-2254, ¶ 26, quoting Seasons Coal 

Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-80 (1984). 

{¶ 9} Accordingly, Adams's assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 10} Having overruled Adams's assignment of error, the judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT, P.J., DORRIAN, J., and NELSON, J.