SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0652- 22 MICHAEL LEONARDI, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, STATE POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent.

___________________ ________

Argued March 5, 2024

– Decided May 6, 202 4 Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System, Department of the Treasur y, SPRS No. xx4 987. Lauren Patricia Sandy argued the cause for appellan t (The Law Offices of Lauren Sandy, LLC, attorneys; Lauren Patricia Sandy, of counsel and on the briefs ). Jakai T. Jackson, Deputy Attorney General, argued t he cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jakai T. Jackson, on the brief ). NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0652

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PER CURIAM Petitioner Michael Leonardi appeals from a final ag ency decision by the Board of Trustees (Board), of the State Police Reti rement System, finding he

wa s not entitled to an accidental disability retireme nt (ADR) benefits under
N.J.S.A. 53:5A -10(a). We affirm. We glean the relevant facts and procedural history from the record. Leonardi was employed as a police officer in Washin gton Township from 2001 to 2004. In September 20 04 , he was hired by the New Jersey State Police (NJSP). Leonardi completed police academy training both to become a police officer and a trooper. At the academy, he was taught basi c lifesaving measures, including CPR. With the NJSP, Leonardi was a road trooper and assi gned to various locations and assignments, as a Trooper I, II and I II. In 2014, he became a detective. During his time wi th NJSP, Leonardi "responded to numerous

— close to 500 or more

— auto accidents, with roughly thirty to thirty-five of them [involving] fatal[ities]." Leonardi explained when responding to an accident, officers usually arrived before medical services, so he typically wo uld render emergency aid until medical services arrived. Thereafter, he wou ld continue to administer CPR3 A- 0652

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if medical services requested. It was common for m edical services to ask for police assistance. On the morning of May 17, 2018 , Leonardi was at the Netcong Station. At the same time, along Route 80 in Mount Olive, a school bus with forty-four passengers was involved in an accident with a dump truck. Reports came in over the radio regarding "a severe school-bus accid ent with numerous injuries and possible fatalities." Leonardi immediately drove to the scene. He stated the scene of the accident: was horrific

— the force of the impact of the dump truck

hitting the bus ripped the bus off its axle, and there were children who had been ejected from the bus on the ground in the median of the highway and other child ren suspended upside down from their seatbelts inside t he overturned bus frame. Leonardi "heard children crying and screaming for t heir parents, and observed children and teachers with severed limbs, brok en bones, bleeding, and other injuries." Troopers carried two unconscious female children to an ambulance. An emergency medical technician (EMT) a ttended to one of the children who "coded," but ultimately survived. Leonardi assessed the other child, M.V. He was told "she had a faint pulse ." The child was lifeless, with severe injuries an d head trauma. Despite4 A- 0652

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her severe injuries, Leonardi provided chest compre ssions to M.V. "After ten to fifteen minutes of chest compressions, the EMT a dvised Leonardi to stop, but [he] continued for several more minutes ." The EMT advised Leonardi that M.V. was dead and requested that he "black tag" her. Leonard i then assisted in moving an other child to an ambulance for transport to a hospital. He re assessed the scene, which included "bloody and injured children all over the place. Every child was screaming for help and for their parents." Leonardi also "helped a trooper stabilize another c hild , who appeared to have internal injuries and broken limbs, and placed her on a backboard and into an ambulance." Further, "[ he ] attempted to comfort another child who . . . reach[ ed ] out and call[ ed ] to him." Leonardi bandaged the child's significa ntly bleeding head and sat him on the median guardrail u ntil the child could be transport ed to the hospital. Next, Leonardi returned to the ambulance and remain ed with M.V. Since
the area was a crime scene, M.V. could not be left alone, a nd "as a father," Leonardi did not want to leave her. M.V.'s age and identity w ere disclosed to Leonardi, and he learned that the children in the b us were fifth and sixth grade students.5 A- 0652

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In the ambulance, Leonardi "broke down" and advised others "he would be the one assigned to remain with M.V." He "prayed and apo logized to her for not being able to save her." Leonardi stayed with M.V. for approximately three hours. During th at time, he thought of her family and learned that M.V.'s twin sister was on another bus. Occasionally he opened the ambulance door, "to get air and a bottle of water." But because Leonardi had a daug hter the same age as M.V., "[h]e became extremely protective of M.V." Once "the NJSP Crime Scene Investigation North Unit arrived, [Leonardi] assisted another trooper in removing [M.V.] from th e ambulance and phot ographing her injuries." "Leonardi remained with M .V. until the medical examiner arrived and removed her from the scene." Thereafter, Leonardi "went to [an] area by the dump truck where [a teacher]'s body was located. Leonardi assisted a Crime Scene trooper in photographing" the teacher's body. Then, "Leonardi just stood on the median and did no t know what to do. His thoughts were racing, and he became almost numb to his surroundings." Not remembering where he parked his vehicle, Leonardi w as driven back the to the Netcong Station. At the station he "washed as much blood off his hands and body as he could and helped detectives with the inv estigation." He stared at his6 A- 0652

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computer screen and recognized "there was nothing e lse for him to do." He decided to go home and was driven back to the accid ent scene to retrieve his vehicle, "which he had not realized he left." After arriving home, Leonardi remained outside in his vehicle for approximately an hour, "trying to process the scene and incident." Once inside he "took a shower to wash off the remaining blood." He could not watch television because coverage of the accident was on every channel. He experienced flashbacks of everything that occurred, had difficulty falling asleep, and kept envisioning M.V.'s lifeless body. Following the accident, Leonardi applied for ADR benefits. By letter of September 25, 2019, the Board advised Leonardi it had "determined that [he

wa ]s totally and permanently disabled from his job du ties due to his psychological condition." However, because the "in cident was not undesigned and unexpected and [since] Leonardi's disability wa s not the direct result of the incident but was instead associated with a pre-exis ting condition, " the Board
denied his application. Leonardi appealed from the Board's determination. The Board approved Leonardi's request for a hearing and transmitted th e matter to the Office of Administrative Law. The Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ) held hearings on7 A- 0652

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January 26 and February 16, 2021. On May 27, 2022, t he ALJ issued an eightyfour-page opinion , concluding the event was not "undesigned or unexpected." She explained:

law-enforcement officers are expected to encounter incidents such as "serious bodily injury to or the death of a juvenile." Thus, while the bus accident was unequivocally horrific, Leonardi responded to a catastrophic accident where he had to render aid an d document a crime scene. While certainly there were several factors that made Leonardi's experience particularly traumatic, including the condition of the victims and his extensive interactions with M.V., who was his daughter's age, I [conclude] that the event was not undesigned and unexpected.
In addition, the ALJ found Leonardi did "not prove [] that the disability [wa]s not the result of

a pre-existing disease aggravated or accelerated by the work ." She explained:

There [wa]s no dispute that an inc ident involving serious bodily injury or death to a child is particularly traumatic and horrific . . . . Even absent any prior psychological or psychiatric history, severe [ post

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD )] might result, but given Leonardi's psychiatric and psychological hist ory, including the prior references to PTSD, depression, and alcohol abuse, whether or not Leonardi's disability [wa]s the result of

a pre-existing disease aggravated or accelerated by work effort cannot be determined from the record, especially in view of, but not limited to, the following: testimony that Leonardi's disability was an exacerbation or aggravation of pre-existing PTSD and alcohol-abuse disorder; . . . testimony that Leonar di 's8 A- 0652

- 22 PTSD [wa]s cumulative; that it cannot be conclusively established when [Leonardi was] treated . . . or for what; and that none of [Leonardi]'s expert witnesses had reviewed any prior medical records. Accordingly, t he ALJ was "constrained to [conclude] that the application for [ADR] benefits should be denied," and the Board's determination denying Leonardi's application for ADR benefits should be affirmed. Thereafter, at its July 26, 2022 meeting, the Board considered: the ALJ's decision; all exhibits; Leonardi's exceptions; the Deputy Attorney General's (DAG) exceptions; and statements made by Leonardi and the DAG

. The Board then adopted the ALJ's decision affirming its denial of the application.
In August 2022, Leonardi requested re consideration of the Board's denial of his application. He argued the ALJ erred in "finding that the May 17, 2018 incident was not undesigned and unexpected" and by "not correctly apply[ing] the legal standard regarding causation." Three days later, Leonardi9 A- 0652

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supplemented his request for reconsideration, pursuant to an amendment to N.J.S.A. 53:5A

- 10 1 and N.J.S.A. 53:5a -10.2. 2 In September 2022, the Board "affirmed the finding that the May 17, 2018 incident was not undesigned and unexpected." The Board also found "[b]ecause . . . Leonardi's application . . . was not denied solely on the basis of direct result,"

1 N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, in part, was amended effective J uly 29, 2022, to provide:

A member with a pre[-]existing and asymptomatic condition that is rendered symptomatic as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties may be eligible for an accidental disability retirement allowance, provided that the traumatic event is caused by a circumstance external to the member and is the substantial contributing cause of the member’s permanent and total disability.

2 N.J.S.A. 53:5A -10, in part, was amended effective Ju ly 29, 2022, to provide:

A member with a pre[-]existing and asymptomatic condition that is rendered symptomatic as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties may be eligible for an accidental disability retirement allowance, provided that the traumatic event is caused by a circumstance external to the member and is the substantial contributing cause of the member’s permanent and total disability.10 A- 0652

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reconsideration of his application should be denied under N.J.S.A. 53:5A

- 10 and
-10.2.
On appeal, Leonardi argues the Board erred in den ying his application beca use : (1) the accident was "undesigned and unexpected"; (2) his PTSD was

not pre-existing; and (3) he qualified for ADR benefits in accord with new legislati on . We disagree.
We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our analysis. "Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd

. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007) ). "We recognize that agencies have 'expertise and superior knowledge . . . in their specialized fields.'" Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (quoting In re License
Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (20 06) ). Therefore, we will not "substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a different result." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)).
For those reasons, we "ordinarily should not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or11 A- 0652

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unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence" in the record as a whole. In re Virtua-West Jersey Ho sp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreas onable rests upon the person challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-
44 (App. Div. 2006) (citations omitted). "Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of

a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing." Thompson

v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 449 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007)). "Such deference has been specifically extended

to state agencies that administer pension statutes be cause a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise." Id. at 483

- 84 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, we are " in no way bound by
the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." Id. at 484 (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J. at 196 ). We "apply de novo review to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law." Ibid. (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27 ).12 A- 0652

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The State Police Retirement System provides for an A DR allowance.
N.J.S.A. 53:5A

- 10 (a)

. To qualify, the member must demonstrate he or she "is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his [or her] regular or assigned duties." Ibid.
In Patterson, the New Jersey Supreme Court developed the standard for qualifying for ADR benefits when a member's claim is grounded on "a permanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor, without any physical impact." Patterson v. Bd

. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 33 ( 2008)

. The Court "mandate[d] a two -step analysis in cases in which a member claims permanent mental incapacity as a result of an exclusively psychological
trauma." Mount v. B d. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 426 (2018). In step one , the court determines whether the disability "result[ed] from direct personal experience of a terrifying or horro r-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the member or another person. " Patterson, 194 N.J. at 34. Second, the "traumatic event posited as the basis f or an [ADR] pension [must]

not [be] inconsequential but . . . objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabli ng mental injury." Ibid.13 A- 0652

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" If the event meets the Patterson test, the court then applies the Richard son factors to the member's application." Mount, 233, N.J. at 426 (quoting Russo , 206 N.J. at 32- 33) . "That is important because it underscores that n ot every person who experiences a Patterson-type horrific ev ent will automatically qualify for a mental-mental accidental disability b enefit." Russo, 206 N.J. at 32. Under Richardson, to receive ADR benefits, a claimant must prove:

1. that he is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is: a. identifiable as to time and place, b. undesigned and unexpected, and

c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work) ; 3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; and 5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty. [Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212 -13.]14 A- 0652

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Here, our focus is on Richardson 's requirement the "tragic event" was "undesigned and unexpected." Satisfaction of the "undesigned and unexpected" factor requires an event "extraordinary or unusual in common experience" and not "[i]njury by ordinary work effort." Richardson, 192 N.J. at 201 (citation omitted). "The polestar of
the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of [the member's] job, an unexpected happening . . . occurred and directly re sulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Id. at 214.
As the Court noted in Russo, a member " who experiences a horrific event which falls within his [or her] job description and for which he [or she] has been trained will be unlikely to pass the 'undesigned and unexpected' test." Russo, 206 N.J. at 33 . "Thus, for example, an [EMT] who comes upon a te rrible accident involving life-threatening injuries or dea th, will have experienced a Patterson-type horrific event, but will not satisfy Richardson 's 'undesigned and unexpected' standard because that is exactly what h is training has prepared him for." Ibid. Nonetheless,
Russo should not be construed to mean that the inquiry regarding whether an event is "undesigned and unexpected" is resolved merely by reviewing the member's job description and the scope of his or her15 A- 0652

- 22 training. In a given case, those considerations may weigh strongly for or against an award of accidental disability benefits. To properly apply the Richardson standard, however, the Board and a reviewing court must carefully consider not only the member's job responsibilities and training, but all aspects of t he event itself. No single factor governs the analysis. [Mount, 233 N.J. at 427 .] Therefore, in Mount, the Court considered the officer: confronted a catastrophic accident at close range. He initially viewed a victim's arm hanging from the vehicle's window. Bystanders approached the vehicl e demanding that [the officer] rescue the occupants. With no firefighting equipment except a small fire extinguisher, [the officer] faced the imminent thre at of an explosion. Within moments, the car burst into flames. As [the officer] learned minutes later, the explosion "melted" the young victims' bodies into t he interior of the vehicle. [Ibid.] The Court concluded the event was "undesigned or un expected" despite "[b]y virtue of his job description, training, and prior experience, [the officer] could anticipate being called to accidents that were serious or even fatal. As his job description suggest[ed], in some circumstances [the officer] would be expected to remove victims from a damaged vehicle p ending the arrival of medical personnel." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427.16 A- 0652

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Nonetheless, the Court held the "tragic event" was "undesigned and unexpected" because the officer "was not trained to combat, unassisted, an explosion of such magnitude experienced at such a c lose range. With no firefighting equipment or protective gear, [the off icer] was helpless in the face of a terrible tragedy." Id. at 427- 28. In Russo, the Court held Richardson was "plainly sa tisfied" when: a newly-minted police officer, with no psychiatric history, completely untrained and unequipped for firefighting, was ordered into a burning building a nd, with his fellow officers, bravely rescued three of the four occupants. The intensity of the fire terrifie d and disoriented [the officer], singed his uniform, and sent him to the hospital overnight for smoke inhalation. One person in the house, who cried out for help to [the officer] and his fellow officers, could not be reac hed because of the fire's ferocity and perished. There after, the victim's family heaped scorn on [the officer] and blamed him for their relative's death. It was as a result of the fire and the confluence of events it generated, including the death of

the victim and the relatives' accusations, that [the officer] was rendered permanently mentally disabled. [Russo, 206 N.J. at 34 (emphasis added).] Under other circumstances the Court ha s held a "tragic event" was not "undesigned and unexpected." In Mount, the Court also considered the ADR benefits application of a hostage negotiator who cl aimed permanent disability "when a lengthy hostage negotiation ended with the shooting death of the17 A- 0652

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hostage-taker, as [the hostage-taker and negotiator ] spoke by cellphone."
Mount , 233 N.J. at 408. The Court concluded the negotiator "directly and personally experienced a terrifying or horror[-]ind ucing event," satisfying
Patterson. Id . at 429. However, the Court concluded the shootin g was not "undesigned and unexpected" because of the direct " sequence of events that led to [the] death." Id. at 431. The Court considered: (1) the negotiator 's training and knowledge of police tactics; (2) that "it was r eadily apparent . . . a violent encounter could occur"; (3) the hostage-taker told the negotiator "the situation would end with the [hostage-taker's] death"; and (4 ) the hostage-taker's "statements and conduct portended a violent confron tation with police." Id. at 430. In other words, there was nothing "undesigned or unexpected" about the "tragic event." We apply these well-established principles to the m atter here, and affirm. We are satisfied the ALJ's decision that the event was not "undesigned and unexpected, " and the Board's subsequent adoption of that decisio n, were based

on "sufficient credible evidence on the record as a wh ole." R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(D). While in no respect minimizing the horrific event, the evidence fail ed to establish the event was "undesigned or unexpected ."18 A- 0652

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Here, Leonardi was alerted to "a severe school-bus related accident with numerous injuries." As he had done countless other times, Leonardi responded to the accident that included injuries and fataliti es. Utilizing his training and experience, he assessed the scene; tended to the in jured; assisted with crime scene photographs; and, because it was a crime scene, s tayed with the body of a deceased child for hours. In short, because Leonardi was train ed and experienced through his employment to assist accide nt victims, the school bus accident was not "undesigned or unexpected." We commend Leonardi for his professionalism and com passion in caring for multiple accident victims, and are sympathetic to his mental condition, but under the circumstances presented before us, we hav e no basis to disturb the Board's determination that he did not satisfy the " undesigned and unexpected" requirement of Richardson. To the extent we have not addressed Leonardi's rema ining arguments , it is because either our disposition makes it unnecess ary, or because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.