J-A10017-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

JOHN WILLIAM COLEMAN 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1197 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 20, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001550-2020 

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., BECK, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2024 

 John William Coleman (“Coleman”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his convictions of ten counts of sexual abuse of 

children and one count of criminal use of a communication facility.1 Coleman 

argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from his cell phone; the police violated his Fifth Amendment rights 

by compelling him to provide his cell phone password; a violation of his speedy 

trial rights pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600; and raises a constitutional challenge 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(d), 7512(a). 
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to the statutory sex offender registration requirements under Pennsylvania's 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).2 We affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the relevant facts as follows: 

On November 21, 2019, [Detective Jim] Reape [of the 

Montgomery County Detective Bureau] received a cyber tip from 

the Pennsylvania Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 

(“Task Force”). The National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children (“NCMEC”)[3] had sent the cyber tip to the Task Force. 

MeWe, a social media application akin to Snapchat and Instagram, 

had sent information to NCMEC that a MeWe subscriber had 

uploaded two (2) images of suspected child pornography on 

September 17, 2019. MeWe also provided the following 

information to NCMEC: (1) the name used by the subscriber to 

create an account with MeWe was Johnny Cole; (2) when creating 

a MeWe account, this subscriber listed a cell phone number of 

215-870-[****]; and (3) a list of 12 IP addresses used by this 

subscriber to access MeWe. Of these 12 IP addresses, nine (9) 

were owned by Verizon Wireless and three (3) were owned by 

Verizon Fios. Verizon Wireless and Verizon Fios are internet 

service providers. One of the three (3) IP addresses owned by 

Verizon Fios was 173.75.254.184 (“184 IP Address”). 

On November 21, 2019, [Detective] Reape sent an 

administrative subpoena to Verizon Fios regarding the 184 IP 

Address, which had been used to access subscriber Johnny Cole’s 

MeWe account on October 31, 2019. [Detective] Reape sent this 

subpoena to Verizon Fios in an effort to further identify the MeWe 

subscriber that had uploaded the two (2) images of suspected 

child pornography. As the tip provided by MeWe to NCMEC did 

not list the IP address used by its subscriber to upload the images 

on September 17, 2019, [Detective] Reape could not request this 

IP address from Verizon Fios. [Detective] Reape selected a 

Verizon Fios IP address, the 184 IP Address, rather than one of 

____________________________________________ 

2

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.42. 

3

 NCMEC is a nonprofit organization that works with law enforcement 

regarding issues relating to missing and sexually exploited children and 

reducing the proliferation of child pornography. NCMEC operates a cyber 

tipline, sex offender trafficking teams, and victim identification programs. 
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the nine (9) Verizon Wireless IP addresses in an attempt to learn 

the location from which the two (2) images were uploaded to 

MeWe. 

Verizon Fios responded to [Detective] Reape that the 184 IP 

address was their address, but it was unassigned on October 31, 

2019, which is the date provided to them by [Detective] Reape in 

his subpoena. [Detective] Reape did not subpoena records for 

any of the nine (9) Verizon Wireless IP addresses because such IP 

addresses can be shared with 100 other cell phones so any 

information derived from such an IP address is not particularly 

reliable. If any of the Verizon Wireless IP addresses had included 

a port, then that would identify the specific cell phone that had 

accessed the MeWe application. The Verizon Wireless IP 

addresses listed in the cyber tip that NCMEC provided to the Task 

Force did not include any port numbers so they would not indicate 

the particular cell phone that had accessed MeWe. 

Since Verizon Fios was unable to provide the name of the 

person who had accessed the MeWe site on October 31, 2019, 

[Detective] Reape used the cell phone number provided in the 

NCMEC cyber tip in an effort to identify the identity of [the] MeWe 

user. [Detective] Reape searched for the cell phone number in a 

police database and found that this number had been listed for a 

John Coleman in a 2018 ambulance report. Per this report, an 

ambulance responded to an injury sustained by [Coleman], and 

the report listed John Coleman’s address in the English Village 

apartment complex at [a specifically identified address in] 

Horsham Township. This address is within the 5-kilometer area 

of the 184 IP addressed that accessed MeWe on October 31, 2019. 

 

[Detective] Reape identified this cell phone number as being 

associated with [Coleman] on December 2, 2019. On December 

4, 2019, [Detective] Reape went to [Coleman’s] employer, 

Jamison Home Services, in an effort to verify that the cell phone 

number was in [Coleman’s] name and he still resided at 700 Lower 

State Road. [Coleman’s] employer confirmed that the cell number 

215-870-[ ] was still [Coleman’s] phone number, and he still 

resided at [the identified address]. Having verified this 

information, [Detective] Reape prepared a search warrant for the 

cell phone associated with that phone number. 

The search warrant was approved on December 5, 2019. 

On the morning of December 6, 2019[,] at approximately 6:20 
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a.m., [Detective] Reape, along with Detective [Vincent] Higgins 

of the Montgomery County[ and] ... Sergeant Adam Dunning of 

the Horsham Township Police Department, went to [Coleman’s] 

address ... to serve the search warrant. They were not in uniform. 

[Detective] Reape wore a vest with police markings. They 

approached [Coleman] as he exited his residence. They identified 

themselves as police officers. [Detective] Reape informed him 

that they were investigation child pornography through the MeWe 

app and asked him if he ever used that app. [Coleman] replied 

that he did for adult pornography. [Detective] Reape asked 

[Coleman] if he had the cell phone on him, and [Coleman] 

responded that it was inside his residence. They asked if they 

could enter his residence, and [Coleman] agreed. 

[Detective] Reape asked [Coleman] if they could look at the 

MeWe app on his phone, and [Coleman] agreed to this request. 

[Coleman] opened the MeWe app on his phone and showed police 

a couple images of adult pornography. At that point, [Detective] 

Reape informed [Coleman] that they had a search warrant for his 

cell phone, and they had to take possession of it. [Coleman] then 

hit the phone’s home button, which locked the phone. 

[Detective] Reape asked [Coleman] if he would mind 

unlocking the phone, and [Coleman] inserted the code to unlock 

the phone. [Detective] Reape asked [Coleman] to provide his 

phone passcode, and [Coleman] did so. [Detective] Reape 

brought the phone to the Montgomery County Detective Bureau 

and downloaded its contents in the forensic lab. The Detective 

Bureau possessed Gray Key technology that allows it to access a 

cell phone’s contents without having a passcode for the phone so 

the police would have been able to download the contents of 

[Coleman’s] cell phone in the event he declined to provide the 

passcode. The demeanor of the police during the entire encounter 

with [Coleman] was cordial. They did not yell, raise their voices, 

or threaten [Coleman]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2023, at 5-8 (footnotes omitted and bracketed 

footnote added). 

 The examination of the phone revealed numerous images of children 

engaged in sexual acts. On December 6, 2019, Detective Reape filed a 
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criminal complaint against Coleman charging him with nine counts of sexual 

abuse of children, graded as second-degree felonies, one count of sexual 

abuse of children, graded as a third-degree felony, and one count of criminal 

use of a communication facility, graded as a third-degree felony. A 

preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for January 14, 2020, but 

Coleman’s counsel sought a continuance, which was granted, and the 

preliminary hearing was rescheduled for February 19, 2020. Following the 

hearing, the magisterial district judge bound the charges over for trial. 

On February 19, 2020, Coleman sent a discovery request to the 

Commonwealth. After failing to receive a response, he sent another letter on 

March 4, 2020. On March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered 

an order declaring a statewide judicial emergency because of the COVID-19 

pandemic.4 On April 14, 2020, Coleman filed an omnibus pretrial motion and 

____________________________________________ 

4

 On March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court authorized the 

President Judges to declare judicial emergencies within their respective 

judicial districts. Within those orders, the President Judges were authorized 

to suspend the operation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 within their districts. In re: 

General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2020) (per 

curiam order); see also In re Gen. Statewide Jud. Emergency, 228 A.3d 

1283, 1287 (Pa. 2020) (noting that as of March 19, 2020, “Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 600(C) is hereby SUSPENDED in all judicial districts during the 

period of the statewide judicial emergency”); In re General Statewide Jud. 

Emergency, 230 A.3d 1015 (Pa. 2020) (extending the Rule 600 suspension 

until June 1, 2020); but see In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 

234 A.3d 408 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam order) (declaring that the statewide 

emergency shall end on June 1, 2020, but allowing President Judges of judicial 

districts to seek to extend local emergencies). As noted in more detail infra, 

the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas specifically suspended the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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a motion for discovery. In the motion for discovery, Coleman sought, inter 

alia, expert and state police reports; any photographs, regardless of whether 

the Commonwealth sought to introduce them at trial; and the names and 

addresses of all eyewitnesses. On May 12, 2020, Assistant District Attorney 

Erika Wevodau (“Wevodau”) sent an email to Coleman’s counsel, attaching 

discovery as well as the notice of formal arraignment, criminal complaint, 

affidavit of probable cause, and bail information. The following day, Coleman’s 

counsel acknowledged receipt of the discovery, but indicated that all the 

requested police reports and expert reports were not included in the discovery. 

Wevodau did not respond to this request, and Coleman’s counsel did not follow 

up with any further conversations about the discovery. 

Following a pretrial conference on May 14, 2021, the trial court 

scheduled a bench trial for August 25, 2021. On July 1, 2021, Coleman filed 

an amended omnibus pretrial motion, and a second amended omnibus pretrial 

motion on July 21, 2021, which included a motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained from his phone and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600. 

Assistant District Attorney Emily D’Aguanno (“D’Aguanno”) was 

assigned to this case in July 2021. She indicated to Coleman’s counsel that 

discovery had been sent to Coleman on May 12, 2020 and that defense 

____________________________________________ 

operation of Rule 600 until May 31, 2020, but extended the judicial emergency 

to August 30, 2021. 
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counsel had viewed the pornographic pictures at the preliminary hearing. 

D’Aguanno also asked counsel if he was missing any other discovery. By email 

dated July 20, 2021, Coleman’s counsel replied that he was still seeking a list 

of witnesses and their contact information, any experts contacted by the 

Commonwealth, the Cellebrite report,5 police reports, any confessions by 

Coleman, and the evidence that would be introduced at trial. D’Aguanno 

responded that she reserved the right to call any witness mentioned in 

discovery, but would not provide their contact information. She further stated 

that she could not provide the Cellebrite report because it contained child 

pornography, but that defense counsel could review the report when viewing 

the pictures. 

On July 27, 2021, a court administrator emailed D’Aguanno and 

Coleman’s counsel about scheduling a hearing on the discovery motion filed 

on April 14, 2020. D’Aguanno replied that defense counsel had not provided 

her a copy of the discovery motion or given her adequate time to respond to 

his informal discovery request. On August 4, 2021, D’Aguanno informed 

Coleman’s counsel that she had reached out to every detective involved in the 

case. D’Aguanno provided reports from Detective Michael Henricks, which 

indicated the phone contained 1,108 images of child pornography. D’Aguanno 

also sent Detective Reape’s updated report to defense counsel. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Cellebrite’s software can extract data from a cell phone and generates a 

report about the extraction. 
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That same day, the trial court held a hearing on Coleman’s April 14, 

2020 motion for discovery. The next day, the trial court entered an order, 

directing the Commonwealth to provide Coleman all police reports related to 

the case, any statements made by Coleman and any Brady6 material, expert 

reports, any cell phone reports, and any physical evidence other than child 

pornography. Subsequently, D’Aguanno provided the Cellebrite report, 

without any images, to defense counsel. 

On August 11, 2021, D’Aguanno emailed defense counsel, advising him 

that she reviewed the photographs possessed by Coleman and that she 

planned to amend the bills of information. On August 12, 2021, Coleman’s 

counsel sent D’Aguanno his expert’s report. Because of the time needed to 

review Coleman’s expert report, the Commonwealth’s requested a 

continuance of the trial date. The trial court continued the trial scheduled for 

August 24, 2021, to September 14, 2021. 

On September 13, 2021, the Commonwealth filed bills of information, 

charging Coleman with the same crimes, but changing the grading of the ten 

counts of sexual abuse of children to third-degree felonies; the count of 

criminal use of a communication facility remained a third-degree felony. That 

same day, the Commonwealth moved to file amended bills of information to 

include sixty-six images of child pornography. On September 14, 2021, 

____________________________________________ 

6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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despite the fact the Commonwealth was ready for trial, the trial court instead 

held a hearing on Coleman’s suppression motion. The hearing took the entire 

day, and the trial did not occur on that date. On October 26, 2021, the trial 

court denied Coleman’s suppression motion. 

On March 4, 2022, court administration issued a notice of call of the trial 

list scheduled for March 28, 2022. Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a oneday bench trial on April 26, 2022. On that date, the trial court instead 

conducted a hearing on Coleman’s Rule 600 motion, which he had filed in July 

2021. The following day, the trial court denied the motion, and conducted a 

stipulated bench trial, incorporating the notes of testimony from the 

September 14, 2021 suppression hearing. The trial court also granted the 

Commonwealth’s request to amend the bills of information in open court, and 

charged Coleman with five counts of sexual abuse of children, graded as thirddegree felonies, five counts of sexual abuse of children, graded as seconddegree felonies, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility, a 

third-degree felony. Ultimately, the trial court found Coleman guilty of the 

above-mentioned crimes, as amended. 

On August 1, 2022, Coleman filed a motion for extraordinary relief, 

asking the trial court to reconsider its Rule 600 ruling and averring that the 

Commonwealth violated Rule 600 by failing to exercise due diligence 

throughout the case. The trial court denied this motion. The trial court then 
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sentenced Coleman to concurrent terms of seven years of probation. The trial 

court also directed Coleman to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA. 

Coleman filed a timely appeal. Thereafter, on September 21, 2022, 

Coleman filed a motion for remand with this Court following the decision in 

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016 (Chester Co. filed 

Aug. 22, 2022) (finding SORNA unconstitutional). Coleman sought to file a 

post-sentence motion challenging the constitutionality of SORNA. The 

Commonwealth did not object to this request. As a result, this Court entered 

an Order vacating the sentence and remanding the case to the trial court. The 

trial court conducted a resentencing hearing, after which it imposed the same 

original sentence and ordered Coleman to register as a Tier 1 sex offender 

under subchapter H of SORNA. Coleman filed a post-sentence motion, which 

the trial court denied. Coleman timely appealed and filed a concise statement 

of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

 Coleman raises the following questions for our review: 

1. Did the [trial court] err by not suppressing evidence when the 

search warrant application lacked probable cause, did not show 

a nexus between the alleged crimes and [Coleman], was based 

upon omitted material information and stale information? 

2. Did the [trial court] err by not finding the Commonwealth 

violated [Coleman’s] Fifth Amendment rights by compelling 

[Coleman] to provide his phone password to law enforcement? 

3. Did the [trial court] err by not dismissing the charges against 

[Coleman] when the Montgomery County District Attorney’s 

Office failed to exercise due diligence throughout the instant 

case, thus violating Rule 600? 
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4. Did the [trial court] err by requiring [Coleman] to register as a 

sexual offender because the registration requirements of 

SORNA are unconstitutional both facially and as applied to 

[Coleman]? 

Coleman’s Brief at 8-9. 

Suppression of Evidence 

 Coleman’s first two claims challenge the trial court’s failure to suppress 

evidence found on his cell phone. Coleman first contends that evidence from 

his cell phone should have been suppressed because it was based on a legally 

insufficient search warrant. Id. at 17. Noting that a search warrant may only 

issue upon probable cause, and such probable cause exists if there is a 

substantial nexus between the search warrant application, a defendant, and 

the alleged crimes, Coleman argues that the unassigned IP address, an 

unreliable geolocation, and unconfirmed cell phone number did not establish 

probable cause. Id. at 18-19. Coleman asserts that the IP address is only a 

number and did not specifically identify a person or his home, and that the IP 

address was geolocated to Ambler, Pennsylvania, which is five miles from his 

home in Horsham. Id. at 19, 21, 22; see also id. at 19 (contending that 

“geolocation technology is not particularly reliable”). 

According to Coleman, the cyber tip included twelve different IP 

addresses, geolocated in Philadelphia and the surrounding area, that were 

used to access the MeWe account between October 8, 2019, and November 

8, 2019, yet none of the IP addresses were used to access the account on the 

day the offending material was downloaded. Id. at 20. Coleman argues that 
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investigators searched only one of the twelve IP addresses, which was 

unassigned. Id. at 20. Coleman thus argues there is no nexus between the 

offending material and the cyber tip’s IP address. Id.; see also id. at 20-21 

(noting that determining ownership or authorship of internet-based accounts 

and communications are view with skepticism because they could be accessed 

by different people). 

Coleman further asserts that there was no information in the search 

warrant indicating that MeWe users had to authenticate the cell phone number 

to sign up for the application, or that the account could be accessed on a 

desktop, laptop, or tablet. Id. at 21-22. He concludes, asserting that “the 

Commonwealth has not established enough probable cause within the four 

corners of the search warrant application to link [Coleman] to an unassigned 

IP address and an unverified social media account.” Id. at 22. 

 We review the denial of a motion to suppress according to the following 

standard: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. 
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Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 745-46 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(citations and brackets omitted). 

“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures by police in areas where individuals have 

a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 296 A.3d 

1270, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “If a person has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in a place, then these constitutional 

provisions generally require police to obtain a warrant to search the place; a 

search warrant must be supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral, 

detached magistrate.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] cell phone often contains 

even more personal information than a home, and, therefore, it logically 

follows that a warrant should be required to search the contents of a cell 

phone, just as a warrant is required to search the contents of a home.” 

Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907, 920 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). 

“‘Probable cause’ is a practical, non-technical concept.” Boyd, 296 A.3d 

at 1274 (citation omitted). “The issuance of a constitutionally valid search 

warrant requires that police provide the issuing authority with sufficient 

information to persuade a reasonable person that there is probable cause to 

conduct a search based upon information that is viewed in a commonsense 

manner.” Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 262 A.3d 1276, 1280 (Pa. Super. 
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2021) (citation omitted). Probable cause must exist at the time the warrant 

is issued and must be based on the facts described within the four corners of 

the supporting affidavit. Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 253 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). “Probable cause is assessed by examining the totality of the 

circumstances and consists of deciding whether, given all the circumstances 

set forth in the affidavit[,] there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Young, 287 A.3d at 

920 (citations, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted). The totality of the 

circumstances may include an assessment of the veracity and basis of 

knowledge of an informant supplying information to police. Commonwealth 

v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012). 

“A court reviewing the issuing authority’s determination of probable 

cause examines only whether a substantial basis exists for the issuing 

authority’s finding of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 263 

A.3d 626, 646 (Pa. 2021). The “after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the 

sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review, as an 

issuing authority’s probable cause determination is entitled to deference.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, “search warrants must be 

read in a [commonsense] fashion and should not be invalidated by 

hypertechnical interpretations.” Young, 287 A.3d at 920 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 
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Here, the affidavit of probable cause sets forth the circumstances that 

prompted the affiant, Detective Reape, to seek to search Coleman’s phone: 

On November 21, 2019, I reviewed Cyber tip 59155622 sent 

by the [NCMEC]. The cyber tip was forwarded to my attention 

from the Delaware County ICAC Taskforce. 

Cyber tip referral 59155622 contained two images that were 

uploaded to MeWe, by a user with the name of Johnny Cole. 

MeWe provided a cell phone for the account, 215-870-[** **]. 

The images are of females estimated to be age 10-14 years old. 

The first image depicts the child standing naked with her vagina 

exposed to the camera. The second image is of the child lying on 

her back naked, vagina exposed with ejaculate on her vagina, 

stomach area. 

MeWe reports the upload by the account holder to have 

occurred on September 17, 2019, at 20:08 UTC. An account login 

provided by MeWe dated October 31, 2019, at 22:24 UTC utilized 

IP Address 173.75.254.184. The IP Address geolocates to the 

Ambler, PA area. This IP address is assigned by Verizon Fios .... 

An administrative Subpoena was sent to Verizon Fios 

requesting subscriber records for the IP Address as assigned 

October 31, 2019. On November 25, 2019, Verizon Fios 

responded to the subpoena that the IP address is under their 

control, yet records show it was not assigned on the requested 

date. Verizon was unable to provide any explanation. 

On December 2, 2019[,] I conducted a search through the 

Montgomery County Police Report Management System for phone 

number 215-870-[ ], the number assigned to the MeWe user 

account. Located in those records was a contact with a John 

Coleman, phone number, 215-870-[** **]. 

On December 14, 2018[,] a medical assistance call was 

received by Springfield Township Police, Montgomery County, PA. 

The location of the call was Jamison Contractors, 150 Roesch 

Avenue, Oreland, PA. The injured party was a John Coleman, DOB 

11/03/1983, with a provided address of [a specifically identified 

address in] Horsham Township. At that time John Coleman 

provided a cellular phone number of 215-870-[ ]. 
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A search of PennDot records shows a John Coleman, DOB 

11/03/1983, of [an address located in] Feasterville, PA .... 

On December 4, 2019, at 2:55 PM, I met with Jamison Home 

Services management. I was able to confirm that John Coleman 

is a current employee of Jamison Home Services and has provided 

them with a cellular phone number of 215-870-[** **] for contact 

purposes. Jamison Home Services provided the address on file 

for John Coleman to be [the same specifically identified address 

in Horsham Township, Pennsylvania.] This address is within a few 

hundred yards of Ambler, [Pennsylvania] [m]ailing addresses and 

is consistent with the geolocation of the Verizon Fios IP Address. 

A search of the National Insurance Crime Bureau[] located 

a previous vehicle claim by John Coleman extending back to May 

8, 2009. In that claim[,] John Coleman listed his cellular phone 

number as 215-870-[ ]. 

Based upon my knowledge, experience, and training in child 

exploitation and child pornography investigations, and the training 

and experience of other law enforcement officers with whom I 

have had discussions with, there are certain characteristics 

common to individuals involved in the possession, receipt and 

distribution of child pornography: 

a. They may receive sexual gratification, stimulation, and 

satisfaction from contact with children; or from fantasies they 

may have viewing children engaged in sexual activity or in 

sexually suggestive poses, such as in person, in photographs, 

or other visual media; or from literature describing such 

activity; 

b. They may collect sexually explicit or suggestive materials, 

in a variety of media, including photographs, magazines, 

motion pictures, videotapes, books, slides and/ or drawings 

or other visual media. Oftentimes they use these materials 

for their own sexual arousal and gratification. Further, they 

may use these materials to lower the inhibitions of children 

they are attempting to seduce, to arouse the selected child 

partner, or to demonstrate desired sexual acts; 

c. They sometimes possess and maintain their copies of child 

pornographic material; that is, their pictures, films, video 

tapes, magazines, negatives, photographs, correspondence, 
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mailing lists, books, tape recordings, etc., in the privacy and 

security of their cellular phones for their ready access and to 

conceal from others. Child pornography collectors typically 

retain pictures, films, photographs, negatives, magazines, 

correspondence, books, tape recordings, mailing lists, 

images of child erotica, and video tapes for many years; 

d. They prefer not to be without their child pornography for 

any prolonged time period. This behavior has been 

documented by law enforcement officers involved in the 

investigation of child pornography throughout the world. 

e. They may download child pornography and at a later time 

delete it with the knowledge that they can reacquire it again 

with the assistance of high[-]speed broadband internet. ... 

Based upon the conduct of individuals involved in the 

collection of child pornography set forth above, possessors tend 

to maintain their collections at a secure, private location for long 

periods of time. Based upon the fact that the user had possessed 

child pornography[,] there is probable cause to believe that 

evidence of the offenses of distributing, receiving and possessing 

child pornography is currently located on the cellular phone of 

John Coleman, assigned phone number 215-870-[** **]. 

Additionally, forensic examiners can recover files even when 

they have been deleted. When the phone which stored the child 

pornography is seized, it is likely to contain evidence relating to 

the possession and possible distribution of child pornography even 

if the images have been deleted. 

This affiant respectfully requests that this Court issue a 

search warrant for the cellular phone of John Coleman 215-870-

[****], authorizing the search, seizure, and further forensic 

search at an offsite location of the cellular phone recovered. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/5/2019, at 6-9. 

 We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the totality of the 

circumstances provided probable cause to search Coleman’s phone. Detective 

Reape’s averments in the affidavit of probable cause included a cyber tip from 
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NCMEC, a nonprofit organization that works with law enforcement regarding 

child pornography issues; child pornography was uploaded to a MeWe 

account; the name on the account was Johnny Cole; an IP address used to 

access the account was in the area of Ambler, Pennsylvania, which is near 

Coleman’s confirmed address; the phone number assigned to the account 

belonged to Coleman; Coleman’s phone number was confirmed through 

numerous sources; a description of two images that would be found on the 

phone; and Detective Reape’s statements, based upon his knowledge and 

experience, regarding the conduct of individuals and their use of cell phones 

in the collection of child pornography. 

Coleman’s focus on the single unassigned IP address and the 

imprecision of geolocation as establishing a lack of probable cause is 

misplaced. The IP address and geolocation was one small piece of Detective 

Reape’s investigation and certainly not the basis for finding probable cause to 

search Coleman’s phone. Instead, Detective Reape was able to tie Coleman 

and, more precisely, Coleman’s cell phone, to the illegal images because the 

phone number linked to the MeWe account had been associated with Coleman 

for over a decade, which Detective Reape confirmed through various sources. 

Further, the MeWe username was merely a variation of his own name. And 

based upon Detective Reape’s knowledge, training, and experience as an 

investigator of child exploitation and pornography, he knew that possessors 

of child pornography often have the images on their cell phones for quick 
J-A10017-24 

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access and may repeatedly download and delete them, all of which can be 

recovered by police.7

As the affidavit of probable cause has established a sufficient nexus 

between Coleman and the phone number associated with the MeWe account, 

given the totality of the circumstances presented, there is fair probability that 

the evidence of the crime would be found on Coleman’s cell phone. See 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (Noting that 

the police are not required to prove their suspicion beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and “[t]he question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct or 

more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a 

____________________________________________ 

7

 Coleman further argues that the information used in the search warrant was 

stale because of the continuous change in IP addresses and the fact that “the 

offending materials were downloaded on September 17, 2019, while the IP 

addresses from the cyber tip accessed the account between October 8, 

2019[,] and November 8, 2019.” Coleman’s Brief at 23. This claim was not 

raised in Coleman’s Rule 1925(b) statement and is therefore waived. See 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/9/2023, at 1 (unnumbered); Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the [s]tatement and/or not raised in 

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). Even if 

not waived, it is meritless for the same reason—the IP address was not the 

basis for establishing probable cause. Furthermore, although the “[a]ge of 

the information supporting a warrant application is a factor,” and information 

that is too old may be stale, potentially eliminating probable cause, staleness 

“is not determined by age alone.” Commonwealth v. Leed, 186 A.3d 405, 

413 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). Under these facts, the IP address evidence 

in question was not stale. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomolekoff, 910 

A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2006) (rejecting a staleness claim where police 

obtained a warrant nine and a half months after the defendant sent emails 

containing alleged child pornography, noting that other courts had observed 

in other cases that “pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child pornography” 

and that “individuals will protect and retain child pornography for long periods 

for time because it is illegal and difficult to obtain”). 
J-A10017-24 

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prima facie showing, of criminal activity.”) (citation, quotation marks, and 

emphasis omitted). Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Coleman’s 

motion to suppress the evidence found on his cell phone. 

 In his second claim, Coleman argues that police violated his Fifth 

Amendment rights by requesting that he enter his password into his cell 

phone, and he complied. Coleman’s Brief at 25-26. He alleges that this 

constituted a violation of Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 543 (Pa. 

2019), in that the government compelled the “mental act of verbal 

communication, as a pathway to files being withheld.” Coleman’s Brief at 24. 

According to Coleman, his “phone password was impermissibly compelled 

because [he] was coerced to use the contents of his mind to communicate 

evidence against himself,” and the password was self-incriminating since it 

directly led to the offending material. Id. As a result, Coleman contends that 

the “cell phone password is protected under the Fifth Amendment and any 

incriminating evidence from [his] cell phone should have been suppressed.” 

Id.

The Fifth Amendment provides, “No person ... shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. “This 

privilege not only applies to a defendant in a criminal trial, but in any other 

proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 

incriminate [the speaker] in future criminal proceedings.” Davis, 220 A.3d at 

542 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “To invoke the Fifth Amendment 
J-A10017-24 

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privilege against the forced provision of information, a defendant must show 

(1) the evidence is self-incriminating; (2) the evidence is compelled; and (3) 

the evidence is testimonial in nature.” Id. at 543; see also Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 497 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“the Fifth Amendment 

proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a genuine compulsion of 

testimony”) (citation omitted). “For Fifth Amendment purposes, compulsion 

exists when some factor denies the individual the free choice to admit, to 

deny, or to refuse to answer.” Brown, 26 A.3d at 497 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). “Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth 

Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions.” 

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 362 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). 

 During the suppression hearing, Detective Reape testified that Detective 

Higgins, Sergeant Dunning, and he approached Coleman outside his 

apartment, and asked him whether he used the MeWe app. N.T., 9/14/2021, 

at 61. After Coleman indicated that he used the app for adult pornography, 

Detective Reape asked Coleman if they could look at his phone. Id. Coleman 

indicated that the phone was in his apartment and allowed the officers into 

the apartment. Id. at 61-62. The officers respectfully waited in the foyer so 

as not to disturb his sleeping girlfriend and dog. Id. at 62. Coleman opened 

his phone and showed adult pornography images to the officers. Id. At this 

point, Detective Reape indicated they had a search warrant for the phone, and 
J-A10017-24 

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Coleman locked his phone. Id. Detective Reape asked Coleman “if he would 

mind opening the phone back up and he put in the code,” and Coleman 

complied, entering his passcode into the phone. Id. at 62-63. Detective 

Reape stated he never told Coleman that he had to open the phone, 

emphasizing that the interaction between Coleman and police was “cordial.” 

Id. at 63-64. Detective Reape further noted that although the easiest way to 

access the phone was with Coleman’s password, the Montgomery County 

Detective Bureau had Gray Key technology that could grant them access to 

the phone, bypassing the passcode. Id. at 65. 

Coleman confirmed Detective Reape’s testimony. He stated that the 

detectives approached him and followed him into his apartment, waiting in the 

foyer so they would not disturb anyone. Id. at 178-179. They requested that 

he unlock his phone, advising him that they had a warrant and would get into 

the phone whether he provided them the passcode or not. Id. at 179-180. 

He agreed that no one yelled at him or raised their voice, no obscenities or 

threats were used, and he voluntarily entered the passcode. Id. at 177, 180. 

The trial court found that Coleman did “not overcome the second prong 

of the three-prong test, as he was not compelled to provide the information.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/2021, at 5. The trial court determined that police 

did not coerce Coleman into providing his passcode, but simply asked for it. 

Id. at 5, 6. The trial court further observed that because of the Gray Key 
J-A10017-24 

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technology, police could access to the phone without the passcode. Id. at 5-

6. 

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of 

compulsion—Detective Reape asked Coleman for his passcode and Coleman 

willingly entered it into the phone. See id. at 1-2 (Finding Detective Reape’s 

testimony to be “straightforward and candid. As such, the [c]ourt credits that 

testimony in its entirety.”); see also Fletcher, 307 A.3d at 745-46. 

Moreover, Coleman did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege prior to 

providing the passcode. See Commonwealth v. Knoble, 42 A.3d 976, 979 

(Pa. 2012) (stating that “if a witness under compulsion to testify makes 

disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not 

‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself”). 

Coleman’s reliance on Davis is misplaced. Unlike here, in Davis, the 

second prong of the test—whether police compelled the disclosure of 

evidence—was uncontested and not at issue, and the Court was only required 

to consider whether providing a computer password is testimonial. See 

Davis, 220 A.3d at 543, 548. 

Coleman failed to meet the second prong of the test to invoke the Fifth 

Amendment privilege against the forced provision of information. As the 

factual finding is supported by the record, the trial court properly denied 

suppression on these grounds. See Brown, 26 A.3d at 497; Padillas, 997 

A.2d at 362. Coleman’s second claim fails. 
J-A10017-24 

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Rule 600 

Coleman’s third claim implicates Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a 

written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 

days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600(A)(2)(a). This is commonly referred to as the “mechanical run date.” 

Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 607, n.7 (Pa. 2021). “The 

‘adjusted run date’ is then calculated by adding any time that is excluded from 

the computation under Rule 600(C)(1).” Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 

A.3d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“[P]eriods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence 

shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence,” while “[a]ny other periods of delay shall be excluded from the 

computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1);8 see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. (“If 

the delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s 

control and despite its due diligence, the time is excluded”). In other words, 

“Rule 600 establishes two requirements that must be met for delay to count 

____________________________________________ 

8

 The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a new Rule 600, effective as of 

July 1, 2013. The general dictates of new rule remained the same, but the 

prior distinctions between excludable time and excusable delay were 

abandoned for streamlined review of Commonwealth’s due diligence. Notably, 

the failure to exercise due diligence constituted “includable time.” 

Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2021). 
J-A10017-24 

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toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay must be caused by the 

Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth must have failed to exercise due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 982 (Pa. 2023); see 

also Harth, 252 A.3d at 617 (“[T]he Commonwealth is required to 

demonstrate that it acted with due diligence during a time period before that 

period can be deemed excludable.”) (emphasis and footnote omitted).

“Otherwise, the delay is excluded from the calculation of the run date.” 

Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982. 

“Due diligence is fact specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does 

not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the 

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Id. (citation omitted). Due 

diligence must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Wiggins, 248 A.3d at 1289. Rule 600 “expressly calls upon a trial court to 

assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence throughout the life of a case, when 

faced with a claim that the Commonwealth violated a defendant’s speedy trial 

rights.” Harth, 252 A.3d at 617; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (stating 

that “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence 

shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence”). 

A defendant who has not been brought to trial within the time specified 

in Rule 600(A) may, at any time prior to trial, “file a written motion requesting 
J-A10017-24 

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that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that [the] rule has 

been violated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). “If the trial court determines that 

the Commonwealth violated Rule 600, it shall dismiss the charges and 

discharge the defendant.” Harth, 252 A.3d at 615. 

With this background in mind, we turn to Coleman’s argument. Coleman 

contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the case 

pursuant to Rule 600 as the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence 

throughout the case.9 Coleman’s Brief at 26. Coleman notes that the criminal 

complaint was filed on December 6, 2019, resulting in a mechanical run date 

of December 7, 2020.10 Id. at 30. Coleman acknowledges that he asked for 

a continuance of the preliminary hearing, which adds thirty-seven days to the 

run date, making the adjusted run date January 12, 2021. Id. Noting that 

the bench trial was scheduled for September 14, 2021, Coleman argues that 

the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence from the date of the 

____________________________________________ 

9

 Although the bench trial did not occur until April 27, 2022, Coleman’s Rule 

600 argument is confined to the trial court’s denial of his first Rule 600 motion, 

based upon the scheduled date of trial of September 14, 2021 and the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence leading up to that date. We therefore confine 

our analysis to the dates and claims raised. 

10 Because 365 days from December 6, 2019 was a Saturday (December 5, 

2020), the mechanical run date extended to the following Monday. See 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1908 (stating that when the final day of a time period falls on a 

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the days are excluded from the 

computation). 
J-A10017-24 

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preliminary hearing, January 12, 2020, through September 14, 2021—611 

days. Id. 

Coleman argues that during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas declared a judicial emergency until August 31, 

2021, but only suspended Rule 600 from March 16, 2020, through May 31, 

2020. Id. at 27. In support of his argument, Coleman relies upon 

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 720 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal 

granted, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023), wherein this Court found that because 

Montgomery County did not provide that Rule 600 would be suspended after 

May 31, 2020, the Commonwealth had a duty to establish it acted with due 

diligence in bringing the case to trial after this date for the judicial delay to be 

excluded from Rule 600 computations. Coleman’s Brief at 27-28. Coleman 

asserts that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence during the 

pandemic when Rule 600 was no longer suspended, observing that the trial 

judge provided notice that the Commonwealth could request access to the 

courthouse, if needed. Id. at 32. 

 As evidence of the Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence, 

Coleman points to the Commonwealth’s failure to file the bills of information 

until the day before the scheduled trial, believing this demonstrates the failure 

to fulfill a basic requirement to have the case ready for trial. Id. at 30-31. 

He further highlights that the Commonwealth failed to provide ongoing 

discovery in a timely manner, noting he first asked for discovery on February 
J-A10017-24 

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19, 2020, and it was not completed until August 11, 2021. Id. at 30, 31-32, 

33. Coleman asserts that the change in district attorney working on his case 

was irrelevant and D’Aguanno had the responsibility to apprise herself of any 

ongoing discovery requests. Id. at 32. 

 Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a Rule 600 motion is 

as follows: 

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a 

trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with 

law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after 

hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the 

law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion 

is abused. 

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the 

trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party. 

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this 

Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. 

Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating 

it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not 

designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. 

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial 

rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner 

consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In 
J-A10017-24 

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considering these matters ... courts must carefully factor into the 

ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law 

enforcement as well. 

Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 821 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation, 

brackets, and emphasis omitted). 

 Here, as noted above, the mechanical run date—365 days from the date 

of the filing of the complaint—was December 7, 2020. Next, we must address 

the time periods in question to determine whether the Commonwealth caused 

the delay and failed to exercise due diligence to determine the adjusted run 

date. Coleman concedes that the delay between January 14, 2020, the date 

of the scheduled preliminary hearing, and February 19, 2020, the date of the 

rescheduled preliminary hearing, was caused by him due to the unavailability 

of his counsel; thus, thirty-seven days is excluded from the Rule 600 

calculations, bringing the adjusted run date to January 11, 2021. 

 Next, as Coleman again concedes, our Supreme Court suspended the 

operation of Rule 600 from March 16, 2020 through May 31, 2020, because 

of the Covid-19 pandemic.11 This seventy-six-day period is likewise excluded 

from Rule 600 calculations. See Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 751 

(Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that an order suspending Rule 600 without 

____________________________________________ 

11 In Lear, this Court found that Montgomery County did not specifically 

suspend Rule 600 after May 31, 2020; therefore, for delay after May 31, 2020, 

the Commonwealth had to exercise due diligence to exclude the time from 

Rule 600 computations. Id. at 720. The Lear Court remanded the issue to 

the trial court to make this determination. Id. 
J-A10017-24 

- 30 - 

qualification adds time to the run date without considering the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence during this period). This brings the adjusted 

run date to March 29, 2021. 

Next, we review the period between June 1, 2020, the end of the Rule 

600 suspension in Montgomery County, and August 18, 2021, when the 

Commonwealth sought a continuance of the trial date originally scheduled for 

August 24, 2021. The record reflects that Coleman filed a motion for discovery 

on April 14, 2020, and Wevodau provided discovery on May 12, 2020. N.T., 

4/26/2022, at 26, 78-79; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 1(email from 

Wevodau to Coleman on May 12, 2020, containing the discovery). Although 

Coleman’s counsel responded the following day asking for police and expert 

reports, the record shows no further communications or filings concerning 

discovery occurred until July 2021, when D’Aguanno was assigned to this case. 

Id. at 29, 31-32; see also id. at 31-32 (wherein the trial court took judicial 

notice of office restrictions for district attorneys and going into courtrooms 

during the pandemic). On July 16, 2021, D’Aguanno emailed Coleman’s 

counsel stating that her file indicated discovery had been sent in May 2020. 

Id. at 32-33, 35-37; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (email from 

D’Aguanno to Coleman’s counsel on July 16, 2021). She did not have access 

to Wevodau’s email to know what, if anything, occurred discovery-wise 

between May 2020 and July 2021. Id. at 32. At that point Coleman asked for 

various reports and for witness contact information. Id. at 37; see also 
J-A10017-24 

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Commonwealth Exhibit 3 (emails between D’Aguanno and Coleman’s 

counsel). D’Aguanno informed Coleman that she could not provide certain 

reports because they included pornographic images of children, or witness 

addresses and phone numbers. Id. at 38-39. Thereafter, both before and 

after the trial court’s discovery order on August 4, 2021, D’Aguanno provided 

discovery to Coleman’s counsel, including contacting all the detectives who 

worked on the case and producing the expert reports. Id. at 44-49, 55-59, 

84-85. 

The trial court found that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence 

during this period: 

It is clear from the record that the Commonwealth exercised 

due diligence during the time at issue. The Covid-19 pandemic 

was unprecedented in its effect upon not only society at large but 

the judicial system in particular. The impacts of Covid-19 were 

far-reaching. It created uncertainty and, at times, confusion in 

the judicial system itself and in offices operating within the system 

such as the District Attorney’s and Public Defender’s offices which 

were functioning in large part remotely with reduced staffs within 

the courthouse. It was, to say the least, an uncertain time during 

which all of us were operating in uncharted waters. 

... The record in this case ... evidences an overburdened 

assistant district attorney who assumed control of the case from 

a former assistant district attorney who had left the District 

Attorney’s office in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. Upon 

being assigned the case, [D’Aguanno] shepherded it through the 

judicial emergency declaration with continued communication 

with the [trial c]ourt and defense counsel in a timely and 

responsive manner under all the circumstances in the 

extraordinary Covid-19 period. ... [The trial c]ourt finds the 

Commonwealth has met its burden of exercising due diligence 

during the pendency of this case. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2023, at 24-25. 
J-A10017-24 

- 32 - 

Based upon the circumstances of the case (and, indeed, the world) 

during the complained-of period, as well as our scope and standard of review, 

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the 

Commonwealth exercised due diligence. After May 2020, when the 

Commonwealth provided Coleman much of the requested discovery, Coleman 

made no efforts or overtures concerning any outstanding discovery (perhaps 

because of the pandemic) until D’Aguanno was assigned to the case in July 

2021. Notably, despite just being assigned to the case, D’Aguanno diligently 

responded to Coleman’s requests for additional discovery and provided 

additional documents and information in a timely manner. 

Coleman’s attempts to gain access to items not subject to discovery, 

including witness contact information, which the Commonwealth did not 

provide to Colemen, does not establish the Commonwealth’s lack of due 

diligence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2) (the names and addresses of 

eyewitness are not mandatory discovery); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 

174 A.3d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding “the Commonwealth was 

not required to disclose the addresses and other contact information of the 

witnesses”). Further, Coleman’s counsel was permitted to view the 

photographs in question. 

The Commonwealth was not required to demonstrate perfect vigilance 

and punctilious care, but simply put forth a reasonable effort. See Johnson, 

289 A.3d at 982. Considering the pandemic, the appointment of a new 
J-A10017-24 

- 33 - 

attorney for the Commonwealth in July 2021, D’Aguanno’s initial belief that 

Wevodau had already provided all required discovery, and D’Aguanno 

presenting much of the outstanding discovery within a month of being 

assigned to the case, the Commonwealth demonstrated that it put forth a 

reasonable effort to bring the case to trial and was duly diligent. Cf. Harth, 

252 A.3d at 621-22 (concluding that the Commonwealth’s negligent failure to 

fulfill its discovery obligations, including requesting multiple continuances to 

provide discovery and providing discovery on the day of trial established the 

Commonwealth did not act with due diligence). 

We likewise reject Coleman’s argument that the Commonwealth’s late 

filing of the bills of information evidenced a lack of due diligence. Coleman’s 

Brief at 30-31.12 It is well settled that a defendant must be fully apprised of 

the charges to avoid being prejudiced by “the last minute addition of alleged 

criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.” Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 979 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). If the 

crimes specified in the original indictment involve the same basic elements 

and factual situation as the crimes specified in the information, “the defendant 

is deemed to have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal 

conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). If the information alleges a different set of 

____________________________________________ 

12 Coleman does not cite to any authority to support his claim that the late 

filing of the bills of information demonstrated a lack of due diligence by the 

Commonwealth. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that argument must be 

supported by pertinent analysis and citation to authority). 
J-A10017-24 

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events or the “defenses to the amended crime are materially different from 

the elements or defenses to the crime originally charged, ... the defendant 

would be prejudiced by the change[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

 The record reflects that, on December 6, 2019, the Commonwealth filed 

the criminal complaint, charging Coleman with ten counts of sexual abuse, 

nine graded as second-degree felonies and one graded as a third-degree 

felony, and one count of criminal use of a facility, arising out of the 

pornographic images found on his cell phone. The amended bills of 

information filed on September 13, 2021, charged Coleman with the same 

crimes, arising out of the same facts, but changed the grading of the sexual 

abuse of children counts to third-degree felonies. Coleman was placed on 

notice of the charges, and he does not raise any argument that he was 

prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s late filing of the bills of information.13 

Therefore, we disagree that this constitutes evidence of the Commonwealth’s 

failure to act with due diligence. 

As the trial court’s finding regarding the Commonwealth’s exercise of 

due diligence is supported by the record, the 437-day period between June 1, 

2020, the end of the Rule 600 suspension in Montgomery County, and August 

12, 2021, the date of Commonwealth’s request for a continuance of the 

____________________________________________ 

13 Notably, Coleman’s counsel raised no objection to the amended bills of 

information, which changed the grading of five counts of sexual abuse of 

children, during the stipulated trial. N.T., 4/27/2022, at 11. 
J-A10017-24 

- 35 - 

scheduled trial, is excludable under Rule 600. This brings the adjusted run 

date June 10, 2022. As Coleman’s stipulated trial occurred on April 27, 

2022,14 the case was brought to trial in a timely manner pursuant to Rule 600 

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coleman’s Rule 600 

motion to dismiss. 

SORNA

 In his fourth claim, Coleman argues that his requirement to register 

under subchapter H of SORNA was unconstitutional. Coleman’s Brief at 34-

35. Coleman argues that SORNA’s registration requirement violates his due 

process rights because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that all sexual 

offenders are likely to commit additional sexual offenses and constitutes a 

punishment. Id. at 35-40. Coleman also asserts that SORNA’s registration 

requirements constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 40-41. Finally, 

Coleman challenges SORNA’s constitutionality for violating the separation of 

powers doctrine by vesting authority over the registration process with the 

Pennsylvania State Police, and places sentencing determinations outside of 

the judiciary. Id. at 41-42. 

 Coleman’s constitutional challenges raise “questions of law for which our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

____________________________________________ 

14 Ostensibly, the scheduling of trial in April 2022 was the result of the court’s 

calendar. However, as Coleman raises no claims regarding this period and as 

his trial was held prior to the adjusted run date, we need not address it further. 
J-A10017-24 

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Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2020) (“Torsilieri I”) 

(citation omitted). 

In addressing constitutional challenges to legislative enactments, 

we are ever cognizant that the General Assembly may enact laws 

which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health, 

safety, and welfare of society, but also that any restriction is 

subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all 

citizens. We emphasize that a party challenging a statute must 

meet the high burden of demonstrating that the statute clearly, 

palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 Coleman’s claims are identical to those raised by the defendant in the 

Torsilieri line of cases. In 2018, the Chester County Court of Common Pleas 

found SORNA’s subchapter H to be unconstitutional; the registration and 

notification provisions constituted punishment, thus violating the separation 

of powers doctrine; and subchapter H was cruel and unusual punishment. Id.

at 574-75. In 2020, our Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s 

determinations that SORNA subchapter H was unconstitutional and remanded 

for further evidentiary hearings regarding the alleged irrebuttable 

presumption and punitive nature of SORNA. Id. at 596. Upon remand, the 

trial court conducted hearings, after which it again concluded that SORNA 

subchapter H was unconstitutional in violation of the irrebuttable presumption 

doctrine and that subchapter H was punitive. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 

316 A.3d 77, 84-85 (Pa. 2024) (“Torsilieri II”). The Commonwealth 

appealed and our Supreme Court reversed, finding that SORNA subchapter H 

did not violate the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, see id. at 91-100, and 
J-A10017-24 

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that subchapter H was not punitive. Id. at 109-10. The Court further 

concluded that 

because a finding that [s]ubchapter H constitutes criminal 

punishment is a threshold factor in determining the viability of 

[the] derivative constitutional challenges — that the legislation 

unconstitutionally usurps judicial power over sentencing in 

violation of the separation of powers doctrine, constitutes cruel 

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and 

infringes upon the right to a trial by jury by failing to require that 

facts which increase the punishment imposed for the underlying 

crime be found by a reasonable doubt — these constitutional 

claims fail. 

Id. at 110. 

 Our Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri II is conclusive as to the 

issues raised by Coleman. Accordingly, Coleman’s final claim is without merit. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge Colins did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 

Date: 8/19/2024