IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 2, 2020 Session1

TALAT PARVEEN, ET AL. v. ACG SOUTH INSURANCE 

AGENCY, LLC, ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals

Circuit Court for Washington County

No. 36261 J. Eddie Lauderback, Judge

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No. E2018-01759-SC-R11-CV

___________________________________

The present appeal concerns an insurance agent’s alleged negligent failure to procure 

excess uninsured motorist coverage in accordance with a prospective insured’s 

instructions. The two insured parties, a married couple, filed suit against their insurance 

agent and agency after they were denied coverage by the insurance carrier. The trial court 

found that it was undisputed that the insureds had paid the premium for the policy in effect 

and applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b), which provides: “The 

payment of premium for an insurance contract, or amendment thereto, by an insured shall 

create a rebuttable presumption that the coverage provided has been accepted by all 

insureds under the contract.” The trial court determined that the insureds had failed to rebut 

the statutory presumption that they had accepted the provided coverage, which did not 

include excess uninsured motorist coverage. Therefore, the trial court granted the insurance 

agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, 

concluding that the rebuttable presumption does not apply to actions against an insurance 

agent. We granted the ensuing application for permission to appeal to address whether 

section 56-7-135(b) applies to create a rebuttable presumption in actions against an 

insurance agent for negligent failure to procure an insurance policy as directed. 

Considering the plain language of the statute, we conclude that it does create such a 

presumption. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 

the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment. 

 

1 We heard oral argument through videoconference under this Court’s emergency orders restricting 

court proceedings because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

12/04/2020
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Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals 

Reversed; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,

and CORNELIA A. CLARK, SHARON G. LEE, and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined.

Charles W. Cook, III, and Rocklan W. King, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, 

Jeffrey Norris and ACG South Insurance Agency, LLC. 

W. Lewis Jenkins, Jr., Dyersburg, Tennessee, and F. Braxton Terry, Morristown, 

Tennessee, for the appellees, Khurshid Shaukat and Talat Parveen.

Julie P. Bowling, Columbia, Tennessee, and James Robert Layman, C.E. Hunter Brush, 

and Hannah Kay Hunt Freeman, Nashville, Tennessee, for amici curiae American Property 

Casualty Insurance Association, Independent Insurance Agents of Tennessee, Inc., and 

Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. 

OPINION

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the purchase of a personal umbrella insurance policy. Dr. Talat 

Parveen and Mr. Khurshid Shaukat (collectively, “Insureds”), a married couple, moved to 

Johnson City, Tennessee, from Georgia in 2013.2

While residing in Georgia, the couple was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty 

Company and specifically possessed a personal umbrella liability policy that provided 

$2,000,000 in excess uninsured motorist coverage. The quotes received by the Insureds 

and subsequent policy documents and declarations pages for the State Farm umbrella 

policy showed excess uninsured motorist coverage as a separate line item with a separate 

premium amount for such coverage. The Insureds received these declarations pages 

annually from 2009 to 2012. The umbrella policy alone would only pay third parties for 

 

2 As the trial court noted, “The material facts in this case are virtually undisputed.” We have 

primarily used the parties’ statements of undisputed facts in our recitation of the factual background herein. 

Because the present case was decided on summary judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the Insureds as the nonmoving parties. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tenn. 1997). For a 

more detailed recitation of the deposition testimony see the Court of Appeals’ opinion, Parveen v. ACG S. 

Ins. Agency, No. E2018-01759-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5700048, at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2019), 

perm. app. granted (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).
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claims against the Insureds—losses for which one of the Insureds was held liable. 

However, as the name indicates, the excess uninsured motorist coverage would compensate

the Insureds for claims against uninsured or underinsured motorists that exceeded the 

amount of uninsured motorist coverage under their automobile policies. 

After relocating to Johnson City in March 2013, Mr. Shaukat scheduled a meeting 

with Jeffrey Norris, who was an insurance agent for ACG South Insurance Agency, LLC 

(“ACG”). Mr. Shaukat intended to obtain replacement auto, umbrella, and renters 

insurance policies—a task that Dr. Parveen agreed he undertook on her behalf as well. 

Notably, Mr. Shaukat maintains that during this roughly thirty-minute meeting, he 

provided Mr. Norris with a copy of his State Farm umbrella policy and explained that the 

Insureds wanted the exact same coverage in Tennessee. Mr. Norris, however, has 

consistently denied this claim. 

As is pertinent to this appeal, Mr. Norris provided Mr. Shaukat with a quote for a 

personal umbrella policy through Safeco Insurance Company of America (“Safeco”). A 

copy of the quote provided to Mr. Shaukat reveals no separate line item for excess 

uninsured motorist coverage, nor did the policy’s premium reflect the inclusion of such 

coverage.

3

Indeed, the parties agree that the quoted policy did not include excess uninsured 

motorist coverage as the Insureds allegedly requested. Even so, Mr. Shaukat accepted 

coverage and purchased the Safeco umbrella policy, among other insurance policies, that 

day. The Insureds received a copy of the policy and a declarations page and paid the 

premiums, which did not include a charge for excess uninsured motorist coverage.

The Insureds renewed the Safeco umbrella policy and paid the premiums in 2014 

and again in 2015. Each subsequent notice of renewal included a copy of the policy and a 

declarations page, which did not list excess uninsured motorist coverage as a separate line 

item. Moreover, the policy itself specifically contained the following exclusion: 

This policy does not apply to any: 

. . . . 

7. amounts payable under any:

. . . .

 

3 The record indicates that the total annual premium for the Safeco umbrella policy was $296; 

however, the premium for the State Farm umbrella policy the Insureds obtained in Georgia was $603. 
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b. Uninsured Motorists or Underinsured Motorists coverage or 

any similar coverage, unless this policy is endorsed to provide 

such coverage as shown in the Declarations.

On November 10, 2015, while the Safeco policy was in force, Dr. Parveen was 

involved in an automobile accident. Dr. Parveen sustained personal injuries, and her 

vehicle was totaled as a result of the crash. The Insureds then discovered that the driver of 

the wrecker vehicle who caused the accident was underinsured. In a later meeting with Mr. 

Norris, they further discovered that the Safeco umbrella policy in effect did not include 

excess uninsured motorist coverage. At that time, Mr. Shaukat requested that such 

coverage be added to their umbrella policy and paid the premium, though he was informed 

that the coverage was not retroactive. 

In February 2016, the Insureds filed an action in the Circuit Court for Washington 

County against the driver and the wrecker service company that owned the wrecker vehicle 

seeking damages related to the November 2015 collision. They also served Safeco with a 

copy of the complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) (2016). The trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Safeco because the insurance policy in effect at the time of 

the accident did not include excess uninsured motorist coverage. It appears that the 

Insureds reached a settlement agreement with the remaining parties, and the case was later 

dismissed. 

In December 2016, the Insureds filed the present action in the Washington County 

Circuit Court against ACG and Mr. Norris (collectively, “Appellants”).4 The complaint 

alleged that Mr. Norris negligently failed to procure the requested excess uninsured 

motorist coverage as a part of the Safeco umbrella insurance policy.5 The Insureds sought 

damages from the Appellants “in an amount no less than One Million Dollars 

($1,000,000).” 

 

4 The complaint also listed American Automobile Association, Inc., as a defendant; however, it 

was later voluntarily dismissed. 

5 The Insureds later filed an amended complaint, which, among other things, clarified their 

allegation that during the initial meeting between Mr. Norris and Mr. Shaukat, Mr. Shaukat “requested 

uninsured motorist coverage and gave Mr. Norris a copy of his existing policy and requested that same 

coverage.” 
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Following discovery, Appellants moved for summary judgment. Specifically, 

Appellants cited to Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135 (2016)6and argued that 

summary judgment must be granted because the Insureds could not overcome the statutory 

presumption that, by paying the premiums for the Safeco umbrella policy, they accepted 

the personal umbrella policy without excess uninsured motorist coverage. 

The trial court granted Appellants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that it 

was undisputed that the Insureds had paid the premiums for the policies in effect in 2013, 

2014, and 2015. The court concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b) 

thereby created a rebuttable presumption that the Insureds had accepted the provided 

coverage, which did not include excess uninsured motorist coverage. It further determined 

that the Insureds had not presented evidence to rebut the presumption and that, therefore, 

summary judgment was appropriate. 

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Parveen v. ACG S. Ins. Agency, No. E2018-01759-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 

5700048, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2019), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020). 

It determined that the statutory presumption does not apply to actions against an insurance 

agent and, consequently, remanded the case to the trial court. Id.

We granted the Appellants’ ensuing application for permission to appeal to address 

whether the rebuttable presumption in Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b)

applies in actions against an insurance agent for failure to procure a policy in accordance 

with an insured party’s instructions. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal originates from the trial court’s grant of the Appellants’ motion for 

summary judgment and the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s order. We review 

the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Under Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee 

Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. On appeal, we must determine 

whether the moving party satisfied its burden of production “(1) by affirmatively negating 

 

6 We note that, although Dr. Parveen’s accident occurred prior to 2016, the statute has not been 

changed since it was enacted in 2012. We, therefore, cite to the most recent publication of the statute.
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an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the 

nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the 

nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 

S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015) (emphasis omitted).

More specifically, the issue presented for review concerns statutory construction, 

which presents a question of law, and we likewise review such questions de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State 

v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 532-33 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 

561 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004)); Carter v. Bell, 279 

S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009).

III. ANALYSIS

We begin with the language of the statute at issue. Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 56-7-135 provides as follows: 

(a) The signature of an applicant for or party to an insurance contract on an 

application, amendment, or other document stating the type, amount, or

terms and conditions of coverage, shall create a rebuttable presumption that 

the statements provided by the person bind all insureds under the contract 

and that the person signing such document has read, understands, and accepts 

the contents of such document.

(b) The payment of premium for an insurance contract, or amendment 

thereto, by an insured shall create a rebuttable presumption that the coverage 

provided has been accepted by all insureds under the contract.

The section provides for two rebuttable presumptions, but the specific question before us 

concerns subsection (b). 

The present case involves a claim by the Insureds against their insurance agent. As 

this Court has explained before, “[a] cause of action for failure to procure insurance is 

separate and distinct from any cause of action against an insurer or a proposed insurer; in 

a failure to procure claim, ‘the agent, rather than [the] insurance company, is independently 

liable.’” Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 163 (2003)). With this in mind, we restate the issue, 

which is one of first impression for this Court: Whether section 56-7-135(b)’s rebuttable 

presumption of acceptance of the policy terms by payment of premiums applies equally to 
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an insured’s action against an agent for negligent failure to procure requested coverage as 

it does to an action against a carrier for coverage under the policy. 

The Insureds argue that the rebuttable presumption does not apply to cases against

the insurance agent. Appellants, however, argue that the rebuttable presumption does 

apply. Appellants further direct this Court’s attention to the trial court’s conclusion that if 

the statutory presumption applies, Appellants would necessarily be entitled to summary 

judgment because the Insureds presented no evidence to rebut the presumption. The 

Insureds admitted as much at oral argument before this Court, so we agree that our 

resolution of the question outlined above is outcome-determinative. 

When engaging in statutory interpretation, “well-defined precepts” apply. State v. 

Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 

S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017)); State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tenn. 2016); State 

v. McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011). “The most basic principle of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly 

restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Howard, 504 

S.W.3d at 269 (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)); Carter, 279 

S.W.3d at 564 (citing State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008)). In construing 

statutes, Tennessee law provides that “courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd 

results.” Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016) 

(citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010)). “Furthermore, the 

‘common law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by 

the statute itself.’” Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Houghton 

v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002)), abrogated on other 

grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016).

“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain 

meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend 

the meaning of the language . . . .” Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564; Eastman Chem. Co. v. 

Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). A statute is ambiguous when “the parties 

derive different interpretations from the statutory language.” Howard, 504 S.W.3d at 270 

(quoting Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926). 

However, [t]his proposition does not mean that an ambiguity exists merely 

because the parties proffer different interpretations of a statute. A party 

cannot create an ambiguity by presenting a nonsensical or clearly erroneous 

interpretation of a statute. In other words, both interpretations must be 

reasonable in order for an ambiguity to exist.
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Frazier, 558 S.W.3d at 152 (quoting Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 50 n.20 (Tenn. 2011)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). If a statute is ambiguous, the Court “‘may reference the 

broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources’ to determine the 

statute’s meaning.” Id. (quoting Sherman, 266 S.W.3d at 401).

In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 

specifically focused on the statute’s use of the phrase “under the contract.” It explained as 

follows: 

Upon a review of the statute at issue, we determine that Tennessee 

Code Annotated [section] 56-7-135(b) is unambiguous. The plain and 

unambiguous language contained in Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 56-

7-135(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that a party has accepted the 

coverage provided in the policy upon payment of an insurance premium by 

the insured parties “under the contract.” In analyzing the statutory subsection 

at issue, our General Assembly included the phrase “under the contract” and 

that phrase must be given full effect. In looking at the statute as a whole, 

subsection (a) also includes language related to the insurance contract.

Construing the statute at issue and giving effect to each word of the 

statute, we determine that by including language regarding the insurance 

contract, our General Assembly intended to restrict the application of the 

statute to actions between the parties to the insurance contract. As such, we 

conclude that the rebuttable presumption in Tennessee Code Annotated 

[section] 56-7-135(b) applies only to actions between the parties to an 

insurance contract, which includes the insurance carrier and the insured 

parties. The insurance agent obtaining the insurance policy for the insured is 

not a party to the insurance contract. Therefore, the rebuttable presumption 

created by Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 56-7-135 does not apply to 

actions brought against an insurance agent who failed to procure the 

insurance coverage as directed by the insured. Because Tennessee Code 

Annotated [section] 56-7-135 is not applicable to actions directly against 

insurance agents, we determine that the Trial Court erred by applying the 

rebuttable presumption in this action and reverse the Trial Court’s summary 

judgment.

Parveen, 2019 WL 5700048, at *6. 
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Appellants take issue with the decision of the Court of Appeals for several reasons, 

but most significantly, the Appellants argue that the Court of Appeals erred by isolating 

the phrase “under the contract” when interpreting subsection (b), resulting in a forced 

interpretation. According to Appellants, this particular language from subsection (b) 

merely defines the class of persons to whom the presumption applies, not any particular 

claim or legal theory to which the presumption applies. 

Our reading of the plain language of the subject statute inclines us to agree with the 

Appellants’ position. The Court of Appeals’ reading of the statutory language and its overemphasis of the phrase “under the contract” is puzzling. It is true that each word of the 

statute—including the phrase “under the contract”—should be given full effect. See In re 

C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005) (“Every word used is presumed to have 

meaning and purpose, and should be given full effect if so doing does not violate the 

obvious intention of the Legislature.” (quoting Marsh v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 

(1968))). Still, we also find it relevant and take notice of the order in which the words of 

the statute are written. See Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2018) (“In 

determining legislative intent, we first must look to the text of the statute and give the 

words of the statute their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear 

. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Again, the single statutory sentence at issue here states: “The payment of premium 

for an insurance contract, or amendment thereto, by an insured shall create a rebuttable 

presumption that the coverage provided has been accepted by all insureds under the 

contract.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-135(b). The phrase “under the contract” immediately 

follows and simply modifies the word “insureds.” In our view, it clearly refers only to those 

against whom the rebuttable presumption applies—“all insureds”—and not to the persons 

or entities by whom the presumption may be asserted. Stated another way, the inclusion of 

the phrase “under the contract” in subsection (b) serves to clarify that the presumption only 

applies against those insured under the contract, not third parties. So, as applied here, when 

Mr. Shaukat paid the annual premium, the rebuttable presumption was triggered “that the 

coverage provided ha[d] been accepted by all insureds[, Mr. Shaukat and Dr. Parveen,] 

under the contract[, the Safeco umbrella policy].” See Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 

Co., 92 F. Supp. 3d 736, 746-47 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), aff’d, 832 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2016)

(applying Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b)’s rebuttable presumption to a 

claim against both an insurer and an insurance broker and concluding that insureds failed 

to rebut the statutory presumption).7

 

7 The federal district court in Harris effectively applied this statute to an action against an insurance 

agent for failure to procure. Harris, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 746-47. However, noting that the plaintiff in Harris
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In addition to their argument adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Insureds argue 

at length that this reading of the statute—allowing its invocation by or on behalf of an 

insurance agent who is not a party to the insurance contract—is a derogation of the common 

law and, consequently, the statute would have to expressly so provide. See Ezell v. 

Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Tenn. 1995) (“Generally, statutes in derogation of the 

common law are to be strictly construed and confined to their express terms . . . .”).

According to the Insureds, the common law elements of a claim against an insurance agent 

for failure to procure the requested insurance8focus exclusively on the actions of the 

insurance agent and that, under the common law, the actions of the purchaser are irrelevant. 

See, e.g., Morrison, 338 S.W.3d at 429 (“[T]he best practice is to always read every word 

of every document before signing. . . . Nevertheless, the failure to read does not insulate 

agents from a suit based upon the procurement of a contestable policy.”); Bell v. Wood Ins. 

Agency, 829 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“Mere failure to read and understand 

a policy may not be utilized to otherwise defeat a policy-holder’s claim.”). Thus, they 

argue, “a statute that focuses on the actions of the insured does not address itself, plainly 

and on its face, to the actions of the agent.” 

We disagree. The statutory language is clear. The legislature was not required to 

expressly state all persons or entities by whom the presumption may be asserted. In fact, 

the Court of Appeals improperly altered the meaning of the statutory language by isolating 

the words “under the contract,” resulting in an overly restrictive reading of the statute—

that section 56-7-135(b) applies only to actions between the insurance carrier and the 

insured parties. If the legislature had intended to limit subsection (b)’s rebuttable 

presumption to actions against certain persons or entities—particularly against the 

 

had not challenged the statutory presumption’s applicability, the Court of Appeals in this case declined to 

follow the district court’s decision. Parveen, 2019 WL 5700048, at *5. We acknowledge that, although 

Harris does support our decision today, the case fails to contain any analysis of the present issue. 

8 As this Court formally adopted in Morrison, 338 S.W.3d at 426, the common law elements of a 

failure to procure claim are as follows: 

(1) an undertaking or agreement by the agent or broker to procure insurance;

(2) the agent’s or broker’s failure to use reasonable diligence in attempting to place the 

insurance and failure to notify the client promptly of any such failure; and

(3) that the agent’s or broker’s actions warranted the client’s assumption that he or she was 

properly insured.

(citing 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 163).
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insurance carrier as the Insureds have suggested—it certainly could have done so. The 

statute, however, is silent as to the types of legal claims to which the rebuttable presumption 

applies and as to which persons or entities may rely on the presumption. This clearly 

suggests that where the acceptance of coverage by the insureds under the contract is called 

into question, the rebuttable presumption contemplated in subsection (b) is applicable. 

Further, we disagree with the Insureds’ characterization of our reading of the statute 

as a significant change to the common law or even as “rejecting” the common law. Section 

56-7-135(b) does not repeal a common law cause of action against insurance agents, but it 

merely acts as a burden-shifting statute. We reiterate that the plain language of subsection 

(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that the insureds have accepted the terms of the 

insurance contract. It does not leave insureds without redress against a negligent agent who 

fails to procure the coverage requested. The language of the statute still permits such an 

insured to present evidence to rebut the presumption that, by paying their premiums, they 

accepted the insurance contract as written.9 The Insureds in the case before us have not 

done so. 

Finally, the Insureds have raised before this Court, as they did before the Court of 

Appeals, what they consider to be a “contextual” argument. They note the timing of the 

passage of section 56-7-135—approximately two months after this Court announced its 

decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Tarrant, 363 S.W.3d 508 (Tenn. 2012). Rather than a 

claim directly against an insurance agent, Tarrant involved a claim asserting an insurance 

carrier’s vicarious liability under an insurance policy based on an agent’s conduct. Id. at 

511. The Insureds contend that section 56-7-135 was clearly enacted in response to 

Tarrant10 and that, because Tarrant only involved claims against an insurance carrier, the 

statute was likewise only intended to apply to such claims. 

Again, we disagree. The Insureds would like to see a distinction drawn between 

claims against the insurer and claims against the agent—allowing the insurer to benefit 

from the statutory rebuttable presumption while ensuring that the agent remains liable for 

his or her negligence. This, however, is not what our legislature has done. We refer back 

to our response above: If the legislature had intended to limit subsection (b)’s rebuttable 

 

9 We expressly decline to opine on the type of evidence or level of proof required to rebut the 

presumption. That question is not before us today. 

10 The Insureds claim that their argument is based entirely on the timing of the statute’s enactment 

and not based on the actual legislative history of the statute. In fact, the parties made much of the legislative 

history of the statute in their briefs on appeal; however, they seemingly agreed at oral argument that the 

legislative history was particularly unhelpful here. We must agree, and we need not refer to it. 
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presumption to actions against certain persons or entities, it certainly could have done so,

but the statute is silent as to the types of legal claims to which the rebuttable presumption 

applies and as to which persons or entities may rely on it.

We, therefore, conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in construing the language 

of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135. The statutory language does not limit 

subsection (b)’s rebuttable presumption to claims against insurance carriers. It also applies 

to failure to procure claims against agents. As such, the trial court properly applied the 

statutory presumption of acceptance of the policy terms by payment of premiums against 

the Insureds in this case. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the rebuttable presumption articulated

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b) does apply to actions against an 

insurance agent by insureds under the contract of insurance for negligent failure to procure 

an insurance policy as directed. Therefore, because the Insureds failed to rebut the statutory 

presumption, the trial court properly granted the Appellants’ motion for summary 

judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment 

of the trial court is reinstated. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellees, Khurshid 

Shaukat and Talat Parveen, for which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

ROGER A. PAGE, JUSTICE