NO. 07-09-00210-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL B APRIL 29, 2010

ROBIN HOSEA, APPELLANT

v. GEORGE WHITTENBURG AND WHITTENBURG, WHITTENBURG, SCHACHTER & HARRIS, P.C., APPELLEES

FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; NO. 57,066-A; HONORABL E HAL MINER, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

OPINION
Robin Hosea attempts to appeal from the tr ial court’s order dismissing for want of prosecution her suit against her former atto rney, George Whittenburg, and his law firm. The 47th District Court of R andall County dismissed her cause on March 23, 2009. She filed her notice of appeal on June 25, 2009.
Although neither party has raised a questi on whether this Court has jurisdiction, we are obligated to consider, sua sponte , our jurisdiction of a case on appeal. See2 Churchill v. Mayo , 224 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Buffalo Royalty Corp. v. Enron Corp. , 906 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1995, no writ). We do not presume jurisdiction. El-Kareh v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n , 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.). If the record does not affirmatively dem onstrate that we have jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. Id. ; Buffalo Royalty Corp. , 906 S.W.2d at 277.
A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. See
T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.1; Thomas v. Neal , No. 07-01-00235-CV, 2001 Tex.App. LEXIS 5963, at *2 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Aug. 29, 2001, no pet.) ( per curiam). Ordinarily, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the date the appealable order is signed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1. If the appellant timely files, inter alia , a motion to reinstate, the deadline is ex tended, and the appellant must file his or her notice of appeal within ninety days of the date the trial court signed the appealable judgment.
T EX

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. P. 26.1(a). Following a dismissal for wa nt of prosecution, a party must file a verified motion to reinstate within thirty da ys after the order of dismissal for want of prosecution. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 165a(3).
It has become fairly well-established that an unverified motion to reinstate does not extend the trial cour t’s plenary jurisdiction and does not extend the time in which to file a notice of appeal. See Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc. , 705 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1986) (refusing writ of error bec ause appellate court properly dismissed appeal for want of jurisdiction because the unverified motion to reinstate did not extend the time for perfecting appeal); see also McConnell v. May , 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex.3 1990) (per curiam); Twis t v. McAllen Nat’l Bank , 294 S.W.3d 255, 260 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.).

Hosea’s motion to reinstate was unverified. 1 As such, under the Butts /McConnell rule, it failed to extend the time in which s he could timely file her notice of appeal. Based on the record before us, then, she had unt il April 23, 2009, to file her notice of appeal; she filed her notice of appeal on June 25, 2009.
Though the Texas Supreme Court has impliedly frowned on the Butts /McConnell rule, it has not expressly ov erruled those cases. See Guest , 195 S.W.3d at 688–89 (assuming that Butts and McConnell have “survive[d]” and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but libe ral, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly te chnical application of rules). We are duty bound to follow the Texas Supr eme Court's authoritative ex pressions of law. See In re K.S. , 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Swilley v. McCain , 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“Aft er a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme C ourt, . . . the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same c ourt or other courts of lower rank when the very point is

1 Further, there was no affidavit or anything that could be said to serve as an effective substitute fo r verification. See Guest v. Dixon , 195 S.W.3d 687, 689 (Tex. 2006); Twist , 294 S.W.3d at 260; In re Dobbins , 247 S.W.3d 394, 396–97 (Tex.App.— Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding). Attached to Hosea’s reply to Whittenburg’s response to her motion to reinstate is her affidavit. To the extent a liberal a pplication of the rules would allow her affidavit to serve as a substi tute for verification, we observe that the reply was filed outside the trial cour t’s unextended plenary jurisdiction. See McConnell , 800 S.W.2d at 194; see also Owen v. Hodge , 874 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (concluding t hat that appellant's verified motion for leave to supplement his unverif ied motion to reinstate was f iled after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired).4 again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties .”). That being so, Butts and McConnell remain the law under which we and ou r sister courts are duty bound to operate. See Twist , 294 S.W.3d at 262 (applying Butts /McConnell rule but noting Texas Supreme Court’s ominous language in Guest ); Silguero v. State , 287 S.W.3d 146, 149– 50 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (same); In re Dobbins , 247 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Tr inity Universal Ins. Co. , No. 04-06-00471-CV, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 8550, at *5 (Tex.App.—San Antonio Oct. 4, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same).
We, too, follow Butts and McConnell to conclude that the unverified motion to reinstate did not serve to extend the time in which Hosea could timely file a notice of appeal from the order dismissing her case for want of prosecut ion. She was, therefore, required to file her notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the trial court signed the order of dismissal. Her notice of appeal filed ninety-four da ys after that date was untimely and did not operate to invoke our jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Mackey K. Hancock Justice