IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISON

HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT 

TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. AND 

UNICORN GLOBAL, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

CHEAPAANZEE et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-04806 

Hon. Thomas M. Durkin 

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER

On November 25, 2020, eBay Inc. (“eBay”) received a request for expedited discovery 

from Plaintiffs Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. and Unicorn Global, Inc. 

(“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to the November 24, 2020 Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 113) (the 

“Preliminary Injunction”). (Declaration of Paul J. Rogerson (“Rogerson Decl.”) Exs. 1–4.) 

Here, eBay respectfully moves for relief from the obligations imposed on it by the Preliminary 

Injunction, including the obligation to provide the discovery that Plaintiffs seek. 

Three months ago, Plaintiffs moved for an emergency Temporary Restraining Order (the 

“TRO”). After eBay moved for relief from the TRO and requested that Plaintiffs provide to 

eBay the information supporting their request for a TRO, Plaintiffs withdrew their pending 

request for a preliminary injunction, the TRO expired, and weeks passed before Plaintiffs filed a

further amended complaint (now the operative pleading) and a renewed request for a preliminary 

injunction, which has now been granted. Plaintiffs have never moved for a temporary restraining 

based on the operative complaint, and have yet to provide eBay the information it requested. 

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Like the TRO before it, the Preliminary Injunction that Plaintiffs have obtained goes far

beyond what is necessary to prevent a risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs and needlessly 

imposes burdens on third-parties like eBay. The Preliminary Injunction allows Plaintiffs to 

demand that third-party service providers freeze Defendants’ assets and (potentially) shut down 

Defendants’ online stores before Plaintiffs take expedited discovery to uncover the facts that 

would show whether these drastic forms of relief are necessary, or indeed whether the Court may 

exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants at all. These remedies, imposed before any 

showing of genuine need, threaten to operate as a source of pressure on Defendants to quickly 

settle Plaintiffs’ allegations, independent of merit. And beyond the burdens on eBay to comply 

with these measures, it is a reputational issue for eBay if merchants come to believe that these 

risks are a cost of doing business on eBay’s online marketplace. The risk of irreparable harm 

that Plaintiffs identify could be resolved, without imposing these burdens on third parties, by a 

more limited order that provided that Plaintiffs may take expedited discovery from third-parties, 

during which time Defendants’ identities would be maintained under seal, and that Plaintiffs may 

then return to the Court to request any further relief warranted in light of the facts uncovered. 

I. The Concerns that eBay Raised about the TRO Have Proven to be Well-Founded.

Plaintiffs’ latest filings vindicate the concerns that eBay raised about the original 

Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (Dkt. 42) issued in this case. Three months ago, 

Plaintiffs asserted that the Court needed to issue an ex parte TRO requiring 

. So far as 

Plaintiffs’ publicly available filings reveal, Plaintiffs’ request for this extraordinary relief was 

based on the allegation that these are located outside the United States and are bad 

actors who willfully infringe intellectual property rights and have a practice of switching 

usernames to avoid allegations of intellectual property infringement, and so would likely move 

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3 

their assets beyond the Court’s reach if notified of the litigation. (See Dkt. 56.) However, as

eBay explained in its filings, 

. (See Dkt. 56.) 

. (See Dkt. 56.) 

.

1

 

In subsequent filings, Plaintiffs told the Court that they intended to conduct an additional 

investigation and file an amended complaint. (Dkt. 93, 94.) Plaintiffs have now filed a Third 

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 101.) The Third Amended Complaint 

. (Dkt. 101.) And, based on publicly 

available information allegedly uncovered by their further investigation (information that 

Plaintiffs’ filings do not disclose), Plaintiffs now allege 

 (Dkt. 101 ¶¶ 10, 11.)2

 In other words, just as eBay 

suggested, a small amount of due diligence based on publicly available information was enough 

 

1 The TRO expired before the dispute between eBay and Plaintiffs regarding the validity of the 

TRO as applied to eBay was resolved. 

2

 And, as explained further below, 

 (See Declaration of Rebekah 

Long in Support of eBay’s Motion for Relief (“Long Decl.”).) 

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4 

to cast doubt on the vast majority of the allegations about Defendants’ locations that Plaintiffs 

presented to the Court in sworn declarations three months ago. 

Despite these developments, Plaintiffs have not meaningfully changed their request for 

injunctive relief. Indeed, in some respects, the Preliminary Injunction goes further than the 

TRO. The Preliminary Injunction still requires certain third parties (who are in “active concert” 

with Defendants) to freeze the assets 

. (Dkt. 113 ¶ 3.) The only change 

over the TRO is that the Preliminary Injunction provides that the asset freeze requirement does 

not apply to any “Schedule B” Defendant “for whom Plaintiffs receive” a particular kind of 

proof of U.S. residency—“official registration documents filed with any state’s Secretary of 

State (or analogous business registration agency).” (Dkt. 113 ¶ 3.) As explained below, this 

safeguard is flawed and inverts the burden of proof for a preliminary remedy. The Preliminary 

Injunction also contains new provisions that permit Plaintiffs to demand that a large set of thirdparty service providers “disable and cease providing services being used by Defendants, 

currently or in the future, to engage in the sale of goods that infringe the Patents-in-Suit.” (Dkt. 

113 ¶ 4a.) It is unclear whether this language applies to eBay or what precisely it requires, but 

on one reading it could require eBay to shut down the entire eBay store of every eBay 

Defendant, even Defendants who are established businesses inside the United States and have 

sold only a small number of allegedly infringing products. 

II. eBay Has the Right to Move for Relief from the Preliminary Injunction.

It is “part of our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in 

court.” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

65(d)(2)(C) authorizes a federal court to issue an injunction that binds non-parties who are “in 

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active concert or participation” with a party or its “officers, agents, servants, employees, and 

attorneys.” But Rule 65(d)(2)(C) does not suspend the fundamental requirement that any person 

bound by a court order has the right to his own day in court, with the opportunity to contest the 

validity of the order. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., Inc., 639 F.2d 29, 37 (1st 

Cir. 1980) (“The central reason that one who is not a party to the action in which the injunction 

was issued cannot be bound by it is that he has not had his day in court with respect to the 

validity of the injunction. Absent an opportunity to contest liability, his knowledge of the 

injunction is not sufficient to bind him as an individual.”); see also Lake Shore Asset 

Management Ltd. v. Commodity Future Trading Commission, 511 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that the threshold question “whether a particular person or firm is among the ‘parties' 

officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; [or] other persons in active concert or 

participation with’ them (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(B), (C)) is a decision that may be made 

only after the person in question is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Under these fundamental rules, eBay has the right to appear in Court to present argument 

as to the validity of the Preliminary Injunction, including arguments that the Preliminary 

Injunction will cause irreparable harm to eBay. Plaintiffs assert in their discovery demand that 

eBay is bound by at least the provisions of the Preliminary Injunction that require certain third 

parties to provide discovery to Plaintiffs. (Rogerson Decl., Ex. 1.) And eBay has an interest in 

settling the validity of other provisions of the Preliminary Injunction (in order to resolve 

concerns about whether it might be bound by them too), such as Paragraph 3 (which requires 

certain third parties to freeze Defendant’s asserts) and Paragraph 4 (which requires certain 

parties to stop providing certain services to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ demand). (Dkt. 113 ¶¶ 3, 

4.) 

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III. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown That They Are Entitled to the Broad Preliminary Relief 

They Have Sought Against eBay. 

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. 

eBay does not object to providing the discovery that is authorized by the Preliminary 

Injunction regarding the “Schedule A” Defendants.3 However, The Preliminary Injunction 

potentially imposes at least three obligations on eBay with respect to the “Schedule B” 

Defendants who Plaintiffs admit they have reason to believe are located within the United States: 

(1) to provide discovery that Plaintiffs can use, without any further showing to the Court, to 

demand that certain third-party service providers freeze the assets of the “Schedule B” 

Defendants; (2) potentially requires eBay itself to freeze the assets of the “Schedule B”

Defendants; and (3) potentially requires eBay to fully shut down the eBay stores of the 

“Schedule B” Defendants. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that they are entitled to 

these forms of relief. As explained above, a much more limited order permitting Plaintiffs to 

 

3

 However, even as to the “Schedule A” Defendants,

 eBay objects to providing this discovery 

as to any Defendant.

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simply take expedited discovery, during which time Defendants’ identities would be maintained 

under seal, would avert any risk of irreparable harm that Plaintiffs identity.

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown that They Will be Irreparably Harmed Absent the 

Relief Against eBay. 

“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is 

inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may 

only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 

U.S. at 22. However, here Plaintiffs appear to have made no particularized showing as to any

Defendant that either asset freezes or store shutdowns as to the “Schedule B” Defendants are 

necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiffs.4 

The relevant allegations in the Third Amended Complaint 

. 

(Dkt. 103 ¶¶ 10–11, 33–40.) For example, 

. (Dkt. 103 ¶ 11.) Indeed, the Third Amended 

Complaint itself alleges 

 (Dkt. 103 ¶ 11.) Or, to take another example, the 

Complaint alleges 

 (Dkt. 103 ¶ 36.) 

 

4

 Indeed, despite seeking emergency relief and rapid expedited discovery from third parties, 

Plaintiffs themselves have acted with no sense of urgency. See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, 

Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“plaintiff’s claimed need for 

immediate relief is undercut by the slow pace with which plaintiff has sought to obtain it”) 

(quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs appear to have waited for more than two months after filing 

their complaint to undertake a basic search of publicly-available information regarding the 

accused Defendants.

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The materials filed in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction have the 

same deficiencies. Plaintiffs’ Motion was supported by several declarations, only one of which 

has been filed in redacted form on the public docket. (Dkt. 106, 118, 119.) That declaration is a 

declaration from Richard F. Bero, who asserts that Plaintiffs may be unable to recover any 

monetary damages assessed because “many of the Defendants are alleged to reside and / or 

operate in the People’s Republic of China or other foreign jurisdictions.” (Dkt. 118 ¶¶ 120–121.) 

However, Mr. Bero himself offers no independent opinion that these statements are true or any 

analysis to support them. Instead, Mr. Bero relies entirely on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third 

Amended Complaint and the “understanding” that he has received from Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 118 

¶¶ 120–121.) And although eBay is unable to access the remaining declarations, the fact that Mr. 

Bero does not rely on these declarations for his assertions regarding the Defendants indicates to 

eBay that the remaining declarations provide no relevant support for these assertions. 

The lack of any detailed factual support for the key allegations underpinning Plaintiffs’ 

showing of irreparable harm is particularly significant given the history of this case. Three 

months ago Plaintiffs told the Court that an ex parte TRO freezing the assets of on 

eBay’s online marketplace was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiffs based on what 

appear to have been high-level, conclusory assertions that those merchants were operating 

outside the United States and had a practice of changing their identities to avoid allegations of 

intellectual property infringement. It now appears, in light of Plaintiffs’ latest filings, that these 

allegations were not based on even minimal due diligence into publicly-available information. 

Yet, in their new filings, Plaintiffs still provide nothing more than high-level, conclusory 

allegations. The Court should not simply accept that these allegations are well-founded. 

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Indeed, once again, the results of an internal investigation conducted by eBay substantiate 

concerns about the accuracy of Plaintiffs’ allegations. As it did after receiving Plaintiffs’ first set 

of discovery requests, eBay has conducted an investigation regarding the Defendants who 

operate on its platform. (Long Decl. ¶ 6.) Given the short time available, this investigation was 

necessarily limited. But what eBay has learned 

 (Long Decl. ¶¶ 7–11.) 

Given the limited allegations provided by Defendants, and the results of eBay’s 

investigation, the facts available to the Court are not close to a “clear showing” that Defendants 

will be irreparably harmed absent asset freezes and store shutdowns of the “Schedule B” 

Defendants. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

B. The Balance of Equities Includes Irreparable Harm to eBay.

Complying with the Preliminary Injunction risks causing irreparable damage to eBay’s 

goodwill, reputation, and market share. See, e.g., Canon Comput. Sys. v. Nu-Kote Intern., Inc., 

134 F.3d 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding finding that “potential loss of market share” is 

an irreparable harm); Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(recognizing that “loss of goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities are 

all valid grounds for finding irreparable harm”). Plaintiffs have not provided eBay with any 

particular listing by any Defendant that that they allege shows an infringing product. And the 

results of eBay’s own investigation indicate

 (Long Decl. ¶ 11.) Accordingly, an asset freeze or store shutdown risks 

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generating very substantial pressure to settle Plaintiffs’ allegations, independent of merit (indeed, 

before any adversarial testing of the allegations’ merit) and that is disproportionate to the scale of 

the alleged infringing activity. See E-Link Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Shenzen Uni-Sun Elec. Co., Ltd., 

No. 20-cv-00247, Dkt. 36 at 6 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2020) (“restraining all funds received by the 

Amazon accounts, in light of the relatively small proportion due to the allegedly infringing sales, 

is disproportionately onerous”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) 

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (cautioning that courts should be careful to prevent the threat of an 

injunction with consequences disproportionate to the accused infringing activity from being used 

“for undue leverage in negotiations”). 

An event that its merchants might reasonably view as an attempt to extract a settlement is 

a reputational issue for eBay. The merchants are likely to blame eBay for freezing their assets or 

shutting down their entire stores, or least take account of the fact that these kinds of events can 

happen on eBay’s online marketplace in future decisions about where to do business. And 

merchants are particularly likely to be upset if their businesses (including large numbers of 

products that are not accused of infringement) are shut down without warning during the holiday 

season. This will damage eBay’s relationship with these merchants and erode eBay’s 

competitive position against other online marketplaces. And loss of merchants risks leading to 

further losses of market share and further erosion of eBay’s competitive position, by thinning out 

eBay’s marketplace compared to rival marketplaces—the opportunity to view listing from a large 

number of merchants in one place is part of what draws customers to eBay’s platform. Similar 

harms to eBay’s competitive position would arise if any of the eBay Defendants are permanently 

damaged by an asset freeze or shutdown, and are forced to leave eBay’s platform or reduce their 

activity. 

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(Long Decl. ¶ 10.) 

The sole safeguard in the Preliminary Injunction—that the asset freeze provisions do not 

apply to “Schedule B” Defendants for whom Plaintiffs receive business registration 

documents—is a flawed protection that will not meaningfully mitigate these harms, for at least 

four reasons. First, it does not apply to the store shutdown provisions in Paragraph 4a., which 

will cause substantially the same harms. (Dkt. 113 ¶ 4a.) Second, there is no guarantee that 

. (Long Decl. ¶ 10.) 

Third, in practice, it will still generate the same kind of settlement pressure and risk the same 

business damage. The assets of the “Schedule B” Defendants will still be frozen immediately 

and stay frozen for a substantial period of time. Under the terms of the Preliminary Injunction, 

eBay is potentially obligated to freeze the Defendants’ assets immediately. (Dkt. 113 ¶ 3.) And 

once eBay provides the discovery Plaintiffs have requested, Plaintiffs can immediately demand 

that other third-party service providers freeze Defendants’ assets.5

 (Dkt. 113 ¶ 3.) Once the 

assets are frozen, the procedure for unfreezing them is time-consuming and burdensome. 

Defendants need to be served to have notice of the procedure, although to date there is no 

evidence that Plaintiffs have served any of the eBay Defendants. After service, Defendants will 

need to retain counsel who can represent them in litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, 

 

5

 Although 

 (Rogerson Decl., Ex. 1.)

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review the terms of the order, obtain copies of official registration documents, and send them to 

Plaintiffs. These steps are likely to be particularly burdensome and time-consuming for the 

many eBay Defendants who are small, individual operators. And the asset freeze Plaintiffs 

demand may further complicate efforts to retain counsel. Even once Plaintiffs receive 

registration documents, they are still permitted by the Preliminary Injunction to leave the 

Defendants’ assets frozen for 10 additional days. (Dkt. 113 ¶ 3.) And many merchants are likely 

to feel particular pressure to avoid even a temporary interruption in business during the weeks 

leading up to the holiday season.

Fourth, and finally, this procedure fundamentally reverses the burden of proof for a 

preliminary remedy. A preliminary injunction, particularly one that threatens to close the doors 

of a large number of operating businesses, is an “extraordinary remedy” to which Plaintiffs must 

make a “clear showing” that they are entitled. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. Here, Plaintiffs seek 

instead to obtain an injunction on the basis of high-level, conclusory allegations—allegations 

that eBay itself can see are likely false—and rely on Defendants to come forward with 

particularized proof that the injunction is not necessary. If Plaintiffs need to take more discovery 

to prove that they are entitled to an injunction, they should do that first and then seek an order 

from the Court to the extent warranted by what the discovery reveals.

C. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Subject to Substantial Personal Jurisdiction and Venue 

Objections.

eBay has not seen the parts of Plaintiffs’ filings that describe the details of their 

infringement allegations against Defendants and takes no position on the merits of those 

allegations.6

 However, in light of eBay’s registration data, which indicates that the vast majority 

 6 Although eBay notes that, unlike in some copyright or trademark infringement cases, it is not 

apparent from the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint that the eBay Defendants are bad actors who 

willfully infringed Plaintiffs’ intellectual property, even if Plaintiffs’ allegations of infringement 

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of the ”Schedule B” Defendants are located in the United States, it appears that Plaintiffs’ claims 

are subject to substantial personal jurisdiction and venue objections. Were Plaintiffs’ claims 

tested in an adversarial hearing, they would likely be dismissed as to the vast majority of the 

“Schedule B” Defendants. Accordingly, the Court should not require eBay to comply with an 

order that further proceeding are likely to show the Court is without jurisdiction to grant. Again, 

a more appropriate course would be for Plaintiffs to take discovery, including jurisdictional 

discovery to the extent necessary, and then move for further relief.

First, Plaintiffs have not provided facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over at 

least the vast majority of the “Schedule B” Defendants who likely reside somewhere in the 

United States. “[T]he Illinois long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the full 

extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,” so the relevant question 

is “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants comports with the limits 

imposed by federal due process.” Curry v. Revolution Labs., LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 393 (7th Cir. 

2020.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over any 

Defendant, and courts in the Seventh Circuit have “distilled three ‘essential requirements’ for the 

exercise of specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant” who resides somewhere in the 

United States: “First, the defendant's contacts with the forum state must show that it purposefully 

availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed 

[its] activities at the state. Second, the plaintiff's alleged injury must have arisen out of the 

 

are correct. Nor is it apparent from the face of the complaint how statutory defenses that are 

available to an allegation of patent infringement would be resolved. See In re Borden, 90 F.3d 

1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (design patent is “subject to the same conditions on patentability as 

utility patents”). 

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defendant's forum-related activities. And finally, any exercise of personal jurisdiction must 

comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 398. 

Cases applying these requirements in the context of online activity by out-of-state 

defendants have required at least something beyond merely providing the option to ship products 

into the forum state, such as proof that the defendant actually sold a substantial number of 

products in the state. See, e.g., id. at 400 (finding personal jurisdiction based on “767 sales” of 

accused products into Illinois); Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(finding personal jurisdiction based on sales of “three hundred packs of cigarettes” into Illinois); 

Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[S]pecific jurisdiction should 

not be exercised based on a single sale in a forum, even when a manufacturer or producer knows 

or reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution 

system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.”); see also

Advanced Tactical Sys. v. Real Action Paintball, 751 F.3d 796, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(cautioning against the creation of “de facto universal jurisdiction” in cases based on online 

activity).7 

 (Dkt. 103 ¶ 5.) That alone is not enough. 

Second, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to show that venue is proper in this 

judicial district as to at least the vast majority of the “Schedule B” Defendants who likely reside 

somewhere in the United States. Venue in a patent case as to a domestic corporation or person is 

governed by the patent venue statute, which provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent 

 

7

 Although New York employs a narrower test for specific personal jurisdiction than Illinois 

does, the analysis in Spin Master Ltd. v. 158, 463 F. Supp. 3d 348, 364–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), 

adhered to in relevant part on reconsideration, No. 18-CV-1774 (LJL), 2020 WL 5350541 

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2020) is also instructive; see also Off-White LLC v. Ali, No. 19-cv-01775, 

2020 WL 5802048 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2020). 

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infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the 

defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 

business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). These venue rules strictly limit where a patent case may be 

brought and were specifically intended “to eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ by previous venue 

provisions allowing such suits to be brought in any district in which the defendant could be 

served.” In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

The patent venue statute “cannot be read to refer merely to a virtual space or to electronic 

communications from one person to another.” Id. at 1362. Instead, as to any Defendant who 

does not “reside” in this district, venue is only proper if three conditions are met: “(1) there must 

be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and 

(3) it must be the place of the defendant.” Id. at 1360. 

 (See Dkt. 103 ¶ 5.) Indeed, 

Plaintiffs’ approach in this lawsuit—naming a large number of defendants who appear not to 

operate a “physical place” within this judicial district and seeking a preliminary remedy that risks 

imposing substantial pressure to settle before any adversarial hearing takes place—might be seen 

as an example of an “abuse[]” that the patent venue rules were intended to prevent. In re Cray, 

871 F.3d at 1361. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant eBay’s motion for relief from the 

Preliminary Injunction. 

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Dated: December 14, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Richard A. Cederoth 

Richard A. Cederoth

Paul J. Rogerson

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 

One South Dearborn 

Chicago, Illinois 60603 

Telephone: (312) 853-7000 

rcederoth@sidley.com

progerson@sidley.com

Counsel for eBay, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served by email on the 16th of October, 

2020 on all counsel of record.

Dated: December 14, 2020 /s/ Richard A. Cederoth 

Richard A. Cederoth

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 

One South Dearborn 

Chicago, Illinois 60603 

Telephone: (312) 853-7000 

rcederoth@sidley.com

Counsel for eBay, Inc.

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