NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DANIEL GARZA, an individual,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 19

- 55952 D.C. No. 2:16

- cv - 03579

- SVW

- AFM
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 19, 2020

Pasadena, California Before: LINN, * * RAWLINSON, and FORREST * * * , Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON Off

- duty Los Angeles Police O fficer Mario Cardona assault ed Plaintiff

-

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

*** Formerly known as Danielle J. Hunsaker

. 

# FILED
JUL 26 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

A ppellant Daniel Garza , who was dating Cardona’s stepdaughter . After a jury returned a $210,000 verdict against Cardona, Garza went to trial against D efendant

A ppellee City of Los Angeles under a ratification theory of Monell liability

. 1 H e argued that the City ratified Cardona’s unconstitutional actions by promot ing him shortly after the jury verdict against Cardona in the first trial

. The jury in the second trial found the City not liable , and Garza appeals

. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Evidentiary rulings. Garza argues it was err or to exclud e an Internal Affairs ’ investigation report (IA report) exonerating Cardona issued before the first trial , a letter sent to Garza summarizing the IA re port , and portions of Police Chief Charlie Beck’s deposition testimony

. We find no abuse of discretion because the district court’s decision was not “beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Est. of Diaz v. City of Anaheim , 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016)

. As stated, Garza’s sole ratification theory in his second trial and this appeal is that the City ratified Cardona’s illegal conduct by promoting him after the jury ’s unfavorable verdict in the first trial , not by exonerating Cardona following an internal affairs investigation

. Garza sought to introduce the IA report and summarizing letter as evidence of what Chief Beck knew when Cardona was promot ed

. A fter Chief Beck testified that he did no t review the IA report, introducing

1 See Monell v. Dep ’ t of Social Servs

. , 436 U.S. 658 (1978)3

its contents and the summarizing letter into evidence would not h ave helped the jury
a ssess whether Chief Beck review ed those documents before signing off on Cardona’s promotion

—

the only probative purpose consistent with Garza’s ratification theory

. T he district court allowed Chief Beck to be questioned ab out the IA rep ort so the jury could assess his credibility regarding his knowledge of it

. Under these circumstances, f

ar from being “quintessential ratification evidence,” as the dissent argues, these documents were not themselves probative of the issue presented by Garza

. 2 For this reason, exclusion of the IA report and summarizing letter also
was not prejudicial. Wagne r v. Cnty. of Maricopa , 747 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining evidentiary rulings are reversed only when “the exercise of discretion is both erroneous and prejudicial ”). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding Chief Beck’s d eposition testimony. Chief Beck ’s testimony at trial and at his deposition were not contradictory. Rather, his trial testimony expand ed upon his deposition testimony. It was not an abuse of discretion to exclud e deposition testimony that offered little, if

2 To the extent the dissent argues that Monell ratification occurs anytime a letter summariz ing an internal affairs report exonerating an officer is mailed on official letterhead

— even if the Monell policymaker never reviewed said letter or the underlying report

— and th e investigated officer is later found guilty of the previously

- exonerated conduct, such a proposition contradicts well

- established caselaw. See, e.g. , Gillette v. Delmore , 979 F.2d 1342, 134 7

– 49 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam ) (explaining Monell ratification requires the po licymaker to make a “ conscious, deliberate choice ” )

. Still, this is beside the point, given Garza’s sole ratification

- by

- promotion theory.4

any, impeachment value. See United States v. Parker , 991 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1993) (“When the trial court excludes evidence tending to impeach a witness, it has not abused its discretion as long as the jury has in its possession sufficient informati on to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.” (citation omitted) )

. Judicial estoppel. Garza argues that the City took contradictory positions in the first trial against Cardona and the second trial against the City. See Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr. , 832 F.3d 1024, 1044

– 45 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) ( “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.” ). Again , we find no error. T he City’s position in the first trial

— that Cardona acted with actual malice

— is not inconsistent with the City’s position in the second trial

— that Cardona’s promotion was dictated by the City ’s civil

- service r ules and was not a “conscious, deliberate” ratification of his actions by the City

. Gillette , 979 F.2d at 1347
. Thus, w hile it does appear that the police department played “fast and loose” with the facts in its IA report , the City did not take contradictory litigation positions before the district court. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 343 , 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)

. Imputed knowledge. Garza ar gues the district court abused its discretion in5

refusing to formulate a jury instruction that addressed “principles of agency and constructive/imputed knowledge , ” yet he concedes the jury instructions accurately pres ented his theory of the case

. See United States v. Knapp , 120 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997). Because ratification under Monell requires a “ conscious, affirmative choice ” by a policymaker , Gillette , 979 F.2d at 134 7 , the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Garza’s requested instruction. Judgment as a matter of law . Finally, Garza’s c onclusory argument for setting aside the jury’s verdict fails because the re is “ evidence adequate to suppor t the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles , 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted ). Namely, Chief Beck’s testimony that he understood California law to prohibit him from reopening the investigation into Cardona following the jury’s verdict in the first trial and , accordingly , to stall Cardona ’s promotion, directly contradicts Garza’s ratification theory and is consistent with the jury’s verdict. The dis sent focus es heavily on whether in fact California’s “ Public Safety Officers’ Bill of Rights Act [ “ the Act ” ] negated Chief Beck ’s ability as the final policymaker to deny Cardona’s promotion. ” Dissent at 4. Whether Chief Beck lacked the authority to preven t Cardona’s promotion was discussed at length in Chief Beck’s trial testimony and in the parties ’ arguments to the jury

. Specifically, t he City argued that Chief Beck could not withhold Cardona’s promotion unde r governing6

law, including ap plicable civil service regulations , and thus promoti ng him was not
a ratification of his conduct. Garza disputed this claim, arguing that Chief Beck could have stopped Cardona’s promotion because the Act ’s tolling provision would have allowed Chief Beck to reopen t he earlier internal affairs investigation

. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, it was not error for the district court to allow the City to present its interpretation of the Act

— as evidence that Chief Beck did not ratif y Cardona’s actions by promoting him

–– just as it was not error for the district court to allow Garza to present his tolling interpretation of the Act

— as evidence that Chief Beck did ratify Cardona’s actions by promoting him. 3 See Dissent at 5. T he jury was presented with both parties ’ positions concerning whether Chief Beck made a

“ conscious , affirmative choice” to ratify Cardona’s actions

— as Monell requires. Gillette , 979 F.3d at 1347. This was not error. * * * Although Garza’s legal arguments fail , we s hare his frustration with the City and its police department ’s opportunistic flip

- flopp ing from exonerating Cardona

3 To be clear , n either party’s interpretation of the civil service promotion statute, or the effect of its tolling pr ovision, was deemed correct by the district court. In stead , the jury heard the parties ’ debate regarding whether Chief Beck could have stopped Cardona’s promotion , a nd each side argued that the statute supported its conclusion

. At the end of the day, for purposes of resolving the issues presented on appeal , it matters not wh ich interpretation was correct

— the contrasting interpretations were relevant only as evidence of whether Chief Beck deliberate ly and consciously ratif ied Card ona’s unconstitutional acts in approving his promotion

.7

internally in its IA r eport to denouncing him publicly in a trial seeking monetary accountability. A group of citizens duly empaneled to serve as jurors , however, heard the evidence on this issue, assess ed the City’s conduct , and declined to hold it liable

. Where as Garza fai l ed to show error by the district court , we will not disturb the jury’s judgment

. AFFIRMED. 4

4 The parties’ motions to take judicial notice (Dk t . Nos. 30, 53) are denied as moot.Garza v

. C ity of Los A nge le

s, No. 19-55952 Raw linson, Cir c uit Judge , disse nting: The m a jority e xpre sse s its disa

pprova l of the polic e de pa rtm e nt’ s

“ opportunistic

flipping from

e xone ra ting [Polic e Offic e r] C a rdona in its [Inte rna l Affa irs] re port to de nounc ing him public ly in a tria l se e k ing m one ta

ry
a c c ounta bility .” The m a

j ority n e ve rthe le ss upholds the judgm e n t in fa vor of the Los Ange le s Polic e De pa rtm e nt be c a

use a jury “ a s se sse d the C ity ’ s c o nduc t a nd de c line d to hold it lia

ble .” B ut be c a

use the distric t c ourt e xc lude d c ruc ia l re le va n t
e vide nc e re ve a ling the C ity ’ s duplic i ty , the jury ’ s a sse ssm e nt wa s not fully inform e d . I re s pe c tfully

disse nt. It is undispute d tha

t the Inte rna l Affa i rs Division of the C ity ’ s Polic e De pa rtm e nt e xone ra t e d C a rdona of a ny wrongdoing. Im

porta n tly , Pla intiff Da

nie l Ga rz a (Ga rz a ) wa s inform e d in a le tte r tha t

a n inve s tiga tion wa s c onduc te d

“ through se ve ra l le ve ls of re vie w” a t the Los Ange le s Polic e De pa rtm e nt, inc luding C a pta in M c M a nus, the Ac ting C om m a n ding Offic e r of the M e tropolita n Division

“ a n d the c om

m a nd sta ff of Inte rna l Affa irs.” Following this re vie w, the Los Ange l e s Polic e De pa

rtm e nt sta t e d in the le tte r to Ga

rz a tha t C a rdona ’ s a c tions we re

“ justifie d, la

wful a nd prope r.” This sta

te m e nt a l one wa s suffic ie nt to e s ta blish

ra tific a tion by

the C ity of Los Ange le s for the purpose of lia bility unde r Mone ll v

. 

# FIL ED
JUL 26 2021 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1De

pt. of Soc . Sv c s. , 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The le tte r c onta ine d the se a l of the Los Ange l e s Polic e De pa

rtm e nt a n d wa s writte n on Polic e De pa rtm e nt le tte rhe a d with Los Ange le s M a y or Eric Ga rc e tti a nd Polic e C hie f C ha

rlie B e c k liste d a s the
se nde rs of the le tte r. Fina lly , the le tte r c onta ine d C hie f B e c k’ s signa ture bloc k. This c olle c tive im

p rim a t ur from the C ity a de qua t e ly

e sta blishe d tha

t the C ity

ra tifie d the a c tions ta

ke n by C a rdona

. Se e C

hristie v . Iopa , 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th C ir. 1999) (e xpla ining tha t ra tific a tion oc c urs whe n “ a uthoriz e d polic y m a ke rs
a pprove a subordina

te ’ s de c ision a

nd the ba sis for it” ) (c ita

tions om i tte d). 1 B ut the story

doe sn’ t e n d the re . In Ga rz a ’ s c ivil a c tion a ga inst C a rdona , the C ity did a c om ple te a bout fa c e , a

rguing tha

t C a rdona ’ s use of e xc e s sive forc e
a ga inst Ga

rz a wa s m a lic ious, ra

the r tha n “ justifie d, la

wful, a nd prope r,” a s de te rm i ne d by

the Polic e De p a rtm e nt’ s Inte rna l Affa i rs Division. This ta c tic wa s
suc c e ssful for the C ity , re sulting in a jury ve rdic t a ga i nst C a rdona , but no Mone l l lia bility for the C ity . Shortly

a fte r the tria l a n d a dve rse ve rdic t a ga i nst C a rdona , the C ity prom ote d C a rdona

to the ra nk of se rge a nt. This prom otion prom pte d Ga rz a to re que st a

ne w tria l on the C ity ’ s Mone ll lia bility , a n d the distric t c ourt gra n te d the re que st.

1 The distric t c ourt should ha ve gra nte d judgm e nt in fa vor of Ga rz a a t this point. 2At the ne w tria l of the C ity ’ s Mone ll lia b ility , the distric t c o urt ine xplic a bly
e xc lude d from e v i de nc e the Inte rna l Affa irs R e port e xone ra ting C a rdona

. As pre v iously

disc usse d, this re port wa s quinte sse ntia l ra tific a tion e vide n c e . Se e id. 2 The distric t c ourt a

b use d its disc re tion in e xc l uding this c ritic a lly re le va nt
e vide nc e . Se e Obre

y v . J ohnson , 400 F.3d 691, 701-02 (9th C ir. 2005) (c onc luding tha t the distric t c ourt’ s e xc lusion of dire c tly proba tive e vide n c e re quire d re ve rsa l). B ut e ve n without the

e vide nc e of the Inte rna l Affa irs e xone ra tion, C hie f B e c k’ s prom otion of C a rdona

in the fa c e of his knowle dge tha t C a rdona ha d be e n found lia ble for the use of e xc e s sive forc e a l so c onstitute d ra tific a tion of C a rdona ’ s
a c tions by

the C ity

. As a pre lim ina

ry m a tte r, the distric t c ourt c om m itte d no e rror in finding tha

t

2 The m a jority m a ke s m uc h of the fa c t tha

t C hie f B e c k de nie d re a ding the Inte rna l Affa irs R e port. Howe v e r, C hie f B e c k c ould not de ny tha t the C ity of Los Ange l e s se nt a

le tte r to Ga

rz a ove r the signa

ture line of both the m a y or a nd C hie f B e c k e ndorsing the e xone ra tion of C a rdone by the Los Ange le s Polic e De pa rtm e nt Inte rna l Affa irs Division. Se e Harpe r v . C ity of Los Ange le

s , 533 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th C ir. 2008) (re ite ra ting tha t ra tify ing a

c onstitutiona

l de priva tion “ suffic e [d] for offic ia l lia

bility ” ). The sum

m a riz ing le tte r a n d Inte rna l Affa irs R e port we re dire c t e vide nc e of M

one ll lia bility a nd we re im

p rope rly e xc lude d. S

e e Obre y v . J ohnson , 400 F.3d 691, 701-02 (9th C ir. 2005) (re ve rsing e xc lusion of dire c tly proba tive e vide nc e ). And C hie f B e c k ne v e r de nie d re a ding the le tte r. Unde r the m a jority ’ s vie w , a polic y m a ke r m a y a

void Mone ll

e xposure by

sim ply de n y ing knowle dge of the c onte n ts of a

doc u m e nt pre pa

re d pursua

n t to his polic ie s. Tha

t is sim ply not the l a w. Se e C

h ristie v . Iopa , 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th C ir. 1999) (e xpla ining tha t ra tific a tion oc c urs whe n “ polic y m a ke rs a pprove a subordina

te ’ s de c ision” ). 3C hie f B e c k wa s a polic y m a k e r. Se e Barone v . C ity of Springfie ld, Ore

gon , 902 F.3d 1091, 1108 (9th C ir. 2018) (c onc luding de nov o tha t the C ity M a na ge r wa s the p olic y m a ke r). To de te rm ine whe the r a public offic ia l is a

polic y m a ke r, we
c onsult sta

te la w. Se e Ly tle v . C

arl , 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th C i r. 2004). The C a lifornia Supre m e C o urt ha s de c la re d tha t the Polic e C hie f for the C ity of Los Ange l e s Polic e De pa

rtm e nt is “ [t] he a

p pointing a

uthority for the [Polic e ] De pa rtm e nt.” R iv e ros v . C

ity of Los Ange le

s , 41 C a l. App. 4th 1342, 1350, as modifie d on de nial of re he aring (1996), the re by

m a king him

the polic y m a ke r for the D e pa rtm e nt. S e e Ly t le , 382 F.3d a

t 983 (de fining a polic y m a ke r a s som e one

“ in a position of a

u thority suc h tha

t a fina l de c ision by

tha t pe rson m a y
a ppropria te ly be a ttributa

ble ” to the gove rnm e nt a ge nc y ). It is indisputa ble tha t a fina l de c i sion by

the C h ie f of the Los Ange le s Polic e De pa rtm e nt “ m a

y
a ppropria te ly be a ttributa

ble ” to tha

t Polic e De p a rtm e nt. Id. ; se e also Harpe r v . C ity of Los Ange le

s , 533 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th C ir. 2008) (c onfirm i ng tha t a de c ision by

the C hie f of the Los Ange le s Polic e De pa rtm e nt to ra

tify a
c onstitutiona

l de priva tion “ s uffic e [d] for offic ia l lia bility ” ). The C ity a rgue d tha

t a provision of the

Public Sa fe ty

Offic e rs’ B ill of R ights Ac t ne ga t e d C hie f B e c k’ s a bility a s the polic y

m a ke r to de ny

C a rdona ’ s prom otion. The C ity spe c ific a lly

re lie d on C a lifornia

Gove rnm e nt C ode § 3304(d)(1), whic h
4provide s tha t no prom otion m a y

be de nie d unle ss a

n inve stiga

tion of the inc ide nt
use d a s the ba sis for de nia l of the prom otion is c om ple te d “ within one y e a r of the public a ge nc y ’ s disc ove ry ” of the inc ide n t. Howe v e r, a s the C ity c onc e de d, the sta tute e xpre ssly

tolls the one -y e a r pe riod of inve stiga tion “ w hile [a ] c ivil a c tion is pe nding” in a

c a se “ whe re the public sa fe ty offic e r is na

m e d a s a pa rty de fe nda

nt.” C a lifornia Gove rnm e nt C o d e § 3304(2)(F). The distric t c ourt ignore d § 3304(2)(F), a nd e rre d in a llowing the

C i ty to pre s e nt this a

rgum e nt to the jury

ba se d on its se lf-se rving a n d m i sle a ding inte rpre ta tion of C a lifornia Gove rnm e nt C ode § 3304 to a void Mone ll

lia b ility

. Inde e d , a t ora l a

rgum e nt be fore us, c ounse l for the C i ty wa s una ble to sa tisfa c torily

a nswe r the que stion of wha t would ha

v e ha p pe ne d if C hie f B e c k

ha d not signe d the prom otion orde r. In m

y vie w, the ina

bility to a d d re ss tha t que stion strongly supports a

n infe re nc e tha t C hie f B e c k a c tua lly ha d the a uthority to de ny the prom otion a s the a

ppointing a

uthority

. 3 The pa

rtie s the n c ould ha ve possibly litiga te d whe the r or not the de nia l viola te d the Public Sa fe ty

Offic e rs’ B ill of R ights. B ut it wa s e rror for the distric t c ourt to a llow the C ity to introduc e its inte rpre ta tion of the sta

tute a s ne ga ting C hie f B e c k’ s ra t ific a tion of C a rdona ’ s use

3 In his de p osition, C hie f B e c k a c knowle dge d tha t he c o uld ha

ve re o pe ne d the i nve stiga

tion into C a rdona ’ s m isc onduc t. B u t the distric t c ourt e xc lude d this te stim ony toge the r with the le tte r to Ga rz a a nd the Inte rna l Affa i rs R e p ort. 5of e xc e ssive forc e without pe rm itting Ga rz a to introduc e e vide nc e tha t would
e sta blish C hie f B e c k’ s ra tific a tion. Se e Harpe r , 533 F.3d a t 1026 (upholding Mone l l lia bility w h e n the L os Ange le s C hie f of Polic e “ a pprove d of the Ta sk Forc e ’ s [unc onstitutiona

l ] ta c tic s” ). B e c a use the distric t c ourt c om m itte d se ve ra l c ritic a l e v ide ntia ry e rrors in this
c a se , 4 I would re ve rse the judgm e nt in fa vor of the C ity

a nd dire c t e ntry

of judgm e nt in fa

vor of Ga rz a on his Mone ll

c la im

.

4 The m a jority sta te s tha t the jury he a rd the e vide nc e a n d rule d a ga i nst Ga rz a . B ut be c a u se of the distric t c ourt’ s e rrone ous e vide ntia ry rulings, the

jury did not he a r ALL the e vide n c e . 6