alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTINE CRAWFORD, et al.,

Case No.: 1:20-cv-05132

Plaintiffs,

Hon. Steven C. Seeger

v.

MCDONALD’S USA, LLC, a Delaware

limited liability company, and

MCDONALD’S CORPORATION, a

Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

Defendants McDonald’s USA, LLC and McDonald’s Corporation (collectively, 

“Defendants”) hereby move the Court for leave to file the opinion in Byrd, et al. v. McDonald’s 

USA, LLC et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-06447 (N.D. Ill), a copy of which is annexed hereto, as 

supplemental authority in support of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 38.) Counsel for Defendants inquired as to whether Plaintiffs object 

to the instant motion, but Plaintiffs’ counsel did not respond.

In support of this motion, Defendants state as follows:

1. On December 21, 2020, Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 38.)

2. On January 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 44.)

Case: 1:20-cv-05132 Document #: 53 Filed: 06/14/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1502
2

3. On February 2, 2021, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion to 

Dismiss. (Dkt. 48.)

4. On June 9, 2021, the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber issued an Amended

Memorandum Opinion and Order in Byrd, et al. v. McDonald’s USA, LLC et al., Case No. 1:20-

cv-06447 (N.D. Ill.), addressing allegations similar to those made in the instant case.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully request leave to file the 

supplemental authority cited above and annexed hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 14, 2021 /s/ Patricia Brown Holmes

Patricia Brown Holmes

Amy C. Andrews

Raymond D. Rushing

RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP

70 W. Madison Street, Suite 2900

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 471-8700

pholmes@rshc-law.com

aandrews@rshc-law.com

rrushing@rshc-law.com

Ariel Schepers Wilson

RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP

121 W. Washington Street, Suite 402

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

(734) 773-4900

awilson@rshc-law.com

Andrew Jason Wu (pro hac vice)

RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP

456 Montgomery Street, 16th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 275-8550

awu@rshc-law.com

Loretta E. Lynch (pro hac vice)

Susanna M. Buergel (pro hac vice)

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &

GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10019

(202) 373-3000

lelynch@paulweiss.com

sbuergel@paulweiss.com

Counsel for McDonald’s USA, LLC and McDonald’s Corporation

Case: 1:20-cv-05132 Document #: 53 Filed: 06/14/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1503
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3876 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3876

 To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prohibit 
  the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the 
                           State of Florida.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 2, 2004

Mr. Hastings of Florida (for himself, Mr. Wexler, Mr. Davis of Florida, 
 Mr. Boyd, Mr. Meek of Florida, Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida, and Mr. 
   Deutsch) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prohibit 
  the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the 
                           State of Florida.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON OPERATION OF MEDICARE COMPARATIVE COST 
              ADJUSTMENT (CCA) PROGRAM IN FLORIDA.

    (a) In General.--Section 1860C-1(b) of the Social Security Act, as 
added by section 241 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173), is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
            ``(3) No cca areas within florida.--A CCA area shall not 
        include an MSA any portion of which is within the State of 
        Florida.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall take 
effect as if included in the enactment of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173).
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH, )

) Case No. 20-cv-5068

Plaintiff, ) 

)

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

v. )

)

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, )

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, )

PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED )

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED )

ON SCHEDULE A HERETO, )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff EMOJI COMPANY 

GmbH hereby dismisses with prejudice all causes of action in the complaint against the following 

Defendants identified in Schedule A. Each party shall bear its own attorney’s fees and costs.

No. Defendant 

32 luanye

93 Libolin

112 KUIZEE

138 luyuhui

143 guanxingjie

147 liweiliang

187 Lichengtong

236 hu yanfeng

254 lixiaowushop

The respective Defendants have not filed an answer to the complaint or a motion for summary 

judgment in this matter. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is 

appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 27, 2021 By: s/Michael A. Hierl _ 

Michael A. Hierl (Bar No. 3128021)

William B. Kalbac (Bar No. 6301771)

Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.

Three First National Plaza

70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 580-0100 Telephone

mhierl@hsplegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EMOJI COMPANY GmbH

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 66 Filed: 01/27/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:3175
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 

Voluntary Dismissal was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court and served on all counsel of 

record and interested parties via the CM/ECF system on January 27, 2021.

s/Michael A. Hierl

Case: 1:20-cv-05068 Document #: 66 Filed: 01/27/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:3176
8323.

#### Reliance Life Insurance Co. *v.*Hightower.

Bloodworth, J.

“An insurance company may limit the power of its agent, and when notice that the agent’s power is limited is brought home to the insured in such manner as would put a prudent man on his guard, the insured relies at his peril on any act of the agent in excess of his power.

*“ (a)*The insured is bound by plain and unambiguous limitations upon the power of the agent contained in his policy.

“ (5) Where the application for a policy of life-insurance and the policy itself stipulate that the insurance shall not become effective until the first premium shall have been actually paid while the applicant is in good health, and that agents are not authorized to modify the policy or extend time for paying a -pi-enurm) the actual payment of the first premium during the good health of the applicant is a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer; and a local agent of the company could not waive such condition.

“ (c) The formal acknowledgement of the receipt of the first premium in a policy of life-insurance containing the provisions above stated is not conclusive of payment, so as to estop the company from denying the validity of the policy, except in a ease of due or unconditional delivery of the policy by the company.”

The foregoing rulings, made in answer to questions certified to the Su*574preme Court by this court, dispose of all the material issues raised in the motion for a new trial, and are controlling on the questions involved. For full opinion see *Reliance Life Ins. Co.*v. *Hightower,*148 *Ga.*843 (98 S. E. 469). Under the principles announced therein, the judgment of the trial court must be

Decided December 11, 1916.

Action on insurance policy; from Murray superior court—Judge Fite. December 11, 1916.

*Brewster, Howell & Heyman, C. N. King,*for plaintiff in error.

*Bryan & Middlebrooks, Leo Sudderth,*contra.

*Reversed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
No. D-656.

#### In re Disbarment of Friedman.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 484 U. S. 893.]
#### Sarah Emmons, etc., *v.*Jas. P. Ringo, etc.

Infants — Judgment Against — Defense.

A judgment can not properly be rendered against an infant until after a defense has been made by a guardian.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

April 7, 1873.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

Although a guardian *ad litem*was appointed for part of the infant defendants, no answer is found in the record for them, besides *632for Jane Emmons, who is sued as an infant defendant, no guardian *ad litem*was appointed, and no guardian answered for her. Sec. 55, Civil Code, provides: The defense of an infant must be by his regular guardian, or by a guardian to defend for him1, where no regular guardian appears, or where the court directs a defense by a guardian appointed for that purpose. No judgment can be rendered against an infant until after a defense by a guardian. And this court has frequently held that unless defense is made as required by Sec. 55, *supra,*a judgment against infants will be reversed. But there is still a more radical error in the judgment than that. Before the court below should have adjudged a sale of the land, he should have caused so much thereof as would not exceed one thousand dollars in value to be selected by the widow of intestate to be valued under oath and be set apart to her by two disinterested housekeepers of the county, not related to either party, the master to act as umpire, and required the valuation to be made to be in writing and returned to court. Myer’s Supp., 714, 15.

*Cord, for appellants.*

*Andrews, Pluster, for appellees.*

In the judgment complained of the homestead law was disregarded and only dower was allotted to the widow in the land of her deceased husband which was prejudicial to her; dower and homestead to be both included to be of the value of one thousand dollars. The administrator in the original petition asks that dower and a homestead be set apart to the widow, which dispenses with the allegation that she was a white woman — even if that were necessary.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to set aside the sale and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Exhibit 32

                          TEMPCO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Tempco, Inc. (the
"Company") for the quarter ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned,
Stanley L. Schloz, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my
knowledge, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

By: /s/ Stanley L. Schloz
    ---------------------
    Stanley L. Schloz
    President,Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
    January 27, 2009
IN THE UNTED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BENJAMIN GARNER and DEBORAH )

SCHICK, individually and on behalf of all )

similarly situated individuals, ) Case No. 1:20-cv-04693

)

Plaintiffs, ) Hon. John Z. Lee

)

v. )

) NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY

) DISMISSAL

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, an )

Illinois insurance company, )

)

Defendant. )

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs dismiss this lawsuit against Defendant with prejudice.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides, in relevant part: 

(a) Voluntary Dismissal. 

(1) By the Plaintiff. 

(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2 and 66 and any 

applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order 

by filing:

1. (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a 

motion for summary judgment; or

2. (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. 

3. (B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is 

without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or statecourt action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates 

as an adjudication on the merits. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04693 Document #: 56 Filed: 01/18/22 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:261
2

In this case, Defendant has neither answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint nor served a motion for 

summary judgment. In addition, no class has been certified in this matter so Rule 23’s exceptions 

do not apply. Likewise, this case does not involve any Receiver so as to implicate Rule 66. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs hereby dismiss these proceedings in accordance with Rule 

41(a)(1)(i) with prejudice. The claims of any members of the putative, uncertified class are 

dismissed without prejudice.

* * * * * *

Respectfully Submitted,

BENJAMIN GARNER and DEBORAH 

SCHICK, individually and on behalf of two 

Classes of similarly situated individuals

Dated: January 18, 2022 By: ___/s/ Steven L. Woodrow__________

 Counsel for Plaintiffs

Steven L. Woodrow

swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com

Woodrow & Peluso, LLC

3900 E. Mexico Avenue, Suite 300

Denver, Colorado 80210

Tel: 720-213-0675

Fax: 303-927-0809

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case: 1:20-cv-04693 Document #: 56 Filed: 01/18/22 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:262
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and accurate copy of the above titled 

document was served upon counsel of record by filing such document with the Court using the 

Court’s electronic filing system on January 18, 2022.

/s/ Steven L. Woodrow

Case: 1:20-cv-04693 Document #: 56 Filed: 01/18/22 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:263
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

ABC Corporation I, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:20−cv−04806

Honorable Thomas M.

Durkin

The Partnership and Unincorporated Associations

Identified on Schedule "A", et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, October 25, 2021:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin: The Court granted an

order to show cause as to why certain defendants should not be held in contempt [444].

The Court ordered those defendants to submit (1) "an accounting of all infringing product

sales that have occurred since entry of the preliminary injunction on November 24, 2020,"

and (2) "statements of their Amazon accounts showing the reasons for the deductions

Plaintiffs have identified." Defendants submitted a response to this order on October 21,

2021 [466] [467]. Defendants' submission argues that the sale of certain products was not

enjoined until dates after November 24, 2020. Defendants, however, do not identify the

total of sales that occurred before and after these later dates. Defendants should submit a

revised submission showing the amount of sales for each product that occurred before and

after the dates Defendants argue are relevant. Defendants also submitted a chart showing

the total amount of deductions from their Amazon accounts. This is not what the Court

ordered. Defendants are again ordered to submit their Amazon account statements for the

Court to review. These submission should be made by 11/1/2021. Mailed notice. (ecw, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04806 Document #: 469 Filed: 10/25/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:12859
### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 97 -C V

______________________________ I N RE: BI L L Y RAY JOHNSON BY A ND THROUGH N EXT F RI END LUE WI L SON

Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r a n d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte r2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Counsel has filed a petition a sking this Court to issue a writ of manda mus ag ainst J udg e John Ovar d, Administrative J udg e of the First Administrative Reg ion, in Dallas, Texas. I n the petition, counsel c omplains beca

use Ova rd did not direct that a

hear ing be held on a motion t h at they filed seeking to rec use a district judg e. This Court has jurisdiction to i ssue a wr it of ma n d amus ag ainst "a judge of a district or
cou nt y cou rt in th e cou rt of appe als di st ri ct. " T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 22.221(b) ( Ver non 2004). Dallas County

is not withi n the terr itorial jurisdiction of this C ourt, and Ova rd is not a judg e of a district or county court within our district. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 22.201(g ). We have no jurisdiction over this petition. We d e ny the pe tit ion

fo r w ri t of

mand a mus .

J ack Ca

rter J ustice Date Submitted: September 9, 2008 Date D ecide d: September 10, 2008
#### T. P. James, Admr., *v.*James P. Branster.

Vendor and Purchaser — Conveyance in' Payment of Debt.

A sale and. conveyance of land was held to be in payment of a debt.

APPEAL PROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT. COURT.

December 10, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin : •

There is scarcely room1 to doubt from1 the evidence, that the debt in controversy was the real consideration of the conveyance of the tract of about 80 acres of land, made July 15, 1864; and we think it is reasonably certain that said deed, though absolute in form, was understood and intended to operate as a mortgage; or that it expresses only a part of a contract, the residue being a parol agreement providing for a repurchase of the land by the appellee.

It is plain that if the first of these is the correct construction, the appellee still owed the debt, and was liable to a personal judgment, but if the latter is adopted, the deed extinguishes the debt; and the agreement to reconvey being in parol and inconsistent with the writing could not be enforced against the heirs of James, if that result were sought on the facts disclosed in this case.

But neither party has elected to treat the deed as a mortgage. No foreclosure is sought on the one side nor a redemption of the land on the other; and the judgment of the lower court has. simply, and we think rightly, adopted the construction of the transaction acquiesced'in by the parties themselves.

*75
      *Greer, for appellant.*

*Bush & Bush, for appellee.*

The question is not presented whether the appellee would have been entitled to redeem the land, had he sought to do so, whatever may have been his verbal agreement with James; but as the case comes before us on this record, we fully concur with the court in treating the sale and conveyance of the land as a payment of the debt.

Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*
----

|   | (a) |   |   | None |   |   | 25% |   | X | 50% |   |   | 75% |   |   | 100% |
|--------|-----|--------|--------|------|--------|--------|-----|--------|---|-----|--------|--------|-----|--------|--------|------|

|   | (b) |   |   | None |   |   | 25% |   | X | 50% |   |   | 75% |   |   | 100% |
|--------|-----|--------|--------|------|--------|--------|-----|--------|---|-----|--------|--------|-----|--------|--------|------|

----

----

|   | (a) | in      the event that the Director shall be determined by a court of competent      jurisdiction to be incapable of managing his financial affairs, and if the      Company has actual notice of such determination, payment shall be made to      the Director's personal representative(s); and  |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (b) | in      the event of the Director's death, payment shall be made to the last      beneficiary designated by the Director for purposes of receiving such      payment in such event in a written notice delivered to the Secretary of      the Company; provided, that if such beneficiary has not survived the      Director, or no valid beneficiary designation is in effect, payment shall      instead be made to the Director'sestate. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----

| ATTEST:                                   |   | MAXXAM      INC.             |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------|
|                                      |   |                         |
| /s/      Nawasa Lafferty                  |   | By:                          | /s/      Byron L. Wade |
| Nawasa      Lafferty, Assistant Secretary |   |                         | Byron      L. Wade, Vice President, |
|                                      |   |                         | Secretary      & Deputy General Counsel |
|                                      |   |                         |   |
|                                      |   |                         |   |
|                                      |   | /s/      Ezra G. Levin       |
|                                      |   | Ezra      G. Levin, Director |

----

----