FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT March 25, 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT

No. 01-14475

D.C. Docket No. 00-03621-CV-SH

LAZARO GONZALEZ, ANGELA GONZALEZ, MARISLEYSIS GONZALEZ, Plaintiffs-Appe llees,

versus

JANET RENO, DORIS MEI SSNER, ERIC HOLDER, Defendants-Appe llants, BETTY A. MILLS, INS Agent, et al., Defendants.

____________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Ma rch 25, 2003)2

Before TJOFL

AT, COX and B RIGHT*, Circ uit Judges. TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: In this case, we must decide whe ther former Attorney Gen eral Janet Reno, former Commissioner of the Im migration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) Doris Meissner, a

nd former De

puty Attorney

General Eric H

older are entitled

to qualified immunity for their alleged involvement in the seizure of Elian G onzalez (“Elian”) f

rom the hom

e of Lazaro, A

ngela, and Marisle

ysis Gonzalez (“the Gonzalezes”) – Elian’s grea t-uncle, great-aunt, an d cousin – on April 22, 2000. The defendants ass erted their qualif ied immunit

y defense in a m

otion to dismiss, which the district court denied. We now reverse. I. A. On September 28, 2000, the Gonzalezes comm enced this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999,

29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1 971), by filing a complaint for d

amages against Attorney General J anet Reno, in her indi vidual capacity; INS Commissioner

____________________1 The Gonzalezes’ c omplaint also asser

ts claims against

William O’Brien, in

dividually and in his officia

l capacity as Chief of the City

of Miami Police Dep

artment; John Brook

s, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Chief of the City of Miami Police Department; and t

he City of Mia

mi. The district cou

rt addressed the

se defendants’ m

otions to dismiss in an order d

ated April 16, 2001 , which is not befor e us in this appeal. 3 * Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. Doris Meissner, in her individual capacity; Deputy Attorney General E ric Holder, in his individu al capacity; INS agent Betty Mill s; an unknown number of I NS agents whose nam

es are not known; an u

nknown number of

U.S. Border P atrol agents whose nam

es are not known; and

an unknown number

of U.S. Marsha

ls whose names ar

e not known. 1 In their compl aint, the Gonzale

zes allege the following facts. On November 25, 1999, six-year-old Elian Gonzalez, a Cuban boy, was found floating on an innertube off t he coast of Fort Lauderd ale, Florida. The Coast Guard br

ought Elian into the U

nited States, and t

he INS paroled him into the country w

ithout inspection, the

n released him

into the custody of

his great-uncle, L

azaro Gonzalez (“Lazaro” ). Lazaro file

d a petition with the I

NS on behalf of Elian seeking political asy lum for the chil

d. Elian also file

d a petition for asylum on his own behalf. On January 5, 2000, INS Commissioner Me issner decided that the INS would not consider the requests for asylum because Elian’s father, a Cuban citizen, had requested that Elian be returned to Cuba. On January 7, 2000, Lazaro4

filed a petition for

temporary

custody of Elia

n in the Family

Division of the Circuit Court for M

iami-Dade C ounty, which w as granted pending a f

ull hearing on the matter. On January 12,

2000, Attorney

General Reno af

firmed Meissne

r’s decision not to consider the pet

itions for political a

sylum. L azaro challenged R

eno’s ruling in the United State s District Court f or the Southern Dist

rict of Florida, and the court upheld Reno’s d ecision. Lazaro appealed to this court. See Gonzalez v. Reno , No. 00-1124-D, (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000) (unpublished opinion). On April 6, 2000, w

hile that appeal wa

s pending, Elian’ s father arrived i n the United States.On April 12, 2000, the INS instructe

d Lazaro to bring E

lian to Opa Locka Airport, and advised Lazaro that the parole of Elian into his care was being transferred to Elian’s father. On April 13, 2000, the circuit court dismissed Lazaro’s peti

tion for tempor

ary custody and vacated its prior order granting temporary

custody to Laza

ro. On April 19, 2000, a panel of this court entered an order enjoining Elian from departin

g, or attempti

ng to depart, the U

nited States; enjo

ining all persons acting on his behal f from aiding , or assist ing or atte mpting to ai d or assis t, Elian’s removal from the United States; and enjoining all officers, agents, and em ployees of the United State s to take such reasona ble and lawful m

easures as necessa

ry to5

prevent the removal of Elian from the United States. Gonzalez , supra . On April 20, 2000, the Gonzalezes began negotiations with Reno, Meissner, and Holder toward the goal of t

ransferring tem

porary custody

of Elian. Even though it was pur

porting to negotiate a

peaceful transfe

r of the child, the INS issued an a

dministrative w

arrant for Elia

n’s arrest on Ap

ril 21, 2000. The

arrest warrant

asserted that Elia

n was within the Un

ited States in violat

ion of the immigration laws and could therefore be taken into custody. The INS then obtained a search warran t to enter the Gonzaleze s’ home and search for Elian. At approximately 5:15 a.m. on April 22, 2000, arm ed federal agents arrived at the Gonzaleze s’ residence to e xecute the search and arrest warr ants. In the course of executing the warrants, th e agents allegedly

sprayed gas into the residence; broke dow

n the front door with a battering ram and entered the residence without f

irst announcing their presence; spray ed more gas; poin

ted guns at the occupants of th

e residence, thr

eatening to shoot; shoute d obscenities; and broke doors, furnit

ure, and religious a

rtifacts. As one

federal agent point

ed a weapon at one of the

occupants and Elian

, INS agent Bet

ty Mills entere

d the room with a blanket and se

ized the child. B.6

Based on the foregoi

ng factual allegat

ions, the Gonzalez

es claim in thei

r complaint that t

he defendants violate

d their First Am

endment rights of

freedom of expression and assem

bly (Count I),

their Fourth Am

endment rights to

be free from unreasonable sear

ches and seizures (

Count II), and thei

r Fifth Amen

dment rights to a liberty inte

rest in personal sec

urity and to be fr

ee from unnec essary and unreasonable forc e (Count III). T he complaint al so claims that th e defendants conspired to violate each of these constitutional rights (Counts IV-VI). Defen dant s Reno , Meis sner, Holde r, and Mills moved t o dis miss th e clai ms against them arguing that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim against them and that they we

re entitled to qualif

ied immunit

y from dam

ages claims in t

heir individual capacity. The district co urt addressed the defendants’ mo tion to dismiss in an orde

r dated June 5, 2001. The court dismissed Count I of the complaint without prejudice after concluding that the Gonzalezes failed to allege any facts supporting their theory that the federal a

gents’ entry into their home w as undertaken for th

e purpose of abridging their Firs

t Amendme

nt rights. The cour

t dismissed Count I

II with prejudice after

the Gonzalezes conceded in their res ponse that their exce ssive force claims should be analyzed under Fourth Amendm ent search and seizure7

analysis rather than Fifth Amendment substantive due process analysis. T he court also dismissed the conspiracy claims in Counts IV-VI. With respect to the Gonzalezes’ Fourth Amendme nt claims in Count II, the court held that the G

onzalezes lacked s

tanding to challenge th

e validity of the administrative

arrest warran

t. The court dism

issed the Gonzalez

es’ Fourth Amendme

nt claims chall

enging the validity

of the search war

rant after conclu

ding that the warrant w

as valid because the

magistrate w

ho issued it was prese

nted with a facially va

lid arrest warr

ant and an affidavit

establishing probable

cause to believe that Elian

was in the Gonzale

zes’ home. The court dism issed Betty Mill s as a defendant wit

hout prejudice bec ause the compla int contained no allega

tions of excessive force by

her. The court d

enied the motion t

o dismiss with re spect to the excessive force c

laims against th

e other federal a

gents because it foun

d that the Gonzalezes had alleged sufficient facts to support their claim that the federal agents (other than M

ills) who executed t

he warrant at the

ir home used exc essive force, in violation of their Fourth Amendment righ ts. The court also denie

d the motion to dism

iss with respect to t

he defense of qualified imm

unity. The cou

rt concluded that the

complaint alle

ged the requisite “causal connec

tion” between the su

pervisory acti

ons of Reno, Meissne

r, and Holder and the alle

ged constitutional viola

tion by the agents o

n the scene to hold8

them liable bas ed on their supervisor y status, notwi

thstanding their absen

ce from the scene. The court based this finding on paragraphs 70 and 75 of the complaint , which alleged that R

eno, Meissner, a

nd Holder “per

sonally directe

d and caused a paramilitary

raid upon Plaintiff

s’ residence” a

nd that the agents on the

scene “acted under the personal direction of Defendants JANET RENO, DORIS MEISSNER AND ERIC HOL DER.” Reno, Meiss ner, and Hol der now app eal, challe nging th e district court’s rejection of their qualified immunity defense. W e reverse. II. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of the defense of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal p ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 12 91. Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct . 2806, 2817, 86 L. Ed. 2d 4 11 (1985). A district court’s decision to grant or de ny the defense of

qualified imm

unity is a question of law which we review de novo , accepting the fa ctual allegations in t

he complaint as true and drawi ng all reasonable in ferences in the plain tiff’s favor. Chesser v. Sparks , 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001). The defense of qua

lified imm

unity comple

tely protects go

vernment offi

cials performing disc

retionary func

tions from suit in

their individual capa

cities unless their conduct violate s “clearly established statutor

y or constitutiona

l rights of9

which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer , ___ U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 , 153 L. Ed. 266 ( 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fizge rald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 1 02 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1 982)). “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fe

ar of personal liability or harassi ng litigation, protec

ting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 ( 11th Cir. 2002) (inte rnal citation and quotation omitted) . Because qualif ied immunit

y is “an ent

itlement not to st

and trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S. Ct. at 2815, questions of qu

alified imm

unity must be

resolved “at th

e earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bry ant , 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991 ) (per curiam ). It is therefor

e appropriate for

a district court to grant the defense of

qualified imm

unity at the m

otion to dismiss sta

ge if the complaint “fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Chesser , 248 F.3d at 1121 (quo ting Williams v. Ala. State Uni v. , 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997). To receive qualified immunity, the governm ent official must first prove that he was acting within h is discretionary autho rity. Vinyard v. W ilson , 311 F.3d10

1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, it is clear – and undisput

ed – that defendants Reno, Meissner, and Hol der acted within thei r discretionary authori ty. Once the defendan

ts have established th

at they were

acting within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. The Supreme Court has set forth a two part analysis for determining whet her qualified immunity is appro priate. Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed 2d 272 (2001). The court must firs

t ask “this thres

hold question: Taken i

n the light most fa

vorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. “[I]f a v iolation could be m

ade out on a favorable view of

the parties’ subm

issions, the next, se

quential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. Our first step, t

hen, is to determ

ine whether the fa

ctual allegations in t

he complaint, if

true, establish a c

onstitutional violation b

y Reno, Meissne

r, and Holder. Id. The district court properly char

acterized the com

plaint as alleging that Reno, Meissner, an d Holder are liable in t heir supervisory capaci ties only. For purposes of this op

inion, therefore,

we will assum

e, without deciding , that the alleged conduct by

the agents on the scen

e – spraying gas i

nto the house, breaki

ng down th e front door, p ointi ng gun s at pla intiff s, and d amaging proper ty –11

constituted excessive

force and deprived

plaintiffs of their

Fourth Amendm

ent rights to be free from unreas onable searches and seizures. See Hartley v. P arnell , 193 F.3d 1263, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (in section 1983 sexual abuse case, assuming, with

out deciding, that m

ale teacher depr

ived female st

udent of substantive due proce ss rights, then proce eding with the analy

sis to determine whether principal

caused that depriva

tion). This leave s us with the task of deciding whether the defendants’ supervisory actions caused the alleged deprivations of p laintiffs’ Fourth Amendment righ ts. “It is well es

tablished in this circ

uit that supervisory

officials are not liable under [ Bivens ] for the unconstit utional acts of their

subordinates ‘on the

basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’ ” Id. at 1269 (quoting Belcher v. City of Foley , 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 ( 11th Cir. 1994)). “The standar d by which a super

visor is held liable in her i

ndividual capacity

for the actions of a

subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Braddy v. Flor ida Dept. of Lab or and Employ ment Security

, 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.1998). Supervisors “can be held liable under [ Bivens ] when a reasonable person in the supervisor’s p osition would hav e known that his conduct infri

nged the constitutional

rights of the plaintif

fs, and his conduct was causal

ly related to the

constitutional violati

on committe

d by his12

subordinate.” Greas on v. K emp , 891 F.2d 829, 836 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (cit ations and footnote omitted). “Supervisory liability [under Bivens] occurs either whe n the supervisor personally part

icipates in the alle

ged constitutional viola

tion or when there i s a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.” Braddy , 133 F.3d at 802 (quot ing Brown v. Crawford , 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). A causal connection can be established “when a histor

y of widesprea

d abuse puts the respons

ible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so,” id. , or when the supervisor’s im

proper "custom or policy . . .resulted in deliber ate indifference

to constitutional rights,” Rivas v. Freeman , 940 F.2d 1491, 149 5 (11th Cir. 1991). A causal connection can also be established by facts which support an inference that the supervisor direc

ted the subordinates t

o act unlawfully

or knew that the subordinates wou ld act unlawfully and fail ed to stop them from doing so

. See Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 7 F.3d 1552, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (find ing no supervisory liability in the absence of such an inference). In examining the

factual allegatio

ns in the complain

t, we must kee

p in mind the heightened pleadi

ng requirement

s for civil rights ca

ses, especially

those involving the d efense of qualified i mmunity. GJR Investme nts, Inc. v. Count

y of13

Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 ( 11th Cir. 1998). T he complaint m

ust allege the relevant facts “with some specificity.” Id. “[M]ore than mere conclusory notice pleading is required . . . . [A] complaint will be dismissed as i

nsufficient where

the allegations it contains are vague and conclusory.” Fullman v. Graddick , 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Veny v. Hogan , 70 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that complaint must “include the specific, non-conclusory allegations of fac

t that will enable t

he district court to d

etermine that

those facts, if proved, will overc

ome the defense

of qualified im

munity”). Moreover, in reviewing a m

otion to dismiss, w

e need only acc ept “well-ple aded facts” and “reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.” Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham , 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 ( 11th Cir. 1992). “ [U]nsupported co nclusions of law or of m

ixed fact and law h

ave long been recogni

zed not to prevent a R

ule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Marsh v. Butler C ounty , 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001). We must also keep in mind the fact that “[w ]e generally accord . . . official conduct a presumption of legitimacy.” United States Dep't of State v. Ray , 502 U.S. 164, 179, 112 S. Ct. 541 , 550, 116 L. Ed. 2d 526 (19 91). We now turn to the complaint to determine whether plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts t

o establish supervisor

y liability.Plaintiffs allege that these defendants “personally directed and caused a paramilitary raid upon [their]14

residence, and ha

d actual knowledge of

, and agreed to, a

nd approved of, and acquiesced in, the raid in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs herein.” Plainti

ffs also allege tha

t the agents on the sce

ne “acted under

the personal direction of Defendants, JANET RENO, DORIE S MEISSNER and ERIC HOLDER, a

nd with the knowledge , agreement , approval, and ac

quiescence of Defenda nts, JA NET RENO, DO RIS MEISS NER and E RIC HOLDER .” Final ly, plaintiffs allege that these defendants “personally participated in the constitutional violations, and ther

e was clearly

a causal connection

between their ac

tions and the constitutional deprivation.” These vague and conclusory allegations do not establish supervisory liability. Pla

intiffs make bold statements a nd legal conclusions w

ithout alleging any facts to suppo

rt them. Pla

intiffs appeal to the

emotions by calling the events that transpired a paramilitary raid, but they do not allege any f acts to suggest that the defendants did any

thing more than pe

rsonally direc

t and cause the exec

ution of valid search and ar

rest warrants. Plaintiffs state t hat there is a causa

l connection between these def

endants’ acts and

the excessive force used by the age nts on the scene, but they do not allege any facts to support this causal connection. Plaintiffs do not allege that thes e defendants direc ted the agents on the scene to spray the house with gas, bre

ak down the door with

a battering ram

, point guns at the15

occupants, or dam

age property. Given the presum ption of legitima

cy accorded to official conduct,

it would be unreasona

ble to draw from

the alleged facts t

he inference that the

supervisory def

endants directed the

agents on the scene to engage in the unconstit

utional activity with which they are charged. I

nstead, the reasonable infere

nce which we m

ust draw from

the factual allega

tions is that the supervisory def

endants ordered the execution of valid search and arrest w arrants with the expectatio

n that the agents on the

scene would execut

e them in a law

ful

manner. In sum, plainti

ffs allege that the

agents on the scene us ed excessive force in violation of their Fou

rth Amendm

ent rights, but they

fail to allege any

facts which, if true, would establi sh that the superv isory defendants caused that violation. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege that the supervisory defendants’ conduct constituted a constitut

ional violation, the s

upervisory defe

ndants are entitled t

o qualified imm

unity under the fi

rst step in our qualif

ied immunit

y analysis.The decision of the dis trict court is therefo re REVERSED. SO ORDERED.