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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RITA KARLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

ST. AUGUSTINE COLLEGE,

Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-5084

Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Rita Karlo (“Karlo”) filed a four-count Complaint against her former 

employer, St. Augustine College (“the College”), in state court on March 20, 2020. The 

College removed this action to federal court on April 28, 2020. (Dkt. 1). Karlo alleges

equal pay violations of the Illinois Equal Pay Act (“IEPA”) of 2003, 820 I.L.C.S. 112/1 

et seq. (Count I) and the federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq.

(Count II), as well as retaliation in violation of the IEPA (Count III) and the EPA

(Count IV). The College has moved to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV. (Dkt. 12). For the 

reasons stated herein, this partial motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in 

part.

I. Background

The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1),

and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. See W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). Karlo, a woman, worked for the 

College from 1998 through 2017, first as an accounts payable administrator, and from 
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2002 onward as a teaching faculty member. Her employment was terminated in July 

of 2017.

1 She alleges that although she and “her male counterparts performed work 

that required substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities” and “performed 

work under similar working conditions” her “male counterparts were paid at a higher 

rate.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 12–15). Karlo offers one specific example, alleging that in 

2017 she was paid “$4,000 less than fellow faculty member Juvenal Nava (before his 

promotion to Chair,) even though Karlo and Mr. Nava both had Master’s Degrees and 

both had similar lengths of tenure at St. Augustine.” (Id. at ¶ 15).

Karlo voiced her concerns about pay disparities between male and female 

employees to “various managers” at the College, including Dean Madeline RomanVargas, department Chair Juvenal Nava, President Andrew Sund, and Faculty 

Committee Chair Eddie Del Carmen. They each told her that the pay disparities were 

caused by the College’s “financial trouble[s].” (Id. at ¶ 16). They also told Karlo that 

she in particular was being paid less because she was “working against them” by 

posting online about pay disparities and organizing other teachers in an effort to 

advocate for better working conditions. (Id. at ¶ 17). Although it is not clear when 

Karlo first raised the issue of pay inequality with her managers, she continued to 

“raise issues of gender inequity and salary disparities until the time of her 

termination in July of 2017.” (Id. at ¶ 8).

1 Karlo also alleges that she was terminated in May of 2017. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 18). Viewing the 

Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court assumes the later date is correct.
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II. Standard

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the

case. See Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual 

information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 

F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2) (requiring that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

accepts plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all permissible

inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763 

F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations”, 

but “still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered 

adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 

738 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a 

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). Deciding the 

plausibility of the claim is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 
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F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1950 (2009)).

III. Analysis

A. Counts I and II: Equal Pay Violations 

The IEPA provides that employers may not “discriminate between employees 

on the basis of sex by paying wages to an employee at a rate less than the rate at 

which the employer pays wages to another employee of the opposite sex for the same 

or substantially similar work on jobs the performance of which requires substantially 

similar skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 

working conditions.” 820 I.L.C.S. 112/10(a). The federal act is nearly identical in 

prohibiting an employer from “discriminat[ing] [. . .] between employees on the basis 

of sex by paying [unequal] wages”. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Claims brought under the 

IEPA and EPA are analyzed the same way. See, e.g., Betts v. Option Care Enterprises, 

Inc., No. 18 CV 4023, 2019 WL 193914, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2019).

The College first argues Counts I and II should be dismissed based on their 

respective statutes of limitations. Second, the College argues that these Counts do

not plausibly state claims for relief. And third, that they are too vague to put the 

College on notice of the charges it must answer.

1. Statute of Limitations under the IEPA

The statute of limitations for an equal pay violation under the IEPA is five 

years from the date of underpayment. 820 ILCS 112/30 (“Every such action shall be 

brought within 5 years from the date of the underpayment. For purposes of this Act, 
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‘date of the underpayment’ means each time wages are underpaid.”). Karlo filed suit 

on March 20, 2020. Equal pay violations that took place more than five years before 

that date are not actionable under the IEPA. The Court dismisses Count I to the 

extent that it relies on time-barred allegations. As Karlo notes, this ruling will have 

very little practical effect until the damages phase of the trial. (Dkt. 16 at 3).

2. Statute of Limitations under the EPA

Parties agree that the EPA ordinarily has a two-year statute of limitations. 29 

U.S.C. § 255(a). That period is extended to three years if the violation is “willful.” Id. 

Karlo was terminated in July of 2017. The statute would run in July of 2019; however, 

Karlo argues that because the College acted willfully, the statute did not run until 

July of 2020. She filed suit in March of 2020. If Karlo establishes the College acted 

with intent, her pay disparity from March to July of 2017 will be actionable under 

the federal EPA. 

A violation of the EPA is considered ‘willful” if the defendant “either knew he 

was violating the [EPA] or was indifferent to whether he was violating it or not (and 

therefore ‘reckless’).” E.E.O.C. v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 

585 (7th Cir. 1987); see also McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 

(1988). The College argues that Karlo’s allegations are conclusory, and that the Court 

need not credit them. (Dkt. 13 at 5). It is true that Karlo makes some conclusory 

allegations, saying that the College’s violation was “willful” because it acted “with 

intent” to violate and/or “reckless disregard[ed]” of violating the EPA, and that the 

College “knowingly” violated that statute. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 24–25). However, Karlo 
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also makes some very specific allegations about what the College knew. She says in 

her Complaint that she herself “raised concerns about her unequal pay with various 

managers at St. Augustine, including Dean Madeline Roman-Vargas, her supervisor 

Juvenal Nava, President Andrew Sund, and Faculty Committee Chair Eddie Del 

Carmen.” (Id. at ¶ 16). These are some of the most important decisionmakers at the 

College, and Karlo put them on notice that they were paying men and women 

unequally. Karlo also alleges that she “continued to raise issues of gender inequity 

and salary disparities until the time of her termination” in 2017. Id. at ¶ 18. While it 

is not clear when the College first knew it was paying men and women unequally, it 

is clear that it was on notice for some portion of the relevant period between 2015 and 

2017. Apparently, nothing was done to investigate or rectify the disparities Karlo 

described.

The fact that, when confronted, these managers denied paying women less 

than men because of their sex and proffered innocent explanations for pay disparities, 

(such as the College’s “financial trouble”) does not mean their alleged violations were 

not knowing or willful. See, e.g., Heise v. Canon Sols. Am., Inc., No. 16 C 8284, 2018 

WL 3533255, at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2018) (employer’s explicit statement that they 

were trying not to pay women less than men “[did] not preclude a finding of 

willfulness” at the motion to dismiss stage). Karlo’s allegations are sufficient to allege 

willfulness at the motion to dismiss stage.
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3. Failure to state a claim

The College argues Karlo fails to state a claim under either the IEPA or the 

EPA because she has not alleged she was paid less because of her sex; because her 

named comparator, Juvenal Nava (“Nava”), did not have similar responsibilities as 

her during much of the relevant time period; and because the allegations about other 

unnamed “male counterpoints” are conclusory. Each argument is addressed in turn.

a. Cause of Pay Disparities

Defendant asserts “Plaintiff must allege she was paid less specifically because 

of her gender.” (Dkt. 18 at 4, emphasis added). This argument misunderstands the 

IEPA and EPA, which, unlike Title VII claims, do not require “discriminatory intent.” 

Stopka v. All. of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Melgoza v. 

Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 17 CV 6819, 2020 WL 6565235, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 

2020) (“Unlike the EPA, Title VII requires plaintiff to show defendant’s intent to 

discriminate.”). In order to adequately plead a violation of the IEPA or the EPA, a 

female plaintiff need only plausibly allege “(1) higher wages were paid to a male 

employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort and 

responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under similar working conditions.” 

David v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 230 (7th Cir. 2017).

The plaintiff does not have to “make a prima facie case of discrimination, just of 

unequal pay.” Leong v. SAP Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 972, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing 

Randall v. Rolls–Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir.2011)).
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Defendant cites only Lauderdale v. Illinois Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 

907 (7th Cir. 2017), in support of its argument. But Lauderdale was reviewing an 

award of summary judgment, after the defendants had availed themselves of the 

statutory affirmative defense that the pay “differential [was] based on any other 

factor other than sex.” Id. citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Therefore, the plaintiff in that 

case did have to prove that she was paid less because of her gender in order to rebut

that affirmative defense. At the motion to dismiss stage, Karlo need only plausibly 

allege the elements of her claim, not anticipate affirmative defenses. And the 

Lauderdale court agreed that “[t]o establish a prima facie cause of action under the 

Act, an employee must demonstrate “a difference in pay for ‘equal work on jobs the 

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are 

performed under similar working conditions.’” Lauderdale, 876 F.3d 904, 907 (7th 

Cir. 2017).

b. Juvenal Nava

Before considering whether Karlo can plausibly claim Nava was a comparator, 

the Court must rule on one procedural issue. Defendants have presented Karlo’s 2017 

EEOC charge to the Court because it contains certain facts and dates not found in 

the Complaint. Ordinarily, when a court considers documents beyond the pleadings 

at the motion to dismiss stage it must convert that motion to a motion for summary 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 

2002). The College argues that because the EEOC charge is a public document the 

Court can take judicial notice of its contents. (Dkt. 18, fn. 1). They cite GE Capital 
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Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., in support of this proposition. 128 F.3d 1074, 1080–

81 (7th Cir. 1997) (courts are permitted to “take judicial notice of matters of public 

record without converting a motion for failure to state a claim into a motion for 

summary judgment”). This principal applies to EEOC charges. See, e.g., Flores v. Bd. 

of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 103 F. Supp. 3d 943, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (an 

“IDHR charge is a public document and, therefore, the court may take judicial notice 

of the charge”); Pierce v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 128 Fed. Appx. 534, 535 (7th Cir. 

2005) (district court appropriately considered “numerous documents [. . .] submitted 

by the parties from the administrative process” when deciding a motion to dismiss 

because they were “public records”). The Court will consider information contained in 

Karlo’s EEOC charge for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

In the Complaint Nava is Karlo’s primary example of a male faculty member 

who was (1) paid a higher wage (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar 

skill, effort, and responsibilities (3) under similar working conditions. She alleges “for 

example, Karlo was paid approximately $4,000 less than fellow faculty member 

Juvenal Nava (before his promotion to Chair) even though Karlo and Mr. Nava both 

had Master’s Degrees and both had similar lengths of tenure at St. Augustine.” 

(Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 15). This allegation, combined with the more general allegations that 

male counterparts such as Nava “performed work that required substantially similar 

skill, effort and responsibility [. . .] under similar working conditions” appears 

sufficient at first glance. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–13). However, later Karlo acknowledges that 
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Nava was “her supervisor.” (Id. at ¶ 16). In her EEOC charge Karlo also alleged that 

Nava was her “supervisor” as of (at the latest) August 19, 2016. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 1 at 1).

These conflicting allegations pose a problem for Karlo. Paragraph 15 of the 

Complaint strongly suggests that Nava was only a viable comparator before he was 

promoted to Chair.2 According to the EEOC charge, Nava was promoted before 

August 19, 2016. The IEPA equal pay claims in Count I are time-barred before March 

of 2015 and her federal claims are limited to between March and July of 2017. 

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Nava was a 

similarly situated male employee between March of 2015 and August 18, 2016 for 

purposes of the IEPA claim. But Karlo has not plausibly alleged that he was a 

similarly situated employee between his promotion on or before August 18, 2016 and 

her termination in July of 2017, during which time neither her EPA claims nor her 

IEPA claims were barred by the statutes of limitations.

c. Other Comparators

From August 18, 2016 through her termination in July of 2017, Karlo does not 

plausibly allege that she was paid less than male employees doing similar work under 

similar conditions. Her allegations about unnamed “male counterpoints” are simply 

that they performed work “that required substantially similar skill, effort and 

2 Karlo “need not show that she and her male comparator had the exact same job titles.” Betts v. Option 

Care Enterprises, Inc., No. 18-CV-4023, 2019 WL 193914, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2019) (citing Fallon 

v. State of Ill., 882 F.2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1989)). But she must “show that she and her male 

comparator had ‘substantially equal’ duties.” Id. Karlo does not describe her duties or Nava’s duties 

(either before or after his promotion). Reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to the 

Plaintiff, the Court assumes the two shared responsibilities prior to his promotion but must conclude 

that his promotion to Karlo’s supervisor corresponded to a change in his duties. Karlo’s own Complaint, 

which only compares her earnings to Nava’s “before his promotion to Chair” leads the Court to conclude 

that after the promotion he was no longer a comparable employee for purposes of EPA or IEPA claims.
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responsibility [. . .] under similar working conditions.” (Id. at ¶ 12–13). It is unclear 

from the Complaint whether these were faculty members, how much they were paid, 

what their work entailed, or under what conditions they worked. These conclusory 

allegations cannot bridge the time gap between Nava’s promotion and Karlo’s 

termination. They are the “bare recitation of the elements” of an EPA or IEPA cause 

of action, and therefore the Court is not obliged to credit them as true. See Bell v. City 

of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). See also, e.g., Wade v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., No. 09 CV 1225, 2010 WL 378508, 

at *4 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2010) (finding that although plaintiffs need not plead 

“unknown details” such as the names or salaries of specific colleagues, “[w]ithout 

some description of the comparable male’s position and duties, as compared to 

Plaintiff’s duties, no inference of plausibility arises to support her conclusion that the 

work was equal”).

Counts I is dismissed without prejudice to the extent that it is based on 

allegations of unequal pay between the date Nava was promoted to Chair and Karlo’s 

termination in July of 2017. Karlo has not plausibly alleged that she was paid less 

than any male colleague during that time. Count II is dismissed based on failure to 

allege the same during the pertinent time period. Karlo is free to file an Amended 

Complaint consistent with this opinion. 

4. Lack of Notice

The College argues that Counts I and II should also be dismissed for lack of 

notice. The College was Karlo’s employer from 1998 through 2017, including the 
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relevant period from 2015 through 2017. It should have a record of the “particular 

workweeks, months, years, or even the specific position she held when the alleged 

pay violations occurred”—information which the College says the Complaint is 

lacking. (Dkt. 13 at 6). Moreover, the Complaint states that Karlo was “[f]ull time 

Faculty [from] 2002 up until the time she was terminated.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 9). That 

is a reasonably specific description of her position. The College is also presumably 

aware of the date on which her employment was terminated. Therefore the “extent, 

applicable time period, or alleged dates of underpayments,” which it claims to be 

unsure of, ought to be obvious. (Dkt. 13 at 6). Moreover, the College attached Karlo’s 

2017 EEOC charge to its own reply brief. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 1). There can be no doubt that 

it has, for several years, had adequate notice of the nature of Karlo’s grievances.

B. Count IV: Retaliation under the EPA

1. Statute of Limitations 

The College argues that Count IV is barred by the statute of limitations for the 

same reason as Count II: Karlo’s failure to allege willful violation of the EPA that 

would extend this statute. The Court rejects this argument for the reasons laid out 

above.3

3 Karlo argues, in the alternative, that “nothing in the Equal Pay Act [. . .] specifically limits the claim 

of retaliation to a two-year statute of limitations.” (Dkt. 16 at 4). She proposes no alternative statute 

of limitations, however, and district courts in the Seventh Circuit generally take it for granted that 

retaliation claims under the EPA are subject to the same statute of limitations as equal pay claims 

brought pursuant to that Act. See, e.g., Akins-Brakefield v. Philip Env’t Servs. Corp., No. 08 CV 710, 

2010 WL 1032637, at *12 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010) (ruling on retaliation and equal pay claims and 

holding that “a cause of action under the EPA has an applicable two-year statute of limitations, unless 

the cause of action arises out of a willful violation of the EPA”); Righter v. Zuccarelli, No. 09 CV 7563, 

2010 WL 1980128, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (same).
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2. Failure to state a claim

Karlo has alleged that she “raised concerns about unequal pay with various 

managers.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 16). If this were her only allegation it would be 

insufficient, because, as the College notes, “[a] complaint about dissatisfaction with 

one’s compensation in general does not trigger protection of the [EPA].” Leong v. SAP 

Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 972, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2014). She must assert that she is being 

paid less than comparable male colleagues in a manner that is “sufficiently clear and 

detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and 

context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their 

protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335, 

179 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2011) (addressing retaliation under the FLSA). Karlo’s allegations, 

taken as true, indicate that she did so. The Complaint, read as a whole, makes it clear 

that the “concern about unequal pay” she raised with her managers, (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 

16), was the concern that “male counterpoints were paid at a higher rate than Karlo.” 

(Id. at ¶ 15, emphasis added). The fact that her managers responded by telling her 

why “male” colleagues earned more supports this inference. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 17). And 

Karlo’s allegations that she “continued to raise issues of gender inequity and salary

disparities,” (Id. at ¶ 18), and “engaged in protected conduct when she complained 

about being paid significantly less than her male counterparts,” (Id. at ¶ 33), are 

further confirmation that she properly invoked her rights under the EPA when she 

spoke to her managers.
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3. But-for Causation

Karlo must also allege that “but-for” her protected activity she would not have 

been subjected to an adverse action. See, e.g., Heise v. Canon Sols. Am., Inc., No. 16 

C 8284, 2018 WL 3533255, at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2018) (citing Krause v. City of La 

Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2001)) (listing requirements to succeed on an 

EPA retaliation claim at summary judgment). She has done so, saying that because 

she “engaged in protected conduct when she complained about being paid 

significantly less than her male counterparts” the “Defendant intentionally retaliated 

against Plaintiff by placing her on probation and terminating her employment, and 

by refusing to remedy ongoing pay disparity.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 33–34). Karlo cannot 

allege more than this without the benefit of discovery, and the Defendant presents no 

case law suggesting otherwise. 

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12) is granted in part 

and denied in part. Count I is dismissed in part and Count II is dismissed in its 

entirety, both without prejudice. The motion to dismiss is denied as to Count IV. 

Dated: May 27, 2021

E N T E R:

MARY M. ROWLAND

United States District Judge