EXHIBIT 9

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BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON 

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 

IN RE: TIKTOK, INC., CONSUMER 

PRIVACY LITIGATION 

MDL Docket No. 2948 

NOTICE OF RELATED ACTION 

Pursuant to Rules 1.1(h) and 6.2(d) of the Rules of Procedure for the United 

States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Defendant TikTok, Inc. (“TikTok”) 

gives notice of the following related action: 

1. Aparna Iyer and Brandy Johnson, on behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated, v. TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc., 3:20-cv-03795 

(N.D. Cal.) (Hon. Laurel Beeler), filed June 9, 2020. 

Copies of the docket sheet and complaint for the action are submitted with this 

Notice. The action contains questions of fact and law that are common to the matters 

listed on the Schedule of Actions previously submitted by Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 1-2) and 

identified in subsequent Notices of Related Actions (Dkt. Nos. 13, 24, 27, 28), and are 

premised on the same core issues as the other actions pending before the Panel. This 

action is therefore a related action for purposes of these proceedings. 

The Iyer action alleges violations of several privacy statutes on behalf of a 

nationwide class (as well as California and Illinois subclasses) of TikTok App users. 

Among the claims asserted in the complaint are violations of the Illinois Biometric 

Information Privacy Act, which are asserted on behalf of a class of Illinois residents 

based on defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc.’s alleged unlawful collection, 

storage, use, and disclosure of TikTok App users’ biometric information. 

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Dated: June 15, 2020 By: /s/ Anthony J Weibell

Anthony J Weibell 

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 

Professional Corporation 

650 Page Mill Road 

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050 

Telephone: (650) 493-9300 

Facsimile: (650) 565-5100 

Email: aweibell@wsgr.com 

Attorneys for all Defendants 

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EXHIBIT A 

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ADRMOP

U.S. District Court

California Northern District (San Francisco)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:20-cv-03795-LB

Iyer et al v. Tiktok Inc. et al

Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Property

Date Filed: 06/09/2020

Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Nature of Suit: 380 Personal Property:

Other

Jurisdiction: Diversity

Plaintiff

Aparna Iyer represented by Lesley Elizabeth Weaver 

Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP 

555 12th Street, Suite 1600 

Oakland, CA 94607 

415-445-4003 

Fax: 415-445-4020 

Email: lweaver@bfalaw.com 

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Brandy Johnson represented by Lesley Elizabeth Weaver 

(See above for address) 

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Tiktok Inc.

a California corporation

represented by Anthony J Weibell 

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 

A Professional Corporation 

650 Page Mill Road 

Palo Alto, CA 94304 

650-493-9300 

Fax: 650-565-5100 

Email: aweibell@wsgr.com 

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

ByteDance Inc.

a Delaware corporation

represented by Anthony J Weibell 

(See above for address) 

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

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06/09/2020 1 COMPLAINT against ByteDance Inc., Tiktok Inc. ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number

0971-14558351.). Filed byAparna Iyer, Brandy Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover

Sheet)(Weaver, Lesley) (Filed on 6/9/2020) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/09/2020 2 Proposed Summons. (Weaver, Lesley) (Filed on 6/9/2020) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/09/2020 3 Certificate of Interested Entities by Aparna Iyer, Brandy Johnson (Weaver, Lesley) (Filed

on 6/9/2020) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/10/2020 4 Case assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler.

Counsel for plaintiff or the removing party is responsible for serving the Complaint or

Notice of Removal, Summons and the assigned judge's standing orders and all other new

case documents upon the opposing parties. For information, visit E-Filing A New Civil

Case at http://cand.uscourts.gov/ecf/caseopening.

Standing orders can be downloaded from the court's web page at

www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges. Upon receipt, the summons will be issued and returned

electronically. Counsel is required to send chambers a copy of the initiating documents

pursuant to L.R. 5-1(e)(7). A scheduling order will be sent by Notice of Electronic Filing

(NEF) within two business days. Consent/Declination due by 6/24/2020. (mbcS, COURT

STAFF) (Filed on 6/10/2020) (Entered: 06/10/2020)

06/10/2020 5 Initial Case Management Scheduling Order with ADR Deadlines: Case

Management Statement due by 9/3/2020. Initial Case Management Conference set

for 9/10/2020 11:00 AM in San Francisco, Courtroom B, 15th Floor. (arkS, COURT

STAFF) (Filed on 6/10/2020) (Entered: 06/10/2020)

06/10/2020 6 Summons Issued as to ByteDance Inc., Tiktok Inc. (arkS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on

6/10/2020) (Entered: 06/10/2020)

06/11/2020 7 NOTICE by ByteDance Inc., Tiktok Inc. of Consolidation Order (Hong v. TikTok)

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Weibell, Anthony) (Filed on 6/11/2020)

(Entered: 06/11/2020)

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

06/15/2020 09:28:34

PACER

Login: wsgr0474:2664493:0 Client Code: 48861.512

Description: Docket Report Search

Criteria:

3:20-cv-03795-

LB

Billable

Pages: 2 Cost: 0.20

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP 

Lesley E. Weaver (SBN 191305) 

555 12th Street, Suite 1600 

Oakland, CA 94607 

Tel.: (415) 445-4003 

Fax: (415) 445-4020 

lweaver@bfalaw.com 

DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC

Amy E. Keller, pro hac vice to be filed

Ten North Dearborn Street 

Sixth Floor 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Tel.: (312) 214-7900 

Fax: (440) 953-9138 

akeller@dicellolevitt.com 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

APARNA IYER and BRANDY JOHNSON, on 

behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

TIKTOK INC., a California corporation, and 

BYTEDANCE, INC., a Delaware corporation, 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 

CLASS ACTION 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

3:20-cv-03795

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Plaintiffs Aparna Iyer and Brandy Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 

situated, bring this class action against TikTok Inc. (“TikTok”), the successor-in-interest to Musical.ly, 

Inc., and ByteDance, Inc. (“ByteDance”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and allege as follows based on 

investigation of counsel, information, and belief: 

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. Defendant TikTok maintains and operates a popular social media application (“TikTok 

App” or “App”) that allows users to view, share, upload, and create short videos. Individuals who wish to 

upload videos to the platform in addition to viewing posts from other users must download the App and 

create an account. 

2. Unknown and undisclosed to users, Defendants engage in a number of practices that violate 

various state consumer protection and privacy laws—including obtaining and storing biometric and video 

viewing information, not providing consumers with a retention schedule for use and storage of biometric 

information, and tracking and disclosing user watch histories without appropriate consent 

3. Defendants’ violations of state and federal laws are particularly egregious given previous 

security and privacy complaints about Defendants’ mobile applications. Defendants continue to ignore 

consumers’ legitimate privacy concerns even after paying millions in fines for their conduct, and continue 

to engage in deceptive practices to ensure that consumers have little understanding about what types of 

information they are sharing with the App and third parties. 

4. This action seeks an order (i) enjoining Defendants’ from further unauthorized collection, 

storage, and use of certain of Plaintiffs’ information; (ii) declaring that Defendants’ conduct violates the 

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, the Illinois Biometric Information 

Privacy Act, and certain sections of the California Penal Code; (iii) finding that Plaintiffs and the class 

members are entitled to quantum meruit and damages for unjust enrichment based upon Defendants’ 

actions; (iv) invalidating Defendants’ use of mandatory, binding arbitration via inconspicuous terms to 

prevent consumers from pursuing their rights under state and federal law; and (v) requiring Defendants to 

clearly and conspicuously disclose its written policy that sets forth its retention and use of Plaintiffs’ and 

class members’ biometric information. 

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

PARTIES 

Plaintiffs

5. Plaintiff Aparna Iyer (“Iyer”) is a citizen and resident of the State of California. Plaintiff 

created her TikTok account approximately nine months ago and maintains her account to the present day. 

6. Plaintiff Iyer has uploaded and posted at least one video using TikTok, which includes 

images of her face and a friend’s face, since creating her account. Plaintiff Iyer has also appeared in 

friends’ videos, which have included the use of a combination of TikTok features such as stickers, filters, 

and the tracker lens available in the App when creating, saving, and posting videos on the App. 

7. Plaintiff Iyer has also viewed and “liked” other videos, commented on videos, and sent 

messages to other viewers concerning their videos. 

8. Plaintiff Iyer does not recall seeing the Terms of Service or Privacy Policy upon registering 

for an account with the App. Based on counsel’s investigation and analysis, set forth in detail below, 

TikTok deliberately designed its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy to decrease the likelihood that a 

user will notice and comprehend its terms and conditions or could provide meaningful, express consent to 

its conditions, in order to encourage users to sign up and not be deterred by accurate and truthful 

disclosures. 

9. Plaintiff Brandy Johnson (“Johnson”) is a citizen and resident of the State of Illinois. 

Plaintiff created her TikTok account approximately six months ago and maintains her account to the 

present day. 

10. Plaintiff Johnson has uploaded and posted at least one video using TikTok, which includes 

images of her face, since creating her account. Plaintiff Johnson has also used a combination of TikTok 

features such as stickers, filters, and the tracker lens available in the App when creating, saving, and 

posting videos on the App. 

11. Plaintiff Johnson has also viewed and “liked” other videos, commented on videos, and sent 

messages to other viewers concerning their videos. 

12. Plaintiff Johnson does not recall seeing the Terms of Service or Privacy Policy upon 

registering for an account with the App. Based on counsel’s investigation and analysis, set forth in detail 

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

below, TikTok deliberately designed its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy to decrease the likelihood 

that a user will notice and comprehend its terms and conditions or could provide meaningful, express 

consent to its conditions, in order to encourage users to sign up and not be deterred by accurate and truthful 

disclosures. 

Defendants1

13. Defendant TikTok, Inc. is a California corporation with its headquarters in Culver City, 

California. Defendant TikTok maintains an office in Mountain View, California. Defendant TikTok is the 

surviving successor-in interest to Musical.ly, Inc. (“Musical.ly”). Musical.ly launched the Musical.ly 

Application (“Musical.ly App”) in 2014. In 2018, the Musical.ly App was rebranded as TikTok. 

14. Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Palo Alto, 

California. Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd. (“ByteDance Ltd.”), a Beijing-based company 

founded in 2012, is the parent corporation of ByteDance, Inc. 

15. DOE defendants. Plaintiffs reserve the right to name additional defendants, including 

Defendants’ corporate parents, based upon further analysis. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. This Court has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because 

(i) this is a proposed class action in which there are at least 100 class members, (ii) the parties are 

minimally diverse, as Plaintiffs and Defendants are domiciled in different states, and (iii) the combined 

claims of class members exceed $5,000,000, exclusive of interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 

17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because both Defendants regularly 

conduct business throughout California, their principal places of business are in California, and Defendant 

TikTok is incorporated in California. 

18. Venue is proper in this District because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 

rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred here, and Defendants caused harm to class members residing within this 

judicial District. 

 

1

 Plaintiffs may add additional defendants—such as Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., which is 

headquartered in Beijing, China—after additional discovery further demonstrates its connection to the 

allegations set forth herein. 

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 

19. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-2, this action may be assigned to the San Jose Division, as 

the events giving rise to the causes of action alleged herein occurred throughout the counties comprising 

this judicial District, including Santa Clara County. 

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

A. Overview of the TikTok App and Its Predecessor Musical.ly 

20. Musical.ly, Inc. and Musical.ly, a Cayman Island corporation, first created a social media 

video platform through a software application in 2014 (the “Musical.ly App”). Like the current version of 

the TikTok App, the Musical.ly App allowed users to create and edit short videos. It also provided a library 

of music that the user could apply as background music to their video, in effect allowing the user to create 

their very own music video. The Musical.ly App included several features that scanned the user’s facial 

geometry. These features included face stickers and face filters, which would alter the image of the user’s 

face. 

21. While the Musical.ly App was growing in popularity in the U.S., ByteDance Ltd., the 

parent corporation to Defendant ByteDance, Inc., created the TikTok App in 2016. The App mirrored the 

purpose and features of the Musical.ly App, allowing users to create and upload videos. 

22. In 2017, ByteDance, Inc., acquired Musical.ly, for $1 billion, and rebranded Musical.ly to 

TikTok, Inc. 

23. On August 2, 2018, TikTok merged the Musical.ly and TikTok Apps. Following its merger, 

the TikTok App has continued expanding its user base. As of November 2019, the TikTok App has over 

26.5 million U.S. users and was the most downloaded application on the Apple app store.2

 

24. The App is predominantly used by young adults and minors. Indeed, at least two-thirds of 

U.S. users are teenagers or in their twenties.3

 

2

 Ansoor Iqbal, TikTok Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), Business of Apps (Apr. 24, 2020), 

https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/. 

3

 Greg Roumeliotis, et al., Exclusive: U.S. opens national security investigation into TikTok – sources, 

Reuters (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opensnational-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL. 

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25. TikTok’s popularity with younger users is by design. The TikTok algorithmic feed 

launches a never-ending-stream of videos at a user.4 The algorithm is constantly learning what content to 

deliver to its users to keep them engaged. A user receives videos based on those the user has already 

watched and interacted with.5 Users are encouraged to engage with other videos by responding in turn. 

26. TikTok’s algorithms allow the App to mine extensive data regarding how its users react to 

videos—which, in turn, allows Defendants to understand how people think, feel, and act, “making 

[TikTok] an expert on what makes people tick and how to persuade them to watch, share [,] or like certain 

content.”6

27. TikTok did not disclose and still has not publicly revealed the ways in which it collects, 

monitors, surveils, and shares users’ activity on the platform as well as other information about users with 

unauthorized third parties. Plaintiffs would not have signed up on the platform if the true extent to which 

their biometric and other information was permanently copied and shared with third parties was revealed. 

28. Given the nature of the App, and the extensive information it gathers on individuals, and 

predictions concerning individuals’ actions the App can make, U.S. lawmakers have labeled TikTok to be 

a “potential counterintelligence threat we cannot ignore.”7

B. Defendants Have an Established Record of Invading Users’ Privacy 

29. Defendants have repeatedly disregarded users’ privacy by collecting, sharing, and using 

users’ information without obtaining consent. 

30. In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a complaint against TikTok over 

allegations that it violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 

 

4

 John Herrman, TikTok Is Rewriting the World, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2019), 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/style/what-is-tik-tok.html. 

5

 Morgan Sung, A Guide to using TikTok’s algorithm to watch videos you actually like, Mashable (Jan. 

13, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/tiktok-algorithm-watch-what-you-actually-like/. 

6

 Shelly Banjo, Take China’s TikTok App Security Threat Seriously, Bloomberg (Oct. 29, 2019), 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2019-10-29/worries-that-tiktok-is-a-threat-to-nationalsecurity-have-merit. 

7 Id. 

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et seq. Defendant TikTok settled the claim for $5.7 million—at that time, the largest penalty ever imposed 

for violation of COPPA.8

31. In November 2019, the United States government announced a national security review of 

TikTok’s parent, ByteDance Ltd.’s acquisition of the Musical.ly app for $1 billion.9 TikTok has been 

banned by use for the United States Armed Forces, Department of Homeland Security, and the 

Transportation Security Administration.10 The Department of Defense has determined that TikTok “is 

considered a cyber threat” and as of December 2019, the Army and Navy no longer allow the App to be 

installed on government-issued phones and devices.11 Subsequently, the Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine 

Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, and Transportation Security Administration issued the 

same restrictions for their personnel.12

32. TikTok is considered such a high-level threat by the government, that Army public affairs 

officer Crystal X. Boring stated: 

 “The message directs appropriate action for employees to take in order to safeguard their 

personal information. The guidance is to be wary of applications you download, monitor 

 

8

 Lesley Fair, Largest FTC COPPA settlement requires Musical.ly to change its tune, FTC (Feb. 27, 

2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/02/largest-ftc-coppa-settlementrequires-musically-change-its. 

9

 Jack Nicas, Mike Isaac, and Ana Swanson, TikTok Said to Be Under National Security Review, N.Y. 

Times (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-securityreview.html. 

10 Mary Meisenzahl, US government agencies are banning TikTok, the social media app teens are 

obsessed with, over cybersecurity fears –here’s the full list, Business Insider (Feb. 25, 2020), 

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-government-agencies-have-banned-tiktok-app-2020-2#7-this-weektsa-became-the-latest-agency-to-specifically-ban-the-app-7. 

11 Matthew Cox, Army Follows Pentagon Guidance, Bans Chinese-Owned TikTok App, Military News 

(Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/12/30/army-follows-pentagon-guidancebans-chinese-owned-tiktok-app.html. 

12 Mary Meisenzahl, US government agencies are banning TikTok, the social media app teens are 

obsessed with, over cybsecurity fears—here’s the full list, Business Insider (Feb. 25, 2020), 

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-government-agencies-have-banned-tiktok-app-2020-2#5-themarine-corps-expressed-similar-reasoning-for-a-ba%25E2%2580%25A6. 

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your phones for unusual and unsolicited texts etc. and delete them immediately and 

uninstall TikTok to circumvent any exposure of personal information.”13

33. This guidance stemmed from scrutiny for ByteDance, TikTok’s owner, when Senators 

Chuck Schumer and Tom Cotton requested Joseph Maguire, the acting director of national intelligence, 

review TikTok for potential security risks.14 On information and belief, TikTok has in the past and/or 

presently continues a practice of removing content at the request of ByteDance, Inc. and other corporate 

entities.15

34. As Senators Schumer and Cotton wrote in their October 23, 2019 letter to Director Maguire 

concerning TikTok, “[s]ecurity experts have voiced concerns that China's vague patchwork of 

intelligence, national security, and cybersecurity laws compel Chinese companies to support and 

cooperate with intelligence work controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Without an independent 

judiciary to review requests made by the Chinese government for data or other actions, there is no legal 

mechanism for Chinese companies to appeal if they disagree with a request.”16 

35. Senator Josh Hawley recently stated that, “[t]he idea that TikTok is not sharing any data, 

is not taking direction from Beijing, that just does not appear to be true.”17 Further, Senator Marsha 

Blackburn asserted: “TikTok is China’s best detective—surreptitiously collecting and sharing user data, 

 

13 Kahlan Rosenblatt, Army bans TikTok following guidance from the Pentagon, NBC News (Dec. 31, 

2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/u-s-army-bans-tiktok-following-guidance-pentagonn1109001. 

14 Id. Indeed, additional security risks have plagued the application—including code that would have 

allowed hackers to carry out malicious attacks. Arjun Kharpal, A security flaw in China’s TikTok app 

was found. It lets hackers use text messages to control accounts, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2020), 

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/09/tiktok-security-flaw-found-that-allowed-hackers-to-accessaccounts.html. 

15 Justine Calma, US Army bans soldiers from using TikTok, The Verge (Dec. 31, 2019),

https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/31/21044559/us-army-bans-soldiers-from-using-tiktok. 

16 Ben Kochman, Sens. Want TikTok Investigated for National Security Threats, Law360 (Oct. 24, 

2019), 

https://www.law360.com/articles/1213180/sens-want-tiktok-investigated-for-national-security-threats. 

17 Emily Birnbaum, TikTok faces lawmaker anger over China ties, The Hill (Nov. 5, 2019), 

https://thehill.com/policy/technology/469114-tiktok-faces-lawmaker-anger-over-china-ties. 

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tracking American tweens and teenagers, and manipulating children’s online purchases.”18 U.S. officials 

have expressed concerns about other social media apps China is developing itself as well.19

36. National legislation is currently being proposed that would ban all federal employees from 

using the App.20

37. International investigations are also ongoing into TikTok’s practices, which all seek to 

prevent the abuse of data collection and potential for national security risks. 

38. Just recently, a Dutch privacy watchdog has announced that it will conduct an investigation 

of the TikTok App to determine whether the information provided to children “adequately explains how 

their personal data is collected, processed and used.”21

39. In July 2019, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office’s representative 

Elizabeth Denham stated, “We are looking at the transparency tools for children . . . We’re looking at the 

messaging system, which is completely open, we’re looking at the kind of videos that are collected and 

shared by children online. We do have an active investigation into TikTok right now, so watch this 

space.”22 The investigation is ongoing.23

 

18 Id.

19 Georgia Wells & Kate O’Keeffe, U.S. Orders Chinese Firm to Sell Dating App Grindr Over 

Blackmail Risk, The Wall Street Journal (March 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-orderschinese-company-to-sell-grindr-app-11553717942. 

20 Alexandra S. Levine, Senate bill would ban TikTok on federal employees’ work phones, Politico (Mar. 

12, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/12/senate-bill-would-ban-tiktok-on-federalemployees-work-phones-126727. 

21 Stephani Bodoni, TikTok Faces Dutch Privacy Probe Over Children’s Data, Bloomberg Quint (May 

8, 2020), https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/tiktok-faces-dutch-privacy-probe-over-safety-ofchildren-s-data. 

22 Alex Hern, TikTok under investigation over child data use, The Guardian (Jul. 2, 2019), 

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/02/tiktok-under-investigation-over-child-data-use. 

23 Press Association, UK data regulator hones in on TikTok as it makes child safety top priority for 2020

(Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.breakingnews.ie/world/uk-data-regulator-hones-in-on-tiktok-as-it-makeschild-safety-top-priority-for-2020-972258.html. 

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40. The Italian Data Privacy Authority (DPA) launched a review of TikTok’s collection and 

handling of users’ data and called on the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) to set up an ad hoc task 

force regarding the same.24

41. Investigations and bans by regulators exemplify the extreme disregard Defendants have 

shown for the privacy and security of its users. 

C. TikTok Automatically Transfers Users’ Personally Identifiable Information to 

Corporate Affiliates Around the World 

42. Unbeknownst to users, TikTok is transferring users’ personally identifiable video viewing 

information to TikTok’s corporate affiliate. TikTok transfers this information to ByteDance Ltd. through 

at least three domains: maliva-mcs.byteoversea.com, sgali-mcs.byteoversea.com and monva.byteoversea.com. Upon information and belief, these domains are owned and operated by ByteDance 

Ltd. and are hosted in China. 

43. TikTok transfers to ByteDance Ltd. information on videos viewed by the user as well as 

several unique identifying numbers (“Unique Identifiers”) associated with the user. TikTok assigns each 

user a user identification number (“UID”). TikTok transmits this UID to ByteDance along with other 

personal information while a user is logged on to the platform. When a user visits her profile page, TikTok 

pairs the UID and other Unique Identifiers with the user’s account name, profile page, and any additional 

information contained on the profile pages, such as a written biography or videos viewed by the user on 

her profile. In this way, ByteDance Ltd. can easily associate Unique Identifiers with the individual user. 

44. For example, if a user has “liked” a video shared by the account of @Jasonderulo, she can 

view it from her profile page. When the user views this video, TikTok transmits the following information 

to the domain of either maliva-mcs.byteoversea.com or sgali-mcs.byteoversea.com: 

a. UID (e.g. 682319*************”), a unique UID, a Service Set Identifier or (SSID) 

associated with the user’s WiFi network, and a web_ID; 

b. The user’s account name, which is included in the page_url (e.g. 

https://www.tiktok.com/@bob*******); 

 

24 Dario Betti, TikTok under review by European Privacy authorities (Jan. 29, 2020), 

https://mobileecosystemforum.com/2020/01/29/tik-tok-under-review-by-european-privacy-authorities/. 

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c. The time the user watched the video (e.g. “Thu Jun 04 2020 10:52:19 GMT-0700 (Pacific 

Daylight Time)”); 

d. The overall duration of the video (e.g. “15.115”); 

e. The “play_duration,”: which indicates how long the video was viewed (e.g. 4.3269244); 

and 

f. The precise URL of the video.25 

45. The information transmitted to these two domains also includes the region where the user 

resides by country (e.g. U.S.), time-zone of the user and the user’s device information. 

46. TikTok associates the same UID to an individual user when it shares information to 

ByteDance Ltd. When a user logs on to TikTok from a new device, TikTok then begins associating the 

same UID to that user. Even after a user has cleared her browser history and cleared her cookies, TikTok 

will continue pairing the same UID with the video viewing information it transmits to ByteDance while 

the user is logged on. The additional Unique Identifiers that TikTok transmits allow ByteDance to continue 

identifying user’s viewing activity even when the user is no longer logged on but is still viewing videos 

on the platform. 

47. As the user navigates through videos on TikTok’s platform, TikTok continues to transfer 

user’s personally identifying video viewing history. For example, if the user then watches a video hosted 

on the content creator page @johnlegendofficial, TikTok transmits the following information to either 

maliva-mcs.byteoversea.com or sgali-mcs.byteoversea.com: 

a. The same User Identifiers associated with that user including the UID (e.g.

682319*************”), unique UID, SSID, and web_id; 

b. The time the user watched the video (e.g. “Thu Jun 04 2020 10:52:19 GMT-0700 (Pacific 

Daylight Time)”); 

 

25 For purposes of illustrating this example, e.g. 

https://v19.tiktokcdn.com/d750332c6ea1a13ae7fd03d218dc3b8a/5ed98954/video/tos/useast2a/tosuseast2a-ve0068c001/8c33500946d64b6a87c21c8ce8f74ae7/?a=1233&br=3430&bt=1715&cr=0&cs=0&dr=0&ds=

3&er=&l=20200604175237010189195216022B7F7F&lr=tiktok_m&mime_type=video_mp4&qs=0&rc

=amU7d3V5eWhndDMzaDczM0ApZjc0Ojo2OTs5N2gzO2Q6O2duZ3NhMV8wcmxfLS0vMTZzc2M

0Li81NWAzM18xXi8zM146Yw%3D%3D&vl=&vr=","event_index":1591293671691. 

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c. The overall duration of the video (e.g. “27.236”); 

d. The “play_duration,”: which indicates how long the video was viewed (e.g. 8.7599897); 

and 

e. The precise URL for the video.26 

48. Because TikTok pairs UIDs and other User Identifiers with additional information showing 

users’ video viewing history, users’ video viewing history are readily identifiable. TikTok continues to 

transmit personally identifiable video viewing history even after a user has logged out of her account. 

49. Likewise, TikTok transmits video viewing information to mon-va.byteoversea.com that is 

paired with a unique identifier titled SLARDAR_WEB_ID. For example, if a user visits the page of 

content creator @willsmith and watches a video, TikTok transmits: 

a. The specific URL of the video 

(e.g. https://www.tiktok.com/@willsmith/video/6820541348022652166?lang=US); 

b. The SLARDAR_WEB_ID of the user (e.g. c3754625-0ed7-468d-9d98-910e7a******). 

50. When a user visits her home page, the SLARDAR_WEB_ID can be easily associated with 

a user’s profile name because TikTok transfers the User’s homepage URL which includes the user name 

along with the SLARDAR_WEB_ID. A screenshot example of a portion of what TikTok transmits to 

mon-va.byteoversea.com is shown below: 

 

26 For purposes of demonstrating this example, e.g., 

https://v16m.tiktokcdn.com/3ebf23bd9093f580fbea179aa6777fae/5ed995fb/video/tos/useast2a/tosuseast2a-ve0068c002/77397da4922848edb50deb52565453c8/?a=1233&br=3438&bt=1719&cr=0&cs=0&dr=0&ds

=3&er=&l=202006041846240101890660473735C389&lr=tiktok_m&mime_type=video_mp4&qs=0&r

c=MztmNzQ8a2pqdTMzaDczM0ApNDxpZjxmZzszN2hkNzg6ZWcvY3EvXmluNTZfLS1jMTZzcy5f

MS00Ly4uMF8zNDEvY2A6Yw%3D%3D&vl=&vr=","event_index":1591295427844. 

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51. TikTok continues to transfer video viewing history associated with the 

SLARDAR_WEB_ID to ByteDance Ltd., even after a user has logged off of her account. 

D. TikTok’s Targeted Advertising Practices 

52. TikTok currently allows for targeted advertising based on age, gender, location, operating 

system, and network on the device.27

53. Additionally, TikTok targets advertisements based users’ interests and video viewing 

preferences, such as beauty, fashion, and food.28 Though the feature has not yet been released in the U.S., 

TikTok has already released a native audience network in China and Japan, which will allow advertisers 

to place TikTok ads based on each user’s video viewing preferences on a network of apps across devices.29

54. TikTok also allows advertisers to coordinate pairing users’ contact data, website traffic, 

app activity, or ad engagement with other TikTok data in order to create custom target audiences for 

advertising.30

55. TikTok also continuously transmits to and exchanges information with companies such as 

Facebook and Appsflyer about users’ video views, subscribed channels, and search terms entered on 

 

27 Ad Targeting, TikTok Ads, https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=6721969269619294213 (Last 

accessed June 5, 2020). 

28 Interest Targeting, TikTok Ads, https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=6730493704647213061 (Last 

accessed June 5, 2020). 

29 Shubham Agarwal, Get ready for targeted ads based on your TikTok watch history (Aug. 27, 2019), 

https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/tiktok-advertiser-audience-network-targeted-ads/. 

30 Kristi Hines, The Complete Guide to TikTok Advertising for Marketers (March 16, 2020), 

https://blog.hootsuite.com/tiktok-advertising/. 

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TikTok.31 The information received from Facebook contains an advertising ID that can be assigned to a 

Facebook user when the user is logged into her Facebook account.32

56. The advertising practices show no sign of slowing down and, in fact, TikTok has stated the 

opposite is true, promising more “interest, behavioral, and more granular [demographic] targeting over 

time.”33

E. TikTok’s Unlawful Use of Biometric Identifiers and Information 

57. The Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act was enacted in 2008 to regulate the 

collection and use of biometrics. The statute recognizes that biometrics “unlike other unique identifiers” 

cannot be changed when compromised.34

58. Under the BIPA, biometric identifiers means “retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or 

scan of hand or face geometry” and biometric information means “any information, regardless of how it 

is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an 

individual.”35

59. The statute further provides that:36

(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or 

otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric 

information unless it first: 

(1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in 

writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being 

collected or stored; 

 

31 Matthias Eberl, How TikTok monitors its users, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Dec. 4, 2019), 

https://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/tiktok-ueberwachung-daten-kritik-1.4709779 (Google Translation). 

32 Id.

33 Mikey Dunn, What You Need to Know About Advertising on TikTok (Aug. 20, 2019), 

https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-advertising-on-tiktok/561235/. 

34 740 ILCS 14/5(c). 

35 Id. 

36 740 ILCS 14/15. 

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(2) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in 

writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric 

identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and 

(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 

identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized 

representative. . . . 

60. Additionally, the statute provides that:37

[A] private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information 

must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 

biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such 

identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s 

last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. 

61. When a user creates a video on the TikTok App, the user can choose to apply effects that 

will apply a graphic animation onto the face of the user or that will alter the facial features of the user. 

TikTok categorizes these effects in groups labeled “Beauty,” “Trending,” and “Funny,” to encourage users 

to access them. Users also have the option to use a face tracking lens that will detect and automatically 

zoom in on a user’s face. 

62. The Musical.ly App operated similar to the current version of the TikTok App, and also 

scanned, collected, and stored a user’s facial geometry when that user applied a facial graphic feature, 

such as a sticker or facial filter. 

63. One form of marketing offered by TikTok also includes “branded lenses,” similar to the 

face filters already offered by TikTok, but allowing companies to provide their own filters.38

 

37 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

38 Mikey Dunn, What You Need to Know About Advertising on TikTok, Social Media Today (Aug. 20, 

2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-advertising-ontiktok/561235/. 

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64. Unbeknownst to the user, when a user engages in these features, TikTok collects, stores 

and maintains a copy of the user’s facial geometry as well as biometric information derived from this 

copy. TikTok does not disclose to users that this information is being collected and stored, and it does not 

disclose how, or for how long, it is maintained. 

65. Based upon preliminary expert analysis, the code is written in a specific way in order to 

extract facial landmarks and identify users’ faces in images, specifically to identify where the face is, 

transform the representation of the face to an internal representation—to make geometry manipulation 

easier—and then convert it back to the pixels that are shown to users. 

66. Upon information and belief, TikTok transfers copies of the users’ facial geometry and 

derivative information to other corporate entities including Defendant ByteDance, Inc. 

67. Preliminary expert analysis indicates that the video search functionality of the TikTok app 

would be severely diminished if TikTok was not storing biometric data as alleged herein. Web analysts 

have discovered that TikTok appears to harvest biometric data in order to create a search function—

allowing users to search TikTok videos based upon the individuals who appear in them. And the App’s 

use of face scanning allows users to “decorat[e] or distort[] their faces, all easily edited into a clip for other 

users to ‘like,’ ‘share’ or comment on.”39 Based upon counsel’s investigation, such search functions could 

not be efficiently performed if the data were not cached. That is, a search would otherwise take days.40

68. Preliminary expert analysis also suggests TikTok may analyze users’ faces even when they 

do not post videos and only post a profile picture.41 For example, TikTok provides content 

recommendations based upon TikTok users’ physical appearance: an artificial intelligence researcher at 

University of California Berkeley School of Information “found that TikTok was recommending him 

 

39 Nick Frisch, We Should Worry About How China Uses Apps Like TikTok, NY Times (May 2, 2019), 

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/02/opinion/will-china-export-its-illiberal-innovation.html. 

40 Shubham Agarwal, TikTok’s creepy new feature lets you search for videos based on people’s faces, 

Digital Trends (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/tiktok-facial-recognitionvideo-face-search-feature-china/. 

41 Marc Faddoul via Twitter: “A TikTok novelty: FACE-BASED FILTER BUBBLES,” 

https://twitter.com/MarcFaddoul/status/1232014908536938498 (Last visited June 5, 2020). 

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accounts with profile pictures that matched the same race, age or facial characteristics as the ones he 

already followed.”42

69. Additional concerns regarding the links between the American and Chinese version of 

TikTok—and in particular censorship, surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software—have also 

raised alarms for consumer advocacy groups.43

70. TikTok’s heavy reliance on artificial intelligence and machine learning has also set off 

alarms with consumer advocacy groups, especially that the Chinese version of TikTok allows its users to 

perform facial recognition on faces selected by users from other users’ videos.44

71. TikTok makes no effort to disclose to users how their biometric information is used or 

stored prior to their using the App. 

F. TikTok’s Collection and Disclosure of Users’ Watch History 

72. Upon launching the App, a user will see a page of videos that TikTok labels “For You.” 

This is a customized collection of videos that Defendants have curated that they believe will meet a user’s 

taste and interest the user based upon the users “likes” of prior videos. The vast bulk of those videos are 

likely from people the user does not know, collated by the App’s algorithm.45

73. TikTok’s algorithm is designed to ensure that users see videos and content that they like. 

This algorithm also allows advertisers to design and optimize ad campaigns to users that are more likely 

to click on them.46

 

42 Maria Mellor, Why is TikTok creating filter bubbles based on your race?, Wired (Feb. 28, 2020), 

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/tiktok-filter-bubbles. 

43 Id.; TikTok: Should we trust the Chinese social-media video app?, BBC News (Nov. 7, 2019), 

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50319690. 

44 Dan Robitzki, TikTok Tracks Users With Facial Recognition, Futurism.com (Sept. 19, 2019), 

https://futurism.com/the-byte/tiktok-facial-recognition; Adan Kohnhorst, TikTok’s New “Video Search” 

Function is From the Future, Radii (Sept. 26, 2019), https://radiichina.com/tiktok-new-video-searchfunction-is-from-the-future/. 

45 How to Feature on TikTok’s “For You” Page, Influencer Marketing Hub (Apr. 16, 2020), 

https://influencermarketinghub.com/tiktok-for-you-page/. 

46 How Does Advertising on TikTok Work?, Influencer Marketing Hub (Jan. 3, 2020), 

https://influencermarketinghub.com/advertising-on-tiktok/. 

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74. Although TikTok only currently allows demographic targeting, the company may engage 

in interest, behavioral, and more granular demo marketing over time.47

75. While TikTok innocuously claims that its data collection for advertising purposes allows 

companies to “[t]ap into unique engagement solutions and immersive formats to creatively and 

authentically connect without audiences around the world,”48 consumer privacy experts have asserted 

legitimate concerns over TikTok’s connection to the Chinese government, and the possibility that 

TikTok’s robust collection of user information could be used without appropriate consent, and for 

improper purposes.49

76. TikTok is a video streaming service that regularly delivers video content to users and 

maintains a cache of videos and virtual materials, including content from users, verified users, and 

advertisers. 

77. TikTok’s terms state that it discloses users’ “video watches,” as well as usernames, device 

IDs and IP addresses, and other device activity.50 In order to disclose this information, based upon 

information and belief, Plaintiffs believe that TikTok would also share the personalized profile of users 

that it uses to deliver highly-specific content to other users.51

78. TikTok does not provide distinct and separate disclosure regarding users’ video watches, 

nor does it require written consent distinct from other forms of consent or obligations either at the time 

TikTok sought to disclose users’ video viewing histories or in advance of sharing those viewing histories 

for a set duration of time. 

 

47 Mikey Dunn, What You Need to Know About Advertising on TikTok, Social Media Today (Aug. 20, 

2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-advertising-ontiktok/561235/. 

48 TikTok Ads, TikTok, https://ads.tiktok.com/homepage/ (last accessed June 6, 2020). 

49 Justin Sherman, Unpacking TikTok, Mobile Apps and National Security Risks, Lawfare (Apr. 2, 

2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/unpacking-tiktok-mobile-apps-and-national-security-risks. 

50 Privacy policy, TikTok (Jan. 2020) https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en. 

51 Jia Tolentino, How TikTok Holds Our Attention, New Yorker (Sept. 23, 2019),

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/30/how-tiktok-holds-our-attention. 

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G. TikTok’s Collection of Stored Communications and Messaging History 

79. In addition to the privacy concerns raised by TikTok’s other practices, the app regularly 

“collect[s] and process[es] [messages], which includes scanning and analyzing, information you provide, 

in the context of composing, sending, or receiving messages through our Service's messaging 

functionality,” and that the information collected “includes the content of the message and information 

about when the message has been sent, received and/or read, as well as the participants of the 

communication.” 52

80. Users’ messages are transmitted from the users’ mobile device to TikTok’s servers, and 

from TikTok’s servers to its affiliates’ servers located abroad. TikTok allows users to send and receive 

messages, and it retains those messages in storage.

81. TikTok’s terms state that it discloses this information to business partners and corporate 

affiliates.53 With respect to TikTok’s business partners, the terms state that TikTok will share users’ 

information it collects (including messages) with business partners “to help perform business operations 

and for business purposes . . . including research, payment processing and transaction fulfillment, database 

maintenance, administering contests and special offers, technology services, deliveries, email deployment, 

advertising, analytics, measurement, data storage and hosting, disaster recovery, search engine 

optimization, marketing, and data processing.”54

82. In response to an inquiry about TikTok’s data transfer to Chinese affiliates, TikTok 

spokesperson stated that as of February 2019 that TikTok user data is stored and processed in the U.S. and 

other markets where TikTok operates at industry-leading third-party data centers. The spokesperson went 

on to state that data still would be shared with others in their corporate group for the explained purposes, 

but never explained that purpose.

 

52 Privacy policy, TikTok (Jan. 2020) https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en. 

53 Id. 

54 Id. 

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83. There is also a close connection between ByteDance Ltd. of TikTok. Kevin Mayer, former 

Walt Disney Company streaming executive, will be the CEO of TikTok and COO of ByteDance Ltd.55 

84. ByteDance has goals of being an international player for quite some time. One former 

ByteDance manager who left in 2019 stated: “They want to be a global company, and numbers-wise, 

they’ve had that success. . . But the purse is still in China: The money always comes from there, and the 

decisions all come from there.”56

85. TikTok’s sharing with corporate affiliates falls outside the scope of the above terms. The 

terms state that TikTok will share personal information (including messages) with its corporate affiliates 

to “improv[e] and optimis[e] the Platform, preventing illegal use and supporting users.”57 Yet TikTok’s 

sharing with its corporate parent in China, as well as potentially the Chinese government, does not clearly 

fall under the scope of this provision since it does not clearly improve or optimize TikTok’s platform.58

86. As such, neither Plaintiffs nor the class have provided the appropriate consent in order for 

TikTok to legally share this information.

H. Defendants Obscure The Terms of Use and Privacy Policy 

87. TikTok also makes no effort to ensure users see the full text of the Terms of Use and 

Privacy Policy. When downloading the App, one step of the process invites users to “Text [themselves] a 

link to download TikTok.” This action is tied to the smallest text on the page though, which also places 

the small gray text on a black background, making the text less readable.59

 

55 Brooks Barnes and Jack Nicas, Disney’s Head of Streaming Is New TikTok C.E.O., The New York 

Times (May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/business/media/tiktok-ceo-kevinmayer.html?searchResultPosition=3. 

56 Drew Harwell and Tony Romm, Inside TikTok: A culture clash where U.S. views about censorship 

often were overridden by the Chinese bosses, The Washington Post (Nov. 5, 2019), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-us-viewsabout-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

57 Id.

58 Helen Ehrlich, TikTok is Scamming People & Stealing Information, Affinity Magazine (Nov. 4, 

2018), http://culture.affinitymagazine.us/tik-tok-is-scamming-people-stealing-information/. 

59 Users are able to view videos without having to create an account. However, when they want to post 

content to the platform, they are required to go through a mandatory sign-in process where viewing the 

Terms of Service and Privacy Policy is not mandatory. 

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88. The text states, “By clicking the ‘send’ button, you confirm that you agree to our Terms of 

Use and acknowledge you have read and understood our Privacy Policy.” But the Terms of Use and 

Privacy Policy documents are not featured on the page nor is review presented as a mandatory step for 

using the App. 

89. TikTok intends this design to have the effect of a clickthrough legal agreement—in other 

words, when users click the “send” button, TikTok considers this to be acceptance of a contract. But 

TikTok has made a number of design decisions that increase the likelihood of the legal agreement not 

being noticed by the end user. Specifically: 

a. The text is the smallest text on the page. This reduces the legibility of the information and 

makes it possible for users to simply not notice it; 

b. The text is in low contrast. The text is gray (#DCDCDE), on a black (#000000) background, 

making the contrast so low that it fails the WCAG 2.0 success criterion 1.4.6 pass indicator 

for fonts below 18 points, making it likely that consumers will not be able to read or notice 

the text; 

c. The text is positioned below the “send” button—meaning that in certain situations, some 

users may have their viewpoint arranged so that the legal agreement is hidden “below the 

fold” (i.e., off-screen), and they proceed to the next page never having read the text; 

d. The Terms of Use and Privacy Policy documents are not presented as a mandatory step, 

nor is the user required to select a checkbox or radio button to explicitly indicate that they 

have read and understood them (meaning that a user can tap the “send” button without 

noticing or reading the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy). 

90. Importantly, a user can install the TikTok app and become a TikTok content customer 

without proceeding through a clickthrough agreement containing the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. 

For example, the user may go directly to the Apple iOS App Store, download the App, and start using it 

to look at videos. In that series of steps, the user is not shown any information about, nor links to the 

Terms of Use or Privacy Policy. 

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91. TikTok’s designers have the ability to ensure that consumers read TikTok’s Terms of 

Service and Privacy Policy, but it has elected not to do so. For example, TikTok designers have required 

users to provide their birthday (meaning that 100% of users who complete the sign-up process must 

provide a date of birth, but not all users will have read the Terms of Use or Privacy Policy). 

92. Requiring consumers to read and review terms of use with an explicit opt-in has been 

common practice in the design of end-user license agreements since the 1990s. 

93. By making the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy difficult to read, and by not requiring 

consumers to read those documents, Defendants are able to hide terms that insulate them from lawsuits. 

TikTok requires users to arbitrate their disputes, complete with a ban on participation in class actions; 

however, few users would understand that they have consented to these terms—because they are not 

required to read them before using TikTok. 

94. Given TikTok’s deliberate design choices to prevent consumers from receiving notice of 

what information is being disclosed, TikTok’s arbitration clause and class action ban is void and 

unenforceable. 

I. TikTok’s Rise in Popularity During the Novel Coronavirus 2019 Pandemic 

95. Official reports as of April 21, 2020 stated that TikTok has over 500 million monthly users, 

and has been downloaded over 1 billion times on the Google Play Store.60 The application is being 

downloaded and used more now than ever before in its history, likely due to the severe acute respiratory 

syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2 or “COVID-19”) pandemic and resulting quarantines. Many 

celebrities and internationally known athletes have downloaded the app and millions of others use the app 

as a means of staying entertained during these times.61

96. According to a recent article in Music Business Worldwide, the app was downloaded 2 

million times in the week of March 16th—around the time of many shutdown and stay-at-home orders 

 

60 Tara Johnson, The Rise of TikTok During COVID-19, Tinuiti (Apr. 21, 2020), 

https://tinuiti.com/blog/marketing-news-covid-19/tiktok-covid-19/. 

61 Id. 

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throughout the world.62 According to the report, this marked an 18% increase in downloads from the week 

before.63 There was an increase of 27% to download rates throughout the first 23 days of March as well, 

again covering the span of the initial quarantine orders.64 It has been so linked to the shutdowns that the 

hashtag #boredathome—tied to Curtis Roach’s song “Bored in the House”—was trending during the same 

time period, which was used where users were showing what they were doing just to pass the time, “while 

bored stuck in the house.”65

97. The COVID-19 pandemic is impacting the nation’s political landscape as well, forcing 

many campaigns and officeholders to do more work online.66 

98. CNN Business emphasized the platform’s utility for millions of users in allowing them to 

bring out their creativity during quarantine.67 PRNewswire developed an entire webinar in 2020 titled 

“TikTok: Best Practices & How to Make it Work for Your Brand During the COVID-19 Pandemic.”68

Even therapists are utilizing the app in order to assist users in getting through quarantine and the 

pandemic.69

 

62 Murray Stassen, Coronavirus Quarantine Appears to be Driving a Global TikTok Download Boom, 

Music Business Worldwide (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/coronavirusquarantine-appears-to-be-driving-a-global-tiktok-download-boom/. 

63 Id.

64 James Crowley, TikTok Users Soar Now that Everybody Is at Home Trying to Get Famous, 

Newsweek (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/tiktok-users-soar-viral-videos-coronaviruscovid-19-1494229, (“With people stuck at home self-isolating, TikTok has seen a spike in users and 

downloads as more people try to get their videos to go as viral as COVID-19. Sorry, the joke had to be 

made.”). 

65 Id.

66 Samanta J. Gross, As COVID-19 forces campaigns to go digital, Florida Democrats lag behind GOP, 

Tampa Bay Times (May 24, 2020, https://www.tampabay.com/news/health/2020/05/24/as-covid-19-

forces-campaigns-to-go-digital-florida-democrats-lag-behind-gop/; TikTok becomes political platform 

ahead of US election, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/c4c09793-993e-4ffd-9e46-

2c609f98b79d. 

67 Quarantine bringing out creativity for millions on TikTok, CNN Business, 

https://edition.cnn.com/videos/media/2020/05/15/max-foster-tik-tok-during-lockdown-pkg-vpx.cnn. 

68 Webinar: Best Practices & How to Make it Work for Your Brand During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 

https://www.prnewsonline.com/webinars/tik-tok-best-practices-how-to-make-it-work-for-your-brand/. 

69 Kaya Yurieff, These therapists are using TikTok to help you get through the pandemic, CNN Business 

(May 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/15/tech/tiktok-therapists/index.html. 

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99. TikTok has seen a boom in users and downloads since the onset of this pandemic and 

continues to see the breadth of usership expand into all fields of professional life and all age ranges. The 

application has appealed to nearly everyone, with over 2 billion downloads to-date, and is one of the most 

utilized apps during quarantine by users of all backgrounds. 

J. Fraudulent Concealment and Tolling 

100. All applicable statutes of limitation have been tolled by Defendants’ knowing and active 

fraudulent concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein through the time period relevant to this 

action. 

101. Instead of disclosing Defendants’ practice of collecting, storing, using and disclosing users’ 

biometric identifiers and biometric information, as well as users’ personally identifiable information and 

video viewing information, Defendants concealed this practice from users by not disclosing it to users or 

making this information otherwise available. Defendants concealed this information to encourage users to 

download and use the App. 

102. Despite reasonable diligence on their part, Plaintiffs remained ignorant of the factual bases 

for their claims for relief. Defendants’ withholding of material facts concealed the claims alleged herein 

and tolled all applicable statutes of limitation. 

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 

103. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated 

individuals. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of: 

Nationwide Class: All persons residing in the United States who have used 

the Musical.ly and TikTok Apps on their mobile devices. 

104. Plaintiffs also bring this class action on behalf of themselves and the following subclasses: 

California Subclass: All Nationwide Class members who, while residing in 

California, used the Musical.ly and TikTok Apps on their mobile devices. 

Illinois Subclass: All Nationwide Class members, who while residing in 

Illinois, used face filters, face stickers, or the face tracker lens on an image or 

video of their face or whose face appeared in a video uploaded to the Mucial.ly 

or TikTok Apps while residing in Illinois. 

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105. Excluded from the Class and subclasses are Defendants, any entity in which any Defendant 

has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers, directors, employees, assigns and 

successors. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice or judicial officer presiding over this matter 

and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 

106. Numerosity. The number of members in the Class (and subclasses) is so numerous that 

joinder is impracticable. The precise number of class members can be determined through discovery, 

including discovery of Defendants’ business records, by reference to objective criteria. At a minimum, the 

Class is made up of thousands of members. 

107. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate. There are questions of law and fact 

common to Plaintiffs and class members, and those questions predominate over any questions that may 

affect any individual class member. Such common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited 

to: 

a. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above and as alleged below 

constitute violations of the statutory causes of action alleged herein; 

b. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices, if they did constitute violations of the 

statutory causes of action alleged herein, were willful; 

c. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above constitute quantum meruit 

concerning which restitution and/or disgorgement is warranted; 

d. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the class sustained damages as a result of Defendants' 

activities and practices referenced above, and, if so, in what amount; 

e. Whether Defendants profited from their activities and practices referenced above, and, if 

so, in what amount; and 

f. Whether Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. 

108. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all members of the Class and 

subclasses. Their claims arise from the same practices and conduct that give rise to the claims of all class 

members and are based on the same legal theories. 

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109. Adequacy. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. They have 

no interests antagonistic to those of the other class members and are committed to vigorously prosecuting 

this case. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in consumer class actions and complex litigation 

involving privacy and data security. 

110. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of this controversy. Given that the relative amount of each Class member’s is small relative 

to the expense of litigating those claims, and given Defendants’ financial resources, no Class member is 

likely seek legal redress on an individual basis for the violations alleged in this complaint. Individual 

actions would significantly increase the expense to all parties, burden the court with duplicative litigation, 

and create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of 

conduct for Defendants. Separate actions by individual class members would also risk adjudications that 

would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 

individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. A 

class action, however, promotes an orderly and expeditious adjudication of the Class claims, presents 

fewer management difficulties, and ensures comprehensive supervision in a single forum. 

111. Injunctive Relief Appropriate. Defendants acted and refused to act on grounds generally 

applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the members of 

the Class as a whole. 

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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

NATIONWIDE CAUSES OF ACTION 

COUNT I 

VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, et seq. 

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class, and, in the alternative, Subclasses) 

112. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully set 

forth herein. 

113. The mobile devices belonging to Plaintiffs and class members are “protected computers” 

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) in that they are “used in or affecting interstate or foreign 

commerce or communication[.]” 

114. Defendants caused Plaintiffs and class members to download and install the App to their 

mobile devices without informing users that the App contained code that went beyond what users expected 

the App to do, the information that was collected by the App, and the information that was disclosed by 

the App. 

115. By surreptitiously collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs’ and class members’ personally 

identifiable information without prior disclosure and consent, Defendant knowingly exceeded its 

authorized access to Plaintiffs’ and class members’ protected computers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(a)(2)(C). 

116. Defendants’ actions caused injuries to users as set forth herein because of the numerous 

threats to public safety caused by Defendants’ surreptitious violations of user privacy, and failure to obtain 

consent before collecting and disclosing certain user information. 

117. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and class members, accordingly seek compensatory 

damages, injunctive relief, and other equitable relief as allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 

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COUNT II 

VIOLATION OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 

18 U.S.C. § 2710, et seq. 

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class, and, in the alternative, Subclasses) 

118. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully set 

forth herein. 

119. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs as though alleged fully herein. 

120. The VPPA provides that “a video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any 

person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer shall be liable to the aggrieved 

person for the relief provided in subsection (d).” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). Defendant TikTok violated this 

statute by knowingly disclosing personally identifiable information to ByteDance Ltd. and other corporate 

affiliates. 

121. Defendant TikTok is a “video tape service provider” under 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) because 

it “engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery of 

prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio-visual materials.” TikTok is engaged in the business of 

delivering video content and services to its users, including Plaintiffs. TikTok’s platform allows users to 

create, post, share, view, and otherwise engage with videos. TikTok platform is built to deliver video 

content to consumers. TikTok regularly delivered videos to TikTok’s subscribers, including Plaintiffs, by 

making those materials electronically available to Plaintiffs on TikTok’s platform. TikTok also allowed 

users to create, and share videos with a non-public audience. 

122. Plaintiffs and class members are “consumers” under 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) because they 

are “subscriber[s] of goods or services” from TikTok. Plaintiffs and class members are registered TikTok 

users who use the website and mobile application through interaction with it. Plaintiffs and class members 

were required to provide personally identifiable information to TikTok, including date of birth, in order 

to sign up, become registered users, establish user profiles, to subscribe to “follow” other accounts, and 

to contribute to TikTok’s video streaming content. By signing up for accounts with TikTok, becoming 

registered users, establishing user profiles, providing TikTok with personal information, and spending 

time and attention using and contributing to TikTok’s video streaming platform, Plaintiffs and class 

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members entered into transactions with TikTok to obtain access to TikTok’s content and services and for 

the purpose of subscribing to TikTok’s video streaming content and services. 

123. The VPPA defines “personally identifiable information” to “include[] information which 

identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape 

service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)(3). TikTok “knowingly disclose[d]” to corporate affiliates 

users’ personally identifiable information, including what videos a user has watched; whether a user has 

engaged with videos by downloading, liking, commenting and/or sharing the video; how long the user 

views the video; whether the user saves the video to their “Favorites” page; and accounts the user follows. 

TikTok’s disclosure also included personally identifiable information because the information shared 

included a user’s: username, device information, and location data. 

124. Defendant TikTok disclosed personally identifiable information to corporate affiliate, 

ByteDance Ltd., through the transfer to at least three domains: maliva-mcs.byteoversea.com, sgalimcs.byteoversea.com, and mon-va.byteoversea.com. Upon information and belief, these domains are 

owned and operated by ByteDance Ltd. 

125. Every time a user visits the platform, TikTok transfers to ByteDance Ltd., through the 

domain of either mon-va.byteoversea.com or sgali-mcs.byteoversea.com: the URL of the video watched; 

the duration that the user watched the video for; and the time the user watched it. TikTok also sends to 

ByteDance: the user’s UID, unique UID, SSID, and web_ID. 

126. TikTok transfers to ByteDance, through the domain mon-va.byteoversea.com domain: the 

specific URL of the video watched by the user and the unique identifier titled SLARDAR_WEB_ID. 

127. TikTok maintains the same UID for each individual user. While a user is logged on to the 

platform, TikTok pairs the same UID with the video viewing information it transmits to ByteDance Ltd. 

This UID follows the user every time she logs on to the platform regardless of the device, and even after 

she may have cleared her browser history and cookies. The additional Unique Identifiers that TikTok 

transmits to ByteDance, allow ByteDance to continue identifying users’ viewing activity even when they 

are not logged on but are still viewing videos on the platform. When the user visits her profile page, these 

Unique Identifiers are easily linked to the user’s account name, and profile page. The profile page contains 

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information that can further identify individuals by name since it includes an uploaded biography and 

videos that the user has shared. 

128. TikTok’s pairing of personal information, including user’s account name and Unique 

Identifiers, with users’ video viewing history violates the VPPA because it readily shows which requested 

or obtained specific video materials. 

129. TikTok did not inform users of its pattern and practice of disclosing personally identifiable 

information and does not obtain their consent to such disclosure. 

130. Unlawful disclosure of personally identifiable information concerning Plaintiffs and class 

members was not incident to the “ordinary course of business” of delivering the visual content as that term 

is defined by the VPPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). The disclosure of users’ personally identifiable 

information to third parties not involved in the transactions as alleged herein was not necessary in order 

for TikTok to deliver those prerecorded visual materials to Plaintiffs and class members. 

131. The VPPA also provides that a video tape service provider may nonetheless disclose 

personally identifiable information concerning a consumer as long as that person has provided “informed 

written consent . . . in a form distinct and separate from any form setting forth other legal or financial 

obligations of the consumer.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A)(i). 

132. However, TikTok failed to obtain the “informed, written consent” of Plaintiffs and class 

members “in a form distinct and separate from any form setting forth other legal or financial obligations 

of the consumer” and “at the election of the consumer,” either “given at the time the disclosure is sought” 

or “given in advance for a set period of time, not to exceed 2 years or until consent is withdrawn by the 

consumer, whichever is soon.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). No TikTok document complied with 

these requirements. 

133. The VPPA also requires that “[a] person subject to the section shall destroy personally 

identifiable information as soon as practicable, but no later than one year from the date the information is 

no longer necessary for the purposes for which it was collected . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e). Upon 

information and belief, TikTok does not destroy this information and maintains users’ personally 

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identifiable information despite the fact that it is no longer necessary for purposes of delivering the 

prerecorded visual information, in violation of the VPPA. 

134. On behalf of themselves and other class members, Plaintiffs seek to recover awarded actual 

damages, not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500 per Plaintiff, punitive damages, 

attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other preliminary and equitable relief as the Court determines to be 

appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2). 

COUNT III 

QUANTUM MERUIT TO RECOVER SUMS HAD BY UNJUST ENRICHMENT

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class, and, in the alternative, Subclasses) 

135. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully set 

forth herein. 

136. Plaintiffs bring this count to pursue restitution based on Defendants’ unjust enrichment, 

including by way of Defendants’ retention of profits that should have been expended to protect Plaintiff’s 

data as required by law. 

137. Defendants have unjustly received and retained monetary benefit from Plaintiffs and class 

members—i.e., by way of their use of, and profiting from, their data under unjust circumstances, such that 

inequity has resulted. 

138. By engaging in the conduct described in this complaint, Defendants knowingly obtained 

benefits from Plaintiffs and class members as alleged herein under circumstances such that it would be 

inequitable and unjust for Defendants to retain them. 

139. Defendants will be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the benefits derived from 

unlawful gathering and sharing of Plaintiff’s and class members’ data. 

140. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to restitution in an amount to be determined at trial, or the 

imposition of a constructive trust upon the monies derived by Defendants by means of the above-described 

actions, or as the circumstances may merit to provide complete relief to Plaintiffs. 

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STATE SUBCLASS CAUSES OF ACTION 

COUNT IV 

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC PRIVACY ACT 

FAILURE TO OBTAIN INFORMED, WRITTEN CONSENT 

740 ILCS 14/15(b)

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Johnson and the Illinois Subclass) 

141. Plaintiff Johnson incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if 

fully set forth herein. 

142. The BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to “collect, capture, purchase, receive 

through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information 

unless it first: (1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in writing that a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the 

subject’s legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which 

a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a 

written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s 

legally authorized representative.” 740 ILCS 14/15(b). 

143. TikTok is a California corporation and thus, qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. 

740 ILCS 14/10. ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in 

California and thus, also qualifies as “private entity” under the BIPA. Id. 

144. Plaintiffs and class members had their biometric identifiers or biometric information 

captured, collected, stored, and used by Defendants through the TikTok App. Defendants’ practice of 

collecting, storing and using Plaintiffs’ and class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information 

violated Plaintiffs’ and class members’ right to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric 

information under the BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. 

145. Defendant did not inform Plaintiffs and class members in writing that their biometric 

identifiers or biometric information would be “collected or stored” as required under 740 ILCS 

14/15(b)(1). 

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146. Nor did Defendants inform Plaintiffs and class members in writing of the “specific purpose 

and length of term for which [their] biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, 

and used” as required under 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(2). 

147. Defendants also did not receive “a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 

identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized representative.” 740 ILCS 

14/15(b)(3). 

148. Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly in collecting, storing and using Plaintiffs’ and 

class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information. As set forth herein, Defendants designed 

the TikTok application to capture and collect biometric information of a user before the user even posts a 

video. In the alternative, Defendants acted negligently when it collected, stored, and used Plaintiffs’ and 

class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric without informing them in writing that this information 

would be collected and without obtaining written consent. 

149. TikTok purposefully avoided providing notices or obtaining consent from class members 

in order to ensure that as many users downloaded and used the App as possible. 

150. As a result of Defendants’ intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA, Plaintiff Johnson 

and Illinois Subclass Members already have been injured and will continue to be injured, in an amount to 

be proven at trial. 

151. On behalf of themselves and Illinois Subclass Members, Plaintiff Johnson seeks: 

(1) injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and Illinois Subclass 

members by requiring TikTok to comply with the 740 ILCS 14/15(b) requirements for the collection, 

storage, and use of biometric identifiers or biometric information and (2) statutory damages of $5,000 per 

intentional or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) and statutory damages of $1,000 

per negligent violation of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and 

costs and other litigation expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3). 

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COUNT V 

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC PRIVACY ACT 

FAILURE TO INSTITUTE AND MAINTAIN PUBLICLY-AVAILABLE 

RETENTION SCHEDULE 

VIOLATION OF 740 ILCS 14/15(a) 

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Johnson and the Illinois Subclass) 

152. Plaintiff Johnson incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if 

fully set forth herein. 

153. The BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to “collect, capture, purchase, receive 

through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information 

unless it first: (1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in writing that a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the 

subject’s legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which 

a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a 

written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s 

legally authorized representative.” 740 ILCS 14/15(b). 

154. Plaintiff Johnson and Illinois Subclass Members had their biometric identifiers or biometric 

information captured, collected, stored, and used by Defendants through the TikTok App. 

155. TikTok is a California corporation and thus, qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. 

740 ILCS 14/10. ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in 

California and thus, also qualifies as “private entity” under the BIPA. Id.

156. Defendants’ practice of collecting, storing and using Plaintiffs’ and Illinois Subclass 

members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information violated Plaintiffs’ and Illinois Subclass 

members’ right to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information under the BIPA, 740 

ILCS 14/1, et seq.

157. Defendants did not make available to the public, a written policy “establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers or biometric information when 

the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 

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3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first” as required under 

740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

158. Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly in not making publicly available a data 

retention policy and guidelines for permanently destroying such identifiers or information, as required by 

740 ILCS 14/15(a). Defendants did so to ensure that as many users downloaded and used the app as 

possible. As set forth herein, Defendants designed the TikTok application to capture and collect biometric 

information and biometric identifiers of users whenever they access the app and before they even posts 

videos. Defendants maintain users’ biometric information and biometric identifiers for an undisclosed 

period of time that exceeds the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information. 

159. In the alternative, Defendants acted negligently when they collected, stored, and used 

Plaintiff’s and Illinois Subclass members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information without making 

publicly available a data retention policy and guidelines for permanently destroying such identifiers or 

information, as required under 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

160. On behalf of herself and Illinois Subclass members, Plaintiff Johnson seeks: (1) injunctive 

and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiff and Illinois Subclass Members by 

requiring TikTok to make publicly available a policy for the permanent destruction of biometric identifiers 

or biometric information pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/15(a); (2) statutory damages of $5,000 per intentional 

or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) and statutory damages of $1,000 per 

negligent violation of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and 

costs and other litigation expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3). 

COUNT VI 

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC PRIVACY ACT 

DISCLOSURE OF BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS AND INFORMATION WITHOUT CONSENT 

VIOLATION OF 740 ILCS 14/15(d) 

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Johnson and the Illinois Subclass) 

161. Plaintiff Johnson incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if 

fully set forth herein. 

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162. TikTok is a California corporation and thus, qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. 

740 ILCS 14/10. ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in 

California and thus, also qualifies as “private entity” under the BIPA. Id. 

163. Plaintiff Johnson and Illinois Subclass Members had their biometric identifiers or biometric 

information captured, collected, stored, and used by Defendants through the TikTok App. Defendants’ 

practice of disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating Plaintiffs’ and Illinois Subclass members’ 

biometric identifiers or biometric information to undisclosed third parties and corporate affiliates violated 

Plaintiffs’ and class members’ right to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information under 

the BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. 

164. Defendants systematically and automatically “disclose[d], redisclose[d], or otherwise 

disseminate” Plaintiff’s and the Class’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without first 

obtaining the consent required by 740 ILCS 14/15(d)(1). Defendants disclosure or redisclosure was not 

made as part of a “financial transaction requested or authorized” by Plaintiffs or class members, the 

disclosure or redisclosure was not “required by State or federal law or municipal ordinance,” and the 

disclosure was not required pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena. 740 ILCS 14/15(d)(2)-(4). 

165. Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly in disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise 

disseminating Plaintiff Johnson’s and Illinois Subclass members’ biometric identifiers or biometric 

information. As set forth herein, Defendants designed the TikTok application to capture and collect 

biometric identifiers and biometric information of a user before the user even posts the video. TikTok 

purposefully avoided providing notices or obtaining consent from Plaintiff Johnson and the Illinois 

Subclass members in order to ensure that as many users downloaded and used the App as possible. 

Similarly, Defendants did not inform Plaintiff Johnson and Illinois Subclass members that their biometric 

identifiers and biometric information was being distributed and/or redistributed to undisclosed corporate 

affiliates, third parties, and other business partners. 

166. In the alternative, Defendants acted negligently in disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise 

disseminating Plaintiff Johnson’s and Illinois Subclass members’ biometric identifiers or biometric 

without obtaining written consent. 

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167. As a result of Defendants’ intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA, Plaintiff Johnson 

and Illinois Subclass members already have been injured and will continue to be injured, in an amount to 

be proven at trial. 

168. On behalf of herself and Illinois Subclass members, Plaintiff Johnson seeks: (1) injunctive 

and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and class members by requiring 

TikTok to comply with the 740 ILCS 14/15(b) requirements for the collection, storage, and use of 

biometric identifiers or biometric information and (2) statutory damages of $5,000 per intentional or 

reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) and statutory damages of $1,000 per negligent 

violation of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and 

other litigation expenses. 

COUNT VII 

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 

Cal. Pen. Code § 484, 496

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Iyer and the California Subclass) 

169. Plaintiff Iyer incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully 

set forth herein. 

170. Section 496(a) prohibits obtaining property “in any manner constituting theft.” 

171. Section 484 defines theft to include obtaining property by false pretense and specifically 

provides: 

Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away 

the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate 

property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly 

and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, 

defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or 

who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or 

mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit 

and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property 

or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. 

53. Defendant intentionally designed a program that deceived Plaintiff Iyer and California 

Subclass members into providing personally identifiable information to Defendant, including username, 

device information, and location data as well as video viewing history and interactions with video content, 

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such as whether a user has downloaded, liked, commented, shared the video, or added it to a “Favorites” 

page. 

54. Defendant acted in a manner constituting theft and/or false pretense by stealing, taking, 

and/or fraudulently appropriating Plaintiff Iyer’s personally identifiable information without consent. 

55. Defendant concealed, aided in concealing, sold, and/or used Plaintiff Iyer’s and California 

Subclass members’ personally identifiable information for Defendant’s own commercial purposes and 

financial benefit, including by sharing this information with third parties. 

56. The reasonable and fair market value of the unlawfully obtained personal data can be 

determined in the marketplace. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, and each Class member, pray for judgment against Defendants as follows: 

A. That this action and the proposed class be certified and maintained as a class action, 

appointing Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class, and appointing the attorneys and law firms 

representing Plaintiffs as counsel for the Class; 

B. Enter Judgment against Defendants on Plaintiffs’ and class members’ asserted causes of 

action; 

C. For statutory damages of $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation of the BIPA, or 

in the alternative, for statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of the BIPA; 

D. For statutory damages not less than $2,500 per Plaintiff for violation of the VPPA; 

E. For damages suffered as a result of the conduct alleged, punitive damages, restitution, and 

disgorgement, to include interest and prejudgment interest; 

F. For equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief as may be appropriate; 

G. For attorneys’ fees and costs as permitted by law; 

H. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as prescribed by law; and 

I. For such additional legal and equitable relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all causes 

of action so triable. 

 

Dated: June 9, 2020 BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP 

By: /s/ Lesley E. Weaver 

Lesley E. Weaver (SBN 191305 

555 12th Street, Suite 1600 

Oakland, CA 94607 

Telephone: (415) 445-4003 

Facsimile: (415) 445-4020 

lweaver@bfalaw.com 

DICELLO LEVITT & GUTZLER LLC 

Amy E. Keller, pro hac vice to be filed

Ten North Dearborn Street 

Sixth Floor 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Telephone: (312) 214-7900 

Facsimile: (440) 953-9138 

akeller@dicellolevitt.com 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Putative Classes 

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