COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Kelsey and Haley 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ROSA COLEMAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2260-09-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

DECEMBER 21, 2010 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FLUVANNA COUNTY 

John G. Berry, Judge 

 Alexis I. Crow for appellant. 

 Mark R. Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Rosa Coleman (“Coleman”) appeals a final order entered by the Circuit Court of 

Fluvanna County (“circuit court”) authorizing the Commonwealth to provide medication to 

Coleman over Coleman’s objection, pursuant to Code § 53.1-40.1. Coleman alleges the circuit 

court erred (1) in denying her a jury trial, and (2) in failing to find that Code § 53.1-40.1 is 

facially unconstitutional. Finding both assignments of error procedurally defaulted, we affirm. 

I. Analysis

A. Coleman’s asserted right to a jury trial under Code § 53.1-40.1

 Coleman first contends the circuit court erred in finding she had no right to a jury trial 

under Code § 53.1-40.1. Coleman concedes the statute does not expressly provide for a jury trial 

in her case, but argues on appeal, as she did in the court below, that since Code § 53.1-40.4 

provides for a jury trial in cases involving involuntary commitment to mental facilities, equal 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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protection and due process require that she be awarded a jury trial for involuntary medical 

treatment proceedings under Code § 53.1-40.1. However, although Coleman’s opening brief 

references equal protection and due process, she cites no legal authority in support of her 

assertion that she has been injured under the United States Constitution.1

 

An appellant’s opening brief must contain “[t]he standard of review and the argument 

(including principles of law and authorities) relating to each assignment of error.” Rule 

5A:20(e). “[W]e have held that ‘unsupported assertions of error do not merit appellate 

consideration.’” Reid v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 42, 48, 698 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2010) 

(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 730, 734, 660 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2008)). 

Moreover, “when a party’s ‘failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e)’ is 

significant, ‘the Court of Appeals may . . . treat a question presented as waived.’” Parks v. 

Parks, 52 Va. App. 663, 664, 666 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2008) (quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 

Va. 510, 520, 659 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008)). 

 In this case, Coleman cites no authority for the proposition that the circuit court violated 

her rights to equal protection and due process under the United States Constitution. Coleman 

simply asserts that “constitutional considerations and just plain common sense seem to lead to 

the inescapable conclusion that medical treatment and the administration of medicine to 

prisoners with mental disabilities should require the right to a jury’s scrutiny and deliberation.” 

She does not cite any legal authority, and we can find none, for the proposition that equal 

protection requires the right to a jury trial for all prisoners in all circumstances. Moreover, 

Coleman “respectfully suggests,” that there is no rational basis for the statutory inconsistency 

 1

 Coleman does cite one case, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), for the 

proposition that the Due Process Clause contained in the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth 

Amendment applies to involuntary commitment proceedings; however, that question is not 

before us. 
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between Code §§ 53.1-40.1 and 53.1-40.4. However, Coleman does not develop her rational 

basis scrutiny argument on brief or cite any legal authority for it. 

 We, thus, consider as waived Coleman’s equal protection and due process arguments and 

afford them no further consideration on appeal. 

B. Facial unconstitutionality of Code § 53.1-40.1

 Coleman also contends Code § 53.1-40.1 is unconstitutional on its face because it 

contains no requirement of a finding of dangerousness before a prisoner may be involuntarily 

medicated. Again, we do not reach the merits of this claim because Coleman has also failed to 

properly preserve this issue for appeal. 

Although Coleman mentioned in her opening statement before the trial court that, “the 

statute as written is constitutionally defective” because the “requirement of dangerousness is 

missing from the statute,” and also stated at the conclusion of trial that she “would appreciate the 

Commonwealth’s addressing the dangerousness issue,” she failed to cite any authority to the trial 

court regarding the constitutionality of the statute and she failed to obtain a ruling on her 

objection, if that is what it was. The trial court did not, therefore, address the constitutionality of 

the statute. Where the trial court has not ruled on an appellant’s objection, “there is no ruling for 

[this Court] to review on appeal.” Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 

484, 489 (1998). 

 We, thus, decline to address this assignment of error because it is not preserved. 

II. Conclusion

 Coleman did not properly preserve either of her assignments of error in this case for 

appeal. Indeed, Coleman failed to develop her due process and equal protection arguments on 

brief, or otherwise support her assertions with any legal authority, and she failed to obtain a 
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ruling on her facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute in the court below. Thus, 

finding both assignments of error procedurally defaulted, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.