PRESENT: All the Justices 

JAMES CHRISTOPHER EDMONDS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 141159 CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 June 4, 2015 

ELIZABETH CASHMAN EDMONDS, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 

when it ordered a photocopy of a will to be probated. We must 

determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal 

standard in reaching its decision, and whether the evidence was 

sufficient to support the trial court's determination. 

I. Facts and Proceedings 

 James A. Edmonds, Jr. ("Edmonds") died on April 30, 2013. 

Edmonds was survived by his wife, Elizabeth Cashman Edmonds 

("Elizabeth"), his daughter from that marriage, Kelly Elizabeth 

Edmonds ("Kelly"), and a son from a previous marriage, James 

Christopher Edmonds ("Christopher"). 

 It is undisputed that on November 8, 2002, Edmonds 

executed a will ("2002 Will") which left all of his personal 

property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his 

property to a revocable living trust ("Trust"). The 2002 Will 

stated that in the event Elizabeth pre-deceased Edmonds all of 

Edmonds' personal property would go to his daughter Kelly. The 

2002 Will intentionally omitted Christopher as a beneficiary. 
2

The documents creating the Trust were also executed on November 

8, 2002. Elizabeth and Kelly are the beneficiaries of the 

Trust. The Trust documents state that Christopher was 

intentionally omitted as a beneficiary. 

 At the same time Edmonds executed his 2002 Will and Trust 

documents, Elizabeth also executed her will and trust 

documents. Her estate planning documents were a mirror image 

of Edmonds' documents, leaving all of her estate to Edmonds, 

and if Edmonds predeceased her, leaving everything to Kelly. 

 After Edmonds died, his original 2002 Will could not be 

located. However, photocopies of the 2002 Will and Trust 

documents were found in a green binder in Edmonds' filing 

cabinet in his office. Thereafter, Elizabeth filed a 

"Complaint to Establish Copies of the Will and Trust Where 

Originals Cannot Be Located," in the Circuit Court of Arlington 

County ("trial court") and named Kelly and Christopher as 

defendants. The complaint acknowledged that Kelly and 

Christopher would both be heirs at law if Edmonds was deemed to 

have died intestate, but asked the trial court to establish and 

direct probate of the photocopy of the 2002 Will and the Trust. 

Christopher filed an answer, counterclaim, and crossclaim. He sought to establish that Edmonds died intestate, and 

that Christopher was an heir at law. Christopher asserted that 

because the 2002 Will was in Edmonds' possession when he died, 
3

and Elizabeth had been unable to locate it, the presumption 

that Edmonds had destroyed it with the intent to revoke it 

applied. 

Kelly filed answers to the complaint and the cross-claim. 

She admitted that she would be an heir at law if Edmonds died 

intestate, but she asked the trial court to find that the 2002 

Will was valid and to probate the photocopy. She asserted 

there was no evidence that Edmonds destroyed the 2002 Will with 

the intent to revoke it. 

 A two-day trial was held on March 25-26, 2014. Elizabeth 

presented numerous witnesses who described conversations they 

had with Edmonds regarding his testamentary intentions. 

Patrick J. Vaughn, an attorney who prepared wills and trust 

documents for Edmonds and Elizabeth in 1973, and again in 1989, 

testified that in the 1973 will, Edmonds left his estate to 

Elizabeth, and expressly excluded any child of his born from a 

previous marriage. In the 1989 will, Edmonds again left 

everything to Elizabeth. In the event Elizabeth predeceased 

him, he left everything to his daughter, Kelly. 

 Marc E. Bettius ("Bettius") testified that he had been 

friends with Edmonds and Elizabeth for more than 30 years. 

Bettius stated that in the fall of 2012, he had gone by 

Edmonds' auto business to have his car serviced, and he and 

Edmonds had a conversation. During that conversation, Bettius 
4

asked Edmonds what plans he had made for the future of his 

business, and Edmonds indicated that everything was taken care 

of in his estate and it would all go to Elizabeth. Edmonds 

also stated that he made the appropriate decisions to maximize 

estate tax benefits. Bettius knew Edmonds had a son from a 

previous marriage and asked Edmonds if he'd ever thought about 

having a relationship with his son. Edmonds responded in the 

negative and said that, "the boy had never been a part of his 

life and never would be a part of his life." 

 Paul C. Kincheloe ("Kincheloe"), an attorney who had been 

friends with Edmonds since the 1970s, testified that he was not 

professionally engaged to do any estate planning for Edmonds, 

but they did discuss the subject on several occasions. At one 

point, Edmonds asked Kincheloe to serve as substitute trustee, 

and Kincheloe agreed. Edmonds told Kincheloe he was leaving 

everything to his wife and daughter, and nothing to his son. 

 John A. Bell, Jr. ("Bell") testified that he had been 

friends with Edmonds and Elizabeth since the 1980s. The last 

time he was with Edmonds was during the first week of March 

2013, when Edmonds invited him to Florida for a four-day golf 

tournament. Bell testified that he brought up the subject of 

estate planning because he was deciding what do with his own 

estate. During that conversation, Edmonds said, "As soon as I 

go, everything goes to Liz. And as soon as she goes, 
5

everything goes to Kelly." When asked if Edmonds ever said 

anything negative about Christopher, Bell responded that 

Edmonds had never mentioned his son. Bell testified that about 

three or four years before this March 2013 conversation, he and 

Edmonds had another discussion about their estates. During 

that discussion, Edmonds said he was trying to set up his 

estate so that Kelly would receive her inheritance in 

increments. Bell testified that Edmonds was concerned that 

Kelly would spend the money all at once. Edmonds was also 

concerned that he had paid for Kelly to have a great education, 

and he was not sure she was using it wisely. 

 Raymond Knight, one of Edmonds' employees in his auto 

business, testified that approximately six years before Edmonds 

died, they had a conversation about the future of the business 

if anything happened to Edmonds. Edmonds told him that "Liz 

would carry on the business." 

 Donald Manning ("Manning") was the attorney who prepared 

the 2002 Will. Manning testified that when he met with Edmonds 

and Elizabeth to prepare their wills in 2002, Edmonds made it 

clear that he did not want Christopher to be a beneficiary. 

Manning testified that after Edmonds and Elizabeth executed 

their wills and trust documents, he made photocopies of the 

originals. Several weeks later, Edmonds picked up both the 

originals and the photocopies. Manning testified that the 
6

photocopies were placed in a green binder before Edmonds picked 

them up. Manning also testified that Edmonds never completed 

several of the items related to the estate plan, such as 

funding a family trust or retitling stock, but Manning agreed 

that those items did not affect the 2002 Will. 

 Meta Jane Mortensen ("Mortensen"), who prepared Edmonds' 

taxes each year, testified that she had a discussion with 

Edmonds wherein she told him she was concerned about the tax 

implications of his estate plan and wanted to see the documents 

governing it. Edmonds finally brought her his estate documents 

in 2011. The documents Edmonds showed her in 2011 were the 

2002 Will and Trust. 

 Dina Knight, the bookkeeper for Edmonds' auto business, 

testified that although Edmonds did not discuss his estate plan 

in specific terms with her, he told her that one day the 

business would belong to his wife and daughter. Knight also 

testified that Edmonds kept all of his important papers in the 

filing cabinet in his office. After Edmonds died, Knight 

looked through the cabinet for important papers Elizabeth would 

need, and that is where she found life insurance papers, lease 

agreements, and the green binder with the copies of the 2002 

Will and Trust documents. Knight did not know the documents in 

the green binder were photocopies when she found them. Upon 

learning that those documents were not originals, Knight 
7

assisted Elizabeth in looking through all the cabinets and 

drawers in the auto business, but they never found the original 

2002 Will. 

 Elizabeth testified that she and Edmonds were married in 

1972. She explained that Edmonds had three serious surgeries 

during their marriage, one in 1992, another in 1998, and the 

last one in 2003. Prior to each of these surgeries, he always 

told her that all the important papers she would need, 

including his will, were in the top drawer of his filing 

cabinet in his office. Elizabeth testified that when they 

prepared their wills in 2002, Edmonds was clear that he wanted 

to exclude Christopher as a beneficiary. Elizabeth also 

testified that in late March or early April of 2013, while they 

were still in Florida, Edmonds stated that when they got back 

to Virginia they should make an appointment with their estate 

attorney to starting putting into place several of the estate 

planning items, including funding the family trust and 

retitling some of their stock. 

 Christopher testified that he had never met or spoken to 

Edmonds, although he did make two attempts to contact him. 

 After hearing the evidence and considering the argument of 

counsel, the trial court stated that "in my mind it's a very 

close . . . case." The trial court held that the execution and 

content of the 2002 Will was not contested. The trial court 
8

also held that the evidence proved that the documents were 

traceable to Edmond's possession but were not found at his 

death. The trial court stated that it had to determine whether 

the evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption that 

the testator had destroyed the will with the intention to 

revoke it. 

 After a thorough review of the evidence in the case, the 

trial court held that the plaintiff had proven "by clear and 

convincing evidence" that the 2002 Will was not revoked. The 

trial court stated that it was relying on this Court's opinion 

in Bowery v. Webber, 181 Va. 34, 23 S.E.2d 766 (1943), which it 

found to be controlling. The trial court noted that here, as 

in Bowery, there was compelling evidence of the decedent's deep 

affection for the proponent of the will, and that the decedent 

had made a number of statements to various disinterested 

parties related to the disposition of his estate. The trial 

court further noted that it found those witnesses to be "highly 

credible." Finally, the trial court held that there was no 

evidence of any credible reason or cause for the decedent to 

have made any change in the testamentary disposition of his 

estate. The trial court ordered that the photocopy of Edmonds 

2002 Will be probated. 
9

 The trial court entered a final order on May 9, 2014, and 

Christopher appealed to this Court. We granted Christopher's 

appeal on the following assignments of error: 

1. The trial court erred when it ordered a photocopy of the 

will to be probated, because it applied the wrong legal 

standard in allowing a decedent's general statements of 

intent and affection to overcome the presumption of 

revocation of the missing original will, thus failing to 

follow this Court's numerous decisions requiring clear and 

convincing evidence of some other cause for the original 

will's disappearance. 

2. The trial court erred when it ordered a photocopy of the 

will to be probated, because it allowed less than clear 

and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of 

revocation, contrary to this Court's decisions. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

 Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard 

in this case is a question of law. We review questions of law 

de novo. See Lamar Co. v. City of Richmond, 287 Va. 322, 325, 

757 S.E.2d 15, 16 (2014). The issue whether Elizabeth, the 

proponent of the will, proved by clear and convincing evidence 

that Edmonds did not revoke his will is a question of 

sufficiency of the evidence. A judgment should be reversed for 

insufficient evidence only if it is "plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it." Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 266 

Va. 288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
10

B. Virginia's Legal Standard for Missing Wills 

 Over the past century, this Court has decided numerous 

cases involving missing wills, and the law controlling this 

case is well-established. The most recent case this Court 

decided involving this issue was Brown v. Hardin, 225 Va. 624, 

304 S.E.3d 291 (1983), where we stated: 

Where an executed will in the testator's 

custody cannot be found after his death 

there is a presumption that it was 

destroyed by the testator animo revocandi. 

This presumption, however, is only prima 

facie and may be rebutted, but the burden 

is upon those who seek to establish such an 

instrument to assign and prove some other 

cause for its disappearance, by clear and 

convincing evidence, leading to the 

conclusion that the will was not revoked. 

Id. at 626, 304 S.E.2d at 292 (citations omitted). 

 Neither party in this appeal disagrees that, where an 

executed will in the testator's custody cannot be found after 

his death, there is a presumption that it was destroyed by the 

testator with the intent of revoking it. In this case, the 

2002 Will was traced to Edmonds' custody, but could not be 

found at his death. Accordingly, the trial court properly 

applied the presumption in this case that the 2002 Will was 

destroyed by Edmonds. 

 The parties also do not appear to disagree that the 

presumption of revocation can be overcome by the proponent of 

the will upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence, 
11

leading to the conclusion that the will was not revoked by the 

testator. Instead, the dispute in this case involves what the 

proponent of the will must prove to meet her burden of proof, 

and whether she met her burden of proof in this particular 

case. 

 Christopher argues that to meet her burden of proof, 

Elizabeth was required to prove "some other cause" for the 

disappearance of the will, and that evidence of general intent 

and affection alone is not clear and convincing evidence, 

sufficient to overcome the presumption of revocation. 

Christopher contends that the only case that supports 

Elizabeth's position, Bowery, is an "outlier" and should not 

have been relied on by the trial court. 

 A review of our decisions over the past century on the 

issue of missing wills is informative. In 1913, we provided a 

synthesis of the operation of the lost will presumption and the 

evidence sufficient to rebut it, in deciding the case of 

Jackson v. Hewlett, 114 Va. 573, 77 S.E. 518 (1913). In 

Jackson, the evidence proved that the decedent had made a will 

in which he devised the bulk of his estate to his illegitimate 

daughter, and left only a few minor devises to others, 

including his legitimate daughter. Id. at 575, 77 S.E. at 519. 

The will was kept in an unlocked drawer, but after decedent's 

death the will could not be located. Id. at 576, 77 S.E. at 
12

519. The proponent of the will introduced numerous 

declarations by the testator regarding his intentions to leave 

the bulk of his estate to her, and not to his other relatives. 

Id. at 576-77, 77 S.E. at 519. 

 We explained that these declarations were not introduced 

for the purpose of proving the will, its due execution, or its 

contents. Rather, 

[t]hey were introduced as evidence showing 

a strong and unvarying adherence by the 

testator to his purposes with respect to 

the disposition of his estate, which had 

obtained for years prior to his death, both 

as to the beneficiaries thereunder and as 

to those omitted therefrom; and for the 

purpose of rebutting the presumption that 

this testator deliberately destroyed, with 

intent to revoke, a will he had so 

carefully prepared, and to which he had so 

firmly adhered. 

Id. at 578, 77 S.E. at 520. 

 We held that, in a case like Jackson, the presumption 

could only be overcome by this type of evidence, since "[i]t is 

impossible for the beneficiaries under the will to say what 

became of it; they can only assert that, whatever may have 

happened to it, the testator did not revoke it." Id. at 580, 

77 S.E. at 521. We concluded that: 

It must be generally the case, in such a 

status, that the best evidence, if not the 

only evidence, that can be adduced to rebut 

the presumption of revocation is that the 

testator's mind for many years contemplated 

a certain disposition of his property; that 
13

when he disposed of that property by will 

his mental attitude was precisely the same 

that it had been during the previous years, 

and that after he made such disposition his 

mind remained in the same state practically 

until his death, supplemented by the 

consistency of his mental attitude towards 

his various relatives. 

Id. at 581, 77 S.E. at 521. Our decision in Jackson recognizes 

that it may very well be impossible for the proponent of a 

missing will to explain what happened to the will, and 

therefore the statements of the testator regarding his 

testamentary intentions may be the best evidence to rebut the 

presumption of revocation. 

 The next case we decided involving a missing will was 

Bowery, handed down in 1943 – the decision that appellant 

contends is an "outlier," but which in fact gave another 

concrete illustration of the nature of the evidence required to 

rebut the presumption of revocation for a lost will. In 

Bowery, the decedent had prepared a will which left her estate 

to her step-granddaughter, whom she had raised as her daughter, 

but excluded other relatives. 181 Va. at 35, 23 S.E.2d at 766. 

At the time of the testator's death, the will could not be 

found, and the proponent of the will filed a bill to establish 

the will, alleging that the will had become lost or misplaced, 

but that it had not been revoked. Id. The proponent of the 

will put on evidence that the decedent repeatedly stated to her 
14

intimate associates that she desired and intended to leave all 

of her property to her adopted daughter. Id. at 37, 23 S.E.2d 

at 767. In contrast, there was no evidence of any such 

affection or intention toward her other relatives. Id. There 

was also no evidence of any incidents occurring which would 

have induced the decedent to revoke or change her will. Id. 

We held that this evidence was sufficient to support the 

conclusion that the testator did not destroy her will with the 

intent to revoke it. Id. at 39, 23 S.E.2d at 768. 

 Three years after Bowery, we decided Tate v. Wren, 185 Va. 

773, 40 S.E.2d 188 (1946), holding that the evidence presented 

in that case was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of 

revocation. We explained that, unlike the record before the 

trial court in Bowery, there was no evidence in Tate of 

declarations by the testator that his 1933 will was still in 

effect. Id. at 785-86, 40 S.E.2d at 194. To the contrary, 

there was evidence that the testator had made numerous 

statements that he intended to change his 1933 will, and that 

he had actually prepared a new holographic will. Id. at 786, 

40 S.E.2d at 194. It is important to note, however, that in 

distinguishing the facts in Tate from the facts in Bowery, we 

never indicated that Bowery was an "outlier" or no longer 

correct. 
15

 Later cases have confirmed the continued application of 

Jackson and Bowery in lost will cases. For example, in 

Sutherland v. Sutherland, 192 Va. 764, 66 S.E.2d 537 (1951), we 

referenced our decisions in Bowery and Jackson, and stated 

that, in our opinion, the facts in those two cases "were clear 

and convincing." Id. at 774, 66 S.E.2d at 543. We determined 

that the facts in Sutherland did not "measure up" to the facts 

present in Bowery and Jackson, and therefore we held that the 

proponent of the missing will had failed to meet his burden of 

proof to overcome the presumption of revocation. Id. at 774-

75, 66 S.E.2d at 543-44. Our opinion in Sutherland makes clear 

that we viewed Jackson and Bowery to be correct, and to be 

examples of factual scenarios where the proponent of the 

missing will had met the necessary burden of proof to overcome 

the presumption of revocation. 

 Where the will-proponent's proof fails to clearly and 

convincingly rebut the presumption of revocation, the burden is 

not met and the will cannot be probated. In Harris v. Harris, 

216 Va. 716, 222 S.E.2d 543 (1976), for example, the proponents 

of the missing will argued that the will was not actually in 

the decedent's possession at the time of his death, and for 

that reason the presumption of revocation should not apply. 

Id. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 545. However, we disagreed and held 

that the evidence proved that the will remained in the 
16

decedent's house, and therefore the presumption of revocation 

applied. Id. at 719-20, 222 S.E.2d at 545. Further, we 

determined that the proponents had not met their burden of 

overcoming the presumption, because the only evidence presented 

was that other relatives were frequently in the house and could 

have had access to the will. Id. at 720, 222 S.E.2d at 546. 

We held that this evidence left the competing inferences 

"equally probable," and was not enough to constitute clear and 

convincing evidence that the will was not revoked by the 

testator. Id. 

 The most recent decision by this Court on the issue of a 

missing will was the Brown case. In Brown, there was no 

dispute that the decedent had made a will in which he left the 

majority of his estate to a family friend instead of his 

sister. There was evidence presented that the decedent had 

told numerous witnesses that he intended to leave everything to 

the friend, and that he was not leaving anything to his sister 

because she was already well off and did not need the money. 

225 Va. at 636-37, 304 S.E.2d at 298. We emphasized that: 

The declarations of a testator, after he 

has made his will, as to its continued 

existence, its contents, or its revocation, 

where the will cannot be found after his 

death, [are] recognized under certain 

circumstances as entitled to great weight. 
17

Id. at 636, 304 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Shacklett v. Roller, 97 

Va. 639, 644, 34 S.E. 492, 494 (1899)). Evidence was also 

presented that the sister had access to the decedent's personal 

papers within 36 hours of his death, which might have explained 

the disappearance of the will. Id. The Court stated that to 

overcome the presumption that the will was destroyed by the 

testator with the intention of revoking it, 

the burden was on [the proponent of the 

will] to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the will was not destroyed by 

[the testator] but was destroyed or 

secreted by some other person with intent 

to prevent its probate or recordation, or 

was lost or misplaced; that it was not 

incumbent upon [the proponent] to prove 

that the [will] was destroyed or suppressed 

by any certain person nor specifically what 

became of said will; and that [the 

proponent] only had to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that [the testator] did 

not destroy the will with the intention of 

revoking it. 

Id. at 637, 304 S.E.2d at 299 (emphasis added). 

 It is clear from a review of our extensive caselaw on this 

topic that a proponent of a missing will is not required to 

specifically prove what became of the missing will. The 

language cited above from Brown demonstrates that we rejected 

the appellant's interpretation of our cases that a proponent is 

required to prove what happened to the will. Instead, the 

proponent is required to prove, by clear and convincing 
18

evidence, that the testator did not destroy the will with the 

intention of revoking it. 

 The evidence presented by a proponent of a missing 

instrument will take different forms depending on the facts and 

context of each individual case. In some cases, the proponent 

may present evidence regarding what could have happened to the 

will; and in other cases, there may be no evidence to explain 

why the will is lost or missing. The facts of each case are 

different, and the evidence in each case will therefore also be 

different. What remains the same is that each proponent of a 

missing will must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

the testator did not destroy the will with the intention of 

revoking it. That is the standard that we have articulated in 

all our cases over the past century, and it remains the law of 

the Commonwealth today. 

 It is clear from the transcript of the trial and the final 

order that in the present case the trial court applied the 

proper legal standard. The trial court recognized that, 

because the will was traced to Edmonds' possession but was not 

located at his death, the presumption of revocation applied. 

The trial court then stated that the presumption could be 

overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not 

revoked by the defendant. Accordingly, with respect to 
19

assignment of error one, we hold that the trial court did not 

err, and that it applied the proper legal standard. 

C. Overcoming the Presumption of Revocation 

 In assignment of error two, Appellant asserts that the 

trial court erred because it allowed less than clear and 

convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of revocation. 

We have defined clear and convincing evidence as: 

[t]hat measure or degree of proof which 

will produce in the mind of the trier of 

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the 

allegations sought to be established. It 

is intermediate, being more than a mere 

preponderance, but not to the extent of 

such certainty as is required beyond a 

reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It 

does not mean clear and unequivocal. 

Brown, 225 Va. at 637, 304 S.E.2d at 299 (quoting Walker Agcy. 

& Aetna Cas. Co. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 540-41, 211 S.E.2d 88, 

92 (1975)). 

 The remaining question is whether the proof in this case 

was sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief or conviction that Edmonds did not destroy the 

original copy of the 2002 Will with the intention of revoking 

it. The trial court found that Elizabeth had proven that fact 

by clear and convincing evidence. Elizabeth is entitled to 

have this Court review the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to her, the 

prevailing party at trial. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton, 
20

285 Va. 115, 121, 737 S.E.2d 16, 22 (2013). Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Elizabeth, the evidence 

is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that she had 

rebutted the presumption that the original 2002 Will was 

missing because Edmonds had purposefully destroyed it with the 

intention of revoking it, by offering clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. 

 Edmonds and Elizabeth had been married for more than 40 

years and had complementary estate plans in place to provide 

for each other and then to pass their estate to their daughter 

Kelly after they both died. On numerous occasions, Edmonds 

stated his intent that his estate be handled in such a manner, 

declarations that are both admissible and entitled to great 

weight. See Brown, 225 Va. at 636, 304 S.E.2d at 298; 

Shacklett, 97 Va. at 644, 34 S.E. at 494. 

 Christopher testified that he had never spoken with or met 

Edmonds. Edmonds stated to his friend Bettius that he had no 

interest in having a relationship with Christopher. Edmonds 

had at least three wills, and each time he changed his will, he 

had a new one prepared. Christopher was never listed as a 

beneficiary in any of Edmonds' wills. During the preparation 

of his 2002 Will, Edmonds was clear that he did not want 

Christopher to be a beneficiary. Because Edmonds did not want 

Christopher to be a beneficiary, he would know that he needed 
21

to have a will to exclude Christopher from inheriting part of 

his estate. Therefore, even if he lost confidence in his 

daughter, there is no indication that he would want his 

property to pass through intestate succession under any 

circumstances. 

 It is important to note in this instance that a neatly 

bound photocopy of Edmonds' 2002 Will and Trust was found in a 

drawer in the filing cabinet in Edmonds' office, exactly where 

Edmonds had stated he kept his important papers. The photocopy 

was fully executed. However, the original of the document 

could not be found. The fully executed photocopy was found 

where Edmonds stated he would keep his important papers. If he 

had intended to revoke the 2002 Will by destroying the 

original, it would have been logical that he would have removed 

the photocopy from his file of important papers. 

 Edmonds never indicated to his wife, or anyone else, that 

he had destroyed the couple's 2002 estate planning documents. 

He also made a number of statements in the last two years of 

his life that reflected his intention that, when he died, his 

estate would be governed by the 2002 Will and Trust. In the 

fall of 2011, he gave a copy of the 2002 Will and Trust to his 

long-term tax advisor for her review. In the fall of 2012, he 

told his close friend, Bettius, that he had no interest in 

developing a relationship with Christopher, that he had made 
22

appropriate decisions to maximize his estate tax benefits, and 

that after he died all the decisions regarding the management 

of his business would be in Elizabeth's hands. This is 

inconsistent with Edmonds having revoked the will, leaving no 

estate plan in place. 

 In March 2013, Edmonds told his close friend Bell that, 

"as soon as I go, everything goes to Liz. As soon as she goes, 

everything goes to Kelly." In late March or early April, just 

weeks before his death, Edmonds told Elizabeth that they should 

meet with their attorney when they returned to Arlington from 

Florida to begin funding their trust and taking the other steps 

their attorney had recommended as part of the 2002 estate plan. 

 As in Jackson and Bowery, it is demonstrated on the 

present record with clear and convincing evidentiary support 

that in all of his statements Edmonds confirmed the intention 

that his wife and daughter were to be the objects of his 

bounty, and that he specifically did not intend to leave 

anything to his son. There is also no evidence in the record 

of anything that might have happened to change Edmonds' mind in 

the period prior to his death. Accordingly, we hold that these 

facts are sufficient to support the trial court's finding of 

clear and convincing evidence that Edmonds did not destroy the 

original 2002 Will with the intention of revoking it. 
23

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

Affirmed.